Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment:

Rhetoric or Reality?

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and approved by

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Newark, New Jersey

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ABSTRACT

Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment:
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by Michele Grillo
Thesis director: Dr. Leslie Kennedy

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have forever changed the landscape of policing in the United States. Federal legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002 & 2007), has had a profound impact on all levels of law enforcement. Specifically, local police agencies are now sharing responsibilities in the mission of preventing and detecting terrorist activities. The responsibilities to participate in terrorism investigations and respond to potential terrorism-related service calls have changed fundamentally the day-to-day functioning of local police. However, the federal government provides little direction as to how local law enforcement should accomplish this mission.

Little information is available regarding how local law enforcement agencies are responding to the continued threat of terrorism. In addition, there is a lack of systematic research investigating whether the events of September 11 prompted organizational
changes in local police departments to accommodate a counterterrorism mission.

Therefore, it is not clear how local agencies are adapting to this new demand.

Using a qualitative methodology, this study explores the post-September 11 response experience of local police agencies in the United States through open-ended, semi-structured telephone interviews. The study included a national, non-probability, purposive sample of twenty-one (N=21) local police agencies throughout the country. Interviewees were sworn officers who currently served or previously served in counterterrorism capacities within the police departments.

The study’s findings indicate the majority (95%) of police agencies in this study (20 out of 21) displayed a spectrum of organizational change. This ranged from changes at the operational strategy level to the implementation of new bureaus in support of counterterrorism objectives. The most frequent organizational change is the establishment of a specialized terrorism unit or the addition of homeland security functions into an existing intelligence unit. There is also evidence that local agencies are moving toward an intelligence-led policing philosophy. The findings from the research have several important policy implications for both the federal government and local law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, this study functions as a source for future research regarding the effects of terrorism on local law enforcement.
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Introduction

Research Question 1: Do local agencies perceive the threat of terrorism as a special problem?

Personnel Increases

Implementation of a Specialized Terrorism Unit (STU)

Mission

Function

Summary

Research Question 2: Are local police agencies responding to the perceived threat of terrorism as a traditional crime?

New Policing Strategies

Integration into Existing Units

Increased Overall Terrorism Awareness

New Policing Philosophies: Intelligence-Led Policing

Summary

Research Question 3: Have local police agencies reprioritized their investment areas and are these changes a result of a “perceived” or “actual” threat?

Reprioritization of Investment Areas

Police Academy Training

In-Service Training

Threat Perception

Definition of Terrorism

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABD</td>
<td>All but dissertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPD</td>
<td>Arlington County (Virginia) Police Department</td>
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<td>ALF</td>
<td>Animal Liberation Front</td>
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<td>ASB</td>
<td>Administrative Services Building (Rutgers University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</td>
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<td>BJS</td>
<td>Bureau of Justice Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>California</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives</td>
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<td>CERT</td>
<td>Community Emergency Response Training</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIMS</td>
<td>Citywide Incident Management System</td>
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<td>CIMU</td>
<td>Critical incident management unit</td>
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<td>CompStat</td>
<td>Computer statistics</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Community-oriented policing</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Office of Community Oriented Policing Services</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DARE</td>
<td>Drug Abuse Resistance Education</td>
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<td>D.C.</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DUI</td>
<td>Driving under the influence</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
<td>Earth Liberation Front</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
<td>Emergency medical technician</td>
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<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency response unit</td>
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<td>FALN</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Puerto Rico)</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FL</td>
<td>Florida</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRONYM</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>Foreign terrorist organization</td>
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<td>FWA</td>
<td>Federalwide Assurance</td>
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<td>G.A.</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>GAOR</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly Official Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1N1</td>
<td>Influenza A virus subtype H1N1</td>
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<tr>
<td>hazmat</td>
<td>Hazardous materials</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IL</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Industry liaison officer</td>
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<td>ILP</td>
<td>Intelligence-led policing</td>
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<td>IOP</td>
<td>Terrorism Interdiction Officer Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRB</td>
<td>Institutional Review Board (Rutgers University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Internal Revenue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITERATE</td>
<td>International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDL</td>
<td>Jewish Defense League</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTTF</td>
<td>Joint terrorism task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Los Angeles Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEMAS</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACJ</td>
<td>Master of Arts in Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPT</td>
<td>Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS-13</td>
<td>Mara Salvatrucha gang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCJ</td>
<td>National Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>NJ</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCT</td>
<td>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York City Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Office of Domestic Preparedness</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRONYM</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSP</td>
<td>Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (Rutgers University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSHA</td>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCII</td>
<td>Protected Critical Infrastructure Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Police department</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal protective equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>Police paramilitary unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>United Nations Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Suspicious activity report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCJ</td>
<td>School of Criminal Justice (Rutgers University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Strategic National Stockpile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard operating procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SORT</td>
<td>Special operations response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>Special response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism database</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEP</td>
<td>California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>STU</td>
<td>Specialized terrorism unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>Special weapons and tactics</td>
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<td>TBE</td>
<td>Tick-borne encephalitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLO</td>
<td>Terrorism liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRIPS</td>
<td>Threat Reduction Infrastructure Protection Section</td>
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<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTAG</td>
<td>Terrorism Threat Analysis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>UASI</td>
<td>Urban Areas Security Initiative</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>ACRONYM</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA PATRIOT</td>
<td>Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIED</td>
<td>Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The issue of police preparedness in the wake of a terrorist attack has come to the forefront of debate since the events of September 11, 2001. No single event of this magnitude had affected the United States since the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 by a solitary domestic terrorist, Timothy McVeigh. September 11 severely tested the ability of first responder agencies, specifically the municipal police. Local agencies now have the added duties of first response to terrorist incidents and the gathering of terrorism-related intelligence (Hickman, 2006). Furthermore, local police have the primary responsibility of protecting critical infrastructure and potential terrorist targets (Hickman, 2006). These issues represent a small number of increasing counterterrorism functions that municipal police must incorporate in day-to-day operations.

Policing literature suggests the terrorist events of September 11 changed the function and organization of police in the United States in significant ways. “Arguably, the most important shift relates to the federalization of municipal police agencies. What was traditionally defined as local or state policing is assuming a mandate that was historically reserved for federal agencies” (Kappeler & Potter, 2004, p. 37). The public readily perceives some of this “change,” such as increased police presence and security in designated areas. Police-mandated searches at transportation facilities are also apparent. However, other “change” may be less visible, such as the implementation of a specialized terrorism unit (STU) to deal specifically with intelligence, response and other terrorism-related activity. Little systematic research to date assesses the extent and degree of post-September 11 “change” in either the function or organization of municipal police
agencies. This is surprising, given the ongoing discussion about how the terrorism threat has affected policing. However, the paucity of research on police organizations in general contributes to this fact. Albert Reiss voiced the complaint about this absence in the early 1990s (1992). Only a handful of studies (e.g. Zhao, 1996; Zhao et al., 1999; Katz, 2001) have begun to take into account external (adaptive) and internal (planned) factors that cause significant changes in police functions and operations. This context frames the consideration of any organizational changes that have followed the dramatic shift in the security environment on the United States post-9/11.

The specific objective of this research is to explore organizational change in American municipal policing in a post-September 11 environment. Four basic goals guide the research:

• Whether local police departments are implementing specialized terrorism units (or similar paramilitary units) to prevent and respond to terrorism, and if so, to what degree;

• If a specialized terrorism unit has not been implemented, whether other change has occurred in the organization (such as a shift in community policing philosophy) and if so, to what degree;

• If no organizational change has occurred, whether there has been a reprioritization of functions (such as from focusing on traffic to target hardening); and

• What facilitated the implementation of the specialized terrorism unit, other organizational change or change in functions (such as planned change because of perceived threats versus adapting to governmental mandates to focus specifically on terrorism-related issues).

Although terrorist attacks could occur at any time, the risk of a directed attack in most communities across the country is relatively low. Furthermore, most communities in the United States have never been the target of domestic or international terrorism. Despite the minimal risk, local, state and federal government have placed substantial
pressure on municipal agencies to respond to the problem of terrorism. Furthermore, antiterrorism rhetoric has further complicated and intensified the issue for police. Former President George W. Bush put forward such rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks: that America is in a “War Against Terrorism,” and that an “evil enemy” exists (e.g. Bush’s Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People on September 20, 2001 and State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002). The declared war on terrorism posed a new challenge to police: to combat an unknown, invisible enemy who knows no geographic boundaries.

This study undertakes a review of policing literature to understand the driving forces behind police organizational change. The literature reveals a need for more systematic information across police agencies. There is a record of changes in federal law enforcement agency practices post-September 11, such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the restructuring of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Yet there are few systematic studies of changes in local police agencies. In addition, “studies on post-9/11 police reform or change are largely atheoretical, depicting developments without drawing references to existing models or theories of planned change” (Marks & Sun, 2007, p. 160). Previous studies of police organizational change primarily focus on micro-level analyses and use the case study method (Zhao, 1996). Qualitative designs are an effective means to study the behaviors of a few particular agencies. However, the case study method fails to provide a broad depiction of organizational change in American policing.

To address this problem in the methodology of past research, this study will rely on state-level data. The data will focus on municipal police departments as the units of
analysis. Specifically, the research will seek to determine whether organizational changes have occurred at the local level. The data collection method will comprise semi-structured telephone interviews with the leaders of established specialized terrorism units (or other designees) to discuss the larger issues of organizational change. Interviews provide an appropriate format and approach for an exploratory study. This method enables the discussion and gathering of specific information on the “how” and “why” police organizations have or haven’t changed. In addition, interviews can help provide information difficult to capture in a written survey. For example, did an actual threat or perceived “fear” of an attack cause the change? A qualitative approach will help assess the nature and impetus of any organizational change (or lack of change) occurring within local police agencies in response to the events of September 11, 2001.

**Overview of the Study**

The study begins with a review of the nature and extent of terrorism in the United States. Chapter 2 first discusses the meaning of terrorism, including academic and legal definitions, and the issues in defining terrorism. The chapter also considers the concept of terrorism as a crime. The FBI’s official terrorism data will provide a guideline to discuss incidents and terrorism trends in the United States. Lastly, the chapter will present a review of what experts have deemed as “tomorrow’s threats.” Chapter 2’s goal is to provide an understanding of how terrorism—domestic and international—operates within the United States beyond the events of September 11. This understanding provides the foundation for how terrorism influences local law enforcement across the country.

Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of terrorism (specifically the events of September 11, 2001) on local law enforcement. The chapter introduces the concept of homeland
security and the new security environment. It describes the federal government’s
response to terrorism in the form of new guidelines and mandates. Theoretical discourse
in the field frames the perceived role of local law enforcement role in the new security
environment. In particular, the discussion focuses on perceived and known changes in
local police functions in a post-September 11 environment. A review of policing
literature suggests organizational change is occurring among local police agencies. Such
changes include the establishment of specialized terrorism units. However, the nature and
full extent of the change is not yet apparent.

Chapter 4 provides the theoretical foundations of police organizational change.
The chapter first presents the structural organization and historical models of change, or
eras, in American policing that Kelling & Moore (1988) and Greene (2000) put forth. The
second part of the chapter introduces the belief that a “new era” of policing has emerged
in the post-September 11 security environment. This is the “era of homeland security”
that Pelfrey (2007) and White (2006; 2009) illustrate. The final part of the chapter
explores three possible theories why police organizations change: contingency theory,
institutional theory and resource dependency theory. Although institutional theory and
resource dependency theory are not theories of organizational change, we can use
specific aspects of each to explain change. This study focuses on the nature and extent of
changes in the functions, priorities and organizational structure of local police agencies.
Therefore, contingency, institutional and resource dependency theories have the ability to
shed light on why police organizations change.

Chapter 5 presents the research methodology. This research explored the impact
of September 11, 2001 (and terrorism in general) to determine whether identifiable,
tangible and “real” police organizational change is occurring as a majority of the policing discourse indicates. The study focused on two specific research gaps the literature (Marks & Sun, 2007) identifies in assessing the September 11 impacts on the organizational development of local law enforcement agencies. First, although state and municipal agencies share a large burden of law enforcement responsibilities, very little is known about how they have changed after 9/11. Second, research produced post-September 11 focusing on the impacts of terrorism on police agency organizational development is largely atheoretical. It depicts developments without drawing references to existing models or theories of planned changed. A related gap in the extant research is that there is no venue for broad data collection from multiple agencies in terms of homeland security. The study addressed these gaps in the research through a qualitative approach, focusing on field research in the form of telephone interviews with key personnel in local police agencies. The goal was to make specific appraisals of what, if any, organizational change is occurring in response to the continued threat of terrorism. As an exploratory study, there was no hypothesis testing, as currently there is little known regarding police organizational change post-9/11. Rather, the study used the grounded theory approach to generate middle-level theory or determine support for a current organizational change theory. The research observed whether there has been a change in priorities for local law enforcement post-9/11. It also examined whether organizational change has occurred, such as the establishment of a specialized terrorism unit. The study analyzed each telephone interview for patterns of organizational change. The hypothesis was that the revealed data patterns would point toward institutional theory as the primary impetus for police organizational change.
Chapter 6 provides the data analysis. The researcher implemented a hybrid model as the methodology (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). This model aimed to generate mid-level theory or to find support for existing organizational change theory regarding the implementation of specialized terrorism units in twenty-one local police agencies across the United States. The objective of this research was to explore and describe the post-September 11 response experience of local police agencies in the country through words and quotes unique to each participant. The study used a semi-structured questionnaire and interview format to collect the data. It included a national, non-probability, purposive sample of local police agencies throughout the United States. The coding methodology used the hybrid model, as the interview questions incorporated specific concepts and themes to elicit during the interview. In using the hybrid model, the initial coding of the data began by looking at the explicit terms and concepts in the questions asked. The study summarizes the relationships between the categories and individual themes. It also looks for connections between concepts within the themes. It provides examples in anecdotes from individual respondents. The analysis of the data provides preliminary support for the contingency approach as a mid-level theory.

Chapter 7 discusses the research findings. This chapter expands on these results by highlighting the significant findings and tying them to previous theoretical frameworks as the literature illustrates. Specifically, it answers the overarching question of “Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?” It also notes additional issues emerging from the research. Lastly, the chapter addresses the limitations of the present research and the implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2: TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Until the 1990s, terrorist targets had historically been selected for reasons of their vulnerability and symbolism. Indiscrimination generally remained an unintended consequence of terrorist attacks. During the 1990s, however, the nature of domestic and international terrorism underwent recognizable changes in tactics and methodologies as terrorists aimed to inflict massive and indiscriminate casualties upon civilian populations. (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States, 2002-2005*)

Introduction

The unprecedented events of September 11, 2001 brought the concept of terrorism to the forefront of national concern. The tragic hijacking of three American airplanes that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City and part of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. shocked both America and the international community. Terrorists had never before used commercial airplanes as “bombs.” Nor had a single terrorist event caused such death and destruction. Although September 11 proved to be the most extraordinary terrorist event in the history of the United States, the American experience with terrorism is not an entirely new phenomenon. In the 1960s, authorities began to label certain violent actions (such as the intimidation of African Americans by the Ku Klux Klan) as “terrorism.” Since then, America has encountered various forms of terrorism and political violence. The 1990s had seen a brush with international terrorism, with the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.

Although each decade has witnessed the rise and fall of domestic extremists and terrorist groups, American terrorism has been difficult to analyze. There are several reasons for this difficulty. According to Hewitt (2003), one reason is that there is considerable ambiguity as to what we should consider terrorism. One definition of terrorism characterizes and restricts it to a series of acts carried out by a group. As a
result, this definition excludes individuals such as the Unabomber from being terrorists. These individuals engage in exactly the same kinds of actions as terrorist groups and for similar motives, which are undeniably political. Furthermore, in many terrorist incidents (such as eco-terrorism), it is often unclear whether an individual or group perpetrated a given act.

Second, there is only one official statistical source on terrorist incidents in the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the agency charged with investigating and prosecuting terrorism in America. Although academics and researchers have developed other databases (such as ITERATE, MIPT and START), the U.S recognizes the FBI’s yearly reports as the only official source of terrorism data in the nation. The FBI is the lead agency in combating terrorism in the U.S. and has formalized its definition of terrorism (1986). However, local law enforcement agencies are not required to adopt and adhere to this definition (Hewitt, 2003). Thus, a related issue is that agencies misclassify many terrorist actions as common crimes (Hewitt, 2003).

Finally, there is a lack of empirical analysis on terrorism data or information (Lum et al., 2006). Lum et al. (2003) conducted a systematic review of evaluation research on counterterrorism strategies. In it, they found that only three to four percent of the thousands of article abstracts from peer-reviewed sources employed some sort of empirical analysis on terrorism. In a follow-up in 2006, they stated, “almost all of the research on terrorism could be broadly described as thought pieces, theoretical discussions or opinions” (p. 492).
Before beginning the discussion of how the changing security environment post-September 11 has affected local law enforcement, an understanding of what constitutes terrorism is necessary. Second, terrorism needs to be distinguished from traditional crime. Many scholars have argued that terrorism should be treated as a crime (such as Hamm, 2007) while others have outlined specific differences between the two phenomena (such as Bodrero, 2002; White, 2006; White, 2009; Oliver, 2007).

An evaluation of terrorism’s definition and categorization in a greater context is crucial to appreciate the multitude of counterterrorism strategies. The third part of the chapter provides a brief history of the American experience with terrorism. It breaks down the history of terrorism in the United States into pre- and post-September 11 incidents. This classification emphasizes the changing nature of terrorism over the last four decades. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of future threats to the United States.

**Understanding Terrorism: Definition and Issues**

A lack of consensus about the meaning of terrorism has troubled researchers for decades. Crenshaw observes, “The problem of defining terrorism has hindered analysis since the inception of the studies in the early 1970s” (2000, p. 406). This is underlined by the fact there are over a hundred definitions academics have developed within the major fields of political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology and criminology (see Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Weinberg et al., 2004). Differences also exist within American governmental agencies, such as the State Department, the FBI and the Department of Defense. Furthermore, the lack of empirical research has hindered the furtherance of not only a universal definition of terrorism, but of a general theory of
terrorism as well. Schmid remarks, “While a definition of terrorism, like a definition of war is not solving the underlying problem, a lack of definition is perceived widely as one of the factors likely to encourage future terrorism” (2004, p. 378).

Boaz Ganor, in his discussion, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” (1998), presents eight important reasons for developing a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism:

1. Developing an effective international strategy requires agreement on what it is we are dealing with; in other words, we need a definition of terrorism.

2. International mobilization against terrorism… cannot lead to operational results as long as the participants cannot agree on a definition.

3. Without a definition, it is impossible to formulate or enforce international agreements against terrorism.

4. Although many countries have signed bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning a variety of crimes, these often explicitly exclude extradition for political offences, and the background of terrorism is always political.

5. The definition of terrorism will be the basis and operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism.

6. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states supporting terrorism, and economic firms trading with them.

7. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerilla activities).

8. Finally, the operational use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral and utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternate courses (such as guerilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism.
The following sections discuss the attempts in the international community, academic community and government community to define terrorism. As Schmid (2004) states, “Definitions generally tend to reflect the interests of those who do the defining” (p. 384). Schmid also contends that we can view terrorism within two frameworks. The criminal justice model can view terrorism as “a very serious crime.” Under this model, acts of terrorism often take the form of assassination or random murder. A war model can depict terrorism as a special variant of “guerilla warfare.” Within this framework, terrorism is a form of psychological warfare that deliberately disregards the laws of war. Hence, it is important to appreciate the varying perspectives of each defining community to understand the development and execution of counterterrorism strategies.

*United Nations Definition of Terrorism*

The United Nations has a long history of struggling to provide a universal definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2004; Scharf, 2004). In 1972, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. It created three subcommittees and charged one with dealing with the problem of defining terrorism. Schmid (2004) states, “While seven draft proposals were submitted by different groups of nations, no consensus could be reached” (p. 386). After six years of continued debate, the committee could reach no resolution on the definition of terrorism, and the U.N. phased out the committee (Schmid, 2004).

The next attempt to define terrorism came in 1996, when the General Assembly established another Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, which they charged with drafting a number of conventions against various aspects of terrorism. The committee developed the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which defined terrorism as:

1. any activity covered by the twelve antiterrorism treaties; and

2. any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. (G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc A/RES/54/109, as quoted in Scharf, 2004, p. 360)

As of 2004, only 129 nation-states have ratified this convention. Without a majority approval of member nation-states, the issue of adopting an accepted definition of terrorism again came to a standstill (Scharf, 2004).

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the General Assembly established yet another working group to develop a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The members of the working group almost reached a consensus, recommending a definition for terrorism as:

[Terrorism is an act] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any persons; or serious damage to a State or government facility, a public transportation system, communication system or infrastructure facility… when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act. (Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 39, U.N. Doc.A/C.6/55/L.2, as quoted in Scharf, 2004, p. 361)

Malaysia blocked the international community’s adoption of this general definition of terrorism. On behalf of the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Malaysia proposed the addition of the following language:

People’s struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-
determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime. (ibid., p. 361)

According to Nicholas Rostow (2004), the Organization of the Islamic Conference intended the proposed language to exempt from the definition of terrorism acts of Israel over the occupied territories and acts of India over Kashmir. Furthermore, the OIC wanted to brand violations of the laws of war by state military forces, such as the Israel Defense Forces, as terrorist acts. The General Assembly could not reach a compromise and once again, work on a general definition of terrorism stalled.

In response, the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 1373. Under Resolution 1373, the Council transformed the Terrorism Financing Convention into an obligation of all U.N. member-states, requiring them to prohibit financial support for persons and organizations engaged in terrorism (S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1373). However, the Council decided not to include the Terrorism Financing Convention’s definition of terrorism in Resolution 1373. The Council left the term undefined to allow each state to ascertain its own definition of terrorism. In addition, the Council created no list of terrorists or terrorist organizations to which the resolution would prohibit financial assistance (Scharf, 2004).

In October 2004, the Security Council responded to the terrorist attack on an elementary school in Russia by building on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee (2001). Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council issued Resolution 1566, which:

Recalls that criminal acts, including acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. (S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566, as quoted in Schmid, 2004, p. 393)

In December 2004, the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change attempted to define terrorism within the international community. The Panel proposed a description of terrorism as:

[A]ny action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. (Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 55, at ¶ 159, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, as quoted in Schmid, 2004, p. 393)

To date, the United Nations has reached no consensus on a formalized definition of terrorism. Member-states still struggle with finding a resolution acceptable to all. Although the international community has made significant progress to define terrorism, the search for an international legal definition of terrorism continues (Schmid, 2004).

**Academic Definitions of Terrorism**

In the academic community, there has been a long-standing debate on the definition of terrorism. Over the last three decades, academics have struggled to arrive at a consensus on a definition. Several renowned authors have noted that few concepts in contemporary political discourse have proved as hard to define as terrorism (Weinberg et al., 2004; Schmid, 2004). Walter Laqueur (2004) has also stated “After thirty years of hard labor there is still no generally agreed definition of terrorism” (p. 232).
While many of the foremost experts on terrorism (e.g. Crenshaw, Laqueur, Wilkinson, Jenkins and Hoffman) have offered definitions over the years, there is still no agreement. If several leaders in the field have offered manners in which to conceptualize terrorism, why is it that the academic community has not accepted a single definition? Weinberg and his colleagues offer several reasons for the difficulties of defining terrorism within academia (2004, pp. 778-779):

- First, following the work of W. B. Gallie and William Connolly, terrorism has become an “essentially contested concept,” one whose meaning lends itself to endless dispute but no resolution.

- Second, terrorism as a concept also seems to suffer from “border” and “membership” problems. Where does terrorism stop and other forms of political violence begin—guerilla warfare and urban guerilla warfare, for example?

- Further, terrorism suffers from “stretching” and “traveling” problems, some literal, others of an analytical character. In regard to the former, some writers seem to identify terrorism based on the physical or social distance between the act in questions and the observer… Considering the stretching and traveling capacity of the term for analytic purposes, writers now deal with terms such as “narco-terrorism” and “cyber-terrorism”: the latter rarely involves any reference to violence or the threat of violence.

Schmid (2004) states “Terrorism is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon and the term is used promiscuously for such a wide range of manifestations (e.g. narco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism) that one wonders whether it is a unitary concept” (p. 380). He provides more than a dozen reasons why terrorism is difficult to define. In this discussion of the definitional problem, he highlights four reasons similar to Weinberg and colleagues:

1. Because terrorism is a “contested concept,” and political, legal, social science and popular notions of it are diverging;

2. Because the definition question is linked to (de-)legitimization and criminalization;
3. Because there are many types of “terrorism” with different forms and manifestations;

4. Because the term has undergone changes of meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence.

Despite the issues in defining terrorism, academics have made many efforts toward a general definition since the inception of terrorism as a field of study in the 1970s. During the 1980s, Alex Schmid made one of the most notable efforts to arrive at an academic consensus definition. Schmid sent questionnaires to his academic colleagues seeking to uncover commonalities in academic definitions of terrorism. The questionnaire produced 109 separate definitions of terrorism by respondents. In an empirical analysis, Schmid found twenty-two elements common to most definitions. He ranked these elements in the order of frequency in which they appeared on the questionnaires. Schmid proposed the following comprehensive definition based on sixteen of the twenty-two definitional elements:


In 2004, Weinberg et al. attempted to determine a consensus definition of terrorism through reviewing how academics have used the term over the years. The researchers sought to compare the twenty-two definition elements Schmid developed to the way contributors to the major journals in the field have employed the concept. The
studies were *Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Terrorism and Political Violence*. This research differed from Schmid’s in that it did not rely on questionnaire responses. Rather, it relied on what experts have said terrorism means in leading professional journals in the field. Their review of these journals revealed seventy-three definitions (drawn from fifty articles). The researchers formed a consensus definition of the concept from elements that appeared frequently in both Schmid’s definition and those employed by journal contributors. A high percentage of experts in both Schmid’s respondents and the journal writers identified terrorism as a method of combat or a tactic involving a threat of force and violence, used for political purpose. They also mentioned the pursuit of publicity, but not as frequently. The consensus definition that emerged from both categories is as follows:

Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.

Lutz and Lutz (2004) take a different approach at a formal definition. They present a definition of terrorism by combining the previous works of Hoffman (1998), Kushner (1998b) and Claridge (1996), which contain six major components:

Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves non-state actors or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in situations in which power previously had been lacking (i.e. the violent attempts to enhance the power base of the organization taking the actions). (p. 10)

Clearly, academics have undertaken significant efforts to determine an appropriate definition of terrorism. However, there is still no one widely accepted definition to date. Despite the challenges, academics in the field continue to pursue a unified definition.
United States Definitions of Terrorism

United States governmental agencies provide another example of the difficulty in developing a single definition of terrorism. The Subcommittee on Terrorism of the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence “found that practically every agency in the United States government with a counterterrorism mission uses a different definition of terrorism.” The Committee further noted, “without a standard definition, terrorism might be treated no differently than other crimes” (Saba, 2004, p. 1).

Various national agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department have a role in terrorism prevention and response. Yet the FBI has the lead role in terrorism investigations. The FBI adopted a formal definition of terrorism during the 1980s. During the 1990s, it refined the definition of terrorism. In addition, the FBI has also divided acts of terrorism into two major categories:

1. *Domestic* terrorism (individual or group violence based and operating within the United States and Puerto Rico, without foreign direction), and

2. *International* terrorism (violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state).

In the current publication, *Terrorism in the United States 2002-2005*, the FBI defines domestic terrorism as:

Domestic terrorism refers to activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. [*18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)*]
This research study adopts the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism. There are several reasons for accepting a government agency’s definition over an academic definition:

- The FBI definition encompasses the common elements of academic definitions of terrorism.
- It designates specific acts as terrorism.
- It is restricted to acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism within the border of the United States (including homegrown terrorists and terrorism initiated by foreign nationals).

As such, this research study will consider only incidents the FBI has officially designated as acts of terrorism as that agency’s statistics have provided.

**Terrorism vs. Traditional Crime**

Should we treat terrorism as a common crime or consider it a special problem? The main argument for considering terrorism a common crime is that terrorism and crime are constructs that share similar characteristics. One commonality is that terrorist acts are often criminal in nature, such as hijackings, bombings and assassinations (Rehm, 2000; McVey, 2003; Oliver; 2007). Terrorists are increasingly turning to criminal activity as an alternative means of support (for money, materials, training, etc.) in response to a decline in state-sponsored terrorism (Hamm, 2007). Local law enforcement agencies train to handle and respond to these types of crimes (Rehm, 2000; McVey, 2003; Oliver; 2007). Furthermore, the police operate in an environment of law-based violations and the enforcement of these laws (Oliver, 2007). Another noted commonality is that young males primarily perpetuate terrorism, as they do the majority of crimes, especially violent crimes (Lafree, 2005). According to Hamm (2007), the application of criminological theory can explain terrorism. Such theories include the routine activities perspective and
social learning theory. Lastly, we view terrorism, like crime, as a social construct. When committed, both crime and terrorism serve to undermine the social trust (Lafree, 2005). Police are well equipped to comprehend and handle the threat of crime. Therefore, law enforcement officials do not need to do anything unique to prepare for and combat terrorism (Rehm, 2000; Oliver, 2007).

Although there are a number of similarities between the concept of crime and the concept of terrorism, there are many critical differences. One significant difference between terrorism and crime is that terrorism, unlike crime, does not occur on a daily basis. Terrorism is a low incident phenomenon in the United States, with 318 terrorist incidents from January 1980 through November 2005 (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005, pp. 11, 15). FBI statistics indicate there were only five terrorist incidents during the 2005 calendar year (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005, p. 1). Thus, many law enforcement officials believe the probability of a terrorist incident occurring within their jurisdiction is very low (Rhem, 2000).

Bodrero (2002) argues that terrorists operate on completely different agendas unfamiliar to most law enforcement investigators. He states, “In the post-September 11 environment, it will be necessary for all law enforcement personnel, especially investigators assigned to terrorism-related activities, to avail themselves of training opportunities that may help them to better understand their enemy in the war on terrorism” (p. 44). To assist law enforcement in understanding the “enemy,” Bodrero provides a non-exhaustive list of examples on how terrorism and crime diverge. He also presents ways on how to differentiate between terrorists and criminals. The following represents a side-by-side comparison of the major distinctions between crime and
terrorism according to Bodrero (with additions from Oliver, 2007; Deflem, 2004; Rhem, 2000):

**Table 1: Differentiating Between Crime and Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME</th>
<th>TERRORISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most criminals are opportunistic and do not plan crimes; they seek immediate gratification</td>
<td>Terrorists plan extensively, conduct reconnaissance of targets and employ strategies to avoid detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most criminals are not focused; rarely do criminals select their victims</td>
<td>Extremists are focused; targets are selected for a particular purpose (symbolic) as is method of attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most criminals are motivated by self-satisfaction and personal gain</td>
<td>Terrorists are trying to effect change in favor of a cause (such as social, environmental, religious or political)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A majority of crime is non-violent</td>
<td>Terrorist actions are almost always violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals tend to maintain a particular <em>modus operandi</em>, where past behavior predicts future behavior (they exhibit patterns)</td>
<td>Terrorists tend to learn, adapt and innovate, making it difficult to employ traditional investigatory techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals are uncommitted, unfocused and are not devoted to crime (as a philosophy)</td>
<td>Terrorists are extremely committed, focused on a particular objective and willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals are often self-centered and operate alone</td>
<td>Terrorists, in general, are team-oriented and operate in cells, often unaware of the existence of other cells within the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals are undisciplined and may be deterred by potential consequences</td>
<td>Extremists are often highly disciplined and will continue to carry out their attacks even when apprehension and/or personal danger are imminent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals are untrained and use readily available resources</td>
<td>Terrorists are often highly trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals do not prepare and train for a life of crime</td>
<td>Terrorists often train for weeks or years; ideology and pragmatic action become a way of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical criminals are escape-oriented</td>
<td>Extremists are usually attack-oriented and will often target their pursuers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td><strong>Terrorism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most criminals do not want to be caught</td>
<td>Terrorists primarily seek publicity and attempt to reach a particular audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals will make deals to avoid punishment</td>
<td>Terrorists rarely cooperate with officials because they do not wish to betray their cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and types of crimes have very specific definitions</td>
<td>Terrorism is often defined in vague and general terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes have very specific definitions, with particular elements that constitute a crime</td>
<td>Unlike crime, there are few laws regarding acts of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to crime is usually handled at the local level</td>
<td>Response to terrorism is not limited to the local level; rather, the highest levels of government respond to it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since most crime is local, the police are better prepared to handle the threat of crime versus the threat of terrorism</td>
<td>Terrorism deals with both response and recovery, as well as more sophisticated levels of planning, preparedness and prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most crimes do not have an inherent “terrorism” element</td>
<td>Most terrorist activities have an inherent criminal element (such as hijackings, bombings and assassinations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discussion above differentiating terrorism and crime provides a strong case for treating terrorism as a separate issue. Terrorist incidents may look like other violent crimes. However, subtle and diverse differences support the view that law enforcement agencies cannot approach terrorism the same way as everyday crime. Rehm (2000) observes, “Terrorist incidents such as the Oklahoma City Bombing, any of the standoffs between cults and the police, and the chemical incident in the Japanese subway system have shown that the standard law enforcement resources are likely to be immediately overwhelmed during and after a terrorist incident” (p. 39). The events of September 11, 2001 proved this fact true, as the damage and destruction required multiple units, agencies and government officials to respond. Furthermore, the distinctions sustain the proposal that police agencies should take a proactive approach to terrorism preparedness,
rather than dealing with incidents as they happen. Rehm advises, “Agency officials must be convinced that terrorism is not ‘regular’ violent crime and that they need to adopt both a new philosophy and a new strategy to deal with these incidents before it is too late” (2000, p. 38). This plea continues today: law enforcement should concentrate efforts on investigating, detecting and preventing acts of terrorism.

**The Nature and Extent of Terrorism in the United States**

A brief history of the American experience will help explain the nature and extent of terrorism in the United States. Terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S., emerging during the 1960s due to major social changes such as the Civil Rights Movement. Most of America’s experience with terrorism is with domestic (American-born) terrorists and extremists, most notably the Ku Klux Klan and Timothy McVeigh. International terrorism was not a serious threat until the Cold War. Al-Qaeda amplified the thread by way of worldwide attacks on U.S. interests.

**Terrorism During the 1950s and 1960s**

Beginning in the 1950s, leftist-oriented extremist groups posed the most serious domestic terrorist threat to America. These groups generally professed a revolutionary socialist doctrine. They viewed themselves as protectors of the people against the adverse effects of capitalism and U.S. foreign policies. Left-wing terrorism often uses a “vanguard” strategy, which is a belief that revolutionary conditions will rarely occur spontaneously from within an exploited group or class. A committed and disciplined revolutionary movement must create revolutionaries. Leftist philosophy claims that capitalism inherently causes social and economic inequities. Such inequities relegate the working class and racial minorities to a subordinate political status. Left-wing ideology is
also group-oriented, with an emphasis on creating a collective conscious. This collective conscious is a precursor to successful revolution. Leftist ideals formed the basis for many class struggles, such as the Civil Rights Movement during the 1960s. One of the more sensational terrorist events during this period included the November 1, 1950 attempted assassination of President Truman at Blair House by two members of the National Party of Puerto Rico. On March 1, 1954, members of the same group opened fire on a session of the U.S. House of Representatives, injuring five congressmen. The 1958 commandeering of a Cuban airliner in flight from Miami inaugurated a decade of hijackings by Cuban revolutionaries. (Martin, 2003; FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005).

The 1960s saw the emergence of right-wing movements. Right-wing ideology typically promotes an uncompromising belief in ethno-national, ideological or religious superiority. Extremist groups may select terrorist violence on the right because they believe they are defending the purity of an ethno-national group, rightist ideology or religion. Those on the right picture themselves as champions of an ideal order that inferior ethno-nationalist interests or religious values have attacked or usurped. Therefore, they seek to preserve hallowed traditions and create an idealized order. They faithfully believe the favored group or belief will restore power and ensure final victory. Indiscriminate attacks carried out by small cells and individuals characterize rightist terrorism (Martin, 2003). The Klu Klux Klan (founded in 1869 as an outgrowth of the Reconstruction period) was the primary terrorist organization during the 1960s. Klan members identified themselves closely with the small-town, Protestant milieu that fostered them (Barkun, 1989). They sought to return to the old politics of nostalgia and
upheld the belief of white supremacy (Barkun, 1989). The Klu Klux Klan became a revolutionary movement in response to the government’s legal decisions granting rights to blacks. It used terrorist tactics to intimidate blacks from trying to create social and political change in the United States (Hewitt, 2003). These incidents primarily occurred in the southern region of the United States where the Klan held most of its membership of approximately 500,000 by the mid-1960s. The Klan believed it was their duty to protect the property, women and civilization itself in the South, where blacks outnumbered whites (Quarles, 1999).

Two different types of black leftist groups carried out violent acts during the 1960s. These groups fought against oppression and for the recognition of a black society. The Black Panthers represented a black-nationalist group and the Nation of Islam formed as separatist black religious cult. Black nationalists carried out guerilla warfare against police. Black separatist cults murdered randomly selected whites, as well as dissidents and apostates. Many of these attacks were deadly, killing nearly 400 through tactics such as shootings and bombings (Hewitt, 2003).

**Terrorism During the 1970s**

During the 1970s, terrorist leftist groups remained active. One such group was the Jewish Defense League (JDL), which formed in 1968 in New York City. The JDL was responsible for nearly all terrorist acts committed by Jewish groups during the 1970s (Kushner, 1998). This group formed to protect Jewish residents of ethnically changing neighborhoods, particularly the elderly and the poor. “Not only was the JDL the only fundamentalist-national terrorist group active in the U.S. during this time, it was also the only group which deployed tactical violence on American soil in order to change the
policy of a foreign entity” (Baumel, 1998 p. 316). Kahane, its leader, attempted to create social change by educating the masses on revolution. He instructed young Jews on the need for tactical violence and used the opportunity to legitimize the cause. He even adopted the symbol of an upraised arm and clenched fist as the background for the group’s slogan: “Never again.” Kahane also used and manipulated the media as one tactic to address issues mainstream Jewish organizations were unaware or unwilling to face. The JDL supported the New York teacher’s strike, which began as a conflict over educational policy and affirmative action for blacks. The movement adopted a militant rhetoric, alienating itself from the American-Jewish establishment and adhering to the issue of Soviet Jewry. Unlike the liberal protest organizations of the time, the JDL adopted a particularistic, exclusionist Jewish stance, drawing heavily on symbolism and rhetoric. Attacks ranged from bombs to tear gas to destruction of property (Baumel, 1998).

Other prominent terrorist groups that emerged during the 1970s included the Croatian nationalists and the anti-Castro Cuban group, Omega 7. These groups committed numerous bombings. The Weather Underground bombed the U.S. Senate building on March 1, 1971 and the U.S. State Department building on January 29, 1975. The Armed Forces for Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) bombed Fraunces Tavern on Wall Street on January 24, 1975. This tragedy resulted in four deaths and 53 injuries (FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 2002-2005).

**Terrorism During the 1980s**

From the late 1970s through the 1980s, a variety of right-wing radical supremacists groups characterized as white supremacists emerged. Groups such as the American Neo-
Nazi movement, the Skinheads, the Aryan Nations, the Order, Posse Comitatus and the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord began to receive much media attention by mid-1980. Unlike earlier American right-wing organizations, white supremacists groups formed a sort of armed militia, possessed of both apocalyptic rhetoric and an elaborate paramilitary structure (Barkum, 1989). Highly idiosyncratic versions of the Neo-Nazi Aryan myth began to emerge (Whitsel, 2001). These more fanatical Christian sects of the era “saw worldly history being brought to its consummation by a final struggle of transcendental importance between the forces of Good and Evil” (Whitsel, 2001, p. 89).

These groups shared a belief system made up of five elements (Barkum, 1989, p.409):

- an identity theology asserting that whites of Western European extraction are direct descendents of the Biblical tribes of Israel,
- a doctrine of racial superiority placing Aryans on the summit of the four race hierarchy,
- a belief in a world Jewish conspiracy,
- an admiration for Nazism with acceptance of Holocaust revisionism, and
- a millenarian view of history emphasizing the imminence of the last days.

The 1980s also witnessed the emergence of many anti-abortion groups. These groups began to form after the United States Supreme Court Decision *Roe v. Wade* in 1974. Anti-abortionist groups exist through today, and include groups such as the National Right to Life Committee, American Life League, Pro-Action Life League and the Lambs of Christ. Collectively, these groups assume power from a relationship with a God they believe speaks directly to them. In concert with churches and political organizations, they take pride in collapsing liberal social initiatives. These groups believe they and their colleagues are conveying God’s immutable law to North American women. The rules as they know them are ironclad: terminating a pregnancy is always
wrong and no pregnancy is either ill-timed or mistaken. To prevent women from obtaining access to abortion clinics, various groups have organized “in-your-face” demonstrations, sit-ins and blockades. Antiabortionists have also used more aggressive sidewalk methods meant to stop women from ending unwanted pregnancies. These amplified demonstrations often use bullhorns outside operating rooms, rescue missions at clinics (the precursors of blockades) and confrontations with doctors at their homes, offices, churches, and at restaurants, funerals and social functions. While many groups have sponsored rescues often involving low-level violence, most groups publicly condemn the concept of “justifiable homicide” against providers. These groups have denounced violent acts. Yet individuals have committed arson, clinic bombings and attacks on doctors in their own homes. However, many of these individuals have acted on their own accord (Baird-Windle & Bader, 2001).

The 1980s also saw a rise in major acts of terrorism against U.S. interests overseas. During this period, the FBI began to recognize “state-sponsored” and “autonomous” terrorist organizations as the two significant sources of international terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism refers to those countries that violate international law by using terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. One of the most infamous acts of state-sponsored terrorism during this period occurred on December 21, 1988 with the mid-air bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) usually form to pursue nationalistic agendas. These autonomous, generally transnational groups maintain their own personnel, infrastructures, financial arrangements and training facilities. FTOs committed two major bombings in 1983. The first was on April 18, 1983, where members of Lebanese Hizballah bombed the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut, Lebanon. Six months later on October 23, Hizballah bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Airplane hijackings were also a popular terrorist tactic during this era. International groups such as Hizballah and the Abu Nidal Organization (in the Middle East and South Asia) targeted U.S. airliners or American citizens on foreign carriers, frequently resulting in extended hostage situations and civilian fatalities (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005).

**Terrorism During the 1990s**

The 1990s brought significant change in the nature of domestic and international terrorism tactics and methodologies. International terrorists made a dramatic shift from selecting vulnerable and symbolic targets to inflicting massive and indiscriminate casualties upon civilian populations. Another trend that emerged during this period altered the paradigm that only international terrorists operating outside of the United States committed major acts of terrorism (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005).

One example of domestic terrorism is that of right-wing extremism, found primarily in the form of domestic militias and conservative special interest causes. The FBI designates these militia and conservative special interest groups as potentially the most dangerous and most prolific domestic terrorist threat during the 1990s. In contrast to the environmental groups, right-wing extremists have consistently pursued a violent method of operation through targeting and physically harming people directly (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005).

Militia groups such as the Michigan Militia and the Patriot Movement formed some of the most prominent right-wing groups of the decade. Following the tragedies of
Ruby Ridge (1992) and Waco (1993), many right-wing militants calling themselves militias began to appear in several states across the United States. Militias maintain a common stance to protect American constitutional rights and block the American government’s infringement of those rights (Freilich et al., 2001). The adoption of the term “militia” dates back to the American Revolution and the original U.S. Constitution (Durham, 1996). Militias argue that the bearing of arms is not merely an individual right. The Second Amendment of the Constitution states, “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 defined “every free-able bodied white male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 as members of his state militia” (Durham, 1996). However, in 1903, the Militia Act distinguished between the organized militia, in particular the National Guard, and the reserve or unorganized militia. The militia movement defines itself as an unorganized militia (Durham, 1996). Furthermore, militias justified the need for paramilitary organizations by pointing to the various conspiracies they believe threaten American institutions. For example, such groups helped establish the currently circulating conspiracy theory by the early 1990s. The essential elements of the generic conspiracy theory are as follows:

[A] plutocratic elite, operating through secret organizations, pre-eminently the Illuminati, plans world domination under the rubric of the “New World Order,” with the United Nations as the conspiracy’s public face. Using black helicopters and new military formations as strike forces, the conspiracy plans to round up those who might block its aims, incarcerating them in a network of detention camps operated by FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Barkun, 1996, p. 51)

The distinguishing feature of the current conspiracy theory is that it is extraordinarily specific and detailed. It also accommodates religious interpretation with ease (Barkun, 1996, pp. 51-52). Other major issues the militia movement has focused
attention on are taxation and the threat to the American way of life (such as sex education in schools) (Frielich et al., 2001).

The most significant terrorist event to occur during the 1990s was the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This attack made the threat of right-wing terrorism in America a reality. American citizens planned, organized and executed the bombing as a manifestation of their grave discontent with the government. Several factors fueled the attack, including the passage of gun control legislation, fears of increased United Nations involvement in domestic affairs and probably most importantly, the confrontations between members of right-wing groups and law enforcement officers at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho. These confrontations inspired American citizens Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols to carry out the Oklahoma City bombing, which coincided with the second anniversary of the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco (FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 2002-2005).

The motivations behind another series of bombings during the 1990s illustrate the increasing prominence of terrorism in support of conservative special interest causes. This period also witnessed the emergence of the “lone wolf” terrorist: one who associates with and operates under the philosophy of a terrorist group but does not maintain official membership in the group. On July 27, 1996, an explosion in Olympic Centennial Park killed two and injured 112 during the closing days of the Summer Olympics held in Atlanta, Georgia. Early the next year, two more bombings occurred: the first on January 16, 1997 at a Birmingham, Alabama health clinic; the second on February 21, 1997 at the Otherside Lounge, a nightclub patronized by Atlanta’s gay community. These latter
bombings were distinctive in that the terrorists used secondary explosive devices with an apparent intent to target emergency responders. On May 31, 2003, law enforcement officials arrested Top Ten Fugitive Eric Robert Rudolph in North Carolina on suspicion of having committed the bombings. Rudolph pled guilty to these attacks and received a life sentence for his crimes (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005).

Environmentalist groups comprised another form of special interest terrorism. Both the animal rights and the environmental movements share similar ideologies. The primary concerns of special interest groups are the use of animals to further human needs and the destruction of the environment (Kushner, 1998). However, there is one distinguishing feature between animal rights and environmental groups and other terrorist groups discussed. Radical animal rights groups and environmental groups tend to have no traditional organizational structure (Kushner, 1998). Thus, these organizations contain neither a hierarchy nor a centralized authority (Monaghan, 1999). Activists operate in autonomous cells and choose their own targets and methods. The non-hierarchical nature of these groups combined with the absence of a centralized authority means there is little or no control over activists’ actions (Monaghan, 1999).

In the 1990s, left-wing political groups and special interest terrorist groups began to assert themselves more strongly. For example, the majority of domestic terrorism incidents from 1993 to 2001 were attributable to the left-wing special interest movements the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). While the ALF and ELF perpetuated much domestic terrorism, both environmental groups have pursued a philosophy of indirect harm. They avoid physical violence in favor of acts of property damage that result in economic harm to victims.
The ALF and ELF were the two prominent environmental groups of the 1990s. The characteristics of both groups included: the use or threat of use of violence, the existence of a political motive, symbolic target selection, the goal to modify behavior, the use of extreme methods and the act of terrorism representing a form of communication (Monaghan, 1999, p. 159). Both groups have adopted aggressive tactics to intimidate their constituencies. Their tactics emphasize attacks on property, and include arson, sabotage and vandalism, designed to cause significant monetary damage. The ALF tend to use incendiary devices such as bombs, while the ELF has gone to the extreme of spiking trees to prevent logging of forests. Another distinguishing characteristic is that environmental groups do not aim to hurt people directly. Rather, they target research laboratories, multinational corporations and the logging industry to destroy the work of individuals and companies (Leader & Probst, 2003).

With respect to international terrorism, terrorist organizations continued to attack U.S. military targets overseas during the 1990s. For example, on November 13, 1995, a truck bomb killed seven people, including five Americans, and injured at least 34 U.S. citizens at the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Seven months later, on June 25, 1996, members of Saudi Hizballah bombed the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where Western military personnel resided. The explosion killed 19 U.S. service personnel and injured over 350 others. These bombings highlighted force protection issues, to which the U.S. government responded by “hardening” its official establishments overseas. The attacks also proved that international threats abroad still posed a significant problem to the United States. (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States*, 2002-2005)
September 11, 2001 and Beyond

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 represent the most malicious and destructive act of terrorism committed on American soil since the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. The hijacking of three American airplanes marked the first successful international terrorist attack in the United States since the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993. The September 11 attack resulted in 2,783 deaths, making it the most deadly act of terrorism ever committed. The attacks also injured an unknown number of persons (FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 2000/2001).

In addition to the September 11 attacks, the FBI recorded thirteen terrorist incidents in 2001. Domestic terrorists carried out twelve of these thirteen incidents. Foreign nationals perpetrated only the terrorist attack of September 11. The remaining incidents consist of an unsolved series of anthrax-tainted letters sent through the U.S. postal system. The FBI has not been able to classify these as either domestic or international in nature. The majority of FBI-recorded terrorist incidents during 2001 occurred before September 11. Even though September 11 brought about much devastation and destruction, three terrorist incidents occurred in the months following the attacks. Domestic terrorist groups perpetrated two of these. With the exception of September 11, no other terrorist attacks carried out in the United States in 2001 resulted in deaths or serious injuries (FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 2000/2001).

Between 2002 and 2005, the FBI recorded twenty-four terrorist incidents. In 2002, there were seven domestic terrorism incidents and one international terrorist incident. During the year 2003, the FBI recorded six domestic terrorist incidents. The FBI recorded five domestic terrorist incidents in 2004. And in 2005, there were five domestic
terrorism incidents. As in the 1990s, domestic extremists continue to carry out the
majority of terrorist incidents during this period: twenty-three of the twenty-four recorded
terrorist incidents from 2002 to 2005. With the exception of a white supremacist’s
firebombing of a synagogue in Oklahoma City, special interest extremists active in the
animal rights and environmental movements committed all of the domestic terrorist
incidents. These extremists typically targeted materials and facilities rather than persons.
The sole international terrorist incident in the United States recorded for this period
involved an attack at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport, which
claimed the lives of two victims (FBI, *Terrorism in the United States, 2002-2005*).

**Current Domestic Terrorism Threats**

In 2005, the FBI projected the threat of terrorism to continue from both
international and domestic sources. Internationally, the focus centers on the militant
Islamic jihad movement. The FBI identified two major operational trends with respect to
this Islamic jihad movement. First, there appears to be a preference for high-casualty,
high-profile attacks directed against lower-risk, unofficial, and so-called “soft” targets, as
traditional military and diplomatic targets become increasingly hardened. A second
concern revolves around the dissolution of much of Al-Qaeda’s structure by international
military and law enforcement efforts. The result has been a dispersion of its multinational
trainees to pursue their own regional agendas.

The FBI is also concerned with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
against civilian targets. The FBI considers the use of WMD to represent the most serious
potential international and domestic terrorism threat facing the United States today. Ricin
and the bacterial agent anthrax are emerging as the most prevalent agents involved in
WMD investigations. A variety of FBI-collected intelligence indicates Al-Qaida has sought to acquire and experiment with biological, chemical and radiological WMDs on more than one occasion. In January 2003, the United Kingdom arrested Algerian extremists suspected of producing the biological toxin ricin. This exemplified the interest some Islamic militants have in the operational use of such agents.

In March of 2005, the Department of Homeland Security issued the Interim National Preparedness Goals. The National Preparedness Goals identified fifteen possible strike scenarios the Department believed most plausible or devastating to the United States. The scenarios identified “potential threats or hazards of national significance with high consequence.” These included:

- Nuclear detonation (such as an improvised nuclear device),
- Biological attacks (such as anthrax, food contamination or foreign animal disease),
- Biological disease outbreak (such as pandemic influenza),
- Chemical attacks (such as nerve agents),
- Natural disasters (such as an earthquake or hurricane),
- Radiological attacks (using radiological dispersal devices),
- Explosives attacks (including bombs and other explosive devices), and
- Cyber attacks (targeting the Internet and other critical infrastructures).

The National Preparedness Goals outlined descriptions of each scenario, event planning considerations, implications, detailed forecast maps, destruction/fatality projections where applicable, response issues and socio-economic impacts for major metropolitan areas.
The Department revised and made the National Preparedness Goals publicly available on September 2007, calling them the National Preparedness Guidelines. The DHS developed the Guidelines through an extensive process that involved more than 1,500 federal, state and local officials, and more than 120 national associations. The Guidelines replaced the Interim National Preparedness Goals issued on March 31, 2005. They also integrated “lessons learned” following Hurricane Katrina and a 2006 review of states’ and major cities’ emergency operations and evacuation plans. The specific National Planning Scenarios described above remained listed as the most immediate threats facing the nation today (National Preparedness Guidelines, 2007).

**Conclusion**

September 11, 2001 exposed many security threats to our nation. Although our government has addressed most of these threats, it is difficult to forecast the how, when and where of the next terrorist attack, whether foreign or domestic. However, we can surmise which threats are the most pressing. For example, from the 1990s to the present, environmentalist groups have predominantly initiated the terrorist incidents in the United States. Furthermore, the United States is highly dependent on computer systems and the Internet. Thus, cyberterrorism has become real threat. Today, other threats are possible, such as a nerve agent attack or biological food contamination. In the wake of the War in Iraq, such capabilities are becoming readily available to terrorist groups.

While many Eastern and third world countries face similar challenges in fighting terrorism within their own borders, these countries do not have the same concerns as the United States. Many of these countries are not as technology advanced, nor do they “ravage” their land for production and industry, as does the United States. Therefore,
while there are some broader international concerns regarding terrorism throughout the world, the United States has its own specific types of terrorism that other countries will not likely experience, and vice-versa.

Furthermore, the threat of terrorism will also vary considerably within the United States. The threat of terrorism differs greatly in Oakley, Kansas, where domestic groups are most prevalent, as compared to New York City, where international terrorism has been a historical issue. The threat of extremism also differs greatly from the Northwestern region of the country, where environmental terrorism is a significant problem, as compared to the Southeast region of the country, where there is a high concentration of white supremacists. Understanding of what constitutes terrorism and differentiating between national and local threats can help municipal police departments better prepare and develop counterterrorism strategies.
CHAPTER 3: IMPACT OF 9/11 ON LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

It is a safe assertion that no other historic event has so fundamentally and so radically transformed American society and culture, American domestic and foreign policy, and American policing. (Henry, 2002, p. 319)

Introduction

The nature of modern violence we have experienced in the twenty-first century makes it clear that law enforcement has entered a unique age of public safety. September 11 clearly has changed how we think about and respond to terrorism in the United States. Yet the prevention and detection of terrorism activities at the local level is an entirely new phenomenon in America. Today, local police agencies must deal with terrorism investigations. Incidents such as 9/11 have impelled many local police agencies to change their day-to-day functioning in a fundamental way. Threats of imminent attack through biological, chemical, nuclear and technological methods have contributed further to this necessitated transformation of policing practices. However, agencies are developing counterterrorism policies without “good” data (or intelligence) on terrorism. Likewise, they are not developing policies with effective response strategies, both proactive and reactive.

Over the last fifty years, America has experienced a number of terrorist incidents. According to Hewitt’s (2003) estimates, the United States has experienced a significant amount of terrorism. Well over 3,000 incidents between 1954 and September 10, 2001 have taken place in the United States and Puerto Rico. Although foreign actors have initiated a handful of incidents, Americans have perpetrated most of the attacks on our country. However, the government often overlooks much of the violence and destruction
committed by our own citizens against it. The government and its agents frequently consider such attacks to be “conventional” crimes.

Development of Homeland Security Initiatives and Guidelines

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States sought drastic changes to its federal law enforcement structure and its governmental policy and law. Within one month of the attacks, the federal government implemented the Homeland Security Act of 2001, establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Department of Homeland Security, the first major reorganization of federal government in decades. The federal government also produced the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, granting new investigatory powers to federal law enforcement agencies. In addition, the government provided several national strategic plans, such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

Office of Homeland Security

On October 8, 2001, President George W. Bush, through Executive Order 13228, established the Office of Homeland Security (the “Office”), to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. President Bush selected Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to serve as its director. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security would have the primary responsibility for coordinating the domestic response efforts of all departments and agencies. It would organize a response in the event of an imminent terrorist threat, during and in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack within the United States. In addition, the Assistant would be the principal point of contact for and to the president with respect to coordination of such efforts. The mission of the Office was to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office would perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission. These functions are to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. With respect to detection, the Office would have the responsibility of identifying priorities, coordinating efforts for collection and analyzing information regarding threats of terrorism against the United States. It would also identify activities of terrorists or terrorist groups within the United States. Furthermore, the Office would identify, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, priorities for intelligence collection outside the United States regarding threats of terrorism within the United States. As part of the Executive Order, the Office would work in concert with federal, state and local agencies regarding terrorist threats or attacks within the United States.

In addition, the president established a Homeland Security Council (the “Council”), which would be responsible for advising and assisting the president with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The Council would serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies. Moreover, it would ensure the effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. (White House, Executive Order 13228, 2001)

**USA PATRIOT Act of 2001**

Following the horrific events of September 11, President Bush pushed for expanded governmental powers of surveillance to target the terrorists who had committed the acts. The result was a bill originating in the House of Representatives: House
Resolution 3162, known as the “Patriot Act.” The official title became the USA PATRIOT Act, which stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” Congress sent the Patriot Act to the president, who signed it into law on October 26, 2001, making it Public Law 107-56 (Library of Congress, 2001). The Patriot Act contains several major provisions. First, the Act granted greater authority to federal law enforcement agencies. This authority enabled them to track and intercept communications for law enforcement and foreign intelligence-gathering purposes. Second, the Act vested the secretary of the treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions for foreign money-laundering purposes. Third, the Patriot Act sought to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the United States, and to detain and remove those already within U.S. borders. Finally, it created new crimes, new penalties and new procedures for use against domestic and international terrorists (Oliver, 2007; Doyle, 2002).

**Homeland Security Act of 2002**

Throughout police history, crises have prompted major changes in law enforcement practices and policies. Such crises include corruption and brutality, the emergence of new crimes and natural disasters. September 11 is no exception. Brandl (2003) states “the events of September 11 have initiated, and in some instances accelerated, a wave of change in American law enforcement, and these changes will dramatically affect the face of law enforcement of the future” (p. 134). For example, the September 11 attacks led to the immediate establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). President Bush created the White House Office of Homeland Security on October 8, 2001 (Public Law 107-296). Congress passed legislation mandating the

Before September 11, most federal law enforcement agencies were autonomous, operating as individual agencies with minimal oversight and accountability. Twenty-two federal agencies merged under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security. The DHS thus oversees the FBI, U.S Border Patrol, Customs, Immigration, Secret Service, Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The government established a new agency, the Transportation Security Authority (TSA), with the principal function of protecting airports and other major transportation facilities. Furthermore, major reforms occurred in the FBI (the agency charged with the primary responsibility of terrorism investigation) in terrorism-related operations, policies and procedures. The DHS represents the largest reorganization of the federal government since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially recognized the creation of the DHS, establishing the position of secretary and the responsibilities of the new department.

**National Strategy for Homeland Security 2002**

In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security first introduced the National Strategy for Homeland Security (the “Strategy”). The federal government defines homeland security as follows:

> Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (p.3)

This definition establishes three objectives for homeland security. The order of these objectives deliberately sets priorities for America’s efforts to secure the homeland. Through this definition, the federal government argues the Strategy is a national strategy,
not a federal one. It calls for the cooperation of and partnerships among all levels of
government, the private sector and American citizens. The intent for publishing the
National Strategy for Homeland Security was to assist Americans in achieving a shared
cooporation in the area of homeland security for years to come. The Strategy attempted to
do so by addressing four basic questions:

1. What is “homeland security” and what missions does it entail?
2. What do we seek to accomplish, and what are the most important goals of
   homeland security?
3. What is the federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals
   and what should it do in the future?
4. What should non-federal governments, the private sector and citizens do
   to help secure the homeland?

To achieve its objectives, the National Strategy established eight founding
principles. Combined, these eight principles seek to guide the implementation of the
Strategy’s three primary objectives.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security establishes, for the first time
in our Nation’s history, a statement of objectives around which our entire
society can mobilize to secure the U.S. homeland from the dangerous and
evolving threat of terrorism. (p. 4)

Table 2: National Strategy Principles

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Responsibility and accountability</td>
<td>Designates lead executive branch departments or agencies for federal homeland security initiatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization of society</td>
<td>This principle recognizes the critical role of state and local governments, private institutions and the American people in securing the homeland. U.S. traditions of federalism and limited government require that organizations outside the federal government take the lead in these efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of risk and allocation of resources</td>
<td>The number of potential terrorist acts is nearly infinite. Therefore, we must make difficult choices regarding the allocation of resources against those risks that pose the greatest danger to our homeland.</td>
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<td>PRINCIPLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seeking opportunity out of adversity</td>
<td>This principle calls for special attention to programs that improve security and at the same time advance other important public purposes or principles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Need for a flexible response to terrorism</td>
<td>Since the threat of terrorism is ever-changing, terrorist enemies can adapt their offensive tactics strategically to exploit what they perceive to be weaknesses in established defenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Measurement of preparedness</td>
<td>This principle demands accountability from every government body, requiring that every department or agency create benchmarks and other performance measures. With these, it can evaluate progress and determine the allocation of future resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protecting the homeland from a terrorist attack is a permanent mission</td>
<td>Lead departments and agencies should plan to sustain homeland security initiatives for years and decades, not weeks and months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constraints on government spending</td>
<td>The National Strategy does not equate more money spent to more security earned. Thus, the National Strategy aims to build upon and improve the coordination of existing capabilities.</td>
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security also implements several strategic visions:

- Threat and vulnerability assessment
- Organizing for a secure homeland
- Critical mission areas
  - Intelligence and warning
  - Border and transportation security
  - Domestic counterterrorism
  - Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets
  - Defending against catastrophic events
  - Emergency preparedness and response
- Foundations of homeland security
  - Law
  - Science and technology
  - Information sharing and systems
  - International cooperation
- Costs of homeland security
Several strategic visions (such as Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation Security and Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets) correlate closely to law enforcement activities. However, Domestic Counterterrorism most directly affects local policing organizations. According to the National Strategy, September 11 redefined the mission of federal, state and local law enforcement authorities.

While law enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they should now assign priority to preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the United States. (p. 25)

The Strategy then presents a “national vision” for law enforcement agencies:

We will redefine our law enforcement mission to focus on the prevention of all terrorist acts within the United States, whether international or domestic in origin. We will use all legal means—both traditional and non-traditional—to identify, halt, and, where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United States. We will prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against such individuals where appropriate and will utilize the full range of our legal authorities. We will pursue not only the individuals directly engaged in terrorist activity, but also their sources of support: the people and organizations that knowingly fund the terrorists and those that provide them with logistical assistance. To achieve these aims, we will strengthen our federal law enforcement community. In addition, we will augment the scope and quality of information available to all law enforcement. In that regard, we will build and continually update a fully integrated, fully accessible terrorist watch list. When we have identified any suspected terrorist activities, we will then use all the tools in our Nation’s legal arsenal, including investigative, criminal, civil, immigration, and regulatory powers to stop those who wish to do us harm. (p. 26)

To fulfill this vision, the Strategy puts forth several major initiatives, with the FBI as the lead agency in the counterterrorism efforts (pp. 26-28):

- **Improve intergovernmental law enforcement coordination.** An effective domestic counterterrorism effort requires the participation of law enforcement personnel at all levels of government, as well as the coordination of all relevant agencies and officials.
• **Facilitate apprehension of potential terrorists.** In order to apprehend suspected terrorists before they have the opportunity to execute their plans, we must ensure that law enforcement officers are able to access information on suspected terrorists.

• **Continue ongoing investigations and prosecutions.** The Nation’s law enforcement community currently is investigating both confirmed and suspected terrorist activity.

• **Complete FBI restructuring to emphasize prevention of terrorist attacks.** Our Nation’s highest law enforcement objective must be the prevention of terrorist acts—a significant shift from pre-September 11 objectives.

• **Target and attack terrorist financing.** A cornerstone of our counterterrorism effort is a concerted interagency effort to target and interdict financing of terrorist operations.

• **Track foreign terrorists and bring them to justice.** The federal government has two key missions in regard to tracking foreign terrorists: barring terrorists or terrorist-supporting aliens from the United States and tracking down and deporting any who have illegally entered our country.

The Domestic Counterterrorism vision calls for an effective reorientation of law enforcement organizations to focus on counterterrorism objectives. It requires decisive action in a number of areas. The Strategy notes that agencies have already taken many of the necessary steps. For example, one major step forward concerns the federal initiatives that have increased information sharing and the coordination of operations throughout the law enforcement community. Not only are federal law enforcement and U.S. intelligence agencies communicating better with each other, the entire law enforcement community—international, federal, state and local—is now sharing more information. Another measure is that law enforcement agencies at all levels of government have worked to enhance coordination of their counterterrorism operational activities. Law enforcement agencies have taken necessary initial actions to counter terrorism. However, they need to work together before they can pursue the counterterrorism mission with maximum effect.
Another important discussion within the National Strategy is that of Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. The Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as:

…systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

The Strategy notes that America’s critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors. America’s critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the functions or services they provide to our country. Moreover, these systems are complex: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct target and reverberate long after the immediate damage.

In addition to protecting critical infrastructures such as agriculture and energy, the Strategy states the nation must also protect a number of key assets: individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems but could cause local disaster or profoundly damage the nation’s morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, such as prominent national, state or local monuments and icons. In some cases, these include quasi-public symbols that link strongly with the United States as a nation. They fall completely under the jurisdiction of state and local officials or even private foundations. Key assets also include individual or localized facilities that deserve special protection because of their destructive potential or their value to the local community. Finally, certain high-profile events correlate strongly to national symbols or national morale and deserve special protective efforts by the federal government.

**National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003**

The Office of Homeland Security released the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) in February 2003. This terrorism-combating strategy further
elaborates on Section III of the National Strategy for Homeland Security strategy by expounding on the nation’s need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas” and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. While the National Strategy for Homeland Security focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders (NSCT, 2003).

**National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006**

In September 2006, the Office of Homeland Security released a second National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This updated strategy sets the government’s plan for winning the “war on terror.” It builds directly from the National Security Strategy and the previous National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It also incorporates a newfound understanding of the enemy. The previous strategy involved destroying the larger Al-Qaeda network and confronting the radical ideology that inspired others to join or support the terrorist movement. The 2006 NSCT notes that since 9/11, the government has made substantial progress in degrading the Al-Qaeda network by killing or capturing key lieutenants, eliminating safe havens and disrupting existing lines of support. However, in response to American-led efforts to combat terrorism, the terrorists have “adjusted.” Thus, the United States must refine its earlier strategy to meet the evolving threat. As this updated strategy outlines, to win the “war on terror” it will be necessary to (p. 1):

- Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism,
- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks,
- Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them,
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states,
Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror, and

Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

Al-Qaeda continues to be the terrorist group of primary interest in the 2006 NSCT. While the U.S. believes it has likely weakened the Al-Qaeda network significantly over the last 4 years, the NSCT states the enemy faced today is not the same enemy faced on September 11. The document observes that U.S. counterterrorism actions have forced the terrorists to evolve and modify their ways of doing business. The principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States has developed into a “transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends” (p. 5).

The strategic vision for the war on terror remains similar to the original document. The updated NSCT calls for:

Continued involvement in the application of all instruments of national power and influence to kill or capture the terrorists,

Denying terrorists safe haven and control of any nation,

Preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction,

Rendering potential terrorist targets less attractive by strengthening security, and

Cutting off terrorist sources of funding and other resources needed for terrorist organizations to operate and survive.

The last section of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on the institutionalization of the strategy for long-term success. For success in defeating the terrorist threat, an array of “transformational structures” will be necessary. These include:
• Establishing and maintaining international standards of accountability
• Strengthening coalitions and partnerships
• Enhancing government architecture and interagency collaboration
• Fostering intellectual and human capital

**National Strategy for Homeland Security 2007**

The Office of Homeland Security issued a revised National Strategy for Homeland Security in October 2007. This updated Strategy builds directly from the first National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 2002. It reflects the increased understanding of the terrorist threats confronting the United States today and incorporates lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes, including Hurricane Katrina. The Strategy proposes new initiatives and approaches that will enable the United States to achieve its homeland security objectives. The government created the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security as a companion to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The updated National Strategy maintains the three principle objectives for preventing and disrupting terrorism, protecting the American people and critical infrastructure, and responding to and recovering from terrorist incidents. In addition, the updated Strategy reassesses the critical infrastructure in need of the most protection. It also assesses the current threats to the United States. The updated Strategy identifies the same sectors of critical infrastructure and key resources as the previous strategy. However, the updated Strategy provides additional areas of concern, such as: commercial facilities; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; dams; and national monuments and icons.

According to the 2007 Strategy, Al-Qaeda remains the most serious and dangerous threat to the United States. The Strategy notes that:
Although earlier efforts in the war on terror deprived Al-Qaeda of its safe haven in Afghanistan and degraded its network by capturing or killing most of those responsible for September 11, the group has protected its top leadership, replenished operational lieutenants, and regenerated a safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas – core capabilities that would help facilitate another attack on the Homeland. (p. 9)

In addition to Al-Qaeda, the 2007 Strategy identifies several other groups and individuals who use terror and violence against the innocent in pursuit of their objectives. These groups, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, pose potential threats to the security of the United States. Hizballah has conducted anti-U.S. attacks outside the United States and, prior to September 11, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. The United States believes Hizballah may consider attacking the homeland if it perceives the U.S. poses a direct threat to the group or to Iran, its principal sponsor.

The updated National Strategy also argues that the United States is not immune to the emergence of homegrown radicalization and violent Islamic extremism within its borders. “The arrest and prosecution inside the United States of a small number of violent Islamic extremists points to the possibility that others in the homeland may become sufficiently radicalized to view the use of violence within the United States as legitimate” (p. 9). Furthermore, the Strategy does not restrict the homeland terrorist threat to violent Islamic extremist groups. Domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the United States also pose an ongoing threat. Often referred to as “single-issue” groups, they include white supremacist groups, animal rights extremists and eco-terrorist groups, among others.

Law Enforcement Response

These documents relate the reality that the “new” terrorism has created an unprecedented phenomenon of modern violence in the twenty-first century, much of
which has transcended national boundaries. Particularly in the United States, the hijackings of September 11, 2001 make it clear that we have entered a unique age of terrorism. Since 9/11, local police agencies have accepted new duties related to homeland security, particularly in jurisdictions with likely targets such as airports and seaports. Police also have assumed new intelligence duties, such as working with federal law enforcement officials to identify potential terrorist activities. Local police departments face other challenges, such as determining how to shift resources to boost protection of city infrastructures, dealing with military deployments of officers and competing for new recruits from an expanding number of federal and private security jobs.

As the initiatives above show, the American public had visibility of major policy transformation in protecting the homeland. However, the national government directed many of its policy and legal changes at federal-level agencies. The policies acknowledged none of the changes could be successful without the support and assistance of state and local agencies. Yet they provided little guidance on how they were to fulfill this role. Although sweeping changes have provided direction at the federal level, there is little documentation on the nature and extent of local police responses to the events of September 11. Nevertheless, some of this change is visible to the public. Just a few of the readily observable changes include: increased police security in designated buildings, mandated police car searches at airports, enhanced police presence at high profile events, and special police equipment to respond to biological or chemical attacks.

Despite the evident changes and guidelines the U.S. government has put forth, there is no standard operating model for local law enforcement in a post-September environment. This fact is disconcerting since in all probability, local law enforcement
will respond first to a terrorist incident or threat. Prior to September 11, local law enforcement agencies viewed the threat of terrorism as real. However, individual responses to the threat varied widely according to the size and resources of the department and the nature of the threat in the community (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). One year after the 9/11 attacks, about half of local law enforcement agencies assessed the chance of a major terrorist incident occurring within their jurisdiction within the next five years as very low (Davis et al., 2004). Furthermore, law enforcement agencies in large counties assessed the likelihood of different types of threats as being somewhat higher for their jurisdictions compared to those in smaller counties (Davis et al., 2004). Following the September 11 attacks, one would suspect that all police agencies would be more sensitized to the issues of terrorism and emergency preparedness for such incidents. However, despite the events of 9/11, there does not appear to be any specific response pattern of local law enforcement. This begs the question: What changes in police functions, if any, have occurred in local law enforcement in response to the September 11 attacks?

Brandl (2003) offers some speculation as to the implications of September 11, 2001 on law enforcement. He reflects upon police history in America, and notes that “crises” (such as the “Red Scare”) have usually prompted major changes in policing. Phenomena such as new crimes and technological demands placed on the police have largely caused these crises. Brandl believes that “the events of September 11 have initiated, and in some instances accelerated, a wave of change in American law enforcement, and these changes will dramatically affect the face of law enforcement of the future” (p. 133-134). He observes two trends in our current world to support his
belief: increasingly sophisticated and devious crimes and globalization. The events of
September 11 and related incidents coupled with these two trends “may point directly to
organized international terrorism as the ‘new’ most significant crime-related demand on
the police” (p. 141). In addition, Brandl indicates there may be another trend that may
have implications for crime and the future of policing: the continued rapid discovery and
adoption of technology. According to Brandl, technology can place incredible demands
on the police, with the Internet of primary concern.

The Internet has created a multitude of criminal opportunities; it can be
used to disseminate information of hate and other unlawful materials (e.g.
child pornography); it can be used to perform acts of terrorism
(e.g. cyberterrorism; Gellman, 2002); it can be used to illegally gain access
to and steal protected governmental and corporate information (e.g.
hacking); and it can be used to distribute computer viruses. (Damphousse
& Smith, 1998, p. 144)

A final trend Brandl notes is the relationship between the police and the military. He
believes the lines separating the police and the military will become increasingly blurry.
Specifically, the police will become more military-like and the military will become more
police-like.

Deflem (2004) observes that the most striking changes in policing post-9/11 are
the rapid expansion of police powers. For example, the Patriot Act broadens police
powers against terrorism. This bill places special emphasis on foreign investigative work
and the investigation of aliens engaged in terrorist activities. It distinctly legalizes
counterterrorist police work. This expansion of U.S. police powers also brought about a
refocusing of police powers and a realignment of federal, state and local police agencies,
as all levels of police now more than ever focus on terrorism. Furthermore, high-profile
terrorist incidents such as the events of 9/11 lead to attempts by national governments and
international governing bodies to redirect police efforts against terrorism as a function of
political objectives. “Among other ironic consequences of these adjustments in policing has been that other crimes besides terrorism now receive much less scrutiny from police and, therefore, may be on the rise” (Deflem, 2004, p. 80).

Kappeler and Potter (2004) further advance Deflem’s argument. They believe the most noticeable shift in policing relates to the federalization of municipal police agencies. Traditional policing is now assuming a mandate that federal agencies historically have followed. Local agencies are devoting more attention and resources to securing the nation’s borders, its seaports, the Internet or enforcing immigration laws, all of which have previously fallen under the responsibilities of federal agencies:

They are experiencing greater centralization, a loss of jurisdictional integrity and local political control. Antiterrorism hyper-rhetoric is also being used to sustain and expand specialized use of force groups like SWAT teams, crowd control units, and rapidly deployed military units. Local police agencies are beginning to play a greater role in domestic surveillance and are becoming the eyes and ears of Federal enforcement agencies. The new emphasis by local police on the enforcement of immigration laws is an example of this phenomenon. (p. 37)

The authors outline the shifts in the role and function of U.S. police as follows:

_Federal Law Police Functions_

- Decline in civil rights enforcement
- Decline in traditional domestic crime investigation
- Increased dependence on local information
- Increased international investigation
- Increased international police training
- Increased collection and analysis of intelligence data

_Municipal Police Focus_

- Increased watchman/security-oriented focus
• Security of infrastructure rather than businesses
• Reemergence of bomb squads and hazardous materials units
• Reduction in drug enforcement
• Increased role in immigration law enforcement
• Increased domestic surveillance
• Decline in community policing orientation
• Renewed emphasis on crowd control

Kappeler and Potter believe these changes are likely to continue into the next decade. They predict the changes occurring in federal law enforcement will remain for an extended period, whereas shifts in local policing may be short-lived.

Raymond et al. (2005) also agree the new homeland security mission increases the demand for local police. In many jurisdictions in the country, new tasks considerably expand the police role. Such tasks include threat assessments, protecting critical infrastructure, intelligence gathering, immigration enforcement, serving on joint terrorism task forces and participating in training to execute emergency preparedness plans. The expanded role and responsibilities of local police thus require an expanded set of police skills and perhaps a different type of police officer. Furthermore, law enforcement’s overall mission is broader than that of other first responders such as fire departments. The mission encompasses a wider range of public safety responsibilities, of which preventing, deterring and responding to terrorist threats is one among many (Davis et al., 2004).

Gathering and sharing intelligence information on the terrorist threat facing one’s jurisdiction or state requires new capabilities. It also requires the removal of institutional and structural barriers to interagency coordination. The overall goal is to coordinate
federal, state and local counterterrorism and emergency preparedness efforts today (Davis et al., 2004).

In a case study, Raymond et al. (2005) investigated the post-September 11 personnel needs and duties of the Long Beach (California) Police Department. Raymond et al. conducted semi-structured interviews with men and women in recruitment, screening, training, human resources, members of the community-oriented public safety unit, the new counterterrorism unit and the new unit on homeland security. They also accompanied ride-alongs and observed SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team preparations. The study found several adaptations to new service demands (section 2, p. 8):

- Created counterterrorism unit
- Created terrorist liaison officers
- Reassigned officers to assess and protect critical infrastructure, such as the port, airport and water treatment facilities
- Sent officers to train in new skills such as WMD responses and signs of terrorism
- Established port police equipped with small boats
- Redistributed officers to respond to areas with high population growth
- Increased visibility and response times by switching most officers from two- to one-person patrol cars
- Reduced staffing on lower priority programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) and community reactions division
- Reduced staffing on narcotics division
- Reduced foot patrols
- Requested additional resources to cover additional demand, both from the city for local needs, and from the government for national needs

This case study revealed structural and procedural changes to the Long Beach Police Department. It also provided an understanding of how police organizations respond to terrorism. However, this is only one example of a single department that exists within the vicinity of the city of Los Angeles, which has had several experiences with
terrorism. Although the changes exemplified here are quite significant, they may not be typical of most local police departments.

Perhaps most critical today is that no paradigm exists for how to systematically manage a police department to respond to both local needs and to unprecedented national requirements under the Department of Homeland Security. These new demands are unpredictable, frequently changing, and unsupported by any long-term commitments of funding and training. (section 2, p. 9)

Currently, no data are available on how agencies participate in systematic force planning.

Hickman (2006) assessed demands on police in a post-September 11 environment. He stated local law enforcement’s expanded role translates directly to personnel demands in terms of more officers, more hours from existing officers, or both. For example, many departments switch to full-time staffing during times of elevated threat, bringing in all available officers for extended shifts.

At the same time, these increased demands on personnel and functions, state and local budgets have been constrained by the need to fund broader homeland security needs: additional statewide or state-level security functions, target hardening of high-risk locations and facilities, and other site- or event-specific security needs. (p. 1)

Hickman sought to understand better the demand the new security environment has placed on local police agencies. To this end, he examined the impact of military reserve activation on police staffing using data from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). He found that over the twelve month period ending June 30, 2003, twenty-one percent of all local law enforcement agencies had officers who were military reservists and who were called up to active duty.

Henry (2002) also maintains that the attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a profound impact on American policing. He argues that the suddenness and magnitude of the attacks brought the issues of terrorism and police response to terrorism into
“substantially sharper focus.” As a result, police agencies across the country are struggling to adapt quickly to the new realities of a post-September 11 environment.

Within police management circles, one of the most important—and most troubling—impacts of the September 11 attacks is the realization that large scale terrorist events can be (and have been) launched against the American people by foreign terrorist groups… but that for many sectors of the population and for many police officials the actuality of this devastating attack and the massive casualties it involved has moved the possibility of terrorist activity out of the realm of abstraction. (p. 320)

Another significant realization is that if terrorists can so effectively strike major cities such as New York City and Washington, D.C., they can strike in smaller and less prepared municipalities as well. The larger cities typically have experienced terrorism previously. They are relatively prepared to prevent, detect and respond to terrorist events. Prior to September 11, terrorism was perceived to be a phenomenon of large cities, or occurred overseas. Thus, there was a false sense of security: America “regarded itself as largely immune from the threat of large-scale international terrorism. September 11 changed all that” (p. 320). In response, Americans have turned to local law enforcement and public safety agencies to ensure their safety and security. As such, the public expects local police and public safety agencies to focus their resources on the prevention and deterrence of terrorism, to respond effectively and decisively to terrorist events, and to investigate thoroughly terrorist acts and bring those responsible to justice (p. 321).

As Henry notes, three issues arise in the institution of policing with respect responding to the continued threat of terrorism, resulting in three goals for law enforcement (p. 322):

1. First, the public expectation and mandate that law enforcement will prevent and deter terrorist acts highlights the compelling need for effective intelligence gathering and analysis, for more sophisticated and realistic dissemination of intelligence information, and for a coordinated proactive
intelligence capability that spans local, state and federal law enforcement boundaries.

2. Second, demands for an effective public safety response to actual crisis events illuminate the need for better, more coordinated, and more sophisticated operation policies and practices that involve a much broader range of agencies and institutions.

3. Finally, demands for swift and certain identification and prosecution of those responsible for terrorist acts are in large measure dependent on the efficacy of law enforcement’s response to the first two categories. At minimum, they require that local, state and federal agencies ignore or overcome some of the traditional organizational boundaries and rivalries that have previously separated them, instead working together to conduct coordinated investigations.

Henry admits achieving these goals will be a complicated task laden with many challenges. For example, Henry notes there are more than 16,600 separate and relatively autonomous local police agencies and sheriff’s departments in the United States. Each agency ranges in size, organizational structure and mission. In addition, law enforcement as a whole currently lacks the formal communications infrastructure and the resolve to share critical intelligence information effectively. Furthermore, the process of evolving and integrating new policies, new structures and new mindsets should be a gradual and deliberate one.

For many, the pace of this process to date has undoubtedly been excruciatingly slow, and the perception may be that rather little substantive progress has been made. It is difficult to empirically examine the accuracy of this perception, since fairly little systematic analysis of organizational and policy change in American policing has been made publicly available in the preceding months, but some police agencies certainly seem to be pursuing practical and practicable strategies designed to address this constellation of issues. (p. 323)

Kelling and Bratton (2006) view local law enforcement officers as “first responders” to incidents rather than potential “first preventers” of terrorism. They suggest using local police officers as preventers in the war against terrorism in three ways (p. 1):
1. First, we can train police in the problem-solving techniques that will make them effective first preventers of terrorism.

2. Second, we can use computer statistics (CompStat) and technology to enhance data sharing and to catalyze intelligence-led counterterrorist policing.

3. Finally and most vitally, we can adapt the theory of order maintenance commonly called “broken windows,” which police in New York City have used so successfully in the war on crime, for the war on terror.

The authors state several reasons for the counterterrorist potential of local police. The first reason is a function of numbers: there are more than 700,000 local law enforcement officers working in the United States (as compared to 12,000 FBI agents). Based on sheer numbers alone, odds are that local law enforcement personnel are more likely than the FBI to encounter a terrorist. Second, local police are most often obliged to probe tips from citizens. Third, local police officers have an everyday presence in all communities. Thus, the police are in a better position to work with local citizens and leaders in the community. “The presence of police in our communities sensitizes them to anomalies and yields counterterrorist data valuable to other agencies” (p. 2).

To realize the full potential of the local police in counterterrorism, Kelling and Bratton point out that there needs to be a “philosophical shift,” as seen in criminal policing during the 1990s. Rather than reacting to individual incidents, the police must become proactive in solving general problems. They call for the use of the problem-solving technique to produce customized responses to terrorism. For example, Kelling and Bratton apply the broken windows theory (that Kelling and Wilson originally formulated) to terrorism. The underlying premise of the broken windows theory is that if the police focused on minor offenses and community disorder and created an environment in which criminals “did not feel at home,” they could substantially reduce
crime. With respect to counterterrorist policing, the application of broken windows would have two components. The first would be to create a hostile environment for terrorists. The second is to recognize that terrorism’s equivalents to subway fare-beating are illegal border crossings, forged documents and other relatively minor precursor crimes. Terrorists often commit such crimes to fund operations to prepare their attacks (p. 2). Kelling and Bratton believe that just as everyday criminals commit crimes, so do terrorists. Terrorists commit crimes not only to carry out an attack, but to sustain themselves as well (such as obtaining illegal documents, committing robberies for money, committing fraud, etc.). For these reasons, Kelling and Bratton believe police should consider no incident too minor for interaction with potential terrorists and for the collection of intelligence (p. 3).

Several studies indicate the events of September 11 have affected the day-to-day activities of local law enforcement agencies (Davis et al., 2004; Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University, 2005; 2006; Marks, 2007; Marks & Sun, 2007). For example, prior to the 9/11 attacks, few local law enforcement agencies had experience with responding to or investigating a terrorist-related incident. However, the 9/11 attacks served to increase the awareness of terrorism and the response experience of local law enforcement agencies. As a result, the studies have found many local law enforcement agencies assess the chance of an attack occurring within their jurisdictions as somewhat likely or very likely. The types of threats local law enforcement identified as of high concern were those involving the use of chemical or biological agents, conventional explosives and cyberterrorism. Consistent with higher threat perceptions, local law enforcement agencies were more likely to have:
• Increased the number of personnel assigned to do emergency response planning following 9/11,

• Created specialized terrorism units and had those units participate in joint training after 9/11,

• Conducted risk or threat assessments before 9/11, and

• Had more prior experience in responding to and assisting with terrorist-related investigations and in coordinating with the FBI and other federal agencies.

In addition, there is a relationship between response and departmental resources. After September 11, a number of local law enforcement agencies increased agency spending or reallocated resources internally to focus on terrorism preparedness.

Moreover, many agencies received an increase in external funding or resources following 9/11. Agencies who received external funding were more likely than other agencies to have:

• Increased spending or internally reallocated resources to focus on terrorism preparedness,

• Updated response plans or standard operating procedures (SOPs) to address terrorist-related incidents, particularly CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives) incidents,

• Established new mutual aid agreements after 9/11 to address terrorist-related incidents, and

• Conducted joint training exercises after 9/11.

Furthermore, these local law enforcement agencies were more likely to have specialized terrorism units.

One study specifically focuses on the impact of September 11 on law enforcement agencies (Marks, 2005; Marks & Sun, 2007). This study examined the 9/11 impact on organizational development of American state and local police departments. The research consisted of analyzing police discourse content in two practitioner magazines, *The Police*
Chief: The Professional Voice of Law Enforcement (a monthly publication) and Sheriff magazine (published bi-monthly). The researchers selected the two magazines because current and former police supervisors and administrators were regular contributors. These contributors have a strong understanding of departmental policies and practices. The researchers analyzed 108 magazines, consisting of 1,552 articles, spanning from 1999-2004. Marks and Sun decided to include the two years prior to 9/11 (1999 and 2000). This established a baseline from which they could measure changes in police discourse.

The research identified notable organizational change in two areas. The first area of change occurred in internal organizational structure. However, this was the least common form of change. It typically involved one or two units within a department rather than the whole department. In addition, the research found change in internal organizational structure to be transactional (where various features of an organization may change but the core framework remains untouched) and primarily involved large metropolitan police departments. The analysis found little or no information concerning smaller police departments.

The second form of organizational change documented was with respect to organizational boundaries. Marks and Sun found evidence to suggest that the boundaries of police organizations have changed dramatically on several fronts. One major observation was the importance of increased interaction between local law enforcement agencies. This change occurred primarily in the field of information sharing and, to a lesser extent, in the field of communications. One of the most common forms of collaboration police practitioners discussed was the development of regional information-sharing networks. The researchers made a second observation regarding changes in the
way police departments interacted with communities. These changes included using community policing to create new programs or adapting existing civilian programs to involve civilians in the process of dealing with terrorism. A final observation took note of modifications in interactions with the federal government. Specifically, change occurred in the form of new or revised departmental procedures for sharing information and intelligence. These changes focused on the ways state and local law enforcement agencies communicate with federal law enforcement.

Marks and Sun also discussed several implications for future research. First, future research should continue to assess the impact of September 11 on organizational factors (such as culture, mission, strategy and leadership) related to transformational change. The researchers believe these variables deserve greater attention than transactional factors because they carry more weight in shaping organizational change. Second, researchers should devote more efforts to uncover how smaller departments respond to external and internal challenges after 9/11. An understanding of the extent of change in smaller police agencies can assess how the impact of 9/11 varies across departments with distinctive geographic and demographic characteristics. Lastly, future research should employ other types of methods to investigate the impact of 9/11 further on organizational development of police departments.

For example, a well-designed survey that contains items measuring transactional and transformational factors will allow researchers to assess the scope of development related to different forms of organizational change. Interview data from key informants can supplement survey information. Data collected from multiple sources are likely to give us a better picture of organizational changes among law enforcement agencies. (p. 171)

Other research related to understanding the impacts of terrorism on local law enforcement agencies has emerged over the last year. In 2009, the National Institute of
Justice released a report focusing on organizational change and best practices following September 11 in the New York City (NYPD) and Arlington County, Virginia (ACPD) police departments. Since the NYPD and the ACPD were the two most directly involved agencies on 9/11, the experiences of both departments can provide perspectives on best practices and responding to future terrorism incidents. The case studies consisted of interviews with agency representatives and a review of internal documents. “Though very different in size and organizational structure, these two agencies provide many similar lessons learned” (p. 18). The researchers found (p. ii):

- Proactive intelligence gathering within communities about terrorist threats and sharing that information within and among agencies are crucial to preventing and responding to terrorist attacks.

- Counterterrorism policing is the same as crime policing.

- The first priority in responding to a terrorist attack is to save lives, including those of first responders. Setting up a secure perimeter and avoiding over-responding to an initial attack can prevent loss of life in a second, more devastating attack.

- Both the New York City Police Department and the Arlington County Police Department have greatly expanded counterterrorism training at all levels and have integrated that training into traditional police training exercises.

- Setting up a media relations plan is essential to get out accurate information both to family members of victims and the general public, to control rumors and prevent the spread of such information, and to ensure the presence of media does not interfere with evacuation, rescue efforts and traffic control.

With respect to the New York City Police Department, significant organizational change occurred immediately following September 11. The NYPD revamped its Intelligence Division and created a new Counter-Terrorism Bureau. The Bureau’s main function is to analyze the worldwide terrorism threat, while the Intelligence Division now proactively engages in efforts to detect and prevent terrorism. In conjunction with the
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Bureau and Intelligence Division develop intelligence and investigative leads. In addition, all NYPD officials received training in antiterrorism tactics and procedures, and the NYPD has integrated counterterrorism operations in the field and on patrol.

In the Arlington County Police Department, improving police preparedness was one of the top priorities. This included assessing targets for possible terrorist attacks, advancing the Incident Command System (ICS) philosophy and emergency management planning, training and support of ICS, and upgrading communication capabilities. Other initiatives of the ACPD comprised coordinating intelligence sharing countywide, improving collaboration with other responders and strengthening community ties.

Oliver (2009) notes the actions of the New York City and Arlington County Police Departments “clearly showed that in the event of a terrorist attack, police would naturally serve as first responders in the incident” (p. 254). However, defining this role has been “somewhat elusive and contradictory” (p. 254). Furthermore, “homeland security, as a national policy, has been ill-conceived and ill-defined” (p. 254). The passage of the Patriot Act of 2001 and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security attempted to correlate the concepts of homeland security and the role of local law enforcement. However, they defined no specific changes to the role of the police concerning homeland security. Since that time, a number of organizations and scholars have endeavored to convey the specific role of local police within homeland security. Although the Patriot Act and the DHS outline much in the way of larger “strategies,” they give little direction to inform the police “what to do” in the event of an attack.
According to Oliver, there have been several movements in recent years to define the police’s role in homeland security. The first movement is a result of the Bush Administration. Homeland Security Presidential Directives numbers 5 and 8 require all U.S. public safety agencies, including local law enforcement, to implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system allows for multiple agency coordination (either within the police sector or across different public safety sectors) to handle large-scale events. Second is police agency adoption of intelligence-led policing (ILP). ILP provides for information sharing among law enforcement agencies to detect threats proactively and develop responses to those threats. Third is the concept of data-driven policing. In contrast to ILP, which pushes information up to the strategic level, data-driven policing pushes information down to the tactical level (p. 256). The officer on the street obtains the information gathered so that he or she may have up-to-date information in real time to respond to calls more effectively. Finally, there is the continued issue of community policing compatibility with homeland security. Scholars and practitioners have clashed over the years since 9/11 as to whether the country can achieve homeland security through continued deployment of community policing or whether these two concepts are diametrically opposed (p. 257).

Oliver’s perspective of the development of the role of local law enforcement in homeland security indicates there is still no consensus to date as to what the police should do. Oliver further comments that “perhaps the most critical issue in regard to the many claims that we are in an era of homeland security or that law enforcement will change, must change, to better respond to future threats, is that there has been little in the way of research in this area” (p. 257). He poses the following questions (p. 257):
• Have the police changed, or is this merely another argument for “old wine in new bottles” or that the “emperor has new clothes?”

• Have the attitudes of the police executives, in regards to homeland security, changed, or are they merely following the theory of resource dependency – homeland security is where the money is at, therefore, I am doing homeland security.

• And perhaps the most important, has the emphasis on police and homeland security given the police too much latitude in regard to the law, threatening the very civil liberties that make America so unique?

Oliver states these questions are important ones researchers have not addressed adequately. Of late, a handful of studies have presented the first research into this important and controversial topic. In one such study, Pelfrey (2009) explores local homeland security preparedness. The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) published *Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence* (2003), which defines a set of objectives and initiatives agencies should undertake to prevent terrorism events (categorized as broad dimensions of collaboration, information sharing, threat recognition, risk management and intervention). However, Pelfrey observes the ODP has not developed a standardized assessment methodology to evaluate an agency relative to those objectives. Therefore, since the ODP has assessed no agency to date relative to those goals, Pelfrey states it is “unclear if these preparedness goals are attainable or even realistic” (p. 265).

To address this issue and assess homeland security preparedness, Pelfrey conducted research at a large, full-service Midwestern urban police department. Pelfrey found the agency had taken significant steps toward terrorism prevention. Examples of programmatic steps included the department assigning administrators to terrorism-related responsibilities, the appointment of a grant officer tasked with acquiring funds to support antiterrorism efforts and the development of an infrastructure for both response and
prevention (p. 268). Other important tasks are in the early stages of development, such as implementation of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). This focuses on enhancing regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas, public-private partnerships to coordinate responses and prevent incidents, an officer specifically assigned to develop location-specific response plans and a cadre of officers trained and equipped to respond to hazardous materials incidents (p. 268). Pelfrey learned that proactive steps toward intervening in terrorist activities are infrequent. Specifically, there were no countermeasures in place or in development, and investigations addressing individuals under suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity were rare.

As if in response to Pelfrey’s recommendations, Giblin, Schafer and Burruss (2009) also examined the perceived risk of a terrorist attack, terrorism preparedness activities and organizational capacity in over 500 Illinois law enforcement agencies. They collected data through a statewide mail survey of all sworn law enforcement agencies in the state. Interestingly, the survey revealed that Illinois law enforcement agencies in general did not perceive a high likelihood of a terrorist attack within their jurisdiction. As one might expect, larger agencies perceived a greater risk for being targets of a terrorist incident. The survey found larger agencies to have taken more steps towards preparedness than smaller agencies. With respect to vulnerability, an interesting finding emerged. Most law enforcement agencies viewed their communities at highest risk for cyber attacks and conventional explosives, and at lowest risk biological, chemical and radiological attacks. In addition, most agencies reported they had written response plans. However, most agencies did not have someone to conduct intelligence analysis. In
consideration of organization capacity, the majority of agencies believed communication within and across agencies had improved, as did the development of partnerships.

Stewart and Morris (2009) report similar findings. Many police chiefs in Texas believed homeland security has become the dominant strategy in policing. The findings indicate federal collaboration, preparedness, and threat perceptions significantly influenced police chiefs’ homeland security perceptions. Although the study found homeland security to be the emergent strategy, police chiefs noted little organizational and operational changes to support the homeland security function in their respective departments (see also Chappell & Gibson, 2009).

Schafer, Burruss and Giblin (2009) conducted another study in Illinois that found that small agencies (employing 9 or fewer full-time officers; N=196) perceived the risk of terrorists targeting their jurisdictions as quite low overall, with some agencies rating their risk at zero. Accordingly, few agencies had created special units, established internal task forces or had increased staffing. While small agencies pursued counterterrorism training more commonly, they seldom participated in mock exercises. Just over half of the agencies reported they had written emergency response plans and approximately one-third had conducted a risk assessment within their jurisdictions. Few agencies employed full-time crime or intelligence analysts. Thus, procedures in data collection and internal distribution of information were not common. Despite the low confidence levels of preparedness, small agencies reported the most confidence in their communications and partnership capacities. However, over half the agencies viewed their capabilities to provide equipment, training, food and shelter to personnel as inadequate. They viewed the availability of personnel and budget to support emergency operations likewise. With
respect to the relationship between perceived risk, preparedness and organizational capacity, the research revealed agencies that perceived a greater risk of future attacks within their jurisdictions had higher preparedness levels. In addition, agencies who had higher preparedness levels also perceived a greater capacity to respond to terrorist incidents.

**Intelligence-Led Policing**

The intelligence-led policing paradigm originated in the United Kingdom. This model of policing developed from the belief that police were spending too much time responding to crime and too little time targeting offenders. There was a call for the increased use of intelligence, surveillance and informants in the early 1990s to target recidivist offenders so the police could be more effective in fighting crime. Since the September 11 attacks, police have used the intelligence-led policing model more widely in the United States (Ratcliffe, 2007).

As Ratcliffe illustrated (2007), intelligence-led policing correlates closely in philosophy to problem-oriented policing. Both models have a strong emphasis on the role of analysis, establishing it as the basis for decision-making. However, the intelligence-led model differs from the problem-oriented model (as well as from CompStat and the community policing model) in several ways (pp. 1-3):

- While the problem-oriented model is a bottom-up philosophy that places street-level police officers at the forefront of problem identification and resolution, intelligence-led policing is more hierarchical, emphasizing the top-down, rank-oriented nature of law enforcement. Criminal intelligence flows up to decision makers at the executive level, who set priorities for enforcement and prevention, and pass these down to the lower levels of the organization as operational taskings.
• Organizationally, intelligence-led policing is similar to CompStat, where there is a top-down operational structure and senior managers hold the lower ranks accountable for crime levels. However, intelligence-led policing has a more holistic view of the analysis of the criminal environment, in that it aims to include information from a wider and richer range of sources to understand better the context of crime patterns.

• Intelligence-led policing also attempts to seek longer lasting solutions to complex local and organized crime problems, and to be future-oriented and strategically focused.

• Where community policing emphasizes policing to the needs and the desires of the local community, intelligence-led policing is a process whereby strategy and priorities are determined through a more objective analysis of the criminal environment. As such, it is possible that crime priorities can differ from the needs of the community as perceived by the local people.

White (2006; 2009) argues that the problem of terrorism brings the need for “preemptive, offensive policing” to a new level. If law enforcement continues with the traditional approach of “reaction,” it will have little impact on the prevention of terrorism. Since law enforcement has taken the leading role in identifying and disrupting terrorism in the United States, local agencies must seek out new roles to accomplish the aforementioned responsibilities. Specifically, local police agencies need to increase and strengthen intelligence-gathering activities. White suggests every American law enforcement agency should assign someone to collect and forward terrorist intelligence.

In small agencies, this may mean assigning a person who represents several police and sheriff’s departments, while in moderate-sized agencies the function could be performed in the detective bureau or the planning unit. Large metropolitan and state police agencies need full-time intelligence units. (2006, p. 280)

Oliver (2007) also notes a call to police for an increased focus on intelligence-driven policing and police intelligence units. According to Oliver, there are two broad purposes for an intelligence function within a law enforcement agency: prevention and planning/resource allocation. Prevention includes gaining or developing information
related to threats of terrorism or crime. It involves using this information to apprehend
offenders, harden targets and use strategies that will eliminate or mitigate the threats
(p. 164). The intelligence function with respect to planning and resource allocation
involves information about the changing nature of threats, the characteristics and
methodologies of threats and emerging threat idiosyncrasies. This function seeks to
develop response strategies and reallocate resources (p. 164).

In 2007, McGarrell et al. remarked there is great potential in using the
intelligence-led policing model to respond to terrorism. They state, “The challenge of law
enforcement is in the systematic analysis and application of problem-solving principles to
identify such threats before an incident occurs” (p. 149). A problem-solving evaluation of
the full range of crimes (an “all-crimes” approach) would help the law enforcement
practice by systematically documenting the types of crimes committed. Such an approach
would document how frequently these crimes occur, whether theses ideologically
motivated offenders specialize or are generalists, what groups commit which crimes and
regional variations in incidents. “Beyond an all-crimes approach, ILP is most likely to be
effective when implemented in a way that focuses resources on particular crime types,
criminal organizations, and terrorist threats” (p. 153). Terrorists are involved in a wide
variety of preparatory crimes. Thus, focusing on a full range of crimes would provide law
enforcement the additional knowledge necessary to assess threats properly and prioritize
ideologies and groups.

While intelligence-led policing might prove to be a useful model, McGarrell et al.
(2007) note that the greatest challenging to implementing ILP may be a conceptual one.
The researchers consider intelligence-led policing as an overarching framework that
builds upon community policing, problem solving and partnerships. It takes an all-crimes approach. “Alternative conceptualizations may including viewing ILP as focused solely on homeland security and terrorism or following the U.K. model of ILP as involving the identification and targeting of high-rate, chronic offenders” (p. 151). Another issue discussed in implementing ILP is that there are different definitions of different forms of intelligence. A related concern pertains to the financial resources of police agencies. Particularly in the United States, the government asks many agencies to direct efforts on the homeland security mandate. However, the agencies lack the necessary means or the government does not provide the means to fulfill the mandate’s mission. Developing an intelligence capacity (whether a full-blown unit or an intelligence liaison officer) then becomes an additional function for resource-limited agencies (p. 153).

Ratcliffe (2008), in an attempted to resolve the definitional confusion of intelligence-led policing, formulated the following definition based on recent research:

Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.

According to Ratcliffe (2007; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2007), intelligence-led policing emphasizes information gathering and analysis from all aspects of the policing process. Through the extensive use of confidential informants, offender interviews, surveillance of suspects, community sources of information and analysis of recorded crime and calls for service, law enforcement can focus on active and recidivist offenders. Ratcliffe comments that law enforcement managers should not use intelligence-led policing as a patrol saturation tactic or a crime reduction strategy. Rather, they should implement it as an “information-organizing process.” By this process, managers can
determine objective policing tactics concerning enforcement targets, prevention activities and further intelligence gathering operations.

Carter (2004), in a U.S. Department of Justice publication directed at local, state and tribal policing agencies, also provides an understanding of the definition of intelligence for law enforcement.

In the purest sense, intelligence is the product of an analytic process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources, integrates the relevant information into a cohesive package and produces a conclusion or estimate about a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to problem solving (i.e., analysis). Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic product intended to provide meaningful and trustworthy direction to law enforcement decision makers about complex criminality, criminal enterprises, criminal extremists, and terrorists. (p. 7)

Carter further refines the definition of intelligence through an understanding of the relationship between “information” and “intelligence.” He defines information as “pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identifies persons, evidence, events, or illustrates processes that indicate the incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a criminal event” (p. 9). The information gathered produces intelligence. Carter notes the phrase “law enforcement intelligence,” is commonly synonymous with “criminal intelligence.” However, Carter comments that most contexts use the term improperly and view intelligence erroneously as pieces of information about people, places or events that can provide insight about criminality or crime threats (p. 9). Furthermore, the failure to distinguish between law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence further complicates understanding of the term “intelligence” (p. 9). For example, law enforcement officials may gather pieces of information from a variety of sources such as informants, bank records and wiretaps. However, these are simply raw data and frequently have limited inherent meaning. Carter states intelligence exists when there is a
wide array of raw information. The application of inductive or deductive logic will assess it for validity and reliability, review it for materiality to the issues at question, and give it meaning (p. 9-10). “Law enforcement intelligence, therefore, is the product of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality” (p. 10). The following table provides a comparison between the concepts of information and intelligence Carter describes (p. 11):

**Table 3: Comparative Illustrations of Information and Intelligence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Criminal history and driving records</td>
<td>• A report by an analyst that draws conclusions about a person’s criminal liability based on an integrated analysis of diverse information collected by investigators and/or researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Offense reporting records</td>
<td>• An analysis of crime or terrorism trends with conclusions drawn about characteristics of offenders, probable future crime and optional methods for preventing future crime/terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Statements by informants, witnesses and suspects</td>
<td>• A forecast drawn about potential victimization of crime or terrorism based on an assessment of limited information when an analyst uses past experience as context for the conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Registration information for motor vehicles, watercraft and aircraft</td>
<td>• An estimate of a person’s income from a criminal enterprise based on a market and trafficking analysis of illegal commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Licensing details about vehicle operators and professional licenses of all forms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Observations of behaviors and incidents by investigators, surveillance teams or citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Details about banking, investments, credit reports and other financial matters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Descriptions of travel including the traveler name(s), itinerary, methods of travel, date, time, locations, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a 2005 study, Riley et al. evaluated eight agencies through the case study approach to gain insights on organizations that are developing or operating intelligence functions. First, they received various responses when asking what units were responsible
for counterterrorism intelligence. Sites indicated an intelligence unit or bureau, criminal
investigation unit, homeland security bureau, counterterrorism bureau or special
command unit was responsible for counterterrorism intelligence. With respect to the
units’ counterterrorism mandate, most agencies stated either the command staff or the
chief set the mandate internally. Most agencies followed federal guidelines for codifying
and applying formal guidelines to counterterrorism intelligence collection, use,
dissemination and retention. Counterterrorism mandates included such policies as
updating crime and gang intelligence; facilitating counterterrorism partnerships with
federal agencies; keeping the chief apprised of crime issues such as gangs, terrorism,
 drugs, local anarchy and organized crime; and supporting officers on patrol, giving them
information to perform their jobs safely.

Local police agencies did not develop a distinct organizational unit to conduct
counterterrorism intelligence activities. The agencies executed counterterrorism
intelligence-related tasks in conjunction with the intelligence activities pertaining to other
major crimes, such as in an intelligence bureau or division. Only two agencies reported
having made significant changes to their organizational structures after the September 11
attacks. One agency supplemented its criminal investigations bureau with a criminal
intelligence unit that focuses on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The second
department created a homeland security bureau and included a criminal intelligence
section. This section conducted both criminal and terrorism intelligence functions. The
department also created an operations section.

In respect to departmental resources, the cost of increasing the counterterrorism
intelligence function has burdened some local law enforcement agencies. Expenditures
have increased in some departments, but without new budget allocations. Some
departments have also shifted funds internally to accommodate the function, while others
have received grants. Consequently, Riley et al. noted the counterterrorism mission has
affected the investment in human resources for intelligence gathering and analysis. Some
agencies have increased their human resources commitment to counterterrorism.
However, the commitment to counterterrorism came primarily at the expense of other
police tasks. Rather than hiring additional personnel, local police departments have had to
pull officers from assignments in such areas as patrolling, gangs, narcotics, fraud and
forgery, vice, burglary and auto theft.

**Establishment of Specialized Units in Policing**

Around the turn of the century, police departments began to develop and
implement specialized units. These resulted from a search for effectiveness in police
response to crime (Alpert & Moore, 1997). Police agencies had found it necessary to
narrow their focus and refine their skills to deal with specific problems such as juvenile
delinquency (Alpert & Moore, 1997). Furthermore, special units represented a quick and
easy way for police departments to implement new ideas without having to restructure
their organizations completely (McGarrell, Langston & Richardson, 1997). Police
reformers cheered special units as a sign of professionalism in police departments
(Walker, 1999). Reformers also welcomed special units as an appropriate response to a
myriad of city or neighborhood problems.

According to Phillips (2005), special units possess two unique characteristics.
First, departments create a special unit to address a special problem and encompass a
specific mandate. Thus, police design special units to deal with particular problems.
When we speak of a special unit, therefore, we are speaking of an administrative decision to separate a number of officers from a broader range of policing responsibilities and assign them to a new organizational entity with a much narrower range of policing responsibilities. The range of responsibilities is defined by the nature of the problem to be addressed. (p. 4)

Shernock (2005) notes we should not view special units simply as traditional institutionalized units within police organizations performing routine specialized functions. Rather, we should view them as *ad hoc* or improvised units that address, often in an innovative fashion, a special need or purpose (p. 54-55). For example, police established Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams for use in emergencies.

The second unique characteristic of a special unit is that it is optional. The policing organization itself or local political forces may identify problems. However, the initiation of a special unit *may* be an appropriate response, depending on the extent of problems in a particular community. There may also be other appropriate responses, such as no action at all to changes in policies and procedures, without instituting a special unit. Police departments must consider the significance of the problem before determining whether to establish a special unit. They should consider the problem’s seriousness, the prognosis for its continuance at a high incidence rate or criticality level, and the success (or lack thereof) of other policing alternatives to diminish the harm (p. 6). Thus, department needs and resources ultimately drive the decision to establish a special unit. These needs and resources vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Two separate national studies have developed insight into how police have increasingly used these specialized units (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). One study surveyed small-locality police departments (municipal and county) with fewer than 100 sworn officers. The second study analyzed medium to large agencies with
more than 100 sworn officers. The results from both surveys indicated a majority of the police departments (77%) had paramilitary units (PPUs), an increase from 48% since 1985. SWAT teams historically have arisen to react to emergencies beyond the normal scope of control (such civil disturbances, terrorism and hostage situations). However, the studies revealed a new emerging trend. The surveys documented nearly a tenfold increase in PPU “call outs” from 1980 to 1995 (a 939% increase). Researchers attributed the increase to a rising emphasis on the execution of search and arrest warrants. Police also use PPUs as a proactive patrol force in high crime areas. Additional PPU activity included no-knock raids, aggressive field interviews and car stops and searches. The researchers documented this trend of moving away from the traditional emergency role into more routine patrol activities in both small-town and large metropolitan policing agencies. The authors therefore concluded that PPUs are becoming a normal part of routine patrol work. Roberg et al. (2005) add “This integration of PPUs into patrol work appears to delineate a parallel trend with, but in opposition to, community policing: from less militaristic to more militaristic, from generalist to specialist, and from service- and problem-oriented to aggressive crime fighting” (p. 121).

Researchers have not studied the decision to establish a specialized police unit within a police organization at great length. Katz (see Katz 1996; 2000; 2001; Walker & Katz, 1995; Katz et al., 2002; Katz & Webb, 2004) has led research on this subject through analyzing both organizational and environmental factors in the establishment of police gang units. Several extensive studies of police organizations throughout the United States indicate one major finding. Police departments do not establish gang units as a rational response to the degree of gang crime faced. Rather, the research suggests police
create gang units “as a consequence of pressures placed on the police department from various powerful elements within the community and that, once created, the unit’s response was largely driven by its need to achieve and maintain organizational legitimacy” (Katz, 2001, p. 37).

Davis et al. (2004) conducted a study that attempts to understand the preparedness efforts of law enforcement agencies in a post-September 11 environment. The research assessed several dimensions of terrorism preparedness of law enforcement: the response experience, preparedness, support needs and risk perceptions. Davis et al. considered one aspect within the preparedness dimension as the organizational changes made to improve terrorism response capabilities. Specifically, the researchers asked law enforcement agencies if they had specialized units, sections, groups or individuals specifically assigned the responsibility of addressing terrorism for the department. They noted several findings. First, they found the majority of state law enforcement agencies and a quarter of local law enforcement surveyed reported having a specialized terrorism unit. Consequently, local law enforcement agencies in large counties were more likely to have established a specialized terrorism unit than agencies located in smaller counties. Second, a majority of state law enforcement agencies reported having a separate criminal intelligence unit, as compared to only a few local police agencies. Third, the responsibilities of these specialized units tended to be broader at the state level than the local level. A small number of local agencies’ specialized units participated in training other law enforcement personnel, investigating incidents or providing resources to other law enforcement agencies. However, the specialized units of state law enforcement agencies primarily performed these activities. Moreover, the terrorism units in large
counties tended to have broader responsibilities, such as analyzing and disseminating intelligence information, liaising with federal agencies and assisting with investigations. One last finding of note was that most specialized terrorism units of both state and local law enforcement agencies had participated in joint training exercises. State and local agencies without a specialized unit rarely performed such exercises. At the local level, a majority of specialized units have done joint training with other city or county agencies or departments. In addition, they have participated in joint training with state-level agencies or the FBI. Moreover, agencies cited the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force most often as the source of counterterrorism training for specialized units.

**Homeland Security Policing: A New Policing Paradigm?**

Much of the evidence for organizational and philosophical change in law enforcement agencies post-September 11 is anecdotal. However, several studies have made important findings that indicate a move toward a new model or style of policing. A number of features characterize the changed policing environment and signify an important shift in the policing paradigm. These include changes in the legal environment, a greater blending of once-distinctive policing and military functions, the development of hybridized security/police agencies, increased federal involvement in law enforcement and a move toward pre-emptive policing (McCulloc and Neveille, 2008). According to Pastor (2005, p. 4), “This new policing model will emphasize tactical methods, technology, and alternative service providers, such as security personnel” and will replace the current dominant strategy of community policing.

The events of September 11 thrust into the forefront of the political realm the importance of public safety and security. The 9/11 attacks gave birth to the concept of
“homeland security” (Oliver, 2004). In the following months, many police departments began to “gear up” for homeland security. They developed new policies, received new equipment, technology and scenario-based training, cooperated with federal, state and other local police agencies, shared information, participated in terrorism investigations and established new policing units to deal with counterterrorism issues. In addition, change occurred in functions and policing priorities, affecting the day-to-day operations of many local law enforcement agencies. Several factors significantly predicted whether an agency has taken meaningful steps towards terrorism preparedness. These include agency size (number of sworn officers), accreditation status (accredited or actively seeking accreditation), presence of a SWAT team, a focus on technology (as compared to an education or community-oriented policing focus) and the presence of funding (from state, federal or local levels) (Pelfrey, 2007).

Oliver (2006) remarks:

Whether they have adopted the concepts of Homeland Security by force (e.g. New York City, Arlington County (VA), Washington D.C., etc.), by local circumstances (e.g. San Francisco, Chicago, Houston, etc.), by lure of grant dollars (e.g. City of Pine Bluff Police Department, Arkansas; Town of Kittery Police Department, Maine; Casper Police Department, WY, etc.), by state directive, or simply by local government and citizen demand, police agencies are beginning to wrestle with what Homeland Security means to their particular agencies. (p. 19)

Oliver also notes that as the idea of a policing role in homeland security took shape, homeland security has become its own distinct policy.

According to Greene’s (2000) analysis of policing styles, four policing policies or models have dominated American policing to date: traditional policing, community policing, problem-oriented policing, and zero-tolerance policing. The traditional policing model focused primarily on crime control through law enforcement. Similar to Kelling
and Moore’s (1988) description of the reform era, Greene’s model states the police enforced criminal law after crimes occurred, making the police principally a reactive organization with a very narrow focus. The police also organized along military lines with a strict chain of command and distanced themselves from the community in which they served. They measured their success by the number of arrests made and the ability to control the crime rate. While there have been many “changes” in policing practices over the past decades, the traditional model still exists today and remains the primary model of policing for many organizations.

The community policing model, derived from innovations during the 1980s, focuses primarily on building community partnerships and preventing crime. Community policing is proactive, using not only criminal law, but also incorporating administrative and civil law, mediation and arbitration. Community policing aims to cooperate with other social service agencies. Not only does it address the problems of crime, it also addresses disorder, quality of life and fear of crime. Partnerships with numerous community groups allow for the identification of problems and coproduction of solutions to different problems that plague various areas and neighborhoods. Communication between the police and the community is vital for success. Thus, community demand and the needs of specific neighborhood police drive the outcomes of community policing.

Herman Goldstein (1979) originally put forth the concept of problem-oriented policing. This model parallels the focus of community policing – crime, disorder and fear of crime – while using a variety of means to address the problems. However, it differs from community policing in that police officers may engage in problem solving without community support or assistance. Under this model, the police assess a neighborhood,
identify specific problems, provide solutions for the problems and then evaluate the solution’s effectiveness. While problem-oriented policing is problem-centered, the process may not necessitate contact with citizens, community groups or engagement with other social service agencies. Therefore, the police officer’s ability to solve problems, reduce the impact of the problem or potentially to displace or disperse the problem from a concentrated area drives the measurement of success under problem-oriented policing.

Greene articulates the last model of policing as zero-tolerance policing. This model, derived during the 1990s, also focuses on crime and disorder problems, and uses proactive means as well as criminal, civil and administrative law. However, the execution of the model occurs by targeting a specific crime (such as prostitution) or disorder (such as graffiti) that occurs in a specific time and place. This happens by concentrating police resources on the specific problem. Thus, zero-tolerance policing has a very narrow focus and relates to the particular behavior or behaviors the police are trying to address. Like problem-oriented policing, involvement with the community or other social service agencies is limited or non-existent. The measurement of success for zero-tolerance policing is much like traditional policing. It emphasizes reduction in the number of arrests and in undesirable behaviors in a specific location.

Oliver (2006; 2007) describes the new policing role that has emerged in the new security environment as a fifth model of policing: the homeland security model. Under this model, the primary focus of policing incorporates the concepts of security and both antiterrorism and counterterrorism. “Recognizing and assessing the level of threat, incorporating security measures to prevent future terrorist acts, and developing methods of mitigating threats and responding to both threats and actual incidents have become part
of policing under homeland security” (2007, p. 52). Thus, policing under this model will be very proactive and will draw on criminal law for enforcement. The traditional methods of law enforcement and the focus on law and order remain important, as this type of activity can serve the function of security through arrests or intelligence gathering (such as for traffic violations or routine field stops).

The range of police activity will be very broad under the homeland security model. Oliver notes the new security measures will include threat assessments, risk analysis and antiterrorism practices for both mitigation and preparedness. The measures will also include counterterrorism and recovery practices in the event of an actual attack. They will focus on crime, disorder and fear of crime, especially when associated with terrorism. “Because of the concentration of many of these activities at the line officer level, discretion for these officers will have to remain high, but due to the nature of intelligence gathering and information dissemination, these officers will be held accountable by the police administration” (2007, p. 53).

Oliver believes that due to the nature of the threat, there will be a mixed police culture. While federal agencies (such as the Department of Homeland Security) or state agencies may create “police only” information, the police will also have to gather their own intelligence. The police may need to rely on traditional means or community partnerships to gather information from citizens. Thus, there will be a mixed range of community involvement, as some aspects of threat analysis may preclude citizen involvement while others may require citizen input. In contrast, homeland security impels police to cooperate with other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, to implement almost any type of security measure. These include agencies such as those
devoted to fire and code enforcement, medical and mental health, and public works, water treatment and transportation.

The organization of police departments under the homeland security model will incorporate a strong centralized command structure. However, the method of execution will be largely decentralized.

Because intelligence gathering and information sharing will be critical not only for the processing of information beyond the police agencies themselves, but also for quickly disseminating intelligence down to line officers, centralized control through active command operations centers that can link with these agencies, both vertically and horizontally, will be critical. (2007, p. 53)

Thus, the centralized operations command center becomes the means of organizational control with respect to processing and disseminating information. However, line officers will require flexibility and discretion in the implementation of centralized information and orders as well as in gathering and disseminating information through routine police procedures.

Measurements of success under the homeland security model will encompass the traditional methods of arrest, field stops and traffic enforcement. It will also be necessary to include the ability to gather, process and disseminate intelligence information. Furthermore, mitigation of security threats and preparation for the possibility of attack are essential. “Simply stated, preventing terrorism, mitigating the impact that a terrorist attack would have, and responding effectively to a terrorist attack are the key outcomes of policing for homeland security” (2007, p. 53).

Conclusion

In the wake of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush, while addressing the nation, declared that America and her allies were in a war on terrorism. Throughout
the aftermath of the tragic events, Bush continually referred to the terms “terrorism,” “terrorists,” an “evil enemy” and referred to the war “as a different kind of conflict with a different kind of enemy.” However, the president did not attempt to define specifically the concept of terrorism, which was an entirely new phenomenon to much of America. The only experiences of international terrorism America previously encountered were the failed bombing attempt of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Until September 11, terrorism against the United States and the American people occurred almost exclusively overseas. The events of 9/11 urged law enforcement to assist in the fight against an evil enemy, although it is unclear who this enemy is and what measures police should take to fight it. Thus, through significant changes to the structure and organization of federal law enforcement, the adoption of new policies and the identification of militant groups worldwide, the United States has been able to legitimize a war on terrorism. It is through this “rhetoric” or “metaphor” that local law enforcement agencies appear to define terrorism and the need for a counterterrorism agenda.

Current knowledge reveals little about the impetus for post-9/11 organizational change in local law enforcement agencies. However, there are no actual records of whether agencies “planned” implemented changes in response to a perceived threat or in reaction to external demands. Limited research suggests both agency size and receipt of funding by individual police agencies may be indicators. A more in-depth analysis needs to occur to understand the driving force behind police organizational change following a major event such as terrorism.
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Introduction

The previous two chapters provided an appreciation of the nature and extent of terrorism in the United States. They have also evaluated the potential impact the phenomenon of terrorism has had upon local policing agencies. The literature review has analyzed much discourse on the impacts on terrorism. A handful of studies have considered these impacts as part of a larger review of the issues local police agencies face in the changed security environment. While there is anecdotal evidence that change has occurred in various police organizations around the country, one question remains. Why do police organizations change?

There are three theories in the organizational literature that relate to structural and organizational change in policing agencies (such as Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003; Zhao, 1996). The first, contingency theory, considers the importance of external environmental stimulants to change. The second, institutional theory, reflects the broad influence of political and socioeconomic factors. The third, resource dependency theory, suggests organizations must obtain resources to survive and maintain legitimacy. Since this study focuses on changes in the organizational structure of local police agencies, contingency, institutional and resource dependency theories can help reveal why police organizations change. All three theories have roots in general systems theory, originally developed in the biological sciences in the 1920s and adopted in social systems in the 1950s (Bertalanffy, 1956). Before providing a detailed discussion of each theory, it is necessary to present first a brief overview of American policing structure and of the significant changes in policing philosophies over the last 100 years.
Structural Organization of American Police

The organizational structure of local police departments varies considerably across the United States. Formal structure depends on factors such as the style of policing involved, the size of the community and the police force, and the resources available, with these variables being interdependent. Police organizational structures may be small, single person departments where one person (usually called a chief, marshal or constable) performs all the police functions. However, local law enforcement agencies may include thousands of police personnel, departments and specialized units. While police agencies, both large and small, share some common characteristics, hierarchical differences exist within police departments (McCamey et al., 2003).

There are two distinct features of the organization of American police agencies. The first is the traditionally highly bureaucratic structure. As classical organizational theorist Max Weber described, bureaucracies maintain a pyramidal design with hierarchical levels. They establish authority through chain of command based on hierarchical position in the organization. Bureaucracies also institute policies and procedures to outline personnel duties and responsibilities within the organization. Within this design, there are two types of structures: tall and flat. Many hierarchical levels and a narrow span of control characterize a tall pyramidal structure. This allows for close supervision and control of employees and operations. Organizations maintaining tall structures coordinate activities through centralization. This means top organizational levels retain authority and decision-making. In addition, tall organizations typically have a greater degree of specialization with respect to the division of personnel labor or the number of activities or tasks each individual performs. “In other words, the fewer the
number of tasks performed, the greater the level of specialization; conversely, the greater number of tasks performed, the lower the level of specialization” (Roberg, Novak & Cordner, 2005, p. 116). In contrast, few hierarchical levels with wide spans of control characterize a flat pyramidal design. This allows for greater employee autonomy and less control of operations. Flat organizations tend to have a more decentralized structure, which delegates authority and decision-making to lower organizational levels. The movement of community policing represents police departments’ efforts to create a more flattened police structure (Roberg, Novak & Cordner, 2005; Gaines & Kappeler, 2003).

The second distinct feature of American policing is that agencies manage and organize themselves along classical military lines. The goal of this is to maintain control over individual officer behavior (Roberg & Kuykendall, 1997, p. 29). Theorists commonly call this feature the “paramilitary model” of policing. The structure seeks to improve efficiency of operations, provide fast response to emergencies, use retrospective criminal investigation to achieve organizational objectives, and ensure the fair and impartial enforcement of the law (Engelson, 1999, p. 64).

In addition to overall agency structure, many police organizations have adopted the paramilitary model in highly specialized units called police paramilitary units or PPU’s (Roberg, Crank & Kuykendall, 2000, p. 118). Special weapons and tactics (SWAT), special response teams (SRTs) and emergency response units (ERUs) are common examples of paramilitary units. Organizations rationalize these units on the rare need for police to address extreme criminal events such as hostage situations, sniper shootings or terrorist acts (Gaines & Kappeler, 2003). Engelson (1999, p. 64) comments that such police units have structures similar to military units because of the perception
they are waging a “war” against crime, as military units fight wars against foreign enemies.

**Eras of Policing**

In *The Evolving Strategy of Policing*, Kelling and Moore (1998) were the first to divide the history of policing into the three distinct eras of political, reform and community problem solving. The authors distinguish each era based on the perceived dominance of a particular policing strategy, which the political climate determines. They believe “there is a certain professional ethos that defines the standards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is more powerful, more widely shared, and better understood than others; and that this ethos changes over time” (p. 6). Kelling and Moore interpret the results of their study through a framework based on the concepts of “corporate strategy.” They describe police organizations in terms of seven interrelated categories:

1. The sources from which the police construct the legitimacy and continuing power to act on society
2. The definition of the police function or role in society
3. The organizational design of police departments
4. The relationships the police create with the external environment
5. The nature of police efforts to market or manage the demand for their services
6. The principle activities, programs and tactics on which police agencies rely to fulfill their mission or achieve operational success
7. The concrete measures the police use to define operational success or failure

*The Political Era*

The political era spanned from the 1830s to approximately 1920. During this time, local governments (usually political leaders) provided police authority and resources. Crime control served as the main function of the police. The police also maintained order and provided a broad array of social services. Police departments were highly
decentralized despite their paramilitary structures. In addition, cities geographically encompassed a number of precincts, and a precinct-level manager operated each precinct like a small-scale department. The police maintained a close and personal relationship to their environments. Police commanders often consulted with local political representatives about police priorities and officers continued to live in the areas they patrolled. Tactics and technology were primarily a function of foot patrol and rudimentary investigation. The ultimate outcome of the political era was political and citizen satisfaction, accompanied by social order.

_The Reform Era_

The reform era, also referred to as the _professional_ era, began in the 1920s and continued through the 1960s. During this period, reformers rejected local politics as the basis for police legitimacy. Instead, they established the law (especially criminal law) and police professionalism as the principal bases for police legitimacy. Crime control and criminal apprehension became the primary police functions. Police reformers also adopted the “classical” theory of organizational administration. Under the classical theory, police organizations became centralized and police work became professional, routine and standardized, especially patrol. Police channeled demand for services through central dispatching centers as they implemented 911 systems. Tactics and technology included preventative patrol and a rapid response to calls for service. The outcome of the reform era was effective crime control.

_The Community Problem-Solving Era_

The reform strategy continued as a predominant and successful policy until the late 1960s when problems arose. The 1960s came with an increase in the crime rate,
unstable social conditions and a citizen fear of crime. In response, the concept of community policing arose again, emphasizing community authorization for many police tasks. It also focused on law enforcement and professionalism. Under this model, the primary police functions centered on crime control, crime prevention and problem solving. The community policing strategy decentralized operational and tactical decision-making. Line officers had the ability and discretion to diagnose and respond to neighborhood and community problems. Thus, the analysis of underlying problems within the community drove the demand for police services. To accomplish the goal of solving community problems, police organizations revived old tactics and implemented new technology, such as foot patrol, crime control programs, educational programs and problem solving. Quality of life and citizen satisfaction were the primary outcomes of the community problem-solving era.

A Fourth Era of Policing?

Oliver (2006; 2007) contends that the police are entering a new “era,” namely the “era of homeland security.” Oliver builds upon Kelling and Moore’s (1988) framework to describe the authorization, function, organizational design, demand, tactics, technology and outcomes of this new era. In the homeland security era, national and international threats of terrorism (mainly the events of September 11) drive authorization for the police. In addition, citizen awareness has put terrorism in the forefront of local concern. Police function under homeland security primarily concentrates on crime control. Oliver argues that crime control, enforcement of criminal law and traffic law can expose many potential threats and enable police to gather intelligence. The organizational design of police departments in the era of homeland security entails a “pendulum swing” back to
centralized policing. It also requires a centralized decision-making process. However, the actual execution of the organizational design requires a decentralized approach. Since the organizational demand is centralized, so is the demand for the agency’s services. This means that the police agency will have a professional relationship with its environment. In addition, under homeland security, the community will be a crucial source of information and intelligence. Therefore, the nature of demand, function and organizational design will be professionally oriented. Tactics and technology form perhaps one of the most critical areas under homeland security. Police will need to incorporate functions such as risk assessments, intelligence gathering and processing and developing large-scale crisis response into their day-to-day operations.

Oliver maintains that the outcome of homeland security will continue to bear elements of previous eras, such as crime control, citizen satisfaction and quality of life. Specifically, the primary emphasis will be citizen safety and antiterrorism methods. While crime control will remain as a desired outcome, preventing future terrorist attacks is the new challenge to law enforcement in America. The following table details the changes to policing in all four eras (p. 45):

**Table 4: The Four Eras of Policing Based on Organizational Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENTS</th>
<th>POLITICAL ERA</th>
<th>REFORM ERA</th>
<th>COMMUNITY ERA</th>
<th>HOMELAND SECURITY ERA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorization</td>
<td>Politics and law</td>
<td>Law and professionalism</td>
<td>Community support (political), law, professionalism</td>
<td>National/ international threats (politics), law (intergovernmental), professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEMENTS</td>
<td>POLITICAL ERA</td>
<td>REFORM ERA</td>
<td>COMMUNITY ERA</td>
<td>HOMELAND SECURITY ERA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Broad social services</td>
<td>Crime control</td>
<td>Broad, provision of service</td>
<td>Crime control, antiterrorism/ counterterrorism, intelligence gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Design</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Centralized, classical</td>
<td>Decentralized, task forces, matrices</td>
<td>Centralized decision making, decentralized execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to Environment</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>Professionally remote</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Decentralized to precincts and politicians</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics and Technology</td>
<td>Foot patrol</td>
<td>Preventative patrol and rapid response to calls for service</td>
<td>Foot patrol, problem solving, etc.</td>
<td>Risk assessment, police operations centers, information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Citizen political satisfaction</td>
<td>Crime control</td>
<td>Quality of life and citizen satisfaction</td>
<td>Citizen safety, crime control, antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Police Organizations Explained**

*Contingency Theory*

According to Walker and Katz (2008), the “contingency theory has emerged as the dominant theoretical framework for understanding the structures and practices of police organizations” (p. 112). Scholars originally developed the contingency school of thought during the 1950s. This theory recognizes the importance of an organization’s environment in explaining and predicting organizational behavior. Under the contingency theory, an organization’s actions depend upon its unique environment. Contingency theorists assume organizations are rational entities, adopting organizational structures and
operational activities that are most effective and efficient in achieving specific goals (Walker & Katz, 2008). As such, the driving force of organizational change is the external environment, particularly the task environment an organization confronts (Thurman et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 2001). The patterns of innovation incidence and technology use are also external factors that affect an organization (Dewar & Hage, 1978; Mohrman & Mohrman, 1990).

Four propositions outline the theory behind the contingency perspective. The first proposition explains that the contingency approach involves three primary and fundamental factors: strategy, structure and environment. The first, strategy, embodies decision-making and operational procedures an organization employs to accomplish its goals. The second factor, structure, concerns arrangements an organization uses to coordinate operations such as reporting and supervision. Lastly, environment generally refers to all the factors outside the organization that affects its operation (Thurman et al., 2001, p. 99).

The idea that an organization’s external environment shapes its strategies and structures drives the second proposition. The environment constantly places new demands on the organization to which it must respond (Hage & Aiken, 1970). The third proposition states the environment itself is not static; organizational environments are dynamic and constantly changing (Thurman et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 2001). An organization must adapt itself to the external environment by making adjustments such as implementing innovative strategies and redesigning its structures (Thurman et al., 2001). The final proposition states that during the process of change, an organization strives to ensure there is a “fit” between an organization and its environment (Thurman et al., 2001;
Zhao et al., 2001). A good fit would include higher levels of performance and efficiency (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). It would also alter goals and operations over the course of time (Donaldson, 1995).

The framework for contingency theory involves a cyclical process. The following points present the framework for organizational change in its simplest form (Thurman et al., 2001, p. 100):

1. An initial fit exists between an organization and its environment.
2. Environmental change (e.g. due to technological changes) results in a misfit.
3. Such a misfit affects performance and forces the organization to make corresponding changes or adaptations, both in structure and operational strategies, or risk becoming irrelevant or obsolete.
4. A new fit occurs between an organization and its external environment.

According to Zhao et al. (2001), the contingency perspective is an appropriate theory to apply to the analysis of organizational change in police agencies. In the late 1960s and 1970s, traditional strategies of crime control developed under the professional model of policing became ineffective. The ineffectiveness of police strategies during this era suggested a poor fit between police organization structures and societal environments. Thus, for police agencies to become more effective, they would have to change their organizations. The authors also note many distinguished scholars have called for change in the operations of police agencies. Angell (1971) argued there was a need for American police agencies to adapt themselves to a changing environment (in response to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). Similarly, Goldstein (1977) stated the bureaucratic model of policing contradicted the basic values of American society. Literature from the 1980s such as “Broken Windows”
(Wilson & Kelling, 1982) further expressed the need for change. Such literature supported replacing the crime control function and making order maintenance top priority. Goldstein (1990) also echoed the development of new strategies to combat the underlying causes of crime rather than having police just respond to specific incidents of crime. Three primary propositions have emerged under the concept of order maintenance (now referred to as community policing) regarding organizational change in American policing (Zhao et al., 2001, p. 368):

1. Police agencies should respond to an environment that has changed dramatically with respect to its expectation about government in general, and police services in particular.

2. Organizational change in policing should lead to a reprioritization of police functions.

3. There needs to be a systematic linkage between a police agency’s operational activities and its manifest organizational priorities.

In sum, the contingency perspective helps explain the need for police organizations to adapt themselves to new demands and find a better fit within external environments. However, a key component is the reprioritization of police functions. Thus, the formal adoption of a policing model, such as community policing, should lead to visible activities directed toward social order and service provision, and away from the core functions of crime fighting (Wasserman & Moore, 1988). If organizations fail to make the appropriate adjustments to environmental contingencies, they will not prosper, and in some cases, will not survive (Walker and Katz, 2008).

**Institutional Theory**

Institutional theory also provides insight to how an organization’s external environment affects its structure. Under the institutional perspective, the forces of the external environment play a role in the organization’s development. These forces are the
rules and regulations of society such as laws and public opinion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Organizations are entrenched in a particular social and cultural context. Distinctive cultural and political elements influence organizational goals and structural arrangements. As a result, organizations cannot change easily (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983).

A central component of the institutional perspective is the concept of legitimacy. The term *legitimacy* refers to “the degree of cultural support for an organization—the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provides explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction” (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 201). However, rationalized organizational settings do not always give legitimacy. Organizations must work “hard” and act “appropriately” to gain legitimacy and sustain it over time (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Furthermore, if an organization does not provide a satisfactory legitimate account of itself, environmental sovereigns (such as local governments) may literally force legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Crank & Langworthy, 1992).

Crank (2003, p. 187-188) outlines three elements of institutionalized organizations: complexity, loose coupling and good faith. All three are interrelated phenomena. The first element, complexity, refers to how an organization, in its behavior and structure, reflects the values of its institutional environment. As such, an organization must understand and respond to the demands of the institutional environment. Institutional pressure placed upon organizations can have a significant impact on how they conduct their daily business. For example, police departments:

…are frequently under pressure, and may be under court order, to hire more minorities or to develop demographic representativeness in their organization. On the other hand, departments can be sued if they fail to
use rationalized hiring procedures, and many want to hire more educated officers. (p. 188)

Crank states institutionalized organizations loosely couple formal practices with actual behavior. Thus, they adhere to the external institutional demands and preserve positive relations with their constituents. There may be pressure on a local police agency to implement a particular policy within the department. Regardless of whether the agency supports the policy, it can maintain positive community relations by loosely coupling the formal position of the agency to the concrete day-to-day working world of its officers. For example, if the social climate is to arrest all lawbreakers, the police can adopt the policy. However, they may then loosely couple it to actual line officer behavior to maintain discretion at the patrol level. Crank notes the reverse may also occur. Loose coupling can work in the opposite manner by allowing officers to continue in highly aggressive police tactics even when there is external pressure to prevent such behavior.

The final element Crank discusses is the logic of good faith, where organizational members believe in the essential rightness of their actions. Good faith promotes a positive relationship between an organization and its institutional environment. However, it distorts organizational practices by impeding critical evaluation and supervision. With respect to police organizations, this belief can obstruct efforts to evaluate ongoing organizational practices critically. For example, police supervisors tend to accept the “rotten apple” theory of police deviance uncritically. They may rationalize corruption as the result of a few bad police officers who slipped through background screening.

Crank and Langworthy (1992) provide three examples highlighting the influence of the institutional environment on police organizations: police appearance, specialized law enforcement units and common police practices. First, police departments must
conform to the broad, institutionally derived community expectations about appropriate police appearance. These expectations include appropriate titles, uniforms, badges and insignia indicating rank, department and assignment. Each expectation ceremonially verifies that a police officer is a police officer. “Failure to conform to institutional expectations of appropriate police appearance may result in a loss of legitimacy” (p. 343). The second example centers around the idea of what the police should do, rather than what the police actually do. Since the public perceives the function of law enforcement as a legitimate police activity, police agencies typically justify their funding in terms of a need for greater law enforcement levels. As a result, police departments tend to increase the number and specialization of their crime-fighting units (or their functional complexity). But as Crank points out, this organizational complexity is ceremonial: “instead of evolving because additional specialization actually improves efficiency and effectiveness, the elaborate structure has developed in response to what a department should look like to sovereigns in its institutional environment (primarily the public and its elected representatives)” (p. 344). Therefore, urban police departments commonly have specialized crime units devoted to areas such as burglary, driving under the influence (DUI), auto theft, fraud, gangs, assault, homicide, robbery, juveniles, vice and narcotics. However, specialization is inconsistent with the actual tasks of a police department. “The elaborate organizational structure emphasizes law enforcement activities, reinforcing the police department’s institutional image as a ‘crime fighter,’ in spite of inconsistencies between that image and the actual work of the department” (p. 344). The last example focuses on technical procedures, specifically preventative patrol and rapid response. Both preventative patrol (a strategy introduced in the 1920s) and rapid response (911 systems,
which officially began in 1968) are crime prevention and law enforcement strategies
police agencies across the country have adopted. While both of these strategies are
widespread across the country, there is little evidence that supports their effectiveness in
either crime prevention or law enforcement. However, preventative patrol and rapid
response continue because each has extraordinary legitimacy with the public. Therefore,
the diffusion of these technical procedures in American municipal policing is more
consistent with institutional diffusion processes than with individual departmental
evaluations of their effectiveness in law enforcement or crime prevention. Failure to use
either strategy (which sovereigns view as important rituals) may bring a police
department under the scrutiny of important sovereigns such as the press, mayor or city
council, and risk delegitimizing (p. 344-346).

In conclusion, several aspects of the institutional perspective may assist in
understanding why change in police organizations occurs. Police departments operate
within an environment that social and political institutions control (such as the mayor,
city council, citizens, special interest groups or even other criminal justice agencies).
These institutions have the capacity to influence the policies and decisions of police
organizations. According to institutional theory, police organizations must receive their
legitimacy from these external institutions. Thus, police agencies must ensure they look
like what a police agency should look like, and act as a police agency should act. In other
words, police agencies need to “walk the walk” and “talk the talk” to maintain
legitimacy. To further this goal, police departments select particular goals, procedures,
strategies and tactics. They conform to broad, institutionally accepted norms. Important
symbols, such as insignia indicating rank, titles, uniforms and badges, all contribute to
the idea of legitimacy. Therefore, institutional theory “suggests that organizational change need not reprioritize core functions; it can, instead, initiate activities in highly visible environmental settings to enhance the external legitimacy of the organization and consciously buffer preexisting priorities” (Zhao et al., 2001, p. 369).

**Resource Dependency Theory**

Resource dependency theory, associated with institutional theory, represents a third perspective in understanding why police organizations change. This theory suggests organizations must obtain resources to survive. To obtain these resources, they must engage in exchanges with other organizations in their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1990). Resource dependency theorists argue that organizations need to alter their structures and/or operational strategies to ensure survival and flow of resources. In addition, organizations must be political in nature and adapt strategically to accommodate the interests and requirements of those with the capacity to provide those resources (Donaldson, 1995). As a consequence, “those in an organization’s environment that have the capacity to provide resources necessarily have indirect or direct power through resource exchanges” (Katz et al., 2002, p. 476).

A second aspect to this perspective is the idea that organizations are “active organisms” with the capacity to determine their own fates. While organizations may depend on outside resources, they have the ability to influence their environments to ensure a flow of resources. Organizations will actively scan their environments for opportunities that may provide access to valuable resources (Scott, 1992). Thus, at the core of resource dependency theory is the belief that organizations adopt structures and practices to meet resource needs rather than to increase their technical effectiveness.
Resource dependency theory has played a limited role in the efforts to understand the structures and operational activities of American police organizations (Katz et al., 2002). Only a handful of studies have used this perspective to understand organizational change in police agencies. One such study was Maguire et al.’s 1998 analysis of the diffusion of community policing. This study argued that one of the reasons so many police agencies implemented community-oriented policing was to obtain funding. The Department of Justice distributed $8.8 billion to facilitate adoption of community policing strategies in local agencies. Similarly, Katz et al. (2002) examined 285 police agencies across the United States. They found that even when controlling for gang-related crime amounts, departments that received external funding for gang-control functions were about 4.8 times more likely to have established a specialized gang unit. The researchers argued that departments might have created gang units due to the availability of resources for crime control efforts aimed at gangs versus an actual and growing gang problem in their jurisdictions.

**Conclusion: Data-Informed Research on Policing**

All three theories can explain the establishment of specialized terrorism units in policing and changes in local police agencies in general. Since this study is exploratory in nature, it will not seek to base assumptions on the little knowledge currently available regarding 9/11’s impact on local police agencies. Rather, the research will use the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory derives from data systematically gathered and analyzed. While this chapter discusses several theories regarding police organizations, the researcher did not conduct the study with a particular theory in mind. The aforementioned theories served as a guide for designing the research
and developing the research questions. This methodology allows a theory to emerge from the data – whether supporting an established theory or pointing to a new emergent theory. “Theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived from putting together a series of concepts based on experience or solely through speculation (how one thinks things ought to work)” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 12).

Because grounded theories derive from data, they are more “likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 12).

As Rubin & Rubin (2005) explain further,

Theories are sets of statements that bring together concepts and themes to explain how things happen or why they took place the way they did. A theory links concepts and themes into an overarching explanation that not only addresses the immediate research questions but also creates broader understandings about important societal issues. (p. 230)

Rubin & Rubin (p. 230-231) also describe how theories can vary in scope. In *case-focused theories*, the focus is on the matter just examined, such as why an organization behaved the way it did. A case-focused theory offers an explanation about what the researcher learned through the interviews. *Middle-level theory* focuses on how far the principles and processes discovered in the research might extend. Rubin and Rubin note that in order for research to extend to a middle-level theory, the research must examine other similar cases or contemplate what other published research has learned. Lastly, there are *grand theories*, which are the broadest in scope. They address a range of issues, with implications that extend to a variety of settings and across time. Researchers develop grand theories only after careful consideration of the results of a wide array of different studies. According to Rubin and Rubin, most qualitative interview work generates middle-level theory that builds on research findings. It then speaks to issues present in the
literature. This qualitative study seeks to confirm through responsive interviewing what
the literature reports about police organizational change in a post-September 11
environment. It also aims to add to the current body of knowledge. Hence, the researcher
is attempting to build mid-level theory to explain what, if any, organizational change has
occurred. If there is change, the researcher seeks to explain the nature, extent and reasons
for change.
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The previous chapters demonstrate there has been increased attention directed at national and state-level terrorism response in the U.S. What this dissertation will address is the paucity of existing research assessing the impact of terrorism on local law enforcement. The lack of research is disconcerting for several reasons. First, 9/11 has pushed the issue of terrorism to the forefront of everyday policing. It affects daily functions as the government asks police to adopt counterterrorism policies and strategies. Second, the expanded role and responsibilities of local police require an expanded set of police skills. Furthermore, many researchers consider terrorism as surfacing at the “street level.” Terrorists often commit precursor crimes to fund the operations to prepare their attacks, such as document fraud, forgery and illegal border crossings. Therefore, local law enforcement agencies frequently face the potential for encountering terrorists within their own communities.

In a 2006 evaluation of policing literature, Gibbs et al. found that a majority of the research relates to police strategies, especially community policing. Several topical trends have surfaced over the last three years, including:

1. The organization of the police
2. Attitudes and behavior of the police
3. Accountability and misconduct; police strategies
4. Citizen satisfaction

Gibbs et al. note that in recent years, theoretical discussions have declined and correlated survey research has increased. Of the policing literature reviewed (N=412), 5.1% mentioned organizational change, 0.7% discussed the militarization of the police and
2.7% the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, Gibbs et al. indicate there is a continuing lack of systematic outcome evaluations in police research.

Lum et al.’s (2006) evaluation study supports this claim, as they found that approximately four percent of articles written after the events of September 11 were studies that employed some type of empirical analysis on terrorism data or information. Specifically, of the peer-reviewed sources, less than one percent (0.6%) of the prior research used empirical methods to evaluate law enforcement responses (such as by airports and police) to terrorism. McGarrell (2007) furthers this argument, observing there is little empirical research that assesses the overall effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. Likewise, there is little research assessing specific strategies involving law enforcement organizations (p. 147).

Marks and Sun (2007) identify two research gaps in assessing the impacts of September 11 on the organizational development of local law enforcement agencies. First, while state and municipal counties share a large burden of law enforcement responsibilities, very little is known about how have they have changed after 9/11 (p. 160). Second, research produced after 9/11 focusing on the impacts of terrorism on organizational development in police agencies is largely theoretical. It depicts developments without drawing references to existing models or theories of planned change (p. 160; see also Pelfrey, 2007).

Studies of police organizational change conducted before 9/11 have also lacked empirical methods. According to Zhao (1996), studies on police organizational change have primarily been micro-level analyses employing the case-study method. Zhao comments that the case study approach is useful to understand the effectiveness of a
program such as Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in a limited number of police organizations. Qualitative designs are an effective means to study the behaviors of a few particular agencies. However, the case studies fail to give a broad depiction of organizational change in American policing (p. 41). Furthermore, Reiss (1992) states even the most recent studies of police organizational change cannot provide systematic and comprehensive information about such change (p. 41). Hence, generalization of previous study results involving single police organizations is not possible. This makes replication of these studies and comparisons to other police agencies (as to the extent and depth of organizational change) difficult at best. Despite this methodological limitation, there are only a few systematic accounts of even short-term changes in police organizations (Zhao, 1996, p. 41).

**Research Problem**

A review of policing literature both pre- and post-September 11 reveals the need for more systematic information across police agencies. This study aims to address this issue in methodology and provide insight into the organizational changes of American municipal policing after 9/11. Specifically, it seeks to identify four goals (detailed on page 2): STU implementation, other organizational change, reprioritization of basic functions and impetus for change.

**Research Goals**

As mentioned earlier, this study aims to understand police organizational change in a post-September 11 security environment. Since terrorism threats tend to be local, threat perception and actual experiences will vary by region and city in the United States. Hence, there are multiple realities with terrorism threats and experiences throughout the
country. Furthermore, this study seeks to explore such issues as what initiatives police agencies are taking, the manner in which they implement these initiatives, what purpose these activities serve and the meanings of terms, symbols and beliefs connected to activities and events. An interpretive paradigm can help achieve the ultimate goal of the research, which is to understand better the day-to-day experiences of police agencies in a post-9/11 world.

**Research Questions**

The following research questions address the extent to which American police agencies have moved to a homeland security model:

Research Question 1: Do local agencies perceive the threat of terrorism as a special problem?

a. Did police local police agencies increases personnel in order to accommodate a counterterrorism mission?

b. Have police departments established a specialized terrorism unit after the September 11 attacks?

c. What is the extent of implementation of specialized terrorism units?

d. What is the nature of the work of the specialized unit?

Research Question 2: Are local police agencies responding to the perceived threat of terrorism as a traditional crime?

a. If local police agencies have not established a specialized counterterrorism unit, have they implemented another strategy such as community policing, problem-oriented policing or intelligence-led policing?
b. Did the organizational change involve a single division or the entire police department?

Research Question 3: Have local police agencies reprioritized their investment areas and are these changes a result of a “perceived” or an “actual” threat?

a. In light of the terrorism threat, have local police organizations reprioritized their “investment areas” (such as focus on patrolling, drugs, vice, burglary or auto theft) in favor of counterterrorism initiatives?

b. Was the reprioritization in conjunction with or independent of organizational change?

c. Do agencies offer counterterrorism training in the police academy?

d. How do law enforcement agencies define terrorism?

e. What is law enforcement’s assessment of the threat to its jurisdiction or state?

f. What is typical of the response experience of law enforcement agencies?

Research Question 4: Are changes in local police organizations a result of “perceived” threat or is there pressure from external sources to implement counterterrorism measures?

a. Was the organizational change planned change, or was it in response to external demands?

b. Is there a relationship between resource allocation or reallocation and the decision to implement a specialized counterterrorism unit?
Research Design

Introduction

To identify organizational change commonalities or differences in policing, the study attempted to build a dataset using qualitative techniques. Specifically, interviews with key personnel in local police agencies aimed to achieve detailed knowledge. The questions sought to answer how local police respond to the continued threat of terrorism and the new threat environment. This study focused on municipal police departments as the units of analysis, relying on key informant interviews to generate the data.

This research consisted of an exploratory study of the impact of September 11, 2001, and terrorism in general. It investigated whether identifiable, tangible and “real” police organizational change is occurring as a majority of the policing literature indicates. The approach for this research followed the basic operations of asking questions and making comparisons (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Glaser and Strauss (1967) call this the comparative analysis approach. The process of asking questions allowed for a more meaningful understanding of the how and why organizational change occurred in local police organizations. The questions followed a pattern to link the research ideas. Thus, they demonstrate a progression of reasoning for organizational change within a police agency. The second operation of making comparisons provided an analytic tool. This considered the properties and dimensions of the various concepts the research revealed. The process of making comparisons illustrated similarities and differences among police agencies with respect to organizational change patterns.

The researcher selected the comparative analytical approach because it allows for broad exploratory research. This type of analysis compares different groups or subgroups
of people and builds their differences into theory. Considering the theory with other comparison groups tests and refines it. An analysis of the data ascertains patterns that can lead to general concepts about the data and behaviors. The researcher can build these concepts into broader theoretical propositions and then evaluate and test them with other comparison groups.

**Data Sourcing**

The research consisted of twenty-one in-depth telephone interviews with key personnel in police agencies. Questions focused on post-September 11 organizational change. The interview style this research adopted is that of responsive interviewing (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Responsive interviewing allowed rich descriptions to aid the creation of categories, properties and dimensions regarding organizational change issues. Thus, this interview method focuses on a deep understanding of the topic of study rather than breadth. “Responsive interviewers elicit from the conversational partners examples, narratives, histories, stories and explanations. Concrete illustrations help ground answers in the experiences of the interviewees in ways that provide nuances and precision, context, and evidence all at the same time” (p. 37). Semi-structured, open-ended interview questions (which included contingency questions) helped maintain consistency and focus throughout each individual interview. The semi-structured questions allowed for detailed answers, flexibility in responses and the ability to ask follow-up questions. In most cases, interviews felt more like conversations rather than question and answer sessions.

Open-ended questions are an appropriate medium for this type of research. There are a myriad of potential questions to ask regarding the impact of terrorism on local law
enforcement. However, the phone interview consisted of eleven open-ended questions. The researcher prepared questions to produce probes used to explore the words, phrases, paragraphs and themes within the interviews. Areas of probing included understanding of the concept of terrorism, experience with terrorism, use of intelligence and organizational change. The study kept the number of questions to a minimum so as not consume too much of the respondent’s time. This approach allowed for thoughtful answers to the questions. The phone interviews ranged from twenty to 100 minutes. The researcher provided the interview questions to the respondent in advance. This helped the respondent prepare for the interview and helped complete the interview in a timely manner. The researcher was also available to discuss any respondent questions or concerns about the telephone interview questions in advance.

The researcher obtained respondent permission to audio-record each interview using Internet technology that Cogi, Inc. provided. This allowed for the ease of taking notes and ensured the researcher missed no details in the conversation. The service also permitted the researcher to note additional questions that arose from respondent comments. It also made the interview more discussion-based. Upon completion of the telephone interviews, the researcher asked Cogi to transcribe the interview. The transcription process generally took 24 hours. When Cogi finished the transcription, the researcher downloaded each interview recording and transcript to her personal computer for review and analysis. All but two agencies who participated in the study agreed to the recording.
**Sampling**

The chosen strategy for the sampling method is one that most closely meets the purpose and goals of this research. The sample element for the study included a national, non-probability, purposive sample of local police agencies throughout the United States. Purposive sampling proved the best approach due to the small sample size (N=21). The process permitted the selection of information-rich cases. The researcher derived the sampling frame from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004*. As part of the census, the BJS lists the fifty largest police agencies in the United States. The historical nature of large police agencies sustained the selection of this sampling frame. Large agencies are more likely to demonstrate organizational change. In addition, the largest agencies typically serve America’s largest cities. The threat of terrorism is more likely to affect these cities. The researcher reviewed each agency website to see if it had a specialized terrorism unit or if the site mentioned terrorism anywhere (such as under Intelligence or Homeland Security). This narrowed the selection of agencies to those most appropriate to contact for an interview. The researcher recruited agencies whose websites indicated a special unit or division or discussed terrorism or homeland security.

In addition, the research used the snowball sampling method, commonly used in field observation studies or specialized interviewing (Maxfield & Babbie, 2009). Local police agencies (the target population) typically do not provide ready access to researchers unfamiliar to them. Therefore, the researcher found it important to try to obtain a reference from other officers or colleagues in the field. By using this method, the researcher was able network with these sources to gain access to some of the agencies.
included in the study. She also asked participating subjects to identify other agencies that might be willing to participate in the study.

Finally, the researcher selected police agencies not included in the BJS census that she believed the continued threat of terrorism would impact. For example, she selected an agency due to its proximity to a large metropolitan area and assumed such proximity would have a direct impact on the agency. The researcher selected another agency due to its high-profile tourist attractions year-round. The researcher implemented this methodology to enhance the list of police organizations sampled.

These three combined sampling methods generated a list of 36 local law enforcement agencies as potential research sites. An important note is that the research only included local municipal police agencies. The sample did not include special policing agencies such as campus police, park police, seaport and airport police, prosecutor's office investigation units or state police agencies. Of the 36 agencies, 21 participated in the research, seven declined participation and eight agencies did not respond or proved difficult to schedule. Some of these agencies did not respond to the investigator's initial inquiries. Others did not respond after acknowledging receipt of the participation request. The research generated a response (participation) rate of 58%, much higher than expected given the small number of agencies contacted.

Recruitment

The preliminary method to gain access to local police departments was an official recruitment package, sent by U.S. mail or by email whenever possible. The researcher addressed the package to the chiefs of local municipal police departments. The chiefs would need to provide permission for the research. They would also forward the name of
the appropriate person to complete the interview. In instances where a colleague or interviewee provided a contact, the investigator sent the recruitment package directly to the contact, referencing the colleague or interviewee’s referral. The recruitment package included the following documents:

- a formal letter of request which explained the nature of the research, the relevant person for the interview, approximate length of the interview and how the agency would benefit from participation (Appendix A);
- a PowerPoint presentation that summarized the research design (Appendix B);
- the Institutional Review Board forms for signature, which included an informed consent form and an addendum for permission to audio-record the interview (Appendix C); and
- a copy of the interview questions (Appendix D).

The researcher believed it was important to provide police agencies with the pertinent information necessary to make an informed decision regarding participating in the study.

Sixteen agencies contacted via mail or email responded to the recruitment efforts. After thirty days had passed, the researcher sent follow-up emails and made phone calls to those agencies receiving the recruitment package. In some instances, the researcher needed to make several follow-up emails or phone calls to obtain a response. Whenever possible, the researcher provided the names of police departments who had already participated in the study to gain the support and trust of other agencies. Follow-up was crucial to the success of obtaining twenty local police agencies to participate in the research. The table below represents the geographic regions represented by participating agencies:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>PARTICIPATING AGENCIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGION</strong></td>
<td><strong>DIVISION</strong></td>
<td><strong>STATES</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Texas</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>Idaho</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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<td>Utah</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>Arizona</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oregon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>California</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
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</table>

*Incentives*

The investigator offered no direct incentives in conjunction with research participation. However, she presented two key motivators during the recruitment phase. First, the investigator allowed the agency the option to remain completely anonymous for the purposes of the analysis and findings. The study would not use identifying information that could reveal an agency’s name, location, etc. If an agency chose to remain anonymous, the study would refer to the agency as one from a specific region of the country, such as the Southwest or Northeast. Second, the investigator expressed the intention to share the data with all participating agencies. This would allow for participating police departments to observe what other agencies are doing and potentially share ideas, procedures, etc. regarding counterterrorism issues.
Confidentiality

Participant confidentiality is of utmost concern in any type of interview. To preserve privacy and confidentiality, the research findings revealed no identifying information without the express permission of a participating agency. The only identifying information recorded during the interview was for the investigator’s reference. This information consisted of the respondent’s name, agency name and rank. In addition, whenever possible, the investigator requested basic demographic information regarding the individual agency. The agency’s size, structure and other area demographics may help to explain counterterrorism steps any agency has taken. The study also grouped local police agencies together into geographic regions within the United States. Such regional comparisons further preserved privacy and confidentiality.

The Internet service that recorded and transcribed the telephone interviews, Cogi, Inc., also provided assurances for privacy and confidentiality. The service only uses human assistance as necessary. This depends primarily on the combination of speech-to-text technology and advanced speech processing used to transcribe conversations. In addition, Cogi’s patent-pending process breaks all conversations into small anonymous segments to ensure privacy and maximize conversational confidentiality. For example, no transcription agent hears an entire conversation or even large, contiguous segments of a given conversation. Furthermore, Cogi subscribers access their conversations over the Internet via a secured connection, similar to accessing a personal bank account. All accounts are password-protected and only the subscriber can access all the recorded conversations. Only the subscriber can provide permission to another individual to access a conversation, and Cogi only grants access for that specific conversation.
**Data Collection**

Collection of the data began immediately after Institutional Review Board approval in April of 2009. As police departments agreed to participate, the researcher scheduled telephone interviews at each officer’s convenience. The investigator initiated the phone calls for the interviews via the Cogi service. Before each interview began, the investigator thanked the officer for his time and expressed gratitude for the agency’s interest and participation in the research. Next, the researcher provided an overview of the purpose of the interview, why the research was important and how the research could benefit law enforcement agencies. The interviewer asked participants if they had any last-minute questions or if they would like any further clarification regarding the research, the investigator’s intentions, etc. The investigator then explained that while there is an “order” to the interview questions, she wanted to keep the dialogue as open and as conversational as possible to make the interview more casual. If necessary, participants could jump ahead to later questions where they felt it was appropriate, or a skip a question they had answered in conjunction with another question. Lastly, the researcher reminded participants that each department’s identify would remain anonymous unless the participant gave permission to use his name or agency name. The investigator noted she would like to provide appropriate credit for quoted statements, acknowledging the person who made the statement whenever possible. However, participants had the option to determine whether the study could indicate their names and agencies. Sixty-seven percent of the participating agencies allowed for the study to reveal the police department’s information. A handful of participants asked to review any quotes the investigator considered using to ensure statements would not cause them to “get in
trouble with their superiors.” The investigator noted those agencies wishing to review the materials before final publication. Those that requested to remain anonymous explained that if the agency remained anonymous, they could be more forthcoming with the information they provided during the interview.

Twenty-one agencies participated in the study. Police departments represented cities across the United States. The participants were all males, with various police ranks ranging from sergeant to chief of police. The table below outlines the number of persons interviewed within each rank.

**Table 6: Participant Ranks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief of Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective Sergeant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Police Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researcher anticipated the telephone interviews would last approximately 45 minutes. The completed telephone interviews were as short as twenty-two minutes to as long as one hour and forty minutes. The researcher used the same interview questions for each interview. However, there was wide geographic variation and experience with terrorism among participants. Therefore, not every participant could answer each question with the
same depth and detail. In addition, the research did not equally probe each participant on all questions. In general, the researcher followed the interview questions in order. For the most part, participants had a clear understanding of each question. However, from time to time a participant asked for clarification. The researcher provided additional explanation until the respondent felt comfortable answering the question.

Throughout the interview, the investigator reiterated key points respondents made. She also provided her interpretation of the information to ensure clarity of meaning. Although Cogi recorded the telephone interviews, the interviewer also took notes during the conversation. This process allowed for the ease of reviewing transcripts and recalling significant words, themes and events that appeared during interviews. In addition, notes proved useful to recall follow-up questions that would arise while a respondent was speaking. The investigator silently noted the follow-up question(s) and when the respondent finished speaking, she immediately asked the question if appropriate. Otherwise, she asked the additional question(s) at the end of the interview. Furthermore, whenever necessary, the investigator prompted respondents to enhance their answers by providing additional information, examples, scenarios, etc. Follow-up questions and prompting methods proved useful to obtain more in-depth information, elaboration on sensitive issues and a greater degree of insight into policing in a post-September 11 world.

At the conclusion of each interview, the investigator asked each respondent if he had any additional information he would like to add, whether there were questions the investigator should consider asking that were not included in the interview, or if there were other issues he would like to see addressed in future research. The investigator
believed it was important to generate feedback from participants to improve the study in the future. She also felt it was important to provide each participant the opportunity to make an individual contribution to the research. The investigator also reminded the respondents she would share the results with each participating police department. All agencies expressed eagerness to see results and a few asked if there were early findings to share. Lastly, the investigator asked for the respondents’ permission to contact them in the future if she had any additional follow-up questions or needed further clarification regarding any of the information discussed during the interview.

Upon completion of the telephone interview, the call ended via the Cogi service, which disconnected both parties. The researcher made a request to have the entire length of the recorded call transcribed. Cogi made phone call recordings available immediately and conversation transcripts generally within twenty-four hours. Upon receipt of confirmation that the transcript was available, the investigator downloaded the audio recording and the transcript to her personal computer for analysis.

Data collection finished in December 2009. The researcher used the Cogi service only for the duration of the data collection period. To preserve confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, the researcher cancelled the Cogi subscription upon completion of the data collection. Upon cancellation of the service, Cogi deletes all recorded voice conversations and any related files such as transcripts associated with the account. The files remained, however, on the investigator’s personal computer for review and analysis.
Potential Risks

The Institutional Review Board of Rutgers University approved this research. Since the primary focus of the research was on organizations and not individuals, the research had a minimal anticipated harm to human subjects. However, the investigator took steps to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, as the participating agencies may consider information provided in the interviews as “sensitive.” First, the interviewer provided police agencies with the questions in advance for review. This gave them time to express any concerns over the questions or the research in general. Second, the agencies also received the consent form and addendum requesting permission to audio-record before the interview. Third, the investigator included full contact information in all correspondence. Thus, agencies could reach her easily at any time to answer questions or discuss concerns regarding the study. Overall, the participants were forthcoming and often spent more time than anticipated to complete the interviews.

Validity

Validity refers to the degree to which a study adequately reflects the meaning of the concept under consideration (Maxfield & Babbie, 2009). Kirk and Miller (1986) describe validity as “the degree to which the finding is interpreted in a correct way” (p. 20). The interview methodology increases the likelihood the researcher collected and interpreted the data with the subject’s intended meaning (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Specifically, this research method attains external validity. This refers to the extent to which the results of a study are transferrable (accounts accurately the meaning of the participant’s responses) but not necessarily generalizable (Campbell & Stanley, 1966).
The findings of this research may apply to large local police agencies in the United States, but one cannot generalize them to all local police agencies in the country.

**Data Analysis**

As previously noted, the overarching question this study sought to answer is whether local police agencies experienced organizational change following the events of September 11. To examine the nature and extent of organizational change, the researcher analyzed the qualitative data in two stages.

*First Stage of Analysis: Coding*

Rubin and Rubin (2005) present three models of coding. They refer to the first as responsive interview coding, where the researcher examines interviews and the literature. The goal is to determine themes and concepts to code, develop new concepts where appropriate and work out definitions of concepts prior to coding. The second approach that many qualitative interviewers prefer is the grounded theory approach. Under this model, concept and theme recognition and theory development form part of one integrated process. In addition, concepts and themes must emerge from the data without the use of literature (p. 222). Therefore, the researcher codes each passage of every interview as the research proceeds (known as open coding) versus developing a separate list of concepts and themes the researcher then applies to the interviews. Lastly, Rubin and Rubin discuss a “hybrid” model, which they describe as being partway between responsive interviewing and grounded theory. In this hybrid model, the researcher does not need to code for every passage or term. Rather, the researcher selects only those concepts and themes most closely related to the research questions. Rubin and Rubin
describe this hybrid model as very effective, since “the more focused your interviews, the more efficient the hybrid is” (p. 223). This research adopted the hybrid model for coding.

Rubin and Rubin (2005) go on to discuss the several and often overlapping stages of the analysis process. The first step in analysis consists of reviewing the interview transcripts for:

- concepts (words or terms that represents an idea important to the research problem),
- themes (summary statements and explanations of what is going on),
- events (occurrences that have taken place), and
- topical markers (names of places, people, organizations or numbers, such as dates).

As the researcher identified concepts and themes, she systematically examined each to clarify what the specific concept or theme meant. She also synthesized different versions of accounts to generate further understanding and provide elaboration of events. After clarifying and synthesizing the concepts and themes, the researcher coded them by designating a label. She systematically labeled concepts, themes, events and topical markers. These became the data units. This expedited the ready retrieval and examination of data across interviews. For example, every time an interviewee referred to a joint terrorism task force, the researcher marked the passage with the code JTTF. Lastly, the researcher sorted the data by grouping all data units with the same label into a single computer file. As Rubin and Rubin explain,

With this file, you then can look for how the concept was seen overall, and then examine it for nuances, that is, for the subtle differences in the way the concept was used, or you can explore what an event meant to different participants, or you can look for systematic similarities and differences between groups of interviewees on the same concept, theme or event. (p. 208)
To begin categorizing the data for this study, the researcher looked for concepts and themes contained within the interviews. Rubin and Rubin (2005) note several ways in which to accomplish this task, ranging from common sense to approaches that are more complex. The researcher selected several of these approaches. First, since the telephone interview questions encompassed specific terms and concepts, the researcher developed the initial coding list through the questions asked. Second, the researcher looked for concepts and themes interviewees specifically mentioned, both obvious and subtle. Third, she developed concepts and themes by comparing what different interviewees said on the same issues and using the comparison to suggest a code. Fourth, the researcher considered whether concepts and themes already identified suggested new, related concepts and themes. She grouped together labeled concepts to determine what they collectively implied. Lastly, the researcher considered figures of speech, slogans, metaphors and symbols contained within the interviews as indicators of central concepts and themes. As concepts and themes arose in individual interviews, the researcher searched for these ideas in the other interviews. This process continued throughout the analysis of the data to progressively define, refine and label the emerging concepts.

As the researcher identified concepts, she coded or labeled each within the interview text. She performed this process on all twenty-one interviews. After physically coding all the data, she sorted it by grouped categories. She examined each concept to see how the respondents expressed it overall, and to determine the differences in the use of the concept. Furthermore, she assessed the data to identify systematic similarities and differences between interviewees on the same concept. Straus and Corbin (1998) refer to this as conceptual ordering. In line with Rubin and Rubin, the researcher did not code for
everything included in the data. Rather, she identified and included only the most important items – those relevant to the research questions and those the published literature suggested.

In conjunction with coding, Bailey (2007) suggests qualitative researchers simultaneously engage in the process of memoing. In this process, the researcher writes memos to herself regarding insights derived from coding and reflecting on the data. “During the memoing stage, the researcher creates, defines and refines conceptual categories, makes tentative notes about links between concepts, and draws a sketch—often literally as well as metaphorically—of features important for understanding the setting” (p. 133). The researcher created memos during the process of open coding to generate initial thoughts and ideas regarding the data. She noted the memos within the body of the document after identifying and coding a significant concept. She modified the content of the memos if necessary as the analysis of the data progressed. In addition, the researcher also took notes and memos during the actual interview as a reminder of important ideas to review that surfaced during the interview.

Second Stage of Analysis: Analyzing the Coded Data

Once the researcher systematically coded the data, the next step entailed generating an understanding of what the coded data meant. As Rubin and Rubin outline (2005), this process involves summarizing concepts and themes, grouping information around particular events and sorting information by groups of interviewees. With items grouped together, the researcher sought to identify patterns and linkages between the concepts and themes. Finally, the researcher considered the data as a whole to determine the broader implications of the findings.
In summarizing the content, the researcher associated main points in the text with the coded category. She also sorted and ranked the data to generate additional ideas. Once the researcher generated preliminary ideas from examining the sorted files, she sorted the files a second time. The goal was to assess whether differences in background characteristics of the interviewees (such as by police rank or region of the country) highlighted the concepts and themes in distinct ways. The researcher then weighed and combined the data to assist in synthesizing different versions of the same event or to separate explanations of the same concept or theme. Weighing and combining the data allows for amalgamation of different events into a single descriptive narrative where applicable. Lastly, the researcher checked the integrated findings for accuracy and consistency by returning to the coded data to see if they matched the initial interpretations.

*Interpretation*

Interpretation is the process by which the researcher builds on and extends what she learned during analysis. According to Wolcott (1994), the purpose of interpretation is “to reach out for understanding or explanation beyond the limits of what can be explained with the degree of certainty usually associated with analysis” (pp. 10-11). During the interpretive stage, the researcher attempts to answer questions regarding the purpose and importance of the research. The researcher must draw inferences, use theory for insights, raise questions, make comparisons and provide personal reactions (Bailey, 2007). Interpretation, as Strauss and Corbin note (1998), comes from both objective and subjective domains. Interpretations of the data in this study come from two sources: the literature and the data or descriptions the subjects themselves provided. Quotes from
The process of theorizing involved extracting examples that best illustrate the concepts and themes in practice. Examples gave a more vivid description of the concept, theme or phenomenon. They provided evidence to supporting the research findings. Next, the researcher examined broader implications. These helped determine how the findings could modify, extend or create theoretical perspectives on police organizational change in a post-September 11 environment. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998),

Theory denotes a set of well-developed categories (e.g. themes, concepts) that are systematically interrelated through statements of relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some relevant social, psychological, educational, nursing, or other phenomenon. The statements of relationship explain who, what, when, where, why, how and with what consequences an event occurs. (p. 22)

Linking concepts and themes into an overarching explanation addressed the immediate research questions and provided a broader understanding of the issues of organizational change.

Rubin and Rubin (2005, pp. 230-231) discuss how theories developed through qualitative research differ in scope. At the most basic level, case-focused theories focus on the matter just examined. They may ask why an organization behaved the way it did. Case-focused theories explain interview findings and suggest broader theoretical implications. Mid-level theories ask how far the principles and processes discovered in the research might extend. To extend one’s research to a middle-level theory, the researcher would examine other similar cases or think about findings in light of other published research. Finally, grand theories develop after considerable reflection on the
results of a wide array of different studies. Thus, grand theories address a range of issues, with implications extending to many settings and across time. According to Rubin and Rubin, most qualitative interviewers generate mid-level theory. They build upon interview findings and speak to issues present in the literature. The researcher in this study attempted to determine whether there was enough evidence to build a new emergent, mid-level theory or whether the evidence supports an existing organizational change theory (contingency, institutional or resource dependency).

**Conclusion**

This study used a qualitative research methodology to achieve the goals of exploring and describing how the events of September 11 affected local police organizations. To accomplish this task, the researcher conducted twenty-one in-depth interviews with key personnel in local police agencies. The researcher adopted the hybrid model of coding to organize and interpret the findings. The hybrid model does not mandate coding for every passage or term. Rather, it specifies coding only those concepts and themes most closely related to the research questions. The actual interview questions incorporated concepts and themes from the research questions. Thus, initial coding of the data began by looking at the explicit terms and concepts in the questions asked. In addition, the researcher identified concepts and themes the interviewees raised and those that emerged from comparing the interviews. She analyzed concepts and themes to suggest new ones and considered metaphors, symbols and figures of speech. Furthermore, the researcher examined concepts to see how respondents expressed them overall and to determine the differences in concept usage. When new insights emerged, the researcher expanded existing themes and concepts or established a new label or
category. Lastly, the researcher grouped together items to identify patterns and links between the concepts and themes. She considered these patterns and links as a whole to determine the broader implications of the findings.
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

Introduction

The previous chapter outlined four research questions that revealed a number of findings. The questions also addressed specific issues about how local law enforcement agencies have responded to the continued threat of terrorism.

Research Question 1: Do local agencies perceive the threat of terrorism as a special problem?

To explore whether local law enforcement agencies considered terrorism a special issue, the researcher asked several related questions of interviewees. This study also considered the issue of personnel increases to support a counterterrorism mission. If agencies have shifted focus toward a counterterrorism mandate, they would need to increase personnel levels, both sworn and civilian. As focus on a counterterrorism mission strengthened and supported, the department would reflect more organizational change. The researcher questioned agencies whether they increased the number of personnel assigned to emergency planning and response for terrorism-related events. The researcher queried agencies further to ascertain whether the departments had implemented a specialized terrorism unit after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Whenever possible, respondents provided a description of the function and purpose of the unit.

Personnel Increases

All agencies required an increase in personnel to support counterterrorism efforts. The interviews revealed that departments created many new positions in concert with adding a specialized terrorism unit or committing personnel to a joint terrorism task force (JTTF). Initially, many positions were administrative in nature and encompassed an
intelligence function. As units grew and expanded, an operational role developed. Remarkably, the growth in personnel did not entail the hiring of new officers. Rather, departments shifted employees from various agency units over time using their own resources. Respondents generally could not comment on the number of personnel shifted. The personnel transferred were primarily commissioned, seasoned officers from existing intelligence units. Several agencies noted they needed to reorganize some units to shift personnel to focus on counterterrorism. If an agency hired new personnel, the employment corresponded with a departmental “growth spurt.” New hires typically were new police recruits and not persons specifically assigned to counterterrorism efforts. Only Agencies 1 and 4 in the Pacific region, Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic and Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region remarked on hiring of outside personnel in the form of crime analysts. Agency 1 in the Mountain region illustrated the largest use of civilian employees. Civilians encompass approximately half of its emergency management section, which includes planning and organizing tabletop exercises. Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region commented that the department employed 80 civilians. However, the major did not provide details on the types of positions civilians held.

Two agencies on opposite coasts experienced the largest personnel increases. Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region estimated it needed 1,000 people between the two newly created bureaus. Agency 1 in the Pacific region reported it currently has approximately 280 personnel dedicated to counterterrorism:

Well, we have an antiterrorism division that I think was 30, 40 people maybe. Its current level is at 266 strictly dedicated to counterterrorism. We’re the nth [omitted] largest. It’s actually probably more like 280 when you count admin personnel, but it’s the nth [omitted] largest after New York.
The captain from Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region described a more “holistic” approach. While the agency did shift personnel, the department also provided more training for the line officer:

I would say our approach was more holistic in that we provided more training for the beat officer, recognizing that they were the ones that were going to possibly encounter and be the front line, and that included medic and fire. And we gave them more knowledge on what to look for when they go out to a scene and things that they should be aware of and recognize even if it’s a routine medical call. “Hmm, this looks suspicious and perhaps I should report this.” So we’ve always had people embedded with the federal agencies and we didn’t ramp that up, although we just crafted differently and we expect more of everybody instead of dedicating a select few with that knowledge.

Additionally, the major for Agency 3 in the South Atlantic region specifically mentioned committing personnel to the area JTTF as part of the increase in personnel. He also explained his department increased first responder training:

I think there was a great emphasis on it and we did commit personnel to the JTTF, and we did increase our first responder level training and just raised a greater level or awareness to it. Did we change programs? Not really: we always were very intimately involved with emergency management and we consider terrorism a function almost of emergency management as well as public safety.

Only two departments, Agency 1 in the Pacific region and 2 in the Mountain region, commented on hiring additional personnel in the form of new recruits. The respondents explained their departments were undergoing “growth spurts” during a time of restructuring. Hence, the addition of personnel did not directly correspond with a counterterrorism mandate. The sergeant for Agency 2 in the Mountain region noted:

Yes. We actually have a host of staff unit nowadays that does planning. That’s their sole job. But we had at that time we had an expansion of the entire police department. They had passed a bond out here and we added 500 police officers. [City name omitted] was just growing exponentially, you know. Really, up to recently, it’s kind of slowed down a little bit but, I mean, this place is just growing and we just needed the additional staff just
to keep up with day-to-day operations, and part of that was used for planning.

Implementation of a Specialized Terrorism Unit (STU)

The majority of agencies participating in this study (13 out of 21) reported implementing a specialized terrorism unit after September 11. Twelve of the 13 agencies indicating this type of organizational change are on the designated list of the 50 largest police departments in the United States. The name of these units varied, with most agencies incorporating the words “homeland security” into the official title. The table below depicts the range of names given to these units.

Table 7: Names of Specialized Terrorism Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Bureau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security Bureau</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security Division</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security Section</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security Unit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Homeland Security</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the shaded cells indicate, nine agencies underwent extensive transformation, creating dedicated, standalone offices, divisions or bureaus related to counterterrorism. One agency included a dedicated section to homeland security within an existing unit. Only three agencies created actual “units.” In these three cases, another section within the department housed the unit. The date of implementation ranged from within one year of September 11 to five years later.

There was also wide variation in the personnel numbers dedicated to these units, from as few as three to over one thousand. Sworn, commissioned officers comprised the specialized terrorism units. Police agencies rarely employed civilian personnel. Based on
the interviews, all STUs are full-time units, operating “24/7.” The primary mission reported was counterterrorism related, although several agencies spoke of a “shared focus” on intelligence with gangs, drugs, homicide, etc. The functions of the units varied from intelligence gathering to deployable units. However, the majority of agencies did not retain deployable units. The units primarily provided counterterrorism training for the department. In nearly all cases, funding for the units was the result of shifting funds within the department.

Three agencies in different areas of the country detailed the extent of organizational change within their agencies. For example, the captain from Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region stated no specialized terrorism unit existed in his department before September 11, despite the city’s incomparable experience with terrorism. He described two bureaus created after the 9/11 attacks. First is the Counterterrorism Bureau. The majority of support for the Counterterrorism Bureau comes from the Counterterrorism Division, which comprises multiple subunits:

- The Technology and Construction Section designs and implements large scale counterterrorism projects.

- The Training Section develops and delivers counterterrorism awareness training (such as how to conduct investigations and vehicle searches) to the patrol force, to other law enforcement agencies and to private sector entities.

- The Threat Reduction Infrastructure Protection Section (TRIPS) identifies critical infrastructure sites throughout the city and develops protective strategies for these sites.

- The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Section researches and tests emerging technologies used to detect and combat chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons and develops plans and policies for their use.

- The Maritime Team is responsible for researching and developing systems and programs to increase harbor security.
• The [city name omitted] Shield Unit manages the department’s public-private security partnership, providing training and open source information to the private sector to structure security posture accordingly.

• The Emergency Preparedness and Exercise Section is the department’s interface with the [city name omitted] Office of Emergency Management.

Another division includes the city’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. The captain noted prior to 9/11, the department had assigned only a small number of officers to the JTTF. Currently, there are over 100 officers assigned to the JTTF, the largest number in the country. The city’s Security Initiative is a networked surveillance project designed to detect threats and perform pre-operational terrorist surveillance south of [street name omitted] Street in [neighborhood name omitted]. It serves as another division within the Bureau. The final division, consisting of the Terrorism Threat Analysis Group (TTAG), performs strategic intelligence analysis. It disseminates this information, both open-source and classified, to the appropriate recipients in the department, the private sector, the U.S. intelligence community and other law enforcement agencies. The captain also stated the second bureau’s name was the Intelligence Bureau. However, he did not elaborate or provide specific information describe the function of the bureau.

Agency 1 in the Mountain region also illustrated extensive organizational change. The lieutenant from this agency explained how his department created a homeland security bureau:

Within that bureau, we have the counterterrorism section… We probably have about… 20 commissions… working within that arena and we also have about six intelligence analysts… assigned. In addition to that, most of this stuff is housed at the fusion center here. I think it’s All Crimes All Hazards Regional Multi-agency Organizational Response… Specifically, some of those things existed prior to 9/11, just not in the same way I guess is the best way to say it. So they came together and created this Homeland Security Bureau.... That’s how much importance we put on it.
Agency 1 in the Pacific region also established a homeland security bureau. The lieutenant for the department noted his agency did have an antiterrorism division before September 11. However, within a year of the September 11 attacks, his agency created the bureau. The lieutenant continued to describe the organization of the bureau:

Well, we have two divisions. One is the emergency services division which incorporates the bomb squad, hazmat, bomb K-9 and physical security response surround team. Then we have major crimes, which focuses on the investigative and the intelligence and surveillance aspect… Major crimes are still the intelligence and investigation, that’s surveillance… EMT, they primarily respond to calls to bomb threats for the bomb unit and hazmat, same thing. So they do a hazmat and the bomb squad, all sorts, just ended up in investigations with their expertise and the K-9, bomb K-9 unit station is at the airport and for works in airport police and airport TSA. And they fall under these services. And then our surveillance unit surveys critical infrastructure that you know, might possibly have a threat or be under threat.

Mission

In general, specialized terrorism units did not have missions independent of the department. The interviews revealed STUs either followed the department’s mission or added a counterterrorism component to the existing mission. In these agencies, the STU had the additional focus on terrorism and criminal intelligence initiatives. Agency 1 in the Northeast region explained, “We do have a mission statement within the division of police. It’s all-encompassing for all areas of the division, so there is no specific mission for homeland security.” Two agencies added to the description of the mission as an “all hazards approach” or as a “unified command approach.” An exception was Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region, where the captain stated the mission of both bureaus was strictly counterterrorism related.

The study also found STU missions have changed or evolved over the years. For example, Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region described the mission development for
its homeland security unit as taking it “one step at a time.” At the inception of unit, the underlying mission was to “stop the next 9/11.” The unit still does not have an adopted mission statement, as it is constantly changing in response to what’s going on in the world:

We use our… liaison officers in London and in Australia, frankly all over the world. Right after the 2007 subway attacks… in London, we reached out to them [and asked], “hey what do you have, because of the subway system we have here in [city name omitted].” Within half an hour, they gave us information that came from directly from their detective in London so you know we have a great relationship in dealing with that type of stuff. So as a mission, as a mission statement, it’s ongoing. It’s constantly changing. You know it evolves based on the threats and what’s going on worldwide.

For Agency 2 in the East North Central region, the mission derived from those first started in its office of homeland security. The officer noted that when the office formed, the administration had a community policing perspective. However, about four years ago, there was a change in middle management. This resulted in several new missions for the office:

His vision really was to create subject matter experts and kind of take it from there and see how the mission evolved. What ended up happening is we have a lot of different missions as far as the intel analysis and the infrastructure protection and the threat assessments and the antiterrorism.

The mission also retained administrative components as well. For example, Agency 1 in the East South Central region described the mission as primarily administrative in nature:

As for the mission, I could probably find it actually our description online, but the primary responsibility of the of the homeland security unit is primarily more administrative in nature I guess than anything else… But anyway, we’ve got everything from scene responsibilities, initial response, notification, dissemination of information, information reporting, things of that nature.
Agency 5 in the South Atlantic region also commented on the administrative component of the agency’s mission. The department’s master police officer described the homeland security unit’s mission primarily keeping in compliance with the DHS:

> Our mission is to monitor the NIMS compliance, the national incidence management system, through DHS. Also, the ICS, coordination of all major incidents, makes sure that we’re properly doing stuff. You know, playing nice with everybody. And under the operations portion, I along with the intelligence unit, we do a lot of the vulnerability. Well, I do all of the physical vulnerability and threat assessments, target analysis of major sites or any of the critical infrastructure within the city.

**Function**

The function of STUs ranged widely from planning and prevention, intelligence, training to response (in agencies that had deployable units). In general, the function corresponded with the STU or department mission. Two consistencies in function emerged from the interviews – the gathering of intelligence and training department personnel – as primary functions. Additionally, several respondents commented on ensuring compliance with DHS standards as part of the STU’s function.

**Table 8: Special Terrorism Unit Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training, Deployable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Intel, Training, Infrastructure, Assessments, Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training, Watch Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 5</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>FUNCTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training, Deployable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Intel, Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Intel, Training, Monitoring Trends, Regionalism, Deployable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agency 2 in the East North Central exemplifies the variety of functions an STU serves. The officer also discussed the close link between the Office of Homeland Security’s mission and the unit’s functions:

I talked about intel analysis. We talked about training. We talked about infrastructure protection. The waterways and the airspace is part of our mission. Antiterrorism obviously, emergency preparedness, a lot, hazmat stuff and any kind of inter-agency liaison we have, that’s part of our mission as well. As far as dealing with outside agencies and even different agencies from the city of [city name omitted], like the fire department and the water department for example, from an emergency preparedness standpoint, those folks, we work with them.

The sergeant from Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region described that one of the main functions of its homeland security unit is to maintain the watch center. This deals with all types of investigations, including terrorism:

Actually… one of the main units too is our watch center which is a 24/7 analysis center or fusion center. So now, we’re dealing with terrorism aspects of it. But you know it also deals with all types of investigations anywhere from homicides to drug enforcement. You know basically anything that’s going on in the city, they’ll reach out to us because we have all the databases and the contacts. So all our analyses have access to a majority of the federal databases. So even homicide detectives trying to track a guy down, they’ll come through us because we can get into the databases and maybe find another address or that they can turn up looking for a possible suspect. We know we’re terrorism, but we’re also spending a little bit on general investigations too which is good, you know, keeps us kind of like in the loop of everything.

The assistant chief from Agency 4 in the Pacific region pointed out that its homeland security bureau has two main functions. He also noted two additional priorities
to illustrate further the array of purposes the bureau serves. He outlined these functions in detail:

The primary function of it is, or the number one priority is information collection and analysis... The second would be training and policy development. So our biggest focus is on what we would say is the prevention piece, which is information collection, analysis and dissemination... A third priority for this group is monitoring trends, tactics and developing response capacities... The fourth, but it’s interconnected, is regionalism. Ninety-five percent of the threat and risk in our region is in our city itself but the police resources and the response resources are spread throughout the tri-county region. And so it’s kind of an interwoven piece.

Most STUs do not retain nor are deployable (tactical) units. In most cases, another unit such as SWAT or the bomb squad would respond. Agency 2 in the Mountain region explained this:

We don’t separate the tactics out there. You wouldn’t use different tactical units in a case of a terrorist as opposed to domestic violence or homicide suspect. So there’s probably no reason to replicate efforts, for lack of a better term. You just wouldn’t use different tactics. So, my point is our SWAT team is our SWAT team for terrorism and day-to-day operations.

STUs commonly conduct assessments and provide command in a situation. Agency 2 in the East North Central region represented the typical response, stating that its office of homeland security does deploy officers, depending on what the incident is:

Oh, absolutely, and, it’s just a question of what exactly we’re doing. We are deployed, but as far as grabbing machine guns and kicking down doors, that’s not really our primary function but [laugh], but no, we’re deployed mostly as support and advisory subject matter experts, sitting in the command post telling the people who have rank what they probably should be doing.

Agencies deploy STUs (if they are deployable) on a case-by-case basis. However, Agency 4 in the Pacific region and Agency 1 in the Mountain region both routinely deploy officers. The lieutenant for Agency 1’s homeland security bureau stated he deploys officers every day. However, this is not necessarily in response to a specific
incident. The lieutenant considers deployment as being proactive in information and intelligence gathering. He refers to this as “policing with a purpose” – traditional detective work:

Deployment in the sense that we have intelligence that’s provided to us about a variety of different things, and the only way to gather that intelligence, to collect that intelligence, is to get your butt out there in the street and interact with people, conduct surveillances, you know, the traditional type of detective work that they’re doing.

Agency 4 in the Pacific region added:

We deploy routinely. We deploy our criminal information section (and that’s a monitoring group, a technology group) to use video and other things to see what’s happening. They use a, I’ll just say a variety of technologies. The SWAT unit is deployed, the arson bomb unit is routinely deployed but the main body of response that’s in the homeland security section would, you’re right, be the SWAT and our marine unit. We have a 28-person marine unit. The SWAT unit has a mixed mission. So they’re deployed every day but deployed related to terrorism investigations. That’s really as needed, an as-needed response.

Training appears to happen on a fairly regular basis, from once a year to several times a year. Training occurs within the STU and through participation in local JTTF-sponsored training exercises. STUs also conducted training for the department, often in conjunction with the city’s emergency management office. The sergeant for Agency 2 in the Mountain region added that his agency also conducts exercises with private companies such as Discover and American Express. However, a majority of the day-to-day work is in the form of meetings, in which the agency discusses situations at length. Agency 1 in the East South Central region explained how its homeland security unit conducts a “tremendous” amount of liaison work:

I do a tremendous amount of liaison work, everything from my seat on the governance board for the state fusion center to representing the department on the crisis group, unless there’s something really important in which case I get a major or colonel to show up. I go to everything from that to
some of the private industry groups that meet on a monthly basis to
discuss emergency response and things like that.

Similarly, the major from Agency 2 in the East South Central region commented
on the amount of time its office of homeland security spends on coordination efforts. He
also remarked on the importance of these meetings and different agencies working
together:

They coordinate. In fact, sometimes I do them for all of the law
enforcement agencies in [city name omitted]. I may go to a meeting, a
planning meeting and I listen to their scenario and I determine how many
cities it might involve or what units might be involved, and I notify all of
those people and let them know, this will benefit you.

Respondents cited one of the primary reasons for training is that the line officer
will be the first to respond. Hence, it is important to ensure these officers understand how
to handle situations, the chain of command, etc. The sergeant for Agency 1 in the South
Atlantic region provided an example of a training exercise referred to as a “red envelope”
exercise. This exercise involved the entire department and the city itself:

We would actually hand them a red envelope and it could be whatever the
situation is. It’s real time. We found out this was very beneficial because if
you go to a district and say, “hey, tomorrow we’re coming to your district
and we’re going to have a terrorism drill.” The district commanders are
like, “well you know what, I’m going to bring in all my operations units.
I’m going to bring in everybody there,” which is really not realistic. So
that way, he could handle it. So we found out that we’d show up at these
unannounced. Right after 9/11 all the training was for specialized units,
for your terrorism units, for your SWAT units, that type of thing. But the
rank and file, the actual officer on the street really wasn’t getting on
training. So we gear our red envelopes toward those people because
they’re the ones that really need the training, SWAT’s going to get their
training and I’m going get my training just as the course of the unit I’m in.
However, our patrol officers on the street have very limited training. So
any time we can come in with a red envelope and give them a real type of
an event as best we can, I think we all gain out of it.

The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Mountain region expressed concern about
training. He commented that training has been difficult for his agency, because the
majority of training for law enforcement comes from those who have been in Afghanistan and Iraq. The training that results from this is more informational, such as the location of Taliban members. The lieutenant feels officers need training in how to talk with members of the community about the process of radicalization:

I would say as far as the training, we do a lot of field exercises with source development and surveillance and approaches. And if we just had guys that were really good at talking to people, that’s really the nuts and bolts of what it is that we’re trying to do. So, I know that’s sort of a roundabout answer to your question, but the joint terrorism task force also operates on a fairly regular basis. So we interact with them daily, but I don’t know that we have any scheduled training there.

The findings also revealed that funding for the STU’s development and implementation was largely internal. Typically, agencies absorbed the cost of the day-to-day operations and personnel within existing budgets. For example, Agency 4 in the Pacific region stated, “Most of these were already funded positions that we simply moved to a different mission.” Only a few agencies received additional funds from the city or county. Agencies also reported grant money, primarily UASI funding, provides additional support for the STU. The Department of Homeland Security funds UASI to help enhance local government abilities to prepare for and respond to threats or incidents of terrorism. It chose participating cities by applying a formula based on a combination of factors, including population density, critical infrastructure and threat/vulnerability assessment. UASI’s mission is to reduce area vulnerability and prevent terrorism and weapons of mass destruction incidents. According to the interviews, UASI funds assisted agencies in obtaining equipment and personnel in the form of analysts. As the captain for Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region explains:

Our primary funding source has been UASI. The Urban Areas Security Initiative enabled the support of alert, which has provided all our vehicles. It’s provided gas masks and PPE outer garments for all the officers in
[county name omitted] County. It’s provided command posts, it’s provided ongoing funding for some aviation upgrades, SWAT equipment, tier-two type bomb squad [equipment]. So we’ve got duplicate equipment to be able to respond to multiple events and robots and all that kind of equipment. It’s also enabled the fire department to have all the gadgets and toys and trucks and everything that they paint red [laugh]. Now that they’ve got them, and certainly the hazmat crew has, [so it] has been a benefit to that. Medic has been a recipient of more training and more equipment. So the UASI area has been a distribution. They received the funding or some funding goes to the state. And the state divides that out based on a formula, and we’ve been doing very well with that.

One component of UASI funds goes to implement buffer zone protection plans.

The major from Agency 2 in the East South Central region explained the purpose of buffer zone protection plans:

Buffer zones are facilities that are considered critical infrastructure and they’d been identified by the federal Office of Homeland Security. And some of them are in the chemical industry, some are in the railroad industry, and most importantly, our bridges that span the Mississippi river, as [city name omitted] is the distribution gateway of America. Transportation, distribution and all of your manufacturers that have buffer zones, which means when we look at a buffer zone, we basically consider everything from the front porch of the company out.

The captain from Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region described his department’s efforts in buffer zone protection. He specifically spoke of pictometry projects, in which a specialist creates a virtual tour of infrastructures:

It’s essentially, what he’s doing is taking visual tours of all of the, and he’ll kick me for saying “tours” but it’s all of the infrastructure and support areas we have in community water systems, electrical systems. We also have two nuclear power plants within 30 miles of each other. One is in our jurisdiction, the other one’s just over the state line and we of course have a lot of information on those. That brings in special ops because obviously we’re going be first responders for that… We have natural water systems that we do acknowledge and protect with dams. So we do tabletop exercises and things like that to either mitigate and… ensure that we don’t have a loss there or some issue come up with all that. So yes, we’ve identified deficiencies and we’ve taken a lot more steps and made more lines in protecting those areas.
Summary

Based on the research findings, local police agencies consider terrorism as a special problem. First, the interviews revealed that agencies have increased the number of personnel to accommodate a counterterrorism mandate. Agencies increased personnel primarily in response to the formation of a specialized terrorism unit. The creation of these units resulted in the creation of many new positions across departments. However, agencies did not hire additional officers to fill these positions. Rather, agencies shifted, promoted or reorganized commissioned officers from existing units. If an agency hired additional officers, it was at the line level, corresponding with a departmental growth spurt. Furthermore, agencies did not typically hire civilians for these positions, with the exception of analyst roles.

Second, the majority of agencies (13 out of 21) included in the study implemented full-time specialized terrorism units. Ten of the thirteen agencies underwent extensive organizational change, creating standalone units in the form of an office, division or bureau. The other three agencies formed smaller units dedicated to counterterrorism efforts. The number of personnel assigned to the STUs ranged from a handful to over 1,000. The primary function of the units varied, from administrative to fully deployable units. The most common functions included intelligence gathering and training department personnel. All agencies participated in antiterrorism training exercises on a regular basis. Agencies primarily supported the STU with departmental funds. Very few agencies received assistance from local, county or state governments.

The remaining research questions seek to support further whether local police agencies consider terrorism a special problem. Implementing a specialized terrorism unit
is the most direct method. It also requires the most organizational change. However, the researcher recognized that not all departments would be able to undergo such extensive organizational change. Yet this does not mean that these agencies are not shifting focus toward counterterrorism initiatives. Research questions 2 and 3 attempt to understand how departments tackle the issue of terrorism without the assistance of a specialized terrorism unit.
Research Question 2: Are local police agencies responding to the perceived threat of terrorism as a traditional crime?

Before the events of September 11, scholars have argued that policing was experiencing a “paradigm shift” into an era of community policing. Since September 11, some scholars have maintained there is a new paradigm shift into the era of homeland security policing. Changes in the legal environment, a greater blending of once-distinctive policing and military functions, the development of hybridized security/police agencies, increased federal involvement in law enforcement, intelligence gathering and a move toward pre-emptive policing represent main features of homeland security policing. A new strategy or philosophy would indicate another form of organizational change in response to the continued threat of terrorism. The researcher asked those agencies that had not implemented a specialized terrorism unit whether the department implemented other policing strategies or philosophies in lieu of the creation of an STU.

**New Policing Strategies**

One agency clearly articulated changes in the department’s policing strategy in response to terrorism. This department is not on the list of the top 50 largest law enforcement agencies. Agency 2 in the Pacific region reported changes in the department’s operational strategies. Specifically, the department integrated counterterrorism efforts into its broader mission and the daily activities of all officers. The chief mentioned the importance of incorporating homeland security into daily operations to collect and share information and to identify terrorist activity:

Well, we’ve added to the mission and in addition, to protecting and serving and functionalities of local police, which is apprehension of violators, return of stolen property, the provision of ingress, ingress in
traffic and these other function responsibilities. We’ve also added the mission to detect, prevent and disrupt actual terrorism.

The chief spoke also of “adjustments” made throughout the department in order to accommodate counterterrorism efforts.

Not particularly, no. We have a rapid response unit, called our metro unit, which has specially trained officers that make up the SWAT team and first responders and so forth, sort of our mobile strike force. And we have actually increased our intelligence unit, which has obviously taken on a larger burden not just looking at threats to public officials and sort of, for lack of a better term, “nut cases” in the city and so forth, but also looking at potential criminal activity and terrorist activity.

Integration into Existing Units

Six agencies, included in the top 50 largest local police departments, did not implement a specialized terrorism unit. Rather, these agencies implemented another related unit or integrated a counterterrorism component into an existing unit. These units had related functions but were not strictly devoted to counterterrorism efforts. The table below outlines the units integrating a counterterrorism function.

Table 9: Units Integrating Counterterrorism Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Criminal) Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Incident Management Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Management Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, 29% (6 out of 21) of local police departments placed counterterrorism functions within an intelligence or within another unit.

The commander from Agency 1 in the West South Central region described how his agency focused on the planning aspect of homeland security. In support of this focus,
the department recently created a new command. However, the command takes an “all hazards” approach to planning:

What we did here at [agency name omitted] and initially after 9/11, I think a lot of agencies were trying to determine how they wanted to handle this new threat that was emerging or probably was here for quite some time that we finally realized. And as far as any planning, we’ve actually recently just created a new command and so we’ve assigned a commander along with support personnel to handle communications and emergency planning. And specifically looking at the planning for multiple types of events whether they be natural disasters or pandemics or things like that, but back to the issue of post-9/11 and anything that we engaged in there… But that’s the thumbnail view of what we did post-9/11, the unit that we formed, what they did and then ultimately, the realization that we didn’t need a special unit to do this. We needed to train the department to handle the incidents. And then my group comes in and handles any of the special meetings or training or anything.

Agency 3 in the Pacific region integrated homeland security responsibilities into the critical incident management unit (CIMU). This unit primarily deals with response to all critical incidents, such as terrorism or a natural disaster. In addition, CIMU oversees the majority of the homeland security training and planning for the department.

Furthermore, it provides training and planning for agencies within the jurisdiction that work with the department:

And that is not a specialized terrorism unit that is just critical incident management. But as part of their responsibilities again, they oversee the planning and training for homeland security here with the police department. So it’s not a proactive response unit per se.

Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region described the intelligence unit as having an “all-crimes” focus, thus the reason for integrating homeland security into the intelligence unit:

We have criminal intelligence, and criminal intelligence deals with a lot of issues. They deal with threats to officers, you know, the MS-13 gang member or the MS-13 group that’s decided they want to try to injure or kill police officers. So they distribute that information and work intelligence with the gang unit.
The captain for Agency 3 in the West South Central region discussed how the focal point of the intelligence unit has changed over the last few years. Originally, the unit concentrated on finding fugitives, running warrants and other related duties. The captain explained the focus recently changed to gathering and disseminating intelligence. In addition, the department created an emergency management unit after 9/11. The two units operate in conjunction with each other, although each has a distinct responsibility:

You know, the way to look at it is the Criminal Intel is prior to the blast, Emergency Management is post-blast. We’re [Criminal Intelligence] trying to stop it and if we can’t stop it they clean up our mess. The Intel would be the strategic or the planning and the Emergency Management would have some planning to but they would be the ones that would respond and provide the support and the equipment and all the stuff that goes along with a terrorist deal. You know, light poles and all the stuff that would need to support the operation afterwards and we use them a lot in [state name omitted] for the tornados.

Similarly, the sergeant from Agency 2 in the West North Central region described how his department divided homeland security functions between two units: the intelligence unit and the emergency management unit:

Well, the intelligence arm is the primary, as far as information gathering and investigation and all that kind of thing: the normal law enforcement stuff. My unit in emergency management is the unit that is responsible for the pre-planning, response, incident management and NIMS compliance and weapons of mass destruction as far as training and personal protective gear and all those kinds of things. So it’s kind of kind of a shared responsibility if you will.

*Increased Overall Terrorism Awareness*

The researcher also asked departments that created STUs whether the department implemented any other policing strategies or philosophies department-wide in support of the STU. Respondents indicated this was not the case. However, four agencies discussed other “change” in the form of increased terrorism awareness of all officers. Awareness included identifying potential threats and training.
Table 10: Increased Terrorism Awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>OTHER CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Terrorism Liaison Officers Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, Agency 2 in East North Central region stated:

I guess you could say the agency has definitely been promoting a kind of awareness, even though we have our “experts.” The agency has been pushing it out, to kind of create an awareness with the average patrol guy of the potential threats and the issues with terrorism. We’re a part of that, obviously, but just awareness of the threat that’s new. And that was never done before 9/11.

The captain from Agency 1 in the West North Central region provided similar comments regarding the importance of awareness:

We have a new strategy and so they have re-focused not personnel, not resources. Because we have such a small unit, but the focus with patrol, it’s not that typical. They’re re-focusing for a bigger picture, understanding that the terrorists do crime too. But there’s a different philosophy and a different reason why they do it. They have an ideological purpose, where your common criminal is doing it just for self-benefit. So there has been a change in what we teach officers because as you run across those people that are in involved in terrorism, they could be much more of a threat to that officer when they stop them.

Agency 1 in the East North Central region specifically discussed how all its officers now receive specialized training, starting in the police academy:

Well we’ve pushed out post-9/11 a whole week of training that was required for every officer in the department. But as part of their annual recertification training, there was a week-long Homeland Security course that was taught. All of the people coming through the recruit classes now get incident command training (ICS) and ICS 100-200. All of our special teams here, by the way, for responding to things, are part-time. Our SWAT team is part-time, our bomb squad, the joint emergency services unit, which is what I command: they’re all part-time. In other words, nobody’s sitting around with their SWAT gear on ready to go at a
moment’s notice. Instead, if we need the SWAT team, we call for them and they come out. Everybody within the department receives training. There’s some increase in office also on personal protective equipment from the standpoint of making sure officers were actually equipped at least with some basic capabilities. We push out intelligence bulletins, things of that nature.

The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Pacific region also mentioned a new program implemented to assist the line-level officer. This program, called the Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs), provides an additional means for the gathering of information from the community:

For example, before 9/11, they didn’t have the Terrorism Liaison Officer program and now we have several TLOs in each specialized division in each area to help pass out and get information and get classes to officers on the beat. And if officers on the beat come up with something that they don’t understand or they don’t know or they think might be terrorism, they can go to TLOs. And we also have a reporting program called SARs to which officers can report suspicious activity most like a crime report on the same form as the crime report.

*New Policing Philosophies: Intelligence-Led Policing*

Three agencies cited the use of intelligence-led policing:

**Table 11: Intelligence-Led Policing Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>In Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first, Agency 1 in East North Central, briefly mentioned that the department was currently in transition to this new philosophy:

Yes, we are, we’ve been in the transition period to move toward intelligence-led policing and we brought in the consultants to lecture command staff on what intelligence-led policing is and how it should be structured. We’ve also provided a block of instruction for the yearly in-service for our officers on how they can help intelligence-led policing and
what it is. We’ve also provided specialized training for certain areas of the division too that’s terrorism related.

The captain of Agency 1 in the West North Central region noted in 2007, the department adopted intelligence-led policing. The agency shifted from using CompStat, a strategy they had used for the prior six years. The captain commented on the timeliness of the information CompStat provided. The main issue was the fact that the information and intelligence discussed at monthly meetings was usually a minimum of three to seven weeks old. At that point, the information/intelligence was not useful. Furthermore, he argued that CompStat is a top-down philosophy, where commanders provide the briefings. The department changed this strategy to one called Terrorism Interdiction Officer Program (IOP) where weekly hour-long meetings occur. IOP reversed the CompStat process, as the IOP is now the line officers. An officer from each one of the patrol divisions represents either a detective or a first line supervisor from each one of the investigative bureaus. Each of the investigative units presents information and intelligence acquired over the last week until the morning of the meeting. The captain provided a brief example:

Let’s say there was an armed robbery that occurred last night. And we had debriefing today. They would talk about that today, not in five or six weeks. So it’s shifted the whole thing from being “how great thou art” five weeks ago to what has happened this week.

He further explained that all officers in the department are now required to complete a training class on the use of intelligence-led policing at least once a year:

In fact, we just put all 1100 officers through a basic intel-gathering class. We partnered with the [organization name omitted], which is located here in [city name omitted]. Everybody looks at the big picture that Al-Qaeda is across the ocean and they look at the federal government as the ones that are going to stop all this stuff.
When asked whether he believed the department had successfully implemented intelligence-led policing, the captain answered affirmatively.

Agency 2 in the West South Central region spoke directly regarding mathematical modeling used to analyze the vast amount of information and intelligence available through the regional fusion center. As the lieutenant explained, the department needed to be more proactive to support one of its missions, “to provide a current and accurate strategic intelligence data analysis so the chief had a comprehensive understanding of crime in the city.” However, the problem therein with terrorism is how is an agency able to anticipate an attack? To respond to this issue, the department developed a mathematical algorithm that would filter through all the data available. If necessary, it would immediately notify the appropriate personnel if it produced a certain mathematical score. Thus, the department relies on mathematical modeling to ascertain “confidence” there is a valid threat that requires instantaneous response. The lieutenant believed that using mathematical algorithms was more efficient than relying on a number of individual analysts to sift through the data. Furthermore, while community-policing principles are still helpful, the lieutenant asserted that an intelligence-led policing model is a more efficient form of counterterrorism policing.

Summary

The study identified several new policing strategies. One strategy was at the operational level. Agency 2 in the Pacific region described integrating counterterrorism into the department’s mission statement. As the agency chief noted, this was necessary for daily operations at all levels of the department, particularly for collecting and disseminating information. A second strategy found was integrating a homeland security
function into an existing unit, or forming a new, related unit. Three agencies incorporated counterterrorism functions into intelligence units. One agency integrated the duties into its critical incident management unit. Two agencies created new related units, but not specifically counterterrorism units. While the primary duties included intelligence gathering, planning and training, these units were not strictly devoted to homeland security initiatives.

A number of agencies with specialized terrorism units discussed increased terrorism awareness as a new departmental strategy. Most agencies recognized this was not an issue before September 11. However, the events of 9/11 and the continued threat of terrorism in the country have led agencies to recognize the importance of basic counterterrorism knowledge, especially at the line level. Terrorism awareness primarily focused on identifying potential threats and training all officers in support of counterterrorism initiatives.

Three agencies conveyed the emergence of intelligence-led policing as a new philosophy within the department. Agency 1 in the East North Central region indicated a move toward the use of intelligence-led policing. However, the department had not fully implemented the philosophy. Agency 1 in the West North Central region shifted from a CompStat model to an IOP model. In addition, the agency implemented intelligence-led policing throughout the entire department. Agency 2 in the West South Central region detailed the implementation and use of mathematical modeling as the principal intelligence-based system for the department. In addition, Agency 2 in the West South Central region also indicated the department was making a philosophical shift away from
community-oriented policing to intelligence-led policing as the primary homeland security strategy.
Research Question 3: Have local police agencies reprioritized their investment areas and are these changes a result of a “perceived” or “actual” threat?

The researcher asked all respondents whether their agencies (including those that have implemented a specialized terrorism unit and those that have not) had reprioritized “investment areas” in favor of counterterrorism efforts. Investment areas include patrolling, traffic enforcement, drug interdiction, vice, burglary or auto theft. This question focused on basic functions that sworn officers conducted. Thus, the researcher also questioned the respondents regarding police academy training for new recruits in counterterrorism and antiterrorism.

Reprioritization of Investment Areas

No agency reported the need for reprioritization of basic police functions to fulfill a counterterrorism mission. Several agencies made further comments to explain why they did not reprioritize basic police functions to support counterterrorism efforts.

Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region commented “most everything falls under criminal intelligence.” Agency 1 in the West North Central region stated the department continues to focus on the bigger picture – to recognize the fact that terrorists commit crimes too. Likewise, Agency 3 in West South Central region explained:

No, because we’ve actually tried to do it as an all-hazard deal. We haven’t, just for instance like, oh, the baby formula stuff that was going on a year or so or two years ago. You know that’s shoplifting. That’s all that was, shoplifting, if you looked at just the reports. But it really wasn’t shoplifting. They were funding terrorism, stealing Similac and the deal with the phones. There was a big push out there for cell phones for a while too. So we have taken the “all hazard” approach where we try not to focus on it being a terrorist event and make it a priority, because we look at anything that’s a pattern. If it has any kind of ties… we don’t try to just shut anybody down… So we haven’t tried to take our focus away from other crimes. We’ve just tried to make it all hazards. Look at it as a big picture instead of a small picture, if that makes sense.
Agency 2 in the Pacific region incorporated counterterrorism into its department mission, adding terrorism awareness as a basic crime function:

No we haven’t, let’s say, dismantled any units because we wanted to shift the resources to a terrorist-prevention program. We just added, as I mentioned, the mission of terrorism awareness to our department [mission], so we haven’t disconnected any enforcement unit or prevention unit or community education unit because of terrorism.

The major from Agency 2 in East South Central region added that keeping his precincts fully staffed at all times takes precedence over any homeland security priority:

If there is a priority of any kind, it’s to make sure that our precincts are staffed with officers. That has to be done before any other special units are staffed. If we’re low in our tactical unit, if I’m low on pilots, or if the K-9 unit is low on dog handlers, it takes second place to making sure the precincts are fully staffed. So that would be the priority. If there ever is one it’s going to be uniform patrol, because of the street vision needed right now.

One department specifically noted equipment as a new priority. The lieutenant for Agency 1 in East South Central region stated:

We have not deployed or made any significant changes, purchasing changes or anything like that in response to terrorism. It’s all been training and awareness-related. I guess the only exception to that would be equipment purchases for the special teams. Now there has been a significant change in spending priorities there on the types of equipment and the amount of equipment bought to reflect potential terrorist activity.

Police Academy Training

Most agencies provided some kind of counterterrorism training in the academy. The amount of training varied widely, from as little as two hours to as many as 40 hours. The median number of hours was eight. The findings also revealed a vast disparity in the type of training new recruits received. Some academy training only provided basic awareness, while other academies required recruits to complete specific Department of
Homeland Security courses, such as the National Incident Management (NIMS) and Incidence Command System (ICS) training, before graduation.

Table 12: Police Academy Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>ACADEMY HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>40 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
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<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>36 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>No specific block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>No specific block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 5</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>No specific block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
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<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>10 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: no time noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two agencies indicated they integrate issues related to terrorism and homeland security within certain training blocks such as intelligence. For example, the captain from Agency 1 in the West North Central region explained that in addition to a four-hour counterterrorism block, the intelligence and perpetrator center also have hour-long training blocks related to homeland security issues.
Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region provided the most counterterrorism education. Recruits undergo approximately 40 hours (or one week) of training. Agency 2 in the West North Central region reported the next largest number of hours, 36. Within the three-day period, the agency instructs recruits on incident command, hazmat and weapons of mass destruction. The sergeant also noted all street-level officers received the same training.

Agency 3 in the South Atlantic region described the specific homeland security courses that recruits must complete before graduation:

Only training I’m aware of (and I didn’t have the time to inquire with them at the public safety institute) but the only thing I’m aware of that they’ve done is the NIMS courses. I believe they mandate now that 100 and 700 ICS, 100 and 700 have to be completed before graduation from the police academy. Other than that, I don’t know that they’ve implemented any kind of training specific to terrorism. I would imagine they had though.

The assistant chief from Agency 4 in the Pacific region discussed the additional training received once recruits graduate from the state academy:

We do and it’s the basic state’s – everyone goes through the state academy. There’s a basic block that actually is taught by a person on our staff who works with the joint terrorism task force.

In-Service Training

The majority of agencies indicated offering in-service training to all officers. In-service training occurred as seldom as once a year to multiple times per year. The department typically provided the training. However, a few agencies reported sending officers outside the department or bringing in outside personnel to conduct the training. Topics ranged from basic awareness to prevention and response to use of specialized equipment. Those who received in-service training varied from all officers within a department to only those who had appropriate assignments.
### Table 13: In-Service Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>IN-SERVICE TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Yes: inside and outside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: inside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Yes: inside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: ad hoc basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Yes: inside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: inside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>No: email alerts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes: inside department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency 5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>East South Central</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
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<td>West South Central</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Agency 2 in the East North Central region does not conduct training on a regular basis. Time and resources provide a challenge to provide regular training. Rather, an officer must request training: “It’s pretty much on an ad hoc or on a request basis.”

Likewise, the assistant chief from Agency 4 in the Pacific region indicated much of the “routine” training occurs on a volunteer basis. The department primarily uses training bulletins and the auspicious activity report (SAR) initiative. However, there is a yearly-required training class for all officers focusing on homeland security issues:
Yeah, we do in-service training in a number of ways. We do training bulletins. Homeland security-related ones, I would say on average come out once a week, sometimes a little bit more than that, but on average probably once a week… We have a SAR initiative, which is Suspicious Activity Report initiative

Agency 1 in the East South Central region discussed several different types of strategies the department uses to conduct counterterrorism training. These include actual training, protective equipment and the use of intelligence bulletins:

Everybody within the department receives training…Our training obviously takes on a large focus on terrorism-related incidents. Response to normal hazardous materials incidents, those teams are not going to be involved in, but the SWAT team has gone mainly from responding to kind of your more normal routine, everyday incidents and stuff. A lot of their training has taken on the issues that a terrorist incident can bring to bear.

Agency 2 in the West North Central region also spoke of training officers to use protective equipment. Equipment training became an added component to the mandated education sessions:

One of which is the law enforcement protective measures course from the center for domestic preparedness. And what they have, it’s a simple little eight-hour awareness type of course, which is not a bad program.

The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Pacific region also described the department’s various counterterrorism training efforts. Training ranges from specific to broader homeland security issues. For example, he notes the specific training the officers in the TLO program receive. The lieutenant mentioned the use of roll call to conduct training, which sends officers to certified schools the state sponsors.

Agency 2 in the East South Central region provided a further description of the type of training officers received. The major also illustrated the importance of training, especially for new officers:

And in in-service training, we have a two-hour block as a refresher and sometimes we may talk about response, sometimes we may talk about
information gathering, sometimes we may talk about just being on the lookout and we give examples of all those things.

**Threat Perception**

The researcher queried the participants on their departments’ prior response experiences with terrorism. This question aimed to discover whether these experiences or any organizational change within an agency resulted from a perceived or actual threat. In addition, the researcher probed respondents on the current state of their departments’ counterterrorism efforts. Whether jurisdictions have had first-hand experience with terrorism-related events provides a perspective and further insight of each individual agency’s counterterrorism response. The issue of planning represents the “proactive” process in which an agency engages so it can prepare for a future terrorism incident. The study asked respondents about their terrorism definitions, response plans, intelligence-gathering activities and response experience (see Appendix D for complete questions).

**Definition of Terrorism**

Ascertaining how agencies define terrorism helps understand the planning (and ultimately, response) efforts of local law enforcement. As Chapter 3 outlined, there are hundreds of academic definitions and a lack of consensus among federal government agencies as to what constitutes terrorism. Moreover, local law enforcement has no requirement to adhere to the FBI definition. However, the study assumes that the definition a police agency adopts will affect the agency’s planning and response efforts. In addition, the selection of a definition of terrorism will also influence an agency’s ability to investigate, detect and interdict terrorism and suspected terrorism-related incidents. Given the multitude of existing definitions, a local agency’s selection of a definition becomes exceedingly crucial for counterterrorism and antiterrorism efforts.
Otherwise, there could be significant issues both within and across agencies in identification of terrorists and terrorism incidents.

No local law enforcement agency included in this study had adopted a specific definition of terrorism, whether academic, legal or as proscribed by a governmental agency. Furthermore, the respondents did not make a distinction between domestic or international terrorism for definitional purposes. However, several respondents stated their agency pays attention to political, ideological and religious forms of terrorism. Specifically, these agencies acknowledged terrorism as “criminal” in nature or as a “crime” with a political nature. Most departments recognized a need for a broad definition of terrorism. A lieutenant for Agency 1 in the Mountain region provided further insight regarding the lack of adherence to a specific definition of terrorism. He explained:

Well, as you know, a real definition for terrorism takes on about a thousand different pictures. But I guess our definition is along the same lines as what the FBI uses, which is: terrorism is unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

_FBI Definition of Terrorism_

The researcher found it interesting that the police agencies included in this study had not adopted a formal definition of terrorism. In response to this finding, the researcher asked agencies whether they followed the FBI’s definition of terrorism, as the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR Section 0.85) outlines. All agencies acknowledged the FBI as the lead agency for terrorism-related investigations. However, they did not officially adopt the FBI’s definition of terrorism. Rather, all agencies (except one) stated the FBI definition served as a “guideline” for their department. Some used the FBI
definition in conjunction with other federal government definitions such as that of the
DHS. One respondent, a captain for Agency 1 in the West North Central region,
discussed the importance of combining definitional elements from the federal agencies.

He also noted the importance of being familiar with all federal definitions:

Actually, it’s taken from – well I don’t remember exactly which one we
took it from. But I know that they were all very similar. We just, because
I’m of the belief that we all need to be DHS, FBI, you know, the Coast
Guard. All of us need to be working off similar definitions. If we defined
things differently, then when we work together, then it makes that working
relationship more difficult.

A captain for Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region also reinforced this idea:

We pretty much use a standard definition as it relates to the federal
government. Because it’s more or less what we get our funding from and
it’s really any act, any overt act, which tries to cause terror or injures or
kills, you know, members of the community that we have jurisdiction over
and we pretty much maintain that as a broad definition for our agency…
We do more DHS, the FBI being the component. They’ve got a part to
play there with DHS concerns and FEMA and some of the other agencies
that we use.

The sergeant for Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region specified the use of the
FBI’s definition for simplicity purposes. He noted it was not necessary to recreate the
wheel, since the FBI would take the lead on a terrorism case:

Well actually because, if there’s any type of, you know, if it’s deemed
terrorism, the FBI, even though we may be first on scene, the FBI or
federal counterparts actually take the lead, so based on that, we didn’t
recreate the wheel and [this is] why we use the FBI’s definition of
terrorism.

One respondent, a major in Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region, was against
using the FBI’s definition. When asked why the agency did not adopt or follow the FBI’s
definition, the respondent said that the FBI’s created its definition for the FBI and the
FBI’s investigations, and not with local law enforcement in mind. The agency also did
not adopt any other formal definition of terrorism and did not intend to adopt a specific
definition any time soon.

**Impact of Definition on Response Efforts**

The interviewees expressed in various ways how the definition of terrorism has
influenced response efforts. In general, the definition of terrorism does not seem to have
had any significant impact on local agency response efforts. However, departments
agreed that if they came across a terrorism-related incident, the department would
immediately notify the FBI. Overall, the definition of terrorism (primarily the FBI
definition) individual agencies used appeared more of a guide as to when to transfer a
potential case over to the FBI – specifically the joint terrorism task force (JTTF) – versus
something that affects day-to-day operations.

**Table 14: Definition Impact on Response Efforts**

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<th>IMPACT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Discern motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Prevention-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Prevention-driven</td>
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<td>South Atlantic</td>
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<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Response-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>Risk assessments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a commander for Agency 1 in the West South Central region described:

Well, I guess maybe the best answer would be is, if we come across an
incident or individuals that we believe fit this definition of terrorism. And
that would obviously alert us to the fact that we need to get the FBI
involved fairly early on and work with them cooperatively through that investigation. As far as how does that impact our day-to-day operations, I don’t believe that the definition of terrorism has a great impact on our day-to-day patrol operations.

For some departments, events have driven response efforts. Agency 2 in the West South Central region described the approach the agency has taken to drive response efforts. These were more of a function of September 11 rather than a definition of terrorism. A captain for Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region agreed terrorism is a component. He provided further elaboration on how response encompasses more than just terrorism events:

That all-hazards plan becomes a foundation for how we would respond to any other incident… But if we really look at what’s driving municipals to step up and take some of these responsibilities on, it’s really the lack of the federal government in assisting or being responsive to municipal agencies.

Additionally, Agency 3 in the South Atlantic region stated events and federal agencies primarily drove response efforts:

You know what? Our agency response efforts really, although beyond policy and procedure, are very driven by the people above us at the state and federal level. It is reactive, you know, it’s just the nature of terrorism. You plan, you incorporate procedures and policies but essentially, you’re event-driven.

Other agencies indicated response efforts for their departments have been proactive versus reactive. For example, Agency 1 the West North Central region believed prevention and deterrence primarily drive response. Agency 2 in the West North Central region also identified response as prevention-driven:

Well, the definition really is that we have a responsibility to the public, the citizens we serve to do prevention to terrorist response and recovery efforts as it pertains to international terrorism, domestic terrorism and really, everyone takes it in all-hazard and threat. So it drives us in the sense of, within that definition, looking at the prevention component. What’s happened since 2001 is with a lot of the federal money that
agencies have received. They have focused on the easiest part of it, because we saw some… issues with the World Trade Center’s coming down as the response and recovery. That’s easy because it’s about buying stuff and putting together plans after it happens. The part that’s the tough part is the prevention and deterrence is, is trying to get our hands around that. And so our agency uh, and working cooperatively regionally, and we’ll probably get into this more as you ask another questions, we had done the response and recovery and so really in the last couple years we’ve turned our focus toward prevention and deterrence.

The agency added there is a mitigative response as well:

Well there’s two types of response efforts. You look at an actual event response and then you also look at pre-planning or potential mitigative response. I mean, the overall guidance we get from the FBI on it is in our planning as far as how we are going to conduct a response should such a thing occur and we have all that pre-identified and documented. As far as any preliminary mitigative, well, investigative response is probably a better term, we work hand-in-hand with all of our local, state and federal partners, with the fusion centers and things like that and sharing information intelligence and so forth. So again, they’re actively involved.

Similarly, Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region noted it is hard to respond to the “unknown.” However, this department described response efforts as “intelligence-driven enforcement.” It identified the concepts of “behavior” and “activities” as key issues in the collecting of information and intelligence. Agency 3 in the Pacific region reinforced this assertion, stating response efforts depend on the current threat, which is dynamic and constantly changing. Thus, response is not black and white. The assistant chief for Agency 4 in the Pacific region added that the definition helps the department to assess risk, which in turn drives response efforts.

Well, I think the definition, what it allows us to do is create some mechanism to assess what’s our risk. And I say the risk to our city, these terrorist-type events and then to develop response plans based on our understanding of that risk. So, for example, in our annex where the definition talks about the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property: What real risk do we have of that particular type of crime? How are we, for our agency, when we say, how does it drive? How do we assess that? We use our criminal intelligence section, our fusion center and say what’s the real risk and what specific incidents can we point to
anecdotally and what risk structure do we get from or what risk analysis do we get from the Department of Homeland Security that tells us: hey, you’re vulnerable to X or X or X? And then we would set up parts of this or structures within the department to help us develop response plans to that. So hopefully that makes sense.

For Agency 2 in the East South Central region, “awareness” and “vigilance” are key factors. The major for the department equated street crime, which occurs every day, to domestic terrorism. He provided the example of drug dealers and gang members killing each other on a daily basis. The major further stated “international terrorism is not your everyday thing” and it is something one doesn’t see – nor can one put a hand on it.

As such, officers must be vigilant to prevent it. He believes that a “sense of awareness” is what essentially drives both his officers and himself to be conscious of homeland security. “This is what we teach the whole police department continuously: awareness, vigilance.”

Two agencies noted the importance of definition to response efforts with respect to being able to differentiate motives. Such motives involve a criminal versus political, ideological or sociological purpose. The goal is to determine whether they are dealing with a criminal or a homeland security issue. The ability to differentiate motives assists local police departments in determining when to transfer a potential case over to the FBI.

As a sergeant for Agency 2 in the East North Central region discussed:

Well, the key thing is that it helps us to differentiate the ideological component, because you know, the FBI’s definition, it talks about the unlawful use of force or violence. Well, that’s street crime. But what’s helpful to us is then adding the ideological component or the motivation behind it. It’s helpful in order to give my officers something very, very specific that they can point to and say okay, this is now a homeland security issue.
**Domestic Security Statute**

One respondent, representing Agency 1 in the Pacific region, brought up the existence of a state domestic security statute. Only a few states in the country have enacted such statutes. California Penal Code 186.20, “California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act” (STEP Act, 2009) provides one example. The state statute provides a definition of terrorism (used in conjunction with the FBI’s definition) should a terrorist attack happen in the agency’s jurisdiction.

We all know terrorism is a criminal act. So, by using the definition that the FBI uses, we basically go along those lines. If there is a any type of attack within the city… we would use the definition of terrorism along with the state’s statute for criminal acts that refer to whatever incident that occurred… We’re actually one of only a few states that actually have a domestic security statute on its books right now that defines terrorism and stuff like that.

**Formal Response Plan**

Interestingly, few agencies had a formal written terrorism response plan. The departments included in this study tended to view terrorism as “criminal in essence and violent in nature.” A majority of agencies (17) adopted an “all-hazards,” “critical incident” or other “mass casualty” plan, as the federal government requires. Surprisingly, departments did not develop response plans immediately following September 11.

**Table 15: Terrorism Response Plans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>RESPONSE PLAN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>FBI as guideline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Mass casualty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>All-hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>All-hazards</td>
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<td>Agency 2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Critical incident</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Disaster readiness &amp; response – terrorism annex</td>
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</table>

The creation of response plans typically occurred within two to four years. While many response plans addressed terrorism, the plans did not acknowledge specific acts of terrorism (such as suicide bombers). Rather, departments integrated incidents that are terroristic in nature into broader situations. For example, the deputy chief for Agency 1 in the East North Central region commented that his department had something called a mass casualty incident plan. Take a terrorism-related bomb threat, for instance. His department would refer to the mass casualty plan. The deputy chief described it as a formalized document that’s an emergency operations plan. However, the plan is not just confined to terrorism or related events. It refers to any type of emergency that would require police response. Agency 1 in the Pacific region added, “We may not know it is an
act of terrorism until after the incident occurs,” in support of maintaining an all-hazards response plan. “So we don’t classify those critical incidents or responses to terrorism to the mere fact that we don’t know if it’s an actual terrorist event, or not until usually a few months later.”

Furthermore, the response plans ranged from single to multiple plans based on different types of incidents. The interviewees’ responses suggest a single approach is impractical: agencies need an all-inclusive plan. For example, the captain in Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region explained his department implemented its response plan in 2005 and the plan has a two-pronged approach. First, the department uses the NIMS system (National Incident Management System), which the federal government mandates. NIMS response derives from the type of incident and core competencies the federal government specifies. The second approach is the CIMS (Citywide Incident Management System), which adapted NIMS to the city’s emergency management system, encompassing all the various agencies involved in response efforts. The captain also mentioned that the department’s focus is an all-hazards approach, as NIMS mandates. It includes lessons learned from the September 11 attacks.

Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region provided another example of the need for an all-hazards approach. The captain stated, “in order to be a recognized municipality you have to have some type of plan on the books for all hazards.” He further explained:

You know what, that incident is isn’t necessarily as important as the response. Terrorism would have law enforcement in immediate response and then the mitigating response after that would be a joint ICS system with medic, fire and us. Then the last by-product would be turning that into the JTTF coming in and the federal partners that would be coming in to do the investigation. And then they would take that investigation beyond [city name omitted]. So yes, there is a component, it’s just built in a way that it is part of our mass casualty event system.
The lieutenant for Agency 1 in the East South Central region noted his department considered “intent” as the key difference between crime and terrorism. However, the agency would respond in the same way – it would require police action whether to criminal or terrorist acts:

The only difference between a hazardous material incident and a weapon of mass destruction is the intent behind it. You know, you respond to them both the same way.

Similarly, the lieutenant for Agency 2 in the West South Central region also acknowledged that his department, the city and the county all maintain emergency-level plans. He also highlighted the concept of a regional fusion center as an “all-hazards type fusion concept” rather than just focusing on terrorism. He said there are hazards, which could include even weather. He also clarified that the difference between intentional and unintentional events is the criminal investigation:

It could be a conventional or unconventional incident that causes the level of response. So, in other words, you could have a catastrophic release of a deadly chemical from a rail yard close to downtown. And it may very well be accidental. But if it was intentional, the only thing that changes is you have a criminal investigation, so it’s good to. But the actual mitigation of the event is, as it’s going forward is, the response is the same.

Three agencies indicated they had sections in their response plans that refer to incidents of terrorism. In these cases, the respondents believed “a more tailored response is appropriate.” As the assistant chief for Agency 4 in the Pacific region illustrated:

We actually have a couple. We have a disaster readiness and response plan and then we have a terrorism annex as a part of that plan. And then we have our emergency operation center, which becomes an overall and overarching city response plan. We have response, specific response plans for different types of incidents… The context of our terrorism annex and our terrorism response guides are in the context of our overall city’s disaster readiness and response plan. But an earthquake, our response, the police response to an earthquake, and the overall city response, is vastly different in an earthquake than if it is an intentional destruction of a building for example. We have, and the easiest example for me to use is
the [omitted]. It’s public information that in Afghanistan and places in Afghanistan they found pictures of the [omitted]. [City name omitted] tall buildings were also a high potential target during the planned second wave of the 9/11 attacks. So if we looked at a building collapse, there are similarities in an earthquake versus an intentional act. But if you look across the world at intentional acts, they involve attacks on responders, on response mechanisms. There are enough significant differences that a more tailored response seems more appropriate.

Surprisingly, not all agencies regularly update individual response plans. A number of agencies reported not having updated the response plans since implementing the plan. Only two departments were able to confirm whether they had updated their response plans. The captain for Agency 3 in the West South Central region noted that at the time of the interview, his agency was in the process of rewriting its emergency operations plan. Agency 1 in the Mountain region considered its response plan a “living document.” It updated the plan every 6 months, “because terrorists change and adapt, so police have to change and adapt.” The lieutenant stated the updates occurred in conjunction with the ever-changing priority requirements that come from both the FBI and the DHS. He commented that in his city, any sort of catastrophic attack might take place in major tourist areas. As a result, there are emergency plans in place for a variety of different types of incidents that might occur, such as a VIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device):

I mean, we have things from car bombs, truck bombs, suicide bomber, homicide bomber, introduction of some biological attack into maybe a hotel or something like that. Or, with Columbine-type stuff. You know anywhere you have large crowds and a crazy with a gun. You know, is that really a definition of what terrorism is? Well, yeah. In a sense that it’s domestic terrorism related, certainly. So we definitely have written plans in place for all of that. But I’ll tell you quite frankly that the written plans never match what the actual response is going to be. It’s just sort of very generic, I guess is the best way to put it.
Homeland Security-Related Programs

The captain for Agency 1 in the West North Central region described a new prevention effort referred to as the counterterrorism patrol strategy. In addition, the agency had a second effort aimed at response, called the Terrorism Interdiction Officer Program. It includes one full week of training for all officers with the desire to learn more and be more proactive in counterterrorism. Upon conclusion of the program, the department certifies the officers as experts to lead their units in counterterrorism.

We have an all-hazard response plan that has been created to incorporate terrorism like, just like it says, all hazards as far as responding once an incident has occurred. We also have, and not a lot of agencies have this, a counterterrorism patrol strategy. We start with recruits when they go into the academy, to teach them about terrorism and who they should call if they run into certain types of things. We have an intelligence unit component; we have a homeland security unit component. Also, we have what we call the Terrorism Interdiction Officer Program, where we actually certify them with a 40 hour program of getting officers in patrol, detectives, traffic, that have a passion and that seem to have a passion and a will and desire to learn about it. They can be experts in their units to help others understand as we bring different people on board. So we’ve got a couple of different plans. One is focused on the response and recovery and one is focused on prevention and deterrence.

Collection of Terrorism-Related Intelligence

All local police agencies included in this study stated they collected intelligence. While the majority of local law enforcement recognize the JTTF’s the lead agency in terrorism investigations, nine agencies indicated that they conduct investigations independent of the JTTF.

Table 16: Collection of Terrorism Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
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<th>INDEPENDENT OF JTTF</th>
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<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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For example, the captain for Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region stated his department analyzes threats and incidents that occur both domestically and abroad. He stated the bureau will ask “[city name omitted] questions.” For instance, if an incident occurs domestically or overseas, what are the implications for [city name omitted]? The captain also noted his department considers threats and incidents collectively and individually. It accounts for soft versus hard targets. Additionally, the department has trained officers stationed overseas who collect intelligence and can respond to international threats. Furthermore, the department employs crime analysts who primarily focus on domestic threats.
Several agencies explained that the local joint terrorism task force would be the lead agency in any terrorism investigation. A department may begin a case as a criminal investigation. However, once an agency believes the criminal investigation has turned into a terrorism investigation, it turns the case over to the JTTF. According to the sergeant for Agency 2 in the Mountain region:

Any terrorist investigation that would be defined as a terrorist investigation is investigated by the Joint Terrorist Task Force here. And then, anything that may lead to a terrorism investigation or suspicious activity, that type of thing, would probably be investigated at a [city name omitted] PD level if that makes sense. But something that falls within the definite parameters of terrorism gets investigated by the JTTF here. We don’t have an independent unit that would either complement or be in competition with the JTTF.

All agencies reported having at least one person from the department assigned to the JTTF. Those assigned to the JTTF have the same jurisdictional powers as the FBI. In most cases, the assignment to the JTTF is a full-time duty. The major from Agency 4 in the Pacific region noted the only time there might be a dual investigation is if there was a bombing incident. In this instance, the department would conduct an investigation and the ATF would conduct its own investigation.

The chief for Agency 2 in the Pacific region further explained the reasoning process:

We’ve had an independent investigation and obviously, we notified the federal authorities, both the FBI, and Homeland Security regarding any information received on perceived threats or organized planning or these sorts of things. So we use a “clearinghouse” approach to make sure that we’re not just observing something that’s, I should say, a regular criminal-type planning, but criminal planning rising to the level of terrorism. So we probably could, but we feel we independently can’t make that decision that what we’re looking at is something that’s terrorist driven or something that’s just street-level criminal activity.
The sergeant for Agency 2 in the Mountain region also expressed his opinion as to why local department should not engage independent terrorism investigations:

Yeah, I think, this is just my opinion, but as a danger zone of running independent investigations of a JTTF because I have a jurisdictional issue. You know [city name omitted] is a very large city, actually the largest geographic city, but what do I do when we run up to the border? And, you know, in [state name omitted], I have jurisdiction throughout the state, but unless you’re participating in a task force, I don’t go up to [city name omitted] or down to [city name omitted] in the furtherance of the [city name omitted] investigation unless I’m part of a task force or something else is going on. So, and it also engages you in a nationwide and a global effort as opposed to just focusing on one little thing that may be the key to the puzzle.

There were also discrepancies between agencies in the types of intelligence collected. These discrepancies appeared to mirror the fact that the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force is the lead authority in official terrorism investigations. One department clearly distinguished between the collection of criminal intelligence versus terrorism intelligence. The interviewee specifically noted his department only collected intelligence that had a “criminal predicate.” As the commander for Agency 1 in the West South Central region explained:

My answer, again that was the one question I was going to tell you that I’m not going to go into a whole lot of depth on, but we only collect intelligence that has criminal predicate, and we comply with what is it, 23CFR, you know, the requirements for that. So, to answer: do we collect terrorism-related intelligence? No. We collect crime-related information that has criminal predicate. We would not and we do not maintain any standalone databases with that information or anything like that.

The respondent for Agency 1 in the Mountain region explained that his bureau physically operated out of the region’s fusion center. His bureau, in conjunction with the fusion center, adheres to an “all-crimes/all-hazards” approach, gathering information in “real time.” The lieutenant discussed what he characterized as a “business model” the agency follows for the collection of intelligence:
And the way that we do this is, we sort of have this all-crimes, all-hazards mission here. So now within the same building is not only our collection people for terrorism-related issues, but we also have crime analysts. We have 13 other agencies. We have federal partners with DHS, FBI, all of these people within the same building and then we have a very significant component of crime analysts and so on, basically in marrying all of that information, because with suspicious activity reporting which is a big part of collection. Everything comes into what we call a watch desk, and so that will be a counterterrorism hotline that will be any tips that are coming in. It is real time monitoring of all the local computer dispatching that comes for all emergency services in southern [state name omitted] and is all actually up on the boards in this center. So you have real time intelligence.

The researcher also queried departments as to whether they collected terrorism-related intelligence independently of the local joint terrorism task force. Surprisingly, a number of departments answered affirmatively. For Agency 2 in the West South Central region, it was a matter of protection for his jurisdiction. As he rationalized:

Independently, but, we don’t need to leave the protection of the citizens of [city name omitted] solely up to the federal government. We are a municipal government. We have that same responsibility. So we need to have our own standalone capabilities too. It just makes sense to me. I never thought that we should defer the protection of the citizens of [city name omitted] to a federal agency, wholly. Does that make sense?

To advance the discussion of intelligence, several agencies pointed out there was a difference between “intelligence” and “information.” They stated police agencies collect information, not intelligence. Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region was the first agency to point out the difference. The major noted his department collects information and explained the process of gathering of information. The first step is to gather the information, the second to validate the information and the third to corroborate the information. Once the department processes information through these three steps, it becomes intelligence. Therefore, information only becomes intelligence after processing and analysis. After this, the department determines it to be valid threat or potential threat.
As the deputy chief for Agency 1 in the East North Central region further clarified:

Well, I guess I can’t answer that as a simple yes or no, because I think a lot of people have a misconception of what intelligence is, and going with which is a better definition of terrorism… as information that has been processed or analyzed and the final result of that information becomes intelligence. So if you look at it from that point, we get a lot of information that we in turn forward over to the joint terrorism task force, and they do the full investigation of the holes. We do some preliminary investigations for activity that comes to our attention and we’ll take a look at it. But then ultimately, we turn it over to the joint terrorism task force. So yes, they do collect intelligence, but that intelligence has been provided by various agencies throughout the United States. We get intelligence from the Anti-Defamation League. We get intelligence from the Department of Homeland Security. We get intelligence from the FBI. We get intelligence from the state fusion center, so in that sense, we do collect intelligence.

The interviewer asked the deputy chief whether he felt receiving information from multiple sources was redundant and/or overwhelming. He responded:

It is so overwhelming. Some of it is very repetitive, but some of it’s very worthwhile. So it still makes sense to subscribe to these different services and also monitor as much as you can. Because even though you may get an intelligence report involving the same group or same incident, you might get a different perspective of it if you collect multiple analyses with that group or a situation.

The study also questioned participants as to whether their respective departments employed intelligence analysts. Interestingly, only four agencies indicated they had crime analysts to assist with the processing, analyzing and dissemination of the information collected.

Additional Sources of Data

Agency 3 in the West South Central region mentioned an additional source of data, E-Guardian, which the FBI houses as a new source of intelligence sharing. The
purpose of E-Guardian is to provide law enforcement a way to document and readily share reports of suspicious activity.

We do it independent and we do it through the fusion center. We have the [state name omitted] information center and then we also collect it and submit it through the FBI E-Guardian. … E-Guardian is a new system that the FBI has rolled out. Are you familiar with SARs, suspicious activity reports? … The E-guardian is part of the SARs system and it allows local law enforcement to be able to share information in, through the FBI’s Leo webpage. And we can put like, a guy’s taken pictures of a water treatment plant. We would enter that in the system. Hopefully, the next agency that came across this guy would have that information so that the second time he got stopped the red flags will go up. Hey, this is not normal. People don’t go on vacation to take pictures of water treatment plants.

Development of Community Partnerships

The lieutenant for Agency 1 in the Mountain region stressed the importance of community partnerships as part of the intelligence-gathering process. As he discussed this issue, he stated community partnerships extend beyond the Muslim community. The police department recognized that terrorism covers a broad spectrum, from radical Islam to domestic, homegrown threats. Partnerships in all areas of the community, particularly the hotel industry as noted below, are essential in assisting the police department in identifying potential threats. The lieutenant considered this a lesson learned from analyzing the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

They are also responsible for TLOs, which is terrorism liaison officers, our own people to be the eyes and the ears of counterterrorism out there. So if they see a particular type of flag then it might be related or indicate a person is a supporter, what does that mean, and they can provide that information back to us. Also, there is ILO, which is industry liaison officer, where we are actually going out and providing training to the hotel casino industry, the housekeepers, bellmen, maids, security, front desk people too.

One of the things, the best practices that we follow, is we really dissect all of these terrorism instances that are occurring across the globe. And one of the things we found out from the Mumbai attacks was that, as I am sure you are aware of all of this, they came through the back door…
And you wanted to know, as far as the collecting the intelligence, the other huge part of that I briefly mentioned, the source development, is that it is imperative for our detectives to develop those relationships within those communities. And I am not talking strictly Muslim communities, like so many people think when they talk about the counterterrorism mission. We know that across the spectrum, there are people who are supporters of radical Islam or, you know, your kind of domestic terrorism type stuff. So it’s important that we have people in place in those communities who can help identify when any sort of radicalization is coming along and we are developing those relationships so that they are comfortable and that we are continually contacting those people and developing them to help us keep the city safe.

**Fusion Centers**

Two agencies provided detailed discussion on the concept and use of fusion centers. Fusion centers are state-level agencies the federal government has established to collect, analyze and disseminate information to local agencies, especially police departments. There are 72 fusion centers in the United States, one for each of the 50 states and 22 additional centers the Department of Homeland Security has approved. In some cases, a fusion centers is the sole source of data. In other cases, fusions centers serve as one manner to receive terrorism-related intelligence. In these cases, departments collect their own information and use the fusion center intelligence as a supplemental source.

The major for Agency 2 in the East South Central region explained how departments are using fusion centers:

Of course, my partner and I, we get information from the officers every day. That’s one of the things they’re taught. They’re taught our phone numbers and they call us and send us faxes every day… And if there’s something suspicious about it that we can't really put our hands on, we send it to the state fusion center and then we copy it to the JTTF… I send my main report to the [state name omitted] state fusion center. And that’s where everything gets processed. That little thing that I send them might have been sent to another fusion center in another state similar to what I sent. And these things, they put these things in computers and they see how they match up.
The assistant chief for Agency 4 in the Pacific region described the hybrid model his department uses. This hybrid model integrates several resources: the JTTF, a regional analytical center and the state fusion center.

Well, we have a hybrid, if you will, and I’m speaking in broad sense. We have an intelligence collection ordinance in our city that requires us to use care in what specific information we collect. So my caveat, since it’s all recorded here, is always consistent with that ordinance. Yes, we do collect terrorism-related intelligence information. And our hybrid approach is we have a fusion center that is primarily staffed by our people but is connected to the JTTF. We also have people assigned to the JTTF… and the joint analytical center… So we try to have almost a three-prong connection. It’s labor intensive, but we have someone at JTTF, we have someone at the [state name omitted] Joint Analytical Center and we have a fusion center which takes up an entire floor of the FBI building.

**Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)**

Agency 1 in the West North Central region specifically mentioned the UASI in relation to perceived threats. This agency represents one of sixty cities in our country that currently receives funds through the UASI program due to the city’s assessed vulnerability and likelihood of attack.

**Call for Service Code**

The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Mountain region noted there was a call code for terrorism-related activity. However, only personnel in dispatch and police officers are aware of this code for service. Interestingly, all calls get routed through the 911 call center, versus filtered through the state-established terrorism hotline. If an individual contacted the hotline with concern about a bomb threat, for example, that call would be re-routed to the 911 dispatch and handled as an emergency police call.

We do have a code for that type of incident. Ours is 445. It doesn’t really mean anything to anybody unless you are within our agency. However, you know in that type of situation, [name omitted], that would be handled by 911 at that point. And you would have your first responders out there, my detectives would ultimately be coming in and providing the
intelligence support from the counterterrorism, homeland security aspect of it. But you know if someone dropped a bag and they thought it was a bomb, that gets a response but it doesn’t get to the hotline response. If that came into the hotline, we would redirect it immediately to 911 and go about it from that aspect.

In addition, the sergeant from Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region confirmed his agency was in the process of implementing a code for terrorism-related calls for service. This code sets off a chain reaction starting with patrol officers and moves up the chain of command regarding how individual officers should respond. According to the sergeant:

Well actually, there’ll be a 1080 code. That’s what we call them if it’s a terrorist type thing. We’ll get a call and we basically put a code that’s called a 1080. And actually that, once again, that falls under our general orders. And once an officer hears it, that it’s a 1080 call, then he has certain things that he has to do. Supervisors on the street have certain things they have to do, based on the code itself. It’s a total chain reaction.

Response Experience

This study also considered individual agency response experience. Since there is an agreement in the field that all terrorism is “local,” terrorism perceptions, threats and incidents will differ from city to city. Thus, police department responses will also vary. The research assumed that as the current threat perception and prior experience with terrorism increases, the resulting counterterrorism activities would also increase. The researcher asked respondents to discuss how they perceived terrorism threats within their jurisdiction. The researcher queried interviewees to determine threat perception, terrorist group presence, identification of physical vulnerabilities, the execution of threat analyses, likelihood of attack and greatest terrorism-related concerns.

Prior Response Experience with Terrorism-related Events

In general, agencies had little to no response experience with terrorism.
### Table 17: Agency Terrorism Response Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>RESPONSE EXPERIENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Direct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency 3</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agency 2</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>Agency 1</td>
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<td>Agency 2</td>
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<td>Direct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
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<td>Direct</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency 4</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
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As the commander from Agency 1 in West South Central region commented, “Well, fortunately, we, like most cities here in America, haven’t had to deal with it head on.”

While response experience varies widely across jurisdictions, agencies typically had indirect experience, such as with protests, graffiti and vandalism, funding and investigations. In addition, it is often difficult to discern motive. As a result, police departments label incidents as criminal, versus as acts of terrorism. The commander provided evidence of this issue:
We did have an incident here back in April of 2007 where we did have a bomb placed at an abortion clinic. And it was a device that could have gone off and injured or killed people [due to] the manner in which it was constructed. The individual was adjudicated and there really was never any reason behind the bombing, so I couldn’t say that that was terrorist-related. But the fact that the target was an abortion clinic and we do have some domestic groups that engage in terrorist activities towards those locations, so the possibility exists.

The lieutenant for Agency 2 in the West South Central region poignantly pointed out:

And that depends on what your investment in intelligence is. In other words, if you’re not out there aggressively investing in intelligence, how are you going to know what your threat perception is? In other words, to quote our ex-vice president, you might not know what you might not know. So you know what you don’t know, and then there’s some things that you don’t know that you don’t know.

However, three agencies articulated direct experience with terrorism. Agency 1 in the Pacific, Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic and Agency 3 in the West South Central regions have a history of terrorism-related events occurring over the last twenty years. These jurisdictions are exceptions and unique in their response experiences due to the numerous targets, symbols and infrastructure.

Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region described an incident where an officer came into direct contact with potential terrorists in the planning stages:

We also had the sheriff’s deputy just down south, I think it was [name omitted] County, who stopped the two Middle-Eastern men who had photographs and a lot of information and also had some bomb-making material that they were en route to start to assemble. We had a couple of occasions where some folks, a living national and there was another individual, I don’t remember the country he came from. He was en route from Washington, started somewhere north in Baltimore and went through DC, was taking photographs and schematics, went through [city name omitted] was doing his schematics here. And a patrol officer encountered him. One of our officers stopped and detained him and it turned out he was actually shipping all those schematics from cities, monuments, national monuments back to his home country. I think it was Libya but don’t quote me on that one, but he was actually mapping out potential targets is what it was. He was sent away and convicted, well, I don’t know if he was convicted at this point. I know he was arrested and charged. So,
we’ve certainly had it come up right here locally and our position is not as in-depth and stringent as New York, but our position is we need to protect ourselves and we’re going do that through our own agency.

The sergeant for Agency 2 in the Mountain region described his agency’s experience with domestic militia groups:

Well, we did have issues back before 9/11. We had a group here called the Viper Militia and I don’t know if maybe you didn’t see as much militia activity after Timothy McVeigh. But we had a large Viper Militia out here and some different folks that were criminally prosecuted for their actions as being part of a militia intending to act against the federal government. So we did see more of that type of thing before 9/11, but there wasn’t as much of that after 9/11.

With respect to threat perception, agencies typically aligned their threat levels with the Department of Homeland Security (replaced in April 2011 by the National Terror Advisory System). At the time of the study, the national threat level was “yellow” (elevated), indicating a significant risk of terrorist attack. The airline industry’s (domestic and international) threat level was “orange,” signifying a high risk of terrorist attacks.

**Table 18: Homeland Security Advisory System Threat Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Risk Assessment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe (Red)</td>
<td>Severe risk of terrorist attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>High (Orange)</td>
<td>High risk of terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevated (Yellow)</td>
<td>Significant risk of terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarded (Blue)</td>
<td>General risk of terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (Green)</td>
<td>Low risk of terrorist attacks</td>
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As the lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Pacific region stated:

Well, we align our threat levels with the DHS threat levels. So if the federal government puts out a high threat level, of course we do. I’ve never seen a difference between the federal level and our level. For example, if they’re at yellow, we’re at yellow. We’ve never been higher or lower than what they’re higher at. I think perception-wise, we perceive in [city name omitted] that, as I said before, we’re a target. And because terrorists are politically-motivated, the target obviously [city name...}


omitted], Washington, New York City are probably the big three targets in the US.

However, four agencies have developed their own threat-level system, such as

Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region:

We were one of the first departments to come up with the alert system. You know we don’t use the federal colors. They’re actually the same ones New York uses. We uses alpha, bravo, charlie and delta. So we made certain areas of the city stay in contact with DHS but you know, just because DHS doesn’t raise an alert, we may raise our alert in the city.

Agency 1 in the Mountain region echoes the sentiment for having a local alert system. The lieutenant provided further comment on the issue of using the national threat level system:

Oh boy, that is an interesting question. I think that the federal government’s color-coding is very confusing. And I think, yeah, I think that they are really doing it sort of on a national perspective on what international terrorism is looking like to the United States, which is good. However, at a local perspective, we have a lot of things that we may put within the confines of terrorism or we may, you know, as for instance, if our water treatment facility were compromised we don’t really have a backup here. So what does that mean for this community? Do we put that at a high level? It doesn’t correspond to what the national color-coding is. I think the best way to put it to you is that within certain areas of our terrorism efforts I think that we have a much higher priority than maybe what the national color code is reflected at. However, there are many things in that arena that we probably agree with.

Although local police agencies generally aligned threat levels according to the federal government’s status, respondents generally perceived threats to their jurisdictions as low to medium. The assistant chief for Agency 4 in the Pacific region framed his perception of threat comparatively:

Yes, well I would say in, I would believe in any jurisdiction in the United States, I would say it’s low, whether it’s New York, DC, [city name omitted] or anywhere else. Comparatively, I would say it’s medium to high. In other words, if you compare [city name omitted] to all of the other US cities, I think it’s probably lower than New York, DC, and probably comparable to San Francisco and Los Angeles.
The research noted two exceptions. The first was Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region. The captain considered his agency’s threat perception as high. He noted there are many “symbolic issues” and targets of “premium value” located within the city limits which would make, and have made, the city a target for terrorist attack. Agency 2 in the Mountain region illustrated the second exception. The sergeant said that while his department follows the DHS threat model, the agency’s threat perception is high:

We’re a border state. Our county borders Mexico by about 30 miles and there’s an Indian reservation that traverses into Mexico, comes up into the United States and then into our county and that’s one of the major trafficking routes from Mexico into the United States. So, the perception is it’s very poor and there’s a lot of activity down there with all types of criminal activity and hopefully not terrorist activity but statistics might show otherwise. So our threat perception is very high.

Additionally, the captain from Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region ranked the likelihood of attack in his jurisdiction as medium, given the financial infrastructure:

I would say this: I’d say we are a good potential target in that we do have the banking industry here. It would cause a lot and disrupt a lot of the financial systems that go on. And you know we are a popular city in that, you know, tourism and so forth, so we are a good target if someone chose to. And we’ve certainly had interest in this area in the past. So I would say a medium. I hope we don’t have any [laugh].

However, departments did recognize a “real” threat existed in a post-September 11 environment. Furthermore, it appears that a major event, such as a football game or horse race, drives a jurisdiction’s threat level. As the commander from Agency 1 in the West South Central region stated, “There are specific events that would raise a greater concern just because of the potential value they would pose for a terrorist act or criminal act.”

The lieutenant for Agency 1 in the East South Central region agreed:

Well, our perception changes up and down. And by that I mean, generally speaking, I would say our threat, our perception of a threat here of
something actually occurring here is relatively low. Except for maybe once or twice a year when we have major events go on. For instance, the [omitted], which is our biggest event every year. That brings in a lot of high-profile people from the Middle East.

The captain from Agency 1 in the West North Central region commented on the difficulty of assessing threat in general. He described threat as the toughest component in homeland security:

And the reason why I say that is because the information-sharing environment is not good. While we’re working on it, the information sharing between federal agencies, local, state, tribal is not near where it needs to be. And a lot of the threat data that comes through working with informants beyond our city limits and even within the city limits isn’t shared. I would say we can constantly look at threat and try to pick up on that. At this time I would have no specific credible threats to the metropolitan area in [city name omitted] but, you know, it doesn’t mean that the threat’s not out there and that’s one of the shortcomings that we’re all trying to fight right now.

The captain from Agency 3 in the West South Central region expressed concern for negating the likelihood of a terrorist attack in his or any jurisdiction. His department has had firsthand experiencing with domestic terrorism. The captain stated he would not have believed it would happen “here” (in his jurisdiction) before the incident. However, there is great uncertainty now, as an act of terrorism can occur anywhere, at any time. He continued to explain the issues of classifying threat in terms of low, medium and high:

I mean, how do they, how do we know? …In all honesty, if somebody’s telling you it’s high, they ought to have tanks on every street corner and the military ought to take over your town.

While threat perception is generally low, all agencies reported they had identified physical vulnerabilities and had conducted threat assessments. Threat assessments consist of evaluating potential targets and ascertaining risk. The timing of threat assessments ranged from immediately following 9/11 to as late as 2007. Eighteen of the departments involved in this study conducted threat assessments for their jurisdictions. For example,
Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region created a position of “counterterrorism inspector.”

This individual travels throughout the city each day conducting threat analyses. Only three departments had threat assessments completed by or in concert with outside agencies. Agency 2 in the East South Central region discussed how there is a combination of efforts based on different industry sectors:

On the different sectors of industry where there’s water, where there’s chemical or distribution, we’ve done what’s called the local emergency planning commission. They’re the group that really, basically, covers the chemical industry. We have Infraguard, which is the private business group. And we have, even in our homes, we have CERT, Community Emergency Response Training. We teach people how to make simple assessments in just their houses and the places around, the places where they shop and as they go from place to place every day.

Physical vulnerabilities primarily include physical infrastructure and key resources such as landmarks, symbolic structures and financial institutions. Two agencies specifically mentioned adopting the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) system as a component of their physical vulnerability threat assessments. PCII originated from Presidential Directive PDD-63 (May 1998). The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Mountain region briefly discussed PCII and the problems with the system. He also provided insight in understanding the difference between security assessments and threat assessments:

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information… it’s actually a national presidential directive. I think it’s 12333 if I remember correctly. And that basically allows for this sort of information to be collected and protected so that it goes into the DHS’s database and sits there… So we have what we call Silver Shield which is basically our critical structure protection program out here, and so we’re trying to populate that stuff. I can tell you that as it sits right now the truth of the matter is that we have security assessments done. True threat assessments are a work in progress. The reason is because those properties, like I told you, the properties are reluctant. But along with that directive there’s nothing that, just like you know if you’re working for the FBI, CIA, my unit, you sign a confidentiality agreement and you know upon penalty of death, you can’t
tell the secrets, right? Well, with gathering of that information, there’s no true mechanism in place so that if we did gather that and an attack happened and somebody goes out and flaps their jaws and said, “Hey we told ’em about that then.” We don’t have anything but to keep at it I guess. Secrecy’s not really the word but it’s that secrecy that surrounds the existence of this threat assessment. That’s the idea, that the threat assessment makes the properties better. But it’s also sort of indirect competition with the fact that properties are supposed to be open to make money and it’s sort of a catch-22 in that situation, and it’s been very difficult.

However, not all threat assessments are citywide, nor are they conducted on a regular basis. Many agencies noted they completed assessments on an as-needed basis (such as for special events), or as requested by businesses. The sergeant from Agency 1 in South Atlantic region provided a good example:

We do threat assessments just about on any major event or anything going on. The latest one I did, we did threat assessments on the upcoming 2009 [name omitted] football season. And as it relates to terrorist attacks on the actual stadium itself… we’ll write up a threat assessment based on the locations up there and what we perceive may or may not be happening.

In some cases, departments rely on the FBI to determine likelihood of attack. Based on the FBI’s assessment, an agency would then focus on those specific vulnerabilities. As the lieutenant from Agency 1 in the East South Central region explained:

The likelihood of an attack would be left to the FBI. They’re doing the investigation into all these people who may want to target those. They’re the ones that are going to provide us our analysis. Focus is more on what are the vulnerabilities of that particular thing. If they do decide to attack, where are they likely to attack based on the fact? Okay, you don’t have a fence up on your backside, I don’t know [laugh]. But what our threat assessment doesn’t get into is that the most likely place, but if it is the place, you know, what is the vulnerability? That’s what we primarily do.

All agencies acknowledged there is some degree of terrorist group presence within their jurisdictions. However, agencies did not want to provide details on the types of groups believed to be present. In addition, five agencies admitted “group” presence,
although not necessarily terroristic in nature. Agency 1 in the East North Central region stated there are over 30 hate groups in its jurisdiction. While currently categorized as "groups," they do have the capacity to turn into terrorist groups. Furthermore, group presence can take on different meanings. With respect to recognizing and acknowledging group presence, the commander from Agency 1 in the West South Central region said:

Well, and what I would say to that is, I think that any major city that does not believe there is terrorist group presence, they need to reevaluate. Now, the terrorist group presence, what I would tell you is, I think that a terrorist group can represent several different things. It may actually be the sleeper cell that’s embedded itself within a community. But on the other end of the spectrum, it may also be the financing arm for a terrorist group that’s simply running legitimate businesses, but funneling the money to terrorist organizations. So I think, given the spectrum of activities involved in terrorist acts, I think that you’ll find most major cities will believe that it is present.

The captain from Agency 1 in the West North Central region added that while there may be group presence, these groups do not always pose a threat. He further clarified this issue in differentiating between threat, hazard, risk, vulnerabilities and consequences. He believes the general public uses these terms interchangeably when in fact they have very singular meanings.

Well, it’s not believed we know it. I mean, we have it. But the fact that they’re here doesn’t mean that they’re a threat, that they have a threat specifically to our area... A lot of folks don’t understand the difference between threat, hazard, risk, vulnerabilities, consequences, and they interchange a lot of them. A threat is just a specific act that someone that’s intentionally working on to destroy property, lives, whatever. You know, that threat is there, they’re working on it and they’re trying to make this thing happen. And risk is something that is interchanged a lot with threat and the nationally-accepted model, and I always try to keep things to where we’re working within so we can work and interchange information with everybody on the same level. Risk is vulnerability, consequence, and threat gives you your risk.

Agency 1 in the Pacific region was the only agency to provide extensive details on the types of terrorist groups they believed were within the department’s jurisdiction.
The lieutenant indicated the presence of both domestic and international groups. Incidents ranged from vandalism to environmental terrorism to firebombs.

We know we have white supremacist groups, we have black separatist groups. There was a case where that kind of bordered on terrorism not too far back called the [name omitted] case, which are the splinter group from the Black Panthers. It started a few years ago and they were intending to launch attacks on police stations. Very, very political motivations. We knew about those groups. Of course, I mentioned we have at least Hezbollah support groups in [city name omitted]. Again, all open-source and we had Islamist extremists like the [name omitted] case as an example. So, yeah, we know we have terrorist cells in [city name omitted].

The chief for Agency 2 in the Pacific region brought up the issue of overlap between the terms “terrorist” and “gang.” He stated that when you talk to police chiefs in general (primarily in mid-level communities), they universally use the term “urban terrorists” to describe criminal gang activity. Thus, when police chiefs talk about the local threat of terrorism, they often mean organized gangs.

The greatest terrorism-related concern varied widely. The most significant concerns respondents noted included: CBRNE, WMD, IED, attack on soft targets, white powder, domestic concerns, vulnerability, fearing the “unknown,” a lone wolf or small group, radicalization and funding. In addition, there was no consistency among respondents as to whether their agencies concerned themselves more with domestic or international terrorist incidents.

Five agencies indicated a chemical attack as the greatest terrorism-related concern because it is the most likely scenario. As the lieutenant from Agency 2 in the West South Central region explained, a person can easily obtain a wide variety of chemicals. Additionally, most chemicals are easy to use and can cause a catastrophic release from a railroad car with a very small explosive. Furthermore, chemical incidents cause
immediate symptoms such as the inability to breathe. Whereas with a biological attack, a victim may get sick, but specific symptoms may not develop for days or weeks.

Respondents alluded to radicalization or the “lone wolf” as another issue of concern. Agency 1 in the West North Central region used the perspective of radicalization in prisons and jails. In such scenarios, terrorists or persons related to terrorism on the inside influence other inmates, particularly the younger generation. Coupled with this is the issue of single persons or small groups who are moving toward the political objectives of a terrorist organization, taking action on their own.

The major for Agency 2 in the East South Central region expressed a fear of the rise of domestic terrorist groups. He believed it is just a matter of time before they “get up in arms and just start doing what they want to do in the United States.”

That’s our biggest concern right now is domestic terrorism. We have the rise of the militias again. Your militias are starting to come up again. Your Aryans are not just out there all the time completely hidden anymore. They’re starting to have conventions more in the [city name omitted] area, and it makes people nervous. But I tell them all the time you can’t stop them from having a convention, and in fact, we have to protect them. We have to protect their right to have it. And, you know, because, everybody in those groups are not bad people. Some of them are there because they’re being coerced by a family member. Or some are in there because they’re really law enforcement people who are in there undercover. So you let them have their stuff and do what they do. And eventually we find out what’s happening, and we can do something to stop what they’re going to do. So I think domestic terrorism, overall, that would be our biggest menace right now.

The captain from Agency 3 in the West South Central region mentioned fear of the unknown:

The unknown: not knowing what’s going to happen next. You know, we have, like, say we have the interstate here, we have an airport. We have two universities within an hour, major college universities. We have a sports arena that has 18,000 people in it. You know, pick a Saturday in [city name omitted], which is just 30 miles from here. When the [team
name omitted] are playing there, there’ll be 80,000 people there. At the same time in [city name omitted], which is another hour north of us, there’ll be 65,000 people at a football game. Where? The biggest fear is what are they going to hit? I mean, if they’re going to hit us, where is it going to be?

The major from Agency 4 in the South Atlantic region noted his belief that terrorists were in his jurisdiction. When asked if they would attack his city, he answered, “yes, they could and would.” From his experience, the primary operating model of terrorists is fundraising; the planning stages do not always have a criminal element. Other related crimes committed in lieu of attack are various white-collar crimes. The major viewed terrorism in this sense as a criminal enterprise, comparing the terrorists to the mafia, “only with bombs.”

Two departments commented on the “shifting” of concerns, depending on the time of year. The sergeant from Agency 2 in the Mountain region stated, “You know, unfortunately it almost changes seasonally. We hear too often about the holiday-related schemes where this guy wants to do something at a large mall. And then as the year progresses, there is another threat.” The chief for Agency 2 in the Pacific region provided further explanation. He described his department’s greatest terrorism-related concern as multifaceted:

Well, let me say this of the risk locations or target locations that I mentioned to you. We do obviously prioritize those, and sometimes during the course of the year, the targets shift depending on what information we receive, whether we get on-the-ground intelligence from those locations and such coming from those directly, whether or not our intelligence unit picks up information about potential demonstrations or the likelihood of an attack on those facilities. And also, we get information from Homeland Security and the FBI. So the information coming directly to us determines if we re-prioritize or not, and if we need to pay, again, particular attention to a location during a certain time of the year. Obviously, we’re also in tune with what’s going on nationally, you know, threat levels shift from time to time. We pick up information from the national level regarding particular groups that may be planning events in the United States and
where we’re more conscious than ever before now that an attack could happen anywhere. Just, we’re sort of out here, you know, away from the major cities. That doesn’t exclude us as being a potential target location, so we take it very, very seriously. And again, during the course of the year, depending on the intelligence we receive from the sources I mentioned, we adjust our priorities and then deploy our resources depending on what we think is a credible threat.

Agency 2 in the West North Central region added:

I mean, see, there’s so many different aspects in the vulnerability scale. Probably what would impact our jurisdiction the most is going to be a 9/11 type of scenario in that we’ve got an international airport here and it would not be difficult if you can get your hands on a plane and hijack it and cause a similar type of incident downtown. The problem we would have with that is that we have less than 10% of the resources that a city like New York does. Yeah, so an event of that magnitude would be certainly a huge type of thing. Which doesn’t discount your Timothy McVeigh: something like that’s going to hurt us too. So it’s really double-edged. You know, a major incident such as 9/11 would be catastrophic, but certainly your homegrown style with the truck bomb is going to be devastating, just a different scale.

The commander from Agency 1 in the West South Central region brought an interesting observation regarding concerns for white powder incidents in his jurisdiction:

I mean, they’re random. I would say that they occur more often during tax season, and the IRS is a frequent receiver, recipient of these letters. But other than tax season and the IRS, they tend to be very random.

**Distribution of Medications**

One department conveyed concern regarding the issue of distribution of medications in the various situations. The captain for Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region commented on situations such as if there was an H1N1 flu outbreak or a biological attack.

So we started looking at how we would do point-of-dispensing pods and distribution of SNS stockpiles. Most areas have a plan because they have to. The state has to have the ability to receive and distribute stockpile assets. And I’ve gone through that because I’ve received Tamil flu stockpile and some TBE stockpile from the SNS. And we have point-of-dispensing working with the school system where we would dispense out
and also, you know, we have that built into some private industry where they were large enough that they can accommodate those things. So that’s also another component where we would be able to distribute and pass out medication or preventative or prophylactic if necessary.

*Risk as a Product of Threat, Vulnerability and Consequence*

During the discussion of threat analysis, the captain from Agency 1 in the West North Central region identified the issue of risk and differentiated it from threat. He explained risk is a product of threat, vulnerability and consequence, versus being a standalone concept. As such, risk is a part of the physical vulnerability assessment methodology.

You know, we weigh threat and war. Because in my mind, if you’re going to go out and protect a facility, you’ve got one that’s really vulnerable but there’s really no consequence and there’s no threat. If you got one over here that’s got high threat, it’s maybe not as vulnerable but has a high consequence. Where should you spend your money? And it’s called buying down risk. Where should you buy down your risk? Some place where there’s no threat at all or never has been? Now there has to be something you try to make quite a healthy facility because we need to. You never know when they’re going to change methods or tactics. The terrorists are going to do that, but there are limited funding streams and whatnot. So you have to think about those things and how you approach buying down risk and protecting the community.

Vulnerability doesn’t really determine the likelihood. The likelihood’s based, really, it comes back to that threat assessment component. The threat assessments are where you’re looking at likelihood.

*Training the Private Sector and Community Partnerships*

In speaking about physical vulnerabilities Agency 1 in the Mountain region identified, the lieutenant brought up the issue of working with the private sector through training. He also commented on developing partnerships with the community, such as with the local university. These trainings are usually brief and occur on an ongoing basis.
The lieutenant indicated that the agency updates the trainings as necessary. However, this provides another set of challenges.

Well, we do a lot of train-the-trainer. So we get key employees at a variety of different places. It is very manpower- and very labor-intensive for us. I’m not going to lie to you. That is a very difficult thing and given the economic environment that we’re existing in today, it’s difficult for those companies to give up those people for that type of training on a regular basis too.

No Organizational Change

If the agency reported no organizational change, the interviewer asked the agency to discern why. Specifically, this question sought to discover whether it encountered any barriers to implementing organizational change. In addition, the question elicited respondent opinions as to what they believed their agency needed to do to improve its response capabilities. Only Agency 3 in the South Atlantic region reported no organizational changes at any level.

The researcher queried Agency 3’s major if the agency would like to have implemented a specialized terrorism unit or other type of organizational change. The major simply stated he believed his department’s mission and objectives were appropriate and there was no need for any organizational changes. When asked if he would like to see a specialized terrorism unit or similar organizational change within the agency, the major answered “In a perfect world, but you know you have to deploy your resources according to what your objectives are, what your mission is. And I think quite honestly we’re okay.”

Summary

No agency reported any reprioritization of investment areas or a need to alter day-to-day functions. Typically, responsibilities for counterterrorism initiatives fell within the
confines of the specialized terrorism unit or another unit that had integrated homeland security duties into its operations. Agencies commonly cited an “all-crimes” or “all-hazards” approach to dealing with terrorism-related issues. Several agencies indicated that reprioritization only took the form of shifting personnel or funds to accommodate counterterrorism efforts. Only one department, Agency 3 in the South Atlantic region, reported no organizational changes at any level.

Most agencies reported the inclusion of terrorism and homeland security issues as part of new recruit education in police academies. However, the study found a wide variation in the number of hours and type of training received. It found no consistency among agencies in what they included as part of the counterterrorism curriculum. Education ranged from basic awareness to completion of specific Department of Homeland Security courses such as the National Incident Management (NIMS) and Incidence Command System (ICS) training before graduation.

All respondents stated their departments offered in-service training for all officers. Counterterrorism and homeland security instruction ranged from mandatory to volunteer training. The research disclosed various methods used for training: bulletins, alerts, roll call, equipment and classes conducted inside and outside of the department. In general, local police agencies offered or provided training to all officers. However, in some cases, the department only provided training to those whose assignments directly related to counterterrorism and homeland security initiatives.

The participant interviews revealed that terrorism threat perception ranged from low to medium. However, local police departments are proactively involved in counterterrorism initiatives. The research findings suggest that agencies are
contemplating the meaning of terrorism, planning for future incidents and improving response capabilities. They are also involved in the collection of terrorism-related intelligence. Furthermore, an agency’s response experience did not appear to influence the extent to which an agency prepares for terrorism. Rather, departments assess threat and risk through a multifaceted approach.

Based on the interviews, local police agencies seem to understand the basic elements of terrorism. However, no agency in this study adopted a standardized definition of terrorism. Most departments adhered to the FBI’s definition, but only as a guideline. Respondents indicated there was a need for a definition, but noted definitions can also restrict and impede police investigations.

The study found that local police agencies developed formal written response plans following September 11. However, in almost all cases, their plans were not terrorism-specific. Instead, agencies chose to implement an “all-hazards” approach. Under an all-hazards philosophy, agencies prepare for and respond to all types of incidents, whether man-made or natural, in the same way. The guidelines are the same whether responding to a terrorist attack similar to 9/11 or to an earthquake. No agencies reported having a separate terrorism response plan, nor did the current response plans reference terrorism-specific events.

The research findings suggest local police departments are involved in the collection of terrorism-related information. While the area FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force would be the lead agency in any terrorism investigation, a department may begin a case as a criminal investigation. Once an agency believes the criminal investigation has turned into a terrorism investigation, the agency turns the case over to the JTTF. The state
fusion center is the primary source of information and intelligence. There was also
evidence that many departments conduct terrorism-related investigations independent of
the JTTF.

Lastly, an agency’s prior response experience with terrorism did not appear to be
a major factor in preparation and planning activities. Awareness of group presence also
seemed to have little influence. Rather, the current threat perception, based on the
national threat level, local physical vulnerability assessments and intelligence, drove
counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, threat perception fluctuated because of seasonal
shifts, altering the focus of threat assessments.
Research Question 4: Are changes in local police organizations a result of a “perceived” threat or is there pressure from external sources to implement counterterrorism measures?

The research sought to identify whether the organizational change occurring in local police departments was proactive (the contingency perspective) or reactive (the institutional perspective). The last question solicited the rationale for the implementation of the specialized terrorism unit or new policing strategy. In addition, the study collected information on how departments obtained the resources to support the organizational change.

This study primarily considered large police organizations across the United States. However, these agencies varied considerably in geographic location, as table 4 in chapter 5 shows. Given this variation, the researcher expected police departments in different regions of the country would have different response experiences with terrorism. They would also have different threat perceptions and fluctuation of group presence beliefs. As such, the continued threat of terrorism and the federal government’s counterterrorism guidelines would have a unique impact on each agency. The participants’ responses revealed the organizational changes did not result from external pressures. Through internal assessments, 95% (20 out of 21) of police departments in this study have adapted to this external environment. They have done so by implementing a specialized terrorism or similar unit, incorporating a counterterrorism function as part of an existing intelligence unit or adopting new operational strategies or philosophies.
Table 19: Impetus for Organizational Change by Agency

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*Internal Assessments*

The captain from Agency 2 in the South Atlantic region explained the pressure was outward for his agency:

I think the pressure is outward. We identify our need or have a need, and the pressure comes outward. So we don’t necessarily feel like they command. You know the assessors will come in and say you need this, you need this and you need this. It’s a pressure from within to make sure it’s immediately safe from crime or safe from terrorists and we get a system.
Likewise, Agency 1 in the Mountain region believed the decision to implement a new bureau dealing with terrorism was internal. The lieutenant also recognized that many local police agencies are taking “the lead” in counterterrorism efforts:

That was us. Our agency did it and I can tell you that, really in my opinion, I think there’s five agencies probably that are really driving the change in the local law enforcement terrorism arena. I think LAPD and Chief Bratton and certainly our department is at the forefront of that. Houston, Boston and New York City and, probably the other one that I would throw in there would be Virginia. Virginia’s state police are driving a lot of the local law enforcement interaction with the federal counterterrorism efforts. And unfortunately, we have a long way to go, but I think those people are the ones that are really pushing for that to occur.

The chief from Agency 2 in the Pacific region also described how his agency executed a new operational strategy independently through a jurisdictional assessment:

Well, first of all, we did that independently… I told you that right after September 11th, we got the increase in bomb threats and then we did an assessment of our community and found out what areas we thought would be target areas… But we do place a high priority on supporting and cooperating with the federal agencies whose mission is to focus on combating terrorism.

Agency 3 in the Pacific region added it was necessary to implement organizational change to share and disseminate information both with other agencies and within the department:

No, there was nothing from the outside. I think it was just a normal response to 9/11 and the fact that we needed to look at a better system, really across the border, across the country, to share information and to disseminate information to the officers on the street.

**Funding and Other External Sources**

The findings revealed local police agencies have adapted to the external environment. Yet the interviews also evidenced backing from external bodies, such as local governments, to implement organizational change. Although four agencies acknowledged there was pressure from government agencies, the decision to realize the
organizational change rested solely on individual departments. For example, the captain from Agency 1 in the Mid-Atlantic region stated a combination of factors influenced the implementation of the two new bureaus. The incidents of September 11, 2001 were foremost. Pressures from the police commissioner, in addition to other external governmental agencies, were also factors. The captain noted part of the departmental decision occurred because the department could not rely solely on the FBI for counterterrorism efforts. The department had the resources and funding and thus moved forward with the implementation of the two bureaus. The captain further commented that when his agency created the bureaus, the mission was “so focused and specialized” that the bureaus “are almost completely removed from the department.”

Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region noted that as the department began to receive federal grant dollars, they needed to have a focus for the counterterrorism efforts. The sergeant explained a combination of efforts affected the decision to establish a specialized terrorism unit. However, his department led the endeavor for the organizational change:

Internally and in the police department, we expanded our representation on the joint terrorist task force. We assigned more detectives and analysts over there to do that. And then, when everybody came together and decided that, well, okay, this is the refocus and the reorganization of the department, that was not only within the police department, it was city management, city political leaders and then we were are also supported by state leadership.

Agency 1 in the West South Central region provided similar comments. The commander also acknowledged his department needed a focus due to receipt of grant dollars. However, he also cited the concern for training officers on how to use protective equipment. Training for his department became the primary reason for the organizational change:
And we slowly transitioned that into the facilities that would take ownership of some of their security needs and requirements. And then when we formalized it with the creation of the SORT team, that was due to a lot of the new training that was coming online and a lot of the personal protective equipment we were receiving through federal grants and the need to train all of the department on how to use those.

The assistant chief for Agency 4 in the Pacific region commented that the decision was both internal and external. He detailed how his department conducted assessments before September 11, but those evaluations were not terrorism-related. Rather, the department was considering history and more high publicity crimes, such as school shootings. The department took the lead in assessing the needs of the agency and the community. However, the mayor also put pressure on the agency:

I think there was a broad expectation across the country that police departments would do something and no one really knew what that was. Our mayor stepped right up and said, “My expectation is that [city name omitted] will be the best prepared city in the nation for a disaster.” And that was not very long after 9/11. That further supported strengthening the emergency response capacity of both the police and fire department and the organization of our emergency operations center and how much planning we really needed to do. So it was internal, external, nationwide, locally and really, for us, it helped galvanize some things we were already looking at into a single plan to respond. So hopefully, that gives you some depth to why and how.

Respondents also indicated how other local, state and federal policing agencies influenced departmental policies. The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Pacific region specifically noted which agencies he believed were the leaders in counterterrorism efforts. These agencies and others, through the action of organizational change, appear to be persuading other agencies to change as well. The master police officer for Agency 5 in the South Atlantic region commented further. He stated the department’s sister agency inspired the department’s decision to implement a specialized terrorism unit:

If memory serves me right… the heads of the local agencies and [state law enforcement agency omitted] wanted to build these task forces rather
quickly. So, all the agency cheese met and a lot of them decided, “hey, we need to form a homeland security unit,” based on the size of the agency. I know [county name omitted] County, which is our sister agency… we’re the two biggest boys on the block. They started a homeland security unit so, you know, we weren’t going to be outdone, so we started a homeland security unit.

Summary

The study also found departments shifted funds and resources to implement counterterrorism measures. Organizational change funding has largely been the individual agency’s sole responsibility, with little to no dependence on outside resources. The exception was the receipt of UASI funds. However, the agency could not use this money for personnel. Agencies in receipt of UASI funds could use the money to conduct threat assessments, create buffer zone protection plans and purchase equipment. Furthermore, the research findings indicate that a majority of agencies (95%) conduct continual, bi-annual or annual threat assessments. This makes their adjustments most effective in achieving specific goals.

Other Information Respondents Provided

At each interview’s conclusion, the researcher asked respondents if they would like to add any supplemental information, or if there were any important topics the researcher had not addressed. Most respondents felt the questions addressed the majority of key issues regarding the impact of terrorism on local law enforcement. The issue of most importance respondents raised dealt with the cooperation in and coordination of information and intelligence gathering. Agency 1 in the East South Central region discussed the problems of coordination (specifically among federal agencies) and reporting requirements:

So the problem is: both sides of the house have statutory authority to require that reporting. So you have chemical companies reporting, ‘yes,
we have X thousands of pounds of ammonia or chlorine” or whatever. And on the other hand, you've got the critical infrastructure protection people under DHS who look at it, who are primarily looking at chemical plants going, “you know this information should be classified, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.” And then they have their own reporting requirements. So then, the companies have to turn around and report it to them. And then you have people like me come along there at the local level going, “hey look, we’d like to know what you have so that if we have to respond, we know what we’re responding into.” And so there’s a lot of layers of repetition there and that’s really a problem.

The lieutenant from Agency 1 in the Pacific region also provided detailed comment of the issue of information and intelligence sharing. He stated there has been some “amount of jointness” emerging from the growing use of fusion centers. However, many jurisdictions are gathering intelligence but cannot share the information because there are no links between databases. He cited an FBI case where the FBI listed his jurisdiction as a potential target. However, the FBI did not release the information to his agency for 30 days:

We have clearances, you know, there’s issues there too because the FBI has been very stingy about giving clearances to local law enforcement. Even though first of all, I’m a military officer in the reserves, I already have a DOD clearance. But yet, you would think it would take an act of Congress to get a cleared police officer a clearance so that they can do the intelligence job that they need to do, get to the database that they need to get into. So really what it comes down to is if you’re going to do this right it doesn’t matter how big or what all the functions of your intelligence unit is or your counterterrorism unit is in your city. What’s most important is can they effectively receive and transmit information or intelligence between agencies and then cooperate on investigation and possibly direct actions that need to be taken if there’s a threat. That’s really the bottom-line issue.

The officer from Agency 3 in the Pacific region added the importance of interacting with the public and private sectors, creating a “force multiplier” effect:

Just one last thing: the last couple of things we talked about and it’s been highlighted and spotlighted in some of the major reports on federal and state levels. The importance of interacting with the public and private sector and community groups as well, because, you know, it’s a force
multiplier concept. The more people that are aware of what we’re looking for and the better information exchange we have, the better job we could do at remaining safe.

The deputy chief for Agency 1 in the East North Central region expressed concern about the perception of emergency preparedness within his department. He believed many in his department did not consider it a high priority, particularly the command staff. He also commented on the risk of ignoring the issue of emergency management and preparedness:

It’s like pulling teeth to try to get people to go to the trainings for those and to take it seriously, and the community is about the same too. Are there any forces in the community thriving to say, “We want to know what you’re doing to address emergency preparedness and terrorism.” So I’m curious how other cities are experiencing that. Is it an effort to try to get their police in the community involved? … And I think that’s a big factor, and we’re also aware that we don’t get hurricanes, so there aren’t people perceiving that there’s a need to ask a lot of emergency preparedness issues because of that. But the potential is, we could have a serious tornado. We’ve had tornados in [state name omitted], but they don’t generally come near big cities. They’re out in our more suburban or rural areas, so people are kind of blowing this off and there really isn’t any interest in it.

Similarly, the chief from Agency 2 in the Pacific region noted the important of being able to respond to an event. He identified “flexibility” as being the key to success:

I think the main thing is the key word “flexibility.” Obviously, the horrors of September 11th, I mean we can’t get away from that even though years go by. But it’s there and we’re reminded constantly Osama bin Laden is still alive and well. Al-Qaeda is still alive and well. There are other terrorist groups that love to take responsibility for attacks. We see them all the time. We see the horrors of war and Iraq and Afghanistan and we see the realities that terrorism can do. So we the community have to wrap our mind around international issues as well as local issues. In the event any international issue spills into our streets, we need to be ready to respond to it.

Three respondents brought up the problem of complacency they believe has developed nationwide, since there has not been another significant terrorist event since
September 11, 2001. During the discussion of the homeland security unit’s mission with Agency 1 in the South Atlantic region, the sergeant brought up the issue of complacency. The sergeant noted the unit’s mission statement was ongoing and constantly changing. He indicated the mission evolved based on threats and worldwide events.

The biggest frustration that I deal with on a daily basis is the complacency that’s starting to take place. It’s just, it’s almost, I remember talking to my lieutenant the other day, saying, “you know what, I hate to say this but we almost need something to go boom in this country again to wake everybody up, but I don’t want anybody to get hurt.”

Agency 2 in the West South Central region made an analogy to the private sector, which invests in research and development. The lieutenant explained that all police agencies also need to invest time, energy and funds to prevent future acts of terrorism:

We need to be looking for the footprints of these things happening and we want to try to find them in the early footprints. We don’t want to wait until they are on the precipice of killing us.

He also stated he believes we are fighting a “Western war” with an “Eastern mentality,” which further complicates the issue:

Well, early in the argument what I began to explain is that we are trying to fight a Western war in this war on terrorism. We are trying to fight an Eastern war with a Western mentality. Their value of life and their ideals, and the things that drive their very actions are different than ours. They’re very committed even to this; we are not. They’re very long-term and patient they’re in a deferred gratification mentality. We in America are in an area of immediate gratification mentality. And that results in complacency which means we’ll never change here until we get hit hard enough and often enough. Then that mentality will change.

Agency 5 in the South Atlantic region furthered the argument of complacency by describing how response is “event-driven.” He felt terrorism is only a top priority when something happens, similar to the effects felt by recent incidents of school shootings:

And you know, a lot of it is incident-driven. I think if we have another incident anywhere, like if you see these school shootings. I’ll give you an example like these school shootings and stuff like that DHS is focusing on
now. Oh, you’ve got to do your vulnerability assessments of schools now. Before, schools weren’t even on our top priority for DHS because it has nothing to do with national security. Now you know as I do, bad guy terrorist comes into a school and blows himself up like the Chechen rebels and you don’t think that’s going to shut down the economy? I think we’re very incident-driven and right now, we’re in that lull right now where nothing’s happened. You’ve just seen that terror plot up in New York City, you know, in Denver when all that stuff just dismantled, with these hydrogen peroxide bombs and all that stuff that they’re looking at doing. I think the next event that will happen in the United States will be some type of backpack bomb or vehicle bomb in some type of major entertainment venue or sporting event. I mean when you think about it, it’s the most vulnerable spot.

Lastly, the sergeant from Agency 2 in the West North Central region was curious as to how other agencies issued hazmat suits and other protective gear, and how they trained officers to use this equipment:

I would be curious to see if in your study and talking to the other agencies how many of them actually have either the program or the concept or whatever of not only training their people and doing it, but actually issuing them protective gear as far as hazardous materials gear. I know that for our state we, I mean, my agency is kind of the front-runner as far as creating the training program and the concept. Many other law enforcement agencies throughout the state got similar equipment and a lot of them just gave it out and said, “there you go.” I mean, I try my best to follow OSHA regulations and things like that and those kinds of standards. So I go talk to my OSHA folks and whatever and they look at me kind of like, “uh, okay.” I don’t get a whole lot of, “oh yeah, this is what they’re doing and this is what they’re doing.” Well, I would love for you to find one that says, oh yeah, we do this program and it’s huge and hey, give me their contact [laugh].

Summary

Although much organizational change within local police agencies is evident, many respondents expressed concern over a number of issues. Of greatest concern is the perception of emergency preparedness. As three agencies noted, the respondents believed emergency preparedness was not a high priority. Complicating this problem is the notion
of complacency. The United States has not seen another attack since September 11.

Furthermore, local police agencies tend to be event-driven, reacting only when necessary.

Respondents discussed additional issues, including problems with reporting and coordination of agencies and resources. Although respondents indicated an improvement in information and intelligence sharing capabilities, the ability to connect easily to the available databases still poses a challenge. Lastly, one agency emphasized the importance of cooperation and assistance from the corporate and private sectors.

While this study describes a wide spectrum of organizational change, the data collected provide evidence supporting contingency theory as the driving force behind organizational change. According to contingency theory, organizational actions depend upon the organization’s unique environment. Organizations are rational entities, adopting organizational structures and operational activities most efficient for attaining specific objectives. Contingency theory maintains the environment constantly places new demands to which the organization must respond. Thus, an organization must adapt itself to the external environment by making adjustments, such as implementing innovative strategies and redesigning its structures.
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

Introduction

Chapter 6 presented this study’s data and suggested contingency theory as the likely impetus for internal organizational change. This chapter will expand on these results by highlighting the significant findings, tying them to previous theoretical frameworks as the literature illustrates and addressing the policy implications. The chapter will also discuss the limitations of the present research and implications for future research on terrorism’s impact on local law enforcement agencies.

Police Organizational Change Post-September 11

Five major themes emerged from the review of the literature. First, the literature provided anecdotal evidence that many local police agencies were reprioritizing their investment areas, such as shifting a focus on traffic enforcement, to support counterterrorism efforts. Second, there was no knowledge of how local police agencies defined terrorism, and how definitions informed threats and drove response efforts. Third, the literature provided some data regarding response experience of larger agencies, but virtually no data regarding response experiences of medium and small agencies. Fourth, the literature review illustrated the lack of direct, systematic research investigating whether the September 11 events prompted local police departments to establish specialized terrorism units. While there is indication that some agencies have established some sort of unit, there is no clear understanding of the nature, structure and function of these units. Lastly, there is little knowledge regarding the impetus for any organizational changes that have occurred within local agencies, whether planned in response to an actual threat or in reaction to external demands. The limited research available suggests
agency size and the receipt of funding by individual agencies may determine whether police departments implement a specialized unit. The following discussion addresses each of these issues based on the research findings.

**Reprioritization of Investment Areas**

The interviewer asked agencies whether there was a reprioritization of basic functions, such as changing emphasis on traffic enforcement to support counterterrorism. All agencies in this study stated there were no changes made in investment areas. Therefore, regardless of whether the agencies implemented organizational change, terrorism did not seem to change basic functions of law enforcement agencies. This is a curious finding, as the literature infers the line officer is most likely to encounter a potential terrorist in during the initial stages of an attack. The literature cites many reports where law enforcement officials have arrested an individual after a routine traffic stop. A leading example is the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, days after the Murrah Building explosion. Police pulled over McVeigh for a broken taillight on his vehicle and subsequently arrested the mastermind behind the domestic attack. Many agencies in this research referenced similar incidents of arresting suspects and people of interest. The line officer, during the normal course of duty, is the one who will most likely interact with potential terrorists. Yet it only seems prudent that a reprioritization of investment areas would occur. However, the data in this study reveal this is not the case.

**Agency Definition of Terrorism**

One assumption of this study was the belief that local police departments would adopt the FBI’s definition of terrorism. Interestingly, no agencies have adopted a formal definition of terrorism. Instead, agencies are using the FBI’s definition or other federal
definitions, such as that of the DHS, primarily as a guideline. Having no formal departmental definition of terrorism does not appear to have a direct impact on organizational change or operational strategies. Nor does it appear to impede terrorism investigations. Rather, using the definition as a guideline allows for continuity in investigations between agencies and the FBI.

**Response Experience**

The research disclosed many local law enforcement agencies are implementing organizational change although most agencies had little to no response experience with terrorism. When asked about experience with hoaxes as a form of terrorism, nearly all agencies reported few hoaxes within their jurisdictions. The only relationship between hoaxes and response experience was in the immediate aftermath of the anthrax attacks of October 2001. During this time, jurisdictions across the country received a “spike” in calls for service for anthrax-related incidents. Furthermore, most agencies believed there is some type of presence, if not terrorist group presence, within their jurisdictions. Terrorism concerns varied depending on geographic location and proximity to major cities, from CBRNE incidents to suicide bombers. Law enforcement agencies also ranked their perceptions of threat and likelihood of attack. On scale of low, medium and high, they ranked their threat perception as medium to low. Police departments had concerns for terrorist presence and certain types of attacks within their jurisdictions. Yet departments generally do not consider themselves to be at risk for an attack. It is surprising they are creating specialized units in response to a perceived minimal threat. While this is further evidence for contingency theory, as agencies are reacting and adapting to their external environment, one may interpret this as an exaggerated reaction
as compared to the threat. However, the potential damage is much higher for terrorist acts than for most crimes.

Establishment of Specialized Terrorism Units

The overarching objective of this research was to ascertain whether the September 11 events and the continued terrorist threat have caused organizational change within local police organizations. One aspect of organizational change was of specific interest: the implementation of specialized terrorism units. Most agencies in the study (19 out of 21) implemented some type of specialized terrorism unit or related unit in response to 9/11.

Katz’s studies of police gang units formed the foundation for this research. The studies generated the idea that departments may be implementing specialized terrorism units in response to September 11, 2001. Katz’s research found police departments were not establishing gang units as a rational response to the degree of gang crime faced. Rather, the research suggested that departments created gang units due to outside pressures (such as the local community) placed on the police department. His studies also revealed the organization of the gang unit varied considerably among departments. The functions of gang units generally fell into one or more of three categories: intelligence, enforcement and prevention efforts. The relative emphasis placed on each function varied from department to department. There were also wide variations in written policies and procedures governing gang units, including significant variations in the gang units’ formal goals and objectives.

Similar to Katz’s research, this study revealed that the name and the organization of specialized terrorism units also varied widely across departments. The unit’s location
in the department’s hierarchy also varied across agencies. Functions of the specialized terrorism unit also fell into one or more comparable categories of intelligence, enforcement and prevention. Like Katz’s gang units, the emphasis on these functions by the specialized units in this study fluctuated from department to department. Written policies and procedures, including goals and objectives, ranged across units. Katz discovered gang units arose not as a rational response to external environment, but rather due to external pressures. However, the specialized terrorism units in this study resulted primarily from internal assessments and an adaption to the external environment. Such adjustments took the form of redesigning structures and implementing innovative strategies. The fact that over half (13 out of 21) of the local police agencies included in this study have implemented a specialized terrorism unit would suggest these departments consider terrorism a special problem like gangs.

Another purpose of this research was to determine whether local police agencies are treating terrorism as a special problem and moving towards a crime-control model of policing. A significant finding of this research appears to conflict with the idea that local law enforcement agencies are regarding terrorism as a special problem. A majority of the departments implemented some type of specialized terrorism unit or integrated homeland security functions into an existing unit. However, agencies have not developed formal response plans for terrorism. Local departments reported the creation an “all-hazards” plan, which they would follow whether there was a natural disaster, man-made disaster or an act of terrorism. When asked if the all-hazards plan included a section that specifically addressed terrorism events, nearly all agencies stated the response plans had integrated response and did not have a separate section for terrorism. It does not seem logical that a
police department would implement a specialized unit and not provide direction for response efforts. In addition, the data did not indicate there were any special response protocols within the specialized units themselves. Therefore, the demonstrated connection between having a formal response plan and a specialized terrorism unit is indirect at best. The data in this study cannot provide a direct link between the implementation of a specialized terrorism unit and a reversion to a crime-control philosophy.

Implementation of Other Philosophies or Operational Strategies

Despite the fact that the data in this study cannot support a reversion to a crime-control model, there is evidence that local law enforcement agencies are moving toward a new philosophy: intelligence-led policing. Much of the literature emphasizes the importance of and calls for an enhanced community policing approach. However, this did not emerge as a dominant strategy of law enforcement in this study. A number of agencies alluded to a shift toward intelligence-led policing without directly acknowledging the philosophy. The fact that many agencies incorporated an intelligence component into their specialized terrorism units, or have integrated a homeland security function into an existing intelligence unit, supports a move toward the intelligence-led philosophy. Furthermore, two agencies specifically discussed in detail the challenges of information gathering and intelligence analysis. They pointed out the need for a systematic manner in which to collect, process and analyze information. This would produce intelligence that is not only accurate but timely. “Good” intelligence and “timeliness” appeared to be of utmost concern to these agencies. One agency referenced the initial use of CompStat, but had to abandon the system. When the agency had their
meetings, the information shared would often be three to four weeks or more out of date, therefore virtually useless in most circumstances. Additionally, the development of fusion centers and the fact that most agencies collect their own intelligence indicates a movement toward intelligence-led policing.

In agencies that created a specialized unit, they adopted no other organizational strategies apart from what they termed a “general awareness.” The idea of generating a general awareness extends to the police academy, to the line officer and to all supervisory positions. However, the agencies that referred to this concept noted it was most important on the streets as line officers went about their daily routines. Through this day-to-day interaction with the public and routine activities, officers are most likely to encounter a potential suspect or terrorist. Thus, awareness training must occur at the onset of an officer’s career and continue through in-service training and other resources. This will keep all officers fresh and knowledgeable about the current issues, persons of interest and threats.

**Impetus for Organizational Change**

As noted earlier, internal assessments drove organizational change among agencies in this study. Such assessments determined the appropriate changes necessary to respond to the external environment. While agencies cited internal assessments as the principal reasons for organizational change, external institutions such as local government played an indirect role in the decision. In general, police departments described governmental entities as having a support role, versus directing certain types of organizational change. In other words, agencies did not report external pressures drove organizational change. Given the widespread impacts of September 11 and the continuing
terrorist threat, it is remarkable that cities are allowing police departments to make independent assessments and decisions. The manner of the 9/11 attacks was unique and unexpected. The federal government has set forth directives and guidelines for future attacks, as opposed to mandates. The lack of external pressure suggests jurisdictions believe police departments are best able to determine the appropriate reaction to prepare and prevent future incidents of terrorism.

This study indicates a natural or man-made event had a significant impact on local law enforcement agencies. The events of 9/11, coupled with the heightened security environment, have influenced the changes in police organizations over the last 10 years. Specifically, this study found that 95% of the agencies implemented a specialized terrorism or similar unit, or adapted operational strategies to fit the security environment. The variation in the nature and extent of these units also reinforces the idea that terrorism is a local phenomenon. Law enforcement will adapt their departments based on the perceived threat for their jurisdictions. Therefore, this study provides preliminary support for contingency theory. Additional research is necessary to determine whether to view contingency as the dominant theory in explaining all police organizational change in a post-September 11 environment.

Additional Issues Emerging From the Research

The research emphasizes three major concerns. First, over time, many respondents indicated specialized terrorism units reduced officer numbers and staff over time, or other units such as intelligence units have absorbed them. Money and resources appear to be the key reasons for the reduction of specialized terrorism units. Unfortunately, agencies were not able to provide detailed information regarding the
reduction or absorption of these units. Another explanation might coincide with contingency theory, where local departments continually assess the threat environment and make adjustments based on a number of factors. They may also determine homeland security endeavors are most appropriate for intelligence units. Additional research on the “lifecycle” of specialized terrorism units is necessary to address this important issue.

A second concern centers on police academy training. Most agencies noted only a handful of hours (averaging four) of counterterrorism training in the police academy. Additionally, agencies provided in-service training primarily on an as-needed or volunteer basis to other department officers who were not associated with the special unit. Several agencies reported using memos, emails and shift roll call as other means of disseminating information or providing basic training. Furthermore, the study found agencies did not offer counterterrorism training consistently. As with maintaining specialized units, time and resources seem to be the main issues with supplying training to police officers. However, most agencies agree the line officers on the streets will most likely come into contact with a potential terrorist. Given this fact, agencies should agree regular training would be essential. According to the anecdotal evidence in the research, this is not the case. It may be a good time for colleges, universities and local law enforcement to work together to provide the training, such as on continued awareness and changes in terrorist targets and tactics. Researchers could provide an invaluable resource to police agencies and offer services agencies cannot deliver themselves.

Lastly, the fact that a large number of local agencies are collecting terrorism-related information or intelligence raises alarm. As mentioned earlier, local agencies have not adopted a formal definition of terrorism. Yet most agencies have integrated an
intelligence gathering function as part of organizational change. The question arises as to how agencies determine whether a case is a common crime versus terrorism. Departments indicated they used the FBI’s definition as a guideline. However, they gave no explicit explanations as to how and when they hand a case over to the FBI JTTF. Agencies must individually decide whether a case has a criminal or terrorism predicate. An agency’s definition of terrorism will notably alter how and when it transfers a case to the JTTF.

Furthermore, several agencies indicated they are collecting information independent of the FBI’s JTTF. Only two agencies provided detailed information on how they collect terrorism-related data. However, there was no continuity between the types of intelligence the agencies collected and how they analyzed this information. This revelation was both surprising and disconcerting. Several questions immediately come to mind. Do agencies have a handle on the legal implications of intelligence collection? Are they staying within the law, specifically the CFR and the Patriot Act? Finally, the FBI provides very distinctive training with respect to intelligence collection. It has access to numerous federal sources of information. Officers receive minimal training in the academy on intelligence collection, if any. Municipal agencies can rarely send officers to the FBI academy for specialized training, especially in the area of terrorism. This begs the question as to whether agencies really know what they are doing with respect to collecting data.

In addition, a few respondents either specifically mentioned or alluded to the idea that the nation is becoming more complacent with respect to counterterrorism. The United States has not experienced a major attack since 9/11. This implies
counterterrorism vigilance has a limited “shelf life” of activity only until another major event occurs.

**Rhetoric or Reality?**

One of the last goals of this research was to ascertain whether the organizational changes the literature highlights were actually occurring in local law enforcement agencies. This study provides evidence that organizational change post-9/11 is a reality. Ninety-five percent of the agencies in this study (20 out of 21) demonstrated a spectrum of organizational change from the operational strategy level to the implementation of a new bureau supporting counterterrorism objectives. While the research primarily included large police agencies, three medium-sized agencies also participated. Two of the medium-sized agencies reported organizational change in the form of philosophy or at the operational level. Only one agency in the study cited no organizational change within the department.

**Policy Implications**

A number of interrelated policy implications emerge from this research. While the concept of regionalism has spread into the local law enforcement realm, no standardized counterterrorism mandate exists across agencies independent of funding. Coupled with this issue is the lack of a standardized response plan for all agencies. Another important policy issue relates to the deficiency in police academy training and in-service training. In addition, there is a need for streamlining information/intelligence sharing and analysis. Standardization of response plans, counterterrorism mandates and police academy training are all missing from the current U.S. homeland security mission. Local law enforcement agencies must therefore determine the proper course of action for
jurisdictions, often with little to no terrorism response experience. The development of baseline standard procedures for all agencies will achieve a greater success in all local departments adopting and adhering to homeland security measures. Streamlining of intelligence sharing can assist law enforcement in ease and speed of access to relevant information. More specifically, advancement of a singular database, such as that of fusion centers, will reduce or eliminate the problem of access. Taken together as a whole, resolving these issues can improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts within and among local law enforcement agencies.

**Standardized Counterterrorism Mandates and Response Plan**

If all local law enforcement agencies are to work toward the same goal of preventing and disrupting terrorism, they need to develop similar strategies. Currently, the research indicates agencies need to implement certain counterterrorism efforts, such as the creation of buffer zone protection plans, to receive federal funding. Similarly, departments need to complete NIMS and CIMS training as part of funding obligations. However, there was no evidence of compliance with other homeland security measures. The Department of Homeland Security only provides guidelines for all levels of law enforcement.

Most agencies included in this study have shown evidence of regional preparedness. The findings demonstrate coordination across geographic boundaries, the integration of policies and practices regarding preparedness, improvement in intelligence sharing and access and the adoption of an all-hazards approach. In addition, funding sources such as UASI have compelled local and state agencies to work together. However, the study found wide variation in planning and prevention strategies among
local departments. The research revealed no discernable patterns in response or prevention plans. Furthermore, there was no evidence that departments developed long-term strategies independent of a specialized terrorism unit.

The creation of standard counterterrorism policies should be independent of funding. DHS could assist local agencies in this endeavor in two ways. One, it could provide baseline mandates for law enforcement based on agency size. In other words, there would be specific homeland security requirements that all large-sized agencies, medium-sized agencies and small agencies must meet. A second option would assess local departments based on the types of potential targets and histories with terrorism, creating a response spectrum. If a department has had significant experience with terrorism and has a high number of potential targets, then it must adhere to certain homeland security preparedness requirements. In contrast, if an agency has had little experience with terrorism and has a low number of potential targets, it would need to adhere to different homeland security requirements. In following one of the two proposed options, local police agencies falling within the same category would follow the same federal counterterrorism mandates. Baseline mandates would represent the minimum long-term strategies for terrorism prevention an agency would make. It would also allow for flexibility, giving local law enforcement the ability to continue to develop additional homeland security measures it believes necessary.

The all-hazards response plan appears to be a logical option. It provides individual departments with one response to a number of potential incidents. However, most all-hazard plans did not acknowledge terrorism or refer to specific acts of terrorism, such as a bombing incident. Law enforcement needs to reevaluate the idea that the
response to an act of terrorism (such as 9/11) would be the same as to an act of nature (such as a hurricane). The ability to predict and plan for a natural disaster exists. In addition, authorities can warn the public in advance, reducing potential harm. In contrast, no capability exists to predict acts of domestic or international terrorism. Information and intelligence gathering can take months or even years to process and identify individual terrorists and potential targets. Furthermore, terrorism is a low-incidence “crime,” exacerbating the difficulty to disrupt an incident before it occurs. Lastly, the panic terrorism causes is more far-reaching than that of an act of nature. A hurricane will affect a certain geographic area. An act of terrorism will affect not only the geographic area in which it occurs. Additional issues, such as a fallout or spread of contagion, will generate panic and fear across the rest of the country.

Local police agencies should at least consider adding sections to the all-hazards plan with respect to terrorism incidents. One issue they should address is chain of command. There should be several courses of action in place should an agency lose a number of officers in commanding ranks during an act of terrorism. Second, they need to account for containment of the event. Some acts of terrorism will require a greater coordination of law enforcement and local agency efforts. Third, communication with and control of the public should be a priority. If the public becomes aware of an act of terrorism in the country, widespread panic would occur. Agencies need to implement specific procedures as to how and when they will share information with the public. In addition, policies should include how to handle public panic. Although these responsibilities may fall under the jurisdictions of emergency management departments, the local police ultimately will respond to a scene and maintain control of the situation.
Standardized Police Academy Training and In-Service Training

The research found a wide range of the number of hours and the type of police academy training about terrorism and homeland security subjects. Again, no pattern emerged in the contact hours or content of terrorism education in the academy. This fact was a bit alarming, as local law enforcement will be the first on the scene or the first ones involved with potential terrorist investigations. Such an officer can be an experienced officer or a new officer on the beat. It is essential that recruits acquire basic skills in understanding and recognizing terrorism indicators. The federal government should again take the lead in creating a mandatory curriculum for all law enforcement trainees. It should also establish who qualifies as an instructor. The curriculum should identify the content and include a minimum number of hours. Providing a baseline for the academy permits flexibility in adding to the curriculum as a department sees fit. It also ensures all new police recruits receive basic terrorism training in the form of “terrorism 101.”

Terrorism and homeland security training should continue long after the police academy. However, the research findings indicated that most law enforcement agencies did not consistently offer in-service counterterrorism training. Agencies most commonly cited higher-ranking officers or those assigned to a specialized terrorism or related unit as receiving training. The research also provided anecdotes of training information through email, bulletins, alerts and during roll call. This poses a serious problem, as all officers need to understand how to combat terrorism. Reading or hearing about what to do in a given situation is not the same as visualizing how to react. Respondents explained that the difficulty in providing training is twofold. One, resources are not available either to bring experts to the department or to provide training. Second, departments cannot absorb
the manpower loss in sending officers to training sessions outside the department. State, county and local governments must begin to fund local law enforcement agencies to assist in basic training efforts. Individual agencies can conduct much of the training in-house. However, they need to bring in experts and send officers to attend training courses on more specialized topics.

*Streamlining Information/Intelligence Sharing and Analysis*

Information and intelligence gathering emerged as one of the primary functions in a post-September 11 policing world. The research discovered many local agencies are collecting information and intelligence in a number of ways. Some departments were going as far as creating their own intelligence databases. In addition, federal agencies operate a number of databases, such as the FBI’s E-Guardian and military databases. If an individual department is not able to collect and maintain its own information, how can the agency decide from where to obtain terrorism-related information? Most departments agree the information-sharing environment has improved. However, there is no single effective means for information sharing and intelligence analysis across local agencies. Furthermore, respondents cited the continued difficulty in obtaining timely intelligence.

Fusion centers provide one solution to this dilemma. For many local law enforcement agencies, the fusion center is the primary source for information and intelligence. If fusion centers are to be valuable, federal and state agencies must invest in technology and personnel, specifically analytical/prediction software and intelligence analysts. Developing software that can produce mathematical models with a high statistical certainty would greatly help law enforcement focus their terrorism prevention and disruption efforts. If local agencies had a source that could gather, analyze and
disseminate intelligence with high accuracy, it would reduce the need for individual
departments to create and maintain separate databases. The ability to employ intelligence
analysts would allow local law enforcement more freedom to conduct terrorism-related
investigations. Intelligence analysts need not be sworn officers. In most cases, local law
enforcement agencies hire civilians for such positions. An investment in these two main
areas would increase fusion center capabilities to receive, analyze and share information
in a timely manner. It would also provide local law enforcement with a “one-stop shop”
for information and intelligence.

A related problem is the federal government’s unwillingness to provide security
clearances to local law enforcement officers. Agency 1 in the Pacific region complained
of the quandary in receiving certain types of information (specifically classified
intelligence) that requires a security clearance. The lieutenant also noted he had a military
background and his position in the military required him to receive a security clearance.
However, the security clearance did not carry over to his public service position. He
explained that the information withheld from his department for 30 days was crucial to
the department’s preparation for a potential attack. Without information such as this,
individual police agencies cannot be proactive in prevention and disruption efforts. While
it may not be prudent that all local law enforcement personnel receive security
clearances, the federal government could identify specific persons within local
departments to receive clearance. This could include those who hold higher positions of
command, such as a chief, major or captain. The ability to receive and review
information that would allow police agencies to prepare for or thwart an attack is critical
to success in the war against terrorism.
Research Limitations

The major research limitation in this study is the ability to generalize. Several issues create this limitation. First, this study only sampled twenty-one local law enforcement agencies. Thus, the sample size is very small. While the use of a small sample is appropriate for qualitative research, it does limit the amount and type of data collected. Coupled with this issue is the number of respondents from each agency. The researcher interviewed only one person from each participating department. Most respondents held higher command positions and typically worked within an STU, intelligence, or related unit. However, it is possible individual respondents did not know everything about their departments’ activities. For example, a respondent may have current knowledge of an STU’s organization and function, but not know the details regarding the unit’s implementation. In addition, a number of participants could not provide information on shifting of funds within their departments. Nor could they say how this affected other department areas. Interviews with multiple persons throughout each police agency might help further understand organizational change.

Second, the research selected a non-probability sample, relying on purposive and snowball sampling to obtain participants from the fifty largest U.S. law enforcement agencies. Terrorism is more likely to have impacted these agencies. The largest agencies are also the most likely to exhibit visible organizational change. Additionally, there is the issue of representation, as the study did not represent all geographic regions of the country. The fact that the researcher hand-selected the majority of local departments also adds to the issue of representation. This study’s findings may apply only to these cases. For example, the study found that internal assessments drove organizational change. If
the sample included all large municipal agencies, it is possible external pressure would be the dominant reason for change.

The last issue pertains to geographic representation. The researcher believes this is not a significant issue. The study only lacked participation from one geographic region of the U.S. Furthermore, there is no comparison to other nations with similar terrorism threats, such as the U.K., Spain and Israel. This study’s sampling methodology is appropriate for exploratory qualitative research to extract information-rich cases. However, the researcher sacrifices both internal validity of the results and the ability to generalize to the greater law enforcement community.

**Improving the Current Research**

The researcher proposes several suggestions to improve the current research. First, research should continue at the national level to include all fifty of the largest police agencies. This would enable a better understanding of what is occurring at the large agency level. It would also provide a better understanding of the threat environment in all geographic areas of the country. The next step would be to expand the research to medium and small agencies. While there is evidence of organizational change in terrorism response at the large agency level, we still know little about medium and small agencies. The literature acknowledges policing research often overlooks medium and small agencies. We need to conduct more studies that include agencies of this size. Unfortunately, the nature of this study required the researcher to focus on large agencies to document organizational change. Historically, large agencies exhibit visible changes. Thus, the researcher was not able to fill this gap in the research. Future research should evaluate medium and small agencies for organizational changes, compare agencies across
the U.S. and develop best practices for different sized agencies based on geographic region or threat level. Further studies could also compare U.S. practices with those of other countries.

Conclusion

This research reveals how the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent heightened security environment affected law enforcement agencies. Large police agencies have adapted to the changing security environment and have responded in varying ways. This study found a majority of police agencies have implemented a specialized terrorism or related unit post-September 11. The second type of change discovered was at the operational level. Third, all police agencies are incorporating counterterrorism training in varying degrees into police academy and in-service education. Lastly, it appears that a number of law enforcement agencies are moving toward an intelligence-led policing philosophy. Many stated they are not only collecting their own intelligence, they are also developing systems to process the intelligence.

STUs ranged from small, non-deployable units to new bureaus focusing primarily on information gathering. However, several agencies believed it was not necessary to establish a specialized unit. Instead, they added a terrorism-related intelligence-gathering component to an existing unit. Moreover, the findings indicate that while many departments perceive that the threat of terrorism is real, the threat perception is generally low. As a result, local law enforcement agencies do not consider it necessary to implement additional operational strategies or reprioritize reinvestment areas in favor of counterterrorism initiatives.
The fact that a majority of police agencies implemented a specialized terrorism unit suggests local law enforcement is responding to the perceived threat of terrorism as a special issue, not as a traditional crime. Conversely, agencies reported their respective departments have taken an “all-hazards” approach to counterterrorism. These two ideas seem to conflict with each other. The purpose of a specialized unit is to handle special problems in specific ways, not in generalized manners. This study was not able to ascertain the reason for this conflict. However, participant interviews suggest agencies are also responding to other unusual issues, such as the increased potential for natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.

Researchers need to conduct more studies to understand fully the nature and extent of terrorism’s impact on local law enforcement agencies both large and small. This research only provides a glimpse into the world of local policing at the large agency level. The addition of a specialized unit may be restricted to large police agencies. There may be other types of responses to discover in small and medium agencies.
APPENDIX A: FORMAL LETTER

To: [Agency]

From: Michele Grillo, MACJ, ABD
Home: 561-455-4087
Cell: 561-376-8130
Office: 954-262-7955
Email: michgril@nova.edu; mikkig@pegasus.rutgers.edu

RE: Outreach for Policing & Terrorism Research Participation

To Whom It May Concern:

My name is Michele Grillo, a graduate student at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, as well as a full-time faculty member at Nova Southeastern University in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. I am currently engaged in the process of collecting data for my final dissertation project, which is entitled: “Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?” The purpose of the proposed research is to understand police organizational change in a post-September 11, 2001 security environment. Specifically, the research seeks to explore the nature and extent of the development and implementation of specialized terrorism units in local police agencies across the United States. I have reviewed the [insert agency name] website and believe your agency would be an excellent site for my research. With your permission, I would like to include your agency as one of 20 cities to be included in my study.

In order to gather data for my project, I will need to conduct telephone interviews. I will be asking general, open-ended questions with respect to police organizational change post-9/11. The interview should take no longer than about 45 minutes to complete, but I would need to speak with you or a member of your dedicated, operational terrorism-response unit, preferably a mid- to upper-ranking supervisor. I appreciate the fact that such officers are extremely busy people, and I would be extremely grateful if you would consider approving cooperation with this project and provide access to an appropriate interviewee.

Please be advised that both my dissertation committee at Rutgers University and the Institutional Review Board (IRB), which approves all projects that involve human subjects, has approved my dissertation research. I have also attached a copy of the interview questions for your convenience. All collected information regarding participants and individual agencies will be kept confidential. I will be the only person privy to this information, and I will only note agencies by geographic region in the United States (e.g. Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, Mid-West, etc.), unless I am otherwise provided permission to use an agency’s name.
I thank you in advance for your time and consideration in assisting me. I am happy to speak with you further regarding my research. If you have any additional questions, please feel free to call me at home 561-455-4087 or on my cell phone 561-376-8130. The phone number for my office at Nova Southeastern University is 954-262-7955, where I can also be reached after August 24, 2009. I do hope that this will be a successful project and that I will be able to share the data and my findings with all the participating police departments.

Best regards,

Michele Grillo

Michele Grillo, MACJ; ABD
Appendix B: PowerPoint Presentation

Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?

Michele Grillo, MACJ
Rutgers University
School of Criminal Justice
January 28, 2009

Statement of the Problem

- Assumed “changes” in local police agencies:
  - First responders to terror incidents
  - Primary gatherers of intelligence
  - Performing basic security functions in protecting the infrastructure and potential terrorist targets (Hickman, 2006)
- Not all changes visible
- Most discourse regarding change atheoretical
- No systematic research investigating the nature and extent of changes

Terrorism in the United States

- Violent actions labeled “terrorism” in the 1960s
- Domestic and international terrorism events in last four decades
- Complications in understanding terrorism:
  - Definitional issues
  - Theoretical issues
  - Terrorism vs. traditional crime
  - Only one official statistical source: FBI
  - Lack of empirical analysis of terrorism

Impact of Terrorism on Local Law Enforcement

- Creation of Department of Homeland Security
- Restructuring of federal agencies
- Creation of new agencies e.g. TSA
- Homeland security initiatives and guidelines
- Office of Homeland Security
- USA PATRIOT ACT
- Homeland Security Act

Impact of Terrorism on Local Law Enforcement

- New duties related to homeland security
  - Intelligence
  - Target hardening
  - Resources for infrastructure protection
  - Military deployments of police officers
  - Competition for new recruits
  - No standard model for local law enforcement
  - Response varies widely across departments

Research Objectives

- Determine if local police agencies:
  1. Have implemented specialized terrorism units and if so, to what degree;
  2. If no specialized terrorism unit has been implemented, whether other organizational change(s) has occurred;
  3. If no organizational change has occurred, whether there has been a reprioritization of functions; and
  4. What facilitated the organizational change
  - Planned change
  - Adaptive change
Significance of Study
• Little known about the impact of September 11 on local law enforcement
• Produce systematic research assessing nature and extent of “change” post 9-11
  • Function
  • Organization
• Explore and generate response patterns

Theoretical Framework
• Contingency theory
  • Posits that organizations are rational entities, adopting organizational structures and operational activities that are most effective and efficient in achieving a specific goal
• Institutional Theory
  • Organizations adopt structures or operational activities because they are perceived as legitimate by environmental actors, independent of the ability of the organization to achieve these goals
• Resource Dependency Theory
  • Organizations would be required to strategically adapt to their environment to accommodate the interests and requirements of those with the capacity to provide resources

Organizational Change Factors
• Common factors:
  • Organization size
  • Organizational age
  • Vertical differentiation
  • Functional differentiation
  • Spatial differentiation
  • Regional differentiation
  • Occupational differentiation
  • Formalization
  • Administrative density

Proposed factors:
  • Agency size
  • Geographic location
  • Terrorist group presence
  • Identified targets
  • Response experience
  • External pressure(s)
  • Funding

Sample
• Sample Element
  • National non-probability sample
  • N=20
• Sampling Frame
  • Snowball sample
  • Utilize collegial network
  • Professional
  • Academic

Research Design
• Semi-structured telephone interviews
  • Key personnel in agency
  • Four open-ended questions
    • Implementation of specialized terrorism units
    • Other organizational change(s)
    • Reprioritization of functions
    • What facilitated the organizational change or change in functions
  • Note-taking and tape-recording
  • Capture details that may not otherwise be readily apparent through the survey

Analytical Techniques
• Methodology: Telephone Interviews
  • Transcribe notes and tape-recorded interviews
  • Identify themes
  • Identify theme elements
  • Provide anecdotal evidence of change through quotes from respondents
Research Limitations

- Generalizability
  - Small sample size
  - Non-probability sample
- Validity
  - Construct
  - External

THANK YOU!
APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL FORM

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
ASB III, 3 Rutgers Plaza, Cook Campus
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

March 23, 2009

Michele Grillo
School of Criminal Justice
7565 NW 44th Street #190
Lauderhill FL 33319

Dear Michele Grillo:

( Initial / Amendment / Continuation / Continuation w/ Amendment )

Protocol Title: “Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?”

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

Approval Date: 3/17/09 Expiration Date: 3/16/10
Expedited Category(s): 6, 7 Approved # of Subject(s): 25 (Police Organizations)

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:

• This Approval-The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted. This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;
• Reporting-ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
• Modifications-Any proposed changes MUST be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
• Consent Form(s)-Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
• Continuing Review-You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project’s approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period;

Additional Notes: None.

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself. The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,

Acting for—
Sheryl Goldberg
Director of Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
graser@orsp.rutgers.edu

cc: Dr. Leslie W. Kennedy
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

Title of Study:
Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?

Principle Investigator:
Michele Grillo, MACJ; ABD

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Michele Grillo, MACJ; ABD, who is a doctoral candidate in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University. The purpose of the proposed research is to understand police organizational change in a post-September 11, 2001 security environment. Specifically, this research seeks to explore the nature and extent of the development and implementation of specialized terrorism units in local police agencies.

Approximately 20 subjects from local police agencies across the United States will participate in the study, and each individual’s participation will last approximately one hour. The study procedures include only a telephone interview with key personnel who has either direct knowledge of the organizational changes occurring within the agency or who is in charge of the organizational change (e.g. commander of the specialized terrorism unit). The questions will be open-ended and provided to you in advance for your review. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the interview questions or the research study, you may contact the Principal Investigator, Michele Grillo, at any time.

If you agree to take part in the study, your name, rank and agency information will be noted during the interview. However, your name and the agency’s name will not be identified in the research findings, unless agreed otherwise. All local police agencies will be linked to a particular area of the country (e.g. Southeast region, mid-Atlantic region, etc.). Therefore, data collected from the telephone interview will remain confidential.

Your permission is also requested for the audio recording of the telephone interviews. The audio recordings are for the sole use of the principal investigator in order to ensure the accuracy of the information collected. It will also allow the principle investigator to focus on the conversation without the distraction of taking notes.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. A previously stated, no identifying information will be revealed in the research findings. The potential benefits of the research are great, as information can be collected on the nature and extent of a phenomenon that has not yet been studied. The study may particularly benefit local police agencies, as information regarding the growth, development, and impediments to the implementation of STUs can be shared amongst them. However, you may receive no direct benefits from participating in this research. Research results will be provided to study participants upon request.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

This research is confidential. Confidential means that the research records will include some information about you, such as agency name, location, your name and rank. I will keep this information confidential by limiting individuals’ access to the research data and keeping it in a secure location. The research team and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews research studies in order to protect research participants) at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated, unless you have agreed otherwise.

If you have any questions about the study procedures, you may contact Michele Grillo via telephone at (954) 262-7955 or email mikkig@pegasus.rutgers.edu or you can contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Lesley Kennedy at: Rutgers School of Criminal Justice – Center for Law and Justice 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102, or phone 973-353-3310, or email kennedy@andromeda.rutgers.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University at: Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects Office of Research and Sponsored Programs 3 Rutgers Plaza New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559 Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104 Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

Sign below if you agree to participate in this research study:

Subject Name (Please print) ________________________________ Date ____________________

Subject Signature ________________________________ Date ____________________

Principal Investigator ________________________________ Date ____________________
AUDIOTAPE ADDENDUM TO CONSENT FORM

You have already agreed to participate in a research study entitled: Police Organizational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality? conducted by Michele Grillo. We are asking for your permission to allow us to audiotope the telephone interviews as part of that research study. You do not have to agree to be recorded in order to participate in the main part of the study.

The recording(s) will be used by the principal investigator for the purpose of analyzing individual responses, to ensure clarity and accuracy of respondent commentary.

The recording(s) will include your name, rank, department name, and location.

The recording(s) will be handled by a third-party service, COGI, Inc. The service will record and store the telephone interviews on a secure sever, under a personal account created by the principal investigator. The personal account will have a unique username and password. Only the principal investigator will have knowledge of and access to the personal account on the COGI service. Upon completion of the telephone interview, the COGI service will then fully transcribe the interview using high-tech voice recognition software. Upon the completion of the transcription, the transcribed interview file will be downloaded to and stored on the principal investigator's personal laptop computer. The computer is password protected, and the files will be password protected. The file names will reflect each individual police department interviewed, for the purposes of analysis by the principal investigator. The personal laptop computer is housed in the principal investigator's primary residence, to which the principal investigator only has access. The recording(s) and transcriptions will be retained on the COGI service until the telephone interviews are completed, on or before August 31, 2009. Once the telephone interviews are completed, the personal account on COGI will be cancelled. Upon cancellation of the COGI account, the service will delete any and all files from the COGI server. The files on the principal investigator's personal laptop will be stored for the duration of the study and destroyed upon publication of the study results, on or before May 31st, 2010.

Your signature on this form grants the investigator named above permission to record you as described above during participation in the above-referenced study. The investigator will not use the recording(s) for any other reason than that/those stated in the consent form without your written permission.

Subject (Print) ________________________________________

Subject Signature ________________________ Date ________________________

Principal Investigator Signature _______________ Date ________________________

APPROVED
Date: 3/17/09

EXPIRES
MAR 16 2010
Approved by the Rutgers IRB
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A. Please state your agency name, your name and rank.

B. Internal organizational change questions:

1. How does your agency define terrorism?
   a. If the agency has a formal definition of terrorism: How does this definition drive your agency’s response efforts?

2. Does your agency have a formal written response plan to deal with terrorism-related incidents?

3. Does your agency collect terrorism-related intelligence?

4. What is your agency’s response experience with terrorism?
   a. What is your agency’s threat perception?
   b. Does your agency believe there is terrorist group presence within your jurisdiction?
   c. Has your agency identified physical vulnerabilities within your jurisdiction?
   d. Has your agency conducted threat analysis to determine the likelihood of an attack?
      i. If YES: What is the likelihood of a terrorist attack within your jurisdiction?
      ii. What was the focus of the threat assessment?
      iii. What is your agency’s greatest terrorism-related concern?
   e. What is the frequency of incidents and hoaxes within your jurisdiction?
   f. Is your agency currently involved in any terrorism investigations?

5. Did your agency increase the number of personnel assigned to emergency planning and response for terrorism-related events?
6. Has your agency implemented a specialized terrorism unit after the September 11, 2001 attacks?
   a. *If YES:*
      i. What is the name of the unit?
      ii. What is the mission of the unit?
      iii. Is the unit a standalone unit or is it connected to another unit or division?
      iv. How many officers are part of the unit?
      v. Is the unit a full-time unit?
      vi. What is the primary function of the unit (for example, intelligence gathering or tactical)?
      vii. What are the responsibilities of the unit?
      viii. How often is the unit deployed?
      ix. Does the unit participate in training exercises or liaise with joint terrorism task forces?
      x. Did your agency receive funding to implement this unit? *If YES:* What was the funding source? *If NO:* Were funds shifted within the agency to implement the unit?

7. If your agency has not implemented a specialized terrorism unit, did your agency implement a new policing strategy or philosophy?
   a. *If YES:*
      i. What is the mission?
      ii. What is the function?
      iii. What are the responsibilities of the officers assigned to this strategy?
iv. Did your agency receive funding for this new strategy? *If YES:* What was the funding source? *If NO:* Were funds shifted within the agency to implement the strategy?

8. If there was no new strategy implemented, has your agency reprioritized its “investment areas” (such as from focusing on patrolling, traffic enforcement, drug interdiction, vice, burglary or auto theft) in favor of counterterrorism efforts?

9. Does your agency’s police academy offer training in counterterrorism and antiterrorism?

10. What was the impetus for the implementation of the specialized terrorism unit or new policing strategy? Was the change driven by an internal assessment or by external demands or pressures from local government, the public or other non-departmental sources?

11. *If NO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE has occurred within the agency:*

   a. Did you agency wish to make organizational changes? If so, what?

   b. What were the impediments to implementing the organizational change?

   c. What does your agency need to do to improve its response capabilities?
REFERENCE LIST


# Vita

Michele Grillo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Born March 25 in Warwick, Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Member, Golden Key National Honor Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice, University of Massachusetts Lowell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>Research Assistant, College of Education, University of Massachusetts Lowell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Master of Arts in Criminal Justice, University of Massachusetts Lowell</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-05</td>
<td>Research Assistant, Rutgers Center for the Study of Public Security, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-05</td>
<td>Research Associate, Center for Justice and Mental Health Research, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-05</td>
<td>Lecturer, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Master of Arts in Criminal Justice, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Recipient, Dean’s Research Grant, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>Part-time Faculty, Curry College, Milton, Massachusetts</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>Part-time Faculty, La Salle University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Instructor, Farquhar College of Arts and Sciences, Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Nova Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Criminal Justice, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Member, Alpha Phi Sigma, Criminal Justice National Honor Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ph.D. in Criminal Justice, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey</td>
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