STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES: THE CASE OF THREE PALESTINIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

By Fidaa Shehada

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Dr. Kyle Farmbry

and approved by

Dr. Kyle Farmbry

Prof. Elizabeth Hull

Prof. Norma Riccucci

Prof. Marc Holzer

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Strategic Organizational Responses to the Environmental Pressures:
The Case of Three Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations

By Fidaa Shehada

Dissertation Director: Dr. Kyle Farmbry

This dissertation belongs to the organizational psychology literature. It explores a) How the environment affects and constrains the actions and characteristics of individual organizations and b) How and Why organizations respond to external constraints the way they do. The purpose of this study is to understand NGOs as strategic organizations that enact specific behaviors in response to pressures within their environment(s).

The basic concepts and premises of the institutional theory provide useful guidelines for analyzing organization–environment relationships with an emphasis on the social rules, expectations, norms, and values as the sources of pressure on organizations. Resource dependence theory, on the other hand, proceeds from the indisputable open-systems proposition that organizations are not able to internally generate all the resources required to maintain themselves and therefore must enter into exchange transactions with elements in the environment to ensure a stable flow of resources. Coupling the two theories helps to examine the ways in which an individual organization reacts to different levels of uncertainties and multiple actions of other social structures in its environment.

The researcher utilized Oliver’s (1991) hypotheses and framework that link institutional factors and organizational strategic responses to guide the research data collection and analysis.
One organizational domain is used to understand the intricate relationship between organizations and their institutionalized environment—the non-governmental organization sector in Palestine. The units of analysis are the individual Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs), which are analyzed using a qualitative method of case study. A series of interviews and focus group discussion were conducted.

The dissertation concludes that while PNGOs are vulnerable to varying degrees to external control given their dependence on external donors for financial resources, the uncertainty created by their dependence, and the political instability that constrains their development, they are not purely passive recipients nor complete political manipulators of institutional pressures, as the extremes of institutional and resource dependence theories postulate. Organizations have at their disposal a wide range of active choice behaviors that vary from passivity to positivity. An organization’s choices are predictable largely in terms of their political power and the nature of the institutional pressures enacted on them.
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<tr>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
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<td>Constructed Environment</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Palestinian National Liberation Movement (the presidential party since the establishment of the PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>The Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGOs Law</td>
<td>Refers to the Palestinian Law No.1 of 2000 Concerning Charitable Associations and Civil Society Organizations (ch1/a2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARC</td>
<td>Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Palestinian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGO</td>
<td>Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>(Palestinian) Preventative Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBGS</td>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza Strip</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction

This dissertation will explore how environments affect and constrain the characteristics and operations of individual non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and how organizations respond to the external constrains. This relationship is examined in the context of institutional theory and resource dependency theory. One organizational domain is used here: the non-governmental organization sector in Palestine. The units of analysis are the individual Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs), which will be analyzed using a qualitative method of case study. The purpose of this study is to understand NGOs as strategic organizations that enact specific behaviors in response to pressures within their environment(s).

PNGOs considered in this research are defined according to the Palestinian Law No.1 of 2000 Concerning Charitable Associations and Civil Society Organizations (ch1/a2):

Any charitable Association or civil society Organization with an independent judicial character, established upon the agreement of no less than 7 persons to achieve legitimate objectives of public concern, without aiming at financial profit-making or other personal benefit for the members.

In different parts of the world, NGOs are fully incorporated in what were previously state-only activities. The literature on NGOs in developing countries is divided between proponents and opponents of the NGOs’ roles. Proponents of NGOs see them as everything that governments are not: they are close to the poor and encourage popular participation, are able to identify and meet the needs of the poor, are flexible and
open to innovation, are free from fixed civil services bureaucracy and standard operating procedures, are faster at implementing development efforts, are cost effective, and are committed to their staff. Opponents of NGOs, as well as of the “new policy agenda” of good governance which promotes NGOs proliferation, raise questions about the authentic role of NGOs in sustainable development as well as their accountability and relationship(s) with the government, donors, and the poor that they are intended to serve. This dissertation concentrates specifically on PNGOs and their environment.

Since the 1960s, grassroots organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been engaged in building social and autonomous infrastructures with patterns of organization in various sectors. Between 1967 and 1993, PNGOs played a vital role in serving Palestinian society at a time when the Israeli occupation was providing minimal services. They have been grappling with the task of responding to the looming humanitarian crisis, the economic collapse and physical destruction caused by Israeli military operations, and the siege later imposed by the occupying power. Even after the Oslo Accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, and the rise

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1 The Oslo Accords are a set of peace agreements between the Palestinians and Israelis. Secret negotiations were held in Oslo/ Norway between the PLO and the Israeli government in September 1993, followed by a process of bilateral negotiations. The Declaration of Principles, (DoP, known as Oslo I), was signed in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993. The agreement lays the foundation for a form of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and for a transitional period of five years leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 383. The permanent settlement should include Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and other issues of common interest. The Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement (also called the Cairo Agreement) was signed on May 4, 1994. The agreement dealt with the Israeli military redeployment from Gaza and Jericho and the setting up of the Palestinian Authority. The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Taba Agreement or Oslo II Agreement) was concluded in Taba on September 26, 1995 and signed in Washington D.C. on the 28th. This agreement dealt with the Israeli Military Forces redeployment of other areas (called A, B, C) in the West Bank (East Jerusalem is excluded) and Gaza Strip. It also dealt with the election of a Palestinian Autonomy Council and its competence was determined. The agreements can be found on http://www.jmcc.org/peace/agreements.html.
to power of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in 2006, PNGOs account for the majority of services in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (WB&GS). PNGOs are active in different fields including health care, agricultural extension, education and training, housing assistance, legal and human rights aid, and technical support. PNGOs also vary according to their size, outreach, relations with donors, level of sophistication, and organizational structure. The PNGOs are acting in an over-politicized society accompanied by a change in the availability, sources, and conditions of resources. In spite of environmental constraints, there has been exponential growth in the number and types of NGOs in Palestine over the years. This unique context of the Palestinian setting provides a heuristic case to understand how civil society organizations may react in a turbulent environment characterized by environmental hostility, dynamism, and complexity.

Research into the relationship between organizations and their environments has generated valuable insights into the processes that define and explain how an environment pressures organizations and how organizations may react. This dissertation considers coupling institutional theory and resource dependence theory into one framework that demonstrates this process. Coupling the two theories helps to examine the ways in which an individual organization reacts to different levels of uncertainties and multiple actions of other social structures in its environment. In particular, the basic concepts and premises of the institutional theory approach provide useful guidelines for analyzing organization-environment relationships with an emphasis on the social rules, expectations, norms, and values as the sources of pressure on organizations. This theory
is built on the concept of legitimacy rather than efficiency or effectiveness as the primary organizational goal. The environment is conceptualized as the “organizational field,” represented by institutions that may include regulatory structures, governmental agencies, courts, professionals, professional norms, interest groups, public opinion, laws, rules, and social values. Institutional theory assumes that an organization conforms to its environment. There are, however, some fundamental aspects of organizational environments and activities not fully addressed by institutional theory that make the approach problematic for fully understanding NGOs and their environment: the organization being dependent on external resources and the organization’s ability to adapt to or even change its environment.

Resource dependence theory has dealt more aggressively with these two issues. It proceeds from the indisputable open-systems proposition that organizations are not able to internally generate all the resources and/or functions required to maintain themselves and therefore must enter into exchange transactions and relations with elements in the environment to ensure a stable flow of resources and services. Further, resource dependence theory provides a wide range of possible adaptation strategies. However, resource dependence theory does not consider the issue of social and cultural mood in the organizational environment, which is an issue that is addressed by institutional theory. Additionally, the environment in resource dependence theory is exclusive to the technical (task) environment represented by resources, suppliers, and customers. Meyer and Rowan (1992) and Scott (1998) pointed out that the distinction between the technical and institutional can be misleading because, in reality, all organizations operate in both
technical and institutional environments. Further, the NGO sector, unlike other organizational fields (i.e., the market), is not about perfect competition or profit margins. The NGOs are “culturally loaded,” often evoke ideological reactions, and are seen as the locus of values (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990). The main challenge for NGOs is to meet certain social and cultural expectations. As such, NGOs have to ensure both a continued supply of resources and the satisfaction of many groups and structures that can provide political influence and societal legitimation in their environment.

The complementary relationship of the two perspectives has been acknowledged by several researchers. Oliver’s (1991) framework provides a high degree of sensitivity for examining how NGOs interact with their external environments in light of the premises of institutional theory and resource dependence theory. Oliver integrated the two perspectives into a single framework that, on the one hand, considers the institutional predictors of the individual organizational environment and, on the other hand, suggests a range of organizational strategic responses that vary from passivity to positivity. The environmental dimensions (also referred to as institutional factors and institutional antecedents) that Oliver (1991) suggested are of special importance when conceptualizing the features of the environment, especially in identifying the status of institutionalization. The indicators of institutionalization are more indirect than the measures of resources dependency. The institutional antecedents suggested by Oliver and used in this research are cause, constituents, content, control, and context. The organizational predicted strategic responses are acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate.
Purpose of the Study

The overall goal of this research is to study how the environment affects the actions and characteristics of individual organizations and why organizations respond the way they do. Specifically, the research is seeking to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To explore and identify the historical and socio-political context that uniquely impacts the relations between PNGOs and their environment. PNGOs have common social, political, and economic environmental features. Thus, it is assumed that there are also common features that shape the whole community of non-governmental organizations. Tracing the historical environmental changes and relating them to the evolution of NGOs in Palestinian society will help in understanding the behavior of individual organizations within this broad dimension.

2. To identify the strategic behaviors that PNGOs employ to facilitate interaction within their environment. This research will explore the behaviors that PNGOs adopt as a result of environmental pressure, specifically whether and to what degree the organizations choose to accept or resist certain actors or institutions in their environment. This research utilizes the patterns of behaviors that were conceptualized by Oliver (1991) as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation.

3. To identify the reasons and the circumstances under which an organization would choose to accept or resist environmental pressures. In light of institutional theory and resource dependence theory literature, and Oliver’s (1991) framework which connected environmental pressure(s) to specific organizational strategies, this
research will analyze the specific factors that encourage an individual organization to choose a specific strategy and pattern of behavior over others.

**Significance of the Study**

This study is significant at both the theoretical and the practical level. At the theoretical level, it examines and extends the premises of institutional theory and resource dependence theory to different environmental circumstances. The two theories were developed and repeatedly applied in the context of Western countries. Examining the insights of these theories in environments characterized by political uncertainty, financial dependency, high rates of unemployment, and poverty may provide a foundation for comparative research in the future.

At the practical level, PNGOs are viewed as prominent agents of the “development machine” and occupy a central position in Palestinian social and political life. While there has been a good deal of public debate over their role and accountability, there is a lack of academic work to assess them. We need to know more about how and why their strategies develop and are implemented and to what extent these strategies affect the legitimacy of such organizations and their chances of survival.

Ultimately, it is also anticipated that this research will provide a deeper understanding of civil society processes in the political, economic, and social contexts of developing countries, specifically what NGOs have at their disposal to live up to the challenges they face and fulfill the promises they made to their beneficiaries.²

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² Referring to the population sectors that NGOs serve as beneficiaries or target groups is value-laden. The researcher believes that this sector should be called and treated as “constituents” with increased ownership and participation. However, she referred to this sector as beneficiaries and target groups interchangeably during the research. The reason for this is that it would have been
Furthermore, this diagnosis of the non-state actors in Palestine is certainly important to understanding the impact of the long and major conflict in the region on civic life, particularly because the PNGOs are considered by many to be a pioneering model for NGOs in the Arab world (Craissati, 2005). Despite the important difference between the Palestinian political environment and other states, some common experiences have shaped the region as a whole, particularly weak and dependent economies characterized by disparity, highly repressive and dependent states dominated by undemocratic governments that attempt to oppress civil society, and the continued interest of developed countries and international donors in this region.

**The Method**

This research adopts a qualitative method of case study analysis. The unit of analysis of this study is the individual organization. Three PNGOs were selected for this study. Each organization was the subject of an individual case study with the same procedure repeated in each of the three cases. The main criterion that was considered when selecting each organization was the age of the organization. The selected organizations provide different types of services and all three are located in the same city. The field work took place from October 1, 2008 to February 23, 2009.

The major questions to be answered in this research are: a) *How* does the environment affect the actions and characteristics of individual organizations? and b) How and Why do organizations respond the way they do? The researcher used Oliver’s confusing to use “constituents” to refer to this sector as Oliver’s (1991) framework used this term differently to refer to several sectors in the organizational environment. Accordingly, the researcher used the terms “beneficiaries” (which is typically used in the literature on NGOs) and “target group” as some interviewees referred to this sector as such. OrgC’s leaders also pointed to this conceptual dilemma as explained in the case report.
hypotheses that link institutional factors and organizational strategic responses to guide the research data collection and analysis. The researcher conducted 25 interviews with the following individuals: three interviews with respective organizational heads (the president of OrgA and the directors of OrgB and OrgC) of the NGOs studied; four board members of OrgB and OrgC, and three board members and the manager of OrgA (eight interviews in total); two representatives of donor organizations of each organization studied (six interviews in total); six representatives of the Ministry of Interior in the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah; and eight Palestinian experts on NGOs and development affairs. Four focus groups were conducted with a group of each organization’s beneficiaries; one on OrgA, two on OrgB, and one on OrgC. Furthermore, organizations were asked for any documents and archives that evidence the information they provide. Data was analyzed based on the idea of pattern matching whereby several pieces of information may be related to the research hypotheses. A separate report of each case study was produced as well as a chapter that draws conclusions based on the three cases.

**Parts of the Dissertation**

Chapter One, “Introduction,” presents an abstract and outline of the other sections of the dissertation.

Chapter Two, “Theories of Relationships between the Environment and Organizations: Literature Review,” extracts from a large and varied body of literature on the relationship between organizations and their environment. It presents open-system theories and organizational-population ecology as a starting point to explain the initial
premise that organizations are not autonomous units. Then, the discussion turns to resource dependence theory and institutional theory. This chapter also presents Oliver’s (1991) framework, which anticipated the organizational strategic responses to the environmental antecedents.

Chapter Three, “Method,” describes the method employed in this research. The research adopts a qualitative approach. The field work of this research was carried out in two lines, horizontal and vertical. The researcher first collected information on the history and environment of the Palestinian NGOs in general from experts in the field (horizontal). Then she collected in depth information of three PNGOs (vertical). The tools used are individual interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis. The chapter also discusses the logic behind choosing this approach, internal and external validity, background of the cases that will be studied, data collection and analysis, and the method appendices.

Chapter Four, “The History of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs),” presents a description of the evolution of the NGO sector in Palestine since the 1960s. This chapter identifies the most important features of the political and social environment and the historically contingent factors that have shaped and constitute the environment.

Chapter Five, “Case Studies of Three Palestinian NGOs,” presents the data collected in the three cases and analyzes each case. For each case, the data include a description of the organization’s life and the challenges that have faced each organization and how the organization has reacted to these challenges. The chapter explains whether
and under what circumstances the organizations were able to survive and achieve stability, longevity, and legitimacy, either by conformity, as institutional theory suggests, or by negotiation and attempts at practicing power and control, as described in resource dependence theory.

Chapter Six, “Discussion, Interpretation, and Depiction of Results,” reviews the main features of the Palestinian NGOs in light of Oliver’s (1991) institutional antecedents, presents the similarities and differences of the three cases examined, and depicts the results from the three cases studies.

Chapter Seven, “Conclusion, Implications and Directions for Future Research” explains the theoretical and policy implications of this research and suggests future research. The dissertation concludes that while PNGOs are vulnerable to varying degrees to external control given their dependence on external donors for financial resources, the uncertainty created by their dependence, and the political instability that constrains their development, they are not purely passive recipients or complete political manipulators of institutional pressures, as the extremes of institutional and resource dependence theories postulate. Organizations have at their disposal a wide range of active choice behaviors that vary from passivity to positivity. The organization choices are predictable largely in terms of their political power and the nature of the institutional pressures enacted on them.
Chapter Two

Literature Review: The Relationship between Organizations and Their Environment

Organizational theorists propose that environmental pressures are extremely important for understanding the actions of foundations. These theorists do not accept that management speaks for the whole or that rational designers build organizations from the top down but rather argue that dominant and subordinate relations with many other entities may enmesh any particular organization (Meyer, 1978). Theoretical models of organizations underwent a major shift circa 1960 with open-system perspectives supplanting closed-system models. Prior to the 1960s, classic management styles emphasizing the system model predominated. Classical management theory treats organizations as if their internal operations are the sole concern of management (Hatch, 1997). Theorists of this period often depicted organizations as tightly bound entities clearly demarcated from their surrounding environment (Suchman, 1991). They did not consider the effect of the larger social, cultural, and technological context on organizations. Organizations were perceived as “rational systems” and “social machines” designed for efficient transformation of inputs into outputs (Scott, 1998).

Afterward, ideas of “loose coupling” and “garbage can model” of organizational decision making by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) were useful correctives to normative theories of rationality and traditional administrative structures (Meyer, 1978). In addition, at this time the concept of environment was introduced to organizational analysis by the
extension of systems theory. This change established the idea that organizations are open to their environment (Hatch, 1997). Over time, the diverse literature on environments and organizations was synthesized into three theoretical perspectives that emphasize the effect of environmental forces on organizations. The 1970s saw the emergence of these three theories known as: organizational population ecological theory, resource dependence theory, and institutional theory. Since this theoretical development, analyses shifted from focusing primarily on internal characteristics towards emphasizing the importance of the surrounding events and processes for the organization (Meyer, 1978). The initial discussion of this change is manifested in contingency theory, which furnished early insights on the effectiveness by which organizations manage the complex and changing environment.

Contingency theory argues that the appropriate organizational structure depends on the contingencies confronting the organization (Meyer, 1978). The theory explains that stable environments create “mechanistic” organizations specialized in routine activities controlled with a strict line of authority yet distinct areas of assigned responsibility. In contrast, rapidly changing environments result in “organic” organizations that, like other living things, require flexibility in skills and patterns of work. Because of less specialization, these “organic” organizations can adapt to changing circumstances with less formalized and hierarchical structures than their “mechanistic” counterparts (Hatch, 1997). Toward the eighties, the debate over open- versus closed-systems and contingency theory fell dormant (Meyer, 1978) with the increasing recognition of the importance of contextual factors required for understanding
organizations. Meyer and Associates (1978) argued that organizations are creatures of their environment, which is determined by social and political factors as much as, or even more, the technical and economic factors that were emphasized by conventional theories. Hatch (1997) further argued that the distinction between organizations and environments was arbitrary because an organization is not simply a contributing member to its environment but is embedded within it. Eventually, Hatch continued, the organization makes up the environment along with other organizations with which it is involved.

The idea of open-systems theory was developed by Katz and Kahn in 1966 and was based largely on general system theory, which emerged from the work of biologists. In “The Social Psychology of Organizations,” Katz and Kahn (1978) explained that closed-system models provided a static picture of an organization, only applicable when the organizational environment is stable. However, according to Katz and Kahn, experience shows that the traditional bureaucratic structures are not workable in modern dynamic environments. They argue that organizations possess many of the same characteristics as living organisms. Accordingly, Katz and Kahn maintain that open-system organizations are largely dependent upon their environment for resources (e.g., power, information, money). As organizations operate in a dynamic environment, they must respond to this environment in a manner that will promote homeostasis and permit growth. Just like living cells, systems must exchange resources with the environment in order to survive. Furthermore, the boundaries of social systems are amorphous, permeable, and ever changing. The important characteristics of a dynamic social system, according to Katz and Kahn, are the flow of materials, energy, and information across
system boundaries that maintain a steady state, where the ratio of energy exchange and the relations between parts remain the same. To accommodate the changes and demands of the environment, an organization will ingest the external forces or acquire control over them (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

A basic source of variation among conceptions of environments stems from the level of analysis selected. Hatch (1997, p. 64-73) explained three of the most common ways of sorting the elements of an organizational environment:

1. The *interorganizational network* is best represented by a group of organizations embedded in a complex web of relationships consisted of suppliers, customers, competitors, unions, regulatory agencies and interest groups. Regulatory agencies occupy a central position because they have legal control over activities associated with tax authorities and licensing agencies. Special interests are people, groups or organizations who attempt to influence the activities of the organization via political, economic and/or social pressure.

2. The *general environment* is usually divided by organizational theorists, for the sake of analysis, into different environmental forces or sectors including the social, cultural, legal, political, economic, technological and physical.

3. The *international and global environment* includes aspects of the environment that cross national boundaries or that are organized on a global scale and affect the concerns of organization(s) when it expands beyond the boundaries of the home nation.
These groups are helpful in the analysis and study of environmental/organizational relationships, but as Hatch (1997) explained, the distinction between environmental levels is “arbitrary” because we are not dealing with different groups of environments but we are talking about different aspects of a singular yet highly complex surrounding.

Scott (1998, p. 124-31) identified four levels to study an organizational environment:

- **Organizational set.** This level views the environment from the standpoint of a specific (focal) organization. Relations or connections between other (counter) members of the set are of no concern unless they affect the activities or interests of the focal organization. This level of analysis is used in the application of resource dependence theory.

- **Organizational populations.** This concept is used to identify aggregates of organizations that are alike in some respects. This is the level where population ecology models and most natural selection theories have been applied.

- **Areal organization fields.** This approach does not emphasize the individual organizational units or even their characteristics as an aggregate, but rather the network of relations among them.

- **Functional organizational field.** This is a domain in which organizations provide similar or substitutable services that constitute a recognized area of institutional life as regulatory agencies, key suppliers, or resource and product consumers.
This research is coupling the premises of both the resource dependence theory and institutional theory, but it adopts the institutional theory view of organizational environment. In resource dependence theory, the interests, resources and dependencies of a given organization are best examined and its survival tactics probed at the organizational set level. It is also at this level that most discussions of strategic decisions occur. Though this level of analysis proved useful in directing attention to the impact of information, resource flows, and relations of a selected organization, Scott (1998) sees that it does so at the expense of detracting attention from the nature of the larger system of relations in which the focal organization is but one participant among many. Scott is more into the functional organization field level concept where institutional theory, to which he subscribes, is applied. It includes all who affect the organization by supporting, funding and regulating, rather than considering only the providers of resources as in dependence theory. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined organizational field as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life…” (p. 148). Zucker (1987) explicates that it is “defined in terms of increased density of interaction, information flows and membership identification” (p. 450).

The levels of analysis described above serve to define both wider systems of organizations and alternative conceptions of environments that depend on how they are used. Several scholars have proposed that it is useful to distinguish between two levels of organizational environments (Alexander & Scott, 1984; Fennell & Alexander, 1987; Meyer & Scott, 1992; Meyer, Scott & Deal, 1992). These levels represent two different types of environmental pressures: technical and institutional. Technical environments
impose constraints relating to the production and exchange of goods or services in a competitive market. This environment fosters the development of rational and adapting structures. These structures control and coordinate work processes and buffer the technical cores from environmental disturbances. By contrast, institutional environments are characterized by elaborate rules and standards to which individual organizations must conform during the quest for legitimacy, survival, and social support (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1992). However, according to Scott (1998), the distinction between the technical and institutional can be misleading because all organizations operate in both technical and institutional environments. Accordingly, it is better to make them as dimensions along which environments vary, not as dichotomies.

**Population Ecology Theory**

A central theoretical contribution to explain the environment–organization relationship is the population ecology model. The foremost work on this model was done by Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Delacroix and Carroll (1983). The ecological model emphasizes the population of organizations as the unit of analysis and uses natural selection to describe the relationship between the environment and the organization. The natural selection model in biological ecology posits that environmental factors select those characteristics of an organism that best fit the environment. In this same perspective, the organization ecological model centers on the nature and distribution of environmental resources that select some organizations for success and others for extinction.
A population consists of “all the organizations within a particular boundary that have a common form... The population is the form as it exists or is realized within a specified system” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 935). Another characteristic that describes the boundary of a population is the niche that “consists of all those combinations of resource levels at which the population can survive and reproduce itself” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 946). Hannan and Freeman’s elaboration on organizational “population” seems to be analogous to “species” in biology. Furthermore, the model is not intended to examine temporary responses to local conditions, but rather the long-term transformations in the forms or organizations being examined (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Organizational ecology researchers concentrate on how social conditions influence (a) the rate at which new organizations and organizational forms are created, (b) the rate at which existing organizations and organizational forms die out (demise) and, (c) the rate at which organizations change forms (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Singh & Lumsden, 1990).

As such, the ecological approach assumes that external events determine the characteristics of the organizational population. Organizations in this perspective do not change or adapt to their environment. Rather, the environment undergoes fundamental restructuring or replacement of the organizations. Hannan and Freeman (1977) explain that the adaptive perspective assumes a hierarchy of authority and control whereby decisions concerning the organization as a whole are made from the top, while in practice, internal and external constraints impede adaptation. Furthermore, stronger pressures mean that the organization will struggle to adapt and it becomes more likely that environmental selection will ensue. Hannan and Freeman list a number of internal
and external constraints that limit adaptability. The internal constraints include the costs of transferring assets to complete other tasks or functions, lack of information available to leaders for making decisions, internal political constraints on restructuring, resource redistribution, and historical and normative agreements challenging adaptation. The external pressures include the legal and fiscal barriers to the entry and exit of organizations to and from the market, barriers on the acquisition of information about the environment, the fear of losing legitimacy, and constraints on collective rationality, in that there is no singular adaptive course when facing challenges. As Hannan and Freeman point out, the population ecology perspective states that conscious adaptation depends on whether or not environmental and organizational rationality coincide; when the two rationalities do not agree, natural selection will prevail.

Organizational ecology scholars theorized and explained a number of variables that may lead to an organization’s founding, failure, and/or change (see Singh & Lumsden, 1990). These variables include availability of resources, population density, organization age, and organization size, among others. For instance, as explained by Delacroix and Carroll (1983), the demise of an existing organization may create free-floating resources that may be reassembled to create new organizations. In addition, large numbers of deaths within an environment would signal that it was noxious and thereby discourage the founding of new organizations. Similarly, a fertile niche, indicated by prior successful founding, would encourage potential entrepreneurs to create new organizations within that environment. Still, the increase of new organizations in a single niche results in the competition for resources and further discourages the founding of new
organizations. Singh & Lumsden (1990) argued that the issue of population density in the organizational theory research captures both legitimization and competitive forces. Density legitimates an organizational form and increases the founding rate, but as density continues to increase, legitimacy begins to be overtaken by the competitive process and results in an increase of the mortality rate of organizations.

For organizational age and inertia, Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983) theorized “the liability of newness.” This theory is defined by the propensity of new organizations to have higher failure rates, while death rates decline as the organization ages. Additionally, Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984) recognized the liability of smallness, in that smaller organizations have higher mortality rates. The relationship between aging and a lower mortality rate is explained in light of the state of internal learning, coordination, and socialization within the organization, as well as external legitimization, networking, and the reproducibility of an organizational structure (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Singh & Lumsden, 1990). The relationship between smaller organizational size and a higher mortality rate is explained by the lack of an ability to compete, raise capital, and deal with government regulations (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). In contrast, older and bigger organizations have greater inertia and ability to reproduction. Since the selection process favors organizations with inert structures, organizational mortality rates decrease with age and with size.

While population ecology theory has generated interesting and suggestive findings about macro-level changes in organizational populations, this theory has been subject to criticism. Critics question the validity and usefulness of employing a biological
analogy in explaining social phenomena (Bielefeld, 1994; Young, 1988) because of the limitation in biological variables, definitions, propositions, and measurements considered in the theory (Herriott, 1987; Young, 1988). The chief criticism is the lack of attention to organizational adaptation and change (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Young, 1988). Furthermore, selection in this model is determined by fitness, but no explanation is provided as to the selection criteria or to the process by which organization–environment criteria is achieved (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). In conclusion, the population ecology approach primarily gives attention to the analysis of competing forms, to varying strategies of competition, and to the selective effects of changes in environments (Scott, 1998). As will be shown below, both resource dependence and (neo)institutional theory argue for greater attention to the connections between the environment and organizational decision-making processes. Additionally, these theories identify the perspective of organizations engaging in strategic actions to adapt, or even modify their environment more so than does population ecology.

**Resource Dependence Theory**

External control in the organizational perspective is an extension of open-systems theories, where “the external control of organizations” is based on the notion that the behavior, choices, and actions of an organization are best understood by analyzing the environmental or the social context of that behavior. In this view, the environment is a powerful constraint on organizational action to the extent that all organizational outcomes are based on interdependent causes or agents within their environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) assert:
What happens in an organization is not only a function of the organization, its structure, its leadership, its procedures, or its goals. What happens is also a consequence of the environment and the particular contingencies and constraints from that environment (p. 3).

To Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) the organization’s environment "encompasses every event in the world that may potentially have an effect on the organization’s activities” (p. 3). Pfeffer and Salancik distinguish three dimensions/levels that explain variations in an organization’s relationship with the environment. The first level is the entire system of interconnected individuals and organizations that are related to one another, and to a focal organization, through the organization’s transactions. The next level, in which the organization can experience its environment, is the set of individuals and organizations with whom the focal organization directly interacts. The third level can be characterized as the level of perception and representation of the organization’s environment, albeit, its enacted environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 63).

The distinction between the second and third level, according to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), is that the organization can neither notice every event in the environment nor are all occurrences important enough to require a response. As such, they introduced the term “constructed environment” in which members of the organization perceive occurrences through a process of attention and interpretation. Some elements of the environment are invisible to the organization, that is to say, the environment often differs greatly from the reality in which they ought to be dealing with (Hudock, 1995). Accordingly, an organization might respond conditionally to its external environment and this can be demonstrated by how an organization attends to the
environment or selects and processes information to give meaning to its environment (Hudock, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Considering the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the theory has three main themes that are crucial in understanding how organizational decision making is constrained by the environment: interdependency, strategic options, and power. Interdependence in social systems is a consequence of open systems and exists “whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 40). Since control of resources lies outside the organization, the focal organization must interact with elements of the environment in order to obtain the resources necessary for survival. The need for resources, including financial and physical as well as information obtained from the environment, makes organizations potentially dependent on external sources for these resources. The actors become mutually dependent as they work to ensure a sufficient flow of resources, the interconnected result of which is a network of social interactions and interdependencies. This state of interdependence, and the doubts that accompany the actions of other actors in the environment, creates uncertainty or unpredictability that also increase with a lack of coordinated activities among social units. Pfeffer and Salancik defined environmental uncertainty as "the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted" (p. 67). The challenge for organizational survival occurs not only because organizations depend on their environment, but also because the environment is “not dependable.” Pfeffer and Salanick explained that environments change as resources
ebb and flow and new organizations enter and exit. As the surrounding circumstances change, organizations face the prospect of either not surviving or adapting in response to these environmental challenges. The diversification of an organization’s activities does not reduce its dependence on the environment, but merely alters the nature of the interdependence and structures of organizational dependence so that it is more readily managed. Furthermore, the problem exists wherein there are many organizations attempting to control the focal organization. Pfeffer and Salancik explained that the attempts by the focal organizations to satisfy the demands of a given group are a function of its dependence on that group, relative to other groups, and the extent to which the demands of one group conflict with the demands of another. This group of organizations may include accrediting organizations and regulatory bodies, including the law, as well as those regulations established by the agreement between the organizations themselves and the various advocacy and interest groups that operate to affect the activities of the organization.

To Pfeffer and Salanick (2003), problematic conditions exist in determining the dependence of one organization on another; consequently, the organization’s vulnerability to the changing environment depends on the following three factors. The first is the importance of resources and the extent to which an organization in dire need for resources can maintain itself. The second is the extent to which stakeholders have discretion over resource allocation and use. The third is the extent to which there are few alternatives, or the extent of control over the resource by an interest group. Considering the conditions that determine an organization’s vulnerability, and the factors that
influence its perception of these conditions (and therefore its behavior), organizational survival is dependent upon extracting resources from this environment.

The second theme of resource dependence theory is that an organization is both active and reactive to its environment. That is to say, though organizations are constrained by their situation and environments, strategic choices and opportunities are possible. Organizations may choose to adapt their activities and comply with environmental constraints, but more often they try to alter those constraints by changing the environment itself. When organizations choose to adapt, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) explain that competition increases pressure for *isomorphism*. That is, competition might lead to increased similarity in inter-organizational behavior. Pfeffer and Salancik observe that organizations as coalitions are willing to change their goals and adapt:

…altering their purposes and domains to accommodate new interests, sloughing off parts of themselves to avoid some interests, and when necessary, becoming involved in activities far afield from their stated central purposes (p. 24).

With respect to social service organizations such as NGOs, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) mention that environmental conditions may make charitable contributions scarce. In such cases, they predict that such agencies may willingly exchange their autonomy for funds as “no other options are available to them” (p. 177).

The external controls of organizations, however, concentrate on non-compliance behavior to face environmental constraints whereby:

…firms do not merely respond to external constraints and control through compliance to environmental demands. Rather, a variety of strategies may be undertaken to somehow alter the situation confronting the organization to make compliance less necessary (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 197).
The advantages of noncompliance, from a resource dependence perspective, include the ability to maintain discretion or autonomy over decision making, the flexibility to permit continual adaptation as new contingencies arise, and the latitude to alter or control the environment in accordance with organizational objectives. The theory presents a set of possible organizational responses to the demanding environment it confronts. The first strategy a dependent organization may try is to take control through acquisition and ownership of resources, but Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that this is not always possible due to costs or the very nature of the organization. Other possible and accessible ways to obtain more autonomy and pursue organizational interests might be cooptation, joining trade associations, cartels, reciprocal trade agreements, coordinating councils, carefully chosen board of directors, joint ventures, and horizontal and vertical mergers (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Such activities and linkages help the organization to extend its legitimacy, access information, and obtain financial resources when required. They also represent strategies for sharing power and a kind of social agreement that stabilizes and coordinates mutual interdependence. Linkages with other organizations can also create new and different constraints that can then be negotiated, established, and reestablished so the individual organization might maintain a degree of discretion.

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that joining such collective structures have a price because the organization must surrender some of its discretion and control. A continuous conflict between the desire for discretion, and the need to control uncertainty caused by interdependence, is created and generates changing inter-organizational
relationships. Other attempts to manage constraints can involve intervention in public policy and the political process through influencing elections, changing the legal statutes and government regulatory activity, using litigation, or co-opting political elites by hiring them once they leave the government.

The third major theme of external control theory is power. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) viewed organizations as “social instructions of power and energy.” Social power in resource dependence theory is contrasted to rationality or efficiency for economists. The critical question of power is: who will control this energy and for what purpose? Power here results from interdependency and is centered on the most critical and scarce resources in the social system. Organizations that rely heavily on other organizations have less power, while those that offer the resources may enforce numerous policies and decisions on dependent organizations. Furthermore, the theory explains that the impact of dependence extends to the internal power dynamics. People and units inside the organization that help lessen dependence, or reduce the uncertainty, hold more power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Another important aspect related to power, and power concentration, is the organization’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) explained that the actions of the focal organization to acquire necessary resources are "effective" when the organization satisfies the demands of the stakeholders upon which the organization depends. It is important to clarify that effectiveness in resource dependence is different from the organizational “efficiency” of economic theories. While organizational efficiency is “an internal standard of performance… measured by the ratio of resources
utilized to output produced” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 11), effectiveness is a sociopolitical issue representing an “external standard of how well an organization is meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations that are concerned with its activities” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 11). As such, effectiveness represents acceptability of the organization and its activities by those located outside the organization. Given the fact that organizations are dependent on their environment for survival and success, they need to gain acceptance and social legitimacy. Society’s evaluation of organizational effectiveness is also an evaluation of its legitimacy. However, as different groups and actors in the society have different criteria to evaluate an organization’s effectiveness, agreement on the legitimacy of the organization is not always feasible. Herein lies the importance of a “coalition” of parties that contribute the resources and support necessary to produce the outcomes desired by the alliance.

**Institutional Theory**

The initial wave of institutional theory, or so-called neoinstitutional theory, to analyze organizations rose to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was led by different contributions of Scott, Meyer, Rowan, Zucker, DiMaggio and Powell among others. This theory built on the argument that the institutionalized “rules and norms of society intrude on the internal structure of organizations” (Beggs, 1995, p. 613). The core idea of institutional theory is that organizations are deeply embedded in an expansive environment and consequently become influenced by the pressures and constraints of this environment. From previous theoretical work, Scott (1994, 1995) identified three major factors of institutionalization in the literature: (a) cognitive elements that include meaning
systems and cultural foundations of the society, the authority of which rests on a consensus of shared conceptions of social reality; (b) normative elements that stipulate expectations for the appropriate behavior, which are learned and internalized through socialization or education; and (c) enforcement processes which involve surveillance, assessment, and the application of sanctions by formal regulatory structures. Davis and Greve (1997) elaborate on these approaches of institutions and their related bases of legitimacy. Davis and Greve (1997) explain:

The cognitive approach focuses on the actors’ shared frameworks of interpretation, which allow them to acquire a common definition of the situation. Thus, legitimacy comes from adopting a common frame of reference consistent with the one that prevails in a social system. The normative conception is more evaluative in nature, and legitimacy takes on a moral tone – doing what others expect as “appropriate” for one’s role. The regulative view looks to formal and informal rules as constraining and regularizing behavior, and legitimacy consists in conforming to those rules (p. 6).

Institutional theory visualizes organizations as a direct reflection of the rules and structures in their overall environment. Meyer, Boli and Thomas (1994) confirm the new institutionalization view by stating:

We see institutions as cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities and activities, integrating them into the larger schemes. We see both partners of activity and the units involved in them (individuals and others social entities) as constructed by such wider rules. Institutionalization, in this usage, is the process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come to be normatively and cognitively held in place, and practically taken for granted as lawful (whether as a matter of formal law, custom, or knowledge) (p. 10).

As such, the focus of the institutional theory is on the institutionalized symbols, values, meanings, and rules that construct a “cultural rationalization” (Scott, 1994). Cognitive institutions attain their authority from shared conceptions of social reality rather than through the promise of rewards or the fear of sanctions (Scott, 1994). The
normative obligations often become “rule like,” “social fact,” “obvious,” “taken-for-granted assumptions,” and “natural” ways for actors to conduct activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott 1994; Zucker, 1977, 1987). DiMaggio (1988) and Douglass (1986) explained that the high triumph of institutional development occurs when rules and beliefs are validated and accepted yet remain invisible to the actors and organizations they influence. In other words, organizations may abide by environmental pressures not to get positive outcomes, but because it is unthinkable to do otherwise (Oliver, 1991).

Consequently, when new definitions or practices become a “social fact,” or “institutionalized,” organizations are under considerable pressure to incorporate them (Beggs, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert, 1985). It is only when organizational practices and policies become institutionalized that they are then considered a legitimate and rational means to attain certain organizational goals (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Otherwise, violating common and rational structures would question the legitimacy of the organization and may affect its ability to obtain resources and social support. Thus, organizations choose conformity or the non-choice behavior (Oliver, 1991) and act as a passive “audience” (Zucker, 1987). Neoinstitutional theorists explained that legitimacy and social fitness organizations gain by conformity to the institutional environment which enhances their stability, invulnerability, and survival prospects (Beggs, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained that organizations not only compete for resources and customers, but also for political power, social legitimacy, and economic fitness.
According to institutional theory scholars, pressure on organizations results in a state of *isomorphism and homogeneity* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1994; Zucker, 1987) in the organizational field. Using Hawley’s (1968) description, as cited by DiMaggio and Powell, “isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). The process of isomorphism assumes that environmental pressures and incentives lead organizations to modify activities towards an increase in compatibility with broader environmental characteristics. In addition, institutional pressures on organizational autonomy can disturb network ties with other organizations or alter the perceptions of others toward the organization (Zucker, 1987). In contrast to the population ecology view of isomorphism as a process resulting in the natural selection of the most efficient organizations, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contend that organizations become similar but not necessarily efficient. Zucker (1987) also noted that the pressure on an organization to be guided by legitimate elements often has the effect of directing attention away from task performance. Zucker explained that the rewards of this isomorphism are more directly related to organizational legitimacy and prestige rather than to efficiency. The attempts to be more compatible with the environment result in an increase of homogeneity among organizations within a given domain. Thus, organizations characterized by common, socially-defined institutions may exhibit similar features, with a diversity of organizational forms parallel to the environmental diversity.
Institutional pressure that results in isomorphism ranges from evaluative signals of disapproval to the development of specialized surveillance and enforcement machinery with powerful sanctions carried out by regulatory agencies (Scott, 1994). In this case, institutional control may be backed by explicit formal and informal control mechanisms including state authority, court definitions of negligence and prudence, knowledge legitimated through education and professional norms, interest groups activities, and the force of public opinion (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992; Scott, 1998).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three general mechanisms promoting isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism results from formal and informal external forces that compel organizations (through legal mandate, negotiations, cultural expectations, or resource dependency) to adopt certain structures, procedures, or functions. As such, the existence of a common legal environment may shape organizational behavior and structure. DiMaggio and Powell explained, for instance, how donors homogenize subsidizers by enforcing standards of reporting, accounting, evaluations, or planning. Mimetic processes either occur when uncertainty leads organizations to imitate, consciously or unconsciously, similar organizations that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. Normative pressures come from professionals and professional associations or institutions (i.e., universities) promoting similar and supposedly superior organizational behavior, norms, and procedures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Zucker (1987) also characterized the implementation of institutional elements by two approaches. The first views the environment as an institution, whereas institutionalization is enforced from an external source in an attempt
to copy or reproduce certain organizational forms and actions. Though Zucker pointed out that “institutions are commonly state-linked” (p. 446), her view is consistent with Powell’s (1988) observation that external donors penetrate the internal operating structures of the recipient organization. The second institutional element is organization as an institution. In this case, the organization is a source of the institutional elements when it works as a “generator” to produce or imitate these elements of other organizations without any interference from an external power.

The above-mentioned state of institutional coercion and enforcement entails more elaboration. Zucker (1987, p. 451) presented the legitimate question: “Why are some organizations interpenetrated by the institutional environment, while others are not?” She explained that if the organizational goals and values are not widely shared, the organization is more likely to be challenged. Further, those organizations that have ties with the government are more likely to adopt government policies so they can gain legitimacy and ensure a long life. Additionally, the power of the organization is a deciding factor because powerful organizations have control over their boundaries. Large organizations use their networking contacts to dilute the internal influence of regulatory agencies. In addition, though institutional theorists have emphasized direct or symbolic compliance and conformity to environmental demands (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Goodstein, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), they have also argued that the choice of conformity or resistance to environmental pressure is a strategic choice (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991). This argument suggests that organizations do not blindly conform to environmental pressures,
but rather assess the extent to which conformity serves organizational interests (Goodstein, 1994).

**Combining Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence into One Framework**

Resource dependence and institutional theories have several issues in common (Pfeffer, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Oliver, 1991; Zucker, 1987). First, they are both theories of organizational sociology. Second, the point of departure of both theories is that organizations have limited choices in the face of environmental pressure. Third, they both envision the environment as collective and interconnected. Fourth, they both assume that organizations must be responsive to external demands and expectations in order to survive. Fifth, both theories emphasize that most organizations confront numerous and frequently incompatible demands from a variety of external actors. Finally, they both emphasize organizational legitimacy for survival and stability.

The main difference between institutional theory and resource dependence theory is that the first elaborate several facets of institutional pressures and constraints while the second main concern is the technical (task) constraints. More specifically, resource dependence theory addressed the pressure of ensuring a stable flow of resources. Conversely, the pressures and demands in an institutional system emanate from a number of sources including, but not limited to, acquisition of material and financial resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992; Scott, 1998). Furthermore, power has different loci in the two theories. In resource dependence theory, it is a matter of who controls and owns the resources while in institutional theory it is
who has command of the assets that shape and enforce the institutional rules and beliefs (Oliver, 1991).

The divergence in understanding the main environmental pressures facing organizations is accompanied by differences in the mood of responses to these factors. Resource dependence theory focuses on a wide range of active choice behaviors that organizations can exercise to manipulate external dependencies or exercise influence over the source or allocation of critical resources (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Organizations in this theory have the potential for controlling or co-opting rather than conforming to externally imposed criteria of acceptable behavior. Stability is attained through the exercise of power, control, or the negotiation of interdependencies to achieve a predictable/stable inflow of vital resources while reducing environmental uncertainty. By comparison, institutional theory tends to limit its actions to non-choice behavior in the context of taken-for-granted norms and beliefs. Conformity takes the form of reproducing or imitating organizational structures, activities, and routines (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver 1991; Zucker, 1977, 1987).

Both resource dependence and institutional theory have received criticism. For resource dependence, it has been argued that the theory, with its focus on transactional interdependence, overlooks other important environmental pressures on organizations, which must not only meet technical constraints, but also respond to a variety of institutional demands embodied in regulations, norms, laws, and social expectations (Goodstein, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). On the other hand, criticism of institutional theory exposes the silence of the theory on the strategic behaviors employed by
organizations in response to institutional pressures. This is best summarized by Oliver's (1991) statement: "Institutional theorists, by virtue of their focus, have tended to limit their attention to the effects of the institutional environment on structural conformity and isomorphism and have tended to overlook the role of active agency and resistance" (p. 195). Powell (1991) warned that a narrow focus on the process of conformity has deflected theoretical interest away from accounting for the circumstances in which institutionalization is contested or incomplete (p. 195).

Reflecting on such important insights and criticisms, a number of scholars found that both resource dependence and institutional theories integrated principles from each other and should be combined to explain environmental pressures and patterns of organizational responses (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simon, 1995; Oliver, 1991). As stated by Oliver (1991), institutional and resource dependence theorists have attributed different degrees of resistance, activeness, and self-interested awareness to the behavior of organizations responding to external constraints and demands. According to this argument, organizations can interpret their environment, make choices, and respond strategically. These responses may include resisting and changing the environment itself.

Oliver (1991) explained that the framework acknowledges the fact that organizations are interest-seeking, accordingly they should not assume invariably passive and conforming behavior across all institutional pressures. Rather, organizational response depends on the nature and context of the pressure itself. Oliver used the organizational active responses and behaviors assumed in resource dependence theory to rectify the passivity and conforming depiction of organizations to environmental pressure
prevalent in institutional theory. Oliver rightly explained that this integration addresses
the “potential for variation in the degree of choice, awareness, proactiveness, influence
and self-interest that organizations exhibit in response to institutional pressures” (p. 146).
The framework provides a continuum of organizational strategic responses to
environmental pressures varying from passive compliance with institutional norms to
direct and active defiance of an institutional environment. The five modes of responding
to the environment are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and
manipulation. Oliver (1991, p. 159) argued that the organizational environment can be
identified by five research questions: (a) why these pressures are being exerted, (b) who
is exerting them, (c) what these pressures are, (d) how or by what means they are exerted,
and (e) where they occur. Each question represents an institutional factor that explains the
rational underlying an organization’s conformity or resistance to institutionalization.
Oliver used two dimensions, also called antecedent conditions, to explain each
institutional factor. The institutional factors and their dimensions are: cause (legitimacy,
efficiency), constituents (multiplicity, dependence), content (consistency, constraint),
control (coercion, diffusion), and context (uncertainty, interconnectedness).

Institutional Factors

- Cause refers to the rationale behind the institutional pressure over the organization.

  Oliver (1991) suggested that external actors (constituents) in the organizational
environment, including government, donors, and the public, may exert pressure on
the organization to ensure its social fitness and economic accountability. Accordingly,
organizations are pressured to conform to the external actors (constituents) in their
environment in order to gain legitimacy and economic resources. According to Oliver, organizations then may choose to acquiesce, compromise, defy, avoid, or manipulate the source of the pressures depending on the anticipated gain of legitimacy and economic fitness and their importance to the self-serving organization.

- Constituents refer to the actors in the organization environment that impose pressure on the organization. Oliver suggested two dimensions of the factor “constituents”: multiplicity and dependence. Multiplicity is defined as “the degree of multiple, conflicting, constituents expectations exerted on an organization” (Oliver 1991, p.164). Both resource dependence and institutional theorists agreed that conformity to the environment with multiple constituents is difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Scott, 1987) because constituents may require competing demands, and the satisfaction of one constituent often requires the organization to ignore or defy the demands of another (Oliver, 1991). Further, conformity or isomorphism with a certain constituent is a function of dependency. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that organizations resist the demands of the constituents on whom they are less dependent.

- Content has two dimensions, as suggested by Oliver: consistency and constrain. She argued that organizational resistance to institutional pressure increases with a lack of consistency between organizational goals and institutional pressure. For nonprofit organizations, Oliver explained that resistance to pressure for economic rationality prevails because compliance may result in inconsistencies in the quality of social service delivery. Further, organizational resistance to imposed pressures is likely to increase with the loss of discretion over issues such as resources allocation, service
selection, or organizational administration. Resistance to a loss of discretion is less likely if the pressure is mandated by the government or by legal agreement.

- Control refers to the means by which pressures are imposed on the organizations. Organizations are subject to institutional pressure by two means: legal coercion and voluntary diffusion. Government mandates are usually enforced by authority (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Oliver 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). According to Oliver (1991) if the legal coercion is high and culturally approved, then acquiescence would best serve the organization. Otherwise, an organization may choose to avoid, defy, or even manipulate the institutional pressure if the legal coercion is low. Similarly, organizations tend to acquiesce to environmental pressure when institutional norms and rules are proudly diffused and valid. This point was highly emphasized in institutional theory as organizations adopt those norms that are widely spread and tend to mimic successful forms of organizations.

- Context (in the environmental sense), as considered by Oliver (1991), has two significant dimensions: uncertainty and interconnectedness. Environmental uncertainty refers to difficulty in anticipating and predicting the future (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Interconnectedness refers to the level of density among constituents and interorganizational relations in an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). As conformity serves the quest of certainty and stability, organizations tend to acquiesce, compromise, and avoid when environmental uncertainty is high. If certainty is high and organizations are confident about their legitimacy and available resources, they may defy or manipulate
institutional values and those who enforce them. Similarly, organizations tend to conform if the environment is highly interconnected. Interconnectedness facilitates the diffusion of norms and values, which tend to create institutional consensus, collectiveness, and conformity.

**Organizational Modes of Strategic Response**

The following presents an explanation of each organizational strategic response as identified in Oliver (1991):

- **Acquiescence**: This may take several forms including habit, imitation and compliance. Habit refers to unconscious consistency with respect to following accepted norms and values. Imitation is consistency with “mimetic isomorphism”, described above in institutional theory. In this form of compliance, organizations choose to mimic the behaviors of trusted actors within their environment. Compliance is a more active form of acquiescence than practicing a habit or imitating other organizations. It is a strategic and conscious obedience to institutional requirements that aims to elevate organizational legitimacy and avoid criticism or financial penalties for noncompliance.

- **Compromise**: When organizations face conflicting institutional demands or inconsistency between organizational goals and institutional expectations, they tend to compromise. Compromise is a sign of partial compliance. Under such conditions, organizations may balance, pacify, or bargain with their constituents. Balancing requires organizations to achieve an acceptable compromise between conflicting interests or choose one over the other. In pacifying tactics, organizations may choose
conformity only to the minimum standards accepted by powerful constituents. Bargaining tactics emphasized by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) are an expression of exchanging concession between an organization and its constituents. It could be over acceptable standards of outputs, reporting conditions, or any other expectation by the constituents.

- **Avoidance**: Avoidance as an organizational response is addressed by both institutional and resource dependence theory. Organizations may avoid institutional pressures by concealing, buffering, or escaping tactics. Concealing is best described as symbolic, in contrast to real, compliance to institutional norms or procedures. Buffering refers to reducing institutional inspections or hiding reality from outsiders. An organization may further escape conformity altogether by changing its goals, activities, or even changing its physical location to a less constraining environment.

- **Defiance**: This may take the forms of dismissing, challenging, or attacking institutional pressure. Organizations dismiss institutional norms when they perceive a low cost of such active departure or when these norms diverge dramatically from organizational values. Organizations may also challenge the rules of the institutional environment to enforce their own vision, especially if these rules are not widely shared. Furthermore, organizations may even attack institutional values and those who represent them if those values are explicitly negative or the organization feels its position will be more privileged to the public.

- **Manipulation**: This is the most active response to institutional pressures that organizations may adopt in an attempt to actively change or exert power over the
source of pressure. It involves co-opting, influencing, or controlling institutional pressures and evaluations. Co-opting is addressed clearly by resource dependence theory as when organizations try to influence institutional elites by putting them on the board of directors. Influencing tactics usually target institutionalized beliefs and values; for example, lobbying the government or attempting to change the performance standards. Controlling tactics aim to exert control over the source, allocation, or expression of social approval and legitimation.

**Research Hypotheses**

This researcher explicitly draws on Oliver’s (1991) hypotheses that provide foundations for identifying environmental features which influence the strategic responses of organizations to institutional pressures. The ten hypotheses of this research are:

**Cause: legitimacy and Economic Fitness**

- “Hypothesis 1: The lower the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160).
- “Hypothesis 2: The lower the degree of economic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160-1).
Constituents: Multiplicity and Dependence

- “Hypothesis 3: The greater the degree of constituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

- “Hypothesis 4: The lower the degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

Content: Consistency and Constrain

- “Hypothesis 5: The lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or requirements with organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

- “Hypothesis 6: The greater the degree of discretionary constraints imposed on the organization by institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

Control: Coercion and Diffusion

- “Hypothesis 7: The lower the degree of legal coercion behind institutional norms and requirements, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 167-8).

- “Hypothesis 8: The lower the degree of voluntary diffusion of institutional norms, values, or practices, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168).
Context: Uncertainty and Interconnectedness

- “Hypothesis 9: The lower the level of uncertainty in the organization's environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).

- “Hypothesis 10: The lower the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).

Below is a table that summarizes the relationship between institutional antecedents (predictive factors) and an organization’s predicted strategies as hypothesized by Oliver (1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive factor</th>
<th>Acquiesce</th>
<th>Compromise</th>
<th>Avoid</th>
<th>Defy</th>
<th>Manipulate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Habit</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Conceal</td>
<td>Dismiss</td>
<td>Co-opt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imitate</td>
<td>Pacify</td>
<td>Buffer</td>
<td>Challenge</td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comply</td>
<td>Bargain</td>
<td>Escape</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiplicity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraint</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interconnectedness</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 3 (Oliver, 1991, p.160) and Table 2 (Oliver, 1991, p.152).
Chapter Three

The Method

This chapter is divided into eight sections: the question, the research hypotheses, unit of analysis, data collection, internal and external validity, data analysis, and study limitations.

The Question

This research focuses on how organizations, represented by their decision makers, envision their environment and react to it. The context of the research specifically imposed a qualitative method because the fundamental interest of the researcher concerned an organization’s “constructed environment,” which members of an organization perceive through a process of attention and interpretation, as defined by Pfeffer and Salanick (2003, p.14). Another interest of the researcher included the strategic choices of organizations and how they respond to institutional pressures in their environment. The researcher used a qualitative method after consideration of the views of Berg (2007) and Auebach and Silverstain (2003), which deem qualitative research as the best method to explore the meanings individuals assign to their experience; the perceptions and subjective apprehensions of individuals; the process(es) by which humans arrange themselves and their settings; the ways in which individuals and groups make sense of their surroundings; and how to interrupt symbols, rituals, structures, and roles in social settings. Qualitative research in this sense provides a means to access the
unquantifiable through observing, talking to people, or tracing documents as archives, publications, letters, and so on.

The researcher used multiple case study analysis of three Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) as the unit of analysis. The same procedure was followed in each unit of analysis. Case study is one of the important tools recommended in social science research and specifically in organizational studies. Hagan (2006) defined the case study method as “in depth, qualitative studies of one or a few illustrative cases” (p. 240). Yin (2003) explained that “the distinctive need of case study arise from the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (p. 3). The case study “allows an investigator to retain a holistic and meaningful characteristic of real life events” (Yin, 2003, p.3). Yin further emphasized that case study entails using a variety of lines of action in data-gathering, and can meaningfully make use of and contribute to the application of theory. This process of theory testing or combining theory development and testing is described as “sensemaking,” defined as “a manner by which people, groups, and organizations make sense of stimuli with which they are confronted, how they frame what they see and hear, how they perceive and interpret this information, and how they interpret their own actions and go about solving problems and interacting with others” (Berg, 2007, p. 285).

In this research, the guiding research questions were: a) How does the environment affect the actions and characteristics of individual organizations? and b) How and why do organizations respond the way they do to environmental changes or influences? To answer these questions the researcher specifically looked at the following:
1. Are there factors related to the historical and socio-political context that uniquely impact the relations between Palestinian NGOs and their environments?

2. What specific features of the environment in which Palestinian NGOs are situated force organizational conformity or resistance to their environments?

3. What strategic behaviors do Palestinian NGOs employ to facilitate interaction with their environments?

4. Why do the organizations choose these strategies?

With the “how” and “why” questions, the use of case study has a distinctive advantage over other research methods. Yin (2003) explained that “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is... asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (p. 9). In addition, this research used the exploratory “what” question to identify the ways in which organizations respond to their environment and examine the applicability of institutional theory and resource dependence theory in the context of the organizations studied. The two theories were developed in a Western context, where the environment is characterized by more political and economic stability, a reasonable level of predictability, and where market rules prevail. Yin (2003) comments on the exploratory role of case studies and explains that “some types of ‘what’ questions are exploratory... This type of question is a justifiable rationale for conducting an exploratory study... to develop pertinent hypothesis and propositions for further inquiry” (p. 6).
The Research Hypotheses

Oliver’s (1991) “institutional factors,” “organizational strategic responses,” and research hypotheses were presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The researcher explicitly draws on Oliver’s hypotheses to provide a foundation for identifying environmental features which influence the strategic responses of organizations to institutional pressures. Oliver elaborated a continuum of organizational strategic responses to environmental pressures that vary from passive compliance with institutional norms to direct and active defiance of an institutional environment. She argued that, depending on five institutional factors or antecedents (cause, constituents, content, control, and context), each organization may respond to institutional pressures in a variety of ways, including acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation (Oliver, 1991).

Unit of Analysis

Case studies tend to be purposive rather than random samplings. The unit of analysis of this study is the individual organization. The researcher did not aim to select representative cases that can be generalized to the whole universe but to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory. Alternatively, the mode of generalization in this research is “the ‘analytical generalization,’ in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 2003, p. 32-3).

Three Palestinian NGOs have been selected for this study: OrgA, OrgB, and OrgC. Each organization was the subject of an individual case study. The main criterion
used to select the organizations was age, as each NGO is older than twenty years. Other
criteria included whether the organizations provided different types of social services and
had a direct relationship with certain target groups. The selected organizations are purely
Palestinian NGOs, not international NGOs based in Palestine. Furthermore, the study
considered only PNGOs in the city of Ramallah. The fact that the three organizations are
located in the same geographic area helps in controlling the cultural and political
differences between the different cities. Ramallah is the central city in the West Bank,
where most of the head offices of PNGOs are located and where PNGOs develop direct
relationships with many international donors who have offices in Ramallah or in
Jerusalem.

There are several reasons for selecting NGOs as the unit of analysis in this research. The most important reason was that they play an active and diverse role in
social, economic, and political life in Palestine, especially with the disparate socio-
economic conditions befalling Palestinians. So it is crucial to explore and understand how
and why these organizations survive in such an unstable environment. Below is a brief
introduction to each organization.

OrgA was founded in 1965 by a group of committed women volunteers. It aims to
empower Palestinian women and serve various sectors of the community. In the
aftermath of the 1967 war and throughout the Israeli occupation, the role of OrgA grew to
provide emergency assistance to the families of the victims of the Israeli occupation and
other hardship cases. In addition, OrgA provides vocational and technical training to
women to enable them to acquire skills to become wage earners and thus productive
members of their community. The organization depends on local and international donors to support its activities. Further, in order to maintain its vital services, the organization established several productive projects.

OrgB was established in 1987 as an independent non-profit organization pursuing a comprehensive approach to community development in Palestine. The organizational mission is to achieve sustainable development for Palestinians through vocational training and producing reports and studies on Palestinian community development. OrgB is active in the WBGS&EJ and has initiated 50 community centers in different areas. Since 2006, several managerial changes have taken place inside the organization, the results of which are reflected by its operations and relationship with the outside environment.

OrgC was founded as a grassroots health movement in 1979. Recently, it has become one of the largest health NGOs in Palestine. The organizational programs emphasize prevention, education, community participation, and the empowerment of people. The health programs focus on the needs of the most vulnerable members of Palestinian society: women, children, and the poor in rural villages, refugee camps, and urban centers.

**Data collection**

The field work of this research was carried out in two lines, horizontal and vertical. The research was horizontal in the context that the researcher was ascertaining different elements that come into play in the organizations environment in general. The researcher was compiling inventories of information on the Palestinian NGOs from
informants active and experienced in this field. The research was vertical in the context that the research went in depth in three organizations for a richer understanding of these complex issues when it comes to a specific organization.

The three main methods of data collection that were used in the field research of this dissertation were interviews, focus group discussions, and evaluation of documents and written textual sources. The field work took place from October, 1, 2008 to January, 23, 2009. Apart from six “experts” and the director of the General Administration of NGOs, the researcher chose to maintain the anonymity of the organizations studied as well as the names of the people interviewed who were part of the organizations, either as employees, board members, or beneficiaries.

The data presented in Chapter 4, “The History of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations” was mainly based on eight interviews with civil society activists and professionals, academics, and government employees. The research often referred to those interviewees as “experts.” The researcher also used published resources on the subject as appropriate to track this history.
Table 2: List of Interviewed Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Expert</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdulhadi, Izzat</td>
<td>January 4, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barghouti, Muharam</td>
<td>October 11, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elnamelh, Hazem</td>
<td>January 22, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacaman, George</td>
<td>January 19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabarin, Shawan</td>
<td>December 12, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhleh, Kahlil</td>
<td>January 2, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of OrgX</td>
<td>December 11, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of OrgXX</td>
<td>December 3, 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher interviewed the director and staff of the General Administration of NGOs in the Ministry of Interior of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The researcher chose this department of the Palestinian Authority to collect data on the relationship between the PNGOs and the PA because: (1) the Palestinian Law No.1 of 2000 Concerning Charitable Associations and Civil Society Organizations (ch1/a2) stipulates that the NGO’s authorization is to be issued by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI); (2) the MOI, under certain provisions identified by the law, has the authorization to rescind the legal approval of the status of an association; and (3) Though article 5 of the law entrusted the competent ministries to follow up on the activities of any association, in practice the MOI took over several roles of the competent ministries, as will be explained in the next chapter (Chapter 4) of this dissertation.
The interviews with the representatives of the General Administration of NGOs department have concentrated on aspects of the relationship between the PNGO community in general and the PA. In addition, the researcher also explored the relationship of the department with OrgA, OrgB, and OrgC.

Table 3: Interviews with Representatives of the General Administration of NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The General Administration of NGO’s in the PA</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the Director of the General Administration of NGO’s (Fadwa Al-Sha’r)</td>
<td>December 31, 2008 &amp; January 1, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Officer of International Organizations Unit</td>
<td>December 31, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Officer of Finance Auditing Unit</td>
<td>January 1, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Officer of Legal Affairs Unit</td>
<td>December 31, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Officer of Gaza Strip NGOs Unit</td>
<td>December 31, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Deputy Assistance for Security Affairs at MOI</td>
<td>December 1, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data of the three case studies was collected from within and outside each organization as explained below.

**Data collection within each organization**

1. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the heads of the three identified NGOs. In the semi-structured interviews, the wording of questions was flexible, the level of language was adjustable, the researcher asked questions and made clarifications, and the researcher added or deleted probes between subsequent subjects (Berg, 2007, p. 93). The pre-prepared questions gave the researcher control to ensure answering the encoded elements of the investigation as presented by Oliver (1991). At the same time it allowed flexibility to deal with the specifications and distinctive character of each organization while also providing uninhibited responses that allowed the researcher to explore the varying ways in which the interviewee
envisioned their organization’s actions. The guiding questions used in the interviews appeared in Appendix II of this dissertation.

2. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted separately with board members of each organization. As Naumes and Naumes (2006) assert, “One person within the organization making a statement involving judgment or values may not reflect the true situation within the entire organization” (p. 54). In this dissertation, interviewing members of the organization’s board of directors provided multiple perspectives from those who were actively involved in the situation being investigated, while also providing an alternative view from that of the organization’s head. Ultimately, this exercise demonstrated whether the board’s view intersects with that of the organization head and presented a means to verify mutual confirmation of organizational perception over their environment and actions.

3. The websites, publications, brochures, and annual reports of the three organizations were other sources of information.

**Data collection from outside each organization**

Other means of gathering information about the relationship between the organization and its environment, and to ensure accurate conclusions, involved interviewing individuals and groups outside the organization. Those actors are referred to as the “constituents” in the utilized framework. Though the researcher considered the “constructed environment,” Yin (2003) and Naumes and Naumes (2006) suggested that such interviews represent an external validation of the information and claims by individuals from within the organization. Naumes and Naumes further explain that,
“...even if the original statements cannot be verified through these interviews with others, the readers are now presented with these alternatives points of view. The readers can then determine for themselves which individuals to believe and which points of view to accept” (p. 54). The interviews listed below represent the major “constituents” in the NGOs environment:

1. Two donors’ organizations. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives of two donors’ organizations that fund each organization studied.

2. The beneficiaries. Focus group discussions were conducted with the beneficiaries of each organization. Generally, focus groups are most useful in exploratory research as they provide room for the generation and discussion of the topic in ways that other methods cannot provide. Focus groups in the context of this dissertation are beneficial in exploring the legitimacy of the organization. Legitimacy of NGOs within their society largely depends on the quality of the service they provide to their target groups, the views of the participants, and how they feel about the service they get. Furthermore, focus groups with the organization’s target group may add new research and theoretical insights when it deals with civil society organizations.

Each focus group discussions of this research were composed of 4-7 participants. The main criteria for participation were that the participant benefitted from the organization’s activities and was more than 21 years old. The focus groups discussions were held at the participants’ site of activity.

The same procedure was repeated in each of the three cases. Initially, the researcher contacted each organization over the phone and asked for an appointment with
the organization’s head. In the meeting, the researcher introduced herself, explained her academic work and interest in studying the organization, and explained the sequence of the study. In the first meeting with the organization’s head, the researcher provided an introduction letter, “Introduction Letter and Request for the Organization Cooperation in a Doctoral Dissertation Project,” as it appears in Appendix II.

The three organizations showed complete cooperation and willingness to participate. Though the research shields the names of the organizations and the interviewees in the three cases, the leaders of the three organizations expressed indifference to this issue. Organization B’s leaders went as far as to express their preference to disclose the name of their organization and each interviewee. However, for consistency, the researcher kept the names shielded. After guaranteeing participation, the researcher and the head of each organization agreed on an appointment for the actual interview. At the end of the introductory interview, the researcher obtained the contact information for board members and donors to be interviewed. The researcher also arranged to conduct the focus group session with organizational beneficiaries.

Before the interviews and the focus group discussions, the researcher secured a signed consent form from each participant. The forms appear in Appendix III of this dissertation. She also asked for permission to record the interviews and focus group discussions using an audiotape. Besides using an audiotape, the researcher took complete notes of each individual interview and focus group discussion. The researcher used the guiding questions in each interview as they appear in Appendix II.
Though the plan was to interview the director of each organization, two board members, two donors, and to conduct one focus group for each organization in addition to the information collected from the government, the following modifications occurred:

- In OrgA, the researcher interviewed four board members, including the president of the organization, and the manager. The reason was that the amount of information available in the interview of the second board member (BM2OB) was inadequate because she was away from the organization at a certain stage in the 1990s. Further, in OrgA, while the president supervises most of the tasks in the organization, the researcher was advised by the president to obtain some details from the manager.
- In OrgB, the researcher held two focus group instead of one as planned because the organization has a broad range of activities that were better covered by two different groups. This was also done for the participants’ convenience because the two groups of beneficiaries that participated attend far apart premises of the organization.
- In OrgC, the researcher interviewed the former director of the organization because he was the head of the organization from the time it was established to 1996. In addition, the recent dynamics of the relationship between the organization and the outside environment reflected these changes in management.
Table 4: Interviews with OrgA, OrgB, and OrgC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Abbreviations used in the cases reports</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization A (OrgA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of OrgA</td>
<td>POA</td>
<td>October 13 &amp; 14, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager of OrgA</td>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>October 30, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board member of OrgA (3)</td>
<td>BM1OA</td>
<td>October 15, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM2OA</td>
<td>October 15, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM3OA</td>
<td>November 6, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors of OrgA</td>
<td>D1OA</td>
<td>December 13, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D2OA</td>
<td>November 13, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussion (6 participants)</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 16, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization B (OrgB)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of OrgB</td>
<td>DOB</td>
<td>October 28 &amp; November 8, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board member of OrgB (2)</td>
<td>BM1OB</td>
<td>November 3, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM2OB</td>
<td>November 24, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor of OrgB (2)</td>
<td>DO1B</td>
<td>November 26, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DO2B</td>
<td>December 4, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussion (2 sessions each of 4 participants)</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December 14, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization (OrgC)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Director of OrgC</td>
<td>CDOC</td>
<td>November 6 &amp; 10, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board member of OrgC</td>
<td>BM1OC</td>
<td>November 11, 2008</td>
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<td>BM2OC</td>
<td>November 23, 2008</td>
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<td>Donors of OrgC (2)</td>
<td>D1OC</td>
<td>December 10, 2008</td>
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<td>D2OC</td>
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<td>Focus Group (1 session of six participants)</td>
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<td>Former Director of OrgC</td>
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<td>December 29, 2008</td>
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**Internal and External Validity**

The research used a qualitative method of multiple case study analysis. Three Palestinian NGOs were subjectively chosen to be studied. Usually researchers fear that a
lack of randomization may present a threat to external and internal validity. External validity examines the question of generalizability to population and setting. However, Yin (2003) observed that in case study research, generalization of results is applied to some theoretical propositions, not to populations or the universe. In this sense, “the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample,’ and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Yin, 2003, p. 10).

For internal controls, the researcher relied on multiple sources of evidence. The history of the NGO community in Palestine and the individual history of each organization were considered in order to understand contemporary events. Also, a variety of evidence was included: Other than the single view of the organization director, the researcher employed a pool of respondents—e.g., the NGO board of directors, the General Administration of NGOs, and representatives of the donors’ organizations—to make inferences.

**Data Analysis**

Data was analyzed by linking the data collected to the ten hypotheses. This is based on the pattern matching approach whereby several pieces of information may be related to the research propositions, as suggested by Yin (2003). The research specified a clear set of propositions that were believed to be true. The data was analyzed accordingly to determine whether the hypotheses were correct. If the information challenged a certain proposition, the analyses indicated why this particular proposition was not demonstrated.
Furthermore, the concluding chapter further indicates why a certain case had certain results, whereas the other cases have contrasting results.

In each case the analyses included:

1. A description of the data,
2. A description of the environmental constituents as perceived by the organization head and the board members,
3. Coding of the data from the individuals and groups interviewed within and outside the organization to distinguish and identify the ten dimensions of the institutional antecedents (environmental factors) with the institutional dimensions of each case being presented in a summary matrix,
4. Derived meanings from the verbatim words of the people interviewed, which were coded into patterns of behaviors identified in the research framework as the organizational “strategic responses,” and
5. Narrative explanation that link (3) and (4) and stipulate the presumed propositions.

Chapter 6 discusses the commonalities and differences of the cases examined.

**Study Limitations**

In the Palestinian context, the occupation is the main determinant in all aspects of life. People usually see all problems through this lens, and it requires effort to surmount this obstacle and concentrate on the specific line of inquiry that the researcher presents.

In this research context, the occupation is always in the middle of any discussion, such as organizational access to the donors’ fund, their relationship with the authority and Oslo
Accord structures, organizational access to its target groups, and the movement and safety of employees, among other factors.

Another limitation related to the occupation and the Palestinian internal conflict is the researcher’s lack of access to Gaza Strip. The research referred to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah as the “government” but the reader should not fail to notice that Hamas, and a wide sector of Palestinians, conceives of itself as the legitimate Palestinian Authority as it is the legitimate elected majority for the Palestinian parliament. Furthermore, Hamas is a governing authority in the Gaza Strip; there are ministries, laws and a deeply entrenched political process. While the researcher obtained the viewpoint of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank regarding relationships with NGOs, she could not reach the Hamas government in Gaza Strip to discuss this issue, especially in light of the fact that Hamas’ NGOs were harassed by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas was accused of harassing other NGOs in Gaza. To lessen this problem, the researcher carried out reconnaissance parties from outside the PA to obtain information in this context.

Another limitation of this research is language. The research was conducted in Arabic and reported in English. Although a quality translation is presumed to communicate the correct information, there are always meanings that are unique to certain social and political contexts that cannot be conveyed to other cultures through translation.
Chapter Four

The History of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations

This chapter tracks the history of Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). The history of associational life in Palestine goes back to Ottoman rule; however, this chapter concentrates on modern associations that have emerged since the Israeli Occupation in 1967 and is structured according to changes in the political context in which the NGOs operate. Interestingly, this political context is directly related to changes in the availability of resources.

After a short overview of associational life in Palestine before 1967, the chapter will discuss two distinct periods of Palestinian history as they relate to associational life. The first period is that between 1967 and 1993, before the Oslo Accords and when the nation was under direct Israeli military occupation. The first Intifada and the Gulf War were the main events that spurred political and socio-economic environmental changes and impacted the number of NGOs, their level of professionalization, and the availability of resources. The second period is after the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the advent of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994. The new political and legal context, influx of funds, the second Intifada, and the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah were the main environmental changes in this period. This chapter draws on interviews with civil society activists and professionals who witnessed this history, in addition to other research that focuses on this history.
The missions, projects, and level of professionalism of PNGOs have passed through different phases in response to changes in surrounding circumstances. According to Abdulhadi\(^3\) (interview, December 29, 2008), the life of PNGOs is a reflection of the national struggle at a certain stage in Palestinian history: Before 1948, the mandates of associations included resisting Jewish immigration to Palestine and preventing the sale of land. Between 1948 and 1967, charitable organizations concentrated on relief for the refugees. After 1967, the number of charitable organizations expanded in order to provide services to refugees without incorporating a development agenda since the conception that prevailed at that stage was “no development under occupation.” Some forms of voluntary development initiatives emerged and provided services to local communities. These started to appear after 1973 and intensified between 1978 and 1982 with the availability of Arab funds. After the eviction of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, various Palestinian grassroots organizations emerged as the Palestinians recognized the correlation between improving standards of living and the resilience of the people. The mission of associations became “development for steadfastness.” It is worth pointing out that the Arab Thought Forum, a research organization based in Jerusalem, was a pioneer in establishing and promoting this concept of development. With the first Intifada in 1987, the development activities of PNGOs aimed for “steadfastness, resistance, and state building” on the assumption that the Intifada would lead to the formation of an independent state. After 1993, hundreds of PNGOs were formed trying to shape the

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\(^3\) Izzat Abdulhadi, a civil society activist and the former director of Bisan Center for Research and Development was recently appointed as the Head of the General Delegation of Palestine to Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific.
nature of the new state through their attempts to influence the social, political, and economic policies and practices.

While the general public in Palestine believes that the proliferation of NGOs after the Oslo Accords was the result of the increased flow of funds to the Palestinians to serve the peace process, one should not neglect the global factor that increased the number of NGOs around the world over the past two decades. This includes the global communications revolution that reduced the cost of organizing; a global tendency towards privatization and identifying the inadequacies of governments; and the emergence of post-materialistic values and political theories on associations with a shift in emphasis from economic concerns to quality of life, social capital, human rights, and environmental protection. These factors, in addition to the interests of donors to facilitate the peace process in Palestine and the reduced political cost of organizing at the time of the Palestinian Authority (PA) vis-à-vis the time of the Israeli occupation (when organizing was criminalized), played together in the escalation of NGOs in the 1990s. After the development of the internal political conflict between Hamas and Fatah, the establishment of NGOs was used as a political tool as well as the search for opportunities to secure external funding, which prompted Hamas and Fateh to form illegitimate NGOs.

Currently there are around 3,000 NGOs active in the WB&GS, according to the MOI’s records in Ramallah. They can be divided roughly into five categories according to their field of activity. The first type includes charitable societies—the oldest and most traditional form of NGOs in Palestine. The second type includes popular, grassroots-based organizations such as women’s and workers unions which continue to represent the
politics of political parties. The third type includes development organizations that concentrate on providing services in areas such as health, housing, and agriculture. They vary in their size, degree of professionalization, organization (top-down or bottom-up), and their level of involvement in political and national affairs. The fourth type includes research, training and capacity building, and human rights organizations. This type emerged in the eighties but proliferated sharply after 1993. The fifth type includes organizations and unions that concentrate on certain sectors of society or a certain interest, such as the disabled, seniors, and environment protection groups.

The History of Palestinian NGOs before the Oslo Accords

Several scholars agree that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been functioning in Palestine since the period of Ottoman-Turkish rule and continued through the British mandate of the twentieth century until present time (Abdulhadi, interview, December 29, 2008; G. Giacaman, interview, January 14, 2009; Hammami, Hilal & Tamari, 2001; Muslih, 1993a, 1993b). Early CSOs basically took the form of pre-modern ethnic, tribal, or kinship-based associations. Scholars explain that associations were founded on the basis of family with a limited to narrow membership and representation, while others were founded on religious principles and have a wider membership, such as the Muslim Societies and the Orthodox Club in Jerusalem. There were also associations that had a broader popular affiliation base, such as sports clubs, women associations, charitable organizations, and the European-style labor unions. In addition to serving their particular cause, these organizations also worked to resist Jewish immigration to

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4 George Giacaman is a Political Science professor at Birzeit University and the General Director of Muwtain, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy.
Palestine and prevent the sale of land. After the catastrophe of 1948, the Palestinian national cause became paramount. The mandates of associations became focused on providing relief services to Palestinian refugees and to resist the elimination of the Palestinian national cause, especially with the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan and administration of Gaza under the Egyptian government.

Associational life has experienced dramatic changes since the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (WBGS&EJ) following the 1967 war. The war challenged Palestinian national identity and national existence through its exclusionist claims to Palestinian land and resources. The Israeli occupation introduced a web of administrative and legal arrangements in an attempt to annex the occupied territories to Israel and shape local civil society in a fashion that suited its interests (Masalha, 2000; Shehadeh, 1985; Sullivan, 1996). Consequently, the Palestinian resistance took the form of popular struggle as well as “collective efforts to deliver an array of relief and development services not provided by the Israeli government.” (Sullivan, 1996, p.93).

Izzat Abdulhadi (interview, January 4, 2009) and Muharam Barghouti (interview, October 11, 2008) have been civil society activists since the 1970s and both became directors of NGOs later. They explain that some forms of development began to appear spontaneously in the WBGS&EJ after the 1973 war in the form of “voluntary work committees.” Grassroots organizing was comprised of non-factional associations loosely organized by voluntary initiatives to serve society. Young women and men organized themselves into groups that were active in building schools, organizing public parks and
recreation activities, cleaning the streets, and helping farmers during the harvest season. These were spontaneous initiatives that were not the result of influence from political parties and did not have any overarching concept of development. Interestingly, Barghouti noted that professors at universities, doctors, and other professionals joined these groups, which in turn gave younger people motivation to boost their activities. As such, labor, student, and women’s movements challenged the traditional and elitist patterns of associations through the mobilization of the poor, especially in villages and refugee camps. Furthermore, a Community Work Program was introduced at Birzeit University in 1972 which required every undergraduate student to complete 120 hours of community service in order to fulfill their graduation requirements, thus making voluntary community work an integral part of each student’s life.

Political events in the 1970s and 1980s marked a turning point in Palestinian nationalism and accordingly in the history of Palestinian civil society. These events included the United Nations’ recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974 as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978, and the eviction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon in 1982. These events were significant because they led to an awareness of the need for greater Palestinian self-reliance and the need for a new strategy of resistance. The Camp David Treaty of 1978 included a proposed framework for Palestinian autonomy through a structure called “civil administration.” This structure was rejected by the PLO and the Arab world as insufficient and was viewed as an attempt to normalize the Israeli occupation through artificial Palestinian
autonomy. Accordingly, the Arab League agreed at the Baghdad Summit of 1978 to contribute aid to support the steadfastness and resilience of the Palestinians. The Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee (PJC) emerged to disperse the funding to Palestine only through both charitable and nonpoliticized organizations headed by elite allies to the Jordanian regime. According to Abdulhadi (interview, January 4, 2009), after the Camp David Treaty and the eviction of the PLO from Lebanon, armed resistance began to fade, Palestinians began to realize that they were under prolonged occupation, and the principle of resistance through development gained popularity. He further explained that a vital social movement grew with two mandates: to mobilize people and to provide alternative services to those offered by the Israeli Occupation.

Nakhleh (interview, January 2, 2009), a Palestinian intellectual and development expert who has worked with donors such as Welfare Association, the UNDP, and the European Commission, explained that the PJC dispersed more than US$417 million during the period of 1979–1986 to municipal and other formal institutions as well as those related to education, housing, and agriculture. However, as Nakhleh further stated, despite the declared objectives of “development for steadfastness,” this aid did not lead to the increased development of Palestinian society. This was primarily attributable to

5 Even after the Israeli occupation, Jordan continued to have strong administrative connections with West Bank organizations especially, but not exclusively, with religious organizations, educational organizations, and local councils.

6 Welfare Association (WA) is a non-profit foundation established in Geneva in 1983 by a group of Palestinian businessmen and intellectuals live in the Diaspora to support Palestinian society in sustainable development. It is better known in Palestine and the Arab region by its Arabic name, Ta'awoun, which means “cooperation.” WA works by strengthening Palestinian organizations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Galilee, Jaffa, Akka, Nazareth, and Naqab, as well as in refugee camps in Lebanon, and assisting them in improving their services to the community and promoting Palestinian culture, heritage, and identity (see http://welfare-association.org/en/).

7 Nakhleh (interview, January 1, 2009) added that, aside from the PJC aid, there were also four other sources of funding, though none of these sources matched the aid contributed by PJC.
deliberate attempts by occupying forces to stifle and curtail Palestinian development. Many small agricultural enterprises, such as raising sheep, running greenhouses, or producing dairy products, were forced to shut down. Their owners were arrested, facilities were vandalized and destroyed, false charges were leveled, and/or huge tax bills were presented. Furthermore, as Nakhleh explained, the exiled Palestinian leadership was obsessively focused on political matters and ignored development issues. The leadership has insisted on being the sole channel for external committed aid in order to increase their local influence by deciding how the aid is allocated and who it will benefit.  

Nakhleh (interview, January 2, 2009) also explained that there were non-Arab groups that funded associations in Palestine during this period and these mainly included UN agencies (namely the UNDP), several European States, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). He points out that the US aid started in the wake of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in order to serve the plans for Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) as described in the Camp David framework. USAID channeled the money through five American Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). In Nakhleh’s view, the objective of the American intervention during this period had nothing to do with the development of Palestinian society; instead it was meant to make Palestinian life under occupation more palatable so they would accept the Camp David Accords’ formula as a solution to the Palestinian issue on the assumption that

For instance, Nakhleh (2009) explained that the Welfare Associations board members were criticized by President Arafat when they support leftist organizations instead of Fatah. As Nakhleh pointed out, the Welfare aid was not distributed according to political favoritism. It is just that most grassroots organizations active in health and agriculture were leftists.
improvements in the quality of life would substitute for Palestinian nationalism and the aspiration for an independent state.

By the end of the 1980s, most of the voluntary movements became organizational extensions of political parties with the goal of increasing political mobilization on the parties’ behalf (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2009; Barghouti, interview, October 11, 2008). These factional service organizations were guided by the populist and nationalist philosophy of extending services to marginalized social groups to empower them and mobilize them politically (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2009; Barghouti, interview, October 11, 2008; Nakhleh, interview January 2, 2009; Hammami, 1995). The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were pioneers in organizing a host of unions, women’s associations, and relief committees (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2009; Nakhleh, interview, January 2, 2009). At this stage, the PCP created two of what became the most established development organizations in Palestine, both of which focus on the provision of services: the Union of Medical Relief Committees (UMRC) established in 1979 and the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) established in 1983. In addition, the Health Work Committee, established in 1985, and Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees, established in 1981, emerged as extensions of the PFLP.

All associations have been subject to Israeli governmental interference and harassment through monitoring activities, the arresting of activists, the control of access

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9 Muharam Barghouti is a civil society activist and the general director of the local NGO, International Palestinian Youth League.
to external funds, and the shutting down of organizations deemed active or effective (Barghouti, interview, October 11, 2008; Nakhleh, interview, January 2, 2009). However, the close association between civil society organizations and political factions has managed to continue clandestinely. Nakhleh (interview, January 2, 2009) explained that some organizations were registered under Jordanian law as charity organizations or under Israeli law under the names of Palestinian volunteers residing in Jerusalem. On the other hand, the affiliation of civil society organizations to Palestinian political parties undermined the authority of the pro-Jordanian elites among people inside Palestine. According to Abdulhadi (interview, January 4, 2009), unlike the charity organizations that existed before, these newer organizations had a broad constituency and their leaders came from marginalized classes, such as workers, villagers, and refugees—not from elites. In some cases brutal competition existed between the parties to gain control over associations. A well known case, as Barghouti (interview, October 11, 2008) explained, was the competition between Fatah and the leftist parties over the labor union (which had been leftist since the 1920s) in the West Bank. The competition resulted in a fractured union that split into two parallel labor organizations.

When the first Intifada broke out in 1987, the number of CSOs combining the delivery of services with grassroots political activity increased sharply. A series of new structures arose, such as “popular committees,” “neighborhood committees,” and “voluntary cooperatives” to ensure the society’s survival under the occupation’s harsh measures. The new grassroots structures reflected a broader effort to organize the masses as individuals cooperating voluntarily, spontaneously, and altruistically in locally-based
organizational forms (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2008; Barghouti, interview, October 11, 2008; Craissati, 1998; Jarrar,10 interview, November 6, 2008).

The new movement was distinguished from past associational efforts by the degree of inclusion of all sectors of Palestinian society in political, economic, and social resistance. At this stage, the participation of women in public life was more remarkable and distinguished than it ever had been. The new organizations were dedicated to dealing with dire needs, such as food distribution, garbage collection, and public education, in an attempt to compensate for the closed schools and universities under Israeli curfews. In addition, the voluntary cooperatives were active in manufacturing basic goods and encouraging the use of household products in an effort to increase Palestinian self-reliance and independence from the Israeli economy.

At that time the more recently known development “NGOs” emerged (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2009) as more professionalized, established service delivery organizations, and these included health and agricultural relief organizations, women’s organizations, human rights groups, and research organizations. Furthermore, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) made its presence known in leaflets first distributed in January 1988, right after the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising of 1987 (Hroub, 2000). Many analysts suggest that the social and health services that Hamas provided to Palestinians during crisis time have increased the organization’s popularity dramatically (G. Giacaman, interview, January 19, 2009; Hroub, 2000; Roy, 2000).

10 Allam Jarrar is an Executive Board Member, of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees and a Steering Committee Member of the Palestinian NGOs’ Network.
During the first Intifada, international support to the Palestinians escalated and more organizations were able to attract funding from European sources and began professionalizing their operations. NGOs showed growing autonomy from political parties during this period, but most continued to proclaim fealty to the PLO parties, the Communist party, or Islamic groups. Clearly, different PNGOs have followed different funding patterns throughout their history. Since the first Intifada of 1987, secular Palestinian organizations depended on foreign funding from both Arab and Western sources (Brouwer, 2000; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). It is worth noting that organizations associated with the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) were pioneers in accessing Western funds, especially because the party was not part of the PLO and did not enjoy the PLO funding. The funding for the PCP’ organizations came mostly, but not exclusively, from leftist European organizations (Jarrar, interview, November 6, 2008). Thus, the PCP was a pioneer in institutionalizing and organizing its service, while other Palestinian secular factions were emphasizing mobilization. Islamic parties, which used to raise funds from the Zakat (alms), began to draw on their external networks with aid being provided by the Palestinian Diaspora as well as from Arab and Muslim states, primarily those of the Persian Gulf (Farsoun & Aruri, 2006).

After the Gulf War of 1991, another pattern of funding PNGOs emerged as significant. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many Arab states lost their interest in and willingness to fund the PLO as they were put off by the Palestinian response to the invasion (Brown, 2003; Robinson, 1997). Furthermore, many Palestinians who lived in the Gulf and previously supported associational life in the West Bank and Gaza came to
need assistance with the overwhelming displacement following the war! (Brown, 2003). While Arab funding drastically plummeted and PLO funding steadily decreased, funding from Western donors continued through the 1990’s and thereafter became the main source of assistance to PNGOs. Increased access to foreign funding has contributed significantly to the capacity of NGOs to break away from their political parties. A new structuring of knowledge, practice, and elite formation among PNGOs thus became evident in terms of entry into new development channels and the framing of NGO-donor relations, as will be explained below.

**Palestinian NGOs after the Oslo Accords of 1993**

What happened in Palestine after the Oslo Accords is a rare case of state building. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is a “quasi-state,” the organization of which is not comparable to any other state in the region. Although the PA is not yet a state structure in the strict sense of the term, it has exercised many state functions through ministries, a body of legislation, and security forces. Meanwhile, it has no control on its border, no territorial continuity, and no control over natural resources. The terms of the Oslo’ agreements limit the power of the PA and give Israel final control over Palestinian legislation, the economy, and its relationship with the outside world. As a state, the PA is in a position to provide associations with a legal framework and licensing among other functions. In addition, it assumes many of the roles previously filled by civil society organizations and networks in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and social welfare and public support.
With the emancipation of the PA, the PNGO community faced two major concerns. First, the PA deliberately attempted to control civil society organizations and strip them of their previous functions, particularly their political roles and service delivery role. Second, since the majority of funds from international donors was directed to the PA, PNGOs have experienced a general abatement of funding. Jarrar (interview, November 6, 2008) explained that the substantial changes that occurred in the political and socioeconomic context in which PNGOs operated necessitated a revision of their strategies and redefinition of their role. Jarrar further noted that NGOs needed a healthy legal environment to regulate the relationship between the NGOs, the PA, the local community, the private sector, and the relationship among and between individual NGOs.

In the 1990s, the conflict between the NGO community and the PA became increasingly contentious. It should be kept in mind that a considerable number of NGO leaders came from parties opposed the flawed nature of the Oslo Accords and the emancipation of the PA. Furthermore, Palestinian society used to organize its own affairs without a state and in spite of the authority of the Israeli occupation. The PA expected NGOs to give up their previous role. But the NGOs were not ready to do so. Under these circumstances, the relationship between the NGOs and PA was tense and confrontational. The major confrontation formally started while the latter worked on drafting the “Law of Charitable Associations, Social Societies and Private Institutions” to regulate NGOs and charitable organizations. The proposed law was modeled on restrictive Egyptian and Jordanian laws, which granted the government a wide jurisdiction and control over NGOs (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2009; Barghouit, interview, October 11, 2008; Jarrar,
interview, November 6, 2008). At the same time, when the NGOs anticipated restrictions from the PA, a group of 42 professional NGOs created the “PNGO Network” to be an umbrella association organized to speak on behalf of civil society. The PNGO Network published a policy paper, *Position of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Occupied Territories in Light of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles*, which outlined the vision of the PNGOs with respect to the nature of their relationship with the new authority. The paper stipulated that:

> Any future relationship taking place between the Palestinian NGOs and the Palestinian Authority is determined by the nature of this Authority and its law and to what extent it respects and acknowledges the role of the Palestinian NGO’s. In addition to its concern of focusing on the national independence and building the Palestinian civil society, especially with all the experiences that were accumulated by these organizations over the years [sic] (PNGOs Network, 1993).

The members of the PNGOs Network were the most prominent group of NGOs in negotiating PA law and restrictions. The network made canvassing for NGO autonomy one of its main tasks by drawing on their influential history of civic associations against the Israeli occupation and their strong connections with left wing political parties. The PNGOs Network worked with donors and members of the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) until they managed in 2000 to pass a more progressive law that allowed organizations to form relatively freely, to privately access funding, and to protect the ability of organizations to set their own agendas and control their budgets without government interference (Abdulhadi, interview, January 4, 2008; Barghouti, interview, October 11, 2008; Jarrar, November 6, 2008)

After the “Law No. (1) for the Year 2000 AD On Charitable Associations and Civil Society Organizations” was enacted, the government decided to abolish the
Ministry of Non-Governmental Organizations and transferred the responsibility of licensing NGOs to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Meanwhile, the responsibility for monitoring day-to-day activities and ensuring that NGOs complied with both the provisions of law and their own individual by-laws was assigned to “competent ministries” associated with organizational missions. For example, the Ministry of Health was responsible for health-related NGOs. This arrangement also included international NGOs that operated in Palestine. Palestinian associations turned to the formal Palestinian authority to provide them with licensing, recognition, and other forms of legal protection.

To get a license, each organization had to submit an application to the MOI along with three copies of its by-laws. The legal department at the Ministry of Interior would then run a security check on the organization’s founders and consult the competent ministry depending on the organization’s mission. According to the law, the decision over the license should take two months. However, according to Al-Sha’r,\textsuperscript{11} (interview, December 31, 2008), due to the instability of the environment in which they operate, it may take longer.

Once an organization has been registered and licensed, it should be assigned to a competent ministry. However, in practice, as explained by Al-Sha’r (interview, December 31, 2008), if problems arise, the competent ministry may request the MOI to intervene to solve conflicts between board members, with employees of other ministries, or with donors since donors may try to impose inappropriate conditions on the NGOs, such as requiring that the NGO hire a certain employees or that the NGO contract with

\textsuperscript{11} Fadwa Al-Sha’r is the General Director of the General Administration of NGOs at the Palestinian Ministry of Interior.
the organization through an intermediary who would then receive part of the funds. In such cases, according to Al-Sha’r, the General Administration of NGOs at the MOI brings the parties in conflict together, provides legal advice and logical tips to solve the conflict, and tries to resolve the issue within the ministry. However, if these measures do not succeed, the MOI refers the competing parties to court. The law requires that NGOs not take grants that impose conditions in exchange for the funding. This includes the well-known USAID stipulation in the “Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing.” However, in Al-Sha’r’s view, Palestinian civil society organizations did not take a firm, courageous position with regard to this document. She explained that some of them are quite hypocritical about it—they condemn it in public, but acquiesce behind the closed doors.

Nevertheless, the coherence between the general articles of the law and the principles and rules contained in the regulatory mandate adopted by the MOI is still problematic and up for discussion, and this is largely due to the absence of a clear separation of powers. Jarrar (interview, November 6, 2008) explained that, in practice, the PA uses selective audits, and supervision over sources and spending channels followed. It should be emphasized that all NGOs and experts interviewed in this research complained about the scrutinization of NGOs by the Palestinian Preventive Security Forces (PSF) over details such as the political affiliations of all the employees in each organization.

The second major concern for the NGOs after the 1993 Oslo Accords was the fact that the creation of the PA entailed a major shift in international funding from NGOs to
the PA. At the time, the PA was the critical structure of the Oslo Accords process and essential for employment in the West Bank and Gaza (Lasensky & Grace, 2006). In October of 1993, representatives of 43 countries met in Washington D.C. to mobilize resources for reconstruction, rehabilitation of the neglected infrastructure, and investment needs in the West Bank and Gaza. A total of US$2.1 billion in aid was pledged at the meeting for the period of 1994 through 1998 (Brynen, Awartani, & Woodcraft, 2000). International pledges grew to more than US$4.2 billion by November of 1998 (Brynen et al., 2000). The European Union (EU) emerged as the largest donor, followed by the United States, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the World Bank, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands (Brynen et al., 2000).

Since 1993 Palestine has received perhaps one of the highest levels of aid per capita in the world and almost ten times the average for developing countries as a whole (Brouwer, 2000; Lasensky & Grace, 2006). Support for the PA coincides with a sharp reduction in financial support to PNGOs. The service-oriented organizations of civil society, in particular, were affected since after Oslo the donors viewed NGOs as becoming a component of the processes of good governance and not as service providers. In addition, foreign donors were sensitive to the arguments of PA officials that aid to those organizations and networks should be redirected to the authority. Many observers agree that funding to PNGOs was reduced by half during the 1990s. While PNGOs received between US$170-240 million yearly in the early 1990s (Brynen, 2000; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005), they received approximately US$60-90 million yearly in 1999 (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). With the increased arrival of development aid to the Palestinians grounded
in new paradigms, smaller NGOs were in a position either to close down or to compete for minimally available aid or for local government contracts (Brown, 2003; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). Meanwhile, the largest NGOs that were most effective in accessing Western donors’ funds were able to consolidate their position and increase their financial self-sufficiency. The competition over resources led to the public criticism of NGOs since the pattern of funding introduced the market logic into the sector which replaced the historical volunteer work value.

In the 1990s, the volatile relationship between PNGOs and the PA continued amid accusations of corruption and a lack of accountability. The exchanged accusations were widely publicized in newspapers and conferences in Palestine. NGOs first criticized the PA for corruption, specifically for the mismanagement of public affairs, patronage, nepotism, and a lack of financial transparency. Hence, international donors were alarmed by these accusations and therefore pressured for a series of administrative and financial reforms, particularly the implementation of financial management systems. In response, the PA accused the NGO community of corruption and excessive salaries. The PA branded them as “fat cats” running after funds and “shops” for international donors’ money that compromised the national struggle, mass mobilization, and sustainable development for either material interest(s) or factional objectives.

Thus, the image of PNGOs and their legitimacy within this environment was significantly transformed beginning in the 1990s forward. The critique of PNGOs emphasizes issues of downward accountability and claims that PNGOs have been gradually shifting from being grassroots organizations that serve the local community to
organizations that serve the political agenda of donors. To some analysts, the unquestioned compliance to donors’ choices is related to a trend towards elitism in Palestine and the profile of the NGO leaders and personnel. Related to this argument is the criticism of NGOs as just being “one man show” organizations, thus highlighting issues of democratic decision making within these organizations.

NGOs leaders are now described as the new elites (Hanafi, 2005; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005) who have subverted the former elites of the first Intifada and the old voluntary charitable societies. The new elites are active at the “global” and “local” levels and manipulate them according to the context (Hanafi, 2005; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). Analysts (Carapico, 2000; Hammami, 1995; Kutab, 2008) explain that NGO leaders are well educated technocrats that participate in international conferences, have ties with global actors, have graduated from English-speaking universities and prefer English-speaking employees, and turned to identify themselves as development professionals seeking to empower the population through development rather than through mobilization. In fact, while many NGOs leaders have been incarcerated in Israeli jails and come from leftist political parties opposed to the Oslo Accords, some have detached themselves and their organizations from grassroots movements and forcefully protected organizational autonomy from the party that established it. In addition, after 2000, some NGO leaders accepted high positions within the PA administration.

More importantly, this criticism of NGOs’ accountability questioned the role of NGOs in broader development paradigms in Palestine. Given the restructuring of aid channels after 1994, international donors began to place political conditions on their
money that were not consistent with the Palestinian national aspiration or sustainable
development. It is common knowledge that donor assistance is often attached to
predefined interests of donors and their priorities; however, the P NGO community did
not seek to effectively influence the agenda of donors, though they were in a position to
do so since donors are obliged to spend the funds allocated by their governments or other
sponsors in their countries. To avoid generalizations, P NGOs can be divided in this
regard into three categories based on their response to donor conditionality: a) NGOs that
only get their funding from international donors that support the Palestinian national
aspiration and development agenda; b) NGOs that seek funding regardless of its source,
the project conditions, or feasibility; and c) NGOs that consciously implement a donor
agenda that is not aligned with the Palestinian national aspiration.

With the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, most of the PA
institutions ceased functioning. Social service NGOs scrambled along with the PA to
meet the daily needs of the population. The radical transformation in the political
environment imposed new challenges over P NGOs. It goes without saying that even
during the heyday of the PA, when the international world was very generously funding
the Oslo project, the P NGO sector was still needed for the service and development
process of Palestinian society as the NGOs were highly experienced and capable
compared to the newly formed structures of the PA. The PA, especially in its first years,
did not have the institutional capacity to carry out service provisions. As Al-Sha’r
(interview, December 31, 2008) acknowledged, the Palestinian senior leaders, who had
lived outside of Palestine until the establishment of the PA, were inexperienced as
technocrats and lacked training in service delivery. Therefore, though the PA was not pleased with strong associational life and the fact that the NGOs had a strong influence and autonomy, it was only toward the peak of the second Intifada when the two parties realized they had no choice but to “work out things” together. In the first years of the second Intifada, as the confrontation with Israel escalated, the argument over competition between the NGOs and the PA became irrelevant. As most interviewees in this research explained, the PA ministries cooperated with various NGOs to provide services linked to the constituencies and other bodies of external credibility in areas\(^{12}\) that the authority could not reach. This positive shift in the relationship transpired because each side needed the other, but more significantly they grew dependent on different financial sources of support that prevented one side from being captured by the other.

In the first years after the emancipation of the PA, Hamas, the “Islamic Resistance Movement,” generally made a shift in emphasis from politics and resistance to social and

\(^{12}\) The West Bank (East-Jerusalem excluded) and the Gaza Strip were divided into three zones according to The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (also called Taba Agreement or Oslo II Agreement). Area A comprise the territories where the Palestinian Authority has civil jurisdiction and responsibility for internal security. Area A encompasses Gaza, Jericho, and six major towns of the West Bank (Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem). Hebron, however, has a special status and was subject to a separate agreement in 1997 by which Israel retained complete control over Area H-2—an enclave of 20% of the city area. Area B comprises other Arab populated areas of the West Bank (towns, villages, and refugee camps). The Palestinian Authority has civil jurisdiction in Area B, but internal security is under a shared Israeli-Palestinian arrangement. Area C comprises Israeli settlements, military locations, state lands, and roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It remains under Israeli civil and overall security control. However, there is a partial Palestinian civil jurisdiction on Palestinian civil matters not related to the territory. Israel has overall control over external security. Different resources provide different estimations to how much each Area is representative of the Palestinian Territories, especially with the fact that the Israeli redeployment was not accomplished as was expected in the agreements. However, according to the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, Areas A and B respectively represent 7.6% and 21.4% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They cover more than 90% of the local Palestinian population. Area C comprises 71% of the Palestinian territories. For more information on the Areas see http://www.jmcc.org/peace/agreements.html and http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=155.
In a study of Islamic organizations in Gaza, Roy (2000) described the Islamic NGOs as professional with an educated management and staff as well as providing high quality services active in marginalized localities that did not discriminate on the basis of social, religious, or political backgrounds and officially and legally registered with the appropriate Palestinian ministries. At this stage, Islamic institutions continued to play an important and visible role in areas of relief and charity work, health, education, library development, rehabilitation of physically and mentally disabled children and adults, and income generating projects for women. However, according to Hroub (2000), in the late 1990s, Hamas social activities were crippled after a confrontation with the PA, which imposed heavy legal regulations on Hamas organizations thereby monitoring their funding and eventually putting them under the surveillance of the security services.

In January of 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections over Fatah (the President’s party that has been politically dominant over Palestinian politics for more than 40 years) by a landslide. Right after Hamas’ victory, the donors’ community, especially the Madrid Quartet of 2002, refused to deal with Hamas and ceased most sorts of funding to the PA. Concurrently, the Israeli government took measures and halted transfers of Palestinian tax revenues owed to the PA. The halting of foreign funding to the PA dangerously exacerbated the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. Though the international donor community declared that it would continue to provide assistance to the Palestinian people directly through the
NGO community, the PNGO Network declared its condemnation of the donors’ position and refused to take on the previous role of the government, as explained in the following:

Palestinian NGOs affirm the principle of solidarity and cooperation with the various state sectors and the private sector in the framework of sustained, genuine development. Attempts to influence the civil sector to assume a governmental apparatus role is totally rejected. In this context, we emphasize our commitment to our well defined role and respect of the role of other sectors to provide services to the Palestinian society (Abdullah, 2006).

In June 2007, Hamas assumed complete control over the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority formed “the emergency government” in the West Bank, and the economic siege imposed on the PA was lifted. In December 2007, during the Paris Donors’ Conference, which followed the Annapolis Conference, the international community pledged over US$5.7 billion of financial assistance for 2008–2010 in support of the Palestinian Reform and Development Program (PRDP).13 According to the interviewees of this research, the plan gave the private sector the largest share for implementing the plan while the PNGO sector was completely excluded from the development of the plan and has been allocated only minimal responsibility in terms of the plan’s implementation. According to Nakleh (interview, January 2, 2009) and BM1OC, this exclusion implied the exclusion of social groups and the broader population of beneficiaries that the NGO sector serves.

Another new chapter of the life of PNGOs, specifically organizations influenced by an Islamic ideology, started when Hamas assumed complete control over the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The PA President declared a state of emergency in the West Bank and disbanded the Hamas-led unity government and installed a new government. An

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important field of the battle between the two governments, situated in Ramallah and
Gaza, is the NGO sector. The President issued a presidential decree on June, 15, 2007
that stipulated that all NGOs must reapply for registration at the Ministry of Interior
within one week and all those who violated the decree would be subject to legal action.
The first article in the decree granted the Minister of Interior “the authority to review the
registration of all associations and non-governmental organizations issued by the
Ministry of Interior or any other governmental body” (Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights [PCHR], 2007). The second article granted the Ministry of Interior the right to
"take the steps deemed suitable regarding associations and non-governmental
organizations including closure, correction of status, or any other measures” (PCHR,
2007). On August 27, 2007, the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority announced in
a press conference that the Minister of Interior dissolved 103 charitable associations and
civil society organizations for committing legal, administrative, or financial violations of
the relevant laws. The Prime Minister asked the beneficiaries of these organizations to
direct their complaints to the Ministry of Social Affairs in the emergency government
(see PCHR, 2007).

Of note, however, in the eve of the elections, 750 new NGOs were registered at the
MOI by individuals close to the PA. Elnamleh (interview, January 22, 2009), coordinator
of the PNGO Network, explained that the Network was at loss as to how these new actors
would fit into the maps of relationships in the NGO community because they did not bear
any vision or clear agenda. In the same manner, during the short period in which Hamas
was in power, 500 new organizations were registered in the names of individuals close to Hamas.

According to Al-Sha’r (interview, December 31, 2008), there were several legal abuses that caused the dissolution of the 103 organizations. She first pointed out that in 2006, when the Minister of Interior in Ramallah was affiliated with Hamas, approximately 500 organizations were registered officially in spite of the fact that the legal department in the Ministry declared that they were not satisfying registration requirements. The Finance Unit Officer (interview, December 31, 2008) at the General Administration of NGOs explained that he was not familiar with all the dissolved cases, but in the cases he was aware of, the dissolve was never based on political bias and rivalry. He supported his position by explaining that some organizations that closed were affiliated with Fatah. He further explained that at least in 10 cases of the 103 there were extreme financial discrepancies. According to the finance officer, while the MOI may overlook a difference of 10% between what is on the books and what is in the budget, and only warn the organization to reconcile the differences, only in a few cases did the MOI immediately close the organization if it was deemed financially corrupt. Organizations are usually given three months to correct registration and other similar legal matters.

Most organizational leaders and PNGO experts that were interviewed suggest that the Preventive Security Forces (PSF) abuse the law and harass NGOs. However, the Minister Assistance for the Security Affairs (interview, January 1, 2009) in the MOI maintained that the intervention of these forces is within their jurisdiction since the Palestinian Preventative Security Forces (PSF) is entrusted to protect the internal security
in specific areas to which the police forces are not entitled. He also maintained that the Ministry investigates any complaints of abuses by the PSF and take necessary action. But the Minister Assistance also reiterated that it takes time to change the mentality and state of mind of the “young” people in security services and this is what the Ministry works on through training and educating. However, the Officer of Legal Affairs Unit (interview, December 31, 2008) at the General Administration of NGOs in the MOI did not in any way apologize for the illegal measures taken against the PNGOs. She viewed the law as too lenient in allowing NGOs three months to fix their violations. In her view the relationship between the government and civil society is like parenting. She explained that, “PNGO’s were spoiled by the ministries of competent [...] To raise your child well, you have to be tough on him so he learns how to behave and be disciplined. Likewise, we need to teach these organizations how to behave” (the Officer of Legal Affairs at the General Administration of NGOs at MOI, interview, December 31, 2008).

Jabarin (interview, December 12, 2008), the general director of Al Haq,14 a well established Human Rights NGO based in Ramallah, explained that his organization examined the issue of terminating the 103 NGOs and found that these dissolutions were in many cases arbitrary and politically motivated. According to Jabarin, it is true that in some cases organizations existed only on paper, or had not been established according to procedures and practices of the law. However, Al-Haq found that there were organizations that had existed and operated legitimately but were closed by the PA anyway. Furthermore, Jabarin stated that in many cases the PA did not comply with the law when it made these dissolutions. For instance, the Law requires the MOI to notify

14 Al-Haq is the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists – Geneva.
organizations of their failure to comply with the Law and allow them a period of three months to rectify this before any decision to dissolve the organization is taken. As Jabarin explained, none of the 103 organizations were notified of their failure to comply with the Law and were therefore prevented from rectifying the situation. After several attempts to obtain copies of the decision to dissolve the organizations, Al-Haq found that some decisions failed to clearly indicate the violations or the relevant law provisions that were breached. Furthermore, some decisions of dissolutions were based on defaults in the organization’s by-laws, while according to the law, Jabarin explained, it is the responsibility of the MOI to examine and review the organizational by-laws during the application process to ensure their conformity with the law.

Of the 103 NGOs that were dissolved, only 23 asked Al-Haq to defend them in the Palestinian Supreme Court. In six cases, the Court ordered the reopening of the organizations. In several cases, the NGOs were ordered to correct certain administrative deficiencies before they would be permitted to reopen. Jabarin (interview, December 12, 2008) explained that Al-Haq’s success in court was eye opening for other NGOs in terms of their legal rights and obligations according to the law. But it has also taught the MOI to become more skillful and more subtle in conducting its illegal activities so that it would be less subject to scrutiny. The latest arbitrary measures of the MOI came quite flagrantly, but Jabarin explained that the Ministry historically took over the role of competent ministries and obliged organizations to obtain prior approval from the Ministry to open bank accounts, intervened in the designation of members to organizational boards, forced organizations to submit financial and administrative reports
directly to the Ministry, and took over other powers that were originally entrusted to the competent ministry.

Furthermore, Jabarin (interview, December 12, 2008) argued that the Occupation and PA are complicit in their assault on the NGOs. In one case, the occupation confiscated the financial and administrative records of an organization, and then the PA accused the organization of violating the law when it failed to submit its annual reports without these records. Al-Haq has very little recourse because Palestinian lawyers are barred from entering pleas in Israeli courts. In addition, most organizations avoid further legal action, like OrgX which was a research center in Ramallah. The director of OrgX (DOX) explained that the Israeli army confiscated its property and left a message on the door not to reopen it. The director explained that in this tense political situation and with the absence of justice, it would be the best to concede for the sake of himself and his family (DOX, interview, December 11, 2008).

The case of organization “XX” can exemplify how the PA and the Occupation complement each other in the war on NGOs. Organization XX runs a private school and income generating projects for women. It has been harassed by the Occupation and the PA in the past two years. The director of the organization explained (DOXX, interview, December 3, 2008):

In October 2007, the Occupation confiscated our records including employment contracts and financial documents. They barred us from traveling outside Palestine…we took our case to the Israeli Supreme Court, which cleared us of all the charges. We were able to establish that we did not take money from terrorist organizations. We were also able to obtain an order allowing us to travel, and the authorities had to return the documents and equipments they seized. Despite that ruling, so far we have not been able to get our files and equipment back…With the assistance of a human rights organization (Al-Haq), we asked the PA to allow
us to postpone submitting the 2007 budget as they require until we could solve this problem [...]

In June 2007, arsonists set fire to our offices, which were partly destroyed. We reported this to the police and the mayor...the authorities recorded that the fire was the responsibility of an “unknown perpetrator.” In March 2008, the Palestinian Preventive Security Forces paid us a visit... They appeared on a work day with jeeps and weapons. The students were there, so I asked them not to show their weapons. An officer told me that he had orders to close us down. I asked him to show me the order, but he refused and I never saw it. He claimed this was an order justified by President’s Emergency Law [...] I went there [to the PSF office] but with a lawyer from Al-Haq. Together, we again tried to explain our mission and that we were legitimately licensed. I even told them that they could visit us or investigate us. We had nothing to hide. In the end, they did not close us down, but they refused to issue a document to me stating that I had been cleared in a criminal background check, even though I needed this clearance as the head of the school.

Jabarin (interview, December 12, 2008) explained that, when the PA terminates or harasses organizations for political motives, it often makes indiscriminate charges without evidence, such as alleging that the organization is cooperating with “terrorists.” Then, the Occupation later uses these charges as facts against the organization and its employees. Al-Haq, as a human rights organization, pleaded with the PA to avoid such inflammatory and potentially dangerous language. In one case, Al-Haq had to obtain a resolution from the Palestinian Supreme Court clearing a particular organization because the Israelis had tried to use the PA’s random accusation against the organization in the Israeli courts.

As the PA did with the PNGOs in the West Bank, Hamas has done with organizations in Gaza. Jabarin (interview, December 12, 2008) noted that ever since the emergence of the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah, the Hamas government in Gaza Strip has begun to interfere with and harass NGOs there, seizing their property and closing
them. Some have been allowed to reopen later. As the PA did in Ramallah, some organizations were forced to accept individuals selected by the government in Gaza to be on organization governing boards. In Gaza, internal security is controlled by Hamas, and there are no laws protecting NGOs, so there is no recourse for them in the courts. Al-Haq wrote to the Prime Minister in Gaza objecting to the arbitrary closures, but there has been no response.

However, the PA continues to have the upper hand in deciding the future of NGOs in Gaza Strip. The officer responsible for the registration of Gaza Strip NGOs, at the General Administration of NGOs in the MOI in Ramallah, explained that 400 organizations in Gaza contacted the PA upon President Order that all NGOs contact the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah to reapply for registration (interview, December 31, 2008). In the officer’s view, this process was to facilitate the operations of NGOs in Gaza under the economic siege that Israel put on Gaza. However, this officer in Ramallah can actually outlaw any NGO by controlling its bank accreditation. Upon the registration of a certain NGO located in Gaza, the officer explained, he conducts a security check through the security apparatus or he can collect the information over the phone from his acquaintances in Gaza. Accordingly, he can decide over the licensing depending on whether the organization is affiliated with Hamas and/or whether the people in charge have a clean criminal record and professional history. Only if he is convinced of the organizational profile does he calls the banks in Gaza and allow the organization to open a bank account. In a few cases, the officer explained, it happened that banks in Gaza required accreditation from the Hamas Ministry of Interior as well but he contacted the
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) in Ramallah and they ordered the banks to accept the NGO’s accreditation. On the other hand, the officer confirmed that 35 NGOs were completely closed by Hamas in Gaza, most of them affiliated with Fatah. The other 400 that have registered with the MOI in Ramallah face investigations, confiscation of property, or have been forced to put three members from Hamas on their boards.

The development of this stage of the PNGOs life is not clear yet. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the major developments in the history of PNGOs since the 1960s. An assessment of PNGOs should be looked at in terms of historical transformation. The changing political context in which NGOs operate explains a lot about them as well as changing international funding patterns. This has a substantial impact on the identity of NGOs, their evolution, types, areas of operation, and the roles they play within Palestinian society.
Chapter Five

Case Studies of Three Palestinian NGOs

The case studies are organized into two sections: The first section is an introductory section containing a general overview of each organization’s history and the second section examines the focal organization’s relationship with the different institutionalized actors/factors in its environment in light of the ten hypotheses identified above.

First Case Study: Organization A (OrgA)

Organization A (OrgA) is a nonprofit and non-partisan organization established in 1965 in the West Bank by a group of women volunteers headed by the late president who passed away in 1999. OrgA aimed to empower Palestinian women and enhance their role in society which would impact their families positively and contribute to Palestinian society as a whole. Though the organization was established in 1965, the organization strengthened its approach in the aftermath of the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (WBGS&EJ) in 1967, at which time the organization’s mission expanded to help Palestinians hold onto their land. The organization supported Palestinians steadfastness by improving socio-economic conditions, and, in the absence of a national government, providing a form of social security, especially to families that lost their breadwinners.

Before the Israeli Occupation of 1967, the organization was registered under Jordanian law as a charity organization, but in 1990 it added development to its mandate. When it was first established, OrgA operated in two rooms and with one paid employee;
however, by 2008, at the time of this research, it ran 18 vocational centers and programs and had more than 100 paid employees. Over the years, OrgA has expanded its programs in response to environmental challenges at the political, economic, and social levels. The organization’s programs can be categorized into educational, cultural, and humanitarian aid programs. After the 1967 war, as board members explained, women were motivated to volunteer after the Israeli Occupation evacuated three Palestinian villages near Jerusalem. The organization provided the refugees with food, but the board members thought that their needs required additional support. Accordingly, the organization established a kindergarten and preschool for children of refugee families. Also, at this time, the concept of “sponsorship programs” began in which wealthy people were encouraged to assist children who suffered under the Israeli Occupation. As the economic and political situation deteriorated, OrgA expanded its assistance to families of the victims of the Occupation and unfortunate social circumstances. This program remained active until the time of this research. OrgA also established a “Home” that provided parenting and family life for young girls victimized by harsh social circumstances.

Since its origins, the protection of Palestinian heritage has been at the heart of organizational activities. The president of OrgA (POA) explained that, since the 1960s, the organization recognized that the Israeli Occupation was attempting to uproot Palestinian heritage. Accordingly, the organization saw its role as one that would defy this scheme. Thus, the Folklore Center was established in 1972 for the study, understanding, dissemination, and preservation of Palestinian culture. The organization was active in cultural, folklore, and arts; it obtained cultural and historical documents;
and it archived material such as newspapers, traditional songs, tales, and Palestinian traditional games. It held festivals highlighting Palestinian customs and established a museum dedicated to Palestinian heritage.

Though it started as a charity and relief organization, as BM3OA explained, the organization has continually sought to provide a means of financial stability and self-reliance for deprived families. BM3OA recalled the first years of the organization explaining that OrgA targeted mostly illiterate women whose job skills were underdeveloped but who had excellent domestic skills such as cooking and embroidery. The founders thought this would be a good place to start because women would not be discouraged by failure. The organization helped women sell food they produced. It assisted women who could do embroidery with marketing their handiwork. As the economic and political situation deteriorated, OrgA launched a number of production centers that provided training and employment for women while generating income for the organization. The organization accordingly established the Handicraft Center and the Clothing Center in 1970 and the Home Product Center in 1986, among others. These projects were still ongoing at the time of this research in 2008. In the 1990s, the organization also opened candy and frozen food production plants, but it was later forced to close them, as will be explained below.

As the level of women’s literacy in Palestine improved, OrgA introduced more sophisticated programs. The organization aimed to empower young women with more advanced working skills as well as responding to emerging needs in the labor market under the Occupation. For instance, the initiative to establish a nursing college came
about to meet an emergency that had arisen at the time of the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada. Another response to the needs of society was the organization’s Secretarial and Medical Administration Program. This began in 2005 at the request of a group of doctors after a well-publicized fatal error occurred that had been caused by an employee who lacked adequate professional training. Furthermore, during the second Palestinian Intifada of 2001, the organization responded to the increasing rate of children with injuries and disabilities because there were too few centers to provide services at reasonable prices. Hence, OrgA launched a center of physiotherapy and an educational/training program to meet the need for professionals in this field. The organization’s programs and centers are recognized by different competent ministries according to their specialization.

**Cause: Legitimacy and Economic Fitness**

- “Hypothesis 1: The lower the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160).

- “Hypothesis 2: The lower the degree of economic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160-1).

Organization leaders attributed the organization’s legitimacy and continued public support for over 40 years to its commitment to the Palestinian national cause, its efforts to make a better life for the general population, its commitment to social norms and traditions, and its transparency and freedom from corruption. When OrgA was
established, it was a very critical time in Palestinian history when the need to serve underprivileged families was especially paramount. There was great desperation among the refugees who had lost all of their possessions on account of the Occupation and settlement of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip in 1967 war. In their quest to achieve organizational goals, the founding volunteers, especially the late president, were subject to harassment by the Israeli Occupation in addition to detention and house arrest. OrgA’s demonstration of patriotism and continuous commitment engendered support from the local community.

By visiting the organizational premises and interacting with people there, one can recognize the discipline, commitment, and spirit of voluntarism of the employees of OrgA and one can hear the satisfaction and gratitude of the beneficiaries. In the beneficiaries’ focus group discussion, a beneficiary of the Handicraft Center explained that the organization gives her the designs and raw materials to produce knitted articles of clothing and embroidered pieces reflecting Palestinian Heritage. She explained that her family is basically dependent on her work. “There are no jobs for men. My husband is a Handyman. He hardly found work\textsuperscript{15}. He works a day off and a day on. My son finished high school but due to our financial circumstances he has not been able to attend the university. He also could not find a job.” Another beneficiary explained that, “My husband abandoned me with our four-month-old twins. I came to the organization and they offered me a sponsorship to feed my babies.” A third beneficiary said, “My two sons

\textsuperscript{15} According to World Bank reports in 2008, the unemployment rate is estimated at an average of about 40 percent in Gaza and 19 percent in the West Bank (source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCJune09Reportfinal.pdf).
have been in Israeli jails for years. I am now old and live in a house of tin. Unlike other organizations, the staff here assists women with a smile on their face.”

Besides being devoted to the Palestinian national cause and helping people with hardship, the legitimacy of OrgA was enhanced through its adherence to established social customs and traditions. The organization leaders anticipated that conformity with societal norms and traditions would enhance OrgA’s social and economic viability. BM1OA was one of the founders of OrgA and she recalled her own experience with social norms in the late 1960s when she followed her personal ambition to volunteer to aid underprivileged people. As a young woman at that time, her family found it difficult to accept their daughter’s long absence from home and her working late into the night. However, the late president convinced them of the importance of the organizational cause, which they opted to support. Without exception, the interviewees from inside and outside the organization attributed much of the organization’s credibility to the leadership style and unique communication skills of the late president. The organization’s leaders explained that the late president understood Palestinian culture and adopted policies that upheld societal norms throughout the four decades since its founding. For instance, BM3OA explained that the late president established a student curfew in the girls’ hostel that was similar to those imposed by most parents on their daughters in Palestinian society. Though the organization avoided acute confrontation with the local community, the late president used to deal with problems with equanimity—not defiance. The organization’s leaders recalled an incident when the local community became uneasy over a book published by the organization. The book was about the folklore and
traditional songs of a Palestinian village, and it contained poems about gender relations that raised the ire of the village elites. Instead of ignoring peoples’ reaction, the late president visited the village and talked with those elites directly to pacify their anger. In fact, reaching out to the elites, mostly men, of local communities is an approach adopted by the organization, although most of their services targeted women. In this way, the organization co-opted those elites and ensured that there was no opposition from these rural society groups headed by men.

For OrgA, fundraising is directly related to social legitimacy. In other words, in the view of OrgA’s leaders, the organization depends on public approval so that it can obtain funding. The generous donations and grants from the local, regional, and international community, BM3OA explained, are indicative of society’s trust and recognition of the high value of the organization’s goals and services. The organization has two strategic donors that have supported the organization for many years and represent the main source of funding for the organization. One donor is a leading Palestinian foundation and the other is a leading Arab monetary organization. In addition, OrgA receives funding from other local and international organizations that support the organization’s specific activities. Also there are the individuals who sponsor disadvantaged kids through the organization.

In order to maintain the cooperation of individual and organizational donors, OrgA needs to be accountable and transparent when it comes to donated funds. The organization’s transparency is demonstrated by its practice of disclosing to the public how and where the organization spends donations it receives, BM2OA explained. She
said that the organizational budget and its financial reports were open to the ministries involved in the organization’s work and also available for public review. The BMs reiterated with pride that the organization records and provides a receipt to any donor or buyer from the organization regardless of how small the amount.

**Constituents: multiplicity and dependence**

- “Hypothesis 3: The greater the degree of constituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).
- “Hypothesis 4: The lower the degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

The interviewees from OrgA agreed that the key stakeholders and institutional forms that affect the organization’s activities included the general public that benefited from the organization’s services, especially women and children; donors, including individuals and organizations that support its mission; and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The organization is also a member of three unions in Palestine. Those unions were established in the 1960s and 1970s, although their activities have declined over time. In addition to the stakeholders mentioned, the continued occupation has had a significant impact on the organization’s activities, as the organization leaders explained, causing an increase in the number of families in need of organizational services.

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16 According to the PNGOs network representative, the Palestinian National Authority has recently been trying to reactivate one of these unions to weaken the role of the PNGO network and to show that the network does not represent civil society organizations in Palestine.
Though the organization has a wide target group and has been in the field for four decades, it did not venture to engage in broad and complex networking activities. The organization’s leaders emphasized repeatedly that the independence of the organization implied its neutrality in a highly politicized and partisan environment. For instance, in line with its neutrality, BM3OA explained, the organization’s board members were not unified on their position towards Oslo. Some members were against the process, while others were supporters. Because of this, the organization decided not to take a public stand against the process. When the conflict took place between the Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) and the PA over the NGO law, the organization did not participate vigorously. In this same vein, BM2OA explained, on occasion there would be disputes between other actors in the environment but, in order to keep the doors of cooperation open, the organization does not take sides.

Since the organization is basically dependent on public support, it has sometimes had to bear costly measures and additional burdens and responsibilities in order to maintain balance between the expectations of the conservative social norms and its efforts to empower Palestinian women living under the Occupation. For instance, students who attended the organization's faculty and programs had to endure long hours on the road because they had to go through checkpoints\(^{17}\) to return home. Consequently, parents wanted to forbid their daughters from attending the organization's programs. In

\(^{17}\) Israel increasingly restricted the Palestinians’ freedom of movement by implementing closure policies. These included checkpoints, earth mounds, trenches, gates, roadblocks, bypass roads, the Wall, and a complex system of permits. According to a report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in May 2008, there were 607 closure obstacles inside the West Bank in addition to dozens of random or “flying” checkpoints. For more details on this report and closure policy see http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/UpdateMay2008.pdf.
order to overcome this predicament and to pacify the parents, the president explained, the organization established a hostel where students from villages and other cities could stay for nominal fees. The organization held a major meeting with the parents to persuade them about the viability of the idea and to assure them that their daughters would be safe under the organization’s supervision. In addition to public opinion, the organization relied particularly on certain strategic donors, and, as will be explained in Hypotheses 5 and 6, this dependence and consistency in goals increased the likelihood that OrgA would comply with the expectations of its stakeholders.

**Content: consistency and constrain**

- “Hypothesis 5: The lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or requirements with organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

- “Hypothesis 6: The greater the degree of discretionary constraints imposed on the organization by institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

As said above, OrgA complied with the wishes of its strategic donor (D1OA) more than to other stakeholders. D1OA has supported OrgA by assisting them with the expansion and maintenance of their premises and providing furniture, equipment, and monetary support for programs. This heavy reliance has forced the organization to make some crucial decisions. For instance, from the 1960s until the early 1990s, the organization was solely managed by the late president and the board members. Then D1OA required the organization to introduce new administrative and financial
procedures. In 1993, D1OA agreed to fund a capacity building program to improve the managerial and financial systems of OrgA. The representative of D1OA explained that there was a clear agreement that his organization would review, revise, and analyze OrgA’s procedures and come up with recommendations for modifications. The assessment showed that OrgA needed to hire a manager and chief accountant. Such a requirement constituted a bitter hard pill for the organization to swallow as the situation would have caused a conflict between the authorities of the suggested manager and the authorities of the late president. The changes also required hiring a new employee to supervise the OrgA accountants and the organization would have to bear the cost of the new salaries. Although OrgA was not convinced that the changes were necessary, D1OA convinced the board members that this was a pressing need that would enable them to raise the professional level of the organization. As the dependence between recipient organizations and the donors is usually bi-directional, D1OA was also willing to endure some of the responsibility to alleviate the burden of OrgA. D1OA offered to pay the salaries of these positions and, in response to the willingness of OrgA, to implement the critical changes. D1OA explained that, “Organization A had confidence in us especially because we are a Palestinian organization. As well as that we are strategic partners, sharing similar goals and mission.”

While OrgA was willing to conform to the requirements of its strategic donor, it dealt differently with funding that may have jeopardized its identity. The organization’s leaders have acknowledged the financial constrains and uncertainty they faced repeatedly; nevertheless, no matter how large the potential donation, the organization
declined any funds that might contradict with its goals, social legitimacy among the Palestinian public, or the organization’s political independence. The organization’s leaders stated firmly that OrgA complies with the expectation of the donors in terms of accuracy, transparency, and commitment but did not accept political and/or other conditions that were not in accordance with its objectives. D1OA commended this stand and pointed out a well-known case in the 1990s, when the late president of OrgA refused a USAID offer amounting to US$1 million. As both the president of OrgA and D1OA recalled, the late president responded firmly and publicly to the USAID representative that she declined this offer because the United States was biased against Palestinian rights. In addition, the organization did not follow the trend among PNGOs of delivering workshops dedicated to the concepts of democracy and gender equality despite the influx of donors’ money for this type of program. The president explained that the organization works instead on women's financial independence as a strategic approach toward equality. She added that, “We believe that women’s empowerment through education and vocational training is the first step in gender equality.”

The relationship with D2OA presents a lower level of consensus than that with D1OA, despite the apparent agreement on goals. D2OA is a very reputable international agency that has long-term goals and strategies to alleviate poverty around the world. The agency uses standardized performance measurements that are adopted and applied widely in developing countries. The representative of D2OA explained that his organization chose to provide a grant to OrgA basically because it targets families that live under extreme poverty as the donor project entails. Though the interviewees of OrgA expressed
their satisfaction with their relationship with D2OA, the representative of D2OA described the relationship as very rocky to the extent that he is not considering future cooperation with OrgA.

He explained that the “graduation goal” stated by the project is to place women in jobs or to help them start their own microenterprise with the support of the organization. “Graduation” is achieved if a woman contributes to lifting her family out of extreme poverty to higher standards of living. However, OrgA instead measured performance on the number of women who received training and not on the quality and extent to which training contributed to the improvement of their life in the long-term. Further, according to D2OA, the organization did not show innovation in its intervention with targeted families. It only concentrated on traditional activities, like beauty parlors and sewing, even though the women could have been much more creative if they had been given the chance. Also, according to D2OA, the job market would not absorb this number of trainees in traditional fields in six months, as the project stipulates, especially given the fact that Palestinian clothing products cannot compete with the cheaper Turkish and Chinese imports already flooding the Palestinian market. D2OA encouraged the organization to learn from other organizations and cooperate with them in creating jobs for women who benefit from the project, but, in spite of their promises to do so, OrgA did not make any changes. D2OA further complained about the fact that the receipts for liquidation reports were hand-written and outdated, they used WinWord instead of Excel, and they submitted reports in Arabic. D2OA insisted on having reports in Excel and in English because this is how they are submitted to the higher levels of management. The
donor ascribed the difficulties with OrgA to the difference in their mindset of development and how to measure the outcomes and outputs of certain projects. He explained that, “Relief and development intervention do not go together. Humanitarian aid distorts the development concept.” Furthermore, the D2OA representative believed that OrgA seemed indifferent to whether it would be approved for a grant extension. He recalled that when his organization reduced the term of the grant from 24 to 15 months, the organization did not negotiate. In his view, OrgA “has donors who can fund them without being so critical about the technical issues and standard project outcomes.”

Control: Coercion and Diffusion

- “Hypothesis 7: The lower the degree of legal coercion behind institutional norms and requirements, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 167-8).

- “Hypothesis 8: The lower the degree of voluntary diffusion of institutional norms, values, or practices, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168).

The main source of legal coercion for OrgA is the PA. The President described keeping a good relationship with the PA as “quite crucial to the organization” as the organization needs the government endorsement for its identity and legal existence. While the organization is registered at the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and at the Ministry of Social Affairs as the competent ministry, the organization is obliged to fulfill the technical and professional requirements for accreditation of its different programs at the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Palestinian
Council of Nurses. The organization maintains convenient communication with these ministries and invites them as honored guests to attend graduation ceremonies for students and trainees. The organization’s manager described situations in which OrgA negotiates with the ministries over technical issues until they reach an acceptable agreement. In addition, the manager of OrgA explained that because the lines of authority and the laws are not so clear in the PA structures, OrgA faced the overlapping of authorities between the different ministries. In these cases, it was necessary to deal with such issues with patience and to clarify the gaps when unreasonable situations arose.

However, OrgA was resistant to pressure exerted by the MOI to introduce changes that was perceived by OrgA to be inconsistent with its mandate and autonomy. Specifically, this was when the MOI interfered with OrgA’s sponsorship program. In 2007, in accordance with the Prime Minister’s order that all PNGOs correct their legal status, the MOI representative paid a visit to OrgA. OrgA’s president explained that after the ministry finalized auditing the organization's records and operations, the MOI representatives questioned several issues, such as the fact that two employees received their salaries in cash instead of as a direct bank deposit. They also noted the fact that the head of the board did not receive a salary. OrgA explained that these two employees were physically challenged and could not stand in lines at banks. The head of the board is a volunteer, like all other board members, they explained to the MOI representatives. More importantly, after the audit, the MOI made it clear that OrgA had to terminate its sponsorships program because the Ministry of Social Affairs was the only party that had that responsibility. The president of OrgA questioned this request and added, “If we were
accomplishing our role in helping disadvantaged people even under the Israeli Occupation, why are we unable to implement it under the Palestinian Authority?” The organization tried to defy the ministry request and sent letters to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and several Parliament members who then commended the organization as actually serving the PA by carrying out some of its duties, especially those dealing with people of poor economic status and political circumstances. The President explained that it is not yet clear how this issue will settle.

What is clear is that the activities of advocacy and lobbying exerted by the organization on senior officials did not bear fruit under the recent complex political situation in Palestine. While the MOI representatives that were interviewed praised the distinguished role played by OrgA, they pointed out that there are several administrative and financial faults that should be corrected. The representative of the ministry who is responsible about this matter explained that at the beginning the financial manager at OrgA showed a disregard for the ministry’s requests for correctness. This OrgA manager responded to the financial officer at the MOI that, “You decide what you want, but I will do what I want.” Accordingly, said the representative, the MOI put the organization’s financial accreditation on hold until OrgA promised to introduce the procedures the ministry recommended. The representative of the ministry explained that the ministry was ready for any legal action OrgA would take, but then OrgA chose not to escalate the issue. The two parties engaged in a negotiation process until the MOI convinced them to adopt all the changes required. For example, the MOI asked OrgA to stop dispersing cash for orphaned children and to use checks instead. They responded that cash is easier for
the beneficiaries and ensures better communication with them because people must come to get their sponsorships in person. The MOI representatives reminded OrgA that the beneficiaries would continue to come to receive checks as well. He also advised OrgA that its staff would be responsible in the event of theft or ambush. Because none of the staff wanted to accept such responsibility, OrgA agreed to change its procedures. 

Regarding the overall continuity of the sponsorship program, Sha’r (2008, January 1, 2009), the director of the General Administration of NGOs at the MOI explained that the issue of the sponsorship program would be postponed for the time being because unlike the new, flawed organizations that had begun to proliferate at that time, OrgA had been working in this area for decades. At present the ministry would only observe the sponsored names to avoid duplication among charity organizations, as Al-Sha’r (interview, December 31, 2008). Ultimately, according to Sha’r, all charities and sponsorship funds were to be channeled to the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs.

**Context: Uncertainty and Interconnectedness**

- “Hypothesis 9: The lower the level of uncertainty in the organization's environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).
- “Hypothesis 10: The lower the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).
The environment surrounding OrgA is described by interviewed organizational leaders as uncertain and unpredictable. The manager further described the surroundings as a dark tunnel of constant political, social, and economic crises, primarily due to the ever-present and relentless Israeli Occupation and impinging of economic globalization. However, the organization’s manager emphasized the persistence of OrgA as a factor in its survival for more than four decades. He said that, “There should be a strategy for survival in spite of the environmental challenges.”

According to the leaders of OrgA, Palestinian society is entrapped by its political situation. BM3OA recalled how the Occupation was trying to disrupt the organization’s activities for years prior to the Oslo Accords. The organization opened production and income generating centers of embroidery in four villages, but the Occupation closed three of them. In the fourth village, which is located on the border of the West Bank and Israel, the occupying administration opened a similar project that paid women workers more in order to compete with and cripple OrgA’s project.

Worse yet, the Israeli Occupation closed the organizational offices for two years in the 1980s. BM3OA explained that the organization resisted the Occupation’s appalling measures and continued to serve its target groups. BM3OA recalled this history and explained that Israeli soldiers came to the building with a military order to close down the organization. The late president responded firmly that OrgA would not comply with the brutal order. The soldiers confiscated artwork and precious pieces of antiquities from its museum. After the soldiers left, the organization enlisted its neighbors to help remove sewing machines and food storage equipment that had been donated for poor families. On
the following day, the soldiers sealed the organization’s doors. OrgA held a press conference, attended by international ambassadors and allies, and the Occupation’s brutality was publicized widely. However, it took two years until the organization managed to obtain a court order to reopen. In the meantime, OrgA’s leaders did not give up; the sewing equipment was taken to needy villages and women continued production until the organization’s premises were reopened. In other cases, as mentioned earlier, the Occupation arrested and placed under house arrest the late president. BM3OA added with irony that, “The soldiers once invaded a students’ party and ‘arrested’ the cake because it was decorated with red and green” (the colors of the Palestinian flag).

The organization’s leaders explained that the Occupation continued to hinder the organization’s activities after the Oslo Accords and the arrival of the PA. On the one hand, the Occupation’s measures increased the number of families living in poverty and accordingly in need of the organization’s services. On the other hand, the organization’s leaders explained, the Occupation’s closure policies impeded the organization's operations to a large extent. For instance, it was forced to terminate the candy and frozen food plants because it was not able to reach other cities in the West Bank to market its products. In addition, due to Chinese and the Turkish products filling the market since the mid 1990s18, financial uncertainty was exacerbated with the reality imposed by the

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18 In April 1994, Israel and the PLO signed the Protocol on Economic Relations (Known as the Paris Protocol). The protocol transferred to the Palestinian Authority the jurisdiction over its own economic policy in sectors such as banking, direct taxation, and insurance. Israel has kept the right to regulate indirect taxes, imports and exports, standards and measurements, and the introduction of a Palestinian national currency. The protocol can be found on http://www.jmcc.org/research/series/annex5.htm. As Israel has full control over ports and boarders, and is a member of the WTO, the protocol inherently requires the Palestinian Authority to abide by WTO rules and obligations without the possibility of following up, negotiating or expressing its interests in the organizational rules and forums. A major negative result of the Protocol and the asymmetry between the authority of the Israelis and Palestinians is the competition
Occupation. It seems that the strategy of the institution to achieve financial security is to maintain its strategic partners and to continue feasible productive projects within the surrounding circumstances.

**Second Case Study: Organization B (OrgB)**

Organization B (OrgB) is a non-profit health organization founded by a group of Palestinian health professionals in 1979 as an outgrowth of a grassroots movement. At that time, the founders explained, providing social services on a volunteer basis was considered a form of resisting the Israeli military Occupation. The idea of establishing a voluntary health movement originated with a group of recently graduated Palestinian doctors from socialist and communist countries who recognized the need in Palestine for independent health services to bolster a decayed and inadequate health infrastructure. In those days, public hospitals in the occupied territories were controlled by the Israeli military Occupation. The private sector concentrated entirely on large urban areas, and independent charitable hospitals were located in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, many rural and isolated communities completely lacked health services of any kind. Under these conditions, these volunteers came together to address the needs of the underprivileged, and particularly rural, Palestinians. The founders of OrgB believed that there was a link between people’s health and their ability to remain on their land or “steadfastness of their resolve.” Over the years, this health movement set up a network of primary healthcare

created by Chinese and Turkish imports, whose cheap prices are particularly attractive to consumers given the dire economic circumstances faced by Palestinians. In addition, checkpoints, permits, searches, and various impediments on the mobility of labor and goods prevented the Palestinian exporters from having full access to the Israeli market and to foreign markets. Hundreds of small businesses in the Palestinian territories have closed as a result.
centers, mobile clinics, and community outreach programs. OrgB gradually built up a network of 27 clinics and 15 centers in Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The centers are comprised of community, youth, and specialized health units mainly targeted to underprivileged citizens who were facing chronic social, economic, and political challenges.

The history of OrgB can be divided into four stages of maturation, DOB, BM1OB and BM2OB explained. The first stage covered the period from 1978 to 1983, the second from 1983 to 1994, the third from 1994 to 2000, and the fourth from 2000 until the time this research took place in 2008. The first stage primarily involved the founding of OrgB and its place in the growing voluntary social movement in Palestine at the time. The founders were driven by a combination of the fundamental spirit of volunteerism that runs through the tradition of communist thought as well as a profound understanding of the genuine needs of Palestinian society. A leftist Palestinian political party recognized this movement and encouraged the formation of the organization with a social rather than a political goal. According to DOB, although the founders were affiliated with a particular political party, doctors from other political affiliations volunteered equally for this voluntary health initiative. Accordingly, as the organization’s leaders emphasized during interviews for this research, OrgB maintained independence in its structure, policies, and finance; it was free from the “factionalism” that characterized other aspects of the Palestinian milieu.

Until 1983, the initiative was purely voluntary. Health professionals, working in public and charitable hospitals, organized mobile clinics during their free time. Hospitals
and pharmaceutical companies donated medications, and the doctors traveled in their own vehicles. During this establishment stage, the activists built a strong relationship of trust and familiarity with local communities, arrived at a better understanding of their needs, and, most importantly, recognized the inadequacy of mobile clinics and the need for permanent clinics that could provide basic health care. This stage of OrgB’s history reflects the relationship, for individuals and for society as a whole, between health needs and social, political, and economic well-being.

Between 1983 and 1994, an independent Palestinian health infrastructure was developing, DOB explained. In 1983, OrgB received its first official funding and began the process of “institutionalization”—building the necessary administrative arrangements to provide primary healthcare. But it was not until 1987 that the organization rented its first office, which was located in Jerusalem. On the eve of the first Intifada, all over the Occupied Territories, including Gaza, there were medical committees with hundreds of volunteers. OrgB played a prominent role during the difficult period after the first Intifada erupted in 1987. Health services became an integral aspect of the public’s ability to resist the Occupation, which enhanced OrgB’s credibility in Palestinian society. Toward the end of this stage, the organizations ran permanent and mobile clinics for all localities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Since 1994, the organization was compelled to respond to the obstacles and advantages that accompanied the emancipation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). On the other hand, the organization also had to deal with the fact that occupation of the Palestinian territories continued. The main question that arose in this new context was
whether the organization should simply surrender its health responsibilities to the new authorities. In many cases the decision was to do just that. Seventy percent of non-governmental primary health care clinics active at that time closed. However, OrgB recognized that it should continue with additional roles. At this stage the mission of the organization that emerged was two-fold: to build a strong health system and to reinforce democratic aspects of Palestinian society. BM1OB explained that the organization introduced new concepts and principles of health such as community health, community-based rehabilitation programs, gender and health policies, and mass health education. In addition, the organization became recognized as a strong advocate of basic principles of development, such as community work, civil society building, democratic principles, and political and socio-economic rights.

BM2OB went on to say that the organization recognized that the Oslo Accords were not leading to an independent Palestinian state. Palestinians had civic control over a mere 18% of their land in isolated, non-territorially contiguous “Bantustans” and had no control over boarders, security, or water. Hence the organization prepared itself well for uncertainties and health emergencies. Beginning in 1996, the organization was able to train and deploy 22,000 first aid volunteers. Accordingly, during the second Intifada, its high level of preparedness was well-recognized and appreciated by the community. The organization came to take a leading role in coordinating relief efforts with governmental bodies, United Nations (UN) agencies and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Other developments at this stage included the complete isolation by the Israelis of the Gaza strip, the international donors’ boycott of the government there, and internal
conflict among Palestinians. These developments held tremendous implications for the social lives of people, including their physical and mental health. Since 2006, the organization was not able to operate effectively in Gaza, because of the siege by the Israeli Occupation. In 2007, the organization’s offices in Gaza were attacked and damaged by an Israeli helicopter gunship. However, the organization was able to continue to function by decentralizing its management.

It is of great significance that the head of OrgB, who was one of the founders, resigned from the political party which had established OrgB and founded a new political party with other people from inside and outside the first political party. While the interviewees from within the organization contended that the organization remained independent from any political party, those interviewed who were from outside the organization said it had always been commonly assumed and continued to be assumed that the organization was elitist and dedicated much effort to furthering the goals of the political party.

**Cause: Legitimacy and Economic Fitness**

- “Hypothesis 1: The lower the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160).

- “Hypothesis 2: The lower the degree of economic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160-1).
The legitimacy of OrgB stems from its origins as a vehicle for resistance to the Occupation, as well as its role as a provider on a voluntary basis of basic health services to the needy, which comprised most of the people living under the Israeli Occupation. Like most NGOs that sprang up spontaneously in the 1970s and 1980s in Palestine to address the life challenges under the Occupation, OrgB was a spontaneous response of a group of healthcare professionals to the lack of health services under the Occupation. The board members that were interviewed explained that the organization’s founders were not outsiders; they came from within Palestinian society and were aware of people’s problems and concerns. They volunteered in order to address those concerns. In addition, the organization upheld the spirit of voluntary work—a concept that is fundamental to Palestinian society. Its culture supports the values of cooperation, solidarity, and compassion. Also, as the board members explained, the organization enjoys inspiring leadership, democratic approaches, and sensitivity to gender perspectives that give women employees equal opportunities with the result that 70% of its employees at the time of this research were women. Several experts and beneficiaries that were interviewed emphasized that the organization works with high efficiency and enthusiasm compared to other organizations that work in the same field.

In addition to OrgB’s responsiveness to urgent medical needs in its environment, it enhanced its social legitimacy by developing an unprecedented medical model for sustainable development. After the emancipation of the PA, the organization introduced several programs to advocate health policies for the most disadvantaged sectors, such as a women’s health program, child health program, school health program, and community-
based rehabilitation program, among others. These programs were models that have been replicated by the Ministry of Health and other health providers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, the organization created media outlets to expose Israeli violations of health rights and address the medical and humanitarian crisis facing Palestinians.

The participants of the focus group, which was comprised of beneficiaries of OrgB, emphasized that they could observe the influence of OrgB “on the ground.” They saw the organization out there assisting disadvantaged people, alleviating poverty, increasing health awareness, preventing disease, empowering women, addressing the mental health of children affected by the Occupation, and advocating for the rights of and appropriate care for the disabled. All the focus group participants said that they had benefited from the organization in one way or another. They cited services such as receiving medical equipment, medicine, and hygienic supplies. They explained that the organization served them at no or minimum cost. One focus group participant recalled his first encounter with OrgB during the first Intifada when medical crews were challenging the Occupation and came to his village through the mountains carrying their medical equipment on their backs to treat people or bring them critical medicine. This participant was inspired to become a volunteer for the organization, coordinating “medical days” with the local community and obtaining places where the health professionals could provide treatment. Another participant in the focus group explained that the organization secured her disabled son an inclined bed and some of the more scarce medications, unavailable at public pharmacies. In the second focus group held at an OrgB youth center, OrgB participants explained that the center provided leadership programs, art
activities, language classes, and training in communication skills, time management, computers, and first aid. One young man said, “I acquired first aid training, and now I go to Bilein, a village on the outskirts of Ramallah, that endures hardships because of the Apartheid Wall. I aid the protestors injured during the clashes. We also help senior citizens cross checkpoints during holy days so that they can attend prayers.” Another young man explained that the organization gave him opportunities to improve his singing skills. He went on to perform at several events.

In addition to its prominent position in Palestine, OrgB’s visible and active participation in the widespread Palestinian resistance to the Occupation contributed to its ability to access financial support from international donors. According to BM1OB, before 1994, OrgB accepted grants channeled through local and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) from governments in Europe, including those of the Swedish, Belgian, and French. This aid was an indication of the “solidarity” INGOs felt with the Palestinians’ cause, and it supported people’s rights for freedom and independence. This aid empowered the Palestinians’ aspiration for any future solution—the donors opinions aligned with the organization’s when it came to the concept of the “two-state solution.” BM1OB explained that these grants were dedicated to core programs. The organization had full discretion over how to spend the money to serve its

19 Since 2002, the Israeli government has been constructing a separation wall throughout the West Bank. According to OCHA reports in January 2006, 525 km (74.6%) of the total length of the wall had been constructed inside the West Bank territory. The wall consists of 8-metre high concrete walls, ditches, trenches, wire fences, patrol roads, and barbed wire. This left thousands of families deprived, landless, jobless, and without access to necessary social services such as health and education. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) opined in July 2004 that the wall is illegal under international humanitarian and human rights law and should be dismantled. For more information on the implication of the wall on the lives of Palestinians and on the ICJ decision see: http://www.ochaopt.org/?module=displaysection&section_id=130&format=html and http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=6.
developmental mission. In the 1990s, the funding environment changed; donors adopted specific managerial and financial requirements such as strategic planning, auditing according to international financial standards, and monthly and annual reports with specific formats. BM1OB explained that OrgB has considered such requirements legitimate and complied with them. Growth in the size and program diversity of OrgB also increased its need for institutionalization and bureaucracy. The purely grassroots character of the organization was no longer effective. Accordingly, OrgB’s leaders restructured the organization to meet the responsibilities and challenges of competition. They modified the authority structure, elected board members, and introduced lower levels of decentralization. However, while OrgB complied with requirements related to institutionalization and financial accountability, it refused to accept any political conditions imposed by its international donors. More details on the relationship between OrgB and its donors are included in the discussion of Hypotheses 5 and 6.

**Constituents: Multiplicity and Dependence**

- “Hypothesis 3: The greater the degree of constituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

- “Hypothesis 4: The lower the degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

According to BM1OB and DOB, the primary stakeholders of OrgB have been the PA, INGOs (including the donors), local populace, grassroots organizations, schools,
local councils, local NGOs and charity organizations, small CBO organizations, and political parties. In addition, said DOB, the Occupation itself is institutionalized and it had a negative impact on the social, economic, and natural environments of Palestine. In spite of the multi-constituent environment, with incompatible and competing demands, OrgB was able to achieve remarkable growth and attain a leading position in society. In this complex environment of stakeholders, the organization followed two main strategies: First, it created and became involved in vast advocacy and lobbying networks; and, secondly, it diversified financial sources to avoid dependence on one sponsor.

Networking for advocacy and lobbying activity has been a strategic choice of OrgB that enabled it to maintain its freedom to maneuver, to control its own destiny, to influence and recruit others, and further its ability to alter the environment through its organizational objectives. OrgB has developed and been involved in a wide range of networking activities at the local, regional, and international levels. For instance, at the local level, as was noted previously by an interviewee who was one of the founders of the PNGO Network as well as OrgB through advocacy and lobbying activities, OrgB acted as a buffer to protect the independence of civil society.

The organization’s leadership position in this network enabled it to more effectively emphasize principles like good governance, institutionalization, and gender equality, BM1OB explained. Additionally, OrgB was member of several national committees that formulated and advocated political and socioeconomic policies, protocols, and guidelines. For instance, OrgB was central in formulating and advocating laws and policies including the Law of Charitable Associations and Civil Society
Organizations, Disability Law, the national policy of the Rational Use of Drugs, and health insurance policies. At the regional level, the organization was a member of the steering committee of the Arab NGO Network for development, in addition to several other committees and networks that specialized in health. The organization was active in numerous global advocacy efforts that emphasized equity, particularly in the face of the new global order that deprives the disadvantaged of their basic rights. These included active memberships in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) Regional Group of the NGO Working Group on the World Bank, the People’s Health Assembly (PHA), and the International People’s Health Council.

DOB noted that, in addition to providing aid, INGOs play an important role as channels of information in Palestine. These INGOs monitor events in Palestine as well as demonstrate that developmental agencies like USAID and CIDA reflect their governments’ political policies by how they choose to distribute funds. Furthermore, the organization led a network of media activities that exposed the Occupation’s violation of human rights, specifically on issues related to the violation of health rights at the checkpoints and as a result of the Apartheid Wall. BM1OB explained that competition or disputes over leadership, visibility, tasks, or financial benefits often arise as part of networking activity. In such cases the organization may make concessions in order to achieve cooperation. In addition, BM1OB said, networking is a priority to OrgB, even though it consumes time, effort, and resources because it broadens the organization’s circle of influence over policies, maintains its leadership position, and enhances its legitimacy as an active participant in public affairs.
The second strategy of OrgB used to protect its independence and ability to control its own destiny was to take steps to achieve financial self-sufficiency. As will be explained in Hypotheses 5 and 6, OrgB considered diversity an important element of fund raising. While OrgB valued its consortium of donors as strategic partners crucial to helping it fund core programs, it maintained a large pool of donors and continually sought out new partners to help protect it from political and financial uncertainties in Palestine. DOB stressed this: “We consider diversity and avoid ‘keeping our eggs in one basket’ as a technique for self-sustainability.”

**Content: Consistency and Constraint**

- “Hypothesis 5: The lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or requirements with organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).
- “Hypothesis 6: The greater the degree of discretionary constraints imposed on the organization by institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

As mentioned in Hypotheses 1 and 2, OrgB has attracted funding from donors that support the Palestinian quest for liberation. After 1994, the bulk of funding for Palestinian organizations came from Western governments with a specific political agenda. However, BM1OB explained that OrgB would not accept any conditions that put constraints on its discretion, specifically political considerations unrelated to the essence of its projects. BM1OB and BM2OB explained that unlike European donors, the USAID requires that the recipient organizations agree to sign an agreement stipulating that grants
will not serve “terrorist” organizations identified under the terms of the U.S. Patriot Act, which specifically names several Palestinian parties. BM1OB stated that, “We never accepted such conditions.” He explained that, in addition to the fact that the Palestinian NGO law states clearly that foreign assistance may only be accepted if it is “unconditional,” there is a view held nearly unanimously in Palestine that this money is a bribe aimed at boycotting a large sector of the Palestinian population. Furthermore, BM1OB explained, this grant is loaded with prejudice as it divides Palestinians into “terrorists” and “non-terrorists,” especially given the fact that its conditions do not refer to a few specific people but to masses who are affiliated with different Palestinian political groups. BM1OB added, “If we are as willing to provide first aid to an injured Israeli soldier who has occupied our land, then how can we not offer the same assistance to our own population?”

Nevertheless, OrgB does appear to accept USAID and similar grants provided there is a buffer between itself and the government agency. BM2OB said that OrgB accepts grants from USAID when it is channeled through subcontractors, as in this case because recipient organizations are not required to sign contracts restricting them on the basis of the Patriot Act. Apart from the political conditions, as the organization leaders explained, OrgB also declines grants if they are inconsistent with its priorities, which include degree of poverty, geographic location, affordability, and accessibility. These priorities are to concentrate resources on the most disadvantaged people, or areas affected most by the Apartheid Wall and the Israeli checkpoints. BM2OB clarified that during implementation, when conflicts with donors arise, they tend to concern the report format,
details in them, or whether the report concentrates on activities more than development. In such cases the donor requests modifications and the staff makes them. If they do not do this in time, the donor may delay the next payment.

OrgB funding can be divided into several categories. One includes program-based grants, in which a donors’ consortium of several INGOs commits to a signed agreement to provide grants supporting its developmental mission overall. These donors have supported the organization for more than 20 years. They share the founders’ vision, objectives, and principles. Two other categories are project-based grants and emergency program grants. OrgB continually watches out for funding opportunities beyond that of the donors’ consortium to fund this category. In these cases, OrgB followed the usual process of submitting proposals with intervention strategies, detailed activities, time frame, budget, and expected results. Another fundraising technique for the emergency and project-based grants has been self-financing. OrgB has an endowment and operates a printing business to generate income. DOB explained that the organization appreciated its major donors and strives to meet the provisions of their grant agreements. At the same time, OrgB has the aptitude to influence its long-term partners. For example, DOB explained, ten years ago, one of the organization’s major donors shifted its strategic priorities from health to education and consequently decided to phase out its donation to OrgB. However, ultimately OrgB persuaded the donor to stay until OrgB could find alternative funding and, in the long run, OrgB actually persuaded the donor organization to remain. The relationship continued at the time of these interviews.
Donor representatives that were interviewed represented two types of donor organizations with different institutional expectations and organizational responses. One interviewee represented an international organization of OrgB donors’ consortium (D1OB), while the second interview subject represented a local subcontractor organization that provides OrgB with a project-based grant (D2OB). D1OB explained that when her organization included primary healthcare in its programs nine years ago, interest in a strategic relationship with OrgB was mutual. The donor organization selected OrgB as a strategic partner because it was a grassroots organization, well-integrated into the local communities, and with high credibility. D1OB pointed out that, “The footprints of OrgB were quite apparent throughout Palestinian society.” The donor organization and OrgB shared a viewpoint about health issues that considered health not merely physical but holistic and related to the social, political, and economic environment. The two organizations sought to eliminate injustice and its implications. Accordingly, their relationship was been based on trust, solidarity, cooperation, and collaboration. D1OB and OrgB decided together on what was best for the localities relying upon their shared holistic approach to health. D1OB put it this way: “Who are we to tell the Palestinians what they need?” The flexibility of this donor, according to D1OB, was demonstrated in the “Job Creation Project.” During the past few years, people in local communities asked for help on issues like the rehabilitation of a clinic or building a kindergarten. Consequently, OrgB started to work on small community projects, providing rehabilitation of clinics or other community infrastructures and at the same time creating jobs. Donor 1 agreed to support the job creation project because of its views on
flexibility. D1OB noted that in response to criticism from other donors and partners who wondered why OrgB supported such a project, she would say, “This project lies within our shared mission and vision, the holistic approach to health care, in which the well-being of people at several levels is considered. It is a creative and constructive initiative.” Both partners, OrgB and D1OB, were willing to compromise in order to maintain their productive relationship. D1OB noted that she had recently made a concession when the staff at OrgB convinced her to skip what she first thought of as an essential step in a project they were planning together and to proceed directly to stage two. Even when it comes to reported delays, D1OB defended and excused OrgB attributing the delays to the volume of work and the press of deadlines.

Unlike D1OB, D2OB expressed much frustration and dissatisfaction about the relationship with OrgB. This appeared to be due to conflicting views about how to achieve project objectives. D2OB was managing a grant aimed at providing broad support in Palestinian areas affected by the Apartheid Wall, including health. OrgB was the only health organization that applied for this grant. This was because it was confident of its qualifications and because its proactive nature when it came to monitoring funding opportunities gave it an advantage over other organizations, D2OB explained. The donor approved OrgB’s plan to implement the project because, according to D2OB, it demonstrated transparency financially. It had clear development strategy, a wide array of outreach activities, was active in areas that the project would target. It shared with the donor the goal of capacity building. Furthermore, OrgB was committed to the cause of nationalism. It had been established under the Israeli Occupation and had much
experience with the provision of healthcare services. The project required OrgB to provide a wide range of technical assistance to the health care CBOs in vulnerable areas in order to increase their competence. This assistance was to include training, consultation, equipment, and furniture in addition to salaries for doctors and management staff.

Contrary to D2OB expectations, the relationship between his organization and OrgB became rocky. OrgB submitted its reports late, and they did not satisfy the level of detail required by the donor agreement. D2OB accepted that delays sometimes occur because of heavy workloads, or lack of skills and technical know-how, but she believed that in this case well-established social relationships among the staff slowed work progress. D2OB also complained about OrgB’s implementation of the program, explaining that OrgB requested equipment for two CBOs, even though it turned out that one already had this equipment but did not know how to use it to generate revenue. That CBO also already had a promise from another donor for this equipment. D2OB contended that OrgB had not adequately familiarized itself with the needs of these CBOs. It did not base its activities on an appropriate feasibility study and milestones for financial sustainability. According to D2OB, the technical relationship between OrgB and the recipient organization ends when the project ends. The difficulty in implementation could be due to different perceptions about sustainable development or was because OrgB was spread too thin. D1OB also criticized OrgB for spending too much time and money on promoting itself in the media. He complained that, “The political aspect of the organization is more prominent than the professional health service. This could be a
source of satisfaction for them, but not for me as a donor supporting a health project.” D1OB mentioned that, in spite of his dissatisfaction, he had no choice but to be flexible. While his organization would not terminate the grant, outright, it would attempt to be stricter in future contracts.

Control: Coercion and Diffusion

- “Hypothesis 7: The lower the degree of legal coercion behind institutional norms and requirements, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 167-8).
- “Hypothesis 8: The lower the degree of voluntary diffusion of institutional norms, values, or practices, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168).

Several interviewed experts have argued that the PA is not a sovereign “state.” Accordingly, it does not enjoy the democratic tools of coercion. The authority tends, instead, to use totalitarian approaches to control civil society activities. Since it began, the PA has attempted to dominate civic culture and political discourse. Accordingly, Palestinian civil society has been in a position to integrate, defy, or reject the policies of the PA. OrgB played a key role in confronting the PA attempts to control the political culture and civil society. It has also challenged the Authority’s development philosophy and plans because these plans do not represent or target disadvantaged people with their exclusion of social justice principles, as BM1OB explained. The PA’s strength originates with its political power and the instruments of the “state,” while the strength of OrgB originates with its long experience and the trust it has cultivated among the people.
BM1OB noted that people had already experienced the commitment of OrgB, its competence and professionalism, and had depended on it to meet major needs, such as health care. BM1OB said firmly that, “If the authority tries to touch or threaten our existence or autonomy, people will simply defend the organization.”

BM1OB and BM2OB explained that OrgB’s relationship with the PA has passed through three major phases: After the advent of the PA in 1994, it was mainly characterized by uncertainty about the role NGOs should play in the emerging political context and the creation of governmental organs. The PA assumed the PNGOs would surrender their activities and power to the new government. At that time, OrgB had 60 of the 250 clinics in the NGOs sector. Even though OrgB deemed it the authority’s role to provide health services, the organization decided to continue by providing health services and to integrate an advocacy and lobbying role for itself to affect its political and socioeconomic goals. BM2OB explained that the organization anticipated a conflict between the PNGOs and the PA because people were aware of the hegemonic style of the PLO and were alerted to the contagiousness of the totalitarianism of neighboring regimes where governments control civil society. Accordingly, the move to protect the independence of civil society began shortly before the arrival of the PA. At this stage OrgB was influential and played a leading role in establishing the PNGO network. It coordinated and collaborated with the PNGOs in the network in the passage of the NGO law.

The second post-PA phase was defined by mutual acceptance between the Authority and civil society organizations. After the adoption of the law, the relationship
between civil society organizations and the PA became less strained because of the clear terms they had agreed upon. More importantly, as BM1OB explained, the PA recognized the tremendous responsibility of providing services and its own lack of experience. It had no choice but to cooperate rather than to challenge organizations such as OrgB. OrgB also tried to cooperate with the Authority to avoid duplication of services provided. The second Intifada reinforced the spirit of positive cooperation between OrgB and the institutions of the PA, particularly those dedicated to health and relief. As BM1OB explained, the Intifada united Palestine against the Occupation; it was no time for such an internal conflict. The crucial role OrgB played became particularly evident, especially with regard to emergency and relief work. The flexibility and high level of performance of OrgB proved invaluable. It assured the provision of essential services to the Palestinian population living under the strict conditions of siege, closures, and curfews imposed by the Israeli Occupation forces. Since then, OrgB has made contracts for joint ventures with the Ministry of Health in many localities. They manage clinics and provide health services depending on each party’s capacity.

Although OrgB was not a subject of the mutual aggression over civil society organizations engaged in the West Bank and Gaza, it made its position patently clear through its media outlets and lobbying activities within the PNGO network that it was against the harassing and closing of NGOs. BM1OB noted that OrgB’s mission is to advocate human rights and the rule of law. OrgB continued to call for an end to infighting. It called on the two rival parties to unify their efforts toward ending the Occupation.
Clearly, OrgB does not derive its legitimacy from the government, and it does not rely on government financial resources. According to the managing director of the General Administration of NGOs department at the MOI, OrgB disregarded the scrutiny of the MOI. While the representatives confirmed that OrgB is indeed deeply rooted in Palestine, it lacks transparency and its leaders act as if they are accountable to no one and above the law. The representative was critical of the fact that the organization was involved in activities that went beyond its official mandate to provide health services. She also suspected that even though OrgB criticized the USAID “Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing” under the Patriot Act and urged the other NGOs to resist it, OrgB still took these USAID funds itself. In addition, the representative contended that OrgB did not live up to its own claims that it was an advocate for good governance, accountability, and transparency, which it so vociferously criticized the PA about on television and in other media outlets. OrgB, she pointed out, had not changed its board structure appreciably since its founding. Furthermore, the representative explained that the organization ignored ministry requests to turn over financial and managerial reports for review. This interview subject argued that OrgB was a “one-man-show” type of organization. The head of the organization dominated all decisions. This was a considerable problem, she explained. It made the organization too dependent on one leader and increased the likelihood that it would be unable to function after his departure.

Context: Uncertainty and Interconnectedness
• “Hypothesis 9: The lower the level of uncertainty in the organization's environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).
• “Hypothesis 10: The lower the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).

BM1OB described the environment in Palestine as constantly oppressive. At all levels, there is deprivation, instability, uncertainty, and expatriation. On the other hand, he has observed the incomparable resilience of people and their desire for change. Since the second Intifada, “…there are thousands of martyrs and 50,000 people wounded. One-third of Palestinians under the age of 40 have been jailed at least once since 1967. There are 630 checkpoints and half a million people are separated from social and economic resources because of the wall. The GDP per capita is USD $1,000. Sixty percent live on less than USD $2 daily income.” He noted that the Palestinian economy has been controlled by the Occupation for more than 40 years. In fact, he explained, the Oslo Accords did not improve the Palestinian economy because Israel continued to control the borders and retained the upper hand in all the agreements related to investment so that investors lost interest and did not invest. The Occupation has also had a major impact on Palestinian social life. DOB explained that this is exemplified by the checkpoints, blockades, and the Apartheid Wall, all of which separate people and create ghettos that make it impossible for individuals to communicate with friends and relatives. As a matter of fact, the organization’s leaders explained that its ambulances have come under fire and
been turned back at checkpoints, its medical staff has been detained or arrested, and an Israeli helicopter gunship attacked the organization’s office in Gaza in 2007. DOB provided a glimpse specifically into life in the Gaza Strip and he explained that Israeli policy of isolating Gaza from the West Bank started in the 1990s. The isolation was accomplished completely after Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. Gaza's population of 1.5 million effectively live in a big prison, cut off from essentials like food, fuel, and medicine.

OrgB has been able to institutionalize a culture that encourages the development of strategies to cope with Israeli aggression that is borne out by the nature of its services. The organization remains flexible, which permits it to continually adapt as new contingencies arise. For instance, the organization introduced mobile clinics for immediate relief care and treatment. The founders were aware that mobile clinics would not lead to sustainable health development, but they recognized an urgent need. In the mid-1980s, OrgB shifted its focus from relief to primary healthcare in order to address systematic problems affecting people health. Since the first Intifada erupted, the organization delivered hundreds of first aid training courses in all localities. Planning in Palestine is based on assumptions, not realities. While, the organization has had contingency plans in Gaza and the West Bank, the realities in Gaza changed. In 2008, the organization advanced its decentralized approach. OrgB activities in Gaza continued in accordance with the organization’s overall strategies, but additional activities were added in Gaza to address the health crisis there. In addition, OrgB’s response to this increasing repression in Gaza includes mobilizing its international partners to carry on their
operations. Actually, since 2006 when Hamas won the legislative elections, OrgB denounced the policy of economic sanctions, cut off aid to Gaza, and warned that it would result in a struggle for power, BM1OB explained.

**Third Case Study: Organization C (OrgC)**

The history of OrgC has three stages, each corresponding with external events and changes in its management and the strategies it adopted in response to these developments. The first stage ran from the founding of the organization in 1987 until the Oslo Accords, the second stage began at this point and continued until the first director resigned in 2006, and the third stage comprises the time period extending from the resignation until the present. According to BM1OC, each stage has its own characteristics, dialectics, and dynamics. The organization was originally founded as a think tank upon the confluence of the aspirations of a group of intellectuals with the aspirations of a Palestinian leftist political party. This party had already established other organizations that were active in health, culture, and the arts. Both the former director of OrgC and a board member (BM1OC) interviewed for this research were among the founders. OrgC was established as alternative voice for development, to conduct research, and to formulate policies that reflected the ideology of the party. Initially, the organization focused on empowering women, improving the Palestinian domestic economy, and boycotting Israeli products. To increase its outreach and impact, the organization built good relationships with women’s committees, student organizations, and local municipal councils. At that stage, OrgC coached community-based
organizations and provided ideas and plans based on its policy research. Thus, the idea of alternative development spread quickly and OrgC became a model for others.

In the view of the management represented in this research by CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC, the influence of the organization as a leading civil society organization declined during its second stage when its leadership chose projects to suit its donors rather than adhering to OrgC’s original mission and the vision upon which it was established. In 1995, the former director (FDOC) and the board members disagreed about the organization’s priorities and its choice of projects. Most of the nine board members resigned in protest. Recalling those events, FDOC explained that, at that time, new realities resulting from the Oslo Accords required new policies and strategies. Under his supervision, according to FDOC, OrgC supported approximately 50 CBOs and conducted policy research and advocacy activities that made it a role model in Palestine and throughout region. In 2006, during the third stage of the organization’s history, and after FDOC resigned, the founders asked the board members who had resigned to return. Two transitional directors managed OrgC between 2006 and the time of this research, when CDOC was the director.

Although CDOC, BM1OC, BM2OC, and FDOC all agree that the organization was established as an alternative voice for development, CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC disagree with FDOC about whether OrgC was established as a professional organization which prepared and participated in state building or as a grassroots organization that worked for development and resistance to the Occupation. BM1OC, articulating a view she shared with CDOC and BM2OC, explained:
When OrgC began, a notable grassroots movement calling for social change existed, and we hoped that OrgC would provide a distinctive voice for that groundswell. OrgC sought to provide an alternative agenda for development to counter the attempts to impose neoliberal models of development on the Palestinians. In addition, while the existing development NGOs devoted themselves to health care and education services, OrgC proposed to undertake high-quality policy studies and academic research that would benefit disadvantaged people, especially women, workers, and farmers. Then, they would apply the research through policies to empower and engage them...Because the founders held left-wing political views, the organization’s perspective differed from that of the traditional Palestinian mainstream on the subject of women.

In contrast, FDOC said this:

OrgC was one of a new generation of organizations founded in the wake of the first Intifada and the political changes in Palestine, when the emphasis of NGOs changed from sustaining the community during the revolution to preparing for state building. Before 1988, development in Palestine was aimed at resistance and liberation, as well as to provide health and education services. That period following the first Intifada and the PLO's Palestinian National Council’s declaration of independence was a time of optimism, when the focus shifted to state building. Unlike their precursors, many organizations established at that time, including OrgC, were not doing grassroots organizing. Instead, they were professional, developmental agencies seeking to build Palestinian society. This was reflected in their mandates and their modes of operation—having a board of trustees and paid staff, as well as qualified, experienced managers... OrgC had a developmental mandate rather than a political one.

The current management, unlike the former director’s, does not see development and politics as two separate approaches and is considering more involvement in research on issues like the impact of the apartheid wall on people life. CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC viewed the Oslo process as a neoliberal project imposed on the Palestinians. They explained that the neoliberals promised political solutions and enhanced human and sustainable development, but these promises were not genuine. They contended that the peace initiatives were used as a tool of further subjugation and deprivation of rights and resources. Several donors served this “appalling” project, the three said, by creating
technocrats accountable to donors instead of to the population. CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC said that the funding from those donors transformed OrgC from an organization with a voluntary spirit and commitment to the public good into a dependent one. CDOC added that, “OrgC got sucked into this new culture and drifted on this new tide.” According to CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC, OrgC began to deviate from its original mission once FDOC normalized the neoliberal concepts. The organization became donor-driven and started working on programs that served narrow sectors of the society.

FDOC refuted the contention that OrgC had deviated from its mission. He contended that the conflict that developed was because of a struggle for power and the ambition of certain board members. He explained that in 1995, the organization and two partners launched a US$2 million program focused on microcredit, the first of its kind in Palestine. Organizational activities had transformed from focusing on revolution to community building. FDOC chose a qualified and experienced manager to oversee the microcredit project, but BM1OC opposed the project. She argued that it was a service-delivery program that was favored by the donors and that it deviated from the mandate of the organization. This position surprised FDOC, he recalled, because BM1OC had been a member of the steering committee that had written the proposal. Nevertheless, the opposition to the microcredit project gained support from other board members at a time when FDOC was abroad. When he became aware of this situation, FDOC decided to resign in protest over what he considered the inappropriate manner with which this conflict was handled. However, matters became more complicated when most board members resigned collectively instead. The organization bylaws had no provision for the
resignation of the several boards members at one time, FDOC explained. The founders and party members asked FDOC to rescind his resignation and to implement the project as planned. They also appointed new board members.

FDOC argued that the Oslo Accords brought new realities that the organization could not ignore. He believed that it was not enough for an organization to state its goals; it should identify its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, and then work within this understanding. Accordingly, in the strategic plan after the Oslo Accords, under FDOC, the organization decided that under the new environment it would conduct programs that would help fulfill its original mandate which was to strengthen local communities. To accomplish this, OrgC identified five strategies: institutional and human resource development; community awareness and mobilization; research and advocacy on public policy issues; coordination and networking; and service provision. FDOC explained that OrgC added the advocacy component to its activities in order to influence the policies of the PA, and it conducted research programs that would result in policy recommendations. The organization sought to increase awareness and to advocate secularism along with principles of civil rights, democracy, and gender equity. The organization also planned to attempt influence other civil society organizations through networking and cooperation. As will be explained in the following paragraphs, OrgC worked intensively to improve the capacity of CBOs and delivered quality services to their constituencies.

FDOC explained that since the early 1990s OrgC had empowered CBOs through genuine, tangible capacity-building programs. These included institutional development
(strategic planning, financial policies, good governance, etc.), human resources development (training programs), and organizational development (development of regulations and procedures). It also supported the construction of playgrounds, libraries, and other types of infrastructure and service facilities. In the view of FDOC, OrgC did not intend to alter or abolish the grassroots nature of the organization; instead the goal was to help CBOs become sustainable. Furthermore, he explained, OrgC considered these CBOs partners, not passive recipients of funding. For example, OrgC supported CBOs through a US$1 million World Bank grant. Unlike other PNGOs, however, OrgC did not only simply disperse the grant. It also coached the CBOs receiving its funds and worked with them to assess their needs and then implement and evaluate programs.

Participants in focus groups comprised of CBO leaders whose organizations partnered with OrgC explained that OrgC reached out to CBOs in rural areas and refugee camps to offer support and cooperation, but, at other times, it was the CBOs that initiated communication and requested support. All focus group participants expressed general satisfaction with OrgC activities under FDOC because OrgC did not determine funding based on political affiliation. It assessed their needs and allowed them to participate in decision making. It met the critical needs of youth and women in marginalized localities. It communicated and responded to concerns effectively during the implementation phase of programs, and it reached out to less fortunate CBOs such as those based in refugee camps. Though some CBOs leaders were not aware of the goals of OrgC, they were able to infer what they were by observing the organization in action, through its projects and its impact on the communities it served. Three participants explained that OrgC, like
most NGOs, generally had political and cultural agendas. Some members of the recipient CBOs who participated in the focus group shared the goals and agenda of OrgC entirely, while other CBO participants said they agreed only with some of its short-term goals such as training activities for the youth sector in local communities. Some participants expected permanent support from OrgC, and they criticized it because it did not continue to support them consistently and continually until they matured. Two participants criticized OrgC for its delays in approving some projects, but they also attributed the delays to the preferences of one particular area coordinator and not to the management. Some participants viewed the organization as more politically oriented at the time of the focus group than it had been previously, and they felt that this impacted negatively on OrgC’s relationship with donors and recipient CBOs.

D1OC represents a donor organization that had a strategic partnership with OrgC from 1991 until the new management, which included BM1OC, CDOC, and BM2OC, took its place. She emphasized the relationship between OrgC and CBO organizations. She explained that before 1994, the donor was working covertly in Palestine because Israel did not allow their activities. D1OC’s first donation was for the construction of two playgrounds in 1991. In the following years, it continued to help OrgC expand its work with rural communities. This work included establishing community centers and strengthening their capacity until they could sustain a variety of infrastructure and community development programs requested by area residents. The community centers encouraged active citizenship, brought people together, and mobilized them around common goals. It empowered them to take charge of satisfying the needs of their own
community. D1OC’s organization donated several million dollars for the program, but OrgC was also able to obtain funding for this program from other donors. D1OC explained that this relationship involved much trial and error and that at times there were extensive negotiations over how OrgC implemented the programs that D1OC’s organization was funding. For instance, during the second Intifada, there were many challenges for project implementation: roads were closed, communities and neighborhoods were isolated by checkpoints and blockades, and curfews were enforced continuously for weeks. These factors caused OrgC to alter its implementation plans. In another project in 2004, the partners considered these challenges when formulating new plans.

BM1OC, CDOC, and BM2OC said that when they took charge of OrgC during the third stage of its history they had taken a new approach from that of FDOC. CDOC explained that the board was re-examining OrgC’s conceptual framework and its environment. These new leaders and their new partner donors and researchers evaluated previous research and literature. They “re-examined priorities” and sought to avoid repeating past mistakes, CDOC explained. They met regularly to evaluate the environment surrounding the organization and to consider how the organization could appropriately influence the course of events. After the former director left, OrgC was involved in preparing a five-year strategy, restructuring the organization, training new staff, and attempting to deepen the existing staff’s commitment and help them internalize its principles. They also reached out to many donors to explain the organization’s current mission and vision and to explore the potential for new partnerships. Furthermore, CDOC
added that they were restructuring the relationship between OrgC and the CBOs. CDOC believed it was unfortunate that many CBOs continued to think of OrgC as merely a channel for donations. She believed that this was the reason CBOs had become passive recipients, lacking innovation and initiative.

**Cause: Legitimacy and Economic Fitness**

- “Hypothesis 1: The lower the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160).

- “Hypothesis 2: The lower the degree of economic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 160-1).

OrgC was able to preserve its well recognized status in its environment throughout its history up to the time of this research, despite the fact that it had introduced itself at the time of its founding as a tool of change and a voice of opposition. It is not surprising that the social legitimacy of OrgC was not challenged during its early stage because it was established by what was, at the time, the second largest political party in Palestine. In addition, the principles of OrgC were consistent and conformed with prevailing positive principles and slogans in Palestinian’s civil society at the time of the first Intifada. These include social solidarity, volunteerism, empowering the workforce, boycotting Israeli products, and integrating women into national development.

Initially, OrgC conducted what was called “research for empowerment.” This involved high-quality policy studies and academic research to benefit disadvantaged
people, especially women, workers, and farmers. BM1OC said, “We rigorously analyzed the status quo in order to pave the way for change.” For instance, OrgC established the Workers Committee which produced studies that challenged attempts by outside powers to impose neoliberal models of development that were not applicable to Palestine nor consistent with the goals of the first Intifada as articulated in its slogans. Furthermore, from the same developmental perspective, OrgC launched an initiative to support the production and improvement of Palestinian products. According to BM1OC, this project served dual goals of supporting the boycott of Israeli goods and economically empowering Palestinian women. The organization emphasized the development of women because, due to their key role, women could make a significant contribution to improving the domestic economy, and this would have a positive impact on the social status of the women themselves. The organization employed the Socialist approach of establishing cooperatives in which women learned by exchanging knowledge and teaching one another production, marketing, and other disciplines. The organization also established a Committee of Women’s Studies that supported the establishment of a women’s studies program at a local university.

While OrgC had conformed to the political and national goals of liberty, it challenged social conventions related to women in order to defend their rights and increase their participation in civil society. OrgC sparked a national debate through its conferences and workshops on critical and socially sensitive issues such as the rehabilitation of women prisoners, enforcement of the practice of wearing the Hijab (veil), the participation of women in politics, and the representation of women in the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although the cultural landscape within the Palestinian community accommodated intellectual pluralism, minor groups in the local community offered a significant challenge to the organization’s legitimacy because of its advocacy for women’s rights. BM1OC explained that, “Conservative groups accused us of being Communists because we encouraged women to challenge social norms by working with men in production and marketing. Some people circulated lies and rumors that women were involved in the production of wine.” Furthermore, BM1OC explained, during the first Intifada, conservatives threatened women who did not wear the veil. BM1OC explained that, as a leftist organization, OrgC could not challenge the conservatives and stand alone against such a practice. Thus, to expand its circle of influence and secure support, the organization decided to adopt its rivals’ strategies in this regard by using customs and social pressure, urging political parties and tribal elites to intervene against attempts to restrict women and to impose on them the wearing of the veil. Once the national movement renounced this phenomenon, the organization was able to challenge it in significant ways such as, in 1991, holding a conference that was the first of its kind and that brought to the fore discussion of the political and social rights of Palestinian women.

Financial support and local legitimacy for NGOs in Palestine do not flow from the same sources. At all stages of its history, the financial resources of OrgC have come from international NGOs. Before 1993, most of OrgC’s funding came from a few NGOs in Europe and Canada, as well as from the PLO. After the Oslo Accords, the organization expanded its outreach and projects and worked with several Western donors. As
mentioned earlier, BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC accused the former director of discarding the organization’s original goals for the sake of funding. But FDOC explained that the Palestinian environment moved beyond aspirations for an independent state to questions about what type of state to establish. In other words, he said, “What are the social and economic policies that we want as a civil society?” At the same time, after 1993, international donors became major players in the Palestinian environment, and their requirements changed. This is why, FDOC said, it was necessary for civil society organizations to compromise on this matter. He contended that this did not mean OrgC had lost its vision, but that the organization had to find ways to operate in a manner that reconciled its mission and the needs of the donors. Except for conflict within the organization and the uncertainty in the relationship with the political party, OrgC did not face any serious challenges to its legitimacy from the local actors in its environment. It should also be noted that even though BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC severely criticized the former director’s policies, they could not deny that his policies maintained a competitive status for OrgC in an uncertain environment. BM2OC stated that, “If OrgC had not changed its path, it would not have been able to maintain its reputation at the local and international level. It is likely that the funding would have been reduced, and the organization would have been less visible.”

Constituents: Multiplicity and Dependence

- “Hypothesis 3: The greater the degree of constituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).
“Hypothesis 4: The lower the degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 162).

According to the interviewees, the actors in the environment of OrgC included CBOs and the community it served through them, Palestinian political parties, the PA, the PNGO Network, and other local NGOs—collaborating and competing organizations, and donors. BM2OC explained that the Occupation influenced every aspect of life—“the very air we breathe.” Defending Palestinian society and mitigating the pervasive impact of the Occupation was the raison d’etre of OrgC. If there had been no Occupation, the organization probably would have an entirely different mission, goals, funding sources, and procedures. More details on OrgC’s encounter with the Occupation will be described in Hypothesis 9 and 10 below.

Before 1994, various local constituents inside and outside OrgC had similar expectations relating to working toward developing local communities. The organization’s donors also shared these expectations. After 1994, to a large degree, disputes within the organization reflected the fact that the organization’s conceptual framework was that of a leftist political party in opposition to the Oslo Accords. Specifically, these disputes focused on whether the organization’s policies, practices, and relationships with the different actors in the environment accorded with the ideological, political, and intellectual framework provided by the party. Despite this multi-constituent environment after 1994, OrgC, under the management of FDOC, was able to create balance in its relationships with different actors. However, at that stage of the
organization’s life, the demands of the party conflicted with the organization’s efforts to placate other constituents. In order to achieve parity between the demands of multiple constituents, FDOC had to neutralize or even dismiss the influence of the stakeholders that were asserting the most pressure—the political party and the board members—as this section specifically discusses. The relationship with donors will be discussed in Hypotheses 5 and 6, and the relationship with the government will be discussed in Hypotheses 7 and 8.

In the view of BM1OC, political parties should provide their affiliated civil society organizations with a conceptual framework. BM1OC compared the “golden age” of the grassroots organizations under the umbrella of the political parties during the years of the first intifada with the time after Oslo Accords. She explained that Palestinian political parties played a positive role by mobilizing civil society, especially during the 1980s. They provided the ideological and conceptual framework for the work of associations. Specifically, the leftist parties provided a holistic developmental approach that included the principles of democracy, gender equality, and social justice. According to BM1OC, when PNGOs detached themselves from the conceptual framework of the parties, they lost their grassroots character. However, BM1OC also blamed the political parties, saying they failed to maintain their momentum within the context of the changes in Palestine. She explained that after Oslo Accords, the opposing political parties marginalized themselves and were passive. They were not able to identify an influential strategy to deal with the implications of the Oslo Accords; thus, their role weakened and they became disengaged from their grassroots.
According to BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC, FDOC kept the board members at arm’s length and monopolized both power and information. For instance, board members were informed about projects only after they had been agreed upon with the donors. When board members tried to expel FDOC, they failed. BM2OC explained that the party intervened, but the former director was able to convince the party leaders that OrgC would not survive without him. This made it hard for the party to make a decision that might put an end the organization. BM1OC further explained that, “This was in part because [the former manager] was practical, savvy, and well connected, and he knew how to seize opportunities. He had good relationships with the donors and knew how to mobilize funds. He also had a good relationship with the national movement.” Accordingly, when the disagreement over the micro-financing project arose in 1996, most of the nine board members decided to submit their collective resignation in protest. New board members who supported FDOC were appointed, BM1OC explained.

In contrast, in the view of FDOC, civil society organizations should be independent from domination by political parties. In his view, NGOs should serve the society, not a political party. Accordingly, when he was the director, he was able to protect OrgC from party interference, he explained: “I never hired an employee based on political affiliation, I never accepted research projects merely to serve the party, and I never agreed to represent the party in international forums or to let the party use the organization for electoral campaigns.”
Content: Consistency and Constraining

- “Hypothesis 5: The lower the degree of consistency of institutional norms or requirements with organizational goals, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).
- “Hypothesis 6: The greater the degree of discretionary constraints imposed on the organization by institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 165).

As discussed in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the organization challenged attempts to impose the veil on women because it was inconsistent with its vision. Also the organization countered attempts to impose neoliberal development models on Palestine through its policy research, advocacy activities, and cooperatives aimed at promoting Palestinian economic independence. Furthermore, as will be explained in Hypotheses 7 and 8, the organization challenged the PA’s vision of a weak civil society. This section concentrates on the relationship of OrgC with its donors and consistency with their goals.

Before 1993, as mentioned in Hypothesis 1 and 2, the organization received funding from INGOs that had a social and political vision that comported with its own. According to BM1OC, this funding was allocated as core budget to support the organization as a whole—not to fund specific projects. Furthermore, because of the agreement over the goals, the donors were not demanding when it came to the format of proposals. BM1OC explained that the typical proposal was limited to two pages because the donor concentrated on the authenticity of the project but not on the format of the proposal. In the 1990s according to the CDOC, BM1OC, and BM2OC, OrgC, in
compliance with the demands of and guidance from the donors, was working on all types of projects regardless of their compatibility with the organization’s mission or with the needs of society. BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC believed that the organization was expanding in quantity but in not the quality of projects. CDOC explained that the organization became professional and effective at the technical level, e.g., writing project proposals and reports, but it failed to have a sustainable impact on the ground. In the view of BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC, the organization undercut the depths of its research work. It adopted research concepts and methods irrelevant to the Palestinian context, it worked on issues such as domestic violence instead of the political violence that the masses suffer, it got involved in micro-credit programs, and it gave up cooperatives that were the cornerstone of its earlier mode of development. While BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC claimed that the organization compromised its mission to enhance its economic fitness in the years after Oslo Accords, but FDOC rejected this interpretation and explained that donor-driven organizations may accept any grant, even those not tied to the organization’s mission. But even so this was not the case with OrgC, as FDOC explained. Clearly, OrgC was program-based with strategic plans. Some organizations legitimately start as activity-based and then evolve to become project- and program-based. Sometimes an organization must compromise and conduct activities not literally in its mandate so that it can meet its operating expenses, attract particular donors, and maintain and enhance its reputation. Similarly, an organization may support an activity that serves a national goal, even if it is not listed in the organization’s mandate. Of course these activities should not exceed 15–20% of the organization budget and should not
change the organization mandate, according to FDOC. He argued that OrgC did not change to satisfy donors. It conducted strategic planning and did a SWOT analysis. In every historical period there are certain prominent events and stakeholders in the organization’s environment, FDOC explained. At some stages the donors were among the most prominent stakeholders. OrgC did not turn a blind eye to this fact; instead it found ways to reconcile its mission with the requirements of certain donors. FDOC said, “It is necessary to compromise on this matter, but this does not mean you lose your vision.” In his view, because this money is allocated to serve Palestinian society, organizations should find ways to reconcile their mission and goals with those of the donors, instead of losing opportunities for funding. BM2OC disagreed with this viewpoint and pointed out that, “He was not a puppet; he believed that this was what should be doing… He wanted the organization to be a leader and to have all types of funding.”

FDOC supported his contention that OrgC did not bend to the whims of donors and their political viewpoints by noting that under his leadership OrgC did not take funds directly from Western governments but through INGOs that supported its mission. Typically, OrgC prepared proposals and agreed on them with INGOs, which in turn negotiated them with their governments. FDOC described the contention that working with donors on women’s rights issues distracted from the goal of Palestinian national liberation as “flawed.” In his view, promoting women’s rights is a priority and not a matter separate from national liberation. Accordingly, he asserted that there was a shared goal with the donor in this regard, and that he had no inhibition about cooperating with them to accommodate these principles in Palestinian society.
The representative D1OC, mentioned above, explained that her organization had a strategic relationship with OrgC for more than 15 years. It was an equal partnership based on shared perception of realities on the ground and goals. The two organizations developed the parameters of needs assessment, project proposals, and concept papers. Typically, meetings involved the organization’s director, project director, field workers, their researchers, and everyone who contributed to the structure of the project that was the subject of the meeting. D1OC explained, “We have dialogue, we communicate, we negotiate, and we challenge each other to overcome relationship challenges and reach a better decision on what and how to do things.” She described the former director as a persuasive person who “could sell freezers to an Eskimo.” D1OC approved of 90% of OrgC’s project proposals. However, D1OC explained that before the decision about funding was made, the power would be on the recipient organization’s side. They were the owners of their ideas and what they wanted to do. But after they signed a contract with a donor, the control moved to the donors’ side or, specifically, to the terms of the contract.

Even so, the donor was aware of the changing realities of the political situation, and this enabled OrgC to adjust project details, such as scheduling or activity details, to adapt. At the time of this interview, D1OC was not sure whether the relationship between her organization and OrgC would continue. On the one hand, she was hoping to continue with what they built in the past, but, on the other hand, she believed the new management did not communicate well with her organization. She explained that there was no official
announcement about the management change in 2006. She said, “I think they have no clue who we are and what we are doing.”

Recently, OrgC faced more significant financial uncertainty. BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC confirmed that they were unsure about whether the donors that formerly worked with the old director would be interested in continuing to fund the organization in light of changes that had recently taken place. CDOC took the position that they were restructuring the relationship with the donors and would not accept unreasonable conditions such as working in areas that did not meet crucial local needs or severing relationships with CBOs that had an Islamic orientation. CDOC explained that she, BM1OC, and BM2OC met a former donor organization which had been cooperating with OrgC for the prior eight years, but that there had been conflicts between their expectations and the requirements of the donor. The two organizations were planning to work with four other local organizations on a project funded by a US$6 million grant. The former director agreed to this project as an advanced stage of an earlier program. BM1OC and CDOC wrote a working plan, granting OrgC responsibility for internal control over various aspects of the project such as coordination with the four local partners and setting standards for project performance evaluations. But the donor rejected the plan, despite the fact that the local partners had agreed to it. OrgC believed that it was appropriate for the donor to do financial monitoring, but that OrgC itself better understood the needs of the local community and was in the best position to determine the appropriateness of a project. OrgC disagreed with the donor organization about the conditions of the partnership and believed the donor did not consider them equal partners.
The donor’s response was that OrgC must either accept its role as the donor defined it or withdraw. Because CDOC and her colleagues were unwilling to lose such a degree of control over their projects, they chose to withdraw.

On the other hand, the third-stage management of OrgC initiated a new relationship with a donor organization that had worked in Palestine for many years. The two parties agreed on goals and vision. D2OC, the representative of this donor organization, explained that CDOC and the new board of OrgC had a completely new view of development, different from that of the previous management. She explained that her organization and OrgC agreed that development is best achieved with a bottom-up approach and that local communities have the right to identify their own needs and priorities. Accordingly their relationship was going smoothly. In her view, the current leadership was enthusiastic. According to D2OC, her organization and OrgC were equal partners with distinct responsibilities. A superior–inferior or hierarchical relationship did not exist, she believed. D2OC said that the relationship of OrgC and its new donor was different in that regard from other PNGOs and their donors. Many international organizations imposed their agendas on recipients. The PNGOs often have had to compromise their agendas accordingly.

**Control: Coercion and Diffusion**

- “Hypothesis 7: The lower the degree of legal coercion behind institutional norms and requirements, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 167-8).
• “Hypothesis 8: The lower the degree of voluntary diffusion of institutional norms, values, or practices, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168).

The legal coercion of OrgC came from the PA which arrived on the scene through a political process that neither the organization’s board members nor the political party with which it was affiliated approved. In the view of the third-stage management, the Oslo Accords were a political scheme imposed on Palestine and were not representative of Palestine’s aspirations for independence and sovereignty. The Accords destroyed both the nationalist movement and unity overall. Nevertheless, the organization had to deal with the PA or risk legal repercussions. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the quasi-government was Palestinian. The organization would not resist in the way it would have done with the occupier. Thus, the relationship between OrgC and the PA had several stages. In the first, OrgC challenged and influenced the rules. In the second, there were mixed reactions that ranged from acquiescence to rules such as the registration and reporting requirements to attempts to manipulate or influence policies and work against the co-opting of civil society organizations.

At the time of the PA emancipation, FDOC wrote a paper about technical cooperation with the PA. During the interview for this research, he said, “I concentrated on the technical, not political, aspects because we needed registrations, licenses, and authorization.” After the Oslo Accords and the emancipation of the PA, the PA tried to assert control and to constrain civil liberties. Though CDOC believed that OrgC had a poor record at the grassroots empowerment level, she admitted that it had been very
effective in laying the foundation for the relationship between civil society organizations and the PA. In 1995, FDOC was one of the founders who established and activated the PNGO Network to fight for civil liberties and defend civil society organizations. At that time, the former director of OrgC also published a policy paper that proposed a complementary role for the civil society and the PA. It conditioned cooperation between the PNGO network and the PA on the continuing process of national liberation and granting a broad range of freedom and democracy within the society.

The most prominent encounter between the NGOs and the PA in the 1990s was the campaign over the NGO law. OrgC, when headed by FDOC, was a part of the PNGO’s successful challenge to the PA. OrgC and others built alliances and lobbied representatives convinced most legislators to support it. In addition, international donors supported civil society organizations in their quest by pressuring the PA. The World Bank provided the campaign with legal expertise from Europe. FDOC explained that civil society organizations negotiated with the PA until they were able to create a law that established a reasonable relationship between the PA and the NGOs. Later, the organization played a leading role in writing policy papers, mobilizing civil society organizations and political parties to cooperate and influence the PA’s activities, and developing drafts for Family Law and Youth Law. The organization also conducted several activities with the Women Affairs Ministry and the Youth and Sports Affairs Ministry.

After September 11, 2001 the political climate changed everywhere. BM2OC explained that the PA, under direction from “external powers,” required NGOs to verify
their legal status through re-registration and detailed disclosure of funding sources. OrgC had never faced challenges relating to registration and legal fitness. This had been the case even in light of the PA’s crackdown on civil society organizations after the Hamas victory in the elections. At this time of political developments, the PA did not regard OrgC and similar organizations as a threat, BM2OC explained. BM1OC, BM2OC, and CDOC complied with legal requirements to submit audited financial and administrative reports or face sanctions. According to BM1OC, “We [did] not want to give the PA an excuse to shut us down.” The organization also endured the chaotic PA bureaucracy in which jurisdiction of ministries overlapped or were at odds with one another. For instance, as BM1OC explained, the MOI rejected the organization’s annual report, which was written in English, requiring instead a report in Arabic, and OrgC complied. Subsequently, the ministry demanded unreasonable details about the organization’s activities. In addition, the Preventive Security Forces (PSF) directed OrgC to complete a form providing detailed information about the staff, a demand which had no basis in law, according to CDOC. The organization refused to comply, and in response the PSF threatened it with other more severe measures. The organization contacted the PNGOs Network and, as a result, the network conducted a campaign to protest these requirements.

According to the director of the General Administration of NGOs, OrgC had always been a political party organization, but FDOC did not succeed in changing that. The organization did partner with the government in several productive activities and,
before the FDOC left, the MOI and OrgC were planning to work together on a project involving the self-monitoring of NGOs.

Soon after the former director left, the third-stage management hired a new director, according to the MOI representative, and their choice was based on the director’s political affiliations and not her professional qualification; thus, she was not able to continue. Furthermore, the representative criticized OrgC for conducting activities unrelated to its mandate. In her view this is improper and has diffused the organization’s efforts. She clearly said that the MOI was not pressing to fix this issue because it wanted to avoid unnecessary difficulties. However, she said her organization could not turn a blind eye completely. The director was not very optimistic that OrgC would be able to continue as long as it allowed the interference of a political party with professional matters.

**Context: Uncertainty and Interconnectedness**

- “Hypothesis 9: The lower the level of uncertainty in the organization's environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).
- “Hypothesis 10: The lower the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment, the greater the likelihood of organizational resistance to institutional pressures” (Oliver, 1991, p. 170).

This section discusses the uncertainty in OrgC’s environment before 1993, during the direct Israeli military Occupation, as well as the uncertainty stemming from environmental interconnectedness after 1993. Before the Oslo Accords, the main source
of uncertainty that challenged the organization’s existence was the Occupation. The organization challenged the Occupation by establishing cooperatives which integrated women into the development process and promoted Palestinian domestic production.

The organization sought to promote the idea of Palestinian domestic production, which would reduce dependence on the Occupation’s products and weaken the Occupation’s grip on the local economy. BM1OC recalled this era of the organization in the late 80s and early 90s, and explained that to avoid prosecution by the Occupation, the organization used the names of women active in production to register its cooperatives as private businesses with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The occupying Israelis recognized this for what it was, a form of resistance, and subsequently shut down the cooperative and arrested the women who coordinated its projects based upon the claim that the cooperatives were not registered legally and had not paid taxes. Despite that, the organization continued to promote its development views through conferences, workshops, and publications.

After 1993, the Israeli Occupation withdrew from major cities of the West Bank (Area A) and implemented hundreds of checkpoints and barricades between the Palestinian cities and villages. OrgC, along with many other PNGOs, opened branches in other cities to manage activities in isolated areas. Continuing their activities was an effective way for the NGOs to challenge the Occupation’s isolationist policy; however, CDOC considered this acquiescing to the Occupation. CDOC explained that, “Instead of being a role model for resistance to the Occupation policy of separation and isolation, the
organization [...] was co-opted, since this activity legitimized the Occupation’s racist policies rather than resisting them.”

The hypothesis that pressure from conflicting constituents increases organization uncertainty was demonstrated in OrgC after 1994. Although many organizations existed in the Palestinian environment, this environment could not be described as interconnected or orderly. However, despite that and the fact that OrgC was not one of the older generation of NGOs in Palestine, it was able to reduce the impact of this environmental uncertainty in a professional way. This was achieved when the organization’s director participated in forming and maintaining the momentum of the NGOs network (PNGOs), thus playing a distinctive leadership role among civil society organizations. The organization on its own and as a member of the network strongly challenged the PA on issues of democracy and development. The organization participated in setting legal rules by which it was judged by conducting a strong campaign to achieve a democratic NGOs’ law and by acting as a watchdog, monitoring the authority activities at the development level. Though the organization opposed the PA, it was able to maintain a positive relationship with it, nevertheless, by cooperating with the ministries and keeping lines of negotiation and dialogue open. The organization complied with the most visible rules, such as registration and disclosure of financial records. The former director maintained neutrality within the organization when his policies led to the resignation of the opponent board members, then he protected the organization from the interference by the political party. He even went so far as to disregard and block its control. In addition, the organization increased its influence by reaching out to CBOs in different areas and
opening new branches. Moreover, the organization had excellent relationships with other civil society organizations at the regional and international level. OrgC has been an active member of the Arab NGO Network, which works on strengthening and shaping the role of civil society organizations in the Arab countries. Also, at the time of the former director, OrgC was an active coordinator of the Palestine Thematic Forum of the World Social Forum,\textsuperscript{20} held in Palestine in 2002. Finally, the organization maintained a secure, stable, and solid financial status through alliances with donors whose viewpoints comported with its own.

\textsuperscript{20} The World Social Forum: An open meeting space of organizations and movements that are opposed to neoliberal globalization and the domination of the world by capital and by any other form of imperialism.
Chapter Six

Discussion, Interpretation, and Depiction of Results

This chapter recapitulates the argument derived from the history of the PNGOs and the three case studies and relates them to the theoretical framework of the research. It is divided into two sections. The first section identifies and discusses the Palestinian NGOs’ environmental antecedents and the second section discusses the three case studies in light of strategic responses to the environmental antecedents.

The PNGOs’ Environmental Antecedents

Oliver (1991) suggested that organizational responses to institutional pressures depend on five environmental antecedents. From the data collected, in the Palestinian context, the main constituents of the PNGOs consists of the target group that the organizations serves; the Palestinian Authority; local NGOs that collaborate and compete; the political parties, especially the competition between organizational leaders and the party that established the organization; donors and INGOs; and the local, regional, and international networks with which the focal NGO is affiliated. In addition to the specific actors in an organizations’ environment, there are a host of general institutionalized forces at work in the organizational environment. A major force includes social and cultural expectations. For instance, this research highlighted society’s legitimatization of resistance of the occupation, the conservative culture regarding women’s participation in public life, the public division over the Oslo Accords, and the shift in the professional
values of PNGOs. The interviewees considered the occupation as the general environment, not a singular actor or institution. Most interviewees expressed that resisting the occupation is the reason for their organization’s existence and that the occupation continues to influence every aspect of the environment. The internal Palestinian conflict is also part of this institutionalized environment, especially with the cutting off of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank. Finally, the international environment with its political, economic, and socio-cultural features and technological interaction brought challenges to the Palestinian organizational environment. Some PNGOs have chosen to expand their activities beyond the local boundaries by joining networks and participating in international forums so they can act as a voice for Palestinians and exert pressure for change. However, even without the expansion of organizational activities to international levels, organizations were affected by globalization and other international factors, as was the case with OrgA which lost its food and clothing markets due to competition with Chinese products after the Oslo Accords facilitated the entry of these products into Palestinian markets. Also, the implications of the international environment were very clear in the interviewees’ description of the pressure of external powers, including the United States and Western European governments, on the Palestinian Authority to scrutinize and constrict NGO activities—especially the accessing of financial resources. Figure 1 below represents the different actors and institutions in the organizational environment.
Figure 1: Depiction of the institutionalized environment surrounding the focal NGOs.

*Cause* was explained by legitimacy and economic fitness (also referred to in Oliver’s framework as *efficiency*). Both resource dependence theory and institutional theory offered extensive discussions of legitimacy and assumed congruence between an organization and its social environment. However, while efforts to gain legitimacy are aimed at resource mobilization in resource dependence theory, the goal of being perceived as legitimate in institutional theory is aimed at social worthiness. If organizations, as characterized by institutional theory and resource dependence theory, are legitimacy-seeking systems, then the centrality of the legitimacy construct to NGOs is even more lucid. In the Palestinian case, NGOs have emerged from a complex political
and social context within their society, with the political context having a profound effect on their development and activities. It is unquestionable that charitable societies and grassroots organizations, the so-called PNGOs since the 1980s, have played a vital role in the fabric of Palestinian society since the Israeli occupation of 1967 and through the PA governance, until this time. In the 1970s and 1980s, the expansive sector-wide legitimatization has grown because the PNGOs’ actions and outputs were consistent with conventions and the extremely validated value-pattern of Palestinian society. In other words, the legitimacy of PNGOs originated in their role of strengthening the steadfastness of Palestinians on their land through dealing with the enormous economic, social, and political hardships emanating from the Israeli occupation. The PNGOs have been voluntarily active in relief programs and activities, in drawing development plans (despite the restrictions imposed by the Israeli military occupation), and were active participants in political struggle and resistance. Though PNGOs were not a panacea for the intractable political and development problems in Palestine, they were legitimate to the public because they played a major role in building the national infrastructure of sectors, such as healthcare, education, agriculture, and cultural and intellectual life, in the absence of a national state. As explained in the body of this research, efficiency in the economic context was not a precondition for support in the 1990s. Factional competition over funds was evident since the 1980s, but the leaders of political parties were not based in Palestine (except the Communist Party and Islamic parties and the latter were not of significant political impact in the 1980s), and therefore the competition did not seriously deter the organization from providing quality work. Also at this stage, as interviewees
expressed, reporting and associated accountability requirements were not a major concern for donors, including the PLO.

As for the content, evidence from data collected showed that while the goals of the PNGO community before the Oslo Accords were consistent with the general public goals of steadfastness, things changed afterward. The Oslo Accords in the 1990s introduced two main contextual factors that affected change in the PNGOs: the creation of a national authority and a new agenda by donors to facilitate the implementation of the Oslo Accords. With this new context, the legitimacy, legality, dependency, level of interconnectedness, diversity, and number of demands placed on NGOs has changed. The new authority, donors, and beneficiaries, along with the NGOs themselves, all have their own individual criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of PNGOs and all started to play a role in shaping the character of PNGOs accordingly.

Funds from donors have raised questions concerning the legitimacy of the PNGO community. A main source of unease with the PNGOs is their financial situation and dependence on Western donors. Since the 1990s, PNGOs bear new legitimacy conditions that came from outside its local community. Donors started to use a variety of mechanisms in order to keep track of NGO activities, including opening local offices in Palestine, conducting regular meetings with local partners, supervising field implementation regularly, conducting strict financial audits, and coordinating among donor communities inside and outside Palestine. Meanwhile, the proliferation of PNGOs was accompanied with the creation of new organizations inconsistent with the value-pattern of local society. Two issues that are important to bear in mind are that, first,
grassroots organizing (or mass mobilization) before the Oslo Accord was an asset and, second, most of the organizing initiatives were initially undertaken by leftist parties. That said, after Oslo the leftist parties lost their momentum and popular followings basically because they did not offer strategies to support their oppositional stand to the Oslo Accords in addition to the ideological crisis after the demise of the Soviet Union. It was at this stage that the locus of power changed because Western donors placed political conditions on their funding that required recipient organizations to be apoliticized or nonfactional. This conditionality happened to intersect with the interests of professionals within some PNGOs to free their organizations from the control of political parties. Financial independence from the political parties enabled NGO leaders to act independently when prioritizing programs. This has transformed many organizations from being politically mobilizing organizations to being independent, “top-down” development organizations. While donors have catalyzed this transformation, the individual organizational decisions in this process should not be underestimated.

The interviewees of this research were divided as to whether organizational resource dependence implied that international donors dictated the agendas of PNGOs. Some interviewees expressed cynicism towards the NGO community in Palestine, especially towards those PNGOs that too quickly and instrumentally adopted the official donor agenda at the cost of socially-validated values and needs. Another concern was whether the NGO sector was living up to the Palestinian aspiration for an independent state regardless of their financial dependency. For this group, NGOs became another business dedicated to “self development” and empowering NGO personnel but not the
poor and disadvantaged. Concerns increased with the evidence that some well established social service NGOs had sacrificed legitimacy by their willingness to participate in implementing programs that reflected the neoliberal policies of donors. Related to these concerns are the donors’ attempts to institutionalize NGOs through technical changes that NGOs were advised to implement in order to stay competitive in their sector. Those who felt uncomfortable with such requirements viewed institutionalization as stripping NGOs from their popular and grassroots origins. They stressed the need to get the politics right first and to resist donor-driven agendas if these served only to bureaucratize and depoliticize NGOs. This view is held more by the left and criticized by others as utopian and unrelated to the “real world.” The other view doesn’t have a problem with PNGOs compromising as long as the funds serve Palestinians. This group said that organizations can access this money and then apply it to the activities it deems appropriate.

The main source of coercion in the PNGO environment was the Israeli military occupation, and its resistance was the essence of the movement to establish organizations in the 1980s. After Oslo the main source of legal coercion was the PA. In the Palestinian context, NGOs have been able to challenge the government due to several reasons: First, the government in the Palestinian case does not enjoy broad local legitimacy—as the Authority’s goals and values were not widely shared, it was more likely to be challenged; secondly, it lacks experience in providing services to deal with the extensive destruction inflicted by three decades of occupation; thirdly, there was a complete legal vacuum which enabled PNGOs to bargain and introduce a democratic PNGO law; and, fourthly, the influential PNGOs are financially independent from the PA. At the same time, there
was an important issue that was not favorable to PNGOs, namely that the Palestinian government, in contrast to many governments in developing countries, enjoyed international support and enabling it meant success for the Western peace project. That said, the “winner” of the conflict between the PNGOs and the PA in the early 1990s was undetermined at this stage; however, it was the seriousness of the non-governmental organizations that ultimately resolved the conflict with minimal losses on the side of the PNGOs.

Three stages were identified in this research to describe the relationships between PNGOs and the PA: outright hostility, tolerance, or acceptance. Upon its arrival, the PA wanted to squeeze the NGOs out of developmental decision making and to shift the power and following of the local population to its side. The PNGO community challenged the PA. After a long negotiation process, the PA and the PNGO community agreed on registration and monitoring mechanisms, which defined a separate institutional space vis-à-vis the PA. But along with this regulatory and supervisory role came the burden of Authority-backed policing measures to defend its sovereignty. A few years after the Oslo Accords, the inadequacies of the government arose to the surface. The PA was not offering significant advantages either in community development or in complex political emergencies, let alone political solutions. Accordingly, PNGOs continued to wield influence in the absence of an effective government. At the time of the second Intifada, the PA recognized that service delivery NGOs are pragmatically legitimate because they offer services that the state cannot afford or provide, especially in the most disadvantaged areas.
However, the PA retains an exclusive power to regulate PNGO activities. The need to maintain cordial relations with the authorities resides in the NGOs dependence on external donors, who insist that an NGO be registered before they provide funding. In addition, the ability of PNGOs to alter the power game remains limited to the biggest and most effective organizations. Small organizations avoid coercive government acts. For instance, as this research explained, PNGOs are entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Authority for unlawful interference, but organizations do not exercise this right.

Oliver (1991) saw uncertainty and interconnectedness as the two dimensions of context. In the Palestinian environment, uncertainty needs no explanation. The description by the manager of OrgA of the Palestinian environment as a “dark tunnel of constant political, social, and economic crises” went even beyond Pfeffer and Salancik’s definition of environmental uncertainty as "the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted" (p. 67). While the Occupation was the primary source of this uncertainty, the internal fighting among Palestinians in 2006 came to wedge this tunnel and washed away any semblance of environmental interconnectedness.

A final point on the PNGOs community is that after the Oslo Accords, the PNGO community became unable to shape the political and public space to the extent that they were in the 1980s and 1990s. The participation and effectiveness of PNGOs more recently shows that they are paralyzed and absent from several political and social aspects on the ground. This includes the Palestinian secular NGOs, which have captured
substantial public space and were hailed as a potential substitute to failing political parties and to PA authoritarianism. Few aspects to mention are:

1. PNGOs are passive in mending the current division between the two rival governments and assaults upon human rights and freedoms in the West Bank and Gaza. It is unrealistic to ignore the external factors that boost the conflict, but the sector can play a pivotal role of promoting civic action among their grassroots base. The PNGO community did not efficiently expose and take a strong stand on human rights violations nor did it take collective action to press for unity and reconciliation, though it is part of the promotion of “good governance” missions that hundreds of PNGOs claim. Such action should not be far from the capacity of the PNGOs sector as it managed to mobilize people in the 1980s. The secular PNGOs, for instance, did not take a strong stand (like that of the campaign concerning the PNGOs Law back in the 1990s) against the PA’s arbitrary measures on Islamic organizations in 2007, and neither did the Islamic NGOs in Gaza. Since the beginning of the rivalry, save for shy condemnation by the PNGOs Network (which only represents 94 of the 3000 NGOs registered at the PA), the PNGOs sector has assumed virtually no active position as far as reconciliation and ending the chaos. Unfortunately, the NGOs community is fragmented, and eventually it became evident that there are PNGOs that play a destructive role by, for instance, using their websites as platforms to accentuate divisions.

2. The PA excluded the PNGOs sector from the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), though some prominent NGOs are much more experienced than the PA
in dealing with the most impoverished sectors of Palestinian society. Civil society organizations need not accept the status quo as a *de facto* reality. Few NGOs, including OrgC in this research, got involved in activities to discuss the plan; however, the PNGO sector indeed can cooperate in collective efforts to create strategies to pressure and redirect the plan by identifying mechanisms for achieving an inclusive and alternative development plan connected to the reality of the majority of Palestinians.

3. There is very little effort to enhance coordination among PNGOs, and this keeps them weak in the face of donors and therefore limited in the agenda-setting process. It is true, as one INGO representative mentioned that international donors helped to make this happen by imposing a process of competition among recipient NGOs akin to that of a market place. However, it also remains true that the level of cooperation among PNGOs is low. The lack of a unified stand of NGOs and a state of organizational competition reduces the space for negotiation. For example, if one NGO refuses to apply for a project, there is other organization that will take the project to prolong its life. Joint actions would have a better impact than those that are separated and unilateral. PNGOs have a space to negotiate with the donors because the relationship is interdependence, but PNGOs choose not use this space effectively.

4. PNGOs were an engine to promote secular and gender equity principle in the 1980s and 1990s. PNGOs failed to sustain this momentum and protect their achievements. In addition, though there are several women’s PNGOs, they have been transformed
into elite organizations and have detached themselves from the grassroots (Kutab, 2008).

The Strategic Responses of the Three Case Study Organizations

The three organizations studied in this research have made undeniable contributions to Palestinian steadfastness and development. OrgA has helped by alleviating poverty and training disadvantaged women, OrgB through their health care and other vital services to communities in areas most affected by the Occupation, and OrgC, though it came to existence at a later stage, contributed to capacity development of local communities. The three organizations, in different ways, also support income generating projects. Both OrgB and OrgC aimed to introduce new and innovative developmental approaches, but OrgA started as a charity organization and, though it entered the developmental field, it was more conservative and traditional in this regard. OrgB and OrgC were affiliated with leftist political parties. OrgA was politically independent and kept a neutral political approach. The three organizations have made important advances toward implementing donors’ approaches, basically through the introduction of more integrated financial and managerial systems.

The three organizations constantly had to carve out a niche for themselves. Nevertheless, the behavior of the organizations was not homogenous throughout their lives; their reactions contrast in the terms of the roles of varying actors and the extent to which each actor exerted pressure on the organization. It is clear that the organizations were similarly faced with environmental constraints at the early stages of their creation. The three organizations encountered resistance to their existence from the Occupation but
they chose to resist criminalization by the Occupation basically by decoupling their activities from the Occupation’s inspection or continuing their work underground at the time of direct military occupation. OrgB was distinctive from the other two organizations by its broad use of the media and documentation to expose the Occupation’s violation of health and movement rights and human rights in general. Also, despite the achievements of the three organizations, the bulk of evidence demonstrates that the three organizations were vulnerable to social pressure from traditional local stakeholders at some stage of their lives. OrgA most readily adapted its behavior to comply with local society constraints. OrgC used several tactical mechanisms, and OrgB was the most resourceful in dealing with several aspects of its environment.

In the 1990s, the three organizations faced numerous and incompatible demands from actors in their environments. It seems that OrgB and OrgC were more perceptive and discerning in the new situation of interdependence. The two organizations were engaged extensively in strategic planning processes in their quests for informed choices and the possible consequences of alternative actions. Thus, these two organizations were especially able to influence the system of constraints and dependencies that confronted their actions.

As indicated in the analysis, there is a certain predictor of how an organization will respond to its environment that assists in differentiating the reasons why organizations respond differently to an institutionalized factor in their environment. This predictive factor needs more elaboration. While the three organizations are constrained by the same institutional environment, there are different expectations for different types
of organizations. Such differentiated expectations have variable effects on organizations and result in variances in the choices organizations make to pursue their objectives. That said, in addition to predictors of organizational resources, leadership style, level of involvement in networks, social and legal legitimacy, there is also the organizational field of activity. The three organizations studied are all nonprofit development organizations, but they are active in different fields. The institutional expectations of a health organization, such as OrgB, are different from those of social welfare organizations, like OrgA, or a research and CBO capacity building organization, like OrgC. However, it is the organization’s choice to adhere or disregard such expectations.

While OrgA has established itself as a symbol of women societies by optimizing the intersection between women’s social work and politics, it did not challenge socially and culturally constructed traditional and conservative roles of women. In the interviews, the leaders of OrgA repeatedly expressed a pre-conscious acceptance, rather than resistance, to society’s expectations. Pre-conscious in this context means that the organization’s leaders have complied with social norms to serve the organization’s charitable and social welfare approach and also recognizes the fact that the organization is dependent on public approval. Through this compliance, the organization seeks stability, social support, and the acceptance and commitment of sponsors. From the case study, OrgA was rewarded with greater organizational legitimacy and prestige rather than increasing its perceived professional competence.

Though OrgA’s board members hold different political views, there was a conscious decision inside the organization to preserve the organization’s neutrality over
the Oslo Accords. Though Palestinian society is highly politicized and partisan, there is no evidence over the years that political neutrality has undermined OrgA’s organizational autonomy over its projects. Generally speaking, OrgA has chosen conformity rather than resistance to the government. Unlike OrgB and OrgC, OrgA did not challenge the values and politics of the advent government and remained outside the conflict between PNGOs and the government.

OrgA avoided invulnerability to questioning by the government through co-optive acts, like inviting ministry officials to their graduation ceremonies and an MOI representative to the board elections, though MOI attendance at board elections is not required by the PNGOs law. However, as explained in the case study of the organization, OrgA came under increasing pressure from the PA in 2008 to change several managerial methods and discontinue its historical sponsorship program to conform to a newly-formed government policy. As OrgA’s activities are structured around the sponsorship program, the organization tried to co-opt some PA figures and have negotiated with the MOI. The government was sympathetic to the organization’s historical legitimacy, but it refused to make an exception for the organization in light of recent political tension and has allocated considerable supervision to redesigning the organization’s methods to fit government expectations.

The structure of funding for OrgA did not change after the Oslo Accords, but, meanwhile, the funding environment has changed. Though OrgA is not confined to a

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21 While Palestinian society was always highly partisan before the Oslo Accords, whether as individuals or organizations, the “Silent Majority” who now claim they are apolitical is increasing due to both the fading of leftist political parties and the political frustration of the two rival governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
specific type of social welfare work, it resisted altering its mission and domains to accommodate donors’ interests, specifically because the interests of donors were so far afield from OrgA’s stated central purposes. This has left the organization with fewer alternatives in terms of fundraising. It is no wonder the organization’s leaders state that the acquisition of resources seems problematic and uncertain at this time. The organization continued to receive solidarity support from Western Europe and the Arab world and depends on two strategic donors for a large proportion of input or output, but the challenges for the organization have become highly visible. First, though the organization has an array of production projects, marketing continues to be a challenge due to checkpoints, economic stagnation and poverty, and competition from the influx of cheaper goods. Second, environmental conditions have made charitable contributions scarce. Also, competition has heightened with the increase of charitable organizations, especially Islamic organizations, which renders sponsors more options for donating than in the past. Third, the lack of managerial professionalization and project innovation has increased the organization’s vulnerability, as explained in the case study. It is interesting to compare OrgA and OrgB in this regard. In the interviews, donors for each organization complained about the management of the organizations and their commitment to reports. One of the donors of OrgA was not willing to compromise and made it clear that he would not fund OrgA again. Meanwhile, the donor of OrgB hinted that he would make sure to include more stringent condition on the reports—not stop funding the organization.
As appeared in the theoretical review of this research, several scholars identified the organization's size and the resources it controls as key determinants of organizational political power. Once organizations attain a high level of power, there is more opportunity to engage in organizational politics. Large organizations controlling important resources are less susceptible than others to external social control as well as more capable of becoming influential. OrgB was able to manipulate the devices of power at different levels. Several factors played a role in OrgB’s ability to be a strong negotiator and to manipulate its environment. First, the organization has a consortium of donors with whom the organization shares common professional goals. Second, the organization tends to diversify its donors and its acquisition of resources to reduce the organization’s vulnerability to uncertainties so that it can adapt to contingencies and alter activities when the environment changes. Third, OrgB and OrgC are involved in transnational networks and actively participate in global forums. Networks provide the organizations with a space to influence and lobby, co-opt, alter the interdependencies confronted by the organization, and create new grounds of legitimacy. In addition, the activities of the organizational leaders and their presence in international forums brought attention to the organizations. Fourth, OrgB is strongly present in Palestinian politics as the president of the organization is the founder of a political party. While some interviewees criticized the president’s control over the organization, the organization went to great lengths and invested in its leader’s character at the local and international level.

Control over resources and influence provide organizations with other types of power over other constituents, i.e., the government. The potency of OrgB allows them to
resist pressure from the government since it may be more difficult for the Authority to revoke their legitimacy than that of less powerful organizations. The organization was more prone to challenge government policies than OrgA or OrgC. Generally speaking, OrgB contested the government’s dysfunctions, thereby highlighting its own integrity. The MOI representative expressed this strongly when she said that the organization ignores government requests to monitor them. Meanwhile, the organization’s leaders condemn the government in terms of its accountability. In addition, OrgB and OrgC were leaders in the campaign for a democratic NGOs law, to which they then responded. Furthermore, OrgB influences wider policy as the organization shapes and enforces new development and health approaches that are different from those of its competitors, including the government and other health providers.

Though OrgC was much smaller than OrgA and OrgB in terms of size and budget, it was able to keep reasonable organizational boundaries. A distinctive characteristic of OrgC is its balanced relationship with different local and international actors in its environment but there was also a tug-of-war inside the organization over its policies and developmental approach. A "one-man-show" phenomenon characterized FDOC’s leadership, as stated in the case study. The former director believed that he marginalized the founder’s political party in his efforts to prolong the organization’s life and to implement the policies he believed were right. The organization responded to various demands outside the organization with flexibility and negotiated exchanges.

First, OrgC was able to ensure its competitive financial position by negotiating with donors to find a middle ground in terms of the two organizations’ objectives.
However, in some cases, OrgC has engaged in activities that are not so much calculative or self-interested as obvious or proper. The organization’s activities were not solely about money, but it used negotiation mechanisms that allowed it to access funds whilst maintaining its autonomy. Second, the organization was able to maintain a collaborative relationship with different entities in the PA in several programs. Meanwhile, through this cooperation, the organization attempted to influence different social policies, especially to influence the discourse on gender and youth. Third, the organization, represented by its former director, was present in the debate over the roles and rights of civil society inside Palestine as well as in civic work coordination at the regional and international level.

The current management mentioned that the former director sacrificed the organization’s mission for financial resources. In the former director’s view, the organization modified its activities in an effort to increase compatibility with the new environment. More specifically, the organization altered its mission to fit the new environmental context. Recently, the future of OrgC has become uncertain. The interviews revealed that the third-stage management is genuine about its mission, but funding opportunities are not certain yet.

On the other hand, while interviewees from outside the organization expressed their hope that the organization would continue, they were not optimistic about the future of the organization because the transition from the old administration to the third-stage management was rocky. The current management dismissed a huge amount of funding that the former director raised before he left but, from the presented argument, this was
not about the character of the donor or the nature of the development project. It was rather related to features of the implementation and reporting arrangements that current management believed would negatively affect organizational autonomy. This is to say that this new management has a more stringent approach with respect to project implementation and reporting, these two stages are usually negotiable between donors and organizations; however, in the case of OrgC, the organization opted not to negotiate, thus illustrating its inflexibility. OrgC current management is more up to dismiss, rather than negotiate, what does not fit the organization’s plans.

Meanwhile, the third stage management is reaching out to other donors that are more consistent with their goals, such as D1OC. An interesting point here is that D1OC, who works at the local office of an international donor organization, explained that the fact that she is locally-based helps her to negotiate better between her organization and PNGOs. While introducing local donor offices clearly meant closer supervision of the projects these donors funded, in other cases it also enhanced donors’ understanding of what the Palestinians want and strengthened relationships and trust between the donors and PNGOs. D1OC representative clearly acted as a buffer between the more stringent head office and OrgC. When the officer of OrgC insisted on including certain points in the proposal or otherwise dismiss the whole project, as explained in the case report of OrgC, D1OC convinced him that some flexibility was required to get the project approved. A final point on OrgC is that while the third-stage management complies with the NGO law’s requirements of registration and reporting, the organization is ready to
challenge the ideology of the government. The organization’s extensive work on the government development plan demonstrates this.

The tables below present how the ten hypotheses of this research function in the context of the three organizations. The tables summarize the general aspects of each organization’s relationship with the main actors in its environment. In these tables:

- The actors and institutions in each organizational environment are presented as the key leaders of each organization perceived them. This is consistent with the “constructed environment” identified by Pfeffer and Slanacik (2003). As not every occurrence in the environment is of importance or is noticed by an organization’s members, there could be other actors/factors that the organization is not aware of and accordingly does not respond to.

- When the tactic is not specified that means this actor is not a critical source of this predictive factor.

- The organization may have responded in different ways to the same actor in different types of interactions. The response mostly depended on the intensity of the predictive factor.

- Tactics are arranged according to the escalation of the predictive factor.

- The greater/lower (as specified) the predictive factor (vertical), the greater the organization will use the presented tactic (middle) with the specific actor in the (horizontal).
The tables read in light of the organizational case studies and match each organization’s actions, as described by interviewees, to the strategic tactics suggested by Oliver (1991).
Table 5: Organization A Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive factors</th>
<th>General public</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Palestinian Authority</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Unions and other civil society organizations</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Habit, Influence</td>
<td>Comply, Balance, Pacify, Bargain, Co-opt</td>
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<td>Comply, Balance, Pacify, Habit, Influence</td>
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<td>Comply, Balance, Pacify, Negotiate</td>
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<td>Dismiss, Challenge, Conceal</td>
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<td>Dismiss, Challenge, Conceal</td>
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### Table 6: Organization B Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive Factors</th>
<th>Local populace</th>
<th>Local- CBOs, NGOs, and grassroots organizations</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
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<th>INGOs &amp; Donors</th>
<th>Local and international networks</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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Table 7: Organization C Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures (under the former director management; early 1990s–2006)

<table>
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<th>Predictive factors</th>
<th>CBOs and their communities</th>
<th>Local NGOs and Networks</th>
<th>Political party of affiliation</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Palestinian Authority</th>
<th>INGOs &amp; Donors</th>
<th>Local and international networks</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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Table 8: Organization C Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures (under the new / 3rd stage management; early 2006–present)

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Chapter Seven

Conclusion, Implications and Directions for Future Research

The goal of this research was to understand how Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) respond to uncertainties in their environment. To do this, the research identified and explicated the main actors and institutionalized forces in the environment of PNGOs, the restrictions imposed on PNGOs by various actors and institutionalized forces, and the mechanisms organizations utilized to deal with external demands. This is done in light of two theoretical approaches concerning organizational behavior: resource dependence theory and institutional theory. The researcher used Oliver’s (1991) framework which combined the two theoretical approaches to structure exploration and analysis. This research is distinct from other research on the two theories by discussing the complexities of the relationship between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and environment in Palestine under complex political emergencies and where a functioning public sector has never existed.

The field work of this research was carried out in two dimensions: horizontal and vertical. It was horizontal in the context that the researcher ascertained different elements that came into play in the organizational environment in general. The researcher compiled inventories of information on PNGOs from informants active and experienced in this field. The research was vertical in the context that the research went into depth about three organizations to gain a richer understanding of these complex issues when it comes to specific organizations. The researcher used in depth discussions with key figures in each of the three selected NGOs, during which the NGO’s head and board members detailed their organizational experiences with the outside environment.
Interviewees were asked to provide descriptions of the environment and organizational life in as open a manner as possible. Additional interviews were conducted with two donors of each organization to describe their relationship with the specific organization. The researcher also held group discussions with beneficiaries of each organization and asked about their implications and interest in the organization’s services. Furthermore, the researcher interviewed representatives of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the government entity that is responsible for licensing Palestinian civil society associations. While the oversight of NGO activities is the responsibility of the competent ministry, the MOI stepped up to oversee many aspects of NGOs, including their relationship with their donors and their activities. The interviews and group discussions were recorded on a digital recorder (when that was acceptable to the participant) and through note-taking. Unlike OrgB and OrgC, OrgA’s leaders were a bit hesitant to go into depth and provide a lot of details. This is not surprising; the state pervades the psyche of any nation that is subject to a prolonged occupation and lawless internal politics.

The researcher then compiled her findings into Chapter 4 of this dissertation, “The History of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations,” and the three case studies presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, both of which summarize information gathered from interviews as well as from background printed material and prior research. The case studies reports related the ten hypotheses of this research with examples from the focal organization’s life. The examples were snapshots extracted from different stages of the relevant organization’s life to explain the applicability of the hypotheses. In each hypothesis, the researcher concentrated and examined the organizational relationship with a certain institutionalized actor/factor and controlled for the others. While the choice of a
certain actor/factor to discuss the hypothesis seems subjective, the explanation for this is that each hypothesis best explains the nature of the relationship between the organization and the chosen institutional actor/factor, while other hypotheses best explain other aspects of this relationship. For instance, the relationship between the organization and taken-for-granted social norms were discussed as the legitimacy dimension (Hypothesis 1) and the research controlled for organizational legal legitimacy (meaning whether an organization follows the appropriate steps for registration and financial accreditation) but this issue is discussed then as part of the legal coercion dimension (Hypothesis 7) and the relationship between the organization and the government. Another example is in examining the relationship with the donors. This issue was discussed in light of whether there is consistency in the goals between the organization and the institutionalized environment (Hypothesis 5), while controlling for whether there is consistency of organizational goals with the taken for granted social norms, as this factor was discussed in Hypothesis 1. Examining the ten hypotheses together draws a complete picture of organizational relationships with different institutionalized actors/factors in organizational environments.

**Theoretical and Policy Implications**

Organizations of different types and different cultures have much more in common with one another than what squatter observers assume. The two theoretical approaches used in this research were not developed to serve the study of NGOs specifically, and certainly not to study social movements. Except for a few sections, Pfeffer and Slanacik (2003) were discussing the behavior of profit organizations. This
was the same for institutional theory—it was not developed in a context that has any similarity with the context studied in this research. Institutional theory was developed in a Western context in which stability and the rule of law prevails. This research has been applied where environmental uncertainty is the norm, not the exception. The organizations studied here developed in a “stateless” environment that transformed into a “semi-state” context. The research affirms that the two theories can be examined and correlated with other environmental contexts other than the one in which it was developed.

The discourse followed in this research refutes the hasty assumption that theory and practice are two different worlds. That said, this research shows that organizations, regardless of their category and culture, are social constructs created to serve certain interests. Their existence presumes and preserves the existence of a certain degree of divergent interests from the existing interests. Accordingly, individual organizations get involved in strategic games in an attempt to pave their way and to win over others with contrasting interests. As other actors are involved in similar processes of strategic gaming, and as some possess the tools of legitimacy and influence, they constitute an exterior constraint on an individual organization, thus limiting its potential. However, the strategic game is a process that no constraint or actor determines once for all. It follows that while organizations are not “rational actors,” decisions are not made arbitrarily by the organization and there always remains room for uncertainty and maneuver. Accordingly, organizations are not apparatuses that follow the rules but rather they are actors that generate rules.
From the case studies of these three organizations, this research concludes that organizations are not completely passive and conform to the pressures exerted on them, as institutional theory postulates, nor are they complete manipulators, as recourse dependence theory postulates. Rather, the responses of organizations illustrate the various traits of organizational actors, the nature of the pressure(s) enacted on them, and the political power they posses. Organizations can interpret their environment, make choices, and respond strategically. These responses may range from compliance to resistance and changing the environment itself.

Some researchers typically draw on a single theoretical approach of the two used here—institutional theory or resource dependence theory—to explain particular aspects of organizational behavior. They assume that positive outcomes validate the chosen approach. This may be valid to understanding one aspect of an organization–environment relationship, such as that between the organization and the donor; however, integrating the two theories together gives a more comprehensive understanding of the intricate relationship: The first perspective, institutional theory, is used to explain the value construct and social aspects of the environment and the organization, while the second perspective, resource dependence theory, explains resource exchanges, specifically the organization’s need to ensure a stable flow of resources from external sources.

This research utilized Oliver’s (1991) suggested framework and found it strongly useful. However, it should be kept in mind that, while sorting varying environmental features into five types (the institutional antecedents) helps to understand the specific features of the environment that stimulate specific organizational choices, the organization actually deals with the complex environment, i.e. with all the institutional
antecedents, all at once. Also, Oliver’s conceptualization of organizational responses can be expanded to accommodate other tactics under the strategic responses which ranged from acquiesce to manipulation.

This research proposes an intensive exchange between the researcher and actors within and around the organizations. Such research is a matter of scholarly reflection on organizational behavior and this approach is very helpful in grasping the significance of organizational actions. Organizational processes are a result of human decisions. It is very important to involve the actors themselves in the analysis of their actions. The researcher cannot alone observe the policy issue being analyzed. Indeed, the researcher needs to immerse herself in the heads of the actors and understand their sentiments in order to understand what drives their actions. This serves not only the research project but it helps the actors in the organizations to understand their own actions through an effective exchange during the research. In addition, the analysis of what actors say goes beyond the researcher’s objectivity or subjectivity, as the researcher has a role as an observer in determining the meaning of the action.

As theory and practice are not two different worlds, studying organizations and environments can provide researchers with insight as to which environmental features are enabling for certain types of organizations or behaviors to expand and which environmental features are contributing to the reform or disappearance of other types of organizations or behaviors. The practice of studying organizations and environments can also illustrate how to direct processes and create enabling factors to achieve desired organizational behavior and construct optimal environments. Research on developing countries is always limited by resources and access. There is much still to be studied and
understood. This research was a contribution to the understanding of how civil society may impact and have the potential to change the discourse in the context of fragile states—the type that exists in increasing parts of the world.

It is misleading to underestimate the donors’ conditionality and the transformation of the PNGO community in the 1990s. Donors’ conditions are silhouetted against the realities and needs of this difficult terrain. The attitude of donors automatically minimizes the impact and outcome of projects. The donors’ lack of experience with the local populations and the necessities of the concerned communities also impacts project success. Also, the new definitions and practices of dependency that started in early 1990s, and was under harsh attack from scholars and the general public, is in a process of institutionalization and beginning to be recognized as a “social fact.” In a meeting with the new director of an organization that was established in the middle of the 1990s, which was not part of this research study, the director clearly stated that, “If an organization wants to raise funds and prolong its life, it should surrender its autonomy to the donors and accept all type of conditions. No other option is available. Otherwise it will go out of business in few years.” Understanding this transformation and “institutionalization” is a key to more accurately assessing and correcting for the interaction between NGOs sector in developing countries at large and the donors.

**Directions for Future Research**

This study is in no way comprehensive or pretending to provide complete answers to questions. No study of this size could thoroughly examine both the past and current influence of environmental and organizational exchanges of action. The focus was basically on three organizations in one city and, with the exception of the brief discussion
of Islamic organizations and the Gaza in context, this study looked at a very narrow range of organizations. It is true that the environmental context reviewed in Chapter 4 is also applicable to Gaza, but the context has changed completely since 2006. However, certain conclusions can be made for other types of organizations from the examination of the three organizations studied in this dissertation.

This research suggests studying Islamic PNGOs in Palestine, specifically Hamas social services organizations, using the same theoretical framework. Several observers, including interviewees of this research, emphasized that “one” of the important factors that explains Hamas’ popularity and led to its victory in the 2006 legislative elections is the social services that Islamic organizations provide to people. Hamas PNGOs were established around the end of the 1980s, but flourished in the late 1990s forward. This research has studied secular organizations. Though the researcher interviewed and discussed her research with several leaders of Islamic organizations, she was not able to include Hamas organizations as a unit of study in this research. This was basically due to the security and sensitivity of the issue at this time. But this will be possible when there is more time allotted to set and structure the research to accommodate the safety part. There are some studies that compared PLO politics with Hamas politics over the course of both their histories, and it is crucial to track the social work of Islamic organizations and relate it to the environment, as this research did with secular organizations. It should be pointed that Sara Roy of Harvard University, who did extensive scholarly work on Gaza, would be a good reference to start with.

In addition, this research considered what actions and strategies organizations utilize in their response to the outside environment but it did not look at the internal

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22 Readers should not be confused with the Brotherhood organizations and Islamic charity organizations.
process of decision making within organizations. In the Palestinian context, which was also reflected in some parts of this research, the “one-man” phenomena prevailed. It would be very informative in future research to relate the detailed internal processes with the actions that occur at the surface and are visible to the outside.
References


Appendix I: Overview of the Field Research

The field research of this dissertation took place between October, 1, 2008 and January, 22, 2009. The researcher contacted the president of OrgA and the directors of OrgB and OrgC. She briefly explained her desire to study the organization and that she would like to meet the organizational leader to explain her work.

The field research on OrgA was from October 6 to December 13, 2008. The researcher conducted an introductory meeting with the president for 40 minutes. Before the meeting, the president called one board member, BM1OB, who also attended the meeting. The researcher gave the president the “Letter of Cooperation” and the “Informed Consent” (Appendices IIIA & IIIC) and she collected them in the second meeting. The actual interviews with the president regarding the organization were conducted in two sessions, each for a duration of 1 hour and 30 minutes. The president gave the researcher the contact information of three donors to interview, of which two would be chosen. The president also scheduled an appointment for the researcher to meet BM1OA and BM2OA. In addition, the president offered the researcher a two-hour orientation during which time the researcher visited the organization’s buildings and sites and learned about the organization’s projects. The researcher had the opportunity to talk to different employees and beneficiaries at the organization. The organization also has an archive center and a library, which the researcher visited another day. The researcher was also offered publications and brochures from the organization. The focus group discussion took place on the organization’s premises. The president asked one employee to make the arrangements. When the researcher arrived to the organization on the focus group discussion day, she went directly to this employee’s office. Two women were
waiting there to participate in the interview. The other participants were not scheduled to be in the focus group but agreed to participate. They had been to the organization for other reasons that day but were in the meeting room when the researcher, staff member, and two scheduled participants walked in and were invited to participate on the spot. The interview with BM2OA was not very informative as the board member was not one of the founders and she was away from the organization in the 1990s. The researcher then decided to interview BM3OA. In an effort to fill gaps in the information concerning pure managerial topics, the research met the manager. The researcher contacted the three donor representatives that manage the grants given to OrgA by their respective organizations. The researcher was able to reach two of them and the interviewees were held at the offices of their respective organizations in Ramallah.

The research on OrgB took place between October 28 and December 14, 2008. The researcher contacted the director over the phone. In the first meeting, the director signed the “Letter of Cooperation” and the actual interview took place directly after, so there was no introductory meeting. The second interview of 1 hour and 30 minutes with the director was held a week later at the organization’s office over the weekend since the director would be travelling during the week. The director of OrgB offered the researcher the contact information of four board members who had substantial and long-time experience with the organization. The researcher met BM1OB and BM2OB at the organization’s office. As BM2OB lives in Tulkarem, he suggested meeting the day before a board member meeting in Ramallah. Under normal circumstances, without checkpoints, the journey from Tulkarem to Ramallah is less than 45 minutes but it took him 2 hours to arrive to the interview. BM1OB offered the researcher the contact information of four
donors of which two would be chosen. The meeting with the first donor was held in the organization’s office since the donor representative’s office was in Jerusalem and the researcher was not allowed to go there due to the closure of Jerusalem. (The researcher holds a Palestinian identity card; Palestinians who hold a Palestinian Authority identity card are not allowed to enter Jerusalem.) The meeting with the second donor representative was held at his office located in Al Ram, right in front of the Wall. Upon the advice of BM1OB, the researcher contacted the managers of two of OrgB’s centers to arrange the focus group discussions. OrgB run different types of activities and the target group is diverse. The plan was to hold one focus group with participants from the two centers, but then, to save the participants the trip, the researcher went to each center and held two separate groups, each of 40 minutes. The researcher tried to arrange a meeting with OrgB’s president but he was travelling abroad during most of the time of the field research. This interview was not in the research plan for OrgB, as the researcher had already met other leaders at the organization. Meeting the president would have provided quality information on civil society in general. The president agreed to meet on December, 24, 2008. On that day, the Gaza Mascara of 2008 started, and, when the researcher arrived to the president’s office, several press journalists were there to interview him, and the research interview was cancelled. The employees at the office were also all busy due to the emergency.

The research on OrgC took place between November 6 and December 10, 2008, but then the researcher interviewed the former director of the organization on December 29, 2008. There was also no introductory meeting for OrgC. The researcher met the director twice. BM1OB was also met at the organization’s office. At the time of the
research, the organization was conducting extensive organizational restructuring and BM1OC was working closely with the director to rearrange different aspects of the organization as explained in the case. The researcher met BM2OB at her home in Ramallah. Each board member meeting was 2 hours long. OrgC had some policy research publications for sale and the researcher bought some of these useful publications. The Director of OrgC offered the researcher the contact information of the organization’s part-time coordinator in the Northern area of the West Bank so that the coordinator could arrange a meeting with the focus group participants. The researcher then met the coordinator at the Hawara checkpoint that separates Ramallah from Nablus, and from there they went to the meeting site. The meeting was held in one of the CBOs that OrgC supports. Besides the director and board member of the CBO, four directors of other CBOs came from another village and a refugee camp in Nablus. The director of OrgC offered the researcher the contact information of three donors. Two of them were supporting OrgC at the time of the former management. The researcher met two of them; one was working with the former director and the other with the new management. The representative was cooperative and came from Jerusalem to Ramallah, as the researcher could not go there. The two meetings were held in a quiet coffee shop in Ramallah for two hours. The researcher contacted the former director of OrgC at his home. Fortunate for the researcher, the former director was in Palestine at the time of the research, as he was living abroad at this time.

The interviews with the MOI employees took place from December 31, 2008 to January 1, 2009. The plan was to interview only the director of the General Administration of NGO’s, but after the researcher introduced the director to her research
plan, the director advised her to interview the other employees according to their field of specialty. The meetings with the each employee last for a duration of 20 minutes. January 1 is a holiday in the West Bank but the director agreed to meet the researcher at the director’s office on that day. Also, the financial officer agreed to meet the researcher on the same day as well, as they are usually too busy for a long meeting on regular working days. Each meeting lasted for a duration of 1 hour. The researcher also met the deputy assistant for 15 minutes to verify some information. The Ministry employees offered the researcher copies of several supporting documents.

The interviews with the experts took place side-by-side with the research on the organizations between October 11, 2008 and January 22, 2009. Meetings were held either at the expert’s office or at her/his home. The meetings ranged from 1–2 hours.

Without exception, all the interviewees were very cooperative. Five interviewees did not let the researcher use the recorder. After December 24, 2008 the atmosphere in the West Bank changed. People were fully occupied with what was happening in Gaza. Every day there was peaceful demonstration to show solidarity with Gaza in spite of the Palestinian Authority’s attempt to repress them. Several NGOs were collecting blankets, clothing, food, medicines, etc. from the residents for their distribution in the Gaza Strip via international organizations.
Appendix II: Guiding Questions for the Interviews and Group Discussions

The interviews were semi-structured. They always started with the researcher introducing herself and her research. During the interviews, the researcher asked for illustrative examples. The following were guiding questions for the researcher in each interview and in the focus group discussions.

The head and board member interviews

- How did the organization start?
- How and why can the organization make a difference in Palestinian society? How does your mission intersect with the needs of Palestinian society?
- How do you characterize the environment around the organization? Who are the main actors in this environment? What strategies do you utilize to deal with this environment?
- Are there conflicting requirements for the different actors in your environment? How do you deal with these differences?
- What are other constraints that prevent the organization from fulfilling its goal? How do you deal with them?

Probe questions

The researcher asked for illustrative examples. If the respondent did not give enough information in the above questions some probe questions were:

Government

- How would you describe the relationship between your organization and the Palestinian Authority?
• Does your organization depend on the Palestinian Authority for resources? If so, what obligations does this dependence impose on you and how do you deal with it?

• What legal obligation do you have to meet? Do you face any difficulty meeting these obligations? How does this legal obligation facilitate/constrain the organization’s activity?

Donors

• What is the source of funding for the organization?

• What conditions do donors put on your organization? To what extent do these conditions facilitate/impede your activities? How do you deal with that?

• On average, how long is the term of the contract with donors? What are the requirements for subsidy renewal? Do you face any obstacles to meet these requirements?

• How often do you report your activities to the donors? What details do these reports include? How do these reports help/impede the organization’s activities?

• How do you manage conflicts with the donor?

Target group

• To what extent do your target groups decide about how you conduct your activity? How do you get them involved? Is there a needs assessment?

• Are you always able to meet the wishes of the target group? How and why/why not?

• Does the organization have membership with any organizational network? Do you have a partnership with another NGO or with the government? How this membership or partnerships affect the organization activities?
Guiding questions for interviewing donors

In the interviews with the donors’ representatives, the researcher first asked the interviewee about his/her organizations’ activities and projects. The researcher then asked about the donors’ relationship with the selected organizations. The following are guiding questions for the interviews.

- Could you explain how the relationships with organization X started?
- Based on what factors do you choose to provide funding to organization X?
- On average how long are the contractual terms? On what basis do you decide to renewal a contract?
- How are the priorities and societal needs identified and measured in your projects with the organization?
- What are the reporting requirements or, in other words, how do you supervise your projects?
- On what basis do you assess the organization’s success in implementing the funding goals?
- What types of potential conflicts arise with recipient NGOs? How do you deal with organizational resistance to any of your requirements?
- Are there other actors who moderate or broker your relations with the organization?
- Over all how you evaluate the consistency of the relationship with the organization?
- In the case that organization was not able to meet your grant conditions, how would you react? Is there space for negotiation or any type of compromise on your side or the organization’s side?

Guiding questions for the interviews with experts
The context of the interviews was according to the expert’s field of expertise and type of involvement with civil society. Basically, Abdulhadi, Bargouti, Giacam, and Nakhleh were asked questions like:

- How did the PNGO movement start in Palestine?
- How did this movement develop and evolved over time?
- What were the main challenges that PNGOs faced?

Jabarin was asked specifically about closing of 103 PNGOs in 2007 as his organization, Al Haq, followed this case closely and defended 23 organizations in court.

DOX and DOXX were asked about the challenging circumstances under which their organizations were closed.

**Guiding questions for the interview with the Director of the General Administration of NGOs**

- How does your unit/department regulate the activities of the PNGOs?
- Under what circumstances did the department take over some of the official responsibilities that were initially assigned to the competent ministries?
- Under what circumstances were the 103 NGOs closed?
- What was the status of OrgA, OrgB, and OrgC in the status correctness that the department supervised in 2007 and 2008?

**Guiding questions for the focus group session**

- Why did you choose to accept this organization’s services or attend their activities over other organizations?
- Are there any alternative organizations where you can receive the same service(s)?
• Are you familiar with the organization’s goals? To what extent are these goals consistent with your own goals?

• To what extent do the organization’s activities meet your needs? To what extent does it meet the needs of other members of society?

• How often do you see the organization’s members or take part in organizational activities?

• In what ways do you participate in deciding what the organization’s activities will be?
Appendix III: IRB Forms

Appendix IIIA
(IRB Attachment 6: Authorization from Non-Rutgers Research Sites)

Introduction Letter and Request for the Organization Cooperation in a Doctoral Dissertation Project

Date: / / 

Dear Sir/ Madam

Head of (organization name)

My name is Fidaa Shehada, and I am a final year Ph.D. candidate at the Rutgers University’ School of Public Affairs and Administration in New Jersey, in the United States of America.

I am writing to formally introduce myself and express my interest in including your organization as part of a doctoral research project. The title of the project is *The Organizational Strategic Responses to Environmental Pressures: the Case of Three Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations*. The dissertation aims to explore how environments affect and constrain the characteristics and operations of individual non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and how organizations respond to the external constrains.

Your cooperation in this research is helping me to accomplish my project. Though, more importantly, you are helping in advancing theory and practice of organizations behavior. Specifically, to understand what NGOs have at their disposal to live up to the challenges they face and the promises they made for their beneficiaries. Further, this diagnosis of the non-state actors in Palestine is certainly important to understanding the impact on the civic life of the long and major conflict in the region, particularly since the Palestinian non-governmental organizations are considered by many to be a pioneering model for the Arab world NGOs.
Your cooperation entitles me to interview you, two board members, two donors of your organization, a representative of the Palestinian NGOs Affairs commission, and a group of 5-7 beneficiaries from the service provided by your organization. The questions of the interviews explores what opportunities and constrains arise in the organizational environment, including the relationship with the above mentioned actors, and what strategies the organization use to adapt and deal with the surrounding context. The name of the organization, your name, and the other subjects’ names will not appear in the final draft of this dissertation.

Your cooperation is highly appreciated. Please if you accept this coordination sign below. If there is any additional information you would need on the research or my curriculum vitae please contact me at my emails (fshehada@pegasus.rutgers.edu) or my cellular phone in Palestine (______________). You can also contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Rutgers University in New Jersey in the United States of America at email zizza@orsp.rutgers.edu or phone number (+732-932-0150)

Best Regards

Fidaa Shehada
Doctoral Student
Public Affairs and Administration
Rutgers University/ United States

Organization name------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Organization head name -------------------------- -- ----------------------------------------------

Organization head Signature----------------------Date---------------------------------------------

Notes---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Appendix IIIB

(IRB Attachment 4: Consent Form)

Informed Consent form (1)

(Circle one: head of the organization, board member, donor organization)

Researcher Name: __________________________________________________
Signature: _______________________________Date: _______________________

Subject Name: __________________________
Subject Signature _______________________ Date: _________________

By signing this form you agree to participate in a research titled The Organizational Strategic Responses to Environmental Pressures: the Case of Three Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations. The research aims to study how the surrounding environment constrains the individual organization and how organizations respond to these constrains. Your participation means that you will be interviewed one time for one hour and thirty minutes - the focal organization head interview is two hours. In the interview you will respond to questions on the Palestinian non governmental organizations (PNGOs) and the relationship between the organization called -------------------------------and its surrounding depending on the type of bond you/ or your organization have with this organization.

Your participation is voluntary. There should be no personal risk or benefit associated with your participation. You are free to withdraw from participation in the study without penalty. You can also refuse to answer a certain question. However, your participation will help planners, whether inside or outside the NGO, to understand and deal with this complicated relationship between the organization and its surroundings.

Further, by signing here ----------------------------------- you allow me to use a recorder during the interview. Otherwise, put the sign x instead of your signature. The recording will be used to make sure your responses are accurately reported. Your name, your organization name, and the name of the organization studied will not appear in the final report of the dissertation. All drafts of this dissertation and the recorded interview will be held only by the researcher.

If there is any additional information you would need on the research or my curriculum vitae please contact me at email (fshehada@pegasus.rutgers.edu) or my phone number in Palestine (______________). You can also contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at Rutgers University in New Jersey in the United States of America at email (zizza@orsp.rutgers.edu) or phone number (+ 732-932-0150)
Appendix IIIC
(IRB Attachment 4: Consent Form)

Informed Consent form (2)
(Circle one: expert in NGOs, representative of the General Administration of NGO’s)

Researcher Name: __________________________________________________
Signature: _______________________________ Date: _______________________
Subject Name: __________________________
Subject Signature _______________________ Date: __________

By signing this form you agree to participate in a research titled *The Organizational Strategic Responses to Environmental Pressures: the Case of Three Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations.* The research aims to study how the surrounding environment constrains the individual organization and how organizations respond to these constrains. Your participation means that you will be interviewed one time for one hour and thirty minutes. In the interview you will respond to questions on the Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) and their surrounding environment.

Your participation is voluntary. There should be no personal risk or benefit associated with your participation. You are free to withdraw from participation in the study without penalty. You can also refuse to answer a certain question. However, your participation will help planners, whether inside or outside the NGO, to understand and deal with this complicated relationship between the organization and its surroundings.

Further, by signing here --------------------------- you allow me to use a recorder during the interview. Otherwise, put the sign x instead of your signature. The recording will be used to make sure your responses are accurately reported.

If there is any additional information you would need on the research or my curriculum vitae please contact me at email (fshehada@pegasus.rutgers.edu) or my phone number is (__________________). You can also contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at Rutgers University in New Jersey in the United States of America at email zizza@orsp.rutgers.edu or phone number (+ 732-932-0150)
Appendix IIID

(IRB Attachment 4: Informed consent form for the participants of the Focus Group Discussion (3)
( the researcher read it to the group and provide each participant a copy to sign)

Researcher Name: ___Fidaa Shehada _________________________________________
Signature: __________________________ Date: ______________________________

Subject Name: __________________________
Subject Signature indicates voluntary participation ______________________________
Subject Signature indicates allowing the use of the recorder____________________
Date: __________________________

My name is Fidaa Shehada. I am collecting data for my dissertation project titled “The Organizational Strategic Responses to Environmental Pressures: the Case of Three Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations.” In this research I am looking at the relationship between the organization (___________________________) and its environment. What pressures do the environment place on the organization and how does the organization deals with it? You are invited here because you attend the organization’s activities and you are part of the actors in its environment. Your views and participation are highly appreciated. By participating in this group you are helping me to accomplish my project and you are helping planners, whether inside or outside the NGOs sector, to understand and deal with this complicated relationship between the organization and its surroundings. Our meeting is just for one time, it should last about one hour and forty minutes.

If anyone is younger than 21 years old please let me know before we begin. Be aware that your participation is voluntary. You are not obliged to attend this session and you can withdraw from the session if you change your mind about participation. Your signature on this paper below indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this session. Also
you can refuse to answer any question in this session. The researcher will not relate your names to your answers and will not include them in any report of this dissertation.

I have a recorder here. The recording will be used to make sure your responses are accurately reported. If anyone has objection on using the recorder please let me know so I do not use it. Your second signature above indicates that you agree on using the recorder during the session.

Your name and the name of the organization studied will not appear in the final report of the dissertation. All drafts of this dissertation and the recorded session will be held only by the researcher. Before we start I will give each of you 10 NIS in case you have paid transportation to attend the session.

In the session please keep your comments as close to your own experience and knowledge as possible.

If there is any additional information you would need on the research or my curriculum vitae please contact me at email (fshehada@pegasus.rutgers.edu) or my phone number is (______________). You can also contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at Rutgers University in New Jersey in the United States of America at email zizza@orsp.rutgers.edu or phone number (+ 732-932-0150)
Fidaa Shehada
Curriculum Vitae

Education

PhD, Public Affairs and Administration/ Fulbright Scholar.
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark, NJ. September 2006-January 2010

PhD coursework, Public Policy and Administration/Fulbright Scholar.
The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH. September 2005–September 2006
(45 credits accomplished)

September 2000- September 2003

B.S., Biology. Hebron University, West Bank, Palestine. September 1987- September 1993

Principal Occupations and Positions

School of Political Science, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Newark, NJ.
Adjunct Faculty, teaching “Ethnic Conflict and Peace Making.” January 2010-May 2010

School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Newark, NJ.
Adjunct Faculty, taught “Strategic Planning for Government and Non-profit Organizations,” July–August 2009

School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Newark, NJ.
Researcher in the Newark Schools Project, April–June 2009

Bisan Center for Research and Development, Ramallah, Palestine.
Consultant, April–August 2005

The Arab Microfinance Network (SANABEL), Cairo, Egypt
Translator of major CGAP’s (the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) Financial Manuals, Jan 2002–Sep 2005

Panorama – Palestinian Institution for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, Ramallah, Palestine.
Crisis Management Officer & Trainer, January 2002–April 2004

Palestine for Credit and Development (FATEN), Ramallah, Palestine
Training and Human Resources Officer, June 1999–January 2002

The Palestinian Academy, Ramallah, Palestine
Biology Teacher and UNESCO Associated Schools Project Coordinator, September 1994–June 1999