PATHWAY FROM TRANQUILITY TO VIOLENT RADICALIZATION:
A CASE STUDY ON 2003 ISTANBUL BOMBINGS

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Abstract

Violent radicalization is considered to be the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to affect social change. This phenomenon poses an important and serious threat worldwide. Since the attacks on the US in 2001 and around the world, popular interest in understanding the “causes of violent radicalization” resulted in an increased awareness of its processes (Hegghammer, 2006). Not only concentrating on the root causes of violent radicalization, but distinguishing them from a more moderate and mainstream perspective becomes crucial for societies and countries as well. There are several models suggesting that there are various entry points, variables and personality types that influence violent radicalization. Although current scholarship on violent radicalization is replete with studies that adapt a one-size-fits-all approach, there is a paucity of research on the determinant factors that make the ordinary individual become involved in violent action or that enable disillusionment of the individuals to go to further stages resulting in a terrorist plot.

This study aims to examine the violent radicalization process from a Muslim-dominated country’s (Turkey) perspective and argues that the phases of the violent radicalization process should be considered in a different fashion or manner than that of the West. Such a perspective will help to identify the significant features of phenomenon – such as the impact of psychosocial variables, frustration, contemporary conflicts, discourses of the violent terrorist organizations - and plan successful and effective responses. Moreover, it claims that misunderstanding key verses of Islam inevitably push moderates and otherwise tranquil individuals to involve themselves with extremist and
violent terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda. The primary focus of the study will be on ideology, training camps and psychosocial traits that shaped the violent radicalization of the individuals in Turkey. Additionally, misinterpretations of key religious verses and consequences will be discussed.

This study will use the datasets from terrorist-suspects’ (n= 128) court-collected testimonies, which were obtained after the 2003 Istanbul Bombings. The researcher will utilize discriminant analysis to determine: (1) which of the variables are useful in predicting involvement in a violent terrorist attack; (2) how these variables might be combined into a mathematical equation to predict the most likely outcome; and (3) the accuracy of the derived equation. Findings of the analysis, policy implications and suggestions for future studies will be proposed in conclusion.
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Statement of Problem

Al Qaeda attacks around the world opened up a new phase in the history of terrorism. Government and media attention turned to a new topic, “radicalization”, mainly in the Muslim world. Recent Al Qaeda attacks reveal that “violent radicalization” in Islamic communities, generally perceived as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to affect social change, poses an important and serious threat worldwide. The strategies of radicalized organizations currently cause global concern regarding unexpected and unprecedented attacks in the name of Islam.

Since the attacks on the US in 2001, popular interest in understanding the “causes of radicalization” resulted in an increased awareness of its processes (Hegghammer, 2006). Accordingly, it has become more important to understand how the supply of terrorist manpower is recruited and the attributes of terrorism emerged (Fair and Shepherd, 2006). There are several models explaining that various entry points, variables and personality types influence violent radicalization. Hafez (2006), for instance, explained radicalization as a step-by-step process of socialization that leads individuals to cut their ties slowly to the social environment. Isolation from society will jeopardize social cohesion and solidarity, and create polarization. He further suggests that alienation from citizenship or/and family and a loss of faith to the current system inevitably create a pool of potential volunteers for extremist groups.

Although current scholarship on radicalization is replete with studies that adapt a “one-size-fits-all” approach, there is a paucity of research taking into account the
determinant factors that make the typical, mainstream, moderate and ordinary individual become involved in violent action or enable disillusionment of the individuals to go to further stages resulting in a terrorist plot. This study agrees on the notion that violent radicalization is a process and is formed by different stages. However, the existing literature has not proposed any concrete explanation about which stage of the process is critical and where we have to focus to prevent individuals from violent radicalization.

The topic, ‘radicalization’ has become “hot” in policy circles but the empirical knowledge base remains relatively weak (Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 1986; Horgan, 2003; Ranstorp, 2006; Silke, 2001-2004; Taylor & Horgan, 2006). As the new trend ‘de-radicalization’ claims, radicalization either violent or nonviolent should be distinguished from ordinary, mainstream, moderate, peaceful and religious individuals. Mainstream Muslims do not necessarily become “terrorists”, do not support violence for the experienced conflicts involving Muslims, do not nurture a terrorist ideology, and should not be disregarded from society. One of the main goals of this study is to eliminate the misleading perception about mainstream Islam, radicalization and violent radicalization by identifying the most real and determinant factors that bring about the most harmful mindsets for the world.

The radicalization of a Muslim individual displays different patterns within Western countries in comparison to the countries with dominant Muslim populations in which the process is perceived to have started with accepting the ideology of a terrorist organization. As explained in the subsequent chapters, this study will argue that attending religious meetings with the intention of being a good Muslim or having some different
viewpoints than the rest of the community as a result of some infrastructural deficiencies (social, economic, or demographic) need not lead to violent radicalization; these might be considered as routine activities or resentments in the daily life of every individual. Yet, when resentments and discontents, emanating from the existence of abovementioned infrastructural deficiencies, are converged and harmonized with the ideology of a terrorist organization, there is likelihood that such discontent can be manifested as violent radicalization. Accordingly, this study argues that accepting the ideology of a terrorist organization, which really shapes the changes in belief, in feelings and provides action for the individual, is the crucial point in the violent radicalization process. Moreover, it creates a trajectory and model on which men can move. It is then the ideologies of any terrorist organization that separate the individual, those sharing similar characteristics and belief systems, at the beginning of the radicalization process. These individuals may have the same discontent, problems and deficiencies; however their varying ideologies may put them onto different pathways. For example, Turkish Hezbollah and Turkish Al Qaeda members have similar deficiencies yet the perception of these problems, shaped by ideology, lead Al Qaeda members to travel abroad and get involved in transnational action where Turkish Hezbollah chooses to operate inside of Turkey.

The report of the NYPD (2007) on the process of radicalization claims that individuals enter into the trajectory of violent radicalization through attending mosques, growing a beard and wearing Islamic clothes, etc. However, these features can be seen in every corner of the Muslim-dominated community and it is certainly inappropriate and risky to profile these individuals as violently radicalized on the basis of the above-
mentioned features and patterns. Hence, this study aims to examine the trajectory from a Muslim-dominated perspective and argues that the phases of the violent radicalization process should be considered in a different manner than that of the West. Moreover, this study claims that most of the studies on violent radicalization are focused on events and individuals. Such an “ethnocentric” perspective fails to account for the root causes of the phenomenon. Instead, this study suggests that examining the trajectory from a Muslim-dominated standpoint helps to identify the significant features of radicalization, such as the roots of discontent, isolation and alienation in the society, and bring some effort to bear on those issues more successfully and effectively. And thus, by penetrating deeper into the roots of violent radicalization, we can identify ways and means to reverse the undesirable outcome. This kind of standpoint which eliminates the “ethnocentric” perspective will help us to see the whole picture of phenomenon from the outside and enable us to understand it from different points of view, like the psychosocial perspective involving socioeconomic, psychological and social facts.

Besides the significant role of ideology in the violent radicalization process, it is essential to study how personal preferences and social incentives can be bound together in the explanation of the paths to violent radicalization and terrorist action. There are numerous studies focusing on the relationship between sociological variables, such as, poverty, authoritarian regimes or cultural and religious practices, and terrorist activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Laqueur, 2003; Reinares, 2003; De la Corte, 2006; Newman, 2006). However, there are many people who do not follow the pathway of violent radicalization despite having experienced the deficiencies of sociological variables. There are countless
studies that have focused on psychological attributes of individuals involved in violent activities, like a lack of empathy with their victims, dogmatic or ideological mentality, or a simplistic or utopian worldview (Beck, 2003; De la Corte, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Post, 1998). This study argues that if terror, following Crenshaw (1990), is the result of individual perceptions of social conditions and if the terrorist action is the last stage of the violent radicalization process, more focus should be given toward the combined effects of these two perspectives. This can be initially studied by understanding the psychosocial perspective of this phenomenon. Social environment certainly influences individuals’ perceptions and behaviors. This study not only touches upon the individuals’ personal propensities that shed light on the reasons for getting into the radicalization trajectory, but also focuses on the variables transcending the personality of the individuals, which is very much related to social environment, as well.

Turkey is a secular country with approximately a 95 percent Muslim population. Moreover, its geographic location between East and West enables the country to be more important regarding different cultural perspectives. As subsequent chapters claim, radicalization of individuals or a specific community in the West is usually perceived as being related to being a minority in the host society, such as, in the case of Moroccans in France and Algerians in Belgium. On the other hand, in Muslim countries in the East, radicalization is considered to be related to infrastructure deficiencies (social, economic, and political) and nationalism (usually created by the resentments of the colonial past). These two perspectives of radicalization are related to internal and domestic problems of the society. Nevertheless, while Turkish Al Qaeda members’ radicalization can be
attributed to their perceived subjugation of the Muslims in the society, it would seem that the real causes of their violent radicalization transcend the domestic issues, which can be defined as “sacred value” that often have its basis in religion and collective identity, e.g., the conflicts involving Muslims worldwide, the Palestinian problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US role in the Middle East, Turkey’s relationship with the imperial powers (US, UK and other Western countries) and especially Israel, etc. (Atran, 2009). This study argues that the radicalization processes of the Turkish people are really a combination of both perspectives (the Eastern and the Western); as such, understanding these processes via clarifying crucial points in the pathway may contribute to terrorism research significantly.

Turkey is one of the most affected countries by terrorism in the world; for example, since 1984 the number of people killed in terrorist attacks has reached approximately 36,000 civilians and security forces. In addition to personal loss, the monetary loss spent on counter-terrorism efforts alone approximates $400 billion. When the cost of opportunities lost within this time period is added, the amount is even higher (Teymur, 2007). In Turkey, there is an absence of scientific studies on the radicalization of the Muslim population, in general, and the root causes of violent radicalization, in particular, which ends with terror specifically in understanding the dynamics and patterns of violent radicalization inside Turkey. Most of the existing studies are opinion-based. Few studies have used an appropriate research design to obtain systematic information on radicalization. This study is seeking to fill such a gap using valuable official data sources on violently radicalized people and their terrorist activities such as the 2003 Istanbul
bombings by asking who in Turkey becomes violently radicalized and why do they join Al-Qaeda?

To sum it up, this study moves towards the following objectives:

1) Exploring the significant stages in the radicalization process that leads to violent radicalization;
2) Identifying explicit features of violently radicalized individuals in a Muslim country;
3) Showing the importance of accepting the ideology of terrorist organizations in the process;
4) And, clarifying the differences between radical and violently radicalized individuals within a Muslim-dominated society.

This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the literature review of terrorism and radicalization and attempts to reflect briefly on the academic and institutional perspectives. The ultimate goal of many terrorist organizations is terrorizing the community by converting radical ideas to terrorism via violent radicalization. Besides the psychosocial traits of terrorism, the first chapter also focuses on radicalization in different religions, mainly in Muslim societies, and tries to shed light on the relation between ideology and radicalization. It is an inevitable fact that ideology is the crucial factor that forms the individual’s political, social, and cultural perception about the world and frames their belief systems.

The second chapter will review the Al Qaeda terrorist organization with its organizational structure, history and ideology. Additionally, this chapter will look at the roots of religiously motivated terrorism in Turkey, specifically the development of the
Turkish Al-Qaeda that hit its pinnacle with the 2003 Istanbul Bombings. Roots of violent radicalization in Turkey, the effect of different ideologies that have important impacts on religious groups’ or movements’ perception of contemporary issues involving Muslims, and differences in the perception of Islam between Turkey and other Muslim countries will be discussed in the second chapter.

The third chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study with Dollard and his colleagues’ Frustration-aggression hypothesis and Magnarella’s Theory of civil violence and terrorism in Turkey. These theoretical perspectives will try to come to terms with the importance of psychological feelings and social settings on violent radicalization.

The fourth chapter in this study will be the methodology part, which includes research questions, hypotheses, data, and how to analyze and operationalize the data. The fifth chapter will focus on the analyses and findings. The last chapter will be a discussion section that includes theoretical implications, policy implications, suggestions for future studies and the conclusion.
Chapter I

TERRORISM AND RADICALIZATION

TERRORISM

Definition of Terrorism

It is a fact that the international community has failed to reach an agreement upon a definition of terrorism. The absence of worldwide agreement on the concept of terrorism has its own cost related to developing and applying proper methods. Moreover, specialists in the area of terrorism studies have devoted hundreds of pages toward trying to develop an indisputable definition of the term only to realize the fruitlessness of their efforts: Terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by different observers (Cronin, 2002). The failure of unity on the definition leads to the necessity of understanding terrorism in its specific context as, “it erupts and flourishes in different places at different times due to an often particular combination of factors” (Hoffman, 1992).

Terrorism is defined in different ways within and between professional boundaries. Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) study found over a hundred different definitions of terrorism in the literature. Although it is very hard to develop a concrete definition, there are some common and fundamental aspects of terrorism that are widely shared. The most common features of terrorism mentioned in these definitions are violence and the use of force, and they were emphasized by approximately 90 percent of the available definitions. Another common element in these definitions is the emphasis
on the ideological and political aims, which have been used in more than half of the definitions. Martin (2006) provides a summary of the common features of the definitions of terrorism such as the, “use of illegal force, sub-national actors, unconventional methods, political motives, attacks against ‘soft’ civilian and passive military targets and acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience.” Following Martin’s categorization, to avoid the chaos on an agreed-upon definition of terrorism, it seems more plausible to study terrorism on the basis of these common features that are widely accepted. Rather than attempting to define terrorism broadly, in order to have a better understanding of the common features of terrorism, this study will give a brief account of the terrorism definitions of academics, different governments and agencies.

**Definition of Terrorism by Governments and Agencies**

Different governments and agencies formulate their definition of terrorism differently but many of these definitions have strong similarities. Terrorism is defined by the United Nations General Assembly as, “the act of destroying or injuring civilian lives or the act of destroying or damaging civilian or government property without the expressly chartered permission of a specific government, thus, by individuals or groups independently or governments on their own accord and belief, in the attempt to effect some political change” (Stevens 2005:512, United Nations General Assembly, 2002b). In the U.S. Code, terrorism is defined as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US Code, Title 22, Section 2656f (d)). The FBI (1999) defines terrorism as, “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons, or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

The 1989 British Anti-Terrorism Act defined terrorism as, “the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear.” Similarly, France (2000) defined terrorism in its anti-terrorism law as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order.”

The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991) defines terrorism as:

All kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security.

Thus, as an argument, it can be inferred that state definitions are generally generic and applied in such politicized and selective manners to undermine their credibility. Silke (2003) portrays this problem by mentioning:

Terrorist is a political term, not a neat, clearly defined psychological label, and governments and security agencies are extremely quick to try to label the enemies as terrorists in the hope that this will undermine international sympathy for the organization and deflect criticism away from any policies used to fight the group.
Definition of Terrorism by Academics

Unlike the positivist definitions of terrorism in the law, academics often define terrorism in a variety of ways that point to the impossibility of any universal cohesive, accurate and reliable definition. Nevertheless, terrorism’s political goals and use of civilians as targets to create an unstable environment are common features. Crenshaw (1990; 2001) takes an organizational approach to terrorism and sees terrorism as a rational strategic course of action decided on by a group. She also asserts that terrorism is an expression of logical choice and political strategy. Schmid (1988) focuses on the communicative dimension and defines terrorism as “an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons. Their targets are chosen randomly or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.” Schmid (1988), referring to Clutterbuck’s insight, points out that terrorism is:

An attack to frighten and coerce a large number of others is as old as civilization itself. It is the recourse of a minority or even of a single dissident frustrated by the inability to make society shift in the desired direction by what that society regards as “legitimate” means. It is primarily an attack on the rule of law, aimed either to destroy it or to change it radically to conform to the terrorist's idea of society (Clutterbuck, 1977).

In his definition, Wilkinson (1989) points out the act, goal and concept of terror, or namely fears, as “coercive intimidation, or more fully as systematic use of murder, injury and destruction, or threat of same, to create a climate of terror, to publicize a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to its aims.” Hoffman (1998) defines
terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fears through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” Anthropologist Nagangast (1994) refers to terrorism as, “the policy of using acts inspiring great fear as a method of ruling or of conducting political opposition.”

Academic definitions generally focus on the illegitimacy of the acts, not on the ends that are aimed to be achieved by such acts. They also view targets as the secondary focus because a terrorist’s targets are proxies for communicating a threat to a primary target that is elsewhere, namely the wider political community or the government. For these reasons, a consensus on a truly accepted definition of terrorism is unlikely to emerge in the near future (Anarumo, 2005).

**Common Features in the Definition of Terrorism**

It is difficult to be neutral in the task of definition when the language of politics often affects perceptions (Crenshaw, 1995; Rapoport and Wilkinson, 2005). Although it is very difficult to reach an agreed-upon definition of the term, there are some common features in the definition of terrorism whether defined by governments or academics:

**Violence:** In Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) study, they assert that 108 out of 120 definitions employ the words “violence” and “use of force” as their most common elements. However, the meaning of violence differs from individual to individual. Generally, peaceful demonstrations, non-violent protests and tax revolts involving violence are not considered as acts of terrorism. Although violence can be defined as bodily harm, as is common in all definitions of terrorism, this is a specific form of violence, distinguished by political motivation and targeting civilians.
**Political motivation:** The primary goal of terror activities is political. The goal is to attain political objectives, such as replacing the regime, the people in power, or the policies of the government. According to Schmid and Jongman (1988), ideological or political aims are found in 65 percent of the definitions. In the absence of a political goal, they cannot be called terror activities. Violent acts targeting civilians that have no political goal can be identified as felony or criminal delinquency. The concept of “political aim” also includes ideological and religious goals.

**Civilian targets:** Terrorist organizations not only attack governmental institutions but civilians as well. Civilians are indeed the primary targets of terror activities. Terrorism can be differentiated from other types of political violence due to this specific character. For example, civil insurrections and guerrilla wars are defined as political violence. Some scholars define guerilla warfare as terrorism even though civilians are not the primary targets, however terrorism is an act purposely directed against civilians.

**Terrorism from different perspectives**

**The social and the psychological perspectives**

The pathway to terrorism can be shaped by unexpected factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal propensities and social incentives. As Moghaddam and Marsella (2004) proposed, recent terrorist attacks around the world lead to psychologists being increasingly interested in the phenomenon because psychology has much to contribute to the understanding and prevention of terrorism. Besides, the importance of social and political conditions that surround and affect the individuals’ behavior cannot
be underestimated. Basically, the individual’s social environment influences everything that they do. There are mainly two very common perspectives that shed light on terrorism: social perspective and psychological perspective. Social perspective analyzes the relationship between sociological variables such as poverty, authoritarian regimes, or cultural and religious practices and terrorist activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Laqueur, 2003; Reinares, 2003; De la Corte, 2006; Newman, 2006). On the other hand, the psychological perspective focuses on personal propensities and the psychological attributes of terrorists, such as, lack of empathy with their victims, dogmatic or ideological mentality, or a simplistic or utopian worldview (Beck, 2003; De la Corte, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Post, 1998).

**Terrorism from the psychosocial perspective**

The psychological and social perspectives contribute huge benefits to the field of terrorism. However, as de la Corte (2007) argued, neither the individual psychology of terrorists, nor their social environments provide a complete explanation of why individuals become involved in terrorism. Terrorism is the result of individual perceptions of social conditions. Crenshaw (1990) declared that the psychological variables must be integrated with environmental factors in order to reach a comprehensive theory. Hence, more and more researchers are turning toward a psychosocial perspective in their studies.

Psychosocial perspective describes one’s environment as the place where a person’s behavior is influenced by the social settings in which they live and by their psychological predispositions. As de la Corte (2007) explained, the psychosocial
perspective is not similar to the widespread interpretation of terrorist attacks as a direct effect of any social or psychological determination, but viewed as several social interactive processes that take place both in inter-and intra-group environments. He presented seven principles of the psychosocial perspective of terrorism: a) terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome but as a method of social and political influence, b) the attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interaction, c) terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with other social movements, d) terrorism is only possible when terrorists have access to certain resources, e) the decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is always legitimized by an extreme ideology, f) every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect, and g) the activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal features of their organizations.

Martha Crenshaw (1990) reflected the common approach of many social psychologists that individuals’ psychological characteristics are the result of several processes of socialization and social interaction. Similar proposals are emphasized by de la Corte (2007) in the explanation of psychosocial perspective, as well. He highlighted the importance of a “secondary socialization” processes in which terrorists become involved after joining a radical group or organization. He continued that, in any case, there is no doubt that the activities and lifestyles developed inside terrorist organizations shape the mentality of its members, intensifying their commitment to such organizations and preparing them to engage in terrorist activities.
The chances of terrorists acting in a rational way are not only limited by their individual psychological attributes, but also by the characteristics of their organizations and their social environment. The comfort of belonging to a group of the like-minded may be the dominant psychological encouragement for many members. Crenshaw (1990) emphasized that terrorism is not an act brought by individuals; it comprises acts committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies. It is a political act performed by individuals acting together and collectively trying to justify their behavior. These justifications reflect prevailing social values, and so neither individual nor group behavior can be isolated from its environment.

**RADICALIZATION**

The attacks on the World Trade Center; the Oklahoma City federal building; the American military residence in Saudi Arabia; the burning of abortion clinics and the shooting of a clinic doctor in the face; the assassination of Israeli and Indian political leaders; the massacre of innocent worshipers at a mosque; the agonizing effects of the nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway; and the bloody confusion of suicide bombings on the otherwise peaceful streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are not just incidents of violence. These attacks represent the outcomes of violent radicalization and reveal to us that it poses an important and serious threat worldwide. This threat has drawn the attention of academia and law enforcement agencies in an attempt to understand and appropriate methods to prevent future attacks.
Definition of radicalization

It is a certain fact that recent terrorist attacks around the world are the outcome of violent radicalization. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) explain that a radical ideology is without a doubt a vital ingredient in producing terrorism. Radicalization of many kinds may be associated with a syndrome of beliefs about the current situation and its history. They define radicalization as a change in beliefs, feelings and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify violence. Saiful Umam (2006) defined radicalization as:

“Tending or disposed to make extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or institutions.” If it applies to a person, it means one that “advocates a decided and often extreme change from existing, usual, or traditional views, habits, conditions, or methods.”

He also asserted that a radical person not only “believes” certain things, but more importantly he “advocates” the necessity of using extremism. There are several models explaining that various entry points, variables and personality types influence radicalization. Hafez (2006) sees both gradual and rapid radicalization within each point. He explained that gradual radicalization, the most common type, is a step-by-step process of socialization, which leads individuals to slowly cut their ties to the outside. Isolation from society will inevitably jeopardize social cohesion and solidarity, and create polarization. Alienation from citizenship or family and a loss of faith to the current system has created a pool of potential volunteers for extremist groups.
Radicalization as a Process

Many academics have asserted that radicalization is formed by stages and perceived as key transition points along a time continuum leading from the ordinary, moderate, and normal life of individuals to their direct involvement in terrorist activity. Robert Gurr (1990) refers to radicalization as:

\[ A \text{ process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact.} \]

He continued that radicalization characterizes groups with future-oriented objectives. Sprinzak (1990) traced the gradual evolution of a terrorist group and concluded that the radicalization process which ends with terrorism begins with opposition to particular officials and social policies, grows to increasing estrangement from, and eventual rejection of, the whole system, and is a process fueled by disillusionment, embittering failures, and hostile confrontations with authorities. It culminates in terroristic efforts to destroy the system and its dehumanized rulers.

Silber and Bhatt (2007) in their report, “Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat” asserted that there are some factors leading people into the radicalization process in the first place and then reinforcing their continued radicalization to the point of committing acts of terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security (2006) explains radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, and facilitate violence, as a method to effect
societal change. Escobar Stemmann (2006) takes the radicalization process to a different point and stresses that it begins with the emergence of anti-integration tendencies and the desire to disengage from the host society. At that point, it continues with hostility towards the host society, rejection of the principles and institutions of liberal democracy, and the growing acquisition of violent attitudes, all of which make individuals a potential target for recruiters.

Sedgwick divided all radical programs into three stages: One stage condemns the current system as illegitimate. Another stage designs a utopia to replace the current system. An intermediate stage seeks to overthrow the current system so that utopia may be built on its ruins (Sedgwick, 2004). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) explained radicalization as the changes in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group.

Radicals who resort to violence usually see themselves as the real victims and feel that they are merely defending themselves. At times, some radical groups take the form of a cult when all members become indoctrinated and justify their cause on the grounds of ideology, ethnicity, politics, or spirituality. When these factors are present, coupled with impulsive, zealous, or antisocial types of personalities, then the outcome will invariably result in some form of terrorism (Abi-Hashem, 2004).
Radicalization in different religions

Terrorism has been increasingly based on religious radicalism in recent years. The National Commission on Terrorism (2000) found that radicalism rather than political interests is now more often the motivation, and that terrorists are more unrestrained than ever before in their methods. Other scholarly sources have reached similar conclusions. A recent FBI strategic assessment of the potential for domestic terrorism in the United States focused on such groups as Christian Identity and other ultraconservative movements associated with Christian fundamentalism and radicalism. There are many examples of the radicals’ attacks in different religions. The assassination of a political leader of Israel by a radical Jew; the murder of 29 Muslim worshippers at a mosque by a radical Jew; the extreme and radical nature of the American anti-abortion terrorists resulting in the bombings of clinics, placing toxic chemicals inside clinics, and sending letters claiming to contain anthrax; the Oklahoma City bombing by a Christian radical resulted in 168 deaths; and various suicide attacks of Muslim radicals around the world are some examples of the attacks that have shown similar mass-casualty proclivities. Paul Wilkinson (1990) pondered the increase in indiscriminateness among terrorists, and argued that there has been a shift from the politically minded terrorist to the vengeful and hardline fanatic and radical.

As Hoffman (1998) remarks, religious terrorists regard their violence to be “first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative.” Religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving, but as outsiders seeking fundamental changes in the
existing order. Religious terrorism is thought to be more violent, more destructive, and more murderous due to the fact that they are not seeking the appeal of constituencies, less likely to engage in such a cost benefit calculus since the outside constituency is comprised of infidels, heretics, and apostates. At the root of this concept is the assumed increase in religious radicalism among terrorists.

As Brown (2007) argued, the reason for being more violent and destructive is the result of more fanatical, radical, and perhaps irrational actors. The paranoia and radicalism of the new terrorism is essentially what creates an increased distance from the political and ‘rational’ motives of the phenomenon’s predecessors, and, as a result, is considered to be what makes the new terrorists all the more unpredictable, irrational and dangerous. Religion—conveyed by sacred text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine—therefore critically serves as a means to explain contemporary events and, in turn, as a legitimating force justifying violence. While Islamic terrorists are the most notorious of today’s violent radicals, Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) identified three elements that all radical extremists share: they perceive their objective as a defense of basic identity and dignity; losing the struggle would be unthinkable; and the struggle is in deadlock and cannot be won in real time or in real terms.

From the radical’s point of view that justify their actions with religion, anything foreign, secular, or modern is labeled without question as evil, while anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle against "the enemy," including the killing of innocents, becomes good (Khan & Azam, 2008). Acts of violent radicals are not always,
but certainly include, rebellion against the secularization of state and society, and the excesses of modernity and globalization. The critique is often in terms of the failures of modern states and societies, and the attendant loss of religious identity and values. We see terrorists as free to seek different political ends in this world by whatever means of terror they consider most appropriate. For the radicals, the primary audience is the deity, and depending upon their particular religious conception, it is even conceivable that they do not need or want to have the public witness their deed. Their struggles are sanctified with respect to purpose and with respect to means; this is why their violence must have unique characteristics. The very idea of the holy entails a contrast with the profane, the normal, or the natural.

The reasons that terrorist incidents perpetrated for religious motives result in so many more deaths may be found in the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and worldviews embraced by the religious terrorist and his secular counterpart. Religion—conveyed by sacred text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming to speak for the divine—therefore critically serves as a means to explain contemporary events and, in turn, as a legitimating force justifying violence. This explains why clerical sanction is so important to religious terrorists and why religious figures are often required to “bless” (i.e., approve or sanction) terrorist operations before they are executed (Hoffman, 1998).

It is also easier to connect personal religious content with reality in a way that inspires religious violence if the individuals have experience with violence, either personally or through a loved one (Silke, 2001). Abuse and humiliation of Muslims, like
that perpetrated in Abu Ghraib, creates easily exploited connections. Only recently has American leadership in Iraq come to the realization that “for every innocent Iraqi killed or wounded by an American, ten new insurgents [are] recruited” (Foulk, 2007). The general chaos and misery in many places in the Middle East makes violent radicalization and religious connections more appealing.

Another aspect of many religions that facilitates terror and violence is eschatology or the belief in a final judgment day and “the end of time” (Crossan 1999). For Christianity, this end of days will arrive with the second coming of Jesus. Jews believe that the “world to come” will be ushered in with the coming of the Mashiach (Messiah) and the complete restoration of Zion. Most Christians and Jews are content for history to play itself out according to God’s will. However, radicals and extremists feel the need to take action to bring about the utopia that will be ushered in by the end of days (Hoffman 1995). Once again, radicalization leads to violence and terror to be used against those who appear to be preventing these millennial visions, such as abortion providers and homosexuals in the United States who offend God and Prime Ministers of Israel who return God’s land to Arab Muslims and Christians in the pursuit of peace.

**Radicalization of a Muslim individual**

According to Dogu Ergil (1980), a well-known Turkish sociologist, radicalization in the Muslim world is developed on the basis of resentments of economic and political exploitation and injustice that has been reinforced by a colonial past and unsuccessful nation-states. Ergil argues that terrorist organizations successfully manipulate Muslims’
perception of “arbitrary, unnecessary, and avoidable injustice” in the Muslim world and present terrorist tactics as justified against “infidel” and “Satanic” systems and states.

Radicalization of a Muslim is described by Harchaoui (2005) as the increasing inclination of some Muslims to align themselves or be involved with persons and groups who rely on Islam as the only legitimate source of inspiration for their actions and who believe it is acceptable to use or support the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Islamic Radicalism is defined by AIVD (National Intelligence Agency of Netherland) as:

*The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect), the politico-religious pursuit of establishing - if necessary by extreme means - a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.*

Taarnby (2005) defines Islamic radicalism as the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslims to militant and violent individuals. Richard Alan (2003), in comments to the U.S. Government regarding radicalization, contends, “Radicalism is a political response to the deep economic, social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim world.” Oliver Roy (2002) defines Islamic radicalization as, “a combination of two elements: firstly, a call for the return of all Muslims to the true tenets of Islam (or what is perceived as such): this trend is usually called “salafism” (“the path of the ancestors”) by its supporters, or “fundamentalism” by Western analysts, secondly, a political militancy going as far as advocating jihad, in the sense of “holy war”, against the foes of Islam, who could include existing Muslim rulers.”
Ideology and Radicalization Process

Changes in belief, feelings and behaviors are ultimately shaped by ideology, which is a crucial factor in sustaining the process. Anthony Giddens (2001) described ideology as “shared ideas or beliefs, which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups.” Gramschi (1971), with a similar approach, argues that an individual’s consciousness is channeled by society whether by constraining presuppositions or by the transformative nature of his will. He divided ideology as organic or non-organic where the non-organic is more rationalistic or willed; creates individual “movements”; and provides action in the making and shaping of historical events. On the other hand, organic ideology, which is more common than non-organic, is characterized as having the “psychological” validity, organizing human masses, and creating the terrain on which men move. Organic ideologies are the products of an era, a cluster of historical conditions and circumstances.

Like Gramschi, Paul Ricoeur (1981) characterized ideology as, ‘something in which men live and think’; ‘it operates behind our backs’, and ‘we think from it rather than about it.’ Similarly, Weber (1978) explained ideology as the system of the ideas and representations that dominate the mind of a man or a social group. Clement Bond (2000) framed ideology in three forms: organic, which is pervasive, diffused and deeply embedded within structures; social section, which is disseminated as a world view but represents the interests of a social grouping or class; and non-organic, that stems from individuals who enunciate a world view. David Apter (1964) defined ideologies as
“frameworks of consciousness” which provide men with an interpretation of the world for the purposes of acting within it.

Ideology is seen as one of the major influences that mobilize individuals and groups into committing acts of terrorism and provides them with a cultural and religious underpinning and guide for action. It does not by itself radicalize people, but helps carry the radical course on which many have embarked. As Ali (2005) mentioned, a radical ideology is indisputably an essential ingredient in producing terrorism and an ideology that was not violently radical could hardly justify terrorism. However, ideology, on its own, is not usually a sufficient explanation for violent radicalization. Zeyno Baran (2005) indicates that indoctrinating individuals with radical ideology leads them to be recruited by more extreme organizations where they can take part in actual operations. El Houdaiby (2005) stated that radicalism is caused by a complex assortment of social, political, economic and ideological factors, some of which are more important than others. The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 in the U.S. Congress describes radicalization as “an extremist belief system for facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.”

Borum (2004) describes how a radical ideology is often used to justify violence. He identifies four observable stages that commonly appear during the ideological development process:

a) Identifying some undesirable event or condition (“It’s not right.”)
b) Framing the undesirable condition as an injustice (“It’s not fair.”)
c) Holding an individual or group responsible and identifying that individual or group as the target (“You’re evil.”)
d) Deeming the target responsible for the injustice ("It’s your fault.") to dehumanize them, make it easier to commit violence against them, and promote oneself as good.

**Ideology-Radicalization Process Relation in Muslim society**

Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to an injustice, real or imagined, that they feel must be corrected. Hafez (2006) explained the importance of ideology by stating, “Once a person goes through the process of violent radicalization, ideology becomes an important factor in sustaining it.” The ideology weaves a powerful yet simple narrative based on three themes, as Ergil (1980) proposes in similar points: Muslims continue to endure global humiliation; Arab leaders are impotent and collaborators with the West; and, if Muslims sacrifice and actively wage jihad, then they will eventually succeed. Harchaoui (2005) claimed that during the radicalization process, Muslims construct their own Koran as a religious-ideological mindset for their behavior; they construct their own parallel social groups, disconnected from the dominant society; and they construct their own world of an idealized, pure, unified Muslim world where all ‘other’ elements are absent.

Currently, violent radicalization of Muslim communities is considered together with jihad. Jihad can be launched on many levels and can take several shapes and modalities (B. Barber, 1996; Firestone, 1999; Johnson, 2002). It can be applied to an individual’s quest toward purity and piety, to a community’s striving toward reformation and renewal, or to a nation’s fight against deviation and corruption. Sinai (2007) asserted that ideologies such as the global Salafi movement supported by Al Qaeda, promote the restoration of their own societies to a state of religious “purity” that supposedly had
existed in previous centuries. Radical groups rely on their (mis)interpretation of jihad to justify their passions, intentions, and actions. As Farhad Khosrokhavar (2005) described, most of the Muslims, involved in the trajectory of violent radicalization, were convinced that Islam is being oppressed and mistreated in several places like Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, and Western countries because of an alliance between Christians and Jews that puts Islam in a position that leads to jihad. Jihadi ideology is based today on what is commonly known as Salafism, an ambiguous concept that has served to designate various and very different movements throughout the years.

Torres et al. (2006) mentioned that the ideology of Salafism is concentrated on three nuclei:

a) Religious nucleus: which provides principles and a method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and problems. Salafism believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and paths of the Prophet they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands,

b) Political nucleus: which aims to re-establish the caliphate, politically uniting the countries with a Muslim majority and establishing a form of government that guarantees the primacy of religion in society and state affairs. To achieve this end, it is necessary to remove tyrants that govern Muslim states and end the international order led by the West and particularly its influence over Islamic territory and to struggle also against those governments that occupy the land of Islam,

c) Instrumental nucleus (to obtain political and religious objectives): this wants to mobilize the Muslim world so it can regain consciousness of its greatness and the humiliation it suffers.

Marc Sageman (2004) concluded that, “the Salafi ideology is based on the following diagnosis: Islam became decadent because it strayed from the righteous path.
Recapturing the glory and dignity of the Golden Age requires a return to the authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Mohammed and his companions.” Likewise, interpretations not based on the original sources of the religion are viewed as distortions that lead Muslims to stray from the path of God.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF RADICALIZATION

For the purposes of this study, the operational definition of violent radicalization will be borrowed from The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 of the U.S. Congress (October 24th, 2007), which defines the term “violent radicalization” as “an extremist belief system for facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.” In order to utilize “radicalization” in an appropriate way and make the distinction between radicalization and violent radicalization, this study prefers to use “violent radicalization” instead of radicalization. As Arjman (2008) asserted, to maintain the framework of a definition and adapt it to the social conditions of a society is not an alien practice in social sciences. Since it is mentioned before, the perception of radicalization can be different in various countries or regions. In the West or US, going to a mosque or wearing Islamic clothes may be considered radical activities and deserving of cautiousness regarding the entrance to the violently radicalization pathway. However, these kinds of activities may not be proof that targeted persons get into the process of violent radicalization in Muslim-dominated societies because they may be perceived as a part of regular belief system, tradition and culture of that society.
Summary

Terrorism is defined and perceived in various ways within and between professional boundaries. Although it varies, there are three common features of terrorism acts; contains violence, mostly conducted with political motivation and not only governmental institutions, civilians are also targeted as well.

Discussions on terrorism and its aspects always shaped with two different perspectives, social and psychological. Although both perspectives are believed to make extensive contributions to the terrorism field, for the complete explanation of terrorism, researchers are turning toward psychosocial perspectives that mainly frame violent acts with the behaviors influenced by the social settings.

Recently, terror acts are considered as the outcome of violent radicalization. Radicalization is believed as a gradual process that involves change in beliefs, isolation from the host society, rejecting the principles of that society and potential to be a member of terrorist organization. Resentments, exploitation of beliefs and circumstances also contribute to the phenomenon. Not only abovementioned issues have contribution to terrorism and radicalization, ideology also has important position in shaping such terms into a systematic approach. Ideology is considered as the system of ideas and representations that dominate the mind of a man or a social group.
Chapter II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

(Why are people violently radicalized?)

In pursuing the inquiries about violent radicalization of individuals apprehended after the 2003 Istanbul Bombings in Turkey, the researcher found Dollard’s (1939) Frustration-Aggression Theory and Magranella’s (1998) Theory of Civil Violence and Terrorism as useful theoretical constructs to understand the roots of violent radicalization of the aforesaid group of people. This study will use Dollard’s theory as a model that explains why individuals in Muslim societies as a whole become violently radicalized. Magranella’s theory will be used for a more narrowed field – roots of violent radicalization in Turkey.

Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

Does frustration serve a role for becoming violently radicalized? To what extent can frustration explain the variation in the involvement of violent radicalization? At first glance, a relationship between a frustrating event and a consequent involvement in any violent acts seems likely. However, constructing such a relationship requires an extensive analysis of individuals, which is very demanding and hard to apply in the study of terrorism due to difficulties in the accessibility of research subjects.

While there are difficulties in the application of frustration into terrorism, the relationship between frustration and aggression had been largely examined in the psychology long before it was first applied to the study of social violence in 1970s. The
frustration-aggression hypothesis has dominated the psychological study of aggression during the preceding three decades of its invention in 1939 by Dollard and his colleagues. Although the concept has been extensively criticized in the following years and the original version has been reviewed several times, the central proposition of a causal relationship between a preceding frustrating event and a following aggressive behavior still remains as the rule (Berkowitz, 1969, 1972; Feshbach, 1971; Whiting & Child, 1953).

**Basic Assumptions and Versions of Frustration-Aggression**

The hypothesis primarily proposed that “the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard et al., 1939). In this context, frustration was defined as the “interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence.” Occasionally, however, the term frustration is used not only as the process of blocking a personal goal, but also as a reaction to such blocking. In other words, in order for a person to be considered as frustrated, that person should not only be thwarted from reaching his goal, but also should show some type of reaction. Dollard et al. (1939) stated that the certainty of aggression depends on: (a) the reinforcement value of interfered goal response; (b) the level of frustration; and (c) the number of interferences. In the occurrence of aggression, first, the reinforcement value of the interfered goal is important because frustration is related to goal attainment. Second, the level of frustration becomes a significant factor because not all frustrations instigate
aggression, but rather frustration instigates aggression only if it is complete. Third, if frustrations can be leveled, then the number of interferences becomes important. That is, frustration is an additive process and it develops cumulatively.

One of the significant components of the frustration-aggression hypothesis concerns the displacement of aggression. Dollard et al. proposed that frustration directs aggression against the primary source of frustration. However, at times, frustration instigates aggression against an alternative target. The displacement of target occurs if there is an association between the primary and the alternative source of frustration. The strength of instigation is related to the similarities between the primary and alternative targets.

How long can instigation to aggression ensue? Instigation to aggression can only be reduced by aggressive or hostile activities either against the primary or alternative targets. Since frustration is an additive process, the instigation to aggression increases with every frustration until it eventually results in violence. Consequently, one may imply from the theory that frustration has long-term effects.

**Versions of Frustration-Aggression**

As mentioned, the frustration-aggression hypothesis assumes that, (a) aggression is always based on frustration, and (b) frustration always leads to aggression. Proponents of the hypothesis quickly acknowledged thereafter that these assumptions were too simplistic and general. Miller (1941), one of the coauthors of the original version, then had to rephrase the latter part holding that frustration may lead to a number of responses,
one of which is “instigation to aggression.” Thus, he clearly acknowledged that frustration may not only result in aggression, but may also result in alternative actions.

Miller’s revised version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis put forth that, (a) any aggressive behavior occurs as a result of frustration, and (b) frustration instigates behaviors that may or may not be aggressive. Accordingly, frustration is sufficient but not a necessary condition for aggression.

In 1962, Berkowitz (1962) made the most sweeping contribution to Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis. He recognized that a frustrating event increases the probability of aggression and this relationship exists “in many animal species, including man” (p. 2). Berkowitz also agreed with Dollard et al. when he held that “frustration is an interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence” (p. 6). On the other hand, he asserted that goal response should be active and the individual should be prevented from reaching that goal if frustration is to result in aggression. In other words, for Berkowitz, frustration is neither a simple deprivation nor a state of mind, but rather is an interference with the realization of a (specific) goal-driven activity at a specific time.

In an important reformulation of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, Berkowitz (1989) posited that frustration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for aggression. However, frustration stimulates an emotional reaction, which then creates a readiness for aggressive behaviors. In Berkowitz’s opinion, even this readiness is not sufficient alone to create aggression unless there is what he calls suitable cues. Berkowitz defined suitable cues as stimuli that are associated with previous or present frustrating
instigators. Accordingly, all stimuli that can be associated with a frustrating experience could be a potential aggressive cue one day. In this context, the probability of aggression depends on two factors: (1) the strength of association between the stimulus and the past or the present frustrating instigators, and (2) the strength of readiness.

When does frustration actually result in aggression? According to Berkowitz (1962), the state of aggressiveness or aggressive drive ends whenever the frustrated individual encounters an aggression-triggering stimulus. In other words, aggression results whenever the frustrated individual finds an appropriate target against which to direct his aggression. However, the appropriateness of the target or the existence of aggression-triggering stimulus does not suggest that this target could be anyone or anything. For Berkowitz, aggressive means and agents may be substituted whereas a target may not be. That is, aggression cannot be displaced in the sense of changing a primary target. Attacks on alternative targets can be explained by excess violence that is committed by extremely ready aggressors.

**Empirical Evidence for Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis and Terrorism**

The literature on the terrorist profile has often questioned the probable link between frustration and joining in terrorism. A majority of the existing studies found support for this relationship. In a study of Palestinian women’s motivation to terrorism, Erez and Berko (2007) found that women sought revenge for harms and losses which they suffered and which they attribute to military operations before they joined a terrorist organization. Stern (2003), Sprinzak (2003), and Soibelman (2004) mention that real or
perceived humiliation of the Palestinian people by Israeli policies has given rise to desperation and unmanageable outrage among the Palestinian people.

Implications of Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis for Violent Radicalization

This study argues that accepting the ideologies of terrorist organizations and looking at terrorism and violent radicalization from a psychosocial perspective are the most crucial points to having a true understanding of the phenomenon. The Frustration-Aggression hypothesis of Dollard et al. (1939) states that the certainty of aggression depends on: (a) the reinforcement value of an interfered goal response, (b) the level of frustration, and (c) the number of interferences.

Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis proposes the importance of the reinforcement value of interfered goal responses as the primary steps for aggression. Sageman (2004) defined the global Salafi jihad as, “a worldwide religious reviveralist movement, which aims to re-establish past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines.” Being thwarted from reaching such goals because of either Western or apostate Muslim rulers will result in some reactions, which includes aggression. As the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (ITAC) mentioned, contemporary events, arising from the foreign and domestic policies of both Western and Muslim governments, have had significant effects on the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide, which inevitably lead to frustration (Table 1).

According to Dollard et al., the term frustration should include reaction besides the blockage of a goal. From this point of view, a violence or terrorist attack conducted by violently radicalized Muslims can be considered as the result of frustration.
Aggression as a result of frustration would be directly realized as the primary source of angst or related targets where we experience the displacement of aggression. The strength of the relation plays a crucial role in the displacement of aggression. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization declared so-called jihad towards the primary sources of the humiliation, deprivation, betrayal, injustice, oppression and subjugation situation of Muslim countries and the U.S., Israel and apostate regimes in Muslim countries being the targets of terrorist organizations. Moreover, they declared asymmetric war towards the countries and civilian peoples, who they perceive to be part of those countries or governments.

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<tr>
<th>Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis</th>
<th>Implementation of Radicalization Process in Muslim societies supporting Al-Qaeda</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frustration has additive process and develops cumulatively</td>
<td>Continuation of humiliation of Muslim population, contemporary conflicts around the world involving Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement of aggression. Primary or alternatives related to source of frustration</td>
<td>Targeting direct countries or civilians of that country. Even citizens of allies. Asymmetric war strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>It stimulates an emotional reaction and readiness for aggression</td>
<td>Not every time attacking as a result of frustration. Being potential to attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of the reinforcement value of interfered goal responses</td>
<td>Ruling the whole world as they did before</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theory of Civil Violence and Terrorism in Turkey

In the “Civil Violence in Turkey,” Paul Magnarella examined political violence that had taken place in Turkey in the years following the 1980 military coup. In order to account for violence in Turkey, Magnarella developed a theory of the “culture of contention” which, based on his observations during his fieldwork in Turkey, was an emerging genesis of the mass culture of material aspirations nurtured by the mass media and greater exposure to the lifestyle of the industrially advanced West. His theory combines major economic, political, demographic, social structural, ideological and the psychological factors contributing to civil violence in Turkey.

In order to support his arguments he invokes Gurr’s theory of “relative deprivation” according to which the causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent; second the politicization of that discontent; and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participation in collective violence” (Gurr, 1970). In light of this, Magnarella changes Gurr’s causal sequence in civil violence and terrorism. For him, the first in the sequence is the existence of infrastructural and perceptual conditions leading to the development of discontent; second, the inability of the society to correct the infrastructural (social, political, economic) deficiencies; third, the acceptance of ideologies condemning those conditions creating discontent and advocating violent action to alter the conditions; and fourth, violent action. Further, he argues that the more extensive and intense the first two conditions, the more likely that widespread (civil) political violence will occur.
Table 2
Theory of Civil Violence / Terrorism and Implementation to Radicalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Stage</th>
<th>2nd Stage</th>
<th>3rd Stage</th>
<th>4th Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theory of Civil Violence and Terrorism</strong></td>
<td>Existence of infrastructural and perceptual conditions leading to the development of discontent</td>
<td>The inability of the society to correct the infrastructural deficiencies</td>
<td>The acceptance of ideology, condemning conditions creating discontent and advocating violent action to alter the conditions</td>
<td>Violent action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation to radicalization Process in Turkish Al-Qaeda</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion from economic, social and political realms: Turkey is considered as an ally of West, Israel and U.S.</td>
<td>Search for other means, isolation, alienation host society, like-minded, individuals, reshaping their life</td>
<td>AQ Camps, Salafi ideology, code names, meetings, picnics to motivate members, advocate action, no need to go abroad instead make jihad here</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Magnarella placed importance on discontent and claimed that some deficiencies and perceptions lead some individuals to become involved in violence. Although he did not mention radicalization, it is very clear that the radicalization process has the same pattern and ends with violence and terrorism. As mentioned earlier, there are still people who believe that religious people are excluded from upper level economic, social and political realms in Turkish society. Moreover, the leader of the Istanbul Bombings, Habib Akdas insists on saying that, “the Muslim community in Turkey is under pressure” (Vick,
2007). The attackers of the Istanbul Bombing also perceived the Turkish government is acting as a strong ally of the West, Israel and the US, and that these countries are responsible for the humiliation of Muslim societies around the world. Secondly, Magnarella proposes the inability of the society to correct the infrastructural deficiencies. Similarly, the radicalization process had shown parallel outlines. It is apparent that radicalized individuals choose their potential mates based on like-minded people’s advice or the fact that they were in close contact with each other for a long time. This proves that because society could not provide any better solutions, they are in search of other means to deal with their discontent and grievances emanating from their feeling of exclusion or suppression. Importantly, individuals who feel these grievances are not involved in any organization yet. In the third stage, by accepting the ideology of the terrorist organization, which claims that Muslims are under pressure and eliminated from society because of “corrupt” and “apostate” regimes, they begin to operate in a more organized and cautious manner. They travel to training camps of terrorist organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan; they adopt a pseudonym, which means that they internalize the terrorist modus operandi and establish a “council” which also proves that they become indoctrinated and accept the ideology of the terrorist organization.
Summary

Terrorism and radicalization experience the lack of theoretical guidance that helps to identify the real causes of the phenomenon. Although it is hard to base radicalization and terrorism on a theoretical approach, this study will inquire the radicalization and terrorism from Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis of Dollard and his friends and theory of civil violence and terrorism in Turkey, proposed by Magnarella.

Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis of Dollard and his colleagues (1939) proposed that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression. There were some contributions and revisions made to the theory but the most important one of these contributions was made by Berkowitz in 1989. He posited that although frustration stimulates an emotional reaction that creates readiness for aggressive behaviors, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for aggression. From this point of view, considerable number of studies on terrorism found support for the impact of frustration.

Secondly, this study will apply Magnarella’s theory of civil violence and terrorism in Turkey to understand the real facts behind radicalization and terrorism. This theory invoked the “relative deprivation theory” of Gurr and based its arguments that there is a causal sequence in political violence. It starts with discontent, and then politicization of such discontent and actualization of it against actors or objects. On the other hand, Magnarella primarily put importance on infrastructural deficiencies and
perceptions those lead to discontent, secondly inability of the society to correct the
problems or circumstances, thirdly acceptance of ideology and ultimately violent act.
CHAPTER III

THE AL-QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION and TURKISH STRUCTURE of the AL-QAEDA

The Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization

History of the Al Qaeda

In the 1980s, a large number of Muslims from predominantly Muslim countries traveled to join the Afghanis’ war against the Soviet Union. These people traveled to Afghanistan for the specific purpose of expelling Soviet infidels from Muslim lands. Many mainstream and radical clerics and scholars also approved these travels. They encouraged the war as a defensive struggle, which pitted Muslims against atheist (communist) non-Muslims. Like many jihadists, Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi contractor, also went to Afghanistan to fight in the war against the Soviets. Coming from a rich family, he used his personal funds to establish himself as a financial donor and as a recruiter of largely Arab volunteers for Afghan mujahidin. He created a network of recruiting and fund-raising offices around the world that are called “Maktab al-Khidamat” which is considered to be the organizational forerunner of Al-Qaeda. Its purpose was to facilitate recruitment, training and fundraising for foreign mujahidin, as well as to chronicle the multinational jihad against the Soviets (Gunaratna, 2002).

Afghanistan provided training opportunities and a secure base for aspiring jihadists to learn the skills they needed in local struggles; it allowed religious nationalists
fleeing the security authorities of Muslim regimes to regroup; and critically, it provided a small fringe group of extreme Islamist revolutionaries with face-to-face opportunities for selecting and indoctrinating mujahidin and seasoned nationalist fighters for global jihad. Afghanistan was only one of several areas where radical Islamic ideas were taking root and practical military skills were being acquired. Algeria, Egypt, Kashmir, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chechnya were others.

After the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. He lobbied Saudi officials not to host U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia against a probable Iraqi invasion. He argued instead for the raising of a “mujahidin” army to throw out Iraq from Kuwait. Anger and resentment towards the West was further inflamed by the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia to fight against Iraq from 1991-2003. Resentment and fear of religious persecution elsewhere was particularly effective in recruiting radical Muslims for jihad in defense of Dar-al-Islam (Muslim lands or communities). Bin Laden and his followers perceived this U.S. action as the occupation of sacred Islamic ground. The American presence that is perceived as “polluting the Land of the Two Holy Places” resolved Bin Laden to target the West. In 1991, Bin Laden split with Saudi leadership and was driven out of the country to Sudan. Once there, he hosted and trained Al-Qaeda militants to fight against enemies in the name of jihad until 1996, when he was expelled, once again to Afghanistan. After being expelled from Saudi Arabia and Sudan, Bin Laden and his associates transformed Al-Qaeda into a global network as a coalition of factions of radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world. Their goal was to unite all Muslims and establish a
government, which follows the rule of Caliphs that seek to establish an Islamic community ruled by Shari’ah (Congressional Research Service, 2005).

The Islamist victory against the Soviets re-energized Salafi ideology and moved it from a local to a global struggle. As Gunaratna (2004) points out, Al Qaeda began as an organization, but with time it has transformed into a movement that inspires millions in no direct contact with the initial network. Since 9/11, Al-Qaeda has clearly shown itself to be a quick, flexible and adaptive entity. The US and allies destroyed and displaced Al-Qaeda’s training camps and operational bases, their infrastructure and command-and-control nucleus in Afghanistan. However, in retrospect, the loss of these infrastructures does not appear to have affected Al-Qaeda’s ability to mount terrorist attacks to the extent anticipated (Hoffman, 2004).

**Ideology of the Al-Qaeda**

Al-Qaeda is one of the terrorist organizations driven by Salafi ideology and is currently operating in more than 60 countries. It promotes radical, Pan-Islamic ideology, which has found widespread appeal throughout the Islamic world (Langhorne, 2006). In many statements Osama Bin Laden has repeatedly explained the organization’s two main objectives: a) to end the presence of the US and Western countries in the Muslim world, and, b) to overthrow all corrupt, apostate regimes, and pro-Western governments in Muslim countries in order to strengthen and purify Islam itself. Hafez (2007) outlined that the leaders of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad movement weave together a powerful yet simple narrative based on three themes: Muslims continue to endure global
humiliation; Arab leaders are impotent and are collaborators with the West; and that if Muslims sacrifice and actively wage jihad, then they will eventually succeed.

This feeling of humiliation is very important in understanding the mental universe of the Al Qaeda members. Khosrokhavar (2005) discussed three kinds of humiliation that have particular significance on the radicalization process. Firstly, they experience humiliation in everyday life by being economically marginalized and feeling socially inferior. Secondly, they experience humiliation of the Muslim world in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq or Palestine. Finally, there is a feeling that their immersion in the Western world has defiled them. Aras and Toktas (2007) claimed that the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization has an apocalyptic world-view and its goal is to destroy the countries and people responsible for the crises, sufferings and problems in the Islamic world. Within this mindset, terrorism is the only available language and method to convey the message to Western enemies and elsewhere. The terror network propagates this destructive ideology to recruit terrorists in operationally diversified ways, thus differing from many other conventional terror organizations.

Although Al Qaeda’s ideology is exclusive in nature, the network accepts newcomers wanting to serve the common goal. The network urges Muslims to join in their jihad (in this case the war on infidels) against the enemies of Islam. The militants become a part of the network by their own decision and are free to establish cells in their own contexts. Although Jihadi interpretations may differ in various territories, the central message turns on an operational philosophy of like-minded perceptions under the Al-
Qaeda umbrella. As a result of the virtual state image, the striking down of personnel and organizations will not make the network disappear.

**Organizational Structure of the Al-Qaeda**

One of the major characteristics of Al Qaeda is the disappearance of the rigidly hierarchical structure that typified classic terrorism. Khosrokhavar (2005) clarified that members of the organization are highly mobile and come together for specific actions. Al Qaeda is structured like a decentralized transnational mafia rather than a centralized terrorist structure with a real organization. Elkus (2007) has the same approach when he says that Al-Qaeda has been moving towards decentralization ever since the invasion of Afghanistan. Isolated cells and loosely affiliated groups have only a tenuous connection to the greater Al-Qaeda hierarchy. Instead, they tap into Bin Laden's "franchise" and appropriate its ideological "brand name" for their actions.

Rohan Gunaratna (2005) remarks on this unique structural infrastructure by explaining that:

> It is characterized by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust capacity for regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class and national boundaries. It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamic political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Al-Qaeda enabled to act in an organizational way what radical Muslims previously did not have.
Gunaratna claimed that the Al-Qaeda’s structure enables it to exercise direct and indirect control through a persuasive, distant force. By issuing periodic announcements, speeches and writings, Bin Laden indoctrinates trains and controls a core inner group and at the same time inspires and supports peripheral cadres. He not only engages in relations with Islamic groups, he has influenced their thinking and behavior, as well. Additionally, Aras and Toktas (2007) assert that the most significant feature of Al-Qaeda is a common psychological mindset in various locations, as members of a virtual network. The organization has been shaped by a common ideology rather than in a physical framework. It operates as a large umbrella scheme expanded over a network of organizations, ideally providing invisible ties that hold the scheme together. This terror network is minus an operational leadership, but sprouts mushrooming units in different parts of the globe. Guidance and leadership are based on ideas that have originated from a specific interpretation of Islamic teaching.

Mark Burgess (2004) posits that the organization has three forms: a) an Al-Qaeda central group which includes Bin Laden and his associates like Ayman Al Zawahiri, an Egyptian strategist; b) a broad range of other groups which have some kind of link to a solid core and c) groups that have an Al-Qaeda ideology and operate locally with a safe haven for the solid core. We see similar approaches in Omar Ashour’s explanations of the organization, too. He divided Al-Qaeda into three layers: a) the first layer is composed of a small core group that surrounds Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and receives direct orders from them; b) the second layer is Al-Qaeda’s self-styled “branches” in Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt; c) the third layer is that of the ‘Internet militants.’ This
group is mostly teenagers and young men inspired by Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric, but have no organizational ties or contacts with its network. In other words, this is a layer of ‘self-recruited members.’ This layer is likely the one that will be affected the most by the contemporary conflicts involving Muslims, and encouraged to follow Salafi-Jihadism ideology in general (Ashour, 2007).

The Turkish National Police classifies the Al Qaeda structure into 4 groups. These are: a) The Central (Core) group of Al Qaeda: the central (core) structure does not have a considerable number of loyal militants; b) Local Terrorist Organizations inspired by Al Qaeda: IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and the Moroccan Islamic Jihad; a more effective form of terrorism involving actors operating independently in their original countries rather than as a sub-unit of central structure; c) Independent Components: existing in the structure, groups specifically assigned by the core group of Al-Qaeda for special operations like 9/11, London 7/7; and d) Mujahidins: those fighting against U.S. and coalition forces training in Afghanistan (TNP, 2006).

Khosrokhavar (2005) claimed that there are five types of actors in the Al-Qaeda network; the great Qadis of radical Islamism originated from Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula and Afghan networks; fighters of Arab origin who fought in the Afghan war and then returned home to launch a jihad in the name of a radicalized Islam; Arabs who left their home countries to live in the West and be indoctrinated in the West; young Europeans from immigrant families who have been educated in Europe and joined Al
Qaeda after being indoctrinated there or coming into contact with the network in Pakistan or Afghanistan; and European converts to Islam.

Al-Qaeda as an organization has adapted its structure and strategy to combat measures implemented to destroy it after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda is successfully carrying out attacks through associated groups and has shifted its centralized structure to a decentralized one. Ideological support is growing and this subsequently creates difficulties for law enforcement agencies to make a distinction between its supporters (TNP, 2006). As Burke (2004) writes:

“Al-Qaeda today has become more an idea or a concept than an organization; an amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely networked transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization with both a defined or identifiable command and control apparatus. Al-Qaeda in essence has transformed itself from a bureaucratic entity that could be destroyed or an irregular army that could be defeated on the battlefield to a less-tangible transnational movement true to its name—the “base of operation” or “foundation” or, as other translations have it, the “precept” or “method.”

Bruce Hoffman also mentions the decentralized structure of Al Qaeda. He (2006) states that today there are many Al-Qaeda rather than the single Al-Qaeda of the past. It has become a vast enterprise, an international movement or franchise operation consisting of like-minded local representatives, who are loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, and are advancing their common goal independently of one another.
**Attacks of Al Qaeda**

The climax of Al-Qaeda’s attacks came to fruition on September 11, 2001. Four planes were hijacked; three of them allegedly hitting their targets while the fourth heroically thwarted from reaching its destination. Although Al-Qaeda had realized suicide attacks towards U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998, the amount of terrorist attacks increased tremendously after the 9/11 attacks. These attacks included acts of terror in Tunisia, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Casablanca, Spain and Istanbul.

![Al Qaeda Attacks Around the World](image)

**Figure 1 The Al-Qaeda attacks around the world**

This is a list of all the major Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks that that took place within two and half years of the 9/11 attacks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 February 1993</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>WTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1996</td>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>USA Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1998</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>US Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1998</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>US Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October 2000</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>USS Cole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 2001</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>WTC, Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 2003</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Entertainment Places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 Nov. 2003</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Synagogues, HSBC Bank, England Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March 2004</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 2005</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Subway</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- In 2002, Al-Qaeda reportedly firebombs a synagogue in Tunisia killing nineteen and injuring twenty-two.

- On October 12th 2002, in Bali, Indonesia, a nightclub is attacked killing approximately one hundred and eighty people.

- In 2002 in Kenya, Al-Qaeda bombs an Israeli owned hotel killing fifteen and injuring forty.

- In 2003, Al-Qaeda supports suicide attacks on three Western housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia killing thirty-four people and injuring eight (Cronin, 2004).

- In 2003 “fourteen suicide bombers, members of a local group allegedly connected to Al-Qaeda, carried out nearly simultaneous attack on five Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing forty-five people and injuring more than one hundred” (Cronin, 2004).

- In 2003, four suicide truck bombs attack synagogues, the British Consulate and the HSBC bank in Istanbul killing fifty-nine people and injuring more than eight hundred.

- In 2003, organization members target four packed commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killing one hundred and ninety people and injuring more than fourteen hundred. (Cronin, 2004).

- In 2005, four suicide bombers target British trains and double-decker buses resulting in over fifty casualties.
Turkey and the Al-Qaeda in Turkey

Terrorist ideologies in Turkey

The geographic location and ethnic diversity of Turkey have been major disadvantages in terms of the experience with terrorism since the foundation of the country. Turkey shares borders with problematic countries like Iran and Iraq, Syria and Armenia, which are believed to have contributed to terrorism in Turkey. Thousands of terror incidents occur in Turkey each year. For example, in Istanbul alone, the number of total terror incidents between 2003 and 2008 is over 500 (Ekici, Ozkan, Celik & Maxfield, 2008).

In light of the above-mentioned facts, Turkey has experienced attacks stemming from three major terrorist ideologies for a long time. The first ideological trend is religiously motivated; the second is derived from the remnants of the PKK’s (Partiya Karkarei Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers Party) Kurdish liberation movement and their separatist/rebellion ideology; the third is the far-left, Marxist ideology, without an ethnic focus. Each group has increased its attacks on state and civil society institutions and representatives. Although it is useful to view these groups as ideological clusters, it should be stressed that neither the leftist nor the religiously motivated Islamic movements are singular or unified actors.

Each ideological movement is made up of several groups, with limited or nonexistent practical cooperation with other groups of similar ideologies. Where alliances have been made, typically there has been a tactical rather than a strategic focus on short-term cooperation. According to Cline (2004), such alliances have been more than offset
by the fissiparous nature of most groups, commonly leading to splits engendering additional movements. There are numerous studies today primarily focused on how terrorist organizations are shaped under the influences of these major ideologies. This study will focus on the religiously motivated ideology and terrorist organizations, specifically Turkish Al-Qaeda.

**Religiously Motivated Terrorism in Turkey**

It became clear with the last terrorist attacks that international activities have become more important to these groups. Terrorists not only operate inside their own countries, they establish relations with other terrorist organizations from the outside and conduct various types of terrorist attacks as well. Although terrorist organizations in Turkey conduct operations inside the country, they always have strong relations with other organizations from different countries. Within this framework, religiously motivated terrorist organizations in Turkey have also been supported from the outside, from countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Turkey is vulnerable to religiously motivated activities because of its geographical position and perception of subjugation of religious people in the society. Its close proximity to conflict areas such as Syria, Iran, Iraq and Georgia has amplified Turkey’s position as a transit route for the religiously motivated terrorist organizations operating in these countries. It can be reasoned that Turkey constitutes an obvious target as a Muslim country with close ties to the West, as well. Its secular political system
presents an alternative model, where Islam and democracy coexist, for the rest of the Muslim countries (Cakir, 2008).

In addition to its geographical importance, some extremists with fundamentalist ideologies target Turkey as a location to promote their message. Religiously motivated ideologies in Turkey, as mentioned above, are mainly influenced by: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by increasing its religious-based political influences in Turkey; the Iranian Revolution where the Iranian Shah stepped down in 1979 and was replaced by Khomeini’s ideology; the translation of many Iranian and Egyptian authors (Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutub, Motahhari, Ali Seriati, Ali Korani and Khomeini) and their published books into Turkish; and Saudi Arabia, by way of promoting its Wahhabi belief system which is considered a revivalist ideology throughout the Muslim world, including in Turkey (Alkan, 2002). Importantly, as the global Salafi Jihadi ideology, the Saudi Wahhabi belief system also promotes the restoration of Muslim societies to a state of religious “purity” that had supposedly existed in previous centuries (Sinai, 2007, p. 39). Sageman (2004) proposed that the Saudi government embarked on an ambitious program of spreading its fundamentalist vision throughout the world. While the Wahhabi ideology rejects the Iranian revolution and considers it an illegitimate version of Islam, it is consistent with the global jihadi ideology, celebrating heroes who had sacrificed their lives in their attempt to build a Salafi utopia (p. 105).

These different sources targeting Turkey have some similar features:

- They originate in the Middle East;
- Their agendas have an international dimension;
They are not cooperative with the world;

They have a reactionary structure.

The sources display some common features but these ideologies maintain significant differences with Turkey in the perception of Islam. In the Turkish culture and history, religion has always been viewed as a tool for forming a peaceful and obedient society. One of the reasons why the Ottomans could rule over millions of people without significant conflicts was believed to be the tolerance and respect they showed toward other religions in line with the instructions of the Islamic doctrine. Moreover, as Alkan (2002) claimed, one of the prominent ideologists in Iran, Motahhari, defined Islam with, “blood, revolution, tears and jihad” where well-known Turkish theologians like Yunus Emre, Mevlana and Haci Bektas Veli defined Islam with, “love, friendship, tolerance and compassion.” However, after 1980, inspired by a Middle East originated perception that integrates Islam with “blood, war, and revolution”; we encountered some violent terrorist organizations like Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA/C (Great Eastern Islamic Raiders/ Front) and Al-Qaeda that still operate in Turkey.

**Al Qaeda in Turkey**

Previous chapters claimed that there were various terrorist organizations from different factions in Turkey such as DHKP/C from a leftist and Marxist ideology, PKK from a separatist ideology and Turkish Hezbollah from a religious ideology. The Turkish Al-Qaeda, which is becoming more active in recent years in Turkey, has different aspects regarding the recruitment process, organizational structure, and ideology. Most of the
terrorist organizations operating in Turkey are recruiting their members from specific regions that have some infrastructural deficiencies and political problems, such as, the eastern part of Turkey where much of the Kurdish population live. However, Turkish Al-Qaeda members are from many different regions and it is hard to identify a specific region that represents Al-Qaeda or point to Al-Qaeda recruits from that region. Besides, only Turkish Al-Qaeda, among active terrorist organizations in Turkey, has international objectives and enables the organization’s structure to be in accordance with these goals such as getting trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and being commanded by foreigners.

The recruitment source of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, which can be called the “mujahidin network,” is not new to Turkey. Rusen Cakir (2008) asserted that there were already sufficient grounds for concerns about the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks in Turkey. It is significant here to highlight the importance of the perception and interpretation of contemporary conflicts involving Muslims: the negative effects of a top-down implementation of secularism after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; some infrastructural deficiencies that people were faced; a perception among religious people that they are excluded from economic, social and political realms in Turkish society; the state’s rejection of Islamic networks like traditional cults that had never been violent; subjugation of the religious people in the community based on principles of the Republic; and the perception that Muslim communities around the world have been humiliated by the West and the U.S., thereby engendering a feeling of responsibility to end Muslim’s worst abuses leading some religiously moderate or mainstream Muslims to criticism.
Likewise, according to Vick (2007), these perceptions led individuals to insist that, “the Muslim community in Turkey is under pressure and the Turkish government is acting under the control of the U.S. and the West.” Thus, it can be concluded that the repression of the state has significantly contributed to the radicalization of Islamic groups (Herman, 2003, pp. 265-267).

Prior to the 1990s, Turkish extremists were importing radical Islamic ideologies from well-known foreign radicals by translating their published books to Turkish, but from the late 1990s to the present, groups or individuals, inspired by radical discourses, started to export militants to “make jihad” in the area of the troubled Islamic world, such as Chechnya, Bosnia and Afghanistan. Exporting the radical individuals to the troubled Islamic world is also related to the gradual declining capacity of sovereign nation-state identity and “the clash of civilization” that Samuel Huntington proposed (1993). Huntington argued that non-state identities such as religious, ethnic and sectarian have become more important in recent decades with the rise of globalization. Such religious identity features a “kin-country syndrome” in which members of the same identity try to help others from the same civilization against their common enemy. Thus, many radical Muslims from Turkey joined the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation, the war in Chechnya that pitted “Slavic-Orthodox” Russians against “Islamic” Chechens and the war in Bosnia between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Similarly, Scott Atran (2009) proposed that devotion to some core values might represent universal responses. Across the world, people believe that devotion to “sacred values” that incorporate moral belief - such as commitment to religion, ummah, brotherhood - are absolute and inviolable.
The discussion of public support in different historical contexts should be mentioned here. During the 1980s and 1990s, it is possible to argue that there was a manifest public support for people who had attended Jihadi training camps and who fought in “global jihad” zones such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, etc.... People thought that there was an ongoing invasion in those areas and the struggle against the invaders was supported by the society. But 9/11 and the 2003 Istanbul Bombings changed the whole picture and reduced public support in the ongoing sense. The struggle of earlier times was seen as a national struggle of peoples in a way against oppressive regimes like the USSR, Serbia and other countries, but after 9/11 and the 2003 bombings, such struggles have been dubbed, “terrorism.” By declaring asymmetric war through the acceptance of the Al-Qaeda ideology, the public perceives these actions as “terrorist acts.” The Al-Qaeda ideology urges all Muslims to attack the U.S., other countries in the West, and Israel and attempts to end the rule of “corrupt” and “apostate” regimes in their own countries. Interestingly, the decrease in public support for Al-Qaeda is not only seen in Turkey. It reflects a fundamental difference felt by many in Muslim society, like scholars and theologians. For many, violent jihad abroad as a defense of Islam, as in Palestine or Kashmir, is justified in a way that terrorism is not. A turn against Al-Qaeda and its operatives has also been experienced in many Muslim societies around the world. Jessica Stern (2010) claimed that:

*Al-Qaeda’s reputation as the brave vanguard against Western oppression has been tarnished by the tens of thousands of Muslim civilians killed in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, and elsewhere since the “war on terror” began. Several Islamist leaders who once supported al-Qaeda, including Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, the*
organization’s ideological godfather, has publicly turned against it, as have many ordinary Muslims.

Although faced with the above facts, successful operations of Al-Qaeda in different regions have enhanced the organization’s recruitment pool, and attracting jihadists in these countries became easier for the organization after some successful operations as well as operations by the Western countries, mainly the United States against the Muslim countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. were a turning point for Turkey’s violently radicalized militants who had formerly limited their activities outside of Turkey to countries like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo. The abovementioned violent radicals who were particularly inspired by global jihad have followed the strategy of the operatives involved in the 9/11 attacks and have started to act in a different manner. While fighting against “enemies” in jihadist regions, hundreds of them had established connections with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and were trained ideologically and militarily in Al-Qaeda camps, which played an important role in the indoctrination process of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. These individuals and groups started to describe Turkey’s political system as corrupt and as “apostate” regime in regard to the country’s position as a strong ally of the United States. Moreover, misunderstandings of what the Quran states and fundamental clashes between religion-based groups have provided the ideological background of these people which ended with the attacks being carried out in Istanbul in 2003.
The Al-Qaeda Structure in Turkey

Being geographically close to conflict areas makes Turkey a transit route to these areas. Perceiving the jihad activities in abovementioned areas as legal and appropriate, supporting them publicly made Turkey a strong base for Al Qaeda.

**TURKISH AL-QUEDA STRUCTURE**

The structure of the organization also shaped according to this situation:

- **Independent Cells**: These are the groups trained in the training camps of Al-Qaeda that return back to Turkey. They prepare themselves for long-term operations. They decide the targets, the time to attack and logistics on their own. They operate either in a semi-independent or independent way but are loyal to the central structure.

- **Mujahidin**: These are the jihadists who fought during the Afghan-Russian war and were trained in Al-Qaeda training camps. They do not have direct relations with the organization. They were involved in the Afghan-Russian war because of “sacred values” and their desires towards martyrdom. The Al-Qaeda terrorist
organization benefits from these mujahidin groups due to their involvement in the Afghan-Russian war.

- **Local Groups/Establishments**: In every Muslim country there exist radical Islamic organizations besides Al-Qaeda that abide and believe in Salafi or Wahhabi ideas considered radical. They may have either direct or indirect relations with the organization. Their members got trained in Al-Qaeda training camps or received financial support from them. Al-Qaeda uses these groups as an umbrella. In Turkey, there are over 20 groups included in this category (TNP, 2006).

**General Information about the Istanbul Bombings**

Turkey had not been attacked by any international terrorist organization since the assassinations of its foreign ministry officials in different countries by ASALA, the Armenian terrorist organization. However, changes in Turkey’s new policies, including recent developments like supporting the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, building relations with Israel, and interfaith dialogue approaches of the Turkish government with different religions made Turkey vulnerable to attacks, especially by religiously motivated terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda.

The Al-Qaeda attacks were crucial in the turning point of a new violent radicalization in Turkey. They were unusual and unexpected. Those attacks showed that there is a new violently radicalized religiously motivated terrorist group in Turkey. The aim, target and process of violent radicalizations were different than the local radical Islamic movements. Despite local radical groups, these new violently radicalized groups
have global goals and targets. The training and radicalization process are somewhat different than those of local groups. The new religiously motivated terrorist organization carried out suicide attacks in Turkey, using four bomb-laden trucks exploding simultaneously, on November 15 and 20, 2003. Turkish Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks, which resulted in 59 deaths and 800 injuries. The targets of the suicide attacks were two synagogues, the British Consulate and the HSBC Bank Headquarters in Istanbul. Regarding the attack, Bandow (2003) explains, “The Istanbul Bombings -- like those in Riyadh, Jakarta, Bali, and on the World Trade Center -- take terrorism a step further. They are intended to kill noncombatants. The goal is not to resist foreign military power per se, but to murder and terrorize civilians. The willingness to kill, and kill indiscriminately, is expected to cow peoples and governments.”

Suicide Attacks against Synagogues

On November 15, 2003, trucks, laden with bombs, simultaneously attacked the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel Synagogues. These two attacks resulted in the death of 27 people including the two suicide bombers, a police officer, and a security guard.

Suicide Attacks against English Institutions

Five days after the suicide attacks against the synagogues, on the 20th of November 2003, two simultaneous suicide attacks targeted the HSBC Bank Headquarters and the English Consulate General. As a result of these bombings, 32 people died, including the English Consul-general, two suicide bombers and two police officers. An additional 258 people were injured and 48 vehicles were destroyed completely.
According to press accounts, more than 150 Turkish suspects were arrested in connection to the events, with twelve receiving the bulk of the attention (Hacaloglu, 2003). With the exception of the suicide bombers who died in the attacks, most of the suspected members of Turkish Al-Qaeda escaped to Syria (Vick, 2007). These operatives continued their fight in Iraq against U.S. forces and many of them died there, whether in suicide attacks or by grenades. Six surviving members, who were involved in the 2003 Bombings, were captured by the Turkish National Police and detained (Mercan, 2006).

The investigations and interrogation statements of the arrested members revealed that the attacks were carried out after very careful and detailed planning. As Chandler and Gunaratna (2007) discuss in their book, Countering Terrorism, the British Consulate and HSBC Bank were not the original targets. The group originally wanted to hit U.S. bases
in Turkey, but when they experienced difficulties, they turned to softer targets. The locations of the revised targets resulted in mass casualties, mostly of innocent Muslim Turkish citizens.

Operatives used masking techniques to eliminate the agencies’ abilities to carry out surveillance and tracking. They opened a detergent factory to reduce suspiciousness of their activity. This kind of activity protected them from the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies prior to the attacks. Without connecting the bomb-circuits, nobody recognized that the detergent or fertilizer was intended to be used as the main ingredients in the bomb-laden trucks (Mercan, 2006). Additionally, they reduced communications to eliminate the potential for the operations to be noticed by security agencies.

Other measures that Turkish Al-Qaeda used before and after the attacks include renting a bank box to hold money they received from the core Al-Qaeda organization. This reduced the risks involved in keeping the money in an account. They also maintained strict rules of confidentiality, limiting information among the members with the highest priority in the organization. Lastly, they applied for new passports to eliminate suspicion while crossing the border after the attacks (Pekgozlu, 2007).

**Summary**

The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization emerged with the ending of Soviet war in Afghanistan and addressing the Mujahidins those fought in the war against Soviets to the organization. Osama bin Laden transformed these Mujahidins into a member of a global
network as a coalition of factions of radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world.

The Al-Qaeda ideology mainly stands on the perception of humiliation of Muslims around the world; ruling governments in the Muslim world are collaborators of the West and U.S., and waging jihad to such enemies in everywhere in the world. Its structure has been shifted and evolved according to the events and developments. The core Al-Qaeda was effective and active before 9/11 attacks where it is kind of weak now and has been replaced by the Al-Qaeda inspired groups.

This study is focusing on specifically Turkey and the Al-Qaeda attacks in 2003. The geographical position, being a Muslim dominated country, being more secular then the rest of the Muslim countries always put Turkey in a crucial position and attracted all kinds’ ideologies, religious, separatist or leftist. Turkey is an important country from terrorism point of view because not only religiously motivated terrorist ideologies, leftist and separatist terrorist ideologies also have agenda on it.

The Al-Qaeda structure in Turkey has its roots to “mujahidin network”, fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. This network justified its actions with “kin-country syndrome”, “sacred values” and etc. They become more apparent and active after the attacks in the U.S. and their inspiration resulted with sending more jihadists to conflict areas involving Muslims like Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and etc. Besides that, such structure in Turkey realized 4 (four) simultaneous attacks in 5 days resulted with more than 60 casualties.
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This is an exploratory study examining characteristics of the violent radicalization process and various stages of radicalization that lead to violence as exemplified in Turkey. The use of exploratory inquiries is a crucial and functional way of studying a problem such as the violent radicalization process, especially when the aspects of a problem are not well known. Further, exploratory studies are a good way of documenting a subject completely and in detail. Moreover, exploratory studies are suggested when theories are unable to foster research goals.

Data

This study will use the datasets from terrorist-suspects’ court-collected testimonies, which were obtained after the 2003 Istanbul Bombings (N= 128). These testimonies include the individuals’ demographic information, criminal backgrounds, the reasons why they were involved in such activities, their personal contact within the organization, and if applicable, their trip to training camps and other relevant locations. In addition to the abovementioned characteristics, data was formed with individuals who were involved in religious meetings with violent radical individuals by social interactions and networks such as friendships, relatives or religious associations, experiencing the same feelings, ideologies on similar levels but not involved in any way with violent activity or terrorist attacks. Related to the research questions asked in this study, the
researcher will use individuals in the religious groups created by social networks as covariates to measure how much the group membership changes simultaneously by looking at the psychosocial characteristics of each individual such as the impact of friendship with entrance to the religious groups, exposing-accepting the terrorist ideology, education levels, employment status whether they have an ordinary, stable or daily employment status, and criminal background checks, marital status, the impact of the perception of humiliation of Muslim on individual’s psychology, and etc.

The authorities apprehended the terrorist-suspects who were believed to have close ties with the attackers through religious meetings, picking up religious key themes during these meetings, traveling to Al-Qaeda training camps together, having been trained in the camps at the same time, or being involved in suicide attacks to different targets in Turkey. Mehmet Savas Ozcan, who is currently working in the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia as the Chief of DDO, and the Police Major in Turkish National Police, collected the testimonies of those individuals from court files and coded them for his study. These records include apprehended individual statements made to the courts. Official data sources, like the ones used in this study, do not have gaps in recording. They have fairly little bias. Hence, they are the most widely used data sources in measuring criminal offending (Maxfield et al., 2000, p. 87). Judges and prosecutors make their decisions according to these testimonies and other collected hard evidences. The decision to arrest a person on the basis of this evidence and testimony means that the prosecutor/judge found probable cause (terrorist activities based on the definition of the Turkish Law of Terror Prevention) based on the evidence presented to the courts.
For the purposes of this study, analyzing the quantitative outcomes of data, which gives an idea about the magnitude of each factor, will be helpful in understanding the process of violent radicalization. The quantitative analysis of official records will account for various different factors affecting an individual’s radicalization process in different stages, and ideologies’ role in the involvement of terrorist organizations. This includes both the individual’s psychological traits and the importance of the social environment in understanding the trajectory of radicalization.

**Research Questions and Hypotheses**

It is mentioned several times in this study that violent radicalization is a gradual development that ends with involvement in a terrorist plot. However, there are some individuals that entered the trajectory at the same time as the violent individuals but did not continue on the process of their violent affiliates, and reject involvement in any violent act. We can define the violent radicalization process as a “pyramid model” where there are a number of individuals at the bottom. By going to the top, we realize that some of the individuals continue on to tranquil, peaceful religious meetings as a moderate, tranquil and mainstream Muslim individual where others in this process involve in violent activities.

This research will address several questions and hypotheses to understand the differences between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals even though they share similar psychosocial and personal characteristics. Specifically, the following questions and hypotheses will be addressed for the apprehended people questioned by the court due to their relations with the violent affiliates who committed terrorist attacks in
Istanbul, 2003. By attending to the following questions and hypotheses, this study proposes to answer the question, “What are the determinant factors affecting an individual’s decision to become violently radicalized?”

The following specific questions and hypotheses will be examined:

**Question #1**

- What are the characteristics of individuals involved in the violent radicalization trajectory?

Numerous studies found that violent radicalization is formed in stages and it develops along a time course leading from the normal life of individuals to their direct involvement in terrorist activity. Therefore, identifying individuals who are at risk of being targeted by terrorist organizations because of their characteristics appears to be more promising. Thus, it is a necessary research task to identify vulnerable groups and characteristics on the radicalization trajectory that is very crucial for terrorist organizations. The profile of individuals has been one of the important concerns of terrorism studies. Although profiles may vary depending on the group size and region, characteristics of targeted individuals such as educational level, family background, marital status, employment status, their criminal background, commitment to jihadi belief, the level of their support to a regime, etc. are important for policy implications. The research question regarding the background characteristics of violent and nonviolent individuals will be tested under 7 (seven) hypotheses.
Hypothesis #1

$H_0$: Age statistically differentiates non-violent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #2

$H_0$: Education level statistically differentiates non-violent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #3

$H_0$: Mobility statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #4

$H_0$: School dropouts statistically differentiate nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #5

$H_0$: The marital statuses of individuals statistically differentiate nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #6

$H_0$: Employment status (irregular or regular) statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

Hypothesis #7

$H_0$: Criminal background statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.
**Question #2**

- What is the importance of “peer relations” as an entry method for becoming violently radicalized and participate in terrorist organizations?

Studies on the process of radicalization like the NYPD model builds on what psychologist Irving Janis (1971) called “groupthink” which is very much related to “peer relations.” Peer relations can lead one down a disastrous path that completely disregards those outside the group (Moghaddam, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). This feeling surely explains the term “us” versus “them” especially at the early stages of the violent radicalization process. Besides, group dynamics and psychosocial conditions make individuals become involved in the radicalization process and ultimately join a terrorist organization. Sharing the same belief provides cohesion in the group activities as well as the justification for the violence. Friendship is only one type of social bond that might foster affiliation to the global jihad. It is realized that friendship is also one of the factors that kept many mujahidin in contact with others when they returned home after training camps or “jihad”. Moreover, “group dynamics” and “peer relations” are considered the key factors in radicalization and also in the deradicalization process. The researcher will seek to clarify the effectiveness of “peer relations” among the individual on the trajectory.

**Hypothesis #8**

$H_0$: Friendship (peer relations) as an entry method to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization statistically differentiates between violently radicalized and non-violently radicalized individuals.
Question #3
- To what extent does “ideology” play a role in violent radicalization?

Ideology is the belief system that offers solutions to the individual’s pressing needs. It is the most common element of definitions of terrorism as well. In fact, without ideology, it is very hard to explain terrorist activities and it is an important distinguishing factor between crime and terrorism. This study argues that especially in Muslim-dominated societies, it is very hard to profile an individual as violently radicalized unless he/she had the ideology of any terrorist organization. The impact of ideology on differentiating the violence status of individuals will be examined in two different hypotheses: exposure to ideology and ideology acceptance.

Hypothesis #9

\[ H_0: \ \text{Exposure to ideology statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.} \]

Hypothesis #10

\[ H_0: \ \text{Accepting the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.} \]

Question #4
- What is the impact of “jihad” as a contact reason to the organization or group for differing violently radicalized and nonviolent individual?

It is hard for any terrorist organization to recruit individuals without justifying their actions towards innocent people. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is inspiring
people by declaring “wage jihad” towards the US, West and their allies. As Farhad Khosrokhavar (2005) described, most of the Muslims, involved in the trajectory of violent radicalization, were convinced that Islam is being oppressed and mistreated in several places like Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria and Western countries because of an alliance between Christians and Jews that puts Islam in a position that makes global Salafi jihad the only way to respond to this so-called oppression. Jihadi ideology is based on what is commonly known as Salafism, an ambiguous concept that has served to designate various and very different movements throughout the years. By asking the abovementioned question about jihad, the researcher tries to understand the impact of it on the violent radicalization process of individuals.

**Hypothesis #11**

\( H_0: \) Jihad, as a reason to connect with terrorist organizations or groups, statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

**Question #5**

- What is the role of the perception of “humiliation” as to become violently radicalized?

Violence, a form of aggression, is a response to frustration and goal blockage conditions in individuals’ lives. These conditions involve poverty, humiliation, discrimination, and political oppression that incite aggression and transform it into violence (Berkowitz, 1962; Gurr, 1970). A number of studies found that frustration is one
of the factors that have an effect on involvement in terrorism (Florez-Morris, 2007; R. Hudson, 2000; Moghaddam, 2005; Soibelman, 2004; Sprinzak, 1991; Stern, 2003; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007; Yom & Saleh, 2004). Recent developments and events show that the humiliations of Muslim populations around the world make individuals more concerned and lured to become involved in violently radical behavior. By asking the abovementioned question, this study tries to shed light on the impact of psychological feelings on violence.

**Hypothesis #12**

$H_0$: The perception of the “humiliation” as one of the indicators of frustration statistically differentiates nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals.

These questions and hypotheses assume that violent radicalization is a gradual development, and each stage in the trajectory has its own specifications and attributes. This study argues that the psychosocial perspective, which includes an individual’s internal or social world will be more easily understood after getting the answers to the abovementioned questions. Especially in Muslim societies, it is very common to experience some radical discourses because of reasons mentioned in previous chapters. Ideological discourses of any terrorist organization are the crucial point this study aims to argue. Moreover, there are also some “turning points” for a radicalized individual, which prevents them from going on to further stages, as well. The major purpose of the current research is the identification of the determinant factors in relation to the decision-making
of involvement in a terrorist plot via violent radicalization or continuing on a tranquil, peaceful and mainstream Islamic view, moreover, how these factors can be effective in different societies depending on the context of that environment.

**Analysis of the Data**

The researcher will use the N-Vivo computer software package to code, organize and analyze the data. The N-Vivo program provides a coding process with speed and more efficiency by easily employing the codes into the nodes and submitting each node separately for analysis.

Variables were measured on both ordinal and nominal levels of measurement. In order to test the hypotheses, tests of equality of group means (bivariate) and stepwise discriminant function (multivariate) analysis were utilized. The cases were divided into two subgroups in terms of involvement in violent acts or not, and were described in terms of the demographic characteristics of each group. This compares the subgroups by interpreting the observed differences between the groups.

To fully understand and summarize the major distinguishing differences among the groups, as mentioned above, this study will utilize discriminant function analysis. It will help to determine: (1) which of the variables are useful in predicting the ultimate fate of the individuals in the process, whether they will be involved in violent terrorist attacks or not; (2) how these variables might be combined into a mathematical equation to predict the most likely outcome; and (3) the accuracy of the derived equation.
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique that allows studying the differences between two or more groups of objects with respect to several variables simultaneously. In the social sciences, there are a wide variety of situations in which this technique may be useful. Klecka (1980) proposed that discriminant analysis enable the researchers to make “interpretations” to “discriminate” between groups on the basis of some set of characteristics, how well they discriminate, and which characteristics are the most powerful discriminators; and a “classification” that will allow them to identify the group which a case most closely resembles.

There are several purposes for discriminant analysis:

- To classify cases into groups using a discriminant prediction equation.
- To test theories by observing whether cases are classified as predicted.
- To investigate differences between or among groups.
- To determine the most parsimonious way to distinguish among groups.
- To determine the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independents.
- To assess the relative importance of the independent variables in classifying the dependent variable.
- To discard variables which are little related to group distinctions.

In this study, the researcher will use 128 apprehended terrorist suspects’ testimonies, those believed to have relations with perpetrators either being in the same religious meetings or training camps in Afghanistan or Chechnya, to understand what elements or characteristics of the individual and situation would predict involvement in a
violent terrorist attack even though following or becoming immersed into a violent radicalization trajectory.

The sample will be divided into two groups: those involved in a violent terrorist attack (N=55) versus not being involved in a violent terrorist attack (N=73). The violently radicalized group is formed with the individuals who went to the Al-Qaeda training camps in order to wage so-called jihad. Going to the Al-Qaeda camp is considered as an important feature of violent radicalization because an individual who joins these camps gets military training as well as religious themes and lessons and involvement in military operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The non-violent group is formed with individuals involved in religious meetings like gatherings every week in a house reciting the Quran, learning some religious lessons from a spiritual leader or charismatic leaders. It is important to mention that non-violent individuals have experienced similar discourses, conflicts and problems as the violent affiliates but have not committed any attacks or have rejected involvement in violent acts like proceeding to training camps. A point here must be explained, that discriminant analysis treats the dependent variable as being measured at the nominal level (violent or non-violent apprehended individuals). The characteristics used to distinguish among the violent and non-violent groups are called “discriminating variables.”

Wilk’s lambda was used to measure the overall difference, and canonical correlation was used to test the magnitude of the difference.
The results of this regression would provide valuable information on the root causes of the violent radicalization of the Turkish population, especially related to the 2003 Istanbul Bombings. Revealing the significantly differentiating independent variables between nonviolent individuals and violently radicalized individuals would eliminate the misunderstandings of the root causes of violent radicalization. As mentioned in previous chapters, the researcher argues the importance of appropriate religious education, exposing or accepting the terrorist ideology, peer relations, training camps, criminal background, and employment in the trajectory of violent radicalization in Muslim countries such as Turkey. The outcome of the discriminant analysis would show which variables of the groups define individuals to be or not to be involved in terrorist attacks. Revealing the significant causes of violent radicalization will help to various segments of society such as law enforcement agencies, theologians, community organizations and foundations to eliminate the factors which cause violent radicalization.
Operationalization

As seen in the previous sections, there is a lack of in-depth approaches for understanding the real features and causes of violent radicalization. Most studies were conducted to profile and explore the motives of terrorists. Studies of this type, however, contributed to violent radicalization literature only to a certain extent in terms of understanding what makes a person violently radical. However, as this study argues, moderates and mainstream Muslims, radicalized individuals and violently radicalized individuals should be distinguished. Moreover, these terms should be considered from different perspectives, which are much related to the context, psychosocial features, infrastructural deficiencies, etc. This kind of approach will eliminate the negative consequences of any intervention from different perimeters like policy-makers and law enforcement agencies. As an example, looking to the radicalization process of individuals in a Muslim-dominated country like Turkey, with the perspective of the NYPD (2007) report, negative consequences of intervention would be inevitable.

The dataset, court-collected testimonies of terrorist-suspects, is secondary data. Thus, it holds certain variables regarding individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics, their initial contacts, the reasons why they contacted the group, their entry methods into the group, the criminal background of each individual, the psychological background for the so-called conflicts involving Muslims, etc. Hence, this study divided such variables into groups: variables about background characteristics and variables about psychosocial characteristics of the individuals.
The Variables and Measurements

1. **Background (Personal) characteristics:**
   
a. **Age:** This study will measure the age with the year the individuals made their first contact with the group or terrorist organization. Terrorist-suspects’ court collected testimonies indicates the year they got into the group. Their ages while first involved in the group were calculated by subtracting the date of birth from the date the terrorist-suspect’s first contact year with the group. They were organized in the following four categories: “1” indicating between 16-23 years old; “2” indicating between 24-30 years old; “3” indicating between 31-37 years old, and “4” indicating 38 and older. Thus, age was measured in ordinal levels.

   b. **Marital status:** Marital status in this study was measured and tested with their status, whether they were married or not when the police authorities apprehended them. It was measured on a 3-point nominal scale: single, married and divorced/separated. In the dataset, there was no observation in the divorced/separated category. Therefore, the scale was recoded into a nominal (dichotomous) scale (“1” indicating married and “0” indicating single).

   c. **Gender:** All of the violent and nonviolent individuals are male. Hence, gender will not be tested.

   d. **Education level:** Education is measured by the highest degree completed and measured on a 4-point ordinal scale (“5” indicating primary school, “8” indicating middle school, “11” indicating high school, and “15” indicating
university). Thus, the primary school category included primary school graduates, the middle school category included middle school graduates, the high school category included high school graduates, and the university category included university students. Since categories are rank-ordered, higher education level individuals less likely involved in violent acts, or vice versa.

e. **School Dropout:** School-dropout, as a separate variable, was available in the original datasets. While giving their background information, they also stated whether they continued their education or not. Besides this, they also asserted the reason why they dropped out of school. A dummy variable was created to distinguish “dropouts” and “non-dropouts.” The measurement level was dichotomous (“0” indicating non-dropouts, “1” indicating dropouts).

f. **Criminal Background:** Criminal background was defined according to any arrest or conviction, not only in Turkey but also in other countries like Germany, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc., due to any type of crime before the individual’s testimony to the court. The measurement level was dichotomous (“1” indicating criminal record, “0” indicating no criminal record).

g. **Employment Status:** Stability in life will be measured according to the sample’s employment status. The employment status was defined according to the expressions surrounding it. The individual who has no job, works in various companies and various branches of businesses in his life forms an “Irregular” employment status. The “regular” employment status, such as
working in the same field or company for at least 5 years, includes students and workers of some humanitarian organizational associations, forming an “irregular” employment status group. This is coded on a dichotomous level (“0” indicating regular job, “1” indicating irregular job).

h. **Mobility**: Mobility is measured by migrations or moves from the individuals’ original birthplace due to socioeconomic reasons, family-related issues like the relocating of his/her parents to another city, moving for a better job or for educational opportunities, usually from small cities to big ones like Istanbul. It is coded as a dichotomous variable (“1” indicating immigrant, “0” indicating non-immigrant).

2. **Psycho-Social Characteristics**

i. **Contact Reason**: A contact reason is defined according to expressions of individuals’ motivations to contact with the group. There are 2 categories of motivations to have contact with the group: “Jihad” refers to having contact with the group for involvement in ongoing wars in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia; “Others” refers to having contact with the group for several reasons other than jihad. A religious goal would include education in the Islamic Schools in Pakistan, Syria, contact through his/her spouse’s relationship with the group and having contact with the group to learn and recite the Quran; to gain knowledge about Islam. A contact reason is
measured on a dichotomous variable ("1" indicating jihad, "0" indicating other).

j. **Entry Method**: Entry method is measured based on the expressions of terrorist-suspects regarding how they enter to the group. There are 2 categories of entry method: "Friendship" refers to any person who helped the individual contact the group, "other" refers to relatives like brother, husband, wife, cousin, organizational association like IHH (The foundation for Human rights and freedoms and humanitarian relief) and educational institutions like Islamic Theology Schools. The entry method is measured in a dichotomous variable ("1" indicating Friendship, "0" indicating other).

k. **Exposure to Ideology**: The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization based its ideology on the humiliation of Muslim societies around the world and invasion of Muslim countries by Western countries or by their allies inside. Moreover, their ideology criticizes all other Islamic approaches and declares others "infidels." Al-Qaeda motivates or recruits members by touching on the abovementioned arguments in all gatherings or meetings. In this study, exposure to ideology is based on statements that were used during picnics, meetings and various socialization gatherings. Important figures that lead the gatherings whether in picnics or religious meetings emphasize the motivation factors and try to recruit individuals for the organization. This is coded as a dichotomous variable ("0" indicating not being exposed to ideology, "1" indicating being exposed to ideology).
l. **Ideology Acceptance:** One of the main features of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist organization is waging so-called jihad in Muslim countries invaded by the U.S. or Western countries like Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Bosnia and the “apostate” regimes inside Muslim countries. After motivating individuals with a humiliation of Muslim societies and arguing that there is an ongoing subjugation of the Muslim population around the world, recruiters send them to training camps and impose upon them a Salafi belief that declares all Muslims other than they “infidels.” According to the above facts, ideological acceptance is based on the acts and statements given by apprehended individuals during their testimonies. It is coded as a dichotomous variable (“0” indicating not accepting the ideology, “1” indicating acceptance of the ideology).

m. **Humiliation:** In this study, the perception of the humiliation of the Muslim population is measured as one of the indicators of frustration. In the testimonies of many terrorist-suspects, the researcher found the term, “humiliation of their Muslim brothers,” whether in Bosnia, Afghanistan or Chechnya. Some terrorist-suspects also put “humiliation” as a first concern and give priority to this term in their statement. The researcher will measure humiliation, whether they state humiliation as a prior concern for them or not. It is coded as a dichotomous variable (“1” indicating the use of humiliation as a prior concern, “0” indicating not using humiliation as a prior concern).
Summary

The data sets used in this exploratory study are secondary and from (N=128) terrorist-suspects’ court collected testimonies obtained after 2003 Istanbul Bombings. Quantitative outcomes of the data reveal the magnitude of the variables and enable the true understanding of the process of violent radicalization.

In the current study, 5 questions are asked and 12 hypotheses are established to understand the differences of the two groups; violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Discriminant function analysis with stepwise modeling technique is used to see the most powerful discriminators, test the reliability of the classification and discrimination of the two groups. The variables used in this study are tested in two groups; background characteristics such as age, criminal background, education, marital status, occupation, etc., and psychosocial characteristics such as perception of humiliation, exposure to ideology, and contact reason with the religious groups, acceptance of ideology and entry method to the group.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter presents the characteristics of the data and the results of the analysis. In the first step, the researcher will utilize descriptive statistical analysis in order to determine violently radicalized individuals and non-violent individuals’ background characteristics. Secondly, discriminant analysis that includes bivariate and multivariate analysis will be used to understand the impact of variables on differentiating between the nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals. Variables such as entry method to organization, contact reason to involve in organization, and occupation contain many responses. The small frequencies of such responses led researcher to code variables in dichotomous way. Moreover, the data has some missing information on some variables such as type of conviction, acceptance of ideology, perception of humiliation which prevented to code variables in a categorical way that may be considered as reductionism.

Descriptive Analysis (Personal Characteristics)

In the overall sample, the descriptive analysis revealed that 48.4% of the samples are between 24-30 years of age where 21.9% are between 17-23, 21.9% between 32-38, and 7.8% above 39-years-old. This study’s descriptive analysis also indicates that 31.3% of the samples are married, whereas 68.8% are single. From the educational point of view, 53.1% have at least a high school diploma, 21.9% have had middle school, 18.8% had primary school and 6.3% hold university degrees. Related to education, 39.1% of the population of this study dropped-out of his school and 61.9% did not experience any
school dropouts. 77.3% of the whole sample had experiences of various job fields where 22.7% had regular and stable jobs. Descriptive results of mobility revealed that 60.9% of the sample moved from their original locations to other cities whereas 39.1% continue living in their birthplace. 71.9% of the apprehended individuals did not have criminal backgrounds before being detained by the police authorities because of a connection with the 2003 Istanbul Bombing suspects, where 28.1% did have criminal backgrounds.

**Nonviolent Individuals**

The nonviolent individuals have a mean age of 25 years. Moreover, 45.5% of the non-violent samples are between 24-30 years old, where 43.6% are between 17-23, 9.1% between 32-38 and 1.8% more than 39-years-old. From the educational point of view, the researcher found that 47.3% of non-violent individuals have finished high school education where 16.4% have primary school, 25.5% have elementary school and 10.9% were graduated from university. Among the non-violent individuals, 32.7% dropped their school and 56.4% migrated from their hometowns to different locations, especially Istanbul for several reasons. 61.8% of non-violent individuals had irregular and various kinds of job experiences where 38.2% had regular and stable jobs including being a student, work for humanitarian organizational associations or housewife as occupation. About 47% of non-violent individuals are married; 53% are single. 81.8% of non-violent individuals have no criminal history whether inside or outside of Turkey, where only 18.2% do have a criminal history. (Table 3)
Violently radicalized individuals

The violent individuals have a mean age of 25 years. Similar to the nonviolent individuals, 42.5% of violent individuals are between 24-30 years old; 45.2% are between 17-23; 8.2% are between 31-37; and 4.1% are more than 38 years old. 57.5% of violent individuals had a high school education where 20.5% had primary school; 19.2% had elementary school; and 2.7% had university degrees. Among the violent individuals, 43.8% dropped-out and 64.4% migrated from their hometowns to different locations. 89% of violent individuals have irregular and different job experiences where 11% have regular and stable occupations including being a student or working for humanitarian organizational associations. About 81% of violent individuals are single; 19% are married. From a criminal background point-of-view, this study shows that 35.6% of violent individuals have a criminal history and 64.4% have no criminal history. (Table 4)
Table 3
Background Characteristics of Non-Violent Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>17-23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>32-38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39-above</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Primary (5)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (8)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (11)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University (15)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropouts</td>
<td>Dropout</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Dropout</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-immigrant</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Background</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Background Characteristics of Violent Individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>42.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>32-38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39-above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropouts</td>
<td>Dropout</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Dropout</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-immigrant</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crim. Backgr.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, this study has 12 hypotheses, which includes background and psychosocial characteristics of the nonviolent individuals and violently radicalized individuals. In the upcoming steps, the researcher will test the first 5 (five) hypotheses related to background characteristics of individuals with bivariate analysis. Subsequently, this study will test the remaining 7 (seven) hypotheses, including background and psychosocial characteristics with multivariate analysis.
Bivariate Analyses

The Tests of Equality of Group Means (similar to ANOVA) table below indicates bivariate relationships between dependent variables and individuals’ violence status (see Table 3). As seen in Table 3, bivariate analysis of age, education, school dropouts, number of siblings, immigrant status and individuals' entry method did not differentiate significantly for the individuals’ violence status \((p > .05)\). Marital status, occupation, contact reason, exposure to ideology, acceptance of ideology, perception of humiliation and criminal backgrounds of individuals had significant differentiate for the nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals in bivariate analysis \((p < .05)\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wilks' Lambda</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>d.f</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>1.621</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>1.621</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal background</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>4.821</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>59.658</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact reason</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>36.383</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure</td>
<td>.891</td>
<td>15.382</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>240.349</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliation</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>59.658</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal background</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>4.821</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>1.621</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry method</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\(p<.05\)

As mentioned above, this study has 12 hypotheses, which include background and psychosocial characteristics of the nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals. In the
upcoming steps, the researcher will test the first 5 (five) hypotheses related to background characteristics of individuals with bivariate analysis. Subsequently, this study will test the remaining 7 (seven) hypotheses, including background and psychosocial characteristics with multivariate analysis.

**Background Characteristics:**

**Hypothesis # 1: Age statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

In the current study, age is measured and tested with the year that apprehended individuals first received contact with the group or terrorist organization. The test of equality of group means (Table 3) shows that age has no impact on differentiating between the groups (violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals) significantly ($F = 1.247, p = .266$). Thus, we failed to reject the null hypothesis (Figure 5).
**Hypothesis # 2: Education statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

The test of equality of group means shows that education does not significantly predict the violence status of the individuals. \((F=.639, \ p=.426)\). Thus, we failed to reject the null hypothesis (Table 3, Figure 6).
Hypothesis # 3: Mobility (migration) statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.

The test of equality of group means presents that between the groups (violently radicalized and tranquilly radicalized) mobility does not differentiate significantly. ($F=840, p=.361$). We failed to reject the null hypothesis (Table 3, Figure 7).
Hypothesis # 4: School dropout statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.

The test of equality of group means demonstrates that school dropout does not differentiate significantly between the violently radicalized and tranquil and nonviolent individuals. (Table 3, Figure 8). We failed to reject the null hypothesis ($F=1.621$, $p=.$ 205).
Figure 8 Descriptive of School Dropout
Multivariate Analyses

In order to examine and summarize the overall significant differences between nonviolent individuals and violently radicalized individuals, a stepwise model of discriminant analysis was used to distinguish the most powerful discriminating variables between the groups. The stepwise model of discriminant analysis is mostly used for selecting and ordering variables in both descriptive and prescriptive discriminant analysis for variable selection. Forward stepwise methods start the analysis without any variables and successively add and delete variables until a prespecified stopping criterion is satisfied. The stopping criterion used in most stepwise methods is based on the $p$ value of an $F$ statistic associated with a test that determines if including or deleting the next variable adds significantly to explaining group separation, beyond the contribution of those variables already present in the model. Wilks’ lambda with an associated $F$ value was used to test the significance of each of the independent variables in relation to the dependent variable. Using it, variables were identified mostly as distinguishable from each item, thus eliminating poor discriminators.

As seen in (Table 4) below, when we included the variables that significantly differentiate nonviolent from the violent individuals in a bivariate analysis into a discriminant stepwise model, our analysis indicated that exposure to ideology, occupation, marital status, criminal background and perception of humiliation become insignificant discriminant predictors in terms of individuals’ violence status ($p > .05$). However, the individuals’ reason to participate in the group and accept their ideology still significantly differentiates between nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized
individuals \((p < .05)\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BIVARIATE</th>
<th></th>
<th>MULTIVARIATE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wilks' Lambda</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Wilks' Lambda</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact reason</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per. of humiliation</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal background</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>.030*</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05

Again, the researcher continued on with the stepwise method to examine the significant variables remaining statistically significant in the model. Table 7 below presents both unstandardized and standardized values of the predictors. They are used to construct the actual prediction equation, which can be used to classify new cases. The discriminant function coefficients are partial coefficients, reflecting the unique contribution of each variable to the classification of the variable criterion. The standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 5 below indicate the relative importance of the independent variables in predicting the dependent variable. As seen below, the most discriminating independent variable was acceptance of the ideology \((.937)\), where the other significant independent variable, 'jihad' as the contact reason, has the value of \((.229)\), according to the discriminant canonical functions. Criminal backgrounds, frustration, marital statuses, exposure to ideology and occupation have less than \(.332\) loadings and were not interpreted because they did not increase the probability of any significant change \((p < .05)\).
Since the dependent variable in this study has only two categories, there is only one discriminant function. Wilks’ Lambda is the ratio of within-group sums of squares to the total sums of squares. This is the proportion of the total variance in the discriminant scores not explained by differences among groups. A small lambda indicates that group means appear to differ. The associated significance value indicates whether the difference is significant. As Table 7 indicates, the Wilks’ Lambda of discriminant canonical function (0.332) has a significant value (Sig. = 0.000) that presents the proportion of the total variance in the discriminant scores not explained (33%) by differences among groups. Thus, the amount of variance, explained by the nonviolent individuals and violently radicalized individuals is 67%.

Eigenvalue indicates the proportion of variance explained. A large eigenvalue is associated with a strong function. Table 5 presents that the eigenvalue of this study (2.010) indicates a strong function. Besides the canonical correlation, the relation between the discriminant scores and the levels of the dependent variable is another important feature of discriminant analysis. A high canonical correlation indicates a function that discriminates well. The canonical correlation of the dependent variable and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized</th>
<th>Standardized</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact reason</td>
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<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>3.191</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* *p < .05

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canonical correlation</td>
<td>0.817</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilks' lambda</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the independent variables in this study was (.817), which represents a statistically
significant and almost perfect (1 = *perfect* correlation) relationship (p < .05).

Nearly 91% of the cases were correctly classified (see Table 8). The percentage of
cases classified correctly indicates the effectiveness of the model. Centroid functions for
the two groups were x = -1.621 and 1.221, respectively; statistically significant at the .05
level. The average score for a group is known as the group centroid which is an
imaginary point having coordinates that are the group’s mean on each of the variables
(Klecka, 1980). The signs of the group centroid tell us that the two groups are distinct.
The negative sign in the nonviolent individuals, on average, scored lower than violent
individuals on many variables. An examination of the functions shows the distinction and
how well the centroids are separated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Nonviolent</th>
<th>Violent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90.90%</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.60%</td>
<td>90.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of “grouped” cases correctly classified: 90.6%
**Hypothesis # 5: Marital status statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

Marital status in this study was measured and tested with the status; apprehended individuals were married or not when the police authorities did apprehend them. The *test of equality of group means* as table 4 shows, there is a statistically significant relationship between marital status of individuals and their violence status ($F=12.466$, $p=.001$). As a further step, when the researcher used stepwise discriminant model, as table 4 indicates, marital status does not significantly differentiate between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals ($p > .05$). Thus, we failed to reject the null hypothesis (Table 5, Figure 9).

![Figure 9 Descriptive of Marital Status](image-url)
Hypothesis # 6: Employment status as an indicator of stability in the life statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.

Table 3 presents the results of the tests of equality of group means of occupation regarding irregular or other including regular jobs. Bivariate analysis results (table 3, figure 6) indicate that irregular job has a statistically significant impact on differentiating between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals. \( F=14.568, p < .05 \). However, when the researcher utilized discriminant model in the following step, to assume proper model specification (inclusion of all important independents and exclusion of extraneous variables) in the analysis, as Table 4 presents, it is seen that irregular job was not statistically differentiate the violence status of individuals \( p > .05 \). Finally, this study concluded that occupation whether irregular or regular does not have impact on differentiating between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. (Figure 10)
Hypothesis # 7: Criminal background of individuals statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.

As seen in Table 3 and Table 4, bivariate statistics reflects significant differences between groups (violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals) regarding their criminal backgrounds ($F=4.821, p<.05$). However, the stepwise model of discriminant analysis as table 4 shows, criminal background of individuals does not differentiate between nonviolently and violently radicalized individuals ($p > .05$). Finally, this study concluded that criminal background of individuals in this study does not have impact on differentiating between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. (Figure 11)
Psychosocial Characteristics:

**Hypothesis # 8: Friendship as an entry method to the group or organization statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

The literature revealed that friendship is the most prominent agent by means of which individuals entered to the groups or terrorist organizations. This study tests whether there is a difference between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals regarding the entry method of them into the group or organization. Table 9 and Figure 12 show that 83.6 % of the nonviolently radicalized individuals entered to group or organization by their friends where it is higher in violently radicalized individuals,
90.4%. The percentage of others, which involves relatives and various organizational associations, is 16.4% in nonviolent and 9.6% in violent individuals.

Table 9
Frequency of Entry Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry method</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Friendship</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12 Descriptive of Entry Method
To determine the differences between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals, the researcher utilized the tests of equality of group means for entry method. The results show (see table 8) that the nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals do not differ significantly regarding entry method of two groups ($F=1.309$, $p=.255$). Thus, we failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 10
The Test of Equality of Group means for entry method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Wilks’ Lambda</th>
<th>d.f</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entry Method</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>1&amp;126</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05

**Hypothesis # 9: Exposure to the terrorist organization’s ideology statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

One of the main purposes of current study is to test the impact of ideology whether it differentiate the violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Ideology in this study was grouped in two different ways: exposure to ideology and ideology acceptance. Exposure to ideology mainly focused on the motivation of group members whether they were exposed to main arguments of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization like humiliation, infidel, jihad, etc.

Table 11 and Figure 13 show that among violently radicalized individuals, around 96% of them were exposed to Al-Qaeda’s radical ideology where only 4% of them were not exposed to radical ideology of terrorist organization. However, exposure to radical ideology among nonviolent individuals is smaller than violent individuals, 73%, and no
exposure to ideology is bigger than violent ones, 27%. In the total sample, about 14% were not exposed to Al-Qaeda ideology where 86% were exposed to it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>27.30%</td>
<td>72.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>95.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>14.10%</td>
<td>85.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13 Descriptive of Exposure to ideology
The researcher utilized the test of equality of group means primarily for bivariate analysis and table 3 presents that exposure to ideology significantly differ the individuals’ violence status \((F=15.382, p < .05)\). However, when the researcher used discriminant model in the following step, to assume proper model specification (inclusion of all important independents and exclusion of extraneous variables), in the analysis, as Table 4 presents, it is seen that ideology exposure was not statistically determines the violence status of individuals \((p > .05)\). Finally, this study concluded that exposure to Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology does not have impact on differentiating between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.

**Hypothesis # 10: Accepting the terrorist organization’s ideology statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals.**

In this study, ideology acceptance is based on waging jihad and accepting the Salafi belief. When we look to the frequencies of ideology acceptance in Table 12 and Figure 14, we realize that 90.4 % of the violent individuals accepted the ideology of Al-Qaeda where only 9.6 % did not accept. Among nonviolent individuals, 9.1 % accept the ideology and 90.9 % did not accept the radical ideology of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. In the overall sample, 44.5 % of the population did not accept the ideology of Al-Qaeda and 55.5 % accept the ideology of terrorist organization.
Table 12
Frequencies of Ideology Acceptance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 3 and Table 4, both bivariate and multivariate statistics reflects significant differences between groups (violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals) regarding their acceptance of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology \(F=240.349, p<.05\). Moreover, in the discriminant model, it is seen that ideology acceptance was
discriminating mostly between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals ($\beta = .937$). The sample result is more supportive of the research hypothesis than the no difference hypothesis. The research hypothesis is thus accepted, because the test of significance shows that violently radicalized individuals and nonviolent individuals do differ in terms of ideology acceptance. (Figure 14)

_Hypothesis # 11: Jihad, as a reason to contact with terrorist organizations or groups statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals._

In this study, contact reason with Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is measured with the individuals’ statements that involve the reason to participate with the group or organization. Table 13 and Figure 15 represent that, among nonviolently radicalized individuals, 85.5% established contact with the group for reasons other than jihad like learning religious themes, Quran, important features of Islam. Only 14.5% of them build relations with the group for jihad reasons. On the contrary, 61.6% of violently radicalized individuals’ goal for contacting with the group was involvement in jihad activities, where 38.4% of them were contacted for other reasons. In overall distribution, 58.6% of the apprehended individuals’ first goal for getting contact with the group was other reasons than jihad, and 41.4% had the idea of involvement in jihad activities for contact reason.
As seen in Table 3 and Table 4, both bivariate and multivariate statistics reflects significant differences between groups (violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals) regarding the contact reason with the group or organization \((F=36.383, \ P < .05)\). Moreover, in the discriminant model, it is seen that contact reason as a variable was...
discriminating nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals significantly ($\beta = .229$). The sample result is more supportive of the research hypothesis than the no difference hypothesis. The research hypothesis is thus accepted, because the test of significance shows that violently radicalized individuals and nonviolent individuals do differentiate in terms of contact reason. (Figure 15)

_Hypothesis # 12: Perception of the humiliation of the Muslim as one of the indicator of frustration, statistically differentiates non-violent individuals and violent individuals._

Frustration was measured according to whether the individuals’ gave priority to the humiliation of Muslim societies around the world as a concern that motivates most of the Al-Qaeda members for waging jihad to the West and justifies their actions. Thinking the humiliation and conflicts involving Muslim as a primary concern in their life may create feelings of frustration.

Table 14 and Figure 16 represent that 67.3% of nonviolently radicalized individuals did not mention humiliation as a first concern, where 32.7% stated humiliation of Muslim societies as a first concern. On the contrary, 87.7% of violent individuals gave priority to the humiliation and only 12.3% did not state humiliation as his first concern. In overall distribution, 36% of the apprehended individuals’ did not state humiliation as a first concern, where 64% have the perception of humiliation that dominates his understanding of life.
Table 14  
Frequency of the Perception of Humiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frustration</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16 Descriptive of the perception of humiliation

The researcher utilized the test of equality of group means primarily for bivariate analysis and table 3 presents that the perception of the humiliation significantly differ the individuals' violence status ($F=59.658$, $p < .05$). However, when the researcher used discriminant model in the following step, to assume proper model specification, in the
analysis, as Table 4 presents, it is seen that the perception of humiliation does not statistically differentiate the violence status of individuals \((p > .05)\). Finally, this study concluded that perception of humiliation that leads to frustration does not have an impact on differentiating between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.

**Violations of Assumptions**

According to Klecka (1980), there are three important assumptions in discriminant analysis: (1) multivariate normal distribution, (2) equal covariance matrices for each group, and (3) multicollinearity.

The multivariate normality assumption may be violated with reference to some of the independent variables. The stepwise model in discriminant analysis, however, reveals the variables remaining in the equation approach normality. It cannot be taken for granted that the variables were normally distributed when joined together. *Box's M test* examines the assumption of the homogeneity of covariance matrices. This test is very sensitive to meeting also the assumption of multivariate normality. Discriminant function analysis is robust even when the homogeneity of variances assumption is not met, provided the data do not contain important outliers. For the data in this study, the test is not significant so we conclude that the groups do not differ in their covariance matrices, thus, not violating an assumption of Discriminant Analysis. When Box’s M test was performed, it indicated that approximate equal covariance matrices were met, thus demonstrating that two of the assumptions were satisfied.
Correlation matrices indicate that there is no problem of multicollinearity in this model. Also, the initial elimination of variables through a stepwise model showed no linear combination of the variables. When variables are correlated with each other, the amount of explained variance tends to be reduced. A stepwise procedure eliminates variables that are affected by linear combinations. Therefore, it appears that the third assumption was also met.
CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter discusses the major findings of the current research along with a model that summarizes the differences between the nonviolent and violently radicalized groups. In the previous chapter (Chapter V), 12 different hypotheses were tested to identify differences between these two groups by bivariate and multivariate analyses (discriminant function analysis) with certain characteristics of violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals apprehended after the 2003 Istanbul Bombings.

The following discussion links the research findings to the literature, theories and policies. The findings of this study have some implications for theory. This is particularly important considering that radicalization, whether it is violent or not, is yet to develop sound and empirically testable theories relevant to the context of society. This chapter also identifies policy implications of the findings in an attempt to help revise existing discussions regarding violent radicalization and de-radicalization policies. Finally, the findings have some implications for future studies.
Discussions of Findings

Discriminant analysis findings reveal more about the variables that show distinction between violently radicalized and nonviolent individuals. Discriminant analysis determined a 67 % variation between the two different groups on two major variables; ideology acceptance and contact reason to the group or terrorist organization. This chapter will start the discussions with hypothesis results regarding background characteristics and will continue on hypotheses related to psychosocial characteristics.

Background Characteristics

Hypothesis # 1

*Age has impact on differentiating between non-violent individuals and violently radicalized individuals.*

In the current study, age was measured and tested according to the individuals’ first contact age with the religious group or organization. The researcher categorized the age group in 4 categories to be understood more easily because neither the each age individually nor the categorical age group statistically significant on determining the violence status of individuals. According to the study, either nonviolent or violently radicalized individuals had contact with the radicalized group or terrorist organization when they were, on average, 25-years-old. The Turkish Statistical Institute data for 2003 concluded that Turkey’s overall mean age was 28.8 in 2003 (TUIK, 2000). So, having contact with a religious group or organization at 25 can be considered as young age, comparing with Turkey’s overall age.
Some analysts claim that individuals join various kinds of terrorist groups or organizations when they are immature, naïve young men and at this age; they become more vulnerable to the indoctrination process of violent or nonviolent organizations. Moreover, related to indoctrination also, a young population is perceived to have weak and vulnerable minds that can be easily brainwashed by their elders (Merari, 1990, 1991; Sageman, 2004). In this study, bivariate analysis in the discriminant model revealed that, whether an individual was nonviolent or violently radicalized, age is not a predictor for differentiating between the two groups. The researcher attributed this result to the fact that Turkey is a Muslim-dominated country and people might seek opportunities to learn about their religion at any age of their life. Religious groups, cults or organizations support violence or not, and have an informal or formal structure. They are proposing these educational kinds of opportunities for their society and are considered a part of their environment in Turkey. These realities of religious groups or organizations often compel the younger population to have contact with them and it is thus difficult to predict and differentiate the violence status of individuals via age. As academics have mentioned, after these young people get into the organization with their mental weakness and emotional vulnerability, the recruiters or elders begin to indoctrinate them; forcing them to choose either the violent or nonviolent radicalization process. Thus, age does not have an impact on the violence status of individuals because getting in contact with a religious group may happen at any time in their life.
**Hypothesis #2**

*Education has an impact on differentiating between non-violently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals.*

Education in this study is measured by the highest degree completed by the apprehended individuals in 2003. Before discussing the results of the study, the researcher needs to acknowledge that the relationship between education and violence is overwhelmingly discussed in the literature. Specifically, the literature on education-terrorism correlation produced various and mixed results (Hassan, 2001; Testas, 2004; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Horgan, 2003; Russell & Miller, 1983). While some studies found correlations between low education and terrorism, others indicated that terrorists have higher education levels, while some others did not find any correlation between them. So far, none of the available research was able to show whether there is a causal relationship between terrorism and education. The Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TUIK) 2000 census data revealed that high school graduation has the highest rate among school graduates and this study shares similar results (48% of nonviolent to 58% of violent individuals completed high school). Moreover, current research, which utilized discriminant analysis, indicated that education does not significantly differentiate between nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals. This result can be attributed to the modus operandi of the religious groups and its context with Turkey. Religious groups are considered to be part of Turkish society and people from all segments of society make contact with these groups due to the nature of religion. Missions in such kinds of groups may not require discrimination between individuals by
their intellectual or educational levels because the spirit of these religious groups is based on the acceptance of any individuals. Most of these religious groups were formed as social networks and inside of a neighborhood. Mostly, informal and unofficial structure is established in such kinds of formations. Thus, these realities of groups and organizations demonstrate that there is no impact of education level on differentiating between violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals.

**Hypothesis #3**

*Mobility has an impact on differentiating between non-violent individuals and violently radicalized individuals.*

In the current study, mobility is measured by migration from the individuals’ original birthplace, usually villages and rural locations, due to socioeconomic reasons; family-related issues like the movement of his parents to another city for better job or educational prospects, usually from small cities to big ones like Istanbul. In this study, a descriptive analysis of violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals revealed that more than half of the samples in this study are migrants (56.4% of nonviolent and 64.4% of violent). The context of Turkey shows similar results as this study. After 1950, migration was accelerated with the improvements of social and economic factors. By 2000, 65% of the Turkish population started to live in the cities after leaving their birthplaces where it was 25% before 1950 (TUIK, 2009).

Dogu Ergil (2010), a Turkish sociologist who has done studies on the country, asserted that smaller, provincial locales have their own values, shaped by a traditional
and religious belief system. Tribal structure has an important effect on the perceptions of villagers. When these people migrate from these small societies to big cities, they start to face different social relations and demands. In big cities, everything becomes anonymous, individuals’ feel unprotected and unselfconfident. These situations lead immigrants to evaluate their belief system, fears and needs. At this point, organizations and groups whether religious or not, offer up solutions to them, considered as safe havens by the immigrants, offering explanations to the questions those people have (Ergil, 2010). The bivariate analysis of mobility and violence status indicated that there is no impact of mobility on differentiating between violent and nonviolent individuals. This can be attributed to the context of Turkey again and modus operandi of the religious groups. Religious organizations, NGOs, and any kind of foundations, violent or tranquil, are formed around these migrated populations to protect, indoctrinate or recruit them. Besides the facts of religious groups, the context of Turkish population, where we experience too much internal migration, shows it is hard to differentiate and predict nonviolent and violent individuals according to their immigrant status. As previous researches revealed, internal migration has no direct effect on crime but with the impact of educational, social and economic problems, intensified and uncontrolled migration leads to high crime rates in Turkey (AREM, 2010).
Hypothesis #4

School dropouts have an impact on differentiating between non-violent radicalization and violently radicalized individuals.

The current study tested whether school dropout rates significantly differentiate between nonviolently and violently radicalized individuals. Before discussing the bivariate results, it is important to mention that the dropout rate of violently radicalized individuals was 44%, where nonviolent ones were 33%. According to Hirschi (1969), founder of the Social Bond Theory, school plays an important role in conventional societies (for example Turkey) and ending the attachment to school like dropping out inevitably leads to more involvement in violence (Hirschi, 1969). Contrary to this prediction, the bivariate results in this study indicated that there is no impact of school dropouts for predicting the individuals’ violence status. The insignificant result of differences between two groups can be attributed to the strategies of radical groups and again, the context of Turkey.

According to the European Commission’s report in 2005, Turkey has a very high rate of school dropout compared to other European countries (DGEAC, 2005). In the context of Turkey, the abovementioned facts explain why there is no differentiating impact of school dropouts between violently radicalized and nonviolently radicalized individuals. Religious groups, whether violent or nonviolent, are part of society and do not have any specific rules or regulations for accepting individuals into their fold. Here, it is important to distinguish some official organizations with these religious groups. These groups are formed in every society and enjoy informal structures that enable every
individual, whether a dropout or not, to be involved in the group and learn some religious information. Besides, education level and school dropouts are not the primary concern of the religious groups because these groups are naturally part of ordinary life, especially in Muslim-dominated societies like Turkey. As a result of these facts of Turkey and religious groups, it is difficult to see a significant impact of school dropout on differentiating between nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals. Moreover, relationships between school dropouts and violence status have the same results as the relationship between education and violence status.

**Hypothesis #5**

*Marital status has an impact on differentiating between nonviolent individuals and violent individuals.*

Marital status in this study was measured by whether or not apprehended individuals were married when the police authorities did apprehended them. The descriptive results indicate that being single is dominant among violently radicalized individuals (80.8%) where it is slightly different, (52.7%), among nonviolently radicalized individuals. Moreover, when the researcher utilized bivariate analysis, there was a statistically significant relationship (p < .05). However, when including all the independent variables in the multivariate analysis, the relationship between marital status and violence status became insignificant. The addition of other variables included in the model accounts for the disappearance of the bivariate relationship between marital status and violence status in the multivariate context. The change in significance in this analysis
indicates a spurious relationship between marital status and violence, because some other independent variables retain the significance in the multivariate model while the relationship between marital status and violence becomes insignificant.

The literature on terrorism indicates various results about the importance of marital status and but it is agreed upon that unmarried members are the rule for most of the terrorist organizations because of security, mobility and dedication to the cause (Russell and Miller). Although Sageman (2004) argued that a high marital status pattern is unique to Salafi mujahidin, he also denoted that most terrorists were single because they were either too young, or still students, or financially unable to afford a marriage. This study displayed similar results as the descriptive revealed that the first contact age with the religious groups is about 25, which is almost a young age. After becoming a member of the terrorist organization, with several reasons mentioned above, violent individuals go to the training camps when they are single. It is a common belief that those who have family responsibilities are expected to have less involvement in terrorist acts because being married compels individuals to have a stake in conformity and be involved in less risky activities.

The relationship between marital status and violence status is significant in bivariate analysis. However, multivariate analysis indicates that marital status does not have an impact on differentiating between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals. It can be attributable to the discriminant model, which involves multivariate analysis. The discriminant model aims to reveal the most significant variables that contribute most for differentiating between the groups. Hence, even the bivariate analysis
indicates significant relations, and a multivariate analysis revealed that the relative importance of marital status in predicting violence status is not high compared with other significant variables.

**Hypothesis #6**

*Employment status has an impact on differentiating between nonviolent individuals and violent individuals.*

Employment status is measured according to individuals’ job experiences whether they work in a stable and straightforward field or in various places of employ. The missing information on exact occupation of the samples and since the aim of testing employment status is to see the impact of instability as an indicator of it; this study coded the variable in dichotomous way. The descriptive results of the study showed that 61.8% of the nonviolent had irregular job status where this rate is 89% for violent individuals. Irregular job rates are greater than regular job rates in both groups. It can be attributable to the context of Turkey where official records had similar results as this study. According to the 2009 statistical information of TUIK, more than half of the young population (between 15-34) had less than a high school education and no diploma or certificate, which is important in finding a stable and regular job in Turkey. For this young population, irregular and various job fields remain as the only option. Violently radicalized individuals have higher levels of irregular job status than the nonviolent ones. As is mentioned in previous discussions, being a member of violently radicalized organizations involves not being connected to any other structure than the radical
organization, like family, job, etc. Literature also supports the aforementioned fact that regular jobs prevent individuals from being involved in crime or violent acts.

As Life Course Theory (Sampson and Laub) proposed, a good job or employment is one of two (2) important turning points that prevent individuals from being involved in criminal acts. Besides the descriptive results, it is also important to mention the bivariate analysis results of the study, which indicate statistically significant results (p < .05). Although, bivariate results do indicate that an irregular job status has an impact on differentiating violent and nonviolent radicalized individuals, the researcher utilizes the multivariate discriminant analysis to see the real picture. This model assumes a proper model specification (including all significant independents and removing insignificants) in the analysis, for some independent variables still remain significant where occupation becomes insignificant. It is essential to point out that discriminant analysis aims to show the most significant variables that contribute the most to differentiating between the groups. Therefore, the researcher comes to the conclusion that having an irregular job does not differentiate between nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals. Again, we should not ignore the reality in the context of Turkey that, religious groups have no specific concern for special individuals because these groups can be considered as a reflection of the society where employment status varies.
Hypothesis #7

Criminal background has an impact on differentiating between non-violently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals. This study defined criminal background based on any arrest or conviction of apprehended individuals, not only in Turkey but also in other countries like Germany, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc., based on the individual’s testimony to the court in 2003. Since, the data has some weaknesses on detailed information on type of convictions of individuals, criminal background was coded as dichotomous. Descriptive analysis indicates that 18.2% of nonviolently radicalized and 35.6% of violently radicalized individuals had custodial experiences. According to the General Directorate of Criminal and Statistic Records, in 2004, 13% of Turkish citizens have criminal records, which is smaller than this study’s descriptive results. This study’s samples of criminal rates are higher than the Turkish overall rate because the researcher added the criminal records, which includes records obtained from different countries. Bivariate analysis of the study shows that criminal background has an impact on an individual’s violence status (p < .05). This can be attributable to the context of Turkey as well as organizations.

It is a well-known fact that once an individual commits any kind of offense, he is more likely to be involved in further criminal acts. Most of the terrorist organizations also benefit from and recruit these individuals because they are labeled as terrorist or criminal by society and security agencies. For example, Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations recruit people who have criminal backgrounds to benefit from their experiences in the operations after completing the indoctrination process. Several operations against Al-Qaeda in
Turkey revealed that most of its operators had criminal backgrounds; not only violent acts but also nonviolent and the violence rates of this study are higher than that of the overall population. Religious organizations always declare that they are one of the most important resorts for criminals who want to end their criminal activities. Not only violent organizations, but also many peaceful religious groups accept individuals who have criminal pasts to adapt these people into society as part of rehabilitation programs and sometimes for specific goals. Moreover, a person who has a criminal background will join religious organizations to eliminate his sins as a result of his bad activities like burglary, robbery, etc. Like nonviolent religious groups, violent organizations also promise removing his/her sins and proceeding to paradise to its members who have criminal pasts. While bivariate results indicate a significant impact of criminal backgrounds on violence status, utilizing significant variables in multivariate analysis of the discriminant model to measure overall differences and test their magnitude between violent and nonviolently radicalized individuals, shows that the criminal backgrounds of individuals has no significant impact on differentiating between the groups. Again, the researcher attributed this result to the nature of discriminant analysis that shows that the most significant variables are those that contribute to the difference (p < .05).
Psychosocial Characteristics:

Hypothesis # 8

Friendship, an entry method to the group or organization, has an impact on differentiating between violently radicalized individuals and non-violently individuals.

Entry method in this study is measured based on the explanations of terrorist-suspects, on how they entered the religious groups, whether via friends or others that involve relatives and organizational associations. Descriptive results of the study revealed that more than 80% of nonviolent and more than 90% of violent individuals had contact with the religious groups or organizations through the inspiration of their friends, while a small amount of individuals entered the organizations or groups via some organizational associations or relatives.

Research findings and arguments indicated that the role of friends in recruitment to any kind of organization or group is very extensive and that friendship is accepted by social movement researchers as a strong facilitator of participation in any organization (R.A. Hudson, Majeska, Division, & Congress, 1999; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Moghaddam, 2003; Nesser, 2006; Ozeren, 2007; Ozsoy, 2007; Sageman, 2004; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wolters, 2002; Snow & Zurcher, 1980). For instance, Sageman’s (2004) study of global Salafi mujahidin emphasized the importance of friendship in mujahidin recruitment strategy, stating that 68% of mujahidin in his study entered the organization through their friends (Sageman, 2004). Moreover, he also found that friendship, a type of social bond, comes before ideological commitment, which can be defined as a bottom-up activity.
Many studies in Turkey found that during the socialization process of the young population, friendship is considered to be one of the most important factors. Not only ordinary and nonviolent organizations but also terrorist organizations operating in Turkey prefer friendship as a recruitment method. For example, Yilmaz’s study (2008) found that in the recruitment process of the Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organization, friendship was the primary agent. Another study that focused on DHKP/C (leftist terrorist organization in Turkey) had similar results with Turkish Hezbollah that friendship had the highest rate among the social networks regarding contact type for the recruitment to the organization (Ekici, 2008).

The abovementioned studies revealed the effectiveness of friendship; nevertheless they also agreed that friendship is not the final recruitment decision. Similarly, descriptive statistics of this study also revealed the dominance of friendship in the recruitment process; however it is hard to predict the violence status of individuals by their entry method to the organization. Bivariate results of this study indicated that there is no significant difference between nonviolently and violently radicalized individuals regarding the entrance method to the organizations or religious groups (p < .05).

This result can be attributed to the nature of the society and religious groups. Most of the religious groups are formed in an informal way and shaped by traditions and values where a social relations network is established. Hence, for both nonviolent and violently radicalized categories, individuals entered the organizations via their friends. This also eliminates the formal entry methods, which may require some detailed procedures. From another perspective, these religious groups are established in social
settings or in places where there is an ordinary process of life; communications utilized face-to-face; and oral culture very dominant. Friendship is one of the most applied ways to enter, participate and involve oneself in such religious or radical groups because proximate and intimate settings (friendship has these features) are the most common relations of communication. The abovementioned facts of religious groups and the need for them in the society as mentioned in previous hypotheses inevitably enable the effectiveness of friendship as an entry method to the religious groups. Consequently, the presence of these religious groups or organizations in the ordinary life of society in Turkey makes it difficult to predict the violence status from the entry method of individuals. Therefore, friendship as an entry method to the radical groups or organizations has no impact on differentiating the violence status of individuals.

**Hypothesis #9**

*Exposure to the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology has an impact on differentiating the violence status of individuals.*

The studies show that changes in belief, feelings, behaviors and important features of radicalization are ultimately shaped by ideology (Giddens, 2001; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Ideology was tested in two different ways in this study: exposure to Al-Qaeda ideology and acceptance of Al-Qaeda ideology. Exposure to ideology was measured based on the statements of apprehended individuals, gauging whether they were exposed to the discourses of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Discourses of Al-Qaeda include perception of humiliation of Muslims around the world; the belief that
most of the ruling leaders of the Muslim community are powerless and an ally of the “infidels”; and “waging jihad” is the only way to avenge the humiliated Muslim populations.

Descriptive results of the study revealed that more than 85% of the whole sample experienced the ideological discourses of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Specifically, 96% of violently radicalized and 73% of nonviolently radicalized individuals were exposed to radical discourses of Al-Qaeda by the terrorist organization’s recruiters or core members who may be identified as so-called gatekeepers during the religious gatherings, whether taking place in homes, picnics, or social facilities. The term gatekeepers refers to veteran members who participated at training sessions in camps in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and so on during the 1990s. Besides the descriptive results, which revealed that high percentages of both nonviolent and violent individuals were exposed to the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, bivariate results also indicate that exposure to terrorist ideology significantly differentiates between nonviolently radicalized and violently radicalized individuals (p < .05).

The high percentage of exposure to the Al-Qaeda ideology and statistically significant results of the bivariate model can be attributed to the context of Turkey, new trends in political science and the nature of the religious groups. After the 1990s, as Huntington (1993) proposed, with the emergence of globalization, religious identities became more important and most Muslims tried to help or at least share the same feelings with the same identity members around the world. In every religious group or organization of the Muslim world, whether supporting violence or not, it is clear to see
that there is great concern about the humiliation of the Muslim population. There may be
differences in their proposed solutions or perceptions of the real causes of the problem
but oppression, humiliation and subjugation of the Muslim population seem to be
important concerns for all radical or religious groups or organizations. Ideology plays a
large role in the recruitment of new members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and it
is true that exposure to the Al-Qaeda ideology mostly comes through contact with the
religious groups or activities that espouse a radical vision even if they don’t really engage
in violent activities.

Regarding the descriptive results of the sample, only 4% of violently radicalized
individuals were not exposed to Al-Qaeda ideology. This shows that almost all of the
violently radicalized people were previously exposed to a terrorist organization’s
ideology. Conversely, almost 28% of nonviolently radicalized individuals were not
exposed to the ideology of Al-Qaeda, which appears substantially different from
exposure to the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization results of violent
individuals. Hence, bivariate results of this study show that being exposed to the ideology
of Al-Qaeda has an impact on differentiating between nonviolent and violent individuals.
Religious organizations or groups are always being considered as offshoots of terrorist
organizations and enable individuals to experience educational and political concerns that
prove to be the entry point (Sheehan, 2009; UN, 2002; Lynch, 2002).

Though bivariate results point to the impact of exposure to the ideology as far as
the difference between nonviolent and violent individuals, when the researcher utilized
the multivariate analysis that includes all significant variables derived from the bivariate
model, there is an insignificant impact of exposure on ideology differentiating between nonviolent and violently radicalized individuals. The result of discriminant analysis show that exposure to radical discourse, which also form the basis of the Al-Qaeda ideology, can be experienced in most of the religious groups or organizations in Turkey; however, it has no impact on differentiating between violently radicalized and nonviolently radicalized individuals.

**Hypothesis #10**

*Accepting the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology has an impact on differentiating between the violence statuses of individuals.*

The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology mainly stands on the Salafi belief system, waging jihad, trekking to the Al-Qaeda training camps and adapting the discourses of its ideology to real life. This study measured the acceptance of Al-Qaeda ideology according to the apprehended individual’s statements of its ideology during his testimonies. The researcher’s measurement criteria from their statements included the individual’s adaptation of the discourses of Al-Qaeda ideology to his life as stating that he is Salafi, does not go to mosques on holy days like Fridays because he rejects the method of Turkey’s management; uses code names and lies to people close to him to prevent him from stopping his plans; acts as a new recruiter for the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization; persists in being with members of the terrorist organization who enable him to become exposed to the ideology; continue to seek more sources (publications, books, audio tapes) to go deeper into the Salafi belief system; and ask to be a suicide bomber,
revealing his total indoctrinated situation. The nature of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization prevents to code acceptance of ideology in a leveled and categorical way because each criterion is “sine qua non” for measurement of the ideology.

Descriptive results of the study regarding ideology acceptance indicated that almost 90% of violently radicalized and only 9% of nonviolently radicalized individuals accept the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology. Literature in terrorism studies (Ali, 2005; Baran, 2005; Houdaiby, 2005; Borum, 2004; Hafez, 2006; Harchaoui, 2005; Sinai, 2007; Khosrokhavar, 2005; Sageman, 2004) argues that ideology is found to be the most important factor to become a member of a terrorist organization. Similar to literature in terrorism, this study’s bivariate and multivariate analysis also indicates that accepting the ideology of Al-Qaeda has a significant impact on differentiating between violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals (p < .05). Although previous hypotheses in this study indicated the insignificant impact of exposure to ideology, the significant impact of accepting ideology in determining the violence status of individuals can be attributed to the nature of the religious groups or organizations in Turkey. As mentioned in previous discussions of several hypotheses, religious groups in Turkey have almost no selection process of its members and are considered as part of ordinary life. In the context of Turkey, one can hear the similar discourses in the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology, such as being humiliated and attacked by the West, Israel, and corrupt local regimes in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, it is hard to label all statements as a reflection of violent behavior. As this study indicates, it is accepting the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology that makes people violent and involved in terrorist activity.
Studies on the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization showed that the organization specifically recruits individuals those have a higher level of acceptance where they can fight for their cause regardless of means (Sageman, 2004). Parallel to literature, in the Al-Qaeda manual (retrieved from www.usdoj.com) recovered in a Manchester, England search in May of 2000, the organization made a list of “necessary qualifications for the organization’s members,” consisting of fourteen traits (The Al-Qaeda Manual, p.16). In this manual, acceptance of and commitment to the Al-Qaeda ideology are mentioned as the primary qualification criteria.

Regarding the acceptance of ideology, there is a significant difference among apprehended people. Prior to acceptance of the ideology, where the process of exposure to ideology was included, the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization recruiters neglected to clarify and declare their ultimate goal. Once the individual experienced exposure to the ideological process later in the recruitment, everything becomes more clear and definite. As mentioned in previous hypotheses, because of the context of Turkey and the nature of the organization, everything in such kinds of religious groups is ambiguous and hard to quantify; to see the whole picture clearly. However, just before the acceptance of ideology, individuals are at a crossroads to make the decision on whether to choose a terrorist organization and become violent or continue to be a peaceful, tranquil and nonviolent Muslim. Hence, it is difficult to predict the violent status of individuals in the first steps of the radicalization process, and to see significant differences among them. On the other hand, with the appearance of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, prior to
acceptance of ideology, it becomes more definite and significant in distinguishing the nonviolent and violent individuals that are out there.

Besides the context of Turkey and religious groups, it is important to mention the results of multivariate discriminant analysis regarding the results of Al-Qaeda ideological acceptance. The major goal in utilizing discriminant analysis is to assume proper model specification (including all important and significant independents and removing insignificants) in the analysis. Results of the multivariate model revealed that accepting the terrorist organization’s ideology is the most significant variable contributing to a differentiation between the groups regarding their violence status. Hence, similar to research findings and seized documents from the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, this study’s findings indicate that accepting the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s ideology has an impact on differentiating between violent and nonviolently radicalized individuals.

**Hypothesis #11:**

*Jihad, as a reason to contact terrorist organizations or groups, has an impact on differentiating between non-violently and violently radicalized individuals.*

This study identifies the contact reason to religious groups or organizations as making “Jihad,” which emphasizes uniting and standing up for Muslim’s faith, fighting against the West and other corrupting influences in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia. The “Others” category involves several reasons, such as to gain references from groups for acceptance into the Islamic Schools in various countries. Furthermore, having a spouse that is involved with the organization or group can influence contact with them.
Wanting to learn and recite the Quran in order to gain knowledge about Islam is also a reason that falls under the “Others” category.

Descriptive results of this study revealed that only 14.5% of the nonviolent individuals made contacts with the religious groups for jihad where more than 60% of the violent individuals were contacted for jihad. In the overall sample, 41.4% of the population joined religious groups for jihadist reasons. Moreover, bivariate and multivariate discriminant analysis results reflected that the contact reason with the religious groups or organizations had an impact on differentiating between nonviolently and violently radicalized individuals (p < .05).

Jihad is one of the important features of violent radicalization and, as Lia (2008) mentioned, jihadi discourse has evolved considerably after the emergence of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization in the 1980s. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization insists upon the duty of jihad and migration to the training camps in Afghanistan is considered the most important step for that duty (Lia, 2008). Moreover, as Esposito (2006) mentioned, in recent decades, jihad is interpreted to mean building a more “just society” that requires exactness and preciseness. From this perspective, we can hypothesize about the impact the contact reasons have on the violence status of individuals. Though mainstream interpretations of Islam describe jihad mainly as a personal, moral and spiritual struggle, Al-Qaeda’s radical exclusionary ideology perceives jihad as a commitment to the violent overthrowing of the existing international and national systems and replacing those systems with an all-encompassing Islamic state. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s perception, which proposes violence whether against
innocent civilians or governmental institutions, is not supported widely in the Muslim world. In previous sections, this study found that especially in Muslim societies, it is hard to predict the violence status of people according to variables like entry method, education, marital status and age due to the context of the Muslim society. However, aiming to wage jihad against so-called enemies with any kind of violent act places these belief systems into violent groups apparently and the distinction between individuals regarding their violence status becomes more explicit. As the perception of jihad becomes more related to violence contemporarily, it is participation in active war-fighting and armed confrontation in the Al-Qaeda training camps, or attacks towards so-called apostate regimes which is the best way of waging jihad. Hence, this study’s research findings conclude that “jihad” as a contact reason has a significant impact on differentiating between violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals.

**Hypothesis #12:**

The perception of the humiliation of Muslim societies has an impact on differentiating between non-violently and violently radicalized individuals.

A growing concern over the perception of humiliation of Muslim societies is considered to be one of the most effective forms of motivation for recruiting. Victims of humiliation, whether directly or indirectly, (as mentioned in previous chapters, “kin-country syndrome” where members of the same religious identity feel the same and try to help others from the same civilization against their common enemy), are the most vulnerable to falling prey to violently radicalized groups (Stern, 2003; Juergensmeyer,
Moreover, humiliation is a crucial term for terrorist organizations as it is also perceived as the source of frustration and a terrorist is often considered an individual who has suffered humiliation for a long time (Marton, 2005; Stern, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Barter, 1989). This study measures frustration according to the terrorist-suspects statements of the “humiliation of Muslim brothers” which shows the individuals’ giving priority to that fact. Giving importance to the perception of humiliation as a primary concern in an individual’s life is essential as this perception will inevitably shape his vision, and the numbers and levels of such humiliation will determine the certainty of frustration, which is an additive and cumulative process (Dollard et al., 1939).

Descriptive results of the study indicate that almost 33% of nonviolently radicalized individuals did mention the humiliation of Muslim societies as his primary concern where around 80% of violently radicalized individuals mentioned the humiliation of Muslim societies as his primary concern. In the overall sample, more than half (64.1%) has a perception of the humiliation of Muslims as their primary concern. This result can be attributable to the context of the religious groups where they share the same feelings as their Muslim brothers. As Huntington (1993) argues, religious identities become important with globalization and such identity features a “kin-country syndrome” where they share the same beliefs and feelings. Similar to Huntington, Scott Atran (2009) proposed that devotion to “sacred values” might represent universal responses. Although, the percentage of the perception of Muslim’s humiliation as a primary concern (64%) is more than half of the sample; it can be considered as not very high according to the abovementioned facts of religious identity. It can well be attributable to the nature of
religion and society. The mainstream Islamic view, specifically in Turkey, mainly deals with personal, moral and spiritual struggle, which prioritizes personal or internal problems. Turkey’s local situations lead Muslims to focus on problems other than humiliation like poverty, illiteracy and disagreement in society to eliminate current problems of Muslim populations. Besides the contextual facts that perception of humiliation of Muslims in the world cannot determine the violence status of individuals from the radicalization point of view, results of multivariate discriminant analysis was run to assume proper model specification, and also shows the insignificant impact of frustration on differentiating between violent and nonviolently radicalized individuals. Hence, frustration (perception of Muslim humiliation and considered as a cause of it) has no impact on predicting the violence status of individuals.
## SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Bivariate</th>
<th>Multivariate</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Marital Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of humiliation of Muslim</td>
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<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>No impact on determining violence status</td>
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</table>
Theoretical Implications

Terrorism and specifically radicalization studies suffer from a lack of theoretical guidance that can help to identify one’s process to violent radicalization. Several academics like Gunning (2007), Schmid & Jongman (1988), Silke (2004), Horgan (2003) associate these sufferings to the difficulties in reaching primary sources in terror-related studies. Moreover, the predominance of a ‘problem-solving’ approach with a “one-size-fits-all” formula, which eliminates focusing on a wider and historical context for the problem, makes ‘terrorism studies’ as Tarrow (2004) proposed, largely innocent of theoretical apparatus. For such reasons, most of the theories applied to the field were adapted from other disciplines such as psychology or political science. This section aims to connect the findings of the current research to theoretical explanations, viewing the process of violent radicalization as the basis for involvement in violent activity. The findings will be evaluated from two different theories’ perspectives: Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis and Theory of Civil Violence in Turkey.

Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

Among the 12 variables, this study finds that school dropouts, irregular jobs and specifically frustration in the form of humiliation can be considered negative life events, which has a potential frustration effect. Bivariate analysis of violent radicalization versus school dropout, occupations that involve irregular employment, and frustration for apprehended terrorist-suspects indicate that other than school dropouts, occupation and frustration have an impact on determining the violence status of individuals (p < .05).
These results show that individuals experience negative life events such as not having a long-term job and perceiving the humiliation of Muslim populations have a positive impact on the violence status of the individuals. However, bivariate results of school dropout, which is an indicator of frustration, reveal that dropout has no impact on predicting the violence status of individuals. Although bivariate results confirmed the significant effect of employment status and frustration in determining violence status, multivariate analysis results point out that these variables do not have an effect on differentiating between violent and nonviolently radicalized individuals. The discriminant function analysis finds the most powerful discriminating variables with a stepwise model by determining if including or deleting the next variable adds significantly to explaining group separation with prespecified criteria based on the $p$ value of the $F$ statistic. Using it, variables were identified mostly as distinguishable from each item thus eliminating poor discriminators. Hence, even though they could be considered as poor discriminators, as the bivariate analysis findings revealed, Hypothesis 6 and 12, or the positive effect of perception of humiliation and irregular job status on involvement in violent acts, were consistent with Dollard et al.’s frustration-aggression hypothesis. The frustration-aggression hypothesis may explain why some individuals who have mainstream Islamic views can be involved in violent activities as a result of the violently radicalization process. Individuals, who are motivated negatively by experiencing a frustrating event in their life such as not having a long-term job or perceiving the belief of humiliation of the Muslim society, develop frustration against the responsible figures that have the primary responsibility for their suffering. When such individuals are recruited into terrorist
organizations, they may prefer to keep a high profile and participate in risky and violent activities.

**Theory of Civil Violence and Terrorism in Turkey**

As Magnarella (1998) built his theory of civil violence and terrorism in Turkey on the general insights of Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory, he noted while studying in Turkey that a sense of relative deprivation is the result of sociological factors such as rapid urbanization and unemployment where they are visible in gecekondu’s (shanty towns) in Turkey. It is true that these places are appropriate resorts for terrorist organizations as far as the recruitment process. Similar to Gurr (1970) and Magnarella (1998), Huntington (1971) also agreed that relative deprivation was intensified with the gap between increasing aspirations and relatively insufficient capabilities, stemming largely from inadequate levels of employment, production and government resources (in Magnarella 1998:203). Magnarella put importance to discontent as the source of deprivation where some infrastructural and perceptual conditions enable the sequence of violence. He added that violent terrorist groups recruit its members usually from the jobless and migrated populations. Similar to the arguments of Magnarella, Dogu Ergil (2010), a prominent sociologist in Turkey, also proposed that immigrants are the most vulnerable groups for recruitment because they feel unprotected and weak because of the huge demands of the new society and resulting lack of self-confidence. These feelings and situations potentially drive individuals to become discontented.
A true measurement of discontent from a deprivation point of view should be able to demonstrate the gap between expectation and achievement (Gurr, 1970; Magnarella, 1998). Migrated individuals have an expectation of finding good opportunities in urban societies where this is hard to find in the context of Turkey, especially in Istanbul. Moreover, the unstable employment conditions of individuals lead them to discontent and deprivation because every application to a new job is the result of high expectations associated with that application. However, instability in employment and resulting lack of achievement from the job reveals the gap between expectation and achievement. From these perspectives, hypothesis 3, mobility and hypothesis 6, occupation can be accepted as a variable related to discontent in this study. Bivariate analysis results of mobility indicate that moving from rural societies to cities may lead to the development of discontent and has no impact on differentiating between violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals. Conversely, statistical outcomes of occupation that test the bivariate analysis results of unstable employment status, which is also an indicator of discontent and deprivation, revealed that it contributes to being violently radicalized. Yet, similar to the results of the previous findings in Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, multivariate analysis shows that it has no impact on determining the violence status of individuals. Hence, research findings about occupation (unstable or stable point of view) and mobility, as a source for discontent and deprivation, are not consistent with Magnarella’s civil violence and terrorism theory in Turkey. Though it has no direct impact on predicting violence status, an unstable employment status has a positive contribution and triggering effect on creating a violently radicalized individual.
Policy Implications

The statistical results of this study have policy implications for policy-makers, security institutions, and terrorism and specifically radicalization scholars. These policy implications will be based on the results of theoretical explanations, such as the frustration-aggression hypothesis and the theory of civil violence and also terrorism in Turkey. Besides this, the statistical outcomes of several variables will also be focused on for any policy implications that can be applied.

Radicalization, specifically violent radicalization, is one of the major challenges for policy-related institutions such as governments, policy-makers and other stakeholders. The context of Turkey makes this phenomenon more complicated and sensitive for them because the nature of radicalization incurs huge amounts of uncertainty, fragility and sensitivity.

Discriminant analysis results of this study have indicated that most of the variables known as predictive on terrorism have no significant impact on determining the violence status of individuals. Being frustrated with the conditions of Muslim society with the perception of humiliation, being exposed to the radical ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, having a criminal background, having an unstable employment status, school dropout, mobility, marital status and age are found to be insignificant in determining the violence status of individuals. These results do not mean that the abovementioned variables are meaningless to consider, but it would be appropriate and more beneficial to focus on variables other than aforesaid ones to eliminate reactive actions of societies. Hence, policies should consider the context of the society from the
point of culture, history and sensitivity. Moreover, the policies should make a concerted effort to understand the background conditions as well as the recruitment processes that inspire individuals to select extremist beliefs instead of moderate, traditional and true interpretations of Islam.

Though it is understandable how the process of violent radicalization creates a distinction between violently radicalized individuals and mainstream Islamic views. The statistical results of the study reveal that this distinction may be criticized because the results revealed that the edge between violently and nonviolently radicalized individuals is very fragile, blurred and indefinite. It is therefore advised that the policy-makers should focus on the nature of Turkey-like societies carefully and effectively. The discourses of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its ideology may find a positive response from the community-at-large due to global events, and benefit from the responses of the community. Policies should pay more attention to moderate, mainstream Islamic views and promote them to challenge the build-up of the violently radicalized ideology of terrorist organizations and its effects.

This study’s research findings also illustrate that the jihadi belief system and involvement in jihad activities are considered to be one of the contact reasons of the individual to religious groups, thereby having a significant impact on the evolution to violence. It is a common misconception that jihad is an inherently dangerous aspect of Islam. The use of Islamic authority figures and mainstream Islamic views could eliminate the misinterpretation of jihad, which is a “sine qua non” element for struggling with violently radicalized views. Moreover, the misinterpretation of jihad can be corrected
with religious reeducation programs that come from within Islam and Islamic scholars, who can refute this interpretation with arguments based on theology and ethics.

While the discriminant (multivariate) analysis results indicate that only two variables (acceptance of ideology and jihad as a contact reason) significantly differentiate between violent and nonviolent individuals, we cannot ignore the significance of some variables in bivariate analysis, such as marital status, occupation, exposure to ideology, criminal background and frustration. Hence, policies focusing on increasing stable employment opportunities to eliminate frustration of individuals, leading single individuals to marry, strengthening the voices of moderate spiritual leaders to divert violent discourses like humiliation, subjugation, etc., into peace, nonviolence and trying to find solutions to problems with means other than violence and revenge. If the policies try to create a counter against the violent discourses of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, it should be moderate and mainstream Muslims who have to lead that struggle with the assistance of the other faiths.

This study identified individuals in risk groups who need to be monitored and focused on. For example, individuals who joined religious groups for jihad, and accepted the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization are predicted to be involved in violent activities. Moreover, other than significant variables in discriminant analysis, bivariate results of some variables also have positive effects on the violence status of individuals, which give some ideas on risk groups. Thus, policies directed towards risk groups might yield promising results in preventing these risky individuals to be violently radicalized.
Literature on terrorism and radicalization points out the reactive responses to the problem. However, such responses have been found to be ineffective and to conversely increase the violence (Miller, 2006; Silke, 2003). Coercive force by security agencies without understanding the process can have a stimulating effect, especially when perceived as illegitimate, and would increase the risks of collateral damage and push moderates into violently radicalized terrorist groups like the Al-Qaeda. As a policy implication, prevention of violent radicalization must include tools to strengthen the resilience of moderate and tranquil populations. Besides mature, responsible spiritual leaders who promote tranquility, change based on patience and long-term solutions should be called upon to calm down individuals.

The research analysis of this study reveals the importance of rehabilitation programs, which focus mainly on deradicalizing, integrating potential recruits to mainstream society. The policies of these programs should be based on misinterpretations of religious themes; a clear understanding of what drives people from tranquil radicalization to violent radicalization. These programs should include clerics or theologians who preach against the terrorist ideology of the Al-Qaeda organization and religious texts to justify violence. Current deradicalization programs that work effectively focus largely on ideology (Barrett & Bokhari, 2009; Boucek, 2008, 2009; Abuza, 2009; Ashour, 2008, 2009) and establish “dialogues” between program participants and moderate imams to abandon violent ideologies in favor of a more moderate, nonviolent understanding of Islam.
The results of this study support the conclusion that accepting the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and jihad as a contact reason to connect with these groups are determinant variables of the violence status of individuals. Policy-makers might consider the importance of a misinterpretation of the Quran, encouraging mainstream society to involve itself in the process of a true understanding of religion, monitoring extremist religious leaders and Web sites that promote “inappropriate purposes.”

**Suggestions for Future Studies**

This study argues that terrorism and specifically radicalization should focus on a psychosocial perspective that includes the mindset of the person and his/her social environment. Although the context, structure, culture, ethics and perceptions of the society have a significant impact on the radicalization process of individuals, most of the studies on terrorism and radicalization revealed that scholars mainly focus on terrorists and terror incidents, which enable an underestimating of the real features and causes of terrorism and violence.

The trajectory of violent radicalization reveals that individuals ensconced within the trajectory have regular and ordinary lifestyles. Hence, it is difficult to propose appropriate explanations to the involvement of the violence. Measurements of known variables like friendship, socioeconomic status, education; age, criminal background, etc. might conclude that they have an insignificant impact on terrorism. Therefore, this study argues that inquiries through quantitative research methods might not reflect a real picture of society from a radicalization point of view. Terrorism scholars should focus on
understanding the mindset and social environment of typical violently radicalized individuals rather than simply describing certain characteristics. This can be achieved through qualitative research methods such as field observations. Researchers should observe the context and culture of that society into which individuals are exposed to the definitions that are favorable to terrorism and violent radicalization.

Revealing the real causes of involvement of radicalized individuals in violent activities should include social and psychological variables. The trajectory of the violent radicalization process, which theories are used in this study, includes isolation, discontent, frustration, deprivation, etc. The accurate measurement of these variables will offer huge contributions to the understanding of the phenomenon. Terrorism scholars should employ reliable and concrete measurements for these feelings and conditions, which will also improve the theoretical models. Moreover, ideology either exposure or acceptance should be focused more detailed by the researchers and aimed to seek more explicit and definitive impact of it.

This study lacks qualitative analysis. However, most of the findings warranted qualitative data for further clarification. Although this study used the terrorist suspects’ court collected testimonies, qualitative analysis that includes observation in a natural environment would help the researcher understand how discontent, frustration, misinterpretation of religious themes, the effect of culture and the impact of spiritual leaders work in practice. Thus, a researcher can use more reliable theoretical models to understand how each of these processes develops and at what point alternative explanations can be used.
This study used a limited number of variables to understand the violent radicalization process of individuals. Further research can also be augmented with a comprehensive database of qualitative data. Measuring the important variables like discontent, isolation, deprivation and frustration with qualitative and quantitative methods will provide a fuller and richer picture of the process of violent radicalization.

Finally, future researchers could work with practitioners to evaluate new laws, regulations, policies, deradicalization and rehabilitation programs that are intended to address dismantling the terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda; those abusing the tranquil, peaceful discourses of Islam.

**Limitations**

It is desirable to use multiple data sources for more accurate and true measurement. Therefore, using multiple data streams is recommended to increase the validity of research in social sciences (Maxfield et al., 2000, p. 87). The current research can be improved by adding more methods and datasets, such as making field observations in locations like their society, schools and universities, or conducting interviews or surveys with violently radicalized individuals and their relations.

Official data sources those were used in this study have their own limitations and strengths. For one thing, official data sources are merely comprised of crimes or criminals reported or detected by the officials only (police or other law enforcement agencies). Therefore, it is generally believed that official data sources underestimate the true volume of crime (Kirk, 2006). Besides the true volume of crime, some variables used
in this study have no detailed information like type of conviction of the individual. These undetailed information also may resulted with the case of reductionism in the coding process of the data that is one of the limitation of this study.

The psychosocial variables such as acceptance of ideology, exposure to ideology, frustration, contact reason of the individual with the organization, entry method to the organization were coded in a dichotomous way which also considered as a limitation of the study. Also, the nature of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the variables used in this study like acceptance, exposure and frustration do not let to categorize them in an appropriate way. Moreover, some subcategories don’t have noticeable frequency. These facts lead researcher to code the variables as dichotomous.

One of the concerns of social sciences is generalization. Although current research has collected samples from different regions of Turkey where the radicalization process takes place, there are many other locations from which samples can be collected. Similarly, the ability to generalize the findings of this research to other violently radicalized individuals in different countries needs to be investigated. The process of radicalization may vary according to the type of religious movement. In this regard, the current research focuses on the processes of people that culminate with involvement in the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. However, the patterns showed in this study may be different than in other religiously motivated terrorist organizations like Turkish Hezbollah or Hizb-ut-tahrir. Therefore, the dynamics of the radicalization process need to be tested on different terrorist organizations or movements.
This study used quantitative analyses. However, it is suggested to use quantitative and qualitative analyses to supplement each other and truly examine the problem. Furthermore, using quantitative analyses to measure the magnitude of each factor in the violent radicalization process, qualitative analyses like using interviews with field officers such as law enforcement agencies, scholars on religious issues and individuals involved in the trajectory will provide in-depth information and descriptions about the phenomenon.

There is another limitation that exists which can be stated as: the context. Although there are no gaps, these terrorist-suspects’ court-collected testimonies might be collected under conditions of duress, for even without physical coercion the reality is that the subjects are powerless and in detention.

Finally, the time frame of the data is limited to the 2003 Istanbul Bombings. Future research may focus on recent years as not only the dynamics of terrorist organizations, but also the dynamics of the radicalization process may be changed according to contemporary developments.
Conclusion

The current study aims to explain the true understanding of violent radicalization by using the court-collected testimonies of terrorist suspects apprehended in Istanbul after horrendous and simultaneous attacks of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization in 2003.

The unit of analysis of this study is the religious grouping formed through social networks in Turkey, which can also be considered as an offshoot for the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. These religious groups have a social network structure where peer relations, relatives and religious associations play important roles in recruiting people. It is important to mention that these groups are distinguished from cults, religious orders and congregations regarding the characteristics of the members, organizational structure and hierarchy. Other than these religious groups, especially in the context of Turkey, cults, religious orders and congregations enjoy basic but effective rules that have a significant impact on the lives of their members. Their historic backgrounds where they bonded with their traditions have a positive contribution on the perception of current conflicts involving Muslims. They are mainly considered to have tranquil, peaceful and mainstream Islamic views and discourses.

On the other hand, the religious groups focused in this study are established in an informal way, more vulnerable to the misinterpretations of key religious verses, more reactive to the conflicts involving Muslims. Their establishment process that includes making new friends and interactions around their environment may also work for the recruitment process of the terrorist organizations. Thus, a solution would be to build a
network of members, prospective members and recruiters to gain new members for the terrorist organization.

Through the analyses, this study identified a process of key factors in the violent radicalization of targeted individuals and a violent radicalization modus operandi that the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization uses to recruit individuals in Turkey (see below, figure 17). In addition to the identification of the process with figures, researchers will also add some remarks and important features about the violent radicalization process other than the findings mentioned on the figure.

With the help of the findings from the current study, this inquiry concluded that there should be a distinction between individuals who have mainstream Islamic beliefs, individuals with radical beliefs, and those have a violently radicalized belief system because they may experience same features in the same group but differ in perceiving and applying them in real life. However, academics, governments, and states perceptions and policies put these different terms and individuals together and consider all in a “one-size-fits-all” manner. This study argues that the mainstream Islamic religious belief system is formed having some in-depth feelings about the religion and applying these feelings to real life. This belief system does not resort to violence for experienced problems but tries to find solutions to problems through personal, moral and spiritual efforts. There is therefore an interior locus of control in the mainstream Islamic perspective.

On the other hand, a radicalized belief system perceives the world from an extreme perspective and blames the “others” and “current system” as the real causes of the problems. Hence, according to the radical belief system, social change is inevitable
and this “problematic system” should be removed by any kind of effort available, including violence. This is a process that may or may not lead an individual to practice violence. Finally, this process may end up being violent through the misinterpretation of key points of the religion such as jihad, and acceptance of the ideology of violent terrorist organizations.

The true understanding of mainstream Muslim beliefs, radicalization and violent radicalization includes using proper definitions, which will also help to determine potential and real threats for the world from the terrorism point of view. Furthermore, the misuse of these terms, especially inside Muslim society, may create a blind spot that increases the benefit of violently radicalized terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda. Also, as with understanding radicalization in a true way, knowledge of the psychosocial process can help us to understand how individuals become bound to the violent terrorists’ networks, and give an indication of the costs of disengaging from terrorist activity.

This current study has shown that there is no set of characteristics that mark an individual as being more likely to become involved in violent activities and become violently radicalized. In the context of the Turkish society, it is hard to propose a violently radicalized individual demographic profile. As mentioned in the findings, many predictive variables are found to be insignificant in determining the violence status of individuals. These results reveal that violent radicalization contains unique features that are really different than any other type of crime or terrorism. It is hard to predict the violence status of individuals with general profiling methods. Hence, all segments of
governments, institutions, social services, academics, etc., have to be vigilant responding to the phenomenon.

**Figure 17 Violent Radicalization process of the Turkish Al-Qaeda Members**

Religious Groups formed through social network

- **Correlates (N=128)**
  - Friendship / Mobility / Marital Status
  - Frustration / Criminal Background / School Dropout
  - Age / Education / Occupation

- **Triggers (N=128)**
  - Contemporary Events
  - Discourses of recruiters
  - Spiritual Leaders

- **Exposure (N=128)**
  - Exposure to Ideology
  - Misinterpretation of key verses

- **Decision (Vio=53/Non=75)**
  - Reject violent ideology
  - Continue on tranquility

- **Violence Status**
  - Nonviolent Religious Meetings

- **Acceptance of ideology**
  - Isolation
  - Alienation
  - Jihad Belief System

- **Violent Training Camps**

As seen in the figure above, many correlates, which are known to be significant predictive variables, do not have a significant impact on differentiating between violent and nonviolent individuals. However, there are some factors worthy of note, like having an unstable employment status, criminal background, marital status, being an immigrant, frustrated and discontented feelings for Muslims that contribute to some extent.
Meanwhile, the pathway to the violent radicalization process starts with involvement in such religious groups for peaceful reasons, such as learning the Quran or responding to religious convictions, rather than violence.

Contemporary global conflicts involving Muslims as a motivational spillover effect, Al-Qaeda recruiter discourses and the influence of an extreme spiritual leader all have key contributions to this process. They are all perceived as “triggers” by the terrorist organizations in the pathway to violent radicalization. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization highlights perceived global injustices and the humiliation of Muslims worldwide. Moreover, the ruling leaders of the Muslim world are perceived as corrupt and non-Islamic, like some who pursue overly aggressive security policies. Although moderate, mainstream Muslims mostly form these groups, they might be motivated, lured and exposed to the terrorist ideology with the help of the discourses of group affiliates, group leaders and recruiters. These social influences are also key factors in understanding the logic behind the decisions. As seen in the above figure, almost every group member of the religious groups experiences such influences.

In the exposure step, the group members experience the ideology and discourses of terrorist organizations more clearly and accurately. The recruiters build a powerful image of Islam under attack and highlight the grievances and humiliations suffered by Muslims worldwide. The exposure also includes visual images like jihadist CDs, audios of terrorist organization’s senior leaders created and circulated by recruiters, affecting the motivations for and justifications of involvement in violent acts. During the exposure step, misinterpretations of key religious terms like jihad also emerged and recruiters
incited others to join the training camps. The misinterpretations of key religious precedents include the perceptions that blame “others” as the reason for the current problems of Muslim societies.

Despite seeking certain characteristics for the violent radicalization process, accepting the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and jihadist belief system are found to be the major criterion for determining the violence status of individuals in this study. All individuals in the radicalization trajectory, apprehended after the 2003 Istanbul bombings due to their link with terrorists, might experience the same predictive variables. Yet the determinant factors of being violently radicalized are accepting the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and holding the so-called jihad belief system. It cannot be ignored that the process of becoming violently radicalized tends to be gradual. This is a process where over time an individual takes many small, apparently insignificant steps, eventually leading to violence. Accepting the ideology of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization brings isolation and alienation from the host society because of the perceived failure of the society to solve the problem, which was also touched upon in this study with the theory of civil violence and terrorism in Turkey proposed by Magnarella.

As mentioned above, this study has more observations about radicalization than the figure on the process. First of all, this study argues that the radicalization process of Muslim individuals should be handled in a different manner to today’s standards and that the context of society is crucial to the process of handling the phenomenon.
and measurements that try to eliminate violent radicalization will always fail if appliers of those measurements ignore or underestimate the sensitivity, makeup and nature of the targeted society. It is inevitable to hear about conflicts involving Muslims around Muslim societies. Yet, labeling these individuals as “radical” and responding to them, as potentially dangerous terrorists will harm the peaceful and moderate Muslims that do not approve of violence.

Moreover, the phenomenon named, “radicalization” is a problem of public health issue not a criminal or terrorism problem in the long term. This study also revealed that we couldn’t ignore the social and psychological aspect of radicalization that include all segments of the society during the prevention, infiltration, disruption, destruction or elimination of the violent radicalization among noxious networks.

Lastly, it is worth to mention that incidents and problems those the world facing with in last decades show that the strategies of many countries whether the U.S., West or specifically Turkey about “radicalization” and “terrorism” is backed-up. In previous chapters, this study argued that many clerics, societies and countries support such violent acts in any conflict areas. However, as Scott Atran (2010) argued, when the problem, especially seemingly intractable conflicts arise, everyone asks for a new frame and solution.
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Curriculum Vitae

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OBJECTIVES
To further my academic qualifications in order to provide a better service to the
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Police College, Ankara, Turkey 1989 – 1993
High School level – including – English, Turkish – literature,
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Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey 1993 – 1997
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Major - Criminology
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