THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN CHANGING ATTITUDES AND POLICY

DECISIONS REGARDING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

by

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A thesis submitted to the
Graduate School-New Brunswick
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of
Master of Science
Graduate Program in Psychology

Written under the direction of
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New Brunswick, New Jersey

May, 2010
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Role of Propaganda in Changing Attitudes and Policy Decisions Regarding Illegal Immigrants

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This research explored the ability of hate-speech propaganda to influence attitudes about illegal immigrants and the willingness to support harsh anti-illegal immigrant policies, and the roles of Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) in mitigating these effects. Participants included 324 Rutgers University undergraduates enrolled in introductory social psychology classes. Results indicate that generally, exposure to negative propaganda messages lead to more negative attitudes about illegal immigrants. Results also indicate that RWA and SDO moderated the effects of negative propaganda, such that: high RWA/SDO individuals expressed the most negative attitudes and policy support, while low RWA/SDO individuals showed almost no difference after viewing negative propaganda. The predictive capabilities of RWA/SDO, general trends in perceptions of illegal immigrants and strengths/weaknesses of propaganda messages are discussed.
Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Lee Jussim, for his guidance, support and abundant enthusiasm. Through his passion for this research, he has been a continuing source of inspiration and encouragement in my growth as a researcher. I would also like to thank my committee members: Dr. David Wilder and Dr. Daniel Ogilvie, for their flexibility and insight during this process. Many thanks also go to the research assistants in the Social Perception Lab for their contributions to the study and data entry. Finally, I would like to thank Matt for his tireless support and patience, (not to mention the countless drafts he has edited), as I work to achieve my dreams.
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Introduction and Background

What leads people, even large groups of people, to participate willingly in genocide and mass murder? In the quest to understand the basis for individual support and action in violent mass movements, it still remains unclear exactly what patterns of attitude formation and change may be driving actions. Are we looking at something particularly unusual, or do these changes still lie in the realm of the well-studied patterns of attitudes and behavior? Putting it differently, do seemingly normal individuals adopt murderous ideology in the same way that they would adopt more benign ideologies?

Previous research into how and why individuals may support or even participate in methodical violence have included a variety of contributing situational and individual factors: the roles of power and obedience (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 1969), individual factors such as authoritarianism and social dominance (Altemeyer, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), qualities of the movement leaders (Prince, 1915; Post, 2004) and even the choice of and experiences of victims (e.g. Leon, G.R, et al., 1981; Kaslow, 1999, Ben-Zur & Zimmerman, 2005). Although these have allowed glimpses into the complexity of the matter, the exact processes by which individuals incorporate particularly poisonous beliefs remains hazy. Since propaganda is so often implicated in the process of pushing normal people to violence, this exploration will address what types of messages have the greatest ability to incite the types of hatred and fear which are often associated with violence. The main goal of this research is to answer two key questions: is exposure to hate-filled propaganda sufficient to cause people to express more hateful and violent attitudes? And how does this change in attitude relate to decisions to support a variety of retaliatory policies?
Explaining the unexplainable: The normal person’s capacity for harm-doing

World War II left in its wake mass confusion and disbelief. How could it be that entire groups of people were exterminated under the watchful eye of the western powers? Those involved invoked a variety of responses to this question: they were brainwashed, they feared for their lives, or they- like Adolf Eichmann pleaded- were simply following orders. Each of these responses reveals potential routes for understanding what went wrong, and provided researchers an avenue to uncovering some method to the madness.

In an effort to explore the role of power and situation structure, Zimbardo (1969) devised an experiment involving the fabrication of a prison atmosphere. Participants were placed randomly in either the role of prisoner or guard and with little instruction, enacted the behaviors they felt fit these roles. What quickly emerged was an explosive demonstration of the sway of power in intergroup situations. In this case, position was enough to evoke atypically sadistic behaviors in the guards, produce in participants a sense of duty to their placement and very real feelings of fear in the inmates. The intensity with which the participants took to these roles was enough to necessitate early termination of the experiment.

Focusing specifically on the issue of obedience, Milgram’s (1974) studies asked participants to take on the role of teacher in what they were told was an experiment on how punishment affected memory. Believing that they were delivering electric shocks to another participant who expressed greater and greater discomfort, it became clear that even under feelings of great duress, individuals would follow instructions if they felt the situation warrants it. Put more basically, if they felt their position in the experiment necessitated it. Again, the capacity for the average participant to engage in behaviors that
have harmful outcomes for others exceeds expectations and the results extend beyond what could merely be a few particularly sadistic individuals.

This research is perhaps the clearest window into some the catalysts and drivers of harmful behavior, but neither Milgram nor Zimbardo directly approaches the role of ideology in eliciting specific behaviors against a certain group or individual (in these cases, the prison guards versus the prisoner or the participant “teacher” versus the “learner” or experimenter). Each of these circumstances shows that normal individuals can, even in an ideological vacuum, have the capacity to inflict harm. Though helpful, this does not accurately reflect the sorts of movements that seem to occur throughout the world. Large-scale mass murder, in the forms it generally takes, does not appear ex nihilo. History, in the areas where violence emerges, is generally rife with generations of hate-filled propaganda, fueling a long-simmering tension between groups. Authorities wishing to escalate conflict need only make use of these longstanding tensions and with the right ideological message, they have their willing executioners. This was true for the Nazis. It was true for the Ottoman Turks, Stalin and the Khmer Rouge.

While ideology was not directly addressed by Milgram, a window into understanding the “why” of participant actions comes from some of the interviews conducted after experimental trials were complete. In subsequent interviews with participants, Milgram (1974) found that quite often, individuals, who had followed the protocol to deliver electric shocks to their fellow participant, to a point where they thought they were harming them, indicated that they felt that there was something wrong with their behaviors. Essentially, they had continued with their behaviors despite some acknowledgement that this was not a manner in which they wanted to act in or would
normally engage in their day-to-day existence. Most indicated that they felt obligated to act because they believed it was in their role as participant to do what follow the experimenter’s instructions. Those who were able to justify their actions were generally only capable of doing so by transferring the responsibility into the hands of those they deemed to have been in control. Although it was not the original intent of this research, the role of attitude begins to emerge, as a facet of the complex web of behavioral justification, and as a potential source of force, propelling action.

*Propaganda, Attitudes and Action*

In many ways, propaganda messages have the capacity to fill this ideological void for actors in violent movements. Propaganda, for the purposes of this research, includes information/ideas propagated with the intent to help or harm persons, groups, movements/institutions, etc. In the case of violent mass movements, propaganda messages serve two purposes: to persuade people into believing that certain actions against particular targets are not only acceptable, but crucial to their group’s success, and that actions taken under the guise of obedience or role requirement are actually the result of individual choice associated with positive ingroup beliefs or a sense of duty to ones group. Understanding when hate-speech and propaganda are most effective offers a clearer picture of why individuals in violent movements act in ways they would not normally consider.

To begin to assess the effects of propaganda on attitudes toward specific groups and events, Altemeyer (1996) devised a series of experiments that involved exposing groups of participants to a variety of hate literature and measured their resulting attitude changes. In the first of the series of studies, participants were pre-tested for their belief
that the Holocaust had, in fact, occurred. Then, at a later date, half were exposed to Holocaust denial literature and their attitudes were retested. The denial literature took the form of an account given by a German officer who claimed the atrocities documented at Auschwitz did not occur, and portrayed the location as somewhat pleasant.

Despite its extraordinarily dubious source, the hate literature succeeded in increasing the extent to which the students doubted that the Holocaust had happened. This was a relatively small shift in beliefs, from a generally strong belief the Holocaust occurred as history documented it to a more neutral/questioning stance. Subsequent research showed that accounts of the horrors of the Holocaust from far more credible sources (such as survivors) mostly failed to undermine the newly emerging doubts about the Holocaust instilled by the essay by the German officer. That a document of questionable origins has the power to persuade beliefs about an event as well-documented and discussed as the Holocaust is truly a frightening prospect.

The second two installments in this series (Altemeyer, 1996) focused on attitudes about two modern target groups: homosexuals and feminists. These groups were selected because they have both been at the center of public controversy and because social norms do not inhibit expressions of negative attitudes towards them. Following similar protocol to the Holocaust studies, the same sort of pattern emerged; those exposed to hate filled propaganda espoused more negative attitudes toward the target group of the propaganda. Again, these attitude changes showed resistance to interventions in the form of positive or neutral (fact-based) messages, and were even independent of the perception of experimenter bias (i.e. patterns did not change even when participants were given an indication of the experimenter’s own pro-gay and pro-feminist attitudes). Though further
replication is necessary, these studies speak for the potentially persuasive capability of propaganda, even when the exposure is brief, provided by manifestly dubious sources, or countered by information from more credible sources.

What remains unclear, though, are how particular situational factors, choice of target groups and individual personality traits might exacerbate or inhibit this effect. Are certain people more susceptible to certain types of propaganda or does propaganda have the capability to incite violent and hateful beliefs about other groups?

**Contributing Personality Factors: Authoritarianism and Social Dominance**

Two of the most well researched individual characteristics predicting obedience and discrimination have been authoritarianism and social dominance (Altemeyer, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Right-Wing Authoritarianism is characterized by beliefs that those in power have the right to their position, and that these leaders should be followed. Presently, measurements of this characteristic rely heavily on what is known as the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale or RWA (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). This scale is comprised of items that ask participants to gauge their level of agreement/disagreement with particular value statements, such as:

“Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.”

“The *real* keys to the ‘good life’ are obedience, discipline and sticking to the straight and narrow.”

“It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal, proper appearance is still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady.”

Each item addresses a particular aspect of the basic beliefs that traditional ways are what’s best for the group, and that it is the role of the individual to support leadership which best maintains this goal. These items have been shown to have an inter-item
correlation of .18, with a resulting alpha of around .85 in the populations used to devise and test the scale (Altemeyer, 1996). Scores on the RWA are also shown to highly correlate with measures of religiosity, political conservatism and prejudice toward minorities. In his test of the effects of hate literature, Altemeyer (1996) found that, in general, those high on RWA (i.e. more authoritarian) showed greater doubt about the Holocaust and more discriminating attitudes towards homosexuals/feminists those who scored low (i.e. less authoritarian) on the RWA scale. What’s more, these discriminatory attitudes persisted even in conditions where participants were exposed to intervention materials (i.e. information about the Holocaust, and pro-feminist or pro-gay literature). More recently, RWA scores have been shown to predict attitudes towards such issues as human rights restrictions during the “War on Terror” (Crowson, DeBacker & Thomas, 2005).

Social dominance, by contrast, deals more heavily with perceptions about the overall social structure as opposed to individual beliefs. Where RWA is heavily associated with conservatism, both political and social, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is rooted more heavily in the area of power structure and hierarchy maintenance. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) proposed SDO as a supplement to the existing RWA scale and as a means of building upon Social Identity Theory; which posits that individuals will express prejudice on the basis of group identity, particularly when these identities are clear and salient, and will generally do so in a manner that favors the higher status group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Similar to the RWA scale, SDO is composed of value statements about group status, asking individuals to show their level of agreement. Items include:
“Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.”

“In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.”

“It is ok if some groups have more of a chance in life than others”

The scale has shown an overall reliability of about .8. Where RWA tends towards broader social conservatism, SDO is more closely associated with the degree to which individuals support the existing social hierarchy breakdown of “dominant” and “subordinate” groups. For this reason, it is highly correlated with ideologies involving racism, sexism and fiscal conservatism.

A close association with social rigidity and prejudice make high levels of both RWA and SDO particularly pernicious in social circumstances involving intergroup tension. Couple these tendencies with threatening social forces and be prepared to witness a sudden jump towards group defensiveness. In a study addressing the RWA and SDO levels of participants pre- and post-9/11, Nagoshi, et al. (2007), discovered that a salient group threat had the power to dramatically increase the levels on both scales as they attempted to cope with the changing social climate. This increase in authoritarianism, dominance, and prejudice may expedite the process by which otherwise decent, normal people become vulnerable to those espousing ideologies of hatred and violence.

Selecting a target group

Over the last few years, there has been a resurgence of emphasis being placed on how to best deal with the continued influx of illegal immigrants into America. With ideas being thrown around including deportation, criminalization and even building a
fence along the southern border, it is an issue that is fairly salient for many Americans; particularly those of voting age. Following a similar logic to that of Altemeyer (1996), target groups of successful propaganda campaigns often seem to share similar characteristics. These can include both historic and current feelings of animosity towards the group as a whole and a lack of clear social norms defending the group against attacks in the form of expressions of negative attitudes. Put succinctly, it is currently far more socially acceptable to express negative of attitudes towards illegal immigrants than it is towards many other American groups.

Illegal immigrants have been politically- and physically- attacked because of the real or imagined (or real but exaggerated) threats that they pose, such as taking over jobs and threatening national security (Staub, 2003). In many ways, the current rhetoric suggests the beginnings of scapegoating (Glick, 2002). Portions of the blame for the current economic downturn, as well as insecurity in the job market and drains to social services have been directed towards these supposed “invaders” and these harsh views have been shown to have strong potential to guide future policy decisions (Esses, et al., 2002; Hitlan, et al., 2007).

Several studies have already begun to look at the perceptions of the illegal immigration issue both in America and abroad. A cross-cultural study, looking at groups in both the Netherlands and the United States indicates that perceptions of illegal immigrants are based on the individual beliefs regarding several key issues in the illegal immigration debate (Ommundsen, et al., 2002). These issues include whether immigrants should have: equal rights, protection against discrimination, allowance into the country, and access to welfare. These types of concerns were also specifically addressed in a
study looking at the association between specific attitudes towards illegal immigrants and support for a California Proposition denying basic welfare rights to noncitizens (Lee, et al., 2001). Their findings indicated that prejudicial beliefs about illegal immigrants were associated with support for discriminatory policies, particularly among those who strongly identify as an American citizen and those who fear broader social change.

The present research took these principles a step further, to analyze the effectiveness of anti-illegal immigrant propaganda to incite hatred and lead normal individuals to support vicious, aggressive anti-illegal immigrant policies. Individuals were exposed to propaganda messages containing varying levels of extremist rhetoric, and were then asked to indicate their feelings about illegal immigrants and their support for increasingly destructive policies. These responses were then analyzed along with their responses on the Right-wing Authoritarian and Social Dominance Orientation scales to explore the possibility that these personality traits might be pushing attitudes to more extreme levels.

Hypotheses:

This research explored two key hypotheses regarding the role of propaganda in affecting attitude and policy support change, and the roles of Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) in mitigating these effects:

1. Exposure to extreme anti-illegal immigrant propaganda would increase anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and increase support for aggressive anti-illegal immigrant policies.
2. Individual levels of RWA and/or SDO would mediate the effects of propaganda exposure on anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and policy support. For mediation to occur, exposure to hateful propaganda would increase levels of RWA and/or SDO, and higher levels of RWA/SDO would lead to an increase in the expression of anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies.
Method

Participants

Three hundred twenty four participants were recruited from Rutgers undergraduate psychology courses and given extra credit for their participation. Participants were run in one 20 minute session. This included 209 females and 114 males. Twenty-three identified themselves as African-American, 99 as Asian-American, 22 as Latino, 154 as White, and 21 identified themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups. Eighty-two identified themselves as Christian, 94 as Catholic, 35 as Jewish, 19 as Muslim, 9 as Buddhist, 24 as Hindu and 56 as “other.”

Design

A 4 (Essay type: high negative, negative, control, positive) x 2 (Bogus Pipeline: used, control) x 2 (counterbalance: attitudes scale first, policy decision scale first) was employed. In each condition, participants were presented with one of the essay types and were asked to complete the attitude scale and policy decision scale, as well as an RWA and SDO scale. Each essay was approximately two pages in length: with the high negative, negative, and positive conditions containing discussions of the immigrant issue. In the ‘high negative’ condition, the essay contained scathing discussions of the negative impact illegal immigration was having on the United States, using particularly inflammatory language and emotional influence tactics (see Appendix A for full essay). The ‘negative’ condition contained the same basic points as the ‘high negative’ condition, but was presented using less inflammatory language (see Appendix B for full essay). The essay in the ‘neutral’ condition was selected from the local student paper and contained no reference to the illegal immigrant issue (see Appendix C for full essay). Finally, the
‘positive’ condition was an essay laying out the history of immigrants in American and discussing the positive contributions immigrants continue to make today (see Appendix D for full essay).

**Bogus Pipeline.** Due to concerns that participants might be subject to the social desirability concerns and would alter their responses to appear less prejudiced, half of the participants were randomly assigned to a ‘bogus pipeline’ condition (Jones & Sigall, 1971). The instructions preceding the attitude and policy scales in the control condition laid out that the following scales were intended to measure group level perceptions and related social judgments (see Appendix E for full instructions). No mention of prejudice was included. Instructions for the bogus pipeline condition were the same, but contained an extra admonition that any attempts to deceive or strategically alter answers would be detected via a complex system of questions designed to indicate lying (see Appendix F for full instructions). In previous research, the use of this type of bogus pipeline has been shown to work well in studies relating to racial prejudice (Walker & Jussim, 2002).

Counterbalancing was employed for the section of the study containing the attitude and policy scales due to concerns that participants might rely on previous answers to determine their responses on future items.

**Materials**

The main dependent variables were the scores on the Perceptions of Illegal Immigrants Scale and the Policy Responses to Illegal Immigration questionnaire. Responses to scale items were given on a scale of 1-5: 1 indicating strong disagreement and 5 indicating strong agreement. Also included in the analysis are the scores on the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scales.
Responses on these scales were given on a scale of 1-7: 1 indicating strong disagreement and 7 indicating strong agreement.

**Perceptions of Illegal Immigrants Scale.** The Perceptions of Illegal Immigrants Scale was loosely based on the updated version of Levinson and Sanford’s Anti-Semitism Scale (1944), used in the studies of modern anti-Semitism by Cohen, Jussim, Harbor & Bhasin (2009). Items were modified to more closely align with modern stereotypes of illegal immigrants. It consisted of 12 questions, assessing participants’ levels of anti-Illegal Immigrant sentiments on a five-point Likert scale (see Appendix G for full scale items) with items such as:

“Illegal immigrants are more loyal to their countries of origin than to America.”

“Illegal immigrants don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.”

Positively phrased items were reverse coded so that higher scores on the scale indicated more negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants. In order to keep participants’ score on the original 1-5 point scale, we added participants’ responses to the 12 items and divided by 12. This average constituted each participant’s score on this scale.

**Policy Responses to Illegal Immigration questionnaire.** The Policy Responses to Illegal Immigration questionnaire was based on the Policy Responses to Israel (Cohen, Jussim, Harbor & Bhasin, 2009). Items were modified to more closely align with actual proposed retaliatory policies and ranged from campaigning against illegal immigrants to forced deportation with the use of deadly force against those who refuse to leave. Proposed policies include:
“Form a National Campaign against Illegal Immigration” – American citizens should rally to demonstrate their opposition towards illegal immigration.”

“Lethal Force Against Illegal Border Crossing” – the only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross they border.”

The questionnaire consisted of 8 brief descriptions of hypothetical policies, increasing in severity from item 1 to item 8. Level of support was indicated on a five-point Likert scale. (see Appendix H for full scale items).

**Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale.** Altemeyer’s (2007) Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (an updated version of the 1996 scale) was employed. It consisted of 22 statements, and responses were given on a seven-point scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). Positively worded items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of RWA (see Appendix I for full scale items). The responses for the items were totaled with a possible range of 22-154.

**Social Dominance Orientation Scale.** Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) Social Dominance scale was employed. It consisted of 16 statements (Cronbach’s alpha = .8), and responses were given on a seven-point scale (see Appendix J for full scale items). Positively-worded items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of SDO. The responses for the items were totaled with a possible range of 16-112.

**Procedure**

The study was introduced by the experimenter as an inquiry into how comprehension and analytical skills were related to the social judgment process.
Participants were instructed to read a short article, carefully answering a series of content-based questions both during and after the reading. These questions were intended to encourage careful attention to detail and connect the essays to the cover story.

Following the essays, instructions guided participants to a section addressing the social judgment process. In the bogus pipeline condition, additional instructions were included which discouraged lying and addressed the presence of tripwire questions among the scales.

The final section was introduced as a series of scales that were designed to explore how individual factors might be associated with the comprehension and social judgment process. Participants then filled out the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the Social Dominance Orientation scale, and a short demographic sheet which collected information on: age, sex, religion, languages spoken and nationality.
Results

Preliminary Analysis

Means, standard deviations and correlations were calculated for all dependent variables and are reported in Table 1. Values are based on the participant mean scores on the Attitude and Policy scales, with higher scores indicating more negative attitudes towards illegal immigrants and greater support for harsh policies. Both the Perception of Illegal Immigrant (Attitude scale) and Policy Response scales were found to be reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .8 and .83 respectively). Means and standard deviation breakdown by propaganda condition reported in Table 2. Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scores were based on the participant total for the scale items, with a higher score indicating greater authoritarianism and social dominance. The RWA and SDO scales were also found to be reliable, in accordance to prior experimental trials (Cronbach’s alpha = .92 and .91 respectively).

To test for effects of ordering, sex, race, immigrant identity and knowing an illegal immigrant on the Attitude, Policy, RWA and SDO scores, a series of ANOVAs was performed. Ordering effects were tested via a 4(Condition: high negative, negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Instruction type: bogus pipeline, control) x 2 (Order: Policy Response first, Attitudes first) ANOVA. There were no significant interactions, and, the counterbalancing conditions will not be discussed further. Demographic effects were tested via a series of 4(Condition: high negative, negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Instruction type: bogus pipeline, control) x 2 (Demographic variable) ANOVAs. Participant ethnicity was recoded into White vs. Non-White categories. Participant immigrant identity was recoded into Close (for those who have parents who are
immigrants or are themselves immigrants) vs. Distant (for those who have grandparents or no close relatives who are immigrants). Demographic effects were tested via a series of 4(Condition: high negative, negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Instruction type: bogus pipeline, control) x 2 (Demographic variable) ANOVAs. Main effects for race, immigrant identity and knowing an illegal immigrant indicate a more negative view of Illegal Immigrants when they are an outgroup: more negative attitudes and policy decisions when participant was white, was not closely associated with an immigrant, and/or did not know anyone who immigrated illegally (Tables 3-5). There were no significant interactions between condition and participant demographic categories (sex, race, immigrant identity, and knowing an illegal immigrant), and, they will therefore not be discussed further.

Main Analysis

The main analysis consisted of a series of 4 (Condition: high negative, negative, neutral, positive) X 2 (Instruction type: bogus pipeline, control) ANOVAs, performed on the scores on the Attitudes towards Illegal Immigrants and Policy Response scores, and the scores on the RWA and SDO scales. These analyses yielded no significant main effects for condition or instruction type, nor any significant interactions (See Table 6-9).

The design was then further simplified to test the general hypothesis that exposure to negative propaganda might have an effect when compared to all other neutral or positive types of messages. To do this, the design was collapsed from 4 article conditions (extreme, moderate, neutral, positive) into 2 (negative: extreme/moderate, not negative: neutral/positive) and a series of T-tests were run on Policy, Attitude, RWA and SDO scores. These results along with cell means are reported in Table 10. The effect of
negative propaganda on Anti-Illegal Immigrant attitudes was marginally significant, 
$t(322) = 1.68, p=.09$, such that those who read the negative propaganda expressed slightly 
more negative attitudes ($M = 2.94, SD = .60$) than those exposed to any other type of 
message ($M=2.84, SD=.55$). Negative propaganda did not have any significant effects on 
policy decisions or RWA/SDO scores.$^1$

Mediation Analyses

To test the hypotheses that RWA and SDO might mediate the effects of 
propaganda on anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and support for retaliatory policies, four 
separate mediation models were employed. Following the Baron & Kenny (1986) model 
of testing mediators, the first step in testing each model required establishing that 
propaganda type has an effect on anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and on support for 
retaliatory policy. The original propaganda conditions (extreme, moderate, neutral, 
positive) yielded no significant effects on attitude or policy decisions. The collapsed 
design (comparing negative propaganda to positive and not negative messages), exposure 
to negative propaganda yielded a moderately significant effect on attitudes, $t(322) = 1.68,$ 
$p=.09$. There was no significant effect of exposure to extreme propaganda on policy 
decisions, and therefore, no possibility of mediation.

Continuing the test of mediation of propaganda effects by RWA and SDO on 
attitude scores, two t-tests were run to assess effects of the collapsed design (negative and 
not negative conditions) on RWA and SDO scores. These tests yielded no significant 

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$^1$ Post hoc comparisons reveal extreme propaganda significantly altered attitudes when 
compared to the effects of all other conditions (moderate, neutral, positive), $t(322)=2.14,$ 
$p<.05$. Such that those in the extreme condition expressed more negative attitudes 
($M=3.01, SD=.54$) than those in the other conditions ($M=2.86, SD=.58$).
effects, (see Table 10). Without a significant effect of propaganda on RWA and SDO scores, it was not possible to establish mediation.

There are several likely reasons the mediational models break down. It could be that exposure to a single piece of propaganda may not be enough to produce the shift in a more stable personality trait, such as RWA or SDO, necessary for it to serve as a mediator to the effects of the hate literature. Or, perhaps the messages in these pieces were not perceived as a strong threat, and failed to activate the world-view protection process that seems to drive changes to RWA and SDO. This does not, however, preclude RWA and SDO from influencing the application of propaganda messages to attitudes and policy decisions.

*Alternative Models*

An alternative explanation could be that, while a single exposure to propaganda might not have the capability to change one’s RWA or SDO levels, these personality factors may still act as moderators of the effects of hate speech and propaganda. If this is indeed the case, it would be expected that exposure to negative propaganda would be most effective for those who are high in RWA and SDO, such that they would espouse the most anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and would show the greatest support for anti-illegal immigrant policies. On the other hand, the negative propaganda messages would likely be less effective for those who are less Socially Dominant or Right-Wing Authoritarian leading them to express less negative views of illegal immigrants and showing little difference as a result of exposure to the propaganda.

To address these alternative hypotheses, four models of moderation were created, using RWA and SDO as moderators of the effect of the propaganda articles on anti-
illegal immigrant attitudes and policy decisions. These models were tested using a two-stage multiple regression analysis. In the first stage, the basic models, which assumed that exposure to propaganda and level of RWA or SDO predicted anti-illegal immigrant attitudes or support for anti-illegal immigrant policies, were tested (see Table 11 for results of the basic models).

Main Effects: Propaganda, RWA and SDO as predictors of Attitudes and Policy Support

The first two models assessed the relations of propaganda and RWA to anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and policy support. For anti-illegal immigrant attitudes, exposure to propaganda was a marginally significant predictor ($\beta = .09, p = .10$), and RWA was a significant predictor ($\beta = .28, p < .001$), such that those exposed to negative propaganda or who were high in RWA were expressing more negative attitudes. RWA was also a significant predictor of policy support ($\beta = .31, p < .001$), such that individuals higher in RWA espoused more support for harsh policies. Exposure to propaganda was not a significant predictor of policy decisions ($\beta = .05, p = .40$).

The second two models explored the relations of propaganda and SDO to anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and policy support. Both exposure to propaganda ($\beta = .10, p < .05$), and SDO ($\beta = .37, p < .001$) proved to be significant predictors of anti-illegal immigrant attitudes, such that those exposed to negative propaganda or those high in SDO were espousing more negative attitudes towards illegal immigrants. SDO was also a significant predictor of policy support ($\beta = .36, p < .001$), but exposure to propaganda ($\beta = .06, p = .30$) still was not a significant predictor of support for anti-illegal immigrant policies.
RWA and SDO as moderators of Propaganda Effects on Attitudes and Policy Support

The second stage assessed the moderation hypotheses (see Baron & Kenney, 1986) by adding product terms to these basic models. These terms were created by multiplying the propaganda condition with the RWA or SDO scores, producing two new variables: propaganda x RWA and propaganda x SDO. The results of these analyses can be found in Table 12.²

Adding the product term (propaganda x RWA) to the regression analyses containing propaganda and RWA as predictors produced two significant models: for attitudes, F(3, 319)=12.27, p<.001, \(R^2 = .10\), and policy support, F(3, 319)=13.90, p<.001, \(R^2 = .12\). The interaction coefficients (propaganda x RWA) were significant in both models: attitudes (\(\beta = .46, p < .001\)) and policy support (\(\beta = .46, p < .001\)). These results indicate that the propaganda worked differently for people high and low in RWA.

To determine the nature and direction of that difference, simple effects were calculated for each interaction by retesting the regressions models at ± 1 SD from the mean of the moderator, in this case, RWA. The resulting predictive equations are graphed in Figures 5 (attitudes) and 6 (policies). Those high in RWA expressed more negative attitudes towards illegal immigrants on the whole and were more susceptible to negative propaganda than those low in RWA (effect sizes: high = .18, low=-.05)³. Similarly, high

² The unstandardized predictive equations for the moderation by RWA are as follows:
Attitudes = 2.573 - .378 (Propaganda) + .004 (RWA) + .007 (Propaganda * RWA)
Policies = 1.730 - .574 (Propaganda) + .007 (RWA) + .01 (Propaganda * RWA).
The unstandardized predictive equations for moderation by SDO are as follows:
Attitudes = 2.447 - .229 (Propaganda) + .009 (SDO) + .008 (Propaganda * SDO)
Policies = 1.797 - .628 (Propaganda) + .008 (SDO) + .016 (Propaganda * SDO)

³ Effect sizes were calculated via the equation = (B1 + (B2 x significant moderator)) x (SD_\text{IV}/SD_{DV}). B1= the unstandardized regression coefficient of the IV from the final
RWA individuals show more support for anti-illegal immigrant policies than those low in RWA. The effects of negative propaganda follow a similar pattern, negative propaganda increased support for anti-illegal immigrant policies only among those high in RWA (effect size = .31). For low RWA individuals, though, there seems to be a weak reactance effect (effect size = .07), whereby, those exposed to negative propaganda, who were low in RWA, actually show slightly less support for harsh policies.

The addition of the product term (propaganda x SDO) to the regression analysis containing propaganda and SDO as predictors also produced two significant models: for attitudes, $F(3, 320)=20.21, p<.001, R^2 = .16$, and policy support, $F(3, 320)=20.08, p<.001, R^2 = .16$. The interaction coefficient (propaganda x SDO) was, again, significant in both models: attitudes ($\beta = .34, p < .05$) and policy support ($\beta = .30, p < .05$). Simple effects were again calculated for each interaction by retesting the regressions models at $\pm 1$ STD from the mean of the moderator, in this case, SDO. The resulting predictive equations are graphed in Figures 7 (attitudes) and 8 (policies). Those who were high in SDO showed more negative attitudes, overall, while those low in SDO held more positive attitudes (effect sizes: high = .31, low = -.01). Again, the negative propaganda condition was only effective in increasing anti-illegal immigrant attitudes for those who were high in SDO. The pattern for policy support was also very similar that using RWA as a moderator, with high SDO individuals showing more support for harsh policies than those low in SDO. Negative propaganda increased support among those high in SDO

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model, where the moderator significantly predicted. $B2=$ the unstandardized regression coefficient of the product term. Significant moderator = the variable that moderated the effects of the IV on the DV. Based on Judd & McClelland 1989.
(effect size = .14), and in a similar reactance response, decreased support among those low in SDO (effect size = -.12).

Comparing Models

To confirm the hypothesis that RWA and/or SDO moderated the effects of propaganda requires that the product terms significantly predict the attitudes and/or policy decisions being made. Each model yielded significant interaction coefficients, thereby supporting the moderation hypotheses. What remains unclear is whether these models of RWA and SDO are explaining different phenomena, or are accounting for the same basic variance in attitude and policy scores. To examine the potential shared variance, a two-stage model was constructed. In the first model, propaganda, RWA and SDO were entered as predictive variables for attitude and policy scores. This model was significant for both attitude, $F(3, 321)=23.67, p<.001$, $R^2 = .18$, and policy support, $F(3, 319)=22.99, p<.001$, $R^2 = .18$. As with the previous models, both RWA and SDO were significant predictors of attitudes (RWA: $\beta = .20, p < .001$, SDO: $\beta = .32, p < .001$), and policy support (RWA: $\beta = .23, p < .001$, SDO: $\beta = .29, p < .001$). Table 13 shows results of both stages of the models.

The secondary models which included these predictors, as well as the two interaction terms (propaganda x RWA, propaganda x SDO) were also significant: attitudes, $F(5, 321)=15.35, p<.001$, $R^2 = .20$, and policy support, $F(5, 319)=16.14, p<.001$, $R^2 = .20$. For anti-illegal immigrant attitudes, the inclusion of both interaction terms in the second model dramatically reduced their distinct predictive capabilities (propaganda x RWA: $\beta = .27, p = .16$, propaganda x SDO: $\beta = .21, p = .19$), indicating that both RWA and SDO levels are likely explaining the same phenomena with regards to
attitude score variance. For support of anti-illegal immigrant policies, though, inclusion of both interaction terms only dramatically reduced the significance of the propaganda x RWA model (propaganda x RWA: $\beta = .23, p = .24$), while the propaganda x SDO model remained significant (propaganda x SDO: $\beta = .39, p < .05$). This suggests that the moderation of propaganda effectiveness by SDO explains variance, above and beyond, that which it shares with RWA’s moderation.
Discussion

The purpose of this research has been to expand the exploration of the efficacy of hate speech/propaganda to sway attitudes and behavioral decisions. Specifically, to explore the attitudes and policy decisions being made regarding an American outgroup, illegal immigrants, and to address the potentially influential role of propaganda to sway these decisions. Though illegal immigrants are a highly visible target group, with the ongoing political debate over policy, little research has examined the potential damage being done by the hate-filled rhetoric that is tossed around in the media and daily discussion.

Taken together, this research suggests several key patterns in the perceptions of illegal immigrants, and the application of propaganda to attitudes and policy decisions. First, limited exposure to propaganda may have the capacity to produce small shifts in attitudes. In this case, negative propaganda, especially in its more extreme rhetorical form, shows a capacity to shift attitudes in a negative direction. While this research did not explore changes in individual scores pre- and post-exposure, the between groups analysis indicates that, on the whole, those exposed to negative propaganda indicated more negative attitudes than those exposed to neutral or positive propaganda. This is fairly consistent with Altemeyer’s (1996) hate-speech work, which indicated that overall, those individuals exposed to hate-speech (or Holocaust denial literature) tended to shift their attitudes/beliefs in response (either to more negative attitudes/beliefs or as an increased willingness to deny the Holocaust occurred). It should be noted that in both these prior trials and the present research, any change was a fairly small one. For most individuals, this was a change from mildly positive attitudes to neutral perceptions of
illegal immigrants and, as the moderation analyses indicate, fairly dependent upon the individual level of Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation.

In a similar vein, this research has further clarified the role of Right-wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in the application of propaganda to attitudes and policy decisions. Although potentially malleable under circumstances of extreme threat (Nagoshi, et al. 2007), these personality traits seem to remain stable under more mild threat, such as the propaganda presented here. The association of RWA and SDO with generalized prejudices, though, keeps them heavily linked to the types of processes involved in evaluating/judging current social issues and groups (Crowson, DeBacker & Thomas, 2005). In this study, individuals with high levels of RWA and SDO followed a pattern of greater anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and support for harsher polices than those who were lower in either characteristic.

With this research, it has become possible to begin to piece together the potential overlap between the two characteristics of RWA and SDO, and to establish where each offers better predictive utility. In the case of attitudes, both RWA and SDO have their roles to play, particularly when dealing with issues of social value and hierarchy threats and outgroup prejudice. The scale used to assess attitudes focused on issues relating to all of these components, allowing for support from the “they are evil and a threat to our traditional way of life” perspective consistent with high RWA and the “they are undeserving of their place in our society and are threatening the balance of power” perspective associated with the high SDO perspective.

On the other hand, there was a more distinct difference in the predictive capabilities for policy decision. In this case, it appears that levels of SDO provide a
better predictive vantage. This is likely related to the content of the policy items. Rather than focusing on how and why the illegal immigrant population was a threat to values, the policy items emphasized measures to restore a more traditional social hierarchy: by eliminating illegal immigrants from the job market, penalizing those who are “undermining” the American economic system by aiding and forcibly removing these low-status interlopers from the country all-together. It is possible that these approaches appeal more heavily to individuals high in SDO, who are seeking to maintain a hierarchical status quo. Further examination would be necessary to truly piece out the components of both the propaganda and scale items that may be producing these effects.

Beyond the specific effects of propaganda and RWA/SDO, this research allows us a clearer view of the current climate surrounding the illegal immigration issue. It is hopeful that college students seem to indicate a moderate, or even positive, perspective on the illegal immigration issue. This is potentially due to the explicit nature of the questionnaires, allowing for self-presentation concerns to bleed in, but if that were the case, one would expect more effect of the bogus pipeline manipulation. In prior studies using this methodology to examine anti-Semitism in a similar subject pool, (Cohen, Jussim, Harbor & Bhasin, 2009), the bogus pipeline condition was not only functional, but necessary to get participants to express any kind of prejudice. To that end, the lack of effects for this manipulation could suggest that views of illegal immigrants are such that individuals do not feel the need to lie at all. If that is indeed the case, the generally moderate views indicate that perhaps illegal immigration is becoming less of a hot-button issue among the college age crowd. Alternatively, it could be that the manipulation was not perceived as realistic, and was therefore ignored.
Despite this potential hurdle of explicit measures, the emerging patterns of ambivalence still seem to fall along ingroup/outgroup lines. In this instance, general perceptions of illegal immigrants and the related policy support remain heavily tied to the relative distance one has from the immigrant identity and illegal immigrants themselves. Knowing an illegal immigrant and/or having a close relative who immigrated (or being an immigrant oneself) may help one to put a face on this outgroup, providing a buffer against rhetorical attacks. For those who lack these close ties, disassociating from the illegal immigrant outgroup, either by choice or sheer lack of exposure, may increase feelings of ambiguity (or even hostility) towards the relatively unknown outgroup, allowing for the pervasive negative media messages to seep in.

*Caveats and Directions for Future Research*

Several limitations exist for the predictive power and generalizability of this study. First, this research is being conducted on a limited population consisting of college students participating in psychology courses at Rutgers. Generally speaking, the present participant pool consists of educated, generally liberal students who have at least a cursory exposure to the notion of attitudes and social beliefs. To have found any effects of this limited exposure to propaganda in this population is actually both surprising and troubling. Among this group general attitudes and policy decisions hint at more moderate leanings, and it should be noted that even RWA and SDO scores hovered around the midpoints of their respective scales. With a more ideologically diverse population, these patterns would likely be much more extreme.

Similarly, the limited effects of the propaganda could be related to its perceived relevance to its audience. The propaganda used in this research was based on the
arguments of several extreme opinion pieces derived from online discussion forums and blogs. These disembodied rants may not resonate strongly with the college population or identity, and are therefore more easily ignored. Future research could address this with two approaches: first, by adapting the propaganda message to make it more relevant to its target audience (by making the illegal immigrant threat salient to the college identity, it would likely produce more reaction among students). Second, the present methodology could be expanded to a population to whom it is more relevant. For instance, when exposing individuals who are in the current American workforce (particularly those who face a real threat of unemployment), the arguments regarding the threat to the American livelihood may prove more salient and effective as a tool of persuasion.

The study is also limited, in that the participants are only being exposed to a single, short piece of written propaganda. Brief exposure of this sort cannot, in and of itself, replicate the likely more extreme effects expected as a result of steady exposure to a variety of forms of propaganda. That being said, this limited exposure does have the ability to produce some change and allows for a glimpse at the process that would likely compound after multiple exposures. Finally, this research is only addressing propaganda’s ability to change attitudes relating to illegal immigrants. Taking into account Altemeyer’s (1996) hate-speech studies, this research would expand the understanding of propaganda effects on attitudes about another politically charged American group.

Conclusions

In many ways, the ability for ideology to drive violent mass movements has been assumed to lie in a separate sphere than those processes that drive more normal attitude
fluctuation. The problem remains that propaganda seems to exert some influence, even in its most extreme forms, and there is no clear evidence that we are really dealing with a distinct and separate method of influence. This research further suggests, along with Altemeyer’s (1996) hate-speech work, that the persuasion process underlying propaganda effectiveness is generally mundane, and perhaps most effective when it is self-relevant.

Propaganda is powerful because it has the potential to serve several key functions in the process of forming and changing attitudes. It provides a reason to act, as well as a means of justifying behaviors which may have already been enacted, but which stand in contrast to previously held beliefs. Propaganda also changes the value of certain behaviors and provides a standard to maintain consistency to (Cialdini, 2001). Powerful though particular messages of hate may be, these functions do not seem to lie outside of our realm of understanding when it comes to the processes by which we come to think and value the things we do. Perhaps the greatest necessity here is to more closely explore how behavioral decisions may relate to these attitude changes.

Though the link between attitude and behavior seems inconsistent at best (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), ideology is often implicated in situations of mass violence and genocide: including the Holocaust (Staub, 1989), Rwanda (Verwimp, 2000) and the ethnic cleansing in Croatia (Denich, 1994). The present research suggests a potential link may lie among personality characteristics such as RWA and SDO. Among those who are high in these characteristics, a predisposition to perceive the world using a more rigid belief structure, that holds to traditional values and social hierarchy, may push them to action if they perceive that their self-concept and worldview is
threatened. Future research would be needed to address this potential to lash out under ideological threat.
Bibliography


Table 1
*Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Dependent Variables.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Anti-Illegal Immigrant Attitudes</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policy</td>
<td>.573**</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Right-wing Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>.314**</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Dominance Orientation</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.355**</td>
<td>.270**</td>
<td>------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| M         | 2.20   | 2.90   | 64.99  | 43.51  |
| SD        | 0.77   | 0.58   | 19.82  | 16.54  |

** p < .01
N = 321 --324 for all correlations.
Table 2: *Means and Standard Deviations by Article Condition for Dependent Variables.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Extreme Negative</th>
<th>Moderate Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Positive</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attitude Average</td>
<td>3.01 0.54</td>
<td>2.88 0.64</td>
<td>2.89 0.57</td>
<td>2.79 0.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Average</td>
<td>2.24 0.79</td>
<td>2.23 0.83</td>
<td>2.23 0.79</td>
<td>2.09 0.76</td>
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<td>RWA Total</td>
<td>67.3 19.38</td>
<td>63.5 21.82</td>
<td>66.42 20.04</td>
<td>62.71 17.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO Total</td>
<td>45.45 15.99</td>
<td>41.04 16.81</td>
<td>42.74 15.87</td>
<td>45 17.36</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Higher means indicate more anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies.
N’s were 80 Extreme negative, 85 Moderately negative, 81 Neutral and 78 for Positive.
Table 3:  
Main Effects of Participant Race on Attitude, Policy and RWA/SDO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>White M</th>
<th>White SD</th>
<th>Not White M</th>
<th>Not White SD</th>
<th>F (df)</th>
<th>r</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
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<td>2.80</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>(1,318), 9.58**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>2.32</td>
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<td>2.07</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>(1,319), 8.56**</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>61.59</td>
<td>20.34</td>
<td>68.48</td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>(1,317), 9.78**</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>46.50</td>
<td>16.52</td>
<td>41.69</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>(1,318), 8.79**</td>
<td>.14</td>
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</table>

** p < .05; *** p < .001

1. Attitude and policy scores are based on mean scores from each scale: higher scores indicate more anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies. RWA and SDO scores are based on total scores: higher scores indicate more right-wing authoritarian or socially dominant beliefs.
Table 4:  
*Main Effects of Being Closely Related to an Immigrant on Attitude, Policy and RWA/SDO.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
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<th>Close vs. Distant/No</th>
<th>Effect Size</th>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
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<td>15.89</td>
<td>44.88</td>
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</table>

***p < .001

1. Attitude and policy scores are based on mean scores from each scale: higher scores indicate more anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies. RWA and SDO scores are based on total scores: higher scores indicate more right-wing authoritarian or socially dominant beliefs.
Table 5: 
*Main Effects of Knowing an Illegal Immigrant on Attitude, Policy and RWA/SDO.*

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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
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*** p ≤ .001

1. Attitude and policy scores are based on mean scores from each scale: higher scores indicate more anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies. RWA and SDO scores are based on total scores: higher scores indicate more right-wing authoritarian or socially dominant beliefs.
Table 6:
*Analysis of Variance for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Attitudes*

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*Note.* Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Significance at p < .05.
Table 7:
Analysis of Variance for Support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policies.

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*Note.* Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Significance at p < .05.
Table 8: *Analysis of Variance for Right-Wing Authoritarianism*

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*Note.* Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Significance at p < .05.
Table 9:
*Analysis of Variance for Social Dominance Orientation.*

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<td>2.25</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P x BP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S within-group error</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Values in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Significance at p < .05.
Table 10
*T-values, cell means and standard deviations for Policy, Attitude and Right-Wing Authoritarianis/Social Dominance Orientation scores as a function of exposure to Negative or Not Negative Articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Negative Article</th>
<th>Not – Negative Article</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>65.35</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>64.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>43.19</td>
<td>16.51</td>
<td>43.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p = .09
Higher means more anti-illegal immigrant attitudes and greater support for anti-illegal immigrant policies. Higher scores on RWA and SDO scales indicate more Right-wing Authoritarian and Socially Dominant personalities.
N’s 164 and 158 for Negative and Not-Negative articles respectively.
Table 11

*Relationships Between Exposure to Propaganda, RWA and SDO on Anti-Illegal Immigrant Attitudes and Support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Model</th>
<th>Support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policies</th>
<th>Anti Illegal Immigrant Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA Analysis</td>
<td>R²=.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictor variable</td>
<td>Exposure to Propaganda</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO analyses</td>
<td>R²=.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictor variable</td>
<td>Exposure to Propaganda</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Resulting \( t \) was marginally significant, \( p=.10 \).

Note: Exposure to Propaganda was coded as 0=Not Negative (i.e. Neutral or Positive propaganda), and 1=Negative (Extreme or Moderately Negative propaganda). Analyses were based on 322 participants.

** \( p \leq .05 \); *** \( p \leq .001 \)
Table 12

Relationship Between Exposure to Propaganda, RWA and SDO on Anti-Illegal Immigrant Attitudes and Support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policies, with Interaction Terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model with Interaction</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant Policies</th>
<th>Anti Illegal Immigrant Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Propaganda</td>
<td>-.57</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-2.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>2.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda x RWA</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>2.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO analyses</td>
<td>R^2=.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Propaganda</td>
<td>-.63</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-2.81**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>2.451**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda x SDO</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>3.413**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Resulting t’s were marginally significant, p=.07

Note: Exposure to Propaganda was coded as 0=Not Negative (i.e. Neutral or Positive propaganda), and 1=Negative (Extreme or Moderately Negative propaganda). Analyses were based on 322 participants.

** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .001
Table 13
Comparing Models: Test of Covariance between RWA and SDO as Moderators of Propaganda Effects on Policy and Attitude Scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1 and 2 Models</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for Anti-Illlegal Immigrant Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictor variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Propaganda</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Predictor variable   |       |      |       |       |      |    |
| Exposure to Propaganda | -.78 | -.50 | -.255** | -.39 | -.33 | -1.68** |
| RWA                  | .01  | .15  | 1.93** | .003 | .11  | 1.38 |
| SDO                  | .01  | .16  | 2.16** | .01  | .03  | 3.36*** |
| Propaganda x RWA     | .01  | .23  | 1.19  | .004 | .27  | 1.42 |
| Propaganda x SDO     | .01  | .39  | 2.51** | .005 | .21  | 1.31 |

1. Resulting t was marginally significant, p=.07
2. Resulting t was marginally significant, p=.09

Note: Exposure to Propaganda was coded as 0=Not Negative (i.e. Neutral or Positive propaganda), and 1=Negative (Extreme or Moderately Negative propaganda). Analyses were based on 322 participants.

** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .001
Figure 1: *Mediational Model 1*

Does Right-Wing Authoritarianism Mediate Effects of Propaganda on Anti-Illlegal Immigrant Attitudes?
Figure 2: *Mediation Model 2*

Does Right-Wing Authoritarianism Mediate Effects of Propaganda on Support for Retaliatory Policies against Illegal Immigrants?
Figure 3: *Mediational Model 3*
Does Social Dominance Orientation Mediate Effects of Propaganda on Anti-Illegal Immigrant Attitudes?
Figure 4: Mediational Model 4
Does Social Dominance Orientation Mediate Effects of Propaganda on Support for Retaliatory Policies against Illegal Immigrants?
Notes: Higher Attitude scores indicate more negative attitudes towards Illegal Immigrants. High RWA scores calculated by subtracting the mean + 1 StDev (=84.81) from each participant’s score. Low RWA scores calculated by subtracting the mean -1 StDev (=45.17) from each participant’s score. Unstandardized Predictive equations are as follows:

High RWA = 2.93 + .25(Propaganda);
Low RWA = 2.76 - .05 (Propaganda).
Notes: Higher Policy scores indicate more support for Anti-Illegal Immigrant policies. High RWA scores calculated by subtracting the mean + 1 StDev (=84.81) from each participant’s score. Low RWA scores calculated by subtracting the mean -1StDev (=45.17) from each participant’s score. Unstandardized Predictive equations are as follows:
High RWA = 2.92 + .27(Propaganda);
Low RWA = 2.03 - .126(Propaganda).
Notes: Higher Attitude scores indicate more negative attitudes towards Illegal Immigrants. High SDO scores calculated by subtracting the mean + 1 StDev (=60.05) from each participant’s score. Low SDO scores calculated by subtracting the mean -1StDev (=26.97) from each participant’s score.

Unstandardized Predictive equations are as follows:
High SDO = 2.99 + .25(Propaganda);
Low SDO = 2.69 - .02(Propaganda).
Figure 8: Social Dominance Orientation as a moderator of the effects of hate-speech on support for Anti-Ilegal Immigrant Policies

Notes: Higher Policy scores indicate more support for Anti-Ilegal Immigrant policies. High SDO scores calculated by subtracting the mean + 1 StDev (=60.05) from each participant’s score. Low SDO scores calculated by subtracting the mean -1StDev (=26.97) from each participant’s score. Unstandardized Predictive equations are as follows:
High SDO = 2.296 + .35(Propaganda);
Low SDO = 2.021 - .19(Propaganda).

Appendix A
The Real Immigration Threat

May 16, 2007

Illegal immigration threatens homeland security. And many politicians are on the wrong side of the issue. We should be outraged by the pandering to the illegal alien lobby, and I’ll unabashedly say that the three most important factors in immigration policy are deportation, deportation and deportation. Still, to focus our eyes narrowly on just illegal immigration is to lament only the salt thrown into the wound while accepting the wound itself. Illegal immigration is not the problem.

It’s an exacerbation of the problem.

It’s really very simple. Do you want to know why we have Muslim prayers broadcast five times daily in Hamtramck, Michigan; Muslim foot baths installed in the Kansas City Airport; “Islamic Immersion” classes in a California school district; Muslims who are planning jihad against us on our own shores; and Muslims who demand an Arabic public school in NYC and Muslim dormitories at colleges? Legal immigration. Why do we have illegal immigrants brazen enough to protest in the streets and demand the rights of citizens? Legal immigration. Why do you have to press buttons to conduct business in the language of the land and why are government documents printed in foreign ones? Legal immigration. Why have we seen Mexicans in our streets burning our flag and wielding signs stating “Gringo Go Home”? Legal immigration.

If you believe that any of these things are actually related to illegal immigration, just ask how it is that we’ve come to tolerate offensive demands made by those who are nothing but invaders. Sure, politically correctness has been a factor, but the truth is these
movements are facilitated by legions of people with no true allegiance to America; individuals who carry water for illegals because their patriotism is only of the ethnic variety.

Please respond to the following questions by either circling your response or filling in the blank. When you have finished, continue reading below:

1. The author argues that instead of focusing on the "pandering Illegal alien lobby" they should focus on the most important factor in immigration policy, __________________________.

2. Which of the following is a program/service the author cites as an accommodation to immigrants:

   A. English as a second language courses in public school systems.
   B. Muslim prayers being broadcast in some areas of Michigan.
   C. Government offices providing forms in English, as well as other common foreign languages.

3. The author argues that focus should be expanded to include groups of legal immigrants because these people often have __________ allegiance to the US.

The fact is that most of the folks who won’t assimilate are here legally, but citizenship papers can’t change a heart. A pious Muslim will gladly upend our culture to make way for sharia just as an ethnic patriot of Mexican descent will subordinate our language to his own. Legality is deceptive. Slavery was legal at one time, as was cocaine, but this
didn’t render the former any more moral or the latter any more healthful. A law doesn’t make a bad idea good; like an inassimilable legal immigrant, it just makes it more entrenched.

Many palliate themselves with the notion that, by golly, after a generation or two these folks will assimilate. But why? Why would a person who is encouraged to hyphenate himself (fill-in-the-blank-American), who is not pressured to conform to our culture or learn our language, who is so puffed up with ethnic pride that he ascribes superiority to his “native” land while viewing the one that suckles him with disdain, ever contemplate assimilation? Never mind, we know the answer.

So, assimilation? Sure, but we are the ones being assimilated. And if you think it’s bad now, wait until 70 million more Mexicans and Muslims strengthen us with their diversity.

Theoretically, we could still right the ship, but there’s a formidable psychological stumbling block. We’ve been inured to invasion, sedated with the supposition that immigration is as American as baseball and apple pie. But there is nothing at all American about support for policies that guarantee the destruction of America.

The FBI just foiled a terrorist plot involving an attack on Fort Dix, NJ, one illustrating the nature of our problem well, as three of the suspects are here illegally.

And three are here legally.

If we had sufficient policies in place to deal with illegal immigration perhaps Sept. 11 may never have happened. At least nine or so of the alleged 16 hijackers who flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon Sept. 11 would not have been in this country. We wouldn’t be beset by ultra-violent, terrorist-enabling gangs such as MS-
13, either. You see, these folks would presently be where their hearts are – in their homelands.

So don’t ask me why I won’t give a nod to legal immigration as I oppose the illegal variety. You might as well ask why I won’t choose a slow death over a quick one.

In no more than three sentences, please summarize the main points of the article which you have just read. When you finish, continue to the next page:
Appendix B

The Immigration Threat

May 16, 2007

Illegal immigration is contributing to the weakness of our homeland security, and many politicians are on the wrong side of the issue. Rather than focusing on the illegal immigrant lobby, we ought to pay more attention to the potential solutions at our disposal: including guest-worker programs, deportation, and further actions to criminalize illegal entrance into the country. If we focus our eyes too narrowly on just illegal immigration we are missing a larger part of the issue. Illegal immigration is not the whole problem.

Right now, our country is being forced to provide a host of services to a variety of immigrants, both legal and illegal. These programs, services and accommodations cost a great deal, in terms of both time and money, by placing strain on our country’s government. It is because of immigrants that we have Muslim prayers being broadcast in Michigan; Muslim foot baths being installed in the Kansas City Airport; “Islamic Immersion” classes in a California school district. They are also the source of numerous protests as they petition for equal citizen rights for illegals. Immigrants are the reason we have to provide countless services in a variety of languages and that English speakers have to take the time to select an “English” option to conduct transactions.
While some of these things may be a byproduct of illegal immigration, we must also take stock of the effects that immigrant presence is having on American culture. Movements and support of illegal immigration are often supported by groups of legal immigrants who have unclear allegiances to America.

Please respond to the following questions by either circling your response or filling in the blank. When you have finished, continue reading below:

1. The author argues that instead of focusing on the ________________, politicians should instead look at the potential solutions at their disposal.

2. Which of the following is a program/service the author cites as an accommodation to immigrants:
   
   A. English as a second language courses in public school systems.
   B. Muslim prayers being broadcast in some areas of Michigan.
   C. Government offices providing forms in English, as well as other common foreign languages.

3. The author argues that focus should be expanded to include groups of legal immigrants because their allegiances to America are often ____________.
It seems that many of those who will not assimilate to American culture and way of life are actually here legally. Being legally American can facilitate some things, but citizenship papers can’t change a heart. Legality can be a bit deceptive. Slavery was legal at one time, as was cocaine, but this didn’t render the former any more moral or the latter any more healthful. A law doesn’t make a bad idea good and in some cases it can make it even worse.

There have been many who argue that assimilation is eminent after a few generations. But if we are to continue to encourage divisions in our national identity, opening up to more “fill-in-the-blank-American,” there seems little incentive for immigrants to assimilate.

Perhaps what we are seeing is in fact assimilation, but we are the ones being assimilated. And if you think it’s bad now, wait until 70 million more Mexicans and Muslims strengthen us with their diversity.

There is still potential to right the ship, but there’s a formidable psychological stumbling block. We’ve been sedated with the supposition that immigration is as American as baseball and apple pie. But there is nothing at all American about support for policies that could spell the destruction of American way of life.

The FBI just foiled a terrorist plot involving an attack on Fort Dix, NJ, one illustrating the nature of our problem well, as three of the suspects are here illegally.

And three are here legally.
If we had sufficient policies in place to deal with illegal immigration perhaps Sept. 11 may never have happened. At least nine or so of the alleged 16 hijackers who flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon Sept. 11 would not have been in this country. We wouldn’t be beset by ultra-violent, terrorist-enabling gangs such as MS-13, either. You see, these folks would presently be where their hearts are – in their homelands.

Making too many concessions in the debate of the immigration issue will set our country up to fall. If we do not stop to take into consideration what we are losing as a society with each allowance we give, soon we will find ourselves overrun.

________________________
________________________
________________________

In no more than three sentences, please summarize the main points of the article which you have just read. When you finish, continue to the next page:
Council proposes Springfest bonfire

Issue date: 4/9/08

The Livingston Campus Council will be holding its first annual Springfest Bonfire Saturday night.

Springfest, a Livingston campus tradition for more than 20 years, will change this year due to budget issues. The event is now combined with Rutgersfest, but council members said they felt something else needed to be done to continue the tradition.

"We wanted to put on an annual event that would be a unique tradition of Livingston," said council Vice President Jacqueline Whitfield, a senior. "We decided to keep the name Springfest because returning students were familiar with the event, and it maintains the history of the event. With these new changes, we hope the Springfest bonfire will become an annual celebration."

The council discussed several ideas but said they felt a bonfire worked best because it had never been done before.

Please respond to the following questions by either circling your response
or filling in the blank. When you have finished, continue reading below:

1. The first annual bonfire was held at Springfest, a tradition on the ______________________ campus at Rutgers.

2. The Vice President of the student council argued that a campus based annual event, beyond that of the combined Rutgersfest was important, because:
   A. students rarely go to the larger Rutgersfest events.
   B. it maintains the history of the event by being unique to the campus, and keeps returning students familiar with the event.
   C. it brings in the revenue necessary to support the Rutgersfest tradition.

3. The tradition of Springfest has been going on for more than ____________ years, but was changed in 2008 due to budgetary concerns.

"I have never heard of there being a Bonfire at Rutgers previously, and so we hope that the novelty of such an event will draw a good crowd," said council President Nicholas Martucci, a junior.

Whitfield said she felt a bonfire would help carry on the distinctive traditions of the campus and promote diversity.
"We thought it would be a new event that would attract a lot of students and become an annual event that is different from Rutgersfest so students will have more diversity in the large events held on campus," Whitfield said.

Council members see the bonfire as an important new tradition because it is a unique event, but also helps maintain the campus' identity and foster community, Whitfield said. Jeremy Davis, a junior who lived on Livingston campus his first year, said he thinks more could have been done to unite the community.

"My freshman year, it was hard being there because you are so far away from all other campuses, so it's good to bond with people you live with," he said.

Having a Springfest Bonfire is a good way to get not only those currently living on Livingston involved, but also those who have lived there in the past to re-unite, Davis said.

"I was a bit upset when I found out the there would be no Springfest, so I'm excited that they are still attempting to have something like it," he said. "I'm excited for the bonfire, and I hope to get re-acquainted with some old Livingston friends I lost touch with."

The event will cost about $7,500 and is sponsored by the Livingston Dean's
Office, Residence Life and the LCC.

There will be food, live music and entertainment in addition to the bonfire. The council encourages students to bring their own musical instruments, if they prefer to play by the fire. A rain date is scheduled if the event is cancelled due to bad weather.

In no more than three sentences, please summarize the main points of the article which you have just read. When you finish, continue to the next page:
Appendix D

**Nation of Immigrants**

March 16, 2007

America is sometimes referred to as a "nation of immigrants" because of our largely open-door policy toward accepting foreigners pursuing their vision of the American Dream. Recently, some politicians have clambered for a more closed-door policy on immigration, arguing that immigrants "threaten" America by taking jobs from American workers, using much-needed social services, and encroaching on the "American way of life." These arguments are almost overwhelmingly false. In fact, immigrants actually enhance American life by creating, not taking jobs, bolster social service funds through tax payments, and bring valuable technical knowledge and skills to our country. If we are to continue to excel as a nation, the traditionalists who fear an encroachment of foreign-born Americans should learn to accept that we achieved our greatness as a result of being "a nation of immigrants."

A common argument among those opposing further immigration is that foreigners take U.S. jobs and cause unemployment among the displaced American workers. A recent Business Week poll states that sixty-three percent of Americans agree that "new immigrants take jobs away from American workers." This is a widely held, erroneous belief. Julian L. Simon, author of The Economic Consequences of Immigration, states: "immigration does not exacerbate unemployment...Immigrants not only take jobs, but also create them. Their
purchases increase the demand for labor, leading to new hires roughly equal in number to the immigrant workers."

Please respond to the following questions by either circling your response or filling in the blank. When you have finished, continue reading below:

1. Due to America’s open-door policy towards immigration, the author indicates the country is often referred to as a _________________.

2. On the subject of Immigration as a source of American unemployment, the author argues that:

   A. immigrants are endangering the economy by taking jobs from American citizens.

   B. immigrants are not just taking jobs, but also creating new jobs through their purchases and participation in the economy.

   C. immigrants are only taking jobs which American citizens do not want

3. According to Business Week, what percentage of Americans would agree that "new Immigrants take jobs away from American Workers?" __________%  

In the same Business Week poll, eighty-five percent of Americans agree that "many new immigrants are very hard-working." The results of the poll may seem
somewhat contradictory, but not necessarily negative. Those polled seem to be at least a little open-minded in their view of the quality of new immigrants.

However, in order to overcome their distrust of foreigners, Americans must abandon their suspicions and recognize, as Simon has, that our lives are enhanced by immigrants creating, not taking, U.S. jobs.

A widely held belief among Americans against immigration is that foreigners "strain social service budgets." In actuality, immigrants are generally young and healthy when they arrive, and therefore, "do not receive expensive Social Security and other aid to the aged," according to Simon. In fact, Americans should be thankful for immigrants as they "contribute more to the public coffers in taxes than they draw out in welfare services" and put "about $2,500 into the pockets of natives" from excess taxes. They are, in fact, raising the quality of life of those dependant of the social services.

In his nationally syndicated column, Pat Buchanan, a past Presidential candidate, wrote "immigration should be suspended to preserve the nation." This appears to be a case of "the pot calling the kettle black." Buchanan's ancestors had to have immigrated from somewhere, so should they have been kept from immigrating "to preserve the nation"? The fear of encroachment by foreign-born Americans is a common one.. The traditionalists opposing immigration must recognize our lives are enhanced by their knowledge and culture, and that in order to "preserve our nation", they must realize we are a "nation of immigrants" and let others prove
their worth.

The issue of immigration must be dealt with rationally, not emotionally. Facts, figures, and statistics must be studied by both sides in order to reach a decision most beneficial to our nation. Our lives are enhanced by the new jobs created by immigrants, the social service funds bolstered by their tax payments, and the valuable technical skills and knowledge brought with them. These benefits far outweigh any negative effects and prove the value of immigrants as they pursue the American Dream in our "nation of immigrants.

In no more than three sentences, please summarize the main points of the article which you have just read. When you finish, continue to the next page:
Appendix E

Section two consists of several tasks designed to explore the social judgment process. On the following scales, please read the statements presented and respond by choosing a number that matches how strongly you agree/disagree or support/oppose the statement. Indicate your answer by writing the corresponding number next to the statement on the line provided.

Remember, your responses are anonymous and cannot be connected to you in anyway. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to these questions. Though we ask that you consider each item carefully, remember that it is often your first instinct that is the most accurate reflection of you opinion. Therefore, read through each statement to make sure you understand all points being made, and indicate your initial response in the blank to the left of the statement.

For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

__4__ "Psychologists tend to stick together more than any other academic community"

In the case that the response to this item would be “Agree,” the number 4 would be selected and written on the line provided (as indicated above).

Work quickly and accurately, and be sure to answer all of the items on the scale to the best of your ability.”
Appendix F

Section two consists of several tasks designed to explore the social judgment process. On the following scales, please read the statements presented and respond by choosing a number that matches how strongly you agree/disagree or support/oppose the statement. Indicate your answer by writing the corresponding number next to the statement on the line provided.

There are no “right” or “wrong” answers and, though it may be difficult at times, we ask that you respond honestly. Psychologist acknowledge that this can be difficult, and that fear of appearing less than favorable often drives people to lie or strategically change their responses. For this reason, a series of sophisticated detection questions have been included in these scales.

For example, consider the following question:

*How often do you stop for stranded motorists?*

*Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Usually  Always*

This question, though it may appear innocent is one of the tools psychologists use to determine if an individual may be lying to appear more positively. With the possible exception of policemen on patrol, **NO ONE** “usually” or “always” stops for stranded motorists. People who say they do are most likely lying.
While some of these detection questions may appear obvious, others will not; we therefore ask that you answer all questions as honestly as possible. If you don’t, we will know that many of your answers are lies. This will allow us to statistically adjust your answers so that they more accurately reflect the real, and considerably less favorable, you.”
Appendix G

Anti – Illegal Immigrant Scale

Below are statements with which you may agree or disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Moderately Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</td>
<td>Moderately Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

___ Illegal immigrants are more loyal to their countries of origin than to America.

___ Illegal immigrants have a lot of irritating faults.

___ Illegal immigrants have too much control and influence on the American economy.

___ Illegal immigrants are losing their distinctive identities and are becoming more like other Americans. *

___ Illegal immigrants don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.

___ Illegal immigrants stick together more than other groups.

___ Illegal immigrants are warm and friendly people.*

___ You can usually tell whether people are illegal immigrants by the way they look.

___ Illegal immigrants are taking jobs that belong to US citizens.

___ American employers seek to hire Illegal immigrants.

___ Illegal immigrants have contributed much to American culture. *

___ Illegal immigrants place excessive strain on the American government and social services to provide for non-English speakers.

* indicates items to be reverse coded
Appendix H

Actions Against Illegal Immigrants Scale

Below is a list of proposed policy actions to be taken in response to Illegal Immigration.

Please use the following scale to indicate your support or opposition to each policy.

There are no right or wrong answers. Use this scale to indicate the number that best matches your response to each statement.

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<td>1</td>
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<td>Strongly Oppose</td>
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<td>Neither Support Nor Oppose</td>
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What types of actions should be taken against illegal immigrants to prevent the detrimental impact on the American economy and to American quality of life?

_____ 1. **Form a National Campaign against Illegal Immigration** – American citizens should rally to demonstrate their opposition towards illegal immigration.

_____ 2. **Citizen’s Boycott** – US citizens should band together to boycott all products produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.

_____ 3. **Governmental Economic Ban** – the US government should ban all products and services that are produced by companies/businesses employing illegal immigrants.
4. **Criminalization of Aiding and Employing Illegal Immigrants** – the US government should pursue legal action against those who provide economic and social support for illegal immigrants and their families including fines and prison terms for violators.

5. **Deportation of all Illegal Immigrants** – the US government require all illegal immigrants to return to their country of origin.

6. **Citizen Border Patrol** – those individuals residing along the borders of the US should have the right to protect the country’s interests via any means necessary, including violence and lethal force.

7. **Lethal Force Against Illegal Border Crossing** – the only effective means of keeping illegal immigrants out is to shoot them as they attempt to cross they border.

8. **Deportation with the use of Lethal Force** – the US government should forcibly deport all illegal immigrants. Those who fail to leave are to be executed.
Appendix I

Instructions:

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from ‘1’ to ‘7’. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance.

2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.

3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
5. It’s always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in peoples’ minds.

6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.

7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.

9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.

11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

12. The “old-fashioned” ways and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.

13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.

14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.
15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”

16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.

17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.

18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.
19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.

20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.

21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional” family values.

22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.
Appendix J

Instructions:

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number from ‘1’ to ‘7’. Your first responses are usually the most accurate.

1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.

2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

5. If certain groups stayed in their place we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.

8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

9. It would be good if groups could be equal.

10. Group equality should be our ideal.

11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. We should increase social equality.

14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.

15. We should strive to make incomes more equal.

16. No one group should dominate in society.