INDECOROUS THINKING: STYLE, FORM, AND SPENSERIAN POETICS

by

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This dissertation considers how questions of poetic form in literary studies converge with questions of epistemology in the early modern period. As early modern pedagogues sought to define the relationship between the arts of speaking and of thinking – rhetoric and dialectic – they spent a good deal of time describing what poetic figures might and might not do in an attempt to preserve thinking, and the mind itself, from the threat of linguistic mutability. I examine how Edmund Spenser’s poetic practices pushed against prevailing pedagogical proscriptions, driving a wedge between an ideal of decorous proportion and the natural limitations this ideal claimed to represent. Drawing on a range of humanist theories and practices – from Latin lectures on rhetoric and dialectic to vernacular handbooks of eloquence – I argue that Spenser experimented with poetic forms as instruments of thinking at a moment when the university characterized these same forms as the mere ornaments of speaking. While recent scholarship has done much to revive form as an object of study, Spenserian poetics teaches us to read form not as an
effect of ideology or circumstance but as the engine of a certain kind of thinking that early modern schoolrooms were looking to exclude. I call this thinking “indecorous” and my dissertation tracks its activity from the disciplinary reforms of 1570s Cambridge to the borders of Elizabeth’s empire, arguing that forms as varied as the pun, the couplet, and the simile offer a model of the mind in which thinking is embedded in the time and labor of poetic production.
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Dedication

For Jackie
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Introduction

In sixteenth-century England, pedagogues began to produce rhetorical manuals in the vernacular with the intention of supplementing – or even replacing altogether – the Latin training of the humanist schoolroom. Composed by scholars dissatisfied with the insularity of the university, these handbooks imagine an audience of lazy or forgetful students as well as an audience of students formally excluded from humanist learning. Claiming to deliver the arts of language from the mouths of university sophists to the hands of “Carters” and “Coblers,” these pedagogues are at the same time anxious to regulate the rhetorical power they disseminate: “A swoord in a fooles hand” is both the objection these handbooks anticipate and a danger against which they arm themselves.¹

The following dissertation is a study of the work performed by rhetorical figures in humanist learning, a learning poised between an instrumental approach to language and a desire to distinguish the mind and its thinking from the forms entailed by such an approach. This dissertation is thus also a study of the significance of figures that we have come to think of as poetic – tropes of thought and schemes of sound – to early modern pedagogy’s attempt to divorce form from the invention of an argument and the judgment of its validity. The significance of poetic figures to this attempt turns on a set of questions that preoccupied humanist teachers: is language instrumental to thinking and do its figures act as constituent structures of the mind? Is language simply ornamental to thinking? Is its work dictated by mental operations from which these figures are excluded? Drawing on an array of humanist theories and practices, I argue that early modern teachers proposed an answer to these questions by subordinating speaking to
thinking and inscribing the relative value of the one to the other into a paradigmatic account of the compositional process.

This paradigm presented its rules concerning the uses of figure as mere adherence to the perceived natural limitations of language. It supplied, as telos to the compositional process, an ideal of decorous proportion that enacted ethical discipline by proscribing stylistic norms. An ornamental definition of language underwrites this paradigm: it assumes that thought proscribes speech and it forges a dualism that will become institutionalized in the seventeenth century by the widespread dismissal of “eloquence” as such. By contrast, an instrumental approach to language suggested that poetic figures were not ornaments to but the engines of thinking. I call this thinking “indecorous” and I examine how one poet, Edmund Spenser, cut across prevailing pedagogical proscriptions to offer a model of the mind embedded in the time and labor of poetic practice.

In the following chapters, I provide an anatomy of indecorous thinking by focusing on a set of poetic figures and forms that occupied the contentious intersection between the early modern arts of speaking and of thinking. In chapter one I examine two of these figures – paronomasia (the pun) and gradatio (the figure of climax) – by locating them within the network of stylistic, social, and epistemological norms established by humanist pedagogy. Responding to an apparent overlap in the material belonging to the university arts of rhetoric and dialectic, pedagogical reforms under the name of “Ramism” reduced rhetoric to style and pronunciation while reserving the discovery of arguments for dialectic. This apparently simple redistribution carried a polemic: stripped of its engagement with res or things, limited only to the adornment of verba or words, rhetoric became the lesser hand-maiden to dialectic. Thus, in a lecture
on rhetoric to Cambridge (1577), Gabriel Harvey ventriloquizes “Eloquentia” for a room full of his students: she renounces her title to the “estate” of dialectic and returns the “land” she has unfairly occupied. As these pedagogical reforms drastically reduce the “kingdom” of rhetoric and widen the “borders” of dialectic, as Harvey put it, poetic figures that were previously seen to facilitate both invention and the production of style became problematic. The use of paronomasia and gradatio in both thinking and speaking constituted a violation of each art’s emergent integrity.

Authors of vernacular handbooks sought to minimize this threat through the pedagogical forms of the taxonomy, the exemplum, and the caution or caveat. While the taxonomy provided a synchronic landscape akin to the commonplace book, it also contributed to an instrumental approach to language by assigning these figures a kind of material reality and transforming them into tools available for use in time. Examples served to qualify use by supplying a telos to this process: they offered an ideal image of what a new text ought to resemble, thereby circumscribing the future according to the parameters of the past. The caution registered the pedagogical anxiety that a student’s own composition might depart from the example, driving a wedge between the example’s idealized projection and the range of possibilities allowed for in nature (a range which the example claimed to represent). If the specter of abuse proposes a scene in which figures drive discourse out of proportion, these pedagogical forms attempt to compass those figures by drafting the boundaries of expression and maintaining that these boundaries are given rather than invented, nature rather than art.

The primary threat of indecorous thinking is not its faulty reasoning or its excessive prattling but the formation of a mind that challenges the reformed curriculum’s
claim to represent natural reason as well as the social norms which determined this representation. Children were at once ideal candidates and dangerous liabilities: impressionable as soft clay, children were also vulnerable to deformation. In my second chapter, I turn to the verse form Elizabethan schoolboys first learned to parse – the *claude carmina* or “limping verse” of Ovid’s exile elegies – to explore the role of imitation in pedagogy’s paradigm of composition. I suggest that the final asymmetrical couplet of Spenser’s stanza or “staffe” is a vernacular imitation of Ovid’s “limping verse” from exile. Paying particular attention to Guyon and his teacher, the Palmer, I suggest that Spenser’s “staffe” recasts the temporal rupture between thinking and speaking – whereby thinking occurs in an abstract plane and speaking deals in mutable materials – as the experience of exile. Elizabeth’s court thus becomes a kind of allegorical landscape from which Spenser’s “staffe” marks the distance of his poetic materials. The *Faerie Queene* itself becomes a corporeal being at the borders of Elizabeth’s empire, subject to the threat of mental and linguistic degeneration. Spenser incorporates these fears of degeneration into a metamorphic aesthetic according to which both his allegorical actors and the poem’s own indecorous composition are susceptible to transforming into something *alter*, subjects that operate outside of the social order for which decorum acted – to quote Peter Ramus – as the “principle of harmonious perfection.”

Chapter two attends to the moment in *Book II* of the *Faerie Queene* when Guyon turns to mount his horse only to find that that horse is no longer there. With this theft, Guyon is forced to “fairly fare on foot,” drawing our attention to both the progression of our central pair and the poem’s own liming progression through time. Chapter three follows the man who stole his horse and examines what he does with it. Braggadocio
travels through faerie land collecting other men’s *ornamenta*, a word that describes both the figures of rhetoric and the weapons of war. His story proceeds according to the paradigm of accumulation that dominated early modern pedagogy and underwrote its central claim that the collection of knowledge might facilitate social mobility.\(^7\) I argue that the early modern *simile* acted as an engine of accumulation and that its copious productivity resisted the very abstraction upon which an art of thinking – as separate from an art of speaking – was predicated. By positing a decorous *telos* to the compositional process, humanist pedagogy suggested that the success of a given composition depended upon disguising the labor that went into its making. Thus, having apparently shown men the path “from cart to schoole, and from thence to Court,” George Puttenham also suggests in his *Arte of English Poesie* (1589) that his students are in danger of returning whence they came. “Being now lately become a Courtier,” he warns, the student must “shew not himself a craftsmen, & merit to be disregarded, and with scorne sent back againe to the shop, or other place of his first facultye and calling.”\(^8\) Spenser casts Braggadochio’s accumulation of comparative images as a means to social mobility while also implicating himself as poetic laborer in acts of accumulation. For Spenser, the simile encodes the time of poetic practice into the *Faerie Queene* and reveals both the craft and the schoolroom that was the “place of his first facultery and calling.”

In chapter four, I suggest that the primary pedagogical form of justice in *Book 5* – the emblem – shares with humanist theories of method a set of assumptions about the speed with which truth makes itself visible to the student. In *Book 5* of the *Faerie Queene*, Braggadocio is stripped of his *ornamenta* and disgraced before a gathering crowd. Transformed into an emblem of shame, the lesson of this emblem is a quick one
and, once learned, gone: after this brief encounter, both Guyon and Braggadchio disappear from the *Faerie Queene*. According to the symbolic logic of justice, Braggadchio’s transformation into an emblem of shame was meant to serve as both a representation of his crime and evidence of his transgression. However, Spenser’s use of the rhetorical figure *polysyndeton* (the figure of “many ands”) exceeds the temporal span of the emblematic lesson’s legitimacy. The transmission of knowledge, here, is less than instantaneous. Spenser’s use of *polysyndeton* tracks the time spent making this emblematic lesson – what Henry Peacham calls in his *Garden of Eloquence* (1593) “too long a continuance in adding conjunctions.” Spenser’s use of *polysyndeton* presents a pedagogical alternative to humanist method, an alternative in which thinking occurs piecemeal, accumulating in time by way of poetic figures.

Spenser’s poetic practices teach us to read forms of the sixteenth century within a dialectic between the time of poetic labor and the abstraction of a mind that sought to steel itself against time and the mutability it entails. While the study of forms generic (e.g. epic), prosodic (e.g. blank verse), and material (e.g. the book) has been central to literary criticism of the past century, scholars have been less interested in historicizing the concept of form itself. The potential for an investigation into both the history of form and the historical work of particular forms has been obscured by a series of polarized debates about the relative importance of formal analysis to cultural studies. For some, form is the instrument of ideology and thus interesting insofar as it breaks down under the pressure of lived experience. For others, form is the *sine qua non* of literary studies, and recent calls for a new kind of formalist practice have suggested narrowing the methodological reach of English departments accordingly. My dissertation contributes to
a growing body of scholarship – including the work of Harry Berger, Judith Anderson, Susanne Wofford, Patricia Parker, Mary Crane, Brian Cummings, and Jeff Dolven – that cuts across the binaries that underwrite these debates: binaries between form and matter, words and things, the aesthetic and the social. My dissertation examines the moment at which early modern pedagogical theories and practices began to institutionalize their opposition, thereby limiting the kinds of work we regularly ascribe to form while also obscuring the time and labor of poetic practice. Such historicizing changes our readings of particular forms by locating them within the network of stylistic, social, and ideological norms that determined the range of activities of which form was thought to be capable in the early modern period.

In these ways, my hope is that *Indecorous Thinking* lays the groundwork from which we might pose a series of questions about the literary scholar’s investment in the “thinkable” as such – what might have been, but was not necessarily thought. In his *Defence of Poesy*, Philip Sidney suggests that poetry is itself interested in this expanded notion of possibility: he distinguishes the historian’s investigation into the “bare was’” from the poet’s exploration of what “may be.” Does a rededication to “form” merely posit “form” as another object of study, one object among many? That is, are we interested in what was “thinkable” about “form” in early modern England? Or, do we want to suggest that “form” is itself a structuring principle of the “thinkable” in early modern England? Does poetic form condition the very parameters according to which we distinguish the “bare ‘was’” from “what may be,” the thought from the thinkable?

It is thus also my hope that this dissertation suggests that certain assumptions that underwrite the polemical division between historicist and formalist methodologies
emerged in the sixteenth century. This, in turn, opens up a series of questions about the history of an institutional marginalization of poetic form from the production of knowledge: In what ways are the criteria by which modern scholars determine what was “thinkable” at a given moment in time predicated on the systematic separation of poetic forms from the art of thinking in the early modern period? To what extent is the knowledge generated by poetic forms embedded within histories of production that the dominant pedagogical paradigms of both the early modern university and our own university are structured to overlook – or perhaps even, to occlude? How did early modern pedagogical reforms and their central assumptions about the relationship between form and thinking help to shape an empiricist epistemology predicated on deeming the kinds of knowledge generated by rhetorical figures sophistic and fallacious? Have prevailing historicist methodologies overlooked the significance of indecorous thinking to an intellectual and social history of the early modern period because these methodologies are grounded in an empiricism that understands rhetorical figures as obstructions to rather than the instruments of knowledge?

In this dissertation, I suggest that poetic forms serve as an index of the sort of thinking – and the sort of mind – that early modern pedagogy came to guard against. By providing an account of how an understanding of the mind as the locus of thinking was predicated on divorcing poetic figures from the art of trained thinking, I hope to suggest that the “thinkable” is predicated on deeming a certain kind of discourse unthinking. I call this thinking “indecorous.”
Chapter One: Indecorous Thinking

In his *Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian* (1549), educational reformer Peter Ramus took the teaching of decorum out of the art of rhetoric, suggesting that it is “clearly ridiculous to assign it to rhetoric as if it were its property alone.” Decorum is not a precept within rhetoric but rather, a principle that governs all of the arts: “there will never be any separate and distinct precept concerning decorum... because decorum itself is that harmonious perfection which the arts by their precepts, and human reason and wisdom by themselves reveal.” Ramus thus insists that decorum stands in for an ideal of “harmonious” proportion that extends to and governs not only matters covered by the art of rhetoric but also, “arithmetic, geometry, music, astrology” which observe “decorum in calculation of numbers, in division of great quantities, in harmonies and sounds and in the movements of the stars.” Even “natural science” observes “decorum in roots, plants, and animals.” According to Ramus, decorum is not a precept but the principle according to which the world itself was an expression of “harmonious perfection.”

We tend to limit our discussions of decorum to its role in rhetorical training. There, the apt fitting together of person, time, and place secures the success of one’s oration: decorum is thus the arbiter of persuasive knowledge. Ramus, however, suggests that decorum governs the apt fitting together of the world itself. Decorum is thus not simply a tool of persuasion, but what Thomas Wilson described in his *Art of Rhetoric* (1560) as the ability to “make our sayings appear likely and probable” and “our doings seem reasonable,” under the condition that “we frame our work to nature’s will.” The sort of knowledge that decorum might secure shifts, accordingly. The “decorous”
maintains a likeness to nature and the knowledge it might therefore afford is not subject to the criteria of persuasion but rather, of probability.

In this chapter, I will explore how early modern pedagogues in the arts of rhetoric and dialectic tailored their teachings in order to maintain the ideal of aesthetic, social, and epistemological proportion for which decorum acted as both governor and guardian. Following Ramus’s declaration, we might be forgiven for believing that the principle of decorum was irreducible to any single art but Ramus himself was loath to place that principle of “harmonious perfection” outside the purview of his favorite, “art of arts”: “in manners lying outside any particular art,” he writes, “the common qualities of intelligence and nature which dialectic draws upon must be aroused and employed.”\(^3\) If decorum does not belong among the precepts of dialectic, it might be found out by way of dialectic. Suggesting that the art of dialectic produced knowledge of decorum, Ramus was thus able to remake the limitations of nature (of which he understands the “harmonious perfection” of decorum to be a representation) in the image of dialectic.\(^4\) In this chapter, I will argue that dialectic’s claim to decorum was predicated on characterizing the thinking afforded by rhetoric – and, in particular, its figures of eloquence – as indecorous and, therefore, as a counterfeit art of improbable knowledge.

In addition to the arts of the trivium and the quadrivium, of natural science and of moral philosophy, Ramus wrote that the “harmonious perfection” characteristic of decorum governed “every word and deed and in every decision on daily affairs that lie outside of any art.”\(^5\) Ramus thus extended decorum’s principle of “harmonious perfection” to living itself – not as an “art” of the schools but as a quotidian affair conducted at more mundane levels. In section one of this chapter, I will suggest that this
extension of decorum’s domain was coterminous with a widespread effort – of which the Ramists were a single manifestation – to translate university learning in the vernacular, thereby opening humanist learning to social groups previous excluded from classical knowledge of the arts. These vernacular treatises combine university learning in the arts of rhetoric and dialectic with an ideal of quotidian pragmatism in an attempt to extend their schoolroom precepts to the “daily affairs” of men. In section two, I will suggest that as these treatises catered to a new audience of “Coblers” and “Carters,” the stakes of pedagogy – and particularly, the potential failures of pedagogy – shifted. If decorum governs “daily affairs” then the threat of the indecorous – a mind that thinks outside of pedagogy’s parameters of right use – transforms faulty reasoning or excessive prattling into local acts of inharmonious social activity. In section three, I will explore the pedagogical practices according to which the vernacular treatise sought to diminish this threat, arguing that these pedagogical practices established a narrative paradigm of production. As the telos to this narrative, the paradigm posited a mimetic ideal that underwrites both decorum and the reformed dialectic’s claim to represent the natural operations of the mind. In conclusion, I will suggest that indecorous thinking drives a wedge between this mimetic telos and the natural limitations it is meant to merely represent.

I.

In May of 1576, Gabriel Harvey delivered the opening lecture in rhetoric to Cambridge University. In this lecture Harvey recounted his conversion from Ciceronian eloquence to Ramistic utility and he encouraged his “students” to follow his example. His audience, however, appears to have contained more than the required first year
“students.” Some “honorable gentlemen” have accompanied the freshmen and it has proved tempting to more than just this reader to fill in two members of Harvey’s audience, one from among the younger and one from among the older crowd.

Somewhere alongside his fellow first years, Abraham Fraunce ought to be listening. In the following decade, Fraunce will publish two vernacular adaptations of the central Ramist texts, Taleus’s *Rhetoricae* and Ramus’s *Dialecticae*, in the *Arcadian Rhetorike* (1588) and the *Lawiers Logike* (1588). The second of these texts imagines, among its own audience, the sort of students who left Cambridge after one year’s “intertayning of Freshmenne in the Rhetorike schooles” and returned to their country homes insufficiently learned, failures of a curtailed university education. Did Fraunce see these “Freshmenne” sitting on either side of him or, perhaps, notice their absence when he returned the following year? It is unlikely that he saw or noticed our second speculative figure from among the “honorable gentleman” though he will use excerpts from this gentleman’s poem, *The Shepheardes Calender* (1579), to exemplify the principles of logic for the instruction of his errant “Freshmenne.”

Edmund Spenser would be sitting somewhere among the older masters students and, we are tempted to imagine, listens to the lecture of his one-time instructor and now, close friend; in a very short time Spenser will be leaving university for good.

Because Fraunce will proceed to champion the Ramist reforms of Harvey’s lecture, because he will choose Spenserian poetics as a vehicle for teaching these reforms, it is tempting to think of the three in the same room at the same moment in time. It is, of course, equally likely that neither Fraunce nor Spenser was there then. Fraunce must have been as capable of skipping class as he was attending. The publication of his
two vernacular treatises is itself predicated upon what he represents as the failings of university education. There are minds, like those belonging to the errant “Freshmenne,” that the university fails to discipline to perfection. There are also those that never enter into a lecture hall of rhetoric and Fraunce is equally critical of the university for failing to discipline these minds altogether. After Fraunce leaves university in 1583, he seems at least as concerned with who doesn’t sit in lecture halls such as Harvey’s. If the gift-books Edmund Spenser delivered to Harvey in 1578 are any indication, he seems to have thought that his friend took university learning rather too seriously. “A Master of Art is not worth a ***/ Except he be in schooles” the prologue to one of these jest books reads. This might have been an elbow in the side. It might have also been a push out the door. Both their not-so-private correspondence and Harvey’s Letterbook suggest that the pralector in rhetoric had ambitions beyond university infamy. We do not, anyways and more generally, always listen to the lectures we attend or remember lectures later for having attended to them in the moment. For these reasons, who may have been there doesn’t get us quite anywhere.

The printed edition of Harvey’s lecture, Ciceronianus (1577), however, encourages another version of this imaginative work. “I return to you at last, my Students,” the text begins and the bodies that filled the lecture hall assume a kind of shadowed shape into which the printed lecture’s students might insert themselves. Harvey’s introduction as printed pedagogue to the latter student is grafted onto a moment of reintroduction to the former after holiday; the Ciceronianus’s students become embedded within the iterations of interim and term that divvy up each year at Cambridge. What is most interesting about this imaginative work, however, is that the lecture hall is
only one of three pedagogical spaces constructed by the *Ciceronianus*. Harvey’s narrative of “conversion” begins with the break between terms during which he retreated to his “suburban school of rhetoric and philosophy.” In this “school” – private, personal, styled as marginal (*suburbano*) – Harvey was able to pursue a line of study that culminates with his purchase of Ramus’s own *Ciceronianus*. Harvey suggests that he “accomplished almost more” in this “suburban school” than he did “within the precincts” (*spatiis*) – time within and also rooms of – “the University.” His “return” to the students of Cambridge coincides with this opening lecture. Refreshed by his alternative pedagogical space, Harvey comes both to cure Cambridge students of their blind (decidedly Catholic) fidelity to Ciceronian eloquence and to reform the lecture hall in the image of his own “suburban school.” As a publication, Harvey’s rhetoric lectures (he will publish two more after the *Ciceronianus*) reach beyond these same “precincts.” They constitute a third pedagogical space, a schoolroom “set in type” by a “Master Printer,” “*Typographe*.” This printed schoolroom functions as a kind of preparative course that “students of rhetoric” ought to “diligently ponder” before proceeding to university. As a conversion narrative – an account of Harvey’s own conversion to Ramism but also an *exemplum* after which Harvey’s readers might model their conversions – it is not difficult to imagine that the text also becomes a course in continued education. *Ciceronianus* acts as a supplement to the learning of Cambridge graduates who, like the unconverted Harvey, value “words (*verba*) more than content (*res*), language (*linguam*) more than thought (*mentem*).” In the interim between sessions, after the lecture hall has emptied, school is not so much out as it is out there.
The necessity of these two alternative pedagogical spaces – the “suburban” and the “set in type” – constitutes a critique of the university’s insularity (the very quality that enables Abraham Fraunce’s characterization of the minds it fails to discipline). In this section, I would like to explore the pedagogical spaces that speak to the university’s limitations. While studies of sixteenth-century pedagogy tend to take the classroom – grammar school or university – as the site in which disciplined thinking originates, these studies do not – as the Ciceronianus does – admit for and explore the consequences of these rooms’ potential for failure. While I will not spend much more time thinking about the Ciceronianus itself, I do understand this text as the product of a more widespread critique of university “precincts.” Harvey’s printed lecture does not stray too far from the lecture hall’s original audience. The students his text projects will go there or will have gone there. At the very least, they can use their Latin. The same is not true for many of the printed treatises on rhetoric and dialectic. Abraham Fraunce’s vernacular adaptations, for example, address themselves to both the poorly educated and the uneducated. These cast a wider net by critiquing the university for both those minds it misguides and those minds it fails to guide. These claims for the popularization of learning in the vernacular are familiar from the protestant reforms upon which they (and Harvey’s conversion narrative) structure themselves. It will come as little surprise that they feature similar anxieties: “A swoord in a foules hand” is both the objection these treatises anticipate and a danger against which they arm themselves.

Pedagogical spaces “set in type” recapitulate a paradox at the center of early modern movements that couple translation from Latin into the vernacular with popularization. We might say of these translations of the classical arts what has often
been said of translations of scripture: if, in theory, these translations promote the redistribution of access, this popularization also constitutes a challenge to the hierarchical social order within which such a redistribution might be idealized. We might adjust the severity of this paradox along a spectrum of audiences imagined by these treatises’ pedagogues. The more popular the audience, the more severe is the challenge they pose. On one end of this spectrum are the individuals who primarily used these treatises as supplements to schoolroom training – as “cribs” for help, as extensions because their education was curtailed, as triggers because their older mind has an imperfect memory.28 In this sense, these treatises recognize the failings of schoolroom training (or, at least, register its potential for failure). In addition to this audience (the historical counterparts of which we can, more or less, document), these treatises project another audience and this audience sits at the other end of our spectrum.29 This is an audience for which we have little historical corroboration but which these treatises promote as cause. This audience is composed of individuals who may have never, or barely, seen the inside of a classroom – primarily on account of class or gender – but who would gain access in these treatises to training in dialectic and rhetoric previously inaccessible by virtue of Latin.30 This audience, much like the gospel’s reformation audience (and any Protestant reader of the Bible must, after all, learn to recognize its figures and tropes), is both a cause to be championed and a source of anxiety.31 In short, these treatises must negotiate between the dissemination of a powerful set of tools and the dissolution of the schoolroom’s ideological perimeters, carefully regulated by institutional conformity, the figure of the teacher, and the schoolroom exercises intended to promote (and monitor) the decorous use of this set of tools.32
We might remap the division of these two projected audiences onto a linguistic plane: there are those from our first audience who would benefit from learning rhetoric and dialectic with the native tongue and there are those from our second audience who must learn rhetoric and dialectic in the native tongue. A treatise might cater to both audiences but they remain, nonetheless, distinct. Thus, Henry Peacham presents the Garden of Eloquence (1577) to not only (and “especially”) “the studious youthe of this Realme” but also “such as haue not the vnderstanding of the Latyne tongue.” Thomas Blundeville’s Arte of Logike (1599) describes itself as “a very necessarie booke for all young students in any profession” but caters “specially” to ministers who “haue not beene brought vp in any Vniversity.” A treatise targeting the first of these audiences acknowledges degrees of familiarity with the classical arts: it might pitch itself – as Richard Sherry’s Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550) pitches itself – to “the better understanding of good authors” or as a path for return to partially forgotten, fading study. In this way, a treatise understands itself less as an alternative to the classical arts and more, as participating in a dialogue with those arts. Richard Sherry cites Agricola who “exhorteth me~ what souer they reade in straunge tongues, diligently to translate the same into their owne language: because that in it we sonar perceiue if there be any faute in our speaking, and howe euerye thyng eyther rightly hangeth together or is darkely, ruggishly, or superfluousely wrytte.” According to this configuration, the treatise remains closely tied to the schoolroom exercise of double translation. Sherry understands his treatise as a way back into the Latin texts. He imagines his vernacular explication as one which will “make these thinges more playne to yᵉ students that lyst to reade them in oure tongue” or those who, “perchaunce shal not haue perfect instructoures” because they
“saye unto their scholers: hic est figura and sometimes to ace them, Per quam figuram?” but “go no further.” These treatises function as the vernacular version of the primers which schoolmasters and university praelectors, such as Harvey, encouraged their students to not only purchase and pursue but “to memorize through and through.” Harvey suggested that the brevity with which these treatises display the arts is “of infinite utility” to the somewhat unfortunate “soft minds.”

Among the members of our first audience, students of the inns and lawyers more generally are particular targets. John Hoskins composed Directions in Speech and Style (ca. 1601) and annotated the Arcadia as a companion volume for the benefit of a pupil who has left university early for training in the law. Abraham Fraunce’s Lawiers Logike sets out to reconcile university learning with legal practice. Lawyers familiar with the practice of law but not the art of logic, he suggests, “like good Catholikes and modest minded men, beleued as the Church beleued, but why the church beleued so, it neuer came within the compasse of their cogitation.” By instructing these men in logic, Fraunce sets out to reorient the course of this “compasse.” Addressing a detractor who might argue that university learning is altogether “easie, elegant, conceipted, nice and delicate” and therefore strange to the law’s utilitarian needs, Fraunce responds that this detractor must not have seen enough of the university: “Surely sire, by your patience be it spoken, it seemeth you came abruptly from a countrey schoole to an Inne of court, or els riding poast towards London, you chaunged horse at the Vniversitie, and coming thither late in the euening, saw nothing but by candell light.” These methodless lawyers, “much like the swarming rabble of our coystrell curates” are in danger of leaving university “hauing once knowen the price of Admission, Salting, and Matriculation, with
the intertayning of Freshmenne in the Rhetorike schooles,” only to return home with their “six French wordes” with which they tease “ignoraunt men” and “dashe their poore neighboures children quyte out of countenance.”

This first audience – those who use vernacular treatises in conjunction with their classical education – did not spend enough time at university. We might think of them, then, as the poorly disciplined whose errancies constitute a critique of the university’s temporal “spatia” or “precincts.”

The second audience on our spectrum constitutes a critique of the university’s physical “spatia” or “precincts”: this audience is composed of those who have hitherto been unable to access any of the arts. This group admits of variations in natural talent but is uniformly “unlearned.” Thus, in his *English Secretoire* (1599), Angel Day admits students “who (being unlearned and hauing a pretie conceit of inuention of themselues) haue heretofor unknowing done weyll.” He also admits the “ignorant” whose natural “reach hath not been so ample.” By following Day’s explication of the “partiuclar natures and qualities” of the figures, the naturally talented might “see how with skill and discretion hereafter pursue the same” while the untalented might “be thereby informed what unto well doing is most consonant and agreeing.”

By catering to this excluded audience, England is playing catch-up with its continental predecessors who have already translated the arts into the vernacular and, as Thomas Wilson describes in his *Rule of Reason* (1551), “for furtherance of knowledge, not suffred any of the Sciences liberall, to be hidden in the Greeke, or Latine tongue, but have with moste earnest travail made every one of them familiar to their vulgare people.”

This is a defense of the English vernacular as equal among continental vernaculars but it is also a defense of English “wittes,” “the capcitee of my countrey men.” In his *Artes of Logike and Rhetorike*
Dudley Fenner suggests that the arts were originally written in Greek and Latin, not to confine the knowledge therein but because these languages were “the fittest to be made the storehouse of the worlde for these commodities”:

A storehouse, I say, not to keepe them for the Romanes and the grecians alone, or for the expert in these toungs they free denizons: but at least that by their trafficke, it might… become common to euery particular nation, that euerie one who had neede, might buie of the same. Wherefore seeing the ende was with their gaine the commoditie of all, let them not still keepe in this corner, to make it rare & excesssively deere, lest the people curse them… Let them take heede also of open injustice, for seeing the common vse and practise of all men in generall, both in reasoning to the purpose, and in speaking with some grace and elegancie, hath sowen the seede of these artes, why should not all reape, where all haue sowen?47

In a similar vein, Abraham Fraunce’s defense of the popularization of logic reaches a rhetorical pitch with, “Coblers bee men, why therefore not Logicians? And Carters haue reason, why therefore not Logike?” Those who would “locke vp Logike in secrete corners” must recognize that “as of her selfe, she is generally good to all, so will shee particularly bee bound to none.”48 Leonard Cox goes even further in his defense of rhetoric in the vernacular: “the more comon it is, the better it is.”49 Thus, in catering to this second audience, these vernacular treatises set out “to fede anf satisfie the thirst and desire of suche Englishe men, as for defaute of the saide tongues [Greeke and Latin], could otherwise not come to the knowledge of Logique.”50 The title page to the first edition of Day’s English Secretoire boasts “a Path-waye so apt and plaine and easie, to any learners capacity.” Anthony Wotton’s Art of Logick (1626) likewise describes itself as “a short exposition of praecepts, by which any one of indifferent capacitie, may with a little paines, ataine to some competent knowledge and vse of that noble and necessary science” and declares itself published expressly for the “vnlearned.”51
In so far as these treatises imagine and shape their instruction in the arts of rhetoric and dialectic in relation to the second audience of cartmen and cobblers, they do not participate in quite the same “pragmatism” with which we have generally accredited vernacular humanism. According to our current understanding of humanist pragmatism, rhetorical training and display are always conceived of in terms of a telos of persuasion: courtier, ambassador, and diplomat (real, would be, personas and modes) engage with rhetoric as a means of convincing and controlling another party. By contrast, the pragmatism envisioned by these treatises imagines a kind of quotidian utility – the piecemeal, aggregative, fashioning of thinking and of speaking. This quotidian pragmatism understands arguments of thinking and figures of speaking as Erasmus understood vernacular translations of scripture: they are the components of a “daily conversation” which conversation, in turn, shapes the speaker, “for almost all of us are as our daily conversation forms us.” Rather than preparing the student to persuade another of a right course of action, quotidian pragmatism takes the transformational dimension of rhetoric and turns it back on the speaker. Student and composition engage in the reciprocal formation of one another. In a certain sense, the transitive dynamic remains within quotidian pragmatism but the second party is eliminated. By producing discourse within the parameters of right use established by the vernacular treatise, the student remakes himself in accordance with these parameters as well as the ideological assumptions upon which they rest. This, in any case, is the fantasy of quotidian pragmatism.

By translating the classical arts into the vernacular, these treatises imagine that they might reach an audience for which training in rhetoric and dialectic has been hitherto
inaccessible. Both the translation of these arts and the direct appeal to this new audience are contingent upon maintaining the proper end toward which discursive composition might work. In the case of these new students, that end appears less as the traditional goal of persuasion and more as the formation of a student who thinks and speaks within the set of parameters provided by the vernacular treatise. Thus, the stakes of pedagogical failure shift in the quotidian dimension of humanist pragmatism. Improper use of rhetoric results, not in a failure to persuade another mind of your ideas but rather, in the steady transformation of the student into a mind that operates outside of a given treatise’s regulations of the arts as well as the political, social, and ethical norms according to which these regulations were codified. In their anxiety to regulate the arts of speaking and of thinking, these treatises also provoke the specter of their own failure. For the Ramists, this failure collapses the disciplinary separation their reforms are built to maintain and results in the conflation of two activities in the minds of their “unlearned” students. The distinction between these two activities served as the Ramist’s primary disciplinary wedge: thinking and speaking.

II.

The Ramists attempted to institutionalize a separation between thinking and speaking by redefining and reinforcing the boundaries between the university arts of dialectic and rhetoric. By stripping rhetoric of its first two canons – invention (the places in which arguments are found) and judgment (the activity of arranging these arguments) – and by reserving these canons for dialectic, the Ramists attempt to reorient dialectic away from its classical status as an art of discourse and toward that of a demonstrative science. With this reorientation, the object of dialectic’s investigation
shifts as does the kinds of claims its makes about the kind of knowledge it might produce. Dialectic becomes invested in not only what is probable but also what is true. Substituting “reason” for “discourse,” the reformed dialectic imagines itself as facilitating the sort of thinking that occurs in the silent, meditative mind rather than within dialogic exchange and this idealization of the meditative mind entails, in turn, a resistance to the temporality which marks some knowledge as contingent. As a result, the reduced rhetoric becomes marginalized as a discipline. Rhetoric’s attachment to language and its insistent aurality render the discipline secondary to the operations of dialectic. The very determination, however, with which reformers assert rhetoric’s supplementary status is itself revealing. That an individual might reason from the figures of an art deemed superfluous constitutes a threat to the methodization of thought central to the Ramist reforms. As a decidedly discursive art, rhetoric carries the potential to pervert the operations of dialectic by wresting thinking – and the mind itself – back into the temporality of speaking. The specter of this conflation – made visible and even courted by the act of separation itself – threatens to subject thinking to speaking and, this section will suggest, to the temporal contingencies that Ramism is built to guard against.

The primary pedagogical impetus behind the Ramist reforms was a sense that an unnecessary overlap of material among the trivium – grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic – had become an obstruction to instruction in those arts. Especially obstructive if the people you were instructing were young boys. At its most ambitious, the Ramist reforms imply that redrafting the disciplinary borders of the humanist curricula involves creating a more accurate representation of the mind itself – an image of how it works. By insisting that the reformed curriculum is a representation of the mind and of natural
reason, this curriculum thus stakes a claim to a kind of mental mimesis. The redrafting of disciplinary borders also offers a corrective to the conventional though perverted representation of the mind – the current distribution of the arts that is really an image (as the Ramists would have it) of how the mind ought not to work.

The process of redistributing what belongs (and what does not belong) to the individual arts operates, however, on a more local level. This process of redistribution proceeds by identifying the differences between the arguments that structure one’s thinking and the figures that structure one’s speaking. In his lecture to Cambridge, Harvey described the polemic of this redistribution as an epiphany, as the realization that one ought to imitate an oration’s learned “causes” rather than its verbal “effects,” its “genesis” in the mind rather than its “consummation” in speech. This realization is the pivot around which his conversion turned. The process of distinguishing arguments from figures, however, comes into tension with the Ramists’ simultaneous desire to define dialectic as the “art of arts” that might be discerned everywhere and in everything. This claim seems to have assumed, as its test case, the presence of logic in poetry (a primary site of schoolroom engagement with rhetoric’s figures). In order to enact this separation between thinking and speaking, Ramists are also forced to engage with the similarities between arguments of logic and figures of speech. Individually, these similarities point to an overlap between specific arguments of thinking and figures of speaking. Collectively, they suggest what undisciplined thinking and speaking sounded like when the pedagogy of quotidian pragmatism failed and the student, deferring from the treatise’s parameters of right use, also threatened the social hierarchy they were built to maintain. I call the products of these spectral, undisciplined minds “indecorous
The conceptual distinction between thinking and speaking is both fundamental and inconsistently deployed within the classical trivium. On the most basic level, thinking and speaking can be distinguished by the objects they assume—res and verbum—but this distinction also extends to the organs upon which they are said to operate—the mind and the ear. In classical rhetoric, this difference is the basis of the loose conceptual and categorical distinction between figures of thought ("mentis vel sensus vel sentiarum") and figures of sound ("verborum vel dictionis vel elocutionis vel sermonis vel orationis"). In his Arte of English Poesie (1589), George Puttenham will english this distinction by dividing “sensable figures” from “auricular figures.” The first “alter and affect the minde” while the second “worke alteration in th’eare.” I call this conceptual distinction “loose” because Quintilian begins his discussion of figures with an account of their similarity to—and some would say identity with—tropes; likewise, he concludes his account of figures of speech with the concession that they often resemble figures of thought. Dubitatio (or rhetorical deliberation), for example, is a figure of thought when the speaker hesitates with respect to a thing, a figure of speech when he hesitates with respect to a word. Correctio (or a parenthetical amendment) is a figure of thought when the speaker amends a thing, a figure of speech when his word choice. Ironia (or, saying one thing and meaning the other) is sometimes a trope. Ironia is also sometimes a figure. For Quintilian, it doesn’t matter what you call ironia or correctio or dubitatio—trope or figure, figure of thought or figure of speech—so long as you know its value and can anticipate its effects. Correctio, dubitatio, and ironia will remain the same regardless
of their classification; the “scrupulosam disputationem” to which the category of figura has given rise has nothing to do with Quintilian’s understanding of a figure’s use.  

“Debates” about categories are, Quintilian suggests, “too nice.”

The same is not true for Quintilian’s sixteenth-century successors. In fact, the shifting nature of these categorical walls opens rhetoric’s entire foundation up to the critique of Ramist restructuring. In classical rhetoric, the conceptual distinction between figures of thought and figures of speech was predicated upon the assumption that –as an art – rhetoric could provide the rules that govern both activities. If persuasion is your end, the techne that gets you there might draw on a large arsenal – from the discovery of arguments to the ornamenting of language. Classical rhetoric’s distinction between figures of thought and figures of speech reproduced in small the larger canonical division between invention (the places in which thinking originates) and eloquence (the figures by which this thinking might be spoken). When the Ramists strip rhetoric of the canons of invention and judgment and reduce it to the canons of eloquence and pronunciation, the distinction between figures of thought and figures of speech gives way entirely to a new principle of division. There is no such thing as a “figure of thought” (thinking does not happen in eloquence with figures): “a figure is either in the word, or in the sentence.” The category of figures only distinguishes verbum from verba or word from words; the distinction is quantitative rather than qualitative; a word sounds pleasantly on its own or by way of its affiliation with the words that surround it. By relegating rhetoric’s domain to speaking and offering it only a quantitative principle for its internal organization, the Ramists deprive rhetoric of its classical end (persuasion) and transform Quintilian’s loose conceptual distinction into the point of disciplinary separation.
reformed rhetoric thus becomes that it conform to the mimetic telos posited by dialectic’s claim to represent man’s mind and its natural reason.

The redistribution of the classical canons was a land grab with a pedagogical motive. Students, Ramism insisted, could not learn how to use a structure – be it a syllogism (three-part instrument of deductive reasoning) or paronomasia (the pun) – without knowing whether it dealt in logical or (merely) aural connections. Merely suggests the polemic of this redistribution. Reduced to eloquence and pronunciation, rhetoric becomes supplemental. In the lectures of Rhetor (1577), Gabriel Harvey ventriloqizes “Eloquentia” as she marks the boundaries of her “estate” and returns, to Dialectic, the land most inconveniently bestowed upon her:

Why do you go about expanding beyond the already determined boundaries and limits of my estate? Why, upon your own judgment, do you enlarge my manor which I have always wished to be built more charming, lovely, and beautiful than wide and enormous?... Why do you affix the sea, the lands, the air, the sky, all things to me who is contented with my kingdom – not large, indeed, but glittering and most brilliant? Why do you annex those under my rule and speech to whom I am myself indebted and wish to try and please? Eloquentia mourns the integrity of her pre-Aristotelian boundaries. The dissolution of these perimeters becomes a figure for uncontrollable speech that digresses (euagari), dilates (dialatas), and amplifies (ampla) beyond intelligible parameters. As she combines the sinews of thinking with the glitters of speaking, the dilated Eloquentia becomes a version of the hic mulier: enormous in size, wide across the chest, broad in the shoulders (57). The act of subjecting thinking to speaking – the organization of res by way of the schematic prioritization of verba – threatens to undermine the evaluative polemic of other conceptual distinctions – like that of gender. Given too much land, Eloquentia grows manly. She looks to scale back on her holdings and pay back her debts
with grateful subordination. Harvey suggests that maintaining the proper orientation - activity relative to passivity, ruler relative to subject - is fundamental to the organization of “estates.” *Eloquentia* does not simply renounce her “rule” but offers her speech up as “subject” to dialectic.

The first “rhetorical” annotation in Edmund Spenser’s *Shepheardes Calender* will serve to demonstrate what is at stake in putting *Eloquentia* in her place and keeping her out of logical places. Whether these often obfuscating glosses were composed by Harvey, Spenser, a Cambridge associate or, most probably, by some form of collaboration, those notes that point out the poet’s use of a particular figure or trope incorporate Spenser’s poetic practices into the liminal pedagogical space characteristic of the *Ciceronianus*. The annotations that E.K. calls the *Calender’s* “scholion” are a schoolroom “set in type.” Harvey’s lectures in rhetoric were not two years old when the *Calender* comes out in 1579 and one gloss praises Harvey for his skill in “Rhetorike and other choyce learning.” Citing a poem entitled “Rameidos” as among his accomplishments, this gloss suggests that Harvey’s works on rhetoric and Ramus are among those texts whose cumulative affiliation pronounces the *Calender’s* status as that of an “instant classic.” In those lectures, Harvey encouraged his students to make note in their readings and reproduce in their speech a long list of rhetorical figures including “correctio” and “adnominatio” (the pun). In the first rhetorical gloss to the *Calender*, these figures appear under their Greek names:

[61] I love) a prety Epanorthosis in these two verses, and withall a Paranomasia or playing with the word, where he sayth (I love thilke lasse (alas etc. This rhetorical note suggests how Harvey’s students might have pilfered the *Calender* for *exempla* and recorded the poem’s lines in their rhetorical commonplace books. To what
kind of work might these rhetorical figures be put? And, to what kind of work might these figures not be put?

E.K.’s englishing of the rhetorical term, “Paranomasia” as “a playing with the word” restricts the range of this figure’s work under the guise of translation. The fluid substitution implied by the conjunction that introduces his translation – “withall a Paranomasia or playing with the word” – excludes those definitions of paronomasia that saw it overlapping with the logical place of invention notation (argument from etymology). Arguments drawn from notation trace the etymology of a word and describe one word’s derivation from another as a logical relation: cause and effect, subject and adjunct etc. By interpreting a word, the logical place of notation offers the “true reason of the word, how it commeth to signifie this, or that.” Thus, if one were to drag the Calendar’s lines through the logical place of notation, she would come up with something like this: “lasse” is so named because she is the cause of speaking “alas;” or, conversely, “alas” is so named because it is the effect of a “lasse.” This argument is not brilliant but neither the thinking it models nor the thought it produces is unfamiliar. Where notation overlaps with paronomasia, it asserts a logical connection by assuming that aural relations are meaningful.

While Peter Ramus and many of his translators maintain notation as a logical place, they admit that it is not always “skillfully” done because there is not always a “reason” with which one might describe the relationship between two words. Both Abraham Fraunze and Dudley Fenner, however, exclude notation from their Ramistic adaptations and they do so on two grounds. First, because each relationship belonging to the place of notation might be described according to another logical place (e.g. cause or
effect), there is no reason to give the argument its own place within invention. There “is
neither reason, nor newe force of reason” in notation and within the reformed dialectic
there is no room for the redundancy of an old “force of reason” let alone an argument
without any reason at all.87 Fraunce and Fenner maintain, however, that a causal
relationship does not describe everything belonging to the place of notation. “But is
there nothing else?” Dudley Fenner asks and he answers, “Yes.”88 We ask, what is this
something else? A Ramist asks, to which university discipline does this something else
belong?

Both Fraunce and Fenner determine that this something else belongs to rhetoric
and this is the second ground for notation’s dismissal from logical invention. What is left
unexplained by a causal relation is “the pretty and conceipted chaung of the woord” or
an “elegant uttering.”89 What is left is the excess to which E.K.’s own etcetera points:
“where he sayth (I love thilke lasse (alas etc.” The structure of thinking that is, for
Ramus as for Cicero and Quintilian, an argument from notation is, for Fraunce, the pun
that he calls a “Rhetoricall agnomination.”90 For Fenner, the figure is only “the elegancie
of the Trope called Paranomasia.”91 Because notation’s unique properties define it as a
rhetorical figure, Fraunce does not believe a discussion of notation belongs in his Logic.
And yet, he hesitates to depart so radically from his model. Fraunce finds a middle
ground by relegating the place of notation to secondary discourse: he will “giue them
leaue for a time to soiourne among the annotations” of his treatise, but he “dare not admit
them into the text.”92 He oscillates again: “yet not fully resolued héerein, I leaue them in
these Annotations.”93 Fenner goes further. He banishes discussion of notation entirely
from his discussion of invention and sends it back to Eloquentia’s hearth: “Wherefore let
vs keepe them no longer, nowe the honour claymeth them, but according to the lawe
turne them home agayne." If Fraunce’s dismissal appears more playful, limiting the
place of *notation* to the “annotations” of his treatise, Fenner’s dismissal is absolute. The
language of return disguises a kind of rhetorical xenophobia under the rule of justice and
the letter of its law: keep *notation* “no longer” within dialectic. Send the stranger back to
his native land (rhetoric).

Distinguishing between the logical place of *notation* and the rhetorical figure
*paronomasia* is not simply locating synonyms from within the separate lexicons of
dialectic and rhetoric. By turning notation “home agayne” both Fraunce and Fenner
suggest that the something “else” of “lasse, (alas” is a structure with which one might
speak but with which one ought not to think. By englishing “paronomasia” as a “playing
with the word,” E.K.’s note relegates “lasse (alas” to the figures of speech that delight the
ear alone – with “elegant uttering” or “pretty and conceipted chaunge.” By contrast,
other critics – classical, early modern, modern – have spent a good deal of time
developing theories of *paronomasia*’s “etc.” My point is not that Fraunce or Fenner is
arguing directly against Hermogones or the Neoplatonists. Rather, they engage with
*paronomasia*’s “etc.” at a level of abstraction. As a place of logic, *notation* threatens to
confound the separation of thinking from speaking by suggesting that one might think
with a figure of speech. By describing *notation*’s distinguishing feature as aural excess,
by turning it “home agayne,” these pedagogues both ward against and produce as
imminent the sort of mind that might think with this something “else.”

At its most explicit, the Ramistic separation of speaking from thinking treats
rhetorical figures as a particular subdivision of logical fallacies. In this case, the
something “else” of “lasse, (alas)” becomes a category unto itself. As with notation, Fraunce “reserued” his discussion of fallacies to “these annotations” rather “then thrusted them in among precepts” for fear he should “iniury the art by ioyning sophisticall fallacians with Logicall institutions.” Fraunce calls this rhetorical subdivision “fallacions in the woord” and he divides them according to a quantitative principle – *verbum* from *verba*, the “simple” from the “coniunction.” This is the same quantitative principle that the Ramists used to replace the classical distinction between figures of thought and figures of speech in rhetoric. These “fallacians” are not merely mistakes in reasoning but “counterfeit reasons” through which a speaker deceives his auditor by capitalizing upon “ambiguitie.” And this deceit need not be purposive. These “counterfeit reasons” might simply proceed from the faulty thinking of an undisciplined mind. They are no less threatening to dialectic, “the art of arts,” however, for their unmotivated origins.

As “counterfeit reasons,” the category of rhetorical fallacies comes to designate not an illogical turn in a system of otherwise right reasoning but rather, an alternative system of thinking. There are no wrong turns within Ramistic logic because violations of the art operate outside of the art itself. The alternative system or art of thinking suggested by the category of fallacies mistakes supplement for constitutive structure; this counterfeit art presents as proof of thinking what the Ramists maintained was only an ornament of speaking. Fraunce’s depiction of “counterfeit reasons” proceeding from “fallacions in the woord” is singular in so far as it treats this alternative system of thinking as a coherent if counterfeit *ars*. This *ars* is marginalized, to be sure, but it is not entirely banned from a treatment of logic. More often – and especially among those
treatises which do not explicitly align themselves with Ramism – this alternative, counterfeit art of thinking only emerges in warnings against the improper use of an individual argument or figure. At this other extreme, at the least explicit, the comments are fashioned as off hand. Individually, these comments could – almost and at times – go unsaid (but are, nonetheless, said).

Taken together, the kind of thinking these comments ward against is representative of the indecorous mind. In the Garden of Eloquence, Henry Peacham warns that because of its “light and illuding forme,” *paronomasia* “ought to be sparingly vsed, especially in graue and weightie causes.” “As the use ought to be rare,” Peacham continues, “so the allusion ought not to be tumbled out at adventure.” In his *Rule of Reason*, Thomas Wilson warns against the use of homonyms in the construction of a syllogism. In his *Directions for Speech and Style*, John Hoskins suggests that agnomination is “pretty to play with among gentlewomen” but “otherwise it will best become the tuftaffeta orators to skip up and down the neighborhood of these words that differ more in sense than in sound, tending nearer to meter than to matter.” This figure is not “true rhetoric” though preferred by the masses. Its popularity is, in fact, a sign of its unthinking: “And of a truth, if the times gives itself too much to any one flourish, it makes it a toy and bars a learned man's writings from it, lest it seem to come more of the general humor than the private judgment.” Thus, Sidney “would not have his style be much beholding to this kind of garnish” and John Lyly, who first thrust the fad of this figure upon us all, “hath outlived this style and breaks well from it.” Neither Peacham nor Wilson nor Hoskins was a Ramist as Fraunce and Fenner surely were. And yet, in their denigration of *paronomasia* as “light” and inappropriate for “weightie causes,” in
their resistance to the incidental causality of “adventure,” in their opposition between “sense” and “sound,” “meter and matter,” we hear the same polemic around which the Ramists rallied. Speaking is not only distinct from thinking, it has the capacity to pervert the mind and the man in which that mind resides.

In these cautions and warnings, we hear classical rhetoric’s conceptual distinction between speaking and thinking flirting with the Ramistic polemic of categorical separation. This is not simply a difference in degree. The Ramists are not more faithful to the premises upon which classical discussions of rhetoric and dialectic proceed (though their critiques advertise as this kind of apostolic recursion). According to the conceptual distinction of classical rhetoric, the division between thinking and speaking constitutes a provisional organization of material. This conceptual distinction allows for the arrangement of material in the mind and, more importantly, in the pedagogical text: it allows for the intelligibility of difference and thus, proposes distinctions according to which a discussion of rhetoric might proceed.103 As we have seen in the case of Quintilian, this point of departure does not delimit instruction in the use of an individual structure. A detailed explication of the possible uses of a single structure – of correctio, of dubitatio, of ironia – trumps the conceptual distinction that shuffled that structure into a given category. By contrast, categorical separation is a representational strategy. In so far as it characterizes thinking and speaking as separate and potentially conflicting activities, the newly defined boundaries between the “estates” of dialectic and rhetoric claim to represent the organization of material as it is. The Ramists disguise the ideological work of their reforms – how the disciplines ought to be organized – by insisting that this reformed curricula is a kind of mirror for the mind of man. Thus, they
naturalize the polemic of their reorganization. If not an explicitly essentialist doctrine, the Ramistic separation is nonetheless an essentializing organization.

The indecorous mind’s speech – John Hoskin’s calls it “disordered speech” – sounds in defiance of the cultural, linguistic, and moralizing standards of decorum.104 “Disordered speech” is significant for both the mind it represents and the threat this representation poses to the world in which it sounds. With respect to its status as representation, indecorous speech suggests that the mind from which it proceeds is not in harmony with the world around it: “Yet cannot his mind be thought in tune whose words do jar, nor his reason in frame whose sentences are preposterous.”105 This mind suffers from the poor instruction and education that inhibits – as Plato would have it – the cosmic regularization of motion within man’s soul. At birth, this soul moves “without rhyme or reason, sometimes in the opposite direction, sometimes sideways and sometimes upside down” until, by way of education, “the soul’s orbits regain their composure, resume their proper course, and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time.” Failing to regain his composure, man will “limp his way through life.”106 The indecorous mind, out of “tune,” fails to conform to these regularizing revolutions. It fails to recover its course. With respect to the threat of its representation, indecorous speech is “not so much injury to the lips which give it forth or the thoughts which put it forth” – neither lips nor thoughts are on the receiving end – as it is injury “to the right proportion and coherence of things in themselves, so wrongfully expressed.” “The order of Gods creatures” is itself “eloquent” and indecorous thinking undermines divine proportion; indecorous speech threatens to reorganize the world of things in its image.107 With respect to the art of dialectic – which the Ramists claim to be a kind of imago mentis –
the counterfeit art is a perversion and interactions between the proper art and its
counterfeit – interactions within, for example, the body of Fraunce’s treatise – may lead
the one to give “injury” to the other.\textsuperscript{108} By separating this counterfeit art from the
precepts of the proper, however, Fraunce lends indecorous thinking its own pedagogical
space. The annotations in which counterfeit reasoning abides become another kind of
scholium. As with \textit{Eloquentia}, Fraunce’s annotations are a pedagogical space that the
counterfeit art might exceed.

As the product of a counterfeit art, indecorous thinking gives us an idea of what
Philip Sidney’s subjunctive – the could, the might, or the should of poetic domain–
suppresses.\textsuperscript{109} More specifically, indecorous thinking outlines what the Ramists mobilize
Sidney’s subjunctive in order to suppress. According to the Ramists, those things which
the poet makes – Cyrus, for example – belong primarily to the domain of ethics; the
processes by which he makes them, however, the relations through which he constructs
the parameters of the could-might-should (what Sidney calls, the “zodiac of his own
wit,”) belong to “dialectical invention.”\textsuperscript{110} “When Aristotle… defines poetry as fiction-
making,” William Temple suggests, “he puts poetry, as it were, in the house of logical
invention.”\textsuperscript{111} According to Temple, “the invention of something that does not yet exist,”
– and by this “yet” Temple both distinguishes the invention of fiction-making from the
historian’s indicative and marks the domain of probability – is a specifically dialectical
invention.\textsuperscript{112} “Whatsoever it bée,” Abraham Fraunce begins before correcting himself,
“nay whatsoever thou canst imagine to bée, although it bée not, neuer was, nor neuer
shall bée, yet by reason it is inuented, taught, ordered, confirmed.”\textsuperscript{113} The alternative
system of thinking constructed from “counterfeit reasons” wanders outside of invention’s reign and marks the parameters of a zodiac out-of-tune.

III.

The vernacular treatises in rhetoric and dialectic facilitated the education of social groups previously excluded from humanist education. In the least, they thought they might – and this ambition was enough to provoke the specter of miseducating these social groups. The threat of miseducation extended beyond the student’s own learning and the discourse he might produce out of this learning – be it epistle or oration, from the pulpit or from a poet. By mistaking supplement for constitutive structure, by presenting a figure of speaking as if it were proof rather than ornament, the indecorous mind thinks within a counterfeit art that challenges the reformed curricula’s claim to represent the organization of material as it is. If indecorous thinking operates within a zodiac out-of-tune, it also exposes a gap between the reformed curricula’s representation of the mind and the “natural” operations it claims as the objects of this representation. In this section, I would like to examine the pedagogical forms with which the vernacular treatise attempted to ward against indecorous thinking. I will focus on three of the most pervasive of these pedagogical forms – the taxonomy, the exemplum, and the caveat. I will suggest that their collective appearance in a given treatise constituted a kind of generic affiliation. My primary object in identifying these pedagogical forms as the characteristics of a particular genre of the educational manual is to suggest that they both derive from and have a share in maintaining a narrative paradigm of production. That is, these pedagogical forms do not merely present the arts of speaking and of thinking, they narrate the relation between these two activities. By providing a narrative paradigm of
production, these pedagogical forms posit a telos to the student’s discursive composition and this telos, in turn, serves to circumscribe the potential vagrancies of indecorous thinking. Collectively, the taxonomy, the exemplum, and the caveat construct a narrative paradigm of production in an effort to limit the uses to which arguments and figures might be put. If the specter of abuse imagines a scene in which discourse wanders out of proportion, these pedagogical forms attempt to compass that wandering by drafting the boundaries of probable expression and maintaining that these boundaries are representations rather than inventions, natural rather than art.

In order to follow this narrative paradigm of production, we will focus on the instruction provided for a single figure: gradatio, or the climax (a figure whereby the last word of one clause is repeated as the first word of the next clause, over a succession of clauses). The most famous example of this figure from the sixteenth century must be that in the opening lines of Sidney’s Astrophi and Stella. In these lines, Astrophil outlines his plans for ingratiation: “Pleasure might cause her read, reading might make her know, / Knowledge might pittie winne, and pity grace obtaine” (1.3-4).¹¹⁴ Gradatio will serve as paradigmatic example to those structures which threatened to conflate the pedagogical separation between speaking and thinking because – much like paronomasia – gradatio overlapped first, with the place of invention known as incrementum and second, with the logical argument known as the sorites (a chain of reasoning whereby one effect is also the cause of a subsequent effect, over a succession of causations).¹¹⁵ Thus, where the arguments of dialectic establish proof and the figures of rhetoric act as ornament, the disciplinary difference between incrementum and the sorites (on the one hand) and gradatio (on the other) is the difference between the discovery and arrangement of
causation and the mere repetition of words. In his famous attack on the *Institutes* (with which this chapter began), Ramus ridiculed Quintilian for including *incrementum* among the places of invention (just as Fraunce and Fenner dismiss *notation*) and he suggests that Quintilian’s got *gradatio* all wrong. Some Ramists allow for *gradatio* in an oration as a kind of concession to its common appearance. Others are more wary. Thomas Blundeville warns that *gradatio* “is much like to Sorites” except that rhetoricians “use it rather as ornament of speech, than as proofe.” To use *gradatio* as “proofe” – to demonstrate proof but also, to think through and arrive at proof – is distinct from the form’s deployment as a figure of speech. The very fact that these pedagogues had to maintain the difference between *gradatio* and *sorites* is an indication of the form’s versatility. Eventually, *gradatio* (rather quietly) begins to disappear from Ramistic rhetorical treatises. In this section, I will chart how our pedagogical spaces “set-in-type” responded to the potential threat of *gradatio* by providing it with a narrative paradigm of production, any deferrals from which constituted indecorous thinking.

Out first pedagogical form, the taxonomy, represents rhetoric and dialectic as fixed arts, the constitutive pieces of which do not adapt to and are not subject to temporal contingencies. Thus, the taxonomy represents the mind fluent in these arts as an essentially synchronic landscape akin to the commonplace-book or the curiosity cabinet in which arguments and figures hang, suspended. The dichotomizing diagrams for which Ramism became so (in)famous in England provide the quintessential example of such a landscape. Such a diagram renders *gradatio* an object of knowledge by suspending the figure within a set of fixed relations to other figures. Thus *gradatio* belongs alongside *anadyplosis* within a category entitled “continued in divers sentence” as
opposed to “continued to the end of the same sentence.” Sounds that are “continued” are distinct from those “broken of” but both belong, in turn, within a category of “lyke sound” as opposed to “unlyke sounde.” Both the like and the unlike fall under the category of the “repetition of soundes” (as opposed to “the measure of soundes”). Both “repetition” and “measure” belong in a category entitled “the garnishing of speache in wordes” as opposed to “in sentence.” The “garnishing of speache” is a definition for “figure” which, in turn, belongs alongside “trope” (the “fine manner of words”) within the category, “garnishing of speache, called Eloquition.” Elocution is precisely half of all of rhetoric. The other half belongs to “Garnishing of the manner of vutterance, called Pronunciation.” This set of fixed relations is both the terrain that the discipline of rhetoric covers and a formal representation of the mind that has been properly instructed in that discipline. Thus, the taxonomy suggests that the defining characteristics of gradatio are the categories within which it might be related to other figures. The ambition, here, is to take the speaking out of thinking. The ambition is to preserve the operations of the mind from temporal contingency by suggesting that such a landscape constitutes a representation of the natural order of the mind itself.

The taxonomy would seem to present these structures as objects within a synchronic landscape, known primarily according to their spatial relation to other structures and the categories into which they fall. Thus, the taxonomy represents knowledge as a thing that stands apart from the process of its apprehension, something that exists independent of – and therefore can act as a guide to – the temporal condition of learning. Taxonomies also, however, project a diachronic existence for structures such as gradatio. According to the transformational objectives of quotidian pragmatism, the
taxonomy’s primary pedagogical purpose is to return these figures to time. Only there – in time – can they become the instruments of a daily effort to remake one’s self according to the parameters provided by the vernacular treatise. If the synchronic landscape objectifies figures or arguments, the ambition of quotidian pragmatism lends these objects the status of tools – available for use in time. Thus, arguments and figures accrue a kind of material reality. Erasmus imagined vernacular translations of scripture as temporally simultaneous with daily labor – “I would hope that the farmer might chant a holy text at his plow, the spinner sing it as she sits at her wheel, the traveler ease the tedium from his journey with tales from scripture.” The vernacular translations of the university arts go one step further. They reimagine the arts of speaking and thinking as if they were mechanical. Thus, Puttenham compares the pride of a poet to “a shomaker” pleased “to have made a cleanly shoe, or a Carpenter to haue buylt a faire house.” Where Erasmus understood spinning and scripture as simultaneous but separate activities, Fraunce turns the sorites itself into the spinner’s wheel. He likens the sorites to Penelope’s telam “because it is wouen, as it were, by ascending and affirming, but unwouen againe by descending and denying.” According to the diachronic projection of the taxonomy, knowledge is a thing made in time and therefore subject to the very temporal contingency against which the taxonomy’s synchronic landscape marks out its dichotomizing branches. These treatises worry that – in their most tangible materializations – the tools of dialectic and rhetoric might become interchangeable. They imagine the mind of the “unlearned” student to be that of a recalcitrant materialist, mistaking gradatio for sorites because both tools are similar in shape and size. The second pedagogical form of our
treatise, the example, serves to qualify use by supplying a telos to the narrative of production. Examples offer an ideal image of what a new text ought to resemble. In this sense, examples serve to circumscribe the future according to the parameters of the past: they, simultaneously, posit a textual past to a figure like gradatio and hold that past up as an image of the figure’s textual future. The ideal narrative of production is, in this sense, as circular as double translation. The projected text ought to model itself on and thus mark a return to the exemplary text. In his Arcadian Rhetorike, Abraham Fraunce provided the following example of gradatio. This example yields the cause and effect logic apparent in the opening lines of Astrophel and Stella in favor of the material arrangement of the fingers of an empty glove. Fraunce takes his example from one of the sillier scenes of the Old Arcadia in which, having been fortunate enough to get his hands on Pamela’s glove, Musidorus (aka Dorus) proceeds to harry a hymn out of it:

   Sweete gloue the sweete despoile of sweetest hand,
   Faire hand the fairest pledge of fairer hart,
   True heart whose truth doth yeeld to truest band,
   Chiefe band, I say, which ties my chiefest part,
   My chiefest part, wherein doo chiefly stand
   Those secrete ioyes, which heauens to me impart:
      Vnite in one, my state thus still to saue,
        You haue my thankes, let me your comfort haue.132

As an example of gradatio, Fraunce’s selection distinguishes its form from the argumentative sorites by surrendering the succession of cause and effect for what appears to be the thumbing of a glove: each step of the gradatio corresponds to a finger.133 As an ideal model for the kind of work gradatio ought to perform, this example draws a strong line between the figure and the argument. In the stead of causation, it offers the formal shape of an empty glove. As Dorus makes his way (let’s tap it out) from “gloue” to “hand” (thumb), “hand” to “hart” (forefinger), “hart” to “band “(middle), “band” to
“part” (ring), and “part” to “joys” (pinky), the material necessity of the glove (dictated by the number of fingers belonging to the human hand and their corporeal relation to one another) stands in for and legitimizes his loosely associative connections. Like the pilfered glove that dictates its transitions, gradatio – this example would insist – offers only ornament.

The exemplarity of this instance turns on the limitations within which it presents the figure. Gradatio, here, offers a form of succeeding repetitions, loosely associative rather than logically argumentative and thus this example maintains the disciplinary distinction between speaking and thinking. The obviousness of this instance of gradatio lends to its pedagogical utility. One might even say that this is a clumsy instance of gradatio but this clumsiness is precisely what provides for its exemplarity. As sung in the Old Arcadia, that clumsiness is not only manifest, it is the primary object of exhibition. In the Old Arcadia, the exemplarity of this figure – how it points back to the process of poetic production – acts as a gauge to the class positions into which the princes, Musidorus and Pyrochles, have fallen by taking on the personas of shepherd (Dorus) and woman (Cleophilia), respectively. Thus, when Cleophilia (jealous that Dorus should have something of his love’s) asks, “can you not joy sufficiently in your joys, but you must use your joys as if you would vauntingly march over your friend’s miseries?,” he treats Dorus like a vulgar maker who betrays the labor of his production (emphasis mine). Here, Dorus is the recalcitrant materialist who fails to produce a text untainted by the labor – and the temporality – of its production. By describing Dorus’s intention in his song as an attempt to “vauntingly march over” his friend, Cleophilia reminds the reader that gradatio literally means “the making of a staircase or a series of
steps.” Both classical and early modern pedagogues appealed to this image of the staircase in their teachings to supply a model of ascension for the figure’s essentially repetitive form. Dorus’s use of *gradatio* marks him as a faux shepherd. *Gradatio* is, as Hoskin’s writes, “too academickall” and therefore inappropriate to pastoral.\(^{136}\) Cleophilia suggests, however, that the clumsiness with which Dorus displays *gradatio* is also a sign of the class position into which he has fallen. Somewhat paradoxically, exemplarity becomes a mark of social descent because it demonstrates a failure to adhere to decorum, according to which the instruments of composition would not be legible as such.

Cleophilia’s sense that Dorus “would vauntingly march over” reconfigures her companion as not so much a fallen prince but an upstart shepherd. That *gradatio* might climb too high was among the primary concerns of our third pedagogical form – the cautions and caveats that these treatise’s employed to police the figure’s use. If the use of *gradatio* threatened to “vauntingly march over,” pedagogues such as Peacham added caveats “to compasse” the range of this figure “for fear of abuse.”\(^{137}\) Thus, in his rhetoric lectures, Harvey warned against “the inept” or indecorous “repetition of words and sounds” and thus, advised that his students use “*gradatione limita*” or a “*gradatio* enclosed within boundaries.”\(^{138}\) Even as Harvey introduces the figure to his students, it is as one already enclosed within a predetermined sense of proportion. Henry Peacham restricted the number of *gradatio*’s steps to well below the five fingers of a glove: “it consisteth oftentimes of fower degrees, but commonly of three.”\(^{139}\) As he counts the iterations of *gradatio*, Peacham asserts an acceptable hierarchy of valuation by instructing which words might be repeated and when:

> In using this figure we ought to obserue a meane, that there be not too many degrees and also to forsee that the degrees following may rather
increase then diminish in signification and lastly, that they so ascend that they may end with a clause of importance.\textsuperscript{140} In his caution, the observation of a “meane” and the schematic valuation work towards the end of closing the figure down. By limiting the operations of repetition to a predetermined hierarchy of values and by controlling the figure’s final clause, Peacham reasserts a \textit{telos} to a figure that threatened to climb too high and nowhere in particular.\textsuperscript{141} In the \textit{Old Arcadia}, Cleophilia marks Dorus’s praise of the glove as a gratuitous display, a quantitative departure from the bounds of due proportion; in Fraunce’s \textit{Arcadian Rhetorike}, the glove becomes a material means with which Fraunce can assert closure to \textit{gradatio}. Dorus cannot keep going with his \textit{gradatio}. The shape of the glove – dictated by the human hand which is determined by nature (but nowhere present in this scene) – provides the limits to how far \textit{gradatio} might go. The physical limitations of the glove stand in for a quantitative ideal of decorum. Fraunce’s example naturalizes this ideal by appealing to the glove’s material reality and the human hand that dictates this reality (but is conspicuously absent).

In the \textit{Old Arcadia}, Dorus’s undisciplined use of \textit{gradatio} to “vauntingly march over” decorous bounds exposes his own descent into indecorousness. “Who would have ever thought,” Cleophilia asks, “so good a schoolmaster as you were to me could for lack of living been driven to shepherdry?.”\textsuperscript{142} Cleophilia’s prod reminds us of Dorus’s former position of moral authority as his “schoolmaster” – a position from which Musidorus schooled Pyrochles for his transformation into an amazonian warrior. Cleophilia also asserts that her own transformation into an amazon is the real cause of Musidorus’s subsequent transformation into a shepherd. By suggesting that Musidorus became Dorus “for lack of a living,” Cleophilia suggests that it is not his love for Pamela that has
enforced his change in class position but rather that, in the absence of Pyrochles, Musidorus’s own position is less secure. Thus, the belabored use of *gradatio* becomes, paradoxically, both the mark of his shepherdry (it is indecorous) and the mark of the schoolmaster he once was (it is, as Hoskin’s suggested, an “academicall” figure). While the translation of the university arts into the vernacular extended the stakes of social mobility to a wider audience, these treatises also suggest that any use of rhetorical figures that defer from their narrative paradigm of production will be the surest sign of the class from which its students originated. Thus, having apparently shown men the path “from cart to schoole, and from thence to Court,” George Puttenham also suggests that his students are in danger of returning whence they came. He warns, “being now lately become a Courtier,” the student must “shew not himself a craftsmen, & merit to be disregarded, and with scorne sent back againe to the shop, or other place of his first facultye and calling.” When *gradatio* becomes legible as an instrument of artifice, as a tool with which one might “vauntingly march over,” that tool will, in turn, expose its wielder for the cartmen or shopkeeper that he is (was).

As “schoolmaster” to Pyrochles, Musidorus described the “alteration” of Pyrochles’s mind as straying from the “course” upon which it began. This instructive “course” is a *cursus* that encompasses all it values and thus, “finds no thing without it of so high a price for which it should be altered.” Musidorus described the center of this *cursus* as an “inward good” and the circumference as Pyrochles’s “countenance and behavior.” By “yielding” his outward actions “to the virutous resolutions of the mind” – or, virtuous *revolutions* of the mind – Pyrochles maintained a “right harmony.” Here, Musidorus offers an essentially static model of Pyrochles’s mind whereby the stability of
its center kept its circumference constant. Musidorus suggests that, by transforming into an amazon, Pyrochles is out-of-tune with the “right harmony” that set his “course.” Thus, he implores Pyrochles to “remember what you are, what you have been, or what you must be.” These are each potential correctives to Pyrochles’s deferral from his cursus but as Musidorus transitions from the indicative – “what you are, what you have been” – into the obligatory, “what you must be” – he invokes the very possibility of Pyrochles’s resistance. What Pyrochles “must be” does not necessarily imply what he “will be.” That slip from the present “are” to the present perfect progressive “have been” paved the way for this possibility. It wrestled that essentializing “are” into historical time and opened it up to contingency. Recognizing a gap between the moralizing of “must be” and the future indicative, Pyrochles steps outside his previous course. Pyrochles recognizes “the bounds of all those knowledges.” Because he can see the fabricated limits of Musidorus’s curriculum, he also suggests that as “these knowledges... are of good use, they are not all the mind may stretch itself unto.” His metamorphosis into an amazonian warrior shifts the center of Musidorus’s cursus by changing up the points along its circumference: “As for my name, it shall be Cleophilia, turning Philoclea to myself, as my mind is wholly turned and transformed into her.” Thus, says Musidorus, Pyrochles “subverts the course of nature”: the revolution of her (now rather than his) new cursus redefines its center, neither static nor stable.

When, in the later scene in which Dorus thumbs his glove, Cleophilia reminds Dorus of his former role as “schoolmaster,” he exposes his use of gradatio as indecorous – as a sign, simultaneously, of his new class position and the one from which he has fallen. By exposing Dorus’s use of gradatio as indecorous, he reminds him of the
instructive course – “the course of nature” – from which he too has deferred into indecorous proportions. Thus, Sidney suggests the form by which his princes wandered from their “resolutions” and outside of the revolutions of a social harmony. The majority of the students of Fraunce’s *Arcadian Rhetorike*, would not, however, have been able to track this example to its source. When Sidney’s romance hits the press, this song has been cut. Under revision, the glove spurs not indecorous verse but digressive narrative: the glove is now Philoclea’s, its theft leads us to a rival lover, and it spends a good deal of time in the mouth of a slobbering dog. Thus, Fraunce’s example serves two audience’s differently. For those to whom the textual past remained elusive, the materiality of the glove stood in for and legitimized the limits of linguistic probability, providing a natural end to a figure that tended to climb too high. For those to whom the *Old Arcadia* was familiar, the exemplarity of this passage would have been ironic. In the context of the *Old Arcadia*, this instance of *gradatio* was belabored – an instance in which the figure, taken too far, betrayed the labor of the maker and marked his class accordingly.

The example’s ideal – what a given instance of *gradatio* ought to resemble – poses as the mere representation of the figure’s natural range, thereby supplying a mimetic.telos to the vernacular treatise’s narrative of production. The caveat registers the pedagogical anxiety that a student’s own composition might depart from the example and, therefore, drive a wedge between the example’s idealized projection and the range of possibilities allowed for in nature (a range which the example claims to represent). Such a departure undermines the example’s status as representation by exposing its quiet conflation of what *gradatio* might do – how long it might continue, in which order it
might present its objects – with what *gradatio* should do. By insisting on a linguistic representation that conforms to the limits of what is probable, this mimetic ideal naturalizes its own moral parameters. To return to Sidney’s terms from the *Defence*, the mimetic ideal presents its understanding of what “should be” as mere adherence to the natural limitations of what “may be.” The moral imperative that reinforces the values of the prevailing social order appears to follow the natural limitations of probability. Thus, by positing a mimetic *telos* to its narrative paradigm of production, these pedagogical practices cast the success of a given composition – and thus, its ability to take the shopkeeper from shop to school, from school to court – as contingent upon effacing the very labor upon which such a transformation would depend. His composition must appear to proceed from nature rather than art. Thus, Puttenham allows for dissimulation in his students:

> only in the subtleties of his arte: that is, when he is most artificiall, so to disguise and cloake it as it may not appeare, *nor seeme to proceede from him by any studie or trade of rules*, but to be his naturall: not so euidently descried, as euery ladde that reades him shall say he is a good scholler, but will rather haue him to knowe his arte well, and little to vse it.  

The specificity with which the caveat attempts to disguise “studie” and “trade” backfires. The caveat’s essentially negative mode of presentation tends to tell its students what they ought not to do with a figure. The specificity with which it does so limns the anatomy of indecorous thinking.

IV.

Indecorous thinking, like Harvey’s figuration of *Eloquentia* herself, marks its departure from the mimetic *telos* under the pejorative intimation of “excess.” Accordingly, superfluity becomes a quantitative departure from an ideal of proportion and the indecorous thinking that exceeds this ideal displays the traces of its own laborious
production. Indecorous thinking is closely related to a vice listed by Puttenham among “deformities in speach and writing.” Puttenham translates periergia (Gk. peri, “exceedingly” and ergon “work”) as the “Ouer labourer” and suggests that its “surplusage lieth not so much in superfluitie of your words as your trauaile.” An excess of words are significant for the time they represent. “Ye ouer-labour your selfe,” he continues “in your businesse.” Peacham warned that “to many wordes and figures used” becomes the sign of “to much labor bestowed” and this labor, in turn, betrays a greater afffection for “figures” than for “truth,” a greater pride in “eloquence” than in “playnenesse.” Figures – for example paronomasia or gradatio – that depart from the mimetic telos reveal the temporality of production. As the markers of this time, they threaten to subvert the pedagogical prioritization of thinking over speaking and model forth a mind subject to the very temporality that the mimetic telos looks to elide.

“Decorum” or “discretion” or “decencie” or “aptnesse” ought to prevent this sort of excess. “Let Discretion,” Hoskins writes, “be the greatest and general figure of figures” The pedagogical form of the taxonomy lead teachers such as Puttentham to highlight decorum’s status as a figure and thus, as a tangible tool wielded in the production of a text: “the line & leuell for al good makers to do their busines by.” But Puttenham also moves quickly away from this materialism and insists on decorum’s more indescribable properties. Thus, Puttenham removes decorum from his taxonomy and insists that it is unteachable. He offers his discussion up, instead, as entertainment, “rather to solace your eares with pretie conceits... then for any purpose or institution of doctrine.” Our ears he suggest, need this play after the “long scholasticall precepts” that could teach the figures but not the principle of their governance. Decorum is the one
aspect of the art of rhetoric that cannot materialize as an object within the taxonomy. It is therefore not teachable within the vernacular treatise’s pedagogical approach. The judgment of decorum, as Derek Attridge has suggested – belongs to the already educated, the elite “learned” few; it belongs precisely to those who do not need to enter the schoolroom “set in type.”  

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that decorum presented something of a pedagogical paradox to these treatises’ narrative paradigm of production. On the one hand, decorum governed the mimetic telos by which these treatises hoped to limit the use of figures and their ability to wrest thinking into the temporality of speaking, a temporality that had come, increasingly, to be marked as mechanical. On the other hand, the very concept that could ensure the success of this narrative paradigm was also the final province of aristocratic learning (or of learning as aristocratic). Decorum thus had to govern the narrative of production without itself materializing as an object of knowledge that a vernacular art might transmit. In order to preserve the normative social scheme in which the popularization of learning and its attendant social mobility might be idealized (rather than feared), decorum had to remain fundamentally unteachable within the vernacular treatise’s pedagogical practices. As Barry Taylor has suggested, this paradox is unresolved. Because decorum is not teachable as such, the pedagogical forms of exemplum and caveat attempt to pick up the slack but instead seem only to increase in number. The endless iterations of cautions and caveats address texts by their piecemeal parts and threaten to overcome the very principle of proportion it is their ambition to maintain as the telos to all composition. They provide a sketch of the very thinking they look to exclude.
At the close of the sixteenth century, the tension between the idealized integrity of a composition which conforms to the mimetic telos and a composition which – deferring from this telos – reveals the traces of its own labor and accounts for the time spent in this labor, produced two competing modes of judgment under the single sign of “discretion.”

According to its first mode of judgment, discretion describes the rather ambiguous capacity a person has to judge the appropriateness of a work as a whole. It is similar, in this sense, to what Cicero described as the “subconscious instinct” (tacito sensu) by which man, without “art” and without “reason” is able to judge “what is right and wrong in matters of proportion.” According to this definition, discretion enabled the apprehension of a composition as a coherent whole – one which effaces the demarcations of its constitutive structures such that the likes of Dorus could not be accused of “vaunting.” It is in this sense that discretion is also a precondition for the apprehension of style in early modern England. “Stile is a constant and continual phrase or tenour of speaking and writing,” Putenham writes, “extending to the whole tale or processe of the poeme... and not properly to any peece or member.” To speak of a person’s style, a sense of conformity had to override one’s ability to distinguish the unique formal pieces that also served as his tools. The “procession” of the poem had to supplant the process by which it came to be. The perception of style was itself contingent upon both adhering to the bounds of decorous proportion and eliding the temporal labor behind its production.

According to the second mode of judgment, however, discretion also describes a person’s ability to distinguish difference. The discrete mind is thus able to separate one thing from another. Putenham writes that discretion “resteth in the discerning part of
the minde, so as he who can make the best and most differences of things by reasonable
and wittie distinction is to be the fittest judge or sentencer of [decencie].” According
to this second mode of judgment, the discrete mind recognized individual forms as pieces
distinct from one another. Discretion thus required that one be able to break any given
work into its constitutive pieces. Puttenham cast style as irreducible to any given piece.
Irreducible to any of its tools, style became an “image of man [mentus character] for man
is but his minde and as his minde is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and
language at large.” The consistency that made style perceptible thus became evidence of
the constancy of the mind of man through time. By contrast, if discretion allowed one to
reduce a text to its constitutive forms and to perceive the practices by which these forms
produced that text in time, then discretion could disrupt the illusion of an imago mentis.
Discretion might override and undo the illusion of a personal style. A composition thus
might become, not a representation of the mind of man as it exists across time, but an
index of the collective places and practices and temporalities of learning out of which it
emerged.

Discretion’s two competing modes of judgment need not outline mutually
exclusive definitions of the poem or the style which one can or cannot perceive. Rather,
discretion’s two modes of judgment suggest that the early modern reader read for and
wielded poetic figures within a dialectic between the temporality of poetic labor (toward
which the rhetorical figure like gradatio points and in which it participated) and the
abstraction of a mind that sought to steel itself against this temporality and the
contingency this temporality entailed. Thus, as a pivot between these two modes of
judgment, discretion suggests to us a way of reading early modern texts both within and
against humanist pedagogy (in school, out of school) as well as the political, social, and ethical norms that regulated this pedagogy. On the one hand, by reading a text for its discrete forms, we are able to identify these forms as units of composition embedded within histories of production. One the other hand, discretion’s insistence upon the text as a whole allows us to situate this assemblage of forms in relation to the narratives with which pedagogy sought to control these histories. By reading a text according to this set of parameters – the first, temporal and the second, representational – we can locate the indecorous thinking of a text, where it threatens to transform the mind into a contingent operation. A text’s indecorous thinking drives a wedge between the moral imperative of the mimetic *telos* and the domain of probability where the vagrant wanderings of excessive forms defer from pedagogy’s narratives of production.

One final illustration. When we encounter a form like that which structured Dorus’s song, we can read it as both *gradatio* and *sorites* even as we understand these readings to have a kind of antagonism with one another. John Hoskins understood *gradatio* as a figure that might “be turned to an argument” at which point it would transform into a *sorites*. Thus, he took the disciplinary antagonism between eloquence and argument characteristic of the Ramist reforms and attempted to resolve it within a metamorphic aesthetic where *gradatio* could become *sorites*. The polemical subordination of eloquence to argument underwrites this narrative of metamorphosis. Hoskins’s characterization of *gradatio* in relation to *sorites* is one of lack: this figure transforms into the logical “climbing argument” when you “join the first [clause] and the last [clause] with an ergo.”¹⁷⁰ The *sorites* supplies a logical ergo whereby the student
returns to the first proposition; *gradatio*, by contrast, cannot point back to its originating idea (in this case, it would no longer be the figure but the argument).

In the *Februarie* eclogue of the *Shepheardes Calender*, Spenser takes that “ergo” – the presence or absence of which distinguishes ornament from proof – and he replaces it (quite literally) with a question mark. The young Cuddie complains to his older companion, Thenot, about the fierce weather. In the liberty of his youth, Cuddy finds February’s “bitter blasts” to be an affront to his age. We might think of Cuddy as proceeding from the more restrictive definition of decorum whereby the apt fitting together of person, time, and place would suggest that the young always live in the springtime. Cuddy understands time as essentially linear, progressing from youth to death and thus, for him, the weather is out of joint. Thenot, by contrast, understands time as essentially cyclical:

> Lewdly complainest thou lasie ladde,  
> Of Winters wracke, for making thee sadde.  
> Must not the world wend in his commun course  
> From good to badd, and from badde to worse,  
> From worse unto that is worst of all,  
> And then returne to his former fall? (8-13).

We might think of Thenot as proceeding from the more encompassing definition of decorum as “that harmonious perfection.” If the world follows along a “course” that is the “commun” experience of all men, then Thenot’s conclusion, “worst of all” returns to his proposition (the “good”). If the world returns to his “former fall,” then Cuddie is caught within the same “common course” as Thenot. In this way, Thenot’s *sorites* protects its speaker from the terminus of death that lurks at the end of Cuddie’s linear conception of time. It reinforces the superlative status of the last proposition: “worst.” And yet, we are left with a question mark in the stead of an *ergo*. Thenot’s understanding
of cyclical time is an attempt to ward against his own death by insisting on the logical “returne” of the sorites but we do not actually return to the initial line. Thenot is still speaking and this speech undoes the possibility of “return” as we move on with him. In spite of the argumentative thrust, Thenot may not think with the sorties but speak with gradatio. Things could get “worse” and worse, indefinitely, displacing the climactic “worst” and the return whence to “good.” The sorites presents the fulfillment of ergo as the fantasy of cyclical time – the “common course.” As gradatio, Thenot’s speech surrenders to succession. In response to the old man schooling him, Cuddie chides Thenot for the obvious “skill” with which he launches his lecture. He says that, if Thenot were young – as Cuddie himself is young – then Thenot would use this “skill” not to lecture his companion but to “hery with hymnes thy lasses gloue” (61-62).
Chapter Two: Spenser’s Staffe

*Book 2* of Edmund Spenser’s *Faerie Queene* reaches its putative end in the capture of Acrasia and the notorious destruction of her bower. In the ruins of that bower, Guyon and the Palmer discover “seeming beasts” who “are men indeed.” The corporeal transformation of these men “into figures hideous,” – into hogs – occurred “according to” the transformation of “their mindes” which are “like monstrous” (85.4–5). Guyon requests that the bower’s hoggish inhabitants be transformed back into men, “Let them returned be vnto their former state” (85.9). By way of his “vertuous staffe,” the Palmer gives these men a second shot at being human (86.1). If hoggishness is the “Sad end... of life intemperate,” the Palmer’s “vertuous staffe” looks to turn from this “end” by returning these “men” to a prior moment in time, the time of “their former state” (85.6). Among these returned men, one holds out. Gryll curses at the Palmer “that had from hoggish forme him brought to naturall” (86.9) and his resistance insists on the impossibility of return, the impossibility of regression toward a prior moment in time – the “former state” (85.6) that preceded this “hoggish forme” (86.9). The Palmer concludes this scene by coupling two imperative commands. The hexameter is less famous than the pentameter it follows: “Let Gryll be Gryll, and haue his hoggish minde;/ But let vs hence depart, whilst wether serues and winde” (87.8–9). This asymmetrical couplet closes Spenser’s stanza and concludes *Book 2* on the cusp of a departure, invoked but not yet realized.

The adversative conjunction that sits at the center of this asymmetrical, concluding couplet – “But” – enacts an anxious separation between Gryll and the conquering pair. This chapter will examine the aesthetic of transformation that
underwrites this anxiety and casts Gryll as a threat to Guyon and the Palmer at the
margins of faerie land. That first command, “Let Gryll be Gryll, and haue his hoggish
minde,” offered the act of predication upon which allegories proceed. That this Odyssean
*Grylle* (Gr. “hog”) is allowed to simply “be Gryll, and haue his hoggish minde” is a kind
of personification that attempts, as Gordon Teskey has shown us, “to conceal in a figure
the rift that is more or less openly on view throughout an allegorical narrative.”

If the Palmer’s command, however, suggests that “Gryll” was always a “hog” (and therefore,
cannot be returned to a “former state” (85.6) that is not hoggish), Gryll speaks a language
that challenges the security of allegorical naming in the *Faerie Queene*: Gryll “did” the
Palmer “miscall” (86.8). The poem does not record this name-calling. It only represents
this alternative system of naming as non-referential, as language that misses its mark.
The Palmer’s command – “Let Gryll be Gryll, and haue his hoggish minde” – is thus an
attempt to isolate and incorporate Gryll’s recalcitrant language. The Palmer’s command
reasserts allegory at the very moment in which the failure of his “vertuous staffe” has
exposed the limitations of such a mode (86.1). Gryll cannot be returned to his “former
state” and the Palmer’s act of predication suggests that this is because “Gryll” has no
“former state”: he was always “hog.”

The second of the Palmer’s commands seems more simple: “But let vs hence
depart, whilst wether serues and winde” (87.9). This command registers the threat of
the pair’s proximity to Gryll – let him be a hog and let us get out of here. The failures of
the Palmer’s “vertuous staffe” (86.1) suggest that the mind and its “fowel incontinence”
(87.7) are the cumulative product of an irreversible temporality. In this closing
command, the Palmer confronts this temporality as decidedly contingent. The final
clause of the hexameter imagines a future moment in which intemperate weather may hinder the pair’s ability to leave the bower and that adverb – “whilest,” poised after the line’s caesura – suggests that the present, temperate moment will end. If the Palmer’s initial act of predication – “Let Gryll be Gryll” – proceeded without respect to narrative (“Gryll” was always “hog”), his second command, – “let vs hence depart” – marks a return to narrative temporality. It conjures the next narrative event (departure) while also pointing to the contingency of that event. In the final moment of Book II, the alternation of the Spenserian stanza’s closing, asymmetrical couplet offers a unique perspective into the “rift” at the center of allegory. In the tension between pentameter and hexameter, we can see the transcendent ambitions of allegory’s “other” – “Let Gryll be Gryll” – at odds with the temporality of its speaking – “But let vs hence depart.”

The return to temporality marked by the Palmer’s decision to depart looks something like narrative recovering itself. The Palmer attempted to reverse time by way of his “vertuous staffe,” (86.1) returning (most of) these men to their “former state,” (86.5) and he subsequently attempted to deny the relevance of time by his act of predication. By virtue of its failure to reverse time, the Palmer’s “vertuous staffe” (86.1) becomes implicated in the inevitability of temporal succession. As an instrument of temporal succession, the Palmer’s “vertuous staffe” (86.1) points to the formal unit that organizes our own temporal experience as readers of the Faerie Queene: the poet’s “staffe.”

Spenser’s critics have long considered the Faerie Queene’s stanza as the engine of a unique experience of time in the Faerie Queene – especially, the stanza’s hexameter, “perpetually pausing” at its close. Spenser’s readers have not, however, sought to define this particular experience of time in relation to the images of corporeality
with which sixteenth-century measure was so often illustrated.\(^5\) At the close of *Book 2*, however, the Palmer’s anxious attention to temporal succession registers the threat of corporeal transformation in Acrasia’s bower and Spenser’s closing, asymmetrical couplet becomes a sign of the pair’s vulnerability to the very transformation that they look to avoid – “let vs hence depart.”

Our critical tendency has been to spatialize poetic form, to transform it into the container of contents. In his *Arte of English Poesie* (1589), George Puttenham warrants this tendency. He traces “staffe” to the Italian “stanza” which he describes as a “resting place.” Stanza means something like “stopping place” or “room” in Italian. Puttenham also offers, however, an investigation into the English word “staffe.” He suggests that a “staffe” helps a poem to walk: “I know not why it should be so called, vnlesse it be for that we vnderstand it for a bearer or supporter of a song or ballad, not vnlike the old weake bodie, that is stayed vp by his staffe, and were not otherwise able to walke or to stand vpright.”\(^6\) Puttenham emphasizes the movement of a poem and this emphasis suggests, in turn, that poetic form is not inherently spatial but mobile – even, a kind of prosthetic. Form, here, is an instrument in the service of a poetic body, a technology of motion. In so far as it helps this body to move, the poet’s “staffe” is also a part of that body. The “staffe” both assists and regulates corporeal motion. As a “supporter” of poetry that is otherwise “not vnlike the old weake bodie,” the stanza as a “staffe” allows the poem to move forward, “to walke.”

In this chapter, I will argue that Spenser’s closing, asymmetrical couplet limps. As the Palmer and Guyon turn away from Gryll, this limp registers this pair’s vulnerability to transformation at the margins of faerie land. I will suggest that as
limping verse, Spenser’s couplet is an imitation of the very verse form with which Elizabethan pedagogues first introduced their students to quantitative measure – the *clauda carmina* or “limping verse” of Ovid’s exile elegies. Spenser’s imitation of Ovid’s *clauda carmina* lends his poem a particular corporeality, a sense that the poetic body is itself vulnerable to transformation because this limp exposes the fundamental illusion of physical integrity. Richard McCabe has suggested that corporeal vulnerability is the enabling precondition for metamorphosis in Ovid’s poetry; in Spenser’s poem, this corporeal vulnerability establishes the precondition for a particular kind of metamorphosis, the greatly feared “degeneration” – a degeneration that might occur at the margins of faerie land or at the borders of Elizabeth’s empire. I will argue that Spenser incorporates this poetic vulnerability to degeneration into the metamorphic aesthetic of his allegory, suggesting that his poem – that the *Faerie Queene* itself – is always vulnerable to transforming into something *alter*.

By arguing that Spenser’s closing, asymmetrical couplet is an imitation of Ovid’s *clauda carmina*, I am also suggesting that the division between quantitative, classical meter and rhyming, vernacular verse was not an absolute in the early modern period. In fact, in so far as we have understood Spenser’s stanza as a rejection of quantitative measure, our own literary histories are complicit in the polemic that motivated such a division, one which resulted in an opposition between rhyme and thought. In the first section of this chapter, I will draw on Gabriel Harvey’s and Spenser’s discussions of quantitative measure in their epistolary exchange, *Three proper, and wittie, familiar letters* (1580), in order to illustrate this polemic. If, in theory, early modern poetics understood quantitative measure and rhymed verse as distinct and even oppositional
forms, pedagogical methods encouraged practitioners to move between these two forms, thereby generating an *ad hoc* system for translating between verse forms. In section two, I will trace this *ad hoc* system back to Elizabethan grammar schools where Ovid’s *clauda carmina* became not only a uniquely useful form for teaching quantitative measure but also a form through which prosody might measure a poet’s distance from an imperial center and act as a gauge to the mind’s transformation at that distance. In section three, I will suggest that Spenser’s own *clauda carmina* acts as what Aristotle called an “erratic member” – by virtue of its limp, Spenser’s *clauda carmina* witnesses the absence of the very virtue that his allegory looks to celebrate. In Book 2, Spenser’s limping verse marks the poem’s difference from the idealized, temperate body and suggests the poem is vulnerable to transformation. I examine how the Palmer’s limping gait regulates Guyon’s pace in faerie land and I argue that his “vertuous staffe” (86.1) also regulates the pace of the poem’s own progression. In the fourth and final section, I examine how Spenser incorporates this *clauda carmina* into the metamorphic aesthetic of his allegory. If his closing, asymmetrical couplet registers the threat of transformation, it also approximates distance from that narrative *telos*. In the end, I suggest that Spenser’s *clauda carmina* insists on the contingency of time against allegory’s ambition toward abstraction such that our own experience of prosody in the *Faerie Queene* mitigates against the lessons of allegory.

I.

In their *Three Letters*, Spenser and Harvey frame the disjunction between quantitative “Number” and vernacular “Accente” according to the Ramistic division between dialectic and rhetoric. The central questions of their debate ask, to what extent
should the spoken sound of English determine the rules for quantitative measure? Or, conversely, to what extent should these rules – derived from classical languages – surrender their *ars* and transform to suit the contingencies of vernacular pronunciation? Another formulation of this question asks, ought verse to be thought or spoken? Are thinking and speaking reconcilable modes of verse composition? Which ought to be subject to the other?

In theory and according to the art of prosody – as taught in the schoolroom, as codified by English practitioners such as Philip Sidney and Thomas Campion – quantitative verse insists on its own distinction from vulgar rhyming.\(^{13}\) Based on classical languages whose perfection is always imagined as a fixture in and of the past, quantitative verse became an *ars* insofar as it distilled practice into a stable set of rules. In their capacity as *ars*, these rules were invulnerable to transformation over time. Accordingly, quantitative verse was not so much spoken as it was seen, not so much heard in the ear as known in the mind by way of the eye. While quantitative verse became an object of knowledge subject to verification within a visual epistemology, rhymed verse and the accentual syllabic line for which “rhyme” acted as a metonym delighted the ear but its organization was precarious. Predominantly aural in its coincidence, rhyme’s organization was, by contrast to quantitative verse, always vulnerable to temporal contingency. In theory, each form asserted different ideas about the world and its organization. Where quantitative verse, in its appeal to numerology, represented the temporal coherency of the world in which it operated, rhymed verse marked a falling away from that ideal.\(^{14}\) Rhymed verse underscored man’s own vulnerability to a relentlessly successive temporality. The difference of rhyme is
linguistic (the word sounds like but is not the same as the one that came before) but the
difference of rhyme is also temporal (the very act of repetition demonstrates the loss of a
previous moment in time).

In the *Three Letters*, “Immerito” (Spenser’s pseudonym from the *Shepheardes Calender*) and “G.H.” map this difference between quantitative measure and vernacular rhyme onto the physical event of an earthquake, the event with which “reformed versifying” shares its titular position: *Three proper, and wittie, familiar letters: lately passed betweene two vniuersitie men: touching the earthquake in April last, and our English refourmed versifying.* This casual coupling of “earthquake” and “versifying” might appear to advertise these *Letters* as a miscellany but G.H.’s competing interpretations of the earthquake’s causes make it clear that he is also thinking about the colossal misfit between Spenser’s “Accent” and “Number.” Spenser worked at applying the rules of quantitative measure – the determination of whether a syllable was long or short according to the arrangement of consonants – but he found the sounds of English to be a recalcitrant material. “Accent,” Spenser wrote, “whyche sometime gapeth, and as it were yawneth ilfauouredly, coming shorte of that it should, and sometime exceeding the measure of the Number” does not map onto a quantitative system: it “sometime gapeth” and it “sometime exceed[s].” Gabriel Harvey reframes what is at stake in Spenser’s division between “Accent” and “Number” or the composition of “Barbarous and Balductum Rymes” and the composition of “Artifical verses” as the difference between rhetoric’s and dialectic’s abilities to explain April’s earthquake.

Harvey’s treatise on the earthquake is divided into two major sections. In the first section, Harvey offers parodic explanations that appeal to the kind of argumentative
structures for which the Ramists dismissed rhetorical invention. He appeals to argument by similitude: the earth is a “mightie great huge body” with “contrarie members.” He amplifies by way of *paronomasia* as he turns the difference between “*Terrae motus,*” or moving land, and “*Terrae metus,*” or fearful land, into an argument for the earth’s body as masculine rather than feminine. Declaring that she “can neither plucke out Rime or Reason” from Harvey’s explanation, “Madame *Incredula*” requests that Harvey try again. Now, he suggests that the earth has taken “too much drinke” and that it “now staggereth, and reeleth, and tottereth, this way and that way, vp and downe like a drunken man or wooman” and he suggests that the earthquake sounds like the speech of a drunk. That speech is “Alebench Rhetorick... and specially the mooing Patheticall figure *Pottypôsis.*” At long last, *Incredula* cuts Harvey off in the midst of his copious tirade: “No more Ands, or Ifs, for Gods sake, quoth the Madame, and this be your great Doctorly learning.” In response to *Incredula*’s request that he speak in “earnest,” Harvey ceases his parody of university learning. In this second section of his explanation of the earthquake, Harvey offers a decidedly dialectical investigation into the “causes” of earthquakes: the “Materiall Cause” is “no doubt great aboundance of wynde,” the “formall Cause” is the “Motion, and shaking of the Earth,” the “Efficient” is “God Himselfe.” He offers this systematic investigation touching on causes as well as “the quantitie of Tyme and Place” as a refutation to what he describes as the imminent “Balductum Tragicall ballet in Ryme, and without Reason.” These looming treatises “in Ryme, and without Reason” are sure to misinterpret the earthquake – much as Harvey did, with his own “Alebench Rhetorike.”
In effect, Harvey produces rhymed and quantitative (or reasoned) explanations for the earthquake, mapping Spenser’s understanding of the misfit between “Accente” and “Number” onto the misfit between rhetoric (of the sort that charicatured university learning and is indistinguishable from the speech of “Alebench Rhetoric” and ballad makers) and dialectic (of the sort that produced a reasoned investigation into causes).\(^{24}\) The Ramistic polemic between a rhetoric which proceeds from similes, puns, and “Pottypôsis,” and a dialectic that attends methodically to causes draws a line between rhymed and quantitative verse. On the one side, we have the contingency of a system that deals in language and on the other, we have a method or *ars* that looks to govern language by imposing necessary relations onto that contingency. In the *Three Letters*, this line becomes a faultline, a fissure, as the friction between “Accente” and “Number” produces a verse with contrary impulses, a verse that quakes.

This conceptual division between rhymed and quantitative verse underwrites our own critical narrative about the emergence of the *Faerie Queene* stanza. We tend to describe Spenser’s *Shepheardes Calender* (1579) as a virtuosic display of poetic forms and we tend to understand this display of versatility as a kind of breeding ground for Spenser’s signature stanza.\(^ {25}\) Accordingly, Spenser’s experiments with quantitative measure in the *Three Letters* constitute a digressive force against the formal *telos* of his prosodic achievement. Spenser’s involvement in the quantitative experiments become a kind of prodigal poesis and he announces his return from these exploits with the vernacular bells and whistles of his limited rhyme scheme. I would like to suggest, however, that Spenser’s training in quantitative measure was fundamental to both the genesis and the function of his *Faerie Queene* stanza. Spenser’s poetic practices
encourage us to examine his stanzaic form as a process – even a practice – rather than a formal product and in doing so, his stanza obscures the conceptual division between the rhymed and the quantitative, spoken verse and verse that is thought, the division that motivates both the Ramistic polemic and our own literary histories about the emergence of vernacular poesie. When viewed as practice, Spenser’s verse becomes a form neither thought nor spoken but inhabited as a kind of alternative corporeality – paradoxically, both a limping deformity and a prosthetic to that deformity.

If, in theory, the early modernist drew a line between quantitative and rhymed verse, the practice of verse composition muddied that line. In the *Three Letters*, Spenser offers two couplets that he describes as “my olde verse of toying in Rhymes, turned into your artificiall straightnesse of Verse.” Here, “Accente” and “Number” exist on a continuum according to which rhyme might be “turned into” quantity. In so far as his discussion of process supplies a kind of narrative to his poetic labor, Spenser’s act of revision incorporates a metamorphic aesthetic into this narrative: rhymed verse might transform into quantitative measure. Harvey likewise records a day spent testing his younger brother while home on holiday from Cambridge. Harvey gives his brother various examples of verse and has him play with the meter – now quantitative, now rhymed. In the morning Harvey delivered his brother a “Theame out of Ouid” and asked him to translate those couplets into English and to paraphrase his own translation. Then, the brother turned his composition into classical pentameter lines, applying quantitative rules to his looser paraphrase. Then, Harvey’s brother amplified his four classical pentameter lines into ten vernacular rhyming lines. In the afternoon, Harvey sent his brother off with two emblems from Spenser’s *Marche* (both emblems, a pair of rhyming
couplets). His brother combined the sentiments of both rhymed couplets into a single
couplet of quantitative verse. As this “peece of hollydayes exercise” suggests, the
conceptual division between quantitative and rhymed verse lost something of its polemic
amidst the practices of the poet and the student (or the poet as student).\textsuperscript{27}

In his emphasis on the “staffe’s” capacity to facilitate motion, Puttenham
embedded a defense of vernacular rhyme against proponents of quantitative measure: he
suggested that the principle by which a poet might move between these two forms was
the production of motion. While describing the quantity of classical feet, Puttenham
explains the prosodic unit’s ability to go “sometimes swift, sometimes slow, some
vneegally marching or peraduenture steddy” by way of “the euident motion and stirre,
which is perceiued in the sounding of our wordes not always egall.” We understand the
combination of varying temporal units (long and short) as the variables with which we
might describe the body in motion because “by the Philosopher’s definition, stirre is the
ture measure of time.”\textsuperscript{28} The motion of a poetic line is thus primarily important in so far
as that motion is also a measure of time. Humanist proponents of the quantitative
experiments routinely described the untimely verse of the vernacular line as inherently
“lame” because it fails to measure the quantity of syllables.\textsuperscript{29} According to Puttenham’s
definition of the “staffe” as a prosthetic to the poetic body, however, that “staffe” might
offset the effects of this lameness. The “staffe” acts as a prosthetic by making up for the
absence of quantitative measure – it allows us to perceive “the evident motion and stirre”
more regularly reserved for quantitative verse.\textsuperscript{30} As a unit of poetic composition,
Spenser’s “staffe” produces the “euident motion and stirre” of quantitative measure.
Spenser’s “staffe” also becomes a form defined by a certain conception of temporality.
This conception of temporality suggests that the rhythms of corporeal motion – the “vnegally marching” of an asymmetrical couplet – also mark the passing of time. The principle of Puttenahm’s translation between verse forms is a gauge for measuring time: the “stirre” or corporeal motion of the poem. The suggestion that form constitutes a kind of poetic body appeals to the visual epistemology that underwrote the apprehension of quantitative measure in the early modern period as well as the sense that prosody was thought rather than spoken. The suggestion, however, that this body was primarily important because its motion was a measure of time, by contrast, returns us to the contingency characteristic of speaking verse.

Spenser’s imitation of Ovid’s clauda carmina therefore both lends his poem a particular corporeality – his poem limps – and suggests that this corporeal motion is a measure of time in the Faerie Queene. My understanding of the relationship between Spenser’s closing couplet and Ovid’s elegiac couplet is twofold. First, this is a philological argument. The alternation of Spenser’s concluding couplet – pentameter, followed by a hexameter – inverts a loose formalist description of the elegiac couplet – a hexameter followed by a pentameter. The central object of Spenser’s imitation is Ovid’s act of metrical variation, his deferral from dactylic hexameter (the poetic line of epic). Though the poet of Ovid’s Amores sets out to write in “weighty numbers” about “Arms, and the violent deeds of war,” his second line comes up one foot short:

Arms, and the violent deeds of war, I was making ready to sound forth – in weighty numbers, with matter suited for measure. The second verse was equal to the first – but Cupid, they say, with a laugh stole away one foot. Instead of writing in the “weighty numbers” of epic, the “lofty strain” of his first line is inevitably followed by a line that “changes to slightness the vigour of my work.” The
poet, consequently, writes of love – a “matter suited to lighter numbers.”

In the *Amores*, Cupid’s arrow lands in the hexameter’s Achilles’ heel; the elegiac alternation between mismatched “tendons” produces Ovid’s *clauda carmina*, a form that George Puttenham described as “a lusty exameter” followed by “a limping pentameter.” This “limping verse” points to a generic difference from epic’s martial prowess.

Spenser’s own act of metrical variation is also an act of generic disaffiliation. With respect to both quantitative and accentual feet, sixteenth-century English poetics understood the iamb as better suited to its more monosyllabic language than the dactyl. Practitioners also suggested that, on account of the frequent inspirations required by the English monosyllabic plod, the pentameter line in the vernacular occupied the same amount of time as the classical hexameter. Iambic pentameter became the alternative to dactylic hexameter and the generic line of epic – but it was modeled after the classical line that it attempted to approximate. Spenser’s own concluding hexameter is thus a way of marking the poem’s difference from epic and its signature line. In this sense, my argument about the closing, asymmetrical couplet of Spenser’s stanza is not only philological. It is also tropological (and this is the second part of my twofold understanding). Spenser’s imitation of Ovid’s *clauda carmina* not only conditions the rhythm by which we move through the *Faerie Queene* or the time it takes us to do so, it also suggests that this rhythm and its time are instrumental to the production of meaning in the *Faerie Queene*. This is not the rhythm and time of epic. In order to understand the stakes of such a deferral, we must turn from Ovid’s *Amores* to his exile elegies, the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae Ex Ponto*. In these poems, Ovid’s second line continues to mark the poem’s difference from epic. Rather than aligning his poetry with love, however, the
asymmetrical couplet of Ovid’s later elegies transforms difference from epic into the
distance of exile. The *clauda carmina* itself becomes a gauge to degeneration in the time
of exile.

II.

While modern scholars have tended to favor the seductions of Ovid’s *Amores*, the
sixteenth-century schoolroom considered the lamentations and retractions of Ovid’s exile
elegies a more suitable model for exercises in prosody. The *Tristia* and (to a lesser
extent) the *Epistulae Ex Ponto* were, at a number of schools (including Eton and St.
Paul’s as well as smaller schools like St. Bees), the first verse form that school children
learned to anatomize, parse, translate, and imitate. According to the evidence compiled
by T.W. Baldwin, on any given Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday (at Eton, at precisely
9:00 in the morning) during the first half of the school year from around 1530 to well into
the eighteenth century, rooms full of schoolboys (usually, in third form) were parsing
elegiac couplets from Ovid’s exile poems. In fact, the “Theame out of Ouid” that Gabriel
Harvey put to his brother “to translate, and varie after his best fashion” as a “peece of
hollydayes exercise” in the *Three Letters* consisted of two couplets from Ovid’s *Tristia*.
(Some holiday).

Surviving evidence suggests that these schools used the art of versification set out
in the final section of the authorized grammar as a kind of rulebook for reading the
*Tristia*. Though Roger Ascham did not recommend the *Tristia* by name, we can find
his name – “R. Ascahmus” – inscribed into a schoolroom edition of the poem. An
additional set of initials along the spine – “E.R.” – indicate that he may have made a gift
of this edition to his most famous student. Another schoolmaster, Charles Hoole,
recommended that grammar schools teach the *Tristia* for the first half of fourth form “at least.” His instructions are worth quoting in full:

1. Their afternoon Lessons on Mondayes and Wednesdayes, for the first halfe of the year (at least) may be in Ovids little book de tristibus, wherein they may proceed by six or eight verses at a Lesson; which they should first repeat memoriter as perfectly as they can possibly, because the very repetition of the verses, and much more the having of them by heart, will imprint a lively pattern of Hexameters and Pentameters in their minds, and furnish them with good Authorities.

2. Let them construe verbatim, and if their Lesson be harder then ordinary, let them write it down construed.

3. Let them parse every word most accurately, according to the Gramatical order.

4. Let them tell you what Tropes and Figures they finde in it, and give you their Definitions.

5. Let them scan every verse, and after they have told you what feet they have in it, and of what syllables they consist, let them give the Rule of the quantity of each syllable, why it is long or short; the scanning and proving verses, being the main end of reading this Author, should more then anything be insisted upon, whilst they read it.

According to Hoole, one reads Ovid for the form of his verse. Taking his exile elegies three or four couplets at a time, students memorize these verse so as to “imprint a lively pattern of Hexameters and Pentameters in their minds.” This pattern is a kind of visual reference point from which they might measure verse, an authoritative imprint for the judgment of a poetic line. We get the feeling that Hoole is primarily interested in teaching prosody by way of Ovid’s elegiac couplet because it allows him to kill two birds with one stone. Students learn both the hexameter and the pentameter at once. This pedagogy also, however, instills a sensitivity to the difference between these two measures and the sense that this difference sits at the center of a single formal unit, visible and impressed upon the mind.

If their combination of hexameters and pentameters had a particular pedagogical utility, the question of how “good” the *Tristia’s* “Authorities” were was an open one.
Though the *Tristia* did not recount illicit love affairs, the poems appear to have posed their own set of problems for Elizabeth’s government and in the schoolroom, stylistic imitation occurred simultaneously with the project of moral edification.\(^{47}\) In 1582, the privy council used “*ouid de arte amandi, de tristibus*” as shorthand for the entire curricula of “heathen poetes... from which the youthe of the Realme recyve rather infectyon of manners and educatyon.”\(^{48}\) No extant curricula suggest that Ovid’s *Art of Love* was used in any English grammar school but the *Tristia* was, Baldwin suggests, “nearly as popular as the *Metamorphoses*.\(^{49}\) The privy council may have wished to denigrate the exile elegies by association; this was a move that Ovid himself anticipated and sought to preempt by building a defense into his *Tristia*.\(^{50}\) The council demanded that teachers replace Ovid’s elegies and “such lyke” with the Christian effusions of Christopher Ockland’s “*Anglorum praelia*” to which was appended “a shorte treatise or appendix concerning the peacable government of the Quenes majestie.”\(^{51}\) The council does not reveal their reasons for singling “*de tristibus*” out among all “heathen” schoolroom texts but the elegies’ relentless expressions of displeasure with a merciless emperor may have given more than one of Elizabeth’s counselors reason for pause.

Throughout the popular schoolroom anthology *Illustratum Poetarum Flores* (1598), selections from *Tristia* and *Ex Ponto* figure prominently under headings such as “De Adversitate,” “De Afflictione,” “De Desperatione,” “De Dolore,” “De Lacryma,” and “De Miseria.”\(^{52}\) What is more, many of these citations are selected to emphasize despair over consolation. Under “De Adversitate,” for example, a selection from the *Tristia* reads, “At my fall, when all fled in fear of ruin, turning their backs upon friendship with me.”\(^{53}\) The act of selection excludes the couplet that follows (the couplet that completes
Ovid’s sentence). In the *Tristia*, the couplet that completes this fragment continues: “you dared to touch the corpse Jove’s fire had blasted and to approach the threshold of a house bemoaned.”

The second half of our sentence witnesses the fidelity of a devoted friend, Ovid’s only consolation. The *Illustratum Poetarum Flores* excises consolation. Ovid remains desperate and abandoned, without friends who might return to him in spite of “Jove’s fire” or the Emperor’s disdain. If the form of the elegiac couplet seems to have suggested that a dependent clause could survive on its own, this same capacity cuts the poet off from relief. The *Illustratum Poetarum Flores* suggests that when Ovid’s couplets made their way into Elizabethan commonplace books, their primary function was to amplify a student’s sense of estrangement (even as the form of the couplet itself could override syntactical connections among other couplets).

In addition to supplying numerous “Authorities” for misery and dissatisfaction, Ovid’s ostensibly loyalist claims provided a perspective of Rome from the margins of its empire. This perspective is all too comparable with one that would have witnessed continuous strife in Ireland and resistance to England’s colonialist attempts at “reformation.”

Under the commonplace “De Bello,” one selection describes the margins of Rome as a place where “barbarous enemies” make “iron weapons” more powerful than “laws.” The perspective of the exile decenters Rome’s imperial power. Under another heading, “De Patria,” a selection from Ovid’s *Epistulae* suggests that a subject’s fidelity to his birthplace will always be stronger than an Empire’s colonialist claims to benevolence:

> what’s better than Rome? What worse than Scythia’s ice-chill? yet the native will flee that City, hasten back here: though her cage be never so comfortable, yet Philomela still strives to return to her native woods.
Ovid’s representations of Scythian resistance to Rome could only undermine England’s monarchical claims on Irish loyalties. The privy council’s 1582 substitution of a treatise on “peacable government” in the stead of *Tristia* does not appear to have lasted (if, indeed, it ever took effect). The council’s anxiety suggests, however, that the parsing, translation, and imitation of Ovid’s elegiac couplet was inseparable from the communication of this form’s moral conversation. The imitation of this form might reshape the child’s mind, as well as his verse. That “lively pattern of Hexameters and Pentameters” that Charles Hoole advised teachers to “imprint” on the “minds” of students also provided a perspective from the margins of empire.

Hoole’s suggestion that the *Tristia* might “imprint a lively pattern” and “furnish” students with “good Authorities,” splits the pedagogical purpose of the poem between the elegiac couplet and its contents. Hoole’s instructions suggest that Ovid’s form and his matter are entirely separate, if simultaneous, objects of instruction and of knowledge. In his *Tristia*, however, Ovid’s *clauda carmina* is not simply simultaneous with his material. Rather, Ovid’s *clauda carmina* is instrumental to the production of meaning in his poems. Ovid’s *clauda carmina* becomes a measure of the distance between Tomis and Rome, between margin and center. Ovid also figures his *clauda carmina* as an effect of the conditions of his exile and the *clauda carmina* thus becomes a kind of gauge to what Ovid figured as his own degeneration. In this sense, Ovid’s poetic form takes on a peculiar relation to the poet’s mind. By deferring from the ideality of physical integrity, Ovid’s *caluda carmina* marks the poet’s own corporeal vulnerability and establishes the preconditions for the very metamorphosis that he fears.
Ovid sends his book of elegies back to Rome and the verse form acts as an alternative corporeality for the exiled poet. His *clauda carmina* functions as a kind of prosthetic: “Go, book, and bring to the places I loved my greeting – / Let me reach them with what feet I may.” Ovid’s book searches for a “kind reader” who will “lend a gentle hand” as it makes its way through Rome, unable to walk around on its own two feet. The book asks this “kind reader” to look upon its deformity:

See what I bring: you’ll find nothing here but lamentation,  
Verse matching its circumstances. If the lame  
Couplet limps in alternate lines, that’s because of the metre  
Or the long journey they’ve made.

Ovid offers two competing explanations for his verse form. According to one, Ovid’s prosodic limp is the product of “the long journey they’ve made.” This journey is the distance his book must travel from Tomis to Rome. It is as if Ovid wrote his elegies in dactylic hexameter but, exhausted by travel, they end up in Rome as the alternation of the elegiac couplet, crippled by the distance of exile. In Ovid’s *Amores*, Cupid stole a metrical foot and laughed; in Ovid’s *Tristia* the journey from exile deforms the poem. In both narratives, Ovid’s verse form marks his poem’s difference from epic but the cause for this difference shifts: while the one insists that love rather than war occupies its time, the other suggests that the poet cannot write epic from the margins of empire.

The second explanation suggests that Ovid’s verse limps “because of the meter” or more literally, “because of the foot itself.” This explanation is almost tautological: the couplet limps because of the meter of the couplet. Indeed, in his 1572 translation, Thomas Churchyard offered a more pathetic account (as if to make up for this tautology):

Behold therefore what I do bringe, saue sorrowes nought at all  
Such matter were in weeping words, as both to time befall,  
Eche other lyne a limping verse, that here in sight is seene,  
The weary foote or length of way, the cause thereof have beene.
Chruchyard’s ascription of “weary” to foot seems proleptic of the physical wear and tear of the book’s journey but Churchyard’s adjective may not be proleptic at all. In this translation, Ovid’s foot is “weary” before it even embarks upon its journey from exile. This second explanation suggests that Ovid’s verse limps, not because of its distance from an imperial center, but because something is wrong with “the foot itself.” Ovid understood the *vitium*, or “vice,” of his *clauda carmina* as the product of his exile. His *clauda carmina* became the sign of his own degeneration: in exile, Ovid’s declares, “my talent” does not “respond to me as it once did.” Like a muddied fountain, his “verse flows in a narrower vein” because “his heart’s been vitiated by the silt of misfortune.”

Ovid insists that the *vitium* of his verse should not be an object of wonder, because he has become “almost a Getic Bard.” The *clauda carmina* provided Ovid with an image of his “limbs... weakened by a sick mind’s contagion” and the “evil region” in which he dwells. “The place, its ways, speech, lifestyle,” reflect back to the poet an alienating image of himself: “always before my eyes/ there sticks like a visible entity the shape, the presence,/ of my ill fate, standing close, for me to scan.” This image forces him to compare “who I am and what I was.” By identifying his style as a gauge to his own transformation, Ovid suggests that his signature *clauda carmina* is also a measure of his degeneration in exile.

The act of transformation is substantive of Ovid’s own poetic identity as he insists that the *clauda carmina* made his poetry recognizably his own – by Ovid. The poem’s “style” and its “structure” witness the source of “saultation.” “Your style,” he warns his traveling book, “will betray you... it’s clear you’re mine.” Elegy’s *vitium* – its shortened “veins” – become the identifying signature of an Ovidian poetics even as he
figures these limping lines as the product of exile. In his *Arte of English Poesie*, George Puttenham defined style as a “constant and continual phrase or tenour of speaking and writing.” By virtue of this constancy, style acts as an “image of man... for man is but his minde.” For Ovid, however, the essential relation between his mind and his poetic style is not mimetic. While he uses the elegiac form continually, the alternation between hexameter and pentameter is not a pattern of constancy. Rather, each moment of alternation constitutes a moment of violence. While classical rhetoricians repeatedly suggested that the “sound body” offered a kind of telos to stylistic coherency, the *clauda carmina* defers from that telos. Deferring from the stability and integrity of the “sound body,” the *clauda carmina* marks the vulnerability of that body – and the mind that is continuous with that body – to degeneration. The *caluda carmina*, however, does not represent the poet’s mind, already transformed into “a Getic bard.” Rather, it becomes an instrument for tracking the process of transformation, a process that is itself continual. Each iteration of the *clauda carmina* further displaces the end that haunts it: Ovid is always “almost a Getic Bard.” Style is thus more a gauge to the mind subject to temporal contingency than a representation of that mind, static or constant, residing outside of time. Style tracks the mind as it participates in an endless and irreversible process of transformation.

Ovid’s *clauda carmina* serves two primary tropological functions in his exile elegies. As Churchyard’s translation suggests, his verse limps because of the “length of way” – because of the distance of the exiled poet from an imperial center. Those feet are also “weary,” however, before they even attempt that trip back. Distance from the center becomes significant as a measure of difference and for the poet especially, a
measure of linguistic difference. In his epistle on style, Seneca suggested that “during certain periods, a degenerate style of speech comes to the fore” because style imitates “the general character of the time.” It is the nature of the “soul” or animus, Seneca suggests, to be subject to the characteristics of the time in which it lives and the poet’s “ability” or ingenium is thoroughly mixed up with his soul. Seneca illustrates the interdependency of ingenium and animus with a metaphor in which his concentration on the “members” of the body recalls the “members” or clauses of composition:

A man’s ability cannot possibly be of one sort and his soul of another. If his soul be wholesome, well ordered, serious, and restrained, his ability also is sound and sober. Conversely, when the one degenerates, the other is also contaminated. Do you not see that if a man’s soul has become sluggish, his limbs drag and his feet move indolently? If it is womanish, that one can detect the effeminacy by his very gait? That a keen and confident soul quickens the step? That madness in the soul, or anger (which resembles madness), hastens our bodily movements from walking or rushing?). Manifested in the fluid or stilted operations of joints and the variety of gaits or rhythms produced by problematic feet, style becomes a representation of the poet’s mind according to a physical and temporal determinacy. In so far as the clauda carmina becomes Ovid’s stylistic signature, it also becomes an object of imitation. The imitation of Ovid’s exile elegies might allow a poet to articulate his affinity with Ovid’s claims to degeneration from the site of another empire’s margins. This imitation also, however, incorporates the poetic vulnerability established by the clauda carmina, the sense that a poem’s limp is also a stylistic gauge to the poet’s mind as it exists in the time of exile, transforming though never fully transformed.

III.

Imitation is the pedagogical principle at the center of the humanist schoolroom: both the child’s impressionable nature and his capacity for imitation made it possible to
“imprint” verse forms into the soft wax of his mind. Children also learn behavior by imitation. Thus, early modern pedagogy advised fathers to carefully select their young son’s companions. If the pedagogy of early modern schoolrooms turned on the imitative nature of children, that same propensity for imitation encouraged schoolrooms to protect their borders from “degenerate” examples – whether through a tightly controlled canon or the selection of individual schoolmasters, companions, and tutors. Impressionable as soft wax, children were also vulnerable to deformation: they might fashion their gait after limping neighbors, their speech after stuttering wet nurses, and their vision after the “goggle-eied.” The anxious regulation of exposure to potentially undermining examples produced the wide circulation of the following directive: “the proverb-makers say, and quite to the point, ‘If you dwell with a lame man, you will learn to limp.’” The threat posed by these companions is that of bending the child out of shape, of turning him into an asymmetrical version of what he ought to be. If Charles Hoole found Ovid’s exile elegies convenient because they could impress on children two verse forms at once, this utility is something of a paradox to a pedagogy that also imbued the asymmetrical with moral significance.

In this section, I would like to place Spenser’s closing, asymmetrical couplet at the center of this paradox. Dwelling with Ovid’s clauda carmina in the schoolroom, Spenser taught his verse to halt. As Spenser imitates Ovid’s limping verse, does his own stanza become a kind of prosthetic, an alternative corporeality for the poet? An Elizabethan emphasis on reading Ovid for his form may have looked to drive a wedge between the clauda carmina and the mind to whose degeneration it acted as a gauge but Spenser’s Faerie Queene does not often allow for so complete a division between body
and mind. This is especially true of Book 2 of the *Faerie Queene* in which the virtue of temperance insists that both body and mind are thoroughly conditioned by one another. Thus, Aristotle compared the “unrestrained” soul to “the body in a case of paralysis: when the patient wills to move his limbs to the right they swerve to the left.” In the case of temperance, an “erratic member” marks the movement of the disobedient element “which opposes and runs counter to the principle.” Does Spenser’s own *clauda carmina* witness this fundamental tension between an “erratic member” and the “principle” it opposes? As an “erratic member,” does Spenser’s *clauda carmina* point to the absence of the very virtue that his allegory looks to celebrate?

*Book 2* of Spenser’s *Faerie Queene* has often been described as “the most pedestrian” of books. After Guyon loses his horse in *canto 3*, he is forced to “fairely fare on foot” and Guyon’s feet often stray from his path (2.12.3). As a tutor to Guyon, the Palmer is meant to lead by his own example. The poem, in fact, introduces us to the Palmer as an object of imitation:

Him also accompanied vpon the way  
A comely Palmer, clad in black attyre,  
Of rypest yeares, and heares all hoarie gray,  
That with a staffe his feeble steps did stire,  
Lest his long way his aged limbes should tire:  
And if by lookes one may the mind aread,  
He seemed to be a sage and sober syre,  
And euer with slow pace the knight did lead,  
Who taught his trampling steed with equall steps to tread  
(1.7).

Where Guyon travels on his “steed,” the Palmer walks on the ground, regulating his own “feeble steps” with a “staffe.” The stanza’s medial couplet carefully contains the Palmer’s gait but that couplet also reinforces the excruciating length of the Palmer’s journey: “That with a staffe his feeble steps did stire,/ Lest his long way his aged limbes
should tire.” Puttenham suggested that “stirre is the true measure of time”: here, the Palmer’s “staffe” steers his steps and makes the poem “stirre” at the very moment that the fifth line carries Spenser’s verse beyond its initial quatrain.\textsuperscript{85} The Palmer’s “staffe,” couples the lengthening of quatrain into stanza with the continuation of his own “feeble steps,” and the Palmer’s movement through faerie land appears to regulate the pace of the poem itself, its “motion” and its “stirre.”

Guyon’s own gait serves as a manifestation of this dynamic between Palmer and poem: he also imitates the Palmer’s pace. The steps of Guyon’s steed are “equall” because they are modeled after the Palmer’s “feeble steps” – they are equal to the Palmer’s pace. These “steps” are “equall” in the sense of temperate if we trust that the Palmer is a good teacher – a good example for imitation – to both Guyon and the poem whose pacing he dictates with his “staffe.” The extra foot of Spenser’s hexameter suggests that the Palmer’s pace is rather painfully slow as Guyon trains his steed to match that pace; the internal rhyme of “steed” with “tread” – “Who taught his trampling steed with equall steps to tread” – suggests that the steed’s imitation is not quite right (1.7.9).

We do not have the absurdity of Red Crosse’s poor horsemanship but Guyon’s excruciatingly slow pace is reminiscent of that foaming bit. Guyon’s imitation of the Palmer requires a kind of physical contortion and Spenser’s stanza provides a parallel: the final, asymmetrical couplet in which Guyon slows down his horse reads like a painful imitation of the “feeble steps” of the Palmer’s medial couplet. The hexameter’s extra foot is a sign of that contortion, a deformation of motion that also measures time according to its own idiosyncratic limp. The poem again describes the pair’s careful “stire”: 
Then Guyon forward gan his voyage make,
With his blacke Palmer, that him guided still.
Still he him guided over dale and hill,
And with his steedy staffe did point his way:
His race with reason, and with words his will,
From fowle intemperaunce he ofte did stay,
And suffred not in wrath his hasty steps to stray (1.34.3-9).

In our previous stanza, “steed” and “staffe” were separate instruments of motion, the one regulated to follow upon the other. In this stanza, the two seem to combine as the Palmer yields a “steedy staffe” to aide in the “forward” progress of the pair. And yet, this movement forward feels like a turn backward. The chiasmic center of the stanza’s medial couplet constitutes a kind of return: “him guided still./ Still he him guided.” This pacing pulls against (if it does not completely immobilize the pair, rendering them “still”) the more explicit statement that the pair travels “forward,” unimpeded by “fowle intemperaunce.” As it pulls against a “forward pace,” Spenser’s *clauda carmina* becomes an “erratic member” to the body of the *Faerie Queene*, running counter to the allegorical principle of temperance. In so far as the Palmer’s “staffe” determines this torturous pace, the poem suggests that the Palmer is a suspect exemplum.

After Guyon loses his horse and must travel “as now befell, on foot,” (3.3.1) the Palmer receives a companion: the “Palmer now shall foot no more alone” (3.3.5). In the absence of a “steed,” Guyon’s body becomes fully subject to the Palmer’s gait. The narrative turns from the absconded horse to “the rightfull owner of that steede”:

But he the rightfull owner of that steede,
Who well could menage and subdew his pride,
The whiles on foot was forced for to yeed,
With that blacke palmer, his most trusty guide;
Who suffred not his wandring feet to slide.
But when strong passion or weake fleshlinesse,
Would from the right way seeke to draw him wide,
He would through temperaunce and steedfastnesse,
Teach him the weak to strengthen, and the strong suppress (3.4.2).
Where “pride,” “strong passion,” or “weake fleshliness” threaten to derail Guyon’s feet, the Palmer checks them: this teacher “suffered not his wandring feet to slide.” That personal pronoun, however, is ambiguous: the Palmer also teaches his own feet what not to do. Guyon’s continuous proximity to the Palmer appears to allow him to find “steedfastnesse” in the place of his “steed.” Guyon perched upon his horse, was among those emblematic artifacts that pointed to him as the knight of temperance. When it comes time to reclaim his horse in Book V, Artegall restores that horse to Guyon because his accoutrements complete the emblem: “Lo there, Sir Guyon, take to you the steed,/ As he with golden saddle is arrayed” (5.3.35.3-4). In the absence of this “steed,” however, the Palmer looks to maintain our emblem of temperance with his “steedy staffe” and instruction in the ways of “steedfastnesse.” The series of puns that structures this replacement, however, undermines the emblematic logic that the Palmer looks to maintain. The Palmer’s “steedfastnesse” is, after all, anything but “fast” and Guyon’s imitation of his pace constitutes learning to limp.

We have reason to be suspicious of the Palmer when we meet the “Pitifull spectacle” (2.40.1) of the dying Amavia who explains to Guyon that she traveled through faerie land “wrapt... in Palmer’s weeds” (1.52.8) This encounter teaches us to look for versions of the Palmer, or even to suspect that the Palmer may also be someone else “wrapt.” When Occasion crosses the path of this pair, she appears to be the Palmer’s pedagogical double. Where the Palmer teaches his student to walk in temperance, Occasion follows her son “prouoking him by her outrageous talke” (4.5.3). Her “ragged robes, and filthy disarray” (4.4.3) contrast with the “comely Palmer, clad in black attyre”
but the opposition between these two figures is not absolute (1.7.2). Where the Palmer “with a staffe his feeble steps did stire,” (1.7.4), Occasion “on a staffe her feeble steps did stay” (4.1.4). Lame in one leg, Occasion also uses her staffe to beat her pupil:

Sometimes she raught him stones, wherwith to smite,
Sometimes her staffe, though it her one leg were,
Withouten which she could not go upright (4.5.58).
The “outrageous talke” by which Occasion instructs her son proceeds from her mouth as a stutter, “And euer as she went, her tung did walke” (4.5.1). Asymmetrical in both speech and gait, Occasion appears to be the very kind of example against which humanist pedagogues sought to guard their students. After Guyon releases her stuttering tongue and halting body from their imprisoning chains, Occasion becomes a shifting figure in faerie land with distinct similarities to the limping Ate. The Palmer is at once marked by his difference from this evil instructor and by their physical similarities. As both of these teachers walk through faerie land by the aide of their “staffe,” they supply example for their students to imitate and they regulate the corporeal motion of the poem. By aligning the limping bodies of Occasion and the Palmer, the poem suggests that its own clauda carmina may constitute an “erratic member” that runs counter to temperance. “Occasion” suggests that this clauda carmina may also relate the poetic body to time – to the contingent, to the very occasions to which limping verse becomes vulnerable.

IV.

Fears of degeneration at the borders of Elizabethan schoolrooms – at the hands of limping example – were not altogether different from fears of degeneration at the margins of Elizabeth’s empire. In Spenser’s View of the State of Ireland, Irenius identifies children as the most vulnerable members of the group of Englishmen who, he declares, “are degenerated and growne almost mere Irish” According to Irenius, the process of
degeneration occurs from “licentious conversing with the Irish.” In particular, “young children” who “be like apes, which will affect and imitate what they see done before them” are especially vulnerable to degeneration. Thus, Irenius warns against choosing wet nurses from among the Irish because “the child that sucketh the milke of the nurse, must of necessitie learne his first speach of her” and even after he has been taught English, “the smacke of the first will alwayes abide with him.” The vulnerability of youth extended from children to nations: “yt is but even the other day,” Irenius declares, “since England grew civill.” If anxieties about English degeneration in Ireland saw the child as the most vulnerable object, the View also suggests that English civility is at its infancy and in need of the careful selection of examples characteristic of grammar school regulation.

The View suggests that degeneration in Ireland may result from physical proximity to the Irish but it also suggests that a prior Englishness may have provided the original “ill examples.” Thus, in the View, the threat of Ireland may be that it defies historical temporality by uniting in the same land a prior Englishness with a present Englishness. This threat suggests that degeneration returns an Englishman to his original shape. Ovid points to his clauda carmina as the gauge to his degeneration in exile, his relegation to a space at the margins of empire in which his proximity to the Scythians threatens to transform him from a Roman. Spenser’s suggestion in the View that Englishmen were confronted with their own history in Ireland complicates the process of degeneration: Spenser’s imitation of the clauda carmina recasts exile as a space in which historical time collapses, casting the temporal proximity of “even the other day” as spatial proximity at the margins. The Palmer’s closing command – “But let vs hence depart,
whilest wether serues and winde” is thus doubly attentive to time (87.8-9). If “whilest” insists upon the contingency of time (the weather will cease to “serue”), “hence” enacts a temporal rupture in which the present becomes the past and that past, decidedly past rather than proximate.

Ovidian metamorphosis provided Spenser with an aesthetic of transformation by which he might incorporate the threat of degeneration into the allegorical structure of his poem. According to an Ovidian aesthetic, corporeal vulnerability is the enabling precondition for metamorphosis. Rape, dismemberment, any violations of the regularity or reliability of physical boundaries exposes the fundamental illusion of physical integrity. Along an Ovidian spectrum, the deformity of the clauda carmina remakes the alternation of the asymmetrical couplet into the rhythm of a pre-metamorphic moment.

The pedagogical trajectory of the humanist schoolroom placed the clauda carmina of Ovid’s exile elegies prior to the Metamorphoses, thereby remaking the historical order of writing (Metamorphoses prior to Tristia) into a narrative of transformation in which the clauda carmina’s de-idealization of the poetic body produces narratives of transformation. From exile, Ovid describes the Metamorphoses as an accurate “image” of himself as he undergoes transformation in exile. The Metamorphoses was “broken off” (rupit) by the poet’s flight from Rome and becomes an image of himself broken by exile:

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I felt myself ripped asunder
As though I’d lost a limb; a part of me
Seemed wrenched from my body. So Mettus must have suffered
When the horses avenging his treachery tore him in two.
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For Ovid, the time of departure enacts a dismemberment of the self. Like Mettus, Ovid is pulled in two different directions or, “in contraria versos.” In these lines, Ovid’s verse
form itself becomes an instrument of torture as “versos” (or directions) plays with being “versus” (or verses). In fact, at least one sixteenth-century edition of this poem supplied “versus” to this line, relegating “versos” to the margins as an alternate. In addition, several early modern editors supplied Priam for the place of “Mettus,” such that – as they attempted to reconcile the image – the horse became, simultaneously, the instrument of dismemberment and the victim of dismemberment. As instrument, the horses pull their victim apart; as victim, the horse’s belly opens up to unload its cargo into Troy.

According to this sixteenth-century edition, the torn limbs and “contrary verses” of Ovid set the preconditions for the metamorphosis of empire. While the violence suffered in Troy produced an exile who would found Rome, the violent dismemberment of the exiled Ovid himself sets the preconditions for another transformation. Torn by contrary verses, the margins of Rome became a site for questioning the integrity of empire.

At the close of Book 2, as the Palmer and Guyon make their way into Acrasia’s bower, they creep. The pair

swarved not, but kept thir forward way,
through many couert groves, and thickets close,
In which they creeping did at last display,
That wanton Lady (12.76.5-8).

At this moment of arrival, the pair find Acrasia with Verdant’s head cradled in her lap and his weapons suspended in a tree. The tableau suggests Venus and Mars caught in the act; when the Palmer captures Acrasia in a net, the allusion is complete, aligning the Palmer with that limping god, Vulcan. At this initial moment of arrival, however, the poem is ambiguous about the origin of our tableau. On the one hand, the agent behind this act of “display” seems to be the “couert groves” and “thickets close” that the pair must “creep” through. These bushes frame their view. On the other hand, the agency for
this display seems to lie with the pair themselves, the “they” that “creeping did at last display.” In this sense, Acrasia’s bower emerges, “at last,” because the pair were finally “creeping.” This second interpretation suggests that the pair provokes the image or that the image itself is predicated upon their “creeping.” The “creeping” of the pair takes on a palpable if complicated causal relation to the intemperance of Arasia’s bower – even before Guyon goes in to destroy it. By way of the internal rhyme – “they... display” – we can track that agency.

With respect to Spenserian allegory, Ovidian metamorphosis outlines the darkest trajectory of allegorical becoming. For this reason, studies of the metamorphic aesthetic of Spenserian allegory have tended to focus on figures like Malbecco, figures who undergo a chilling transformation from man into abstraction: Malbecco is “woxen so deform’d that he has quight/ Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is hight.” Malbecco, the man who participates in the narrative temporality of the *Faerie Queene*, transforms into the idea that is “other” to allegory’s speaking, the abstraction of “Gelosy.” As a result, Malbecco disappears from the narrative altogether. By almost all accounts, however, this act of transformation is not typical of Spenserian allegory. Rather, this act of transformation haunts the trope throughout the *Faerie Queene*. By turning our attention to the deformity of the *clauda carmina* rather than metamorphosis, to the preconditions for transformation rather than the finalizing act, we might develop a more characteristic description of how an Ovidian aesthetic enables Spenserian allegory. The pair that is “creeping” into Acrasia’s bower is vulnerable to transforming into Gryll (hence, the urgency of the Palmer’s concluding command and its cautious “whilest”). That the creeping pair might be responsible for the very transformation they look to avoid,
however, suggests that the pair look to leave the bower because Gryll is also a figure for
themselves, (a “former state” (85.6) to which they might return). Thus, the very different
urgency of “hence” in the Palmer’s closing command, one which suggests that departure
is not only spatial but also, temporal. If Spenser’s own clauda carmina registers the
threat of degeneration, however, it also insists on the incompleteness of this
transformation – as Ovid suggests, “almost a Getic bard.” 102 The clauda carmina is,
finally, a gauge to the process of transformation rather than an embodiment of
transformation itself.

Malbecco’s final abstraction from narrative – “hight Gelosy” and disappeared – is
atypical of Spenserian allegory but his physical contortions prior to this abstraction result
from the violence he suffers at the hands of narrative (3.10.60.9). Having followed his
lustful wife to a den of Satyrs, Malbecco hides behind a bush in order to get a better look:
“close creeping, as he might,/ He in a bush did hyde his fearfull hedd” (3.10.44.1-2).
Wresting his body into an ambulatory deformation, “close creeping” and seemingly
acephalic, Malbecco’s jealous voyeurism is both physically and mentally deforming.
When the satyrs begin their march home, Malbecco “out of his bush,/ Vpon his hands and
feete he crept full light,/ And like a gote emongst the Gotes did rush” (3.10.47.1-3).
Here, the simile continues the physical deformation of Malbecco, suggesting that his own
corporeal boundaries are fluid, capable of transforming into another animal (though not
yet transformed) – not “a gote” but “like a gote.” The corporeal deformities that result
from Malbecco’s participation in narrative do not simply provide the conditions for
metamorphoses. While they occur, these corporeal deformities also ward against
transformation. The poem links, here, the vulnerability of physical corporeality with the
likeness of a simile. Both the *clauda carmina* and the simile suggest that Malbecco is vulnerable to transformation – may even be in the process of transforming – but they also measure the distance from that *telos* of metamorphosis.

Malbecoo will, finally, metamorphose into the abstraction of “Gelosy.” The poem even gives us the sense that Malbecco had a prior affinity with the goats that he approximated because his “gotish beard” made him a better “counterfeit” (47.6-7). Like “Gryll,” Malbecco was always something other than a man *anyways* (the allegory seems to suggest). If this prior similarity is suggestive of the final transformation that will occur, Malbecco’s own corporeal deformation of “creeping” was imitative, approximate rather than exact, conditional upon a concentrated contortion of motion. In this sense, Spenser’s own *clauda carmina* mitigates the rhythmic progression toward transformation. Prior to his transformation into an abstraction, Malbecco is “like” many things for which the poem provides no evidence of a prior affinity:

So soone as he the Prison dore did pas,
He ran as fast, as both his feet could beare,
And never looked who behind him was,
Ne scarcely who before: like as a Beare
That creeping close, amongst the hiues to reare
An hony combe, the wakefull dogs espy...

High ouer hilles and ouer dales he fledd,
As if the wind him on his winges had borne,
Ne banck nor bush could stay him, when he spedd
His nimble feet, as treading still on thorne:
Griefe and despight, and gealosy, and scorne
Did all the way him follow hard behynd,
And he himselfe himselfe loathed so forlorne,
So shamefully forlorne of womankynd:
That as a snake, still lurked in his wounded mynd.

Still fled he forward, looking backward still,
Ne stayed his flight, nor fearfull agony,
Till that he came vnto a rocky hill (4.10.53.1-6. 54, 55.1-3).
In this passage, Spenser’s use of “as” slips between signifying temporal simultaneity “so
soon as” (53.1) and the introduction of a simile “like as a bear” (53.4). When, for
example, we read that Malbecco “ran as fast, as” (53.2) we expect a comparison –
leopard, lion, (anything that runs fast) – rather than a qualifier, “ran as fast, as both his
feet could beare” (though this rhyme, “beare,” produces the simile that will, finally,
arrive – “like as a bear.”). Spenser’s clau da carmina provides a similar ambiguity. As
with the “as” of this passage, Spenser’s clau da carmina insists on the almost but not quite
of the simile. In fact, a commonplace description of the simile in the early modern period
suggested that the figure “limps” or “does not always run on four feet” (if on all fours, the
simile would be a metaphor). In addition to approximating that distance, Spenser’s
clau da carmina also insists on the contingency of time, on the moment, the “as” of
simultaneity and rapid-fire succession, the time in which transformation occurs but is not
completed.
Chapter Three: Braggadochio and the Schoolroom Simile

The simile never quite recovered from Aristotle’s subordination of the figure to metaphor. Simile, he warned, is “longer” than metaphor and therefore simile is “less attractive” than metaphor: “it does not say outright that ‘this’ is ‘that,’ and therefore the hearer is less interested in the idea.” While metaphor’s act of substitution, its claim that “‘this’ is ‘that,’” startles us by its audacity, the simile builds hesitation, negotiation, even accommodation into its own syntax – in English, its *As* and its *So*. The simile’s value as a rhetorical figure depreciates accordingly: “both speech and reasoning,” Aristotle argued “are lively in proportion as they make us see a new idea promptly.” If metaphor presupposes an act of translation in the strictest sense of the word, a “carrying across” conceptual boundaries, the simile’s syntax exposes the route of this translation. It forces us (at length) to retrace the journey – or even, the poetic labor – that metaphor disowns.

The formal structure of the simile weakens the end of its own comparative work – its ability to render the unfamiliar, familiar – by extending the time it takes for us to get from “this” to “that.” The very syntactical hinges, the *As* and the *So* that make the simile identifiable as a form, also offer a peculiar organization of time.

In comparison to metaphor, the syntax of the simile marked duration or an extension of time, but the very reliability of the simile’s syntactical markers also turned them into a means of industry in the humanist schoolrooms of the sixteenth century. As both the formal indicators of a sententious bit and a kind of instrument in the production of discourse, the simile’s syntax became both the sign of a piece of text ready to be gathered and a linguistic method for its accumulation. Classical and humanist rhetoricians distinguished the simile from metaphor by turning it into a mechanism for
collecting images and defining it instead in relation to icon, parable, and the example. In the *Arte of English Poesie* (1589), George Puttenham defines similitude as the “common Ancestour” of icon, parable, and the example but he also treats it as a figure, the “bare similitude.” According to this taxonomy, the simile or more commonly, the “similitude,” appears as both a category encompassing these other figures of comparison and a discrete figure in its own right. When discussed alongside these other figures, pedagogues often praise the simile for its utility – the ease with which it might be found and, the ease with which it might be deployed. As a belabored metaphor (on the one hand) and a reliable tool for the production of discourse (on the other), the simile’s temporal organization appears even more peculiar. The very facility with which the simile might be handled appears to offset – though not conceal – the form’s slower thinking.

As a genus encompassing other figures of comparison, similitude posited a separate temporal claim. In addition to being an industrious figure of elocution, similitude was a place of invention and, as a “place,” similitude had come to participate within an increasingly spatialized understanding of knowledge and its production. While classical and early humanist rhetoricians were content to allow similitude to act as both a place for the discovery of arguments (invention) and an ornament of style (elocution), the series of reforms under the name of Ramism drove a disciplinary wedge between these two functions. To remind us of my discussion in chapter one, discovering an apparent overlap in the materials belonging to rhetoric and dialectic, the Ramists reduced rhetoric to “elocution” and “pronunciation,” while reserving “invention” and “judgment” for dialectic. This apparently simple redistribution carried a polemic:
stripped of its engagement with res or things, limited only to the adornment of verba or words, rhetoric became the lesser hand-maiden to dialectic. While the Ramists began to define invention – and thinking, more generally – as an operation of the silent, meditative mind, their marginalization of the figures exposed an anxiety concerning rhetoric’s abiding commitment to language as such. Thus, as a place of invention within the reformed dialectic, similitude marked a turn away from the temporality of dialogic exchange and a turn toward a synchronic space within the mind – a space that, increasingly, privileged the visible and the quantifiable. By contrast, as a supplementary figure of elocution, the simile carried the threat of its own excess. It carried the potential to pervert the operations of dialectic by wresting thinking out of the synchronic space of the mind and into the temporality of speaking. The Ramist reforms were an attempt to preserve the art of thinking – and the mind, for which the art had come to be a representation – from the contingencies of linguistic mutability. Similitude’s second life as a figure threatened to subject this art to its own peculiar organization of time. According to this organization, thinking might become subject to both the extension of the simile’s syntactical markers and the labor of their accumulation.

The history of similitude both as a place of invention and as a figure of elocution marks the simile as a vexed structure of composition in early modern England. This chapter seeks to recover the antagonism between similitude’s two functions as it conditioned both the reading and the writing of similes. As a place of invention, the logical function of similitude facilitated an epistemological move toward abstraction. This move constituted a turn from temporal experience and a turn toward the spatialization of knowledge. In this sense, the similitude’s assertion of a hypothetical “as
if” marked a transition into poetry’s subjunctive space. In his *Defence of Poesy* (1595), Sir Philip Sidney described this subjunctive space as “what may be and should be.” In her important study of figuration – for which the simile was paradigmatic – Susanne Wofford described this turn toward abstraction as the simile’s ideological work. By asserting an identity between the “action” of a poem and “the cultural or poetic value attributed to it,” the simile’s claim to comparison was predicated on “the suppression of any direct acknowledgment of what could disrupt it.” If the very necessity of the simile tended to indicate that such cultural value was not inherent within the action itself, the simile’s aesthetic work amounted to a kind of interpretive violence upon that action. By contrast, as a figure of elocution the early modern simile also organized an experience of the indicative. Sidney called this the “bare ‘was’” of history. As an engine for the production of *copia*, the simile provided a narrative paradigm of accumulation. The juxtaposition of images this paradigm encouraged allowed for the very disjunction that similitude’s subjunctive claims sought to suppress. Slow but industrious, the simile threatened to wrest the subjunctive projections of its comparative claim back into an experience of the indicative and the contingency that indicative entailed.

In his “Letter to Raleigh” appended to the 1590 *Faerie Queene*, Edmund Spenser described his own poetic labor according to the act of negotiation outlined by Sidney – the negotiation between “what may be” and the “bare ‘was.’” The *Faerie Queene*, Spenser writes, offers an “ensample” of “such as might best be.” The early modern simile with its conflicting temporal claims – its projection of a subjunctive space, on the one hand and, its organization of the indicative, on the other – was among the instruments with which Spenser tested the limits of this negotiation. Most discussions of narrative
temporality in the *Faerie Queene* operate at the level of genre and identify the digressive force of romance as a centrifugal pull against the linear movement of epic and the *telos* of its quest.\(^{22}\) The simile, I argue, became a form with which Spenser could wield this digressive motion on both a local and a narrative level. On the local level, Spenser exploited the simile’s capacity for temporal organization by suggesting that the form’s syntax might, itself, come unhinged. In the following simile, Braggadochio – the vagrant who stole Guyon’s horse – climbs out from the bush in which he has been hiding. Getting himself together before Belphoebe, the beautiful huntress whose loud horn he has fled, Braggadochio reemerges from his bush as a shameless bird tending to its ruffled feathers:

As fearfull fowle, that long in secret caue

For dread of soring hauke her selxe hath hid,
Not caring how her silly life to saue,
She her gay painted plumes disorderid,
Seeing at last her selxe from daunger rid,
Peepes forth, and soone renews her native pride;
She gins her feathers fowle disfigured
Prowdly to prune, and sett on euery side,
So shakes off shame, ne thinks how erst she did her hide.

So when her goodly visage he beheld,
He gan himselfe to vaunt:

(2.3.36-37.1-2).

This simile missteps. It stumbles out of its comparative image and repeats – as if rousing itself – its own correlative: “So shakes off shame,” (36.9), “So when her goodly visage he beheld” (37.1). If, as Aristotle suggested, the simile takes more time to get from “this” to “that,” from the bird resetting her “gay painted plumes” to Braggadochio reassembling himself before Belphoebe, Spenser suggests that the simile’s syntax is itself generative of further delay (36.4). The slow thinking of the simile is capable of resisting the process of
abstraction – if only for another moment. By exploiting the correlative’s capacity to both modify the bird as she gets a hold of herself – “So shakes off shame,” (36.9) – and initiate the comparative turn toward our dubious knight – “So when her goodly visage he beheld” (37.1) – Spenser allows the simile’s temporal organization to displace the logical point of similitude. The simile’s own syntactical materials can get, as it were, in the way.

For Spenser, the local formal work of the simile also informs the larger narrative of which Braggadocio is a part. As the thief of Guyon’s horse and spear, Braggadocio’s entrance onto the scene of the Faerie Queene initiates the digressive narrative threads characteristic of romance. When Guyon goes to collect his steed and spear and finds them missing, the poet delays revelation of the thief – “By other accident that earst befell,/ He is conuaide, but how or where here fits not tell” – until a proper time that is decidedly not “here” and only, some time later, very awkwardly there (2.2.11.8-9). This self-consciousness is typical of the Faerie Queene’s central books in which the poet’s proliferating narrative threads challenge his ability to move among them.23

Braggadocio’s own narrative, however, is modeled after the labor of the schoolroom simile. Braggadocio collects, like schoolboys, other men’s ornamenta – a word, we might remember, that describes both the weapons of war and the figures of rhetoric.24 If, in fact, Braggadocio’s activity throughout the central books of the Faerie Queene constitutes a centrifugal pull against the telos of epic quest, Braggadocio proceeds through time by collecting comparative images – horse, spear, groom – and he uses them to generate his own simile: the likeness of a knight.25 His accumulation of comparative images, like the early modern simile itself, organizes the narrative temporality that constitutes this centrifugal pull against logical abstraction. In the following pages, I
attend to the paradoxical temporality of the early modern simile by situating it within the conflicting directives of humanist pedagogy. While I will suggest that the subjunctive projections of similitude facilitate the construction of “such as might best be” in Faerie land, I will also suggest that this abstraction operates at the expense of the simile’s temporal work – its peculiar organization of time, its narrative paradigm of accumulation, and finally, its historicity as a tool available for use in time (716). It will be the final move of this chapter to suggest that the abstraction of a subjunctive space seeks to efface the poetic labor of the simile and – in the case of Braggadchio – the social mobility facilitated by the narrative of accumulation that also underwrites this labor.26

II.

At least one of Spenser’s early modern readers stumbled, with the “fearfull fowle,” out of Braggadchio’s simile (36.1). In his 1617 Spenser, Ben Jonson marked a number of good similes. In fact, while Spenser’s modern readers tend to take allegory as the defining trope (or genre, or mode) of the Faerie Queene, Ben Jonson identified “Simile” alone among tropes and figures and schemes in the margins of his Spenser. Sometimes, also, and only when it was extended, he marked “Excellent simile.” Once he commanded himself to memorize one of Spenser’s similes with “M.” for short.27 In the margin beside the “fearfull fowle” simile, however, the kind of work Jonson is doing shifts. Rather than simply identifying the figure, as with a notation like “Simile,” Jonson performs the sort of abstraction against which the simile’s own syntax militates. Jonson’s notes are reproduced to the side:

As fearfull fowle, that long in secret Cauce
For dread of soaring hauke her selve hath hid,
Not caring how, her silly life to saue,
She her gay painted plumes disorderid,

An excell.
Simile to
Expresse word crossed out
cowardnesse.
Seeing at last her selfe from daunger rid,
Peepes forth, and soone renewes her natuie pride;
She gins her feathers foule disfigured
Proudly to prune, and set on euery side,
So shakes off shame, ne thinks how erst shee did her hide.

So when her goodly visage he beheld,
He gan himselfe to vaunt…

Lead in at least one wrong direction, initial interpretation no sooner written than dashed
quite, Jonson’s careful step backward seems almost to mimic the simile’s own misstep.
While Spenser’s simile seems to have slowed him down along the way, Jonson’s final
move is to elide this temporal work. The transition to “cowardnesse” witnesses an
ambition to fix meaning upon a mobile narrative image by arresting it within a
synchronic framework. The interpretive act that survives looks a lot like allegoresis. By
insisting that this simile means something “other” to what it “speaks” and by identifying
this “other” as “cowardnesse,” Jonson’s note suggests that the simile is only intelligible
within a system of thinking that cancels out experience of the simile’s temporal
organization. This notation eschews temporal experience in favor of erecting – and
securing the simile within – a schematic conceptual plane.

The danger in reading similes within an interpretive framework that prioritizes
abstraction (and is complicit in the spatial codification of a visual epistemology) is that
the simile’s form can only become a measure of exegetical slack. The “As” and the “So”
by which likenesses and differences confront one another in the simile simply keep the
recalcitrant materials – those images which resist abstraction from narrative – in
interpretive play. Thus, in the example above, “cowardnesse” circumscribes (rather too
easily) the simile’s somewhat problematic suggestion that “shame” is the sort of thing
one simply “shakes off” (36.9). Or, that “shame” persists only for as long as one “thinks”
about the transgression from which it arose (36.9). Standing to the side of the stanza, “cowardnesse” is neither acquired nor lost; it appears to exist independent of what anyone “thinks” about it. Accordingly, the sort of allegoresis evidenced by “cowardnesse” offers the simile two equally limited functions. Within what Helen Cooney calls “meaning oriented” interpretations, the comparative image of the simile might act as extra figural mass, subject to abstraction’s centripetal pull and reining those recalcitrant materials in by way of “So.” Within what she describes as “self-referential” interpretations, “As” and “So” might mark the borders of a contained space in which to play with the potentially vagrant materials. They produce the potential for digression only, finally, to dramatize an act of logical incorporation. Such readings prioritize the simile’s function as a place of invention over its function as a figure of style. That is, they prioritize the logical point of similitude as abstracted from the contingencies of time while subordinating the materials produced by the simile and determined by their temporal relation to one another. As Jonson’s act of allegoresis prioritizes an abstraction from the “fearfull fowle” to “cowardnesse,” it cancels out the simile’s temporal work. And that, in a moment when Spenser has dramatized the simile’s capacity for even slower speaking – “So shakes off shame” (36.9), “So when her goodly visage he beheld” (37.1).

At least part of the hesitation evidenced by that one word, whatever it might have been, crossed out between “Expresse” and “cowardnesse,” comes from the fact that Jonson switches, mid-note, between two different ways of reading similes. The first part of his annotation, “An excell./ Simile” resembles Jonson’s more usual markings in the margins beside Spenser’s similes. There, he simply points to the figure and names it,
“Simile.” In this capacity, his notes act like Richard Sherry’s lousy “common scholemasters,” lamented in “The Epistle” to his *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550), who “saye vnto their scholers: *Hic Est Figura.*” This first kind of reading identifies Spenser’s poem in terms of a unit of composition and suggests (as is particularly clear with Jonson’s imperative to himself, “M.”) that the simile is detachable from the poem in which it appears by virtue of its formal integrity. Detachable, the simile becomes intelligible as an instrument of production. In the second part of his annotation, Jonson performs the kind of allegoresis we see in other moments of his reading. For example, “St. George!” inscribed above Red Crosse Knight’s bumbling entrance into the poem. This notation points to itself (rather emphatically, I think) as a parody of its own reductive gesture. If “to/Expresse” does not contain the bathos of such punctuated marginalia, it does suggest that this simile thinks something other than what it speaks. It is not difficult to imagine that “cowardnesse” serves as subject heading in a commonplace book, immediately preceded by “bravery.” The second kind of reading prepares the simile for entry into this commonplace book but this preparation requires that one read through the simile’s “As” as well as its “So.” The first way of reading suggests that the form of the simile itself renders the figure available for accumulation. The second way of reading suggests that the abstraction of allegoresis is a precondition for the selection and accumulation of similes.

As Jonson’s note transitions between these two ways of reading, the object of his interpretation shifts. According to the first, Jonson locates the figure within a narrative of poetic labor. “Simile” understands the *Faerie Queene* as “Poesy,” defined by Jonson as “labour and studye... skill, or Crafte of Making.” Jonson also calls this “the doing.” By
contrast, the abstraction by which Jonson shuffles this simile under the heading of “cowardnesse,” takes, as its interpretive object, the “Poeme” or “the thing done.” With this transition, Jonson (to Richard Sherry’s great relief) prioritizes the “meaning of our mynd” over the “folyshe” inclination “to laboure to speake darkelye for the nonce.” But prior to his marginalia’s shift from studying “the doing” to studying “the thing done,” from gerund to participle, from endless work to completed action, Jonson locates the Faerie Queene within the technology of poetic labor. “Simile” registers the figure’s availability for, if not other-speaking, other-makings.

If Jonson's identification of "Simile" within this narrative of production would seem to say more about Jonson's style than Spenser's, it says even more about the pedagogical training that pervaded the early modern schoolrooms to which both Jonson and Spenser and many of their early readers, at times, belonged. Jonson's most devoted pupil, William Drummond, also marked a particularly good simile in his 1609 Spenser; according to Jonson, Drummond’s verse "smelled to much of y° schooles." One of Spenser's early modern annotators left markings pointing out only similes. “E.K” calls attention to a number of the Shepheardes Calender's similes in his printed annotations and these comments are, in turn, restrained in comparison to the notation's ubiquity in the printed marginalia of books pedagogical and also, literary. An entire subgenre of printed commonplace books devoted to collecting similitudes emerges in the sixteenth century. Following the lead of humanist educators such as Erasmus, the simile becomes a figure for which one reads in books and in the natural world as if a book. Plants, animals, all are a source of similes. The simile, in turn, becomes an engine for producing one's own speech or for converting someone else's speech to one’s own
purposes. As both text and natural world become a limitless supply of similes, the syntax of the simile itself becomes a method of composition. A common early modern proverb naturalizes this comparative work and distills it into the sort of pithiness one could inscribe on a ring or carve into one’s dinner plate: *similis simili gaudet*, "like delights in like."  

The underside to this naturalization is a fear of copious surfeit. The articulation of likeness might, by way of rhetoric’s protean powers, transform an object into a resemblance where there was no likeness with which to begin. The pilfered book of nature might run dry, as in one of John Marston’s character’s dreams. Here, the earth belches forth from the inside a parody of its own comparative fecundity:

> For methought I dreamt I was asleep, and methought the ground yawned and belked up the abominable ghost of a misshapen Similie, with two ugly pages, the one called Master *Even-as*, going before, and the other Mounser *Even-so*, following after, while Signior Similie stalked most prodigiously in the midst.

In *As You Like It*, Jacques “moralize[s]” the “spectacle” of his pastoral surroundings “into a thousand similes” and the very figure meant to gauge nature, to parcel it into useful pieces, becomes a mark of man’s solipsistic distance and its superfluous iteration, a means of isolating the individual. If early modern pedagogy’s emphasis on the sheer number of similes prioritizes the copious production of speech, abstractions such as “cowardnesse” emerge as a response to potential surfeit. As a place of invention, similitude facilitates this abstraction and reins in production under the telos of argumentation or persuasion. Thus, the figure’s apparent utility in the generation of discourse poses a particular problem for its narrative of poetic labor: if Jonson’s “Simile” imagines the poetic text within a narrative of production that neither climaxes nor concludes with the *Faerie Queene*, how did the exercises of early modern pedagogy...
control the shape of this narrative? Was the form itself always alien to the context of its appearance, pointing to its origins elsewhere? What end did the accumulation of similes serve? What sorts of texts might the simile project as a continuation of its narrative?

The fragmentation of the text implied by "Simile" is akin to the fragmentation performed by the commonplace book, a tool through which the early modern reader produced new speech from what he read. One seventeenth-century compiler described the entries in his commonplace book as "Rhetorical expressions, description, or some very apt Simile" and this attention characterized his attempt to read what he called "understandingly." Reading "understandingly" meant that, "he considers how aptly such a thing would fitt with an exercise of his." It understands reading as part of the writing process and may, in fact, be close to what Jonson meant when he suggested that, "things, wrote with labour, deserve to be so read." Following the work of Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, early modern scholars have understood reading with labor as "goal-oriented reading," what Eugene R. Kintgen has described as a "teleological" reading: "primarily practical, aimed at some goal other than private edification, typically conceived of as private education for public action or persuasion." According to this version of "active reading" the abstraction of allegoresis enables the telos of "goal-oriented reading": the subject headings of the commonplace book usher its user's selection into predetermined themes, "Cowardnesse," and the training in utrumque partem for which schoolroom disputationes have prepared its students assures us that "Bravery" does appear on a preceding page or in a preceding column. Allegoresis, it would seem, is a precondition for the accumulation of similes.
There is, however, another kind of commonplace book proposed by humanist educators. The commonplace book organized into predetermined and antithetical subject headings facilitates the “goal-oriented readings” described by Jardine and Grafton: it filters the humanist’s potentially unruly investment in the copious production of discourse into the linear logic of argumentation and persuasion. By contrast, the commonplace books described by Juan Luis Vives and, most importantly, by Erasmus in De Ratione Studii as well as the earlier drafts of De Copia, prioritize “patterns of expression” over “a method of rational thinking.” For Vives, Ann Moss writes:

The organizing principle is almost entirely lexical, and the categories employed cover everyday and unusual vocabulary; obscure and familiar idioms and expressions; amusing and perceptive sayings; proverbs and tricky passages. (126) These are the building-blocks of composition, which Vives presents as a purely linguistic exercise in which the pupil starts by arranging and rearranging phrases taken from his notebook in order to assemble mosaics of other men’s words. Rather than facilitating the allegoresis necessary to the persuasive end of rhetoric, this kind of commonplace book enables a piecemeal, aggregative composition, primarily associative in its selections and lexical in the organization of its selections. The commonplace book of “goal-oriented readings” tends to prioritize – and even, comes to claim itself as a representation of – the world of res or things. It is built to facilitate the fundamental move of allegoresis, the move away from verba or words toward a plane of ideas abstracted from the contingency of time and place. By contrast, this other commonplace book presents us with an alternative epistemology in which the engine of production – be it the commonplace book or “Simile” – is the primary tool of a maker’s knowledge.

Braggadochio acts as just such a reader in faerie land. Like the commonplace book compiler trolling for “some very apt simile” that “would fitt with an exercise of
his,” Braggadochio’s acts of accumulation constitute the laborious production of a simile. Stealing Guyon’s horse and spear, acquiring a groom in Trompart and, eventually making off with another man’s money and, another man’s snowy lady, Braggadochio moves through time by collecting the comparative images that constitute the likeness of a knight. Compiling other men’s *ornamenta*, he is a version of early modern composition, the “packet of pilfries” told by Thomas Nashe. These compositions arrive at press in “disguised arraie” and “vaunt” other poets’ “plumes as their owne.” When Braggadochio crawls out from the bush in which he has been hiding and faces Belphoebe, his “plumes” (or *ornamenta*) are all in disarray. As he sets about re-ordering his “gay painted plumes disorderid” and re-figuring his “feathers fowle disfigured,” the simile’s emphasis on individual pieces put together ill recalls George Puttenham’s description of indecorous poetic compositions:

> as th'excellent painter bestoweth the rich Orient coulours vpon his table of pourtraite: so neuerthelesse as if the same coulours in our arte of Poesie (as well as in those other mechanicall artes) be not well tempered, or not well layd, or be vsed in excesse, or neuer so little disordered or misplaced, they not onely giue it no maner of grace at all, but rather do *disfigure* the stuffe and spill the whole workmanship taking away all bewtie and good liking from it… wherfore the chief prayse and cunning of our Poet is in the discreet vsing of his figures ([my emphasis](#)).

As with “those other mechanicall artes,” bad work – the conspicuous placement of pieces, excess and superfluit – rots. They “sp[o]ill” the work because they display its labor and embed its figures in the time this labor implies. Conversely, the “discreet” poet, by using figures inconspicuously, produces an object outside of and untainted by this labor. If, according to Puttenham, indecorous poesie produces a waste that negates its labor, decorous poesie disguises the action of “workmanship” by producing an ordered (rather than “disordered”), a figured (rather than “disfigured”) poem. Work(manship)
becomes “the thing done,” at one metonym’s remove from “the doing” and the verbal – or temporal – implications of this gerund.

When Puttenham suggests that “disordered” and “disfigured” compositions take “good liking” away from the “whole workmanship,” he may be referring to a somewhat casual aesthetic pleasure – as if a watered down version of Horatian delight. He may also, however, be projecting the subjunctive telos of a decorous composition – the thing that, once done, the poetic composition ought to be like. In the fumbling of the “fearfull fowle” simile, Spenser suggests that Braggadochio’s assembly resists this sort of abstraction from its own narrative of production. His process of accumulation – the collection of comparative images and the compilation of his own exercise – is visible precisely because it is ongoing. Spenser also suggests, as the “fearfull fowle” simile repeats the correlative “So,” that the simile’s formal structure is itself capable of resisting this abstraction. The simile’s “As” as well as its “So” are among the recalcitrant materials bound to narrative. Thus, a more particular set of questions produced by the simile’s role within a narrative of poetic labor emerges: How did the conflicting directives of early modern pedagogy attend to the simile’s syntactical markers? In what ways might the simile’s form facilitate the very subjunctive projections it would also seem to resist? And how did a pedagogy preoccupied with making good use of one’s time offset the simile’s slower thinking?

III.

In John Marston’s play, Antonio’s Revenge, the dream of “Signior Simile” who climbs up out of the earth, flanked by “Even-as” and “Even-so,” suggests that the figure itself was composed of a series of discreet parts. As the Ramist schoolmaster William
Kempe instructed, the reduction of a composition into its smallest units enabled imitation. By “unmaking” a text, a student could make again another text. But the Signor’s parts are also moveable. Marston attributes a kind of agency to them – the agency to climb up out of the earth and the agency to fall into position (and, perhaps, to fall out of formation). In the case of “Signor Simile,” the agency to get fat. The “unmade” simile reduced to its discreet parts might come back from the dead – or the student’s autopsy table – as a “misshapen” simile.

As “pages” to a simile, “Even-as” and “Even-so” point to the instrumentality of the simile’s syntax, its humdrum utility if not its labor. A schoolboy’s earliest formal encounter with the simile engages with the figure’s “pages” as grammatical units. Among the various classifications of adverbs in William Lyly’s *Shorte introduction to grammar* (1567), “some,” one diagram declares, “be of Likenesse: as Sic, sicut, quasi, ceu, tanquam, uelut.” The *Grammar’s* poem, *Carmen de Moribus*, reinforces this introduction to the syntactical “pages” with a simile that, as does the entire poem, combines instruction in right syntax with instruction in right morals:

Nam *veluti* flores tellus nec semina profert
Ni sit continuo victa labore manus:
*Sic* puer ingenium si non exercitet ipsum
Tempus & amittet, spem simul ingenii (*emphasis* mine).

According to the schoolmaster, John Brinsley, each schoolboy was first expected to translate these lines, assuring his teacher that he "know the meaning of them, and can construe them perfectly":

For, *even as* the earth can cause neither seeds nor flowers to grow
Unless it is made to thrive by the continuous labor of the hand:
*Even so*, if the boy does not exercise his genius,
He will lose, at an instant, the expectation of this genius and time itself.
Next the teacher prompts his pupil to parse the text in the order of his translation; "veluti" would come early in this parsing and the child should explain, "why he began to construe there.” The child should be able to identify it as an adverb of "Likenesse" with, perhaps, a reference to the authority of his Grammar, as "set down in the booke.” The teacher might ask "what… [veluti] is like" and the child ought to point to "Sic." He may or may not have been expected to know that the presence of the correlative "Sic" is rare. Here, the correlative makes the comparative structure of the verse its most prominent form. Students may have received the most elementary instruction in prosody and thus, if prompted, the child might be expected to know that the otherwise synonymous "velut" does not fit the meter as "veluti's" long, final vowel does.

In early education, this simile became a kind of syntactical touchstone within the mind. Eventually, the students were expected to take their own English translation and turn the verse back into Latin (the process known as double translation); then, “(which is the principall, and wherein you [the schoolmaster] will take much delight),” the children were expected to recite this simile “with their bookes vnder their armes.” Taking the poem two couplets at a time, students could move onto their afternoon lessons once, as another schoolmaster, Charles Hoole advised, "they have repeated these verses of Mr. Lilies so often over, that they can say them all at once pretty well by heart." Thus the syntactical “pages” of this simile, “Veluti” and “Sic,” retrieved the logical point of similitude – the necessity of diligence – even as the simile itself served to reinforce the student’s knowledge of grammar. Memorizing the poem in fragments, a student would not have to run through the whole poem from the beginning to find his adverbs of
Similitude functions, simultaneously, in the service of abstraction and as a formal device, an engine for linguistic recollection, organization, and generation.

As a tool of intellectual labor, the slow thinking of simile becomes implicated in—if not the efficiency—then, the temporality of educational cultivation itself. Indeed the fear expressed in these lines, perhaps even greater than that of the loss of genius, is the loss of that demonstratively produced, “ipsum/Tempus,” “Time itself.” At the very moment, “simul,” that the student loses the hope of his inborn talent, “ingenium,” the time of his labor transforms into an object of waste. Even by turning “Time” into an object— one that can be possessed, one that can be lost—these lines initiate an abstraction from the experience of time, a kind of recuperative move in the face of its loss.

Rhetorical instruction prioritized the simile as an instrument for the generation of discourse rather than as the expression of a point of resemblance. Its very instrumentality facilitated the temporal work of the schoolroom. The schoolmaster might read a similitude out loud as a prompt for a writing exercise and thus, generate multiple epistles from the unpacking of its comparative claim. But the simile could also be useful for its form. This form might supply a writer with an easy transition: by allowing any text to pivot from one idea to another, the simile’s syntactical hinges became a structure to which any student might reliably refer when he needed to get to the next topic or idea. The simile might also act as a closural device, lending any composition the sense of sententiousness enacted by its formulaic alternation. Thus, as the simile becomes an engine of compositional productivity, it implicates its own discursive production in the economic enterprises of the classroom. Within this economic register, the availability
of a simile, readied – as Erasmus suggests, “in your pocket, so to speak” – offsets the form’s slower thinking.\textsuperscript{78}

The very time that similes, held in reserve, saved the student when it came time to compose was also pedagogy’s most precious commodity. The printed commonplace books dedicated entirely or primarily to the collection and circulation of similitudes (the most popular of these were Erasmus’s \textit{Parabolae} and Meres’s \textit{Wits Commonwealth}) turned the schoolroom itself into a flexible, mobile space.\textsuperscript{79} Their ready supply extended the timely productivity of the simile to a larger, vernacular audience. These collections were self-generating, understanding themselves as prompts for further accumulation. While providing schoolmasters and students alike with preapproved selections, they were also, always, incomplete, offering their readers a “taste” of what was out there in order “to arouse the young to exert their talents to search out other comparisons similar to these.”\textsuperscript{80} While copiously illustrating the first half of the meta-comparison, “just as the recommendation of learning can be supported by comparisons,” Erasmus declared that he “shall omit the second part.” By leaving unelaborated, “so can the denunciation of ignorance,” Erasmus recognizes the potential endlessness of such a project. His discourse has already exceeded a sense of boundaries and become “too lengthy” (much like the form of the simile itself). He also, however, desires “to leave something for others to devise.”\textsuperscript{81} As both things to find and forms to generate discourse, similitudes in singular and in multitude establish an endlessly productive economy that is always also incomplete, a “taste” to provoke and to be continued.

Those treatises that present themselves as “storehouses” or “treasuries” of “similitudes” translate the simile’s potential for the timely productivity of discourse into
the hyperbolic valuation of precious stones. Offering his readers “many gems encased in one little book,” Erasmus suggests that each “gem” mobilized to produce copia also contributes to the value of the new text: “by this figure the value of a sentence is doubled.”

Shunning “barbershops” and the “sordid intercourse in the marketplace,” these collections deal only in “exquisite gems from the secret treasurie of the Muses.”

If the simile builds into its form the very journey that metaphor disowns, these treatises claim to perform that journeying for their students. They claim to act as a supplement to those bound to the discourse of “barbershop” and “marketplace” and facilitate the very travel that the simile’s form keeps slow. When Astrophil claims, in an early sonnet, to shun the “strange similes” that “enrich each line/ Of herbs or beasts, which Ind or Afric hold” he makes the claim that Stella’s face is sufficient. He also, however, rejects the very economy that these treatises maintain. Like the “dictionaries methode” that allows a poem to go “running in rattling rows” or like “Nizolian paper bookes” containing “figures and phrase,” these collections of similitudes place a student’s text within an economy that takes its value from the journey its forms organize. That they do not require their students to go on their own journey at once offsets the simile’s slower form and suggests that the line between the “sordid intercourse in the marketplace” and the “secret treasurie of the Muses” is not altogether secure.

By contrast to its productivity in the generation of discourse, similitude was understood to be among the weakest forms of proof. As a place of invention, arguments ex similitudine offered abject evidence used more often by other, less rigorous disciplines (“other” to whatever discipline was at hand). Similitudes acted as both a supplement to man’s weakened intellect, what Seneca called “props to our feebleness,” and as a sign of
this decidedly less erect wit. If similitudes were always among the weakest forms of proof, the Ramist reforms pushed this source of invention further to the margins of their discipline. Within the reformed dialectic, the student was taught to subject the similitude’s “pages,” its “Euen-as” and its “Euen-so,” to a process of abstraction that denied temporal contingency. According to Abraham Fraunce, the simile’s markers – “like as, euen as, so” – constituted the “plaine and euident signes” of argument from similitude “briefly expressed.” A student proved an argument by testing these “signes” because “the coniuncion is the very relation it selfe.” By abstracting the conjunction from its temporal work in the production of discourse, a student could only appeal to doxa – or preconceived opinion – in his testing. Thus, in his illustration of a fallacious argument from similitude, Fraunce elides any attention to contingency through recourse to doxa: “As a new coate is better than an old: so new friendship, and new wine; these be not like.” The Ramist reforms were, more generally, invested in reorienting dialectic away from the probable reasoning of the discursive arts and toward the certainty of a demonstrative science. “Fayned similitudes,” however, could only ever contribute to the “plausible.” Thus, they served as the markers of the very sort of knowledge Ramism strove to suppress – dialogic, contingent and, decidedly spoken.

The similitude’s attachment to probability was a problem for the reformed dialectic. That same commitment was an asset within poetics. If, as Sidney suggested in his Defence, poets “borrow nothing of what is, hath been or shall be” committing themselves solely to “consideration of what may be and should be,” similitude’s demonstrative failure made it useful in the construction of a subjunctive space. While Sidney was ready to embrace similitude as an abstracted principle of likeness that
facilitates construction of a subjunctive space, he was not altogether sure that poets shouldn’t shun similes as tools. Readily available from newly translated rhetorical taxonomies, from printed commonplace books, similitudes filled everybody’s pockets (so to speak). The sheer number of similitudes – potential, actual – was itself a threat to decorum:

Now for similitudes in certain Printed discourses, I think all herbarists, all stories of beasts, fowls, and fishes, are rifled up, that they come in multitudes to wait upon any of our conceits; which certainly is as absurd a surfeit to the ears as is possible. For the force of a similitude not being to prove anything to a contrary disputer, but only to explain to a willing hearer, when that is done, the rest is a most tedious prattling, rather over-swaying the memory from the purpose whereto they were applied, then any whit informing the judgment, already either satisfied, or by similitudes not to be satisfied.\textsuperscript{95}

Sidney’s apparent concern for the weak nature of the evidence supplied by similitudes appears to understand persuasion as the figure’s end. He treats it, that is, as a place of invention (rather than a figure of style) and locates it within the contested intersection of rhetoric and dialectic.\textsuperscript{96} And yet, his articulation against this weak breed of evidence takes the form of a quantitative rather than a qualitative monster. Collecting “in multitudes to wait” upon the more dignified “conceits” or thoughts, similitudes signify a “surfeit” that overtakes the “ears” but does not penetrate the mind or facilitate thinking. Once a mnemonic, now the similitude distracts memory, displaces any kind of telos in favor of its own copious production. The poet with a sense of decorum knows to employ similitudes, “these knacks very sparingly.” For Sidney, the threat posed by the simile within textual production is that it facilitates a certain kind of composition by men “more careful to speak curiously than to speak truly.”\textsuperscript{97} Easily come by and, easily deployed, the similitude’s utility backfires. The figure threatens the ear with the endless iteration of its own syntactical “pages.” “They come” Sidney warned “in multitudes.”
In poetics, dialectical recourse to *doxa* survives under the sign of decorum and discretion. Sidney’s quantitative fears at once assert an ideal of proportion and suggest that the simile’s very utility – its capacity to generate *copia* – is a mark of the indecorous. In this sense, Sidney’s dismissal of similitudes limns the normative values that theories of decorum helped to sustain. His fears also suggest that such ideas of decorum were beginning to operate within a visual epistemology. Here is not so much a concern for person, time, and place as a quantification of design that registers deviation under the sign of “surfeit” and reduces the value of deviation from poetry to “prattling.” Implicit within the subjunctive projection of “what may be” is the ideological imperative of “should.” Thus, the conjunction that links the two projections in Sidney’s famous demarcation – “what may be and should be” – is misleading. The ideological imperative disguises its work with the additive “and.” On account of this disguise, the sort of composition that threatens the decorous becomes not only a violation of proportion but also, improbable.

IV.

The men who trade in these “knacks” upset not only decorum but also the harmony of a social structure that relies on the authority of the decorous. The man working with these similitudes “doth,” to quote Sidney again, “dance to his own music.” He operates, that is, outside of the poet’s subjunctive space. His very presence challenges the parameters according to which that subjunctive space organizes itself. He suggests that the line between the plausible and the implausible, what may be and, what may not be, is a social contingent. The very stability of that line is predicated on the naming and the exclusion of implausible or indecorous speech. In a moment
reminiscent of the *Defence* itself, Abraham Fraunce located the construction of those subjunctive parameters squarely within dialectical invention. “Whatsoeuer it bée,” Abraham Fraunce begins before correcting himself, “nay whatsoeuer thou canst imagine to bée, although it bée not, neuer was, nor neuer shall bée, yet by reason it is inuented, taught, ordered, confirmed.”

“Tedious prattling” wanders outside of invention’s reign and the figures according to which it proceeds mark the parameters of a zodiac out-of-tune.

If Sidney’s *Defence* tends to emphasize the ideological imperative of “should” over the more ambivalent “may,” Edmund Spenser’s defense of his own poetic strategy threw “should” to the philosophers and reserved, for poets, a more accommodating subjunctive. For Spenser, this was the difference between Plato’s instruction in what “should be” and Xenophon’s “ensample” of a government “fashioned... such as might best be” (716). Thus, while describing the “Methode” (716) of the *Faerie Queene*, Spenser defended his use of “historical fiction” as “most plausible” (715):

For this cause [the pleasing of “commune sense”] is Xenophon preferred before Plato, for that the one in the exquisite depth of his judgement, formed a Commune welth *such as it should be*, but the other in the person of Cyrus and the Persians fashioned a government *such as might best be*. So much more profitable and gratious is doctrine by ensample, than by rule. So haue I laboured to doe in the person of Arthure (716). That which “might best be” is a subjunctive space that does not limit itself to a future indicative but does understand mortal lodgings as the essential parameters of its construction. What “might best be” posits a gap between its own representation and a “may” or a “should” unmitigated by the limitations of historical temporality. As Demetrius indicated, we might think of Spenser’s subjunctive as restaging the difference between metaphor and simile:
When the metaphor seems daring, let it for greater security be converted into a simile… In this way, we obtain a simile and a less risky expression, in the other way, metaphor and greater danger. Plato’s employment of metaphors rather than similes is, therefore, to be regarded as a risky feature of his style. Xenophon, on the other hand, prefers the simile. If metaphor’s audacity lies in its claim to substitution (“this” is “that,”” Aristotle said), simile’s caution erects a comparative structure of potential (but unrealized) exchange.

Humanist pedagogy taught that the simile’s syntactical “pages” might also double as negotiating caveats intended to disarm metaphor’s disruptive potential – “as if,” “as it were,” “if one may say so.” In these moments, the schoolboy’s parsing of “veluti” returns: “veluti” might function as either the introduction to a comparative image or an apology to hedge metaphor’s bet.

By comparing his own poetic production to Xenophon’s – “So haue I laboured” – Spenser places himself along a spectrum of relative similitude that defined the textual production of the schoolroom (716). If the abstraction encouraged by invention takes the simile’s syntax out of time, the productive labor of the classroom conceived of likeness – more generally – as relative and flexible to change over time. Thus, a schoolmaster “compared” his students’ Latin compositions to the original in order that they “might see as in a mirror what they have missed.” By comparing his own labor to Xenophon’s, Spenser places the *Faerie Queene* within this textual history. This principle of relative similitude, however, constructed not only a spectrum of textual production but also a hierarchy among the students themselves: “stimulate the pupils’ spirits,” Erasmus advised, “by starting with comparison amongst them, thereby arising a state of mutual rivalry.” It is worth remembering, here, that the *Letter’s* addressee, Sir Walter Raleigh, had begun his own poem to Elizabeth, *Ocean to Cynthia*. Spenser’s engagement with a comparative textual history also constitutes a challenge to Raleigh, the sort of challenge
Spenser will dramatize in *Colin Clouts Comes Home Again* as Colin competes with “The shepheard of the Ocean” (a figure for Raleigh):

> He sitting beside me beside in that same shade,  
> Provoked me to plaie some pleasant fit,  
> And when he heard the musicke which I made,  
> He found himselfe full greatly pleased as it:  
> Yet æmuling my pipe, he tooke in hond  
> My pipe before that æmuled of many,  
> And plaid theron; (for well that skill he cond)  
> Himselie as skillfull in that art as any.  
> He pip’d, I sung; and when he sung, I piped,  
> By chaunge of turnes, each making other mery,  
> Neither envying other, nor envied,  
> So piped we, untill we both were weary.¹¹⁰

These lines dramatize the competition between poets, their emulation of one another.

They also, however, place this competition within a diachrony. They play on a pipe that “before” emulated “many.” If the careful symmetry of some of these lines – “He pip’d, I sung; and when he sung, I piped” – would seem to deny the edge of competition, they also protest too much. This competition threatens to remake the apparent equality of a couple of piping shepherds according to the social hierarchy of the schoolroom.

The act of comparison mobilizes the poet within a social hierarchy structured by poetic labor. The student’s use of simile as an engine for the generation of discourse within a composition thus becomes an instance, writ small, of a method for wielding the more abstract structures that determined both his relation to other texts and his position within a social hierarchy. As a tool that one can carry out of the schoolroom – even sell, out there, in and to multitudes – the simile remakes the parameters of the schoolroom on the other side. The simile will necessarily negotiate with a different kind of indicative outside the schoolroom (e.g. monarch rather than schoolmaster) but it remains one of the fundamental tools for building, out of the indicative, a plausible world of habitation.¹¹¹
Insofar as Spenser’s subjunctive and its commitment to plausibility reassert the normative values of decorum, it disguises the simile’s temporal work as an instrument of poetic labor. Decorum insists – like *sprezzatura* – that art disguise art and produce itself as “the thing done.” Decorum disowns (with metaphor) the narrative of “the doing.” Spenser’s problem is, then, not altogether different from the problems Braggadocio faces as he generates his similitude of a knight. Like Spenser, Braggadocio attempts to create his own subjunctive space within faerie land. After this vagrant traveler has stolen a horse and spear from Guyon, “he gan to hope, of men to be receiu’d/ For such as he him thought or faine would be” (2.3.5.5-6). If Spenser’s subjunctive, “such as might best be,” displaces its source of judgment – with Abraham Fraunce – to doxa or, as the letter calls it, “commun sence,” Braggadocio’s “would be” challenges this act of displacement (716). Braggadocio’s willed subjunctive suggests that individuated desire is never actually effaced, checked by, or subsumed within an appeal to the customary. Like the schoolboy pillaging texts for *ornamenta* – or even, like Jonson collecting Spenser’s similes – Braggadocio’s theft of Guyon’s horse and spear places his own composition within the spectrum of textual production that defined the schoolroom. According to this narrative, Guyon becomes the idealized model against which we (in the place of schoolmaster) might gauge Braggadocio’s relative similitude. The poem also dramatizes the model text as vulnerable: Guyon, himself, becomes a debased version of this idealized text walking, in most unknighthly fashion, on foot. As within the schoolroom, Braggadocio’s entrance into this narrative of textual production also mobilizes him within the social hierarchy of faerie land. Running around collecting other
men’s’ *ornamenta*, Braggadochio imagines the generation of his similitude as the means of social advancement.

Through a sustained *paronomasia* (or pun), the *Faerie Queene* suggests that Braggadochio’s accumulation of comparative images and his ability to advance within a social hierarchy are the results of his words. When Braggadochio collects the third image of his similitude, he intimidates Trompart – the man who will serve as his groom – by waving his spear and whipping his horse. He also asserts his power over Trompart by what the poem repeatedly calls his “vaunts” (2.3.13.1). Exhaling the “smoke of vanity” (2.3.5.3), Braggadochio, as a “vaunter” (2.4.1.6), offers (merely) speech. This “auaunting” verbiage is also, however, a plan for social *advancement* (2.3.6.3). When, with horse beneath him and spear in hand, Braggadochio first hatches his plan to construct a similitude of a knight, “to court he cast t’aduaunce his first degree” (2.3.5.9). The narrative of Braggadochio’s productive similitude, the accumulation of his comparative images over time, understands advancement within faerie land’s social hierarchy as the product of his speaking. When Braggadochio charges Trompart, he approaches “As Peacocke, that his painted plumes doth pranck” and he speaks (2.3.6.4):

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Vile Caytiue, vassall of dread and despayre,
Vnworthie of the commune breathed ayre,
Why liuest thou, dead dog, a lenger day,
And doest not vnto death thy selfe prepayre.
Dy, or thy selfe my captiue yield for ay;
Great fauour I thee graunt, for aunswere thus to stay (2.3.7.4-9).
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Braggadochio’s speech challenges the formal integrity of the stanza itself. A stanza holds together as a unit of verse by conditioning its reader to anticipate certain rhyme sounds (and rewarding this anticipation at the end of a line). Braggadochio’s speech challenges the ear’s ability to distinguish certain repeated sounds from others. The heavy
repetition of rhyme sounds at the beginnings of lines, in the midst of lines, the alliteration of “d” and “v” (pronounced with a kind of physiological drama at the front of the mouth): each of these qualities aligns Braggadocio’s speech with the kind of indecorous “surfeit” that bothered Sidney’s “ears.” His is a “tedious Prattling.”

Like the pun with which the poem couples Braggadocio’s “vaunting” and his desire to “aduaunce,” alliteration and rhyme (also known as, *similiter cadens*, the “like falling” of words) suggest associations between things that are the product of a material likeness that acts in the place of abstraction. According to George Puttenham, alliteration – or “the Figure of like letter” – is a barbarism that should be used sparingly. He continues, however, to suggest that it has this one virtue. Alliteration saves time. The repeated letter, Puttenham writes, “passeth from the lippes with more facilitie by iteration of a letter than by alteration” while “alteration of the letter requires an exchange of ministery and office of the lippes, teeth, or palate, and so doth not the iteration.” The production of like sounds is industrious because it localizes labor: alliteration maximizes the efficiency of the organs by which we produce speech by isolating these organs’ unique “ministery” and “office.” As Braggadocio’s recurring “d” requires the tongue to pluck (repeatedly) against the roof of the mouth, as his recurring “v” requires the teeth to bite (repeatedly, if momentarily) the bottom lip, Puttenham suggests that this action operates within the same economy of efficient production that characterized the function of the simile in the schoolroom. Puttenham’s assessment of the utility of alliteration naturalizes the simile’s syntax by suggesting that it is the product of (rather than an imposition on) the organs with which the body generates speech.
It is in this coupling of empty speech with narrative progression and social mobility that the poem first fixes – and tries to contain – the threat that Braggadochio’s alternative subjunctive orientation of what he “would be” poses to the poem’s construction of "such as might best be." The poet intercedes with a sententious judgment that attempts to isolate what Braggadochio “fain would be” – or feign “would be” – from two overlapping (and temporarily) idealized narrative paradigms. "To thinke," the poet declares disdainfully, "without desert of gentle deed,/ And noble worth to be aduaunced hye" is "the scorne of knighthood and trew cheualrye" (2.3.7-8, 6). The thought of advancing by neither the work of "gentle deed" nor the "worth" of nobility is figured as a violation of faerie land's essential construction. "Such prayse is shame," the poet declares, prohibiting Braggoadochio's sustaining paronomasia. The poet endorses, by contrast, two potentially but not necessarily overlapping narrative paradigms that accommodate, in turn, two definitions of nobility in sixteenth-century England. According to the first, a knight in faerie land advances on account of the actions he performs; according to the second, a knight advances because of his birth. If the first allows for advancement by way of actions performed over time, the second posits advancement as the fulfillment of a design already in place upon introduction into faerie land – advancement by virtue of inception. Neither narrative paradigm allows Braggadochio's superfluous speaking to project a mode of narrative progression. The endorsed narrative paradigms may exist in single or overlap but each is distinguishable: the temporality of "such as might best be" may take the shape of an epic quest or it may be determined by an act of allegoresis.
If the poem, then, seems to clearly distinguish its own subjunctive space from that of Braggadochio's desire, the poet's subsequent retrenchment suggests that the dividing perimeter is not altogether secure. His sententious dismissal continues: "Such prayse is shame; but honour vertues meed/ Doth beare the fayrest flowre in honourable seed" (2.3.10.8-9). Here, the poet retreats to the more conservative alternative and the hermeneutic by which it sustains itself: allegoresis. By rewriting "gentle deeds" as the natural extension of "honorable seed," Braggadochio is already of an alternative subjunctive by virtue of his birth. In sacrificing the mobility implied by "gentle deed" in favor of the proleptic "honourable seed," the poem suggests that "to thinke" of advancement by speaking and "to thinke" of advancement by "gentle deed" are not altogether distinguishable. The deeds of faerie land are, after all, only ever spoken. The poem's subjunctive space shifts and redefines its borders, if only for a moment, in response to Braggadochio's "flowing tongue" and the subjunctive space projected by its organizing pun.

Upon hearing Braggadochio’s “vaunts,” Trompart surrenders. He “cleeped” Braggadochio his “liege,” thereby transforming into a comparative image within Braggadochio’s simile (2.3.8.9). As a comparative image, Trompart facilitates in the subjunctive projection of Braggadochio’s “would be” (2.3.5.6) The poem marks Trompart’s transformation into a comparative image with another simile. Trompart falls to the ground “as an offal,” as a piece of refuse, discarded waste that Braggadochio collects in order that it might participate, like horse and spear, in the production of his similitude (2.3.8.7). And this comparative image “offal” – a waste that is a “falling off” from somewhere else – becomes a constitutive element of Braggadochio’s similitude.117
V.

This characterization of Braggadochio’s speech as excessive allows Spenser to register Braggadochio as an indecorous figure within faerie land. Indecorousness is, on the one hand, a method of exorcism. Braggadochio’s pretensions allow Spenser to draw a line between “such as might best be” (716) and “such as” Braggadochio “thought or faine would be” (2.3.5.6). The poem’s subjunctive space, however, then becomes dependent upon a difference that is quantitative rather than qualitative. That is, the sustainability of such a line requires the perpetuation of Braggadochio’s pretensions.

And this is the other hand: the poem’s identification of Braggadochio is not so much an exorcism as it is a goad to continuation. If Braggadochio’s method for social advancement is implausible because his speech is excessive then Braggadochio better keep talking. His collection of comparative images becomes an imperative to the construction of “such as might best be” rather than a violation of it (716).

Braggadochio’s initial theft was not a piece of refuse. The spear and especially the steed are losses that Guyon feels. “[H]is good steed is lately from him gone;/Patience perforce” the poet demands of a figure who cannot hear him, “helplesse what may it boot/To frett for anger, or for griefe to mone?” (2.3.3.2-4). If Guyon begins Book 2 as a knight “who taught his trampling steed with equall steps to tread,” he fares less well on foot (2.1.7.9). As several critics have noted, Guyon’s feet often stray from his path. In this sense, Braggadochio’s narrative digression – for which the acquisition of Trompart is a continuation – becomes a measure of the difference between Guyon and the “Temperance” he fails to embody. The narrative of production that takes its shape from the simile’s temporal work in the schoolroom – its work as a mechanism for the
accumulation of comparative images – becomes a measure of the complexity with which allegorical narratives proceed in the *Faerie Queene*.

When Braggadocio steals Guyon’s horse, he initiates the multiplication of digressive narrative threads that will disrupt both central heroes along their quests in the *Faerie Queene* and the poet’s ability to remain in control of his proliferating narratives.

In the *Faerie Queene*, our introduction to Braggadocio is belated. The poet first indicates the presence of this “losell” – a rake or profligate, someone judged to be without worth – by way of a series of absences (2.3.4.4). The first absence marks the site of an intersection not altogether different from the intersection evidenced by Jonson’s second-guessing hand. There, the abstraction of allegoresis responded to the unruly potential of a narrative of poetic labor. Here, the epic narrative of Book 2 projects its telos – the infamous destruction of Acrasia’s bower – after Guyon swears to bring about “dew vengeaunce” for Amavia and Mortdnat’s untimely deaths (2.1.61.6). Spenser suggests the perspectival limitations of epic – its insistent linearity – when we find that a horse (unnoticed) has gone missing. After passing Amavia’s orphan off to the Palmer and picking Mortdant’s armor up off the ground, Guyon turns around to find that his horse and spear are gone:

> An heauie load himselfe did lightly reare,  
> And turning to that place, in which whyleare  
> He left his loftie steed with golden sell,  
> And goodly gorgeous barbes, him found not theare.  
> By other accident that earst befell,  
> He is conuaide, but how or where here fits not tell  
> (2.2.11.4-9).

Guyon’s narrative and the digression that will account for his horse collide at “found.”

The initial simple claim that Guyon “him found” weights toward the more elliptical “found not theare” as its fulcrum shifts from the literal act of discovery to its figurative,
cognitive counterpart. The poet’s passive contraction, “He is conuaid” and its absent actor point, finally, to the last absence: the narration of “how” this horse left and where (since “not theare”) he has gone is not fit for “here.” The stanza concludes with a moment of narrative disorientation in which the poet’s “here” is Guyon’s “theare.” These spatial indicators are also temporal markers and the deferred moment of narration becomes the “not theare” where the horse might be found.

Properly, this is no kind of intersection at all. Abandoned just outside the borders of the “thick” in which Amavia will kill herself (and in that act, project the telos of epic), the horse stands as a kind of narrative marker, a token for the point at which Guyon surrenders one journey for another. Here, at the borders of this “thick,” Guyon “left his steed without, and spear besyde” and there, by stealing them, Braggadocio makes it impossible for Guyon to pick up where, and with what, he left off (2.3.3.8. emphasis mine). In so far as Braggadocio’s theft challenges Guyon’s ability to embody the virtue of Book 2, Temperance, Braggadocio’s narrative digression becomes a measure of the difference between Guyon and his abstraction. In this sense, Braggadocio’s own ability to complete his similitude of a knight, to become “the thing done” and disguise the temporal work of “the doing,” is a dramatization of Jonson’s transition from a narrative of poetic labor to the abstraction of allegoresis.

At this narrative moment (reported belatedly) one digressive narrative dislodges from epic and the production of a schoolroom simile becomes a gauge of the failures of allegoresis. “Such as” Braggadocio “would be” splinters off from (and compromises) the Faerie Queene’s ambition to project “such as might best be.” Spenser registers this moment of generic (epic and romance), or readerly (allegoresis and a productive
hermeneutic) collision as a temporal problem. Our stanza’s initial syntactical turn, with Guyon, to the fleeting location of Braggadochio’s narrative is loosely associative: “An heauie load himselfe did lightly reare./ And turning to that place, in which whyleare” (2.2.4-5). The flat, paratactic movement of this additive clause challenges the Spenserian stanza at the precise moment in which it threatens to divide into smaller units – quatrains and couplets. These are the forms that constitute the stanza’s own narrative of “the doing” and must, for the stanza to become recognizable as such, generate the illusion of having been transformed into “the thing done.” With “And turning,” the second half of the medial couplet barely connects itself to the initial quatrain. The couplet’s rhyme word, “whyleare,” is also ambiguous about the narrative time to which it points. The contingency of “whyleare” reverberates throughout the stanza in the temporal and spatial ambiguity of its other rhymes – “theare” and “earst,” “where” and “here.” This stanza never regains its commitment to the past perfect of its quatrain, “did lightly reare.” As it flounders between the abstraction of an epic telos and the potential endlessness of Braggadochio’s productive similitude, we are left in the space of negotiation that belongs to both the simile and even poesie as such – a negotiation between the hyperbolic contingency of the “bare ‘was’” and the subjunctive’s synchronic distillation.

After acquiring Trompart, it becomes clear that Braggadochio is missing one crucial ornament in his similitude – an ornament that keeps him form becoming “the thing done.” When Braggadochio runs into the arch-villain, Archimago, he is almost recognizable as a knight. Archimago is impressed by the gleam of “armour fayre” and the speed of his “goodly courser” (2.3.11.3-4). When addressing the pair, he enquires of Trompart, “what mightie warriour that mote bee,” recognizing the “offall” as a groom
While praising the “golden sell” (or saddle of his horse) and “spere,” Archimago enquires into the “wanted sword” (2.3.12.3-4). Looking to avenge himself upon Guyon, Archimago has hatched a plan that would revise the central revenge narrative of Book 2. Falling prostrate before Braggadochio (as Trompart fell before him, who himself fell “as an Offal”), Archimago begins:

To plaine the wronges, which had committed bin
By Guyon, and by that false Redcrosse knight,
Which two through treason and deceitfull gin,
Had slayne Sir Mordant, and his Lady bright:
That mote him honour win, to wreak so foule despight
(2.2.13.5-8).

The poet’s straight-faced account of Archimago’s revisionist narrative reveals no sense of falsehood in its sturdy, pluperfect “had comitted bin.” In fact, the suspended actor of Archimago’s passive construction is reminiscent of the series of absences by which the poet indicated the horse’s theft. This revision constitutes, like the series of syntactical absences that marked the fleeting location of Braggadochio’s narrative, a kind of intersection at which Braggadochio could enter into yet another subjunctive space – where, according to Archimago, he “mote him honour win.”

The subjunctive ambitions of this alternative revenge narrative is itself inlaid within Archimago’s own revenge plot for ensnaring both Red Crosse and Guyon. Upon meeting Braggadochio, he looks to him “Of his reuenge to make the instrument” but he requires a knight and this knight must have a sword (2.3.7). As both a reader of Braggadochio and a poet-maker attempting to reshape the central narratives of the Faerie Queene, Archimago recognizes that Braggadochio is incompletely assembled. Without a sword, Braggadochio is not so much a knight as someone who looks like a knight. By fixating upon the absence of a sword, Archimago suggests that Braggadochio’s
incompletion constitutes a centrifugal pull against his own act of allegoresis. If Braggadochio’s lack of a sword would seem to resist his transformation into an abstraction – his transformation from the likeness of a knight to “the instrument” of Archimago’s “reuenge” (2.3.11.6) – Archimago’s attempt to acquire him a sword seems to promise that the digressive force of a “wanted sword” will succumb to the centripetal pull of allegoresis. In this revenge plot, the poem attributes knowledge to Archimago that is specific to Book 5 of the Faerie Queene. Archimago's attempt to enact an allegorical transformation whereby the digressive knight becomes "the instrument" of "reuenge," whereby the productive hermeneutic transitions (with Jonson’s own hesitating hand) into allegoresis, is an attempt to incorporate Braggadochio into the epic quest of the Faerie Queene. In Book 5 of the Faerie Queene, Artegall becomes the “instrument” of Elizabeth’s “iustice” after acquiring his sword and the poem seems to promise, here in Book 2, through an act of prolepsis, that Braggadochio’s digressive narrative can be incorporated into a larger allegorical design (Proem.11.8-9). If Braggadochio's lack of a sword would seem to mark his difference from the "instrument" of Archimago's revenge and thus, his resistance to abstraction, Archimago's act of allegoresis seems to promise, by way of prolepsis, that the digressive force of the absent sword will succumb to his own act of allegoresis. Archimago will, like Astraea, get the knight his sword.

By proceeding from proleptic resemblance, Archimago's revision would also contain the act of predication that facilitates allegorical transformation – the transformation of a mobile, narrative agent into an abstraction. If not "honorable" in the poet's earlier sense of the word, Braggadochio's transformation would follow the narrative logic of the "seed." By suggesting that Braggadochio was always becoming an
"instrument" of "revenge," Archimago's alternative subjunctive space would place Braggadochio in an allegorical narrative in which he "mote him honour win."
Braggadochio is willing to partake of Archimago's subjunctive, but only so far. Shaking his spear and on the point, it seems, of madness, Braggadochio acts “As if” Mortdant’s and Amavia’s “liues had in his hand beene gagd.” Braggadochio is willing to participate in Archimago's narrative. This “As If” effectively places Braggadochio at the court of the Faerie Queene herself, the court at which he is "gag'd" to protect the lives of Amavia and Mortdant. Charged with hunting down the knights who hide "for feare of dew vengeaunce" (2.3.14), Braggadochio betokens the possibility of the Faerie Queene's first failed knight gone vigilante and his logical incorporation into Archimago’s design locates this disturbance at the center of the Faerie Queene's court where – according to Archimago and Braggadochio's collaborative revision – the Faerie Queene issues out conflicting directives.

Braggadochio’s lack of a sword would seem to resists his transformation into an abstraction – his transformation from the likeness of a knight to Archimago’s “instrument” of “reuenge” (2.3.11.6). While entertaining the idea for a while, pleasing Archimago with his boasts and swearing, “dew vegeaunce,” upon Guyon and Red Crosse Knight, Braggadochio ultimately backs down (2.3.14.7). When Archimago tells him that he can get him the sword of “the noblest knight” (2.3.18.3) in all of faerie land, the sword of Arthur, Braggadochio trembles with fear “And wondred in his minde, what mote that Monster make” (2.3.18.9). Braggadochio “gan to quake,” with Jonson’s own hesitating hand, between the narrative of production that has conditioned his movement through
time and the final abstraction of allegoresis, incorporation into a monstrous subjunctive space, the “mote” of Archimago (2.3.18.8).

This is only the first of many instances in which the poem – through suspect strategies – attempts to restrain the digressive force of the simile’s narrative of production by an act of abstraction. Ultimately, in Book 5 of the Faerie Queene, Braggadochio’s similitude is disassembled. Going too far with his vaunts, Braggadochio is shamed by the Knight of Justice’s right-hand-man, Talus. Artegall himself plucks Braggadochio’s “borrowed plumes” (5.3.20.7). Exposed as “conterfeits” and “forgerie,” Braggadochio’s similitude is turned into an indecorous composition: his beard is shaved, his shield turned upside down (5.3.39.1-2). Braggadochio is turned into an object of laughter and, as the crowd “gan to iest and gibe full merilie,” the violence characteristic of Book 5 transforms the simile’s narrative of production into an emblem of shame (5.3.39.4). Braggadochio’s ongoing similitude of a knight is arrested within an iconic abstraction before he disappears entirely from the Faerie Queene. This is the argument of the next and final chapter.

I would like to conclude this chapter, however, by returning to the simile with which this essay began. I include Jonson’s notes (once again). I also include a few lines from the previous stanza and the remainder of the stanza begun by the simile’s stumbling correlative. Suspecting that the animal she has been chasing is making all of that noise behind the bush, Belphoebe is ready to impale her catch until Trompart fills her in and,

She staid: with that he crauld out of his nest,
Forth creeping on his caitiue hands and thies,
And standing stoutly vp, his lofty crest
Did fiercely shake, and rowze, as coming late from rest.

As fearfull fowle, that long in secret caue An excell.
For dread of soring hauke her selfe hath hid, Simile to
Not caring how her silly life to saue, Expresse word crossed out
towards cowardnesse.
She her gay painted plumes disorderid, c
Seeing at last her selfe from daunger rid,
Peepes forth, and soone renews her natuie pride;
She gins her feathers fowle disfigured
Prowdly to prune, and sett on euery side,
So shakes off shame, ne thinks how erst she did her hide.

So when her goodly visage he beheld,
He gan himselfe to vaunt: but when he vewd
Those deadly tooles, which in her hand she held,
Soone into other fitts he was transmewd,
Till she to him her gracious speach renewd;
All haile, Sir knight, and well may thee befall,
As all the like, which honor haue pursowed
Through deeds of armes and prowess martiall;
All vertue merits praise, but such the most of all (II.iii.35.6-37).

It appears that Spenser’s poem had as much trouble getting into this simile as it had
getting out – “as coming late from rest” (35.9), “As fearfull fowle, that long in secret
cauce” (36.1). If the second, extended simile suggests that “as coming late from rest” did
not quite get the job done, it also suggests the generative potency of “As.” The sort of
half-line simile that closes Spenser’s alexandrine is characteristic of Belphoebe’s famous
blazon. (While the rest of us, with Trompart, have been gazing at Belphoebe,
Braggadochio has been staring at sticks and leaves or, more probably, with eyes shut
tight). In that blazon, the similes came out in succession: “Cleare as the skye” (22.3),
“Like roses in a bed of lillies shed” (22.6), “Like a broad table” (24.2), to name a few.
Their iterative procession attested to the inexpressibility of Belphoebe in language as
each additional simile witnessed the failure of the previous. Their procession also,
however, called attention to the production of the blazon they constitute – piecemeal and
aggregative. The fragment “as coming late from rest” reminds us that a simile is just the
sort of thing Spenser might use to fill out his alexandrine or lend it that sense of closure
In fact, when the blazón brought us to Belphoebe’s skirts, we would have done worse than to have looked for a simile in that missing half-line. Belphoebe’s “silken Camus,”

Which all about besprinkled was throughout,
With golden aigulets, that glistered bright,
Like twinkling starres, and all the skirt about
Was hemd with golden fringe (26.9).

The half-line Spenser does supply – “as coming late for rest” – suggests that the subsequent simile of the “fearfull fowle” is already excessive, already superfluous but its iterative structure – like Braggadochio’s own narrative – proceeds by accumulating more (25.9). Spenser tests the limits of the simile’s syntactical industry and, in doing so, makes its labor even more visible.

After reordering his “gay painted plumes disorderid,” (36.4) and refiguring his “feathers fowle disfigured” (36.7), Braggadochio’s assembly is precarious. Fearing Belphoebe’s own ornamenta, Braggadochio’s comparative images – what Artegall will call his “borrowed plumes” – threaten to fall again into disarray. Belphoebe saves him by an act of interpellation (that he will soon give her cause to regret): “All haile Sir knight” is an abstraction that proceeds from a comparative judgment, “As all the like.” “All haile Sir knight” is an act of interpellation that compares itself to (and understands itself as interchangeable with) greetings issued to all knights everywhere. It recognizes Braggadochio only in so far as he is like or is a likeness. We might, therefore, revise an Aristotelian conception of the simile’s slow thinking. As Spenser exacerbates the simile’s pace by repeating its syntactical “page” – “So shakes off shame,” (36.9) “So when her goodly visage he beheld” (37.1) – he dramatizes a momentary temporal resistance to an abstraction no more monstrous (and, in the Faerie Queene, no less
monstrous) than direct address. After Belphoebe flees Braggadocio’s lustful advancements and threatens him with her own javelin, Braggadocio turns to Trompart and commands, “But now for feare of worse, that may betide,/ Let vs soone hence depart” (2.3.46.1-2).
Chapter Four: Laughter and Indecorous Poetics

In the opening verse of his treatise on the art of poetry, Horace drew a line in the sand. When a poet (like a painter) attaches “a human head to a horse’s neck,” when he fixes “feathers of various colors” to the body below that neck and, when he selects the limbs for that body from among several different species, the poet steps across Horace’s line. Faced with such a figure, Horace asks, “could you keep yourself from laughter?”

The implication here is, of course, that you could not keep yourself from laughter. The unfortunate image that Horace depicts combines a set of discreet parts into something other than a whole – a mixture of pieces that depart from the mimetic telos and come apart from one another at their ill-conceived joints. No matter how hard we might try to restrain ourselves, Horace insists that we will laugh at such a dramatic departure from verisimilitude. I would like to suggest that the laughter Horace invokes at the sight of such a hodgepodge production serves as an index to the very distinction that he also looks to naturalize. Horace’s line in the sand separates the decorous from the indecorous composition and laughter, here, is an involuntary reaction to the violation of plausibility. Laughter is not just a response to the indecorous composition. Laughter names the composition indecorous in a language legitimized by its claim to physical compulsion.

Horace’s distinction between the decorous and the indecorous composition projects a formal telos for each poetic production. We might turn Horace’s line into a spectrum and imagine the representation of each formal telos at either end of a rather short continuum. At one end of this spectrum, the formal telos of the decorous composition posits a continuous shape with matching members, symmetrical and of a single species. This is a corporeal representation of what a poetic composition ought to resemble. The emphasis, here, is on a unity of form and in his conduct book Galateo,
Della Casa’s old man calls this “Bewtie”: “Where jointly & seuerally, evry parte & the whole hath his due proportion and measure.” At the other end of our spectrum, we get an idea of what a poetic composition ought not to resemble – this is an indecorous form with mismatched members weak at their impossible joints. Here, the combination of parts resists the sound body and produces, instead, deformity. If “Bewtie,” Della Casa’s old man insisted, “would consist but of one, at the moste,” then “Deformitie contrariwise, measured her selfe of Many.” Thus, if you see a woman big in the eyes but with a little nose, with “blubbe cheekes” but “flat” at the mouth, “you thinke straite that that face is not one womans alone: but is moulded of many faces, and made of many peeces.” Both Horace’s chimera and Della Casa’s composite woman suggest that departure from decorum and deferral from the mimetic telos is a matter of multiplicity. In this quantitative sense, deformity means not only “misshapen” (lt. de-forma) but also “difformity” from the medieval Latin dis-forma meaning “of diverse forms.” The indecorous text does not simply bend form out of shape. Rather, it prioritizes the member over the corpus, the piece over the whole.

Both of these images are significant as illustrations for a principle of uniformity that governs but is not limited to the natural body. This principle of uniformity abides, Galateo informs us, not only in “the faces, the partes, and the bodies” but also “more or lesse, in speache, in gestures & doings.” The pedagogical utility of Horace’s painting or Galateo’s lady lies in its ability to transform what is essentially a quantitative departure from the proportional norms of decorum into the iconic language of a visual epistemology. Within this visual epistemology, Horace’s student no sooner perceives the threat of the indecorous as a corporeal form than the threat of excess is already reduced to
finite – if diverse – forms. A visual epistemology neutralizes the threat of excess. Thus, Quintilian uses Horace’s image to warn his own students against the ornamental vice known as *cumulatio*. *Cumulatio* describes the activity whereby an orator pulls the words of a single sentence from the lexicons of several different languages – as if those words might go together as one language in one sentence. In his *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550), Richard Sherry describes this figure as “a mynglyng and heapyng together of wordes of diuerse languages into one speche.” By incorporating such a mishmash of languages into a single period, Quintilian insists that the misguided orator combines horse and human right at the neck. The images with which these teachers represent departure from decorum appeal to mimesis as a means for naturalizing the parameters of plausible speech. This appeal to mimesis disguises the ideological work of decorous boundaries by insisting that excessive speech violates a principle of proportion for which the natural world acts as both witness and evidence to that principle’s existence.

Horace’s representation of the monstrous text as a portrait rather than a poem rendered the indecorous composition both visual and static. While Horace’s laughter dismissed the indecorous, it also concealed the temporal effect of this dismissal: interruption. Horace’s comparison of indecorous poetics to the grotesque is thus a similitude that does not walk on all fours – as Erasmus would say, this simile limps because of an imperfect correspondence. The quantitative problem with indecorous poetry is its tendency towards excess. Horaces’s chimera does not incorporate this temporal dimension of indecorous speech – its capacity to take up time in the listening but also, to take up time in the making. Indecorous poetry wears its artifice on its sleeve,
it sounds out with the bells and whistles of ornamentation and calls to account the time of poetic production.

In Book 5, canto 3 of the *Faerie Queene*, Talus performs the baffling of Braggadochio in order to translate the indecorous composition of our would-be knight into the same visual epistemology that underwrites the discursive boundaries represented by Horace’s chimera and Galateo’s composite lady. The translation of deviance – discursive, ethical, political – into a visual epistemology is characteristic of Book V more generally and the iconic violence of justice whereby a mobile member of faerie land is transformed into an emblem of something else. Physically rearranged as symbolic representations of their crimes, trespassers are made to signify a moral while arrested on visual display. Thus, Artegal orders the murderous Sangliere to string his late girlfriend’s severed head about his neck, “to tell abrode your shame.” By contrast, the tyrant Pollente parts from his own head and Artegal orders that head “pitcht upon a pole on high” that it might stand as “a mirrour to all mighty men” (5.2.19.4-6.). Pollente’s avaricious daughter is drowned in the mud. Munera sinks out of sight but not before Talus dismembers her golden hands and silver feet, “Chopt off, and nayld on high, that all might them behold” (5.2.26.9.).

In this chapter, I will examine a moment when Talus attempts to transform another deviant member of faerie land into an emblem of shame, the episode known as “the baffling of Braggadochio.” Braggadochio has been running around faerie land stealing the ornaments of knighthood from other men, ornaments like horse, sword, spear, and shield. He has been putting himself together, piecemeal. In Book 5 of the *Faerie Queene*, after the celebration of the long awaited marriage of Florimel to Marinel, the
knight of temperance, Guyon, discovers that Braggadochio has been riding around on his horse, a horse that Guyon lost sight of way back in Book 2. Artegał sets up a makeshift trial scene to learn the true ownership of the disputed steed and pronounces Braggadochio a fraud, a “counterfeit” and a “forgerie” (39.1-2). With this language, Artegał draws our attention to the textual nature of Braggadochio’s composition. He calls him a “losell base” who hast “with borrowed plumes” “[him]selfe endewed” (20.6-7). We are, of course, more familiar with this insult for it having been launched against no one less than William Shakespeare, that “upstart crow,” who Robert Greene declared to be “beautified with our feathers.”

If Braggadochio’s composition has proceeded from the piecemeal accumulation of other men’s ornaments, Talus responds by plucking his borrowed plumes. When Braggadochio is “in the sight of all men cleane disgraced,” the crowd of knights and ladies who have witnessed the baffling “all gan to iest and gibe full merilie” (39.4). I will argue that this crowd’s laughter is not unlike the laughter invoked by Horace, though it restores the temporal effect that Horace’s limping simile concealed. This laughter acts as a closural device. It performs a kind of exorcism of the indecorousness that it names. After the baffling, Braggadochio disappears from the Faerie Queene, as do the vagrant narrative threads of romance that his various exploits have motivated.

In keeping with the symbolic logic of Justice established by the early cantos of Book 5, putting a stop to Braggadochio’s knavery involves transforming him into an emblem that might serve as both punishment to and representation of his crime. Granted,
Braggadochio’s transformation into an emblem is not so violent a process as those we have recently witnessed. Braggadochio’s severed head is not fixed to a pike, nor is someone else’s head strung up about his neck (Braggadochio keeps his head, though Talus does shave his beard). Neither Braggadochio’s hands nor his feet are chopped off and staked on high (Braggadochio keeps his arms though he loses that borrowed arma). Braggadochio has feigned knighthood in faerie land by pilfering other men’s ornaments and so, Artegall’s iron man Talus takes him apart piece by piece:

First he his beard did shawe, and fowly shent:  
Then from him reft his shield, and it reuerst,  
And blotted out his armes with falshood blent,  
And himselfe baffled, and his armes vnherst,  
And broke his sword in twaine, and all his armour sperst  
(37.5-9).

“In the sight of all men clean disgraced” (39.3), Braggadochio’s crime is made visible by the elaboration of his punishment and Spenser hangs something of a motto beneath this image: “So ought all faytours, that true knighthhod shame/... be banisht with defame” (38.6-8). Being “bannisht with defame,” creates something of a paradox within the symbolic logic of emblematic punishment. On the one hand, the banishing of Braggadochio with “defame” – his decomposition, piecemeal – translates his trespass into a visual epistemology. Within this visual epistemology, Braggadochio’s acts of accumulation become knowable only as a lesson in shame “in the sight of all men” (39.3). Talus fixes the meaning of these acts retrospectively but this lesson is the only perspective from which members of faerie land come to learn of the acts themselves. On the other hand, at the very moment in which these acts become knowable as “shame,” Braggadochio disappears from view “bannisht” (38.6-8). After Talus translates Braggadochio’s significance into the symbolic language of the emblem, Braggadochio
drops out of the *Faerie Queene* altogether. Never spoken of again – “defamed” or stripped of rumor, of fame, – we never see him again. The lesson of this emblem is a quick one and, once learned, the emblem itself disappears.

As a maker of emblems, Talus’s performance of the baffling is an attempt to fix Braggadocio’s meaning within a schematic conceptual plane where the spatial reorganization of his remaining *ornamenta* constitutes a visual representation of shame. In its ambition to fix Braggadocio’s meaning within this conceptual plane and to deny temporal contingency (while also freezing Braggadocio in time), Talus’s emblematics is a method of thinking peculiarly aligned with Ramism. In fact, in the same year that Abraham Fraunce published his Ramistic adaptations in the *Arcadian Rhetorike* and the *Lawiers Logike*, he also rolled out a third treatise on emblems, *Insignium... Explicatio* (1588). Arguing for an “emblematic aesthetic” to Ramsitic logic books, Tamara Goeglein has suggested (*via* Bernard Scholz) that the treatises in rhetoric and dialectic encouraged a “perceptual gestalt” derived from emblem books in which a reader mediated between logical abstraction and the ekphrastic image of an *exemplum* to derive “conceptual knowledge.” In his treatise, Abraham Fraunce refers to the symbolic theory of emblematics as a “new discipline, as it were” and it is worth rehearsing two of Fraunce’s proscriptions for the making of emblematic devices. Both proscriptions share with Ramism and its celebration of one true method a set of assumptions about the making of knowledge, the teaching of knowledge, and the temporal paradigms that sometimes distinguish the one from the other.

First, Fraunce characterizes the reading of emblems and impressas as targeted. The visual epistemology that underwrites emblematics does not embrace the pluralism
characteristic of *copia* in either maker or viewer. Rather, it is the viewer’s job to recover what it is the maker’s job to disclose: “the very intention of the author – his purpose, theme, thought and meaning.” This “intention” of the author is always prior to his act of making an emblem. It is “a concept deeply implanted within his mind.” Thus, the interaction of word and image in a device does not make this knowledge so much as it allows a viewer to access knowledge that precedes the production of the device. In the case of the emblem (as opposed to the impressa) this “concept deeply implanted” sits in that part of the maker’s mind which he shares with society at large. This concept is commonplace wisdom or *doxa* rather than the maker’s personal expression (of, say, love). Talus’s emblematic transformation of Braggadocio proceeds from the assumption that faking knighthood is shameful and the image he produces by way of the baffling looks to make this tenet visible to the members of faerie land. The legitimacy of this tenet, however, is predicated on its conception prior to the act of emblem making. In its appeal to such a “perceptual gestalt,” Talus’s emblematics only deal with Braggadocio’s parts in so far as they are visually symbolic of this concept. Thus, when Talus “blotted out his armes” and his “armes vnherst,” we get the sense not only that Braggadocio’s *arma* are tossed aside but that this is a visual representation of the dismemberment we have witnessed elsewhere (37.7-8). They are his arms. Braggadocio disappears precisely because he is no longer there (he is spread out in pieces all over the place).

Braggadocio also disappears, however, because emblematic theory privileges the instant, the single moment as the perfect site for the transmission of this concept, firmly fixed within the mind. In this, it owes something to the humanist fascination with
symbolic languages more generally – hieroglyphics, for example – but it also anticipates the universal language experiments of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{24} By privileging a moment which seems to bypass time rather than reside within it, Fraunce’s discussion of emlematics supplies the second of our proscriptions. Suggesting that the meaning of an impressa ought to be perceived by the viewer within the temporal scope of “a single look or glance,” Fraunce dictates the form of the impressa accordingly. During a tournament (such as the one just finished up in canto 3), the viewer has little more than a moment in which to see the device and so, the singularity of his “glance” requires that the maker limit the number of images contained within that device. Of particular importance to Fraunce’s quantitative description of form – two, at most maybe three, images – is the correlating claim that images are not amenable to sequence: “one cannot readily perceive which ought to be regarded first, which last in terms of their significance.”\textsuperscript{25} Here, Fraunce pits the symbolic theory of a visual epistemology against narrative. In so far as it privileges the moment as an abstraction from temporal sequence, emlematics posits as its ideal form one that is not only visible but also, static. As a form for the transmission of knowledge – the teaching of that “concept deeply implanted within his mind” – the emblematic device is built by its maker to safeguard against temporal contingency.\textsuperscript{26}

As these two proscriptions suggest, Ramism shares with Fraunce’s emhelmatic theory the fantasy of a mind in which reason operates independent of the material of its expression, thereby safeguarding the processes of reason from the contingency introduced by the mind that works with words in time. Both the Ramistic method and symbolic languages privilege the saving of time at the expense of words whose quantitative tendency to exceed things wastes time and obscures knowledge. Walter J.
Ong has suggested that Ramism was instrumental to the spatialization of knowledge and a reconceptualization of the mind as a container to which an attribute such as “deep” might be applied. What I am most interested in here, however, is how both this spatialization and the idealization of instantaneous transmission serve to displace the labor of making knowledge. Thus, Ramus describes dialectic’s ability to arrive at truth with visual metaphors that privilege the immediacy of apprehension rather than time spent in making:

> the truth of the things understood in our arts is thus naturally presented to the mind [in dialectics] as colours are to sight, and what we call teaching is not to inculcate knowledge but simply to turn and direct the mind to contemplate what it could itself have perceived had it turned and directed itself in that direction... Just as the eyes of bats are blinded by daylight, so the point of our understanding blinks and closes before things whose nature is very clear and most evident.27

Ramus takes the idealized glance and turns it into the blink of an eye. He transforms the privileged instant into the product of a physical compulsion before the visibility of truth. Both emblematics and Ramism displace the temporal paradigm of making knowledge from their closed loop of transmission and the legitimacy of their lesson is predicated on the speed with which it might be learned. By privileging the reduction of time in the process of reasoning and the comprehension of meaning, both movements separate the knowledge they claim to convey from the time – and labor – spent making that knowledge.

Ramus’s method is an important example of how an investment in the speed with which one recognizes truth produced both an instrument to aide in the recognition of this truth and a model for how the mind works. Humanism’s investment in the organization of learning saw to the production and popularization of any number of pedagogical tools for saving time – epitomes and commonplace books, for example. “Method” was among
the most celebrated of these devices and the Ramists were not alone in supplementing
their interpretation *de notatione* that *methodus* provides a “way” through learning with
the additional claim that method’s “way” is brief. “Method” as such promises to save
both teacher and student alike time: method’s path through a discipline is “compendious”
and it teaches “commodiously.” Proponents of method not only provided a catchall
order for the arrangement of university learning in total but they made the additional
claim that this order supplied the most amount of learning in the shortest amount of time
possible. Thus, the Ramistic translator Rolland MacIlmaine suggests that a solid reading
in Ramus’s *Dialecticae* is equal in value to four years of laboring over Plato and
Aristotle. Following Ramus’s method, one might attain “perfecte knowledge of the
same” in “the space of two monthes” time. Method encouraged the perception that not
only is time valuable in education but that one’s time is, in fact, subject to quantification
and control by way of method. “Perfecte” or complete knowledge of a subject is, by the
aide of method, divorced from “the space of two monthes,” or time spent in study.
According to Ramus’s method, learning is not cumulative of time but an object on the
other side of time’s space.

While Ramus’s critics – both then and now – describe his method as a shortcut
unearned, he insisted that his method was a model for how man’s mind ought to have
been working all along – had it not been perverted from its course by miseducation.
Ramus claimed that his was a representation of both man’s natural reason and the order
of nature (both of which, in turn, were reflections of the mind of God). Method is thus
as efficient as the mind of man ought to be and nature itself is. Specifically, the Ramistic
method organizes knowledge by proceeding from the best known to the least known,
from the general to the special. As Abraham Fraunce indicates, this movement reverses the temporal paradigm for making knowledge by beginning with the universal rather than the particular. If, as Fraunce suggests, the making of knowledge in time or the “inuenting of Artes” begins with “observation of particulers... the teaching and conformation” of the arts, by contrast, “beginneth at the vniuersall.” Thus, the Ramistic method reverses the temporal process of discovery or making knowledge by putting first “that which precedes in nature.” The Ramistic method remakes the temporal experience of making knowledge in the image of a logical organization that prioritizes the general over the special because it is first in nature and in natural reason.

In Ramus’s early descriptions of method, the order it provides acts as a path to both the elaboration of material already known – axiomatic knowledge available for teaching – and as a model for ratiocinative procedures themselves – dianoetics, or a method for thinking through new matter. Following criticism that his method conflated teaching with reason, Ramus himself began to pursue models for the discovery of knowledge within mathematics. His early tendency to conflate teaching with reasoning (in his discussion of method and also elsewhere) proved, however, particularly resilient and mobile. Additionally, Ramus’s claim that the same method might be properly deployed when dealing with both certain knowledge and contingent knowledge reinforced the applicability of method when principles were not known (for sure) but were probable: “as sight is the same for seeing all colours, whether immobile or changing, just so is the art of knowing, that is to say Dialectic or Logic, one and the same doctrine for perceiving all things.” Thus, even a Ramist, such as Abraham Fraunce, who distinguishes the discovery of principles (by way of invention) from their orderly
arrangement will describe method as providing a way to the “conformation of knowledge.”35 If method is not the first to make knowledge here, it allows for the remaking of knowledge (“conformation” claims to repeat formation, thereby lending legitimacy to the knowledge produced and tested by virtue of the iterability of its process). Method, it seems, provided its students with the ability to go through the motions of producing knowledge while also displacing the labor of discovery. “Conformation” reverses this labor’s temporal paradigm by moving from the general to the special while suggesting to the student (and his mind) that this is the process of knowledge formation.

The Ramistic method stakes a claim to a kind of temporal mimesis: the “way” of method from general to particular is in imitation of what is first and next in nature and in man’s mind. The Ramistic reforms and particularly, their commitment to method have as a fundamental ambition the desire to shape man’s mind according to a temporal paradigm evidenced (they claimed) by nature. Instruction in accordance with method therefore does away with those who, in the words of Roland MacIlmain, “in teaching and writing (to the great hurte of memorie) dothe put as it were the tayle formost, hauing no regard how euerie thinge is placed, but euen as it chaunseth to come into their Mouthes, so letteth it go.”36 In fact, Ramus is able to do away with the rhetorical canon of memory entirely by virtue of his method. A separate art of memory is superfluous to a mind that – trained in the Ramistic method – naturally retains knowledge in the order in which it is taught because this order is itself a representation of his mind’s natural order.37 In MacIlmaine’s description, method seems almost to replace the human mouth as a vehicle for transmission – it certainly mitigates against that mouth’s subordination to what
“chaunseth.” MacIlmaine’s opponents’ mouths are inofficious gatekeepers and the order of their discourse is subject to the contingency of the moment in which they speak – “euen as it chaunseth to come into their Mouthes, so letteth it go.”

Within the temporal paradigm supplied by Ramus’s method, by contrast, the logical prioritization of the general provides an ideal model for and dictates the temporal experience of the student; through this process of reversal, the Ramistic method displaces the labor of making from the site of learning. By casting itself as mimetic – as a representation of the natural order – the temporal paradigm of the Ramistic method excises contingency from the process of learning. The turn to mimesis also serves to legitimize the knowledge itself as its verity rests within the right operations of a natural reason.

At the close of canto 3 of the *Faerie Queene*, the fiction of emblematic violence requires that the visibility of Braggadocio’s guilt is immediate and that the emblem which allows for this immediacy appear to be the product of natural operations. Talus’s dismemberment of Braggadocio must pose as unnecessary to securing his guilt even though it is the immediate recognition of this guilt by way of the emblem that serves as primary evidence to the crime. As an emblem, the lesson provided by the baffled Braggadocio operates within the temporal paradigm which structures Ramistic method: shame is not produced by the baffling but acts as the general from which his shaved beard and reversed armor naturally emerge and toward which they instantaneously point. What is peculiar about this moment of emblematic violence, however, is that prior to the baffling, Braggadocio’s shame is supposed to have already been evident. After the trial scene in which the stolen horse gnaws off one man’s shoulder and breaks another man’s ribs, Artegall cedes the disputed steed to Guyon. He declares:
Lo there Sir Guyon, take to you the steed,
As he with golden saddle is arrayd;
And let that losell, plainly now displayd,
Hence fare on foot, till he an horse haue gained (35.3-6).

Without a horse, Braggadochio is “plainely now displayd” as a “losell” rather than a knight. Guyon also assumes that the lack of a horse is a sufficient visual indicator of Braggadochio’s shame: “It’s punishment enough,” Guyon declares, “that all his shame do see” (36.9). Both Artegall and Guyon take for granted that Braggadochio should be legible in faerieland as an emblem of shame since he has no horse. This assumption, however, is belied by the fact that Braggadochio’s lack of knightly ornaments has served as precondition to his narrative in the Faerie Queene: Braggadochio’s acts of accumulation – stealing this man’s horse and that man’s lady – have served as both a social paradigm for his movement up faerie land’s hierarchy and as a narrative paradigm for his movement through time. Artegall’s sentencing of the thief – “Hence fare on foot, till he an horse haue gayned” – is thus an act of figuration. It attempts to deny Braggadochio’s paradigm of accumulation and the narratives that it energizes. As an act of figuration, this command is a first attempt to transform Braggadochio into a representation of shame. To be without a horse, to walk around on foot, is itself a sign of shame and Artegall’s sentence attempts to perform, by way of the imperative, what Talus’s actions will subsequently make visible.

Braggadochio’s response to Artegall’s sentence is not, however, to fulfill Artegall’s command that he “fare on foot” (35.6). Rather, Braggadochio reasserts his own paradigm of accumulation with more vaunting – he offers Artegall a “lewd word” that enrages his judge and elicits the statement from Guyon (intended to temper Artegall’s wrath), “It’s punishment enough that all his shame do see” (36.1, 9). While
Artegall and Guyon assume that Braggadochio minus a horse is already an emblem of shame, Talus understands Braggadochio’s “lewd word” as the sign that he has not been translated into the visual epistemology within which emblematic justice teaches its lessons. Thus, Talus takes Guyon’s pronouncement of “punishment enough” as an imperative in need of fulfillment rather than an indicative statement of description (36.9). And so, Talus shaves Braggadochio’s beard and he ruins it; he wrests his shield and he reverses it; he wipes out the armes that have already been wiped out by “falshood” and he removes each of these arms and breaks the sword and he throws all of this on the ground (37.7). And, in the midst of this activity, he “himselfe baffuld” – a word that describes the whole host of activities among which it is here listed as a single part (37.8). If the justice in transforming Braggadochio into an emblem of shame is predicated upon the transparency of this shame – “plainely now displayd” – Talus’s activity at the baffling is belabored (35.5).

In fact, what emerges most prominently from Spenser’s depiction of the baffling is less its vividness than the poet’s own discursive inefficiency:

First he his beard did shaue, and fowly shent:
Then from him reft his shield, and it reuerst,
And blotted out his armes with falshood blent,
And himselfe baffuld, and his armes vnherst,
And broke his sword in twaine, and all his armour sperst
(37.5-9).

The orderly sequencing of Talus’s dismantling – “first he his beard,” “then from him reft” (emphasis, mine) – quickly gives way under the pressure of successive conjunctions prominent for their place at the heads of lines or for following upon dramatic caesuras. Proceeding from Guyon’s claim that the visibility of Braggadochio’s shame is “punishment enough,” Talus’s early actions – what he does “first” and what he does
“then” – work toward the telos of this representation (36.9). Their adverbial
demarcations impose a logical organization upon time by suggesting that each action is
ddictated by the concept toward which it also points: Shame. The loose coordination of
“and,” by contrast, disrupts this adverbial work and displaces the logical organization it
implies as well as the concept of shame that stands as its universal. Spenser’s repeated
ands do not so much organize time into discreet actions in the service of a telos as they
provide for a kind of discursive extension through time at the expense of logical
organization.

Rhetorical handbooks called Spenser’s repetition of “and” polysyndeton, and
Quintilian defines polysyndeton as a scheme “abundant in conjunctions.” His language
suggests that the figure’s defining structural property is one of excess: the conjunctions
flow over (ab-undo). If polysyndeton provides a scheme defined by a quantitative
departure from one principle of organization (that which is over-flown), it does so
without necessarily implying its own alternative form of organization. In his Arte of
English Poesie (1589), George Puttenham’s example of polysyndeton is suggestive of the
ways in which the figure’s formal tendencies toward excess overturn the logical
organization that figure as such is meant to merely articulate. In this example, Puttenham
takes one of the most commonplace of phrases, and he alters it by adding conjunctions:
he transforms Caesar’s, “I came, I saw, I overcame” into “I came, and I saw, and I
overcame.” The “tenour of speach” of the original, Puttenham declared, is “no lesse
swift and speedy then his [Caesar’s] victorie.” Caesar’s original lack of conjunctions
offered a stylistic representation of the speed – and presumed ease – of his victory.
Asyndeton (or the elision of conjunctions) is the stylistic equivalent to the emblematic
It ensures the disclosure of meaning by operating within the instant.

Asyndeton shuffles Ceasear’s actions into an order that both points toward victory and justifies this victory by virtue of the ease with which it is accomplished. Caesar no sooner “saw” than he “overcame.” In fact, sight seems here to be both the instrument of and precondition for Caesar’s victory; the stylistic representation of his actions asserts causality to historical temporality. By contrast, Puttenham’s adaptation of the verse makes Caesar’s accomplishment somewhat less impressive – “I came, and I saw, and I overcame.” The repetition of ands displaces the telos of victory by stylistically exceeding the temporal span of its legitimacy. In Puttenahm’s revision, Caesar does not overcome within the temporal scope of the emblematic “single glance” and the place of Caesar’s vision in this record of events is merely incidental. Polysyndeton offers no principle of logical organization in the stead of victory. Caesar’s speech could easily continue with another “and.”

Spenser’s use of polysyndeton in his depiction of the baffling displaces the emblematic telos of shame. Spenser’s use of polysyndeton also restores something of Braggadochio’s own narrative paradigm of accumulation at the very moment in which the emblematic violence of justice looks to arrest this mobile member of faerie land within a visual display. As Quintilian suggests, polysyndeton provides a “heaping” or an “accumulation” of conjunctions that could, like Braggadochio’s acts of theft or his alliterative bombast, proceed into perpetuity. In Artegaill’s sentencing of Braggadochio, a simple and singular use of “and” served to distinguish the innocent from the guilty and to deal out reward and punishment accordingly:

Lo there Sir Guyon, take to you the steed,
As he with golden saddle is arrayd;
And let that losell, plainely now displayd,
Hence fare on foot, till he an horse haue gayned (35.3-6).
This “And” draws a dichotomy between Guyon and Braggadochio. As we have seen, however, Braggadochio’s refuses to fulfill Artegall’s command and speaks, instead, a “lewd word” (36.1). In a moment reminiscent of the end of Book 2 where Gryll did the Palmer “miscall,” Braggadochio’s is a “lewd word” to which we are not privy – the poem does not record Braggadochio’s language (2.12.86.8). The poet’s description of Braggadochio’s “lewd word,” however, seizes upon Arelgall’s easy and dividing “And” and runs away with it: “the proud boaster gan his doome vpbrayd,/ And him reuil’d, and rated, and disdayned” (35.6-8). The imperative constructions on either side of Artegall’s “and” assumed that this command would determine the narrative futures of both Guyon and Braggadochio. In this sense, his command to Guyon is itself also an act of figuration. Handing the horse over for the purported reason, “as he with golden saddle is arrayed,” Artegall’s command suggests that Guyon’s rightful ownership is evidenced by the “golden saddle” that is also a symbol of temperance. This suggestion is a revision of the trial scene we have just witnessed and this act of revision subjects Guyon to the very symbolic logic upon which emblematic punishment depends even as it declares in favor of him as the plaintif. Braggadochio’s response to Artegal’s sentence – “And him reuil’d, and rated, and disdayned” – suggests that the necessary fulfillment of both imperatives as future indicatives is a fantasy of justice and that the conjunction that combines these imperatives is capable of generating alternative narrative futures – more speech from Braggadochio (and, perhaps, more intemperate behavior from Guyon). Talus’s baffling mitigates between Artegal’s fantasy of “Hence” and the fundamental contingency of its fulfillment; Spenser’s use of polysyndeton in his depiction of the
baffling pushes back. The fantasy of “Hence,” the fantasy of from here on in requires that Artegal’s act of figuration enact a temporal break. The accumulations of polysyndeton obscure this break.

With his suggestion that the horse belongs to Guyon on account of the symbol it carries on its back, the “godlen saddle,” Artegal revises the makeshift trial scene that we have just witnessed. There, the horse’s ownership was evidenced not by a visual representation of temperance but by the beast’s reaction to hearing his master call his name. This revision – “as he with golden saddle is arrayed” – is an act of recuperation; it reasserts the efficay of a visual epistemology just after a scene in which that visual epistemology failed to register viable knowledge of the horse’s ownership. At the opening of this episode, Guyon claims the horse as his own, by telling Artegal “all that piteous storie” of how his steed was stolen while he was tending to the dying Amavia (31.1). Artegal responds to this account by dismissing the story as sufficient evidence of ownership. He asks, instead, for Guyon to display knowledge of any “priuie tokens” belonging to the horse. Apparently skeptical of Artegal’s means of satisfaction – “If that (said Guyon) may you satisfie,” – Guyon directs Artegal to look inside the horse’s mouth for “a blacke spot” which is “shapt like a horse shoe” (32.7-9). I hear a dubious emphasis on that, here, an emphasis produced, in part, by the parenthetical speech tag with its double caesura. These pauses strengthen the conditional nature of the clause in which that might bring satisfaction – “If that (said Guyon) may you satisfie.” (Where did Guyon learn this lesson? The lesson that “priuie tokens” do not satisfy?) Trying to pry open the horse’s mouth “to looke” for this “priuie token,” proves disastrous. The horse
crushes one man’s ribcage, rendering him mute for life; he takes a chunk out of another man’s shoulder with his teeth.

Observing this scene, Guyon calls out his horse’s name and the poem provides two different accounts of Brigadore’s response. Paradoxically, these two accounts appear to occur in the same fictional moment, triggered by Guyon calling out the name of his horse, though they are recounted by the poet in succession. According to the first of these accounts, Brigadore’s response to his master’s naming is to comply with the evidentiary logic according to which Artegal seeks ocular proof in the shape of a horse’s shoe. Guyon’s calling of the horse’s name thus merely facilitates the elaboration of justice by pacifying the ornery steed:

Ne he his mouth would open unto wight,
Vntill that Guyon selfe vnto him spake,
And called Brigadore (so was he hight)
Whose voice so soone as he did vndertake,
Eftsoones he stood as still
As any stake,
And suffred all his secret marke to see:
And when as he him nam’d, for ioy he brake
His bands, and follow’d him with gladfull glee,
And friskt, and flong aloft, and louted low on knee (34).

According to the first description, Brigadore stands still and opens his mouth: “Eftsoones he stood as still as any stake,/ And suffred all his secret marke to see.” Spenser, however, offers a second description of the horse’s reaction: “And when as he him nam’d, for ioy he brake.” According to this second description, Brigadore’s response to hearing “him nam’d” is not to suffer the silent exposure of his “priuie token” but to respond gleefully to his master’s voice with not less but more rambunctious activity – “And friskt, and flong aloft, and louted low on knee.” If no one else loses his rib or his voice or his shoulder blade, it is because he has gotten out of the way. The first depiction suggests that the legitimacy of Guyon’s ownership is predicated on that knowledge of his horse
which remains true at all times – a “priuie token” that is a birthmark already there. This horse shoe is not like the four on Brigadore’s feet (the sort of shoes which can be thrown or worn down, the sort of shoes which had to have been put on in the first place).

According to this first description, Guyon’s ownership is evidenced within this visual epistemology because his knowledge of the “priuie token” is not subject to temporal contingency. In this sense, Guyon’s name calling facilitates access to a kind of atemporal knowledge and the adverbial focus, here, is on the immediacy with which this knowledge is disclosed: “so soone as” he heard Guyon’s voice, “eftsoones” Brigadore opened his mouth.

The second description suggests that rightful ownership of the horse is not evidenced by the viewer’s recovery of a “priuie token” disclosed but because the horse is pleased to have been named by his master. The evidence, here, is not a fixed mark exposed to view but a performance. Ownership becomes a piece of knowledge made in an extended exhibition – “And friskt, and flong aloft, and louted low on knee.” Here, “and” accumulates the horse’s activities throughout the rest of the stanza. Polysyndeton becomes the instrument of a different kind of knowledge as it collects evidence in time.

The adverbial demarcations of the first description imposed a kind of causality onto narrative temporality – “so soone as... eftsoones.” The introduction of the second description loosens causality’s adverbial grip: “And when as.” Brigadore still responds to his name (and here, we are assured that it his name and not merely Guyon’s voice that he responds to) but the successive ands leave this prompt behind. These ands displace the “priuie token” from its central position as evidence. That sort of knowledge seems superfluous to the aggregative knowledge of accumulating ands. The knowledge
produced by a series of ands that track a dancing horse suggests that ownership is evidenced outside of the visual epistemology in which Artegal has set the terms of justice (though Artegal will reassert these terms in his revision of the trial’s findings – “as he with golden saddle is arrayd”(35.4)). The trial scene offers us both kinds of knowledge: the knowledge produced by a “priuie token” already there and the knowledge made in time by accumulating ands. As far as the scene is concerned both of these explanations appear to occur simultaneously, each prompted by the single act of name-calling. In the poet’s description of this scene, the stanza doubles back on itself: the “priuie token” becomes available after Guyon “called Brigadore” and the knowledge of the accumulating ands, “And when as he him nam’d” (34.3,7).

Quintillian appears to be comfortable defining polysyndeton as a figure which proceeds from a formal commitment to accumulation and excess. He thus allows it to exceed one principle of organization without supplying an alternative (that which the figure would not over-flow). By contrast, sixteenth-century discussions of this figure take their cue from polysyndeton’s etymology “bound together with many” to supply an alternative organizational form. Thus, in his Epitome, Susenbrotus describes polysyndeton as a figure of speech that “weaves together” many conjunctions. Henry Peacham and George Puttenahm abandon Quintilian’s description of “abundance” entirely in favor of the language of knitting. In these later treatises, polysyndeton does not proceed from a principle of excess but reproduces the motions of a quotidian activity.

The language of knitting realigns polysyndeton’s disruptive excess with the mechanical arts. As a tangible tool wielded in the knitting of clauses, polysyndeton becomes an instrument of occupation. When separated from its classical associations
with abundance, polysyndeton’s potential for excess – a superfluity of ands – becomes the sign of an indecorous use of the figure rather than that figure’s formal cause. Superfluity is no longer the precondition for polysyndeton’s operations but rather the sign of its misuse. In his *Garden of Eloquence* (1593), Henry Peacham frames polysyndeton’s excess as a problem derived from the maker’s use of the figure in time: his caution reads, “too long a continuance in adding conjunctions bringeth a deformitie to this figure.” If polysyndeton is a figure that extends language through time, Peacham worries here that the prolonged labor of the maker who engages in “too long a continuance in adding conjunctions” might threaten decorous boundaries by producing a “deformitie.” Tracking a quantitative departure from an ideal of proportion, Peacham regards misuse as a decidedly temporal phenomenon. Polysyndeton marks with every “and” the time spent “adding conjunctions” and, in turn, the labor of production. If Talus’s baffling arrests Braggadochio’s movement through time, Spenser’s verbal representation of this visual stasis unleashes a narrative impulse that replaces Braggadochio’s own movement.

Spenser’s use of polysyndeton disrupts the symbolic logic of Talus’s emblems by exceeding the temporal span of its legitimacy. The transformation of Braggadochio into an emblem of shame must couple the enactment of justice with a claim to mimesis. The abundance of ands suggest that that this emblem’s representation is not produced by a natural order but a belabored activity. Spenser’s use of polysyndeton offers, in the stead of emblems, a temporal paradigm that eschews the logical *telos* in favor of the temporal paradigm of making. By proceeding piecemeal in time, the temporal paradigm of making suggests that polysyndeton may not only defer from the logical organization of a text it is meant to merely ornament. The temporal paradigm of making suggests that
polysyndeton may also supply an alternative kind of pedagogy. According to this alternative pedagogy, learning is not conditioned by the logical prioritization of what is “first” and “next” in nature; it does not posit a conceptual telos legitimized by claims to a kind of mental mimesis. Rather, Spenser’s use of polysyndeton suggests that learning occurs by accumulating, piecemeal, in time.

Learning is thus not the recovery of an emblematic argument on the other side of time’s space (“two mothes,” two years, etc.) but rather, a thinking in time. The method of polysyndeton does not quarantine the element of chance but seizes upon contingency as a formal principle by eschewing the logical telos. Peacham registers the threat of this alternative pedagogy under the sign of excess. By describing an excess of conjunctions as a “deformitie,” Peacham translates the poetic labor of “adding” and the time of this labor – “too long” – into the same visual epistemology characteristic of emblematic lessons.\(^5^2\) Time adds an extra limb. “Deformitie” suggests that an excess of time spent “adding” this “too long” makes Spenser’s stanza look a lot like our Horatian chimera. We might remember, here, that Cicero called little words like “and” the articuli or joints that connect the members or clauses of a sentence together.\(^5^3\) Peacham’s caution would suggest that in Spenser’s use of polysyndeton we have an instance of the grotesque: an abundance of conjunctions attaches an awkward number of limbs to a single body. The language of the misshapen serves as a visual representation of the indecorous text; as such it also conceals the temporal work of polysyndeton. Peacham’s caution is thus itself a kind of emblematics. It serves to register “endless worke” as a “deformitie.”

As the instruments of an alternative pedagogy, Spenser’s ands allow us to read against the emblematic argument of Talus’s baffling. In this sense, polysyndeton allows
for precisely the sort of reading that Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine have described as the failure of humanist pedagogy. Demonstrating a disconnect between humanism’s ambition to produce thoughtful citizens readied for right action (on the one hand) and its pedagogical tendency to dwell on textual minutia (on the other), Jardine and Grafton describe the early modern teacher as follows. Say, he is teaching a book of the *Aeneid* or an epistle from Cicero, it is as if that teacher “had on his desk a beautiful completed jigsaw puzzle and instead of calling up his students to look at the puzzle, he takes it apart, piece by piece.” Attending to a rapid-fire lecture focused on these individual pieces, the students “busy themselves writing down each explanation before the piece in question vanishes into the box.” Jardine and Grafton are right to question the efficacy of such a pedagogy to the production of a moral citizen. Or, in the case of *Book 5*, the production of a citizen who acts in accordance with Justice. The form of their critique, however, betrays an abiding commitment to the text as a whole: they write: “And the vital question we have to ask ourselves is whether the accumulation of fragments which the student made his own could ever take shape as the whole from which they originated.” By contrast, Spenser’s use of polysyndeton suggests that the process of accumulation may itself be a kind of pedagogy, one which privileges the time of production over and above the “whole” which may, finally, never take shape at all.

One final pedagogical example. In the sixteenth-century classroom, Richard Sherry recommended using emblems as instructional props for young children because “the childe lerne so much more gladly, and remember the better, if he may see before his eyes the argumentes properly painted.” Sherry’s goal, “to see” the emblematic argument
“before” one’s “eyes” appears to reassert the telos of that argument. Sherry’s discussion of the emblem, however, tends toward more disparate directions:

The table may haue an an Elephant whom a Dragon claspeth harde aboute, wrapping his former feete with his tayle. The litle chyld laugheth at the syght of thys straunge paintynge, what shall the master do then? He shall shew him that ther is a greate beaste called in Greeke an Elephante, and in latine lykewyse, saue that sometyme it is declined after the latine fashion. He shall shewe, that that whyche the grekes cal proboscida, or his snout, the latines call his hande, because wyth that he reacheth hys meate. He shall tell hym that that beaste doth not take breath at the mouthe as we do, but at the snoute: & that he hath teth standyng out on bothe sides, and they be iuory, which rich men set much price by, and therwith shal shew hym an iuory combe. AfterwaDES he shall declare that in Iude ther be dragons as greate as they. And that dragon is both a greke worde and a latine also, saue that the grekes saye dracontes in the genitiue case. He shall shew that naturallie betwyxte the dragons and Elephantes is great fyghte. And if the chylde be somewhat gredy of learnynge, he maye rehearse manye other thynges of the nature of Elephantes and dragons.55

In this schoolroom exercise, accumulation seems precisely the point; students “gredy of learnynge” collect words: the name for elephant in Greek and in Latin (even though it is the same thing). The name for snout in Greek which the Latins understood as a hand. Rehearsing the natural enmity between elephant and dragon may seem to reassert the emblematic lesson but the greedy student pushes the teacher on after the fact of the argument. The end, here, is not for the child to reconstruct an alternative whole but to collect words like ivory, like the ivory comb set before him, the ivory comb that “rich men set much price by.”

The crowd that gathers around the baffled Braggadochio does note engage with this emblem as a lesson from which they might collect. Thus, the Faerie Queene’s students split into two. There are those who take to the lesson of this emblematic argument and there are those who have spent too much time counting Spenser’s ands, tracing the “too long a continuance” in “adding conjunctions.”56 Students like me and
now, students like you, too. As we have seen, the construction of the emblem was itself predicated on suppressing Braggadocio’s narrative paradigm of accumulation, the paradigm that allowed for his piecemeal “forgerie” (39.2). Thus, the crowd does not do anything more with Braggadocio’s *ornamenta* (they do not even hang it from a tree). Instead, the crowd laughs:

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Now when these counterfeits were thus vncaed
Out of the foreside of their forgerie,
And in the sight of all men cleane disgraced,
All gan to iest and gibe full merilie
At the remembrance of their knauerie.
Ladies can laugh at Ladies, Knights at Knights,
To thinke with how great vaunt of brauerie
He them abused, through his subtill slights,
And what a glorious shew he made in all their sights (39).
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When Richard Sherry showed the emblem of elephant and dragon to his students they also laughed. But their laughter was his prompt. Their laughter was a way in: “the litle chyld laugheth at the syght of thys straunge paintynge, what shall the master d...”

The laughter of this crowd, by contrast, rings of the Horatian laughter with which this chapter began. This laughter reasserts the logical *telos* of the emblematic lesson and it constitutes a kind of closure: his shame becomes their shame (albeit in muted form) and the student takes to his lesson. We first understand the crowd to be laughing at the “knauerie” of Braggadocio and his groom but the ambiguity of that possessive pronoun – that “their” in line 5 – allows the crowd to turn to their own part in what has past: “All gan to iest and gibe full merilie/ At the remembrance of their knauerie./ Ladies can laugh at Ladies, Knights at Knights” (emphasis, mine). Laughter, here, is an instrument of last resort; it reasserts the telos of the emblematic argument while also drawing the bounadires of a normative social scheme – “Ladies can laugh at ladies, Knights at knights.” If Spenser’s use of polysyndeton exceeded the temporal span of the
emblematic argument’s legitimacy, this collective act of memory making reasserts the emblem’s lesson. This laughter remakes Braggadochio’s narrative into the image of a comedy – a spectacle that instructs by producing a deformity and then teaching the student how to avoid reproducing that deformity in himself.

Thus, Braggadochio’s disappearance is finally the result of the crowd’s “remembrance.” The emblem becomes an object of “remembrance” before we even realize that Braggadochio and his groom are no longer in front of the crowd. Before them in space, the emblematics of justice allows the crowd to put Braggadochio behind them in time. They do not “jest and gibe” at Braggadochio’s shaved beard; rather, as a symbol of shame, Braggadochio’s shaved beard allows them to “jest and gibe” at a remembrance from which he is no longer the central actor (39.4). Ramus’s method assists this collective act of memory-making. Instead of polysyndeton’s “heaping,” the poet describes “remembrance” with the dichotomizing turn characteristic of Ramus’s ramifying diagrams. He draws the crowd from the general “all men” in the sight of whom Braggadochio is baffled to the more particular separation of “ladies” from “knights.” Spenser emphasizes this division by eliding the verb each special shares (a figure known as zeugma): “Ladies can laugh at Ladies, knights at knights” (39.6). That this dichotomizing distinction – ladies from knights – is somewhat arbitrary to the matter at hand seems precisely the point. Ramus’s method reasserts a normative social scheme at the very moment in which it has excised the threat of excess and restored the emblematic lesson.

The “remembrance” of the crowd pushes Braggadochio into the past even as it revises this past, replacing a narrative paradigm of accumulation with the “glorious
shew” of a comedy. We might look for Braggadocio’s exit from the scene – something like Duessa disrobed and fled into the woods “from liuing eies her open shame to hide” (2.8.50.4). We would be disappointed. Braggadocio’s disappearance is a temporal dislocation. No sooner is he incorporated into the visual epistemology of the emblematic argument then he becomes an object of memory. No sooner does he become an object of memory then he is subject to the editorial practices of “remembrance.” According to this “remembrance,” Braggadocio’s temporal dislocation becomes the occasion for eliding the paradigm of accumulation characteristic of his own narrative (a paradigm resuscitated – not so briefly – by polysyndeton).

The success of the crowd’s “remembrance” becomes a measure of the failure of emblematics – “remembrance” picks up the slack of an emblematics stretched out by Spenser’s polysyndeton. Artegal’s original command offered one potential future for Braggadocio, his narrative “Hence,” one set of terms for continuation in the Faerie Queene: “Hence fare[s] on foot, till he an horse haue gayned.” The success of the crowd’s revisionist memory entails establishing a new set of terms for the continuation of the Faerie Queene. In this continuation, there is no room for Braggadocio and his vagrant narrative threads. He disappears from the Faerie Queene and the digressive narrative style of the central books comes to a partial close.59 There does not even appear to be room for Guyon in the terms for continuation established by this laughter. Guyon also disappears from the Faerie Queene. His disappearance is the price of Artegal’s own revisionist memory of the trial scene. After producing both a “priuie token” and the accumulating ands of the dancing horse, Artegall constructed an allegorical emblem. Guyon gained Brigadore not for either of the horse’s responses to his name but because
that horse completed his own emblem (of temperance, rather than shame): “as he with golden saddle is arrayed.” Guyon disappears because more time with Guyon could only give the lie to that emblematic claim.
Notes

Introduction

7 See Halpern, Crane.


Chapter One: Indecorous Thinking


3 Ramus, Arguments, 158.

4 This paradox – whereby the art of dialectic is simultaneously a representation of nature and proscriptive of nature – is evidenced by Abraham Fraunce’s chatacerization of the relationship between the two in his Ramistic adaptation, the Lawiers Logike (London, 1588). Fraunce first describes art’s allegiance to nature: “And because the true note and token resembling nature, must bée estéemed by the most excellent nature, therefore the preceptes of artificiall Logike both first were collected out of, and alwayes must be conforrmable vnto those sparkes of naturall reason.” He then, however, reverses the dynamic: “And then is this Logike of Art more certaine then that of nature, because of many particulers in nature, a generall and vnfallible constitution of Logike is put downe in Art. So that, art, which first was but the scholler of nature, is now become the maystres of nature, and as it were a Glasse wherein shée séeing and viewing herselfe, may washe out those spottes and blemishes of naturall imperfection” (Bii r).

5 Ramus, Arguments, 158.

6 Abraham Fraunce, Lawiers Logike (London, 1588a), p. 13. Hereafter cited as L.L. Prefatory material has faulty pagination, my citation counts from the first page of text.

7 Gabriel Harvey, Ciceroniumus, Studies in the Humanities No.4, introd. and notes, Harold S. Wilson, trans. Clarence A. Forbes (Lincoln, Nebraska: University Press, 1945a), p. 7. For a summary of Harvey’s printed lectures on rhetoric, see H.S. Wilson, “Gabriel Harvey’s Orations on Rhetoric,” ELH 12, no.3 (September, 1945b), pp. 167-182.

8 “mei Auditores,” (44).

9 Wilson 1945a, 10. While first year students were required to study rhetoric, senior members of university were granted the privilege to also attend these lectures (Wilson
It is these senior members that Harvey acknowledges when he suggests that his lecture is directed to students and not “istos ornatissimos viros” (44) or those “honorable gentleman” (45).

For Fraunce’s career as a Ramist (and where it overlaps with Sidney and Spenser), see Ralph S. Pomeroy, “The Ramist as Fallacy Hunter: Abraham Fraunce and the Lawiers Logike,” Renaissance Quarterly 40, no.2 (Summer, 1987): 224-246. I will introduce editions, translations, and adaptations of these works as I make use of them but for a full listing, see Walter J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 82–146; pp. 179-284. Ong’s book, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958) remains the best history of this movement and my account is largely indebted to his work.

Fraunce, L.L., (prefatory) 8.

Katherine Koller understands Fraunce’s selection of Spenser as a sign of the poet’s standing with the Sidney circle in “Abraham Fraunce and Edmund Spenser,” ELH 7, no. 2 (June, 1940): 108-120.

In subsequent decades, Gabriel Harvey will group Sir Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, and Abraham Fraunce together in scattered marginalia – as stylists of a similar vein, as those poets among “owre best Inglish” (127). While Virginia Stern suggests that the “Amyntas” of these “best Inglish” identifies Thomas Watson after his latin verse, Amintae Gaudia (1592), it seems to me at least equally likely that he refers to Fraunce after The lamentations of Amintas for the death of Phillis: paraphrastically translated out of Latine into English hexameters (1588). In the margins of Gascoigne’s Certaine Notes of Instruction, Harvey suggests that perversely accented words is “the reason of manie a good verse, marred in Sir Philip Sidney, M. Spenser, M. Fraune, & in a manner all owre excellentest poets” (173). Virgina F. Stern, Gabriel Harvey: His Life, Marginalia, and Library (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Andrew Boord, The first and best part of Scoggins iests full of witty mirth and pelasant shifts, done by him in France, and other places: being a preservative against melancholy (London, 1626), p. 1. The 1565 edition has not survived. If it did not feature this “Prologue,” the narratives of Scoggin’s activity outside of Oxford, for which this prologue is a kind of distillation, convey a similar message. Harvey recorded his receipt of the gifts inside his cover of Howleglas:

This Howleglasse, with Skoggin, Skelton, & Lazarillo, given me at London, of M' Spenser XX. Decembris, 1578, on condition [I] should bestowe the reading of themover, before the first of January immediately ensuing; otherwise to forfeit unto him my Lucian in fower volumes.

Wherupon I was rather induced to trifle away so many howers, as were idely overpassed in running thorowgh the foresaid foolish Bookes,” (Stern, 49).

For Harvey’s attempts to move outside of the university by way of print, see Sarah Knight, “‘It was not mine intent to prostitute my Muse in English’: Academic Publication in Early Modern England,” Print and Power in France and England, 1500-1800, ed. David Adams and Adison Armstrong (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 39-51.

Harvey, Ciceronianus, 45.

Ibid, 45.

Ibid, 71.

Ibid, 55.

Gabrielis Harveii Rhetor (London, 1577).

Harvey, Ciceronianus, 43.

For a discussion of the “role” Ramistic texts including the Ciceronianus “played… in inculcating students with political and social values consistent with the interests of Puritan educators,” see John Charles Adams, “Gabriel Harvey’s Ciceronianus and the Place of Peter Ramus’ Dialecticae Libri Duo in the Curriculum,” Renaissance Quarterly 43, no.3 (Autumn, 1990): 551-569.

Harvey, Ciceronianus, 43.

This is most true of mid-century studies such as William Badwin’s William Shakespeare’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944). While both suspicious of humanist pedagogy and consistently depicting the schoolroom’s arts as a collection of skills from which Shakespeare might have, equally, selected or deferred, Baldwin understands these skills as unproblematically available in the idealized form recorded by humanist pedagogical treatises. Similarly, see Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) and Sister Miriam Joseph, Shakespeare’s Use of the Arts of Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947). More recently, Rebecca W. Bushnell has described early modern pedagogical spaces as a site in which both teacher and scholar were forced to negotiate a “web of contradictions” (117). Her attention to the metaphors of pedagogical discourse, however, tends to favor “uneasy balance” over conflict, the early modern aestheticization (and sublimation) of the possibilities for failure. A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). She responds to an entirely different version of the success of humanist pedagogy in Jardine and Grafton’s insistence that humanist training “fostered in all its initiates a properly docile attitude towards authority” (xiv). Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberrall Arts in Fifteenth and Sixteenth-Century Europe (London: Duckworth, 1986). Most recently, has explored how Renaissance authors cast pedagogical failure in terms of the error of romance in Scenes of Instruction.


For a discussion of the paradox with respect to biblical translations, see Timothy Rosendale, “‘Fiery Tongues:’ Language, Liturgy, and the Paradox of the English Reformation,” Renaissance Quarterly 54, no.4, Part 1 (Winter, 2001): 1142-1164. Barry Taylor sees this paradox operating in Puttenham’s Arte: he understands the treatise’s final turn to the importance of “experience” as an attempt to maintain “the established framework of social hierarchy and authority” in the face of his socially mobile reader/student armed with method (150). Vagrant Writing: Social and Semiotic


29 Mack, p.79; Mann, p.34.

30 Below, I will outline audiences in terms of degree of access to the arts in Latin or the schoolroom more generally and this spectrum acknowledges that these degrees are shaped by class and gender. While vernacular treatises rarely address gender specifically (unless we understand those unlearned in the latin tongue to be an acknowledgement of gender), George Puttenham’s Arte of English Poesie is both singular and famous for its direct address to women.

31 Richard Sherry, in the “Epistle” to his Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (London, 1550), writes that his treatise will “greatlye profit vs in the readinge of holye scripture, where if you be ignoraunte in the fyguratiue speches and Tropes, you are lyke in manye great doubtes” (A_vii.). Also Peacham’s, Garden of Elocution... helpeth much for the better understanding of the holy Scriptures (London,1577). See also, Fenner’s Arte of Logike and Rhetorike; Thomas Swynnerton’s The Tropes and Figures of Scripture, in A Reformation Rhetoric, ed. Richard Rex (Cambridge: RTM Publications, 1999).

32 See Dolven, pp.15-64. For the schoolmaster’s careful negotiation for authority in a variety of pedagogical spaces, see Bushnell, 23-72.

33 Peacham, Garden of Eloquence, A_1r.

34 Thomas Blundeville, Arte of Logike (London, 1599), A_i_r.

35 Sherry, A_1r. In his “Epistle,” he suggests that among his motives for writing this treatise was “to renew the pelasure of mine olde studies” (A_vii). Leonard Cox invokes “such as haue by negligence or els fals persuacions be put to the lernyng of other sciences or euer they haue attayned any meane knowledge of the latin tongue” in his The art or craft of rhetoryke (London, 1532), pp. A_iir-A_iiiiv.

36 Sherry, 7-8.

37 Ibid, 11.

38 “ad verbum totam ediscetis” in Harvery, Rhetor, 41?

39 Ibid, 38.

40 Cox, 3-4.

41 John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. with introd. by Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), p.2. Composed circ. 1601. Although Directions was never printed on its own in the sixteenth century, it appears in fragments throughout the seventeenth century – in Jonson’s Timber (1646), Thomas Blount’s Academy of Elocuence (1654), and John Smith’s The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail’d (1657). See Hoyt’s “Introduction,” pp.ix-xl.

42 Fraunce, L.L., (prefatory) 2-3.

43 Ibid, 5.


46 Ibid, 2.
Fraunce, L.L., (prefatory) 3. At these moments, we hear echoes of Tyndale’s cry for the “boy that driveth the plough” and his right to knowledge of scriptures by way of vernacular translation or Cranmer’s long list of figures, “Here may all manner of persons, men, women, young, old, learned, unlearned, rich, poor, priests, laymen, lords, ladies, officers, tenants, and mean mean, virgins, wives, widows, lawyers, merchants, artificers, husbandmen, and all manner of persons, of what estate or condition soever they be, may in this book learn all things.” Quoted by Rosendale, 1154-1155.

Cox, Aiiii.

Wilson, Rule of Reason, Axiv.

Anthony and Samuel Wotton, The art of logick Gathered out of Aristotle, and set in due forme, according to his instructions, by Peter Ramus (London, 1626).


E.g. Abraham Fraunce explains, “the whole force and vertue of Logike consisteth in reasoning, not talking: and because reasoning may be without talking, as in solitary meditations and deliberations with a mans selfe, some holde the first deriuation as most significant.” (L.L., B.). See also Gerard Passannante’s account of the “containment mechanisms” with which Ramus’s method attempted “to quarantine the problem of chance and contingency.” “The Art of Reading Earthquakes: On Harvey’s Wit, Ramus’s Method, and the Renaissance of Lucretius,” Renaissance Quarterly 61, No.3 (Fall, 2008), p.821.

In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, Ong describes the Ramist relation to language as the “drive to tie down words... Words are believed to be recalcitrant in so far as they derive from a world of sound, voices, cries; the Ramist’s ambition is to neutralize
this connection by processing what is itself nonspatial in order to reduce it to space in the starkest way possible” (89). See also Jessica Nash Smith, “(Dis)membering Quintilian’s Corpus: Ramus Reads the Body Rhetoric,” *Exemplaria* 11.2 (Fall, 1999): 399-429.

59 For an overview of training in dialectic in 16th century Cambridge and a context for these reforms, see Lisa Jardine, “The Place of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge,” *Studies in the Renaissance* 21 (1974): 31-62. She suggests in her concluding analysis that the disagreements between Ramists and their conservative detractors lay primarily in the field of “educational theory” (62) but that training in dialectic in Cambridge was more broadly committed to what they perceived as “the mind’s natural operations” (58).

60 Ong (1958), 136-142.

61 For Ramistic method’s claims to mimesis, see Robert Goulding, “Method and Mathematics: Peter Ramus’s Histories of the Sciences” *Journal of the History of Ideas* (January, 2006), p. 66; “Invention, the power of finding probable arguments, Ramus derives from the Latin *in rem venire*, a laying open of the arguments which reside in things themselves. These arguments arise to invention in a natural order, an order which is itself an echo of the larger order of nature: the arguments which are the stuff of dialectic are simply the relations which obtain in nature, made present to the mind. Invention thus becomes a kind of natural reasoning, a kind of memory even, since according to Ramus its following out of the connections which reside in nature is in large past a remembering of the same patterns already encountered in other circumstances.” Douglas Lane Patey, *Probability and Literary Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 22.

62 *Ciceronianus*, 73.

63 “Some Artes are appliaable onely to some certayne subiect, but Logike is scientia sientarum… not tyde to one thing, but apt for anie thing, free from all, framing orderly, prouing strongly, expounding playnly, perswading forcibly, any Arte, any cause, any question, any man whatsoeuer” (*L.L.*, 4).

64 Harvey, for example, suggests that before Aristotle (on account of his envy of Isocrates) confused everything, “*alia erat intelligendi, alia dicendi disciplina: & ab alii rerum, ab aliiis verborum doctrina quarebatur*” (the one was the study of thinking, the other of speaking: and from the one, the theory of things, from the other, of words, was sought” (*Rhetor*, 61).


67 Quintilian, 9.1.1-15.

68 Quintilian, 9.3.88. The standard definitions with which modern literary critics work divide the rhetorical categories as follows: tropes are concerned with the “turning” of a single word into a new or strange signification; schemes are concerned with the arrangement of these words into new shapes; within the category of schemes, certain arrangements alter meaning (figures of thought) and certain arrangements alter the shape of sound (figures of speech). While this chapter is most interested in how these categories break down and thus, what it means, for example, to think with a figure of
speech, any reader might find it useful to hold these basic definitions in his or her mind as I trace categorical ambiguity. Richard Lanham’s, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) is a fine reference for the terms as they are in use in classical and early modern rhetoric. Also useful is the website, *Silva Rhetoricae*: www.rhetoric.byu.edu.

69 Quintilian, 9.3.88
70 Quintilian, 9.3.89.
72 *Ibid*, 9.1.7
74 In my use of “distinction,” “separation,” and “conflation” as the organizing terms for my history of the relationship between speaking and thinking within the disciplines of rhetoric and dialectic, I am indebted to the suggestion of Michael McKeon. See also “Introduction,” *The Secret History of Domesticity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. xv-xxiii.
75 “*Cur extra praestitutos fundi mei terminos, atq[ue] limites euagari facis? Cur mea praedia, quae ego semper amoena potius, & pulchra, & belle aedificata esse volui, quam ampla atq[ue] vasta?... cur mihi meo regno, non magno illo quide[m], sed splendido, & florentissimo contentae, mare, terras, aërem, coelum, omnia subiicis? Cur quibus ipsa & debeam, & velim morigerari, eas sub meum imperium, dictionemq[ue] subiungis?*” (*Rhetor*, 54). Contrast this Ramist position with Lorenzo de Valla’s statement in *Dialecticae Disputationes*: “What else is dialectic but forms of rebuttal, which are themselves portions of ‘invention’? And invention is one of the parts of rhetoric.” Quoted by James Richard McNally in, “*Rector et Dux Populi: Italian Humanists and the Relationship between Rhetoric and Logic,*” *Modern Philology* 67, no.2 (November, 1969), p.171.
78 Spenser, *September* [176].
79 And many of Spenser’s readers, I should add, would stop there. According to this perspective, E.K.’s glosses are only really significant by virtue of their presence and the historical distance this presence establishes between the text of the poems and their first readers. For example, the glosses’s “significance lies not in what they say about the twelve eclogues, but what they contribute to the meaning of the whole volume... by their simple presence in it” (p.7). Michael McCanles, “The Shepheardes Calender as
Document and Monument” SEL 22, no.1 (Winter, 1982): 5-19. E. Armstrong has also read E.K.’s glosses according to their Ramistic bent. She suggests that his focus on “techne” “dispenses with the potential and possibilities of poetry to effect moral virtue” as these glosses wrest the example of a figure from its “rhetorical context” (the poetry) (p.48). A Ciceronian Sunburn: A Tudor Dialogue on Humanistic Rhetoric and Civic Poetics (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), esp. pp. 40-62.

Harvey, Rhetor, 106-7.

Harvey recommends that students survey “nostris gemmis” by which I understand him to mean English bred eloquence in both English and Latin: his list of “jewels” includes Chaucer and More, Elliot and Ascham (Rhetor, 127). Johannes Sturm recommended that students keep a commonplace book dedicated solely to the art of rhetoric in A Ritch Storehouse or Treasurie for Nobilitye and Gentlemen, trans. T.B. Gent. (London, 1570), p. 22. The manuscript, Arte novata aliqua dicendi forma figura est (circ.1625, Folger MS. 234315) is suggestive of a hybrid between a rhetorical treatise and one of Sturm’s commonplace books. It reproduces the taxonomy of a treatise and provides exempla. For further discussion of rhetorical figures and commonplace books, see “Chapter 3: Braggadochio and the Schoolroom Simile.”


Wotton, 84. Anthony Wotton will supply a Spenserian example for his illustration of notation: “From Court it seemes, men Courtesie doe call,/ For that it there most vseth to abound” (86). Spenser’s reads, “Of Court” rather than “From Court” (FQ.VI.i.1.1).

Abraham Fraunce will himself arraign the “moonkish” practice of fabricating notations like “A Woman is a woe man, because shee woorketh a man woe” (L.L., 67).

Wotton, 85.

Fenner, 5; see also L.L., 51.

Fenner, 5.

Fraunce, L.L., 51; Fenner, 5.

Fraunce, L.L., 50.

Fenner, 5.

Fraunce, L.L., 35.

Fraunce, L.L., 50.

Fenner, 5.

Fenner, 5; Fraunce, L.L., 51.


“Thus much of such fallacians as bée in the woords eyther seuered or conioined: which indeed are rather Grammaticall and Rhetoricall than belonging to Logike,” (L.L., 28).

Fraunce, L.L., 26.
Although Ramus does not address Aristotle’s categories of fallacies, arguing that there are only two kinds of fallacies, “those opposed and hostile to true invention” or “to correct judgement,” his Elizabethan disciples often chose to engage directly with the Aristotelain fallacies. See C.L. Hamblin, *Fallacies* (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 138-143. See also, Pomeroy.

Thus, Richard Waswo suggests that Erasmus “calmly maintains the cognitive dualism between words and things, giving priority to words, in order to establish the initial basis of education as instruction in Latin and Grammar” without the “challenge, suspicion, or anxiety,” without “the anguish” that emerged around the humanist transition from the “apodictic dialectic of Aristotle” to “the probabilistic ones of Cicero” (p.219). Richard Waswo, *Language and Meaning in the Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

For a brief note on influence of Taleus’ *Rhetoricae* on Hoskin’s *Directions*, see Hoskins, xxv-xxvi.


Lawrence Manley writes, “the conscious Renaissance parallel between stylistic devices and logical places in artistic practices has important theoretical implications… By insisting on the logical basis and structure of stylistic devices, the figurists established a close relationship between the style of discourse and the nature of its subject.” *Convention 1500-1750* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p.145.


Philip Sidney’s Analysis of Sir Philip Sidney’s Apology for Poetry, ed. and trans. Temple, 83.

Ibid., 81.


With respect to Quintilian’s *Institutes*, gradatio’s relation to incrementum, both a place of invention (5.10, in passim) and a structure of arrangement (8.4.3-10), obscured a series of conceptual distinctions between figure of thought and figure of speech but, perhaps most crucially for the sixteenth century, those separating the first two canons of rhetoric – invention and arrangement – from eloquence.

*Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian*, 207 (trans. 133) and 219 (trans. 148-149). With respect to arrangement, he will suggest that Quintilian “has no grasp of any art at all” because he treats amplification as though it is derived from “elocutione verborum” rather than rerum “inventione” (207, trans. 133).
117 For Fraunce, “a Logicall gradation” may be “sometimes joyned with a Rhetorical climax” and may be “sometimes alone without it” (L.L., p.79). William Temple refers to gradatio as the “crypsis of method” to which he does not “object” because “it is frequently used in common organizational practice” (p.77).
118 Blundeville, p.177.
119 Rhetorics arising out of the Ramist reforms, such as Fraunce’s, tend to treat anadiplosis and gradatio as different only in degrees. Anadiplosis, “redubling, or reduplication is when the same sound is repeated in the ende of the sentence going before, and in the beginning of the sentence following after,” (A.R. p.36) Gradatio, “is a reduplication continued by diuers degrees and steps, as it were, of the same word or sound, for these two be of one kind” (A.R. p.38). In this sense anadiplosis is the smallest unit with which gradatio works. For Dudley Fenner, “Redoubling, called Anadyplosis” and “A pleasaunt clyming, called Clymax” are the two figures which repeat the like sound across sentences (pp.171-172). Hoskins defines “climax” as “a kind of anadiplosis” (p.12). Fraunce, “that which in deverse sentences is either Anadiplosis, or climax” (A. R., 36).
121 Fenner, D4v
122 Fenner, D3r
123 Fenner, D2v.
125 M.M. Slaughter has described this process of abstraction as the activity of “decontextualization” by which the taxonomy’s form removes its structures from “a sequence of time” in which they are “transitory,” and works to change them “into something static.” By wresting these structures out of their “temporal context,” the taxonomy acts against “the flow of time to which speech is subject” and attempts to hold it “in a permanent form.” M.M. Slaughter, Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 39-40. Here, Slaughter is talking about “writing” more generally but her purpose is to suggest that the “taxonomy” is a kind of distillation of this “decontextualization.” See also, Frank D. Walters, “Taxonomy and the Undoing of Language: Dialogic Form and the universal language of the seventeenth century,” Style 27, no.1 (Spring, 1993): 1-16. Walters relates taxonomic abstraction and its representational claims to Bakhtin’s notion of “unitary language.” Both Slaughter and Walters discuss taxonomic essentialism as a feature of logic and Walters, in turn, understands rhetorical deferral from the unitary as a version of “heteroglossia.”
126 The taxonomy would seem to present the tool as what Jonathan Gil Harris has called a “product”(p.116). In this sense, gradatio becomes a tool that any composer might seize or ignore and thus, the materiality of the figure is constituted by a dialectic between subject and object rather than histories of production.
Inquiry into “the qualitie of proofes alleaged” is “the square of this art,” “the touchstone of Logike” (William Temple, *A logicall analysis of twentie selecte psalmes* (London, 1605), p. 2-3).

Paraclesis, 121.

Puttenham, 308.

L.L., 99. By likening the sorites to “Penelope’s telam,” Fraunce understands the structure as a tool for the generation of an argument, and, in turn, the dissolution of that argument by the refutation of its points. In this, he departs from Cicero and Erasmus. Cicero employed the similitude of Penelope’s telam to launch a critique against Stoic dialectic: “Your dialectical art,” Cicero suggested, “ends up undermining its own principles, like Penelope unraveling her weaving.” In his *Adages*, Erasmus explains that “Penelope’s telam” is a figure for “tak[ing] up a useless task, and then undo[ing] what one has done.” Thus, according to Erasmus, when Cicero questions the utility of a “science” that “destroys at the end the steps that came before, like Penelope unweaving her web,” Cicero “is thinking of [stoic] dialectic, which by the same reasoning which has been used to make an assertion, subsequently weakens and destroys it, so that nothing seems to have been settled” (352-353). For both Cicero and Erasmus, “Penelope’s telam” is a figure for fruitless labor – a structure that weaves vague causal relations only to pass the time and mark the limits of a waste of time. *Collected Works of Erasmus, Adages i1 to Iv100*, trans. R.A.B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 352. Cicero, *On Academic Skepticism*, trans. Charles Brittain (Indianapolis: Hackett Publichising Company, Inc., 2006), p. 55. See also, *De Oratore* 2.158.

Rhetoric and dialectic – as represented in these vernacular treatises – thus belong among what Patricia Parker has called “artisinal crafts” in, “Rude Mechanicals,” in *Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture*, ed. Margareta De Grazia, Maureen Quilligan, and Peter Stallybrass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 43-82. Esp. 49-53. According to this diachronic configuration, these tools move away from the Ramist’s essentialist claims of representing a “natural method” and toward what Henry Turner has described as a “maker’s knowledge.” According to the “maker’s knowledge,” Turner suggests that “the subject knows a thing not by observing it, collecting it, or formulating logically true statements about it, but because he is instrumental in the process of its coming to be” (Turner, 544).

We might discover a nod, I think, to the commonplace distinction between logic and rhetoric as that between a man’s hand, closed and displayed. Richard Rainold, for example, compared Logic to the fist which “closeth and shutteth into one, the iointes and partes of the hande, & with mightie force and strength, wrappeth and closeth in thynges apprehended.” By contrast, rhetoric is like the hand set large, wherein euer part and ioint is manifeste, and euer vaine as braunches of trées sette at scope and libertée. So of like sort, Rhetorike in most ample and large manner, dilateth and setteth out small thynges or wordes (Rainolde, A.iv.v). If the traditional distinction between logic and rhetoric afforded strength of argument to the former and persuasive clarity to the latter, Fraunce’s exemplum takes the sinews out
of *gradatio* and the category of figures of eloquence to which it belongs. For a partial list of sources for this commonplace, see Ong (1958) n. 24 (pp.322-323). He notes that the Ramists worked this simile to a different end: “clunch fist of logic (good to knock down a man at a blow) can so open itself to smooth and stroke with the pal thereof” (Thomas Fuller in, Ong (1958), p.16). For the Ramists, the reformed dialectic does double duty. Jenny Mann has suggested that Sidney’s *New Arcadia* was read as a “handbook of English Rhetoric” (p. 25). Fraunce’s text may have been, in part, an agent in this generic configuration. Before any version of the *Arcadia* was available as printed Romance, fragments appeared in Fraunce’s *Arcadian Rhetorike* as the *exempla* of rhetorical figures: readers of Fraunce’s text were thus predisposed to pursue the *Arcadia* with one eye or ear out for its figures. An early modern reader’s annotations to *Arcadia* (1593) include, among the more usual Latin, French, and Greek marginalia, the underlining of this use of *gradatio*: “His armes no oftener gaue blowes. then the blowes gaue wounds, then the wounds gaue deaths” (133). Folger Copy HH190.24.

Sir Philip Sidney, *Old Arcadia*, ed. Katherine Duncan Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) *emphasis*, mine 149; Quintilian separates “gradatio” from his account of figures of thought (and classifies it as a figure of repetition) because of his sense that it offers a rather shameless display of artifice: gradatio, he warns, “has a more obvious and conscious art about it, and accordingly should be used less often” (9.3.55).

Hoskins, 13.

Peacham, 5.

Harvey, *Rhetor*, 106.

Peacham, 133.


Peacham’s own *exempla* maintain this ideal. Take “All are yours, you are Christes, and Christ is Gods” (133). Here, the rhetorical ascension confirms a divine hierarchy but, more importantly, I think, his insistence on the maintenance of this hierarchy and the emphatic nature of its close suggest both the possibility of its disruption and the possibility that it might keep going. Moreover, should *gradatio* defer from the bounds of due proportion, it might open up the objects of its hierarchy to reevaluation.


Puttenham, 298.

Puttenham, 299.


“As Zelmane was coming to the later end of her song, she might see the same waterspaniel, which before had hunted, come and fetch away one of Philoclea’s gloves, whose fine proportion showed well what a dainty guest was wont there to be lodged” (p.291). *New Arcadia*, ed. Maurice Evans (London: Penguin, 1977).


Puttenham, 308 (*emphasis*, mine).
E.g. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 168; the “seasoning” becomes the “meat” (p.172); Cicero, *De Oratore* 3.25.98-100. This “excess” is, as with *Eloquen·ta*, gendered female: see Puttenham, 272. See also, Thomas Wilson, *Art of Rhetoric*, 192.

Puttenham, 265; Richard Sherry names it “sedulitas superflua” (Cv).

Peacham, 1577, Giiiiv. This is at the heart of Harrington’s critique that Punteham presents poetry-making as if it were an “art” rather than a “gift.” He suggests that Puttenham, putting forth “so many new named figures… the poore gentleman laboreth greatly to proue, or rather to make Poetrie an art, and reciteth as you may see in the plurall number, some pluralities of patternes, and parcels of his owne Poetrie, with diuers peecees of Partheniads and hymnes in praise of the most praise-worthy: yet whatsoeuer he would proue by all these, sure in my poore opinion he doth proue nothing more plainly, then that which M. Sidney and all the learned er sort that haue written of it do pronounce, namely that it is a gift and not an art” (3). John Harington, “Preface” to *Orlando Furioso* (London, 1607).

Thomas Wilson, “aptness”: “Such are thought apt words that properly agree unto the thing which they signify, and plainly express the nature of the same” (*Art of Rhetoric*, p.191).

Hoskins, 15. See also Harvey, *Rhetor*: “sic tamen ista velim omnia temperetis… videantur” (p.107). Also cited by Hillman, 76. See also Jonson’s *Discoveries*, in which he discusses “Discretio”: “Respect to discerne, what fits your selfe; him to whom you write; and that which you handle, which is a quality fit to conclude the rest, because it doth include all. And that must proceed from ripenesse of judgement, which as one truly saith, is gotten by foure meanes, *God, Nature, Diligence*, and *Conversation*. Serve the first well, and the rest will serve you.”

Puttenham, 261.

“But herein resteth the difficultie to know what this good grace is, & wherein it consisteth, for peraduenture it be easier to conceve then to expresse” (261)

Puttenham, 282.


For Taylor, this is the tension between “method” and “experience”: “Whereas the rule claims to exercise a prior government of experience, and retains an ideality and unity in relation to the fissile, multiplicitous nature of the experience which it governs, the example claims merely to supplement a quantitative deficiency in experience itself. Rather than articulating the rule of decorum by which experience may be mastered, the text now provides instances of unmediated experience from which the nature of decorum has to be inferred. Puttenham’s discourse undergoes an erosion of the self-consistent ideality which characterizes the sovereignty of method and begins to manifest the fragmentation and particularity of the material which it claims to organize. Instead of a generally prescriptive text standing in opposition to the flux of experience, the Arte now appears as a discourse which seeks to pre-empt the ungovernable speech-act instance by instance, and so threatens to become as interminable as actuality itself,” (146).

The rhetorician’s emphasis on the perception of integrity rather than the discernment of structures imagines its mimetic telos as a sound body. E.g. the “artificer” as “Phisition” (Puttenham, pp. 308-09); Thomas Wilson quotes Quintilian, “Quintilian likeneth the colors of rhetoric to a man’s eyesight. ‘And now,’ quod he, ‘I would not have all the body to be full of eyes or nothing but eyes, for then the other parts should want their due place and proportion’” (A of R, 194; also 196). Thus, when Cicero’s Crassus discusses eloquent style, he suggests it does not belong to and cannot be perceived from “singulorum articulorum” (individual members) but belongs, rather, to “toto corpore” (the whole body). Also, Puttenham, 268; the anecdote of an exposed courtier and the injunction “all such persons as take pleasure to shew their limbs, specially those that nature hath commanded out of sight” should either “go stake naked, or else resort backe to the comely and modest fashion of their own countrie apparel” (290).

De Oratore 3.1.195. For Cicero, unlike his early modern students, this “subconcion instinct” is endowed to all men. “It is remarkable,” Crassus claims, “how little difference there is between the expert and the plain man as critics, though there is a great gap between them as performers” (3.1.197). He speaks, here, specifically of the rhythmic proportion of the period.

Puttenham, 160.

“Discretion,” in this sense, is closely related to *sprezzatura* and *celare artem*. For a discussion of these two terms in relation to decorum, see Heinrich F. Plett, “Style in Renaissance Poetics,” *Renaissance Eloquence*, 356-375. 369.

Thus, the opposite of the “discreetest man” is the “simple” (sim, one; plex, to fold) man – unmixed, without complication – in addition to the class implications (p.264).

Puttenham, 270.

Hoskins, 12.

Ramus, *Arguments*, 158.

**Chapter Two: Spenser’s Staffe**


4. William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (New York: New Directions, 1947), p.33. George Saintsbury describes this pause as a motion, the hexameter as “a great stroke by a mighty swimmer... it is greatly in this that the untiring character of the Faerie Queene consists” (p.43). *A History of English Prosody*, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1906). See


7 While critics have attended to the influence of the Metamorphoses in Spenser’s poetics and in Renaissance literature at large, much less attention has been paid to his exile elegies. I am not, however, the first to suggest this influence: Syrithe Pugh (for example) has suggested that Spenser presents the Calender’s Colin as “a figure of Ovidian exile,” a figure through which Spenser expresses “his ideological distance from the centre of power.” *Spenser and Ovid* (Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005). She also suggests that Colin’s journey in *Colin Clouts Comes Home Again* is modeled after Ovid’s journey from Rome to Tomis, pp.180-183.


9 As Robert O. Evans pointed out some time ago, Spenser’s modern readers tend to exhibit an unmitigated “gratitude to Spenser for not having written the Faerie Queene in classical hexameters.” He continues to articulate the assumption that underwrites our sense of Spenser’s commitment to vernacular verse: “Fears that Spenser might seriously have become a quantitatvist are unfounded... Spenser was deeply committed to the traditional, native prosody, not only because he was an Englishman brought up on the rhythms of Chaucer but also because of his serious, earlier work in the *Shepheardes Calender*” (253). Robert O. Evans, “Spenser’s Role in the Controversy Over Quantitative Verse,” *Neophilologische Mitterlungen* 57 (1956). In his *Observations in the Art of English Poesy* (1602) Thomas Campion describes rhyme as an instrument of torture that deforms thought and insists that a poet could not “without blushing” look upon his “lame halting rhymes” (p.284). In, Sidney’s ‘The Defence of Poesy’ and Selected Renaissance Literary Criticism.


S.K. Heninger’s *The Subtext of Form in the English Renaissance: Proportion Poeticall* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1994) is a useful exploration of this tension.

Spenser and Harvey, 463.

Spenser concludes that the earth is a “distempered” masculine body that “moveth with the very impulsive force of the malady, and not trembleth, or quaketh for dastardly fear” as the female body might.

Spenser and Harvey, 452.

Spenser and Harvey, 453.

Spenser and Harvey, 453-454.

Spenser and Harvey, 456.

Spenser and Harvey, 457.

Spenser and Harvey, 452.

Spenser and Harvey, 456.

Harvey suggests that Cambridge cannot tell the difference between “Tully, and Tom Tooly” – there is “much verball and sophisticall iangling: little subtile and effectual disputing: noble and royall Eloquence, the best and persuasiblest Eloquence” (p.460).

E.g. Evans, 253.

Spenser and Harvey, 16.

On the final page of a Gower manuscript owned by Spenser’s patroness, Ann Russel, Lady of Warwick, the following lines appear with the name, “Spenserus” inscribed along the side:

\[
\text{Tempore foelici} \\
\text{multi numerantur amici} \\
\{ \\
\text{Cum fortuna perit} \\
\text{nullus amicus erit} \\
\} \\
\text{Spenserus}
\]

These lines are adapted from Ovid’s *Tristia* and they rehearse the reversal of fortune characteristic of the poet’s lament as the number of his friends diminishes with exile. It is not entirely clear what motivated a reader – Rosemond Tuve has suggested that that
reader is Spenser himself – to inscribe these couplets and then “Spenserus,” along the side. What is, perhaps, most peculiar about these lines, however, is not that Spenser has been associated with the exiled poet. Rather, what is more peculiar is that the lines themselves are an adaptation of Ovid’s *Tristia* verse. This adaptation obscures any strict division between classical and vernacular meters by rhyming in Latin. See, Richard Helgerson, “The New Poet Presents Himself: Spenser and the Idea of a Literary Career,” PMLA 93, No.5 (October, 1978), p.910, ft. nt. 31; Rosemond Tuve, “Spenserus,” in *Essays in English Literature from the Renaissance to the Victorian Age Presented to A. S. P. Woodhouse*. Ed. Millar Maclure and F. W. Watt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), pp. 3-25.

28 Puttenham, 67.

29 Thus, Roger Ascham described Surrey’s blank verse:

> here is the fault, that their feete: be feete without ioyntes, that is to say, not distinct by trew quantitie of syllables: And so such feete, be but numme feete, and be, euem as vnfitt for a verse to turne and runne roundly wthal, as feete of brasse or wood be vneoeldie to go well wthal. And as a foote of wood, is a plaine shew of a manifest maime, euen so feete, in our English versifying, without quantitie and ioyntes, be sure signes, that the verse is wither, borne deformed, vnnaturall and lame, and so erie vnsennlie to looke vpon, except to men that be google eyed them selues.


30 Puttenhm, 67.

31 As Debra Fried has noted, “lameness” became a trope by which Spenser described his own negotiation between quantitative measure and vernacular accent. He describes a syllable that measures “short in speache” but “long in Verse” (as with the middle syllable of “carpenter”) as akin to “the lame gosling that draweth one legge after her.” By contrast, “Heauen” which is a single syllable when spoken but “stretched” out in quantitative measure as “a lame Dogge that holds vp one legge” (p.16). Debra Fried, “Spenser’s Caesura,” *ELR* 11, no.3 (Autumn, 1981): 261-280.

32 Kenneth Gross draws a distinction in the study of metrics between a focus on “genesis” and a focus on “function,” or, “those aspects of prosody that seem susceptible to empirical or philological investigation” and “the practices and premises of versification” that are “deeply topological” (p.22). My argument draws on both of these approaches.


Arma gravi numero violentaque bella parabam
edere, materia conveniente modis.
par erat inferior versus – risisse Cupido
dicitur atque unum surripuisse pedem (1.1-4).

35 Ovid, *Amores*, 321. “Cum bene surrexit versus nova pagina primo,/ attenuat nervos proximus ille meos” (1.16-17).


37 To quote Puttenham again, that “limping pentameter” makes elegy “go dolorously more then any other meeter (p.49).

38 E.g. Ascham, 145-146; Campion, 285-286.

39 See fn.32.

40 At St. Paul’s, the *Tristia* were read by the third form on Monday and Thursday (p.119); *Tristia* first appear on the Eton curriculum for third form in 1530 (p.298, 355, 367); for *Tristia* at Canterbury (p.167), Bury St. Edmund’s and Bangor (p.305), Harrow (p.310), Westminster (pp.339, 382), Winchester (p.339), St. Bee’s (p.432); Westminster includes the *Epistulae* (p.387). T.W. Baldwin, *William Shakespeare’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*, vols.1-2 (Urbana: University of Illinois press, 1944).


42 At Harrow (Baldwin, 312) and probably, therefore, at Bury St. Edmunds (after which Harrow modeled itself) and Bangor (which also took Bury St. Edmunds as its model); at Westminster (Baldwin, 404) and probably, therefore, at Eton (after which Westminster modeled itself).

43 Baldwin, 511-512.

44 Charles Hoole, *New discovery of an old art* (London, 1661), p.105. Though the *New Discovery* was not published until 1661, Baldwin suggests that his pedagogy represents the “continuity and cohesion of the tradition” more than it does the novelty (p.450).

45 Hoole, 156-157.


48 Baldwin, 112.
Baldwin, 115.

50 E.g. *Tristia* 1.1 and 3.1.

51 Baldwin, 112.


53 Mirandula, 20.

54 Ovid, *Tristia*, 3.5.6-8.

55 McCabe (2002), 57-78.

56 Mirandula, 140; *Epistulae* 4.9.93-94.

57 Mirandula, 584; *Epistulae* 1.3.37-40.

58 Baldwin, 112.


61 3.1.9-12; The Latin reads:

```plaintext
inspice quid portem: nihil hic nisi triste videbis,
carine temporibus conveniente suis.
clauda quod alterno subsidunt carmina versu,
vel pedis hoc ratio, vel via longa facit.
```

62 Thomas Churchyard, *The first bookes of Ouids de Tristibus* (London, 1572), 3.1.9-12. C.S. Lewis wrote that Churchyard’s translation “is one of the better specimens of its kind. He stops his couplets with almost Popian regularity, surrenders himself to the swing of the metre, and is not unmusical. But the original has few qualities that can survive in the Drab style and homely verse,” in *English Literature of the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama* (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1954), p.253. By contrast, Frederick Samuel Boas suggests that “the rhymed ‘fourteener,’... is less suited to the elegiac metre of the *Tristia* than the hexameters of the *Metamorphoses*” and describes this verse as a “jog-trot.”


63 *Epistulae* 4.2.15, 18-19; Mirandula, 21. (ingenium nobis repondet, ut ante... Pectora sic mea sunt limo vitiata malorum./ Et carmen vena pauperiore fluit). See also, *Epistulae* 1.5.5-8; Mirandula, 436.

Tristia 3.8.25-26; Mirandula, 101.

Tristia 3.8.34-38.

Epistulae, 4.13.3-4. “The poem’s style and structure should bear instant witness to the source of the saultation” (unde saluteris, color hic tibi protinus index et stuctura mei cirminis esse potest).

Tristia 1.1.61-62. “You may lack a title: no matter, your style will betray you; dissipulate all you like, it’s clear you’re mine” (ut titulo careas, ipso noscere colore; dissimulare velis, te liquet esse meum).

Puttenham, 160.

Ovid identifies his own exile with “poor Elpenor, who plunged from that high rooftop, met his king as a crippled ghost” (3.4.19-20).

See Chapter One, fn.164.

Epistulae, 4.3.17-18.

Churchyard, Tristia, 3.1.12


For humanists, the translation and imitation of Ovid’s exile elegies became a vehicle for expressing the grief of estrangement. Zachary Caitlin prefaces his 1639 translation by advising his readers to “learne of him [Ovid] to sing like Nightingales, when their own dark night of sorrow shall come” (A₃₋₄₋₅₋₆). Caitlin defends his translation from the accusation that “this taske is too youthfull” by explaining that “it is an hard matter to expell nature... and to abandon in age the laudible propensities and studies of one’s Youth” (A₃₋₄₋₅₋₆). Zachary Caitlin, De Tristibus or Mournefyll Elegies (London, 1639). Another translator, Wye Saltonstall, suggests that “my owne sorrow hath learnt me how to translate Ovid’s sorrow” (A₂₋₃₋₄₋₅₋₆). Saltonstall’s “brother in misfortune” is living abroad, “exul in patria,” having been forced to find work in “forraine nations” and Saltonstall’s translation constitutes a plea on behalf of his friend (A₂₋₃₋₄₋₅₋₆). While a student at Oxford, William Gager wrote an elegy to one of the Canons of Christ Church, Robert Dorset, in which he asks Dorset to act on his behalf. His elegy begins, “Ovid, cease your sad lamentations about your exile” (l.1). Gager insists, “To be sure, you were an exile, but not because your song came so readily for its appropriate measures” (ll.3-4). Gager, by contrast, receives beatings for the readiness of his own verse, for his “ability to versify,” and hopes that Dorset might take pity on him (l.8). “59. Salutations to Dominus Robert Dorset” in, William Gager, The Complete Works (http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/gager/), hypertext edition by Dana F. Sutton, accessed May 31, 2010. Finally, when John Milton is suspended from Cambridge, his own schoolroom exercises from St. Paul’s provided him with the “alternating measures” for his letter to Charles Diodati. Milton, however, turns Ovid’s grief on its head as he embraces his “profugi nomen” and “exilium” while also wishing that Ovid could have been graced with such a lot: “Ah! Would that the bard who was a pitiful exile in the land of Tomis had never had to bear anything worse!” Riverside Milton, ed. Roy Flannagan (Houghton Mifflin, 1998), p.180.


77 E.g. For reconciling Pagan authors with Christian values, see Ann Moss, “Humanist Education,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 3, ed. Glyn P. Norton (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.145-154; for carefully selecting passages from potentially corrupting influences like Plautus, see Ascham, 142; for the excision of bawdy passages, see Baldwin, 108-117. For an interesting discussion of humanist approaches to minor authors as, on the one hand, a kind of apprenticeship before tackling major authors or, on the other hand, as a corruptive influence that might ruin the ear of the student before he got to those major authors, see JoAnn DellaNeva, “Reflecting Lesser lights: The Imitation of Minor Authors in the Renaissance,” Renaissance Quarterly 42, no.3 (Autumn, 1989), pp.449-479.

78 Richard Sherry, “A Declaration made up by Erasmus,” in A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (London, 1550), Aii: In the pedagogical treatise embedded within Anatomy of Wit, Lyly’s Euphues warns against exposing children to the “barbarous talk” that might hinder a child’s ability “to pronounce aptly and distinctly, without stammering, every word and syllable of their native speech” with the suggestion that linguistic barbarism carries with it morally “unclean conversation” (p.105). John Lyly, Euphues: the Anatomy of Wit, ed. Leah Scragg (Manchester: manchester University Press, 2003).


80 E.g. the physiognomist, Thomas Hyll, in The contemplation of mankind (London, 1571):

Why doste thou limpe and halt,
thy minde is lame I see,
These outwadd signes are tokens plain
Of secret yll in thee (¶¶).

81 Stephen Greenblatt has suggested that Spenser’s decision to “plant himself ever more firmly in Munster... may have... felt like the beginning of the threatened transformation.” Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), p.186. C.S. Lewis wrote that “The Faerie Queene should perhaps be regarded as the work of one who is turning into an Irishman.” C.S. Lewis, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p.126. McCabe has recently amended that declaration to suggest that “it would be more accurate to regard it as the work of one who feared that his descendants might turn into Irishmen.” (p.109).
Aristotle, 1.12.16.

Aristotle, 1.12.16; “Limping” was not only a sign of the intemperate body but also, of the corrupted, mortal body (Lewis Bayly, *The practice of pietie directing a Christian how to walke that he may please god* (London, 1613), pp.153-154); in the *Timaeus*, Plato suggests that “if the soul’s orbits” fail to “resume their proper course” then man will “limp his way through life” (*Timaeus*, trans. Donald J. Zayl (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), pp.30-32); limping became the sign of man, torn between two allegiances (Mathew Parker, *A defence of priestes marriages* (London, 1567), p.195; Thomas Wilson, *A Christian Dictionaries* (London, 1567), p.211).


Puttenham, 67.

A description of Ate is worth citing, here:

Her face most fowle and filthy was to see,
With squinted eyes contrarie wayes intended,
And loathly mouth, vnmeete a mouth to bee...
Her lying tongue was in two parts divided,
And both the parts did speake, and both contended;
And as her tongue so was her heart discided,
That neuer thought one thing but doubly stil was guided.

Als as she double spake, so heard she double,
With matchlesse eares deformed and distort,
Fild with false rumors and seditious trouble,
Bred in assemblies of the vulgar sort,
That still are led with euery light report.
And as her eares so eke her feet were odde,
And much vnlike, th’one long, the other short,
And both misplast; that when th’one forward yode.
The other backe retired, and contrarie trode (6.1.27-28).

By the close of the second stanza, Spenser’s asymmetrical couplet has become representative of the discord it describes.

Aristotle, 1.12.16.

In his discussion of Spenserian self-fashioning, Stephen Greenblatt suggested that Spenser’s decision to “plant himself ever more firmly in Munster” may have “felt like the beginning of the threatened transformation.” Thus, Greenblatt understands Acrasia and her bower’s hoggish inhabitants as English representations of the threat of the “wild Irish.” C.S. Lewis suggested that the “Faerie Queene should perhaps be regarded as the work of one who is turning into an Irishman” and Richard McCabe has recently amended Lewis’s declaration to suggest, “it would be more accurate to regard” the *Faerie Queene* “as the work of one who feared that his descendants might turn into Irishmen.”


Spenser, *View*, 70.
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91 Spenser, View, 71.
92 Spenser, View, 70.
93 Spenser, View, 67.
94 Patricia Palmer has suggested that “critics that come to Ireland through English
canonical texts are always going to end up back in England” (p.383). “Missing Bodies,
Absent Bards: Spenser, Shakespeare and a Crisis in Criticism,” English Literary
Renaissance 36, no.3 (Autumn, 2006). I am suggesting that Spenser casts degeneration
as a return to a prior Englishness, thus anticipating and instructing us in this return.
95 See McCabe, Fox, Burrow.
96 Ovid, Tristia, 1.7.14.
97 Ovid, Tristia, 1.3.73-76.
99 E.g. Catlin, “For now I part, even as my limbes were torne,/ And joynt from joynt were
quire asunder shorne,/ Grieving like Priamus when the techerous steed,/ Against his
hopes hatcht revengefull breed” (pp.74-77); Saltonstall, “My heart was so divided
therewithall,/ As if my limbes would from my body fall./ So Priam griev’d when he too
late did finde,/ The Grecian horse with armed men was lined” (B3r).
100 See Patricia Parker, “Suspended Instruments: Lyric and Power in the Bower of Bliss,”
in Literary Fat Ladies, p.54.
101 The dismemberment and deformity characteristic of the Ovidian aesthetic is also what
Angus Fletcher has called the “surrealist isolation” of allegory (p.100). Because allegory,
he argues, proceeds from a primarily metonymic logic between part and whole rather
than sweeping metaphorical figuration, Fletcher describes a “surrealist surface texture” of
allegory: the temporal and spatial relationships of the poem are rendered “discontinuous”
(p.107) by a dramatization of the part as part, a “fragmentary detail” (p.101) akin to the
“hyperdefinite sight that a drug such as mescaline produces (p.102).” This impulse
toward isolationism produces a “cult of deformation” characteristic of surrealism which
“deforms by recombining the parts of bodies” and mannerism “by stretching and
compressing the parts” (p.101). Angus Fletcher, Allegory: the Theory of a Symbolic
103 E.g. Martin Luther, “On the Bondage of the Will,” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will
and Salvation, ed. E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson (Louisville: Westminster Press,

Chapter Three: Braggadochio and the Schoolroom Simile
1 Rhetoric, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle, tr. W. Rhys Roberts (New York:
Modern Library, 1954), 3.10.18-20. For mitigating syntax of the simile (in contrast with
metaphor), see Demetrius, On Style, tr. Doreen C. Innes, based on W. Rhys Roberts, 2nd
ed. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995),
2.89; See also Longinus, in which these correlatives are grouped with the modest, "as it
were" etc. On the Sublime, tr. W.H. Fyfe and rev. Donald Russell, 2nd ed. Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), 32.4.
2 Aristotle, 3.10.21-22.
3 For temporal difference between metaphor and simile, see also Quintilian, Institutio
Oratoria, tr. H.E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard


7 Marsh H. McCall tracks the origins of similitude’s division into (or conflation of) figure and place in a survey to which the present essay is indebted: Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969). McCall concludes that, while we can separate the simile from other figures of comparison on the basis of form, we cannot separate it “in sphere and method of use” (259). I will suggest that the simile’s unique form came to determine a celebration of its utility (on the one hand) and a fear of its overuse (on the other) and thus, conditioned both “the sphere” and “method” of its use in early modern England. For treatments of the “places” as producing a spatialization of thinking, see Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 12-38. For a history of the topical places, see Ann Moss Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), esp. pp. 1-24; 101-134.

8 Richard Sherry, for example, writes “Neyther skylleth it that we haue rehearsed ficcion and comparacion among argumentes, for there is no cause why that amplificacion and ornacion shuld not be taken out of the same places from whence commeth probacion” (73). The very fact that Sherry found the need to anticipate and refute such an objection to the organization of his discourse, however, is itself evidence that the objection existed and that it had produced a certain anxiety or ambivalence among pedagogues. See also Quintilian, 8.3.72-75. Walter J. Ong’s study of Ramism and its implications for intellectual history remains the best introduction to the movement. See Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958).

9 See Gabriel Harvey’s printed lectures Ciceronianus (1577), tr. Clarence A. Forbes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1945) and Gabriellis Harveii Rhetor (London, 1577). The first stages a “conversion” to Ramism and, in the second, Harvey allegorizes the disciplinary land-grab. He ventriloquizes “Eloquentia” as she marks the new boundaries (“terminos”) of her estate and returns the land that had been so inconveniently bestowed upon her. “Why” she asks, “do you annex those under my rule and speech to whom I am myself indebted and wish to try and please?” (54). For Ramism in England,

10 E.g. Abraham Fraunce explains in his adaptation of Ramus’s *Dialecticae*, “the whole force and vertue of Logike consisteth in reasoning, not talking: and because reasoning may be without talking, as in solitary meditations and deliberations with a mans selfe, some holde the first derivation as most significant.” *Lawiers Logike* (London, 1588), B., 11 Ong calls this a “corpusscular” epistemology, p. 203. Jeff Dolven writes of the results of humanist pedagogy’s emphasis on invention more generally: “there will be something fundamentally atemporal, anarrrative, even ahistorical about the arguments you make. Even when you draw the words of the question through the place a causa you are seeking after commonplaces rather than a narrative, and seeking a space of memory that is not stratified or sedimented with time, but laid out in a topical field. The mind so represented is a timeless place.” *Scenes of Instruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 48. See also pp. 178-181.

12 Ong describes the Ramist relation to language as the “drive to tie down words... Words are believed to be recalcitrant in so far as they derive from a world of sound, voices, cries; the Ramist’s ambition is to neutralize this connection by processing what is itself nonspatial in order to reduce it to space in the starkest way possible” (89). See also Jessica Nash Smith, “(Dis)membering Quintilian’s Corpus: Ramus Reads the Body Rhetoric,” *Exemplaria* 11.2 (Fall, 1999) 399-429.

13 See Gerard Passannante’s account of the “containment mechanisms” with which Ramus’s method attempted “to quarantine the problem of chance and contingency.” “The Art of Reading Earthquakes: On Harvey’s Wit, Ramus’s Method, and the Renaissance of Lucretius,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 61 no.3 (Fall, 2008), p. 821.

I understand this alternative as a complement to what Wofford describes as the simile’s “metonymic” tendencies though where she separates the simile from “action,” I am suggesting that the simile participates in narrative action (43-44). See also Wolfson’s suggestion that, for Coleridge, the simile is among those “poetic processes [that]… are resistant, often devoted to fragments, disjunctions, and revisions” (69).

Dolven has described the tension between “understanding as an abstraction from time” and the necessary return to time when one puts that understanding to use as a defining characteristic of Elizabethan pedagogy (53). See especially, “Telling Learning” (15-64).


In my suggestions that the collection of comparative images also doubled as an accumulation of cultural capital and a means of social mobility in early modern England, I am indebted to Mary Thomas Crane’s Framing Authority. See also Richard Halpern, The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English Renaissance Culture and the Genealogy of Capital (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). David Quint reads Braggadocio as a

27 All references to Jonson’s marginalia refer to the transcriptions provided by James A. Riddell and Stanley Stewart, in Jonson’s Spenser: Evidence and Historical Criticism (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1995). For the annotation, “Simile,” see pp. 164 (I.ii.16.1), 165 (I.iii.31.1; I.v.8.1). That a simile was only marked as “excellent” when it might be considered “epic” is Riddel & Stewart’s, p. 78. For the annotation “excellent Simile” (including autographical variants), see pp. 168 (II.v.10.3), 175 (II.vii.42.1), 184 (III.iv.17.4). For “M.” next to a simile, see p. 175 (II.viii.50).

28 Riddell & Stewart, 167. Text of the Faerie Queene is here quoted from the folio: The faerie queen: The shepheards calendar: together with the other works of Englands arch-poët, Edm. Spenser: collected into one volume, and carefully corrected (London, 1617), G2v.

29 I understand my account of the simile’s subjunctive projections and the moral register of its abstraction as a complement to what Jeff Dolven has called (via Jerome Bruner), “paradigmatic understanding, which satisfies us by providing some kind of detemporalized paradigm... to which we can contract and compare the flux of experience” (53). In this instance, “cowardnesse” enables just such a contraction.


31 Stephen A. Nimis reports that allegoresis was among the strategies wielded by Homer's ancient commentators who found his similes "to be diffuse, loosely constructed and full of digressions and illogic." Narrative Semiotics in the Epic Tradition: The Simile (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 2-3. Such prioritization has been a defining feature of the simile's critical reception. Whether in the early modern preference for Vergil's similes over those belonging to Homer or in the modern critical vocabulary of “relevance v. irrelevance” (Empson), “homologation” v. “heterogeneity” (Whaler), “argument” v. “ornament” (Ferry), these oppositions prioritize the logical point of similitude over the figure’s productive capacities. For the early modern preference, see its rebuttal in Chapman's Homer: The Iliad, ed. Allardyce Nicoll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 69. See also, William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (New York: New Directions Publication Corporation, 1974), p. 170; James Whaler, "The Miltonic Simile," PMLA 46 no.4 (December, 1931), pp.1034-1074, "Grammatical Nexus of the Miltonic Simile," Journal of English and Germanic Philology 30 no. 3 (July, 1931), p. 327-335, "Similes in 'Paradise Lost'," Modern Philology 28 no.3 (February, 1931), pp. 313-327; Ferry, pp. 68-69. James Whaler's early opposition between "homologation" and "heterogeneity" attempted to prove the argument that Milton's similes "are reducible to logical patterns" by mapping them with symbols as static dichotomies in space, a process itself reminiscent of Ramus's dichotomizing branches ("Miltonic Simile,” 1034). Harry Berger offers a critique of such dichotomies and their polemical subordination of “ornament” as “irrelevant,” highlighting instead,
“conspicuous irrelevance” as a strategy the poet might wield. Allegorical Temper (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp.120-160; esp. pp.120-132. If, however, an earlier insistence on logical incorporation reined seemingly irrelevant images in via prolepsis, Berger places the burden of similitude in and on literary history via allusion. Without denying the importance of the logical point of similitude – and indeed, the model of intertextuality it might sustain – it is my argument that such a focus solves only half of the simile’s problems.

32 Thomas Wilson distinguishes between questions "infinite which generally are propounded without the comprehension of time, place, person" from questions "definite, which set forth a matter with the appointment and naming of place, time, and person." Wilson begins by suggesting that, "Things generally spoken, without all circumstance, are more proper unto the logician, who talketh of things universally, without respect of person, time, or place" (45-46). That he backtracks to include inquiries into the infinite within rhetoric's domain is one example of the rhetorical “expansionism” targeted by the Ramist reforms. Boethius offers a concise explication of this difference with reference to similitude: "Dialectic discovers arguments from qualities themselves; rhetoric, from things taking on that quality… the dialectician [discovers arguments] from similarity; the rhetorician, from a similar, that is, from the thing which takes on similarity." De topicis differentiis, tr. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 95. See Moss's analysis, pp. 15-17.

33 This notation is the most frequent identification of simile in Jonson’s Spenser. See pp. 167 (II.i.24.2-3), 168 (II.iv.7.8; II.v.2.5) 175 (II.viii.48.4-5), 176 (II.ix.16.5), 180 (II.xi.19.4-5; II.xi.32.4), 181 (II.xi.36.6-9).

34 Sherry, 12.
35 Riddell & Stewart, p. 164.
37 Sherry, 12-13.
Chapman's *Ouids Banquet of Sence* (London, 1595), and Josuah Sylvester's translation of *Bartas: his deuine vveekes and workes* (London, 1605). For a schoolroom edition whose printed margins demonstrate a more general interest in locating "Adages, metaphores, sentences, or other ygures poeticall or rhetorical... for the more perfyte instructyne of the lerners, and to leade them more easilye to see howe the exposyton gothe," see John Plasgrave's *Comedy of Acolastus* (1540), ed. P.L. Carver (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 1.


45 As with Jonson’s “Carlo Bvffone” from *Every Man out of His Humor* (1599) whose “Character” begins, "A Publike, scurrilous, and prophane Iester; that (more swift that Circe) with absurd similie's will transforme any person into a deformity," in Ben Jonson, 3, p. 423.


47 William Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, ed. Juliet Dusinberre (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006), II.i.44-45. This leads Robert N. Watson to ask, “Capturing the deer is certainly more brutal, but captioning its picture may be no less appropriative. Which has done more insidious violence to pristine nature as a collectivity, during its long siege by humanity: shooting it with arrows or shattering it into similes?” “As You Like It: Smile in the Forest,” in *Back to Nature: The Green and the Real in the Late Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), pp. 82.


Moss, 104-105. For a complete discussion, see: "The Common-place Book at Birth," 101-130. Moss constructs a spectrum, at one end of which we might find the logical organization taught by Agricola and Melancthon, at the other end of which we find Vives's lexical organization and, as a pivot between the two, Erasmus's revisions of De Copia which move increasingly toward the linear organization of copious material.

Moss, 117. See also her description of Jesuit commonplaces books in Europe, 166-185, esp. 176-177.


The apparent corpulence with which “the misshapen simile... stalks prodigiously” is reminiscent of Patricia Parker’s fat ladies who were made to embody – and contain – the threat of copious surfeit in, “Literary Fat Ladies and the Generation of the Text.” Barbara J. Baines reads Balurado’s dream as a parody of Antonio’s figurative excess. “Antonio’s Revenge: Marston’s Play on Revenge Plays,” SEL 23, no.2 (Spring, 1982), p.284.

Charles Hoole, A new discovery of the old art of teaching (London, 1661), p. 49.


Lyly, *D*iv.*

See Thomas Wilson’s illustration of how similitudes allow one to “dilate” matter “with poesies and sentences” so that “we may with ease talk at large” in which he offers an extended exemplum comparing the lesser value of money to the greater value of time which, in wasting or “losing of time we lose all the goodness and gifts of God which by labor might be had” Wilson, *Art of Rhetoric*, p. 214. See also Erasmus, “De Copia,” pp. 622-623.


Erasmus, “De Conscribendis Epsitolis,” 33.


When, in “De Ratione Studii,” Erasmus demonstrates how multiple figures can allow you to amplify on any topic, such as “iron,” the simile brings us back to the value of time: “Or the simile: just as iron is worn away by use, yet if not used it is eaten away by rust, so ability is consumed by over-working, yet if not exercised it is further atrophied by disuse and neglect” (677).

Erasmus, “De Ratione Studii,” p. 635.

See Erasmus, *Parabolaes*, pp.27-34.


Erasmus, “De Conscribendis Epsitolis,” 35.

Erasmus, *Parabolaes*, 47.

Erasmus, *Parabolaes*, 47.

Sidney, “Sonnet 15,” ll. 5-6 of *Astrophil and Stella*, p. 158.

Sidney, *Defence*, 246.

Erasmus, *Parabolaes*, 47.


Fraunce, *L.L.*, Uiiiv.

See Ong (1958), 150-151.

Fraunce, *L.L.*, Uiiiv.

Sidney, *Defence*, 218.


Sidney, *Defence*, 247


99 For the reorientation of conceptions of decorum toward a visual epistemology, see Ong (1958), 212-213.
100 Sidney, Defence, 247.
101 Sidney, Defence, 247.
102 John M. Hill (via Ludwig Wittgenstein) wrote that, “every language has a structure concerning which nothing can be said in that language” and he suggested that Braggadochio was such a structure with respect to the poem’s “primary language” of a “Golden World.” While Hill’s understanding of the “Golden World Concept” is not compatible with the subjunctive space I outline here, his suggestion that “sometimes that structure has its own language” and his identification of Braggadochio as constituting a “second language” within the poem provides a nice parallel to my point. “Braggadochio and Spenser’s Golden World Concept: The Function of Unregenerative Comedy,” English Literary History 37, no.3 (September, 1970), pp.322-323.
104 Sidney, Defence, 247.
105 For a reading of the subjunctive and the imperative in protestant debates concerning the will, see Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 159-167.
106 Demetrius, II.80.
107 E.g. Longinus, XXXII.4.
111 For subjection to the schoolmaster as preparation for a student’s relation to monarch, see Rebecca W. Bushnell, A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, 1996), pp. 23-72.
112 Quint points to this pun, p. 415.
113 Puttenham writes that just as the “distaunces” between rhymes “may not be too wide nor farre a sunder, lest th’eare should loose the tune,” so “on the other side doth the ouer busie and too speedy returne of one maner of tune, too much annoy & as it were glut the eare” (83).
114 Sidney, Defence, 247.
115 Puttenham, 174.
116 Puttenham, 255.
117 (Faerie Queene), Hamilton, p.181n.
118 E.g. Nohrmberg, 299-300.

Chapter Four: Laughter and Indecorous Poetics

1 The Latin reads:
   Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit, et uarias inducere plumas
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatam admissi risum teneatis, amici? (1-5).


3 Cicero describes this physical compulsion as the ground that he will not cover in his discussion of laughter – “how it comes into being, and bursts out so unexpectedly that, strive as we may, we cannot restrain it, and how at the same instant it takes possession of the lungs, voice, pulse, countenance, and eyes” (Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vol., Loeb Classical Library (1942; repr., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 2.58.235). Quoted by Herrick, 49. While the claim to physical compulsion naturalizes the distinction between the decorous and the indecorous and therefore serves to legitimize what is convention, Horace’s question also implies that one might *want* and therefore *try to keep from laughing*. This begs the question of whether Horace lodges an implicit critique of the naturalization of this distinction, whereby the individual is beset by a contrary impulse to keep form laughing. I am grateful to Darryl Ellison for this suggestion specifically and his many comments on this chapter as a whole.

4 See Chapter One, fn.164.


7 Giovanni Della Casa, *Galateo, Of Manners and Behaviours in Familiar Conversation*, trans. Robert Peterson (1576; ed. Herbert J. Reid, Privately Printed, 1892), pp.102-103. Harry Berger discusses the misogyny of this passage: “when the principle of male decorum is rhetorically shadowed under the image of ideal female beauty, the danger of being overcome by the desire to embrace the ideal and make it one’s own is the danger of being effeminized.” *Absence of Grace* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000) 223. See 217-224.

8 C.f. “deform” and “difform” in the *OED*.

9 Della Casa, 104. *Galateo’s* “more or lesse” opens up something of a gap between the principles of unity and fragmentation (on the one hand) and the corporeal representations that serve as the formal *telos* to decorous and indecorous discourse (on the other hand). “More or lesse” is our Elizabethan translator’s hesitation. The Italian insists that the same happens in language as it does in bodies, “just as much.” Berger, 219.

c.f. “sardismos” in Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H.E.Butler (rpt. 1989, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 8.3.60. Henry Peacham will point out in his *Garden of Eloquence* (1577) that *cumulatio* is a vice endemic to the English vernacular. He defines *cumulatio* (under the name of *sorœsmus*) as “a mingling together of divers Languages, as when there is in one sentence English, Lattine, & French, some think weé speake but little English, and that our speach is for the most part borrowed of other languages” (*G*iviv). *Garden of Eloquence* (London, 1577).

While modern scholars have rightly dislodged the easy binary between the temporality of verbal representation and the spatial coherence of visual representation, it was a commonplace to Renaissance discussions of the sister arts and their competing modes of representation. On this point, see Claire Preston, “Ekphrasis: painting in words” in *Renaissance Figures of Speech*, ed. Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 120-121.

This limp – or the element of the comparison that stands apart – is the “more or lesse” that, in *Galateo*, qualified the transfer of uniformity from “bodies” to “more or lesse, in speache.” See fn. 9.


Robert Greene, *Groats-worth of witte* (London, 1592), F2v. This is Dolven’s argument (2001): emblematic justice presents a closed circuit of reasoning whereby the spectacle created serves, paradoxically, as evidence of the crime for which it is also a punishment.


“perceptual gestalt,” (p.232); “conceptual knowledge,” (p.228) If this act of mediation remains “volatile,” it is still primarily interested in poetic language in so far as it is “visually symbolic” (pp.228-229). While Goeglin offers an important corrective to Ong’s thesis by reanimating the printed forms of these treatises, she also tends to reaffirm the visuality of a Ramsit epistemology by, for example, emphasizing the dynamic interactions of type script but de-emphasizing the linguistic medium of ekphrasis.


21 The primary principle of difference between the emblem and the impressa in the early modern period was that, while the emblem looked to generate a moral or precept of general truth, the impressa looked to convey an idea particular to the mind of its maker. Early modern theorists distinguished between these two forms but also found them to overlap in important ways (including the aesthetic) and did not always know where to draw the line of distinction and how to maintain it. See Bath, 17-20.

22 Insignium, M4; Philosophy of Symbols, 7.

23 Goeglin, 237.


25 Fraunce, Philosophy of Symbols, 7.


27 Thomas Blundeville, The arte of logick (London, 1617), pp. 62, 64. Blundeville departs from Ramus in admitting several methods into logic and maintaining that proceeding from whole to parts, and parts to whole allow for learning while proceeding from general to particular allows only for the transmission of knowledge already conceived (teaching).

28 Rolland MacIlmaine, The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (1574), ed. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, California: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969). “After the exacte obseruation of the forsaid materiall and documentes and naturall methode thou hast this lytle booke sett furthe to the, which being well perused is able to bring more profytt to the (I speake after experience) then all thy fower yeares studie in Plato or Aristotle” (p.8).

29 For Ramistic method’s claims to mimesis, see Robert Goulding, “Method and Mathematics: Peter Ramus’s Histories of the Sciences” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no.1 (January, 2006), p.66; In Probability and Literary Form, Douglas Lane Patey writes: “Invention, the power of finding probable arguments, Ramus derives from the Latin in rem venire, a laying open of the arguments which reside in things themselves. These arguments arise to invention in a natural order, an order which is itself an echo of the larger order of nature: the arguments which are the stuff of dialectic are simply the relations which obtain in nature, made present to the mind. Invention thus becomes a kind of natural reasoning, a kind of memory even, since according to Ramus its following out of the connections which reside in nature is in large past a remembering of the same patterns already encountered in other circumstances.” Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 22.

31 Fraunce, L.L., 115.
See Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) pp.129-163, 197-212. “The forme and methode which is kept in this arte, communedeth that the thing which is absolutely most cleare, be first placed, next followeth the diuision, first into the partes, and next into the formes and kyndes.” p.6. Method, Macilmains writes, “continually procedethe from the most generall to the speciall and singuler” (p.54).


Fraunce, L.L., 115v.

MacIlmaine, 7.


Fraunce, 7.


See Chapter Three for the elaboration of this argument.

Thus, Turpine refuses to give Calepine a ride across a river too deep to cross on foot: “But as thou hast thy steed forlorne with shame,/ So fare on foot till thou another gayne” (6.3.32.1-2).

“est schema quod coniunctionibus abundat” (Quintilian, 9.3.50-3).


Fraunce, Philosophy of Symbols, 12.

Puttenham, 175.

Fraunce, Philosophy of Symbols, 12.

Quintilian called polysyndeton “acervatio iuncta,” acervatio meaning a “heaping up or accumulation” (9.3.53). C.f, “acervatio” in Lewis and Short.

“est multis nexta coniunctionibus oratio” (Susenbrotus, C.).

“Polysindeton is a figure which knitteth together the parts of an oration with many coniunctiones” (Henry Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (London, 1593), Iiiv); “We may call him the [couple clause] for that euery clause is knit and coupled together with a coniunctive” (Puttenham, 175).

Peacham (1593), Iiiv.

Peacham (1593), Iiiv.

Cicero, De Oratore, 2.88.359.

Grafton and Jardine, 20.

Sherry, Nviii-r.

Peacham (1593), Iiiv.

Sherry, Nviii

For “heaping” see fn.48.
While there is general agreement among Spenser’s modern readers that Book five puts an end to the romance narratives that dominated Book 3 and exceeded the bounds of Book 4, there is less agreement about when and how Book 5 does this. In chapter two I suggested that Guyon’s own status as a “pedestrian” after losing his horse implicated him in the very intemperance that he is meant to destroy in Acrasia’s bower; in chapter three I argued that Braggadochio’s act of theft initiated the digressive narrative threads characteristic of romance while also suggesting intersections between romance and Braggadochio’s narrative paradigm of accumulation; in this chapter, I have suggested that the scene in which Guyon regains his horse puts a stop to Braggadochio’s acts of accumulation, though the poet resurrects this paradigm in his use of polysyndeton. More often, Spenser’s readers understand the digressive force of romance in terms of gender rather than social mobility. Thus, Katherine Eggert suggests that romance comes to a close when Artegaill, with Radigund beheaded, leaves Britomart behind – such that we never see her again. Katherine Eggert, “Changing all that forme of common weale”: Genre and the Repeal of queenship in The Faerie Queene, Book 5,” *English Literary Renaissance* 26, no. 2 (1996): 259-290.
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