FOR THE PH.D DEGREE

THE UNHOLY PARADOX:
UNDERSTANDING THE FATALITY OF GOD
IN DEMOCRATIC CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Unholy Paradox:
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This dissertation explores culture, particularly that of religion, arguing that religion transitioned its role as an historical authority structure to its current status as a marketplace for the production, distribution, consumption and investment of “god products”, which it is explained come from the pressures applied from late stage capitalism. I define god products as any direct or peripheral value acquired by spending time or money in a particular religious marketplace.

The research demonstrates that, despite the appearance of fervent religiosity in two societies used as examples: the United States and Turkey, religions currently fail to meet their stated purpose as authoritative organizations that put forth a specific ethical and supernatural belief system, accompanied by specific rituals and practices agreed upon by the persons who take part in such organization.

Due to the self-regulating nature of religiosity in the United States and Turkey, the supply and demand for god products strives to become a perfectly competitive market. Consequently, because of such self-regulation and low barrier to entry, suppliers continue to enter the marketplace until all consumers are serviced and the value of god becomes closer to zero. It is argued that consumers of, and investors in, god products are
increasingly putting pressure on producers to invent new and low cost ways to produce and deliver these products.

Because of this, religion has been transformed into a series of activities which center on the consumption and investment of personally constructed god products. Similar to other industries, this research suggests that democratic capitalist societies can modify macro and micro-economic policies, both in the broader economy and in the local religious goods economy to deliver more efficiently the societal benefits that these goods provide.

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Preface

An Unhappy Salutation for Necrosis

King Solomon, arguably one of the wealthiest and wisest of kings, well trained in many subjects, ranging from architecture and engineering to art and theology, never let something that he wanted evade his authority. According to the Bible, Solomon wrote,

And so whatever mine eyes desired I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy; for my heart rejoiced in all my labour; and this was my portion of all my labour. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do: and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun (Ecclesiastes 2:10).

In the book of Ecclesiastes, which Solomon wrote in the 10th century B.C., he documents certain aspects of his life’s journey, where he sought wisdom and knowledge, of both worldly and otherworldly things. During his life’s journey, Solomon built great palaces and homes, planted trees of all kinds and made great pools to water them. He had vast livestock, enjoyed the pleasures of servants and maidens, lavished in great treasures of silver and gold and enjoyed the presence of great musicians—all with the intent of holding nothing from his eye’s desire and his personal pursuit of happiness. However, after a period of enjoying such abundance, King Solomon announced that all his successes and pursuits were useless and borne of vanity that no matter what his next venture or success could be, nothing new and satisfying would come of it. He explains that God provides all riches and wealth necessary to sustain a person’s happiness. Nevertheless, Solomon also recognized the existence of hidden personal ambition that pushed people beyond contentment for these Godly riches, pushed people toward the acquisition of more. Solomon explains,

There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is common among men: A man to whom God hath given riches, wealth, and honour, so that he wanted
nothing for his soul of all he desireth, yet God giveth him not power to eat thereof, but a stranger eateth it: this is vanity, and it is an evil disease (Ecclesiastes 6:1-2).

Solomon articulated many great lessons in Ecclesiastes, many of which are relevant for this dissertation and reflect my personally constructed and consumed ethical system, yet most of which I will exclude for purposes of staying in focus to the task at hand. First, Solomon explains that personal pursuits and the wanting for earthly riches, including wisdom and knowledge, are futile to the individual because they all pass away with life and bring grief for those who pursue them. In subsequent sections of Ecclesiastes, Solomon explains that happiness comes from the love of work and from enjoying community, not from the accumulation of things, which can be seen as the ability of one to take from another, leaving one with more and another with less. Second, he explains that God has given all of humanity riches and honor in the form of the lushness of the earth, a place for each individual in society to pursue virtue and enough bounty from land and sea to create a system of communal wealth. Third (and quite wisely), Solomon understands that although these benefits are available for all of humanity, there is another competing factor present: power, or his view that within humanity there is a compulsion to steal, exploit and take from some to further enhance the gain of others. This power is referred to by Solomon as vanity, which many interpret as living away from God, conceivably away from communal values, to be gripped by something else, something that Solomon refers to as ‘evil,’ something that is referred to within this dissertation as utilitarian individualism.

Contemplating Solomon’s writings, I ask myself, how can it be that someone in the 10th century B.C., approximately 3,000 years ago, can recognize the disease that
plagued the society of the time, yet many scholars of modern or current society (presumably much more empirically intelligent) cannot see the similar infestation? It appears that the disease has infected society’s entire body to the point that parts have deteriorated or are currently deteriorating into a form of necrosis? How is it that presumably great minds such as Adam Smith, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and a plethora of others have not recognized that the actions of utility constructed individualism are disastrous for society? Moreover, how is it that these same thinkers take the position that utilitarianism or forms of it are needed to propel humanity to greater achievement? This dissertation at the most deepest level addresses these evolutionary changes that have been occurring since the first human and arguably will continue to happen until the death of the last.

Despite my own desires and efforts to write this dissertation it would not have been possible without substantial support from those whom I love, those who gave both time and talents rather liberally, without ever asking for something in return. To you all I am indebted greatly! First, I thank my wife, Michele Young, for her constant support and patience over the last five years. Second, I thank my three children, Taylor, Thomas and Christopher for their patience when I was not available to play, go to the park or just chat. Third, I thank my parents, Christopher and MaryAnn Young for their sacrifices they made for me throughout my life, coupled with their never-ending support. Fourth, I thank Professor Richard Langhorne and the entire staff at Rutgers University for providing a place for fervent discourse and a program of the utmost quality. Last but not least, I thank Dr. Geoffrey Allen Pigman, of Bennington College, who over our seven-year relationship
has been nothing less than an absolute friend, a treasured advisor and a person who was always available when questions arose – of which there were many.
Section I

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Hume argued,

It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, all in nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind….Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in that particular (Pojman 181).

The Story of Narcissus and Echo 1.0

From pre-history to the early periods of recorded history, Greeks and Romans told of legends, some for entertainment, some for ethical learning and some for the preservation of history. One of these legends told by Roman poet Ovid is about a love tragedy between Echo, a wood nymph and a beautiful 16 year old boy named Narcissus. Legend has it that one day, Echo was wandering about the forest and she stumbled upon Narcissus who was hunting a deer. Echo quickly identified the physical beauty bestowed upon Narcissus and at a single glance fell deeply in love with him. Although Echo wanted desperately to speak with Narcissus she could not because she was under a spell that would only allow her the ability to repeat the last words of whoever was speaking. As time went on and her love grew stronger for Narcissus, she became bolder in her attempts to let Narcissus know of her watching and her desire for him. So one day while Narcissus was away from his mates, deep into the forest, yet feeling that someone was watching, he called out, “Is anyone here”? Echo replied, “Here”. Astonished at this voice, he called Echo to “Come” and she replied back, “Come”. This went on until eventually Echo came out, all with the hopes that Narcissus would fall in love with her. Despite
Echo’s hopes, Narcissus ran far away from her, not wanting her to touch him and ridiculing Echo strongly as he went. Ashamed and disgraced, Echo went into hiding, holding to her love for Narcissus for the remainder of her life. But just before her death, Echo called out to Nemesis, asking that perhaps as a lesson, Narcissus would fall in love with himself, so that he will not obtain the love he really wants. To grant Echo’s wish, Nemesis set the scene so that Narcissus was sitting alone next to a pool of crystal waters, flat and mirror like in reflection. While sitting there, Narcissus gazed upon the mirror water. Upon sight, Narcissus fell in love with the image, to the point that he became fixated upon its own beauty. As time went on, he only became more in love with his own image to the point that he would not leave the mirrored pool and would not eat or sleep.

He cried out,

Has anyone ever had a crueler love than mine? What I behold enthralls me, but the enchanting sight escapes my reach. Yet only a sheer covering of water separates us. You would think we could touch each other when so little stands between. Whoever you are, rise up and come here to me. Why, splendid youth, do you slip away from me? Where do you disappear to when I reach out” (Hendricks 94)?

With a broken heart and longing to meet himself, Narcissus died at the pool. Narcissus died a lonely person, in love with himself, not aware that the reflection he saw was his own, not aware that he was in search of something he could never have. The moral of the story, at least this writer’s interpretation, is that Narcissus was not attuned to those things that would sustain his life and was only aware of himself and his personal needs. Because of this poor perspective on life, because of deceit and vanity, Narcissus did not embrace community, he did not embrace people of lesser means (in this case beauty), he was brutally harsh to those less comparable and because of this he died, miserable, alone and heartbroken. Obviously Narcissus was acting upon his own perspective and utility system
and was failing to recognize the needs of others. In this fable, Narcissus could not buy his happiness, but only laid there in vanity, almost as though paralyzed in futility, what he wanted and needed was beyond his grasp. Perhaps if only Narcissus knew in advance this outcome, he would have changed his course of action and his views on utility maximization. Although a fable, this story holds significance when understanding the actions of some in contemporary society. As this dissertation will explore, perhaps citizens in democratic capitalist societies are becoming Narcissuses.

**Proposal 1.1**

Historically, evidence suggests that the human decision-making process is often two-pronged in its intent. From one perspective, humans choose and act upon those things which are socially beneficial. Conversely, there are also actions based solely on personal interest that are perhaps contrary to societal benefit, such as the actions of Narcissus.

Many would agree that authority structures, such as monotheistic religious structures, throughout history have been chartered, powerful influences that counteract such self-interested acts when they are contrary to societal benefit. Despite the relevance or lack thereof for religion as a god created structure, it has historically played a substantial role in counteracting the forces of self-interest that are contrary to societal benefit.

Despite the obvious and historically significant watchdog role that religion has inherited, it appears that its doctrines have been altered to allow for the pursuit of self-interest over societal interest. It will be argued, that because of these alterations in doctrines and practices, the system of social relations has taken a back seat to self-interest motives in many democratic capitalistic societies.

As Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will demonstrate, the power that is bequeathed to the innate human phenomenon of self-interest is best exploited in democratic, capitalistic
societies. It is explained that this is due to the celebrated freedom that such societies allow individuals, while simultaneously offering the option to be liberated from all traditional power structures.

It is important to note that there appears to be a continuous devaluation of social relations in comparison with the increasing value of self-interest and economic relations. Although this revaluing has most likely been occurring incrementally since the beginning of history, it appears to have accelerated its pace since the dawn of the Enlightenment (circa 17th Century) and once again since the beginning of the age of Modernity (circa 18th Century). Espousing the philosophy of logic and rationality, the period of the Enlightenment, followed by the period of Modernity, created a set of rules upon which the elite of society agreed. It was this group of elites who put forth new governing structures, such as democracy and capitalism, mainly in an attempt to aggregate vast financial resources. By propagating self-interest, capitalism and liberal structures, the elites replaced traditional authority structures with less conspicuous, yet more harmful authority structures that are comprised of powerful, yet somewhat inconspicuous industrial organizations.

Looking at it from a purely economic perspective, Karl Polanyi argued that such liberal economic structures created a powerful and harmful tonic composed of fictitious assets made up of land, labor and capital in rather fluid forms that drove changes in the social and production systems and which assisted in creating vast amounts of wealth for the elite class. It was this mixture of fictitious assets that altered the modes of production forever. Rather than being sole beneficiary of their own production function, individual laborers were now put into groups who contributed to the production function together as
one. This type of production function where laborers each represent a particular aspect of the production function is broadly defined as the division of labor. Although the division of labor created higher incomes for individuals, it also created a mechanism by which to extract and transfer value, also known as profit or utility, from the laborer to the capitalist elite. In addition to altering modes of labor, society adopted rules by which to privatize land, thus creating another new and important transformation. Although perceived as autonomous assets, these transformations and adoptions of such fictitious assets put the sole provisions of society’s talents, traits and various modes of collective life squarely into the center of the economically embedded society and the self-regulating market.

This movement to a rapidly expanding utilitarian economic society based on the self-regulating free-market economy, herein referred to as capitalism, started an evolutionary construction process that is best described by what Schumpeter referred to as ‘Creative Destruction’- a process in which all modes of production must be continually changed, modified and improved to drive the economic system constantly towards growth and society toward utopia. All values need to be creatively destroyed and reinvented to meet the demands of market participants and to continue to win against rival competitors. Schumpeter’s argument also resonates with Polanyi’s idea of ‘embeddedness’ which expresses the idea that the economy is not an autonomous activity subordinated to liberal government structures but rather a structure that subordinates all of life to the self-regulating market ideal.

It is in this evolutionary process where capitalism shows its most unattractive attributes. Furthering Schumpeter’s and Polanyi’s thoughts, this research will demonstrate that under the governing structure of democratic capitalism, the entire
process of life, every belief, every action, every desire, every dream we conjure and everything we value, - is not necessarily from within our natural being but is rather a continuous construction process that pushes and pulls society by the ever-expanding and further embedding capitalist system. Under the discipline of such a system all values become assets or take on aspects of commercial products. This type of system or process resonates well with Hardt and Negri in their definition of ‘biopolitical production,’ defined as “the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest in one another” (Hardt, Negri xiii). Many of these thoughts are not necessarily new but have been forecast by many earlier economists, sociologists, theologians, artists and philosophers such as Nietzsche, Weber, Durkheim, Niebuhr, Lichtenstein, Marx, and others.

The vast changes induced by this process of Creative Destruction and ‘embeddedness’ or ‘biopolitical production’ raise a subject that has historically been very important to many people - the relationship between God and humanity, which is the focus of this dissertation. Because many would agree that monotheistic religious structures were foundationally chartered to counteract self-interested acts, this research will analyze this important relationship in the context of the democratic capitalist societies of the United States and Turkey. The United States and Turkey were chosen as case studies because they are similar in a few respects. Both countries maintain a high concentration of one religious faith, the United States being predominantly Christian and Turkey being predominantly Muslim. Each state employs some form of democracy and capitalism, with each trending toward further deregulation and further providing enhanced human rights and freedoms.
This research will review historical movements and changes in the general market and more particularly the religious market with the sole intent in bringing light to matters of the present. By utilizing critical analysis from various periods in time, this research will bring in many inter-subjective views to help support the overall answer. It is not necessarily the historical periods that matter in this dissertation but rather the trends and movements which can be identified and correlated to the phenomenon of the present.

By analyzing and understanding the purchasing decision of the consumer (congregants) and the production decision of producers (religions), we will be able to understand if god, the main focus of monotheistic religions, has been transformed into a product (perhaps an inferior product) of the capitalist system, which will lead to insight into whether religious markets can be regulated to maximize the benefits it provides to society. For purposes of this research god is defined as the primary object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions. Out of respect for both Christians and Muslims and perhaps from my own lack of sound understanding, I chose not to capitalize the word god or allah in almost all situations. The reason for such action is because with the evolution of religion, comes an evolution of god products. It becomes rather impossible to find the real god or allah within the market for such god products. However, when identified, or at least assumedly identified as the real god, it is referred to as the Alpha God, and can also be related to an Alpha Allah. The Alpha God maintains its ontological nature as defined biblically and in earlier stages of history. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 through Chapter 7.

Although this research will review the historical behaviors of religions as “god producers” (supply), the main focus will be on the actions of “god consumers” (demand).
The demand for god will be explored by segmenting consumers into classifications comprised of three market participants. Two of the three market participants will be analyzed to help understand how and why they do or do not purchase and/or invest in god. A valuation algorithm for god will be used to help explain the historical changing value for god and what impact this change in value may have on democratic capitalist societies.

**Category 1: God ‘Consumers’**

In this category, consumers purchase and discard god on a daily basis. These types of consumers are those who may not believe in god per se, but who get immediate utility from purchasing a god product. These utilities may include silent prayer and personal reflection at a church or attending traditional holiday celebrations. These consumers do not invest long-term in god and do not see benefits such as the afterlife or heaven but rather spend time or money to acquire the short run utility that this product provides in the short term.

**Category 2: God ‘Investors’**

This second category is made up of those who probably believe in god but perhaps ‘invest’ in a continuum of god, mainly because they see future benefit in doing so. These benefits may be immediate (like god consumers) but are also more concentrated on long-term benefits. The benefits accruing to these investors can be tangible, intangible or both. Tangible benefits can be tax benefits given to the investor for annual cash contributions, meeting friends and or expanding social networks, etc….
Intangible benefits may be eternal life, peace of mind, prosperity, wisdom, knowledge, etc... This participant category, albeit probably unknown to them, make an investment in a god product in a manner similar to the way they invest in capital goods. This research will explore a consumer’s investment in god to determine if such rationale and analysis are similar to that which takes place when one invests in capital goods – a process by which an investor analyzes the discounted future value of benefits that have yet to come.

**Category 3: Irrational Participants**

The third category, to the extent *humanly possible*, is a group of people who do not purchase or invest in god for the sole purpose of receiving utility from either short term or long term benefits. Unlike Category 1 and Category 2 where the participants purchase and/or invest in god to assist in maximizing utility, this group of participants may not maximize their utility system and perhaps may actually decrease the value in their utility system when they worship god. These participants were not driven to worship god due to rational arguments, but rather worship god because they have been guided by spiritual revelation. This participant group worships god because he is god and do not look upon rationality or economic gain as a system to make a decision – this group of consumers are confident in their irrationality.

This research will focus primarily on understanding the behaviors of Category 1 and Category 2 above.
The supply of god will be analyzed by referencing the work of ‘New Paradigm,’ a group of academics who argue that Americans, as a people, have become more religious since its founding since 1776 and established the self regulating religious market. Most New Paradigm research argues that the “supply” of religion increased substantially after the separation of church and state and the elimination of church funding in the early colonies. The reason for such an increase in supply was that the monopolistic market of large denominations lost state funding, thus eroding their powerful financial position and allowing new churches and sects to compete in this newly self-regulating market. Low barriers to entry, coupled with low cost production systems and new sales and marketing campaigns allowed new suppliers of religion to compete effectively against some of their formidable rivals.

New Paradigm research demonstrates that when churches and sects compete for members, new sects evolve which attract new participants; this continues to happen until the market for god clears. From this perspective, it appears that the market adopts a similar process to that of Creative Destruction, constantly mutating into new forms, yet continually becoming more embedded into the capitalist system. To the extent that there is profit to be made from such mutations, religious suppliers will continue to modify the traditional or predecessor god products by changing the production system to more effectively and efficiently deliver it. These innovations come about by moderating doctrine and liturgies with the hope of selling more god products. What this research will express is that this process of changing doctrines and liturgies is more a function of the capitalist system and the market structure for god products than a function of divine guidance or intervention.
New Paradigm research also highlights the changing role of religious leaders and their compensation in the self-regulating religious market. From a host of New Paradigm research, it may be concluded that religious leaders act in a utility-maximizing manner in response to the ways in which their compensation is determined. This research also demonstrates that leaders of new religious sects are paid based upon their performance and their ability to maintain and/or increase sales to congenial and entertained purchasing groups.

In contrast to New Paradigm research, a broader group of academics maintains that New Paradigm research is not completely accurate. Opposing arguments are many, however the overarching and historical opinion that clearly contradicts New Paradigm thought is that change in structure and funding of churches is a continuation of an earlier process of Secularization that would unceasingly modify the doctrine of the church as well as reduce the church’s political and cultural influence. Those who subscribe to this and other theories based on the idea that demand for religion has decreased over the years are broadly classified as Secularizationists. Unlike New Paradigm research, which focuses predominantly on change in religion supply, Secularizationists focus contrarily on the changes in “demand” for religion. Secularizationists argue that society’s preferences have changed over time and that people have moved away from god in pursuit of all things modern. New Paradigm research believes that religious participation is increasing in the United States and other self-regulating religious economies, signifying a move away from secular policies to more traditional religious based one’s. Secularizationists, not unreservedly disagreeing with these studies offer a different perspective on these changes. Secularizationists argue that despite the increase in
religious participation, there has been a paramount change in the influence of religion on modern society.

It is this (aforementioned) change with respect to consumers that may pose the most risk for society and with which this research is most concerned. This research will explore the interaction between god, consumers, producers and their relationship to societal change. Analyzing the democratic capital societies of the United States and Turkey, this research will explore the following questions:

1. What drives societal change?

2. What drives an individual’s or collectivity’s value judgments?

3. What impact has logic, rationality and its later evolution to empiricism had on the consumer’s view of the traditional government structures, particularly focusing on the traditional structure of religion?

4. Do market participants within democratic capitalist societies apply self regulating market pressure to religious organizations, causing alterations to doctrines and liturgies in hopes of attracting more participants?

5. Do all possessions, including god, become product valuations in a democratic, capitalistic system?

6. Has god become productized within the democratic capitalist systems of the United States and Turkey?

7. What historical significance has god had on forming a body of moral cohesion amongst a society of similar consumers?

Upon answering these questions, I will assimilate the findings, all in hopes of answering the overarching dissertation question:
Is freedom of religion, coupled with an free-market economy, optimal for the sustainability and/or advancement of a democratic society?

In addition to analyzing New Paradigm and Secularization theory, this research will utilize, in a qualitative manner, the basic underpinnings of a microeconomic supply and demand model to depict changes in supply and demand and its suggestive change in price this research will be supported by a multivariate valuation model to help demonstrate the historically decreasing value for god in democratic capital societies. This valuation model will be expanded upon with each new chapter. In addition to the qualitative micro-economic model and quantitative valuation model this research will also draw upon various writings spanning geographical and historical boundaries, yet encompassing academic fields, including but not limited to economic, sociologic, theological, music, visual arts and natural sciences.

To support the quantitative valuation model, a survey will be fielded by approximately 100 citizens in the United States and (an additional) 100 citizens in Turkey. Solicitation of responses based on consumer demand will include questions about demographics: income, preferences and buyers expectations.

The results of these surveys will help one understand the following:

1. The reason why people do or do not purchase god products.

2. Do people invest in god like a security or purchase it like a commodity?

3. How much are people willing to spend on purchasing god products?

4. What aspects of god are most important to people?

5. Are the benefits from god taught by biblical principle or learned by experience?

6. How much do purchasers know about the first god product (Alpha God)?
7. What impact does religion have on stabilizing democracy, and what impact did it have in the past?

This research will provide the ability to understand how today’s god products have changed from god product(s) of the past and will provide insight into the process of Creative Destruction demonstrating its application to historically non-traditional market goods.

**Relevance to Society 1.2**

According to Robert Bellah in *Habits of the Heart*, religion is one of the most important ways in which Americans interact and experience life in their community and society as evidenced by money and time committed (Bellah 219). The same can be said for Turkey, where more than 98% of Turks participate in the Muslim religion.

Religion and the purchase of god products has been a very important and life-long process for many worldwide. As history has documented, these pursuits have compelled people to kill and love in the name of god, to create theocratic governing structures, and to be inspired to take on and overcome enormous obstacles. The pursuit and worship of god has been and continues to be an important value to vast amounts of people in the United States and Turkey. Many of these consumers have very little if any understanding of how the god product has changed over the centuries.

From this dissertation, we can conceivably obtain an accurate picture of the true outcome of the Enlightenment and the views extolled in a humanist government, void of any need or want from religious intervention.
Relevance to Other Academic Disciplines 1.4

Richard Falk states that, “Historically the exclusion of religion from political life was seen as a vital step in the struggle to establish human global governance”(Falk 3). Falk goes on to say, “Among the surprises of the last several decades has been a multifaceted worldwide resurgence of religion as a potent force in human affairs, suggesting a relevance to concerns of the public as well as the private sphere”(Falk 23). Similar to Falk, Rodney Stark claims that historically there has been very little religious influence in the social sciences. He claims that the Enlightenment held the conviction that not only was religion false but also evil, and therefore should not be part of the social sciences altogether. Stark makes further claims that for more than three centuries social scientific theories were dominated by two themes:

1. gods are illusions generated by social processes
2. gods are illusions generated by psychological processes (Stark, 1999 42).

Because of these claims, the social scientific study of religion was not included in the overall social sciences. Additionally, and in line with other recent academic studies such as those by Richard Falk and Rodney Stark, governing structures and democracy in its entirety have been lacking in understanding of the real significance that religions and god play on human interaction.

Only by understanding the importance of god products and their relationship to capitalism can a democratic society come to understand how to effectively govern for the benefit not only of its domestic people, but for global society as well.

Sociologists, political economists, artists, theologians and global affairs scholars may benefit from this research because it draws not only upon much of the earlier academic
research in these areas but also puts forth a model to explain the actions of participants in a god economy.

While the surveys have been conducted in the United States and Turkey, they may hold substantial application in other states. By understanding the outcome of this research, a government can make policy changes which can assist in the establishment of a humane civil society not based on theocracy but a society that understands the importance and shortcomings of protecting religious freedom.

This research is organized into four parts:

Part I consists of Chapters 1-4.

Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are theoretical analyses explaining why people pursue personal greatness and liberation. These chapters help clarify why self-interested motives led to technology, the appearance of liberation from traditional authority structures and personal sovereignty, only to understand that liberation from all power structures and the pursuit of personal sovereignty are masquerades performed by the elite. Chapter 4 looks at value formation, capital, and how these motives created the democratic capitalistic society. By analyzing information flows and existing beliefs, Chapter 4 demonstrates that information drives beliefs and beliefs determine what a person values. By understanding values we can understand how a person allocates time and financial resources in exchange for some measure of utility from a possession. These chapters do not address the religious market per se, but rather set the stage for understanding the evolution to a free-market religious economy. Additionally, this chapter explains how capital assists a person or collectivity in maximizing utility. The overarching purpose of
this chapter is to demonstrate that all values eventually become products in a democratic
capitalistic system.

Part II consists of Chapter 5 and 6.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 quickly review the historical definitions of human nature
throughout the ages, showing that there has been a changing perspective of humanity by
humanity, from that which was grounded in irrationalism to nature grounded in
rationalism and its later evolution to empiricism. Similarly, this changing perspective
brings into question all things not logically and empirically proven, such as the
perception and need for god.

Part III consists of Chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 7 and 8 explains the historical and financial significance of the separation of
church and state and the move to a self-regulating religious economy in both the United
States and Turkey. These chapters will utilize the work of New Paradigm academics and
Secularizations comparing similarities and differences between the religious economies
of the United States and Turkey. Contradicting New Paradigm thinkers, Secularizationists
who argue that religion loses its relevance mainly from competition from secular
industry.

Part V consists of Chapters 9 and 10.

Chapter 9 puts forth the hypotheses to be tested, the quantitative research agenda and
the research results for the United States and Turkey. Chapter 9 is focused primarily on
assimilating the data and drawing conclusions in relation to the hypotheses. Chapter 10,
the final chapter, will pull together all the data and will provide an answer to the overall
question – Is the freedom of religion, coupled with an open market economy, optimal for the sustainability and/or advancement of a democratic society?
Chapter 2 - Reflections on Change

Rousseau wrote, “tis in vain to seek for a cause; but here the effect is visible, the depravation palpable; our minds have been corrupted in proportion as our arts and sciences have made advances toward their perfection. Shall we say that this is a misfortune particular to our times? No, gentlemen, the evils arising from our vain curiosity are as old as the world. The flow and ebb of the sea are not more regularly guided by the moon’s course, than our manners and probity by that of the arts and sciences. We see virtue flying on one side, as their lights rise on the other of our horizon: and the same phenomenon has been observed in all times and places (Kramnick 367).

The Emerging Epoch 2.0

On the eve of an “emerging epoch,” technology, mainly through the pharmacon\(^1\) of globalization appears to be furthering and deepening the “fragmegrative” pattern of change within and beyond societies. Richard Langhorne comments:

The contemporary world is seeing change on a greater scale and at a deeper level than anything that has happened since the sovereign state began to evolve in Europe towards the end of the sixteenth century: the lighthouses really have been turned out and it is crucial to comprehend where the coastline really is if we are to make sense of the inevitable, and potentially violent, transitions which must occur (Langhorne 43).

In the *The Coming of Globalization*, Langhorne argues that over the centuries technological advancement, particularly information and communications technology (ICT) advancement, has made globalization possible, while at the same time there has been substantial desire and need for increased human activities among and within societies.

The effects of these activities have on the whole range of humanity’s expectations, systems and structures have been and are a heady mixture: they have come and keep coming at different paces in different places; sometimes they share them with older systems and structures; sometimes they induce adaptation but sometimes they erode and destroy (Langhorne 2).

\(^1\) Depending upon the type of disease, a pharmacon can be either a medicine to cure or a poison to kill.
What resonates well with Langhorne’s analysis is his enlightened aspect on technology as a catalyst for and a facilitator of change. By reviewing technological progress through the centuries, Langhorne shows that with each new time/space innovation, change occurs.

Similar to Langhorne, James Rosenau argues in *Distant Proximities*, that

“All givens of life are undergoing change, and the meaning of boundaries is thus being altered as old tradition yields to new processes of modernity. Today, the intersubjective agreements that sustain boundaries have become frayed as ideas, people, goods, money, pollution, drugs, crime and terrorism increasingly pass over and through them with ease (Rosenau 35-36).

Like Langhorne, Rosenau argues that, “technological innovations may be necessary sources of huge transformations sustaining the emergent epoch, but they are not sufficient sources” (Rosenau 45). Technological innovation would not exist if it were not for incessant consumer demand. This process of change is described by Rosenau as the process of Fragmegration – in which aspects of life and society fragment into dissimilar spheres simultaneously, while other previously fragmented aspects of life begin to re-integrate. Supporting Rosenau and Langhorne, Young, Deos and Pigmian in “The Disintermediation of Diplomatic Communication: Propaganda, Lobbying and Public Diplomacy”, using diplomacy as subject, argue that the speed and demand for information since the late 20th century A.D. has modified the manner in which diplomats represent their organizations and the messages they communicate. This has led to etymological integration of meaning regarding diplomacy and propaganda, two subjects that have historically been perceived as polemic, one representing truth within communication and the other representing deception. This etymological blurriness or integration is caused by the quickening of information exchanged in the feedback loop.
between publics, diplomats and private agencies. With enhanced informational speed, meaning breaks down due to the high costs needed to either support or deny such information sourced. This example is only one of many examples where information communication technologies are starting to challenge traditional definitions and meanings. On the one hand, as the example of diplomacy shows, information communication technologies are integrating historically divergent subjects, yet on the other hand, fragmenting or disintermediating subjects and their correlated actors. These changes are putting pressures upon many organizations, most important of which are historically defined institutions, such as the state and or the church. These changes are also providing for new modern institutions to emerge as new authority sources. In the *The World Economic Forum; A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global Governance*, Geoffrey Allen Pigman explains,

One dominant theme in contemporary global studies is the blurring and breaking down of boundaries between what has traditionally been understood as the public and private. This has taken place in a variety of ways. The “public” has become more “private” through decisions such as the privatization of traditional government functions such as provisions of public utilities, outsourcing of tasks historically done by government (such as road and building repair), delivery of social services, and aspects of military and civil security provisions. On the other hand, the “public” has entered traditionally “private” space as governments have become involved in finance research and development of leading-edge technologies, including taking ownership stakes in technology-intensive businesses. This notion of “public-private partnerships” encapsulates the blending of rules traditionally viewed as separate, both by adherents of classical market economies and Marxian social ownership of means of production (Pigman 55)

Writing about the World Economic Forum as a post-modern authority structure, Pigman explains that this structure, although overwhelmingly private in its founding, has overtime become more public, challenged by the public’s demand for a seat within this historically elite community of businessmen, politicians and intellectuals. A substantial
portion of this change is due to the increasing speed and vast amounts of new information provided to civil society, which in turn empowers civil society to apply pressure to such historically elite foundations. Langhorne, Rosenau and Pigman argue similar points, overall showing that the evolution of information communication technologies has provided a mechanism for quicker revaluation of all values, historically a Nietzschean concept.

These ideas can also be equated with the term post modern, as defined by Hal Foster, professor of art and archaeology. In *The Anti-Aesthetic, Essays on Post Modern Culture*, Foster states, “Perhaps then, postmodern is best conceived as a conflict of new and old modes-cultural and economic, the one entirely autonomous, the other not at all determinative – and of the interest vested therein.”(Foster xii) Others, such as literary theorist Frederic Jameson in his essay “Postmodern and Consumer Society”, has argued that post modern

…is closely related to the emergence of this new moment of late, consumer and multinational capitalism…I believe also that its (post-modern) formal features in many ways express the deeper logic of that particular social system. I will only be able, however to show this for one major theme: namely the disappearance of a sense of history, the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social formations had in one way or another to preserve. (Foster 143-144)

In addition to these comments, Jameson argues that post modern society has two distinct features that reflect post-modern culture; ‘pastiche’ and ‘schizophrenia’.

Pastiche is like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something normal compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, parody that has lost its sense of humor…. (Foster 131)
Utilizing this construct, it appears that culture in democratic capitalist societies takes on the properties of a Lichtenstein painting; it imitates previous known and understood cultures and values, yet there is no regard for copying or plagiarism, nor is there any sense of humor regarding the comic manner in which the painting is displayed. Life, like a Lichtenstein painting becomes flat, becomes lifeless, where a sense of meaning, good or bad, beautiful or ugly becomes distorted and disjointed.

Regarding schizophrenia, Jameson argues that postmodern culture is a schizophrenic one mainly because experience is isolated, disconnected and discontinuous which fail to provide coherence and meaning to everyday life. (Foster 132) A schizophrenic culture thus does not have one identity but perhaps multiple, continuous splits in identities which perhaps cause confusion, paranoia and hallucinations. Utilizing the ideas of pastiche and schizophrenia as defined by Jameson, I will later illustrate how such ideas correlate to the changing meaning and changing value placed on the Christian and Muslim god. More specifically, I will show how god will be and is currently imitated, a copying of unprecedented proportions, the Alpha god maybe replaced with gods of the new, the new god perhaps will be the industrialized pastiche version looking and taking on properties of the older god, yet lacking meaning and connectedness to the broader schizophrenic population. It will be shown that God becomes industry, embedded within the overall free market economy, part of industry as a creatively changing product, yet also part of industry as a modern disciplinary authority which stands from the ‘panopticon’ of the church sanctuary understanding each move of the prisoner, so that rules and doctrines can be changed in order better to guide and steer the prisoner to the most well suited exchange relationship in the democratic capitalist system. As a disciplinary authority
source, the church becomes part of the capitalist system as a structure that modifies and changes doctrine not to discipline for reasons of piety but rather to eliminate those traditional rules that have so dampened capitals entrenchment within the church’s walls. Church becomes the handmaiden for capitalism.

Jameson believes that post-modern society is mainly guided by late capitalistic authority structures and is fragmented, yet correlated to the inner logic of the society. As we will continue to see, this inner logic is the same logic that Polanyi argues is embedded within society. This inner logic is to look toward the future, challenge to forget the past traditions and live in the present, all in hopes of expanding the market ideal. Furthermore, in such a society, traditions of the past take on an imitation quality because such traditions appear to resemble something from previous generations but are not. The description of pastiche almost resembles the idea that the plagiarist does not care about his offense, almost laughs at it in a very uncomfortable way, or perhaps has no idea that these changes are even plagiaristic or have happened before – perhaps the comic becomes the tragic and or the tragic becomes the comic, depending upon which perspective one chooses to embrace.

Post-modern culture becomes schizophrenic because society loses communicative meaning; knowledge and previously understood beliefs break down and take on new, perhaps less shared meaning for individuals. These new individualistic meanings create the fragmentative pattern of culture that Rosenau articulated, society becomes a dichotomous pull and push, integrating and fragmenting all at the same time. All of these changes, regardless of size and impact are driven not directly by the industrialized technology which is provided to society but rather changed by a revaluation of values, a
major theme we will continue to explore throughout this dissertation. Emphasizing this point, Rosenau argues, “The technologies are simply equipment, inanimate hardware, gadgetry, but as such, they are both powerful and neutral...They permit the pursuit of values, but they do not determine what values are sought” (Rosenau 258). Rosenau states,

They (technologies) are inherently neutral because they do not in themselves tilt in the direction of any particular values—neither toward good or bad, not toward left or right, nor toward open or closed systems. They are neutral in the sense that their tilt is provided by people—by those in local and global worlds who affirm or resist globalization, and, in so doing, employ information technologies to advance their perspectives. It is people and their collectivities that employ the technologies to infuse values into information...The technologies enable authoritarians as well as democrats to skew information and speed up its spread in whatever way they see fit (Rosenau 257).

Although both Rosenau and Langhorne argue that change is caused by movements in a person’s values and is facilitated by technology, it appears that both academics do not address, perhaps quite knowingly, a very important objective of understanding change: why a person alters their values and overall value system. One of the overarching goals of this chapter and the next is to explain not only how change happens, but why it happens, mainly by examining the primary value-changing motives of individuals and collectivities. By understanding the value changing mechanism, a framework is established and explored in later chapters which can assist in understanding how religious choices are made and the value of god determined.

The Human Condition 2.1

Arguably the desire for technology or more particular enhanced time, space technologies to assist in facilitating change within and beyond society has perhaps been
the hallmark of the human condition since the creation of mankind and may remain such until its extinction. David Harvey defines time-space compression as the following,

I mean to signal by that term processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves. I use the word ‘compression’ because a strong case can be made that the history of capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of life, while so overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to collapse inwards upon us (Harvey 240).

Many will agree that all change, both personal and societal, is fueled by the pursuit of personal and/or societal greatness and the want of personal and societal sovereignty.

Francis Fukuyama, in his *New York Times* best seller, *The End of History and the Last Man*, quotes and utilizes the work of G.W. Hegel, who claims that a person desires prestige and recognition from others. “According to Hegel, the desire for recognition initially drives the primordial combatants to seek to make the other ‘recognize’ their humanness by staking their lives in a mortal battle” (Fukuyama, 1992; xvi). Only by sacrificing oneself in a bloody battle can one obtain recognition or greatness; through this trial a person frees himself from the shackles of the powerful. It is possible to interpret Hegel as believing that it is better for a person to fight and die for her freedom than not to fight and be taken into slavery.

And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, it is not merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance… The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized; as a person; but he has not attained the truth of his recognition as an independent self-consciousness… (Hegel 233).

Hegel’s comments emphasize two important points: (1) the pursuit of personal greatness; (2) in order to obtain greatness, a person must first achieve freedom from others and from all things which hinder such possibilities. A more contemporary
capitalist perspective of Hegel is to view this primordial struggle as a competitive battle for personal wealth and success. Those who risk their financial well-being in pursuit of personal gain are perhaps those same individuals who Hegel argues are willing to risk their life in a bloody battle for recognition. Different in perspective but similar in thought, the (great statesmen and) economist Adam Smith equated this want and need to one’s pursuit of improvement, stating “Every individual ‘seeks to better his own condition,’ and this ambition is a ‘desire which comes with us from the womb and never leaves us until we go into the grave’” (Kramnick xvii). Looking at this ambition-driven motive, Richard Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* posits a similar Darwinian perspective on the human condition by arguing that genes act in a manner that is in their best interest and not necessarily in the interest of the organism or the organization of which the gene is a part. Dawkins’ micro-cosmic perspective is evident in his overall premise that individual entities within an organization will naturally always work to fulfill their personal interests. The argument by Dawkins, although evolutionary in context, can also be viewed as an economic anthropological study utilizing natural scientific principles to help explain cultural and social events. The underlying argument that Dawkins makes can be closely linked to the neo-classical form of economics. Neo-classical economists argue that individuals will always make choices to maximize their utility under conditions of scarcity and uncertainty. By understanding neo-classical principles, anthropologists analyze cultures utilizing the utility maximization theory.

In later chapters, utility maximization will be used to help explain how people choose (or not) to purchase god and or other related religious products. What will become more apparent as the chapters unfold is that people purchase and make choices about
participating in religions and valuing god in the same way they purchase goods at the store or make investments at the bank.

**Pursuit of Knowledge 2.2**

Historical evidence suggests that early civilizations employed technology to help alleviate hard labor (agricultural and otherwise). At the same time, and in line with Hegel and Smith’s arguments, technology was adopted to assist people in obtaining personal greatness. For example, the discovery of how to make and employ serviceable tools such as plowshares, which occurred somewhere in Asia Minor about 1400 B.C., helped civilization greatly by providing rich land owners and farmers the ability to expand tillage of heavy clay soils (McNeill 12). This discovery provided farmers with the increased ability to grow, sell and profit from their crops, and most importantly, those other than rich farm- and landowners began to see benefits. Innovations in tools and the like created trades and crafts which in turn fostered the first appearance of labor division. Peasants began to profit tangibly from the differentiation of skills - that became the hallmark of civilization (McNeill 12).

With each new invention, individuals and societies as a whole learned and applied the knowledge obtained from such innovations to broaden and build upon existing technologies, thus increasing the overall utility obtained from technological advancements. Each successor generation takes with it the accumulated scientific knowledge of all the preceding generations, thus increasing the knowledge of the overall populace. Fukuyama takes a similar position when he sites Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757) who states,

> A good cultivated mind contains, so to speak, all minds of preceding centuries, it is but a single identical mind, which has been developing and improving itself all
the time...but I am obliged to confess that the man in question will have no old age; he will always be equally capable of those things for which his youth is suited, and he will be ever more and more capable of those things which are suited to his prime; that is to say, to abandon the allegory, men will never degenerate, and there will be no end to the growth and development of human wisdom (Fukuyama, 1992; 57).

In *The Victory of Reason*, Rodney Stark demonstrates some of what he terms, “production innovations.” For example, the watermill, which was invented to power electrical appliances such as lights and stoves, was quickly adopted by tradesmen to assist them in cutting wood, splitting rock, making cloth and crafting metal instruments” (Starke, 2005; 39). Other inventions that Stark highlights, many of which are consistently overlooked as transformative innovations, include the simple horse collar and horse shoe, each of which greatly attributed to enhancing farming production by moving European farmers from slow oxen-drawn plows to more powerful and faster horse-drawn plows (Starke, 2005; 40). Each of these new inventions reduces the cost and time needed to increase production and consumption of goods.

These examples, although arbitrarily chosen, demonstrate that knowledge acquired and disseminated amongst the masses allow such inventions to be utilized by successor generations, at the same time providing greater amounts of goods at lower prices. With each new invention, time and space are compressed, allowing more people to share and apply the knowledge of the past innovations to current and future innovations. This phenomenon of time space compression and the exponential curve of technological advancement are most observable since the entrance into modernity.

Since the mid 1800’s - the beginning of the modern era - we have seen the steam engine evolve into the internal combustion engine, allowing people to travel greater distances in shorter periods of time. With the invention of the airplane, great distances
could be covered in hours, as opposed to days and weeks. The invention of the first affordable automobile by the Henry Ford Corporation in 1908 provided people with the ability to economically travel somewhat long distances in minutes and hours which previously may have taken hours or days. The introduction of the telephone was another invention that compressed time and space. The phone eliminated the need to send letters via the postal service over long distances and allowed people to communicate in real time. Although networks to communicate globally were not quickly developed, the benefits that could be gained from such international communication were very apparent. The ability to communicate with people all over the world allowed for continuous interaction, which assisted in enhancing the international trade and market system. The most influential and quickly adopted technology ever invented is the personal computer. Initially, the computer was created to assist in performing work tasks and mathematical calculations for use by those in various quantitative occupations; however it quickly morphed into a mechanism with myriad applications. Computers are now used for everything from personal daily planning to processing transactions in the international markets. A product extension of the computer, the Internet, is an interesting and revolutionary technology because it has acquired and merged attributes from various predecessor technologies, which include but are by no means exclusive of communicative technologies such as landline and wireless telephone but also the attributes of the computer, the calculator and the clock. Similar to the Internet, recent advances in gene mapping and gene identification would not have been possible without parallel advances in the computer, information technology (IT) and data record storage.

The merger of biology and information technology has led to the emergence of a new field, known as bioinformatics. What will be possible in the future will
depend heavily on the ability of computers to interpret the mind-boggling amounts of data generated by genomics and proteomics… (Fukuyama, 2002; 74).

The Internet exemplifies the entire notion of evolutionary knowledge transfer – which is to argue that technology knowledge transfer will exponentially continue with each successive generation. This phenomenon is best conceived by the way in which communication and knowledge transfer is happening in the social media segment. Companies like MySpace, Facebook and others are providing another mode of communication over the Internet that previously was not known to humanity. This new phenomenon in social media is also providing a place where people can share and have dialogue anonymously, if they choose, thus providing even further engagement and interaction, considering they will not be plagued or feel guilty that they are not supporting society’s aggregate value systems. We will address the reasons and patterns of technology knowledge transfer in later sections of this chapter and in chapter 3.

As we will see in Chapter 5 and 6, with each new incremental development in knowledge and its corresponding increase in technological advancement, there comes a re-valuation of previously held values. It is within this idea of revaluation that led Polanyi to argue that,

At the heart of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century there was an almost miraculous improvement in the tools of production, which was accompanied by a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people (Polanyi 35).

Polanyi’s dislocation reference comes from his study of eighteenth century England. In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi performs critical analysis on the impact of 18th century England’s policies toward land enclosures and communicated quite elegantly what these policy inventions did to the working population. Because enclosures were
affordable only to the wealthy and provided them the ability to deliver more goods at lower prices, with less labor, the poor remained wedded to the heavy work of non-enclosures, profiting substantially less. These changes caused the poor to be dislocated from their land, their community and their way of life.

Enclosures have appropriately been called the revolution of the rich against the poor. The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down the houses which, by the hither to unbreakable force of custom, the poor had long regarded as theirs and their heirs’. The fabric of society was being disrupted; desolate villages and ruins of human dwellings testified to the fierceness with which the revolution raged, endangering the defences of the country, wasting its towns, decimating its populations, turning its overburdened soil into dust, harassing its people and turning them from decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves (Polanyi 37).

However, as we will see, it is not just the re-valuation of values but also the speed at which re-valuation happens. Many would agree that technology advancement and knowledge accumulation has dramatically increased since the advent of modernity, quickly altering previously held value systems and quickly challenging previously held authority structures which in turn has the potential to quickly dislocate the values that are most important. The value and authority structure that this dissertation is primarily concerned is that relating to the Christian god in the United States, and the Muslim god in Turkey.

**Pursuit of Liberation 2.3**

With each new invention, starting with the first human, each subsequent generation acquires enhanced human abilities and because of such abilities humanity gains confidence in itself, thus pursues liberation from all forms of subjugation in hopes of enhancing personal sovereignty. Human beings recognized quite quickly that reason -
which is herein defined as the ability to think in a logical manner and/or to form judgments based upon observable and defensible facts - coupled with a great deal of scientific knowledge can reap great benefits. This rational mindset personifies the principles of the Enlightenment philosophers, who believed that unassisted human reason, not belief or governance of previously familiar institutions, was the primary guide to human achievement (Kramnick xii). In the introduction to *The Portable Enlightenment Reader*, Isaac Kramnick argues that:

Everything, including political and religious authority, must be subject to a critique of reason if it were to commend itself to the respect of humanity....Pleasure and happiness were worthy ends of life and realizable in this world. The natural universe, governed not by the miraculous whimsy of a supernatural God, was ruled by rational scientific laws, which were accessible to human beings through the scientific method of experiment and empirical observation. Science and technology were the engines of progress enabling modern men and women to force nature to serve their well-being and further happiness. Science and the conquest of superstition and ignorance provided the prospect of endless improvement and reformation of the human condition, progress even unto a future was perfection. The Enlightenment valorized the individual and the moral legitimacy of self-interest. It sought to free the individual from all varieties of external corporate or communal constraints, and it sought to reorganize the political, moral, intellectual, and economic worlds to serve individual interest. (Kramnick xii).

In *The Conditions of Postmodernity*, David Harvey makes a similar case, stating:

The project amounted to an extraordinary intellectual effort on the part of the Enlightenment thinkers ‘to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic.’ The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. The scientific domination of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of natural calamity. The development of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought promised liberation from the irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, and release from arbitrary use of power as well as from the dark side of our own human natures. Only through such a project could the universal, eternal, and the immutable qualities of all of humanity be revealed (Harvey 12).
Harvey attempts to explain the view of Enlightenment philosophy as that which tried to alter all of human life by creating universal rules, scientific truths and logical objectivity, yet at the same time eliminating all things which were not explainable by such rules, truths and objectivity. The Enlightenment thinkers were bold in their conquest to rule out all things irrational and incomprehensible, and I will argue in Chapter 3 that this mindset, although perhaps dormant in generations prior to the Enlightenment, is omnipresent and has always been part of the human condition.

**Economic Motive 2.4**

To take advantage of technology and to pursue personal greatness and sovereignty at any point in history, one particular possession is absolutely needed by all – capital. This idea was known and argued by French economist, statesmen and religious scholar Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781). Turgot explains this in paragraph 52 of his article *Reflections*:

> Every kind of work, whether in cultivation, in industry, or in commerce, requires advances. Even if one should work the land with one’s hands, sowing would be necessary before reaping; one would have to live until after the harvest. The more that cultivation is perfected and more energetic it becomes, the longer are their advances (Clark 533).

Turgot states that technological innovation used for production purposes requires capital, which is necessary not only to pay for labor but to sustain the entrepreneur during periods of low to zero income, and is also required to purchase equipment and materials needed to build different technologies. I will delve deeper into the need and use of capital in Chapter 3.
Early technological thought created the ideals of what is now regarded as market economics, whereby everything is traded for the sole intent of meeting humanity’s self interest and pursuit of greatness.

Rejected were the ideas of moral economy in which economic activity was perceived as serving public moral ends of justice, whether these be realized through church-imposed constraints on wages and prices, or through magistrates setting prices and providing relief to insure that the poor not starve (Kramnick xvi-xvii).

This successive pattern of technological advancement, coupled with the introduction of capital, led to unbridled and perhaps destructive patterns of natural science that were fostered by philosophers and scientists of the Enlightenment, which has led to initiatives such as the Manhattan and Genomic Projects, one espousing ideals of destruction and the other creation.

Enlightenment philosophers and scientists furthered technological advancement in vain attempts to improve humanity through scientific progress and to conquer human nature. Such change represents a condition that advances personal sovereignty from socially entrenched traditions and allows for vast scientific discovery and personal experimentation. Because of these changes, people are becoming less reluctant to remain faithful to any fixed set of norms or behavioral roles (Kramnick ix-xxvii).

Bill McKibben states in *Enough*, that in the past five hundred years, science has created new laws and theories which assisted in the creation of new technologies that replaced many of the older traditional information centers such as the church. These new technologies, McKibben claims, ordered Western civilization. He goes on to say, “Static peasant life, and guild life, in which the carpenter was the great-great grandson of one carpenter, and the great-great grandfather of another, gave way to the enormous
dynamism of technology-driven capitalism” (McKibben 44). He also states that conservatives have also complained about such scientific and technological advancement since the days of Galileo, yet similarly he argues that liberals, such as Marx and Engels, have done the same (McKibben 44). Marx, for example, stated that

All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind (Crane, Amawi 88).

Regarding liberation, McKibben states that:

..in the last century, the invention of the car offered freedom of mobility, at the cost of giving up the small, coherent physical universes most people had inhabited. The invention of the radio and television allowed the unlimited choices of a national or a global culture, but undermined the local life that had long persisted...The 1960’s seemed to mark the final rounds of this endless liberation: the invention of divorce as a mass phenomenon made clear that family no longer carried the meaning we’d long assumed, that it could be discarded as the village had been discarded; the pill and the sexual revolution freed us from the formerly inherent burdens of sex, but also often reduced it to the merely “casual” (McKibben 45).

**Pursuit of Freedom 2.5**

As mentioned by McKibben and supported by the earlier Enlightenment thought, liberation from power structures coupled with the success of early technologies and the invention of capital allowed humanity to believe that the only way to attain happiness was through personal achievement. This personal achievement can only be accomplished when power was transferred from traditional authority structures to the common person. This change laid the groundwork for capitalism, which in a sense was a way for the common person to calculate his position in the integrated world of power relationships. To assist in solidifying the integration of capitalism, the common person began to push for a shift in power from the governing elite and traditional values to the entrepreneur and
modern industrial values. The allure of capitalism inspired society as a whole to pursue diffused governing structures, propagating a balance of power and motivating society to liberate itself from the exploitive ruling powers, which continually over time rear their ugly head. In *The Victory of Reason*, Rodney Starke illustrates this point in his discussion of 12th century Italy where the political system transitioned from one of repressive rulers to something more akin to a capitalistic republic.

The proximate cause of the rise of Italian capitalism was freedom from the rapacious rulers who repressed and consumed economic progress in most of the world, including most of Europe. Although their political life often was turbulent, these city-states were true republics able to sustain the freedom required by capitalism. Second, centuries of technological progress have laid the necessary foundations for the rise of capitalism, especially the agricultural surpluses needed to sustain cities and to permit specialization (Starke, 2005; 106).

It is important to observe here that similar events occurred in 12th century Italy as it did in 18th century England.

In this new system, a diffused government structure allowed for the success of the common person. At the same time, the structure ensured that tyranny would not be tolerated and that laws would be enforced. Something else to consider is rather than providing rules and laws to regulate abusive power of the ruling classes or governments, society in general appeared to want a system that would subvert away the possibility of such future tyranny. It also created an environment that encouraged freedom and further fueled capitalism. This freedom, coupled with a maturing capitalist system, spawned a cycle of technological advancements never before seen.

However, these diffused governing structures from which capitalism spawned, are losing their relevance and authority in contemporary society. Richard Langhorne comments, “The need for government is not disappearing, but it is being reconfigured,
and as far as populations are concerned the resulting changes can look like a serious loss of authority” (Langhorne 27). It is no revelation that the state has been continually deteriorating and losing authority ever since technology integrated societies fostered the self regulating market economy.

Although democratic capitalistic societies have appeared to be successful in allowing people to choose their paths to greatness and personal sovereignty, it is argued that the system still needs to make modifications so that humans will not be oppressed by any forms of traditional authority. Democratic capitalism is only one historical stop to such a place where human sovereignty can overcome all forms of authority.

C.S. Lewis argues that liberation from traditional authority structures and the pursuit of personal sovereignty actually turns out to be power exercised by some men over other men, and nature is the instrument (Lewis 55). What Lewis means by this is that technology provides people with enhanced personal abilities which assist them in their struggle to attain personal sovereignty. However, Lewis goes on to say that these abilities are only cosmetic because the technology employed is not owned by the individual. The owner of the specific technology is the only person who becomes closer to sovereignty, not only over themselves but also over others seeking that technology. The owner of the technology has the ability to sell or not to sell the technology (Lewis 56). Lewis takes this argument even further when he states the following:

Man’s conquest of Nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on Man’s side. Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows the triumphal car (Lewis 58).
Lewis’s statements resound very closely with the earlier statements of King Solomon, where he claimed that although there are abundances provided by God, there are others who take claim to these rights, thus leaving some with more and others with less.

Although democracy and capitalism are only structural steps along the finite path to personal sovereignty, Lewis argues that a person will exercise control over himself, thus obtaining personal sovereignty, only when he has the ability to exercise power over pre-natal conditioning and eugenics. In doing so, a person chooses to make future generations what he wants them to be, individual gods of personalized dominion. It is only at this time that nature ultimately surrenders to humanity. Lewis goes onto say:

The battle will be one. We shall have ‘taken the thread of life out of the hand of Clotho’ and be henceforth free to make our species whatever we wish it to be. The battle will be indeed one. But who, precisely, will have won it? For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what they please (Lewis 59).

What is important about this statement is Lewis’ recognition of a transcendent power that will always exercise control over humanity, despite humanity’s perceived liberation from all powers of authority. This transcendent power cannot be eliminated but perhaps can only be transferred from one authority source to another. It emerges from Lewis’s intent that power moves from Clotho, metaphorically meaning the god that determines human fate to another power, yet one with limited historical relevance and quickly modulating modes of authority. Although it appears that humanity becomes more powerful, more liberated, it seems Lewis is calling this a false liberation, a masqueraded authority that props up humanness and the need for freedom, yet at the same time this power is holding substantial and overwhelming authority over all of humanity.
By pursuing personal greatness and sovereignty, humanity creates technologies which construct *appearances* of obtaining such goals, only to later conclude that such pursuits lead to self destruction. Looking at this another way, with technological advancement, power transfers from those traditional sources, such as religion and government to new forms of authority, which include entrepreneurs and the elite who own those technologies. The slave-bondsmen, as referred to by Hegel, are once again called to mind. Although the perception is greater freedom, in truth humanity’s shackles are only transferred from that of traditional authority structures to new authority structures. What Lewis is implying here is that a person or collectivity will always be enslaved to somebody or something else, sometimes these shackles are known, yet many times they are not, they are hidden within constructed organizations and environments. Importantly, enslavement transfer occurs most often from those structures which are more socially oriented to those which are more self-interest oriented. It is suggested that the only individuals becoming liberated from such technology, and thus becoming more powerful, are the entrepreneur and capitalist who own and employ the technology. But it can be argued that over time, these individuals will lose power as well.

**Conclusion 2.6**

The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate why change occurs by examining the motives of individuals and collectivities. This chapter has argued that all change is caused by personal and societal ambition for greatness. Dawkins’s thesis emphasizes that genes will always cause one to act in their own self–interest, but may succumb to collectivities or social ambitions only when such ambitions assist the self-interest of the individual gene. To corroborate Dawkin’s thesis, I reviewed Hegel, who argued that all men seek
recognition which originates from a primordial battle where men fight one another to the
death to obtain personal freedom and recognition. I have also reviewed the words of
Adam Smith, who mentions that such individual ambitions will always be part of human
nature. Similarly, I have taken a look at how technology has assisted humanity in its
attempts to obtain personal greatness throughout history. I pondered the words of C.S.
Lewis, who argues that all perceptions of personal sovereignty and liberation from
technology are actually false perceptions, because a person is merely shifting his bondage
from traditional authority structures, such as religion and government, to more capitalist,
utility based authority structures. Arguably, in a person’s pursuit of greatness she will
ultimately want to control and create her own genes, and will also want to control those
of her offspring, in the hopes of liberating humanity from one of the last sources of
authority which she believes she can overcome – death. By pursuing such grandiose
ambitions, humanity will come to know that this pursuit will only solidify its inability to
ever fight again in that primordial battle for freedom, because the technology used to alter
life and its offspring will be owned by the new bondsmen, the corporation.

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that humanity is capable of being
motivated by self-interest that can and will destroy society, unless this ambition is
regulated by some governing authority. Historically, religion has assisted in regulating
this behavior. Abrahamic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam each have
within their doctrines and sacred texts rules which moderate self-interested behavior.
However, in democratic capitalistic societies, such as the United States and Turkey,
religion loses value, salience and its ability to regulate such behavior. In these countries,
where freedom is celebrated, personal sovereignty exploited and self-interest glorified,
religion loses its ability to govern such behavior. To compensate for such loss of authority and value, religious producers act in a rational manner by offering new and innovative ways to deliver variations of their once singular product offering - god. Like technological innovation, as this chapter quickly reviewed, god is re-invented for better adoption by consumer groups. As I will continue to demonstrate in each of the following chapters, these changes cause surmountable and dangerous problems for democratic, capitalistic societies.

I will close this chapter with the following statement from Hegel:

We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself (cited in Avineri 64).
Chapter 3 - Reflections on Capital

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (—its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (‘union’) with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on—

From Nietzsche, The Will to Power, s.636, Walter Kaufmann transl.

Power and Change Framework 3.0

The opening salutation from Nietzsche argues that all people desire to accumulate power and avoid loss, all in hopes of securing future happiness. Because of this “Will to Power” motive, people tend to seek out those things that will provide them the greatest benefit, which in turn, helps them create benefit further. This idea, although not expressed by Nietzsche, is an attempt to explain how people exponentially increase their power base. However, when a person encounters someone of equal power and it appears that they cannot exert their “will,” they in essence come to some middle ground, a negotiation or a union of like-powered people. When this occurs, “the will to power” is aggregated, at least for the time being, to help this union aggregate even more power. This competitive relationship, over time, creates a society where people use their innate and or acquired values, albeit talents or capitals, to accumulate more talents and capitals. Because of this emergent obedience, many historical values that once had the primary intention of providing community benefit later mutated into self-serving values. These values became later associated with price and later adapted the look and feel of consumer goods.

For instance, providing communal safety within tribal and small communities mutated into the product of war, where large corporations distributed massive and deadly armaments globally. The defense corporation’s intention is not community safety per se
but rather self-interested gain. In the *The Pursuit of Power*, William McNeill argues that industrialization of war occurred somewhere between 1840-1884, presenting historically the movement from small volunteer armies to millions of paid soldiers, from the creation of armaments by tradesmen to the new American automation of machine guns (McNeill 223-261). McNeill shows that global military expenditures grew (constant 1978 dollars) from US ~$134 billion in 1950 to US ~$455 billion in 1980 (McNeill 374). According to the Global Issues website\(^2\), recent estimates show this spending to be approximately US $1.3 trillion (not factoring in constant 1978 dollars). On the other end of this spending are corporations profiting from the production, distribution, and marketing of new industrialized warring technologies. This type of industrialization can be seen further in the recent proliferation of competitive mercenary bidding for duties in Iraq, with special attention and media press being given to companies’ such as Blackwater, a mercenary company based out of North Carolina and owned by multimillionaire, Erik Prince.

Another example is that of artistic expression. Art was originally associated with the visual representations of religious ritual, historical events, social action and commentary, storytelling and sometimes propaganda. Yet it became, over time, industrialized both in production and in consumption. Art historian, Donald Kuspit, in “Art Values or Money Values,” argues that:

> Art has never been independent of money, but now it has become a dependency of money. Consciousness of money is all-pervasive. It informs art -- virtually everything in capitalist society -- the way Absolute Spirit once did, as Hegel thought. Money has always invested in art, as though admiring, even worshipping, what it respected as its superior -- the true treasure of civilization -- but today money’s hyper-investment in art, implicitly an attempt to overwhelm it, to force it to surrender its supposedly higher values, strongly suggests that money regards itself as superior to art (Kuspit).

Rather than art being a method of communication to teach, it becomes an aesthetic wallpaper to augment other properties and values of the purchaser. Kuspit states:

Today art's importance is that it creates money. It is not clear that money creates art, however much it may "patronize" it. Art's value is guaranteed by money, which doesn't mean that without money it has no value, but that money value overrides art's value while appearing to confer it. Both art and criticism have been defeated by money, even though money gives art critical cachet, thus validating it as art. Even more insidiously, money has become more existentially meaningful than art (Kuspit).

The last example discussed here, although there are endless examples in society, is the historically changing role of relationship and friendship building. The value of relationships where one spends time to meet others, get acquainted, and have discussion appears to have mutated into the product of online dating, online communities, match services, speed dating, etc. With the evolution of the Internet to Web 2.0 and soon to be Web 3.0, applications to share information and engage in online dialogue is quickly mutating the way people historically interacted and found life-sharing mates, business partners, and or customers. Companies such as Facebook, LinkedIn, e-Harmony, Muslima, Secondlife, and thousands of other new companies are coming to the fore each day, challenging and applying pressure to this once historical value of relationships, friendships, etc. Relationships can be explored in the virtual world of the Internet by taking on new identities via things like avatars within Secondlife or one can assume an anonymous identity in social media forums, each time allowing the individual to become less constrained by social norms and historical traditions. With new inventions come new products and a greater sense of liberation.

Similar to Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue, where he argued that internal virtues became competitive goods because of the separation of virtue and excellence from
social norms, this chapter will demonstrate that traditional values such as belief in god, like that of war, art, and relationships, will become a product and assume similar attributes of a product, which include its ability to trade and be traded in a discrete marketplace. Despite the artist, warrior, priest or minister’s desire to be financially content there was a fundamental shift away from historical norms of contentment, such as level of artistic skill and reputable standing in the community to a more utilitarian norm of personalized accumulated wealth. As MacIntyre defines, rather than wealth being an important yet external peripheral good, it became the primary, internal good, the life-seeking good, disciplined by modern philosophy and enlightenment thought. Rather than pursuing “virtues” and innate human qualities such as artistic talents, the eccentric beauty of a warrior’s skill or the theological learning of a minister or priest to establish belonging within a community or to provide a place for an individual to seek honor and prestige in society, people changed their approach to life. According to MacIntyre, people now seek benefit from those “external goods,” those goods that bring them the most utility and, conceivably power, to help win in the now competitive society, all in hopes of gaining a higher status, a higher place in the public sphere. Rather than having the traditional and many times prestigious status as artist, warrior, or priest, achieving respect of others in the community, people now seek out other forms of respect, this time in the form of capital’s power, a power that can provide autonomy and can challenge those historically identified roles and norms. Using MacIntyre’s lexicon, this pursuit of external goods (ie, the pursuit of capital) supplanted the deterministic perspective of internal goods, those goods associated with socio-economic status and the virtuosic contentiousness of providing communal service based upon the role into which a person
was perhaps born. Virtue and excellence now take on new meaning according to MacIntyre. Virtue becomes lost and instead associated with a historically valueless act; it takes on properties of utility, seeking individual gain over societal well-being. What this chapter and the next chapter will explain is that these changes mean much more to society that perhaps MacIntyre asserts. These changes not only affect ethics, as he explains, but they tend to alter all of human action, all of life becomes subsumed to the new way of exchange. This chapter and the next chapter will explain these changes.

To perform this analysis, this chapter will expand upon the personal sovereignty and liberation argument of the previous chapter. The next chapter will perform a bottom-up study of the evolution of power and change. Utilizing the Nietzschean concept of power and its evolutionary construct, it will be argued that power originated from the early success and adoption of science and technology, and was further accelerated by the advance of capitalism and the creation of secular, democratically free governments. Together these chapters will demonstrate that although the pursuit of personal greatness is innate within each individual, the motive is personified and encouraged in a democratic capitalist society because all values under its control will adopt a market and exchange relationship, all in hopes of maximizing personal utility (Fukuyama, 1992 143). In this chapter I will discuss power, ultimately agreeing with Nietzsche, who argues that power transcends all human action and all authority structures in an attempt to destroy all things less capable of regulating it (Nietzsche 340).

The primary challenge of these chapters is to demonstrate that capitalism, freedom, and democracy are not the evolutionary end-products of power, but rather one or more stages of a finite metamorphosis. It is presumed that this metamorphosis can only
end when all of life, humans and otherwise, has succumbed to its disguised view of liberation, while ultimately enslaved by its mandatory discipline and unfulfilled authority. The outcome of this study will demonstrate further that capital transcends all forms of life, and drives a continuous separation/liberation process that will appear to separate humans from all forms of authority, except that of capital itself. Finally, this chapter will briefly touch upon the idea that the pursuit of capital can ultimately liberate humanity from itself. In this scenario, capital will creatively destroy society as we know it: the Nietzschean, nihilistic society where nothing matters, where meaning is obsolete and passion for life and the pursuit of perfection are expunged – mainly because power has progressed into another phase, thus leaving behind the remnants of human civilization (Nietzsche 9). Ultimately, as Nietzsche argued, the greatest of values will be shown to devalue themselves (Nietzsche 9). Lastly, these chapters will demonstrate that the movement of capital drives change and, conversely, change drives power into different planes of a multi-dimensional world. The outcome of these chapters will answer the question: What drives an individual’s or collectivity’s value judgments?

Utilitarianism 3.1

To support such argument, this chapter will draw on a body of academic research that can be broadly classified as Utility Theory or Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, as defined by Louis Pojman in The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature, “is a consequential theory which aims at maximizing happiness or utility” (Pojman 227). This idea of free choice in humanity is why John Stuart Mill referred to humanity as homo-economicus, the wealth maximizing human (Johnston 21). The
founders of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), were reformers who believed that the law (referring to both religious law and secular law) was often a serious impediment to social progress and therefore they created the idea of utilitarianism to help quantify value judgments and decision making, regardless of the existing moral or written laws of that society (Pojman 227). Citing Jeremy Bentham’s essay, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Pojman argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain is the only intrinsic bad. All other goods and evils are derived from these two values (Pojman 231). However, what Pojman argues is that good and bad values are those values primarily based on the views of the individual and do not necessarily correlate with historical definitions of good and evil. Although perhaps not the most tactful, but nonetheless very moving in relation to this premise of individualized values, Pojman cites a discussion between the mass murderer Ted Bundy and one of his victims.

Then I learned that all moral judgments are “value judgments;” that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured out for myself--what apparently the Chief Justice could not figure out for himself--that if the rationality of one more value judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any ‘reason’ to obey the law for anyone, like myself, who has the boldness and daring – the strength of character--to throw off its shackles…I discovered that to be truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the unsupportable ‘value judgment’ that I was bound to respect the right of others. I asked myself, who were these ‘others’?...Surely you would not, in this age of Scientific enlightenment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as ‘moral’ or ‘good’ and others as ‘immoral’ or ‘bad’ (Pojman 171)?

Reverting into the philosophical construct, Bentham argues more definitively in Paragraph II of *An Introduction to the Principles and Legislation*, that:
By the principles of utility is meant that principle which approves or disproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. …To a person committed by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself will be greater or less according to the four following circumstances: its intensity, its duration, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or remoteness (cited in Pojman 232).

What we can take from Bentham is his ability to articulate clearly what drives happiness and or grief, pleasure and or pain, risk and reward. Intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity are all information sources that support knowledge of and belief in the benefits of a particular utility. According to Bentham, every action, every value judgment is a utility judgment.

Bentham’s utilitarianism can be viewed also as the evolution of earlier ideas from intellectuals such as Antoine Arnauld, Luca Pacioli, Fermat, David Bernoulli, Jacob Bernoulli and many others – all of whom have contributed to a body of work that can be classified as probability theory, a theory that provides tools and processes to help people make decisions without perfect information – or what has been now referred to as Decisions Under Uncertainty. Peter Bernstein, in *Against the Gods: The Remarkable History of Risk* outlines the history of probability theory and documents that such evolution of thought ultimately contributed to what Jeremy Bentham has coined Utilitarianism.

The strength of our desire for something which came to be known as utility, would soon become more than just the handmaiden of probability. Utility was about to take its place at the center of all theories of decision-making and risk-taking (Bernstein 71).

According to Bernstein,

The revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim of the
gods and the men and women are not passive before nature. Until human beings discovered a way across that boundary, the future was a mirror of the past or the murky domain of oracles and soothsayers who held a monopoly over knowledge of anticipated events (Bernstein 1).

Bernstein clearly makes the argument that utilitarianism is really the study and theory of risk and reward, to which many great scholars have contributed. Bernstein shows that Utilitarianism was/is the evolutionary stage that developed from the Hindu-Arabic numbering system, which became available to the West approximately 700-800 years ago (Bernstein 2). The numbering system, which started out as a tallying system, evolved over time to become a system to quantify probability, which clearly can be argued was/is a system to understand future opportunity, all in hopes to maximize utility. “Probability has always carried two meanings, one looking into the future, the other interpreting the past, one concerned with our opinion, the other concerned with what we actually know” (Bernstein 49). Demonstrating that probability theory has evolved from understanding games of chance to decision-making systems, Bernstein cites Leibniz; who argues that probability is determined by evidence and reason (Bernstein 49). In one respect, probability observes historical outcomes, which provide information in relation to the four determinants described by Bentham. Past experiences and the information acquired from observation help support the belief that the future will follow similar patterns. Thus, the valuation of all utilities is a normative belief, which one hopes will come true in the future as it has in the past. “In the first sense, probability means the degree of belief or approvability of an opinion – the gut view of probability” (Bernstein 49).

Using the work of the theologian Antoine Arnauld, Bernstein cites the final chapter of Arnauld’s book, *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, a publication from 1662: “Fear
of harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the harm, but also to the probability of the event” (Bernstein 71). Here Bernstein highlights that Arnauld’s idea was the first to articulate this new understanding, taking into consideration not just the gravity of the loss but also the chance of the loss.

Bernstein cites many of the great ideas that contributed to the evolution of Utility Theory and Probability Theory. One of the more profound and intellectual contributions to this body of literature, as described by Bernstein, came from Daniel Bernoulli, the renowned scientist and mathematician. Bernoulli argued “utility….is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making the estimate...There is no reason to assume that risks anticipated by each [individual] must be equal in value” (Bernstein 103). Bernoulli was one of, if not the first, to recognize that value is predicated not only on the expected benefits of a particular value but also the risks associated with that particular value as well. Using the example of being hit by lightening, Bernoulli explains that although the probability of being struck is minimal, the risk and fear can be so great to some people that they tremble at the idea (Bernstein 105). The idea of individualized risk analysis later becomes a major idea put forth by Bernoulli: “Utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods possessed” (Bernstein 105). Bernstein argues that:

The brilliance of Bernoulli’s formulation lies in his recognition that, while the role of facts is to provide a single answer to expected value, the subjective process will produce as many answers as there are human beings involved. But he even goes further than that: he suggests a systematic approach for determining how much each individual desires more or less: the desire is inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods possessed (Bernstein 105-106).
However, this was only one of two major contributions put forth by Bernoulli. Bernoulli’s second contribution had to do with human capital, as paraphrased by Bernstein,

Today, we view the idea of human capital – the sum of education, natural talent, training and experience that comprise the wellspring of future earnings flows – as fundamental to the understanding of major shifts in the global economy. Human capital plays the same role for an employee as plant and equipment play for the employer (Bernstein 110).

Bernstein’s definition correlates precisely with that of Nietzsche, who took the position in The Will to Power that value accumulation, which can also be equated with power, is mainly driven by a steady accumulation of all values and efficiencies of the body:

All the virtues and efficiency of body and soul are acquired laboriously and little by little, through much industry, self-constraint, limitation, through much obstinate, faithful repetition of the same labors, the same renunciations; but there are men who are heirs and masters of this--slowly acquired manifold treasure of virtue and efficiency – because, through fortunate and reasonable marriages, and also through fortunate accidents, the acquired and stored up energies of many generations have not been squandered and dispersed but linked together by a firm ring and by will (Nietzsche 518).

Using the idea of calculation put forth by Nietzsche, Bernstein makes the following comments:

Utility Theory requires that a rational person be able to measure utility under all circumstances and to make choices and decisions accordingly – a tall order given the uncertainties we face in the course of a lifetime. The chore is difficult enough even when, as Bernoulli assumed, the facts are the same for everyone. On many occasions the facts are not the same for everyone. Different people have different information; each of us tends to color the information we have in our own fashion (Bernstein 111).

Although Daniel Bernoulli put forth an enormous contribution to Utility Theory, he was later trumped by his uncle Jacob Bernoulli who argued, unlike Daniel, that all information was not known to the person valuing the belief.
Jacob Bernoulli’s contributions to the problem of developing probabilities from limited amounts of real-life information was twofold. First, he defined the problem in this fashion before anyone else had even recognized the need for a definition. Second, he suggested a solution that demands only one requirement. We must assume that “under similar conditions, the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of an event in the future will follow the same patterns as was observed in the past” (Bernstein 121).

This idea is what we now classify as the Law of Large Numbers, which simply means that over a substantial number or events or trials, particular outcomes will follow a probable pattern and will trend to what has been now referred to as the average (Bernstein 120-122). Jacob Bernoulli was the first person to draw correlations between probability of an event occurring and the quality of the information flows from which a person believes (Bernstein 117). Moreover, Bernoulli introduced the concept of sampling a small population and drawing conclusions that can be extrapolated across a whole population. The main argument that Jacob put forth was that we never have all the information in real life but rather bits and pieces. It is these bits and pieces from the past that can help us explain and forecast the future. By understanding the certainty of past events, the future of uncertain events can be quantified, or so we believe. According to Bernstein:

> There were no longer any inhibitions against exploring the unknown and creating the new. The great advances in the efforts to tame risk in the years before 1800 were to take on added momentum as the new century approached, and the Victorian era would provide further impulse (Bernstein 133).

Another influential Utility Theorist was William Stanley Jevons. In *The Theory of Political Economy*, Jevons argues that “value depends entirely upon utility” (Bernstein 190). Bernstein states that here we have a restatement of Bernoulli’s pivotal assertion that utility varies with the quantity of a commodity already in one’s possession (Bernstein
190). Later Jevons modifies this statement: “the more refined and intellectual our needs become, the less they are capable of satiety” (Bernstein 190). Jevons, like Bernoulli, argues that the more wealthy and powerful a person becomes, the less likely that person will want to amass more wealth. Rather they are more concerned with the risk of losing the existing wealth.

What can be taken from this brief historical analysis can be summed up by the following remarks from Bernstein, who states that decision making:

…lies in maximizing the areas where we have some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us (Bernstein 197).

What we can take away from Utility Theory and Probability Theory in relation to the advancement of human understanding and empirical analysis is that people make valuations based upon two major determinants, risk and reward, risk being equated with bad and reward being equated with good. Moreover, Bentham’s four determinants of value--intensity, duration, certainty and remoteness--are viewed as by-products of information flows. Similarly, by understanding information flows and the four determinants, beliefs become more or less true and thus produce higher or lower values because consistency of information has caused such a revaluation. By understanding the past, probability of occurrence into the future becomes established, which again aids in creating or destroying value.

There are two important aspects to value that need substantial attention. First, values have benefits that were communicated or promised from a particular possession. However, these benefits are discounted by the risk associated with not obtaining that value. From this simple idea, which will be further explained, all values can be viewed as
discounted instrumental normative assumptions--such normative assumptions that are fostered by information flows, each of which are discounted based upon the level of the four determinants. It is also known that risk is even more important for the wealthier and more powerful person. Each incremental opportunity for gain in value is inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods received. This is interesting because it signifies that the wealthier a person is, the less willing they are to take risks and therefore the more certainty they need from the benefits of a particular utility and the more protection they will seek in this society. Wealth is defined as the summation of human and financial capitals.

**Information Consistency 3.2**

When information alters a belief based upon any of the four determinants, it may change the value one places on a possession, thus possibly altering the utility expectation from that possession as well (Bernstein 71). So an individual’s belief system is comprised of information acquired from life experiences and perhaps from innate knowledge as Durkheim argues in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Durkheim 4). This information can be derived from traditional sources such as family, government, church, nature, etc., and can also be acquired from formal training programs, such as school. Based upon the validity and acceptance of this acquired information, a person accumulates a “basket of beliefs” that makes up her belief system.

For instance, many people believe in a god because they accept information received from a trusted individual, such as a priest, parent, or teacher. On the other hand, others may believe in a god mainly because society as a whole may accept its existence as fact, thus socially constructing a person to accept this belief. It seems that many people
believe in so-called truths or god, not because they are truths per se but because they do not possess the knowledge to validate or refute such, nor do they have the time needed to acquire such knowledge. This is normally what is referred to as bounded rationality. For example, people will only spend enough time and money to learn about values, such as god, if they believe the costs will be lower or at least equal to the benefits received by purchasing it. As with all possessions, there is an opportunity cost for the god consumer, which means that if other opportunities exist that bring higher utility, consumers will purchase these alternative possessions instead. Another group of people accept information perhaps “on faith” and assume that some information rests not on logical proof, but rather on some mystical, all-powerful and perhaps unrecognizable phenomenon.

The exchange of information, via direct contact or through secondary sources, causes one to evaluate the validity of particular beliefs. For example, every time a person gets into a car and turns the ignition, he or she is making a decision based upon a previously held belief. Most often, a person decides that the car will start and that it will move in the direction in which they steer it. The reason they believe this is because over a period of time the car has started regularly and responded to their manipulation of the steering wheel, thus strengthening the previously held belief. This idea resonates well with Bernoulli, who argued that the probability of past occurrences drives utility (Bernstein 121). This ignition example, although trite, demonstrates that the information comes from direct communication or from secondary sources such as a car ignition and steering wheel. Beliefs are formed not only by investing one’s trust in information flows, but they are also strengthened or weakened by how consistently a particular belief
delivers the purported value (Bernstein 121). As I will demonstrate later, valuing possessions, particularly those which one deems trustworthy and relatively consistent, is much easier than valuing those intangible possessions that pose more risk, or the appearance of more risk.

As I define it, these information flows can include any combination of primary and or secondary communications. Primary communications include exchanges between two primary nodes (such as person-to-person or person-to-group or person-to-observation or sense), whereas secondary communications are exchanges of information from a third-party source (such as news services, radio, and the Internet).

**The Speed of Information Exchange 3.3**

The speed at which information flows is very important in helping to understand the rate at which values are exchanged. In a society where information flows quickly, values have the potential to change quite often. So, when an individual is bombarded with differing information flows, it becomes very challenging for a person or collectivity to make rational decisions about a belief. When this situation presents itself, the person will do one of two things: shut down and cease to function properly, or accept a belief based upon faith, which can result in the creation of fictitious values, once again a bounded rational assumption. This phenomenon resonates with Rosenau’s idea of fragmentative dynamics, where he states that the rapid flow of ideas and information across boundaries has shifted authority and influence from traditional authority structures to new structures that are perhaps more fluid and more in line with modern values (Rosenau 51).

…a communications revolution has facilitated the rapid flow of ideas, information, images, and money across continents; a transformation revolution has hastened the boundary-spanning flow of people and goods; and organizational revolution has shifted the flow of authority, influence, and power beyond
traditional boundaries; and an economic revolution has redirected the flow of goods, services, capital, and ownership among countries. Taken together, these flows have fostered a cumulative process that is both the source and the consequence of eroding boundaries, integrating regions, proliferating networks, diminishing territorial attachments, truncated traditions, coalescing social movements, weakening states, contracting sovereignty, dispersing authority, demanding publics, and expanding citizen skills—all of which also serve to generate counterreactions intended to contest, contain, or reverse one or another of the multiple flows and thereby preserve communities and reduce iniquities. (Rosenau 51).

These thoughts from Rosenau also resonate well with Frederic Jameson’s idea and notion of society as schizophrenic, in the sense that under these circumstances, society loses identification to meaning, mainly because it has limited time and resources to disambiguate correct from incorrect information (Foster 143). Similarly, these ideas also correlate with Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of Liquid Modernity:

A liquid modernity, where the traditional certainties have become fluid and blurred, presents a major challenge...The world is changing so quickly that homo-sapiens, learning animal par excellence, can no longer rely on strategies acquired through learning experiences, let alone those derived from traditional values or wisdom. The excess of useless information creates a glut. When saturation level is reached, accumulation ceases to be a sign of wealth and becomes undesirable. Knowledge is confined--discarded like refuse--in the infinite capacity of cyber-computers. (Bauman 2006;15-26).

Under these conditions, fictitious values based on personal observation or faith are often created. This situation actually contradicts the views of the positivists (as discussed Chapter 2), by stating that rational processes, thoughts and structures can actually lead people back to making irrational or “bounded” value judgments. Bounded judgments are defined as the use of illogical and or nonvalidated information to defend or refute a particular belief. It is the belief in a particular value that may aid a person in the pursuit of their personal sovereignty and greatness. Irrational valuations give individuals the ability to alter their beliefs based upon information that they manipulate or
unconsciously accept, which assists in their pursuit of utility maximization. Again, this correlates with Nietzsche who argues that, “values and their changes are related to increases in the power of those positing the values” (Nietzsche14).

**Value System 3.4**

Up until this point, value has been discussed quite frequently, mainly associating it to the socially understood role as something of importance. However, value has two uses as articulated by Adam Smith:

>The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in exchange.’ The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it (Smith, Book 1, Chapter 4).

Going forward, this dissertation will mainly focus on the “value in use;” herein defined as the monetary and/or nonmonetary resources that a person spends or invests to acquire an asset or commodity. “Value” as defined herein is the price a particular “use” can command in the marketplace. Historically, human existence can be viewed in the context of acquiring values – or acquiring uses, also known as utilities. Assets or commodities can be anything that take up time or require financial resources to acquire them. The value system then is the aggregate view of all investments and purchases that provide utility to a particular person or group. For instance, some may argue that personal health in the United States is gaining value, mainly because more time and money is being spent to acquire it. The reason for this may lie in the acceptance of new studies that have altered society’s belief system. As argued earlier, the more one believes in particular
information flow and the more one believes in its outcome, the more value will be
assigned to it.

A different example, one more in line with the overall subject of this dissertation,
draws on the work of Bertrand Russell. In *Religion and Science*, Russell highlights the
impact that new revolutionary scientific ideas had on religion:

The first pitched battle between theology and science, and in some ways the most
notable, was the astronomical dispute as to whether the earth or sun was the
centre of what we now call the solar system (Russell 19).

On the one end of the argument was the religious authority who claimed that
everything revolved around the earth and the earth was the center of the universe. To
support this argument, they referred to particular scriptures in Psalms, a book of the Old
Testament. On the other end, Copernicus, a great scientist of the Middle Ages,
subsequently learned that the sun was the center of the universe and therefore the earth
revolved around it. This new information flow, which was later proved correct according
to scientific principles, put substantial pressure on the infallibility and or literal meaning
of the Bible and religious teachings more broadly. In this situation, the useful value of
religion became less and the useful value of science became greater. In this book, Russell
highlights many examples where science and theology came in confrontation, ultimately
showing that a literal reading of the Bible and the overall beliefs of the church were not
necessarily aligned. Because of this, Russell states:

Successive scientific discoveries have caused Christians to abandon one after
another of the beliefs which the Middle Ages regarded as integral part of the faith,
and these successive retreats have enabled men of science to remain Christians…
(Russell 172).

Looking at this from the Islamic perspective, Mohamed Charfi, professor of law,
argues that the Qur’an also has similar problems with literal interpretation. Referring to
the holiday of Ramadan, the Qur’an states, “Eat and drink until you can tell a white thread from a black one in the light of the coming dawn. Then resume the fast until night fall” (Qur’an 2:187). Using this example of Ramadan, Charfi argues that the Qur’an’s literal interpretation of this holiday requires a Muslim to refrain from eating from “sun up” to “sundown.” However, Muslims who live in Nordic regions where sun up and sundown may be 24 hours a day obviously cannot remain faithful to such rules. Because of these contradictions, Charfi states:

> The ulema (defined as educated Muslim scholars) therefore had to avoid taking the Qur’an literally and to adopt a solution logically consistent with its spirit. Is this not striking irrefutable proof that the Qur’an spoke a language that the inhabitants of Arabia understood fourteen hundred years ago, and that outside that time and place, its letter is often inappropriate and sometimes entirely inapplicable (Charfi 98)?

It is observed from both Russell and Charfi that when new information or differing information flows come into contact with traditional information sources and subsequently challenge those sources, the values of those traditional sources become less.

**Conclusion 3.5**

What was learned from this chapter is that there are determinants of value, intensity, duration, certainty and remoteness. When any of these four determinants are further solidified or challenged by new information flows, a revaluation occurs. However, sometimes these revaluations happen due to either biased or unvalidated information, thus artificially maintaining higher values or lower values on assets that are not rationally justified. It was also determined that the speed of information has substantial impact to the valuation process. Additionally, the evolution of information communication
technologies, providing speedily information exchanges, coupled with the notion of higher scientific knowledge, mandates accelerated decision making. Because of these new features provided in postmodern society, society becomes exposed to the risk of making irrational valuation decisions. Unlike pre-industrial society where people made irrational valuations because of lack of information or perhaps lack of intellect, postmodern society runs the risk of making irrational valuations based upon the opposite effect. Because of too much information coming from different sources and at different speeds, coupled with utility theory, people readjust, making valuations based upon those thoughts that bring them the most utility, not necessarily the truth, if there is such a thing.

What this appears to demonstrate is that the levels of information provided to society fall upon a pendulum: on the one end, not enough information, and on the other end, too much information, with each extreme leading to bounded rationality. When using this in the religious context, it is observed that premodern societies believed in a god because they were either told to do so by someone superior to them or because they were not scientifically literate enough to know the shortcomings of such belief systems. Similarly in postmodern society, these same individuals hold to religious belief systems because there is so much information, most of which providing differing facts, each again putting negative value pressure upon the four determinants of value. Thus, in postmodern society, people tend to factor information into or out of the valuation equation based upon their own utility, all in hopes of increasing their capital base.
Chapter 4 – Further Reflections on Capital

Introduction 4.0

Most people when probed with the question, “what is a value system” or “what are your values” most likely would fumble around looking for the correct words to define or describe such a system. There probably would be different interpretations and calculations in the manner in which these individuals answered the question. Because of this presumed lack of definitive understanding regarding values or a value system, this chapter will explore the importance, definition, and calculation of such a system, ultimately developing a valuation framework to calculate the value for god.

To understand the importance of value systems, we first must acknowledge that a value system for any person is comprised of two factors: time and money. The first factor, time, is rather fixed in that we each have 24 hours in a day and 365 days in a year. Throughout one’s life, considering the finite expectancy of about 70 years, it is fair to say that only limited time is available to purchase those possessions that bring a person the most utility. For example, a person may spend a great deal of time working, perhaps much more time than spent with family. Does this mean that the individual values work more than family? The answer is maybe. From another angle, this person may believe that long hours at work will enable the acquisition of long-term value for herself and her family. Examining this in financial terms, this individual is investing time in work so that she may not have to work later in life, at which point she may reap the benefits of that work. This person believes that investing in work (ie, spending more time at work) will actually deliver greater future benefits and utility than investing in the family would today.
The second factor of a value system, money, is obviously highly variable from one individual to the next. Similar to time allocations, we can comprehend part of the value system by understanding how people allocate their financial resources. Financial resources are a combination of one’s current and previously stored earnings. Possible sources for previously stored earnings could be an individual’s personal savings, employment earnings, or inheritance. Utilizing the same work/family example above, if one spends more financial resources on family as opposed to work, either as an investment or a commodity purchase, then again it may be presumed that this person values family more than work. But this is not necessarily so. This example was chosen to demonstrate that the total value of a particular possession is the aggregate of both the cost of time and the dollar value of purchases.

In short, a value system is the accumulation of possessions that people deem valuable. These possessions are values based upon time and financial resources spent to acquire a particular utility. Therefore, value equals utility/usefulness, and thus a value system is equal to a utility system. Similarly, a person increases or decreases value based upon the enhancement of a particular belief. As shown by Bertrand Russell, because religion has been substantially challenged by scientific discovery over the centuries, religion and thus belief in god has lost its command of authority--and thus value--because doctrines that were once formally understood as literal were challenged, then overturned, then reinvented by the same religious authority. As we will continue to see through the remainder of this dissertation, when religious suppliers of values are challenged by other competing religious suppliers, such suppliers will alter their offerings and creatively destroy themselves in hopes of winning in the exchange relationship.
There is, however, a notion that is very important to understand here. Value is a
time-based, human construct that can be understood only in the context of a finite time
system. Value obviously does not exist beyond the human world, demonstrating that the
God of monotheistic faiths, such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, does not have a
value system (ie, thus cannot think in value terms, as humans do) because such a God is
argued to be infinite, with no beginning and no end. Another notion to consider: each of
the monotheistic faiths believes in the afterlife, in the sense that the faithful will live on
past this human world. Because of this, it can be argued that believers of such faith who
truly acknowledge the afterlife have a similar position with god and therefore should not
have a value system. Thus true believers should not feel challenged or threatened by
scientific inquiry or from any other earthly value that confronts the authority of god,
because to these true believers, value and logic do not exist and therefore the
confrontation is illogical. Logic, the underbelly of value creation, breaks down into mine
fields of distortion when ideas of infinite time and everlasting life are adopted. To these
believers, god is God, and there should be no value association. To these believers, god
cannot be a value judgment but rather a revelation-like understanding supported by some
phenomenological experience. To the extent possible, these types of believers I classify
as Category 3 (see Chapter 1). Considering these believers are outside of logic, we can
no longer analyze such behavior and therefore we must focus exclusively on
understanding the behaviors of Category 1 and Category 2 believers, as described in
Chapter 1.

However, despite this proposition for Category 3 believers, it will be argued that
believers in monotheistic faiths, particularly those in democratic, capitalistic societies, do
not adhere to this revelation phenomenon but rather creatively destroy their beliefs in a value-based proposition for god, ultimately valuing god based upon the benefits that He provides. God and believer becomes a pure exchange relationship (In this sentence, God refers to god, lower case g, as earlier defined).

Valuation 4.1

Moving forward, from this analysis, it can be argued that value received from an asset or a commodity is equal to or greater than the cost needed to acquire that asset or commodity. Therefore, Value \( V \) is equal to or greater than the cost to purchase the asset or commodity. We can take this equation a step further by arguing that value equals or is greater than the sum of both the opportunity cost of time \( OC \) and the opportunity cost of money \( C \), which together equal the opportunity cost of capital. Thus, \( V \geq (OC + C) \).

This equation states that people will pay for a possession by spending time and resources to acquire it assuming it is the best known alternative. The value of a particular possession varies from individual to individual based upon Bentham’s four determinants of value creation. To understand the differences in the valuation of possessions for each individual, we need to reintroduce two variables that make up value as earlier shown: risk and reward. Risk is defined as the chance that one may not receive the benefit associated with purchasing a possession. Thus, the more risk of not receiving a particular benefit from a possession, the lower the price a person will be willing to pay for it, and the greater the discount a prospective purchaser will expect. Reward in this context is the opposite of risk. People may be willing to pay more for a possession due to the quality and consistency of benefits associated with owning such a possession.
For example, a person has the option to purchase one of two automobiles: Automobile A or Automobile B. Automobile A, based on recent consumer feedback is a steady performer with a good history. Automobile B, which has the exact same specifications as Automobile A is produced by an unknown company with a limited history and no consumer feedback. When background information on the producers is not available, a purchaser will make a decision based purely on the expected benefits of the vehicle, without regard for the character or makeup of the manufacturer. However, when background information becomes available, most would choose Automobile A, mainly because it appears to have less risk due to the stability of its manufacturer. Under this example, the purchasers are modifying their values based upon Bentham’s four determinants, yet the main driver between both options is risk.

This example can be applied to sects and schisms with discrete faiths, such as Pentecostalism and Catholicism, or between entirely different faiths, such as Christianity and Islam. The former represents an Interbrand example and the latter an Intrabrand example (Introvigne). Utilizing the schism example within Christianity, assume that a potential believer is in the market to find a church, spiritual home, or a faith. The person has only two options: Option A, the Roman Catholic Church and Option B, the Pentecostal Church. The Roman Catholic Church has a very long history and a substantial membership base with established governing rules, processes, and doctrines. On the other hand, the Pentecostal Church, a denomination of Protestantism, has been around only for a short time, has very few processes, and is mainly governed by local practices, customs, and doctrines of the local minister. The Roman Catholic Church, it can be argued, has less risk to the purchaser, mainly because history has proved that its
doctrines have been studied and validated due to the long-standing history and substantial membership base. The Pentecostal Church, on the other hand, has little history and tends to be more charismatic and accepting of new practices and doctrines—or perhaps lack thereof. The membership base is much smaller than the Roman Catholic Church, thus making the point that it is less validated and has potentially more risk.

Assuming for a second that both churches provide the same benefit, it could be argued that by adding risk, people would be more willing to pay a higher price for the Roman Catholic Church membership, mainly because the risk discounts the possibility of receiving such future benefits.

In short, the price one is willing to pay has a great deal to do with the risk \((R)\) of not receiving the benefits ascribed to a particular possession. By understanding risk, we can alter the equation once more to be the following:

\[
V = \text{Benefits} \geq \frac{(OC + C)}{(1+R)}
\]

By adding \((1+R)\) to the equation, we in fact are creating a mechanism that will discount the overall value and benefits that are supposed to come from such a possession.

Assume there is a very bright, yet extremely lazy child who just got accepted to a prestigious and expensive university, such as Yale, Harvard, Columbia, etc. The child’s parents receive a welcome package from this university in the mail, which states that the cost to attend this university for four years will be approximately $200,000. With this information, the parents need to ask themselves, is it worth sending their child to such an expensive university? Despite the strong parental belief in an excellent education at a prestigious university, their belief may change when they factor in all of the information regarding their child. Due to the child’s laziness, the risk of dropping or failing out of
school could be very high. It is also possible that the child will finish school, yet continue to be lazy, making him other unemployable and unable to reap the benefit from this possession (an expensive college education). Because of these beliefs, the parents now armed with information on college costs and their child’s unstable work ethic, adjust the risk factor, causing a shift in value. In this situation, R>0, thus decreasing the overall benefit and value that the education will bring them via their child’s attendance. Perhaps it makes more sense to send their child to a state university or community college, where the child can still get an education but at a much lower cost (in both time and money).

From this example, we can understand that information about their child, coupled with the cost of the institution, altered the value placed on this education. Here the parents are altering their beliefs based upon the determinant of certainty.

Utilizing the same situation, yet changing the ability of the child from one who is smart yet lazy to one who is smart and assertive changes the investment profile. In this scenario the investment benefits are probably or could be substantially greater than the cost. To make up for the increased benefits, I will alter the equation again, this time adding a growth (g) factor to the equation. The growth factor increases the benefits that will come from such an investment:

\[ V = \text{Benefits} \geq \frac{(OC + C) \times (1+g)}{(1+R)} \]

In this situation, the parents may decide that the $200,000 value for the education is actually a fair or perhaps even an understated price, mainly because the benefits accrued to them are greater than the cost. In this situation, the parents believe that the child will not squander the education, but rather will exploit its benefits. The parents do consider some risk but, more importantly, believe that the benefits will be much greater
than the cost. Note: risk and reward are not mutually exclusive but rather are interchangeable, and most situations will have both variables as part of a valuation. In both of these situations the parents are not buying a commodity but rather are making an investment in an asset (I purposely ignore multiple years/periods for the moment). The asset in this case is their child’s education, which holds the potential to reap future benefits for them and their child.

Again, utilizing the church example, when analyzing the choices between Option A, the Roman Catholic Church and Option B, the Pentecostal Church, the purchaser would need to acquire greater benefit from the Pentecostal Church to help offset the higher risk, which is mainly attributable to its lack of history, processes, and validated doctrines. In order to provide greater benefits to compete affectively against the Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Church will need to either invent/create new doctrines, practices, and processes (or all of the above) in order to compete effectively for new members. Simply put, the Pentecostal Church needs to increase the benefits or reduce the risk to compete effectively. Because of this need to increase value, pressures are put upon clergy to either invent new services, such as social events like dinners, dances, parties, or doctrinal exaggerations, such as the health and wealth doctrinal positions. The health and wealth doctrinal positions are relatively new interpretations of the Bible that argue that believers should be healthy and wealthy and those who are not are not living a life according to god’s laws and rules. The benefits that these purchasers are buying include both worldly and otherworldly values, such as prosperity and/or peace on earth and/or everlasting life in heaven. This Christian example can be correlated to the Islamic faith. For example, the Sunni sect of Islam can be equated to the Catholic Church and the
Shiite/Sufi sects can be equated to the Protestant faiths. The Shiite/Sufi sects, which broke from the original Sunni sect, are presumably more risky and therefore need more benefits to offset the higher risk. As we will see in later chapters, there are many mutations of both the Christian faith in the United States and the Islamic faiths in Turkey. The preponderance of these mutations appears to be caused by market forces acting upon the product’s current market position.

Unlike commodities, which bring immediate gratification, assets require a long-term perspective. People invest in assets, both tangible and intangible, in hopes that it will bring future rewards. Obviously, there are many factors that go into the decision-making process to invest in assets. When individuals consider making an investment, they tend to think in terms of future benefit and the time in which the investment has to grow. Considering the time (t) element in an asset purchase, we can manipulate the equation even further. By adding time to this equation, we are in essence building a similar model to that which is used in modern security valuation analyses. What this model tells us is that value is equal to the discounted future benefits associated with investing or purchasing a possession:

\[ V = \sum \text{Benefits} \geq \sum \left( \frac{((\text{OC}+C) \times (1+g)^t)}{(1+R)^t} \right) \]

This model is only partially complete and assumes that the benefits that will accrue to a person are one-time benefits, which is probably not the case. The true understanding of the benefits, such in the case of the students or religious purchasers, would look something more like this:

\[ V > \sum \left( \frac{(\text{Benefits} \times (1+g)^0)/(1+R)^0) + (\text{Benefits} \times (1+g)^1/(1+R)^1) + \ldots (\text{Benefits} \times (1+g)^t / (1+R)^t) } { } \right) \]
This equation is changed to demonstrate that benefits to a particular person may change over time, depending upon risk and reward. It is also interesting to note that the benefits in the very distant future may be substantially less valuable than the benefits today. The investor will discount future benefits more than current or near-term benefits because substantial new information can alter the value before the possession’s utility is fully received. This resonates well with the ideas of the afterlife and/or heaven. For the rationalists, the Category I and Category II believers, the benefit of heaven does not materialize into a substantial value until a person comes closer to death. An interesting data point to help solidify this principle is in relation to the users who visit Beliefnet\(^3\), an Internet site tailored to education about different faiths. Quantcast\(^4\), an Internet traffic rating and demographic company, shows that users of Beliefnet.com are twice as likely to be those older than 50 years of age in comparison to other well-known websites.

People or groups invest in assets because they deem the future benefits worth it. For instance, people invest in stocks or other securities today in hopes that at some later date the value of that possession will increase their overall financial resources in relation to others. This is what is referred to as future value. Similar to stocks, people invest time and money in those possessions that they believe will increase in overall value/utility.

Going back to the previous education example, the parents of the child perform a valuation in their minds that is similar to the scenario that follows. They need to spend \$200,000 over the next four years to put their child through university, thus they will spend \$50,000 per year, ignoring annual price increases. This \$50,000 per year can get X% return if they kept their money in the bank. By investing the \$50,000 in the


education, they are in essence making the assumption that the benefits/utility that will come to them via their child’s education will be greater than X% in the bank. This analysis is more than just numerical and financial, but the parents need to analyze what this decision will do to their overall utility system. For example, what will this investment do for their relationship with their child? They may even wonder what it will do for bragging rights among their competitive peers? All of these thoughts and judgments add or take away from the value system. More importantly, they assume that these benefits will be compounded, similar to the way in which a bank or financial institution offers compound interest on demand deposits, CDs, and the like. This idea is what in the financial services industry is referred to as net present value (NPV). Quantitatively, NPV

\[
NPV > 0
\]

\[
NPV > \sum((Benefits \cdot (1+g)^0/(1+r)^0) + \ldots \cdot (Benefits \cdot (1+g)^n/(1+r)^t))
\]

A positive NPV signifies that the investor/purchaser is getting more value than they are paying for and will move forward with the purchase. Benefits can be both positive and negative. For instance, in year 0 above, the investor initially puts out either some time or financial obligation, with the hopes that this investment will reap future rewards. In this sense, the benefits are the net effect of those benefits that are positive and those that are negative. In the financial world, this model uses cash flow to explain this same phenomenon. For the god valuation model employed here, both the cost of time and money will be utilized.

In the university example, the parents would assume a four-year investment horizon to begin recovering their investment. Assuming that the reason for the initial investment was to reap the benefits of their child’s success, the investment horizon would
presumably be very long, from the time the child graduates college to the time he or she retires or dies. Again, the personality and talents of the child will determine the growth of the education benefits. The higher the growth and the longer the time to reap the benefits, the greater the value placed on a particular asset. Similarly, the higher the risk associated with the asset and the longer the time period, the lower the overall value. People will always seek situations where NPV > 0, but never will they knowingly enter into a situation where NPV < 0, as this would indicate that the asset will not accrue any future benefits. It is this fundamental idea that drives utility theory and capitalism more broadly. Utilizing this same concept and application to the church example, a church member will spend time and give money to a church all in hopes that these investments will provide future benefits, such as heaven in the afterlife. Additionally, some members believe that giving time and money today will also provide them short-term benefits, such as health and wealth (discussed above). Perhaps they can gain recognition and the feeling of trust by their peers.

Benefits will continue to be innovated as the product of god continues to mutate over the centuries. An example is Joseph Simmons, formerly known as Run Love and now referred to as Reverend Run. Reverend Run was formerly one of the megastar performers who made up Run DMC, a rap group that topped the R&B charts. Reverend Run is now a minister of Zoe Ministries and hosts a show called “Run’s House.” where he shares his life with MTV viewers. Reverend Run does not perform religious services in a church but rather offers benefits such as guidance on his show and via his daily “Words of Wisdom” e-mail blast. Reverend Run’s words of wisdom are being sent out to thousands of people daily. Another good example is Creflo Dollar (yes, that is his birth
name), a minister who propagates that god promises health and wealth to his followers.

Minister Dollar lives this belief by driving around in his Rolls Royce, which was given to him from members of his congregation, and enjoying his $3 million dollar mansion in Atlanta and his $2 million dollar condo in Manhattan. He represents to his listeners and members that health and wealth are virtuous and should be part of each Christian’s life.

Below is a small excerpt from Minister Dollar’s section of his website, www.worldchangers.org.

Are you tired of living from paycheck to paycheck?
Have you ever observed a need that you longed to meet, but you didn’t have the finances to help?
Do you yearn to sow freely into the needs of the ministry?
Do you want more out of life for you and your family? If so, you need the School of Prosperity!

Even though you are to owe no man any thing, but to love (Romans 13:8), having no increase renders you useless to the kingdom of God. By the same token, you can experience financial increase, but existing debt can just as easily hinder you from kingdom advancement. Dr. Creflo A. Dollar’s School of Prosperity is a course designed to teach you how to fulfill your God-given destiny, to be a blessing to others and by being His distribution center.

Whether you are financially comfortable or head over heels in debt, you need this course! You will learn:

Why God wants you rich

How to use biblical principles to make natural principles work on your behalf

The keys to debt reduction

How to increase for kingdom advancement

The automatic systems for financial freedom
Obviously from Minister Dollar’s website it can be argued that there are short-term benefits to becoming a member of his School of Prosperity and of Christianity more broadly.

Another important point yet to be considered is the number of similar options available to the purchaser. If, for instance in any of the above-mentioned cases (either the automobile, education, or church) other options were substantial in number, the possibility of choosing the possession that brings the most utility would be extremely challenging. Utilizing the church example, with each additional new denomination there comes a substantial change in the ability to make the right decision, thus causing pessimism and lack of trust regarding any of the denominations. Just as important, when other new information or discoveries challenge such religions in their entirety, such as the Copernicus or Ramadan example, all the variations of these products become challenged and thus increase risk, calling into question the doctrines and beliefs. In both of these situations, and bringing in Bentham’s four determinants of value back into the equation, the value will be challenged due to the lack of certainty. When this happens, value decreases, causing people to sell their investments or stop engaging in such behavior. To offset the uncertainty in this situation, religious producers alter their product, perhaps by changing the intensity of the product’s benefits. It is fair to argue that value of such products decrease based upon the number of choices available, because it becomes very costly to support the value.

Thus far, I have discussed how people make value judgments and how such value judgments accumulate utility in a value system. Considering that a value system is equal to a utility system (as explained earlier), the logical conclusion can be made that value
and utility systems are systems that quantify the wealth of a particular person or collectivity. This is because capital quantifies the usefulness of a basket of possessions, which are acquired through persuasive contractual exchange agreements with other individuals. One’s total capital determines how she will succeed in value exchange transactions, mainly because capital accumulation is exponential. Thus, for each new acquired capital, a person acquires additional possessions, which further assists in the acquisition of more capitals.

**Value Transfer 4.2**

It can be concluded further that each and every value exchange requires two parties: a person accepting a possession and a person providing a possession (buyer and seller). Both want to maximize their own position, in turn maximizing their utility systems. A contract, although often a mutually beneficial agreement, often appears as a form of value transfer in which one party acquires, loses, or holds static the utility relationship. When observed in this manner, it becomes evident that every value is used to acquire capital or maintain its existing capital structure, and because of this each and every person will do whatever is required to assist in gaining an advantage in value exchange transactions.

Thus, the utility and or value system is also the aggregate of their capital or what I term the Capital structure. The theoretical Capital structure is the weighted average summation of all capital, which consists of Primary and Financial Capital. Primary Capital is the accumulation of talents and abilities that can be used to influence others or used as a means to amass Financial Capital. A person’s Primary Capital can be understood as the accumulation of (1) Physical Capital (PC), one’s physical ability; (2)
Intellectual Capital (IC), one’s intellect; and (3) Social Capital (SC), one’s overall relationship network. It is important to understand that Primary Capital encompasses those values that help a person acquire Financial Capital or utility, and therefore there are an infinite number of Primary Capital. Financial Capital is the amount of discretionary cash available to a particular person or group, which can further assist in the acquisition of additional Primary Capital. FC comes from three main sources: earnings from an existing profession, bank earnings, or unrealized capital gains. Each of these earning streams is directionally reflective of the amount of Primary Capital a person has acquired throughout life. To assist in explaining these relationships, consider for example a well-educated executive who is very influential in his business and social environment. If and when he chooses to enter into a contract, he will most likely have a powerful position from which to attract a situation that is most favorable to him. The reason this is possible is because he will divest some of these social and intellectual benefits he has acquired, presumably through his education and networked relationships. Because of his access to these stored values, he will most likely increase his FC in the process because he will divest one value for the accumulation of other values – presumably those that appear to bring more utility, and thus will further aid in the pursuit of personal sovereignty and greatness. Another example is that of a preacher and congregant. A preacher who values theology and presumably has a great deal of a religious capital can acquire FC by entering into exchange transactions with his congregants. In both situations, the goal of the businessman and the preacher is to exchange a capital they have in exchange for another capital – all in hopes of increasing their overall utility system.
What we can learn from this is that the greater the cost to acquire and maintain the capital structure, the less value will be put upon each new incremental possession. This idea resonates again with what we showed earlier regarding the idea of individualized risk, and the inverse relationship between wealth and the quantity of goods possessed (Bernstein 103-105). What this means is that as people acquire more, either through debt or equity purchases, they start to question all future values and become pessimistic regarding new opportunities and capital acquisition. It also argues that those with higher costs of acquisition and higher costs to maintain such positions become even more pessimistic. Therefore, the wealthy, well educated, cultural elite or others who maintain a high level of PC or FC become pessimistic or a bit eccentric regarding future decisions. This form of pessimism is what Nietzsche argued is the precursor to nihilism (Kaufman 11). “The logic of pessimism down to ultimate nihilism: what is at work in it? The idea of valuelessness, meaninglessness: to what extent moral valuations hide behind all other high values ” (Nietzsche11).

So, with each subsequent increase in the capital structure, not only is the person becoming more powerful but they are also creating systems to help minimize risk of loss. It is the importance of these assumptions from which Nietzsche believed all ethics structures stemmed. According to Nietzsche, this type of phenomenon not only created ethics but also created the disciplinary institutions from which we now slave.

Capital structure is in essence the quantification of how a person is invested for growth and quantifies the person’s ability to influence others in contractual relationships. A person who has a weak capital structure will not be positioned for utility maximization because he will have succumbed to the will of those who possess a much stronger capital
structure. The process is one in which people exchange their capital, mainly by the alteration of beliefs, which are caused by continuous and differing information flows. These belief alterations spur change in investment forms of capital and assist in accumulating more FC.

Theoretically, capital structure is expressed in the following analytical manner:

\[
\text{Capital Structure} = (\% \text{ of CS that is Primary Capital} \times \text{Cost to acquire and maintain that capital}) + (\% \text{ of CS that is Secondary Capital} \times \text{Cost to acquire and maintain that capital})
\]

In this sense, the capital structure is the historic cost to purchase/acquire the capital, plus the cost needed to maintain the capital. The goal of the individual in the capital system is to acquire as much capital as possible but at the lowest cost. Looking at this from a purely financial point of view, assume for a second there are two individuals, one who has vast financial resources and has accumulated advanced degrees with a strong relationship network made up of similar and like-minded individuals who maintain similar social positions. The other individual has limited financial resources, has only a high school diploma, and maintains social relationships with like-minded individuals who maintain relatively similar social positions. Now you need to ask yourself who of these individuals would be more successful in acquiring assets and commodities at perhaps similar or even lower prices? The answer may appear obvious; the second individual, the person with the weaker capital structure, would be a higher risk to those who may want to lend money or time to her. Because of the higher risk, the second individual would need to pay a higher price to borrow money or garnish time from those who may want to enter into an exchange relationship. The higher cost for the second individual thus puts the person in a situation where they cannot afford other assets or commodities. Thus from
the perspective of the lender, the second individual has a higher R, thus the lender
demands a much higher benefit to offset the higher risk. Because the first individual can
command a lower discount rate because of the lower risk, they will win in most
competitive exchange relationships and will have the chance to accumulate more.
Summary

The above diagram is a representation of the exchange of values: assets or commodities, tangible or intangible, real or fictitious. The purpose of the diagram is to show that people will exchange one value, such as “education” for other values, perhaps “stocks.” The exchange process is theoretical because the exchange is non-quantifiable and is only known by the seller or buyer of a particular capital. The value exchange process is endless and continues with each and every value judgment made. Importantly, with the adoption of time/space technologies, the value exchange process accelerates mainly from the facilitation of advanced information communication technologies. The value
exchange process assumes that every action in life is a value exchange action, in the sense that all time allocations and financial resources are used to acquire more or less of similar or different values. As the diagram depicts, one may exchange sleep for work, or time with the family, for education. Each of these actions are exchange actions, all with the hope of enhancing the utility system. The value exchange process is a process whereby people alter their value system by acquiring those values that bring the most utility and similarly divest those which do not. When looking at value exchange in this manner, it becomes clearer that every action in the capital system is driven by utility and wealth maximization.

Financial Capital Explained 4.3

Moving away from a more abstract example and by adding money to the equation, it can be concluded that all values/utilities are measured in the form of assets and commodities, which can be assigned a monetary value. French economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) summarized this process most eloquently:

To the extent that men became familiar with the practice of valuing everything in money, of exchanging all their entire surplus for money, and of exchanging money only for things which were useful or pleasing to them at the moment, they became accustomed to consider the exchanges of Commerce from a new point of view. They distinguished between two persons, the Seller and Buyer. The Seller was the one who gave the commodity for the money, and the Buyer was the one who gave the money for the commodity. The more money came to stand for everything else, the more possible it became for each person, by devoting himself entirely to that type of cultivation or industry which he had chosen, to relieve himself of all worry about providing for his other needs, and to think only about how to obtain as much money as he could through the sale of his produce or his labour, in the complete certainty that with this money he would be able to get all the rest. It was in this way that the use of money prodigiously accelerated the progress of Society (Clark 531).
It is important to note that although money accelerated society, the thought of accumulation and gain was always part of the human condition (as explained in Chapter 3). What money provides, as Turgot goes on to say in *Reflections*, is moveable capital. Moveable FC is surplus money that can be stored and quickly moved into other ventures:

Anyone who, whether in the form of revenue from his land, or of wages for his labour or his industry, receives each year more value than he needs to spend can put his surplus into reserve and accumulate it: these accumulated values are what is called a capital (Clark 536).

This new financial capital, quickly spawned capitalism--the economic system based on open, free markets where people are engaged in competitive commercial activity with hopes of providing for their current or future needs. By understanding capital accumulation, people had to make choices about their accumulated and moveable wealth. Unlike times prior to the invention of moveable capital (the 1700s), people now had the ability to do one of two things: invest their FC in new ventures, or keep their FC “under the mattress.” Again, as stated, these choices were mainly decided by risk and reward. As shown previously, the higher the risk to reward ratio, the less likely one would invest in a particular asset and vice versa.

With the understanding of risk and reward, coupled with the innovation of money and moveable FC, all values became associated with price. For example, if an investor had the ability to invest in a historically proven enterprise, as opposed to a new venture, the risk associated with the enterprise would be substantially minimal, whereas the investment in the venture would be much higher. To make up for this risk of the venture, the entrepreneur had to do one of two things: show that the venture had strong growth opportunity in the future, or offer the investment at a substantially lower price than the farming or manufacturing operation. It was this type of competition that drove and
continues to drive the capitalist system. With the accumulation of moveable wealth, entrepreneurs had to compete aggressively for capital, thus they had to continuously alter and transform their businesses continually into those that increased the return on the invested capital. If entrepreneurs could not sustain a strong profit or could not execute on the previously agreed upon business plan, capitalists (owners of capital) would move their money to other more profitable investments. To attract and keep FC, entrepreneurs must drive new growth continuously by winning against rival competition and new market entrants.

Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* states:

The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production, or transportation, the new markets, the new form of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates (Schumpeter 83).

Schumpeter goes on to say that the capitalist system needs to expand continually into new markets and that entrepreneurs continually must alter their businesses. They must do so by changing manufacturing and production capabilities and altering the nature of their organizations, which can and does include altering the role of the human element in business. These changes are what Schumpeter coins “industrial mutation.” He argues that the alteration of business structures must come from within an organization, “incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 83).

The change of a business organization from within and from the outside is broadly defined by Schumpeter as the “Process of Creative Destruction.” Schumpeter shows that because of a competitive market and the quick changes that must occur to ward off rival competition, business organizations are constantly on the defense against perceived
threats from rivals. These threats cause entrepreneurs to exercise constant discipline, thus always pushing to make their organizations more efficient and more profitable. Albeit real or fictitious, these threats will drive organizations to employ technology to make their organizations more effective. Additionally, they will also strive to create a more efficient labor element by initiating programs and providing benefits that ultimately drive increased production.

These ideas resonated with Frederick Taylor (1856-1915), who developed systematic labor methods that led to increased production for the factory and perceivably increased benefits for the employee. Taylor’s principal invention was the division of labor, breaking up the producer’s fulfillment processes into smaller sections of a supply line, all in hopes of studying each subgroup to deliver more efficiently that group’s products. However, the Process of Creative Destruction arguably goes beyond “Taylorism,” not just by enhancing the physical production processes of the factory but also by altering the internal workings of the employees themselves. The Process of Creative Destruction is not just about altering modes of production from the factory’s viewpoint, but rather altering the modes of production by altering the laborer’s internal essence. This idea can be best understood by the example put forth by Michael Budde and Robert Brimlow in *Christianity Incorporated*. In Chapter 2, the authors make the argument that corporations are recruiting spiritual leaders and religious organizations within the workplace to help drive a more productive and happy workforce. They cite Christopher Neck and John Milliman, who argue that spirituality and religious programs at work can do the following for the organization: 1. Enhance the employees intuitive abilities; 2. Increase innovation; 3. Drive a more purposeful vision; 4. Help retain the best
employees; and 5. Enhance teamwork (Budde, Brimlow 34). The overall purpose of spirituality and religious programs at work is to create a more productive and industrial work force. This idea echoes the ideals of many firms in Asia that utilize exercise time, such as Radio taisō meditation and other spiritual practices, to drive production efficiencies within the employee workforce.

Perhaps just as important as employee production efficiency is the fact that the capitalist system must expand into new markets to drive labor and technology efficiency, and must also solicit and construct social organizations that further the capitalist ideal. These construction processes include recruiting all forms of power and authority that might limit, if not negatively affect, capitalist production and accumulation. These powers include secular government, religious authorities, schools, police organizations, and the like.

This Process of Creative Destruction is most obvious in advanced capitalist societies such as the United States, where the economic system is traded on public exchanges or in aggressive private capital markets. With the invention of the stock and bond market and the evolution of communicative technologies, the capitalist system has moved from a slow-paced moveable capital model to one where capital can be moved instantly. Using the United States as the benchmark for open capitalist markets, we come to understand how this system works most effectively. For example, in the United States when a publicly traded company does not reach its agreed upon revenue and profit targets, the stock price will drop, mainly because investors will sell the stock and move on to something more reliable. Investors alter their value because the information they received altered their belief system, thus mandating them to make a decision. As they
invest this moveable FC into other stocks, the receiving stock price will go up. Similarly, if an investor has money in a bank at an X% depository rate and finds that another similar bank is offering X+% depository rate, that investor will move the moveable wealth out from X% bank and into X+% bank.

Creative Destruction 4.4

From competition for capital, Schumpeter’s Process of Creative Destruction extends further, perhaps even further than he perceived himself, ultimately disciplining entrepreneurs, capitalists, workers, the government, and all other authority structures. In essence, all participants in the system creatively destroy their personal values and historical virtues to further their chances of obtaining more capital. By exchanging societ al values from those such as family, religion and other traditional structures to the entrepreneurial and capitalist values, society transfers authority from traditional, perceivably collective authority structures to new, self-interested structures. In doing so, these new structures use their capital to influence and acquire other additional capital sources, such as government, religion, and more. By doing this, they construct societal institutions from which to discipline and educate their dominated purchasers.

Although ultimately disagreeing with the outcome of The Great Transformation, I cite Karl Polanyi who clearly understood the powerful pressures that capitalism places on cultural goods. Polanyi understood that traditional authority structures, such as family, religions, schools, etc. were based on social relations prior to capitalism, but after the invention of capitalism, social relations and traditional authority structures became embedded in and subject to market relations. Polanyi states, “A new way of life spread over the planet with a claim to universality unparalleled since the age of Christianity
started out on its career, only this time the movement was on a purely material level” (Polanyi 136).

However, Polanyi argues that society has and will counter the forces of free market capitalism by ultimately creating a spontaneous reaction that will be grounded in the ideals of collective society (Polanyi 156). Polanyi believed that collective society had the ability to regain influence and thus put pressure on further expansion of capitalism. Disagreeing with him, it appears that he did not necessarily foresee the deep globalization of capital that now exists. With such deep and fast-moving capital within global society, traditional value structures are and will continue to be exchanged for new value structures; society perhaps loses its ability to check the influence of such a system. The Polanyi double movement loses its ability to govern and counteract the influence of such expansion (Polanyi 136). This change is very important to understand for society as a whole, because when one understands the hidden nature of the capital system, one can see that all possibilities of revolting or counteracting the forces of such system are lost.

Zygmunt Bauman argues a very similar perspective:

…we seem to be no longer in control, whether singly, severally or collectively--and to make things still worse we lack the tools that would allow politics to be lifted to the level where power has already settled, so enabling us to recover and repossess control over the forces shaping our shared condition while settling the range of our possibilities and the limits of our freedom to choose: a control which has now slipped or has been torn out of our hands (Bauman 26).

Underpinning the democratic capital system is a system of control and discipline, but not like control and discipline of the previously established modern or premodern institutions. Unlike modern institutions that evolved to help govern society, the capitalist system goes beyond, becomes not only the authority but also the teacher, the policeman,
the priest, the mother, etc. The capital system governs not from above per se, like the Leviathan, but governs from below, teaching and disciplining society to become wealth maximizing individuals. In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri explain this disciplinary institution in the following manner:

The disciplinary institutions, the boundaries of the effectivity of their logics, and their striation of social space all constitute instances of verticality of transcendence over the social plane. We should be careful, however, to locate where exactly this transcendence of disciplinary society resides. Foucault was insistent on the fact, and this was the brilliant core of his analysis, that the exercise of discipline is absolutely immanent to the subjectivities under its command. In other words, discipline is not an eternal voice that dictates our practices from on high, overarching us, as Hobbes would say, but rather something like an inner compulsion indistinguishable from our will, immanent to and inseparable from our subjectivity itself (Hardt, Negri 329).

The democratic capitalist system goes beyond just disciplining society to be the best wealth maximizers, but rather also distorts, destroys, and modifies the ontology of a human being by modifying its core, by removing its previous functionality in hopes to create newer beings, with new desires and new wants, once again all in hopes of driving capital expansion. Society becomes capital; society becomes fluid with no barriers and no bounds known to its existence. These ideas are similar to Hardt’s and Negri’s notion of subjectivities. They claim that capitalism in its natural ability to push expansion actually modifies the essence of humanity, in a sense that humanity becomes fluid, not fixed to anything, including the capital system. For capitalism to expand, all authority structures must be broken down, unless of course such structures further the expansion of utility maximization:

The great industrial and financial powers thus produce not only commodities but also subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical context: they produce needs, social relations, bodies and minds – which is to say, they produce producers. In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production and production is made to work for life (Hardt, Negri 32)
Hardt and Negri correlate the changing role of societal institutions and individuals themselves with the evolution of the modern factory, the factory representing the social institution and the worker and machines representing the equipment.

The modern social institutions produced social identities that were much more mobile and flexible than the previous subjective figures. The subjectivities produced in modern institutions were like the standardized machine parts produced in mass factory: the inmate, the mother, the worker, the student and so forth. Each part played a specific role in the assembled machine, but it was standardized, produced en masse, and thus replaceable with any part of its type. At a certain point, however, the fixity of these standardized parts of the identities produced by institutions came to pose an obstacle to the further progression toward mobility and flexibility. The passage toward the society of control involves a production of subjectivity that is not fixed in identity but hybrid and modulating. As the walls that define and isolate the effects of modern institutions progressively break down, subjectivities tend to be produced simultaneously by numerous institutions in different combinations and doses (Hardt, Negri 331).

It is this change from a Hobbesian authority structure, such as the Leviathan, to a structure embedded within capitalism that causes great concern for civil society. Unlike the Leviathan structure of overt rule, the capitalist structure is made up of networked and masqueraded structures that are extremely hard to locate and counteract. For instance, when looking at modern religious institutions, it becomes difficult to understand if such institutions are maintaining a value for god or have become one of the subjectivities that drive the capitalist system and the devaluation of god altogether. It is argued that religious institutions in democratic capitalistic societies have become subjectivities because such organizations are disciplined by the same rules of value exchange.

Again these ideas correlate with Hardt and Negri, who claim that modern social institutions produce new identities that are more mobile and flexible than traditional identities, mainly by creating multiple identities for a single person (Hardt, Negri 331).
As in Fragmegration, identities are pulled apart, yet pushed together at the same time. In order for capitalism to expand its reach, it must break down traditional authority structures and boundaries and then later build new disciplined authority structures based upon the inherent rules of the system. It is argued that this has led and continues to cause changing identities to monotheism in all democratic, capitalist societies. This will be explained further in subsequent chapters.

**Conclusion 4.5**

The main purpose of this chapter and the previous one was to first expand upon the sovereignty and liberation argument of Chapter 2, and to perform a logical, bottom-up study of the evolution of capital accumulation in an effort to understand the impact this evolutionary process may have on advanced capitalistic societies.

This analysis argues that a person values those things that bring the most utility. These values are comprised of tangible and intangible possessions, which consist of assets and commodities. In turn, these assets and commodities constitute the basket of possessions that are referred to as the value and/or utility system or also referred to as a person’s capital structure. Value is the aggregate cost to acquire a particular possession and that value is a direct reflection of the benefits that will presumably be derived from such a possession. It has been determined that the risk of not receiving benefits from a particular possession actually reduces value. Conversely, there are times when the benefits due may actually be greater than the cost of the possession, thus increasing the value.
From here I demonstrated that people will allocate their time and financial resources to those values that bring the most utility in the short- and long-term. This was done by addressing the discounted value of future benefits, which demonstrated that those possessions with benefits that will not materialize until the very distant future may hold less value than a possession that will avail immediate benefits, mainly because there is risk in waiting for such benefits to mature. However, this analysis implies that the closer a person gets to their benefits, the more valuable these benefits become. Moreover, this section showed how a person makes value judgments based upon Bentham’s four determinants of value. This chapter also demonstrated the disturbing notion that because of the breakdown that can occur in the value exchange process, people may value those things that are based upon potentially false information.

An understanding of values/utility enables insight into the pursuit of capital. This analysis argues that the pursuit of utility is actually a pursuit of capital, mainly because such capital assists in influencing contractual arrangements between parties. Capital can be broken down into two forms: Primary Capital and Financial Capital. Primary Capital is made up of an infinite number of forms such as Intellectual Capital, Social Capital, and Physical Capital. Each of these is competitively accumulated to assist individuals in obtaining Financial Capital. This analysis argues that one of the main purposes of the capitalist system is to assist humanity in quantifying utility. The theoretical capital structure can be explained as the weighted average summation of all capital forms, such that all forms equal 100% of the applicable capital available. Each of the capital forms have an associated cost, such that one’s personal capital structure may have a higher cost
than another. The capital structure can also be viewed as the accumulation of time and resources spent to accumulate values to help maximize utility and future potential.

Finally, this chapter explored the historical works of Schumpeter, who argued that the Process of Creative Destruction is actually the main driver behind the capitalist system. Additionally, a review was conducted of the more recent writings of Hardt and Negri, who claim that capitalism not only demands the Process of Creative Destruction for the corporation, but also demands the Process of Creative Destruction for each part of society, which is disciplined to modify itself and all of its values to adopt the rules of capitalism. The overarching outcome of this chapter shows that every aspect of life in an advanced capitalist system becomes commoditized and loses traditional relevance, mainly in an attempt to adopt new identities that assist in maintaining its societal influence. This chapter also proposed a simple valuation framework that will be expanded with each subsequent chapter. This valuation framework is the basic underpinning of the quantitative portion of this dissertation.
Section II

Chapter 5 - Debating the Conch

“The rock struck Piggy a glancing blow from chin to knee; the conch exploded into a thousand white fragments and ceased to exist.”

Lord of the Flies

Ralph Beats on Jack 5.0

The opening salutation is an excerpt from the famous 1954 book, Lord of the Flies, by William Golding. The book’s underlying story has many meanings, some clear and others buried, but as interpreted by this writer, the overall story is about ethics, governance, freedom, and human nature. In the story, the conch represents, in a figurative sense, ethics and law. When the conch explodes it defines a climatic turning point with the children who inhabit the island. For some, the conch may represent a symbol of historically developed ethics and governance grounded upon previously understood laws and social norms, whereas for others, the conch represents a constraint to more freedom not encumbered by the conditions of previous lifestyles.

In this chapter, there is a similar explosion of the conch, a similar fight amongst harmless schoolboys, and there clearly is a perceived winner, who, like Jack, may actually win the outwardly facing fight but forever lose the opportunity to govern a civil society. This chapter is a metaphorical story of that fight.

Unlike Section I, which focused on the empirically rational and naturalistic understanding of the human condition, this Section provides a more philosophical and theological interpretation of human nature as explored by contemporary and historical
scholars. From these historical interpretations of human nature, it will be argued that they give an historical account of how views of human nature have changed and what effect these changes have had on socially constructing individuals as consumers (including religious products) under capitalism. Up until this point, this analysis has put forth an interpretation of the human condition with regard to how humanity makes value judgments to accumulate capital, using the rational tools from which modern society disciplines. Thus far we have seen how people acquire, assimilate, and change valuations based upon new information flows and newly acquired knowledge. Additionally important, this analysis shows that all values (assets and commodities, both tangible and intangible) in a capitalistic society become ultimately associated with monetary price mainly to assist humanity in maximizing utility through the exchange relationship. To maximize utility, humanity utilizes all of its Primary Capital to accumulate Financial Capital and vice versa, and will subsequently creatively destroy and bring into the exchange relationship all traditional authority structures to help them continue their utility-maximizing efforts and to maximize their capital structure. In short, in a democratic capitalist society, everything becomes associated with monetary value as defined by price. Those things that cannot be associated with price and utility maximization are discarded as irrational and unworthy claims.

Although understanding the human condition is challenging unto itself, it is perhaps less challenging than trying to comprehend and define humanity, mainly because the human condition encompasses the earthly environment that is understood by our rational faculties, which include but are not limited to time, space, and number as argued by Niebuhr, Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Bentham, Mill and others. On the one hand, the
human condition attempts to explain the rational actions that one is socially constructed to make in general situations based upon the knowledge and beliefs of that particular individual (and society in general) and his need and want to maximize his utility system. On the other hand, as we will see in this section, human nature tries to explain the essence of humanity as a being composed of mind, body, and spirit, an entity that perhaps has a purpose and destiny in the worldly and otherworldly environments. As we will see, encompassing the comprehension of the human condition, human nature endeavors to explain why people have an internal pursuit for otherworldly values such as “heaven” and “salvation.” Many would agree that the human condition is less controversial and cosmological than human nature because the human condition is based on the presumably explicable world, whereas human nature takes into account those things that are inexplicable and outside the reach of existing human intellect.

Utilizing the texts of the Bible, Qur’an, and the Sharia, coupled with philosophical references, this chapter and the next will describe various understandings of the Abrahamic aspect of human nature, concentrating predominantly on the Christian and Muslim perspectives, yet also visiting the definitions of human nature as explored by the philosophers of antiquity and their contemporary counterparts. These chapters will span eastern and western thinkers, which include but are not limited to, Durkheim, Spencer, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, Luther, Erasmus, Augustine, al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, Ibn Taymiyya, and Ibn Khaldun. The goal is not to take a position on any one of the philosophies of the thinkers cited, but rather to demonstrate the changing views of human nature and to correlate such changing understanding to the hypothesis more broadly.
Similar to the story *The Lord of the Flies*, where there is a competing ideal between both groups of boys, this chapter will show that there is a similar competing stress between the two polar positions, one supporting reason and the other supporting empiricism, the latter potentially destroying the conch, yet idealizing a new conch that does not exist as a formal position but rather a position that is hidden and constructed into the minds of its participants. The new system’s values cannot be countered or challenged empirically, only debated. As MacIntyre shows, the system’s values become, or already are, grounded upon ideas that are plural, supported and adopted by those who believe that the loudest and most eloquent debater and speaker holds the most intelligent position. The system becomes grounded in Emotivist discourse, where there is no right, no wrong, only comparative hues of such graying tones (MacIntyre 23-35).

**Supporting Scriptural Reference 5.1**

Despite what some may believe about the validity of religious and philosophical texts and their interpretation of human nature, it is fair to say that even if the Bible, Qur’an, and/or other philosophical texts (which are cited herein) are read as literary novels or books of fiction, many can still glean that the thoughts and ideas describe the various understandings of the “Abrahamic aspect” of human nature. Herbert Spencer, the father of social Darwinism and a known agnostic, concluded in *First Principles*, that even the most ridiculous historical stories, in almost all circumstances, come from some actual occurrence. Referring to religion and belief in god, Spencer states that religious beliefs that have always existed and shall continue to exist are all based on some ultimate fact, and to think that such beliefs are absolutely groundless discredits the average human intelligence. Similarly, Spencer goes on to state:
Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to admit that if not Godly derived as the majority contends, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized. (Spencer, Paragraph 4)

Correlating Spencer’s ideas to the previous chapters, it is suggested from Spencer that participation in a religion is a value judgment that has changed over time. And because it is a value judgment, it is implied that it is also a mechanism to increase capital, and perhaps these judgments are mechanisms to accumulate power.

Perhaps more importantly, Spencer argues that he has found an a priori reason for:

…believing that in all religions, even the rudest, there lies hidden a fundamental verity….this fundamental verity is that element common to all religions, which remains after their discordant peculiarities have been mutually cancelled. And we have further inferred that this element is almost certain to be more abstract than any current religious doctrine” (Spencer Paragraph 7).

It seems that Spencer is arguing that when all judgments are removed, there remains this hidden or opaque ideal sought by such religious participants, which many rationalists, as we will see later, equate to a god or a godly like spirit – a thing or phenomenon outside of logic and empirical valuation. However, it seems that because this godly like spirit is outside of logic, it continues to lose its salience and is continually challenged as history becomes older and society becomes more constructed to adopt empirical intelligence.

From this idea of a godly like spirit, it is reasonable to suggest that Spencer would agree that religious stories, which are the essential doctrines and articulations of religions, are accurate to some extent and are at least partly valid representations of society as a whole, and that such stories are grounded in something outside of human logic, something perhaps only applicable to humanity.
To summarize Spencer, it appears that he believes that at the most basic level of humanity, there is this need for something that religions provide, something that when all normative value judgments are removed, connects the fabric of human civilization. Spencer does not go so far to argue an a priori claim for god, but rather a prior claim to something that religions provide – something that has united humanity in different geographies and in different time periods.

Similar to Spencer, Emile Durkheim, in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, argues that if religion was not founded in the nature of things, it would have met societal resistance and that it would not be able to overcome (Durkheim 2). So, similarly to Spencer, Durkheim would also agree that the religious stories and references that help define human nature are grounded in something real, an a priori claim of sorts. Durkheim accepts that all religious beliefs rest on an experience that is not inferior to scientific experiences, but rather he accepts that religious experiences are different subject matter altogether and it may not be valid to test such experiences using the same rational and empirical tools as those used in scientific study (Durkheim 420). Durkheim not only argues that religions are grounded in reality but that “all the great social institutions were born in religion” (Durkheim 420). He argues that the first manmade systems of representation in this world were of religious origin and that all knowledge, including philosophy and science, were born in religion. He states that such religions helped form the intellectual capacity of humanity (Durkheim 8). Durkheim continued to define this principle of representation by further arguing that religious representations were/are societal representations that express social realities and that rites that are borne of religion are representations of society (Durkheim 9). Durkheim concludes,
At the foundation of all systems of beliefs and all cults, there must necessarily be a certain number of fundamental representations and modes of ritual conduct that, despite the diversity of forms that the one and the other may have taken on, have the same objective meaning everywhere and everywhere fulfill the same functions (Durkheim 4).

Durkheim goes even a step further in this analysis by stating that,

At the root of our [value] judgments, there are certain fundamental notions that dominate our entire intellectual life. It is these ideas that philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, have called the categories of understanding: notions of time, space, number, cause, substance, personality. They correspond to the most universal property of things. They are like solid frames that confine thought. Thought does not seem to be able to break out of them without destroying itself, since it seems we cannot think of objects that are not in time and space, that cannot be counted and so forth (Durkheim 9).

Durkheim makes a point of noting that “the division of days, weeks, months, years, etc. corresponds to the recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals” (Durkheim 10). Similarly, he states that:

For the principal features of collective life to have begun as none other than various features of religious life, it is evident that religious life must necessarily have been the eminent form and, as it were, the epitome of collective life. If religion gave birth to all that is essential in society, that is so because the idea of society is the soul of religion (Durkheim 421).

**The First Value Judgment 5.2**

Perhaps the most important element that comes from Durkheim and Spencer are their abilities to recognize that value and therefore value judgments were borne of religion and these judgments correlate with the ideals of the human condition as previously discussed. So, one can argue that if religion was one of the first organizations to recognize and define value, it perhaps is also one of the first organizations to understand truly how to aggregate power. As argued by Spencer and Durkheim, this power provides religion with its primary function--to act upon moral life, to assist in setting rules that are grounded in
the real fundamental elements of a collective society, and to recognize that the soul of religion is manifest in collective realities and social action. According to agreed upon rules of conduct that are presumably delivered from god, one of the major purposes of religion is to assist humanity in living a socially ordered life. However, because religion is a value judgment it takes on properties dictated by the human condition, which means it takes on the principles of utilitarianism. This important distinction is necessary to understand because it draws the logic that religions therefore create ethics and rules that perhaps are not godly but rather human. It is argued that over time, these ethical systems become more and more human and more influenced by utilitarianism.

Even if one would take the position that religion and its governing systems are not godly derived but rather value judgments passed down from generation to generation, many would agree that such systems were intended to be representative of collective society and its ideal of such society to live according to some fundamental verity. Alternatively, one can take the position that because value judgments were either created and or encouraged in religion, religion was the first organization to spawn the idea of utilitarianism. Religion therefore created both the ethical and utilitarian systems. The latter, it will be explained, is the system that ultimately devalues the value of god and puts pressure on the salience and ethical governing authority of religious institutions, which will be shown to potentially threaten the existence of collective life.

What will continue to be shown is that the underlying a priori knowledge will ultimately be divorced from religion, and all the power that this a priori claim commanded earlier in history will be transferred to the humanist formation of the religion. Religion becomes a purely human institution governed not by some a priori
claim or something grounded in truth, but will take on the principles of utilitarianism and will ultimately need to creatively destroy itself in order to compete with more capital-rich institutions or other value-based judgments. Institutionalized religion becomes the proverbial and prophetic harlot, who sells herself in the marketplace.

As argued by Spencer and Durkheim, all knowledge, including secular and theistic, grew from religion. Although many would agree with this hypothesis and argue that religion was the foundational structure that fostered knowledge, this same or sub-segmented group may also argue that such knowledge was not god-inspired, but rather a learned and observable metamorphosis. Interestingly, religion has created a type of knowledge contradiction for its own followers. In a sense, religion has directly or indirectly created notions of time, space, number, etc. and has created the foundation for scientific principles, those same principles that challenge the foundation of religion and belief in god altogether as described with the Copernicus and Ramadan example in the previous chapter.

Throughout history, many believed that rational and empirical faculties were not the only human tools from which to explain worldly and otherworldly phenomenon, as there are many instances in the Bible and Qur’an that define powers outside of mind and body, powers that refer to god features such as the Holy Spirit or Holy Ghost.

The following are historical references from the Bible and the Qur’an that define powers outside of rationality and logic:

1. In the New Testament Book of Luke 12:12, Jesus, the Christian Messiah, states to his followers, “For the Holy Spirit will teach you in that very hour what you ought to say;”
2. In the New Testament Book of Acts 2:4, the writer Luke states, “And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance;”

3. In the New Testament Book of 2 Peter 1:21, the writer Peter states, “for prophecy never came from the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.”

4. In the Qur’an, Sura 2.97, Muhammad, the Islamic prophet of god, states, “Whoever is the enemy of Jibreel—for surely he revealed it to your heart by Allah’s command, verifying that which is before it and guidance and good new for the believer.” In this passage Jibreel is synonymous with an angel Gabriel, the angel of divine action.

5. In the Qur’an, Sura 32.9, Muhammad states “the He (referring to god) made him complete and breathed into him of His spirit, and made for you the ears and the eyes and the hearts…”

As we will continue to see throughout this analysis, the scientific notions that challenge the existence and power of god have been tools used by Empiricists and Skeptics throughout history to challenge anything not logically proved, such as these features of god discussed above. Because value was created in religion, it is argued that religion is the ultimate institution that destroyed the value of god and the use of such previously understood faculties such as the Holy Spirit. Religion created the tools from which to challenge all those things not scientifically proved and thus is the institution that challenges the revelation-based aspects of the faith. Ultimately, religion creates its own
destructive forces, while thinking that it is maintaining or mutating in hopes of sustaining its value.

Historical and contemporary arguments still debate about whom or what caused the first value judgment that sparked the acquisition of knowledge. There are two opposing groups who attempt to answer this question: one on the far right, referred to as the knowledge a priorists, and one of the far left known as the knowledge a posteriorists. Knowledge a priorists claim that knowledge is independent of experience and is innate of humanity; they believe that knowledge is instilled in the mind, body, and soul of man by god, or that it is perhaps present at the point of creation, therefore it is unexplainable by empirical observation. Contrary to knowledge a priorists, knowledge a posteriorists claim that all knowledge is dependent upon experience and that there is no such thing as innate knowledge.

As we will see, the fundamental differences between these groups issued a significant challenge to society when trying to understand ethical- and other rule-based governance structures, such as religion. For the knowledge a priorists, ethics is an unchangeable constant passed down by god via the prophets or innately created by god within the human mind and spirit; whereas knowledge a posteriorists believe that ethics and rule-based structures can only come from empirically based knowledge with the understanding that such structures are subject to change as new information is acquired.

In addition to examining this topic from either the knowledge a priorist or knowledge a posteriorist perspective, there are an infinite number of viewpoints that can fall between these two extremes. It is helpful to look at this debate from a philosophical perspective, including the extreme positions of rationalists and empiricists. Rationalists,
who are also knowledge a priorists, argue that there are times where the content of our knowledge is greater than the information that our life experiences have provided. They agree that some knowledge is innate within humanity, and that this inherent knowledge created the first value judgment. Early rationalists argue that there is inherent knowledge, knowledge outside of scientific principles that they refer to as priori knowledge. Like knowledge a posteriorists, empiricists present similar yet different ideals to knowledge a priorists and rationalists. Empiricists develop accounts of how experience provides humanity with the information that rationalists argue is innate. Empiricists take the position that all knowledge is experiential and that there is no knowledge that is innately born into humanity -- learning begins only at creation. Empiricists believe that although the genesis of knowledge is currently unknown, it will ultimately be discovered through future scientific inquiry. The rationalist and empiricist arguments can be summarized by three distinct and notable theses. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rationalism versus Empiricism provides a very nice summary of these arguments:

**Innate knowledge thesis** claims that knowledge is not learned through experience but rather is just part of our fundamental nature. Participants of this school hold that experience elicits learning by bringing innate knowledge into consciousness.

**Intuition/Deduction thesis** claims that knowledge is learned through a process of intuition and or a deduction where one derives conclusions based upon rational insight or through valid arguments that are based upon such insight. Participants of this school believe that learning comes from both intuition (learning’s outside
of the senses) and deduction (learning’s experienced by understanding cause and effect)

**The empiricism thesis** claims that we have no source of knowledge other than experience/deduction. Participants of this school believe that learning only starts and birth and it only comes by experiencing cause and effect which is communicated the senses.

Each of these three theses can summarize the philosophical and theological debate that has gone on throughout history. Although not necessarily using the same lexicon, theologians have engaged in debates similar to those of the philosophers. As we will see in Chapter 5, the innate knowledge thesis takes an absolute position, claiming that all knowledge is innate to humanity’s intellect. Under this thesis, humanity is created with inherent knowledge, and there is no such thing as learning through experience (and therefore no learning at all). Plato was probably one of the earliest philosophers who adopted the innate knowledge thesis. The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* paraphrases Plato’s position,

> How do we gain knowledge of a theorem in geometry? We inquire into the matter. Yet, knowledge by inquiry seems impossible. We either already know the theorem at the start of our investigation or we do not. If we already have the knowledge, there is no place for inquiry. If we lack the knowledge, we don’t know what we are seeking and cannot recognize it when we find it. Either way we cannot gain knowledge of the theorem by inquiry.

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/)

The innate knowledge thesis can also be viewed as a determinist perspective. According to this thesis, all knowledge and thus all actions assumedly are determined by
some a priori knowledge or what can also be defined as god. The other extreme position is the empiricism thesis, which argues that no innate knowledge is and that all knowledge is learned through inquiry. The empiricism thesis can be mapped to what we in democratic, capitalistic societies refer to as free will. Free will in this sense means that we can acquire and learn what we want mainly by acting upon our own inquiry and desires. Like the empiricism thesis, free will maintains that there are no supernatural constraints to our learning, thus no constraints on exercising humanity’s will. Free will takes the position that humanity becomes whatever it wants to be.

Author Richard Dawkins, a staunch empiricist, employs some skeptical language about the innate knowledge thesis by arguing that just because we cannot prove everything does not mean that we should accept those things we cannot prove. Dawkins believes that at some point, science will solve all hidden mysteries:

There’s an infinite number of things that we can’t disprove….You might say that because science can explain just about everything but not quite, it’s wrong to say therefore we don’t need God. It is also, I suppose, wrong to say we don’t need Flying Spaghetti Monsters, unicorns, Thor, Wotan, Jupiter or fairies at the bottom of the garden. There’s an infinite number of things that some people at one time or another have believed in, and an infinite number of things that nobody has believed in. If there’s not the slightest reason to believe in any of those things, why bother? (Wolf 184)

Similar to Dawkins, David Hume argued a similar perspective in 1751 when he published, *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*:

If we take in our hand any volume—of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance—let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume 173)
The last and compromised position between both extremes is the Intuition/Deduction Thesis that argues both positions, making the claim that while some knowledge is innate, much other learning needs to be acquired. In 1691, philosopher Rene Descartes wrote *Rules for the Direction of our Native Intelligence*, Rules II and III, pp. 1-4, arguing that we know a priori is certain, beyond the even slightest doubt, while what we believe, or even know, on the basis of sense experience is at least somewhat uncertain. Similar to Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz argued in his book, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, that:

The senses, although they are necessary for all our actual knowledge, that is to say particular or individual truths. Now all the instances which confirm a general truth, however numerous they may be, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of this same truth, for it does not follow that what happened before will happen in the same way again…From which it appears that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics, and particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on instances, nor consequently on the testimony of the senses, although without the senses it would never have occurred to us to think of them… (Leibniz 150-151).

Differing from all of the above positions, Immanuel Kant argued “That knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt…But…it by no means follows that all arises out of experience” (Kant, Introduction paragraph 1) Kant states that “…it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself” (Kant, Introduction paragraph 7) In *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant fundamentally asked, “how can we know things?” Kant argued that the mind works by absorbing raw “noumena” information, then analyzing, synthesizing and making sense of it in the form of ‘phenomena’ or sensory understood information, all under the constraints of time and space. This noumena information cannot be understood without the ability of
the senses, under the constraints of time and space, to form it into phenomenological information. Kant believed that noumena information caused phenomena, meaning that he believed that cause created effect.

Also, Kant believed that if there is information that is outside of time and space, such as a god, it is impossible for the mind to validate empirically its truth because it is outside of the normal structured processes of the mind and therefore outside of phenomenological interpretation. Kant’s position was that we know only those things which the mind allows us to know, meaning those things which the senses can comprehend in a spatiotemporal world. However, because the mind could not comprehend things outside of spatiotemporal framing, Kant did not argue that there was/is no god, but rather that it cannot be proven under existing knowledge constraints. Addressing the positions of his peers, Kant suggested that both the innate knowledge thesis, determinism perspective and the empiricist, naturalist determinist perspective were both problems for society. First he argued that because we cannot comprehend things outside of the phenomenological world does not mean that they do not exist. In relation to this, he argues that there may be a god. Second, he believed that a natural determinist perspective or an innate determinist perspective would ultimately lead to bad ethical character or fatalist behavior. Trying to reconcile his position with ethics, Kant seems to have embraced the idea of a free will, arguing that people have choices to live as civilized human beings and not subject to the rules of natural or innate determinism. For Kant, human beings need to act as if they have choices, regardless if the world is metaphysically determined or not. For most scholars, Kant put an end to the medieval debates of free will versus determinism. On the heels of Kant, the discussions took on a new character moving away from theological discussion.
about god and rationality to a more psychological discussion regarding the structure and applicability of the mind in helping to establish the rational actor and paving the way for the ideas of the Enlightenment and the construction of humanity as *homo economicus*.

These theses are important to understand tangentially because they are and continue to be debated not only in the realms of philosophy, natural sciences, and sociology, but also in theology. From these debates we can understand the changing value of god in modern society. As we will see, the topic has challenged many great minds since the beginning of history, which include but are not limited to Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics, Descartes, Kant, Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Arminius, Whitfield and Wesley, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldun. By understanding these debates and the evolving perspective of the Christian and Muslim population from antiquity to modernity, we learn that such change in perspective has consequences to the Christian and Muslim faith and perhaps society more broadly. These consequences will be addressed in Chapter 6 and 7.

To summarize thus far, the overarching premise of this chapter is to show in the aggregate historical worldview that there has been and continues to be a contested, evolving debate on the origin of knowledge (and by default also the origin of ethical systems). On one extreme, there is the argument that knowledge/ethics is innate and inborn in humanity. On the other hand, there is the perspective that nothing is innate and everything is learned through experiences, which may alter the need for earlier learning and understanding. It appears that, although Kant resolved much of this problem by showing that knowledge comprises both experience and reason, he created another problem regarding the defensibility of ethical systems. Because of this, there still seems
to be a somewhat hostile perspective from empiricists and rationalists, the former continually argue against such rationality of intuition and the latter argue against the creation of personal ethical structures. There is also a spirit of hostility building from philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, who argues that empiricism is a fictitious project that failed mainly due to the weak foundation on which it is built.

**Rise of Empiricism 5.3**

As humanity continues to learn and the average intelligence continues to grow as defined by modern standards, downward pressure will continually be applied to the value of the innate knowledge thesis and the belief in values outside of the empirical logic, such as the idea of god. This negative hostility and continued push from the empirical pole, it can be argued, has gripped most of secular society and perhaps has also taken hold of those believers who perhaps historically were wed to some form of innate knowledge. For instance, many studies have been conducted that conclude that increased secular knowledge, particularly in the area of natural science, is correlated negatively with belief in god. This would also assume a negative correlation to the innate knowledge thesis, when such a thesis is understood to have a supernatural component. In his recent book, *The God Delusion*, Richard Dawkins stated:

> Of the 43 studies carried out since 1927 on the relationship between religious belief and one’s intelligence and/or educational level, all but four found an inverse connection. That is, the higher one’s intelligence or education level, the less one is likely to be religious or hold “beliefs” of any kind (Richard Dawkins, *God Delusion* 102-103).

To account for the rise in empirical knowledge, the valuation model will once again change to reflect this new variable. Up until this point, this dissertation has
explored the concept of valuation as it relates to generic assets or commodities. At this time and going forward the valuation is constructed to address the value of god. I define god as a basket of products that either singularly or as a group offer any direct or peripheral value. Going forward, the valuation of god will be expanded upon continually, adding identified variables as appropriate. The first variable that will be added to the valuation model is that of secular knowledge. Considering that secular knowledge as described by Dawkins is correlated negatively to the belief and value in god, it will become one variable that makes up the capital structure.

Previously we have shown that:

\[
\text{Value of God} = \sum((\text{Benefits} \times (1+g)^0)/(1+\text{CS cost})^0+..(\text{Benefits} \times (1+g)^t)/(1+\text{CS cost})^t)
\]

Where, CS cost = 1+((% of CS made up of Education Expenses) + (% of CS made up of Other PCs * Cost of those PCs)

If we look at the equation initially with a cost of zero, the overall value would be the summation of benefits. However, when we add in the cost of a person’s education per se, we come to understand theoretically that the value of god decreases, mainly because the denominator is now greater than one. Taking this equation further, we can break down PC into an infinite number of variables that are negatively correlated with belief in god. It can be argued that incremental utility maximizes a person’s capital structure, simultaneously devaluing the utility of god. Thus, utility maximization and value of god are correlated negatively. To make this statement more broad and direct, capitalism and democracy, as the principal drivers of utility maximization, are correlated negatively with the value placed on god.
**Conclusion 5.4**

Underpinning this chapter are the ideals of the human condition, which imply that humanity will constantly desire those values that increase its utility. Because of this, it appears that as humanity becomes more intelligent, based upon the modern perspective of intelligence, grounded in understanding the application of empirical tools, humanity perceptively will move further away from metaphysical ideas of god and religion. Thus, as time grows older, logical succession would entail that humanity, motivated by empiricism would most likely become less dependent on anything not empirically proved and the idea of an innate knowledge thesis or thought will become less relevant. Religion may become purely humanized, grounded upon a collection of value judgments, perhaps biased by utility maximization. Perhaps at first glance this does not seem important to the socialized modern or postmodern individual, but it will be seen in the next chapter that the changing mindset from innate knowledge to empiricism changes the overall way that humanity views itself. This directly affects the value people associate with god. Humanity becomes socialized to act as modernity dictates. As we will continue to see in the next chapter, in this scenario, humanity has moved away from being an entity that is protected and created by god to one that is solely responsible for itself, a mini-god, if you will. So, if humanity embraces the belief that it has the ability to change society for the better by adopting modern principles, it perhaps runs the risk of becoming lost and confused by its own distorted notions of time, space, and number. If humanity moves toward a purely empirical-based nature, god as historically defined will be changed not only by secularists but also by theologians. Logical progression of these causes would
affect religious leaders by disciplining them to alter doctrines and liturgies to compete with the modern and postmodern fruits of capitalism and democracy, only to be lost to further alienation and division by its own constituents.

This chapter has argued that within early religions there was a fundamental verity, something that grounded religion with the ideals of collective society. This ideal, it was argued, is or was the ideal of a priori knowledge, something unknown, yet rational to the premodern individual, something that emphasized and governed collective society. This something, this a priori knowledge, this god became challenged throughout history, mainly by the rise in empirical observation and mastery of the senses.

This chapter briefly touched upon the innate knowledge thesis, which argues that all knowledge is innate and thus all knowledge is predetermined at birth. This chapter looked at the Empiricist thesis, which argues the contrary point, stating that all knowledge is learned through experience of the senses. Not taking a position on which, if any, of these arguments are correct, this chapter looked at actions of religious institutions that created utilitarianism and further influenced the development of modern government structures. Because of these actions, it is argued that religious institutions have, over time, adopted the Empiricist thesis and subsequently put aside mention of innate knowledge. So, it is also argued that religious institutions created the foundations that now challenge and will continue to challenge their own existence and the value of god more broadly. Religious institutions in essence first devalued god by taking the Empiricist position and further devalued god by creating institutions that compete against utilitarian-based rules, yet at the same time employing such utilitarian modes of behavior to effectively compete against the utilitarian rules it created. In order for such religions to
compete with these values, they would need to modify continually and enhance the benefits offered and subsequently reduce the ethical rules, which they previously mandated. By following this path, religion in democratic capital societies would ultimately become devoid of any god or attributes of the first god and would creatively destroy and alter its product offering to maintain its user base. The impact of these devaluations will be articulated in later chapters.

So, of the schoolboys, who won the fight, Jack or Ralph? In *The Lord of the Flies* Jack wins the outward fight for the rule of the new, unrecognized conch and the theoretical role as head of the new society. After Jack wins the fight, he attempts to kill Ralph and while he is just about to accomplish his mission, at the climatic ending to the story, a British naval officer arrives on the island to rescue the boys. The irony in the story and the irony within this chapter is that the person doing the saving, either the British officer or the religious actors, both represent a manifestation of the broader society, perhaps plagued by the same disease of which it is trying cure society. Both are infected with necrosis. From this chapter, it was learned that empiricism has destroyed the conch of tradition, the conch of religious veracity. However, what comes to light is the actuality that empiricism was created from religious actors, those same actors most vehemently arguing for the traditional conch and role of religion as moral authority.
Chapter 6 - The Changing Understanding of Humanity

Durkheim states, “...whenever we set out to explain something human at a specific moment in time – be it a religious belief, a moral rule, a legal principle, an atheistic technique, or an economic system – we must begin by going back to it’s simplest and most primitive form” (Durkheim 2).

Another “Disquieting Suggestion” 6.0

Despite Kant’s argument in Prolegomena that knowledge comes from both experience and a factor of innate cognition, each providing a portion of the overall learning phenomena, many people throughout history and in contemporary society continue to take bi-polar positions regarding how one learns and how such learning can or cannot assist humanity in accomplishing humanity’s goals. It is suggested in this chapter that these polar positions have altered human nature and because of this has altered the manner in which people embrace historical values.

This chapter will present varying interpretations of human nature and the principles underlying the historically identified ethical rules of Christianity and Islam. To do this, this chapter will refer to Christian texts of the Old and New Testament and the Islamic texts of the Qur’an and Sharia, all of which many would agree have presumably been so resistant to major social change. In addition to examining these texts, this chapter will review historical definitions of humanity as interpreted by Reinhold Niebuhr, who analyzes and defines humanity through the perspectives of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and early conservative Christians. This chapter will also analyze two short chronological histories, one of Islam and the other of Christianity, outlining the competing views of human nature, as understood from religious and secular thinkers. From the Christian, particularly Western, perspective the views of Augustine and Pelagius, Luther and Erasmus, Calvin and Arminius, Whitfield and Wesley, and several more contemporary
theologians will be explored. From the predominantly Eastern Islamic perspective, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Khaldun, and a few more contemporary scholars. These perspectives will cover the period from the 5th century A.D. through today. Within each of these debates, a shift in consensus from the innate knowledge thesis to the empiricism thesis can be identified, emphasizing that the secular, free will perspective is now prevalent in modern thought. Additionally, I will demonstrate that Christianity in the United States and Islam in Turkey both have lost important aspects of their faith that were previously evident throughout the apostolic and premodern ages. Lastly, the perspective of human nature as it exists today will be examined, and it will be determined what impact, if any, this new view of human nature holds for humanity in general.

Views of Human Nature 6.1

The theologian and political analyst Reinhold Niebuhr opens the highly successful 1941 book *The Nature and Destiny of Man, Volume 1* with the following observation: “Man has always been his own most vexing problem. How shall he think of himself?” (Niebuhr 1) By understanding how a person views himself in relation to his capital structure, one can comprehend how religion has changed and what impact this change has had on humanity and human nature more broadly. By understanding how he thinks of himself, it can be gleaned how and why the human condition gained relevance and how this condition spawned democratic capitalist structures that flourish in modern society. From this analysis, we come to understand how god, which was once assumed to be a nonvalue, later becomes the absolute value, and later again becomes one of an infinite of
values. Rather than being the proverbial Alpha and Omega, god has been transformed into a means unto an end, the end ultimately being humanity itself. It will be shown that this change is in direct opposition to Christian and Islamic texts, which teach that god remains a static entity that will remain the same into eternity.

Reinhold Niebuhr defines human nature as possessing three distinct historical identities: the first is antiquity, the second is biblical, and the third is modern. Under each of these identities the general understanding of human nature changes sufficiently, causing an alteration in humanity’s perception of itself. At the periphery, Niebuhr argues the following regarding human nature:

The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and confined within the brevity of the years which nature permits its varied organic form, allowing them some, but not too much, latitude. The other less obvious fact is that man is a spirit who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the world. This latter fact is appreciated in one or the other of its aspects by various philosophies. But it is not frequently appreciated in its total import. That man stands outside of nature in some sense is admitted even by naturalists who are intent upon keeping him as close to nature as possible. They must at least admit that he is homo faber, a tool-making animal. That man stands outside of the world is admitted by rationalists who, with Aristotle, define man as rational animal and interpret reason as the capacity for making general concepts. But the rationalists do not always understand that man’s rational capacity for self-transcendence, the ability to make himself his own object, a quality of spirit which is usually not fully comprehended or connoted in “ratio” or “reason” or any of the concepts which philosophers usually use to describe the uniqueness of man (Niebuhr 3-4).

Niebuhr takes the position that man is comprised of two parts: his rational abilities and his spiritual abilities (Niebuhr 3). Rational abilities encompass a person’s physical capacity to become part of nature and his intellectual capacity to think logically based upon the cognitions of the senses. His spiritual capacities are those that allow him the ability to transcend the worldly, to imagine or create other worlds and other forms of
existence, and to possess a micro-understanding of thought and phenomena outside of the
material world. The first two parts, physical and intellectual, are necessary to help a
person function in the physical world, but the third part is to help a person understand
what exists beyond his physicality, his ability to look at himself as subject. It is this third
part that Niebuhr equates to the “Image of God.”

Niebuhr summarizes his epistemology by looking at three distinct historical
definitions. The first definition is the “Classical View of Human Nature”:

The classical view of man, comprised of primarily Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic
conceptions of human nature, contains, of course, varying emphases but it may be
regarded as one in its common conviction that man is to be understood primarily
from the standpoint of his uniqueness of his rational faculties. What is unique is
his reason (Niebuhr 6).

It must be observed that while the classical view of human virtue is optimistic
when compared to the Christian view (for it finds no defect in the center of human
personality), and while it has perfect confidence in the virtue of the rational person, it
does not share the confidence of the modern thinkers in the ability of all humanity to be
either virtuous or happy. Aristotle confessed that, “not to be born is the best thing and
death is better than life.” The classical philosophers were optimistic in their confidence
that a wise man would be virtuous; but alas, they had no confidence that many could be
wise (Niebuhr 9).

Niebuhr’s second definition of human nature is the “Christian View”:

The Christian view of man is sharply distinguished from all alternative views by
the manner in which it interprets and relates three aspects of human existence to
each other:

1. It emphasizes humanity’s spiritual ability to self-transcend the
material world and he equated this closely to the “Image of God.”
2. It insists on humanity’s weakness, dependence, and finiteness, on
humanity’s involvement regarding the needs and risks of the
material world. Regarding finiteness as, of itself, a source of evil
in man. In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life.

3. It affirms that the evil in man is a consequence of his inevitable though not necessary unwillingness to acknowledge his dependence, to accept his finiteness and to admit his insecurity, an unwillingness which involves him in the vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity from which he seeks escape (Niebuhr 12-13).

The Christian view can also be equated with the Muslim view, as argued by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, professor of Islamic studies. In *Islam, Religion, History and Civilization*, Nasr states,

To be human is to be concerned with religion; to stand erect, as men and women do, is to seek transcendence. Human beings have received the imprint of God on the very substance of their souls and cannot evade religion anymore than they can evade breathing...men and women are created in the “form” (surah) of God, according to the famous Prophetic Hadith. Here surah means the reflection of God’s Names and Qualities, for otherwise God is formless and imageless (Nasr 35).

In addition, Islam teaches that humanity has within its nature a certain corrupt essence, as defined with the fall of Adam and Eve, yet at the same time humanity is a reflection of God (Nasr 67). Both Niebuhr’s Christian view of human nature and Nasr’s Muslim view appear similar in a few respects, mainly regarding the position that humans are not perfect by themselves and need some help from a supernatural god. There are many differences between the Christian view and the Muslim view that are not discussed here, but the point we need to understand is that neither position views humanity as all encompassing of goodness or as having the ability to create a utopian ideal.

Niebuhr’s third definition of human nature is the “Modern View”:
The modern view of man is informed partly by classical, partly by Christian and partly by distinctively modern motifs. The classical element tends to slip from the typical classical, Platonic and Aristotelian rationalism to a more naturalistic rationalism. That is, the Epicurean and Democritan naturalism, which remained subordinate in the classical period of Greek thought, becomes dominant in the modern period....Modern man ends by seeking to understand himself in terms of his relation to nature... (Niebuhr 18-19).

In his definition of the Modern View of Nature, Niebuhr concludes that humanity can be defined by rational faculties, where actions can be observed and understood exclusively by the senses. Like a plant or machine, humanity has repeatable and empirically proven motives and actions that can be learned via observation and scientific study. By understanding such actions, society can develop means by which to improve itself, and in essence create a utopian society (perhaps a heaven on earth) without the help of the Christian or Muslim god. The Modern view does not share the Christian/Muslim or Classical ideas of human nature because it argues against the finiteness of humanity and subscribes to the belief that all things can be overcome. The Modern view accepts radical change as if such transformations are believed to further society as it evolves toward perfection. Additionally, the modern view socially constructs humanity to devalue its spiritual (transcendent) abilities, when such abilities create irrational or unworthy claims that are not justified via empirical observation. In the modern view, likened to the observations of Hardt, Negri, and Schumpeter, modern humanity becomes the self-destroying machine, mutating and transforming itself like products in the self-regulating market, all in hopes of improvement. Due to this new perception, humanity, although unbeknownst to it, becomes industry, subject to the disciplinary rules and authority of empiricism. Niebuhr credits the Renaissance for causing the shift from the Christian and
Classical Views of humanity to the current Modern View. Regarding the modern persona, Niebuhr makes the following observation:

Modern man has an essentially easy conscience; and nothing gives the diverse and discordant notes of modern culture so much harmony as the unanimous opposition of modern man to Christian conceptions of the sinfulness of man. The idea that man is sinful at the very centre of his personality that is in his will is universally rejected. It is this rejection which has seemed to make the Christian gospel simply irrelevant to modern man, a fact which is of much importance than any conviction about its incredibility. If modern culture conceives of man primarily in terms of the uniqueness of his rational faculties, it finds the root of his evil in his involvement in natural impulses and natural necessities from which it hopes to free him by the increase of his rational faculties….Either the rational man or the natural man is conceived of as essentially good, and it is only necessary for man either to rise from the chaos of nature to the harmony of mind or to descend from the chaos of spirit to the harmony of nature in order to be saved….A further consequence of modern optimism is a philosophy of history expressed in the idea of progress. Either by a force immanent in nature itself, or by the gradual extension of rationality, or by the elimination of specific sources of evil, such as priesthoods, tyrannical government and class division in society, modern man expects to move toward some kind of perfect society (Niebuhr 24).

Niebuhr claims that there has always been a competing stress between the Classical and Christian (thus by extension Islamic) views of humanity as that which is rational yet grounded in the realities of nature, its finiteness and its relationship to a god, as opposed to the modern view that argues that humanity is held back by nothing and can be liberated from all forms of oppression, including those forms presented by nature and by people. Humanity will be liberated by understanding and empirically proving the actions of itself and nature, and only through such understanding can humanity make arrangements to alter unwanted oppressions.

Niebuhr’s argument resonates with that of C.S. Lewis as cited earlier. Lewis argued that nature is the instrument by which one person can gain control over another. For Lewis, this control manifested itself as ownership of economically profitable
discoveries, all in hopes of liberating humanity from oppression. These discoveries can be used to overcome nature’s vicissitudes and restraints but in reality it is a false perception of liberation. According to Lewis, humanity is not being liberated from anything but is rather exchanging one form of dominance for another, the latter a form not readily seen or understood and one that is not socially oriented. Therefore, when one observes the changing perceptions of human nature, it becomes more clear that the overall goal of modernity is not to build institutions and structures to assist in overcoming socially challenging problems or oppressions, but rather to provide mechanisms for individuals to increase their capital structure in hopes of eliminating personal risk from unforeseen circumstances.

It was historically observed by people of faith that some of the unforeseen circumstances caused by nature perhaps came from the sin in one’s life. Niebuhr, similar to many others, defines “sin” in a theological manner as the rebellion against and ultimate desire to replace god. From the moral and social dimension, sin is equated to injustice (Niebuhr 179). Niebuhr takes the position that a person has a natural inclination to avoid risk, and therefore any risk that sin may cause. Because of his tendency to avoid risk, a person attempts to accumulate capital in an effort to stave off the occurrence of unforeseen problems, which perhaps historically were understood to be caused by a person’s sin. By accumulating more capital and thus diffusing sin’s power, the modern human takes on attributes that were mainly associated with god. But again, it is another false liberation because rather than god holding the authority of power and all theoretical capital, other people control the power over other men. Therefore, as a person increases
her capital structure, she reduces her need for god, thus decreasing the overall value that
she is willing to pay.

Additionally, Niebuhr argues that:

Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his
insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human
creatureliness. Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind;
but he pretends that he is not limited. He assumes that he can gradually transcend
finite limitations until his mind becomes identical with the universal mind. All of
his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of
pride (Niebuhr 178-179).

Here Niebuhr corroborates the earlier argument made in Chapter 3 that
humanity’s insecurity drives it into value exchange relationships. Using the Nietzschean
definition of will-to-power, a person needs to amass wealth and power to assist in
overcoming unwanted claims made by nature. Niebuhr explains that “the ego which
falsely makes itself the centre of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably
subordinates’ other life to its will and thus does injustice to other life” (Niebuhr 179).

Changing Mindset 6.2

In his analysis, Niebuhr claims that competing biblical and classical views of human
nature changed dramatically at the time of the Renaissance, and continued throughout the
Reformation to today. The main change was directly related to the understanding of
individuality.

The modern sense of individuality therefore begins on the one hand in
Protestantism and on the other hand in the Renaissance. From the standpoint of
the typical modern, Protestantism and Renaissance are merely two different
movements in the direction of individual freedom, the only difference between
them being that the latter is a little more congenial to the modern spirit than the
former. The real significance of the two movements lies in the fact that one
represents the final development of individuality within terms of the Christian
religion and the other an even further development of individuality beyond the limits set in the Christian religion, that is, the development of the “autonomous” individual. It is this autonomous individual who really ushers in modern civilization and who is completely annihilated in the final stages of that civilization (Niebuhr 59).

The Renaissance individual and the modern individual are one and the same (yet the latter brings more analytical advancement) and their components make up the mind of the empirical idealist, one who believes that all problems can be solved by employing reason and calculation to understand humanity in general. The modern individual has little value for the god that assists and/or restrains the individual’s will. The modern view eliminates any mention of god, and in a way advocates a society of sin, as defined by Niebuhr (Niebuhr 179). The modern individual creates his own god, to reflect his own values and utility system. Going forward, the modern view and thus the modern god are assumed to be the values extolled in democratic capitalist societies.

It is not only Niebuhr who highlights such changes in the views of human nature. Theologian and minister Erwin Lutzer in *Doctrines That Divide* and religious historian Bruce Shelley in *Church History in Plain Language*, argue that the movement toward modern society from the Christian perspective started in the early 5th century A.D. when a fiery debate about predestination and free will ensued between the theologian Augustine of Hippo and the philosopher and ascetic monk Pelagius.

**Augustine versus Pelagius 6.3**

The debate between Augustine and Pelagius began when Augustine intoned the following in a prayer: “O God, command what you will, but give what you command” (Lutzer 154). Augustine’s perspective, which somewhat represented the opinions of the church at
this point in history, was that if god wanted anything from a person, god would have to
give it directly because humanity was corrupted by sin and could not accomplish
anything for god of their own power. Referring to the fall of Adam, Bruce Shelley
paraphrases Augustine,

His power to do right was gone. In a word, he died, spiritually--and soon,
physically. But he was not alone in his ruin. Augustine taught that the whole
human race was “in Adam” and shared his fall. Mankind became a “mass of
corruption,” incapable of any good (saving) act. Every individual, from earliest
infancy to old age, deserves nothing but damnation (Shelley 129).

Similarly, Lutzer makes the following claim,

Augustine believed that Adam was created with the ability not to sin, but because
of the Fall, sin was now inevitable. No man, of himself, had the freedom to live
righteously….Augustine believed that infants are born into the world under the
condemnation of Adam’s sin, but they have a corrupt nature and hence lack the
ability to fulfill the commands of God. If men are saved, it is because of the direct
intervention of God. The regeneration of the soul must be the exclusive and
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. Salvation is by grace alone (Lutzer 158).

According to Augustine, humanity does not possess free will and/or does not have
the ability to choose righteousness because one’s will is bound to sin, which also means
one’s will is tied to ego, pride, and injustice. Augustine believed that god needs to
intervene in order to save humanity and thus enable it to achieve righteousness.
Augustine also took the position that god was all-knowing and therefore god knew, from
the onset of a person’s life or perhaps even before then, for whom god would or would
not intervene.

Thus, it is therefore understood that Augustine believed in what is defined as
predestination and he also believed in the inability of humanity to do anything outside of
the will of god. However, his position has been challenged historically as unfair based
upon the following observation. If god “foreknew” who would accept or reject him, then
effectively god created humanity knowing what the outcome would be, thus he created portions of humanity for salvation and portions of humanity for damnation.

Pelagius, the British monk, took exception to Augustine’s position, arguing that humanity has “the absolutely equal ability at every moment to do good or evil” (Lutzer 155). Pelagius held the position that humanity possesses all of the faculties to avoid sin and live a Christian way of life. Paraphrasing Pelagius, Shelley states,

God predestinates no one, except in the sense that he foresees who will believe and who will reject his gracious influences. His forgiveness comes to all who exercise “faith alone;” but, once forgiven, man has power of himself to live pleasing to God. Thus, Pelagius found no real need for the special enabling power of the Holy Spirit. His idea of the Christian life was practically the Stoic conception of ascetic self-control (Shelley 129).

Pelagius argued that humanity has the ability to accept or reject god by his own will.

Lutzer observes that Pelagius believes in humanity’s ability to exercise righteousness, thus eliminating the need for god’s intervention (grace). Reverting back, there is a subtle and important note of interest here that the reader should consider. The predestination perspective effectively places god as the ultimate end of all things. This belief removes all utility and value judgments from the believer mainly because the action is outside of humanity’s control. However, when humanity creates and then adopts the position of Pelagius, it locates humanity directly in control of its own future. With this subtle change, humanity becomes the ultimate end with god as the means, and thus humanity’s future is based upon the individual’s value system and ultimately their actions, thus once again holding to the will-to-power.

At the time of this debate (431 A.D.) the church did not accept the Pelagian view and remained somewhat faithful to the Augustinian perspective. Only a portion of
Augustine’s doctrine was formally adopted by the official church of his day. Lutzer states that this was due to the fact that Augustine’s proposed doctrine was thought to lead to fatalism, and many argued that humanity was not avowed to remove all control to god for humanity’s salvation (Lutzer 160). According to Lutzer, the overall consensus for the denial of the doctrine was that predestination would remove humanity’s responsibility for pursuing righteousness because humanity could/would take the position that they were predestined for sin (Lutzer 160). Additionally, Lutzer documents that while the idea of predestination was not formally accepted, a compromise position utilizing both grace and free will (also known as semipelagianism) was. Though initially condemned by the Council of Orange in A.D 529, semipelagianism eventually became the official position of the church.

Overall, Augustine held the position that humanity cannot achieve goodness unless god provides the ability for humanity to do so. Augustine does not believe in a person’s need for capital because even with it, he can do no good. According to Augustine, all power is god-given, thus there is no need to attempt to avoid risk because god has already predetermined everything. Contrarily, it is assumed that if Pelagius lived today, he would take the position that humanity should amass capital and increase its capital structure because by doing so it would help society in general. In a sense, the formal adoption of semipelagianism actually aided in destroying the idea of god as supreme being to the creation of god as absolute value to the current state of god as substratum of many inferior values. Like other parts of society, god became embedded into the human condition, constructed as part of the utilitarianism tautology. The significance of these changes are important to understand because they show that the
doctrines of the church are influenced by secular thought, which also means they are influenced by the human condition and utilitarianism more broadly. It will be shown that this compromise position was neither the end of the debate nor the end of the changes to the church and society.

**Luther and Erasmus 6.4**

During the time of the Reformation, approximately 1,000 years after the debate between Augustine and Pelagius, theologian Martin Luther took up a similar debate with theologian and humanist, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, referred to by most as simply Erasmus. The year was 1524, and Erasmus’s *Diatribe on Free Will* had recently been completed and argued the position of free will. Shelley explains this debate in the book [*Church History in Plain Language*],

Luter believed that the human will was enslaved, totally unable, apart from grace (god’s intervention), to love or to serve God. But Erasmus considered this a dangerous doctrine since it threatened to relieve man of his moral responsibility. What Luther regarded basic to biblical religion, Erasmus dismissed in the name of scholarship.

The differences in the Reformation and the Renaissance lie right here, in the view of man. The Reformers preached the original sin of man and looked upon the world as “fallen” from God’s intended place. The Renaissance had a positive estimate of human nature and the universe itself. This confidence in man and his powers flowered and filled the air with fragrance during the Enlightenment (Shelley 313).

In the *Diatribe of Free Will*, Erasmus put forth his position by presenting an imaginative prayer between himself and God:

Why do you promise upon condition what is decided by your own will?... Why do you reproach when it is not in my power to guard what you have given me, or to exclude the ill you sent into me? Why do you entreat when it all depends on your good pleasure? Why do you bless as though I have performed a good work when whatever is done is your work? Why do you curse if I have sinned by necessity?
What ends do all the myriad of commandments serve if it is not possible for a man in any way to keep what is commanded? (Lutzer 168).

Contrarily, Luther’s position was that it was humanity’s inferior reason that leads to its belief in free will. Paraphrasing Luther, Lutzer states that there is a “revealed will of God and the secret, hidden purpose of God. On the one hand, God pleads with the sinner to believe; yet, on the other hand, he plans the damnation of many. This secret will is not to be inquired into but to be reverently adored. We should not ask why it is so but rather stand in awe of God” (Lutzer 170). This Lutheran position stands in direct correlation to the story of the potter and his clay which is stated by Paul in Romans 9:20-21:

But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed say to him who formed it, “Why have you made me like this?” Does not the potter have the power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?

Lutzer uses a similar example to explain this hidden will of god and the hidden purpose of god by presenting the example of Abraham and Isaac.

God telling Abraham to slay his son was an expression of the revealed will of God; but at the same time, God was secretly planning that the boy would live. Thus, God may make certain commands but be planning something contrary to what he commanded. In other words, we must not think we can read God’s ultimate intentions (Lutzer 171).

In the hope of defending the semipelagianist position, Erasmus and others would cite the Bible, particularly the book of 1 Timothy 2:4, which states, “God desires all men to be saved.” Again, utilizing the position of a revealed and hidden will, Luther would argue:

…that God may desire the salvation of all men but had chosen to forgo those desires for a higher, hidden purpose. If the salvation of all men was his overriding
priority, he could prevent Satan from blinding the eyes of the unconverted so that more would believe. He would work toward the softening, not the hardening, of all men (Lutzer 171).

Many would argue that this interpretation of Luther was the primary principle separating him and his followers from the church.

Both the Luther perspective of predestination and the Erasmus perspective of semipelagianism share one common component: grace. This shared belief in grace explains that god must provide the means by which one can be saved. In either view, humanity is not solely responsible for salvation; humanity is believed to be fully or partly enslaved to god by god. As we will continue to see, throughout history the balance moves from that heavily weighted with predestination to one in modern society weighted predominantly toward free will.

**Calvin and Arminius 6.5**

The Luther and Erasmus debate was not the end of this subject. The next two thinkers to take up this debate were theologian and lawyer John Calvin and theologian Jacob Arminius in the early 17th century.

Similar to Luther, Calvin believed in predestination and argued that, “God’s eternal decree by which he determined with himself what he willed to become of each man…Eternal life is ordained for some; eternal damnation for others” (Lutzer 177-178). Similar to Erasmus and Pelagius, Arminius showed his support for free will by publishing five articles of faith:

1. God decreed to save all men who believe and persevere in the faith
2. Christ died for all men

3. Man has not saving grace of himself

4. Without the operation of grace, man cannot do anything good and

5. Believers partake of eternal life and have power to strive against Satan (Lutzer 178).

Although Arminius’s articles were rejected by the church at Synod of Dort in 1618, Lutzer argues that the articles and ideas of Arminianism have come to dominate society today. At the Synod of Dort, Calvin’s positions were adopted and initiated throughout the Protestant church. The ideas of Calvinism, although originally part of the Protestant doctrines are rarely understood and believed today:

1. Man inherits Adam’s sin (Bible: Book of Romans 5:12) and is by nature a child of wrath (Bible: Book of Ephesians 2:3). Because a person is dead in sin and is a child of wrath, a person does not have the ability to make any righteous choices, a person is totally deprived of anything relating to god.

2. Only those who are elected by God are saved and those who are not elected are damned to eternal death.

3. Christ did not die for all men but only for the elect. (Bible: Book of Isaiah 53:5; Romans 8:24; Matthew 20:28; Acts 20:28; Ephesians 5:25)

4. All of the elect will be saved because god’s grace will accomplish everything it sets out to do; god’s grace cannot be pushed away, thus once chosen, always chosen (Bible: Book of Acts 7:51).

5. All of the elect will persevere in their faith and that none of the elect can be lost (Bible: Book of John 6:37-39).
What we come to understand from the Synod of Dort is that the Protestant Church took up the position of predestination, arguing that god controls the lives of everyone. The Protestant Church took a different position from the Catholic Church by still maintaining the doctrine of predestination. According to this doctrine, humanity does not have any ability to choose salvation, and god chooses whom he wants and does not want to save. This doctrine of Calvin presumably conjured the early positions of the apostles, showing that god is the means and the end to salvation. However, what we will see is that this reformed position did not last long.

**George Whitefield versus John Wesley 6.6**

In the mid 18th century in England, Methodist preachers George Whitefield and John Wesley disagreed vehemently on the subject of personal salvation. As history has it, Whitefield, a preacher known for his belief in predestination, requested that his friend Wesley care for his congregation while he traveled to the Americas. Upon Whitefield’s return to England, he found that Wesley had persuaded his congregation to adopt free will theology and abandon their belief in predestination, thus sparking a debate between the two former friends (Lutzer 201). Wesley came out publicly in his denunciation of predestination by arguing the following:

To say that God hath decreed not to save them is the same as saying that he hath decreed to damn them. Call it whatever name you please, election, preterition, predestination or reprobation…it comes in the end to the same thing…By virtue of an external, unchangeable decree of God, one part of mankind is infallibly saved, and the rest is infallibly damned (Lutzer 202)…. [It represents our blessed Lord] as a hypocrite, a deceiver of the people, a man void of common sincerity (Lutzer 202-203).
From the mid 18th century onward, Lutzer explains that predestination was on the decline. Showing that the Puritans, who were predominantly Calvinists, started to succumb to the theology of free will and by the Second Great Awakening, which occurred in the late 18th century to the early 19th century, Calvinism and predestination were substantially diminished (Lutzer 204). Much of the decline, according to Lutzer, was due mainly to the introduction of the altar calls by the revivalist Charles Finney (1792-1875). According to Finney, “man had the power to determine his own destiny; indeed, he believed that the Millennium was just around the corner” (Lutzer 205).

According to Finney, “A revival is not a miracle or dependent on a miracle. It is purely the right use of constituted means” (Lutzer 205). Where we see a change in overall Christian theology is in Finney’s sermon entitled “Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts,” where he states, “It is entirely the result of temptation to selfishness arising out of the circumstances under which the child comes to being” (Lutzer 205-206). Finney believed that people are internally good. Ellis Sandoz, Renaissance scholar, argues in *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730-1805*, that the theologians of the Second Great Awakening (1800-1830) had a dramatically different perspective of human nature than their predecessors of the First Great Awakening. From the perspective of the Second Great Awakening preachers, they:

…saw man as a moral agent living freely in a reality that is good coming from the hand of God…with the responsibility to live well, in accordance with God’s commandments and through exercise of his mind and free will, man longs for knowledge of God’s word and truth and seeks God’s help to keep an open heart so as to receive them. Among the chief hindrances to this life of true liberty is the oppression of men, who in service to evil deceive with untruth and impose falsehood in its place, proclaiming it to be true…Liberty is, thus, an essential principle of man’s constitution, a natural trait which yet reflects the supernatural creator…Man’s dominion over the earth and other creatures, his mastery of nature through reason, is subject to no restraint but the law of his nature, which is perfect
liberty; the obligation to obey the laws of the Creator only checks his licentiousness and abuse (Sandoz xix).

Sandoz’ s statement summarizes the overall change in theology from predestination/free will theory to a purely free will theology in modern democratic capitalist societies.

In the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, sociologist Max Weber explains that it was this change in doctrinal understanding that established the pursuit of wealth and entrenched capitalist society. Weber wrote:

It might thus seem that the development of the spirit of capitalism is best understood as part of the development of rationalism as a whole, and could be deduced from the fundamental position of rationalism on the basic problems of life (Weber 76).

Exploring many Christian sects but focusing on Calvinism, Weber explained that Calvinism presented the ideals of predestination, but with it came some unforeseen social dislocations and mutations of the doctrine itself. He eloquently shows that Calvinists were only assured of “election” (also known as salvation) into heaven by seeing the fruits of their labors. Because of this belief, Calvinists worked extremely hard, putting off communal ties all in pursuit to maximize opportunities for more fruits. According to Calvinists:

The world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments to the best of his ability (Weber 108)

In addition to maximizing their fruits, Calvinists needed to maintain a strong will of confidence because without such confidence, believers were considered to have a lack of faith:

On the one hand it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen, and to combat all doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is
the results of insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace…On the other hand, in order to attain self-confidence intense worldly activity is recommended as the most suitable means (Weber 112)

From these citations, we can understand that Calvinism, which was presumably grounded in predestination, actually became subjected to the rules of the capitalist system, ultimately adopting its discipline and embedding itself into the ideals of utilitarianism. Calvinism, although holding to the doctrine of predestination, unknowingly created a mechanism that would eventually appear to be similar to free will, providing believers with the ability to enhance their own possibility of election. Weber states:

Here also, with the dying out of the religious root, the utilitarian interpretation crept in unnoticed, in the line of development which we have again and again observed (Weber 177).

Weber’s most important argument is that Protestant virtues, starting with Calvinists, encouraged believers to become rational, economic agents, such that each person who is called to be the elect or saved by grace will know they are saved only by the fruits they bear. To obtain these fruits, the “elect” used reason and empiricism to develop institutions and structures to assist further with greater monetary reward. So what is argued is that with the change from predestination theology to free will theology there became a substantial mutation in the learning and the acquisition of knowledge. Rather than salvation and knowledge being predestined, humanity took a new course of action, believing that within humanity’s own will, there was a possibility for perfection. More important, it was humanity’s duty to bring greater glory to god via humanity’s own intellectual achievements. This change spawned major modifications and innovations
within Western society. It is within this narrow and extremely tedious point that I argue, using Polanyi’s framework, that religion becomes disembedded and subject to market forces. As capitalism and democratic freedoms grew during this period, people became conditioned to think in market terms and subsequently conditioned one of humanity’s most important institutions to think similarly.

By the late 18th century, the debates of Protestant theologians such as Whitefield and Wesley, which owed their antecedents to the mediaeval metaphysical debates over predestination and free will, appeared increasingly parochial. Kant’s understanding of phenomenological free will had resolved the older debate conclusively for scholars of analytic philosophy and cleared the way for Enlightenment philosophers and political economists in Western Europe and later the United States to posit a behavioral understanding of humans as *homo economicus*. This rational actor understanding of human behavior both facilitated and in turn was reinforced by the emergence of financial and industrial capitalism.

**Islam and Human Nature 6.7**

The debates discussed thus far have been targeted predominantly to the thinkers of western society and Christianity. However, there is a substantial body of evidence that clearly shows that within the east, portions of the Spanish west, and Islam more generally, there is another group of thinkers who debated and continue to debate the same topics. Although perhaps less linear and obvious in progression from the idealism position to the empiricism position, there are noticeable parallels with the western thinkers, yet perhaps more volatility in the ebbs and flows of such thinking. Although Islam has a different history altogether, many Islamic scholars, such as Anthony Black in
The History of Islamic Political Thought; From Prophet to the Present, would argue that at the time of the Prophet Muhammad’s death, modern ideals, such as that which exists in the West today, were already prominent in Islamic thought. Similar to the progression explained above, starting in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century and ending in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, there are clear parallels with Islamic beliefs. However, after Muhammad’s death and with subsequent generations of scholars, Islam moves back and forth from modern to premodern modes of thought regarding human nature and the origin of knowledge. Despite these perceived volatile swings, it will be shown that underpinning these ebbs and flows of competing thought, there is a fundamental trend continuing within Islam. To the chagrin of conservative Islamists and perhaps to the pleasure of the West, it will be shown that Islam is again re-engaging modern principles, mainly due to the changing perspective of human nature.

\textbf{Al-Farabi 6.8}

In the early centuries following the death of Muhammad, Al-Farabi (870-950 A.D.), one of the better known Islamic philosophers, probably an Imami Shi’ite of Turkey who studied Aristotle and Plato, argued that philosophy was a means to better understanding Muhammad’s message and Islamic law (Black 62). Al-Farabi, like other Islamic scholars who are analyzed below, believed that knowledge was the most important attribute to human perfection, that intelligence was a gift from god and that faith, although important, was of the least importance to obtaining knowledge (Black 62). “Philosophers [like al-Farabi] claimed that they could attain by demonstrative proofs knowledge of the same truths which the Prophets taught by inspiration and rhetoric. Philosophy is ‘true
education’ and the way to salvation” (Black 63). Al-Farabi believed that philosophy and rational dialogue was the only way to true knowledge. In Happiness, al-Farabi states, “Religion is an imitation of philosophy…In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account based on imagination” (Happiness 77). Al-Farabi goes so far as to say that the person who is capable of knowing things via empirical observation and his own reason is the one who receives true revelation and is the one most suitable to rule (Black 64). It is within this idea that al-Farabi involves the free will. He believes that a person can achieve a higher status by knowledge and that the pursuit of knowledge is an extremely important virtue. “Knowledge derived from “certain demonstration…is the superior science and the one with the most perfect authority” (Black 65). Knowledge and authority, according to al-Farabi, are dependent upon each other, and from this independency it can be argued also come knowledge and wealth, knowledge and happiness, etc. Al-Farabi also argued that for a person to become knowledgeable, wealthy, and happy, they needed to rely on the assistance of others, to an extent. Black argues that:

al-Farabi showed by demonstrative argument, based on empirical generalizations about human life, what the origin and purpose of political association is. First, the division of labor makes it necessary for human beings to live in society. ‘Every human being is by his very nature in need of many things which he cannot provide himself… Therefore man cannot attain the perfection, for the sake of which his inborn nature has been given to him, unless many societies of people who co-operate come together’ (Black 70).

In Virtuous City, al-Farabi explains,

Human societies, unlike organisms, are a mixture of natural and voluntary elements. Perfection is achieved only in those societies’ in which people aim for association in co-operating for the things by which felicity in its real and true sense can be attained (al-Farabi 231) (Virtuous City)
Ibn Sina, also known as Avicenna (980-1037 A.D.), a Persian who was influenced by al-Farabi’s writing on metaphysics, argued many similar things to al-Farabi. In *Healing*, Avicenna argues, “it is necessary for a man to find his sufficiency in another of his species who, in turn, finds in the former and his like, his sufficiency” (Healing, 10: LM 99) Paraphrasing Avicenna, Anthony Black states,

Collectively, human beings are self-sufficient; and thus they form cities and societies. Such partnerships require reciprocal transactions; these in turn require customary law [sunna] and justice; and these require a human lawgiver and law-enforcer, who is, therefore, essential for human survival (Black 74).

Avicenna took a very rationalistic approach to knowledge and challenged those texts that were supposedly sacred. He put more focus, and it is probably fair to say, more trust in the secular government than the religious polity (Black 76). Avicenna questioned and challenged the religious law (Sharia) by arguing that it is open for adaptation based upon human reason and intellect (Black 76). However, Avicenna also believed in the social significance of Islam, arguing that religious practices remind people of god and the rewards in the afterlife, thus keeping them grounded in strict and historically understood morals (Black 74) Like al-Farabi, Avicenna argued that empiricism and not predestination is the only way to happiness and salvation.

Only some societies capable of self-sufficiency achieve true perfection, because “good in its real sense is such as to be attainable through choice and will.” Human societies, unlike organisms, are a mixture of nature and voluntary elements. Perfection is achieved only in those societies “in which people aim for association in co-operating for the things by which felicity in its real and true sense can be attained” (Black 71).

Similar to the Christian perspectives above, particularly those of Arminius, Wesley, and Finney, the early Islamic philosophers were already maintaining a modern
perception of humanity, arguing that humanity has within its own capabilities the opportunity to create a utopian society, based upon the actions of that society.

**Averroes 6.10**

Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), also known as Averroes, was one of the best Aristotelian philosophers of all time and one of the best-known thinkers in Islam (Black 117). Born in Cordova, Spain into a politically active Sunni family, he was trained early in his life as a lawyer and a physician, and then later became a philosopher. He was known for his interpretation and translations of Aristotle and also known for his time as Judge in Seville (1169-1179 A.D.) and later again in Cordova (1171) (Black 117). Averroes maintained a stronger empiricism perspective than that of al-Farabi or Avicenna, arguing that knowledge is acquired through empirical observation:

His philosophy was based upon the Qur’anic esteem for knowledge (‘ilm) and the Islamic tradition of Knowledge as the way to God. He argued that the Shari’a not only permits but obliges us to study and reflect on things with the intellect, by means of ‘rational speculation…whose method reaches perfection with demonstrative syllogism’ (Black 118).

Averroes maintained that the state was the highest ethical agent and that the moral authority of the state is embedded within the division of labor (Black 122). He explains that the division of labor requires communication, distributive justice, education, and penal law. Following Aristotelian ethics, Averroes believed that for a person to achieve ethical perfection, the state needed to provide a method of coercion and development for the individual (Black 122). Although a student of Aristotle and Plato, Averroes went a step further in his argument of ethical coercion by arguing that for a person to develop to their highest potential, they need to arrive at their own opinions, which to the extent
possible, should be based upon demonstrable argument or empirical observation (Black 122). Although Averroes held to an empirical perspective, he also was a philosopher who vigorously studied the Qur’an, trying to decipher the contradictions of that time period. Averroes was known as being the philosopher who enjoyed spirited debate with the theologians, particularly the Ash’arite and Mu’tazilite sects of Islam. Averroes often criticized Ash’arite and Mu’tazilite theologians for claiming to know more than they actually did (Black 118). He explained in general terms that there were two groups of believers within Islam:

We maintained there that religion consists of two parts: external and interpreted, and that the external part is incumbent on the masses, whereas the interpreted is incumbent on the learned (Averroes 17).

Averroes clearly believed that the “learned,” also interpreted as the philosophers or those educated in logic and reason, had the ability to interpret or perhaps reinterpret the Qur’an. But the common person, who made up the majority of the population, should read the Qur’an literally, void of any interpretation, because when this occurs, the scripture becomes confusing and then the common masses splinter into many Islamic sects (Averroes 17-20). Averroes frowned upon interpretation of Scripture without sound logic and reasoning, and this is what caused him to rebuke theologians and even perhaps the common person who generalized and made representations without support. This rebuke is best embraced by Averroes’s following metaphorical example:

The case of the person who interprets a part of Scripture and claims that what he has interpreted is what Scripture has intended, and then divulges that interpretation to the common people, is similar to the case of [someone] who takes a medication prepared by a skillful physician for the preservation of the health of all or most people. It may [then happen] that somebody took that very well-prepared medication without profiting from it, due to a bad humor which only affects a small minority of people. He then went on to claim that some of the ingredients that the original physician had prescribed in preparing that medication
for the general benefit [of the public] were not intended for that medication habitually referred to by the name applied to it in that language, but were rather intended for another medication which may be referred to, through a remote metaphor, by the name of that medication. He has thus removed the original ingredients from that great medication, and replaced them with the ingredients from that he believed the physician had intended, telling people: “This is [the medication] intended by the original physician.” Thereupon people proceeded to use this medication prepared in the manner interpreted by that interpreter and thus the health of many people began to deteriorate because of it. When [others began] to feel the damage caused by this medication to the humor of so many people, they attempted to remedy it by replacing some of its ingredients with some ingredients other than the original ones, a new kind of disease, other than the original one, afflicted the people. Then a third person came forward offering an interpretation of the ingredients of the medication other than the first and second interpretation. Thus a third kind of disease other than the first two kinds afflicted the people….many diseases spread [in the community] and the common benefit intended was lost, as far as the majority of people for whose sake it was originally intended were concerned (Averroes 67-68).

Averroes claims that splintering happens because theological arguments that are grounded in poor logic or intuition and abstraction are embraced by sections of the population who develop new religious groups, based upon these new interpretations. Averroes believed that these splintering groups were/are a detriment to society and because of this, he addressed many theological questions of his time, one of which pertained to the origin and acquisition of knowledge.

In *Faith and Reason in Islam, Averroes’ Exposition of Religious Arguments*, Averroes states, “This question is one of the most difficult religious questions, for if the evidence of reported testimony supporting it is examined, it is found to be conflicting, and the same is true of the evidence of rational arguments” (Averroes 105). Averroes, like Arminius above, interprets Qur’anic scripture with logic and reason, yet one will find within the subtleties of his writing, a somewhat charming affinity for god. He examines the subject of knowledge by looking at Scriptures from both sides of the debate. Like the Christian debates highlighted earlier, Islamic debates reflected the same challenges, from
one side there was a group of believers who took the position that all knowledge was
foreordained or predestined by god; yet on the other hand there was a group of believers
who took the position that knowledge was acquired by the actions of men who explored
and learned through empirical observation of the senses. Similar to Kant, Averroes
explained that the polemical positions put forth by both schools were deficient for a
variety of reasons.

To start his analysis, he addresses the theologians by putting forth common
Scriptural citations reflecting the thoughts of each position, and then moves on to
interpret the Scriptures from his logic. Regarding predestination, Averroes cites the
following Scriptures:

1. “Indeed, We have created everything in measure…” (Qur’an 54: 49)
   (Averroes 106)
2. “And everything with Him is by measure…” (Qur’an 13: 8) (Averroes
   106)
3. “Not a disaster befalls in the earth or in yourselves but is in a Book, before
   We created it. That for Allah is an easy matter.” (Qur’an 57: 22) (Averroes
   106)

   Each of these Scriptures from the Qur’an refers to god or him as the all-knowing
deity, who created everything and knew everything. As we will see below, Averroes did
not disagree with some of these thoughts but rather believed that this position was only
part of the puzzle to be solved. From the free will position, or what Averroes refers to as
“man’s credit” or man’s actions, he cites the following:

1. “Or destroy them for what they have earned, while pardoning many,…”
   (Qur’an 42: 34) (Averroes 106)
2. “[Whatever calamity might hit you] is due to what your hands have
   earned,…” (Qur’an 42: 3) (Averroes 106)
3. “[Fear a day when you will return to Allah:] then each soul will be
   rewarded fully for what it has earned; [for the good works it has done] and
   none shall be wronged,…” (Qur’an 2: 286) (Averroes 106)
But before Averroes goes deeper into his solution, he addresses a third group of Scriptures that appear to integrate each of the positions referenced above, clearly making the point that these theologians are only addressing half of the challenge:

1. “Whatever good visits you, it is from Allah; and whatever evil befalls you, it is from yourself.” (Qur'an 4:79) (Averroes 106)
2. Averroes also cites the Hadith, the proclamations of Muhammad. “Everyone is born in the state of nature (fitra), but his parents make him a Jew or a Christian.”(Averroes 106)
3. “I [Allah] made these for Paradise, and thus they perform the actions of the people of Paradise, and I made those for Hell and thus they perform the actions of the people of Hell” (Averroes 107).

Averroes used these three bodies of scripture to explain that although what seems to be a contradiction is really not, but rather is the lack of the interpretation from the learned. He first states that the Muslim community splinters into groups over this particular misinterpretation. For example, he states that the Mu'tazalites believed that humanity’s “earnings,” also defined as humanity’s actions, are the cause of obedience or disobedience, and from these actions humanity is judged accordingly. The Mu’tazalites did not address the first part of the problem, which was to address the statements on foreknowledge or predestination. On the other hand, Averroes cites the Determinists, who take the predestination perspective, arguing that humanity’s fate and knowledge are determined prior to the beginning of life and that humanity has no possibility of altering its own position or the position of society in general. Averroes then shows that there is yet another middle-of-the-road position, somewhat compromising the positions of the Mu’tazalites and the Determinists. Overall, Averroes explains that all of these positions are incorrect for various reasons:

For if we assume that man is the originator of his actions and their creator, then there must exist certain actions that do not occur according to God’s will or His choice, in which case there will be a creator other than God. But they
(theologians) object that this is a [breach] of the consensus of Muslims that there is no creator other than God Almighty. However, if we assume that [man] is not free [to “earn”] his actions, then he must be compelled [to perform] them [because there is no intermediate position between determinism and earning. Then if a man is compelled in his actions] religious obligation is intolerable. For, if the human being is obliged to perform what he cannot tolerate, then there would be no difference between imposing an obligation on him and on inanimate objects, because such objects do not have any capacity to act (Averroes 107).

Similar to Erasmus, Averroes takes the position that if predestination were true, then god has created humanity without control of choosing, in a sense like tools or other objects, without a mind or soul. This position appears to be in contradiction to the Qur’an’s call for action, based upon virtue and law. Averroes addresses these positions by asking a question of the reader and then subsequently answering it:

If this is the case, then how can one reconcile the conflict between what is based on tradition and what is based on reason? We answer that it appears that the intention of the lawgiver is not to separate these two positions, but rather to reconcile them in an intermediate position, which is the true solution to this problem (Averroes 108).

He asserts his own interpretation of these scriptures with the following,

For the will is a desire that arises in us from imagining something or from believing something. This belief is not part of our choice, but is something that arises by virtue of the things that are external to us. An example of this is that if something desirable presented itself to us from outside, we would desire it necessarily without any choice, and then we would move towards it. Similarly if something frightful descended on us from outside, we would necessarily hate it and run away from it. If this is the case, then our will is preserved by the things that come from outside and is bound to them… However, since the eternal causes occur in accordance with a definite pattern and a well-planned order, without the slightest deviation from what their Creator has decreed for them; and since our will and our actions are not accomplished, and do not exist, as a whole, without the concurrence of external causes, it follows that our actions occur according to a definite pattern – they take place at specific times and in a determinate measure (Averroes 109).
What can be taken from Averroes’s position is that he believes that will is a desire, which in turn can be equated with a value that is influenced or constructed by external causes. As shown earlier, all values are based upon utility, thus one would assume that Averroes would agree with this dissertation thus far in that the actions of the free will are based on individual self-interest, wrapped up into what is defined as utility. However, there is a second part to Averroes’s position, and this pertains to the will of god. According to Averroes, the human will exercises its actions based upon external causes, which are the general laws of nature and these causes are delivered based upon god’s time and plan (Averroes 110). Underlying Averroes’ position is the belief that human beings have the autonomy to choose their actions, but that god foreknew what actions would come about and because of this god created the perfect plan (Averroes 110). Averroes did take the position that human perfection can only come about by studying, particularly studying the senses and understanding phenomena through empirical observation. Averroes appears to take a similar position to Luther, in the sense that he believes while all is foreordained by god, humanity still has the chance to exert its will, yet this will and the actions pertaining to it were already known by god prior to the actions themselves. Averroes also appears to be aligned with Kant. Averroes seems to believe that despite the metaphysical possibility of determinism, humanity needs to act rationally as though their actions are independent of such pre-determined phenomenon.

This position seems to work with the earlier arguments regarding god, time, and number. If god does not have a value system (argued earlier) because of the infiniteness of his life, time-based constructs (such as before, after, today, tomorrow, etc.) that resonate with human reason and value systems break down into what I refer to as
minefields of distortions. The reconciliation of god’s will and human will seems very challenging to reconcile with reason, mainly because part of the action is based upon the human value system, yet the other part is based upon god’s will, which is grounded in knowledge that is outside of human logic and outside of value. Another point to note on Averroes was that he did not necessarily believe in the infallibility of the Scriptures, but did believe that the learned should study the Scriptures in hopes of interpreting the meaning of the Scriptures according to god’s will.

**Ibn Khaldun and Others  6.11**

Following in the footsteps of Averroes, many thinkers came to the fore, some borrowing his ideas, some creating entirely new ideas inspired by him. For instance, the great Persian Ismaili thinker, Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274 A.D.), as paraphrased by Black argued,

> The human person may achieve eternal felicity, or disaster; that is up to him or her. This view of human freedom went with and elevated view of human nature. “Man’s perfection and the enabling of his virtue entrusted to his reflection, reason, intelligence and will; and the key of felicity and affliction was given into the hand of his own competence…The human species, the noblest of existent things,” is created by God, but its improvement and perfection ‘are entrusted to its own independent judgment’ (Black 147).

Tusi, like al-Farabi and Averroes, took the position that god creates human knowledge, and he argued that humanity can achieve perfection of its own accord, based upon how much knowledge society can acquire either as individuals or a collectivity. However, Tusi also took the position similar to the philosophers of antiquity that most of society cannot attain such perfection, mainly because knowledge and advanced reasoning were beyond their capabilities. To overcome the intellectual shortcomings of these
individuals, society needs to create organization and institutions to train, discipline and persuade such individuals to learn and grow, similar to the elite; those who have the capacity for perfection. “He (Tusi) concluded that human welfare requires first the organization of the material world by reason, through the arts and crafts; and then instruction, discipline and leadership. Humans may attain perfection by their own effort and reason, but most of them need instruction, many need discipline and some need coercion” (Black 148).

Following Tusi, Syrian born Sunni thinker Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) argued for strict adherence to the Qur’an and Islamic religious practices, yet at the same time explains that revelation, reason, and tradition can all co-exist (Black 154). Taymiyya took many positions contrary to the Islamic scholars already mentioned. He believed that revelation was superior to intellectual achievement and the knowledge of the senses. An uncompromising controversialist who was jailed many times for his obstruction of public order, Taymiyya maintained a substantial public following. He did not support a purely literal reading of the Qur’an or Sharia but used syllogism and analogy as a means of relating stories and lessons to law, life, and culture (Black 154). Ibn Taymiyya was not fond of philosophers, and because of this shared very little room for rational argument based upon exclusively empirical observation. However, despite his intolerance for philosophers, Taymiyya cautiously accepted free will, rationality, and empiricism in general. For instance, he argued that religion, focusing exclusively on Islam, needs state power to be successful. Taymiyya stated, “The trouble with the world today, he said, is that, on the one hand, rulers think they can achieve material ends by means of force, ambition and self-interest, while on the other hand, religious people think they can
achieve spiritual ends by mere piety” (Black 155). Taymiyya argued in Laoust, “the right course, is once again, the happy mean (wasat): concern for the material and moral interests of the community—which are closely linked…honesty joined with power” (Laoust 55-57).

In addition to believing in closely linking religious and political power, Taymiyya also believed in private ownership (Black 156). “In general, Ibn Taymiyya sought to protect the rights of public ownership. He argued that the purpose of all Public Functions is the material and spiritual welfare of human beings. But the material and spiritual welfare of human beings depend upon the (prophetic) postulate of hisba: therefore, ‘to Command the good and Forbid the bad is the supreme goal of every Public Function’” (Laoust 1939:70). Taymiyya identified the utopian ideal as that of a society embedded with revelation of the prophets and the coercion of the state, both of which were wrapped around individual property rights of the Muslim. Taymiyya pushed for integration of the prophet’s life with that of public service and cultural life more broadly and vice versa. Although Taymiyya was a very conservative theologian, his propositions resemble the Christian theologian John Calvin in one respect: They both took the position that the pious life of the theologian and scholar should be infused with the lives of secular society, mainly arguing that by doing so, god’s glory will be revealed and the righteous in essence will be blessed. Taymiyya argued, “Since the aim assigned to dawla (state) and shawka (force) is to approach God and to put His religion into practice, therefore when state and religion are wholly employed for this purpose, perfect spiritual and temporal prosperity is ensured” (Laoust 1939:177). It is within this subtlety that one can start to
glean that Taymiyya maintained a somewhat positive relationship with reason and experience of the senses. Following on the heels of Taymiyya was Ibn Khaldun.

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 A.D.) was a scholar who gained recognition after the death of Taymiyya and who argued similar positions to his predecessor. Ibn Khaldun explains that god distinguishes humanity from all other animals by his ability to think, which he classifies into three degrees: 1) understanding of the natural world via the senses; 2) understanding of experiential learning; and 3) understanding of speculation (Khaldun 333-334). Khaldun believed that, although a human is distinguished from animals through his ability to think, he maintained that humanity is born as an animal and only through learning and perfecting his animal instincts can he become a “man” (Khaldun 339). Khaldun also mentions in another section that prior to the acquisition of discernment and knowledge, humanity is simply “matter”(Khaldun 140). “He (humanity) reaches perfection on his form through knowledge, which he acquires through his own organs (senses)”(Khaldun 140). Regarding revelation, Khaldun maintains that god and the understanding of god is beyond human reason and therefore is an inferior way of knowing anything. (Khaldun 152) Khaldun states quite nicely his position on revelation and knowledge:

Now, it might be assumed that there exists another kind of perception different from ours, since our sense perceptions are created and brought into existence. God’s creation extends beyond the creation of man. Complete knowledge does not exist in man. The world of existence is too vast for him. Therefore, everyone should be suspicious of the comprehensiveness of his perceptions and the results of his perception. This does not speak against intellect and intellectual perceptions. The intellect, indeed, is a correct scale. Its indications are completely certain and in no way wrong. However, the intellect should not be used to weigh such matters as the oneness of God, the other world, the truth of prophecy, the real character of the divine attributes, or anything else that lies beyond the level of intellect….Thus, the intellect cannot comprehend God and His attributes (Khaldun 350).
Khaldun then goes on to define “attributes” as an action that must be repeatable many times, therefore Khaldun is taking the empiricist position that learning only comes through observation of the senses (Khaldun 351). Although Khaldun appears to have an affinity toward empirical knowledge, he, like Averroes and some of the earlier philosophers, still maintained a somewhat quaint relationship with revelation. Khaldun states:

When Muhammad guides us towards some perception, we must prefer that to our own perceptions…even if rational intelligence contradicts it…We must be silent with regard to things of this sort that we do not understand. We must leave them to Muhammad and keep the intellect out of it (Black 168).

Khaldun seems to have a similar position to Arminius and Averroes, in that both believed that reason and revelation were together important aspects to acquiring knowledge. However, it can also be argued that Khaldun did not necessarily believe in a predestined position, considering humanity has the ability to make changes and alter the will of the world. It is also shown that Khaldun believed in secure property rights, justice and the rule of law, all in hopes of driving a fervent capital market, a modern and empirical structure:

“The equitable treatment of people with property” will give them “the incentive to start making their capital bear fruit and grow,” which in turn will generate increases in the “the ruler’s revenue in taxes.” The ruler’s revenues will be maximized by keeping taxes as low as possible, since confidence in “making a profit” is an incentive to economic activity. Finally, “profit is the value realized from labor,” which suggest both the labor theory of value and surplus value (Black 179).

From Khaldun’s death in 1406 to the early 19th century, there was a move away from empiricism and a move toward interpreting all perceptions through revelation (Black 184). However, between the Crimean War (1854-56) and World War I, there was
once again a push toward the modern ideal. When the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with the Europeans during the Crimean War, they were pushed to adopt a set of reforms known as the Tanzimat Reforms. These reforms were developed to bring a European style of democratic government to the Ottoman Empire. The reforms called for rights that exemplify the European (mainly French) and United States model of governance:

The (1839) Tanzimat edict stated that there must be “guarantees insuring to our subjects perfect security for life, honour and fortune.” The Sultan declared that “the difference of religion and sect among the subjects is something concerning only their persons and not affecting their rights of citizenship. As we are living all in the same country under the same government, it is wrong to make discriminations among us” (Black 281).

This edict and the following edict in 1856 started a liberal ideology of freedom, more aligned with their European counterparts. At around this same time, western ideas were being considered in Iran, mainly to assist in reforming the legal system. It was during this time and within Iran, that Malkom Khan (1833-1908) entered into the discussion. Malkom Khan a western-educated Iranian with strong interests in humanism, freemasonry, and Auguste Comte spread his ideas through his personally founded secret society, House of Oblivion:

Malkom’s constitutional proposals were based upon the separation of powers. Only in this way would reforms be implemented as well decreed: ‘enforcing such laws is impossible…except through that wondrous system that the states of Europe have invented for these laws of theirs. Power must be divided between two state councils, one for legislation, in which there was to be freedom or expression, the other to supervise the executive (Black 288).

Following on the heels of Malkom Khan was Mirza Yusef Khan. Writing in 1862, he was one of the first Muslim writers to fully adopt the ideals of the French republic and he argued that democratic governance was passed down from Muhammad himself (Black 288):
The spirit of Islam, he argued that, while the French legal system had advantages over the shari’a in its organisation, and in being based upon the will of the people, “if you study the contents of the codes of France and other civilized states, you will see how the evolution of ideas of nations and the experiences of the peoples of the world confirm the Shari’a of Islam…Whatever good laws there are in Europe…your Prophet set down and established for the people of Islam 1,280 years ago” (Black 289).

Following Kahn, the Young Ottomans appeared in Turkey. The Young Ottomans wanted to take the Tanzimat edicts a step further (Black 293).

Their political ideals were summed up by Namik Kemal as “the sovereignty of the nation, the separation of powers, the responsibility of officials, personal freedom, equality, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom of association, enjoyment of property, sanctity of home” (Black 293).

Black argues that the Young Ottomans correlated the political language of Islam with modern liberal democracy; they reinterpreted the Qur’an to meet the ideals of such structures (Black 295). The Young Ottomans “insisted that not everything is predetermined by God; some things are dependent upon human action” (Black 294). Part of these ideas from the Young Ottomans and Tanzimat edicts clearly established the role for Turkey in 1924, when it declared itself a secular nation, where freedom of religion and democracy ruled.

It can be gleaned from this historical review that within Islam there was and continues to be a modern mindset that seeks to establish rational thought and action, democracy, and modern ideals, all in hopes of creating the utopian society. Similar to the phenomena that happened in Christendom, when the understanding of humanity’s nature shifted from a determinism perspective controlled exclusively by the Alpha God, to the empiricism perspective controlled mainly or exclusively by individuals, it seems that the same phenomena has occurred in Islam. With the adoption of liberal democracy in
Turkey in 1924, the traditional values of Islam--where church and state were considered to be one based upon the literal reading of the Qur’an and Sharia--have given way to new interpretations, all of which personify the modern view of human nature.

The main purpose of this chapter was to challenge David Hume’s definition of human nature as partly inaccurate and skewed toward Enlightenment thought. Hume defined human nature as follows:

It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, all in nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind….Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in that particular (Hume cited in Pojman 181).

Hume excluded the important fact that man’s self-perception and thus his nature have mutated throughout the course of history. Humanity began as a slave to god, weak in intelligence (according to the modern definition) and personal resolve. Over time, humanity evolved into highly intelligent beings, beings that mastered nature via understanding the senses, yet at the same time putting away ideals of a metaphysical god or deity. Additionally, Hume neglects to acknowledge that humanity’s changing persona would ultimately alter all systems of government, including religion, in an effort to encourage empiricism further. Not only have government and individuals evolved to reflect the modern creed of individualism, but also so have religion and faith, particularly those engaged in democratic capital societies.
This chapter has documented the changing perspectives of philosophers and theologians over the last 2,000 years, showing that there was an early belief in the sovereignty of god, where god was seen as the beginning and the end of life and was viewed as humanity’s sole savior and governor. This view changed substantially throughout history, ultimately morphing to the perception that humanity has the ability to create utopia, thus giving humanity the power and ability to decide if and when they want to pursue reconciliation with god. God’s will and revelation as earlier understood is gone. Underlying this chapter is the main assertion that with rationality and empiricism came the devaluation of previously held values, such as the value of god as revelation. In addition, interpretations of the sacred text were and currently are being reinterpreted based upon reason, but again reason that is embedded in with the human condition.

To compensate for such changes, both to the revelation of god and the reinterpretation of the Scriptures, religious organizations, both Islamic organizations in Turkey and Christian organizations in the United States, used these same tools of rationality and empiricism to reinterpret meaning and thus to deliver meaning that had/has something to do with contemporary society. As these reinterpretations occur, religious organizations become further embedded into the capitalist system. As this occurs, revelation, which was agreed by many to be or have some place in learning, is also gone because of the inability to prove it truthful based upon empirical observation.
Section III

Chapter 7 - Commoditization of god

The religion of one age is the literary entertainment of the next.
--Ralph Waldo Emerson

Introduction 7.0

As argued in Section II, the preponderance of humanity has adopted the modern understanding of human nature as defined by Niebuhr and supported by the debates. This modern understanding depicts humanity as homo-faber and homo-economicus, the ultimate toolmaker and utility-maximizing species. With the self-determined powers of modernized humanity come the perceived abilities to build a utopia, devoid of any need for metaphysical influences, the same influence that have been present for all of history.

Considering this historical shift from a predetermined to self-determined perception of humanity, many would have thought that religious organizations within democratic capitalist societies would become bankrupt due to the lack of funding and the time committed by religious participants. However, what this chapter and the next will argue is that the opposite has occurred; religions appear to be thriving in these societies. These next chapters will explore the historical changes in the religious economies of the United States and Turkey in hopes of explaining what these changes mean and how they have come to be. This chapter will address Christianity in the United States; the next chapter will address Islam in Turkey.

These chapters will answer three questions:
1. Does Christianity or Islam provide substantial benefits to such societies and if so, what are these benefits?

2. What has happened since these countries deregulated the religious marketplace?

3. What do these changes mean to the practice and distribution of religious goods?

These chapters are structured in a relatively similar manner and employ the same underlying logical structure to help answer the questions. First, each chapter analyzes the societal benefits that these religions bestow upon the members of the overall population. It is explained that these religions offer benefits to both members and nonmembers of these discrete groups, and without such religions, perhaps these countries would need to compensate for this void by some other means.

Next, each chapter addresses the percentage of the overall population who claims membership with Christianity and Islam in their respective state, presenting historical trends in growth or continued solidarity with that religion. Finally, the religious market structure will be reviewed. Considering both countries have similar, yet different market structures, these sections will analyze what and why the current structure is in place.

Once the structure is identified and the importance of the religion presented, this chapter will move into analyzing the supply and demand of the religious participants. These sections will review the historical and current mutations that have occurred and are currently occurring within these religions. At the end of Chapter 7 is a summary, which will encompass all of the chapters up until this point, hoping to solidify the overall argument and to prime the reader for the following quantitative chapter.

**Societal Benefits from Christianity 7.1**
The role of religion is an important element of the United States and has been ever since the United States was founded. George Washington, for example, stated that, “religion and morality are indispensable supports of public prosperity” (Bellah 222). Washington doubted that “morality can be maintained without religion,” and he suggested that religion and morality are the “great pillars of public happiness” (Bellah 222). Alexander de Tocqueville argued points similar to that of George Washington. Robert Bellah captures the essence of these comments with the following words:

Tocqueville was fully aware of and applauded the separation of church and state, and yet, while recognizing that religion “never intervenes directly in the government of American society,” he nevertheless considered it “the first of their political institutions”….Its (religion) political function was not direct intervention but support of the mores that make democracy possible. In particular, it had the role of placing limits on utilitarian individualism, hedging in self-interest with a proper concern for others. The “main business” of religion, Tocqueville said, “is to purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being” so common among Americans (Bellah 223).

Francis Fukuyama cites a similar reference to Tocqueville:

The political function of social capital in a modern democracy was best elucidated by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, who used the phrase the “art of association” to describe Americans propensity for civil association. According to Tocqueville, a modern democracy tends to wipe away most forms of social class or inherited status that bind people together in aristocratic societies. Men are left equally free, but weak in their equality since they are born with no conventional attachments. The vice of modern democracy is to promote excessive individualism, that is, a preoccupation with one’s private life and family, and an unwillingness to engage in public affairs. Americans combated this tendency towards excessive individualism by their propensity for voluntary association, which led them to form groups both trivial and important for all aspects of their lives (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm)

Although Fukuyama does not provide commentary on the type of voluntary associations that combated excessive individualism, he was concerned with religious
associations, mainly because this was the mainstay of Tocqueville’s argument. Similar to Fukuyama, Robert Putnam cites Robert Wuthnow, a professor of religious studies:

Religion may have a salutary effect on civil society by encouraging its members to worship, to spend time with their families, and to learn the moral lessons embedded in religious traditions. But religion is likely to have a diminished impact on society if that is the only role it plays. What interested Tocqueville about voluntary organizations was...their ability to forge connections across large segments of the population, spanning communities and regions, and drawing together people from different ethnic backgrounds and occupations (Putnam 78).

Putnam argued that, “Churches and other religious organizations have a unique importance in American civil society. America is one of the most religiously observant countries in the contemporary world. (Putnam 65) Putnam goes onto say that:

Churches provide an important incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community interests, and civic recruitment. Religiously active men and women learn to give speeches, run meetings, manage disagreements, and bear administrative responsibility. They also befriend others who are in turn likely to recruit them into other forms of community activity. In part for these reasons, churchgoers are more likely to be involved in secular organizations, to vote and participate politically in other ways, and to have deeper informal social connections (Putnam 66).

Putnam also states that religion, particularly Christianity, rivals education as a powerful form of civil engagement (Putnam 67). In addition:

Religious involvement is a strong predictor of volunteering and philanthropy, 75-80 percent of church members give to charity, opposed to 55-60 percent who are not church members and 50-60 of church members volunteer with charities while only 30-35 of non members do (Putnam 67).

The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey Study states;

That religion involvement is less biased by social standing that most other forms of civic involvement. Poorer, less educated Americans are much less likely to be involved in community life that other Americans, but they are fully as engaged in religious communities. Conversely, religiously engaged people have, on average, a more diverse set of friends that those who are less engaged in religion. Holding constant their own social status, religiously engaging people are more likely than other Americans to number among their friends a person of a different faith, a
community leader, a manual worker, a business owner and even a welfare recipient. (http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/communitysurvey/index.html)

Moreover, Putnam states that churches are important providers of social services in the United States, with approximately $15-$20 billion spent annually. He states:

Nationwide in 1998 nearly 60 percent of all congregations (and even a higher proportion of larger congregations) reported contributing to social service, community development, or neighborhood organizing projects. Congregations representing 33 percent of all churchgoers support food programs for the hungry, and congregations represent 18 percent of all churchgoers support housing programs like Habitat for Humanity (Putnam 68)

Similar to Putnam, Robert Bellah, professor of sociology at University of California, Berkeley, states that:

Americans give more money and donate more time to religious bodies and religiously associated organizations than to all other voluntary associations put together. Some 40% of Americans attend religious services at least once a week and religious membership is around 60% of total population (Bellah 219).

From this brief exposition, it is evident that within the United States, Christianity in particular provides many societal benefits, benefits that are more than just insular to this discrete community. Many groups, both domestically and internationally, benefit from the giving and support of Christian churches in the United States. If for some reason, the Christian church failed to exist or operate efficiently, many of these benefits can be in jeopardy, thus potentially causing a void that would need to be filled by the state or some other modern or post modern institution.

**Christian Beliefs 7.2**

In the United States, approximately 75% of the population claim to be Christian, with approximately 62% of the population belonging to a church (Finke, Starke 15). The
percentage of those belonging to a church has substantially changed over time. As we will see in this chapter, the number of those belonging to a church has increased dramatically from its 17% base in 1776. Just as important as the statistics, Sam Harris highlights other relevant points regarding Christians in the United States.

From the article titled, *Imagine There’s No Heaven* which appeared at www.truthdig.com http://www.truthdig.com/dig/item/200512_an_atheist_manifesto/,

According to several recent polls, 22% of Americans are certain that Jesus will return to Earth sometime in the next 50 years. Another 22% believe that he will probably do so. This is likely the same 44% who go to church once a week or more, who believe that God literally promised the land of Israel to the Jews and who want to stop teaching our children about the *biological fact* of evolution. As President Bush is well aware, believers of this sort constitute the most cohesive and motivated segment of the American electorate. Consequently, their views and prejudices now influence almost every decision of national importance. Political liberals seem to have drawn the wrong lesson from these developments and are now *thumbing Scripture*, wondering how best to ingratiate themselves to the legions of men and women in our country who vote largely on the basis of religious dogma. More than 50% of Americans have a “negative” or “highly negative” view of people who do not believe in God; 70% think it important for presidential candidates to be “strongly religious.” Unreason is now ascendant in the United States—in our schools, in our courts and in each branch of the federal government. Only 28% of Americans believe in evolution; 68% believe in Satan. (http://www.truthdig.com/dig/item/200512_an_atheist_manifesto/)

**Rates of Religious Adherence, 1776-1980**

*1776 through 1980 figures taken from Finke, Starke pg 16*

*1990 and 2000 figures taken from Putnam pg 70*

Note on Graph: these are based on church membership records and differ from self reported figures of church membership from companies like Gallup.
Establishing the Free Market Structure 7.3

As I have documented thus far, belief in a god has been part of human nature since the beginning of time. Wars have been waged, murders committed, love declared, and martyrs sacrificed—all in the name of god. From Jesus Christ and Mohammed to Mother Theresa and Gandhi, the idea of god has inspired people to extraordinary actions, both good and bad. Additionally, people of such faith created governing structures that, although changed in the modern world, were founded upon the doctrines of such beliefs. These theocratic governing structures were aided by certain religions that oppressed nonbelievers during the Dark Ages, which instigated wars during the Reformation ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. At the Peace of Westphalia, the modern state system was introduced, substantially limiting the power of the church and ushering in the sovereign state and the modern age. Approximately 100 years later, this system laid the foundation for the separation of church and state that was introduced in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion…”). The separation of church and state, although not explicitly described as such, was a way for the founding fathers of the United States to employ a mechanism that would diminish the power of the church both in government and civil life. Richard Falk comments, “Historically, the exclusion of religion from political life was seen as a vital step in the struggle to establish humane global governance” (Falk 3).

Similarly, some religions also called for this separation to help eliminate unfair state funding for religious and cult organizations. It is important to note that at this time in history, churches were predominantly funded by state subsidy. Roger Finke, professor
of religion and Rodney Starke, professor of sociology, in *The Churching of America Since 1776*, state that, “The freethinkers resented having their taxes go to any religion; the sectarian resented their taxes going to false religions” (Finke, Starke 59-60). Bellah states that:

> They sought religious freedom, not as we would conceive of it today, but rather to escape from a religious establishment with which they disagreed in order to found a new established church. They were seeking religious uniformity, not religious diversity (Bellah 220).

Finke and Starke’s position is that, “given each of the religious groups wanted religious freedom for itself even if few of them really wanted religious freedom from all, there was no other safe way to proceed but to create an unregulated, free market, religious economy” (Finke, Starke 60). Finke and Starke explain that religious organizations were banned from receiving federal assistance, which was the mainstay of church funding up until this time (Finke and Starke 59):

> In the eyes of the newly established federal government, not only would all faiths be permitted to worship, all would be given equal opportunity. There would be no established church, and the state would be separated from all religious entanglements (Finke, Starke 59).

The elimination of state funding put churches in a very uncomfortable and rather vulnerable position. Churches now had to obtain most, if not all, of their funding via voluntary contributions. These contributions started to come in the form of pew rentals, permanent funds, and personal tithes and offerings. The separation of church and state was a massive task when considering the important role religion played in history up until this point.

Kelly Olds, economist, argues that the disestablishment of the church in the United States has been the most significant privatization in American history. At no time,
before or after, has any important economic sector so dominated by government been
turned over so completely to private enterprise (Olds 277). Similarly, Olds argues that
privatization’s direct effects were to end the monopoly power of the local public churches
and to allow consumers the option of not supporting religion if they chose not to consume
(Olds 282).

Bellah explains that the privatization of religion changed the nature of religion as
ethical agent to an organization more in line with establishing rules of self control:

For religion to have emphasized the public order in the old sense of
deferece and obedience to external authorities would no longer have
made sense. Religion did not cease to be concerned with moral order, but
it operated with a new emphasis on the individual and the voluntary
association. Moral teaching came to emphasize self-control rather than
deferece. It prepared the individual to maintain self-respect and establish
ethical commitments in a dangerous and competitive world, not to fit into
the stable harmony of an organic community (Bellah 222).

In a similar vein, Hardt and Negri, although referring to a different subject matter,
demonstrate what happened to agriculture when it adopted modern principles of industry.
The views of Hardt and Negri can also be applied to the understanding of the religious
economy. [Bracketed texts were added by the author].

The process of modernization and industrialization transformed and redefined all
the elements of the social plane. When agriculture [religion] was modernized as
industry, the farm [church] progressively became a factory, with all of the
factory’s discipline, technology, wage relations, and so forth. Agriculture
[Religion] was modernized as industry. More generally, society itself slowly
became industrialized even to point of transforming human relations and human
nature. Society became a factory (Hardt, Negri 285).

By disestablishing the church, breaking up the monopoly power and ending state
subsidies, the modern state created a market for churches, whereby churches started to
compete for members. Similarly, members had the ability and option to choose their own
religion and church. As a result, church ministers had to research and develop new tactics to gain members.

**Creating the Religious Economy 7.4**

Like products sold in the marketplace, religions needed to enhance their offerings by either extending their products, enhancing marketing, or increasing efficiency. Similarly, social scientists Brooks Hull and Gerald Moran demonstrate this idea by explaining that churches now had to consider the distribution platform in which sermons were preached:

> A crucial economic advantage not previously accrued to a church whose ministers’s preaching attracted members; and the evangelical orientation of the ministry, whatever its denomination or theological persuasion, gained an economic incentive. The outcome of these developments was an unacknowledged popularity contest among ministers and a profound change in the character of religious leadership (Hall / Moran 489).

In *The Churching of America, 1776-1990*, Finke and Starke describe these changes in the behaviors of ministers by documenting the changes in the way religious organizations conducted “revivals” and attracted new members and competed with other institutions. Rather than being directed by revelation, the Holy Spirit, Holy Ghost, or early religious law, church clergy started to employ modern business practices, including marketing tactics and religious packaging, as part of their everyday tasks in an effort to attract members. Simultaneously, members started to move into new churches that appealed to their personal understanding of doctrine or lack thereof. These monumental changes in the behavior of both clergy and church members created a competitive religion market, with lower barriers to entry and very little, if any, regulation. Bellah states:
Privatization placed religion, together with the family, in a compartmentalized sphere that provided loving support but could no longer challenge the dominance of utilitarian values in the society at large. Indeed, to the extent that privatization succeeded, religion was in danger of becoming, like the family, a “haven in the heartless world,” but one that did more to reinforce that world, by caring for its casualties, then to challenge its assumptions (Bellah 223).

Here Bellah observes, and is supported by this dissertation thus far, that religion lost its ability to effect change. Rather religion became the governed, the handmaiden of capitalism and democracy. Many of these changes were addressed in a popular Business Week article. Author Joseph Weber posed the following question to various scholars in the field of Sociology and Political Economy of Religion: “Can organized faith be explained by supply and demand?” (Weber, Joseph 136). The overarching answer to the question, mainly espoused by economist Laurence Iannaccone, is that, “yes, it can.” Iannaccone has been influential in establishing an economic-based model to help explain some of the changes in the market for religion, predominantly in the United States. Additionally, in a paper titled “The Progress in the Economics of Religion,” Iannaccone brings to light a new group of researchers, coined by Stephen Warner as the “New Paradigm” researchers. This new breed of researcher attempts to explain why the United States population has gone from 17% belonging to a church in 1776 to approximately 62% in 1980 (Finke, Starke 15). To further validate these statistics, the 2004 United States Census concludes: of the 293 million citizens in the United States in 2004, approximately 84%, or 249 million, profess to be Christians (World Christian Database). Religion, predominantly the Christian religion, is by no means dying or being marginalized by modernity, but rather appears to becoming more influential and its roots
seem to be entrenching themselves deeper and deeper into the soil of American culture.

Bellah states:

Though Americans overwhelmingly accept the doctrine of the separation of church and state, most of them believe, as they always have, that religion has an important role to play in the public realm. But as with every other major institution, the place of religion in our society has changed dramatically over time (Bellah 219).

This modern phenomenon appears to be contradictory to what the early founders would have expected and what many of the earlier enlightened philosophers, such as Hume, Jefferson, Smith, and others, thought would happen.

The world isn’t turning out the way the intellectual elite of a hundred years ago and many of its heirs today thought it would. In 1900 it was widely assumed that in the twentieth century, under the impact of modernization, humanity would outgrow its need for religion (Abrams 65).

Similarly, Huntington, in his article, “Religious Persecution and Religious Relevance in Today’s World”, published in *The Influence of Faith; Religious Groups & U.S. Foreign Policy*, explained that this overwhelming move toward religion, Christianity in particular, is a new phenomenon. “We are witnessing what various observers have called the “Revenge of God,” “the questioning of the secular state” and “secularism in retreat” (Abrams 58).

**New Paradigm 7.5**

To understand why the United States is more religious today than it was approximately 230 years ago, it is necessary to review recent literature offered by some of the more influential New Paradigm scholars such as Stephen Warner, Rodney Starke, Roger Finke, William Bainbridge, and Laurence Iannaccone.
Most of these New Paradigm thinkers believe that the supply of religion increased substantially following the separation of church and state. This increase in supply was due to the fact that the monopolistic market of large, influential churches lost operational state funding, thus eroding their powerful position and opening the market for new competition from other churches and religious sects. New sects began to flourish due to relatively low barriers to entry coupled with new technologies that helped advance the production systems, sales and marketing, and customer service models. Like industrialized corporations, religious suppliers adopted new technologies to offer more utility to purchasers at continually decreasing costs.

For instance, in the new colonies, new sects, such as Baptists and Methodists, began to compete for members by offering dynamic religious services, and they offered the novelty of sermons delivered by ordinary laymen:

The Baptist and Methodist preachers looked like ordinary men, because they were, and their sermons could convert and convince ordinary people because the message was direct and clear and the words were not read from notes, but seemed (to both speakers and hearers) to issue directly from divine inspiration (Finke 85).

Charles Finney, one of the most acknowledged ministers of the Great Awakening (1739-1830) stated:

Many ministers are finding it out already, that a Methodist preacher, without the advantages of a liberal education, will draw a congregation around him which a Presbyterian minister, with perhaps ten times as much learning, cannot equal, because he has not the earnest manner of the other, and does not pour out fire upon his hearers when he preaches. (Finke 86).

It has been argued by Finke and Starke, as well as others, that the Great Awakening and other small revivals in the United States came about not by a divine
inspiration from above (or at least not solely from such inspiration), but rather had substantial help from a well-planned and executed revival program, based on innovative marketing techniques. Finney, in a published document to Methodists ministers, stated the following:

Ministers ought to know what measures are best calculated to aid in accomplishing….the salvation of souls. Some measures are plainly necessary. By measures I mean what things ought to be done to get the attention of the people, and bring them to listen to the truth. Building houses for worship, and visiting from house to house, are all “measures,” the object of which is to get the attention of people to the gospel….What do the politicians do? They get up meetings, circulate handbills and pamphlets, blaze away in the newspapers, send their ships about the streets on wheels with flags and sailors, send coaches all over town, with handbills, to bring people to the polls, all to gain attention to their cause and elect their candidate. All these are their “measures,” and for their end they are wisely calculated. The object is to get up an excitement, and bring the people out. They know that unless there can be excitement it is in vain to push their end. I do not mean to say that their measures are pious, or right, but only that they are wise, in the sense that they are the appropriate application of means to the end. The object of the ministry is to get all the people to feel that the devil has no right to rule this world, but they ought all to give themselves to God, and vote in the Lord Jesus Christ as governor of the universe. Now what shall be done? What measure shall we take? Says one, “Be sure and have nothing new.” Strange! The object of our measures is to gain attention, and you must have something new (Finke 90).

Even more direct, Finney stated, “[A revival of religion] is not a miracle…It is purely a philosophical result of the right use of the constituted means” (Finke, Starke 19). The spirit of this statement is clear. Finney, along with countless other Christian leaders of new sects, was planning on utilizing new tactics to win members to his faith.

New Paradigm researchers believe that as churches and sects compete for members, new sects evolve, thus attracting new participants. The evolution process is a continuous one in that each religion finds ways to deliver the gospel more effectively and moderate doctrine more effectively with the hope of bringing more people to god.
Warner documents this competitive structure very nicely by using a modern example of what has been going on for the past 230 years. In his article, “More Progress on the New Paradigm,” published in Sacred Markets, Sacred Canopies, is the example of Troy Perry, a noncelibate homosexual male who was educated in a Florida Pentecostal church. Perry, presumably disgusted with the negative attributes associated with homosexuals in the Pentecostal church, started his own church in California in 1968. The Pentecostal church historically maintains very literal interpretations of the Bible and remains very conservative with regards to religious law. Because of this, lifestyles such as homosexuality are outwardly frowned upon and are typically associated with sin (rebellion against God). Perry’s church quickly became popular and was embraced not only by homosexual Pentecostals, but also attracted support from other faiths who wanted to recognize that homosexuals were children of god. Perry’s church, currently known as the Metropolitan Community Church, is now a successful denomination and is considered a legitimate part of the Christian religion (Jelen 18). As of this writing, the Metropolitan Community Church has congregations in Africa, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Europe, Central and South America, and 47 of the 50 states (as well as Puerto Rico) in the United States.

Another example of this phenomenon is Willow Creek Community Church in the Chicago suburbs:

Some twenty five years ago, Bill Hybels and his early followers did a door-to-door canvass to determine what was keeping fellow baby boomers out of church (answers included such varied responses as hypocrisy, dark buildings, and musty hymnals). Based on his findings, Hybels designed a church to appeal to those he termed “Unchurched Harry.” In Hybels’s church, visitors are not greeted with handshakes, but are left alone to explore the church on their own terms, and they are conspicuously not asked for money during the offering. The auditorium has
clear glass and no religious symbols. There is no dress code, no hymnals and no arcane liturgy (Jelen 8).

Another example, although perhaps a less extreme product mutation than the other examples, is Liquid Church, headquartered in Morristown, New Jersey. Liquid Church classifies itself as a contemporary Christian church that employs contemporary music, lively bible teaching, and state of the art multimedia. The church, like many modernized churches, employs new media to deliver its messages. This new media ranges from PowerPoint like slides during church services to web-based videos and animations. Liquid Church does not resemble other churches in the sense that there are few historical representations to iconography, statues, old world religion paraphernalia and it is grounded in new techniques, fresh ideas, and appears to be tailored to youth. The website of the church (www.liquidchurch.com) states, “Whether you’re exploring faith for the first time or already miles into the journey, we’ll change the way you think about church.”

These are just three of many examples that demonstrate changes in the way Christian organizations have tailored their services and religious doctrines to attract new members. From a handful of denominations in the early colonies, such as Baptists, Methodists and Calvinists, to today’s myriad sects, American Christianity has seen enormous growth. According to the World Christian Database, there are more than 9,000 Christian denominations in the world, of which the United States is home to approximately 635. Britain and India come in a far second with approximately 263 different Christian denominations. The United States is the most pluralistic, open religious society, boasting far more denominations than any other state. Today, Christian
denominations attract people with various needs and desires, from the extremely devout in search of strict doctrine to others who wish to be only peripherally involved with religion and faith.

A point to be noted here is that there is a substantial difference in the way some New Paradigm theorists understand the phenomenon referred to by Finke and Starke as the “Church–Sect” theory. First, Finke and Starke believe that new sects start mainly because older churches lose their relevance and start to “water down” their liturgies and doctrines. Unwilling to participate in this way, some members leave these churches to form their own stricter sects that adhere to older doctrines. Warner, on the other hand, appears to believe that this is not only the case but also that people start new sects that more closely align with their personal belief system and not necessarily with that of the old religions. These new sects combine aspects of the old church doctrine with new ideas to create a fresh take on Christianity.

Another aspect to keep in mind when trying to comprehend how and why the supply of religion has increased over the past 230 years is to understand the impact of changes in clergy compensation. Powerful, monopoly-like Christian denominations, such as the Roman Catholic Church, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians who received some sort of state funding, paid their ministers, priests and other full-time clergy a fixed salary. These church workers often did not have to worry about their next pay check, as the church was historically financially solvent. This changed for the new sects in the early colonies. Most full-time clergy in the new sects were paid from contributions they received from church members and others to whom they would evangelize. A study by Bonifield and Mills shows that the primary factor influencing a minister’s salary is the
size of the congregation (Bonifield Mills 151). When examining minister salaries today and in earlier times, a church’s largest expense is often its minister’s salary. Another study conducted by Iannaccone claims that 80% of the tithes and offerings given to churches come from approximately 20% of the members, thus assuming a powerful and very influential purchasing base (Iannaccone 1997). Moreover, Hull and Moran state that, “preachers often came to loggerheads with parishioners over theology and ecclesiology. In fact, the period from 1700 to 1740 saw a marked rise in church conflicts over doctrine, some of which resulted in the dismissal of ministers” (Hull Moran 483). With this in mind, it makes sense that job-conscious ministers began to behave like modern-day business people with the intention of maximizing profit by leveraging the rational tools of modernity. To maximize profit, it was necessary to increase the size of the membership base, thus ensuring the contentment of existing members and catering to the top 20% of the membership base. If ministers could not achieve this goal, they would lose money for the religion/local church and subsequently not get paid, could eventually be fired by the more powerful members, or go out of business entirely.

It appears that changes in the supply of Christianity in the United States are based upon a few select events. First, the market was deregulated, causing monopoly churches to lose state funding, resulting in the need for churches to compete for membership. Second, in order to attract new members, religions were forced to change the way services were offered and conducted, and alter their doctrines to continually attract new members. Third, ministers had to act more like corporate CEOs, by offering services superior to those of their competitors or complimentary product offerings in order to maximize membership, ensuring that membership fees were appropriate, conducting
tailored marketing campaigns to attract new members and offering an entertainment
benefit for those who attended services regularly.

**Summarizing New Paradigm Thought 7.6**

To further this discussion and to continue in line with the market model, I will utilize the
basic tenets of an economic market as described by Finke and Starke:

Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a
market made up of a set of current and potential customers, and a set of firms
seeking to serve that market. The fate of these firms depends upon (1) aspects of
their organizational structure, (2) their sales representatives, (3) their product, and
(4) their marketing techniques (Finke, Starke 17).

Similar to Finke and Starke, many economists take a similar position on religious
behavior, arguing that religious suppliers and religious consumers act in a similar
capacity to other markets.

In examining religious behavior, economists argue that individuals make choices
based on internal preferences and external factors like opportunity costs and
income. In this view, religious activity is produced with endowments of money
and time and influenced by individual productivity, preferences and income(Hull
488).

Moreover, Iannacone equates the market for religion to the following:

The combined actions of religious consumers and religious producers for a
religious market that, like other markets, tends toward a steady-state equilibrium.
As in other markets, the consumers’ freedom to choose constrains the producers
of religion. A “seller” (whether automobiles or absolution) cannot long survive
without the steady support of “buyers” (whether money paying customers, dues-
paying members, contributors and coworkers, or government subsidizers).
Consumer preferences thus shape the content of religious commodities and the
structure of the institutions that provide them. These effects are felt more strongly
where religion is less regulated, and, as a consequence, competition among
religious firms is more pronounced. In competitive environments, religions have
little choice but to abandon inefficient modes of production and unpopular
products in favor of more attractive and profitable alternatives (Iannaccone 77).
So it appears from the current literature of New Paradigm thought that the market for religion is somewhat analogous to other industrial markets.

Using the work of New Paradigm research, it becomes apparent that privatizing religious organizations in the early American colonies created a competitive market for religious goods. This competitive structure, similar to that of corporations in a capitalist system, put pressure on religious organizations to alter their doctrines to attract more participants and pay preachers, all in hopes to save more souls and perhaps make a few shekels in the process. What we learn from New Paradigm thinkers is similar to what Schumpeter described as the process of Creative Destruction. The separation of church and state spawned an evolutionary process that is changing the way consumers socially construct god. The religion and/or the God of the past perhaps may no longer exist; perhaps god will be or is in a form substantially different from previously recognizable versions. It is this process of “Creative Destruction,” the altering of modes of production and distribution that have aided the growth of religion, particularly Christianity in the United States.

Secularizationists 7.7

From a different perspective, there is a broad group of thinkers including sociologists, historians, economists, theologians, and others who claim that religion continues to lose authority both as an ethical governing body of common believers and as a political influencer, mainly due to the rise of empirical thought and the lack of acceptance for those things not logically or scientifically proved. This group of thinkers, herein referred
to as Secularizationists, would have a different explanation for the growth of Christianity in the United States. The arguments from these thinkers who oppose New Paradigm ideas are many, but the overarching and historical one that clearly contrasts their research espouses that the change in the market structure of churches continued an earlier deterioration process that would continually alter the doctrine of the church as well as reduce its political and cultural influence.

Secularizationists perceive that changes in the religion economy are not necessarily due to the increase in supply, but rather due to a change in demand. Instead of the church having the ability to dictate doctrine, believers now have the ability to determine what they will give to the church in exchange for what doctrine they will accept. They now have the ability to pressure clergy to alter the doctrines and liturgies to reflect the self-interested concerns of members and the congregation as a whole.

In general, Secularizationists argue that modernity, mainly through the advent of reason and empiricism coupled with classical economic principles, created less of a need for church, religion, or god, a view similar to what I have argued thus far. In *God Is Dead*, Steve Bruce, professor of sociology explains:

> The Secularization story is an attempt to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes. It is an account of what has happened to Christianity in Western Europe (and its North American and Australasian offshoots) since the Reformation (Bruce 37).

Bruce explains that the Reformation ushered in a new way of life and new future vision for a great majority of western civilization. After the Reformation, western civilization observed an increase in the spread of literacy and science. At the same time, a transfer of power from the church to modern inventions, like the state and or free market
system, took place. Additionally, the Reformation ignited a demand for the written word of god, spurring the translation of bibles into accessible modern languages. Common people were encouraged to read the bible for themselves and to challenge doctrines and scriptures that were previously only read and taught by the clergy. People were encouraged to think for themselves and to pursue reason over all things. The advent of the printing press not only created demand for bibles and religious materials, but also assisted in the massive spread of knowledge throughout the west. The populace began to understand that knowledge, combined with reason and capital, created a powerful recipe for worldly wealth and prosperity. Secularizationists also argued that people were encouraged to abandon superstition and religion to pursue scientific ideas and endeavors in the post-Reformation years (Bruce 37). People were challenged to move away from things unquantifiable to only things that were --thus laying the foundation for positivist science. In his essay, *Of Miracles and the Origin of Religion*, Hume clearly articulates the spirit of this movement:

For first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves, of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable (Kramnick 110).

Similar to Hume, in *The Enlightenment Reader*, Isaac Kramnick, political scientists, states,

Everything, including political and religious authority, must be subject to a critique of reason if it were to commend itself to the respect of humanity….Pleasure and happiness were worthy ends of life and realizable in this world. The natural universe, governed not by the miraculous whimsy of a God, was ruled by rational scientific laws, which were an empirical observation.
Science and technology were the engines of progress enabling modern men and women to force nature to serve their petition and ignorance provided the prospect even unto a future was perfection. The enlightenment valorized the individual and the moral legitimacy of self-interest (Kramnick xii).

It was from this premise of self-interest that classical economics crept in. It is this thought process, otherwise known as utilitarianism (discussed earlier) that evoked the critiques from Karl Marx, Nietzsche, Polanyi and a plethora of others.

Focusing exclusively on the adoption of market principles and capitalism, Marx did not attack religion per se but rather railed against the agents of religion, i.e., those who claimed to represent god. Marx argued that the elite structured society and made religion the mask to hide the undergirding movements of the capitalist system:

The bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man and man to his “natural superiors” and has left no other bond between man and man than naked self interest, than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, chivalrous enthusiasm, and philistine sentimentalism in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has converted personal wealth into exchange value. In place of the indefeasible chartered freedoms, it has substituted a single unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. It has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation veiled by religious illusions (Crane 87).

In support of his famous proclamation that god is dead, Nietzsche asserted: “He who no longer finds what is great in God will find it nowhere--he must either deny it or create it” (Heller 13). Both Nietzsche and Marx believed that modern principles and mechanisms, such as free markets and empiricism eroded the Church and religion to the point that it no longer resembles its original structure. Both argued that the Church (i.e., religion) is nothing more than a mask to coerce or guide market behavior, whether in the Nietzschean idea of “Will to Power” or Marx’s idea of exploitation of the masses. While
they differ in some respects, Marx and Nietzsche’s ideas are in harmony with Adam Smith’s claims that free market systems need religion because it encourages ethical behavior of its participants. Adam Smith stated:

> When the general rules which determine the merit and demerit of actions, come thus to be regarded as the laws of an All Powerful Being, who watches over our conduct, and who, in a life to come, will reward the observance, and punish the breach of them; they necessarily acquire a new sacredness from this consideration…the sense of proprietary too is here well supported by the strongest motives of self interest. The idea that, however we may escape the observation of man, or be placed above the reach of punishment, yet we are always acting under the eye, and exposed to the punishment of God, the great avenger of injustice, is a motive capable of restraining the most headstrong passions, with those at least who, by constant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them (Anderson 1069).

Similarly, Weber acknowledged that religious authority had been replaced by the authority of free markets: “Reformation meant not the elimination of the Church’s control over everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control over a previous one” (Weber 36). Weber beautifully articulated the relationship between Christianity and capitalism and how the one fed off of the other. Weber’s overarching concern was that doctrine was being adopted quite vigorously to work within the modern system. In a similar vein as the New Paradigm thinkers, Weber believed that churchgoers, especially the elites, were altering doctrine to buttress the capitalist system. Weber explained that Protestants pursued professions that generated high profits and increased their social standing. This type of behavior spawned a belief system whereby the greater profit a believer made, the more it appeared that her occupational calling was willed by god. It is within this idea that Nietzsche perhaps understood when he declared “God is dead.”

Weber’s arguments are echoed in the work of Polanyi, who similarly remarked:
Ultimately that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system (Polanyi xxiv).

Everything becomes surrendered to market forces. Over time, people have been socially constructed to think economically in all their various dealings, including interactions with supernatural power. According to Weber, people no longer believed in God as a sovereign deity, but began to view him as a means to acquire something, rather than the end in itself. God no longer represented a being to love and worship, but rather a being that provided goods and services in exchange for His followers’ time and money.

Reflecting this notion, the popular minister John Wesley explained that as people become rich, the spirit of religion dies:

I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches….So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away (Weber 175).

From a more contemporary perspective, the late Pope John Paul II voiced similar concerns when he stated, “The individual today is often suffocated between two poles represented by the state and the marketplace. At times it seems that he exists only as a producer and consumer of goods or as an object of state administration” (Dulles 1). Moreover, he stated that Christians (read Catholics) should dispense with the ideals of a free market system and re-embrace to the foundations of Christian doctrine. Quoting Pope John Paul II:
Only when we have citizens who are concerned with these transcendent values can we overcome the tendency to put profits ahead of people and self-indulgence ahead of responsible service. A lived relationship to the transcendent can foster self-control, the spirit of service and sacrifice that are requisite for a workable free society and a corresponding free-market economy. Without these cultural attitudes there can be no culture of peace, no civilization of love (Dulles 2).

The theologian Harvey Cox claimed that Americans are embracing religion as a mechanism for dealing with the consumer culture endemic to American society:

In American society, I believe we’re now in the late phase, the most deteriorated, decadent phase, of consumer capitalism. When I say “consumer capitalism,” I don’t mean simply the form of our economic life, I mean our whole culture….People’s primal energies are fixated on commodities that are supposed to bring satisfaction of inner hungers. Through the suggestive and hypnotic power of the advertising industry, a direct connection is made from very basic and underlying needs and fears to material commodities which are touted as things which satisfy those needs; but of course they do not (Finke 243).

In *Consuming Religion*, the theologian Vincent Miller argues that it is impossible for people to choose transcendent values of the Christian Faith as put forth by Pope John Paul II because such values have, in essence, been replaced by the entire process of desiring:

The shape and texture of consumer desire is not what it is commonly assumed to be; a shallow attachment to things. It is much more complex. It is constituted in the never-fulfilled promise of consumption. It is about the joy of desiring itself, rather than possessing. Even the most banal objects are marketed through the invocation of profound values and desires. Thus, the conflict between consumer and religious desires is not direct and explicit. Consumer desire is similar in form to traditional religious desires. It resembles more profound longing for transcendence, justice and self transformation enough to be able to absorb the concepts, values and practices of religious traditions into its own form without apparent conflict….Not only has consumer culture succeeded in turning people into shallow narcissists, but it has also encompassed those who attempt to hold out against erosion by drawing from the wisdom of religious traditions (Miller 144).

Miller’s arguments are best supported by the following statistics:
Over a seventy five year life span, Americans will spend approximately thirteen of those years behind a television, of which three years will be watching commercials….Overall, children aged two to eighteen average five and half hours per day of media use, with kids in the eight to thirteen brackets spending more time with media (nearly seven hours per day) than with any other waking activity including school (Budde Brimlow 65).

Despite the late Pope’s idealist intentions, it appears that the movement back to transcendent values is extremely difficult to navigate. Considering Cox’s and Miller’s statements, modern society is entrenched with consumerism to the point that such consumer desire replaces the transcendent value of god. By understanding the commercial activities of the media, one can see that modern society is constructed to become an economic agent, subject to rules of the disciplining or praising mechanisms that the system promotes. Modern media has done more than alter the way people choose products; it has changed the very nature of desire.

Stepping back, it appears that the modern system initiated by free markets and positive science some 230 years ago may now be coming to an impasse. Secularizationists argue that modernity will supplant the church and religion with humanity’s pursuit of its individual desires. Such subversion will occur when religion is being replaced by all things modern, as humans attempt to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. Secularizationists argue that people are perpetually oriented toward the ever more efficient adoption of market principles. Reflecting upon Miller’s argument, it appears that consumer desires—the action of desiring something—is replacing (or has already replaced) the need for god. Desire, with its almost spiritual overtones, sits in for religion as tool for enhancing one’s quality of life.

Miller’s argument turns on a similar axis as those of Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber in the sense that they all agree that market forces altered the entire system of believing:
everything succumbs to market forces. On the heels of Miller’s argument, Alexander Yip, in “The Persistence of Faith Among Nonheterosexual Christians: Evidence for the Neosecularization Thesis of Religious Transformation,” paraphrases Yamanes study:

He [Yamane] argued that religious authority structures are increasingly losing their ability to control what people choose to believe and how they practice their religion. Individuals are increasingly empowered to actively construct their religious faith, rather than uncritically relying on views prescribed by authority structures (Yip 201).

To demonstrate the accuracy of Yamane’s views, Alexander Yip conducted a survey of 565 self-defined nonheterosexual Christians, and found that roughly 85% of the respondents, most of whom were avid churchgoers, believed that traditional Bible teaching is inaccurate as it relates to homosexuality. He also found that 82% of respondents thought that personal experience was the most important guide for Christianity, meaning that personal experience was the foundation of Christianity, more so than the Bible, human reason, or church authority (Yip 207). Yip concludes:

One point is clear: the respondents considered church authority as the least important when they reflected upon and constructed personal and public morality. Data from elsewhere in the questionnaire show that 40.9% percent of the sample “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that “morality is a personal choice and a personal matter” (Yip 208).

Unquestionably, capitalism’s influence over modern society has caused great angst among religious leaders over the past 230 years. However, it appears that such agitation is unwarranted if we measure religiosity and the health of the Christian church based upon church attendance, stated beliefs regarding heaven or hell, and other criteria described in the “New Paradigm” research. It appears that as capitalism becomes more pervasive in the United States, so does religion. Regardless of the reason for embracing
religion (economic forces, personal problems, or simply the desire to become more spiritual), it can be argued that Christian churches no longer adhere to the original doctrines. According to sociologist and Secularizationist Steve Bruce, “As many surveys have discovered, present day Americans – the beneficiaries of a religious free market – are often woefully ignorant of the basic tenets of their faith” (Bruce 173).

Conclusion 7.8

To summarize, it appears that the arguments of the New Paradigm and Secularizationists are valid. On the one hand, the New Paradigm school argues that growth is mainly driven by a change in the supply of religion, which was caused by the separation of church and state and the privatization of the religious economy. Because of these changes, Christian churches and religious institutions had to modify more broadly their product offerings to attract more participants, all in hopes of gaining market share and solidifying a strong financial future. Where perhaps New Paradigm supporters see these changes as beneficial to the church and society in general, Secularizationists perhaps do not. Secularizationists perceive these changes as modifications in the demand for religion and god more broadly. Secularizationists explain that religion loses relevance because it competes with other more contemporary values, those values that were promoted since the beginning of modernity. However, to counteract the decreased demand for religion and god, religions and churches in general modify their offerings by reducing the price or increasing the benefits. The price was cut by reducing the time, financial and ethical commitments that were part of the original god product. Similar to other markets and products, this process continues with each new product release, and with each new
release, the price is reduced even further. Perhaps like the phone, a product that has changed dramatically over the years and whose current incarnation resembles very little of the first product, the product “Christianity in the United States” resembles very little the early versions. In addition and similar to other products, the price will continue to decrease until the opportunity for personal production and consumption becomes possible. It is argued in later chapters that the rise in Christianity is a short-lived phenomenon and will eventually become personalized, thus reducing the need for a formal product governed by formal organizations such as the church or religion.

Chapter 8 - Commoditization of allah

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: “I am looking for God! I am looking for God!” As many of those who did not believe in God were standing together there, he excited considerable laughter. Have you lost him, then? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they shouted and laughed. The madman sprang into their midst and pierced them with his glances.

"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science.

Introduction 8.0

Marvine Howe, former New York Times bureau chief for Turkey and Greece, wrote a very insightful book entitled, Turkey, A Nation Divided Over Islam’s Revival, arguing from a pessimistic perspective that there is an Islamic revival occurring within Turkey. She makes this argument with many examples, showing that long-established Islamic
values are resurfacing with vengeance against modern-day secular Turkey. Howe is only one writer among many who are making a similar argument. Because of the current passionate discourse between devoted secularists and mainstream Muslims, particularly around topics like the role of religion, the rights of women, the current Hadith Project, coupled with the desire for increased religious freedoms (such as the ability to wear headscarves and the still-recent election of a fairly traditionally Islamic government of the AKP), many secularists are spooked by the new perspective being adored by many people within Turkey. However, despite these alleged ghosts of Turkey’s Islamic past, which Howe argues are pulling Turkey away from modernity, this chapter explores a different course, explaining that modern-day Turkey is moving closer to modernity and the Western ideals of equal rights, personal freedoms, and a privatized, deregulated religious economy. In “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” professor and Turkish scholar Emir Baki Adas argues that Islam and democratic capitalism are not at odds, as many have argued, such as Barber in Jihad vs. McWorld or Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations. Adas shows that Islamic entrepreneurs deconstruct Islam based on reason, then proceed to reconstruct it based upon entrepreneurial and modern principles (Adas 114). Adas states:

In other words, the focus is on the hermeneutics of economic Islam; the ways in which Islamic actors interpret their relationship to others, reconsider their past and present from the perspective of modern economy, and reconstruct themselves as Islamic entrepreneurs and Islam as entrepreneurial religion (Adas 114-115).

The outcome of this chapter will show that Turkey is experiencing similar, yet somewhat different movements regarding the competition for god products relative to the United States, which, it has been argued, created a strong religious economy built upon the ideals of democracy and capitalism. The United States, similar to the present
occurrences in Turkey, has already undergone a period of Christianity deconstruction and utilitarian disciplined reconstruction in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This dissertation has reviewed these changes in Chapter 6. Similar to Chapter 6, this chapter will answer three questions:

1. Does Islam, as a religion, provide substantial benefits to Turkey as a country, and if so, what are these benefits?
2. What happened to the religious economy since the country deregulated the religious marketplace in 1924?
3. What do these changes mean to the practice and distribution of god (allah) products?

This chapter, like the last, will utilize the New Paradigm model as explained by Finke, Starke, and others. This chapter will apply the same logic of the previous chapter, so definitions and historical explanations of previously explained literature are not being reviewed again. However, similar to the last chapter, this chapter will present similar ideas and relationships, this time referring only to god products associated with allah and Islam.

**Similarities and Differences between the US and Turkey 8.1**

The United States does not have a long history, but it has a distinct history based upon merely two principal ruling parties: first, the British Empire, and today itself, as a democracy. Although the United States tends to have many cultures infused within its geographical walls, and despite these cultures disagreeing on many issues, it appears that the cultures share one powerful ideal--the element of individualized freedom enshrined
under the law and capital together pushing for life, liberty, and happiness. The element of individualized freedom or self-determination is not just embraced by the majority or even a ruling minority, but encompasses the ideals of the collective society, which includes secular and theistic institutions such as government officials and/or the church, synagogue, or mosque. Because of this somewhat uniform element of individualized freedom, coupled with a short and noncomplex national history, the United States tends to be more easily understood and analyzed compared with a state like Turkey. Unlike the short 200+ year history of the United States, Turkey has a very long history dating back to the early 11th century when Osman, a Turcoman warlord, inherited land in Asia Minor and expanded it by conquering various lands of the Byzantines (Mango 4). By the end of the 12th century, the lands conquered by Osman and his followers were being referred to as Turkey (Mango 4). Although Osman and his followers did not consider themselves to be Turkish, but rather just Muslims, the name Turkey started to stand for the lands that they conquered. Although Osman was the first to ignite the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, the land he conquered had a diverse history with influences from the Hittite, Assyrian, Byzantine, Roman, and Ottoman empires. Some scholars even date the Turkish people back to the 5th and 6th centuries, essentially as people of shamanism (Oktem 79). According to Niyazi Oktem, professor of law, prior to the conquest and redevelopment by Osman and his followers, previous inhabitants of Turkey were Buddhists, Brahmans, or Hindus. From these earlier religious settlements within Turkey came further migrations and thus further expansions by the Mazdaists, Manicheans, Nestorian Christians, and Zoroastrians (Oktem 379). According to Oktem, missionaries at this time played a large role in accelerating religious migrations. These missionary activities
sparked conversions of many sorts, thus creating a highly diffuse Turkish religious
demography. Turks synthesized many of these new beliefs taught by the missionaries into
a mixture of new religious identities, sometimes borrowing from Christian, other times
Judaism, Hinduism, etc. This synthesis happened regularly when new lands and cultures
were conquered. According to Oktem, this worked in the opposite direction as well:

This entire process of religious aggregation was repeated when Muslim Arab invaders conquered Central Asia. Thus, the faith and theology of Anatolian Muslims is based on an aggregate blend of religious traditions, or what I term a “multidimensional harmonization of faith.” The result in modern Turkey is the existence of many diverse sects of Islam, including the Alevi, Hallaji, Babi and Arabi traditions (Oktem 380).

In addition to the fervent religious culture of Turkey, the state has historic and
culturally rich secular influences, such as experiencing rule under Alexander the Great
and a tradition of great folklore similar to that of the Amazons and Greeks. The country
has significant monotheistic historical landmarks, ranging from great mosques, such as
Suleymaniye, Yeni Cami, Eyup, and Sultanahmet to the Christian Seven Churches of
Revelations, the birthplace and main region of ministry for Saul of Tarsus, and the place
where Mary, the mother of Jesus, spent the latter part of her life. Additionally, Mt. Ararat
in Turkey is presumably the landing place of Noah’s Ark. Turkey has been at the
crossroads of great theological and political debate and has represented rulers that have
held to pagan, theistic religious, and other more contemporary secular ways of life.
Because of this complex past, Turkey’s existing culture is infused with many influences.
Despite this long history, various Empires, and various modes of governance and
cultures, modern-day Turkey appears to have a few similarities with the United States
and perhaps even more similarities with the United States of the mid-18th Century.
When comparing Turkey’s history to the history of the United States, there becomes evident three apparent attributes that these countries share, each of which is modern. Although Turkey holds a significantly longer history with profound cultural roots, it was only in 1924 that the country adopted a purely secular government based upon democracy and separation of church and state – the first similarity with the United States. Although this chapter will analyze briefly the events leading up to the 1924 secularization of Turkey, the main purpose is to analyze religious behaviors, after the adoption of secularism, to determine if there has been an increase in supply and demand for god products, like that which has occurred in the United States.

Those who are familiar with both Turkey and the United States will clearly recognize that the United States espouses a rather comfortable situation toward an unqualified separation of church and state, with almost no regulatory oversight of religious organizations, other than public self-regulation, some monetary tax oversight, and some faith-based regulatory bodies. Turkey, on the other hand, still maintains substantial state control over the regulation of religion. Some may go so far as to argue that the United States *encourages* the entrepreneurial activities of new god suppliers by offering favorable tax treatments to both the suppliers and purchasers, not to mention providing government funds for faith-based initiatives. This chapter explains that Turkey is in a place similar to, yet not exactly like, the United States prior to deregulating the supply of religion in the late 18th Century. Turkey is in all probability one of the most religiously free Muslim societies, and appears to stand at the crossroads between totally deregulating all religious institutions, like the United States, or perhaps sliding back into a society of the Middle Ages like its Salafi-dominated neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Although
Turkey has a secular government, it will be shown that Turkey’s growth and mutations of god products happen at a slower pace than the United States because of the impact from its current supply side market regulations.

The second similar characteristic pertains to the economy. Although the United States’ economy is based on free-market principles and Turkey’s economy is based on quasi-statist control, there are obvious deregulating trends occurring in Turkey, moving the country to be more in line with a Western style free market system. Although there were two previous unsuccessful attempts at economic liberalism, the first between 1923 and 1929 and the second during the 1950s, it appears that the current development in economic liberalism that started in 1980 has consolidated political and societal support. Up until 1980, Turkey stayed the course to its internally focused, statist-controlled economic policy. However, the weaknesses of these policies started to appear when the country pursued import substitution (Onder 232).

“One major weakness was the neglect of the export competitiveness of the national industry. Whereas the country had to import much of the technology and many of the inputs used by local industries, its export revenues did not improve” (Onder 232). Because of the lack of exports, Turkey’s trade balance deteriorated in the 1970s and experienced substantial balance of payment problems (Onder 232). Along with the balance of trade dilemma, Turkey was experiencing high inflation and was plagued by the oil crisis of the mid-1970s (Onder 232). Because of these problems, it became extremely difficult for Turkey to service their sovereign debt to international lenders. Because of the perceivably high risk of Turkish debt payments, coupled with the 1970s’
turmoil in the international lending markets, Turkey was at odds to find new lenders to extend credit.

With these problems, Turkey turned toward the IMF and World Bank. Both of these institutions required structural adjustments in the economic policies of Turkey, mainly seeking “trade liberalization, removal of restrictions on the cross-border flows of capital, and closer integration into transnational networks of production through FIA and various partnerships between Turkish companies and MNC’s” (Onder 242). In exchange for these adjustments, the IMF extended a US$1.65 standby agreement and the World Bank helped restructure the existing cumbersome loans (Onder 233). “A major dimension of Turkey’s participation in neoliberal globalization is trade openness” (Onder 243). The trade policies adopted in the 1980s and that continue today have created a phenomenal increase in export growth. The Turkish Embassy reports that Turkey’s exports have risen from US$3bn in 1980 to approximately US$63bn in 2004. A recent report has Turkey’s exports at approximately US$124bn (Tarsus). This is a 12-month calculation, ending in June 2008.

According to the Heritage Fund’s Index of Economic Freedom, Turkey has a strong and growing private business and trade system, accompanied by lower trending tax rates, strengthening property rights, and perhaps the elimination of the cumbersome and inefficient labor regulations

Although Turkey is trending toward a more neoliberal economy, there are still paramount differences regarding wealth and entrenchment of capitalism. The United States, for instance, maintains a GDP per capita of about US $46,000, whereas Turkey maintains a GDP per capita of about US $9,000, a fivefold difference. Because of such
differences in the sizes of the economy, coupled with the lower levels of industrial competitiveness within Turkey, my argument would expect that the mutations and entrenchment of religion as industry to be less. With Turkey’s aspirations of becoming part of the European Union, many would assert that the economic system would continue to become more aligned with the laissez-faire market principles of the United States and, because of this, religion will continue to face mounting pressure from the principles of the human condition, as earlier explained.

The third point of similarity is the fact that both the United States and Turkey maintain a very high concentration of one religion. Depending upon which study one consults, the United States is about 75-80% Christian, and Turkey is about 95%-99% Muslim. Although each state has a short history of fervent religious argument, it seems that each is experiencing perhaps heightened levels of religious discourse today, with the United States continually taking up issues like abortion, the death penalty, just war doctrine, poverty, civil rights and many other religious-related topics; Turkey is discussing topics such as women wearing headscarves, women imams (clergy), the applicability of the Sharia law, re-instituting the Caliphate, religious rights, and many others. American and Turkish government officials are predominantly Christian and Muslim, respectively, with very little representation from minority religions.

Despite the similarities between each of these countries today, it is argued that Turkey is even more closely aligned with the United States of the late 18th or early 19th centuries, when the latter was going through substantial cultural change, including but not limited to defining the place of religion in the public sphere, civil rights, the rights of women in particular, and the development of unified and agreed-upon system of law that
satisfied both the secular and theistic groups. Turkey appears to be experiencing similar events as the United States during the First and Second Great Awakenings, developing, modifying and re-interpreting scriptures to better assimilate societies’ human needs with those of religious doctrine. Like the underlying argument embedded in the Max Weber’s *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, perhaps Turkey is entering into a new era of the “Islamic Ethic,” reinterpreting Scripture and the foundations of collective society to support the individualistic system of democratic capitalism. To support this claim, Adas states:

Islamic entrepreneurs are very well aware of the fact that they owe their success to these economic and political transformations and openly embrace and support a free-market economy with minimal state intervention. Most express their admiration to the former Prime Minister Ozal (1983-1991) who, Islamic entrepreneurs believe, energized latent entrepreneurial spirit in Anatolia by opening their eyes to the world, i.e. the market (Adas 132).

Adas goes further in his analysis by referencing a statement by one Islamic entrepreneur, who reinterprets a particular hadith, “Those who live two succeeding days the same way are lost indeed” (Adas 129). According to this entrepreneur, the hadith should be interpreted as, “If you employ two workers today, you must employ four tomorrow; if you have one factory today, you must make it two tomorrow. This is the philosophy!” (Adas 129) Adas cites another entrepreneur who states, “Those who claim that Islam does not support economic development and entrepreneurship simply do not know anything about Islam. Had the prophet lived today, on his business card it would have been written ‘exporter’ and ‘importer’”(Adas). One can see that the spirit of these statements resounds loudly with some of the rhetoric from the 18th century ministers and political figures in the United States. In this simple statement, you start to hear a new type of Islamic rhetoric, one that perhaps dovetails into democratic capitalist rules. In this
rhetoric there are seeds of a growing Calvinist doctrine, meaning that Muslims, like Christians (according to Calvin), should be wealthy and perhaps, by being wealthy, they are certain of their place in heaven. But regardless if this Calvinistic ideal is manifesting itself, it appears that there definitely is a deconstruction and reconstruction processes happening, breaking down Islamic texts and rebuilding new texts and rules based upon the disciplines of democratic capitalism. To my thinking on “Islamic Ethic,” the Asia Times and many other reporting organizations are claiming that Turkey’s Diyanet (more on this organization later) is re-analyzing the Hadith (which in simple terms is the book of deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), to determine if such writings are out of favor with modern times and perhaps holding back the progress of Turkey and, more broadly, Islam. According to reporter Fazile Zahir, “The Turkish state has come to see the Hadith as having a negative influence on a society that is in a hurry to modernize and some scholars are convinced that it obscures the original values of Islam” (Zahir). Zahir also quotes Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Islamic authority, as saying, “We are not here as Turkish Muslims to put ourselves in the service of Islam, but to put Islam in the service of life” (Zahir). The spirit of these statements echo the views of the American theologians of the Second Great Awakening, many of whom used religion and faith to push society forward in a progressive humanistic manner. In addition, these comments resonate with theologians of the mid-20th century United States, when the social gospel became in vogue. Fethullah Gulen’s comments seem to echo the argument made in Chapter 5 that the religious and secular authorities mutated the role of religion from god as the “end” to a “means to an end,” with the “end” ultimately being the individual. From first glance it
appears that Turkey is mutating on par with and on the same course as the United States of 150-210 years ago.

From a different perspective and despite the appearance of a deepening bond with modernity, Oktem argues that Turkey is so overwhelmingly Muslim that its ability to continue with secular legislation presents practical problems in social life, because law and faith are so intertwined. According to Oktem, “For many Turks, general principles of Islam are not compatible with Western philosophy. Muslim fundamentalists and some Muslim intellectuals believe that the ideas of democracy and secularism are inimical to Islamic dogma” (Oktem 372). However, in the very next sentence, Oktem rightly states that Turkey has not been a traditional Muslim society but rather a society caught in a constant ideological battle between Islam and Western values. On the one hand, Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim, yet with less veracity than the more traditionalist states, such as Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Islam in Turkey maintains more tradition and authority than perhaps Christianity does in the United States. As stated earlier, Turkey appears to be at a crossroads, or a mid-point between total secularization like the United States and total theocracy like Saudi Arabia.

Another point that needs to be clearly articulated is that although Turkey is secular, it still maintains a regulated market economy for religion, a substantial difference from the United States. As described in more detail below, Turkey currently has two organizations that regulate religious suppliers: one that regulates the suppliers of Islamic goods and another that regulates the suppliers of religious minority goods. But despite regulation of religious supply, the demand for religion and the ideas supporting religion are not regulated, meaning that people can think and take action on religious argument or
participate in religious services as they deem fit. This right, although skewed at times, is
granted under the Turkish Constitution. However, there is a note of caution here. There
are various cases that support a type of informal regulation on consumer demand, which
include censorship, death threats, killings, and or imprisonment.

For instance, in April 2007 five young Muslims slit the throats of three Christians
(two of whom were converts from Islam) for working at and for a Christian publishing
house that produced and distributed Bibles. A note found in the pocket of one of the 19-
and 20-year-old murderers stated, “we did this for our country,” and other reports stated
that the note said “they are attacking our religion” (Baker 1). Later investigations show
that the murderers had links with local police officers and members of the special military
forces (Cromartie et al., 304). According to other sources, such as the Hurriyet
newspaper, one of the murderers stated, “we didn’t do this for ourselves. We did it for
our religion. May this be a lesson to the enemies of religion” (Baker 1). In another case,
three Muslims who converted to Christianity were arrested. These three Christians now
face up to three years in jail for presumably disobeying Article 301 of the Turkish penal
code, claiming that they denigrated ‘Turkishness.’ The sentence for such a crime is
somewhere between 6 months to 3 years (GodTube). In February 2006, a priest was
shot in his church by a 16-year-old boy, who was upset over insulting cartoons of
Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper (Cromartie, et al. 304). Although within
United States there are various cases of informal regulation of demand, in Turkey there
appears a more hostile, medieval approach to curbing demand of “wayward” citizens.
This type of behavior goes even further and is not just relegated to violence against
Christians. For instance in 2006, Nobel Prize winner and Turkish citizen Orham Pamuk
was charged under Article 301 stating that he insulted, “Turkishness”. Orham Pamuk potentially could have served 6 months to 3 years in prison, if the case had not been dropped. In addition, journalist Hrant Dink was sentenced to 6 months in prison for declaring that Turkey committed genocide when exterminating Armenians in the early 20th century. Hrant never made it to prison – he was assassinated prior to serving his time. What has been discussed thus far is that the United States and Turkey have similarities, which include democracy, separation of church and state, deregulating economies, and a high concentration of one religious faith. However, despite these similarities, there are substantial differences, the most important of which is that Turkey still regulates the religious economy, and because of this, religious competition will be lessened. In addition to the supply side regulation of the government, there also appears to be an informal regulation of demand for religious goods, which are exercised mainly by fundamentalists or ultra-fundamentalist religious people. This informal demand, although not a legal right, still maintains some control over the ideas of citizens of Turkey. The second difference between Turkey and the United States is with regard to the open market structure of the industrial economy. Although lessening, Turkey still maintains some regulatory control over industry and because of this the ideals of the human condition will not be fully realized. In addition, the rules of the free-market economy will not have disciplined the minds and social structures of all Turkish citizens, creating the “subjectivities” of the capital system, a point that Hardt and Negri so powerfully argued. When looking at both states and where they are in relation to levels of freedom, secularism and capital, it is safe to say that the United States provides a more robust environment for the religious entrepreneur and for the free-spirited religious
consumer. Because of this, Turkish mutations of religious organizations will be minimal when compared with the United States. Yet, because there still is relatively unregulated demand for religious products, there will be some product mutations, although perhaps these mutations will be insular, pushing upon the existing Islamic organizations for reform, rather than creating new sects or splinter groups. There will be further discussion of this later in the chapter.

The Founding of Turkey 8.2

From 1830–1920, Islam was experiencing social, economic, and cultural challenges from Western influences, such as the separation of church and state, democracy, capitalism, and new and various forms of freedoms. To address these challenges, Muslims, as a global entity, moved in one of two directions, either toward these new Western ideas by reinterpretting Scripture (Chapter 5) in favor of such beliefs, or they receded to presumably the original practices of Islam, once again embracing revelation and knowledge. The underlying aspiration common to both of these polemical views was to revive Islam by going back to its core roots as set out in the Qur’an, all in hopes of staving off political, religious, and cultural pressures from the West (Black 281).

Starting during the Crimean War (1854) and ending with World War I (1918), global Islam cautiously adopted many changes. The Ottoman Empire, in particular the Caliphate, reluctantly embraced Western-style reforms, mainly in an attempt to partake of Western success in war, technology, and economic development (Black 280). The Caliphate was the head of the Muslim faith and commanded similar respect as perhaps the Pope does in Roman Catholicism. The first of these reforms, the igniter if you will, were the Tanzimat reforms of 1839. These reforms were established with the intent of
securing British and French support against Muhammad ‘Ali, the aggressive ruler of independent Egypt (Black 281). In addition to the Tanzimat reforms, which were implemented from 1839 through 1876, the Ottoman’s implemented other, more far-reaching reforms, mainly for the protection of religious minorities within the Empire:

The Ottoman central government was reorganized, with new ministries, consultative assemblies, and a “complete hierarchical system of provinces and subdivisions…” largely based on French practice. A new penal code was to apply to Muslims and non-Muslims, with special courts to hear cases between Muslims and non-Muslims. A new civil code, utilizing the Sharia was applied only to family matters relating to Muslims (Black 281).

The Tanzimat reforms called for the guarantees to all of the Empire’s subjects, eliminating religious discrimination in hopes of securing a society where life, honor, and fortune can be pursued (Black 281).

Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatsoever of the subjects my Empire inferior to another because of their religion, language or race, shall be for ever effaced from the laws…of the Empire…As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominion, no subject of the Empire shall be in any way annoyed on this account and no one shall be forced to change his religion (Black 282).

Modernizing reforms were adopted not only in the Ottoman Empire, but Iran also was experiencing sweeping changes. As discussed earlier, Malkom Khan pushed for the separation of legal and religious powers within the government (Black 282). He believed that the law would not be implemented properly and fairly without proper checks and balances. Seeking to emulate Western style institutions, he stated, “enforcing such laws is impossible…except through that wondrous system that the states of Europe have invented for these laws of theirs” (Black 288). He explains that power must be diffused between the legislature and executive (Black 288). Although Iran is not the subject of this chapter, the reference is meant to show that modernization and its effects were being felt
throughout all Islamic civilization. Some Islamic states and regions, like Iran, parts of India, Egypt, Tunisia, and the Ottoman Empire moved forward embracing modernity, whereas other states, particularly those in Central Asia, either became skeptical and cautious or outright hostile toward its elements.

At this time in history, the most powerful civilizations within Islam were adopting modern principles based upon secular law, division of labor, and the advancement of individual rights. Still, it was within the Ottoman Empire that the most aggressive and sweeping changes took place. Following in the succession of earlier reforms, the Ottoman Empire received new pressures from a group of subjects who called themselves the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottomans believed that national sovereignty, separation of powers, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and equality should be the lifeblood of Turkey (Black 293). The Young Ottomans were not antireligious or even perhaps true secularists as defined by Western standards, but they did take the position that religion should govern otherworldly events and leave worldly governance to secular law and humanist institutions. From the push of the Young Ottomans in the 19th century to the early 20th century leading up to World War I, the Islamic civilization went through additional mutations, some again receding into revelation and theocracy, others embracing modernity, empiricism, individualism, capitalism, and democracy. During this time, some states embraced modernity by reconciling it with the Qur’an; others adopted them, despite religious law, primarily to build up sufficient power to fight against Islamic oppression and or to fight against the powers and manipulations of the West.

The Rise of Kemal Ataturk 8.3
At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, with substantial portions of its land going to Greece and other parts falling under the influence of France, Britain, and Italy. Between 1919 and 1922, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk as military commander, Turkey won the War of Independence, eliminating control of foreign occupiers in lands that were perceived to be illegally apportioned after WWI. Because of the perception of Islamic oppression, coupled with his national stance to make Turkey a regional power, Ataturk moved the state of Turkey toward modernity more than any Islamic leader had done up until this point. Ataturk diminished the Caliphate’s powers, due to its perceived involvement with the foreign occupiers, plus its undergirding involvement with creating propaganda to undermine Ataturk’s secular regime. In 1923, following the war, Ataturk became President of the new Turkish Republic. As such, he abolished the institution of the Sultan and the Caliphate and created a religious governing authority called the Diyanet (Howe 13). Another example of Ataturk’s swift hand against competing theocratic ideals came in 1925 when he reacted firmly against a Kurdish insurrection that was started by the Sheik Said and 46 of his followers from the Naksibendi Brotherhood. To deal fairly with the 47 individuals involved in this insurrection, Ataturk created an independent tribunal, which subsequently convicted and executed each of these individuals. Because of this insurrection, Ataturk abolished all Sufi Muslim Brotherhips and forbade their style of dress in Turkey, which caused these religious groups either to disperse or go underground.(Howe 36). From 1920-1950, religious regulation from the Diyanet was at its highest point. Brotherhips only resurfaced in Turkey around 1950, once again gaining influence (Howe 37). On the heels of these sweeping religious changes, particularly the removal of the Caliphate, Ataturk’s
regime solidified its position. To some people the elimination of the Caliphate was necessary because it opposed modernization and individual freedom, but to others the Caliphate was the authority needed to maintain the Islamic way of life. Charfi, for instance, argues that the Caliphate agreed to the earlier adopted Tanzimat reforms grudgingly and wanted to revert to theocratic rule by the Caliphate and Sultan at the very earliest possibility (Charfi 102). Charfi states, “This pivotal event (the abolition of the Caliphate) in the modern history of Islam is seen by some as liberation and by others as a veritable catastrophe whose consequences are still with us today” (Charfi 102).

Massimo Introvigne, a religious scholar, argues that Ataturk was inspired by the positivist theories of Auguste Comte and viewed religion as an obstacle to progress (Introvigne 15). Ataturk abolished the Caliphate and established a religious regulating authority, not as a mechanism to mandate purity or quality of religious doctrine, but rather to ensure that religion was kept in a box, easily isolated and observed. In this sense, Ataturk was not a true believer in the freedom of religion or at least not a believer in freedom of religion’s growth.

Marvin Howe states in *A Nation Divided over Islam’s Revival* that:

Many scholars attempting to define Ataturk’s ideology start with the six arrows, the basis of his Republican People’s Party: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Revolutionism, Secularism and Etatism. Others prefer to define Kemalism as a dynamic force for the transformation of society or simply the modernization of society (Howe 18).

**Establishing the Market Structure 8.4**

Oktem argues that, “From the first republican Constitution of 1924, through the more liberal and democratic Constitution of 1961, and finally to the most recent and more
authoritarian Constitution of 1982, the concept of secularism has always occupied an important place in Turkish legislation” (Oktem 371). Due to reforms started by Ataturk in 1923, the existing Constitution of the Turkish Republic, particularly Article 2, 10 and 24, clearly supports Oktem’s previous statement on modernity. The following Constitutional Articles (below) state that everyone within the Republic has equal rights without discrimination on any particular demographic attribute, and each citizen has the right to choose their own convictions and modes of conscience, albeit religious or not. Religion will not be forced upon citizens by either the state and or other individuals.

**Article 2 Characteristics of the Republic**
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.

**Article 10 Equality Before the Law**
(1) All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.
(2) Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice.
(3) No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class.
(4) State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings.

**Article 24 Freedom of Religion and Conscience**
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.
(2) Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.
(3) No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.
(4) Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.
(5) No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or
things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.

Although Turkey does not have a state religion as do many other highly concentrated Muslim states, the one visible point of contention with modernity and the United States’ religious market model is with regard to state-funded and managed religious education and Islamic religious services. One of the state regulating authorities called Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi, which in English means the Ministry or Department of Religious Affairs (DIB), provides Hanafi Sunni structured religious education in the primary and secondary public schools and manages all the state funded Islamic religious services. Those students who are other than the Sunni Muslim faiths such as Sufi, Shia, Alevi, etc. or other faiths like Jewish or Christian, are forced into a Sunni structured religious education in the public schools (Oktem 371). It appears that the purpose for providing a structured Sunni education was to ensure that moderate religious teachings were conducted, eliminating the potential for ultra-conservative religious education, a perceived threat to Kemalism. This forced education does not take into consideration the 20%-25% of the population who are Alevi, plus the 2%-5% who are Shia and the 1%-2% who are other than Muslim. However, it seems like things may be changing with regards to this tradition. In October 2007, a member of the Alevi faith pursued this issue with the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled that the Alevis were being denied the right to pursue their own religious convictions (Cromartie, et al, 302) The DIB also appoints Imams, Vaizes, and religious administrators, pays salaries for religious officials, and directs the affairs of approximately 80,000 mosques and conducts approximately 8,000 Qur’anic courses within Turkey (Diyanet).
The current religious system in Turkey resembles the United States’ religious system in the mid to late 18th century. As explained earlier, many of those paying taxes in the American colonies did not want their money going to a particular religious organization that they did not deem worthy, so they applied pressure to the government to eliminate such state funding, ultimately creating a free-market religious economy (See Chapter 6). Similar to the smaller, less concentrated religions in the early colonies that did not receive state funding, Muslim sects, other than Sunni, do not receive state funding. For instance, the Alevi Muslims do not receive state funding and do not use the mosques, but rather support themselves with operating funds and use their own Cem Houses (Oktem 388).

According to Introvigne, Turkey at the initial request of Ataturk instituted the Ministry of Religious Affairs, not to regulate religion doctrine or practices but rather to be the watchdog arm for Ataturk himself, the military, and later subsequent governments (Introvigne 15). Ataturk believed that Islam had such a strong hold on Turkey, both from a governmental and individual perspective, that a structured process of de-Islamization was needed, thus Ataturk created the DIB (Introvigne 15). Introvigne explains that the creation of the DIB did not necessarily cause the religious organizations to die, but rather caused an inward migration toward underground religious services. He further argues that those sects, such as the Sufi sect that can thrive without external religious mosques, survived the heavy regulation during the early years of Ataturk’s regime.

All non-Muslim religious organizations need to acquire financial support from their own members or constituents. These religious minorities are recognized under the Treaty of Lausanne, established in 1923, giving rights of practice and assembly to many of the
minority religions. The Treaty of Lausanne was not only a peace treaty signed between the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey to settle the land disputes that were carried over with the Treaty of Sevres, but was also the Treaty that first recognized the independent state of Turkey. In addition, this treaty established a separate governing body called the Valiflar Genel Müdürlüğü (VGM) or also referred to as the Office of Foundations (Oktem 371). The VGM approves all operations of churches and related organizations, which include granting more property, capital improvements or perhaps, on occasion, taking back the land and property when a religious organization cannot afford maintenance (Oktem 371). Oktem states that on occasion some religious minorities find it challenging to receive approvals for improvements or expansion, particularly in the Kurdish areas, in the eastern parts of the state.

The Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom showed that religions such as Greek Orthodox suffered and are still suffering from these restrictions (Cromartie, et al., 302). Oktem also argues that, “the Turkish government does little to officially prohibit religious activity. Likewise, proselytizing and religious propaganda are not officially prohibited, but in practice missionary activities are not well received either by conservative Muslims or by the state” (Oktem 376). Oktem also shows that religious regulation by the DIB and the VGM over time continues to become less forceful and more tolerant of religious minorities’ needs. For instance, Oktem shows that Istanbul University recently added a Christian Theology Department, and afterward the DIB created a Department of Interreligious Dialogue. The DIB extended warm greetings to Christians when they celebrated the second millennium of
Jesus Christ, an action very rarely observed in Muslim concentrated states (Oktem 378). In addition to these reforms, in November 2006, as part of reforms required for EU accessions, the government passed a law making it easier for minority religions to form a foundation, the mechanism by which such minorities can acquire land and property. These reforms also provided a way for minority religions to recover appropriated properties that had been seized by the state (Cromartie et al., 304). Overall, most religious groups in Turkey believe that these reforms are the right moves to increase religious freedoms (Cromartie, et al., 299).

Despite the supply side regulation from these organizations, it is assumed that the Turkish religious market still operates in a semicompetitive market environment because the demand side of the market is largely self-regulated. This type of market structure, although different from the United States, still allows for competition, particularly from intra-brand competition. Introvigne explains that on the one hand there is the “inter-brand” competitive religious market, which allows different brands, in this case faiths, to compete with each other; on the other hand, there is the “intra-brand” market, which provides for competition within the brand family, in this case within discrete faiths, like Christianity or Islam. The United States model, as shown previously, provides a market where both inter-brand and intra-brand competition is encouraged. Conversely, Turkey provides only a substantial intra-brand market because the state controls the supply of religious faiths. Introvigne explains that because of controlled supply and high concentration of Muslims in Turkey, similar to Catholicism in Italy, Islam becomes an “umbrella category” encompassing many varieties of Islamic ideas (Introvigne 8). Introvigne also cites Saudi Arabia in his analysis, arguing that it is the most monopolistic
Islamic market, but even in this highly controlled marketplace, there is intra-brand religious competition. He states that the professional Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia compete with the unregulated private sector, which in turn creates various shades of Islam, from “ultrafundamentalist” to outright disregard for some of the more dominant beliefs. He explains that it is this intra-brand competition that many are calling the “The Revival” (Introvigne 8). Introvigne argues that Turkey is a highly pluralistic Muslim marketplace, and because of that, it is a great case to study intra-brand Muslim competition.

Although not mentioned by Introvigne, supply side regulation also brings to the light the possibility of black market religious activities, where people gather, buy, and sell religious goods and services. Because the nature of most religious or god products are service based, black market activities are often hidden services in an individual’s home, personal discussions or gatherings among like-minded purchasers. Because the market for god products is regulated in many ways, yet unregulated in others, the need for black market religious products and services seem to be nil. However, those god products that may appear to be out of mainstream Islam may find solace in black market religious activities.

What the reader needs to understand is that rather than many competing discrete god products in the marketplace, as in the United States, Turkey experiences most of its competition in the form of ideas and discourse, with the winning arguments putting substantial pressure upon the existing Islamic faiths. Although not as religiously plural as the United States, with hundreds of Christian sects offering different god products,
Turkey has handfuls of different Islamic sects but perhaps with hundreds of differing bundles of god products offered or purchased within each of these sects.

**Intra-brand Religious Competition 8.4**

There are many historical and contemporary examples of this intra-brand type of competition occurring within Turkey, a few of which are discussed here. But before these examples are shared there is one important attribute of Turkey that needs to be assessed and viewed in light of the changes discussed below and in relation to what has been discussed regarding the Human Condition and the ideas of Hardt, Negri, Polanyi, and Schumpeter.

First, Turkey has experienced 20 quarters of economic growth, an event not often experienced since the country’s founding. In addition, Turkey is also being considered as a candidate for membership into the European Union. Because of these positive moves over the past five years and the optimistic outlook ahead for Turkey, reporter Fazile Zahir explains that the recent and fervent religious discourse is none other than wealthy, conservative business men exercising their right to a private faith, while at the same time wanting to continue with their recent economic and political successes. Zahir explains that these citizens want to have their values reflected in the constitution, thus they are pushing ultimately for enhanced human rights and freedom of expression, which encapsulates freedom of religion (Zahir, online article). Again, these ideas dovetail with the ideas of the founders of the United States, who modified religious doctrines and practices and drove religion to a personal experience, all in hopes of furthering economic success. The goal of these moves by the founders of the United States and the modern-
day Turkish government and business officials seems to be the modification of religious life to work for the economic system, opposed to the economic system being subjugated to the rules of religion.

Human rights and the modifications of religious expression and doctrines to accompany such rights are at the forefront of most contemporary religious issues occurring in Turkey. Although the current constitution provides for equal rights of all citizens in Turkey, women tend to have been dominated by historical Sharia law, thus limiting many of the rights experienced by men. According to an article published by the *Christian Science Monitor*, there is a new class of educated women who are demanding more rights; these rights include the ability to perform religious services, the ability to govern religious practices, and the elimination of commonly accepted rituals like sexual mutilation and honor killings (Schleifer). Author Yigal Schleifer cites Zuleyha Seker, graduate of theology and one of the 400 women *vaizes* (women preachers), “In the past, [women] believed anything told to them by their older brother, father, or teacher. But as they are becoming more educated, they are coming up with more questions…We need new answers for new questions” (Schleifer). According to Seker, *vaizes* are seen as revolutionaries within the DIB’s religious community, always pushing for change. Seker’s role as a *vaize* is a new phenomenon happening in Turkey, and in Islam much more broadly. *Vaizes* are new in Turkey, only coming into existence in 2007. Today, there are a few hundred *vaizes* in Turkey, whose main service is to provide preaching and guidance to Muslim women. In addition, some of these *vaizes* are being considered for roles as *muftis*, better known as interpreters and or scholars of Muhammad’s law (Schlaefer). Nevin Meric, a women’s education expert at the Istanbul’s mufti’s office
argues, “Now women are more educated, they participate more in social life, and they are mixing more with men, so they are demanding more….Today they are aware of their rights and they are learning by reading and asking” (Schleifer). For instance, Seker, who teaches at local Istanbul community center, explains to her female students that they can no longer believe everything that was taught to them because some of the traditions are not part of Islam. For instance, the honor killing, where a woman is to be killed by her family if she dishonors them, is not an accepted practice of Islam (Schleifer). However, as one would expect, not all Muslims are happy with these new developments. “Sunni Preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Qatar issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, saying ‘that leadership in prayer in Islam is reserved for men only,’ and warning that a woman leading prayers might arouse men” (Shleifer).

Another important topic taking deep root within Turkey is that relating to the newly instituted initiative to re-interpret the hadiths, or the sayings of the prophet Muhammad. In the Jerusalem Post, Daniel Pipes wrote an article entitled, “Is Turkey’s Government Starting a Muslim Reformation?” Pipes explains that the “Hadith Project” is an initiative to take the 162,000 existing hadiths and to pare them down to 10,000 (Pipes). Theology professor Ismail Hakki Unal from Ankara University and a participant on this project, explains the ultimate goal of the Hadith Project is to eliminate any hadith that conflicts with the Qur’an (Pipes). Pipes also cites Mehmet Görmez, the vice president of religious affairs, “We will make a new compilation of the hadith, and re-interpret them if necessary…The project takes its inspiration from the interpretation of the modernist vein of Islam…We want to bring out the positive side of Islam that promotes personal honor, human rights, justice, morality, women’s rights, respect for the
other” (Pipes). Hidayet Sevkath Tuksal, another member of the project, goes so far to say that some hadiths are just wrong because they try to enforce male dominance over women (Pipes). Fadi Hakura of the Chatham House, International Affairs Think Tank, sees this project as the beginnings of a reformation more in line with the Christian Reformation (Pipes). Fadi Hakura at a different time explains this project to be an attempt to make Turkish Sunni Islam “fully compatible with contemporary social and moral values” (Traynor). In the article, “Turkey Strives for 21st Century Form of Islam,” author Ian Traynor explains that as part of this Hadith Project, Felix Koerner, a Roman Catholic Jesuit scholar who is an authority on Turkey and Islam, is also participating. Felix Koerner is teaching the Islamic scholars about western religious change and how to ensure that lessons learned from the Christian experience are not lost but applied most appropriately (Traynor).

The two aforementioned examples appear to influence intra-brand competition, but it is probably still too early to tell what these changes can mean to inter-brand competitiveness and/or breaking away into new sects. However, the next example clearly shows a new competitor in the inter-brand Islamic market within Turkey. Fethullah Gulen, a moderate Islamic spiritual leader who maintains a very liberal outlook toward Islam, now has a religious following of somewhere between 400,000 to nearly 2 million largely Turkish citizens. Although Gulen started his career as one of the state-appointed imams in the late 1950s, then subsequently became a teacher at a mosque in Ederne, he claimed his fame in the early 1970s when he was arrested for offering black market religious services, such as providing summer camps to disseminate Islamic ideas (Aras 1). After serving a seven-month prison sentence for these activities and after suffering in
the 1980s for similar activities, Gulen was embraced by Turgut Ozal, the then Prime
Minister of Turkey. Gulen is known by his followers as *hocaefendi*, which means
respected teacher (Aras 1). Fethullah Gulen was a follower of Said Nursi, a prominent
religious scholar who was exiled from 1925 through 1950 for his devout Islamic beliefs.
When Said Nursi died in 1960, his followers splintered in many groups, one of which
was founded by Fethullah Gulen.

A well-traveled and quite articulate man, Gulen, who has written 60 books during
his life, is best known for his views on tolerance, explaining that religion is a private
value and should not be forced upon anyone (Aras 2). Bülent Aras, in “Turkish Islam’s
Moderate Face,” published in the *Middle East Quarterly*, explains that Gulen wants to
Islamicize Turkey, yet at the same time wants the Turkification of Islam (Aras 2). This
comment seems to encapsulate the Gulen movement in general, meaning that it wants
more Islam within Turkey, yet at the same time it wants to enforce upon Islamic
principles the ideals of a modern society. Gulen proposes two attributes to achieving this
goal and perhaps, more broadly, peace, “We can build confidence and peace in this
country if we treat each other with tolerance” (Aras 2). From Gulen’s perspective, “no
one should condemn the other for being a member of a religion or scold him for being
an atheist” (Aras 2). In addition, Gulen believes in equal rights for women, particularly as
regards their taking roles in religion. Like many of the early Christian religions in the
United States, Gulen believes that a worldly education is necessary and that Muslims
should better integrate with the broader modern society (Aras 2). Gulen’s followers have
set up organizations to distribute his ideas to the elite of Turkish society. These
organizations include a monthly journal (*Sizinti*), two academic journals (*Yeni Umit* and
Fountain), a daily newspaper (Zaman), a television station (Smanyolu), and a radio station (Burc FM) plus international panel discussions and conferences (Aras 2). The Fethullah Gulen movement is using new and modern marketing tactics and modes of distribution to reach potential god purchasers. In this situation, the Fethullah Gulen movement appears to represent the model of religious production and distribution, similar to the more progressive Christian organizations in the United States. In addition to the media distribution, the Gulen community owns and runs about 100 hundred schools in Turkey. These schools are under state control and use the same curriculum as do Turkish state schools, only with a more conservative social agenda (Aras 3). Like religious schools in the United States, these schools are funded by charity collections in the local mosques and from business people (Aras 3). Some have called Gulen, “Turkey’s answer to media-savvy American evangelist Billy Graham…In televised chat shows, interviews, and occasional sermons, Gulen speaks about Islam and science, democracy, modernity, religions and ideological tolerance, the importance of education, and current events” (Aras 3).

Conclusion 8.5

What this chapter explains is that despite Turkey’s differences in the market structure of religious economy, there appear to be mutations similar to those that occurred during the early founding years of the United States. Similarly, it appears that Turkey is undergoing change and engaging in dialogue that is not antisecular or antimodern but rather entering into a new phase of democracy, one that enshrines personal freedom, more akin to the United States and Western society models. Because of this dialogue, coupled with enhanced education for all of Turkish citizens, but perhaps more importantly women,
Turkish Islam is confronting challenges from middle class citizens. Turkish citizens are asking new questions, in light of their recent economic success and intended accession to the European Union. Some of the questions being avidly discussed concern human rights, the role of women in society, the role of religion in influencing politics, the literal interpretation of the Qur’an, and the need and desire for a more secular and diffused governing structure. Like the United States, Turkey is exploring ways to utilize better religion to advance society, rather than sliding back into the worrisome traditions of the Dark Ages. Because of these new changes and desires, the entire foundation of Islam is coming into question, but again, not with a negative goal to eliminate it, but rather to cultivate it better and remove the historical biases, hatred, and male dominance that historically have so controlled the ignorant. Although Turkey maintains supply side regulation of Islam, subjectively delivers state contributions to Sunni mosques, and force feeds Sunni education in primary and secondary schools, there still appears to be competitive pressures coming from more progressively focused and liberal Islamic organizations such as that of Fethullah Gulen.

The DIB and VGM were developed to be the watchdog arm for the secular government and military, but it appears that what they have become is actually counterintuitive to their intended purpose. As we have shown in the case of the United States, when god products are allowed to compete in an open-market religious economy, the god products mutate into new forms like a product traded in an industrial or technology-intensive economy. The production and marketing of the products become more efficient and less expensive to deliver, which in turn allows the supplier to reduce the price and entice more participants in the marketplace. It is suggested that the DIB and
VGM regulate god products so as not to allow for mutations or more competition within the market, therefore artificially keeping the god prices higher than necessary.

We learn from the United States that when the religious market is open to full competition, more purchasers enter the marketplace for god products because the price decreases. We learn from Turkey’s case that when the supply of god products is regulated, the price for these products remains higher than optimal, thus limiting potential purchasers. Despite the supply side regulation of religion within Turkey, we learn that because the demand for religion is “relatively” de-regulated, mainly by various forms of freedoms provided under the Constitution, that the overall suppliers in the religious economy still innovate and develop new, lower cost forms of god products, as evidenced by the Fethullah Gulen movement and internal pressures put upon existing institutions, as evidenced by the adoption of women vaizes by the DIB.

We learn that religion and the market for god products still maintains a substantial place in modern and or modernizing society, and perhaps it is needed to regulate democratic, capitalist society. So because of this continued, yet declining value for god products, it is suggested that society needs to understand better the determinants that drive the decisions that increase and or decrease the value for such products. By understanding these, society in general can become better equipped to optimize the effects from such institutions.

In Chapters 7 and 8, taken as a whole, it is made clear that despite the historical significance of religion playing a mystical role, the actual ideation, production, and distribution of such products in contemporary society works in a similar manner to other market economies—appearing as nothing other than a human organization, governed by
the human condition. The Alpha God of Christianity and or Islam appears to be dead in
the physical organization of these historically great institutions, perhaps the madman with
the lantern is gone as well, and perhaps the only thing remaining is the learning and or
accusations that he promoted. The madman argued that society has killed God, capital G
emphasized. So what is left, if not for God? What governs this human institution of
religion, and how can modern society best regulate, deregulate or modify it, so better to
serve the needs of such society? Like other institutions, can society better construct the
marketplace to eliminate war, hatred, biases and or other historically oppressing rules that
these institutions put upon us? These questions are approached with the utmost caution,
and these questions are not tailored to ask “whether society should” but “rather whether
society can” establish rules to regulate or deregulate the marketplace.

To answer the question of whether society could regulate the marketplace to make
the religious economy and the creation, distribution, and consumption of god products
serve the needs of society more broadly, we now shall turn.
Chapter 9 - Empirical Research

“He that lives upon hope will die fasting.”
Benjamin Franklin

Introduction 9.0

Up until this point, the research here has explored the competitive, free-market structure of the religious marketplace. It has looked at the supply-side effects of religious suppliers and has utilized economic theory to explain the utility-maximizing behaviors of religious consumers and investors. Overall, this dissertation has explained how Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction takes hold of all historical values and re-creates them into competitive goods. The dissertation has explored the process of creative destruction and how it commands participants in democratic, free-market systems to act in the same manner corporations do, ultimately competing with each other for higher levels of capital, all in hopes of winning power in the competitive market relationship.

Considering all of the above, this chapter’s main purpose is to support further the underlying theory and analysis, with the primary focus on understanding the purchasing determinants for god consumers, and to develop the beginnings of a universal valuation for god products. Considering this is the beginning of a model, it is not assumed that all the variables that drive the valuation for god have been chosen correctly, but rather those variables that are most obvious were. The tests that are conducted herein assume that further research will be necessary to optimize the valuation.

This chapter plans to answer 6 broad questions:
Question 1: Is there a relationship between a person’s age and their conviction that they are rational actors inhabiting a world governed by rational laws versus the conviction that they believe that supernatural beings interfere suddenly in ways as to violate rational laws?

Question 2: Is there a relationship between a person’s value for god and their conviction that they are rational actors inhabiting a world governed by rational laws versus the conviction that they believe that supernatural beings interfere suddenly in ways as to violate rational laws? Going forward, I will refer to the latter descriptions as rationalism and religious traditionalism respectively.

Question 3: Is there a significant relationship between a person’s value for god and the level of financial, religious, social, and intellectual capital?

Questions 4: Is there support for the process that humanity purchases god products in the same manner that it makes investments or purchases goods and services?

Question 5: Is there a significant relationship between demographic variables, such as age, gender, sex, marriage, children and political ideological beliefs and the value that a person places on god?

Question 6: Is there a universal valuation for god that can be utilized by governments to help in modifying macro- and micro-economic policy to harness better the societal benefits that god purchasers provide?

These broad questions will be answered--to the extent they can be--by employing basic correlations and linear and log-based multivariable regression analyses. This chapter has five sections. The first two sections review the construction of the questions used in the survey and the methodology used to collect the data, the third section puts
forth a glossary of the variables and the fourth section reviews each of the analyses that were performed. The last section is the conclusion, which will summarize the results of the analyses.

**Variable Construction 9.1**

The survey questions (not to be confused with the broad chapter questions) were derived with two intentions in mind. The first intention was to gain insight into the historically changing preferences of god consumers and the second was to explore the purchasing determinants of god consumers. The survey questions were created with the intention of collecting data that would help answer the six broad chapter questions, defined above. The surveys provided enough information to create 25 discrete variables that were used for the econometric analyses. The variables are described in the glossary below.

Of the 50 questions on the survey, approximately 2/3 of these questions were demographic in nature. The first four survey questions were screener questions, tailored mainly to ensure that the survey respondents were qualified. To qualify, respondents needed to be self-professed Christians or Muslims in the United States and Turkey respectively. In addition, the respondents needed to maintain some form of income and be at least twenty years of age. If the respondents did not meet these criteria, the survey was not included in the data set.

After the qualifying questions, the first five survey questions were constructed to capture basic demographic data, including gender, age, living proximity to metropolitan area, marital status and number of children. Age information was collected because the study wanted to understand if a person’s age had a correlation with their belief in
rationalism or religious traditionalism. Living proximity to major metropolitan areas, marital status and number of children were fielded mainly for exploratory purposes.

Survey questions 6 and 7 were created with the intent of understanding if there is a correlation between the value a person puts on god and their self-professed ideology of conservatism, liberalism or other and their proclivity for increasing or decreasing regulation of business entities. The bases underlying these questions were to gather information to support the idea that conservatives are inclined for less business regulation, yet at the same time, they are also in favor of maintaining religious traditionalism. If a correlation exists, the research would show that conservatives, who are pushing for less regulation of business entities, are in actuality allowing for enhanced competitiveness in the marketplace for religious goods and services, which in turn moves them away from religious traditionalism because it ensures enhanced product mutations.

Survey questions 8, 9 and 10 were created to collect personal salary information, including annual income and the number of estimated hours worked per week. The bases for these questions were to collect the necessary information needed to calculate the hourly wage rate, which is used as a metric to calculate the value of the time a person spends attending religious services.

Survey questions 11 through 18 were constructed to get an understanding of the respondent’s education level, amount of money spent on post-high school education, any existing educational loans and who paid for their education. The purposes of these questions were to understand if there is a correlation between a person’s secular education, the amount of money spent on education, the remaining amount of educational loans still outstanding and the value placed on god products.
Survey questions 19 through 23 were created to get an understanding of the respondent’s wealth, both in gross and net terms. The purposes of these questions were to understand if there is a correlation between a person’s wealth and the value they place on god products.

Survey questions 24 through 25 were created to establish a proxy which would give insight into the strength of the respondent’s relationship network and social status. The questions relate to the number of hours and the amount of money the respondent spends in and on social activities, outside of the church or mosque.

Survey questions 26 through 31 were created to get an understanding of the religious education of the respondent, with the intent of seeing if there is a correlation between a person’s religious education and the value they place on god products.

Survey questions 33 through 38 were created to get an understanding of the perceived short and long term benefits of purchasing god products with the intent of seeing if those who have a higher value for god products also have a greater belief in the benefits of them. The short term benefits were related to things that a respondent may obtain during their lifetime. The long term benefits were related to things that a respondent may receive in the afterlife, with the afterlife being a benefit unto itself.

Survey questions 39 through 40 were constructed to gather information about the respondent’s preference to favor rationalism or religious traditionalism. In addition, these questions intended to get an understanding of how a person believes ethics should be governed. The answers to these questions were correlated against the value a person places on god products.
Survey question 41 through 46 were created to get a simple estimate of a respondent’s religious knowledge, all in hopes of seeing if there is a correlation between how much a respondent knows about the religion he or she is a member of and the value they place on god products.

**Methodology 9.2**

The data used for this study were collected from survey respondents in the United States and Turkey. The survey employed quota sampling methodology with the minimum quota of 85 and a maximum quota of 150 qualified and fully completed surveys for each country. Other than ensuring that the respondents were qualified and that all of the answers were completed fully, there were no other sampling methodologies employed.

Approximately 500 surveys were sent to United States and Turkish citizens via email. In addition to the e-mail invitations, there were 240 surveys distributed in the mail and or fielded face-to-face in the United States and approximately 200 surveys distributed similarly in Turkey. Of the 1,440 sent invitations, 317 surveys were returned, with 110 qualified and completed surveys in the United States and 89 qualified and completed surveys in Turkey representing a total sample of 199. The survey sample represents a 95% confidence level with a 10% confidence interval. The survey requirements were that each completed survey be fielded by a self-proclaimed Christian in the United States or a self-proclaimed Muslim in Turkey. In addition, the survey participant needed to maintain some form of income. Lastly, in order for surveys to be included in the dataset, the surveys needed to be fully answered. The surveys that did not meet these requirements were discarded and are not part of the data used.

Due to the amount of surveys that did not meet the criterion (118 or 37% of total submitted surveys) either because they did not qualify (have a job, retired, self
proclaimed Christian or Muslim and older than 20 years of age) or because they did not answer all of the questions completely were discarded. This elimination of surveys that were not complete or non-qualified helped to eliminate some of the normal bias that is inherent within quota sampling and the target list. There was limited randomness in the sample selection criteria and because of this; the reader needs to understand that there exists some level of bias within the sample data. A copy of both the United States survey and the Turkish survey are included in Appendix 1 and 2.

**Model Variables and their Explanations 9.3**

Included in the glossary below is a summary of the variables used in the econometric analyses. The table includes four columns, “Variable”, “Explanation”, “Calculation” and “Variable Group”. The first column, Variable, provides the name and symbol of the variable. The second column, Explanation, provides a summary of the variable. The third column, Calculation, provides a summary of how the variable was calculated, if in fact, the variable is made up of a calculation of data obtained from the survey. If there were no modifications to the data and they were taken and used in testing exactly as reported on the survey, the row states, “Reported as submitted.” The fourth column, Variable Group, provides a sub-classification for many of the discrete variables, hoping to provide a broader classification category. For instance, Intellectual Capital is considered a Variable Group and consists of three distinct variables. Observed together, these variables are equated to a broad category referred to as Intellectual Capital.

### Variable Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Calculation</th>
<th>Variable Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (GEN)</td>
<td>No explanation needed, variable used as reported</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (AGE)</td>
<td>No explanation needed, variable used as reported</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>No explanation needed, variable used as reported</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAR)</td>
<td>reported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (CHIL)</td>
<td>No explanation needed, variable used as reported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (IDEO)</td>
<td>IDEO is a variable that shows a respondent’s political ideology</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation (REG)</td>
<td>RE G is a variable that was asked to see if a person was more inclined to believe that business should be more or less regulated by government.</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Industry Spend (ANNINSP)</td>
<td>ANNINSP is the amount of money and the value of time a person spends annually to keep abreast of their industry.</td>
<td>Intellectural Capital (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNINSP is calculated by taking a person’s hourly work rate, which is the annual income divided by 52, then divided by the number of reported work hours and then adding this amount to the annual amount of out of pocket expenses a person makes to stay abreast of the applicable industry.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Cost (EDCOST)</td>
<td>EDCOST is the amount of money that a person has spent on all post high school education.</td>
<td>Intellectual Capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level (EDLEVEL)</td>
<td>EDLEVEL is the highest level of education achieved.</td>
<td>Intellectual Capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Income (INC)</td>
<td>INC represents total gross annual income.</td>
<td>Financial Capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount of Personal Debt (TD)</td>
<td>TD is the total amount of debt a respondent has currently. This includes mortgages and all outstanding loans on any assets.</td>
<td>Financial Capital (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Market Value of Personal Assets (TMVA)</td>
<td>TMVA is the estimated total market value of all assets owned by the respondent.</td>
<td>Financial Capital (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-wealth (NW)</td>
<td>NW is the market value of assets less the total debt outstanding on those assets</td>
<td>Financial Capital (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital (SC)</td>
<td>SC is the amount of time and money a person spends on social activities. It is calculated on an annual basis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC is the summation of (the number of weekly hours allocated to social activity multiplied by a person’s hourly wage rate multiplied by 52) plus (the amount of money allocated weekly to social activities multiplied by 52).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Years in Faith (YIF)</td>
<td>YIF represents the number of years a respondent has been a Christian or a Muslim.</td>
<td>Religious Capital (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Religious Education (RE)</td>
<td>RE represents the number of years in formal religious education.</td>
<td>Religious Capital (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Questions Correct (NQC)</td>
<td>NQC represents the number of religious questions answered correctly.</td>
<td>Religious Capital (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God Value (GV)</td>
<td>GV represents the amount of time and money spent on purchasing god products.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GV is calculated by taking the summation of (the number of hours a person devotes to attending religious services plus the number of hours a person spends in religious reflection, whether at home studying or reading or with other groups where religious tradition or practice is conducted multiplied by a person’s hourly wage rate) plus (the amount of money a person gives to a church or mosque on a weekly basis multiplied by 52).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of god (EXIST)</td>
<td>EXIST represents the level of conviction a person has regarding the existence of god.</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afterlife (AFLIF)</td>
<td>AFLIF represents the level of conviction a person has regarding the possibility of an afterlife.</td>
<td>Reported as submitted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Long Term Benefits (LTBG)

LTBG is a combination of AFLIF and EXIST. LTBG is calculated by taking the averaging the scores from AFLIF and EXIST.

Short Term Benefits (STBG)

STBG is made up of 8 factors, each factor representing a benefit that god may provide to a purchaser while on earth. STBG is the average score of the 8 different factors.

Physical Capital (PC)

PC is the level of health a respondent self reports. Reported as submitted.

What Governs Society, Rationalism or Religious Traditionalism (WIIC)

WIIC represents the level of conviction a person holds to their belief that society is governed by rationalism or by religious traditionalism. Reported as submitted. Knowledge System.

Ethics Governance (EG)

EG represents the level of conviction a person holds to their belief that ethics should be governed by rationalism or religious traditionalism. Reported as submitted. Knowledge System.

Notes:

1. Variable Groups are compilations of variables that when observed together formulate a proxy for something else. There are 3 variable groups that represent a proxy for a particular capital. In addition, Knowledge System is a proxy for a respondent’s belief system.

2. Intellectual Capital is made up of three variables that when observed together may represent a proxy for the level of secular knowledge and intellectual capital that a person has acquired.

3. Financial Capital is made up of four variables that when observed together may represent a proxy for the level of financial capital a person has acquired. Financial Capital includes INC, TD, TMVA and NW.

4. Religious Capital is made up of three variables that when observed together may represent a proxy for the level of religious capital a person has acquired. Religious Capital includes YIF, RE and NQC.

5. Knowledge System is comprised of two variables that when observed together represent a proxy for a person’s inclination to believe more in the rational actor and a rational world or an irrational world, governed by the rules of a supernatural being(s).

Analysis 9.4

Question 1: Is there a relationship between a person’s age and their belief in rationalism versus their belief in religious traditionalism?

To answer this question, two tests were performed.
Test #1

Correlation between AGE and EG

The first test is to see if there is a correlation between AGE (age) and EG (the variable representing a person’s belief in what should govern ethics—rationalism or religious traditionalism). To perform this correlation test, 35 respondents who answered “no opinion” or “other” were removed. EG data represents the answers collected from survey question #40: "Should ethics be based more on traditional religious values or more on humanity’s experience over the centuries?" Possible answers: 1. Traditional religious values, 2. Humanity’s experience over the ages, 3. Other, or 4. No opinion.

Hypothesis: The hypothesis is that younger people are more inclined to believe in rationalism and older people are more inclined to believe in religious traditionalism. If true, this test will support the hypothesis that as history grows older, human nature takes on new meaning, moving away from a nature that believed in a god that controlled human destiny to a nature that controls its own destiny.

Results--Christian and Muslim Data: When observing the raw Christian and Muslim data together, there is a slight and insignificant negative correlation $r(162) = -.118$, $p > .05$ between AGE and EG, meaning that older survey participants are more inclined to hold to “traditional religious values” as the ideology that should govern ethics. However, considering the p-value is $>.05$, the significance of this correlation is minimal.
**Results--Christian Data:** When observing the Christian data separately, there is a significant negative correlation that is greater than the data in total, $r(98) = -.242, p<.05$ between AGE and EG, meaning that older survey participants are more inclined to hold to “traditional religious values” as the ideology that should govern ethics. Unlike the aggregate data, when observed as a single data set, the Christian data shows a greater correlation and is significant as the p-value is <.05.

**Results--Muslim Data:** When observing the Muslim data separately, there is a negative correlation that is less than the data in total import and less than the Christian data by itself, $r(63) = -.102, p>.05$ between AGE and EG, meaning that older survey participants are more inclined to hold to “traditional religious values” as the ideology that should govern ethics. Unlike the aggregate data, when observed as a single data set, the Muslim data shows a lesser significant correlation.

**Data Observation:** The data, both in aggregate and individually, show a negative correlation, with the Christian data showing a significant negative correlation. Considering the results, although not significant in total, the hypothesis holds true for the United States but inconclusive for Turkey.

**Test #2**

**Correlation between AGE and WIIC**

This test is to see if there is a correlation between AGE (age) and WIIC (the variable representing the conviction regarding what is in control of human destiny—rationalism or religious traditionalism). WIIC data represent the answers collected from survey question #39: “On a comparative scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing your belief that God

“controls all the actions in this world and humanity cannot do anything to change such
“actions” or 10 representing your belief that humanity “controls all the actions and happenings in this world by understanding nature and scientific proof?” Each of these tests is conducted using correlation analysis.

**Hypothesis:** The hypothesis is that younger people believe in rationalism and older people believe in religious traditionalism. If true, this test will support the hypothesis that as history grows older, human nature takes on new meaning, moving away from a nature that supported religious traditionalism to a nature that controls its own nature through rationalism.

**Results Christian and Muslim Data:** When observing Christian and Muslim data together, there is almost no correlation, \( r(197) = .011, p>.05 \) between AGE and WIIC.

**Results--Christian Data:** When observing the Christian data separately, there is a slight positive correlation, \( r(98) = .035, p>.05 \) between AGE and WIIC.

**Results--Muslim Data:** However, when observing the Muslim data separately there is, although slight, a negative correlation, \( r(63) = -.072, p>.05 \) between AGE and WIIC, meaning that older survey participants are more inclined to believe that “God controls all the actions in this world.”

**Data Observation:** The data shows a negative correlation for Muslims and a very slight positive correlation for Christians, with the total data showing a very slight positive correlation. Considering the correlation is so minimal with each variance moving in the opposite direction, it can be argued that there is no definitive correlation and therefore the hypothesis is null.

**Test 1 and Test 2 Observation:** Looking at these two tests together, there appears to be support, although minimal, that older individuals are more inclined to maintain a
religious traditionalism perspective. This may signify that older people are more inclined to believe in ideals that are outside of rationality and logic and, to the contrary, this data may signify that younger people are more inclined to believe in rationalism. Overall, this data modestly supports the suggestion discussed in the dissertation that humanity, as it becomes older, continues to evolve, moving closer to a species that believes in its own powers to modify its own future. Another interpretation of the data with regard to this idea is that perhaps it is too late in history to calculate this belief, considering the majority of individuals have already evolved into another human phase.

**Question 2:** Is there a relationship between a person’s value for god and their belief in rationalism versus their belief in religious traditionalism?

**Test #3**

**Correlation between GV and EG**

This test is to see if there is a correlation between GV (god value) and EG (the variable representing a person’s belief in what should govern ethics—rationalism or religious traditionalism). Similar to Test #1 and #2 above, 35 cases that answered “no opinion” or “other” were removed. Each of the tests is conducted using correlation analysis.

**Hypothesis:** The hypothesis is that those who are more inclined to believe in religious traditionalism maintain a higher value for god because such ideas are founded upon ideas outside of utilitarian logic.
**Results--Christian and Muslim Data:** When observing Christian and Muslim data together, there is a strong and significant negative correlation, $r(162) = -.196$, $p<.05$ between GV and EG.

**Results--Christian Data:** When observing the Christian data separately, there is a stronger negative correlation than the data in total, $r(98) = -.255$, $p<.05$ between GV and EG.

**Results--Muslim Data:** When observing the Muslim data separately, there is an even stronger negative correlation than the data in total and compared to Christian data, $r(98) = -.323$, $p<.05$ between GV and EG.

**Data Observation:** The data shows a significant negative correlation between GV and a person’s belief that ethics should be based more on humanity’s experience over the centuries. Looking at this another way, the data signifies that those who have a higher GV align themselves with a stronger belief that ethics should be governed by religious traditionalism.

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**Test #4**

**Correlation between GV and WIIC**

This test is to see if there is a correlation between GV (god value) and WIIC (the variable representing the conviction regarding what is in control of human destiny—rationalism or religious traditionalism. This test is conducted using correlation analysis.

**Hypothesis:** The hypothesis is that those who are more inclined to favor religious traditionalism maintain a higher GV because, unlike those who maintain rationalism, these purchasers are not drive by purely utilitarianism principles.
**Results--Christian and Muslim Data:** When observing the Christian and Muslim data together, there is a strong and significant negative correlation (r(197) = -.199, p<.05) between GV and WIIC.

**Results--Christian Data:** When observing the Christian data separately, there is a stronger negative correlation than the data in total, r(107) = -.271, p<.05 between GV and WIIC.

**Results--Muslim Data:** When observing the Muslim data separately, there is a weaker negative correlation than the data in total and compared to Christian data. In addition, the data is less significant as the data in total and the Christian data respectively. r(187) = -.179, p>.05 between GV and WIIC.

**Data Observation:** The data show a significant negative correlation between the values placed on god and belief that humanity controls human destiny. Looking at this another way, the data signifies that those who have a higher GV are more inclined to believe that “god controls all the actions in this world, and humanity cannot do anything to change such action.” This negative correlation supports the hypothesis.

**Test 3 and Test 4 Observation:** Unlike Test 1 and Test 2, Test 3 and Test 4 both show significant correlations for the data in total and for the most part, for the religions separately. Because of these significant correlations, it appears that those who place a higher value on god are older and more inclined to hold to religious traditionalism.
Question 3: Is there a significant relationship between a person’s value for god and the level of financial, religious, social and intellectual capitals?
Test #5

Significant Correlation between GV and Capitals

This test is to see if there is a correlation between GV (god value) and the following variables:

1. ANNINSP (the amount of money and time a person spends annually to keep abreast of their secular industry, EDCOST (the amount of money a person has spent on education post high school), EDLEVEL (the highest level of education achieved), collectively representing secular intellectual capital,

2. TD (total debt that a person has accumulated), TMVA (is total market value of all assets), INC (annual income), collectively representing financial capital,

3. SC, representing social capital,

4. YIF (number of years a person has been a Christian or Muslim), RE (the number of years a person has received some sort of Christian or Muslim education), NQC, representing religious capital, and

5. PC, representing personal physical capital.

In each of the columns and rows below are the results that correlate to the appropriate variable and the corresponding dataset. The column to the far right of the table states those variables that have a significant positive and or negative correlation.
**Hypothesis:** The hypothesis is that there is a significant relationship between a person’s value for God and the level of financial, religious, social and intellectual capital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Results</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Correlation and Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intellectual Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANNINSP</td>
<td>r(197) = .156, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .144, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .254, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>TR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDCOST</td>
<td>r(197) = .032, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = -.096, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .191, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDLEVEL</td>
<td>r(197) = -.048, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = -.046, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .186, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>r(197) = .221, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .076, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = -.110, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>TR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMVA</td>
<td>r(197) = .348, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .207, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .663, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>r(197) = .217, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .018, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .488, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>TR, MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>r(197) = .450, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .407, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .397, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIF</td>
<td>r(197) = .228, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .070, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .398, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>TR, MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>r(197) = .207, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .129, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .252, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>TR, MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NQC</td>
<td>r(197) = .340, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .464, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .175, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>TR, CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>r(197) = .032, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .131, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = -.111, p&gt;.05</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data Observation:** The data show the results for 11 different variables and their correlation with GV. When analyzing the data in total, it becomes apparent that some variables show a significant correlation with GV than when comparing them to each of the religions as separate datasets. The variables that demonstrate the most significance to GV in total are TMVA and SC, or alternatively viewed as financial capital and social capital. The variables that show a significant correlation in total and with one religion but not the other are INC, YIF and NQC, one representing financial capital and other two representing religious capital. Therefore, it can be argued that there are correlations between GV and financial capital, social capital and religious capital, yet there is limited to almost no correlation between intellectual capital and physical capital.

From the starting 11 variables in the table above, it becomes clearer that only five variables show some form of correlation. These five variables, considering they have
high correlations, will be utilized as starting variables in the multi-variable regression tests.

Data Observation (on the significant variables):

Financial Capital

The correlation between TMVA and GV shows that when a person’s market value of assets increases, there is a corresponding increase in the amount of time and money that they spend on purchasing god. This implies that as people feel or perceive themselves to be wealthier, they also spend more time and give more money to their religious organizations and or spend more time and money in personal religious reflection.

Looking at financial capital from another perspective, there is a significant correlation between INC and GV, signifying, like TMVA, that the wealthier a person becomes and the more money they make, the more they spend to purchase god products. However, by analyzing the GV as a percentage of INC (Graph 9.1), it demonstrates that as INC increases, there is a negative relationship to the percentage of INC spent on god products. This seems to signify that there may be decreasing marginal benefit with each subsequent purchase of god products, showing a rather similar pattern to normal goods and services. If in fact this observation remains true with additional testing, it will signify that the god products may maintain the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, like other tangible goods and services.

GRAPH 9.1
**Multi-Collinearity between TMVA and other variables**

There is a significant correlation between INC, AGE, MAR, CHIL, IDEO, ANNINS, TD, NW, SC, YIF and TMVA.

**Social Capital**

The correlation between GV and SC suggests that those who spend more time and more money at social events, establishing their social network and building a base of social capital tend to have a higher GV. It could be inferred from this correlation that those who have more SC and a higher GV are also those who participate in or are members of clubs or civic groups. According to Bellah, Putnam and Tocqueville (discussed in Chapter 7), high levels of SC among religious believers encourages civic engagement, volunteering, philanthropy, and assisting the poor. Additionally, there is support that high levels of SC also break down walls between socio-political demographics (Chapter 7). What this implies in light of the dissertation’s argument, is when churches compete and new sects develop, SC increases within these organizations as well. But what is interesting here is because there is a continuous division within religious organizations, there will continue
to be splits in agreement among these religious institutions. Therefore, SC has the potential to lose significance across the broader population of the United States and Turkey.

Multi-Collinearity between SC and other variables

There is significant correlation between SC, INC, CHIL, IDEO, EDLEVEL, EDCOST, ANNINSP, TD, TMVA and NW.

Religious Capital

The correlation between GV, YIF, RE and NQC shows in one capacity or another that higher levels of religious capital increase GV. Although YIF and RE have positive correlations in both the United States and Turkey, the main driver of this significant correlation is Turkey. Similarly the main driver of the correlation between NQC and GV is the United States. What these three variables signify is that the greater number or years a person has belonged to a religion, coupled with higher levels of religious education and the amount of religious knowledge they have, the more value they would put on GV.

Multi-Collinearity between Religious Capital and other variables: There is significant correlation between YIF, RE and NQC with MAR, CHIL, IDEO, EDLEVEL, EDCOST, TMVA, NW, EXIST, AFLIF, LTBG, STBG and TBG.

Hypothesis Answered

The results have shown that there is a significant correlation between levels of capital and the value placed on god, with the main drivers of value being financial, social, and religious capital.
Questions 4: Is there support for the idea that humanity purchases god in the same manner in which it purchases investments or commodities?

Test #6

Significant Correlation between GV, STGB, LTGB

This test is to see if there is a correlation between GV, STBG (short-term benefits of god) and LTBG (long-term benefits of god), each representing a product feature of god. Each of these analyses is conducted using correlation analysis. In each of the columns and rows below are the results that correlate to the appropriate variable and religion. The column to the far right of the chart states those variables that have a positive and or negative correlation and are significant variables affecting GV.

Hypothesis: The hypothesis is that there is significant relationship between a person’s value for god and their belief in long-term and short-term benefits of it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Results TR</th>
<th>Christian CH</th>
<th>Muslim MU</th>
<th>Correlation and Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STBG</td>
<td>r(197) = .288, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .372, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .246, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTBG</td>
<td>r(197) = .281, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(107) = .312, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>r(87) = .225, p&lt;.05</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Observation: Both variables show significant correlation with GV. Going forward, both variables will be used in the regression tests.

LTBG

First, LTBG is the average score from answers received on survey questions #34 and #35. These questions pertained to a person’s belief in the afterlife and the belief that god exists. Scores of 10 indicated that there was no doubt in the person’s mind. Scores of 1
indicated extreme doubt. The high significant correlation between LTBG and GV indicates that those who have a higher GV also have a greater belief in the existence and the afterlife.

*Multi-Collinearity between LTBG and other variables:*

There is significant correlation between GV, LTBG, AGE, IDEO, EDLEVEL, YIF, RE, EXIST, AFLIF, NQC, WIIC and EG.

*STBG*

STBG is the calculated average score from answers received on survey question #38. This question pertained to a person’s conviction that god provides or does not provide short term benefits here on earth. The survey participants were asked to rank from 1-10 their conviction that god provides the following benefits: health, wealth, love, joy, peace, patience, kindness or self-control. 10 represents that god absolutely provides this benefit and 1 represents that god does not provide this benefit. The significant correlation between GV and STBG signifies that those who believe that god provides these benefits on earth apply a higher value to it. An interesting point to note here is that “wealth” was ranked as the lowest benefit that god provides. This is interesting because it appears to demonstrate that the ministers who are preaching the wealth doctrine are bringing to the market a new god benefit that historically may not have been associated with previous versions of the god product.

*Multi-Collinearity between STBG and other variables:*
The correlation between STBG and other variables is the exact same as LTBG. When observing STBG and LTBG against each other on a scatterplot (GRAPH 9.2), it becomes clearer that more people are associating value to god based upon the LTBG, thus looking at god products more like an investment than a consumer, short term good. What this signifies is that people are purchasing god both as investors and consumers, yet each benefit driving a different level of value for the consumer.

GRAPH 9.2

Together, both of these variables suggest that there is utility-maximizing behavior occurring in the purchasing decision. Both of the graphs below (GRAPH 9.3 and 9.4) show the relationship between GV, LTBG, and STBG. Note the positive relationship with higher values for god and higher beliefs in STBG and LTBG. When observing LTBG and STBG for those with a higher inclination for religious traditionalism, there appears a slightly higher GV. This may signify that people inclined toward religious traditionalism and those inclined rationalism both make conscious rational decisions when purchasing god products. However, those who are more inclined to religious
traditionalism have a stronger belief in the benefits, both STBG and LTBG of the god product.

GRAPH 9.3

GV = 811.69 * STBG

R-Square = 0.08

GRAPH 9.4

GV = -2447.61 + 957.74 * LTBG

Hypothesis Answered
The results have implied that there is a significant relationship between benefits and the value a purchaser applies to god. Additionally, there appears to be a relationship with growing income and a decreasing portion of the income being allocated for god products, which again may suggest that god products hold a similar utility relationship as typical goods and services. It appears from the analysis that purchasers of god products make a very similar decision to purchasing other products and investments. It appears that the purchasing decision is not guided by religious traditionalism but rather by rational decision making under conditions of income and time scarcity.
**Question 5:** Is there a significant relationship between demographic variables, such as age, gender, sex, marriage, children, and political ideological beliefs and the value one places on god?

**Test #7**

**Correlation between GV and EG**

This test is to see if there is a correlation between GV and AGE, GEN (gender), MAR (marital status), CHIL (children), IDEO (ideology) and REG (regulation), each representing a consumer demographic. Each of these analyses is conducted using correlation analysis. In each of the columns and rows below are the results that correlate to the appropriate variable and religion. The column to the far right of the chart states those variables that have a positive and or negative correlation and are significant variables affecting GV.

**Hypothesis:** The first hypothesis assumes that demographic variables, other than AGE and IDEO do not provide any substantial relationship with GV.

The second hypothesis assumes that those who self-identify as conservative maintain a higher GV and similarly have an inclination for deregulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Results TR</th>
<th>Christian CH</th>
<th>Muslim MU</th>
<th>Correlation and Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>$r(197) = .035, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(107) = -.019, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(87) = -.046, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>$r(197) = .347, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(107) = .176, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(87) = .416, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>TR, MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>$r(197) = -.191, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(107) = -.115, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(87) = -.065, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>TR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIL</td>
<td>$r(197) = .276, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(107) = .197, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>$r(87) = .062, p &gt; .05$</td>
<td>TR, CH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Data Observation:** The data show the results for six different variables and the correlation they have or do not have with GV. When analyzing the data in total, it is suggested that AGE, MAR, CHIL and IDEO have significant correlations with GV. Age signifies that as people become older they apply a higher GV. Marriage and the number of children a person has are also positively correlated with higher GV. Lastly, those who proclaim themselves to be conservative also maintain a higher GV, yet there is also a clear correlation between those who are conservative and the belief in less regulation ($r(197)=.264$, $p<.05$). This is interesting because it signifies that those who advocate for less regulation and more free-market competition are also the same people who have a higher inclination to believe in religious traditionalism. It is interesting because with competition, particularly competition between religious suppliers, there appears to be a movement away from such religious traditionalism to a more definitive path toward rationalism.
**Question 6:** Is there a universal valuation algorithm for god that can be utilized by governments to help in modifying macro- and micro-economic policy better to harness the societal benefits that god purchasers provide?

**Test #8 and #9**

**Multivariable Regression Analysis**

**Multivariable Log-Based Regression Analysis**

Lastly, as an extension of the correlation analyses, these analyses will utilize those variables that were correlated with GV into two multivariable regression tests, each trying to understand what impact all or a combination of these variables has on GV. The first analysis will perform a regression utilizing the raw data and the second test will perform a regression using log-based data. Outcomes of the analyses will provide statistical data that will show the variables that have the highest impact in forecasting GV.

**Hypothesis:** It is assumed that when taken together, EG, WIIC, TMVA, STBG, LTBG, AGE, CHIL, IDEO, INC, YIF and NQC will predict a substantial portion of the GV.

Prior to conducting this analysis, the research analyzed the correlations between the independent variables, removing those variables that have a high and significant correlation between themselves. By doing this, the research used variables that provided unique contribution in predicting the dependent variable (GV).

After removing the variables that had substantial correlation amongst themselves (raw data only), only six independent variables remained after the elimination of multi-
collinearity were IDEO, RE, TMVA, NQC, SC and STBG. The variables that remained for the log-based regression were SC, EG and AGE.

**Raw Data**

Overall, the regression was significant, $F(6,192) = 18.78, p<.05, R^2 = .370$. Of the predictors investigated, IDEO ($\beta = -.157, t(198) = -2.6, p<.05$), NQC ($\beta = .235, t(198) = 3.7, p<.05$) and SC ($\beta = .353, t(198) = 5.4, p<.05$) were identified as the most impactful determinants of GV. TMVA was not a significant predictor of the value for god, $\beta = .107, t(198) = 1.6, p>.05$. RE was not a significant predictor of the value for god, $\beta = .056, t(198) = .9, p>.05$. STBG was not a significant predictor of the value for god, $\beta = .122, t(198) = 1.9, p>.05$.

Overall, the test showed that 37% of the variance in GV was predictable from the combination of IDEO, RE, TMVA, NQC, SC and STBG. This means that 63% of the variance in GV has not been identified with this model and/or factors that cannot be established with market behaviors. Nonetheless, a 37% predictability of the variance is statistically significant. Additionally, from this test, a GV equation was determined. The equation for GV, based on linear variables is as follows:

$$GV = -373 + (-1889 \times IDEO \text{ Factor}) + (74.21 \times RE \text{ Factor}) + (.001 \times TMVA \text{ Factor}) + (1430.7 \times NQC \text{ Factor}) + (.057 \times SC \text{ Factor}) + (375.9 \times STBG \text{ Factor})$$

Factor Explanation:

- IDEO Factor represents either 1 for Conservative and 2 for Liberal.
• RE Factor represents the number of years a person has in religious education.

• TMVA Factor is the total market value of all assets.

• NQC Factor is the total number of questions answered correctly.

• SC Factor is the total amount of money and the value of time a person spends in social activity.

• STBG Factor is the average score a person has regarding their belief in short-term benefits of god.

**Log-Based Test**

Overall, the regression was significant, $F(3,117) = 38.1, p<.05, R^2 = .501$. Of the predictors investigated, all (SC ($\beta = -.464, t(117) = 6.8, p<.05$), EG ($\beta = -.131, t(117) = -1.9, p<.05$) and AGE ($\beta = .420, t(117) = 6.0, p<.05$)) were identified as significant determinants of GV. None of the variables fell out in this model.

Overall, the test showed that 50% of the variance in GV was predictable from the combination of SC, EG and AGE. This means that 50% of the variance in GV has not been identified with this model and/or factors that cannot be established with market behaviors. Nonetheless, a 50% predictability of the variance is statistically significant. Additionally, from this test, a GV equation was determined. The equation for GV, based on log variables is as follows:

$$GV = 1.208 + (.464 \times SC \text{ Factor}) + (-.131 \times EG \text{ Factor}) + (.420 \times AGE \text{ Factor})$$
Factor Explanation:

- SC Factor represents the amount of time and money spent on socially related activities, outside of church functions.

- EG Factor represents a person’s belief in who should govern ethics, god, or humanity.

- AGE Factor is the present age of an individual.

When observing both regression analyses, there appears to be similar high-impact drivers of GV. SC seems to be main driver in establishing a value for god products, followed by FC and RC. Both models should be taken into consideration when analyzing religious policy considerations.

**Overall Conclusion 9.5**

This chapter explored the relationship between a person’s inclinations toward religious traditionalism or toward rationalism against a person’s age and the value placed upon god products. Similarly, this chapter analyzed the relationships between the value placed on god products and host of different forms of capital. Overall, there are clear relationships between the value placed on god, a person’s inclination toward religious traditionalism or rationalism, and financial, social, and religious capitals. The chapter showed that the majority of survey respondents purchase god products in a similar manner in which they purchase or invest in other products. The research demonstrated that as people become wealthier, they allocate more money toward god products, signifying that it is a normal good. At the same time, it was observed that as people make more money, a smaller percentage of their income is devoted to purchasing more god
products, this suggesting decreasing marginal utility. Overall, this shows that once people acquire a certain level of god products, they make conscious decisions to move money away from god products into other utility-maximizing products or investments. This chapter showed that those who are more inclined toward a religious traditionalism tend to put higher value on god, yet at the same time hold a higher conviction toward the benefits that god provides, both rational actions. Overall, this suggests that all decisions, both those from religious traditionalism or rationalism are all based on utility maximizing behaviors. Lastly, this chapter put forth a valuation algorithm for god suggesting that there appear to be variables that increase or decrease the value placed on god. It is also suggested and argued in the next chapter that these variables may be regulated or modified to enhance the societal benefits that the god economy provides. To this last point and the conclusion of this dissertation, let us now move.
Chapter 10 - Conclusion

Introduction 10.0

This dissertation set out in Chapter 1 to answer seven supporting questions, which when viewed together would answer the overall dissertation question: Is the freedom of religion, coupled with a free-market economy, optimal for the sustainability and/or advancement of a democratic society?

In Chapters 2 and 3, the research articulated the human conditions that drive societal change and an individual’s or collectivities’ value judgments. These chapters argued that societal change is driven by self-interest. Self-interest drives individuals and collectivities to innovate and develop new technologies and processes that will further assist humanity in obtaining their self-interested goals of liberation from all authority structures. This evolutionary process will also ensure that all traditional values, such as religion, will also be drawn into this self-interested mode of thought, if in fact they want to survive. Chapter 2 through Chapter 5 in essence put forth a new interpretation of Western history. Moving away from a history that emphasized the importance of the Enlightenment in creating logical processes and modes of production, these chapters instead emphasize a social evolution of humanity, starting with the first human and continuing ever since. This evolution started with a move away from the idea of a god-controlled humanity to a modern idea that humanity controls itself. This change in perspective appears to have modified humanity’s nature.

Chapter 3 reviewed the determinants of value, intensity, duration, certainty and remoteness, arguing that when these determinants are challenged or solidified by new information flows, new valuations occur. But it was shown that there is something more
to valuation than just these four determinants; there is also the determinant of speed, which in fact puts substantial pressure on the valuation process. The acceleration of communication technologies, coupled with the notion of higher scientific knowledge, mandates accelerated decision-making. Because of these features provided in post-modern society, society becomes exposed to the risk of making irrational valuation decisions. Unlike pre-industrial society, where people made irrational valuations because of the lack of information or perhaps the lack of intellect, postmodern society runs the risk of making irrational decisions based upon just the opposite. Because of too much information coming from different sources and at different speeds, coupled with self-interest and utility maximization, people readjust, making valuations on those items that bring them the most satisfaction. What this appears to demonstrate is that minimum levels of information on one end, and too much information on the other end, leads people to making irrational valuations.

When applying this concept in a religious setting, it is observed that in pre-modern times, societies believed in god because they were told to do so by either a parent, society in general, or by some other authority figure. In postmodern society, these same individuals hold to religious belief not because they are told to do so or not told to do so, but rather because it is extremely costly to determine if they should or should not. In the earlier periods, it seems that people respected traditional value structures, such as parents, family, church, etc. But in postmodern society--because these structures are continually challenged and because it is costly to determine the right position--people tend to make judgments based upon irrational facts or fictitious valuations. This is why the research takes a nihilistic perspective, arguing that in postmodern society, meaning
breaks down, society loses its connection to prior history, while at the same time embracing new versions of historical values. These new versions appear as a resurgence of premodern thought, or perhaps a regression to medieval times, but in fact it is a move closer to later-stage capitalism. The appearance of historical value resurgence seems to be a masqueraded action of the capitalist system, offering some aspects of the historical value, yet now more focused on utilitarian benefits. The demand for these pastiche versions of historical values seems to be from the consumer who wants perhaps to reconnect to the past in hopes of establishing meaning to life. Yet, not knowingly, they are just further entrenching themselves in another exchange relationship. To make up for the loss of meaning and the connection to a past that is no longer there, they compensate by employing utilitarian logic under conditions of scarcity. Due to this process of creative destruction, both the consumer and supplier of pastiche versions of traditional values, I argue that society has become schizophrenic.

But it is even more than this. To garner and maintain value in a fast, competitive global marketplace, traditions need to enter the exchange relationship. To do this, traditional value structures mutate, change, and modify their meaning to meet the demands of market participants. This means that in order to maintain and increase value, traditional structures, like god, need to take on properties of a product, providing defensible marginal benefit. Because of this, traditional structures that were once viewed as influences to check self-interested behavior must modify and lose their historical governing role, to becoming part of the system that it historically tried to regulate.

From the beginning of humanity, there also appears to be an evolutionary change in humanity’s nature. Rather than being subjected to an Alpha God and the rules that
accompany such subjection, humanity has evolved into a new species, one that thinks for itself, reviews the past, and forecasts the future. Humanity moved away from a “will” that was dictated by the whims of the gods, to a species where it may be the god. Although much of this appears like a successful process of evolution, C.S. Lewis takes a different position. Lewis claims that society moved its bondage from Alpha God to the entrepreneur, or the person that owns the capital and technology. He shows that humanity will always be subjected to something; call it god, entrepreneur, traditions or another form of power. Regardless of humanity’s pursuit of liberation, humanity will eventually learn that there is no such thing. Liberated from one power means bonded to another.

**Macro-Economic Market Determinants 10.1**

But it appears from this dissertation that all is not lost for the production of traditional values. It becomes clear that there are micro and macro market determinants that can be used by democratic societies to ensure these traditional values continue to provide the positive aspects of their offerings.

This analysis has explained a string of events that add to or take away from the value for god products both in the United States and Turkey. First, it has been discussed that there are three primary “macro” religious economic or “market-based” determinants that add to or take away from the competitiveness among religious suppliers within a religious economy:

1. The separation of church and state

2. The personal religious freedom of a citizen to think or act upon his or her personal religious conviction
3. The freedom of religious suppliers to invent new god products in an unregulated religious market economy

The first of these three market-based determinants is the entrance point into a competitive religious marketplace, becoming further competitive by allowing religious consumers the ability to think and act according to their religious convictions and, again, lastly becoming even further competitive by deregulating the actions of religious suppliers, giving them the independence to mutate and invent new low-cost, or higher quality god products.

Although the separation of church and state is step one, there are many states that have adopted this principle, yet still hold to regulating religious self-conviction—the demand side—and religious product invention—the supply side. When this situation presents itself, religious competition may compete underground as black market religious services. When the freedom of religious conviction is deregulated, espoused in constitutional or legal systems, allowing people the ability to think differently from the traditional values espoused within such society, the person may choose a different belief system, reinterpret existing belief systems, or debunk the system altogether. When this happens, religious competition moves from an underground activity to one applying pressure to religious institutions in the open economy.

Similarly, when religious suppliers are allowed to invent new low-cost or higher quality god products, they tend to match consumer demand or perhaps invent new demands that have yet to be identified. As in the case of the United States, when religious suppliers are allowed to innovate and mutate based upon consumer demand, the market will continue to fluctuate until the market clears. As in the case of Turkey, when religious
suppliers are regulated, they tend to stall religious competition and stem mutations by keeping the prices for god products artificially higher than market demand, thus keeping people out of the religious market. However, this may or may not stem the availability of black market religious products.

In addition to these primary “macro” determinants, it has been made clear that there are two momentous and very important determinants that apply pressure to the competitiveness of a religious economy:

1. Level of free-market economic activity (broader sense),

2. The speed of information exchange caused by the evolution and adoption of information communication technologies

It has been explained that the level of free market economic activity applies its “immanent” and “disciplinary logic” across the entire social space, commanding people as “subjectivities” to think in terms of market-based rules, taking action, thinking and living according to such regulation. When a subjectivity within a free market economy embraces religion, they (Tier 2 and Tier 3 purchasers) embrace it with the mindset of a market participant, perceiving it as a product that brings individualized utility, rather than perceiving it as a historical, ethical, and revelation-based structure (Tier 1) that was developed not as a means for utility but as means for service to god and community. In democratic, capitalist societies, the ideals of the human condition-- pursuit of knowledge, liberation and wealth--command all citizens to make judgments based upon a valuation that encompasses all actions: the tautology of utilitarian discipline takes over. When such free market principles are applied to a particular industry, the Schumpeterian ideals of Creative Destruction take hold, pushing the suppliers of industry to compete, based upon
real and perceived competition, which in turn demands re-invention. But similarly, within these societies, individuals become suppliers of labor, competing for values that aid in creating further exponential utility. In this situation, individuals take hold of the ideals of Creative Destruction as well, pushing themselves to compete against other individuals based upon real and perceived competition for values. Exposure to high levels of free market activity appears to construct or force the mind to evolve further into utility-maximizing machines.

The speed of information exchange is another significant economic determinant and one that accelerates the mutations caused by Creative Destruction, both from suppliers and from consumers. It was shown that when a democratic capitalist society has a high concentration of new information technologies, where information is exchanged quite rapidly and in a plural context with differences of opinions, “bounded rationality” ensues, causing people to make “bounded” valuations that are perhaps based upon either false, partial, or biased information. So when business suppliers or consumers in such an economy are exposed to differing and speedy information flows, they tend to make valuations that bring them the perception of the most utility, but perhaps are not. As it was shown, if the cost of acquiring or deciphering accurate information is higher than the perceived benefit, subjects will either exit the market, stay in the market looking for lower cost alternatives, or stay in the market looking for higher quality products. Because technology provides a communication platform for the exchange of many ideas at extreme speeds, historical values and/or historical virtues (as defined by MacIntyre), become challenged. This phenomenon seems to have splintered the historical Alpha God into newer pastiche versions, some offering low-cost features, demanding little time and
money for purchase, and others offering premium features, moving upstream in quality and service, demanding more time and more money. The benefits offered can be either worldly benefits or otherworldly benefits, short-term or long-term, assets or commodities.

**Micro-Economic - Market Determinants 10.2**
This dissertation has explored the supply-side effects of market deregulation in the United States and Turkey, exploring New Paradigm research and providing a few examples of product mutations that appear to occur more frequently in the United States than in Turkey. Although it was shown that Turkey maintains regulation over religious supply, it was also shown that unregulated religious consumers (those free to think liberally) in supply-regulated religious markets apply pressure to religious suppliers and governing authorities in hopes of ensuring innovations and efficiency in the delivery of god products.

From a demand perspective, the research has shown that there has been a change in demand for the historically recognized Alpha God products. First, this was shown with the positive correlation between a person’s age and the value they place on god. It appears that older people are buying a higher quality god product than are younger people. This argument is made in light of the fact that not only are older people putting a higher value on god, but also assume that the god product will provide greater benefits.

Second, it was shown that those who are more inclined toward a faith or traditional value perspective also maintain a higher value for god. Due to the positive correlation between age and the value placed on god, it is assumed that younger consumers have less of a need for god, as reflected in the price and believability of benefits. The younger consumers appear to have evolved into a new breed of humanity,
one in which free will, rationality, and logic reign most supreme. But interestingly, although these consumers are more inclined toward a free will perspective, they still maintain some value for god.

Relating this idea to the New Paradigm research, it appears that these younger individuals are purchasing god products mainly because the price for such god products has decreased over time. Together, a decrease in value or price and an increase in supply support both the New Paradigm argument and the Secularization argument. Consumers in the United States, for instance, are not necessarily more religious as New Paradigm academics contend but rather more capitalistic. It seems as though secular thought processes have pushed down the demand for Alpha God and because of this, suppliers reinvented the product for better consumption. These new god products are obviously different from the previous versions because they have lost their foundational features, most important of which is the pre-eminence of a priori knowledge. To use an analogy here, the rotary phone that was once the product of choice for telephony mutated into a digital phone, which later again mutated into a cell phone and which recently mutated in a handheld personal digital assistant (PDA) with telephonic features. Although there were various mutations of the rotary phone, it still maintained its underlying feature – to allow communication between two parties. However, if the PDA did not allow two people to speak with each other, but perhaps only provided e-mail or instant messaging, then one could argue that it is not a phone at all and therefore preference for the phone has decreased and preferences for e-mail have increased. What occurs in this situation is none other than a change in a product’s meaning. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 5, with the advancement of scientific knowledge came a revaluation of revelation-based
learning, with revelation losing value and scientific discovery gaining value. With this change came a doctrinal mutation in the understanding of how a person receives eternal salvation, with the ideals of predestination taking a back seat to the newly founded ideals of free will. With this foundational change, it appears there became a substantial alteration and meaning of the historically identified Alpha God. With this mutation, the Alpha God was no longer responsible for saving souls, but rather individuals claimed this right, in a sense the preference for Alpha God moved to the preference for god (intentional emphasis on the lower case). The god, lower case g, was an alteration in preference, causing a once cosmological influence to become a human value judgment, disciplined by the rules of the human condition.

As in other industries, the trend line suggests that god products will continue to be devalued, and the market will continue to be serviced with new mutations until the market is fully serviced. Perchance, the 500 different Christian denominations in the United States may splinter into 300+ million different, individualized-based production and consumption systems. With the devaluation and personal production and consumption of god products, the historical institution and marketer of such products may suffer the fate of a theoretical bankruptcy. If this were to occur, society might experience positive and negative social externalities. The negative externality associated with such a phenomenon is the potential breakdown in the democratic system caused by the following (see Chapters 5 and 6 for clarification of religious benefits):

1. Loss of community involvement and interaction
2. Loss of religion’s ability to place limits on utilitarian individualism, which according to de Tocqueville purifies, controls and restrains excessiveness
3. Loss of ethical behavior, which in turn will limit public prosperity and happiness
4. Loss of enhanced civil association, which is an “incubator for civic skills, norms, and community interests” (Putnam 66)
5. Loss of an institution that eliminates socio-economic class
6. Loss of a strong volunteering and philanthropic base
7. Loss of an outlet for poorer, less educated people to be engaged in civil community
8. And lastly, because of all the above, a less concentrated base of individuals who can agree on civic norms, the foundation of a successful democracy.

But by the same token there are positive externalities from such phenomenon as well:

1. With the lack of historical agreement and increased plurality of modern thought, particularly with the splintering of god suppliers, there comes a shrinking of the ultraconservative religious base, which has historically been linked to terrorism or other acts of violence (see Introvigne).
2. Second, there comes a market structure that can be modified and changed based upon economic and political policy decisions, which in turn can increase or decrease religious supply and demand when necessary to either galvanize or diffuse topics of democratic importance. These points unto themselves have substantial relevance for those in security studies who are quite regularly dealing with rogue Islamic states. Rather than trying to regulate religious suppliers by cutting off funding or slowing down supply growth, this dissertation argues just the opposite. If these organizations were to be further funded, with financial resources being allocated to new mosques, new Islamic perspectives, new
interpretations of older texts, most likely splintering will occur. Similar to the phenomena in the United States, the free market pressures coupled with pluralistic supply ideas will cause a devaluation of god products, thus removing ultraconservative tentacles, mainly through the rationality mechanism.

**Concluding Thoughts 10.3**

Overall, a better understanding of the macro determinants will provide the policy expert with the ability to alter the god marketplace to optimize democratic institutions and/or to defuse threats from religious organizations. Without such learnings, democratic institutions over time may experience the negative externalities outlined above, some of which are most likely occurring in democratic capitalist society. In addition to the macro-determinants, there are, arguably, a host of micro-determinants that can help decide empirically if there has been a change in preferences for god products, and if so, whether these changes help support the theory espoused thus far. By understanding the macro-determinants and micro-determinants, the policy expert, government official, and religious supplier will be able to understand better how to adjust either the product and/or modify the marketplace to utilize better the historically relevant power of religious institutions.

There are obviously many ways such regulation can be accomplished. If a country like the United States needs to ensure that splintering slows, hoping to maintain some form of traditionalism and value on god products, it can regulate suppliers by putting greater educational requirements on clergy, and perhaps by removing churches’ tax-exempt status. By taking actions similar to this, suppliers will exit the market and price will go up. Similarly, governments can regulate demand by removing tax breaks for
donations. Together, these actions will increase the price for god products. Because of this, the positive social externalities may be maintained. Alternatively, governments can do just the opposite, if in fact they want to devalue god and remove historical biases or negative historical influences. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, a historically traditional Muslim country, the government, if they choose to do so, can over time remove traditional Islamic ideals by funding new Islamic sects or views. By doing this, new interpretations of older texts become more accepted by society. Each time this happens, the historical values, such as god, are devalued and modern values, such as science and logic, increase in value. This coupled with democratic, capitalist systems can remove negative aspects of religious fundamentalism.

As this dissertation has shown, religion is a very important aspect of democratic capitalist society, which if analyzed in a market framework can be very beneficial to such societies. **This dissertation has shown that it is not necessarily optimal for democratic capitalist societies to allow religions to compete in a completely deregulated free market.**

In conclusion, democratic capitalist society poses negative pressure on the foundational and traditional values structures that are needed to sustain such a system. Because of this, these foundational structures need to be handled in a way that is outside of normal capitalist rules, meaning they need to be regulated by a “visible hand”, a hand of government that perhaps can solidify its long term value. Despite the shortcomings of a democratic capitalist society and its influence on traditional values, it should be noted that this system has to date been the most productive system in changing society for the betterment of humanity, meaning it has pulled humanity out from the doldrums of
poverty and oppression in many societies that have adopted such principles. If such a system wants to continue its reign, traditional values such as god need to take a higher place in regulating market behavior.
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Appendix 1 - United States Survey
1. INTRODUCTION

Dear Survey Participant,

I want to personally thank you for participating in this survey. The survey you are about to take consists of 50 questions, most of which you will be able to answer in under 5 seconds. There are approximately 15 questions that will require probably a bit more time, perhaps 10-20 seconds. Overall, to complete the survey it should take you about 5 minutes.

The survey is being used to support an argument being made in a doctoral dissertation. The dissertation explores the intersection between religion, open market economies and democracy and can potentially hold significant importance in contemporary society.

The survey does not ask for any personally identifiable information and is being conducted electronically so that all such personal contact is avoided.

The information being collected will be utilized to build a financial model ONLY for the purposes of completing the research and for book publishing purposes.

For those of you who would like to learn a bit more about the research once it is complete, you have a place at the bottom of the survey to provide your email address within the survey. I will send you updates about the research as it becomes available. It is expected that the research will be published in the Fall of 2008.

If you have any questions regarding the survey, please feel free to email me at cyourgiresearch@gmail.com

Again, I want to thank you for your time and patience.

Best of everything,

Christopher Young
2. SURVEY SCREENER

1. Are you a Christian?
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

2. Were you born before 1988?
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

3. Are you employed full time?
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

4. If you answered NO to the previous question, are you a full time student AND employed part time? (If you answered yes to the previous question, please skip this question)
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No
3. SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. Gender
   - 1. Male
   - 2. Female

2. Age
   - 1. 21-30
   - 2. 31-40
   - 3. 41-50
   - 4. 51-60
   - 5. 61-70
   - 6. 71-80
   - 7. older than 80

3. What is your closest nearest city (please provide state as well, example: Newark, New Jersey)?

4. Are you married?
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

5. How many children do you have (enter zero if you have no children)?

6. What ideology most reflects your mode of thinking?
   - 1. conservative
   - 2. liberal
   - 3. other

7. Do you believe that government should increase business regulation in this country or decrease business regulation?
   - 1. Decrease regulation
   - 2. Increase regulation
   - 3. It is fine where it is today

8. How many HOURS a WEEK are you paid to work?
9. What is your ANNUAL income in US Dollars? (Please include tips, part-time jobs, side jobs, etc...) (enter numbers without commas and dollar sign, example: $50,000 should read 50000)

10. Please select the category that is closely aligned with your occupational industry?
   - 2. Business Management (Accounting, Business Admin, Economics, Finance, Marketing, Sales, Strategy)
   - 3. Communications (Broadcasting, Digital Media, Film, Video, Media, PR, Advertising, Journalism, Other Similar)
   - 4. Education (Teacher K-12, Counselor, Principal, Other Education. College and University Professor should classify themselves under their appropriate discipline)
   - 5. Medicine (Physician, Dentist, All Other Physician Types)
   - 6. Health (Nurse, Exercise Science, Nutrition, Speech/hearing)
   - 7. Religious Services (Clergy, Priest, Minister, Pastor, Deacon, Nun, Support Staff, Teacher, Other Related)
   - 8. Other Services (Public Official, Public Administration, Library Services, Social Worker, Recreation, Leisure, Travel)
   - 9. Law
   - 10. Behavioral Science (Anthropology, Geography, Psychology, Sociology, Economics, Other Similar)
   - 11. Vocational/Trade (Carpenter, Plumber, HVAC, Electrician, Mechanic, Other Similar)
   - Other not specified above

11. How many YEARS of work experience do you have (round to the nearest whole number, numbers only)?

12. What is your highest level of education?
   - 1. Did not finish grammar school
   - 2. Completed some high school
   - 3. Obtained high school diploma
   - 4. Attended but did not graduate from undergraduate college
   - 5. Obtained undergraduate degree
   - 6. Attended but did not graduate from graduate college
   - 7. Obtained graduate degree
   - 8. Attended but did not graduate from doctoral degree college
   - 9. Obtained doctoral degree
   - 10. Attended graduate school for post doctoral studies
   - 11. Completed post doctoral program
13. Choose the major course of education that is MOST reflective of your college studies?

- 2. Business Management (Accounting, Business Admin, Economics, Finance, Marketing, Sales, Strategy)
- 3. Communications (Broadcasting, Digital Media, Film, Video, Media, PR, Advertising, Journalism, Other Similar)
- 4. Education (Teacher K-12, Counselor, Principal, Other Education. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR SHOULD CLASSIFY THEMSELVES UNDER THEIR APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE)
- 5. Medicine (Physician, Dentist, All Other Physician Types)
- 6. Health (Nurse, Exercise Science, Nutrition, Speech/hearing)
- 7. Religious Services (Clergy, Priest, Minister, Pastor, Deacon, Nun, Support Staff, Teacher, Other related)
- 8. Other Services (Public Official, Public Administration, Library Services, Social Worker, Recreation, Leisure, Travel)
- 9. Law
- 10. Behavioral Science (Anthropology, Geography, Psychology, Sociology, Economics, Other Similar)
- 11. Vocational/Trade (Carpenter, Plumber, HVAC, Electrician, Mechanic, Other Similar)

Other not specified above

14. Estimate how much money you SPENT on all education, post high school (This should include tuition, room and board, meals, books, etc.). This should include undergraduate, graduate and any doctoral programs. (PLEASE PROVIDE ESTIMATE BASED UPON US DOLLARS, ENTER WHOLE NUMBERS ONLY) ($50,000 should read 50000)

15. Did you pay for college or did someone else?

- 1. I paid for all colleges and universities
- 2. Someone else paid for all colleges and universities
- 3. I shared this cost with someone else. Someone else can include parents, friends, military, scholarship, etc...

16. How many HOURS per WEEK do you commit to studying, reading industry magazines, industry papers, maintaining professional certificates or other similar actions to keep up with your industry?

17. How much money do you spend ANNUALLY on occupational books, industry news and magazines, newspapers, trade show attendance and similar events (include travel costs)? (Please include all estimates in US Dollars) ($50,000 should read 50000)
18. If you have a student loan, how much of the loan do you still have to pay back? (Please include all estimates in US Dollars) ($50,000 should read 50000)

19. Do you own a home?
   ☐ 1. Yes
   ☐ 2. No

20. If you own a home, how much of a loan do you still have to pay back (Enter in US Dollars) ($50,000 should read 50000)?

21. Do you own other real assets, this would include boats, secondary homes, time shares, highly valued jewels, cars, etc...?
   ☐ 1. Yes
   ☐ 2. No

22. What is the amount of debt you have currently have to pay back on all these real assets (do not include mortgage from previous question) (enter all numbers in US Dollars)?

23. If you wanted to sell all of your assets TODAY, this includes your home, boats, cars, jewels, etc..., what do estimate these valuables to be WORTH (enter number in US Dollars) ($50,000 should read 50000)?

24. How many HOURS per WEEK do you spend building or maintaining your social status (network), this includes maintaining relationships with friends, work colleagues, clients, customers? (Please include time at dinners, dinner parties, social gatherings, recreational activities such as softball games, golf, healthclub. This is a WEEKLY calculation, so to the best of your ability include spikes in activity that may occur at certain points of the year)

25. How much MONEY do you spend per WEEK to maintain your social status? This would all expenses to conduct the activities mentioned in the previous question. These may include the cost for dinners, golf outings, healthclub dues, etc... (Please enter all numbers in US Dollars) ($50,000 should read 50000)

26. How many years have you been a Christian?

27. On a comparative scale of 1-10, with 1 representing that you are in bad physical health and 10 representing that you are in fabulous physical health, what do you believe your level of physical health is?
28. Not including college or university, how many YEARS of religious (Christian) education do you have (this would include catholic school, CCD, christian bible school, etc...)?

29. How many HOURS per WEEK do you spend at church, this includes attending services, prayer meetings, bible teachings or other similar events? (do not include attending prayer meetings or bible studies at friends homes)

30. How many HOURS per WEEK do you spend reading scriptures, attending bible studies (not at the church), praying, singing religious music to yourself or other similar activities?

31. How much money do you give to the church on a WEEKLY basis (Please use US Dollars)? (Consider periods when you give greater amounts, such as Christmas, Easter or other holidays. Try to factor this in to your calculation)

32. Do you receive tax benefits for giving money to the church?
   ○ 1. Yes
   ○ 2. No

33. How much of a factor are tax benefits when giving to the church? On a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing "that you would not give money unless there was a tax benefit" and 10 representing "that you would still give the same amount even if there was no tax benefit"

34. On a comparative scale of 1-10, with 1 representing your belief that 'God does not exist at all' and 10 representing your belief 'that God absolutely exists, there is no doubt in your mind', what would you say your level of belief is?

35. On a comparative scale of 1-10, with 1 representing your belief that 'there is not life after death' and 10 representing your belief that 'there definately is life after death', what would you say your level of belief is?

36. On a comparative scale of 1-10, with 1 representing that 'you are sinless and never have sinned' and 10 representing your belief that 'you continuously and incessantly sin' what would you say your level of sin is? (DEFINITION: Sin is defined as the rebellion against the rules established by the Christian God) NOTE: A score of 0 indicates that you do not believe in the concept of sin.
37. On a comparative scale of 0-10, with 1 representing your belief that 'all people experience an afterlife regardless of the level of sin' and 10 representing your belief that 'only people forgiven of their sin from God have an afterlife', what would you say your level of belief is? A score of zero indicates that you do not believe in the afterlife.

38. Of the following earthly benefits, on a scale of 1-10, rate your conviction that God provides such benefits. 1 indicates that 'God does not provide this benefit' and 10 represents that 'God absolutely provides this benefit'.

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39. On a comparative scales of 1-10, with 1 representing your belief that God 'controls all the actions in this world and humanity cannot do anything to change such actions' or 10 representing your belief that humanity 'controls all the actions and happenings in this world by understanding nature and scientific proof'.

40. Should ethics be based more on traditional religious values, or more on humanity's experience over the centuries?

- 1. Traditional religious values
- 2. Humanity's experience over the centuries
- 3. Other
- 4. No opinion

41. Can you name 5 of the 10 Commandments?

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
42. What are the first four books of the New Testament?
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

43. Who delivered the Sermon on the Mount?

44. Where was Jesus born?

45. What is the great commission?

46. For updates on this research, please include your email (Optional).
Appendix 2 - Turkish Survey
1. INTRODUCTION

Sayın Anket Katılımcısı,

Bu ankete katıldığınız için size bizzat teşekkür etmek istiyorum. Dolduracağınız anket, çoğu 5 saniyeden az bir zamanda cevap verebileceğiniz 50 soruyu oluşturuyor. 15 kadar soru belki de biraz daha fazla zamanınız, muhtemelen 15-20 saniyeniz alacak. Tuzla'da anket doldurmanız 5 dakika kadar sürecektir.

Anket, bir doktora tezindeki bir savi desteği arayışında kullanılacak. Söz konusu tez, din, kapitalizm ve demokrasi arasındaki kesişme noktasinı incelemektedir ve çağdaş toplum açısından belirgin bir öneme sahip olma potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Ankette, kimliğini açıkça çıkarabilecek kişisel bilgiler istememekteyiz ve anket elektronik olarak uygulanmaktadır, dolayısıyla her türlü kişisel itibarınza kaçırmaktadır.


Anketle ilgili sorularınız olması halinde, cyoungresearch@gmail.com adresinden bana e-posta atmakta tereddüt etmeyin.

Ayrıldığınız zaman ve gösterdiğiniz sabır için tekrar teşekkür ederim.

Saygılarınma,
Christopher Young
2. SURVEY SCREENER

1. Müslümanınız?
   - 1. Evet
   - 2. Hayır

2. 1988’den önce mi doğdunuz?
   - 1. Evet
   - 2. Hayır

3. Tam mesaili bir işte çalışıyor musunuz?
   - 1. Evet
   - 2. Hayır

4. Eğer bir önceki soruya cevabınız HAYIR ise, full-time bir öğrenci VE part-time çalışan mıınız?
   - 1. Evet
   - 2. Hayır

5. Cinsiyetiniz
   - 1. Erkek
   - 2. Kadın
6. Kaç yaşındasınız?
- 1. 21-30
- 2. 31-40
- 3. 41-50
- 4. 51-60
- 5. 61-70
- 6. 71-80
- 7. 81+

7. Size en yakın kent neresi?

8. Evli misiniz?
- 1. Evet
- 2. Hayır

9. Kaç çocuğunuz var (çocuğunuz yoksa sıfır yazın)?

10. Düğünce tarzınızı en iyi yansıtan ideoloji hangisidir?
- 1. Muhtezemler
- 2. Liberal
- 3. Diger

11. Bu ülkede devletin iş hayatı ile ilgili düzenlemeleri artırmaya mı yoksa azaltmaya mı gerekiğine inanyorsunuz?
- 1. Düzenlemeler azaltmalı
- 2. Düzenlemeler artırmalı
- 3. Buğünkü haliyle yeterli

12. Bir HAFTADA kaç SAAT ücretsiz çalışıyorsunuz?

13. YTL cinsinden YILLIK geliriniz nedir? (Aldeğerin bahşişleri, part-time işleri, ek işleri, vb. dahil edin...) (rakamları nokta ve YTL işareti olmadan yazın, örneğin: 50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazmalıdır)
**14. Çalıştığınız sektöre en yakın olan kategoriyi seçin.**

- 1. Sanat/Himayi (Sanat Tarihi, Sanat, Himayi, Tasarım, Grafik, Kültürlük, Sahne Sanatları, Tiyatro, Diğer Sanatlar)
- 2. İşletme (Müşahbetlelilik, İşaretlelilik, Ekonomi, Finaş, Pazarlama, Satış, Statede)
- 3. İletişim (Yazarlık, Dijital Medya, Film, Video, Medya, İk, Reklamcılık, Gazetecilik, Diğer Baskınlık)
- 4. Eğitim (İk-Orta Öğretiminde Öğretmen, Danışman, Okul Muhasebe, Eğitim İlişki Diğer. YÜKSEK OKUL VE ÜNİVERSİTE PROFESÖRLERİ KENDİLERİNİ İLGİLİ DISİPLİNKİN BULUNDUKU BÖLÜM GÖRE SINİFLANDIRILÂR)'
- 5. Tıp (Rekem, Düşçi, Diğer Tım Hekim Tülleri)
- 6. Sağlık (İşemine, Doen Eğitimi, Besleme, Konuşma/Işime)
- 7. Dini Hizmetler (Papazlık, Ruhelinlik, İsmişi, Dahilci, Din Görüşleri, Hocalık, Dıvıc İlişki diğer)
- 8. Diğer Hizmetler (Menur, Kamu İdaresi, Kütüphaneçilik Hizmetleri, Sosyal Hizmetler, Konaklama, Fıshane, Gayhâr)
- 9. Hukuki
- 10. Davranış Bilimleri (Antropoloji, Coğrafiya, Psikoloji, Sosyoloji, Ekonomi. Diğer Benzeri)
- 11. Serbest Meslek (Marangoz, Şii Tercüman, İstah Havadanisma Kına U斯塔, Tamirci, Diğer Baskınlık)
- 12. Bilim (Tarm, Hayvan Bilimleri, Biyoloji, Yaşam Bilimleri, Biyoteknoloji, Mühendislik, Kimya, Biyokimya, Jesoloji, Ter Bilimleri, Fıshik, Ùzay ve Havaçlık, İstatistik, Matematik)
- Yanıında belirtilmeyen diğer

**15. Kaç YILLIK iş tecrübeniz var (en yakın tam sayıya yuvarlayın, sadece rakamla yazın)?**

**16. Aldığınız en yüksek eğitim düzeyi nedir?**

- 1. İlkokulu bitirmemiş
- 2. Lisede okudum
- 3. Lise çıkışması olduğum
- 4. Yüksek okula geçtim, ama mezun olmadım
- 5. Ön lisans derecesi aldıım
- 6. Yüksek okula lisans programına devam ettim, ama mezun olmadım
- 7. Lisans derecesi alındım
- 8. Doktora derecesi veren bir programa devam ettim, ama mezun olmadım
- 9. Doktora derecesi alındım
- 10. Doktora sonraş çalışmalere ilişkin yüksek lisans programına devam ettim
- 11. Doktora sonraşı (post doctoral) programı bitirsem
17. Yüksek okul eğitiminiz en iyi yansitan anabiliş démarchini seçin

- 1. Sanat/Mimarlık (Sanat Tarhi, Sanat, Mimarlık, Tasarım, Grafik, Müzik, Sahne Sanatları, Tiyatro, Diğer Sanatlar)
- 2. İşletme (Muhasebecilik, İcarenlik, Ekonomi, Piyasalar, Pazarlama, Satış, Satışcilik)
- 3. İletişim (Yayıncılık, Dijital Medya, Film, Video, Medya, İk., Reklamcılık, Gazetecilik, Diğer Benzeri)
- 4. Eğitim (Bk.-Orta eğitimde Öğretmen, Danışman, Okul Hizmeti, Eğitim İlişki Dışı. Yüksek okul ve üniversitelerin size en uygun bapış çizgisi bulunduğunu bilmek göre sünphandırınız)
- 5. Tür (Rekab, Düşçi, Diğer Tüm Hekim Türleri)
- 6. Sağlık (Hemşire, Bölün Eğitimi, Beselesme, Konuşma/İşte)
- 7. Dini Hizmetler (Papazlık, Rahiplik, İmamlık, Rahibillik, Din Görevlisi, Hocalık, Divle ilgili diğer)
- 8. Diğer Hizmetler (Menur, Kamu İşleri, Kütüphaneçilik Hizmetleri, Sosyal Hizmetler, Konuklama, Eğlence, Seyahat)
- 9. Hukuk
- 10. Devasa Bilimleri (Antropoloji, Coğrafiya, Psikoloji, Sosyoloji, Ekonomi, Diğer Benzeri)
- 11. Sosyalヘルセ (Haragöz, Eski Tescilcilik, İstema Havalandırma, Kama İçtak, Tamirci, Diğer Benzeri)
- 12. Bilim (Tarm, Hayvan Bilimleri, Biyoloji, Yaşam Bilimleri, Biyoteknoloji, Mühendislik, Kimya, Biyokimya, Jeoloji, Ter Bilimleri, Fizik, İstatistik, İstatistik, Matematik)

Yukarıda belirlenmeyen diğer

18. Lise sonrasıda eğitiminiz temamı boyunca tahminen ne kadar para HARCADINIZ (Harçlar, yeme-içme, barınma, kitaplar, vs. dahil)? Buna ön lisans, lisans ve doktora programlarında harcadığınız para da dahil olmalıdır. (TAHMİNİ HARÇAMANIZI, YTL CİNSİNdEN, SADECE TAM RAKAM ŞEKİNLİDE YAZIN) (50.000 YTL YERİNE 50000 YAZIN)

19. Eğitiminizin parasını siz mi ödediniz, başka mı?

- 1. Tüm yüksek okul ve üniversite marafonları kendim karşıladım
- 2. Tüm yüksek okul ve üniversite marafonları başka birisi karşıladı
- 3. Bu marafonları başka birisiyle paylaşım

20. Sektörünüzdeki gelişmeleri takip edebilmek amacıyla inceleme yapmaya, sektörle ilgili dergi ve makaleleri okumaya, meslek sertifika programlarına veya benzeri faaliyetlere HAFTADA kaç SAAT ayırırsınız?

21. Mesleki kitaplara, sektörle ilgili gazete ve dergilere, gazetelere, fuarlara ve benzeri etkinliklere YILDA ne kadar para harcıysınız (ulaşım giderleri dahil)? (Tüm tahmini harcamaçınızı YTL cinsinden yazın (50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazın)
22. Öğrenci bursu aldıysanız, bu bursun kalan geri ödeme tutarı ne kadardır? (Tüm tahmini harcamalarınızı YTL cinsinden yazın (50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazın)

23. Kendinize ait eviniz var mı?

- 1. Evet
- 2. Hayır

24. Kendinize ait bir eviniz varsa, kredinin kalan geri ödeme tutarı ne kadardır? (YTL cinsinden yazın) (50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazın)

25. Başka mülk ve varlıklarınız var mıdır (botlar, ikinci evler, devre mülkler, değerli mücevherler, arabalar, vb. dahil)

- 1. Evet
- 2. Hayır

26. Halen, bu varlıklarınızı bedeli karşılığında ödenmemiş borçunuzun tutarı nedir (buna, önceki soruya ilgili ipotek/tutsat kredisi dahil değildir) (tüm rakamları YTL cinsinden yazın)?

27. Eviniz, botlarınız, arabalarınız, mücevherleriniz, vs. dahil olmak üzere tüm bu varlıklarınızı BUGÜN satmak isteydiniz, bu varlıklarınızın DEĞERİ sizce ne kadardır (rakamı YTL cinsinden yazın) (50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazın)?


Yemek giderleri, golf, sağlık kulübü ücretleri, vs. buna dahil edilebilir... (Tüm rakamları YTL cinsinden yazın)(50.000 YTL yerine 50000 yazın)

30. Kaç yıldır Müslümanınız?
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<td>31</td>
<td>1’in sağlık durumunuz çok kötü, 10’un ise sağlık durumunuzın mükemmel olduğu anlamına geldiği 1-10 arası bir puanlamaya, sizce vücut sağlığınızın durumu nedir?</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Yüksek okul veya üniversite hariç olmak kaydıyla, kaç YIL dini (İslam) eğitim aldınız?</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>İbadetlere, vaazlara, dini törenlere, eğitimlere veya sair benzeri faaliyetlere katılım da dahil olmak üzere, Camide HAFTADA kaç SAAT harçyorsunuz? (Arkadaşlarınızın evlerindeki dua veya çalışmalardan dahil etmeyin)</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Kutsal yazları okumaya, İslami çalışmalarla katılmaya (Camide değil), dua etmeye, ilahiler söylemeye veya sair benzeri etkinliklere HAFTADA kaç SAAT harçyorsunuz?</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Camiye HAFTADA ne kadar PARA veriyorsunuz? (YTL cinsinden yazın) Noel, Şükran Günü veya diğer tatiller gibi, daha fazla para verdiğiiniz dönemleri dikkate alın. Bu oran hesabınızda yer vermeye çalışın)</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>1’in “Allah Yoktur” inancına, 10’un “Allah kesinlikle verdir, içimde bu konuda hiç bir kuşku yok” inancına karşılık gelsin 1-10 arası ölçekte, Allah’a olan inancınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>1’in “ölümden sonra hayat yok” inancına, 10’un ise “ölümden sonra kesinlikle hayat var” inancına karşılık gelsin 1-10 arası ölçekte, öteki dünya inancınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>1’in “günahsız olduğunuz ve hiç günah işlediğiniz,” 10’un ise “sürekli ve inatla günah işlemeye devam ettirin” anlamına gelsin 1-10 arası bir ölçekte günahla ilişkili olarak kendinizi nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? (TANIM: Genç, Allah’ın koyduğu kurallara karşı gelmek olarak tanımlanır) NOT: 0 puan, günah kavramına inanmadığınız anlamına gelir.</td>
</tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>O’nun “gününlü ne olursa olsun herkesin öteki dünyada yaşadığını” inancına, 10’un ise “sadece Allah’ın günahlarını bağışladığı kişilerin öteki dünyada yaşadığını” inancına karşılık gelse 0-10 arası bir ölçekte, bu konudaki inancınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? 0 puan, öteki dünyaya inanmadığınız anlamına gelir.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
40. 1-10 arasında değişen bir ölçeekte, Allah’ın aşağıdaki türden dünyevi iyiilikler bahşettiği konusundaki inancınızı değerlendirin. 1, "Allah’ın söz konusu iyiliği bahşetmediği," 10 ise "Allah’ın söz konusu iyiliği kesinlikle bahşettiği" anlamına gelir.

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41. 1’in "Bu dünyadaki her olayn Allah’ın iradesi ve kontrolü altında olduğu ve insanların bu olayları değiştirmek için hiçbir şey yapamayacağı" inancına, 9’u ise "insanların, doğayı anlayarak ve bilimi kullanarak bu dünyadaki olayları kontrol ettiğimi" inancına karşılık geldiği 1-10 arasında ölçeekte, bu konudaki inancınızı nasıl değerlendiriniz?

42. Ahlakın, daha çok geleneksel dini değerleri mi, yoksa daha çok insanlığın yüzüllarca süren tecrübelerine mi dayandırılması gerekiyor?

- 1. Geleneksel dini değerler
- 2. İnsanlığın yüzüllarca süren tecrübe
- 3. Diğer
- 4. Fikrini yok

43. İslam’ın beş şartının sayabilir misiniz?

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 

44. Kâbe nedir?

45. Hz. Muhammet nerede doğdu?

46. İşa’ın Müslümanlktaki önemi nedir?

47. Halifeliğin amacı neydi?
48. Bu araştırmada bilgi almak için e-posta adresinizi yazın (isteğe bağlı).
VITA

Christopher W. Young Jr.

1972  Born May 22 in Newark, New Jersey.

1990  Graduated from Belleville Senior High School, Belleville, New Jersey.

1990-98  United States Army.

1994  BFA Montclair State University.

1994-96  Owner, Results Incorporated.

1996-98  Ernst & Young LLP.

1998-00  Newcourt Financial.

2000-02  Commonwealth, Comvest Ventures.

2002-08  Thomson Reuters.

2008  Professor Economics, Seton Hall University.

2008  Ph.D. in Global Affairs.