RETHINKING ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM: SUB-HEGEMONY IN THE DELIAN LEAGUE

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Rethinking Athenian Imperialism: Sub-Hegemony in the Delian League

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This dissertation examines the territorial possessions of the members of the Delian League, which I refer to as sub-hegemonies, since these regional hegemonies existed under the overarching control of Athens. Specifically, this study focuses on the administrative processes of syntely (grouping of tributaries often headed by a regional hegemonic state) and apotaxis (dissolution of tributary groupings) as a means of illuminating wider questions of fiscal administration, clashing imperialisms, and the coherence of tributary polities.

Traditionally, scholars of the Delian League have mainly focused on Athens’ role as the hegemonic state of an empire stretching throughout the Aegean and Ionia. Canonical studies such as the Athenian Tribute Lists and Russell Meiggs’ Athenian Empire have traced the development of Athens from the head of an alliance to the ruthless mistress of an empire. Much scholarship was devoted to charting the ways in which Athens exerted her will over her imperial subjects. Little attention was focused on the allies themselves outside of generalizations about the disenchantment with Athenian rule and periodic revolts. In place of an analysis of this kind, I examine the various sub-hegemonies that many allies in the league controlled, such as the peraiai (‘coastal strips’) possessed by the large insular allies, including Thasos and Rhodes, as well as the regional
hegemonies of important littoral states. My conclusions reveal that Athenian policy was much more varied than previous analysis has shown and that the allied states often managed the tribute system to their advantage and were generally successful in maintaining their traditional spheres of influence. For example, *syntelic* and *apotaxic* tributary arrangements were primarily strategies employed by the allies to meet the changing demands for tribute and not solely determined by Athens to enhance revenue or weaken an ally. Moreover, Athens generally tolerated and even supported the historical claims of large states such as Miletos, and Mytilene. Thus, Athenian policy was more flexible and less imperialistic than is often understood.
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Introduction

There are few subjects in the study of ancient history that have had a longer life or have aroused more scholarly controversy than the Athenian empire of the 5th century BC. Issues such as the original purpose of the Delian League, the controversial first assessment tribute figure of 460T, and the historicity of the Peace of Callias have all been endlessly debated. Yet, there remain important areas of investigation that have not received adequate attention from scholars. For example, there is yet no substantial treatment concerning the regional hegemonies of the allies of the Delian League. The creation of the Delian League did not hinder the aspirations of Greek states under Athenian hegemony to create and maintain their own spheres of influence. Many cities continued to control their own dependencies throughout the 5th century although subject to Athens. Most conspicuous of these regional hegemonies were the peraiai, ‘coastal strips’, possessed by large island states such as Samothrace and Thasos in the north Aegean. There were also several mainland states such as Miletos and Erythrai, which held sway over dependent communities. Both literary and epigraphical evidence attests to the size and nature of some of these “sub-hegemonies”. The most notable instance was perhaps the Mytilenaian controlled Aktaian poleis in the Troad and Mysia, which included at least fourteen cities in the mid-420s. The term sub-hegemony best illustrates the nature of these regional dominions by the allied states since they nested within the overarching hegemony of Athens and were nominally subject to influence and, possibly, interference by the Athenians. Thus, it can be said that Delian League included smaller
hegemonic configurations throughout the Aegean basin with Athens residing at an apex of political authority.

I define sub-hegemony as the control by a *polis* over a range of communities which could be classified in some cases as dependent villages or *poleis*. At the same time, control over dependent communities by a *polis* in and of itself should not be considered a sub-hegemony if these communities were sub-divisions of the *polis* such as the demes of Eretria and Athens. Often, the appearance in the tribute lists or identification by a geographic source is the only evidence of a community’s existence in the Classical period. The tribute lists abound with many small tributaries that were clearly *poleis* and many that cannot be categorized, such as the island of Leros, which belonged to Miletos. These issues are of great importance in determining the nature of dependency in the Delian League. It is certainly true that the league was not an alliance solely of *poleis* but of a range of communities tied to other member states in varying degrees of dependency. Furthermore, the range of communities that paid tribute to Athens must have greatly impacted issues concerning sub-hegemony. For example, Euboia and Rhodes were two islands that were dominated by a small number of major cities such as Eretria and Lindos (respectively) that also seem to have controlled varying types of dependent communities that appeared as individual tributaries throughout the period of league. In general, I have focused on the most well-documented sub-hegemonies of the tributary states. There were many regional hegemonies of varying sizes around the league for which there is virtually no surviving evidence. I have tried to identify many of these sub-hegemonies in the course of this study, but not have attempted to chart every hypothetical case. Generally, the large allies that controlled smaller dependencies, which at various times were
assessed by the Athenians or are known to have been *poleis* or significant settlements dominate this study. Individual assessment by the Athenians or identification by an ancient source of *polis* status must be considered differentiating criteria for most settlements from their neighbors too small and unimportant to be considered to have enjoyed autonomy on any measurable level.

A key to identifying and understanding these sub-hegemonies is contained in the Athenian Tribute Lists since most of the regional hegemonic states were tributaries of the Athenians. The fragmentary Athenian Tribute Lists, or more accurately the Quota Lists, since they only enumerated the 60th of the allied tribute set aside for Athena, record the annual payments from the allies beginning in 454/53. Although most of the lists are fragmentary, they provide actual documentation of income derived from the tributary members of the league in a given year. The Athenian Tribute Lists, therefore, form the most important sources for the study of the tribute system and many other aspects of Athenian and allied policy. The numerous decrees emanating from Athens and allied states in this period form another important body of evidence for the workings of the empire. These inscriptions include treaties, accounts, innovations in the collection of tribute and other aspects of imperial administration, and honorary decrees. The literary testimony of the ancient historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides form another major category of evidence for the Delian League. A few of the ancient writers lived in the 5th century such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon while other important sources such as Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch lived centuries later. Many of the later sources sometimes contain even more valuable evidence than those from the period of the Delian League. Archaeological and numismatic material also provides important data for the size
and economic output of Athens and many other cities in this period. Yet, the epigraphical
and literary evidence is generally most important for my conclusions.

Alongside the individual payments of the allies that are recorded on the tribute
lists are also group payments of tribute in an arrangement called syntely. Notable allies
such as Miletos, Olynthos, and Erythrai contributed in syntelic relationships with their
dependencies. In other words, these cities paid their tribute on behalf of or together with
smaller tributary states under their control. The lists duly record these joint payments
from the very first list in 454/53 and often, in the absence of literary testimonia,
constitute our sole evidence of a sub-hegemony. Just as significantly, it is possible to
observe on the lists the separation of syntelic groups into individual tributaries, a process
called apotaxis. The shifts which these processes create in the record of payment of
tribute are not only the main evidence for the phenomenon of sub-hegemony, but also
document the changing statuses of such amalgamations of allies.

Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that a syntely does not always necessarily
reflect the existence of a sub-hegemony, but simply signifies the union of two peer
communities for the purpose of tribute payment. Scholars have yet to understand fully the
fundamental features of syntely and apotaxis because many important aspects of the
tribute process are still shrouded from us. Yet, these features of the tribute system form
the most important evidence for the range of regional hegemonies that existed in the
Delian League and also are valuable for understanding the nature of the tribute system
itself.
The examination of sub-hegemony in the Delian League offers a new approach to the study of various aspects of the Athenian empire such as the relationship between Athens and her allies, the local economic and political circumstances of the members of the league, and even Athenian imperialism. Through the study of *syntely* and *apotaxis*, it is also possible to illuminate much concerning the tribute process itself which was so central to the Athenian hegemony. Although the tribute lists were available to scholars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was with the publication of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* by Meritt, Wade-Gery, West, and later McGregor from 1939 that historians had a full reconstruction of the surviving fragments. The editors of the *ATL* also provided a collection of *testimonia* concerning the Delian League and a Gazetteer of the often disputed locations of the members of the empire. The impact of the publication of the *ATL* was substantial. The *ATL* has become the basis for much of the reconstruction of almost every aspect of the Delian League. The publication in 1950 of the third volume of the *ATL* has heavily influenced interpretations of the alliance especially among British and American historians. Although the editors of the *ATL* addressed almost every aspect of the Athenian empire, they did not provide an in-depth study of the sub-hegemony, but restricted their treatment to a brief discussion of the *peraiai* of the large islands. ¹ However, *apotaxis* did warrant more attention from the editors. They offered a general explanation for *apotaxis*, claiming boldly that beginning with the 440s the Athenians promoted *apotaxis* in order to raise revenue, and they suggested that this process is an

¹ *ATL* 3.195.
explanation for the appearance of several special categories of tributaries in the late 430s.²

The intellectual thrust of the ATL can be said to have been presenting a full picture of the Delian League with a special emphasis on its change from a military alliance against Persia to an imperial system controlled by Athens. Scholars such as Russell Meiggs and David Lewis built upon the work of the ATL in the second half of the 20th century. In particular, Meiggs and Lewis focused on what Meiggs called the “Crisis of Athenian Imperialism”, referring to the period in the mid-5th century when he thought that the Athenians suffered from massive unrest among their allies in his ATL-derived interpretation of Thucydides and surviving epigraphic evidence.³ To sketch this crisis, Meiggs based his reconstructions on the missing tribute payments of some allies or reductions in payment, believing missing payments resulted either from defection or from the confiscation of allied land by the Athenians primarily in retaliation for rebellion. The harsh nature of Athenian imperialism was especially highlighted by Meiggs in his interpretation of any increases in tribute levels and in his reading of surviving Athenian decrees. These enactments tended to consider settlements after various hypothetical revolts. As in the case of the ATL, Meiggs’ specific studies and especially his Athenian Empire have become a standard for historians of the period. Yet, throughout Meiggs’ works, little attention was bestowed upon the regional hegemonies of the allies and little ground was covered that had not already been charted by the ATL. However, Meiggs did

² ATL 3.80-87.
³ See Meiggs 1963, 1-36.
generally emphasize both supposed Athenian unease with amalgamations of allies and Attic reactions against efforts at consolidation among league members.  

Over the past thirty years other scholars have dealt with sub-hegemony to a limited extent. Wolfgang Schuller has periodically contributed to the study of apotaxis and other issues surrounding sub-hegemony, but has not offered a full study. Like Meiggs, Schuller concentrated on the hypothesis that the Athenians generally attempted to divide and separate groups of allies and to dissolve regional hegemonies. For Schuller, syntely and apotaxis were reflective of deeper unions of allies that Athens generally found threatening and sought to weaken. In 1980, Noel Robertson published an important article in the American Journal of Ancient History entitled “The True Nature of the Delian League.” In the article, Robertson provided a revisionist view of the original purpose of the Delian League, claiming that the original intent of the league was as an alliance of a few strong naval powers to force smaller cities into paying tribute. An important contribution of Robertson was his acknowledgement that important member states strove to aggrandize their territory even at the expense of other allied cities. He recognized that the attack of Samos on Priene in 441/40 typified this aggression.

Most recently, a series of publications of the Copenhagen Polis Centre under the leadership and direction of Mogens Herman Hansen has advanced the study of the institutions of the Greek polis. Since the tribute lists provide the only evidence for the

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7 Robertson 1980, 64-133.
8 Robertson 1980, 71.
history of many small city-states that were otherwise lost to history, the Polis Centre has contributed much effort to the interpretation of certain aspects of tribute lists. Notable scholars such as Wolfgang Schuller and Alexandru Avram have contributed to the publications of the Copenhagen Polis Centre with studies that have attempted to categorize the communities that belonged to the Delian League. Their contributions have examined issues of dependency in the league, while exploring *syntely* and *apotaxis* in some detail, with particular emphasis on *apotaxis* as Athenian economic and political strategy.\(^9\) Having noted the major trends in the scholarship, I do not intend in this introduction to provide an exhaustive list of every work which has touched on sub-hegemony in any form. Instead, I shall discuss the contributions of other scholars as they become relevant.\(^10\) It can be said, however, that the general appreciation of Attic hegemony has tended to hold that the Athenians were hostile to *syntelic* arrangements of their allies, no matter whether they were reflective of regional hegemonies or simple unions among relatively equal states. An Athenocentric perspective in which analyses begin and end with a determination of what the Athenians might have wished has dominated this topic.

This project aims to offer a comprehensive study of the sub-hegemonies of the allies in the Delian League. More specifically, this study will focus on the administrative processes of *syntely* and *apotaxis* as a means to illuminate wider questions of fiscal administration, clashing imperialisms, and the coherence of tributary polities. My aim is not merely to describe the size and nature of the regional hegemonies of states such as

\(^{10}\) For the main treatments of the regional hegemonies of the allies and *syntely* and *apotaxis* see *ATL*. 1.445-49, 3.195 and Lepper 1962, 25-55.
Mytilene, Samos, and Thasos, some of which in fact have also recently received attention from scholars such as Graham Shipley, Peter Funke, Cristina Carusi, and Christy Constantakopoulou. These scholars have all offered studies on the nature and political function of the peraiai of the large Aegean island states from the Archaic to Hellenistic periods. Instead, my focus is on the tributary processes of syntely and apotaxis as a key to understanding the means by which allies managed their hegemonic impulses within a tributary system controlled by Athens. Moreover, the annual tribute payments provide invaluable data for the economic output of allied states. Reductions in tribute, missing tribute, and types of payment are sometimes the only evidence of significant disruptions and other type of changes in the interrelations of the allies.

For instance, the appearance of new tributaries on the lists, often through apotaxis, probably signified changes not only in the tribute assessment process but also in the underlying local political situation in a given region of the league. These changes are reflected on the lists in the way in which the Athenians credited the payments. For example, the separate entry of dependent communities after a period of joint payment is often interpreted as the result of political unrest or Athenian actions leading to the dissolution of local hegemony. At the same time, the disappearance of small dependencies from the lists is often viewed as the renewed control by hegemonic states over estranged dependencies. In these suggestions, it is often forgotten that the tribute payment of many allies included dependent communities of varying sizes, which were never entered on the lists. Yet, these communities were just as integral to the economic productivity of large states. Therefore, an important question remains concerning the

reasons for the listing of certain small dependencies along with their syntely ‘heads’ while others were not. For example, Orobiai in Hestiaian territory and Oisyme in the Thasian peraia were both identified as poleis by Thucydides, but never appeared with their own entries on the quota lists while places like Brikindera and the Pedies on Rhodes, which were probably not poleis, paid their own tribute. The status of these small dependencies is often difficult to determine. Historically, scholars have assumed efforts by the Athenians to ensure the independence of these small places through individual assessment without providing hard evidence or even convincing argumentation. It is left unexplained why the Athenians embarked upon a grand strategy of domination that was predicated on its application to tiny, indefensible places split from larger entities. The cases of Orobiai and Oisyme illustrate well the danger of generalizing about Athenian policies toward the sub-hegemonies of the allies.

Athenian policy was the most important but not sole determinant of these tributary arrangements. The tribute payments recorded on the lists are themselves the products of negotiation on many levels between the Athenians and allies. Unfortunately, a syntelic arrangement or apotaxis was the outcome of a process that is often mysterious to us. Furthermore, we receive only occasional glimpses of how the Athenians assessed communities for tribute from the surviving documents. Further research is also needed to clarify the appeals process between the Athenians and allies that often followed initial assessment as prescribed in the assessment decree of 425/24. The decision made by Athens or its allies to pay in a syntely or to separate payment individually among the members of a group must have affected the assessment process in ways that militated for

\[12\] Thuc. 3.89.2 (Orobiai), 4.107.3 (Oisyme).
\[13\] IG I^1 71.15-17.
or against group payments of tribute. We can only speculate on the reasons why Erythrai or Thasos continued to pay for their dependencies after becoming tributaries when the benefits of maintaining a regional hegemony were minimized in significant ways. For instance, the demands by Athens of tribute meant that the allies were not permitted to monopolize revenue drawn from their dependent territory, and the Athenians gained the capability of influencing local issues through assessment.

Although much of the evolution of Athens’ control over the alliance is unclear, there must have been many issues at play that determined a syntelic arrangement ranging from purely administrative and fiscal motives to the desire for local aristocracies to maintain longstanding privileges inherited from periods pre-dating the Delian League.\footnote{My treatment below will suggest that the allied states of Samothrace and Euboian Khalkis acted in 424 to shed dependencies through \textit{apotaxis}. The case of Priene seems to demonstrate how aristocratic groups could have a particular interest in maintaining regional hegemony.} I emphasize that some of these hegemonies (like that of Mytilene) was not merely “grandfathered” in the arrangements of the Delian League, but must have been consolidated during the early decade of the life of the confederacy.

At the same time, Athenian encouragement or at least toleration of \textit{syntelies} must have had yielded benefits for the imperial hegemon as well as \textit{apotaxis}. Yet, there exists the danger of assuming that these different tributary arrangements signify more than they really do. For example, without further evidence it is difficult to judge whether \textit{apotaxis} was the result of the actual division of a regional hegemony, as assumed by many scholars, or simply a new arrangement for the purposes of tribute payment. At the same time, it may also be misguided to view \textit{syntely} and \textit{apotaxis} simply as contrasting processes. In a sense, \textit{apotaxis} was not exclusively the division of a \textit{syntely}, but could be
the creation a new individual tributary where a syntely never existed before.

Concomitantly, apotaxis was a work to separate an earlier tributary unity to form a syntely. In all these cases, there must have been forces that permitted the economic and political viability of a community that equipped it to furnish tribute on its own.

The appearance of a number of small tributaries in special tribute categories in the late 430s, which I will mainly attribute to apotaxis, illustrates this issue well. Without further evidence for the local conditions around the league it is difficult to tell if apotaxis was more than a strategy to lighten tribute. Thanks to Thucydides, there is no doubt that the Athenians confiscated the Thasian peraia in 463/62 and the Mytilenaian in 427. Yet, it is almost impossible to interpret the nature of tributary groupings of other states without any other evidence; I think of the syntelies such as those in Chalkidike on the first tribute list of 454/53, groupings which suffered apotaxis by the next assessment period.\footnote{IG I\textsuperscript{3} 259.V.6-8 (Olynthos, Assera, and Skabra); IG I\textsuperscript{3} 259.V.10-12 (Mekyberna, Polichnitai, and Stolos).}

I have divided my study into six chapters with a conclusion. The first chapter tackles the fundamental features of syntely and the related process of apotaxis. Special attention is given to the major previous interpretations along with an examination of the processes as represented on the tribute lists. Chapters two through six examine a range of sub-hegemonies throughout the league, both inland and insular. Chapter two is a study of the Erythraian syntely, which was centered on the Mimas peninsula and underwent several periods of syntely and apotaxis. Chapter three focuses on the Milesian sub-hegemony, which is known to have contained the island of Leros and the community of Teichioussa. Special attention is given to interpreting the city’s complicated history in the...
mid-5th century. Rhodes and Euboia are treated in chapter four. Both islands were dominated by a handful of major *poleis* that controlled communities of differing statuses. Rhodes is also believed to have controlled a *perai* and surrounding islands in the late Archaic period and early Classical period. Chapter five is dedicated to Thasos and Samothrace, two northern Aegean islands that possessed well-attested *perai* in Thrace. Finally, chapter six covers the three autonomous member states, Mytilene, Chios, and Samos. These islands formed a different class of allies since they were not tributary states, but contributed ships to the alliance. Thus, they did not appear on the tribute lists and do not form the main focus of this dissertation. Furthermore, even the subjection of Samos and Mytilene by the Athenians after failed revolts did not result in transformation of these states into tributaries like Thasos in the 460s. Yet, an examination of the sub-hegemonies of the three states does yield important conclusions for this study.

Finally, as I discussed at the beginning of this introduction, there are many unresolved issues concerning the Athenian empire. Even the term “Athenian empire” is controversial and implies certain views about the nature of Athenian hegemony and the very structure of the league. I have chosen to use the different terms generally employed to describe the Delian League for the sake of variation. Empire, alliance, and league all adequately describe the different aspects of the Delian League. It may be noted that empire is better suited to describe the league from the mid-century when the Athenians seem to have exerted more control over the allies than in the first few decades after the foundation of the alliance. I have also not tackled the issue of the Peace of Callias in this study. This issue has a long and complicated history, which would be distracting from the issues at hand. For our purposes, it is not crucial to decide whether the Athenians and
Persians made a formal peace ca. 450 or the reasons for the supposed missing tribute list for 449/48. In place of taking a firm position on the historicity of the Peace, I have discussed related problems such Persian activity in Ionia in the 440s when necessary. My aim is not to rewrite the history of the Delian League, but to offer an examination of an important aspect of the league that has been generally ignored by scholars. As such the resolution of its challenges will condition the terms under which the evolution of Attic hegemony must be understood.
Chapter 1: Syntely and Apotaxis

Any study of sub-hegemony in the Delian League must consider the evidence from the tribute lists not only as a basis, but often in the course of any investigation. The quota lists are often the only source for the existence of a number of regional hegemonies in the Aegean region in the 5th century, and their evidence is enigmatic in its construal. Sub-hegemony is the control over dependent territory by members of the Delian League most of which were subject to Athens through the mechanisms of the tribute system.¹ The limitations of the lists for understanding sub-hegemony are also evident in that they naturally only document the tributary states of the alliance while providing little information concerning the autonomous allies such as Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. However, the evidence for a number of sub-hegemonies can only be observed through the documentation of syntely and apotaxis on the quota lists.

The Processes

These terms refer to the groupings of tributaries often in a hegemonic relationship and dissolutions of these groups into individual tribute-paying states. The late antique lexicographer, Harpocration, provides a definition of each of these terms, which were used in a speech of Antiphon on the tribute of the Samothracians. It is generally agreed that Antiphon delivered the speech in 425/24 as an appeal before a court of 1,000 to lower the Samothracian assessment, which had possibly had risen from 2T to 15T.² The mention of apotaxis preserved in the fragments likely alludes to the individual

¹ The brief discussion of the Athenian policy toward the dependencies of the allied states vis-à-vis apotaxis in ATL 3.195-96 illustrates this definition well.
² IG I³ 71.16-18 for special court; See IG I³ 71.III.58 (15T restored); Perdrizet 1909, 38; Gernet 1923, 161; Meiggs 1972, 241.
assessments of three Samothracian settlements on the Thracian mainland, which appear separately assessed in the list of 422/21.\(^3\)

\[\text{ἀπόταξις: τὸ χωρίς τετάχθαι τοὺς πρότερον ἀλλήλοις συντεταγμένους εἰς τὸ ὄριον μένον φόρον’ Ἀντιφών ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Σαμοθρακῶν φόρου.}\(^4\)

*apotaxis*: The assessing separately of those previously arranged together for paying a defined tribute. Antiphon in “Concerning the Tribute of the Samothracians”.

\[\text{συντελεῖς ὀἱ συνδαπανώντες καὶ συνεσφέροντες τὸ δ’ πράγμα συντέλεια καλεῖται ὡς ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν ἐν τῷ Ἀντιφώντος περὶ τοῦ Σαμοθρακῶν φόρου.}\(^5\)

*syntelies*: Those making expenses together and joining in making contributions. This situation is called a *syntely*, as it is possible to find in the speech of Antiphon “Concerning the Tribute of the Samothracians”.

On the surface, a *syntely* is defined as the union of allies for the purpose of paying tribute and *apotaxis* is their separation into individual tributaries. The terms themselves do not necessarily connote the existence of a hegemonic structure. It is clear, however, that in many cases one city seems to have paid on behalf of nearby smaller, once or possibly still dependent communities.\(^6\) These arrangements span the entire period of the league and ranged from small groupings of just two communities to some aggregations of more considerable size. Both Miletos and Erythrai belonged to *syntelies* and experienced *apotaxis* throughout their memberships in the league. Both these cities seem to have been the heads of their *syntelies*, while, to take an example from the other end of the scale of magnitude, tiny Perkote and Palaiperkote seem to have been relatively equal partners in

\(^3\) IG I\(^1\) 77.V.27-28 (Zone); IG I\(^1\) 77.V.31 (Sale); IG I\(^3\) 77.V.29-30 (Drys).
\(^4\) Harp. s.v. ἀπόταξις . (A 208) Keaney.
\(^5\) Harp. s.v. συντελεῖς . (Σ 61) Keaney.
\(^6\) See ATL 1.446-49 for a list of *syntelies* and group payments.
their syntelic arrangement. Surprisingly little scholarship has delved into this important aspect of the Delian League.

The majority of the modern scholarship on syntely and apotaxis began with the publication of the Athenian Tribute Lists [1939]. The editors of the ATL devoted some space for an analysis of syntely and apotaxis. They limited themselves to enumerating the various syntelic arrangements, and they not only proposed a general explanation of the Athenian policy of apotaxis, but specifically offered the observation that apotaxis is central to the understanding of the special rubrics on the quota lists which began to appear in the 430s. Although the editors of ATL synthesized much valuable information here, they failed to examine adequately these issues. Within a decade of the publication of the third ATL volume, F.A. Lepper had leveled significant criticism at the editors of ATL’s explanation of the special rubrics in his article entitled “Some Rubrics in the Athenian Quota-Lists.” Lepper denied that apotaxis is a sufficient explanation for the appearance of a number of new members to the league in the 430s as the ATL had postulated. At the same time, Lepper offered some useful observations about these tributary statuses. A decade later Wolfgang Schuller devoted a few pages to syntely and apotaxis in his important volume on the Athenian empire, entitled Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund, in an attempt to grapple with underlying Athenian imperial policy. Schuller mainly concentrated on apotaxis as an imperialistic tool of Athens. Schuller returned to this subject again in his contribution in Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 2 entitled “Poleis im Ersten Attischen Seebund.” He once

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7 See ATL 1.446-49, 456, 3.195-96.
8 Lepper 1962, 39-44.
10 Schuller 1995, 165-70.
again observed that Athens used *apotaxis* as an instrument of imperialism to divide and weaken allies. In the same vein, Alexandru Avram, in his contribution to the volume entitled *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, likewise viewed *apotaxis* as a repressive measure.\(^{11}\)

In general, scholars have tended to view *apotaxis* as a tool of Athenian policy toward the allies, ensuring a weakening of allied ambitions or seeking an increase of revenue from *phoros*.\(^{12}\) Consonant with these views, it is argued that Athens tolerated *syntelies* until it became economically or politically useful to pursue *apotaxis*. My own understanding of the phenomenon differs substantially for I shall suggest that there was no uniform Athenian policy toward *syntely* and *apotaxis*. I believe that much of the previous scholarship on these issues has failed to attach enough importance to analyzing the bureaucratic processes of assessment themselves, while all too readily assigning a single motivation to the Athenians. A close examination of the function that the union and dissolution of tribute payment had on the allies and Athens as the hegemonic state of the league is of central importance. Only after an analysis of this kind can further judgments be made about the political and economic ramifications that these processes possessed in the league. Clearly, Athens used *apotaxis* as a tool in a variety of circumstances. For instance, Athens applied *apotaxis* to punish Mytilene after her revolt was subdued in 428/27. Yet, if Athens did not intervene in other cases to break up *syntelies* or other regional hegemonies, sometimes even after revolts, then it appears that certain factors militated for or against a *syntely* of contributors or toward or away from *apotaxis* beyond accelerating “imperialism”.

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\(^{11}\) Avram 1995, 191-200.

\(^{12}\) See Engelmann and Merkelbach 1972, 34 for an analysis of the *apotaxis* of Erythrai and its dependents.
The editors of *ATL* recognized *syntely* and *apotaxis* as fundamental aspects of the Athenian empire. For instance, they noted that the separate assessment of an island’s *peraia* was a form of *apotaxis*.\(^{13}\) As stated above, they also offered a general explanation for *apotaxis*:

“Apotaxis, which was not employed on a large scale until after 440, was a means of increasing Athenian revenues; the assessment of a large city might decrease, but the sum total realized by Athens, when she took over direct assessment of the small dependencies, increased.”\(^{14}\)

This explanation depends on the supposition that after 440 Athens decided to squeeze the allies by employing *apotaxis* to yield greater tribute payments. It is possible by examining the tribute lists to calculate whether *apotaxis* generally yielded higher tribute at any period and especially after 440.\(^ {15}\)

For example, in the case of the *syntely* headed by Erythrai, the actual tribute decreased after *apotaxis*. In 450/49 Erythrai and its five dependent communities paid a tribute together of 9T.\(^ {16}\) In 443/42 Erythrai and its dependents paid separately a total tribute of 7T 5,700 dr.\(^ {17}\) In this case, *apotaxis* led to a reduction in the total tribute for Athens. One explanation, offered in *ATL*, for the reduced figure is that Athenian colonies might have been settled at Kolophon and Erythrai in ca. 447/46.\(^ {18}\) Meiggs, however, attributed the reduction to the league-wide lowering of tribute in 446.\(^ {19}\) Whatever the reasons for the reduction, it is clear that Athens received less from Erythrai and its dependents after *apotaxis*. After 440, when Athens is supposed to have pursued *apotaxis*

\(^{13}\) *ATL* 3.195.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) See Lepper 1962, 38-41 for a useful summary of the tribute levels before and after *apotaxis*. His conclusions are revealing and convincing that *apotaxis* generally did not yield greater tribute.

\(^{16}\) *IG I*\(^ {1}\) 263.II.13-18.

\(^{17}\) *IG I*\(^ {1}\) 269.I.20-25.

\(^{18}\) *ATL* 3.282-84.

\(^{19}\) Meiggs 1972, 162-3.
on a large scale, there was in fact a significant rise in tribute to over 10T when Erythrai and its dependents paid together again as a syntely in 433/32 and 432/31.\textsuperscript{20} In this period, reversing an apotaxis yielded an \textbf{increased} assessment. In 428/27, Erythrai paid 12T separately from the group, which seems to have been the highest amount paid by the city in a period of increased tribute, probably because of the pressures of the siege of Mytilene.\textsuperscript{21} The reduction in the tribute of members of the Thracian Chersonese from 18T in a syntely to 1T 4,500 dr. after apotaxis could again be attributed to an Athenian cleruchy set out in 447.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, even then, the exception does not support the \textit{ATL} hypothesis. On Rhodes, Lindos and Oiai paid 9T in total separately in 454/53 but 10T together when it is likely that Oiai had been reabsorbed by the Lindians by 448/47.\textsuperscript{23}

Turning from cases where apotaxis is followed by reduced assessments, one notes that in some cases the assessed tribute remained the same \textit{in toto} after a change from a syntely to apotaxis. For example, Dion and Athenai Diades in Euboia paid 4000 dr. together in 444/43 and 2000 dr. each separately in 443/42.\textsuperscript{24} Perkote and Palaiperkote paid a total tribute of 1,500 dr. together in 433/32, while furnishing the same amount of total tribute separately before and after.\textsuperscript{25} In one case it is indeed true that there is a rise in tribute from a syntely to apotaxis. Olynthos, Assera, and Skabala paid 2T 4,000 dr. in 454/53 and then paid a total tribute of 3T 1,000 dr. in 450/49 after apotaxis.\textsuperscript{26} This increase, however, does seem rather trivial in the whole picture of Attic federal finances.

\textsuperscript{20} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 279.I.48-49, IG I\textsuperscript{3} 280.I.40.
\textsuperscript{21} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 283.III.28, \textit{ATL} 3.70; Meiggs 1972, 532-33.
\textsuperscript{22} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 263.V.12; Meiggs 1972, 160.
\textsuperscript{23} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 259.IV.6, IG I\textsuperscript{3} 259.III.26 and IG I\textsuperscript{3} 264.II.2.
\textsuperscript{24} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 268.V.28, IG I\textsuperscript{3} 269.V.25, IG I\textsuperscript{3} 269.V.26.
\textsuperscript{25} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 279.II.19-20.
\textsuperscript{26} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 259.V.6-8, IG I\textsuperscript{3} 263.III.16, III.17, III.30.
Overall, it seems that the change from a *syntely* to *apotaxis* did not guarantee that Athens would receive more tribute at any given juncture and there does not seem to be a general pattern in the change in levels of tribute from *syntely* to *apotaxis* or vice versa. In some cases there were more determining factors, such as the sending of a cleruchy, which seem to have affected assessment levels. It also clear that Athens did not adjust the assessments upward to compensate for an *apotaxis* but actually lowered them at various times. Lepper suggested that *syntely* followed a period of revolt or defaulting in tribute payment and could have been employed in periods when tribute was difficult to collect. Conversely, he proposed that *apotaxis* was “adopted in times of general peace”.\(^{27}\) As I shall show below, generalizations about a process that occurred throughout the league in all periods are a dangerous and will not withstand scrutiny.

Another scholarly approach has been to propose a non-financial, exclusively ‘political’ hypothesis for *apotaxis*. Schuller and Avram have observed that Athens used *apotaxis* to weaken potentially hostile power blocks in Chalkidike and the Thasian *peraia*. Let us explore the Chalkidian situation first. Schuller sees the *apotaxis* of the *syntely* including Olynthos, Skabala, and Assera as an effort made by Athens to weaken the military potential of the cities to ally together and represent a challenge to Athenian interests.\(^{28}\) As stated above, the Chalkidian states along with the Bottiaians and Poteidaia did eventually revolt in 432, which supports a supposed Athenian distrust of its allies in the region.\(^{29}\) Schuller also cites two *indicia* as an effort to isolate Spartolos, the chief place of the Bottiaians: the only appearance of the Bottiaians in the tribute lists in 446/45, instead of the usual entry of Spartolos, and Spartolos’ rise in tribute in 434/33. Schuller

\(^{27}\) Lepper 1962, 40.
\(^{28}\) Schuller 1974, 59.
\(^{29}\) Thuc. 1.58.2; Schuller 1974, 59-60.
suggests that a few other similar cases may have existed, primarily in Chalkidike.\textsuperscript{30} Schuller further notes the separate assessments of the Samothracian and Mytilenaian *peraiai* as examples of Athenian efforts to weaken hostile or potentially hostile allies.\textsuperscript{31} For Schuller, the individual assessments of the Aktaian *poleis* after the suppression of the Mytilenaian revolt served as a repressive measure against the rebellious city.\textsuperscript{32} The main thrust of Schuller’s argument is that the Athenians employed *apotaxis* to separate communities from their ostensible *syntely*-‘heads’ in order to make them solely dependent upon Athens.\textsuperscript{33}

In support of Schuller, Avram cites the reduction of Galepsos’ tribute by a third ca. 442 and the change from the identification with the toponym to designation with ethnic in the lists for Neapolis in the 443/42. For Avram, these steps were Athenian efforts to weaken Thasos.\textsuperscript{34} Coupling with the foundation of Amphipolis in 437/36 by Athens, Avram sees these actions as attempts to counteract the influence of Thasos after the possible return of the island’s mainland holdings in the mid-440s. That further hypothesis is surmised on the basis of an enormous jump in the island’s assessment from 3T to 30T in 447/46.\textsuperscript{35} Both Galepsos and Neapolis were former Thasian colonies, but they had not rejoined the Thasian *peraia* at its supposed reconstitution in 447/46. According to Avram, Athens had successfully dislodged Galepsos and Neapolis from the Thasian sphere of influence and converted them into communities dependent more

\textsuperscript{30} Schuller 1974, 60 also suggests several other cases of apotaxis such as the Thracian Chersonesos, the *syntely* comprising Mekyberna, Stolos and the Polichnitai, and the *syntely* of Dion, Sane, and Olophyxos as examples of Athenian distrust. Schuller also cites the *apotaxis* of Mende, Skione, and Therambo.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid 60-61.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} Shuller 1995, 166-67.

\textsuperscript{34} Avram 1995, 192-95.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid 192.
Avram also cites the *apotaxis* of the Samothracian dependencies in Thrace ca. 422/21 as another instance of the divide and conquer strategy of the Athenians.\(^{37}\)

Although Schuller and Avram have offered useful observations about *apotaxis*, it is important to specify carefully the effects that this process had on the tribute status of these allies. First, every city in a *syntely* whether headed by a hegemonic state or a combination of equal contributors was ultimately subject to Athens. For example, Thasos and Samothrace were not free to monopolize the resources of their dependents as long as they were members of the *arkhē*, if by monopolization one means separating such assets from the procedure of assessment. Athens’ control over her allies did not depend on whether the Hellenomamiaeai received tribute directly from a community or indirectly through a group payment. Secondly, there were also other ways in which Athens exerted control over disloyal allies. For example, Athens installed garrisons and supervisory officials in various places throughout the empire to insure the cooperation of her allies.\(^{38}\)

If Athens had been seriously concerned for her interests in the Thraceward region, to take an example, then the emplacement of Athenian officials and colonies, such as Brea and Amphipolis, would have served her purposes more effectively than *apotaxis*.\(^{39}\) Finally, Schuller and Avram have failed to analyze adequately what a *syntelic* relationship entailed. There is the important question of whether these tributary groupings implied more cooperation than the temporary combination of tribute. If such cooperation existed fundamentally, as it might based on shared ethnicity and history, the superficial

\(^{36}\) Ibid. 193.
\(^{37}\) Ibid. 194.
\(^{38}\) Meiggs 1972, 205-19; See Raaflaub in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009, 98-112.
\(^{39}\) *ML* # 49: Meiggs 1972, 196; See Flensted-Jensen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 848-49 for a discussion of the possible locations of the Athenian colony of Brea in Thrace.
manipulations which might be involved in assessment process from year to year are not likely to have influenced underlying cultural solidarities. For example, the separation of the allied states did not prevent the outbreak of revolt in Chalkidike, nor, in the event, does apotaxis seem not to have inhibited the cooperation between these communities and Perdikkas of Macedonia. Manipulation of syntely and apotaxis in Chalkidike seems a singularly oblique and ultimately unsuccessful technique for impeding anti-Athenian alignments.

Nor does the ‘imperialism’ scenario make much sense for Thasos and its various potential dependencies. At most times the total tribute of Galepsos and Neapolis amounted to under a talent. It is difficult to see how they would have benefited Thasos in any significant way if they had rejoined the Thasian peraia, since Thasos’ tribute jumped dramatically in ca. 444/43 from 3T to 30T, the latter amount constituting the highest pre-war assessment level. It is even more doubtful whether the increase in tribute should be ascribed to the return of the peraia and not to the fulfillment of the indemnity owed to Athens as a consequence of the revolt. Clearly, Thasos’ large economy must have supported a tribute higher than a mere 3T even after Athens confiscated its possessions on the mainland. Furthermore, founding of Amphipolis seems to have served Athenian interests in Thrace much more significantly than the independent status of Galepsos or Neapolis could possibly have done. The loss of Amphipolis substantially affected the Athenians (Thuc. 4.108.1-3).

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40 See Thuc. 1.58.
41 IG I’ 266.III.8.
42 Thuc. 1.101.3; Meiggs 1972, 85-86.
43 Meiggs 1972, 85-86; Nixon and Price in Murray and Price 1990, 152-3: More will be said about Thasos in Chapter 5.
44 See Meiggs 1972, 195-96.
Moreover, Schuller’s analysis of Athenian policy toward Mytilene does not take into account some important differences from that toward Thasos (after 463/62) or toward Samothrace. It is true that Athens opposed the synoikism of Lesbos by Mytilene and confiscated the Aktaian cities after her failed revolt in 428/27. However, this situation is significantly different, since Athens converted the Aktaian cities into tributaries while Mytilene remained a ship-contributing member. Mytilene was therefore deprived of a significant amount of income that was now redirected to Athens. In this case, Athens did substantially weaken an ally through the separate assessment of her dependents, but only because Mytilene had not paid tribute previously and now had to fulfill the duties of alliance without the revenue from the Aktaian cities. Furthermore, the removal of the Aktaian cities was accompanied by other serious punitive and recuperative measures, such as the execution of 1,000 members of the elite, and the emplacement of a cleruchy while the Athenians had even contemplated a mass enslavement of the Mytilenaians. It makes little sense to compare this apotaxis with others that lack these aggravating features.

The case of Mytilene might tempt us into proposing that apotaxis was merely one tactic for achieving a broader goal, inhibiting the unification of allies into larger units. Yet, in the first place, there does not even seem to have been a uniform Athenian policy toward synoikism of allied states. Both Meiggs and Schuller have proposed that Athens prevented the synoikism of Rhodes until the Rhodian revolt of 412/11. Recently however, Gabrielsen has shown that the synoikism of the three poleis of Rhodes was a

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45 Thuc. 3.50; See chapter 6 for a longer treatment of Mytilene.
46 Schuller 1974, 61.
47 Meiggs 1972, 210; Schuller 1974, 61.
process that began long before the usually accepted date of 408/07.\textsuperscript{48} Athens seems not to have inhibited this growing federalism of the Rhodian poleis throughout the 5\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{49} In fact, the Rhodian poleis were democratic during their membership in the league, and there is no evidence of any disloyalty until the revolt of 412/11 instigated by the Spartans and Rhodian oligarchs.\textsuperscript{50}

Schuller and Avram’s theory that apotaxis was a defensive and often a repressive measure toward the allies offers a starting point for a discussion. However, their vision of apotaxis fails to address the process itself and do not hold up to scrutiny in most cases. Further analysis is needed to understand syntely and apotaxis as a feature of the league structure, which affected many allies over the entire life of the alliance. In general, the literature on syntely and apotaxis has tended to ignore their most basic features of the processes, while primarily viewing these processes as results of a broadly imperialistic political and economic policy. It will be useful to offer some observations about these processes.

On the surface syntely and apotaxis are particular arrangements for the purpose of tribute payment. As stated above, these arrangements involved a regional hegemonic state and dependent states or two or more nearly equal communities. Clearly, the formation a syntely implied cooperation on different levels. Ethnic ties, shared histories, and other bonds must have influenced whether two or more communities paid their tribute together in a given assessment period. Let us consider peer syntelies. For

\textsuperscript{48} Gabrielsen in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen, and L. Rubenstein 2000, 177-205 cites evidence from Homer, Pindar, and Herodotus who often speak of the island of Rhodes as a unit and not as simply as three individual cities. Gabrielsen also shows that Olympic victors were often referred to as “Rhodian” and not by their respective polis in inscriptions and literary sources. All of his evidence points to an early federal system of the three major cities.


\textsuperscript{50} Thuc. 8.44; Gabrielsen in P. Flensted- Jensen, T. H. Nielsen, and L. Rubenstein 2000, 186.
example, Palaiperkote and Perkote in the Hellespontine district were clearly related communities as their names suggest. Athenai Diades and Dion were close neighbors on the Kenaion peninsula in Euboia and were both dependencies of Hestiaia. Yet, it is difficult to determine if a syntelic arrangement always signified deeper levels of cooperation. In the examples mentioned above syntely lasted only one assessment period. In fact, an examination of the tribute lists reveals that most syntelic arrangements were temporary, with some only lasting only as long as one assessment period. Obviously a syntelic agreement must have been considered advantageous at certain times for the allies. Whether combining tribute provided a simple administrative advantage or was one aspect of deeper cooperation in the end is impossible to prove in most instances.

This question is slightly easier to answer in situations where there was a regional hegemonic city that paid on behalf of smaller communities. In these cases, it is fair to assume that syntely was a reflection on one level of an enduring hegemony. Clearly, the Samothracian or the Erythraian decision to pay for their dependencies on the Thracian coast and Mimas peninsula were determined by their status as regional hēgemones. In a sense this kind of situation existed throughout the league as many cities paid on behalf of other smaller communities, which were never entered on the tribute lists at all. However, if syntely reflected a sub-hegemony, it does not follow that apotaxis necessarily meant its dissolution as has been assumed previously. As I shall argue below, there is little evidence to indicate that apotaxis effected all-encompassing changes in political affiliation among large hegemonies. The exceptions are mainly non-tributary members such as Thasos and Lesbos, which themselves are already exceptional.

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The decision by Athens to accept group payments must also be explored. Lepper’s observation that *syntelies* generally yielded higher tribute payments than *apotaxis* is important. Even accounting for the changes that must have occurred between assessment periods, it seems reasonable to conclude with Lepper that *syntely* tended to produce higher tribute payments than *apotaxis* or no change at all. Thus, the union of tribute payments for some reason resulted in higher assessment by the Athenians or at least did not seem to have exerted an extra burden on the allies. Yet, if exacting more tribute were the sole aim of the Athenians then one would expect to see more joint payments evident on the tribute lists. At the same time, *apotaxis* would have been much rarer than it was. Therefore, it is better to see in most cases these processes as determined by local conditions that militated for or against joint payment and not simply implicate an Athenian policy to raise and lower tribute through these processes.

Certainly, the Athenians had a role in determining whether allies paid in groups or individually just as they determined tribute levels every four years. Yet, there does not seem to have been any kind of uniform policy. These arrangements probably depended more on the local conditions that were much more vulnerable to change and instability. Political transformations and economic considerations probably played their parts in determining tributary status. Smaller communities dominated by a regional power might not have the administrative capability in the early years of the alliance or organization to furnish payment on their own but over time acquired the capacity. The very small tribute payments of later members such as on Rhodes, Euboia, and small islands could be partly explained in this way. Lepper suggested that smaller members of *syntely* could have
sought *apotaxis* as an economic strategy.\(^{52}\) I would add that *apotaxis* was also be initiated by larger members of a *syntely* unable or unwilling to pay for their smaller members, a policy either resulting in a reduction in tribute or at least no change in return (e.g., Chalkis and Samothrace). The special rubrics of the tribute lists, which contain a large number of new tributaries in the late 430s may be in large part explained through allied strategizing of the tribute system. Thus, it seems that *syntely* and *apotaxis* were mainly tributary arrangements that allies employed to meet certain annual demands for tribute. Occasionally, *apotaxis* in particular was part of a larger Athenian policy than mere readjustments in the tribute system but generally it is difficult to determine the goals of these decisions without additional evidence.

*The Rubrics*

Although good evidence is deficient for the process of the amalgamation of allies into *syntelic* groups and their dissolution through *apotaxis*, the tribute lists sometimes reveal the outcomes of these processes, most notably the results of *apotaxis*. The most illustrative and useful example are attached to the special rubrics that first appeared in the 430s. An examination of these special rubrics will be helpful in further understanding how tributary groups functioned in the league, both as hegemonic structures and as simple combinations of allies. There are five rubrics altogether with their first appearance in 435/34 and last in 429/28. There appear as:

\[ \pi\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\varepsilon\varsigma \tilde{\alpha}\tau\acute{a}t\kappa\tau\omicron\iota, \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma \alpha\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{a}i \phi\omicron\omicron\nu\upsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\acute{a}m\acute{e}n\acute{a}i, \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma \acute{a} \sigma\iota \iota \]\n
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\(^{52}\) Lepper 1962, 40.
The editors of *ATL* in their first volume, following Couch, claimed that that these rubrics recorded cases of *apotaxis*.\(^{53}\) They asserted that the πόλεις αὐταί rubric recorded payments by communities that were not included in the previous assessment of 438. The rubric was translated as ‘cities assessed tribute separately’, while they interpreted the ἰδιώται rubric as referring to members of the Athenian public who added these communities to the list drawn up by the *takta* in 434/33.\(^{54}\) In the third volume the editors of the *ATL* modified their position by including cases in these rubrics where “outlying” communities now joined the empire for the first time.\(^{55}\) The editors of the *ATL* also dropped the word “separately” from their translation of the πόλεις αὐταί rubric, translating the rubric now as “cities which accepted assessment by special arrangement” meaning that they were guaranteed that their assessments would not change in the future.\(^{56}\) However, they still rejected the notion that these communities were able to determine their own assessment. In general, the editors of the *ATL* saw these rubrics as acts of policy by Athens to offer concessions to undependable allies in Thrace.\(^{57}\)

Lepper rejected the idea that *apotaxis* was the correct explanation for the special rubrics. Following the suggestions of Nesselhauf, Lepper preferred to see the rubrics as referring to mechanisms by which allies came to be assessed, in particular, through the

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\(^{53}\) Couch 1929, 502-14; *ATL* 1.455-57; See Kahrstedt 1936, 419-24 for a defense of the *apotaxis* interpretation; See Schaefer 1939, 240-43.

\(^{54}\) *ATL* 1.455.

\(^{55}\) *ATL* 3.83.

\(^{56}\) *ATL* 3.85.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
initiative of the communities themselves in joining the empire. He translated the πόλεις αὐταί rubric as “cities which themselves took the initiative in getting themselves assessed” or “in proposing an assessment for themselves.”

Lepper also rejected the idea that apotaxis could explain how most of the new communities appeared under the special rubrics. Rather, he saw these rubrics as a special category for small outlying communities, which Athens had ignored previously. For Lepper, the impetus for membership in the 430s was the tightening of restrictions on trade for non-members of the empire, and their appearance under the rubrics was the result of a special arrangement made with Athens in order to take advantage of league membership.

More significantly, Lepper pointed out some significant problems with the apotaxis explanation. For instance, Lepper argued that it is unclear why Athens would have devised these special rubrics for cases of apotaxis only in the 430s since apotaxis is evident in the lists as early as the 450s without necessitating any special rubrics. Instead, Lepper suggested that the rubrics referred only to communities, which had not been formally assessed by the taktaī. The new category of assessments would have necessitated notation on the lists instead of merely irregularities in payment, which only would have been the results of apotaxis. Lepper’s criticisms of the position of the editors of ATL are substantial and worth some analysis.

In the third volume of the ATL, an effort was made by the editors to determine the original extent of the Delian League. In the course of the chapter, the editors of ATL

58 Lepper 1962, 25-55; Meiggs 1972, 249-52 generally follows Lepper concerning the special rubrics.

59 Nesselhauf 1933, 58-69; Lepper 1962, 28.

60 Lepper 1962, 38; Zahrnt 1971, 44-45 argues that many of the communities were too small and too far removed from the Aegean to have been motivated by trade advantages. Zahrnt returns instead to the conclusion that the appearance of these communities was the result of apotaxis.

61 ATL 3.194-224.
proposed that a large number of communities that appear for the first time in the special rubrics and in many cases in the surviving assessment lists of the 420s were cases of *apotaxis* from larger neighbors. For our purposes here, I shall only discuss the communities in the special rubrics. The editors of the *ATL* asserted that the following communities in the ἰδιωταί rubric were separated by *apotaxis*: **Thraceward district:** Piloros from Assera or Singos on the peninsula of Sithonia, Kleonai from Thyssos on the peninsula of Athos. **Karian district:** Syme from the Karian Chersonesos. **Island district:** Euboic Diakres possibly from Chalkis. According to the editors of the *ATL* the following communities in the πόλεις αὐταί rubric were products of *apotaxis*: **Thrace:** Sarte and Gale from Torone on the peninsula of Sithonia. An examination of the rubrics reveals that the editors of the *ATL* did not connect all of the communities to a *syntely*-‘head’. However, scholars have convincingly shown that Amorgos, listed in the πόλεις αὐταί rubric, was most likely separated from Samos and the koinon of the Eteokarpathians also in the same rubric was separated from the city of Karpathos. However, Kasos, which was enrolled in the πόλεις αὐταί rubric was Dorian, making it possible that the island truly was an abstainer until the 430s.

Some of the cities in the ἰδιωταί rubric were assumed by the editors of the *ATL* to be Bottiaian such as Kithas, Tinde, Smila, Gigonos, Sinos, and Haisa, which paid 3000 dr. together in 434/33 and therefore might have been cases of *apotaxis* from Spartolos. A few other Bottiaian cities appear in the πόλεις αὐταί rubric in 434/33 such as Pleume

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62 Amorgos = *IG I 3* 278.VI.10 (434/33); Eteokarpathians = *IG I 3* 278.VI.14 (434/33); Shipley 1987, 118; See Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 746 for a succinct history of the Eteokarpathians.
63 *IG I 3* 278.VI.5-6.11; See *ATL* 3.210.
64 *IG I 3* 278. 29-33; *ATL* 3.217; See Flensted-Jensen 1995, 122-25.
and Aioleion.\textsuperscript{65} However, Gigonos, Smila, and Haisa were located in the district of Krousis, which Flensted-Jensen believes should not be regarded as composed of Bottiaian cities.\textsuperscript{66} Farther east in the Hellespontine district, it is difficult to determine from which syntelies Bysbikos and Kallipolis were separated. They appear in the \ensuremath{\text{idio\tau\alpha}} rubric and the \ensuremath{\text{πόλεις αὐτοί}} rubric.\textsuperscript{67} It has been suggested from an interpretation of Strabo, Bysbikos in the Hellenistic period might have been a dependency of Kyzikos.\textsuperscript{68} Strabo’s testimony certainly could have relevance for the 5th century. Unfortunately, scholars have not securely located Kallipolis.\textsuperscript{69} In general, most of the syntelies suggested by the editors of the \textit{ATL} appear plausible in their broad outlines and should be taken seriously as explaining the absence of many of these communities until the 430s.

Lepper attacked many of these potential cases of \textit{apotaxis} proposed by the \textit{ATL} and other scholars seeking to establish some general features of the special rubrics. Lepper convincingly proposed that up until the 430s \textit{apotaxis} was not used as a repressive measure to weaken syntely-‘heads’.\textsuperscript{70} However, the major axis of his criticism concerned the financial effect on the potential syntely-‘heads’ of these communities. Lepper noticed that tribute tended to rise for the syntely-‘head’ in changes from \textit{apotaxis} to a syntely and to decrease or not change in movement from a syntely to \textit{apotaxis}.\textsuperscript{71} While acknowledging the impact of cleruchies in a few places, Lepper’s observations seem to hold true. Based on this observation, Lepper tested the potential cases of \textit{apotaxis} in the special rubrics. For instance, Lepper found that the tribute of Singos shows a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[65] \textit{ATL} 3.217.
\item[66] Flensted-Jensen 1995, 123.
\item[67] Bysbikos= \textit{IG I}\textsuperscript{3} 278.VI.34 (434/33); Kallipolis= \textit{IG I}\textsuperscript{3} 278.VI.12 (434/33).
\item[68] Str. 12.8.11 C 575-76; Avram in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 978.
\item[69] See Avram in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 981-82.
\item[70] Lepper 1962, 39.
\item[71] Ibid. 39-40.
\end{footnotes}
decrease from 3T to 1T when the city was supposed to have experienced *apotaxis* in the period of the special rubrics, while the assessment of Torone was stable at 6T although it is supposed have lost Gale and Sarte. Overall, Lepper found no clear pattern in the changes of assessments for the potential *syntely*-‘heads’ and for those cases that exhibit alterations in assessed tribute he preferred to link with the reassessment of 438. Lepper also questioned whether it is even possible to connect a number of communities, thought to have appeared as tributaries as a result of *apotaxis* to their supposed *syntely*-‘heads’. For instance, Lepper doubted whether Amorgos belonged to Samos in the 5th century, whether Bysbikos and Kallipolis ever belonged to Byzantion as it had been surmised by some, or whether Syme had any connection to various conjectural *syntely*-‘heads’, namely the Karian Chersonesos, Rhodes, or Knidos.  

Although Lepper’s criticisms are valid in many cases, his arguments fail to consider adequately some fundamental aspects of the empire. The notion that the *arkhē* at the height of Attic naval power was filled with dozens of abstainers as late as the 430s and 420s seems highly unlikely. Throughout the first generation of the alliance, it is possible to discern a pattern in which larger members had tended either to maintain traditional dominance or even to swallow up smaller communities. The process of absorption occurred on many levels. The large ship-contributors such as Lesbos, Chios, and Samos possessed substantial parts of the coast of Asia Minor in their *peraiai*, while even weaker mainland tributary cities such as Erythrai and Miletos controlled their smaller neighbors. A closer examination of the peninsulas of Sithonia and Athos in Chalkidike, for example, reveals that is highly unlikely that small communities that were

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72 Ibid. 41.
73 Lepper 1962, 41; See Fraser and Bean 1954, 139-41 for evidence of Syme’s history in the 5th century.
surrounded by larger members of the alliance escaped dependency on a regional
hegemonic state by the 430s. The 6T assessment of Torone on the southwest coast of
Sithonia put it in the class of Miletos and Erythrai, thereby easily large enough to have
absorbed many smaller communities on the peninsula. In fact, Gale and Sarte’s
northern neighbors, Singos and Sermylia, on the peninsula were already league members
by the time of their appearance on the tribute lists. Thus, it is highly improbable that these
two rather small communities were independent of any of their large neighbors in the
mid-5th century. Moreover, on Athos, little Kleonai was surrounded by Thyssos and
Dion, which appeared on the early tribute lists. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that
Gale, Sarte, and Kleonai along with many other small towns that appear in the special
rubrics and in the assessment lists of the 420s could have escaped the control of their
larger neighbors in earlier periods. As in the case of the Gale, Sarte, and Kleonai in the
Thraceward district, *apotaxis* seems to be the only conceivable answer for the appearance
of the Diakrioi and Brikindera on Rhodes in 430/29 and 429/28, although, in the case, the
communities do not appear under the rubrics. Brikindera seems to have been a
dependent polis within the sphere of Ialysos while it is not clear to which Rhodian *polis*
the Diakrioi were connected. It is *prima facie* unlikely that Athens was unaware or
unable to assess these communities until the 420s or that they enjoyed full independence
from one of the main cities on Rhodes. The Diakrioi paid a significant tribute of 2T, well
above many other poorer and more isolated communities that had become tributaries long

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74 Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 47 argues that Sarte was a dependent of Torone throughout the city’s history.
75 *IG* I 281.I.11; *IG* I 282.IV.13; See Lepper 1962, 45; Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen
2004, 1198; See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the tribute history of the island of Rhodes.
76 See *ATL* 1.513 for the suggestion that both Brikindera and the Diakrioi were located within the territory of Lindos; See Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1198.
before. Clearly, these communities were separated by *apotaxis* from one of the major cities of the island.

The absence of solid evidence for many of these potential *syntelies* or regional hegemonies should not be considered an obstacle to the *ATL* position. As stated above, direct evidence for many sub-hegemonies is lacking in most cases. For instance, had the record of the tribute payments of the Aktaian cities not been preserved in the assessment of 425/24, the extensive mainland holdings of Mytilene might very well have been underestimated. However, it is unavoidable that the *apotaxis* explanation for the special rubrics cannot explain the appearance of every new member of the alliance in these years. It is possible to discern reasons for the existence of some abstainers in the 430s. For instance, it is conceivable that Athens was unwilling or unable to rein in small communities on the Propontic coast of Asia Minor because of the presence of the Persian satrap at Daskyleion or in Karia, where Athens generally had trouble collecting tribute in the period before the first appearance of the rubrics. The activities of Perdikkas and the Odrysian kings affected Athens’ reach in Thrace as well. Yet, there are other areas where there does not seem to be any ostensible reason for Athens to have failed to implement the collection of tribute. For instance, the absence of Amorgos from the lists until 434/33 cannot be explained other than that island was a dependency of Samos. Amorgos’ position east of the coast of Naxos and its significant tribute of 1T make very likely that Athens would have incorporated the island into the league at an early date if it had been

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77 *IG I² 71.III.122-40.*
free of Samian control. Yet, Lepper questioned why Amorgos was not detached from Samos immediately after its defeat by Athens in 439.\textsuperscript{78}

As in the case of Amorgos, Syme’s position in the eastern Aegean probably meant its absorption into a sub-hegemony at an early date. Syme’s neighbor Chalke appears in the tribute lists by 450/49 at the latest, while the island’s location near Rhodes and the coast of Karia makes it likely that Athenian influence would have engulfed the island as early as Chalke.\textsuperscript{79} Syme’s inclusion in the Karian Chersonese, which originally might have been a Rhodian dependency, provides an adequate explanation for its absence from the lists. In Thrace, Spartolos was most likely the syntely-‘head’ of the Bottiaian cities since in 446/45 as the entry βοττια[ἰοί καὶ σ] replaced that of Spartolos with same amount.\textsuperscript{80} The appearance of a number of these cities in the rubrics should be ascribed to apotaxis as there simply is no adequate reason why they do not otherwise appear on the lists until the 430s while Spartolos was an early member.

If the special rubrics contain both previous abstainers and cases of apotaxis, then the ATL position must be considered as the most reasonable explanation. The special rubrics should be understood as categories that the Athenians developed originally to incorporate both new members initiating their entry into the empire and communities that were initiating apotaxis from their syntelies and/or regional hegemonic centers, those originally in the Thracian district. These categories might not have been so different to the Athenians as they may seem to us. If the Athenians were in the process of developing new classifications of assessment, as the rubrics suggest, for communities such as

\textsuperscript{78} Lepper 1962, 41; Shipley 1987, 118 argues that Amorgos did belong to Samos and was detached by Athens by 434/33.
\textsuperscript{79} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 263.1.10.
\textsuperscript{80} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 266.II.19; ATL 1.550; See Flensted-Jensen 1995, 119.
Pharbelos or the Chedrolioi, for example, then new cases of *apotaxis* for a time could have been included under the rubrics as they entered the lists of *aparkhai* for the first time as new individual tributaries. For instance, Gale appears in 435/34 as ἀτακτοὶ along with Pharbelos, the Chedrolioi, Milkoros, and Othoros. Three of these communities seemed to have joined league again after a period of absence. Pharbelos, the Chedrolioi, and Othoros had been tributaries in the 440s but seem to dropped from the lists, until their reappearance as ἀτακτοῖ. As the *ATL* proposed, Gale’s location on Sithonia means that the city must have been a dependent of Torone, which suggests that the city was included as an ἀτακτος so that that heading covers a case of *apotaxis*.

As Lepper showed, a reduction in tribute levels is not always evident for syntely-‘heads’ in cases of suspected *apotaxis*. At the same time, it is not clear that in every case the tribute of a syntely-‘head’ was affected by its control over a dependent community. It is a logical assumption that a syntely-‘head’s’ assessment would have been lowered if shed of a dependent community now paying directly to Athens. However, we simply do not know enough in most cases how control was exerted by regional hegemonic states or if it is a realistic assumption that Athens always adjusted tribute in cases of *apotaxis*. The kind of benefits Samos received from its peraia may be instructive for other regional hegemonies. Shipley has argued that wealthy Samian landowners largely benefited from the possession of large estates in the *peraia*. Elites in other syntely-‘heads’ may have profited in similar ways from their dependents. At the same time, they would have also retained long-standing privileges such as enhanced

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81 See Lepper 1962, 35-36.
82 Ibid. 42.
83 Shipley 1987, 120.
social status accruing from control of traditional priesthoods and cults that received recognition in dependencies. Thus, it is possible that the benefits of a regional hegemony were not always exploited in land and economic privileges for the state treasury that were reflected in the tribute assessed by the Athenians.

If my hypothesis is correct then Athens recognized in these rubrics moves toward individual assessment by communities such as Syme, Amorgos, and Gale away from a previous dependency or syntelic relationship to another ally. As the πόλεις συνταξί and the ἴδια συνταξί rubrics seem attest to initiatives by some allies in some form to deal with Athens directly, apotaxis could have been seen by Athenians as an assertive move by other communities to achieve recognition of individual tributary status. Unfortunately, the lack of evidence prevents us from fully understanding the circumstances surrounding the emergence of these new independent tributaries. Yet, it is possible to offer some suggestions that might shed light on the processes. Some of the dependencies of larger sub-hegemonies might have sought relief from the burden of continued dependency on a larger neighbor through individual assessment by the Athenians. For instance, Sarte or Gale on the peninsula of Sithonia could have concluded that a disproportionate amount of Torone’s tribute burden had fallen upon them. Direct assessment by Athens would then be seen as preferable to continued payment through Torone. The Athenian role would have been to accept the changed circumstances in a given region.

Assessment by Athens would not always have meant the termination of dependency on a local city. One must be aware that the special rubrics are concerned with the tribute process and may not reveal deeper political changes. The rubrics did not

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84 See Lepper 1962, 40.
survive long into the Peloponnesian War and Athens seems to have included new members and cases of *apotaxis* together on the lists without any special rubrics in the 420s. The two rubrics, which seem to be the successors of the πόλεις αὐταί and the ἰδιωταί rubrics, the ταίσδε ἔταξαν οἱ τάκται ἐπὶ Κρ[,]ο γραμματεύοντος rubric, translated as “for which the Taktai for whom Κρ[,]o was secretary made an assessment” and the ταίσδε ἡ βουλή καὶ οἱ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι ἔταξαν rubric, translated as “for which the council and court of 1500 made an assessment”, are probably references for the auditors to the previous two rubrics, as Lepper has suggested. Lepper convincingly showed that these new rubrics only included communities that had originally been assessed in the πόλεις αὐταί and the ἰδιωταί rubrics and probably recalls the initial conditions of their assessment as determined by at least the council in 434/33.

However, it has been argued that there was a change in the assessment status for some communities when they entered these new rubrics. Two communities that moved into the βουλή rubric from the ἰδιωταί rubric were identified by the ethnic instead of the toponym. The change in designation might have had significance. As I will discuss below, the different appellation might have reflected a new assessment status but the evidence is not clear since Tinde and the Diakres apo Chalkideon, which appeared in the ἰδιωταί rubric, never experienced a change in their designation.

Two decades after Lepper’s analysis of the special rubrics Wolfgang Schuller offered a comprehensive explanation for the appearance of the ἰδιωταί rubric. An examination of Schuller’s theory will be useful in further clarifying the importance of

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85 Lepper 1962, 33-34.
86 Syme and Bysbikos.
87 Schuller 1981, 141-51.
syntely and apotaxis in the formation of the special rubrics. Schuller has proposed that the communities enrolled in the ἵδιωται rubric were in the midst of political strife between pro-Athenian democrats and their local governments.88 According to Schuller, the rubric represents the efforts of the pro-Athenian democrats to tie unofficially their communities to Athens through the private payment of tribute. In turn, Athens received the tribute as a show of support to their allies in their attempt to bring about democratic revolution. It seems that a political explanation explains more sufficiently the league-wide incidence of the rubric than economic/fiscal considerations for Schuller. Rejecting the ATL position that the ἵδιωται were Athenian citizens who proposed that these communities be assessed in the assembly, Schuller believes that they were probably members of the communities themselves.89 For example, Schuller cites Thucydides’ account of the origin of the Samian revolt as evidence for the use of ἵδιωται in a 5th century source to describe the attempt of private citizens to overthrow their non-democratic governments and replace them with more pro-Athenian democracies.90

Schuller further proposes that the identification by toponym of the communities when first entered under the rubric suggests an incomplete membership that was only completed when they were designated with the ethnic after their eventual assessment by the council and court of 1500 in 430/29.91 Full membership occurred after what Schuller assumes to have been the success of the democrats in altering the ideological orientation of their home governments. Schuller’s suggestion for the meaning of ἵδιωται rubric is interesting, but not wholly convincing. First, Schuller provides an explanation for the

88 Ibid. 148-50.
89 For defenses of the ἵδιωται as Athenian citizens, cf. Schaefer 1936, 241-42; Kahrstedt 1939, 420-21; ATL 3. 86.
90 Thuc. 1.115.2.
meaning of the ἰδιωταί as referring to natives of the states in the rubric. Clearly, private citizens of these communities alone would not have been able to enroll their cities in the assessment process or even been credited by Athens on an official document.\(^\text{92}\)

Schuller’s suggestion that private citizens paid the tribute in opposition to their local governments is a logical inference since the local governments should ordinarily have played the central role in the assessment process. Yet, the exact nature of the role of the private citizens in Schuller’s analysis is still unclear. In the end, the final say lay with the Athenians, thus it is more tempting to see the ἰδιωταί as referring to Athenian citizens possibly acting on behalf of a community with which they had ties. For example, an Athenian proxenos of a small community seeking apotaxis from a larger neighbor could have originally been approached to initiate the community’s new assessment status.

Moreover, if Athens was gambling on the success of these democrats to alter the political orientation of their communities in order to facilitate their entry into the empire, there is need of a reevaluation of Athenian imperialism in this period. As argued above, several of these communities such as Bysbikos in the Propontis, the Diakres apo Chalkideon on Euboia, and Syme, all of which are included in the ἰδιωταί rubric, were not difficult for Athenian power to reach. One must ask why Athens would have depended on its local sympathizers in these communities to bring about a revolution to achieve Athenian policy aims. Syme and Bysbikos could have easily been incorporated by any number of Athenian expeditions undertaken in those regions. In fact, all of the communities in the rubric were already surrounded by members of the league by the time

\(^{92}\) See *ATL* 3.74 for the meaning of ἐγγράφειν as “add names to an already existing list.” Lepper 1962, 29 cites the *ATL* explanation to argue that the verb means “to enrol in the literal sense of entering in a written document, such as a list of public debtors;” See *LSJ* s.v. ἐγγράφω II.3 for basis of these interpretations of the verb.
of their enrollment. However, it is barely possible that the Diakres apo Chalkideon were detached from Chalkis the subjugation of the Chalkidians ca. 446 by the Athenians, which could have also eluded Athens for a decade. Yet, Athens’ willingness to enter upon these political machinations with a small band of rebellious Euboians seems out of character for the imperial power while the sources are unanimous that Pericles subdued the whole island after the island’s revolt.

The number of Bottiaian communities in the rubric poses a special problem as well for Schuller’s analysis. The revolt of the Bottiaians and Chalkidians in 432 clearly accounts for the large reduction in the members in the ἰδιωταί rubric in 433/32. Schuller attributes the success of the opponents of the democrats for the revolt. Yet, it is generally accepted that from the 450s Spartolos had paid for the entire ethnos of the Bottiaians. Therefore, in order for Schuller’s theory to be plausible then an unlikely complex of scenarios would have had to occur. It seems that Tinde, Kithas, and Sinos had been separated from Spartolos by 434/33 as well as Pleume and Aioleion, which appear in the πόλεις αὐταί rubric, since all of these communities were listed in the special rubrics. As stated above, most of the cities of Bottike had originally been dependencies on Spartolos, which was tributary from at least 454/53. According to Schuller’s hypothesis, these communities were either never dependent on Spartolos or had been separated through apotaxis from Spartolos at some point in the late 440s or early 430s and then allowed to leave the league only to be enrolled later in the special

93 Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 650.
94 Thuc. 1.114; Diod. 12.7; Plut. Per. 23.
95 Thuc. 1.58.
96 Schuller 1981, 149.
99 IG I1 259.III.24.
rubrics. This succession seems implausible since Schuller’ theory requires the proposition that Spartolos’ payment did not include most of the Bottiaian cities or that Athens made an agreement with a foreign power such as Macedonia over their possession until the 430s when they would have reentered the league. It is true that a few Bottiaian communities do appear in later lists for the first time. However, the majority of known Bottiaian communities appear in the special rubrics. If Spartolos did control only the cities that appear in the later lists in the 420s, there does not seem to be a reason why the large number of Bottiaian communities listed in the special rubrics would not have been included in Spartolos’ payment. The simplest explanation is that for some reason in the 430s either the Athenians or more likely these communities on their own initiative sought separate assessments by Athens apart from the syntely headed by Spartolos. Whether oligarchs or democrats controlled these communities is difficult to know. In either case, they must have still belonged to the league only to revolt a few years later along with Poteidaia and the Chalkidians.

Schuller’s hypothesis concerning the ἕδωρα rubric provides some important observations concerning this important but little understood aspect of Athenian imperial finances and hegemony. Yet, his reconstruction betrays significant flaws and must be received with caution in assuming that all members of a rubric enrolled for the same reasons and under the same conditions. It has been shown that most of the members of each rubric were already members of the Delian League by the time of their enrollment in the special rubrics, consequently, the rubrics must be understood as an internal reorganization of the imperial finance structure.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have attempted to challenge many of the underlying assumptions concerning group payments in the tribute system. For most scholars, syntely and especially apotaxis were means by which the Athenians either raised revenue or enhanced their control over the allied states. As I discussed, it is difficult to credit the viability of these strategies since the Athenians had more useful tools at their disposal. Certainly, garrisons, political oversight, and the threat of armed intervention were more successful than stripping small dependencies from wealthy allies. Moreover, apotaxis did not generally yield greater tribute so it is unlikely that the Athenians employed apotaxis simply as a strategy to generate greater income from the allies. Instead, these processes were more likely to be determined by the allies themselves to meet the needs of tribute demands at various points in the history of the league. Some syntelies were short-lived while others lasted for decades, particularly those that signified hegemonies such as the Milesian and Erythraian examples. At the same time, the division of groups into individual tributaries also might have been another way to manipulate the tribute system as the record of tribute seems to indicate and not simply been the results of significant political changes as often assumed.

The evidence contained in the special rubrics of the late 430s is especially valuable since they contain the results of apotaxis. Many of the members of these special categories must have been dependencies of larger allies since it is difficult to otherwise account for their late appearances in the tribute lists. Although, Lepper offered many useful criticisms of the ATL view, he failed to adequately account for history of
dependency in the empire. In the end the special rubrics seem to contain some new members in Thrace along with small allies recently detached, at least in terms of the tribute system, from larger states. The initiative for *apotaxis* in some cases lay with these small communities or even the large states and was recognized by Athens for reasons which are not completely clear. The decree honoring an Eteokarpathian indicates the *koinon* was granted autonomy for benefactions conferred upon Athens.\footnote{IG I\(3\) 1454; See Ma in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Palmer 2009, 129-35.} It is possible that other allies like the Eteokarpathioi were eager to exhibit loyalty in return for some of recognition of their new independent status. Yet, I would deemphasize the strategic value that the *apotaxis* had for the Athenians especially in cases of small allies. I shall emphasize this point in the following discussions of the major sub-hegemonies. Finally, Schuller’s contention that the ίδιωται rubric was devised to support Athenian allies in non-league states in their attempt to bring their cities over is not convincing. Again, it is unlikely that the cities in the rubric were outside of the league as late as the 430s as my discussion of the Bottiaian communities makes clear. Furthermore, Schuller underestimates Athens’ influence in this period especially in regions clearly under Athenian control such as the eastern Aegean and Euboia. Like the πόλεις αὐται rubric, the members of the ίδιωται rubric were the products of *apotaxis*, in which private Athenian citizens, likely connected to these communities in some official capacity, played a role. Unfortunately, the deficiencies of our evidence concerning these aspects of the tribute list prevent us from understanding as much as we would like. Yet, I believe that is useful to see groupings of tributary states as generally reflective of the allies’
attempts to negotiate to their advantage the demands of tribute imposed on them on a yearly basis.
Chapter 2: Erythrai

An examination of Erythrai’s membership in the Delian League offers a useful look into the varying conditions that could affect sub-hegemonies in the Athenian empire as well as the process of tribute payment by syntelic groups. The tribute lists record five communities that were part of the Erythraian orbit and reveal that Erythrai and its dependencies vacillated between a syntelic relationship and apotaxis from the 450s to ca. 412.1 The changes in tributary status are unusual and reveal important information about the structure of regional hegemonies. Erythrai’s history during this period also reveals the vulnerability of Ionia to outside influence and to civil unrest, which were factors in the tribute status of the city. Most scholarship has been concerned with untangling the complicated history of Erythrai in the late 450s and early 440s. Scholars have limited themselves to interpreting the evidence from the tribute lists and other sources and have concluded that Erythrai was disloyal to the Athenians ca. 454/53. Several inscriptions do attest to political unrest and/revolt. However, the most fruitful ground for analysis seems to lie in examining the nature and history of the Erythraian syntely. We note to start that scholars have not yet reached a consensus in defining the status of the five small communities on the Mimas peninsula in their relation to Erythrai or what affected the unity of this group of allies over the period that the tribute lists cover. After an examination of Erythrai’s history in the Delian League, concentrating mainly on general history, I shall devote some needed attention to the Erythraian sub-hegemony and then

1 The dependent communities are listed as: Boutheieis, the Polichnitai, Sidousioi, the Elaiousioi, and Pteleousioi.
attempt to answer some of the more complicated questions of federal hegemony and sub-hegemony.

Erythrai was a member of the Ionian dodekapolis and a major maritime power in the Archaic period. The city contributed eight ships at the battle of Lade in 494.² It is unclear when Erythrai entered the Delian League, but the editors of the ATL concluded that Erythrai was an original member.³ In doing so, they rejected Highby’s contention that the Athenian decree concerning Erythrai, IG I³ 14, marked the city’s original entry to the league in the 460s.⁴ As I shall show, the arguments are persuasive that IG I³ 14 should be interpreted as the marking the return of Erythrai to the alliance after a revolt or some other disruption in the late 450s. In contrast, Robertson has suggested that the city was not an original member because of its historic rivalry with Chios, which was a founding member.⁵ Robertson contends that both Miletos, located opposite Samos, and Erythrai entered the league “rather late and under compulsion.”⁶ Robertson’s suggestion should not be ignored as it takes into account the realities of Ionian history, such as Miletos and Samos’ dispute over Priene in the 440s, a conflict that attests to longstanding rivalries between major Ionian poleis.⁷ Erythrai might have been averse to joining an alliance in which Chios was a founding and leading member. Thus, one can only say that Erythrai most likely joined the alliance after the first few years but well before the late 450s. The editors of the ATL suggested that both Erythrai and Miletos were ship contributors until 460, which does seem like a reasonable conjecture based upon the

² Hdt. 6.8.2; See Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1074-75 for a useful summary of Erythrai’s history in the Archaic and Classical periods.
⁴ Highby 1936, 32, 34-35.
⁵ Robertson 1980, 72; See Jeffery 1976, 229 for Erythrai’s historical enmity with Chios.
⁶ Robertson 1980, 73.
⁷ Thuc. 1.115.2.
wealth and size of the cities. It is even possible that Erythrai contributed ships until the supposed revolt in the late 450s. Erythrai’s dependent communities could have contributed money or their own forces to the city’s contingent in the years when Erythrai fielded a naval force. I would also argue that the five dependencies entered the league along with Erythrai because of the attested control of the Mimas peninsula by the city in the 440s.

Aristotle affirms that Erythrai was led at some point by an oligarchy controlled by the Basilidai that was eventually overthrown in a popular uprising. It is difficult to determine from Aristotle’s account when the Basilidai fell and what type of constitution was inaugurated next. The nature of the ruling government when Erythrai entered the league is also unknown. One can surmise that Mardonios installed a moderate democracy in 492 as in the rest of Ionia, but the issue is not clear. An inscription usually dated to the mid-5th century seems to provide evidence of a limited democracy or moderate oligarchy in place at Erythrai. The most important aspect of the inscription for our purposes concerns the regulations for the initiation of prosecutions and the appointment of jurors. The inscriptions attest to the existence of prytanies who are to introduce cases heard by a court consisting of 27 jurors. Nine jurors are to be selected from each of the three tribes who have property valued no less than thirty staters (A. 10-17). The sixty-one men needed to fill the court and the jurors are to swear the same oath as the council (A. 17-24). Scholars have been mostly concerned with question of whether this inscription

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8 ATL 3.253.
10 Hdt. 6.43.4.
11 I.Erythrai 2A; Highby 1936, 36-38 suggests the 460s shortly after Erythrai entered the league according to his reconstruction; Engelmann und Merkelbach, 1972, 12 “vor 454”; Lewis 1997, 56 suggests a date after 452; Jeffery 1990, 344 dates the inscription to ca. 465; Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 367 date the decree to “before ? after c. 453/2.”.
has any relation to \textit{IG I}^{3} 14, which is generally dated to ca. 453/52.\textsuperscript{12} If the decree dates before \textit{IG I}^{3} 14 then it is solid evidence that Erythrai had elements of a limited democracy before the Athenians intervened. The property qualification of thirty \textit{staters} for jurors can be explained in one of two ways. On its own, the property qualification would argue for a date before \textit{IG I}^{3} 14, since it has been assumed that the Athenians would have created a democracy in their mold when they intervened to install a new democratic constitution. However, the inscription speaks of sixty-one men needed to fill the court, which is a majority of the 120-member council set up by \textit{IG I}^{3} 14 (line 9). This fact has led scholars to connect the two inscriptions.\textsuperscript{13} If the decree is connected to the democracy set up by the Athenians in ca. 453/52, then Erythrai’s new democracy differed slightly in the number of councilors and a property qualification for jurors from provisions prevailing at Athens. There is evidence that a short-lived anti-Athenian faction was in control of the city before Athenian intervention attested in \textit{IG I}^{3} 14.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, it is possible that a limited democracy was in place before a coup brought to power a faction, which is believed to have revolted sometime in the 450s.\textsuperscript{15} While the evidence is unclear, it is best to relate the two decrees since the number of councilors prescribed in both inscriptions appears connected. Therefore, either Athens installed a democracy on the model of the previous government at Erythrai before its intervening, or the decree dates from the same period as \textit{IG I}^{3} 14.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{ATL}. 3.202; \textit{ML} \# 40; Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 367 argue for “c. 453/2.”
\textsuperscript{13} Engelmann und Merkelbach 1972, 25 believe that the two decrees possibly date from the same period; Rhodes 1986, 167; Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 367, 369.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{IG I}^{3} 14.27.
\textsuperscript{15} See Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1074.
According to most scholars’ reconstructions of Erythraian history in the 450s, the city revolted from the league after the Athenian expedition to Egypt.\(^\text{16}\) The editors of the \textit{ATL} suggested that the cause of the revolt was Erythrai’s unwillingness to campaign along with Athens to Egypt and then to convert their ship contributions to cash.\(^\text{17}\) Still, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. Instead, one should look to the possible ramifications of the Athenian defeat in Egypt in 454, which was also a reversal for the important Ionian contingents that served along with them. The Ionian contingents would have consisted of the pro-Athenian elements of the cities. Miletos, Samos, and other Ionian states had long standing interests in Egypt, most famously at the \textit{emporion} of Naukratis.\(^\text{18}\) Athenian efforts to detach Egypt from Persia could have been viewed as essential for trade by the allied Ionians. The destruction of the Ionian forces serving with Athens would have emboldened their anti-Athenian opponents in Miletos, Erythrai and other places.\(^\text{19}\) The anti-Athenian factions would have then looked to Persia for aid.

During this period, Miletos appears to have suffered civil strife as indicated by the three separate entries Milesian communities on the tribute lists in 454/53.\(^\text{20}\) In the mid-440s, Miletian oligarchs slaughtered their democratic opponents and revolted from Athens and events at Erythrai probably took a similar course.\(^\text{21}\) The pro-Athenian Erythraians were temporarily weakened and the oligarchs seized the opportunity to take control with Persian aid. Scholars generally cite Erythrai’s absence from the first assessment period and \textit{IG I} \(^3\) 14 as evidence that Erythrai revolted from the league in the


\(^{17}\) \textit{ATL} 3.253.

\(^{18}\) Hdt. 2.78.

\(^{19}\) See Delorme 1995, 269-70.

\(^{20}\) \textit{IG I} \(^3\) 259.VI.19-22; See Piérart 1974, 163-67.

\(^{21}\) [Xen]. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3.11.
450s. Erythrai does not appear in the tribute lists until 450/49. Yet, Boutheia, which appears to have been a dependency of Erythrai, is listed in 454/53, though no amount survives, and in 453/52 with a tribute of 3T. In later years, when Boutheia is listed separately, the community usually paid a tribute of 1000 dr. It is believed that Boutheia’s exceptionally high payment represents the contribution from the loyal Erythraians and from their possessions while the city was in revolt.24 *IG* I3 14 is then interpreted as the Athenian decree outlining Erythrai’s return to the league.

In the 19th century, Fauvel made a copy of the inscription now enumerated as *IG* I3 14, which it has since been lost.25 In much of its first section his copy is illegible or difficult to decipher; however, the rest of the decree is much more legible. The editors of the *ATL* restored the archon Lysikrates in the prescript (line 2), which would date the decree to 453/52.26 The restoration is possible, but not absolutely necessary. The first section, where Fauvel’s copy is particularly difficult to read, deals with Erythrai’s commitment to the Great Panathenaia (lines 2-8). Next, the decree outlines the creation of the new democratic institutions that the Athenians are to install (lines 8-29). Athenian officials are to oversee the creation of a council made up of 120 members no less than 30 years old. The councilors are to be chosen by lot as in Athens. Future selection is to be overseen by the garrison commander, along with the outgoing council. An oath is prescribed for the council in which they swear not to revolt from the “Athenian people or the allies of the Athenians.” This section of the oath is usually taken as evidence of the early date of the decree and that the Athenians had not fully converted the league to

23 *ATL* 3.252.
24 *ATL* 3.252; Meiggs 1943, 25.
25 See Highby 1936, 1; *ML* # 43, 91.
26 *ATL* 2.54-55 (D10).
empire, as they still refer to it as an alliance.\textsuperscript{27} Another significant part of the oath concerns the prohibition on receiving fugitives who had fled to the Persians (line 27). In line 31, a fragmentary section speaks of “tyrants,” probably referring to the faction that assailed the previous government and caused an upheaval. The final section of the decree concerns judicial matters (lines 29-46?), describing how the Erythraiians are allowed to decide capital cases and those banished from the city are also prohibited from the rest of the league.

The decree’s reference to “banished tyrants,” the absence of Erythrai in the first tribute period, and Boutheia’s unusually large tribute payment all suggest that Erythrai suffered severe unrest, likely leading to defection in the late 450s. Although this explanation is not irrefutable, there does not seem to be any other reasonable conclusion based upon all of the evidence. Robertson has proposed that the absence of Erythrai in the first tribute period could have been caused by the city’s resistance to the league foothold, which was centered at Boutheia.\textsuperscript{28} In this scenario, Erythrai had not yet joined the alliance. This suggestion cannot be reconciled with the evidence from $IG I^3$ 14, which speaks of the establishment of a new democracy and the permanent residence of an Athenian garrison. These steps point to efforts to quell civil unrest and possibly disloyalty. Moreover, by this period, Miletos and other significant Ionian cities were already tributary. It seems unlikely that Erythrai, without a significant navy to match Athens and the allies, could have held out until the late 450s while others similar Ionian states were already league members or tributary allies.

\textsuperscript{27} Highby 1936, 22-23; \textit{ATL} 3.255; \textit{ML} #43, 92.
\textsuperscript{28} Robertson 1980, 91 n. 55.
Moreover, Meiggs and Lewis have demonstrated that *IG* I$^3$ 14 is not the decree announcing Erythrai’s entry into the league by observing that it lacks “a declaration of alliance.”$^{29}$ The prohibition of receiving “those who have fled to the Medes” suggests that a pro-Persian or at least anti-Athenian faction was in charge for some time. The only real option in this period for those opposed to league membership would have been to turn to Persia for aid.$^{30}$ It is possible that *stasis* broke out which led one group to seek assistance from Persia. In the same period, civil discord probably occurred at Miletos, which might have had Persian involvement. Athens intervened in Miletos in similar ways as *IG* I$^3$ 14 attests at Erythrai. If a full scale revolt did occur, there is the strong possibility that Persia would have supported the rebels as in the case of the Samian oligarchs whom Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis, aided a decade later.$^{31}$ The reorganization of the government under Athenian supervision and the establishment of a garrison would have protected against civil discord as much as interference from Persia.

Once secured by Athens, Erythrai appears in the tribute lists for the first time in 450/49, paying a tribute of 9T (see the table attached to this chapter for a summary of tribute payments).$^{32}$ During this period, Erythrai’s payment includes that of five communities: Boutheia, the Polichnitai, Sidousa, Pteleon, and the Elaiousioi, who are absent in 450/49, but usually included in the *syntely* in later years. Let us first consider the placement of these communities. The editors of the *ATL* located four of these communities on the Mimas peninsula and the Elaiousioi as the small island just off

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$^{29}$ *ML* # 43, 92.
$^{30}$ See *ATL* 3.253.
$^{31}$ Thuc. 1.115.2.
$^{32}$ *IG* I$^3$ 263.II.13.
Pitane, based upon Strabo’s testimony (Str. 13.1.67 C 614). Engelmann and Merkelbach disputed that the Elaiousioi inhabited this island by observing that many Greek communities derived their names from the word for olive tree. Instead, they suggested a mainland location. Based upon Thucydides’ account of operations around Erythrai in 412/11, Sidousa and Pteleon were likely located on the west coast of the Mimas peninsula, opposite Chios. The editors of the ATL, however, preferred to locate Sidousa on the northeast edge of the peninsula. Without becoming bogged down further in inconclusive discussion about the placement of these settlements, I would emphasize that Erythrai was associated with territories well inland. Their situation exposed the Erythraians to the interference of the Persians beyond the degree of vulnerability created by the location of Erythrai itself.

The more important issue for our purposes concerns the status of the five communities in relation to Erythrai. Beyond tackling the issue of the locations of these communities, the editors of the ATL did not address a few key questions, such as whether they were units of the Erythraian state or separate but dependent poleis. Gschnitzer offered an in-depth analysis of the Erythraian syntely in his 1958 publication Abhängige Orte im Griechischen Altertum, concluding that the five communities were not independent poleis but rather outlying settlements of the Erythraian state. He also observed that the fluctuations between syntely and apotaxis of the Erythraian syntely did not reflect changes in the relationship between Erythrai and its dependents.

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33 ATL 1.485-87.
34 Engelmann und Merkelbach 1972, 37; See Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1070.
35 Thuc. 8.24.2; ATL 1.486; Gschnitzer 1958, 115.
36 ATL 1.486.
37 Gschnitzer 1958, 116-17.
38 Ibid. 114.
Gschnitzer proposed that the large size and the nature of the Mimas peninsula forced these communities to manage their own affairs in “Gemeindeversammlungen,” particularly their own economic issues, which is reflected in the tribute lists.  

Gschnitzer’s suggestions for the Erythraian group provide a helpful corrective to the usual assumptions about changes from syntely and apotaxis—one that avoids recourse to generalizations about Athenian imperialism. For instance, Engelmann and Merkelbach interpreted the separate assessments of the five communities as the results of Athens’ effort to ‘divide and conquer’ Erythrai. This analysis seems rather crude and does not address what Athens aimed to gain through this policy. As we will see, the syntely was reformed in the 430s after apotaxis in the 440s. It is difficult to understand why Athenian policy would have then shifted in support for a syntely after a decade of supposedly insisting on separate assessments. One must examine what circumstances and motivations were in play for the supposed change in Athenian policy, without taking for granted that some ever-tightening knot of hegemony dominated the league.

One the whole, Gschnitzer’s solution is also somewhat unsatisfactory. The notion that the five settlements were simply extensions of the Erythraian state does not take into account some important evidence. Hansen has recently analyzed the evidence surrounding the status of Sidousa. He observed that Sidousa is referred to by the ethnic without mention of its dependent status to Erythrai in the tribute list of 430/29. In the same list, Sidousa is noted as belonging to Erythrai. He also observes that “Thucydides’ description of Sidousa as a teichos is not in conflict with the evidence of

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39 Ibid. 116-17.
40 Engelmann und Merkelbach 1972, 34.
42 IG I 281.1.24.
the tribute lists which indicates that it was a dependent *polis.*” 43 Most importantly, Hansen refers to Hecataeus’ *Periegesis* in which Sidousa is classified as a *polis* in the urban sense. 44 He concludes that Sidousa was a dependent *polis* situated in Erythraian territory in the mid-5th century that might have been an independent *polis* ca. 500. Interestingly, Gschnitzer also cited the evidence from Hecataeus concerning Sidousa, but did not believe that it affected his conclusions. 45 Hansen’s theory concerning Sidousa should probably be applied to the other four communities. In *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* all of the communities are listed as dependent *poleis* and not as units of the Erythraian state. 46 According to Hansen, *syntelies* generally were grouping of cities and not smaller units of a state: “*Synteleia* were usually formed by grouping *poleis* together and not by severing civic subdivisions from a *polis* to which they formerly belonged.” 47 This assertion holds true in most cases; however, one notable exception is the Milesian *syntely*, which contained the island Leros and the inland community of Teichoussa located on the southern boundary of the city. Both of these members of the *syntely* seem to have been communities of the Milesians and not *poleis*, which were separated because of civic unrest ca. 454/53 and possibly in the 420s. 48 The example of the Milesian possessions offers evidence that non-*polis* communities could be assessed separately in certain circumstances. However, following Hansen, it seems that the Erythraian *syntely* included five small *poleis* on the Mimas peninsula that in some periods were tied to Erythrai in a group payment and in others paid separately.

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44 Ibid. 25.
46 Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1074-75.
A close examination of the tribute lists reveals two important features of the Erythraian syntely, which have significance for the study of sub-hegemonies in the Delian League. First, as stated above, the syntely seems to have dissolved and been reconstituted twice. The number of changes in tribute status for the group is unusual and, on the surface, reveals a lack of stability in the retention of the hegemony. During the first tribute period, Boutheia seems to have paid for the loyal Erythraians and dependencies in a time of unrest. In the second tribute period, the five communities paid a tribute of 9T together. In the third period, apotaxis had occurred as each member paid separately until 433/32 when they paid a tribute of 10T 1,100 dr. in a syntely.49 By 430/29, apotaxis had occurred again and there is no evidence that syntely was reconstituted for the rest of the period of the league.50 The fact that several of the dependent communities of Erythrai were listed as paying for themselves while members of the group remain together is another unusual aspect of the syntely. Sidousa, Boutheia, the Elaiousioi, and Pteleon are listed as paying on their own behalf in 448/47 but only one payment from the group was recorded by the Athenians.51 Clearly, each of these towns seems to have had a dependent relationship to Erythrai during this period. Gschnitzer’s explanation considers their isolated positions on the Mimas peninsula, which meant that they were forced to manage their own economic affairs independently, though still just settlements of Erythraians. Yet, any explanation must take into account that they were probably poleis in their own right and not outlying units of Erythrai that occasionally appeared separately in the tribute lists. Before tackling these important issues, it will be useful to examine some other approaches to these problems suggested by scholars.

49 IG I2 279.1.48-49.
51 IG I2 264.III.28-30.
One approach to solving the general question of the motivation for *syntelies* typically has been to propose that they were intended to ease tribute collection.

According to Nancy Demand, two *syntelies* in Chalkidike in the 450s and 440s were “more likely to have been made for convenience in tribute collection.”\(^52\) On the surface, one could apply this solution, convenience for the Athenians, to the Erythraian *syntely*, if we suppress for the moment our doubts over precisely how such an advantage to Athens worked. However, the appearance of Erythrai and dependents in a special rubric in 430/29 seems to speak against Demand’s idea. In the list of 430/29, the editors of the *ATL* restored Erythrai and the five dependent communities under the heading, Μισθ/υνιεν/τέλεσαν αἶδε ἀπὸ τοῦ φόρου τῇ στρατιᾷ, translated as “These cities furnished pay for a military force out of their tribute.”\(^53\) The editors restored all of the names of the cities in the rubric, seemingly based upon a reasonable premise.\(^54\) The editors connected the payment of tribute to the expedition of Melesandros to Karia and Lykia in the same year.\(^55\) This payment to an army in the field is the first recorded instance of its kind on the lists. Each of the communities paid for itself and not as a group as in the previous period. On the same list, however, Erythrai and the other five communities are listed separately making another payment, though with the indication that they all belonged to Erythrai.\(^56\) Unfortunately, no actual amount survives for either payment of any of the cities.

\(^{52}\) Demand 1990, 76 only discusses the Olynthos, Skabala and Assera group and the Mekyberna, Stolos, and the Polichnitai group; Reger 1997, 465 also suggests that *synteleiai* aided tribute collection.

\(^{53}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 281.61-66.

\(^{54}\) *ATL* 1.193.

\(^{55}\) Thuc. 2.69.

\(^{56}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 281A.1.19-24.
Therefore, it seems that in this year, Erythrai and its dependents made two payments separately to Athens. One payment was made to Melesandros and the other as their usual tribute payment. It is striking that the six communities delivered their payment to Melesandros separately. For convenience purposes, one would imagine that Melesandros would have preferred that they pay as a group to facilitate his reception.\(^57\) In this case, Athens did not employ a *syntely* to ease the reception of tribute, but was willing to receive the tribute both at home and for a military operation in the field separately from each of the communities. The notion that convenience for Athens can explain the creation of a *syntely* seems not to apply to Erythrai in this period. This fact probably should also be applied to the *syntely* in earlier periods as well. It is difficult to envision how Athens was much benefited by the cycling of the payments of the *syntelies* through Erythrai, or, even if it was, why the Athenians did not have recourse to *syntelies* for other groups of tributaries.

The assumption, prevalent among commentators, that Athenian imperialism was manifested as a “divide-and-conquer” policy also does not seem to apply to the *apotaxis* of the Erythraian *syntely*.\(^58\) If one judges from the results, the Athenian reaction to the civil unrest or revolt at Erythrai in the late 450s does not seem to have affected the unity of the group, nor is there any hint of such an approach in *IG I*\(^3\) 14. If Erythrai had represented the group either in ship contributions or in cash payment in earlier assessment periods before the first list in 454/53, then Athens did not hesitate to reform the *syntely* after revolt. Engelmann and Merkelbach’s suggestion that *apotaxis* was a

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\(^57\) Alternatively, there is the possibility that the group did pay together, but each was credited separately. I prefer, however, the simpler explanation that Erythrai did not pay for the *syntely*, although it is clear that the five communities were dependencies in this period.

\(^58\) See Kirsten 1956, 79.
policy to weaken Erythrai through the detachment of the dependent communities is
difficult to reconcile with the evidence from the tribute lists and what we know of the
history of the period. If Erythrai revolted in the late 450s and was forcibly returned to the
league shortly afterward, it is clear that Athens did not choose at this opportune moment
to weaken the rebellious city by assessing separately the dependencies that had remained
loyal. Athens did not employ the tactic it had wielded in the 460s against Thasos and
would utilize in the 420s against Mytilene. Athens must have felt confident enough in
Erythrai’s loyalty or believed that apotaxis was not an effective or proper means of
weakening the city even after intervening radically in local affairs. The supervision by
Athenian officials and a garrison mentioned in IG I 1 14 seems to have been sufficient to
ensure hegemonic interests. The possible emplacement of a colony at Erythrai in the early
440s proposed by the editors of the ATL could have affected the syntely or at least caused
a reduction in tribute. The purpose of the colony would have been to guard this part of
Ionia, probably as a bulwark against civil unrest and Persian interference. A colony
certainly would have served Athenian interests more efficiently than apotaxis. In the third
assessment period, the syntely suffered apotaxis around the time that the colony would
have been established. Nevertheless, the issue is not absolutely clear and the existence of
a colony must be considered with the reformation of the syntely in the 430s, if it survived
that long. Based on the available evidence, apotaxis was not a policy pursued by Athens
to divide the Erythrai group in order to further Athenian hegemony.

Any explanation of the fluctuations of the tribute status of the Erythraian syntely
must first consider local causes. Economic and political conditions probably had more of

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59 IG I 2 396; ATL 3.283-84; Figueira 1991, 223; Brunt 1966, 77, 91. n. 30 and Meiggs 1972, 162-63 argue
against a colony at Erythrai in this period.
60 ATL 3.283-84.
an effect on the changes between *syntely* and *apotaxis* of the Erythrai group than Athenian desire to weaken the city by separating the dependents. Based upon the evidence from the tribute lists, until the 420s, *apotaxis* seems not to have financially benefited the Athenians. Athens actually received about 1T less from the group when they paid separately in the 440s. In any case, the difference in tribute received by Athens when the Erythrai group paid together or separately seems quite small when compared to the total revenue received from the rest of the empire. Moderate changes in assessment, however, would have been substantial to Erythrai and its dependents. The fluctuations between *syntely* and *apotaxis* were then products of various local political and economic changes, which unfortunately are lost to history.

Still, it is possible to offer a few suggestions, which may help to explain the changes in tribute status of the Erythrai group. Adjustments made in the tribute assessment process could explain the change from *syntely* to *apotaxis* in the 440s, a reversal late in the 430s and then what seems to be permanent *apotaxis* until the Erythraian revolt along with many of the Ionian allies in 412.\(^61\) The allies had the opportunity of appealing their tribute assessments by at least 425/24.\(^62\) Although the only secure evidence of the opportunity for appeals comes from the Thoudippos Decree, Meiggs has demonstrated that the *terminus ante quem* for such appeals was ca. 446/45.\(^63\) The editors of the *ATL* suggested that the allies always had the recourse to appeal of their tribute assessment.\(^64\) According to the Thoudippos Decree, a court of one thousand jurors was established to hear appeals from the allies against the new assessments. The

\(^{61}\) Thuc. 8.14.2.
\(^{62}\) *ATL* 3.79; Meiggs 1972, 240-42.
\(^{63}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 71; Meiggs 1972, 240 cites the Athenian regulations for Chalkis 446/45 (*IG* I\(^1\) 40, lines 26-27) in which Chalkis promises to pay the tribute which they 'persuade the Athenians'.
\(^{64}\) *ATL* 3.79.
adjudicated figures were then to be ratified by the council. Any innovations in this system probably concerned the role of dicasteric panels, while the overarching authority of the council had probably always existed.

Significantly, the record of Erythrai’s tribute in the 440s and 430s shows a rise when there was a syntely and decrease after apotaxis. I suggest that the Erythraians at several points could have appealed to lower their tribute, being ready to rid themselves of their dependents if necessary. The first appeal could have occurred in the third assessment period since it is clear that by 444/43 apotaxis had taken place leading to a reduction from a 9T assessment paid in the previous period by the entire group to 7T 5,700 dr. Various reasons such as the inability to furnish the assessed tribute or a reversal in the policy concerning the city’s regional hegemony could have led to an appeal for tribute reduction accompanied by apotaxis in the new assessment period. The damage caused by recent Persian intervention and the risk of a renewed threat are likely to have played roles. Erythrai would have sought to separate the hegemony from the calculation of tribute as a tactic to focus Athenian attention on their own financial strength. Nor is it to be excluded that the dependencies of the Erythraians might have taken the initiative for requesting the various syntelic and apotaxic arrangements.

As a ship contributor in earlier years, Erythrai would have exploited the resources of the dependent communities alone, which might have been arranged through various administrative channels. As a tributary beginning ca. 450/49, Erythrai was responsible for meeting cash obligations that could have been difficult to fulfill from year to year. The

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65 See ATL 3.71-80 and Meiggs 1972, 240-42 for a detailed discussion of IG I3 71 and its consequences.
66 The highest amount the Erythraian syntely paid was 10T 100 dr. in the late 430s, while separately the city usually paid 7T in the 440s; Meiggs 1972, 162-63 suggested that a league wide lowering of tribute was the reason for the reduction. Yet, this explanation does not adequately explain the increased tribute in 433/32, which is over a talent more than in the second period, which dates before the supposed reductions.
emplacement of a colony at Erythrai could also have affected the payment of tribute.
Perhaps Erythrai, whose aristocrats had been the focus of the turmoil in the region, bore
the costs of remediation and, accordingly, dealt with the advantages and disadvantages
that the colony might have brought. There is still every indication that Erythrai, however,
would have continued to maintain long standing hegemonic privileges not included in the
furnishing of tribute. It is essential to observe that in 444/43 and in 430/29, the
dependencies are listed separately, but with the indication that they still belonged to
Erythrai. Admittedly, in 444/43 the identification is a little ambiguous and could be
understood as implying that the Polichnitai and the Elaiousioi merely lay in the territory
of Erythrai although at this period independent of the city. This additional
identification would have served to distinguish these communities from three other
communities called the Polichnitai, which also appear on the lists. Furthermore,
another community called Elaious was in the Thracian Chersonesos. However, in
430/29 the genitive 'Ερυθραίον is appended to the each of the five dependent
communities. The genitive must signify that the five towns really belonged to Erythrai,
and the inclusion of the group in a special rubric seems to indicate that Erythrai and the
dependencies were still behaving as a unit although furnishing tribute separately. Thus, I
suggest that in 444/43 the additional identification also signifies that the Polichnitai and
the Elaiousioi belonged to Erythrai. Although in other years the communities are not
listed with the additional signification that they belonged to Erythrai, they are generally

67 In 444/43, IG I.1 268.1.27, Πολιχνιται/Ερυθραίον is listed and in the same list and in list 28, IG I.1 284.2.
(427/26 or 426/25) Έλαιοιοι/Ερυθραίον is listed. In 430/29 all the dependents are listed as belonging to
Erythrai in the assessment decree of 425/24, IG I.1 71.1.144-45, II.151-52, the Polichnitai and the
Elaiousioi are listed separately but also as dependents.
68 Gschnitzer 1958, 116 argues that the addition means more than just a topographical reference.
69 ATL 1.541.
70 ATL 1.484.
listed just before or after Erythrai, even after *apotaxis*. The positions of the entries on
the tribute lists need not necessarily reflect when the tribute was received by Athens,
which would merely indicate geographic proximity. Therefore, the consistent grouping
of Erythrai with its dependents implies a continuing relationship even after *apotaxis* as
they tended to be listed together even when assessed separately.

Nevertheless, let us consider briefly the other hypothesis, however unlikely a
possibility it has seemed to me, namely that the dissolution of the *syntely* ca. 446/45
signifies Erythraian loss of control over their possessions. In this scenario, the
independence of the dependent communities would have lasted until Erythrai reasserted
control over the peninsula in the late 430s, when the *syntely* was reformed only to lose
control again ca. 430/29. The reasons for the hypothetical loss of the hegemony in the
third assessment period could have been caused by any number of issues obscured from
us. For instance, if a colony was dispatched to Erythrai, the result could have been a
weakening of the Erythraian polity leading to the loss of the dependencies or Athenian
supervision of this area of Ionia could have required the detachment of the dependencies.
The lack of evidence from Erythrai in this period outside of the tribute lists makes almost
any conjecture plausible. The tribute quota lists, however, do indicate that, even during
some periods of *apotaxis*, these communities still belonged to Erythrai. If *apotaxis* was a
result of a loss of control over the towns on the peninsula then it is clear that Athens did
not completely recognize their new status as grounds for a change in expectations over

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71 The notable exceptions to this observation are in 444/43, 441/40, and in the assessment decree of 425/24; Paarmann 2004, 104-05 has shown that the order of names on the assessment decrees follow an order determined by how much they paid in the previous period in descending order.
72 Paarmann 2004, 82, 107-08.
73 Ibid. 82.
how tribute was to be paid. Thus, it is best to conclude that Erythrai had continual control over its possessions on the Mimas peninsula even when they were assessed separately.

The fragments of Antiphon’s speech *On the Tribute of the Samothracians*, dated to the 420s, provide some evidence for the nature of the appeals process and the techniques that league members could employ before the courts, offering a glimpse of how Erythrai could have shed itself of the direct responsibility for paying for the dependent communities. Antiphon seems to have described the barren nature of the island of Samothrace and its meager resources in an effort to prove that Samothrace could not support the proposed tribute burden. He also mentioned *syntely* and *apotaxis* in some context. One hypothesis would be that the mention of *apotaxis* refers to the effort of the Samothracians to shed themselves of their dependents on the coast opposite the island that were now too burdensome to pay for. *Apotaxis* would have had the benefit of removing components of the state, which were not contributing enough to the total tribute during the increased assessments of the Archidamian War. Gernet suggested that the speech dates to 425, which would be the point when the towns were separated from the island.

The success of the appeal may be seen at the latest in the assessment of 422/21, when Samothrace’s dependents Drys, Zone, and Sale, are recorded separately contributing a substantial total sum of 3T 3,000 dr.

Alternatively, the initiative for separation came from the cities of the Samothracian *peraia* who thought their interests better served by assessment in their own

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74 Fr. 49-56 Thalheim; Gernet 1923, 161 proposes ca. 425 for the date of the speech; Meiggs 1972, 327 also proposed the occasion as the assessment of 425/24. See also Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis of this speech.

75 Meiggs 1972, 241 suggested that Athens wanted to increase revenue by assessing the communities separately.

76 Gernet 1923, 161; *ATL* 3.195; Meiggs 1972, 241 suggests that the communities could have been detached in 425/24.

77 *IG* I 77.V. 27-31.
regard. Thus, it is possible that Samothrace could have appealed in the speech to retain the *perea*, which the island was in danger of losing, because of the efforts of the dependent communities to receive their own assessments as independent polities. In this case, the reference to the island’s lack of resources would be equally reasonable.

Unfortunately, Samothrace’s entry did not survive on the assessment of 422/21, so it is difficult to know the effect of *apotaxis* on the island itself. The important fact is that, in some way, the appeal of the Samothracians was related to the separation of three of their dependent communities, which probably reduced Samothrace’s tribute. The fragments provide no further information in order to understand the full context of the speech, but they reveal the type of arguments that the Erythraians would have employed in appealing their own assessments. Although *apotaxis* seems to have led to a reduction in total tribute for the group in the third assessment period, circumstances seem to have changed in the 430s allowing the *syntely* to reform, this time with a tribute over 10T. Then just a few years later, Erythrai could have sought *apotaxis* again because the city was once again unable to pay the assessed amount. Generally for the communities of the Mimas peninsula, the underlying political realities were probably more stable than the shifting manifestations of *syntely* and *apotaxis*, which reflected changing arrangements for payment of funds.

We must remember that *syntely* and *apotaxis* probably affected how guarantors were enrolled for each unit’s annual tribute payment. From the decree proposed by Kleonymos, it is possible to discern by at least ca. 426/25 how the Athenians had developed the procedures for tribute collection. According to the decree, each tributary state is required to appoint tribute collectors, *eklogeis*, who are also liable for the delivery

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78 *IG* I³ 68 = *ML* #68.
of payment.\textsuperscript{79} From a fragment of Antiphon’s speech for the Samothracians it seems that the guarantors were wealthy citizens of the allies.\textsuperscript{80} In a sense, \textit{apotaxis} must have increased the responsibility of the aristocrats in dependent states that had not existed in periods of \textit{syntely}, if we can be certain that smaller members of a \textit{syntelic} arrangement were not required to appoint collectors. Thus a disproportionate impact at either end of the process of tribute collection was created. At times the Athenians could even have received approximately the same amount of tribute now split between a \textit{hēgemôn} and its “severed” dependencies. Yet the wealthy members of the elite in the separated tributaries experienced a dramatically different distribution of responsibility in the collection of the requisite funds. \textit{Apotaxis} clearly had this effect, but it is uncertain which aspects of the tribute process were individualized in \textit{syntely}. It is unknown if the added burden of tribute collection actually affected moves towards \textit{apotaxis} by smaller dependencies.

In considering the \textit{apotaxis} of the 420s, Athens’ need for increased revenue because of the Archidamian War must lie in the background. In 428/27 Erythrai paid 12T, the highest recorded amount for the city.\textsuperscript{81} In the same list, the Polichnitai paid an increased amount of 1T 3,000 dr.\textsuperscript{82} The tribute increases should be traced back to a new assessment in the same year, when Athens was constrained by cost of the siege of Mytilene.\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Apotaxis} in this period might have been motivated by changes in Athenian policy because of new economic and political realities of the war. Yet, \textit{apotaxis} here was not inevitable since it is clear that a \textit{syntely} of contributors had generally yielded more tribute before the war. It is possible that in this period that a \textit{syntely} would have entailed

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 68.5-9.
\textsuperscript{80} Fr. 52 Thalheim.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 283.III.28.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 283.III.30.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{ATL} 3.70.
an even higher tribute burden for Erythrai. Consequently, the Athenians would have assessed the *syntely* at a higher rate than the allies separately. The surviving evidence for the status of the Erythrai group in the later period of Delian League seems to show that they never formed a *syntely* again. Nevertheless, not enough evidence survives to make this conclusion absolutely certain.

In 412, the Athenians made Sidousa and Pteleon bases from which they attacked Chios after that island’s revolt.\(^84\) The Athenian occupation in itself says nothing about the recent assessment or tribute status of the communities. In Thucydides’ description of the towns as fortified bases for Athenian operations, he does affirm that they still belonged to Erythrai in this period.\(^85\) It seems that the Athenians were able to occupy the two cities, separated by some distance from a now rebellious Erythrai on the Mimas peninsula.\(^86\) From an examination of available evidence it is most likely that Erythrai continued to control the dependent communities on the Mimas peninsula through the 420s up until the Athenian occupation of Sidousa and Pteleon in 412.

Another important aspect of the tax history of the Erythraian group for the study of sub-hegemonies in the league concerns the unusual way the *syntely* was listed in the early 440s. The lists record that several of the dependent communities ‘paid for themselves’ while in a *syntely* in the second assessment period. In 448/47 and in 447/46, Sidousa, Boutheia, Pteleon, and the Elaiousioi are recorded as furnishing tribute on behalf of themselves, while Erythrai paid for the Polichnitaï.\(^87\) The entry is a little ambiguous since it is unclear whether the four communities each paid for themselves or

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\(^84\) Thuc. 8.24.2; See Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1099.
\(^85\) Thuc. 8.24.2.
\(^86\) See *ATL* 1.485-87 for a detailed discussion of the size of the Mimas peninsula and locations of the dependent communities: See Gschnitzer 1958, 116-117.
\(^87\) *IG* I\(^1\) 264.III.28-30, *IG* I\(^1\) 265.I.58-64.
together as a separate group. In the list dated to 450/49, there is no indication that the four dependents paid for themselves.\(^\text{88}\) In the late 430s, when the syntely was reformed, it seems that Erythrai paid for the whole group and the individual members are not listed.

Thus, for at least two years in the second assessment period, four of the dependent communities furnished their own tribute while in the syntely.\(^\text{89}\) As stated above, in the first year of the syntely the dependent communities are listed below Erythrai with no special notation. The individual listing of members of a syntely on the tribute lists is not unusual.\(^\text{90}\) The editors of the ATL believed that Erythrai’s payment on behalf of the Polichnitai in these two years signified that the two had a closer relationship with each other than with the rest of the group.\(^\text{91}\) The editors of the ATL provided no further argument or evidence to support their conjecture. Clearly, for some reason, Erythrai paid directly for the Polichnitai and not for the other towns in these two years. One figure seems to stand for the whole group in both years, so it must not have been a case where each of the four communities paid separate tribute to Athens. It appears that they were credited on the lists in both years as contributing individually to one total sum. The four dependents, then, were not in apotaxis. Unfortunately, no other syntely is documented in this way on the lists making a comparison impossible with any other group.

I conclude that it is misguided to see in this case the estrangement of the four dependencies from Erythraian control. If they were truly contributing separate tribute, then the lists should have reflected their status by listing individual sums. Gschnitzer’s observation concerning the size and mountainous terrain of the Mimas peninsula may

\(^{88}\) IG I\(^1\) 263.II.13-18.
\(^{89}\) IG I\(^1\) 263.II.13-18, IG I\(^1\) 264.III.28-30.
\(^{90}\) Paarmann 2004, 82.
\(^{91}\) ATL 1.487.
have relevance in explaining the unusual entries. In this scenario, Athens would have received individual payments from the four communities since they were handling their own economic issues separately because of their isolation. The Athenians would have still credited Erythrai with heading the syntely although acknowledging the separate payments. Yet, the distant locations of the dependencies did not change over time and it is clear that Erythrai paid as the syntely-‘head’ without any special notation in the late 430s. Thus, this explanation does not account sufficiently for the other years when the syntely was reformed. More likely, the syntely in the second assessment was already in the beginning stages of apotaxis, which occurred in the next period. Erythrai already could have been seeking to be shed itself of the dependent communities, but for some reason Athens still received one payment as from a syntely, albeit with the careful notation that four of the dependent communities paid their own tribute. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to surmise that special circumstances in the way in which local leaders and wealthy guarantors (as indicated above) were organized for the Erythraians finds abbreviated and cryptic expression on the quota lists. Unfortunately, no answer seems to be completely satisfactory. Yet, it is clear that the same special notation does not indicate totally separate payments or any other division in Erythraian hegemony.

The history of Erythrai in the mid-5th century provides evidence for the unsettled conditions and vulnerability of the Ionian coast. The absence of Erythrai in the first tribute period and the reorganization of the Erythraian government by Athens, attested by IG 1 13 14, prove that the polity suffered severe unrest in the 450s. It is probable that Persia interfered by backing a faction or factions that led to a revolt. In the same period, Miletos
also suffered *stasis* but probably remained loyal until the mid-440s.\(^{92}\) The effect on the regional hegemonies of the Miletos and Erythrai were significant. Boutheia seems to have acted as a *syntely*-center for the Mimas Peninsula and for loyal Erythraians during the period of trouble, while Miletos stood apart from (at least) the island possession of Leros and the community of Teichioussa for a few years.\(^{93}\) The result of the *stasis* at Erythrai was the separation of the state and dependent territory into at least two factions. Much later, in 412, Athens was able to occupy Sidousa and Pteleon, while Erythrai was in revolt, repeating in some ways the fractures of the 450s, revealing once again the weakness of the cities in Ionia.\(^{94}\)

After Athens brought Erythrai back into the fold ca. 450 and restructured the state, the dependent territory was brought under the control of the city and paid as a *syntely* in the second assessment period. Yet, it seems that by 448/47 the Erythraian group was making a move toward *apotaxis*. By 444/43 at the latest, *apotaxis* had occurred. However, the separation of the dependent territories seems not to have been complete. The annotations of the quota lists continue to reveal sustained control over the five communities by Erythrai even in periods of *apotaxis*. The reformation of the *syntely* by 433/32 also implies that Erythrai maintained close supervision over the Mimas peninsula throughout the late 440s and 430s. My hypothesis that *apotaxis* was a result of adjustments made in the tribute process through appeal is an attempt to consider all of these issues. Any explanation for the frequent changes between *syntely* and *apotaxis* must take into account the evidence from the tribute lists, which shows that Erythrai never completely lost control over the towns of the Mimas peninsula. Every

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\(^{92}\) Robertson 1987, 387-90.  
\(^{93}\) ATL 3.252.  
\(^{94}\) Thuc. 8.24.2.
four years Athens reassessed the tribute and gave opportunities for the allies to appeal. The volatility of the situation of Erythrai and the Mimas peninsula probably prompted appeals and adjustment by the Athenians in every assessment cycle. It is clear that apotaxis led to a reduction in tribute for the Erythraian syntely until the late 430s. These changes in the tribute may reveal the success of these appeals. The movement between the two different tribute statuses demonstrates the flexibility Athens afforded her allies in meeting tribute obligations and the recognition of the longstanding prerogatives Erythrai and many others had over their regional hegemonies.

The separate assessments of the five dependencies on the Mimas peninsula did not fundamentally alter their status as a group, as Athens still recognized their dependent relationship to Erythrai. There is little evidence that Athens sought to weaken Erythrai through apotaxis just a few years after installing a garrison and reorganizing the government. These prior actions would have served Athenian interests much more effectively than the detachment of a few small nearby communities. Instead, it is probable the Erythrai attempted to separate the hegemony from the tribute assessment by appealing for apotaxis, but retained recognition of its control. No other group experienced as many changes as the Erythraian syntely or appears on the lists with so many indications that the separated components were still possessions of the dominant city. Thus, it is difficult to generalize for other local hegemonies based upon the history of the group. I would note that for two other sizeable sub-hegemonies that tended to belong to autonomous allies such as Thasos (463/62) and Mytilene (428/27), apotaxis was the actual detachment of dependent communities. The uniqueness of the Erythraian situation is significant, however, as it contains much evidence for the potential flexibility
of Athenian policy toward local hegemonies and the local conditions which affected them.

Table of Tribute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Tribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>454/53</td>
<td>Bouthieis</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>453/52</td>
<td>Bouthieis</td>
<td>3T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>452/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451/50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450/49</td>
<td>Erythraioi</td>
<td>8T, 3300dr (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polichnitai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidousioi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pteleousioi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bouthieis</td>
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<tr>
<td>448/47</td>
<td>Erythraioi</td>
<td>They paid for the- 9T</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polichnitai</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These cities paid for themselves: Sidousioi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bouthieis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elaiousioi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pteleousioi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>447/46</td>
<td>Erythraioi</td>
<td>They paid for the- 8T, 4000 dr. 2000dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polichnitai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These cities paid for themselves: Sidousa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bouthieis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elaiousioi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pteleousioi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>446/45</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>445/44</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>444/43</td>
<td>Polichnitai (Ἐρυθραίοι)</td>
<td>4000 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Elaiousioi (Ἐρυθραίοι)</td>
<td>100 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erythraioi</td>
<td>7T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443/42</td>
<td>Erythraioi</td>
<td>7T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bouthiea</td>
<td>1000 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polichnitai</td>
<td>4000 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pteleousioi</td>
<td>100 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidousioi</td>
<td>500 dr.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
442/41 - Erythraioi 7T
   Elaiousioi 100 dr.
   Polichnitai 4000 dr.
   Pteleousioi 100 dr.
   Sidousioi 500 dr.
   Boutheia 1000 dr.

441/40 - Sidousioi 500 dr.
   Polichnitai 4000 dr.
   Elaiousioi 100 dr.

440/39 - Erythrai 7T
   Boutheia 1000 dr.
   Sidousioi 500 dr.
   Polichnitai 4000 dr.
   Pteleousioi 100 dr.
   Elaiousioi 100 dr.

439/38 - Erythraioi 7T
   Polichnitai 4000 dr.
   Boutheia 1000 dr.
   Sidousioi 500 dr.
   Pteleousioi 100 dr.
   Elaiousioi 100 dr.

433/32 - Erythraioi and *synteles* 10T 1100 dr.
432/31 - Erythraioi 10T 1100 dr.

430/29 - Erythraioi (-)
   Boutheieis of the Erythraians (-)
   Pteleousioi of the Erythraians (-)
   Elaiousioi of the Erythraians (-)
   Polichnitai of the Erythraians (-)
   Sidousioi of the Erythraians (-)

“These cities furnished pay for a military force out of their tribute”
   Erythraioi (-)
   Sidousioi (-)
   Boutheieis (-)
   Pteleousioi (-)
   Elaiousioi (-)
   Polichnitai (-)

429/28 - Boutheieis 1000 dr.
428/27- Erythraioi 12T
   Boutheieis 1000 dr.
   Polichnitai 1T 3000 dr.

427/26
or 426/25- Boutheieis 1000 dr.
   Elaiousioi of the Erythraians (-)

416/15- Erythraioi (-)
415/14- Erythraioi (-)

A9-425/24- Erythraioi (-)
   Polichnitai of the Erythraians (-)
   Elaiousioi of the Erythraians 1T
Chapter 3: Miletos

The history of Miletos after the battle of Mycale in 479 down to the city’s revolt from Athens in 412 has been variously interpreted by scholars. The unusual amount of extant evidence for the political conditions of the city in the mid-5th century has led to a variety of different interpretations. Evidence from the Athenian tribute lists, two inscriptions, and a reference to civil strife in the pamphlet of Old Oligarch on the Athenian constitution all attest to significant civil unrest in the city in mid-5th century. The fragmentary nature of the decrees has made any certain interpretation impossible. It has generally been assumed that an oligarchic government controlling Miletos revoluted in the late 450s and then again mid-440s. The revolt led to intervention by Athens and the eventual establishment of democracy on the Athenian model. My approach to these complex issues, however, is to bring to the forefront of investigation Miletos’ local hegemony in this period. Like other cities in the Delian League such as Erythrai or Samos (as already noted), Miletos had laid claim to a significant amount of territory in the 5th century, including several traditionally dependent communities. Claims to some of this sphere of influence had probably solidified in the Archaic period and then again in first decades of the Delian League as the city was re-founded and expanded. Miletos had been the leading east Greek state most damaged by the Persians at the center of the Ionian Revolt. The city had been besieged and finally sacked in 494. Herodotus records that much of the male population was transferred to Ampe on the Persian Gulf while the women and children were enslaved (6.19-20).
A close inspection of the evidence reveals significant disruptions in the mid-5\textsuperscript{th} century within Miletos’ local hegemony. It is my contention that the political unrest hypothesized by scholars and the state of the Milesian regional hegemony are interconnected. The disruption of the hegemony has importance in evaluating the limits of regional ambitions of mainland tributaries in the league. The history of Miletos in the mid-5\textsuperscript{th} century like that of Erythrai illustrates the instability of Ionia and weakness of moderate sized mainland states compared to the larger island powers in retaining or expanding regional hegemonies. The unique amount and complexity of the literary and epigraphical evidence of Milesian history of this period render it necessary to focus on the differing interpretations offered by scholars over the last century. Without a clear and exhaustive discussion of the political status of Miletos it would be difficult to examine effectively the city’s regional hegemony. The Milesian sub-hegemony was only one facet of a large and powerful state that underwent substantial changes in a short period of time in the mid-5\textsuperscript{th} century. Therefore, I shall begin by outlining the available evidence for the political situation of the city during the period of its membership in the Delian League and then survey the major interpretations of the evidence by scholars in order to better illustrate Miletos’ place as a major ally in the Delian League. I shall continue by offering my own analysis of the evidence while also examining the extent of the Milesian hegemony in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century and its impact on the history of Miletos along with its relations with Athens. Thus, my analysis of the Milesian hegemony cannot be separated from a thorough study of the complex evidence of the city’s history in the mid-5\textsuperscript{th} century.
Miletos’ influence and power was considerable in the Archaic period. The city was renowned in antiquity as a major colonizer, particularly in the Propontis and Black Sea regions. Scholars have calculated that Miletos founded between 30 and 45 colonies. Thus in the early Archaic period Miletos already enjoyed a substantial population and resources. Miletos founded such notable colonies as Sinope on south coast of the Black Sea and Kyzikos on the Propontis. The city also had substantial trade relations and participated in the first recorded international conflict in Greek history. During the so-called “Lelantine War” between Chalkis and Eretria in Euboia beginning in the late 8th century, Miletos is said to have supported Eretria. Already in this period, Samos seems to have been Miletos’ main rival as the island supported Chalkis in the conflict. Herodotus states that the Milesians had a permanent presence at the pan-Hellenic emporium of Naukratis in Egypt. Thus, the early history of Miletos is one of a major Greek power influential in trade and colonization throughout the Greek world and beyond.

Miletos’ foreign relations in the Archaic period also reveal its significant military power. During the reign of the tyrant Thrasybulos in the late 7th century, Miletos came into conflict with the Lydian kingdom under Alyattes. The Milesians withstood a Lydian siege and in ca. 605 concluded a peace with the Lydians on terms of friendship and alliance. In the 6th century Miletos might have perhaps experienced some sort of loss of its special status secured under Alyattes when Croesus subdued Ionia. As an extremely prosperous metropolis, Miletos probably paid tribute to Croesus but at the same time

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1 Gorman 2001, 64.
2 Ibid. 257.
3 Hdt. 5.99.1; Thuc, 1.15.3.
4 Hdt. 2.178.1-3.
5 Hdt. 1.22.
retained some sort of special status with the Lydians.\textsuperscript{6} After Croesus’ defeat at the hands of the Persians, Miletos was able to secure the same terms under Cyrus that the city had enjoyed under the Lydians.\textsuperscript{7} Although Persian rule was not oppressive, Miletos was the major instigator in the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt in ca. 500.\textsuperscript{8} Miletos became the center of the rebellion and was the scene of the final major sea battle of the war of the island of Lade in 494. After the defeat at sea, Miletos then was besieged and sacked by the victorious Persian forces. The conquest was accompanied by deportation of its people.

*Primary Evidence*

A brief overview of the main evidence for Miletos in the period after the Ionian Revolt will be helpful before examining the issues in detail. The literary tradition is almost silent concerning the political situation of Miletos after its destruction in 494. There is even the question of whether Miletos existed as a city between its destruction and the Persian wars. The community does appear to have existed in some form by 479 since Herodotus provides an account in which the Persians distrusted the loyalty of the Milesians during the battle of Mycale. They posted the Milesians in the rear to guard the mountain passes which acted as escape routes in order to remove them from their camp.\textsuperscript{9} The Milesians subsequently betrayed the Persians by leading them down the wrong paths. Other than in Herodotus’ account, Miletos does not appear in the historical record until the first Athenian tribute quota list. The first list dated to 454/53, contains the

\textsuperscript{6} Gorman 2001, 124.  
\textsuperscript{7} Hdt. 1.141.  
\textsuperscript{8} Hdt. 5.35-6.  
\textsuperscript{9} Hdt. 9.104; See Burn 1962, 550; Hignett 1963, 257-58.
assessments of two dependent Miletos’ dependent territories, the island of Leros and Teichioussa.¹⁰ They are listed as follows:

Μιλέσιοι
[ἐ][χε] Λέρο: ΗΗΗΗ
Μιλέσιοι
[ἐκ, Τ] εἰχίοσε[ς:

[The Milesians from Leros: 300 dr. The Milesians from Teichioussa: . . .]

Leros is an island off the coast of the city and Teichioussa is identified as a settlement to the south on the Gulf of Iasos. For many years it was thought that Miletos was absent from the first list. The city’s absence and the inclusion of Milesians from Leros and Teichioussa figured prominently in reconstructions for the period. Miletos’ missing entry was generally interpreted as proof of the city’s revolt from the Delian League.¹¹ However, in 1971 a new fragment of the first quota list was found in the Athenian Agora.¹² The new fragment belongs to column 3, lines 18-20. The fragment reads as follows:

Νεοπο[. . . . . . . . . .]
Μιλέ[. . . . . . . . . .]
’Ακρ[. . . . . .].:ΗΗΗΗ¹³

Meritt restored the fragment to read:

Νεοπο[λταὶ ἐκ νν]
Μιλέ[το ἐν Λευκοῖ]
’Ακρ[οτερίο]: ΗΗΗΗ¹⁴

[The Neapolitai from . . .]

¹⁰ IG I² 259.VI.19-22.
¹¹ ATL 3.253.
¹² Meritt 1972, 403-17.
¹⁴ Meritt 1972, 409.
Meritt believed that the Neapolitai were a third band of loyal Milesians in exile from a rebellious Miletos, along with others on Leros and in Teichioussa. Meritt located this community on the peninsula above Halikarnassos. Thus, Meritt’s restoration was predicated on the supposition that Miletos was absent from the first list because of revolt. However, Piérart, after reviewing the fragment, concluded that Meritt’s reading was impossible. He argued for including Milesians themselves in the first list. Piérart’s reading seems preferable to the ad hoc, complicated, and methodologically unsound restoration of Meritt. Robertson in support of Piérart suggested that Μιλέσιοι should stand instead in line 19 while Νεοπολται in line 18 and Ακρα in line 20 are separate tributaries. Miletos does appear conclusively in the third list (452/51) assessed at an unknown sum and then in the fifth list (450/49) with an assessment of 10T, including Leros and Teichioussa. In the twelfth list (443/42) the city’s tribute was reduced to 5T, while still including Leros and Teichioussa. Miletos’ appearance in the tribute lists is the only securely dated evidence of the political situation of the city in the mid-5th century. Another important piece of evidence is the fragmentary Athenian decree often called “The Regulations for Miletos”. The nature and even the date of the decree have long been disputed. The mention of the archon Euthynos in the body of the decree (lines

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16 Robertson 1987, 397.
17 IG I 261.II.28, IG I 263.V.18.
18 IG I 269.I.33.
19 IG I 21.
61, 85) has led scholars to date it to 450/49, 426/25, and a variety of other dates.\(^{20}\) The fragmentary condition of the decree has made any secure interpretation difficult, although it is clear from the surviving fragments that Athens intervened considerably in the affairs of the city. Mention is made of five officials to be sent from Athens to oversee the city (line 4). There are other stipulations regarding judicial relations between the two states (lines 26-64). Oaths are also to be sworn between Milesian and Athenian officials (lines 65-71). Some scholars have argued that the decree announces the return of Miletos to the alliance after a revolt or an Athenian attempt to quell \textit{stasis} there. Below I will discuss my interpretation of the decree in my own reconstruction of Milesian history of the period.

The second important decree concerns the banishment of a small group of individuals by the Milesian authorities.\(^{21}\) The inscription is on a marble base of a lost stele. The decree banishes the sons Nympharetos, Alkimus, Kresphontes, and Stratonax. A reward is also offered to anyone who succeeds in killing them. Most scholars have concluded that the decree records a sentence of banishment conferred upon traitors.\(^{22}\) It has also been suggested that the offenders were of Neleid descent and therefore belonged to the traditional Milesian aristocracy.\(^{23}\) The officials in charge of executing the degree are called \textit{epimenioi}, ‘monthly officers’. The existence of these officials implies that the government was still controlled by an oligarchy and had not yet been replaced by an

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\(^{21}\) Milet 1.6 # 187; Tod 1946, # 35; \textit{ML}, # 43.

\(^{22}\) See Barron 1962, 2; Meiggs 1972, 564-65.

\(^{23}\) Barron 1962, 2-6; See Hdt. 9.97; Neleus was the mythical founder of Miletos during the migration to Ionia. The names of some of the outlawed individuals on the inscription reveal Neleid connections. For instance, Alkimos was a son of Pylian Neleus.
Athenian-style *prytany* system. Any further interpretation of the decree is difficult and its date is disputed. Scholars have argued for dating the inscription from 479-440.\(^\text{25}\)

The Old Oligarch provides literary evidence for severe civil strife in Miletos at some point in the 5\(^{th}\) century. Describing the Athenian policy of backing popular elements in cities suffering *stasis*, the Old Oligarch states that when Athens supported the oligarchs in Miletos, within a short time, they revolted and attacked their democratic opponents: τούτο δὲ ὁ Ἱλησίων εἰλούτο τοὺς βελτίστους, ἐντὸς ολίγου χρόνου ἄποστάντες τὸν δήμον κατέκοψαν˙ ([Xen], *Ath. Pol*. 3.11). In the same passage, the Old Oligarch adds that the Athenians also made poor decisions in backing the Spartans instead of the Messenians and in another instance, Boiotian oligarchs. The Old Oligarch offers no other information that would aid the dating of this event. However, it is possible to date the Athenian support of Sparta to ca. 464 after a massive earthquake led to the Helot Revolt. The Boiotian oligarchs were favored by Athens between the battle of Oinophyta (457) and the battle of Koronea (447). It is likely that Athenian support of a Milesian oligarchy probably occurred in the mid-5\(^{th}\) century as well but before 441/40, since I will maintain that the Athenians had established a democracy in Miletos by that time.\(^\text{26}\)

**Interpretations**

Until the discovery of a new fragment of the of the Athenian tribute list in 1971, Scholars were generally in agreement about the fundamental outline of events on Miletos in the mid-5\(^{th}\) century. It was believed that the absence of Miletos in the first tribute list

\(^{24}\) Robertson 1987, 379.

\(^{25}\) Barron 1962, 5-6, argued for 442; *ML*, 105 suggested a date between 470 and 440 and Robertson 1987, 380 for after 479.

\(^{26}\) Lapini 1997, 285 suggests that the revolt occurred between 446/45 and 444/43.
signified that the city was in revolt along with another Ionian city, Erythrai, which was also seen as an absentee in the period.\textsuperscript{27} The motivation for the revolt, possibly instigated by a pro-Persian faction, was seen as a reflection of the crisis in the Delian League after the Athenian failure in Egypt.\textsuperscript{28} It was suggested that Athens must have recovered Miletos by 452/51 in order to account for the appearance of the city in the third tribute list. The exiles in Leros, Teichioussa, and possibly Neapolis on the Leukos Promontory, are supposed to have returned to the city and the Athenians, after intervening once again in 450/49, had effected a reconciliation between the different factions as reflected in $IG\ I^3$ 21. The Athenians then backed the oligarchy and sent representatives to oversee Miletos’ return to the alliance. Then in the mid-440s the oligarchy rebelled, and Athens once again recovered the city by the time of Miletos’ reappearance in the list for 443/42 after an absence of three years. The Old Oligarch’s passage on Milesian stasis was seen as evidence for this revolt.

However, various adjustments have been made to this basic outline by a number of scholars. Disagreement has especially centered over the date and nature of $IG\ I^3$ 21. Generally, the decree has been seen as an Athenian attempt to bolster a loyal Milesian oligarchy in 450/49 or shortly after.\textsuperscript{29} However, there are a few dissenters to this view. Gehrke, while accepting Milesian disloyalty in the late 450s, has argued for a single revolt and the imposition of democracy by 452.\textsuperscript{30} He sees the Athenian regulations for Miletos as an effort to strengthen the original settlement made after the revolt. This view contends that these regulations were intended to strengthen a Milesian democracy already

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\textsuperscript{27} ATL 3.252-3; Barron 1962, 5-6; Meiggs 1972, 562-65.
\textsuperscript{28} See Gehrke 1980, 29-31.
\textsuperscript{29} Meiggs 1972, 562-63; Robertson 1987, 384-90.
\textsuperscript{30} See also Balcer 1984, 11-30.
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in place for a few years. As evidence, Gehrke considers the mention of Milesian 
*prytanies* in line 65 of the decree as referring to an Athenian-style presiding committee 
for a democratic council, instead of the traditional officials of oligarchic Miletos.\(^3^1\) Consequently, he rejects the view of a second oligarchic revolt in the mid-440s.

Piérart’s restoration of the new fragment of the first tribute list confirming the appearance of Miletos has provided the possibility for new interpretations of the events of the period. Accepting Piérart’s conclusions, Robertson has suggested that the separate payments in the first list of the Milesians, the Milesians from Leros and from Teichioussa was not caused by revolt, but by *stasis*.\(^3^2\) In his view, the single payment made by Miletos in 450/49 for Leros and Teichioussa is evidence of renewed control by the city of rival groups and not of a return to the league.\(^3^3\) Robertson contends that *IG I*\(^3\) 21 is the result of an Athenian attempt to quell the *stasis* by backing a Milesian oligarchy, while at the same time protecting pro-Athenian allied factions. In his view, the decree dates to shortly after the year of Euthynos when an oligarchy still controlled the city.\(^3^4\) He dates the revolt of the Milesian oligarchs to the mid-440s but before the city’s appearance in the assessment of 443/42.\(^3^5\) Athens then installed a democracy that lasted until the final stages of the Peloponnesian war.

*A Hypothesis*

My view of events in Miletos in the mid-5\(^{th}\) century generally follows those of Robertson but with greater emphasis on the potential cause or effect of the civil unrest in this period. It is clear that Piérart’s restoration of the new fragment of the first tribute list

\(^{32}\) Robertson 1987, 397.
\(^{33}\) Ibid. 390.
\(^{34}\) Ibid. 384-90.
\(^{35}\) See Gorman 2001, 216-236 for a similar reconstruction to that of Robertson.
should be the preferred reading to that of Meritt. Meritt’s restoration relied chiefly on the belief that Miletos had to be absent from the first list. Furthermore, the evidence for his identification of a Neapolis on Leukos Promontory is not well supported. Meritt places the community on the peninsula above Halikarnassos, which is only represented by a coin from the Hellenistic period and citations by Mela and Pliny.\textsuperscript{36} Even if Piérart had not shown that Meritt’s restoration is epigraphically impossible, Meritt’s identification for this band of Milesians is an unlikely reconstruction. It is much more probable that the fragment contains the assessment of the city of Miletos in 454/53. Thus, the hypothesis of a Milesian revolt in the first assessment period cannot be sustained.

The separate payments of the Milesians on Leros, Teichioussa, and the city itself in the first list probably should be ascribed to factional strife when considered along with other evidence.\textsuperscript{37} Just a few years later in 450/49, Miletos is listed alone with an assessment of 10T.\textsuperscript{38} Miletos’s payment probably continued to include two dependents until list 28 (427/26 or 426/25) when the three communities are listed separately again.\textsuperscript{39} Thereafter, Miletos’ payment included other two communities until the city’s revolt in 412. In list 28, Leros and Teichioussa are only identified by their toponyms and not with the additional ethnic, Μιλέσιοι, as in the first list. The change in appellation might have some significance for the political situation between the three communities. In 454/53, the identification of the inhabitants of Leros and Teichioussa as Milesians might have reflected a division between rival factions all claiming to represent Miletos. It is also possible, however, that this change the identification of Leros and Teichioussa in the first

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{36} Meritt 1972, 407.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Robertson 1987, 397; Gorman 2001, 234-35.
\item \textsuperscript{38} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 263.V.18.
\item \textsuperscript{39} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 284.15-17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
list and in list 28 merely reflects Athenian accounting procedure. Although, the evidence is not conclusive for a Milesian *stasis* in list 454/53, the separate entries probably reflect a fractured polity. Miletos’ single appearance in the list of 452/51 must then be evidence of renewed control by the city over its dependencies 

Leros’ large assessment in the first period deserves further attention as has significance for the size of Miletos in this period and importance for understanding the hypothesized factional strife. Leros is recorded as paying 3T to Athens in 454/53. A comparison to other islands reveals that Leros was assessed at a considerably higher rate than other islands of similar size. Leros’ territory comprises 53 km². No other island of comparable size is assessed at a rate close to that of Leros’ in any period. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare Leros’ payments in the first list to any other periods because no later amount survives. D.M. Lewis, while noticing the rather high proportion of Miletos’ assessment paid by Leros in the first list, speculated that the island and Teichioussa in this period were “lavishly demonstrating their continued loyalty” during a Milesian revolt. Lewis’ hypothesis depends on the existence of a Milesian revolt in 454/53 or soon after. It also makes the dubious assumption that allies ever altered their tribute payments upward on their own authority, when there were many alternative ways to flatter the Athenians (such as the installation of Atticizing cults). Another reason hypothesized by scholars is that this large assessment reflected refugees from the factional strife in the city who had fled to Leros, thereby, causing the island’s

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40 *IG* I³ 259.VI.19-20.  
41 Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 758.  
42 For example, Sikinos with a territory comprising 43km² was assessed at 500 dr. in 418/17 (*IG* I³ 287.I.16) and 1000 dr. in the assessment of 425/24 (*IG* I³ 71.I.90); Seriphos comprising a territory of 75 km² was assessed 2T in 451/50 (*IG* I³ 262.I.20) and 1T subsequently. See Reger in Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 732-93 for a complete list of size and assessments for islands belonging in the Delian League.  
43 Lewis 1994, 295.
payment to rise to 3T from a much lower amount that had previously been subsumed in a total Milesian payment. A related explanation, more likely in my view, is that the faction in control of Leros might have been paying for Miletos’ other island possessions.

An analogous situation might have occurred at Erythrai in the same period. It is generally believed that the exceptional large payment of 3T of the city of Boutheia in 453/52 accounted for Erythrai’s other dependents and/or refugees from the rebellious city. Yet, it is unlikely that in the midst of civil strife the Athenians would have accounted for the refugees in the assessment process since the size of a territory and its economic output were the basis of the assessment. Temporarily displaced people would not have been considered an appropriate means of raising revenue for the Athenian state. Yet, the partisans on Leros were able to achieve individual assessment, which implies that the Athenians were willing to recognize the current state of affairs in Miletos.

Another situation from the tribute lists that resembles that of Miletos and its dependents seems to have taken place on the island of Karpathos. In list 21 (434/33), a community on the island called the Eteokarpathians appears under the πόλεις αὐταὶ φόρον ταξάμεναι rubric. The Eteokarpathians were one of four communities on the island separately assessed throughout the period of the league. According to the editors of the ATL, the Eteokarpathians were a separate organization distinct from the city of Karpathos, but did not constitute a city themselves. Their name “Genuine Karpathians” incorporates a polemical claim vis-à-vis the other Karpathian communities. At least by the time of their appearance in the tribute lists, a group of citizens of the city of Karpathos took the

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46 IG I 278.VI.14.
47 ATL 1 497; See Meiggs 1982, 498 n. 36 and Ma in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009, 129-35 for discussions of an Athenian decree honoring the Eteokarpathians (IG I 1454).
initiative to be assessed separately as an independent group for unknown reasons. There is the possibility that they opposed the government of their city, which might have come to power recently or that they were disenchanted for other reasons. The important fact is that a group of citizens of Karpathos received a separate assessment from Athens without vindicating full independent polis status. The situations of Leros and Teichioussa might be analogous to that of these communities that in a time of stasis received an assessment separate from a city to which they formerly belonged. Such arrangements were practical mechanisms both for raising money from loyal allies and for crediting them officially for that loyalty.

As discussed above, the separate assessments of the island of Leros and the inland community of Teichioussa have been used as evidence by scholars for political unrest in the mid-5th century. More can be said about the extent of the territory under Milesian control in this period and the impact it might have had on the political situation. The only secure evidence for a Milesian hegemony in the mid-5th century exists for Leros and Teichioussa by virtue of the tribute lists. Yet, there is no direct evidence of Milesian control of Leros and Teichioussa before their appearance in the aparkhai lists in 454/53. However, Herodotus states that during the Ionian Revolt Hecataeus advised Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletos, to fortify Leros and use it as a base of operations. Therefore it is probable that by the end of 6th century Miletos controlled Leros as well as other neighboring islands. It is even possible that Miletos possessed Leros and the nearby island of Lepsia and Patmos as early as the 8th or 7th centuries, that is, even before the

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48 See Lepper 1962, 25-55 for the translation and analysis of the special rubrics in the tribute lists.
49 Hdt. 5.125.
period of Milesian colonization in the Propontis and Black Sea.\textsuperscript{50} The Milesians could not have ignored the islands controlling the approach to the city from the west at the same time at which they were founding colonies in the Black Sea region, since they had enemies near at hand.

Nonetheless, the precise status of the community on Leros in 454/53 is more difficult to determine. In the Hellenistic period Leros was one of Miletos’ five demes, probably representing the chief place among the Milesian islands.\textsuperscript{51} However, the Milesian demes functioned differently than those at Athens. Deme affiliation was not hereditary, but solely depended on place of residence, while tribal affiliation was inherited from father to son.\textsuperscript{52} It is unlikely that the introduction of demes and Cleisthenic tribes occurred at the same time at Miletos as there seems to be no tight alignment of the five demes and twelve Cleisthenic tribes.\textsuperscript{53} Based upon his analysis of honorific decrees from Leros, Piérart concluded that the introduction of demes could not have occurred until the Hellenistic period. Piérart contends that Leros and Teichioussa were instead simply Milesian possessions in the 5th century.\textsuperscript{54} Robertson has challenged some of Piérart’s conclusions. He contends that the Milesian demes reflected earlier territorial divisions that are observable in the first tribute list. He interprets the five proshetaroi- ‘companions’ of the aisymnetes in the decree of the Molpoi as representing the five divisions of the Milesian state.\textsuperscript{55} The absence of a numerical relationship of the

\textsuperscript{50} Benson 1963, 49; Gorman 2001, 50.
\textsuperscript{51} Piérart 1985, 282-283.
\textsuperscript{52} Piérart 1983, 2-18.
\textsuperscript{53} Robertson 1987, 365.
\textsuperscript{54} Piérart 1983, 291-2.
\textsuperscript{55} Robertson 1987, 366 identifies the five divisions as follows: The Καταπολίτοι refers to those who occupied the area around the city and as possibly as far north as Heracleia. The Πλατε/υνις refers to those who lived in the flat region between the city and the shrine of Didyma. The Άργασεις occupied the south
demes and the Cleisthenic tribes instituted, as we shall see, by the 430s, means that the
demes could have existed alongside the earlier Ionic tribes. This suggestion may help
to explain the large assessment of Leros in the first list. If already in this period the
islands usually ascribed to Miletos (Leros, Patmos, Lepsia, and Pharmakoussa), were a
defined district of the Milesian polity but not fully incorporated as their tribute record
reveals, then the 3T payment of the first list for Leros could have been based on their
combined territory and resources. A rough calculation of the territory of the islands not
including tiny Pharmakoussa yields 107 km$^2$ to 118 km$^2$. A comparison with other
islands of comparable size such as Kythnos (100 km$^2$ assessed usually at 3T) or Ios (109
km$^2$ assessed at 1T in 454/53) reveals that it could have been possible for an island group
represented by Leros to have paid a tribute of 3T in 454/53. Any precise calculation of
tribute is impossible without a complete knowledge of the economic condition of the
islands, but the possibility exists that the islands together could have supported an
assessment of 3T.

Thus, the faction centered on Leros would have controlled a significant amount of
Miletos’ resources in a period of civil strife. As we shall see, the seriousness of situation
led to Athenian intervention. Whether one chooses to believe in mid-century revolt or
*stasis* at Miletos, or some combination of the types of political dysfunction, the later
reappearance of the same components of the Milesian community is unlikely to

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57 Cf. Haussoullier 1902, 143 who argues against the inclusion of Patmos and Lepsia in the 3T tribute. However, he does not provide an explanation for the considerable size of the assessment.
58 Greaves 2002, 3-4 provides the following data for the size of the islands: Lepsia c. 14 km$^2$, Leros c. 64 km$^2$, and Patmos c. 40 km$^2$; Cf. Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 758 where Leros’ territory is calculated as comprising 53 km$^2$.
accommodate the same line of analysis. The separate payments of Leros, and Teichioussa, and Miletos in 427/26 or 426/25 could have been result of *stasis* as in the first list. However, as stated above, the ethnic Μιλέσιοι that designated those dwelling on Leros and Teichioussa has disappeared, implying that communities were no longer asserting their Milesian origin. Thus, *apotaxis* not caused by or reflective of civil unrest could also explain the separate payments. No amount survives for the communities from any of the later lists so it is impossible to determine how much Leros and Teichioussa contributed in this period.

I prefer to see the individual payments of the Leros and Teichioussa in 454/53 as reflecting the unique status of these communities as a result of the destruction of Miletos in 494. The transfer of Milesians to Persian territory at Ampe near the Persian Gulf could have forced Leros and Teichioussa to manage their affairs more autonomously as they were rather isolated outposts of Milesians.\(^{60}\) Herodotus states that a number of Milesian refugees accompanied some Samians in an attempt to populate a colony in Sicily shortly after the city was destroyed (Hdt. 6.22). Thus, there must have been a sizable population of Milesian survivors scattered around the Aegean. As Miletos was repopulated and grew again in the early years of the Delian League, Leros and Teichioussa continued to enjoy a level of autonomy that is reflected in the tribute lists. The territories would have been vulnerable to separation from the 450s to 420s from Miletos in times of stress because of their distance from the city and their status as the chief Milesian settlements in the years after 494, when Miletos lay severely damaged.

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\(^{60}\) Gschnitzer 1958, 121 suggested that Leros enjoyed “certain autonomy” in the late Classical period.
Some of Miletos’ other possessions on the mainland are attested as well in the mid-5th century. Evidence exists for Milesian claims across the Bay of Latmos. The origins of the Samian revolt can be attributed to a dispute between Miletos and Samos over the city of Priene in ca. 441/40. It seems that Samos made a move to control Priene and in response Miletos asserted or re-asserted a long-standing claim over the city exhibited by a complaint made to the Athenians about Samian conduct. By the late 450s Priene was a tributary of Athens, implying that a period of Milesian domination must have been over. However, Thucydides’ account of Miletos’ actions, which included an appeal to Athens for aid, seems to show that Miletos had a claim to the town. In fact, Priene is missing from the complete list of 440/39 and henceforth does not appear in any extant quota list. Admittedly, the lists in the 430s and early 420s are all fragmentary; still Priene’s absence is especially notable since other cities in the neighborhood were entered on the lists throughout this period. Priene appears in the assessment decree of 425/24, implying by this period that the Athenians were once again drawing tribute directly from the city. It is possible to propose following Beloch and Meyer that Miletos was permitted by the Athenians to incorporate the city after the Samian War. The awarding of Priene to a now democratic controlled Miletos would not have been surprising. Priene would have still existed as a poleis as before but would not have been assessed again directly by the Athenians until ca. 425/24. In Herodotus’ account of the

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61 Thuc. 1.115.2-3; The scholion to this passages endorses its conservative connotation by reading Thucydides to mean that Samos and Miletos were contesting Priene itself; Meiggs 1972, 428 proposes that Samos was attempting to incorporate Priene; Shipley 1987, 113 suggests that the dispute concerned land claimed by all three cities.
62 Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1092 argues that Priene “may have been regarded as a potential dependency by both Samos and Miletos”. Greaves 2002, 133 argues that Priene had traditionally been considered to be Miletos’; Gallo in Lupi 2005, 247-58 argues that the war was over Priene.
63 IG I² 272.II.7-25 (440/39).
64 IG I² 71.I.149.
65 See Beloch 1922, 194 n. 2; Meyer 1954, 712-13; Cf. Gomme 1945, 350 n. 1.
Ionian deployment at Lade in 494, the 12 ships of Priene were stationed next to the 80 Milesian ships, which could be an indication of the dependent status of the city to Miletos in that period (Hdt. 6.8). The recent estrangement of Priene adequately explains Miletos’ strong reaction to Samos’ provocation.

In the Hellenistic period, Miletos absorbed two neighboring cities, Pidasa and Myous, two cities, which Miletos might have also claimed in the second quarter of the 5th century. The origins of Pidasa are closely tied to Miletos. According to Herodotus, after the destruction of the city in 494, the Persians gave some mountainous territory to the east of Miletos to some Carians from Pedasa, usually spelled with an eta in Greek, located near Halikarnassos. Yet, the editors of the ATL identified the city given to the Carians as Pidasa, a toponym, normally spelled with an iota, which is located on Mt. Grion to the east of Miletos. The editors of the ATL argued that it is this Pidasa and not the older city near Halikarnassos far to the south that appears in the first tribute period with an assessment of 2T and then in the second with an assessment of 1T. In the reassessment of 425/24, a Pedasa is recorded with an assessment of 3,000 dr. The editors of the ATL believed that it was unlikely that the Athenians would have abandoned such significant tribute so close to the sea so that they preferred to identify the Pedasa of the first and second tribute periods with the community near Miletos. They further suggested that it was unlikely that the same city appeared in 425/24 with significant reduction in tribute so they identified this Pedasa as the city near Halikarnassos. As a significant tribute payer to Athens in the 450s and 440s, Pidasa must have constituted a rather

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66 Paus. 7.2.11; Piérart 1985, 292-4.  
67 Hdt. 6.20.  
69 ATL 1.535-6.  
70 IG I³ 71.149.
important community in the neighborhood of Miletos. It is possible that Miletos would have laid claim to this city in the early years of the Delian League considering that its land formed a piece of its former territory before its destruction in 494. It is difficult to believe that after Miletos’ re-foundation, the city would not have asserted its claim in some form over its former territory now occupied by the Carians from Pedasa. Like Priene, Pidasa is absent in a complete list in the late 440s and is missing on the quota lists thereafter. Even if Pidasa is the city listed in the reassessment of 425/24, which is not certain; its absence must be explained. Re-absorption by Miletos could account for the city’s missing entries in the 430s and 420s. It is difficult to believe that the Athenians simply decided to release Pidasa from the burden of tribute or permitted the city to leave the alliance. Pidasa was eventually absorbed by Miletos through a sympoliteia in 175 BC.

Furthermore, I would suggest that long before its absorption in the 2nd century Myous might reflect earlier claims by Miletos before the city’s destruction in 494. As in the case of Priene, Myous’ forces were stationed to those of Miletos during the battle of Lade. Myous’ status is a little more difficult to determine than others in the mid-5th century. In the early years of the Delian League Myous might have been independent or perhaps controlled by Persia. The Persian grants to Themistocles represent only in part

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71 In the late 4th century Pidasa and Latmos were temporarily united. A fragmentary treaty published in 1997 by Blümel provides the record of the union of the cities. However, the treaty sheds no light on the history between Pidasa and Latmos and there is no evidence of any close ties before the late 4th century. See Blümel 1997, 135-142; Habicht 1998, 9-10; Jones 1999, 1-7.

72 IG I 271.1-11.63-86 (441/40).

73 Milet 1.3 # 149; See Gorman 2001, 45.

74 See ATL 3.201; Gorman 2001, 44; Persian control over Myous in the mid-5th century has been concluded by many scholars from Thuc. 1. 138. However, it is just as likely that Miletos could have claimed Myous as well considering its Ionian origin, proximity, and the great difference in size of the two cities. The capacity to dominate Myous would have been possible shortly after Miletos’ liberation from Persia. Str. 14.1.3 C 632-33 and Paus. 7.2.7 state that Myous was founded in connection with Miletos as Neileus and Kyaretos, the supposed founder of Myous, were brothers.

75 Hdt. 6.8.
actual transfers of assets, such as Lampsakos, where the ties of the statesman to the site are secure. In other cases, the grants might have been motivational, in the case of Myous intended encourage Themistocles to meddle. Thus, the status of Myous in the 470s and 460s is ambiguous and any hypothesis must stand on unsure ground.

The extent of the Milesian hegemony in the first few decades of the Delian League was extensive but vulnerable. The offshore islands protected the approach to the city and at the same time seem to have been places of refuge for opposing factions in the period of civil strife in the 450s, while the region of Teichioussa in the south also might have been a source of opposition. However, Miletos seems to have securely re-absorbed both Leros and Teichioussa from 452/51 onwards, which were Milesian settlements enjoying limited autonomy, while Priene and Pidasa, two securely attested poleis, might have exerted more independence possibly through an earlier application of the process of apotaxis. Any claim to Priene and Pidasa would have been much more tenuous than Leros and Teichioussa, which were Milesian settlements and not separate poleis. It may be possible to relate these developments in a closer way. I suggest that the stasis recorded in the first list may have been the occasion when Miletos lost control or at least significant influence over its dependencies, evident from their appearance in the tribute lists. The forces in the cities asserting their independence from the Milesian orbit in a period of stasis could have contributed to the divisions and fractures in Miletos itself leading to a temporary disintegration of the polity into at least three factions or, more likely, the Milesian stasis could have led to the loss of dependent territory. The weakened state no longer would have been able to hold onto these cities that now took the opportunity with or without Athens’ help to achieve independence from Miletos. It seems

76 Thuc. 1.138.
that Miletos eventually was able to re-absorb the dependent territories of Leros and Teichioussa. These communities were much more integrated into the state and should not be seen as polities in their own right. Athens’ role in this period is unclear, but as the Athenian Regulations for Miletos reveals, the Athenians were eager to resolve the *stasis*.

The political unrest of this period seems not to have terminated the rule of the oligarchy. From the Decree of the Molpoi, it is clear that Miletos was still governed by an oligarchy in 450/49, revealing the continuity of oligarchic rule into the 440s. Therefore, there is no real possibility that Miletos was governed by a democracy by this time. The Decree of the Molpoi, contained in an inscription of the Hellenistic period, provides regulations for the ritual practice of the body and is dated to 450/49.\(^77\) The date is known from a Hellenistic list of the *aisymnetai*, which begins in 525.\(^78\) In the decree, the *proshetairoi* of the *aisymnetes*, are listed as belonging to the old Ionic tribes.\(^79\) Three of the old Ionic tribes are listed in the prescript (Lines 1-4). However, from a decree dated by Hermann to 437/36, it is clear that Miletos by that period was employing Athenian style tribes.\(^80\) The prescript of the degree follows Athenian practice closely.

\[-10-]\*[--12--]
\[-9-]\*[E]υδήµο, Λεντ[ι]ς ε[δ][---5---]ς, ε[πεν:...]

\[...E]udemus, when the tribe Leon[tis]
held the pry[tany], Telag[r]os was the se[cretary], and Temen[os] was the e[pistate][s].
[...] proposed:...\(^81\)

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\(^77\) *Milet* 1. 3. # 133; Robertson 1987, 359; Gorman 2001, 182.
\(^78\) See Gorman 2001, 228.
\(^79\) Robertson 1987, 359.
\(^81\) Hermann 1970, 165.
It can only be concluded from Herman’s dating that by the mid-430s, democracy had been installed, one closely modeled, at least in some respects, on Athenian practice.\textsuperscript{82} Gehrke has argued that it is possible that the Molpoi kept the use of the old Ionic tribes when the democracy was introduced ca. 452 just as the old tribes were maintained in some cases for religious purposes as at Athens after the reforms of Cleisthenes.\textsuperscript{83} However, Gehrke provides no concrete evidence to support this proposition. Consequently, his proposition that democracy was introduced in the late 450s cannot be sustained.

References to the archonship of Euthynos in \textit{IG} \textit{I}^3 21 reveal that Athens’ first known intervention in Milesian affairs left the ruling oligarchy in power. In the decree, at least two references are made to the archonship of Euthynos in an unknown context (Lines 61, 85) It is generally accepted that Diodorus’ attestation for the archon of 450/49 as Euthydemos is incorrect as he also calls the archons of 431/30 and 426/25, Euthydemos (Diod. 12.3.1, 12.38.1, 12. 58. 1). Since the archon for 426/25 was really called Euthynos, so it is likely that the archon for 450/49 might also be named Euthynos.\textsuperscript{84} A number of scholars have dated the decree to 450/49 because of the mention of Euthynos in the body of the decree, and not in a prescript. Whether the decree should be dated to Euthynos’ year is debatable since mention of unknown events of his year is made only in the body of the decree.\textsuperscript{85} It is more likely that reference was made to past events of some importance between Athens and Miletos conducted in Euthynos’

\textsuperscript{82} Rhodes 2006, 116 proposes that the decree dates to 434/33 based on his reordering of the \textit{Stephanephoroi} list. His argument is convincing but does not fundamentally change the conclusions presented here.
\textsuperscript{83} Gehrke 1980, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{84} See Robertson 1987, 385.
\textsuperscript{85} Fornara 1971, 473-75.
archonship. Thus, the decree must date to sometime after 450/49. It can only be concluded that Athens intervened to some degree in the affairs of Miletos during Euthynos’ year, 450/49, when the city was still probably governed by an oligarchy.

The Old Oligarch’s reference to Athenian support of a Milesian oligarchy fits well into the context of the late 450s to early 440s. Since it is probable that a Milesian oligarchy was still in power in 450/49 and the tribute lists reveal a potential *stasis* both inside and outside of the city in the late 450s, it is in this period that the Athenians most likely supported the Milesian oligarchy. The traditional government of Miletos was an oligarchy at least from the end of the Persian wars and would have been responsible for joining the Delian League at some point after its foundation.\(^86\) Athenian support for the ruling oligarchy in the late 450s or early 440s would not have been unusual. Yet, support for the oligarchy in time of civil conflict between rival political factions, possibly including pro-Athenian democrats forced to take refuge on Leros and in Teichionissa is a little surprising. The Old Oligarch states that after a short time the oligarchs revoluted, which must rule out a long interval between Athenian support and revolt. Valuable evidence for this conclusion comes from the tribute lists, which reveal a reduction from an assessment of 10T in 450/49 to 5T in 443/42.\(^87\) Notably, Miletos is also absent from the lists from 446/5 to 444/43. It is in this period that the oligarchs were likely in revolt and by 442 Athens and Milesian loyalists had recovered the city, and its assessment had been reduced in order to strengthen a new democracy or because of the effects of the revolt itself. Further evidence for the establishment of a Milesian democracy by 442 can be deduced from the events surrounding the Samian revolt in 441/0. Thucydides states

\(^{86}\) Gehrke 1985, 114.  
\(^{87}\) *IG I*\(^1\) 263.VI.18, *IG I*\(^1\) 269.I.33.
that the origin of the revolt was a dispute between Miletos and Samos over the possession of Priene. 88 Samos and Miletos were traditional rivals, and, by the mid-5th century, Samos’ superior position in the league as a ship contributing member put Miletos at a significant disadvantage in any quarrel. Samos’ own mainland possessions were centered north at Anaia and its move south was clearly interpreted as a threat by Miletos. 89 Miletos sent representatives to appeal to Athens, who were joined by Samian democrats wishing to establish a democracy on Samos. It is not an accident that the Samian democrats appeared in conjunction with the Milesians as they had probably brought them along.

In contrast, the ruling Samian government must have felt confident enough to make an attempt on Priene, thereby challenging Miletos’ historical claim over the city and causing considerable worry even for Athens. Miletos desired to see a democracy established on Samos in the expectation that a democratic Samos would relinquish its aggressive expansionist policy since the two democracies would be more likely to share common ground. The Milesians may well have experienced a diminution in the hegemonic impulses in their own polis, once a democracy had been emplaced and expected a similar result in Samos. If the oligarchic revolt in Miletos can be dated to the mid-440s, then it is possible to connect Samos’ attack on Priene as motivated by Miletos’ recent history. The Milesians had become tributaries, demobilizing most of their naval force, their outer dependencies had slipped away, they had experienced a stasis that

88 Thuc. 1. 115. 2.
89 Thuc. 3. 19, 32; ATL 3.196; Shipley 1987, 34-36.
temporarily created three tributary units of Milesians through *apotaxis*, a revolt had been suppressed, and a democracy had come into existence. ⁹⁰

If this hypothesis appears adventurous, consider the alternative. A Milesian oligarchy would not have been interested in appealing to Athens in concert with Samian democrats unless Miletos was practicing some version of *Realpolitik*. In this scenario, Milesian oligarchs would have formed some sort of agreement with Samian democrats in which the island’s new democracy would relinquish any claims to Priene. Without any further evidence it is dangerous to attribute such complex motives in this case. The simpler scenario in which Samian democrats accompanied their Milesian counterparts is more likely. Thus, it can be concluded from these events that a Milesian oligarchy had accepted Athenian support and within a few years had revolted and been replaced by a democracy by 441/40.⁹¹

The Regulations for Miletos provide evidence for several Athenian attempts to quell *stasis* by exerting direct control and reconciling opposing factions. The decree has generally been regarded as an Athenian attempt to bolster a Milesian oligarchy in 450/49 or soon after, while Gehrke, followed by Gorman, dates the decree after the installation of democracy, though each opts for different periods.⁹² It must be noted that some scholars have followed Mattingly’s re-dating of the decree to 426/25.⁹³ Putting aside the long-standing arguments surrounding the three barred sigma, the historical context of the late 450s and early 440s seems a better fit for the decree than the

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⁹⁰ Meiggs 1972, 188.
⁹¹ Gorman 2001, 218-19; The fragmentary nature of the lists makes it also possible that the entry for Miletos simply did not survive. Interestingly, Erythrai is also absent from 446/45 to 444/43. It is possible that pro-Persian activity was active again at Erythrai in the period when Miletos was in revolt.
Archidamian war since there is no literary or secure epigraphical evidence in that period of severe trouble in Miletos. Furthermore, no surviving section of the decree firmly indicates that a democracy was in place. Thus, I prefer a date shortly after 450/49 for the decree since it is clear from the tribute lists and the Old Oligarch that Miletos was suffering from severe unrest in that period. The fragmentary condition of the decree makes any secure judgments about its implications impossible. The restoration of the name Euthynos, traditionally restored in the prescript, should be discarded since it is likely that his year had passed from the mention of the name in the body of the decree. It is not even clear if an archon name existed at all in the prescript. The decree does not seem to detail the return of Miletos to the alliance after a revolt or installation of democracy, as argued above. Unlike the Athenian regulations for Erythrai, there is no evidence of the formation of new democratic council or the text of an oath of allegiance to Athens. Oaths to be administered between Milesian and Athenian officials are mentioned, but the text of the oath is not formulated as in other decrees concerning disloyal allies (lines 65-71). Instead, the oaths might have been to uphold the terms of the decree.

The decree states that five Athenian officials are to be sent to oversee affairs in the city, but not enough remains to fully understand their function as in the case at Erythrai where Athenian officials are to oversee the formation of a new government (lines 5-7). They are mentioned intermittently as dealing with judicial arrangements between the two cities (lines 35, 40, 46). In line 75 there is mention of a garrison, which means that the situation was considered unstable and in need of direct intervention.

94 Robertson 1987, 386 suggests that the archon of 449/48 was named Pedieus.
95 IG1 14.
96 Robertson 1987, 388.
Gehrke and Gorman support their view that this decree belongs to the period of the Milesian democracy by contending that the *prytanies* of the Milesians in line 65 refer to the democratic office. The exact nature of their function is unknown because of the poor condition of the text. However, they are usually interpreted as the traditional oligarchic board of magistrates. There is evidence that restitution of lost property is to be granted to Milesians returning from abroad (lines 51-63). Bradeen and McGregor interpreted this section as dealing with restitution granted to loyalists during a Milesian revolt.

It is also possible that this section deals with the recent effects of *stasis* between competing factions and returnees from Leros and Teichiousa. In this reconstruction, one group, probably democrats, was forced out of the city by the oligarchs and as part of the Athenian settlement was allowed to return under protection. It is likely that these refugees were those that fled to Leros and Teichiousa. The reference to the archon Euthynos in line 61 concerns previous decrees about this matter.

Toward the end of the inscription, the Athenian council is to take charge of the defense of a place outside of the city called Arnasus, otherwise unknown (line 82). This place still seems to be unsettled and of concern to the Athenians and Milesians alike. In general, the decree seems to presuppose an unstable situation in Miletos in the early-440s. The best context for the decree is sometime after 450/49 and the oligarchic revolt, which we have seen must date to after the tribute payment of 446. Robertson’s suggestion of 449/48 is a strong possibility for second Athenian intervention. This decree could

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97 See Gorman 2001, 228; Gorman’s view rests on her conclusion that the archaic *prytany* was stripped of its power ca. 540 and replaced with an eponymous *aisymnetes*. Therefore, if the archaic *prytany* had survived into the 5th century, it would have retained little importance.

98 See Robertson 1987, 386-7.


represent further actions taken after a settlement a year earlier. It seems that in the end the Athenian action failed to quell the Milesian *stasis* and Athens had to intervene again resulting in the installation of democracy by 442.

The nature and motivation of the oligarchic revolt has received little attention from scholars. Although the Old Oligarch does not provide any specific reasons for the actions of the ruling oligarchy, a broad reconstruction of events is possible. An examination of the full context of the passage of the Old Oligarch is important.\(^{101}\) The author begins his discussion by describing how the Athenians choose the worst element (democrats) in cities suffering civil strife and then proceeds to explain that Athenians never succeeded when they sided with oligarchs.\(^{102}\) Thus, the Milesian revolt must be viewed in the context of factional politics along with traditional lines of analysis, which emphasize general oligarchic resistance to the Athenians in allied cities. Support for this interpretation comes from *IG I*³ 21. Since the tribute lists do not provide any evidence for a Milesian revolt before the mid-440s and Miletos was still governed by an oligarchy in 450/49 after the re-absorption of factions on Leros and Teichioussa, it is improbable that any action taken by Athens in the year of Euthynos was a consequence of Milesian disloyalty. The exact nature of the intervention is unknown on account of the poor state of the decree. However, any action taken by Athens in that year must have left the oligarchy in power. Within a few years, between the city’s payment in 446 and 442, factional strife probably reached a boiling point once again ending in the oligarchy’s revolt from Athens.\(^{103}\) Key to this interpretation is the fact that the Milesian oligarchy is said to have “slaughtered the *demos*.” This step taken by the ruling oligarchy was most

\(^{101}\) See Mattingly 1966, 207, 221 n. 86.
\(^{102}\) [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.11.
\(^{103}\) Gorman 2001, 216.
likely in defiance of agreements brokered by Athens in 450/49 to end the previous round of civil strife. Athens must have afforded protections to the democrats as their natural supporters, if the oligarchs were allowed to remain in power. Consequently, the slaughter of the democrats by the oligarchs constituted a de facto revolt from the alliance since Athens could not tolerate a blatant violation of its will by a subject city. No splinter groups appear on the tribute lists so it is conceivable that the oligarchs retained control of the surrounding territories that were once refugees for their opponents. The possibility exists that the Milesian oligarchs took advantage of Athenian difficulties in Euboia, Megara and Boiotia, areas that also revolted at this time.\(^{104}\) The Old Oligarch’s inclusion of Athens’ support of Boiotian oligarchs along with that of their Milesian counterparts seems to serve to connect the two episodes. However, it is noteworthy that author limits himself to a description of the oligarchy’s attack on their opponents during the revolt. The motivation for the oligarchic revolt of the mid-440s, therefore, should not be viewed apart from the impact of local politics. The resumption of factional strife between competing factions seemed to have impelled a previously loyal government to violate agreements concluded with Athens just a few years before, amounting to a challenge to Athenian power.

The importance of *stasis* in the history of Miletos in this period is reflected in the so-called “Banishment Decree”. The decree dates to around the mid-5\(^{th}\) century or even earlier based upon the examination of the letterforms and before the introduction of democracy from the mention of the board of the *epimenioi*.\(^{105}\) I have stated above most of the arguments concerning the decree. The fact that the list of names is small and a reward

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\(^{104}\) See Meiggs 1972, 177-89.

\(^{105}\) *ML*, 107; Robertson 1987, 381.
is to be offered from property one of the banished individuals reflects that only a small group was exiled. Even more convincing in support of the fewness of the number of the traitors is that it is unlikely that the base of the stele was a continuation of the inscription on the stele itself. More likely, the base contained an addition to what was inscribed on the stele at an earlier time. Meiggs and Lewis inferred that the banished group consisted of the leaders of a revolt ca. 452, now dead or exiled after the intervention of Athens. Robertson has argued that the decree refers to the exile of Persian sympathizers shortly after the re-foundation of the city in 479. Clearly, during a period of *stasis* a rather small group of wealthy aristocrats were banished for treason by an oligarchic government. This group may have been democratic sympathizers, pro-Persian sympathizers or some other faction lost to history. Most significantly, the decree reveals the unstable situation in the city during the mid-5th century and should be viewed as further evidence of the role that *stasis* played in Milesian history.

The history of Miletos in the mid-5th century can be outlined after a full review of the evidence. The reestablishment of a regional hegemony by Miletos is helpful in exposing the nature of the early Delian League. While the sub-hegemonies of some allies could arguably be considered legacies of the pre-league period, Miletos, sacked in the late 490s, must have (re)acquired its dependencies after 479. From 479 to the mid-450s Miletos was governed by a moderate oligarchy. In the middle of the decade dissension arose resulting in the division of the city and its dependent possessions, Leros and Teichoussa. The tribute lists reflect the discord in the first list by the separate payments

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106 Gorman 2001, 232 argues that the location and position of the stone confirm that it dates from the Archaic period.
107 ML # 43, 107.
108 Robertson 1987, 384.
of the three communities and by the unusually large payment of Leros, which was probably paying for other components of the Milesian state. The transfer of the league treasury to Athens, the subsequent alterations in tribute payment and most importantly the defeat of the allied fleet in Egypt seem to have led to severe problems in the league. The effects of these events at Miletos led to civil strife leading to the loss of a substantial amount of the city’s dependent territory. By 452/51, the city was able to re-absorb Leros and Teichionissa.\textsuperscript{109} Athenian intervention by 450/49, the year of Euthynos, seems to have aided the reconciliation of the opposing factions, while strengthening the ruling oligarchy. A year later, the Athenians sent out five officials to oversee affairs and increase their control over the city. The Regulations for Miletos seem to refer to these activities. The agreements did not hold and another round of civil \textit{stasis} occurred most likely with aid from Persia between the city’s payment of tribute in 447/46 and reappearance in 443/42 without the separation of the state into three factions as before. It is impossible to determine what became of the five Athenian officials and the garrison during the revolt. Either they were withdrawn before the revolt or were simply unable to restrain the civil conflict. The Old Oligarch describes the oligarchs’ violent attack on their democratic opponents, thereby creating a de facto revolt from Athens. The Athenians once again intervened and replaced the disloyal oligarchy with a democracy. The absence of Miletos in the tribute lists of this period and the reduction of its assessment from 10T to 5T supports this conclusion. By 441/40, a Milesian democracy was in place in time come into conflict with the oligarchic controlled Samos over Priene. The Milesian willingness to recover dependencies may well have been conditioned by shift of away from oligarchy.

\textsuperscript{109} Priene and Pidasa might have been lost in this period then regained for a time after 440.
Overall, Milesian history in this period reveals the weakness of the city as a member of the Athenian empire. Civil unrest possibly fueled by Persia led to the dissolution of the state into competing factions. Miletos was simply not strong enough to control other allied poleis as other larger powers in the league. Yet, Athenian actions seem not to have been a factor inhibiting Milesian expansion. Instead, local conditions played the major role in the loss or retention of the hegemony. In fact, Athenian intervention was important in the settling of the stasis of the late 450s, which resulted in the return of Leros and Teichioussa. Athens also sided with Miletos against Samos in the conflict over Priene. Thus, Athens seems to have been accommodating to the Milesian hegemony by recognizing long-standing claims to at least some dependent territory if not tolerating Milesian control of Priene and Pidasa until the cities were lost in the late 450s.
Chapter 4: Rhodes and Euboia

Compared to other major Aegean islands such as Lesbos, Samos, and Chios, a Rhodian sub-hegemony in the 5th century is not as well attested, but usually hypothesized by scholars to have existed. It is certain that synoikised Rhodes controlled several nearby islands and portions of Karia and Lykia beginning in the late Classical period. Although, the evidence for the existence of sub-hegemonies belonging to separate Rhodian cities before or during the Delian League is not as clear as for the Hellenistic period, scholars generally agree that the three main cities of Rhodes controlled neighboring islands and portions of the Asiatic coast before and possibly during the island’s membership in the alliance. The question of the extent and nature of an overseas Rhodian hegemony in the 5th century is also related to the issue of the nature of the synoikism of the three main cities of the island, Lindos, Kamiros, and Ialysos, which is generally dated to 408/07.

Scholars have traditionally viewed the Rhodian synoikism as a policy only instituted after the island’s revolt from Athens in 412/11 when it was primarily intended as an effort to strengthen the island against the reassertion of Athenian hegemony. More recently Gabrielsen has suggested that the synoikism was the culmination of a long process of unification of the island beginning, at the latest, in early Archaic period. Gabrielsen views the synoikism as a decisive step that the Rhodians took in a long

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1 See Fraser and Bean 1954, 94-98, 138-54; Meiggs 1972, 210; Berthold 1984, 41-42; Gabrielsen 2000, 177-205; Constantakopoulou 2007, 187-95, 243-45.
2 See Thuc. 8.44 for the revolt and Diod. 13.75.1, and Str. 14.2.10 C 654 for the synoikism. Meiggs 1974, 210 argued for 409-08 as the date of the synoikism. Berthold 1984, 22 argues for 408/07, a date followed by Demand 1990, 89 and Constantakopoulou 2007, 244.
3 See Meiggs 1972, 210; Schuller 1974, 61; Demand 1990, 92-94; Reger 1997, 473.
4 Gabrielsen 2000, 177-205; See Reger 1997, 476-77.
progression of increasing unity and not simply as a technique of resistance to Attic imperialism. At the same time, the tribute lists reveal that during the period of growing federalism of the island in the 5th century four small communities within the territory of the three main cities received independent assessments from the Athenians.\(^5\) The nature of these assessments (in some cases belonging to very small tributaries) has consequences for any analysis of the territories possessed by the Rhodian cities in this period and their relation to the application of Athenian power. I shall first attempt to define what territory, if any, the Rhodians might have controlled during the period of the Delian League and then try to determine Athenian policy toward that hegemony. I shall then turn to a discussion of the tribute history of the communities on the island and their importance for the relationship between Rhodes and Athens.

It is clear that from the early Archaic period the island of Rhodes was dominated by three cities: Ialysos, Kamiros, and Lindos.\(^6\) All three Rhodian cities belonged to the Dorian *pentapolis*, which was centered at the sanctuary of Apollo at Triopion near Knidos.\(^7\) The Rhodians were active colonizers who participated in the founding of Gela in Sicily along with Cretans, with the Lindians in a leading role.\(^8\) Strabo credits the Lindians with participating in the founding of Soloi in Kilikia (14.5.8. C 671) Diodorus records a tradition in which the Rhodians and Knidians founded Lipara in Sicily (5.9.2-5).\(^9\) There is no evidence that the Rhodian cities provided support to either side during the Ionian Revolt while it is also unclear to what extent the island was ever subject to

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5 Brikindera, the Diakrioi, Oia, and Pedies; See Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1198-1208 for a useful summary of the known history of these communities.
6 See Il. 2.654-56.
7 Hdt. 1.144.
8 Hdt. 7.53.1; Thuc.6.4.3.
9 See Fischer-Hansen, Nielsen and Ampolo in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 211.
Persia. However, important literary evidence does suggest that Rhodes was part of the Persian empire. In the *Persians*, Aeschylus included Rhodes in the list of Darius’s subjects (line 888). Diodorus Siculus recorded that Rhodian ships were in Xerxes navy during the invasion of Greece in 480 (11.3.8). However, it has been recently contended that the Rhodians never submitted to Persia since Herodotus does not mention a Rhodian contingent in Xerxes’ navy. Furthermore, according to the Lindian Temple Chronicle, at some point in the late Archaic period the Persian general Datis unsuccessfully laid siege to Lindos.

*Sub-Hegemony and Apotaxis in the Overseas Holdings*

As I shall argue, it is probable that the Rhodians controlled mainland territory in Asia that was under the formal power of the Persians in the late 6th and early 5th centuries, as is generally agreed by scholars. I would propose that it is unlikely that the Persians would have permitted Rhodian possession of a *peraia* without some formal arrangement that brought the island under Persian control, however loosely that suzerainty was exercised. Both Mytilene and Samos controlled *peraiai* in Persian Asia Minor as subjects of the Great King. However, Chios seems to have maintained some level of independence from Persia until ca. 493 (or the Battle of Lade), while controlling Atarneus in Mysia in this period, probably in return for a small yearly payment of tribute. Chios seems to have nominally acknowledged Persian sovereignty in the years before the Ionian revolt in a *modus vivendi* that stood in place of outright subjection.

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10 See Berthold 1984, 19.
11 Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1197.
12 *FGrHist* 532 D.1; Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1202 date the siege to 490.
13 See Hdt. 6.31.1-2 for the subjection of Chios to Persia ca. 493; Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 86; See also Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1066.
14 Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 86.
Although by itself the possession of a *peraia* does not conclusively prove that the island of Rhodes was subject to Persia, Persian hegemony is likely based upon parallels with Mytilene and Samos, and even Chios.

It is probable that the cities of Rhodes became members of the Delian League shortly after the island’s liberation from Persia. The editors of the *ATL* argued that Ialysos, Kamiros, and Lindos were original members of the alliance.15 This suggestion is likely considering the location of the island: the vulnerability of Rhodes to the Phoenician fleet was a strong incentive for Rhodian enrollment in the league and the strategic role of Rhodes as a base for intercepting a Persian expeditionary force or for launching forays along the southern coast of Asia Minor made gaining the adherence of the island’s cities a high priority.

Most historians have followed Fraser and Bean’s conclusions that the three main cities of Rhodes possessed a portion of the Asiatic coast and several nearby islands before the island’s synoikism in 408/07.16 Fraser and Bean mainly argued their case by citing evidence attesting to the existence of *ktoinai* situated on the islands and neighboring mainland, which they defined as “a territorial division of the Rhodian population before the synoecism, closely akin to the later deme system which was instituted after the synoecism.”17 According to Fraser and Bean, new *ktoinai* ceased to be established after the introduction of the deme system that characterized the period after the synoikism. Consequently, Fraser and Bean argued that the *ktoinai* must reflect early Rhodian control

15 *ATL* 3.213.
16 Fraser and Bean 1954, 94-98, 138-145 followed by Meiggs 1974, 210; Berthold 1984, 41-42, Reger 1997, 450; Constantakopoulou 2007, 187-95, 243-45; Cf. *ATL* 3.195; Cook 1961, 56-60 argued that Rhodes did not acquire a *peraia* until after the synoikism.
17 Fraser and Bean 1954, 95; See Gabrielsen 1997, 151-54.
over any territory in which there is evidence of these territorial units.\textsuperscript{18} After the
synoikism, in contrast, newly acquired territory was incorporated into one of the old
cities (Lindos, Kamiros, and Ialysos) on the island through the deme system.\textsuperscript{19}

From these conclusions Fraser and Bean proposed that the portion of the
peninsula extending opposite the island southwest of Physkos terminating at Loryma was
incorporated before the Athenians arrived and enrolled the communities in this region in
the Delian League. Amos and at least two other unknown cities are identified on the
tribute lists as former members of the Karian Chersonesos in 428/27.\textsuperscript{20} As a group the
states of the Karian Chersonesos appeared in the first tribute period.\textsuperscript{21} Fraser and Bean
argued that Athens must have detached this portion of the peninsula from Rhodes at an
unknown date earlier in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{22} In contrast, the rest of the known Rhodian
\textit{peria} extending as far as Lycia and the Knidian frontier was incorporated beginning in
the 4\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{23} We need not accept their implication that the creation of this \textit{peria}
must necessarily precede other accessions to the Delian League in this area, as it need
only suffice that the Athenians and the other principal allied powers were prepared to
concede the claims of the Rhodian cities to certain zones of influence while coastal Karia
was freed from Persian and Medizing control.

For our purposes, I shall only consider the territory of the peninsula known as the
Karian Chersonesos southwest of Physkos in the discussion of a Rhodian \textit{peria} before
the synoikism based upon Fraser and Bean’s observations. The role that Persia could

\textsuperscript{18} Fraser and Bean 1954, 96; Berthold 1984, 42; Constantakopoulou 2007, 244-45.
\textsuperscript{19} Fraser and Bean 1954, 95.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{IG I}\textsuperscript{I} 283.III.31-33; \textit{ATL} 1.562-63; Fraser and Bean 1954, 96-97.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{IG I}\textsuperscript{I} 261.IV.9.
\textsuperscript{22} Fraser and Bean 1954, 97.
\textsuperscript{23} Fraser and Bean 1954, 98-117; Berthold 1984, 42; Constantakopoulou 2007, 244.
have played in this area must not be ignored in any discussion of Rhodian possessions in
the Archaic and Classical periods. Persia at least formally controlled territory known to
have been part of the Rhodian peraia, which entered the Attic alliance by the 450s.24 The
evidence of ktoina found at Tymnos, located between Amos and Loryma, leaves little
doubt that Rhodes possessed this part of the peninsula during the period of Persian
sovereignty. Moreover, Rhodian possession of this portion of the mainland points to the
island’s formal subjection to Persia, even though that has been doubted recently (see
above) I reiterate that other island states such as Mytilene, Samos, and Chios controlled
mainland territory while under Persian domination. It is difficult to believe that Persia
would have tolerated a Rhodian presence on the Asian mainland if not formally subject to
the Great King. Thus it is likely that the Rhodians paid tribute to Persia and were allowed
to maintain possession of what was later administratively called the Karian Chersonesos.

Fraser and Bean also proposed that the Rhodian cities controlled a number of
islands in the course of the 5th century including Syme located just off the coast of the
Karian Chersonesos, which they argued was a Rhodian possession sometime before the
Athenians assessed Syme separately in 434/33.25 Fraser and Bean cited as evidence the
existence of ktoina on the island, which points to possession before the synoikism.26 The
editors of the ATL argued, however, that Syme was assessed along with the Karian
Chersonesos until 434/33 when it was detached through the process of apotaxis.27
Therefore, Fraser and Bean suggested that Rhodian possession of Syme probably dated
before the late 450s when the Karian Chersonesos began to appear on the lists. Fraser and

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24 See Fraser and Bean 1954, 96.
25 IG I2 278.VI.28; Fraser and Bean 1954, 139; Berthold 1984, 41; Constantakopoulou 2007, 189.
26 Fraser and Bean 1954, 139.
27 ATL 1.552-53.
Bean sensibly rejected the idea that Syme was incorporated by one of the cities on Rhodes in the few years between the revolt 412/11 and the synoikism of 408/07 as too brief a window for the creation of the *ktoinai* there.\(^\text{28}\)

Fraser and Bean further suggested that Chalke was a Rhodian possession before the island’s entry onto the tribute lists. Kamiros had probably incorporated Chalke sometime before the island’s first surviving tribute payment of 3,000 dr. in 450/49.\(^\text{29}\)

Fraser and Bean cited an inscription from Kamiros dated to the 3\(^{rd}\) century, which mentions Chalke in connection with *ktoinai*.\(^\text{30}\) Chalke lies even closer to Rhodes than Syme, which is also a good indication that Kamiros would have turned its attention to the island before joining the league. Chalke could have been assessed separately from Kamiros ca. 454/53 or even earlier than its first apparent appearance on the lists. By 412/11 it is certain that Chalke had been detached from Rhodian control since the Athenians employed the island as a base of operations against a now disloyal Rhodes.\(^\text{31}\)

Furthermore, Karpathos, Saros, and the small island of Megiste were all likely Rhodian at some point in the 5\(^{th}\) century.\(^\text{32}\) Fraser and Bean argued that the site of Potidaion on Karpathos was a *ktoina* of the deme *Karpathiopolitai* from a 3\(^{rd}\)-century inscription.\(^\text{33}\) It is generally agreed that Karpathos belonged to Lindos.\(^\text{34}\) The independent tribute payments for the cities on the island, Arkeseia, Brykous, Karpathos, and the *koinon* of the Eteokarpathians are attested first in 450/49 in the case of

\(^{28}\) Fraser and Bean 1954, 139-40.

\(^{29}\) *IG* I\(^{1}\) 263.I.10; Fraser and Bean 1954, 144-45; Constantakopoulou 2007, 188-89 doubts that Chalke belonged to Kamiros before Athenian absorption and was, therefore, independent of Kamiros.

\(^{30}\) Syll.\(^{3}\) 339 = *Tit. Cam.* 109; Fraser and Bean 1954, 144-45; Cf. Constantakopoulou 2007, 188-89.

\(^{31}\) Thuc. 8.55.1.

\(^{32}\) Fraser and Bean 1954, 141-44; Berthold 1984, 41; Constantakopoulou 2007, 190-91 argues for the incorporation of Megiste in the 5\(^{th}\) century following Bresson 1999, 104-6.

\(^{33}\) *IG* XXI. I 1033 = Syll.\(^{3}\) 570; Fraser and Bean 1954, 141-42; Berthold 1984, 41; Constantakopoulou 2007, 189-90.

\(^{34}\) Fraser and Bean 1954, 144; Reger 1997, 453.
Arkeseia.\textsuperscript{35} Brykous appears first in the list of 448/47, Karpathos in 445/44, and finally the Eteokarpathians in 434/33.\textsuperscript{36} Constantakopoulou has suggested that the mention of the Rhodians as a separate state in the Athenian decree honoring the Eteokarpathians dated by Meiggs based upon a re-examination by Lewis from the mid-440s to 430 confirms that the island had been detached from Rhodes by this time.\textsuperscript{37} However, the mention of the Rhodians in the decree is not evidence on its own that the Eteokarpathians upon the grant of autonomy ceased to be dependencies in some form of one of the cities on the island. Their new autonomous status was probably directed at Karpathos from whom they sought independence. Interestingly, a Lindian, mentioned at the end of the decree, played an important though unclear role in the transfer of the cypress wood to Athens.\textsuperscript{38} The Lindian’s role could be reflective not just of historical but also of continual involvement by Lindos in Karpathos.

The incorporation of Karpathos by the Rhodians most likely implies that the small island of Saros would also have been Rhodian. Saros is located just off the coast of Karpathos and would not have escaped Rhodian attention if its larger neighbor had been absorbed by one of the Rhodian cities. It has also been suggested that Saros might have belonged to Brykous until its appearance in the 420s.\textsuperscript{39} Saros appeared first in the tribute lists in 428/27 paying 300 dr.\textsuperscript{40} Saros’ late appearance should be attributed to apotaxis either from Brykous (possibly itself under Rhodian hegemony) or directly from one of

\textsuperscript{35} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 263.II.26-27 (Arkeseia).
\textsuperscript{36} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 264.III.17 (Brykous); IG I\textsuperscript{3} 267.III.23 (Karpathos); IG I\textsuperscript{3} 279.II.76-77, 81-82 (Eteokarpathians).
\textsuperscript{37} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 1454; Constantakopoulou 2007, 190; Meiggs 1982, 498 n. 36 argued for a 5th century date; Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 746 suggests c. 445-430; See Tod 110, Fraser and Bean 1954, 143, and Flensted-Jensen and Nielsen 1996, 150 for a 4th century date.
\textsuperscript{38} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 1454.16-17.
\textsuperscript{39} Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 771; Ma in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009, 133.
\textsuperscript{40} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 283.III.21.
the cities on Rhodes since the island’s location so close to Karpathos suggests that it would not have been ignored by the Athenians until the 420s.\textsuperscript{41}

The last three islands that were fully incorporated in the late Classical or Hellenistic periods by the Rhodians were Telos, Kasos, and Nisyros. Most scholars, following Fraser and Bean, have denied that Telos belonged to Rhodes until at least the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century.\textsuperscript{42} Fraser and Bean supported their conclusion by citing an inscription dated to the early 3rd century that records an alliance between Telos and Rhodes affirming that the small island was autonomous in this period.\textsuperscript{43} However, the status of Telos in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century is in fact unclear. The island only appeared in the tribute lists late, by list 28 (427/26 or 426/25).\textsuperscript{44} It is doubtful whether Athens would have omitted to assess Telos in earlier periods since the other islands in the neighborhood had joined the league long before. Significantly, Telos was not included in any of the complete tribute lists of the late 440s. I suggest that the island was hidden in the assessment of another tributary until the 420s. Therefore, one ought not rule out that Telos was separated through \textit{apotaxis} from one of the cities on Rhodes, possibly Kamiros.\textsuperscript{45} However, Fraser and Bean drew attention to the similarities between the coinage of Telos and Kos during the 4\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{46} Koan control of Telos into the 420s could also explain why the island did not appear in the tribute lists until well after others in its neighborhood.

\textsuperscript{41} See Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 771 for a discussion of the tribute history and political status of Saros vis-à-vis Karpathos in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century.
\textsuperscript{42} Fraser and Bean 1954, 146; Berthold 1984, 42; Papachristodoulou 1989, 46; Constantakopoulos 2007, 192.
\textsuperscript{43} SEG 25.847; Fraser and Bean 1954, 146; Papachristodoulou 1989, 46-47; Constantakopoulos 2007, 192.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 284.12.
\textsuperscript{45} See \textit{ATL} 1.555 for this suggestion; Fraser and Bean 1954, 147.
\textsuperscript{46} Fraser and Bean 1954, 146.
As in the case of Telos, Nisyros seems to have had historically closer ties to Kos than to Rhodes. Nisyros is located nearer Kos than to Rhodes and tradition holds that the island was ruled by a Koan king in the early Archaic period. Diodorus also records a tradition of an early colonization by Kos (5.54.3). Nisyros paid tribute to the Athenians by 452/51. Sherwin-White suggested that Nisyros was separated from Kos by the Athenians shortly before the island’s appearance in tribute lists or perhaps even earlier. Attested Rhodian control only dates to later in the Hellenistic period. Thus, Telos and Nisyros might have belonged to a small hypothetical Koan sub-hegemony. Finally, the island of Kasos is generally believed to have been incorporated by Rhodes in the 3rd century. Kasos first appears in the πόλεις αὐται rubric in 434/33. With the examples of Thera and Melos foremost, it has been argued that, as a Dorian island, Kasos was not assessed by the Athenians until that period. Thus Kasos was most likely independent until 434/33 though it is difficult to be completely sure of its status.

From the discussion above it is possible to conclude that the Rhodian cities possessed at some point before the synoikism culminating in 408/07 a peraia containing the portion of the peninsula of the Asiatic coast from Physkos to Loryma and the islands of Syme, Chalke, Karpathos, Saros, and Megiste. The other islands that Rhodes eventually incorporated later probably belonged either to Kos, were independent, or were possibly controlled by other larger powers until the Hellenistic period.

47 Fraser and Bean 1954, 147-48; Sherwin-White 1978, 32; Constantakopoulou 2007, 192-93.
48 Hom. II. 2.676; Constantakopoulou 2007, 192.
49 IG I 261.IV.4.
50 Sherwin-White 1978, 32; See Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 763-64 for the suggestion that Kos controlled Nisyros ca. 500 but the island was independent by 478.
51 Fraser and Bean 1954, 151 argued for incorporation by Rhodes by 200 BC based on their interpretation of IG XII.3 103; See Constantakopoulou 2007, 193.
52 Fraser and Bean 1954, 153; See Constantakopoulou 2007, 193
53 IG I 278.VI.11.
Admittedly, much concerning the history of the Rhodian sub-hegemony in the Delian League is hypothetical. Almost no evidence exists concerning Rhodian administration of the peraia and islands in the 5th century. It is not even clear if the Rhodian possessions ceased to be Rhodian while tributaries to Athens, as has been generally assumed by scholars. As stated above, Fraser and Bean decided that Athens found the territory southwest of Physkos under Rhodian control and subsequently detached the region. Yet, there is no direct evidence outside of the tribute lists for any direct relationship between the Rhodian peraia and the Athenians or for its detachment from Rhodes by Attic initiative. The appearance of these communities in the tribute lists -- absent of any other evidence -- is not probative per se against their continued possession by the Rhodian cities or the Rhodians in common. For instance, it is just as possible that the Rhodians preferred that the peraia and islands pay directly tribute to Athens while still maintaining control and as the island’s membership in the alliance altered the hold of its cities over their dependencies they eventually ceded any hegemonic influence to the Athenians over time.

In the latter scenario, the Rhodians could have decided that it was economically more advantageous that their dependents furnish tribute directly to the Athenians than to continue to pay for them once the cities on Rhodes had themselves become tributary. Since it is likely that the three main cities on the island entered the league as ship contributors, just like the other large island allies such as Samos and Lesbos, the change to tributary status by the three main cities on the island might have involved a

\[55\text{ Fraser and Bean 1954, 96 suggest the possibility that the dependencies remained Rhodian when they became tributary to Athens.}\]
\[56\text{ Fraser and Bean 1954, 97; Meiggs 1974, 210 followed Fraser and Bean; Reger 1997, 450 argues that Athens detached the peraia for “purposes of tribute collection.”}\]
reconsideration of their overseas possessions. Maintaining control over communities in Asia and surrounding islands attested by the *ktoinai* probably had more benefits to the Rhodians when they contributed forces to the league fleet in the early years of the alliance. An important benefit to the Rhodian states would probably have been the military contributions drawn from the dependent communities. A change to tributary status would have lessened the importance of these military contributions from Karpathos, Chalke, and the communities of the *peraia*. However, if the Rhodians lost parts of the sub-hegemony (or sub-hegemonies) to Athens over the course of the 5th century, as generally thought by scholars, it must also be considered whether these communities sought independent entry into the league as being preferable to continued Rhodian control. Generally, there is little evidence that the Athenians detached territory from other league members especially in the early years of the alliance. Since it is probable that Lindos, Kamiros, and Ialysos were original or early members of the Delian League, the incorporation of the Rhodian *peraia* and islands into the league most likely occurred early when the Rhodians joined the alliance.\(^{57}\) It is evident that cities on Rhodes enjoyed significant resources throughout the 5th century even as their tribute histories show. The Rhodians also maintained a fleet providing two ships and also 700 slingers for the Athenian expedition to Sicily.\(^{58}\) Moreover, Thucydides’ account of the Rhodian revolt in 412/11 confirms that even at this point in league history the Rhodian cities had

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\(^{57}\) See *ATL* 3.213.

\(^{58}\) Thuc. 6.43.
forces of considerable size.\textsuperscript{59} Rhodians are also attested as serving in the Athenian fleet.\textsuperscript{60}  

The argument that Athens detached the Karian Chersonesos and surrounding islands such as Syme and Chalke already incorporated into one or more Rhodian cities implies that the loss of this territory came at a cost to Rhodes, particularly if the Rhodian cities were not yet tributaries.\textsuperscript{61} The Rhodian cities would have lost a substantial amount of revenue now redirected through tribute to Athens that had been exclusively exploited by the cities on the island. Gabrielsen has argued that the main motivation of the Rhodian revolt of 412/11 was the desire among the elite to recover the former \textit{peraia} in the Karian Chersonesos lost to Athens by the first tribute period.\textsuperscript{62} Gabrielsen argues that Rhodes simply traded one hegemonic state for another as their 32T payment to the Spartans indicates.\textsuperscript{63} Gabrielsen’s suggestion means that other motivations were at play for Rhodians beyond a simple desire to be liberated from Athenian rule. Unfortunately, we can only speculate why the \textit{peraia} and insular possessions were more valuable to the elites of the Rhodian cities than to their dēmoi.

This type of analysis presupposes a dynamic in which incorporation into the alliance of the island’s dependencies required a concurrent loss for the hegemonic state. It is not clear what the relationship of the \textit{peraia} and islands to the Rhodians was after their individual assessments by the Athenians in the course of the 5\textsuperscript{th} century. It is has been argued that the incorporation of the islands and \textit{peraia} cannot be traced until the 4\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{59} Thuc. 6.43, 8.44.  
\textsuperscript{60} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 1032.93-94; See \textit{LSCG} Suppl. #85 for the dedications to Enyalios by Rhodians officials and mercenaries in Attic service; See Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1203.  
\textsuperscript{61} See Meiggs 1974, 210.  
\textsuperscript{62} Gabrielsen 2000, 189-90.  
\textsuperscript{63} Thuc. 8.44.4.
century and that the process of annexation continued even into the Hellenistic period. Yet, I maintain that is more likely that the Rhodians continued to control dependencies on the Asian mainland and a few surrounding islands during the life of the Delian League, if they had not ceded their possessions to Athens when the island became tributary before 454/53. As stated above, there is no evidence to suggest that in the early years of the alliance Athens sought to detach dependent territory on a large scale from an ally, except in the cases of revolt. The Rhodians seem to have been loyal members of the league until Spartan intervention in 412/11 after the Athenian defeat in Sicily.

The role of the elites in the decision to revolt was critical, and Thucydides relates that the Spartans had to persuade the inhabitants of Kamiros, Ialysos and Lindos to leave the Athenian alliance. While Thucydides’ account does not imply that the Rhodians were inert in their diplomatic or power-political relations, the decision to revolt was not automatic even after the Athenian disaster in Sicily. The vulnerability Rhodes experienced regarding a Persian fleet sailing from Phoenicia could have been a deterrent to revolt from Athens. Gabrielsen’s assertion that the Rhodian elites were motivated to revolt in order reclaim the lost peraia deserves attention since it takes into account local political realities. The elites might have had the most to gain and lose concerning Rhodian claims to an overseas hegemony as Gabrielsen’s hypothesis presupposes. As contrasted with an arrangement for separate tribute assessment and payment, the actual and complete loss of a peraia in the early years of the league certainly would not have been welcome to the aristocrats who enjoyed land and privileges from the possession of a regional hegemony. Concomitantly those without those interests might have the

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64 See Constantakopoulou 2007, 187-95.
65 Thuc. 8.44.2.
questioned the continued benefits of maintaining control of dependent territory on the mainland now useful mainly for its help in the payment of yearly tribute contributions.

Yet, as argued above, it is not clear if the Athenians really detached the *peraia* and insular possessions. Unfortunately, the status of the Rhodian sub-hegemony in the 5th century may not ever be fully understood without further material. However, there is little evidence that the Athenians confiscated the mainland possessions in order to raise tribute or to weaken the island. As I have suggested, it is more likely that the Rhodians either maintained control of the mainland and insular dependencies in some form, or had handed them over to the Athenians for separate assessment at some point before the first tribute period when the cities of Rhodes became tributary.

*Apotaxis on Rhodes*

On the island itself, the tribute lists record changes in the tribute status of a number of communities that have importance in untangling Athenian and Rhodian relations in the Delian League. Starting in the first two tribute periods, four small communities appear assessed independently that must have been controlled by one of the large *poleis* on the island. It is even more striking that in this period of growing federalism of the island as argued by Gabrielsen these communities seem to have been detached from the larger cities, at least if we view unity and disunity on Rhodes exclusively through the tribute assessment process. In 454/53, Oiai, which is listed as belonging to Lindos, was assessed separately at 3,300 dr.\(^66\) In 452/51 this community is recorded again as paying 3,300 dr.\(^67\) Thereafter, Lindos seems to have paid with Oiai in a

\(^{66}\) *IG* I\( ^1 \)* 259.III.26.
\(^{67}\) *IG* I\( ^1 \)* 262.III.28.
In 448/47, the Pedies are listed with an assessment of 2,000 dr.\textsuperscript{69} This group is recorded individually down to at least 415/14 and also seem to have been located in Lindian territory.\textsuperscript{70} A third community called the Diakrioi first appears in 430/29 paying an unknown sum and is listed paying 2T in 421/20.\textsuperscript{71} It is not known to which \textit{polis} the Diakrioi belonged. Finally, a fourth population, called Brikindera, appeared in the lists in 429/28, with their amount of payment lost.\textsuperscript{72} They paid 1T in 421/20 and were recorded last in the extant lists in 415/14.\textsuperscript{73} Brikindera most likely lay in Ialysian territory.\textsuperscript{74}

The appearance of these communities has been examined most recently by Nielsen and Gabrielsen in their contribution of the history of the Rhodian \textit{poleis} in the \textit{Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis}. For each of these communities Nielsen and Gabrielsen suggested several possibilities for the occurrences of the individual payments of these communities in the tribute lists. For instance, Nielsen and Gabrielsen propose plausibly that these communities were dependent \textit{poleis} within the territory of one of the three major cities.\textsuperscript{75} The authors also suggest that these communities might have been estranged from Lindos and Ialysos through civil strife and consequently received

\textsuperscript{68} Schuller 1995, 167.  
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 264.II.12.  
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 290.I.13; Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1205.  
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 281.11; \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 285.1.101-2.  
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 282.IV.13.  
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 285.I.103-4; \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 290.I.15.  
\textsuperscript{74} Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1198; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 112 suggest that Brikindera possibly lay in Lindian territory.  
\textsuperscript{75} Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 112 propose that it is possible that these four small tributaries were dependent \textit{poleis} or "just civic sub-divisions" that were assessed as individual members of the league. Kirsten 1956, 110 argued that independent assessment of these communities elevated their status to that of \textit{poleis}.  

individual assessments as independent polities. Alternatively, the authors suggest that the Athenians detached these communities as a means of weakening one of the main cities.\textsuperscript{76}

Although there is no evidence outside of the tribute lists that would support any of these hypotheses, it is possible to rule out the scenario that the Athenians sought to further their hegemony by detaching these small communities at various times in order to weaken Lindos and Ialysos.\textsuperscript{77} There is no evidence to suggest that the application of the process of \textit{apotaxis}, particularly of trivial dependencies, was generally an effective means of weakening tributary states. All that Athens could have expected was a reduction in income to Lindos or Ialysos issuing from these small outlying communities. Lindos and Ialysos were two of the larger contributors in the league both paying more than 10T in different periods.\textsuperscript{78} The detachment of Oiai and the Pedies in the 450s and 440s would have been a tiny loss to Lindos compared to the city’s substantial resources. In fact, during the first tribute period when Oiai paid separately 3,300 dr., Lindos paid over a talent less in tribute than when the two communities paid together, which suggests that the Lindians benefited financially to some notable degree when they were assessed without Oiai.

As I discussed in my first chapter, Athens had other means at its disposal in order to weaken potentially hostile or powerful members such as the imposition of garrisons and placement of officials or the reorganization of the polity to fit Athenian interests.\textsuperscript{79} In the case of tributary states, \textit{apotaxis} did not have anywhere near as great an impact as the process did for non-tributary allies. Lindos and Ialysos had originally paid with their

\textsuperscript{76} See Nielsen and Gabrielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 1198, 2004.
\textsuperscript{77} Ma in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009, 135 suggests that these communities were detached by Athens.
\textsuperscript{78} Ialysos paid 10T in 428/27 (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 283.III.19); Lindos paid 15T in 421/20 (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 285.I.97).
\textsuperscript{79} See Meiggs 1972, 205-19.
small dependencies most likely in a *syntelic* arrangement, contributing a portion of the income they drew from them to Athens through regular tribute payment. At the same time, the population size and resources of Lindos, Ialysos, and Kamiros ensured their domination of the island. This reality meant that Brikindera, the Diakrioi, along with the other communities, were bound to the dominant cities of the island whether they paid separately or not. Furthermore, there is no mention of these communities in Thucydides’ narrative of the Rhodian revolt in 412/11 and it is difficult to see not only how they could have resisted the three larger cities, even though solely dependent and consequently loyal to Athens, but also how the Athenians would have considered them to have any geopolitical or strategic value.\(^{80}\) These communities seem not to have played any significant role in the events as Lindos, Kamiros, and Ialysos determined Rhodian policy during the revolt from Athens. Their thorough insignificance is demonstration that they were not tokens in some game of hegemonic politics.

Nielsen and Gabrielsen’s hypothesis that these small communities were dependent *poleis* within the territory of Lindos or Ialysos is a reasonable surmise, but not mutually exclusive of their other two suggestions. It is just as likely that these communities were *kōmai* or settlements of the three major *poleis* – or were composed of *kōmai* -- that were assessed separately like the *koinon* of the Eteokarpathians on Karpathos in 434/33.\(^{81}\) Individual assessment in the Delian League cannot always be an indicator of full *polis* status, particularly if the tribute lists are the sole evidence of a community’s existence as a *polis*.\(^{82}\) Nielsen and Gabrielsen’s third hypothesis proposes that civil unrest leading to estrangement from the larger cities could account for the

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\(^{80}\) See Thuc. 8.44 for the revolt of Rhodes from Athens in 412/11.
\(^{81}\) *IG* I\(^{3}\) 278.VI.13; See Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 771.
\(^{82}\) See Schuller 1995, 165-70.
independent payments beginning for the Oiai in the 450s and notable as late as for Brikindera in 429/28. Previously, Schuller had also suggested this possibility to account for the history of the separate payments by Oiai and Lindos. Since it is *prima facie* always more likely that local conditions and not Athenian intervention determined the conditions for allied tributary status, civil strife could have been the impetus for their individual payments. One must hesitate, however, to suppose both that these smaller communities had the resources to withstand pressure from Lindos or Ialysos and at the same time that it was in Athens’ interest to recognize their independence, an action which might have resulted in strained relations with one of the major cities of the island. Therefore, I find it unlikely that Brikindera or the Pedies were able to enjoy a significant level of autonomy for any extended period of time *vis-à-vis* their much more powerful neighbors. Accordingly, any political struggle over the separate tributary status probably cannot have lain exclusively between Oiai and Lindos, for example, since that *demarche* seems so disproportionate. Instead it must also have entailed factions or groups of stakeholders within the larger community itself. There well might have been disaggregating forces operating on three levels: the dependent community experiences urges toward greater local autonomy, the hegemonic community experiences less resolution toward maintaining the previous situation, and it remains to be seen where the Athenians fall in their policy, whether toward encouraging disaggregation and *apotaxis* or merely toward acquiescing in a process determined *in situ*.

Our way then falls open to another hypothesis, that Lindos or Ialysos was willing to shed these communities as way of reducing their tribute burden in times of economic stress or as simply executing a change in policy regarding dependent communities in

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83 Schuller 1995, 166.
their territory. Unfortunately, the record of tribute is not complete for any of the three main cities, which hinders the possibility of our charting the potential tribute reductions through apotaxis. It is also dangerous to make assumptions about a possible tribute reduction particularly during the Archidamian War without knowing the proposed figures of the taktai before allied appeals. This period shows large increases throughout the league. The surviving assessment decrees from the 420s only record the final numbers at the end of the process so it is impossible to understand how the tribute assessments originally proposed by the taktai were then appealed by the allies, resulting in the final numbers, which appear on the assessment decrees and quota lists.

Fortunately there is some evidence that the Lindians were active in the appeals process in this period. The orator Antiphon composed a speech entitled On the Tribute of the Lindians, which probably concerned an effort by Lindos to appeal for a tribute reduction probably in the 420s or possibly later. Meiggs suggested that the speech dates to the assessment of 425/24 BC. Although no extensive fragments of the speech survive, the speech probably resembled in some ways Antiphon’s appeal for the Samothracians from which substantial fragments remain. In the speech for the Samothracians, Antiphon argued that the poverty of the island inhibited their ability to pay the proposed tribute.

As in the case of Samothrace, the Lindians probably argued that they did not have resources to pay the assessed tribute. Lindos could also have employed this strategy as early as the 450s and 440s when Oiai and the Pedies began to appear separately assessed by the Athenians. Lindian complaints, as I maintain in the case of Samothrace, could

84 Fr. 25-33 Thalheim.
85 Meiggs 1972, 327 also dates this speech to the assessment of 425/24.
86 Fr. 49-56 Thalheim; See Meiggs 1972, 327.
have been accompanied by an appeal for the separate assessments of a few dependencies, for which it was seen as too burdensome to continue to pay. The individual payments of Oiai in the 450s may be an indication of the early application of this strategy. The later appearance of the Diakriói, if situated in Lindian territory, could show the continued employment of this type of appeal. Ialysos might have also shed Brikindera in this way by the 420s as well. The existence of the speech makes it clear that Lindos appealed for a reduction in some way during the period of heightened tribute burdens in the Archidamian War. It must be recalled that Lindos paid less in tribute when Oiai was assessed separately in the first tribute period; that thereby reveals that this type of strategy could indeed be viable. Unfortunately, it is impossible to gauge from surviving tribute payments whether Lindos received a reduction in the 420s or even what the general circumstances of the appeal fashioned by Antiphon may have been. In the 420s *apotaxis* might have been significant for Ialysos or Lindos since Brikindera paid 1T and the Diakriói paid 2T in 421/20.

Therefore, when all is said and done, it is likely that Lindos or Ialysos did not oppose the independent assessment of these communities whether it occurred through estrangement, originally triggered by civil strife, or was achieved through a fiscal strategy applied in the tribute assessment process. Athenian intervention in the territory of these strong cities would not have significantly advanced Attic hegemony nor would *apotaxis* have severed the ties between the Rhodian communities in any substantial way. Furthermore, we must remember that there is no direct evidence in the extant “imperial” decrees concerning assessment or the collection of tribute that would support the hypothesis that the Athenians employed *apotaxis* simply to raise tribute levels, however
popular the idea has been for some scholars. Unlike the detachment of the Rhodian peraia and islands, the separation of small communities adjacent to or even within the territory of Lindos and Ialysos would not have constituted as much of a threat to the sovereignty of the main cities on the island or contributed to the weakening of their economic and financial foundations.

Conclusion

Although the evidence for the size and status of the Rhodian hegemony in the Delian League is deficient when compared to other states such as Thasos or Samothrace, scholars are almost unanimous in accepting that the three large cities possessed a substantial amount of territory that appeared individually assessed at various periods. The reasons for the individual assessments of the peraia on the Karian Chersonesos and islands in the tribute assessment process are shrouded in mystery. I contend that it is unlikely that Athens detached the overseas Rhodian possessions since this action would not have advanced its interests in any significant way. Similarly, Persia seems not to have fundamentally interfered with the Rhodian peraia as the existence of ktoinai indicates. In fact, in the late 6th century and early 5th century, Persia had probably permitted Rhodes to control a peraia in a manner like that of the other larger island states such as Mytilene, Samos, and Chios. By the 450s and 440s, it is clear that Athens was drawing tribute directly from the former peraia and some islands. Thus, Rhodes or its dependents might have entered into an arrangement with Athens over their separate assessments by this period. In the same way, Kos and its dependencies, Telos and

87 See ATL 3.195; Meiggs 1972, 241 suggests that the separate assessments of the communities Samothracian peraia ca. 421/20 were motivated by the Athenians in order to raise revenue.
Nisyros, might have sought independent assessments by the Athenians. By the Hellenistic period, however, these two islands had become Rhodian.

The individual payments of four small communities on the island during a period of growing unity between Lindos, Kamiros, and Ialysos are also difficult to interpret. Not much is known about Oiai, the Pedies, the Diakroi, and Brikindera outside of the information provided on the tribute lists, which reveal the relative economic output and general location of a few of these communities. It is unlikely that Athens sought to separate them from the larger Rhodian cities since this policy would not have been particularly effective in controlling the island or in weakening the major cities. Estrangement through civil strife that resulted in individual payment is possible in a few cases, but it is rather unlikely that Lindos or Ialysos would have permitted their small satellites to defy them for an extended period of time. I believe that it is possible that the large cities sought individual assessments for these communities in order to reduce their tribute burden. Antiphon’s speech on behalf of the Lindians might have concerned an effort to continue this strategy, which might have been implemented as early as the 450s. Athenian acceptance of the new tributary status of these small communities was probably recognition of the new local political reality that in some way either served or was neutral to Athens’ interests. Yet, Athens need not have been the prime mover in the local political situation on Rhodes since the three large cities seemed to continue to determine events.

From the reconstructions I have proposed, the history of Rhodes in the Delian League can be outlined in some general ways. The cities on island controlled a peraia on the Asian mainland and nearby islands during the period of Persian rule, and, whether
carried over or restored, this hegemony continued into the Delian League. Over the course of the alliance some communities in the *peraia* and islands were separately assessed by the Athenians for unknown reasons. It is doubtful that Athens stripped Rhodes of their dependencies to further Athenian imperialism. Rhodes likely acquiesced in their individual assessments. On the island itself, four small communities dependent on the three main cities began paying tribute individually during the course of the alliance. I would suggest that the individual assessments of these small communities did not come at significant cost to Lindos, Ialysos, or serve as a great benefit to Athens. In fact, it is most likely that Lindos and Ialysos shed these dependencies purposely or they were detached for reasons of tribute with their ultimate consent. Attic imperialism seems not to have been heavy-handed in this case. The size and power of the main cities on relatively distant Rhodes guaranteed a level of autonomy not enjoyed by other Athenian subjects.

**Euboia**

Like Rhodes, Euboia in the period of the Delian League was an island dominated by small number of dominant cities and their dependencies. However, Euboia’s close proximity to Attica made it a region of particular importance to the Athenians. Fortunately, unlike most regions of the Delian League, the history of the island is rather well documented by literary and epigraphical sources so it is possible to construct a relatively satisfactory picture of its membership in the alliance. Euboia was a center of much Athenian activity and intervention, especially in the 440s. The Euboian revolt in 446 was a crucial blow to Athens that took the skilled generalship of Pericles to put
Its results were tighter holds on Eretria and Chalkis, the expulsion of most of the native Hestiaian population, and the creation of the Athenian colony of Oreos.\textsuperscript{90} Along with the effects of the Euboian revolt of 446, there has also been much scholarship concerning the Athenian cleruchies, possibly sent to Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos in the late 450s and early 440s and thus predating the revolt.\textsuperscript{91} The late first appearance of the cities of Euboia in the tribute lists has also been much discussed by scholars.\textsuperscript{92} However, neither the revolts nor the emplacement of cleruchies seem to have affected the regional hegemonies controlled by the main cities of the island except for Hestiaia, which will be discussed below. In fact, the evidence of the whole Classical period attests to a gradual unification of Euboia by the four main cities culminating in the mid-4\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{93} I shall discuss the issues surrounding the effects of the Euboian revolts, imposition of cleruchies, and the missing tribute in the first tribute period only when appropriate since my aim is not provide a complete history of Euboia in the Delian League but an examination of the regional hegemonies on the island in this period.

It has been estimated that there were over a hundred Euboian settlements in the Archaic and early Classical periods, at least a dozen of which might have been poleis.\textsuperscript{94} By the mid-4th century, of these twelve potential poleis, only Eretria, Chalkis, Hestiaia/Oreos, and Karystos remained independent while the other nine had been absorbed or destroyed.\textsuperscript{95} These four poleis had gradually brought the island under their control. Nonetheless, there is a strong possibility that this process of amalgamation in the

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  \item \textsuperscript{89} Thuc. 1.114; Diod. 12.7; Plut. Per. 22-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 40; Meiggs, 1972, 177-81; Balcer, 1978;
  \item \textsuperscript{91} See Meiggs 1972, 122-23, 565-570, Figueira 1991, 225 (Karystos), 258-60 (Chalkis).
  \item \textsuperscript{92} See Lewis 1994, 285-301.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} See Knoepfler 1997, 354.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 644.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 644.
\end{itemize}
late Classical period might essentially have recreated earlier hegemonies. The territories of the four major cities in the Classical period bear traces of earlier hegemony because they comprised and were divided into systems of demes, which included former poleis. In the 5th century the tribute lists record the individual payments of seven small communities that were eventually incorporated into one or another of the main cities.

The editors of the Athenian Tribute Lists suggested that Chalkis, Eretria, Styra, Hestiaia, Athenai Diades, Grynychai, and Dion were original members of the Delian League based mainly upon their appearance as tributaries by the second assessment period. However, as I shall show, considering that Athenai Diades, Dion, and Grynychai were dependencies of various ones of four main cities, it is more likely these smaller states entered the league at the same time as their dominant states and not independently. Herodotus and Thucydides record that Karystos located in the extreme south of the island was forcibly brought into the league in the late 470s or early 460s. Three other Euboian communities appeared as tributaries in later periods. The Diakres apo Chalkideon appeared first under a special rubric in 434/33 with a tribute of 800 dr. The Diakrioi en Euboia were listed by 429/28 with a tribute of 1T, 2,000 dr. Finally, Posideion was recorded in the assessment decree of 425/24 as obligated to pay 100 dr.

Starting in the far north of the island, there is solid evidence that Hestiaia possessed a large section of northern Euboia by the time of the Persian invasion under Xerxes including several communities that later appeared on the tribute lists. In the

97 ATL 3.197-99.
98 Hdt. 9.105; Thuc.1.98.3; See Brock 1996, 359, n. 7.
99 Πόλεις ἡς ἐνέγματον φόρον φέρειν (IG I2 278.VI.25-26).
100 IG I2 282.III.24.
101 IG I2 71.I.91-92.
course of his narration of the battle of Artemision in 480, Herodotus describes in some detail the northern part of Euboia, which Hestiaia seems to have already dominated (8.23.2). The historian calls this section of the island ἧ γῆ ἤ Ἰστιαιώτις ‘the territory of Hestiaia’ (7.175.2). In the 4th century the region under Hestiaian control has been estimated to be 850 km² encompassing all of northern Euboia and stretching to the territory of Chalkis.

There is good evidence that, already by the mid-5th century, Hestiaia had been in possession of the Kenaion peninsula. In an Athenian decree concerning the new colony of Hestiaia/Oreos, which probably dates to shortly after the city’s subjugation by the Athenians in 446, two communities, Dion, located on the Kenaion peninsula, and Ellopia, are mentioned in the context of judicial arrangements. Unfortunately, not enough of the decree survives to interpret fully Dion’s relationship to the new colony. Yet, it is clear that Dion, attested already in the early Archaic period as a polis, was included in the new arrangements of the Athenian settlement and thus, should be viewed as a deme and/or a dependent polis. Ellopia, which never appears on the tribute lists either before or after the Euboian revolt, was already a dependent community of Hestiaia (Hdt. 8.23.1). Dion’s neighbor on the Kenaion peninsula, Athenai Diades, must have also been under Hestiaian control in this period and even might have been included in the new colonial arrangements, although the city is not mentioned in the surviving fragments of the decree.

102 Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 656.
103 Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 656.
104 IG I3 41.100-3=SEG 32 3; See McGregor 1982, 111.
105 McGregor 1982, 111.
106 Dion is described as a city, πολίσθρον, in the Homeric epics (Il. 2.538); Reber Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 650-51.
Not only did Athenai Diades lie in the territory of Hestiaia near Dion, but in the third assessment period, the two communities also paid 4,000 dr. together in a syntely.\textsuperscript{108} It is not likely that a dependency or a sub-division of a larger state would have entered into a syntelic relationship with another independent polis. The syntely becomes more understandable in this period if Dion and Athenai Diades were two dependencies of Hestiaia/Oreos that paid jointly to the Athenians in a period of transition during the establishment of the colony. It is not clear whether the Athenians took the opportunity of the colony’s emplacement to attach the two communities to the new city. The separate payments of the communities immediately before the Euboian revolt should not be regarded as absolute indications of their independence from Hestiaia. Herodotus’ description of Hestiaian control over much of the northern region of Euboia in 480, which certainly should have included the Kenaion peninsula, is good evidence that Hestiaia possessed the two communities by the late Archaic period. Moreover, both Dion and Athenai Diades continued to pay after the revolt of 446, when it is virtually certain that they were dependencies in some sense of the new Athenian colony, which indicates that the individual payment of tribute did not automatically constitute or reflect independence.

Hestiaia/Oreos controlled many other settlements that never appeared on the tribute lists such as Orobiai, located near modern Rovies on the northwest coast of the island, which Thucydides described as a polis (3.89.2).\textsuperscript{109} Hestiaia paid for Orobiai and numerous other communities of various sizes in its territory as part of its annual tribute.

\textsuperscript{108} Location: Strabo 10.1.5 C 446; Syntely: IG I\textsuperscript{3} 267.IV.28; Athenai Diades is only listed but with a payment of 4,000 dr. which is generally believed to include Dion; See Lepper 1962, 40; McGregor 1982, 111.

\textsuperscript{109} See IG I\textsuperscript{3} 418a.6.
payment up until the mid-century revolt. Since Orobiai and other such communities never paid tribute independently even after the Athenian colony was established, most, if not all, of Hestiaia’s dependent territory must have been transferred to the new Athenian colony.

Athenai Diades and Dion, which had tribute histories of their own, might have preferred or were required to continue to furnish tribute though attached to Attic Oreos. The reasons for the individual tribute payments of the two dependencies before the revolt, a situation unlike the rest of Hestiaia’s possessions, are unclear. The possibility remains that the Hestiaians preferred that Dion and Athenai Diades pay tribute separately in order to ensure a lowered assessment. Apotaxis in this case could have relieved the Hestiaians of the burden of paying for Dion and Athenai Diades. Hestiaia would have still controlled the region although Dion and Athenai Diades ceased to be included in the city’s annual tribute payment. Malcolm Wallace suggested that civil strife after the Persian War, attested by Aristotle, could have resulted in the division of the demos into factions with the democrats residing at Dion and Athenai Diades while an aristocratic faction controlled Hestiaia. According to Wallace, the Athenians likely would have favored the democrats on the Kenaion peninsula leading to apotaxis.

However, the individual tributes of Athenai Diades and Dion were actually greater than the usual 1000 dr. payment of Hestiaia. Hestiaia’s surprisingly low assessment could itself have been a result of the civil strife. Aristocrats fleeing Hestiaia might have relocated to their estates on the Kenaion peninsula thereby temporarily transferring their assets away from Hestiaia which resulted in an increase in taxable assets measured at Dion and Athenai Diades. However, there as yet no completely

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110 Arist. Pol. 1303b31; Wallace forthcoming.
satisfactory explanation for Hestiaia’s low tribute before the revolt. Whether civil strife or Hestiaian manipulation of the tribute assessment process were the original reasons for the separate tribute payments of Dion and Athenai Diades, they likely remained dependencies of Hestiaia. By the Hellenistic period, Dion and Athenai Diades were demes of Hestiaia/Oreos.111

Further south on the island, Chalkis, like Hestiaia, must have controlled a large number of small communities, which formed the economic basis of much of the city’s tribute to the Athenians. In the 4th century the territory of Chalkis probably comprised ca. 825 km².112 The city’s territory in the Archaic and Classical periods was already substantial and bordered on that of Hestiaia and Eretria.113 Most of the communities that made up the Chalkidian state never paid tribute separately to the Athenians. The exception is the Diakres apo Chalkideon, who first appeared in the πόλεις αὐτοῖ ῥυμί rubric in 434/33.114 The inclusion of the Diakres in the special rubric seems to indicate that the Diakres might have taken some initiative in their individual assessment in 434/33.115

The reasons for their separate assessment remain unknown. I would suggest that they remained a dependency of the Chalkidians, even though they began to pay tribute directly to the Athenians.116 The appearance of the Diakres should not be regarded as having a major significance for the political status of Chalkis in this period or for its relations with Athens. The small size of the Diakres indicates that Chalkis probably

111 IG XII.9 1186.2-3; See Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 656.
116 Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey 2004 in Hansen and Nielsen, 650 following Geyer 1924, 224 suggest that the Diakres were a “short-lived splinter community” from Chalkis after the Athenian subjugation that resided in the northern territory of Chalkis after 446.
acquiesced in their individual assessment by the Athenians, if, in fact, this community sought some degree of independence through their individual tribute payment.\textsuperscript{117} It is highly unlikely that the Diakres had been detached as a consequence of the revolt of 446. The loss of income that had issued from this dependency must not have had a significant economic or political effect on Chalkis, which paid 5T at first, then 3T subsequently in tribute.\textsuperscript{118} Chalkis would have likely maintained some control over the Diakres, considering the vast differences in their resources and the unlikelihood that the Athenians viewed the Diakres as a strategic ally on Euboia. One may consider that the Diakres simply preferred to pay separately to Athens, instead of paying their traditional contribution to Chalkis, in which Chalkis acquiesced, at least momentarily, instead of bearing the responsibility of paying for this small community as in previous years. I hesitate to view the independent entry of the Diakres as constituting a full move toward independence or an Athenian attempt to weaken Chalkis in some way through the assessment of a rather small dependency of the city. Chalkis clearly controlled a considerable number of such communities that never sought independent assessment by the Athenians and/or were detached from Chalkidian control. The Diakres apo Chalkideon were a tiny community that would have provided minimal tribute and almost no strategic advantage to the Athenians.

It has been recently suggested by John Ma that the individual assessments of the Diakres share some similarities with the individual assessments of the small communities on Rhodes discussed earlier and the Eteokarpathioi, who appeared in the same rubric as

\textsuperscript{117} See Lepper 1962, 38-39.
\textsuperscript{118} See IG I\textsuperscript{3} 264.IV.23 (448/47) and IG I\textsuperscript{3} 270.V.32 (442/41).
It is not clear if any of these small communities were *poleis*. It is certain that the Eteokarpathioi were not, as they are referred to as a *koinon* in an honorary inscription from Athens granting them autonomy.\(^\text{119}\) In all of these cases it is easy to overstate Athens’ role without further evidence and a better understanding of what the Athenians hoped to gain through *apotaxis*. Although Ma is rightly unsure about Athenian policy in the *apotaxis* of the Eteokarpathioi from the city of Karpathos, he insists on a strong Athenian role. I find it highly improbable that the Athenians hoped to gain much through the detachment of these small dependencies if *apotaxis* was motivated by the desire to “weaken” a regional hegemonic state or to enhance Athens’ position in some way. If Athens engaged in what Ma calls “strategically fostered local segmentation” in the cases mentioned above, it still not clear what advantages the Athenians accrued.\(^\text{121}\) Instead, the answer must lie in changing local conditions, which the Athenians recognized but probably did not see as vital to the empire. For example, the granting of autonomy to the Eteokarpathioi was a reward for the donation of cypress wood for the temple of Athena. It is not likely that the Athenians created the Eteokarpathioi but enhanced their status in the region. In other words, the *koinon* of the Eteokarpathioi had already been estranged from the Karpathians, a new reality that Athens acknowledged. Their name does seem to encapsulate an ideological claim to some superior level of autochthony or of authenticity of identity.

Chalkis’ neighbor, Eretria, is believed to have possessed the largest territory of any city on Euboia, at least by the mid-4th century. In the 4th century, the region under

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\(^{119}\) See Ma in Ma, Papazadarkas, and Parker 2009, 129-35 for a useful discussion of the individual assessment and grant of autonomy to the Eteokarpathioi.

\(^{120}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 1454.7 (ca. 445-430).

\(^{121}\) Ma in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker, 135.
Eretrian control was ca. 1500 km\(^2\).\(^{122}\) During the period of the Delian League, Eretria seems to have controlled territory stretching from the border with Chalkis to Styra in the south. As in the case of Hestiaia, the territory of Eretria seems to have included multiple *poleis*, of which one appeared as an independent payer on the tribute lists. Grynchai, usually assessed with a tribute of 1,000 dr., was eventually incorporated or reincorporated into Eretria and reduced to the status of a deme.\(^{123}\) It has been argued that the incorporation of the community occurred after the Euboian revolt of 411.\(^{124}\) However, the individual payment of Grynchai in the Delian League does not exclude the possibility that the city was already a possession of Eretria that had not yet been transformed into a sub-division of the Eretrian state. Little is known about Grynchai although it was possibly located on the east coast of the island near modern Krieza.\(^{125}\)

It has been proposed that the Athenians preferred to control Grynchai directly in order to ensure safe passage to Skyros, thus, explaining its individual tribute assessment.\(^{126}\) This hypothesis presupposes that the city’s individual tribute payment is certain proof of independence from Eretria. Yet, in Thucydides’ description of the allied contingents from the cities of Euboia in the Sicilian campaign, no mention is made of forces from Grynchai (7.57.4). Therefore, the contingent from Grynchai, along with other admitted Eretrian dependencies, probably served under the Eretrians, who are specifically named by Thucydides. Accordingly, Grynchai in this period was an Eretrian dependency, which might have been a *polis*. There were other notable similar communities that never

\(^{122}\) Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 652.

\(^{123}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 262.I.24 (451/50); See Knoepfler 1997, 354.

\(^{124}\) Knoepfler 1997, 400.


\(^{126}\) Knoepfler 1997, 384.
appeared in the tribute lists such as Dystos and Peraia that were also eventually incorporated as demes by Eretria.\textsuperscript{127} It has been held that Dystos was a \textit{polis} until its transformation into a deme of the Eretrian state since it was the only deme of the sixth Eretrian \textit{phyle}.\textsuperscript{128} Peraia might have also shared a similar history.\textsuperscript{129} Both communities already belonged to Eretria in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century since they did not appear on the tribute lists as individual tributaries.\textsuperscript{130} In addition to Thucydides’ omission of the city, Grynchai’s eventual absorption by Eretria, probably after 411, could also be an indication of its dependency similar to that of Dystos or Peraia. Grynchai could have used its membership in the league as a means of preventing attrition of \textit{polis} status at the hands of Eretria or, alternatively, the Eretrians preferred that they pay tribute directly to Athens. In any case, Athenian control of Grynchai need not have entailed complete detachment from the Eretrian sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{131}

As in the case of Grynchai and Dystos, Styra eventually became a part of the Eretrian state reduced to the status of a deme sometime after 411.\textsuperscript{132} Yet, unlike the other smaller cities on island that appear on the tribute lists, Thucydides mentions by name the contingents of Styra in his catalogue of Athenian allies in Sicily (7.57.4). Thus Styra must have contributed its own forces to the campaign as an independent member of the league. Moreover, unlike Grynchai or Dystos, Styra had a role during the Persian wars supplying two ships at Salamis in 480.\textsuperscript{133} At the battle of Plataiai in 479, Styra combined with Eretria to contribute 600 hoplites, which could be an indication that Styra was allied

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} See Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 651, 659-60.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 651.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 659-60.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Knoepfler 1997, 400 suggests that Peraia and the Diakrioi en Euboia, who appeared first on the tribute lists in 429/28, were the same community.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Wallace forthcoming.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Knoepfler 1971, 242-44 and 1997, 400.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Hdt. 8.46.4.
\end{itemize}
to Eretria at that time. W.P. Wallace argued that Styra was “a free and equal member of the Eretrian state” before 490. Since Styra furnished a separate force in the Sicilian campaign, it may have maintained this status throughout the Athenian hegemony. Thus, it is possible that Styra preserved a certain level of autonomy vis-à-vis Eretria into the first half of the 5th century guaranteed by an alliance, possibly something like what would later be called *sympoliteia*, which was eventually lost in the late 5th or early 4th centuries.

Styra’s independent membership in the league could have buffered the city from Eretrian domination in the way in which Eretria might have controlled the city in the Archaic period and the 4th century. Although it has been suggested that Athenian fear of Eretrian power was paramount for the situation, one should hesitate to attribute the independence of Styra solely to Athens. Eretria already controlled a large section of the island including dependencies that never appeared on the tribute lists. Moreover, Styra’s usual payment was only one talent, which suggests that Eretria’s absorption of the city would not have enabled Eretria to alter its military situation regarding nearby Athens in any significant way. It is more likely that the Styreans objected to Eretrian aggrandizement at their expense and saw their membership in the Delian League as a bulwark against threatened dependency, especially if a pre-existing alliance with Eretria did not already guarantee independence. The Styreans’ membership in the Hellenic League and service against the Persians gave them an argument and leverage unavailable to the other dependencies of Eretria.

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134 Hdt. 9.28.5.
135 Wallace 1936.
Nevertheless, it is possible that Euboia’s close proximity to Athens could have contributed to different policies concerning Eretria than other regional hegemonic states farther away from Attica. The Athenians might have viewed the potential alienation of Euboia as worthy of special attention in the early years of the alliance just as they would at the end of the century. Precautions could have been taken to prevent Eretrian aggrandizement beyond a tolerable level. Such a hypothesis, however, must be set against the long record of collaboration between Athens and Eretria, seen, for example, in ties with Peisistratos, the Ionian Revolt, and the Marathon campaign. Moreover, as stated above, Eretrian control of Styra would have done little to challenge Athenian power on Euboia. The eventual successful revolt of the island occurred through the intervention of the Peloponnesians and was backed by the support of the Boiotians, who by 411 were much stronger relative to the Athenians. Unfortunately, the process of absorption of Styra into Eretria after 411 remains mysterious. Thus, it is impossible to tell whether or not Styra was voluntarily annexed to Eretria.

South of Styra, Karystos seems to have controlled the southern end of the island already by the period of the Delian League, a territory estimated to be 450 km$^2$ in the 4$^{\text{th}}$ century. As in the case of the other three main cities, Karystos’ tribute was supported by many dependent communities of varying sizes, many of the names of which are lost to history. As in the cases of other large cities on the island, a few small communities in Karystian territory appeared on the tribute lists furnishing their own contributions, the Diakrioi en Euboia and Posideion. Little is known about these communities apart from their entries on the lists. There is, as yet, no general consensus even on their location.

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137 See Thuc.7.28.1, 8.96.1.
Until recently scholars had identified Posideion in the north in the territory of Hestiaia/Oreos and the Diakrioi in Chalkidian or even Eretrian territory. Instead, Malcolm Wallace preferred to locate Posideion as the sanctuary of Poseidon near Geraistos, while he situated the Diakrioi near the Cavo d’Oro region. Wallace’s location of these communities is attractive and could help explain Karystos’ tribute history in the 420s. Unlike the other main Euboian states Karystos did not suffer a large increase in their tribute level in the famous re-assessment of 425/24. Wallace noted that the Euboian cities on the decree of Thoudippos, the assessment decree of 425/24, are listed roughly in the order of the magnitude of their assessments. The entry for Karystos is, however, out of order on that basis. From the magnitude implied by its placement, Wallace argued that the Karystians might have been originally required by the taktai ‘assessors’ to pay twice their earlier usual amount of 5T in the new assessment. The Karystians achieved a reduction of 1½T through proceedings before the dikasterion that was appointed to adjudicate claims over assessments shedding the two communities during the assessment process. This conclusion is an important indication of the nature of apotaxis, because this case, along with that of the Samothracians, would suggest that tributary states themselves initiated apotaxis. Athens’ lenient treatment of Karystos compared to Eretria and Chalkis, which were assessed at 15T and 10T, had been explained by Meiggs as a reward for recent notable Karystian participation in Attic

140 Wallace forthcoming.
141 IG I 71.1.70 (5T).
142 Wallace forthcoming.
service. However, Wallace’s hypothesis convincingly elucidates the late appearance of two rather small tributaries since it is unlikely that \textit{apotaxis} would have been strategically useful for the Athenians or they simply decided to raise revenue by detaching rather small dependencies. The separated communities were too tiny to swing any weight in power politics, and Karystos had already been chastised with a cleruchy. Wallace suggested that southern Euboia might have “experienced a diminution of economic strength” causing the city to appeal the new assessment.

The 420s were a period of increased assessments and, specifically in the assessment decree of 425/24, a large number of new tributaries probably appeared for the first time. Many of these were not just new additions, but might have been cases of \textit{apotaxis} on appeal by allies hoping to reduce their tribute burden. There is no extant evidence that Athenians pursued \textit{apotaxis} simply to increase revenues or to weaken an ally, except in cases of revolt. A rise in the assessment of a city would normally have been enough to ensure that all elements of the state would pay their share. \textit{Apotaxis} forced Attic authorities to revisit the issue of the burden of tribute at a time when the ordinary complaints of the inability to pay were receiving short shrift. It must be remembered that in 425/24, a court of 1,000 jurors had been especially established in order to hear cases of appeal by the allies hoping for reductions in their tribute burden.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Eretria: IG I\textsuperscript{3} 71.I.67; Chalkis: IG I\textsuperscript{3} 71.I.71; Meiggs 1972, 569.
  \item See ATL 3.195; Meiggs 1972, 241 for the \textit{apotaxis} of the Samothracian \textit{peraia} ca. 422/21.
  \item Diod. 11.88.5; Paus. 1.27.6; See Figueira 1991, 225.
  \item Wallace forthcoming.
  \item See Constantakopoulou 2007, 219-222 for the appearance of a few small Aegean islands for the first time as individual payers probably through \textit{apotaxis}. The appearance of the Aktaian cities on the assessment decree detached from Mytilene is an example of the enrollment of new tributaries through a form of \textit{apotaxis}, though not through appeal but as the consequence of a failed revolt.
  \item IG I\textsuperscript{3} 71.16-18.
\end{itemize}
The Diakrioi had already been separated from Karystos by 429/28 probably for similar reasons, since they are first recorded on the list of that year. Clearly, Karystos had paid for these groups in earlier periods and the pressure exerted by Athens to increase tribute in the Archidamian war could have forced the Karystians to reassess their relationship with these two dependencies at least in the tribute assessment process. Yet, their individual payments need not have entailed a complete move towards independence, certainly not in any way that would necessarily have been disadvantageous to the Karystians. Like the other small communities on the island such as Dion or Grynchai, no mention is made of Posideion or the Diakrioi in Thucydides’ catalogue of Athenian allies in Sicily in 413. Therefore, they must not have sent forces to Sicily independently.

Conclusion

Overall, my analysis of Attic policy towards the regional hegemonies on Euboia reveals that the Athenians were quite content to recognize the territorial claims of the main cities on the island. The vast majority of communities on Euboia already belonged to one of the four major cities when the alliance was founded -- with the exception of Styra, which Eretria had probably dominated in some way before its sack by the Persians in 490. Athens instead preferred to assert control over Euboia directly through the implementation of cleruchies, colonies, and garrisons and not through economic and territorial isolation of the main cities by the detachment of dependent communities. The valuable evidence of Euboian forces in Sicily hints that the military and fiscal exploitation of the island by Athens yields two different maps. The non-coincidence of these two overlays of hegemony urges caution about apotaxis and separate assessment.

149 IG I 282.III.24.
150 See Thuc. 8.95.6 for evidence of an Athenian fort in Eretrian territory by 411.
It has been contended here that all of the other communities that appeared as independent payers on the tribute lists remained dependent on one of the major cities in some form. After the revolt from Athens in 411, Grynchais, Styra, and the other small tributaries were finally absorbed, without leaving traces in the historical record by the large states, thus completing the process begun much earlier. By the mid-4th century, only four communities remained that could be classed as *poleis* that substantially controlled their own affairs. Yet, the process of the consolidation of the island had already been underway in the 5th century. In a sense, Attic hegemony suspended the advance toward total absorption that was represented by the 4th century deme system. W.P. Wallace argued that the Euboian League should date from the last decade of the 5th century in part as a bulwark against Athenian imperialism. If the league dates from this period, then his suggestion is perfectly reasonable. Yet, one must consider that the Euboians did not suffer large-scale confiscations of territory with notable exception of Hestiaia. The large cities still dominated most of the island, and the Athenians must have seen advantages in handing over the responsibility to them for marshalling forces from their dependents for campaigns and collecting revenue, so relieving Athens of the burden of assessing directly a vast number of insignificant communities. If Wallace is correct about a late 5th century league, the first Euboian divergence from Attic hegemony was a federal state, and not the extension of the deme system.

Generally, the Athenians showed an unwillingness to interfere with the sub-hegemonies of their allies unless for pressing reasons, such as the consequences of failed revolt. For example, the Thasians lost their *peraia* in 463/62 after war with Athens and

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151 Wallace 1956, 1; Cf. Larsen 1968, 97-103; Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 643.
152 See *ATL*. 3.195 with caution.
the Athenians confiscated the Mytilenaian cities in the Troad after a failed rebellion in 427. In the case of Euboia, it seems that the failed revolt in 446 did not lead to a thorough alteration of the preexisting status quo for most of the cities. The major consequence of the revolt was the establishment of the Athenian colony at Oreos and expulsion of most of the Hestiaian native population, which was unusual for its severity compared to the treatment of Chalkis or Eretria. Previously, Hestiaia and Karystos had been permitted to dominate the northern and southern regions of Euboia, while Chalkis and Eretria controlled the rest of the island.

The individual payments of the smaller tributaries should be ascribed to *apotaxis* for a number of possible reasons, but not necessarily for reason of full political independence or categorically attributed to Athenian attempts to weaken the main cities through the detachment of these rather small tributaries. The loss of Athenian control and subsequent political changes after the final Euboian revolt in 411 could have altered the climate of the island enabling Eretria and the other large *poleis* to absorb completely the few remaining cities, whether willingly or unwillingly by the 4th century.

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153 See Thuc. 1.101.3 for the conditions imposed by Athens on Thasos and 3.50.2-3 for Mytilene.
Chapter 5: Thasos and Samothrace

The history of the Thasian sub-hegemony in the Delian League is one of the most contested issues for scholars of the alliance. There is still no consensus concerning the status and history of the island’s peraia and the significance of its tribute assessments and payments during this period. Both archaeological evidence and literary sources are clear that Thasos controlled a large strip of territory on the Thracian coast beginning in the 7th century not very long after the island was settled by colonists from Paros. The peraia included at least seven communities by the 5th century, which are called both colonies and poleis in the literary sources.¹ As I shall show the peraia was an essential feature of the Thasian state with which Thasos was reluctant to part even when faced with confrontation with Athens. Athenian interests in Thrace conflicted with those of Thasos in the early years of the alliance, which eventually led to outright war in the 460s and confiscation of territory after the island’s surrender to Cimon.² Compared to other sub-hegemonies of the allies in the Delian League, there exists rich material on the dependencies of the Thasians in 5th century. Using the available evidence a more complete picture of the Thasian peraia can be pieced together than most other regional hegemonies in the league.

In contrast to much earlier scholarship, I contend that most of the peraia was returned to the Thasians by the first tribute period and not later, e.g., in the second period or in the final years of the league, views proposed by many students of the question. My conclusions fall, therefore, more in line with a general picture of Athenian policy toward

² Thuc. 1.100.2; Plut. Cim. 14.1-2.
the sub-hegemonies of the allies and the available evidence concerning Thasos and its dependents. Although the vast natural resources of Thrace seems to have determined Athenian policy toward the Thasian *peraia* by the 460s – a policy that was unusual for its interference in the traditional claims of an allied state – it would be wrongheaded to conclude that Athens behaved in fundamentally different ways toward Thasos than toward the other large allied states. Moreover, my examination of the Thasian sub-hegemony under Athens will hopefully shed some new light on the general history of island under Athenian domination.

The history of the Greek presence on Thasos began with the colonization of the island by Parians in the early to mid-7th century BCE. The foundation date is a controversial issue. Graham recently argued for ca. 650, which is about thirty years later than had previously been accepted. It is generally agreed that soon after settling the island in the 7th century, the Thasians turned their attention to the Thracian coast as Archilochus attests. Archilochus describes fighting between Thasos and Maroneia for the Thasian foundation of Stryme on the Thracian coast. Thasos also founded a number of colonies west of Stryme probably beginning in the same period.

Much of the surviving literary evidence concerning the early history of Thasos concentrates on the exploitation of the rich gold deposits on Thasos itself and at Skapte Hyle, located recently east of modern Kavala. Herodotus records that the Thasians received between 200T and 300T per year in the late Archaic period from their

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3 Thuc. 4.104.4; Strabo. 10.5.7 C 487.
5 Lazaridis 1971, 36; Graham 1983, 81; Archilochus, Fr. 291 West; Harp. s.v. Στρύμη (Σ 49) Keaney
6 Archilochus, Fr. 291 West; Harp. s.v. Στρύμη (Σ 49) Keaney.
exploitation of these mines and from other revenue from their peraia (6.46.3.). These figures are impressive compared to known revenue the Athenians were receiving in the 5th century. According to Thucydides the first assessment of the Delian League in 478/77 yielded 460T.\(^8\) Thucydides reports that in 431 the Athenians were receiving 600T in revenue from their allies.\(^9\) Thus, the Thasians enjoyed revenue much earlier in the century that was almost half what Athens was receiving from abroad on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.

The wealth and natural resources of Thasos and the coast of Thrace drew the attention of hostile foreign forces in the late Archaic period, which eventually resulted in the subjugation of the island by the Persians. The tyrant of Miletos, Histiaeus, attempted to found a colony at Myrkinos and unsuccessfully besieged Thasos in 494.\(^10\) Two years later a Persian force under the command of Mardonios subdued Thasos without a fight.\(^11\) In 491, Darius ordered the Thasians to tear down their walls and hand over their fleet to their rival Abdera.\(^12\) At some point after the defeat of Persia in 479 by the Greeks, Thasos joined the Delian League and even might have been an original member.\(^13\)

Nonetheless, ca. 466/65 the Thasians and the Athenians went to war over disputes centered on the island’s emporia on the coast of Thrace and the rich mines probably at Skapte Hyle.\(^14\) The Athenians defeated the Thasians at sea and besieged the island for three years. Cimon is said to have destroyed thirty Thasian ships in the sea battle.\(^15\)

During the siege, the Thasians were said to have secretly appealed to Sparta for aid.

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\(^8\) Thuc. 1.96.2.  
\(^9\) Thuc. 2.13.3.  
\(^10\) Hdt. 5.11.1-2; 6.28.1.  
\(^11\) Hdt. 6.44.1.  
\(^12\) Hdt. 6.46.1.  
\(^13\) ATL 3.223.  
\(^14\) Thuc. 1.100.2; Diod. 11.70.1; Meiggs 1972, 571-72.  
which was prevented by the Great Earthquake and ensuing helot revolt.\textsuperscript{16} Eventually the Thasians came to terms with the Athenians, who ordered them to surrender their fleet, tear down their walls, and pay an indemnity for the costs of the war.\textsuperscript{17} The Thasians were also forced to become tributary, which confirms that they had contributed ships up until this point, and to hand over their possessions on the mainland, τὴν τε ἡπείρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες.\textsuperscript{18}

Most of the discussion concerning Thasian history in the Delian League centers on the origins and ramifications of the war with Athens in the 460s and the revolt of 411.\textsuperscript{19} Thucydides’ account of the war between Thasos and Athens ca. 465 leaves no doubt that competition for the mineral wealth and natural resources of Thrace was the core issue of the strife. Athenian intervention into Thrace was viewed as a threat by the Thasians, whose economy benefited greatly from the exploitation of their \textit{peraia}.\textsuperscript{20} Cimon’s capture of Eion from the Persians in 477/76, an attempt to establish a colony at Ennea Hodoi in the mid-470s and a better documented effort to settle the region led by Sophanes and Leagros on the later site of Amphipolis ca. 465 is evidence of the type of activity that must have led to war.\textsuperscript{21} Direct control of the natural resources of Thrace and access to the gold mines of Mt. Pangaion were the motivating factors for Athenian

\textsuperscript{16} Thuc. 1.101.1-2.
\textsuperscript{17} Thuc. 1.101.3.
\textsuperscript{18} Thuc. 1.101.3.
\textsuperscript{20} Hdt. 6.46.3.
\textsuperscript{21} Thuc. 1.100.2-3, 4.102.2; Diod. 11.70.5, 12.68.2; Plut. Cim. 8.2; See Schol. Aeschin.. 2.31 for the attempt in the 470s. See Meiggs 1972, 83-85.
activity.\textsuperscript{22} The Athenian foothold in the region established with the occupation of Eion by Cimon in 476 must have already caused the Thasians some concerns for the future.\textsuperscript{23}

The abundant natural resources and trade opportunities in the region were crucial for Athens, which needed timber and money for the maintenance of the fleet.\textsuperscript{24} Thasos’ status as a ship contributor in the 470s and 460s meant that the Athenians did not receive a share of the revenue from the Thasian \textit{perea} in the form of tribute as in the case of some other allied sub-hegemonies throughout the league. Thus, inhibited in its exploitation of a lucrative region of Thrace under Thasian influence, Athens must have seen direct intervention in the area such as the foundation of the colony at Ennea Hodoi on the banks of the Strymon River first in the mid-470s and then in the 460s as the most efficient way to ensure their interests in the region.\textsuperscript{25} These interests subsumed archaic claims that were independent of relations with Thasos, which can be traced back to the Peisistratids. Peisistratos is said to have drawn revenue from the region of the Strymon River near Mt. Pangaion and lived there during a period of exile raising money and mercenaries.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, Thucydides the historian had claims to work mines in the region of Mt. Pangaion in the 5th century.\textsuperscript{27} Thucydides’ rights stemmed from an ancestral inheritance in the region. Just as important, claims to the Strymon region were also grounded in Athenian myth. One of Theseus’ sons, Acamas, was said to have received the area of Ennea Hodoi as a dowry.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, Figueira has suggested that

\begin{itemize}
\item[157] \textsuperscript{22} Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 855.
\item[21] Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. \textit{Cim}. 7.1-3.
\item[24] Thuc. 4.105.1; See \textit{ATL} 3.308-09 for the economic and strategic importance of Amphipolis for the Athenians.
\item[25] See Hdt.7.114.1 for the location of the region named Ennea Hodoi.
\item[26] Hdt. 1.64.1; Arist. \textit{Ath. Pol}. 15.2.
\item[27] Thuc. 4.105.1; \textit{Vita Marcellini} 13-15, 25; \textit{Vita Anon}. 3.
\item[28] Aeschin. 2.31 with scholia; See Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 66 n. 298 with bibliography; Figueira in Tsetskhladze 2008, 454.
\end{itemize}
Hagnon’s establishment of a heroon to Rhesus at Amphipolis “provided a cultic rationale for colonisation”. Thus, Athenian claims to this part of Thrace were not without mythical precedent, and it had already been an area of exploitation by the 6th century. The failure to establish a permanent presence at Ennea Hodoi in the 470s and 460s seems not to have altered Athenian determination to occupy the region to exploit securely the resources of Thrace as the Milesians and Persians had tried before them, which culminated in 437/36 with the establishment of Amphipolis.

The first recorded tribute payment of the Thasians is in the list of 454/53 with the surprisingly small amount of 3T. Thasos seems to have paid this amount until ca. 444/43 when they are recorded as paying 30T. The island paid this sum until at least 425/24 when it was assessed to pay 60T. In 411, Diotrephes installed an oligarchy on Thasos following the oligarchic revolution in Athens, which then revolted shortly thereafter with the aid of a Peloponnesian force. Four years later, Thrasybulos was able to retake the island for the pro-Athenians and Athens after a siege. Athenian hegemony over Thasos did not last long as the Spartan admiral Eteonikos captured the island in 405.

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30 See Plut. Cim. 7.1-3 and Schol. Aeschin. 2.31.
31 IG I’ 259.V.14.
32 IG I’ 266.III.8; Meiggs 1972, 85 proposes that the increase in tribute could have occurred the regular assessment of 446 or in 443 twenty years after capitulation to Athens. Reger 2004, 779 in Hansen and Nielsen 2004 suggests that the Thasos might have paid 30T in 447/46 when the island made three payments of which only one survives.
33 IG I’ 71.III.155.
34 Thuc. 8.64.2-5; Hell. Oxy. 10.4-5.
35 Xen. Hell. 1.4.9; Diod. 13.72.1.
36 Xen. Hell. 2.2.5; see Polyaen, Strat. 1.45.4.
As stated above, by the 7th century the Thasians had founded colonies on the mainland coast of Thrace opposite the island. The Thasian peraia is usually regarded as the coastal area between the Strymon and the Nestos rivers, with the exception of Stryme to the east. In the 4th century, the Thasians were successful in founding settlements further into the interior of Thrace such as Krenides. Yet, there is nothing to suggest that the Thasians had not penetrated into the interior in earlier periods. The coastal communities supplied precious metals, timber, and acted as emporia for the rich trade that inland Thrace provided. For the 5th century at least eight communities are named in the sources or have been otherwise identified as Thasian dependencies on the Thracian coast. The oldest attestation is for Oisyme, which is named by Homer (Il. 8.304). Thucydides refers to Oisyme as a colony of the Thasians in his description of Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace in 424 (Thuc. 4.107.3). No payment of Oisyme is ever recorded on the tribute lists. Thucydides also calls Oisyme’s western neighbor, Galepsos, a Thasian colony (4.107.3, 5.6.1). Unlike most of the other Thasian possessions, Galepsos paid tribute to the Athenians independently. The city originally contributed 1T, 3000 dr. in 454/53 and after several reductions is last recorded paying 1,000 dr. in 433/32.

As stated above, Archilochus attested to fighting between the Thasians and Maroneians for Stryme in the 7th century. Herodotus reports that Stryme was the

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37 Lazaridis 1971, 36.  
38 Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 80.  
39 Ibid.  
40 See Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 80 with bibliography.  
41 See Isaac 1986, 64-65 for a useful summary of the colony. See also Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 864-65 and Constantakopoulou 2007, 235 n. 29.  
42 See Diod. 12.68.4; Isaac 1986, 63-64; Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 861; Constantakopoulou 2007, 235. n. 29; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 83-84.  
43 IG I3 259.IV.15; IG I3 279.II.35.
easternmost Thasian controlled city on the Thracian seaboard in his description of Xerxes’ march through Thrace in 480 (7.108.2). As in the case of Oisyme, Stryme never appeared on the tribute lists.

Herodotus also mentions that Xerxes passed the city of Pistyros, which he identifies as a Thasian possession located west of Stryme (7.109.2). The Kistyrioi, who made an appearance only once in the tribute lists as an ἄτακτος πόλις under the year 434/33 have been identified by some scholars as the city of Pistyros. As I shall demonstrate, this identification is attractive and has significance for the tribute history of this region of the league. Furthermore, an inscription found near Vetren in Bulgaria from the 4th century attests to an emporion called Pisto and may shed light on the history of the city and the rest of the peraia in the mid-5th century. The evidence of an emporion called Pisto so far north of Herodotus’ placement of the Thasian colony of the same name has confounded scholars. It is clear that the line of march of Xerxes’ army could not have lain as far north in Thrace in 480. Loukopoulou has suggested that the Aegean Pistyros named by Herodotus was duplicated or replaced by the emporion of Pisto deep in Thracian territory. However, the identification of the Kistyrioi of the tribute lists with Herodotus’ Pisto makes it probable, following Hansen’s suggestion, that the emporion of Pisto in modern day Bulgaria was a foundation of the Aegean Pistyros. Thus, there is little doubt that a Thasian dependency named Pisto was located opposite

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46 IG I’ 278.VI.37; ATL 1.509; Salvat 1999, 271-72.
Thasos in the 5th century. Herodotus’ description of Stryme and Pistyros as Thasian-controlled poleis should leave no doubt that these communities existed in the 5th century.

Situated west of Pistyros, Neapolis was probably the most important Thasian settlement in Thrace. Located at modern Kavala, the city was rich in natural resources, provided a good harbor, and access to the plain of Philippi. Epigraphic and archaeological evidence affirm that Neapolis was a Thasian foundation. Like Galepsos, Neapolis paid tribute independently to the Athenians. From 454/53 the city paid a consistent tribute of 1,000 dr. at least until its last recorded entry in 429/28. Neapolis’ relationship to Thasos seems to have already been strained in the late Archaic period and was openly hostile in the last decade of the 5th century. Tiverios even suggests that Neapolis had ceased to be a Thasian dependency by the late 6th century.

The existence of two other Thasian possessions that might have been active in the 5th century, Apollonia and Antisara, is not as well supported. Apollonia is not directly confirmed as a 5th century Thasian community, but might have been a Thasian foundation as its name and location between Oisyme and Galepsos suggest. Apollonia minted its own coinage in the 4th century and was eventually destroyed by the Macedonians. In the 5th century Apollonia never appeared on the tribute lists. Antisara is better attested as a community in the 5th century. On the tribute lists Neapolis is identified as located near

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51 Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 80-82.
52 See Isaac 1986, 66.
53 IG I’ 101; See Pouilloux, 1954, 158-61; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 80-82.
54 IG I’ 259.VI.9-10; IG I’ 282.II.19-20.
56 Ibid.
58 Isaac 1986, 65.
Antisara, Νεοπολίται π[α]ρ’ Αντισά[ρ]αν. The attachment of Antisara to the annotation of Neapolis on the list clearly was meant to differentiate Neapolis in Thrace from other communities in the league of the same name. However, from the fact of the addition of Antisara, it is inescapable that the community must have existed in the 5th century and might well have been a Thasian colony, but interestingly never appeared with an entry on the tribute lists with its own payment. In the 4th century Antisara seems to have functioned as a port for the Thasian colony at Daton and has been located at Kalamitsa, a suburb of Kavala.

Both Herodotus and Thucydides mention the community of Phagres, which lay to the west of Galepsos. According to both authors, it was a Pierian community. Yet, [Skylax] listed Phagres as a Greek city and a Thasian emporion (67) in the 4th century. Loukopoulou has suggested that Phagres was colonized and incorporated into the Thasian peraia in the 6th century. However, there is simply not enough evidence to be absolutely certain that Phagres was a Thasian holding in the period under discussion, though it was possibly such. Finally, Loukopoulou has suggested that Berga was originally a Thasian settlement that was detached by the Athenians. Berga has been identified as a Thasian foundation mainly because of the discovery of an inscription dated to 470-460 in the Parian-Thasian alphabet. Berga independently paid a tribute of 2,880

59 IG I3 282.II.19-20; Tiverios in Tsetskhhladze 2008, 81.
60 Tiverios in Tsetskhhladze 2008, 81.
61 Lazaridis 1971, 37; Tiverios 2008, 81.
62 Steph. Byz. 100.17; Tiverios 2008, 86.
63 Hdt. 7.112.2; Thuc. 2.99.3.
64 Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 865; Isaac 1986, 62-63 denies that Phagres was a Greek city in the 5th century.
dr. to the Athenians beginning ca. 452/51.\textsuperscript{66} In 447/46 Berga paid 3,240 dr. and from 435/34 to at least 429/28 the city contributed 3,120 dr.\textsuperscript{67} It is not impossible, however, that Berga saw some Thasian or Parian settlement or infiltration in a primarily non-Greek milieu during the Archaic period rather like other places in the Strymon valley. Among the known poleis of the Thasian peraia, there were probably other communities and settlements that functioned as small emporia, the names of which are lost to history.\textsuperscript{68}

In the aftermath of the war with Athens, Thasos found itself without fleet, breached city walls, stripped of its peraia, and reduced to the status of a tributary. The record of Thasian tribute payments has been the focus of much scholarly controversy, which is integrally related to the island’s sub-hegemony in the period of Athenian domination. Scholars have attributed to different factors the rise in the Thasian payment from 3T, beginning in 454/53, to 30T ca. 444/43. The position articulated by the ATL for this abrupt increase in the Thasian tribute in the third assessment period was that the island was granted back a portion of its peraia from the Athenians, probably as part of the terms of the thirty-year peace with Sparta.\textsuperscript{69} Other scholars still follow the general lines of this view.\textsuperscript{70} Pouilloux attributed the large increase in tribute to the revitalization of Thasian commerce in this period, though without the return of the peraia.\textsuperscript{71} Pouilloux

\textsuperscript{66} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 261.IV.29.
\textsuperscript{67} IG I\textsuperscript{1} 265.I.93 (447/46); IG I\textsuperscript{3} 277.VI.30 (435/44); IG I\textsuperscript{3} 282.II.32 (429/28).
\textsuperscript{68} See Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 86-87 for a discussion of the range of settlements in the Thasian peraia including Akontisma, which might have been active in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, but is only attested in Roman period sources.
\textsuperscript{69} ATL 3.259, 302.
\textsuperscript{70} See Piéart in J. Servais, T. Hackens, and Servais-Soyez 1987, 294; Avram 1995, 192-95; Samons 2000, 104 argues that ca. 446 Thasos’ payment ceased to underwrite the navy and began to be received as a cash contribution.
\textsuperscript{71} Pouilloux 1954, 109-21.
based his analysis on evidence concerning Thasian trade and the building program on the island in this period. This theory has also found some adherents.\textsuperscript{72}

Meiggs attacked both the position of the ATL and that of Pouilloux by pointing our attention to the small amount that Thasos had paid until the sudden increase, while downplaying the rise in assessment itself.\textsuperscript{73} Rejecting the hypothesis that the mainland possessions were returned in the 440s or a revival of prosperity led to the change in tribute, Meiggs convincingly argued that Thasos’ payment of the indemnity to Athens for the cost of the war accounted for the small tribute of 3T in the first two tribute periods. According to Meiggs, once the indemnity had been paid off, the Thasians began to pay a tribute amount relative to their economic output. This view has become popular and further elaborated by other historians.\textsuperscript{74}

Recently, in an influential analysis, Brunet argued that the Thasians began the process of the reacquisition of the \textit{peraia} only after the oligarchic revolt from Athens in 411/10.\textsuperscript{75} Brunet focuses on three late 5\textsuperscript{th} century Thasian decrees, which he determines reveal the various stages in the reacquisition of the Thracian coast. The first two decrees concern the rewards given to informers on Thasos and the colonies on the mainland for information regarding plots to overthrow the government, which Brunet dates to the winter of 410 and the spring of 408 respectively.\textsuperscript{76} Brunet regards the second decree concerning the colonies as an addition once the \textit{peraia} began to be reacquired beginning in 410. At this stage, the re-acquisition was still incomplete since the communities on the

\textsuperscript{72} See Lazaridis 1971, 18; Graham 1983, 82-83 also argues for the return of the \textit{peraia}.
\textsuperscript{73} Meiggs 1972, 85-86.
\textsuperscript{75} Brunet 1997, 233.
\textsuperscript{76} ML #83; Brunet 1997, 239; Graham and Smith 1989, 405 argue that the decrees stem from the period of rule of the Thasian oligarchy but do not suggest an exact date for either.
mainland were not organized as they had been by the Thasians before 463. Brunet also sees a similar process in a decree concerning regulations on the wine trade, which he dates to the last decade of the 5th century or the early 4th century.\textsuperscript{77} For Brunet, the mention of Thasian officials in charge of the mainland in the decree is evidence that by that period Thasos had reabsorbed its \textit{peraia} on the coast.\textsuperscript{78} Brunet has also observed that this decree was an addition to a pre-existing law promulgated earlier, which did not include mention of these officials.\textsuperscript{79} Brunet argues that the institution of a board of officials to oversee the \textit{peraia} and the law itself could only have been achieved once the Thasians were free from Athenian pressure after the end of Peloponnesian war in 404 and the reconciliation with Neapolis had been completed. Brunet’s hypothesis is attractive but does not take into account some important evidence, which does shed some doubt on his hypothesis.

Brunet dismisses the proposition that the Thasians received their \textit{peraia} back ca. 446/45 by observing that Neapolis and Galepsos continued to pay tribute to Athens in the following years.\textsuperscript{80} It is true that Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga, which was probably also originally a Thasian settlement, as both Loukopoulou and Tiverios have argued, continued to furnish tribute directly to the Athenians for several decades after the Thasian tribute rose from 3T to 30T in the 440s. However, these three communities are the only Thasian possessions that paid tribute directly to the Athenians. The other communities that constituted the Thasian \textit{peraia} never appeared as independently paying members of the Delian League unless Pistyros should be identified with the Kistyrioi (as indicated

\textsuperscript{77} IG XII Suppl. 347, with Brunet 1997, 239.
\textsuperscript{78} IG XII Suppl. 347.II.3.
\textsuperscript{79} Brunet 1997, 238.
\textsuperscript{80} Brunet 1997, 231.
above). The Kistyrioi only appeared once and so their absence in the tribute lists must be explained in a single theory encompassing the other known Thasian possessions. The Kistyrioi paid 300 dr. in 434/33 as an ἀστακτὸς πόλις. Furthermore, the Athenians were aware of Antisara, which was likely a Thasian dependency, and it is quite possible that Apollonia was already a Thasian foundation in this period that like Stryme never appeared on the tribute lists. In Thucydides’ description of the defection of Galepsos and Oisyme to Brasidas in 424, the historian makes no distinction in the status of the two poleis as he calls both colonies, ἀποικίαι, of the Thasians. Although it is clear that Thucydides does not imply anything concerning their present political situation or relationship to Thasos, there is no suggestion that Galepsos was the more important community and therefore paid tribute to the Athenians. Thus, there is simply no evident reason why at least five known Thasian dependencies of this period never appeared on the tribute lists. Galepsos and Neapolis might have had a separate history under the Athenians because of their collaboration with Athens at the time of the Thasian revolt.

There are three conceivable reasons that could account for the missing tribute of the communities of the Thasian peraia. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Athenians did not assess these Thasian dependencies for tribute after detaching them in 463. Athens could have preferred to draw revenue from these communities through the importation of raw materials instead of exacting tribute. However, Neapolis and Galepsos were assessed for tribute, which it makes it likely that Stryme, Oisyme, and the other former Thasian colonies would also have been tributaries.

81 IG I 278.VI.37.
82 See Meiggs 1972, 571.
Another possibility is that these communities paid their tribute in a *syntely* with Galepsos, Neapolis or even Berga, which do appear on the lists. In Thucydides’ description of the revolt of Galepsos and Oisyme to Brasidas in 424, there is some indication that the two communities acted in concert. Both Thasian colonies are said to have gone over to Brasidas at the same time. Thus it is possible that Oisyme and Galepsos were united in a *syntelic* relationship, since they were close neighbors with only Galepsos appearing on the tribute lists. This explanation could account for Oisyme’s hypothetical missing tribute. However, it could simply be the case that Oisyme, presently under Thasian hegemony, decided to take the opportunity to go over to Brasidas as did its close neighbor Galepsos with which it probably maintained many ties. One could also argue that the identification of Neapolis on the tribute lists with Antisara could also imply that the two communities paid their tribute together. Again, a *syntelic* relationship between the two communities is possible. Yet, it must remain hypothetical since no clear evidence exists that would indicate that Antisara paid with Neapolis. At the same time, Stryme, Kistyros/Pistyros and the rest of the *peraia* would still have to be accounted for in the tribute of Galepsos, Neapolis and/or Berga. However, the tribute figures of Galepsos, Neapolis and Berga seem too low to accommodate so many cities. Neapolis consistently paid 1,000 dr. and Galepsos never more than 1T, 3,000 dr. The tribute of Galepsos was eventually reduced to the even more modest sum of 1,000 dr. by 433/32, which seems exceptionally low for a city paying for even one, let alone, several of its neighbors. Berga’s tribute was never more than 3,120 dr., which also seems too small an amount to include a *syntely*. Thus, a *syntely* of the former Thasian dependencies

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83 Thuc. 4.107.3.  
84 *IG* I 259.VI.9-10; *IG* I 259.IV.15.  
85 *IG* I 279.II.35.
probably centered at Neapolis, Galepsos and/or Berga must have yielded more tribute than these cities are recorded as paying.

The most likely reason that these communities do not appear on the tribute lists as individual tributaries is that Thasos had assumed their tribute payments by the first tribute period. Following Meiggs, there is indeed the strong possibility that the low assessment of Thasos in the first tribute period was owed to the payment of the indemnity imposed by Athens in 463/62.\textsuperscript{86} The natural resources of Thasos, with or without its \textit{perea}, should have been adequate to support a tribute assessment well above 3T, even though the city had suffered greatly during the war with Athens.\textsuperscript{87} Ten years after the breaching of Thasos’ walls and the surrender of its fleet, Athens would have had little reason to withhold from it the island’s former possessions. The Athenians would have still controlled the coast of Thrace strategically, and held the gold and silver mines along with those particular natural resources that drew them there and had been disputed in the first place. The Thasians would have lost some of the resources of the \textit{perea}, those disputed with Athens, but, nonetheless, would have regained control of the bulk of their former possessions. The Athenians would have benefited by handing over to the Thasians the responsibility for the tribute collection and the marshalling of military contributions from these communities.

Furthermore, if Thasos received back some of its mainland possessions by the first tribute period, then it is possible to better account for the tribute history of Kistyros/Pistyros. It is possible that Kistyros/Pistyros was only registered as an \textit{\acute{a}tακτος πόλις} when the community was temporarily separated through \textit{apotaxis} from Thasos.

\textsuperscript{86} See Picard 1998, 591-98 for a convincing defense of this hypothesis.
\textsuperscript{87} See Meiggs 1972, 86 and Nixon and Price in Murray and Price 1990, 152-3 for analyses of the Thasian economy in the mid-5\textsuperscript{th} century.
The reasons for the hypothetical *apotaxis* are unknown, and the interventions of the Odrysian kings are a constant factor in the background. Yet it is likely that Kistyros/Pistyros paid through Thasos before and after their separate assessment in 434/33 thus explaining their single occurrence on the tribute lists.

However, Neapolis and probably both Galepsos and Berga seem to have maintained a degree of autonomy from Thasos guaranteed by independent membership in the league. Evidence of Neapolis’ attitude toward its mother city is most evident in the city’s actions ca. 410 when it actively sided with Athens against a rebellious Thasos. In an Attic decree praising the Neapolitans, we learn that they supported Athens against Thasos after the island’s rebellion, even sustaining a siege by the Thasians and their Spartan allies. At the end of the 5th century or the beginning of the 4th century the Parians oversaw a settlement between Thasos and Neapolis, which was intended to end the longstanding hostility between the colony and mother city. Our evidence suggests that Neapolis preferred direct dependency upon Athens rather than dependency under Thasos. That situation, attested in the last decade of the 5th century, probably began much earlier. In this case, assessment by the Athenians was probably sought by a dependency of a regional power, which indicates independence from Thasian control. The Neapolitans probably viewed a return to the Thasian hegemony at any time in the period after the revolt as a threat to their fundamental interests. Little is known of Galepsos and Berga’s attitude toward Thasos in this period. The defection of Galepsos in 424 to Brasidas could have been motivated by many reasons including the loss of income stemming from the foundation of Amphipolis in 437/36 or general discontent with

88 *IG I² 101*; Pouilloux 1954, 155-60; Graham 1983, 84-88.
90 Brunet 1997, 236.
membership in the alliance. We hear nothing concerning the city after its recapture by Cleon in 422. It is possible that the Thasian campaign to subjugate Neapolis in ca. 410 was also directed at Galepsos.

Although Athens confiscated the peraia from Thasos, there is evidence that the colonies including Neapolis never completely severed ties with their mother city during the period of the Delian League. A Thasian inscription from 410/09 recording the confiscation of the property of political opponents lists two Neapolitans as victims. Thus, even though Neapolis had not returned to the Thasian regional hegemony after 463/62, ties were maintained between the two cities, at least, in the eyes of the Thasians. Neapolitans continued to own property on Thasos though no longer part of the Thasian peraia. The other colonies must have maintained an even closer relationship to the Thasians if, as I contend, after Athens returned them by 454/53 to become dependencies of the Thasian state. It is doubtful that Thasos and Neapolis were especially hostile toward each other in the years between 463/62 and the oligarchic rebellion in 411. Both cities were governed by democracies friendly to Athens. Thus, connections were maintained based upon their shared history until the oligarchs assumed power on Thasos and rebelled.

As I argued in the first chapter in my general discussion concerning syntely and apotaxis, there is little evidence to support the suggestion that the independent assessments of Galepsos and Neapolis were part of an Athenian effort to isolate Thasos.

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91 See Brunet 1997, 234.
92 Thuc. 5.1.6.
93 IG XII. 8.263.12-13; Pouilloux 1954, 156; Graham 1983, 85.
94 Brunet 1997, 236 n. 33.
95 Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 863 argues that property on Thasos owned by Neapolitans reflects the situation before 463 after which Neapolis was detached from the island. Yet, it is important to observe that the Thasians permitted Neapolitans to continue to own property though no longer a dependency.
politically and economically after the hypothesized return of the island’s *peraia* in ca. 444/43.\(^6\) Alexandru Avram has suggested that Galepsos’ tribute reduction from 1T, 3,000 dr. to 3,000 dr. in 443/42 is evidence of Athenian attempts to ensure the city’s independence from Thasos.\(^7\) Avram also views the change in the designation of Neapolis in the tribute lists from a toponym to an ethnic by 443/42 as part of this effort.\(^8\) Instead, I prefer to see the low payment of Thasos in the first two tribute periods as caused by the large indemnity imposed by Athens (as suggested by Meiggs) and not by an Attic retention of their possessions, which I believe were in fact mostly regained by 454/53. Neapolis and probably Galepsos along with Berga, if their status resembled that of the Neapolitans, preferred rather to remain free from Thasian control, which would explain their individual payments to the Athenians. These communities contributed small sums compared to the very large tribute payments of Thasos. Thus, there is little reason to think that Thasian interests were significantly damaged by the separate assessments of the three relatively small communities. They would have offered only a small share of the 200T that Herodotus says the Thasians earned from their mainland holdings. In fact, Neapolis’ loyalty to the Athenians during the Thasian revolt seems solid proof that the Neapolitans were willing members of the empire.

Instead of simply drawing tribute from the Thasian *peraia* and other communities of Thrace, the Athenians themselves preferred to exploit the resources of the region, a policy that would have entailed the reduction of Thasos to tributary status and the disarmament after 463/62, the very conditions which Thucydides’ explicitly describes. At the same time, it is possible, but unlikely, that Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga remained

\(^{96}\) Avram 1995, 192-95.
\(^{97}\) *IG I* 269.III.3.
\(^{98}\) *IG I* 269.II.28; Avram 1995, 192.
under Thasian control but paid tribute separately to the Athenians. In this scenario, Neapolis’ allegiance to Athens ca. 410 would be explained by the city’s refusal to revolt in the company of the Thasian oligarchs, though technically under Thasian possession previously. Yet, it is unclear why Galepsos, Neapolis, and Berga would have been the only cities under Thasian hegemony that paid directly to Athens. It is more likely that these communities remained apart from Thasian control after the return of the rest of the peraia by the first tribute period.

Brunet’s conclusions concerning the two Thasian decrees on delation and the regulation of the wine trade from the latter part of the 5th century do not constitute the only possible interpretations. Admittedly, Brunet’s suggestion is compelling in that the second decree concerning the colonies should date from the spring of 408, while the first to the winter of 410. Yet, his conclusion that the Thasians only began to re-acquire their peraia in the intervening period does not flow inevitably from this chronology. As shown above, the Thasians maintained some ties to their former possessions, even to Neapolis, which clearly preferred to remain independent of Thasian control.99

One should prefer to view the decree on delation as targeted at the colonies as striking a more aggressive position, now taken by the oligarchs, one that was too provocative previously, in the years before the break with Athens in 411, when the Thasians possessed somewhat restricted latitude toward their peraia. The decree could well have been a measure taken by the oligarchs after they revolted against their possessions deciding to remain with Athens. The delay between the first and the second decrees might have occurred for various reasons. It is possible that the Thasian oligarchs could not legislate for the colonies, which stayed loyal to Athens at first or that the decree

conveyed a veiled threat to Neapolis, which persisted in maintaining an active pro-
Athenian stance after Thasos’ initial revolt in 411. The oligarchs, now free from
Athenian control, unsuccessfully attempted to subjugate Neapolis ca. 410. It is not clear
whether this campaign included attacks on any other former dependencies such as
Galepsos, which had been recovered by Cleon in 422. The independence of Neapolis
clearly constituted a threat in the eyes of the oligarchs, and the Neapolitans could have
been actively engaged in influencing the behavior of other colonies.

The mention of officials charged with supervision of the *peraia* on a decree
concerning the wine trade in the late 5th or early 4th centuries is important for the
understanding the development of the Thasian *peraia* at the end of the century. Yet, there
is no direct evidence that these officials were a new creation of the last decade of the 5th
or of the early 4th centuries. This decree only provides a *terminus ante quem* for their
creation. As I have argued, it is also possible to argue that the Thasians were free to exert
more control of the *peraia*, which included a board to oversee the colonies, after the
revolt from Athens in 411 and dissolution of the Delian League in 404. Though paying
for their colonies from ca. 454/53, they were not permitted to control and exploit the
region with complete latitude as they had in the years before 463/62.

Overall, it could have been advantageous to the Athenians for the Thasians to take
over the responsibility of gathering the tribute from their colonies and mustering forces
for allied campaigns after the island became tributary. The maximum pre-war
assessment of 30T was eventually extracted from Thasos and the Thasians looked to the

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100 *IG* I 1 101.
101 Thuc. 5.6.1.
102 See *IG* I 1 1032.431 for evidence of Thasian service in the allied fleet probably in the later years of the
Peloponnesian war; See Figueira 1981, 59-60.
safety of the *peraia*. That the return of the Thasian sub-hegemony could have been administratively beneficial to Athens is witnessed by the facts on the ground. There is no evidence of Thasian disloyalty in the years between 463/62 and 411, even when Peloponnesian forces under Brasidas appeared in the region. Thasos and its mainland possessions consistently paid a combined tribute of 3T or 30T, while Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga furnished tribute separately, most likely preferring direct dependency on Athens rather than a return to Thasian hegemony. It is likely that it was only for a brief period during Thasos’ membership in the Delian League that the island had been deprived of its possession of the main, considerable bloc of its former colonies.

Unlike most of the regional hegemonies in the Delian League, the Thasian *peraia* drew the special attention of Athens because of the vast natural resources of the region and the tradition of Attic involvement in the area. Other notable insular allies that controlled *peraiai* were able to maintain their possessions for most of the history of the alliance. The notable exception is Mytilene, which lost its *peraia* after a failed revolt in 428/27. The Thasian example is similar in that one respect since the Athenians did also confiscate Thasos’ coastal possessions. Yet, unlike the Aktaian *poleis* of Mytilene, which appear separately assessed in the assessment decree of 425/24, only three Thasian colonies consistently paid tribute. The absence from the tributaries of the other communities attested in 5th and 4th century sources implies that the Athenians did not collect revenue directly from most of the Thasian *peraia* after ca. 454/53.

The individual tribute payments of Galepsos, Neapolis, and Berga are solid evidence that the Athenians decided to levy tribute from some communities in the

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103 Thuc. 3.50.3, 4.52.2-3
104 See IG I\(^3\) 71.III.122-40 for the assessment of the Aktaian panel.
Thasian *peraia* by the first tribute period. However, the absence of the other communities must be explained. It is probable that Thasos paid for at least Stryme, Oisyme, Pivityros, Antisara, Apollonia, and possibly Phagres as the traditional hegemonic state over this part of the coast of Thrace. Moreover, the individual assessments of Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga would have had little impact on the large Thasian economy, especially once the indemnity had been paid off ca. 444/43. Neapolis sided with the Athenians against Thasos in the last decade of the century, while strong evidence for the attitude of Galepsos and Berga toward their mother city is lacking, it is likely that the colonies took a somewhat similar position. How did this happen? It is quite likely that these three cities had cast their lot with the Athenians as soon as Thasos revolted. We might be tempted to canvas the possibility that Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga were returned to Thasian hegemony, but, nonetheless, paid tribute directly to Athens. Such an administrative convenience might be traced to an Attic decision over the responsibility for the revolt. Neapolis, Galepsos, and Berga were exempted from paying the indemnity, but bound to pay tribute. While not impossible, it is surely more likely that Neapolis and, presumably, Galepsos and Berga were freed from Thasian influence because they had sided with Athens.

The defeat of Thasos in 463/62, which included the razing of the city walls, dismantling of the fleet, and imposition of an indemnity, removed any threat the island could have posed to Athens for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the eventual return of most of the *peraia* ca. 454/53 is not inconceivable from a security standpoint. As argued above, the Thasians would not have been permitted to control the region as they had in the late Archaic period since Athens was keen to settle the area. At the end of the century,
the Thasian oligarchs took the opportunity to increase their control over the colonies in an intensification of hegemony that had been difficult when Athens had close supervision over the region.

The history of Thasian peraia reveals the extremes of Athenian policy toward the sub-hegemonies of their allies. Athenian intervention into Thrace was an aggressive move that challenged Thasian interests in the region. Yet, it seems that the Athenians recognized the historic claims of Thasians in regard to their colonies and returned most of them at least for purposes of tribute collection. Tiverios’ conclusions concerning the history of Thasian control of the peraia are similar to those argued in this chapter. Tiverios believes that Thasos maintained possession of its mainland colonies with the exception of Neapolis and Galepsos only for the time they paid tribute independently to the Athenians. Thus, in this case, Athenian policy was not one dimensional even toward one of the most powerful and wealthy allies in the alliance. We also note that the ‘push-back’ against Athenian hegemony can be localized in the Thasian elite. It is they who launch a policy of tightening control, as witnessed by the delation legislation, and of recovery of former dependencies, as shown by the war with Neapolis, when they were imprudently handed the reins of power by the Athenian oligarchs through their agent Dietrephes.

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105 Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 90.
Samothrace

The Samothracian peraia in the 5th century provides important evidence for the changing conditions and statuses of sub-hegemonies and the potential impact on a regional hegemonic state. Though smaller than the Thasian peraia, the Samothracian territory on the coast of Thrace functioned in similar ways insofar as it contained emporia for the lucrative trade of inland Thrace. Though little is known about the Samothracian settlements on the Thracian coast in the 5th century, they offer some evidence for Athenian policy toward the regional claims of an ally and illustrate how local conditions could affect the hold of a state over its sub-hegemony. Although not as wealthy and powerful as Rhodes or Thasos, Samothrace was able to maintain possession of its mainland dependencies for the duration of the league. In the 420s the Athenians separately assessed three Samothracian dependencies, a move, which has usually been viewed by scholars as evidence of the detachment of the entire peraia for economic and/or political reasons. Instead, as I shall argue, the apotaxis of Samothracian peraia probably had more to do with island’s strategy of coping with demands for tribute in a period of increasing financial burdens imposed by the Athenians than an aggressive step toward a subject ally.

The exact period of the colonization of Samothrace by the Greek colonists is not fully agreed upon by scholars. There is even disagreement concerning the origin of the Greek settlers. Based upon the collection of available literary evidence, Graham recently
suggested that the island was settled in the first half of the 6th century by exiles from Samos. \textsuperscript{106} Other dates have been offered by scholars that range from ca. 700 to 650. \textsuperscript{107} It is possible that the Greek settlers were a mix of Ionian and Aiolian colonists based upon modern pottery analysis. \textsuperscript{108} Regardless of the date in the Archaic period at which one puts the successful settlement, little more is known concerning Samothracian history until Xerxes’ campaign against the Greeks in 480. Xerxes’ forces marched through the towns of the Samothracian \textit{peraia} (Hdt. 7.108.2). Herodotus reports that a Samothracian ship fought at the battle of Salamis on the Persian side (8.90.2).

According to the editors of the \textit{ATL} Samothrace was probably an original member of the Delian League. \textsuperscript{109} The Samothracians are first recorded in the tribute lists in 454/53 paying 6T. \textsuperscript{110} The Samothracians seem to have paid this amount consistently until 430/29 when a payment of 2T was recorded. \textsuperscript{111} The editors of the \textit{ATL} restored Samothrace’ assessment in 425/24 to 15T. \textsuperscript{112} Based on the 6T tribute that Samothrace usually paid before the Peloponnesian war, it is clear that the island did not possess an economy comparable to the size of other islands in the league such as Thasos or Rhodes, which paid 30T or more in tribute. Yet, like those islanders, the Samothracians controlled a \textit{peraia} in the Archaic and Classical periods.

\textsuperscript{106} Graham 2002, 255.
\textsuperscript{107} Lazaridis 1971, 18 proposes that colonization began ca. 700. Ehrhardt 61, 1985 argues for a date around 700 to 650. Isaac 1986, 126 suggests colonization occurred ca. 700. Tsatsopoulou-Kaloudi 2001, 7 accepts a date of ca. 700. Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 111 concludes that the island could have been settled by Aiolians and Ionians ca. 650. See Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 110-11 with bibliography.
\textsuperscript{108} Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 110-11.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{ATL} 3.223.
\textsuperscript{110} IG \textit{I} \textsuperscript{1} 259.III.13.
\textsuperscript{111} IG \textit{I} \textsuperscript{1} 281.II.16.
\textsuperscript{112} IG \textit{I} \textsuperscript{1} 71.III.158.
It is generally agreed that the Samothracian *peraia* extended from the region east of Maroneia around Cape Serreion to the Heiros River.\(^{113}\) The Samothracians are known to have eventually possessed six to seven communities in their *peraia*, which were described as *poleis*, *emporia*, and *teikhe* in ancient literary sources: Mesambrie, Sale, Zone, Drys, Tempyra, Karakoma, and Serreion.\(^{114}\) Little is known concerning these communities outside the modest witness of ancient literary and epigraphical sources, since archaeologists have not yet securely identified the sites of most of the settlements.

According to Herodotus, Mesambrie was the westernmost Samothracian possession on the mainland (7.108.2). Herodotus places Mesambrie near Stryme, the easternmost Thasian settlement. Unfortunately, the exact location of Mesambrie is still unknown. Some scholars have identified Mesambrie with a site called Shabla Dere. However, the large number of coins found at the site and further archaeological excavation seem to support identification with Zone.\(^{115}\) Since Herodotus’ mention of Mesambrie constitutes the only ancient attestation of this community, taking his lead from earlier work, Tiverios has suggested that Mesambrie was the original name of either Zone or Drys or even that the city never existed.\(^{116}\) Following in particular a suggestion of Zahrnt, Tiverios would even accept that Herodotus was possibly mistaken and that a Samothracian Mesambrie never existed in the northern Aegean region. Yet, it seems rash to ignore or discount Herodotus’ testimony in this case. That Herodotus identifies Zone, Drys, and Mesambrie in his history is good evidence that all three communities existed at

\(^{115}\) See Isaac 1986, 133-34 with bibliography; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 9; Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, suggests that Mesambrie should be located 3 km. west of Shabla Dere. Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 107 argues that the numismatic evidence is persuasive that Shabla Dere is Zone.
the same time. Let us proceed by accepting the existence of a Samothracian dependency called Mesambrie in the 5th century, which has yet to be discovered by archaeologists. Nonetheless, there is no indication that Mesambrie ever paid tribute independently to the Athenians, which is an important piece of evidence for the status of the peraia in the league.

The next Samothracian city in Herodotus’ account of Xerxes’ march along the Thracian coast in 480 is Zone (7.59.2). According to Herodotus, Zone lay near Cape Serreion. As stated above, scholars have now generally accepted the site of Shabla Dere as Zone. In the assessment decree of 422/21 Zone is listed as assessed 2T, the highest amount of the three Samothracian communities on the mainland. Lying near Zone on the coast of the Doriskos plain was another Samothracian possession called Sale. It is accepted that Sale was situated near modern Alexandroupolis or possibly at Makri. Sale must have had a sizable port since Herodotus states that Xerxes brought his fleet to anchor at the city. The city was assessed in 422/21 at the relatively modest sum of 3,000 dr. when compared with its neighbor Zone. The last recorded Samothracian settlement in the assessment of 422/21 was Drys, which was assessed to pay 1T. Herodotus did not mention Drys in his account of the other Samothracian settlements. However, [Skylax] described both Zone and Drys as emporia of the Samothracians (67). In the 4th century Drys was besieged by the Athenian general Chabrias and was the seat of the

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118 IG I 77.V.27-28.
121 IG I 77.V.31.
122 IG I 77.V.29-30.
Athenian general Iphikrates.\textsuperscript{123} The individual entry of Drys in the assessment decree of 422/21 is listed next to Zone and Sale, and its location near Cape Serreion leave no doubt that the city was a Samothracian possession during the 5\textsuperscript{th} century.

Primarily based upon the testimony of Herodotus, Stephanus Byzantius, and other sources, Isaac has suggested that another Samothracian city and/or fort called Serreion might have also existed in the Classical period.\textsuperscript{124} Although Isaac’s identification is not impossible, the evidence that located a city Serraion on or near Cape Serreion in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century is not as strong as the attestations of the four communities mentioned above. Therefore, I shall regard the existence of Serreion in this period as only a conjecture. It is likely that both Tempyra and Karakoma, two other attested Samothracian settlements that lay to the east of the rest closer to the Heiros River were foundations either the late Classical period or of the Hellenistic period since they are only mentioned by post-classical sources.\textsuperscript{125} As in the Thasian \textit{peraia}, there were probably many trading stations and small dependent settlements that the Samothracians controlled, the names of which are lost to history.\textsuperscript{126} These communities were vital for Samothracian trade and control of their \textit{peraia}.

However, for our purposes, the important conclusion is that the Samothracians controlled at least four dependencies in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, which were all foundations from the island in the Archaic period. All of these communities were located east of Maroneia

\textsuperscript{124} Isaac 1986, 131-32; Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004 does not list Serreion as \textit{polis} of the Classical period.
\textsuperscript{125} Isaac, 1986, 132-33, 133 n. 55; Loukopoulou in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 871 who notably does not list Tempyra as a \textit{polis} or settlement of the Classical period; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 116-118.
\textsuperscript{126} See Isaac 1986, 135-37; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 118.
on the coast near Cape Serreion and west of the Hebrós River. The date of the acquisition of the *peraia* is still in dispute among scholars. Yet, it is inescapable that the Samothracians had founded Mesambrie, Zone, Sale, and likely Drys by the time of Xerxes’ march through Thrace in 480. These communities not only functioned as trading centers, but also provided the Samothracians with cultivable land, which was in short supply on the island. Thus, as in the case of the Thasian *peraia*, the Samothracian colonies served multiple functions for the mother city.

Little further is known of the history of Samothracian control of the *peraia* in the 5th century. There is no conclusive evidence that the Persian presence on the Thracian seaboard in the late Archaic period affected the Samothracian *peraia*, although the editors of the *ATL* proposed that the region would have been unstable until their departure. Ultimately, it is impossible to know for certain what the conditions of coastal Thrace were in the late 480s and 470s. Yet it is most likely that the Samothracians had achieved some hegemony over their dependencies on the mainland if their Thasian neighbors may be employed as a model. We are put on somewhat firmer ground for the Samothracian *peraia* by the assessment decree of 422/21 inasmuch as Zone, Drys, and Sale are recorded there. Yet, it is a reasonable inference that the Samothracians had continually controlled their colonies/dependencies since 454/3 — and very possibly throughout the period of the Delian League -- since the cities of the *peraia* did not appear to have paid

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127 Maroneia, a wealthy city with a vigorous mint and a high tribute assessment, inhibited the accumulation of a *peraia* by the Samothracians.
128 Isaac 1986, 126-27 suggests any period between ca. 700-480. Constantakopoulou 2004, 237 argues the colonization of Thrace must have occurred shortly after the island was settled but before the 5th century based upon the Thasian parallel. Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 114 argues that the *peraia* was acquired shortly after the settlement of the island, which would be after the middle of the 7th century according to his dating scheme.
130 *ATL* 3.195.
phoros until the 420s. General agreement maintains that Samothrace had paid for the three communities until then through its regular tribute contribution.  

Further conclusions are more problematic. Scholars have generally viewed the separate assessments of the communities of the peraia in 422/21 as indicative of an Athenian effort to increase revenue or to weaken Samothrace through the detachment of its mainland dependencies. Revenue enhancement and imperialistic undermining could both be at work. Meiggs suggested that the Athenians sought to raise revenue from the Samothracians and their dependents by assessing them separately. While the editors of the ATL did not propose any explanation for the separate assessments of 422/21, Meiggs’ analysis does in fact apply their usual interpretation in instances of apotaxis among league members. The ATL proposed that the Athenians pursued apotaxis on a large scale after 440 to increase revenues. As I have argued systematically, this theory does not stand up to scrutiny since the tribute lists attest to the continued existence of many syntelies and sub-hegemones like that of Erythrai after 440. Moreover, the process of apotaxis did not always lead to increased tribute assessments. No surviving literary or epigraphical evidence directly indicates that the Athenians pursued apotaxis to increase tribute. And no one has ever even explained why apotaxis would be necessary to increase the revenue from a syntely of contributors, since an increase in the assessment of a syntely-‘head’ would have provided a sufficient means to ensure increased revenue.

Other scholars have argued that the apotaxis of ca. 422/21 affecting the Samothracian hegemony was motivated by ulterior political motives and that the apotaxis

131 Perdrizet 1909, 33-34; Gernet 1923, 161; ATL 3.195, 217; Meiggs 1972, 241; Constantakopoulou 2004, 238.
133 ATL 3.195.
had significant deleterious effects on Samothracian rights of their *peraia*. Most analysis of this type assumes the permanent loss of the *peraia* to the Athenians. As I shall show, there is little evidence to support arguments of this kind as well. Only one thing is certain: the assessment decree records a change in the assessment results from previous periods when Samothrace paid for the dependent communities. We cannot be sure enough of the status of the mainland communities under the previous dispensation to conclude that the individual tribute payments of the three communities of the *peraia* constitute evidence of the detachment of the mainlanders from the Samothracians.

The few surviving fragments of the Athenian orator Antiphon’s speech entitled *On the Tribute of the Samothracians* provide some evidence for the possible conditions under which the separate assessments of the Samothracian *peraia* occurred ca. 422/21. Although I have already analyzed these fragments in my discussion of the possible reasons for the dissolution and reconstitution of the Erythraian *syntely* in the 440s and 430s, a recapitulation will be valuable in understanding the nature of *apotaxis* for the Samothracian *peraia*. Naturally, most scholars have concluded that the speech was written and delivered in the 420s. Perdrizet, Gernet, and Meiggs concurred that the occasion of Antiphon’s speech was an appeal of the island’s assessment before the special court established to hear allied complaints in 425/24. The decree stipulated that a new court of 1,000 jurors was to adjudicate cases during the month of Posideion and no ally was to be assessed less than it was previously contributing unless an inability to pay was manifested. Lazaridis, however, suggested that the speech dates from 430/29, when

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134 Avram 1995, 194; Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 770; Tiverios in Tsetskhladze 2008, 114 views the *apotaxis* as indicating the separation of Samothrace and its colonies.
135 Fr. 49-56 Thalheim.
136 IG I 71.16-18; Perdrizet 1909, 38; Gernet 1923,161; Meiggs 1972, 241.
Samothrace’s tribute decreased from 6T to 2T.\textsuperscript{137} His hypothesis cannot be excluded, although the content of the fragments is accommodated somewhat better by the conjecture of an \textit{apotaxis} which has to fall between 425/24 and 422/21.

From the fragments of Antiphon’s speech, it is evident that Samothracians argued that they were unable to meet the tribute assessment because of the poverty of their island, which was caused by a lack of arable land.\textsuperscript{138} Antiphon also seems to have discussed \textit{apotaxis} and \textit{syntely} in a more obscure context that probably involved the individual assessments of the communities of the \textit{peraia}.\textsuperscript{139} Unfortunately, not enough of the speech survives to fully understand the tenor of his treatment of \textit{apotaxis}.

Perdrizet thought the occasion of the appeal was an effort by the Samothracians to argue for a reduction in the tribute assessment after the separation of their \textit{peraia}.\textsuperscript{140} According to Perdrizet, the Samothracians felt burdened by the new tribute obligation without the resources of their former dependents. Gernet and Constantakopoulou have followed this view.\textsuperscript{141} Constantakopoulou argues that the Samothracians “lost control of at least part of her \textit{peraia} in the fifth century, when Drys, Zone, and Sale appear in the Athenian Tribute Quota Lists.”\textsuperscript{142} Implicit in the background of these analyses is that the Samothracians opposed the \textit{apotaxis}, which was forced by the Athenians. Meiggs’ argument concerning Athenian desire to raise revenue certainly implies an aggressive effort to detach the dependencies from the island. Ehrhardt argues that the Athenians confiscated Zone, Drys, and Sale, and that the speech of Antiphon, which he dates to ca.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Lazairdis 1971, 20.
\item Fr. 50 Thalheim; Meiggs 1972, 240-41.
\item Harp. s.v. \textit{ἀπόταξις}. (A 208) Keaney; Harp. s.v. \textit{συντελεῖς}. (Σ 61) Keane; See Meiggs 1972, 240-41 for a useful discussion of the fragments of the speech. For example, Meiggs compares \textit{συντελεῖς} to 4\textsuperscript{th} century symmories at Athens.
\item Perdrizet 1909, 37.
\item Gernet 1923, 161; Constantakopoulou 2004, 238.
\item Constantakopoulou 2004, 238.
\end{enumerate}
420 was an appeal for their return.  

Avram proposes that Athenians sought to convert the communities of the *peraia* into friendly allies through their individual assessments in order to make them solely dependent on Athens at the expense of Samothrace. Reger has suggested that the Samothracians lost control over the *peraia* until the end of the Peloponnesian war as a result of *apotaxis*.

Most of these lines of argument presuppose an aggressive disposition of the Athenians towards the claims of Samothrace in the 420s concerning its own colonies, an imperialistic demeanor for which there is really no specific evidence beyond the general suspicion that this is the kind of thing that the Athenians were doing at the time or even all the time. Such arguments run up against an argument based on economy of hegemonic effort. Here one must ask whether the Athenians during the Archidamian war would have had a compelling reason or found a suitable return for the investment of time and resources to concern themselves with the petty dependencies of a third rank tributary power such as Samothrace.

Thus, it is important to analyze carefully the arguments offered by scholars for the confiscation of the *peraia* by the Athenians. First, it is doubtful that the entire *peraia* was detached since Mesambrie never appeared on the tribute lists. As argued above, Mesambrie appears on the basis of Herodotus’ attestation to have been a Samothracian possession in the 5th century. Samothrace must have continued to pay tribute for Mesambrie. It is barely possible that Mesambrie and another Samothracian community

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143 Ehrhardt 1985, 69.
144 Avram 1995, 194; Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 770.
paid together in a syntely.\textsuperscript{145} Furthermore, if Serreion existed as a Samothracian community in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, the Samothracians must have also retained possession of this community, as Isaac has suggested. It too is absent from the documentation or quota or assessment lists. Thus, the confiscation or imperialism scenario runs up against the failure of the Athenians to arrogate the whole peraia if indeed that is what apotaxis in this case ought to have entailed. It may also be remembered that detachment of the peraia is a far cry from confiscation so that one asks once more where the advantage lay for the Athenians in such an apotaxis. Marginal changes in income, whether for Athens or Samothrace, cannot have bulked large in policy decisions.

Furthermore, in the 4th century [Skylax] (67) referred to Drys and Zone as coastal emporia lying opposite Samothrace, a formulation, which implies that the island still controlled these communities after the end of the Peloponnesian war and was still using them as trading stations.\textsuperscript{146} It is certainly possible that Samothrace recovered them in an unattested recuperation, but it is equally reasonable (and simpler) to suppose that it had never lost them. Samothrace does not, therefore, provide a close parallel to the detachment of the Thasian or Mytilenaian peraiai because those actions are directly attested and occurred in direct response to failed rebellions. We cannot be sure that Drys, Sale, and Zone truly ceased to be dependent upon Samothrace under some guise, though now separately assessed by the Athenians.

To repeat: it is hard to understand how the fiscal rationale for this apotaxis works practically, let alone psychologically for the Athenians. Since it seems that not all of the

\textsuperscript{145} However, evidence is lacking for this hypothesis such as the mention on the tribute lists of Mesambrie along with another settlement such as Zone or Sale, which would be solid proof of Mesambrie as an independent tributary.

\textsuperscript{146} See Isaac 1986, 127-28; See Flensted-Jensen and Hansen 2007, 212.
communities of the *pераia* were separately assessed through *apotaxis* ca. 422/21, it becomes even harder to assert that the Athenians sought to detach the *pераia* simply to raise revenue, albeit in a period of intense economic pressure brought on by the demands of the Peloponnesian war. Why not take of all of what was a very small revenue flow in any event? What is more, the Athenians could always have increased the Samothracian tribute burden in order to raise revenue without resorting to *apotaxis*, because the power to assess rested exclusively at their discretion. There is no indication or argument in favor of Samothrace as a ship-contributing ally at any stage so that the island was probably assessed originally, along with its dependencies, when it entered the alliance. Any changes in the assessment down to ca. 422/21 seem not to have required *apotaxis* as when the island’s tribute was known to have been reduced from 6T to 2T ca. 430/29.\(^{147}\) Athens was always guaranteed a share of the revenue derived from the Samothracian *pераia* through the island’s yearly tribute contribution. And it is very challenging to comprehend how elaborate machinations to weaken or manipulate Samothrace would have paid off, let alone compensated for the prior exertion of political energy and the resultant animosity.

Although details are lacking, Samothrace seems to have been a loyal ally of the Athenians throughout the life of the league. Thus, it is difficult to determine why the Athenians would have waited until the 420s to undermine or attack the much less powerful subject state through the type of measure that earlier scholarship has imagined. Based upon their tribute assessment, the Samothracians were rather poor compared to other allies such as Thasos, Aigina, and Rhodes, all of which sustained larger economies. The result of an aggressive Athenian effort detach (or even to confiscate) the *pераia*

\(^{147}\) *IG* I\(^1\) 281.II.16.
would have been to further weaken an already poor ally in order change the status of a small strip of territory, which was already under their hegemony indirectly through the tributary status of the island.

Instead of viewing the creation of individual payments for three communities of the *peraia* as a means of “exploiting” Samothrace, it is possible, as I argued briefly in my chapter on Erythrai, that Antiphon’s speech concerned an effort by the Samothracians to appeal to the Athenians to assess separately three of their mainland communities in order to receive a reduction of their tribute burden. Such an offer would be a powerful gesture in support of the argument of poverty. It would represent a sort of *antidosis* in which the Samothracians would have welcomed the Athenians to get more tribute out of their *peraia* by dealing directly with their dependencies, almost challenging them to do so. Unfortunately, the fragments of Antiphon’s speech do not provide sufficient material to prove this hypothesis.

Nor does the Samothracian entry appear on the fragments of the assessment decree of 422/21, where it would have provided independent evidence for the impact of the *apotaxis* on the Samothracian assessment. Addressing the reassessment of 425/24 when it has been thought that the *apotaxis* might actually have occurred, the editors of the *ATL* restored the Samothracian allotment to 15T.¹⁴⁸ That rise in assessment would be almost eight times that of Samothrace’s last surviving figure, and two and one half times the usual 6T pre-war assessment. Could that increase have compelled the Samothracians not only to enlist Antiphon to cry poverty on their behalf, but also to seek separate assessments for their dependencies? It would not be unreasonable for the reassessment to motivate a reconsideration of advantages of the three towns of *peraia*, now much more

¹⁴⁸ *IG I³* 71.III.158.
burdensome to pay tribute on behalf of. Their total tribute was assessed at 3T 3,000 dr. in 422/21, which was undoubtedly a substantial sum for the Samothracians to provide from 425/24, especially if the ATL’s restoration of the assessment of 15T for them is sound.

At the same time, it possible that *apotaxis* was initiated by the dependencies themselves. According to this hypothesis, the burden of the new assessment of 15T in 425/24 could have been viewed by Zone, Drys, and Sale as falling disproportionately upon themselves. An appeal could then have been lodged before the special court outlined in the Thudippos decree for individual assessments at lower rate than their share of the new Samothracian tribute of 15T. Although, this scenario is possible and probably occurred in other regional hegemonies throughout the league, I still prefer to view the separate assessments of the *peraia* as initiated by Samothrace considering the evidence from Antiphon’s speech.

The special court established in 425/24 that is attested in the Thudippos decree, must have been intended to hear cases like that of the Samothracians. An *apotaxis* that emerged from the process of reassessment could have been beneficial both to the Athenians and the Samothracians. By insuring the Athenians continued to receive revenue from the *peraia* and by removing a burden from the Samothracian tribute payment, *apotaxis* would have been an effective compromise in a period of stress for both the allies and the Athenians. Yet, the relationship between the communities of the *peraia* and Samothrace need not have been fundamentally altered. The taxes from the *peraia* need only have been kept separate so that the three individually assessed cities could buy their own way. Outside of the tribute assessment process, Samothrace retained
possession of its mainland dependencies and continued to function as a metropolis in many of the same ways as in earlier years.

In general, there is no evidence that the Athenians resorted to detaching, let alone confiscating, an insular ally’s *peraia* simply to increase its flow tribute revenue. Comparisons of Athenian policy toward other regional hegemonies and in particular island *peraiai* show no genuine examples of efforts to detach territory unless as consequences of a failed revolt. The Thasians lost their *peraia* as a result of a war caused by disputes with Athens over access to the goldmines and *emporia* on the Thracian coast. There is no evidence that the Athenians had originally sought to confiscate the Thasian mainland holdings in the run-up to the revolt. The Thasian *peraia* was largely returned, as I contest, by ca. 454/53. Chios and Samos retained their mainland dependencies for the entire history of the league, while Mytilene lost its possessions in the Troad only after revolt just as in the case of Thasos.149 Little is known concerning the Rhodian *peraia* in the 5th century except that some of the hypothesized possessions of the island’s cities paid tribute separately to the Athenians at various points, places which might or might not have been detached from one or the other of the Rhodian cities. Certainly, the Athenians might have assessed Loryma, Amos, and other mainland Rhodian possessions in Asia without confiscating them from the Rhodians, since we do not know how they were liberated from the Persians.

In the case of Samothrace, the island had been a consistent contributor to the league treasury, paying 6T or 2T, and there is no indication in the literary or epigraphical sources that the island rebelled or even was suspected of disloyalty in the years before 422/21. Even if Meiggs’ hypothesis were correct that Athens was motivated for economic

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149 Thuc. 3.50.3.
reasons to separate the *peraia* – however hard it may be envisage what those reasons may have been – it does not necessarily follow that Athens would have also permanently detached the communities from Samothrace. Zone, Drys, and Sale simply would have been obligated to pay a higher tribute figure though still remaining dependent on the island. Yet, as I have argued, *apotaxis* would not have been necessary to raise revenue at any point in the history of Attic hegemony.

A parallel in some respects for the *apotaxis* of the Samothracian *peraia* would be the tribute history of Erythrai and its five dependent cities in the 440s and 430s, which I believe sought to reduce its tribute burden through *apotaxis* in at least two assessment periods. Erythrai seems to have retained possession of its dependents though they paid separately to the league treasury, an indication that *apotaxis* did not lead to the confiscation of the city’s dependencies on the Mimas peninsula. In the end, one must question what advantages would have accrued to Athenians if they had sought to detach Samothrace’ *peraia* in this period as has been proposed by a number of scholars. The hypothesis that Athens stripped Samothrace of its mainland possessions in order to increase revenue is unsupported by evidence or parallel actions by the Athenians. It is only certain that by 422/21 three of the Samothracian settlements on the Thracian coast began to pay tribute individually to the league treasury. The context in power politics unfortunately remains obscure.
Chapter 6: Mytilene, Samos, and Chios

Mytilene, Samos, and Chios are usually regarded as the most powerful, and, therefore, most important allies in the Delian League. There was a tradition that the three island states were crucial in the transfer of the leadership of the naval wing of the Greek alliance to Athens from Sparta and the subsequent creation of the Delian League.\(^1\) Their contributions were certainly essential for the overall strength of the league; they counted as its most powerful members following Athens.\(^2\) The three island states were the last remaining ship-contributing allies in the league, persisting in the role long after the others had become tributaries, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Moreover, Chios, Samos, and Mytilene all had expansionist ambitions that pre-dated the league as witnessed by their possession of peraiai on the Asian mainland. The largest and arguably most important of these was the peraia controlled by Mytilene. This peraia, located across from the island in the Troad and northern Aiolis, comprised over thirteen communities which were called in antiquity the Aktaian poleis.\(^3\) Samos’ holdings were based at Anaia and at various times included the region between Anaia and Priene.\(^4\) Finally, Chios was believed to have received Atarneus in Mysia from the Persians as a reward for handing over the fugitive Lydian Pactyes.\(^5\) Atarneus remained under Chian control throughout the 5\(^{th}\)

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2 Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.2; Although Aristotle mentions the island of Lesbos in this passage and not merely Mytilene, the city was the most powerful on the island and held a significant peraia on the mainland. Thus, Mytilene will be the focus of this chapter and not the other poleis. The other poleis were subordinate in the military alliance, which contributed ships to the league fleet.
3 IG I\(^1\) 71.3.III.122-40; Thuc. 4.52.2-3; ATL 3.195-96; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1030; Constantakopoulou 2007, 240-41.
4 ATL 3.195; Shipley 1987, 30; Constantakopoulou 2007, 242-43.
5 Hdt. 1.160.4; ATL 3.195-96; Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphoppoulou-Richardson 1986, 86; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1039; Constantakopoulou 2007, 241-42.
century. It is, however, difficult to specify the extent of this *peraia* since the Chians were so successful in maintaining the regional hegemony and the Athenians down to 412 had not reason to meddle in their affairs.

Any approach to an examination of the sub-hegemonies of these three island allies must emphasize that they never became tributaries in the manner represented on the tribute lists. Although both Samos and Mytilene were subdued by the Athenians after their failed revolts, they were never reduced to the status of the tributary states required to pay annual tribute as were most of the other allies except Chios. In point of contrast, earlier in league history, after the defeat of wealthy, populous, and militarily powerful Thasos in 463/62, there was a complete change in status from a ship-contributor to a tributary.\(^6\) Thus, the unique status of Mytilene, Samos, and Chios in the alliance had a great effect on the retention and the nature of their hegemonies and Athenian policy towards them.

**Mytilene**

Since Mytilene had the largest sub-hegemony of the three islands, it will be useful to start with an examination of that city’s *peraia*. It is important to note that the Mytilenaians seem to have been the dominant state in a military alliance of the Lesbian cities, although in the later 5\(^{th}\) century Methymna was concerned about their predominance.

Mytilene seems to have turned its attention to the region of the Troad in the Archaic period. Already by the 7\(^{th}\) century the Mytilenaians had acquired a *peraia*

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\(^6\) See Robertson 1980, 71.
centered at Sigeion and Achilleion. Herodotus records fighting between the Athenians and Mytilenaians over Sigeion in the late 7th century that was begun by the Attic seizure of the city by Phrynon (5.94-95). The war ended with the Athenians being awarded Sigeion by Periander of Corinth and the Mytilenaians retaining Achilleion. Thus, early on, the Athenians had interests in controlling the approaches to the Hellespont, which conflicted with Mytilenaian aspirations in the same region. It is probable, but not certain, that the Mytilenaians gained control of what was called the Aktaian cities by the late Archaic period. The occupation of Asia Minor, however, and the subjugation of Lesbos by the Persians might have affected the growth of Mytilene’s mainland holdings to some extent. As a subject state of the Persian Empire, Mytilene participated in the invasion of Egypt in 525. However, the Mytilenaians with the rest of Lesbos participated on the rebel side during the Ionian Revolt, contributing 70 ships at Lade. The whole island of Lesbos was recaptured after the revolt. After the Persian defeat in Greece and at Mycale in 479, the Lesbians joined the Hellenic League. As noted above, the Lesbians along with the Samians and Chians played an important role in the transfer of the leadership of the Hellenic League navy to Athens and in the foundation of the Delian League. By the 5th century Mytilene had become the most important city on Lesbos, in part because of the possessions in the Troad and its sizable fleet. It is likely that the status of Mytilene as the wealthiest and most powerful Aiolian city contributed to its success in

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7 Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1026; Constantakopoulou 2007, 240 following Kontes 1978, 20 proposes that Mytilene acquired Adramyttion in the 8th century.
8 Str. 13.1.38 C 599-600; D. L. 1.74; Figueira 1991, 132-33; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1026 date the conflict to the years after ca. 620.
9 Hdt. 5.95.
10 Hdt. 3.13-14; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1026.
11 Hdt. 6.8.2.
12 Hdt. 6.31.2; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1026.
13 Hdt. 9.106.4; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1026.
14 Plut. Arist. 23.4; Meiggs 1972, 42-43.
amassing its sub-hegemony because the cities of the Akte shared this cultural affiliation (Hdt. 1.149.1-151.1).

There is little evidence before the failed revolt of 428/27 concerning the size and nature of the Mytilenaian sub-hegemony in the Troad. According to Aristotle, the Athenians permitted the Lesbians to retain their constitution and maintain control over their possessions after the league was founded.\textsuperscript{15} The privileged role that the Mytilenaians retained until 427 ensured that Athenian influence over their administration of the \textit{peraia} was probably minimal compared to the ability of Athens to influence the tributary states. The Mytilenaians’ status as a ship-contributor excluded the Athenians from receiving revenue directly or even indirectly from the cities in the \textit{peraia}. The amount of income generated from the communities under Mytilenaian control must have been substantial, as the tribute assessment list of 425/24 later reveals (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 71). This same document happens to constitute the best evidence of the size of the Mytilenaian sub-hegemony during the Delian League. Unfortunately, there is little additional evidence outside the few scattered references about the \textit{peraia} in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century in Herodotus, Thucydides, and several other writers.

The Aktaian panel in the assessment list of 425/24 records the tribute of the cities recently confiscated from Mytilene: Hamaxitos, Antandros, Achilleion, Ilion, Larisa, Ophryneion, Pordoselene, Rhoiteion, Petra, Thymbra, Kolonai, Palamedeion, and Pordoselene.\textsuperscript{16} The stone has room for one more entry so it seems that the Athenians

\textsuperscript{15} Arist. \textit{Ath. Pol.}, 24.2.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 71.III.122-40; \textit{ATL} 3.196; See Debord 1999, 266; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1030; Constantakopoulou 2007, 240-41; For a useful discussion of the location of each of the cities see Carusi 2003, 31-44.
“liberated” and then assessed 14 cities.\textsuperscript{17} The assessed amounts from the cities were considerable, totaling at least 45T, 4,000 dr. Meritt suggested that the total amount was 50T.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the \textit{peraia} could have yielded the Mytilenaians an enormous amount of income, an amount even larger than the maximum pre-war assessments (those levied from Thasos and Aigina). Furthermore, the \textit{peraia} must also have been a source of natural resources and manpower useful for the Mytilenaian navy. As stated above, Mytilene’s privileged and powerful status in the league until its failed revolt in 427 ensured a strong hold over the \textit{peraia}.

The Athenians seem to have acknowledged the historic claims that the Mytilenaians held in the Troad from the very beginning of their association and might have even endorsed further aggrandizement in the Troad and Mysia in the first decades of the alliance. The benefits accrued by the Athenians from the Mytilenaian \textit{peraia} were tangible and important for the administration of such a vast hegemony. For example, the naval forces from the Lesbians were probably invaluable for campaigns throughout the Pentekontaetia, just as they seem to have been in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. Fifty-five Lesbian and Chians ships assisted the Athenians during the Samian revolt ca. 441.\textsuperscript{19} Thucydides also records Mytilenaian participation in campaigns during the Archidamian war.\textsuperscript{20} Although the Athenians did not receive income from the Aktaian cities through regular tribute payment as in the cases of sub-hegemonies controlled by tributaries, the large naval forces partly financed by Mytilenaian-held cities in the Troad greatly enhanced Athenian power. It may well have been more efficient for the

\textsuperscript{17} Gomme 1956, 328.
\textsuperscript{18} Meritt in Shrimpton and McCargar 1981, 92.
\textsuperscript{19} Thuc. 1.116.2, 1.117.2; Diod. 12.27.4, 28.2; Meiggs 1972, 190-91; Quinn 1981, 24-25.
\textsuperscript{20} Thuc. 2.56.2, 3.3.4.
Mytilenaians to mobilize their numerous dependencies, with which they had deep cultural connections and long association than for the Athenians to assess them.\textsuperscript{21} As long as the Mytilenaians supported Athenian policy and were loyal allies, Mytilene was able to control securely their territory in the Troad and Western Mysia. In fact, there is no evidence of Athenian interference in Mytilenaian internal matters until the 420s except for the somewhat dubious claims of Mytilenaian envoys at Olympia in 428 during the revolt.\textsuperscript{22}

The Mytilenaian revolt of 428 greatly altered the relationship between this city, Athens, and the \textit{peraia}. The revolt was precipitated by the attempt of Mytilene to unify Lesbos under a synoikism.\textsuperscript{23} The Athenians were informed by the Tenedians, the Methymnians, and some \textit{proxenoi} in Mytilene of the synoikism and planned revolt.\textsuperscript{24} The Methymnians opposed the synoikism and remained loyal to Athens, while it is possible that the Tenedians, lying off the coast of the Mytilenaian \textit{peraia}, feared absorption by Mytilene.\textsuperscript{25} The Athenians did not believe the reports at first but sent a delegation to persuade the Mytilenaians to abandon the synoikism.\textsuperscript{26} Thucydides makes it clear that the Athenians were especially concerned about the disposition of the Lesbian fleet, coupled with the added pressures on them of the war and plague, which were sapping manpower and resources. Nonetheless, they dispatched forty ships to the island to persuade the Mytilenaians to abandon the project of synoikism.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{21} Figueira “Hegemonies within the Delian League” (draft).
\textsuperscript{22} Quinn 1981, 32.
\textsuperscript{23} Thuc. 3.2; Meiggs 1972, 311-12.
\textsuperscript{24} Thuc. 3.2.3.
\textsuperscript{25} Figueira, “Hegemonies within the Delian League” (draft)
\textsuperscript{26} Thuc. 3.3.1.
\textsuperscript{27} Thuc. 3.3.2.
Thucydides provides the Mytilenaian view of the revolt through a speech offered by an envoy to the Peloponnesians at Olympia.\textsuperscript{28} In the speech the Mytilenaians complain of Athenian encroachment on their autonomy and their general discontent with the treatment of the allies.\textsuperscript{29} The Mytilenaian ambassador also asserts that they had planned revolt at an earlier time and sought help from the Peloponnesians.\textsuperscript{30} No mention is made of concern for the peraia, but it is clear that the Mytilenaians viewed continued membership in league as a threat to their overall interests and ambitions. They naturally present their anxieties as reactive and defensive in nature. Yet, that the context for the revolt was a radical alteration in their favor of power relations on Lesbos suggests that a healthy degree of skepticism is owed toward the Mytilenaian argument at Olympia.

Athens’ fear and anger in response to the revolt was deep, as the debate concerning the conditions to be imposed upon the Mytilenaians after their failure reveals. At first the Athenians decided to execute the male population and enslave the women and children. However, after further debate the Athenians decided only to execute the leaders of the revolt, demolish the city walls, and confiscate the navy.\textsuperscript{31} The Athenians also divided the island into three thousand plots of land for Athenian cleruchs (except Methymna) of which three hundred were set aside for the gods and, most significantly, for our purposes detached the Aktaian cities in the Troad and Mysia from the Mytilenaians.\textsuperscript{32} The treatment of Mytilene after revolt resembles in some ways the settlement after the Thasian rebellion in 463/62.\textsuperscript{33} In both cases it seems that the

\textsuperscript{28} Thuc. 3.9-14.  
\textsuperscript{29} Thuc. 3.10.6.  
\textsuperscript{30} Thuc. 3.13.  
\textsuperscript{31} Thuc. 3.50.1.  
\textsuperscript{32} Thuc. 3.50.2; See Debord 1999, 266.
Athenians were careful to ensure that the rebel states would be unable to constitute a threat in the future. The demolition of city walls and the surrender of ships were clearly meant to weaken militarily both Thasos and Mytilene. However, there is ample evidence that the Athenians had long-standing economic interests in the region of Thrace bordering upon the Thasian *peraia*, which were the main cause of the conflict that led to revolt. For the Troad Athenian interests were limited to Sigeion which possibly contained some settlers recognized to have been Athenian in extraction.\(^\text{34}\)

The detachment of the Aktaian cities was likely a direct reaction to the revolt. The Athenians must have viewed the detachment of the *peraia* as another means to weaken Mytilene beyond the surrender of the fleet, demolition of the walls, and execution of the leaders of the rebellion. As I have argued, the Mytilenaians had monopolized the revenue from their mainland holdings by virtue of their autonomous status in the league. Thus, the confiscation of the rather wealthy cities of the *peraia* greatly benefited the Athenian treasury for the first time. As stated above, the total assessment of the Aktaian panel in 425/24, which can be restored, amounted to at least 45T 4,000 dr. The increase in revenue particularly in the midst of the pressures of the Archidamian war must have also been a major reason for the confiscation. Kallet has suggested that the Athenians might not have immediately made the Aktaian cities tributary but instead decided at first to “derive revenue in other ways”.\(^\text{35}\) Kallet bases her suggestion on Athens’ decision not to turn Lesbos into a tributary state after the subjugation of the island. She proposes that the

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34 Figueira 1991, 132-34, 141-42.
reduction of Mytilene into a tributary “would have been the expected result and one that would seem to be the best method of insuring systematic, centralized revenue”. 36

It must be noted that was not inevitable that Mytilene be reduced to a tributary. The prior settlements after the Thasian and Samian rebellion ought to be considered. Although the Thasians became tributary, the Samians never appeared on the tribute lists. They were only forced to pay an indemnity, and, therefore, do not appear on the tribute lists. 37 The major differences in the settlements in all of these major revolts by the large island states involve how the Athenians decided to draw revenue from the defeated ally. The Athenians already had the model of Samos to draw upon when they decided upon Mytilene’s fate. Thus, it was probably not inevitable that the island become a tributary state like Thasos, which appeared annually in the tribute lists. Instead, the division of the land into allotments for cleruchs and the confiscation of the peraia were the means by which revenue was to be drawn by Athens for the future. 38

At the same time, one must inquire for which reasons the Athenians would not have initially drawn tribute from the Aktaian cities, as Kallet-Marx suggests, instead choosing to import raw materials from the region or some other form of revenue. There is some evidence that the area around Mt. Ida had abundant timber and other natural resources that drew exiled Mytilenaians there in 424. 39 Yet, it is a stretch in reasoning to believe that the region was as rich in natural resources as Thrace, which contained many tributary cities, as there is no evidence for exploitation of mining. The lack of evidence of the payment of these communities on the lists immediately following their subjugation

37 Thuc. 1.117.3.
38 Thuc. 350.2-3; Figueira 1991, 252-53; See Moreno in Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009, 214.
39 Thuc. 4.52.3; See Meiggs 1982, 108, 357.
should not be considered proof that the Athenians delayed their assessment. As Kallet
acknowledges, “the tribute quota record is so spotty for these years that lack of positive
evidence does not mean much”. Therefore it seems best to follow Hornblower, who
suggested that the cities were assessed as early as 427. The Athenians might have had
no choice but to assess the cities for tribute as the best means to direct revenue to the
treasury from a region that had previously been closed to them because of Mytilene’s
status as an autonomous ally.

The Athenians seem to have been careful to retain the peraia throughout the 420s,
as epigraphical evidence indicates (cf., e.g., IG I³ 1454ter). Two fragmentary inscriptions
probably dating from the years immediately after the revolt appear to be decrees
regulating relations between Athens, the cleruchy, and the Mytilenaians. It has been
convincingly argued that IG I³ 66 is evidence that the Athenians granted autonomy back
to the now greatly weakened and unthreatening Mytilenaians. However, in the decree
the Athenians pointedly refrain from returning the Mytilenaian peraia. If this
inscription dates to shortly after the revolt, then evidence from the Aktaian panel in the
assessment decree dated to 422/21 is further proof that the Athenians refused to return the
Aktaian cities even after Mytilene regained autonomy and rehabilitated its status to an
appreciable degree. The decision not to return the peraia is significant and reveals a
concern to prevent the Mytilenaians from reacquiring a major source of revenue,
especially since the island was not reduced to the status of a tributary.

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41 Hornblower 1991, 441; See ML, 194.
44 IG I³ 66.11-13.
45 IG I³ 77.14-27.
As we shall determine concerning the Samian sub-hegemony, the Mytilenaian *peraia* became a battleground for exiled anti-Athenian elements in the years after the Lesbian revolt. Thucydides records the activities of anti-Athenian Mytilenaians operating in the Troad in the mid-420s. In 424, Mytilenaian exiles captured Rhoiteion and Antandros and had larger designs on the other Aktaian cities in order secure a base to attack Lesbos.\(^46\) It seems that the former *peraia* was now vulnerable to raids and even susceptible to limited seizure by the exiled oligarchs. Although in the end the Athenians were able to defeat the exiles and hold on to Antandros at least until ca. 411/10, perhaps the most valuable prize in the region, control of the Aktaian cities must have been a cause of some concern.\(^47\) Persian support for the exiles could have been a factor as well, and, as Thucydides notes, the exiles hired Peloponnesian mercenaries to add to other troops raised in the region. Thucydides records that in 411/10 the Antandrians expelled a Persian garrison from the city, which must indicate that Antandros was outside of the league by that period (8.108.4-5).\(^48\) The activities of the Mytilenaian exile reveal how vulnerable under Attic control were the recently detached areas of the Troad and Mysia to attack by hostile elements, who must have had allies and bases of support in local communities. The choice of the *peraia* as a theater of operations by the exiles might have been especially advantageous since many oligarchs probably had estates and dependents in the region.\(^49\) The Troad must have been a realm of exploitation for the aristocrats on Lesbos for centuries. It is important to note that even when the Athenians controlled the

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\(^{46}\) Thuc. 4.52.2-3; Meiggs 1972, 331-32; Kallet-Marx 1993, 155-56; Constantakopoulou 2007, 251.

\(^{47}\) Thuc. 4.75.1.

\(^{48}\) See Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.26 for cooperation between Syracusans and Antandrians in the fortification of city.

\(^{49}\) It must be noted that the occupation of a *peraia* by losing factions during civil strife seems to have been common by this period. See Thuc. 3.85.2 for the occupation of mainland forts by Corcyrean exiles ca. 427.
mainland cities, formerly under Mytilenaian control, the exiles seem to have used their familiarity with the region to carry on guerilla warfare.

Although there is no direct evidence, the Athenians probably retained control of most, if not all, of the peraia until the end of the Peloponnesian war. The Mytilenaians revolted for a short time in 412 but were quickly subdued by the Athenians.\(^{50}\) Lysander finally took Lesbos in 405 after Aigospotamoi.\(^{51}\) There are no complete surviving tribute lists or records of the eikostē to make it absolutely certain that the Aktaian cities were a source of Athenian revenue until Athens’ defeat in 404. Thus, some possibility remains that the Athenians returned some of cities to the Mytilenaians, those not under Spartan or Persian control, just as they had done in the case of Thasos ca. 454/53.

After the Thasians had been disarmed and weakened, the Athenians had little motivation to retain the supervision of communities that were foundations from Thasos and had maintained close ties with their mother-city. For parallel reasons, rehabilitation of the Mytilenaian sub-hegemony might have been occurred in the final two decades of the history of the league. And there indeed may be some epigraphical evidence for this hypothesis. There is a reduction roster of tributaries in the Aktaian panel from fourteen in 425/24 to eleven cities in the assessment list of 422/21.\(^{52}\) Since there are missing entries in both assessment decrees, it is difficult to determine which cities were included or excluded in the assessment of 422/21. For example, Thymbra, Kolonai, and Palamedeion are all candidates for the missing entries. Yet, it is most economical for our analysis to explain a three-tributary reduction in Aktaian panel between 424 and 421 by the return of

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\(^{50}\) Thuc. 8.22.2, 23.2; Hansen, Spencer, and Williams in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1027.

\(^{51}\) Xen. _Hell._ 2.2.5.

\(^{52}\) _IG_ I\(^1\) 77.IV.14-27: Antandros, Hamaxitos, Achilleion, Ilion (fully restored), Larisa, Ophryneion, Pordoselene, Rhoiteion, Petra (fully restored).
three communities to the Mytilenaians whose precise identification must unfortunately elude us. It is certain that, by the mid-4th century, the Mytilenaians had regained some territory in the gulf of Adramyteion.53

Samos

Like Mytilene, Samos was a powerful ship-contributing member of the Delian League until a failed revolt rendered the island a subject ally of the Athenians.54 During the early years of the Delian League, Samos seems to have been one of Athens’ closest collaborators. There is evidence that the Samians participated in the Eurymedon campaign in the 460s and the Egyptian campaign shortly after.55 Furthermore, Plutarch preserves a tradition that the Samians were the prime initiators among the allies of the transfer of the league treasury from Delos to Athens ca. 454.56 Overall, it seems that the Samians were a loyal and active ally contributing ships for campaigns until the late 440s.

As with Mytilene, the Samians controlled a peraia on the coastal plain stretching roughly from the north of Priene to Ephesos. Samos is believed to have possessed Anaia, probably Marathesion, and Pygela in the Archaic and Classical periods. Samos acquired different portions of the peraia through both conquest and territorial exchanges with other poleis.57 Like the Rhodian cities, Samos also controlled surrounding islands. The Samians had colonized the island of Amorgos sometime in the Archaic period.58

54 Thuc. 7.57.4.
55 See Dunst, 1972 no. 22 for Samian participation at Eurymedon; See ML # 34 for participation in Egypt; Shipley 1987, 110.
56 Plut. Arist. 25; Shipley 1987, 111.
57 Thuc. 3.33.2, 4.75.1; ATL 3.196; Shipley 1987, 29-34; Funke in Gabrielsen et. al. 1999, 62-63; Constantakopoulou 2007, 242-43.
58 Shipley 1987, 118; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen, 1098; Cf. Lepper 1962, 41.
origins of the acquisition of the _peraia_ were traced in antiquity to the early conflict called
the Meliac War.\(^5^9\) According to tradition, when the city of Melis was defeated and
destroyed by its neighbors ca.700, the Samians received Pygela or Anaia for the first
time.\(^6^0\) However, there is also a different tradition that, at some point in the Archaic
period, the Samians exchanged Marathesion and Thebai for Anaia and Akadamis.\(^6^1\)

Unfortunately the history and chronology of these territorial exchanges are
unclear. However, by the period of the Delian League, the Samians seem to have
controlled at least Anaia, its surrounding territory, and, probably up until the late 440s,
Marathesion.\(^6^2\) Anaia never appeared on the tribute lists. As will be discussed below,
Marathesion only began appearing as a tributary in the late 440s.\(^6^3\) The island of
Amorgos was also probably under Samian possession until 434/33 when it appears for
the first time in the tribute lists under a special rubric.\(^6^4\)

The late appearance of Amorgos can only be adequately explained on the premise
that another larger league member, such as Samos, controlled the island in previous
years. It is unlikely that the Athenians would have omitted to assess the island,
considering its rather substantial tribute of 1T and location close to Naxos, which
belonged to the league at an early date.\(^6^5\) Samos appears to be the best candidate because
of its historical ties to the island.\(^6^6\) Amorgos’ inclusion in the πόλεις αύτωι rubric in

\(^{59}\) See Vitruv. 4.1.4.

\(^{60}\) Maiandros of Miletos (FGHist 491) Fr. 1; Cf. Shipley 1987, 30; Funke in Gabrielsen _et al._ 62;

\(^{61}\) IP 37.56-59; Shipley 1987, 34; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1082.

\(^{62}\) Meiggs 1972, 428; Cf. ATL 3.204 for the possibility that Marathesion already belonged to Ephesos by the
mid-5th century and Debord 1999, 268-69.

\(^{63}\) IG I\(^1\) 269.15 (restored in the list of 443/42).

\(^{64}\) IG I\(^1\) 278.VI.10.

\(^{65}\) IG I\(^1\) 278.VI.10; See Thuc. 1.98.4 for the subjugation of Naxos.

\(^{66}\) Couch 1929, 511; Shipley 1987, 50-51, 118; Reger in Hansen and Nielsen 734; Cf. Lepper 1962, 41,
Meiggs 1972, 251 and Constantakopoulou 2007, 183-84.
434/33 seems to indicate that it was not stripped from Samos immediately after revolt. Instead, Amorgos itself seems to have sought in some way to leave Samian hegemony in exchange for direct dependency on Athens; it was not a matter of arbitrary detachment by the Athenians.\textsuperscript{67}

In general, there is little information concerning the \textit{peraia} for the first few decades of the existence of the Delian League until the circumstances surrounding the Samian revolt in 441/40. Meiggs, following Nesselhauf, proposed that the loss of Marathesion, previously under Samian hegemony, was a spur for the attack on Priene in 441/40, which led to war with Miletos and eventually Athens.\textsuperscript{68} Meiggs believed that as a consequence of the possible detachment of Marathesion by Athens, “Samos might have been tempted to try to compensate by the incorporation of Priene”.\textsuperscript{69}

Furthermore, in this period it seems that the Milesians were particularly vulnerable during a period of transition from oligarchy to an Athenian backed democracy after a failed revolt a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{70} As I argue in my chapter on the Milesian sub-hegemony, the strong reaction to the Samian attempt to possess Priene indicates that the Milesians had a recent claim to the city, which was lost either in the 460s or, more likely, in the 450s during a period of intense \textit{stasis} that resulted in the fracture of the state and loss of dependencies. Whatever its motivating factor, the Samian attack on Priene was an aggressive move to extend their mainland holdings. Priene had been a tributary of the Athenians since at least 454/53.\textsuperscript{71} It is likely that the Samian action against this city was a major reason for the Athenians decision to alter the government from an oligarchy to

\textsuperscript{67} Figueira, “Hegemonies within the Delian League” (draft)
\textsuperscript{68} Thuc. 1.115-117; Diod. 12.27.1; Plut. \textit{Per.}24-28; Meiggs 1972, 428; See Shipley 1987, 118 n. 34.
\textsuperscript{69} Meiggs 1972, 428; Marathesion first appeared in the list of 443/42 (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 290.I.28 completely restored)
\textsuperscript{70} [Xen] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3.11 (mid-440s); See Meiggs 1972, 188, 428; Gorman 2001, 236.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{1} 259.II.11.
democracy. The Athenians might have viewed the move as an overtly aggressive act against a vulnerable tributary. Shipley has suggested that the Samian move on Priene was an effort to acquire land claimed by all three cities (Miletos, Priene, and Samos) and not an attempt to possess the small city itself. However, Thucydides’ words are clear that the Samians fought Miletos “for Priene” and not just for territory along its boundaries. He seems to mean that the Samians and Milesians went to war over the possession of the city and not just to settle a land dispute between all three.

Shipley’s hesitation may stem from an unwillingness to believe that the Samians would have been so bold as to try to absorb another league member. Yet, it is not surprising that the Samians would have attempted to extend their mainland holdings at the expense of Priene with little thought of opposition from the Athenians. Samos and Priene had a long history of conflict stretching back to the Archaic period, and their disputes would last until the Hellenistic period. The attack on Priene was a bold calculation by the ruling oligarchs that they would meet little resistance from Athens considering their traditional support and their military strength, which was as great as any Aegean power. They might have judged that Athens would be acquiescent so long as the tribute from Priene was not interrupted. Thus, the aggressive action by the ruling oligarchy was consistent with our picture of a regional power extending its influence, as it had in the past, notwithstanding its membership in the Delian League.

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72 Meiggs 1972, 188 suggested that Athens opposed on principle the war between Samos and Miletos, two league members. Naturally, this might have been a complementary consideration. See Shipley 1987, 113-14.

73 Shipley 1987, 113.

74 See Thuc. 1.115.2 where the phrase περὶ Πριήνης is used.

75 A scholiast to Thucydides understood the passage to imply a conflict over the city; See Schol. Ar. Vesp. 23; Plut. Per. 25-1-3.

The Athenian reaction to the Milesian appeal was to take advantage of the offer of some Samian democrats to alter the island’s constitution in order install a more amenable government. A change in constitution seemed a solution to curb Samian ambitions and allay Athenian concerns. There has been a tendency to fold the imposition of a democracy on Samos into a general Athenian policy of promoting democracy. It is worth considering whether a democracy on Samos was not a more focused remedy to a situation where the ruling oligarchs had started a war in service of extending their mainland estates. Note that the Athenians and the Samian democrats did not dispossess the Samian oligarchs from their estates on the mainland.

The result of the Athenian intervention was the full scale rebellion by the deposed Samian oligarchs who had escaped to the peraia. Persia support was critical for the initial success of these exiles, and their ability to engineer and sustain the revolt reveals the vulnerability of mainland Asia to Persian interference long after Athenian domination of the Aegean. The exiles based at Anaia would continue to offer an active opposition to Athens until the end of the Peloponnesian war. After a difficult struggle the Athenians subdued the rebel Samians. The settlement after the revolt resulted in the surrender of the fleet, the demolition of the walls, the surrender of hostages, and the Samians agreeing to pay an indemnity for the war.

Unlike the case of Thasos in 463/62 and Mytilene later in 427, the Samians were permitted in principle to retain their mainland territory. Thucydides makes no mention of the detachment of Anaia, and the community never appeared on the tribute lists. Thus, it seems that the Athenians did not punish the Samians with the confiscation of their peraia.

77 Thuc. 1.115.4-5.
78 Thuc. 3.19.2, 3.32.2, 4.75.1, 8.61.2; Shipley 1987, 36.
79 Thuc. 1.117.3; See IG I1 48 for the oath of allegiance to Athens.
Yet it could be argued that the Samians lost Anaia in any case through the occupation of the region by exiled oligarchs. It may be possible to detect a few reasons for the Athenian decision not to confiscate Anaia. Unlike the Thasian peraia, there is no evidence that the Samian holdings on the Asian mainland had rich natural resources, nor had the Athenians ever asserted any prior claim over the Samian peraia unlike their dispute with Thasos over silver mines in the 460s. The Athenians had strong historical and mythological claims in the region of the Thasian peraia, and the revolt sprang from Thasian perceptions of Athenian aggrandizement. Therefore, the confiscation of the Thasian peraia immediately after the rebellion was a natural consequence of the rationale for the war.

As I argued above, the Mytilenaians controlled more than thirteen cities in the Troad and Mysia that returned ca. 50T in tribute in 425/24. The confiscation of the Aktaian cities both economically and politically weakened Mytilene while considerably benefiting the Athenians. The acquisition of Anaia might not have seemed very lucrative to the Athenians, or, more significantly, was not seen as a necessary means to weaken the island (if that motive were assigned the Athenians). For instance, Marathesion’s tribute never seems to have amounted to more than 3,000 dr. If Marathesion’s appearance in the tribute lists in the late 440s is proof of its detachment from the Samian peraia, as suggested by Meiggs, its loss would hardly have been felt by whole Samian community. Furthermore, Pygela’s highest tribute level was only a little more substantial at 1T 3,000 dr. in 432/31. However, we cannot even be sure whether it was Samian previously:

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80 Thuc. 1.100.2.
81 IG I¹ 270.1.6.
Pygela might have earlier belonged to Ephesos or could have been entirely autonomous. Thus, the Samian mainland was just not as extensive or as profitable as the peraiai of other large island states such as Thasos or Mytilene.

Instead, the importance of the Samian peraia was much more limited to its agricultural potential that was mainly exploited by the elite. It lacked abundant mineral wealth or substantial trade. The strong connection of the aristocrats with the peraia was a key reason why the exiled oligarchs operated so easily at Anaia in the decades after the revolt. Anaia was a moot factor in Attic policy, because, as mentioned above, the Athenians were unable to assess and draw tribute from there once the exiles took firm control (as Thucydides’ narrative seems to indicate). Even if we imagine that the Athenians wanted to weaken post-rebellion Samos, they would scarcely have earned gratuitous opprobrium for confiscating a place the Samians could not use anyway. Whatever the reasons, the Samians kept at least a nominal hold of a sub-hegemony immediately after full-scale revolt and subjugation by Athens (unlike Thasos and Mytilene). After a popular uprising on Samos against the ruling oligarchy in 412 and winning autonomy from the action, the island remained a loyal ally until the final defeat in 404. Anaia likely remained at least a nominal dependency throughout this period, though controlled by exiles as late as 411.

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82 IG I 280.1.47; See ATL 3.204 n. 48; Debord 1999, 268.
83 Shipley 1987, 36.
84 Thuc. 8.21; Xen. Hell. 2.2.6.
85 Thuc. 8.61.2; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1063.
Chios

Chios seems to have controlled the smallest *peraia* of the three large autonomous islands. Nevertheless, the Chians were a significant military power rivaling, if not surpassing, both Samos and Lesbos throughout the 5th century. The Chians contributed 100 ships to the Ionian side at the battle of Lade in 494, which was the most of any ally. Like Lesbos, there is little evidence of Chian activity in the Delian League until the Samian revolt when the island supported the Athenians with its substantial navy. However, it is probable that like the Samians the Chians contributed forces to the league fleet throughout the Pentekontaetia. For example, Plutarch records a tradition that Chios persuaded Phaselis to join the league during the Eurymedon campaign in the mid-460s. The Chians were also notably active in aiding Athens in campaigns during the Peloponnesian war. The Chians participated along with the Lesbians in the campaign with Athens in the Peloponnese in 430. In 425, the Chians contributed at least four ships at Pylos.

In general the Chians seem to have been especially loyal among Athens’ allies until the Sicilian disaster, unlike both the Samians and Mytilenaians who had attempted revolts much earlier in 441/40 and 428. Yet, there is evidence that the Athenians became wary of Chian behavior during the early years of the Peloponnesian war. In 425 the Athenians commanded the Chians to demolish a new city wall fearing possible

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86 Constantakopoulou 2007, 241-42.
87 Hdt. 6.15.1; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1065.
88 Thuc. 1.116.2
89 See Barron in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 94.
90 Plut. Cim. 12.3-4; See IG I 10 for legal arrangements between Phaselis and Athens in the mid-5th century; Barron in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 94.
91 Thuc. 2.56.2.
92 Thuc. 4.13.2.
Athenian fears after the recent Mytilenaian revolt has been suggested as the main motivation for the injunction. However, it is likely that the Chians were not seriously contemplating revolt but the recent experience with Mytilene probably concerned the Athenians enough to take precautions. In this period there was already pro-Spartan sentiment among the Chians, but pro-Peloponnesian influence at this time does not seem to have been great. An inscription, which is believed to record the contributions of Spartan war effort ca. 427, mentions Chian allies of the Spartans. The inscription has been connected to the Spartan Admiral Alcidas’ expedition to Ionia in order to aid Mytilene in 427. It is not surprising that there were pro-Spartan Chians in an island governed by a “moderate constitution”, which implies that there was scope for pro-Spartan elements. It is important to note that at this stage Chios was still loyal as the execution of Chian prisoners by Alcidas indicates (Thuc. 3.32.2-3). The Chians eventually revolted in 412 only after the Athenian disaster in Sicily did they become the major Spartan ally in the east Aegean. Thucydides even considered their revolt a prudent decision.

The Chian holdings on the mainland centered on the territory around Atarneus in Western Mysia. According to Herodotus, the Chians received Atarneus in exchange for

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93 Thuc. 4.51.  
95 Meiggs 1972, 359; Quinn 1981, 40; Figueira 1993, 310 suggests that there were small grounds to suspect the Chians of rebellion.  
96 See ML 67, line 8; Meiggs 1972, 312; Quinn 1981, 40; Barron in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 101.  
97 Thuc. 3.29; Barron in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 101.  
100 Thuc. 8.24.4-5.  
101 Hdt. 1.160.3-4, 8.106.1; [Skylax] 98. See Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson 1986, 86; Debord 1999, 267; Funke in Gabrielsen 1999, 64; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1043 suggests that the Chians might have also possessed Karene but is not sure; Constantakopoulou 2007, 241-42.
handed over the Lydian fugitive Pactyes to the Persians (1.160.3-4). One may assume that this was a confirmation of traditional rights in the area. Atarneus lay just south of the Mytilenaian holdings. Atarneus likely provided the Chians with fertile agricultural land as the region of Anaia did for the Samians. The distance between Chios and its peraia was unusual and has attracted attention of scholars. Funke, followed by Constantakopoulou, has suggested that the presence of large and powerful Ionian states opposite Chios like Erythrai, with whom the Chians had collided more than once, forced them to expand so far north of the island. Given the number of significant cities that lay on the coast between Erythrai and Atarneus this suggestion is quite reasonable. Roebuck proposed that the Chians originally paid a “small tribute” to the Persians for the city.

There is little evidence before 409/08 for Atarneus. In that year the Spartan admiral Cratesippidas restored exiled pro-Spartan oligarchs and effected the banishment to Atarneus of what appears to have been an oligarchic faction less supportive of the Spartans, which probably included members of the pro-Athenian elite. Diodorus reports that around 600 were exiled. The seizure of Atarneus by the moderate oligarchs is similar to the activities of the exiled Mytilenaians in the Troad and Samians at Anaia. Once again the peraia of a state in stasis became a base for oligarchic partisans. However, in this case it was a pro-Spartan group controlling the island that was the target. The parallel situations at Mytilene and Samos suggest that among the ranks of the Chian moderates were those with strong connections to Atarneus. This group of oligarchs

102 [Skylax] 98; ATL 3.196.  
103 Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphoppoulou-Richardson 1986, 86.  
104 Funke in Gabrielsen 1999, 64; Constantakopoulou 2007, 242.  
105 Roebuck in Boardman and Vaphoppoulou-Richardson 1986, 86.  
106 Diod. 13.1.65; Meiggs 1972, 362-63; Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1069.
must have had knowledge of the place and support awaiting them there, possibly from dependents on estates and clients in the local population. Atarneus seems to still have been held by exiles in 398/97.\textsuperscript{107}

In general Atarneus seems to have functioned as an agricultural region to be exploited by wealthy Chians. In times of political unrest Atarneus became a natural place of refuge for the losing side in elite faction fighting. Unfortunately, if there was an Athenian policy toward Atarneus, it has left no trace in our sources. As with Mytilene and Samos, the Athenians must have conceded Atarneus as a Chian possession from the very beginning of the league and recognized some benefits in continued Chian possession.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, Atarneus was off-limits to assessment as long as Chios was an autonomous ally.

\textit{Conclusion}

The sub-hegemonies of the large autonomous islands were similar in some important ways to those of tributary states. Elites throughout the league benefited from the available land and other inherited privileges that accrued from the possession of dependencies. However, the autonomous status of Mytilene, Chios, and Samos ensured that they monopolized the revenue from their dependencies unlike tributary states. The revenue and manpower generated from the \textit{peraiai} varied to differing degrees. The largest and wealthiest hegemony belonged to Mytilene. Fourteen cities in the Troad were listed in the assessment decree of 425/24 assessed at ca. 50T. The wealth and resources generated from the Aktaian cities made Mytilene a great Aegean power. Yet, one may note that the Mytilenaians were still unable to match Athenian power, as the revolt of

\textsuperscript{107} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.2.11; See Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1065.
\textsuperscript{108} Arist. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 24.2.
428/27 revealed, even with Athens beset by the Peloponnesian war. As one consequence of the revolt the Athenians confiscated the *peraia*, a step taken to both weaken Mytilene and aid the Athenian treasury. There is no evidence that the Athenians or Mytilenaians had been in conflict over the *peraia* during the period of the Delian League. In fact, there is every reason to believe that the Athenians recognized Mytilenaian possession of the *peraia* and benefited from the support of the city’s fleet that was partly financed from the Aktaian cities themselves.

Further south Samian ambitions on the mainland were not historically as strong as those of Mytilene. The region of Anaia seems to have been the center of the *peraia* by the period of the Delian League. Like Mytilene, Samos’ status in the league meant that the island was free to monopolize the resources of the *peraia*. Thus, revenue generated from Anaia and surrounding territory did not find its way into the Athenian treasury. At the same time, Samian ambitions seem not to have been hindered by its membership in the league. The attack on Priene is evidence that the ruling oligarchy felt free to enlarge the *peraia* at the expense of a smaller tributary state. The Athenian reaction was an expression of concern and then an attempt to alter the Samian government when the opportunity presented itself, but not outright war. Only after the Athenians miscalculated and provoked the oligarchs did the Samians rebel. Yet, after the failed revolt the Athenians did not confiscate Anaia or any other territory under Samian control. There is no surviving entry of Anaia on the tribute lists and Thucydides does not mention the detachment of the *peraia* as a consequence of revolt. However, one must consider as well that oligarchic control of Anaia might have been the reason why the city never appeared on the lists as being beyond the reach of Athenian assessors. After the revolt, the
Athenians seem to have been satisfied declare further expansion of the peraia, at least, toward Priene and Miletos, out of bounds.

The island of Amorgos, which Samos likely settled and continued to possess until the 430s, was listed in a special rubric in 434/33. The inclusion of Amorgos under this rubric over five years after the subjection of Samos implies that the Athenians did not detach the island as a consequence of revolt.\(^{109}\) In fact, Amorgos’ inclusion in the special rubric indicates that the island initiated to some degree its entry into the league as a tributary state. The reasons for Amorgos’ move are obscure, but it had the likely result of terminating its dependency from Samos. Athens’ role in Amorgos’ move is also unclear. It is probable that the Athenians had been receiving some revenue from Samos’ dependencies after 439 indirectly through the islands’ annual indemnity payments. Thus it seems that Amorgos’ new status as independently assessed tributary was a means to distance itself from a Samos still recovering from the effects of the revolt and should not be seen as a victim of Athenian confiscation.\(^{110}\)

Finally, the history of the Chian peraia centered at Atarneus during the period of the Delian League is less well known. Atarneus lay south of the Aktaian cities in Western Mysia. Until the ca. 409, it seems that the Chians continued to possess the city and surrounding territory free from Athenian interference as an important and loyal ally. As in the Mytilenaian and Samian peraia, Atarneus became the home of exiles during a period of stasis. In this case, it was not anti-Athenian oligarchs who found refuge on the mainland. Instead, it has been plausibly suggested that the Chian exiles were moderate oligarchs opposed to the harsh pro-Spartan regime. Atarneus subsequently became a base

\(^{109}\) See Meiggs 1972, 251.

\(^{110}\) Figueira “Hegemonies within the Delian League” (draft)
for attacks against the ruling government on the island and thus a collaborator with the Athenians. Throughout the life of the Delian League Chios was free to control Atarneus as long as it was an autonomous ally. The revolt and interference of Sparta had the unintentional consequence of separating the *peraia* from the island.
Conclusion

This project has attempted to grapple with many issues surrounding Athenian imperialism and the status of the allies in the Delian League, particularly regarding the tribute system. It is clear that the allied states controlled hegemonies of varying sizes and natures throughout the course of the Delian League. I have mainly focused on the larger regional hegemonies both insular and littoral for which there is some surviving evidence. Miletos and Erythrai controlled dependent communities, which in the case of the Erythraiians were small *poleis* on the Mimas peninsula. Miletos possessed the island group represented or headed by Leros, the non-*polis* settlement of Teichioussa, and until the mid-450s probably Priene and Pidasa. The large insular allies controlled *peraiai* on the Asian and Thracian coasts. There is strong evidence that the three large Rhodian *poleis* held the region known in tribute lists as the Karian Chersonesos as a *peraia* and surrounding islands including, Chalke, Karpathos, and Syme, along with numerous smaller settlements on the island itself during the period of the Delian League. Although the Euboian cities are not known to have possessed coastal portions of Boiotia or nearby islands in the 5th century, the large cities dominated smaller communities on the island, some of which were probably *poleis*. The most famous *peraia* in the 5th century might have been Thasos’ in coastal Thrace, while Samothrace founded at least four small settlements in the Archaic period east of the Thasian possessions. Finally, Mytilene, Chios, and Samos all held territory including *poleis* on the coast of Asia Minor. The Mytilenaian hegemony contained at least fourteen cities in the Troad and Western Mysia by the early 420s.
Beyond the well-attested hegemonies that were the main focus of this study, there were other hegemonies that existed throughout the league. As I have stated, in most cases, there is little surviving evidence for most regional hegemonies. The origins of most, if not all, of these sub-hegemonies seem to lie in the Archaic period. The evidence indicates that the large island states entered the league in the early 470s with their mainland possessions. Although conditions in Thrace might have been chaotic because of the Persian presence that was finally terminated by Cimon and the league fleet, it is contended here that Thasos and Samothrace first took possession of a *peraia* shortly after colonization. There is nothing to indicate that the Persians detached the *peraiai* from the two islands after their subjugation. It is also likely that Erythrai and Miletos controlled their later dependencies before their entry into the Delian League. The attested possession of sub-hegemonies by the two cities in the 450s and 440s should be understood as reflective of that historical control. In the case of Miletos, the result of the Persian destruction of the city in 494 probably terminated direct control over Leros, Teichioussa. In the early years of the Delian League, Miletos seems to have re-acquired dependent territory which was then lost in the civil unrest that rocked the city in the late 450s. As a consequence of the Persian destruction, Leros and Teichioussa probably retained a level of autonomy that lasted throughout the 5th century, but were still part of a Milesian hegemony that was firmly reconstituted ca. 450.

The examples of Miletos and Erythrai, and even Thasos are instructive for the expansion and acquisition of regional hegemonies in the years after the foundation of the alliance. Revolt and *stasis* were capable of disrupting regional hegemonies producing temporarily or even permanently independent communities. Yet, it seems that the
resumption of control over formerly dependent territory was often an eventual sequel to the suppression of revolt and *stasis* for the large tributary states. Athens seems to have permitted and recognized the historical claims of Miletos, Erythrai, and even Thasos after its rebellion.

It is important to emphasize the possible reasons for the initial expansion and reacquisition of regional hegemonies after disruptions, and, in particular, to note the cases of allies that joined as tributaries or converted to that status. Elites in the larger states might have been permitted to retain or acquire small dependencies as a means to facilitate their entry into the league. It is conceivable that in many places, like Karystos, acceptance of Athenian hegemony was not welcome even when Attic imperialism had not yet become as heavy-handed as it would become in later years. The demand for ships and tribute would have particularly affected aristocrats, who traditionally favored autonomy even under Persian domination, as the Ionian Revolt revealed. The continuance of inherited political and religious prerogatives guaranteed by Athens might have been a powerful incentive for their acquiescence in Athenian leadership.

Moreover, as I have argued, tributaries were not free to monopolize the control or revenue accruing from sub-hegemonies. Thus, there must have been other factors militating in favor of the retention of regional hegemonies that survived reduction to tributary status. States such as Samothrace, Torone, and Erythrai probably still benefited economically from their dependencies, even though these communities were required to furnish tribute to the Athenians. In other words, the cost-benefit analysis for the tributary ally favored the continued possession of a regional hegemony. For the non-tributary allies this calculation was different. Aristotle recorded a tradition in which the Athenians
permitted the Lesbians, Samians, and Chians to retain their dependencies when the alliance was founded.\footnote{Arist. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 24.2.} Since no revenue had to be directed to Athens from regions under the control of these islands, the elites enjoyed uninterrupted possession of estates on the mainland while Athens received naval contributions and was released from the burden of assessing dozens of communities in Asia. In a sense, the possession of a traditional hegemony, free from interference from Athens, was indicative of the special status of Mytilene, Samos, Chios, and Thasos (before 463).

In this study I have attempted to define some basic characteristics of the tributary processes of \textit{syntely} and \textit{apotaxis}. These statuses reflect both unions of peer tribute payers, and, in other cases, are hegemonic relationships. Generally, there is little evidence to suggest that the unions among peer communities signified more than temporary arrangements for the purpose of paying tribute. Although historical ties were probably important in the decision to merge tribute payments, the temporary nature of most \textit{syntelies} indicates that they were formed mainly as administrative convenience in tribute collection and payment. Moreover, it is not clear that \textit{apotaxis} among tributary groups headed by a \textit{syntely}-‘head’ always had the effect of terminating dependency, even in the instances where \textit{syntely} previously signified a regional hegemony. Thus, the argument offered by many scholars that the Athenians pursued \textit{apotaxis} to weaken or somehow exploit the allies is mostly unfounded. Instead, the significance of \textit{syntely} and \textit{apotaxis} seems to have been mainly confined to the tribute system. These processes were means of managing the payment of tribute in ways that were meant to benefit both sides: maximization of tribute for Athens without bankrupting the allies. The differing levels of
assessment visible on the tribute lists that attended changes in syntely and apotaxis indicate that tribute levels could be dependent on these statuses. As Lepper noted almost fifty years ago, apotaxis tended to lead to lower tribute assessments while syntely led to the opposite result. It is my contention that the hegemonic states throughout the league often employed apotaxis as a means of reducing their tribute levels. The shedding of dependencies would have removed burdensome components of the state that were subsequently required to furnish tribute on their own. The drop in tribute assessments in periods of apotaxis for many groups of tributaries should not be considered coincidental.

Unfortunately, much of the tribute system is still mysterious. Surviving contemporary literary or epigraphic sources do not address explicitly the issue of changes in tribute statuses. However, my hypothesis on the initiation of apotaxis by allies is based upon the tribute histories of Samothrace, Erythrai and Karystos. These states experienced apotaxis that seem not to have terminated their regional hegemonies. There is no indication that Athens sought to weaken these states through the detachment of their dependent communities. The Athenians had more effective means at their disposal to control the allies. Thus, economic or fiscal motives must have been at play, which forced changes in tribute arrangements between these cities and their smaller dependencies. In the end, most products of the process of apotaxis were tiny communities that offered little financial or strategic advantage to the Athenians.

At the same time, apotaxis could be initiated by the small dependencies in a regional hegemony. Lepper had suggested this possibility, but did not provide further elaboration. The special rubrics of 430s contain many small states, most of which belonged to larger allies in previous years. Lepper’s heroic effort to argue that all of these
communities were new entries into the empire is unconvincing. Even one exception to his argument would indicate that both new entries and cases of *apotaxis* were included together in the rubrics. I suggest that the Diakres apo Chalkideon, Amorgos, Gale, and Sarte were separated through *apotaxis* and placed under the rubrics. Moreover, the small Bottiaian cities in the rubrics must have been separated from Spartolos, which was clearly the most important city in Bottike. Just as hegemonic states could initiate *apotaxis* to reduce tribute burdens, dependencies could have also appealed for direct assessment if continued membership in a *synetly* was considered overly oppressive or expensive. It must be noted that individual assessment by the Athenians need not have terminated dependency on a regional hegemonic state except in the cases of ship-contributors. These special categories indicate that the small communities themselves or private Athenian citizens played important roles in enrolling lesser member states. Although it is not clear how the processes occurred, I would suggest that the ἰδιῶται were private Athenian citizens possibly *proxenoι* of the small states that were approached to initiate or aid in allied appeals for individual assessment. It is difficult to imagine that private foreigners somehow enrolled their communities and were then credited for their role on important Athenian state documents like the quota lists.

An integral component of the decisions either to form or retain a *synetly* or to separate into individual tributaries must have been the role of the local guarantors of tribute. The participation was either prescribed or, more probably, reaffirmed by the decree of Kleonymos in 426 (*IG I³* 68). Responsibility for tribute that was formerly in hands of guarantors in hegemonic cities might have fallen to the prominent men in these small communities which had now come under the obligation to furnish tribute directly to
Athens. Although it is not clear how the process of raising tribute in a syntely actually worked, new responsibilities for collecting and guaranteeing tribute must have created new dynamics among groups of tributary states. From fragments attributed to Antiphon, the guarantors seem to have been members of local elites that must have had influence in the decision to seek or accept individual assessment.

Another difficult question concerns the reasons that some small states were entered on the quota lists as or often called syntelies while others were not. For example, Erythrai’s dependencies were listed as early as the second assessment period while Thasos’ colonies in Thrace (except for Neapolis, Berga, and Galepsos) never appeared on the lists. It could be argued that entry on the tribute lists was indicative of a higher status. According to this hypothesis, Erythraian Boutheia enjoyed a level of autonomy that other small states like Thasian Stryme did not. The Erythraian dependencies did receive independent assessment in various periods, which does indicate that they had the capacity to furnish tribute on their own. However, some communities like Leros, Teichiousa, and the Oiai on Rhodes appeared and disappeared on the lists for reasons which are not obvious. Thus establishing any “rule” concerning the nature of small dependencies based on their listing by the Athenians is difficult. It is fair to say that in some cases places like Boutheia or the Oiai might have had greater “independence” or even importance than the others that were never listed like Orobiai and Dystos on Euboia, but the issue is not entirely clear.

In my analysis the most important factors that dictated the acquisition, retention, and re-acquisition of sub-hegemonies in the league were local conditions. No source indicates that the Athenians sought to dissolve the large hegemonies as a matter of
general policy, unless as a consequence of war or rebellion in notable cases. The example of Thasos is especially illustrative. The existence of sub-hegemonies and syntelies throughout the history of the league should leave no doubt that there was no uniform policy of apotaxis pursued by the Athenians whether to raise revenue or “weaken” an ally. On its own, apotaxis would not have done much to enhance Athenian control over the tributary states in the alliance. Short of installing garrisons, planting political officials, and supporting pro-Athenian locals, it is difficult to see how apotaxis could have been an effective method of control. Moreover, the re-direction of tribute from a small dependency directly to Athens must not have been as serious an economic blow to a regional hegemonic city as envisioned by scholars since these large tributaries were not free to monopolize the revenue drawn from their hegemonies anyway. The true economic effects of apotaxis on these groups of tributaries requires more exploration. The difference in revenue between syntely and apotaxis on a hegemonic state is mostly difficult to determine. However, the loss of income because of the redirection of tribute to Athens was mitigated by the fact that these large cities had always been responsible for their dependencies and could now receive a lower assessment as a consequence of apotaxis.

As stated above, the most fruitful line of research for this project in the future is to examine further the local economic and political conditions in the league that determined so much of the different tributary statuses that were available to the allies. In particular, the role of elites in the allied states must be emphasized and further examined since it is their interests that often dictated relations with Athens and the specific behavior of their polis. Only then can a more complete picture of the Delian League be formed, which de-
emphasizes the crude focus on Athenian imperialism that has dominated so much of the scholarship.
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