©2010

Nicole Bryan

RECONCILIATION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:

UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS AND REASONS FOR RESISTANCE

By Nicole Bryan

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Global Affairs

Written under the direction of

Professor Richard Langhorne

and approved by

_____

_____

_____

_____

Newark, New Jersey

October, 2010

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Reconciliation in former Yugoslavia:
Underlying Motivations and Reasons for Resistance

By Nicole Bryan

Thesis director: Richard Langhorne

The aim of this dissertation is to gain insight into the role and meaning of reconciliation in the post-conflict communities of former Yugoslavia. The study is designed to create an understanding of reconciliation grounded on insights from ordinary people as well as those working on reconciliation-related activities. The approach is explicitly interdisciplinary; it builds upon thinking in the fields of philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, and peace and conflict studies. While much has been written on the meaning of reconciliation in post-conflict societies, how people in former Yugoslavia conceive of reconciliation, what it means to them, what are their motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance, as well as what benefits reconciliation can bring, are under-explored and thus represent a gap in the literature on reconciliation in former Yugoslavia.

My study relies on insights gained through field research I conducted in the region from 2005 through 2009. My methodology includes: 1) 160 semi-structured interviews among ordinary people and members of civil society working on reconciliation-related activities; 2) participant observation in activities aimed at reconciliation, tolerance, dialogue, inter-ethnic exchange and dealing with the past; 3)

analysis of public discourse on reconciliation and dealing with the past. My findings reveal a number of challenges and opportunities. The results show: a) ordinary people have mixed views on what reconciliation entails and what benefits it can bring; b) motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance are complex and multifaceted; c) public discourse is deeply polarizing; d) civil society serves as the backbone of reconciliation efforts while government plays a muted role; e) reconciliation efforts are disconnected and uncoordinated; and f) results are difficult to measure.

Just as reconciliation involves complex, multifaceted processes, the underlying factors that motivate people to support such processes are also complex and multifaceted. Those in favor of reconciliation reveal a range of motivations, just as those who resist it. My recommendation is for reconciliation programs in former Yugoslavia to be built upon these motivations, not in isolation of them, and for results to be measured using an incremental or scaled approach based on milestones, rather than all or nothing criteria.

PREFACE

The dissertation topic and approach I selected has inspired feelings of joy and despair. There have been times when I experienced great optimism for the promise of reconciliation and what it may bring to people suffering in the aftermath of violent conflict. There have also been times when I felt great discouragement and alienation. Finding a balance would not have been possible without the continued support of my closest loved ones, committed advisors and supporters in former Yugoslavia. First and foremost, I am eternally grateful for the undying support of my husband and partner, Saša Poučki, who shared his life with me and assisted me with all aspects of my work, including contacting people, scheduling interviews, conducting interviews, transcribing and translating hundreds of hours of interview recordings, helping me organize my findings, translating reports, sharing his personal wartime experiences and providing thoughtful comments on all versions of this dissertation. His support is immeasurable. The advice and encouragement I received from Richard Langhorne provided a constant source of strength and determination. The insight and direction I gained from Aleksandra Sasha Milićević and Alex Hinton yielded renewed vigor. Yale Ferguson and Kurt Schock shared thoughtful comments and genuine interest. The sheer kindness and hospitality I experienced from people in the countries of former Yugoslavia inspired humility and humanity during times of uncertainty. Gordon Bacon opened his home to me in Sarajevo and Tom Clarke introduced me to colleagues in the region. The encouragement and assistance I received from local activists, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations and various institutions throughout the region enriched my work tenfold. I am forever grateful to Sanja Bahun-Radunović for teaching

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Introduction: Perspective, Research Questions, Methodology, Outline & Approach

> *I think very often about my sons. All my memories were wiped out. I have only one picture of one of my sons when he was in first grade. Sometimes I wonder 'did I just dream about all this and my life?' –Azra*

There is a reason people mourn when loved ones are lost. There is a reason they carry pictures in their hearts, wear memories on their faces and keep loved ones in their minds. Grief is a very human emotion. In the aftermath of trauma, especially trauma following violent conflict, grief is accompanied by other emotions as well. Denial, fear, hatred, disappointment, uncertainty, confusion and depression are common; for some, hope and relief also arise. A futile desire to change the past often consumes people in a tortuous game of "what if" as does a desire for understanding what happened, why it happened and who is responsible. Blame is common in these circumstances. So too is the quest for revenge and the quest for closure; some seek one or the other, some seek both. These quests can be found in the aftermath of the series of violent conflicts[1] that plagued the people of former Yugoslavia in the nineteen nineties and thereafter. They are not unique to former Yugoslavia. They can be found in Cambodia and Rwanda just as surely as they can be found in South Africa, Argentina, East Timor and Sierra Leone. There is no shortage of trauma in the world today, just as there is no shortage of violent conflict. What to make of these emotions and how they intersect in the daily lives of people struggling in the present to face the past and carve out a future is a key question running through this inquiry. The particular people in focus in this inquiry are those of

---

[1] Violent conflict emerged as part of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) during the early nineteen nineties. There were a series of inter-related armed conflicts in the Yugoslav republics and the province of Kosovo, including armed conflict in Slovenia in 1991; in Croatia from 1991 to 1995; in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995; in Serbia (including the Kosovo province) from 1998 to 1999; in Macedonia in 2001.

the countries of former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia.

The post-conflict[2] context I focus on primarily deals with societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia who are struggling with the aftermath of armed conflict in Croatia (1991 to 1995) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992 to 1995); the aftermath of conflict in Kosovo (1998 to 1999) is discussed to a much lesser extent.[3] My overall research questions are focused on how people in the region of former Yugoslavia, particularly those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, think about reconciliation and how discourse on dealing with the past, truth and justice, factor into this. I focus on ordinary people and those working on reconciliation-related activities e.g., tolerance, inter-ethnic dialogue, inter-cultural exchange, etc., in various organizations. The role of the international community and elites in shaping discourse is also included. Insofar as understanding can be gleaned from the experiences of people in other post-conflict contexts, they are included as well.

Perspective

My personal interest in the region of former Yugoslavia stems from personal relationships dating back to 1990 with members of the diaspora community in New Jersey. My personal interest has extended well beyond that initial circle of acquaintances and now includes close friendships with people living in the region, as well as a long-

---

[2] In this case, post-conflict refers to the period following armed conflict or violent conflict. This is not to say conflict is over (social conflict may continue) nor that violence is over (structural violence may continue) (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005), but to distinguish between the period of armed conflict and its cessation. Bloomfield (2006) prefers post-violence to post-conflict on the grounds that social conflict may continue. Post-violence is also problematic, however, because violence in the form of discrimination and overall structural violence may continue as well. For this reason, I use post-conflict with the understanding that what is meant is the aftermath of armed conflict.

[3] Though relevant, the conflict in Slovenia in 1991 and the conflict in Macedonia in 2001 are not discussed directly; the conflict in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999 is also not my primary focus.

term relationship with my husband who is from Serbia. In my case, a deeper interest in humanity and human trauma serves as a theme linking the personal and the academic. My academic interest in the region can be traced to my undergraduate study of crimes against humanity in 1995. I remember guest speakers coming to class and sharing their work on the legal case to arrest and prosecute Radovan Karadžić in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of U.S. Federal Law. The graphic descriptions of the alleged acts of torture committed were enough to capture anyone's attention. The accompanying legal briefs about whether the Geneva Convention was breached and whether the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was internal or international raised a series of controversies and contradictions that continue to shape discourse today. While these early experiences may have sparked my interest, it is further study of the region during the nineteen nineties and the period following that has sustained it. As a student of global affairs, the collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of communism in Eastern Europe are watershed phenomena that cannot be ignored. These phenomena along with the rise in influence of non-state actors, development of the European Union, emergence of new states and increased threat of internal violent conflict are factors that have influenced and continue to influence the countries of former Yugoslavia. Global theories on competing identities and shifting loyalties (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1999), which emphasize the role of identity and its impact on societies in transition, whether transition from communism to democracy, violent conflict to stable peace, or both–have a place in the study of post-conflict former Yugoslavia. Identity is indeed an important factor as is the role of diplomacy and evolutions in diplomacy in the global era (Langhorne, 2001). The post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia and the challenges

and opportunities that communities in the region face are highly relevant topics in global affairs. My interest in these topics makes the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia and the role of reconciliation within this context an ideal case for my dissertation study.

Research Questions

There are many views on reconciliation and how it is defined, e.g., is it a process or an end goal, is it wishful thinking or does it have practical value, are truth and justice necessary for reconciliation, etc. There are those in academia as well as on the ground who simply do not believe in the idea of reconciliation. Reconciliation raises complex questions. For the purposes of introduction, the working definition of reconciliation I am using here conceives of reconciliation as a process whose aim it is to restore, rebuild or transform relationships to a more harmonious or mutually respectful state/level. The way reconciliation is portrayed and understood in the larger context in former Yugoslavia is connected to discourse on dealing with the past, truth and justice. For some, reconciliation is considered a meaningless concept imposed by the international community or moral do-gooders and not relevant in their daily lives. For others, reconciliation is considered vital for their future and for building better relations with their neighbors. There are different attitudes toward reconciliation and different behaviors surrounding reconciliation–some support reconciliation while others resist it, yet what is missing is an understanding of what underlies these attitudes and behaviors at the level of motivations. My main objective is to uncover motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance among people in former Yugoslavia and then to shed light on how understanding these motivations can help shape a path toward reconciliation in the region that is in tune with *why* people support such initiatives and *why* people resist them.

This discussion is the crux of my field research and is covered in the third chapter. It is my position that attention to these underlying motivations could help solve what might be called *the reconciliation paradox*. The paradox is that despite the millions of dollars invested in support of international organizations and members of civil society working on reconciliation-related projects, critics argue there does not seem to be much progress. Statements like: *there is no reconciliation* can be heard at all levels. One issue is how to measure progress; this connects back to the question of whether reconciliation is a process, end result or both. Another question is what counts as reconciliation to begin with. Understanding how people in the region conceive of reconciliation, what it means to them, and how it fits in their lives is vital for addressing some of the doubts around reconciliation. Identifying motivations for reconciliation and resistance to it helps fill in the "why" questions that are left unanswered in the reconciliation paradox. The "why" questions are central to my dissertation; I address these in the third chapter.

My research questions are designed around the following topics: a) what is the meaning of reconciliation for people in former Yugoslavia; 2) how do people in the region understand reconciliation and its role in their lives; 3) what are people's perceptions of dealing with the past; 4) what do truth and justice mean in this context; 5) how do people envision the future; 6) what is the role of political elites, mid level advocates, such as NGOs, and people at the ground level in contributing to reconciliation-related processes; 7) how are media, education, regional integration in the EU, and the ICTY[4] part of this discourse; 9) what motivates people to be in favor of reconciliation; 9) what motivates them to resist reconciliation; 10) how can motivations

---

[4] ICTY refers to The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

help shape a path toward reconciliation; 11) how can reconciliation be measured; and 12) are there any signs of success.

Methodology

The methodology I have chosen includes a combination of in-depth interviews and participant observation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. My field research was conducted in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. I conducted interviews with ordinary people as well as those working on reconciliation-related projects in the region. My sample is comprised of 160 interviews, which include professional interviews (with members of organizations) and personal interviews (with ordinary people); elites were not included in my sample. I conducted 58 semi-structured interviews with professionals, e.g., various members of civil society, psychologists, journalists, local grassroots activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), veterans organizations, women's organizations, members of international organizations (e.g., UNDP, UNHCR, OSCE, ICTY, etc.).[5] I also conducted 102 interviews with ordinary people (e.g., taxi drivers, university students, refugees, etc.); 35 were in-depth semi-structured interviews and 67 were less formal conversational interviews. The sample primarily includes individuals living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia (including Vojvodina) as well as a small number of those living abroad. For practical reasons as well as reasons of focus, the sample is limited to a handful of people living in Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Kosovo. The interviews were conducted mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia; some were conducted abroad in Austria, Czech Republic and the United States. The focus of this study is on communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and

---

[5] UNDP refers to The United Nations Development Programme; UNHCR refers to The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; OSCE refers to The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; ICTY is referenced above.

Serbia. Obtaining a more extensive sample by conducting interviews in all the former republics was not my research focus. The sample table below reveals where interviews were conducted.

Table 1: Sample of interviews conducted by location

	Personal Interviews 102		Professional Interviews 58
	In-depth 35	Conversational 67	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	22	19
Croatia	11	18	13
Serbia	11	15	24
United States		7	2
Austria		4	
Czech Republic		1	

The sample includes a majority of individuals (93) who are from the region, i.e., nationals, and a small number of individuals (9) who are not from the region, i.e., internationals/foreigners. The 93 individuals from the region reflect different ethnic backgrounds and social positions. All 35 in-depth interviews were with people from the region; all 35 were conducted in the region. Of the 67 conversational interviews, 61 were with people from the region and 6 were with internationals/foreigners. All 6 conversational interviews conducted with internationals/foreigners were conducted in the region. Of the 61 conversational interviews conducted with people from the region, 12 were conducted abroad. Of the 58 professional interviews conducted, 55 were with people from the region; 3 were with internationals/foreigners. Of the 55 professional interviews conducted with people from the region, 1 was conducted abroad. Of the 3 professional interviews conducted with internationals/foreigners, 1 was conducted

abroad. Of the 102 interviews conducted in total, 88 interviews were conducted in the region and 14 interviews were conducted abroad.

My interview questions were semi-structured in nature. In order to encourage open dialogue and reflection, I allowed respondents to discuss topics that I did not directly ask about. Using a less structured, more open-ended active listening approach: 1) enabled respondents to feel their ideas and input were valued, and 2) remained sensitive to their needs to tell their stories in their own voices. In addition to conducting interviews, my study also included analysis of current reconciliation-related activities in the region. I paid particular attention to understanding the goals of these activities, their impact on communities, and what lessons can be learned from their work. This analysis helped inform the direction that organizations have taken in approaching reconciliation in the region. Findings developed from reconciliation-related projects in the region also informed my approach. Incorporating findings from studies in the region allowed me to make good use of insights already developed and expand the reach of my study. The existing projects complement the goals of my research by enabling me to understand attempts to bring people into the process of reconciliation.

There are three areas of concern to address with regard to my methodology: language, method of recruiting and generalization. About half the people I interviewed spoke English very well; the other half spoke little to no English. I gave respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia the option of the language to use and most selected their local native language–Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian–BCS, though some chose English. In order to demonstrate good faith and trust among people, before beginning my research, I learned the Serbo-Croatian language, paying particular attention

to the *ekavica* and *ijekavica* forms/dialects. Though Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia have shifted from use of Serbo-Croatian as the official language to Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian (BCS) respectively–the BCS languages are mutually understandable and largely congruent with Serbo-Croatian. My ability to converse in the local language was a great help in establishing comfort while interviewing people, particularly those of older generations. To complement my language skills, for the majority of the interviews, I relied on the assistance of an assistant interviewer and translator who is intimately familiar with my work and is from the region. This helped to ensure that my language skills neither prevented accurate understanding of the interviews nor hindered free flow of ideas. The interviews I conducted with Macedonians were conducted using a combination of the Serbo-Croatian and English language. The interviews I conducted with Albanians from Kosovo were conducted in the English language. The interviews I conducted with people living in Slovenia were conducted in Serbo-Croatian and English.

My experience in the region has revealed that in terms of recording insights during interviews, it is important to balance the comfort level of those who are being interviewed with the need to accurately record their insights. In the interviews I conducted, I used a number of methods: digital voice recorder, cassette tape recorder, use of laptop to type what they were saying, and writing notes by hand on-the-spot or immediately after the interview. In some cases, the venue restricted use of voice recorders or laptop computers, whether because of background noise or because of limitations on where to put the devices, e.g., small tables in cafés were not conducive to either. It has been my experience that people were most comfortable sharing their ideas about reconciliation and their experiences during the conflict years when they were

physically comfortable. In the former Yugoslavia, I have found this to mean when they were drinking coffee at a café or sitting outside on a terrace. This cultural nuance did not present a problem for completing the research with accuracy.

The second concern to address is the method of recruiting. In recruiting people for the professional interviews (e.g., among NGOs, international organizations, journalists, psychologists, etc.), I focused on those who were performing or reporting on reconciliation-related activities, e.g., tolerance, inter-ethnic dialogue, inter-cultural exchange, etc., as well as those providing assistance to vulnerable groups, e.g., minority rights, refugee support, psychological assistance for trauma, legal support, technology training, etc. In recruiting ordinary people for the interviews, I relied on the use of snowball sampling, i.e., recruiting respondents to interview by asking people I interviewed/was in contact with who would be a good person to talk to. Given that my aim was to include people from different ethnic backgrounds, as well as those who were disproportionately affected by the conflict, e.g., minorities, refugees, veterans, etc., asking for recommendations of people to interview presented itself as a valuable method. Paula Pickering is among the many scholars who have used snowball sampling when conducting research among ordinary people in the former Yugoslavia (Pickering, 2007). Aleksandra Milicevic also used the snowball sampling method in her ethnographic study of volunteers and draft dodgers in Serbia's wars (Milicevic, 2004). In order to avoid bias, I relied on different networks to ask for recommendations of people to interview. Since I am not a native of the region and I do not live in the region, my access to different groups would have been far too limited without the use of snowball sampling. While snowball sampling presents problems for generalization, since my purpose was not to generate

findings based on a representative sample of all the people of former Yugoslavia, but rather to gain insight into people's perceptions on the meaning and process of reconciliation, as well as the related themes of dealing with the past, truth and justice, I am comfortable with the snowball method of recruiting.

The third area of concern has to do with representation. While I primarily interviewed people from urban and rural areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, the sample is not representative of these countries. Though it is certainly worthwhile to conduct a comprehensive study across a number of communities in each of these countries, this was neither feasible nor necessary for my study. My objective was not to make generalizations about Serbia's youth or Bosnia and Herzegovina's elderly, but rather, to uncover insight into the motivations for and resistance to reconciliation and reconciliation-related activities in the region. These insights are integrated into the larger learning developed from analysis of newspaper articles and reports in the region.

In 2005, I obtained human subjects certification and subsequently received approval of my human subjects research protocol to conduct and analyze interviews with people in the region of former Yugoslavia. While the nature of the interviews involved sensitive issues, rather than experiencing emotional harm, when given the chance to share their stories in a more open-ended forum–people experienced comfort in the opportunity to express their views freely. In my experience, having an attitude of unconditional regard and being non-judgmental enabled respondents to share their ideas honestly, without worrying about "saying the wrong thing." This is a skill that I developed over the course of conducting hundreds of qualitative interviews using an open-ended methodology. There are of course risks with interview data, though they are not nearly as

problematic as the risks associated with surveys. While there are ways to minimize risks, as Paula Pickering points out, there is always a risk that respondents will try to tell you what they think you want to hear or what they think they are supposed to say, rather than what they really believe (Pickering, 2007). This risk is difficult to mitigate with survey data as it not possible to use personal skills to double-check or follow-up on answers. In the interviews I conducted in the region, respondents shared feedback with me, explaining that my open attitude enabled them to feel comfortable sharing their ideas honestly, e.g., without worrying about whether I thought they were nationalistic or extremist. Given the sometimes marginalizing tendencies of researchers and journalists in the region, e.g., tendencies to pigeon-hole people as being nationalistic or extremist, taking care to show good faith, active listening and empathy was important for establishing trust and encouraging open and honest dialogue when conducting interviews for my study. The majority of the interviews lasted between one and two hours; the longest interview lasted five hours. Respondents were free to determine how much time they wanted to spend, though I told them in the beginning that I anticipated one to two hours. Some respondents participated in follow-up interviews as the relationship developed over time. The difference between the professional interviews and interviews with ordinary people was sometimes difficult to parse out. Many of the professional interviews veered into interviews about their own personal experiences. They would typically begin with their experiences related to professional activities and then shift to their personal experiences. Though I counted them as professional interviews, the line between professional and personal is hardly crisp. Among the interviews I conducted, many of the people working for NGOs or grassroots organizations had their own

experiences with trauma and had their own ideas about reconciliation. Many were internally displaced persons or refugees and wanted to share their experiences. As a result, personal experiences and professional experiences in some cases were not mutually exclusive. The difference between the in-depth interviews with ordinary people (35) and conversational interviews (67) is largely that respondents in the conversational interviews wanted the character of the interview to be less formal and less structured. Many wanted to tell their story and felt doing so in a less formal, less structured way would be more comfortable. Very often these conversational interviews were rooted in a social context and took place over social encounters rather than at a scheduled time and place to conduct the interview. I did not tape-record the conversational interviews, but took notes, usually after the interviews. The conversational interviews can be thought of as closer to participant observation than semi-structured interviews.

For the participant observation portion of my work, I participated in several seminars on the topics of reconciliation, dealing with the past, teaching tolerance, multi-cultural dialogue, etc., in the region. I also participated in several conferences on the topics of genocide, minority rights, media and conflict, commemorations, etc. The interviews and participant observation were conducted between 2005 and 2009, mainly in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. The combination of interviews, participant observation, analysis of reconciliation-related activities and discourse on dealing with the past in the region provided a balanced grounding in the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia surrounding the topic of reconciliation.

Outline

The flow of this dissertation begins with an introduction to the topic, then continues with a discussion of the literature on reconciliation, the post-conflict context in former Yugoslavia, the meaning of reconciliation, underlying motivations and reasons for resistance to reconciliation, challenges and obstacles, and ends with a summary and recommendations. The dissertation sections are outlined as follows. In Chapter 1: Literature Review: Approaches to Reconciliation in the Post-Conflict Context, I provide an overview of some of the main themes discussed in the literature on reconciliation in the post-conflict context. In Chapter 2: Context, Discourse and Practice in former Yugoslavia, I discuss the post-conflict context in former Yugoslavia and themes that are important for reconciliation. Findings and quotes from my interviews are also included. In Chapter 3: Perspectives, Conceptions, Motivations and Challenges: Motivations and Resistance to Reconciliation in former Yugoslavia, I reveal insights from my interviews on underlying motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance. The Conclusion provides a summary of the learning and discusses recommendations for creating reconciliation-related strategies and practices in the post-conflict context.

Approach

Given the inter-related social, economic, psychological, legal factors at work in former Yugoslavia, my approach is explicitly interdisciplinary and builds upon relevant theories and practices from literature in philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, and peace and conflict studies. As described above, the method of inquiry I have chosen for this dissertation involves a combination of in-depth interviews and participant observation, as well as an analysis of readily available findings of

organizations working on reconciliation-related activities in the region. Research on reconciliation-related activities and initiatives in other post-conflict contexts is included for reference as well. The cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa are significant as they provide insight into: a) developments in the area of reconciliation in divided societies; b) the role of civil society in creating momentum for change; and c) the importance of political will in framing the meaning and process of reconciliation. The cases of Rwanda, Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola, among others, are also important as they point to different approaches to reconciliation and dealing with the past in the aftermath of violence, including being culture and conflict sensitive. While some of these cases are discussed in brief, the purpose is not to provide an in-depth discussion of these contexts, but rather to assess whether any insights can be applied to the situation in former Yugoslavia. While there are cultural differences across post-conflict societies, there are also commonalities. Attention needs to be paid to understanding where analogies are relevant and where they fall short.

Given the relevance of NGOs and international organizations, local grassroots organizations, professional associations, women's groups, and other civil society groups in the region, I have been especially mindful of gaining input from individuals working in these capacities, as well as ordinary individuals from different backgrounds. The sample of ordinary people and professionals has been constructed to include people from different levels of society, across ethnic backgrounds, including some of those who are marginalized, e.g., refugees and veterans, as well as those who are part of the mainstream.

In my study design, I borrowed from the approach of multi-track diplomacy (Miall, 2004; McDonald, 2003) and tried to include as many tracks as possible. Though elites at the top level were not interviewed, some analysis of elite behavior is part of this study. Paula Pickering calls attention to the need for more research at the ground level and suggests researchers have focused largely on elites and too little on ordinary people (Pickering, 2007). As mentioned above, my interviews were among ordinary people and professionals working on reconciliation-related projects. In focusing on the ground and mid levels, I attempted to build on the idea that, in societies stricken by violent conflict, one of the best ways to understand how to create conditions for peace and reconciliation is to include ordinary people in the process. This is grounded in what Colin Irwin refers to in the context of peace as a "People's Peace Process" (2002a).

Creating an inclusive path toward reconciliation that involves ordinary people in the process is very important, not only for the people of former Yugoslavia, but also for people suffering in other societies divided by conflict and facing risks to security and stability. In the post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia, in the absence of sustainable integrated efforts at all levels (top, mid and ground), there is a dangerous potential for new conflicts to emerge, develop, spread, and further destabilize the region of Southeastern Europe. This is particularly significant in light of the transitional nature of the region. When I began this research, reconciliation processes were in very early stages, Serbia and Montenegro were joined and former President Slobodan Milošević, who has since died, was on trial for war crimes. During this research, Serbia and Montenegro separated, Albanians of Kosovo declared independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina sued Serbia and Montenegro for genocide, and Radovan Karadžić was

arrested. As I end this research, Serbia passed its Srebrenica Resolution condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica, and a new wave of support for reconciliation among some top level leaders in Serbia and Croatia seems to be in reach. Despite such hope, the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), including the Bosniak-Croat Federation (the Federation) and Republika Srpska (RS), the two main entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), remains fragile, as do Serb-Albanian relations in the Preševo Valley and Serb-Croat relations in the divided communities of Slavonia. Nonetheless, recent events in support of reconciliation from the top level of regional political leadership may signal better things to come. If top level efforts come to fruition, the trick is to integrate them with the numerous mid and ground level activities underway.

Conclusion

Reconciliation is considered by some to be extremely important for peace and social transformation in the post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia. There are a host of interconnected issues and conditions related to the success or failure of reconciliation efforts in the region. In some cases, the legitimacy of the initiative is thrown into question. In other cases, the groups of people who are considered to be eligible for reconciliation activities are drastically marginalized. It also remains in question whether all members of society are capable of or ready for reconciliation. These are practical matters. At the conceptual level, if reconciliation consists in a kind of rebuilding, restoring or transforming of relationships, how can young communities who previously had no relationship, i.e., the children born during or after the conflict years, begin to think about what reconciliation means to them? Clearly the meaning of reconciliation varies among different levels of society and different spaces in time. Motivations to reconcile

differ from person to person and tend to reveal themselves in different ways, shapes and forms. There are those who wish to reconcile for the sake of preventing future harm. In other cases, motivations are purely economic. Yet, for others, the old values of Tito's brotherhood and unity, though overtly dismissed, seem to have a place inwardly in the hearts and memories of people who were once part of Yugoslavia. Positive memories of the past are relevant for some; for others, such memories are either suppressed or never existed. Such is the situation of the multifaceted scene of people that make up former Yugoslavia. How people of the region will move forward is a question at the heart of this dissertation; my goal is to share perspective on what reconciliation entails and how it might be realized among the societies of former Yugoslavia.

The evolving nature of the post-conflict situation in former Yugoslavia mirrors the evolving nature of the global world: in both cases there is an interplay of local, national and transnational forces that push and pull people in all sorts of directions to and from all sorts of transitions. The dynamics at play in the societies of former Yugoslavia mimic the dynamics at play in the field of global affairs, thus making this context instructive for global affairs research. Given the fragile nature of the situation in former Yugoslavia, the need for developing sustainable strategies for reconciliation and the related work of peacebuilding and post-conflict transformation is highly relevant. While these issues have been explored in the literature, and indeed there is a good body of research, resources and case studies applicable to the region, the approach I have chosen seeks to identify underlying motivations that could help drive support for the long-term goal of fostering reconciliation in the region. As consistent with key learning in the field, my approach takes into consideration multiple dimensions of conflict transformation,

which is discussed in the first chapter, and is particularly sensitive to the range of actors, including non-state actors, that have an important role to play in helping rebuild, restore and transform post-conflict societies. In the end, my goal is to inform and outline a path toward reconciliation in former Yugoslavia. My hope is that this research provides lessons that can be applied to other post-conflict contexts as well.

**Chapter 1: Literature Review: Approaches to Reconciliation in the
          Post-Conflict Context**

> *Complexities are, of course, involved in attempting reconciliation, but it is
> not a grand or mysterious undertaking. –Susan Dwyer*

Introduction

In this chapter my aim is to provide an overview of some of the main themes discussed in the literature on reconciliation in the post-conflict context. I discuss: a) conceptions of reconciliation and attempts at definition; b) the significance of reconciliation in post-conflict contexts; c) approaches to dealing with the past and how reconciliation is a part of this; d) the role of truth and justice and their relationship to reconciliation; e) conflict transformation and peacebuilding as connected to reconciliation. The main purpose of this chapter is to shed light on what is meant by reconciliation, why it is considered to be important, how is it typically framed, what are contemporary approaches to reconciliation in post-conflict contexts, what are some of the challenges associated with reconciliation, and how these challenges can be understand in a larger post-conflict context.

Part I: Conceptions of reconciliation and attempts at definition

Within the literature defining reconciliation is a work in progress. As many authors have pointed out, while there is no consensus on how to define reconciliation, there is nonetheless fair amount of agreement on its role in the aftermath of atrocities (Skaar, Gloppen & Suhrke, 2005; Assefa, 1999). The literature on reconciliation is rich with descriptions of reconciliation as well as strategies for putting reconciliation into practice. My aim in this section is to share contemporary ways of thinking about reconciliation and its role in post-conflict contexts. In such contexts, reconciliation is

characterized as having different levels, types or forms. Some describe reconciliation as relationship-centered; others focus on political dynamics; there is also attention on the role of narratives, tensions and disruptors. Distinctions are often made between the individual/interpersonal level versus the collective level (i.e., community, national, political); thick versus thin forms; macro versus micro level approaches, and so on (Gloppen, 2005; Crocker, 2003; Dwyer, 2003). Reconciliation is frequently described as both a process and an end goal (Skaar et al., 2005; Dwyer, 2003), often with little explanation of the relationship between the two. There are those who place reconciliation within the contexts of truth and justice; others house reconciliation within conflict transformation and peacebuilding settings. The different ways of characterizing reconciliation suggest there may not be *one phenomenon* that is reconciliation, but rather a *set of phenomena*–reconciliation(s). The following provides a brief introduction to contemporary conceptions of reconciliation and how they are applied in post-conflict contexts.

To accommodate problems of definition, both Siri Gloppen (2005) and Tristan Anne Borer (2004) propose ways of thinking about reconciliation that are not too rigid and that encompass multiple meanings. Borer offers a "multi-dimensional" view of reconciliation.

> It would be almost impossible to believe that reconciliation could be understood as a single concept. Rather, it is a complex concept; one which might be best described as multi-dimensional. Any attempts at defining and measuring it should, therefore, be approached with a certain degree of caution. (Borer, 2004, p. 3)

Gloppen's view is that reconciliation encompasses a wide range of processes; the implication is there is no either/or dilemma. Reconciliation is about forgiveness just as surely as it is about peaceful coexistence. Gloppen argues:

> Reconciliation refers to processes of different kinds and at different levels. It is about individuals forgiving each other; about societies torn apart by conflict mending their social fabric and reconstituting the desire to live together, and about peaceful coexistence and flexibility. It may refer to an ambitious goal of creating a shared comprehensive vision of a common future or common past; or to a situation where former enemies continue to disagree, but still respect each other as equal citizens. (Gloppen, 2005, p. 20)

The views of Borer and Gloppen are not uncommon. Most scholars find it difficult to define reconciliation as consisting in any one form. Rather than opt for a philosophically grounded definition of reconciliation(s), it is common practice to *describe* reconciliation by referring to different examples. Contemporary conceptions of reconciliation are less focused on definition and more on instances of reconciliation that correspond to different levels, types or forms. The following is a brief overview of some of the main ways of *describing* reconciliation. At the end, I sketch a view of how to analyze these descriptions and perhaps bring them into a more grounded conceptual framework.

Individual versus collective/ Micro versus macro

Building on her approach of *different kinds* and *different levels*, Gloppen (2005) categorizes reconciliation as individual and collective. She places individual reconciliation at the interpersonal level and collective reconciliation at the societal level; collective reconciliation includes local community, national, and political reconciliation. For Gloppen, individual reconciliation falls within the domain of psychology and religious counseling; community reconciliation within the domain of anthropology and sociology; national reconciliation within the domain of political science, history and law; political reconciliation within the domain of human rights and democracy (2005, p. 20). Categorizing reconciliation along these lines is widely accepted in the literature.

Borer distinguishes between individual reconciliation and national reconciliation. On her view, individual reconciliation is about interpersonal relationships whereas national reconciliation is about sociopolitical institutions and processes (Borer, 2004). Susan Dwyer describes reconciliation at micro and macro levels. Reconciliation at the micro level largely corresponds to individual reconciliation whereas macro level reconciliation corresponds to collective reconciliation. The difference between these levels is largely the constituencies: at the micro level they are individuals and at the macro level they are groups (Dwyer, 2003).

Some authors see a connection between different types, forms or levels of reconciliation; others claim individual and collective reconciliation are completely different. For Gloppen, there is a direct relationship between individual and collective levels.

> Lasting reconciliation is held to be possible only within a democratic framework, and reconciliation is seen as a precondition for democracy… Reconciliation at the individual and local community level is generally held to be necessary for (at least conducive to) national reconciliation. (2005, p. 21)

Charles Hauss (2003) also sees a connection between the various approaches to reconciliation.

> There is at least one common denominator to all these approaches to reconciliation. They all are designed to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about their historical adversaries. As a result, reconciliation occurs one person at a time and is normally a long and laborious process. (p. 2)

Borer worries that in the case of South Africa drawing a connection between individual and national reconciliation has muddied the understanding of each form of reconciliation. On her view, both are distinct forms that cannot be seen as "additive" or simply moving from individuals to groups; rather, they may be "fundamentally opposed" (2004, pp. 6-7).

On Borer's view, individual reconciliation "is predicated on a notion of overcoming divisions and disagreements; it is a model that envisions harmony." (2004, p. 8)

For Borer, national reconciliation:

> assumes that political disagreement and conflict are intrinsic to politics and that an element of political discord is to be accepted and even welcomed as a sign of a healthy society. (p. 2004, p. 8)

On Borer's view, individual reconciliation "requires people to get along" whereas national reconciliation "assumes they won't" (2004, p. 8). For her the two are distinct. Borer's understanding of individual reconciliation tracks closely with David Crocker's "thick" form of reconciliation; Borer's understanding of national reconciliation corresponds to Crocker's "thin" form. Crocker's views are discussed below.

While the idea of reconciliation between individuals at the interpersonal level may be somewhat familiar to us, e.g., in the context of marriage, broken friendships, etc., collective reconciliation between groups in whose names atrocities have been committed tests our intuitions. Coming to consensus on the meaning of this form of reconciliation requires careful exploration. For many, individual reconciliation calls to mind visions of former enemies making friends and turning the other cheek. This vision corresponds to what Crocker (2003) calls thick reconciliation. Collective reconciliation, however, is more difficult to envision. Being able to live side by side with former enemies but not engage in meaningful interaction is considered by Crocker to be a thin form of reconciliation that many associate with collective reconciliation. It seems to me, however, that individual reconciliation may take a thin form just as collective reconciliation may take a thick form. One can imagine communities being harmonious just as surely as one can imagine individuals engaging in nothing more basic coexistence.

The discussion below clarifies what is meant by the thick thin distinction. In the end, it may be that Crocker's thin form of reconciliation is not reconciliation at all, but a step along the path to reconciliation.

Thick versus Thin

Crocker's thick thin typology is well cited throughout the literature. On Crocker's view, thick reconciliation is about reconstruction of relationships whereas thin reconciliation is about basic coexistence; in between the two is a state of mutual respect in a democratic sense (Crocker, 2003). Crocker's idea is that in its thickest form, reconciliation may bring harmony to relationships; in its thinnest form, reconciliation is simply the agreement to live together nonviolently; in between is more than simple coexistence, but less than friendship. Gloppen (2005) builds on the idea of thicker and thinner forms.

> [I]t is useful to distinguish between 'thicker' and 'thinner' notions of reconciliation, with nonviolent coexistence as a minimal definition and, at the other end of the scale, a shared comprehensive vision of a common future. (p. 20)

For Crocker, reconciliation typically takes thinner forms, particularly in the aftermath of atrocities. Despite her attraction to Crocker's thicker and thinner notions, Gloppen offers a wider view of reconciliation and its applications.

> In societies coming out of a violent or repressive past there may be a need to reconcile conflict understandings of history and diverging views of the meaning and political relevance of the past. (2005, p. 22)

Reconciling conflict understandings takes reconciliation outside of the thick versus thin framework and places it within a larger context of dealing with the past. This will be discussed more in Part III of this chapter.

Narratives, tensions and disruptors

Gloppen's broader approach to reconciliation calls to mind Dwyer's discussion of narratives, tensions and disruptors. Dwyer provides an interesting account of reconciliation. She suggests that reconciliation is a process that involves somehow negotiating narratives, e.g., of friendship, community, family, national identity, etc. The process involves confronting tensions and interpreting disruptive events that have affected (previous) narratives in such a way that they are "anomalous" to the narrative.

> [R]econciliation is fundamentally a process whose aim is to lessen the sting of a tension: to make sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes, in the overall narrative context of a personal or national life. (Dwyer, 2003, p. 106)

In post-conflict contexts, this kind of negotiation or interpretation may involve coming to terms with tensions related to a particular disruptive event, e.g., betrayal of neighbors, which does not fit with a *previous* narrative of good neighborly relations. The process calls upon individuals or groups to confront a disruptive event and find ways of interpreting why/how it happened. The process depends on the existence of a previous narrative, e.g., one that is often though not necessarily more positive.

> When a disruption occurs–say, when one friend betrays another–the two are faced with an event that is anomalous with respect to their shared story. If they choose to continue their friendship, they need to make sense of that event…The task is to move beyond the mere statement of agreed-upon facts of who did what to whom and toward a mutually acceptable interpretation (or interpretations) of those events. (Dwyer, 2003, p. 100)

While this may sound like closure or healing, Dwyer distances her account from such terms; she differentiates reconciliation from forgiveness, arguing that reconciliation may be possible when forgiveness is not (2003). Of course, just as reconciliation does not rely on forgiveness, forgiveness does not necessarily deliver reconciliation–though the two sometimes coincide. We can imagine cases where an individual decides to forgive

someone who betrayed her but nonetheless chooses not to reconcile in the sense of restoring the relationship. She may also decide not to reconcile with other individuals in the group or regime she considers responsible for the harm. The relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation is messy.

Dwyer outlines a way of conceiving of reconciliation at both micro and macro levels that does not tie it too closely to forgiveness or harmony. She calls her account *reconciliation for realists*:

> [A]ny conception of reconciliation–at either the macro- or micro- level–that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasizes interpersonal harmony and common fellow-feeling, will fail to be a realistic model for most creatures like us. If we care about reconciliation, let's advocate in terms that make it credible to the relevant parties. (Dwyer, 2003, p. 108)

Dwyer is concerned with what reconciliation means and what form it typically takes in real situations. This again moves away from a definition of reconciliation, toward a description of reconciliation in certain contexts.

Dwyer's notion of "credible to the relevant parties" touches upon a question that Gloppen raises, i.e., "the question of *between whom* reconciliation is needed" (2005, p. 20). Gloppen argues that in post-conflict contexts, reconciliation often is needed between victims and perpetrators, conflicting groups, victims and beneficiaries, society and a criminal regime (2005, p. 20). For Dwyer, it makes sense to talk about reconciliation at the micro or macro level among those who have a shared narrative. The idea is that reconciliation is not needed among people who have no such narrative and therefore have not encountered tensions or disruptions to their narrative.

Discussions surrounding for whom reconciliation is needed or even possible are important for understanding the nature of reconciliation as a process. In post-conflict

settings, narratives of peaceful coexistence and even friendship have been tested by conflict. From Rwanda to Cambodia to former Yugoslavia, perceptions of betrayal are plentiful. In the case of former Yugoslavia, the narrative of *brotherhood and unity* (*bratsvo i jedinstvo*) can be called upon as a previous (positive) narrative that was disrupted. Of course, an empirical question is whether this narrative was really shared by different groups in former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, if we accept that this narrative was at least relevant for some, we can apply Dwyer's approach to reconciliation and propose that addressing tensions and disruptors to that narrative is part of the reconciliation process. The focus would then be on *why/how* the tensions and disruptions occurred, not simply what occurred. This certainly outlines a process that could lead to reconciliation among individuals and communities in the sense of helping them come to terms with their experiences. The question remains, however, how to include younger generations who grew up during the conflict years and may not have experienced the shared (positive) narrative that was disrupted. For them, the narrative of *brotherhood and unity,* for example, may not have been part of their experience. In light of this, is it possible for younger generations to participate in the process of reconciliation? Is there a *need* for them to reconcile with anyone? If so, is it as individuals or members of a group, e.g., members of an ethnic or community group that experienced the disruption? Perhaps they need to deal with the tensions and disruptions that the post-conflict process brings to their previous (negative) narratives–perhaps they need to confront tensions that disrupt the narrative that all members of other ethnic groups cannot be trusted or are evil, for example. It seems clear that members of the younger generations who grew up during or were born after the conflict years have been exposed to a narrative of conflict. It may be

that this generation can participate in reconciliation in a different way than those who experienced a pre-conflict narrative. Dwyer does not deal with these questions directly. It seems to me such questions are worthy of consideration, particularly given Dwyer's intention to provide a realistic account.

In discussing positive and negative disruptors, Dwyer allows that in some cases the previous narrative may be negative, e.g., as in the case of South African apartheid, or the disruptor may be positive, e.g., change from an oppressive to democratic regime. Nonetheless, on her view this does not take away from the need for individuals and communities to address the (negative or positive) disruptors and find ways to accommodate them. Dwyer's account calls upon the notion of reconciliation as a process that accommodates (reconciles) differences. Dwyer acknowledges, however, that in most cases, reconciliation is needed when identity-threatening disruptions occur.

> The sort of tensions that rightly trigger reconciliation are ones that result from severe identity-threatening disruptions to ongoing narratives. But even in these cases, I am recommending that reconciliation be understood as the incorporation–not as an erasure–of that tension. (Dwyer, 2003, p. 97)

On most accounts of reconciliation in post-conflict contexts, both individual/interpersonal and collective reconciliation involve accommodating tensions in relationships (not necessarily erasing them). Individual reconciliation focuses on accommodating tensions at the interpersonal level between *individuals*, e.g., victims, perpetrators, bystanders and beneficiaries. This includes victim–self reconciliation, victim–perpetrator reconciliation, perpetrator–perpetrator reconciliation, etc. Collective reconciliation focuses on accommodating tensions at the societal level between *groups* or *institutions*. Examples include conflicting group–conflicting group, community–community, victims–regime, perpetrators–regime, etc. In the case of victim–self reconciliation, this takes the form of

individual victims coming to terms with/making peace with what they've experienced. The idea is for the victim to be able to free herself from the harm she experienced and for it not to consume her. Perpetrator–self reconciliation also calls upon the perpetrator to confront what she has done, e.g., to confront a tension or disruption in her own self-identity as a moral human being. This notion rings of acceptance; in some ways, to reconcile with oneself is to accept what has happened and move on. A sense of reflection and psychological healing dominates the conception of reconciliation with oneself. This type of reconciliation, however, is not the typical form of reconciliation we think of with respect to individual/interpersonal reconciliation in post-conflict situations. The typical form is victim–perpetrator reconciliation. Victim–perpetrator reconciliation also involves some sort of acceptance and coming to terms with harm the perpetrator inflicted on the victim. This type of reconciliation is often thought to bring about healing by creating a platform for the victim's pain to be acknowledged by the perpetrator and for the perpetrator to apologize and free herself of her wrongdoing. It is not surprising that critics of individual/interpersonal reconciliation characterize the *healing aspect* as wishful thinking, claiming victims cannot be expected to *forgive and forget* and perpetrators cannot be counted on to show sincere remorse or admit what they've done, especially in the absence of incentives such as amnesty. Another complication arises when individuals are often both victims and perpetrators. Child soldiers in Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola were clearly both. Interestingly, in all three cases, healing and reconciliation were inextricably linked (Schabas, 2005; Honwana, 2005). In Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola cultural processes of healing, including cleansing rituals, dominated reconciliation processes. Typically the linkage between healing and

reconciliation is associated with confession and penance central in Christianity. In these contexts, however, healing had little to do with verbal expressions of confession and more to do with spiritual cleansing and reintegration into the community. While many discount the role of healing in reconciliation because of its spiritual connotations, those who prefer to uphold the healing aspect in a secular way emphasize psychological wellbeing and cathartic effects of freeing oneself of the burden of wrongdoing.

Collective reconciliation between groups, e.g., conflicting parties or former enemy combatants, also involves acceptance and coming to terms with the harm that members of a group inflicted on another group, groups inflicted on each other, or the regime inflicted on groups and society at large. Typical examples include atrocities or human rights abuses motivated by group belonging, e.g., ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, political affiliation, etc. In other cases, examples include a group inflicting harm on members of *its own group*. The case of Hutu extremists attacking moderate Hutus in Rwanda or Serb paramilitary troops torturing Serb refugees in Erdut as punishment for fleeing the frontline in Croatia during the mass expulsion of Serbs from Krajina in 1995 (Opačić, Jović, Radović & Knežević, 2006) provide vivid examples of the relevance of intra-group tensions.

A main goal of collective reconciliation is to prevent abuses from recurring. Collective reconciliation may involve confronting group generalizations and assignments of blame that ought to be attributed to the regime or offending individuals (not the group to which the individuals belong). It may also involve raising awareness among bystanders and beneficiaries of an unjust regime that has afforded their group an unfair advantage in society, e.g., whites in the United States. Collective reconciliation shares

processes of transforming or resolving conflict as well as peacebuilding, e.g., through teaching tolerance. It often relies on cultural mechanisms of reconciliation as well as transitional justice mechanisms, particularly truth commissions. Whereas individual reconciliation may happen in private, collective reconciliation typically involves some sort of public process or ritual. This will be discussed more in Part III.

Reconciliation in practice–relationship-centered approaches

Within the literature, consensus on the meaning of reconciliation and its relationship to other post-conflict practices, including conflict transformation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, is far from being achieved. In his discussion of "The Meaning of Reconciliation," Hizkias Assefa (1999) describes the difficulty of conceptualizing and operationalizing reconciliation. Assefa places reconciliation within what he calls "the spectrum of conflict handling mechanisms" (1999). On Assefa's view, while reconciliation is a poorly defined and poorly understood concept, this doesn't detract from its importance in our day.

> Despite the lack of knowledge about how to operationalize reconciliation, there is however no question about the tremendous need for it. In fact, it could be said that the need in today's world is much greater than at any other time in the past. (Assefa, 1999, p. 3)

While reconciliation is often described as an elusive concept that travels between what Martha Minow (1998) calls "vengeance and forgiveness," efforts to clarify its meaning are often insightful. In his work on reconciliation, Lederach (1999) discusses four components that he sees as being at the heart of reconciliation: truth, justice, mercy, and peace. His view is that all four are essential and that reconciliation is critical for any peacebuilding effort to be successful. Lederach's practitioner experience and Mennonite background serve as inspiration for his views on reconciliation; his work figures

prominently in peacebuilding and conflict transformation literature. For Lederach, relationships are the crux of reconciliation and peacebuilding. He sees reconciliation as inextricably linked to conflict transformation and peacebuilding practices. As a result, his account does not directly match up with the accounts provided by Crocker, Dwyer and Gloppen. Lederach's ideas about reconciliation cannot be properly understood outside of conflict transformation and peacebuilding; these are discussed in Part V.

Assefa also offers a relationship-centered view of reconciliation. On Assefa's view, like that of Lederach, reconciliation is about transforming relationships with the goal of addressing underlying causes of tension that lead to conflict. Assefa emphasizes the importance of addressing underlying causes in the aftermath of *internal* conflict. On his view, while physical separation of parties in international conflict may help prevent violence from re-emerging, in internal conflict situations, this is not a viable option.

> [I]n civil war situations conflict management strategies are not adequate. One has to move towards conflict resolution and reconciliation processes where not only the underlying issues to the conflicts are resolved to everyone's satisfaction but also the antagonistic attitudes and relationships between the adversaries are transformed from negative to positive. (Assefa, 1999, p. 3)

On Assefa's view, for reconciliation to work all parties have to be willing participants. The impetus for reconciliation should come from within as opposed to being forced on people by external mandates. Charles Hauss agrees with the willingness requirement.

> At the most basic level, reconciliation is all about individuals. It cannot be forced on people. They have to decide on their own whether to forgive and reconcile with their one-time adversaries. (Hauss, 2003, p. 2)

Hauss emphasizes the willingness of participants at the ground level but also acknowledges the role of top level leaders:

> By its very nature, reconciliation is a 'bottom up' process and thus cannot be

imposed by the state or any other institution. However, as the South African example shows, governments can do a lot to promote reconciliation and provide opportunities for people to come to grips with the past. (Hauss, 2003, p. 2)

The views of Assefa, Hauss and Lederach contribute to the larger literature on conflict transformation and peacebuilding. They point to the role reconciliation can play within these processes. Their views are focused on transforming damaged relationships among individuals and community members. This kind of transformation may ultimately lead to Crocker's thicker forms of reconciliation and may involve a process similar to Dwyer's process of confronting tensions and disruptions to narratives. The transformation aspects of the relationship-centered views are discussed in Part V of this chapter.

Analysis

In reflecting on the varying conceptions of reconciliation discussed above, it seems a philosophically grounded definition of reconciliation(s) may help identify some common threads. J.L.A. Garcia's work on racism is instructive in this regard (1997). According to Garcia, contemporary conceptions of racism ought to be put to the test to judge whether a particular definition of racism captures what intuitively we take to be racist and preserves the immoral character of racism. Garcia places the seat of racism within the human heart; he provides a volitional account of racism based in *contempt* for others because of their race. For Garcia, if *ill will* or *disregard* is not present, the instance is not racist, at least not in a primary sense. Garcia also takes on the sticky problem of the connection between individual and institutional racism. On his view, institutional racism is a derivative form of racism. Racism begins in individuals, though it may spread to societal practices and remain in institutions long after the original racist infectors have ceased. Garcia's approach could offer a good way of evaluating contemporary

conceptions of reconciliation and the issue of whether individual and collective forms of reconciliation are connected in some way. His analysis is particularly relevant for evaluating the thick versus thin distinction.

In applying a Garcia-like test: does *thin* reconciliation in the form of minimal coexistence capture what we intuitively mean by reconciliation; does it preserve the character of reconciliation as we typically understand it? What if the minimally coexisting parties are indifferent toward each other? Would it make sense to point to such an example as an instance of reconciliation, even in a thin form? Perhaps an analogy can shed light on this. There is a relevant distinction between tolerance and acceptance; we may tolerate some people but not accept them, just as we may agree to live side by side our former enemies, not because we want to (imagine we don't) and not because we respect their right to exist (imagine we don't) but simply because we have no other viable choice–it is a last resort. It may do a disservice to call this an instance of reconciliation; strained coexistence would do the trick. Surprisingly, examples of thick reconciliation may not fair much better on this test. In certain cases we may agree to forge alliances with former enemies and even engage in joint communal activities, but we may do so in order to receive some financial incentive from an international donor (or political gain such as EU candidacy), yet inwardly deny that our former enemies are worthy of respect and refuse to give up our thirst for revenge. This again would not seem to fit with our intuitive perceptions of what counts as reconciliation nor would it fit the character we normally take to be consistent with reconciliation. This smells more of entrepreneurism than reconciliation.

In reflecting on both examples, there are at least three dimensions of reconciliation that come to mind: behavioral, attitudinal and motivational. One may *behave* in a cordial or friendly way with former enemies but nonetheless hold the *attitude* that that the former enemies do not deserve to live and indeed secretly *will* that harm come to them. The behavioral component may camouflage the attitudinal and motivational dimensions making the instance appear to be one of reconciliation (thick or thin). These cases would fail the Garcia-like test; they would not match what intuitively we take to be instances of reconciliation, nor would they preserve the character of reconciliation as we typically understand it. Intuitively, reconciliation in post-conflict contexts seems to require some sort of acceptance of and making peace with conflict-related harm that we experienced as a result of the conflict, and that someone/some group/some regime can be held accountable for (in contrast to a natural disaster). Revenge and hatred do not seem to be consistent with the character of reconciliation. Intuitively, in its most recognizable form, reconciliation seems to be about good will; it seems to be consistent with a benevolent and magnanimous character; it is about a willingness to try to overcome tensions for the good of the self, the interpersonal relationship, the family, the community, the nation or society at large. On my view, malevolence seems to be the opposite of what reconciliation is about.

Placing emphasis on the character of reconciliation brings motivations into focus; it suggests that reconciliation is not just about how one behaves and what one thinks but *why* one behaves and thinks in those ways. Critics may claim *intuition* cannot be relied upon because it suggests there is some ideal or prototypical instance of reconciliation, perhaps the instance *of turning the other cheek* or *forgiving those who trespass against*

us–that simply does not exist. In reality, in the aftermath of violent conflict, such *ideal* cases are hard to come by. As a result, contemporary conceptions of reconciliation have strayed away from thinking of reconciliation in some ideal form and instead have either opted for a realistic view of reconciliation–as Dwyer has, or put forth a view–as Crocker has, that describes characteristics of reconciliation in various forms without offering a grounding of what reconciliation consists in. My aim here is not to put forward a comprehensive definition of reconciliation but rather to suggest that analyzing behavioral, attitudinal and motivational dimensions may add clarity to some of the fogginess that surrounds reconciliation. There is an awful lot of clarity around the distinctions between different forms, levels and types, but not around what reconciliation consists in. Attention to all three dimensions–behavioral, attitudinal and motivational, may shed light on this and provide insight into how to measure the impact of reconciliation-related activities in post-conflict settings.

Garcia's rationale for the connection between individual and institutional racism, i.e., that institutional racism is a derivative form of individual racism, may help shed light on the connection between individual and collective reconciliation. Imagine a case where individual reconciliation occurs (perhaps a victim accepts or even forgives a neighbor's betrayal) but collective reconciliation with the regime or offending group does not. In such a case, it would seem that individual reconciliation does not *necessarily* lead to collective reconciliation (though it might). But could collective reconciliation, say national or community reconciliation, exist outside of individual reconciliation? That is, does it make sense to talk about groups reconciling without any instances of individuals reconciling? This seems a harder sell. It may be that individual reconciliation of *at least*

some member(s) of the collective are necessary for national or community reconciliation to take place. To argue that there is no reconciliation at the interpersonal level but reconciliation at the national or community level would imply a schizophrenic relationship between individuals and collectives. I think Hauss is right to claim that individuals are the basis for reconciliation.

In post-conflict contexts, reconciliation-related programs (tolerance, inter-ethnic exchange, etc.) are judged by whether and the extent to which they bring about reconciliation as an end goal. Measuring reconciliation is difficult for organizations involved in this work, in part because it is not clear what counts as reconciliation, and in part because it is not clear what counts as success. The question: *how are we doing on reconciliation* suggests reconciliation is an ongoing process that may have ups and downs but that is designed to lead to an end goal, some end state of reconciliation. The question: *have people reconciled* calls to mind a finished process; it focuses on the end result rather than the steps along the way. While both questions are relevant in post-conflict settings, measuring steps along the way may be more telling than looking for a finished process. Focusing on the process takes into consideration that reconciliation takes time in the aftermath of violence and trauma.

My working conception of reconciliation accepts reconciliation both as a process and an end goal and acknowledges that different *mechanisms* may be needed for individual and collective reconciliation to come about. Such mechanisms may include peacebuilding, conflict transformation, development, capacity building, democracy, tolerance, truth, justice, dealing with the past, local community processes such as spiritual cleansing, etc. I agree that Crocker's thick versus thin distinction resonates in the sense

that there may be weaker and stronger forms of reconciliation; my point is rather that what counts for Crocker and others as thin may in fact be a step along the path to reconciliation, but not itself an instance of reconciliation. On my view, without taking into account the behavioral, attitudinal and motivational dimensions, it is unclear just how far along this step really is. It also remains unclear whether an approach to reconciliation that is devoid of context makes sense. Many contemporary conceptions underscore the role of local ownership in the process of reconciliation (Skaar et al., 2005; Crocker, 2003; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005). Culture and local ownership certainly play an important role in reconciliation. In the aftermath of violence in Mozambique and Angola, for example, a process involving the revisiting of narratives, tensions and disruptions would have been culturally *inappropriate*. The reconciliation process in these contexts included a cleansing ritual whereby the people who committed violent acts needed to be cleansed of the bad spirits that caused them to do such harm; after the cleansing ritual they were then reintegrated back into the community (Honwana, 2005). In these contexts, public truth commissions were culturally *inappropriate*; talking about the violence and harm would have invoked bad spirits when what was needed was to bury them. In keeping with the need to be sensitive to context, it seems the process of reconciliation in post-conflict contexts should be defined (at least primarily if not completely) by these societies, rather than for them. Whether mechanisms such as confronting tensions and disruptions to narratives are *necessary* for reconciliation should be left up to the people to decide. This may move reconciliation closer to the democratic framework that Crocker (2003) and others conceive of as necessary for reconciliation. With this in mind, the next section reflects on reconciliation *in context*.

Part II: The significance of reconciliation in the post-conflict context

In post-conflict contexts, the significance of reconciliation lies in the hope that people coming out of violent conflict can find a way to rebuild, restore or transform troubled relations and therefore: a) decrease the likelihood of armed conflict re-emerging, b) limit the danger of isolation, and c) increase the likelihood of productive human relations. This is particularly important against the backdrop of violent conflict that is internal/intra-state in nature. The challenges facing people in the aftermath of internal conflict are vexing. They often include a combination of the following:

• Inter-group and intra-group tensions, discrimination, bias, guilt, blame, myths

• Unresolved disputes over borders, language, homes, rights

• Complex victimization, missing loved ones, psychological trauma

• Impunity, limited or selective justice, victor's justice

• Oppressive regime, lack of transparency, lack of leadership

• Threat of new conflict, dissatisfaction with outcome

People in post-conflict societies often face overwhelming despair, hopelessness and helplessness, limited mobility, inadequate resources, fresh wounds, and resentment. Proponents of reconciliation argue that reconciliation can help alleviate tensions with these consequences.

It is a sad reality that, in the aftermath of the internal violent conflicts that plagued societies during the nineteen nineties and continue to devastate a number of societies today, the need for strategies to bring about reconciliation is both urgent and profound in our day (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Recognition of this need coupled with growing awareness of the important role non-state actors have to play within this context has led

conflict scholars, peace practitioners, religious leaders, women's groups, media professionals and ordinary members of civil society to begin shaping the emerging discourse on how to transform societies suffering from violent conflict, as well as how to rebuild, restore and transform relationships devastated by the effects of insidious violence[6] (European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), 2005). Reconciliation in post-conflict settings often goes hand in hand with peacebuilding and conflict transformation, both are discussed in Part V of this chapter.

Why is reconciliation significant for internal/intra-state violent conflict in particular? In the aftermath of international/inter-state conflict, enemy combatants typically go their separate ways once the fighting ends (except in cases of continued occupation); in internal/intra-state conflict, this is not necessarily the case. Physical separation is not always achievable or advisable in the aftermath of internal/intra-state violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). The absence/failure of reconciliation in the aftermath of internal/intra-state violent conflict often coincides with further destabilization of the conflict communities, isolation, and an increased risk of violence erupting. As Hauss describes it:

> Reconciliation matters because the consequences of not reconciling can be enormous…Without reconciliation, the best one can normally hope for is the kind of armed standoff we have seen in Cyprus for nearly 30 years…At worst, without reconciliation, the fighting can break out again, as we have seen since the tragic beginning of the second Intifada in Israel/Palestine since 2000. (2003, p. 2)

The promise that reconciliation can help rebuild, restore and transform relationships in post-conflict settings has become increasingly significant for preventing future conflict

---

[6] For an enlightening discussion of the "cycles of violence" that emerge/remerge in conflict situations, as well as insight into the ways in which "structural violence" and "secondary violence" affect women in such contexts, see Schirch and Sewak (2005).

and for stabilizing relations in post-conflict societies. Its significance is connected to changes in the post-cold war era, including: a) a rise in violent conflicts that are internal/intra-state in nature (Ramsbotham et al., 2005); and, b) emergence of an empowered civil society and their use of the Internet and new technologies to raise awareness of social injustice and human rights abuses around the world.

In the post-cold war period, the *relative* success of the South African "Truth and Reconciliation Commission"[7] and "Northern Ireland Peace Process,"[8] has inspired hope in the prospect of building peace in divided societies. While these two examples provide evidence that, not only with time and effort, but more importantly, with sufficient political will and motivation at the level of civil society, peace is possible–there is much to be done in determining the conditions under which such peace is *sustainable*, and moreover, whether the lessons taken from South Africa and Northern Ireland can be applied to other conflicts.[9] These kinds of questions make up a significant portion of the thinking that transpires in the interdisciplinary field of peace studies today. Unlike the realist-idealist driven literature of the cold war era, a good portion of the current literature is less ideology-driven and more concerned with practical questions[10] of what it takes to move from what Johan Galtung has called negative peace, characterized by the absence

---

[7] The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has helped shape contemporary thinking on the possibilities for reconciliation in societies suffering from grave injustice and inter-group violence. For many, it offers a culturally sensitive yet pragmatic model for dealing with the past and building sustainable peace. For a discussion about the need to build a new, forward-looking model in South Africa see Hugo van der Merwe (2004).

[8] For a discussion of the merits of the Northern Ireland process, see Brandon Hamber (2004).

[9] For a discussion of how the South African and Northern Ireland models of dealing with the past may shed light on the case of former Yugoslavia, see the work of the Victimology Society of Serbia (VDS) (2004).

[10] Hugh Miall (2004) sheds light on the theoretical and practical approaches to peace and conflict analysis.

of direct physical violence, toward a more positive peace associated with the presence of harmonious human relations (1996).[11]   In post-conflict societies, negative peace is typically brought about as an immediate result of peace deals requiring cessation of fighting; positive peace takes far more work at the level of social interaction. To mitigate the risk of violence re-emerging in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, negative peace is typically prioritized for the sake of security and stability.   Positive peace initiatives emerge once security and stability have improved.   Reconciliation typically tracks the spectrum of negative and positive peace. Crocker's thick reconciliation would fall under positive peace; his thin form would be closer to negative.

While reconciliation is considered by peace practitioners to be vital in the aftermath of violent conflict and indeed straddles the distinction between negative and positive peace, it is important to look to post-conflict contexts to determine just how important reconciliation is to people on the ground.

Attitudes toward reconciliation vary across post-conflict settings.   In post-apartheid South Africa, perhaps due to the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Desmund Tutu, reconciliation became a national priority. Discourse on reconciliation in South Africa was filled with references about the importance of forgiveness, healing and catharsis (Skaar et al., 2005).   It would be an exaggeration to suggest that forgiveness filled people's hearts in South Africa–indeed at the ground level people had very mixed reactions, but government leaders provided a *reason to believe*, a reason *why* the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) should be accepted and *why* people should

---

[11] The distinction between negative and positive peace is widely expressed in literature on "philosophy of peace." A parallel distinction is the difference between *freedom from* (negative) and *freedom for* (positive), which has helped shape the literature on freedom and democracy.

engage in processes that would bring about more harmony and less division. The *reason to believe* had to do with the healing of individuals and society as a whole as well as moving forward to a new era based on respect for human rights. Reconciliation was tied to the reality that in post-apartheid South Africa, people would live together under a new form of government that respects human rights, equality, justice and rule of law. As a result, for some, hope in the new leadership may have motivated conditional acceptance of the new leadership's policies regarding reconciliation. For others, however, there is evidence that the government's push for reconciliation had very little impact (Verwoerd, 2003; Gloppen, 2005).

The overall idea of the South African model was to establish truth and promote reconciliation. While this model seems to have brought relative peace to South Africa, not everyone agrees that these activities should be characterized as fostering reconciliation in the sense of transforming relationships. In his discussion of the process in South Africa, UN representative Dumisani Kumalo suggested that the decision to cooperate with the TRC was pragmatic, nothing more.[12] Kumalo's comment calls to mind a distinction between what we might call a fuller, robust sense of reconciliation and a narrower interpretation. On Kumalo's view, participation in reconciliation processes was motivated by pragmatic reasons of stability and economic progress rather than forgiveness. Despite different interpretations of the motivations for participating in reconciliation and different visions of what reconciliation could bring (stability, closure), a basic understanding of what reconciliation entailed was present in the case of South

---

[12] Dumisani Kumalo spoke at The Global Scholars Symposium at Fairleigh Dickinson University in 2006. I attended this symposium.

Africa. This again can be attributed to the political leadership of Mandela and spiritual leadership of Tutu.

While South Africa's policy of amnesty for confession was not accepted by everyone as an appropriate way to deal with the crimes of the past (and in some cases was counterproductive vis-à-vis ongoing trials), the process did allow victims to learn the fates of their loved ones, and in some cases, sincere apologies did lead to some sense of reconciliation. However, as Priscilla Hayner (2001) points out, not everyone wanted to learn exact details about the crimes and who was responsible; such knowledge prompted some to shift their hatred of the political regime toward hatred of the individuals who carried out the crimes. In other cases, learning what happened instigated trauma and reopened wounds that had been buried (Hayner, 2001). Though not beyond criticism, perhaps because large scale violence did not re-emerge and because people actually participated in and were part of the process, South Africa serves as a pillar of how to achieve peace and some sense of reconciliation[13] in the aftermath of violence, particularly internal/intrastate in nature.

The results of reconciliation processes in other post-conflict contexts have been more difficult to discern. While the Northern Ireland Peace Process is credited with achieving a great deal in terms of bringing former enemies together in peaceful coexistence, it is not clear that Galtung's positive peace or Crocker's thick reconciliation play prominent roles. Continued tensions between Catholics and Protestants suggest Christianity itself is not a sufficient enough motivator for reconciliation. While Tutu's spiritual vision in South Africa is often taken to show the forgiveness embedded within

---

[13] Gloppen refers to opinion polls that suggest reconciliation has not been achieved in South Africa. See Gloppen, 2005, p. 49, FN 39.

Christianity, in Northern Ireland, Christianity has been a source of division. Important developments at the political level, however, may have helped shape a more peaceful path conducive to reconciliation. The power-sharing arrangement agreed upon during the peace process seems to have laid the groundwork for the restructuring of relations at the societal level. In both South Africa and Northern Ireland, political leadership was instrumental in creating stable peace and laying the foundation for reconciliation. The recent apology of Prime Minister David Cameron on behalf of the British government for the killing of thirteen civilians by British soldiers on Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland in 1972–an event credited with igniting the conflict between loyalists and republicans– supports this.[14] This apology seems to have contributed to reconciliation by addressing a major tension/disruptive event in the narratives of loyalists and republicans. In post-conflict settings, apologies are not always conducive to reconciliation, particularly when they are perceived as being forced or insincere. In Northern Ireland, however, it appears the tone and sincerity of Cameron's apology has made a positive impact on the process of reconciliation. While critics may discount the role of political leadership and argue that benefits of EU membership play a more significant role in keeping communities committed to peace in Northern Ireland, in reality, both political leadership and the EU contribute to peace and reconciliation.

Reconciliation in Rwanda is a bit trickier. It is well documented that, since 1998, the Rwandan government has put forth a forceful program promoting national unity and reconciliation. The government has established a number of policies purported to *undo*

---

[14] For an interesting analysis of the apology of Prime Minister Cameron, see
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/weekinreview/20jburns.html

the ethnic[15] division that has persisted in Rwanda, perhaps since the beginning of its colonial period (Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). While national unity dominates public discourse, the *mechanisms* for bringing about reconciliation, including trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and gacaca processes, are often perceived to be polarizing and tend to limit reconciliation to the thinner level of coexistence. The message people receive from the government is: it is acceptable to acknowledge Tutsi suffering at the hands of the previous regime, but Hutu suffering does not count and ought not to be mentioned for fear that mentioning it will be perceived as denying genocide against the Tutsi or inciting ethnic tensions (Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). Rwanda's laws banning speech that incites ethnic division have hampered the process of reconciliation to some extent, making it less democratic and more authoritative. Dwyer's idea of finding a mutually acceptable interpretation (interpretations) of tensions and disruptors is simply off the table. Dialogue on *why/how* people committed atrocities is forbidden. While the sheer magnitude of perpetrators and victims has given the Rwandan government an enormous burden to deal with in the aftermath of genocide, including: a) the logistics of prosecuting an overwhelming number of perpetrators; b) preventing the type of revenge violence that occurred immediately after the regime change in the post-genocide period; and c) preventing new violence from erupting in communities where perpetrators and victims live together, its program of encouraging national unity and reconciliation may backfire if it too tightly restricts the will and needs of the Rwandan people to interpret the genocide and *why/how* it happened.

---

[15] The ICTR has had a difficult time interpreting whether the different groups: Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, are in fact ethnic groups. While they have been treated as ethnic groups for practical reasons, the basis of the difference between the groups remains unclear.

There is a real danger the legacy of the new regime will be connected with victor's justice and artificial reconciliation.

The post-conflict context of Cambodia raises another layer of complexity regarding the significance of reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide. In the Cambodian case, the line between perpetrators and victims is blurred. Under the Khmer Rouge, perpetrators were forced to commit horrible atrocities and betray their loved ones and sense of humanity (Etcheson, 2005). Today, community life remains divided. In some cases, perpetrators and victims live side by side. In other cases, family members have lost contact with their loved ones who committed crimes under the Khmer Rouge. For years there has been a culture of ignoring the past and people have not had a forum in which to discuss the past or interpret why/how the genocide occurred. Despite this, ethnographic research shows that reconciliation is considered to be necessary for the future, i.e., necessary for preventing what happened under the Khmer Rouge from ever happening again. It is also considered to be necessary for families to be reunited with their loved ones (Etcheson, 2005). While justice and truth often go hand in hand with reconciliation, the complexity in Cambodia lies in the quest for revenge. As Alex Hinton points out, revenge is central to Cambodian culture (Hinton, 2005). The issue here is that revenge is typically inconsistent with reconciliation. As a result of this, perceptions of reconciliation and how to achieve it are deeply complex in the Cambodian case. There is a push for culturally sensitive practices aligned with Buddhism as well as internationally recognized mechanisms.

Despite many years of ignoring the horrors of the Cambodian genocide, in the last several years the international community has been instrumental in proposing strategies

for dealing with the past in Cambodia. These efforts have been greeted with a mix of skepticism, resentment and encouragement. As Hayner describes, even the Documentation Center has received mixed support (2001). The path to reconciliation in Cambodia remains a work in progress (Etcheson, 2005).

Mozambique and Angola represent post-conflict societies where reconciliation processes are culturally based. For Mozambique and Angola, reconciliation was vital for restoring the community in the aftermath of violence, particularly violence that involved child soldiers. The mechanism used to bring about reconciliation in Mozambique and Angola was based on rituals designed to cleanse those who witnessed or participated in trauma. The process was focused on the importance of keeping the bad spirits that caused the harm at bay and sometimes burying them in ritual form. It also involved the burning of all clothes and items connected with the violence. The reconciliation process did not advocate public truth commissions or trials, nor did it support therapeutic sessions designed to face trauma; such mechanisms would have invoked the bad spirits. The reconciliation process in Mozambique and Angola (though perhaps more so in rural areas than urban areas) was designed to bring about healing through ritual cleansing; it was aimed at thicker, more robust forms of reconciliation focused on restoring the community, not simple coexistence (Honwana, 2005).

The case of East Timor also introduces a cultural dimension to reconciliation, i.e., the practice of nahe biti, which involves rolling down a mat for both sides of the conflict to sit together in a ritual of reconciliation. In East Timor, this practice involved bringing the winners and losers together and providing a public/community forum within which the winners shared their stories and the losers had a chance to speak (Babo-Soares, 2005).

The goal of the nahe biti process was community restoration and reintegration of perpetrators into the community. According to Babo-Soares, though there had been formal attempts from the national level to bring about reconciliation, it is the local process of nahe biti that has been most successful (2005).

While the cases discussed above provide different views on reconciliation practices, they all underscore the significance of reconciliation as a way of preventing violence from re-emerging, discouraging isolation and allowing communities and societies affected by conflict to function under peaceful conditions. Though the mechanisms and forms vary, the significance of reconciliation in post-conflict contexts cannot be ignored.

Part III: Approaches to dealing with the past and reconciliation

Thus far, the discussion has been focused on the meaning of reconciliation and its significance in post-conflict contexts. This discussion would not be complete without an account of dealing with the past and how reconciliation is part of this. Very often attempts to bring about reconciliation involve mechanisms for *dealing with the past*. Depending on the approach, these attempts can be seen as one-sided, biased and divisive–instigating additional harm; or fair, balanced and inclusive–encouraging dialogue, reflection and healing. In between these extremes, dealing with the past can be seen as irrelevant, pointless and disconnected–supporting a flat, disengaged response.

Approaches to dealing with the past vary within and across post-conflict societies. As Gloppen points out, the most common approaches include: a) retribution (vengeance, justice and punishment); b) truth (establish facts via truth commissions); c) restitution (rehabilitation and restoration of conditions); d) reform (political and legal change); e)

oblivion (do nothing or encourage amnesia and amnesty) (2005, p. 18). Gloppen presents these approaches as strategies for bringing about reconciliation. Often, reconciliation is the goal of dealing with the past in post-conflict contexts.

These five approaches to dealing with the past have commonalities and differences. Retribution is considered to be victim-centered. In the aftermath of violence, victims have a need for justice or revenge; they have a need for perpetrators to be punished. Society also has a need to establish that certain behaviors are not acceptable and ought not to be allowed. Retribution leads to judicial processes that are focused on punishment, e.g., trials and tribunals, as well as non-judicial processes, such as public shaming (Gloppen, 2005). One of the *purported* benefits of trials is that they establish an official record of what occurred so the leaders and conflict parties cannot plausibly continue in denial. Trials face criticism in post-conflict settings, particularly regarding perceptions of victor's justice as well as bias in prosecution and sentencing. Nonetheless, retribution remains a central aspect of dealing with the past; its major contribution is in standing up against impunity.

Uncovering truth is often considered one of the most important elements of dealing with the past. Proponents of truth claim that it brings hope for closure and healing. The possibility that truth will bring acknowledgement and ward off denial is also relevant. The idea is: if truth is made public, people will have to acknowledge what happened and will no longer be able to deny it. Of course, truth is a difficult thing to bring about in post-conflict contexts. The dynamics of acknowledgement and denial are not easily dealt with because truth is typically contested. Trials bring what is referred to as forensic truth, but typically fail to provide a more contextual truth that is often needed

in post-conflict contexts (Skaar et al., 2005). Unlike trials, which are judicial processes associated with producing forensic truth about *what* happened, truth commissions are non-judicial processes that are appreciated for producing a more contextual truth of *why/how* horrors occurred; they are sometimes seen as forms of public story telling (Gloppen, 2005).

As many point out, however, truth is a contentious topic and conflict parties typically hold different truths (often competing truths) about what happened and why/how it happened. In order for truth to have an impact on reconciliation it needs to be balanced and inclusive and stories need to reach people (a criticism of trials is they are often removed from the public domain). Still, truth remains one of the most fundamental aspects of dealing with the past in post-conflict societies; it is often considered central for victims and for the functioning of society.

Restitution in the form of rehabilitation of victims and restoration of social conditions, e.g., returning property and restoring rights lost during the conflict, is also a victim-centered approach. This is about righting a wrong (to the extent possible); it is a way of clearing a path for reconciliation. Restitution is supposed to provide victims with some level of reparation for what they lost. Refugees and internally displaced persons are supposed to be able to return to their pre-conflict homes and regain what they've lost. In reality, restitution faces many challenges. Even in cases where property is returned or funding to rebuild destroyed homes is given, victims do not feel the measure adequately captures what they lost or they are afraid or not interested in return. Furthermore, restitution relies on the willingness of government officials to support such programs; huge losses in terms of human capital, infrastructure, the economy, mean restitution often

takes a back seat to more pressing concerns, e.g., water, electricity, etc. Despite these challenges, restitution is considered an important element of dealing with the past. Indeed, on Tone Bringa's analysis, restitution in the form of refugee return in Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential (2005).

The last two approaches: reform and oblivion seem to be opposites but actually have a good deal in common. Reform is about creating a context within which reconciliation and dealing with the past are possible. Political, societal, economic and legal changes help to create a new, typically democratic, regime that respects human rights and establishes rule of law. In post-conflict contexts, reform is not always a swift process. In cases where conflict parties or corrupt officials remain in power, it is typically civil society and the international community that create pressure for reform. Oblivion is similar to reform in that the objective is to create a context within which reconciliation can take place. Dealing with the past in an active sense is not part of this process; it is about turning a new page, not opening up wounds. This approach may seem to be a misfit; it does not seek truth or justice; it works on the assumption that horrors may need to be *let alone* to allow time for healing. The oblivion approach is sometimes practical in situations where fear of reprisals dominates. Typically, powerful members of post-conflict societies decide which approaches for dealing with the past are appropriate, though the international community and civil society often exert pressure. Reconciliation is often the intended goal of dealing with the past, though it is not clear how often it is achieved (Skaar et al., 2005; Gloppen, 2005).

Discussions about reconciliation vary within and across post-conflict societies and often reveal opposing or competing goals. The tendency to prioritize from among the

different approaches to dealing with the past is prevalent and inspires rigorous debate. Questions about truth, i.e., is truth attainable and does it lead to healing, are paramount. Debates about whether justice is necessary for reconciliation, and if so–what kind of justice (restorative, retributive), create friction. Forgiveness is frequently a sore point; questions about whether forgiveness is necessary, whether it is too idealistic to hope for, and whether new conflicts can be prevented without it emerge. Concerns over retribution and whether punishment and vengeance can bring about reconciliation are highly contested.

Regardless of the particular approach adopted, dealing with the past is considered by many to be urgent in post-conflict societies. In light of this, there are a number of *mechanisms* that match up with the five approaches listed above (Skaar et al., 2005). Among these are truth commissions, local community processes, *ad hoc* tribunals, hybrid trials (domestic and international), domestic trials, fact-finding missions, documentation centers, public shaming, lustration and public acknowledgement via apologies and memorials. Members of civil society frequently rally behind these mechanisms and try to gain support among leadership and ordinary people. In contexts where international organizations play an active role, they also emphasize the importance of these mechanisms. These mechanisms are credited as ways of preventing violent conflict from erupting, minimizing impunity, stabilizing tensions, decreasing isolation, increasing cooperation, building respect for human rights and law, and creating a more productive post-conflict society. Despite the variety of mechanisms for dealing with the past, the two most widely discussed mechanisms are trials and truth commissions. Both are at the

forefront of contemporary approaches to dealing with the past in the aftermath of violent conflict (Minow, 1998; Hayner, 2001).

Trials are often seen as the best way to mitigate impunity and establish respect for law and order. In cases where trials are not plausible, are technically difficult to accommodate, or are not conducive to reconciliation, truth commissions are typically proposed. Despite their prominence, while trials and truth commissions sometimes run simultaneously, they are often at odds. As Gloppen provides:

> Those in favor of trials argue that true reconciliation is impossible unless those responsible for past atrocities are brought to justice–that a culture of impunity is the main obstacle to long term reconciliation, understood as mutual tolerance between citizens of a democratic state. Any negative effects in the short and medium term are seen as being offset by the positive long-term effects of ending impunity. (Gloppen, 2005, p. 26)

While truth commissions have been around since at least the mid nineteen seventies (Uganda, 1974) (Hayner, 2001) and early nineteen eighties (Bolivia, 1982-84) (Argentina, 1983) (Amnesty International, 2007; Skaar et al., 2005), the potential impact of truth commissions on reconciliation has received renewed attention following the emergence of the TRC in South Africa from 1995-2001 (Skaar et al., 2005). Hayner reminds us, however, not to conflate truth commissions with reconciliation; while the TRC had "truth and reconciliation" as its goal, not all truth commissions follow this.

> [A] truth commission may have any or all of the following basic aims: to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past. (Hayner, 2001, p. 24)

According to Gloppen, "[t]he central task of truth commissions is to give an authoritative account of 'the relevant past.'" (2005, p. 36). Those who prefer truth

commissions to trials argue that trials do not offer a contextual truth, but more of a forensic truth.

> Various forms of truth commissions may uncover a more contextual truth, not only the forensic facts of isolated incidents, but also the logic behind the violence and the interacting of social forces that allowed the atrocities. (Skaar et al., 2005, p. 8)

The concern is that trials do not provide victims with a sense of closure or healing, nor do they provide society with a common narrative about the recent past. The suggestion is that truth commissions seek more:

> [T]ruth commissions seek to establish the broader patterns of violations and their causes, providing for a richer *narrative* and *social truth*, an *interpreted truth* establishing the meanings of what happened in the past. (Gloppen, 2005. p. 28)

For many, truth commissions come closer to bringing acknowledgment than trials. The results of trials are easily disputed; plea bargains also allow perpetrators to arrange deals and avoid any signs of remorse. Denials are expected in trials; perpetrators have their freedom on the line. Truth commissions, on the other hand, are designed to counteract denial, bring about acknowledgement, and encourage remorse among perpetrators.

Other acknowledgement-related mechanisms for dealing with the past include public apologies and memorials. These stand in contrast to judicial mechanisms such as international tribunals that occur outside the conflict communities and are far removed from them. Public apologies and memorials are not without criticism, however. Though they are thought to bring about reconciliation through acknowledgement and ending denial, they often add fuel to the fire. As an example, apologies from top leaders in the countries of former Yugoslavia often receive mixed responses, particularly when they are seen as polarizing or reinforcing the moral equivalence of victims on all sides. Victims do not feel apologies are sincere when they include a "but" in them, e.g., we are sorry for

the harm caused by members of our nation, *but* members of our nation also suffered and deserve an apology. Memorials are equally troubling when they are created for one group. The suggestion of creating memorials that commemorate all the victims, not just those on one side, is often thought of as equalizing the victims–typically considered a big "no-no" in the case of genocide or where victims of one group were disproportionately harmed. These issues are discussed in the second chapter.

IV: The role of truth and justice and their relationship to reconciliation

Truth and justice loom large in societies coming out of internal violent conflict. Whether a common truth can be achieved and whether something more than victor's justice can be delivered is on the minds of many people working to bring about conditions for reconciliation in post-conflict contexts. The tangled web of collective guilt and complicity of bystanders become imbedded in discourse on dealing with the past, truth and justice in the aftermath of violence. If reconciliation is to be tied to this discourse, as I am not sure it should be, care needs to be taken to ensure there are opportunities for being constructive, proactive and inclusive, rather than accusatory.

In discussing the significance of truth, many argue that truth has a healing power, i.e., that truth can remove the uncertainties and angst connected with what happened and why/how it happened. The distinction between forensic truth and contextual, narrative or interpretive truth is relevant in this regard. Forensic truth involves just the facts–what happened, how many were killed, how the killing was done, how many atrocities were committed–as well as where the events took place, where the bodies are located and which parties are responsible. In essence, forensic truth involves the concrete details of what happened. While there is no question that most family members want to know what

happened, and indeed, may need to know what happened to their loved ones, it is not clear that such truth brings closure, healing or satisfaction. As Hayner (2001) points out, truth can sometimes incite feelings of anger and resentment rather than closure or healing. With forensic truth, people are left to deal with and interpret raw facts out of context–their search for meaning and understanding of why/how the horrible events occurred remains unfilled.

Narrative or interpretive truth, on the other hand, is specifically focused on the context, on the *why* questions, and on the existential questions that deal with *how* such horrors could take place. This kind of truth is likely to deal with underlying causes of conflict, tensions and disruptions and how they affected all conflict parties. The focus is not exclusively on the victims of violence but on the larger context within which such violence unfolded. The idea behind narrative or interpretive truth is to bring closure and healing, to help people find a place and context within which to make sense of the insensible and imagine how and why the unimaginable could occur. This kind of work is something anthropologists and existentialists do on a regular basis. Ordinary people, however, are not typically accustomed to such processes, nor are they typically willing to open up to new ways of interpreting truth. For many, such processes could be seen as putting perpetrators on an even footing with victims. While ordinary people often create narrative or interpretive truths, often the interpretations are one sided, straightforward and uncomplicated–good is good and evil is evil plain and simple. Within the context of reconciliation, narrative or interpretive truth has the power to place events in a wider context that is often messy and complex, a context where the line between victims and perpetrators is not so clear and where good and evil are blurred.

Justice in the aftermath of violence is similarly complex. The notion that justice is necessary for reconciliation is widespread. In reality, however, it is not entirely clear what kind of justice is required for reconciliation. According to Assefa:

> There cannot be reconciliation without justice. Justice and equity are at the core of reconciliation. The central question in reconciliation is not whether justice is done, but rather how one goes about doing it in ways that can also promote future harmonious and positive relationships between parties that have to live with each other whether they like it or not. Justice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reconciliation. Reconciliation takes the concern for justice a step further and is preoccupied with how to rebuild a more livable, and psychologically healthy environment between former enemies where the vicious cycle of hate, deep suspicion, resentment, and revenge does not continue to fester. (1999, pp. 5-6)

In transitional contexts, debates about whether retributive justice or restorative justice is better suited for reconciliation are common. Some argue that retribution is necessary for establishing order and resisting impunity and that this will lead to reconciliation. Others argue that restoration of social conditions is more conducive to reconciliation. There are good arguments supporting both positions. A climate of resentment may be encouraged when perpetrators run free, sometimes mingling with victims. It is likely such a climate would not be conducive to reconciliation–fear and outrage would likely outweigh good will. Victims would have a sense that their suffering simply does not count; ordinary people would have a sense that anything goes; an overall demoralization would likely set in. Retributive measures, however, frequently do not satisfy victims or society at large. In cases of internal/intra-state conflict where large segments of society contributed to the conflict, it is impractical to punish everyone involved and so a decision is made to be selective and focus on the top criminals, the commanders, the so-called big fish. In practice, this means small-fish are likely to roam the streets freely.

Restorative measures, on the other hand, recognize that selective punishment will not satisfy victims and that retributive measures do not give ordinary people a sense of closure or healing.

> [T]he methodology used to arrive at justice in the reconciliation process is different from that used to arrive at justice in the conventional (juridical) approach. The aim of the latter processes…is primarily to identify guilt and administer the punishment that the law requires with little attention to healing the bitterness and resentment that exist between the parties in the conflict. (Assefa, 1999, p. 6)

Retributive measures also do not give ordinary people a chance to tell their stories and gain acknowledgement. Perpetrators are not given a chance to express their remorse or to find ways to make up for the harm they caused. Punishment is severely limiting. As Assefa outlines:

> Identifying ways in which offenders are assisted to redress the material and emotional damage they have inflicted through self-reflection, acknowledgment of responsibility, remorse, and compensation would be an important step towards establishing an environment of reconciliation. The approach known as 'restorative justice' as opposed to 'retributive justice' brings us closer to the point where justice can be done but at the same time the possibilities for reconciliation are enhanced. (Assefa, 1999, p. 6)

The fundamental debate between retributive and restorative measures in relation to reconciliation is about which is better suited for reconciliation; both accept that justice is indeed necessary for reconciliation. For those who do not care about reconciliation or do not prioritize it, this debate may be less relevant. On the question of which approach is more conducive to reconciliation, restorative measures have made important headway, particularly in light of the nature of internal/intra-state violent conflict where tensions continue in the post-conflict period. It is my conviction that both measures can contribute to reconciliation but that restorative measures are much better suited. This, of course, must always be checked against cultural nuances and the actual situation on the

ground in a particular post-conflict society.

As Gloppen points out, the results of the variety of measures aimed at reconciliation in post-conflict settings are humbling.

> The relationship between reconciliation and the different measures employed to achieve this aim–trials, purges, truth commissions, restitution, reforms, amnesty and amnesia–are ambiguous and disputed. (Gloppen, 2005, p. 45)

The task of measuring reconciliation is complex. There are at least two approaches that could be created to measure reconciliation. One would involve looking for incremental milestones along the way (a process approach) and the other would involve looking for characteristics in the end state (an end-goal approach). In the absence of measurement, it is tempting to insist that one or more strategies or mechanisms are better for bringing about reconciliation. It is unclear, however, whether any one strategy or mechanism has been *proven* to bring about reconciliation–just as it is unclear what reconciliation looks like in post-conflict societies. It seems the strategies and mechanisms discussed above have the *potential* to bring about conditions conducive to reconciliation, but in practice face challenges and complications of execution. Another idea is that what is needed to bring reconciliation to fruition is a framework that allows for reconciliation at a deeper level, a framework that digs deep into the heart of tensions and disruptions and finds ways to accommodate these. With this in mind, the final section of this chapter looks at reconciliation in post-conflict contexts within the framework of the deeper approaches of conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

Part V: Conflict transformation and peacebuilding

In the literature, reconciliation is closely linked with conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Rill, Šmidling & Bitoljanu, 2007). Conflict

transformation is designed around the idea of addressing the root causes of conflict, including perceptions of social injustice, cultural discrimination, and other factors that cause insecurity and distrust. Left unaddressed, root causes of conflict have the potential to erupt into direct physical violence (armed conflict), sew structural violence (unjust institutional practices), spawn cultural violence (intolerance) and thus breed resentment (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1999).

Conflict transformation is connected to reconciliation in at least two ways. First, conflict transformation facilitates reconciliation in the sense that addressing root causes of conflict can help people repair damaged relationships and ultimately encourage reconciliation processes. Second, conflict transformation has reconciliation as its goal; it is designed to bring about reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). In many ways, peacebuilding provides the foundation upon which reconciliation and conflict transformation can flourish. Peacebuilding refers to the processes through which the underlying social conditions that lead to violence are identified and transformed; the goal of peacebuilding is to prevent violence from re-emerging. This process sounds very much like conflict transformation. While both share commonalities, e.g., addressing root causes or transforming underlying conditions that lead to violence, the following characterizations may help distinguish the two. Conflict transformation can be thought of as a process that deals directly with people's *perceptions* of social injustice, discrimination, alienation, and other root causes of conflict. Peacebuilding can be thought of as a process that focuses on creating the *structural foundation* upon which social justice, equality, inclusion and mutual respect can be built and sustained. Conflict transformation, e.g., addressing perceptions that lead to conflict, helps set in motion new

ways of thinking and behaving that can foster reconciliation, e.g., via tolerance and willingness to engage in more harmonious social relations. Peacebuilding provides the structure upon which new relationships can be enriched and sustained, e.g., via just institutions, transparency, legitimacy, etc. Based on these characterizations both conflict transformation and peacebuilding can be instrumental in bringing about reconciliation in post-conflict contexts.

In reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and peacebuilding, a number of overlapping themes emerge. The first concerns the difficulty of conceptualizing the meaning and nature of reconciliation and its role in post-conflict contexts. As described above, there are a number of perspectives that link reconciliation to healing and forgiveness, while others connect it to truth and justice (Skaar et al., 2005). In this section, I am dealing with reconciliation as linked to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The second theme that emerges concerns theoretical and practical distinctions between "peacebuilding," "peacemaking," and "peacekeeping." Lederach is among the major thinkers articulating the difference between peacebuilding (transforming the underlying social conditions that lead to violence), peacemaking, (stopping violence through force), and peacekeeping (preventing it from erupting) (Lederach, 1999). The third set concerns distinctions between "conflict transformation," "conflict management," and "conflict resolution." Lederach prefers transformation (transforming the underlying conditions and relationships leading to conflict), over management, (keeping conflict from getting out of hand), or resolution (resolving issues at the surface level) (Lederach, 1999). For the purposes of this discussion, I use "conflict

transformation;" for many, however, the more commonly used "conflict resolution" at a deeper level would suffice (Ramsbotham et al., 2005).

The fourth set of themes involves the need to be "culturally sensitive" and "conflict sensitive" when attempting to engage in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The message here is: not all conflicts are the same and not all cultures are the same, so strategies need to be customized to the particular contexts in question. The fifth set of ideas involves the need to create a culture of peace and an overall environment that is more receptive and inclusive, i.e., includes women, educators, media, business leaders and other members of civil society in the processes of peacebuilding. Finally, the sixth area emerging in the literature is the need to strengthen coordination among different levels of society, e.g., top level elites and government officials, mid level NGOs and civil society members, ground level grassroots activists, and ordinary people. This theme is connected to Lederach's views on interdependence (1999) and McDonald and Diamond's views on multi-track diplomacy (McDonald, 2003); both are discussed below.

Themes in the literature on conflict transformation and peacebuilding

In reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the importance of reconciliation as connected to peacebuilding and conflict transformation cannot be underestimated. According to some, without reconciliation, there can be no peace, and without justice there can be neither (Skaar et al., 2005). Within the context of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, reconciliation is placed within what Assefa calls "the spectrum of conflict handling mechanisms" (Assefa, 1999). Reconciliation is considered to be a fundamental aspect of peacebuilding. In spite of this, as described above, the meaning of reconciliation is difficult to grasp (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Assefa, 1999; Lederach

1999). For the purposes of discussion, the working definition I am adopting in the post-conflict context conceives of reconciliation as rebuilding, restoring or transforming relationships that have been damaged by the causes and/or consequences of conflict. I also maintain that the character of reconciliation is consistent with benevolence and magnanimity, not malevolence, hatred or revenge. Attention to the behavioral, attitudinal and motivational dimensions of reconciliation is crucial to my account and is discussed more in chapter three. In my view there may be weaker and stronger senses of reconciliation, just as reconciliation may take the form of process and end goal.

"Peacebuilding" refers to the building of relationships and transforming of social conditions and institutions in such a way as to create a more sustainable peace (Lederach, 1999; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Lederach distinguishes peacebuilding from peacemaking and peacekeeping, characterizing the latter two as dealing more with stopping hostilities and enforcing cease-fires, as opposed to addressing the underlying social conditions that give rise to violence (1999).

In his discussion of peacebuilding, Lederach points up the need to address three gaps in current peacebuilding efforts: interdependence, justice and structure-process. By interdependence, Lederach means the interaction and codependence between three levels of activities: 1) top leadership (military/political/religious leaders with high visibility); 2) middle range leaders (leaders respected in sectors; ethnic/religious leaders; academics/intellectuals; humanitarian leaders, NGOs); and 3) grassroots leaders (local leaders; leaders of indigenous NGOs; community developers, local health officials; refugee camp leaders) (1999, p. 3). Lederach's view is that it is important for all three levels to work together. He argues that peacebuilding efforts are inherently

interdependent, i.e., that what happens on one level affects the others. Efforts that focus on only one level or are uncoordinated may not be as effective at peacebuilding. Lederach's interdependence gap calls to mind the new wave of diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy, involving peacebuilding activities at multiple levels, i.e., state, NGO, grassroots, civil society, etc., which is discussed below.

The justice gap, according to Lederach (1999), refers to the need for efforts that not only stop violence, but also transform the underlying *unjust* social conditions that give rise to it. He argues that while peacemaking and peacekeeping may succeed in stopping the fighting, without addressing underlying injustice and attempting to rebuild relationships, such approaches are incapable of creating sustainable peace as they tend to produce winners (satisfied parties) and losers (dissatisfied parties) which further perpetuates the sense of injustice/imbalance that gives rise to violence.

In his discussion of the structure-process gap, Lederach describes the need to understand the nature of peacebuilding as a dynamic process that ebbs and flows, as well as a structure that is purpose-oriented toward the goal of rebuilding relationships and creating sustainable peace. As a prominent peacebuilding thinker and practitioner, Lederach underscores the need for more work to be done in assessing peacebuilding activities and addressing these gaps. His hope is that doing so will help bring about his vision of peace as a process and structure, what he calls a "justpeace" concept (1999).[16]

While Lederach thinks it is vital to address all three gaps, his discussion of the interdependence gap is particularly illustrative. In describing the importance of addressing the interdependence gap, Lederach outlines the need to strengthen what he

---

[16] See John Paul Lederach's "The Challenge of the 21st Century: Justpeace" (1999).

calls the "vertical capacity" and "horizontal capacity" of peacebuilding efforts.

> [W]e are hampered in our ability to create and sustain vertical and horizontal integration strategically necessary for implementing the kind of long-term peace-building we hope to put in place. The challenge of horizontal capacity is how to foster constructive understanding and dialogue across the lines of division in a society. The challenge of the vertical capacity is how to develop genuine recognition that peace-building involves multiple activities at different levels of leadership. (Lederach, 1999, p. 3)

When viewing the need to strengthen the vertical and horizontal capacity of peacebuilding *in context*, e.g., in the societies of former Yugoslavia, it seems important to strengthen not only the horizontal and vertical capacities *within* each of the former Yugoslav societies, but also *across* these societies, at the regional level. To be sure, while addressing the vertical capacity by encouraging interaction among grassroots organizations, mid level NGOs and state-sponsored programs may help improve the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in each state (at least to the extent that there is less contradiction and competition), the impact of such efforts also depends on strengthening the horizontal capacity to build relationships *across* the former Yugoslav societies.[17] The conflict in former Yugoslavia is one where the Yugoslav federation fragmented into separate states, largely along the lines of the federation's republics. Horizontal interaction across former Yugoslavia thus involves horizontal interaction across the former republics (now new independent states) where the ethnic composition has changed, e.g., refugees and internally displaced persons have relocated within and between the former republics (as well as outside former Yugoslavia). While these issues are discussed in the next chapter, my point in raising them here is that addressing the

---

[17] The case of veterans groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia collaborating to overcome the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an example of strengthening horizontal capacity across the region.

interdependence gap in post-conflict former Yugoslavia implies *regional* coordination. Developing a cohesive regional approach to peacebuilding that is sensitive to the challenges of transforming relationships *across* the former Yugoslav societies is particularly important for long-term peace in the region. Indeed, without cohesive peacebuilding activities at the regional level, efforts that focus only on transforming relationships within, but not across state borders, will hamper the full potential of such efforts in the region. The development of "REKOM," a regional commission for dealing with the past, is relevant in this regard and is discussed in the next chapter. The regional context is important to address in other post-conflict societies as well. In Rwanda, for example, failing to take into account the role of the region, particularly actors in Uganda and The Democratic Republic of the Congo, runs the risk of ignoring the larger picture of conflict dynamics in the region.

On Lederach's view, conflict is natural in human relations and thus should not be looked upon as inherently negative. According to Lederach, conflict provides us with an opportunity to be "constructive" rather than "destructive," to be "proactive" rather than "reactive" (1999). He conceives of conflict as an opportunity to address an injustice/imbalance *constructively* and *proactively* e.g., by addressing underlying causes and creating new relations that satisfy all members of society. As discussed above, transforming *relationships* is often considered to be essential for successful peacebuilding, as well as the driving force behind transforming societies suffering from conflict. In the views of Lisa Schirch and Manjrika Sewak:

> Peacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform, and help people recover from violence in all forms, even structural violence that has not yet led to massive civil unrest…it empowers people to foster relationships at all levels…between and within individuals, families, communities,

organizations, businesses, governments, and cultural, religious, economic, and political institutions and movements. (Schirch & Sewak, 2005, p. 4)

Inspired by Lederach, Schirch and Sewak's views are written in the spirit of "constructive" "proactive" and "transformative" thinking. On their view, addressing structural violence in the form of injustice at the institutional level should be a main priority. This is the case because structural violence ultimately leads to secondary violence, prompting people to deal with their frustration at the unjust social system in a number of "destructive" ways, e.g., turning it: a) inward (suicide, self-destruction); b) toward family members (domestic violence); or c) toward members of other groups (community, inter-group violence). The need to deal with structural and secondary violence in the aftermath of conflict, according to Schirch and Sewak, requires finding "constructive" ways to address the root causes that lead to violence. The incidence of self-destruction in the form of suicide and drug abuse, as well as domestic violence and occasional inter-group attacks in post-conflict former Yugoslavia provides reason to think Schirch and Sewak's ideas about violence are highly relevant for this context and for reconciliation in the region (2005).

In their description of the cycles of violence that pervade societies in the aftermath of conflict, Schirch and Sewak (2005) are particularly instructive in pointing to the need to include women in peacebuilding activities. This is often referred to as "mainstreaming gender" in the literature. Paul van Tongeren underscores the role of media, business community, donors, educators, religious organizations, women's groups and a range of non-state actors in peacebuilding activities:

One of the lessons which can be learned from the inspiring developments in countries like South Africa and Northern Ireland…is the importance of a coherent and integrated effort involving as many tracks as possible. The multiplier effect

which is created this way greatly enhances the chances for sustainable peace. (van Tongeren, 1999, p. 3)

While van Tongeren's idea of working on "as many tracks as possible" seems promising, care should be taken to ensure that among the many tracks, those who are disproportionately affected by conflict, e.g., minorities, refugees, ex-combatants, as well as ordinary people, are represented. Irwin's "Peace Polls" are meaningful in this regard. Irwin's "People's Peace Process" in Northern Ireland involved conducting "Peace Polls" to understand how to build common ground and create a path toward reconciliation among people in the divided communities of Northern Ireland. His approach to including people in the peace process underscores the role of ordinary people in peacebuilding. In applying his model to the societies of former Yugoslavia, Irwin used polls to provide an understanding of what is most important for communities in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, as well as what they may be willing to compromise on. The idea is to capture the attitudes of ordinary people in the process. The "Peace Polls" (2002a, 2004, 2005) Irwin and his team conducted in the region offer a step toward unweaving the complex web of issues that go into finding common ground among ordinary people. The work of the Center for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in Belgrade and Sarajevo also underscores the importance of including people in the process (Rill et al., 2007). CNA's peacebuilding sessions specifically include war veterans as well as other traumatized people in their peacebuilding and peace education work. This is discussed in the next chapter on activities in former Yugoslavia.

The growing significance of themes such as: including women, e.g., "mainstreaming gender," being "culturally sensitive" and "conflict sensitive," and the theme of including "people in the process" of peacebuilding is pronounced in the

literature (Schirch & Sewak, 2005). The intersection of these ideas presents an interesting dynamic in the search for common ground and building a path to reconciliation. Those who favor Lederach's approach to conflict transformation, i.e., that it is important to address the underlying root causes "constructively" and "proactively," are driven by the realization that without addressing these causes, violence that devastated societies during the conflict years will likely return. This understanding has inspired new thinking about the importance of peace education and non-violence. As Federico Mayor articulates:

> Just as violence is a learned behaviour, so, too, is the process of active non-violence. It must be learned and perfected through practice. The skills are many: active listening, dialogue, mediation, cooperative learning, conflict transformation. It may be said that, as we enter a new century, the 'second literacy' of 'learning to live together' has become as important as the first literacy of reading, writing and arithmetic. (Mayor, 1999, pp. 2-3)

On Mayor's view, peace education and active non-violence can help people learn to live together and deal with conflict through non-violent means. This is echoed by CNA (Rill et al., 2007).

While Mayor highlights the role of the United Nations (UN) in its efforts to promote a "culture of peace" (1999), others are critical of the UN and its role in peacebuilding. Though internal violent conflict is hardly a novelty in the history of human relations, its prevalence against the backdrop of the latter half of twentieth century–the century that gave birth to the UN and witnessed the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall, is troubling. While some point to the failure of diplomacy to prevent conflict escalation in the wars of the nineteen nineties, others argue that as an intergovernmental organization (IGO), the UN was designed to deal with the threat of inter-state conflict emerging between countries, and therefore less equipped to deal with conflicts emerging

within sovereign borders. In response to these observations, and in light of the challenges associated with applying traditional (UN style) diplomacy to internal conflicts and wars of secession, newer approaches to diplomacy in the post-cold war era have been at the center of innovations in thought (Langhorne, 2001).

Within the literature, traditional diplomacy involving state actors, often called track-one diplomacy, is now criticized for being overly focused on inter-state relations and insufficiently sensitive to the role of non-state actors and cultural nuances (Miall, 2004). This thinking has led some to prioritize track-two diplomacy, i.e., diplomacy at the level of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),[18] professionals, scholars and other non-state actors (McDonald, 1991). Track-two diplomacy is also criticized for being too limited to the local level and ineffective at establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the mass public and elites. Despite this challenge, the call for track-two diplomacy in post-cold war contexts, whether implemented along with track-one diplomacy or on its own, is being heard. The relevance of track-two diplomacy is linked to growing recognition of the rise in power of non-state actors and corresponding decrease in power of state actors, both of which are connected to the consequences of globalization in the post-cold war era.[19] Beyond the debate over track-one and track-two diplomacy, and in light of the strengths and weaknesses of both tracks, attention is now focused on incorporating these tracks into a coherent whole.[20] Coined by John McDonald and Louise Diamond

---

[19] For an interesting perspective on the role of globalization in the context of peace, see Pierre Schori: "when the world has finally overcome apartheid and the Cold War, another gap is growing between countries and people, challenging peace and development. At the same time as globalization generates new wealth and rising incomes, the distribution of that wealth is becoming increasingly uneven, and more and more people live in poverty. We now face the risk of what I would call 'global apartheid'." (2005, p. 2)

[20] See Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) at http://www.imtd.org/

(McDonald, 2003), this approach is referred to as multi-track diplomacy and includes nine tracks that have been updated since McDonald and Diamond's original thinking: 1) government; 2) nongovernment and professional organizations; 3) business; 4) private citizens; 5) research, training and education; 6) activism, 7) religion; 8) funding; and 9) communication and media. Multi-track diplomacy is explicitly sensitive to the consequences of globalization and post-cold war politics, i.e., that states are not the only/main movers and shakers, and thus incorporates efforts from a range of state and non-state actors in figuring out how to build peace and rebuild trust in post-conflict societies (Miall, 2004; McDonald, 2003). Multi-track diplomacy may be one approach for addressing the interdependence gap in peacebuilding activities outlined above.

Why is there so much attention on developing newer approaches to diplomacy? According to conflict experts, the increased threat of internal violent conflict is a trend that is likely to continue within the global era (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC), 1997; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). This trend can be traced to a number of factors resulting from: the collapse of communism coinciding with the end of the cold war; the consequences of globalization, particularly loosening/redrawing of national borders, erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing gap between the rich and poor (Schori, 1999); the corresponding shift in loyalties away from the state toward seemingly more relevant forms of allegiance (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1999), whether regional, ethnic, cultural, religious, or some combination thereof; and, the overall rise in power of non-state actors of all types, especially transnational groups, local NGOs, religious leaders, student activists, and ordinary individuals armed with only a laptop and Internet connection.

In light of this realization, the increased threat of internal violent conflict has prompted researchers from various disciplines to examine the causes and nature of internal conflict. These efforts have yielded a number of leading theories on factors and underlying conditions that increase the likelihood of internal conflict emerging in particular societies, whether such conflict is associated with ethno-nationalism, religious extremism, class struggles, elite meddling, or some combination thereof. In addition to these efforts, a number of NGOs and international organizations have developed important capacity-building programs to minimize the impact of internal conflict in societies devastated by inter-group violence. In the global era, the work of NGOs and international organizations has become highly visible via the Internet for those with access. NGOs and international organizations can be credited with empowering people with knowledge about the importance of not only ending hostilities, but also transforming the social conditions that lead to hostilities. As Pierre Schori points out in this regard: "The development of thousands of NGOs all over the world will perhaps be the most important contribution of our age to the achievement of a peaceful and just world." (1999, p. 3)

Addressing social conditions that give rise to conflict brings to mind Lederach's vision of "conflict transformation," i.e., roughly, the effort to transform the underlying conditions that give rise to conflict. As Lederach articulates:

> I have preferred the words conflict transformation over conflict resolution. Resolution lends itself to a metaphor that suggests our goal is to end something not desired. Transformation insinuates that something not desired is changing, taking new form. (1999, p. 6)

On a conflict transformation perspective, conflict typically continues beyond the cessation of fighting. While direct physical violence may have ceased, structural and cultural violence often remain below the surface. Failing to address the underlying causes of conflict allows structural and cultural violence to continue to fester and perhaps one day erupt. The idea is that conflict presents an opportunity to address grievances that continue to damage relations in the post-conflict years, i.e., once armed conflict has ceased. In reality, because the underlying causes of conflict remain below the surface, it may be difficult to identify them. Another challenge consists in the fact that conflict transformation is a tool for transforming damaged relations, e.g., a tool for reconciliation; it requires willingness to engage in such work. Conflict management and conflict resolution practices are much more straightforward; the trade-off, of course, is they do not get to the root causes.

Of the larger NGOs that stand out in the area of conflict transformation, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)[21] and Search for Common Ground (SFCG)[22] in particular, have developed practical tools for dealing with the aftermath of violent conflict and engaging in conflict transformation within communities. UNDP and OSCE have engaged people in conflict transformation type activities, including public sessions and teaching tolerance trainings in schools. On Mayor's view (1999), the UN has helped set forth a new approach:

> The United Nations initiatives for a culture of peace mark a new stage: instead of focusing exclusively on rebuilding societies after they have been torn apart by violence, the emphasis is placed on preventing violence

---

[21] ECCP has published a number of case studies enumerating successful approaches to peacebuilding in highly divided societies. See ECCP (1999) (2005).

[22] For an overview of SFCG's work, including their research polls among societies divided by conflict, see http://www.sfcg.org/.

> by fostering a culture where conflicts are transformed into cooperation before they can degenerate into war and destruction. The key to the prevention of violence is education for non-violence. (Mayor, 1999, p. 2)

While "culture of peace" initiatives indicate a start, a separate analysis assessing the impact and efficacy of UN initiatives in this regard, though beyond the scope of this dissertation, would be instructive. Within the context of developing a "culture of peace," as Mayor points out, education for non-violence is important for transforming societies plagued by internal violent conflict. In post-conflict societies, debates often arise as to how to ensure that future generations do not learn to hate and kill each other because of the conflicts of the past (Cole & Barsalou, 2006). In this spirit, steps toward reform of textbooks and rewriting of history to be more inclusive and less revisionist have been on the agenda of NGOs working in the post-conflict societies. The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) is an NGO that has worked with people in the region of former Yugoslavia to develop inclusive, balanced textbooks.[23]

Within academia, scholars in various disciplines have shed light on the prevalence of internal violent conflict from a number of perspectives, including the social sciences, humanities and religious traditions (Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Sampson & Lederach, 2000). The media have also begun identifying ways to contribute to peacebuilding and conflict transformation, whether through dialogue, reporting on civil society efforts, or some combination thereof (Howard et al., 2003). This idea of *media as peacebuilder* is perhaps prompted by the realization that in many cases media have directly contributed to the escalation of conflict and the exacerbation of tensions, whether by reinforcing bias or showcasing nationalist propaganda (van de Veen, 2005). New technology also offers

---

[23] For a description of CDRSEE's work, see http://www.cdsee.org/

hope for societies in the midst of/or emerging from violent conflict. In 2007, video recordings posted on the Internet allowed viewers to witness violence taking place against Buddhist monks. This was particularly important given that the Myanmar government was denying such violence.[24] Of course the Internet is also used to broadcast torture and bolster violent causes. The potential for it to be used as a tool for peacebuilding, however, cannot be ignored.

The range of perspectives that are contributing to studies of peace and conflict provides an indication not only of its importance, but also, of its relevance in today's world. As Paul van Tongeren points out:

> The contribution of civilians, whether working from the bottom up or the top down, to resolving the conflicts of our time can no longer be ignored. Churches, women's organisations, the media, and business have all demonstrated their potential for building peace. So too the role of education, the arts and sports is gaining increasing recognition. (1999, p. 2)

While there are a number of promising efforts contributing to peacebuilding and conflict transformation, the cases of South Africa, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, among others, reveal that rebuilding relationships and establishing trust in societies divided by violence and demoralized by the effects of war, poverty,[25] and trauma, cannot be accomplished overnight. As Mayor (1999) argues, sustainable peace requires a new culture of peace, i.e., conditions that encourage not only the absence of hostilities, but also the presence of harmonious relationships sustained over the long-

---

[24] For an interesting analysis of the role of the Internet and the government's response in Myanmar, see http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/asia/04info.html

[25] Pierre Schori (1999) discusses the significance of poverty as a major obstacle to peace is his work "Poverty: Prime Enemy of Peace and Democracy." Schori writes: "Indeed, the major threats of our time - human rights violations, war and conflict, mass migration, international crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism and environmental degradation - are rooted in poverty and social inequality. Poverty is the prime enemy of peace and democracy in the world today."

term. In the absence of sustainable efforts aimed at truly transforming societies, the effects of violent conflicts are likely to continue to pose a threat in many regions of the world. In light of this reality, there is a compelling need for appropriate methods to understand: 1) how to prevent internal conflict, 2) how to mitigate/limit its damage, and 3) how to deal with its aftermath. All three questions correspond to different stages on the scale of conflict escalation/de-escalation: difference, contradiction, polarization, violence, war, ceasefire, agreement normalization and reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, pp. 11). While all three are indeed worthy of intense study, in this dissertation I deal directly with the third question, i.e., how to deal with the aftermath of conflict, and specifically, the final stage of conflict escalation/de-escalation–the process of reconciliation. Nevertheless, since preventing conflict and minimizing its impact are relevant, they are discussed as well.

Conclusion

In this chapter I provided a discussion of what is meant by reconciliation, why it is considered to be important and how is it typically framed. In addition, I also outlined approaches to reconciliation in post-conflict contexts, how reconciliation is understood, some of the challenges associated with it, and how these challenges are understood in the post-conflict context. This chapter has shown there is little consensus on the meaning of reconciliation in the literature. Reconciliation is typically described according to different forms and levels; a grounded definition of reconciliation is missing. I have argued for the need to analyze the behavioral, attitudinal and motivational dimensions of reconciliation to gain further clarity on its meaning(s). I have also suggested that defining the character of reconciliation as consistent with benevolence and magnanimity

may help clarify some of the confusion surrounding what reconciliation is and is not. In the section on significance, I discussed the relevance of reconciliation in post-conflict contexts. While there is no agreement on the particular path to reconciliation, there is agreement that reconciliation offers hope for preventing violence from re-emerging, stabilizing tensions, decreasing isolation and increasing productive human relations in post-conflict societies. In the section on dealing with the past, truth and justice, I explored the different contexts within which reconciliation is typically framed and introduced five approaches to dealing with the past and their connection to reconciliation. I also discussed the role of trials, truth commissions and other transitional justice measures in post-conflict settings. The discussion on truth and justice revealed debates within the literature about whether truth can contribute to reconciliation and whether justice is necessary for it to come about. While there is good moral and theoretical reasoning supporting the relevance of truth and justice, both bring challenges for reconciliation. Truth is often contested in post-conflict contexts and it is unclear that a common truth can be achieved. The debate over whether retribution or restoration is more conducive to reconciliation is equally challenging. While there is a clear connection in the literature between truth and justice on one hand and reconciliation on the other, it is not clear that in practice either truth or justice actually contributes to reconciliation.

Just as there are those who conceive of reconciliation within the context of truth and justice, there are also those who conceive of reconciliation within the larger context of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. In this context, reconciliation is imbedded within the larger process of addressing underlying tensions that lead to violence and

creating new ways of dealing with those tensions. The approach of bringing about reconciliation through conflict transformation and peacebuilding is not so straightforward. It is not a matter of setting the record straight about what happened, nor is it a matter of punishment or restoration; it is a matter of transformation at the deepest levels of society and highest levels of institutions.

The literature on reconciliation and its role in post-conflict contexts is complex and multi-dimensional. Rather than select a particular approach to reconciliation, it is my view that the different approaches to reconciliation are likely complementary. The next chapter focuses on the approaches to reconciliation underway in the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia and the ways in which practices and activities aimed at reconciliation and related themes of dealing with the past are carried out.

Chapter 2: Context, Discourse and Practice in former Yugoslavia

*Reconciliation has a much better chance of stopping the cycle of violence
and hatred that sometimes transcends generations. –Hizkias Assefa*

Introduction

My aim in this chapter is to provide an overview of the post-conflict context in
former Yugoslavia. I include a discussion of: a) brief background of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia; b) the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia, with a focus on Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia; c) discourse on dealing with the past in the region;
d) practices and activities aimed at reconciliation, including main actors. My overall
purpose is to introduce tensions surrounding the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, shed
light on the how the conflict has been framed, discuss perceptions of polarizing forces at
work in shaping discourse on dealing with the past, and highlight a range of practices
aimed at reconciliation in the region. This chapter includes quotes and insights from my
own interviews in the region, literature on dealing with the past, as well as reports and
newspaper articles depicting discourse on dealing with the past in the region.

Part I: The dissolution of Yugoslavia

The dissolution of Yugoslavia has been a topic of great interest for scholars,
journalists and researchers from various disciplines, including political science,
sociology, history and global affairs. The *causes and consequences* of Yugoslavia's
break-up, in particular, have been a source of intense debate within and outside the
region. Perhaps one of the main reasons for such interest in Yugoslavia has to do with
the nature of its demise, i.e., bloody war that stole the lives of thousands, damaged
infrastructure, destroyed social trust, eroded human decency, and compromised the

futures of generations to come. The history of Yugoslavia cannot be covered adequately in the few pages I have to dedicate to this, nor can the causes and consequences of its break-up be fully explored in such a short space. My aim here is not to provide a comprehensive account of these issues, but to highlight some contemporary ways of thinking about and framing the dissolution of Yugoslavia and how this is relevant for the topic of reconciliation in the region.

Before its break-up in 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a loose federation composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia and two autonomous provinces that were part of Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija. Throughout history, the people in the region that became known as Yugoslavia experienced many tumultuous transitions, particularly with respect to political structure and social life. For years foreign powers fought for control of the region, creating political and social unrest. A proper tracing of the region's history could begin with the medieval period, extend through the Ottoman Occupation and Austro-Hungarian rule, and end with the periods following World War I and II. It could also be restricted to the actual periods when "Yugoslavia" was part of the official name, e.g., the post World War I Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929), which followed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918) and the post World War II Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (1945), which transitioned to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (1963) and remained that way until the break-up in 1991 (Kollander, 2004).[26] Since my aim in this section is to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, I concentrate on the phase of Yugoslavia that was formed following

---

[26] Of course, "Yugoslavia" remained in the name of the successor state union of Serbia and Montenegro until 2003. In 2006, Serbia and Montenegro officially separated.

World War II and became known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)–or for short, "Yugoslavia."

The concrete timeline of Yugoslavia's demise can be traced to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and the subsequent declarations of independence by Macedonia in 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 (Stokes, 2009; Calic, 2009; Privitera, 2004). Of course, all four of these events count as disruptors–they disrupted the narrative of Yugoslavia as a federation of peoples joined together. This is not to say such a narrative existed for everyone, but to the extent it existed, it was disrupted. The subsequent recognition by foreign powers, e.g., Germany, the Vatican and United States, of the independence declarations added to these disruptions by legitimizing what for some were a series of unconstitutional declarations (Stokes, 2009; Thomas, 2003). These disruptive events, however, are not the only events typically mentioned when describing the dissolution of Yugoslavia. There are a number of tensions that are linked to the federation's fall. In the space that follows, I reference just a few of the most compelling tensions.

One tension has to do with the period of inter-group fighting and genocide that took place during World War II. The alignment of Croatian Ustasha with Nazi Germany and subsequent genocide that the Ustasha committed against Serbs, Jews, Roma, and others, is frequently mentioned as a major tension contributing to underlying conflict and subsequent dissolution (Calic, 2009; Crocker, 2003). Another tension concerns allegations of atrocities and other bad behaviors of Partisans who were on the winning side in World War II and Chetniks who were aligned with the Serbian Monarchy and fought against the fascists (Calic, 2009). It is well established that, in the aftermath of

World War II, Josip Broz Tito rallied on the heels of Partisan victory, and during his subsequent presidency, shaped Partisan-inspired narratives that would take hold of the social imagination and direct policies for Yugoslavia. As a result of Tito's policies, many tensions[27] were stifled for the sake of peace and stability of the country.

Another set of tensions frequently referenced as contributing to the dissolution of Yugoslavia surrounds what are perceived to be nationalist declarations, i.e., the Islamic Declaration written by Alija Izetbegović in 1970 and later republished in 1990, the new Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 1990 and the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) of 1986 (Stokes, 2009; Bjelajac & Žunece, 2009). Scholars, journalists, researchers and ordinary people have included these tensions in their analyses of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

The tensions discussed thus far do not create a complete picture of Yugoslavia's dissolution, but rather highlight some of the disruptors and tensions that are typically associated with it. The Yugoslav constitution in 1974, partitioning of Serbia by carving out two autonomous provinces, Croatian Spring uprising, Albanian student movement in Kosovo, and anti-bureaucratic revolution in Serbia are all disruptive events that are part of different framings of the dissolution (Calic, 2009; Stokes, 2009; Bjelajac and Žunec, 2009; Janjić, Lalaj & Pula, 2009). My aim here is not to analyze what caused the break-up of Yugoslavia, but rather to identify some of the main factors that are the subject of controversies and debates over its break-up. In the following, I highlight the way these and other tensions figure into the literature on Yugoslavia's dissolution.

---

[27] These tensions do not refer to ancient hatreds; they refer to political, social and moral tensions that naturally follow the experience of trauma and the uncertainty of transition from war to peace. Tensions such as these may have been exacerbated by imprisonment, and loss of loved ones, property, and mobility.

Charles Ingrao and Thomas Emmert have recently completed their edited book: "Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative" (Ingrao & Emmert, 2009), which was a multi-year long project designed to explore the major controversies surrounding the causes and consequences of Yugoslavia's dissolution. The book includes chapters written by teams of scholars from within the region and outside it. In the chapter written by Andrew Wachtel and Christopher Bennett, the authors analyze the dissolution of Yugoslavia according to three spheres "whose long-term problems put the Yugoslav state in a vulnerable position entering the late 1980s" (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, p. 14). On their view, understanding the dissolution requires a look at all three spheres: political, economic and cultural. The political sphere covers "the perceived illegitimacy or at least ineffectiveness of the central state and rise of competing power centers within the country" (p. 14). The economic sphere refers to "the inability of Communist states in general and the Yugoslav state in particular to generate wealth and provide sufficient economic opportunity and prosperity for its citizens" (p. 14).

The cultural sphere refers to:

> [T]he inability or unwillingness of the Yugoslav state to create a sufficiently large group of citizens with a shared national identity and the existence and growth of separate national narratives that directly competed with, and eventually overwhelmed, the Yugoslav narrative. (p. 14)

The political sphere is focused on vulnerabilities in the state, the economic sphere on vulnerabilities related to communism, the cultural sphere on vulnerabilities related to national identity and national narratives. Though there is often a tendency to prioritize from among the three spheres referenced above, attention to these spheres is common throughout the literature on Yugoslavia's demise (Woodward, 1995; Thomas, 2003, Bookman, 2003).

Separate from the spheres of analysis, the factors contributing to the break-up of Yugoslavia can be evaluated according to different levels of analysis: global, regional, national, political and cultural.[28] From a global perspective, the failure of communism and break-up of the Soviet Union were watershed events that had an impact on Yugoslavia as its strategic importance waned with the end of the cold war. As a result of the failure of communism, major transitions in the region among Yugoslavia's neighbors, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, contributed to a regional climate of uncertainty in the immediate aftermath of the cold war. Leading up to the end of the cold war, perceptions of inequality and competition over resources also influenced the regional climate within Yugoslavia among its republics and provinces (Bookman, 2003).   From a national perspective, overwhelming debt and the erosion of confidence in the state following the death of President Tito in 1980 were major factors laying the foundation for tension and disruption in the country (Bookman, 2003). From a political perspective, disillusionment with the communist party coupled with interest in new political parties and nationalist politics created friction. At the cultural level, the climate of uncertainty and instability provided fertile breeding ground for identity construction around nationalist goals; the manipulation of elites and media contributed to this. In analyses on the break-up, there is often a tendency to prioritize one level over another as having a stronger effect. In my view, the vulnerabilities, tensions and disruptions resulting from all these levels contributed to the dissolution of the country. In view of the confounding tensions and disruptions associated with each level, it might appear that the fall of Yugoslavia was inevitable. Wachtel and Bennet, however, argue that the fall of Yugoslavia could have

---

[28] For a discussion of conflict according to levels of analysis, see Ramsbotham et al., 2005.

been avoided with proper attention to the vulnerabilities it faced within the political, economic and cultural spheres (2009).

Another way of analyzing the break-up of Yugoslavia involves an analysis of internal and external factors. In the immediate aftermath of its dissolution, some journalists and academics emphasized internal factors that contributed to its fall: primordialism (ethnic tensions, ancient hatreds) (Kaplan, 1993); elitism and entrepreneurism (power struggles among political elites; influence of political or ethnic entrepreneurs) (Silber and Little, 1995); economic failure (Woodward, 1995); or some combination of the above. The primordialist/ancient hatreds perspective has had a significant impact on the framing of the Yugoslav crisis. Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts* is frequently mentioned as an account of ancient hatreds that influenced the framing of the conflict among foreign media and political leaders. The theory that political elites and ethnic entrepreneurs controlled the media and manipulated ordinary people to support nationalist policies also contributed to the framing of the break-up of Yugoslavia (Reynolds, 2004; Collin, 2001). While primordialist and political elite/ethnic entrepreneur perspectives shaped popular framing of the crisis, economic analysis seems to have had less traction–perhaps because it lacks the sensationalism of the other two.

While it appears that the factors discussed above are internal, the distinction between internal and external is not easy to discern and may in fact be more fluid than rigid. In the case of economic failure, for example, factors that contributed to the economic collapse had both internal and external components (Woodward, 1995; Bookman, 2003). Those who prioritize external factors typically point to international influences (interests of other states, e.g. Germany and the US, the failure of communism,

the break-up of the Soviet Union, rise in influence of diaspora communities, etc.) as reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Thomas, 2003).

Raju Thomas argues:

> The dissolution of Yugoslavia had much to do with the political intrusions of Western powers, especially Germany and the United States, in support of their favored ethnic groups and to advance their own policy agendas. (2003, p. 4)

Thomas takes this a step further and argues:

> The denial of the historic goal of a Greater Serbia for the Serbs in 1991-1992 and the de facto creation of an ethnically pure Greater Croatia for the Croats in 1995 were not coincidences or accidents. It was the natural outcome of Great Power politics and a preponderance of power at the end of the Cold War. (2003, p 10)

Thomas' perspective on the causes of Yugoslavia's dissolution is echoed in the region; ordinary people in former Yugoslavia include foreign power interest or lack of interest in their narratives on the wars that unfolded.

> I blame Germany and the Vatican. They were behind the break-up. They should not have encouraged Croatia to secede. They had their own interests and caused all these problems. –*Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina*.

While "Great Power politics" may have had an impact on decision-making, it seems a combination of actors, state and non-state, contributed to Yugoslavia's dissolution.

Nearly twenty years after the break-up of Yugoslavia, there are still a number of controversies surrounding its demise. Was it inevitable? Did foreign powers dictate the outcome of Yugoslavia as they had throughout its history? Were nationalist forces simply too strong to quell? The proliferation of books and analyses on Yugoslavia suggests that the controversies will likely continue to take hold of the imagination surrounding Yugoslavia's dissolution. The Scholars' Initiative is one attempt to address

some of the most compelling controversies and to set the record straight, which is not to say the Scholars' Initiative hasn't received its own share of criticism.[29]

While my objective is not to solve the puzzle of what caused Yugoslavia to fall, the evidence in favor of a combination of forces at the global, regional, national, political and cultural levels, which overlaps with the three spheres: political, economic and cultural, seems most fitting. In reality, the framing of Yugoslavia's dissolution is not simply an academic matter; its significance lies in the fact that people in the region remain divided and often uncertain about why/how the country fell apart, who the responsible parties are, how to characterize the nature of the wars that ensued (i.e., international versus internal), and how to evaluate conduct in the wars (genocide, ethnic cleansing, self defense, etc.). This division and uncertainty often influences people's willingness to participate in various processes of social transformation and reconciliation, which is discussed later.

The views of ordinary people have been shaped by and continue to shape popular understandings of the destruction they experienced with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Their views have morphed into narratives that are deeply divisive and perpetually polarizing. There is a tendency for competing narratives to dominate discourse on the causes and consequences of conflict and who is to blame. For example, the idea that Yugoslavia fell because of nationalist policies, e.g., policies of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (Silber and Little, 1995), typically coincides with the belief that the wars were international wars of aggression, e.g., Serbian aggression against Bosnia and

---

[29] In a book panel I attended on the Scholars' Initiative at the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) in 2009, the editors received a fair amount of criticism for including certain controversies and overshadowing others. The book panel listing can be found on page 105 of the ASN program. See http://www.nationalities.org/convention/pdfs/ASN_2009_final_Program.pdf

Herzegovina. This in turn shapes how the conduct in the war(s) is evaluated–*defenders are the good guys and aggressors the bad guys; the good guys do no wrong*. On the Croatian side, for example, there is a tendency to characterize Croatia's role in the war as "defending the homeland" against the aggressors (JNA,[30] Serbia and Serbian politics). There is often also a tendency to describe the war as defending the homeland against rebellion or terrorism from within, rather than outside aggression. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are competing narratives: an international war of aggression, an internal war of defense, a war brought about by foreign powers, etc. Serbia is also subject to competing narratives: aggression versus defense of Serbs. If there were one common narrative, any narrative, so much tension and controversy in the aftermath of the conflict might not persist. The tension and controversy, however, is related to the fact that there are competing views on the causes of the wars, the conduct in the wars and the consequences of the wars. These competing views influence and often inhibit reconciliation efforts in the post-conflict context. As an example, when one individual/group believes the wars were international wars of aggression rooted in Serbian nationalism and another believes the wars were internal wars based on defense of Serbs whose rights were unconstitutionally violated, these competing narratives must be sorted out for reconciliation processes to have meaning. This doesn't mean both have to give up on their views, but find a way to accommodate the difference and see the other side's perspective. As is discussed in the next sections, the framing of the causes and consequences of Yugoslavia's dissolution has a significant impact on dealing with the past and reconciliation in the post-conflict context. The next section discusses the post-

---

[30] JNA stands for Yugoslav National Army.

conflict context in former Yugoslavia, specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Following that is a discussion of discourse on dealing with the past in the region, where some of the tensions and controversies referenced above are discussed in more detail.

Part II: The post-conflict context

In the aftermath of the series of inter-related violent conflicts[31] that consumed the people of former Yugoslavia[32] during the nineteen nineties and thereafter, the people of this post-conflict situation, like those of Rwanda, Cambodia and many other post-conflict societies, are in dire need of appropriate strategies and practical tools for dealing with the consequences of their recent past. The conflicts[33] of former Yugoslavia involved intense inter-group[34] violence that not only resulted in severe structural damage, but also spawned the breakdown of trust along nearly every level of society.[35] Though approximately fifteen years have passed since the signing in 1995 of the Dayton Agreement that ended the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,[36] and the Erdut Agreement

---

[31] Whether the conflict in former Yugoslavia was internal, international, or some combination thereof is highly contested. Many aspects of the conflict appear to make it both internal and international.

[32] The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was an example of a relatively stable, prosperous and secure multi-ethnic federation that fell-apart in the context of its transition during the early nineteen nineties.

[33] The region of former Yugoslavia suffered a series of violent inter-group conflicts spanning 1991-2001; in March of 2003 intergroup violence re-erupted for a short period in Kosovo.

[34] Inter-group fighting between Muslims, Croats and Serbs took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina; inter-group fighting between Croats and Serbs took place in Croatia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, intra-group also fighting took place between Muslims who followed Fikret Abdić and those loyal to the army of BiH.

[35] In her discussion of relations between Serbs and Croats in Berak, a multi-ethnic village in Croatia devastated by inter-group violence during the war, Corinne Bloch (2005) illuminates the haunting breakdown of trust among community members who were formerly friendly neighbors.

[36] To view the Dayton Agreement, i.e., General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), see United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 1998.

that allowed for the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Croatia,[37] the instability, suspicion

and despair that plagued the Yugoslav societies during the conflict years continue to live

on in the post-conflict situation. With over 100,000 dead,[38] thousands missing,[39] and over

500,000[40] still uprooted–whether internally displaced or in exile as refugees, the societies

of former Yugoslavia may have begun to rebuild, but they are no way near being

restored, just as many relationships are no way near being reconciled, let alone

harmonious. The need for developing an effective approach to rebuilding societies and

restoring or transforming relationships, sometimes called "reconciliation," is critical in

former Yugoslavia. It is critical not only for the well-being of the individuals living in

such societies, and not only for the stability of the region, but also for the hope that

lessons from former Yugoslavia may help prevent or transform conflict in other contexts

around the world.

A closer look at the post-conflict context in former Yugoslavia reveals a multitude

of tensions and disruptors that need to be addressed in order for reconciliation to be

---

[37] To view the Erdut Agreement, i.e., Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, see United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 2000.

[38] The exact number of dead is a highly contested issue due to reluctance to disclose mass graves and the tendency to inflate numbers. Recent figures provided by Mirsad Tokača's Research and Documentation Center (RDC) count approximately 80,545 direct casualties and about 16,662 missing persons in BiH of BiH citizenship. Tokača's numbers are most detailed as he breaks down military versus civilian deaths as well as deaths by ethnicity. See http://www.idc.org.ba/. Figures in Croatia and Serbia are not yet available, though estimates of casualties in the war in Croatia are around 22,000 Croatian citizens, including 15,000 Croats and 7,000 Serbs (Bjelajac & Žunec, 2009, p. 263). The Serbian government has been reluctant to publish numbers of Serbian citizens involved in the wars from 1991-1995. Nataša Kandić of the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) has begun collecting names; thus far she has collected 1,787 citizens of Serbia and Montenegro killed or missing in the wars in from 1991-1995. Human casualties in the wars in 1998-1999 (Kosovo and NATO) are estimated to include 8-10,000 Albanians and 2-2,500 non-Albanians, including Serbs, Roma and others. See http://www.hlc-rdc.org.

[39] Mirsad Tokača's Research and Documentation Center (RDC) counts 16,662 missing persons.

[40] During the height of the wars, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons were much higher and reached 1.3 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone (Calic, 2009, p. 115). Still, after fifteen years of peace, nearly 500,000 remain uprooted. Internally displaced persons in Serbia alone are nearly 225,000. For statistics on the uprooted (refugees and internally displaced) see UNHCR 2010a, 2010b, 2010c.

viable. The tensions and disruptors affecting the post-conflict context can be analyzed according to different levels or themes; the following is a description of some of the main themes at work in the post-conflict context.

Themes in the post-conflict context

Structural changes/changes in composition

As a result of the Dayton and Erdut Agreements, the geographic boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia returned to the pre-conflict borders they held as republics in the Yugoslav federation. The internal composition, however, changed remarkably as a consequence of the conflict. The following provides a brief overview of some of the structural changes that appear in the post-conflict context in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The changes in the composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are quite complex. As a result of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained its pre-conflict external borders, i.e., portions did not collapse into Croatia or Serbia, but nonetheless developed new internal borders that split the state in two *de facto*. As a result of the conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is divided between two main entities–the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), i.e., the Bosniak-Croat Federation (the Federation), and the Bosnian Serb Republic, i.e., Republika Srpska (RS). Brčko is an independent district that overlaps both entities. The Bosniak-Croat Federation itself is composed of ten administrative cantons; within the cantons are municipalities. Republika Srpska has no cantons, but has its own municipalities. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is responsible for overseeing Bosnia and

Herzegovina and has the power to overturn decisions. At the state level, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member presidency: one Bosniak[41] (Bosnian Muslim) and one Croat elected from the Federation and one Serb elected from Republika Srpska. Separately, at the entity level, both entities have their own presidents and prime ministers.[42] All three groups: Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats and Serbs are constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina–meaning they have legal rights to live in any entity. While the administrative hierarchy is difficult to contemplate and seems to erode a sense of unity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the internal borders that make it appear to be two separate states.

In the post-conflict context, the internal composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina is drastically different from the pre-conflict years. Places that were home to large amounts of Muslims now have large amounts of Serbs or Croats. Communities that counted Serbs in large numbers now find few to no Serbs. An overwhelming consequence of the change in composition in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that community life changed, neighbors changed, people changed (Bringa, 2005; Calic, 1999). A major tension consists in the fact that the internal borders are largely drawn around ethnicity and around the conflict battle lines. The legitimacy of Republika Srpska is frequently contested, as some members of the Bosniak-Croat Federation perceive that Republika Srpska was rewarded for genocide, i.e., that the Dayton Agreement upheld the acquisition of territories acquired and secured by Serb forces through genocide, e.g., Srebrenica

---

[41] The term Bosniak is used to refer to Bosnian Muslims. In my interviews, Bosnian Muslims did not use the term Bosniak, but Muslim, so I use Bosnian Muslim or Muslim in place of Bosniak. In places where I reference political formations I use Bosniak, e.g., the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

[42] For a description of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political structure, see United States Department of State (2010) at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm.

(Čekić, 2009).[43] As an illustration of this perception, Smail Čekić writes:

> The entity of Republika Srpska is the genocidal construction of the Greater Serbian Nazism, erected on the grave violations of the international humanitarian law, marked and smeared with, mainly, the blood of Bosniacs. (2009, p. 47)

Given the brutal nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not surprising that changes in internal composition cause tension and disruption in the post-conflict context.

Croatia

In contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina, though Serb forces and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) occupied approximately thirty percent of Croatian territory during the conflict in Croatia between 1991 and 1995 (UNHCR, 2001), the territories were returned to Croatia at the end of the conflict. As a result of two offensive strikes in 1995, Operation Flash (Bljesak) in May and Operation Storm (Oluja) in August, Croatia managed to take back its territory in Western Slavonia and Krajina a few months before signing the Erdut Agreement, which outlined the return of the remaining portions in Eastern Slavonia, Western Baranja and Sirmium. The war-time creation of the Serbian autonomous areas (Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia, Western Baranja and Sirmium), were in effect dismantled in 1995 following the offensive strikes and Erdut agreement; this further exacerbated tensions between those loyal to the Serbian autonomous areas and those loyal to Croatia. While the peaceful reintegration brought about by the Erdut Agreement did not result in a mass exodus of Serbs, Operation Storm in August resulted in what has been called the ethnic cleansing of approximately 200,000[44] Serbs from Krajina in a matter of a few days[45] (HRW, 1996). As a result,

---

[43] See Smail Čekić (2009). Čekić presented and distributed a paper at the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in Virginia, United States in 2009, which I also attended.

[44] The numbers who fled Krajina during Operation Storm (Oluja) range between 200,000 and 250,000.

Croatia's Serb population decreased from 12.2% in 1991 to 4.5% in 2001, according to census data.[46]   In addition to this change, refugees from other parts of Yugoslavia, including Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (including Kosovo) settled into Croatia, thus changing its post-conflict composition.

Serbia

There are a number of changes in composition that affect the post-conflict context in Serbia. As a result of the conflicts in Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999), Serbia received an overwhelming number of refugees and internally placed persons (UNHCR, 2010c). The magnitude of refugees and internally placed persons in Serbia has confounded humanitarian workers. Serbia also lost a significant portion of its pre-war non-Serb population. During the conflicts, Croats in Vojvodina were intimated to leave Serbia;[47] Muslims from Sandžak also felt pressure to flee.[48] Return is less likely in Serbia in part because people who left often exchanged property with Serbs fleeing Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. What Serbia lost in its non-Serb population it quickly picked up in Serb refugees and internally displaced persons. Masses of refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia sought refuge in Serbia. In 1999, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Serbia and Montenegro reached 480,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and 240,000

---

[45] See Human Rights Watch (HRW) (1996) report at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Croatia.htm

[46] For the number of Serbs in Croatia according to the 2001 census, see Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics (2001) at http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm

[47] According to ReliefWeb (2004), approximately 10,000 Croats were forced out of Vojvodina in 1992. In my interviews, some Croat refugees site the numbers as closer to 39,000 during the period of the war.

[48] For a discussion of the situation in Sandžak, see International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005).

from Kosovo.[49] Though there have been returns, as of January 2010, there are still 86,351 refugees and 224,881 internally displaced persons residing in Serbia.[50] With a population of approximately 7.3 million as of June 2010 (including Serbia proper and Vojvodina, not including Kosovo),[51] the sheer magnitude of refugees and internally placed persons has crippled Serbia and wreaked havoc on community life.

Though Serbia did not face conflict on its territory until 1998 and 1999 (conflict between the Kosovo Albanian Liberation Army and NATO respectively), Serbia endured a series of sanctions and exorbitant increases in inflation (Lyon, 1996) that created economic tension during the nineteen nineties (Andreas, 2005). Organized crime and corruption also spiraled during the conflict years (1991 to 1999) as it did throughout the region (Andreas, 2005). Serbia suffered for years because of President Slobodan Milošević's policies but later experienced a period of exhilaration with the ousting of Milošević in 2001 (Collin, 2001). This exhilaration soon fell into despair with the political turmoil that followed the regime change and later assassination of President Zoran Đinđić in 2003. Though its separation from Montenegro in 2006 did not drastically change the structure of Serbian society, the most compelling disruptor is still the unsettled status of Kosovo. Under the direction of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, Kosovo Albanians declared independence in 2008,[52] later to be recognized by a number of states, including the United States and most European countries, but not by a

---

[49] For a discussion of the refugee crisis in 1999, see United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (1999).

[50] See UNHCR (2010c).

[51] See CIA World FactBook (2010c).

[52] Kosovo Albanians declared independence on February 17, 2008. For a discussion, see BBC (2010, Feb. 17).

number of other influential states, including Russia, China, Spain and Greece.[53]   Of
course Serbia has not recognized the independence and awaits additional proceedings
following the recent non-binding ruling of a lawsuit it filed with the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) regarding the illegality of Kosovo's independence and violation of
Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. On July 22, 2010, the non-binding ruling of
the ICJ indicated that international law does not prohibit Kosovo's independence (BBC,
2010, July 22; B92, 2010, July 22a). Serbia plans to address its claims of violation of
sovereignty to the United Nations (B92, 2010, July 22b).[54] There is already speculation,
however, that the ICJ ruling may have an impact on Republika Srpska's future. In a
recent article in The New York Times, Milorad Dodik is quoted as saying that the
decision: "'represents a good road sign for our future'" (2010, July 23).[55]

Legal disputes between Serbia and its neighbors have influenced the post-conflict
climate. The ICJ lawsuit filed against Serbia and Montenegro on behalf of Bosnia and
Herzegovina for its role in the genocide perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e., in
Srebrenica) resulted in a decision in 2007 that Serbia and Montenegro was not
responsible for perpetrating the genocide but failed in its responsibility to protect, i.e.,
prevent genocide.[56]   Currently, Serbia and Croatia are contemplating dropping the
genocide suits they have filed against each other; Croatia first filed and then Serbia filed

---

[53] As of July 22, 2010, "69 of the UN's 192 countries have recognized Kosovo" (BBC, 2010, July 22) and 22 of the EU's 27 countries have recognized Kosovo (B92, 2010, July 22a).

[54] For a discussion of Serbia's case, see Lawrence Marzouk (2010, May 27).

[55] An analysis of the impact of the ICJ ruling for future separatist movements can be found in The New York Times (2010, July 23).

[56] See International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2007) for the ruling.

a counter-suit.[57]   The changes Serbia has experienced as a result of the conflicts contribute to a climate of tension and disruption in the post-conflict context. As a result, Serbia has experienced cycles of good and bad relations with its neighbors, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

As in many post-conflict societies, tensions in former Yugoslavia are complex. The discussion above provides only a brief overview of some of the tensions and disruptors that exist within Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and are largely related to structural changes resulting from the conflicts. There are also a number of tensions and disruptors that cut *across* all three societies. The following provides an overview of some of the tensions that cut across all three societies in the post-conflict context.

Intra-group tensions

The changes in composition in all three societies have had a significant impact on intra-group and inter-group relations. In addition, the nature of the changes–whether perceived to be a result of ethnic cleansing, peaceful reintegration, personal preference, or some combination thereof–have informed the narratives of people in the post-conflict context. While intra-group and inter-group tensions are not new to the region, they are particularly relevant for understanding the post-conflict context.

There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that intra-group tensions existed at different levels (e.g., regional) during the pre-conflict period and continue to exist in the post-conflict period. Intra-group tensions often manifest as marginal dislike, resentment, bias and othering. A respondent from Knin explained:

---

[57] For a discussion of the genocide suit and counter-suit, see International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2009, Jan. 22); B92 (2010, Jan. 4); and, B92 (2008, Nov. 18).

Some people came here for the same reasons that most of the Serbs left from here…but you have a second group of people who came here for economic opportunity. The second group was and still is the most problematic and rude…those are the ones who create problems. If they would have to leave the homes they repossessed from people who left they would destroy them and take things away. *–Interview with Cvetka, Croat from Knin.*

The change in ethnic structure was also described as loss:

A good part of the urban and young educated population from Knin definitely is gone for good…and in the same time a great number of people that came from Bosnia with a different mentality have changed absolutely the urban and Mediterranean culture that this town and its people once had. *–Interview with Magdalena, Croat from Knin.*

After Oluja people from all around Croatia or Bosnia moved in and replaced Serbs from Knin. That was an organized and planned effort of the Croatian government to make this an inhospitable place for Serbs to return and to change the ethnic structure. The village of Kistanje was populated after Oluja with Janjevci, Croats from Kosovo. They live very separated from others in part because they came from rural areas. *–Interview with Cvetka, Croat from Knin.*

Loss was also a common theme for a respondent in Zagreb:

We lost the urban spirit, even though my family comes from a small village in Dalmatia. Every place has its own newcomers *[pridošlice]* and in a way their values have taken over the old ones. *–Interview with Vesna, Croat from Zagreb.*

Similarly, a respondent from Vojvodina shared:

After World War II, the Germans were expelled from my grandma's village and replaced by Bosnians. They were mountain people; they destroyed the German homes. They picked up the wood floors and burned the wood for heat. The Germans kept their houses nice and they came and destroyed everything. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

In these cases the narratives involving intra-group tensions are connected to loss/change of culture. Interestingly, in the Vojvodina example, the Bosnian *Serb* refugees were not regarded as fellow Serbs but as Bosnians, they were intra-group others.

We called them Bosnians (*Bosanci*)…we didn't think of them as Serbs. We really didn't trust them…they replaced German neighbors and obtained leadership positions due to their communist ties and Partisan background. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

Intra-group othering is often internalized and becomes part of the intra-group other's self image. As a Bosnian Serb whose family resettled in Vojvodina explained: "we aren't like Serbs here, we are crazy…we have a different mentality." *–Interview with Srdjan, Serb whose family settled in Vojvodina after World War II*. Maria Todorova's (1997) work on Balkan identities and interpretation of Edward Said's orientalism adds clarity to the complexity of intra-group identification described above.

In the post-conflict context, intra-group tensions surface in communities where ethnic groups fled and were replaced by intra-group others. In Knin, for example, where Serbs fled and were replaced by refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, while some resent "newcomers" who replaced the Serbs and blame them for disrupting community life, others simply question the political decision to bring intra-group others to their community.

> The Croatian government and church came up with the idea to bring Croats (*Janjevci*) from Kosovo to Knin. It was a political idea…I am not sure how much they were endangered in Kosovo. Janjevci are traders-merchants so they have had a hard time since the town is in a rocky place and very remote…it's passive with no hope for a better life. You will not see a single car passing by there. They are now moving out or having stands during the summer in tourist areas. They have a lot of children and the church has a big role in efforts to keep them put by providing help, clothes, food, etc. I think that they live very hard…they have one elementary school and no jobs…I am not sure how much they benefited by coming here. *–Interview with Magdalena, Croat from Knin*.

Intra-group tensions in Serbia can be found along roughly the same lines. There are Serbs in Novi Sad who questioned and resented "newcomers" from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia changing the makeup of their society. As a Serb from Vukovar explained:

> I left Vukovar to study in Novi Sad during the war. There were a lot of us who came from Croatia and Bosnia. They resented us. In Vojvodina, I was not accepted well, nor were many other refugees…I was friendly more with other

refugees than the native kids from Vojvodina. Two thirds of my class in Novi Sad were kids from Bosnia and Croatia…only three or four local guys started to be friends with us by the last year, but more as some kind of personal benefit. I never made a genuine friend there…They felt that we disrupted their classes because the university broke up classes and mixed us with the regular kids plus they added additional classes because of us. –*Interview with Milan, Serb from Vukovar.*

In January 1996, following the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, approximately 70,000 Serbs fled parts of Sarajevo that were to be handed over to the Bosniak-Croat Federation; there is evidence that both the Federation and Republika Srpska encouraged this.[58] At the same time, Bosnian Muslims from Eastern Bosnia (and other parts) flooded Sarajevo and moved into the homes left by Serbs. Not all Sarajevans were thrilled with the idea of the "newcomers" settling into Sarajevo and changing the community. As a Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo explains:

> All these people from Eastern Bosnia changed Sarajevo. They came from the mountains where there is nothing–why would they want to go back? *Interview with Nada, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo.*

Despite resistance to newcomers, there are also those who value change and dismiss intra-group tensions. As a representative from a local NGO in Serbia explains:

> Change is good for society…if an influx of refugees come to your town, they should not be blamed for change. Mixing and change in values, music or culture is not their responsibility…if someone blames them for that, that can start prejudice. It's wrong to try to freeze things in time and keep things the way you liked. –*Interview with Jovanka, Serb from Belgrade.*

Inter-group tensions

Though inter-group tensions existed (at least to some extent) in the pre-conflict period, they have taken on new meaning in the post-conflict context. While regional

---

[58] For a discussion of Serbs fleeing Sarajevo in 1996, see Chris Hedges (1996, June 1).

differences may have some bearing on levels of inter-group tension,[59] it is the context-specific factors, e.g., conduct in war and ethnic composition after war, that typically dictate the form inter-group tensions take in the post-conflict context. In the most extreme cases, inter-group tensions result in direct violence; in the least extreme cases they amount to personal insults or slights. In between these extremes, violations of property rights and discrimination take place.

Immediately after the wars ended, the security situation in the region was volatile. People were afraid to travel to places where they would be a minority. Perceptions of inter-group tensions were reinforced by experiences people shared. As a young Serb from Belgrade explained:

> We went to Lika to visit the place where my family is buried. When we arrived at the old family house, we were greeted with horrible slurs and stares. People said: 'what are *they* doing here.' It's as if they forgot my family lived there for generations. We didn't belong. *–Interview with Ivana, Serb from Belgrade*.

People were afraid to travel–they were afraid of being victimized and discriminated against or simply wanted to avoid being subjected to insults.

> I used to go to the Croatian coast every summer. I have no interest in that now. I know someone who returned and had a bad experience. They refused to accept his credit card because he signed in Cyrillic. *–Interview with Sanja, Serb from Vojvodina*.

Interestingly, as the security situation improved, perceptions of poor security persisted.

> They don't want us there. They removed the signs on the highway from Croatia to Serbia. I wouldn't go to Croatia with Serbian plates. If they see my plates, that would be the end of my car. *–Interview with Nenad, a young Serb from Belgrade*.

---

[59] In Istria, for example, where tolerance is high, people did not experience significant ethnic hostility during the war and did not lose significant portions of non-Croats the way other places in Croatia did.

A young woman from Zagreb expressed a similar view: "I would like to see Belgrade; I've never been to Serbia. But I would be afraid to go with Croatian plates." *–Interview with Vesna, a young Croat from Zagreb.*

When I mentioned to Vesna that I had heard the same fears raised in Belgrade, she seemed baffled: "No such thing would ever happen in Croatia. *They* are the ones shouting in *our* square 'this is Serbia.'" In some cases inter-ethnic tensions are blinding and prohibit people from seeing connections. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, inter-ethnic tensions are often connected to mistrust.

> When we returned to Višegrad they acted as if nothing happened. They know what they did. We lost two sons. We can't go back to live with people we can't trust; they won't admit what happened. *–Interview with Bosnian Muslim couple from Višegrad living in Sarajevo.*

In all three societies, inter-group tensions are part of the make-up of the post-conflict context. Inter-group tensions have influenced many aspects of life in the post-conflict context in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including travel between entities and education (two schools under one roof). There is a tendency for people living in one entity to avoid travelling *through* the other entity, even if it is the most direct route. In the Federation, there are separate schools for each ethnic group, thus limiting inter-group exchange.

In some societies in Croatia, such as Vukovar, people also live divided lives. In Vukovar, Serbs and Croats do not mingle in social life, e.g., there are Serb-friendly and Croat-friendly bars, clubs, cafes, etc. Similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vukovar also has two schools under one roof. With the exception of at least one NGO-run after school club, i.e., Youth Peace Group Danube (YPGD), Serb and Croat children have little

opportunities to interact. Parents often choose a life of separation for their children and refuse to allow them to engage in inter-ethnic exchange.

In Vukovar, parents are aware of the consequences of separation in schools–they know integrating into Croatian society entails sending their children to Croatian schools. In recent years, they have begun choosing schools based on where they anticipate the future of their children will be–in Croatia or Serbia. While there have been attempts to create an integrated school, e.g., with the support of Nansen Dialogue Center in Osijek, they have not been terribly successful.

> We tried changing the two schools under one roof. This change was not prepared or followed up by preparation of students, parents and teachers. They were just pushed in school in one building. We had a huge increase of ethnic conflicts since then. We have here a completely divided society with parallel lives, from kindergarten and upward, even fishing clubs are separated, and then suddenly you have to go in the same high school together. They are not educated to be tolerant but educated based on an enemy image. *–Interview with Mirko, Serb from Vukovar working for NGO.*

> In my experience, young people want to interact among each other but are blocked by parents…kids are open minded...here we don't have really a change in mentality regarding the other side…there aren't heartwarming stories of people becoming friendly. I don't know about any case like that. I only know that those who are in mixed marriages are open for change and they are the ones who support the idea of a new integrated school. As you know we had 25-30% mixed marriages before the war. *–Interview with Milan, Serb from Vukovar.*

Intra-group and inter-group tensions and disruptions certainly have an impact on the prospect of dialogue and willingness to engage in reconciliation. Initiatives aimed at addressing these tensions are described in Part IV of this chapter. They typically include youth camps, peace education training seminars, inter-cultural exchange programs, and various dialogue enhancing projects. The connection between reconciliation, conflict transformation and peacebuilding is made real in light of the need to address underlying tensions within and between groups.

Economic instability

Economic instability is a major source of tension and disruption in the region. Lack of job opportunities causes frustration that sometimes filters into intra-group and inter-group tensions. Unemployment rates are high throughout the region. Though the situation has improved since immediately after the wars, the global financial crisis (2008 onward) has affected the economic strength of the region. Unemployment rates are approximately 23.4% in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 15% in Croatia; and 17.4% in Serbia.[60]

Throughout the region, the transition from a socialist system (market socialism) to free market economy has brought confusion. While foreign firms, particularly larger consulting firms and banks, have set up offices in the region, these jobs are typically reserved for the well educated or English speaking. All three societies suffer from dissatisfaction with material living conditions; young people often experience poor job prospects for the future. Gallup's Balkan Monitor study in 2009 study suggests a future brain drain may be less of a threat than in the past, but that migration among young people will be driven by the search for better economic opportunities.[61]

Lack of transparency in the privatization process has created confusion for shareholders, i.e., employees and former employees. Pensions are frequently paid at less than what pensioners need to survive; in Serbia they are frozen and are not adjusted for inflation (B92, 2010, April, 26). In some cases, employees continue to work without pay just to maintain medical benefits and credits for retirement.

---

[60] The unemployment rates are reported by Banka Magazin (2010, May 17). The United States Department of State (2010, June 3) lists the official unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina at 40%, but includes unofficial estimates that include the grey zone of employment are between 18-22%.

[61] See Gallup Balkan Monitor (2009).

> I go to work every day even though I haven't received a paycheck for a year. I am not sure why I go…I guess maybe it's because of the benefits. For women in my age group it is hard to find a new job. We are not desirable as new employees. This is the case for most people in their fifties. *–Interview with Goca, Serb from Vojvodina*.

Perhaps the most frustrating tension is the rise of the new rich who are perceived as having made fortunes on the tragedies of the war. Hostilities regarding the disparity of the rich and poor are present in all there societies. Bitterness regarding treatment in war and being taken advantage of runs deep.

> I will never forget how they took advantage of us in Croatia. We had nothing and they raised their prices by three to four times just to make a profit on us. They knew we had no other choice. *–Interview with Senahid, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

The overall impact of these tensions is lack of trust; lack of trust in politicians, lack of trust in the nation, lack of trust in people. Suspicion and lack of trust resulting from economic instability have a greater impact on social conditions.

> You see this glass building [in Sarajevo]. This is all war profiteer money. Our politicians made money on the war and now we are suffering and they are still making money. *–Interview with Mirsad, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

A young person from Belgrade had a similar view.

> You know Arkan's son owns these restaurants. Belgrade is built on dirty money. We have the ultra rich and the ultra poor. *–Interview with Nataša, Serb from Belgrade*.

Uncertainty and unresolved issues

Uncertainty regarding unresolved issues, e.g., tenancy rights, rights of return, and border disputes are pronounced in the post-conflict situation. There is also widespread uncertainty about the future–will they enter the European Union, will Bosnia and Herzegovina manage to stay together or will Republika Srpska separate, will Kosovo's independence be accepted, etc. These uncertainties are even more pronounced given the

transitional nature of the post-conflict context. Clearly, the societies of former Yugoslavia are in a period of transition–transition from war to peace, transition to democracy, transition to free market economies. One of these transitions is sufficient to bring about uncertainty; people in the region face them all at the same time.

There is significant uncertainty regarding the national climate. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, divisive rhetoric between Haris Silajdžić, chair of the tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, has signaled red flags among ordinary people and the international community.

> When I hear Silajdžić and Dodik go back and forth, it sends chills. It brings back all the fear of the war. We were victims of terror, which was pushed on us. We are so far from peace…this past March [2008] with Dodik and Silajdžić it was so bad that I felt worse than in the nineties. I was sure that we were going to have another war. They were saying that returnees should start packing their stuff and that this time they will have warm bread to wait for them in their entities. That's something only ordinary people can understand–someone like me who lost their whole family. The politicians who are saying this are oblivious. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica*.

Though return rates have increased over the years, it is no surprise that return to some areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still waning–the climate of fear that existed during the conflict years continues to cloud the post-conflict context (Calic, 2009).

The right of return and tenancy rights are two issues that international organizations have worked on, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The former Yugoslav policy of tenancy rights whereby people had tenancy rights (similar to ownership rights, though not quite the same) to live in the socially owned apartments they occupied creates legal complications. Refugees have had a difficult time proving they did not abandon their apartments but were forced to leave because of war. In many cases, property cannot be easily returned because refugees

from other parts of the region have settled into the "abandoned" apartments. UNHCR describes such a case in its *Refugees Magazine*:

> Dusanka Jolic was not so lucky. Since her return, the ethnic Serb has lived for five years in a small basement while only a few hundred meters away, an ethnic Croat refugee from Bosnia has continued to occupy her three-story family home in the village of Kovacic. The Croat had already dismantled part of the house for building materials and every time Mrs. Jolic demanded the property back, he threatened to totally destroy it. 'I applied to get my house back first in 1998,' she said. 'I am still waiting.' (UNHCR, 2005, Sept. 1, p. 18)

In order for the original inhabitants to return, the state in question has to relocate the refugees who are currently living there, which is not necessarily something it is able or willing to do. As a result, not being allowed to even enter one's home or collect one's belongings is a source of frustration and counts as a major tension and disruptor.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a much better record than Croatia with respect to the issue of assistance with return–though it is far from perfect and people continue to struggle. As Marko, a Serb with tenancy rights in Sarajevo explained:

> I left Croatia and came to Sarajevo so I could report on what was happening. Things were getting bad where I lived so I got out of Croatia in time. I stayed in Sarajevo during the war and my flat was bombed several times. After I spent money fixing it, the state tried to take it from me. They said because I left the country for a period of time I abandoned it. I was lucky because I had all my documents and I went to court and fought it. *–Interview with Marko, Serb from Šibenik who relocated to Sarajevo during the war.*

Croatia's laws have prohibited former inhabitants from obtaining tenancy rights if they did not file a claim and present all the necessary documentation in a short time period after they fled. In many cases, documents were destroyed or people were physically unable to return in the short time they were required; in many cases they were also not made aware of the requirements. The situation has improved slightly in recent years, though it is far from resolved. As Magdalena explained in 2008:

> One problem that started to be resolved in 2006 was the regulation of lost tenant rights (*stanarsko pravo*). During socialist times those apartments were given to people just for their use and not to own…but under the pressure from outside (*internationals*) people were granted rights to request from government to be compensated for a loss of those tenant rights and provided with return of their apartments or some other solution for their housing. The momentum to solve this is getting better this year, but it is still quite slow. According to the rules, for example, if you did not leave Knin you had until December 31, 1997 to regulate your apartment, but if you left Knin you lost it. My friend who is a Croat had her case pending for seven years despite that she left Knin just for a month.
> –*Interview with Magdalena, Croat from Knin.*

Not being able to enter one's home because of what are perceived to be discriminatory practices designed to keep former inhabitants out has discouraged people from returning to live in the communities they fled. In cases where they are able to secure their property rights or rights of tenancy, there is a tendency to either sell the property or not occupy it (leave it empty and visit it once or twice a year). This behavior complicates statistics on return because on paper it may appear that refugees have returned but in reality this is not the case. Equally disturbing is the issue of pensions and retirement benefits. People who were citizens of Croatia but relocated to other states because of the war have lost years of their pensions or retirement benefits due to Croatia's policies.

> The deadline for getting this regulated was one year after the conflict was over. That was not enough time for such a scrupulous method and lack of ability of people to gather IDs and other paperwork related to past work history. You had to have some written document related to your work, e.g., a pay stub, vacation document, and two witnesses in order to prove your benefits and relationship with the company. Generally that was a big problem since people left in a hurry and without any documents. In my personal case I did not have all the necessary paperwork so I lost a portion of my retirement; I lost four years and that comes to five hundred Kunas. After many years of our efforts and other organizations, recently Croatian Parliament granted an extension for this process but in my opinion not many people will be able to benefit from this due to lack of documentation…After some time after Oluja all remaining Serbs had to leave their jobs, including my husband, who luckily had enough years for retirement.
> –*Interview with Magdalena, Croat from Knin.*

In many cases, Croatian citizens who worked for the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) have had a difficult time securing their pensions. In Serbia, many people receive inadequate pensions that are not adjusted for inflation. Veterans' rights regarding pensions and benefits represent another sore point; veteran protests are common in all three states.[62]

Disputes over borders further complicate matters. This is pronounced in Serbia with respect to the status of Kosovo, though border disputes are still being resolved between Croatia and Slovenia.[63] While the internal borders within Bosnia and Herzegovina were established in the Dayton Agreement of 1995, tensions over internal borders persist. Travel between the entities is at times tortuous. As Amir Husak (2010) points out, since each entity has its own transportation system, travel that involves passing from one entity to the next can result in changing trains or buses several times before reaching the final destination. Travel within the region is also difficult. In the case of travel by train between Sarajevo and Belgrade, passengers experience four customs controls and three changes of locomotives.[64] Frustration over borders and dissatisfaction with borders frequently cause people to create elaborate routes to avoid traveling through the other entity.

> To get to Srebrenica, people in Sarajevo take the long way through Tuzla to avoid going through Republika Srpska. It adds a lot of time to the commute, but they feel better about it. They don't like to enter Republika Srpska until they have to. I used to do the same, but now I take the more direct route. –*Interview with Amir, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

---

[62] For coverage of veteran protests, see B92 (2010, June 9) and B92 (2010, April 21).

[63] Serbian President Boris Tadić has been selected to mediate the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. See B92 (2010, May 27).

[64] See Politika Online (2010, July 2).

In some ways, the internal borders have also worked to solidify identity with one's entity.

Many people feel "at home" when they enter the entity where their ethnic group is not in

the minority; for others, they no longer feel "at home" anywhere.

> I am for separation, I want to live in Republika Srpska and others can live where they want…when I am coming from Tuzla with some friends and I see that board 'Welcome to Republika Srpska' it feels like I am coming home and I can relax. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

> Sarajevo used to be my home but I don't recognize it anymore. I don't belong there. I don't feel comfortable. There are so many mosques and women covering, it's like Sarajevo is only for Muslims now. *–Interview with Nena, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Srebrenica.*

> For me, it does not matter if I live in Republika Srpska or the Federation–I live alone one way or the other. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

One case where tensions over internal borders were addressed in Bosnia and Herzegovina

is in the case the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the victims of genocide

that took place against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in 1995.   The fact that the

Srebrenica-Potočari site is part of Republika Srpska is a major source of contention for

many Bosnian Muslims. From the perspective of the families of victims, the place their

loved ones are buried should not be located in the entity responsible for their murder. Up

until 2007, another sore point was that Republika Srpska was in charge of security for the

site. While some Bosnian Muslims may have been hopeful that all of Srebrenica would

be counted as part of the Federation, they succeeded in creating enough pressure for the

Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery to be placed under the protection of the

State Agency for Investigations and (SIPA).[65] Of course, to get to the site, travel through

Republika Srpska is necessary; perhaps the meaning of the change is largely symbolic.

---

[65] For a discussion of the change, see SETimes.com (2007, June 28).

The climate of uncertainty and unresolved issues that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina is terribly complex. Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a real crisis of legitimacy. Though it has made strides in the issue of tenancy rights and rights of return, for many, dissatisfaction with the outcome/consequences of the war remains.

Of the three states, Croatia is in the best position with respect to future prosperity; it has achieved EU candidacy and will likely be the first of the three to join the EU, perhaps as early as end of 2011 or beginning of 2012. This itself will cause disruptions, however, as people from the region (except for Slovenia which is already an EU member) will have to get visas to travel to Croatia. Though unresolved issues regarding property rights and return continue to fester in Croatia, it may stand the best chance of overcoming uncertainty about the future. On the issue of return, interestingly, Croatia's joining the EU may prompt an increase in Croatian Serb refugees returning to Croatia.

Uncertainty in Serbia is somewhere between the levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. On one hand, Serbia stands a much better chance of achieving EU candidacy before Bosnia and Herzegovina; on the other hand, uncertainty over the status of Kosovo may inhibit Serbia's future collaboration at the regional level as well as in talks with the EU. Unfortunately for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as long as polarization at the entity level continues, it is likely its path to EU candidacy will stagger.

Identity

Tensions and disruptions surrounding identity are common throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. In the post-conflict context, there is a struggle for recognition and for acknowledgment. The transitions and uncertainties people face sometimes cause certain aspects of identity, e.g., ethnicity, nationality, religion, to shift or

become more salient. Though there is debate about whether a strong Yugoslav identity ever existed in the former Yugoslavia, to the extent that at least some people identified with Yugoslavia as a part of their identity, this aspect of identity has been challenged by the painful dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued. In many ways, the brutal nature of the dissolution challenges positive aspects of what it meant to have a sense of Yugoslav identity. While this is not necessarily relevant for younger generations, it is often salient for the generations who remember what it was like to live in Yugoslavia. These generations face the consequences of the disruption of at least one aspect of their identity. For some, a sense of identification with Yugoslavia was replaced by identification with the national group, e.g., Croatia, Serbia, etc.

> Today you have to know who you are. I have a friend, a Croat, who is agnostic and I tell her 'you have to celebrate your Christmas or otherwise your kids will not have an identity.' Today in schools kids study religion, there are no more Yugoslavs or Bosnians. Now you are either: Muslim, Croat or Serb. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

For others the loss of identification with Yugoslavia has been traumatic.

> It makes me sick when I think of what we did to each other, of all we destroyed. Young people today have no idea how great it was to grow up the way we did. I remember hitchhiking with my friends from the Montenegrin seaside to Croatia. We never had any fear. We would sleep in the park after clubbing or a night-out in Croatia and nobody would bother us. Today, you have to be afraid wherever you go. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

It is not only the loss of Yugoslavia but also the symbolic meaning of that loss that affects some people most.

> We were so much bigger. Now I feel so small. We were part of something really great. We were a presence in the world. Now we are nothing.
> *–Interview with Nenad, Serb from Belgrade.*

> We were the envy of all the countries in Eastern Europe. They all wanted to be like us–they wished they could have what we had. Now look at them and look at us. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

There are also those who find themselves confused about where to place their identification with Yugoslavia. As I accompanied a Serbian woman, Milena, on a visit to meet her Bosnian Serb friend, Branka, in the United States, I realized just how confusing this can be in day to day life events, even something as mundane as presenting a gift of chocolate. In this case of participant observation, Milena proudly presented a box of chocolate to Branka, but suddenly became confused with how to describe her special gift:

> Here you are, this is for you. And it's *ours*! I mean–it used to be ours. I mean, uh, well it's Kraš, it's from Croatia…um, well, I bought it here [in the US].
> –*Observation of Milena, Serb from Vojvodina*.

After the confusion, Branka thanked Milena for the gift. At one point, as the day went on, Branka asked me about my recent trip to the region. I started by describing some experiences in Sarajevo, but was quickly interrupted:

> Oh Sarajevo is terrible now. It has completely changed. It is only for Muslims. Women are covered and there are so many mosques–it is not for *us*.
> –*Conversation with Branka, Bosnian Serb from Bijeljina*.

My efforts to explain that I hadn't experienced Sarajevo in quite the way she described did not go well so I decided to mention another place–Medjugorje. That was even more problematic. "Oh that place is all made-up. It's a scam so the Croats can get attention and money." –*Conversation with Branka, Bosnian Serb from Bijeljina*. Thinking on my feet, I quickly suggested that next time I am in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would make sure to visit her town. Milena quickly interrupted: "but her town isn't in Bosnia, it's in Serbia." I was now at a loss for words. Luckily Milena's husband interrupted and confirmed that Bijeljina is in fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In reality, it is confusing for people to place their identification with Yugoslavia and everything it entailed. Many people I met who immigrated to the United States and

were born during the time of Yugoslavia continue to refer to their homeland as Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a place with an identity that is difficult for many to forget. As I accompanied a group of three men (in their late-twenties) out for the night in Sarajevo, I experienced some of what has been called "Yugo-nostalgia."

> These two are my best friends. You see me, I am Muslim, he is Orthodox (*Pravoslavac*) and he is Catholic. Don't go by what you hear from people about hatred. We are best friends, we were best friends during the war and we will always be best friends. –*Conversation with Damir, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

As Damir was driving us back from the outing, he started singing songs from his days as Tito's pioneer in Yugoslavia. The other two quickly chimed in but relied on Damir for most of the words. Their memories were fading. After about three or four songs, Damir stopped singing and got quiet. One friend frantically replied: "Give more, give more! (*Daj još, daj još!*)." On some level the friend appeared to be desperate to hold onto part of his identity that has now been lost or forgotten.

Identification with Yugoslavia is not the only aspect of identity that creates tension and disruption. Identification with one's ethnic group also creates challenges.

> I don't buy into this idea that Croatia is the best, that it has the prettiest women and the best beaches. I have travelled and I have seen prettier women, I have seen better beaches. I don't share this identity. –*Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb*.

Particularly troubling are times when people feel restricted from questioning anything about their identity.

> I watched them throw flowers on the tanks in New Belgrade. I was very young but I was taught that this is what a *good* Serb does. –*Interview with Ivana, Serb from Belgrade*.

There are also times when people cannot help but question their identity.

> I can tell you what I was thinking just before the war. I was studying *Japanese…* I never imagined what would happen to my life, to my country. Everything I envisioned for my future went up in smoke…I reached a point where I became disgusted–when I received the morning newspaper showing a big picture of a man's head with a pitch-fork in it, that's when I knew I had to separate myself from this–it was barbaric. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

Confusion and identity conflict struck on another occasion when I observed Milena as she watched CNN's airing of the riots in Belgrade following the declaration of independence by Kosovo Albanians in February of 2008. Through participant observation, I witnessed Milena's personal struggle. Embarrassed by the scene of protesters destroying storefronts in Belgrade and then attacking the US Embassy, Milena decried in disgust: "animals, they are animals, pure hoodlums!" After a minute, Milena turned to me and asked in a defensive tone: "what are they saying, are they saying that they have a right (*pravo*)?" Milena was torn between her sense of dignity as a person and as a Serb; she was ashamed that Serbs would behave as the protestors did for the world to see. On the other hand, as soon as she said something negative about them, she immediately became defensive of the protesters. She was conflicted between her personal sense of identity and that of her group.

Identity construction is tricky business. Identities are complex and multifaceted. Aspects of individual identity often become entangled with collective dimensions. Some people look inward and cling to certain aspects of their personal identity in times of crisis; others look outward and mimic the identity scripts they see in their surroundings. As Appiah (1994) points out, there is an aspect of identity that is scripted, but one has to be careful that identity is not so tightly scripted that it inhibits individual freedom. In the

post-conflict context, tensions and disruptions surrounding identity scripts of what it means to be a good Muslim, a good Croat, a good Serb, are salient.

Trauma

Of all the tensions and disruptions discussed so far, trauma is perhaps the most prevalent and most difficult to deal with. In all three states, trauma and the effects of trauma have a major impact on individual and social life. Trauma comes in many forms and the people of the region have been exposed to more than their fair share. Those who experienced torture or were in prison camps are haunted by the traumatic experiences they endured (Beara & Miljanović, 2006; Opačić et al., 2006). This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. For people who have missing loved ones, the gruesome ordeal of giving DNA samples and identifying body parts takes its toll.[66] In all three societies, missing persons is a major tension. People are consumed by thoughts of what happened to their loved ones. In cases where they eventually identify their loved ones, they often become obsessed with the questions of why, how and who is responsible. In many cases the trauma of identifying loved ones is further exacerbated by the fact that loved ones' bodies were buried in mass graves only to be dug up and dispersed in secondary and tertiary mass graves in order to avoid identification. In reality, organizations for missing persons, such as International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP), may eventually identify a part of an arm from one mass grave, a part of a leg from another, and a piece of clothing from another. It is often up to the organizations to decide when they have secured enough "parts" to inform the family and allow them to put the loved one to rest. The kind of trauma associated with this ordeal is haunting.

---

[66] For insight into the process of identifying missing persons and related data, see International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP) http://www.ic-mp.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/fact-sheet-eng1.pdf

> It is going to be a year since the remains of my children were positively identified. Before that I was always hopeful that maybe they would be found alive…for 13 years I was living in a dream. I don't know how, but you live…when you hear stories about how they would throw people in mass graves and then tanks would go over them, you have a feeling that you to go out of your skin, it is horrible.
> –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

In some cases, family members plead with the (suspected) perpetrators for the whereabouts of the graves. There are cases where family members receive anonymous tips about the locations of mass graves. For some this is a sign of relief and good will but also proof that someone knows something and isn't letting on.

As a result of the multitude of open issues surrounding what happened in the war, why and how it happened, people are left dissatisfied and mystified by the trauma they experienced. While some seek psychological counseling, others rely on anxiety medications and rituals for getting through the day. The sense that the war is still not over looms large, especially for the traumatized. It is difficult for traumatized people to accept what happened and to turn the page.

As Beara & Miljanović (2006) describe, the sense of reliving the war is dominant in veterans in particular–they have a very difficult time integrating into normal life. Those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) exhibit feelings of anger, resentment, sadness and guilt, which they have a difficulty expressing. While some have benefited from psychological therapy and have even become peace activists, many veterans become further isolated in their communities and even in their families. Suicide among veterans is a problem in all three states (Beara & Miljanović, 2006; Opačić et al., 2006).

Dissatisfaction with the results of the war causes many people to dwell on the outcome, become consumed with what they lost, and fixate on the past and who is to

blame. In such situations, people become entangled in a vicious cycle of trauma that keeps them in the past and prevents them from engaging in the present or planning for the future. The issue of trauma is perhaps the most confounding tension and disruptor in the post-conflict situation. People live with the trauma of what they did or did not do as well as what they, their loved ones, their community, their country endured in the years of war they were subjected to. All three societies experienced war-related trauma and continue to live with the effects of trauma on a daily basis. While people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Croatia have visual reminders of the destruction of war, i.e., with destroyed homes and burnt villages, people in Serbia recall the trauma they experienced during war (whether because of sanctions or on the front line). The visual destruction in Serbia proper is not severe as it is in the other two states, though buildings and bridges bombed by NATO serve as reminders. Kosovo, of course, bears the visual signs of war and destruction. In light of the debilitating aspects of trauma, the tensions connected with trauma are critical to a proper understanding of the post-conflict context. The themes and tensions described above have a direct impact on dealing with the past and on initiatives designed to bring about reconciliation. The next section addresses some of these themes and tensions within the context of dealing with the past. Following that section is a discussion of practices aimed at reconciliation.

Part III. Discourse on dealing with the past in the region

For many communities in former Yugoslavia, despite a sort of Yugo-nostalgia, i.e., a longing for meaningful aspects of "Yugoslav culture" before the recent conflicts expressed *by some*,[67] the process of facing the recent past is characterized as opening a

---

[67] Surely Yugo-nostalgia is not dominant. The point here is there is sometimes a willingness to look to positive aspects of the shared past, but often an unwillingness to look into darker aspects of the recent past.

Pandora's box. While cursory criticism assumes this has to do with people's resistance to admit wrongdoing, a deeper look reveals the complex psychosocial baggage that comes with it. Dealing with the past is painful; it is painful to revisit trauma; it is painful to hear so many stories of betrayal and destruction. It is painful to hear about atrocities committed in the name of one's group. In spite of the pain associated with it, dealing with the past is often characterized by civil society[68] and international organizations as something people in the region *must* do. This is in part a reflection on the region's history of impunity, i.e., ignoring crimes committed during World War II. Despite the Croatian Ustasha's practice of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Roma and others during World War II, these atrocities along with those committed by other groups were swept under the proverbial rug during Tito's rule of Yugoslavia.[69] On some level, lack of formal/institutional measures to face the crimes and atrocities committed during World War II allowed memories, mistrust and resentment to lay dormant and victims to feel as though their pain did not count. In the absence of formal acknowledgement of these abuses, memories were passed down through generations in informal ways. According to Refik Hodžić, this kind of generational storytelling must be avoided in the current context. In an interview with Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA), he argues:

> [A]s long as we rely on the method of oral history, so genuine and characteristic of us, to transfer to our children the stories of what had happened and these same children have nothing of an objective truth by means of which to compare the

---

[68] By civil society I mean members of organizations, associations, or social groups that are not affiliated with the government, including non-governmental organizations and not-for-profit institutions. In this context, civil society includes NGOs, grassroots organizations, religious associations, etc. Ordinary people may or may not choose to be part of civil society. Journalists may or may not be part of civil society; if they work for a for-profit institution or for the government, they are typically not counted as civil society.

[69] There were of course memorials created for victims of fascism throughout former Yugoslavia. It is not that victims were not acknowledged, but that it was up to the state to create the narrative about who were victims and who were perpetrators and how to go about acknowledging victims.

> stories they hear at home to accessible facts, we will be creating a fruitful soil for possible conflicts, lack of understanding, quarrels that will always have some very direct connections to the past. (Rill et al., 2007, p. 145)

On Hodžić's perspective, ignoring the recent past would amount to repeating the mistakes of Tito's post World War II Yugoslavia and laying the foundation for future conflict. As Nenad Vukosavljević argues: "[t]he goal of dealing with the past has to be to learn a lesson for the future and prevent violence" (Vukosavljević, 2007, p. 152). Unlike Mozambique and Angola, oblivion is not a viable option for former Yugoslavia.

In the post-conflict context in former Yugoslavia, members of civil society are the most vocal in stressing the importance of dealing with the past. Though they may not always agree on which mechanisms are appropriate, across all three societies (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia) civil society plays a dominant role. Members of civil society speak frequently about the need to address crimes, to acknowledge victims and to end the cycle of impunity. They also speak about the need to establish the truth about what happened during the recent conflicts and to promote justice and reconciliation (Rill et al., 2007).

In all three societies, members of civil society have received criticism from their own communities. In extreme cases, they are referred to as traitors and Western spies. Some of the most visible members of civil society have received death threats for their outspoken convictions on the need for their societies to face the past, accept truth and promote justice. Others have been the subject of public scrutiny, often accused of being under the influence of international donors. Despite criticism from within and outside their own societies, with the help of international donors and international organizations,

members of civil society have carried efforts to face the past and promote reconciliation in the region.

Until recently, elites have not been so vocal about dealing with the past and promoting reconciliation, though a change is seemingly underway. Recent efforts of Croatian President Ivo Josipović and Serbian President Boris Tadić in opening dialogue through apologies and renunciation of crimes committed during the conflicts is a sign of this (B92, 2010 July 11a, July 11b, June 23, June 1, May 31a, May 31b, May 29a). In addition, the recent agreement for better relations organized by the Igman Initiative[70] and signed by Ivo Josipović, Boris Tadić, Filip Vujanović, President of Montenegro, and Haris Silajdžić, Presidency Chairman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shows signs of a possible commitment among regional leaders to face the past and promote reconciliation (B92, 2010, May 29b).[71] Shortly after this agreement, Ivo Josipović, Sulejman Tihić (President of the SDA[72] political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Milorad Dodik and Rajko Kuzmanović (Prime Minister and President of Republika Srpska respectively), visited sites of victims of war from all three sides (Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs) and commemorated those victims (B92, 2010 May 31b). While it is too early to judge the impact of these efforts, it is possible they will have a positive effect on dealing with the past and reconciliation in the region. It is also possible, however, that any positive impact will be diminished by a series of negative exchanges. Indeed, despite the apparent progress made, around the time of the Igman Initiative inspired agreement,

---

[70] The Igman Initiative is a regional network of non-governmental organizations aimed at establishing dialogue throughout the region. See http://www.igman-initiative.org/

[71] The leaders agreed on cooperation and normalization of relations.

[72] The SDA is the Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Silajdžić cancelled his trip to meet Tadić in Belgrade, in part because he was not going to be able to meet with a Bosnian prisoner in Belgrade (B92, 2010, May 26).

Among the most compelling developments at the elite level, and perhaps what paved the way for the events described above, is the passing of the Srebrenica Declaration in Serbia. Under Tadić, in March of this year, the Serbian government passed a resolution condemning the crimes committted in Srebrenica (B92, 2010 Mar. 31a). Though not everyone is satisfied with the language of the resolution–Serbian opposition parties want a condemnation of crimes committed against Serbs (B92, 2010 Mar. 31a); civil society organizations, such as Women in Black and Mothers of Srebrenica, want the crimes to be listed as genocide (B92, 2010 May 11, Mar 31b); others want all crimes and all victims to be acknowledged (not just Srebrenica), the fact that Tadić pushed this resolution through shows signs of good faith (B92, 2010 Mar. 31a, Apr. 2, Apr. 4; Toma, 2010, Apr. 1). While the recent steps taken by elites marks a new level of engagement, it is not clear whether these steps will have a concrete impact on how dealing with the past and reconciliation are perceived in the region.

Despite the appearance of disengagement, elites have been part of the discourse all along, though not necessarily in positive ways. Nationalist elites, for example, have insisted on their own selective versions of dealing with the past, often blaming other groups for crimes and creating a climate of denial surrounding their own group's culpability. This type of discourse has produced tension among society and has tied dealing with the past to cycles of blame and denial. As a result, it is not surprising that elites overall have not made a *positive* impact on dealing with the past. Nonetheless, whether because of pressure from the European Union or simply because "the time is

right" it seems the tide may be turning for *some* elites to take a more active and positive role in dealing with the past. There are, however, those who are skeptical of their motivations, e.g., EU appeasement or genuine good will.

Across the region, the media have played a dominant role in discourse on dealing with the past and reconciliation. With the ability to reach wider audiences, they have had the most influence on shaping how efforts are portrayed. Of course, not all media contribute in the same way. Some independent-leaning media have created inter-ethnic dialogue sessions promoting efforts to overcome division and build trust. Marina Fratucan's *Restart*[73] series in Vojvodina on multi-ethnic dialogue is an example of an independent-leaning media program that aired on RTS (national television) in Serbia. Criticism has been launched, however that *Restart* was shown during off hours, thus minimizing its impact (Ignjatović, 2007 Dec. 14). *Latinica* in Croatia is another example of media promoting multi-ethnic dialogue.

The media have also aired footage on war crimes to support acknowledgement of crimes and impede denial.[74] Often, however, state sponsored media have publicized divisive rhetoric and politically charged exchanges.[75] As a result, in some cases, the media have contributed to open-minded reflection and dialogue, whereas in others they have contributed to a climate of polarization and competing victimization on the topic of dealing with the past (Sadovic, 2006, Aug. 18). For some, the impact of negative rhetoric should not be dismissed.

---

[73] For a discussion of the placement of *Restart*, see Sanja Ignjatović (2007 Dec. 14).

[74] B92 was among the independent media channels airing the infamous Scorpions footage in 2005, which showed genocide in Srebrenica.

[75] The bitter exchanges between Silajdžić and Dodik in 2008 are examples of this.

You can discount negative political rhetoric, but we all witnessed what the end result of that can bring. In the case of BiH it is not only that we have internal political currents, but also that we cannot free ourselves from outside currents coming from Serbia and Croatia. I mean just recently it was so bad that my parents called one day and asked what is going on and are we going to have war again? That's how bad it was here just recently. –*Interview with Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo.*

The framework within which facing past is characterized by the media and elites is itself instrumental in creating the context within which members of civil society create initiatives for dealing with the past as well as the context within which ordinary people understand these initiatives. Against the backdrop of blame and denial, truth and justice are major elements of many of civil society's efforts to face the past. On their view, by confronting the past, the post-conflict societies will be in a position to: a) accept the truth and overcome denial, b) demand justice and focus blame where it belongs, and c) open up to reconciliation. Often there is an expectation that truth and justice are necessary for reconciliation and for preventing the mistakes of the past from being repeated. Both truth and justice, however, are contentious. People have different truths–sometimes competing truths. People also have competing visions of justice–retributive versus restorative. There are also different motivations for dealing with the past–some seek closure, others seek revenge. As a result, rather than being conducive to reconciliation, dealing with the past as connected with truth and justice can be a source of continued hostility.

In the context of former Yugoslavia, the five approaches to dealing with the past discussed in the first chapter play a role in discourse on dealing with the past: retribution, truth, restitution, reform and oblivion (Gloppen, 2005). While Gloppen envisioned all five as potential strategies for bringing about reconciliation, it is not entirely clear that reconciliation is always the main goal of dealing with the past in former Yugoslavia.

What is clear, however, is that reconciliation (whether thought of as positive or negative) is typically tied to dealing with the past and, by default, to truth and justice. The following provides a brief overview of some interrelated themes that surface in discourse on dealing with the past in the region.

Themes in discourse on dealing with the past

Normalcy

For many people, the horrors of the conflicts and the continued sense of angst that surrounds them has meant their lives, their societies, their fellow countrymen are simply not normal. Returning to normalcy is something many people hope for. Normalcy often means being free of the burden and stigma of the past–being free to live one's life without worrying about the next political upheaval or the next outbreak of war. It also means being able to travel and talk to neighbors as "normal" people do. In some cases, returning to normalcy means turning one's back on the recent past and moving forward–a sort of therapeutic *forgetting*; in other cases, it means just the opposite.

For veterans normalcy is bittersweet. As Beara & Miljanović (2006) point out, veterans have a very difficult time adjusting to "normal" life. They have a difficult time feeling comfortable in their own societies, in their own families and even in their bodies after war. They face something of an existential crisis (Beara & Miljanović, 2006). They are constantly searching for the meaning of life through the meaning of the war(s) they participated in (Beara & Miljanović, 2006). Feelings of guilt, rage, and betrayal consume them. For veterans, dealing with the past is not as much about returning to normalcy as it is about reconciling with oneself, about personal healing and social understanding. Being able to get through a conversation without an outburst, to hold their own child without

fear, to sleep without nightmares are "normal" aspects of life that seem out of reach for many veterans, especially those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Beara & Miljanović, 2006). The appearance of normalcy that ordinary people are looking for in the post-conflict context often disturbs those who have been traumatized, including war veterans, torture victims, and former camp prisoners, causing further isolation rather than a return to pre-conflict "normal" life. Beara and Miljanović (2006) discuss an interview with a wounded veteran that demonstrates this:

> 'In war, all you think about is how to stay alive and to get back to your family. And then you get wounded and finally you get back to your family and you still feel alone. That's when your heart breaks. Then you ask yourself if you are normal. It's nicer for me to get back to war among those without arms and legs than being with my own kids. Then you wonder if you are a beast.' (p. 113)

There are, however, some veterans who have overcome isolation. After working through their own trauma and reconciling with themselves, they have decided to promote dealing with the past and reconciliation in their own societies. Some have become involved in community work and speaking at schools. Others have become peace activists, conducting training sessions on peacebuilding and nonviolence.[76] For these veterans, dealing with the past is their responsibility. Beara & Miljanović (2007) argue:

> The voice of immediate participants of the war needs to be heard, because they know what war is, they have seen the suffering of people, their mates, they have lost parts of their bodies. Participants of the wars are not allowed to speak in any country. If that happened, there would be no wars to start with. (p. 172)

According to Beara and Miljanović (2007): "A traumatized veteran is a person who values peace highly, but has great difficulties living in it normally after their experiences from the war" (p. 171).

---

[76] Adnan Hasanbegović's work at the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) in Sarajevo is an example of this. See http://www.nenasilje.org/cna/aboutus_e.html.

The return to normalcy is multifaceted and complex when it comes to people who are traumatized. For victims of trauma, normalcy brings with it a fear that they will forget their loved ones and turn their backs on what they experienced during the wars. Envisioning the future is difficult because the past is always with them. Unresolved issues, missing persons, destroyed homes, lack of jobs are all signs of the war. Like war veterans, they are torn between the past and the future and somehow stuck in the present. A path to normalcy often oscillates in and out of reach. As Amela Puljek-Shank (2007) describes:

> Trauma has the ability to split a person in half where one part of us wants to live a normal life and forget that we ever had any kind of traumatic event that took place in our lives. The other part of us just cannot get over what happened to us. If we do not work intentionally on healing our own trauma(s) these two states within ourselves will always be at war. (p. 197)

In addition to the traumatized, there are also ordinary people who are tired of hearing about war, death, destruction and sadness. They want something to hope for, something to look forward to. They don't want to be tied to the burden of the past. They don't want to be stigmatized by what occurred. Even among civil society–the major proponents of dealing with the past, burnout is common. It is difficult for people to deal with such heavy issues on a regular basis–to be overwhelmed with stories of immense sadness and bombarded with images of genocide, of mass graves and destroyed villages. A temporary return to normalcy is something even the strongest advocates of dealing the past strive for.

In an interview with Refik Hodžić conducted by the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA), Hodžić links normalcy to dealing with the past. On his view, dealing with the past is *necessary* for the societies of Bosnia and Herzegovina–oblivion is not an option.

> [D]ealing with the past is really a process in which we need to create a space for ourselves within which we can deal with what is, unfortunately, a recent and a horribly bloody past...[W]e need to face the fact that at one point we had simply moved in an unwanted direction in terms of our lives, the history of this country, and the future of ourselves and our children. We had simply strayed off a normal path...into some sort of darkness. Now, of course, it's horrible to look into this darkness because we know it's filled with blood, fear, evil, injustice, but in order for us to be able to retrun to this path that leads to...a more normal life...we have to, unfortunately, revist this darkness. (Rill et al., 2007, p 137)

According to Hodžić, dealing with the past can help bring people back to a normal path by: a) establishing truth or facts, b) sanctioning perpetrators, and c) reforming institutions (Rill et al., 2007). He believes the societies of former Yugoslavia must face the past in order to return to normal life.

Nenad Vukosavljević also echoes the view that it is necessary to face the past. Vukosavljević describes dealing with the past as a social process, not just a judicial process. On his view, dealing with the past will prevent society from repeating the mistakes of the past (2007). In spite of the necessity of dealing with the past, as he points out, there is disagreement among ordinary people about why they should bother. Vukosavljević attributes this in part to the stratification of society, particularly Serbian society, where young people see it as a burden and others just want to escape the past (Vukosavljević, 2007, p. 154). A closer look at *why* young people see it as a burden or *why* others want to escape may reveal something about how dealing with the past is presented as well as the different ways in which the past affects people of different generations. As a young student explained:

> We are sick of hearing about what Milošević did. We are sick of hearing about all the mistakes of the previous generations. They took so many years from our lives. We don't want them to take anymore. *–Interview with Goran, Serb from Višegrad who relocated to Belgrade.*

Many people resent the depiction of dealing with the past as something *they* must do. It restricts their freedom to decide what they want to think about, to engage in, to read and learn about. It also influences their perceptions of self and how they want to think about their lives, futures, and identities. Perceptions of individual and collective identities are often disrupted in the process of dealing with the past. In the view of a young person from Belgrade:

> I don't want to see pictures of mass graves and dead bodies. I grew up with these pictures and I have had enough. I want to see beautiful things, pictures of the world, not this depressing stuff. *–Interview with Nataša, Serb from Belgrade*.

> Personally I don't care about past… I like to look to the future. You have to forget about what was 200 years ago. The situation now is different and you have to adjust. *–Interview with Sandra, mixed Serb and Macedonian background from Rijeka who relocated to Belgrade*.

People also become desensitized to elements of the past. For some, over-exposure to the horrors people experienced makes them numb. In a conversation with someone who works for the ICTY, we entered the subject of the film *Snjeg*. I mentioned I was planning to see it that day and asked her to recommend a movie theater. She was very interested in explaining the differences in the movie theaters in Sarajevo, but never mentioned anything about the film that she'd seen a few days before. I finally asked, "so, how was the film?" She responded: "oh, it's just another film about the war in Eastern Bosnia." *–Conversation with Marija, Croat from Zagreb working in Sarajevo*. Of course, it is an award winning film about life after the war in Eastern Bosnia. Yet, for Marija, she has seen and heard this so many times that there is nothing remarkable about the film, nothing worth mentioning. The film's depiction of the trauma of a young child who witnessed the massacre of children and the awareness of a neighbor who failed to

protect them is common for Marija. The proliferation of horrifying stories has led to a level of desensitization. For others, however, this is not the case.

In some ways, the persistence of civil society in the region has made it difficult for ordinary people to ignore the past. Even those who choose to ignore it are aware that civil society wants them to face it, wants them to play an active role. Dealing with the past is something individuals and groups are encouraged by civil society to take part in. It is also something people sometimes feel forced to hear about, forced to see, as though they don't have a choice. This can be frustrating, especially for young people who don't want the mistakes of previous generations to continue to infiltrate their future.

Polarization

Dealing with the past in the post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia is deeply polarizing. There are those who think of dealing with the past as a euphemism for a process designed to blame, stigmatize and punish their own group. There are also those who think of dealing with the past as necessary for some groups–the perpetrators and victims, but not for society as a whole, e.g., not for bystanders and beneficiaries of violence. Then there are those who think everyone must face the past. The context within which these different views can be heard is one of division and polarization. The way in which dealing with the past has been framed in the media and by elites (particularly extreme nationalist elites) contributes to this polarization. In most cases, the benefits of dealing with the past are not made clear–people often perceive they have nothing to gain and everything to lose.

Criminologist Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović of the Serbian Victimology Society (VDS) characterizes discourse on dealing with the past in Serbia as caught between two

extremes (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004). On one extreme, there are nationalist extremists who consider most efforts to face the past tantamount to betrayal, particularly when they involve looking into the crimes of Serbs. On the other hand, there are a number of vocal anti-nationalist extremists of a sort, such as Nataša Kandić of the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade and Sonja Biserko of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, whose aim seems to be to shame Serbian society into accepting full blame for the magnitude of crimes committed in its name. Nikolić-Ristanović has proposed the need for a "third way" for dealing with the past in Serbian society (2004). Within public discourse in Serbia, nationalist extremists purport that Serbs are the main victims (only/mainly Serb victims count), whereas anti-nationalist extremists argue that Serbs are the main perpetrators (only/mainly non-Serb victims count).   As Nikolić-Ristanović points out, both extremes serve to further isolate Serbian people from participating in the various opportunities for dealing with the past, particularly if they do not fully agree with either extreme view (2004).

While this discourse of extremes is not unique to Serbia, it is particularly pronounced in Serbia, perhaps due the *perception of* "collective guilt" that the international community and the other former Yugoslav republics place on Serbia for its role in instigating the conflicts. Indeed, in my own observations of university students from the former Yugoslav republics, the first point many want to consider is who started the war; once agreement is reached on this point, then dialogue begins. When agreement is not reached, however, because the question is overly simplistic, dialogue often breaks down. This scenario is not unique to university students, but is common in discourse on dealing with the past in the former Yugoslav republics. The question of who started the

conflict and who was the aggressor often leads to challenging the legitimacy of victims and assigning or denying blame in broad strokes. It sets up the problematic expectation that whoever started the war is the ultimate perpetrator and whoever didn't is the ultimate defender, the ultimate victim. As a result of this divisive discourse, some members of civil society in Serbia face criticism for being against Serbs and not caring about Serb victims. Others try to distance their work from the stigma of the two extremes described above. As a trauma specialist from Serbia conveys:

> I cannot have anything to do with Nataša Kandić. I would lose all credibility with my clients. They associate her with hatred of Serbs. They would not trust me or open up to me if I were associated with her. Really, I think she is too aggressive. There is no balance in her approach. It might be that Serbian society needs someone like her to stir things up, but she cannot bring about reconciliation.
> –*Interview with Milan, Serb from Vojvodina.*

A student had a similar experience in his encounter with Sonja Biserko:

> I was trying to understand why her views are so extreme. Her view is that Serbs are one hundred percent responsible for the conflict and everything that followed. I asked her if it is possible that at least one percent can be attributed to another group, she said, 'no, absolutely not, Serbs are one hundred percent responsible.'
> –*Interview with Goran, Serb from Višegrad who relocated Belgrade.*

Clearly dealing with the past involves facing the discourse of extremes. In Serbian society, this discourse is particularly challenging. Even those who offer moderate views are accused of being traitors or in denial. In a very telling encounter, a law student from Belgrade experienced this during the conference of International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in Sarajevo, which I attended in 2007. The opening day of the conference began as a one-sided account of Serbian nationalism, aggression and genocide against Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a day's worth of similar speeches, in the final session for the day, a brave law student from Belgrade ventured a comment. He raised his hand and explained that he was hoping to hear something about the future, something

about how the countries can move forward. He blamed the previous generations for stealing years of his childhood and the childhood of his generation. His comments echoed the spirit of many in the room who were surprised at the one-sided tone of the conference. The response the student received was troubling. A local organizer of the conference accused him of being a genocide denier and insulted him by saying words to the effect: "I am surprised you are on the faculty of law in Belgrade." The discussion continued for a few exchanges, including one from a law student from Sarajevo who defended his colleague from Belgrade. It is unclear how the exchanges would have ended, had they not been interrupted by another law student from Belgrade who took a seizure in front of everyone in the session. The overall feeling that local organizers in Sarajevo hijacked the conference to advance their own political goals was the subject of a series of emails and complaints sent by IAGS members. Having received those emails, the polarizing effects of discourse on dealing with the past, even among academics, are difficult to ignore.

In Croatia, civil society members who demand that Croatia look into its role in the conflicts face similar challenges. In extreme cases, they are cast as traitors who do not appreciate the sacrifices made by the Croatian *defenders of the homeland war*. The popular narrative that Croatia did not start the war but fought bravely and with little weaponry to defend the nation seems inconsistent with the idea that Croatian defenders could have committed crimes. This inconsistency leads many to resent the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for indicting Croatian defenders, especially war hero/war criminal Ante Gotovina. For many in Croatia, dealing with the past is not something they need to do–it is something the aggressors must do. When

members of civil society trace Croatian nationalism to the start of the war, this becomes particularly troubling for the Croatian homeland defender narrative. This tension is further exacerbated when members of civil society demand that Croatia not only face its recent past, but also face its past during World War II and how this contributed to the recent conflict. Overall, the demands of civil society challenge the idea that Croatia is *exempt* from dealing with the past. A young person from Zagreb explained her frustration with this:

> There is no reason for our generals to go to The Hague. They were defending the country against aggression. Anyone who supports this is saying: 'if you are attacked, you have no right to defend yourself.' – *Interview with Vesna, a young Croat from Zagreb.*

Furthermore, a veteran in Knin explains: "Our men did nothing wrong. I can guarantee one hundred percent that they did nothing wrong." –*Interview with Dino, Croat veteran from Knin.*

Despite the persistence of civil society, for many people in Croatia, dealing with the past is not something they need to be concerned with. As Dino explained: "The war is over and we won. The problem is dealt with. We don't have a problem with Serbs anymore. We took care of that." –*Interview with Dino, Croat veteran from Knin.* Just as there are those who outwardly object to the need to deal with the past, there are also those who support civil society efforts.

> Anyone who thinks Croatia can move forward without dealing with the past is kidding himself. Croatia had almost thirteen percent Serbs and now we have less than five percent. The fact is *we* are the ones who have to account for what happened to four hundred thousand Serbs. –*Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

On Petar's view, it is the civic responsibility of Croatians to deal with why Serbs left: "This is not an ethnic matter, it is a civic matter. It is not about being a good Croat, but

being a good citizen." *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.* In reality, the popular homeland defense narrative and fact that many Serbs left Croatia creates a sense that Croatians do not have to deal with the past. Those who disrupt this position and insist that Croatia must deal with the past face many challenges.

Dealing with the past in Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps most challenging. Division and polarization in Bosnia and Herzegovina are omnipresent and inescapable. In many communities, people live divided lives and children attend divided schools. Extreme nationalist rhetoric from both entities has framed the discourse in divisive ways. Often, efforts organized by civil society and international organizations that try to address division are greeted with suspicion. For many, the proliferation of international organizations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina sends a message that the international community is in charge and that they are forcing their ideas on people. Resentment of the international community as well as the lucky locals who get to work for international organizations runs deep.

> I speak English perfectly. I have a degree and yet I cannot get a job here. There are so many international organizations here but they hire foreigners. They make a lot of money here but there is no opportunity for us. *–Interview with Merisa, Muslim from Sarajevo.*

As an extension of resentment of the international community, negative perceptions of the ICTY are also present in both entities. In the Federation, people see the ICTY as too soft on sentencing and not focused on acknowledging the needs of victims. In Republika Srpska, they see it as unfairly biased against Serbs and undermining the suffering of Serbs.

The media contribute to this climate of polarization. They are quick to broadcast scenes of people in Republika Srpska wearing t-shirts with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić as war heroes–the two (most) hated war criminals for Bosnian Muslims. They are also quick to pick up on stories of Mujahideen or Wahhabist sects circulating freely and wreaking havoc in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B92, 2010, July 22). These images feed narratives of division and polarization carried over from the recent past. The individual and social benefits that can be achieved by dealing with the past are lost.

Dealing with the past is highly contentious in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both within and between communities. A number of unresolved issues remain at the surface and continue to divide people. As a young woman from Sarajevo explains:

> We suffered in Sarajevo, but we don't count. Everyone wants to hear about Srebrenica and what happened there but what about us? What about the rest of the country? –*Interview with Velma, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

An older woman who works for an NGO also feels neglected:

> Look at this wall. Look at all these missing people who are Serbs. Look at all these mass graves. It hurts because no one cares about Serb victims. They only want to know what Serbs did. –*Interview with Verica, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Banja Luka*.

My interview with a 'foreigner' who works for the war crimes prosecution team nearly confirmed the perception that the international community cares about *certain* victims.

> When we show up in Srebrenica and Bratunac they know our car. They already know why we're there. A response I usually get when I ask if they saw anything, is 'how come you always want to know what we saw or did but never ask what happened to us Serbs?' –*Interview with Mark, foreigner working for war crimes prosecution*.

Mark was content to classify this as reluctance to reveal evidence about the crimes he was sure they witnessed. When I asked him: "did you ever think to ask what happened to them?" and "do you think it would be important to hear what they have to say?" Mark

paused as though it never occurred to him. He responded: "I suppose they have a point, but it is not in our mandate." *–Interview with Mark, foreigner working for war crimes prosecution*. Mark then proceeded to tell me a story he thought would clarify matters.

> Things are really bad in Srebrenica and Bratunac. Serbs have contracts from international development agencies to fix Muslim houses, the same houses they destroyed. In my last trip I couldn't believe what I heard. As I entered a Muslim man's home, a Serb worker was just leaving. As he left he said to the Muslim man: 'I am finished rebuilding this house that my father burnt down and that my son will likely burn down in the future.' The Muslim man was shivering. You see, that is the mentality. *–Interview with Mark, foreigner working for war crimes prosecution*.

Despite Mark's anecdote of hatred, it would be misleading to suggest that no one gets along in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that people cannot communicate regarding the past. There are cases where dialogue and open discussion occur, it is just very challenging given the tensions that people have to deal with.[77] In addition, while some mechanisms for dealing with the past may be conducive to reconciliation, others seem to exacerbate rather than mitigate tensions.

Mechanisms for dealing with the past

As discussed in the first chapter, there are multiple mechanisms for dealing with the past. Some involve judicial practices (international courts, *ad hoc* tribunals such as the ICTY, domestic courts) and others involve non-judicial processes (truth sessions, apologies, memorials, etc.). Many stem from a general commitment to truth, justice and reconciliation. In the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia, the ways in which particular mechanisms are perceived influences the extent to which cycles of blame and denial can be interrupted and normalcy and reconciliation fostered. The following

---

[77] For a discussion of tensions between Croats and Muslims in Kiseljak and how they improved, see Tone Bringa (2005).

provides a brief overview of some of the mechanisms for dealing with the past in the region.

Judicial Mechanisms

–ICTY

The ICTY was established in 1993, while the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were still ongoing. As an *ad hoc* tribunal, the principal aims of the ICTY are to prosecute serious violations of international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, to create a historical record and to contribute to reconciliation. Unfortunately, for many, the ICTY is perceived to be a source of tension in the region. Though one of its aims is reconciliation,[78] the ICTY is not thought of as promoting reconciliation (Vukosavljević, 2007, p. 150). Rather, the ICTY is regarded as deeply polarizing. The proceedings of the international conference "Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY" held in Februrary of this year confirm this polarization.[79]

Given that he works for the ICTY, it is not surprising that Refik Hodžić thinks the ICTY *can* play an important role in both dealing with the past and fostering reconciliation; he points to factors outside the ICTY that create tension. On Hodžić's view, propoganda portraying the ICTY as unfair, unjust, biased, imposed by the international community, has influenced ordinary people to fear or hate the ICTY. Since the ICTY is connected to dealing with the past, anti-ICTY propoganda has also inspired skepticism and resentment of dealing with the past and its connection to truth and justice. According to Hodžić, the success of the anti-ICTY propoganda has led to an absurd

---

[78] For a discussion of the fourfold mission of the ICTY, see Nenad Vukosavljević (2007) pp. 149-150.

[79] For an overview of the conference and to see video recordings of the proceedings, see International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (2010, Feb. 23-24).

situation where ordinary people identify their own group's war criminals as heroes, simply for the fact that they are indicted by the ICTY (Rill et al., 2007, p. 140) and hence *de facto* victims of an unfair, unjust, biased, internationally imposed institution. This is the case for all groups, though perhaps most pronounced for Serbs since Serbs make up the majority of the indicted war criminals.[80] In a normal society, ordinary people would not identify the worst perpetrators as their heroes, but anti-ICTY propaganda has led to this (p. 140).

As a mechanism of dealing with the past, the ICTY touches on three of the five approaches listed above: retribution, truth and restitution. It is most known, however, for its role in punishment (retribution) and less for its role in promoting truth or restitution. The ICTY is based in The Hague, Netherlands, and is therefore removed from the former Yugoslav societies. Though they have access to the trials on television, the *away factor* creates a sense of isolation–the ICTY is separate and outside the post-conflict societies. While there is good reason for holding the trials outside the conflict region, e.g., inability to secure a fair trial, climate of impunity, problems with witness protection, etc., it is not clear the ICTY has figured out a way to balance its role in trying the most notorious war criminals with helping to promote reconciliation.

To accomodate the gap between the ICTY and the public, in recent years the ICTY has created an outreach program[81] designed to connect more with the community and provide information on how it works. While this is a step in the right direction, it

---

[80] As of June 30, 2010, the ICTY has indicted 161 persons; it has concluded proceedings for 125 accused in 89 cases. Currently, the ongoing cases include 36 accused in 15 cases (including trials and appeals). For a breakdown of the cases, see International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (2010, June 30) at http://www.icty.org/sid/24

[81] See Outreach at http://www.icty.org/sections/Outreach

may be too little, too late. Not only has the ICTY failed to promote reconciliation, its role in dealing with the past and promoting truth and justice is also sketchy. In view of the three approaches to dealing with the past that it links up with, i.e., retribution, truth and restitution, all three suffer. Punishment is typically weakened by plea bargains and reduced sentencing. Truth suffers due to a focus on forensic facts rather than big picture narrative truth. Victims often feel cheated or manipulated. As a result, it is unclear whether the ICTY can claim retribution, truth and restitution as its crowning achievements. Despite this, at least one person has characterized the ICTY as a *gift*:

> The Hague Tribunal was not well accepted among any of the republics or people despite its ability to provide a factual gift to people in Balkans. Without the international community we would never have been able to do this work ourselves. The tribunal provided millions of dollars and resulted in millions of factual proofs and documents, pages of confessions, and details on a variety of crimes committed during the nineties. We should think of this as a gift.
> *–Interview with Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo.*

The ICTY is currently in the final phase of its mandate. It is expected to complete trials and appeals by the end of 2013. In order to facilitate the transfer of knowledge beyond its completion, the ICTY is working with national/domestic courts in the region to transfer cases and build capacity. National/domestic courts represent another mechanism for dealing with the past.

–National/domestic courts

In order to accommodate the numerous cases and to create a sense of accountability and respect for law within the countries of former Yugoslavia, national courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia have been given the jurisdiction to hear cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity. National courts have advantages and disadvantages as compared to the ICTY. First, they take place in the countries of

former Yugoslavia, thereby minimizing the *away factor* associated with the ICTY. Second, they involve local judges and prosecutors in the process, unlike the ICTY, which is a double-edged sword. On one hand, this could improve local responsibility, but on the other, bias and impartiality are present. In some cases, international members are included to promote impartiality. Third, national courts *may* have more legitimacy in the eyes of the public because they take place in the region and not in a foreign country. On the other hand, national courts face many challenges. First, they are accused of being partial and mainly trying cases where members of their own group are victims; this was particularly problematic in the early phases. They are also accused of practicing leniency against members of their own group. Partiality has been a significant problem in Croatia and Republika Srpska. Second, they are affected by the corruption that plagues the entire region and is present in all three states. Third, they do not have the capacity to handle all the cases handed to them and therefore rely on international assistance, threatening the *potential* perception of legitimacy or credibility. Fairness and justice are compromised by lack of sufficient witness protection, lack of fair procedures, and insufficient coordination.[82]

National courts are tasked with investigating crimes involving their own nationals. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a special section was created to deal with war crimes in the state court; in Serbia, a special chamber was developed in the district court; in Croatia, chambers were formed in county courts.[83] The courts in all three states faced

---

[82] For a discussion of the challenges facing the national courts, see Josipović (2006, March); OSCE (2003, 2010); UNHCR (2004, Oct. 14); Freebairn & Jelacic (2004, Nov. 26); Balkan Insight. (2010, Jan. 13); and Djikoli (2010, May 27).

[83] For a description of national courts see http://www.icty.org/sections/Outreach/CapacityBuilding and http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/balkan_031210_en.pdf

obstacles in the early stages of their work, including lack of political will, public support and serious commitment.   In recent years, however, all three courts have improved somewhat and passed more convictions against members of their own national groups, though bias is still a problem, particularly in Croatia.[84]

Despite their local presence, whether the proceedings of the national courts have had a significant impact on dealing with the past or reconciliation remains to be seen. While some high profile cases receive a good deal of attention, others stay under the radar. Public interest in the proceedings is variable. Furthermore, the proceedings are judicial in nature and therefore face some of the issues the ICTY faces, including focus on retribution, partial truth and insufficient restitution for victims.   Without public engagement with the national courts, it is questionable whether they will have a significant impact on encouraging local societies to face the past or open up to reconciliation.

Non-judicial Mechanisms

–Truth

For many, dealing with the past is associated with coming to terms with "the truth" about what happened. As discussed in the previous chapter, in most post-conflict contexts, this is connected to the work of truth commissions and local truth-telling processes. While there have been attempts at creating a truth commission in former Yugoslavia, until recently, the attempts were made at the national level, e.g., in Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than at the regional level.

---

[84] It cannot be overlooked that the motivation for improvement is in part due to pressure from the European Union and the International Court of Justice.

The truth commission created in 2001 under former President Vojislav Koštunica is considered a failure. Though the commission was called "The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission" its focus was on investigating crimes committed against Serbs and did not include civil society, victims groups or other former republics in the process (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004). The truth commission simply did not get anywhere; a final report was never delivered and it is unclear what exactly it accomplished. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the idea to create a truth commission is largely credited with Jacob Finci, a Bosnian Jew and long-time advocate of reconciliation. Despite Finci's good intentions, the truth commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not come to fruition. There is some speculation that the Bosnian truth commission never made it off the ground because of a fear that it would disrupt the work of the ICTY (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004). Unlike South Africa, amnesty was not an option for Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was resistance to the idea of amnesty on the grounds that it would detract from the gravity of the crimes committed (including crimes against humanity and genocide), leaving victims dissatisfied, creating a culture of impunity, and disrupting rather than complementing the work of the ICTY. Though in South Africa, the truth commission was compatible with trials, in this case, the ICTY took priority leading to an early demise of the truth commission.

In the absence of a *bona fide* truth commission, given the *regional* element of the ICTY's jurisdiction, one might expect its activities to offer an opportunity for people from each of the former Yugoslav republics to collaborate and exchange experiences, to come to a sort of "common truth" about the past. This expectation is far from being realized. As discussed above, the ICTY is perceived to be too far removed from the

Yugoslav societies to have any meaningful impact on social truth. In addition, it is designed to encourage fact-finding, not contrition, though many have confessed and apologized for their crimes–sometimes as a way to reduce sentencing, and sometimes a way to express genuine remorse.[85] The ICTY has now made some transcripts available to the public, which could serve civil society's efforts to face the past and promote reconciliation. The ICTY's legacy, however, may consist in a narrow focus on forensic truth, victor's justice and overall dissatisfaction of victims, rather than reconciliation.

In reality, the results of the ICTY have not been able to break through competing versions of truth and accommodate a common narrative. Coming to a common narrative, however, is not necessarily the work of the ICTY. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a common narrative is even possible in former Yugoslavia. To borrow from Appiah's work on racism and cognition, it may not be competing truths, but the fact that they are held in an *ideological way* that causes problems (1990). On Appiah's account of racism, it is not simply holding false beliefs (about races, racialism), but holding them *in an ideological way*–clinging to the beliefs in the sense that they *must* be true, that makes for trouble. In the case of former Yugoslavia, when counter-evidence is presented that contradicts one set of beliefs, e.g., the belief that that Muslims bombed their own people in the *Markale massacres* in Sarajevo, there is sometimes ideological resistance to the idea that one's version of truth may be flawed. Instead of allowing this as a possibility, there is a tendency to cling to one's beliefs in an ideological way, in a way that they *must* be true. After all, if one's version of truth is flawed, then the entire ideological framework within which the truths were constructed could also be flawed. Very often

---

[85] For transcripts of the confessions, see http://www.icty.org/sid/203

counter-evidence is not perceived to be credible–it is considered to be manufactured or flawed with the attitude that it simply *cannot* be true. Veran Matić of B92 in Belgrade provided a very vivid example of this in a conference on reconciliation I attended in Vienna in 2008.[86] This example is also cited by Božičević (2007). Essentially, Matić received an angry call from a Serbian viewer refusing to believe the massacre in Srebrenica took place. When Matić asked why the viewer refused to accept it, the viewer answered: "how am I supposed to live with it, if I accept it?" (Božičević, 2007, p. 129). In an interesting way, it is not simply competing truths nor denial, but the consequences of accepting "other" truths and letting go of denial that wreak havoc on the mind.

Justice is similarly problematic. While for some, the aim of establishing "truth" is to empower people with knowledge so they can heal and one day reestablish ties and restore communities, i.e., restoration, in many cases the goal is revenge, i.e., retribution. This element of dealing with the past tends to be in contrast with reconciliation. Indeed, while truth and justice are important in the post-conflict dynamic, very often efforts aimed at truth and justice focus on particular measures, e.g., punishment, institutional reform, creating a public record–at the expense of social transformation, i.e., addressing underlying conditions and building trust conductive to reconciliation. According to Nikolić-Ristanović, emphasis should be placed on listening to all sides and promoting restorative measures, not retribution (Nikolić-Ristanović, 2004).

–RECOM/REKOM

The idea of listening to all sides and giving voice to all victims underlies a regional initiative that has been underway since 2006 and has recently come into focus

---

[86] The conference was held in Vienna, Austria and organized by Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The title was "Dealing with the past and reconciliation processes in the Western Balkans-10th November 2008." For information, see http://old.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/frontpage/214.

with The Regional Commission for establishing the facts about all victims of the wars waged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the period 1991–2001 (RECOM/REKOM).[87] REKOM is a civil society initiative designed to establish the truth about the recent past and ultimately create a path for reconciliation. Unlike the failed truth commissions discussed above, REKOM is designed to be inclusive and regional; it is not focused on listening to the victims of only one side, but giving all victims a chance to have their stories heard. REKOM relies largely on consultations–on processes designed to give ordinary people and members of civil society (e.g., victims groups, NGOs, etc.) a chance to participate in the process of dealing with the past. The initial organizers of REKOM include Nataša Kandić of the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) in Serbia, Mirsad Tokača[88] of the Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vesna Terselić of Documenta in Croatia. In their own work, all three have been proponents of initiatives for dealing with the past in their own societies. HLC is largely focused on truth and justice; among other things, it provides legal support for vicitms and collects testimony. RDC is known for its work on human losses, i.e., on documentng the number of dead and missing to establish an accurate historical record. RDC also collects testimony in an attempt to match human faces and human stories to human losses. Its unique mapping software allows people to zoom in on particular areas and learn about the fate of victims. It includes victims of all ethnic groups. RDC is currently in the process of collecting positive stories to augment its focus on human

---

[87] REKOM is used in BCS–Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian; RECOM is the English translation. I use REKOM in this text. See http://www.korekom.org/.

[88] In late 2008/early 2009, Tokača made a decision to pull out of REKOM. He communicated this to me at the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) conference in Virginia in June of 2009.

losses. Documenta provides consultations in different communities in Croatia to include ordinary people in the process of dealing with the past.

The idea behind the regional approach of REKOM is to incorporate stories of victims into a coherent whole so that something close to a common understanding of the past can be achieved. It is not a judicial process; it is a non-judicial social process designed to address cycles of blame and denial in the societies of former Yugoslavia. While REKOM offers the potential to bring people closer to a common narrative, it is still too early to tell whether it will be successful in this endeavor.

REKOM is in the process of collecting a million signatures to gain governmental support for its initiatives. The lack of governmental support for dealing with the past has led many to worry that the impact of initiatives created by civil society will be limited.

–Positive stories

The mechanisms for dealing with the past discussed so far face many hurdles. As discussed above, they are part of a discourse that fosters division and hostility rather than inclusion and understanding. In commenting on what he calls the "stratification" of society in the context of dealing with the past, Vukosavljević writes:

> what we hear about each other are the voices of the most shameless and most aggressive amongst us. In this way, the feeling of opposition is maintained, which for the most part makes both the peacebuilding process and the process that could be called reconciliation harder. (2007, p. 154)

Overemphasis on negative, hostile stories has led some members of civil society to prioritize the power of positive stories as a way of dealing with the past and creating a path toward reconciliation. Positive stories provide examples of neighbors helping each other, rather than hurting each other. They provide examples of strangers standing up for the rights of others, even at their own expense. In the region, discourse on dealing with

the past has ignored positive stories and perpetuated only negative stories of betrayal and indecency. These negative stories have overwhelmed the psyche and dampened the spirit making people feel stuck in the misery of the past. Positive aspects of shared life are largely ignored or even erased in public discourse.

In his essay "Living Together or Hating Each Other?" David MacDonald proposes the need for a positive narrative in the societies of former Yugoslavia.

> In producing a more positive narrative, a key goal must be to focus on those who did resist the spiral of ethnic hatred and who did demonstrate against the rise of ethnic conflict, either openly or more clandestinely. This metanarrative remains underexplored in contemporary literature on the Yugoslav conflict, yet it is necessary in order to deconstruct nationalistic mythologized narratives and pave the way for reconciliation. (2009, p. 402)

In an interesting way, introducing positive stories into discourse on dealing with the past may sidestep the cycles of blame and denial that penetrate other approaches. Positive stories offer truth, but not the divisive or forensic truth associated with the ICTY. They offer a more uplifting and contextual truth about people facing difficult decisions. As Merisa's story reveals:

> My neighbor was a Serb; she helped us. She knew the Serbs were coming for us and she came to us and told my mother and me 'run, drop everything and run.' She smuggled us into a bread truck and she and her husband drove us across the line. –*Interview with Merisa, Muslim from Sarajevo*.

Positive stories have the power to unite people through their common humanity rather than divide people through difference.

As an approach to dealing with the past, positive stories may be more conducive to reconciliation than the other approaches discussed above. Nansen Dialogue Center in Osijek has collected positive stories and recently completed a film showing *Untold*

Stories.[89] Under Tokača, the RDC in Sarajevo is also in the process of collecting positive stories.

–Apologies

Apologies are non-judicial mechanisms of dealing with the past and promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies. While they have the potential to restore a sense of dignity among victims and repair relations between community members, they also have the potential to ignite animosity. Apologies offer restitution. Depending on how they are executed, however, apologies can help overcome division or reinforce it.

In the case of former Yugoslavia, though elites have made apologies,[90] the sincerity of the apologies has been a source of contention. In 2000, Montenegrin President Milan Đukanović apologized to Croatia with a special recognition of the damage and pain Montenegrins caused for Dubrovnik.[91] The apology was a first step in a series of apologies. The question remains whether the apology was motivated by remorse or practical reasons to improve relations between the neighboring communities of the Croatian and Montenegrin coasts. In 2003, then President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić, and then President of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marović, engaged in a mutual/reciprocal apology for the crimes committed by their countries.[92] Following this, Marović also apologized to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the evils and misfortunes caused by Serbia and Montenegro.[93] In 2004, Serbian President Boris Tadić apologized in

---

[89] See Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC) Osijek at http://www.ndcosijek.hr/engleski/novosti.html

[90] For a summary of apologies, see Press Online (2010, Apr. 14).

[91] See Thorpe (2000, June 25).

[92] See Phillips & Petrovic (2003, Nov. 14).

[93] Ibid.

Sarajevo, but also suggested that other nations must apologize as well.[94]   While the apologies of 2000, 2003 and 2004 were characterized as a first step toward better relations, the climate in which they were made was still very hostile. The wounds of war were still fresh, cooperation with the ICTY was strained, and political turmoil threatened the region, especially Serbian society, with the assassination of Zoran Đinđić in 2003. Though the apologies may have been made in good faith, it is also possible they were made to appease the European Union and improve bilateral relations, rather than to express genuine remorse.

The apologies that came in later years were perhaps more meaningful, but not without criticism. In 2007, President Tadić apologized to the citizens of Croatia for injustice committed by members of the Serbian people.[95] At the same time, he also accepted responsibility for the crimes committed against Bosniaks.[96] Tadić's apology in 2007 received praise from some human rights leaders, including Nataša Kandić, but also received criticism from Serbian radicals and Bosnian Muslim victims.[97] Reflecting on Tadić's apology in 2007, someone who lost many family members in Srebrenica explained:

> Tadić did not really apologize. It seemed like he wanted to express remorse but then had to say something like 'but Serbs suffered too.' There should be no *buts* in an apology. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica*.

---

[94] See B92 (2007, June 24).

[95] See Popovic (2007, June 26).

[96] See B92 (2007, June 24).

[97] Ibid.

Separate from such complaints, some expressed anger at apologies in general and the idea that a politician would have the audacity to speak for them and reinforce the idea of collective guilt.

> A lot of Serbian representatives who came to Vukovar apologized for what happened in the name of Serbs. This pisses me off. Some Croats apologized for some selected actions too...I don't care for that apology of Serbs because I don't see why someone from Belgrade should do that. It should be an individual process if someone feels guilty or needs to do that. I can understand that some officials have a need to do it, but they should not use the same model they used for blaming in 1991...that all Croats or Serbs are the same...that we are all guilty. There is individual guilt and I personally don't have to apologize for anything.
> –*Interview with Mirko, Serb from Vukovar working for NGO.*

Recently, following the signing of the declaration on Srebrenica in March of 2010, Tadić offered an official apology to the families of the Bosnian Muslim victims of Srebrenica.[98] His apology again received criticism from within and outside his nation. Tadić's recent apology may not be perfect, but it brings Serbia much closer to accepting its role in the conflict and to creating a genuine path toward reconciliation. Following Tadić, in April, Ivo Josipović apologized to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the role Croatia played during the recent conflict.[99] This apology is seen as monumental as it is the first time Croatia officially acknowledged its role in the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are, however, some who await an apology from Croatia for its crimes during World War II.[100]

In light of the controversies surrounding apologies in the region, it is unclear whether the apologies will have a significant effect on dealing with the past or

---

[98] See Boris Tadic (2010, Apr. 16) printed in The Wall Street Journal at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303695604575182284149946008.html

[99] See CBC News (2010, Apr. 14).

[100] See James Bissett (2010, Apr. 2).

reconciliation. It is clear, however, that they have inspired diverse reactions, including praise and blame, as can be seen in the divided responses both within and between ethnic groups. It cannot be denied that efforts to join the European Union may help explain the impetus for the recent apologies and for Serbia's declaration on Srebrenica. Irrespective of their individual motivations, these steps seem to reflect a commitment among top leaders to face the past and promote reconciliation.

Considering the complexities underlying discourse on dealing with the past and reconciliation and the tensions associated with judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, it is not surprising that many of the organizations working on reconciliation-related initiatives in the region have a difficult time demonstrating the effectiveness of their programs. The dynamic interplay between multiple factors, including: desire for normalcy, polarization and division, competing truths, opposing views of justice, cycles of blame and denial, fatigue and burn-out, hierarchy of victimization and confusing identity scripts, creates a challenging situation for initiatives designed to bring about reconciliation. Despite these challenges, a number of initiatives have addressed some of these factors. The following section provides a brief overview of some compelling practices and activities aimed at reconciliation in the region.

Part IV. Practices and activities aimed at reconciliation

In the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia, there are a number of NGOs, international organizations, and local grassroots activists working on overlapping issues of dealing with the past, peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict transformation. While these initiatives are often conceived of at the local level and limited to implementation within a particular community in a particular state, e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,

Serbia, very often they have the potential to offer well thought out opportunities for collaborating and sharing experiences across multiple communities in former Yugoslavia. These efforts range from individual and group therapy sessions for post-traumatic stress disorder,[101] peace education, youth camps, community gardening projects,[102] media dialogue programs on dealing with the past,[103] music concerts and scores of other initiatives aimed at rebuilding trust and establishing relationships among people in former Yugoslavia. While there have been attempts to bring local initiatives to the national level and/or across borders, at times they have been greeted with distrust. This is in part due to competition among local grassroots organizations, NGOs and international organizations, and in part due to the ways in which the initiatives are characterized and funded. While there are a number of initiatives aimed at reconciliation, with some exception, there has been difficulty in expanding such efforts to the regional level. Among the different practices and activities aimed at reconciliation, a few stand out as particularly interesting. These include grassroots initiatives focused on vulnerable populations, e.g., young people in divided communities and war veterans with PTSD, as well as initiatives that operate at higher levels and deal mainly with decision makers and local community leaders. The initiatives described below provide a snapshot of some of the reconciliation-related efforts in the region. They are organized according to six themes: tolerance, dialogue, interaction & cultural exchange, regional cooperation, awareness & community engagement, and peace education.

---

[101] See, for example, the work of Psychologist Vladan Beara at the Centre for Trauma in Novi Sad and MIRamiDA in Croatia.

[102] See Dimitrijević & Kovacs (Eds.) (2004).

[103] B92 has for long been at the forefront of these initiatives within Serbia across the region.

Tolerance

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has organized culture of tolerance sessions among young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[104] Through participant observation, I was able to see firsthand how these sessions are carried out. A session I attended in Sarajevo included high school students from different schools, e.g., students from a Muslim majority school and a Serb majority school. The idea was for the students to meet outside the school setting and engage in tolerance workshops. The topics of the workshops did not address ethnic division or war directly, but rather encouraged students to discuss the different biases and prejudices they held, e.g., that people who wear glasses are nerds, etc. Another theme was for students to create a presentation about bias and stereotypes reflected in media. Students were broken up into diverse groups, so Serbs and Muslims were mixed together, rather than separate. The series of workshops culminated in a final presentation for the International Day of Tolerance in November in 2008. As one representative pointed out, for many students these workshops were the first time students met students from a different ethnic background and/or from a different entity, i.e., the Federation and Republika Srpska.

> Even though some students live near each other, they have no opportunity to interact with each other. Some never even visited the other entity…This is where students learn for the first time that 'Serbs don't really have horns.' –*Interview with Jasmina, Serb from Banja Luka who relocated to Sarajevo*.

The OSCE tolerance sessions are examples of promoting reconciliation indirectly. They do not directly address inter-group tensions, but address the underlying social conditions that give rise to tensions. In some cases, the indirect approach to reconciliation is

---

[104] See OSCE at http://www.oscebih.org/public/default.asp?d=6&article=show&id=2292

preferable, particularly when parents are involved and might object if the program has "reconciliation" in the title.

Dialogue

Another example of promoting reconciliation can be found in the work of local NGOs, e.g., Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC)[105] and the programs they run throughout the region.   There are a number of local NDCs operating throughout former Yugoslavia.[106] Though they are part of the Nansen Dialogue Network (NDN), each center has its own unique approach and is independent of the other centers.   The centers utilize similar tools for dialogue, peacebuilding and reconciliation, but customize their approach to the local population they are working with.   In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, there is a focus on building dialogue in war-torn areas, such as Srebrenica, Bratunac and Mostar. In Croatia, there is also a focus on divided communities, such as Osijek and Vukovar.

In several cases, the local NDC teams do not address the past directly, but rather try to teach people practical skills to bring about social transformation. In several NDC programs, the local NDC works with students and parents in separate sessions. Students who participate engage in workshops with students from different ethnic groups, e.g., Croats and Muslims in Mostar, Serbs and Muslims in Srebrenica and Bratunac, Serbs and Croats in Vukovar and Osijek.   The beginning is always difficult, as many students are interacting for the first time and come with their own bias and prejudice.   As the sessions progress, however, constructive dialogue on tolerance and related topics improve.   In some cases, students from different ethnic backgrounds who begin with a lack of trust

---

[105] Nansen Dialogue Network (NDN) is comprised of a number of local centers (NDCs) throughout former Yugoslavia. See http://www.nansen-dialogue.net/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/

[106] NDCs are in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Sarajevo in BiH; Osijek in Croatia; Belgrade and Bujanovac in Serbia. There is also a NDC in Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM).

later become friends. In other cases, marginal progress is seen. Results are difficult to measure, as a dialogue worker explains:

> It is difficult to show the results on paper or in numbers. Our funder wants to see progress. There is progress, but how can I explain how meaningful it is when at the end of a session a Muslim says 'zdravo' to a Serb. *–Interview with Bruno, dialogue worker of mixed background from Herzegovina who relocated to Sarajevo.*

"Zdravo" is a word for *hello* and *goodbye*; it is a greeting. On the issue of measurement, perhaps allowing oneself to *acknowledge* someone from another ethnic group, a hated ethnic group, is a milestone along the path to reconciliation. Efforts to understand these smaller milestones rather than larger signs of friendship may help in creating a *scaled or incremental* approach to measuring reconciliation rather than an *all or nothing* schema.

The case of parents engaging in dialogue sessions in divided communities is sometimes more challenging than sessions with young people. Parents often enter these sessions with deep resentment or marginal distrust of another ethnic group. The topics are not necessarily related to the war, but to issues that affect them as parents, including education, jobs and corruption. In the case of education, some parents go out of their way to send their children to schools where they will be in the majority. This creates a financial burden as well as time loss and disconnection with the community in which they live. Through dialogue sessions, parents open up about the reasons why they send their children to schools where they will be in the majority. As Bruno conveys:

> Parents face a lot of issues within their own community. Some of them want to be able to send their kids to local schools because it would be easier and they wouldn't have to worry about bus fare and the kids being far from home. But they are afraid of what people in their own ethnic group will say. They are afraid of being ostracized within their own ethnic community. *–Interview with Bruno, dialogue worker of mixed background from Herzegovina who relocated to Sarajevo.*

In many ways, it may be the case that addressing intra-group tensions is just as important as addressing inter-group tensions in creating a climate for reconciliation.

Youth Peace Group Danube (YPGD), a local NGO in Vukovar, faces challenges similar to those expressed by NDCs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. As the first (at one time the only) youth club in Vukovar where young Serbs and Croats could interact, YPGD has experienced tension and disruption at various levels, including intra-group, inter-group, local media, etc. As a representative communicated during participant observation in 2005:

> We are the only place where Serb and Croat kids can meet. They are totally segregated in school and in the community. We don't deal with political issues…it is just a place for kids to hang out and play games and stuff. We face a lot of resistance from parents and from the newspapers. The newspapers don't want to print our announcements. Despite the growing problem of drugs, parents are reluctant to let their kids come here. I had one parent tell me: I'd rather have my son on the street doing drugs than play with a Serb. —*Conversation and Participant Observation with Ilijana, Croat from Vukovar*.

When I asked if there are examples of parents changing their minds and, if so, what motivated them to do so, Ilijana could not recall such cases. In her view, intra-group pressure persuades parents to keep their children away from the program. Interestingly, it seems identity may play a role. In the example she gave of the mother who would rather have her son doing drugs than playing with a Serb, it would be easy to dismiss this as hatred or bad parenting. It is, however, entirely likely that this mother is conflicted within her own identity *as mother*, *as Croat*, *as member of a community that was divided along ethnic lines by war*. It is possible that what it means to be a good mother and a good Croat are in conflict and that intra-group pressure and inter-group hatred work together to influence how this mother negotiates her identity conflict. In light of this, working with parents is just as vital as working with young people.

Decision makers and local leaders represent another segment of society with which it is important to work. NDC in Serbia engages in this kind of work. Rather than engaging young people and parents, as the centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia do, NDC in Serbia engages decision makers and local leaders in communities in Serbia with significant inter-group tensions, e.g., Sandžak (Novi Pazar), Preševo Valley (Bujanovac) and Vojvodina. As a representative, explained:

> We work mainly with local politicians who can have an influence on the local municipal level. We work in smaller towns, outside of Belgrade, which are multiethnic and have the potential for developing conflicts in the future.
> –*Interview with Jovanka, Serb from Belgrade*.

The goal is to teach people in positions of local authority tools for overcoming conflict and addressing underlying tensions that inhibit democracy and strong governance. This approach is quite different from the approaches discussed above. In part, dialogue among decision makers and local leaders may trickle down to the community level and help prevent violent conflict or encourage dialogue. This is not the direct aim of these initiatives but is a secondary effect. The direct effect is to improve decision making at the local level.

Interaction & Cultural Exchange

A number of NGOs have also focused on the role of interaction and cultural exchange in creating a path toward reconciliation among society. The NGO Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), for example, has a visiting program wherein YIHR brings young people on weekend visits to another city/town in the region (frequently where they will be in the minority). Examples include young people from Belgrade visiting Priština and Sarajevo. The idea behind the visiting program is for young people to confront pre-existing images of people and places they have never been exposed to.

For those who grew up before the Yugoslav conflicts, the idea of never travelling outside one's own town or city is incomprehensible, but in the post-conflict context, travel throughout the region and especially international travel, has been strained. The visiting program facilitates travel so young people can gain exposure and overcome ignorance and prejudice.

Though YIHR operates throughout the region, there are local differences that affect how the program is run and how young people are prepared for the visit. As one representative explains:

> With Sarajevo, they are usually excited to visit. They think it is going to be *cool*. We have to remind them that Sarajevo was under siege and there was war there. They are surprised when they learn about the suffering of Sarajevo. With Kosovo it is very different. They are afraid to go. They expect it will be rural and people will be hostile. They are pleasantly surprised when they learn that young people go to cafés and clubs just like them. It is really an eye-opening experience.
> –*Interview with Snežana, representative of visting program in Belgrade.*

While YIHR faces some challenges with respect to participants' family members not supporting the program, in general this is not an issue. In addition, YIHR is quite selective in the participants they choose.

> We screen people before allowing them to participate. We don't want people who are going to disrupt the program or not take it seriously. We don't take on the hard-core nationalists…they have to have an interest. *–Interview with Snežana, representative of visting program in Belgrade.*

YIHR is very visible in Belgrade and often receives hostile criticism from local NGOs. In many cases, the criticism is related to its international funding and overall approach.

> YIHR is confrontational. Their approach is not at all subtle. They are also internationally funded, which threatens their credibility. I don't trust NGOs that have fancy offices and big budgets. *–Interview with Miloš, Serb from Belgrade who is a local grassroots activist.*

Regional Cooperation

The Igman Initiative has a unique approach to reconciliation; it focuses on promoting regional cooperation among leaders. It is tailored to local leaders and decision makers, youth groups, and cross-border cooperation. Examples of Igman Initiative projects include encouraging dialogue and cooperation among leaders in different communities in different states, e.g., Trebinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik in Croatia and Herceg Novi in Montenegro. In this example, these three communities (Trebinje, Dubrovnik and Herceg Novi) have been linked for years through a common water source. After the wars, however, borders divided the water lines and created an ambiguous situation regarding how to facilitate the water supply across borders. With the help of the Igman Initiative, leaders from all three communities found a way to communicate and facilitate proper water flow. They also created a regional fire fighter center to deal with the high level of wild fires in the region. An Igman Initiative representative described these as pragmatic solutions:

> Models from outside don't work here…for example, Alex Borain's model in South Africa doesn't work…so we created our own. That's why we started working on this with the towns, since they have a need for pragmatic solutions and to fulfill the needs of local people. *–Interview with Novak, representative of the Igman Initiative*.

The Igman Initiative has helped repair relations and address very practical issues that affected people in all three communities. Its regional approach has helped facilitate dialogue among leaders and set an example of how to address underlying tensions and build a path toward reconciliation among leaders.

Awareness & Community Engagement

Another unique approach is in the efforts of NGOs in Vojvodina to create the Vivisect[107] project, e.g., Vivisectfest. The Vivisect project is based on a collection of war photos taken by Ron Haviv and displayed in different cities in Serbia in 2002. While some cities were receptive to Haviv's *Blood and Honey* exhibition, others banned it or insisted on its removal from their town. The war photos were very graphic and elicited resentment, anger, and shock in the communities in which they were displayed. The original idea behind the *Blood and Honey* exhibition was to create awareness of the impact of war and initiate dialogue. The exhibition created so much controversy, however, that dialogue was initially inhibited. In response to this controversy, a group of local NGOs, including Vojvođanka–Regional Women's Initiative, Center for Political Education, and MEDIAPACT, came up with the idea to create an exhibition to display the photos from *Blood and Honey* and allow people to write comments/read comments next to the photos. The idea was to allow people to express their feelings and thoughts without interruption, censorship or direction. This came to fruition in 2003 with the first Vivisectfest exhibition in Novi Sad. The results of the Novi Sad Vivisect exhibition are very interesting. As a representative explained:

> People were very angry at first, but when they realized they could write whatever they wanted and we weren't going to take it down, they were impressed. They expected censorship but we left it all as they wrote it. *–Interview with Milica, representative of Vivisectfest*.

The comments written on the pages next to the photos were published along with the photos in a book documenting the 2003 exhibition. The comments include a range of responses–everything from hatred directed at the organizers to responsibility. According

---

[107] See Vivisectfest at http://www.vivisectfest.org/index_eng.html

to Milica, it was fascinating to people that they were free to write whatever they wanted. When people saw that their responses were not erased or blocked, it provided credibility and inspired trust in the organizers of Vivisect. After the initial Vivisectfest, subsequent exhibitions have taken place in different cities throughout Serbia. While it may be too early to tell whether Vivisectfest can lead to reconciliation, it is likely that: a) allowing people to express their views freely, and b) sharing these expressions with society rather than suppressing them, can be important steps in dialogue and possibly reconciliation.

Another interesting approach is that taken by Group 484[108] in Serbia. Group 484 is a local NGO that was formed in 1995 to support four hundred eighty four refugee families that fled from Croatia to Serbia. Group 484 is involved in a number of initiatives, including support for refugees and internally displaced persons, youth groups and regional cooperation. It is a trusted partner for larger NGOs and international organizations, e.g., it is typically selected as an implementing partner for UNHCR. Group 484 is interesting because it takes a combined approach to reconciliation. It works with young people and vulnerable populations, e.g., refugees, in divided communities, but also works with local leaders and decision makers. One lesson taken from Group 484 is that a multifaceted path toward reconciliation may be what is needed in Serbia.

Peace Education (CNA)

Peace education is one of the cases where initiatives have expanded beyond the local or national level. A number of organizations are involved in peace education throughout the region. The Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA)[109] is an interesting

---

[108] See Group 484 at
http://www.grupa484.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=156&lang=english

[109] See CNA at http://www.nenasilje.org/aktivnosti/aktivnosti_e.html

example in that it involves collaboration across borders and includes a range of activities, e.g., peacebuilding training, documentary films, public forums, publications, seminars and networking meetings. CNA has offices in Belgrade and Sarajevo. Its initiatives are focused on dealing with the past, encouraging dialogue and restoring public trust. The public sessions include veterans from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. The veterans who participate share their stories and motivations for engaging in war. In an interesting way, veterans from different sides who may have fought against each other (literally), join together in dialogue in a public forum. The idea is for people to hear about experiences in war firsthand from the perspective of local people, as opposed to foreign peace educators. The films and public sessions bring the human side of war and its aftermath to the public through stories of real people. CNA initiatives include rather than exclude vulnerable populations, such as war veterans. They also provide a platform within which war veterans can rebuild, restore and transform relationships within and outside their own communities. This approach has created a context within which some former enemy combatants have become friends and have made a commitment to work together to promote peace and reconciliation. While it is difficult to measure the impact of CNA's efforts, creating future studies that measure the level of trust or willingness to engage in dialogue and reconciliation *before and after* CNA's initiatives may be a way to start the measurement process. Perhaps the *scaled or incremental* approach to measurement that I suggested above would be appropriate. In the case of CNA's work, a milestone along the path to reconciliation surely would include the cooperation between former enemy combatants.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a discussion of several themes present in the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia. I introduced tensions surrounding the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and shed light on the how the conflict has been framed. I also outlined unresolved issues that influence the post-conflict context and discussed the forces at work in shaping discourse on dealing with the past. In the last section, I highlighted a range of practices aimed at reconciliation in the region. As this chapter has shown, the way in which the dissolution of Yugoslavia is framed reveals competing narratives, e.g., internal versus international conflict, aggression versus self-defense, etc. These narratives affect perceptions of the past, as well as behaviors and attitudes in the post-conflict context, i.e., they affect how people interact and how they think about their lives, their relationships and their communities. These narratives also affect processes aimed at dealing with the past and reconciliation-related practices.

As a result, dealing with the past often entails sifting through competing truths in the hope of coming to consensus on a "common narrative." Unfortunately, resistance to dealing with the past and the polarization associated with it tend to hinder the development of a common narrative. Furthermore, the underlying issues and tensions present in the post-conflict context, including uncertainty, instability, intra-group and inter-group tensions, trauma, etc., influence both dealing with the past and practices aimed at reconciliation. Though members of civil society often insist on the *necessity* of dealing with the past and promoting truth and justice, ordinary people's understanding of these efforts reflect ambiguity. Many are tired of being told what they have to do and just want to live normal lives. For others, the motivation for dealing with the past is based on

practical rather than moral concerns. According to Goran Božičević, in many cases, the motivation for dealing with the past stems from the realization that if they don't face the past, no "milk and honey" will flow (2007, p. 134).

> The outcome of DwP [dealing with the past] process is of interest to a not so great number of people in the post-Yugoslav states. However, an increasingly large number of people are realizing that without DwP no milk and honey will begin to flow. (Božičević, 2007, p. 134)

Ambiguity, polarization and resistance to dealing with the past represent significant challenges in the post-conflict context, particularly with respect to reconciliation.

While there are some glimmers of hope in reconciliation-related initiatives across the region, since these initiatives are not connected to an overarching plan, collaboration and shared learning is limited. Though some initiatives are imbedded within a vision of social transformation and involve collaboration across the region, others are isolated projects that are likely to end when funding runs out. Moreover, despite the existence of initiatives aimed at creating dialogue and multi-ethnic exchange in the region, without the support of government officials, it is unclear what impact these initiatives will have. According to Hodžić, without the role of government, civil society's efforts will remain "scattered." Hodžić's provides:

> I really think that without true engagement of government institutions, this process…that is given a 'push' by the civil society, will not yield results that would contribute to our really dealing with the past in the long run…we will constantly have this polarisation, this schizophrenia…[the process] doesn't have the dynamics that involve an entire society, all of us…but instead it is initiatives that are sort of scattered, all over the place, not linked to one another, and are also of a usually limited influence. (p. 148)

Hodžić's quote points to an additional concern over the level of inclusion, i.e., "dynamics that involve an entire society." Though this is changing, e.g., CNA's work with war veterans, the practice of excluding certain people from participating in such

processes has not disappeared.[110]   This occurs at all levels of interaction, from local grassroots initiatives, to mid level NGOs and internationally run programs. In various cases, members of society who are disproportionately affected by the conflict, e.g., ex-combatants and former prisoners of war have been excluded altogether. Groups who are marginalized in this way suffer additional trauma from being further isolated and prevented from contributing to social transformation. The suicide rate of ex-combatants suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder in the region is a significant indicator of this (Beara & Miljanović, 2006; Opačić et al., 2006). There is a sense among members of civil society that politicians use victims to suit their own purposes in the process of dealing with the past. Vukosavljević argues that "real victims in this process become an 'all purpose currency.'" (p. 156). Hodžić points to manipulation of victims as "one of the biggest problems of dealing with the past" (p. 143). On his view: "[p]oliticians masterfully use putting the victims to the foreground" and "victims of war are still victimized, on societies' margins" (p. 143). As a result of manipulation, polarization and marginalization, people living in the post-conflict context of former Yugoslavia are in need of initiatives that are inclusive, collaborative and non-polarizing.

In addition, while there are a number of activities aimed at dealing with the past and rebuilding relationships, it is unclear how successful these efforts are and whether ordinary people accept them as important in their lives. A large part of this has to do with the framing of initiatives and how they are positioned in the media and by elites and civil society. Very often, these efforts are presented with a false dichotomy: *if you participate, you will be a traitor* or *if you don't participate, you will be shamed*. Against

---

[110] Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović discusses the hierarchy of victimization and the ways in which public discourse becomes framed in terms of which group is the most victimized, thereby creating the sense that not all victims count (2002, 2004).

this *either/or* backdrop, identifying what would motivate people at different levels of society to engage in reconciliation-related activities, whether in a narrower sense of economic cooperation or a broader sense of being good neighbors, is seemingly absent. In the next section, my aim is to shed light on motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance in the region. The next section highlights insights from interviews I conducted from 2005 through 2009 in the region.

**Chapter 3: Perspectives, Conceptions, Motivations and Challenges:
Motivations and Resistance to Reconciliation in former Yugoslavia**

> *Reconciliation is for priests. I tell people 'hate each other, just don't kill each other!' – Žarko Puhovski.*

Introduction

My aim in this chapter is to discuss perceptions of reconciliation from my interviews with ordinary members of society as well as people working on reconciliation-related activities in the region of former Yugoslavia. I discuss: a) perspectives on reconciliation in the region; b) what reconciliation means to people in the region; c) motivations in favor of and resistance to reconciliation; d) challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region. My overall purpose is to shed light on how people in the region perceive reconciliation, what it means to them, what role it plays or may play in their lives, how different actors, e.g., top level elites, mid level nongovernmental organizations, ground level local grassroots activists, media, members of the international community contribute to discourse on reconciliation, and how an understanding of motivations can inform strategies and practices aimed at reconciliation. This chapter relies on quotes and insights from my interviews in the region.   I also include insights from the literature, reports and newspaper articles depicting reconciliation in the region.

Part I: Perspectives on reconciliation in the region

In recent years, reconciliation has become something of a buzzword in former Yugoslavia. Though not clearly defined, reconciliation is often characterized as a difficult process that takes time but is *necessary* for the future of the region. Civil society and political elites offer their own perspectives on reconciliation and its importance. Members of civil society frequently include reconciliation as part of their mission. Many

are outspoken about the need for reconciliation in promoting *healing* on both individual/interpersonal and collective levels. A war veteran and peace activist I interviewed explained: "reconciliation is not just healing relationships between people or groups but within yourself, with the life you have and the choices you have made." *–Interview with Ivan, Croat war veteran and peace activist*. In addition to the individual/interpersonal level, members of civil society also emphasize the necessity of reconciliation at the collective level, e.g., among groups or nations.

> Serbia and Croatia need reconciliation but Bosnia and Herzegovina needs it much more since it has three ethnic groups and three different stories. Without reconciliation there is no future and no functional state for Bosnia and Herzegovina. *–Interview with Dejan, peace activist from Herzegovina who relocated to Belgrade*.

Recently, some political leaders have regarded reconciliation as something that is necessary for the future of the region. These political leaders tend to focus on reconciliation at the collective level among nations. In recent statements, Boris Tadić provided:

> Reconciliation is to us a moral imperative, and in order for that to happen the truth has to be told without embellishing it. It has to be based on facts, truth and bloodshed that must never happen again in this region. (B92, 2010, May 31a)

Ivo Josipović has emphasized the hard but necessary work of reconciliation: "It's easier to find an excuse but it's much harder to offer a hand of reconciliation, start constructive dialog and finish it" (B92, 2010, June 1).

Just as civil society has many voices, so do political elites; widespread acceptance of reconciliation does not exist. Nevertheless, among members of civil society and political elites who argue for the necessity of reconciliation, most tie it to dealing with the past. As a representative of a local NGO indicated: "reconciliation is part of the painful

process of dealing with the past." *–Interview with Stepan, representative of local NGO in Vojvodina*. Boris Tadić also underscored the role of dealing with the past as connected to reconciliation: "[f]or reconciliation to be completed, all nations must hold themselves accountable for what individuals did in their name" (B92, 2010, June 23).

A common perception is that dealing with the past is necessary for reconciliation. Given that dealing with the past is a contentious process, as discussed in the previous chapter, reconciliation becomes tied to the tensions associated with dealing with the past– including the recent past, the past of World War II and the following communist period.

> There are many crimes that were never punished, and for this reason there are not healthy foundations for reconciliation; and instead, under the cover of the communist ideology of brotherhood and unity, the remembrance of a traumatic past was attempted to be repressed. The punishments for massacres carried out by the communists were often not even legally founded and justly measured punishments, but were instead massacres against those disagreeing politically and against class enemies. Many were punished unjustly, in order to be able to nationalize their properties more easily. (Beara & Miljanović, p. 174)

In the description above, "healthy foundations for reconciliation" do not exist in former Yugoslavia. According to Beara and Miljanović: "[r]econciliation is a long and difficult process. There are many obstacles in this path" (2007, p. 175). Despite serious attempts to deal with the recent past and promote reconciliation, for societies of former Yugoslavia with a history of repressing the past, the process is often overwhelming. As a peace activist in Belgrade explains: "people are sick of war stories and reconciliation; they want to move on and have normal lives." *–Interview with Anja, peace activist from Sarajevo who relocated to Belgrade*.

While there is recognition of the importance of reconciliation among civil society, there is also a sense that the language of *reconciliation and dealing with the past* proliferated by civil society and political elites is imported from the international

community. The need for language that is culturally appropriate/culturally relevant is sometimes expressed.

> When I hear words such as reconciliation, I want to kill myself…even my own words from 1995 about catharsis bother me because words are spoiled before they are implemented. This kind of language, especially used by politicians, is like putting alcohol on an open wound. The war in Bosnia was not a crisis but a war. Our citizens need our own language regarding dealing with past. *–Interview with Cica, representative of a local NGO in Belgrade.*

While members of civil society frequently comment on the need to apply reconciliation and what it means *in context*, many have accepted the idea that reconciliation is vital for the region. In part, this acceptance may be prompted by an increase in international funding for reconciliation-related activities. In recent years, a number of NGOs have received funding from international donors for projects aimed at reconciliation.

> Reconciliation has become a hot button among international donors. In the beginning the focus was on reconstruction. Now donors realize they don't want to have newly built houses with no one living in them. Establishing trust and building reconciliation is very important in our societies. *–Interview with Nebojša, Serb from Vukovar working for local NGO.*

Though talk of reconciliation is prevalent in the region, its value is not universally recognized. In a lecture given in 2005 in Zagreb by Žarko Puhovski, then head of Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, I asked Puhovski his view on reconciliation. His response was unexpected: "Reconciliation is for priests. I tell people 'hate each other, just don't kill each other!'" (Puhovski lecture, Global Partnership for Activism and Cross-cultural Training (GPACT),[111], July 2005). At first glance Puhovski's response could be taken as supporting hatred and as anti-reconciliation. His intention, however, was not necessarily to support hatred but rather to emphasize other priorities. On his view, developing respect for human rights is a top priority.

---

[111] For information on GPACT, see http://cgsd.rutgers.edu/gpact.shtml

Reconciliation may follow in time, but without respect for human rights, reconciliation, even in a minimal form of *not hating each other*, would be meaningless.

In analyzing Puhovski's response, it becomes clear that there may be *competing priorities* in the post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia, e.g., truth, justice, reconciliation, human rights, economic growth, regional cooperation, etc. The idea of competing priorities is further supported by a response from a historian and head of a research institute in Sarajevo. When I asked about reconciliation, the response I received was: "first we have to talk about truth, then justice, then maybe we can talk about reconciliation, but even then I am skeptical about reconciliation." *–Interview with Hasib, Bosnian Muslim living in Sarajevo*. On Hasib's view, reconciliation should take a back seat to more pressing priorities: truth and justice. Hasib is not alone; many members of civil society argue that truth and justice are necessary for reconciliation. In light of the controversies surrounding truth and justice, however, e.g., competing truths and competing visions of justice, it is unclear whether prioritizing truth and justice will create a space for reconciliation.

In the region, reconciliation is frequently linked to discourse on dealing with the past, truth and justice. As a result, it is typically perceived to be dependent on the results of processes designed to deal with the past and bring about truth and justice, rather than its own separate process. With the exception of NGOs and local grassroots activists who work on reconciliation outside the context of dealing with the past, truth and justice, its role as an independent process is muted. For many, dealing with the past is a precondition for reconciliation. In the interviews I conducted with ordinary people and those working on reconciliation-related activities, a common expression was: "prvo treba

očistiti svoje dvorište pa tek onda govoriti o tuđem," which is roughly: "first you should clean your own backyard before you talk about others." In the context of dealing with the past and reconciliation, this expression is used to communicate the view that each society should address its own crimes before pointing to the crimes of others. In this way, the necessity of looking inward and taking responsibility for one's own crimes ties reconciliation tightly to dealing with the past and the tensions associated with it.

The way in which reconciliation is perceived in the region has a direct effect on the willingness of ordinary people to engage in reconciliation-related activities. Perceptions of reconciliation are very much driven by how reconciliation is portrayed by civil society, the international community, the media and political elites. Religious leaders have not contributed much to reconciliation; religion is often a source of division in the region (Peuraca, 2003). Ordinary people also have their own ideas about reconciliation and what it entails. As a result, there are multiple forces at work in shaping perceptions of reconciliation and what it means for ordinary people as well as those working on reconciliation-related activities, e.g., dialogue, tolerance and peacebuilding.

Part II: What reconciliation means to people in the region

While reconciliation has become top of mind in recent years, its meaning is still elusive. The different senses of reconciliation discussed in the first chapter are relevant for discussions of reconciliation in the region. In the region, there is a tendency to describe reconciliation as a process that corresponds to the individual/interpersonal and collective (community, national, political) levels discussed in the first chapter. People often refer to reconciliation *with the self, the family and the community*. There is also a tendency to refer to different senses of reconciliation (full/broad versus narrow) that

correspond roughly to Crocker's thick versus thin description. Some conceive of reconciliation in the thicker/broader sense of friendship and harmony, whereas others focus on the thinner/narrower sense of pragmatic interaction and basic coexistence. Clarity and consensus on the meaning of reconciliation is lacking in the region, just as it is lacking in the literature, i.e., there is a tendency to *describe* rather than *define* reconciliation. What reconciliation means is very much tied to the different ways in which reconciliation is portrayed in the post-conflict societies of former Yugoslavia. Among ordinary people, some think of reconciliation as necessary for the future, while others find it confusing and unnecessary. The following provides a brief overview of some common ways of thinking about what reconciliation means in the region.

The noun "reconciliation" is typically translated as the noun "pomirenje" (Benson, 1998, p. 196). The noun "mir" or "peace" is part of pomirenje (Benson, 1998, p. 111). The verb "pomiriti" means to reconcile, conciliate, pacify (Benson, 1998, pp. 196, 111). Pomirenje often implies making peace with or being at peace with after some grievance. When discussing pomirenje, additional concepts come up: "suživot" and "jedan pored drugog." Suživot means *conjoined life*, *living along with or among* others–it implies some mutual interaction. Jedan pored drugog means *one next to the other* or *living side by side or alongside another*–it implies minimal interaction. *Jedan pored drugog* may also imply *parallel life*. In this context, both *suživot* and *jedan pored drugog* correspond to levels of coexistence; *suživot* corresponds to moderate coexistence with mutual interaction; *jedan pored drugog* corresponds to minimal coexistence with minimal interaction. In my interviews with ordinay people and those working on reconciliation-related activities in the region, there was a tendency for all three concepts to be used. All

three can be thought of as different stages on a scale or spectrum of reconciliation, i.e., reconciliation at one end, living along with or among others/mutual interaction in the center, and living next to or side by side others/minimal interaction at the other end. Table 2 shows this spectrum. Additional terms that are mentioned in discussions on reconciliation include *snošljivost* or *trpeljivost* (tolerance) and *oprost* (forgiveness).

Table 2: Spectrum of reconciliation with behavioral and attitudinal components

concept	pomirenje reconciliation	suživot conjoined life	jedan pored drugog parallel life
behavioral component	making peace with/ being at peace with	living along with or among others mutual interaction moderate coexistence	living side by side, next to, or alongside others minimal interaction minimal coexistence
attitudinal component	acceptance forgiveness	tolerance pragmatism	tolerance pragmatism necessity

The way these concepts factor into what reconciliation means to people in the region is discussed below. Before entering this discussion, however, it is interesting to note that none of the three concepts referenced above points to the *character* of reconciliation. In chapter one, I proposed conceiving of reconciliation as consistent with a benevolent, magnanimous character and inconsistent with malevolence, hatred and revenge. The spectrum outlined above accounts for the behavioral and attitudinal components of reconciliation rather than the deeper motivational elements. Motivation elements will be discussed below in Part III.

While coexistence is frequently connected to reconciliation, the relationship is not so straightforward. Coexistence in either moderate or minimal forms *may* be a step in the path to reconciliation under certain condiitions, i.e., provided certain motivations are in

place. Recall the examples from chapter one: if one chooses coexistence for the sake of economic advantage but secretly wishes harm to others, this does not sound like reconciliation, but entrepreneurism. Since motivations are discussed in the next section, the behaviors and attitudes assoicated with reconciliation are explored below and a fuller account of motivations follows in Part III of this chapter. In this space I only wish to add a note about character. If the character of reconciliation consists in magnanimty and benevolence, does coexistence as connected to reconciliation have a similar character? My proposal is to think of coexistence as connected to reconciliation as having the character of prudence. Connecting prudence to coexistence preserves the pragmatic sense of coexistence but disallows reckless vengeance, i.e., the prudent person (when she is being prudent) does not recklessly seek revenge or secretly wish harm, but exercises caution and is careful in her judgement, even when pursuing her own interests. Prudence is different from but consistent with magnanimty and benevolence; it is inconsistent with malevolence, hatred and vengeance. Thinking of coexistence in this way may help tie it closer to reconciliation and farther from hatred and revenge. The different ways people in the region characterize reconciliation and coexistence are discussed below

In the region, reconciliation often is tied to a sense of restoring trust and rebuilding relationships at individual/interpersonal and collective levels. Relationship-centered conceptions of reconciliation discussed in the first chapter are common.

> Reconciliation has many meanings. It is about establishing trust between people and groups. It is about improving relationships. Sometimes it involves forgiveness, but that is separate. –*Interview with Ivan, Croat war veteran and peace activist*.

For many, reconciliation requires time and patience; it requires a readiness and willingess in the hearts and minds of people in the region.

> I think we need time. Reconciliation cannot happen overnight. It is too soon for reconciliation because the wounds are still fresh. Our generations are lost. Future generations may have a chance at reconciliation. *–Interview with Velma, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo.*

Velma's comments are not unique; many in the region think the timing has to be right for reconciliation. When I asked Velma how future generations will be different if nothing is done to work toward reconciliation now, she replied: "I don't know. I guess that is a problem. But people are just not ready." *–Interview with Velma, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo.*

For some, reconciliation, particularly in the form of restoring relationships and friendships, is out of the question. A young person from Belgrade described reconciliation as confusing and hypocritical–she linked reconciliation to friendship.

> First we were supposed to hate each other, now they want us to forget and be friends…It is all so hypocritical. *–Interview with Nataša, Serb from Belgrade.*

For Nataša, the idea of reconciliation in the form of forgiving and forgettng and becoming friends is confusing and doesn't fit with the identity scripts outlined during the war years. Her objection is to the fuller form of friendship, i.e., what Crocker would call thick reconciliation. For others, Crocker's thinner forms of reconciliation, i.e., what can be called moderate and minimal coexistence, also raise controversy.

> I am not sure how we are suppposed to live next to each other, like one big happy family, and pretend as though nothing happened. The fact is people have been murdered, tortured and brutalized. All sense of decency has been lost. *–Interview with Emir, Bosnian Muslim from Višegrad who relocated to Sarajevo.*

On Emir's view, even minimal coexistence is difficult to imagine; moderate coexistence and living along with or among people who have committed horrible acts is unthinkable. For Azra, who lost two sons, her husband, brothers and family members, living among those responsible for killing her family is something she accepts as part of her life.

It is now seven years since I returned to Srebrenica, but I don't belong anywhere. I am like a ghost. Despite having family in Sarajevo and even the United States, I wanted to come back here to be with my children.[112] It is hardest to have something and for that to be taken away from you than not to have it at all but what can I do. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Azra is among those who move beyond minimal coexistence and engage in behavior that is closer to moderate coexistence and mutual interaction. Adnan is another:

We work together in the army. It is like it was before, in a way. There are no problems. They know who I am and that I lost many family members in Bratunac and Srebrenica. Still, life goes on and we must live together. *–Interview with Adnan, Bosnian Muslim from Bratunac who relocated to Sarajevo.*

Adnan may seem like an exception, but he is not. He has lost many family members and remembers clearly the events that unfolded in Bratunac and Srebrenica. Still, he is willing and able to work together with Serbs in Republika Srpska. He accepts moderate coexistence and mutual interaction as a normal part of life. Though he works and lives in Republika Srpska during the week, he returns to Sarajevo on the weekend. His life is split between two entities; he exercises prudence and tries to find a pragmatic balance.

For others, however, the decision to *live among or alongside others* is less based on prudence and pragmatism and more on revenge.

I stayed in Srebrenica. I want them to see me everyday. I am a constant reminder of what they did. I want them to suffer and to never be able to forget. That is my revenge. *–Conversation with Damira, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Damira's behavior appears to be consistent with coexistence, though the character seems removed from prudence and far from benevolence and magnanimity. Her attitude does not express a willingess to establish normal relations, as Adnan's did. For her, normal life after genocide is impossible. She is not one or two steps away from reconciliation, but actually quite far from it. Damira's story illustrates the complexity of coexisence and

---

[112] Azra's children are dead. Returning to Srebrenica allows her to be with their remains and whatever memories she has of them.

the importance of looking into motivations, not just behaviors, when describing coexistence as a stage or form of reconciliation. While her behavior may appear to be consistent with coexistence as related to reconciliation, her attitudes and motivations are not. Damira's behavior may appear normal at the surface level, but underneath it, the eeriness of what appears to be normnal behavior in the post-conflict context is revealed.

The eeriness of normalcy in the post-conflict context is often discussed in connection to reconciliation.

> I am always amazed there aren't revenge killings in Sarajevo. I personally know people on both sides who know exactly who is responsible for the deaths of their family members, even for their own imprisonment and rape. I always wonder why they don't take revenge. They see them on the street and don't do anything about it. –*Interview with Emira, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

For Emira, the time of war marked a period of "anything goes," when lawlessness was common. She finds the return to normal life both surprising and unsettling. Her description of life in Sarajevo is neither one of full reconciliation nor moderate coexistence, but minimal coexistence, i.e., living side by side. In cases where victims and perpetrators live side by side, minimal coexistence may be all that is possible in the immediate aftermath of war. Moderate coexistence and reconciliation in a fuller sense may require time for wounds to heal and emotions to settle. On the other hand, exactly how much time is required seems variable. It may not be time as much as personal will that affects attitudes toward reconciliation and coexistence.

Though fifteen years have passed since the end of the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, minimal to moderate coexistence remains the best-case scenario for many. In communities that have been divided, reconciliation in the thicker,

fuller or broader sense of the term is often out of reach. For some, however, restoring broken or lost friendship is something they contemplate in private.

> It is difficult for me when I think back. I was so young. My best friend was a Serb, but she is gone now and I don't know what happened to her. I have mixed feelings. I miss her and would love to see her again. At the same time, I remember her father and what he did. I will never forget what I saw. He had piles of weapons in his home. When I think about that I get upset–how could he want to hurt *me*, I was just a kid? I take it very personally. –*Interview with Jelena, Croat from Osijek who relocated to Zagreb.*

Jelena finds herself wondering about her best friend and how she is doing. She is caught between wanting to rebuild the relationship she had with her friend and the image of her friend's father. She thought they were so close and cannot understand how the father could have planned attacks against Croats knowing that his daughter's best friend is a Croat. When I asked her if it was possible that the weapons were there for some other reason, for defense or out of fear, she found that difficult to believe. In her view, the father who welcomed her into his home and watched her play with his daughter performed the ultimate betrayal. While she understands that Serbs in Osijek were afraid and thinks they had some reason to be afraid, she cannot get past the broken trust of her friend's father.

> I can understand Serbs being afraid, but the violence and betrayal is hard to accept. My father was for independence of Croatia, but not the way it happened. He felt even if it took fifty years, it would be better for a peaceful independence than the violence that ensued. –*Interview with Jelena, Croat from Osijek who relocated to Zagreb.*

Jelena has thought about her broken friendship for a while. Others, however, find broken friendship too painful to think about.

> We were like brothers. We went to school together, to the army together, we did everything together–heck, we slept in the same bed together. When things were getting bad in Foča, I was in Sarajevo. I tried to reach him to ask him to save my brother and watch over our homes. He was in a position to do something. I

> wanted to hand over all the keys so nothing bad would happen. I couldn't get through to him but I got through to someone else and I asked that person to pass on the message; my friend never called me. Our houses were burned and my brother was killed. I still don't understand why he didn't save us. *–Interview with Enis, Bosnian Muslim from Foča who relocated to Sarajevo.*

When I asked Enis if it is possible the friend never received the message or tried to help but failed, he was doubtful. He was sure the friend would have known what was taking place and would have been in a position to do something about it. Enis has mixed feelings about reconciliation (pomirenje), but he thinks *living along with* others (suživot) or *together among each other* is important for society and that separate communities are dangerous.

> Reconciliation is an idealistic, not realistic term. Life and current events dictate the forms of reconciliation…We live next to each other but not together and that is a relationship that divides us and is very dangerous…In time, togetherness will replace brotherhood and unity and then living among each other will follow. *–Interview with Enis, Bosnian Muslim from Foča who relocated to Sarajevo.*

While Enis is skeptical of reconciliation in a deeper (idealistic) form among Bosnians, he has a more optimistic attitude about repairing relationships between Bosnia and Serbia.

> Serbs from Serbia are different. They feel remorse. They feel regret. They have a sense of the harm that was done. Our brothers in Bosnia have no remorse at all. They are not ready for reconciliation; they are not ready to admit what they did. *–Interview with Enis, Bosnian Muslim from Foča who relocated to Sarajevo.*

Reconciliation at the group level is not universal. Reconciling with a group or some members of a group, e.g., Serbs from Serbia, may not entail reconciling with all Serbs, e.g., Serbs from Bosnia. The relationship between reconciliation at the individual/interpersonal level, e.g., among former friends, and reconciliation at the group level, e.g., among community members, is more complex. Individual/interpersonal reconciliation often involves addressing tensions and disruptions to a personal, sometimes intimate, relationship. Group reconciliation involves addressing tensions and

disruptions between people who may not know each other on a personal/intimate level. Confronting former friends or neighbors is very different from confronting strangers, just as confronting individuals is very different from confronting groups. Generalizations and group dynamics often complicate relationships between groups. Emotions are often higher as are expectations in the individual/interpersonal case.

Enis has not had a chance to confront his former friend; I asked him what it would mean to him to have that chance. He said it would bring him a sense of "closure" because he cannot figure out how his best friend could let him and his family suffer. On his view, addressing tensions at the individual/interpersonal level would bring closure and healing. Addressing tensions between "brothers in Bosnia," e.g., Serbs and Muslims, would help restore the community and a sense of human decency or humanity. Addressing tensions between Bosnia and Serbia would restore good relations with neighbors in the region and promote respect for humanity. On Enis' view, closure is more relevant at the individual/interpersonal level than the collective level. There are some, however, who seek closure at the collective level.

> I cannot understand why the Dutch would allow that to happen. They should have protected us. They knew what was going to happen. I blame the UN and the international community for Srebrenica. I still want to know why they let this happen. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Tension between individuals or groups and the international community is common in the region. Some find the international community's efforts to promote reconciliation to be hypocritical in light of its contribution to the conflict.

> I have to say that I find the international community's efforts to promote reconciliation to be absurd, especially since they are responsible in part for the conflict. *–Interview with Dina, Serb refugee from Knin who relocated to Belgrade.*

Anger directed at the international community does not fit neatly into the individual/interpersonal or collective levels. In some cases, individual expectations were broken; in others there was a broken bond of trust between the group and the international community, e.g., as in the case of Bosnian Muslims trusting the UN in Srebrenica or people having faith in the UN during the Croatian offensive Operation Storm (Oluja).

> The UN pretended to offer us protection but they actually allowed us to be boxed in. We had no way out. If they did something, my sons would be alive.
> –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

> One of the saddest days of my life was when I had to tell Mira about her father. During the Serbs' hold over Krajina, she arranged for supplies to be brought in. Her family helped everyone, Croat and Serb. If it weren't for her, our organization wouldn't have made it in…When I entered Krajina after Oluja I could not believe my eyes; it was total devastation. Everything was burnt to the ground…Later, when I met with Mira and she asked about her father, I couldn't find the words to explain that he didn't make it. I cannot help but hold the UN responsible for this. They should have prevented it or at least sent a warning.
> –*Interview with Bruce, former representative of a humanitarian organization.*

The need for closure regarding the behavior of the international community or international organizations is sometimes mentioned. Closure plays a prominent role in broken friendships. Enis' story of broken friendship in Foča is reminiscent of the stories of many. Too frequently, however, closure does not come. It is not often that we get to hear the other side of the story, e.g., the side of Enis' friend. A film project called "Videoletters" attempted to do this and actually brought together people who had relationships/friendships before and during the war and were separated. In some cases, the outcome was uplifting and helped bring about reconciliation at the

individual/interpersonal level (Riding, 2005, June 9).[113] Closure is not always possible, however, as people often disappear or are afraid to reach out or confront former friends.

Petar had the chance to confront his former friend, but this did not bring closure as much as further disappointment.

> I went back to my old street after years. I saw my old friend and she asked me why I left and where had I been. This unnerved me. I told her 'how can you ask me that when you saw everything from your window?' She said she didn't know what I was talking about and didn't see anything. I remember clearly seeing her in the window the night they beat my father and chased us from our home.   We barely made it out alive. I cannot consider going back and being friends with someone who could deny this. *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

In Petar's case, he is convinced his friend watched a terrible scene unfold and did not do anything to help. He is also convinced that she is either so ashamed of her behavior or simply has no remorse. Petar and his friend's version of the story are irreconcilable.

Individual/interpersonal reconciliation often involves confronting tensions and disruptions that have caused a break in close personal relationships. In some cases, the process of addressing these tensions and disruptions is terribly daunting.

> In my case, I was attacked and driven away by my own first cousin. I don't know what happened, maybe he went crazy. He chased me and threatened to kill me and my father. My father is a Muslim and my mother, his aunt, is a Serb. I could never imagine something like that could happen in my own family. What's worse is even to this day, my grandmother won't acknowledge what he did. She acts like nothing happened. *–Interview with Lejla, refugee of mixed background from Vojvodina who relocated to Osijek.*

In Lejla's case, individual/interpersonal reconciliation is not feasible in her relationship with her cousin. He shows no remorse and acts as if the event never took place. In many cases, reconciliation seems to require a willingness on both sides to face a harm, tension or disruption that occurred in the relationship. The lack of such willingess seems to

---

[113] For information about Videoletters, see http://videoletters.net/

impede reconciliation in the fuller, deeper, thicker sense. This is the case for both individual/interpersonal and collective reconciliation. As Biljana provides:

> How can we reconcile with Croats when they won't admit what they did wrong? They cannot face what they did in World War II and they cannot face the fear that Tudjman's nationalism invoked in the nineties. –*Interview with Biljana, Serb refugee from Slavonia living in Belgrade*.

Trust is also a major factor at both the individual/interpersonal and collective levels.

As a young Albanian from Kosovo explains:

> Reconciliation for me is difficult to imagine because it is difficult to trust. I remember this day so vividly. My friend, a Serb, and I were talking about the unjust treatment of Albanians in Kosovo. He acted like he was on my side and everything. Then as we walked away, for some reason I turned back. When I turned back, I saw him salute the Serbian military–the same ones who were oppressing us, the same ones he was just condeming. How can I trust strangers if I can't even trust someone who was my own friend. –*Interview with Ilire, Albanian from Kosovo*.

> I don't think about going back…I had a scholarship but someone wrote a letter to have it taken away from me. My mom also had a lot of problems during the war. She is very petite and very positive. She is a Serb but with a very good Croatian accent...Her colleagues always liked her but then they turned against her. She helped them find good positions in JNA when their sons had to serve but then they changed. They would put fan to blow on her back, not say hello, say she is the enemy, etc., so she had to quit and move out. –*Interview with Sandra, mixed Serb and Macedonian background from Rijeka who relocated to Belgrade*.

In many of the stories discussed above, the tension or disruption in the individual/interpersonal relationship exists in the form of a personal attack, betrayal, perceived slight or insult. At times, individual/interpersonal tensions bleed into group tensions. Often, tensions at the group level are focused on a combination of identity threats, fear, hatred, revenge, and even jealousy. Violence and injustice are also sources.

> I think they were jealous because my family lived in a wealthy part of town in a nice house. They used the war as an excuse to intimidate us. I remember when my father received pink letters with blood on them and the harrassing phone calls. At first he didn't tell us what they said...When they came to the door to force us out I realized what was happening. They wanted us to leave out of jealousy and

personal interest. *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

In Petar's case, reconciliation at the group level involves confronting those who had interests in driving people out as well as those who allowed this to happen. On his view, citizens of Vojvodina need to take responsibility for what they allowed to happen just as citizens of Croatia need to take responsibility for the exodus of four hundred thousand Serbs.[114]

> Thirty nine thousand Croats were driven out of Vojvodina. My family lived there for four hundred years. We have a whole section of the cemetery with our last name. There is no acknowledgement of this. *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

Acknowledgement is often mentioned as an important element of reconciliation. It means a great deal to people for others to acknowledge the harm they endured. For many, lack of acknowledgement, and indeed, stubborn denial, impedes reconciliation.[115]

> Denial is strong on all sides. It amazes me that after all the evidence of camps in Prijedor, the local people still deny there were camps there. The world documented these camps, but the locals still don't acknowledge what happened. Acknowledgement is needed for reconciliation. *–Interview with Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo.*

Vera explained why acknowledgement was so important to her:

> Nobody cares about Serb victims; we don't count…Acknowledgement would mean that we have value, that our lives actually mean something. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

Vera was responding to an overall lack of empathy for Serb victims. This lack of empathy prompts some to turn outward and become consumed with proving their suffering. It prompts others to turn inward and not bother expressing their suffering.

---

[114] Petar's view on this is included in his quote on page 136 of this dissertation.

[115] For an excellent account of denial and acknowledgement after trauma, see Stanley Cohen (2001).

> I organized a meeting of Serbian and Muslim women, six and six, who lost family members. The meeting was sponsored by Japan's Hiroshima Association (JHA). After the meeting, the JHA associate was surprised with the outcome; he thought only one ethnic group of women were present…Bosniak women were accusing and telling their side of the story but Serbian women did not talk at all. They didn't want to create conflict since Serbian truth is generally not being taken as real or important. One reason for that is the one-sided approach of media. They are not interested in listening to the Serbian side of the story. –*Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

For Serbs, particularly in the Srebrenica area, the killings that occurred during their Christmas in 1993 in nearby Kravica are not acknowledged. When Serbs try to bring this up, they are accused of trying to equate the killings of less than fifty Serbs[116] with about eight thousand Muslims in 1995. Of course the total number of Serbs killed in the Srebrenica area from 1992 to 1995 is much higher.[117] The equivalency argument is used to dismiss the plight of Serbs for acknowledgement of their losses. As a result, competing victimization and cycles of blame and denial are perpetuated while acknowledgement stagnates.

Acknowledgement is often tied to apologies and remorse; it is also connected to admitting wrongdoing and bringing about closure. As Azra explained: "I don't have my children, but someone has to say *why* I don't have my children." When I asked Azra if anyone from her community said they were sorry for her loss, her voice became serious.

> Those words I still did not hear. If I did something like that, I would be the first to come and say that I did that and I am sorry…It is so strange, when you scrape someone's car, you say 'I am sorry' but for killings of this kind we don't have anybody who is guilty or feeling guilty. We have mass graves, people killed but nobody who did it. That is what I cannot understand. Still the 'guilty one' (*krivac*) is in the air. –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

---

[116] ICTY figures count 43 victims in Kravica between January 6 and 7 of 1993. The number of Serbs killed from 1992 to 1995 in the Podrinja area, including Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Skelani, has been a matter of debate and ranges from 1,400 to 3,500. See ICTY (2005, July 6) at http://www.icty.org/sid/3639

[117] Ibid.

Despite her suffering, Azra is open to reconciliation. She does not harbor hatred and vengeance. While many assume those who lost loved ones are not open to reconciliation, often those who suffered losses are proponents and recognize the value of reconciliation.

> Reconciliation will come when those who committed crimes are punished and publicly admit their role in the atrocities committed during the war and when Serbian politicians publicly apologize…No one can return my children but those who were killing have to admit their sins and that will prevent further problems and a repeat of what we had in the nineties. –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica*.

As discussed earlier, though Tadić has apologized for Srebrenica, his apology was not satisfactory to many because he did not call the crime "genocide" and because he also encouraged others to apologize, thereby feeding into the contentious equalization issue.

As the discussion above reveals, explanations for what caused the wars and what happened in the wars often involve cycles of blame and denial rather than acknowledgement of wrongdoing. Cycles of blame and denial are typically part of discussions on reconciliation and coexistence. In order for there to be harmony and possible friendship again, many feel that individuals and groups have to admit what they did. In order to live together and engage in mutual interaction, there is a strong sense that some level of acknowledgement is required.

There is a fair amount of skepticism about whether acknowledgement will ever come; as a result, many are hesistant of reconciliation and any meaningful sense of coexistence that goes beyond living side by side.

> Serbian hegemonic tendencies is responsible for what happened. They were always paranoid that we were going to do something to them. Their paranoia from the second world war is responsible for the war. They are still obsessed with that. –*Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran in Zagreb*.

> Croatians have an identity complex. They are always trying to prove something. They are obsessed with their national identity. If you ask for *hleb* and not *kruh*

> they act like they don't know what you need. Bread is bread and they know that. They should be grateful that Serbs spend money at the coast. *–Interview with Sanja, a young Serb from Vojvodina.*

> Muslims think they are the only ones who suffered. They won't admit what their Mujahideen did during the war. They tortured people in the worst ways, much worse than anything any other group did. *–Conversation with Branko, Serb veteran from Doboj.*

The stereotypes and stigmatizations described above insulate people from having to address underlying tensions and disruptions that are present in the post-conflict context.

As the descriptions above reveal, there are a number of tensions that exist at the individual/interpersonal and collective levels. In many cases, these tensions are readily identifiable. In some cases, however, they are not clearly disernable, which makes addressing them as part of reconciliation confusing or uneccessary. As two young people provide:

> I don't need reconciliation since I did not fight with anyone. All my friends are still my friends, regardless of their national background, so I don't need that. Most times when I talk to friends of a different nationality they blame their own side and no one says anything bad about others. At least that is how it is with my friends. *–Interview with Ana, Croat refugee from Bugojno, living in Zagreb.*

> I don't need to reconcile with anyone because I didn't do anything to anyone. I have nothing to apologize or feel sorry for. *–Interview with Nataša, Serb from Belgrade.*

For Ana, reconciliation is about healing broken friendships; it is not necessary for her because her friendships stayed intact. Ana sees reconciliation as healing interpersonal relationships between people who have had quarrels. For Nataša reconciliation makes sense at the individual/interpersonal level between victims and perpetrators. Since she is neither, it is irrelevant to her. The idea of reconciliation between victims and bystanders or beneficiaries is confusing and foreign to Nataša.

In some cases, tensions and disruptions are somehow perceived to be *in the air,* which makes the process of addressing them as part of reconciliation difficult to grasp.

> There was some feeling in the air. People stopped coming out and started locking their doors. It was a very tense time. I remember clearly when my neigbhor (Muslim) was shouting in the streets 'come out you mice, come out.' He was upset because his wife just had a baby and he had no one to celebrate with. That's when I knew something was coming. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

Others, however, provide clear ideas about what caused the tensions and disruptions–though they often have different interpretations.

> The SANU Memorandum is what caused all the problems. Serbian nationalism is responsible for starting the war and Serbia needs to take responsbility for this. *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

> Croat children started drawing the Ustasha flag in schools. Where did they get that idea? It had to be from the parents. They were planning to expel Serbs all along. The Croatian constitution is proof of this. *–Interview with Biljana, Serb refugee from Slavonia living in Belgrade.*

> The Islamic Declaration of Izetbegović showed very clearly what their intentions were. The Muslims wanted to make Bosnia an Islamic state. *–Interview with Dragan, Serb from Belgrade.*

Attitudes toward reconciliation are very much tied to perceptions of the wars, what caused them, what happened during them and the consequences the wars have brought. Dealing with the past is typically central to discussions of reconciliation. How the conflicts are framed is also important, e.g., many think if the *other* group caused the conflict, they are the ones who have to reconcile. The discussion above provides an overview of how people think about reconciliation and what it entails in the post-conflict context. Ideas about whether reconciliation is necessary, for whom it is relevant and what forms it takes provide an initial picture of what reconciliation means to people in the region. What is missing from this picture is more detail about why reconciliation matters, if it does, and what motivates people to support reconciliation or resist it.

The discussion so far has revealed diverse views on what reconciliation means, e.g., restoring friendship, restoring respect for humanity and human decency, rebuilding trust, etc. Coexistence as an alternative or step along the way to reconciliation, whether in the form of: a) living along with or among others, or b) living next to or side by side others, is also part of this discussion. The focus so far has been on perceptions of reconciliation at the surface level; the following section deals with not only what people think about reconciliation (and coexistence) at a deeper level, but *why* they think the way they do. Just as reconciliation is multifaceted, so too are motivations for and resistance to reconciliation. The discussion that follows addresses the motivational components of reconciliation and paints a picture of why these are important for understanding reconciliation in the region.

Part III: Motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance

In Table 2, *Reconciliation spectrum with behavioral and attitidunal components* on p. 177, I discussed some ways of describing behaviors and attitudes associated with reconciliation in the region. As mentioned, the table provides an overview of how the concepts *pomirenje, suživot and jedan pored drugog* are described. What is missing are the motivational components that underly these concepts. The following table provides an outline of *some* of the motivational components mentioned during my interviews. There is significant overlap between reconciliation and coexistence. The motivations that fall under *suživot* and *jedan pored drugog* are also relevant for reconciliation, e.g., one might be motivated by economic interest to pursue reconciliation, just as one might be motivated by closure/healing to support coexistence but not full reconciliation. The motivations are separated in Table 3 (below) to show dominant patterns, acknowledging

that in many cases, individual behavior is driven by multiple motivations and varies by case. For example, some are open to reconciliation in specific relationships at the individual/interpersonal level but not others (e.g., old friends versus former neighbors). Others are open to reconciliation at the collective level among specific groups/sub-groups but not others (e.g., among Serbs from Vojvodina but not Serbs from Vukovar, or Croats from Zagreb but not from Zadar or Split). People are sometimes selective in deciding with whom reconciliation is accpetable.

Table 3: Spectrum of reconciliation with motivational components

concept	pomirenje reconciliation	suživot conjoined life	jedan pored drugog parallel life
behavioral component	making peace with/ being at peace with	living along with or among mutual interaction moderate coexistence	living side by side/ next to/alongside of minimal interaction minimal coexistence
attitudinal component	acceptance forgiveness	pragmatism tolerance	pragmatism tolerance necessity
motivational component	friendship closure/healing understanding humanity/empathy/ remorse	economic interest normalcy	survival self-preservation

While one might assume motivations are transparent, e.g., that people who support reconciliation are predisposed to peace and forgiveness and that people who support coexistence, but not reconciliation, are more pragmatic, the table above shows some complexity. The discussion below highlights how people I interviewed described their motivations for reconciliation and coexistence. This is by no means a comprehensive account; the table outlines why reconciliation or coexistence is important to people (when

it is). In analyzing these motivations, there are cases where some people support reconciliation at the individual/interpersonal level and coexistence at the collective level. In other words, blanket support for reconciliation at both levels may not exist.

My research revealed two general groups, those *for* and those *against* reconciliation. It also revealed a set of motivations underlying each group. A group that is ambivalent or neutral could be added, though those who started out as ambivalent or neutral quickly fell into one of the two groups during my interviews. Table 4 below provides a snapshot of these two groups. In actual cases, not all the elements apply, e.g., forgiveness does not always apply, though it may. The table is focused on how people describe motivations for reconciliation and the related (thinner) concept of coexistence. In addition, it allows for cases where support for reconciliation may apply in some cases (e.g., between former friends) but not other (e.g., between victims and perpetrators). It also allows for cases where some may resist reconciliation (e.g., between former friends) but support coexistence (between groups or in the community). (See Table 4 on the next page).

Table 4: For and against reconciliation with motivational components

group	for	against
position	support reconciliation	resist reconciliation
	support dialogue	resist dialogue
	support inter-ethnic interaction	resist inter-ethnic interaction
	prioritize reconciliation	prioritize other processes
behavioral	making peace with/	resist making peace with/
component	being at peace with	resist being at peace with
attitudinal	acceptance	ambivalence
component	forgiveness	resentment
	tolerance	**righteousness
	pragmatism	disdain
primary	friendship	fear/hatred/revenge
motivational	closure/healing	betrayal/ lack of trust
component	understanding	honoring loved ones
	humanity/empathy/remorse	**righteousness
		contempt
secondary	economic interest	
motivational	normalcy	apathy
component	*survival	*survival
	*self-preservation	*self-preservation

*motivational components common to both groups.
**righteousness appears at both the attitudinal level (righteous) and motivational level.

The motivations displayed in the table above are described below. For purposes of discusssion, *primary* motivational components refer to those that are closely connected to reconciliation, e.g., people typically describe them as the underlying motivation for reconciliation.   Those that are listed as secondary motivations are common for reconciliation *and* coexistence, e.g., people typically describe them as the underlying motivation for *both* reconciliation *and* coexistence.

Motivations for reconciliation

In the interviews I conducted, the group that was *for* reconciliation provided a variety of reasons why they support reconciliation. Among these reasons were: friendship, closure/healing, understanding, humanity/empathy/remorse, economic interest, normalcy, survival and self-preservation. Closure/healing and humanity/empathy/remorse are clustered together because they were often mentioned in tandem. Economic interest is close to pragmatism, in the sense of building good neighborly relations or future relations, but was mentioned discretely and therefore seems to stand on its own. Survival and self-preservation are often mentioned together, though survival is sometimes regarded as existence whereas self-preservation often involves identity. The following vignettes provide insight into the different motivations underlying support for reconciliation (*pomirenje*) and the related concept of coexistence (*suživot and jedan pored drugog*).

Restoring friendship is a powerful motivator. This motivator, however, may only be relevant for those who have experienced a break in their friendships. For younger generations who grew up after the war years and did not lose touch with friends or experience tensions between them, this motivation may seem irrelevant. Friendship represents what Crocker would call a thick form of reconciliation.

> After 20 years I can't believe I have found my good friend from the army. We were together serving in JNA before the war in 1989. I have worried for years about what happened to him, how did he survive the war, is his family okay. We were really so close. It is too emotional to explain how it feels to see him again. –*Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina.*

I had the opportunity to observe Vlada and his friend Zlatan, a Muslim from Jajce, as they were rejoined after 20 years. Though Vlada did not support the war and successfully

avoided serving in the war, he felt the need to express remorse for what some Serbs did in the war. Zlatan continued to reassure Vlada that there was no need for this and that he did not hold any anger against Vlada or Serbs generally. Still, Vlada could not help but feel pain when he heard all that Zlatan endured during the war.

In addition to friendship, humanity/empathy/remorse were also important motivators for Vlada. In another situation I observed, Vlada expressed these motivations in a heartfelt way. As we approached a Muslim graveyard in Sarajevo, Vlada froze. He could not enter the graveyard. When I asked what was wrong he said:

> I cannot enter. It wouldn't be right. My people did all this. They killed all these people. Look how many graves there are; look how young they are. I don't think it's my place to enter out of respect. –*Participant observation of Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina*.

In Vlada's case, existential issues affect him and shape how he sees his role in the post-conflict context and how he navigates through issues connected with reconciliation. Beara & Miljanović (2006) discuss existential issues that affect war veterans, including the search for the meaning of life through the meaning of war. These kinds of issues affect non-veterans as well. In the post-conflict context, existential issues often leave a powerful mark on people. People are affected by stories they hear, experiences they recall and visual reminders of war.

> When I learned about an atrocity in the city of Višegrad where a Serb burned down a house with children in it, my stomach turned. I don't want anyone to put me in the same bag with a person like that. I am sure that person was not a member of my nation and that something was fundamentally wrong with him. That is such a horrific thing. –*Interview with Nena, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Srebrenica*.

In the case of both Vlada and Nena a deeper sense of humanity and empathy underscore their emotioanl reactions regarding conduct in war. These motivations also drive their

support for reconciliation in the form of restoring relationships. They see reconciliation as restoring relationships that have been damaged by the horrors of war. For both, the image of pain and suffering at the hands of members of their own group brings shame and remorse. Nena has a hard time with shame and remorse. She finds it difficult to accept someone from her nation could do such horrific things. She also is afraid of how the behavior of an individual in her group may affect how she is perceived and shade her identity, not simply as a Serb, but as an empathetic human being who is a Serb.

While some people express one or two motivations for reconciliation, others express many. Azra is someone who expressed multiple movitations for reconciliation. Humanity is a central theme for Azra. Empathy and remorse are motivations she wishes those responsible for harm would have more of. Azra views reconciliation in the form of restoring relationships among fellow human beings, especially those living in her own town, as very important.

> Before the war we had more friends who were Serbs. We couldn't believe that war could happen, especially here in a place like Srebrenica. It is hard to think that so many people can be killed, like they were chickens and not humans.
> –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Azra talked about humanity and empathy as connected to sincere regrets or remorse. When I asked what an apology would mean to her, she provided:

> For me personally, it would mean that I can see that the ones who committed those crimes still have some humanity left in them and they are sincere about their regrets. –*Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Azra is not focused on friendship but on humanity and basic human decency. A sense of closure and healing also underscore Azra's motivations for reconciliation.

> If they would come to me and tell me the details about how my sons died, I would not have to think about how that happened...Today we cooperate with other ethnic groups. We received some good information from Serbian women. They were

not able to give us exact locations of some mass graves, but it was enough to help us find two out of three. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Cooperation between ethnic groups is a sign of good will for Azra. It is a sign that some people have a sense of humanity, empathy or remorse. She is hopeful that through cooperation she will be able to achieve closure and healing. Azra is willing to give people the benefit of the doubt and engage in behavior that could bring about reconciliation. Azra has suffered a great deal with the loss of her sons, husband, brothers and many family members. Despite this, she is hopeful reconciliation will prevent the cycles of violence from repeating in the future. Pragmatic concerns for good neighborly relations and good future relations are also relevant to Azra, though she admits that neighborly relations are quite strained in Srebrenica.

Deeper existential issues often have the power to influence how people view reconciliation and what motivates them to support it.

When we were forced out of Novi Sad I was very bitter. It wasn't until I arrived in Zagreb that something clicked. I remember looking at the empty desk that I was supposed to sit in–it immediately hit me 'this desk is empty because a Serb my age in this class was pushed out of this desk just like I was pushed out of mine.' *–Interview with Petar, Croat refugee from Vojvodina who relocated to Zagreb.*

Petar's experience provided a tangible, concrete reminder of his situation and allowed him to empathize with an imagined someone his age who was in the same situation as him. He was aware of Serbs being pushed out of Croatia because his family eventually exchanged property with a Serb family that had to flee Zagreb. The empty desk provided a visual reminder that he is not the only one suffering. It also allowed him to open up to reconciliation, not in the form of friendship, but in the form of making peace with others.

For some, reconciliation is a personal journey they hope will bring understanding and allow them to deal with their experiences during war.

> I have a need to understand what happened and where this destruction came form. I can't accept that we live in an ethnically divided society. So in a way, my work on reconciliation and peacebuilding helps me to understand myself better and to deal with my fears. *–Interview with Nermin, Bosnian Muslim veteran and peacebuilder from Sarajevo*.

The drive to understand how atrocities unfold and the sheer brutality of war sometimes motivates people to face their fears and seek a path to reconciliation. Veterans typically relive trauma when evaluating their behavior in war. In some forms of trauma therapy, a deep sense of guilt sets in once they reach the point of rehumanization and trace the steps that brought them to a state of dehumanization (Beara & Miljanović, 2006). Through trauma therapy, many begin to question why they were sent to war and start to feel manipulated. Humanity, empathy and remorse sometimes follow when veterans reach a new level of understanding of their role and behavior in war. In some cases, anger at other groups is redirected to anger at one's own group or at the regime.

> It was the same situation in Croatia and in Kosovo. Local Serbs would be sitting around while we were risking our lives. When I asked them 'why are we here protecting you if you aren't bothering to fight?' they would say 'you shouldn't have come' and that they got along nicely with the Croats or Albanians until we arrived and ruined things. *–Interview with Miloš, Serb veteran from Belgrade*.

When I asked Miloš about reconciliation he was cautious but hopeful. He was aware of a great deal of harm that was done on all sides in the wars. For Miloš, restoring inter-group relations is only one aspect of reconciliation. He felt restoring intra-group relations among Serbs and the politicians who sent Serbs to fight and protect people who "didn't need protecting" was necessary for his own peace of mind. Miloš was motivated by understanding and remorse. He wanted to understand why his country would subject him

and people his age to such unnecessary danger. He also began to feel remorse for participating in wars he no longer understood.

Remorse is a strong motivator for reconciliation at individual and collective levels. Some are driven by personal remorse for their own behavior or lack of action (bystanders) during the wars. Others are driven by remorse for what their group did, often expressing hope that the real criminals will be identified and clear the nation's name, thereby alleviating a sense of collective guilt and individualizing responsibility.

> I did not fight with anyone and I didn't cause anyone harm. I would like to see the individuals who committed crimes punished and reconciliation to come about. That way I won't have to have this collective guilt over my head.
> –*Interview with Veljko, Serb from Vojvodina.*

Veljko is not alone. The desire for the nation to be cleared of wrongdoing is common. Many suffer as a result of atrocities committed in the name of the group.

Economic interest is a different type of motivator for reconciliation. Economic hardship as a consequence of the wars that ensued has left some feeling they should support reconciliation for the sake of the economic situation. The idea is that restoring, rebuilding or transforming relationships will allow groups in the region to cooperate and work together for the economic interest of all. In this case, reconciliation is seen as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Economic interest is often a motivation for coexistence as well.

> I had to leave Serbia because there are no jobs; that is true for everyone. I left after the war. The tension that exists between the countries is holding the region back. *–Interview with Muhamid, Muslim from Sandžak who relocated to Sarajevo.*

> We are broken financially because of war. People are afraid to cooperate. The war criminals and mafia are living large and the rest of us suffer. We should pull together and improve relationships between groups so we can work together and improve economically. Otherwise, all the young people will leave and there will be nothing left. *–Interview with Nikša of mixed background from Slavonia.*

> Life is hard not only in Srebrenica but overall in Bosnia. Politics is to blame for all that happened. Lots of people moved from this area, not only Muslims but Serbs too...The hand of justice will get those who committed crimes but we have to have jobs. Across from here someone opened an old factory and now both ethnic groups can get a job. We should build factories and not memorial centers...people need jobs so mothers can see life for their children and husbands can greet their wives and so on. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Economic interest is a pragmatic motivator that may be relevant for a larger group of people. Those who think of reconciliation as tied to *friendship for the sake of friendship* are sometimes cynical about the idea. The same people, however, often find merit in the idea of *reconciliation for the sake of economic interest*. In some cases, economic interest is seen as a stepping stone for embracing a fuller sense of reconciliation down the line. In most cases, it is a means to an end.

> We have to learn how to be good neighbors. This is important for the economic situation. We are close together and we have to be able to work together so we can join the European Union. *–Interview with Edon, Albanian from Kosovo.*

Economic interest is sometimes described as a pragmatic reason for reconciliation. People who hold this view often explain that good neighborly relations and future relations are in the economic interest of everyone.

Another motivator that is characterized as pragmatic is normalcy. The desire for normalcy was discussed in the second chapter in connection with dealing with the past. Some felt normalcy could only come about if the past is dealt with whereas others wanted normalcy in lieu of dealing with the past. In the case of reconciliation, the desire for normalcy is often a motivating factor for coexistence rather than reconciliation in a fuller sense of the term.

> When we traveled as alpinists during Yugoslavia we slept anywhere, in the middle of the mountain or on a field. Now I have to hide my car when I drive to

Sarajevo. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

For Nela, a return to normal life is a motivating factor for coexistence in the form of *jedan pored drugog* or *living next to each other*. She is skeptical of reconciliation in a fuller sense. Nela's story is complex. She was born in Herzegovina but lived in Sarajevo in a Muslim dominated part of town most of her life. She recalls a strange sense of normalcy that was far from normal during the war.

> My apartment was in the Muslim part…I kept my job and had to go through three controls to get there. It all started on the sixth of April…I had to start work at 7:00 but for some reason there was always shooting at 7:00. At 8:00 it was okay so I would go then. After work I had to run since shooting started again at 5:00. On the first of May we got a paycheck and received some money for vacation so it was surreal and I did not think it would be as bad. That is the day when Sarajevo became totally blocked. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

Normalcy for Nela is relative. What she accepted as normal during the war is different from her expectations now. Nela has no interest in returning to Sarajevo; in her view relationships are not normal, the city is not normal, people are not normal, coexistence is strained and reconciliation out of reach. She is skeptical the situation will improve. Nela has a difficult time with changes, including language, culture, street names, that have made Sarajevo uncomfortable for Serbs. Nela left Sarajevo after the war because she no longer felt comfortable. Her family protected a Muslim neighbor during the war and that same Muslim neighbor protected a Serb neighbor after the war. Her brother was protected by a Croat family that forged a birth certificate for him and helped him escape through Kiseljak. Betrayal is not part of her experience, though she did experience many personal insults and slights from people telling her to leave Sarajevo. Sarajevo is just not a place she identifies with any longer.

Today the accent is totally different. It is a mixed Croatian and Muslim accent. Now in Sarajevo they add an "h." Instead of marama it is mahrama. Why is that? Maybe because they need to feel special...Tito gave them the status of a constitutional nation as Muslim but now after Dayton they are Bosniak... the "h" was something older people added, not the educated, but now it is literary...I lived all my life in Sarajevo and we said opština and now they say općina as Croatians would. They erased words because they were considered Serbian. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

Nela is cautious about reconciliation; she describes herself as open to reconciliation but in reality is more pessimistic. She is afraid that reconciliation may not be possible in Sarajevo; she thinks coexistence may be more realistic. In her view, the divide between groups is very strong and is amplified by identity politics. In an interesting way, Nela sees her group's identity as inherently open to reconciliation whereas she sees the identity of *others* as resisting reconciliation.

Despite all the crimes Serbs were subjected to and that no one cares about those crimes, Serbs are overall very forgiving and ready to go ahead with reconciliation. That is the art of the Orthodox religion. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

For Nela, reconciliation has to be reciprocal. In her view, Serb victims are not acknowledged and that has to be done for there to be any real sense of reconciliation. In a way, Nela is on the fence about reconciliation. She supports it but is troubled about the conditions under which it can actually come about.

There were too many crimes in BiH and people need more time. All crimes need to be addressed, not just those committted by one side...The world needs to know and justice needs to be done for what Orić and Thaçi did to Serbs... Members of my family were in war prisons on all three sides and luckily survived all. Doboš Silos camp was twenty kilometers away from Sarajevo. The international community knew about it but did not do anything, the same as for the ones in Sarajevo....It hurts that there is no acknowledgement...that prevents people from reconciliation...One day I would like to hear *I am sorry* from all sides. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

Acknowledgement and denial are central themes in discourse on dealing with the past. The lack of acknowledgement and persistence of denial are major obstacles to reconciliation. This is discussed further at the end of this chapter.

The idea that life would return to normal after war kept people going. Unfortunately, many have come to the realization that normal life may never return and that inter-group and intra-group tensions may remain. Marko's story is multi-layered as he has experienced tensions at both the inter-group and intra-group level. Reconciliation for him is complicated.

> I left Šibenik when things were getting bad. I bought a house for my family in Montenegro and they left too. I came to Sarajevo because I wanted to report on what was happening. I was able to get access to the front because of my name, but I would catch slack from both sides. For Serbs I wasn't Serb enough because I wasn't fighting. For Muslims, I was accussed of being a spy. It was unreal. I lived and still live in a building that snipers would hit nearly everyday. We would all sleep in the basement. One night I decided, 'who cares, I am going to sleep in my own bed. The next day my neighbors accused me of collaborating with the Serbs.' That should have been a sign, but I kept thinking things would get better after the war. –*Interview with Marko, Serb from Šibenik who relocated to Sarajevo during the war*.

Marko works with Muslims, has a Muslim girlfriend and is generally progressive in his political opinions/views. He was optimistic about reconciliation for a while but now wonders about whether coexistence is even working. Though Nela and Marko have different political views, Marko has begun to feel like Nela, that he just doesn't belong in Sarajevo.

> I have started to wonder whether there can be normal relations. It is not normal that Muslims cheered for the Turkish team over the Croatian team. It is not normal that the newly painted lines on curbs are considered to be offensive because they are green and therefore for Muslims. Everything in Sarajevo is ethnic and political. I have come to the realization that things may never be normal here; it's just not for me; it's not a place I identify with. –*Interview with Marko, Serb from Šibenik who relocated to Sarajevo during the war*.

Sarajevo is an interesting example because it is tauted as being cosmopolitan, tolerant and multi-ethnic–the ideal setting for reconciliation. In reality, however, Sarajevo is home to a Muslim majority. The appearance of tolerance may be the result of the large presence of internationals, rather than presence of minorities. For those who are now minorities in Sarajevo, it often appears to be anti-reconciliation and coexistence.

> I was intimiated to leave Sarajevo. I don't think about going back...Personally, I don't think I can live in a place where I will be in the ethnic minority. I just don't have the courage to do that. –*Interview with Nena, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Srebrenica.*

Survival and self-preservation often are described as pragmatic motivations for reconciliation and coexistence. They are closer to the other pragmatic motivators (economic interest and normalcy). Both survival and self-preservation also are mentioned as reasons for resisting reconciliation. In the case of those who point to survival and self-preservation as motivations for reconciliation, there is a tendency to reference existence and identity respectively. "We have to learn to live together and respect each other without killing each other." –*Interview with Filip of mixed background from Sarajevo.* Filip's idea of reconciliation is closer to coexistence. He believes division will continue to feed cycles of violence and threaten future generations. Filip's philosophy is perhaps one of the most basic. He is not focused on deeper motivations of understanding, friendship or humanity, but existence.

Milan also has a pragmatic view of reconciliation. He is frustrated with division and wants his community to open up to reconciliation and coexistence. In Milan's case, a combination of motivations drive him, i.e., economic interest, normalcy and self-preservation. He lives in a divided community (Vukovar) and does not like being forced

into a box with an identity script that he cannot stray from. Milan is not willing to sacrifice his future much longer.

> The new generation is leaving the city. There are no jobs and there is no future. People are socially divided and you cannot present yourself as you want to because you have to stay within the box...Every person sees reconciliation differently. With reconciliation, people respect each other, differences, human rights, minority rights and law. Reconciliation can bring a new perspective, new society, new ideas, better life and security for children...We lost so much time– seventeen years. I don't want to have this town divided anymore; we need new political and economic ways here. I will leave this place if they don't figure this out. I only have one life and I will go somewhere else. *–Interview with Milan, Serb from Vukovar*.

In many ways Milan is like Marko. Both work in civil society. Both have had hopes that their community would change. They both think of themselves as worldly citizens and resent being boxed in by identity scripts. They are both frustrated with the lack of progress in their communities. Milan and Marko both talked about leaving. Both want to be citizens of the world, not minority citizens in divided communities. Self-preservation, particularly in the form of protecting one's identity or perception of self, is relevant for Milan and Marko as well as others I interviewed. People do not want to be tied down to the stigma of the past and the stigma of what was done in the name of their group. They want the choice to express the multiple layers of their identities, rather than the identities that have been forced on them. This is particularly true of people I interviewed who were in their early twenties during the wars and have fond memories of life in Yugoslavia before the wars. As Vlada explained:

> I had to remove myself from all that hysteria. I stopped reading the newspapers and watching television. I saw how they were manipulating people's emotions and I did not want to allow myself to get caught up in that. I knew if I did I would lose myself in the process. *–Interview with Vlada, Serb from Vojvodina*.

The above descriptions of people's attitudes toward reconciliation reveals a set of complex, inter-woven motivations that underly these attitudes. Understanding what motivates people to support reconciliation is important for building strategies that are in tune with people's emotional states. An approach that is sensitive to why people resist reconciliation is also important. The next section deals with the latter.

Resistance to reconciliation

There is often an assumption that people who suffered severe trauma would never be open to reconciliation. In the interviews I conducted and in the work of others (Puljek-Shank, 2007) the relationship between trauma and reconciliation is not so straightforward. In some cases people are consumed with the effects of trauma and unable to contemplate reconciliation. In others, however, a sense of empathy surpasses other emotions and allows them to open up to reconciliation. Just as motivations for reconciliation are complex, so are reasons for resistance. The following provides a snapshot of some of the dominant motivations people in my interviews expressed for resisting reconciliation.

As might be expected, fear, hatred and revenge often underly resistance to reconciliation. In my interviews these tended to cluster and that is why they are grouped together, though there are cases where fear is present without hatred or revenge. Betrayal and lack of trust are also common reasons for resisting reconciliation that cluster together. Honoring loved ones is a very different kind of motivation; often it is expressed as a form of respect for the memory of the dead, as well as fear that reconciliation will allow them to forget what happened. Righteousness is often regarded as a reason for resisting reconciliation on moral grounds. There is a sense that people suffered unjustly

at the hands of others, that the injustice cannot be forgotten, and the people who engaged in or supported the injustice cannot be forgiven. In some ways, righteousness interferes with acceptance. Contempt in this case refers to the lack of respect or sufficient human feeling for members of a group as members of that group. Contempt is often expressed as a reason for resistance to reconciliation. Contempt is connected to hatred in that both consist in insufficient regard (Garcia, 1997). In this case, I have separated them out because that is how they surfaced in my interviews. Apathy is tricky to describe. In my interviews, some people had a general lack of feeling for the idea of restoring relationships at the individual/interpersonal or collective level. Often they could not see the benefit in reconciliation. As in the case of motivations *for* reconciliation, survival and self-preservation often went hand in hand as reasons for resisting reconciliation. Both were described as possible protective mechanisms; people did not want to be caught off guard or allow themselves to be hurt or victimized. The following describes how people discuss reasons for resistance to reconciliation.

Fear is a strong motivator underlying resistance to reconciliation; hatred and revenge are also prevalent.

> When you feel that fear on your skin, you realize reconciliation is meaningless. My town is between two Albanian towns. We are stuck in the middle and we can't go anywhere without being afraid of what will happen. You have to feel that on your skin to know what I am talking about. *–Interview with Vlatka, Macedonian from rural area in Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia–FYRM).*

When Vlatka explained her fear she was convinced no American would ever be able to understand that kind of fear and how it prohibits reconciliation. Having grown up in a racially divided community in Jersey City, I was able to relate to Vlatka's description of *fear on your skin*. In such cases, education and exposure to non-threatening individuals

from other groups may pave the way for reconciliation that is resisted due to fear.

Vlatka's description is vivid; in other cases fear is not so visceral. Drina describes fear

more as learned from her family members.

> I think people are afraid. I was afraid. I know my family wouldn't accept me if I
> dated a Muslim. My grandfather wouldn't accept me if he knew I had a Serbian
> roomate. I used to think like them too, but I started to change at the university.
> There was one Serbian student in my class and we always clashed. Then I met
> another one and she opened my eyes. The first time she took me to a party and
> they were playing Četnik songs I was so scared. I said 'how could you take me
> here!' She asked me: 'if you meet a guy you like and find out his name is Milan,
> a Serb, you won't date him?' At first I said I'd be too afraid. Then I started to
> realize how stupid all that is. –*Interview with Drina, Croat from Rijeka.*

Drina's story is not unique. There are several people I met who admitted to being afraid

of interacting with people from another (hated) ethnic group. While some maintained

their fear, others overcame it. Education and exposure to people from hated ethnic

groups often helped people overcome their fear and become open to reconciliation.

Fear is often expressed along with hatred and revenge. In Dino's case, hatred and

revenge are mentioned separately from fear.

> How can I support reconciliation? When you see an innocent child tortured and
> left to die on a tree, then you realize that the only thing left is hatred and revenge.
> The savages who did this are not human and do not deserve to live, let alone
> forgiveness. –*Interview with Dino, Croat veteran from Knin.*

Vera describes hatred and revenge in the overall context of EU talks, reconciliation and

ethnic tension in Srebrenica.

> We all have the perception that one day we will live in the EU, but our kids are
> growing up with these almost epic stories of struggle and war. Then you have a
> school teacher who is 'covered' or you hear from a twenty-five-year-old about
> how we (Muslims) are going to kill you (Serbs) just as you did to us in the
> nineties. So I am for separation. –*Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

Vera is not alone. Many think hatred and revenge run too deep for reconciliation to have

a chance. Vera is even skeptical of moderate coexistence.

In their work with traumatized war veterans, Beara and Miljanović (2007) underscore cycles of hatred and revenge that affect generations.

> Many crimes were committed with great atrocity and sadistic hatred; hatred that is transgenerationally passed from one generation to another, for centuries. In these regions, children grew up believing that 'if we don't get them first, they will kill us all, just as they did that time in the war.' These are the beliefs people carry from childhood, inherited from their grandmothers and grandfathers, more often than not themselves the traumatized victims or even participants of massacres. (p. 174)

Beara and Miljanović (2007) also link fear with hatred and revenge.

> Crimes were perpetrated out of hatred and revenge, most frequently, often out of fear, and often under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Some people simply had the chance to manifest their psychopathic leanings and jumped in. (p. 174)

It might be an overstatement to suggest that hatred and revenge are widespread, though they do have a place in the lives of many who resist reconciliation.

While betrayal and lack of trust are sometimes connected with fear, hatred and revenge, they are often mentioned on their own. Betrayal and lack of trust are common motivations for resisting reconciliation at individual/interpersonal and collective levels. In many communities, stories of neighbors betraying neighbors and friends betraying friends circulate and lay the foundation for mistrust and resistance to reconciliation.

> Betrayal and lack of trust are difficult to overcome:

> We went to a bomb shelter without anything...when we saw Muslim ladies there they all had supplies, food, blankets, everything. They knew about the attack. I was defeated; my own neighbors brought their kids and food safely and didn't care about me. Later my mom went out and got a jacket for my child and I got food and water. It was horrible for me to realize that my neighbors did not let me know there would be an attack. *–Interview with Verica, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Banja Luka*.

Over time, some overcome feelings of betrayal and lack of trust. As Lana provided:

> I grew up on stories of how Serbs disappeared overnight, how they had to know what was coming...why didn't they just warn us...they left us to die. I grew up

> thinking I cannot forget that kind of betrayal, especially from neighbors. I thought–reconciliation requires trust and I would never be able to trust them. Later I started to see things differently. My family has a lot of mixed marriages. My mother is from Bihać; her brother is married to a Serb. My family tried to ignore that she is a Serb and my cousins are Serbs because that would negate the story that all Serbs are bad. One day it hit me: the whole time during the war she was stuck in the basement with everyone else in my family. She had to shit in plastic bags just like everyone else. That's when I started to question the whole story about how all Serbs are bad. *–Interview with Lana, Croat from Plitvice*.

Betrayal and lack of trust certainly hinder inter-group relations. While Lana reached a point where she began to question betrayal and lack of trust, many others have not. For Lana, it happened when she went to Zagreb to study at the university and became exposed to peace protests. For others, betrayal and lack of trust remain dominant themes. They are themes that not only affect inter-group relations, but also affect intra-group relations and relations between those of mixed background.

> My sister who is half Croat half Serb had a hard time during the war. She stayed in Belgrade with her mother during the war in Croatia, but things got hard. She was threatened because she was a Croat; they would write hate messages on her door and finally she had to leave. She stayed with my father in Croatia during the NATO bombing in Serbia, but it was the same deal. She learned how to speak both dialects to perfection so Croats wouldn't know she was a Serb and vice versa. For Serbs she wasn't Serb enough and for Croats she wasn't Croat enough. She learned she couldn't trust anybody. *–Interview with Mate, Croat from Zagreb*.

Though it is fifteen years since the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have ended, betrayal and lack of trust remain dominant. Both are given as underlying reasons for resisting reconciliation. Overcoming betrayal and lack of trust may be one of the most difficult reasons for resistance–especially when betrayal is experienced first-hand. Perhaps that is why many of the reconciliation-related initiatives discussed in chapter two focus on dealing with the past along with building trust, tolerance, dialogue and communication.

Honoring loved ones is a very different kind of motivation. It is often about respect for family members, friends, fellow soldiers and their memory.

> I don't know that I can support reconciliation. I don't want to forget what they did. I can't ever allow myself to forget all the pain and suffering. I owe it to my family not to forget. *–Interview with Rosa of mixed ethnicity from Herzegovina.*

Honoring loved ones is a motivation that may leave an opening for reconciliation. In some cases, it is not reconciliation itself that is resisted, but the fear of forgetting or disrespecting one's memory.   On Rosa's perspective, reconciliation entails forgivng and forgetting; she is not ready for either. An understanding of reconciliation that does not require these two elements, but instead involves some type of dialogue with other people who have lost loved ones, is a step Rosa would consider. She does have empathy for other victims, but fears that reconciliation would erase the memory of those dear to her. She doesn't want to hate, she doesn't seek revenge, she is just afraid to forget.

Contempt is an underlying motivation that is related closely to hatred. Both contempt and hatred consist in insufficient regard for others (Garcia, 1997). In the case of resistance to reconciliation, contempt is a powerful motivator that should not go unnoticed. Contempt for others, e.g., in the form of insufficient regard for members of a particular group, wreaks havoc on reconciliation and further undermines respect for humanity and fellow community members. The significance of contempt as connected to reconciliation became clear to me in an event I attended in November 2008 in Vukovar on the peaceful reintegration of Vukovar.[118] The event was sponsored by the Ivo Pilar

---

[118] The event was held on the 13th and 14th of November 2008; I attended both days.   The translation of the event title is: Vukovar 91: "Seventeen years later." The 11th Scientific conference–Peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Basin: Expectations, impacts and perspective (1996-1998-2008). Title translated by Saša Poučki.

Institute of Social Sciences in Croatia.[119] The purpose was to commemorate the peaceful

reintegration of Vukovar and success of the UNTAES[120] peacekeeping mission from

1996 to 1998. A number of journalists and high ranking Croats were present, as were

Croat victims of the siege of Vukovar. Serbs were conspicuously absent or excluded,

despite that the reintegration was supposed to signify cooperation between Serbs and

Croats.

In a speech given by Jacques Klein,[121] former UN Transitional Administrator for

Vukovar's peaceful reintegration,[122] the signifcance of contempt came across. As Klein

bragged about his close relationship with Tudjman, he thought he'd share an interesting

conversation he had with Tudjman when he convinced him to give Serbs jobs in the

demining of Vukovar. Vukovar, of course, was severely devastated during the war in

Croatia. According to Klein, Tudjman was adamantly opposed to allowing Serbs to help

with demining, but was persuaded by what Klein offered.

> When I spoke to Mr. President about the problem of demining, I said: 'Mr.
> President, why don't you hire Serbs to do that?' he said, 'why would I do that?
> We know how to do that.' Then I said, 'Mr. President, off-the-record, would you
> rather have a Serb blown up or a Croat?' he said 'Oh I see what you mean.'
> *–Participant Observation, speech given by Jacques Klein during a conference*
> *on the peaceful reintegration of Vukovar on November 13, 2008.*

---

[119] See Ivo Pilar Institute for Social Sciences at
http://www.pilar.hr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100:abou-the-
institute&catid=5:info&Itemid=12&Itemid=9999

[120] The United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) was a peacekeeping
mission that lasted from January 1996 to January 1998 and was supported by the Erdut Agreement
discussed in chapter two. See UNTAES http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untaes.htm

[121] To read about Jacques Klein's role in the Balkans, see Office of the High Representative and EU Special
Representative (OHR) http://www.ohr.int/cv/jpklein.asp

[122] Jacques Klein served as the Transitional Administrator of the UNTAES peacekeeping mission from
1996-1997. After his "success" in Vukovar, Klein was appointed to assist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Klein's story was followed by laughter from the audience. The underlying meaning, however, was that Serbs in Vukovar were expendable. Klein's acquiescence in Tudjman's extreme anti-Serb nationalism was strikingly blunt. This kind of example shows just how high contempt goes. Klein's story is hardly a way to honor the reintegration of Vukovar. In light of it, it is no wonder that Vukovar remains deeply divided fifteen years after the end of the war. Given his position as representative of the UN and former American Foreign Service Officer, Klein's story at this official event in Vukovar shows partiality and erodes credibility and trust in the institutions he represents.

Righteousness as a reason for resistance to reconciliation cannot be ignored. Righteousness is present in people I interviewed on all sides. It is typically experienced as a reason for resisting reconciliation on the individual/interpersonal and collective levels. For those who have a sense of righteousness, there is a tendency to object to reconciliation on what are perceived to be moral grounds.

> We don't have anything to do with them. We don't need them. We were always part of Europe throughout history...we don't have that Balkan mentality. They attacked us and we defended ourselves and won with the little weapons we could find. –*Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran from Zagreb.*

> Croatians have a complex and need to prove themselves to others. I don't need to go to their coast; we have beautiful beaches in Greece where we are welcomed. I can live a very nice, normal life without seeing any Croat for the rest of my life. They are the ones who had to dig out Ustaša memorabilia and ideology on the ashes of Serbian victims from Jasenovac and elsewhere. –*Conversation with Sava, Serb from Vojvodina.*

> It is hard to think about reconciliation when we suffered aggression from JNA and Serbian forces. They attacked us and held the city for three years. Children were killed. It is clear who started all this. They cut off our water, we had no food. Snipers worked regular jobs during the day and murdered innocent, unarmed people at night. How can we think about reconciliation? –*Interview with Hasib, Bosnian Muslim living in Sarajevo.*

Righteousness is strong on all sides and plays a role not only in resistance to reconciliation but other processes as well. In their work with war veterans, Beara & Miljanović (2006) trace righteousness to dehumanization and acts of brutality in war.

Apathy is a very different kind of motivation. It is almost a lack of motivation. Some of the people I interviewed expressed a general *lack of feeling* not only for reconciliation but other efforts as well, including joining the EU and regional cooperation. Apathy is sometimes described as a mechanism that protects people from getting their hopes up. It fits in the larger context of hopelessness and depression that people in region experience in the aftermath of trauma.

> Why should I care about reconciliation? Why should I care about the EU or the new regional commission. It means nothing to me. I don't care. I just want to be left alone. *–Conversation with Aldin, Hungarian and Sudanese from Vojvodina.*

In order to address apathy as a source of resistance to reconciliation it may be necessary to address other factors that contribute to apathy, including lack of interest in life, in the community, in the future, hopelessness and depresssion. Apathy is common among the people I interviewed. Even Azra, someone who expressed multiple motivations for reconciliation, feels apathy at times. "I died in 1995. I breathe but I am not alive." *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica.*

Survival and self-preservation are also motivating factors that drive people to resist reconciliation. Some are afraid if they open up they will become weak and vulnerable. Others are afraid to forget the trauma they endured. In some cases, survival and self-preservation are tied to honoring loved ones; in other cases, they are tied to fear, hatred and revenge. Survial and self-preservation also stand on their own as pragmatic approaches to reconciliation. As Samira indicated in a session I attended in Sarajevo:

> I will never forget what they did. After we escaped my mother went crazy. She was convinced we were headed for a trap. She begged me to follow her to the water but I couldn't. I just couldn't. I think they must have poisoned her and the others because people went crazy even when they were free...My mother taught me what Četniks are capable of; she taught me to be ready for them. *–Participant observation of Samira, Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica*.

Surival and self-preservation as described by Samira intersect with a number of underlying issues connected to the traumatic experience she endured. For Samira and people like her, resistance to reconciliation is strong and deep. It will not be easy for Samira and people like her to overcome their resistance to reconciliation.

This section has focused on how people describe motivations for and resistance to reconciliation. In the discussion above, I identified underlying motivations expressed in the interviews I conducted. The interviews included people who described themselves as supporting reconciliation and those who described themselves as resisting it. In some cases, people described a change in their position, e.g., a switch from being against reconciliation to being open to it.

There is not an impenetrable line between those for and against reconciliation; there is room for people to change their positions. Some are on the fence about where they stand whereas others find themselves firmly fixed on one side or the other. The discussion above has shown that motivations for and resistance to reconciliation are complex and multifaceted. Attention to these underlying motivations may help improve the way reconciliation-related efforts are conceived, implemented and measured. The next section addresses some of the issues described above in the context of challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region.

Part IV: Challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region

In the discussion thus far, a number of themes have emerged as challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region. These include:

• Competing truths and competing victimization

• Denial and lack of acknowledgement

• Betrayal and lack of trust (within and between groups)

• Perceptions of injustice and duality of standards

• Lack of leadership and poor leadership

• Scattered efforts (disconnect between top, mid and ground level efforts)

• Unclear benefits (unclear what reconciliation can bring)

These challenges and obstacles have been referenced in the discussion in chapter two as well as in the discussion on resistance to reconciliation in this chapter. The following provides a brief overview of how these challenges and obstacles are described and the importance of addressing them for reconciliation to have a chance.

Competing truths and competing victimization are two of the most compelling challenges to reconciliation. As discussed throughout, each group has its own truths about the causes, conduct and consequences of the wars that ensued. Each group also has its own story of victimization, often a story that prioritizes its own victims over others. Competing truths and competing victimization often impede reconciliation. While it is common for warring sides to have their own perspectives on what transpired, in the case of former Yugoslavia, competing truth and competing victimization narratives negate the experiences of others and portay a one-sided view of victimization. This in turn creates

and exacerbates tension. The perception of *equalization of victims* (the idea that all victims are equal) also infuriates groups who perceive their suffering to be greater.

Narratives of competing truths and competing victimization create tensions between groups and often involve different perspectives on the causes, conduct and consequences of the wars. When I asked Vera her view about the infamous Scorpions video of the genocidal killing of Muslims in Srebrenica, Vera provided:

> We look on that completely differently. Our kids and husbands were being killed as well. I personally know some kids who were tortured, crucified and killed in horrible ways, so in that case a bullet is nice way to die compared to what I just said above. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

Interestingly, Vera did not claim the video footage was altered or innacurate. Her point was that Serbs experienced even worse atrocities than those depicted on the video.

In my interview with Verica, she explained her view about the siege of Sarajevo.

> My father was killed in the Sarajevo hospital by a doctor there...the same doctor who was laughing afterward....They were telling me how Sarajevo was under Četnik siege…Muslims were the ones who closed off the town and encircled it from within…I don't buy that story that we were aggressors. I lived in Sarajevo all my life. What kind of aggressor am I? The same goes for Serbs in Vukovar. Today there is a Vukovar Memorial, but where is the memorial for influential Serbs of Vukovar? Even before the war started they were arrested and had their property confiscated. Nobody talks about that. *–Interview with Verica, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Banja Luka.*

Magdalena commented on the competing truths about crimes committed in Croatia.

> Very few judges had the courage of Ika Šarić and Marin Mrcela to prosecute and enforce the law against people like Mirko Norac. It is sad because ordinary people don't see that they did anything wrong. The truth for them is that Norac fought for Croatia, but for me that is not the case since I don't see anything heroic in going around the city of Gospić and killing old ladies. So people see things differently. *–Interview with Magdalena, Croat from Knin.*

For many, narratives of competing truths and competing victimization are insulated from counter-evidence. Depsite documentation on prison camps where Serbs were held in Croatia, Andreja is convinced that no such camps existed.

> In Croatia, genocide was committed by the JNA against unarmed Croatian citizens. They destroyed towns, villages and killed women and children...they moved mass graves overnight. It was ethnically motivated against Croatian citizens. They had eight hundred camps and we didn't have one. *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran from Zagreb.*

Denial and lack of acknowledgement are related to competing truths and competing victimization. There is a tendency for each group to deny its own wrongdoing and prioritze the harm done by other groups. The pain resulting from denial and lack of acknowledgement leaves many angered and disheartened. While lack of acknowledgement of victims is a major sore point for all groups, war veterans also long for recognition and acknowledgement of their sacrifice in war and after. There was interesting symmetry in the discussions I had with war veterans. In my interview with Dino, a Croat war veteran and ultra-nationalist, he was eager to share many stories of horrible crimes committed by Serbs. He was also eager to discuss his work with Croat war veterans and how he was helping them improve their lives. On a few occasions over the course of the interview, he explained how important his work was and how it would be an "excellent topic for the Oprah Winfrey Show." *–Interview with Dino, Croat veteran from Knin.* On some level, Dino thought if his story gets to Oprah Croat war veterans will finally receive the acknowledgement they deserve.

My conversation with Branko, a Serb veteran from Doboj and ultra-nationalist took a similar course. Branko was adamant about sharing stories of Serb victims at the hands of Croats and Muslims. He was convinced that once people learned of all the

horrible atrocities committed against Serbs they would finally understand and acknowledge the suffering of Serbs. Branko provided the following:

> I have a video which shows the rape of a young twelve year old girl. It is brutal. People have to see this to understand how Serbs suffered. She was just a young girl...you should take this video to the Oprah Winfrey Show. *–Conversation with Branko, Serb veteran from Doboj.*

Branko also wanted me to meet with Serb veterans who were subjected to horrible torture and maimed during the war. On his view, Serb war veterans have not gotten the acknowledgement they deserve. Both Dino and Branko were driven to gain acknowledgement of the atrocities committed against their group. It was interesting that they both viewed the Oprah Winfrey Show as their chance to finally get the word out and win the hearts and minds of people all around the world.

Denial and lack of acknowledgement represent significant challenges and obstacles to reconciliation. The denial of genocide by some Serbs is a major tension for communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

> We (Serbs) really don't know anything about genocide. How can we do what they say, when we didn't even have a professional army? That fight was done on a shoe and a string. Nobody saw or heard anything about what they say happened. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

Similarly, denial and lack of acknowledgement of the suffering of Serbs forced to flee the Krajina area during Operation Storm (Oluja) are major sources of tension.

> The Croatian army was accused of crimes against humanity during Oluja for our 'genocide policy' that forced Serbs to load their tractors and take everything away. If you compare that with when our people had to leave not having more than one small plastic bag, Oluja was not so bad…I can't understand how this happened when it is so apparent that the Serb 'exodus' lasted three days and they could take everything with them. How is this a war crime when the Croatian army was giving them milk for their kids, and water and fuel for their vehicles? …Something is wrong here…our humanitarian gestures are being treated as though we helped them leave…history will show the truth. *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran from Zagreb.*

Within the context of denial and lack of acknowledgement, some are concerned with explaining the context and underlying reasons why events occurred. The explanation that the Srebrenica massacre took place as a reaction to crimes committed by Muslim commander Naser Orić was communicated a number of times in my interviews among Serbs who downplay or relativize the severity of the Srebrenica genocide.

> Stories that people in Srebrenica were unarmed are for little kids. Now new discoveries are showing the trail of armament and influx of Mujahideen and money. I don't want to negate victims of Srebrenica…I am only asking 'if that was a UN controlled zone, how come forces of Naser Orić were getting out and attacking Serbs?' They killed and burned villages and families on Christmas Eve and that is not a crime. For four years someone was killing Serbs there and only after that is when Srebrenica took place. You have causes and reactions. Orić killed hundreds of Muslims but they are afraid to say that openly…he is a pure criminal and he is in jail now for his mafia crimes. *–Interview with Verica, Serb from Sarajevo who relocated to Banja Luka.*

While betrayal and lack of trust are discussed above as reasons for resisting reconciliation, they also represent challenges and obstacles to reconciliation. Even those who support reconciliation find it challenging to overcome their own feelings of betrayal and lack of trust, whether in personal relationships, group relations (intra and inter), or perceptions and expectations of political leaders. Betrayal and lack of trust signify important challenges and obstacles, not only for reconciliation, but also for a host of other efforts aimed at peacebuilding and social transformation in the region. Despite progress made in the transition period, confidence in political leaders and community members remains tenous. Betrayal and lack of trust need to be addressed for reconciliation and other reform efforts to have a chance. Andreja undercores the role of betrayal as an obstacle to reconciliation:

> The subjective guilt of treason will have to be overcome. What bothers Croats about Serbs from Krajina, despite the fact that they suffered from their own people, is the fact that they accepted what was going on, and moreover supported

it, while protecting themselves and moving their families during the night and not telling us that something bad would happen. That is a big obstacle for reconciliation and for us to have empathy for pain on both sides. *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran in Zagreb.*

Edin argues that lack of trust is an important obstacle to reconciliation. He holds leaders accountable for perpetuating lack of trust:

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, with what has happened after the war and what role politicians have played, we have a totally different result than South Africa. Here they have continued war by other means. They perpetuated a negative narrative and obstructed all efforts of establishing trust. I believe that they have unlimited grand power over people and they are the ones who should encourage people to talk to neighbors and open up for reconciliation. You don't have to love them, but trust your neighbors and trust your leaders that we will not have war again.
–Interview with Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo.

Perceptions of injustice and duality of standards are challenges and obstacles that significantly hinder reconciliation. Despite the efforts of the ICTY and national courts, perceptions of injustice remain and continue to serve as sources of tension betwen groups. Duality of standards is exacerbated by perceptions of unfairness, partiality and favortism. Serbs in particular feel their group is unduly punished and that others receive better treatment than they do. This occurs at the individual/interpersonal level, intra-group and inter-group level. Regarding intra-group unfairness, Nela provided:

I had a problem here in Serbia too. People blamed us refugees for everything. They were saying *why did we come* and 'because of you, we are being bombarded and we don't have money.' They blamed us for all kinds of things. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

Nela also shared her perspective on inter-group injustice:

They need to prosecute all sides. Srebrenica did not happen in Potočari only. I met a Serb kid from the Srebrenica area whose whole family was killed, including his three-month-old cousin. He was saved only because he was between two villages. He was in Guber Banja camp and helped by the Red Cross. He was a wreck. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

Andreja had an interesting perspective on favortism and unfair benefits at the group level:

> In Croatia some minorities are becoming elitist. Serbs are privileged minorities who are being treated as little bears and that is not good. This is just like the gay population. Fine, you can do what you want in the privacy of your own home but when you start asking for parades, you had better slow down...it's like they want to be elite. The situation is similar in Bosnia and Herzegovina where one small minority group is asking people not to wear jeans–we grew up wearing jeans. *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran in Zagreb.*

Duality of standards is often discussed as a form of favortism. In my interviews in Srebrenica, preference for Muslims to work in nongovernmental organizations was mentioned. Vera explained that she was demoted so a Muslim could take her place. Nena indicated that her job was also earmarked for a Muslim, but because they couldn't find someone who was qualified and Muslim, she managed to keep her job. Duality of standards and the impact on inter-group relations were sensitive issues for Vera:

> My friend, a young Serbian person who works in town, lost her father during the war and she never found him. She goes around the terrain, works with Muslims and goes to school. You have to do that–you have to live, especially since nobody will give you things. You have to work if you are a Serb. Muslim kids like her get all the help and stipends from the government and foreign countries, especially Muslim ones, but not our kids. *–Interview with Vera, Serb from Srebrenica.*

A representative from a local organization for minority rights in Zagreb also explained:

> Where I see problems is with dual standards. For example, if Croatia has the right to subdue a minority rebellion, why then is Serbia denied its own Oluja in Kosovo? If we have universal standards and then suddenly don't have them, then we are losing the definition of who is a soldier and who is a murderer. You can't say that someone is a terrorist if he has legitimate ideas and goals and if he attacks you the way he can, meaning maybe not a frontal attack but more guerilla style. If Croatia was able to resolve its problems with Serbs why shouldn't the same standard be used for Serbia vis-à-vis the Albanian problem? Here I am not going into what is right or wrong or about human rights, but just pointing out dual standards. *–Interview with Đorđe, Serb from Zagreb.*

The sense of injustice, unfairness and dual standards is proliferated by politial leaders and the media. This serves as a source of division among people in the region. The ICJ's

recent decision that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence does not violate international law has served to invigorate discussion among political elites regarding the separation of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community's support of Kosovo's independence and lack of support for the possibility of Republika Srpska's indepedendence is seen as a double standard which further threatens the integrity and legitimacy of the international community in the eyes of many.

As Nela provides:

> It is strange that on one side they are creating the EU and on the other they are breaking one state and making so many new little ones. It does not make sense. Why is it they won't let the Basque separate but it is okay for Kosovo?
> –*Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade.*

A recent statement made by Milorad Dodik outlines the perception of injustice and of dual standards regarding the international community's acceptance of Kosovo's indepedence and insistance on keeping Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik is quoted in B92[123] as referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina as "'one big mistake of the West.'" (B92, 2010, July 28). Furthermore, Dodik is quoted as saying:

> 'The big world made Bosnia so that Muslims wouldn't stay alone. But life with them is neither acceptable for Serbs nor Croats. Currently, this idea is good only for Muslims who believe that they can take power over the whole Bosnia and that is not going to happen.' (B92, 2010, July 28)

---

[123] The B92 article is written in Serbian. The English translation I am using has been provided by Saša Poučki. For the original, see B92 (2010, July 28) at
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=28&nav_category=167&nav_id=44825 8

According to Dodik: "'Bosnia is for us a nightmare. Something we wish to shake from our back as a load.'"[124] (B92, 2010, July 28). The perception of injustice and dual standards continue to present problems for the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Lack of leadership and poor leadership represent significant challenges and obstacles to reconciliation. In the second chapter, I discussed recent efforts by some political elites (especially Tadić and Josipovič) in favor of reconciliation. Despite these efforts, leadership on reconciliation has been unremarkable at best and counter-productive at worst.

> I blame politicians. It is so pathetic; in the whole world you don't have a smaller state with more rulers like here in Bosnia and Herzegovina…Ethnic cleansing is still conducted, today it is done politically...but we have to normalize our life. After everything, today I don't see anything that is being done, only gas stations and a few tycoons...the ordinary person lives very hard. *–Interview with Azra, Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo*.

> Despite the mostly micro-level progress on reconciliation, where some people returning back were welcomed by neighbors and got some help from them, we have a situation where because of this very heated political rhetoric from all sides, people have started wondering *where are those bomb shelters*. Despite the fact that people don't have realistic reasons for fear of another war, nonetheless the fear is creeping back up on people as some kind of natural mental code. To me that is a great illustration of the power of politics in a negative sense, but in the same time that can be a sign of opportunity if the negative political rhetoric is reversed. *–Interview with Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo*.

The interviews with Azra and Edin were conducted through 2008. In the interviews I conducted in the region through 2009, there was a tendency to blame leadership for failing to set an example for improving relations between groups and instead inciting further division. Reactions to the recent decision of the ICJ regarding Kosovo's independence will likely add to this division.

---

[124] Ibid.

Scattered efforts and a general disconnect between top, mid and ground level efforts further impedes reconciliation. Attempts at each level to bring about reconciliation often leave the impression of uncoordinated *ad hoc*, *one-off* efforts rather than serious, collaborative initiatives. While some reconciliation-related activities offer promise, others seem misguided and inconsequential to people on the ground. Competition among NGOs and local grassroots activists further impedes a sense of continuity, often causing reconciliation to suffer rather than blossom. The need for well integrated and well coordinated efforts at multiple levels, e.g,., local, national, and regional, cannot be ignored. Some worry that without proper coordination reconciliation-related activies will remain insignificant in the eyes of people.

> We do not have serious efforts for starting the process of reconciliation, at least not on some meaningful level. The ones we have are isolated and are coming from some larger process done by NGOs or some marginalized groups. They are short lived and too weak to produce some greater outcome and results on a larger scale. Mostly because of the negativities of those who matter in society–those who hold power and can influence larger social opinion. On the other hand, we have pretty good efforts of smaller groups, grass roots movements and NGOs but they are unable to leave a larger impact. We can have neighbors welcoming each other but if we fail to have government efforts to support this, it will continue to be hard to talk about a meaningful process of reconciliation. –Interview with *Edin, Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor who relocated to Sarajevo*.

Unclear benefits, i.e., the idea that it is unclear what reconciliation can bring, is another challenge for reconciliation. Reconciliation-related initiatives are relatively new in the region and coincide with the post-conflict period following 1995. The meaning of reconciliation and what it entails is often confusing to people. Similarly, what they can expect to gain from reconciliation, whether as individuals or as members of society, remains hazy. While there is awareness of South Africa's experience with truth and reconciliation, people are not immediately receptive to similar processes in the region.

What reconciliation can bring to people in terms of benefits, whether psychological, social or economic, remains unclear. It would be appropriate for those who support reconciliation-related activities at the top, mid and ground level to take the lead in explaining what reconciliation can bring in terms of benefits. For people like Nela, who see a dim future for Serbs living in divided communities, the benefit of reconciliation is far from clear.

> My cousin is in a mixed marriage. He returned to his village in Herzegovina. Twice bombs were thrown into his house. Luckily nobody was hurt. His wife is Croat and her brothers and the rest of her family doesn't talk to her. They live from farming; it is very hard. Two other cousins who are also there can't even marry. People say openly that they are nice and good-looking but nobody wants to talk to them or date them because they are Serbs. Their lives are destroyed and with no future. If they sell their property it is so cheap that they would not be able to live in Serbia. *–Interview with Nela, Serb of mixed marriage from Herzegovina who grew up in Sarajevo and relocated to Belgrade*.

For many, the situation is so bleak that they are not able to realize what reconciliation can bring and how it might help improve the future of people in divided communities. It is common for people to focus on reconciliation in future generations.

> In reconciliation, our politicians, individuals and local community members are looking to overcome feelings of being betrayed...and accept apologies...We have a lot of missing and still do not know where they are buried. From a victim's perspective, it is hard...In order for us to give forgiveness, they have to show good will. On the other side, they say that at the time of the conflict they were scared and didn't know anything and had their windows covered. This is the same story from the Nazi times when villagers would see smoke from Auschwitz and didn't know or didn't want to know why. To overcome this, we need time and a new generation that is not going to be burdened with this. Whether that is possible is another question, since our children see, hear and feel the same as their parents. *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran in Zagreb*.

Andreja may see some benefit in reconciliation for future generations, but she is skeptical about whether such benefits will ever be realized.

When thinking about reconciliation and how to characterize the benefits of reconciliation, a related challenge is the difficulty of measuring results. Since many efforts are relatively short-lived or in the beginning phases, it is difficult to provide concrete results. Some are not sure how to go about measuring results. Others find their results are inconclusive. The difficulty of measuring results affects the discussion of benefits. It remains unclear what benefits, if any, have been or can be achieved by reconciliation.

In chapter two, I proposed an incremental or scaled approach to measuring reconciliation based on milestones. In light of the complexity of motivations for reconciliation, reasons for resistance, and the daunting challenges that exist, it seems each of these elements could be part of a schema for measuring progress in reconciliation. Betrayal and lack of trust, for example, could be measured before and after participation in reconciliation-related activities to determine whether the activities have any impact on these elements. A more comprehensive scale would include the multitude of tensions and disruptions in the post-conflict context, including those discussed in chapter two as well as the themes discussed in this chapter. The challenges and obstacles discussed above are by no means comprehensive. There are many issues that impede reconciliation; my aim here was to identify some of the most compelling.

In addition to the challenges and obstacles discussed above, cultural characteristics and the lack of a democratic system may also represent challenges and obstacles to reconciliation. While these factors play a role in impeding reconciliation at the structural level, I have not explored them in enough depth to include a discussion of them in this dissertation. The challenges and obstacles I discussed above appeared

repeatedly as themes in my interviews. Cultural characteristics or tendencies and the lack of a democratic system were mentioned to a lesser extent. Very often, those who were skeptical of reconciliation were also hesitant about EU integration and democratic change on a broader level.

> By joining the EU we are becoming a minority...I say we should let society develop on its own and not have the EU dictate what we should and should not do. We have a different culture, traditions and customs and we ask for that to be respected. Why should our uniqueness be denied? *–Interview with Andreja, Croat veteran in Zagreb.*

Attention to cultural characteristics and the lack of a democratic system appear in the literature on reconciliation (Rill et al., 2007). Another theme I have not discussed is the role of religion as connected to reconciliation. Overall, the people I interviewed did not mention religious leaders as playing an important role in reconciliation. Indeed, some even suggested that Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim leaders ignited rather than mitigated tensions and disruptions. A thorough assessment of the role of religion is not part of this dissertation, though it is recommended for future work.[125]

Conclusion

My overall purpose in this chapter was to shed light on how people in the region perceive reconciliation, what it means to them, what role it plays in their lives, how different actors contribute to discourse on reconciliation, motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance, and challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region. In the first section I introduced perspectives on reconciliation in the region and provided a snapshot of how reconciliation is characterized by members of civil society and political elites. The discussion revealed a mix of perspectives, including support for and

---

[125] For a discussion of the role of faith in promoting reconciliation in the region, see Branka Peuraca, 2003.

resistance to reconciliation among civil society and political elites. It also revealed a connection between reconciliation and dealing with the past, truth and justice. While some felt reconciliation was necessary for the future, others were skeptical of reconciliation and what it could bring. Competing priorities, including respect for human rights and justice, were also discussed. In the second section I discussed how people in the region conceive of reconciliation and its meaning. I provided a description of three concepts: *pomirenje, suživot, and jedan pored drugog,* which correspond to reconciliation in a fuller sense and coexistence in moderate and minimal forms respectively. The discussion revealed a range of perspectives on what reconciliation means in the region. While some describe reconciliation as tied to friendship and harmony, others focus on pragmatic interaction and basic coexistence. For some, reconciliation is necessary; for others it is confusing and unnecessary. The findings from the first two sections reveal lack of consensus on what reconciliation entails and the range of attitudes and behaviors connected with it. A discussion of the role of multiple forces in shaping reconciliation, including the international community, civil society, media, political elites and ordinary people was included. While the first two sections focused on attitudes and behaviors associated with reconciliation, the third and fourth sections covered motivations and challenges.

In the third section I discussed two groups, i.e., those *for* and those *against* reconciliation, and provided a description of motivations for reconciliation and reasons for resistance. The discussion revealed a range of motivations underlying attitudes toward reconciliation. Whereas some were motivated by friendship and humanity, others were driven by fear, hatred and revenge. The range of motivations discussed reveals a

complex picture of what drives behaviors and attitudes toward reconciliation in the region. The learning from this section provides a foundation for creating reconciliation-related programs that are more in tune with what actually motivates people to support reconciliation and what motivates them to resist it.

The last section deals with challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region. I examined several themes that impede reconciliation and that need to be addressed for reconciliation-related efforts to have a chance. These themes emerged throughout this dissertation, and include: competing truths and competing victimization; denial and lack of acknowledgement; betrayal and lack of trust; perceptions of injustice and duality of standards; lack of leadership and poor leadership; scattered efforts; and unclear benefits. These themes not only represent challenges and obstacles for reconciliation, but impede other efforts as well, including dialogue, tolerance and peacebuilding. Addressing them requires a multifaceted approach and cooperation among multiple levels and actors. As the above discussion has shown, reconciliation is not without hope, though it requires careful effort and attention to the nuances of meaning and diversity of perspectives in the region.

Conclusion: Summary and Recommendations

If people would be 'allowed' to feel sorry for the losses of other sides that would be the first initiating move of recognition of suffering and reconciliation. –Edin

My aim in this chapter is to provide a summary of the research insights discussed in this dissertation and to outline recommendations for creating reconciliation-related strategies and practices in the post-conflict context. The discussion is not meant to provide an overview of all the learning, but rather to highlight some of the main findings about what reconciliation entails and suggest areas for future work.

Summary

Reconciliation is complex and multifaceted; there is not one agreed upon definition of reconciliation, but multiple senses, forms, meanings and interpretations. This is supported in the literature on reconciliation in post-conflict contexts generally and in my own research on former Yugoslavia specifically. Reconciliation is described as both a process and an end goal. Distinctions between individual/interpersonal and collective levels are common, as are distinctions between fuller/thicker and narrower/thinner forms. My proposal is to think of these forms as existing along a spectrum of reconciliation, with fuller/thicker forms at one end and narrower/thinner forms at the other. Fuller/thicker forms include friendship and harmony whereas narrower/thinner forms include basic coexistence. While coexistence is often linked to reconciliation, there are important distinctions between the two. In my view, these distinctions can be understood by analyzing attitudinal, behavioral and motivational components, as well by looking into the character of reconciliation and coexistence. I have proposed conceiving of reconciliation as consistent with a benevolent,

magnanimous character and inconsistent with malevolence, hatred and revenge. I have also suggested thinking of coexistence as consistent with prudence.

The attitudinal, behavioral and motivational components that underlie reconciliation and coexistence reveal important insights into the complexity and multifaceted nature of reconciliation. For some, closure and healing are important motivators, whereas for others economic interest and survival take precedence. Discussions are typically focused on attitudinal and behavioral aspects, while motivational components remain understudied. Attention to motivations is extremely important for understanding why people support or resist reconciliation and informing reconciliation-related programs. It is also important to view reconciliation *in context*.

In the context of former Yugoslavia, reconciliation is connected to dealing with the past, truth and justice. As a result, it is tied to the tensions associated with all three. The desire for reconciliation ranges from strong to weak in the region. Disgust with the past motivates some to promote reconciliation; for others, the past is paralyzing. Many are caught between wanting to move forward and being stuck in the abyss of war. Ordinary people conceive of reconciliation in different ways. Some think of it as necessary for society; others find it confusing and irrelevant. Some associate reconciliation with friendship and forgiveness, whereas others see it as a pragmatic path to economic stability. There is strong support for reconciliation among civil society, including mid level NGOs and ground level local grassroots activists, but support among political elites is spotty. While political elites have contributed recently to discourse on reconciliation, the significance of their contribution is unclear. Religious institutions have not played a dominant role in reconciliation. While some have explored the

potential contribution of faith based NGOs, the results have also been less than promising (Peuraca, 2003). In the context of former Yugoslavia, motivating religious leaders to support reconciliation will likely take significant effort.

Resistance to reconciliation is complex and cannot be reduced to one simple motivation. Ordinary people resist reconciliation for reasons of fear and hatred but also for reasons of honoring loved ones and basic apathy. People who resist reconciliation do not form a homogeneous group. Members of civil society who resist reconciliation often point to competing priorities, such as human rights, democracy and respect for law, as reasons for resistance. Though members of civil society often prioritize structural factors, ordinary people emphasize emotional factors such as betrayal and lack of trust. The idea that it is just too soon is also part of the reasons for resisting reconciliation.

There are a number of challenges and obstacles to reconciliation in the region. The nature of these challenges and obstacles makes the prospect of bringing about reconciliation seem daunting. Despite these challenges, there is some progress on reconciliation in the region, though it is difficult to measure. At the micro level, neighbors sometimes welcome returnees and offer help; in other cases, returnees are greeted with hatred and their homes are vandalized. At the macro level, in some cases people feel safe when travelling throughout the region; in other cases, cars are damaged because of national license plates. In order to assess progress on reconciliation, I have proposed an incremental or scaled approach that tracks milestones along the path to reconciliation. This could involve keeping track of people's attitudes, behaviors and motivations before and after return, travel or even participation in reconciliation-related activities, e.g., dialogue sessions, tolerance and peacebuilding training.

It is clear there are many challenges and obstacles that impede reconciliation in the region, but these challenges and obstacles also point to opportunities for creating strategies that are in tune with what motivates support for reconciliation, what drives resistance, and what stands in the way of reconciliation in the region. While developing strategies that account for different motivational components and address the multitude of challenges and obstacles is no easy task, the pay-off may go beyond reconciliation and yield additional benefits for social transformation.

Given the complex and multifaced nature of reconciliation, the need for strategies that build reconciliation at different levels is compelling. Multi-pronged strategies may be more appealing to those who are movitaved by different factors, e.g., friendship, economic interest, understanding, etc., and may help create a more encompassing approach to reconciliation. Ultimately, there is no clear answer on what works for reconciliation. Reconciliation is not straightforward in that way; there are some pockets of clarity but many areas of darkness. In the next section, my aim is to reflect on the findings discussed in this dissertation and put forward ideas for informing strategies and practices to help bring about reconciliation in the region.

Recommendations

While there are a number of initiatives aimed at reconciliation in the region, the impact of these initiatives remains sketchy. The following recommendations call to mind some of the tensions discussed throughout and try to fill in gaps that exist among different approaches to reconciliation in the region. The list of recommendations is not comprehensive, but is meant to address some of the most compelling challenges to reconciliation efforts in the region. A more comprehensive approach would involve

incorporating these recommendations into the wider context of addressing the full range of underlying tensions and disruptions that affect people in the post-conflict context.

Recommendations for building inclusive and collaborative strategies

1. Communicate clearly the benefits of reconciliation so people understand what they can expect to gain from it.

2. Be inclusive in the process of defining which paths are appropriate, so people do not feel marginalized, isolated and ignored.

3. Acknowledge that in some cases dealing with the past, truth and justice, impede reconciliation and offer approaches that are non-confrontational, e.g., reconciliation through art, music, dance, etc.

4. Appeal to multiple generations and multiple senses of reconciliation by creating a multi-generational, multi-pronged approach to reconciliation.

5. Encourage accountability for efforts by developing parameters of success via an incremental or scaled approach that focuses on measuring milestones along the spectrum of reconciliation.

6. Incorporate motivations and resistance into program development so that initiatives appeal directly to the underlying factors that drive support for reconciliation and address rather than ignore underlying reasons for resistance.

7. Create opportunities for collaboration across all levels of society to build a more inclusive, cooperative and streamlined approach to reconciliation.

8. Incorporate conflict transformation and peacebuilding so people can learn new strategies for dealing with tensions and disruptions that prohibit reconciliation and other forms of constructive social interaction.

9. Build on the approach of multi-track diplomacy and incorporate as many levels as possible into reconciliation-related programs, e.g., education, media, film, etc.

10. Improve legitimacy and accountability of efforts so people are not disheartened.

11. Address all the challenges and obstacles discussed in this dissertation, including competing truths and competing victimization, and give everyone a voice in a way that encourages cooperation not competition.

12. Realize that reconciliation is both a process and an end goal and that measuring reconciliation may require fluidity and flexibility.

13. Be realistic in setting up goals. Reaching a point where resistance to reconciliation is minimized may be an important milestone.

14. Create features of success, e.g., willingness to cooperate with someone from another group, willingness to live next to someone from another group, etc., so incremental or scaled progress can be measured.

15. Recognize the overlap between concepts of tolerance, dialogue, peacebuilding, etc., and take care to maximize opportunities for collaborative efforts.

16. Be aware of character and motivations when selecting leaders and spokespersons for reconciliation–advocates promoting one-sided views are off-putting.

17. Recognize positive stories of reconciliation and coexistence.

18. Acknowledge suffering on all sides to build trust and recognition.

19. Encourage leaders to support reconciliation.

20. Strengthen regional cooperation on reconciliation.

Concluding Thoughts: Is there hope for reconciliation in former Yugoslavia?

The recommendations outlined above represent ideas for creating a path toward reconciliation that is inclusive and collaborative. This dissertation has revealed that reconciliation is hard work. While efforts are being made in the societies of former Yugoslavia, questions about whether these efforts are working remain. While there are some pockets of hope, progress on reconciliation is shaky. The good news is many members of civil society are committed to reconciliation. While political will has been lacking, there is reason to believe political elites may be headed in the same direction. Ordinary people represent a mixed bunch; the importance of understanding the range of attitudes, behaviors and motivations of ordinary people, civil society and political elites should not be ignored. The gaps that exist between ordinary people, civil society and political elites create division and polarization that must be addressed. The recommendations outlined above offer ideas for how to fill some of the gaps in current efforts aimed at reconciliation and how to create opportunities for inclusion and collaboration.

While many assume reconciliation is necessary in the aftermath of conflict, I began this research asking whether reconciliation is important to the people of former Yugoslavia, and if so, why it is important. After almost five years of study, the conclusion I have come to is complex. Reconciliation is important to people for a set of reasons, but it is also unimportant for another set of reasons. Part of what makes reconciliation important are the benefits people expect to receive from it. These benefits are both psychological and pragmatic. For those who have difficulty seeing benefits in reconciliation, it is understandable why it seems unimportant.

In reality, if reconciliation is not important and ought not to be prioritized, the question remains: what are the alternatives? Based on the research I conducted, the alternatives are scary to contemplate. Without reconciliation, people will likely remain mentally and socially, if not also physically divided, and tensions will continue to dictate the course of relations in the region. While developing a culture of human rights and democracy as an alternative to reconciliation may provide a (false) sense of security, unaddressed tensions will likely remain under the surface.

Despite the many tensions, disruptions and challenges to reconciliation discussed in this dissertation, my goal was to offer insight into the complexity of reconciliation and how to bring it about in the societies of former Yugoslavia. My hope is the learning shared in this dissertation contributes to this goal and can be applied to other post-conflict societies suffering similar division and polarization.

Bibliography:

Adelman, H. (2005). Rule-Based Reconciliation. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke

    (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 287-307). Lanham: Lexington.

Amnesty International. http://www.amnesty.org/

-----. Truth Commissions. http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-

    commissions.

Anderson, S. (2005). *Women's Many Roles in Reconciliation*. In *People Building Peace*

    II: Successful Stories of Civil Society, *Online Version*. Utrecht: European Centre

    for Conflict Prevention. Retrieved from

    http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/4/2_intro.htm

Andreas, P. (2005). Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its

    Legacy. International Studies Quarterly, 49 (2), pp. 335-360.

Anteros, C. (2007, Jan. 8). The Paradox of National Reconciliation in Sudanese. *Sudan*

    Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan. Retrieved from

    http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=19654

Appiah, K. A. (1990). Racisms. In D.T. Goldberg (Ed.), *Anatomy of Racism* (p.p. 3-17).

    Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

-----. (1994). Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social

    Reproduction. In A. Gutman (Ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of*

    Recognition (pp. 149-164). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Asiimwe, A. (2007, Jan. 26). *Rwanda to release 8,000 more genocide prisoners*. Kigali:

    Reuters. Retrieved from

    http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26801736.htm

Assefa, H. (1999). *The Meaning of Reconciliation*. Retrieved from

http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/part1/2_reconc.htm

Babo-Soares, D. (2005). Nahe Biti: Grassroots Reconciliation in East Timor. In E.

Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 225-246).

Lanham: Lexington.

Bailey, A., & Smithka, P. J. (Eds.). (2002). *Community, Diversity, and Difference:*

Implications for Peace. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Bajraktari, Y., & Serwer, D. (Jan. 2006). *Explaining the Yugoslav Catastrophe: The*

Quest for a Common Narrative. Retrieved from

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0105_narrative.html

Balkan Insight. (2010, Jan. 13). OSCE Attacks Interference in Bosnian Judiciary.

Balkan Insight. Retrieved from

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/24926/

Banka Magazin. (2010, May 17). Plaća u Srbiji 320 eura, najniža u regiji. *Banka*

Magazin. Retrieved from

http://www.bankamagazine.hr/Naslovnica/Regija/tabid/103/View/Details/ItemID/

59858/ttl/Placa-u-Srbiji-320-eura-najniza-u-regiji/Default.aspx

Barnes, C. (2002). *Democratizing peacemaking processes: strategies and dilemmas for*

public participation. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/public-

participation/introduction.php

Barnes, C. (Ed.). (2002). *Owning The Process - Public Participation in Peacemaking*.

London: Conciliation Resources. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/our-

work/accord/public-participation/contents.php

Barsalou, J. (2005). *Trauma and Transitional Justice in Divided Societies*. Special

    Report No. 135. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved

    from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr135.pdf

BBC. (2010, Feb. 17). Kosovo MPs proclaim independence. *BBC News*. Retrieved

    from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249034.stm

-----. (2010, July 22). Kosovo independence not illegal, says US court. *BBC News*.

    Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10730573

Beara, V., & Miljanović, P. (2006). Oh, where have you been, my blue-eyed son? An

    existentialistic contribution to the understanding of war trauma and PTSD.

    Association for Mental Health Protection of War Veterans and Victims of Wars

    1991-1999: Novi Sad.

Beara, V., & Miljanović, P. (2007). Veterans in Peacebuilding. In H. Rill, T. Šmidling

    & A. Bitoljanu (Eds.), *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening Change* (pp.

    165-177). Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

Benson, M. (1998). Standard English-SerboCroatian, SerboCroatian-English Dictionary.

    A Dictionary of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian Standards. Cambridge:

    Cambridge University Press.

Bjelakovic, N. (Jan 2003). *What kind of Justice for the Post-Yugoslav States?* Ottawa:

    Carleton University. Retrieved from

    http://www.carleton.ca/ces/papers/january03/bjelakovic03.pdf

Biggar, N. (2003). *Burying the past: Making peace and doing justice after civil conflict*.

    Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press.

Biserko, S. (2003, April 8). Can the Balkans (Ever) be Reconciled? Challenges,

    Approaches, Projects, New Designs. *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in*

    Serbia. Retrieved from

    http://www.helsinki.org.yu/confront_detail.php?lang=en&idgnrc=910

-----. (2005). Sonja Biserko's speech at the Panel on Justice and Reconciliation Geneva

    Conference 19-22 October 2005. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in

    Serbia. Retrieved from

    http://www.helsinki.org.yu/activities_detail.php?lang=en&idgnrc=1505

Bissett, J. (2010, Apr. 2). Croatia should apologize for World War II genocide before

    joining the EU. The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from

    http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0402/Croatia-should-

    apologize-for-World-War-II-genocide-before-joining-the-EU

Blitz, B. K. (1999). *Balkan Returns: An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority*

    Repatriation. Special Report. No. 57. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute

    of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr991221.html

Bloch, C. (2005). *Listen to Understand: The Listening Project in Croatia*. In *People*

    Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society, *Online Version*. Utrecht:

    European Centre for Conflict Prevention. Retrieved from

    http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?id=151&typ=theme&p

    id=34

Bloomfield, D. (2006). On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation. *Berghof Research*

    Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berghof Report No. 14. Retrieved

    from http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/br14e.pdf.

B92. http://www.b92.net/eng/

-----. (2007, June 24). Tadić apologizes to Croatian citizens. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=6&dd=24&yyyy=2007

-----. (2008, Nov. 18). Croatian genocide suit in ICJ jurisdiction. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=11&dd=18&nav_id=55092

-----. (2010, Jan. 4). Serbia files genocide lawsuit against Croatia. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=1&dd=4&yyyy=2010

-----. (2010, March 31a). MPs adopt Srebrenica Declaration. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=03&dd=31&nav_id=66160

-----. (2010, March 31b). RS, Bosnia dissatisfied with declaration. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=03&dd=31&nav_id=66181

-----. (2010, April 2). Int. rep on Srebrenica Declaration. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&dd=02&nav_id=66215

-----. (2010, April 4). Muslim community denounces mufti. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&dd=05&nav_id=66275

-----. (2010, April 21). Bosnian veterans clash with police. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&dd=21&nav_id=66629

-----. (2010, April, 26). "Pension system reform necessary." *B92*. Retrieved from

   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&dd=26&nav_id=66731

-----. (2010, May 1). Declaration on Serb victims next week. *B92*. Retrieved from

   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=01&nav_id=66855

-----. (2010, May 11). Women in Black hold protest. *B92*. Retrieved from

   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=11&nav_id=67065

-----. (2010, May 26). Bosnian official cancels trip over prison visit. *B92*. Retrieved

   from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=26&nav_id=67378

-----. (2010, May 27). Tadić to mediate in Croatia-Slovenia dispute. *B92*. Retrieved

   from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=27&nav_id=67407

-----. (2010, May 29a). Regional Cooperation has Improved. *B92*. Retrieved from

   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=67458

-----. (2010, May 29b). Regional leaders mark 10 years of Igman Initiative. *B92*.

   Retrieved from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

   article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=67456

-----. (2010, May 31a). Tadić: Truth leads to reconciliation. *B92*. Retrieved from

   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=31&nav_id=67483

-----. (2010, May 31b). Croatian president honors "all victims." *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=05&dd=31&nav_id=67493

----. (2010, June 1). Croat leaders says Serb counterpart "wants friendship." *B92*.

Retrieved from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=06&dd=01&nav_id=67513

-----. (2010, June 9). Veterans from 4 towns to protest. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=6&dd=9&nav_id=67698&version=print and

-----. (2010, June 23). Tadić to attend Srebrenica commemoration. *B92*. Retrieved

from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=06&dd=23&nav_id=67988

-----. (2010, July 11a). Tadić attends Srebrenica commemoration. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=11&nav_id=68366

-----. (2010, July 11b). Srebrenica visit "act of reconciliation." *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=11&nav_id=68361

-----. (2010, July 12). Bosnian Serbs commemorate war victims. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=12&nav_id=68377

-----. (2010, July 22). Bosnia: House packed with explosives. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=68612

-----. (2010, July 22a). Kosovo UDI not in breach of intl. law. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=68590

-----. (2010, July 22b). Serbia looks to UN GA after ICJ ruling. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=68617

-----. (2010, July 28). Dodik: Srpska će izbeći avanturizam. *B92*. Retrieved from

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=28&nav_cate

gory=167&nav_id=448258

Bookman, M. (2003). Economic Aspects of Yugoslavia's Disintegration. In Thomas, R.

(Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Intervention*

(pp. 117-137*)*. Lanham: Lexington.

Borer, T. A. (2004). Reconciling South Africa or South Africans? Cautionary Notes

from the TRC. *African Studies Quarterly: The Online Journal for African

Studies*, 8 (1). Retrieved from http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i1a2.htm.

Bove, L. F., & Kaplan, L. D. (Eds.). (1995). *From the Eye of the Storm: Regional

Conflicts and the Philosophy of Peace*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Božić-Roberson, A. (2005, January 4). Words Before The War: Milošević's Use Of

Mass Media And Rhetoric To Provoke Ethnopolitical Conflict In Former

Yugoslavia. *East European Quarterly*, XXXVIII, No. 4.

Božičević, G. (2004). Moves that are turning into a process. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from

http://www.vds.org.yu/File/GoranBozicevic.doc

-----. (2007). Is Dealing with the Past Slow and Difficult in Our Regions? In H. Rill, T. Šmidling & A. Bitoljanu (Eds.), *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening Change* (pp. 127-136). Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

Bringa, T. (2005). Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 187-199). Lanham: Lexington.

Brown, K. (2003). *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Calic, M. (2009). Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991-1995. In C. Ingrao & T. Emmert (Eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (pp. 114-151). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Cash, J. D., & McKenna, F. (2003, January 8). The Dilemmas of Political Transformation in Northern Ireland. *Cain Web Service*. Retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cash98.htm

Cash, J. D. (1996). The Framework Document and its Discontents. *Identity, Ideology and Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC). (1997). *Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report*. Washington, D.C.: Author. Retrieved from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/rept97/finfr.htm

CBC News. (2010, Apr. 14). Croatian president apologizes to Bosnia over war. CBC
    News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/04/14/croatia-bosnia-
    apology.html

Čekić, S. (2009). The Practice of the International Court of Justice: Legal or Political?
    The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. Presented and
    distributed at International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in Virginia,
    United States.

Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) http://www.nenasilje.org/cna/aboutus_e.html

Centre for Trauma. http://www.wartrauma.org/index.php?mylang=english

Chandler, D. (2003). Coming to Terms with the Terror and History of Pol Pot's
    Cambodia (1975-1979). In C. Prager & T. Govier (Eds.), *Dilemmas of
    Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (pp. 307-326). Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid
    Laurier University Press.

Chr. Michelsen Institute. (2001). *Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans.
    An Evaluation of the PostPessimist Network and other Youth Initiatives*. Oslo:
    Royal Norweigan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
    http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/35171731.pdf

CIA World Factbook. (2010a). Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html

-----. (2010b). Europe: Croatia
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html

-----. (2010c). Europe: Serbia
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html

Clark, R. (Ed.). (1998). *NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition*. New

      York: International Action Center (IAC).

Cohen, C. (2006). *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

      Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from

      http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srs/srs1.pdf

Cole, E. A., & Barsalou, J.   (June 2006). *Unite or Divide? The Challenges of Teaching*

      History in Societies Emerging from Violent Conflict. Special Report 163.

      Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from

      http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr163.pdf

Collin, M. (2001). *Guerrilla Radio: Rock 'n' roll and Serbia's underground resistance*.

      Belgrade and New York: Thunder's Mountain Press/Nation Books.

Cohen, S. States of Denial: (2001). Knowing about atrocities and suffering.

      Cambridge: Polity Press.

Crocker, D. (2003). Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework. In C.

      Prager & T. Govier (Eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (pp.

      39-63). Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Cushman, T., & Mestrović, S, T. (1996). *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to*

      Genocide in Bosnia. New York: New York University Press.

David, R., & Choi, S. Y. P. (June 2006) Forgiveness and Transitional Justice in the

      Czech Republic. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 339-367.

Dimitrijević, N. (2006). Justice beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (The Idea of) A

      Truth Commission. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 368-382.

Dimitrijević, N., & Kovacs, P. (Eds.). (2004). *Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis for Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the Former Yugoslavia*. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative Open Society Institute LGI/OSI.

Djerejian, E. P. (2003, Oct. 1). *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*. Washington, D.C. : The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf

Djikoli, J. (2010, May 27). OSCE: Success of War Crimes Processing Endangered. *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)*. Retrieved from http://www.bim.ba/en/1/80/28427/

Dwyer, S. (2003). Reconciliation for Realists. In C. Prager & T. Govier (Eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (pp. 91-110). Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Etcheson, C. (2005). The Limits of Reconciliation in Cambodia's Communes. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 201-224). Lanham: Lexington.

European Centre for Conflict Prevention. (1999). *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*. Utrecht: Author. Retrieved from http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/

-----. (2005). *People Building Peace II:* Successful Stories of Civil Society, *Online Version*. Utrecht: Author. Retrieved from http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/

Elster, J. (2006). Redemption for Wrongdoing: The Fate of Collaborators After 1945. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 324-338.

Ferguson,Y. H., & Mansbach, R. W. (1999). Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of 'Us' and 'Them'. *International Studies Review*, *1* (2), 77-107.

-----. (2002). The Elusive Quest Continues: Theory and Social Politics. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

-----. (2004). Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freebairn, A. & Jelacic, N. (2004, Nov. 26). Bringing War Crimes Justice Back Home. Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/29328.html

Friedman, T. L., (2000). *Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Knopf.

Gajicki, M. (2004). *New experience in the process of facing the past*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/File/MarijaGajicki.doc

Gallup Balkan Monitor. (2009). Impact and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans. Focus On: The Impact of Migration. Retrieved from http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/090626_Gallup_Balkan_Monitor-Focus_On_Migration.pdf

Garcia, J.L.A. (1997). Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, *28* (2), 5-42.

Garling, T., & Et al. (Eds.). (2002). *Diplomacy and Psychology: Prevention of Armed Conflicts After the Cold War*. Goteborg: Goteborg University.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 22 (2).

-----. (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development, and

    Civilization. London: Sage.

Gibson, J. L. (2006). The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South

    Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. *50* (3), 409-432.

Glenny, M. (1992). *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. London: Penguin.

Gloppen, S. (2005). Roads to Reconciliation: A Conceptual Framework. In E. Skaar, S.

    Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 17-50). Lanham:

    Lexington.

Gojković, D. (2000). *The Issue of Guilt and Responsibility*. *The Future in a Triangle:

    On Guilt, Truth and Change*. (N. Ivanović Trans.). Retrieved from

    http://www.b92.net/casopis_rec/59.5/pdf/064-75.pdf

Goodpaster, A. J. (1996). When Diplomacy is not Enough: Managing Multinational

    Military Interventions. Washington, D.C. : *Carnegie Commission on Preventing

    Deadly Conflict*. Retrieved from

    http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/dip/dip.htm

Govier, T. (2003). What is Acknowledgement and Why Is It Important? In C. Prager &

    T. Govier (Eds.), *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts* (pp. 65-89).

    Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Gutman, R. (1993). *A Witness to Genocide*. New York: Macmillan Publishing

    Company.

Group 484.

    http://www.grupa484.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&I
    temid=156&lang=english

-----. (2005). *Human Rights of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees and Asylum-Seekers in Serbia and Montenegro*. Report for 2004. Budapest: Open Society Institute.

Habermas, J. (1994). Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State. Translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen. In *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Ed. Amy Gutman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 107-149.

Hamber, B. (2004). *Coming to terms with the conflict in and about Northern Ireland: Lessons from the Healing Through Remembering Project*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia.   Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/File/BrandonHamber.doc

Hamilton, K., & Langhorne, R. (1995). The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration. London: Routledge.

Hanak, N. (2004). *The project: From remembering the past towards positive future: which model of truth and trust/reconciliation is suitable for Serbia?* Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia.   Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/File/NatasaHanak.doc

Hauss, C. (2003). Reconciliation. *Beyond Intractability*. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/

Hayner, P. B. (2001). Unspeakable truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity. New York and London: Routledge.

Hedges, C. (1996, June 1). Muslims in Sarajevo Take Over Homes of Serbs Who Fled War. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/01/world/muslims-in-sarajevo-take-over-homes-of-serbs-who-fled-war.html?pagewanted=1?pagewanted=1

Held, D. (2001, September 14). Violence and justice in a global age. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net.debates.article-2-49-144.jsp

Hinton, A. L. (Ed.). (2002). *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hinton, A. L. (2005). *Why did they kill? Cambodia in the shadow of Genocide*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hinton, A.L., & O'Neill, K.L. (2009). Genocide: Truth, memory and representation. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Honwana, A. (2005). Healing and Social Reintegration in Mozambique and Angola. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 83-100). Lanham: Lexington.

Hoffman, S. (2002). Clash of Globalizations. *Foreign Affairs, 81* (4).

-----. (1998) The Political Ethics of International Relations. Seventh Morgenthau Lecture on Ethics & Foreign Policy. *Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*. New York: Merrill House.

Howard, R., Rolt, F., van de Veen, H. & Verhoeven, J. (2003). *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders*. Retrieved from http://www.gppac.org/documents/Media_book_nieuw/a_b_contents.htm

Humanitarian Law Center (HCL) http://www.hlc-rdc.org/

Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/

-----. (1996). Croatia. Impunity for Abuses Committed During 'Operation Storm' and

the Denial of the Right of Refugees to Return to the Krajina. Retrieved from

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Croatia.htm

-----. (2003). *Broken Promises: Impediments to Refugee Return to Croatia*, *15* (6).

Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/09/02/broken-promises

Husak, A. (2010). Dayton Express: Bosnian Railroads and the Paradox of Integration

(Interactive documentary based on Vozovi Sviraci [The Reed Trains], US/Bosnia

2009). Presentation at the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), April

17, 2010, New York, NY.

International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). http://www.icty.org/

-----. (2003, Dec. 10). View from The Hague: The Tribunal and National Courts as

Partners. *ICTY*. Retrieved from

http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/balkan_031210_en.pdf

-----. (2010, July 6). ICTY Weekly Press Briefing–6th Jul 2005. Retrieved from

http://www.icty.org/sid/3639

-----. (2010, Feb. 23-24). Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY. International Conference

23-24 February, The Hague. Retrieved from http://www.icty.org/sid/10293

-----. (2010, June 30). Key Figures of ICTY Cases. Retrieved from

http://www.icty.org/sid/24

Igman Initiative. http://www.igman-initiative.org/

Ignjatović, S. (2007, Dec. 14). Jedino rešenje – udruživanje Položaj i budućnost

nezavisnih produkcija u Srbiji. *Medija Centar Beograd*. Retrieved from

http://www.mc.rs/code/navigate.aspx?Id=897

Ingrao, C. & Emmert, T. (Eds.) (2009). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). http://www.ic-mp.org/ and http://www.ic-mp.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/fact-sheet-eng1.pdf

International Court of Justice (ICJ). (2007, Feb. 26). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina *v*. Serbia and Montenegro). Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=1897&code=bhy&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=91&k=f4

-----. (2009, Jan. 22). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia). Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/14961.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search=%22croatia%22

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2005) Serbia's Sandzak: Still Forgotten. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/162_serbia_s_sandzak_still_forgotten.ashx

Irwin, C. (2002a). *The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

-----. (2002b). Forum: Macedonia. Peace, Stability and Elections. An Opinion Poll and its Implications. *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, *2* (1), 62-74. Retrieved

from

http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_II/issue_1/forum.pdf.

-----. (2004). Baseline Survey for *Our Town, Our Future*: A project about

democratisation, good governance and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Retrieved from http://www.peacepolls.org/Resources/BosniaFull.pdf

-----. (2005). Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The People's Views from

Kosovo and Serbia. Institute of Governance. Belfast: Queen's University

Belfast. Retrieved from

http://www.peacepolls.org/Resources/KosovoSerbiaFullReport.pdfJames, W., &

Vijver, van de, L. (2001). *After the TRC: Reflections on truth and reconciliation*

in South Africa. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Isla, A. (2009). Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Summary of the

Final Report and an Epilogue. Canadian Woman Studies, 27 (1).

Jamieson, R. (2002). *Denial, Acknowledgement and Reconciliation*. Belgrade:

Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from

http://www.vds.org.yu/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliation2002E.htm

Janjić, D., Lalaj, A. & Pula, B. (2009). Kosovo under the Milošević Regime. In C.

Ingrao & T. Emmert (Eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A*

Scholars' Initiative (pp. 272-301). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Josipović, I. (2006, March). Responsibility for war crimes before national courts in

Croatia. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 88 (861). Retrieved from

http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-861-

p145/$File/irrc_861_Josipovic.pdf

Kaminski, M. M., & Nalepa, M. (2006). Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating Truth Revelation Procedures. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 383-408.

Kaminski, M. M., Nalepa, M., & O'Neill, B. (2006). Normative and Strategic Aspects of Transitional Justice. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 295-302.

Kandić, N. (Ed.). (2001). *Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosovo*. Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center (HLC).

Kecmanović, D. (2002). *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Kelava, V. (2004). *The contribution of the Youth Communicative Center (YCC) to the process of peace building on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/File/VeraKelava.doc

Kiernan, A. (Ed.). (2001). *Voices for Peace: An Anthology*. London: Scribner.

jur Kirchhoff, G. F. (2002). From Denazification to Renazification. Experiences in Postwar Germany and a Victimological Point of View on Truth and Reconciliation. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliation2002E.htm

Kollander, P. (2004). In J. Morton, S. Bianchini, C. Nation & P. Forage (Eds.), *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia* (pp. 3-22). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kuper, L. (1982). *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kuperman, A. (2003). Transnational Causes of Genocide, or How the West Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict. In Thomas, R. (Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Intervention* (pp. 55-85*)*. Lanham: Lexington.

Lacina, B. (2006). Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (2), 276-289.

Lake, D. A., & Donald, R. (1996). Containing Fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. *International Security*, *1* (21), 41-75.

Langhorne, R. (2001). The Coming of Globalization: its evolution and consequences. Houndmills: Palgrave.

Lederach, J. P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

-----. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press.

-----. (1999). *The Challenge of the 21ˢᵗ Century*: JustPeace. Retrieved from http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/index.htm

-----. (2005). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lederach, J. P., & Jenner, M. (Eds.). (2002). *A handbook of international peacebuilding: Into the eye of the storm*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lederach, J. P., & Maiese, M. (2003). Conflict Transformation. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.), *Beyond Intractability*, Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation/

Liebmann, M. (2004). *Picturing truth and reconciliation*. Belgrade: Victimology
  Society of Serbia. Retrieved from
  http://www.vds.org.yu/File/MarianLiebmann.doc

Lotter, H. (1997). *Injustice, Violence, and Peace: The Case of South Africa*.
  Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Lyon, J. (1996). Yugoslavia's Hyperinflation, 1993-1994: A Social History. East
  European Politics and Societies, 10, pp. 293-327.

MacDonald, D. (Ed.). Living Together or Hating Each Other? In C. Ingrao & T. Emmert
  (Eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (pp. 390-
  424). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Maiese, M. (2003). Peacebuilding. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.), *Beyond
  Intractability*, Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado.
  Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacebuilding/

Malek, C. (2005). Reconciliation in Bosnia. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.), *Beyond
  Intractability,* Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado.
  Retrieved from
  http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/Reconciliation.jsp?nid=5105

Marjanović, Z. (2004). *Without the national strategy on truth and reconciliation, there is
  no real solution*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from
  http://www.vds.org.yu/File/ZdravkoMarjanovic.doc

Marzouk, Lawrence. (2010, May 27). ICJ Ruling on Kosovo 'by July.' *Balkan Insight*.
  Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/28430/

Mayor, F. (1999). Towards a New Culture of Peace and Non-Violence. Retrieved from http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/intros/a6_towar.htm

McClintock, A., & Et al. (Eds.). (1997). *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation & Postcolonial Perspectives*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

McDonald, J. (1991). Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy. In L. Kriesberg & S. J. Thorson (Eds.), *Timing the De- Escalation of International Conflicts*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, p. 201-220.

-----. (2003). Multi-track Diplomacy. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.), *Beyond Intractability*, Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/Reconciliation.jsp?nid=5105

McEvoy-Levy. (2006). Troublemakers or peacemakers? : Youth and post-accord peace building. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

McKim, R., & McMahon, J. (Eds.). (1997). *The Morality of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Melaugh, M., & McKenna, F. (2003, January 8). 'Bloody Sunday', 30 January 1972 – A Chronology of Events." *Cain Web Service*. Retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bsunday/chron.htm

van der Merwe, H. (2004). *Building a Forward-Looking Agenda for Transitional Justice in South Africa*. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliationE.htm

Minority Rights Group International. (2003). *Minorities in Croatia*. London: Author.

Retrieved from

http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/Croatia2003.pdf

Mitev-Shantek, Georgi. (2005, Aug. 8). Serbia Seeks Way out of Pensions Nightmare.

SETimes.com. Retrieved from

http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2

005/08/08/reportage-01

Marzouk, L. (2010, May 27). ICJ Ruling on Kosovo 'by July.' *Balkan Insight*.

Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/28430/

Meyer, E. C., & Nash, W. L. (2002). *Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeast

Europe: Preventing Conflict in the South Balkans*. Report of the South Balkans

Working Group. Center for Preventive Action. Retrieved from

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Balkans_TF.pdf

Miall, H. (2004). *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Retrieved from

http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/miall_handbook.pdf

Milicevic, A. (2004). Joining Serbia's Wars: Volunteers and draft-dodgers, 1991-1995.

Retrieved from ProQuest Digital Dissertations. (AAT 3164307)

Minow, M. (1998). *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, Boston: Beacon Press

MIRamiDA. http://www.zamirnet.hr/miramida-centre/information.htm.

Morton, J., Bianchini, S., Nation, C. & Forage, P. (Eds.). (2004). Reflections on the

Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia. New York:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Moser-Puangsuwan, Y., & Weber, T. (Eds.). (2000). *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision*. Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace. Honolulu: University of Hawaii.

Nansen Dialogue Network. http://www.nansen-dialogue.net/

Neuffer, E. (2001). *The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda*. New York: Picador USA.

Neumayer, E. (2005). Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49* (6), 925-953.

Nesiah, V. (2005). Coming to Terms with Irreconcilable Truths. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 271-286). Lanham: Lexington.

New York Times, The. (2010, July 23). After UN Court Ruling Fears of Global Separatism. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/07/23/world/AP-EU-Recognizing-Kosovo.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hp

Nikolić-Ristanović, V., & Hanak, N. (2006). Truth, Reconciliation, and the Serbian Victimology Society. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, *18*, 379-387.

Nikolić-Ristanović, V. (1996). War, Nationalism and Mothers. *Peace Review*, *8* (3).

-----. (1998). Serbia Between Civil War and Democracy. *Peace Review*, *10* (2).

-----. (2000). *Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans*. Budapest: CEU Press.

-----. (2001). Children as Multiple Victims of War. Peace Review, *13* (4), 577-582.

-----. (2002). *Social-historical Context, Victimization, and Truth and Reconciliation Process in Serbia so far*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from

http://www.vds.org.yu/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliation2002E.htm

-----. (2004). Truth and Reconciliation in Serbia. *Victimology Society of Serbia*. Retrieved from

http://www.vds.org.rs/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliationE.htm

Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative. (1995). *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Retrieved from

http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

http://www.oscebih.org/public/default.asp?d=6&article=show&id=2292

-----. (2003, Oct.). War crimes before Domestic courts OSCE monitoring and empowering of the Domestic courts to deal with war crimes rule of law and human rights department. *OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro*. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/documents/fry/2003/11/1156_en.pdf

-----. (2010, Jan.). Witness Protection and Support in BiH Domestic War Crimes Trials: Obstacles and recommendations a year after adoption of the National Strategy for War Crimes Processing A report of the Capacity Building and Legacy Implementation Project. *OSCE*. Retrieved from http://www.oscebih.org/documents/16563-eng.pdf

Opačić, G., Jović, V., Radović, B., & Knežević, G. (2006). Redress in Action: Consequences of forcible mobiliztion of refugees in 1995. Belgrade: IAN International Aid Network.

Othman, M. (2005). Justice and Reconciliation. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 249-270). Lanham: Lexington.

Pesić, V. (1996). *Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis*. Peaceworks No. 8. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks8.pdf

Peuraca, B. (2003). Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Special Report No. 103. *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr103.pdf

Phillips, J. & Petrovic, D. (2003, Nov. 14). Serb leader says sorry for 'evil' of war in Bosnia. *The Times*. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1016820.ece

Pickering, P. (2007). Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Pogge, T. (1998). The Bounds of Nationalism. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22*. Supplementary Volume, 463-504.

Politika Online. (2010, July 2). Voz koji kasni 19 godina. Retrieved from http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Voz-koji-kasni-19-godina.lt.html

Popov, N. (Ed.). (2000). *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Popovic, L. (2007, June 26). Tadic Apology to Croats divides Serbia. *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network*. *BIRN*. Retrieved from http://birn.eu.com/en/89/10/3417/

Potter, N. N. (Ed.). (2004). *Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Local and Global Levels*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Prager, C. & Govier, T. (2003). Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Prendergast, J., & Smock, D. (1999). *Post-Genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi*. Special Report No. 53. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990915.html

Press Online. (2010, Apr. 14). Pored Josipovića, izvinili se Tadić, Mesić, Marović. *Press Online*. Retrieved from http://www.pressonline.rs/sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/112038/Pored+Josipovića,+izvinili+se+Tadić,+Mesić,+Marović.html

Privitera, F. (2004). In J. Morton, S. Bianchini, C. Nation & P. Forage (Eds.), *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia* (pp. 35-53). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Puljek-Shank, A. (2007). Trauma and Reconciliation. In H. Rill, T. Šmidling & A. Bitoljanu (Eds.), *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening Change* (pp. 181-204). Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2005). Contemporary Conflict Resolution, (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

RECOM/REKOM. http://www.korekom.org/.

ReliefWeb. (2004). Serbia: Fear ripples through Vojvodina Minorities. Retrieved from

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/115a7d49cd4da7bac1256e

280059ce24

Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics. (2001). Census 2001.

http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm

Research and Documentation Center (RDC) http://www.idc.org.ba/

Reynolds, P. (2004). In J. Morton, S. Bianchini, C. Nation & P. Forage (Eds.),

Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia (pp.

75-90). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reyntjens, F. & Vandeginste, S. (2005). Rwanda: An Atypical Transition. In E. Skaar,

S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 101-128).

Lanham: Lexington.

Riding, A. (2005, June 9). In Balkans, Video Letters Reconcile Lost Friends. *The New

York Times*. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/09/movies/09ridi.html

Rill, H., Šmidling, T., & Bitoljanu, A. (2007). 20 Pieces of Encouragement for

Awakening Change: Peacebuilding in the region of the former Yugoslavia.

Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

-----. (2007). Without Dealing with the Past, All of It Is on Some Sort of an Abstract

Level. (Interview with Refik Hodžić. In H. Rill, T. Šmidling & A. Bitoljanu

(Eds.), *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening Change* (pp. 137-146).

Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

Robins, N. A., & Jones, A. (2009). Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern genocide in theory and practice. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Rothstein, R. L. (Ed.). (1999). *After the peace: resistance and reconciliation*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.

Sa'adah, A. (2006). Regime Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution Building, and Democracy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 303-323.

Sadovic, M. (2006, Aug. 18). War, crimes and videotapes. *Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR)*. Retrieved from http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/war-crimes-and-videotapes

Sampson, C., & Lederach, J. P. (Eds.). (2000). *From the ground up: Mennonite contributions to international peacebuilding*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schabas, W. (2005). The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 129-153). Lanham: Lexington.

Schirch, L., & Sewak, M. (2005). *The Role of Women in Peacebuilding*. Retrieved from http://www.gppac.net/page.php?id=63

Schori, P. (1999). *Poverty: Prime Enemy of Peace and Democracy*. Retrieved from http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/intros/a5_pover.htm

Search for Common Ground (SFCG). http://www.sfcg.org

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. (1986). Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). Retrieved from http://suc.suc.org/~kosta/tar/memorandum/

Shraga, D. (2005). The Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of Mixed Jurisdictions. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 55-79). Lanham: Lexington.

Silber, L., & Little, A. (1995). *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. London: Penguin.

Skaar, E. (2005). Argentina: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp. 157-175). Lanham: Lexington.

Skaar, E., Gloppen, S, & Suhrke, A. (Eds.). (2005). *Roads to Reconciliation*. Lanham: Lexington.

Smock, D. (Ed.). (2006). Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War. Peaceworks No 55. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pw55.pdf

Snoddon, M. (2004). *Healing the Memories*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/File/MartinSnoddon.doc

Špirić, Ž., Knežević, G., Jović, V., & Opačić, G. (2004). Torture in War: Consequences and rehabilitation of victims. Yugoslav experience. Belgrade: IAN International Aid Network.

Staub, E., Perlman, L. A., & Miller, V. (2003). Healing the Roots of Genocide in Rwanda. *Peace Review*, *15* (3), 287-294.

Stokes, G. (2009). Independence and the Fate of Minorities, 1991-1992. In C. Ingrao & T. Emmert (Eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (pp. 82-112). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Tadic, B. (2010, April 16). An Apology for Srebrenica. The Wall Street Journal.

Retrieved from

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023036956045751822841499460

8.html

Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In Gutman, A. (Ed.), *Multiculturalism:*

Examining the Politics of Recognition (pp. 25-73). Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

-----. (1997). Nationalism and Modernity. In McKim, R., & McMahon, J. (Ed.), *The*

Morality of Nationalism (pp. 31-55). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Theidon, K. (2006). Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in

Postwar Peru. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *50* (3), 433-457.

Thomas, R. (Ed.). (2003). *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination and*

Intervention. Lanham: Lexington.

Thomas, R. (2003). Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Secession: Principles and

Practice. In Thomas, R. (Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-*

Determination and Intervention (pp. 3-39*)*. Lanham: Lexington.

Thorpe, N. (2000, June 25). Djukanovic 'sorry' for Dubrovnik bombing. BBC.

Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/805024.stm

Tir, J. (2005). Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump

and Secessionist States. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49* (5), 713-741.

Todorova, M. (1997). *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Todorova, M. (Ed.). (2004). *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*. New York: New

York University Press.

Toma, Marijana. (2010, April 1). Srebrenica Declaration: No Landmark but a Muddy

     Compromise. *Balkan Insight*. Retrieved from

     http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/comment/27079/

van Tongeren, P. (1999). *Inspiring Stories of Peacebuilding*. Retrieved from

     http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/intros/a4_inspi.htm

Udovicki, J., & Ridgeway, J. (2000). *Burn this House: The Making and Unmaking of*

     Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke University Press.

United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).

     http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

-----. (2001). The Balkans–What Next? *Refugees*. 3 (124). Retrieved from

     http://www.unhcr.org/3bcd4fcc4.html

-----. (2003, Oct. 14). Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and

     Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. *Refworld*. Retrieved from

     http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,MNE,4562d8b62,42c3bcf70,0.html

-----. (2005, Sept. 1). The Balkans After the War Was

     over. *Refugees Magazine*. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/433bded34.html

-----. (2006). *Briefing Note UNHCR and Displaced Persons in Bosnia and*

     Herzegovina. Retrieved from

     http://www.unhcr.ba/protection/DPsbackgroundnote.pdf

-----. (2010a). Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2010 UNHCR country operations profile–

     Bosnia and Herzegovina

     http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766

-----. (2010b). Croatia. 2010 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile–South-Eastern

Europe. Retrieved from

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d7d6

-----. (2010c). Serbia. 2010 UNHCR country operations profile–Serbia. Retrieved

from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d9f6

United States Department of State. (2010, June 3). Background Note: Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). (1998). Peace Agreements Digital Collection.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: The General Framework Agreement for Peace in

Bosnia and Herzegovina

http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/dayton.pdf

-----. (1999). Balkan Returns. An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority

Repatriation. Special Report Number 57. Retrieved from

http://www.usip.org/resources/balkan-returns-overview-refugee-returns-and-

minority-repatriation

-----. (2000). Peace Agreements Digital Collection. Croatia: The Erdut Agreement

http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/croatia_erd

ut_11121995.pdf

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). Retrieved

from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untaes.htm

van de Veen, H. (2005). *Better media, less conflict*. Retrieved from

http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/5/2_intro.htm

Verwoerd, W. (2003). Toward a Response to Criticisms of the South African Truth and

Reconciliation Commission. In C. Prager & T. Govier (Eds.), *Dilemmas of*

Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (pp. 245-278). Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Victimology Society of Serbia (VDS). (2004*).* International Conference. *Truth and Reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia: Where are we now and where do we go?* Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/MedjKoferencijaIstinaIPomirenje102004E.htm

Vivisectfest. http://www.vivisectfest.org/engleski/knjige/knjga_vivisect.html

Vukosavljević, N. (2007). One Injustice Cannot Be Made by Causing a New One. In H. Rill, T. Šmidling & A. Bitoljanu (Eds.), *20 Pieces of Encouragement for Awakening Change* (pp. 147-161). Belgrade and Sarajevo: Centre for Nonviolent Action.

Vukotic, V. (2007, June 28). State given security over Srebrenica memorial centre; Bosnian Serbs object. *SETimes.com*. Retrieved from http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2007/06/28/feature-02

Wall, D. (2002). Northern Ireland and Truth and Reconciliation. *Healing Through Remembering: The Story So Far*. Belgrade: Victimology Society of Serbia. Retrieved from http://www.vds.org.yu/SelectionOfThePapersTruthAndReconciliation2002E.htm

Walzer, M. (2000). *Just and Unjust Wars (*3rd ed.). New York: Basic Books.

Wachtel, A. & Bennett, C. (2009). The Dissolution of Yugoslavia. In C. Ingrao & T. Emmert (Eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (pp. 12-47). West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Wils, O. (2004). *Dealing with the Past and Conflict Transformation former Yugoslavia.*
Berlin. Berghof Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.berghof-
center.org/uploads/download/joint_evaluation_report_cna.pdf

Woodward, S. (1995). *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.*
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.

Youth Initiative for Human Rights. http://www.yihr.org/

-----. (2005). Violent Societies in Transition II. Belgrade and Prishtina: Youth Initiative
for Human Rights.

-----. (2006). Violent Societies in Transition III: Alternative dialogue Kosovo–Serbia.
Belgrade and Prishtina: Youth Initiative for Human Rights.

Zamora, R. (2005). Truth for Reconciliation: The Salvadoran Experiences of 1979 and
1992. In E. Skaar, S. Gloppen & A. Suhrke (Eds.), *Roads to Reconciliation* (pp.
177-183). Lanham: Lexington.

Zorbas, E. (2009). What does reconciliation after genocide mean? Public transcripts
and hidden transcripts in post-genocide Rwanda. *Journal of Genocide Research,*
11(1), 127-147. Retrieved from
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a910835983&db=all.

VITA

1975	Born in Jersey City, New Jersey.
1993	Graduated from Academy of St. Aloysius, Jersey City, New Jersey.
1997	B.A. in Philosophy and Administration of Justice, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
1998	Bryan, Nicole. (1998). (Review of the book *Nothing Bad Happens to Good Girls: Fear of Crime in Women's Lives* by Esther Madriz.) *Social Pathology* 4 (Fall 1998): 134.
1998	Welch, Michael, Russell Wolff and Nicole Bryan. "Decontextualizing the War on Drugs: A Content Analysis of NIJ Publications and their Neglect of Race and Class." *Justice Quarterly* 15 (December 1998): 718.
1999	Welch, Michael, Nicole Bryan and Russell Wolff. "Just War Theory and Drug Control Policy: Militarization, Morality and the War on Drugs." *Contemporary Justice Review: Issues in Criminal, Social and Restorative Justice* 2 (1999): 49.
1999	M.A. in Humanities and Social Thought, New York University, New York, New York,
1999-02	Employed by Veritas Group, Ltd., New York, New York.
2002-03	University Teaching Assistantship, Rutgers University.
2003-04	National Science Foundation Fellowship, Rutgers University.
2004-05	University Teaching Assistantship, Rutgers University.
2005	Bryan, Nicole. "Reflections on Responses to International Terrorism in the Context of Globalization." *Global Ethics: Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science* (2005): 151.
2005-06	Dissertation Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.
2005-09	Field research in former Yugoslavia (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009).
2008-09	National Security Education Program, David L. Boren Fellowship.
2010	Ph.D. in Global Affairs, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.