

Save

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Jan 11, 1957

(Notes of Proposed Change in Rate of Refugee Arrivals): Mr. Voorhees
1,700. Second, an airlift through MATS from the balance,

The order of instruction to do this through MATS I verified personally
Following the meeting which the President had with the Congress -
through Governor Adams as being the President's policy, and I was advised
ional Leaders of both parties on January 1, I was informed that Speaker
General Collins who proceeded accordingly. Because of congested condi-
Rayburn - and perhaps some other Democrats - had raised questions
tion at either Salzburg or Munich, the American Ambassador needed to
about the numbers of refugees being admitted. Further, that the
have substantial number airlifted immediately, so we therefore arranged
President had been asked to indicate the number or rate at which he was
for the first week to have about two flights a day and thereafter about two
going to continue to admit refugees; that in response to this the President
flights per week.

had indicated that it would be about 200 per day or in another version, as
The second Naval transport arrived with refugees, reached New
I heard it, it would be not to exceed 200 a day.

York on Monday, January 7. It required a slight additional turn-around
I took the following steps: first, with General Collins to ensure the
time in order to have the alterations, above stated, made and was due to
utmost care that this figure would not leak out through us until the White
sail either today or tomorrow.

House was prepared. Second, to make plans for a sealift and airlift

On the afternoon of January 10, in New York, General Collins
for the month following the completion of the original quota of 21,500
informed me that General Swing had told him that Attorney General Brownell
which would not exceed 6,000 refugees (such plans were developed on a
had spoken with Speaker Rayburn, and that the Attorney General wanted
basis of bringing in approximately 5,400 during the month period).

the sailing of the HAHN held up and that General Collins had had this done
Third, to verify the accuracy of the instructions, I met with General
temporarily. As I had to be in New York at the Doctors this morning and
Persons who had originated the meeting with the legislative Leaders
could not reach Washington before noon, I explained the above situation
January 1, and verified with him that we were to bring in about 200 a day.
to my assistant, Mr. Carter, and asked him to explore it. Immediately

We learned that the percentage of women and children would be
upon arriving in the office this afternoon, I called General Swing. I
very much higher - two steps were taken: first, have temporary and
pointed out that I was greatly troubled about delaying the sailing of the HAHN.
inexpensive alterations, principally by canvas partitions which were made
First, because I had been instructed from the President to bring in refugees
in the Naval transports so that they could carry half women and children
at the rate above described. Second, because there would be a considerable
though this reduced the total carrying capacity to about 1,500 instead of

waste in delaying the ship; third, because I felt that this would become 1,700. Second, an airlift through MATS was arranged for the balance. known and would create adverse comment, perhaps both here and abroad. The order of instruction to do this through MATS I verified personally on the basis that we did not know what we were doing, that this might through Governor Adams as being the President's policy, and I so advised reflect on the President. Further, that it would be contrary to the General Collins who proceeded accordingly. Because of congested condition at either Salzburg or Munich, the American Ambassador needed to have substantial number airlifted immediately, so we therefore arranged for the first week to have about two flights a day and thereafter about two flights per week.

The second Naval transport arrived with refugees, reached New York on Monday, January 7. It required a slight additional turn-around time. I said that I did not want to try to communicate directly with the Attorney General because General Swing had been representing him in sail either today or tomorrow.

On the afternoon of January 10, in New York, General Collins informed me that General Swing had told him that Attorney General Brownell had spoken with Speaker Rayburn, and that the Attorney General wanted the sailing of the HAHN held up and that General Collins had had this done temporarily. As I had to be in New York at the Doctors this morning and Hill yesterday and had seen Speaker Rayburn who questioned the admission could not reach Washington before noon, I explained the above situation of refugees at this rate. That accordingly the Attorney General wished to my assistant, Mr. Carter, and asked him to explore it. Immediately upon arriving in the office this afternoon, I called General Swing. I pointed out that I was greatly troubled about delaying the sailing of the HAHN.

First, because I had been instructed from the President to bring in refugees at the rate above described. Second, because there would be a considerable

He further stated that General Brownell wished to have him waste in delaying the ship; third, because I felt that this would become (General Swing) and me meet with Governor Adams and discuss the known and would create adverse comment, perhaps both here and abroad matter. That he (General Swing) would stand by. I expressed to on the basis that we did not know what we were doing, that this might make an appointment to see Governor Adams and I informed Mr. Raab of the situation. Further, that it would be contrary to the

Vice-President's recommendations. Fourth, that I thought this had

Later, Governor Adams phoned me and said the Attorney General serious foreign policy implications and that State ought to be consulted. was concerned about the ship arriving on account of its effect on his legislative program. He thought that was indicated that we would bring where it was being changed from day to day without any advance notice in more than 200 per cent. I had been carefully to me. However, that I naturally wish to ascertain the Attorney General's based on the 200 per cent. I had cleared to bring in 5,400 views and then say whether there was a change in the Presidential instruc- in the month after the original tions. I said that I did not want to try to communicate directly with the quota established a month ago. I said that then it must Attorney General because General Swing had been representing him in be a question of fact. I said that I thought it was not a question of fact these matters, and I thought that was my appropriate point of contact, but that the Attorney General had changed his mind about either the that I would request General Swing to set up an appointment for us both quantity coming in or their coming by ship. Governor Adams said that with the Attorney General because I was disturbed about holding the ship. He would phone General Swing.

In a few minutes General Swing phoned that he had talked with Attorney General Brownell personally. General Brownell had been on the Hill yesterday and had seen Speaker Rayburn who questioned the admission of refugees at this rate. That accordingly the Attorney General wished to have it slowed down as much as possible and that he particularly did not want to have large groups like 1,500 or 1,700 brought in at one time.

like it. He further stated that General Brownell wished to have him (General Swing) and me meet with Governor Adams and discuss the matter. That he (General Swing) would stand by. I endeavored to make an appointment to see Governor Adams and I informed Mr. Raab of the situation. Jack Martin.

Later, Governor Adams phoned me and said the Attorney General was concerned about the ship arrivals on account of its effect on his legislative program. He thought that this indicated that we would bring in more than 200 per day. I said that our plans had been carefully based on the 200 a day ceiling and that we had planned to bring in 5,400 in the month after the completion of the 21,500 which was the original quota established a month ago. Governor Adams said that then it must be a question of fact. I said that I thought it was not a question of fact but that the Attorney General had changed his mind about either the quantity coming in or their coming by ship. Governor Adams said that he would phone General Swing.

I reported the above situation to Mr. Raab.

I also phoned Loy Henderson indicating that I felt that he should be informed of the consideration of changes in the quota as this seemed to me to have foreign policy implications. He said that any considerable cut would cause great embarrassment and that State would oppose it. It was agreed that I would say in his behalf that State was opposed to any substantial cut, that if this were to be decided upon, Mr. Henderson would

like time to consult with Mr. Dulles so that State's views could be presented at a Cabinet level.

I reviewed the above situation generally with General Persons later in the afternoon because of its legislative implications and also thereafter informed Mr. Jack Martin.

January 24, 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

At 1 p.m. on this date, Tracy S. Voorhees informed me that Governor Adams had told him the following with respect to the rate of transportation of Hungarian refugees in the near future:

That until the sailing of the USS WALKER (understood to be about February 6 from Bremerhaven) no contracts should be made with ICEM but that there should be continued the three (3) flights of military planes a week (these being without sub-contracting on the part of MATS). *rate of arrival*

No decision was taken as to what the rate of entry would be after the sailing of the WALKER.

TSV indicated that Governor Adams had made the above decision on his own after talking to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State and discovering that the Secretary of State wanted to bring in as many as possible and the Attorney General as few as possible. TSV asked me to inform Messrs. Porter, Sage and Macy and General Collins of the above decision.

General Collins raised two points when I talked to him. First, that the Air Force had not yet laid on the third weekly flight; and second, that the agencies concerned at Kilmer would have to be notified as to the decrease in the number of arrivals from that previously anticipated since these agencies were beginning already to be over-staffed. I agreed with General Collins that he should see to it that the Air Force added the third flight as soon as possible since it seemed clear that both Governor Adams and TSV acted in the belief that there are already three (3) flights a week.

When I informed Mr. Sage, in addition to some general comments, he specifically raised the issue of keeping Camp Kilmer open with the remark that it would be excessively expensive if the refugee population fell below 1,000.

When I informed Mr. Macy, he raised the question as to whether the three flights a week contemplated were inclusive or exclusive of any relief regarding Yugoslavia. We agreed that the Yugoslav problem was probably not in Governor Adams' mind when he made the decision; I stated my conviction however that the decision was made on the basis of entry into the United States rather than the sources of the refugees themselves.

When I informed Mr. Porter, he raised two specific points: first, that the Yugoslavian situation was really explosive and that some offer by the United States was required; and second, that on the explicit authorization of Governor Adams, Mr. Henderson on last Friday had informed Ambassador Gruber that the United States would take out of Austria up to 200 a day and that the Ambassador had clearly understood that the figure would not be much below 200 a day.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 24, 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for the record (continued)

Page 2

I informed TSV of my conversations and with respect to Mr. Porter's two points, TSV asked me to tell him that State should get something in writing, however informal, addressed either to TSV or Governor Adams, but in either case delivered to TSV. With respect to the conversation with Ambassador Gruber, it was TSV's opinion that the period between now and the sailing of the WALKER was so short, and the policy to be followed out after the sailing was so indefinite, that good faith would not require the Department of State to restate the position of the United States Government to the Ambassador.

Harry Tyson Carter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAVE
TS ✓

February 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MAXWELL RABB -

SUBJECT: Rate of Arrival of Hungarian Refugees

On Saturday February 9th, Governor Adams directed a memorandum to Tracy Voorhees as follows:

"During the month of February we will receive not to exceed 5,000 Hungarian refugees, with the stipulation that, except for brief periods following the arrival of already-scheduled MSTs transports, the accumulated total of refugees received in this country since January 3, 1957 shall not exceed an average of 200 per day.

The program for March will be reviewed not later than February 23."

As a result of this memorandum, General Collins directed Mr. Carusi to call a meeting today of the interested agencies to finalize the program for refugees to be carried by ICEM for the balance of February.

I have just been informed by Mr. Carusi that the Immigration Service was unable to be represented at this meeting. However, the other interested agencies developed mutually agreeable plans which would provide for about 1700 refugees to be carried by ICEM under a contract with ICA for the balance of the month. When Mr. Carusi called Mr. Hennessey of Immigration to fill him in on the meeting and to make certain that enough refugees would be processed and available to meet the target established by Governor Adams, Mr. Hennessey said that he would call Vienna within the hour.

However, he later called Mr. Carusi back to say that General Swing, feeling that Governor Adams' figure was a ceiling, did not believe Immigration should change their rate of processing in Austria merely to meet transportation schedules. Mr. Hennessey said that, of course, if the decision was to regard the figures as a target to be met, they would change their rate of processing and meet the target.

I am informed that Immigration is currently processing about 750 a week and that with the inevitable "no shows" and ineligibles among those processed, this rate, if not increased, would mean a short fall of at least 500 refugees for the balance of the month. However, the implication for March is even more serious, for the current rate of processing would produce fewer than 3,000 refugees for the entire month of March.

Thus, the question which apparently remains to be settled is whether all agencies should endeavor to meet the figures in Governor Adams' memorandum, or whether the effective rate of arrival should be a lesser number determined, among other things, by the current rate of processing in Vienna by the Immigration Service.

(Memorandum to Mr. Rabb - continued)

February 12, 1957

The Department of State considers it imperative that the figures in Governor Adams' memorandum be considered as a target to be met and not just a ceiling.

Harry Tyson Carter