INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: WIELDERS OF POWER IN THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

International Organizations: Wielders of Power in the Emerging International Order

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Do international organizations have power in the international system? This study evaluates the impact of regional international organizations in modern global affairs. The study employs statistical and case study research to uncover the process involved in regional intervention in support of constitutional order. It weighs the impact of regional organizations vis-à-vis regional powers and powerful states at the global-level. The empirical findings show that regional organizations hold power independent and at times greater than powerful states in the international system. Realism remains the dominant theory in international relations, yet current global trends evidenced from this project question the usefulness of realist-based assumptions that states are the sole dominant actors in the international system, even in a world filled with international organizations.
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For over three hundred years, nation-states have dominated global affairs. They have also been the focus of scholarship on international relations. The dominant view is that international organizations created by nation-states since the nineteenth century have held a subservient role as instruments of states to facilitate the existing diplomatic, economic, and legal relationships that had been occurring between them for centuries. Following World War II, international organizations increased in number, developing complex structures and increasing their role in international affairs. States remain hesitant to sacrifice sovereignty to supranational authorities, but the complexities of modern international affairs has made these organizations indispensable to the conduct of diplomacy between states. International organizations in this study can also be understood as intergovernmental organizations that are comprised of states as members,
differing from nongovernmental organizations with a global presence comprised of nongovernmental or non-state members. Intergovernmental organizations provide a means to facilitate cooperation and dialogue among states, as well as the administrative mechanisms to execute collective decisions and address problems between (and at times within) states as they arise.

Breaking with realist-based assumptions, neoliberal institutionalism in international relations embraces international institutions as relevant non-state actors in the international system. At its core the function of intergovernmental organizations in neoliberal institutional thought is that, although states maintain their freedom to participate or comply with agreements made by the majority of an organization’s member states, they often find the growing number of intergovernmental organizations useful to minimize the costs and likelihood of conflict, increase efficiency, and boost international standing. Cooperative agreements among states—such as the facilitation of global mail exchange and worldwide telecommunication networks—have mutual advantages for all states involved, and few disadvantages. Increasing contact across state lines in the modern world requires more complex mechanisms for collaboration to promote common interests across national boundaries (Koehane and Nye 1977, Koehane 1984, Archer 1992, Martin 1992, Goldstein 2000 et al., Hawkins et al. 2006, Barkin 2006, Acharya and Johnston 2007, Dai 2007). Intergovernmental organizations are increasing in number and complexity, and have become indispensable tools of states, especially the most powerful ones, in the conduct of modern global affairs that reduces the likelihood of conflict among states while promoting interdependent cooperation that can impact both international relations between states and their domestic affairs. Today, there are around
190 nation-states in the international system, while there are over 300 intergovernmental organizations (Bennett and Oliver 2002: 4).

While neoliberal institutionalism embraces the role of international institutions in relations among states—promoting cooperation, reducing potential for conflict, and also having an impact on domestic affairs of states—the question remains, do international organizations themselves have power? While little has been done of the power of international organizations independent of states some studies assert that they have power of moral authority and information because of their capability to gather data from member states (Barkin 2006: 23-24). Moving beyond the core of neoliberal institutionalism the hypothesis of this study assumes a greater power of international organizations in the international system that parallels and rivals the power of states. It also further undermines neorealist assertions that international institutions are simply a new venue for power politics of nation states.

Even the most advanced and developed nation-states in the international system do not fully control their most essential bureaucracies, which they established independently and placed under their sole authority (Levy 1986; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Zisk 1993; Halperin, Clapp and Kanter 2006). It is astonishing then that the dominant view in international relations based in neorealism reduces intergovernmental organizations, which are in essence supranational bureaucracies jointly established under the collective authority of several nation-states, as reflecting the influence of just the few powerful states in the organization. This oversimplified notion does not begin to explain the true nature of intergovernmental organizations within global affairs and should not be accepted as remotely reflective of reality. Just like other types of bureaucratic
organizations, intergovernmental organizations have standard operating procedures created by the agreements that established them and governed by the rules and procedures developed collectively by member states. The actions of the intergovernmental organization are determined by the procedures established to facilitate cooperation and integration among members. No single state or individual decision-maker can immediately alter these procedures once they have been created.

Intergovernmental organizations have set priorities and agendas that mirror the expressed basis for their creation. The main priority of international organizations is to execute their agenda in the international system. In doing so, they protect their budgets and overall standing in the system by responding to threats and defending the organizational agenda when overlap occurs in the international system. Overlap may occur as a result of other international organizations that have member states with concurrent membership. It may also arise due to competition with other bureaucratic organizations within member states that are defending their bureaucratic organization and its importance. Other international organizations or domestic bureaucratic organizations will be reluctant to give up their own importance to the intergovernmental organization. International organizations engage in turf wars and other organizational behavior in the same manner as domestic bureaucratic organizations. As a result, the behavior of international organizations could potentially fail to reflect the wishes and desires of decision-makers (member states), especially since cooperation with national bureaucracies is one of the key functions assigned to international organizations. As in any complex bureaucracy, individual decision-makers, even in small groups, do not fully control the organization. In order to understand them, one must take into account the
forces of bureaucratic organization theory. The activities of international organizations should be viewed as an organizational output that innately places limits on member states (decision-makers) in executing policy.

International institutions are designed to promote cooperation and further entrench interdependency among states. Since WWII interdependence has caused states become reliant on each other especially at the regional level (Beslin et al. 2002, Söderbaum and Shaw 2003, Milner and Moravcsik 2009). Beyond *Power and Interdependence*, the power of interdependence can be held and wielded by highly integrated regional organizations when the regional IO is the primary vehicle for integration. Interdependency power of regional IO’s is held independently of powerful states within the organization. Coupled with the power of moral authority and information, interdependency power of regional IO’s in their region may be greater than the power of even the most powerful nation states in the international system in the same region.

Most intergovernmental organizations emerged after the Second World War, yet institutional security mechanisms had been created more than one hundred years prior in order to counter the threat posed by the Napoleonic Empire, on behalf of a collective security alliance between Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, and Austria-Hungry (Archer 1992). A similar establishment of collective security was a core principle for the League of Nations and the United Nations, which emerged as the preeminent global intergovernmental organizations after the First and Second World Wars, respectively. The League of Nations, the last piece of US President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, was meant to be a “general association of nations…for the purpose of
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”¹ Although the United States never joined the League of Nations, it is considered the first international organization with universal membership and members from every major region of the world. The United States often cooperated with the activities of the League—though not as an official member—through the US Consul in Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert (Bennet & Oliver 2002: 31). The two major principles of the League were that members should respect and preserve the territorial integrity and independence of other states, and that any war or threat of war was a matter of concern to the League as a whole. The Covenant of the League of Nations purposefully steered clear of matters of domestic affairs, a provision advanced by the United States delegation when the covenant was drafted. On domestic matters, the Covenant of the League of Nations contained few provisions for fair and humane labor conditions or the just treatment of non-self-governing peoples.

The bulk of the framework of the Covenant dealt with international relations between states, with an emphasis on dispute resolution and the prevention of war by adjudication. Sanctions were designated as the collective response against violators of international peace or the territorial sovereignty of member states. The Council of the League of Nations was the primary organ of the organization, designed to peaceably resolve disputes alongside another universal international organization, the Permanent Court of International Justice, by providing a means to negotiate and sanction members who violated the covenant. The onset of the Second World War brought an end to the League of Nations as it was deemed a failure in preventing the global conflict, yet many

¹ See Covenant of the League of Nations.
of its principles made their way into the framework of the United Nations, its immediate successor.

As the Second World War was drawing to an end, the Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco and came into force shortly thereafter on October 24. The lofty ideals and principles set forth in the preamble were an unmistakably bright vision of hope in comparison to the opaque conditions of the world at that time. Moreover, the Charter addresses domestic affairs to a greater degree than the Covenant of the League of Nations had. It calls for restoring “faith in fundamental human rights” and “the dignity and worth of the human person,” with equal rights for “men and women and of nations large and small.” It promotes “better standards of life” so people can “live together in peace with one another as good neighbors,” and commits to “the economic and social advancement of all peoples.” As to how these objectives should be achieved, it asserts that its member states will strive to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” Today, the United Nations stands as a major element in the codification of international law.²

Conventions and declarations passed through the newly constituted UN further addressed domestic affairs. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—both adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and entering into force on March 23, 1976—all seek to establish internationally recognized standards for

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² Two key divisions responsible for codification are the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and the International Law Commission established through article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations.
human rights and governance. The UN Charter was designed to achieve three objectives; like the League of Nations before it, the primary goal of the UN Charter was to maintain and preserve international peace and security. The second goals are to facilitate cooperation on social and economic affairs and advance the respect of human rights globally. Third, the charter recognizes the sovereign equality of all its members, in that all states are recognized as legal entities in the international system with political independence and territorial integrity that should be respected by all other member states (see Peterson 2006). The charter also requires that all members refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with UN purposes and that member states resolve international disputes peacefully. Members also agree on collective support of enforcement actions on behalf of the United Nations, through upholding sanctions and not aiding states that are objects of UN enforcement actions.

Aside from the League of Nations and the United Nations, numerous regional and cultural intergovernmental organizations later arose throughout the world. The UN Charter makes it clear in paragraph two of Article 52 that regional arrangements are to be the primary means for resolving disputes among member states that have established regional agreements. Only when member states have exhausted all regional arrangements for conflict resolution should a dispute be brought to the United Nations Security Council for deliberation. Regional intergovernmental organizations are recognized as an integral component of the international system by the UN Charter, which places them at the forefront of maintaining international peace and security. There are thousands of intergovernmental organizations, government-sponsored organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in the international system that have substantially
changed international relations in the modern world, including the World Bank, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and Human Rights Watch (see Bennet and Oliver).

**From Anarchy to an Emerging Order**

The objective of this study is to determine whether intergovernmental organizations make substantial contributions to global affairs. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that international institutions promote cooperation in the international system that can impact both relations between states as well as domestic affairs. One such domestic outcome that international organizations have included in their agendas has been the preservation of constitutional order. By evaluating the impact of international organizations on the maintenance of constitutional order, I seek to determine if there is strong empirical evidence demonstrating the influence of international organizations vis-à-vis powerful states in the immediate region and in the international system as a whole.

Few approaches to this topic have focused on the role of international organizations in such domestic affairs as constitutional order. Various works on democratization highlight regional trends of democratic change (Gleditsch and Ward 2004; Whitehead 1996) whereby transition in one state increases the likelihood of other states in the region undergoing a similar change, yet these studies do not specify the process behind this trend. Analysis of international organizations largely focuses on the way in which they affect international processes but not domestic affairs (Kennedy 1987; Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane & Martin 1995). A small body of literature focuses on international institutions and their domestic effects in a few industrially developed or
long-established democratic states (Drezner 2003; Milner 1997, Kahler & Lake, 2003). There is also work on nongovernmental organizations and domestic change (Sikkink 2004). John Pevehouse’s *Democracy From Above* is one of the few works that analyzes regional international organizations and the effect they have on democratic transition and consolidation. This analysis uses quantitative data to establish causal links between democratization and membership in democracy-promoting regional organizations, and refutes realist assumptions that these organizations are controlled by powerful solitary actors (i.e., the largest member state). The study’s primary regions of focus were Europe and Latin America. The main regional organizations it discussed were thus the Council of Europe, European Economic Community (EC/EU), the Organization of American States, NATO, and MERCOSUR. Furthermore, it identifies cases in which regional organizations helped complete a democratic transition, prevented a reversal to authoritarianism, or even collapsed an authoritarian government. This study concludes that regional organizations are an important and effective means of bringing about democracy and sustaining it where it already exists.

While the study shows that regional international organizations can impact the outcome of democratic transition, it asserts that in Africa and Asia, more so than in other areas of the world, international organizations are less significant. Citing evidence that Africa and Asia have few regional international organizations and that their existing international organizations have a low democratic membership, studies suggests that one should not expect to find a systematic influence on states in those regions. These views are shared by many in the field of international relations that often considers Africa as an

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outlying region, claiming that many advanced theories in international relations are not applicable to Africa due to weak state structures and low levels of economic and political development (Okafor 2000). According to this logic, the least likely place to observe international organizations impacting modern international affairs would be in Africa and not in the places that the literature on international organizations focuses on, such as Western Europe and the Americas. In selecting these cases, the Pevehouse study fails to break away fully from the core of realism by only analyzing international organizations with the wealthiest and most powerful nation-states on the planet as members. In contrast, the focus of this study assesses the impact of international organizations in modern international affairs by deliberately including cases of developing nations in Africa, where it is least expected that these organizations would have an impact. At present, very little study has been conducted on international organizations in Africa and even less so at the sub-regional level. This project focuses specifically on assessing the impact of regional international organizations in promoting and consolidating constitutional order in the West African sub-region. Constitutional order and democracy are separate and distinct conditions where the latter does not usually exist without the former. Constitutional order is defined as a condition where all political and governing institutions attain and sustain power through constitutional means. Emphasis on constitutional order in this study is done to establish an observable benchmark of the power of international organizations without being mired by the debate of competing definitions of democracy that emphasize outcomes and procedures or just the latter. In the last decade, there has been a dramatic reduction in the incidence of breakdown in constitutional governance in West Africa. In the 1990s, 12 West African leaders were
either killed or removed from power by coups or failed coups. Similarly, there were 12 in
the 80s, 10 in the 70s, and 16 in the 60s. From 2000 to 2009, only three West African
leaders were removed in coups. In Guinea-Bissau, one of the three, military rule lasted
for less than two weeks and officers willingly withdrew as planned for a neutral civilian
transitional leader, selected through regionally mediated negotiations to oversee the
upcoming elections (McGowan, 2005: 10, see also IRIN, Sept. 2003). The reason given
for the coup was the repeated delay of constitutionally scheduled elections by the civilian
leadership, which some in the political elite believed to be illegal, contradicting previous
agreements and the state’s constitution.4 Both of the other two cases, occurring in 2005
and 2008, took place in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

In the years 1960 -1999, 50 leaders were killed or removed in coups and coup
attempts in West Africa. The probability of a coup occurring in the 16 West African
countries in the 40 years was 0.078125. In the years 2000-2009 there were only three
coups in the region. The probability of a coup occurring in the last ten years was 0.01875.
The binomial proportion test comparing the probability of coups in the two time frames at
the 99% confidence level found that the probability of a leader being killed or removed in
a coup or an attempted coup in West Africa from 1960 – 1999 is greater than the
probability of the same event occurring from 2000 – 2009. This reduction in the number
of West African leaders removed or killed in coups or coup attempts is statistically
significant. The shift after 1999 suggests the need for a closer examination of the region
to better understand why coups have become less common.

4 Following a presidential assassination in Guinea-Bissau March 2, 2009, the only ECOWAS state this
decade to have a leader removed by a coup, constitutional order has been respected in the succession of
power.
Table 1

| (1960 – 1969) | 16 |
| (1970 – 1979) | 10 |
| (1980 – 1989) | 12 |
| (1990 – 1999) | 12 |
| (2000 – 2009) | 3 |

Binomial proportion test, \( p_1 = \frac{50}{640} = 0.078125; \ p_2 = \frac{3}{160} = 0.01875; \ p = \frac{(50+3)}{(640+160)} = 0.06625; \ N_1 = 640, \ N_2 = 160. \ Z = \frac{0.059375/0.02198383}{0.02198383} = 2.700849. \) One sided p-value is 0.0034581<0.01. *World Political Leaders 1945-2009*, http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00index.htm (accessed July 13, 2009).

Evaluating the risk of coups is part of democratization literature (Diamond and Plattner 1996). There has also been some focus on how to manage coup risk (Snyder 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996), sometimes through subordinating armed forces (Farcau, 1994; Feaver 1995, 1996; Quinlivan 1999) or using foreign threats as diversions (Huth and Russet 1993; Walt 1994). There are many variables and regional specificities at the national level, as well as historical individuality, leaving few reliable ways to quantitatively study coup risk (Belkin and Schofer 2003; 597) or predict when coups are most likely to occur. It seems clear that around the turn of the millennium, the West African region experienced a decisive shift, evident in the decade that followed. In December of 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed the *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security*, which pronounced the regional community’s commitment to constitutional order. It contains a zero-tolerance policy for coups and unconstitutional seizures of power among member states. This position was further defined in
Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. A significant reduction in the number of leaders being removed or killed by coups or attempted coups in the region can be traced to that very point.

Just as with law enforcement where it is difficult if not impossible to determine how many crimes have not occurred as a result of increased police vigilance, it is equally difficult to determine how many coups did not occur in West Africa over the last decade for the same reasons. What can be observed though is a decrease in crime or a decrease in coups in the case of West Africa over a period of time. What also can be observed is the response of law enforcement or the response of the regional organization to a violation of their protocols or laws for law enforcement. Considering cases in which constitutional order broke down but there was substantial integration with regional international organizations, and contrasting them to cases where there was less integration in regional international organizations, it may be possible to demonstrate that in Africa these organizations have a significant impact on international affairs. Further if West African regional organizations can be shown to have the power to reverse coups it can also logically be assumed that they are largely responsible for the decrease in coups over the last decade. This is significant because preventing coups would likely be easier than reversing them given that a coup reversal could send a potentially strong message to future plotters that such acts would not be taken lightly akin to a high-profile police crackdown on criminal activity. This would also suggest that Africa should not be excluded from the discourse on international organizations or other systematic theories in international relations, but that it can in fact offer some of the most convincing empirical observations of theory in practice. By leaving Africa out of the literature on international
organizations, scholars in international relations may rob themselves of the opportunity to bolster theory with robust empirical data.

In Pevehouse’s study, the impact of regional international organizations on democratization is broken into two related theories: transition and consolidation. Transition is defined as a change from an authoritarian government to a procedural democratic system. Consolidation is defined as the preservation of an existing procedural democratic system. Transition mechanisms initially advanced are: (1) encouraging domestic liberalization and providing protection to key elite groups, (2) socializing key elite groups, and (3) legitimizing the interim regime. Regional international organizations in transition are able to “re-educate” political elites on the value of democracy and persuade domestic actors to embrace political reforms. The mechanisms of consolidation (1) help new democracies commit to certain policies by binding losers and winners, (2) deter anti-regime forces, (3) limit audience costs, (4) provide legitimization of regimes, and (5) provide resources to gain the support of societal groups. The theory advances an additional mechanism of changing national institutions to better support democracy, which appeared in the case of Greece. Yet this mechanism, he asserts, may have appeared in Greece due to the EU’s utilization of state-building devices not present in other regional organizations. Binding domestic stakeholders is the most effective mechanism produced by organizations, in that it provides conditional benefits on the basis of support for democratic governance.

Pevehouse applies this theory to each of the steps that lead to democratic transition, following the methods of third wave democratization literature, demonstrating that international organizations (IOs) serve as a cause for each step. In the

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democratization process, initial liberalization usually occurs as the result of an exogenous shock that is either political or economic in nature, forcing elites to act. Regional IOs can serve as a source of this exogenous shock to push for liberalization using both political and economic measures such as suspension, sanctions, and verbal condemnation.

Regional international organizations can also provide guarantees to business and military elites that establishing a democratic state will not lead to adverse policies, such as populism or the purging of opponents. They can safeguard elite interests through international agreements for trade and investment, locking in certain social and economic policies throughout the region, irrespective of regime type. Similarly, military elites are safeguarded from attacks of future governments (i.e. amnesty) and steered clear of domestic political conflicts through regional mediators and collective security organizations that provide support, aid, and benefits from alliances with other member states. IOs can bolster the standing and legitimacy of transitioning or interim regimes, both domestically and internationally. A state in transition is surrounded by uncertainties that inhibit commitment to reform, such as through the holding of elections. Membership in regional IOs, such as the EU, serves as a source of national pride, assuring that interim regimes will reorient foreign policy. It also assures assistance in the transitional process, providing the easiest path to remove said uncertainties.

In cases of consolidation, regional international organizations assist member states by binding elites that would lose status as a result of the democratic system (“losers”) or who would have a higher status in an authoritarian regime. The military is often the key “loser” and the most visible threat to the consolidation of democracy. Business elites are also potential losers due to policies that may affect their interests or
preclude more favorable financial conditions under an authoritarian regime. Regional international organizations, in a process similar to binding elites during transition by providing safeguards and guarantees, bind the elite in consolidation by heightening the cost of moving against the democratic system through both economic and political isolation. Sanctions, condemnation, and suspensions are means by which the cost of anti-regime activities can be increased for elites that find themselves on the losing end.

Beyond keeping costs high for domestic losers, as outlined in past studies, I would add that international losers are also weakened or muted by regional IOs. International losers include opportunistic states and multi-national businesses outside of the affected country, seeking to take advantage of the unstable situation of a post-coup state to gain political and economic leverage. These international losers are pushed out by regional international organizations that play a central role in the transition or consolidation process; they are reduced to the periphery, only able to engage in the process proactively if they are invited by the operative regional organization. Where regional IOs are integrally involved, non-member states do not have major roles; neither do multi-national business interests, except when invited by the regional organization to work under the direction of the region. In addition to binding losers, regional international organizations also provide bribes to losing elites through economic assistance and direct transfer of resources such as energy. In consolidation, winners are contained from using their power to ensure permanent advantages, in order to prevent fragility due to mistrust from the masses or the elite in opposition. Regional international organizations provide an external means through which winners can bind themselves to political liberalization and compromises of power. This occurs through the conditionality
of membership and the regional agreements restraining their actions in order to maintain credible institutions or other regional policy standards and agreements. Such accountability serves as an external validation of the new government that increases the likelihood of acceptance by the masses.

**Regional International Organizational Theory**

Supranational regional organizations are bureaucratic organizations designed to integrate member states to reduce the cost of governing and increase efficiency. Effective integration should have mutual benefits for all members at minimal costs. The more areas of cooperation the regional organization assumes, the more integrated its member states could potentially become. Integration leads member states to set budgets, organize personnel, create corresponding standard operating procedures, allow more decision-making on domestic affairs to occur outside their borders, and reorient foreign policy to reflect their membership with the regional body. Membership within the organization is voluntary in large part. Yet for expediency, states reorient many of their basic affairs to coordinate with the efficiency-maximizing regional organizations they create. Though states have the choice to create, change, and sustain these organizations, they are not in total control once they have been integrated. The relationship between states and regional organizations is one in which power is jointly shared. As a result of interdependency, states become reliant on integration with each other. Highly integrated regional organizations hold the power of interdependency when they are the primary vehicle for integration.

When a circumstance in a member state requires intervention, supranational regional organizations lead in the process. All other international actors participate
largely in coordination with the regional organization. International actors that do not coordinate with the regional organization are not welcomed by the organization, as they may threaten the agenda or prestige of the body and could cause a turf war. Regional organizations naturally seek to eliminate unwanted competition from those who do not support the organization’s agenda. Interventions follow standard operating procedures. States that hold the chairmanship of the regional body—regardless of size or economic status—lead the process. They are followed by other organizational leaders, including secretaries general or presidents of regional organizations. The designated appointees of these figures may also lead in the intervention process. Regional leaders schedule emergency meetings and regional summits among members, as well as negotiations and consultations with the targets in the member state. The supranational regional organization also coordinates other like-minded stake-holders, and control who gets to attend the intervention summits and meetings they schedule. Supranational regional organizations are best equipped to make the most direct overtures towards the targets as a result of regular and consistent integrated contact with member states. In many cases, leaders of supranational regional organizations know the targets in member states personally. International actors outside the region coordinate with the regional international organization while the regional body does most of the management and monitoring on the ground. International actors outside the organization do not coordinate international interventions, nor do they host intervention meetings and consultations. In the absence of an integrated supranational regional organization, international stake-holders that may not have similar views or who do not coordinate with the region may be able to directly engage the targets and possibly influence the process.
Targets within member states respond instantly to the advances of the regional organizations, to which they also address their demands and concerns more than any other international stake-holders. Supranational regional organizations are integrated to the point that the regular and immediate affairs of member states become affected during intervention. Supranational regional organizations often embrace freedom of movement of nationals across borders, market activity, and other regular daily benefits from being integrated with the body. If they are pressured through such an organization, the targets may immediately address concerns of other parties outside the region. Concerns of other parties outside of the organization have a lesser impact on the immediate affairs of state, and thus have a minor impact on the short-term calculus of the targets.

The cost-raising strategies (or “sticks”) that have an immediate impact are almost exclusively the domain of the supranational regional organizations. Cost-raising strategies, either threatened or executed, could include condemnation both in public and behind closed doors, suspension of membership from the regional body and other forms of political isolation, sanctions on trade, travel bans for key targets, and other cost-raising mechanisms including coercive intervention. I do not expect to see donors, international financial institutions, or aid organizations having an immediate impact even if they threaten the withdrawal of aid as a cost-raising mechanism. At most, the immediate contributions of donors signal support for the supranational regional organization’s intervention efforts. Regional organizations also provide and arrange incentives (“carrots”) such as aid, technical support, legitimacy, and coordination of other aid for the targets in order to further encourage their cooperation and compliance with the
organization. External donors may also be included in the process of providing aid incentives in support of regional organizations.

Supranational regional organizations restrain targets that are “winners” to ensure that there are safeguards to protect targets that are “losers, preventing opponents from establishing permanent advantages over one another. Regional organizations engage all stakeholders and signal the region’s expectations for their cooperation, binding them through monitored agreements on regional standards, protocols, declarations, and other settlements reached at emergency summits surrounding intervention. Constraints on winners create an added incentive for all sides to cooperate, enhancing the credibility of the regional IO as a trustworthy mediator. In the absence of supranational regional organizations there are fewer safeguards and constraints on targets. As a result, there is a great deal of distrust among domestic stakeholders, which slows the process of intervention, creates fragility, and introduces incentives for stakeholders to defect after the intervention.

Realist-based alternate theories explaining international intervention suggest that regional organizations are not important, independent of powerful states. Realist hypotheses alternatively assume that powerful states within regional blocks dominate the institutions each region creates. According to this hypothesis, a very dominant state within a region sets up organizations to use them as an instrument of its foreign policy. In doing so, powerful states establish rules and procedures that reflect their national interests. In addition, regional powers assume the lead role in intervention while other states yield to them, regardless of rules and procedures. Other realist hypotheses assert that large, powerful states dominate international intervention at the global level, including
interventions outside their own region. Global powers—through a combination of conditional threats and incentives to either cut or provide aid to targeted states—influence policy. Economic reliance, of the poorest developing states in particular, is presumed to ensure immediate compliance with the desires of large, powerful donor states or groups of large donor states in the international system.

**Case Selection**

Four states in West Africa have experienced unconstitutional transfers of power in the decade following 2000, two of which did not last more than a few weeks. Only Mauritania underwent a repeated unconstitutional power transfer. In 2003, a coup took place in Guinea-Bissau in which the military overthrew and arrested the civilian leadership for repeatedly delaying constitutionally scheduled elections. A civilian administrator was appointed through regional mediation after a few weeks to oversee the elections, and the military willingly withdrew in days. In 2005, the long-time president of Togo died, and shortly afterward the army named his son as the new president. After regional intervention, this appointment was reversed back to constitutional order. Also in 2005, Mauritania underwent an army-led coup that overthrew the longstanding president while he was out of the country. This coup was not overturned and Mauritania did not return to constitutional order until 18 months after the coup had occurred. Once again in 2008, the army in Mauritania overthrew the elected government just 15 months after the new administration took power. This process was not reversed either, and new elections did not take place until July of 2009, almost a year after the initial coup occurred and amid much controversy. Most recently, the army took power in Guinea after the longtime president died. Regional mediators moved for elections to occur within one year
following the death of the sitting president. All five cases represent breaks in constitutional order, some of which did not last. Only in the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania were leaders removed from power; in the cases of Togo and Guinea, the army took power after the death of the sitting president before a constitutional transition could occur.

In selecting which cases to study, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea are problematic because both are known to have substantial narco-trafficking industries, with numerous security issues that arise from the presence of well-financed organized criminal activity. In Guinea-Bissau, a recent string of assassinations took place in 2009, claiming both the sitting president and the head of the army; as a result, locating reliable information on the transfer of power has become problematic at the present. The transition of power in both countries, especially Guinea, is also very recent, and the outcome of intervention is not yet known. Still, both cases appear to support the thesis that regional integration through intergovernmental regional organizations will collectively push back to avert unconstitutional transfers of power among member states, now that it has been made a core policy. The cases of Togo and Mauritania present fewer problems for conducting a study and uncovering information. In 2003, São Tomé & Príncipe, a nearby Central African country closely integrated with West Africa and in particular Nigeria, also faced an unconstitutional transfer of power. Just as with Guinea-Bissau, constitutional order was restored in several weeks. Also like Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Principe is a Lusophone country with close ties to Portugal. This case makes for a reasonable

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6 See IRIN, 5 March 2009. GUINEA-BISSAU-SENEGAL: Assassinations breed uncertainty in neighboring Casamance. Given the heightened sensitivity, official sources are not disposed to providing any information that could further undermine ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability.

comparison to test the impact of regional intergovernmental organization theory alongside Togo in 2005 and Mauritania in 2005 and 2008.

**Case 1: São Tomé & Príncipe Coup of 2003, GGC, ECCAS, AU**

On July 16, 2003, a coup occurred in São Tomé & Príncipe while the president, Fradique de Menezes, was on an official state visit in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. The junta leaders that had taken over this small island nation off the Nigerian coastline were immediately condemned and called upon to step down. After receiving pressure and participating in negotiations, the coup plotters stepped aside, allowing the president to return aboard a Nigerian presidential jet and restore civilian rule (Seibert 2003). Given the proximity of Nigeria to São Tomé, its relative size, and the fact that the civilian president was in the Nigerian capital, it was highly likely that this case would be resolved bilaterally. Any coordinated and cooperative effort among IOs of which São Tomé & Príncipe is a member—namely the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)—would strengthen the validity of the expected process that regional IOs take to preserve constitutionality. Even in unlikely scenarios these institutions may still matter, and may constrain or guide member states’ actions when dealing with issues of consolidating constitutional order in the immediate region.

**Case 2: Togo Power Transition in 2005, ECOWAS, AU**

On February 6, 2005 the long-standing president of Togo, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died suddenly in his sleep. Shortly thereafter the army named his son, Faure Gnassingbé (who was also a member of the national assembly), president in his place in an
emergency address to the nation. The army also suspended the constitution. Under the Togolese constitution, the speaker of the National Assembly is to become president. At the time of the president’s death, Faure Gnassingbé was the communications minister and a member of the National Assembly, but not the speaker. However, the current speaker was in Paris at the time. The next morning, the National Assembly convened with the members who were present and unanimously selected Faure Gnassingbé to be speaker and thus president. In addition, the assembly removed the legal requirement to hold elections in 60 days following the vacancy of the office of president, clearing the way for Faure Gnassingbé to lead until 2008 when the next presidential elections were scheduled. Essentially, the National Assembly made him president after the announcement of the army a day earlier. The dealings by the army were widely condemned as a coup and the subsequent actions taken by the National Assembly were rejected as a mere rubber stamp on that coup. Nigeria sent a high-level envoy and invited the unrecognized Togolese leader to its capital for talks. After intervention, the moves were overturned and Togo returned to constitutional order, holding a special election within the constitutionally stipulated 60-day transition period (Ebeku 2005). Togo is a member of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Case 3: Mauritania Coup of 2005, AU

On August 3, 2005, as the sitting president of Mauritania, Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, was out of the country attending a funeral, the army assumed control of the state and refused re-entry to the president, who was forced to land in nearby Niger. Intervention after the coup was substantial: Nigeria sent a high-level envoy in the form of the foreign minister, as it had with Togo. After the intervention the junta remained in
power, pledging that within two years it would hold elections in which none of its members would stand as candidates (Jourde 2005; N’Diaye 2006). The Mauritania junta eventually held elections in 2007, and President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallah was elected. On August 6, 2008, the military overthrew the elected leader and Mauritania remained under a military government until May 2009, when a transitional authority was appointed to oversee yet another election (Reuters 2009). The outcome of intervention in Mauritania differed substantially from both Togo and São Tomé. One key difference is that in 2000, Mauritania withdrew its membership from ECOWAS, and therefore it is no longer a member of the regional body. It remains a member of the African Union (AU). Of the three cases, Mauritania is the least integrated with regional IOs.

**West Africa’s Regional Organizations**

There are several regional organizations relevant to the West African sub-region. First, the African Union, formerly called the Organization of African Unity, is a continent-wide body with a broad-based membership of states including those in West Africa. Preserving peace and security and maintaining constitutional order have emerged as a prominent issues at the continent-wide level, and thus the African Union has increased its role in this area. Second, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the primary organization of West Africa. All West African States are members of the organization except Mauritania, which withdrew in 2000. Like the African Union, ECOWAS has also played a proactive role in maintaining peace and security and has become increasingly involved in maintaining constitutional order as an extension of its original mandate. In addition to these two primary organizations, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)—the sister of ECOWAS in
Central Africa—plays a similar role to ECOWAS in its region. In particular, São Tomé & Príncipe is a member of ECCAS and often falls under the scope of that regional organization. In addition to ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), merges West and Central Africa in an organization created to coordinate security and energy policy among regional oil-exporting countries; its membership includes the coastal ECCAS members and Nigeria, a member of ECOWAS but not a member of ECCAS.

Beyond the primary regional intergovernmental organizations, there are a number of linguistic and cultural intergovernmental organizations that have relations with states in the region that hold concurrent membership to these IOs. As a result these IO’s may also have a role in all three cases. In the first case, São Tomé & Príncipe is a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), which includes states that are members of ECCAS and ECOWAS, as well as Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, but also members that are in other regions such as Brazil in Latin America, Mozambique in Southern Africa, East Timor in Asia, and Portugal in Europe. Being a non-regional body this organization and its member states play a secondary role to the regional organizations in the case of São Tomé and Príncipe, because it is a member and is integrated to a degree with states outside the region in this intergovernmental organization. São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo, and Mauritania are all members of the International Organization of Francophone States, or Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Also being a non-regional body, OIF and its member states may play a secondary role in Togo and Mauritania because both states are integrated with states outside its region through this cultural organization. São Tomé and Príncipe joined OIF in 1999, thus it has a much shorter history of integration with this organization than
Togo and Mauritania. In addition, Mauritania is a member of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Both of these intergovernmental organizations fall behind the main regional organization, the AU, in Mauritania’s case because geographic proximity makes regional organizations integration stronger and more immediate than integration in organizations with states outside the region.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the pre-eminent intergovernmental organization of the pan-Africanism movement, comprised of all the independent states in Africa excluding those under apartheid or colonial rule. The main principle behind pan-African unity was that there was a common African struggle that could only be addressed if the continent worked collectively. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity states, “All African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of the peoples can be assured.” The belief that Africa would be better off with a collective front was promoted emphatically by the first President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who together with other pan-Africanists forged the drive to establish the OAU (Addona 1969).

Pan-Africanism underscores the common legacy of African states as being underdeveloped vis-à-vis the rest of the world—a reality that cannot be addressed by one state but rather requires the collective cooperation of all of the region’s people. It asserts that each individual country becomes greater and more significant when it combines its resources and works together with other states. The spread of pan-African ideals closely paralleled African nationalism movement. Many of the original pan-African leaders were also African nationalist leaders in their respective countries. The drive for independence from colonial rule and representation were common issues that leaders across the
continent all agreed upon, and thus sought to address in partnership with one another. African leaders reinforced their unity through the common objective of moving their people towards independence, calling for greater respect and freedom to determine their own ways forward.

The OAU, both in its form and proposed function, served to institutionalize pan-Africanism, African nationalism, and African unity, deepening the economic, political and social integration of the continent and its people. As more states became independent, divisions began to form over the shape and scope that African unity should take on. Three multi-national conferences took place on behalf of the various competing splinter groups; the more proactive radical group met in Casablanca, while a moderate faction of African leaders held their meetings in Brazzaville and later Monrovia. These meetings were venues for leaders with similar political mindsets to coordinate their strategies to win over the continent; thus leaders who wanted a strong, confederated union met separately from leaders who wanted a weaker organization or no organization at all. The Casablanca Group consisted of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic (now Egypt), and Algeria. President Nkrumah of Ghana led this group (Naldi: 2, 38). The first meeting of moderate leaders in Brazzaville included representatives from Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D’Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Mauritania, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). In a later meeting held in Monrovia, the full Brazzaville Group grew to include Liberia, Togo, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In general, the Monrovia Group rejected a political union of African states, stressing the sovereignty of states based on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Still, the group urged
solidarity among Africans and called for cooperation in economic, cultural, scientific and
technical areas.

In stark contrast, the Casablanca group sought to form a political union, forming what President Nkrumah often called “the United States of Africa.” The plan they formulated was to create a central authority that would unify Africa into one political entity. At a continental summit in May of 1963, thirty states met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the capital of the oldest African country that withstood European conquest until a brief occupation in WWII. At the summit, both sides presented their arguments as to how best to promote unity in Africa. Competing arguments both for and against federalism were advanced. In the end the Monrovia Group, with its superior numbers, prevailed. Its vision for advancing unity in Africa was embraced as the OAU Charter took shape, emphasizing the sovereignty of member states. Eventually leaders settled on a compromise with the Casablanca Group, accepting a mildly proactive OAU in the arena of liberation and decolonization that would be less unified than the confederation advocated by Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of Egypt, and Nyerere of Tanganyika. The strong pan-African views of the Casablanca Group influenced the formation and the overall vision of the OAU, although the organization took the Monrovia Group’s blueprint (Murithi: 8, 2005).

Historically, the OAU has taken a non-intervention policy with the internal affairs of member states. The primary aims of the OAU as outlined in Article 2(1) are:

to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states, co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence, eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and to promote international co-operation, having due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The organization positioned itself as a regional association aligned with the principles and objectives of the United Nations, making it the foremost organization for maintaining peace and security in the African region, in keeping with Article 52 of the UN Charter. The OAU Charter also sought collectively to contest neo-colonialism—the dependent ties left behind by colonial powers limiting the influence of newly independent states. The inclusion of this effort was largely attributed to President Nkrumah of Ghana and the Casablanca Group’s platform to aggressively combat colonial domination. The main areas of cooperation in the OAU were to be political affairs and diplomacy, economic matters, transport and communication, education, health and science, and cooperation for defense and security (Article 2(2) OAU Charter). The emphasis on cooperation weighed more in the economic areas than in the military and political (Naldi, 1999: 4-5). Proposals to become proactive in peace and security or create an African Defense Force, as was called for by Nkrumah, did not materialize until 1993 as an additional Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The principles of the OAU outlined in Article 3 followed the mild approach taken with the Monrovia Group regarding cooperation. Member states were called to adhere to the principles of sovereign equality of all members, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful settlements of disputes, condemnation of political assassination, dedication to emancipate African territories, and refusal to align themselves with any international blocs. Much of Article 3 of the OAU Charter mirrors Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. The strong emphasis on territorial integrity, non-interference, and equality among member states was designed to allay fears that some states would dominate the organization or other states in the process. It also set in place
organizational procedures that would allow equal representation for states irrespective of size, evident in three of the four main institutional units in the structure of the OAU.

The OAU contained four major organs to carry out its mandate: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The paramount organ of the OAU is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The assembly met to coordinate efforts around the continent, established specialized agencies when it deemed necessary, and held responsibility for interpreting and amending the OAU Charter. The Assembly also elected the Chairman of the OAU and appointed members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is the same body that elected members of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.\(^8\) The Assembly required a two-thirds majority vote to approve resolutions, except on procedural matters which required only a simple majority.

The Council of Ministers of the OAU acted as a subsidiary to the Assembly of Heads of State, doing most of the preparatory work before the annual summits and holding regular meetings on at least one other occasion during the year. The Council only required a simple majority to pass resolutions, which were usually recommendations to the Assembly. They also needed at least two-thirds of member state delegations present in order to constitute a meeting of the council. The General Secretariat of the OAU acted as the administrator for the Council of Ministers, preparing materials for member states before meetings and distributing minutes of past meetings to delegations. In addition, the Secretariat maintained budget records, received gifts and donations, and processed the notifications and requests of member states. The Secretary General had little executive

\(^8\) Nouakchott Protocol on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
power and was intended to be a chief administrator of the OAU Secretariat rather than an active political figure. The Secretariat was designed to act as the civil service of the OAU, serving the Council of Ministers and all other special commissions established by the Assembly of Heads of State. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was supposed to mediate disputes between member states, but it never became fully operational. The proposed Commission required consent from the state parties in order for it to assert jurisdiction over dispute resolution; thus, it would never possess compulsory jurisdiction. The fact that it was never made operational reflects the OAU’s lack of effectiveness in conflict prevention.

The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights was passed in Banjul on June 27, 1981, entering into force on October 21, 1986. It was among the first steps the OAU took to address the issue of human rights abuse on the continent, especially emanating from conflict. The Charter echoed many of the themes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seeking to promote them more deliberately in Africa. The OAU Assembly adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1994, about a decade later, after several years of debating competing proposals. In the end, the mechanism conformed to the fundamental OAU principles of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. The Mechanism’s main body was composed of member states that formed the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, elected annually, and the Secretary-General of the OAU sat as its head. The Mechanism was used to mediate internal conflicts in Somalia, Congo, Rwanda, and Angola, as well as inter-state conflicts between Nigeria and Cameroon and Ethiopia and Eritrea. The clear ineffectiveness of these
interventions and the incapacity to handle conflicts on the continent led to calls for retooling the OAU mechanisms, and stronger calls to reevaluate the rigid OAU principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Yet the Mechanism signaled a change from the past and laid the groundwork for peace-keeping forces, going so far as to endorse the intervention of ECOWAS forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Naldi, 1999: 32-33). In addition to creating the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, the OAU took a firm stance on the maintenance of constitutional order in member states with Decision AHG.DEC 142 (XXV). Adopted in Algiers in July 1999, it established the framework for the OAU’s reaction to unconstitutional changes of government. Decision AHG.DEC 142 (XXV) of 1999 and its principles later became part of the treaty that formed the African Union, as well as various other agreements and instruments of regional intergovernmental organizations on the continent, including a similar measure passed by ECOWAS in December of the same year.

The African Union (AU) was formed deliberately to possess greater powers of intervention, beyond the capacity of the mechanisms of the OAU. The OAU was often characterized as a “club” of presidents and prime ministers, a reference to the central organ of the OAU Assembly. The rigid adherence to non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states was criticized for allowing human rights atrocities, which culminated in the genocide in Rwanda and other massacres in Sudan, DRC, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. In addition to the devastating impact of conflict, the period beginning in the 1980s and extending into the 90s was known as Africa’s “lost decade” because African economies shrank even while there was economic growth in other regions (Meredith 2005: 368-369). Almost identical to the way in which the United
Nations emerged as the direct successor of the League of Nations after the perils of WWII, the African Union emerged in the 90s after a decade of conflicts on the continent. The AU is the direct successor of the OAU, housed in the same headquarters in Addis Ababa. There are ten major organs of the AU; of them, the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers were retained from the OAU before it. In addition to these, there is a Pan-African Parliament, an Economic Social and Cultural Council, and a Peace and Security Council. The mandate of the Peace and Security Council is to intervene in member states to prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity (Murithi, 2005: 31).

The mandate of the Peace and Security Council is a significant break from the rigid principle of non-intervention of the OAU. In addition, the AU created the African Court of Justice, which will be based in Banjul, Gambia (Charter on the African Court of Justice). The newly formed AU has sought to integrate Africa’s defense forces with the creation of a pan-African Standby Rapid Reaction Force, which will contain 15,000 troops by the year 2010. In addition to the creation of a Pan-African Force, the AU has also considered the formation of an African High Command, an idea originally championed by Nkrumah when the OAU was founded.

The formation of the AU formally began with the Sirte Declaration of September 1999, when the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, holding their fourth Extraordinary Session in Libya, agreed to “establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives” of the OAU and its charter. At first, it was unclear whether the AU was simply a change of name, seeking to drop the old title and connection to the failures of the 90’s, or whether it would be a different and more robust organization. After the Sirte Declaration, the Secretary General of the OAU convened a meeting in
Addis Ababa on April 17–21 of the following year, attended by distinguished delegates from OAU member states who would commence drafting a treaty to establish the AU. Secretary General Salim outlined five main points: (1) the purpose of Sirte was to transcend the existing structures for integration and integration, (2) Sirte received broad support from ordinary people throughout the continent, (3) it was urgent to complete the treaty for the AU and Pan-African Parliament in order to submit it to the Summit in July 2000, (4) other integrative institutions in the world such as the EU must be taken into account, and (5) the Secretariat of the OAU must carry out the decisions taken at Sirte with a spirit of urgency (Biswaro, 2005: 69-70). There was an understanding among leaders in Africa that the OAU needed urgently to be reformed. There was also a greater willingness to concede sovereignty in exchange for a more effective continental body, one capable of addressing the political and economic calamities facing the continent.

After several rounds of meetings, the fourth of which took place in Libya and included several heads of state as delegates, a draft constitutive act for the AU was agreed upon and presented at the Lomé Summit in July of 2000, where it was signed on July 11 by 27 member states. By May 26, 2001, all member states had signed the constitutive act, entering it into force on that day—less than two years after the Sirte Declaration. The First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union took place in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 2002, in which the constitutive act was formally adopted.

The Constitutive Act of the AU reaffirms non-interference in Article 4, but in paragraph (j) it provides for the right of member states to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security. In the language of this clause, non-interference refers to non-military matters, while intervention is applied to military matters according
to customary international law (Biswaro 2005: 112-115). The ability of the AU to approve intervention for matters of peace and security is a direct link to the conflicts that plagued the continent in the 90s and the insufficient response of the continental body. In addition to clauses on intervention, Article 28 of the Constitutive Act rejects all unconstitutional changes of government—a carryover from an earlier declaration, and a much stronger stance than before. Under Article 30, unconstitutional governments may not participate in AU proceedings, and must remain suspended until constitutional order is restored. Madagascar’s seat at the 2002 Durban summit remained vacant because the government was unconstitutional and unrecognized by the AU, despite the fact that the United States, France, Norway and other powers recognized the Ravalomanana regime at the time. The AU set a new tone, even from its first summit, as to how affairs would be conducted on the continent, and made a clear signal to other actors in the international system to take note. Changes in function undermine pessimists who argue that the AU constitutes a mere change of name with little substantive alterations in the way the body operates (Sturman 2002, 2004; Cilliers and Sturman 2002). The AU does include a number of the old structures of the OAU, but a number of key differences in the way it functions were evident from the outset.

One institution retained by the AU from the OAU is the African Economic Community (AEC), established by an OAU treaty in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991 in order to promote economic integration on the continent. The pillars of the AEC are the regional economic communities, many of which were established before the AEC Treaty was adopted. There are eight regional economic communities: East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA). Due to ongoing disputes over Western Sahara, the AMU has largely been inactive with heads of state of member countries calling for its dissolution.9

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stands among the older regional economic communities on the continent. ECOWAS formed in 1975, but there were a number of attempts at integration in West Africa before that. The first President of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe, promoted a proposed West African Common Market in 1961, and his close friend and colleague Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, had proposed a West African Economic Union (Gambari 1991; Kufuor 2006: 21-22; Edi 2007: 27). These proposals were an integral part of what became the ECOWAS Treaty years later. Some measures taken towards integration were more intense than in a common market. In the late 50s and early 60s the Mali Federation, joining Senegal and Mali, and the Union of African States, comprised of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali (joining in 1961 as a single country) comprised the most acute examples of states willing to establish integrative links among each other in West Africa. Little was done to merge the institutions in these sovereign states, but the declaration of a political union to form one country signaled serious attempts toward integration. In addition, French-speaking countries in West Africa formed an economic community called the Union douanière de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UDAO) in 1959. The organization, planned before the

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economy of France. Several other organizations formed among French-speaking West African states, including a monetary union; most of them did not achieve regional integration but rather strengthened ties with France. The initial move towards the formation of ECOWAS was reignited by then-Lieutenant Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo, with the signing of a Nigeria-Togo agreement to form a West African Economic Community. This formed a unique and significant bond between an Anglophone and a Francophone state. Both heads of state began touring the capitals of regional states, meeting with fellow West African heads of state to convince them to join the union. The tour culminated in a meeting of 15 regional heads of state in Lomé, Togo in 1973. In May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria, the 15 signatory countries approved the ECOWAS Treaty.10

When the ECOWAS Treaty was forming, many heads of state in the region had shifted away from post-independence leadership towards military leaders. Their primary objective was to promote cooperation in order to achieve collective economic gains. Specifically, they aimed to eliminate customs, tariffs and trade barriers, establish a customs union, and ensure the free movement of persons, services, and capital throughout the community. The ECOWAS Treaty establishes five primary organs in its fourth article: the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, the Tribunal of the Community, and the Technical and Specialist Commissions. The Authority of Heads of State and Government is the central organ of ECOWAS, comprising the highest level decision-makers of member states. The Authority also selects a head of state from among its ranks to lead the organization. It

10 Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1978 as the 16th member. The Treaty entered into force on June 1975. Member states were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
meets at least once a year and holds the executive power of the organization. The Council of Ministers resides one step below the Authority. Each state has two representative members, who collectively make recommendations to the Authority and meet twice a year. Their decisions are binding on all other lower institutions of the community. Article 8 establishes the Secretariat, to be headed by an Executive Secretary. It is meant to assist all other institutions of the community execute their functions by reporting on meetings and issuing special studies relating to the objectives of the community. The Technical and Specialist Commission is comprised of representatives from each member state, and submits periodic reports through the Executive Secretary of the Community and to the Council of Ministers. The Tribunal of the Community has judicial power to interpret the treaty and to settle disputes.

In addition, the community enacted a number of protocols that serve to deepen integration and cooperation. For instance in 1976, ECOWAS members signed a Non-Aggression Protocol in which members obligated themselves to refrain from the use of threats or force in their foreign relations with member states. Furthermore, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense (PMAD) of 1981 lays out a framework for integrating military institutions in the community. The protocol created an ECOWAS Defense Council that would set up an ECOWAS Force and appoint its commander in defense of a member state or states in need, which would be placed under the political control of those states. ECOWAS military intervention would occur in response to an external threat or conflict between two member states, or if there was internal conflict within a member state that was maintained and sustained by external means. Intervention is only disallowed in conflicts that are purely internal in nature. Under PMAD, ECOWAS took a
much more proactive stance toward the maintenance of peace and security than did the OAU, with respect to intervention, its only limitations being internal conflicts that member states characterize as issues of law enforcement. These distinctions demonstrate the higher level of integration at the sub-regional level vis-à-vis the continent-wide body.

Economic integration fell far short of the proposed goals and objectives set forth at the onset of ECOWAS’ formation. The treaty’s objective to open up and liberalize trade failed due to a lack of support for the removal of tariffs, which comprised almost half of government revenues among some member states. The budget set up to refund member states for loss of tariff revenue was grossly unfunded and only three states—Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mali—actually made their payments. In addition, a number of member states hosted domestically registered industries with ownership structures that were overwhelmingly (if not entirely) foreign. This was especially true for Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, which housed subsidiaries of French industries. Regional trade liberalization would essentially provide these French industrial outposts with unfettered access to the markets in West Africa, to the detriment of nascent industries in other member states like Nigeria and Ghana. After recommendations from Nigeria were adopted to classify rules of origin for firms that wanted to take advantage of free trade, only 17 manufacturers in the region met the criteria to participate in trade liberalization (Kufuor, 2006: 28).

Coupled with this failure, the fall of primary commodity prices drastically reduced the revenues of member states in the 80s; rising inflation and increasing international debts alongside revenue reduction compounded the economic woes of West African states. By 1990, member states remained dependent on industrialized nations and had not realized the economic prosperity that integration and cooperation had promised.
After the formation of ECOWAS, West Africa remained the most politically unstable region in all of Africa. Despite protocols for military intervention and non-aggression, 60 percent of all the coups in Africa in the 80s and 90s took place in West Africa (Edi, 2007: 31-33). In the same period, there were several cross-border conflicts and civil wars that threatened to severely destabilize more than half the region. A high level of political instability and conflict had a compound effect on ECOWAS and the core objectives of its community. Unstable and unorthodox changes in political leadership inhibited any sustained efforts to commit to major multilateral community-wide programs and policies. This political instability stalled trade liberalization and the free movement of persons, especially when borders were so often closed to give military officials leverage, to tighten their control on the security apparatus, and to eliminate dissidence. Furthermore, the fall of key regional leaders such as General Gowon of Nigeria and President Tolbert of Liberia left a massive void in the community, as the new leadership of these member states often shifted its attention to domestic concerns, focusing more on securing a hold on power while pushing multilateral regional affairs aside.

Regional political instability in West Africa also contributed to capital flight and the exodus of highly skilled technocrats and professionals to other parts of the world, commonly referred to as the “brain drain.” Of the three African countries affected the most by the “brain drain,” Nigeria, Ghana, and Ethiopia, two are in West Africa. The UNDP estimated that at least 60 percent of doctors trained in Ghana during the 1980s left the country.11 Although nationals abroad still contribute in the form of uncoordinated

remittances, the depletion of skilled professionals has complicated the achievement of development goals. In addition to the loss of human resources, the region has also suffered loss of capital, stemming from reluctance on the part of investors, foreign and domestic, to commit large capital investments to a region plagued by instability, civil conflict, and a volatile political-economic climate.

With the backdrop of a crippled regional organization, civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989. In May 1990, ECOWAS established a mediation committee in Banjul and held a ministerial meeting on Liberia in Sierra Leone in July of that year. The incumbent president of Liberia, Samuel Doe, invited ECOWAS to intervene; by August 1990, eight months into the conflict, ECOWAS released a Final Communiqué announcing its imminent intervention. Its representatives established an interim government that excluded warring factions and deployed the community monitoring group ECOMOG, consisting of 4000 troops to demilitarize combatants and maintain law and order.

ECOMOG forces met resistance upon arrival in Liberia and moved to secure Monrovia. Rounds of talks and disagreement among regional heads of state over how to handle the situation drove the various factions on the ground to challenge the intervention of ECOWAS, even militarily, and to object to the negotiated settlements with provisions they viewed as unfavorable (Jaye, 2003: 144-164). The willingness of some regional heads of state of ECOWAS member nations to recognize the militant warring factions as politically viable and legitimate clearly emboldened the latter and allowed them to subvert regional efforts to secure peace. Moreover, conflict arose in neighboring Sierra
Leone in 1991, partially due to support from warring factions in Liberia seeking to weaken their domestic opponents who used Sierra Leone for bases and training.

With the ongoing conflicts in Liberia & Sierra Leone, a committee of eminent persons was established to review the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty. The committee found that the Treaty was weak, in that the decisions of the central ECOWAS organs were not binding on member states with the exception of sanctions for non-payment of the budget. It was suggested that ECOWAS become a supranational organization, as opposed to an intergovernmental one (Kufuor, 2006: 30). The committee also faulted the organization for slow decision-making and the exclusion of the civil society of member states. To address this, the committee recommended creating new organs to represent societal organizations as well as a community parliament. Acting on the recommendations of the committee, ECOWAS sought to reform itself and drafted a revised treaty in 1993. The revisions of 1993 included the ECOWAS Court of Justice, a more robust Council of Ministers and an Authority of Heads of State and Government with clear authority to make binding decisions regarding member states. The revisions also included an Economic and Social Committee, which offers societal groups in member states a venue for voicing concerns, and an ECOWAS Parliament that was constituted later in 2002.

In addition to establishing new institutions, ECOWAS sought to promote regional security by expanding regional military cooperation. In Article 58 of the Revised Treaty, regional security is coordinated through periodic consultations, meetings between relevant ministries of member states, joint commissions to examine problems between neighboring states, establishment of early-warning peace and security observation, and compulsory commitment to peacekeeping forces as needed. Defining provisions in the
revised treaty, the 1999 Protocol on Peace and Security authorizes ECOWAS to take the necessary steps to restore political authority when the ability of a member state to maintain order becomes non-existent or acutely negated, including military intervention without consent from the member state whose authority is undermined. These provisions were relevant to both Liberia and Sierra Leone when unsupportive or even hostile member states questioned the legitimacy of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and instead supported various warring parties. Creating this regional security regime in the community organization serves to minimize opportunistic behavior of member states, thereby ensuring cooperation (Kufuor, 2006: 52-54).

Beyond ensuring cooperation, Article 42 in the Protocol on Peace and Security ensured that ECOWAS would “be involved in the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in Member States…also monitor and actively support the development of democratic institutions of Member States” as a means of stemming “social and political upheavals.” Later, in the December 2001 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS approved a supplementary measure to the 1999 Protocol further detailing the communities’ support of constitutional order and outlining the measures that would be taken to establish constitutional order, electoral institutions, the monitoring of elections, the depoliticizing of the police and security forces, and the promotion of other humanitarian and social issues among member states. The supplementary protocol also calls for the Authority of Heads of State and Government to impose sanctions on any member state that violates any of the provisions, including those pertaining to human rights. ECOWAS has since advanced additional

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12 A New Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security was later adopted in December of 1999.
measures relating to peace, security, and conflict prevention, to enhance or provide
details for provisions in the 1999 protocol and the revised treaty. In 2007 ECOWAS
also converted the position of Executive Secretary to President and selected and officially
sworn in Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the former Executive Secretary, as the first
president of ECOWAS at the 32nd Summit of the Authority in Abuja. The move
completed the conversion to supranational commission designed to integrate members
into a more consolidated cohesive “borderless” community (Akinsanmi 2007).

After its conversion one of the key collective regional benefits ECOWAS offers
member states is political support. Many of the smaller countries in the organization have
few bilateral ties and lack the resources to maintain embassies through much of the world.
Through a partnership with other states in the region each state reaches every region in
the world. Further the regional block often unites on issues at global and continent wide
summits. These partnerships give each country in the organization a greater global
presence. Leaders of member states holding the rotating chairmanship of regional IO’s
builds national pride and provides political elite support at home for their role in the
organization. The organization has also advanced economic cooperation including
financial and capital markets which even includes two common currencies for most
members by 2015. Like other AU pillar sub-regional IO’s, ECOWAS has a common
markets with trading benefits and regional banks to provide capital to member states.
Peace and security integration of ECOWAS provides training and aid to military and

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13 Declaration on a sub-regional approach to Peace and Security, Abuja, Nigeria 28 May 2003 provides that
all issues pertaining to peace and security should have a regional approach. The ECOWAS Conflict
Prevention Framework, enacted on January 18, 2008, outlines the process through which the community
seeks to address the threat of conflict in the region.
police to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of maintaining peace in the region (see Kufuor 2006).

In addition to ECOWAS, designated as a pillar of the regional body in the African Economic Community of the OAU/AU in West Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has played a similar role in Central Africa. The community was established in 1983 and began functioning formally in 1985 when leaders of the Central African Customs Union decided to expand into a larger body. It was comprised of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), and São Tomé and Príncipe. Eccas is comprised of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zaire (now DRC). Angola was an observer until 1999 when they formally joined.

Historically, central Africa has possessed instruments of economic integration including a common currency, the Central African franc (CFA franc) used by a number of its member states. The system started under the colonial administration of France and is now administered by the Central Bank in Cameroon for the six states that use it. CFA franc is used by Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic.

In contrast to ECOWAS, ECCAS has been less active, plagued in part by budgetary constraints and conflict both within and among member states, including its largest member, the DRC (formerly Zaire); member states have taken opposing sides of the conflict there for the last two decades. At their second Extraordinary Summit, held February 6, 1998 in Libreville, Gabon, the Heads of State and Government decided to
resurrect the organization from its dormant state and have since moved forward with a number of measures aimed at realizing the core goals set forth in the ECCAS Treaty. ECCAS has five main organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, Executive Secretariat, Community Tribunal, and an Advisory Commission. The structure also includes specialized commissions or committees established by the Treaty.

Other mechanisms for peace and security in the region include a pact of non-aggression created in 1996, while the Rwandan crisis was raging among six member states that met in Cameroon.16 Two years later in Cameroon, the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) was formed with an early-warning system, a defense and security commission, and a Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) to carry out peace and security missions and provide humanitarian relief. Joint military exercises were conducted in Gabon, in which seven of the eleven member states took part. ECCAS also established a Human Rights and Democracy Center under the Protocol Establishing the Network of Parliamentarians of ECCAS (REPAC) within the framework of peace and security, to prevent conflict by promoting good governance.17 After the decade of conflict and economic stagnation and decline, Central African states have taken a proactive stance to forge regional cooperation and sustain lasting peace. By 2003, when constitutional order collapsed in São Tomé and Príncipe, seven states (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo [Brazzaville], Congo [Kinshasa], and Rwanda) still had a form of armed conflict in their territories, in many cases relating to neighboring countries.

Yet just as the OAU and AU had rejected any unconstitutional transfers of power by 1999 and reaffirmed their position in 2001, as a designated pillar of the AEC of the AU, ECCAS commits itself to promoting core aims and objectives of the AU; since 1996, it has begun to do so more aggressively.

A third relevant regional organization that includes members from both ECOWAS and ECCAS is the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) created in 1999 and formally launched in 2001. Membership is limited to states that border the Gulf of Guinea (see GGC Treaty 2001). The organization was created to coordinate the environmental and economic policies of states along the gulf with respect to fishing and exploitation of offshore natural resources, including Exclusive Economic Zones such as the one between Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe. It also seeks to enhance stability, peace, and security throughout the region. The headquarters of the organization is Luanda, Angola. GGC is not a designated pillar of the AEC, but Article 12 of the organization’s treaty states that the “Commission shall co-operate through all appropriate means with relevant sub-regional, regional, and international organizations, as well as with any concerned institution.” The GGC intends to work in partnership with the AU and the AEC and its sub-regional “pillars,” including ECOWAS and ECCAS, of which its members hold concurrent membership. There are two main organs of the GGC: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers. The Assembly is the governing and decision-making body of the Commission and meets once a year in a member state, rotating from one member to another in alphabetical order. The Council of Ministers also meets at least once a year to harmonize the agenda of the

18 Members are: Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Principe.
Commission, in preparation for the meeting of the Assembly. The GGC is the main regional organization that links West Africa directly to Central Africa and seeks to harmonize policies between both regions in view of stability and development.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the three cases of disruptions in constitutional order to determine if these regional organizations—the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC—affected a significant difference in the outcomes, or if the difference in outcomes was caused by other factors. The dominant paradigm in international relations—realism and neorealism—suggests that these regional organizations are irrelevant or insignificant independent of the powerful nation-states that dominate these regional bodies and the world system. Today more so than ever, these paradigms must be re-tested and re-evaluated in line with current global events to determine their usefulness. If even in West Africa, historically the most unstable region on the continent of Africa and the most unlikely place on the planet to apply a systematic international relations theory, international organizations matter, wield power in the region rivaling powerful states, as shown by these regional IOs impact on the establishment of constitutional order, then it is likely that similar organizations are also making a difference throughout the world. Scholarship in international relations need not dwell on the paradigms of the past that fail to account for this new reality, but rather should evolve and recognize the gradual emergence of a new order. Ushered in through the vehicle of a complex network of supranational intergovernmental organizations, these bodies are transcending their predecessors, wielding power that rivals powerful states, and assuming an ever-increasing role in modern global affairs.

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19 See Treaty on The Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2001. The GGC Treaty registered with the OAU & UN.
The next three chapters contain case studies that empirically evaluate the impact of mechanisms involved in consolidating political institutions. These analyses compare the mechanisms associated with regional IOs to mechanisms identified by two other realist based causal theories, which emphasize the impact of dominant regional states and international donors. As evidenced in chapter one, the statistically significant reduction in the number of West African leaders removed or killed in coups or attempted coups over the ten years following 2000 correlates with the zero-tolerance policy adopted by the region in December 1999. Yet the significant reduction and correlation does little to demonstrate mechanisms or the process for implementing the zero-tolerance policy, nor does it indicate other factors that may have caused the shift. Starting with São Tomé and Príncipe in this chapter and Togo in chapter three, these case studies will examine the
intervention process and evaluate the impact of the various mechanisms advanced by competing theories, in view of determining the validity of each. The Mauritania case in chapter four contrasts with the other two cases; since the main sub-regional IO was less involved in this incident, it better showcases the mechanisms of competing theories.

**Background**

São Tomé and Príncipe is a small archipelago comprising two main islands and several smaller isles, with a population of just over 200,000. The main island of São Tomé is approximately 290 kilometers west of Gabon, while the island of Príncipe is about 160 miles west of Equatorial Guinea, and about 144 kilometers north of São Tomé. It is the only island nation in the Gulf of Guinea. By geographic size, it is the second smallest state in Africa with just over 960 square kilometers of territory. The volcanic origins of the islands resulted in their mountainous terrain and rich soils. There are disputing claims as to whether the islands were populated before the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century, later settling in 1485 (Hodges and Newitt 1988: 1-4). In the southern region of São Tomé, there is a community known as the “Angolars.” They are the closest approximation to indigenous inhabitants. By some accounts, they lived on the island before the arrival of the Portuguese. Other stories claim that they descended from survivors of a wrecked slave ship from Angola in the mid-sixteenth century, placing them on the island more than fifty years after the first Portuguese settlements. Until the late nineteenth century, they remained a separate and autonomous population with a centrally organized traditional political leadership (Shaw 1994: xii-xxiii).

Historically, the settlers of São Tomé and Príncipe relied on plantation agriculture, first cultivating sugar. The islands were also an important trading port in the trans-
Atlantic slave trade to Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Americas, linking with trading posts on the African mainland and other Portuguese-held islands such as Cape Verde. Rich soils, rivers flowing from the mountains and available labor made sugar plantations among the most profitable ventures for settlers, who included Portuguese criminals and Jewish orphans that had left hardship on the Portuguese mainland. The mixed descendents of the settlers and the slave population emerged as the islands’ elite class, as many European settlers died from disease with no natural immunities. These wealthy and powerful families would play a role in the slave trade, profiting from the use of the islands as holding stations for slaves bound for Brazil and the Americas, even establishing a settlement in Luanda. They also profited from the sugar plantations, becoming the world’s largest producer of sugar in the sixteenth century. As other territories such as Brazil began to export sugar, Santomean sugar plantations found themselves unable to compete and many plantations were abandoned. Escaped slaves fled into the forests to join forces with the “Angolars,” raiding remaining plantations. In 1595 the Angolar King, Amador, led an uprising that almost conquered the island of São Tomé. Peace was not fully restored until an accord was reached with the Angolars in 1693, almost 100 years later (Shaw 1994, also see Hodges & Hewitt 1988: 21-22, 60).

In the nineteenth century, São Tomé and Príncipe began cultivating coffee and cocoa on its plantations for export to European markets. To capitalize on the boom created by coffee and cocoa, plantations began to expand to the forests, which were held largely by the elite families of mixed decent who owned land and had owned slaves before the emancipation of 1875. Expansion began to push out the smaller farmers of the forests, freed slaves, and the Angolars, who all refused to be plantation laborers.
“Contracted” slave laborers were brought in forcibly from Angola to fill the labor void. In addition, laborers were brought from Cape Verde on a contracted basis. Neo-slavery from Angola was dangerous and many laborers died in São Tomé and Príncipe. These deaths required the recruitment of more laborers for plantation work. As other African territories began to produce cocoa, the coffee and cocoa boom began to wane—due in part to European boycotts over the practice of “contracted” slavery on the islands (Hodges & Hewitt 1988: 36-40, 62-63).

Before 1953, there was little opposition to Portuguese rule on the islands, but the event that became known as the Batepa Massacre marked a turning point. The Governor of the islands, Carlos Gorgulho, ordered work brigades to be drawn from the local population that had refused to do plantation labor. Residents protested the order and were met by armed troops organized by plantation owners. In the aftermath of the massacre, oppositional political groups began to form both from abroad and within São Tomé and Príncipe, including the Movimento de Liberatacao de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), formerly the Liberation Congress or CLSTP. After a left-wing coup in Portugal in April of 1974, the Portuguese government moved to end its wars in Africa and its presence on the continent, and negotiated for an independent government in São Tomé and Príncipe in July 1975, which included the MLSTP (Hodges & Hewitt: 90-99). After independence, the MLSTP established itself in a one-party system with Miguel Trovoada as foreign minister and later prime minister, and Manuel Pinto da Costa as the first president.

**Political Climate**

The MLSTP constructed a Soviet-style government, nationalizing the country’s plantations. It also established a one-party system that remained in power until 1991.
Party president Manuel Pinto da Costa, a foreign-educated economist, assumed most of the highest positions in government during the 1980s, at one point holding the posts of president, prime minister, and several other key ministerial positions simultaneously.

Occupying public office was among the most secure forms of employment, resulting in acute conflicts for posts within the party. Internal party conflicts culminated in charges that Prime Minister Trovoada was fueling civil unrest over the government census and the nationalization of livestock while President Pinto da Costa was out of the country—he also faced allegations of neglecting his duties. Faced with mounting accusations at the MLSTP party council meeting, the next day Trovoada sought asylum in the Portuguese Embassy but his request was rejected. He then fled to the offices of the UNDP where he was arrested only to be detained for 21 months without trial before he was released and exiled in Paris (Seibert 2006: 146-149).

Foreign-based opposition groups also attempted to invade São Tomé and Príncipe in 1978 and 1988. The attempts led President Pinto da Costa to ask for foreign troops, largely from Angola, to protect the islands and solidify his hold on power. After the second attempted invasion, Angolan forces were installed, remaining until 1991. Angola also provided oil for the islands at extremely generous rates. Both Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe received substantial aid from nations in the eastern block during the cold war. The São Toméan government saw socialist countries as natural allies, according to their first ambassador to Lisbon (Seibert 2006: 134). President Pinto da Costa had completed his doctorate degree in economics in East Berlin; East Germany was a key donor during his time in office. São Tomé and Príncipe, not aligned with either side, also received aid from Portugal, France, and the European Commission.
During the mid-eighties, President Pinto da Costa sought to reintegrate opposition elements into his government, to signal an opening up and to weaken the foreign-based opposition. After the fall of the Soviet Union—and with it, many Eastern European donors—the MLSTP opened up the political process further by drafting a new constitution in 1990, ending the one-party state and holding multi-party elections in January of 1991. The main opposition party was led by former Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada, who had fled the islands after being imprisoned; he managed to win the parliamentary elections and his party, Partido de Convergencia Democratica (PCD), swept into power. Trovoada was later elected president when President Pinto da Costa, sensing the changing tide, decided against making a presidential bid in 1991. Once in office, President Trovoada made few changes from the MLSTP with his PCD ruling coalition. Structural adjustment policies advocated by the World Bank liberalized the economy to attract investment, opened up plantations to foreign firms, and curbed state spending. These practices had already begun to take root under the MLSTP and continued after the election of Trovoada, even against his will. When he was in Paris in 1991, the parliamentary speaker, Trovoada’s constitutional deputy, signed a treaty with the World Bank to continue the structural adjustment that Trovoada sought to avoid (Seibert 2006: 236). In 1992 and again in 1994, the government of the PCD coalition (PCD-GR) was dismissed by President Trovoada. The renamed MLSTP Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD) regained control of the legislature in the early parliamentary election, Trovoada named its party leader as prime minister.

Despite the two invasion attempts by foreign-based opposition groups in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, which resulted in the need for foreign troops to support
the government until 1991, the leadership of São Tomé and Príncipe never came under siege by armed opposition. The military remained in barracks and under civilian control, as did the police and presidential guards. In the early morning of August 15, 1995, all this changed when army recruits and junior-level officers stormed the presidential palace seeking to detain President Trovoada. Killing one presidential guard, they managed to remove the president from the palace and detain him at army barracks. The army also placed the prime minister under house arrest later that day. They claimed they were staging a “democratic coup,” in that their objective was not to overturn the government and take power for themselves but to contest mismanagement and corruption. Higher-level officers were not aware of the plot and were not involved. Their lack of involvement may have reflected the fact that they did not share some of the grievances of the lower-level officers. Soldiers had not received pay for over six months at the time of the coup, while the monthly salary of lieutenants amounted to just $14 USD. Many young men refused to report for the obligatory 30-month service in the army, due largely to the poor conditions. The army remained ill equipped, with few of the vehicles and basic resources that had been afforded to others in government.

The soldiers used the detention of the president and house arrest of the prime minister as leverage to garner greater concessions, in order to address the unfavorable conditions they faced. They also pointed to President Trovoada as principally responsible. Leading up to the coup, mid-level officers had written to the defense minister about their low pay, lack of uniforms, and poor living conditions, among other grievances. When they did not receive any response from the minister, they began to plan the coup. The day after they had detained the president and the prime minister, the coup plotters announced
that they did not intend to hold power or occupy the highest offices in the governing structure of the archipelago. Rather, they indicated that they wanted redress of their grievances and reform of what they saw as the mismanagement of public funds by the democratic government. Later in the process, soldiers stated that they had taken up arms because they could not go on strike like other government employees did in the months leading up to the coup (Seibert 1996: 75-77). With the exception of closing the bank to prevent capital flight, the military did not move against any other governing institutions.

The day after the coup, the military held talks with the political parties to restore constitutional order. The prime minister and foreign minister represented the opposition while the former justice minister and secretary general of the ruling party represented the party of the president. The prime minister was no longer under house arrest after the second day and was able to leave his residence to negotiate with the military. The military wanted a government of national unity in which they would be included, in addition to early elections. Most parties rejected this proposal, except for the prime minister who said in an interview that he would accept it as long as his party headed the government. Not reaching any agreement that afternoon, the military accepted the Angolan president’s offer to mediate the talks. The military rejected a similar offer made by the Gabonese president, who was viewed as an agent of France; this decision also stemmed from the close relationship between the archipelago and Angola. Angola had stationed troops in the country until 1991 and was a key supplier of subsidized fuel, credit, and aid.

In the day that followed, the head of the Military Commission tried to name the president of the National Assembly as interim president, claiming that according to the
constitution he was supposed to take over when the president was unable to lead. The National Assembly’s president did not accept the appointment, despite his known loyalty to the opposition. The Angolan mediators arrived on the next day, August 18, led by their foreign minister. That same day, the Angolan foreign minister secured the transfer of President Trovoada from military barracks to a government residence in the capital where he was able to receive visitors and make calls but could not make public statements. In the negotiations, the Military Commission made six demands: (1) to receive amnesty for all coup participants, (2) to appoint the minister of defense, (3) to review the role of the president as commander of armed forces, (4) to restructure the army, (5) to reform the state bureaucracy, and (6) to dismiss corrupt government officials. In the end, the coup participants received amnesty and in the memorandum of understanding were granted their request to approve the defense minister. They also received pay increases and promotions through the agreement.

The “coup” did little to affect daily life on the archipelago. Furthermore, very few governing institutions were affected, and those that were only experienced marginal changes such as the prime minister’s house arrest for an evening. The primary target was the president, who remained detained for the longest period of time and had his fleet of cars relocated to military barracks. These events signaled the tepid support for the first multi-party democracy: public reaction was mild. Although the country remained peaceful, claims of widespread corruption were common throughout the public sector, triggering strikes by several other major groups in the months before the coup. Radio employees, teachers, and doctors went on strike, calling for salary increases similar to the soldiers’ demands in the summer of 1995 (Seibert 1996: 74). Still, President Trovoada
blamed the coup on political opponents, asserting that they were trying to prevent his reelection in 1996. He even compared his detention as president to his imprisonment in 1979 as prime minister. In the aftermath of the coup, President Trovoada built up his own presidential guard to 160 men with equipment rivaling that of the armed forces. He also closed off the street leading to his official residence (Seibert 2006: 271). Trovoada was still able to win reelection in 1996 against his primary rival, former President Pinto da Costa, securing a second five-year term.

Political stability continued in the archipelago during Trovoada’s ten years in office. There were a total of eight different governments, many of which the president dismissed himself due to political disagreements and ongoing disputes. In the presidential elections of 2001, Trovoada advanced the candidacy of businessman Fradique de Menezes to run in elections against former President Pinto da Costa. After winning the election, President Menezes dismissed the government and appointed Evaristo Carvalho as prime minister. He also formed his own party, the Movimento Democrático Forças da Mudança (MDFM). A dispute formed between the new president and the former president’s son, Patrice Trovoada, who had been foreign minister but resigned after Menezes asserted that the Trovoadas were aspiring to become oligarchs. President Menezes called for early elections in 2002 and exacerbated political instability by rapidly dismissing governments, similar to his predecessor. In Menezes’ first two years as president, São Tomé had five different governments (Seibert 2003: 3). He also vetoed proposed constitutional amendments that would have reduced the power of the president vis-à-vis the power of parliament, insisting that the reforms be put to a popular referendum. A report also surfaced late in 2002 that a foreign account belonging to one of
Menezes’ companies had received an unexplained $100,000 payment from Nigerian firm Chrome Oil Services, owned by Emeka Offor. In a press conference in early 2003, Menezes acknowledged the payments stating that they were donations for an election campaign, which was a violation of national law (Seibert 2006: 278-279).

**Buffalo Battalion & Executive Outcomes**

The elite division of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) known as the 32\textsuperscript{nd} ‘Buffalo’ Battalion included both white and black officers fighting alongside each other. The unit was formed in 1975 as the South African government entered the Angolan conflict in support of the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA). Apartheid South Africa viewed the group as a strategic ally because its opponents the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) backed the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO had mounted offensives against SADF positions in South West Africa, also known now as Namibia. By getting involved in the Angolan war, the SADF began to arm and train African soldiers under one of its own commanders. Among the fighters were soldiers of Portuguese descent as well as soldiers from other countries, which eventually included citizens of São Tomé and Príncipe. The 32\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion became known as the best unit in the SADF since WWII (Nortje 2004: 4-11).

In 1986 as part of reconciliation between São Tomé and Gabon, Gabonese President Omar Bongo had asked the FRNSTP (exiled Santomean opposition group) to leave Libreville, which was its primary base of operation in exile. First they fled to Cameroon, but later 76 men went to Namibia where they were detained as illegal immigrants by South African authorities. After a year, they were asked to choose between remaining in prison or joining the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion. The FRNSTP members from
São Tomé and Príncipe and the few among them from Cape Verde chose to become soldiers and joined the 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.

After the collapse of South African Apartheid, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was dissolved along with other elite units of the SADF. Some of its members were incorporated into the SADF while others retired. A former SADF officer founded a South African security firm, Executive Outcomes, which recruited many members of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and other disbanded units including Santomean Alercio Costa. Executive Outcomes and 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion soldiers were highly trained elite soldiers with superior techniques, developed as members of battle-hardened units of the SADF and as mercenaries. They fought in Namibia, Angola, the Congo, the townships of South Africa, and Sierra Leone during its civil war. In the late nineties Alercio Costa and some of the Santomean members of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion returned to their home country and joined the ranks of the FDC, the remnant of the small party Frente de Resistência Nacional de São Tomé e Príncipe (FRNSTP) that had tried to invade São Tomé in 1988 while Pinto da Costa was president. Costa and his 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion colleagues continued to be politically active attempting to settle grievances from the previous decades (Seibert 2006: 279).

Oil

In the nineties, off-shore oil was discovered in the waters located midway between São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. After their initial disagreements in negotiating the boundaries of territorial waters, the two countries decided to create a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) to jointly manage exploitation and licensing of the off-shore oil blocks. Negotiations to establish the JDZ began in 1999 between then-president Trovoada and President Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Joint Development Authority was formally
inaugurated in 2002, allocating sixty percent of the resources to Nigeria and forty percent to São Tomé and Príncipe (JDA). By 2003, it was estimated that São Tomé and Príncipe could generate over $100 million in licensing bonuses alone by early 2004, roughly double the annual national budget of the small archipelago. The discovery of oil and the looming revenues from signing bonuses as oil blocks were licensed gave an added incentive for the coup plotters and their civilian financiers to move forward when they did. If revenues fell into the hands of their political opponents, the increase in leverage would tip the balance of power against them, potentially excluding them out of future oil profits permanently. The move was also a way in which they could blunt the impact of the likely temporary loss of revenue from donors, and perhaps diversify and increase aid revenue sources by securing additional donor aid from countries seeking to exploit oil reserves.

The Coup

On July 16, 2003, a coup took place in São Tomé and Príncipe while President Menezes was attending the Leon Sullivan Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. The coup was led by Major Fernando Pereira and backed by the FDC the reconstituted FRNSTP. After their unsuccessful invasion attempt, some of the FRNSTP members went to Namibia, formerly called South West Africa. Since they were illegal immigrants, they were forced to join the 32nd Battalion (also known as the Buffalo Battalion) along with soldiers from Angola and other countries, an elite fighting group formed by the apartheid South African government in exchange for their freedom. In the nineties, they returned to São Tomé and rejoined their former party in the FDC. Major Pereira, along with half of the 400 soldiers in the army and over a dozen Buffalo Battalion soldiers, executed the coup by seizing key
sites including the airport, the ministries, several television and radio stations, and the banks. The rebels arrested the cabinet ministers and the president of the national assembly and held them at army barracks. Afterward, Major Pereira declared that they would dissolve all state functions and form the Junta of National Salvation with FDC’s President Alercio Costa and Vice President Sabino dos Santos as his deputies. Other military leaders were not involved in the coup, nor were the police or presidential guards. However, the other security outfits and the military leadership made no attempts to oppose it.

In the lead-up to the coup Major Fernando Pereira, a respected mid-level officer, became vocal about military pay, poor living conditions, and inadequate supplies. He voiced these concerns to both the president and the prime minister. The FDC, along with former battalion members, also felt the government owed them for their forced service abroad and for a boat that had been confiscated from them during their invasion in 1988. The government had given them $50,000 for the boat after they had demanded $130,000. The FDC consulted Major Pereira about the coup they were planning and asked if he wanted to work with them, since he also had grievances with the government on behalf of his soldiers. According to Major Pereira, he agreed to join on the condition that the coup would be bloodless and well organized. Planning took place for over eight months, assisted by Alercio Costa and over a dozen of his fellow Buffalo Battalion retirees. In their public quarrel with the government, the FDC called for a demonstration march that would end in front of the prime minister’s office, where they would remain until she was dismissed. In a bid to prevent the FDC protest and the possible unrest it could cause, President Menezes met with the leaders of the FDC on July 14, the day before he left for
Nigeria. He also called a meeting of the National Defense Council to ensure that they would quell any unrest stemming from a protest.

The Response to the Coup

Immediately following the coup, there was a concert of condemnation throughout the international community. President Menezes in Abuja condemned the coup, calling for the reinstatement of democratic order (Seibert 2003: 249-252). Foreign Minister Mateus Rita, who was abroad at a meeting in Portugal of the CPLP (an organization of Lusophone countries), also condemned the coup. There was an unusually intense international response to the coup. The AU, ECCAS, Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, Mozambique, Angola, Portugal, France, the United States, the United Nations, CPLP, and the EU all condemned the junta. Initially, Nigeria sent an envoy to intercede and to ensure the safety of its embassy and officials (Eigbire 2009). When mediations eventually took place, the representatives of eight different countries took part. Among the neighboring states, Gabon and Angola had the strongest historic relations with the archipelago. In addition, since the establishment of the Joint Development Authority between São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria, Nigeria held an increasing political and economic role in the affairs of the islands. This was especially significant since Nigeria is also the largest neighbor close to the archipelago, and happened to be hosting the recognized president as a guest in the Nigerian capital when he was ousted. Still, none of these countries led the international mediation effort. The major bilateral donors to the archipelago were Angola, Portugal, and Nigeria; again, none of these countries led diplomatic efforts. Rather, the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville assumed control. Congo-Brazzaville held the rotating presidency of ECCAS, the immediate sub-regional
organization to which São Tomé and Príncipe belongs. The Foreign Minister of Congo Brazzaville, Rodolphe Adada, first held a conference in Brazzaville gathering the concerned parties from the region before departing for São Tomé and Principe, where he chaired the International Mediation Group (IMG) (Seibert 2003: 254).

At the core of the IMG were representatives of ECCAS countries, including the Chairman of the group, Rodolphe Adada; the Foreign Minister of Gabon, Jean Ping; and the Minister of the Interior from Angola, Osvaldo Serra Van Dunem (Eigbire; also see Seibert 2003). It was evident that ECCAS formed the core of the process, as its three representatives constituted the highest-ranking officials at the IMG meetings. All participating ECCAS countries sent envoys at the ministerial level of their respective states. The lower-ranking participants of the IMG were essentially invited observers of the process, and took a back seat to the ECCAS ministers for most of the mediations. Other regional participants included a representative of Mozambique who held the rotating presidency of the African Union and the Secretary General of ECCAS, Nelson Cosme, in support of the ECCAS mediators. A Nigerian delegation was already in São Tomé, as well as representatives from Brazil, the United States ambassador to Gabon, and the Portuguese ambassador in São Tomé. Many of the additional members of the IMG represented the archipelago’s economic partners and donors, invited to observe the process as potential sources of assistance once negotiations were complete, given that many of the countries had an increased economic stake in the islands. The FDC members of the junta asked the ECCAS-led IMG to invite a South African delegation to join the mediation. A South African delegation was later present along with the ten members of the junta, seven from the military and three from the FDC. The meetings commenced at
the UNDP offices in São Tomé on June 20 once the IMG Chairman, Rodolphe Adada, had arrived (Chancery, also see Seibert 2003: 254). He was last to arrive; other delegations were in São Tomé by June 19, the day before.

The IMG was established in São Tomé in a manner consistent with the expectation of regional IO theory that the most relevant countries to the mediation process were those within the regional organization, ECCAS. The Chair of the IMG was the president of the immediate regional block. Other core members of the IMG came from ECCAS. The AU president and president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, sent a representative to join the mediation, announcing support for all efforts by São Tomé’s neighbors to reverse the unconstitutional transfer of power. In addition to ECCAS, states outside the immediate regional block such as the CPLP states, Nigeria, the United States, and later South Africa took part in the IMG, becoming involved by the invitation of the IMG leadership. All parties to the IMG coordinated their involvement with ECCAS, the immediate regional organization. The meeting did not commence, despite the presence of the entire IMG group except South Africa, until the Chair of the IMG had arrived.

Nigeria had sent an envoy initially after the coup to resolve the impasse, and the US and Portuguese ambassadors were present when the coup took place. All of these participating international actors ceased direct engagement with the junta and supported the IMG under the direct coordination of the immediate regional IO and its leadership. In addition, no international actor that did not coordinate with the immediate regional organization was present or involved in the mediation process.

In accordance with the expectations of regional IO consolidation theory, the state that held the presidency of ECCAS, the sub-regional IO, took the lead in coordinating the
process of international negotiation and intervention. ECCAS scheduled all meaningful
and productive emergency meetings and negotiations with the targets in São Tomé, both
“winners” and “losers.” While other international actors held brief meetings to appeal for
stability, no real changes in behavior or policy occurred as a result of those “meet-and-
greet” encounters. ECCAS was the primary coordinator of all other like-minded
stakeholders, and controlled who could attend the key intervention summits and meetings.
ECCAS also made the most direct overtures towards the targets in São Tomé, while other
actors such as the CPLP made their overtures toward the ECCAS as the sub-regional IO.
The CPLP countries went first to Brazzaville, where ECCAS had gathered with its
leadership, before they went to São Tomé to participate in the ECCAS-led IMG (Seibert
2003). Other organizational actors outside of the immediate regional IO, such as the
continent-wide AU organization, did not coordinate the international intervention, nor did
they host meetings or consultations, except to support the immediate regional IO.

The targets responded directly to the overtures of the sub-regional negotiators, as
predicted by the consolidation theory of regional organizations. Other bilateral actors,
such as the Nigerian envoy and the ambassadors of Portugal and the United States, did
not schedule or hold any summits with the targets nor bring them to the negotiation table
in the same manner as the ECCAS-led IMG. Furthermore, as the ECCAS-led IMG
mediations were being scheduled, the junta made a request to the mediators to invite
South Africa to join in the discussion. This request demonstrates clearly that the junta
recognized ECCAS and its ministerial mediators as the entity in charge of the diplomatic
process. The junta also realized that ECCAS had the authority to invite or exclude any
party. Just as the international participants in the IMG recognized the primacy of ECCAS
and its ministerial mediators, the junta likewise accepted them as the legitimate leading intermediaries in the process. As mediations began, Rodolphe Adada read a message from his president to the IMG group and the ten members of the junta that were assembled. The message contained instructions from his president, also the president of the regional block, as to how the process was to go forward. Though the president of Congo-Brazzaville held less power in the international community than the leaders of the other states present on the IMG, because he held the presidency of the regional block, the regional power was placed in his hands, in accordance with the standard operating procedures of ECCAS and the expectations of regional IO theory.

The first meeting lasted three hours. Among the mediators’ immediate concerns was the condition of their ministerial colleagues that were still being held at military barracks in São Tomé. Later that evening, the junta released all the remaining ministers being held in barracks. This faith-building gesture by the junta marked the first major shift in its behavior and policy. Despite other bilateral attempts to elicit change, in line with the expected impact of regional IO consolidation mechanisms, the targets responded directly to the overtures of the immediate regional IO and their mediators, immediately addressing their demands and concerns. The released ministers were not allowed to resume their duties or speak out publicly, so as not to influence or alter the outcome of the international mediation (Eigbire 2009, also see Seibert 2003). Their release was secured as the result of intervention by the mediators. The junta complied to demonstrate its good faith on an international scale, and to ease tensions in the negotiating process without losing any political leverage. The junta’s change in behavior, occurring on the same day the regional organization requested it, empirically demonstrates the impact of
the mechanisms of regional IO theory. It was the immediate regional body, more than any other stakeholder, to which it responded first. The concerns of other parties outside the regional IO were not addressed initially, particularly the interests of the junta to discuss the formation of a new government of national unity.

As negations continued into days two and three, the junta pressed the issue of establishing a new government of national unity that included all major political stakeholders, to prevent the president from returning to power and removing the prime minister’s government. The junta members backed away from seeking power for themselves, instead asserting their intentions to clear the way for a transitional (non-corrupt) civilian government and prepare for elections. As the mediators continued to refuse all parts of the junta’s plan, talks broke down early in the third day of negotiations. At that time the leader of the junta, Major Pereira, went on national radio and publicly explained the position of the junta. His public address claimed to reflect what he and the other members of the junta negotiation team were saying behind closed doors. Other public statements made by decision-makers of the junta also claimed to parallel what was being said behind closed doors. Although it seemed initially that the junta members sought to be part of the new government of national unity, they began to deviate from some of their previous positions. In addition to asserting that the military did not want to take part in governing, Pereira went on to say that the military had acted on behalf of the public, and that the ongoing negotiations were designed to ensure the best outcome for the public. A memorandum released afterward revealed that a large part of the negotiations had to do with grievances specific to the FDC members of the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion and with permanent power concessions from the government to the military. Using its
control of the airwaves, the junta engaged in public posturing and signaling in public statements that did not fully reflect the reality of closed-door negations. Trying to bolster public support was perhaps one of the only means it had to leverage their mediation effort.

**Sticks**

One of the main cost-raising mechanisms used in the case of São Tomé was open condemnation by the international community, which sent a repeated message that the move by the junta would not be accepted or recognized. The AU announced that it would support all efforts by São Tomé’s neighbors to restore constitutional order. States outside the regional IO such as Nigeria indicated that they would do the same. It is the policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to take all diplomatic measures to restore constitutionality anytime constitutional order collapses in a state (Mann 2009). According to this policy, no official threats were made by Nigeria to militarily remove the junta, as that would be a contradiction to the official policy of the Federal Republic to use diplomacy first as its sole course of action. President Menezes also confirmed this in a statement from Abuja, asserting that Nigeria had no intention of invading the archipelago (see BBC Interview). It is possible that unofficial posturing by officials in Nigeria may have been interpreted as a threat by targets in São Tomé. One example includes a reported phone conversation immediately after the coup between Nigerian President Obasanjo and FDC leader Alercio Costa, in which the former cautioned the latter about being unreasonable. The conversation referred to the junta’s hostile activities, including surrounding the Nigerian Embassy in São Tomé with troops and forcibly holding-up all the officials inside as the coup was taking place. The Nigerian government spokeswoman, Remi Oyo, also stated that Nigeria would act against any threat to its interest in the Gulf.
This statement was interpreted as a partial reference to the Joint Development Authority between Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe, in which Nigeria held 60 percent of ownership of the jointly controlled oil blocks. While military action remained a possibility, especially to rescue embassy staff, it was never used by Nigeria or any of São Tomé and Príncipe’s other neighbors to influence the junta. Junta members did not feel threatened by neighboring states, as they later threatened to make a second coup attempt for political leverage in the lingering disputes long after the intervention.

The most effective cost-raising strategies arose largely from international condemnation. This became clear when the AU and all the regional states warned the junta that its actions would not be recognized, leaving it only the path of convincing the international community to support them. This led the rebels to hold off plans to name a new government after they had established their junta of “national salvation.” The cost-raising strategy of condemnation took effect both publicly and behind closed doors. The junta was politically isolated, which was especially problematic in a country as small as São Tomé and Príncipe, as it relies on neighboring countries for the trade and travel that link it to the region and the rest of the world. While other states and actors outside the region condemned the coup, the mechanisms of condemnation and political isolation were almost exclusively the domain of the member states of the immediate regional IO and the AU, since few states outside the region had any official representative in the archipelago. The real isolation came from neighboring states that not only had representatives on the islands, but also had long-standing ties linking the islands and its people to the rest of the world.
A few donors to São Tomé and Príncipe announced they would review their future relationship with the country, yet no aid was suspended in the seven days that the coup lasted. The United States said it would reevaluate aid to the country, and the World Bank said it was suspending future support until the legitimacy of the institutions had been clarified, which included an assessment of the debt forgiveness program. Yet these statements were worded in such a way that they did not actually threaten that any aid would stop indefinitely; they amounted to mild cautionary notices. The junta had planned to appoint a “government of national unity” comprised of civilians, and to hold new elections at a future date, which they believed would achieve international legitimacy for them. The overall impact of these announcements in the short timeframe did not create an immediate concern and was not significant. Although the World Bank and the United States contributed a substantial amount of aid to São Tomé and Príncipe, they were not principal donors and did not provide a large percentage of its aid. Other key bilateral donors such as Angola, France, Taiwan and Nigeria did not announce any suspension of aid to the country. Many of São Tomé’s donors are countries within the region, both in the gulf and on the African continent. Moreover, the donor aid was less than half of what the country was slated to make in the coming year from signing bonuses for licensing oil blocks. If regional states like Angola and Nigeria were using aid as a cost-raising mechanism, vis-à-vis AU and ECCAS sanctions, it would still be consistent with regional organizational theory since it would amount to a cost-raising mechanism led by the regional IO. Without being prompted by the regional block, neither state took any of these measures unilaterally. In line with the expectations of regional consolidation theory, non-regional donors and non-regional international financial institutions or aid
organizations did not alter the process or serve as a significant cost-raising element. Threats to withdraw aid to the archipelago by any of the key donors did not emerge as a factor or mechanism. At most, the contributions of donors followed expectations to primarily support the immediate regional IO’s intervention efforts in providing incentives when requested.

Perhaps one of the most damaging cost-raising mechanisms came when the government of Nigeria did not recognize the junta and was not willing to work with the rebels as partners in the Joint Development Authority. The rebels had hoped to secure additional finances for their government through the oil revenues from the Joint Development Zone, and perhaps secure new donors through the licensing of oil blocks to friendly states. At no time did the Nigerian government signal that this would be possible. All signaling and statements indicated that that Nigeria would only work with the elected administration of President Menezes, and Nigerian officials closely worked with the ministers of the Joint Development Zone and housed its headquarters in Abuja (Chancery 2003, ECAD 2009). This meant that the junta would not be able to utilize future oil revenues. In addition, the stated position that Nigeria would respond to any threat to its own interests in the Gulf of Guinea demonstrated that the junta could not unilaterally break from the Joint Development Authority in order to develop and license some of the blocks without Nigeria as a collaborative partner. In the agreement, both countries jointly own every block, such that there is no way for one country to assert exclusive ownership over any section or exploit it unilaterally. Nigeria made it clear that any such action would be viewed as a direct assault on its territorial and economic interests and would elicit a direct response. Given that Nigeria would not work with the junta and would not
accept its unilateral infringement on the Joint Development Zone, the junta had to accept
that there was no way for it to benefit from oil revenues, at least in the foreseeable future.
In addition, many of São Tomé and Príncipe’s bilateral donors, including one of its
largest, Angola, were part of the IMG behind the regional effort. The junta thus had to
respond to all these cost-raising mechanisms by accepting the ECCAS mediators’ plan
and engaging the immediate regional organization to develop some redress to their
grievances within the framework of the overall strategy of ECCAS.

On the afternoon of June 22, mediators began to finalize the memorandum
designed to address many of the major concerns of the rebels, establish partners to assist
the government, and monitor the progress of the memorandum’s implementation. The
latter would provide assurances to all stakeholders that the region would not abandon its
efforts or their grievances once constitutional order had been restored. At the same time,
President Menezes left Abuja and traveled to Libreville, the capital of Gabon, so that he
would be close to São Tomé to sign the memorandum once it was complete. The signed
copies could then be quickly returned to the rebels and the IMG chairman, Rodolphe
Adada. Once the memorandum was complete on June 23, the three mediators of the
IMG—Rodolphe Adada, Jean Ping, and Osvaldo Serra Van Dunem, of Congo
(Brazzaville), Gabon, and Angola respectively—went to Libreville to present the
memorandum to President Menezes to sign. The overwhelming role afforded to ECCAS,
the primary sub-regional intergovernmental organization, in this process was reflected in
the significant fact that the three ECCAS ministers were the only members of the IMG to
deliver the memorandum to President Menezes, and Chairman Rodolphe Adada was the
only member of the IMG to sign it. Once the agreement had been signed, it was
immediately delivered back to São Tomé, clearing the way for President Menezes to return to power.

While the mediators successfully negotiated the dispute, there were lingering issues regarding President Menezes’ safe return to São Tomé since the negotiations did not disarm the participants in the coup, some of whom did not answer to the military. The FDC, former mercenary/SADF 32nd Battalion soldiers, remained armed. In addition, since neither the other military officers nor the other security outfits in São Tomé resisted the coup, including the police and the presidential guard, it was unclear who would protect President Menezes as he was returning to São Tomé. In the event that any rogue dissenters remained hostile, Nigerian President Obasanjo promised President Menezes that he would make sure his ally returned safely to São Tomé while the two men were in Abuja (Eigbire 2009). To do this, President Obasanjo sent his own elite Nigerian presidential guard in two planes to São Tomé upon receiving word of the completion of the memorandum, along with press and other staffers that travel with the Nigerian presidential retinue. To avoid the appearance that Nigeria was invading São Tomé, he then flew to Libreville and picked up President Menezes so they could go to São Tomé together just hours after the memorandum was signed.

Upon arrival, the two leaders convoyed to the Presidential Palace in São Tomé and then to UNDP building where the mediation had taken place. While the Nigerian presidential guard was in São Tomé to protect President Obasanjo on his official visit, it was also quite useful in ensuring the security of President Menezes who was right next to him. President Obasanjo’s visit in the company of President Menezes in the moment of his return to power surreptitiously achieved the objective of ensuring Menezes’ security,
creating the needed space to reestablish control over the security outfits in the country. This was all accomplished without causing a diplomatic or domestic political backlash for either leader, as it would have otherwise looked like an invasion of a large neighboring state into the small island to forcibly restore constitutional order. While he was in São Tomé, President Obasanjo also spoke to the military and other stakeholders to convey his government’s support of improving their conditions, and appealed to them to defend the constitution (Pindar 2003). President Menezes later thanked his “brother” President Obasanjo, stating shortly after the coup in an undisclosed letter, “I also appreciate your personal courage in coming with me back to São Tomé and Príncipe after the coup.” Afterward, the two developed a friendship as President Obasanjo had stood firmly behind Menezes, showing he was even willing to personally travel into harm’s way on his behalf. The visit by the Nigerian president after the signing was not an invasion and is not what caused the junta to sign the agreement. The move came after the agreement, with the full support of and in coordination with ECCAS.

**Carrots**

As the memorandum from the negotiation process reveals, the rebels were given a number of incentives to ensure their support for the respect of constitutional order. Many of these incentives reflected requests the junta made to the mediators and the government before the coup. The incentives in the memorandum were designed to assure the junta that their conditions would improve once constitutional ordered was restored, and that the region’s and the archipelago’s development partners would pitch in to help. The first key point in the memorandum was general amnesty for all the participants in the coup. This was granted as part of the arrangement for the military to step aside and allow the return
the President Menezes (see Seibert 2003). Amnesty was crucial, not only to the military but also to the FDC, as it was unclear if they would have any role or value to the government after constitutional order was restored.

The memorandum also states that a national forum would be organized within three months to allow for a hearing of political parties and civil society. This provision was designed to assure the junta that their grievances would not go unaddressed once they stepped aside. It also helped the military fulfill promises made to the public, that their actions would bring concrete changes on their behalf. Another provision in the memorandum was that no foreign troops would be stationed on the archipelago outside the constitutional provisions of the country. Since two coups had taken place in less than ten years (1995 and 2003), the junta feared a return to the eighties when Angolan troops presided in support of President Pinto da Costa; however, in this case the foreign presence could involve Nigerian troops. The FDC had not forgotten their previous invasion attempt when it was the FRNSTP, and was particularly concerned about the potential for another executive-led bilateral military alliance that would tip the balance of power. Both the granting of amnesty and the provision to block foreign troops were examples of binding safeguard incentives that the region was able to provide for the junta, who were the “losers” in São Tomé. Despite the fact that they lost, they would still be safeguarded from severely adverse consequences, and opponents would not secure permanent advantages over them through military alliance or occupation. In addition, they were promised a national public hearing in which political parties and civil society would have the opportunity to exhort the government to address their concerns.
The memorandum included language that allowed for a new government to be appointed, to ensure greater credibility and transparency in normalizing the affairs of the state. Before the coup, the FDC had an ongoing dispute with the government of Prime Minister das Neves, and had been calling for her removal. The provision in the memorandum that a new government could be formed was a nod to its grievance with the government of Prime Minister das Neves, and reflected the regional mediation team’s acknowledgement that personnel changes in the government might be needed to resolve lingering political differences. It was also an example of an incentive that the regional mediators were able to offer the junta in exchange for its cooperation. The memorandum asked the parliament to grant amnesty and explore the creation of a new government to implement the rest of its points. In addition, the memorandum states that parliament should pass a law determining how oil revenues would be managed. At the time, there was no specified framework for the management of oil revenue. São Tomé and Príncipe had never before faced a large source of potential revenue like the oil sector, so no framework had been established to manage and distribute the revenue. The lack of established mechanisms to manage oil revenues fueled speculation among society that these moneys would fall into the hands of the corrupt political elite, and do little to stimulate development of the archipelago. Corruption was a major concern for the rebels; thus, the mediators sought to provide incentives that included not only a law to manage oil revenue, but also a call for the government to improve the management of other public funds.

Some of the most direct incentives in the memorandum were the provisions that dealt with the military and the FDC leadership. The memorandum provides for resources
for the military including food, vehicles, clothes, medical supplies, salaries, and housing. These incentives represent the core of the military’s grievances that were presented to the government before the coup but not addressed. The mediators’ decision to include them in the memorandum signaled to the military that its requests would be answered this time, and that the regional body would see to it they were fulfilled. In addition, the military secured greater access to privileged government information and management, as the memorandum states that the Supreme Commander of the army is to be informed of development policy and the portfolio on oil (Alege 2003, also see Seibert 2003). This further alleviated the military’s concerns and addressed its main charge of corruption in the government.

The memorandum also included provisions and incentives for the FDC and the former SADF 32nd Battalion soldiers. The agreement called for the South African government to look into repatriating the bodies of the nine soldiers from São Tomé who died in Namibia, and to repatriate the other 22 ex-soldiers and their families who were still in South Africa. The South African government was also called upon to assist the archipelago in reintegrating these former fighters by resolving their economic problems, since they claimed they had been forced to fight for the SADF. One such provision contained in the agreement was for the government to give the former fighters a farm in the southern part of São Tomé so they could have an economic stake in the country. This provision was not made known to the public, as it was considered sensitive information. The granting of farmland as an incentive to the FDC essentially fulfilled one of its key demands to the government of Prime Minister das Neves before the coup. The government was responsible for fulfilling this request, as it was the government that
controlled all the plantations and farms once they had been nationalized after independence. Before the coup, the Prime Minister stated that the request was unreasonable, asserting that the group was lazy and had done little for the country, yet the IMG mediators were able to facilitate the concession as an additional means to secure compliance. The government also later approved an $80,000 loan for the farm project (Pindar 2003).

**Binding**

After he returned to power, President Menezes was faced with the task of appointing a new government. Most of his cabinet resigned within days, and on the first of August, Prime Minister das Neves also resigned (Pindar 2003). On August 4, President Menezes re-appointed her as Prime Minister, asserting that continuity in governance was required for debt forgiveness with international financial institutions and for the Joint Development Zone dealings with Nigeria. He further stated that a change in government was not a requirement of the internationally brokered mediation agreement, simply a possibility. The former rebels viewed this as a violation of the agreement, prompting President Menezes to accuse the FDC of plotting another coup, which Alercio Costa denied. The accusation was particularly problematic since it was known that many of the civilian participants in the coup were not yet disarmed. As the new government took shape, seven new members were sworn in. Among them was a new Minister of Natural Resources, who oversees the Joint Development Zone for the government. Disputes among stakeholders persisted in the capital over power sharing and the composition of the government. Potential for instability and continuing political conflict remained.
The ECCAS mediators had set up a 13-member “Monitoring Commission of the Agreement of July 23, 2003,” presided over by a representative of the Foreign Minister of the Congo, Rodolphe Adada, who took up residence in São Tomé keeping his government and the ECCAS informed of daily developments. The Monitoring Commission was designed to assure the junta that the regional community would follow through with implementing the provisions in the memorandum. There was no definitive date indicating how long the Monitoring Commissions mandate would last. The IMG also set up a Contact Group to commence distribution of some of the incentives promised to the military. The Contact Group consisted of ambassadors from four non-ECCAS countries in the IMG, which were accredited to São Tomé and had pledged to contribute: Nigeria, the United States, South Africa, and Portugal. The IMG dispersed on July 24 to implement the memorandum. On August 6, 2003, thirteen days later, the IMG chairman, Rodolphe Adada, convened another meeting to examine the report of the Contact Group and the ongoing implementation of the agreement. At the meeting were Foreign Minister Adada, representatives of the Contact Group, representatives of the other ECCAS mediators (Gabon and Angola) also on the monitoring commission, and the Brazilian ambassador to São Tomé. At the onset of the meeting, Foreign Minister Adada noted that his president, Dennis Nguesso, would host the presidents of Angola and Mozambique on the 18 of August (that month) to address São Tomé and Príncipe, and would eventually make a trip to São Tomé together at a later date (Alege 2003).

US Ambassador Moorefield indicated that material assistance from his country for the Santomean military could be available in a few months. He also stressed that improving the military’s living conditions and attending to the ex-mercenaries’ problems
were key for future sustainable development. He viewed the country’s political problems as purely internal, and believed that the IMG could only advise the government to embrace dialogue and resolve their differences. South African Ambassador Mokgethi Monalsa informed the IMG that his government had contacted the families of the nine deceased 32nd Battalion soldiers from São Tomé and Príncipe. He said that his government found that the wives of these soldiers were from South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique. In addition, neither the wives nor children of the deceased had been to São Tomé, and did not want their relatives’ bodies moved there because they would not be able to visit their graves. The request of the FDC soldiers to have the bodies moved to São Tomé was simply a request of the friends of the soldiers, which they could not prioritize over the wishes of their families. Ambassador Monalsa also stated that, after his government had consulted with the families of the remaining 22 soldiers from São Tomé and Príncipe still living in South Africa, it was clear that they did not want to leave South Africa. Since they were all granted South African citizenship in 1993, they were entitled to rights as citizens; his government could not force them to leave and repatriate them to São Tomé in accordance with the request of the FDC. He indicated that some of them were still serving in the SADF. Further, he said that those who had left chose to do so and that their families did not wish to join them in São Tomé. He also stated that his government had already given them all their outstanding salaries and benefits and did not owe them anything. Finally, he noted that the FDC were pleased with the farm project they received, and that his government would facilitate private investment. He stated that the government would deal heavily with the group if they continued to disturb the peace in São Tomé.
The Portuguese ambassador, Mario Jesus dos Santos, noted that the young population in São Tomé may end up serving as recruits for the FDC soldiers if they were not given an economic stake and alternative opportunities. He also stated that soldiers dismissed after the 1995 coup still possessed weapons and remained good friends with the FDC soldiers. He indicated that he believed they also participated in the recent coup, and remained a threat. He thought the real “brains” behind the coup were political opponents of Menezes, who he said had personal—but not ideological—disputes with the president. He was likely referring to the clash that arose when Menezes alienated the family of former President Trovoada upon taking office. The Portuguese ambassador indicated that his country had donated trucks to the military in the past, as well as other equipment yet to be installed. The Charge d’Affaires of Nigeria, S. F. Alege, continued to convey his country’s support to aid the military in order to improve its conditions and reduce its threat to peace and stability.

As Adada closed the meeting, he summed up the agreements reached therein: the IMG would not push for elections, it would continue to facilitate the Presidential Committee in the recovery of weapons that were in the wrong hands, it would maintain contact with stakeholders, it would address immigration issues, and it did not consider President Menezes’ re-appointment of Prime Minister Das Neves a violation of the agreement, but an internal political matter. It was clear from the meeting that Adada and ECCAS were in the driver’s seat. The meeting was called by Adada, and he chaired the meeting as the highest-ranking member present. In addition, he informed the committee of decisions that he and his government had made, such as the decision to hold a tripartite meeting between his president and his colleagues in Angola and Mozambique (ECAD
MFA 2009). He did not inform the contact group further of decisions his government was making with respect to the political disputes in São Tomé, including the national dialogue scheduled for November. His role in the meeting was to coordinate non-ECCAS members of the IMG, in line with the plan established by his country and the ECCAS regional block.

The Contact Group sent delegations to São Tomé and began to support the revitalization of the military in accordance with the agreement that ended the coup. South Africa and the United States sent delegations, as did Nigeria. Portugal had an existing military agreement with the archipelago that was clearly ineffective, failing to meet the needs of São Tomé. Given this state of affairs, the representatives of the other three Contact Group countries continued to provide aid and explore partnerships with the Armed Forces of São Tomé. President Menezes welcomed the additional support and actively called upon Nigeria to assist with the military arrangements between São Tomé and the other Contact Group members (Pindar 2003). The military assistance and partnerships were all consistent with the mediated agreement, and did not go beyond military or financial assistance to delve into the internal political affairs of São Tomé and Príncipe.

In mid-September of 2003, the chairman of the IMG visited São Tomé to negotiate a dispute between President Menezes and some of his political rivals. Rumors were circulating that another coup was in the works. President Menezes threatened to arrest Patrice Trovoada, the son of the former president, until his advisers persuaded him against it. According to Nigerian intelligence, Patrice Trovoada was alleged to be one of the major financiers of the July 16 coup. He was also dismissed as Foreign Minister
shortly after Menezes took office. After the intervention of Foreign Minister Adada, President Menezes announced the appointment of Patrice Trovoada as his petroleum adviser (Pindar 2003). The appointment was an attempt by the incumbent to weaken the opposing coalition by co-opting one of its key financiers. The move was facilitated by ECCAS leader and IMG chairman Rodolphe Adada of the Congo. His continued vigilance over the internal politics of São Tomé and success in bringing together political rivals demonstrates again the relevance and impact of the regional IO in the process of stabilization. It further showed the impact of the sustained Monitoring Commission set up by ECCAS to monitor implementation and address disputes as they arisen. None of the other IMG members or Contact Group donors had any desire to get involved in the internal politics of São Tomé, based on the statements they gave within closed meetings. The IMG chairman and ECCAS considered themselves responsible for putting out fires and monitoring internal political disputes, and were welcomed as credible outside mediators by some of the key stakeholders in São Tomé. The pressure applied to Menezes—first to abstain from arresting Trovoada, and then to go so far as appointing him as a key member of the government—was another key example of binding, in which the regional IO puts pressure on “winners” to prevent them from seeking permanent advantages over political opponents.

Political disputes continued in São Tomé long after the coup of July 16, 2003. There were disputes between the parliament and the government over certain official appointments. For example, the appointment of attorney general was disputed since the appointee had not practiced law on the islands (Pindar 2003). President Menezes rejected the resignation of his attorney general, stating that the imposed requirement of a local
practice violated the constitutional provision granting the president the power to appoint his attorney general. In addition, his appointment of a convict as head of the police was strongly opposed by many in the National Assembly. President Menezes took the position that a general amnesty cleared the record of the appointee, and thus he was eligible to serve as police chief. Similarly, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Major Idalcio Pachire, newly appointed in September of 2003, was second-in-command to Major Pereira when he led the July coup just two months earlier (Pindar 2003). By March of 2004, political disputes had reached a fever pitch with members of the government threatening to resign (Chancery 2004, Imam 2004). A high turnover rate in government continued on the island, yet international mediators—especially those of ECCAS—continued to monitor disputes and bind both the “winners” and “losers” to adhere to the established agreement of July 23, 2003. Though rumors of new coups persisted, no coup has occurred in São Tomé and Príncipe since that date.

**Alternative Explanations**

The alternatives to the consolidation theory of regional organizations follow realist assumptions that powerful nation-states dominate organizations and their immediate region. The relevant actors in this theory are the independent state actors, and not regional international organizations. This theory would assume that Nigeria is the dominant state in the region, which would mean it has the capacity to implement its objectives with or without the regional organization. In the case of São Tomé and Príncipe, Nigeria is not a member of ECCAS, yet since it is the dominant state, it would have assumed leadership of the mediation process. As noted, the process was led by ECCAS and particularly by the foreign minister of the country holding the rotating
presidency of ECCAS, the President of Congo-Brazzaville. This was neither the most significant state in the region nor the state that had the longest history of relations with the archipelago. Angola and Gabon had much closer historical ties than did Congo-Brazzaville. Neither of these nations led the process. In fact, as time went on the only high-ranking cabinet-level member of the IMG who continued to be actively involved in São Tomé and Príncipe was the Foreign Minister of the Congo and ECCAS leader, the IMG Chairman.

The role of Nigeria in São Tomé and Príncipe was to maintain standing economic relations and support the efforts of ECCAS, in order to protect its own national interests. Neither Nigeria nor Angola, the two main powers in the region, dominated the process. Both states worked under the umbrella and leadership of the primary regional organization. With respect to the ongoing internal political dispute, Nigeria did not get involved in mediating between political opponents. Along with other members of the Contact Group, it viewed these politics as an internal matter. At the same time the Foreign Minister of the Congo was actively negotiating settlements and prodding to bind political stakeholders in the country to adhere to the regional agreement. Nigeria was well aware that the ECCAS chairman took an active role in the internal affairs of São Tomé, a fact inconsistent with realist assumptions that Nigeria would assume a more active role for itself. Internal communications indicate that Nigeria wanted to assume a strong presence in São Tomé and Príncipe, and that in fact its representatives were uncertain as to whether the decision-making of ECCAS would adhere to their interests, yet they were never able to usurp the dominance of ECCAS in the process. In the end, they, too, worked under the umbrella of ECCAS, in direct contradiction to realist assumptions.
Far more likely to reflect Nigeria’s influence than ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) is an organization to which Nigeria belongs and over which Nigeria is likely to have a significant leverage. At the time of the coup, São Tomé had not yet ratified the GGC treaty. Nigeria continued to press for ratification as part of its policy to maintain influence in the region. Former President Trovoada asked to meet with President Obasanjo in the aftermath of the coup because he wanted support for his bid to be the organization’s first Secretary General (Pindar 2003). The most Nigeria achieved was to secure some key stakeholders in São Tomé to lobby for the country to move forward with ratifying the GGC treaty. As an organization, the GGC had no role in the process because it was not yet operational. What the GGC shows is that Nigeria was unable to convince the re-installed government in São Tomé to ratify the treaty despite openly pushing for it. The treaty had not even been forwarded by the executive to the parliament for ratification. Both Presidents Trovoada and Menezes neglected to forward the treaty. In the aftermath of the coup, when Nigeria’s influence increased by most accounts, São Tomé and Principe’s refusal to ratify the GGC treaty (until much later) contradicts realist assumptions of Nigeria’s power. Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister of Congo-Brazzaville was able to convince the Menezes to appoint an opponent as a top adviser, one who was believed to be responsible for the coup, who Menezes had threatened to arrest just a week before announcing the appointment. Moreover, he accomplished this act of persuasion in a single visit.

Another alternative explanation to consolidation theory in this case is that developing countries like São Tomé and Principe finance much of their national budgets through aid. Western nations, international financial institutions, and other donors are
able to use their leverage to demand change. This theory is backed by the evidence that human rights and democracy have become requirements for aid and support (Youngs, 2004: 29-30). States in need of aid may democratize under pressure. Quantitative study shows that the states that receive larger percentages of aid in relation to their GDP are more likely to hold elections within five years of a successful coup than states that receive a lower percentage of aid (Goemans 2008). This correlation could reveal the difficulty of holding power in a low-income country, or even demonstrate the effectiveness of conditionality on aid, as was assumed by the study. One way to demonstrate this effect in the case of São Tomé and Príncipe is to look for substantial amounts of conditional foreign aid, especially if the sources of that aid were Western or outside of the region, and if representatives from these donor states were present in the process.

One of the largest bilateral donors of São Tomé is Angola, which is also a member in the regional block of ECCAS. Other bilateral donors outside of the regional block include Portugal, Nigeria, France, and Taiwan. The key donor countries actively involved in the São Tomé and Príncipe IMG consolidation process were the four members of the Contact Group plus Angola. In the short time frame of the process, only a few international financial institutions announced that they would not continue projects until ascertaining the legitimacy of governing institutions. These donors accounted for a small portion of aid to the islands. There were no moves to withdraw aid as a threat; rather, aid was used as an incentive. Some of the incentives came in the form of direct aid from Contact Group members, which would be consistent with the conditional aid thesis. However, the bulk of the incentives came directly from power sharing and government
concessions. Furthermore, all incentives resulted directly from the mediation led by ECCAS, and were in no way dominated by the Contact Group. The group did not use aid to conditionally pressure action from the stakeholders in São Tomé and Príncipe. The aid provided by the Contact Group was intended to support the mediators and ECCAS. Aid was not used conditionally to pressure the targets of international efforts, neither was it presented as a tool of the donor states to influence the process. It came only after the mediators had successfully convinced the targets to step down through cost-raising measures, which had less to do with the individual donors themselves and more to do with the intervention of the ECCAS team.

Members of the Contact Group indicated in a meeting with the ECCAS that they had no desire to get involved with the internal affairs or political disputes of São Tomé and Príncipe. Their involvement in the process came primarily under the direction and in support of ECCAS and the IMG chairman, Rodolphe Adada. The contact group also represented states that had a vested or potential economic interest. They were approached and asked to contribute by ECCAS, as it was in their future interests to do so. They put no pressure on ECCAS, and their contributions had no impact on ECCAS’s control of the process. In fact, the four Contact Group donors were actually competing with each other for influence on the islands vis-à-vis cooperation with ECCAS. They presented no collective threat to the dominance of Rodolphe Adada or ECCAS in the mediation process. If any one of them did not cooperate with the ECCAS-led effort, the other three would have been glad to undermine the other out for future influence. Given these realities, the conditional aid thesis as a cause of the outcome does not parallel the process that unfolded in São Tomé, and is not a useful explanation.
Conclusion

The international intervention in São Tomé and Príncipe clearly illustrated that the immediate regional organization held a central role in the post-coup negotiation process. It was recognized by both the international community and the targets on the ground as the leader of the mediation process. At the same time, other regional powers and major donors who had initially attempted to intercede were not effective and did not secure a central role in the process. The mechanisms employed were closely connected to ECCAS and their mediation team on the IMG. Powerful states in the region, such as Nigeria and Angola, did not dominate the mediation process. Rather, the Republic of Congo, a seemingly less significant state without a long history of bilateral relations with São Tomé and Príncipe, did take leadership without strong economic links like those of Angola and Nigeria. The only explanation for the dominant role afforded to Congo-Brazzaville comes from the standard operating procedures of ECCAS, and likewise the process proposed by regional organizational consolidation theory, since it held the rotating presidency of ECCAS. Large donor countries did not dominate the process. Many donor countries volunteered their assistance but indicated that they did not wish to get involved in the internal disputes of São Tomé. They became involved largely for their own future interests, some perhaps even opportunistically, trying to gain leverage over the others. The members of the Contact Group stood in competition with one another for their own interests, and exerted little influence on the ECCAS-led mediations. The regional IO was the primary actor that remained involved throughout the process, raising costs, negotiating and arranging incentives, and binding the actors long after the coup.
In 2005, the longest serving leader in West Africa was Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the President of the Togolese Republic. This chapter outlines the transition of power after his death. Because the country had one leader for almost 38 years of its mere 45 years of independence, it did not have an established precedent for transferring power from one leader to the next in accordance with the policies set by ECOWAS in 1999 and the OAU in 1999 and 2000. Unlike the case of São Tomé and Príncipe, this case provides an opportunity to analyze the mechanisms of competing theories regarding the establishment and consolidation of constitutional order. This chapter starts by briefly reviewing the unique history of Togoland and the establishment of the Togolese Republic. It then provides a background of the political climate in the country and details some of the major shifts that occurred in the lead-up to the coup. The main focus of the chapter
evaluates the impact of the mechanisms in regional IO theory versus the impact of powerful regional states and donor countries.

Background

Togo is a small state in West Africa with about 51.5 kilometers of coastline and just over 56,000 thousand square kilometers of territory. There are over six million people living in Togo today, most of whom are said to be under the age of 18. With an incredibly young population, the country has the potential for civil unrest emanating from youth disillusionment and alienation, as well as from poverty, which limits opportunities and can result in ethnic tensions. There are two main ethnic groups in Togo. The largest is the Ewe who live in the south around the capital city and the coasts, making up about 40 percent of the country’s population. The Kabre are the second largest group, residing mostly in the north; they make up around 30 percent of the total population. In the colonial eras of both France and Germany, the southern-based Togolese had greater access to resources and were more likely to be integrated into the administrative network, while northern ethnic groups resisted colonial intrusion and were subsequently underdeveloped relative to the south. This condition contributed to regionalism and political antagonism both before and after independence.

The first known contact between Europeans and the people of modern Togo occurred in the late 1470s with the arrival of Portuguese traders. Several European nations vied for a stake in the territory. The slave trade was among the main industries operating between the indigenous population and Europeans. Togo never became an important destination for European slave procurement (see Decalo 1995). Regions neighboring Togo provided traders with a larger number of slaves as a result of more
favorable conditions. Due to the mountainous terrain in Togo, European traders were not able to penetrate the interior and relied on middlemen who provided slaves at a higher cost. As the slave trade came to an end, many former traders in Togo established plantations to sell raw materials such as cotton to Europeans. A number of the former traders were freed slaves from Brazil who had settled in Togo. Raw material production eventually led to territorial advances by Europeans looking to exploit these resources for themselves. After a conflict with British interests on July 4, 1884, German Commissioner Gustav Nachtigal signed a protectorate agreement with Mlapa III, an Ewe king in Togo, which at the time was simply the name of a small coastal town meaning “to the water’s edge.” The agreement established the German protectorate of Togo. Other indigenous groups to the north resisted German advances, particularly the leaders of Aneho and Agbodrafo, slowing the Germans’ progress toward the interior. The key objective of this expansion was to reach the Niger River through the Togo. The Germans were thwarted by other colonial outposts belonging to France and Britain, as well as the Treaty of Paris of 1897. Still, unlike the British and the French in the neighboring Gold Coast (Ghana) and Dahomey (Benin) respectively, Germany did not have to engage in military campaigns in Togo.

In the thirty years of German presence in Togo, large-scale infrastructural projects and investments transformed the territory into a self-sufficient colony with cocoa, cotton, and coffee as primary exports. At this time road networks, a shipping harbor, and the rail network that would later be extended were constructed. Infrastructure assisted in the transport of agricultural goods for export. The profitability of agriculture in Togo made it the first self-sustaining colony in West Africa, becoming what Germany called a
Musterkolonie, meaning “model colony.” German administrators relied on the kings and chieftains in the south to administrate and collect agricultural goods; many retained small armies under their control. In the north, Muslim leaders remained while German administrators focused primarily on an effective economic agenda, doing little to alter the culture and society of Togo.

Despite economic vitality under the authoritarian German administrators, there was considerable resistance to their rule. Many of the Ewe people migrated to neighboring Gold Coast (Ghana). In August of 1914, the allied forces in neighboring Gold Coast and Dahomey captured Togo without difficulty in less than three weeks, marking their first victory of World War I. After the war, Togo was split into British and French Togoland, dividing indigenous ethnic populations among colonial administrators. Two-thirds of the original territory was designated as a French protectorate, and the rest remained a British-controlled territory, administered through the Gold Coast (Curkeet 1993: 1-9).

As Ghana neared independence in 1957, a British-administered referendum gave the people of British Togoland the option to either remain with Togo or join the soon-to-be-independent country of Ghana. A majority of the people opted to join with Ghana, splitting the Ewe people (the minority in British Togo) between the two countries. France moved its section of Togo toward independence, attempting to install pro-French leadership under Nicolas Grunitzky in an autonomous republic from 1945-1958. The pro-French government of the autonomous republic eventually fell in an election supervised by the UN, due to the rise of the Comite de l’Unite Togolaise (CUT) led by Sylvanus Olympio. Upon independence, Olympio became the first president of Togo. He enjoyed
widespread support in the southern regions of Togo and among the Ewe elite. Centralizing the power of his CUT, Olympio established a one-party state in less than two years after independence. As president, he publicly opposed new taxation policies, and his disagreements with President Nkrumah caused him to close the border with Ghana. In addition, he fell into a feud with the Catholic archbishop in Lomé, and clashed with officers from the former colonial army (Decalo 1996: 4-5).

The conflict between President Olympio and the military began in 1962 when several hundred French colonial army veterans of Togolese decent were repatriated from neighboring French colonies where they had been serving.20 These colonial army soldiers asked to be incorporated into the Togolese army. Olympio refused, and rejected a compromise that would have incorporated just 60 of the most qualified veterans, most of whom were from the north. Shortly afterward in 1963, a group of soldiers launched an assault on Olympio’s unguarded residence in the night. Olympio was said to have been assassinated by Eyadéma one of the officers among the French veterans, gunned-down as he attempted to scale the wall of the American Embassy in Lomé; more accurate accounts assert that Eyadéma shot the President in his residence that night and that the other story was fabricated later (Decalo 1996: 103-104). The assassination and coup toppled CUT’s government.

After the coup, the military handed power back to Grunitzky and appointed Antoine Meatchi, a northerner, as his deputy. Soldiers preferred Meatchi, as they were mainly northerners, but French intervention favored the candidacy of Grunitzky. The selection of Grunitzky after the coup reinstated the pro-French leadership from the pre-

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20 France was not permitted to recruit soldiers from within the Togolese protectorate according to the post-WWI agreement. Soldiers of Togolese decent crossed the border and served in French colonial armies in Dahomey (Benin) and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
independence era, which remained highly unpopular in the south and enjoyed little backing elsewhere in the country. During this time the Togolese military tripled in size, largely by recruiting French colonial army veterans who were mainly from the north.

After implementing a multi-party system by 1966, Grunitzky’s cabinet began to unravel, with members of former President Olympio’s party defecting and acute disagreements arising over the performance of cabinet members in key posts. Popular unrest increased in the south, led by factions loyal to Olympio’s CUT party. These dissenters seized the national radio and called for public demonstrations. Mass crowds responded to the radio appeal and listened to addresses made by leading opposition party members.

The military eventually intervened to take back the radio station and quell demonstrations. The unpopularity of Grunitzky’s government had become a liability, and the military leaders could not allow the former president’s party to assume power, fearing retaliation for the assassination of Olympio. Shortly afterward, on the four-year anniversary of the Olympio assassination, the military overthrew the Grunitzky government. Grunitzky was allowed to leave the country with several close aides.

Although elections were promised by Army Chief Kleber Dadjo, the promise was soon broken by Gnassingbé Eyadéma, a leader among the French colonial army veterans, who consolidated executive power and established his own authoritarian government.

**Political Climate**

In the three years following the 1967 coup, Eyadéma sought to quell opposition to his rule, especially among the Ewe elite in the south where Lomé, the capital of Togo, is located. Eyadéma himself was a member of the Kabre ethnic group based in the north of Togo, and lacked strong academic or technocratic credentials to gain respect among Ewe
elite. Since he was a military leader, he initially asserted that he had no ambition to hold power himself, but rather was setting up an interim administration for the sake of stability stating that he would eventually hand over to civilian authorities. He co-opted civil society groups, such as trade unions, in an attempt to project himself as a benevolent force. The legislature and political parties were prohibited to promote unity and stability during this time while a new constitution for Togo was being drafted (Decalo 1996: 129).

By 1969, Togo began to receive increased revenue from phosphate production. With this financial boost, Eyadéma established a single-party nationalist non-ethnic movement called Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) through a series of caucuses and constituent congresses across the country (Decalo 1996: 249). With Eyadéma as president and Edem Kodjo as secretary general, the RPT served to legitimize Eyadéma, who had forcibly come to power despite having formed a constitutional committee and having pledged to hand-over to civilians. The RPT eventually declined to adopt the draft constitution, citing the greater importance of addressing issues of unity and lingering conflict between factions.

Several years after the forming of the one-party RPT state, a national referendum in 1972 gave an overwhelming victory to Eyadéma in all regions, allowing him to project himself as a civilian leader with nationwide support. During much of the 1970s, Eyadéma ran an effective administration with numerous accomplishments in the area of development projects, including the nationalization of the phosphate industry. He became a leader in regional integration, serving as one of the two founders of ECOWAS and the first chair of the organization. All these initiatives proved to be popular among skeptics in the coastal regions. In addition, his appointment of skilled technocrats to key positions in
his administration, including many from the south, also won him cautious support among Ewe elite. He afforded his appointees autonomy in their areas of expertise.

By the late 1970s, the price of phosphate began to collapse around the globe, plunging the Togolese government into debt on the assumption that prices would return to their earlier levels. Eventually, public projects had to be halted, some in midstream. To sustain support for his rule, Eyadéma began to project a cult of personality, transforming himself into a larger-than-life figure present in all parts of Togolese society. Public reference to Eyadéma was often filled with flattery and drew parallels to national pride and patriotism. Large portraits and statues were erected throughout the capital and across the country. During this time, many of his previous technocratic appointments were replaced with allies, relatives, friends, and ardent supporters. Meanwhile, corruption and lack of professionalism in the public sector also increased. As a result of this cronyism, many of the former southern elite were excluded from key posts. The economic downturn also hit the southern economy the hardest. As Eyadéma lost legitimacy and opposition to his administration began to grow, especially in the south, his government engaged in a series of crackdowns including arrests, extrajudicial killings, and other measures geared at suppressing dissent.

Unable to make dept payments by the 1980s, Togo had to undergo a structural adjustment initiated by the World Bank, which included the privatization of state enterprises and other cost-cutting measures. Poor economic performance in the 80s, corruption among members of the RPT including Eyadéma, and growing unpopularity led the government to embrace political liberalization late in the decade. Due to rising protests over the one-party system, Eyadéma called for a National Conference on
political institutions. He opened the conference to opposition members, many of whom were living abroad. The National Conference was given the power to decide on the implementation of the multi-party system. The conference proceeded to dissolve the RPT, remove Eyadéma from power, and appoint an interim prime minister to oversee elections scheduled for the following year. Furthermore, it disclosed the rampant corruption of the RPT including the massive wealth of Eyadéma, which totaled 80 billion CFA francs at the time. Eyadéma refused to resign and remained in the presidential palace, using his control of the armed forces to retaliate against the measures being taken by the National Conference (Decalo 1996: 130-132). The security forces launched targeted killings, reported assassination attempts on the political opposition, assaults on the National Conference and Radio Togo, and even went as far as kidnapping interim Prime Minister Koffigoh. Despite a crippling eighteen-month-long strike in the south and continued clashes, Eyadéma managed to hold on to power between 1990 and 1993.

To break the stalemate, interim Prime Minister Koffigoh annulled the provision that barred the RPT and Eyadéma from participating in the upcoming elections. Eyadéma then proceeded to disqualify his main competitor and son of the former president, Gilchrist Olympio, for not having provided a certificate of his health and fitness to the electoral board (Decalo 1996: 222). A year before the election while he was campaigning, Olympio was wounded in an assassination attempt by a military unit led by one of Eyadéma’s sons. He had to be flown to Paris for several months of treatment. The disqualification of Olympio led all opposition candidates to boycott the vote, ensuring the victory of Eyadéma in 1993. In the parliamentary elections of 1994, Eyadéma continued to use the military as a means to shore up support for the RPT in the north and secure the
second-largest delegation for his party in the National Assembly. International donors suspended aid to Togo in response to Eyadéma’s authoritarian measures.

The outcome of political liberalization served to provide Eyadéma with an electoral means of retaining power. His strong hold over the nation’s military allowed him to intimidate political opponents and quell opposition, even while claiming to be an elected leader. While in exile and after the 1993 election, Gilchrist Olympio launched covert attempts to assassinate Eyadéma, infiltrating militia fighters from neighboring Ghana in an assault on Eyadéma’s motorcade in 1994 (Decalo 1996: 103). The attack failed but struck Eyadéma’s vehicle, injuring his driver. By the 1998 election, Olympio had built his Union of the Forces of Change (UFC) party to contest the election. Three other parties competed in the election. It occurred without major incidents; however, during the counting of ballots the government was said to have dismissed the electoral commission and declared Eyadéma the winner. Despite widespread claims of fraud from the opposition and an alleged massacre of hundreds of opposition supporters, the government-certified result showed Eyadéma winning outright with over 52 percent of the vote (Ebeku 2005: 10). It was clear the incumbent’s advantageous position and control of the military assisted him in his re-election. The opposition claimed, and several international election observers believed, that UFC candidate Gilchrist Olympio actually won the election.

According to the 1992 Togolese constitution drafted by the National Conference, presidents get a maximum of two terms. These term limits meant that Eyadéma would not be able to stand for re-election in 2003. In 2001, Eyadéma publicly pledged to retire in 2003. In the delayed parliamentary elections of October 2002, disagreements arose
over government interference in the composition of the independent electoral commission, leading to a boycott by the main opposition parties. The boycott gave Eyadéma’s RPT party a sweeping victory in the National Assembly. With RPT assuming full control of parliament late in December 2002, the National Assembly amended the constitution, removing the term limits and clearing the way for Eyadéma to run again in 2003. The assembly also reduced the age limit to run for president from 45 to 35. Some observers believed this was done so that Eyadéma’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, could assume or run for the presidency after his father left office. The National Assembly also added a residency requirement of 12 months for presidential candidates to run. The move essentially blocked UFC leader Olympio from running, since he had been living abroad continuously after almost being assassinated in 1992. Eyadéma won the 2003 election, with official tallies giving him over 57 percent of the vote over Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, his main contender and UFC First Vice Chairman. Just as in 1998, there were many opposition claims of fraud and rigging. Political tensions between the main opposition parties (led by the UFC) and the ruling RPT party continued after the election. In 2004, attempts at dialogue and reconciliation in talks with a visiting EU delegation failed, leaving EU officials to hold separate private meetings with President Eyadéma and several opposition leaders.

**Army**

By the time of Eyadéma’s death, the army in Togo numbered well over 10,000 soldiers—over ten times the size of the army after independence. The northern transformation of the army began in 1963, when former French colonial army veterans joined the armed forces after they overthrew and assassinated President Olympio.
inclusion of French colonial army veterans tripled the size the Togolese army in 1963. By 2005 most of the members of the Army, including those at the top of the hierarchy, came from the north. Many belonged to the same Kabre ethnic group as Eyadéma. It is estimated that over 80 percent of the armed forces were from the northern region of Togo. Historically, the northern region was disproportionately represented in the colonial armies of both Germany and France. Northern youth willingly enlisted in the colonial armies at higher rates than Togolese in the south, who had other avenues of social mobility and were disproportionately represented in the civil services.

At present, the main military center for training and recruitment in Togo is located in the center of Kabre ethnic territory, Eyadéma’s homeland. Eyadéma’s bond to the military was so close that he chose to reside at army headquarters in Lomé, using the less secure presidential palace only during the day for administrative purposes (Decalo 1996: 48-51). In the 1980s, the military grew substantially as Eyadéma began to face increased opposition to his rule. In the early 90s, the army carried out assassinations, massacres and other intimidating measures geared at bolstering the Eyadéma administration. The army was his only means of maintaining control of the country after the National Conference had stripped him of his power as leader of a one-party state; it had even attempted to ban and dissolve the RPT. Eyadéma had several relatives serving as key leaders in elite units of the armed forces, including the presidential guard, and many members of this guard were recruited from Pya, Eyadéma’s hometown. Some of the elite units commanded by Eyadéma’s relatives were involved in the political violence that followed the National Conference. The largely northern Togolese army has been a key tool of the ruling RPT and Eyadéma in particular. The army benefited from cooperative agreements with France
that included military collaboration, receiving both equipment and training. It has also hosted French bases, most recently in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict (AFP 2004).

**Coup**

On January 24, 2005, President Eyadéma began to show signs of physical weakness at the African Union summit in Abuja. Prior to this, Eyadéma had left inauguration festivities in Accra early while attending the swearing-in of President John Kufuor in neighboring Ghana on January 7. He was also unable to attend the ECOWAS regional summit in Niamey, Niger on January 12, 2005 (Afanyiakossou 2009). On Saturday, February 5, 2005, after serving almost 38 years as the Togolese president, Eyadéma died as he was being evacuated for medical treatment abroad. Prime Minister Koffi Sama made the official announcement on national radio that President Eyadéma had died. The prime minister also announced that all of Togo’s airports, seaports, and land borders would be closed in an effort to maintain order and prevent unrest in the wake of Eyadéma’s death. A few hours after the announcement, Army Chief of Staff General Zachari Nandja gave an address on national television, announcing that the constitution had been suspended and that the army was appointing Faure Gnassingbé, son of the late president, as head of state in place of his father. In the announcement General Nandja said, “The Togolese armed forces swear allegiance to Faure Gnassingbé as president of the Republic of Togo” (IRIN 2005). In the televised address, General Nandja was accompanied by other high-ranking members of the army and was shown shaking hands with Faure Gnassingbé and one of his younger brothers, Kpatcha Gnassingbé.
The amendment to Article 65 of the 1992 Togolese Constitution, Law No. 2002-029 passed December 31, 2002, states that when the office of president becomes vacant, presidential functions are to be handed to the Speaker of the National Assembly to serve as acting president. The acting president then has 60 days to conduct presidential elections. At the time of the death of president Eyadéma, Faure Gnassingbé was the Minister of Public Works, Mines and Telecommunication, a portfolio that included Togo’s lucrative phosphate industry. Faure Gnassingbé was also a member of the National Assembly, but not the Speaker of the Assembly. The National Assembly Speaker, Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba, was out of the country at the time of Eyadéma’s death, leading a delegation to the EU in Brussels. The next morning, the National Assembly convened with the members who were present (over 90 percent of whom were still RPT or government-sponsored partisans) and unanimously elected Faure Gnassingbé to be Speaker of the Assembly, and thus president. In addition, the assembly eliminated the constitutional requirement that the speaker hold elections within 60 days of the president's death. The elimination of the electoral clause cleared the way for Faure Gnassingbé to remain head of state until 2008 when his father's term was set to end (IRIN 2005). The RPT-run National Assembly made Faure Gnassingbé the official president retroactively, after the army had already made a televised declaration.

National Assembly Speaker Natchaba was en-route to Lomé when he heard of the death of the Togolese president. When the president’s death was announced by the prime minister, all the airports and borders were closed. The National Assembly Speaker, in his attempt to return, was forced to land in Cotonou in neighboring Benin. Due to the closure of the land border between Benin and Togo, Natchaba was also unable to cross into Togo
by land. The borders and airport remained closed for three days; by the time Natchaba was able to return to Togo, he was no longer relevant as Gnassingbé had already assumed the presidency (IRIN 2005). In his final years in office, it seemed that President Eyadéma had been grooming Faure Gnassingbé as his successor. The constitutional amendment on the age limit of a president as well as his ascension to a ministerial post pointed towards a prominent future for Gnassingbé, who also began to take an active role in international negotiations with donors and the domestic political opposition (Cornwell 2005).

Response to the Coup

The nationally televised announcement of Faure Gnassingbé’s ascendance to the presidency made by General Nandja, the Togolese Army Chief of Staff, was immediately condemned as a coup by the opposition as well as African and international observers. The retroactive measures taken by the National Assembly the following day were rejected as a mere rubber stamp to legalize the coup. At the time, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo was chairman of the African Union. While on an official state visit to Zambia, President Obasanjo declared that “all African leaders should not accept what has happened in [Togo] until there is a democratic transition” (IRIN 2005). He went on to say that the events “that have happened since the death of President Eyadéma do not give us comfort that peace will follow in that country.” Through his spokeswoman, Obasanjo’s office also released an official statement asserting that “the AU will not accept any unconstitutional transition of power in Togo.” The statement also called upon the Togolese people “to insist on respect for the nation’s constitution in the provision of interim leadership for Togo that will lead to the democratic election for Togo in accordance with the constitution” (Nigeria Today Online 2005, see also BBC 2005).
The Chairman of ECOWAS at the time of the coup was Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja. In a BBC interview, he stated that “what's happened in Togo does not honor Africa.... We've told our Togolese brothers not to go in this direction. It's the worst route they could take.” He also articulated that the desire of the region was “that we should be following the legal democratic road. Organize democratic elections. Whether it's Eyadéma Junior or another man, the Togolese people should decide who leads them.”

The chair of the African Union Commission and former president of Mali Alpha Oumar Konaré said in an interview with AFP that “what's happening in Togo needs to be called by its name: it's a seizure of power by the military, it's a military coup d'état” (BBC 2005). He went on to say that “the African Union obviously cannot support any seizure of power by force; an immediate return to constitutional government is essential” (Toulabor 2005).

Opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio, speaking to Reuters in Paris, said that the coup “won't be accepted inside the country and it won't be accepted outside the country. So this state of affairs won't last long.” He called on the Togolese to take to the streets in protest of the coup. His call prompted the government to declare a two-month ban on public demonstrations within hours. After the ban was set in place, Togolese opposition parties called for a two-day general strike in Togo for Tuesday and Wednesday, February 8 and 9 to bring the country to a dead halt. In their press release, they urged all of Togo’s people to stay at home during the nationwide strike to show their rejection of the military coup. The strike was partially observed, but was particularly noticeable in Lomé. There were also reports of small protests held at the University of Lomé that were broken up by police.
In contrast to the statements from African leaders, the international response to the coup in Togo was more reserved and mild. The UN Secretary-General released a statement that Monday that the transition in Togo “has not been done in full respect of the provisions of the Constitution.” The French Foreign Ministry also released a statement on Monday after over a day of fierce condemnation from African leaders, announcing that it supported the calls from African leaders for “the swift holding of free and democratic elections to put an end to the transition opened up by the death of President Eyadéma and provide the institutions with legitimacy.” Both US and EU statements asserted concern for the events in Togo as well as hope for the chance of greater electoral legitimacy and transparency in the country. Immediate international statements did not make threats of serious action, but mildly reflected concern and support for regional efforts.

In the day following the coup, Secretary General of ECOWAS Mohammad Chambas flew to Lagos, Nigeria and tried to enter Togo passing through Benin, but was prevented from crossing the sealed border by Togolese security (PAPS 2009). The African Union Peace and Security Council met on Tuesday, February 8, rebuking “the manner through which the de facto Togolese authorities organized the succession in Togo” (Afrol 2005). The AU condemned the constitutional changes made the following day, stating that they were “in violation of the relevant provisions of the Togolese Constitution.” The AU further threatened that if Togolese authorities did not comply, there would be a “firm response to the unconstitutional change which occurred in Togo.”

On February 9, four days after the coup, ECOWAS leaders met in Niamey, Niger immediately after the AU Peace and Security Council meeting. The “extraordinary summit” in Niger was attended by heads of state from member nations. At the summit,
ECOWAS refused to recognize the new government in Togo. The group insisted on an immediate return to the constitution and declared that Faure Gnassingbé should step down as Togo’s president. The return to the Togolese Constitution would mean that elections had to be held within 60 days. According to the decision, if the Togolese government failed to comply with ECOWAS demands, it would be suspended from the regional block and face an arms embargo (The Authority 2005; Afrol 2005). The same day of the extraordinary summit, Faure Gnassingbé gave a brief, nationally televised statement that he was committed to holding credible elections in Togo. He also extended an olive branch to the exiled opposition, welcoming them to return to Togo for real dialogue on the political future of the country stating that they “want serious discussions... that will lead as soon as possible to the organization of free and transparent elections that reflect the will of the people.” In his statement he did not say when he was planning to hold elections, nor whether they would be parliamentary or presidential elections or both (IRIN 2005). While Gnassingbé did not refer to the international condemnation of his rise to the presidency, his statement was the first indication that Togo’s officials were responding to pressure.

Later that week, the heads of state from five ECOWAS countries were set to meet in Lomé for talks with Togolese leaders to convey the resolutions of the extraordinary summit in Niger. The leaders of two of Togo’s neighbors, Benin and Ghana, as well as those of Niger, Mali, and Nigeria were supposed to attend the intervention meeting. In all, those attending were: President Mamadou Tandja of Niger, Chairman of ECOWAS, President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairman of the African Union, President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, President John Kufuor of Ghana, President Toumani Toure of
Mali, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS Mohammad Chambas, and Chairperson of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konaré. An advanced team sent by Nigeria, which included Foreign Minister Olu Adeniji, was prevented from landing in Lomé, directed by Togolese air traffic control to land in the northern city of Kara instead (MFA 2005, PANA 2005). Togolese officials wanted to change the venue of the meeting from the south of Togo to the north. Public protests opposing the coup in the southern capital could have undermined the position of Togolese leaders, reflecting that a large segment of the population did not stand behind them.

Rather than land in the northern city of Kara, the Nigerian plane returned to Abuja in protest of being prevented from landing normally. Togo’s unplanned re-routing of the Nigerian foreign minister prompted calls from Nigeria for an apology. Other ECOWAS leaders joined in the call, including Secretary General Mohammad Chambas who said that Togolese officials should “apologize unreservedly” to the Nigerian President. As a result of the incident, the intervention meeting was diverted to a smaller meeting in Cotonou, Benin. There, ECOWAS leaders summoned the new Togolese government to attend a meeting with ECOWAS Chairman President Mamadou Tandja in Niger or face automatic sanctions from the West African block (MFA 2005, see also BBC 2005).

Togolese officials responded sending a delegation to Niger to receive the demands of the West African regional block that Saturday, February 12. Togolese officials led by Foreign Minister Kokou Tozoun were presented with demands from the regional block, which called for a return to the constitution and for Faure Gnassingbé to resign as president. The return to the constitution meant Togo would have to hold a presidential election in 60 days. After the demands were presented, Togolese officials
continued to resist pressure to reverse their actions. As the stalemate drew into the second week and sanctions became imminent, Faure Gnassingbé himself and key members of his new administration were invited to Abuja, Nigeria to meet with AU Chairman and Nigerian President Obasanjo (Suleman 2009). In order to resolve the crisis, defuse regional pressure, and personally explain his position, Gnassingbé ventured out of his country for the first time to negotiate. Gnassingbé was received as an unrecognized leader and dignitary in the Nigerian capital, with none of the trappings that would have been afforded to a head of state. On February 19, a day after returning to Togo from the round of intervention meetings in Abuja, Gnassingbé made a televised announcement that there would be a special election in Togo in early April—in 60 days’ time according to what he had said earlier. Despite this, he refused to resign in his announcement stating that he would remain president until elections were held (IRIN 2005). Shortly afterwards, the Togolese National Assembly also reversed their change to the constitution that allowed for Gnassingbé to stay on as president until the end of 2008 (Afrol 2005). The Assembly once again retroactively affirmed the announcement about elections.

After Gnassingbé announced the elections and indicated that he was not going to step down as president, ECOWAS Chairman Tandja moved forward with the threatened sanctions the same day February 19 (Tandja 2005). The regional body imposed an arms embargo on Togo, suspended Togo from the regional body, placed travel restrictions on Togolese officials, and recalled the ambassadors of all member states accredited to the country (DWAR 2009, see also AU Press Release 2005). As the sanctions against Togo were announced, opposition parties and ruling RPT party protests began to form in Lomé and in other opposition strongholds in southern Togo, creating the potential for clashes
and adding to security concerns for the Togolese authorities. The African Union endorsed all the actions taken by ECOWAS the next day, February 20. Later, on February 25, the AU announced the suspension of Togo from all AU activities through the African Union Peace and Security Council. The AU Security Council took further action against Togo, enacting a continent-wide arms embargo on Togo and calling for Gnassingbé to step down (AU 2005). The African Union also said that the body would not recognize the results of any election in Togo conducted under the present unconstitutional authorities. The AU declaration thus rejected Gnassingbé’s pledge to hold elections as worthless as long as he remained in office.

Several days after the declaration of elections, the ruling RPT party of Togo selected Faure Gnassingbé as their presidential flag-bearer for the upcoming elections. After securing the nomination of the RPT, Faure Gnassingbé resigned as president of Togo on February 25, 2005 to run in the elections in early April. In his resignation speech, he indicated that it was up to the National Assembly to select a new president and to organize the upcoming elections. The National Assembly convened and selected Deputy Speaker Bonfoh Abbass as the new Speaker of the Assembly and acting president. The resignation of Gnassingbé brought an end to the constitutional crisis and put the country on the path toward a constitutional transition of power. Later that day on February 25, ECOWAS withdrew sanctions and repealed the suspension of Togo from the regional body, paving the way for the resumption of normalized relations (Tandja 2005). The move also drew ECOWAS in to monitor and assist Togo in organizing elections within the 60 days stipulated in the constitution. ECOWAS as a regional body assists member states with national elections, providing experts to help electoral officials organize
credible institutions in line with regional standards. ECOWAS also sends monitor teams for the national elections of every member state.

**Sticks**

In the case of Togo, the first cost-raising mechanism used was the open rejection and condemnation of the transition that took place after Eyadéma’s death. The chairs of both of the relevant regional organizations came out against the developments in Togo. In addition, the administrative leaders of the regional organizations openly condemned the actions in Togo and made it clear that they would not be accepted. The cost-raising mechanism of condemnation came almost exclusively from within the African region, and in particular West Africa. States outside the African region gave mildly worded statements in response to the events in Togo and primarily aligned themselves with the positions established by regional IOs. It took several days before the French Foreign Ministry came out with a statement in opposition to the events that took place in Togo. By that time, condemnation from within Africa was in full swing and had been going on for days. The soft statement by France echoed sentiments voiced by leaders in Africa. The US State Department also released a statement endorsing ECOWAS statements, calling on “Togolese authorities to fully cooperate with ECOWAS, the African Union, and other members of the international community.” The EU released statements in support of AU and ECOWAS and made similar calls echoing the statements made earlier by African leaders (Afrol 2005). In their statements, both the US and the EU recognized the primacy of the regional IOs in the process and sought to align themselves with them. The verbal condemnation of what took place in Togo occurred first in the African region and was most forceful in Africa, particularly among West African leaders of the regional
IOs. Condemnation from outside Africa came later, with less vigor, and was deliberately
aligned with ECOWAS and AU efforts.

In addition to condemnation outside of Togo, opposition groups within Togo
began to add to the pressure on Togolese officials by calling for demonstrations, unrest,
and national strikes. While there was little domestic unrest and only minor work stoppage
at the onset, the size and scope of domestic opposition grew substantially as regional
leaders held firm in rejecting the Togolese leadership. As West African leaders brought
their second wave of cost-raising mechanisms, which included threats of suspension from
ECOWAS, diplomatic isolation, an arms embargo, and travel restrictions on Togolese
officials, domestic unrest in Togo spiked. Early in the process the Togolese army
declared a national state of emergency and “national mourning,” banning street
demonstrations for two months. Fear of the repressive measures used by the army caused
many to ignore the initial calls by the opposition to engage in protests and demonstrations.
After both the AU and ECOWAS released their demands and threats, the first
demonstrations occurred on February 11 and 12, 2005. Three people were killed,
according to news reports and international observers (IRIN 2005; Amnesty International
2005: 4). The population began to engage in demonstrations as regional pressure
mounted against the government.

The targets of the cost-raising measures in Togo also responded to regional
condemnation of their actions. Initially, the army chief of staff announced in a televised
address that Faure Gnassingbé was president and that the Togolese constitution was
suspended. Immediately following that announcement, African leaders vigorously
condemned the coup and rejected the transfer of power. The very next day, the Togolese
National Assembly convened to provide a legal path for Gnassingbé to assume the presidency. If the Togolese constitution remained suspended, there would be no reason for the National Assembly to convene. The open condemnation that came immediately from African leaders led the targets in Togo to reverse their suspension of the constitution and begin to change their actions (WAD MFA 2009).

As condemnation continued, it became clear that attempts to legalize the ascent of Gnassingbé to the presidency would not move regional leaders from their original position—that the transfer of power in Togo was a coup. After the AU Peace and Security Council condemned the coup, and as ECOWAS leaders were holding a summit in Niamey, Niger, Faure Gnassingbé gave a statement that promised elections without giving a date. The fact that his government was considering elections indicated another direct response to the demands being made by regional leaders. Togolese officials moved first from suspending the constitution to utilizing constitutional organs to legalize the transfer of power, to then accepting in principle the original constitutional provision of holding elections after initially removing the provision. The continued shift by the targets in Togo towards regional demands demonstrates further links between supranational regional organizations and the actions taken by the target state.

After mediations organized by the chairs of ECOWAS and the AU, in Niger and Nigeria respectively, targets in Togo again shifted further towards regional demands announcing that they would hold elections in 60 days, by early April. The announcement paralleled the statute in the Togolese constitution which had been the key demand of the AU and ECOWAS. The announcement came a day after Faure Gnassingbé himself met with the Nigerian president in Abuja. In the meeting, the Nigerian president explained
firmly to the Togolese delegation that the AU and ECOWAS would not recognize his administration. They rejected the accusations made by Togolese officials that regional leaders were destabilizing Togo and that following regional demands by reversing their actions could potentially cause unrest and civil war. Despite their disagreements, Togolese officials agreed to hold elections but Gnassingbé himself refused to step down as president. Officials close to him argued that such a move would cause a downward spiral and potentially cause the collapse of order in Togo (WAD MFA 2009, PAPS 2009). This claim echoed the claims made behind closed doors in their mediations in Niger and Nigeria.

Gnassingbé’s refusal to resign prompted the last major wave of cost-raising mechanisms from ECOWAS and later the AU. The measures employed by ECOWAS included diplomatic isolation, as all ECOWAS ambassadors posted in the country were immediately recalled, as well as the suspension of Togo from the regional body. ECOWAS also implemented an arms embargo and travel restrictions on Togolese officials (Tandja 2005). After ECOWAS, the AU immediately suspended Togo and supported the sanctions. The AU also made it clear that the results of the scheduled elections in Togo would not be recognized as long as the unconstitutional leadership remained in place to organize the election. This proclamation nullified the move by the targets in Togo to hold elections in 60 days without resigning from power. Outside of Africa there were few comparable cost-raising measures. Since 1993, the EU had frozen aid to Togo while Eyadéma was president. There were no additional cost-raising measures from outside Africa that had an immediate impact on Togolese authorities.
One additional effect of Togo’s suspension from ECOWAS was the increase in domestic pressure and public demonstrations. Initially there were greater public fears of security crackdowns on public protests, especially when the government announced a ban on all demonstrations after the coup. When it became clear that the government no longer had any legitimacy within the region, demonstrations occurred on February 11 and 12 (IRIN 2005). Opposition leaders calculated that any harsh response to public unrest would only isolate the government further and provide even more ammunition to undermine its status. In a statement issued on February 11, Nigeria announced that it would “hold the Togolese Authorities responsible for any breakdown of law and order… or any acts of intimidation or harassment visited on any African or non-African resident in Togo” (MFA 2005). The statement was meant to put Togolese officials on notice that their handling of domestic security was being closely monitored by the region and they would alienate themselves further if the mismanaged the situation.

The harsh crackdown of the earlier demonstration on February 11 and the government ban prevented most demonstrations from occurring. When sanctions were announced on February 19 demonstrations re-emerged. On February 22, two protests—one by the opposition and the other by the RPT—were banned by Minister of Interior François Akila Esso Boko, citing a ban on demonstrations during that week (Amnesty International 2005: 4-6). It was clear that as international pressure mounted, domestic stakeholders responded on both sides creating additional security concerns for the government on the domestic front. In response to the mounting pressure at home and abroad, Faure Gnassingbé resigned, but only after securing the nomination from his party to contest the upcoming elections.
Carrots

As soon as Faure Gnassingbé announced his resignation, ECOWAS Chairman President Tanja of Niger moved quickly to restore Togo’s membership and reverse the sanctions that same day, issuing a communiqué on February 25 (Tandja 2005). The decision to impose or remove sanctions remained in the hands of the chairman, according to ECOWAS operating procedures. Regional leaders were also primed to implement a credible transfer of power and prevent Togo from spiraling into a destabilizing conflict. The position of ECOWAS was that the region was willing and ready to assist in the constitutional power transition if the targets in Togo followed regional demands. The Chairman of ECOWAS and President of Niger, Mamadou Tandja, led a delegation to Lomé on February 28, 2005 to meet with interim President Bonfoh Abbass three days after Gnassingbé stepped down. He was joined by Malian President Amadou Amani Touré, Nigerian Minister for Regional Integration Lawan Gana Guba, and Executive Secretary of ECOWAS Mohammad Chambas. The aim of the visit was to reinforce the interim president’s legitimacy at home and abroad, and to pledge support for the transition process. The delegation also met and consulted with the members of the Togolese opposition. The statement released after the meetings affirmed that “ECOWAS approves the choice of Mr. Bonfoh, and elections should happen as soon as possible.”

According to the standard operating procedure, the leader of the delegation aimed at helping Togo hold credible elections was the ECOWAS Chairman President Tandja of Niger. In his role as regional chair, the first major benefit he conferred on behalf of ECOWAS was legitimacy. By legitimizing interim President Bonfoh, the Togolese government was simultaneously released from some of the opposition’s pressure at home.
The six major Togolese opposition parties would have preferred the former National Assembly leader Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba to take over as interim leader. As ECOWAS accepted the right of the National Assembly to appoint Bonfoh and shifted their focus towards the upcoming elections, opposition protests of Bonfoh were limited. In addition, ECOWAS-certified legitimacy opened up other avenues for the interim government to solicit aid and electoral assistance in the transition process. Electoral assistance came from the region, but also from other sources including the United Nations, the EU, IFIs, and other interested parties not likely to support the Togolese government while ECOWAS had suspended it. According to their stated positions, international observers had called on Togolese officials to work with ECOWAS and the AU to bring the country in line with its constitution, and were working in cooperation with both organizations.

ECOWAS Chairman President Tandja also appointed a special envoy and election observer that was stationed permanently in Togo: Mai Manga Boukar, a former minister from Niger (IRIN 2005, see also AU PSC 2005). The special envoy was to monitor daily preparations for the poll in view of providing credible elections in the short time frame of 60 days, as stipulated in the Togolese constitution. Two other electoral experts from Benin and Mali were also appointed and placed at the disposal of Togolese authorities to organize the upcoming election. The ECOWAS envoy, along with the appointed experts, took up residence in Togo and was available on a day-to-day basis. Mai Manga Boukar was also to remain permanently stationed in Lomé as an ECOWAS envoy long after the election had been held.
Since 1993, the EU had frozen all aid to Togo for what were viewed as violations of the community’s policy on democracy and human rights. For 13 years, the freeze on aid continued. Despite several attempts in Eyadéma’s second and third terms as elected president, the EU was unable to make any inroads on the Togolese government’s policy toward political opposition. At the time of Eyadéma’s death, the National Assembly leader was heading a delegation meeting with EU officials to clarify the position of Togo and normalize relations between the county and the European block (see Ebeku 2005).

After the ECOWAS-mandated election took place in Togo, ECOWAS officials and regional member-states spearheaded the effort on behalf of Togo to normalize relations between Togo and all development partners, including the EU. In addition to legitimizing the interim government of Bonfoh, after the election ECOWAS served as an international advocate and guarantor for Togo, legitimizing and validating the new government, the political processes that led it to power, and its governing institutions.

As expected in regional IO consolidation, ECOWAS arranged for incentives to ensure cooperation and compliance by the targets. First, ECOWAS legitimized the de facto leaders, reducing both international and domestic pressure on Togolese authorities. Second, the regional body provided electoral assistance in the form of experts and technical support to set up shop in Togo with a team of over 150 ECOWAS officials (Afanyiakossou 2009, ECOWAS 2005: 4). Since the election was one of the key regional demands, there was a general expectation that the region would also provide electoral assistance. The presence of ECOWAS in the election was used as an incentive to both the ruling RPT party and the opposition parties in Togo; based on past experience, the latter were not willing to work with the RPT as a trustworthy partner. Many of the opposition
parties did not support the appointment of Abass Bonfoh as acting president, but they largely withdrew from the matter once ECOWAS stepped in to provide support to all sides in moving forward.

**Binding**

One of the most significant binding provisions of ECOWAS and the AU in the Togo transition was to set safeguards for the key stakeholders in Togo. During Eyadéma’s time, many key opposition leaders—such as Gilchrist Olympio—lived in exile due to assassination attempts and other intimidation tactics orchestrated by the Togolese army and security outfits. With the involvement of ECOWAS, an open invitation was extended by Gnassingbé for the free return of the opposition while he tried to defuse regional tensions after taking power. The process of reaching out to the opposition was continued by the interim administration of Bonfoh. Opposition leaders needed greater assurances that their candidates would not be targeted for assassination as they had been in the past, and that they would be able to campaign and contest the election. The ECOWAS team and election monitors were able to offer safeguards to opposition leaders. Among the nine measures that were decided upon, the safety of political figures was number four (ECOWAS 2005: 4-5). Through mediation with the Interior Ministry who provided protection for political candidates, ECOWAS was able to ensure that the interim Togolese administration adhered to the framework set out by regional monitors and that political violence was largely averted.

In addition to safeguarding opposition leaders from the Togolese security forces, several opposition parties protested the provision in the Togolese constitution to hold elections in 60 days, stating that it was not enough time to campaign for the election. The
group of parties, which included the main UFC party led by Gilchrist Olympio, provided a different interpretation of the statute, saying that polls had to be announced in 60 days but not formally conducted. The ruling RPT indicated that it interpreted the statute as requiring that polls be held within 60 days—despite the fact that the same party had recently attempted to annul the provision. Since ECOWAS demanded that the Togolese authorities follow the constitution, Regional Chair Tandja agreed that the elections could be held in 60 days. It was agreed by the electoral commission and the Togolese Interior Ministry that since the Togolese government did not return to the original constitution until February 25, the 60 days began at that point and not from the point of Eyadéma’s death. This decision was based on the fact that the army had attempted to suspend the constitution, and the National Assembly had tried to amend it the following day. The election was thus scheduled for April 24, 2005—exactly 60 days from February 25. The mediation of disputes between both sides of the key domestic stakeholders in the lead-up to the election was entirely the work of the ECOWAS Observer Mission to Togo. The ECOWAS Chairperson, the Observer Mission, and the special envoy played substantial roles in mediating many of the key disputes as the latter two were permanently stationed in Togo and present on a daily basis.

Another contentious issue was the statute in the Togolese Constitution that all candidates for president must reside in Togo for at least one year prior to the election. Gilchrist Olympio, the main opposition candidate, had been living in Paris for security reasons. His ineligibility to run as leader of the UFC—among other concerns in his party about the interim government and the electoral process—prompted the UFC to announce that it would not participate in the election. Instead, it called for a transitional government
of national unity and for the Togolese governing institutions to be reconstituted before a fair election could take place (AU PSC 2005, Afanyiakossou 2009). In particular, since the UFC and other opposition groups had boycotted the previous parliamentary elections in 2002, their party had received no seats in the National Assembly. Without a presence in the assembly, the UFC and other opposition groups were not able to nominate members to the independent electoral commission that had been charged to oversee the vote, alongside the Ministry of Interior. With the mediators of ECOWAS urging all stakeholders to take part in the process, the UFC and five other opposition parties selected Emmanuel Akitani Bob, the First Vice-Chairman of the UFC, to be the consensus opposition flag-bearer for a second time. The other three candidates included Faure Gnassingbé, Chairman of the RPT; Nicholas Lawson, Chairman of the Parti du Renouveau et de la Rédemption (PRR); and Harry Olympio, Chairman of the Rassemblement pour le soutien de la démocratie et du développement (RSDD). The involvement of regional mediators smoothed over a dispute that could have caused a further negative impact on the election process.

During the two-month campaign, tensions were high throughout the country. By April, opposition leaders began to have doubts about the electoral process, but ECOWAS insisted that all stakeholders participate and pledged to address opposition concerns. On April 16, 2005 an advanced ECOWAS election monitoring team arrived in Lomé to prepare the groundwork for the election. The team of 150 ECOWAS observers consumed a budget of over $1.3 million USD for hotels, cars, and security (Frank Afinyiakossou 2009). During the first week of the ECOWAS Observer Mission, election planning appeared to be relatively uneventful. The night of April 22–23, 2005, Togo’s Interior
Minister François Boko called an emergency meeting at 2:00 a.m. summoning the foreign envoys and representatives in Togo at the time. Present at the meeting were the ambassadors of France, Germany, the United States, Nigeria, and Chief ECOWAS Representative Mai Manga Boukar and other African envoys. The interior minister told the envoys that he felt the situation in Togo was too delicate for elections to be held on April 24 as had been scheduled. He revealed to the envoys that he had collected intelligence demonstrating that some people in the country had private militias in support of their various factions. His belief was that the election would lead to violence, crisis, and potentially civil war. He also cited irregularities with the registration of voters. Boko proposed the establishment of a transitional government of national unity in which the opposition would hold the post of prime minister under interim President Bonfoh. The interim government would review the constitution, oversee national security, grant amnesty to exiled opposition members, and organize new elections at a later date. His views were supported by the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), a regional NGO that issued a similar statement on April 23, 2005—the day before the election and shortly after the conference with Boko. Boko’s proposal was similar to UFC and opposition demands before they had agreed to participate in the election.

Togolese Interior Minister Boko was a member of the ruling RPT party and faithful to former President Eyadéma. He was also a well educated and respected technocrat with a PhD in politics and a master’s degree in law. According to procedure, his recommendations were immediately forwarded to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, which was created under the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in December
1999, ironically in Lomé. At the time, the chair of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was President Tandja of Niger, who was also chair of ECOWAS. Immediately below him, chairing the ministerial level of the Mediation and Security Council was Niger’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Aïchatou Mindaoudou. According to standard operating procedures, the message from the Togolese Interior Minister went up the chain of command and reached her Niger’s representative. Upon receiving the warning, she rejected his call and stated that it was irresponsible of him. She directed all ECOWAS member-states and representatives to proceed with the planned election. Far too much had been invested in the elections to hold off or change the ECOWAS position that mandated Togolese authorities to follow their own constitution. Further, since the minister was a loyal RPT member, his true motives for issuing such a warning were questionable. Despite the presence of other envoys in the meeting, the decision-making authority rested with the immediate regional organization and its leadership. The targets, as well as other international observers, yielded to the directive of ECOWAS, the immediate regional IO, and its chair, the Foreign Minister of Niger, according to regional IO theory.

The election was conducted on April 24, 2005 as scheduled. The voting was relatively calm, but opposition supporters accused the RPT of massive fraud. An independent electoral observer, the Rencontre africaine pour la défense de la démocratie et des droits de l’homme (RADDHO), discovered a number of cases of fraud, including problems with voter registries and electoral lists. Several international observers including the European parliament stated that they would not recognize the results of the poll due to widespread irregularities. The message from the Togolese
Interior Minister warning of imminent post-electoral conflict also reached the AU Chairman, President Obasanjo of Nigeria. As opposition groups and observers claimed electoral fraud, he immediately reached out to regional leaders and to the heads of the two major parties in Togo, Gilchrist Olympio of the UFC and Faure Gnassingbé of the RPT, inviting them both to Abuja on April 25, 2005 before the results of the election had been announced (AU PSC 2005, see ECOWAS 2005). The Nigerian president brokered a gentleman’s agreement signed by both leaders stating that no matter the results of the election, neither side would contest the other; both would work together to form a “government of national unity” (GNU). The idea of a GNU came first from the Togolese opposition in February when they initially refused to participate in the ECOWAS-mandated election in 60 days. The Togolese Minister of Interior François Boko of the ruling RPT also made a similar proposal on the eve of the election in a bid to delay the vote. Both proposals were rejected by ECOWAS, as they were irreconcilable with ECOWAS’ regionally endorsed policy to respect constitutional order. A precedent was set in Togo that ECOWAS would not support any deviation from its policy. Regional leaders, however, were willing to address the concerns of stakeholders once constitutional order had been respected.

The Nigerian president, in his capacity as AU Chairman, was seen as the best positioned figure to mediate between the two sides. He already had the ear of Gnassingbé before the election. On the other hand, Olympio respected him considerably, more than other francophone West African leaders who were accused of being too close to France—a notorious backer of the RPT. The meeting was meant to bind both sides in Togo to not seek permanent advantages over the other but rather to work towards a common objective.
The binding that occurred in the Nigerian capital, while ballots were still being counted, was essentially designed to reduce the impact of the voting irregularities on the election and to provide recourse for both sides. In addition, the credible third-party mediator, respected by both sides, created a means by which the Togolese opponents could put more trust in each other’s intentions despite a turbulent history. After all, the father of Gnassingbé had killed the father of Olympio, yet the leader of the AU was able to bring the two of them to together and get them to agree on a set course of action. The trust both had in making the agreement was not in each other but rather in the regionally mediated permanent consultations and the monitoring body that the regional IO had set up in Togo. Olympio was unable to admit publicly that he had signed the agreement when questioned by reporters, because he had not consulted with his party prior to signing and because he was not the official candidate for the UFC in the poll (Suleman 2009, Afanyiakossou 2009). His denial, however, angered President Obasanjo.

The official results of the Togolese election were announced the following day by the independent electoral commission, presenting Faure Gnassingbé of the RPT with a commanding 60.22 percent lead over his closest rival, Emmanuel Akitani-Bob of the UFC who followed with 38.19 percent, and Harry Olympio of RSDD trailing with less than one percent of the vote. Opposition parties immediately condemned the results as fraudulent and called upon militants to resist their implementation. The following day, Emmanuel Akitami Bob declared himself the winner of the election and President of the Togolese Republic. He also called on his supporters, including militants, to resist the order imposed upon them. Violent clashes between opposition supporters and the army began in Lomé and in four other towns. The UN panel report on the Togo crisis estimated
that at least 500 people died in post-election violence. According to the joint ECOWAS-AU mission, the estimated death toll was near 1000.

ECOWAS issued a call to all parties to refrain from violence and embrace the framework for permanent consultations, to enable dialogue and prevent further unrest. ECOWAS Director of Early Warning Colonel Yoro Kone made three recommendations to resolve the crisis in Togo. First, he asserted that ECOWAS should deploy troops preventatively to avoid more violence; second, he recommended that the constitution be reviewed; and third, he recommended that the Togolese security and defense forces should be reformed. Three days after the election results were announced, on April 29, 2005, the ECOWAS Observer Mission in Togo declared the election fair despite minor irregularities. Immediately after the announcement was made, the ECOWAS team—staying in a hotel in Lomé in the south of Togo where opposition was strongest—found themselves bunkered down as unrest increased outside.

Some of the other international observers did not agree with the ECOWAS report on the Togo election. The EU and the UN were critical of ECOWAS’s role in Togo and did not fully back the ECOWAS assessment. The United States continued to yield to ECOWAS and indicated that it supported the regional body. Executive Secretary Chambas called all ECOWAS envoys to make a decision on the report presented by the ECOWAS team. ECOWAS accepted the results of the election and Gnassingbé was recognized as president-elect. The decision was justified as an important step toward stabilizing Togo and preventing another crisis, especially in light of ongoing crises in Côte D’Ivoire and Liberia that needed attention. Instead of contesting the results, the joint ECOWAS-AU mission backed the process already underway with the first meeting
between AU Chair President Obasanjo and Togolese stakeholders, to push for the
formation of a GNU that would include all stakeholders and provide a forum for dialogue.

AU Chair Obasanjo invited all stakeholders in Togo to a national forum of
dialogue in Abuja on May 19, 2005, to form a GNU for the Togolese Republic. The
heads of all major parties in Togo, along with leaders in the acting government and in the
security forces, attended the summit. Several West African heads of state attended
including ECOWAS Chair President Tanja, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso,
President John Kufuor of Ghana, and high-ranking delegations from other ECOWAS
member states. The only non-ECOWAS leader present, President Omar Bongo of Gabon,
was invited to attend the meeting as a representative of French interests, since France was
not allowed to attend. The meeting was chaired by President Obasanjo, who ran the first
summit with a unique strategy devised by him and his administration. ECOWAS
presented Obasanjo with their general recommendations just before the summit, but he
had prepared his own plans already.

The objective of the meeting was to develop a compromise so that all the
stakeholders in Togo would go home with something, even if they were on the losing side
of the election; those who had won the election would still be asked to make concessions
to the other stakeholders. In essence, the creation of a GNU was meant to bind the
“winners” and “losers” by placing constraints on targets that had won (the RPT), ensuring
that there were safeguards in place for targets that lost. By engaging the RPT and
signaling the region’s expectation that it cooperate with regional intervention efforts,
ECOWAS and the AU made their certification of the RPT electoral victory conditional
upon cooperation with the GNU. This overture to the winners in the form of incentives
was enacted to bind them to regional agreements. Constraints on the winners were also communicated to the losing opposition, as an incentive for cooperation and an assurance of the goodwill of the intervention, boosting the credibility of the immediate regional IO among stakeholders.

The first seven hours of the meeting consisted of an intense debate among Togolese stakeholders. President Obasanjo conducted the meeting patiently, listening to everyone according to his strategy for facilitating dialogue and reconciling the parties. The opposition demanded an apology from Gnassingbé for the 800 supporters that were killed in post-election violence. Gnassingbé and his delegates refused to apologize, alleging that the opposition groups had killed themselves through internal fighting. The claim drew sharp rebuke from President Obasanjo, as it was clear that Togolese security forces were largely to blame for the deaths. Taking this position gained the Nigerian leader more credibility among opposition delegates. In the middle of the meeting, President Bongo of Gabon left, stating that he was tired of listening to the bickering among Togolese stakeholders (Afanyiakossou 2009). By the end of the initial meeting, the formation of the GNU had not been possible due to disagreements among the opposition. Several mechanisms that had been put on the table were later agreed upon through further mediation of ECOWAS and regional leaders, including the appointment of a member of the opposition as prime minister, the second-highest ranking position in the government, during Gnassingbé’s five-year term as president. The agreement also called for the creation of a Bureau of the Inter-Togolese Dialogue to promote reconciliation and power-sharing among stakeholders, which was to be monitored by ECOWAS observers already permanently stationed in Lomé (Projet du Bureau 2006).
The first prime minister under Gnassingbé was Edem Kodjo, a prominent opposition leader who backed Olympio in the 1998 election against Eyadéma. His selection was contested by some opposition members because he had formerly been in the RPT until a fall out with Eyadéma. After about a year Kodjo resigned, but remained a minister while Yawovi Agboyibo, another opposition figure who had backed the victory of UFC candidate Emmanuel Bob Akitani in 2003, was named prime minister. Prior to his appointment, Agboyibo was Chair of the Executive Bureau for the Inter-Togolese Dialogue and a respected opposition conciliator. In the 2007 parliamentary election, Agboyibo had run with his CAR opposition party, won a seat in the legislature, and resigned. Komlan Mally of the ruling RPT was appointed to replace him. UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio stated that the appointment of Mally contradicted the GNU, asserting that an opposition member was supposed to serve as prime minister. He further indicated that a government under Mally would not last long due to ongoing negotiations between the government and the opposition (République Togolaise 2007). It was clear that even Olympio had faith that the regionally brokered and monitored agreement with the RPT would be respected. The appointment of Mally as prime minister came as Gnassingbé was seeking to regain leverage after the legislative election.

The opposition parties participated in the 2007 parliamentary election, picking up several dozen seats. The poll won praise from international observers, prompting the EU to restore economic cooperation and aid to Togo after a 14-year suspension. After just 11 months, Mally resigned as prime minister. Gnassingbé appointed Gilbert Houngbo, a Togolese international diplomat who had been working for the United Nations at the time of his appointment. The GNU in Togo remained relatively intact during the five-year
term of Gnassingbé. Cabinets were comprised of ministers from opposition parties, and multi-party rule returned to the legislature in 2007. The permanent ECOWAS mission led by Special Envoy Mai Manga Boukar remained in Togo, working with Togolese stakeholders on all sides to implement the GNU during Gnassingbé’s first term.

**Alternative Explanations**

One realist theoretical assumption is that dominant states within regions control the regional institutions. Some explanations for the intervention in Togo would reduce the significance of regional intervention, contending that it was dominated by Nigeria as the largest country in the African region. While Nigeria played a substantial role in the creation of ECOWAS, General Eyadéma of Togo was one of the organization’s most prominent forefathers and the organization’s first leader. He convinced the leaders throughout much of francophone West Africa to join the regional body. In addition, Togo hosted a number of key agreements including the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” that created the zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional seizures of power. Accordingly, some of the rules and procedures that led to the regional rebuke of Togo’s transfer of power were created in the Togolese capital, at a summit hosted and chaired by the former Togolese president himself while he was the leader of the organization. Though Nigeria continues to play a significant role in ECOWAS, hosting the organization’s headquarters in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, leaders in other countries (especially Togo) also played a substantial role in the creation of the organization and the rules and procedures that applied to this case.
At the time of the coup the Nigerian president held the rotating chairmanship of the AU. Accordingly, President Obasanjo was charged with implementing the instruments of the continent-wide body that pertained to transfers of power in the region. While Nigeria played a prominent role as the chair of the regional body during 2005, Nigeria did not dominate the AU nor the OAU before it. Nigeria was always a prominent member-state, but the organization has been influenced by leaders from other countries on the continent—especially Togo. Both the “Constitutive Act of the African Union” and the “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government,” implemented by the AU in response to Togo’s power transfer, were created and approved in July of 2000 in the Togolese capital, at a summit hosted and chaired by the former Togolese president himself while he was the leader of the organization. The rules and procedures that the AU implemented under the leadership of the Nigerian President in response to the transfer of power in Togo were created with substantial influence by the then leader of the target country. Analysis that reduces the AU under the leadership of President Obasanjo to an instrument of Nigerian foreign policy, especially as it relates to the case of Togo, does not take full account of the facts behind the establishment of the AU itself and the instruments that govern the organization. As Gnassingbé was reminded in the many lectures he received from regional leaders, former Togolese President Eyadéma was one of the most prominent figures in African regional integration. He was present and active in every major development regarding both ECOWAS and the AU, and in many cases he led the organizations through them.
In 2005, President Tandja of Niger was chair of ECOWAS while his Nigerian counterpart, President Obasanjo, chaired the AU. If realist assumptions are correct, since Nigeria was leader of the AU which includes all of ECOWAS, and Nigeria is the largest, most dominant state in West Africa, then Niger should have had a small and insignificant role in the intervention in Togo. The process as effected, however, reveals that Niger continued to play a dominant role despite the fact that Nigeria had both material and institutional reasons to overshadow its neighbor to the north. The first regional summit on Togo was held in Niamey, the capital of Niger, hosted and chaired by President Tandja. After Gnassingbé resigned, President Tandja imposed and withdrew the regional sanctions in his capacity as Chairman. He also led the regional delegation, holding the first meeting with interim Togolese leaders to begin planning for the election. He mediated disputes between domestic stakeholders and appointed the regional observer for ECOWAS, Mai Manga, a former foreign minister from Niger. While Nigeria maintained a representative present throughout the process, Niger remained the leader of the regional body. In addition, Nigeria was head of the AU but continued to yield to ECOWAS and its chairman, specifically regarding the tasks of planning elections and implementing regional instruments.

The Nigerian president, in his capacity as chairman of the AU, had a substantial role in the Togo intervention. Obasanjo was the first leader to meet personally with Faure Gnassingbé after he took power, and the first to appeal to him to follow regional demands. In addition, he met with the leaders of the two major parties in the aftermath of the disputed election, to get both of them to commit to forming a GNU before election results were announced. He later hosted and chaired the conference that started the process of
creating the GNU for Togo. While it is not definitive whether Nigeria would have played such a prominent role without the institutional role of AU Chair, the prominence of Nigeria in the Togo intervention is consistent with regional IO theory.

Other realist theoretical assumptions emphasize the impact of donor countries in influencing the behavior of decision-makers in developing nations, particularly in moving them toward democratic procedures. In the case of Togo, the EU had frozen all aid to the small nation in 1993, along with France, Germany and the United States, for what was viewed by the block as a “democracy deficit” in the country inconsistent with their aid policy (BBC 2009). For almost 13 years, Togo remained in opposition to European donors up until Eyadéma’s death. For those 13 years Togo’s main opposition leader, Gilchrist Olympio, remained in exile in Paris. Very few concessions were made in the direction of political liberalization. In the last several years of Eyadéma’s time in office, the opposition party boycotted the legislative election giving almost total power to the ruling RPT at multiple levels of government. The RPT proceeded to create more rules and procedures that entrenched its rule and further marginalized the opposition. Although negotiations between the EU and the Togolese authorities were ongoing in earnest, after 13 years of economic pressure the political situation on the ground continued to move in the opposite direction of the EU’s goals as donors. Indeed, when a visiting EU delegation tried to hold an open dialogue and consultation between the RPT and the opposition in 2004, shortly before Eyadéma died, the group had to settle for meeting with both sides separately as neither side was willing to come to the table and negotiate through EU representatives (see Ebeku 2005).
ECOWAS and AU leaders were able to accomplish in just over 3 months precisely what the EU was not able to do after almost 13 years. The hastily organized election in Togo was flawed, as was noted and accepted by both AU and ECOWAS observers in their reports after the poll. But the Nigerian president, as AU Chairman, was able to get both the RPT and UFC leaders to sign a joint agreement to share power in Togo, even before the results of the election were announced. This transpired in contrast to the EU delegation’s failure after more than a decade of pressure to get both sides merely to attend a joint meeting where no concrete decisions were set to be made, demonstrating the level of power that regional instruments hold in Togo as compared to donors. Adding to this dynamic, both sides later came together for a dialogue in Abuja, Nigeria to follow through on creating a GNU for Togo. The regional body created a Bureau of the Inter-Togolese Dialogue that remained intact throughout Gnassingbé’s term as a means through which stakeholders in Togo could negotiate agreements and make pledges that would be verified by the regional IO.

The intervention by international donors, enduring over a decade, showed that these players had neither the mechanisms nor the capacity to enact change in Togo to the extent that ECOWAS did with the support of the AU. Although the EU rejected the 2005 presidential poll, the regionally brokered GNU, and the Inter-Togolese Dialogue, it restored full economic cooperation to Togo after the 2007 parliamentary election, just two years after the regional intervention began, recognizing the substantial changes that had been made largely as a result of regional intervention. The inability of the EU to achieve any substantial results despite having working to do so for a longer period does
not support realist assumptions that large powerful donor states are dominant in the international system.

**Conclusion**

The regional intervention in the Republic of Togo comprises another case that demonstrates the effectiveness of regional IOs to enact change in member-states. The process of putting pressure on Togolese leaders followed regional IO theory and was initiated and led by the regional IOs. The targets in Togo responded to the regional IOs, attending regional intervention meetings and making announcements and concessions that reflected the demands of regional leaders. Regional leaders were primarily responsible for raising the cost of the actions of Togolese leaders through condemnation, isolation, sanctions, travel restrictions, and the empowerment of domestic opposition to proactively oppose the government. By setting incentives, the regional IO was able to move the interim Togolese government toward holding elections. Finally, regional IOs bound the stakeholders on both sides, restricting the winners from seeking absolute advantages and providing safeguards and guarantees to the losers, ensuring that they, too, would be included in the process. With the regional body as the external arbiter in the case of Togo, the stakeholders had greater confidence and trust that the other side would follow through with the joint agreement. This was because it had been brokered and monitored by the regional IO, which both sides trusted more than each other. Although conflicts continued in Togo between the ruling party and the opposition, and even within the ruling party itself between President Gnassingbé and his younger brother Kpatcha, the power-sharing agreement and respect for constitutional order survived, under daily monitoring by ECOWAS.
By the time the 2007 parliamentary elections arrived, even the staunchest international skeptics acknowledged that the regional intervention in Togo had succeeded and thus restored full economic aid to the country after a 14-year suspension.

While Nigeria played a major role in the process as the AU Chair, Niger’s president as ECOWAS Chair also maintained a central role. Nigeria did not circumvent the role of Niger in the process, even though there were material and institutional means to do so. The AU is the bigger organization and Nigeria is the larger, more powerful country; still, the standard operating procedures remained intact in the case of Togo, with the chair in the immediate sub-region taking the lead in the process while the AU Chair supported him. This is not consistent with realist assumptions; however, it does follow the expected process of regional IO theory. Donor countries had attempted to pressure Togo since 1993 and failed to get substantial concessions from Togolese authorities. The visiting EU delegation was unable even to get the two sides to hold a joint meeting. Yet in 2005, in just over 3 months, the regional organizations completed the task that eluded donor countries for almost 13 years. The repeated failure of donor countries, in contrast with the rapid success of regional mechanisms, empirically refutes realist assumptions and reaffirms the explanatory supremacy of regional IO theory, even in the most unlikely regions.
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania is the only West African country that is not a member of ECOWAS because it withdrew its membership in 2000. In both 2005 and 2008, successful coups overturned constitutional order. In the first decade of the new millennium, Mauritania has experienced more disruptions in constitutional order than any other West African country. It is one of two countries in the region to have a sitting leader removed from power by a coup, the only country in the region to have it happen twice, and the only country in the region that has experienced military rule for over two years in the same time period. This chapter looks at the coups of both 2005 and 2008 to determine if there are noticeable differences in the process of intervention as compared to the cases of São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003 or Togo in 2005. Of the three cases, Mauritania is the only one without membership in an active sub-regional organization.
Background

Mauritania comprises just over one million square kilometers of land, bordered by Senegal to the south, Mali to the south and west, and Algeria and Western Sahara (a Moroccan-held territory) to the north.21 The country also has over 750 kilometers of Atlantic coastline to the west. There are just over 3.1 million people in Mauritania—roughly half the population of Togo—most living in southern towns bordering Senegal and Mali. The ethnic makeup of Mauritania includes Arab-Berber Moors, Black Moors, and Black Africans. Roughly 40 percent of the people are Black Moors, 30 percent Black Africans, and 30 percent Arab-Berber Moors. White Moors are said to be a mixed race between Berbers and Arabs, while Black Moors are largely Black Africans that descended from the slaves of Berbers and therefore identify with their culture.

Historically, the territory known today as Mauritania was dominated by the Bafour, a Black African people. Through centuries of desertification, the Bafour who relied on hunting and fishing for subsistence moved south. Berbers from North Africa also began to move into the territory, trading with African kingdoms to the south. The prosperity of their trade allowed them to establish a loosely confederated state that was eventually swallowed up by the Almoravid Empire, which spanned across the Maghreb into southern Spain, and almost as far south as the Senegal River. After facing Spanish defeat, the Almoravid rule began to decline everywhere except Mauritania. Maqil Arab invaders eventually conquered the territory, setting up a rigid hierarchy among the people of Mauritania with Arabs at the top, mixed Arab-Berbers or Moors below them, and the Black African population sequestered from the top. Mauritania remained relatively

untouched by European colonial expansion, although France had won rights to the
territory in the Treaty of Paris in 1814. After 1900 a French official, General Henri
Gouraud, launched a military assault from Senegal to successfully capture the territory.
Once France had secured Mauritania, little was done to develop the territory. It became
one of the most neglected outposts in French colonial Africa, changing little from the
Middle Ages—except that French rule put an end to the practice of raids between rival
groups.

As a result of increased international pressure after the Second World War,
coming especially from the United States, France began to move its colonial territories
toward independence. Moktar Ould Daddah, the only lawyer in Mauritania at the time,
led the Union Progressiste Mauritanienne (UPM) to win Mauritania’s seat to the French
National Assembly in 1951, and swept the newly formed Territorial Assembly of
Mauritania, winning 33 of the 34 seats in 1957. On November 28, 1960, Mauritania
became the world’s first Islamic republic under the leadership of President Ould Daddah.
Shortly after securing independence, the ruling party of President Ould Daddah was
merged with small parties into the Parti du Peuple Mauritanien (PPM). Through the
Congress of Unity in October 1961, Mauritania became a one-party state with the PPM as
the only legal political group under the leadership of Ould Daddah. Until 1970, Morocco
refused to recognize Mauritania, leaving its neighbors to the south as the primary regional
allies. In the mid 1960s President Ould Daddah began a policy of Arabization,
introducing Arab language and culture into Mauritania and building closer ties with the
Arab League. After formally recognizing Mauritania, Arab countries provided substantial
economic aid, boosting the Mauritanian economy that had been sustained largely by iron ore exports from the north and vast ocean fisheries.

**Political Climate**

One of the major defining moments in Mauritanian history occurred on November 8, 1975, when Morocco and Mauritania reached an agreement with Spain to divide the territory of Western Sahara between the two African countries. In the agreement, Mauritania would take over the southern third of the territory while Morocco retained to upper two-thirds. A Western Saharan nationalist group called the Polisario Front opposed the partition and wanted the territory to become an independent state. The Polisario Front raised a guerilla movement armed by Algeria that began a full-scale assault on Mauritania in 1976, in retaliation for its participation in the partition with Morocco. The Spanish hand-over of Sahara had been prompted by the November 5, 1975 “Green March” of King Hassan II of Morocco. The march organized by King Hassan sent over three hundred thousand Moroccan civilians across the southern border into Western Sahara. After the march, the Madrid accords ceded the territory to the two countries without a referendum. The day after Spain officially withdrew from the territory, on February 27, 1976, the leader of the Provisional Sahrawi National Council declared that the territory was an independent nation called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Jensen 2005: 31-32).

The Polisario Front guerilla forces focused their attention first on Mauritania, attempting to dislodge their stake in Western Sahara. They succeeded in disrupting the Mauritanian iron ore mines and even staged attacks on the Mauritanian capital in 1976 and 1977. In an bid to fend off the attack, President Ould Daddah increased the army
from 3,000 to 17,000 troops and struck a defense agreement with Morocco. Despite having reached out to France, the Mauritanian army was unable to halt the attacks of the Polisario Front. Growing increasingly disillusioned, the Mauritanian military staged a coup led by Chief of Staff Colonel Mustapha Ould Mohammed Salek. The army arrested President Ould Daddah and overthrew the government on July 10, 1978, establishing a military council called the Comité Militaire de Redressment National (CMRN) to rule. The war with the Polisario Front did not end immediately; it took another year for a peace agreement to be signed in Algiers, Algeria, finally forcing Mauritania to withdraw from the southern third of the territory. The withdrawal ended the attacks on Mauritania, but did little for the Saharan nationalists as Moroccan troops moved in to lay claim to the entire territory.

In Mauritania, internal disagreements within the CMRN led to a series of military coups that overthrew successive military heads of state. After two additional coups, Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Heydallah emerged as head of state in 1980; he was a senior officer who had previously been Prime Minister in the “Junta of National Salvation.” Ould Heydallah sought to make peace with the Polisario Front, and recognized the government of the SADR as a sovereign state independent of Morocco. The move improved relations with Algeria, but resulted in severed ties between Mauritania and Morocco. Algeria and Morocco had maintained a hostile relationship since the 1963 Sand War, when Morocco invaded Algeria to reclaim territory that France had annexed and incorporated into French Algeria. Though fighting ended in 1964 through an OAU brokered cease-fire, a formal settlement was not reached until 1972 when Algeria offered Morocco shares of its local iron ore mines so that the latter would
recognize the colonial border. The episode influenced Algeria to back the Polisario in the Western Sahara conflict. On the domestic front, Heydallah faced a poor economy, droughts, and corruption within the junta. He imprisoned opponents and implemented an Islamic shari’a legal system to enforce social discipline. Nevertheless, on December 12, 1984, Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya overthrew Heydallah in a bloodless coup, in part due to Heydallah’s sympathy towards the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

As president, Taya took a new approach to domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic front, he reduced corruption, freed political prisoners, and reversed some of the shari’a legal reforms. With regard to foreign policy, Taya took a pro-Western stance, strengthening ties with France and severing ties with the Polisario. The pro-Western policy also coincided with the need to restructure the large debt burden Mauritania had incurred as a result of the war. One of the main factions opposing Taya in the mid 1980s was a group of Black African Mauritanians called Forces de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM) that issued “The Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian.” The group cited systematic discrimination against blacks by Arab-Berber Moors in Mauritania. Taya purged the army and junta of anyone who was suspected of sympathizing with FLAM. In addition to FLAM, a pro-Iraq Baath Party formed in Mauritania, which Taya eventually allowed after initial attempts to suppress the group.

Moving toward democratization in 1986, Taya held local elections, but did not allow political parties to form. The elections were heralded as the first step towards a new civilian government. The move toward civilian government was sidelined in 1989 when violence erupted along the Senegal-Mauritania border, which is marked by the Senegal River. Disputes between livestock herders from both countries escalated into targeted
violence against Mauritanian Moors in Senegal, and against the Senegalese in Mauritania’s capital and other cities. Rampant violence claimed hundreds of lives on both sides, and resulted in both countries deciding to exchange their expatriate populations to prevent further bloodshed. During the exchange, Taya’s administration took the opportunity to expel many black Mauritanians into Senegal, a claim that was denied by the government until recently. The conflict between the two countries persisted with the potential for war, and also caused deeper internal rifts in Mauritania. FLAM’s presence swelled and Baathist party members in influential government positions expedited the Arabization program begun by Ould Daddah in the 70s. Mauritanian Baathists also drew the country into a diplomatic conflict during first Gulf War as a result of their close ties with Saddam Hussein, which in turn caused many Arab states to withdraw aid from Mauritania after the invasion of Kuwait.

In the early 1990s, Mauritania (under Taya) began to move away from the conflict with Senegal and Western Sahara, continuing the transition process from military to civilian government. On July 12, 1991, Mauritanian voters approved the new constitution, paving the way for multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for January of 1992. Taya declared his candidacy against Ahmed Ould Daddah, the younger brother of the former president. Taya ran under the Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social (PRDS), while Daddah formed the Union des Forces Démocratiques (UFD). Taya won a close-fought victory over Daddah in the election, which was disputed by the opposition. The presidential vote led to an opposition boycott of the parliamentary election in the months afterward, giving Taya and the PRDS almost total control after the elections. While diplomatic relations between Mauritania and Senegal were restored, the
main obstacles faced by his administration after the election remained similar to those before it. Issues of race and ethnicity, the persistence of slavery in the Mauritanian countryside, droughts and desertification, and foreign debt lingered. By the mid-1990s the economic situation in Mauritania, though far from strong, had stabilized. Taking direct policy initiatives from the IMF and World Bank, Taya implemented structural adjustment, devalued the national currency, curbed state spending, and privatized state-owned enterprises. The programs, as expected, remained unpopular among ordinary Mauritanians yet resulted in mild growth.

Under Taya’s economic policies, the Mauritanian economy still relied on commodity exports and agriculture through the 90s. Urbanization continued to present problems as a result of limited infrastructure to accommodate overcrowding in the main cities and towns. Further complicating matters Taya used clientelist regional and ethnic politics for political leverage, providing greater economic opportunities to his home province of Adrar and his fellow Arab-Berber Moor Semasside ethnics. Despite difficulties at home, his administration continued to receive Western backing for his foreign policies, such as repressing the Baathist party linked to Iraq in the mid 90s and severing of relations with Libya. In 1997, President Chirac of France visited Mauritania, conveniently just three months before the presidential election; it was the first time a French head of state had been to the country. Three months later, Taya won a second six-year term with official vote tallies giving him over 90 percent of the vote. In the parliamentary polls, his party continued to hold huge majorities amid widespread evidence of fraud and manipulation.
After his re-election, Taya began to take hostile action against his opponents. In 1999 and 2000, two opposition parties (including the UFD led by Daddah) were banned by the government. In 2001, Taya imprisoned a former presidential candidate charged with acting on behalf of Libya. The following year, the Action pour le Changement (AC) led by Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, a prominent anti-slavery campaigner, was also banned by the government. Taya made enemies within the army for failing to address grievances. He showed no signs that he was going to resign at the end of his term in 2003, despite having been in power for 20 years. On June 8, 2003, retired and serving army officers staged a coup, killing the army chief of staff and igniting a 36-hour battle with the rest of the army. After the coup attempt, Taya engaged in further acts of repression while pursuing and imprisoning some of those responsible for the coup. Despite political instability, Taya went on to win the 2003 election, with voting manipulation witnessed as in previous elections. Meanwhile, many of the perpetrators of the 2003 coup had escaped into the vast Mauritanian countryside, and many others fled abroad. The group formed an armed resistance movement called les Cavaliers du changement (Knights of Change). In 2004, members of the group returned and were arrested along with opposition party members. However, Taya commuted some of the sentences and spared the lives of the 2003 coup participants who were apprehended. The move was done as a means of showcasing his benevolence to international critics.

In addition to his close ties with France, Taya’s pro-Western stance drew his administration closer to Washington, beginning in the 1990s with the Clinton administration. Earlier on in July 28, 1999, at a ceremony in Washington, D.C., Mauritania had become the only Arab League country to establish full diplomatic ties
with Israel. Many opposition parties were opposed to the move, and riots ensued in the
capital of Nouakchott. Other Arab League countries also reacted harshly to the
development, including Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, and Syria. After September 11, 2001, Taya
positioned himself as the regional champion determined to eliminate Islamic terror in
northwest Africa. He allowed Mauritanian airports to be used by the US for the
“extraordinary rendition” of al Qaeda militants. Although controversial at home, his
positions won him praise from Western leaders, including the Bush administration as it
sought to pressure others in the North African region—particularly Libya. After his 2003
reelection in Mauritania, Taya received a warm message of congratulations from
President Bush, despite the fact that the electoral process was marred with massive fraud,
repression, and voting irregularities.

Taya’s close ties with Israel became more problematic at home when the
conservative Likud government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon came to power in 2000
with a policy of hard-line military campaigns against Palestinians. Furthermore, Taya’s
refusal to denounce the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq drew harsh criticism from
domestic opponents. In response to attacks Taya utilized the terrorism issue against
opponents, accusing them of being friendly towards or even allied with Islamic
extremism. He linked some of them to an incident on June 4, 2005 in which an Algerian
terrorist group claimed responsibility for an attack on a Mauritanian army base, launched
in response to Mauritania’s support of recent American extraction and detention of
Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda. Taya also blamed the June 2003 coup attempt on
pro-Islamists (N’Diaye 2006: 426; see Pazzanita 2008: 217-220). US special operations
troops were sent to Mauritania to train the army to combat terrorism in the vast Sahara
region, and remained in Mauritania until June 2005, long after the attempted coup. Taya’s record, especially later in his tenure as president, positioned him as one of the most Western-leaning leaders in his region.

Withdrawal from ECOWAS

In the ECOWAS Summit in Lomé on December 15, 1999, a number of key decisions were made, among them the zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional transfers of power. Another decision made was for West African countries not in the CFA currency zone to create a common currency. These states included Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and The Gambia (likely to be joined by Liberia) (WAMZ 2009, WAD MFA 2009). The delegation from Mauritania opposed the measure as Mauritania is the only West African country that did not participate in the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) created by ECOWAS to promote monetary integration. Previously in 1972, Mauritania had discontinued membership with the CFA currency union that included most Francophone African countries, and withdrew from the CFA in 1973 to create its own currency, the ouguiya. Mauritania continued a similar policy towards the proposed ECOWAS common currency union (Pazzanita 2008: 163). On December 26, 1999, two weeks after the summit, the leaders of Mauritania wrote a letter to ECOWAS headquarters announcing their intent to withdraw from the organization (ECOWAS Secretariat 2000: Chapt. 2, BBC 1999). Opposition parties in Mauritania and business elites vigorously protested the withdrawal, citing fears of lost trade revenues from cooperative agreements with the regional block (Pazzanita 2008: 219). The Taya Administration moved forward with complete withdrawal by December 2000.
Some analysts believe the real issue influencing the administration’s move was the stronger pro-democracy measures that the organization had enacted at the summit (N’Diaye 2006: 427). This view is supported by the fact that Mauritania had the choice to opt out of the currency union, as did Cape Verde, another ECOWAS state not party to the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Mauritania had long marginalized its Black African and non-Arab-Berber population through forced expulsions, mass killings in the late eighties, the continued practice of slavery and forced servitude, judicial incarcerations of blacks, and economic and political domination by the Arab-Berber minority. ECOWAS members as a result of the elevated pro-democracy stance were likely to take exception to at least some of these practices, especially due to the wave of democratic shifts in states neighboring Mauritania in the regional block.

**Oil**

Between 2001 and 2004, commercially viable quantities of oil were discovered in Mauritanian territorial waters. In 1999, Woodside Energy and Hardman Resources, two Australian companies, conducted seismic surveys and later drilled exploratory wells. The two companies began exploring blocks with a British concern called Dana Petroleum, discovering large quantities of oil in Block 4, about 90 kilometers southwest of Nouakchott. Several other oilfields in the block showed commercial quantities of oil, as well as a trillion cubic feet of natural gas. One oilfield was set to begin exporting 75,000 barrels per day in 2006. The prospect of oil revenues coming into Mauritania would have given a substantial boost to state revenues. Questions arose as to how the new oil revenues would be managed by the governing authorities. In addition, the new income provided a potential revenue base and an added incentive for the military to overthrow
the government (Pazzanita 2008: 402-407). While it was unclear how much oil would be produced in total—not enough to impact global energy markets—the incoming revenues, including hundreds of millions in bonuses, were set to make a large impact on Mauritania by 2005.

**Slavery**

Slavery has existed in Mauritania among the Berber, Almoravid, and later Arab settlers, as well as among Black African groups in the country, dating back several centuries. By 1960, most groups in Mauritania had abandoned the practice of slavery, except the non-black Moors of Arab and Berber decent. Most slaves and servants are black. Slavery was made illegal by the French colonial government and was prohibited under the 1959 Mauritanian Constitution. Slaves in Mauritania are not held by large plantation owners, as occurred in other parts of the world where slavery existed. Most slave owners live in rural areas with small families that are not much better off than their slaves. Since the droughts of the 1970s, continued desertification in Mauritania has forced Moors out of the rural areas and into the cities where slavery is not as practical. Former slaves known as Haratines often worked as servants for their former masters; however, many received some education and moved to other areas.

In 1976, President Daddah drew former slaves into the army to increase the size of his forces in response to Western Sahara’s war with the Polisario Front. After the peace agreement of 1979, many of the former slaves were released from the armed forces. Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the leader of the anti-slavery movement and an educated former slave, was appointed to the government early in Taya’s second republic, along with S’ghair Ould M’Barek, another former slave who served as prime minister from
2003–2005. Boulkheir (as leader of the AC) and FLAM continued to push the issue of slavery in Mauritania to the forefront. During Taya’s opposition crackdown, anti-slavery groups and their leaders were routinely harassed by security forces. Opposition leaders were charged with “harming the reputation” of Mauritania and belonging to “unauthorized organizations” in 1998, and sentenced to 13 months in prison when trying to demonstrate the existence of slavery (Pazzanita 2008: 477-485). All were pardoned by Taya shortly afterward, in his attempt to quell the ensuing international uproar from human rights groups. It was apparent by 2005 that Taya and his government were unwilling to take a strong stance against slavery and were not willing to embrace opposition groups that championed the issue.

**Coup 2005**

The leader of Saudi Arabia, King Fahd, who was one of Mauritania’s Arab donors, died on August 1, 2005. On the same day, President Taya boarded his plane and left for Saudi Arabia to attend the funeral of the king. His quick departure was due to the Islamic tradition wherein burials typically occur the same day or the day following a death. By the time Taya had departed for Saudi Arabia, Mauritanian Director of National Security Colonel Ely OULD Mohamed Vall, along with Colonel Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz—commander of the presidential guard that helped defeat the 2003 coup—had devised a plan to overthrow Taya while he was out of the capital. The military intelligence chief and the assistant army chief of staff were drawn into the plot. The National Guard commander, the army chief of staff, and the head of the army air unit, however, were not aware of the plot. At 3:00 a.m. on the morning of August 3, 2005, Vall and Abdel Aziz (along with the presidential guard commanded by the latter) arrested all senior officers
that were not aware of the coup plot. They then took over army headquarters and radio and television stations in the capital by 5:00 a.m. Only the commander of the National Guard resisted the coup and threatened to take up arms. After being surrounded, he eventually surrendered at 11:00 a.m. and was detained, thus completing the coup with no fatalities.

By midday, Taya had been overthrown. It was reported that the US Ambassador in Nouakchott called Taya early in the morning to inform him that a coup had taken place (N’Diaye 2006: 426). Taya quickly rushed to Niamey, Niger and met briefly with President Tandja, the current chair of ECOWAS, to appeal for help. Since he was unable to return to Mauritania, he took lodging in a government guest villa and remained in Niger with his family for five days, until Tuesday the 9 of August when an AU delegation traveled to Nouakchott. The day of the coup, President of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konaré had issued a statement of concern for the events in Mauritania. Once it was confirmed that the events in Mauritania indeed constituted a coup, the AU immediately suspended Mauritania from the AU, condemned the coup and demanded restoration of constitutional order (PANA 2005). The statement given said that the AU “strongly condemns any seizure of power or any attempt to take power by force” (BBC 2005). Femi Fani-Kayode, spokesperson for Nigerian President Obasanjo the AU Chair, stated that “as far as we are concerned, the days of tolerating military governance in our sub-region or anywhere are long gone” (AP 2005). Tunisia and South Africa also condemned the coup, and AU Commission President Konaré made it clear that the AU would not accept any unconstitutional government.
Other international observers also expressed concern for what was going on in Mauritania. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan voiced support for a peaceful democratic means of resolving disputes, indicating that what had happened in Mauritania was troubling. The Organization of Francophone States (OIF) and the francophone parliament condemned the coup outright (PANA 2005). The EU also condemned the seizure of power in Mauritania; the UK, serving as EU President, stated that the EU condemns “any attempt to seize power by force.” The United States condemned the coup in Mauritania and specifically called for President Taya to be reinstated. The statement the United States gave was more specific in support of Taya than the calls of other regional international or regional actors. A spokesman for the State Department, Tom Casey, issued the US call for “a peaceful return for order under the Constitution and the established government of President Taya” (Mohamed 2005).

Once in power, Col. Vall instituted a 17-member junta called Conceil Militaire pour la Justice et la Démocratie (CMJD). The junta dismissed the government and dissolved the parliament. It issued a statement the day of the coup to make its intentions clear to political stakeholders and the international community: it was only a “transitional” authority that would hand over power to a democratic government in two years at most. In a statement the junta said:

In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Gracious. The national armed forces and security forces have unanimously decided to put a definitive end to the oppressive activities of the defunct authority, which our people have suffered from during the past years. . . . The council is committed before the Mauritanian people to create the appropriate circumstances for an open and transparent democracy. . . . The armed forces will not rule for longer than the necessary period required to prepare and create genuine democratic institutions. This period will not exceed two years at the most.22

22 See Pazzanita 2008.
In addition to the statement issued after the coup, the CMJD appointed a transitional civilian Prime Minister, Sidi Mohamend Ould Boubacar, a respected pro-Western economist and technocrat, following the resignation of former Prime Minister Sghair Ould M'Bareck on August 7, four days after the coup. Boubacar returned to Nouakchott from Paris where he had been serving as the Mauritanian ambassador to France since 2004. According to the CMJD, the new cabinet that would be led by Boubacar was to be dominated by technocrats with no discernable political leanings. Col. Vall and the CMJD sought to reassure the AU, international observers, and domestic stakeholders of their intentions and began to take steps such as appointing a civilian to lead the government to convince observers that they were sincere about bringing democracy to Mauritania. The pro-Western prime minister’s and CMJD’s pledge to adhere to all of Mauritania’s international agreements was meant to ease the concerns of international—and especially Western—backers of the Taya regime. The statement issued by the CMJD also played toward marginalized pro-Islamic groups, unions and civil society groups, as well as the repressed opposition political parties in Mauritania. In the days after the coup, the junta also released Islamic militants that had been detained by Taya, including known leaders like Mohamed El Hacen Ould Dedow.

In Nouakchott, news of the coup was greeted with optimism and hope that it would lead to substantial improvements for Mauritanians at large. Some in the opposition vocally favored Taya’s overthrow in 2003 and were not opposed to his ousters in 2005. The former military leader from 1980–1984, President Mohamed Ould Heydallah, said the coup “freed Mauritania from a bloody dictatorship that was plunging the country into chaos” (PANA 2005). The Independent Union of Mauritanian Workers (CLTM), a labor
union close to the opposition, said the coup was “a peaceful change, though it happened in particular conditions, and may be a solution to get the country out of the crisis.”

Islamic groups, the opposition, and many of Taya’s former adversaries all welcomed his overthrow and expressed support for the coup. Days after the coup, hundreds joined in street demonstrations held in the capital to show support for the junta.

**Response to the Coup**

In the aftermath of the coup, Vall and the CMJD began to receive envoys from international community. On August 5 a Moroccan envoy arrived; several Arab League countries sent envoys on August 6, and El Khalil Sidi Mohamed, the Western Sahara ministerial envoy, arrived on August 7 (see PANA 2005). A high-level AU ministerial delegation led by Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Olu Adeniji, Chair of the AU Ministerial Council, was sent to Mauritania to meet with the junta on August 9, 2005. On the same day, Taya flew to Banjul, Gambia, another ECOWAS country very close to Mauritania, and called on officers to stand down and allow his return just as the AU delegation was gathering on the ground. He continued to make pledges that he would return to Mauritania, seeming to believe that his best chance was to coordinate his effort with the presence of the AU delegation (Guardian 2005, see also PANA 2005). In addition to the AU, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) sent Libyan Foreign Secretary Abderahmane Chelgham to head up a delegation on behalf of the AMU to meet with Col. Vall and the CMJD (PANA 2005).

The AU delegation of ministers was comprised of Oluyemi Adeniji, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Chair of AU Ministerial Council; Charles Ngakula, Minister for Safety and Security of South Africa and the current AU Peace and Security
Council Chair; and Mathieu Kinouani, analyst in the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission. In the meeting with the AU delegation, Colonel Vall asserted at the outset, “I am going to surprise you by saying that I agree with this condemnation in principle. I, myself, condemn what happened. If I had another way of avoiding chaos in my country I would have used it. I chose the only way open to me.” Col. Vall also added, “You are free to meet all those with whom you want to discuss, they will confirm to you.” The CMJD junta made it clear that it was only a “transitional” authority that would hand over power to a democratic government within two years. The junta members gave their pledged assurance that none of the members of the CMJD or the appointed government would be eligible to stand in the election. They also pledged not to create or sponsor any party. The pledges and arguments the CMJD made to the AU delegation were similar to what was said in meetings between domestic political stakeholders and opposition parties, when they also met with the AU delegation (AU PSC 2005; PANA 2005).

After the meeting with the CMJD, Nigerian Foreign Minister Adeniji said that the AU was ready “to co-operate with the government in Mauritania.” He indicated that the delegation he led to Nouakchott was “reassured after meeting all the various political parties of the reasons for the change and, some even say, the necessity of the change.” Despite this sentiment, the Nigerian-led delegation made it clear that “Mauritania will not be restored, that is clear, until there are elections, until there is a democratic system” (IRIN 2005). The AU maintained its rejection of the unconstitutional transfer of power in Mauritania (and throughout the region), and for that Mauritania remained suspended from the body until a constitutional authority was established. Despite reports to the contrary,
the AU remained unconvinced by Col. Vall or any other political stakeholders who seemed supportive of the coup that the junta was committed to returning constitutional order to Mauritania. At the closed-door 37th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, Foreign Minister Adeniji said, “we have seen and heard all this before.” He stressed that the AU should work to get Mauritania back to a constitutional government “within the shortest time possible.” The AU delegation believed that if the timeline for transition was two years, the CMJD might not fulfill its pledges. As the delegation was leaving Mauritania, Adeniji told Col. Vall, “The government that will be established must do everything in its power to shorten the transition period,” to which Col. Vall responded, “You can tell the AU on my behalf.”

Many in the AU, including the Nigerian president, chair of the organization, opposed the timeline. In Abuja, Nigeria on August 18, 2005, a meeting was held between AU Chair and Nigerian President Obasanjo and Sidi Mohammed Ould Sidina, Mauritanian Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Economy.23 In the meeting the latter declared that he wanted to see the transition completed in Mauritania within a year, half the time the CMJD set out in its initial statement. In addition, Nigerian President Obasanjo called on Col. Vall and the CMJD to end the practice of slavery in Mauritania, as it was (and still is by some accounts) the only country in the world where the institution of slavery still exists legally (NHAD MFA 2009, Suleman 2009). One key assurance that Col. Vall and the CMJD gave was that none of them would run in the

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23 In the meeting Nigeria was also represented by: Professor Julius Ihonuber (Special Adviser to the President on Programme and Policy Monitor), Mrs. Remi Oyo (Senior Special Assistant to the President on Media), Ambassador S. A. Ovalabi (Director of African Affairs MFA), and Mr. E. D. Osumakinde (Act. Deputy of NAHD). Mauritania’s presence also included Mrs. B. A. Coumba (Special Assistant for Mauritania) and H.E. Mr. Abderrahim Hadrami (Mauritanian Ambassador to Nigeria, CMJD-appointed) (NHAD MFA 2009).
election, to allay fears that their seizure of power was a prelude to the securing of power by other means at a later date—similar to the way Taya rose to power in the mid 80s and 90s. The AU had no intention of reducing the pressure on Col. Vall and the junta in order to bring Mauritania into compliance with the AU.

The Libyan Foreign Minister representing the AMU did support CMJD’s pledge that none of its members would stand in elections. Aside from the brief visit by a Libyan representative, the AMU implemented no major sanctions, suspensions, sustained mediations, or consultative intervention with measures geared at altering the behavior of the CMJD, unlike the AU (PANA 2005). The presence of the Libyan envoy primarily supported the intervention undertaken by the AU, rather than initiating any parallel or separate measures through a distinct organization. The AMU remains deeply divided as a result of internal conflicts among member states, mostly emanating from previous border conflicts and the dispute over Western Sahara. The Chair of the AMU at the time of the 2005 coup, Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi, had called for the organization to be disbanded in 2003 (Le Quotidien D’Oran 2003). There were no major summits held by AMU leaders and no collective targeted action to address the issue of Mauritania.

Morocco even sent Yassine Mansouri, Special Adviser and envoy of King Mohamed VI, separately to Nouakchott on August 5, days before the AMU or AU arrived, to ensure the cooperation of the new governing authorities with Moroccan policies.24 Rather than deal with a united collective focused response from states in its immediate region, Col. Vall and the CMJD Mauritanian leadership sent separate envoys to regional capitals and

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24 Morocco is the only sovereign country on the African continent that is not a member of the AU. There presence in Mauritania after the coup was not in coordination with the AU intervention.
received envoys from Gambia, Senegal, Morocco, and Libya, in addition to the AU delegation, in the days and weeks following the coup (see PANA 2005).

Taya realized his bid to return to office had failed after the AU intervention adopted a policy to work with the junta to move Mauritania toward new elections. He later accepted an offer for asylum in Doha, Qatar. After the AU intervention meeting, US State Department Spokesman Adam Ereli said in a briefing that “the guys running the country right now are the guys we're dealing with. . . . We're dealing with who we have to deal with in order to effect change in the right direction.” The United States shifted its position and eventually sought to align with the AU, yielding to the primary regional organization intervening in Mauritania (IRIN 2005). Shortly afterward, the US Ambassador in Abuja, Nigeria, John Campbell, requested an audience with AU Chair President Obasanjo over the issue of Mauritania. In the meeting on August 18, 2005, Ambassador Campbell asked for permission to attend the upcoming AU summit on Mauritania so the United States could “show their support for the AU” efforts (John Campbell 2005). President Obasanjo thanked Ambassador Campbell for his interests and told him that he would check with other AU heads of state to see if they supported the idea (NHAD MFA 2009). In reality, as AU Chair President Obasanjo did not need permission from any other AU member state to invite an ambassador to attend the meeting. His refusal to do so clearly demonstrated his uneasiness with the idea. Further, the request of the United States to attend a special regional summit underscores the level of interest that it had in the outcome of the Mauritania intervention. In the closed 37th AU PSC meeting on Mauritania that had only AU member states present, the group’s
consensus was to continue to support the junta in moving Mauritania toward elections, but that the Mauritanian electoral calendar should be reduced as much as possible.

**Sticks**

The cost-raising strategies of the immediate region occurred mainly through the AU. Immediately following the coup, the Nigerian President condemned the action as AU Chair on the basis that it violated AU principles on unconstitutional transfers of power. Once the AU had confirmed that Mauritania had undergone a coup, it was suspended from the regional body through the AU Peace and Security Council. Condemnation of the coup also came from other African leaders. In addition to condemnation within Africa, the EU, and the United States, other international actors condemned the coup and expressed concern for the events in Mauritania. From the outset, the AU called for a restoration of constitutional order. The United States called for the reinstatement of the Taya constitutional government. Initially, the United States did not signal its support for the AU—the primary regional IO involved in the intervention efforts—but condemned the coup in a similar manner.

Targets in Mauritania responded to these cost-raising mechanisms by addressing the concerns of the regional intergovernmental organization. The junta issued a statement announcing that they had taken power in order to restore the country to a constitutional democracy, showing that they understood regional standards and their obligations to observe them. They immediately positioned themselves as a “junta of national salvation” trying to reform political institutions and bring about a more credible, legitimate government. They emphasized that their aim was to shift Mauritania into a democratic civilian system, and not to hold power for themselves. They pledged to hand over their
power to a civilian government in two years. The junta reached out to domestic political stakeholders and appealed to civil society and opposition parties in order to secure their support. It also reached out to neighboring countries and pledged to respect and honor all of Mauritania’s international agreements. The prime minister appointed by the junta was a respected economist that had been serving as the ambassador to France. His appointment further underscores the junta’s effort to address international fears over its intentions.

The targets also engaged the AU by holding meetings with envoys in Nouakchott to further explain their intentions and solicit support. After international envoys from neighboring countries and from the AU met with Col. Vall and the CMJD, they were invited by the junta leaders to meet with opposition party leaders and any domestic stakeholders as well. The AU accepted in principle the plan for the junta to move the country towards a democratic transition. The AU, however, did not revoke Mauritania’s suspension from the regional body, deciding instead that the suspension would remain until the country had held elections and handed power to a constitutional government. The AU leadership indicated that it was ready to work with the CMJD to ensure that it followed through on its pledges. After the AU accepted, in principle, the plan of the CMJD, international actors that had previously called for the return of President Taya, including the United States, decided to work with the junta as well.

The position of the AU prevented greater unfavorable reactions, such as economic sanctions or isolation, from other international observers (particularly the United States) that condemned the coup. The plan the CMJD presented asked the AU and the international community, as well as societal stakeholders, to all trust them to make the
transition as faithful, impartial trustees. The idea of trusting the junta was problematic to some, given the fact that the same military leaders had for twenty years executed the repressive policies of Taya. In addition, some had been involved in the expulsions and black ethnic purges of the army in the 1990s and were trained in Arab countries to be “guardians of the privileges of Arab-Berbers threatened by a ‘Black Peril’” (N’Diaye 2006: 428-429). There were fears within society that the coup was actually an attempt to preserve the old order rather than to change it, since Taya’s unpopularity had become a liability. This feeling was only aggravated when the CMJD announced its new cabinet; Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, a former slave and leader of one of the main opposition parties said:

It seems as though this cabinet comes from a list found in a drawer of the ousted president…. Our reaction is one of extreme disappointment and skepticism. I thought that the transition would mean new faces, but with a couple of exceptions they are all people from Ould Taya's time…. I don't see a break with the old regime (IRIN 2005).

In addition to domestic opposition to the cabinet, there was some disagreement about the way to proceed with the transition in Mauritania. Ahmed Ould Daddah—another major opposition leader and younger brother of former President Daddah who started the Arabization policy—said in response to the cabinet appointments, “We believe that the objectives and the calendar for democracy that have been announced are more important” alluding to the electoral calendar. The AU had indicated earlier that it did not support the two-year calendar set by the junta, and made calls for it to be shortened to one year at the most. In addition, the Nigerian President and AU Chair called on Col. Vall to end slavery in Mauritania, showing that regional leaders were aware of the serious domestic problems
in the country and wanted to see them addressed. Both domestic stakeholders and the AU had substantial reason to be uneasy about trusting the CMJD to run the transition process.

In response to AU requests on November 14, 2005, the junta announced through the Mauritanian embassy in Abidjan that it had shortened the 24-month transition calendar by 5 months to 19 months, leaving about 1.5 years total for both parliamentary and presidential elections to be held. The timeline included a national conference (already held October 25-29, 2005) meant to revise the constitution and address past disputes, and a constitutional referendum (June 25, 2006) before local, parliamentary, and then presidential elections would take place. The junta also planned on conducting a census and creating an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to oversee the polls. With these measures on the table, the AU accepted the 19-month transition period and continued to work with and monitor Col. Vall and the CMJD in the process. The AU also convinced other international stakeholders to support the junta’s and AU’s efforts to bring about change in Mauritania. After initial condemnation, the junta faced very little pressure from the AU to change its policies, yet domestic and international concerns about its sincerity remained along with marked regional monitoring. The junta leaders responded by making pledges to not stand for office in the planned elections and not support the candidacy of any faction.

**Carrots**

In the absence of a sub-regional IO to provide and arrange for incentives for the targets, the AU served as the primary regional coordinator of incentives to ensure the cooperation and compliance of the CMJD. First, the AU gave the junta international legitimacy. Many of the critics of the CMJD altered their positions and decided to work
with Col. Vall after the AU had indicated first that it was willing to work with him to bring about the desired changes. Originally condemnation emanated from within Africa and from the EU and the United States. After the AU’s visit and subsequent policy switch, the junta gained greater acceptance and faced less international opposition going forward. The AU continued to monitor the situation, and by May 31, 2006 recommended resuming full cooperation with the junta. Donors continued to supply aid to support the targets in the transition, in part as a result of their cooperation with the AU.

The AU also provided technical support, sending M. I. Abdool Rahman, the Electoral Commissioner of Mauritius, from January 17–20, 2006 to assist in the establishment of an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to oversee the upcoming votes and help prepare for the referendum. The AU dispatched Rahman again along with Yousuf Aboobakar, the President of the Elections Supervisory Commission of Mauritius, for June 4–9, 2006, before the constitutional referendum. The AU organized a Donors’ Round Table on April 25, 2006 to mobilize funding for the election in Mauritania. Donors pledged to support elections in Mauritania, raising $3.3 million USD. The AU continued to solicit more support for Mauritania after the Donors’ Round Table (AU PSC 2006: 7). The junta also made a special request to the UN to provide electoral assistance. The involvement of the AU to assist the CMJD in the democratic process created an avenue for the AU to generate other incentives and coordinate donors outside the AU. With the extra oil revenues the junta received in 2006 and the continuing flow of revenue from mining and fishing reserves, the CMJD had $20 million USD at their disposal for the transition elections, about $7 million less than their budget needs. Even without donors, the CMJD created a state oil company, the Société Mauritanienne des
Hydrocarbures (SMH), that enabled it to withstand aid shortages through oil licensing revenues—including $100 million in bonus pay from Woodside Oil in 2006 (Pazzanita 2008: 406).

**Binding**

The primary constraint on the CMJD was a monitored written and verbal commitment from Col. Vall that no member of the junta would declare candidacy for the presidential race or run for any political office in the upcoming election. In addition, the group agreed to neither endorse nor support the candidacy of any particular faction, as that would be tantamount to fielding a candidate from among its own ranks. To ensure the junta’s compliance with its pledges, the AU continued to monitor developments in Mauritania. First, Ambassador Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, led a delegation from October 1–3, 2005 that included the Nigerian AU Chair and South African Peace and Security Council Chair to reaffirm the AU’s commitment (including the shortened timeline). Before Mauritania announced that it had shortened the transition calendar, the AU continued to send delegations to press the issue and hold Col. Vall and the CMJD to their pledge to do so. After the initial AU visit on August 9, when it became clear that the intervention in Mauritania would last longer than a few months, the AU Commission Secretariat and its permanent officials took on greater responsibility for the intervention since the terms of rotating AU positions held by member states would not last the duration of the intervention. According to organizational procedure, more responsibility was delegated to the AU Commission Secretariat and its permanent staff.

The AU appointed Ambassador Vijay Singh Makhan as the AU Special Envoy to Mauritania. Makhan did not reside permanently in Mauritania, as did the ECOWAS
Special Envoy to Togo, but he repeatedly visited Mauritania on missions to monitor the implementation process. On October 25, 2005, he participated in the National Dialogue Day, conveying the AU’s support for the timely completion of the transition process. After the dialogue, the CMJD granted amnesty and released political prisoners (mostly Islamic militants), welcoming back exiles, former coup perpetrators, and others who had been jailed or exiled for questionable reasons during Taya’s rule. They did not, however, release the large numbers of black Mauritanians victimized by the judicial system in the same period (Pazzanita 2008: 156; N’Diaye 2006: 435). The release of prisoners was not mandated by the AU but reflected the requests of domestic stakeholders who had backed the junta and even supported the CMJD when they met the AU delegation. Makhan returned to Mauritania from December 12–17, 2005 to press for a further reduction in the timeline and to work on establishing the INEC. He was also in Nouakchott on March 27–31, 2006 for further monitoring and to set up the Round Table to raise funds for the elections (AU PSC 2006).

The constitutional changes implemented by the CMJD were approved by 97 percent of the eligible voters who participated in the referendum on June 25, 2006, monitored by the AU. The amendments made several changes to bind future leaders, particularly term limits and restrictions on future alterations of the constitution. Changes to Articles 26 and 27 made presidential terms five years long as opposed to six and barred presidents from holding leadership in private parties or other functions; a maximum age of 70 years old was also set in place for presidential candidates. A change to Article 28 limited presidential terms to a maximum of two. The change to Article 99 made it more difficult to alter the constitution, particularly to change term limits (N’Diaye 2009: 138-
139). These rule changes served as internally instituted rules to bind future political actors from seeking permanent advantages and holding on to power as long as Taya did.

While the AU remained involved in much of the process, the transition government selected by the CMJD was appointed without AU mediation between the junta and political stakeholders. The AU, however, pressed the CMJD to ensure the new government’s commitment to a quicker transition as a principal agenda even before it had been formed. Although the AU was in continuous contact with opposition parties, there was no mediation over the dispute that erupted with the opposition over the appointment of former Taya associates to the transition cabinet. The CMJD seemed reluctant to fully cooperate with Mauritanian civil society and political opposition parties in the long transition process, and the AU as the primary regional IO, without a permanent daily presence on the ground, did little to alter the situation. The main provision enforced by the AU concerning the new government was that none of the civilian members of the transitional cabinet were allowed to run for office in the election, according to the agreement monitored by the AU (N’Diaye 2009: 137, Suleman 2009).

The CMJD conducted parliamentary and presidential elections on schedule. After a two-round presidential vote that ended on March 25, 2007, Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheik Abdallahi was elected as the next president of Mauritania in a vote that was regarded as free and fair. As soon as the transitional elections took place, there were very few constraints or safeguards put in place to bind the targets in Mauritania to support the system, with the exception of preexisting AU agreements on governance and constitutionality. As soon as the election occurred, the AU essentially packed up and left and targeted their resources elsewhere on the continent. There was no permanent
presence of the AU in the country at any point during the transition, and afterwards there was almost no AU follow-up as the capacity for permanent monitoring had never been established in the transition. In interventions the AU as an organization relies on support from the sub-regional AU pillar organizations like ECOWAS and ECCAS that were not present in Mauritania.

Like CMJD during transition, President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheik Abdallahi selected a new government following his election without any international mediation. Further regional integrated efforts established no capacity to monitor disputes, let alone intervene when they occurred. The disputes that arose among political factions over the composition of the cabinet were resolved internally without the involvement of the AU or any external mediator. As expected in the absence of an immediate sub-regional IO, there were fewer safeguards in Mauritania, fewer constraints on the targets that held power during the transition, and almost no constraints on the major stakeholders afterwards. There was virtually no binding after the transition to ensure continued compliance of the military, the opposition, and the new administration to consolidate constitutional order and respect the new Mauritanian constitution.

**Aftermath**

Without safeguards and constraints, there was a great deal of distrust between the various stakeholders in Mauritania. The lack of a permanent AU presence also allowed covert backdoor deals and maneuvers that reflected the disingenuous disposition among some of the supposedly impartial CMJD junta members. On November 19 and December 3, 2006, parliamentary elections resulted in no political party or coalition taking control. Many of the candidates who won seats were moderate, Islamic-leaning independents,
backed by the army and the ruling establishment. At least sixteen parties won seats in the parliamentary elections, yet the largest group was independents, who controlled 41 of the 95 seats in the National Assembly. Most “independents” who won seats were close associates of the former ruling PRDS party that had occupied high-ranking positions in the PRDS and Taya’s regime. While Taya’s former party, now called the PRDR, won only 7 seats, the military insisted upon rules allowing parliamentary candidates to run as “independents.” This allowed many of the individuals from the former establishment to hide their affiliation with the former ruling party and prevented the opposition parties from sweeping to power in the parliament (N’Diaye 2009: 139-142, Suleman 2009, Abbas 2009, NHAD 2009). While there were 41 “independents” elected, the collective alliance of opposition parties known as the Coalition for Forces for Democratic Change (CFCD) carried only 39 of the 95 seats.

After no party or coalition won control of the parliament, the CMJD began to promote the idea that the fragmentation of the legislature was a potential reason to lengthen the transition period. Drawing on support from the politicians of the former regime, the junta members argued that without a clear majority in the legislature Mauritania could become unstable and potentially collapse. In the proposed backdoor dealings, Col. Vall would remain head of state in a prolonged “government of national unity” while an opposition politician, perhaps Daddah, would serve as Prime Minister until presidential elections were held at a later, undetermined date. Most of the leaders of political parties rejected the idea of the military remaining in power any longer than the set transition date. The maneuvers showed clearly that the CMJD and Col. Vall were not as sincere as they had intimated, having pledged to hand over power to civilian
authorities. Their attempt to co-opt domestic civilian support behind a second grab for power failed.

Despite the likelihood of incurring substantial international pressure if the CMJD reneged on previous pledges, members of the junta continued to engage in secretive backdoor activities in support of declared presidential candidates. The CMJD Chairman, Col. Vall, had not given up on extending the transition period either, nor on finding ways around his pledge to not seek power for himself or members of his clique. On January 27, 2007, just two months before the presidential poll, Col. Vall escalated efforts to hold on to power and to influence the political process. He directed the newly elected local officials to prevent public debate in the presidential campaign by suppressing public discussions of key issues such as the government’s diplomatic ties with Israel, the human rights record of the Taya era, and Mauritania’s withdrawal from ECOWAS; these were among the most prominent issues among the slate of presidential candidates, as well as the citizens of Mauritania. Col. Vall also promoted the issue of “blank ballots,” saying that if enough voters demonstrated their discontent with the slate of presidential candidates by casting a “blank ballot”—thereby preventing any candidate from garnering 50 percent of the votes—then the election itself could be discarded and the transition period extended. Presumably, Vall would be able to run in the following election since he had honored his pledge not to run the first time around. Once again, these moves precipitated a domestic backlash against the junta and Col. Vall, forcing the latter to refine his statements days later in a press conference and declare his support for the transition’s time frame.
Without safeguards in place to guarantee its economic interests and amnesty for past crimes, the military felt the need to promote its own candidate. A substantial amount of resources from the junta, Arab-Berber ethnic elites, and elements of the former regime still holding administrative government posts financed the candidacy of Zeine Ould Zeidane, the former Central Bank Governor under Taya. Zeidane belonged to an Arab-Berber elite family and his father, General Moulaye Ould Boukhreiss, was a former army chief of staff with substantial financial resources. When the main opposition candidate (Daddah) was announced with name recognition as the first president’s brother, the CFCD opposition coalition united behind him, and the anti-establishment electorate worked against Zeidane who had been a key part of the Taya era. As the situation turned against the junta’s favored candidate, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi joined the race as a late entrant, immediately receiving backing from members of the junta.

Abdallahi ran as an independent candidate. He was also part of the Arab-Berber elite, married to a woman from the same family as the CMJD “number two” and presidential guard leader Col. Abdel Aziz—who was Col. Vall’s cousin. Abdallahi was a respected economist that had served as a minister and civil servant in both Daddah’s and Taya’s administrations. In the late 1980s, after being dismissed as a minister in Taya’s government, he left Mauritania for Kuwait and Niger where he worked rotating between the two countries for 15 years under the Kuwait Development Fund. As a result of having been out of the country for so long, Abdallahi was not affiliated with the Taya era. It was also known that he was not going to pursue perpetrators of the human rights abuses committed by the military in the late 80s and 90s against Black Moors and Black African Mauritanians. Late in the election, it became apparent that he was the favored candidate.
of the CMJD and had been recruited by Col. Vall to be the next president of Mauritania (Pazzanita 2008: 473-474). He had also secured backing from many of the “independents” in the parliament. The amendment to Article 26 of the constitution made Abdallahi eligible to run for only one term since he would be 69 when he entered office. This would conveniently allow Col. Vall, the soon-to-be-proclaimed hero of democracy, to run as a civilian five years later.

Despite attempts by the junta to delay the presidential poll and influence its outcome, the election was on schedule for March 11, 2007 with almost two dozen candidates competing. In the first round, Abdallahi outpaced all the candidates with 24.8 percent of the vote, trailed by Daddah with 20.69 percent and Zeidane in third place with 15.28 percent. Since no single candidate received an absolute majority, a second round of balloting was held between the top two candidates, Daddah and Abdallahi, on March 25, 2007. As promised, the coalition of opposition parties (CFCD) rallied around Daddah for the second round while Zeidane threw his support behind Abdallahi. In a surprise move, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the well known anti-slavery activist and opposition leader who had come in fourth place behind Zeidane threw his support to Abdallahi, breaking ranks with the ten other parties in the CFCD opposition coalition. In return, Abdallahi pledged to pass legislation criminalizing slavery and to assist Black Moors marginalized in the Taya era. Abdallahi also promised to get his “independent” supporters in the parliament to elect Boulkheir as parliamentary speaker. The split by Boulkheir was costly, since Daddah had always shown tendencies of Arab nationalism that alienated much of the population and created suspicion about his intentions among many Boulkheir supporters. (see N’Diaye 2009, Pazzanita 2008). In the second round of voting, Abdallahi
prevailed with a narrow margin of victory (52.85 percent to 47.15 percent). The election was peaceful and the vote was hailed by the AU and other international observers as the first credible democratic election in Mauritania. The AU restored Mauritania to full membership status on April 10, 2007, and its representatives packed up and left Mauritania shortly after the election, leaving no permanent observers or mediation mission in Nouakchott (AU PSC 2007).

The peaceful transition and its widely accepted result brought high hopes for the new Mauritanian democracy, both internationally and domestically, which most observers thought would last as a model for the Mahgreb (see Zisenwine 2007). Col. Vall left Mauritania for Europe as the new government established its hold on power. Meanwhile, most of the CMJD remained in the military and continued to exert an influence on the new government, indirectly and directly through the civilian deputies they had assisted in getting elected to parliament. After taking power on April 19, 2007, President Abdallahi chose Zeine Ould Zeidane as his prime minister. Col. Abdel Aziz was promoted to the position of general and was made President Abdallahi’s chief of staff. Col. Ghazouani was also promoted to general and made the army chief of staff. The rise of the two top former CMJD members was viewed as a reward for their role in bringing Abdallahi to power and not as reflective of their merits or years of service since other officers outpaced them in seniority and service.

After appointing Zeidane as prime minister, Abdallahi appointed a cabinet of technocrats and did little to co-opt his political opponents. As promised, parliament quickly criminalized slavery and Abdallahi repatriated tens of thousands of black Mauritians forced into exile in neighboring Senegal under Taya, using state resources
to reintegrate them back into Mauritanian society (see Pazzanita 2008: 475; N’Diaye 2009: 146, Abbas 2009). Such a comprehensive outreach effort made some military officers and other retired officials uneasy about whether the new president would go as far as prosecuting them for their involvement in the initial deportations, even after they had helped bring him to power. During Taya’s rule, a Mauritanian officer was charged in France for crimes against humanity; he later fled back to Mauritania with the help of Taya who had refused to allow military officials to be tried. In further contrast to his predecessor, Abdallahi began the process of negotiating cooperative agreements with ECOWAS with the view of reintegrating Mauritania back into the organization.

Seven months into Abdallahi’s presidency on November 13, 2007, large riots broke out in Nouakchott and the towns of Aleg and Bogue in the south of Mauritania over the increased price of food. A drought and a large drop in oil revenues only made the situation worse. President Abdallahi and Prime Minister Zeidane were blamed by “independent” parliamentarians for not caring about the plight of poor in the country. The global price of food increased at the time, while government revenues were down. Furthermore, higher public employee salaries prevented President Abdallahi from doing much to amend the situation. Abdallahi’s political woes did not end with the riots; conflicts with “independents” in parliament over the cabinet and the affairs of state continued into 2008. Abdallahi started his own political party called Pacte National pour la Démocratie et la Développement (PNDD) and recruited independents in the parliament to join it, in an effort to blunt the criticism he had been receiving. Yet the National Assembly continued to hammer away at the presidency, prompting Abdallahi to dismiss Zeidane (the military’s favored candidate) and appoint a new prime minister, Yahya Ould
Ahmed El Waghef, a technocrat and opposition politician. The attacks on Abdallahi caused him to move closer to the opposition and to reevaluate his initial cooperation with military leaders.

Supporters of president Abdallahi began to complain about military interference in the political process, coming especially from General Abdel Aziz who remained head of the presidential guard and General Mohamed Ould el-Ghazouani who became army chief of staff. Parliamentary deputies, encouraged by military leaders, led charges against the president and the new government further undermining their ability to govern. In July 2008, Abdallahi announced a new cabinet, which included former Taya insiders labeled as “technocrat appointments.” The move to include former Taya associates was designed primarily to pacify opponents close to Taya’s former party, but only created new ones. It did little to stop the parliamentary deputies of the military from launching attacks.

As the drought continued, 50 members of the president’s PNDD party called for a special parliamentary session to deal with food shortages. After their request was refused by Speaker Messaoud Boulikheir, who opposed the move and was not party to the attacks on Abdallahi, the 50 PNDD members withdrew their support from the party on August 4, 2008. It was known that senior army officers were behind the defection and the continued conflict. The distrust between the government and the military created a fragile situation with Abdallahi in power. Without any mediation, disputes between the opposition and the government were not addressed or resolved by stakeholders creating incentives to defect from their pledge to honor and support the new constitutional government. Furthermore, the military continued to make its presence felt overtly in politics, through deputies who remained in the parliament long after the transition had taken place.
Coup 2008

With knowledge of an impending military plot to overthrow him as early as August 5 and 6, 2008, President Sidi Abdallahi attempted to preserve his fledgling administration by dismissing senior military officers who had been known to meddle in political affairs by stoking controversies and who were reportedly planning to overthrow him. In a decree announced on the radio at 7:00 a.m. on August 6, 2008, President Abdallahi dismissed Presidential Guard Commander Gen. Abdel Aziz, Army Chief of Staff Gen. El Ghazouani, National Guard Commanders Col. Ahmed Ould Bekrine and Col. Felix Negri. After the coup, it was revealed by Prime Minister El Waghef that the military had planned to overthrow Abdallahi on August 9, 2008. Shortly after the president’s decree, the president was arrested in his office. The radio station was sealed off by the guard while the army closed all of Mauritania’s airports and land borders for several days. Col. Negri personally arrested Prime Minister El Waghef in his office and held him for several days before he was released. The military announced the leadership of its Haut Conseil d’État (HCE) with Gen. Abdel Aziz as leader. After the coup Abdel Aziz released Communiqué 1, which reversed the sacking of the four senior officers, including him.

The military coup was strictly an executive coup. The parliament and other governing institutions remained functional after the coup (Suleman 2009). It was clear, however, that the parliament would not be permitted to criticize the junta as it had before during the presidency of Abdallahi. In the 48 hours following the coup, confusion remained as to the identity and political intentions of the members of the HCE. Abdel Aziz offered positions in the HCE to opposition leaders such as Ahmed Ould Daddah and
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, who was Speaker of the National Assembly at the time, along with three other civilian politicians. Boulkheir refused to be a member of the HCE and immediately made known his strong opposition to the coup. Daddah also refused to join, though he was not opposed to the coup itself as was Boulkheir. He was quoted on August 12 as saying that the coup was “a movement to rectify the democratic process” in support of the junta and its leaders (Aljazeera 2008). After failing to convince opposition politicians to join the junta, Abdel Aziz appointed five army officers to form an 11-man junta and promised to hold elections in as few as two months. After the coup, those opposed to the army takeover protested in the streets. It was eventually revealed that several members of the HCE had been involved in the black ethnic purges and human rights violations of the late 80s and early 90s, triggering a statement of condemnation from FLAM for the coup and its leadership.

The international response to the coup was almost unanimously negative, the only exception being Morocco which called the leaders of the junta “patriots.” As AU Chair, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Bernard Membe declared, the “African Union will suspend Mauritania until the country returns to a constitutional government. . . . The coup is a serious setback for Mauritanians because it has robbed the people of their basic right to freely elect leaders of their own choice” (AFP 2008, BBC 2008). In a separate statement, the AU asserted that it “condemns the coup d'état and demands the restoration of constitutional legality.” In addition, the AU sent Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, to “assess the situation and promote a peaceful solution.” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that there should be a “restoration of constitutional order” (AFP 2008). Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua said that “Nigeria totally
condemns the event that took place today in Mauritania. Nigeria will not recognize any government that did not come to power through constitutional means.” He also stated that “our sub-region has made great advances in terms of peace and security and sustenance of democracy at such great cost to our peoples that we cannot afford the hand of the clock to be turned back again” (Reuters 2008, Afrik 2008, PANA 2008). Poignantly, President Yar’Adua was hosting a meeting of West African defense leaders from ECOWAS countries at the time, as part of a collective security effort focused on depoliticizing regional armed forces. Mauritania has not been party to this process since 2000. Nigeria as well as other regional leaders were determined to stamp out the practice of coups and to establish a precedent that it would not be tolerated.

In a more cautiously worded statement, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner answered a question about the situation by stating, “You know how attached we are to Mauritania’s stability. . . . Let me remind you nevertheless of France’s attachment to preserving the rule of law in all circumstances and its hostility to the seizure of power by force” (French MFA 2008). US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated on behalf of her administration that “we oppose any attempts by military elements to change governments through extra-constitutional means” (US State Dept. 2008). Other African leaders and the EU all condemned the coup. Most international observers demanded an immediate return to constitutional order with the reinstatement of President Abdallahi—who was still being detained by the junta—as the rightful head of state in Mauritania.

Once in power, Abdel Aziz received the backing of most “independents,” some opposition members, and later local government officials. On August 13, 2008, more than
two-thirds of the Mauritanian parliament signed a declaration in support of the junta. Only a minority of parliamentarians led by Boulkheir did not sign the letter. The letter called the military intervention a “democratic transition” and called upon the AU, the EU, the United States and the Arab League to support the junta (The Guardian 2008). The letter read:

The legislators of Mauritania . . . support the change that occurred in the interest of the Mauritanian people. . . . We regret that all of the attempts made by members of parliament and other well-intentioned people failed to lessen the stubbornness of the former president, who did not listen to his constituents.

Abdoulaye Mamadou Ba, the spokesperson for President Abdallahi, said that “President Abdallahi is the victim of a coup concocted by the army with the connivance of lawmakers in Parliament.” The remaining 19 members of parliament formed a group called the Parliamentary Group for the Preservation of Democracy (PGPD) to counter those who had defected and supported the coup, in an attempt to show that there was no domestic consensus on the junta (PANA 2008). The National Assembly, weeks after the coup, held hearings on the food crisis despite vehement protest from Parliamentary Speaker Boulkheir, who refused to hold the session and eventually boycotted the “illegal” sessions that took place (PANA 2008). The sessions allowed opponents of the president to further accuse him of corruption and publicly blame him for the country’s woes.

In order to create the appearance of popular support for his administration, Abdel Aziz staged a march on August 7, 2008, the day after he seized power (Mohamed 2008). A counter-demonstration arose the same day, which the army and police broke up by firing tear gas (AFP 2008). A week after seizing power, Abdel Aziz appointed Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, the serving Mauritanian ambassador to the EU in Brussels, as the country’s next prime minister (PANA 2008). Laghdaf was internationally known and
was selected to help the junta deal with international opposition to the coup. Abdel Aziz sought to build further domestic support for his rule by implementing populist programs such as lowering the price of fuel and food, providing land for the overcrowded slum residents in the cities, and building roads in under-serviced regions (Pazzanita 2008: 158-162). These short-term projects allowed him to project himself as a president for the poor and an opponent of corrupt politicians who do not care about the people.

Response to the Coup

The response to the coup was forceful. Countries in Africa, the AU, the EU, the UN and other international IOs condemned the junta. The Arab League and the OIC were concerned about the possibility of instability in the country, along with the fact that President Abdallahi was being detained and prevented from meeting with international delegations. Inside the AU, it became apparent almost immediately that intervention in Mauritania might require a longer sustained effort, beyond the tenure of rotating member state chairs set to end by January 2009. This assessment brought AU Secretariat officials to lead the intervention on behalf of the block. Almost three weeks after the coup, AU Commission President Jean Ping traveled to Mauritania to meet with the junta on August 25-26, 2008.25 Ping made it clear that the only purpose of his mission was to discuss the reinstatement of President Abdallahi and not to engage the junta on any other course of action. From the beginning, the AU wanted to mediate a compromise or perhaps a unity government and power-sharing agreement among stakeholders to restore constitutional

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25 Jean Ping is the former Foreign Minister of Gabon. He had served as President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was one of the ECCAS ministers on the IMG for the intervention in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003.
order. In the AU communiqué Ping released after his visit, he expressed optimism that President Abdallahi and his prime minister would be released from house arrest.

Abdallahi had remained detained since the coup; Prime Minister El Waghef, who was released several days after the coup, immediately spoke to thousands of demonstrators and made public statements detailing the interference of senior military officers in state affairs, and their intention to overthrow the regime even before they had been sacked. He was re-arrested on August 22, 2008, and was still being held by the junta when Ping arrived. Both he and President Abdallahi were prevented from meeting with international delegations, even to verify their condition. Abdel Aziz gave Ping a “commitment” that he would release President Abdallahi. Despite this pledge, President Abdallahi remained detained for months after the coup, unable to speak publicly or meet with international delegations or even guests, until he was finally released in December.

By September, AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramadan Al-Amamra had made three trips to Mauritania to get the junta to change course. In late September, the AU Peace and Security Council set an ultimatum that the junta must revert to constitutional order by October 6, 2008 or face sanctions. In response, the junta announced it was rejecting the ultimatum, keeping President Abdallahi under arrest (PANA 2008).

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had sent his Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, to Mauritania for talks with the junta several times in August. By the end of August, the OIF had joined the AU in suspending Mauritania, the United States had cut non-humanitarian aid and was threatening further sanctions, and France had joined the United States in declaring the civilian government formed by the junta at

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26 Said Djinnit was the former Commissioner for Peace and Security for the AU who led a delegation to Mauritania in 2005 on behalf of the AU.
the end of August illegitimate (PANA 2008). In an effort to defuse international pressure, the junta attempted to send envoys to African states including Nigeria. These envoys were turned away due to the AU’s refusal to recognize their government and its representatives. Parliamentary Speaker Boukhier made several trips, including to Nigeria, and was recognized. He also remained in contact with the AU in the intervention process, to ensure that regional states and the AU knew that there was great domestic political opposition to the coup despite the overwhelming support from Parliament. In mid September, the EU sent delegates to Mauritania to meet with Gen. Abdel Aziz. They pressed for the release of President Abdallahi and for the junta to restore constitutional order. Later on, Prime Minister Laghdaf, appointed by the junta, traveled to Paris to meet with EU officials over the situation in Mauritania.

After holding a series of meetings on Mauritania, including one in New York on the sidelines of the General Assembly, the AU hosted a summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on November 10 and 21, 2008. The summit drew representatives from the Arab League, the OIF (Organization of Francophone Countries), the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries), and the EU (AU PSC 2008). Forming the backdrop of the summit was the junta’s recent rejection of AU demands to release President Abdallahi and restore constitutional order. The move was designed by the AU to coordinate a response among other international stakeholders, and to create an International Contact Group (ICG) that the AU would lead. Despite the involvement of both Western and Middle Eastern actors, the AU was the primary regional IO and remained at the center. The AU selected Senegal to lead the International Contact Group as AU mediator. Senegal remained close to Mauritania as a neighboring state and was a member of three of the five international
organizations represented in the contact group (the AU, OIF, and OIC) (NHAD 2009). After the difficulties encountered by the AU Secretariat and other international partners of Mauritania to make inroads and alter the junta’s actions, the decision was made that perhaps a sub-regional state such as Senegal could assist the AU in mediating among the targets and stakeholders, similar to the way sub-regional IO’s led intervention in the previous two cases.

**Sticks**

In addition to the immediate condemnation after the coup and demands for reversal, the AU suspended Mauritania for another unconstitutional transfer of power. Coupled with the measures announced by the AU, Western development partners took substantive action to reduce support for the junta. The United States announced a suspension of non-humanitarian aid to Mauritania within a week of the coup. A spokesman at the US State Department, Gonzalo Gallegos, announced that more than $22 million USD in aid would be withheld, which included $15 million in military aid and $3 million for development. The suspension also included the training that had been provided to the country as part of the joint anti-terror efforts between the US and Mauritania armies. The EU announced economic sanctions as well as suspension of further aid, including the $241 million USD aid package that was on the table at the time. The World Bank announced a suspension of its aid, totaling $175 million USD in funds designated for projects in Mauritania by mid-August (AFP 2008). By February 6, 2008, the AU had launched its own set of sanctions against Mauritania, which included travel bans and the freezing of assets on all individuals, civilian and military, that were working to prevent the restoration of constitutional order through the Mauritanian junta (Reuters
Abdel Aziz rejected AU sanctions, stating that no member of the junta had accounts outside of Mauritania, a condition caused in part by Mauritania’s non-integrative stance on its currency and monetary policy. On February 20, 2009 the ICG, led by Senegal, met in Paris to coordinate further sanctions among other international partners and to agree on a roadmap to bring the country back in line with the AU standard of constitutional governance, which included plans to mediate a power-sharing settlement among stakeholders with likely safeguards for the military (Suleman 2009, NHAD 2009).

These cost-raising strategies were not exclusively the domain of the AU. Many of the cost-raising strategies consisted of sanctions that were implemented immediately by Western development partners of Mauritania. One of the primary requests made by African states and international partners, including Nigeria, the EU, and the United States, was that the junta release President Abdallahi (PANA 2008). The junta initially promised the AU it would do so but continued to hold the president until December when a high-level AU-led delegation came to Mauritania on December 6–7, 2008—more than four months after the coup (AU PSC 2008). The junta also rejected demands to step down and restore constitutional order.

After the coup, Abdel Aziz reached out to Israel for support. When he was refused, he cut relations and expelled the Israeli ambassador from Nouakchott (see Pazzanita 2008). The move won him praise from Islamic groups and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in November 2008. The junta continued to reject regional demands to step down and restore constitutional order and began to shift Mauritania’s pro-Western stance despite the active role of Western donors in the process. Aziz scheduled a national dialogue in late December 2008 after receiving the backing of Libya’s President. Joining
Morocco as the only other African country to embrace the junta, Libya received the junta’s prime minister in December, in seeming violation of AU Peace and Security Council orders to not recognize the junta’s government. Libya was the only AU country to embrace the junta, since Morocco is not an AU member state. Shortly after his appointment the EU had also met with the junta-appointed Prime Minister. The national dialogue organized by the junta in December 2008 presented recommendations for presidential elections to be held by late May. Elections were later announced for June 6, 2009 (PANA 2008).

International actors outside of Africa were substantially involved in the response to the post-2008 coup in Mauritania. International aid was cut by donors opposed to the unconstitutional power grab. Donors did not specifically signal support for the AU’s intervention efforts. The response of the targets to cost-raising mechanisms was to continue discussions with the AU and other international observers, in order to buy time and to appeal for understanding. In December, just days after the release of President Abdallahi, the junta praised the soft international response in a statement of thanks by Abdel Aziz saying that it welcomed “the positive attitude of the international community regarding the political situation in Mauritania” (PANA 2008). It was clear from these statements that the cost-raising mechanisms did not have a great impact on the junta. When releasing the president, the junta confiscated his passports and those of several family members, continuing its policy to control the movement of the president.

**Carrots**

Initially, the AU did not offer many incentives to the junta to secure its compliance. International donors did not offer many incentives either, aside from a
resumption of the aid that had been cut as a result of the coup. In addition to the aid that Mauritania lost, the EU had a five-year aid package for $241 million USD on the table that would not go forward due to the coup (AFP 2008). Later in the process, one of the most significant benefits the AU offered the junta was to recognize that the overthrow of President Abdallahi would not be reversed. After Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi was selected as AU Chairman on February 2, 2009, he visited Mauritania and met with junta leader Abdel Aziz on March 12, 2009. He intended to negotiate a settlement between stakeholders in Mauritania, and to work toward a compromise that would restore constitutional order. After the trip, he called on President Abdallahi to recognize that the junta would not allow him to return (NHAD 2009, Sapa-AFP 2009).

The elections that had been scheduled and organized by the junta for June 6, 2009 were recognized as the best path for Mauritania to return to constitutionality. This gave junta leader Abdel Aziz four more months in power to use the apparatus of the state to influence the outcome of the elections, which would potentially be recognized by the AU and thus the entire international community. The idea to shift gears and accept the coup as a fait accompli started with the leadership of the AU, according to standard procedure, and was eventually accepted by the rest of the AU’s member states due to months of failed efforts to pressure the junta. Abdallahi and the opposition were not pleased with the intervention by President Gaddafi. He was accused of openly siding in favor of junta leader Abdel Aziz.

Others in the AU-led international contact group also accepted the position and its implied shift in policy. The AU’s decision came after eight months of the international community failing to gain the compliance of the junta. President Abdallahi had also
begun to grudgingly accept that the coup would not be reversed. Once the plan to hold new presidential elections was in place, the AU assisted in organizing and conducting the polls, and worked to get other donors to contribute as was done in 2005 (AU PSC 2009). The AU hoped that by intervening in the election it could once again move Mauritania toward holding credible elections that would be accepted domestically and internationally, just as it had in 2007.

**Binding**

The first major attempt at binding in Mauritania entailed securing the release of President Abdallahi, his family, and his prime minister. Initial attempts to bind the junta to this course of action had failed for five months. After the release, the AU-led ICG sought to mediate the disputes among the major stakeholders in Mauritania and work out a settlement to restore constitutional order. The opposition parties rejected AU Chairman and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi as the lead intervention mediator, accusing him of holding an overt bias towards the junta. It was clear that he would not be able to lead the international contact group on behalf of the AU after talks failed during his visit to Mauritania on March 12, 2009 (VOA 2009). In his place, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, the Chair of the ICG, was tapped by the AU to be the AU mediator for Mauritania. President Wade led the AU intervention and the ICG while the Libyan President and AU Chair, who supported Wade as the new principle mediator, stepped aside. Opposition groups in Mauritania who had rejected Gaddafi agreed to work with President Wade. The contact group sought to organize elections in Mauritania such that all parties would accept results after the vote. Competing priorities and concerns on all sides questioned the credibility of a vote under the current conditions.
On May 6, 2009 at the 186th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, the AU devised a plan to bind all stakeholders in Mauritania in order to bring an end to the political crisis in the country. The plan involved the creation of a transitional government that would oversee the vote and would include representatives from all stakeholders, including the opposition parties. Abdel Aziz was to step down as junta leader and resign from the Army in order to run in the election. In addition, President Abdallahi was to formally resign from office to allow for the election to take place where he indicated he had no desire to run himself. The plan devised by the AU Peace and Security Council was supported by the rest of the international contact group in Mauritania (AU PSC 2009). The AU remained the primary regional IO, coordinating the binding process and setting international policy. Abdel Aziz complied, resigning from office and leaving the military in May in order to run in the election. The opposition refused to participate due to what they termed “substantial advantages” for Abdel Aziz that would almost guarantee his victory, including his access to the media, the composition of the INEC, and the presence of the military HCE ruling council as the primary governing structure until the date of the polls.

On June 29, 2009, representatives from the AU, EU, Arab League, and UN met in Dakar, Senegal to resolve the stalemate. The three main target groups involved were the camp of President Abdallahi, the group led by opposition leader Daddah, and supporters of Abdel Aziz (AFP 2009, Suleman 2009, NHAD 2009). The opposition’s refusal to participate in the vote led to intense negotiations in the Senegalese capital that ended on June 3 with a delay of the vote until July 18, 2008. In the agreement that was reached, the ruling military council would “symbolically” step down and hand power to a joint
government with both military and opposition members as part of the transition cabinet. The opposition group would also be granted access to media. In exchange, President Abdallahi agreed to sign an official letter of resignation that would clear the way for presidential polls to be held on July 18. Abdel Aziz also announced he would suspend his campaign until July 18 in compliance with the delayed vote (AFP 2009). The shift of the presidential election date was the first major policy change that the AU-led contact group was able to achieve in Mauritania.

As part of the agreement, the transitional government was formed, but the junta did not cede power formally to the new transitional authority, essentially remaining in place. The HCE’s refusal to hand over power caused another rift with opposition parties. On June 19, 2009, about a month before elections, mediators called for another round of talks in Dakar to resolve the renewed stalemate. President Abdallahi refused to resign unless the HCE junta formally handed power to the transitional government (AFP 2009). Representatives of Abdel Aziz refused to take part in the talks, but international mediators were able to convince the remaining members of the junta to step aside symbolically. President Abdallahi then signed a resignation letter, officially ending the coup. After Abdallahi resigned, the AU lifted sanctions against Mauritania on June 30, 2009.

In the first round of balloting, Abdel Aziz won 52 percent of the vote. His closest challengers were Boukheir with 16.3 percent and Daddah with 13.7 percent. The opposition called the vote a “sham,” asserting that the outcome had been “deliberately fabricated” through “massive fraud.” Opposition candidates issued a statement claiming that “electoral lists had been tampered with and voters had used fake ballot papers and
identity cards during the poll to add to Abdel Aziz’s tally.” Furthermore, opposition member Miriam Mustapha also said,

Remember, well before the election it was General Aziz who was seen on national television talking about his plans for Mauritania. Projects funded by the government were credited to him and in the months leading to the election, the military junta embarked on a wild spending spree on projects in rural areas and in the capital which were credited to Aziz and his commitment to help the poor (Sillah 2009).

Daddah said afterwards, “I am calling on the Mauritanian people to reject this new coup d’état” (AFP 2009). Col. Vall, who also ran in the election in 2009 as an independent opposition candidate, said afterwards that the election had taken Mauritania back to “the situation prior to August 3, 2005.” He said he was going “to continue to fight” against the government (PANA 2009).

The head of the Mauritanian electoral commission, Sid’Ahmed Ould Deye, resigned in the face of the accusations from the opposition, saying, “The complaints I received, as well as the contents of the challenges sent to the Constitutional Court, have sown doubts in my mind about the reliability of the election” (BBC 2009). Most of the complaints targeted the junta’s role in elections that took place in the presence of even fewer international observers and in the hands of an even less prepared body of officials than had been enlisted previously; still, the constitutional court refused to investigate and accepted the results. The court had already been stacked with members nominated by the same parliament that had backed the coup. Based on some of the manipulation that occurred in the 2007 election, in which a greater international role was occupied in setting up and coordinating the election, it seems possible if not likely that the military continued to engage in manipulation. The fact that Abdel Aziz was accepted as a candidate, having resigned shortly before the election—at the end of an unsustainable
spending blitz meant to bolster support for his candidacy—makes it apparent that the election was never designed to be competitive, even without further manipulations.

**Alternate Explanations**

Compared to the cases of São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo, a massive void existed in the absence of a primary sub-regional organization attached to Mauritania. All relevant entities were either unwilling or unable to lead cost-raising, provide and arrange for incentives, and ensure compliance of targets with their demands. Powerful regional states or international donors could have easily led these efforts since a sub-regional IO would not prevent them from talking over the process. Nigeria was AU Chair when the first coup occurred in Mauritania, and remained a dominant regional country. Mauritania has a population of just over 3 million people—less than half the size of Togo’s population. As demonstrated in Mauritania, especially in the 2008 coup, Nigeria did not replace the sub-regional IO to achieve its desired outcome. It is nevertheless West Africa’s regional power player, having projected influence as far as Sierra Leone in the 1990s and Liberia in the following decade. The junta behind the 2005 coup continued to exploit different means of holding on to power, and in the end handed it over to a civilian government of its choosing, designed to do its bidding. Nigeria did little as the regional power to prevent this. After the transition, Nigeria was unable to prevent a second coup from occurring or to persuade Abdel Aziz and the 2008 junta to step aside. Nigeria as well as other regional leaders opposed the second coup because it set a precedent in West Africa for behavior which Nigeria believed should no longer be accepted. Nigerian delegates were also unable to secure the release of President Abdallahi, who was held for five months after the coup. Moreover, Nigeria did not dominate the process of the AU
intervention when it did not hold the AU Chair. Given that there was no sub-regional IO to constrain Nigeria or any other dominant regional state from taking the lead and commandeering the process, the realist assumption of a dominant regional state did not hold true in the case of Mauritania, even though the conditions were ideal.

Mauritania received a substantial amount of aid from Western states. It received more military aid from the United States than most countries in West Africa, as a result of its joint anti-terror military program. Ever since the Taya era, the country has moved very close to the West. According to realist assumptions, given the amount of aid Mauritania was receiving from Western donors and the close relationship the country had with many Western countries, large donor countries should have easily filled the void of a sub-regional IO to achieve their desired outcome in the case of Mauritania. After the 2005 coup, it was evident that the United States wanted Taya, their closest ally in the region, to return to power. US officials, both in Mauritania and across the region, went as far as telephoning Taya when he was overthrown and requesting to be involved in the AU regional meeting. After the AU made the decision to work with the junta, the United States changed its stance and adopted the position of the regional block. The AU remained at the center of the intervention process and made key decisions that were eventually accepted by all, despite the presence of large western donors.

In the lead-up to the second coup in 2008, without ECOWAS there was no consistent international institutional presence to mediate disputes and bind the stakeholders to preserve constitutional order. International donors did not fill this void. The United States continued to equip, arm, and train the Mauritanian army in the lead-up to the second coup, but was unable to prevent the same army from seizing power
unconstitutionally. The United States as a major donor to the Mauritanian security apparatus yet had less impact than the ECOWAS mechanisms in coordinating regional armies and steering them away from politics or binding governments through sustained monitoring and mediation. Furthermore, after the coup the United States and other donors were unable to convince the Mauritanian junta to reverse its actions, or even to release President Abdallahi. The United States, the EU, the World Bank, and other donors cut their aid to Mauritania immediately following the coup, demanding the release of the president and later the prime minister, as well as a return to constitutional order. Yet for over five months the junta refused to release President Abdallahi. In addition, the junta refused to restore constitutional order and instead moved to hold new elections, in which one of its own would run.

There were no substantive shifts of the military’s actions in the direction of Western donors, despite the loss of aid from donor states. From the beginning, major international investors in Mauritanian oil, gold, and iron ignored the coup. The spokesperson for Tullow Oil, which has interest in eight offshore blocks, said the coup “has had no effect on operations whatsoever” (Magnowski 2008). After the second coup the government that emerged in Mauritania began unraveling Mauritania’s pro-Western ties, cutting relations with Israel and strengthening ties with states that have been shunned by Western donors including Libya, Iran, and Sudan. Military leaders reversed pro-Western policies despite the strong presence of Western donors, both before the coup and during the intervention.

Donor countries did not usurp the centrality of the AU as the de facto primary regional IO in the absence of ECOWAS. The AU set up and coordinated an international
contact group in which it retained the roles of primary mediator and director. Key decisions to work with the junta and organize new elections were made by the AU leadership. Donors continued to coordinate with the AU as the primary director of the intervention process. At no time was the intervention in Mauritania run by any donor country or group of Western donors. Even without a sub-regional IO, and in spite of the substantial Western donor aid that had been flowing into Mauritania, regional organizational theory was still followed in the case of Mauritania. The AU remained the principal leader of international intervention, albeit with substantially less impact in the absence of a sub-regional partner.

**Conclusion**

The Mauritanian case provided an opportunity to test regional IO theory under circumstances in which there was no prominent sub-regional IO. In the first intervention, the AU assumed the role of the primary regional IO, making the key decisions in handling the situation. Other international observers took their cues from the AU and shifted their policies along with the regional block. Neither powerful regional states nor major international donors dominated the process above the AU, and neither assumed the role of the sub-regional IO. In the absence of the integrated sub-regional IO, that the AU relies on to spearhead intervention, there was far less binding of the stakeholders in Mauritania and no permanent regional presence integrated into the country. As a result, the AU faced difficulties monitoring the compliance of the junta. Without the sub-regional IO there were also fewer safeguards and no external arbiters to mediate disputes. The absence of safeguards led to stakeholders taking measures to protect their interests and prevent opponents from gaining absolute advantages. The military engaged in
backdoor maneuvers in the first transition to ensure that no adverse parties came to power. After the transition, disputes between the parliament, the president, and the military were never addressed or mediated by the AU or any other international partners. Without a sustained monitoring mechanisms in place it is not clear if they were even aware of them. The AU established no permanent consultative framework to monitor and mediate disputes, as was seen in the cases of both São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo. With no permanent consultative presence, internal disputes in Mauritania were never resolved or mediated among stakeholders.

Despite AU intervention, aid cuts from international donors, and rejection from powerful regional states, the junta did not immediately respond to pressure after the second coup. It took over five months merely to secure the release of President Abdallahi, and even then his movements were restricted. The junta even thanked the international community for its “positive attitude” towards their actions. It was clear that in the absence of an integrated sub-regional IO, there was far less pressure on the targets. Despite this, the AU still remained central in the process, leading the intervention by an international contact group it had established that included donors and other IOs. Mauritania’s loss of Western aid after the second coup was far greater than the loss of aid for Togo, including a quarter of a billion dollars in aid from the EU and almost that amount from the World Bank. The involvement of large international donors in the Mauritanian intervention was also substantially greater than in the other two cases. The United States had been equipping and training the military even before the first coup. Still, in the absence of the sub-regional IO, the pressure felt by the targets—according to their actions and their own statements—was less profound. If realist assumptions are
correct, holding that powerful states and in particular donor states are the main dominant forces in the international system, then these forces should have had a greater impact in Mauritania. Yet in the absence of a sub-regional IO, the impact of international intervention from the AU, dominant regional states, and international donor states yielded very few and very slow results.
Wielders of Power in the Emerging International Order

International organizations have drastically increased in number since the end of the Second World War. At the same time IOs have also become more sophisticated and advanced. Today, international organizations are more prevalent in the daily relations among states than they were after the Second World War. Despite this, little has been done in the study of international relations to evaluate the power of these structures independent of and in relation to other actors in the global system. The purpose of this study is to assess the impact and power of international organizations in the current international system and to suggest the role they may play in the future. By identifying cases in which international organizations are least likely to have an impact, I attempt to indicate the impact of the effect of regional organizations on international affairs. The
findings are pertinent to the study of international relations as well as to diplomacy and international affairs.

**Argument**

In the first chapter, I cite bureaucratic organizational theory to demonstrate the limits in power of even the most advanced and developed states in the international system. They do not fully control even the most essential bureaucratic organizations established independently, under their sole authority. The assumption that these same states could fully control intergovernmental organizations—which are in essence supranational bureaucratic organizations established jointly and under the collective authority of several sovereign states—is a gross oversimplification, given that there are far more limitations to individual state control at the international level than there are at the domestic level. Similar to other bureaucratic organizations, intergovernmental organizations have standard operating procedures generated by the agreements that established them, as well as the rules and procedures developed collectively by member states. The actions of the intergovernmental organization are determined by the procedures established to address set circumstances. No state or individual can immediately alter procedures once they have been created.

Intergovernmental organizations also create a system of priorities and agendas that reflect the specific purposes of their creation, such as economic integration and development. The main priority of IOs is to execute their agenda in the international system. In order to do so, they must protect their budgets and overall standing in the system. They must respond to defend the organizational agenda when overlap occurs in the international system. Overlap may occur with other IOs whose member states hold
concurrent memberships. It may also arise from competition with other bureaucratic organizations within member states, which are defending their own agendas and importance. Other IOs or domestic bureaucratic organizations will be reluctant to give up their status to any other intergovernmental organization. The potential for IOs to engage in turf wars is just as great as it is among domestic bureaucratic organizations, if not greater. Turf wars occurred with ECOWAS when regional leaders refused to welcome France to their post Togolese election summit in Abuja and instead invited President Bongo of Gabon. The also protected its turf when the US representative was turned away from meetings on Mauritania. Coordination between ECOWAS and Nigeria after the Togolese election led to both preparing separate plans for the post election summit. While the Nigerian President chaired the summit with his plan, the post-summit leg work to consolidate an agreement between the parties was largely spearheaded by the ECOWAS team on the ground. As a result of overlaps and potential turf wars, the behavior of the IO could potentially fail to reflect the wishes and desires of decision-makers (member states), especially since cooperation with national bureaucracies is one of the key functions assigned to IOs. As in any complex bureaucracy, individual actors or groups do not fully control the organization. In order to understand them, one must take into account the forces of bureaucratic organization theory. The execution of the agendas and priorities of IOs should be viewed as an organizational output inherently understanding the limitations of member states (decision-makers) to control the outcome.

Regional organizations are IOs particularly designed to integrate member states in a cooperative framework. The principal objective of cooperation is to reduce the cost of governing any individual state and increase the efficiency of all members. Effective
integration should have mutual benefits for all involved, at minimal costs. The more areas of cooperation the regional IO takes on, the greater the degree of integration its member states could potentially achieve. Since each measure is designed to reduce costs and increase efficiency, over time integrated member states become more reliant on the benefits received from being part of the regional body. Integration leads member states to set budgets, organize personnel, create corresponding standard operating procedures, allow more decision-making on domestic affairs to occur outside their borders, and reorient foreign policy to reflect their membership in the regional body. In the case of ECOWAS and the AU, regional IO’s offered political support in the global arena for smaller countries with few bilateral ties giving each country a greater global presence. Holding the rotating chairmanship of regional IO’s also offers political support for regional leaders at home. AU pillar sub-regional IO’s like ECOWAS created larger common markets with trading benefits and regional banks to provide capital to member states. ECOWAS also provides joint training and aid to military and police to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of maintaining order throughout the region. ECOWAS removed travel restrictions and opened boarders for nationals of member states to travel throughout the region without visas, further entrenching integration at the micro-level.

The rapid increase and development of IOs, especially regional intergovernmental organizations, since the end of the Second World War is similar to the rapid development of technology during the same time period. Internet, mobile phones, email, social networking pages, credit and check cards, ATMs, satellite services, digital media, and a host of other technological devices were introduced, which people use on a daily basis now but which were not available to the same people a few decades ago. Just like
regional IOs these devices, for better or worse, were designed to reduce certain burdens on daily life and to increase efficiency. As people started to use them, these technologies were integrated into the daily functions of modern human society. As a result, human beings today are heavily reliant on them for basic needs and rudimentary tasks. Even though an individual may make the choice to own a mobile phone, or create a social networking page or register an email address, once he or she has begun to use these instruments on a regular basis it becomes quite cumbersome to give them up at a moment’s notice. Because of their initial choice, people live under the illusion that they have total control over their technological instruments, but through closer evaluation one can see how the power relationship between an individual and his or her technology is more or less a reciprocal one.

In the same manner, states have created IOs, and supranational regional IOs in particular, by their own choosing. Membership to the organization is in large part “voluntary.” For the sake of expediency, states have oriented much of their basic affairs around the efficiency-maximizing organizations they have created. While the decision-making process of creating, changing, and sustaining these organizations creates the impression that states maintain ultimate control, in reality the relationship between states and IOs (especially supranational regional organizations) is one in which, at best, power is jointly shared. Once integration has occurred it is difficult for states to give up functioning regional organizations at a moments notice. According to neoliberal institutionalism, IOs promote cooperation in the international system, which impacts relations between states reducing conflict and increasing cooperation and can impact the domestic affairs of states member to the IO. Beyond this, cooperation and integration
creates interdependency among states within a regional IO. Neorealism recognizes that interdependency is a power that can change the nature of the international system and thus the relationship between states and domestic affairs within states. Beyond this, this study argues that the power of interdependency, especially within a region, can be wielded effectively by the regional organization that serves as the primary vehicle for integration. Power wielded by regional IOs within their region, in some circumstances, can be greater than the power of dominant states in the region and the power of dominant states in the international system outside the region.

For nation states that are members of highly integrated supranational regional organizations, it is most likely that when a situation occurs in a member state that results in international intervention, the regional supranational organization takes the lead in the process. All other international actors typically participate in coordination with the supranational regional organization. International actors that do not coordinate with the supranational regional organization are not likely to be welcomed by the organization, as they threaten the prestige of the body and could encroach on its turf. Supranational regional organizations naturally undercut unwanted competition from those who do not support the organization’s agenda. This happened when the U.S. was not welcomed to AU emergency meetings on Mauritania and France was not welcomed at the Togo post election summit. This also occurred with ECCAS as they held meetings amongst themselves and mearly vaigly informed other stakeholders, while at the same time insisting upon closely coordinating the activities of the contact group of non-member states. All this is consistent with the organizational nature of regional IO’s.
In the case of IO’s in Africa, the states that hold the chairmanship of the supranational regional IOs, followed by other organizational leaders including secretaries-general or presidents of regional organizations and their designated appointees, take the lead in coordinating the process of international mediation and intervention on behalf the IO. The leadership structure of regional IO’s may vary between regions but the principle of supranational regional IOs leading international intervention is likely to remain constant anywhere such organizations exist. They schedule emergency meetings and regional summits, as well as negotiations and consultations with the targets in the member state. The supranational regional organization also coordinates with other like-minded stakeholders, and controls access to the summits and meetings therein. Regional IOs also most likely to be in better position to directly engage the targets than other international stakeholders as a result of their consistent integration with member states. In many cases, especially with supranational regional organizations, regional mediators may know the targets in member states personally. International actors that are less integrated with the region coordinate with the regional IO, which is managing affairs on the ground. Where a supranational regional organization is present, other actors outside the organization are not likely to coordinate international intervention or host intervention meetings or consultations. Only in the absence of an integrated supranational regional organization, will international stakeholders that have differing views be likely to have direct access to engage the targets and possibly influence the process.

Targets within member states of integrated supranational regional organizations are most likely to respond to the overtures of the regional organization and address their demands and concerns—more so than they do to any other international stakeholder.
Supranational regional organizations are integrated to the extent that the immediate affairs of the target member state in the organization are (or could be) adversely affected during intervention. Supranational regional organizations often allow freedom of movement for nationals across borders and other regular daily benefits and transactions from being member to the body. To remedy the situation, decision-makers in target states must respond to the regional IO. The targets may immediately address the concerns of other parties outside supranational regional body only if they are proposed through the IO. Otherwise the concerns of parties outside of the organization have a minor impact on their immediate affairs, and thus have a minor role in the short-term calculus of the targets.

For states that are members to integrated supranational regional organizations the cost-raising strategies (sticks) that have an immediate impact, able to alter the immediate behaviour of states, are most likely to be exclusively the domain of the regional organizations. Cost-raising strategies, whether threatened or executed, will include condemnation both publicly and behind closed doors, suspension of membership from the regional body, political isolation, trade sanctions, travel bans on key targets, and other cost-raising mechanisms including coercive intervention. Donors, international financial institutions, and aid organizations are not likely to make an immediate impact on the immediate affairs of target states, even if they threaten the withdrawal of aid as a cost-raising mechanism. The immediate contributions of donors will, at most, signal support for the supranational regional organization’s intervention efforts. Supranational regional organizations also provide and arrange for incentives (carrots) for the targets in order to further encourage their cooperation and compliance with the organization. External
donors may also be included in the process of providing aid incentives in support of regional organizations.

Supranational regional organizations also place constraints on the targets in member states that are considered “winners” to ensure that there are safeguards protecting the targets that are considered “losers,” preventing opponents from establishing permanent advantages over one another. Regional organizations engage all stakeholders and signal the region’s expectations of cooperation, binding the players through monitored agreements, regional standards, protocols, declarations, and other settlements reached at emergency summits. Constraints on winners create an added incentive for cooperation on all sides, and bolster the credibility of the supranational organization as a trustworthy mediator. In the absence of a supranational regional organization, there are fewer safeguards and constraints on targets. As a result there is a great deal of distrust among stakeholders, which slows the process of intervention and creates fragility afterwards.

I look at the possibility of alternate theories to explain international intervention. Realist-based alternative theories suggest that IOs are not important independent of powerful states in the international system. The realist hypothesis assumes that powerful states within regional blocks dominate the institutions that a region creates. According to this hypothesis, a very dominant state within a region sets up these organizations itself to use as an instrument of its own foreign policy. It establishes rules and procedures that reflect its national interests. In addition, it would assume the lead role in intervention while other states yield to it. Other realist hypotheses assert that large powerful states in the global system dominate international intervention, even outside their region. They do
this through a combination of conditional threats and incentives to either cut or provide aid to targeted states. The economic dependence of particularly the poorest developing states ensures their immediate compliance with the desires of large powerful donor states, or with a small group of such states, in the international system.

Test Results

In testing my argument, I employ both statistical quantitative experiments and case study analysis. In the first chapter, I show that while other studies argue that regional IOs in Africa are unlikely to have an impact in regional intervention to consolidate constitutional order, because of a lack of these organizations and because existing regional IOs have a low democratic membership, in reality the empirical evidence in Africa suggests the opposite. The field of international relations often claims that many advanced theories in international relations do not apply to Africa due to its weak states and economic and political constraints. Some of the core alternative realist theories are also most relevant in Africa due to economic conditions. Within the African subcontinent, West Africa has been the most politically unstable region; the majority of all the coups in Africa in the 80s and 90s took place in West Africa. I chose to conduct tests in West Africa, the least likely place on the planet (according to assumptions in mainstream international relations) to observe empirical evidence of functioning regional IOs leading interventions, to promote and preserve constitutional order.

First, the statistical tests I conducted on West Africa in chapter one reflected a significant reduction in the number of West African leaders removed or killed in coups or attempted coups in the last ten years, as compared to the previous decades going back to the 1960s. From 2000 to 2010, only three West African leaders have been removed in
coup: in Guinea-Bissau in 2001, and in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in 2005 and 2008. To further study the region and determine if regional IOs had the capacity to reverse coups from 2000-2010 and thus likely be what was preventing them from happening in the first place, I select three cases in which there was a break in constitutional order. In chapter two, I test the case of São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003. In chapter three, I chronicle Togo in 2005. For chapter four, I analyze Mauritania in 2005 and 2008. The regional IOs I follow are ECCAS and ECOWAS for chapters one and two and the AU for all three cases.

The case of São Tomé and Príncipe tested the intervention administered by ECCAS. I concluded that the sub-regional IO was central in the process. The international participants and targets yielded to ECCAS’ rotating president, also president of the Republic of Congo, as the leader of the intervention process. The regional powers and large donor countries involved did not dominate the process. In addition, the AU supported the sub-regional effort. ECCAS was the primary intervening actor in mediating and in arranging incentives. It remained involved throughout the process especially in the long-term, binding the targets after its intervention. Other powerful donors in the Contact Group were coordinated directly by ECCAS to provide incentives and assist with its mission. Donors competed with each other for the protection of their own interests, and thus could not use aid to impact ECCAS’s control over the intervention.

In chapter three, regional intervention in the Republic of Togo is another case that demonstrates the centrality of regional IOs in enacting changes in member states. I conclude that the process was initiated and led by ECOWAS and the AU. The targets and international observers recognized ECOWAS first and AU second in the process of
raising costs, providing incentives, and binding. I found that strong regional binding was particularly important in Togo, because conflicts among targets continued. President Gnassingbé’s younger brother and former defense minister allegedly planned to overthrow him when he was out of the country in 2009. ECOWAS also constantly monitored agreements through its representatives and envoys who had taken up residence in the country. Testing the influence of powerful regional states, Nigeria played a large role as AU Chair, as did as Niger, the ECOWAS Chair. Both countries were active; still, for most of the intervention, results reveal that the ECOWAS chair led while the AU Chair supported. Evaluating the influence of donors for over a decade leading up to the Togo intervention, the evidence uncovers repeated failures by donors to induce any major changes in policy. These results reinforce the argument that regional IOs have a greater capacity to influence targets than do donors.

The fourth chapter on Mauritania is the sole case without a functioning sub-regional IO, which presented the best opportunity for powerful regional states and international donors to dominate the process. I found that the AU, as the primary regional IO, remained central in the process, more so than powerful regional states and international donors. Despite the continued dominance of the regional IO, I found less binding and monitoring, fewer safeguards, and no permanent monitoring or mediation of disputes as was seen in both São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo. I concluded that these differences led to the second coup. International intervention in the second coup, which involved the AU, donors, and regional powers, had less impact on targets than in the first two cases. Initially, international donors were closely involved in raising costs by immediately cutting aid. The AU took charge in the intervention process, leading the
international contact group of donors and other IOs. Testing the impact of donor aid cuts intended to raise costs, it was clear that these attempts to influence the negotiation process did little to pressure targets—despite the greater loss of aid for Mauritania as compared to Togo or São Tomé and Príncipe, and despite the country’s close partnership with the West, including the United States. The intervention was slower and produced mixed results. Even though it boasted more donors and a greater avenue for regional powers to assert their influence, intervention in Mauritania was not effective without a highly integrated sub-regional IO.

Implications

Understanding the impact and power of regional IOs in the current international system has both academic and practical implications. These findings strike at the heart of the dominant theoretical approach in international relations, raising serious questions about realism’s neorealism’s usefulness in explaining global affairs at present, and even more so in the future. Global policy-makers within states and international organizations can learn lessons from this empirical study to gain insight into the process and the mechanisms behind successful interventions. Civil society, citizen groups, and domestic activists may also make use of this study in demonstrating to their constituents and supporters the need to develop a greater understanding and acknowledgement of the increased power of regional IOs. Recognizing the true role of regional IOs in the international system is vital in order to encourage civil society to directly engage regional IOs and to do more to promote their responsiveness to the regions—and ultimately people—that they are to serve.
International Relations Theory

Neoliberal institutionalism in international relations advances the argument that intergovernmental institutions create a framework to promote greater cooperation among states in the global system and reduce the potential for conflict. Cooperation can also, and likely does, impact both the international and domestic affairs of states involved. What the institutionalist literature does not demonstrate is that the cooperation-maximizing institutions created by states in the international system wield power rivaling other dominant actors in the system. First, the power relationship between states and their regional international institutions, once integration occurs, is mutually reinforcing where both exert power on each other. Second, the power of the regional institution on member states can be substantially more than power exerted by states outside the regional block. The rise of highly integrated regional organizations throughout the world, even in Africa, suggests that nation-states are no longer (or certainly will no longer be) the dominant actors in the international system, but rather exist in tandem with the supranational institutions they created.

Realist-based assumptions about the international system are far too simplistic in their understanding of international institutions. Institutions cannot simply be reduced to the powerful states that create them. There are too many constraints on individual states and their decision-makers to assume they could control a supranational bureaucracy when that same state and its decision-makers do not fully control their own bureaucratic institutions. Beyond neoliberal institutionalism, international institutions are more than a mere tool to reduce conflict and increase cooperation while producing benefits. They create substantial changes in the standard operating procedures of member states that are
adopting a new framework to coordinate and cooperate with other states. This integration and interdependency of member states within regional IOs cause member states to grow more accustomed to and reliant upon the institutional collective benefits over time as they do not develop the capacity to unilaterally deal with many economic, political, and security matters of state. According to established neoliberal understanding of the international system interdependency has the power to change the nature of the international system, reducing the likelihood of conflict and promote cooperation. Neoliberal theory should also include that the power of interdependency especially within a region, can be held and wielded by supranational regional organization that often serve as the primary vehicle for integration. Regional interdependency (vis-à-vis an integrated regional organization) affects the immediate and even daily affairs of member states when regional IOs create institutions such as common markets and integrated financial systems. Contrary to realist assumptions, large or powerful states in the international system outside of integrated supranational regional IOs seeking to intervene in a member state are unlikely to supersede this power unless they are equally integrated with the member state upon which they wish to exert power. In modern global affairs, the ability of global powers to project influence on states outside their region that are integrated into supranational regional organizations is most likely to be significantly less than the power of the integrated regional institutions to which the state belongs.

The findings of this study broaden the concept of neoliberal institutionalism to include the prospect of shared power between states and institutions and the limitations of states to unilaterally control them. It suggests that international institutions have a greater role and a greater impact on the international system, which ought to be included as part
of institutional debate. This study also advocates a de-emphasis of neorealism and the realist assumptions that states are the dominant actors in the international system. These findings question the usefulness of realism as the dominant theoretical approach in explaining power relationships in modern global affairs, especially given the fact that global institutions have become more numerous and more integrated than at any other time, particularly at the regional level.

**Global Policy**

One of the key questions this study seeks to answer is: what are the ways regional IOs impact member states? In all three cases, this study traced three basic tools that IOs use: (1) raising costs of unsupported policies, (2) providing incentives for supported policies, and (3) constraining policy-makers to adhere to supported policies. The policy tested in this study was constitutional order; however, supported policies could address a range of issues. Highly integrated regional IOs are not constrained in the policies they can promote, and therefore the mechanisms found in this work are not only applicable to the promotion of constitutional order. Effective promotion requires a sufficient increase in cost versus incentives, as well as closely monitored constraints.

All three cases applied a sufficient quantity of costs and incentives in order to promote a supported policy. The substantial difference in the third case was the level of constraints. In the third case, the regional IO did not have a representative resident on the ground at all times. Furthermore, it did not instate any instruments to monitor or mediate continued disputes to ensure that all would support the policies promoted. According to this lesson, regional IOs are likely to have a greater and more sustained impact if they put greater constraints in place to monitor and promote supported policies in the long run. In
chapters two and three, the sub-regional IO became involved in the composition of cabinets. In chapter four, the continental regional IO remained uninvolved in the composition of both the transitional and post-intervention cabinet. Unlike the cases of chapters two and three, there was no regional mediator to resolve the acute political disputes post-intervention. The larger, less integrated regional IO in chapter four (the AU) did not follow through after intervention, and may not have developed the capacity to constrain policy-makers without a functioning sub-regional IO according to its structure.

Global policy-makers within member states of regional IOs should understand the power exerted by a regional block over them once their state has been integrated. The relationship can produce desirable results such as stability, development, efficiency in governing, and greater international clout for all member states. A collective partnership with regional IOs can resolve many domestic problems. Decision-makers in member states that face severe difficulties in governing, as found in chapter four, may want to reach out to regional IOs for support and assistance, rather than relying fully on domestic instruments. The relationship between member states and regional IOs also results in a loss of power for decision-makers in member states, giving them a decreased ability to formulate or change some national policies. Regional agreements exert a power that constrains the ability of decision-makers in individual states to make changes on agreed regional policies. Decision-makers in the member states of regional IOs need to carefully scrutinize cooperative policy agreements, in view of the power that they potentially hold.

Civil society and domestic activists in member states of regional IOs should also take note of the power of regional IOs over state-level decision-makers. The policy agreements of regional IOs serve as another entity (like a constituency) with the capacity
to influence state-level affairs. Just as decision-makers must carefully scrutinize cooperative policy agreements, civil society and domestic activists must monitor regional IOs and the agreements their states enter into with regional blocks, all the more. Domestic stakeholders must also ensure total transparency and obtain greater access to the decision-making process at the regional level. The tendency for regional decision-making to occur behind closed doors by small cliques of largely unknown and unaccountable officials presents a very dangerous threat to domestic liberty and freedom. Foreign affairs departments at the national level that are usually responsible for engaging regional IOs are by nature secretive, possessing large quantities of classified information. These conditions increase the dangers of having a powerful external constituency that is hidden from and unresponsive to the people it affects. The greatest danger of the emerging international order, a network of international and supranational regional intergovernmental organizations, signifies the potential loss of the people’s power to effect change and control the affairs of their own society. As the power of international institutions increases daily, and as integration becomes more entrenched, domestic civil society and domestic stakeholders need to retool in order to serve as a check on decision-making, demanding greater access to and transparency in international institutions.

**Avenues for Further Research**

As a key part of civil society, scholars of international relations should conduct more research on the international institutions to which their state belongs, rather than abiding by the increasingly inadequate principles of realism and neorealism that suggest ignoring IOs. More focus on international institutions, particularly by scholars that are nationals of member states in these institutions, can increase transparency and reduce the
likelihood that the institutions will become unresponsive to their people. Further research can develop a better understanding of the relationship between the many international institutions in the global system. International institutions have relations with member states and states outside the region, but they also have relationships with other international organizations. Very little research has been conducted on organization-to-organization relations in the international system especially in view of the power they wield.

**Conclusion**

The focus of this study answers the key questions: do international organizations have power in the international system? Do they matter when considered independently of the powerful states within them? The findings in this study empirically demonstrate that they do.

The cases in this study were selected deliberately because they were the most likely to fail. Yet given that these cases reflect the power of international organizations in the global system, power is likely being wielded by many of the over 300 other such organizations in the world—almost twice the number of nation-states on the planet. International relations should embrace not only the usefulness and power of international institutions in changing the international system, but also the potential power they hold, which rivals and could potentially eclipse the power of the individual nation state. The emerging international order of supranational regional organizations has already, perhaps permanently, altered global affairs. The task of scholarship in international relations is to first recognize the reality of the new global system, in order to then develop a clearer understanding of the benefits and potential dangers it presents.
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