BREAKING THROUGH THE GLASS CEILING:
ONLY TO GET STUCK IN THE RAFTERS
A Study of Gendered Legislative Leadership in the 50 States

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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While some women have cracked the glass ceilings of state legislatures, in most states they are still getting stuck in the rafters of the ornately decorated chambers in which they serve when it comes to ascending to top leadership posts. Less than one-third (29%) of the states’ legislative bodies have been headed by women since 1997. Just 40 women in all have served as presiding officers during this period. For the most part, women have been limited to tertiary or secondary committee leadership positions while the increase in women policy leaders have been largely confined to the Executive Branch.

This dissertation examined the antecedents to legislative leadership in the states’ lawmaking chambers and examined whether the antecedents varied by gender. This research also investigated whether institutional, electoral and egalitarian factors influenced who became a leader and if factors impeded access to top leadership for women as compared to men. Finally, this research compared the individual styles and behaviors of men and women leaders and examined the influence gender purports to play in the policy preferences, proposals and products of leaders.

This research found that leaders shared many common traits including higher levels of education, professional, financial and management careers, as well as chamber seniority. Women do not have equal access to top leadership as compared to men; in
part, because women start their legislative careers later in life and take-on different family responsibilities. As for structural barriers, factors such as term limits, constitutionally vested powers and chamber size as well as electoral composition appeared to influence who led in the states. The lack of proportional representation by women at both the tertiary and secondary leadership levels had the greatest implications. Overall, the styles and behaviors of women and men leaders were quite similar. Furthermore, women did not attempt to make wholesale changes in the chambers in which they led. The policy preferences of leaders fused along with the policy proposals and products of the caucus. The job of top leadership was shaped by the policy and political interests of the caucus, not by the leader.
Dedication

For my parents, Harry and Joan, who first gave me love, faith and the desire for knowledge, while teaching me that all things are possible.

For my husband, John, whose love, encouragement, and support was my constant companion throughout this journey.

And for my daughters, Bethany and Madison, who are my biggest cheerleaders and whom I adore.

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The success of one is always rooted in the contributions by many. This research is no exception. It began with a rich and supportive faculty and staff that guided my steps along the way. Among the many who contributed, Julia Rubin, my advisor, helped me find my topic and directed my path throughout my coursework and examinations. David Listokin, the Doctoral Program Director, helped me channel my earliest wanderings and ideas into a dissertation proposal. Still, this research would not have been possible without the contributions of some of the greatest minds in the academic community. I will always be grateful for the years of support, counsel, raising the bar, and collaborations of my chairman, Alan Rosenthal, and my committee, Henry Coleman, Jocelyn Crowley, Kira Sanbonmatsu, and Cliff Zukin. They never refused any of my requests of their time, energy or intellect. They treated me as a colleague long before I earned that honor. And to Alan, thank you most of all for your enduring enthusiasm.
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I. Introduction

While some women have cracked the glass ceilings of state legislatures, in most states they are still getting stuck in the rafters of the ornately decorated chambers in which they serve when it comes to ascending to top leadership posts. Less than one-third (29%) of the states’ legislative bodies have been headed by women since 1997. Just 40 women\(^1\) during this period have served in the role of House Speaker, Senate President, or Senate President Pro Tem in states where an executive branch lieutenant governor presides over the chamber. In the remaining 69 chambers scattered across 26 states in the nation, women have been limited to tertiary or secondary committee leadership positions.\(^2\) Of the more than 7000 plus legislators who serve annually in the state polities, no more than 12 women have ever held presiding officer roles during the same term. In other words, women legislators have about the same chance of being struck by lightning as they do of striking the gavel in their own chambers.\(^3\)

This dissertation examines the antecedents to legislative leadership in the states’ lawmaking chambers. The key to understanding leadership begins by exploring whether leaders are different from rank and file members since just 1% of legislators ascend to the top. The antecedents to leadership are next scrutinized for gender differences. In addition

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\(^1\) One woman, sitting Senate President Libby Mitchell, has served as both Speaker and Senate President in the State of Maine. Mitchell was the 2010 Democratic gubernatorial nominee in Maine.

\(^2\) Figures derived from data compiled by the Center for American Women and Politics’ (CAWP) National Information Bank on Women in Public Office (various years) and from The Book of States, The Council of State Governments (CSG), (various years). Tertiary leadership positions are defined wider by CAWP, but herein counted as majority and minority leaders and all assistant leaders. Secondary leadership positions included in CAWP counts are chairs and co-chairs of all senate, house, and joint standing committees as are chairs and co-chairs of joint statutory committees and joint commissions.

\(^3\) The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates the odds of someone being struck by lightning in their lifetime in Florida (estimated to be 80 years) are 1 in 1000 (0.001). Over the last 14 years, 2010 represents the largest percentage of women serving in top leadership positions (0.006) with 12 out of 1799 women serving as presiding officers.
to the personal attributes of leaders, this research investigates whether institutional, electoral and egalitarian factors influence who becomes a leader. Again, this study models these influences and examines if factors impede access to top leadership for women as compared to men. Finally, this research compares the individual styles and behaviors of men and women leaders, considers whether gender differences exist, and examines the influence gender purports to play in the policy preferences, proposals and products of leaders.

**Background**

A 2006 analysis conducted by the Center for Women in Government & Civil Society (CWIG) examined the progress women have made between 1998 and 2005 in policy leadership positions throughout state governments. The report painted a dismal picture for women in all three branches of state government. CWIG (2006) found “In 40% of the states, women’s overall share of top executive, legislative, and judicial posts, compared to their share of the population, actually fell, remained level, or increased by less than .01 percentage points in the eight-year period” (p. 2).

The report (2006) further documented “The gender gap in state policy leadership is greatest among state legislators. It is three times larger than the gender gap among top advisors in governors’ offices...” (CWIG, p. 2). Yet if the data had been stratified by legislative leadership roles, it would have revealed a gap approaching an abyss in the majority of states, as displayed in Figure 1. Women made gains as policy leaders
throughout state government, but those gains were largely confined to the Executive Branch. In 2004, parity among women and men came closest in top gubernatorial advisor positions, women held 41% of all key positions in governors’ offices as compared to men (59%), (CWIG, 2006). Comparatively, the presence of women in state legislatures was much less remarkable; women accounted for less than a quarter (22.5%) of all state representatives as compared to men in 2004 (CAWP, 2004). Within top legislative leadership posts, only 6% of all presiding officers were women.

The low percentage of women serving in legislative bodies, never topping 25% nationally (CAWP, 2010), does not fully explain the limited access to gendered leadership in the states. If “numbers affect power in institutions” (C. Rosenthal, 1998), the figures might tell part of the story, but legislative representativeness\(^4\) is not a reliable

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\(^4\) Legislative representativeness is defined and measured by CAWP as the percentage of women legislators out of the total number of legislative members serving in a chamber.
predictor of where women lead. Few patterns or clues are noticeable. The lack of a clear explanation provoked this inquiry by former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman “What kind of state elects women to only one in six available seats in the Legislature?” (Whitman, 2003). Her answer branded Arkansas, Tennessee and New Jersey, a seemingly unlikely cohort in 2003. To confound matters more, female chamber membership within individual states has not been static over the past decade and a half --- states have experienced both losses and gains in female participation.

The numbers alone fail to explain why women have commanded the podium in some states and not in others. The lack of stability and steady growth may be part of the reason for the mismatch between female membership levels and proportional leadership. States like Washington, with almost 47% women-occupied chamber seats, followed by Colorado (36.9%) and Connecticut (32.5%), provide high probabilistic explanations for these outcomes; however, North Dakota (12.2%), Alaska (12.5%), and Missouri (20.6%) provide no comparable explanation. Women have served as the presiding officers in all of these states during the past decade. In fact, both North Dakota and Alaska are among the handful of states that have had women lead both chambers and had women lead during more than one term. Overall, women have led chambers with female membership ranging from a low of 9.6% to a high of 46.9% since 1997 (CAWP, various years).5

The national picture of women in the workforce does not explain the lag among women in state leadership roles or legislative membership. As further highlighted in the CWIG report (2006), the 2000 census recorded substantial changes in the composition of

5 States (24) that have had legislative chambers led by women from 1997 through 2010 are AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI, IA, MA, ME, MI, MN, MO, ND, NH, NJ, NV, OH, OR, RI, TX, VT, WA and WY. Eight states have had women served in more than one term, including ME which has had women leaders in 5 different terms, as well as AK, CO, ND, NH, OR, TX and WA. Five states have had women leaders head both legislative chambers: AK, CO, ME, NH and ND during the panel study.
the U.S. population; yet the percentage of women serving in state legislatures from 1997 to 2010 has increased less than 3% (CAWP, 2010). Figure 2 shows the gap between women in the American workforce and women legislators during the comparable period. The share of women in the labor force grew to about 47% in 2000 and is predicted to continue to increase (Toossi, 2002). By comparison, growth in female legislative membership steadily grew starting in the 1970s but begins to flatten in 1997 as subsequent increases have been less than 1% annually across the country.


Fig. 2. Women participation in American labor force and state legislatures.

Note: Chart from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Employment and Earnings, (1990-2000) and adapted to reflect data from CAWP Fact Sheet, various years.

As significant changes have occurred in the background characteristics of women in the general population, so too has the make-up of women legislators since the 1970s (Dolan & Ford, 1997). Women in the labor force increased to 60% by the turn of the century, a sharp increase from 34% in 1950s (Toossi, 2002). Comparatively, the percentage of women serving in state house chambers rose from 8.1% in 1975 to 22.5% in 2000 (CAWP, 2009). Just prior to when female membership began to flatten, Kathleen Dolan and Lynne Ford (1997) measured the dramatic transformations that had occurred in state legislators and found “…the percentage of women completing degrees beyond the B.A. more than doubled - from 7% to 17%...women in 1992 were
significantly more likely to be employed in business or professional positions and were less likely to be homemakers than were their predecessors…finally, women legislators in 1992 are somewhat younger and more likely to be married than their counterparts in 1972” (p. 143). This change in the state polities reflects the general population trends in which more women are entering occupations predominantly held by men in executive and professional specialty occupations as presented by Reneé E. Spraggins in the March 2003 Current Population Reports; however, Spraggins (2003) further cites that the majority of women were still in traditional “female” occupations. Professional career paths may be a factor contributing to the relatively low percentage of female members in some state legislators as well as the vacuum of top leaders in the states.

The annual number of female presiding officers since 1997 is curvilinear. The mean of women serving as presiding officers during this period is 7.6; however, the number of women leaders climbed to 10 in 2007 and has remained at or above that level. In total, 15 Senate and 14 House chambers have been led by women. Only five states (Alaska, Colorado, Maine, New Hampshire and North Dakota) have had women serve as the top leaders in both chambers of their legislatures. While these numbers mark the highest gains made by women in more than three decades, the gains are more modest as

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6 Of the 15 Senate chambers headed by women, four chambers were in states (MI, ND, TX and WA) where the Lt. Governor is a member of the executive branch but presides over the Senate. For purposes of this dissertation, the presiding officer is operationalized in those states as the Senate President Pro Tem, the highest ranking member of the legislative chamber.

7 The lower chamber in each legislature will be referred to as the House throughout this dissertation. In the 50 states, the lower chambers are referred to as House of Representatives, Assembly, House of Delegates and General Assembly. Similarly, the term legislature will be used to describe the 49 bicameral states as well as Nebraska, as compared to actual names: General Assembly, General Court or Legislative Assembly.
compared to advancements made among women in the upper echelons of the private and career governmental sectors.

**Glass Ceiling Effects: What is it and does it vary by sector?**

When the Ceiling Commission (FCGC, 1995a, 1995b) first explored the status of women and minorities in the workplace in the early 1990s, women made up approximately 45.7% of the American workforce. Female wages were at 68% of that earned by men; while 95% of senior managers (vice presidents and above) were men; only two women held Chief Executive Officer (CEO) titles at Fortune 500 companies (FCGC, 1995a, 1995b). The Commission (1995a, 1995b) also reported that less than 5% of the top executives in Fortune 1500 companies were women.

At the upper echelons of the corporate world in 2010, women ran 27 Fortune 1000 companies, of which 13 were CEOs at Fortune 500 companies (“Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000”, 2010). The gains among Fortune 500 CEOs represent a 550% increase as compared to a 200% gain among presiding officers during the same period (CAWP, 2009b). Women also now make up 15.2% of Boards of Directors in the United States, (Soares, Carter, & Combopiano, 2009) which are considered by some as a recruitment and referral source for CEO candidates. Within the federal career sector, only a quarter of supervisors and a tenth of senior executives were women in 1992 while almost half of the federal workforce was female (Reskin & Padavic, 1994). Yet by 1996, then U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao speaking at a national women’s conference, touted that “women comprised 26.5% of federal employees in the senior pay levels.”

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8 Catalyst is a nonprofit corporate membership research and advisory organization which defines its mission as working to expand opportunities for women and business. The organization conducts surveys and research on the American workforce. These statistics are excerpted from a press release titled: *Damned or Doomed—Catalyst Study on Gender Stereotyping at Work Uncovers Double-Bind Dilemmas for Women* issued June 17, 2007.
a more recent report of the federal workforce (The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, FY2008), women have increased their participation rate in senior level positions by almost 50% since FY1999.

So while incremental gains have been made in the private and federal career sectors, the scarcity of women at the top of the leader board within state legislatures prompts this inquiry: is the lack of women leaders at the highest echelons of state legislatures due to the lack of qualified candidates or does a glass ceiling exist? To examine this question further, it is important to define and operationalize “glass ceiling effects” within the context of legislative chambers.

The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission (1995a, 1995b) defined glass ceiling as the “unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements.” The extant glass ceiling literature emphasizes the notion that the “glass ceiling” terminology should not be used to describe general observations of gender or racial inequalities, but rather as a means to distinguish the specific form of inequality it produces (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, & Vanneman, 2001). Relying on past models used to measure glass ceiling effects (Wright, Baxter, & Birkeland, 1995; Frankforter, 1996; Duleep & Sanders, 1992; Fernandez, 1998), several researchers identified four outcome based criteria to measure glass ceiling inequalities (Cotter et al.).

Of note, the criterion was constructed for utilization within a job sector where tests for glass ceilings effects could be made by observing promotions and raises within an organization. By design, legislative salaries and benefits are determined by states’ constitutions and laws. There is no distinction in salary and benefits between a tenured
incumbent and that of a new member. Only some leadership positions, as determined by law or chamber rules, receive additional compensation; these additional benefits flow to the individual holding the position, not the individual per se.

Therefore in order to measure glass ceiling effects in the states’ chambers, a discussion follows as to whether the criterion is applicable for comparison, and if so, how the state indicators are operationalized. To begin: “A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference that is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee” (Cotter et al., 2001, p. 657). For the most part, job-relevant characteristics are non-descript in state legislatures; aside from minimum age and residency requirements, there are no job qualifications to become a member of the legislature or to become eligible for a leadership position. Still in some chambers, seniority (length of service) is required to gain access to leadership opportunities. That is not to say, informal rules of seniority are not a factor in predicting who leads. Moreover, the personal profile of a state leader, which may vary by region and institutional structures, is also important to observe. Qualities such as tenure (herein referred to as time served in the chamber and the legislature overall), age, educational background, professional experience and prior leadership experience, are attributes used to measure advancement in the glass ceiling literature. Similarly, these traits are used to operationalize the personal antecedents to legislative leadership in order to examine whether the personal qualities or skills of a leader are both unique and necessary to do the job. In the end, the effects of seniority are measured and the concept of top leadership attributes is constructed in order to assess if

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9 In many cases, State Senators have served in the House prior to service in the upper chamber which serves to lengthen their legislative tenure; in a few instances, House members have served in the State Senate.
these variables vary by gender when controlled for by other factors such as region and structures.

The second criterion developed by D. A. Cotter et al. (2001) states: “A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome” (p. 658). This criterion is very applicable to studies of glass ceiling effects within legislative chambers. In this context, the effect is measured by observing whether women are represented disproportionately at the secondary committee level and the tertiary leadership level as compared to the base. The base is defined as legislative representativeness. When female membership and leadership posts are examined across the states in 2007, a disproportionate pattern is observed in the majority of states, as displayed in Figure 3. Only 20 states have women serving at tertiary leadership level equal to or greater than the total percentage of female membership in the state’s legislature. Of those, only 11 states had women serving in leadership roles at both the secondary committee and tertiary levels proportional to or greater than the base. Of the ten legislatures with women serving as presiding officers in 2007, seven had women serving in tertiary leadership roles proportional to their membership.

In half the legislatures, women served in secondary committee leadership positions that exceeded female membership elected to the body (see Figure 3). This observation leads to the third criterion developed by Cotter et al. (2001): “A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels,
not merely the proportions of each gender or race currently at those levels” (p. 658). Such a distinction introduces the concept of “tokenism” -- particularly in those instances where women hold leadership positions within the chambers but historically have never advanced to the top positions, including those roles immediately held by Speakers, Senate Presidents or Senate President Pro Tems prior to their ascent. For instance, Louisiana (50.0%) and Illinois (33.3%) ranked as states with the highest percentage of women in leadership positions nationally in 2007; yet neither have ever had women serve as its presiding officers. Further, because tertiary leadership positions vary in power from one state to the next; it is important to distinguish these differences in legislative career paths by state and to control for these differences.

![Graph showing the percentage of women legislators, women committee leaders, and women leaders by state](image_url)

**Fig. 3.** The “2007 State Leadership Profile” displays the percentage of women members, the percentage of women serving as chairs and the percentage of women in secondary leadership roles within each state for that year, along with those state chambers* led by women in 2007.

*Note: Data from CAWP Fact Sheet (2007).*

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11 The distinction is that the gender gap, if it exists, not only grows but accelerates as one moves up in the hierarchical order of the structure, organization or institution.
Finally, the fourth criterion Cotter et al. (2001) used to demarcate a glass ceiling is when an “inequality represents a gender or racial inequality that increases over the course of a career” (p. 661). Such patterns are difficult to measure in legislative bodies since it is difficult to measure what constitutes a political career for a member. Since not all members enter the legislature at the same point in their professional or political careers, this criterion would be more difficult to measure without tracking the age of legislators when elected. Again, it underscores the importance of identifying the leadership antecedents described earlier including prior elected and appointed service, tenure, and leadership roles held.

In other studies, researchers (Gunthrie & Roth, 1999) have argued that institutional environments influence the likelihood that women will “rise to the highest levels of organizational leadership” (p. 531). Similarly, Erik Olin Wright and Janeen Baxter (2000) examined a range of issues including gender inequalities that resulted from institutional structures and social environments. Women have also been observed to work for much smaller corporations than men when measured in terms of market value (millions), sales (millions), assets (millions) employees (thousands) (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). For these reasons, modeling where women are likely to lead should include variables that measure district-sized constituencies, the degree of professionalization in the legislature, electoral competition and egalitarian culture. Based on the empirical data observed in 2007, it appears that a glass ceiling exists in many state legislatures today where top leadership is still largely reserved for men (Carroll, 2004). Why have things changed so little? Why have transformations occurred in some states and not others? And does it matter?


**Legitimate Democracy**

This patchwork of gendered leadership has several implications. As gender scholar Sue Thomas (1994) argues, “Leaving any group out of policy formulation and legitimation necessarily means that the range of ideas is artificially limited,” (p. 147). More broadly, Iris Marion Young (2000) posits that justice in a democracy requires participation in the decision making process in order to strive for self determination and self-development. Legitimacy is also defined in terms of representation by American civil rights scholar Lani Guinier (1992). Guinier (1992) states: “A homogenous legislature in a heterogeneous society is simply not legitimate…we need to put the idea of proportionality at the center of our conception of representation” (p. 33).

Such discourse introduces the theoretical frame that serves to inform this research. Four major areas of literature are relied upon: Democratic Processes and Participation serve to situate the function representative democracy plays in the state polities. Glass Ceiling Effects, as discussed earlier in this section, served to identify the phenomenon that is the central focus of this dissertation: gendered leadership in the states. The body of literature on State Legislative Leadership provides the contextual backdrop which describes the functions of legislative leadership as well as divergences in strength which vary by institutional structures, forms and functions. Lastly, the literature on Women in Government focuses on women as candidates, women in positions of leadership and women as policymakers.

A discussion of the Democratic Processes and Participation literature is presented in this section as it centers the focal query: does it matter how our governments are organized and who leads us? The extant literature on State Legislative Leadership and
Women in Government is discussed later in this dissertation as this literature informs the hypotheses tested in subsequent chapters. While our federal and state polities are representative democracies in design, the wider literature on democratic processes and participation are drawn upon to identify the strengths and limitations of the current structures. In this way, an assessment as to the import of who leads us and why may be better understood.

To begin, legitimacy in democracy is rooted in many theoretical frameworks for political and social scholars. The principles, norms and assumptions underlying the tenets of participatory versus representative models of democratic decision-making raise unique implications for the process of democratic decision-making and for the practice of policy-making. Within each theoretical frame, access to structures, processes and policy formation as well differentiated consequences associated with difference and diversity are revealed.

As expressed by Jane Mansbridge (2003), there are many forms of representative democracies ranging from the traditional principal-agent format (promissory representation) which is forward looking to an outgrowth of this form, described as anticipatory representation (retrospective voting based upon representatives past behaviors). Mansbridge (2003) further defines two additional forms: gyroscopic and surrogate representation; the former model is one in which voters elect their representatives based upon common ideologies and the latter is a descriptive form of representation in which a representative of a marginalized group represent other members of the group (i.e. women lawmakers representing the interest of women in the population at large.)
Descriptive representation is almost a prerequisite for some (Rosenthal, 2003) given the limitations of substantive representation conducted in largely single member districts to the exclusion of minorities and women. Descriptive representation invites representatives of marginalized groups to advocate for the interests of others with whom they identify (race, gender, and ethnicity); those groups often extend beyond district boundaries. This form of surrogate representation depicts a legislative environment in which a representative of a marginalized group represents the interests of other members of the group beyond their legislative districts (women working for women in the population at large) (Mansbridge, 2003).

For deliberative democrats characterized by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in *Why Deliberative Democracy* (2004), the need to justify decisions is a central characteristic. As Jurgen Habermas first introduced, democratic democracy is grounded in the “collective judgment of the people” (Harbermas, 1995). While there are differences among scholars (Habermas, 1995; Mansbridge, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004) as to where and when deliberative processes should be applied, reciprocity lies at its core. “Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one another justification for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 98).

The largest distinction in participatory versus aggregative representative democracies can be found in their criterion. As described by Mansbridge (1980), representative democracies are largely adversarial. They are designed as institutions in which electoral representation assumes citizens’ interests intersect and are in constant conflict. Decisions in a representative democracy are premised on the notion of one
citizen, one vote in which the majority rule prevails. This distinction illuminates the limitations of representative governments.

From Archon Fung’s perspective as presented in *Empowered Participation* (2004), our current policy formation system is broken and our political institutions are incapable of remedying the problem. In Fung’s contemporary outlook (2004), a participatory democracy should provide citizens with “substantial and equal opportunities to participate directly in the decisions that affects them” (p. 4). “Empowered and engaged citizens” are only made possible when the public is able to feel the effects of their deliberations (p. 4).

Along these same lines, “strong democracy” as advocated by Ben Barber (1984) attempts to maintain the positive attributes of a thin democracy (liberal democracy) while diminishing its weaknesses – “to associate democracy with a civic culture nearer to the themes of participation, citizenship and political activity that are democracy’s central virtues” (p.117). Barber (1984) argues that strong democracy is a “distinctly modern form of participatory democracy” which it is capable of overcoming the competing interests and conflicts that are endemic in a large, widely dispersed heterogeneous civil society. Barber (1984) argues there is a difference between the politics of bargaining and exchange and the politics of transformations where choice leads to modifications and enlarged options. More specifically, strong democracy is self-government by citizens rather than representational government in the name of its citizens. Succinctly stated, Barber (1984) claims strong democracy transcends limits of representation by making politics the business of amateurs.
In *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), Young is critical of representative processes, as noted earlier. While Young (2000) recognizes differences exist in a civil society, she asks how one attains justice under a structure of inequality. Young (2000) is critical of representative processes because it segregates interests and ignores the unequal access to information. In her view, lack of participation in an agency or its processes harms the normative ideal of democracy.

Yet despite Fung’s (2004) preference for deliberative decision-making processes, he recommends “a bottom-up hybrid of participatory-democratic and representative arrangements that directly solicits the opinions and preferences of residents regarding (Chicago) city services and infrastructure…” (p. 236). The corresponding need for support resources in participatory processes highlights limitations to capacity in general. Fung (2004) also found in his examination of participatory decision-making processes in Chicago, some of the citizen empowerment difficult to sustain without independent funding sources. Further, Fung (2004) acknowledges not all deliberations are suitable to bottom-up processes. Young (cited in Fung, 2004) also notes that there are some issues in which citizens must rely on experts (elected officials). Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) concede some democratic actions are beyond the scope of a deliberative democracy process, such as security concerns.

In the background, civic and electoral participation have assumed decreasingly important roles in our democratic society in recent decades. In *The Public and its Problems*, John Dewey (1927) asserts it is essential for the public to “support and substantiate the behavior of officials” in our government. He (Dewey, 1927) further implies that government officials are free to pursue their own interests which may in fact
produce wrong consequences for the public. In effect, an “eclipsed public” diminishes the original purpose of a state; it further calls into question the motives of the remaining structures and functions that exist. If the public does not act to substantiate the actions of the government through active and widespread collective voting, Dewey (1927) believed the actions will likely come to be filled by an alternative entity.

While some scholars and researchers (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins & Delli Carpini, 2006) weigh the generational effects of this trend, others (Skocpol, 2003; Putman, 1995) focus on the decline in associations and voluntary memberships within US civil society that have been replaced by entities commonly referred to as advocacy groups. In the first instance, generational trends may predict that civic participation will continue to diminish as younger members of society participate at lower levels than their predecessors. The focus for others (Skocpol, 2003; Minkoff, 1995) is on the shift from rights based organizations, which relied upon large scale protests to attain major policy changes for women and racial or ethnic minorities, to policy advocacy groups which may be more narrowly focused, funded and supported (Skocpol, 2003).

Assessing the Implications and Framing the Research Questions

Limitations in all forms of democratic processes and participation turns us back to the focus of this dissertation: in a representative form of government, does it matter who leads us? For some scholars, the nature of a “winner-take-all governing system” may leave marginalized groups underrepresented (Guinier, 1992; Hawkesworth, 2003). For Mary Hawkesworth (2003), the question is no longer does race-gendering exist, the questions become how pervasive is it and what are the systematic effects on agenda-setting and policy formation.
Descriptive representation invites representatives of marginalized groups to advocate for the interests of others with whom they identify (race, gender, and ethnicity); those groups often extend beyond district boundaries. In practical terms however, this effect is characterized as the “double bind” (Bratton & Haynie, 1999). It no doubt places a burden on some members and perhaps hinders their pursuits of other goals such as leadership or a higher office which both require time. The intersection of race and gender may erode representation further (Hawkesworth, 2003). To whom do they serve when issues of race compete with gender? For these members, the “triple bind” as offered by Debbie Walsh, the director of CAWP, may serve as another form of contextual constraint (personal communication, April, 12, 2006). More directly, the glass ceiling effects for women of color has been characterized as “a concrete ceiling” (Catalyst, 1999).

More broadly, how much influence do leaders have on policy formation and advocacy? In a comparative case study of the Arizona and California legislatures, Beth Reingold (2000) found women legislators did not pay closer attention to their constituents than male legislators in either state, even though the Arizona legislature had a higher proportion of women representatives and one chamber was led by a woman. Reingold further noted the women and men’s policy preferences were not significantly different, particularly on gendered issues. What emerged from Reingold’s case study was the observation that the positions taken by the members in both states were influenced by advocacy groups, symbols and the public visibility of policy issues. There appears to be an association between the stronger women’s political caucus in California, as compared to none in Arizona, in terms of the passage of women’s issues for both male and female members (CAWP, 2007). Yet without an engaged citizenry or strong advocacy groups
(Reingold, 2000), the question returns us to who will work to advance the interests of marginalized groups if access to agenda-setting leadership positions is impeded for minorities, including women?

Further, do institutional constraints, political and cultural norms inhibit women from getting elected to state legislatures or serving in its top posts? As advanced by some researchers (Strass & Corbin, 1998), the examination of the actions, interactions, and occurrences of alignments among individuals acting in groups and whether they are coordinated is relevant. “The final paradigmatic term is consequences…Delineating these consequences, as well as explaining how they alter the situation and affect the phenomenon in question, provides for more complete explanations” (p.134).

Finally, for those women who have gained access to the podium, are they constrained by institutional norms or are they reformers opening the doors for women and other marginalized groups? Thomas (1994) frames the debate in this way: “…power is power, and those that have it exercise it to get what they want. Women will no longer be different, or they will not long share its reins with men” (p. 152).

The implications stemming from representative forms of democracy reflects widely upon the practice of public policy making; it affects who our leaders are, whether they have the ability to alter institutional norms and structures, as well as how policies are formulated. Through the theoretical lenses of democratic processes and participation, the effects of glass ceiling, leadership factors in the states and an examination of women in government, two research questions are framed:

- RQ1. What are the personal antecedents to legislative leadership in the state’s lawmakers? How do institutional, electoral and egalitarian factors
affect leadership? Do factors impede access to leadership differently for women than for men?

- **RQ2.** Do women and men bring different styles and behaviors to the job of leadership? Does gender make a difference in the policy preferences, proposals and products of legislative leaders?

**Organization of the Research Questions under Study**

As women’s legislative gains began to slow in the late 1990s, some scholars began to reopen the research question as to whether this change will be one of an increase in *numbers* or in *kind* of the women serving (Dolan & Ford, 1997). At the same time, less has been observed about both the men and women who occupy the presiding officer positions in the states during this period; there is a dearth of literature on gendered leadership of Senate Presidents (Senate Pro Tem) and Speakers. Several legislative scholars make note of the limited studies on leadership patterns (Freeman, 1995; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Squire, 1992) which underscores how much is left unknown (Moncrief, Thompson & Cassie, 1996). Finally, Sue Carroll (1985) posited that future research must consider not just the political ambition of women, but to detect for possible patterns of discrimination and limitations in structure or political experience that may explain the paucity of women in office.

This is the starting point for this dissertation: the 21st century cohort of both men and women leaders in the states. This dissertation builds on the literature by studying legislative leaders and leadership styles, behaviors and policies during the period of 1997 through 2010 from the perspective of individual leaders. Additionally, this study measures the effects legislative design, function and form may place on leadership.
Within each chapter that follows, a literature review that informs each research question and the hypotheses formation is provided. The differences in the research questions also invite varying methodological approaches. The data collection process and the methods utilized are described in each chapter; the methods include a preliminary grounded theory case study, an analysis of material culture and documents, a census survey of legislative leaders and a logit model estimating structural variables to predict where women lead.

Chapter 2 begins by examining leadership in the state’s lawmaking chambers and assesses if these characteristics vary by gender through a grounded theory study of the New Jersey legislature in 2006. Given the scarcity of comparative case studies and national state leadership databases (Moncrief, Thompson & Cassie, 1996), a useful approach for examining state legislatures was to begin by theory building. Additionally, since there are few discernable patterns as to where women lead and why as described earlier, it invites a qualitative exploratory investigation from the perspective of female legislators into why this is happening. In one sense, only a study collecting first-person subjective experiences from the participants is likely to unveil what is occurring, as well as the why and the how (Holstein & Gubrium, 1998). Three key variables emerged as being central to legislative leadership: access, time and money.

Once we explore the why and the how, we are better positioned to explore the personal antecedents to legislative leadership. While providing little in the way of generalizations about gender leadership, the preliminary grounded theory study provides the basis for formulating hypotheses about top leadership positions in the 50 state polities. Chapter 3 begins this examination through both a material culture and document analysis and a survey of the panel of legislative leaders on the three variables
hypothesized in Chapter 2. A personal profile of each of the panel members serving from 1997 to 2010 is portrayed and distinctions in gendered leadership are presented in Chapter 3. Paths to legislative leadership are also mapped. Finally, in order to assess whether glass ceiling effects within states emerge from job-relevant characteristics (Criterion 1) or career longevity (Criterion 4) in future research (Cotter et al., 2001), profiles of state leaders are highlighted.

Another strong measure of glass ceiling effects described earlier includes structural variables and the impact on leadership overall, and gendered leadership more specifically. Chapter 4 examines whether structural, electoral and egalitarian factors affect legislative leadership and the extent to which, if any, these variables impede access to leadership differently for women than for men. The focal variables modeled in Chapter 4 include legislative institutional power, electoral factors and egalitarian measures. Here, the effects of formal and informal rules governing seniority are measured as well as the proportionality threshold and advancement related opportunities identified in Criterion 2 and 3 earlier (Cotter et al., 2001). The model also includes cultural variables theorized in the glass ceiling leadership to impact where women lead.

Studying leaders and the environment in which they function, naturally leads to an initial inquiry into their policy preferences, proposals and products. More specifically, does gender make a difference or do other factors matter more? Chapter 5 compares the individual styles and behaviors of men and women leaders and examines the influence gender purports to play in the policy preferences, proposals and products of leaders. Data from both the open-ended and close-ended survey instrument are relied upon to respond to the research question. In the end, it appears that women do not change their leadership
styles after they become presiding officers, but rather, men appear to make changes as compared to the leadership styles observed at the committee level. Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses the overall results, the implications and limitations of this study while offering opportunities ripe for future research.
III. What Is Leadership And Is It Available To All Who Seek It?

“Leadership is an elusive and powerful phenomenon.”

M. E. Jewell and M.L. Whicker
Legislative Leadership in the American States, 1994

Perhaps just as intangible as the notion of what leadership is, is the path to top leadership opportunities in the states. What personal factors determine who commands the podium in legislative chambers? Do members arrive as equals? In other words, do all members have the same opportunity to ascend in leadership? Do some pursue leadership positions shortly after arriving in their State Capitols while others are content to remain as rank and file members for the duration of their tenure? Furthermore, are prospects better in less professionalized legislatures and less electorally competitive states for those members so inclined to climb the ladder to the top? Are women legislators, who are clearly underrepresented at the pinnacle, disadvantaged by personal attributes?

Electoral demographics is a good place to look for explanatory predictors about access to leadership opportunities since it is the first step in determining who gets elected. Today, electoral factors have come to define states more in cultural terms, as red or blue states, than by regional or other socioeconomic and demographic descriptions. The colors have subsumed these other variables and now provide a visual depiction of a state’s historical and predicted electoral vote. New Jersey (NJ) is a state that has voted Democratic in the last five Presidential elections. If “party identification is a primordial force in election decision-making,” as offered by some (Zukin, 2001), “over the past
decade New Jersey has become an increasingly Democratic state. Moreover, because of the party preferences of young voters, this is likely to continue over the current decade.”

By these definitions, New Jersey is as a cloudless sky. So why did the state find itself juxtaposed alongside red states like Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas when it came to electing women to its state legislature during the decade? Once seated, no woman in New Jersey has ever held the job of Senate President and only one woman, Marion West Higgins, briefly served as Speaker of the General Assembly some 40 years ago before Assemblywoman Sheila Oliver’s sudden assent in 2010. This paucity of gendered legislative leadership exists despite the preferences of the voters who elected Christine Todd Whitman (R) as the state’s first woman governor in 1993. Whitman was not only the chief executive in one of the nation’s most constitutionally powerful offices at the time; she was also the only woman in the nation serving as a head of state for much of her first term. Today, New Jersey’s highest court has also been headed by a female, and the state was only one of 13 states in the nation to have a 1:1 ratio of women to men, on the state Supreme Court (CWIG, 2004). In 2010, the top bench still maintains its 1:1 gender ratio and is also represented by one African American male and one Hispanic male. These minority accomplishments do little to contradict the portrayal of a progressive New Jersey citizenry – so why does the legislature appear resistant to gendered leadership?

The empirical data suggest that party identification, party control, percent of women in the workforce, geographical location, or a state’s median household income and average educational attainment do not seem to be correlated to the percentage of women in legislative bodies or their hold on top leadership positions. Electoral map
coloring also bears no relationship. “It’s more than being blue,” mused Walsh, Director of the Center for Women in American Politics (CAWP), Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. Walsh continued her assessment:

Arizona is a red state and they have a lot of women in leadership. Arizona has had both Democrat and Republican (women leaders), so it’s not partisanship. Everything points to highly educated, high income, basically pretty progressive, Democrats or Republicans. If you talk about what should be going on in New Jersey, we say this all the time and this is my mantra, we are a progressive state…we should be the state leader.

So why isn’t New Jersey at the top of the leader board when it comes to women legislative leaders? Is the absence of women leaders related to the low percentage of women in the legislature? Some might have tilted in this direction until recently. In 2003, New Jersey ranked 39th in the nation in terms of female legislative representativeness; however, by 2007, the state climbed to the 27th position and as high as 15th in 2008. Yet, it was not until 2010 that the Speakership was passed to Assemblywoman Oliver; the same year that the state slid back to the middle of the pack in 24th place.

This see-saw pattern of representation offers little empirical explanation for the lack of women in top leadership roles in the Garden State. This case study invited a qualitative exploratory investigation from the perspective of female legislators into why this was happening in New Jersey. While the purpose of this phase of the study was to examine the New Jersey phenomenon more closely, it was not limited to the female legislators themselves. Participants also included past legislative leaders, male members
and stakeholders, since it was also important to discover relevant categories of meaning and to generate hypotheses for further research (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

The first question considered was whether leaders were different from rank and file members. Only a small percentage of members ascend to the top; therefore, it was important to understand if personal factors distinguished members from their leaders. This then prompted the next level of inquiry: do the personal antecedents of legislative leaders vary by gender?

Literature Review

While the institutional constraints or political and cultural norms inhibiting women from getting elected to state legislatures or from serving in its top posts vary from state to state, the impact is considered by some scholars to be significant and pervasive. In her work on integrative leadership in state legislatures, When Women Lead, Cindy Simon Rosenthal (1998) concluded that “only when both significant numbers and gender power exist will women’s leadership styles show their potential to transform leadership.” Carroll (2003) put forward the argument that women are closely connected to women networks which creates accountability and explains why significantly larger proportion of women lawmakers than men work on legislation to benefit women.

While other studies demonstrate women legislators have agendas that are different from their male counterparts (Little, Dunn, & Deen, 2001), the gender gap impinges on wider audiences, public policies and government in general. According to a 1998 nationwide survey of state legislators conducted by CAWP on the impact of women in public office, women public officials were found to be changing the way government works. Women were more likely to bring citizens into the process, more likely to expose
government processes to public view and more responsive to groups previously denied full access to the policymaking process (CAWP, 1998 study). The findings (1998) also revealed “women were more likely to give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as caregivers in the family and society, (including) policies dealing with children, families and health care.” Finally, the importance of leaders as agenda-setters (Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing & Kurtz, 2003) and the finding that leadership positions directly contribute to bill passage (Ellickson & Whistler, 2000) supports the contention that the lack of women in legislatures and in leadership positions influences how women are impacted by legislative policies.

As the literature informs about the implications of gendered literature, it leaves open the questions about why and how it occurs. As guided by grounded theory methodology, concepts, themes and theory development are an integrative process that must emerge from the data as opposed to from the literature (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Therefore the literature review was initially limited, with further review conducted after the data were collected and coded. Another reason this study was not constrained by the literature, is it is “impossible to know prior to the investigation what the salient problems will be or what theoretical concepts will emerge” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 49).

Data and Methodology

Because “the procedures, traditions, power dynamics and norms of the legislature in which one serves are determinants of behavior” (C. Rosenthal, 1998, p. 80), only a case study approach which is not limited by information found in the foreground may truly reveal what is constraining women legislators in New Jersey. To inform the New Jersey case study, two data collection methods were utilized. These included
participatory observations (11) obtained during a series of class lectures studying state legislators and lawmakers (October-November, 2005) and depth interviews (7) conducted from January to June, 2006. The participants were stratified into three groups in order to explore if the concepts that began to emerge varied by the respondents’ background: women legislators, male legislators with leaders denoted and stakeholders (women scholars, legislative staffers and lobbyists), as displayed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male Members</th>
<th>Female Members</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader Sam</td>
<td>Member Lisa</td>
<td>CAWP Director Debbie Walsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Cal</td>
<td>Member Denise</td>
<td>Cong. Eleanor Holmes Norton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Brad</td>
<td>Member Carla</td>
<td>Staffer Don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Bob</td>
<td>Member Sally</td>
<td>Staffer Nina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Patrick</td>
<td>Member Kathy</td>
<td>Staffer Fred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member Donna</td>
<td>Lobbyist Gabby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member Nadia</td>
<td>Lobbyist Ben</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 18 total participants from whom observations were gathered, 12 were Democrats, three were Republicans and three were non-partisan; 10 of the participants were women and two of the 18 were minorities; five were state senators and five were assemblypersons. Women were over-sampled to give more weight to the examination of this phenomenon from their perspective.

Recognizing that feminist theories “put women at the center and identify patriarchy as central to understanding experience” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 6-7) and “they uncover cultural and institutional sources and forces of oppression” (Marshall 1999, p.12), this study also relied on data collected through an discrete participatory observation session which featured Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, (D-DC)
self-described as one of the “early feminist in the revolution.” Sponsored by CAWP, Holmes was the 2006 Senator Wynona Lipman Chair in Women’s Political Leadership speaker on the topic of “Can Women Who Changed the World Keep Changing It?” In addition to gaining Norton’s perspective on the struggles of women legislators, the forum provided an opportunity to observe those in attendance, particularly during the give-and-take question and answer segment (Adler & Adler, 1998). While observations can certainly be subjective, observations obtained in a naturalist setting, with the least intrusive research techniques, are an advantage to a research study. Reliability of the data collected is strengthened when it is combined with other methods, as was the goal in this study (Adler & Adler, 1998).

Interview Strategy and Ethical Considerations

Topical interviews ranging from 45 to 90 minutes were conducted face-to-face with members from each of the three data clusters interviewed during the spring of 2006 (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Three interview guides were structured in order to explore themes and concepts that emerged from the coding of the participatory observations. The guides utilized were modified as part of an iterative process designed to strive towards saturation of coherent and consistent concepts and themes, as well as explore new ideas as they emerged (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).

All conversational partners were asked open-ended questions about the research topic; leaders’ inquiries focused on their personal path to success, while female members were asked if opportunities and obstacles varied by gender within the legislature. Interviews with stakeholders were scheduled throughout the process as a means to validate the concepts and themes that were emerging from the interviews. Some
interviews were digitally recorded if the participants consented; otherwise, remarks were captured by utilizing a speedwriting technique which was supplemented with field notes immediately following each session.

While the data remained informed by the coding of the participatory observations, questions were formulated to assess the structure of legislators’ networks by posing comparative and relational queries along the lines as those solicited by Connie Gersick, Jean Bartunek and Jean Dutton’s (2000) in their work in academia:

- Who were the most influential people in your life and career?
- What was the most significant experience you have had as a legislator?
- What was the best piece of advice you ever got?
- Who gave it to you?

To balance time constraints against the goal to generate “fresh and rich results,” a hybrid model was utilized for this study (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). All interviews were coded after each session. Open coding was used to conduct a paragraph by paragraph analysis of the depth interview transcripts (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Although research involving the use of interview procedures or observation of public behavior where the subjects are elected or appointed is considered exempt research, some theorists argue that interviewers have an obligation to go beyond the rules bounded by an Institutional Review Board (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). When scheduling the depth interviews, some of the participants expressed concern when presented with the topic. In one instance, one female member expressed apprehension about “being on the record”; she commented: “whining about the problem with the good ol’ boy system is not
the way to advance in leadership.” Additionally, the small size of the population (23 female New Jersey legislators in 2006) easily facilitated internal identification.

To address these concerns, and to avoid the strain by participants to provide “politically correct” responses to sensitive questions, all conversational partners were described with pseudonyms, unless otherwise consented by the stakeholder participants. References to individuals by the interviewees were similarly not identified by name or distinguishing characteristics unless it was a matter of public record or the event in question occurred in public. Attributed quotes were derived from statements made in public forums, published or recorded in a public document, or with the consent of the participant.

After the coding was completed, details of conversations were omitted from the transcripts to ensure a participant could not be readily identified (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Instances of deletions or additions of data strived not to alter the content or the context of the conversation. In the final analysis, many if not all of the concepts and themes identified are attributable to more than one member.

**Participatory Coding**

Employing the hybrid coding and analysis approach, the concepts of coalitions, relationships, agendas and money emerged from the participatory observations along the hierarchical research question. Participants in all five observational sessions provided data that suggested that several concepts bore a relationship to power. These concepts guided the power theme explored during the depth interviews. Power integrated these concepts along several dimensions; power had both contextual and intersecting attributes.
Power developed into the storyline used to selectively code the data around the conditional preposition: Leadership requires individual power (Creswell, 1997).

Findings

Since everyone is not destined to lead (Kirkpatrick, 1974), state leadership requires distinct individual power by the member who is actively pursuing the position. As such, the research inquiries must follow a logical path: what is leadership power, how is leadership power acquired, are there obstacles to leadership power and is access to leadership power affected by gender? The working hypothesis for the storyline evolved: Leadership requires individual power that is multi-faceted; the more access to the components of power a legislator has, the more likely a member is to attain a top leadership position. Obstacles converge to impede access to power differently for women than men; therefore, leadership opportunities for women are limited.

Leadership requires individual power

As seen through the eyes of one former leader, a legislator needs to have power in order to rise up the ranks. “Nobody hands it to you. You've got to earn it,” added member Patrick. This assessment was back up by a female legislator who reflected upon the ascent of NJ Speaker Albio Sires (D-Hudson) who did not come up through the typical path and was in turn, viewed as owing his power to another, namely Governor James McGreevey.

I think about the stories I heard after Albio Sires who became Speaker (after only one term in the Assembly). It was so weird and I’m not sure how much credibility I give them, but many people told me that Albio Sires only became Speaker because McGreevey didn’t want another Alan Karcher. Alan Karcher
had worked himself up through the system. He acquired his own power and when he took over the office, he made the Speaker co-equal with that of Kean (then Governor Thomas H. Kean-R).

For Leader Sam, “power was always having the ability to influence public policy or components of it.” From the observations of legislative staffer Nina, power “is the ability to make things happen, influence people and make decisions. Power means your presence and your actions truly count. Your actions are important to other people.”

Another leader, Cal, saw leadership power in succinct terms:

Power is political capital. It’s the ability and the personal relationships to accomplish things. The gives and the takes. The “owesies”, meaning you help me, I help you. You need a vote one day and I need your help on another issue on another day. The “owesies”. Its cooperative relationships everywhere: with the Administration, members across the aisle and in your own caucus.

To affirm the contention of authority, Leader Brad paraphrased the words of Sophie Tucker who said: “I’ve been rich and I’ve been poor. Rich is better.” For me, “I have been in the majority and I have been in the minority, the majority is better. You need to be in power in order to get things done.” And finally, power is synonymous with political capital which was defined by one leader as “the ability to work cooperatively to accomplish your goals. It takes cajoling, convincing, and persuading to move people in the same direction. It’s playing nice in the sand box.” Leadership is more about influence than control over others.

Just as the participants could recognize power and who had power, some readily offered descriptions of what power is not. “It’s not brute force…that’s not real power.
People who are very forceful won’t maintain power. Getting your way by force will only give people a reason to work against you,” offered Leader Cal. He continued: “You need to understand power and the uses of power. You need to understand having power versus exerting power. They are two different things. You use it positively, rather than negatively.”

Power was not always uni-directional. It requires or is often enlarged through self-sacrifice and compromise. “Sometimes you have to sacrifice one of your bills for someone else in the caucus who needs help,” added Member Patrick who had his eye on advancing in leadership at the time of the interview. “You do it for other members who are in a competitive district when they need help on something. You give up something for the benefit of the caucus.” This idea was advanced by Leader Cal who said “You have to stand up for what you believe in, but you also need to know when to push and when to pull back. You need to know when to do which one. It’s the art of compromise.”

According to another leader:

You have to be at the right place at the right time. But you have to have the ability to be there. That comes more from hard work more than other things. It’s a unique mixture. It’s not for every person. It’s not the same thing at all times and places in history. It’s different at different times and places.

Added Member Patrick: “The stars aligned for me (referring to a chairmanship he gained as a freshman.)” This leads to the next concept in the working hypothesis: how is power acquired?
Power flows through access, time, and money

Power is acquired through access, time and money. To move towards this relationship, it is important to first consider whether these variables are stochastic.

Modeled on the academic network research conducted by Gersick, Bartunek, and Dutton (2000), the coded data were organized into data units, each unit represented a discrete descriptive discussion point. Each unit was analyzed to determine if power was associated with access, time or money in the framework of lawmaking and legislative leadership. These observations are displayed in Table 2 by gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Power: Number of Data Units from Depth Interviews by Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Unit Number*</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access was associated with relationships, coalitions and networks.

Time was related to events, occurrences and length of processes or historical references.

Money was linked as having an influence or producing a result.

On average, almost half of the men and women considered access, time and money the key components of power needed to attain a top leadership position. These concepts emerged from the representative conversations that took place during the depth interviews and the participatory sessions.

Access...who do you know

Opportunities in leadership often begin before the member is ever elected to public office. Access to the electoral process through blood-relationships and through political appointments or governmental staff positions was portrayed as a jumping-off
point or an accelerant for many members. These experiences were presented as an advantage by many participants. In the words of former Leader Sam:

> You need to have several tools in order to get power. One of those is a background or framework from which to build power. The two things that drove me when I was growing up were sports and politics. My dad was at the center of those worlds. (His father was a former local and county elected official for decades). While my mother was always supportive of those interests, it was my dad who spawned my interest and desire in politics.

Two other members described their background in terms of being the family business. First we hear from Patrick: “My dad was in the assembly and a freeholder. I've grown up in politics in the 70’s.” Similarly, Leader Brad introduced himself as coming “from a family of lawyers and politicians.”

But it was not just family relationships that aided members and more directly, leaders. Leader Sam cautioned that “you also have to have the framework to build power.” He continued: “In addition to my family background, I was fortunate when I walked out of college. I immediately went to work for someone who later went on to become Governor. The Governor had a huge influence on my early professional development.”

Overall, access to power was identified in the data as the most significant factor associated with leadership; moreover, women talked about this concept by a 2:1 margin over men. For some women legislators, it was sometimes described as having limited

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12 The office of county freeholder was substituted for the actual elected office to avoid self-identification by the member.
access, as in this exchange: “Women go into a meeting and they often feel like there was a meeting before the meeting.”

For the members of the 212th New Jersey Legislature (2006-2007), 77 of the 120 member delegation had held prior elected office, of which 20 maintained dual offices after winning their State House seat. About one-third held government or political jobs prior to serving in the legislature. In all, 96 of the 120 members had some form of access that was used to gain their legislative seat. While only about 10% had followed in the family business of politics, the ascension rate for any of these members going on to serve as a presiding officer or in the number two position in their caucuses was relatively high – at 50%. When it came to prior government service, men and women leaders shared similar traits. Still, access was not the only attribute possessed by top leaders that emerged.

*Time in a bottle*

Time was often described as an essential tool needed to attain leadership. Time had many attributes. Time was both temporal and cyclical. It was connected to members’ tenure, the age of a member when he or she was first elected to the legislature, and availability of time in relation to the average work week. Not surprisingly, having the time to seek a leadership position was essential.

At the outset, tenure, defined as legislative service in the chamber, appeared to play a role in who became leaders in the New Jersey legislature. “The biggest issue is being there...having seniority, unless it’s an extremely unique situation, emphasized Leader Cal. “The history of the speakers in New Jersey shows you that the past speakers have been there for five to seven to 10 terms before they took the podium...The first step is getting there (getting elected.) The next step is staying there long enough.” As another
participant observed, unless there is a political coup staged, you have to pay your dues in order to rise to the top. Seniority began to emerge as a prerequisite to leadership in New Jersey, as illustrated in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Speaker Term Begins</th>
<th>Member Elected</th>
<th>Prior Assembly Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardwick</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doria</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haytaian</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sires</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Avg. Tenure | 8.5 years |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>President Term</th>
<th>Member Elected</th>
<th>Prior Senate Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russo</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynch</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiFrancesco</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennett</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codey</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Avg. Tenure | 13 years |

Paying your dues means having *disposable time* and *timing*. “When I decided I wanted to be in leadership, I visited everybody up and down the state,” added Leader Patrick. This pattern of making “courtesy visits” up and down the turnpike was routed by another leader. “There were four of us vying for the Speaker position…when we knew our party would be in control after the election,” offered leader Cal. “So I spent my time running around the state, up and down the state, trying to gather support. Again, you need time.” From another female member, this perspective was shared: “You have to have time to work it (to be in leadership.) I have also heard you have to have time to raise money.”

*Money, money, money…and then you need more money*

Perhaps more than any other concept, money was the most significant factor that emerged in terms of emphasis lent to it. Money co-varied with almost every other
variable referenced throughout the combined lawmaking and leadership data sets. Its import was often valued above all other variables by participants. Money provided access. Money provided leadership power. Money determined races.

Money and Access

“Money does have an influence on some issues… It may help a bill faster or not…a chairman may post it or not,” noted lobbyist Ben. “Money is an important part of the process, but it's not everything.” But for legislative staffer Nina, “Money is part of power. Money, more than anything else, makes a difference. You can have good honorable intentions and not have power without money behind it…” Another female member recalled the adage oft repeated in the State House hallways: “You are familiar with the Alan Marcus quote…He says anyone who tells you they give you money for access is lying, it’s about getting your stuff done.”

Money and Leadership Power

The frequency of comments that referenced money was not unexpected when one considers the cost of electoral expenditures in the state. In 2007, the median fund-raising receipts by New Jersey state legislative candidates topped $290,000 for the winning campaigns; the median upper limit quartile for the winners reached almost $900,000. For state senate candidates, the spread was much wider. Winning Senate candidates had median fund-raising receipts near $400,000 and the median upper limit quartile topped $1.1 million that year.13 For an individual member, that means a candidate has to have a significant war chest to remain competitive or discourage viable contenders; for a leader

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13 Data were extracted from the PULSE dataset which is compiled by the non-partisan, non-profit organization The National Institute on Money in State Politics, last accessed 10.04.10.
in New Jersey, who is tasked with raising additional funds to protect vulnerable members of the caucus, the bank role is in the millions of dollars range.

Here are some firsthand accounts of the importance money plays in terms of getting elected and ascending in leadership. “Money for me is an opportunity to move up in the legislature,” added one member has who since climbed his way to the top. Member Denise echoed those sentiments: “You have to have time to raise money (to be in leadership.) You have to have a significant level of money to do that.” Member Kathy concurred with these sentiments: “Raising money is a little like the chicken and the egg question. It’s true you can raise more money if you chair a powerful committee. It is also true that if you can raise a lot of money, you can get to move up in leadership by chairing a powerful committee.”

When describing the steps he took to ascend to the top, Leader Cal outlined the role money played: “The next thing you need is money…I think money plays a bigger part (today.) It eventually got to a point where I had the ability to raise money. Money matters more now than it did…I believe the press has been marginalized as a result of money. In a similar way, Member Patrick emphasized the relationship between money and leadership opportunities:

Raising money is a key factor in gaining leadership positions. If you’re in a leadership position, it’s easier to raise money. It helps if you chair a powerful committee. If you're not a chairman down here, you're nothing. In the real world, if you raise money, you can advance in leadership. The better way to raise money is to wait for a committee chairmanship.
For Leader Cal, money was not only a step in the process, but a tool. He added: Money becomes important because it’s a tool. It doesn’t give you power by itself. I know lots of people with money. Some have succeeded in leadership and others have not succeeded. Money doesn’t do it by itself. You have to know how to use it to help yourself. It’s a resource. It doesn’t guarantee you can use it to gain power.

Finally Leader Brad summed it up this way: If you look at the balances in the leadership (campaign) accounts, you will understand how much money matters. The Democrats are in control and their PAC (political action committee) dwarfs the Republicans. Without money, nothing is going to change who controls the majority, short of the next redistricting process.

Money and Elections

Speaking about caucus majorities, Member Patrick underscored the connection in this way: “The decision for our current leader was a unanimous one. He has been gaining seats for the caucus since 1992. He has been such a networked fundraiser and has raised campaign funds for the majority of the campaigns.” In contrast, the growing influence of money in the election process was viewed dimly by Member Bob: “It bodes ill of the political process in our country. The American dream used to mean anyone could run for public office…that’s not the case more and more.” Leader Brad concurred: “It is beyond even millionaires now; you must be a multi-millionaire to run. Money cleared the field; it limited opposition in the last gubernatorial race (among each party’s candidates.)”

From a historic perspective, the concept of money and access was disputed very little by the participants. Walsh reflected on the long-term implications of the influence money plays in state’s electoral politics:
I think in New Jersey you’re absolutely right, money matters. There’s the ability to raise money or (to see who) they (party bosses) can turn to for money. And it’s not just in the legislature; it’s all the way up the political pipeline. If you’re in municipal government or even in a municipal party position or a committee person in your local party, the person who’s going to move forward is the person who can raise $5,000 for the committee. Or if you’re in Middlesex County, it’s the person John Lynch (party boss) can turn to and say I need $10,000 and they (get it) and that matters. Money also matters when the party bosses are thinking about who they are going to run.

_Hurdles to Jump_

Just as access, time and money emerged as three concepts that bore a relationship to leadership and power; the three also converged and presented obstacles to climbing the ladder to the top. In particular, the competitiveness of a member’s district often determines who gets elected as well as the opportunities they have after they arrive.

Incumbency is a key factor in the leadership equation. As described by one long-time legislative staffer: “…75% of seats can't lose and most (members) if they are alive and breathing, will win by 60%, and 58% if they're not (alive).” As is the case in most legislative bodies, few seats are up for grabs in an election cycle meaning most members are running for reelection in safe districts.14 In the words of one observer, the competitiveness of a district determines how much a member has to be concerned about losing an election. It also bears directly on one’s ability to be in leadership.

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14 For targeting purposes, competitive districts are considered to be any split district where the district is simultaneously represented by members from either party or a district where the party performance for the winning candidates is less than 55%.
An analysis of the New Jersey Legislative election returns in 2003 and 2005 revealed 21% of the seats in which women members were elected and 19% of men’s seats in 2003 were competitive in the general election cycle. What these numbers overlook is how many members of the 212th legislature actually gained access to their seat initially in the House or later in the Senate through mechanisms other than direct elections. The first means was through a special election which often followed a prior appointment to temporarily fill the vacancy. The second door to the chamber was through a process in which party officials determined the candidate in lieu of an open primary contest when an unexpected vacancy occurred. This analysis gives rise to an interesting proposition. Did the 34 members who drove through the “EZ pass lane” on their first trip to a legislative chamber in New Jersey do so because they were well positioned in terms of a campaign war chest or were they able to clear the money hurdle because they had access to the party bosses? In either case, the gender ratio was disproportionate; only six of the 34 who used a bypass route to their seat were women.

The relationship between the competiveness of one’s district and leadership opportunities was noticeable for several members. “Absolutely, it helped me to get to leadership by being from a safe district,” noted Leader Sam. “I did not have to watch my back too much. My district was solidified when I walked in as a result of the party organization.” Leader Cal detailed another step in the leadership climb:

The next thing (that affects leadership) is your geographic location. Is your district competitive? You’ll never be in leadership if you have to fight to protect yourself. You’ll never have the ability to focus on a leadership position because
you’ll always be concerned about survival. You have to have some stability, feel
secured in your elected position…

From the other side of the coin, Member Kathy saw her limitations: It’s harder to get into
leadership if you are from a competitive district. You have to be able to take one, take
several, take many for the team.” Member Nadia, who sits in a safe urban district,
revealed the opposite perspective: “I am really only here today because folks in the party
came to me and urged me to run for the seat. When they first asked me, I thought are you
kidding…I am not qualified to run. Believe me, it was the last thing on my mind. I owe
all this to the party.”

Although Nadia was empowered within her district, she also gave no indication or
interest in a leadership position: “I would only seek it if I were asked or encouraged to
run.” On the other hand, in every interview with a top legislative leader, all expressed the
notion that leadership was part of their personal agenda. One member put in this way:
“It’s something you have to grab for yourself. No one is going to hand it to you.”

And let’s not forget the linkage between the competitiveness of a district and
money, especially given the increased trends which far outpace the cost of inflation. By
comparison in 2005, the median fundraising resources for state legislative candidates
were $130,396; median campaign receipts was $221,476 for the winning candidates ---
all for a seat that pays $45,000 annually in compensation. In the words of Member
Patrick, it highlighted a skill set any leader in New Jersey needed: “If you’re not in a
competitive race, you must raise money for other people. If you are in a very competitive
district, there is little opportunity for leadership.” “For me, I was not traveling in circles
where there was a lot of money or wealth,” emphasized a female member who hailed
from a competitive district and who had no immediate leadership plans. “I need to raise a lot of money to fund my own race.”

The Political Culture in New Jersey

Some have argued that New Jersey’s political culture is a phenomenon unique to other states. Two gender scholars offered that the political culture in New Jersey and its affect on women reminded them of the Deep South -- 50 years ago. As such, you cannot fully understand the lack of women in legislative leadership roles unless you explore the effect, if any, political culture has on access. The perspective shared by many of the study’s participants indicates that political culture creates an environment that marginalizes newcomers such as women.

Walsh introduced the concept by offering a comparative analysis:

When you consider where we rank in terms of women representation in the legislature as compared to other states, you have to ask yourself: why would we be so different? Take for example, Washington State which consistently ranks near the top in the percentage of women elected to its state legislature (33.3% in 2006). Washington State is geographically much tougher for women because it’s not a full time legislature and to come to the state capital, it’s a much bigger distance (than in New Jersey). So you can’t tell me that women’s lives in Washington are less complicated than women’s lives in New Jersey…it’s the same. But it’s a different political culture, and that what’s in play for a large part in New Jersey.

15 Kathleen Dolan offered her observations, along with that of Lynne Ford, after she served as the discussant on a panel when this paper was presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Conference in January, 2007.
Walsh continued after noting how different New Jersey was from the other open primary processes she had witnessed around the country:

We have county party chairs that control who get the line. The fact that we have something that is called the line in most counties is very different from other states. In effect, the parties are endorsing pre-primary; putting resources, money and people into the campaigns pre-primary. And it just makes it very tough for newcomers. But there’s an even larger force looming in the politics. You’ve got party bosses behind the chairs. So even where you have women as county chairs, although the few we have are in counties where their parties don’t win very often, you have men (behind them) who are the force in those counties. So you’re looking at situations where the people choosing and the people picking are white men and people choose and pick people like themselves…and they choose and pick all the people. Especially in a state like New Jersey, where you are talking about freeholder races and municipal races which are the pipeline for the legislature, it’s so important to look at that.

As discussed earlier, when candidate selections were being made to determine who to run and where, there was often an intersection of money. Walsh summed up her analysis:

Another factor (that maintains the status quo) is there’s a lot of money and contracts and jobs, patronage tied to those positions (elected officials at the local and county levels.) So they want to keep tight control over those, so they’re picking certain kinds of people that they can keep in their control. It makes it

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16 Recall 64% of all legislators in 2006 served in a local or county elected position prior to serving in the New Jersey Legislature.
tough for women, it makes it tough for people of color and it makes it tough for a newcomer in a community to break in.

Her observations were supported in part by the participatory observation offered by Member Patrick when describing his political strategy and successes: “I became a municipal chairman and used that power to raise money.”

*Standing in the shoes of a woman: “You’re not entitled”*

As surprising as it may sound in a state as progressive as New Jersey, women legislators expressed a sense of second-class status that may reflect upon their interest and willingness to climb the leadership rungs after they arrive. Here’s what one woman faced in her first bid for the legislature:

When I ran for the legislature, I was told I was crazy. I would have men, with whom we shared a mutual mentor, take me aside and tell me if so-and-so was alive, he would tell you not to do this. It just isn’t your time. This is too big to take on. It’s political suicide...I hate to admit it, but it did raise some self doubt. It really made me question my decision. And I really hate to admit *this*, but it even brought me to tears. People would tell me I had to pay my dues. I should wait until it was a safe district. But I would also have to say, if it was my brother running instead of me, I think these same people would have lined up behind him. They would have said: ’at a boy, you go get it.

Another female member received the same bitter dose of reality upon her first run for local office:

When I first ran…the message I got was women have to be active and they *absolutely* have to pay their dues before they’re given opportunities. I remember feeling a lack of power. People told me, you have to be willing to come up
through the ranks…I remember thinking to myself: you deserve to be *whipped* because you’re doing this. It was only later, much later, when I noticed that this didn’t happen to men.

The legislator recounted coming to grips with not feeling entitled several years later:

A few years later, there was another male candidate who was running in our area for a higher elected position and he had never held public office before. But I don’t remember people saying to him, he shouldn’t be running because he had no experience. I never heard *anyone* say that to him. I never heard him *question* it.

Because women often follow a different path to the legislature, the altered route may intensify the effect of feeling marginalized once they join the rank and file. When asked directly about why he thought there have not been more women leaders in the state, Leader Cal responded: “It’s also much more difficult for reformers. Many women come in as reformers. If you can’t go along to get along, you won’t be successful.” Member Patrick shed some further light: “One of the things we see, is we almost have class warfare within our caucus (speaking to its large size). There is an inherent conflict within our core caucus (urban districts) and other members in the caucus (suburban districts).”

Of note, as the democratic ranks began to swell in the Assembly from about 2000 on -- which also ushered in more women -- a larger percentage of these women were from suburban districts, not typical democratic strongholds.

Member Kathy experienced this rift directly: “If you're coming from a suburban district like mine, I watch how I say things and what I say, because you can really offend others.” A fellow female colleague also found herself poorly positioned within her own caucus:
One day another member of my caucus asked me what’s a Democrat from “X” County doing here? You’re all about rich towns. I had to ease my way in there. It was also very difficult for me coming in here. Recently a vote occurred and I had to vote against my party leadership. Even though I told everyone in advance I am not ready to take part in that…when the vote occurred and I did not vote for it, everyone looked at me and said: why didn’t you vote for that? My reaction was: why did you think I was going to vote for it. I told you I was not voting for it. What did you think I meant when I said: NO! It involved an issue where my party wanted me to go along to stack a committee in order to get a controversial measure released that benefited the urban constituencies. Again one of my colleagues confronted me and inferred that I didn’t understand my actions. I said: look, I am a white woman from the suburbs. This doesn’t play well back home where I am from.

She understood both the consequences of her vote as well as what her future prospects might be for her in the caucus. “I also think what happens to women is they’re pretty marginalized in these institutions,” summed up Walsh. “So in some ways they almost have to learn to work around the system…When I think about one of the women here who has really rocked the boat of late…she has become a threat.”

*Agendas are different for women...and crowded, because they are different*

While some women believed access was limited within their majority caucuses, the agendas of women are often different: catapulting to a top leadership position may not even be the goal. As one legislative staffer put it who worked for both a male and female legislator in her career:
Women seek office because they often come with a desire to make things better whether it is spurred by a go-go bar in their neighborhood, concern for their children's education, the landfill in their backyard; it is often these types of issues that are at the root of their motivation. Women are different from men innately. Most don’t desire power. I’m not trying to make a blanket statement but I believe it (power) is a greater motivation for most men seeking office.

Sure I know my name is important in terms of how I act, but I really am doing this for them; it’s for their future.” Another female legislator described her ascent to the legislature in this way: “I decided to run so I can help my husband get a judgeship.”

In a lecture that touched on feminist issues as well as her role as a Member of Congress, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) underscored both the different agendas women have as well as the time constraints facing most women in elected office: “Women’s (legislative) agendas are often so crowded; it’s difficult to focus on priorities. They get a cacophony of answers when they ask what they should focus on first.” At the state level, Member Kathy shared her perspective:

There are many things competing for your attention including women’s issues, family and children concerns. First of all, it is absurd to define these issues as women’s issues, but for years, men didn’t pay attention to them. When I first got here I consciously choose to work on many issues. Perhaps that has kept me from focusing.

One female member summarized the constraints on her time with this story:

I certainly think (women have crowded agendas when they come to the legislature.) I would like to think your work can speak for itself. When I came
here, I had this filter I was going to use. It was going to help me develop my personal agenda and actions. It included ethics, smart growth or at least smart growth that is balanced and property tax reform. These were the three things I wanted to focus on. Then when I got here, I got a call from (Governor Jim) McGreevey who asked me to sponsor a women’s health bill. I thought, well sure, I guess I could do that. I certainly wanted to support women’s health issues. When I agreed to sponsor it, he told me, “Great! We have wanted to do this bill for a long time and we haven’t had a sponsor. You are perfect. You are the perfect face for this bill. You can really advocate for the need for a ‘women’s health issue.’” I remember thinking at the time, that it was a rather odd statement. But then as I started working on the bill, I was surprised by how many other men said the same thing to me. “We were waiting for someone like you to do this.” Again, I thought to myself, “You’ve been waiting for me? Why were you waiting for me to do this? What would you do if I wasn’t here to do this?” I guess it was then that I realized I needed to care deeply about women’s issues. But you have to be careful that your own agenda doesn’t get high-jacked.

The CAWP Director was the first to introduce this “burden/time constraint concept” that she had heard frequently expressed by women officeholders around the country. Walsh noted:

Well, I also think women have extra constituencies. Especially in a state like New Jersey, where there are so few women in the legislature, you have your regular constituents who can vote for you in your district, but you end up taking on women all over the state…So (women) almost have a double constituency; and

\[17\] The specific proposal was omitted from the direct quote to limit identification of the sponsor.
then, God help you if you are a woman of color who’s in the legislature, because then you have a triple constituency. So that also makes for some crowded agendas that I think do add to the problem. What I’m trying to get at is there’s a lot that women are taking on…

In fact, two women serving in the Senate in 2006 were African American women; three women in the General Assembly were African American and two were Hispanic. If the “triple bind” presents itself as a “concrete ceiling” for these women, it may further explain why women in top leadership roles has been historically non-existent in the state. In the end, almost one-third of the 23 female member delegation was minorities as defined by race, further reducing the number of women who may actually have the time to seek a leadership role.

Recalling that time was an important concept associated with leadership, crowded agendas may serve to steal time which presents an obstacle for women interested in pursuing a leadership position that may be different than for men. If you add to the tally the number of non-minority females sitting in competitive districts, which numbered seven in 2006, almost two-thirds of the delegation simply may not have had the time to seek a leadership position. This convergence of crowded agendas and electoral instability appears to be correlated with the lack of time echoed by all the female participants. And we have yet to consider the personal constraints placed on time that may vary by gender. In the words of one leader: “If you don’t have the time, you’re just another player.” Another leader concurred: “One thing you need in order to advance in leadership is you need a lot of time: time to run for office, time to get there and then time to do the job.”
Social Networks and Socialization

Women legislators have strong credentials as cited in the 2001 CAWP study; the Garden State’s 2006 class\(^\text{18}\) continued to reflect this trend. Eight in 10 male legislators had earned a college degree or higher, with 59% holding a graduate degree. Eighty-six percent of female legislators had a college degree or higher, with almost half (48%) earning a graduate degree. While education did not separate the gender, professional careers and background greatly diverged. Most legislators still came from traditionally male dominated fields such as law and business as displayed in Figure 4.

![Professions of NJ Legislators, 2006](image)

Fig. 4. Of the 103 members for which career data were available in 2006, half were in the legal and business/financial sectors.

Of the 29 lawyers in the legislature, only three did not have active practices; one of those was a practicing physician. Only one woman serving in the Assembly in 2006 was an attorney; however, she was a non-practicing attorney. In the Senate, two women were lawyers and again one was non-practicing. Two other sectors presented clear

\(^{18}\) An analysis of biographical information was compiled by the author based on data in The New Jersey Legislative Fitzgerald Manual (2005), the Office of Legislative Services Legislative Picture Book (2004) and OLS website, [www.njleg.org](http://www.njleg.org). Missing data was not calculated as part of the total percentages; complete data was available for all legislative attributes in 103 cases; some variables were missing for the remaining 17 cases.
gender distinctions. One-fifth reported holding careers in the governmental sector; yet a third of those were held by women who made up 19% of the body. Within that group, more than half of the women working in government were full-time legislators as compared to only one-third of the men. In the educational sector, almost half of the members were women, more than double the rate of male representation.

This disparity was summed up by one female legislator in this way: “For men, this is often a part-time job that supplements their other activities. For women, they come here because they are very dedicated to public service. Not a lot of women come through the same route as men.” Walsh added her perspective as to why men come to the legislature by way of legal and business related careers: “…for a lot of them, their other job pays them (a full-time salary) but they really don’t have to go into the office (9 to 5). Men are usually in some firm that gets how incredibly useful it is to have their employee or partner in the legislature.”

Another striking difference between the men and the women was age – particularly in the Senate. Although the average age was 47 in the General Assembly, it was slightly older for women at 49 years of age. In the Senate, the average age of members was 48; men were just slightly younger, arriving by the age of 47. By contrast, the average age of female Senators in 2006 was 56. In the Senate, only one woman had ever reached the chamber before the age of 40, and then only by a month. Forty-nine percent of the men were elected to the Senate before 40 and 76 % arrived before the age 50. In an institution where seniority matters and membership often comes through the Assembly (65% of Senators served in the Assembly first), some participants observed
that many women leave before they have earned the tenure to even be considered for a leadership opportunity.

If you do the math, adding the average age a woman arrives in the Senate (56) to the average chamber tenure prior to becoming a Senate President (13 years, see Table 3), the calculated age of a likely female candidate for the post would be 69. As compared to the other Senate leaders over the past 30 years, she would have a significant age disadvantage, given that the average age of past Senate leaders was 52 when they were first sworn in as the presiding officer. Leader Cal put the age difference in context:

Look at the current majority leader (reference to Assemblywoman Bonnie Watson Coleman at the time of the interview). She could become the next Speaker, but it depends if you are in the right place at the right time. There are lots of variables that will determine if she will move up: you (your party) have to stay in power; she will have to want to stay; in her case, she’s not likely to get unelected in her district (competitiveness of district) and it will depend if she wants to go elsewhere, in the cabinet, for instance.

Leader Cal was alluding to the pension building opportunities members look for as they approach retirement.

One last social demographic that some say explains why there is a disproportionate share of women leaders as compared to their legislative representativeness is that of family status. Of the women who have since begun to arrive at the State House in Trenton a bit earlier in life, many now bring with them children. This personal variable and the way in which women are socialized (Lawless & Fox, 2005) may help to tell a part of the story.
Sometimes, those who pursue leadership, or do not chase the brass ring, do so as a matter of personal choice. One female member, who described it as a very personal choice, couched her future ambitions in these terms:

I don’t have the same luxury of time as other members with a family. I don’t think women do. I suppose there are some male members who have been here with young families, like Dick Codey. But then he is also from a safe district…you have to have time to work it to be in leadership. Everyone is not on equal standing (when they walk through the door)...look at Senator Scutari (Senator Nicholas P. Scutari, D-Union) who is also a freshman. I think he’s a great legislator. But by the nature of his district (non-competitive), he has a different job. It’s different electorally. He has the ability to get things done.

Walsh summed it up this way: What we most often hear from women candidates and officeholders about what they really need most in government or politics to be involved or get ahead “is a wife.” Nor was this perspective just shared by the women.

“When I started in this business, I had the luxury of time, offered former Leader Sam. “I was single. I was solely focused on politics. If I had $10 bucks in my pocket, I thought I was rich. I was living in a broken down apartment at the time but I didn’t even know it was broken down. What I did have was time!”

When asked directly if he thought families interfere with women moving up in the leadership ranks, Leader Sam responded and then redirected the question:

Certainly, the acquisition of power requires a singular focus. You have to wonder if a women’s innate desire to have a family is in conflict with that goal. You can also ask yourself that question. Do you think it made a difference in your career?
When you started, you were young and single and totally focused on your career. And then when you got married, you had a husband that was wildly supportive of what you wanted to do and did not object to you putting the time in. Now think about where you are today with young children. There’s just no way you could or would even want to put in the same type of time that it requires.

At the time of the interview, Leader Sam was no longer a member of the legislature; in his legislative departure announcement a few years earlier he cited the need to spend more time with his young family which by then had grown to include a wife who had a full-time career and four children.

**Analysis**

Women’s representation in the New Jersey Legislature is not a factor of the gender’s electability from the voters’ point of view. In fact, the 2003 aggregate vote tallies show that women won 29% of the total ballots cast for legislators statewide. If the vote was apportioned according to race-based redistricting proposals advanced by some constitutional theorists, women should have captured eight Senate seats and 21 in the Assembly for a total of 29 seats.¹⁹

Just as electability cannot be used to predict proportional representation, nor can legislative representativeness be used to predict where women will lead. The empirical data in other states supports this notion. What has emerged from this study is a better understanding of the antecedents to leadership which further sheds lights on the obstacles to gendered leadership in the Garden State. In particular, the concepts that began to emerge, access, time and money, and the interaction between each, are of prime interest.

¹⁹ The total legislative seats in NJ held by women were 19 in 2003, and 20 in 2004-05.
and were used to make generalizations at the theoretical level and served to inform the hypotheses to follow.

**Access Hurdle**

Access to the legislature provides both opportunities for some and obstacles for others. For women in New Jersey, it appears to manifest itself as a deficit for many women who run for office in districts with deeply entrenched incumbents or where the partisan configuration is not in their favor in the general election cycle. The composition of the state’s primary and vacancy selection processes also appears to work against women. The data does support the notion that access to the legislature as well as leadership positions is more limiting for women. As for access, women and men legislators in New Jersey generally all worked their way up to the legislature via the county or local pipeline of government jobs and political appointments. Family connections, however, were more non-existent for women. While 13% of the women had a family network of politicians as compared to 8% of the men, half of the men rose to secondary leadership positions or higher while only one woman did.

In New Jersey, the party bosses decide who gets the line; this translates to favorable ballot positioning as well as the receipt of financial, technical, and political resources of the major party figures in the county. It is more powerful than an endorsement and free media. The county line, in effect, predetermines who will win the primary. Historical electoral data has shown that it is a very rare occasion when a candidate who runs “off the line” wins the election. During the election cycle immediately preceding the 2006-07 legislative session, women did not get the same opportunities as men to fill vacancies or run for open, competitive seats.
As Walsh argues, if women do not have access to party bosses through former positions, family lineage or already occupy offices of significance (i.e., big city mayors), then they are often overlooked by the bosses when opportunities arise in the legislature. It is worth mentioning that there were only four female party bosses out of 42 chairs in the Republican and Democrat state party organizations in 2006. Of these four, two represented counties where its party registration numbers were extremely low. The remaining two were described by one female participant as “token” leaders; the real power was held by men.20 Perhaps this is because women legislators in NJ do not come from the traditional career paths as men; namely the business and legal sectors.

At a minimum, women legislators in New Jersey appear to labor harder just to “get there.” The challenges they had to overcome and the discouragement many women said they received along the way, may serve to diminish any interest they had or have in climbing to the top of a male dominated heap after they arrived – meaning they do not choose to run for the job. While the state’s somewhat closed electoral and appointment processes are distinct from those primaries held in the majority of other states; electoral barriers alone do not explain why a progressive state such as New Jersey has only had two women Speakers. “Clearly, you have to get there,” one member offered when noting that legislators, by definition, all possess a certain amount of political ambition. So what else, aside from self-selection, may be contributing to the dearth of women leaders in the Garden State and across the country? The answer is hypothesized to be two-fold: there

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20 At the national level, the picture is not very different. “In 2009, only 11 Democratic state party chairs and 8 Republican state party chairs are women. In addition, women hold only 15% of state legislative leadership positions. These statistics mean that relatively few women are leading their parties’ candidate recruitment efforts” (Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, & Walsh, p.14, 2009).
are personal antecedents possessed by leaders which vary by gender; and, like electoral barriers, other factors impede access to top leadership for women in the states.

_The Chicken and the Egg: Access & Money_

The social and professional networks of the female legislators are markedly different from those of their male counterparts. This not only plays a role in gaining access to the legislature, but it may provide some members with a financial edge. To begin, the men interviewed credited their political and professional networks in helping them gain access to office. Once they arrived, these same networks were used to leverage campaign contributions for themselves, fellow members they supported and their party caucus. By contrast, women legislators in New Jersey cited social and community networks as spring boards to elected office. As noted earlier, only two female members of the legislature were practicing attorneys. This was offered as one of the primary reasons women found it difficult to raise funds. For those female members in targeted districts, most of the funds they raised had to be used to secure their own re-election; few dollars were available to contribute to other candidates in the hopes of building political coalitions in the caucus. The lack of professional networks aligned with deep pockets was also cited as the reason many qualified female candidates are passed over by party bosses. For some bosses, the return on investment is smaller when it comes to financing a woman with limited campaign resources than endorsing a male candidate who is in a position to help finance his own race and brings new dollars into the party coffers in the future.

Sometimes, the ability to raise money may come from one’s own personal station in life. In general, women legislators in New Jersey have less personal wealth than men.
In a review of Senate financial disclosure forms for the 2006 members, only one male Senator earned less than $100,000 a year in 2006 while more than half of the women earned less than $100,000. A look to other states, controlled by state’s median income, may reveal similar traits across the country. Both of these factors may further lead to a perception that women are not as able bodied fundraisers as men; contrary to what campaign finance records show as well as the literature (Burrell, 1994).

*Never Enough Time*

Women in the New Jersey Legislature for the most part arrived at the State House later in their professional careers than did men, particularly in the Senate where female representation is much lower than in the House. On average, women arrived in the Senate almost a decade older as compared to the men. Since top leadership positions corresponded to longer tenures, this means that many women legislators are confronted with retirement options sooner than their male counterparts. Given the pension structure in New Jersey, no legislator is immune from the lure to join the Administration if their party is in control or accept a political appointment which significantly serves to increase retirement benefits.\(^\text{21}\) As such, older members may opt out of the legislature just as they accumulate sufficient seniority to vie for a top leadership slot; thereby shrinking the small pool of female candidates.

Others interviewed described the older women legislators as “grandmothers” which may serve to create a perception that they were not possess typical leadership qualities. For the younger female members with children at home, they described their time as being divided between very active political careers and their young families. The

\(^{21}\) The calculation for retirement benefits is based on years of service, age at retirement and the high three – the highest salary the beneficiary earned for any three years during his or her enrollment in the pension fund.
time needed to focus on leadership opportunities did not seem to present itself to
members with young children, particularly in those households where the member
assumes the primary caregiver role.

Because there are fewer women in the body, women have a disproportionately
higher burden to grapple with the so-called “women and family issues” that have long
been overlooked by a male dominated legislature. Spending time on substantive
representation further diminishes the time women have to consider and spend on
leadership opportunities. Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton’s words delivered to a
college audience in the spring of 2006 categorized the challenge for all women in this
way:

This is a revolution. It is not over yet. It took women in the suffrage movement
over 100 years to secure the vote; they did not do it in a wholesale fashion…It
should be the goal of women alike to concentrate against the remaining gender
bias. The historical changes that woman have achieved cannot afford to make a
u-turn now.

Comparisons in other states

As the working hypothesis proposed, women faced disproportionate obstacles as
compared to their male counterparts. Obstacles of access, time and money converge to
limit women’s leadership opportunities once they reach the Golden Dome. To elaborate
this theory further, other factors may be contributing to the inequality that appears on the
surface. Cultural gender biases and differences in socialization also began to emerge as
concepts that invited further exploration. Differences in the utilization of power between
male and female was another concept that evolved during the observational phases and throughout the interviews with the participants.

This study was exploratory; it was not conceived to generalize to individual members in the New Jersey legislature, but rather to generalize at the theoretical level about the antecedents to legislative leadership given the dearth of the extant literature on the topic. The study was intended to probe the questions as to how leaders ascend to the top and why there is a void of women in top legislative leadership positions in New Jersey in order to formulate hypotheses about leadership in the other states. Grounded theory is only complete when saturation has been reached; while the number of interviews was limited, no new concepts emerged. Further, the limited number of interviews does not preclude testing the limits of the concepts that began to emerge about gendered leadership (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 241). By better understanding what power is; how it is obtained; what some of the obstacles to power are; and, if gender plays a role in a single state case study, it serves to better inform the next steps which explore the phenomenon in the 50 states.

No doubt, power will be different in every state; it may be more reliant upon relationships, both familial and community-based; it may be routed through a political power-broker that practices politics at his ranch rather than in an urban mayor’s office or at a party boss’ headquarters. It is likely influenced by customs and mores, including political culture and social constructs. Although these structural, electoral and egalitarian factors are expected to vary by state, personal antecedents to leadership are also expected to distinguish leaders from rank and file members, and men from women.
IV. One of the Last Private Men's Clubs: State Legislative Caucuses

“I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a King, and of a King of England too.”

Queen Elizabeth I

"I have found that women do not participate in politics and government because it may not be a convenient time or they do not believe they are qualified...”

Jo Ann Davidson, Former Ohio Speaker 1994-2000

Over the last 14 years, state legislative leadership has been dominated by men --- 353 male leaders as compared to 40 females. Whether that domination is the result of gender discrimination, gender self-selection, or perhaps both, is at the center of this research. These comparative quotes by two prominent historical female leaders infer that the pattern may be more a mixture of biases and personal choices. Yet other than the aggregate numbers, little is known about the job of leadership in the states or the leaders that have held and currently hold these positions, regardless of gender. Given the scarcity of the extant literature on state leaders, including case studies and longitudinal studies of state legislatures in general, it makes sense to begin by constructing an information bank of those who have served.

A material culture review of historic and public documents allows a profile of the average state legislative leader in the panel to be fashioned. In the House, the Speaker typically is elected to the chamber at the median age of 39 years old and has served as a rank and file member for 11.2 years, on average, prior to advancing to the top leadership

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22 A complete list of the women who have served as presiding officers during the panel is presented in Appendix A.

23 Material culture is often used to describe the physical remains of a culture to better understand its history; in this research, material culture refers to the physical documents of public officials including those published online governmental documents and records were utilized to collect individual member data including elections, public finance and disclosure sites; the methodology is described in full detail under the Data and Methods section of this chapter.
position. The Speaker is male, works full time as a lawyer and holds a graduate degree. He served as the Majority Leader immediately prior to his ascension at the age of 50. In the Senate, the President or President Pro Tem typically served in the lower house for a period of 3.4 years and was elected to the Senate at the median age of 44 years old. The Senate leader is male, works full time in a business or financial industry and holds a graduate degree. On average, he served as a Senator for 11.4 years and held the position of Majority Leader immediately prior to his selection as the presiding officer at 56.

No doubt, the average leader profiled here does not sufficiently characterize the individual uniqueness and traits of all leaders --- particularly since the ability to advance in leadership is hypothesized to be influenced by personal, structural and cultural factors. As such, this chapter focuses on the personal attributes of leaders and examines the extent to which they vary by gender. Specifically, the first aspect of the research question under study is: What are the antecedents to legislative leadership in the state’s lawmaking chambers (R1)?

**Literature Review**

As one legislative scholar (Rosenthal, 2003) contends, legislators often arrive at their station by running as outsiders -- ardent critics of the institution they are trying to ascend to. Once they arrive, new members are often befuddled by the chaotic nature of the negotiating and consensus-building. Ultimately, their focus is directed towards advancing their own personal agendas. Members have neither the incentive nor the assets to strive towards satisfying their other functions. Alan Rosenthal argues that it is only after a member assumes responsibility as a chair that s/he begins to emerge in a different
role and comes to understand the key aspects of lawmaking. Dolan and Ford (1997) also found tenure matters in determining leadership positions.

This portrayal of new members helps to explain why seniority or tenure in the chamber is correlated to the typical presiding officer profiles depicted above. Here too, the reference to “assets” suggests there is a need for personal skills and attributes that must take shape as new members attempt to climb the ladder to the top. Likewise, Moncrief (1999) builds on the work of other scholars to argue that institutional arrangements such as leadership ladders and seniority rules will be adapted by members to meet their own career goals. Harold Lasswell (1948) focused his work on “the interplay of power and personality.” He raised the question as to whether they are “born leaders” and he pondered further whether the earliest experiences combined with a basic biologic type “culminate(s) in personalities oriented to power…in a word, a political man…” (Lasswell, 1948, p. 19).

Patricia Freeman (1995) took up the challenge of comparatively examining the types of legislative leadership paths to the speakership in 49 states (excluding Nebraska) from 1975 to 1991. She found that most speakers had prior legislative experience. Freeman also observed a link between their career paths and the professionalization of the legislature which led her to ask several key questions:

- Is there a distinct career path for U.S. state legislative leaders?
- If so, does the career path vary across states?
- Has the career path or ladder of state legislative leaders changed over time?

While Freeman found that “virtually no one becomes presiding officer without an apprenticeship in some other leadership position in the House… there is a great deal of
flexibility in the selection process” (p. 374). Today, however, a longitudinal analysis suggests a more sequenced path exists than that observed 10 years ago. Nonetheless, Freeman (1995) concluded that the “structure of legislative leadership is the product of planning” (p. 375). She left open the question as to whether this planning is exclusionary in terms of race, gender or class; therefore, such pathways are important to map when attempting to measure glass ceiling effects.

As members advance in leadership positions, they take on more expansive roles in terms of the influence they have over members and policy debates (Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing, Kurtz, 2003). Perhaps this influence is derived from members’ respect for the tenure of leaders, their political skills, their subject matter expertise over wider policy domains or their access to campaign resources. Whatever the reason(s), leaders can use this influence to build coalitions needed to advance the caucus’ agenda. Members holding top leadership positions become more focused on the big picture -- the public good or at least the good of the caucus – as opposed to their individual needs. The role of the leader is expanded --- they are now charged with serving the interests of the whole as opposed to the one. Moreover, strong leadership is required when consensus is not achieved through the committee process (Rosenthal, 2004). This concept of coalitions and agendas also emerged from the participatory observations and depth interviews.

Often it falls to the presiding officers or their leadership teams to make the hard choices, including what bills to advance and which ones should fail. In undivided governments, the role of the leader is often to advance the policy interests of the Governor. In the words of a former New Jersey Speaker, “we often carried the Governor’s water – at times we were carrying so much water, we were almost drowning
In divided governments, the role of the leader is to advance alternatives to the Governor’s policy initiatives or to act as a check and balance in the traditional sense. In both instances, strong leadership is needed in order to negotiate the best deal possible with the Governor.

Rosenthal (2003) characterizes this function as perhaps one of the legislatures’ most formidable tasks. It is made more difficult in those states where the Governor is constitutionally strong (invested with line-item veto power) or conversely where the legislature is constitutionally weak (i.e. term limits, spending caps and limited taxation authority). To measure the power differential between the two branches, Malcolm Jewell and Marcia Lynn Whicker (1994) developed a legislative power index comprised of 17 variables ranging from institutional power, legislative representativeness, partisan polarization, rules and centralization of structure, professionalization of legislatures, norms on leadership tenure and turnover, party position, majorities and bipartisan coalitions, as well as factors relating to control over committee appointments, legislative agendas, staff size and the use of party caucus. Again the notion of majorities and coalitions as well as leadership tenure suggests the need for leaders to possess certain personal traits.

Aside from advantages that flow from personal wealth and social position (Lasswell, 1948), access to financial resources through networks and campaign resources emerged from the grounded theory study of the New Jersey legislature. Moreover, Moncrief (1999) notes the emergence of legislative campaign committees may have an effect on who runs and why. The role of organized PACs have both increased (Rosenthal, 1995) and been found to aid incumbents and challengers in competitive districts.
(Thompson, Cassie & Jewell, 1994) and more recently challengers. Additionally, one of the fundamental roles of leaders is to get their caucus members re-elected (Rosenthal, 2004). In states with higher campaign expenditures, it is expected that this function will be more of a factor than in states with lower campaign expenditures. The growing role played by legislative leader committees (leader PACs) over the last several years provides an opportunity to examine the influence these committees have on leaders in addition to affecting who runs for office (Sanbonmatsu, 2006).

As the dependency of members on legislative leaders and their PACs grows, it is likely that we will see the influence of legislative leaders continue to grow stronger, particularly in high cost states. C. Rosenthal’s work (1995) explored the impact of legislative campaign committees, a structure that emerged from the campaign finance reform initiatives designed to limit campaign contributions to individual candidates per election cycle. She argues these legislative campaign committees have served to directly increase the profile of leaders among its members and interest groups.

Kira Sanbonmatsu’s recent work (2006) also identified campaign finance resources as a major contributing factor in the scarcity of women candidates. Sanbonmatsu (2006) found: “Because most states do not find a relationship between gender and fundraising, I did not anticipate the extent to which interview subjects would identify campaign finance as a factor that disproportionately discourages women from running for office” (p. 199). Many offered that it did not present a barrier but many “others identified fundraising as a major obstacle – if not the major obstacle to women candidacies” (Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p. 200). Similarly, if fundraising hoists barriers for women at the outset, it may influence their decision to ascend in leadership which, in
more times than not, is more expensive as a caucus leader. Sanbonmatsu suggests future research is needed to determine if recent campaign finance reform laws have exacerbated the problem by concentrating contributions in the hands of fewer legislative leaders and party leaders who are not typically women.

Finally, if incentives (compensation and resources) have increased institutional capacity-building that bears directly on ambition and careerism, (Rosenthal as cited in Moncrief, 1999) what is the impact on gendered leadership? “Politics is a career ladder; politicians often move from local to state to national office” (Lawless & Fox, 2005, p. 48). So if women are in the pipeline, why have so few risen to the top? A review of the women who have run for and served in American electoral politics reveals significant contextual factors that may have affected their recruitment to office as well as their roles as members once they arrive. Some of these variables are cultural while others are present themselves as personal and institutional constraints.

The examination of women as candidates, legislatives leaders and policy makers serves as the focal point for the two research questions. Cultural constraints are frequently noted as a contributing factoring in the hindrance of women running for office in the extant literature during the last quarter of the 20th century (Thomas, 1994). It follows that cultural or social variables may play a similar role in predicting where women lead. Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1974) calls the early candidates and officeholders “deviants” because their pursuit of electoral office ran against the typecasting of the traditionally defined roles for women. She examined four hypotheses to explain the paucity of women representatives. Although Kirkpatrick discounted physiological and
male conspiracy constraints, she found that cultural and role constraints presented significant obstacles for women.

More specifically, Kirkpatrick found a leader is interested in the whole business of the state, a moralizer focuses on issues of right and wrong, a personalizer is preoccupied with interpersonal relationships, while the problem solver is committed to family and policy oriented public service. By these definitions alone, it is important to recognize that not all members, regardless of gender, want to be leaders or want to lead for the same reasons. Overall, Kirkpatrick found women are not much different than men in ego, expectations and persistence.

At the national level, Barbara Burrell’s (1994) examination of women who ran for Congress from the early 1970s through 1992, revealed three distinctive phases that chronologically described the candidates. Not surprisingly, the early pioneers arrived at elected office as “wives and widows” – their route was clearly through their husbands – be they dead or alive. Similarly, Irwin Gertzog’s (1995) historical overview of American women serving in Congress confirmed the “matrimonial connection”. On the whole, women were only elected to Congress prior to World War II if they had access to significant personal family wealth or to their husbands’ networks.

Still, while physiological and cultural constraints are less inhibiting to women’s participation in decision-making, traditional sex roles remain (Lawless & Fox, 2005; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). More dramatically, a personal preference, which may emanate from culture, is considered to have the largest effect on recruitment prior to the selection phase as posited by Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox (2005). In their work measuring political ambition, Lawless and Fox found women do not have the same political
ambition as men; this is deeply rooted in the way women have been and still are socialized in American society. The research suggests women do not enter the eligibility pool due to self selection. This is caused by traditionally scripted cultural expectations of women’s role in society; a male ethos in which men are encouraged and asked to run more than women; and third, a gendered psyche that finds women self-selecting themselves out of the process or never entertaining a political pursuit because they do not think they are qualified. This latter dynamic was found even when women possessed the same or greater educational and professional credentials as men. Consequently, the political ambitions of women may influence their interest or pursuit of state legislative leadership positions.

**Expectations**

In particular, three variables emerged from the concepts defined and operationalized from the grounded theory study of the New Jersey Legislature. They include:

- **Access:** assessing the role networks play;
- **Time:** the time a member has to focus on leadership, both personally and professionally, and the time it takes to attain seniority; as well as
- **Money:** primarily in terms of campaign resources or access to networks.

Each of these concepts is discussed in the literature, along with other factors such as the pathways to legislative leadership that create a quasi-career track, and political ambition. Each factor sheds light on the antecedents to legislative leadership. Once defined and measured, an assessment as to whether these traits vary by gender is possible. This leads to the hypothesis:
H1: Legislative leadership requires individual power that accrues to members through access, time and money. The more one acquires or possesses each of these traits, the more likely one is to ascend in leadership.

Data and Methods

This examination began with a material culture analysis and was followed by a census of legislative leaders on the hypothesized variables that emerged from the grounded theory study and as informed by the literature.

Data

Individual level data were collected on all the presiding officers in the panel (1997 to 2010) through an examination of public documents described in more detail below. The variables collected included data from the period just prior to service in the legislature as well as during their tenure as a legislator and as the presiding officer. Of the former, the data collected included whether or not a member held elected or appointed government or political service; employment, if any, outside the legislature; and whether the legislator had a family member who served in a political or governmental position prior to their legislative service. Additionally, data were collected on the year the member was first sworn into the legislature, the year first sworn into the chamber s/he presided over and the year first sworn in as the presiding officer. In some cases, service in the legislature and in leadership was non-consecutive which was noted; however, in order to make comparisons, the start of the most recent service dates was recorded. A note about tenure calculations: for leaders at the start of the panel in

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24 In an effort to calculate tenure prior to leadership, service in the chamber needed to be distinguished from tenure in the legislature which is more of a concern for Senate leaders since 42% have previously served in the lower house. Also, a few leaders in history have served as presiding officers in both chambers; for the most part, data were collected on both leadership tenures but with the exception of Libby Mitchell (ME), no leader had served in dual roles during the study period.
1997, their leadership tenure was calculated from the start date s/he was sworn in as the presiding officer – even if this date preceded the panel period. However, data are censored for those leaders currently serving since an end date for their tenure may extend beyond 2010. At most, this may have the effect of underestimating average leadership tenure for approximately 5% of the leaders in the panel.

As for demographic and political variables, data were collected on the state legislature and chamber of leadership service, party affiliation, gender, year of birth, professional career background, marital status, dependent children, highest level of education, and the electoral percentage received during the last general election cycle while serving as leader. Additionally, the legislative position held immediately before becoming the presiding officer, the current legislative status of former leaders, offices sought outside the legislature following or corresponding to a leader’s tenure, career paths held after service in the legislature and the leadership selection process within the chamber as well as tenure rules, both formal and informal, was collected. With the exception of two states, New Jersey and Virginia, state legislatures elect their members in even numbered years which mean the 1997 legislature was the second year of the first session in the panel for those two states; for all other states, 1997 was the start of a new session when most leadership changes are likely to occur.\(^\text{25}\)

Data on political variables in each state were also collected in an effort to control for differences in political preferences and environments. First, Daniel Elazar’s (1972) nominal variable measuring political culture was added to the dataset: states are

\(^{25}\) Some legislatures are sworn in shortly after the November general election; yet the majority takes office at the start of the legislative session in the following calendar year. For consistency, years of service were recorded at the start of the calendar year. In those instances, where mid-term changes occurred, the leader with the longest calendar year service was recorded. This record-keeping adjustment did not have the effect of eliminating a leader from the panel set; the effect would be to underestimate the length of one’s leadership tenure by 6 months or less.
characterized as traditional, moralistic or individualistic. Other static variables added to the dataset included census regions and divisions. Professionalism of state legislatures was also added to the dataset as this variable is used in studies of state legislatures to distinguish those bodies that more closely mirror the inner workings of Congress in terms of resources and legislative scope (Squire, 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Kousser, 2005).

Finally, variables were fashioned to measure the constructs of access, time and money in a census of legislative leaders as described in more detail in the Methodology section that follows. Generally, Section 1 of the survey instrument measured personal attributes that preceded the leadership position. Section 2 measured the job of the leader as s/he perceived it; an effort was also made to capture differences in legislative structure and power as well as the individual styles and behaviors of leaders. Section 3 measured factors affecting policy formation overall and the extent to which a leader has control over these dynamics as well as his or her ability to advance personal policy priorities. Lastly, Section 4 collected demographic and electoral data on the leaders which were also the focus of the material culture review, but went further by exploring division of childcare responsibilities in homes where children were present.

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26 There are four census regions in the country: the Midwest, Northeast, South and West regions. Within each region, the Census Bureau further stratifies states into divisions with two divisions in each region with the exception of the South which has three regions.

27 For measures of access, see survey questions Q1, Q3, Q5, Q7, Q8, and Q27; for time variables, see Q2, Q4, Q6, Q9 Q12, and Q13; and for measures of money, see Q10, Q14 and Q27.

28 The survey instrument and verbatim wording of all questions asked is reproduced in Appendix B.

29 Measures to assess if there were gender differences in styles and behaviors were constructed as Q10, Q11, Q14 and Q17 through Q20. Q 14 also was used to gage variations in the job of leadership by state structures, form and functions in states as were Q15, Q16 and 17.

30 The variables in Section 3 measured two concepts: preferences and constraints. Q6, Q25, and Q26 were used to measure the policy preferences, proposals and products of leaders. In particular, Q21 tried to measure how much time a leader has to spend on personal priorities. Similarly, Q22 thru Q 24 also tried to measure how much discretion the leader actually has on the big policy issues and who also influences those major policy issues.
Material Culture and Document Analysis

Using depth interviews and participatory observations is a necessary means to gathering direct quotes, not prepared or edited, as well as subjective perspectives. Still, some scholars maintain “a full sociological analysis cannot be restricted to interview data alone. It must also consider the material traces” (Hodder, 1998). Material culture, records and documents can also be used to confirm hypotheses and validate data gathered through the depth interviews and observations, as was the intent in this study. As such, a compilation of documents and records were reviewed to construct biographical information on the 393 leader panel that included political backgrounds, electoral competitions, official legislative biographies and financial records. This data were a useful tool in hypotheses formation and the construction of survey questions. From a time management perspective, the document review limited the basic demographic data that had to be collected through the survey instrument.

National Survey of State Legislative Leaders

The review of the literature revealed the dearth of survey studies involving legislative leaders; in particular presiding officers. The survey instrument created for this research study represents the first national, longitudinal survey of presiding officers in the states. Questions from past national surveys of state rank and file legislators were relied upon to generate measures to examine the roles and priorities of leaders as perceived by legislators across the country. Overall, the survey instrument offers a unique national perspective into the attitudes and behaviors of state legislative leaders. Guided

31 Questions were informed, modeled, or replicated from the following surveys: ICPSR 1995 State Legislative Survey and Contextual Data, ICPSR 2002 State Legislative Survey, 2001 Citizen Political Ambition Study, and Ohio State University Center for Survey Research 2002 Survey of State Legislators. A complete citation reference is provided in References; however they are referred to in the text as the 1995 study, the 2002 panel, the 2001 study, and the 2002 Survey of State Legislators respectively.
by the grounded theory study in New Jersey, three distinct variables were explored, rather than only those variables that have been previously informed by the literature. Such an approach presents an opportunity to discover “variables that may help to explain particular role orientations” or identify the “behavioral consequences of role orientation” (Jewell, 1983, p.310 as cited by Moncrief et al., 1996). Further, the survey responses serve to shed light on the question as to what the antecedents to leadership are and whether the antecedents are different for men than they are for women.

The survey was conducted in two phases for ease of administration and follow-up; the first group was mailed to those for whom current addresses were readily available (n=188). This phase was conducted from February 2nd through March 30th of 2010. The second phase was conducted from June 10th through August 31st of 2010 (n=178). This period represents the initial and follow-up mailings, not necessarily the actual dates when surveys were returned, given the voluntary nature of the invitation. The survey was administered in two modes: a mail version (also sent as a facsimile to those participants for whom fax numbers were available) and an online version. Concerns for effects from events and history are not applicable given the retrospective focus of the survey instrument.

All participants received an initial invitation letter which included the assent language specified by the IRB at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey where the research was conducted. Within 7-10 days, the questionnaire was mailed along with an invitation letter; although this timeframe is longer than recommended (Dillman et al.,

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32 Only one participant returned the survey by facsimile and 27 participants completed the survey online.
33 An exemption was received from the IRB on January 15, 2010 in order to conduct the research. The co-principal investigators for the study were Dr. Alan Rosenthal and Debra Borie-Holtz; Dr. Cliff Zukin served as the advisor to the survey study.
2009) a slightly longer period was included to allow for returned mail since no official database was available for the sample frame as most of the participants (61%) no longer serve in their state legislatures. Within 12-13 days, a follow-up post card was sent as a reminder. The postcard also invited the leaders to complete the survey online which was accessed at www.policy.rutgers.edu/stateleaders with a three-digit code randomly assigned. As with the mail questionnaire, respondents were stratified by chamber and by position within the Senate, namely President and President Pro Tem, in order to aid with question wording clarity.

For those with whom fax numbers (n=165) and email addresses (n=231) were available, two more rounds of follow-up were initiated during the first phase. At this point, the response rate achieved was approximately 48%. Finally, a second questionnaire was mailed to the first cohort about 6-8 weeks after the pre-mailing; however, in this round, two changes were made to the invitation letter. First, the year and specific office held by the leader was highlighted and prioritized in the invitation letter; about 7% of the initial incomplete returns received were from members who thought they had been misidentified since they no longer held the position. Second, a personalized note was added to the second invitation letter based upon data culled from the material culture and document review. In essence, a “personal pitch” was made to each leader in an attempt to highlight why their response was both unique and of value to the research. The effect of the second mailing served to increase the overall response rate of the survey by 14 percentage points, which is higher than expected for second mailings of survey instruments (Dillman et al., 2009). The response rate for Phase 1 of the study was 62%.
The Phase 2 mailing also emphasized the year and position of service as the reason for the presiding officers selection; however, a second questionnaire with a personal pitch was not initiated since the period corresponded with the summer vacation months. A future survey of presiding officers is planned as part of an ongoing living history project. Overall, the response rate for both phases of the study combined was 50% after you remove those leaders for whom addresses had not been located (n=11) and for those who have died or been incarcerated (n=27).

The panel size for the study totaled 393 with members stratified by chamber and title: House Speaker (n=193), Senate President (n=113) and Senate President Pro Tem (n=87). In this stratification, the unit of analysis is presiding officer. As noted above, the survey was sent to 355 leaders in total, from which the response rate was calculated. Because this study is a census of the panel, errors relating to sampling, coverage, and nonresponse are not comparable to a probability sample drawn from a sample frame of the population; however, attention must be paid to errors that may introduce bias. For these reasons, two datasets have been constructed.

The first dataset\textsuperscript{35} (n=393) includes all presiding officers for the study period; the variables are limited to those that could be collected through a review of material culture and official documents as described in the Data section. The advantage to this approach is that a basic demographic profile was constructed for all members regardless of concerns for coverage. Additionally, the panel members are public citizens, for whom much material is available for inspection, including from sources such as press releases,

\textsuperscript{34} Nebraska is a unicameral legislature and leaders are the Senate President and in North Dakota, an Interim Senate President is elected to serve during the inter-session. In some states, the Majority Leader was included as this position is considered the top ranked official in the chamber.

\textsuperscript{35} To identify findings derived from this data, the dataset will be referred to as the “public dataset”.
speeches, news accounts, privately maintained personal and campaign websites as well as third party information banks. In those instances, where data were culled from sources other than official state government records, validity was gained by collecting data from more than one source.\(^{36}\) Finally, because anonymity was a condition extended to survey participants under the IRB exemption approval, a full examination of glass ceiling effects which relies on a chamber by chamber analysis within the states would have been precluded.

The second dataset represents the responses received from the surveyed participants. Given the need to ensure that no variables can be used to identify a participant, all survey data are reported at the group level.\(^{37}\) For this review (n=177), questions about generalizability need to be raised given the small n size. To begin, sampling of small populations is not uncommon.\(^{38}\) In a small (hypergeometric) population size of 355, a sample size of 177 would yield the commonly accepted margin of significance at ± 5%, at a 95% confidence interval. Although not an apples-to-apples comparison, the response rate of the census in effect mirrors the sample size that is required to be 95% confident that random error does not exceed ± 5.2%. Again, sampling error is not applicable in a census; yet, it is relevant to note that the n size of

\(^{36}\) One source that proved reliable when the data was compared to available public records was [www.spokeo.com](http://www.spokeo.com) from which dates of birth were obtained for many members. Other sources from which data was culled include non-partisan organizations such as Project Vote Smart and National Institute on Money in State Politics.

\(^{37}\) A three digit randomly assigned code was maintained in a separate database that only corresponded to the name and contact information for the leader. After the data was collected, the three digit access code was removed and a second randomly assigned code was assigned as the respondents’ ID in the panel dataset. Still the small n size, particularly by state chamber, allows identification. For these reasons, data is reported at the group level or some analysis is limited to the public dataset.

\(^{38}\) In order to calculate sampling size in large populations, the normal approximation to the binomial distribution is utilized; for small populations, the normal approximation to the hypergeometric distribution is relied upon.
respondents for the census exceeds that which would have likely been achieved if this study had relied upon a sample of the population.

In a census, the focus shifts to nonresponse error – are those who responded different from those who did not respond? To make this assessment, a variable was created in the public dataset that coded respondents as 1 and nonrespondents as 0. A test of the null hypothesis that the respondents were no different from the non-respondents was performed. The chi-square statistic tested the null hypothesis of no difference among those who did and did not respond on key jurisdictional, political and demographic variables including: census region and division, state, chamber of leadership service, age, age elected to the legislature and as presiding officer, professional career background, seniority prior to leadership, panel year of leadership, professionalism, political culture and party affiliation. The results of the tests showed that there were no differences among the leaders with few exceptions except for: gender, highest level of education and prior legislative service and earlier leadership positions. A difference in the respondents based prior service and leadership service is not a concern since no data was available for 8% of the nonresponders which likely skewed the comparison. As for gender, a difference was expected since 60% of the women responded. The chi square analysis is provided in Appendix C. Panel nonresponse produces no biases according to the geographic, political, and SES demographics measured, excluding gender.

This brings us to the question of weighting. The descriptive analysis of the leaders in the panel does not warrant weighting; for one thing the public dataset is used to describe the panel (n=393) with respect to legislative and personal demographics; overall,
there is a low percentage of missing biographical data (<8%).\textsuperscript{39} Second, the chi square analysis reveals there is no statistically significant difference on most of the key variables in the public dataset. To weight each response equally would serve to bias the results from the perspective of leaders in states with shorter leadership tenure.

A note about recall and measurement error: there is a concern that interviewing office holders that have not held office for more than a decade raises issues about memory recall and in turn accuracy in the data collected from the participants. In part, the study period was bounded from 1997 to 2010 to help diminish this effect.\textsuperscript{40} More to the point, the pre-test was conducted with leaders that pre-date the study period and there were no concerns raised about recall during the pre-test. Additionally, of those members (about 20% of the respondents) who in effect waived their anonymity by including their name and contact information on the returned survey, a comparison was made, limited exclusively to demographic and electoral information, between data collected from official records to the responses provided by the participants. No significant errors were detected in the voluntary responses recorded which suggests that recall did not produce systematic errors. Lastly, to aid with recall and to minimize errors that results from question wording and question order, questions about events were asked in the order the events occurred. “Asking about events in the order they occurred is helpful because autobiographical memories are often hierarchically linked in a network so that remembering one event can facilitate accurate recall of the next event in the sequence” (Belli, as cited in Dillman et al., 2009, p.159). The questions followed in a chronological

\textsuperscript{39} On the whole, data is available for all the leaders in the panel; in a limited way, data is missing for some cells. When this analysis is conducted, missing data greater than 3\% is reported.

\textsuperscript{40} Another consideration for the study period selected was this timeframe also examines a cohort less observed than past studies since it includes men and women leaders serving in state legislatures during the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.
manner from the period prior to legislative service, through tenure as a rank and file member to the leadership period at the center of this study.

**Findings**

Who are the leaders in the state legislatures? Do they vary by state, legislative professionalism, political culture, personal background, skill-sets and more importantly, gender? Remarkably, the resumes of legislative leaders in the states share many common traits. In fact, the findings suggest that most leaders do not walk into the chamber on day one and lay claim to the top prize, but rather, they engage in a long and methodical journey to the top of the pinnacle. Along the way, skills are also acquired or honed in order to help them capture a job that is reserved for the few. Lessons about leadership are often learned by watching others do the job. It is a prize that is only earned by those who have the time to actively seek the position and those who “yearn for power.”

**Access and Networks**

Family connections and political relationships forged during early stints in local or county office and other appointed governmental positions are prominent bullets in the biographical profiles of state leaders. Here the panel is not much different from members of the U.S. Congress that too have held previous political office (Canon, 1990, as cited in Lawless & Fox, 2005). Almost half of the leaders (47%) held positions in elected or appointed office prior to running for the state legislature. By comparison, only about one-quarter (26%) of legislators surveyed in a 2002 cross-sectional study (n=2982) had held government or political jobs prior to being elected to the state senate or general

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41 This concept is introduced by Lasswell (1948, p. 37) and is discussed in further detail in the analysis that follows.
assembly. It appears that prior political experience may give leaders some extra political capital that makes them different from other members upon arrival in the State House.

Twenty percent of the all leaders were introduced to politics through a family member that may have included a father, mother, aunt or uncle, sibling, grandparent, spouse or in-law. Generally speaking, those family members were male by a 3:1 margin. A third of the state leaders came from a long-line of family politicians, totaling up to four relatives in some cases, who had served in government or political service prior to the leader’s election to the legislature. Lawless and Fox (2005) point out the celebrity like political family patriarchs in U.S. history; of recent they include U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), former Vice President Al Gore (D-TN) and the Bush prodigies, former President George W. Bush (R-TX) and former Governor Jeb Bush (R-FL). While they note not all elected officials benefit from the same kind of prodigious lineage, “more modest levels of political interest are often passed on within the family unit” (Flanigan and Zingale, 2002, as cited in Lawless & Fox, 2005). Leaders in New Jersey also mentioned their family connections when it came to influencing their own political ambition.

Fig. 5. Data of those leaders who held elected or appointed positions prior to service in the legislature and who had family members with political experience.
Wider Spheres of Influence

When it comes to employment status outside the legislature, gender differences are more prominent between men and women rank and file members at the outset. For the most part, 8 out of 10 leaders worked full time; of those who worked part-time or were retired, most were women. When compared to rank and file members, CAWP found in 2001 that “Women (34%) are less likely than men (66%) to hold another job while serving in the state legislature.”

The role networks play in leadership is also evident. The most significant faction of statewide supporters for leaders who responded was businesses at 80%. Returning to the 2002 cross-sectional snapshot of state legislators, in a similarly worded question, members were asked to identify their strongest supporters. Overall, business groups got a 66% support rating among the rank and file members; only 53% of women counted businesses among their strongest supporters as compared to men (70%). Among the state leaders, the gender divide was evident, but a larger percentage of women leaders (62%) counted business groups among their strongest supporters as did the men leaders (83%) when compared to rank and file legislators.

Other top groups among leaders included the medical community (72%), gun owners (63%), teachers (60%) and lawyers (54%). It is also interesting to examine more closely how a legislator’s professional background was correlated to the interest groups s/he considered to be among his or her strongest supporters before becoming a leader. For example, when leaders were asked who they counted among their strongest supporters, lawyers were at the top of the list (54%). Among those leaders who practiced law, 78%
counted their fellow lawyers as their strongest supporters as compared to 44% of non-lawyers in the panel (n=144).

Coalition support, both in kind and number, suggests most leaders are well connected prior to their ascension to the top. Of the respondents in this survey, the mean number of support groups counted among their base was 5.2, with a high of 10 groups identified by some leaders. This result was skewed as men fared far better here; on average men had 14.3 groups of supporters as compared to a mean of 2.4 for the women leaders.

Another way to look at the influence networks have is to look at the role interests groups play in the state politics. When leaders were asked which groups were the most influential in their state in terms of lobbying and fundraising, the same kinds of groups topped the list as those found to be among the leaders’ initial supporters.

As seen in Figure 6, businesses, lawyers, labor groups, teachers and the medical community had the most influence when it came it to policy formation and electoral campaigns. After that, the influence a group had was more one-sided and extended largely to the legislative arena. These two findings support the idea that there is a correlation between personal coalition support prior to leadership and the most influential coalitions in a state.
Fig. 6 The chart displays the percentage of leaders who indicated the group was the most influential in their state.

*Carpe Diem*

As described in the first-hand accounts of former leaders, researchers have also found “For both women and men, a political actor was the most influential source of recruitment when they ran for their first elective office” (Sanbonmatsu, Carroll & Walsh, 2009, p. 11). This underscores the advantage a member has if they had access to political networks or family connections. Yet for women, this effect may be offset by another perspective; *without* prompting or encouragement, some women candidates do not run for office (Lawless & Fox, 2005). One leader, former Ohio Speaker Jo Ann Davidson, argues women often sell themselves short in the political arena because they do not think they are qualified for the job. In the political arena, women are less likely than men to run for office (Sanbonmatsu, 2006) and “women are less likely than men to consider running for high-level positions” (Lawless & Fox, 2005, p. 50).

In short, top leadership *is* self-recruited. Wanting power is insufficient. Waiting for it to come your way is a long shot prospect. As Lasswell (1948) instructed:
“Yearning for power is not enough. It is essential to acquire and exercise appropriate skill with at least a minimum degree of effectiveness” (p. 37). For these reasons, it is important to explore if there is a career path to the top and does it vary by gender? If such a path can be plotted, when do men and women start to think about leadership opportunities after they arrive in the State House? As emphasized throughout the New Jersey depth interviews by both leaders and stakeholders, “Someone always has their eye on the seat.”

As noted earlier, some scholars believe it is not until a legislator has served in a leadership capacity that s/he begins to understand the role of leadership (Rosenthal, 2003). When the panel (n=177) was asked at what point did they first consider seeking the top leadership position in their chamber, the majority seemed to confirm this belief. Twenty percent thought about the position during their first leadership job which many identified as a chairmanship. For almost one-third of the respondents, they did not contemplate the job until after they had moved up in leadership which was described as a secondary leadership positions42 for the most part. Interestingly, about one-quarter (26%) never considered it until the year they ran. A smaller percentage, 12%, said they considered running for the job shortly after they were elected to the chamber. As one former New Jersey leader put it, “when I got here and looked around and saw the chaos, I immediately thought to myself, I can do a better job than that other guy…that’s when I first decided to run.”

As for the women leaders who responded, almost half did not consider seeking the position until after they had moved up in secondary leadership. None had considered

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42 For those leaders who volunteered the position he or she held at the time, it represented a position ranked higher than the committee chair level.
the idea upon arrival. Although a small group to generalize from, two outcomes are likely. First, women in general are more likely to delay the pursuit of leadership opportunities for the same reasons they delay or defer decisions to run for office. Alternatively, women, like men, are more inclined to consider pursuing the job only after they had moved up in leadership. Yet, if a barrier to secondary leadership positions exists in a chamber, as it does in many states (see Figure 3), then the route to the top may be permanently detoured for this subgroup.

So what is the pathway leading to the top? In nearly one-third (30%) of the profiles, the presiding officer served as the Majority Leader immediately before becoming the Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker. The numbers swell to 44% when you add in the Senate Pro Tem (in chambers where the lieutenant governor does not preside over the Senate) and the Speaker Pro Tem positions in legislatures where this office is ranked as the second highest job in the general assembly.

Because control of the chamber matters greatly here, it is no surprise that 10% of the presiding officers served as their party’s Minority Leader immediately prior to taking over the reins. In all, 40% of the group served as the second highest ranked party caucus official before ascending to the top. Other leaders for whom data could be found got there after serving as Chair of the Appropriations, Budget or Finance Committees (12%); another 21% got there after chairing another committee. If you control for those states that have term limits, the path to the top becomes less splintered; 54% of the leaders served as their party’s second highest ranked caucus leader or the highest ranked minority party leader immediately prior to their leadership tenure. Additionally, if you control for

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43 For this analysis, data were culled from public records.
the degree of professionalism in the legislature, the percentage rises to 60%. Whether more formalized, as in many southern states or less so as in others, leadership experience is a significant factor in determining who leads. Overall, 73% of the top leaders served in a secondary leadership position immediately prior to their leadership tenure.

A final word on leadership experience: experience in a leadership role was the most significant factor that helped the presiding officers in getting their jobs. The role of mentors is often part of the personal story that inspired many former leaders to launch a political career and to learn how to “do leadership.” In Tom Loftus’ autobiographical account (1994), the former Wisconsin Speaker recalls that he was a “self-recruited” candidate, not one promoted by a party boss or rewarded for party loyalty. Instead, he was driven to public service through his encounters with former Arizona Congressman Morris Udall during his presidential quest as well as his early experiences serving as a legislative aide and speechwriter to the Assembly Speaker beginning in 1973. In a similar way, former Vermont Speaker Ralph Wright credits an effective and capable mentor early in his career as part of the equation for his success. For Wright (2005), he notes how he understood the learning curve involved in his new job as a member by observing other leaders. Wright’s first mentor was Democrat Edgar May, the Chairman of the Health and Welfare Committee, the committee on which he first served when he entered the House. Whether it was the importance of finding consensus on a bill, knowing the strategy of your adversary, or that of your opponents by trash-picking the

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44 In term limited chambers, 6% of the leaders held chairmanships of the Rules Committee immediately prior to becoming the Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker. In hybrid states, leaders came directly from the chairs of other committees (excluding appropriations, budget and finance) at a 7% higher rate. In both hybrid legislatures, leaders held chairs of all other committees by the same margin. Term limits and professionalism appear to be correlated to prior leadership experience. This effect is examined further in Chapter 4.
Speaker’s waste basket, Wright tells how he learned the secret to effective lawmaking and leadership from May.\(^{45}\)

When the panel was asked to rank the three attributes\(^{46}\) that were the most significant factors in helping them to get their job as Senate President/Pro Tem and Speaker, 62% said having skills as a consensus builder, 61% said leadership experience, and in a distant third, 22% said being a subject matter expert (n=174). As depicted in Figure 7, few other attributes mattered as much as leadership experience and consensus building skills. Here, too, is the first inkling that top leadership requires more of an integrative style of management that is not reflective of men’s management style at the committee level (C. Rosenthal, 1998). Skills as a consensus builder was described as both as asset to getting the job and as a well–practiced style of management in keeping the job, the latter of which is discussed more fully in Chapter 5. On the importance and practice of this trait, there were no gender differences.

![Key Attributes in Getting to the Top](image-url)

\(^{45}\) Both Ralph Wright and Tom Loftus graciously agreed to participate in the pre-test of this survey instrument.

\(^{46}\) If respondents gave more than 3 selections, as in a few cases, all responses were coded.
Fig. 7. Respondents were asked to rank the three factors that most help them get the job as the presiding officer in their chamber.

Additionally as seen here in Figure 7, 22% of leaders thought having seniority was important and 15% thought being the next in line was most important in getting to the top. When these two measures were combined, 37% of leaders listed this attribute as most important. As the concept of seniority, both formal and informal, is redefined, its importance is solidified as the third most significant factor leaders reported as helping them get their job.

*Now All it Take is Time*

While having time to do the job ranked low as a key attribute, time was a necessary element for those who ultimately became leaders. This may be interpreted to mean that having the time and making the time to pursue leadership opportunities are two different concepts. On the whole, the job of a legislature varies widely, generally based upon the characterization of the professionalism of the legislature – professional legislatures are full-time structures; citizen legislatures meet less frequently as sessions are held for a limited number of days in a calendar year (or biannually in some cases); while hybrid legislatures do not generally meet year-round, but have a heavier schedule and greater resources than that of citizen legislatures (Squire, 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Kousser, 2005).

In the 2002 study of legislators, members were acutely aware of the time it takes to do the job. When asked to measure the time spent on all legislative activities,

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47 Consideration was given to merge these two attributes given the nature of formal rules of succession (next in line) versus less formal notions of seniority. Additionally, when the chi square was calculated for these two measures, no measures of association were computed for the cross-tabulation. At least one variable in each 2-way table upon which measures of association are computed is a constant.
including session and interim time as well as constituent work, three quarters of the members put the number between 20 to 40 hours in a typical week. While not a perfect comparison, it appears leaders were spending more time than the average legislator as they work their way up the ladder. In almost three-quarter (73%) of instances, leaders were also spending more than 20 hours per week on legislative and constituent activities, including politics. The difference takes place at the upper end: 22% of all legislators surveyed in 2002 logged more than 28 hours per week on legislative work as compared to what leaders said they did when they were rank and file members (35%).

When asked about how much more time they spend on all activities after becoming Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker as compared to before, 40% said they spent more than twice as much time as before and 41% said between 25 to 50% more time. Only 14% said less than 25% more time and just 5% said no more time than before. In terms of the typical work week, almost two-thirds of the panel was spending 46 hours in the job after becoming the leader. Only 15% indicated the combined duties amounted to less than 30 hours per week, as depicted in Figure 8. Nearly half (48%) were spending more than 60 hours per week. It is clear that leadership becomes a full-time job, regardless of the professionalism of the legislature. When compared to the time spent by rank and file members on legislative and political activities or their own work schedules prior to becoming leader, the time commitment is expansive and significant. Of leaders in the panel, 69% indicated they spent more than 40 hours per week in the job.

48 In the 2002 survey, legislators were asked what percentage of a full time job did their legislative activities took up. For purposes of comparison, these percentages were converted to hours based on a 40 hour work week.
49 Less than 1 percent of leaders did not know.
50 To make these estimates, the midpoints were used to calculate the time spent on legislative duties as a rank and file member: less than 10 hours was measured as 5 hours per week, between 10 and 20 hours per week was measured as 15 hours, between 20 and 40 hours was measured as 30 hours, and more than 40
Fig. 8. The average percentage of time spent on the job was measured as time spent on legislative and political activities after becoming leaders.

Another aspect of time that is hypothesized to affect top leadership opportunities is tenure. Tenure is measured by calculating how long members serve in the chamber prior to being sworn in as leader. Most leaders logged six years or more before ascending to the top. Thirty-two percent served as legislators for 6 to 10 years, 18% served for 11 to 15 years, 17% served between 16 to 20 years and 10% served more than 20 years before they were sworn in as Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker, (see Figure 9). Although slightly less than a quarter (23%) served 5 years or less prior to becoming the leader, almost half (47%) of those leaders served in chambers where term limits was in effect. The mean year of service prior to becoming the leader was 11.2 years. In legislatures without term limits, the mean of service for leaders (n=272) was 13 years.

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hours was measured as 40 hours. The variable measuring additional time spent as a leader (Q13) was recoded as multiplier factors: 1 for no more time spent; 1.20 for less than 25% more; 1.4 for between 25 to 50% more; and 2 for more than twice as much as before.

Tenure in the legislature is longer for those leaders who first served in the House.
Fig. 9. The average length of service is depicted. Two-thirds of leaders serve between 6 to 20 years in the chamber before becoming the leader.

On its face, term limits did not appear to advantage women over men, as less than one-third (11) of the women leaders served in term limited legislatures. However, the effect of term limits on leadership is a rather new phenomenon. In the 15 term limited states, term limits were not implemented until the 2000 decade in most chambers; the effect on individual leaders by term is modeled in Chapter 4.

_Do you really need money?_

The third variable that is hypothesized to have a bearing on who leads is money. Legislative campaign expenditures vary widely across the country. Consider the chasm between the expenditure ledgers in states like NH and NY; the distance is as wide as the ideological differences between liberals and neo-conservatives. In the land of the “Live Free or Die,” state lawmakers running for House seats in 2005 spent approximately $491 on average. By comparison, New Yorkers saw their state Senate candidates spend, on average, $213,000. Yet New York was not the biggest apple in the basket; candidates in the Illinois Senate spent more than $735,000 on average to compete for a legislative seat paying $55,000 annually.
In more states today than during the previous decade, the costs of campaign expenditures per district have skyrocketed which have increased pressure on members who are generally expected to be able to fund their own races. For caucus leaders, the stakes are higher as they are expected to raise funds for the caucus, especially targeted members. More specifically, changes in campaign finance laws over the 1990s have served to expand the role of legislative leadership PACs which was intended to limit contributions made to individual members. In many cases, legislative leaders are now both able and required out of necessity to raise significant proportions of the campaign war chests. As such, we are beginning to see the formation of a new relationship between members and their leaders.

So what do leaders in the panel think about the role money plays? To assess factors of import after they became Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker, leaders were asked to rate a dozen legislative and campaign activities on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most important (see Figure 10). As depicted in Figure 7, raising money for the caucus and running campaigns were important factors for about one-fifth of the leaders in helping them get their job. Overall, the findings show the job of leadership was focused more on lawmaking activities including building consensus in the caucus (4.09), and negotiating with the Governor (3.97) and the other chamber (3.95). Presiding officer functions also ranked among the top five activities of importance to leaders including presiding on the floor (4.02) and making appointments (4.0).
Fig. 10. Leaders were asked to rate the importance of legislative and campaign activities on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most important, while they served as Senate President/Pro Tem or Speaker.

Nonetheless, activities related to raising and allocating campaign funds were rated as a 3.11 – higher than the midpoint in the scale. Given the wide distribution in campaign costs, it is likely that campaign related activities may be important to leaders in those states where party competition is higher, campaign expenditures are higher and turnover is higher. To examine the correlation of these factors more closely, a logit model is estimated in the following chapter in which electoral composition is one of the focal variables.

What is informative about leaders from an electoral perspective is that 81% of the panel (n=158) won their last general election by 60% of the vote or greater. Only about one-fifth (22%) of the sitting leaders had a primary challenger. What this suggests is that leaders may not have to be as focused on raising funds for their own election – which frees them up to raise money for the caucus and, in effect, gives them the option of seeking the job of leadership in the first place.
Analysis

As informed by the literature and the concepts that emerged from the New Jersey grounded theory study, the personal antecedents to leadership include a level of access through networked relationships, both political and familial; a background in the legal or business/financial sector; a graduate level education; seniority as a member; experience in a leadership role; as well as the ability to make leadership and legislating a full-time job. While the need to raise campaign funds, both before and after becoming a leader, is correlated in some states more than others, the degree of this effect is examined more closely in the following chapter since electoral data are available for all leadership terms.

The antecedents to legislative leadership are summarized in Table 6 which focuses on the frequencies described above in the Findings section for which public data were available for the full panel. Additionally, an examination was made to determine if a relationship existed between these antecedents and states. With the exception of dual access and education, all the measures are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The p values are recorded in Column 3 of Table 4 for the correlations between each antecedent and the states. Table 5 compares the antecedents by gender.

52 For this analysis, the public dataset was utilized and estimates where only used for the following variables due to nonresponse. To estimate the average work week of a leader, a measure for each state was first calculated based on the perceptions of legislators in the 2002 panel (n=2925) of their time spent on the job. The average is the mean value of all responses in that state, using the midpoint for the categories. (A composite was similarly constructed in analysis by Rosenthal, 2004.) This dataset was used for average time spent on the job by legislators rather than the mean of leaders in the panel due to the larger sample size. A multiplier was then applied to determine the total time spent by leaders; a state average was calculated using the mean value of responses received by leaders in those states. Data were missing for Illinois and Delaware due to nonresponse; a factor of 1.8 for IL and 1.5 for Delaware was used based upon comparable states data extrapolated from the session time indices ranking of legislative professionalism (Kousser 2005). There was little variation in the times estimated for the missing cell data as compared to the mean of the leaders who responded.

53 The independent variable is state and the dependent variable is the antecedent.
Gender differences are not expected to emerge; women should have the same characteristics as men in terms of the personal antecedents to legislative leadership in the absence of glass ceiling effects. Moreover, rank and file women legislators who also share these traits should have the same opportunity for advancement as men legislators. Yet, if women are overqualified – meaning their job related characteristics exceed that of men - it may mean that women have to work harder to get the same opportunities or that they need to compensate for a trait they may not have. In the comparison displayed in Table 5, women are fairly evenly matched with their male counterparts in the areas of seniority and leadership experience. This further underscores the impact that leadership paths and proportional levels of leadership are hypothesized to have in terms of advancing within an organization (Criterion 2 and 3). At the same time, it does not portend well for women in the future.

### Table 4

**Personal Antecedents to Legislative Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>% of Leaders with Attribute</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to networks</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual access or family connection*</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career in business/financial industry or legal profession</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree or higher</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority as a member (11+ yrs.)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership experience at the tertiary level</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time job as leader (40+ hrs.)</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dual access is defined as having been elected or appointed to a government or political position prior to serving in the legislature and/or having a family connection to someone in politics before serving.

### Table 5

**Personal Antecedents to Legislative Leadership by Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>% of Women</th>
<th>% of Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to networks</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual access or family connection*</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career in business &amp; financial industry or legal profession</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree or higher</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority as a member (11+ yrs.)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership experience at the secondary level</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time job as leader (40+ hrs.)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When you look at a composite of those who dabbled in local politics or had a family connection prior to legislative service, the numbers climb to 56% for leaders with an established network, as depicted in Figure 5. Some difference in access was found between men and women presiding officers; a small advantage went to the women. Sixty-four percent of women leaders had held government or political positions or had a family connection as compared to 55% of all men. This finding adds to the literature that associates social structure and political ties to political power. More specifically, Lasswell (1948) maintained “Power may be based on power, as when it depends on being born to a privileged position” (p. 27). He added that one of the principal bases of power may be derived from family wealth and intermarriage or social standing.

The two largest occupational streams for legislative leaders was the legal profession (28%) and the business sector or financial industry (31%) – these two fields dwarfed all other professional careers (59%) held by leaders. When gender is factored in, women list business backgrounds at the same rate as men, but the male lawyers outnumbered the women 105 to 4. Not surprising given the background of women rank and file legislators: men attorneys outnumbered women attorneys in 2001 by a 2:1 margin (CAWP, 2001). Just 41% of the women leaders had professional careers in the business or legal sectors.

When it came to the time spent on being a leader, women and men leaders were spending about the same proportion of extra time on leadership; however, women (92%) reported spending more time to start on legislative activities that topped 20 hours in a typical week at the beginning of their legislative careers as compared to men (70%). In the 2002 cross-sectional survey (n=2923), women legislators also reported spending more
time working on legislation as compared to their male counterparts. Two-thirds (64%) of the women legislators reported spending proportionately 70% or more of a full-time job on legislative work as compared to less than half of the men (43%).

The notion that women spend more time on the job in the legislative arena than men do is supported by this research. This finding sharpens the focus on how much extra time representatives of minority coalitions, like women, actually have for leadership beyond the demands faced by their own district and substantive constituencies.

Substantive representation invites representatives of marginalized groups to advocate for the interests of others with whom they identify (race, gender, and ethnicity); those groups often extend beyond district boundaries. In practical terms, this effect is characterized as the “double bind” (Bratton & Haynie, 1999). As described by Jane Mansbridge (2003), this form of surrogate representation depicts a legislative environment in which a representative of a marginalized group represents the interests of other members of the group beyond their legislative districts (women working for women in the population at large.) Such representation no doubt places a burden on some members and perhaps hinders their pursuits of other goals such as leadership or a higher office which both require time.

The intersection of race and gender may only serve to further erode representation (Hawkesworth, 2003) and swallow up a member’s time and, in turn, opportunities for advancement. For instance, of the 1,686 women serving in the state legislatures in 2006, almost 20 percent (331) are women of color. To whom should women serve when issues of race compete with gender? For these members, the “triple bind” may serve as another form of contextual constraint.

Such a finding may help to explain why although women have similar credentials in terms of education and more professional degrees as the men serving in today’s legislative bodies (Dolan & Ford, 1997), they are less likely to climb the leadership ladder. It was a theme that began to emerge from the depth interviews of both men and women legislators in New Jersey. Leadership is a third job – it comes on top being a legislator and having a career, or in some cases, a family (Rosenthal, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, 2006).

Finally, the time that must be invested in order to climb the ranks presents another limitation for women who generally arrive in legislatures later in life. Almost 8 out of 10 leaders (79%) were elected to the chamber in which they will serve before the age of 50. Seventeen percent are elected between the age of 50 to 59 and only 5% are elected after the age of 60. An analysis of the public dataset (n=374) reveals that female leaders were slightly older than men; nearly two-thirds of females (64%) were elected leader after the age of 50 as compared to just over half of the men (54%).

According to the CAWP 2001 study, “women legislators are older on average than they were in 1988. Significantly more women legislators in 2001 (74%) than in 1988 (58%) are 50 years of age or older. The women are also older than the men. Only about a quarter (24%) of the women legislators are under the age of 50, in contrast to 39% of male legislators.” The report also takes note of the fact that women are arriving at a later age now than in 1988. “Just as the average age of women legislators has increased over the past decade, so too has the average age at which women legislators entered the state house or state senate.” If you consider the average tenure prior to leadership (11.2 years)

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55 In their 1997 research, Dolan and Ford found women had clearly changed in terms of education, occupation and age over the last 30 years while the characteristics of men have remained relatively constant.
for the current panel of leaders, it is likely there will be fewer leaders in the states’ chambers in the future. The CAWP report (2001) continues: “On average, a woman serving as a state senator in 2001 started in her current position at age 50, up slightly from an average age of 48 in 1988. Similarly the average age of entry for women state representatives has increased from 45 to 49 since 1988” (p. 4). If you factor in 11 years of tenure after they arrive, it would put women in the Senate at age 61 and 60 in the House. By comparison, the average age of leaders in the panel was 53 years old.

As some scholars (Jewell & Whicker, 1993) suggest, feminized representation should be aided by changes in our society including more egalitarian attitudes, outside employment of women, longer lives with opportunities for second careers and increased symbols in the media and in elected and appointed office providing role models. So as cultural norms change and constraints are removed, women should be the beneficiary. If they are not, which one can argue is the case when you consider the 353 to 40 gender leadership ratio that exists in the states, what and where are the barriers?

Personal preferences and choices which were found to have the largest effect on candidate recruitment prior to the selection phase (Lawless & Fox, 2005) may also be a factor in deciding to advance in leadership. It stands to reason that if you add dependent children into the mix, a member’s disposable time diminishes rapidly, particularly when the division of labor in the home is not egalitarian (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Lawless & Fox, 2005). For this reason, the panel was asked about their marital status and the presence of dependent children in the home during their tenure as leader as well as the childcare arrangements.56

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56 Question wording was adapted from Lawless and Fox’s 2001 Citizen Political Ambition Study to measure this construct (2005).
In general, 87% of the panel (n=164) was married; 6% was single, 5% was divorced and 3% was widowed. Of the women leaders, 73% were married compared to 89% of the men. This finding is consistent with a recent CAWP survey that found “Women legislators are far less likely than their male colleagues to be married (69% vs. 87%), a difference that has not changed since 1988” (CAWP, 2001, p.4)

Ninety percent of the leaders in the panel had children, but only 30% had children living in the home at the time. Of those leaders with children in the home, 37% identified their spouses or partners as having primary care giving responsibilities. In effect, 67% of the leaders did not have dependent children living in the home or did not share the child care responsibilities. Only 3% reported being the primary caregiver and 5% reported having other arrangements such as a nanny or an in-law. Only 26% shared the responsibilities equally.

Of the women leaders who responded (n=22), three-quarters did not have children or did not have children living at home during their leadership tenure. None of the women reported being the primary caregiver of the children in the home. For the most part, the childcare responsibilities were provided through other arrangements; just two women leaders shared the job equally with their spouse or partner. The “conundrum of balancing family life with a political career” and the disproportionate share of responsibilities as identified in Sanbonmatsu’s research (2006) appears to be a factor in leadership antecedents (p. 177). Although in this case, it is the absence of dependent children for women that appears to be a prerequisite to leadership.

The CAWP’s “Women State Legislators: Past, Present and Future 2001” study also provides a useful comparison of the leaders in the panel as compared to legislators as
a whole. As cited in the report: “As was true in 1988, women in 2001 still seem to delay their political careers because of family responsibilities…Only 17% of women legislators, compared with 36% of men, have children under age 18. Clearly, combining parenting with a political career is still more difficult for women than for men.” As hypothesized, women legislators with dependent children in the home are less likely to have the additional time needed to spend on pursuing and doing the job of leadership if they are also the primary caregiver.

Aside from prior legislative tenure and leadership experience, the characteristics possessed by the women leaders far exceed that of the men in every other measurement. As for access to networks before being elected to the legislature, it is not unexpected to find that a greater percentage of women (64%) had access than men (55%). Some scholars (Bledsoe & Herring, 1990) have found “men are more likely to be ‘self-motivated’ – guided by political ambition” while others (Fox, 1997; Astin & Leland, 1991) suggest “women tend to be more motivated by community issues” in contrast (as cited in Lawless and Fox, 2005, p. 48). The magnitude of the differences in their motivational interests may help tip the balance in terms of their becoming politically motivated.

As for being better educated, 79% of women leaders hold a graduate degree as compared to men leaders (50%). Additionally, a larger percentage of women (80%) are working 40 hours or more in a typical week in the job as compared to 60% of men. Both of these attributes may serve to make up for coming from professional careers that are still divergent to that of men in legislative bodies. According to the 2001CAWP study, “Women legislators are better educated and more frequently have historically male
occupations than they did in 1988, but they are still older and less likely to be attorneys than their male colleagues” (p. 3). Alternatively, the differences may emerge from a feeling that she is not qualified or entitled to the opportunity at an earlier juncture in her career. This effect of diminished political ambition among women is at the center of research by Lawless and Fox (2005) who argue it results from women being “subjected to patterns of traditional socialization that persist in U.S. culture” (p.8). In the end, self-recruitment is a prerequisite to top leadership. If a woman lacks the political ambition to climb the career leader or is less inclined to seek the position for personal reasons, fewer women will command the gavel in the state legislative chambers --- despite their personal traits or over-qualifications. The effect that political culture and socialization plays in what is a personal decision to run for leadership is tantamount to gendered leadership. To that end, personal antecedents are not the only factors that determine who will lead. In addition to culture and politics, structural and electoral factors are hypothesized to play a role. These variables are examined in Chapter 4.
V. Standing on the Runway with No Chance to Take-off

In New York, there are too many planes waiting on the runway. You have guys who have been planning their careers for four, eight, twelve years out. To try to get a chance to move up in politics here, takes money…and lots of it.

Alec Baldwin, Times Talk
December 3, 2009

This was the perspective of television, stage and film actor Alec Baldwin when he was asked about his intentions for a political run in his home state of NY after his contract with NBC’s “30 Rock” ends. For Baldwin, he minced no words about his interest in pursuing a political career, but the actor was daunted by the amount of money he would need to raise and spend in order to be competitive as a political newcomer. What is more daunting is the notion that an individual with high-profiled celebrity and political contacts, as well as personal wealth, would consider NY electoral politics a remote prospect.

Politics has long been thought of by scholars, general observers and candidates as a career ladder (Lasswell, 1948; Burrell, 1994; Thomas, 1994; Gertzog, 1995; Squire, 1988a, 1988b; Clucas, 2001; Lawless and Fox, 2005). No doubt, there are steeper climbs in some places than others. In states like NY, where winning state senate candidates spent nearly $400,000 each last year, it is no surprise money is considered an electoral barrier for newcomers. Although the states are regarded as models of “citizen legislatures,” unlike the U.S. Congress, the varying level of legislative compensation and resources make some more suitable for careerism or as a career ladder to higher office (Rosenthal, 2004; Clucas, 2001; Lawless and Fox, 2005). In some ways, it may mean access to a legislative seat or a top leadership opening is made easier in those states.
where the power of the institution is low or where service in the chamber is considered a springboard (Rule, 1990; Clucas 2001).

Assuming for a moment that some legislative chambers are more welcoming to newcomers such as women than others, where women leaders in the panel have led over the last 14 years may shed light about access and career advancement within the chambers. Yet, this inspection at the national level of the empirical data provides no immediate clues as to why women have led in some states and not in others, as depicted in Table 6.

Table 6
The split table provides a pictorial display of where women legislators have led in the states and by key demographics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Person per sq mi</th>
<th>Median HH Income</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>Education (BA +)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>$52,141</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>$43,696</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>$61,017</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>$50,105</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>702.9</td>
<td>$56,617</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>296.4</td>
<td>$40,900</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>188.6</td>
<td>$51,359</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>$42,865</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>809.8</td>
<td>$53,657</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>$41,287</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>$48,606</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>$23,198</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>$40,885</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>$39,233</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>$53,377</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1134.5</td>
<td>$70,347</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>$47,231</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>277.3</td>
<td>$43,371</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>$42,568</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>1003.2</td>
<td>$54,562</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>$50,049</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>$44,548</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>$48,438</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>$43,785</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even when you consider regional clusters such as in the Northeast, there is no plausible explanation for why states like NY and PA are like isolated islands within a sea
of women-led states. Moreover, the disbursement in the observed SES demographics is wide; median family income in the states led by women ranges from $23,198 to $70,347 with a standard deviation of $8,959. Of the percentage of state residents with a bachelor’s education or higher, the range is 18.2% to 33.2% with at least a college degree. Population density has a large variance as well, from 1.1 persons per square mile to 1134.5 persons per square mile with a standard deviation of 329 square miles.

While a relationship was found between legislative leaders and the personal attributes of those leaders in the preceding chapter, the persona of an individual (Lasswell, 1948) cannot explain all the variation in the states (Rosenthal 1981, 1998). The purpose of this chapter is to better understand the other factors that may be correlated to State House legislative leadership. The second part of the research question (RQ1) under study is: How do structural, electoral and egalitarian factors affect leadership? Do these variables impede access to legislative leadership differently for women than for men?

**Literature Review**

Other factors that make a study of glass ceiling effects in the state polities more difficult are the wide variation in legislative design. These structures of democracies are also believed to affect both the behaviors of the members and the policies they produce (Kousser, 2005). In particular, Thad Kousser (2005) argues that legislative designs have an effect on both a legislature’s form and function. In essence, variation in legislative design, form and function affect those who serve, and in turn, are presumed to affect

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57 Legislative design is defined by Thad Kousser to mean “the rules and institutions…that govern the composition and operation of state legislatures” (2005, p.3). This definition excludes norms and behaviors.  
58 Kousser puts forward the argument that legislative design helps to shape the form (internal organization and dynamics functions) and the policies produced (external factors such as interactions with other branches of government).
those who lead. Moreover, variables that have been hypothesized to affect the composition of women in legislative bodies, such as legislative representativeness (Rule, 1981), political culture (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Carroll, 1985, 2003, 2004), socio-economic characteristics (Hawkesworth, 2003; Reingold, 2000), educational and professional backgrounds (Gertzog, 1995; Dolan & Ford, 1997), legislative design (Moncrief, Thompson & Cassie, 1996; Squire, 1988a, 1988b, 1992) and size (Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing & Kurtz 2003; Rosenthal, 2004) cannot be used to explain the dearth of gendered leadership nor to predict where women are likely to lead in the future.

Taken as a whole, however, this literature provides the theoretical framework to inform this research; in particular, two major areas of literature have significance. The body of literature on State Legislative Leadership provides the contextual backdrop which describes the functions of legislative leadership as well as divergences in strength which vary by institutional and electoral factors. The literature on Women in Government focuses on women as candidates, women in positions of leadership and women as policymakers. It also provides the background for hypothesizing about how women leaders will function in response to these structures.

**Focal Variables**

Three focal variables are hypothesized to affect gendered leadership: Legislative Institutional Strength; Electoral Composition; and Egalitarian Culture. As noted above, two theoretical frames were used to define and operationalize the concepts that underlie each of the focal components and to hypothesize about the relationships between leadership power and gender; electoral composition and gender; and egalitarian culture
and gender. The main hypothesis follows and the literature review then proceeds in three sections which explain the theories that underlie each of the components.

- **H2: The power of leaders varies by legislative strength, electoral compositions and egalitarian cultures which affect where women lead.**
  - **H2.1** Legislative chambers with strong institutional powers are less likely to be led by a woman.
  - **H2.2** Legislative races with higher electoral costs are less likely to be led by a woman.
  - **H2.3** States that have a more egalitarian (women-friendly) culture are more likely to be led by a woman.

As framed by Clucas (2001), the first question to consider is how important are the three focal variables in shaping the institutional powers of the leader? For his part, Clucas (2001) looked at the relationship between the Speaker’s power (dependent variable) and professionalism, electoral competition and careerism. He theorized that these variables would influence leadership power consistent with principal agent theory (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). This research extends the question by broadening the structural and electoral factors believed to affect leadership power.\(^{59}\) Relying on the literature, hypotheses are presented about the influence these additional variables have on leadership power.\(^{60}\) The direction of the expected relationship between institutional and

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\(^{59}\) Clucas acknowledges that the scale he created may not reflect actual power in all instances; for instance his construct of tenure does not take into account term limits. This study attempts to measure other factors, including term limits that serve to expand or decrease leadership power.

\(^{60}\) To extend the research, the dependent variable created by Clucas for Speaker’s Power (a 25 point scale comprised of ratings on Appointment, Committee, Resource, Procedural and Tenure Powers of the Speaker) is utilized. While the hypotheses apply to leadership powers in the Senate, this study is limited to predicting leadership effects in the House. Future research is planned to create a Senate President and Senate President Pro Tem Power index based upon the same indices employed by Clucas.

The second step in a glass ceiling study considers how important the three focal variables are in influencing gendered leadership. Again, the literature is relied upon to hypothesize about the relationships that are expected between institutional and electoral factors and the dependent variable, Gendered Leadership. The expected direction of the relationships is presented and the interaction is summarized in a table for each variable. While not affecting leadership power directly, egalitarian culture is also hypothesized to influence where women lead? As informed by the literature, the influence culture has on gendered leadership is described below and the expected direction of the effect is presented.

**How Different Are the States?**

In the same way that “the Senate and House can be farther than a rotunda apart” (Rosenthal, 1996), so too is the expanse between State Houses in neighboring states. The differences can be measured by many factors including social, political, economical and legislative design, function and form. In all but the capital of Nebraska, the states are organized as bicameral legislatures. Legislative sessions are held on an annual basis, except in eight states\(^{61}\) where lawmakers meet on a biennial schedule. The length of the session varies greatly, ranging from 30 days in some states to year round in others.

Member compensation and staff resources also vary widely. By way of illustration, salaries and benefits range from $200 annually in New Hampshire to more than $100,000 in California for a legislator. Staff allocations often mirror the level of compensation in a state. States like New Hampshire and Wyoming provide no staffing

\(^{61}\) States that meet on a biennial schedule include AR, MA, MT, ND, NV, OR, SC and TX.
while other jurisdictions provide staff assistance from session-day-only appointments (Virginia and New Mexico) to year round employment in New Jersey and Illinois.

In addition to wide variations in compensation, tenure is also influenced by both the formal and informal rules of the chambers, affecting both rank and file members as well as leaders. Looking first at the members, absent mandatory term limits or service in a springboard legislature, the tenure of members may range from a few years to several decades. This in turn bears on leadership opportunities, particularly in those states where it takes seniority in order to ascend to the top. Squire (1988a, 1988b) found such relationships existed in what he termed career legislatures.

District size also reflects upon the wide variations in the states. In the Senate, the number of seats ranges from a low of 21 in Delaware and Wyoming to a high of 67 seats in Minnesota. Additionally, the district population are widely disbursed in these same states from Delaware (37,000, pop.) and Wyoming (95,000, pop.) to Minnesota (73,000, pop.). On the House side, the number of seats goes from 41 seats in Delaware (19,000, pop.) to 400 in New Hampshire (3,000, pop.). Some states have multi-member districts while others have single member districts and still others have districts at large.

Other factors that contribute to differences in legislative design include variation in constitutionally vested powers such as gubernatorial line item veto and override powers, as well as budgetary authorities. In addition to constitutional provisions,

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63 Squire also argued that springboard “will have weaker leaders than others, since decentralization provides members with the ‘resources and positions of power needed to advance their career’” (as cited in Clucas, p. 324, 2001). At the other end of the spectrum, “dead-end” legislatures are likely to be more centralized and have stronger leaders.
64 Populations are rounded to the nearest thousand.
65 A review of the structures reveals 22 states have chambers with multimember districts (Book of the States, 2005); only five states have Senate and House chambers with an equal number of district constituents.
statutory and voter referendum measures serve to impinge or expand legislative powers, such as term limits and legislative oversight over rules.

Money has long been a source of access for interest groups seeking to advance their policy agendas with lawmakers (Rosenthal, 2004). Today the increasingly high costs associated with state legislative campaigns suggests access to legislative politics and leadership opportunities requires all legislators to tap into those resources for themselves or on behalf of caucus members. The job of fundraising is exaggerated by inter-party competitiveness in the states (Sanbonmatsu, 2002) as well as the number of open seats in an election cycle (Burrell, 1994).

In general, increased fundraising expenditures are a hindrance to gendered candidates. Although Burrell credits the creation of Emily’s list and links the bundling of direct contributions to the successful candidacies of women, these kinds of benefits do not extend to women leaders. All leaders need access to broad-based donor groups. If there are limitations for women as members to these groups, so too might there be limitations for women leaders.

A sampling of the women (shaded in green in Table 7) who have served over a 10 year period (1997-2007) shows that none have headed a chamber where the average legislative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Avg. Senate Race</th>
<th>Avg. House Race</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>$146,429</td>
<td>$16,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>$38,983</td>
<td>$28,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>$57,895</td>
<td>$25,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>$53,409</td>
<td>$14,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>$128,205</td>
<td>$76,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>$146,939</td>
<td>$41,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>$22,826</td>
<td>$4,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>$125,455</td>
<td>$30,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
<td>$491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>$4,651</td>
<td>$2,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>$257,500</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>$208,333</td>
<td>$60,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>$12,698</td>
<td>$2,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>$38,983</td>
<td>$28,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>$9,091</td>
<td>$5,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>$85,926</strong></td>
<td><strong>$27,455</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
campaign expenditures have topped $150,000. The stark contrast to the ones waged in the seven priciest electoral competitions is informative (Table 8). At the least, levels of campaign spending, access to contributors and the degree of electoral competition distinguishes the states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>$526,667</td>
<td>$322,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>$735,135</td>
<td>$154,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>$100,730</td>
<td>$53,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>$161,789</td>
<td>$124,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$213,287</td>
<td>$69,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>$346,154</td>
<td>$83,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>$550,000</td>
<td>$154,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7 State Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>$376,252</strong></td>
<td><strong>$137,629</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, the cultural divide is alive and well in the state polities. Culture, in the broader sense, continues to shape our structures and processes. In the same way culture has been found to play a role in candidate recruitment (Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Lawless & Fox, 2005), it plays a significant role in leadership. Despite their increased numbers in every state legislature since the 1970s, women continue to serve in a male institution (Thomas, 1994). Similar to what was found at the CEO level of Fortune 500 companies, leadership at a secondary or tertiary level does not aid women in getting to the top in the same way it does for men (Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999). While gains have been made for women over the last 10 years in all sectors, the very top leadership positions in the corporate boardrooms and tenured academic institutions are still reserved for men (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, & Vanneman, 2001; Monroe, 2002; and Gersick, Bartunek, & Dutton, 2000). The private internal workings of our political institutions are no different.
Legislative Institutional Strength (LIS) Focal Variable

Given the differences in legislative design, it follows that some legislative chambers are situated in states with more institutional powers than others. As Kousser (2005) argues, differences in design will have affects on both internal and external institutions, organizations and actors. Constructs must be used to measure these differences; control for these variations when estimating other factors; and ultimately to measure glass ceiling effects.

When it comes to legislative institutional strength (LIS), legislatures that are empowered with constitutional authorities are more stable than those bodies whose authorities may be removed by statute or citizen referendum. To assess leadership powers (LIS) within the legislature, seven measures are used: Legislative Institutional Power, Gubernatorial Institutional Power, Term Limits in Effect and Term Limits Adopted, Professionalism, Seniority, District Size and Tools of the Speaker (Leadership Power). This focal variable measures leadership power in the chamber (House) in relation to outside institutions, including the executive branch, governmental actors, as well as power over rank and file members. The LIS focal variable is hypothesized to affect women in different ways for different reasons. Generally speaking, in state chambers with strong institutional powers, the bodies are less likely to be led by women.

LIP Power and Gender

Legislative Institutional Power (LIP) is a construct theorized to measure the power of legislative leadership against other policy actors in terms of those authorities constitutionally derived (Jewell & Whicker, 1994). Since power is not easily forfeited (Jewell & Whicker, 1994) and there are incentives for strong leadership which further
adds to both chamber and electoral stability (Clucas, 2001), leadership opportunities are likely to be limited due to fewer turnovers. Given that politics is historically viewed as a “man’s world” (Mezey, 1980), the odds are women will have more difficulty ascending to the top leadership position in strong institutions where men have long held the reigns.

The relationship between Institutional Strength and Leadership Power is expected to be positive (Table 9). In past studies of leadership power, institutional strength, as defined here, has not been tested; however, only four states with strong LIS have been headed by women leaders in the panel. In strong institutions, a negative relationship is expected between LIP and gendered leadership. Women are expected to lead in low LIP states.

**GIP Power and Gender**

By contrast, the governor is the most powerful outside actor legislative leaders have to do deal with (Rosenthal, 2004). In terms of policymaking, stronger chief executives make it more difficult for legislatures to exercise power, even when leaders are of the same party. While some believe the relationship between the executive and legislative branch is inversely correlated, yet there are many states where both branches are institutionally strong or on par (see findings below). Yet, few studies have examined the interaction between institutional gubernatorial and legislative power.\(^6\)

To measure this effect, GIP is added to the focal variable because theory says it serves to influence legislative power. While the powers do not appear to be inversely

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\(^6\) Comparable rankings of legislative power do not exist for all chambers in all states.
correlated, leaders with strong governors will likely find their time split between the agenda of the caucus and that of the governor (Rosenthal, 2004). Such fractured attention likely means leaders are weaker if they are of the same party (Rosenthal, 2004).

Because symbols are critical to social acceptance (Kirkpatrick 1974; Moncrief 1999; Burrell 1994; Thomas, 1994) it is more likely women will not seek a leadership position in a state where there is a strong governor who is generally a man. Only 20 states have ever had women serve as the Chief Executive. When we compare where those women have served as the chief executive, we see that just 8 women governors have ever served in states ranked above the median GIP (3.48). By comparison, 11 of the 20 states that have had female governors have also had women serve as presiding officers supporting the notion that symbols have an effect.

The relationship between GIP and Leadership Power is expected to be negative (Table 10). It is more difficult to generalize about the effect of gubernatorial powers on leadership in states where the executive is weak; perhaps women would see leadership as an opportunity if the governor was perceived as weak. If the relationship between GIP and Leadership Power holds, a negative relationship between GIP and gendered leadership is expected. Women are more likely to lead in low GIP states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10</th>
<th>Gubernatorial Power</th>
<th>Leadership Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 On a nominal scale of 0-4, the LIS was calculated. Of those states with the lowest LIS (0-1), the median GIP was 3.52; of those states in the middle LIS (2), the median GIP was 3.5; and those ranked with the highest LIS (3-4), the median GIP was 3.32. The mode for the LIS ranking was 2.
68 Annual GIS data available for 1994 through 2005 was used to calculate an average GIS rating for the panel period.
Term Limited Power and Gender

The next significant limitation on legislators and leaders is term limits (Kousser, 2005). Although Jewell and Whicker (1994) theorized term limits as one component in the LIP scale, it is considered as a separate measure given the changes that have occurred during the panel. This variable is lagged since the influence is expected to occur in the term prior to a leader being termed out.69

Terms limits were hypothesized to increase the likelihood of newcomers, which includes women and minorities, serving in state legislatures. Such new membership was expected to increase the probability of women as leaders (Jewell & Whicker 1994). At best, a termed legislature should level the playing field between men and women. To date, term limits have not proven to change the historical patterns of women serving in the body or in top leadership positions (Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Moncrief et al., 1992).

Instead term limits have been found to have weakened the legislature as an institution (Kousser, 2005). Without question, it has ended and cut short the tenure of leaders serving in term limited states.70

This has the net effect of weakening leadership powers that are no longer centralized among the few (Squire, 1988a, 1988b). 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Power</th>
<th>Term Limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (Terms effective)</td>
<td>High (No term limits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low No difference</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 Term limits have been adopted in 18 states, but only are effective in 15 states in 2010. By the end of the panel period, terms had been implemented in all states were they had been adopted, unless a provision had passed to repeal them or term limits were overturned by the courts. Term limited states include: AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NE, NV, OH, OK, and SD.

70 Leaders in the panel in term limited states served 4.8 years, on average, in leadership, as compared to 2.9 years after the term became effective in their chamber.
The relationship between Term Limits and Leadership Power is expected to be negative (Table 11). If this relationship holds, no difference between men and women leaders is expected. Women are expected to be impacted by term limits in the same way as men; men are still more likely to lead in states without limits. However, term limits may provide an advantage to women in those states where there is an interaction between seniority and terms.

**Professionalism and Gender**

The professionalism of legislatures is a prominent characterization used to explain many of the changes that have occurred within the state polities (Moncrief, Thompson & Cassie, 1996). The construct captures variances in design from how often legislatures meet, how many resources they have (member to staff ratio) and the level of compensation received by the members. Session length is a key component (Squire, 1988a; Kousser, 2005). Taken together, these indices are a good proxy for measuring the influence of the institution within and among the states.

More importantly, scholars have long argued that professionalism shapes leadership; further, it reduces leadership power in the most professionalized states because members have more resources (Moncrief, Thompson & Kurtz, 1996; Pound, 1992; Rosenthal, 1998; Clucas, 2001). In his research on the question however, Clucas found the measure was not statistically significant and the direction was opposite of what was hypothesized. Clucas (2001) added variables to his model to be more certain about the effects he found, but no differences were found.

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71 Squire (1988) argues that springboard legislatures, with decentralized power, have weak leadership. The effect of decentralization serves to weaken leadership power.

72 In the panel, 28% of women leaders served in term limited chambers as compared to 26% of the men.
For this study, professionalism remains included in the model. First, the theory informs that there is a relationship. Second, like Clucas (2001), other explanatory variables are added to the model which may affect the results. Third, professionalism is hypothesized to influence gendered leadership.

The more professional legislatures are also likely to look like career legislatures -- bodies where career advancement is poor, but the compensation is good (Squire, 1988a; Clucas, 2001). In these chambers, “Squire argues that they will have a distribution of power based on seniority” (as cited in Clucas, 2001, p. 323). For this reason, in the more professional legislatures, longer tenured rank and file members are expected to be found, therefore, a positive relationship is expected between Professionalism and Leadership Power (Table 12). A negative relationship is expected between Professionalism and Gendered Leadership. Some scholars contend professionalized legislatures are more hostile to integrative leadership styles more typical of women (Simon Rosenthal, 1998) and access to the more professionalized chambers might be constrained for newcomers (Berry et al., 2000).

Finally, when institutional factors were examined, Mark Ellickson and Donald Whistler (2000) found women in professional legislature accessed leadership positions through seniority. Without seniority, they held fewer leadership positions and had lower bill passage success rates than men.

Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Power</th>
<th>Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low Women High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Women Man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73 Similarities are found when comparing Squire’s measure of professionalism (median=.015) to his measure of careerism (mode=2) for those states ranked as the most professionalized. The interaction between the two variables in the model may affect the direction of the relationship. Another possibility exists: professionalism is a static variable and the differences that have occurred over the panel period may not be fully measured by this construct (1998).

74 Leaders with longer tenures are often described in the literature as having greater powers given a consolidation of power that flows from informal norms and behaviors of leaders.
Seniority and Gender

Since careerism and professionalism are different constructs (Squire, 1988a, 1988b, 1992), one cannot be substituted for the other. Yet, both indexes have similar indices which open up concerns about multicollinearity.75 Primarily, Squire first created a careerism measure, which comprises members’ compensation levels and career advancement beyond the body, since he believed these factors provide an incentive for membership stability. In turn, career legislatures are thought to be more powerful than dead-end legislatures (Squire, 1988a, 1988b, 1992). Squire observed the higher-paying legislatures had members with longer tenures, and power within the more stable legislatures was distributed based upon seniority (Squire, 1988a; Clucas, 2001). It follows then that chamber tenure may be a good proxy for careerism.

Tenure is also useful for measuring the effects both informal and formal rules have on seniority which was found to be highly correlated with personal leadership antecedents. It has long been observed that seniority determines leadership selection in Congress (Mooney, 1995); it follows that senior members have a similar advantage in the states (Rosenthal, 2009). In the earlier referenced study of recruitment patterns of House speakers, it was observed few rank and file members became the presiding officer “without an apprenticeship in some other leadership position in the House” (Freeman, 1995). Seniority, both formal and informal, has also been found to be a personal antecedent to leadership.

Tenure or seniority is thought to play a more significant role in two kinds of legislatures: career and dead-end legislatures (Squire, 1988a, 1988b; Clucas, 2001). It matters greatly since slightly more than half of the panel leaders observed serve in these legislatures. The financial incentives offered by legislatures are used in both measures to calculate the index.
types of bodies. One-fifth of the leaders in the panel served in states characterized as career legislatures. In the same way fewer recruitment opportunities exist for women in political cultures where there were low levels of economic development, low median incomes for men or higher unemployment rates, women legislators are expected to be competitively disadvantaged in an economic structure that provides a high level of compensation (Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Burrell, 1994; Rule, 1981).

Another third of the panel served in dead-end legislatures. Conversely, a greater percentage of women leaders in the panel served in these types of chambers, 20% of women as compared to 13% of men. This outcome is not unexpected given the observation in some regions that men are more likely to abandon dead-end State Houses for opportunities to pursue higher office --- thereby creating an environment where women have longer tenures (Rule, 1981).

While strong leadership is linked to tenure in career legislatures, leadership is also thought to be stronger in dead-end legislatures where "cohesiveness and continuity" is important (Squire, as cited in Clucas, 2001, p. 323). Both effects are likely to impact gendered leadership; however, the direction may vary. As such, the relationship between Seniority and Leadership Power is expected to be positive (Table 13). The relationship between Seniority and Gendered Leadership is expected to be negative in career legislatures and positive in dead-end legislatures. Notwithstanding these interactions,

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76 Forty-eight percent of leaders in the panel served in springboard legislatures and 33% of the leaders served in dead-end legislatures. The proportion of men and women leaders was identical in springboard legislatures, but more women (49%) served in dead-end legislatures than men (42%).
two studies conducted by CAWP (1998, 2001) consistently show that women are older than man when they are first elected to the state legislature; age is correlated to tenure. Therefore, seniority is expected to be negative overall.

**Chamber Size and Gender**

Elements of professionalism and careerism often relate to the structures of the districts and electoral norms. For one thing, “Representation is probably easier in smaller than in larger districts” (Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing, and Kurtz, 2003, p. 99). It is also likely to cost less to campaign in those smaller districts. More importantly, access to elected office may be easier for women in smaller districts by lowering upfront investment costs for candidates in terms of campaign financing. Additionally, women candidates have been found to engage in grassroots methods of campaigning which is more manageable in smaller districts (Rule, 1981). Of the 39 women leaders that served in the panel since 1997, two-thirds have served in states where the size of the district is under 66,000 residents; half of those are under 32,000. Size certainly seems to influence where women serve in legislatures. In turn, women in smaller districts (number of constituents) may have more time for leadership pursuits once elected.

Yet another argument can be made that size matters in a different context. Specifically, the number of districts in a chamber may play a role in where women lead given the correlation of seats to campaign expenditures. The fewer number of seats in the chamber reduces the pressure caucus leaders might feel in raising significant amounts of campaign funds required in highly competitive electoral chambers (Rosenthal, 2004).

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77 For the leaders in the panel, the relationship between age elected to the leadership chamber and seniority was significant ($p < .015$). The relationship is moderate as measured by the Pearson’s R statistic ($r = .237$); the older a member is when elected to the chamber, the less likely s/he is to have seniority. Also the relationship between age elected as leader and seniority was statistically significant ($p < .000$). This relationship was stronger as measured by the Pearson’s R statistic ($r = .444$) and positive which is expected since the older the leader is, the more likely s/he has acquired seniority.
States with fewer chamber seats are often located in electoral jurisdictions with lower cost campaigns.

Since legislatures are by definition transactional, leaders skilled in bargaining and compromise are expected to exist in larger bodies (C. Rosenthal, 1998). In contrast, smaller sized chambers also tend to rely upon informal relationships (Frances, 1985). Thus, as the number of seats increases, competition for top leadership positions is likely to be more transactional and the power of the top leader is likely to be stronger (Clucas, 2001; Smith, 2000). The relationship between Chamber Size and Leadership Power is expected to be positive (Table 14).

In the private sector, women in top leadership positions have been observed to work for much smaller corporations than men when measured in terms of market value (millions), sales (millions), assets (millions), and employees (thousands) (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). If similar patterns hold, women are more likely to lead in smaller chambers, particularly in environments where more informal relationships exist and where “integrative” styles of leadership may be more welcomed. The relationship between Chamber Size and Gendered Leadership is expected to be negative. Women are more likely to lead in smaller chambers.

**Leadership Power and Gender**

Finally, to measure leadership power and its influence on gendered leadership, it is important to first examine the relationship between formal and informal kinds of power. At the center of power is the leader’s control over legislative procedures and
management (Rosenthal 1981, 1998; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Clucas, 2001). Richard Clucas (2001) created a variable for the House which ranks the power of the Speaker to appoint party leaders and chairs; control the committee system; control procedures affecting legislation; control resources in terms of campaign committees and House staff; and whether the tenure of the leader was restricted. As the leader’s tools and techniques increase over the chamber, so does the leader’s power increase (Rosenthal, 1981; Clucas, 2001).

This study looks at what other LIS factors influence Leadership Power and what effects, if any, leadership power has on gendered leadership. The first question to answer is whether or not the additional measures within the LIS focal variables serve to strengthen or weaken leadership power. It is expected that as the other powers increase, or do not impose limits, the relationship between these factors and Leadership Power (defined by Clucas as Tools of the Speaker) is expected to be positive. Because leadership roles are hypothesized to change from the integrative styles at the committee level practiced by women to the more command style rolls of men presiding over Rules committee and the caucus, women are less likely to seek and be consider for secondary leadership positions or beyond (C. Rosenthal, 1998; Jewell & Whicker, 1994). The relationship between Leadership Power and Gendered Leadership is expected to be negative.

Electoral Composition Focal Variable

As hypothesized, legislative races with higher electoral costs are less likely to be led by a woman. Several factors affect electoral success for individual legislators which ultimately affect the success of party leaders. At the top of the list is legislative
competitiveness within the chamber, cost of the contest and access to campaign donors as funding sources.

**Legislative Competitiveness and Gender**

The principal agent theory is at the center of this hypothesis. “If legislative leaders are agents of their followers, then we expect that these differences would affect leadership” (Clucas, 2001, p. 319). In his study, Clucas (2001) found by centering power in the hands of the few, the many – in the party – stand to benefit in highly competitive environments. Conversely, when members face little competition, there is less reasons to concentrate power (Clucas, 2001). Sinclair (1995) first made the distinction that party strength is not what makes “stronger leaders.” “Rather, what matters is the members' cost and benefit analysis on how their goals can best be attained. Thus, other factors may also influence the distribution of power” (Sinclair, as cited in Clucas, 2001, p. 4).

Legislative competitiveness captures how competitive the overall seats in the state legislature are. As competitiveness increases and more seats are “up for grabs,” campaign costs generally increase (Rosenthal, 1994, 2004). As more power is centralized in the chamber, women are less likely to lead for all the reasons hypothesized. A leader made stronger due to stiff electoral competition lessens opportunities for women (Jewell & Whicker, 1994). And, as noted by Sinclair (1995), women may not be perceived as having the best interest of men. A negative relationship between Legislative Competitiveness and Gendered Leadership is expected.

**Networks and Gender**

Just as a leader’s campaigning and fundraising responsibilities increase, so too does the need to raise funds for members of his or her party. Historically, campaign
funds come from the party and the relationships formed with donors in professional networks. In the past, women have not been found to share the professional backgrounds of their male counterparts and major gaps remain in some areas (Dolan & Ford, 1997; CAWP Survey, 1998, 2001). As the networks of women increase in the private sector, so too will their opportunities in elected bodies reliant on private donors. The relationship between Networks and Gendered Leadership is expected to be positive. A caveat: even if women’s networks are prominent in a state, women legislators with non-professionalized career background may still be limited when it comes to accessing these resources.

**Campaign Costs and Gender**

One of the fundamental roles of a leader is to get caucus members reelected (Rosenthal, 2004). In the past, comparative case studies in single states and paired states have explored questions concerning campaign financing (Moncrief et al., 1996) and its effects on state legislatures. C. Rosenthal’s work (1995) also explored the impact of legislative campaign committees, a relatively new structure that emerged from the campaign finance reform initiatives designed to limit campaign contributions to individual candidates per election cycle. She found these legislative campaign committees have served to directly increase leadership among its members and interest groups. Overall, the role of organized PACs have both increased (Rosenthal, 1995) and been found to aid incumbents (Thompson, Cassie & Jewell, 1994). This growing role played by legislative leader committees (leader PACs) over the last several years provides an opportunity to examine the influence these committees have overall (Sanbonmatsu, 2006).

Clucas also counted the leader’s party control over a campaign committee as a campaign resource available to members. Control over a party PAC contributed to a
higher power ranking within the Leadership Power variable. Yet this is definitively a case when scale matters: a PAC that raises tens of thousands of dollars an election cycle versus tens of millions of dollars is major. To capture the wide variation that exists, the average campaign costs expended by winning candidates during each cycle will be used.

In states with higher campaign expenditures, it is expected that this function will be more important than in states with lower campaign expenditures. In high costs states, the relationship with Leadership Power is expected to be higher. A negative relationship is expected between Campaign Costs and Gendered Leadership. For the same reasons, women candidates see campaign fundraising as a barrier to running, so too do women leaders (Sanbonmatsu, 2006).

_Egalitarian Culture Focal Variable_

States that have a more egalitarian culture are hypothesized to be more likely to be led by a woman. At the core of this concept, is the idea that feminized representation should be aided by changes in our society including more egalitarian attitudes, outside employment and second careers by women; and increased symbols in the media and in elected and appointed office providing role models (Jewell & Whicker, 1994). So, as cultural norms change and constraints are removed, women should be the beneficiary. In part, Rule (1981) credited the increased numbers of women in state legislatures to changes in political culture, such as the dominant moralistic states. Rule (1981) found that states that had a strong Democratic Party dominance presented an impediment for women recruitment. It was thought that in these areas (North), candidate selection was fueled by the “local boys” and their ethnic ties to the “good ol’ boy” network. While Rule did not detect these patterns in her later work (1990), Sanbonmatsu noted that
women respondents did not credit the Democratic Party as providing assistance to their candidacies.

Gertzog’s longitudinal study of women’s recruitment to Congress (1995) also found dramatic changes over time transforming it from one heavily reliant upon personal relationships to one now accessed through political skill and public achievement. In the past, the traditional roles of women as members and leaders of social and voluntary organizations fueled their transition into electoral politics at the federal level. That changed in 1992, the so-called “Year of the Woman” in which women gain a substantive increase in the Congress (Burrell, 1994). These women, both the ones who won and lost, came from backgrounds that more closely resembled men in terms of education and professional experience. Still their unprecedented rise in that year, and since then, may have more to do with them being identified as “outsiders” in years when corruption and the institution was under attack (Burrell, 1994). All the more reason, it is important to observe cultural changes over time and differences among the states.

**Egalitarian Culture and Gender**

To measure Egalitarian Culture, Political Culture and Citizen Ideology is used. Daniel Elazar (1966) modeled factors that characterized states by three distinct political cultures while acknowledging states possessed by a dominant culture and a secondary culture. Elazar (1966) noted regional groupings of the states could be organized into three categories: Moralistic, Individualistic, and Traditional. To measure Citizen Ideology, William Berry’s (2000) dataset is used from 1998: “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States.” The index ranges from 0-100; a rating of 100 is considered the most liberal.
Finally, data were culled from CAWP historic listing of statewide elected political figures ranging from governors to elected department heads such as Secretary of State to Insurance Commissioner, as well as a few other high profiled state boards and commissions. Given the influence symbols and role models are believed to have (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Burrell, 1994; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; Moncrief, 1999), a continuous variable of the total number of women who have served in these positions from 1980 forward is constructed. The time period is bounded to capture the way young women are socialized as they grow up (Lawless & Fox, 2005). Also, many of the earliest officeholders came to government by way of their husband’s death; thereafter, women began getting elected on their own talents and skills (Burrell, 1994; Gertzog, 1995). It is this group that potentially has the greatest symbolic effect on women as role models.

In other studies, researchers (Gunthrie & Roth, 1999) have argued that institutional environments “significantly influence the likelihood that an organization will have a female CEO.” Similarly, Wright and Baxter (2000) examined a range of issues including gender inequalities that resulted from institutional structures and social environments. The Networks, as part of the Electoral Composition focal variable, may also capture cultural effects that emerge from these social environments.

The more egalitarian a culture is perceived – in other words – the more women-friendly or the greater degree to which women are favorably cast, the more likely women are to head legislative chambers. The relationship between the measures of Egalitarian Culture and Gendered Leadership is expected to be positive.
Data & Methods

The dependent variable is women leaders serving in a term. Out of the 343 terms observed in 49 states over 14 years, a woman served as the Speaker in 23 terms. In all, just 17 women served as Speaker during this period. The central tendencies measures of the three focal variables are summarized in Tables 15, 16 and 17. The name of the variable is described, its source and how the concept is operationalized. All data were collected by term (2 year period beginning in 1997); unless it is a static level variable and so noted in the table. The level of measurement is highlighted and a distinction is made to denote whether the variable is lagged or is a dummy variable.

The unit of analysis is “state term” as the model is trying to predict where a leader will be a woman in the following legislative session. Leadership terms begin in 1997; Term 1 covers the period 1997-1998, Term 2 covers the 1999-2000 years, and so on through 2010. Term 1 is predicting gendered leadership in the legislative session beginning in calendar year 1999. For the most part, legislatures have two year sessions; however, resignations, deaths, or political coups that change leadership in the middle of a term will not be estimated by the model. The selection of leaders generally occurs in the election year preceding the term. 78 Only New Jersey and Virginia hold odd-year elections; therefore, the 1997 data were replaced by 1996 data so that Term 1 is predicting gendered leadership in 1998 that is linked to the preceding election cycle held in 1997. At the end of the panel, Term 7 data are being used to predict who will lead in 2011, with the exception of New Jersey and Virginia which is used to predict 2010.

The analysis is restricted to the House chamber because the Leadership Power variable is only available for Speaker’s powers. While limiting, it also addresses another

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78 There are exceptions to the selection process in some states such as LA.
concern since the unit of analysis is at the chamber level for some variables. Although data are at the state level for most variables, it is at the chamber level for other factors: Chamber Size and Campaign Costs (the latter of which is only available by term, not year). Some state data are omitted by the use of Terms, but in those cases where the construct is static, it helps eliminate concern about multicollinearity that occurs within the states. The omitted state level data (even numbered years) is not a concern since the panel spans a 14 year period and likely captures the variations between the years within the states. What could affect the estimation would be to eliminate a woman leader as a dependent variable in a term that happens to fall on an even numbered year within a term; in those instances, the dependent variable was coded as a 1 for the term, even if a woman did not serve for both years of the term.79

The control variables are also summarized in Table 18. These variables add the contextual factors that are believed to influence gendered leadership. The control variables include the difference in partisan philosophies (Democratic Party control), the proportion and difference in state population demographics such as college educated women, women in the labor force and the wage gap between women and men. The proportion of women serving in the house chambers (legislative representativeness) is also included. Several dummy variables which measure glass ceiling effects are added which look at the proportion of women in the body as compared to women serving at the committee level and women in secondary leadership positions. For the most part, glass ceiling is characterized in four ways as coded below:

0- Leadership is below membership proportions at both committee and secondary levels

79 There was only one time when this occurred during the period.
1- Leadership is proportional or exceeds leadership at the committee level, but not the secondary level
2- Leadership is proportional or exceeds leadership at the secondary level, but not at the committee level
3- Leadership is proportional or exceeds membership at both levels

The central tendency measures for each variable are presented in Tables 19 through 22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative Institutional Power</strong></td>
<td>Ordinal data (0 to 6, with 6 having stronger legislative power)</td>
<td>Rosenthal 1981, 1998; Jewel &amp; Whicker, 1994 (Data collected from CSG Book of the States, various years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gubernatorial Institutional Power</strong></td>
<td>Ordinal data (0 to 5, with 5 having stronger governor’s power)</td>
<td>Beyle, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term Limits Effective</strong></td>
<td>Nominal data, 1 = yes; lagged by 1 term; dummy variable</td>
<td>Data collected from NCSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professionalism</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data; (Index ranking with higher scores characterizing the more professionalized legislatures); static level</td>
<td>Squire, 1988a, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seniority</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data (calculated as number of years, on average, leaders served as members prior to top role); data averaged before and after mid-point</td>
<td>Squire, 1988a, 1992 (Data collected leader dataset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chamber Size</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data; static level</td>
<td>Rosenthal, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Power</strong></td>
<td>Ordinal data (5 constructs, each indices ranked 0-5; 25 maximum point scale indicating strong Speaker); static level</td>
<td>Lucas, 2001 (“Tools of the Speaker”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Competition</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data (higher levels correspond to higher levels of competition); static level</td>
<td>Holbrook &amp; Van Dunk, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Networks</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data (% of employed women aged 16 and older who were employed in executive, managerial or professional specialty occupations); 2 yr. intervals through 2004</td>
<td>Institute for Women’s Policy Research (Data collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign Costs</strong></td>
<td>Ratio data (average campaign expenditure of winning candidates in election cycle); 2 yr. intervals; lagged by 1 term</td>
<td>National Institute on Money in State Politics’ PULSE dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17  
Egalitarian Focal Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>Nominal data (coded by moralistic, 1; individualistic, 2; and traditional, 3 as dummy variables) static level</td>
<td>Elazar, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Ideology</td>
<td>Ratio data (values from 0-100; 100=most liberal)</td>
<td>Berry et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols</td>
<td>Ratio data (total percentage of women elected to statewide office 1980-2010; 2 yr. intervals)</td>
<td>CAWP, “Historical Listing of Women Statewide Officeholders by Office”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling</td>
<td>Measures proportionality of women membership to committee leadership positions and secondary leadership positions at 2 yr. intervals; 3 dummy variables; lagged by 1 term</td>
<td>CAWP Fact Sheets, various years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18  
Contextual Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women College Educated</td>
<td>Ratio data (collected at 2 yr. intervals, adjusted for inflation)</td>
<td>Institute for Women’s Policy Research (Data collected from US Census Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Gap</td>
<td>Ratio data (Women to Men Earnings Compensation Ratio collected at 2yr. intervals)</td>
<td>Institute for Women’s Policy Research (Data collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Nominal dummy variable; 1= Democratic party control</td>
<td>Book of the States, various years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Representativeness</td>
<td>Ratio data (% of the total House chamber that is composed of women at 2 yr. intervals)</td>
<td>CAWP Fact Sheets, various years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Validity and Reliability of Data

Although four models are estimated, the final model contains 20 variables. To help ensure reliability, measures were selected that have been used consistently in the past by other scholars and researchers. With the exception of the LIS, Seniority, District Size, Symbols and the Glass Ceiling variables, all have been tested and have yielded consistent scores. While Professionalism did not move in the direction that has been hypothesized in past studies of leadership power, it is not thought to be unreliable (see footnote #47).
To help ensure validity, correlations were run to determine the significance, strength and direction of the variables to another validated measure as in the case of the Leadership Power variable. Then a second correlation measured the significance, strength and direction of the focal variables with the dependent variable. If the results were not as hypothesized, explanatory footnotes were added. Although all the variables were informed by the theory, in some cases, there was more than one way to measure a concept. In these instances, a few different approaches were tried.

When a new measure was evaluated, as in the case of District Number versus Chamber Size, a separate correlation was run to help inform the selection. In this case, the number of seats and the size of the district were correlated and statistically significant \((p < .000)\) for leaders in the panel. Therefore, district size was utilized in the construct with a higher level of confidence. When similar questions arose or expectations were made about the direction of relationships, the panel dataset was considered to see if hypotheses held for the census of leaders from 1997 to 2010. Finally, to avoid measurement error since many of the variables were manually gathered, scatter-plots and descriptive statistics were run to assess the quality of the data and to determine if outliers were produced by data entry errors.

**Legislative Institutional Strength Focal Variables**

The median LIS power ratings for House terms in the panel were 3.0 terms and 3.5 for GIP power ratings. While the relationship between the two variables was significant and the direction was inversely correlated, the strength of the measure was weak \((-0.007)\). Nine states, however, both had GIP and LIS power ratings above the

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80 The direction of the relationship is negative and the strength is moderate as measured by the Pearson’s R statistic \((-0.233)\).
median. The mode for Term Limits Effective was zero, meaning term limits were not effective in most states. Professionalism had a median of .1850 with a range of .62 and the median was 18.50 for Leadership Power with a range of 16.0. The mean for Seniority was 13.4 years with a standard deviation of 6.92. Finally, District Size had a mean of 110 seats and a median of 100; the minimum number of seats in a chamber was 20 and the maximum number was 400 in New Hampshire. All LIP measures are summarized in Table 19.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Institutional Power (LIS)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial Institutional Power (GIP)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms Effective</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>.1850</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Power</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>18.50</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Size</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>55.78</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electoral Composition Focal Variables

The mean cost of the winning campaign expenditures was $55,312; the minimum was $1000 to $641,000. The range of $640,000 depicts the extreme variation that exists in states from $1,000 in North Dakota and New Hampshire to the high end in California. Networks had a mean of 31.23% of women in the civilian workforces were employed in executive, managerial or professional specialty occupations; both Maryland and Virginia had the largest percentages of professionalized women. As for Party competition, the mean was 38.71% reflecting that most Speakers serve in states with relatively low competitive electoral environments. The most competitive states houses were located all
across the nation from Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, North Dakota, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii. The variables are summarized in Table 22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Costs (Winners in $000)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>$55</td>
<td>$81</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>$641</td>
<td>21.20</td>
<td>43.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>31.23</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>21.20</td>
<td>43.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition (Legislative Competiveness)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>38.71</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>56.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Egalitarian Culture Focal Variables

What is most enlightening about the cultural variables is the influence that Glass Ceiling Effects seems to have. In terms of the overall membership, 24% of women have served as legislators in the lower house during the seven terms. Of those, 21% have held committee chairs. Just 14.5% of the women legislators have held a secondary leadership position. Recalling the effect this lack of proportionality is thought to have (Cotter et al., 2001) combined with the finding that top leadership positions in both chambers required experience which most often comes by way of secondary leadership positions, it goes a long way towards explaining the gender vacuum at the top of the pinnacle.

Overall, there are 10 states that had legislative terms where the proportion of women in both secondary and committee leadership positions was equal to or greater than the percentage of women legislators serving in the chamber. Of these, six states had a woman as Speaker during the panel period: Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Oregon and Vermont. Still, proportional representation at all leadership levels was limited to no more than two terms. It is not surprising that so few women have

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81 The ten states include: AK, CA, CT, ID, IL, ME, MN, OR, VT and WA.
become Speakers. It is not just legislative representation that matters, but the career advancements paths they pursue or are awarded after they arrive.

Political Culture is treated as two dummy variables in the panel. About one third of the states are characterized by Daniel Elazar as either Moralistic (34.7%) or Individualistic (32.7%). Citizen Ideology has a much wider variation (72.45%) with states ranging from the more conservative end of the scale (13.74%) to the more liberal (86.19). A related diversity factor may be the range in states that have elected women to statewide offices since 1980 (n=3401). While all states have elected at least one woman to statewide office during this period, Arizona has elected more than 30 women. The variables are summarized in Table 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture (Moralistic)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture (Individualist)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Ideology</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>48.68</td>
<td>16.89</td>
<td>13.74</td>
<td>86.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols (Cumulative percentage)</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling</td>
<td>343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contextual Control Variables**

Measures were used to capture the diversity among women among the states by using the Wage Gap ratio and the percentage difference in College Educated Women (11% in some states to 36% in others). The latter is important given the higher level of education held by leaders in the National Survey of State Leaders panel. Additionally, the literature suggests that as the percentage of women rises in the chambers, so too will their leadership roles (Thomas, 1995); this variable’s frequency was described under Egalitarian Culture. Lastly, Democratic Performance is used to control for differences
that may occur due to political preferences. Party control was not used as a control variable in the model since the effect being measured was differences between men and women. As observed, some states (87%) are clearly more democratic than others (12%). The variables are summarized in Table 22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 22 Contextual Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Legislative Representativeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women College Educated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methods**

A multivariate analysis was undertaken to help explain where women have led in state legislative chambers over the last decade and to predict where they will lead in the future. For each model estimated, the dichotomous dependent variable was woman leader serving as the presiding officer in the term (1 = woman). Panel data were constructed for the period 1997 through 2010 at two year intervals known as terms. Panel data allow you to control for observed variables, such as egalitarian and political culture, that exists among the states. Panel data also help to control for unobservable factors that vary over time, but not across organizations and governments.\(^{82}\) The unobserved variables are less a concern in a study about state polities --- that in effect control the policies and procedures that govern them.

Two modifications were then made to the panel data from earlier models that had been estimated: terms versus years and different predictors were operationalized. First, it was counterintuitive to begin with a unit of analysis that observed changes in the state

\(^{82}\) Panel data analysis presented by Oscar Torres-Reyna, Data Consultant at Princeton University.
chambers on an annual basis since most legislatures operate either on a biennial schedule and/or select leadership for two year terms. By reducing the number of observations, a secondary benefit was expected: namely, the within-in cluster variation effects would be minimized.

Second, how the variables were operationalized was reassessed to determine if nominal level variables could be measured at higher levels if data were available that measures the variation between the years. Alternatively, could different predictors be used to measure the same concepts? As described in detail in the code book, changes were made including substituting Seniority for a static tenure term. For some predictors, such as Citizen Ideology, attempts were made to update the latter years of the data which now extend through 2010. Yet, in this case, as in a few others, there was little to no variation in the additional years collected.

From this point, I reexamined each of the focal and control variables to determine if different predictors could be used. For the Electoral Composition focal variable, one of the two original variables (Networks) measured access to donors at 4-year intervals. While this measure is still expected to influence leadership power, a wider variation in the costs of electoral campaigns (Win000, median expenditures measured in thousands\(^83\)) was added as a predictor to better capture the differences and ranges that exist in the states. As for the Egalitarian Culture focal variable, one of original predictors was static (Political Culture) and the other (Citizen Ideology) did not show great variation in the updated years.\(^84\) This led me to consider other culturally-influenced job predictors.

\(^83\) This variable was recoded as a negative dollar amount since it represents a burden to candidates and a leader, meaning it is the amount of money that has to be raised or it expended per election cycle.
\(^84\) The authors of the construct reevaluated the measure from 2004 and found 36 did not change and the variation in the other states was small.
A review of the glass ceiling and women’s literature informed that constructs should be added that directly measure biases or gender advancements at hierarchical levels within an organization. Based on this guidance, the Glass Ceiling Effects variable was constructed (three dummy variables were used measuring proportionality at every level; the omitted category was no proportionality) and Symbols (cumulative percentage of women elected statewide in each term) were added to the panel data.\(^{85}\)

At last, the control variables were reexamined. Informed by the National Survey of State Legislators (see Chapter 3 discussion), prior leadership experience and leadership tracks were found to be extremely important in helping Speakers and Senate Presidents/Pro Tems get their jobs. To capture advancement paths, a lagged data predictor called “Advance” was operationalized that measured if a woman held a secondary leadership position\(^ {86}\) in the preceding term. I expected that the added predictors would better measure changes in the outcome and minimize the within-cluster variation problem.\(^ {87}\)

When the new fixed effects model was estimated for the LIS focal variable, it dropped 35 groups (245 observations) because of all positive or negative outcomes, despite the changes that were made. Additionally, the Power and Professionalism variables were dropped because of no within-group variance. This presents a more fundamental problem since the Power variable was relied upon to measure the significance of relationships to other LIP variables as well as to measure the strength and direction of those variables.

\(^{85}\) The Glass Ceiling Effect measure is an ordinal level variable; it was recoded as four dichotomous dummy variables. Symbols are the cumulative total of women elected statewide each term; it increases in count by term.

\(^{86}\) See Appendix D: Code Book for how secondary leadership was defined.

\(^{87}\) In the final model, the glass ceiling effect measure was used because it was found to be correlated with leadership at all levels in the chamber.
Because panel data utilizing states as the unit of analysis violates the assumption of independence among the observations, two alternative models, fixed and random effects, was considered. Although the fixed effect model is generally not suitable data for panels where within-cluster variation is minimal or for slow changing variables over time such as was the case and the differences across the states were hypothesized to have an influence, the decision to use random effects was made after conducting the Hausman test. The Prob > chi2 test was not significant, so I could not reject the null hypothesis that the errors were not correlated with the regressors.

The number of observations for the current House model is 343. The full model has 20 parameters. The equation for the full House model was:

\[
P(\text{Woman Speaker} = 1) = f [\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{LIS} + \beta_2 \text{GIP} + \beta_3 \text{TermsEf} + \beta_4 \text{Prof} + \beta_5 \text{Seniority} + \beta_6 \text{ChamberSize} + \beta_7 \text{LeaderPower} + \beta_8 \text{PartyComp} + \beta_9 \text{Networks} + \beta_{10} \text{WinCost} + \beta_{11} \text{PolCul} + \beta_{12} \text{CitIdeo} + \beta_{13} \text{Symbol} + \beta_{14} \text{GlassHs1} + \beta_{15} \text{GlassHs2} + \beta_{16} \text{GlassHs3} + \beta_{17} \text{LegRep} + \beta_{18} \text{WomColEd} + \beta_{19} \text{WageGap} + \beta_{20} \text{DemPerf}]\]

Three separate models were then estimated for the House chamber based upon the theoretical considerations specified. The base, Model 1, included the Legislative Institutional Structure variables. Model 2 introduced the Electoral Structure variables and Model 3 added the Egalitarian Culture variables. The full model (4) added the contextual control variables.

After each new set of focal variables was added, an overall assessment of the model fit was conducted. The likelihood ratio test was used in the case of the xttlogit regressions. As each model was estimated, an assessment was made about rejecting the null hypotheses: Ho = The individual coefficients in the model were not significantly different than 0.
Findings

Correlations were first examined to determine if the expectations held and were in the direction hypothesized, as well as which predictors where statistically significant. A discussion of the results follows for each focal variable.

Correlations

In past studies, Leadership Power has been found to be highly correlated with electoral composition, but those studies did not look at the LIP powers as defined in this research with the exception of Professionalism. Here too, professionalism was not found to be statistically correlated with Power. Two relationships did emerge: Chamber Size and Power (0.2783) as well as LIS and Power (0.1546), the latter of which reflects the correlation between the constitutional powers of the legislature and the function of the speakership job. By contrast, Squire’s measure of careerism was found to have a stronger relationship with Power at (.1939) at the $p < .01$ level of significance. Both relationships, Chamber Size and LIS, were in the direction hypothesized.

As displayed in Table 25, the dependent variable, House Speakership, is statistically correlated with Power, Chamber Size, and Professionalism and with Power and Professionalism, at a lower level of confidence ($p < .10$). The direction of the relationships are in the same direction hypothesized between these factors and Leadership Power which is intuitive since these factors measure the relationship between powers of the speakership and gendered leadership, albeit those powers that are extended through legislative design and function, in addition to form.

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88 Squire’s Professionalism and Careerism predictors were not both added as predictors in the model given concerns about multicollinearity.
Table 23  
*LIP Statistically Significant Correlations*  
\[ p < .000^{***} \quad p < .01^{**} \quad p < .05^{*} \quad p < .10 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakership</th>
<th>LIS</th>
<th>GIP</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Seniority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>House Speaker</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.0916</td>
<td>0.1546*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.3132***</td>
<td>-0.0943</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2704***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chamber Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>0.1751***</td>
<td>0.2024***</td>
<td>0.1235</td>
<td>0.2703***</td>
<td>0.2704***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>-0.1143**</td>
<td>0.2343***</td>
<td>-0.0937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other LIP statistically significant relationships are shown in Table 23. These correlations extend the notion that legislative institutional power (LIP), consists of many factors and more than those defined by form\(^{89}\) (i.e. Clucas’ Leadership Power construct). To begin, statistically significant relationships are found between LIS (constitutionally derived powers of design) and Seniority (0.2343) as well as Terms (-0.3132). Both of these relationships move in the direction as hypothesized for Leadership Power.

A positive and moderately significant relationship was found between GIP and Professionalism (.02013). Although not explored earlier, the direction of this relationship seems counterintuitive if you expect to find an inverse relationship between GIP and LIP. However, this research expected to find polities with strong legislative institutions juxtaposed alongside strong governorships. In these instances, a positive relationship may be found since the balance of power was institutionalized. The same positive relationship can be expected in those states in which both branches are weak. In fact, a negative relationship would only be expected in those states where the power of the governor is inversely correlated to that of the legislature. This may help to explain the

\(^{89}\)“Form” is defined by Kousser (2005) as the internal organization and dynamics of a legislature as compared to “design” which are the rules and institutions that govern the composition of the body and “function” which are the external interactions with the other branches of government and policy outputs. Utilizing these definitions, this study considers LIP to be powers provided by design with the exception of Leadership Power and Seniority which are powers extended by form and GIP which is a power related to function. Overall, the focal variable, LIP, hypothesizes that speakership power is derived by legislative design, function and form.
positive relationship. Weaker and negatively significant relationships were found between GIP and Seniority (-0.0937) as well as GIP and Chamber Size (-0.1235). These correlations may shed more light into which factors influence an inverse relationship between GIP and LIP.

As the wider literature suggests (Kousser, 2005), a negative relationship between Term limited states and Professionalism would be expected; however the relationship found was positive. Additionally, one of the strongest relationships found was between Seniority and Terms (-.4095) for as terms become effective, it should serve to decrease the tenure of legislators which should in fact, decrease the amount of time on the job historically found prior to ascending to top leadership. A negative relationship was also found between Professionalism and Seniority (-0.1490) which complicates Clucas’ (2001) contention that legislative tenures are longer in the more professionalized legislatures where career advancement is poor.

Among electoral factors, the second focal variable of study, all three predictors had significant relationships as summarized in Table 26. Positive relationships were found between the dependent variable, Speakership, and between Party Competition (0.2124) and between Networks (0.1498) as expected and in the direction hypothesized with the exception of Party Competition. While hypothesized to have a negative effect on women, the direction of party competition was positive which may suggest that the relationship is not about the power of the speaker as discussed but more about opportunity costs. The more competition there is, the more likely turnover will occur and opportunities for women are then likely to increase. As for other relationships, there was a moderate correlation found between Winning Campaign Costs and Networks (0.2094)
and in a direction expected. Party Competition and Winning Campaign Costs (0.1070) as well as Party Competition and Networks (0.1606) were also positively correlated and in expected directions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Competition</th>
<th>Winning Costs</th>
<th>Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.1498**</td>
<td>0.1070*</td>
<td>0.2094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2124***</td>
<td>0.1606**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the correlations among egalitarian factors, the third focal variable of study, the statistically significant relationships are summarized in Table 25. Weak, yet positive relationships were found between the dependent variable, Speakership, and between Moralistic political culture (0.1630) and between Symbolism portrayed by women serving in statewide positions (0.1381) as expected and in the direction hypothesized with the exception of Moralistic culture where a negative relationship was expected. Citizen Ideology was negatively correlated with Individualistic states (-0.3595); Moralistic states were inversely correlated with Individualistic states (-0.5075). For this reason, the dummy variable for Moralistic states and Citizen Ideology were estimated in the model. Glass Ceiling Effects were correlated with Moralistic states. A negative relationship between Symbolism and Citizen Ideology (-0.1195) was also found. Symbolism was also correlated with Glass Ceiling 2 (proportional leadership at the tertiary level) and was positive (0.1461) as would be expected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolism</th>
<th>Individualistic</th>
<th>Speakership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.1195*</td>
<td>.3595***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.5075***</td>
<td>-.1195*</td>
<td>.3595***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1334*</td>
<td>-.5075***</td>
<td>-.1195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1381**</td>
<td>.1630**</td>
<td>-.1195*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24
Egalitarian Cultural Statistically Significant Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p&lt;.000*** p&lt;.01** p&lt;.05* p&lt;.10</th>
<th>p&lt;.000*** p&lt;.01** p&lt;.05* p&lt;.10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spearkership</td>
<td>Party Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>0.1498**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Costs</td>
<td>0.2094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>0.2124***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25
Egalitarian Cultural Statistically Significant Correlations
To better grasp the relationship between glass ceiling effects and speakership, the relationship are examined directly in Table 26. Also the interaction among women serving at various leadership levels, define in the literature as advancement opportunities and legislative representativeness are examined. Recall, these variables are lagged dummies (by one term) and each indicates leadership proportional to the proportion of women serving in the chamber at a particular level. As for correlations between legislative representation and women in leadership, the dummy variables are not lagged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 26</th>
<th>Gendered Leadership Correlations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Speakership</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary &amp; Secondary Leadership (Glass 3)</td>
<td>0.1280</td>
<td>&lt; 0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Leadership (Glass 2)</td>
<td>0.1367</td>
<td>&lt; 0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Proportionality (Glass 0)</td>
<td>-0.1541</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women Legislators</td>
<td>p value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary &amp; Secondary Leadership (Glass 3)</td>
<td>0.1735</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown, statistically significant relationships were found between woman speakership and proportional leadership at both the tertiary and secondary levels (0.1280) and in the direction hypothesized that suggests the absence of a glass ceiling leads to a positive influence on gendered leadership. At the same time, a correlation was found between woman speakership and proportional leadership at the tertiary level (0.1367) which again suggests there is a career track to the top which was found to be through tertiary leadership positions in the panel of state leaders (1997-2010).

Although, the proportion of women in the chamber are hypothesized to lead to more women in leadership, the only statistically significant relationship found was

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90 Proportionality at the tertiary & secondary is defined as Glass Ceiling 3; proportionality at the tertiary level only is defined as Glass Ceiling 2; proportionality at the secondary committee level only is defined as Glass Ceiling 1; and no proportionality at any leadership level is defined as Glass Ceiling 0.
between the proportion of women serving in the House chamber and proportional leadership by women serving at both the committee level and the secondary level. Further, negative correlations were also found between Glass 3 and Glass 1 and Glass 2 (not reported here) which on its face is counterintuitive; however, it may suggest that a lower percentage of women serving in the chamber negatively impact other leadership opportunities. In other words, given a limited number of women in the chamber, the likelihood of a women serving at the secondary level of leadership might be lower if they are already serving at the tertiary level.

Lastly, when it came to the remaining contextual factors, only College Educated Women was significantly correlated with Woman Speakership (0.1561) at the $p < 0.01$ level.

**Model Assessment**

As described under the Methods section, each of the focal variables was estimated individually. For Model 1 (Legislative Institutional Strength), with 21 degrees of freedom the model was not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. I cannot reject the null (Ho: The effect of all of the predictors in the model is simultaneously equal to 0. Ha: At least one of the predictors in the model is significant). Both Seniority and Chamber Size are statistically significant. Model 2 (Electoral Composition) was added to Model 1 and estimated. When the electoral predictors were added, the overall fit of the model improved. The Prob > chi2 = .01 was statistically significant and supported rejecting the null. In Model 2, both Chamber Size ($p < .000$) and Seniority ($p < .05$) remained statistically significant, along with Party Competition. When the cultural predictors were added (Model 3), the overall fit of the model remained statistically significant at the $p <$
.01 level and the coefficients improved for most predictors. Chamber Size ($p < .000$) and Party Competition ($p < .000$) statistically significant along with Professionalism and Seniority both at the $p < .05$ level. Glass Ceiling proportionality at both the secondary and tertiary levels ($p < .01$) and Glass Ceiling proportionality at the tertiary level ($p < .05$) were also significant.

The full Model, with the three focal variables and the contextual control variables, served to again strengthen the power of the coefficients, as you can see by looking across the rows in Table 30. The model remained statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level and provided support for rejecting the null. In the full model, all variables remained statistically significant with the exception of Seniority which was significant at the $p < .07$ level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 27: Comparison of Model Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 (N=343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Institutional Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial Institutional Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms Limits Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Median Race Costs (000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture (Moralistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Both levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Secondary level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Committee level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Representativeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Educated Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p< .000***  p < .01**  p < .05*

Interpretations

While an interpretation of the log odds is not particularly intuitive, the odds ratio and percent odds are more relevant. STATA allows the odds ratio for both a unit and a standard deviation change in the independent variable (Long & Freese, 2006); however, the command does not work with models estimated with xtlogit. As such, the percent odds derived from the odds ratio was calculated as follows: \(\{e^{\text{coefficient}}-1\} \times 100\%\). The odds ratio and percent odds for the coefficients is presented in Table 28.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Full Model (N=343)</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>% Odds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Institutional Strength</td>
<td>-0.2212 (0.324)</td>
<td>0.8016</td>
<td>-19.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial Institutional Power</td>
<td>-0.0410 (0.887)</td>
<td>0.9598</td>
<td>-4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms Limits Effective</td>
<td>1.1660 (0.926)</td>
<td>3.2091</td>
<td>220.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>-7.2816* (4.314)</td>
<td>2.2782</td>
<td>127.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Power</td>
<td>0.0546 (0.136)</td>
<td>1.0561</td>
<td>5.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Size</td>
<td>0.0263*** (0.008)</td>
<td>1.0266</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>-0.1525 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.8586</td>
<td>-14.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>0.2472*** (0.062)</td>
<td>1.2804</td>
<td>28.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>0.1925 (0.091)</td>
<td>1.2123</td>
<td>21.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning Median Race Costs (000)</td>
<td>-0.0024 (0.004)</td>
<td>.9976</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture (Moralistic)</td>
<td>-1.0579 (0.788)</td>
<td>0.3472</td>
<td>-65.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Ideology</td>
<td>-0.0194 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.9808</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Both levels)</td>
<td>1.8340* (0.826)</td>
<td>6.2589</td>
<td>525.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Secondary level)</td>
<td>2.0810** (0.756)</td>
<td>8.0125</td>
<td>701.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass Ceiling (Committee level)</td>
<td>0.5779 (0.794)</td>
<td>1.7823</td>
<td>78.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols</td>
<td>0.0282 (0.033)</td>
<td>1.0286</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.2324 (0.678)</td>
<td>0.7927</td>
<td>-20.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Gap</td>
<td>0.1633 (0.082)</td>
<td>1.1774</td>
<td>17.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Educated Women</td>
<td>-0.1111* (0.104)</td>
<td>0.8949</td>
<td>-10.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Representativeness</td>
<td>0.0248 (0.025)</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-29.9854*** (9.307)</td>
<td>9.4952</td>
<td>849.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interpretation of the coefficients includes both the within state and between state effects reflecting the average effect of the predictor over the dependent variable
when the predictor changes across time and between states by one unit. The most

dramatic effect appears to occur where there are no glass ceiling effects in the chamber,
meaning women are represented in secondary leadership positions and as committee
chairs at proportional levels to women’s legislative representativeness in the House. For
every unit increase in Glass Ceiling Effects over terms and between states, the odds of a
woman becoming Speaker in a state where there is proportional representation in the
membership and at both levels of leadership is about eight times (8.1) greater, or about
701% greater for a woman in those states, holding all other variables constant. Both the
relationship and direction are expected.

Looking at other egalitarian cultural factors, the largest influence occurs in
Moralistic States and is negative as expected. For chambers in Moralistic states as
compared to all other states over terms and between the states, the odds of a woman
speaker are 65% lower for a woman as compared to a man, holding all other variables
constant. Citizen Ideology and Symbols have a nominal effect. As such, for every
percentage increase in the cumulative percentage of women elected statewide, the odds of
a woman speaker are 3% higher than that for a man over time and between the states,
holding all other variables constant. For every one percent increase in the liberalism of a
state’s Citizen Ideology over terms and between the states, the odds are only 2% lower
for a woman than a man, holding all other variables constant.

As for electoral factors, the direction of the relationship between Party
Competition and Networks is positive as expected. For every one percent increase in
Party Competition, the odds of a woman speaker are 28% higher than that of a man,

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91 Interpretations guidelines appear in the earlier cited Princeton University Data Consultant presentation.
holding all other factors constant. Similarly for every one percent increase in Networks, the odds of a woman speaker are 21% greater than that of a man.

The influence money plays in terms of campaign expenditures is more difficult to isolate since the median campaign expenditures per term in the panel is relatively low, $33,000 per election cycle. Comparatively, the average campaign expenditures are just $55,000 per election cycle in the House during the panel years. At these levels, money is not expected to influence who becomes a leader. Nonetheless, money was hypothesized to play a role in the high cost states. If we examine, campaign expenditures in the upper tier, the costs range from a minimum of $64,000 to a maximum of $641,000; the midpoint is $104,000. At these levels, the effect money alone has can be measured as shown in Table 29. For every $1 more expended on a winning campaign, the odds of a woman speaker over time and between the states is 14% lower as compared to a man in states where the campaign expenditures are $104,000 per cycle. The influence money has is still not as important as other factors modeled.\(^\text{92}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 29</th>
<th>Influence of Money in High Campaign Cost Chambers</th>
<th>% Odds</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median Cost ($33,000 per cycle)</td>
<td>5% lower</td>
<td>343 cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Cost ($55,000 per cycle)</td>
<td>7% lower</td>
<td>343 cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Tier: Minimum ($64,000 per cycle)</td>
<td>9% lower</td>
<td>86 cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Tier: Mid-point ($104,000 per cycle)</td>
<td>14% lower</td>
<td>86 cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Tier: Maximum ($641,000 per cycle)</td>
<td>190% lower</td>
<td>86 cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{92}\) When the average cost of the campaign is increased from the mean to the maximum level in the model, the change in the odds is still less than 1 percent. This is not unexpected since money is hypothesized to interact with other factors such as professionalism and district size. This discussion is presented in the Analysis section that follows.
As for factors relating to legislative institutional factors, the only significant relationship was House Size and while the relationship was positive as expected, the effect was minimal. As expected for every one unit increase in Legislative Institutional Strength (LIS) over terms and between states, the odds of a woman speaker are 20% lower than that of a man holding all other variables constant. The influence of Terms Limited states appears as if woman are the beneficiaries in terms of ascending to the top, perhaps because Seniority is no longer as important in these chambers in becoming the Speaker. In states where terms limits are effective as compared to those where they are not, the odds of a woman speaker is 220% higher than that of a man, holding all other variables constant. The relationship between GIP and the dependent variable is opposite than was expected. There may be an interaction between GIP, gendered leadership and Careerism (Squire, 1997) in legislatures which were not measured in the model. For every one percent increase over time between the states, the odds of a woman speaker are only 128% higher than that of a man in the more professionalized legislatures, which was as expected. Also as expected, for every one year increase in chamber tenure, the odds of a woman speaker are 14% lower than that of a man, holding all other variables constant.

Analysis

Overall, the hypotheses held, the relationships ranged from weak to strong for the predictors influencing the dependent variable and were in the direction hypothesized for most predictors. I concluded that Professionalism, Chamber Size, Party Competition, Glass Ceiling Effects and College Educated Women had a significant effect on a

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93 Glass Ceiling Effects refers to the absence of a glass ceiling at the leadership levels within the organization; in other words, those chambers where women served in leadership positions at both the
woman becoming Speaker of the House. Seniority was also found to be statistically significant at a slightly lower confidence level \((p > .075)\).

The odds of a woman becoming speaker over time and between the states were hypothesized to be optimal under certain conditions: in a state with average legislative institutional powers; electorally competitive but with low campaign costs; and in an egalitarian culture, including proportional leadership at both the secondary and tertiary levels of the chamber. Given these parameters, the difference in the marginal effect was calculated by using the discrete change approach.\(^9^4\)

As for legislative institutional powers, LIS, GIP, and Leadership Power were set at their means. Since larger chambers were hypothesized to have less centralized power, the chamber size was set at 150 seats, slightly above the average but representative of those chambers that have been headed by women. Additionally, states in which terms limits were in effect \((1=\text{yes})\) were considered optimal because they force leadership changes and appear to be correlated to reduced seniority requirements \((4 \text{ years})\). As for the electoral composition focal variable, electoral competition and networks were set at the mean, but average winning electoral costs were set at the median, $33,000 per election cycle. Finally, the egalitarian predictors were also set at their mean (percent of women elected to statewide office and citizen ideology) and the state was considered to have political culture other than moralistic which was hypothesized to be less friendly to

\(^9^4\) To calculate the marginal effect of the focal variables on a woman speaker, the discrete change approach was utilized. All variables were first set at their mean in the model and then compared to a state in which optimal conditions existed for a woman. The discrete change was then calculated by comparing the difference in probabilities for the mean probability of the panel to the mean probability of state described above.
women. Glass ceiling effects were factored as non-existent, meaning women were represented at both the secondary and tertiary levels proportional to their percentage in

Under favorable institutional, electoral and egalitarian factors, the odds of a women speaker over time and between the states were 168% higher as compared to a man. The odds of a women becoming speaker were 98% lower as compared to a man, holding all institutional, electoral and equalitarian variables constant at their mean and mode. The difference in probabilities was 268%.

What was revealing and has not been studied before is the dramatic role proportionality has on gendered leadership within the House chamber. In other words, in states where a glass ceiling exists as measured by Criterion 2, women are not likely to ascend to the top. As informed by the literature, “A glass ceiling inequality represents a gender or racial difference that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome” (Cotter et al., 2001, p. 658). Recall, the earlier account observed about gendered leadership in 2007 (see Figure 3). In that year, only 3 house chambers had women serving in secondary and tertiary leadership positions proportional to the percentage of women in the body during the preceding term. Of these, Nevada and Vermont both had women serve as presiding officers in 2007 the subsequent 2007 term. Similarly, of the 11 women who served as presiding officers in 2009, seven served in chambers that had been led by women in the preceding terms and three served in states with proportional leadership at both the secondary and tertiary levels.

The effect term limits has on gendered leadership also emerged as a legislative institutional factor that influences where women lead. Although the hypothesis that term limits would open seats for women and minorities has not been realized, it does appear
that term limits are opening the door for women leaders. Since 2000 when most limits became effective, a larger percentage of women who have served as speaker have served in term limited states 83% as compared to 64% in states without term limits.
V. Does the Man (or Woman) Shape the Office? Or does the Job of Leadership Shape the Leader?

If you want something said, ask a man; if you want something done, ask a woman. Margaret Thatcher

Throughout the centuries, men have traditionally been cast in the role of leaders. On the few occasions when a woman has taken center stage, comparisons have often been drawn that illuminate the differences in their styles and behaviors. At times, as in the case of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, these gender distinctions have often been drawn by the women holding the power. But are these characterizations measurable or are they simply perceived differences?

Lawless and Fox (2005) maintain that “women’s presence in our political institutions bears directly on issues of substantive and symbolic representation,” particularly in the area of a legislator’s priorities and preferences (p. 5). Similarly, C. Rosenthal (1998) emphasizes women’s influence lies not only in advancing policy agendas, but in their styles of leaderships. Along these lines, C. Rosenthal found that gender, social contexts and gendered institutions all influence leadership styles. She argues that women “do leadership” differently as compared to men.

On the flip side of the debate, Reingold (1996, 2000) observes “The successful rational actor is aware of the dangers of ruffling feathers, stepping on toes, and burning bridges” (as cited in Lawless and Fox, 2005, p. 5-6). Under these constraints, advancing women are less likely to upset the status quo. Thomas (1991) extends the idea that “feminist transformation” in politics is limited. “Women politicians can theorize and dream about a different way of working in the political arena, but when it comes right down to it, power is power, and those who have it exercise it to get what they want.
Women will be no different, or they will not long share its reins with men” (Thomas, 1991, p.152).

While some strong women leaders have been credited with changing the institutions in which they serve, the larger question is do all women leaders have this same effect or ability – or for that matter, do leaders in general? Do all women do leadership the same and do all women leaders want to change the institution in which they serve? Moreover, leaders are credited with shaping the agenda of their chambers – although that does not mean they operate without constraints. At the outset, legislatures have been described as “disorganized, inefficient and unpredictable” (Rosenthal, 2003). In addition to maintaining the institution, leaders are also charged with balancing the power of the executive – perhaps their toughest job (Rosenthal, 2003). The flexibility a leader has over policy formation is likely linked to the degree of flexibility s/he has, or limits imposed by, these internal and external factors. These queries prompt the second research questions in this study:

- **RQ2.** Do women and men bring different styles and behaviors to the job of leadership? Does gender make a difference in the policy preferences, proposals and products of legislative leaders?

**Literature Review**

The gender gap in legislative leadership impinges on wider audiences, public policies, and government in general. *Who* is at the table becomes more important as civic and electoral participation play decreasingly important roles in our democratic society (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins & Delli Carpini, 2006). In *The Public and its Problems*, Dewey (1927) found an “eclipsed public” diminishes the original purpose of a
state; it further calls into question the motives of the remaining structures and functions that exist. If the public does not act to substantiate the actions of the government through active and widespread collective voting, Dewey believed the actions will likely come to be filled by an alternative entity.

If the alternative entity is not inclusive, the polity becomes less legitimate (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 651). Many feminist theorists and scholars also argue the lack of participation in an agency or its processes harms the normative idea of democracy. The literature is steeped in theoretically framed research which attempts to establish the effects with respect to proportional representation (Barber, 1984; Skocpol, 2003; Fung, 2004). Through this lens, the implications stemming from “if” and “where” women lead in the states and its correlation to the level of influence women have over policy formation is emphasized.

**Women on the Job**

According to a 1998 nationwide survey of state legislators conducted by CAWP on the impact of women in public office, women public officials were found to be changing the way government works. Women were more likely to bring citizens into the process, more likely to expose government processes to public view and more responsive to groups previously denied full access to the policymaking process. Carroll (2003, 2004) also maintains that women make a difference in the process by making it more open to women and other marginalized groups. The CAWP findings further revealed “women were more likely to give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as caregivers in the family and society, (including) policies dealing with children, families and health care.” Earlier in her study on the American political women,
Kirkpatrick (1974) found that most women leaders could be defined as “problem solvers,” committed to family and policy oriented public service; their goal was to co-exist peacefully. This led Kirkpatrick to offer that we need to abandon the notion that men are natural governors and women are “natural nurturers.”

At the federal level, Gertzog’s longitudinal study (1995) found congresswomen’s substantive interests began to expand from gender domains to policy areas typically defined as male including defense, banking and budgeting. He observed that women recruitment changed dramatically over time, transforming it from one heavily reliant upon personal relationships to one now accessed through political skill and public achievement. One of his most significant findings traced the roots of women political caucuses; their formation and their impact. Gertzog (1995) concluded these changes in skills, resources and interests will long contribute to the character of the House (U.S. Congress) becoming a much less gendered one. Despite the role expansion, Carroll (2003, 2004) observed that women are closely connected to women networks which creates accountability and explains why significantly larger proportions of women lawmakers than men work on legislation to benefit women.

On this latter point, African Americans and women members of Congress, both sponsored disproportionate pieces of legislation dealing exclusively with the issues of blacks (discrimination and housing) and women (education and health care) as compared to white male congressman (Bratton & Haynie, 1999). Each of these groups also helped the other advanced the priority issues of marginalized groups suggesting without these coalitions, neither would have been successful in advancing these policy initiatives due to lack of traditional support from white male members on non-traditional issues.
Beyond providing access and opportunity for marginalized groups, substantive representation helps ensure different perspectives are introduced into the decision-making milieu. At the state level, Kathlene (1995) studied gendered legislative policymaking in the context of views on crime and found distinctive positions between male and female legislators. In a more limiting way, men viewed the content of a news account on crime in more authoritative terms. On the other hand, the women members looked at the causal problems as well as the solutions in very different ways from a broader societal perspective. The women also considered contextual issues such as the costs of the solutions. Although the men and women in the study group had similar backgrounds and information on the subject, the men rejected major aspects of the article or added factors not originally supplied in making their judgment. Kathleen mused that the different backgrounds and social orientations of women generated the differences in their responses.

Yet at the secondary leadership level, constraints were found on the role of women serving as chairs or on committees. While some may have been self imposed as personal preferences and styles (C. Rosenthal, 1998), Kathlene (1994) found women participated in committee deliberations differently. They spoke later, less often and were often interrupted more. Although she characterized this effect as a means difference rather than an ends difference, it may mean that women have to work (or think they do) harder to get their bills passed.

The early recruits, perhaps like all newcomers in the majority of states today find themselves relegated to committees of low salience. Some scholars hypothesized (Carroll 2003, 2004) the low proportional number of women legislators is causally
related to the low number of leadership positions held by women. While Thomas (1994) did not find any differences in the activities of male and female legislators; she too found that women included traditional women issues on their priority list of legislation more often than their male counterparts did.

In addition to finding that women officials advanced legislative agendas distinct from men as measured by traditionally identified gendered issues, Little, Dunne and Dean (2001) tested the strength of this relationship by controlling for a variety of institutional, political and personal attributes. They discovered that women do not lose their distinct policy preferences as they rise in leadership; however, the authors recommended more research is needed to determine “the degree to which women leaders can translate their agendas into public policy.”

This is not to say that all scholars agree that women represent women more effectively than men. In 1994, Sue Mezey posed the question as to whether increased numbers of women mattered in terms of policy outcomes. While she argued the studies are mixed, she acknowledged that women did prioritize women’s issues more than men; this is significant in itself since many gender issues have been ignored due to failures of representative democracies.

Finally, Reingold (2000) dramatically challenges the long-held “women work for women” premise. In her comparative study of the Arizona and California legislatures in 1990, Reingold found no differences in the way women and men related to their constituencies. Reingold also found little difference in roll call votes. While the Arizona legislature had a higher proportion of women in its chambers and more institutional power, it did not significantly advocate for ways differently than men and women
legislators in California. Reingold (2000) did find that women were more connected to their women constituents than men.

Reingold did not suggest that difference never counts; it did in terms of the strength of alliances with women organization and women members, as well as the kind of connection between women members and women constituents. Reingold also did not discount the symbolic value that the presence of women in legislatures makes for society. She concluded her book by noting “the uncertain probabilistic framework in which women’s political representation can occur” (Reingold, 2000, p. 253).

Her work still suggests a descriptive component at work. In some ways, Arizona’s political culture, which shuns larger governments, may have played a controlling role by diminishing policy initiatives on education, health and child care which often require higher governmental expenditures. So why were both men and women accountable to women in the California legislature? The difference may be found in the state’s well organized women’s advocacy groups which effectively served to hold all members accountable (Reingold, 2000). In this sense, the women’s organizations were representing women in the California population and the members were surrogates of the advocacy groups on policy items. This further illuminates the important role civic and political participation rates may hold, as well as the strength of state advocacy groups in legislative politics.

The Job of Leadership

As described in the literature sections of Chapter 3, Alan Rosenthal (2003, 2004) offers if legislatures are to perform their functions of (1) representing constituents and constituencies, (2) lawmaking, and (3) balancing the power of the executive, strong
legislative leadership is required. The overall strength in legislative leadership in the states has waned since the 1990s according to Rosenthal; although he might agree that recent expansions in the role of legislative leadership PACs may be causing a shift in the legislative power base, at least in those states with competitive races, large district sizes and high campaign expenditures.

At the same time, newer members to state legislatures are more independent than in the past and often do not arrive beholden to party bosses for their electoral success. In part, this has paralleled the decline of party organizations in many areas. Additionally, the professionalism of the state legislatures, particularly in the area of staffing and salary resources, provides members with their own resources to pursue their own individual agendas as noted earlier. In part, professionalism has been purported to have further fragmentized the role of leaders (Rosenthal, 1993). At the same time, leadership positions significantly increased bill passage success in professional legislatures among all members (Ellickson & Whistler, 2000). Increases in civic participation through direct democracy (initiative and referendum) and term limits have also raised questions not just about policy outcomes (Kousser, 2005) but the role of leaders as well.

The complexity of issues confronting state legislatures makes it increasingly more difficult for leaders to force lock-step behavior from their caucus members. In the traditional sense, more leaders credit their success to consensus-building skills and limit the times they have to twist arms. With changes in district populations, leaders are often less willing to force a tough vote on someone who hails from a competitive district. In larger majorities, these members are given passes and stories are often told by members
from safer districts about “falling on their sword so someone from a targeted district could escape a tough vote,” as was expressed in the New Jersey grounded study.

Appropriating funds to operate the government is a constitutional function imposed on all state legislatures; the budget product itself is considered by some scholars as the most important piece of legislation that legislatures take up each session (Rosenthal, Loomis, Hibbing & Kurtz, 2003). While the literature has generally regarded the governor and the legislator as the primary actors in the budget process, a review of recent studies confirms that the legislature’s traditional secondary position in the process may be shifting in some states (Moncrief et al., 1998). Although many single state studies have taken place, a recent 13 state cross-sectional analysis (Clynch & Lauth, 1991) identified seven state legislatures that are capable of influencing the budget process. Three of those states (Connecticut, Minnesota and Florida) have had chambers led by women during the study period; one state (Ohio) was led by a woman legislative leader in an executive-dominant state. We are reminded of the intersection of leadership power and gendered leadership.

*Expectations*

As informed by the State Legislature and Women in Government literature, the following hypotheses are expected:

- **H3**: Legislative leaders are focused on the job of leadership; there is no gender difference in the approaches, styles and behaviors of leaders.
- **H4**: There is little to no difference in the policy preferences, proposal and products of top women and men leaders.

The job of leadership is largely shaped by institutional design, form and function. The ability to direct policy formation varies by institutional design, not by gender.
Data and Methods

As noted in Chapter 3, the survey instrument used to investigate the last two research questions is reproduced in Appendix B. The methodology employed for the survey phase of the research is fully described in the Methods section of Chapter 3.

Data

The survey instrument was hierarchically organized. Section 2 measured the job of the leader as s/he perceived it, including differences in legislative structure and power as well as the individual styles and behaviors of leaders. More specifically, the measures to assess if there were differences in styles and behaviors that varied by gender or other factors are summarized in Table 30. Two measures queried members about the tactics they employed to get the last few votes needed for passage as well as strategies to gain consensus on major policy issues. Two other measures asked leaders about formal changes they made to rules as well as appointments to advance women and minorities in positions of leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 30 Survey Questions Measuring Styles and Behaviors of Leaders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q18</td>
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<td>Q19</td>
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<td>Q20</td>
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<td>Q28</td>
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<td>Q29</td>
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Section 3 measured factors affecting policy formation and parts of Section 2 looked at the extent to which a leader has control over these dynamics. In particular, the variables in Section 3 measured two concepts: preferences and constraints. Three measures were used to measure the policy preferences, proposals and products of leaders. For purposes of this dissertation, policy preferences was defined as those policy areas
identified as priorities by the leaders early in their careers; *policy proposals* was operationalized as the major bills advanced in the chamber of the leaders and *policy products* was the most important policy accomplishments identified by the leader.

Another question measured how much time a leader spent on personal policy priorities, given other institutional constraints. Similarly, two questions asked leaders how much discretion they actually had on the big policy issues as well as who what actors most influence policy formation. Finally, two measures asked leaders to assess how they ranked their own leadership power in comparison to the executive branch, as well as the other chamber. These measures are summarized in Table 31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 31</th>
<th>Survey Questions Measuring Policy Constraints and Outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q6</td>
<td>Policy areas of specialization before leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q15</td>
<td>Power ratio to governor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q16</td>
<td>Power ratio to other chamber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q24</td>
<td>Setting budget priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q25</td>
<td>Areas of policy proposals advances as leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q26</td>
<td>Most important policy accomplishment as leader</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

All open ended questions were coded and characterized into response categories patterned after the close-ended questions to aid with correlations and comparisons later in the analysis. It is important to note that questions were asked in a hierarchical fashion so let responses were more likely influenced by the chronological recall rather than by primacy or recency of the order in which the questions were asked.

**Methods**

For this analysis, the survey data as defined in Chapter 3 was again utilized for this analysis. Weighting was not used to adjust for non-response. For this examination, the unit of analysis is “state leader” for the years 1997 through 2010, (n=177).
Findings

It is important to acknowledge that the majority of men and women legislative leaders credited their skills as a consensus builder as one of the most important personal attributes that helped them get to the top. Two-thirds of all leaders (64%) in 43 states said consensus building was the most significant factor in their success. This broad agreement refutes the notion that leadership in a man’s world consists largely of bargaining and logrolling. When we look at how leaders described their interactions with most of the caucus members, the majority characterized their dealings as more “integrative” than “aggregative” as had been observed by C. Rosenthal, (1998) in her study of gender differences among committee chairs.

Style

A key aspect of leadership can be gauged by observing how leaders interact with their caucuses. When asked to describe their interactions with the caucus, slightly more than half the leaders (53%) said they listened to their members more often than they provided direction to the caucus (47%); about the same percentage of women (58%) as men (54%) listened to members. When differences did emerge, institutional factors were more significant than gender effects. By a 52 to 38 point margin, House leaders offered direction to their caucuses rather than listened to their members. This may stem in large part from chamber size and the need to manage larger chambers; the mean number of seats in the lower house is 100, ranging from 20 to 400 seats as compared to the average of 40 seats in the Senate. The strength of the relationship is weak (0.15) but the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Southern leaders also directed more often

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95 Surveys were returned by legislative leaders in all states but Illinois and Delaware.
96 This finding was statistically significant at the \( p < 0.05 \) level.
(58%) than they listened to their members (37%). The strength of the regional relationship is a bit stronger (0.20) at the 0.001 level of significance.

When it came to other kinds of interactions between leaders and caucus members, 54% of leaders described themselves as someone who empowered members rather than negotiated on their behalf (46%). While gender differences were observed, the relationship was in the opposite direction as scholars have hypothesized. As characterized by C. Rosenthal, “Women leaders are described as encouraging participation, empowering others, and emphasizing the self-worth of others” (p. 58, 1998). Jewell and Whicker also observed that the common style for men was more of a coordinating one and a participatory one for women (as cited in C. Rosenthal, 1998).

Here the opposite was found. When leaders were asked to describe whether they most often negotiated on behalf of caucus members or empowered their members, only 40% of the women said they empowered their members as compared to 57% of the men who did. The strength of the relationship between gender and leadership interaction is weak (0.108), but the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. The styles of gendered leadership are displayed in Figure 11.

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97 While some scholars would argue that empowering members and negotiating on behalf of members are not opposing styles, the question asked leaders to describe their interaction with most of the caucus. Additionally, these two leadership styles were distinguished by the literature in which women were characterize as possessing styles more empowering and collaborating (Carroll, 2003; C. Rosenthal, 1998) and men more compromising and negotiating (classic log-rolling dynamics) (C. Rosenthal, 1998).
Fig. 11. Interactive styles described by leaders between themselves and their members.

While regional effects also distinguished leadership styles among leaders, institutional factors mattered more. The leader’s chamber influenced how s/he interacted with the caucus more than gender did. Two-thirds (65%) of Senate leaders empowered their members as compared to 45% of House leaders. While the relationship is moderate (0.192), the correlation is significant at the 0.000 level. Comparatively, 58% of leaders in the Mid-west negotiated on behalf of their caucus rather than empowered their members, as compared to 36% of leaders in the West. The strength of the relationship is weak (0.115) at the \( p < 0.01 \) level. Differences in political culture and party do not explain the differences in the regional effects.

Another way to gain insight into the style of leaders is to watch them in action. When leaders were asked to describe what it most often took to get the last few votes to pass a key piece of legislation, 53% of leaders said they made an appeal to the member for the “good of the team.” This approach dwarfed all other tactics including those that both incentivized and penalized members, as displayed in Figure 12. There were no differences in tactics between men and women.
In order to gain consensus on major public policy issues, leaders were also asked about their most effective strategies (Figure 13). Overwhelmingly, 63% of leaders said they deliberate broadly among the caucus in order to gain consensus on a major policy debate. About one-fifth of leaders also allowed committee leaders to take the lead. No gender differences were found.

The relationship between leaders’ tactics and gender was moderate (.284) and significant at the 0.000 level.
Behaviors

While male and female chairs have been observed to have different motivations which in turn affect their exercise of power (C. Rosenthal, 1998), the job of the presiding officer may present its own constraints on leaders, both institutional and political. Furthermore, efforts to make the chamber more open or transparent may also serve to limit the powers of the presiding officer. Although some leaders campaign on promises of change and more inclusiveness, few cede power once they gain it. But if women in the legislature are changing the way government works, then one of the first places to look for these transformations is to observe their behaviors. More specifically, how leaders organize and structure the chambers (task behaviors) sheds light on whether women govern differently than men at the top.

The day-to-day business of the chamber is governed by the chamber rules which are adopted with each new legislative session and/or change of guard. The rules prescribe the procedures and processes for all legislative matters ranging from bill introductions to appointment powers to public comment and access. When the presiding officers were asked if they changed the rules governing the chamber after becoming the leader, 58% said yes. When asked to describe the type of changes made, 23% were directed at committee procedures, followed by broader organizational changes that run the gamut from making the process more transparent to limiting debate. Overall, women leaders initiated fewer rule changes than men by a 3 to 1 margin.

If women leaders are more open to women and other marginalized groups as some scholars believe (Carroll, 2003) then we should be able to track advancements given to women and minorities during their tenure. When leaders were asked if they had
the opportunity to advance women or racial minorities into positions of legislative leadership, 83% indicated they did. Of those who did, slightly more were men (85%) as compared to 70% of women leaders. The good news for women and minorities however, is that most advancement opportunities came at both levels of leadership: at the committee level and in secondary leadership.

*Policy Constraints*

Before one can assess the influence of gendered leadership, the environment in which all leaders operate is important to explore. No doubt, the more powerful a leader is, the more influence s/he has over policy formation. Although actual powers are difficult to measure, and the perception of power is equally intangible, leaders were asked to rate the power of their office as compared to that of the governor; the other chamber; as well as rank and file members. Almost 9 out of every 10 (86%) leaders rated the power they had over rank and file members as substantial. There was no statistical difference between men and women.

As for their counterparts in the other chamber, almost half (48%) saw themselves on equal footing. About one-third characterized their position as having substantially more power than the leader in the other house. Again, there was no difference between men and women. But when it came to the power of the governor, just one-fifth saw their power as equally balanced. Thirty-five percent thought the governor in their state had somewhat more power while 24% saw the governor as having substantially more power than the leader. About one-fifth also thought the legislature had somewhat to substantially more power than the governor. Overall, there was no difference between men and women leaders.
Turning next to the budget, when leaders were asked who had the most influence over setting priorities, the leaders were split between the Governor (34%) and the Budget committee chairs (29%). Just one-fifth thought the chief executive and the leaders of the legislature had the same level of influence. Although the budget is the most significant piece of legislation the legislature considers (Rosenthal, 2004), less than 8 percent of the leaders thought the presiding officers had the most influence when it came to setting budget priorities (see Figure 14). No differences emerged between women and men leaders; both understand who held power and its limitations when it came to their own roles.

![Influence over budget priorities](image)

**Fig.14. Policy actors with influence over legislative budget priorities.**

_Policy Preferences, Proposals and Products_

To evaluate the influence leaders have on policy formation, respondents were asked what policy areas s/he specialized in as a legislator at the beginning of the survey. The idea is that the policy preferences of a leader can be traced back to his or her earliest days as a rank and file member. This is likely influenced by a confluence of factors such as constituency support, campaign promises and personal backgrounds. Leaders were

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98 Respondents were asked questions in a hierarchical manner to aid with recall but to also help ensure that questions were not influence by answers that immediately preceded the question.
also asked about the policy proposals they most often advanced or advocated for during their leadership tenure. Finally, leaders were asked to identify their most significant policy contribution or product. By tracking the influence leaders had throughout their legislative career, particularly from their own perspectives, we can better assess the sway presiding officers have over policy formation.

Policy Preferences

For this study, relationships between policy specializations as a legislator and a leader’s educational and career background were examined. The notion being tested is the degree to which legislators shape their policy agendas based upon their own personal preferences and backgrounds and the extent to which these preferences hold in the face of the interests of other policy actors such as constituents, colleagues and eventually caucus members. To start, the relationship between a member’s professional career and policy preferences is strong (.743) and the correlation is significant at the 0.000 level. Similarly, there is also a statistically strong relationship (.556) between a leader’s educational profile and his or her earliest policy preferences.

The policy preferences of leaders when they first started out in their legislative careers were measured by asking leaders to identify those policy areas in which they specialized as a legislator before becoming Speaker and Senate President or Pro Tem. At this juncture, the policy interests of leaders were more narrowly defined over 12 policy domains. For the most part, legislators focused on law and order issues (17.1%), followed by the budget (13.6%) and education (12.1%), along with general issues (12.9%). Of note, women’s issues were not identified by either men or women as an area in which they

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99 For this analysis, the first area of policy specializations listed by legislators was recoded from open ended responses to those policy categories defined in Q25. Some respondents listed more than one area of interest.
leaders specialized as rank and file members. Figure 15 displays the rankings of the policy preferences of legislative leaders at the start of their career. There were little to no statistical differences between men and women policy preferences.

![Policy Preferences](image)

Fig. 15. This chart displays the percentage of leaders who characterized their initial policy interests within a specific policy domain.

**Policy Proposals**

Leaders were then asked to name five policy areas in which h/she most often advocated. As shown in Figure 16, the policy issues widened a bit more but three policy areas captured most of the leaders’ focus: education, business and commerce and budget and taxation issues. Education topped the list for both men and women at almost 30%; this finding is not unexpected for two reasons. First, education is a priority for legislators as it makes up 20 to 25% of state expenditures annually. Second, two-thirds of leaders identified teachers among their strongest supporters early in their careers. Teachers maintained their influence as an outside policy actor when it came to lobbying; nearly two-thirds (64%) of leaders rated teachers are the most influence lobbying group in their state.
After education, business and commerce issues ranked second at 23.7% and budgetary and taxation issues captured one-fifth of the policy issues most often advocated for by leaders. The so-called women, children and families issues were advocated for by leaders to a greater extent after they took the reins of power as compared to the policy preferences leaders held at the start of their careers.

![Policy Proposals](chart)

Fig. 16. This chart displays the percentage of leaders who characterized their initial policy interests within a specific policy domain.

In terms of gender differences, 68% of the men focused on educational proposals as compared to 56% of the women. The largest, yet not unexpected difference, between men and women was in the area of business and commerce policy issues, where 57% of the men advanced proposals as compared to 36% of the women. Similarly, a larger percentage of the men advocated for taxation issues (47%) as compared to 32% of the women. There was no statistical difference between men and women in the area of advocacy for children and family, health or human services policy issues. Finally, more
women (20%) than men (7%) advanced proposals identified specifically as women’s issues, which lends support for the belief that the “double bind” burdens women leaders as they climb the ladder; but overall, this policy domain captured the attention of few leaders as compared to other policy issues.

Policy Products

One of the best ways to gauge the policy products of top legislative leaders was to ask them to identify the most important policy accomplishment achieved during their tenure as the Speaker and Senate President or President Pro Tem. For some leaders, the clock is still running since they still hold the position. For the wider group, the accomplishment was a reflection of what they had achieved looking back on their careers.

From this perspective, the policy accomplishments of leaders were in the same areas as the policy domains they most often advanced during their leadership tenure --- suggesting even the leader’s most significant policy achievements were influenced by their work on behalf of the caucus rather than their personal preferences (Figure 17). This too is not unexpected since the majority of leaders acknowledged prioritization of their own policy preferences paled in comparison to the time they spent on the caucus’ policy issues, as discussed below. This sets up the proposition that leaders are able to influence the margins of policy formation, rather than focus on the “big picture” as governors often do. Moreover, it highlights the influence the caucus has over policy formation.

To support this contention, leaders were asked who influenced their decisions more when it came to deciding which bills to post for a chamber vote. Sixty-two percent of leaders ranked individual members over constituents and lobbyists; 63% of the men
and 50% of the women.\textsuperscript{100} Women struck a bit more of a balance between the two groups (39% said both groups as compared to 22% of the men), but overall the Members influenced leaders the most. When leaders were asked who had the most influence in determining which proposals to prioritize during the term, Members or Chairs, 46% said the Chairs. Twenty-one percent of leaders decided priorities based upon feedback they received from both the chairs and members, while 31% were influenced more by the members. There was no statistical difference between men and women.\textsuperscript{101}

Overall, educational reforms and advancements remained at the top of the list (21.1%). In all, major policy accomplishments spanned 15 different domains, while initiatives encompassing fiscal, taxation, and budgetary matters also topped the list (21.1%). Although only a small percentage logged accomplishments in social policies; the environment, advocacy on behalf of children, families, and senior citizens as well as women’s issues were among the most significant policy achievements for some leaders. Still, major policy accomplishments, otherwise defined in this study as policy products, were lower in these same areas than those policy proposals advocated for by leaders during their tenure as presiding officers.

\textsuperscript{100} This question was posed as an ordinal scale in which mail respondents placed an “X” over a hash-marked line with constituents and lobbyists at one end of the bar and Members at the other end. Online respondents had a similar visual depiction that was demarked by radial buttons. Respondents did not visually see a number corresponding to their selection: 1 being constituents and lobbyists and 5 being Members. All coded was completed during the data entry phase.

\textsuperscript{101} The question structure was the same as described in Footnote \# 106: in this case, 1 was coded as the Members and 5 was coded as the Chairs.
Fig. 17. Areas in which leaders claimed their most significant policy accomplishments fell.

Analysis

Do women “do leadership” differently than men? No. In fact, men do leadership exactly like women. That is to say, consensus-building, deliberating broadly, listening to and empowering members are the stock and trade of top legislative leaders. If men are not approaching leadership with more integrative styles, then it is the job of leadership that requires its occupants to transform themselves in order to exercise and maintain power.

The job of leadership also imposed constraints on the time spent on personal policy issues and interests. Overall, leaders were focused on the policy proposals advanced by the caucus and to a much lesser extent, the governor, rather than their own personal preferences. To measure this daily tug of war waged between their personal interests and those of the caucus and the governor, leaders were first asked how they balanced their time. About half of the leaders (48%) said they spent more time on the caucus’ policy issues, while an almost equal proportion (46%) said they divided their
time between their own policy issues and those of the caucus. Just 6% of all leaders said that spent more time on their own personal policy interests. Interestingly, women leaders reported spending more time on caucus’ policies (59%) as compared to men (46%), so it is not surprising to find women are not single-handedly championing feminist issues once they reach the top.

When the job of the leader was not focused on managing the agenda of the caucus, time was spent balancing or responding to the policy goals of the governor. In divided governments where the governor is a member of the opposition party, legislative leaders said they spent 86% of their time on caucus priorities. When the governor was a member of the same party as the leader, the caucus’ priorities still took precedence, at 83%. Clearly, leaders were focused on the priorities of the caucus. The focus for women was exclusively (100%) on the caucus agenda rather than that of the governor, despite whether or not the governor was a member of her party.

Given the day-to-day time constraints and the disproportionate share of power that exists between the governor and presiding officers, as well as between the chamber leaders, and with so many inside (budget chairs and members) and outside actors influencing the policy setting process, leaders are constrained. Leaders do not have the luxury of time to devote to their own personal preferences, nor are their personal agendas more important that those of the caucus from the leaders’ own perspectives.

While most leaders are in service to their caucus, women leaders appear to be dedicated primarily to the policy preferences of the caucus. Women, slightly more than men, advanced the caucus policy priorities over their own personal agendas and women leaders said they focused exclusively on caucus priorities rather than those of the
governor. When women leaders reach the top, they do not fail to champion the rights of women; rather they become the flag bearers for their caucus – a caucus who is less likely to be homogenous in its policy preferences or focused on transforming government.
VI. Policy Implications, Limitations, and Future Research

Through the theoretical lense of the democratic processes and participation, legislative leadership in the states, women in government and glass ceiling effects literature, two research questions were framed. In some instances, the literature offered competing hypotheses about how men and women led, while offering theoretical notions about how legislative leadership functioned and who ultimately became leaders. This study builds on the scholarship by describing the antecedents to leadership, hypothesizing about the institutional, structural and egalitarian factors that influence who become leaders and advances the debate about whether women lead differently than men, as well as considers the public policy implications. This final chapter recaps the major findings, discusses the limitations of the research and describes future research opportunities.

Leadership Profiles

The first goal of this research was to determine if legislative leaders were fundamentally different from the 7000+ rank and file members who serve in the 50 state legislatures annually. Indeed, the 1% of members who become Speakers and Senate Presidents or Pro Tems share many attributes in common. The antecedents can be measured by the breadth and the depth of the networks leaders develop before running for the legislature, including familial connections; these networks and access to power are shared by both men and women alike. Leaders also appear to be more highly educated than the general population and to the extent that national legislative surveys were available for comparison, leaders held educational credentials that exceeded that of the average rank and file member.
In many instances, leaders held professional degrees, such as lawyers, while the majority of leaders came from management and professional positions in the business or financial sectors. These career tracks served to distinguish men from women leaders, but not necessarily the men leaders from the rank and file members. Women rank and file members still have different professional backgrounds as compared to men. This area of comparison warrants further study; and it is important to determine if state legislators as well as their leaders are decidedly different from those they represent. Social and political theorists like Young (2000) and Guinier (1992) would argue that “legitimate democracy” requires subgroups of the population to have a seat at the table where decisions are being made, not simply to have their interest represented at the table. Moreover, future research should consider whether the gender differences that exist among rank and file members affect the leadership pool.

Another significant antecedent to leadership was having experience in a leadership role, as well as seniority prior to becoming a leader. While term limits have met with mixed results since it failed to create more opportunities for women and minorities to serve in unrepresented polities and usher in new ideas about governing, this study found that term limits may be having an effect on leadership access. In the first instance, members serving in term limited states had shorter seniority tenures and second, appeared to access leadership outside the normal leadership ladder. This has the potential to benefit women who, on the whole, arrive in state houses much later than their male counterparts.

This leads to another policy implication: the social roles of men and women are distinguishable among leaders, and self-selection by women, is affecting both the pool of
candidates as hypothesized by scholars, as well as the pool for top leaders. Child care responsibilities and marital status distinguished men leaders from the women as it also differentiates women and men rank and file members (Carroll, 2003; Thomas, 1995; CAWP, 1998, 2001). If socialization serves to limit the low proportion of women serving in legislative chambers, then the odds of a women legislator becoming Speaker and Senate President or President Pro Tem, are significantly lower, regardless of other factors found to impede gendered leadership. Even if more women served in legislative bodies, women legislators are still less likely to take on the role of top leadership which was characterized by leaders alike as a full-time job if they are also full-time caregivers. This hypothesis might also guide future research.

This research found that women do not have equal access to top leadership as compared to men; in part, this is because women start their legislative careers later in life and take-on different family responsibilities. The more significant implication is that these societal gender biases impede our system of representative democracy.

**Barriers to Leadership**

Broad-base institutional changes are limited throughout history; unless fueled by scandal or deep-rooted economic and social movements, representative democracies thrive and the members who serve in them are shaped by these institutions. At the very least, these factors, including legislative structures, electoral composition and egalitarian culture, have the ability to influence who our leaders are. To the extent that these factors impede access for one or more subgroups, underscores the policy ramifications.

In this study, three focal variables were found to be correlated to the odds of a woman legislator becoming speaker. In some instances, the influence is positive when it
comes to women who serve in term limited states, openly competitive electoral districts, and less centralized leadership associated with larger chambers. However, these advantages are likely to be mitigated in the Senate, at least in terms of chamber size. Additionally, some factors were negative as in the case of high spending campaign states, which are often higher in the Senate than the House, as well as the lack of proportional access to all levels of leadership by women legislators.

More specifically, an examination of each focal variable highlights the potential policy implications as well as opportunities for future research. First, scholars hypothesized that legislative structures influence legislators as well as policy outputs (Kousser, 2005; Clucas, 2001; Squire, 1997). This study operationalizes those factors influencing legislative power emanating from legislative design (LIS constitutional powers, term limits, professionalism and chamber size), legislative function (GIP) and legislative form (seniority and power). Two aspects are compelling about the correlations and the model estimates. First, the idea that leadership power cannot be captured simply by measuring powers associated with elements of legislative design, function or form individually. Rather, all these factors serve to predict those chambers in which leadership power will be stronger as compared to others. This hypothesis invites further research in order to operationalize those constructs that best define legislative power from a broader perspective. Further, no significant inverse correlation was found between LIP and GIP; a stronger governor does not imply a weaker legislature. This finding is supported by the national panel survey of state leaders where only 26% of leaders thought the governor had substantially more power than the legislature in their state, while 20% thought power was equally balanced. This is not to say the balance of
power did not tip in favor of governors, still 4 out of 6 leaders believed power was balanced or stronger in the legislature.

Second, the effect term limits portends needs further study as well. Terms limits were found to be correlated with LIS, seniority and professionalism. Furthermore, there was a three-fold increase in the odds of a woman speaker in term limited states. This is likely because term limits served to lower the seniority required in order to ascend to the top which is an advantage to women who arrive later in legislatures. The mean seniority of a legislator prior to becoming the leader was 14 years in the national panel. The mean seniority was 6.4 years for those leaders once term limits became effective in their states. It is expected seniority may continue to decrease as members are limited to 8, 10 and 12 year of consecutive service.

The second focal variable that studies the influence electoral composition played confirms what other scholars have found: party competition affects leadership power and in turn, the odds of a woman speaker. This study also extended the notion that as women took on more professionalized roles (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Thomas, 1994; Jewell & Whicker, 1994), their roles in society would change. In this case, the stronger the professional networks of women were in a state, the more likely there was to be a woman speaker. What was unexpected was the influence of money which was hypothesized to have a strong influence on gendered leadership. While correlations were found among those high spending campaign states, the role of money still leaves much to be explored. In particular, to what extent does money interact with other factors that potentially serve to decrease or increase its overall influence. While money was statistically significant, in the full model, its overall effect was not meaningful as compared to other factors.
Last, the third focal variable, egalitarian culture, presents the most compelling policy implications. What does it say of a society when culture influences gender roles? To begin, this study found that a woman legislator’s personal attributes, such as age, marital status and child care obligations, bore a relationship to the low proportion of women in top legislative positions – even if that effect resulted from self-selection. This study further found that in those chambers where glass ceilings were not evident at the secondary or tertiary leadership levels, the odds of a woman speaker were 6 times greater. What further complicate this finding and was left unstudied by this research is the impact entrenched glass ceiling legislative bodies have on policy formation. What is the effect on social and economic programs when they emanate from an institution that does not embrace egalitarian principles of leadership?

Overall, future research should look to predict gendered leadership opportunities in a hierarchical model that measures both the chamber and state level differences that often exist. This research should build upon the correlations found between proportional representation, seniority, district size and professionalism as well as careerism. Only through repeated and comprehensive studies can findings about structural barriers be established. Without valid and reliable research, the hope that structural barriers can be abated by future legislatures is unlikely.

Finally, in order to assess glass ceiling effects within the states that emerges from job-relevant characteristics (Criterion 1) and career longevity (Criterion 4), profiles of state legislatures are needed (Cotter et al., 2001). This analysis is the work of future research; as was conducted in the New Jersey case study, a state-by-state biographical directory of the members should be contrasted to those leader profiles from individual
states. At a minimum, these rank-and-file member databases can be used to answer the question: are the leaders in a state chamber historically different from its members? If so, do members who possess the antecedents to leadership found in this research have the same opportunity for advancement? If there is no difference between those who lead and the members at large, are there other factors affecting gendered leadership in those states where few or no women have led? This research calls for additional case studies, both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs, in order to respond to these questions. The place to start is in those states that have never been led by a woman.

*The Caucus Shapes the Leader*

When it comes to top legislative leadership, it is not the individual, be that person a man or a woman that shapes the job. Rather, it is the caucus that leaves its mark on the leader. The state leadership literature informs that the job of top leadership is almost predefined for the occupant. The leader must attend to the concerns of the caucus, both the policy and political interests. Moreover, leaders often have their hands tied by other policy players, namely the governor. At the center of the matter, leaders are charged with moving legislative policies that are influenced through strategies, negotiations and settlements in the chambers.

From another perspective, although limited mainly to the leadership of committee chairmanships, scholars have observed that women have more integrative styles of leadership than their male counterparts, as well as spend more time deliberating issues while widening the circle of debate. Much of the literature offers hypotheses that these gendered styles and behaviors will transcend into the upper echelons of leadership in legislative bodies and serve to transform the way government works.
Until now, no national longitudinal studies tested these competing hypotheses in both chambers in all 50 states. This research found that leaders reflect the policy preferences, proposals and products of their caucuses. Leaders do not, nor can they be expected to have policy agendas that vary widely from their caucuses. Or else the leader is less likely to lead, regardless of gender. Under current legislative designs, functions and forms in the 50 states, women did not govern differently or advance policy proposals that were significantly different than the men. In most instances, the styles and behaviors of women and men leaders were quite similar. Furthermore, women did not attempt to make wholesale changes in the chambers in which they led. Overall, leaders’ policy preferences fused along with the policy proposals and products of the caucus.

There are some qualifications to these findings. Perhaps if the percentages of women in legislative bodies were larger, changes to the institutional structures would follow, which may in turn produce different policy outcomes (Thomas, 1994). But here too, those larger caucuses, filled with larger proportions of women would still have to want those institutional changes to be made. Such a notion was not supported by Reingold’s comparative case study (2000) that found a higher proportion of women in legislative bodies did not advance the causes of women. This hypothesis also lays the foundation for future research. In particular, depth interviews with legislative leaders may serve to shed further light on the extent to which top legislative leaders have on formulating policy. Additionally, comparative case studies should control for egalitarian and institutional factors that have been found in this research to be correlated with leadership power and who becomes a leader. These contextual controls were not taken into account in Reingold’s work (2000). Finally, even if a leader’s imprint is limited at
the margins, the major policy accomplishments of leaders should be evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, budgetary changes should be considered since the marginal effect made here could result in policy outcomes measured in dollar terms that could amount to tens of millions dollars.

While some scholars may be unwilling to embrace the notion that women in top leadership do not make a difference in the way they governed or in the policy outcomes that were advanced during their tenures, it is made more difficult to refute when the countervailing evidence is offered by both men and women leaders. Much more so than governors, legislative leaders are constrained in their jobs. The job of leadership is to advance the agenda of the caucus, to serve the interests of the caucus, not necessarily to lead. In practice, it is difficult to lead when you are managing the interests of many as compared to the interest of one, as is the case with governors.

When reflecting upon the limitations of feminist powers in politics, Thomas (1994) said women were unlikely to lead differently than that which was expected of men. The same can be said of leaders who are accountable to caucuses and not predominately focused on their own policy preferences. To paraphrase Thomas (1994), leaders will be no different than their caucuses, or they will not long share its reins.
## Appendix A: Chronological Listing of Women Presiding Officers (1997-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Gail</td>
<td>Phillips</td>
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<td>Senate President</td>
<td>Brenda</td>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>Senate President</td>
<td>Toni</td>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Senate President</td>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>Kramer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Libby</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
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<td>House</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Donna</td>
<td>Sytek</td>
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<td>House</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>JoAnn</td>
<td>Davidson</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>President Pro Tem</td>
<td>Judith</td>
<td>Zaffirini</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Senate President</td>
<td>Drue</td>
<td>Pearce</td>
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<td>Moira</td>
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<td>Snodgrass</td>
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<td>Wojahn</td>
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<td>Senate President</td>
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<td>President Pro Tempor</td>
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<td>Krebsbach</td>
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<td>President Pro Tempore</td>
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<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Karen</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>President Pro Tempor</td>
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<td>Shapiro</td>
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<tr>
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument (Identical instruments were prepared for Senate President Pro tem and Speaker positions.)

National Survey of State Legislative Leaders: President (PDF)

Section 1

We would like to begin by asking you about your background before you became President.

1. Please indicate whether or not you held an elected or appointed position in government or politics before you were elected to the legislature.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Elected Position</th>
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<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointed Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Before you became Senate President, which one of the following best describes your employment status outside the state legislature.

   - I worked full time > > > > Go to 4
   - I worked 25 hours or less > > > > Go to 4
   - I was retired > > > > Go to 5
   - I was not employed > > > > Go to 5

3. In what profession were you employed?

   - Legal
   - Business/Financial Industry
   - Labor/Union
   - Education
   - Politics/Government
   - Agriculture
   - Other

   If you selected Other, please specify.

4. What year were you first sworn in as a legislator? USE 4 DIGITS FOR THE YEAR

   

5. Please indicate if a member of your family served in a political or government position prior to you being elected to the legislature. Check ALL that apply. (Include family members by blood, adoption, half-blood, marriage or remarriage.)

   - Father
   - Mother
   - Parent-in-law
   - Grandparent
   - Great Grandparent
   - Spouse
   - Brother
   - Sister
   - Uncle or Aunt
   - None
National Survey of State Legislative Leaders: President (PDF)

6. Before you became Senate President, in which policy area(s) did you specialize as a legislator?

7. What year were you first sworn in as Senate President in your chamber? **USE 4 DIGITS FOR THE YEAR**

8. Thinking about your legislative career before you became President, did you consider these groups to be among your strongest supporters?

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
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<td>Doctors/Medical</td>
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<td>Women's Groups</td>
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<td>Gun Owners</td>
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<td>Christian Coalition</td>
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<td>Teachers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Coalitions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you selected Other, please specify.

9. Immediately before you became Senate President, please indicate the legislative position you held, if any.

- Majority Leader or Majority Floor Leader
- Assistant Majority Leader/Floor Leader
- Majority Whip
- Majority Caucus or Conference Chair
- Minority Leader or Minority Floor Leader
- Assistant Minority Leader/Floor Leader
- Minority Whip
- Minority Caucus or Conference Chair
- Chair, Budget or Tax Committee
- Chair, Rules Committee
- Chair, All other committees
- Other (please specify)
10. Thinking about your career before you became Senate President, which three of the following attributes were the most significant factors that helped you get your job as Senate President? (Select no more than 3.)

- Being a subject matter expert
- Raising money for caucus members
- Having support from important groups
- Helping run campaigns for the caucus
- Having seniority
- Having the time to seek the position
- Having flexibility in my job or career
- Having access to campaign donors
- Doing favors for caucus members
- Experience in a leadership role
- Communicating with the media
- Sponsoring major legislation
- Being the next in line of succession
- Recruiting legislative candidates
- Having skill as a consensus builder
- Other (please specify)

11. At what point did you first consider seeking the position of President?

- Shortly after I was elected to the chamber
- During my first leadership job (List position you held at the time in the box below.)
- After I moved up in leadership (List position you held at the time in the box below.)
- I never considered it until the year I ran
- I don't recall

Leadership position held at the time

12. In a typical week as a legislator, about how much time did you spend on all legislative activities including session time, interim work, constituent services and politics before you became Senate President?

- Less than 10 hours per week
- Between 10 and 20 hours per week
- More than 20 hours, but less than 40
- More than 40 hours per week
- Don't know
Now we would like to ask you some questions about your job as Senate President.

13. After becoming Senate President, about how much more time did you spend on all legislative activities as compared to before?

- [ ] No more time than before
- [ ] Less than 25% more time
- [ ] Between 25 to 50% more time
- [ ] More than twice as much as before
- [ ] Don’t know

14. How important to you were each of the following legislative and campaign activities in doing your job? (On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most important, please rate each activity.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing the agendas of committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointing chairs and other position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiating with the governor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiating with the other chamber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting members from tough votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building consensus within the caucus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twisting arms to get the last key votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising and allocating campaign funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping run campaigns for the caucus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting candidates to run</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presiding on the floor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the staff of the chamber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Compared to the Governor in your state, how would you rate the power of the legislature?
- Governor has substantially more power
- Governor has somewhat more power
- Power is equally balanced
- Legislature has somewhat more power
- Legislature has substantially more power

16. How would you rate the power of Senate President as compared to that of the Speaker in the other chamber?
- Substantially more power
- Little to no difference in power
- Substantially less power
- Not sure

17. How would you rate the power of the Senate President as compared to that of a rank and file member in your chamber?
- Substantially more power
- Somewhat more power
- Slightly more power
- No difference in power

18. Which one of the following best describes what it most often took to get the last few votes to pass a key piece of legislation?
- Offer an incentive to a member
- Threaten to remove a perk from a member
- Make appeal for the "good of the team"
- Use "outside" leverage
- Ask for vote as a personal favor
- Other (please specify)
19. In order to gain consensus on a major public policy issue, what strategy was most effective in your chamber?

- Limit deliberations to leadership
- Allow committee chairs to take lead
- Deliberate broadly among the caucus
- Follow the lead of other party leaders
- Other (please specify)

20. In each pair below, how would you describe your interaction with most of the caucus?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As one who offered direction to Members</th>
<th>As one who listened to Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pair 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Again, how would you describe your interaction with most of the caucus?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As one who negotiated on behalf of Members</th>
<th>As one who empowered Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pair 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 3

*Before we finish, we'd like to ask just a few questions about policy priorities in your state.*

22. Generally speaking, how would you categorize the time you spent working on policy issues?

- Spent more time on caucus policy issues
- Spent more time on my own policy issues
- Spent an equal amount of time on both

23. If the Governor was a member of your party during your tenure as Senate President, please answer this question. (Please answer both Q23 and Q24 if the party of the Governor changed during your tenure.)

When the Governor was of the same party, I spent more of my time and efforts on the priorities of:

- The Caucus
- The Governor
24. If the Governor was NOT a member of your party during your tenure as Senate President, please answer this question. (Again, please answer both Q23 and Q24 if the party of the Governor changed during your tenure.)

When the Governor was NOT of the same party, I spent more of my time and efforts on the priorities of:

☐ The Caucus
☐ The Governor

25. When deciding which bills to post for a chamber vote...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituents &amp; Lobbyists</th>
<th>Individual Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place a check near the entity that most influenced you.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Again, when deciding which proposals to prioritize for the term...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituents &amp; Lobbyists</th>
<th>Individual Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place a check near the entity that most influenced you.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. When it came to setting priorities in the state budget, who had the most influence?

☐ Governor
☐ Presiding officers
☐ Governor and presiding officers equally
☐ Budget committee chairs
☐ Caucus Members
☐ Constituency groups and lobbyists
National Survey of State Legislative Leaders: President (PDF)

28. During your tenure as Senate President, in what areas did you most often advocate for policy proposals? (Select up to 5 policy areas.)

- Agriculture
- Banking & Finance
- Business & Commerce
- Children & Families
- Education
- Energy & Utilities
- Environment
- Human Services
- Health
- Local Governments
- Insurance
- Senior Citizens
- Taxes
- Transportation
- Veterans
- Women
- Other

29. What do you consider to be your most important policy accomplishment during your tenure as Senate President?

30. In terms of influence on legislation and campaigns, which of the following groups were the most influential in your state?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th>Fundraising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor/Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors/Medical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Owners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Coalitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. After becoming Senate President, did you change the rules governing your chamber?

- No
- Yes

If yes, please describe the changes.
National Survey of State Legislative Leaders: President (PDF)

32. As Senate President, did you have the opportunity to advance women or racial minorities into positions of leadership?
   ○ No
   ○ Yes

   If yes, please list position, gender and race.

Section 4

Finally, we would like to ask you some questions about your background.

33. Please indicate your gender.
   ○ Male  ○ Female

34. Please indicate your marital status at the time you became President.
   ○ Single  ○ Married  ○ Divorced
   ○ Unmarried, living as a couple  ○ Separated  ○ Widowed

35. What year were you born? **USE 4 DIGITS FOR THE YEAR**

36. Did you have children at the time you were Senate President?
   ○ Yes > > > > **Go to 37**
   ○ No > > > > **Go to 38**

37. Which of the following best characterizes your childcare arrangements at the time?
   ○ I had/have children, but not living at home
   ○ I was/am the primary caregiver
   ○ My spouse/partner share(d) care equally
   ○ My spouse/partner was /is the primary caregiver
   ○ Other arrangements
38. What was the highest level of education you attained when you were Senate President?

☐ Graduated high school or less
☐ Some college
☐ Graduated college
☐ Earned graduate degree

Please list ALL graduate degrees.

39. In which state legislature did you serve?

List state

40. During your last election as President, did you have a primary challenger?

☐ Yes
☐ No

41. During your last general election cycle, approximately what was your winning percentage? Estimate % in two digits

42. Was your selection as Senate President typical for your chamber’s appointment process?

☐ Yes
☐ No

If no, how was it different from the past?

43. Thank you again for participating in the survey.

Please feel free to elaborate on your answers to any questions in the survey in this section or on a separate page. We also welcome any comments you may wish to offer or any advice you may have for new leaders!
## Appendix C: Chi Square Results: Panel Nonresponse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi² Value</th>
<th>Geographic Demographics</th>
<th>Unweighted Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Nonresponders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>Census Region</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>Census Division</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Political Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi² Value</th>
<th>Political Variables</th>
<th>Unweighted Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Nonresponders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>Chamber</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legislative Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi² Value</th>
<th>Legislative Background</th>
<th>Unweighted Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Nonresponders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Prior Elected/Appointed Service</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>Initial Year of Service (1997-2010)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Prior Leadership Position</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SES Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi² Value</th>
<th>SES Demographics</th>
<th>Unweighted Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Nonresponders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>Highest Level of Education</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>Age (Year of Birth)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>Age Sworn into Chamber</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>Age Sworn in as Leader</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Center for American Women and Politics National Information Bank on Women in Public Office (CAWP), various years.


http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/research/reports/PoisedtoRun.pdf


State Legislative Survey on Term Limits. (2002) Data source: ICPSR.
*Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 13, 65-82.


Curriculum Vitae

DEBRA BORIE-HOLTZ

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Dissertation Defense Date (12/17/10)
Breaking through the Glass Ceiling: Only to Get Stuck in the Rafters
A Study of Gendered Legislative Leadership in the 50 States

Doctoral Committee: Dr. Alan Rosenthal, Chair, Rutgers University; Dr.
Henry Coleman, Rutgers University; Dr. Jocelyn Crowley, Rutgers
University; Dr. Cliff Zukin, Rutgers University; Dr. Kira Sanbonmatsu,
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Political Science
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  Course Instructor: Research Methods
  Course TA: Principles of Public Health
  Course TA: Research Methods
  Instructor: Methods 1, MPP
  Course TA: Methods 1, MPP
- English Department
  Course Instructor: Research in the Disciplines: The Environment
  Course Instructor: Expository Writing
  Course Instructor: Hybrid Expos

2009-2010

Seton Hall University

- Department of Public & Healthcare Administration, MHA & MPA
  Course Instructor: Research Methods and Statistical Analysis
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NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, Trenton, New Jersey
Chief of Staff & Lead Political Consultant, NJ Senate/Assembly Members

1994-1999
USDA, FARM SERVICE AGENCY, Bordentown, New Jersey
State Executive Director

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NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Trenton, New Jersey
NJ Assistant Secretary of State

1981-1992
NJ SENATE MAJORITY LEADER, Trenton, New Jersey
Chief of Staff

PUBLICATIONS

May, 2010
“No End in Sight: The Agony of Prolonged Unemployment.”
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/Work_Trends_May_2010_0.pdf

August, 2009
“In the Regulatory Weeds of the Garden State: Lessons from New Jersey’s Legislative Process.”