THE SHIFTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS IMPLEMENTING BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING

by

MICHAEL JOSEPH JENKINS

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Abstract

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Dissertation Director: Dr. George L. Kelling

Police departments are salient governmental organizations in the lives of many United States citizens. Police officers, empowered with the authority of the government, serve as the front line and first responders to a range of citizen problems (from settling family disputes to apprehending murder suspects). Police departments in the United States have employed various strategies to respond to shifting political, cultural, and social tides, with the current strategy being community problem-solving (hereafter, CPS). The broken windows theory has been highly influential in effecting and understanding the current strategy. This dissertation studies the contextual elements of how departments’ organizational strategies adapt to a particular theory (i.e., broken windows), how personnel in these departments view the impact of a shifting organizational strategy on policing, and the conditions that inhibit and facilitate a CPS strategy.

This study follows the multiple-case study approach and relies on both qualitative and quantitative data gathered from in-depth interviews, personal observation, surveys and archives (e.g., chief’s bulletins, memoranda of understandings, newspaper articles, annual reports, and action plans); reports on and interprets the perspectives of key police personnel as they relate to the shifting organizational strategy; and explains key police personnel’s understandings of the effects of broken windows policing on their work.
The sample consists of three urban police departments (Boston, Milwaukee and Newark). Following purposive and convenient sampling methods, the departments were chosen based on knowledge of their experiences with implementing broken windows policing as part of a wider departmental move towards CPS policing and on a reasonable expectation of access to department personnel and data.

Research findings explain the role of police executive leadership in implementing the CPS strategy, clarify the nebulous concepts of CPS and broken windows policing and offer suggestions for a more efficient and honest implementation of the strategy and tactic. This research goes beyond police departments’ stated objectives and explores the actual changes they make to accommodate the current era of policing. Understanding police personnel’s interpretations (and police departments’ implementations) of broken windows policing advances our understanding of a pertinent part of the CPS strategy.
Acknowledgments

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Chapter 1: Introduction

A Brief History of Policing in the United States

A review of policing in the United States reveals a dynamic evolution in policing strategy, mission, technology, authorization, demand, function, structure and relationship with the community (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Changing social, cultural, economic, and political environments punctuate various elements of policing, thereby altering each era’s idea of “policing.” Police responsibilities and community expectations of their police change with the times.

Police relationships with the community most conspicuously define the history of policing in the United States. From an era when every able-bodied townsman fulfilled the police function by responding to the hue and cry, to a time when a highly organized, well paid, educated, and professional\(^1\), full-time police force prevents and responds to all types of problems, crimes and criminals, the intimacy with which police and citizens work together varies over the years. Each node in the evolution of policing represents police attempts to respond to the social, cultural, economic, and political environments in which the police and the community negotiated their relationship. For instance, indignation with the corrupting closeness of police, politicians, and the public sparked the drastic moves to “get the politics out of the police and get the police out of politics” during the Reform era (Miller, 1977, p. 11). The police estrangement from the community that symbolized this era came to a head in the 1960s as riots and the police inability to successfully combat

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\(^1\) “Professional,” when referring to the police, connotes the particular bureaucratic, para-military governance that arose in police organizations in response to corruption and general dissatisfaction with police.
crime and to work with the community challenged the police to find new ways of relating to the community.

Beginning in the 1960s, rising crime rates, the fear of crime, and emerging research on the ineffectiveness of principal police tactics (i.e., preventive patrol and rapid response) assisted the police in reappraising their profession (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Police officials, responding to academic research (e.g., Trojanowicz, 1982; Kelling, 1981), recalled the value of conducting neighborhood foot patrols and began to see a reduction in citizen fear of crime as an end in itself. Police administrators learned to appreciate line officers’ broad use of discretion and began to question the primacy of the law enforcement function of police. The community problem-solving era, as it came to be known, followed, and is the period in which this study is situated.

**Theoretical Framework**

Over the past thirty years, police departments across the country have made strides in adopting aspects of CPS. The manifestations, magnitude, and maintenance of these moves vary across departments and over time. The conceptions that police personnel have of CPS sometimes differ from researcher constructs of the same strategy. CPS represents different tactics, strategies, philosophies, and organizational strategies to different people, sometimes even within the same police department. In conducting case studies, this research will explore police personnel’s views of CPS by focusing on one aspect of it, broken windows policing (though many other aspects of CPS are also explored). But, first, a condensed explication of community policing, problem-solving,
and broken windows policing follows.²

**Community Policing**

While the concepts overlap, each idea has a distinct meaning for police work. Skogan (2006, p. 28) states, community policing is “an organizational strategy that leaves setting priorities and the means of achieving them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighborhoods…. [It] is a process rather than a product.” Of the three terms (community policing, problem-solving policing, and broken windows policing), community policing most directly involves extensive and considerable change for police personnel and the organization for which they work. It is a philosophy that undergirds all aspects of police operations, including how the department is organized, how police spend their time, how police measure their performance, and how police view their relationship with the people they serve. Skogan (1990a, pp. 90-93) offers four underlying principles of community policing:

1. Community Policing assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing.
2. Community Policing relies upon organizational decentralization and a reorientation of patrol tactics to open informal, two-way channels of communication between police and citizens.
3. Community Policing requires that police be responsive to citizen demands when they decide what local problems are, and set their priorities.
4. Community Policing implies a commitment to helping neighborhoods help themselves, by serving as a catalyst for local organizing education efforts.

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² Police personnel, academics, policy analysts, and the public often conceive of and operationalize these concepts differently, leading to difficulties in implementing and studying the effects of each. Other terms used to discuss similar concepts include community-oriented policing, problem oriented policing, CPS policing, neighborhood policing, team policing, zero-tolerance policing, and quality of life policing. These terms encompass various policing philosophies, strategies, and tactics. This paper uses community policing and community-oriented policing interchangeably. CPS specifically describes the most recent era of modern policing. The term captures both the policing strategy and the wide range of activities that I will explore in this study. This research focuses specifically on one tactic used in this era, broken windows policing.
Though little evidence supports the crime prevention benefits of community policing, research examines the ability of a community oriented police department to improve their relationships with citizens and to assist them in community based activities. Furthermore, research shows that aspects commonly found in police departments implementing community policing (i.e., problem-solving and broken windows policing) have a more direct effect on the crime and disorder reduction outcomes of a police department. These are discussed in more depth below. Problem-solving policing is a process by which the police department works with the community to respond proactively to a wide range of problems (which can include, enforcing laws); broken windows policing is often part of a community oriented police department’s repertoire of tactics, stemming from their implementation of a problem-solving exercise (Reisig, 2010).

**Problem-Solving Policing**

Research on the inefficacy of rapid response (Kansas City Police Department, 1977) and preventive patrol (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974), Wilson’s (1968) work on police discretion and the “varieties of police behavior,” and Herman Goldstein’s (1979) introduction of the idea of problem-solving mark the beginning of the community-problem-solving era. It also marked the beginning of a shift in how police viewed their success and provided a channel for police and community collaboration. According to the problem-solving model, police should use the number of problems solved, not response times, in measuring the success of their work (Goldstein, 1979). Eck and Spelman (1987) advanced and refined Goldstein’s ideas in their research on the successful implementation
of a problem-solving model that included scanning, analyzing, responding, and assessing (or, the SARA model). This model has become the most accepted understanding of how police departments implement problem-solving policing. Eck (2006, p. 117) lays out five premises of problem-oriented policing:

1. The public demands much of police;
2. The causes of these demands are often complex;
3. The police serve the public better when they make systematic inquiries into these complexities;
4. Knowledge helps build new approaches to police services
5. Learning from successful and unsuccessful innovations makes police more effective in handling the demands of the public.

Whereas community policing offers a wide range of broad philosophical tenets for organizing and administering police services and working with the community, problem-oriented policing more narrowly focuses on the specific way police could work with the community to respond to problems and on the outcomes police should use in measuring their success. Problem-solving is a method used by a community-oriented department to respond to a variety of community needs; community policing is a driving philosophy for police departments that implement problem-oriented policing. Clarke (2002) differentiates between community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing; he notes, community policing “seeks to strengthen relationships with communities and engage their assistance in the fight against crime. Problem-oriented policing, on the other hand…is mostly directed to reducing opportunities for crime through environmental changes and criminal or civil enforcement” (emphasis the author’s, p. 3). A variety of tactics, then, can be used with a problem-oriented approach to respond to any number of problems. Research confirms the success of police problem-solving in a number of
communities and for a range of crimes and problems (Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Mazerolle, Spelman, & Gajewski, 1999; Hope, 1994; Sampson & Scott, 2000; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piel, 2004). Additionally, while a Campbell systematic review of the effectiveness of problem-solving policing (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010) found various forms of problem-solving to have an overall statistically significant modest effect on crime and disorder, the authors found only ten evaluations rigorous enough to meet their inclusion criteria and conclude that future implementations of problem-solving should consider the specific problem-solving approaches that can best combat specific types of crimes. This dissertation adds to the knowledge of problem-solving policing by explaining the problem-solving experiences of three police departments and interpreting the police personnel’s perceptions of their problem-solving efforts (as police work with the community and employ broken windows policing tactics, that, research shows, can sometimes hurt the police department’s relationship with citizens) (Gau & Pratt, 2008).

**Broken Windows Policing**

Broken windows policing is credited with helping to usher in the CPS era and is often viewed as a way for CPS police departments to respond to a crime or disorder problem in their neighborhood. Wilson and Kelling first presented their broken windows theory of neighborhood crime in 1982. Their theory explored the psychological and normative effects of neighborhood incivilities and disorder on criminal offending and the role that police could play in reconciling community norms to neighborhood order. Based on their observations of police in the field, they urged police departments to return to what Wilson and Kelling argued was the historical responsibility of police: to maintain
orderly communities.

The oft-quoted broken windows metaphor follows:

if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing (Wilson and Kelling, p. 30).

The one broken window (e.g., a persistent beggar, a group of intimidating teens, excessive litter, graffiti, and individuals sleeping in public places) gives the impression to potential wrongdoers that no one cares how people act in or treat the neighborhood, opening the door to more serious lawbreaking.

In their empirical testing of broken windows policing, Wagers, Sousa, and Kelling (2008, p. 253) further assess the main tenets of broken windows, giving greater insight into the theory’s implications:

1. Disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked;
2. Police (in the examples given, foot patrol officers) negotiate rules of the street. “Street people” are involved in the negotiation of those rules;
3. Different neighborhoods have different rules;
4. Untended disorder leads to the breakdown of community controls;
5. Areas where community controls break down are vulnerable to criminal invasion;
6. The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself;
7. Problems arise not so much from individual disorderly persons as it does from the congregation of large numbers of disorderly persons; and,
8. Different neighborhoods have different capacities to manage disorder.

People have perceived police departments largely as implementing these understandings of the broken windows theory as zero-tolerance policing, where police officers are
expected to formally intervene in all instances in which they suspect an individual has committed a low level offense. Furthermore, research on the effect of broken windows policing on crime often measure the policing tactic by numbers of misdemeanor arrests and citations, which, in some instances, neglects the informal ways that police also deal with citizens who are acting disorderly (e.g., Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Shi, 2009; Kubrin, Messner, Deane, McGeever, & Stucky, 2010). Nevertheless, many of these studies do in fact support the inverse relationship between proactively policing disorderly (and misdemeanor) offenses and rates of fear and crime (though, as mentioned before, concerns are also raised about the effects such policing can have on the police department’s relationships with citizens in certain neighborhoods).

Wilson and Kelling were not the first to posit a link between disorder, crime, and fear of crime (e.g., Jacobs, 1961; Zimbardo, 1970; Glazer, 1979), however their broken window metaphor and the progressively popular community policing movement combined to make change more palpable to police departments looking to advance their services. The broken windows metaphor aided police administrators in understanding the relationship between disorder, crime, and the fear of crime, gave line-officer supervisors tangible tactics to employ in carrying out the theory, and spoke to those line-officers who had already been doing broken windows policing in fulfilling their day-to-day duties.

Researchers variously differentiate among community policing, broken windows policing and problem-solving, and yet these concepts are often implemented in conjunction with each other. This current research traces the CPS efforts of police departments, paying special attention to their attempts at broken windows policing. An
initial examination of the police departments, discussions with George Kelling (who had recently consulted with each of the police departments), an understanding of the proven leaderships abilities of the police departments’ recently (at the time) appointed police executives led this researcher to focus on the CPS strategy and broken windows policing tactic as a way of orienting the study of the police departments’ organizational strategies. The elements of organizational strategy (explicated below) further helped to manage, understand, and interpret the extensive amount of data collected for this study.

Conducting case studies of the three police departments offers insight into the factors related to the ebb and flow of a department’s commitment to CPS policing. The analysis of the three police departments in this study shows how the police organizations implement broken windows policing in the CPS strategy, how police personnel view broken windows policing as fitting into their police department (including aspects of problem-solving and community policing3) and the most salient inhibitors and facilitators of organizational change within the departments implementing broken windows policing in the CPS strategy.

Organizational Change in Police Departments

Research commonly refers to the more restrictive term “corporate strategy” when discussing

“the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objective, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies or plans for achieving those goals, and describes the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of…organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the…contribution it intends to make to its…communities” (Andrews, 2003, p. 51).

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3 Hence, using community problem-solving (CPS) as an organizing theme.
“Organizational strategy” more aptly describes the business of public service agencies, and hence will be used to discuss the policing organization. Seven elements of a police organizational strategy, adapted from Kelling and Moore (1988), inform and guide this current research:

1. legitimacy (or, authorization; from where do police derive their power to influence society?);
2. police function (what is the police role in society?);
3. organizational structure (how do orders and information flow through the organization?);
4. administrative processes (what activities are necessary to maintain the proper functioning of the organization and how are decisions made?);
5. external relationships (what relationships do police have with their external environment?);
6. demand entrance and demand management (how and to whom do the police market or sell their services? how does demand enter the organization and who controls this demand?); and
7. tactics, technology and outcomes (what are the main activities, programs, and tactics police use to achieve their mission? what are the specific measures police use to define success or failure?).

Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (1997) offer a similar typology, distinguishing between

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4 For a brief discussion of how corporate strategy applies to public institutions, see Kelling, G. A Discussion of the Concept of Organizational Strategy for Use in ‘Planning and Management’ Sequence, unpublished manuscript.
four types of innovations: programmatic, administrative, technological, and strategic. This study determines the extent and nature of the organizations’ changing strategy by examining each organization holistically, looking at how Kelling and Moore’s (1988) elements of organizational strategy fit into the four types of innovation. This study explores the programmatic, administrative, and technological innovations; these innovations (in toto) evidence strategic innovation and shifting organizational strategies in each police department. First, a discussion of the elements of organizational strategy follows. Though these terms refer to a multitude of possibilities in an organization, only the most striking parts of each element (as they arise from the data in each case) will be discussed in this research. Thus, some of the findings explore only a narrow portion of some elements.

**Legitimacy.** A wide range of activities and factors relate to views of police legitimacy. Researchers examine police legitimacy by using objective and subjective measurements, including, the police department’s relationship to the community, their relationship with local politicians, the police personnel’s and citizens’ beliefs and behaviors, the education and training levels of department personnel, the representativeness of the police department, and the ways of recruiting, hiring, firing, promoting, and investigating police personnel. Data on citizens’ perceptions of the police department and on citizens compliance and cooperation with the police reflect the department’s legitimacy in the community and suggest that how police perform their duties (e.g., procedural justice) is sometimes more important than the outcomes of their work (i.e., order maintenance or crime reduction) (Tyler, 2002; Fagan & Tyler, 2004). For
police legitimacy, then, the traditional ways of measuring what police do and their effectiveness doing it do not account for its most pertinent aspect, the manner in which they fulfill their responsibilities.

Themes of legitimacy are central to the creation, discourse and evolution of the broken windows theory (Walker, 1984). A more sophisticated understanding of how broken windows policing affects a police department’s organizational strategy can offer suggestions on how to improve legitimacy in police departments and can provide information on how best to facilitate citizens’ co-production of order, as the broken windows theory suggests. Past research has shown that broken windows policing (sometimes misinterpreted by police departments as zero-tolerance policing) can hurt or help police efforts at gaining legitimacy. This depends on community and police understandings and perceptions of that type of policing and on the citizen and police definition of the crime problem (Skogan, 2008; Gau & Pratt, 2008). Evidence of police legitimacy relating to broken windows policing in the CPS strategy can include, a decrease in citizen complaints against the police department, transparent processes within the police department (especially including the investigation of police personnel), increased efforts by the police to encourage positively engaging the community, support from relevant political bodies, and training officers in properly using their discretion to intervene with citizens upon reasonable suspicion of a low level offense.

Function. This chapter has discussed the changing functions and roles of policing in the United States. The police function changes with time and location and by police department and individual police personnel, as personnel and their departments interpret
and implement their own understandings of what is expected of them. The main functions of police throughout time are maintaining order, serving the community, and fighting crime. The “varieties of police behavior” that departments use to fulfill those functions are the “watchman style,” the “legalistic style,” and the “service style” (Wilson, 1968).

Initial conceptions of the broken windows theory discuss the need for the police function to shift from one focused on crime control to one in which the police and community work together to reduce disorder, crime, and fear of crime. The function of a police department implementing broken windows policing tactics, within a CPS strategy, manifests in a police department’s successful establishment of positive working relationships with citizens and other community groups, response to lower level offenses (i.e., quality of life offenses, violations of city ordinances, and motor vehicle violations), and in connecting these relationships and responses to reductions in crime, disorder and fear. As is discussed below, the CompStat process is one way that police organizations try to connect their crime, fear, and disorder strategies to their efforts at community building, broken windows policing and problem-solving. This study explores three police departments’ experiences in implementing the broken windows theory and offers data to help police departments and researchers move beyond traditional “zero-tolerance” applications of the broken windows theory as part of their CPS strategy and to better understand the these connections.

Organizational structure and administrative processes. The form of an organization should be directly related to the function it fulfills. The traditional quasi-military structure of police organizations is intended to enhance the ability of supervisors
to control police behavior, to manage the allocation of resources and personnel, and to
deliver the crime fighting services of police departments by delineating clear lines of
supervision and authority. This structure dominates the history of modern policing in the
United States. Other types of organizational structures will have a less stringent hierarchy
of authority and varying degrees of flatness (that is, they will include more personnel
within the decision-making and administrative processes).

Administrative processes refer specifically to the opportunities for and
mechanisms by which decisions are made and processed through the organization.
Traditionally, the police executive (e.g., police chief or police commissioner) consults
with his or her administrative personnel to create orders and send them down through the
ranks. Standardized decisions on how to allocate resources and deploy personnel are
made at headquarters and are founded on equalization. Investigative personnel are based
in a central location and responsible for their content area of specialization (i.e., robbery,
burglary, homicide, shootings) across the entire city. This research examines changing
relationships between patrol and investigations units, department reorganizations, new
task forces, criteria for decisions dealing with personnel, training, the role of leadership,
the CompStat process and the police subculture to discuss changes in the organizational
structure and administrative processes.

More specifically, nearly 60% of police agencies with 100 or more sworn
personnel claim to follow some version of a CompStat process (Weisburd, Mastrofski,
Greenspan, & Willis, 2004). Police departments use CompStat in various ways (as a
management tool, as a problem-solving exercise, to transmit the executive leader’s values
to command staff, and to hold personnel responsible for using their own problem-solving skills to respond to data-derived crime and disorder problems) (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007). The CompStat process, then, can directly relate to a police department’s implementation of community, problem-solving and broken windows policing. In addition to integrating these ideas into their CompStat process, a police department implementing broken windows policing in the CPS era should exhibit signs of decentralization, shared leadership, investigative and patrol maintenance of a limited geographic area, and training and personnel decisions that support the department’s move towards (and enculturates its personnel into) such a strategy.

**External relationships.** The police department’s relationship to its external environment refers to the department’s social, political and economic situation (specifically, the police department’s access to economic resources, the political context in which the department operates, and the department’s relationship with the union, the community and other law enforcement agencies). These relationships most conspicuously define discussions of the CPS strategy and inevitably arise when studying most of the other elements of organizational strategy.

Any number of socio-political and economic combinations can exist at a given time. Discussions of a police department’s external environment commonly include the department’s relationship with the union, the community, and other governmental bodies, the economic strength of the organization, and social or cultural movements that challenge or promote police authority. A police department practicing broken windows policing should have sustained, sincere and productive working relationships with
citizens and other community groups, as well as support from local politicians. The police and the community, under the CPS strategy, would be viewed as co-producers of reduced levels of crime, disorder and fear of crime. Ideally, as with any other type of policing, a department would also have the benefit of a healthy economic situation.

**Demand entrance and demand management.** The avenues in place for an organization to receive demand for their service and how the organization interprets and manages that demand speak to how the police department views their relationships with the groups mentioned above. Again, the form of those avenues should relate to the stated nature of the police department’s relationships with citizens, community groups and politicians. Demand enters the police organization through contacts with citizens while on patrol or in the precinct house, formal meetings (and collaborations) with community groups, citizen calls to 9-1-1, local politicians, or general surveillance (and crime analysis) technologies. As such, that demand can be managed by upper-level command staff, other police personnel, politicians, the police department’s communications division, or crime strategies units.

Broken windows policing in a CPS strategy should result in demand entering the organization at all levels and emphasize giving line and mid-level police personnel the authority and resources to work within limited geographic areas to manage and respond to that demand in a neighborhood-specific way. Additionally, under this strategy, contacts with citizens and community groups would be increased and calls for service prioritized based on seriousness and time since occurrence. Finally, avenues should be put into place by which line personnel are free from responding to non-emergency calls for service and
can use that time to partake in these other, community building and problem-solving activities.

**Tactics, technology and outcomes.** Although multiple tactics and technologies can be used to fulfill any number of outcomes, functions, missions or strategies, understanding how a police department employs specific ones further evidences the type of strategy underlying a police department. Tactics can include preventive patrol, investigative operations, and rapid response to calls for service. Broken windows policing within a CPS strategy can include many possible tactics, including zero-tolerance policing, police-community meetings, foot patrol and arrests for misdemeanor offenses, and the use of a number of technologies. Braga and Bond (2008) and Braga *et al.* (1999) discuss other effective tactics used by police implementing broken windows policing as part of a problem-solving process (e.g., dealing with problem properties, civil remedies, collaborations with community groups and environmental design changes). Police operations should include these tactics and evidence the proper use of technologies in support of them (such as, at CompStat). Though CompStat aids police departments in creating (and holding commanders accountable for) problem-solving strategies at the highest levels of the police organization, problem-solving at the line level often takes a different form (e.g. interacting with citizens, community groups and other law enforcement or city agencies to respond to geographic hot spots of crime and disorder as determined by multiple data sources).

Broken windows policing is a tactic used by many departments to achieve reduced levels of crime, disorder and fear, and to increase citizen satisfaction with the
police within a CPS strategy and assisted by a CompStat process. In addition to the usual outcomes of police work (i.e., crime control), a police department doing broken windows policing should also be concerned with citizens’ views of the police department, crime, disorder and the overall quality of life in their community.

The preceding elements of organizational strategy will be used to frame the analysis of each case, which includes what effect (if any) broken windows has on each element, how do police personnel view their police organizations, and what are the inhibitors and facilitators to change in each police department. A review of the literature on organizational change in police departments implementing the current strategy of policing (i.e., CPS) follows.

**Organizational Change in Departments Implementing Community Problem-Solving**

The literature on organizational change in police departments discusses the inhibitors (Zhao *et al.*, 1999; Moore *et al.*, 1999) and facilitators of police innovation (Zhao *et al.*, 1999; Mastrofski, 2006), generally, and as it regards CPS, specifically. Researchers use a variety of methods in studying this organizational change, including panel data collected from mailed surveys, a single case study, literature reviews, quasi-experimental analyses of secondary data, and comparative case studies.

Researchers also explore the various macro-level and micro-level effects of the seven above-listed elements on a changing organization and officers’ perceptions of those effects. For instance, Zhao *et al.* (1995) relate post-materialist societal values to trooper, command staff, sergeant, and public support of community policing. Others examine how leadership, technology, resources, officer attitudes and education, organizational
structure, and police culture facilitate or inhibit organizational change in police departments. Facilitators (training, organizational restructuring, and police leadership) and inhibitors (ineffective leadership, the police subculture, and a lack of resources) to change in police departments are discussed below.

**Facilitators.** Comparing survey data from 1993 and 1996, Zhao *et al* (1999, p.79) find four aspects of training that facilitate the implementation of community policing (“enhancement of overall performance skills, police-citizen collaboration in crime prevention efforts in the community, improvement of middle management skills, and improving police-community relations”). Their findings reveal a progression in training for community policing from 1993 to 1996, suggesting that the police departments surveyed continued to recognize the value of training for community policing. Similarly, in their cases studies of ten police departments receiving COPS grants, Moore *et al.* (1999) note the importance of recruiting, hiring, training, and promotional procedures in thoroughly implementing community policing. Organizational restructuring enhances the benefits of these new human resource and personnel changes at both the organizational and the individual level.

Kim and Mauborgne (2003) demonstrate the New York Police Department’s experience with redistributing officers’ shifts, refocusing in what activities police spent their time, creating new bureaus, and pushing responsibility and authority down to the precinct command. A prominent feature of CPS policing is the decentralization of authority and responsibility. Departments that prudently restructure the organization (e.g., placing the right people in the right positions) reinforce the department’s commitment to
community policing as an organizational strategy. Research into organizational restructuring emphasizes the importance of such change to a successful adoption of community policing. Moore et al. (1999) show how re-designing the organizational, physical, and information-sharing infrastructure aids police departments in their move toward CPS. This restructuring not only provides the material resources and framework, but also authenticates for police personnel the department’s staidness on CPS policing. The value of line officer and supervisor beliefs that their leaders’ are authentic in their community policing undertaking becomes apparent when discussing the police subculture as a barrier to community policing implementation.

Police executive leadership is key to effective restructuring (Appelbaum, Everard, & Hung, 1999). As Skolnick and Bayley (1986, p. 9) discovered, “administrative leadership, an animating philosophy of values, can indeed effect change…[altering] both the structure of police organization and the performance of street patrolmen.” The bureaucratic, paramilitary organizational structure of most police departments offers the chief executive officer (e.g., the police director, commissioner, chief) the authority to direct the actions of department personnel. Acting as both political representative to the community and decisive leader of their police organization, and by gaining the authority and trust of both groups, police leaders can institute radical changes in police departments (to include, organizational restructuring, reallocation of resources, and revising the organization’s mission) (see Skolnik & Bayley, 1986; Moore et al., 1999; Kim &

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5 Interestingly, the same bureaucratic, paramilitary structure that community policing challenges is helpful for police leaders trying to implement community policing strategies. As with other government institutions, leaders of an authoritarian structure can choose to democratize at will, but it also takes buy-in from personnel at all levels for lasting change to occur. See Wilson, J. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. United States: Basic Books.
Mauborgne, 2003). A savvy leader creates the logistical and cultural environments that inure department personnel to the CPS strategy.

Restructuring the organization, recruiting, hiring, training, and promotional procedures, committed and energetic leadership, the strategic use of technology, increased resources, and personnel and community buy-in facilitate change in police departments implementing CPS. Deficiencies in these areas will inhibit a police department's move toward community policing. For instance, research finds the internal structure of police departments, inadequate training in community policing values, a police leader’s lack of clear vision for the department, insufficient resources, inefficient means of evaluating their community policing experiences, and a subculture resistant to change contribute to police departments’ difficulties in implementing CPS (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Moore et al., 1999, Zhao et al. 1999).

Inhibitors. While a bureaucratic, paramilitary organization aids police administrators in the initial push for CPS, the nature of the change (i.e., giving subordinates the freedom to innovate and holding them accountable for delivery of services to their precincts) demands widespread acceptance and buy-in from a range of department personnel.6 As just mentioned, an insightful and persuasive leader can assist the department in making the necessary changes to facilitate the organization’s move to community policing.7

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6 See Kim & Mauborgne (2003) and Bratton & Knobler (1998) for the role of police leadership in working with limited acceptance of (and scant resources for) such change.

7 As already suggested, each of the facilitating and inhibiting elements interacts with the others to create differences in the speed and magnitude of an organization’s adoption of CPS.
Skolnick and Bayley (1986) discuss how the lack of a courageous, executive visionary can effectively stall any propensity an organization may have to CPS. The dual role of many current police chiefs as chief executive officer and political figure requires the police chief to balance their own convictions with a clear and compelling vision, while also ensuring an adroit rapport with their department as well as the wider community. Police leadership also influences other possible inhibitors to organizational change, including confusion over what is community oriented policing, organizational culture, “internal structure and operational impediments,” a lack of resources, and unions (Zhao et al., 1999, p. 8).

Research often cites the police subculture as the most impenetrable element to change in a policing organization (Sparrow, 1988). Researchers, however, disagree on what is the police subculture and how it might affect personnel beliefs about organizational changes. In one of the most popular ethnographic studies of police subculture, Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) discuss the two distinct cultures that arose in the New York City precinct they studied (i.e., street cop culture and management culture). Their research uncovers the social organization of police work at the precinct level, how formal policies and informal understandings interact to influence police behavior, and how each culture relates to their environments and negotiates their sometimes differing values to bring about change in the organization. Chan (1996), in her review of the police subculture literature, reconceptualizes the relationship between Reuss-Ianni and Ianni’s cultural dichotomy and situates police work within a greater cultural, environmental, and socio-political environment.
Regardless of the strength researchers give to the police subculture, penetrating that subculture and using it to facilitate change is a key task for effective organizational change. The organization’s ability to change and the manner of that change will depend on how police administrators perceive and mediate the gaps between street cop culture, management cop culture, and command culture. Fortunately, the structural changes and the philosophies that drive the CPS strategy (i.e., participatory decision-making, and a transformation of command and control) are also stimulants for breaking down obstinate police subcultures and are facilitated by a strong police executive. Therefore, CPS-minded leaders should presumably be open to working with the other levels of police personnel in a manner most conducive to organizational and cultural change. Instead of viewing the subculture as a barrier to change, crafty police leaders should use that subculture as a conduit for their change (Appelbaum et al., 1999). Chappell (2009) holds that organizational restructuring (as previously discussed in this paper) should occur before, and therefore, instigate, cultural change—build it, and they will come.

Police chiefs can create the material conditions (i.e., organizational and information processing structures) that are best equipped to execute a CPS strategy. Even with such change, however, Zhao et al. (1999) mention civil service rules, police officer perceptions of community policing as too soft, and police union and line officer resistance as impeding an organization’s change to community policing. Yet, a bright and politically astute police executive anticipates such difficulties and responds to them in a manner that illuminates his or her plan for the department and encourages union, police personnel, and community support for their innovation.
Kim and Mauborgne (2003) document how, during his tenures as head of a number of policing agencies, William Bratton successfully brought about rapid organizational change by overcoming cognitive, political, motivational, and resource hurdles. This type of leadership does more with less. Despite a lack of support from many line officers and managers, limited resources, and less than optimal enthusiasm from police personnel, William Bratton exemplified what Kim and Mauborgne call “tipping point leadership” (2003, p. 64), as he led the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the Boston Police, the New York Transit Police, and then the New York Police Department.

One explanation of how police leaders may do more with less is that they more wisely and more efficiently expend the resources they have. For instance, Chappell’s (2009) observations of police officers on patrol revealed line officer’s concerns that they could not do community policing because of a lack of personnel in their department. A successful police leader, however, works with their organization and the community to determine the most resourceful way to meet the most pressing needs of the community. Restructuring the organization and refocusing its mission results in a more efficient and effective use of resources and creates buy-in from department personnel and the community. Moore et al. (1999) demonstrate the merit of strong leadership in helping to overcome cultural and resource impediments in their case studies of ten urban police departments (see also, Sparrow, 1988).

Often times cited as the element most resistant to change in the police organization, the police subculture can be influenced by each of the factors already mentioned (recruiting, hiring, training, promotional standards, organizational
restructuring, external grant money, and the strategic use of technologies to support the change). Getting police personnel to understand why changes are being made, how that change will occur, why change is beneficial to them and their organization, including an array of officers at all the stages of the change, and assuring them (through action) that change is real will help drive change in an organization otherwise characterized by an obstinate police subculture (Adams et al., 2002). The organization must walk the talk. Clearly communicating the purpose and nature of the organizational change also facilitates that change. For instance, research into multinational corporations and other private organizations discusses the pivotal role of effective communication in combating rumors, reducing uncertainty, and maintaining trust to bring about change in those organizations (Appelbaum et al., 1999; DiFonzo & Bordia, 1998).

Police leaders can reinforce their commitment to change by realigning police performance and outcome measures (Alpert & Moore, 1997). A police organization may state their commitment to a specific philosophy or strategy (and the organization may even make moves toward that new strategy) but if the organization does not set up the avenues by which the department’s and officers’ performance will be measured, lasting change is unlikely. Instituting new ways of measuring police performance signals to police personnel that change is real and establishes channels for departments to reward officers who embody the new values, further affirming the new organizational philosophy.

**Summary**

This section has explicated the central policing ideas that are discussed in this
research and has explained what past research has found about the policing experience as it relates to the various elements of organizational strategy and broken windows policing. Facilitators and inhibitors to police organizational change in the CPS era were also discussed and give insight into this study’s findings on the three departments’ experiences with broken windows policing in the CPS strategy.

A useful way to explore how an organization adapts to specific strategies and tactics is by conducting case studies of police departments implementing such changes. The current research intends to better understand how the above-mentioned factors facilitate or impede organizational change and how each element works together in the CPS strategy. Since researcher and police interpretations of how best to implement certain strategies change in response to the times and environments in which they serve, the current examination of three police departments experiences will further add to the body of knowledge on police organizational change and the strides police departments have made in the CPS era. The methods and methodology of the proposed research will now be discussed.
Chapter 2: Methods and Methodology

The Purpose of this Dissertation Research

Scholars debate the role of CPS and broken windows policing in lowering crime rates, but few can dispute the role that these have had on the policing world. A large majority of police departments have implemented or are implementing some form of CPS (Skogan 2006b; Hickman & Reaves, 2001; Erickson, 1998). An understanding of how police departments (and police personnel) interpret the current era of policing and the ways in which they use CPS to drive their departments forward is useful in clarifying the nebulous idea of CPS and to advance our understanding of broken windows policing.

The current study presents the findings of in-depth case studies of three medium-to large-sized police departments. As argued in Chapter 1, police respond differently to shifting environments. So, a study conducted on innovations in community policing in the first decade of the 21st century (i.e., in a post-9/11 world) will offer different insights into the concept of CPS than studies conducted in the 1980s or 1990s. The conditions to which police respond, and the environments in which they work, change over time. This study, then, offers a snapshot of three police departments’ recent experiences in implementing broken windows policing in the CPS strategy.

While previous research has “disregarded the importance of history, process, and the temporal dimensions of organizations,” (King, 2009, p. 213) the current study’s review of past research and a retrospective analysis of the three departments’ experiences enhances this study’s contribution to the field by “including time and process,” (King, 2009, p. 229) and “introducing an historical and temporal element to organizational
studies” (King, 2009, p. 232). Quantitative data and one-time surveys and questionnaires alone do not fully portray the contextualized experiences of police departments implementing CPS policing.

This current dissertation research, rooted in previous research on organizational change in police departments, explores how police departments implement broken windows policing as part of an adaptation of a CPS organizational strategy, describes how police personnel view the effect of this shift on police work, and suggests barriers and facilitators to a successful implementation of CPS policing, of which broken windows policing is a tactic (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Sparrow, 1988; Rossmo, 1994; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Alpert & Moore, 1997; Maguire, 1997; Moore, Thacher, Hartmann, Coles, & Sheingold, 1999; Zhao, Lovrich, & Thurman, 1999; Connors & Webster, 2001; Gaylor, 2001; Adams, Rohe, & Arcury, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007; King, 2009; Chappell, 2009).

This study focuses on three major research questions:

1. How does the broken windows theory of policing influence a police department’s CPS organizational strategy (as evidenced by changes in their legitimacy, function, organizational structure, administrative process, external relationships, demand, technologies, tactics, and outcomes)?

2. How do police personnel view the effect of this shifting strategy on the work they do?

3. Which elements in the police organization facilitate an implementation of broken windows policing? Which inhibit such change?
Methods

This study uses mixed methods to:

1. focus on in-depth interviews, personal observation, surveys, and archival data;
2. report on and interpret in detail the perspectives of key police personnel as they relate to the shifting organizational strategy;
3. explain the way key police personnel understand the effects of broken windows policing on police work; and
4. triangulate personal observation, archival data, interview data and survey data (Creswell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003).

This research project follows the case study methodology; this is appropriate because the primary concern is obtaining detailed, in-depth analyses and multiple, multifaceted perspectives within a particular setting, and will be helpful in investigating discrepancies between the police departments’ stated values and actual organizational changes (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 1995; Creswell, 1998; Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003; Yin, 2003; Weisburd & Braga, 2006).

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current Research

Methodologists across fields recognize the value of using mixed methods and offer frameworks for conducting rigorous (qualitative and quantitative) case studies (see, Yin, 1981; Agranoff & Radin, 1991; Rossman, 1993; Anderson, 1996; Clarke, 1997; Moore et al., 1999; Shadish et al., 2002). The organizational, public administration and policing literature discuss the advantages and possible disadvantages of conducting this type of research. Many of these studies cite Yin’s (2003) seminal work that describes the
value of the case study design and methods when asking “how” and “why” questions.

Yin (2003, p. 13) defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.” As the definition suggests, an advantage of conducting a case study includes the ability to contextualize a phenomenon (Yin 2003). For example, the gold standard, randomized experimental design may be useful in finding statistically significant relationships between variables, but does not reveal the manner in which two variables might interact. Similarly, complex statistical testing attempts to ferret out relationships between multiple variables (separate from the phenomenon studied) and fail to describe or anticipate the social and contextual phenomena that affect those relationships. As Shadish et al. (2002, p. 478) argue, qualitative methods and the case study methodology “have unrivaled strengths for the elucidation of meanings, the in-depth description of cases, [and] the discovery of new hypotheses.” The case study firmly embeds its data in the context of the case material, and, therefore, necessarily includes a richer understanding of the relationships between variables (Agranoff & Radin, 1991). The current study responds to others’ concerns for “context sensitivity,” unwraps the elusive “black box” that often arises in evaluations of police activities and, in so doing, suggests areas of inquiry for future researchers (Eck, 2010, p. 863; Braga et al., 2004).

Case study research gives the researcher access to in-depth knowledge and understandings of personnel within specific contexts and allows the researcher to use a site’s original documents to look beyond respondents’ interpretations of certain phenomenon to gain a more accurate picture of the phenomenon studied (Agranoff &
Radin, 1991). DiFonzo and Bordia (1998) used two case studies to examine organizational change in the private sector, Agranoff and Radin (1992) champion the use of the comparative case study for research in public administration, and a number of rigorous and compelling case studies have been conducted in the policing arena, specifically with regard to innovation and change within police departments (Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Greene, 1999; Moore et al., 1999; Clarke 2002; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2004; Chappell, 2009). The case study methodology suits the current study of shifting organizational strategies within three police departments. As Yin (2003) notes, the multiple case design (within the case study methodology) makes the findings even more robust.

Finally, researchers champion a cross-case analysis in the synthesis of “general patterns, themes, metaphors, and images across the cases through the processes of comparison and contrast” (Rossman, 1993, p. 11). Anderson (1996) employs Rossman’s analysis process in his cross-case analysis of curriculum reform (similar processes are discussed in Yin, 1981; Agranoff & Radin, 1991; Moore et al., 1999). Yin (1981, p. 61) analogizes both the single case and cross-case analysis to detective work:

Presented with the scene of a crime, its description, and possible reports from eye-witnesses, the detective must constantly make decisions regarding the relevance of various data....the adequate explanation for the crime then becomes a plausible rendition of a motive, opportunity, and method that more fully accounts for the facts than do alternative explanations.

Regarding the cross-case analysis, Yin (1981, p. 63) writes,

modification may be necessary in applying the explanation to the second case, and the detective must learn to ignore irrelevant variations from case to case. How the detective carries out this work in (a) constructing an adequate explanation for each case singly, and (b) knowing the acceptable levels of
modification in the original explanation as new cases are encountered is analogous to a researcher conducting a cross-case analysis (see also Agranoff & Radin, 1991, p. 219).

Yin’s analogy illustrates the task of conducting a cross-case analysis and implies the immense amount of rigor, critical analysis, and impartiality required of the researcher.

Such reliance on the capabilities of the researcher is one of the possible weaknesses of qualitative case study methods, as the researcher holds certain biases, loyalties, preconceptions, and analytic constraints. Conversely, the current study of only three cases by one investigator ensures that the same standards of inquiry will be met in each case (e.g., when gathering archival data, conducting semi-structured interviews, reflecting on observations, and analyzing cases).

Other possible disadvantages of case study research include, the perception that case studies do not follow rigorous, standardized and unbiased procedures, the inability to generalize case study findings (i.e., external validity), and the large amount of time it takes to conduct adequate case studies that usually end up as lengthy, unreadable documents (Yin, 2003). While the findings of the current research may not be statistically generalizable, they are analytically generalizable and, therefore, useful to police departments and their leaders when deciding among possible paths on which to move their organizations (Yin, 2003). An explication of the purposes, strengths and weaknesses of this study’s sampling strategies and survey methodology follows.

**Sampling strategies.** The purposive and convenience sample in this study consists of three large, urban police departments. The three departments (Boston, Milwaukee, and Newark) were purposely chosen based on knowledge of their varied
experiences with implementing broken windows policing as part of a wider departmental move towards CPS, an understanding of the leadership capabilities of their police executives, and a reasonable expectation of access to department personnel and data.\textsuperscript{1} Characteristics of the three departments and the cities they serve add to the strength of this study’s findings. While each department polices within an urban setting, their cities are distinguished by geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic factors.\textsuperscript{2,3} This variation allows for a meaningful cross-case analysis and will produce more robust findings on the shifting organizational strategies of police departments implementing broken windows policing.\textsuperscript{4}

Though the purposive and convenient sample of police departments in this research does not offer itself to the same levels of generalizability as more rigorous random sampling techniques, past research on police organizations demonstrates the merit of conducting case study research on such a sample. The extensive accessibility this researcher had to each of the departments and the time and resource constraints of having only one researcher to collect data at each of the cites justify the use of these methods in this study. Similarly, this research uses convenience, purposive and snowball sampling techniques to obtain interviews with the police departments’ high ranking personnel.

The main data collection source is face-to-face interviews with key personnel

\begin{enumerate}
\item Knowledge of these departments’ experiences with broken windows policing in the CPS strategy comes from guidance given to the author by his dissertation advisor, Dr. George Kelling, who has worked as a consultant for each department.
\item These differences are explained in more depth in the following chapters.
\item See Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd (2004) for a further discussion of their choice of similarly situated cities (Lowell, MA, Minneapolis, MN, and Newark, NJ) as case studies for their research on the role of CompStat on organizational change.
\item This dissertation is part of a larger study that will include the Los Angeles police department.
\end{enumerate}
within the police departments (each lasting between twenty-five and ninety-five minutes). With initial assistance of my department contact, a purposive and snowball sampling method was used to select interview participants from the police departments, based on their history with (and the positions held within) the department (see Appendix A for a sample letter that was sent to the contact person within the organization). From the beginning, the contact persons within the department asked the researcher to please inform them of any personnel he was interested in interviewing. The researcher and contact person, together, created a list of key personnel with whom to speak. These personnel presumably have greater insight into the institutions’ histories and are in the positions (currently) that give them knowledge of the departments’ organizational strategies.

A semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix B) focused on specific questions about the shifting organizational strategy of the police department and on respondents’ views of the effects of broken windows policing on their organizations and communities. Using a convenience sampling method to obtain interviewees lends itself (initially) to the whim and agenda of the contact person within each department. Arguably, this person may wish to present the police department in a favorable light. However, the methods previously discussed and the use of snowball sampling help to offset this possibility by giving the researcher the opportunity to choose interviewees and to have interviewees refer other personnel to participate in the semi-structured interview. Furthermore, the triangulation of archival data from within and outside the police department, a survey of sworn personnel, adherence to the chain of evidence, and maintaining proper
documentation of the coding rationale (See Appendix D) assists in systematically portraying each case.

**Survey methodology.** Surveys were administered in Milwaukee and Newark police departments\(^5\) to obtain personnel’s views of their mission and of broken windows policing (See Appendix C). Because the survey data is used to triangulate data in this study and response rates in the police departments were low, the survey reports results from a non-probabilistic (convenience) sample and, consequently, no significance tests were run. Thus, conclusions from this survey data represent only this study’s sample of personnel’s interpretations of their police departments’ missions.

The survey content (intended to measure respondents’ views of their police departments’ missions) borrows from the tenets of broken windows policing offered by Wagers *et al.* (2008). The first question is the only open-ended question on the survey and is used to assess the respondents’ unfiltered views of their missions. The remaining closed-ended, interval level questions help to determine the extent to which sworn personnel agree with or view as important to their police department’s mission specific assumptions and tactics relevant to the study of broken windows policing. Because many of the data sources in this study (i.e., interviews, observations of crime strategy meetings, and departmental archives) relate more to command level views of the police department, efforts were made to gather mid- and low- level personnel’s (i.e., police officer) views in this survey. Therefore, the researcher administered the survey online (in both Milwaukee and Newark) and at shift roll calls (in Newark).

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\(^{5}\) A lack of cooperation from police unions in Boston prevented this researcher from administering a survey to that department’s personnel
Despite the cooperation of the police departments and the researcher’s best efforts (e.g., attending all three shifts’ roll calls for five days straight in Newark), the response rates for this survey are not ideal. Theoretically, all sworn personnel had access to the survey in either paper format or via a link to an online survey. In Milwaukee, the link to the survey was sent to the work e-mail accounts of all sworn personnel and posted on both physical and virtual roll call boards in the department. Surveys in Newark were administered at various roll calls and sent to all sworn-personnel above the rank of police officer. In all instances, respondents were reminded of their police executive’s support of the study. The samples’ respondents account for about 5% and 10% of the sworn personnel in the Milwaukee and Newark police departments (respectively), and a majority of the sample’s respondents from each survey were from the rank of patrol officer (52.3% in Milwaukee; 66.1% in Newark).

Apart from logistical challenges to administering a department-wide survey, researchers discuss the suspicions that police personnel may have about how such a survey may be used (Paoline, 2001). However, a concise statement regarding the purpose of the survey, an assurance that the survey is completely confidential and anonymous, and the use of a focused survey tool [in some instances, administered online] help to allay these suspicions. Furthermore, although the researcher’s efforts to reach the lower levels of the organization in Newark (by attending roll calls) resulted in a greater response rate, one must consider the implications of the different collection methods on responses. For instance, Newark police officers filling out paper surveys at the end of their roll calls (many times while standing in front of supervisor’s role call desk) might be less
forthcoming than officers in Milwaukee who had the option to fill out an online survey in the privacy of their own home. To respond to this potentiality, the researcher (and the police officer supervisors in Newark) did give officers the option to take the paper survey with them and return it at the end of their shift. Along those same lines, though the online survey format can facilitate more honest responses, it may preclude more seasoned personnel who are not as comfortable giving information on a computer. The final sections of this chapter discuss how these data sources help to build the case in each site and how the cases are analyzed.

**Building the Cases**

Because of the sensitive nature of some of the data (i.e., chief’s memos, general orders, observations of command staff meetings, and personal accounts of officers) and to protect participant confidentiality, all hardcopies, audio recordings, and other electronic documents are stored in a locked office and on a password-protected computer. Furthermore, audio recordings and typed computer documents are identified by an alphanumeric code (i.e., BOS-01).

Initial site visits oriented the researcher to the physical and social layouts of this study’s three police departments and included, ride-alongs with police officers and sergeants, observations of intradepartmental meetings, and introductory conversations with personnel within the department. Two more visits to each police department followed and consisted of more intensive interviews and focused data collection. Throughout all visits, the researcher was cognizant of his presentational strategy and mostly balanced the roles of the “socially acceptable incompetent” and “selective
competence” in response to the corresponding interactions. These strategies are important in gathering the most accurate qualitative data (especially in police departments) (Lofland, Snow, Anderson & Lofland, 2006, pp. 68-70).

This study includes a total of sixty interviews, conducted with the open-ended, semi-structured interview guide. Of those, fifty were also audio recorded with the respondents’ explicit permission. There are nearly 30 hours of audio recordings from these interviews. The ten remaining semi-structured interviews do not have recordings for various reasons including, one respondent’s refusal to give permission, technological difficulties, and circumstances in which the researcher did not request to have the interview recorded due to a noisy environment (i.e., a crowded restaurant at lunch time) or because he believed that doing so might inhibit the respondent’s candidness (for example, when interviewing the police director). In all of these cases, notes were taken during the interviews or immediately following the interview and coded in the same manner as the other interview data. Conversations with other police department personnel (including discussions with police officers during ride-alongs and with non-sworn personnel while in between appointments) provided additional insight into the departments and are used to contextualize and corroborate the police department-assigned interviews. These conversations were less formal, more organic, and every bit as rich as the more formal, planned interviews. They took place in a variety of settings (e.g., restaurants, bars, and police cars), and there are no audio recordings. These data sources,

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6 Such presentations help both the researcher and police personnel to negotiate their data collecting and information-revealing relationship. The researcher must have enough understanding about the environment he studies to ask the right questions and to maintain his appropriate place as an outside researcher in the police department. The researcher must be selective in portraying his knowledge, however, so as to not inhibit the police personnel from offering information that they might assume the researcher already knows.
along with the ability to request formal interviews and the snowball sampling technique strengthen the initially convenient interview sample.

This research attempted to administer surveys to all current, sworn personnel. The survey gauges respondents’ views on their police departments’ missions by asking respondents to assign a level of importance or agreement to beliefs, tactics, and understandings commonly discussed in research of broken windows policing. The relative strengths and weakness of using the surveys in each case are discussed previously. The survey was administered using already established avenues (for example, on the internet at SurveyMonkey.com in the Milwaukee Police Department and at roll-calls in the Newark Police Department). Documents (such as, general orders, chief’s bulletins, memoranda of understandings, newspaper articles, annual reports, directives, and strategic action plans), personal observations, and survey data corroborate and rebut interview and survey data, and, with the semi-structured interviews, demonstrate: (1) from where police receive their authorization, (2) the police function, (3) the organizational structure, (4) the administrative processes, (5) how police relate to the community, (6) from where the demand for police service arises and how that demand is managed, and (7) the tactics, technology, and outcomes used by the departments.

The researcher was granted what is perceived to be a great amount of access to a variety of documents. In each site, he was given hours of access to sit alone on a department computer and explore the departments’ intranet files or in a room with cabinets filled with historical and current internal documents. In many instances, he could take the files with him in hardcopy and/or electronic format; at other times, the
department contact put information on CDs to make the data more portable. The interview schedules were initially set up by the police department contact person, which can presumably lead to biased samples of interviewees. The contact person also assisted the researcher in obtaining interviews with other department personnel at his request (for example, when respondents suggested other personnel with whom to speak or when the researcher thought a certain perspective would enrich his study).

Analyzing the Cases

After building each of the three cases in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, Chapter 6 explores the magnitude and manner of change within each police department. Chapter 7 concludes with suggestions from a cross-case analysis and offers implications for police departments and insight into the common facilitators and inhibitors to the implementation of broken windows policing in the CPS strategy.

Data from each case are organized within the framework of the elements of organizational strategy and then are analyzed for the magnitude of change that the department demonstrates within each. This model borrows from Eck and Stern (1992) (as used in Moore et al. [1999] in their cross-site analysis of ten police departments). Eck and Stern (1992) (in Moore et al., 1999, p.5) argue that improved problem-solving efforts and “improved efforts at developing and sustaining ‘community partnerships’” evidence a departments’ move toward CPS. Moore et al. (1999, p. 5) characterize the magnitude of change “in terms of how likely it seemed that the changes would be sustained over time.” This study, then, applies their framework to each of the elements of organizational strategy, in determining a department’s observed magnitude of change, giving specific
examples of each element’s change within the three police departments.

The interview transcripts were analyzed using the coding and node schemes offered by NVivo 8.0 (a computerized qualitative data-management program). The NVivo 8.0 software facilitates the management, coding, and querying of electronic data. It is used in place of filing cabinets, folders, highlighter markers, and post-it-notes (that are traditionally used) to organize the multiple sources of data for each case, to electronically highlight patterns, themes, and/or areas of interest (as recognized by the researcher’s understanding of the data), and allows for electronic searches of documents within and among each case.

The data analysis process includes a coding scheme that derives from a provisional start list of codes stemming from research questions and the areas of inquiry (i.e., legitimacy, function, structure and process, etc.). Initial readings of the interviews, onsite observations and the organizational strategy framework revealed a number of “nodes” to the researcher. They include community, community oriented policing, discretion, ineffective strategies, political context, resistance to change, resources, personnel, scandal, broken windows policing, internal affairs, leadership, patrol and investigative divide, legitimacy, administrative processes, demand for services, police function, external relationships, restructure, technology, data, training and a general interest node.

Text searches for each node and coding any missed, relevant material into their corresponding nodes served to clean the data. Then, again using NVivo 8.0, the researcher ran a query to include all places coded at “broken windows” and any of the
other nodes (for example, a query for all Newark interview data coded at “broken windows” and “CompStat” or “culture” or “internal affairs”). For ease of reading and analysis purposes, the data was queried in groups of five (such as the grouping in the previous example) for each case. A query of places coded at only “broken windows” was also conducted and those few results were placed in the other queries. In Newark, for example, this process resulted in a collection of approximately 273 pages of interview data. The researcher then went through each interview and copied and pasted each relevant section into a word processing document, color-coded by interview code and organized in an outline form. This returned a word processing document of 136 pages for Newark. After further analyzing these data, the researcher pared down the interviews to a 33 page word processing document that serves as the immediate base for these research findings. A similar analysis of internal and external documents (i.e., general orders, strategic plans, online newspaper articles, and blogs) and survey data (except in Boston) are used to triangulate the interview data. Pattern coding helps to “understand the patterns, the recurrences, the plausible whys...[and] identify an emergent theme, configuration, or explanation” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 69). The codes were used to make contrasts and comparisons among data sources, summarize themes, provide varying explanations of those patterns, and, in particular, analyze how departments adapt their organizational strategies to accommodate and implement broken windows policing. Even with the NVIVO 8.0 software, the researcher is still responsible for translating “raw

7 While the use of blogs and online users’ comments sections might raise methodological concerns for some researchers. This study uses them much like the use of lie detector tests in police hiring decisions. That is, not as definitive sources of inherently reliable information, but rather, as an indicator of other possible areas of inquiry, in building a case.

**Summary**

While the findings from this research cannot offer ironclad prescriptions for police administrators, the rigorous and comprehensive (yet specific) case study and cross-case analysis clarifies for researchers and administrators how police department personnel view broken windows policing within a CPS strategy, offers a contextualized look into key facilitators and inhibitors in departments implementing such change, and explains ways that three departments adapted their organization to broken windows policing. Though this study does not offer findings from a random sample of police departments (or even of the personnel within those departments), the in-depth exploration of these three departments’ experiences with broken windows policing within the CPS strategy allows readers of this analysis to consider their own experiences in relation to those presented here and to adapt these findings to their organization as they see fit. This is, after all, the way that police and the citizenry have always negotiated their relationships and responsibilities to each other.
Chapter 3: Findings from the Newark Police Department

Introduction

A short history of each city and recent developments in police practices and crime rates will situate the police departments within the greater historical and sociopolitical circumstances of their department, their city, and its people. Such experiences invariably improve one’s understanding of the “how” and “why” questions that this study attempts to answer. The next three chapters begin with an explanation of the data sources used to build, and then continue to present the findings from each police department (Newark, Milwaukee, and Boston). The data from all three sites were gathered, stored, and analyzed as described in previous sections. The amount and types of data available at each cite, however, differs slightly. Every effort was made to obtain similar kinds of data from each cite. As necessary, part of the research findings will discuss the implications this missing data can have on the analysis of each case.

This exploration reveals how three police departments interpret and implement to varying degrees various aspects of broken windows policing as part of the CPS era.

First, a reminder of the three research questions that guided this look at the police departments:

1. How does the broken windows theory of policing influence a police department’s organizational strategy (specifically with regards to changes in their legitimacy, function, organizational structure, administrative processes, external relationships, demand, technologies, tactics, and outcomes)?

2. How do police personnel view the effect of this shifting strategy on the work
they do?

3. Which elements in the police organization facilitate an implementation of broken windows policing? Which inhibit such change?

Newark, New Jersey

About ten miles from New York City, on the Port of Newark, and accessible by the Passaic River, Newark’s history is intertwined with the growth and decline of industry that benefited from Newark’s convenient and accessible location. The constant challenges that mark Newark’s history and Newark’s attempts to face them are described in various terms—renaissance, rebirth, resurgence, and revitalization. Among those challenge are a declining economy, rising violent crime rates, race riots, and incompetent governing.

Settled by the Puritans in the 17th century, Newark welcomed settlers of a variety of Christian backgrounds. Visitors to Newark in the 1830s describe Newark as “wonderfully altered...[and as a] strong arm of industry” and speak of its people as “remarkably industrious,” but always in the shadow of the world’s greatest, big city—New York City (History of the City of Newark). In this study, Newark represents the policing experience of the United States’ mid-atlantic region.

As Newark continued to grow, its diverse populations (i.e., Italians, Germans, Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians) settled in different areas of the city. While many of these distinct neighborhoods today survive, their inhabitants are more likely to include Blacks, Portuguese, Brazilian, and other Latino groups (See Figure 3.1). The most drastic change in Newark’s demographics took place in the 1960s, when newly arriving southern Blacks began recognizing their disenfranchised and inferior position in Newark’s socio-
economic-political system.

Figure 3.1 Newark, NJ Population by Race, 2008


The 1967 race riots in Newark, as in other cities, marked a clear distinction in the trajectory of Newark’s history. Middle-class and White residents fled the turmoil of Newark’s streets for the safer suburbs, taking with them their social and economic investments, and beginning a steady decline in the quality of life for Newark’s citizens. A 1968 *Report for Action* commissioned by then governor Richard Hughes suggested reforms in police-community relations as a way to prevent future disorder in the city (Liebman, 2007). However, incorrigible, incompetent leadership hurt Newark’s ability to rebound from the traumatic experiences of the 1960s, and (as this case study demonstrates) Newark has yet to implement some of the forty year old suggestions.

In 1975 *Harper’s Magazine* named Newark “the worst American city” (Louis,
1975, p.67). As business and police ventures\textsuperscript{1,2} tried to make strides in Newark, themes of “Resurgence,” “Rebirth,” “Revitalization,” and “Renaissance” continued to frame Newark’s struggles to undo its past. By the early 1990s, Newark was commonly referred to as the “stolen car capital of the country” (Nieves, 1993). In 1996, \textit{Time} described Newark as the most dangerous city in the United States (Fried, 1996). Then, in the last years of the 20th century, the criminal justice community, spurred by successful demonstrations of CPS in Boston, Chicago, Indianapolis, and Memphis, began laying the groundwork for the Greater Newark Safer Cities Initiative. This network opened the doors for collaboration and cooperation among a wide range of law enforcement agencies, community and religious groups, and academics (Kelling, 2005). By 2009 Newark was off the list of the twenty-five most dangerous cities and drawing national attention for its crime reduction strategies (\textit{Safest and Most Dangerous}, 2009).

Contrasting the city’s Puritan roots, numerous police officials and politicians have been found guilty of various corruptions. Five of the last seven mayors have been indicted on criminal charges, with the immediate past mayor (Sharpe James) serving a two year sentence in federal prison. As the city continues to progress, an enthusiastic young mayor and a director of police (who played a pivotal part in the 1990s turnaround of crime in New York City) are implementing new strategies to meet community needs and to fight crime and disorder. Figure 3.2 tracks crime in Newark for the past ten years

\footnotesize{1} See Skolnick and Bayley (1986) for a case study of policing innovation in Newark, NJ during the early 1980s.

\footnotesize{2} George L. Kelling’s work with the Newark Police Department informed his “Broken Windows Theory” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Kelling also published work on the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment during this time.
and reflects the successes of Newark Police Department under Director McCarthy. Although political corruption, governmental dysfunction, crime, and social ills did not always define New Jersey’s largest city, they factor into the current situation in which the Newark Police department serves the citizens of Newark.

**Figure 3.2 Crime Index by Year***

*City-data.com crime index (higher value means more crime)*
Adapted from: [http://www.city-data.com](http://www.city-data.com)

**Newark Police Department**

The case study of the Newark Police Department (hereafter, NPD) was built using 21 audio-recorded semi-structured interviews, two semi-structured interviews without audio-recordings, informal conversations with department personnel, an online and
paper-pencil survey of 128 sworn personnel, observations of two CompStat\(^3\) meetings and one Intelligence Meeting (on 25 March 2009, 6 May 2009, and 19 January 2010, respectively), over 230 General Orders, approximately 5,000 online news and blog articles, and other department documents (e.g., draft community relations handbook and gun and violence strategies Powerpoint presentations). Intensive research visits to the NPD took place from 18 January 2010 to 22 January 2010, from 24 May 2010 to 26 May 2010, and from 15 September 2010 to 19 September 2010. Please refer to Appendix E for an example of a complete breakdown of the 39 nodes used in the analysis of Newark’s interview data.

**Legitimacy and external relationships.** The answer to the question “from where do Newark police receive the authorization to act” points most directly to the police department’s relationships with citizens and politicians. Along with defining the three eras of modern policing in the United States, these relationships also concern today’s CPS police departments implementing broken windows policing. Newark’s recent history demonstrates fluctuations in the source (local political and community support) and magnitude of the police department’s legitimacy.

After the 1967 riots, the governor’s commission (acknowledging the complicity of police-citizen relations) made a number of recommendations to the police. They include, taking the politics out of hiring and promotional considerations, increasing salaries,

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\(^3\)Although I was welcomed to attend other CompStat proceedings, scheduling conflicts made it impossible to attend. Additionally, Director McCarthy holds CompStat on an “as needed basis,” so there are periods when CompStat is not held for three or four weeks. Weekly CompStat meetings are scheduled for every Thursday morning. An e-mail on Wednesday night informs participants of whether it will be held. This process, as explained by a number of department personnel, is intended to save time and maintain the usefulness of the meeting, while still ensuring that commanders are prepared every week for this meeting.
recruiting Black and Spanish-speaking personnel, placing Blacks in operational command positions, civilianization and residency requirements (Liebman, 2007). Currently, though Whites make up the numerical racial minority in Newark, they are disproportionately over-represented at the highest levels of the NPD. Figure 3.3 reflects this, and also shows a more proportional representation of ethnic and racial numerical minorities at the (combined) patrol officer and detective level.

*Data from NPD as of 6 September 2010

While strides have been made in recruiting and promoting racial and ethnic minorities, there is room in today’s police department to increase their legitimacy with the community. There are even suggestions that the NPD could improve their legitimacy within their own department. Internal documents aimed at new community relations
strategies, interviews with police department personnel, observations of the Police Director during CompStat meetings, and newspaper articles exhibit these continuing challenges to (and successes in) the police department’s efforts to gain legitimacy and reveal how a police department can use technology and professionalism to secure a more legitimate image in the eyes of the public.

_Legitimacy is a tough road to hoe._ A newspaper article, dated 10 September 2010, reports on the city’s support of federal oversight of the NPD (Giambusso & Megerian, 2010). The call for federal monitoring is a result of a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union alleging NPD civil rights abuses of citizens and subsequent Internal Affairs coverups of citizens’ complaints. The Superior Officers’ Association followed with an unanimous vote of no confidence in the city’s police director, with the president of the Fraternal Order of Police suggesting his group might do the same (Queally, 2010). The situation highlights the ongoing tenuous relationships the NPD has with citizens, politicians and its own personnel, and raises questions about the magnitude of the NPD’s legitimacy regarding these groups.

The legitimacy of a police department is sometimes caught in the fickle love triangle of police, politicians, and citizens. This is due, in part, to the obvious role police-citizen relations has played in the success or failure of a police department and to the closeness of police and politics (both throughout history and into today). Like all passionate love affairs, a duo’s amorous relationship often comes at the cost of an afflicted third party, and in some cases, with an illegitimate child. In Newark, close

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4 The NPD police role in influencing the 2002 mayoral election in which incumbent Mayor Sharpe James defeated Cory Booker is documented in a 2005 film, _Street Fight._
relations between longtime Mayor James and his NPD mean some citizens could potentially view the newest mayor’s police department as illegitimate. Interviews conducted with police personnel (incidentally, but importantly, during the 2010 mayoral election season) suggest a slow road to legitimization for the NPD, at least in the minds of Mayor Booker’s political opponents. As one precinct commander replied, in response to a question about the community’s response to new strategies,

> It depends who you talk to. The majority of the people that I go to community meetings with, they love what we’re doin’ and they see a major reduction within their community of perceived crime, of actual crime....Since we’re goin’ into a political year, if you talk to somebody with a political agenda, you may get a different answer (EWR_08).

Since the police director is appointed by the mayor and the two often appear together publicizing their new crime strategies and touting their crime declines, citizens’ anti-incumbent feelings towards the mayor might surface as beliefs of an illegitimate police department.\(^5\) Director McCarthy, himself, is a plaintiff in a lawsuit in which he alleges a political flier in support of three candidates (for city council and mayor) defames his character (Giambusso, 2010). A sergeant views the legitimacy of the department differently and points to the local city council as the source of police authority:

> It’s so volatile, we probably can’t approach the public, they hate our guts right now....Half the people are so frustrated they’re not comin’ to ya anymore, they’re not complaining. What’s the sense of complaining if nothing gets done....Things are pretty bad for people in Newark to call a councilman to say I’m fed up with this guy dumpin’ his garbage down the block. Then the councilman calls the police department and it gets down through channels. Well, why can’t that guy get a hold of the precinct commander, or the precinct cop... (EWR_20).

Clearly the NPD understands there is a group of citizens who do not view the

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\(^5\) While this dissertation research cannot conclude that this process is occurring here, the divisive nature of Newark’s recent political culture make such an exploration is worthy of inquiry.
NPD as a legitimate organization and who warrant significant attention from the NPD. Interviews with NPD personnel suggest reasons why some people do not support the NPD—a belief that police are not successfully doing their job and perceptions that they act unprofessionally when interacting with citizens. These two factors point directly to the nature of the police-citizen interactions that occur in broken windows policing. One NPD commander explains how the factors interact to produce even less citizen support.

EWR_16 says,

They have genuine resentment for the police. Because, imagine this, when you call for the police, when you need us the most, and again, what's serious to you, it's subjective. What's serious to you, may not be serious to me. But at the time they're calling for the police, they want us there. We don't get there, or we get there late, after the fact, but now they encounter the police sometime in the future; we stop them and issue them a blue summons for something. Imagine how you would feel as a citizen. When I needed you, you weren't there, and now you're gonna hit me with something as trivial as maybe I was smoking a cigarette and I threw it on the sidewalk. You know, again, it's not good.

The commander acknowledges the importance of responding to quality of life violations, but also understands the necessity of the officer’s professional response to such a violation. He also notes the need to respond first to those other, more serious complaints, thereby assuring citizens of the NPD’s standards of professionalism and concern for the safety of their citizens. The later section on tactics further analyzes how professional relationships with the community, as suggested by broken windows policing, can improve citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy, disorder and crime.

EWR_16 goes on to discuss his doubt of the crime reductions, saying, “I see the calls for service. This is my job....this is where everyone complains, and we get repeat calls. If crime is reduced, I don’t see it.” This perception of illegitimate police numbers
is supported by an internal survey of NPD that found 34% of sworn personnel believe citizens “have a point” when they say, “The murder rate and overall crime rate is much higher than the stats reported by the Department” (Office of Policy and Planning, 2010, pp. 15-16). This contrasts to a community survey that reveals only 14% of respondents, when presented with Newark’s murder statistics from 2006 through 2009, “don’t believe the stats” (Center for Collaborative Change, 2010, p. 41). Nonetheless, an honest implementation of broken windows policing depends on the citizenry viewing the police department as legitimate. Perceptions that the police department misrepresents crime statistics do not assist in creating positive views of the NPD. Citizens’ impressions that police do not professionally respond to incidents only exacerbate this issue.

Personnel perceptions of lacking professionalism in the NPD are reflected in one sergeant’s comment, “We’re despised by a lot of people because of the stupid shit that some of our people are doin’, from the leadership down to the newest guys” (EWR_20).

A captain offers an example of that “stupid shit,”

It’s [quality of life enforcement] coming under a little bit of attack lately because certain groups feel that some of those quality of life enforcement infringes on people’s constitutional rights. So sometimes there’s a fine line between [safety and individual rights]....I think the public sometimes needs to understand that there’s information they don’t know....That’s not to say some of these things aren’t legitimate violations. Cops stoppin’ somebody for absolutely no reason is uncalled for, but it’s not always what it seems to be (EWR_21).

Police officers must always walk that fine line of public safety and individual rights, lest the public perceive police actions as unprofessional harassment. The interactions in which police officers stop citizens for quality of life offenses make that line even finer. As such, the requirement for police to act professionally is even more necessary in
broken windows policing. EWR_21 suggests that citizen misperceptions of police-citizen interactions may arise when citizens lack certain information that the police officer may have on the individual being stopped. This and other police personnel views of NPD legitimacy are discussed in the following section, but first, a findings from a community-based survey are discussed.

A survey of community and NPD personnel perceptions of the NPD, administered by The Center for Collaborative Change in Newark, offers further insight into the previously discussed beliefs of some NPD personnel and support generally positive feelings toward the NPD that are discussed in greater detail in the next section (Center for Collaborative Change, 2010). One pertinent finding from the community survey regards issues, problems, and concerns that community members have with the NPD’s conduct, performance, and responsiveness. It found that nearly 31% of those responding to the question had “no problem” with the NPD or believed the NPD was “Doing well.” The top two concerns of the remaining 70% of respondents who answered that question regarded issues of “rudeness, respect, or attitude” and “harassment, profiling, or racism,” with Whites accounting for the largest proportion of those with the former concern and Latinos making up the largest percentage of respondents who cited the latter (Center for Collaborative Change, 2010). This finding confirms personnel perceptions of unprofessionalism in police work and highlight the need for the NPD to improve their handling of citizen interactions. Other survey findings will supplement the later discussion of personnel’s favorable perceptions of the NPD.

More important than perceptions of illegitimacy, is that the NPD is taking steps to
encourage stronger support of their department. At one CompStat meeting in March of 2009, Director McCarthy adjures those in attendance to, “Get your [city] council people here.” He discusses the importance of maintaining the quality of life in areas where police have ended street drug markets and states these should occur for “the legitimacy and integrity of the agency....for the good order of the agency.” He concludes, “the road to legitimacy is a tough road to hoe,” (that is, getting politicians and citizens on the same page as the NPD).

That tough road included such advancements as the Senior Citizen Academy, a Clergy-Citizen Academy, an enduring reduction in crime, a survey of community and personnel perceptions of the NPD, revamping certain Internal Affairs policies and training procedures, and holding a number of community meetings aimed at improving the department’s image. During the same time, however, two videos of what appears to be police use of excessive force (one instance on a 15 year old) and the revelation of discrepancies in the numbers of Internal Affairs investigations confirm citizen suspicions that improvements in the NPD are lacking.

Newark’s excessively divisive political landscape and perceptions of police harassment along with a belief that police are not responding to the appropriate, immediate concerns of their citizens contribute to negative citizen and personnel views of the NPD (views that suggest the NPD does not receive its mandate from the people they police). This is contrary to the ideals of broken windows policing. The following section discusses positive views of the NPD, explains affirmative actions that NPD is taking to increase their legitimacy with the community, and cites the Collaborative Change study
in arguing that, overall, the NPD is viewed as a legitimate source of police service in Newark.

**At the end of the day, it’s about how you treat people.** While the previous section discussed the mechanisms by which people might view the NPD negatively, other data reveal favorable views of the NPD and suggest mechanisms by which the NPD can and does continue to cultivate those opinions. Relatively low (though still high) violent crime rates, increasing constructive interactions with citizens, and using technology (i.e., intelligence and mapping software) to allocate resources and to suggest tactics assist NPD in maintaining legitimacy in the community.

Most interviewees relayed the delicate relationship the community has with the police department. Police personnel understand the community generally views the NPD as legitimate and realize one negative interaction can suddenly reverse public opinion. One high ranking police official discusses a situation in which his team helped to reduce violent and drug activity in a high crime public housing complex, resulting in mixed reviews for the police. He says,

You know, honestly, it depends who you ask. It really does, it’s uhm, I’ll give you an instance; [the] unit did a hell of a job in guarding the housing complex....always plagued with violence....We have now given it back to the residents, to the hard workin’ resident, and it’s funny because I go there, and I still check in because it’s like my baby, and sometimes the old people, senior citizens are like, ‘Thank you so much, this is a long time coming,’ and then it’s funny because then I hear of people tellin’ me that their experience is a lot different. They’re sayin’ ‘You guys locked up my cousin, you guys locked up my family, F the police, F that.’ It really depends on who you ask because, like I said, you’re askin’ a senior citizen who’s lived in the buildin’ thirty years who’s seen this building completely get worse and worse every year, and now without everyone doin’ anything, and now here we go in and we’re able to, to, to give it back to them, you know in the way it should be and they’re happy. Then you talk to the
people where they’re like, ‘That’s my relative who you locked up for nothing’ and this and that...I’ll take that criticism everyday because they mean absolutely nothin’ than the fact that I’m doin’ my job....Because at the end of the day, I don’t do it for the drug dealers, I do it for the families, the good families. Like any other city, the majority of the people are good people, and you always have your small handful of bad apples who continually commit crime. It’s always the same people with a felony convictions in the area, and they’ll do it time and time again, as long as at the end of the day, they’re good residents that I’m makin’ happy. It honestly depends on who you ask, and I’m from the city so I always get feedback (EWR_24).

Though most citizens appreciated the positive outcomes of the concentrated police effort, some people whose family and friends were rounded up during the police operation harbored negative feelings. This reflects the influence of perceptions of police (in)effectiveness (i.e., outcomes) and police-citizen encounters on citizen views of police legitimacy.

Echoing EWR_21’s previously discussed rationale for what some perceive as the “stupid shit” police do, EWR_24 turns to the controversial practice of stopping and frisking citizens. He explains,

We might hit a location and we’re there for a reason, a purpose. Intelligence has told us this is the location to be, and we might stop and frisk eight or nine people, well you only got one person. That one person could have committed eight shootings, eight robberies, eight homicides...is that a failure?...Ask the people that live there, the good people, if they mind the inconvenience of us goin’ there and targettin’ that area....We go places for reasons.

Resultant crime reductions, citizens understanding the impersonal (or, data-driven) reasons why police target specific locations, and police acting professionally alleviate citizens’ negative perceptions of the police.

Technology, implicated in the latter part of the reform era for alienating the police from the community, is now used to justify the allocation of police power and police
attention. Though data-driven, these tactics are still person performed and citizen centered. Thus, another key to gaining and maintaining legitimacy with the citizenry is for police officers to conduct themselves in a personable and courteous manner while fulfilling their data-driven mandate. As one respondent explains,

If you ask any policeman or any citizen...at the end of the day, it’s about how you treat people. I can stop you and say, ‘This is the reason I’m stoppin’ you, A, B, C and D. You have the right to stop and talk to me, or you don’t. However, it’s on you, but I’m telling you what I’m doin’ and the purpose.’ As long as you treat people with respect, at the end of it, they can walk away saying, ‘Yes, it was an inconvenience, yes he held me for ten minutes...but overall goal, I don’t have to worry about a stray bullet hittin’ me and killin’ me through the window (EWR_24).

The need to for police to be perceived as treating citizens fairly remains true regardless of the setting or the reason for coming in contact with them. Survey results from the Center for Collaborative Change reveals that when given the option to choose all the ways in which the citizen has been in contact with the NPD, citizens report 64% of those contacts involved being “stopped and frisked,” “stopped and questioned,” “stopped by police officer in car or on foot,” “arrested,” or filing a complaint. As already mentioned, the top two concerns of respondents regarded issues of “rudeness, respect, or attitude” and “harassment, profiling, or racism,” (Center for Collaborative Change, 2010). This highlights the fact that a majority of this sample’s respondents interacted with the NPD as a result of what are commonly considered aspects of broken windows policing (i.e., stop and frisk, community meetings, approaching an officer on patrol).

Two other respondents cite past and present examples to illuminate the merit of police establishing professional relationships with the community to respond to problems
in their neighborhood. One self-admitted champion of the broken windows theory describes the community’s response to this type of policing in Newark:

There’s always gonna be somebody who feels they were slighted but, for the most part, they loved us. There’s not really much to talk about because they saw a big reduction....They don’t realize numbers, they saw a difference. You can tell people all you want that crime is reduced, but if they don’t see a difference in their neighborhood, the numbers mean nothing to them....After shootings or homicides, I would have my guys go out and if I saw Mike comin’ down the street, I’d ask you the first time, ‘Do you live here, Mike? Yeah? Can I see some ID, because we’ve had some violence here, and we’re trying to stop it, and we wanna make sure your neighborhood is safe....‘ And when you took the time to explain that, it probably took nine seconds to say that, but in the world of a cop, that’s like nine hours, and I had difficulty getting guys to do that. But once I did, the people were happy to see the cops because they knew that the cops are there to protect them....In the past, they would always put cops on barricade, stop everybody, and really inflame the community because they never explained to the community what they were doing and what their purpose was (EWR_11).

When questioned about the importance of explaining police tactics to the community and to the police themselves, he says,

Actually, it’s more important to explain it to the cops, because, not that the cops are more valuable than the community, but what’s gonna happen is the cops are gonna encounter the community first...and if you don’t get it right with the cops, then you’re working backwards (EWR_11).

Before we can expect police to articulate to the citizens their rationale for stopping them, police departments must first implement the training and managerial components necessary to getting their police officers to understand and value such behavior.

EWR_22 offers a more recent example of police using technology to maintain open lines of communication with the community. As the excerpt demonstrates, these four officers appreciate the value of communicating their rationale to citizens, implement a more specific strategy, and see the results of their work:
The four [police officers] that are there permanently, will give you their personal
 cell phone number if you see something out here, or somebody’s lurkin’ around,
 just call me, and I can respond, you don’t have to call 911 or 6000 and wait on
 line, call my cell phone and I will be there to handle it. They’ve had quite a few
 good arrests off of that, from people...trusting them enough to know they are only
 a few blocks away and they’re comin’....I wanted them to go door to door, let
 everyone know who you are, you know who they are, get used to them....We’re
going [the community] back to where they trust [the police] and say ‘Look at the
guy across the street, because I know you’re not gonna tell on me, I think the guy
is strippin’ stolen cars in his garage,’ or ‘I think the guy across the street his son is
sellin’ drugs,’ or whatever the case may be….And it’s worked out well. They’ve
 gotten a very good response up there. And, initially, their arrests were very high,
their summons activity was very high, the city ordinance activity was very high,
but after about two months, they stabilized the area, and their stats, numbers wise,
they’re actually plummeting and the crime has actually plummeted also.

These working relationships with the community members, facilitated by technology and
in combination with police intelligence and data, allow police to target more specific
locations, individuals, and problems, thereby reducing the amount of actual and perceived
crime and disorder problems and legitimating the NPD.

Though the NPD has made advancements in the way it relates to the community,
the police department and community leaders still look for ways to fortify that
relationship and to make the NPD more legitimate. This section has placed the NPD in its
greater political context and has explored the fragile relationship between the NPD and
its citizens (a vital relationship in broken windows policing). It has also demonstrated
how a police department implementing broken windows policing can improve its
legitimacy by using technology and data to justify to the community their tactics and their
allocation of resources and to prove their effectiveness in reducing crime and disorder.
The intimate nature of the interactions that police have when “fixing broken windows”
requires police to ensure they are perceived as acting professionally and justly.
**Function.** The function of the NPD is to prevent violent crimes by maintaining order and enforcing quality of life violations. The mission statement of the NPD, as articulated by a majority of respondents in this study’s survey, and as printed in the department’s *Community Relations Strategy* reads, “The Newark Police Department is dedicated to eliminating crime and improving quality of life while fostering mutual trust and respect with our community” (Office of Police and Planning, 2010, p. 4). While NPD official statements and publications and survey responses specify this three-pronged function (eliminating crime, improving quality of life, and fostering positive relationships with the community), interview data and information from online news and blogs focus most explicitly on preventing violent crime and enforcing lower-level quality of life offenses. This section discusses these two functions and explains the subtleties of police personnel’s views of their department’s function.

*If you change the quality of life, you eliminate conditions that foster crime.*

When Director McCarthy took office in late 2006, he described Newark as a city “held hostage by crime for at least three decades” (Erminio, 2006). This dramatic belief about Newark’s crime problem, coupled with Director McCarthy’s previous post as chief crime strategist for NYPD (where he successfully implemented strategies to reduce violence and drug dealing in a high crime area), manifests in the NPD’s portrayal of Newark’s triune crime problem--violence, drugs, and quality of life.

Upon taking office, Director McCarthy offered his “‘three-pillar strategy to bring down the city’s crime rate--’” crackdown on quality of life crimes, computerize the crime-tracking system (to more efficiently allocate resources to the precincts) and create
a narcotics unit to control mid-level drug dealing (Schuppe, 2006a). More explicitly, Director McCarthy states, “If you change the quality of life, you also eliminate conditions that foster crime” (Schuppe, 2006). Many in the NPD compare the underground drug trade to a free market where (gun) violence is used to squelch competition and collect debts. It follows, then, that any potential to reduce crime in Newark would have to include efforts to respond to the multitude of crimes and disorders associated with drug use and drug distribution. This discernment of the crime problem is reflected in the department’s narcotics strategy, gun violence reduction strategy, and quality of life initiative and is supported by interview and survey data from this study and the Center for Collaborative Change.

When asked, “what issues should the NPD focus on in your neighborhood,” the large majority of residents chose “Youth-Gangs-Drugs,” with “Robberies-General Safety,” “Community Relations,” and “Violent Crime” (respectively) following distantly; typical order-maintenance concerns are at the bottom of the list (Center for Collaborative Change, 2010). This finding can be interpreted many ways. It supports, however, the idea that the NPD and community are on the same page when it comes to defining the general crime problem in Newark and suggests a disjoint between community expectations and police actions regarding how to respond to crime. The NPD believes paying attention to minor crimes and other signs of disorder can reduce the more serious crimes, while citizens prefer the NPD to spend their time on more serious offenses without the mediating influence of attacking lower-level crimes.
While the NPD works to both fight crime and enhance citizen quality of life, stopping the next crime is undoubtedly the more prized of the two functions. As one Captain stated, everything else the NPD does “is just the road to get there [crime reduction]” (EWR_21). Similarly, a Lieutenant offers, “Everything else for me is cake on top of that” (EWR_22)! The ultimate focus of the new administration is “reducing the shooting, reducing the murders” (EWR_23). Online news coverage of NPD and its functions also overwhelmingly favors stories of the NPD’s efforts at reducing violent crime.

Interview data reveal NPD’s multi-pronged approach to stemming violent crime and an understanding of the need to comprehensively respond to crime by employing problem-specific solutions that concentrate on the violence, guns and quality of life triumvirate. One official offers his interpretation of the Director’s mantra, “It’s not one thing that reduces crime, it’s everything” (EWR_05). He cites quality of life enforcement, NPD’s first-ever centralized narcotics enforcement unit, the criminal intelligence unit, and the gun enforcement, gang enforcement and street level narcotics teams, and posits, “All those things together have brought a major reduction in our violent crime.”
Table 3.1 Extent of NPD Personnel’s Agreement with Statements on Disorder and Fear of Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements.</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>IDK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked.</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD is involved in making disorderly neighborhoods more orderly.</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untended disorder leads to the breakdown of community controls.</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas where community controls breakdown are vulnerable to criminal invasion.</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree; IDK = I don’t know

Most officers in the NPD are cognizant of the need to respond to problems of crime and disorder. Many also recognize the necessity of quality of life enforcement in preventing more serious crime and enhancing the quality of life for Newark’s citizens. Table 3.1 lists the extent to which police personnel in my sample (N= 128) agree with statements on disorder, crime, and fear of crime. A majority of respondents in my sample agree or strongly agree with statements on the positive relationships between disorder, fear of crime, and the breakdown of community controls. Nearly 90% agree that there is a positive relationship between the breakdown of community controls and crime. The majority of my sample agree that that breakdown is a result of untended disorder. They
also agree that the NPD is working to bring order to its neighborhoods. As Table 3.2 reflects, of those personnel responding to the only open-ended question in my survey ("What is the current mission of your police department, as you understand it?"), 63% explicitly cited preventing (and/or eliminating) crime and improving quality of life. Police personnel in my sample reflect an understanding of the role of broken windows policing to the mission of the NPD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the current mission of your police department, as you understand it?</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent crime and improve QOL</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate crime</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve QOL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and serve</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview respondents add perspective to these views,

We are focused on intelligent policing, responding to those indicators that show us where our problems lie, dealing with those things up front, before they become a major problem...handle the small problems, and then the big problems go away (EWR_05).

To demonstrate his own understanding, one respondent uses the NPD’s new narcotics strategy:

For a while, narcotics enforcement was placed really low on the ladder; it wasn’t a priority....Today our focus as far as narcotics has definitely changed...patrol’s task
is pretty much locking down that location and making sure that what we took out there doesn’t come back, and the condition is gone, and we keep the condition gone (EWR_08).

The other respondent says, “The little job is the stepping stone to preventing further acts of criminality or even violence, depending on the person you lock up” (EWR_11).

The NPD uses their newest computerized crime tracking, mapping, and analysis systems, to create problem specific solutions to respond to low-level offenses and to prevent more serious crimes. One respondent suggests CompStat is useful in helping to “redirect our sources to give more quality of life. The Director’s big on getting our hands on people, interacting with people--good people, bad people” (EWR_19). A Lieutenant also describes the NPD’s “stress on field interviews, the stress on quality of life is huge at this point” (EWR_11). Police recognize that contacts with individuals for lower-level offenses (via NPD’s “blue summonses”) provide the entrée needed to conduct field interviews and glean information on the person’s knowledge of or participation in more serious crime.

Given Newark’s notorious spot near the top of all lists violent, it is not surprising to find prevention of violent crime as the first priority of its police department. In line with the broken windows theory, the NPD enforces low-level offenses with the intent of enhancing the quality of life for Newark’s citizens and creating the conditions necessary for a reduction in violent crime. Succeeding in both of these functions, in turn, helps to foster trust and respect with the community (the third leg of the NPD’s stated mission and an important part of a holistic approach to broken windows policing). The next section
looks at the tactics and technologies used to fulfill these functions and investigates what the department’s outcomes reveal about their crime prevention and quality of life efforts.

**Tactics, technology and outcomes.** As much of this study demonstrates, each of the elements of the police organization interact with each other. Articulating these interactions gives a clearer picture of the workings of the police department and can provide confirmatory evidence to findings on each element. This allows the researcher to distinguish between stated and actual changes in each element. This section explores the various tactics and technologies used in the NPD, describes the outcomes used to measure their efforts, and discusses discrepancies among the function, tactics, technologies and outcomes in the NPD.

**An emphasis on putting your hands on people.** With an understanding of Newark’s crime problem as one fueled by the drug market, the NPD uses a variety of tactics (i.e., patrol in cars, park-and-walks, rapid response to serious and in-progress calls for service, community meetings, field inquiries, and information sharing) and takes advantage of a number of technologies (computerized records management, GIS mapping, surveillance cameras, Crime Stoppers and Gun Stoppers Hotlines, Livescan and Shotspotter) to increase their contact with the community and to respond to violent crimes.

There is little doubt that those in the upper echelon of the NPD believe that increasing the number of police-citizen interactions will reduce levels of crime in Newark. These interactions take the form of community meetings, field inquiries, knocking on doors, and stopping citizens upon reasonable suspicion of lower-level
offenses. Though intended to increase contacts with both “good people and bad people,”
evidence suggests that more positive police-citizen encounters occur in those areas less
frequently plagued by violence. For example, the successful knock-and-talk initiative,
previously discussed in the Legitimacy section, occurred in one of the more socio-
economically advantaged sections of Newark where property crimes were citizens’
biggest problem and where, subsequently, citizens are more likely to have more positive
views of the police (Albrecht and Green, 1977). Other structured, positive contacts that
police have with citizens include, precinct commanders and executive officers attending
community meetings, a Police Clergy Alliance, Police Citizen-Clergy Academy, and the
Senior Citizen Police Academy. These are part of NPD’s still evolving efforts to enhance
community relations. An explication of the more routine (and currently, the more
consequential) citizen-police interactions follows below.

Observations of Director McCarthy at CompStat and an in-depth interview reveal
his strongly held conviction that quality of life contacts with citizens reduce serious
crime. He states, “There’s an absolute correlation between quality of life, field
interrogations, and guns on the street. They are important for crime reduction.” He then
offers a situation to demonstrate his point. He tells of an officer who stops a person for
public consumption of alcohol and finds the individual in illegal possession of a gun. The
Director argues that officer prevents a possible homicide that could have occurred with
the convergence of a criminal, alcohol and a firearm. He suggests these scenarios play out
in a number of ways to help prevent a variety of crimes. He asks and responds, “Are
shootings up? Look at your quality of life offenses and they’ll always be down.” As he
leads CompStat he demonstrates his view on the relationship between quality of life and violence. While grilling one precinct commander on his area’s burglary problem, the Director asks to see (on the projection screen) the burglary events overlaid with quality of life stops and field inquiry reports. He then instructs the room to make sure those activities are occurring in the crime-dense areas of their precincts. During a subsequent CompStat meeting, he again stresses quality of life summonses and field interrogations and adds “We need to get people’s hands on the wall,” implying the need to stop and search those individuals who police reasonably suspect are in violation of an offense.

Interviews with and survey data from other department personnel also exhibit this idea of increasing contacts with citizens to prevent crime. Another police official refers to the focus on quality of life at CompStat meetings as the “cornerstone to preventing the larger issues” (EWR_23). EWR_19 affirms the belief that CompStat looks at summonses to see if they are bringing down crime. Another respondent says,

We start with the smaller stuff, like urinating in public and drinking in public....Those are the people that maybe after a few beers are gonna hit somebody...so you get them because a lot of them have warrants, once you make contact with them...it winds up getting them off the streets” (EWR_22).

And yet another respondent describes the contact the NPD has with citizens as,

Putting our hands on people, how many touches do we have with individuals, whether it’s a friendly visit, whether it’s not a friendly visit, we gotta be in contact with the community (EWR_09).

Additionally, the tables below display the views of the police personnel in my sample regarding specific actions of the NPD and the role those actions have in the mission of

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6 “Putting our hands on people” is a unique, recurring phrase used by NPD personnel that represents the department’s desire to increase the number and variety of contacts they have with citizens.
the NPD. Table 3.3 reflects that while the majority of my sample agrees that both patrol officers and detectives establish positive relationships with citizens within their precincts, a higher percentage (69%) agree that patrol officers establish positive relationships with citizens and only 53% agree that detectives do the same.

Table 3.3 Extent of Agreement with Statements on the Role of Patrol Officers and Detectives in the NPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>IDK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol officers establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their precinct.</td>
<td>4.9% (6)</td>
<td>7.3% (9)</td>
<td>17.1% (21)</td>
<td>41.5% (51)</td>
<td>27.6% (34)</td>
<td>1.6% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their precinct.</td>
<td>5.6% (7)</td>
<td>11.3% (14)</td>
<td>21.0% (26)</td>
<td>33.9% (42)</td>
<td>19.4% (24)</td>
<td>8.9% (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree; IDK = I don’t know

Table 3.4 (below) demonstrates personnel’s mixed understandings on the importance of broken windows policing-specific tactics to the mission of the NPD. For example, while the overwhelming majority of surveyed personnel view broken windows policing tactics (i.e., aggressive enforcement of QOL offenses, community meetings, community collaboration, the CompStat process, and crime mapping) as at least somewhat important to the mission of the NPD, a large majority also viewed traditional policing tactics as somewhat important or very important to the NPD’s mission. Comparisons of the numbers show greater relative percentages for the traditional tactics of patrolling (i.e., in
a car) than on foot or other non-traditional mode of patrolling. The relatively high percentage (67%) viewing rapid response as very important reflects a continued faith in traditional modes of policing. While these tactics are not at all mutually exclusive, *prima facie* distinctions between the numbers of personnel viewing some tactics as “very important” at higher rates than other tactics suggests my sample might view traditional policing tactics as more important to the NPD mission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>NAI</th>
<th>SI</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>IDK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive enforcement of QOL</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community meetings in which community members and police work together to identify problems and create solutions in their neighborhood</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police collaborate with the community and other municipal agencies to combat physical disorder</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of arrests and citations</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of field interrogations</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of traffic violations</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid response to calls for service</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrons are done on foot, bicycle, or segway.</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrons are done in a car.</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CompStat process</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime-mapping</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAI = Not at all Important; SI = Somewhat Important; VI = Very Important; IDK = I don’t know;
The idea that responding to lower level offenses prevents more serious crime is infused throughout the NPD, though police personnel are confused about how that connection arises. That finding is anticipated, since neither do researchers have a coherent view of this process. This study of NPD personnel suggests three mechanisms to view this connection: detection, deterrence, and incapacitation. Most personnel who discuss this effect contribute it to an increased likelihood that interacting with individuals will necessarily increase the amount of wanted individuals, guns, and knowledge of other crimes that officers will uncover. For instance, one official says,

Quality of life summonses put the officer in contact with a lot more people...we’ve taken guns of the streets, simply because there has to be a lot more contact with people....In the process of warrant checking those guys out, checking their identification, you find out this one’s got a warrant, this one’s holding a gun, this one’s got drugs, so it’s made us more effective in the smaller things, as opposed to just looking for the big, major crime (EWR_05).

A lieutenant with experience in the detective bureau wishes there was more emphasis placed on patrol officers using quality of life stops and field inquiries as a “research tool,” and that there were more, formal avenues for patrol and detectives to share their research findings (EWR_10).

A captain gives an example of how stopping citizens for quality of life violations can deter more serious would-be criminals, saying, “Today people are becoming more proactive and putting their hands on people, and the criminals are more likely to not have guns in their pockets” (EWR_09). Finally, a Lieutenant offers insight into the third understanding of the relationship between quality of life enforcement and crime reduction, stating,
We start with the smaller stuff, like urinating in public and drinking in public and...attacking that, and those are the people that maybe after a few beers are gonna hit somebody with that beer bottle later on, or break into a car, so you get them because a lot of them have warrants, once you make contact with them based on them drinking in public or something that seems small and irrelevant, it winds up getting them off the streets (EWR_22).

When police interact with a citizen on the basis of a lower-level offense, and that interaction leads to an outstanding warrant, that individual is off the street and simply not present to commit further crimes.

The tactic of “touching” citizens (or, police interacting with citizens based on reasonable suspicion of a lower-level offense) occurs within an overall crime reduction strategy that involves other tactics and technologies. These include, rapid response to serious and in-progress calls for service, field inquiry reports, an electronic records management system, Violent Enterprise Strategy Taskforce (VEST) meetings, a High Risk for Violence (HRV) list, a Fugitive Apprehension Team (FAT), geographic information systems (GIS) mapping and analysis, surveillance cameras, ShotSpotter, LiveScan and crime hotlines (Crime Stoppers and Gunstoppers). As many respondents conclude, “It’s not one thing that reduces crime, it’s everything.” These tactics, taken together, seek to focus resources on those people and places that account for clusters of crime and disorder and indicate a police department that is governed by the broken windows theory.

Officers describe how this fits in to the overall crime reduction strategy of the NPD:

Every quality of life summons that we issue now, we enter into a database, so we come up with a list of chronic locations or a list of chronic offenders and we use
that to go out and monitor people as we patrol and do things. We find that they’re turning out to be very productive and people know that you’re watching them all the time. We’re gonna get you for the smallest thing (EWR_01).

The most valuable and effectively used tools in monitoring behavior and deploying resources include, the HRV list, “blue summonses,” field inquiries, GIS mapping and analysis, the crime hotlines, VEST meetings, and the FAT. One Commander describes the HRV list of “approximately 300 people throughout the entire city” (EWR_08) as,

A database of individuals who we monitor very closely. We use the term ‘touch.’ We either attempt to arrest them when there’s probable cause, vehicle stops when there’s reasonable suspicion, field interrogations. These are the chronic offenders, people who have been arrested at least two or more times with a gun and a violent crime (EWR_17).

To facilitate this interaction, in 2007 the NPD instituted the Title 23 summons in lieu of arresting an offender for quality of life offenses (i.e., aggressive panhandling, public consumption of alcohol, noise violations, and motor vehicle repair). These became known as the “blue summonses” (for the color of the top carbon copy page of the summons) and aided officers in responding to lower-level offenses. Whereas in the past officers would have to arrest individuals for such offenses, these summonses give the officers a much less time consuming response to quality of life violations. A Captain states,

Now you can issue somebody a blue summons for something that would be considered minor. Where before we would have to make an arrest on that matter, which would take somebody off the street...It gives [the officers] the ability to still handle the problem but they don’t have to go in and do all sorts of paper work, so they can stay out and patrol (EWR_19).

When issuing a blue summons, officers are expected to conduct field inquiries and to record check the individuals given a blue summons. Responding to the reasonable
suspicion that a quality of life offense has occurred gives officers a “foot in the door” for finding information on the person’s involvement in more serious criminality, knowledge of other crimes (and problems) in the area, and may even lead the officer to make an arrest based on probable cause.

Don’t just do ‘em to do ‘em. The interview data reveal two recurring inhibitors to police officers doing broken windows policing--bean-counting (a measurement issue) and a belief that conducting such stops is not real police work. One sergeant discusses how the emphasis on blue summonses at CompStat leads commanders to make overtime decisions based on the number of summonses written by individual officers, since more summonses result in more overtime. He explains,

The CompStat process here, the way they look at numbers of enforcement, it’s just driven by the data. So each one of these blue summonses ultimately becomes a dot on the screen on the map at the CompStat meeting, and the dot just tells you that a blue summons was given at this location, and what they do is they say, ‘here’s where your violent crimes have been, or your problem in your precinct,’ and then they’ll overlay on that what you’ve done with your blue summons activity. So, all that matters is you have lots of dots where the reds are in the final crime concentration…but in reality what’s underneath all those dots is what’s actually going on. So you have lots of cops out there, just trying to plaster these violations where there commanders want, and if as a patrolman, you’re able to accomplish that, you’re likely to get overtime for doing that sort of thing. It’s become the money making thing for cops. So what’s underneath that? If you look closer at dispositions of these blue summonses in court, you’re gonna find that...lots and lots of them are getting thrown out as soon as they get to this stage where they’re in putting it into the system for a variety of reasons (EWR_18).

By valuing numbers alone, supervisors devalue the role of the police officer as investigator, since spending time with the individual (asking questions that could lead to information on further criminality) takes time away from writing more summonses.
Another interviewee mentions a move in the department away from simply counting summonses and field inquiry reports.

The point that we’re trying to drive through from the upper echelon down to the guys in the street is not just do them to do them [enforcing the quality of life offenses]....In the past...it was just numbers for the sake of numbers....It’s not just numbers now to do them, but the numbers are certainly a gauge. But if you listen to our police director long enough, you’ll hear it’s not just to do just to do it, it’s to do it at the times and the places with the people who are committing these offenses ultimately to use it as a tool to drive down the crime. It’s definitely being monitored, again, not just as an indicator for productivity in general, but it’s more to see is that effort, these quality of life offenses, are gettin’ out of the car, gettin’ our hands on people, stopping motor vehicles for certain crimes in the areas (EWR_23).

Though NPD leadership sees the need to assess the quality of these stops, that belief does not appear to be making its way through the ranks of the supervisors in charge of tracking and managing police performance. One high-ranking NPD official notes the importance of getting supervisors to understand the need for police officers to have quality, blue summonses interactions with citizens, saying,

You have to be very careful the message you send as a leader because it can get misconstrued and people are willing to please....So I really have to capture the minds and spirits of the precinct commanders and some of their execs (the lieutenants, the squad commanders, the special operations lieutenant, the platoon commander). They have to be the ones who carry the message down to the troops and get those sergeants really actively engaged (EWR_12).

In addition to not fully understanding the value of enforcing quality of life issues, interviews with NPD personnel and survey data suggest a need to change how police officers view their responsibilities. Officers and the public often associate police with fast-paced crime-fighting, even though most police-citizen interactions are for purposes of order maintenance. When police officers hear they are expected to intervene in
situations where they witness someone committing a low-level offense, they may view such actions as not worthy of their time. A lieutenant notes,

Police officers don't believe that quality of life summons are real police work, they'd rather be catching a burglar, they'd rather be doin' narcotics, they'd rather be gettin' firearms. We've tried to explain to them that they wouldn't have to focus on robberies so much, or focus on narcotics so much, if they were focused on the quality of life sentences....We went through a period where they were bein' overzealous, given out too many to the same people, and that causes backlash from the community because they think you're just bein' extremely petty (EWR_01).

This excerpt highlights some officers’ attitudes toward responding to low level offenses and the dangers of police officers’ misinterpreting how to administer the summonses.

Table 3.5 reflects a similar attitude toward the blue summonses and the role they play in the everyday responsibilities of police officers. Almost 75% of my sample believes an officer should issue a summons if they observe a quality of life violation, nearly 65% of my respondents view that stop as an effective way to garner information about crime or criminals in the area, and almost 55% of respondents believe that police officers have the time to issue a summons for quality of life violations. Though these results reflect respondents’ favorable attitudes toward broken windows policing tactics, one should note that the survey was administered within a week of the NPD receiving notice that over 160 police officers would be fired and nearly 200 officers demoted. The responses may reflect attitudes about cutbacks and a desire to show that an already overburdened police force cannot afford any more cuts in personnel.
Table 3.5 Extent of Agreement with Statements on NPD’s Response to QOL Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SD (%)</th>
<th>D (%)</th>
<th>N (%)</th>
<th>A (%)</th>
<th>SA (%)</th>
<th>IDK (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stopping someone for a QOL summons is an effective way to get information about crime or criminals in the area.</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If an officer observes someone violating a QOL ordinance, that officer should issue a summons.</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers are too busy to worry about issuing summonses for violations of QOL.</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree; IDK = I don’t know

Next, a discussion of the outcomes of the NPD’s work and how they measure police performance follows. These measurements and outcomes support the NPD’s claims as to their actions, but also uncover an area in which the NPD can improve.

*The bottom line is the level of crime; everything else is just the road to get there.*

NPD personnel agree that the number one outcome of their efforts is crime reduction, as measured by index crime reports. To this end, police personnel reveal that supervisors view arrests made, summonses and blue tickets written, and field interviews conducted as reliable indicators of an individual police officer’s crime fighting performance. One Captain admits, though each of those categories is a measure of a police officer’s activity, “The only true measure....The bottom line is just the level of crime” (EWR_21).
A few statistics highlight tactical changes in the NPD. For instance, from 2006 to 2009 the NPD reports a 60.73% increase in parking and moving summonses, quality of life summonses, and field inquiries, with quality of life summonses and field inquiries accounting for the largest percentage increases. This indicates the NPD has indeed amped up their focus on lower-level offenses and that they are using quality of life and field inquiry contacts with citizens as a major tactic. There is a 14,099% increase in recorded quality of life offenses and a 232% increase in field inquiry reports from 2006 to 2009. For the same period, arrests increased 6.62% and (crime) complaints decreased 19.63%. Overall, the table below reflects relatively constant levels of non-quality of life summonses, arrests, and crime complaints, and a huge increase in field inquiries and quality of life summonses, since Director McCarthy assumed his position. The Collaborative Change survey supports this finding. Citizens in the survey reported nearly 50% of their contacts with the NPD were a result of police initiated stops or questioning.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summons - Moving</th>
<th>Summonses - Parking</th>
<th>QOL Summons</th>
<th>Field Inquiry</th>
<th>Arrest</th>
<th>Complaint**</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>45,199</td>
<td>88,657</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>9,103</td>
<td>26,413</td>
<td>14,389</td>
<td>184,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>48,483</td>
<td>100,095</td>
<td>42,468</td>
<td>38,225</td>
<td>28,336</td>
<td>13,005</td>
<td>270,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>60,910</td>
<td>120,387</td>
<td>27,923</td>
<td>28,835</td>
<td>30,582</td>
<td>12,706</td>
<td>281,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>68,203</td>
<td>94,772</td>
<td>36,635</td>
<td>30,248</td>
<td>28,162</td>
<td>11,564</td>
<td>269,584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data provided by the NPD CompStat Unit
**Reported index crime incidents

NPD personnel agree the above-mentioned measurements relate to the police role and caution that as “a good supervisor, you’ll certainly be looking beyond the sheer numbers in evaluating personnel,” examining where, when, and with whom those interactions occurred (EWR_23). The department must be mindful, however, of anti-quota laws that prohibit the use of mandated quotas and of the Union’s preference of using such evaluations for training (not disciplinary) purposes. A formal annual evaluation of sworn personnel up to and including the rank of lieutenant, stemming from their Community Relations plan, began in June 2010, and proposes to do just that. The
NPD believes this will allow them to more effectively respond to their mission to reduce crime, enhance the quality of life, and improve police-community relations. NPD’s other stated functions of enhancing citizens’ quality of life and fostering relationships with the community are just beginning to receive attention as areas worth measuring.

While valuing crime numbers that indicate actual crime decline, NPD police personnel also recognize that citizens’ perceptions more directly influence how citizens view the outcomes of the NPD. One respondent states, “It’s their perception, they don’t have crime as we track it (by the seven index crimes). They’re more quality of life offenses” (EWR_08). Another respondent adds, “If they don’t see a difference in their neighborhood, the numbers mean nothing to them” (EWR_11). A respondent in the Homicide Unit uses numbers of homicides in Newark to prove the point that, “Sometimes perception is harder to overcome than the actual numbers;” He says,

In 2007, we had 99 murders and in 2008 we went down to 67, that was a pretty big drop. Now, 2008, we went from 67 up to 77. Now all of a sudden ‘Ahh! See! The murders are back up, ten more murders than last year, that’s unacceptable.’ But we’re still 22 murders down from two years ago....You didn’t hear a peep from anybody when it went from 99 to 67, nobody was sendin’ us fruit baskets to the precinct congratulating us (EWR_23)

There is little doubt that one of the more potent driving tactics of the NPD is broken windows policing. As one Lieutenant states,

They don’t come out and say, ‘Hey, listen, we’re implementing this broken windows theory,’ but if you look at what’s being put in place, it has the broken windows theory at its core (EWR_23).
This study examines how each police department views their organization in light of this theory, to arrive at a more honest understanding of the application of the broken windows theory in practice.

This section has shown the various mechanisms by which the NPD implements broken windows policing and how both positive and negative contacts with citizens and how CompStat and technology complement relational and information-gaining interactions. It also showed that though the NPD is in fact increasing the numbers of contacts they have with citizens, not all personnel buy into the idea that stopping individuals for quality of life offenses is an important part of their police department’s mission. A discussion of the ways demand for NPD service enters the organization and how the NPD manages that demand follows.

**Demand entrance and demand management.** Newark’s bid to reduce violence by focusing police attention on lower level offending includes a shift in the avenues by which the NPD receives demand for their services and in the ways that demand is managed in the organization. Respondents who voice both support of and concern with the direction of the NPD agree that much of the demand for police service has shifted since a time when the Communications Division received demand and allocated it throughout the organization. Many argue that today the “street boss” (or, precinct captain or sergeant) should (and increasingly does) have the authority to interpret and administer that demand. As one respondent puts it,

> Sector integrity, giving the street ownership to the street boss, as opposed to listening to the boss up in communications. The street boss (usually a sergeant) is quarterbacking his own team. He’s not really getting any plays brought in through the sidelines (which would be communications) (EWR_11).
This section discusses this shift in the NPD and describes how, in line with broken windows policing, the NPD receives its demand not only from contacts with the community, but also from calls for service, and how that demand is managed through crime mapping and analysis technology.

\textit{We go places for reasons, intelligence has told us this is the location to be.} As this research discusses in a number of places, the NPD’s shift from the reform era to the CPS era most strikingly manifests in the new ways the NPD negotiates its relationship with the community, a relationship that undergirds many of the other processes involved in organizational change in this study. In this shift, the NPD is moving from a time when they \textit{sell} their crime-fighting goods to the public, to one in which they consult with citizens and work with them to create the most marketable and useful tools to respond to community needs (see Kelling and Moore, 1988).

Technology (a distinguishing element in the three eras of modern policing) plays a pivotal role in discussions of demand management and in responding to that demand in Newark. For instance, technology in the NPD forms the basis of demand reception and the response to that demand. Traditionally, demand in the NPD entered (and was administered through) the organization by calls for service to 9-1-1 and is facilitated by computer-aided dispatch technologies. As EWR_19 remembers,

In the last ten years we had a period of time where calls for service were definitely the priority,...where we utilized the work core (which for us means how many people are handling 911 calls) it got bumped up....Now we’ve gone away from as the director would say, chasing the radio, going from job to job to job. He’s very big on sector integrity, which is having the same people in the same sectors so they get to know the business people, the people who live there, the bad
people, etc. So that’s a big philosophic change, and that’s been in the last two years.

All respondents agree that calls for service are no longer the priority for the NPD. Some speak disparagingly of this shift, others reminisce on the days of “queue goals” (i.e., time limits by which officers need to respond to and handle calls for police service) and still others laud the move toward (what some officers refer to as) “intelligent policing.” One respondent disagrees with the new change, stating, “You live and die by your calls for service in the community” (EWR_16). He adds, “Response times are certainly not a concern....The boss has made it perfectly clear he’s not interested in response times for those types of assignments [less serious offenses].”

Though the NPD still requires officers to respond to serious and in progress calls for service, and relies on communication with citizens (through field inquiries, 3-1-1, community meetings, and tip hotlines), technology most primarily directs demand through the organization and indicates to which places, crimes, and people the NPD should respond. EWR_24 says,

We might hit a location and we’re there for a reason, a purpose. Intelligence has told us this is the location to be....We go places for reasons....He [crime analyst Eric Piza] is able to give me a breakdown when I look at shootings by year, prior incidents, shots fired, and we put a total piece together, we’re hitting the right locations.

The ample data and demand sources, analyzed using computers, further legitimize police actions. Armed with actionable intelligence, derived from and explained to citizens can justify police tactics and ease tensions with the community. EWR_11 offers,

It’s...quality of life, go after the right people, target the right crimes, in the right areas, at the right times. You know, our analysis tells us that... every Friday at
between six to two o’clock in the morning, somebody in the Valisburg area will get shot. Okay. Where? Well Smith’s and Elizabeth, South Orange Avenue. Okay, what are we doing about it? Oh, we did car safety check points in that area, we wrote quality of life summonses…up along that area we did 50 FI’s, well who’d you stop?

Under this rubric, neither race, nor sex, nor age, nor socio-economic status alone drive police response. Whereas the Reform Era used technology (i.e., radio cars) to take the politics out of the police and the police out of politics (Miller, 1977), the CPS era uses technology to sterilize the police justification for their response. So, the NPD still “responds” to crimes. The response, however, is no longer simply a reaction to individual crimes or criminal, nor guided by power struggles between minority groups, but rather, it is a response to a systematic analysis of geographically and temporally immediate crime and problem areas (in which quality of life issues have a central focus). One respondent states,

[It’s] just repetitive. Every day we go and there’s calls for service, calls for service, calls for service. You know, sometimes it’s the old, “make work.” You know, we never really solve the problem we just keep going, revisiting the old problems over and over, and then more problems get built and thrown on top of that so we never accomplish anything….So, unless we start addressing the actual underlying problems of what’s going on in that area, we’ll continue to get more and more calls for service with less and less resources to answer those calls. Therefore, the radio car team is strangled. The radio just killed them. They can’t do it effectively, do any policing. It’s called fire brigade policing. You just respond to this fire, and then go to this fire, and then go to this fire, go to this fire. Meanwhile, we don’t know who’s lightin’ the fires….We’re damn good at puttin’ out fires, but we don’t know who’s lightin’ the fires, or why the fires are bein’ lit….That’s really what you gotta go after, and that’s part of what the intelligence model tries to do, is find out who’s lightin’ the fires….Go after them. Then you don’t have to do that fire brigade policing. You know, responding to call, after call, after call, after call.
The NPD is moving away from the traditional police response to all calls for police service and toward a clearer understanding of CPS policing. Technologies such as ShotSpotter and the surveillance cameras serve as additional technologies that initiate the demands for police time and resources, and meetings such as CompStat help to manage that demand and to push it through the organization.

Though facilitating demand entrance and management, the value of the technological output relies on the merit of the information relayed by contacts with citizens. Whether using informants to take down higher level players in the drug trade (EWR_06), going to community meetings to hear citizens explain their specific quality of life concerns (EWR_08; EWR_01), or proactively “putting their hands on people” (EWR_09), technology’s value depends on the quality and amount of information that it processes. Such successful interactions are discussed in previous sections. One Lieutenant tells his officers,

You’re going out tonight, working an area where you had three shootings. I don’t care if you’re arresting nobody tonight, but if you can talk to fifteen people and find out who they are, what’s their nickname, what are you doing here, who do you hang out with, as an FI (Field Interview), that’s huge (EWR_10)!

The residents know what the problem is before the police do. One respondent quotes the Director, saying

There’s an older woman with the pillow who’s got nothing else going on but to watch what’s going on. So, those are the kind of people you want to befriend because they’ll tell you the information (EWR_11).

Patrol officers, detectives, commanders and various technologies process this information and use it to develop strategies and allocate resources. As EWR_24 explains,
Everything goes through the Criminal Intelligence Unit....but patrol is the backbone of the department. They always will be because they are the ones that are out there in the area. They’re in the same locations, they see the people, they know the people, they interact with the people. So they’re more apt to receiving the information than the investigators who would come out after an investigation....

NPD’s CompStat process further connotes the preeminent role of this information and technology fusion in guiding NPD’s police deployment decisions.

This section has explained the clear shift from a Communications Division-run police department to one that increasingly relies on new technology and data analysis to give precinct-level decision-makers the tools they need to devise strategies and tactics and to allocate resources. The number and magnitude of changes within the department and employees’ equivocal explanations of demand mechanisms make it currently difficult to establish the precise manner of this continued change. As the NPD continues to negotiate their relationship with the citizenry (assuming they stay on the trajectory posited in this research), they will more specifically enumerate the various channels by which demand enters, and is managed in, the organization. The next sections on the organizational structure and administrative processes of the NPD shed more light on many of these mechanisms and offer additional evidence of an organization on a path to broken windows policing.

Organizational structure and administrative processes. Any shift in an organizational strategy should bring the requisite change in how the organization is structured. A change in strategy emphasizes different content areas, divisions, and responsibilities within the organization. A discussion of changing relationships between
the patrol and investigative divisions within NPD, personnel hiring and promotional considerations, and the addition or subtraction of other bureaus and task forces evidence changes in NPD’s organizational structure that assist in the implementation of broken windows policing.

**O.K., we’re going to push down authority to precinct commanders.** Like most police departments, the NPD is shifting towards a CPS strategy while maintaining its quasi-military structure. This makes it difficult to disentangle some of the decentralized activities from the centralized structures in which they occur. This section explains the NPD experience in implementing decentralized processes and changing part of the organization’s structure in light of a profession, an organization, and a subculture that holds tight to the centralized, bureaucratic model of police organizations that has traditionally defined such departments.

NPD’s most significant structural change is the centralization of the narcotics division. The formation of the Central Narcotics Division signals the NPD’s interest in preventing crime by focusing efforts on all levels of drug distribution. This new division supplements the efforts of the precinct-level Narcotics Enforcement Teams and coincides with a “push down” of decision-making, “sector integrity,” and a redistribution of personnel to those high-crime times. The seeming contradiction between centralization and pushing down decision-making reflects the NPD’s understanding of the interconnected and expansive drug problem. Their response to this drug problem involves attacking it at the lowest levels (i.e., on the streets), and corroborating intelligence on drug distribution rings that reach far beyond Newark’s city limits. Centralization best
responds to the latter, and pushing down decision-making authority is best suited for the former.

The Central Narcotics Division is intended to detect and to investigate individuals involved in the mid- and upper-levels of drug distribution rings and to coordinate the efforts of the precincts’ Narcotic Enforcement Teams and of the other law enforcement agencies. One respondent states,

We never had a really essential narcotics bureau before. We have a street level narcotics (Narcotics Enforcement Team) at the precinct level that handles street buys, and we have our central narcotics that handles mid-level drug dealing, we have guys that detail for the DEA, chasing the ‘kilofairy’ (EWR_11).

Again, the respondents reveal the distinction and relationship between lower-level and more serious crimes (that is, the need to coordinate the efforts of those working on lower-level offenses with those investigating the mid- and upper-level drug offenders). In following broken windows policing, a police department can attack low-level crimes and disorder, while still spending time on more serious crimes. The two activities are mutually conditioning and are not mutually exclusive.

In addition to this new arrangement for dismantling drug organizations, the NPD also reorganized their investigative units, to allow precinct detectives to investigate all crimes in their precinct (except for shooting incidents, which are the only crimes handled by the Major Crimes Unit). The NPD is both centrally and de-centrally organized, depending on the seriousness and perceived organization of the crime to which they respond. Units that respond to upper-level drug distribution crimes, shooting incidents, and homicides remain centralized, while less serious drug offenses and most other crimes are handled by decentralized units whose patrol officers and detectives are commanded at
the precinct level. At the same time, NPD leaders attempted to push authority down to the precinct level and to install the idea of sector integrity within the organization. One respondent explains,

So this administration pushed down the authority to make choices about quality of life to the precinct commanders as opposed to being dictated or pointed out through the office of the Chief of Police. This administration basically said, ‘OK, we’re going to push down authority to precinct commanders. As precinct commanders, I expect you to understand what’s going on in your area of jurisdiction, and that you can begin to gather the intelligence and then review to make sure it worked. If it doesn’t work, change it’...Everybody’s need in the city is different, every area in the city is different. (EWR_05).

This respondent reports the new police administration added

quality of life enforcement as a major component to each precincts operation. Whereas, in the past it was maybe one or two officer who were focused on it, now every officer is focused on quality of life.

Now, instead of arresting individuals for these lower level offenses, police officers were empowered to issue a blue summons, which allows them to continue patrolling the street. Furthermore, decisions about how and when to respond to specific local problems are the responsibility of precinct captains.

Finally, though not mentioned by any of the respondents, newspaper articles chronicle the tension that occurred between Police Director McCarthy and Chief of Police Campos over the leadership of the NPD. The key point of contention was over who controlled the daily operations (i.e., personnel transfers) of the police department. This resulted in the eventual abolition of the office of the Chief of Police. It is clear that flattening the organizational structure facilitated the push down of authority and allowed
for clearer, more unified leadership in portraying the new way of doing business in the
NPD. A deeper exploration of the department’s move toward decentralization follows.

What we want to do is change the department into a philosophy, the CompStat
philosophy. While the use of CompStat is not new to the NPD, NPD personnel agree that
how the NPD uses CompStat is. The new electronic Records Management System and
mapping software vastly improved the usefulness of the CompStat process to the NPD.
The NPD relies on the CompStat process to receive the maximum benefit from many of
the previously discussed elements of organizational strategy (i.e., function, demand,
legitimacy, and tactics). CompStat, viewed by some as a tool for managing an
organization, is a pivotal part of the NPD.

One respondent describes the “CompStat philosophy” as,

Where you are given ownership of a specific area, and when you’re workin’ in
that area, you should be very familiar with that area. You should say, ‘I’m gonna
prevent crime in my specific zone.’ And if every officer takes that approach and is
put in the same spots all the time, and then they’re given this support through
investigations and D.B., that should come to fruition (EWR_07).

Interestingly, this respondent describes CompStat in reference to what it means for
everyday police work in the street. This contradicts common conceptions of CompStat as
a managerial process, but also accurately describes the logical implications of this
process on the daily activities of police officers. Highlighting the former (and more
common) point, one Captain says,

I don’t think CompStat touches our police officers very well. It’s more the upper
management. I think it’s helpful. It gives us what to look for. I don’t think the
officers see directly what happens in CompStat, they really don’t have a concept
of what the captain goes through or the sergeant who puts the crime data together
and what he’s looking for. I don’t think they see the connection between CompStat and what we ask them to do (EWR_09).

He goes on to suggest one way to facilitate officers’ understandings of this relationship, saying, “I personally would bring a sergeant or lieutenant to CompStat so they could understand exactly why they’re being asked to do things they’re being asked to do.”

Echoing EWR_07’s latter point, EWR_17 offers this oblique reference on how CompStat affects daily operations,

> We’re more focused now. We do more research to see exactly where and when the crime is happening, we’re pinpointing that, and that’s where we’re putting the police officers, when and where they’re needed, the forces, and that’s also where we’re doing a lot of the operations: narcotics, gang operations. We monitor what day of the week, what hours these crimes take place, and we’re reacting to that instead of just putting police officers out carte blanche (EWR_17).

Again, the NPD CompStat Unit uses the data analysis and mapping software in the CompStat process to offer guidance to commanders who are responsible for determining the tactical activities of their officers. The underlying purpose of these data and mapping programs is to demonstrate in multiple forms the relationship between low-level crimes, disorder and more serious crimes.

The NPD’s CompStat approach holds precinct commanders accountable (in line with giving those commanders the authority to act) and allows them to visualize their problems and receive feedback in the CompStat meetings. One Lieutenant describes the value of the data presentation of CompStat:

> Any information can be dispersed in three ways--in numbers, in narrative, or in maps. Numbers are good because it show you percentages, increases or decreases. Narratives is good because you can read, but, it's nothing like mapping. Mapping gives you the most accurate view of what's actually going on. You're seeing dots, you're seeing groups you know this is where you need to go. So, that's the one
thing we did, we used to use pin maps, but because we embarked upon this technology, we able to do it instantaneously, in a matter of seconds. Put a map up, you can see. Of course you could overlap it with other things, not just crime, but you could put quality of life issues, you could put complaints, you put arrests, so that definitely has made the CompStat process, better (EWR_01).

This researcher observed this mapping process at both CompStat meetings he attended. For instance, the map of one precinct revealed an increase in burglaries, occurring at specific times, and in a limited geographic area. Among other questions, the Director asked the commander about his officers field inquiries and quality of life offenses. He then asked the GIS Specialist to project on the screen the overlay of police activities and the recent burglaries. Both the Director and the commander (with punctuated proffers from others in the room) suggested a few tactical and temporal changes to make in police activities.

This section explained the role of the CompStat process in helping to push down the problem-response decision-making authority to precinct commanders, demonstrated the ways in which NPD personnel view CompStat, and specifically discussed the CompStat emphasis on interacting with citizens for lower-level offenses. Not everyone in the NPD is convinced, however, that the organization is successfully pushing down that authority to the precinct level.

The importance of CompStat and crime mapping to the overall mission of the police department are reflected in this study’s survey data (refer back to Table 3.4). Of those personnel surveyed, 85.5% and 92.8% believed CompStat and crime mapping (respectively) were important or very important aspects of their mission, with a comparatively higher percentage holding crime mapping as very important. This supports
the notion that personnel at all levels of the NPD recognized the role of CompStat and crime mapping activities to the department, and gives more reason to explore how to better reach these personnel.

Another issue (raised by police personnel) is the cultural impediment to giving managers the authority and responsibility in many of these new decisions. For instance, one Sergeant notes,

This police director has involved the commanders. He has empowered the commanders to make a lot of decisions on their own and he has involved them with a lot of the policy making process, providing drafts of proposed changes to them and asking for their input before the policies actually become finalized. But frankly, the problem here is there’s just a sort of sense of apathy or indifference; I see it every time something goes out. The vast majority of the comments we get back, are just one or two lines, ‘oh I read it everything looks great, just implement it the way it is.’ ...It’s almost as if people don’t have an interest in what we’re tryin’ to do. Which is sort of strange because the commanders here today definitely have a lot more power than they ever did before. Prior to 2006 this was a very, very centralized, bureaucratic police department. Decisions on transfers, reassignments, even just tour changes, and allocation of overtime had to be made from the police director. It had to be on his authority. You wanna talk about decentralization, there was absolutely none of that, administratively and also with crime strategy....So there was absolutely no sense of decentralization, whether it was strategic, or just administrative stuff like that. So it doesn’t make sense to me why commanders wouldn’t have more buy in to try to effect some positive change in the agency, because he’s made them far more powerful than they ever were before. Today commanders can transfer people within their own commands, they can change their tours, they run their commands as if it’s their own little police department....So in spite of all this decentralization that’s gone on in the last three, four years now these guys are just still apathetic (EWR_18).

A decentralized department is one in which both strategic and administrative decision-making is pushed down to the lower levels of the police organization. EWR_12 underscores the importance of middle-management in the police department and explains one option the department is exploring to get that buy-in from police personnel:
We’re creating an evaluation, formal evaluation system here. They never had that before, so that will also call them to task. We’re tryin’ to institute a monthly activity report, so we can actually quantify exactly what you’re doin’ on a day-to-day, month-to-month basis....You really gotta have that pushed down. I can’t go on and tell a hundred and thirty police officers in the 4th precinct what I want them to accomplish. So I really have to capture the minds and spirits of the precinct commanders and some of their execs, the lieutenants, the squad commanders, the special operations lieutenant, the platoon commander, they have to be the ones who carry the message down to the troops, and get those sergeants really actively engaged (EWR_12).

These last two excerpts include information on the department’s human resources and the organizational culture (as do many other studies of a police department’s organizational structure). As in those studies, this discussion of police personnel inevitably reverts to a need for more personnel and the much studied impenetrable police subculture.

**The golden rule is having the police officers.** Policing in the CPS era requires hiring and training police officers to be better equipped to interact with the community in the ways discussed in this research. It also relies on effective management of personnel. Themes of “doing more with less” recur throughout research on successful innovations in police organizations, and in this study, it speaks to the ability of police managers to most providently allocate their resources. The mutually conditioning relationship between the police personalities that make up the police department and the police culture influences the ability of an organization’s managers to effectively implement a new era of policing. The recruits a police department hires, the training provided to them, and the skill with which they are managed can change the culture of a department over time.

One respondent discusses when broken windows policing was first, formally introduced to the NPD:
We weren’t really rebellious in that sense of the police department. The department was growing in leaps and bounds, the police grant was out there and the department was hiring....So there wasn’t really a lot of time to sit around and say, ‘I don’t want to do it this way. We gave everybody their marching orders and they went out and just followed it. So we didn’t run into really a lot of resistance...a lot of older officers were retiring, a lot of the older commanders were retiring, newer commanders were being promoted and coming up through the ranks. They of course bought into the new strategy, and that really pushed it and made it work (EWR_05).

During the NPD’s first iteration of broken windows policing in the late 1990s, an influx of rookie officers, new promotions, and grant money helped to gain buy-in from police personnel. Today, tough economic conditions result in almost 170 layoffs and nearly 200 demotions. This researcher experienced the consequent low morale while administering surveys to police personnel in the precinct houses (near the end of his data collection). The effects of this cannot be known by this study, but they will certainly factor in to future research on the organizational strategy of the NPD.

One final indicator of the NPD’s commitment to the drugs, violence and quality of life triune (and to broken windows policing tactics) is the way personnel perceive the NPD’s reassignment process. For instance, one respondent notes that personnel who wish to be reassigned from a patrol position to a detective slot believe the road to what they perceive as a promotion to detective is by first working in the Narcotics Enforcement Unit, the Anti-Crime Unit, or the Conditions Unit (which focuses on quality of life concerns). This is one way in which the organization signals to its personnel what it views as important to the mission of the police department, thereby influencing the department morale and culture.
Police personnel emphasize the relevance of morale, recruitment, training and economic conditions. EWR_07 says,

You gotta remember, it’s not only about violence reduction and crime strategies, but it’s also about morale building. I always say, you hire good people, you’re gonna get good cops....Secondly, making sure they’re trained well in the police academy, so they start to focus and get steered in the right direction as to what we need them to do when they get on the streets when it comes to fighting crime and their responsibilities and so on.

This speaks to the necessity of recruiting qualified people and giving them the appropriate training to not only more professionally serve the public, but to create a police organizational culture that is more knowledgeable to the nuance of broken windows policing. EWR_21 offers,

There’s a lot of other things that play, like certain moral issues...there’s an issue with personnel here. We don’t have enough people, and guys are gettin’ held over a lot. There’s some morale issues because some people are asked to do more with less.

EWR_22, speaking of his (previously discussed) successful patrol operation, indicts lack of money and personnel as inhibitors to carrying out that operation in other parts of the city: “They’ve covered the area very well for just four guys, and, if we could do that all over the entire city, we wouldn't have a problem anywhere, but money. Cops, you know.” He adds, “The golden rule is having the police officers to do that.” EWR_08 would like every officer to do have that continual citizen interaction, saying

Every police officer should be a community service officer. With that said, not every police officer is cut out to go out and do your aggressive police work. So, if I knew a police officer is from this area...and I know I’m havin’ problems up in [states a specific location] on it, and the police officer hears, he’s on the job and he lived up in [specific location], he know everybody up in [specific location], I tend to assign him up there because he knows everybody, so if a crime does happen, they’ll probably give him information first, than they’ll give
anybody else, because he already has the community ties. Not to say that someone else from another precinct couldn’t work the city neighborhood resources, but it’ll take more than somebody who grew up in the neighborhood. I tend to also team up officers with different talents. Like if one officer is really good with traffic, and he knows all the little summonses on it, I’ll team him up with someone who’s not as strong as he is on it, just to get the cross training on it (EWR_08).

This commander notes important aspects of broken windows policing in the CPS era, including aggressive police work (i.e., positive and negative contacts with citizens) and information-producing relationships with citizens. He also supports the commonly held belief that police departments quickly revert to the traditional ways of policing when they face cutbacks. These community policing efforts are often the first to go.

Though officers argue for more police personnel, the rate of NPD personnel per 1,000 Newark residents is approximately 4.8. This is significantly higher than both the nationwide average of 2.5 and the Midatlantic average of 3.6 for cities with 100,000-249,999 inhabitants and suggests a need to better administer resources and deploy personnel (FBI, 2007; Khavkine, 2010). In addition to the usefulness of “cross training” police personnel, a lieutenant suggests the following for a successful intensive citizen interaction operation,

The officers you have doing it. If they’re not all the same. As much training as you can give them, or send them, give them any classes, it’s in the person, whether they wanna get along with people or not, and blend in with their community. I can send people up to that area that are gonna go up there and write a book of tickets every day, lock up everybody they can, but, if you don’t have a balance of it, where the people like you and trust you, they’re not gonna talk to you if they think you’re just the jerk who writes me tickets. ‘Every time we’re speeding down Lake Street he writes us tickets, he’s an ass, you know, stay away from him,’ that’s not what we want (EWR_22).
He speaks to the limitations of training and illuminates the proper relationship between the police and community. This also helps to explain the absence of the expected positive relationship between more police personnel and improved police service. Police departments do not simply need numbers, they need well trained and high caliber individuals executing the responsibilities of the position. The issue, as one commanding officer sees it, is the tension between the official zero-tolerance policy that many police departments have on the books, and the well documented reality that police officers use a vast amount of discretion on a daily basis. He says,

We do have a zero tolerance policy. That’s the bottom line, that’s what it is. I think officer discretion is...is not that we’re going to ignore a violation but, there may be violations that you don’t cite for if the situation doesn’t work, if you understand my point. I think givin’ someone one summons versus six, sometimes the six seems like an overkill, and the community doesn’t react well to that. I mean, some people in the community may not react well to that. It’s just a matter of usin’ good common sense I think, in some ways, and I don’t know how you teach good common sense sometimes (EWR_08).

The recruitment process, training, supervision and deployment of police officers and the organizational structure center on the desire to inculcate officers with the ability to properly use their discretion in a nearly infinite number of situations (many of which involve direct interaction with citizens). The ability to use discretion appropriately is a pivotal part to broken windows policing. This section has shown how the various organizational structure and processes influence and are influenced by personnel’s views and reactions to broken windows policing.

This concludes the discussion of the Newark Police Department’s experience with implementing broken windows policing. This section has applied an evolving
understanding of the broken windows theory to the actions of the NPD by discussing the requisite changes in the elements of the department’s CPS organizational strategy and through careful consideration of personnel’s conceptions of their police department. A similar analysis on the police departments in Milwaukee (Chapter 4) and Boston (Chapter 5) follows.
Chapter 4: Findings from the Milwaukee Police Department

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Milwaukee represents, in this study, the police experience in the Midwest region of the United States. Called Mahnawaukee-Seepe by the Native Americans who inhabited the 97 square miles of land bordering Lake Michigan and three rivers, Milwaukee’s history reflects the promise that America’s manufacturing roots offered to a diverse group of immigrants from Europe and the southern United States. In the decade following 1840, Milwaukee’s population increased over 1,000%, and in 1855, Milwaukee established their first official police force. Milwaukee consists of distinct ethnic neighborhoods and is described by one Milwaukee police official as a “big, small town” (See Figure 4.1 for a breakdown of Milwaukee by race). Policing firsts in technology (and in instituting systems to prevent and detect corruption) and labor and race riots accent Milwaukee’s policing history.

As immigrant groups jockeyed for political and economic power, riots erupted, marking disputes between workers and factory owners and between Blacks and Whites. While Milwaukee welcomed immigrants from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds, the political and socioeconomic structures that arose in Milwaukee incorporated Blacks differently than their European peers. Competition for power and employment meant racial distinctions would continue to divide Blacks and Whites, as each group attempted to increase their lot in the burgeoning metropolis.

As in other city police departments at the time, Milwaukee created a Police and Fire Commission to respond to the corrupting influence that politics had on policing
standards. In 1888, John Janssen became the first chief to serve under the commission; he served for 33 years and was known as the “Father of the Milwaukee Metropolitan Police Force” (History of MPD; John Janssen 1888-1921). The new commission, the police department’s introduction of (for the first time in the United States) fingerprinting, a motorized patrol, and police training academy could not keep Milwaukee from becoming a “city of officially sanctioned vice” (Milwaukee Historical Society; John Janssen 1888-1921; Jacob Laubenheimer 1921-1936). Nearly 100 years later, legislation required term limits of police chiefs, gave the Police and Fire Commission more power over the police department, and required the Police and Fire Commission to conduct annual policy reviews of the police department.

**Figure 4.1 Milwaukee, WI Population by Race, 2008**

Read more: [http://www.city-data.com/city/Milwaukee-Wisconsin.html#ixzz0aTwgSRgA](http://www.city-data.com/city/Milwaukee-Wisconsin.html#ixzz0aTwgSRgA)

After 20 years of Chief Breier’s “law and order” reign, Milwaukee acknowledged the need for their police department to respond to shifting demographics by appointing its first Hispanic, Black, and female chief of police, beginning in 1989 (see Figure 4.2 for a
breakdown of current Milwaukee Police Department personnel by race and sex) (goMilwaukee, 2011). During this period, the police department attempted to address increasing crime rates and to improve community relations by employing various forms of community oriented policing and broken windows policing. Scandals arising from the Jeffrey Dahmer\(^1\) and Frank Jude, Jr.\(^2\) cases, however, strained the Milwaukee Police Department’s relationships with the significant Laotian, Hmong and Black communities. Figure 3.2 reflects Milwaukee crime rates, which often landed Milwaukee on the list of the ten most dangerous cities its size in the United States and include within them Milwaukee’s 23-year low murder rate in 2008 (Milwaukee).

\(^1\) The MPD was criticized for mishandling a run-in with Jeffrey Dahmer, in which two police officers returned a naked and drugged 14 year old Laotian boy to Dahmer after they had encountered the boy in the street, thinking that Dahmer and the boy were lovers. Dahmer killed the boy and four others before he was caught again by the MPD.

\(^2\) In this case, White police officers were accused of beating Jude, Jr., a biracial male, after they accused him of stealing one of their police badges during a party held at one of the off-duty police officers homes. MPD officers who responded to the call were also accused of beating Jude. Three of the officers were later found guilty of violating Jude’s civil rights.
Though the city’s growth has made it ethnically diverse and culturally rich, one cannot separate the city’s historical industrial, manufacturing, and employment undulations or newly arrived immigrants’ struggles for socioeconomic and political power from the challenges Milwaukee police today face. The current study locates the Milwaukee Police Department’s changing organizational strategies within the diverse history of the city and builds on this history to better understand the police undertakings in such a city.

**Milwaukee Police Department**

The Milwaukee Police Department (hereafter, MPD) case study consists of 17 audio-recorded semi-structured interviews, six semi-structured interviews without audio-recordings, informal conversations with department personnel, an online survey of 99
sworn personnel, observations on ride-alongs with patrol car units and of two CompStat
meetings (on 22 July 2009 and 16 June 2010) and morning crime briefings, just under
5,000 online local news articles, and unrestricted access to the MPD intranet (which
included annual reports, chiefs’ memos, a police personnel blog, brainstorming papers,
and CompStat and strategy Powerpoint presentations). A field orientation was held at the
MPD from 18 March 2009 to 22 March 2009 in which the researcher was introduced to
key personnel within the MPD, became acquainted with the structure of the MPD within
the city, and became familiarized with the sources of archival data that would be made
available. Intensive research visits took place from 20 July 2009 to 24 July 2009 and
from 16 June 2010 to 18 June 2010.

Function. The stated function of the MPD reflects a return to an emphasis on Sir
Robert Peel’s principles of policing and shows how “new” ideas about policing are
simply refurbished concepts of the past. Interview, archival and survey data demonstrate
MPD’s official view of its mission. This section explores the current understandings and
manifestations of MPD function.

To prevent crime and disorder, and to reduce the level of fear in the community.
Before being sworn in as MPD’s police chief, Edward Flynn said he planned to run a
“community-oriented department,” discussed his “‘broken windows’ approach to
policing, in which officers do not neglect minor crimes and nuisances,” and emphasized
the need to reduce fear and crime (Spice and Borowski, 2007). During his swearing in
speech on 8 January 2008, Flynn invoked Sir Robert Peel’s principles, declaring the
mission of the MPD “‘to prevent crime and disorder,’” and, he adds, “to reduce the level
of fear in the community” (2008 Annual Report, p. 2). He also notes the variation in what different people and different neighborhoods will define as crime and disorder problems, signaling a geographic and neighborhood-level view of crime and related problems. This understanding of the MPD function clearly arises in the interview and survey data and in other organizational changes discussed later.

Whether discussing the police function, relationships with the community and media, or organizational restructuring, “problem-solving” leavens the language of MPD personnel. While the main, self-acknowledged function of the MPD is to prevent crime, data from this research emphasize the role of preventing disorder and reducing the level of fear in achieving that end. The MPD also notes their role in CPS as a pivotal piece in fulfilling each of those functions. Tracing the recent history of the mission of the MPD, MKE_16 mentions strands of “broken windows policing concepts,” “CompStat style policing strategies,” and “problem oriented policing,” and says,

We’ve not let go of that [targeting the small things]. It’s just that we’ve refocused and we’ve involved community partners and problem oriented policing, looking for groupings and clusters, related crimes, in addition to focusing on small things.

It is not simply a zero-tolerance policy, aimed at arresting or citing individuals for every small infraction, but rather, an approach that involves including community members in the process of problem definition and using data on all offenses (i.e., low level offenses) to look for clusters or patterns that indicate a more serious problem. The police function is to work with the community to understand the various crime and disorder problems and to give attention to all offense categories when defining problems and devising solutions. As MKE_17 says, “That’s where the quality of life enforcement comes in. But,
it’s not just across the board, everywhere. It’s specific to solve specific problems.” Including the community in an ongoing problem-solving process increases citizens’ cooperation and the amount of information that the MPD has, “focusin[ing] on the problem people and the problem places,” and increasing solvability rates and preventing crimes (MKE_10).

Respondents mention that when the community policing philosophy first entered the organization in the early 1990s, the department’s unclear understanding of community policing rendered it an ineffective driving force. Of that time, MKE_07 says his peers thought community policing was “hug-a-thug,” and, “If you were to ask ten cops what is community policing, you would get 11 answers.” During the same time, MKE_16 says that the MPD began operating under the “broken windows theory and targeting the small things” to “prevent larger issues from arising.” He and others report that this approach, during the Chief Arthur Jones’ administration, was implemented as a strict, “zero-tolerance” approach and that the MPD neglected to fully understand the possible crime control benefits of their efforts. Though imperfectly divined and incompletely implemented, that iteration of the MPD’s CPS function laid the groundwork for the MPD’s most recent mission.

Building on the early attempts to institute a CPS police department, Chief Flynn implemented a hybrid philosophy, if you will. Taking bits and pieces from policing strategies or philosophies that had success elsewhere over time. So we have a community based, problem oriented and data driven approach to policing. To a certain extent it’s a “broken windows” philosophy, in that he wants us to have a highly uniform visible police presence in public spaces, in the public spaces that have historically been prone to historical violent crime, and disrupt the environment. So...he’s allowed officers to use their discretion, to be creative
in how they are going to approach certain problems that are occurring in the neighborhood (MKE_01).

The current mission of the MPD borrows from these popular philosophies, clearly relates to the work of the MPD (i.e., building community relationships, problem-solving, using data driven strategies, maintaining police visibility, and combatting violent crime), and aligns with the expectations of the greater Milwaukee community. To the last point, in late 2007, the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel held a “violent crime roundtable” (including the mayor, the district attorney, the Milwaukee county sheriff, and a number of representatives of community groups and social service organizations) that advised the incoming chief to nurture productive, working relationships with the community.3 As the representative from an interfaith, non-profit criminal justice agency says, “I think community policing is just absolutely what's got to come to Milwaukee. Real community policing....” Others agree, and mention the need for “community-based policing,” “a very close connection with the people,” and getting “the neighborhoods to be self-sustaining....to help the people start helping themselves” (Milwaukee Quality of Life Round Table, 2007). These excerpts relate directly to the MPD function of working with the community to solve an array of problems and acknowledge the preeminent role of communities in working with the police department to do so. Chief Flynn reaffirms these points, saying, “Public safety is not a spectator sport. Safe neighborhoods are a result of people and their police working together to create communities capable of sustaining civic life” (2008 Annual Report, p. 4).

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3 This was despite clear agreement among the roundtable that Milwaukee’s violent crime problem is a result of various social factors beyond police control (i.e., poverty, unemployment, under-education, and family and cultural issues).
Table 4.1 The Current Mission of the MPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the current mission of your police department, as you understand it?</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work with the community to reduce crime, disorder, and the fear of crime</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce crime, disorder, and the fear of crime</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce crime</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and serve</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/NA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey data (N= 99) support a widespread understanding of this MPD mission in the police department. Table 4.1 shows, of those personnel responding to the open-ended survey question, “What is the current mission of your police department, as you understand it?,” that over 75% explicitly cited reducing crime, disorder, and the fear of crime. Nearly 20% of those respondents explicitly mention the role of CPS in fulfilling their function. Regarding the relationship between the three prongs of the MPD mission, Table 4.2 lists the extent to which police personnel in my sample agree with statements on disorder, crime, and fear of crime. A majority of respondents in my sample agree or strongly agree with statements on the positive relationships between disorder, fear of crime, and the breakdown of community controls. Nearly 85% agree or strongly agree that disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked, and over 90% agree or strongly agree
that untended disorder leads to the breakdown of community controls, making the area vulnerable to criminal invasion. Relative to these function-related responses, the statements that are among the lowest percentage of agreement in my survey are those regarding the MPD’s role in reducing disorder and fear of crime. These exploratory results more strongly support the MPD’s understanding of the positive relationship between disorder, crime, and fear of crime (and their stated mission to respond to those), but, as Table 4.2 shows, they also reveal less support for the MPD’s self-acknowledged role in reducing disorder and fear, which may lead one to conclude that part of the MPD’s understanding of its mission is lost where the “rubber meets the road.”
### Table 4.2 Extent of MPD Personnel’s Agreement with Statements on Disorder and Fear of Crime

Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SD (%)</th>
<th>D (%)</th>
<th>N (%)</th>
<th>A (%)</th>
<th>SA (%)</th>
<th>IDK (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked.</td>
<td>3.3 (3)</td>
<td>6.6 (6)</td>
<td>5.5 (5)</td>
<td>45.1 (41)</td>
<td>39.6 (36)</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MPD takes citizens’ perceptions of rising crime seriously, even when the actual crime rate is decreasing.</td>
<td>12.0 (11)</td>
<td>9.8 (9)</td>
<td>20.7 (19)</td>
<td>41.3 (38)</td>
<td>15.2 (14)</td>
<td>1.1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MPD is involved in making disorderly neighborhoods more orderly.</td>
<td>7.6 (7)</td>
<td>10.9 (10)</td>
<td>12.0 (11)</td>
<td>46.7 (43)</td>
<td>22.8 (21)</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different neighborhoods have different rules for what is considered civil (or orderly) behavior.</td>
<td>6.5 (5)</td>
<td>2.2 (2)</td>
<td>9.8 (9)</td>
<td>38.0 (35)</td>
<td>43.5 (40)</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untended disorder leads to the breakdown of community controls.</td>
<td>2.2 (2)</td>
<td>1.1 (1)</td>
<td>4.3 (4)</td>
<td>41.3 (38)</td>
<td>50.0 (46)</td>
<td>1.1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas where community controls breakdown are vulnerable to criminal invasion.</td>
<td>2.2 (2)</td>
<td>2.2 (2)</td>
<td>2.2 (2)</td>
<td>47.3 (43)</td>
<td>46.2 (42)</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree; IDK = I don’t know

This section has demonstrated the consensus among MPD personnel and Milwaukee’s citizens that the MPD must work with the community to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime. This function is rooted in a general understanding of the
positive relationships among disorder, the fear of crime and disorder, and in the belief that different communities have different definitions of problems and various capacities to try to lower levels of these phenomena. The next section describes tactics and technologies used by the MPD in fulfilling their function and the manner in which they account for and measure their outcomes.

**Tactics, technology and outcomes.** The actual tactics, technologies, and measured outcomes of the MPD should align with their stated function. This section describes these elements of the MPD and explains the extent to which they support or evidence the “community based, problem-oriented, and data driven approach” of the MPD (MKE_01). Themes of “shallow problem-solving,” discretion, and new technologies frame this discussion.

**It’s really that problem-oriented policing model of SARA.** The MPD works to fulfill their function by utilizing available technologies to organize, retrieve, analyze, and display data about problems and responses and to create open lines of communication with citizens. Crime-mapping, data analysis software, in-car computers, and teleconferencing technology provide the framework for MPD’s problem-solving. The daily citywide crime briefings (where commanders meet with the police chief to discuss “real-time” crime data) and CompStat meetings use these technologies to conceive of and implement immediate and long-term crime tactics. These technologies are also used to hold supervisors and line personnel accountable when they execute those tactics. As

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4 Braga and Weisburd (2006, p. 149) differentiate between line officer use of traditional tactics and limited assessments “that focus on high risk places, situations, and individuals” and the principled SARA model of problem-oriented policing, which, they argue, should occur at the higher levels of the police organization.
MKE_07 relates, “Everyday we talk crime, we have the maps and people are held accountable...every single day at 9 A.M., we’re talking crime.”

An exchange during a morning crime briefing exemplifies this process. A number of district captains had mentioned auto thefts as a recent problem and were employing various tactics (i.e., checking with scrap yards, increasing patrols, and motor vehicle stops) to respond to that problem. This was clearly a problem that the captains had noticed and with which they had already been dealing in their districts. Chief Flynn asked, “What types of vehicles have been stolen from your district?” The captains were unsure. The Chief then asked their new civilian crime analyst to report back with the types of cars being stolen and (later) from where stolen vehicles were being recovered (or “dumped”). Crime mapping, data analysis software, and a computerized records management system were used to reveal target and geographical patterns, giving captains the ability to formulate a more focused approach to interdicting stolen vehicles (i.e., stopping specific vehicles, in specific areas, upon probable cause of a violation). In one district, this approach correlated with a 33% reduction in auto thefts between 2008 and 2009.

The 2009-created Intelligence Fusion Center, the use of Smartboards to relay real-time information to patrol officers and detectives, and in-car computer technologies that allow individual patrol officers to both maintain contact with the updated information and to run individual license plates make these data and tactics even more beneficial. These cutting-edge technologies complement the traditional modes of thinking about and conducting police work by allowing widespread access to copious amounts of
information (or, “evidence”). These technologies organize, store, query and analyze massive amounts of relevant information far beyond the capabilities of a police department’s personnel (see Figure 4.3). The scenario above highlights not only the merit of new technologies, but also the MPD’s efforts at shallow problem-solving, the importance of police officer discretion, and the MPD’s move toward neighborhood-level policing.

**Figure 4.3 MPD Technology and Data**

**Data Producers:**
- Street knowledge;
- Shared understandings;
- Experience & practice;
- Arrest & Incident reports

**Data Managers:**
- Analysis software;
- Sharepoint;
- Records Management (RMS)

**Data Deliverers:**
- CompStat;
- Crime Mapping;
- Scanning Tools;
- Sharepoint;
- RMS;
- Mobile Data Terminals;
- Smart Boards

MKE_07 mentions a number of district captains who follow this shallow problem solving approach, saying,

These captains look at all this data, they don’t need to be said, ‘Here’s the data, here’s your plan, and here’s the raw data.’ They’re smart enough cops to say, ‘Oh, okay. I’m going to do this or that.’ And then we discuss and we adjust based on what works. It is really that problem-oriented policing model of S.A.R.A. Not that it’s all in theory and in paper, but it is in daily discussions about what I’m doing about this problem, and other people can listen to it. There isn’t this fear that you’re going to be yelled at. I think if you were to go over and tell this chief, ‘I’m going to use pogo sticks,’” he wouldn’t say a word. And if it didn’t work, the next day, he wouldn’t be afraid to say, ‘Pogo sticks don’t work,’ and somebody might suggest a beat cop or something else....

The respondent acknowledges that the MPD encourages their leaders to be innovative
and to rely on data to inform their tactical decisions (i.e., to partake in a shallow SARA process). Respondents note the value of a disciplinary process that personnel perceive as fair. Now, as the organization moves toward a “values-based organizational culture” (MKE_01), police officers are more inclined to interact with citizens as they come to realize “cops are allowed to make decisions,” and that the administration “backs its cops to the nth degree when they deserve it” (MKE_15).

Carpet bombing in an area isn’t always the proper way to attack a situation. Respondents discuss the difference between an organization that values officers’ use of discretion and those that do not. MKE_11 says of MPD’s broken windows policing,

Part of what had happened in the past was going to an area and bombarding them with a citation or a charge for every thing imaginable. Well, Chief Flynn calls that a crime tax on people, and, if you’ve got good people in a neighborhood who are hard working, trying to make things right, to get them caught in sweeps and absolute ticketing of everybody that walks through that area, it becomes counter productive too. We don’t do that, we attempt to use some thought in the process now and find out why people are where they are and there’s nothing wrong with giving officers discretion if there’s a warning that can be issued to somebody going to work and maybe they got a car and they don’t have a front license plate and they should, you don’t have to give them a citation, you can have them take care of that problem and help them figure out how, tell them where to go to the DMVs. If it’s a stolen plate issue that’s different, then we’ve got do something about that, but there’s just different ways to attack the problem. Carpet bombing in an area isn’t always the proper way to attack a situation.

This statement recognizes the need for police officer discretion and epitomizes a common (mis)interpretation and (mis)application of broken windows policing. Paying attention to low-level offenses while patrolling does not mean that all low-level offenses warrant a citation or an arrest. Even more importantly, when targeting a limited geographical area,
data technologies can assist officers in more acutely deciding to which cases of reasonable suspicion they should respond. For example, while riding in a two-person patrol car, this researcher observed officers pulling over (on average) between two and three vehicles an hour for probable cause of various moving and equipment violations. The researcher observed the officers electronically scan individual license plates (either through their Mobile Data Terminal or by calling in the license plate). Officers used the rapidly returned information in deciding whether to pull someone over. During a stop for an obvious moving violation, the police officers’ perceptions of probable cause of a more serious crime (i.e., a sheathed knife in plain view) led to the arrest of an individual in possession of illicit drugs and a knife.\(^5\) Other stops resulted in other serious violations or in written warnings or summonses. Figure 4.4 shows the nearly 150% increase in documented subject and traffic stops from 2007 to 2009, in which traffic stops account for the majority of the increase.

\(^5\) MKE\_09 confirmed the researcher’s reaction to observing drivers who are later found to be in violation of more serious offenses and yet blatantly violate moving and equipment ordinances. The respondent says, “I’ve stopped some kids who didn’t have driver’s license or who were wanted [for more serious crimes] driving crazy, and that always surprises me cause you’d think that they would abide by the law [to avoid apprehension].”
Officers use this technology to focus their tactics. An interview respondent discusses the strain that the “zero-tolerance” approach of the past can have on community relations:

One of the things that detracted from our success in the high crime areas is that the mistake in enforcement policy was that, everything that walks, talks, and moves in that area is going to be stopped and/or cited, and obviously there’s people that, for a variety of reasons are are trapped in that neighborhood and are very good people, very law abiding people that want to support the police, but then they’re the ones who are being stopped and inconvenienced at the least, or penalized because of where they have to live. So we recognize that, and we’re dealing with that, now with the data we can get on the real-time basis, we can analyze what officers are making what kind of stops in the particular area, and does it look like they’re focusing in on one person or a race of citizens in particular or something that we need to sit down with that officer and say, “From what we look at, it appears that you’re missing the point here. Part of what your interaction is supposed to be here, is to work with the citizens to instill confidence so that they feel comfortable when we have to reduce our force in the neighborhood, that they can still reach out to us and report to us about crimes.... (MKE_12).
This excerpt reveals how these technologies assist police officers in the street as they ferret out the troublesome street people from the street populations. MKE_02 explicates these ideas, saying,

> It’s a double-edged sword there. They were happy to see the officers in the plagued areas of the city, but then, on the other hand, good citizens were getting tickets as well, so….Now, under Chief Flynn, it’s the quality of ticket. He’s always preached that it’s the quality of the stop, it’s not necessarily the quantity of tickets that you can write at the stop. He made it very clear to officers that you don’t have to necessarily even have to write a ticket if you make a stop and deem it not a good quality stop--guns, drugs, or things like that. If it was just a citizen who made a minor traffic infraction, a warning is good enough, and the officers get that, which is huge because the good citizens in the communities that are plagued by violence are actually supporting the police department.

This represents the dilemma police face in balancing their duty to keep communities safe while upholding individual rights. It also touches on a move in the MPD toward not simply counting numbers of tickets, but looking at the quality of those stops and the information gained from conducting the stops that can lead to probable cause for more serious past, present or future offenses that in turn will reduce the rate of crime.

This is also supported by the finding that almost 80% of this survey’s sample believe that stopping someone for a low-level offense is an effective way to get information about crime or criminals in the area. An interview respondent echoes this,

> The chief isn’t measuring their performance based on how quick they get to a call, but rather what you’re doing here 8 hours a day, what impact does that have on our crime rate. That’s what matters. He’s emphasized a traffic enforcement policy that isn’t about the numbers, it’s about the number of traffic stops you make, but not the number of citations issued. We’re not out there to give people four or five, six citations. We’re out there to make traffic stops to engage the community and to maybe turn that traffic stop into a lead towards a shooting that might happen two days from now, or how might that traffic stop end up leading to
taking a couple of guns off the street, or some drugs off the street, or something like that (MKE_01).

An exchange during CompStat reflects this intelligence-led focus on individuals. Chief Flynn, in response to a Captain’s presentation on violence stemming from a feud between gang sets, states, “Do we know who these guys are so we can pass their information along and harass them.” He is suggesting using police officer and other criminal justice agency (e.g., probation and parole) interactions with these known offenders to find probable cause of law violations.

Police are quite cognizant of the need to both interact with citizens and to do so in a professional manner. The MPD relates officer discretion, the outcome of a police-citizen interaction, and the views that citizens have towards for police. As MKE_05 states,

The discretion, that’s a huge thing police officers today didn’t have before [Flynn] came to office....[For example] a traffic stop, people think it has to be a citation and it doesn’t. It’s taking a while and some people are there now, but it’s going to take a while. We also have a very young department, very inexperienced. So it’s going to take a while before they catch on and realize that they are the representative. This is the way I learned it when I came out--your decision is what’s made out there on the street. If you decide to arrest or not arrest, advise or how you handle it, that’s your decision, and your sergeant would support you, provided you made a decision. Now, obviously if you made the wrong one because you intended too, you just don’t want to do something here, well you’re going to get in trouble, but if you made a mistake, and you explain, ‘This is the way I handled it, this is why....’ You were supported because you made a decision.

The respondent gives further support to the idea that the MPD is producing a culture that acknowledges and values discretion. It is not enough to simply tell police officers to use discretion. As the respondent notes, the supervisors and avenues of discipline must also support officers who, in good faith, misuse that discretion. MKE_03, says of those
officers still learning the proper use of discretion,

   It’s a sense of empowerment for them that, ‘I have been given this ability to make reasonable decisions and not only enforce the law, but effect crime, and maybe cultivating information or giving someone a warning and letting it be a positive interaction that maybe we can cultivate something in the future from.’ It goes towards really turning the citizen’s perception of the police force, the positive, as a whole, one person at a time.

MKE_04 adds,

   People should fear police if they’re committing crimes. If they’re driving down the street with an expired plate they shouldn’t fear the police. You might get a ticket, but they shouldn’t fear the police.

   Survey data of personnel’s views on the tactics used and knowledge of what the MPD measures (in terms of the outputs of their work) also lend insight into the shifting organizational strategy of the department. Previously presented survey data demonstrate a thorough understanding of the stated mission of the MPD to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime, but also raise questions about the degree to which the MPD acts on two parts of that mission (i.e., to reduce fear and disorder). Responses to the importance of certain tactics to the mission of the police department reflect a police department whose tactics concur with its stated mission (see Table 4.3). The top tactics to which respondents assigned the highest percentage of “very important” responses include “crime-mapping,” “community meetings in which community members and police work together to identify problems and create solutions in their neighborhood,” and “patrol officers maintain responsibility over a limited geographic area (i.e., sector integrity).” This indicates the importance of the community-based, data-driven, neighborhood-level problem-solving that other data support. Those receiving the highest percentage of “not at all important”
include “rapid response to calls for service,” the police force representing the racial makeup of the community, and “increasing the number of arrests and citations.”

The first and third items directly support previous data on the shifting tactics used by the MPD in fulfilling its mission. Other tactics used by the MPD include, differential police response, saturation patrols, directed patrol missions, foot patrols, park and walks, and bicycle patrols. Each of these tactics plays a part in the community-based mission to reduce levels of crime, disorder, and fear of crime. This section concludes with an exploration of the measurement processes of the MPD.

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It is also worth noting that “increasing the number of traffic violations was not listed among the top percentages for either the “very important” or “not at all important” options. While this may seem to contradict other data that emphasize the role of traffic stops, the confusion might have resulted from the wording of traffic violations, which implies that the MPD values numbers of tickets issued. Since this contrasts what other data reveal, the survey data might be understood as supporting the previous data on the value of traffic stops in gaining information on crime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how important each of the following items is to the overall mission of the MPD.</th>
<th>NAI</th>
<th>SI</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>IDK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive enforcement of QOL</td>
<td>14.7% (14)</td>
<td>41.1% (39)</td>
<td>43.3% (41)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community meetings in which community members and police work together to identify problems and create solutions in their neighborhood.</td>
<td>2.1% (2)</td>
<td>31.6% (30)</td>
<td>65.3% (62)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police collaborate with the community and other municipal agencies to combat physical disorder.</td>
<td>8.5% (8)</td>
<td>39.4% (37)</td>
<td>52.1% (49)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol officers maintain responsibility over a limited geographic area.</td>
<td>16.8% (16)</td>
<td>22.1% (21)</td>
<td>61.1% (58)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detectives maintain responsibility over a limited geographic area.</td>
<td>16.8% (16)</td>
<td>22.1% (21)</td>
<td>61.1% (58)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police force represents the racial/ethnic makeup of the community in which they police.</td>
<td>31.6% (30)</td>
<td>37.9% (36)</td>
<td>23.2% (22)</td>
<td>7.4% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of arrests and citations</td>
<td>29.5% (28)</td>
<td>53.7% (51)</td>
<td>16.8% (16)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of field interrogations</td>
<td>5.3% (5)</td>
<td>42.1% (40)</td>
<td>51.6% (49)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the number of traffic violations</td>
<td>24.2% (23)</td>
<td>43.3% (41)</td>
<td>27.4% (26)</td>
<td>5.3% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid response to calls for service</td>
<td>33.7% (32)</td>
<td>37.9% (36)</td>
<td>27.4% (26)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime-mapping</td>
<td>5.3% (5)</td>
<td>20.0% (19)</td>
<td>71.6% (68)</td>
<td>3.2% (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAI = Not at all Important; SI = Somewhat Important; VI = Very Important; IDK = I don’t know
The measurements of police work should support the stated goals, functions, and tactics of the MPD. While the MPD acknowledges the goals of reducing levels of disorder and fear of crime, and the need to improve relations with the community, crime reduction is, not surprisingly, the ultimate goal of most of the MPD’s functions. MKE_18 discusses the connection between crime and the fear of crime:

You can’t argue with the overall success that the department has seen in reducing the crime rates. Even though we may say we want to reduce the fear of crime, you reduce that by putting it all back to reducing crime. And how does a police officer reduce crime? He is visible out there, and is physically preventing it, or arresting the guys who are committing crimes so they can’t commit any more crimes. I think everybody knows there’s a very, very small percentage of criminals out there that commit the vast majority of crime. If we ever get to the point where we can target those people, get them off the street, I think we would be much more successful than we already are.

He notes that focusing efforts on the small proportion of the population who are responsible for a large percentage of crimes can reduce crime and the fear of crime.

The MPD measures traditional units of police work, including, incident reports, arrests, citations, dispatched calls for service, field interviews, vehicle stops, park-and-walks, and clearance rates. These measurements are highlighted throughout the pages of the MPD Annual Reports (with FBI Index crimes taking the spotlight). But, as previous interview data exhibit, the MPD is also concerned with the outcomes of the measurable activities in which police partake.

A memo informing the MPD of the new requirements for CompStat presentations states,

Crime numbers will be examined to determine if the issue was resolved, dispersed or the plan was not effective. It is understood that some problems can only be managed, while others can be solved. The plan can produce results, such as
arrests, traffic stops and seizures, without a satisfactory outcome. The question is not whether we are expending an effort to solve the problem(s), but rather whether we are effective in our efforts.

While supervisors and even command level personnel acknowledge the importance of the tangible numbers discussed above, the daily crime and CompStat meetings help to create an environment that values the meaning of those numbers and the outcomes that they represent, as opposed to simply counting these numbers as a measurement of line officer production. In both of those settings, the tangibles are used to bring those in attendance to an understanding of the problem, the response to the problem, and an ongoing assessment of outcomes.

Additionally, patrol officers in the MPD’s Neighborhood Task Force (NTF) have their performance visually displayed during CompStat. Patrol officers’ names are placed in quadrants, based on the numbers of arrests, incident reports, subject stops (or, field interviews), and traffic stops (relative to the mean of their shifts). For example, a presentation slide will show quadrants for high and low numbers of arrests and incident reports. Officers who find themselves in the lower, right quadrant are those officers who are below their group’s mean number of arrests and incident reports. Officers who consistently underperform are highlighted in red, representing their need for “coaching.”

The MPD also offers one way in which it measures the quality of the stops that their police officers make. During a CompStat presentation, a representative from the NTF

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7 “The mission of the NTF is to provide highly visible, proactive, multi disciplinary policing presence in hot spot locations aimed at driving down street level crime and disorder” (2008 Annual Report).

8 Officers in need of coaching have their badge numbers displayed on the screen, while those officers in the satisfactory quadrants have their surnames displayed. This maintains the positive purpose of this unique accountability tool.
reports that his officers’ municipal citations are down, while their felony arrests are up. This suggests that officers are using the proper amount of discretion in arresting wrongdoers while still refraining from “carpet bombing” entire areas with citations. Finally, the CompStat process also includes risk management measures (use of force incidents, pursuits, accidents, and complaints against officers), as well as the supervisors’ success in reviewing those incidents. Though there was no evidence of a formal method of measuring improvements with the community (e.g., community survey data), taken together, these exercises support the MPD’s commitment to responding to problems and building positive community relationships.

Using data to derive, implement, execute, and assess strategies results in more geographically- and target- focused tactics. This information (when effectively produced, conveyed, and interpreted) inform officers’ decision-making about how to act on the street. Departmental processes such as CompStat and the Neighborhood Task Force further ingrain a data-driven, problem-solving, discretion-valuing culture in the MPD. A discussion of the MPD’s legitimacy and their relationships with the community follows, giving deeper insight into the MPD’s function and tactics.

External relationships and legitimacy. The MPD’s move toward neighborhood problem-solving exemplifies their adaptation of broken windows policing. An exploration of MPD’s balance between broken windows policing and positive community relationships belies a widely held perception that the two are oppositive.

The MPD, like many big-city police departments has faced challenges dealing with the many, significant minority groups within its city. The MPD’s handling of both
the Dahmer and Jude incidents exasperated already strained relationships with some of their minority communities. Increased information sharing and formal collaboration between the community and the MPD, a more transparent and balanced internal disciplinary process, lowered crime statistics, and a relatively calm political environment help to legitimize the MPD with the community.

**Gardener cops and those who cut the grass.** Following the fallout from the Frank Jude, Jr. case, and succeeding MPD’s first female police chief, Chief Flynn was brought in to the MPD as a change chief, charged with, among others, enhancing community relations (Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, 2007; Spice & Borowski, 2007). One of the ways the MPD responded to that charge was by involving the community in their crime reduction efforts. In January 2008, the MPD created and publicized individualized Neighborhood Policing Plans for each of their districts. The plans’ mission was the same: to work with the community to reduce crime, fear and disorder; but the tactics and strategies used were based on the specific problems occurring in the diverse neighborhoods within each district. Common community-based, broken windows policing tactics included enhancing foot patrols, holding stakeholder meetings, park and walks, neighborhood events, distribution of crime prevention material, and meetings with problematic landlords. Traditional broken windows policing efforts (i.e., attacking quality of life violations and signs of disorder) were also used.

Increasing the number of positive contacts the MPD has with its citizens empowers citizens to partake in making their own neighborhoods safe, develops information about crime and problems, and boosts the community’s stake in crime
reduction efforts. MKE_12 talks about the role these collaborations play in the crime-fighting efforts of the MPD:

And not to say that there aren’t good, decent, hardworking people living in those areas, but unfortunately they are trapped by economics and certainly intimidated by what’s going on around them and wanting to protect themselves and their families, it’s hard for them to speak out and to assist us. And through the years, with the shrinking size of our department, I’d say we’ve had to rely more and more on citizen involvement in terms of block watches, and assisting us to provide us with information...but through this block watch organizations and officers interacting that way, and having a name to go with a person on the department, they’ve been able to get intelligence and do some certainly some good work.

MKE_10 adds,

From the feedback I get, the public views the police department in a positive light for the most part. A lot of the tactics that [Chief Flynn] changed put an emphasis on having the bike officers out there, putting an emphasis on having patrol officers do a lot of park and walks and even the change with painting the squads a different color has made us more visible even though there’s probably less officers out on the street now than there were when he took over (unless you tell the public that, I don’t think they’d know that). I think they really believe that there are more police out and that the police are in their neighborhood more often, cause that’s constantly what I hear at the community meetings, and I have these people thanking us for checking their alleys, walking up and down the street. So they’re seeing the officers more.

Improved community relations, says MKE_10, make it easier to obtain volunteered information from citizens, which helps the MPD to “focus on the problem people and the problem places to prevent crime.”

Other efforts to increase citizen’s views of MPD legitimacy include the Office of Media and Communications “Be a Force” branding campaign and the use of the internet and online social networking (i.e., Twitter) to provide citizens with positive information about the MPD’s efforts and achievements. This further enhances perceptions of
transparency and gives citizens more information from which to base their views of the MPD. MKE_03 confirms this, saying,

I think the community widely accepts us for what we’re doing, they know where we’re at, they kind of know what we’re doing, we’re flooding these areas of high crime. They see us out there....So I think we’re having an impact, not only us being there, but the street role calls that we do periodically. We invite the media out there, we are filmed, it gets out there, through all media outlets, keeping people informed of what we’re doing and why we’re doing it. Cause it all builds into the reception or the goal to make people feel safe in their neighborhoods....

MKE_04 adds,

And I think that end has been extremely successful and part of our message that people out there doing their work is not only--you have several factors, you have a deterrent factor, just being out there on patrol, and then there’s obviously, the interdiction factor...then there’s also the community presence type of thing where the community and the police work cooperatively together because we have to both be on the same page to be successful on reducing crime....And I think the department has done a very good job on promoting that--this administration specifically, at putting out the good information about what’s happening in the department, how we are helping the community, how the community has stepped up and helped us in a number of areas. It’s not just to go out and stop cars and arrest people, but it’s during these contacts, not every contact is an arrest or and adversarial situation, it’s engaging the community and cultivating information about what’s going on in the neighborhood. ‘Hey, who’s involved in the robberies and shootings here?’ or, ‘Do you know someone that’s carrying around a gun that shouldn’t be or that’s on the street dealing drugs?’ They’ll often times come forward and tell us, but now, by virtue of all of the contacts that we have out on the street, we can get that information, and in a couple of instances, it’s paid off real big for us. We just had this situation where some cops were shot at last week, and we’ve obtained some information just by doing that, where before that we had no suspect information. The coppers went out as part of an enhanced patrol force. But went out and obtained information instead of going out and just making it look like we’re going to arrest everyone in the neighborhood to show you that shooting at the police is a bad thing. They get that part of it, and that’s a very good thing for both sides, the community and the police.

This excerpt underlines the main reasons for establishing quality relationships with the community (deterrence and detection). It also emphasizes a more productive style of
broken windows policing. While many police departments will respond to a crime incident by saturating an area and “arresting everyone in the neighborhood,” this respondent recognizes the importance of using those stops to garner actionable information about the crime problem in that area (just as the MPD suggests it champions with other stops). The “zero-tolerance” hue of broken windows policing serves both to create the perception that someone does indeed care about an area, and gives police access to valuable information about the crime problems in that neighborhood. Pre-established positive relationships with neighborhood citizens strengthen the police department’s ability to create those perceptions and to gain that information when needed.

While an earlier section discussed tactics that put the MPD in contact with citizens on grounds of reasonable suspicion, the current section has focused on the mutually beneficial police-community relationships that the MPD has nurtured, with the ends of crime reduction and improved community relations. A central theme to each discussion is the manner in which police interact with citizens. Interview data, a 26% decrease in complaints against officers from 2007-2009, and newspaper articles suggest that, except for a few rotten apples, the MPD has taken the appropriate steps in maintaining positive views among the public. One MPD official offers insight into a useful approach to police work that should enhance these relationships. He says,

My father who was a cop, would always say there was two types of cops, those that cut the grass, that’s their [limited] interaction with the community. The other cops, were gardener cops, the ones that actually touch the community. And you look at the difference. Look at someone who cuts the lawn--their lawn looks nice, it’s cut, and you go to the house next door, where the “gardener” lives there,
and you have flowers, you have other things, the difference is the touch, and that’s what we’re trying to return to, is the day of gardener cops (MKE_07).

This respondent distinguishes between cops who take the time to cultivate relationships with citizens and those who do not—Gardeners and Grass-cutters. This distinction is not new to the police profession, but rather it is an understanding of police work that comes and goes with different strategies and in response to various problems and political pressures. The MPD, in its current mission to work with neighborhoods to respond to crime, fear, and disorder, finds it useful to emphasize the role of the department in this light.

Employing broken windows policing requires police to be in the neighborhoods interacting with citizens to both enforce laws and to co-produce self-sustained, lower levels of crime, disorder, and fear. With this understanding, a “Gardener’s” approach to policing may be best suited to fixing broken windows. Working alongside other city departments and with other community groups and citizens, the MPD as a whole demonstrates its commitment to “gardening.” Additionally, the MPD’s head-on handling of potentially calamitous challenges over the past three years (i.e., deaths caused by pursuit driving, allegations that officers ignored sexual assault victims, troubles with a new police radio system, and officers arrested for drugs and domestic abuse) proved their commitment to transparency and confirmed the strength of their relationship with the community. MKE_01 summarizes the department’s overall relationships with its external environment and lends insight into the successes of the MPD:

The chief has done a great job on the media side of things, in communicating our mission, our vision, our policing strategy and philosophy, having a vision and mission, as we do, communicating that by use of the media, going and speaking to
the community leaders. The elected officials are on board, the community leaders are on board, the district commanders have their monthly crime meetings, their neighborhood meetings in communicating that. And when we communicate in advance to say, ‘This is what we’re going to be doing, this is how we’re going to go about doing it, you’re going to see a visible presence in your neighborhood.’ And we understand that not everybody in a neighborhood that’s historically prone to violent crime is a bad person, but you are going to get stopped, and it’s not so much as what we do, but how we do it that’s been a problem in the past when you have this zero-tolerance kind of approach,...everybody got locked up, everybody got a ticket, everybody got stopped. The chief isn’t saying that you have to give everyone a ticket. Everyone doesn’t have to get arrested. It’s having that visible presence to disrupt the criminal environment....So I think it’s a combination of a lot of things. Communicating to the masses of what we’re about, how we’re going to go about doing it. And when you have less crime,...people are aware of the fact that the city is safer. The neighborhoods that were most out of control, are now under control. And it’s in no small part because of the fact that the police are there. I think they’re less offended by maybe getting stopped a couple of times in a week, but being let go and treated well because they know that that is a, for lack of a better term, a necessary evil to being able to be able to sit on my front porch and not be feared of getting shot, or being a victim of a crime. So our complaints aren’t at zero, we still have officers, who are maybe too aggressive, or who don’t treat some citizens the way that they should be treated. But overall, with fewer crimes, we have fewer crime victims, the community sees us more and it’s an overall execution where the officers are treating the people that they’re running into better than they might have 10 years ago.

The MPD rebounded from a tumultuous period by working with citizens to apply neighborhood-level crime plans and increasing information sharing with other city agencies and community groups. The gains were facilitated by a congruous political context, in which the mayor and Common Council supported the MPD’s bid to gain legitimacy with Milwaukeeans. Though responding to low-level offenses and stopping high numbers of individuals, the MPD’s ability to be perceived as working in the citizens’ best interest, the improved working relationships with the community, and the consequent crime declines brought the MPD to a higher level of legitimacy. The following section on the organizational structure and administrative processes provides
information about MPD’s restructuring and the role it played in setting the foundation for the crime-fighting and community-building activities discussed previously.

**Organizational structure and administrative processes.** To support the function of the MPD, in 2008 Chief Flynn led the department in multiple modifications that created four distinct bureaus (Professional Standards, Administration, Neighborhood Policing, and Criminal Investigations), a Differential Police Response Unit, and a Neighborhood Task Force (NTF). In 2009, a newly created Intelligence Fusion Center was placed along with five other divisions (Investigative Management, Neighborhood Investigations, Organized Crimes, Sensitive Crimes, and Violent Crimes) within the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB). This move signaled the MPD’s commitment to an intelligence-led, neighborhood problem solving policing strategy. These changes in 2009 coincided with a redistricting of Milwaukee’s seven districts along neighborhood lines and crime patterns (2009 Annual Report).\(^8\) This shift in the MPD, along with the addition of the CompStat process, improving the allocation of resources, and decentralizing some CIB functions, are discussed below.

**The CIB represents the most significant change in the business model.** As discussed later in this section, the MPD was traditionally a CIB-dominated police department. The CIB (as opposed to the patrol unit) was viewed as the preeminent bureau within the MPD, the CIB drove the MPD mission, and the top leaders in the MPD were consistently chosen from the CIB. Reorganizing the CIB and rethinking its place in the

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\(^8\) As of the end of the data collection for this case study, the MPD was transitioning into another redistricting plan in which the city is divided into three geographic areas (North, South, Central) led by a captain.
The overall function of the MPD has personnel, work environment and tactical implications. While intended to enhance the MPD’s service to the community and to improve its neighborhood-based crime prevention strategy, the drastic change also created unease among personnel in the CIB and represented a paradigm shift in the way the MPD works.

One of Chief Flynn’s earliest moves was the creation of the Neighborhood Task Force, to which were assigned nearly 200 personnel from the Vice Control, Intelligence, and Patrol Support divisions, and which was intended to increase the amount of uniformed police presence in Milwaukee’s most crime-infected neighborhoods. MKE_15 reports, the MPD “needs to get those guys [personnel in the specialized assignments] to be cops first and specialists second.” At the same time as the creation of the NTF, the MPD established a Differential Police Response Unit (DPR). Together, these moves represented a wiser use of personnel and freed up resources to focus on a more proactive approach to solving neighborhood specific problems. As MKE_03 reports,

Patrol at one point was looked on as kind of secondary aspect of the department. Patrol generally took assignments, and that was their main focus--going from call to call, and taking care of assignments as quickly as possible, and as many as possible. We’ve been focusing more on freeing up those squads from taking assignments and giving them more time to actually patrol and reduce crime, reduce fear in the neighborhoods.

Though the new NTF had widespread support among the Common Council President, the Chair of the Public Safety Committee, the President of the Milwaukee Police Association, and a representative from a neighborhood association, some within the CIB perceived the

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10 The DPR was an important move in redeploying police personnel and making time for police to partake in a variety of activities discussed in this research. The DPR represented the MPD’s move toward making the most advantageous use of limited duty personnel who were otherwise serving the MPD by fulfilling non-police specific clerical functions.
move as a “blow to the CIB” (Haggerty and Diedrich, 2008). This sentiment would prove to be a challenge for the MPD as it continued to change the organizational structure and environment in which it operated.

While detectives perceive the change as devaluing their work, patrol, as MKE_01 reports, “is happy to say, ‘We’re back on the map again, we matter, we count!’” Respondents reflect on the CIB-based tradition in the MPD, in which the organization assigned prestige to personnel in the CIB. They note that the department’s penchant for the CIB was manifest in the MPD’s strategies and promotional processes. MKE_05 says,

This was always a detective-bureau run police department. The detectives, you know, they walked on water, and the uniform people were just the worker bees. It was not really recognized, but it was known that that’s where you cut your teeth in order to get a good reputation.

The reorganization was a tangible display of the MPD’s interactive, neighborhood focus. Shortly after this move, the transfers of 19 captains and rumblings of a plan to decentralize part of the CIB added to the uneasiness that some personnel felt (Haggerty, 2009). Many of the captains were transferred from the Neighborhood Policing Bureau (patrol) to the CIB (and vice versa), with the intent of “cross-pollinating” leaders and exposing them to various parts of the organization. Department records and newspaper and interview data suggest that this move was intended not only to enhance MPD service to the community, but also to influence the provincial culture that had arisen in the MPD bureaus. This research, however, focuses on the role that this reorganization has on MPD’s implementation of broken windows policing, within the CPS era.
The CIB reorganization, the NTF, and the push for decentralizing part of the CIB reflects a previous attempt at breaking away from CIB domination. As some respondents explained,

A lot of the older guys, there’s not too many of them left, say, ‘This is how we did this, 25 years ago.’ We didn’t have homicide detectives, we didn’t have burglary detectives, we didn’t have robbery detectives. You were assigned a district and anything that came into your district, you handled. Some of that was good, some was bad. I think our homicide unit success over the last 20 years has proven that. We handle homicide investigations very well. Do we handle burglary investigations very well? No. Did we handle shooting investigations very well? No. Did we handle robbery investigations very well? Yeah. We did some that was good, some that was bad.

For detectives, the pendulum swings from geographically-based investigations (and a structures that support that set up) to functionally-based investigations (or, the generalist versus specialist and centralized versus decentralized models). In line with broken windows policing, then, the MPD is moving to a more decentralized model of investigations in which detectives work with patrol officers to maintain a geographic area of responsibility in investigating a variety of crimes in their areas.

Though many in the MPD perceived the CIB’s clearance rates to be above national averages, memos from the MPD explain that, except for homicide clearance rates, clearance rates for most other offenses were at or below national averages. And, as MKE_13 discusses,

For years the organization has been missing out on a great opportunity to really endear itself to a lot of the citizens we would normally rely on for support. I mean, because we never clear or arrest anybody who stole a barbeque grill, or broke into the garage, or broke the window out of her car and took their GPS. We’re getting so many more of those crime than the killings and the robberies and that’s the point where we’re having our touch points with most of our citizens here.
Interview and department archival data show the MPD recognizes that the majority of crimes occurring within their city (the crimes that directly affect the greatest number of people) are the crimes that have traditionally received the least amount of successful effort from investigators. These shifts in the organizational structure and the various processes in which the MPD partakes are a response to this reality, are in line with their stated function to work with neighborhoods to reduce levels of crime, disorder, and fear, and follow from the theory behind broken windows policing. The reorganization also advances MPD’s plan to increase the amount of positive interactions with citizens. By having patrol officers and detectives work together on cases, the MPD hopes to raise clearance rates and proactive prevent and solve problems, thereby increasing the number of satisfied citizens and their relationship with the community.

Survey data shed light on the community-relationship building and personnel information sharing purposes of the CIB reorganization. Though survey data from this research reflect agreement that patrol officers establish positive relationships with citizens in their districts, there is much less agreement on whether detectives do the same (see Table 4.4). The same data also reveal a lack of agreement about the information sharing purpose (between patrol officers and detectives) of the CIB reorganization. Only 42% of MPD personnel in this survey agree that patrol officers regularly share information with detectives, and only 26% of those surveyed agree that detectives regularly share information with patrol officers. Looking back at the data presented in Table 4.3 reveals a definite distinction between the level of importance assigned to statements regarding patrol officers’ and detectives’ responsibility for maintaining a
limited geographic area. For instance, 61% of this survey's respondents believe it is “very important” for patrol officers to have sector integrity while only 36% believe it is “very important” for detectives to do the same. A limitation to the survey research and a history effect explain these discrepancies: patrol officers made up the majority of respondents and the survey was conducted before the CIB reorganization was fully implemented.

Table 4.4 Extent of Agreement with Statements on the Role of Patrol Officers and Detectives in MPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements.</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>IDK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol officers establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their precinct.</td>
<td>3.3% (3)</td>
<td>17.4% (16)</td>
<td>9.8% (9)</td>
<td>47.8% (44)</td>
<td>21.7% (20)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their precinct.</td>
<td>15.2% (14)</td>
<td>22.8% (21)</td>
<td>26.1% (24)</td>
<td>16.3% (15)</td>
<td>13.0% (12)</td>
<td>6.5% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol officers regularly share information with detectives regarding crimes, criminals, or neighborhood conditions.</td>
<td>18.5% (17)</td>
<td>17.4% (16)</td>
<td>20.7% (19)</td>
<td>33.7% (31)</td>
<td>8.7% (8)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detectives regularly share information with patrol officers regarding crimes, criminals, or neighborhood conditions.</td>
<td>22.8% (21)</td>
<td>29.3% (27)</td>
<td>20.7% (19)</td>
<td>18.5% (17)</td>
<td>7.6% (7)</td>
<td>1.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree; IDK = I don’t know

Along with breaking up bureaucratic “silos,” the structural change (and new processes and technologies) created different means of accountability and authority.
MKE_10 discusses the MPD’s success of new technologies, crime meetings, and pushing authority down to the district level:

Focusing on the repeat offenders so keeping track of who the people are that are getting arrested for stealing, and when they start stealing them from the same areas again, going back and checking if those people are in custody or not and following up on them and arresting them faster. That’s all the stuff that’s attributed to that decrease. And a big part of that, which would be what the chief has changed is, he’s pushed much more accountability down at the district level, holding the district commanders and supervisors responsible for the crime that’s occurring in the district. A lot of times, the responsibility for a lot of the crime problems would be placed on the commanders in the Detective Bureau rather than the district commanders. So I think that the commanders at the district level will focus on crime and not all this other stuff that’s going on. That’s had a huge effect.

Crime mapping and crime analysis technologies used during the CompStat and daily crime meetings focus police work and help to hold commanders and supervisors accountable for the problems in their areas. Additionally, the establishment of the NTF supplies resources to patrol to further assist their efforts to prevent and investigate crime problems.

The new organization of the MPD, in which detectives and patrol officers work more closely together, emphasizes the prevention of crime and disorder problems for both the CIB and patrol bureau. These new processes, then, hold commanders and supervisors in both bureaus responsible for producing the desired effects. The meetings, now on a daily and weekly basis and involving representatives from all areas of the MPD, fortify this process. MKE_07 and others explain the value of these meetings:

Our strategies are based on crime and based on what works and what doesn’t. In the past we’ve had these conversations once a month, once every two weeks, and they were separate conversations really--the detective bureau having their conversation over here, districts having there conversations over there. Districts
were concentrated on things that probably weren’t connected to the entire city. Now the conversation is everyone together, it’s every single day, and it’s about what’s going on right now, not about what happened two weeks ago or three weeks ago. And then everybody works together because collaboration is the key. So those things where we pump this down to the lowest level, decision making down to the lowest level, deployment decisions, down to the lowest level, so if there is an emerging trend or problem, you don’t have to go through all of this bureaucracy to get it done.

The excerpt also explains the benefit of pushing down decision-making, resource allocation, and deployment decisions to the lowest levels of the organization. Respondents discuss the Safe Streets Initiative as exemplifying the pushdown of authority. Under the current structure, captains and even sergeants can decide deployment strategies without needing to have the inspector’s or assistant chief’s approval. MKE_09 summarizes this discussion, saying,

What [Chief Flynn] managed to do is that he has not allowed the investigative units to determine a mission of the department in terms of resources deployment, he has brought it down back to a neighborhood level where it should be. Each block by block, the district captains, allowing them to have a say in how and where their resources be deployed.

This respondent and others portray the move in the department from one that is driven by the detective bureau to one in which both the detective and patrol bureaus have a say in the driving mission of the police department, a department in which more decisions are made at the lower levels of both bureaus.

Major structural and administrative process modifications to the MPD include, the creation of the Neighborhood Task Force (which took personnel from the Criminal Intelligence Bureau and many of the specialty patrol units), a Differential Police Response unit, and Intelligence Fusion Center, the institution of weekly CompStat and
daily crime meetings, a move towards decentralizing part of the CIB, and a pushdown of authority to the district level. These influence the manner of police delivery of services and are also intended to change the police culture. Most importantly, these changes coincide with a more efficient application of broken windows policing within the CPS era because they facilitate police interaction with the community, encourage collaboration between two historically separate bureaus (the CIB and patrol bureau), and increase information, free time, resources and authority (at the lowest levels of the organization) to allow for more proactive neighborhood-level problem-solving. The final section of the MPD case study discusses the change in the sources and management of demand for MPD service.

**Demand entrance and demand management.** The previous sections imply new ways the MPD receives and manages demand for their services. The MPD’s community-based, data-driven, neighborhood-level, problem-solving function, suggests an understanding of how demand enters and is handled by the MPD. This section explains the impact of MPD’s increasingly community-based, data-driven mission on their demand processes.

*We basically just went from hitch, to hitch, to hitch.* The technological, data, and community aspects of the MPD mission translate into a demand for services stemming from and managed by these sources. Under a new mission, these technologies and strategies result in different ways of receiving and managing demands. For instance, telephone and computer aided dispatch systems are traditional sources of demand entrance and management. This, as MKE_12 reports, resulted in officers going “from
hitch, to hitch, to hitch...[that is,] assignment, to assignment, to assignment, not looking at the long term things that went on in their squad areas.” The community and the MPD still use these technologies to request and deliver police service. However, what police do upon responding to calls for service, the importance placed on certain calls, and the role of data analysis, mapping technologies and crime intelligence meetings distinguish the past from the present.

An understanding of the MPD police role as one of responding to problems, even when responding to calls for service, is the mechanism for the difference. MKE_10 explains,

You have a lot of people that just have it in their minds that they can’t control or effect anything that’s going on in the district, that their only responsibility or job is to wait and respond to whatever’s coming over the radio and run around. Even in many cases when they respond to what’s on the radio, it’s a quick solution that they’re looking for. If there’s ten kids in the street fighting, we can break them up and just get them to run away without us getting out of the car. In many ways, that’s acceptable, when really if they’re getting out and figuring out what’s going on they might be able to get two mothers involved that are going to settle the problem and they’re not going to have to come back two hours later for the same thing. I think it’s changed in that mindset to realize that there’s on going problems, that if we address them on a longer term basis, rather than just looking for the quick fix, we can be more successful and prevent stuff.

The respondent discusses the transition from a department whose police officers are only concerned with clearing (or, responding to) their calls for service, to one in which officers’ responses to calls for service involve a view towards preventing underlying problems that may cause or interact with the initial purpose of the call to which they responded. This “mindset” is reinforced by various command meetings, highlighted by
data analysis and crime mapping technologies, and supported by a Differential Police Response (DPR) unit that frees police time to conduct these problem-solving activities.

In October 2008, following an April 2008 pilot program, the DPR was implemented throughout Milwaukee. This program uses limited duty, sworn personnel to respond to these lower priority calls, freeing up time for patrol officers to partake in proactive, community-based problem-solving or other traditional police activities. In 2008, the DPR handled more than 15,000 lower priority calls for service, and produced a nearly 75% satisfaction rate among surveyed callers. In 2009, the DPR received almost 28,000 calls. In addition, the MPD eliminated going to certain calls for service (e.g., unverified burglar alarms), freeing up even more time for patrol personnel.

MKE_05, in response to a question on factors contributing to crime decline, speaks about patrol officers’ connection to the radio:

That’s the sad part of what’s happening, even right now in our age of progress. They were still strapped to the radio. Communications division needs to be revamped. There’s too much authority for those dispatchers, and they seem to carry a supervisory role, and again, if the sergeant doesn’t have the backbone, they’re going to acquiesce to what the dispatcher wants and they could go completely against what the captain wants. So, an answer to your question, I think the single most factor was giving the autonomy to the captains, the district captains.

Changing the organizational structure of the MPD, pushing down authority to captains (as discussed previously), and the addition of the DPR facilitate the MPD’s move away from depending on the communications division in allocating the demands for police

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11 A citizen satisfaction survey was built in as part of the establishment of the DPR, to gauge citizens response to the MPD’s new way of responding to citizen calls for service.
Changes in what MPD commanders pay attention to and measure also assist this change.

As one inspector reports,

This chief has said that it isn’t the response time necessarily that’s the driving factor here. It’s what you’re doing when you get to a scene and what we can do proactively to reduce the number of calls for service coming in. Of course priority one calls, are priority one calls, and you’re going to go to those as soon as possible. In the past we’ve been kind of driven by response time. Maybe quality was sacrificed for expediency. Even on smaller types of offenses or things that maybe aren’t even a crime, but are nuisance problem in the neighborhood. If you don’t spend enough time on that, it creates an opinion in the public that you don’t care. And once they think you don’t care, you’re starting to lose them, you know? You’re not going to get calls about the problems in neighborhoods coming through as quickly as you would if people understand that you do care. So, doing that, shifting away from that response time only protocol, that’s helped us, explaining all of that to the public at every opportunity when there’s a meeting. The captains have their monthly meetings for the community. Their community liaisons officers are always out at community meetings and just making sure that people understand what we’re trying to accomplish and how we’d like to do it has done a great deal to help us get the message across and start to break down some of those old perceptions (MKE_11).

This quote ties together multiple areas discussed in this research: measurement, tactics, community relations and demand. It is the police response to those calls lower-priority calls for service that, he suggests, influence citizens’ views of the police. These are the calls, after all, that place the greatest demand on patrol officer time. Though the DPR handles many of those calls, patrol officers and community liaison officers represent the department in person and implement the various responses to the demand created by the community and data analysis technology. Calls to, and information gathered by, the DPR are another source of data from which the MPD makes decisions about deployment and strategy.
MKE_15 explains how data and technology help to manage the demand for MPD service:

Knowing what you're doing and why you're doing it didn’t exist until 2008. Why are we in this neighborhood? Well there's robberies and there's burglaries. And you went out there and you did the same thing. Whether they told you there's robberies and burglaries, there's sexual assaults and homicides, there's car thefts, or panhandling. You did the same thing. We started looking at crime, we started looking at data. It was amazing. You're here because there's been these burglaries during this time of day, committed by this kind of perpetrator, stealing this kind of item. Ok, now that changes things a little. Focus. These are the blocks, this is what you need to do. That is amazing. These are the vehicles you should be looking for. These are the target vehicles you should be focusing on. You gotta be kidding me! If I would’ve had that when I was a cop, I would’ve cut my workload in half. I mean, I can actually tell you this car is stolen more than any other car. Holy mackerel! That's awesome. Focus the data. It’s been an incredible transformation. Part of me wishes I could still be a cop, to have all this at your fingertips. The technology, the share point sites. I could look at my profile. This is how many arrests I've made, this is how many stops I've made, this is how many people I've engaged. The reports I've made. None of that existed when I was a cop. Everything was paper. It got filed God knows where. I could be investigating a burglary at your house, knowing that, or not knowing that next door to you was a burglary yesterday--never would’ve known.

As the respondent reports, this widespread access to data on crimes, criminals, and places helps patrol officers understand why they are being deployed to the places and to respond to the crimes to which they are. This “focus” can be viewed as a way in which demand for police service is managed. Similarly, the renewed relationships with the community (i.e., meetings with the community) serve as manner of demand entrance and (as discussed earlier) have the added benefit of enhancing the MPD’s relationship to the community.
MKE_17 sums up the tension between a police department driven by rapid response to calls for police service and one with a more judicious response demands for their service:

There’s been some great community response, and then there’s been some not so great community response, as we are concentrating on trying to do problem-solving and trying to be in the neighborhoods more. At the districts we’re doing a lot of park and walks to have cops just stop what they’re doing, park the car, and get out and walk in the neighborhoods, and do some observation and policing that way. That’s really great for people who in that neighborhood they like to see the officers. But the person that was waiting for a cop to respond to their call that’s not getting their call responded to now, because that cop’s on a park and walk, they don’t like it. Now, there’s calls for service. When you go from years...of rapid response for calls to service where people are expecting cops to show up two minutes after they call to now trying to change that, a lot of people don’t like that. So, that’s been difficult, but I think we’re more engaged with the community. We had some really terrible community relations times during our whole Frank Jude era and it’s taken a lot to come back from that. There’s a lot more community meetings, there’s a lot more cops and district people that are going to community meetings or community liaison officers who are super busy. The community has embraced that but they want a cop to come to their door, and they want that cop there now when they call the police, and that’s hard for people to, get over. You know? Get past.

Even though the MPD may no longer use response times to measure police performance, the community still expects a rapid response. However, the MPD’s continued use of community liaison officers, positive community interactions, successes in problem-solving, and reductions in crime, disorder, and fear should continue to move the community along with the MPD’s new way of managing demand.

This section has shown how the MPD’s newest methods of service delivery influence the way demand enters and is managed by the organization. These changes also apply to the tenets of broken windows policing by encouraging a differentiation of responses based on data of neighborhood level problems and on neighborhood abilities to
respond to those problems. Creating the DPR unit and limiting the types of calls that require patrol officers’ response combine with the MPD’s new data analysis and mapping technologies and community interactions to form the entrance and management processes for the demand of MPD service. These processes, as well as the other elements of the MPD explored in this study support (to varying degrees) the community-based, data-driven, problem-solving mission of the MPD. A final case study on the Boston Police Department follows.
Chapter 5: Findings from the Boston Police Department

Boston, Massachusetts

During our nation’s nascent years, the Puritans settled on the Shawmut Peninsula and founded the town of Boston, now Massachusetts’ capital city and the 21st most populous city in the nation (Boston Successfully, 2009; Banner, 2009). In this study, Boston represents the Northeast region of the United States and is one of the nation’s most densely populated big cities. Despite (or perhaps because of) its strict, Puritan roots, a number of riotous episodes (i.e., the Boston Tea Party, the Boston Massacre, the birthing of our nation’s Revolutionary War, the Great Boston Fire, the Boston Police Strike, the 1970s busing riots and a precipitous rise and fall in youth homicide rates) represent the varied problems to which the Boston Police Department and its citizens have responded.

Its prominence in the foundation of the United States and its serving as one of the main ports for newly arrived immigrants made Boston a likely place for the formation of the first organized police force in the United States, in 1838. The history of the Boston police force mirrors that of the evolution of American policing as discussed in Chapter 1. Throughout its history, the Boston police have served and focused on a variety of community needs including public safety, order maintenance, law enforcement, and public service. They have employed a variety of strategies and tactics to respond to the various problems they faced, and have operated under varying levels of authority and legitimacy.

Described by many as a “city of neighborhoods” and reflecting the diversity of the
city’s history, Boston maintains distinct subsections distinguished by race, ethnicity, and culture and demarcated by geographic boundaries and landmarks. Whites make up nearly half of the residents in Boston’s more than twenty neighborhoods, with substantial Black and Hispanic numerical minorities (See Figure 5.1). Racial tensions in Boston, similar to those in other U.S. cities, came to a head in 1974 when a federal court ordered the city to desegregate its public school system (Bratton, 1998). The city answered the order by busing Black and White students; the public reacted riotously. For nearly six years, Boston police worked to quell these riotous outbursts, while responding to racially driven assaults and still addressing the routine calls for service (Bratton, 1998). The busing riots, as they came to be known, underscored police-citizen hostilities that arose from the police department’s alienation from its citizens and moved the Boston Police Department closer to its CPS era.

Figure 5.1 Boston, MA Population by Race, 2008

Read more: http://www.city-data.com/city/Boston-Massachusetts.html#ixzz0a4MYhWfi

Though calls for the BPD to become more involved in the community followed,
harsh police tactics and corrupt practices in the Boston police department continued to strain police-citizen relations (Braga et al., 2008). In May 1991, Mayor Raymond Flynn, under increasing pressure from the media, requested a review of the Boston Police Department’s management and supervisory systems. The St. Clair Report outlined the pervasive culture of corruption that enabled instances of citizen mistreatment and contributed to disparate hiring and promotional practices for ethnic minorities. The commission recommended an overhaul of Boston Police Department’s leadership to implement vast changes in hiring, training, and promotional practices, strategic planning capabilities, technological innovation, CPS policing, case management, and internal affairs (St. Clair, 1992).

The St. Clair report proved to be the gadfly the Boston Police Department needed for wide-reaching and lasting change within the department. An increase in funding from local and federal government sources helped police administrators implement many of the structural, technological, and community-oriented changes, as recommended by the St. Clair report (Bratton, 1998). Though then Mayor Raymond Flynn did not follow the Report’s suggestion to allow the much maligned Commissioner Mickey Roache’s term to expire, he did appoint William Bratton as Superintendent-in-Chief of the BPD. This appointment led to the eventual selection of William Bratton as BPD commissioner in 1993, helping to lay the groundwork for the BPD’s successful implementation of the community policing philosophy. Then, beginning in 1995, Commissioner Evans oversaw the creation of a “locally-initiated, neighborhood-driven” strategic plan for neighborhood policing, which included input from police personnel, citizens, and other stakeholders.
The “Boston Miracle” embodies the value of these changes and is discussed below. Figure 5.2 presents the current results of making a more inclusive police department and suggests the BPD has room to go in creating a police department that reflects the proportionate racial makeup of the community in which it polices.¹

![Figure 5.2 BPD Personnel by Race and Sex*](image)

*Data from BPD as of 9/7/2010

The “Boston Miracle” refers to the period in the 1990s when Boston successfully implemented their Operation CeaseFire and the Ten Point Coalition programs to dramatically reduce rising juvenile violent crime rates. Operation CeaseFire was a “carrot

¹ A report by *The Boston Globe* finds Boston leads Massachusetts’s ten most populous cities in the proportion of recruited and promoted police to city populations. See Ballou, B. (31 October 2007). Few Minority Police Supervisors: Recruiting and Promoting are Lagging in State’s Largest Cities. *The Boston Globe*
and stick approach” in which community groups offered services to seriously involved gang members, while numerous criminal justice agencies collaborated to provide assured punishment if said gang members continued on their criminal path. The Ten Point Coalition was an unprecedented collaboration between the Boston Police Department and leaders of relevant Black clergy, which lent legitimacy in the historically strained Black communities to the crime-fighting and community-building efforts of the Boston Police Department. These efforts, in conjunction with the citizen-initiated neighborhood-based policing strategic plan, formed the organizational and functional bases by which the police began to work with citizens to respond to an array of neighborhood-specific and citywide problems.

As a result of the programs, after a steep rise in youth homicides (both as homicide victims and perpetrators), Boston saw an even greater decline in the number of homicides (consisting overwhelmingly of a drop in youth and adolescent violence). Part of this decline is contributed to the aforementioned collaborative efforts of academics, community groups and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996). Figure 3.2 reflects Boston’s fairly consistent index crime rates in the decade following the “Boston Miracle.” While this rise and fall reflected similar trends occurring across the nation’s urban centers, some scholars contribute the “Boston Miracle” to this unprecedented coalition between law enforcement and community groups during the height of the community policing era (Winship, 2002; Braga, Hureau, & Winship, 2008). These collaborations and shared understandings about the crime

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2 For further reading, see numerous articles by policing scholar and current Boston Police Department chief policy advisor, Anthony Braga (e.g., Braga et al., 2008; Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996).
problem in Boston signified a renewed emphasis on police and community relations (Kelling, Hochberg, Kaminska, Rocheleau, Rosenbaum, Roth, & Skogan, 1998).

With the success of the 1990s as a reference point and prelude, the current research will continue Boston’s policing narrative to better understand the police organizational role in responding to citizens’ needs. As violence rates fluctuated through the first decade of the 21st century, the Boston police department and their community partners have undergone a number of administrative, staffing, and strategic changes. This study will offer insight into these changes and how police personnel view the current role of the police department in Boston.

**Boston Police Department**

The Boston Police Department (hereafter, BPD) case study consists of 12 audio-recorded semi-structured interviews, three semi-structured interviews without audio-recordings, informal conversations with department personnel, observations on ride-alongs with patrol car units, walk-a-longs with the Safe Streets Team, an IMPACT meeting and meetings of captains and commanders of the BPD’s Safe Streets Teams, nearly 1,500 online local news articles, and unrestricted access to the BPD archives (which include annual reports, chiefs’ memos, community presentations, and strategic planning committee reports). Disagreement among the various unions prompted the police commissioner to prohibit this researcher from administering a survey to their personnel. Though the Office of the Police Commissioner was willing to assist, Union representatives cite two reasons for not allowing the researcher to administer surveys (a fear that the information obtained from a survey can be used negatively against their
personnel and a desire to keep their personnel from becoming “survey monkeys,”
expected to assist with the many requests they receive for survey data). A field orientation
was held at the BPD from 27 April 2009 to 28 April 2009 and intensive research visits
took place from 17 August 2009 to 19 August 2009 and from 27 May 2010 to 28 May
2010.

**Function.** About his first full year as Commissioner of the BPD Edward Davis
writes, “We enhanced that commitment [to community policing] by ensuring that its
philosophy informed all of our decisions and guided all of our actions” (2007 BPD
Annual Report, p. 3). Similarly, this research examines the extent to which broken
windows policing (within the CPS strategy) influences police departments’ decisions and
actions. The analysis of the BPD first considers the BPD’s function, before moving on to
the other elements of organizational strategy, to uncover evidence of the BPD’s stated
commitment to community policing (which includes broken windows policing). The
BPD official mission statements reads, “We dedicate ourselves to work in partnership
with the community to fight crime, reduce fear and improve the quality of life in our
This section corroborates data from interviews, a community survey, news articles, and
BPD archives to explore the BPD’s experience in fulfilling their mission.

*The first basic tenet of community policing is, you got to go out there and arrest
the fucking bad guys.* The BPD’s successes combatting youth gun violence in the 1990s
epitomized for many the community policing strategy. The BPD, like many police
departments, has been, at different times, more and less committed to the community
policing philosophy. The St. Clair Commission’s report (St. Clair, 1992) on failed leadership, a stagnant vision for the department, and questionable Internal Affairs investigative practices in the BPD spurred the laying of the groundwork for the BPD’s “Boston Miracle” in the latter half of the 1990s. Braga et al. (2008) then document the end of the miracle, and this current research explores the BPD’s most recent experiences reestablishing the mechanisms and relationships by which they had successfully fulfilled their mission.

The upper echelon of the BPD clearly understands the multifaceted function of the BPD. In-depth interviews with BPD command personnel echo their mission statement and reveal a community-based, neighborhood-specific, problem-solving function in which the police department, through various tactics, works with the community to define problems (ranging from loud neighbors to gun violence) and to create and implement solutions (from removing a bench from an apartment complex to arresting neighbors). The interview data reflect BPD’s balance of working with the community to fight crime, reduce disorder, and improve the quality of life.

BOS_05, first admits, “Our mission has always been to protect the public, reduce crime.” He then goes on to explain,

Where I think we’re getting better is, we understand we have to deal with all the little issues too, the gang disturbances, the kids in the park, the problems of that particular neighborhood....let’s address their concerns, whether it’s gang caused, or kids drinking down the park, or loud parties, or college kids in Brighton, or is it the Theater District down on Tremont St. with the clubs, or is it some gang neighborhoods. We know what the neighborhoods want by talking to them, going to the community meetings, working with their neighborhood advisory groups, and listening to them day in and day out because if you listen to people as opposed to talk to them, they’ll tell you what they want and just adapt your
policing to what they want, and that problem solving, community police and problem solving in policing hot spots, it all works, but the main parts of this is dealing with the community and working with them to solve the community’s problems, not just the police problems--the community’s problems.

The respondent captures the subtleties of broken windows policing within the CPS strategy. While people often view crime control and community policing as opposites, this quote displays the BPD’s recognition of the need to respond to a variety of citizen concerns, with the most pressing concern being public safety. What is noteworthy, given the traditional emphasis on crime control through arrest and rapid response to calls for service, is the baseline acceptance of the need for police to work with the community in policing signs of physical and social disorder and other low-level forms of community offending.

Another respondent portrays the BPD’s history with community policing as auguring the current iteration of that strategy, which relies on the crime and disorder control function of police. This foundation, he states, brings the BPD to a clearer understanding of the many functions of the police department. He says,

The first basic tenet of community policing is, you got to go out there and arrest the fucking bad guys. If I’m trying to walk up and down the street and get everyone jobs and alternative programming and they’re slanging dope and carrying guns and shooting kids, well, the community is not interested in that. They need to have the crime stopped first. And I think some people confuse community policing with not arresting people. The first tenant, stop the disorder, and that means making arrests, and then talk to kids about an alternatives (BOS_01).

Concerning community policing, this respondent portrays the role of an initially strong police presence in creating perceptions of safe and orderly neighborhoods. BOS_11 adds,

An important part of [community policing] is that we arrest criminals, we want
people to feel safe in their neighborhoods. That message needs to be promoted among the officers, and I think the additional messages are looking at quality of life issues, problem-solving with the community, and doing prevention work with youth will really start to form nice.

These statements reflect an understanding of the role of citizens’ perceptions in forming productive problem-solving relationships with the BPD and evidence their mission to reduce crime and fear and improve the quality of life. BOS_05 explains,

I don’t know what people’s perception of crime is in certain neighborhoods, but I think that’s important because if they perceive themselves to be safe, they’ll be more involved in the community. They’ll go outside, they’ll go use the park. If they don’t feel safe, whether it’s real or imagined, but it’s still their perception, they won’t go out and they won’t let their kids out because they just don’t feel like it’s safe. I think police presence is probably the biggest that make people feel, if they see the police officer and they know the police officer on the beat, if they have a relationship with the district and they feel like they could call somebody like the community service officer, if they have that sort of relationship, that makes people feel better.

BOS_01 explains the challenge of getting BPD officers to understand their proper function, within the community policing strategy. He says,

I have a challenge, even today, where officers feel we don’t want them to make an arrest up there. That’s not the case, if an arrest is warranted, it’s warranted. I don’t need you to arrest just for the sake of an arrest. I think the community sees us more problem solving in dealing with quality of life issues than they do arrest because we talk to them, we survey them. If areas with major crimes going on (whether it’s homicides, ton of youth violence) and we’ll survey the community and ask them what the issues are, and they’ll tell us, abandon cars, speeding cars, people illegally dumping stuff. Jesus, what about the homicide? Yeah, that’s a problem, but we got to get rid of these kids that graffiti up the place. So, you know, they’d rather us focus on quality of life stuff too (BOS_01).

The respondent notes that although police maintain the sole ability to enforce the law and to legally arrest a suspected lawbreaker, the community expects the BPD to also assist in maintaining order by dealing with their quality of life concerns. The BPD works with the
community to reduce crime and disorder, which enhances citizens' perceptions of their city and of the BPD. A biannual survey of a representative sample of Bostonians (conducted by a BPD-contracted firm) contextualizes these findings.\textsuperscript{3} The 2006 survey asked respondents to state how serious a problem is each of 15 conditions listed (ranging from noise to gun usage); the top five conditions that the highest percentage of respondents listed as somewhat or serious include, 1. litter and trash lying around, 2. cars broken-in, 3. drug sales, 4. burglary, and 5. vandalism. These problems reflect the variety (and notably nonviolent nature) of problems the BPD responds to in fulfilling their problem-solving, crime and disorder reduction strategy.

This section has explored the definite community-based, crime and disorder reduction function of the BPD. In line with broken windows policing, the BPD seeks to work with neighborhoods to define a wide range of criminal and lower-level, neighborhood-specific problems and solutions and recognizes the relevance of citizens’ perceptions and feelings of safety to collaborating with the BPD. These solutions involved a variety of tactics, new technologies, and measurements that support the BPD’s mission to work with the community to fight crime, reduce disorder, and enhance the quality of life.

Tactics, technology and outcomes. BOS_11 gives a brief history of the BPD’s community policing philosophy, reporting that the BPD moved from an arrest-based approach in the 1980s and early 1990s to one where “we really saw the need to expand

\textsuperscript{3} This survey was conducted just prior to Commissioner Davis’ appointment to the BPD. However, the findings are still worth exploring in lieu of data from the yet to be published 2010 community survey. Also, presenting aggregate level survey data makes it difficult to disentangle the neighborhood level issues and concerns that this paper explores.
the way we viewed policing” and “we started to think more comprehensively--enforcement, intervention and prevention, as well as forming partnerships with law enforcement agencies, the community, clergy, and the business community.” Though the strength of and reliance on these tactics and collaborations have changed over time, the BPD’s most recent strategies represent a return to the successful efforts of the “Boston Miracle.” They include, increased, formal and informal community contacts, real time data analysis, and violent and disorderly hot spots (i.e., people and places) policing, and epitomize Commissioner Davis’s goal to reduce violence and revive community relationships.

*There’s more than just runnin’ and gunnin’.* Operating with a belief that relationships matter and that “small things lead to bigger things” (BOS_13), the BPD instituted Safe Street Teams (SST) and a Street Outreach Team (SOT). These teams form productive relationships with citizens in Boston’s hot spots of crime and disorder. The SOT is a two person patrol unit that spends their time proactively interacting with individuals who are among the truly disadvantaged (i.e., mentally ill, homeless, drug addicted) and criminal street populations to provide (when applicable) non-arrest responses to underlying problems. The relationships the officers build with individual street people and with the agencies with which they work facilitate the BPD efforts in keeping these areas safe and orderly, and help to focus police attention on the high-risk people and places that contribute to disproportionately high levels of violence.

Policing low level offenses against high risk criminals and in high risk places, without arresting individuals for those offenses assists police in sending signals of
neighborhood control and can increase citizens perceptions of the BPD. Discussing the BPD’s response to lower-level offending, BOS_10 says

You arrest someone, in some cases you arrest under these circumstances but we’re trying to gain in the aggressive panhandling, now you just took that officer off the street for an hour, an hour and a half, if it’s a busy day, it’s gonna be two hours before you get that prisoner processed and the reports done. The citation takes all of ten minutes and the guy is still in his area, and the same ultimate goal is reached....It’s tryin’ to target somebody, the behavior of these individuals; we just try to tell them we don’t want this, we’re not gonna tolerate it....Our goal is to address their behavior. For example, for public drinking we do have a right of arrest, but I think it’s counterproductive to arrest everyone you see with a drink, and I think we’ve seen improvement, we don’t have the huge numbers. The other thing we’ve done down there too is using some of the smaller issues to address some of the bigger issues.

This respondent acknowledges the need to respond to these “smaller” quality of life offenses without relying too heavily on arresting individuals. He gives an example of BPD’s “Operation Common Cure” that used both a strict law enforcement component and a “little compassion” for individuals’ plights to respond to concentrated levels of crime and disorder. This type of approach has the potential to save officers time (e.g., processing the arrest and going to court) and to more sustainably affect crime and disorder in these locations (by responding to problems, not just incidents). Like the SOT, the SST derive from a similar emphasis on building relationships and of taking ownership of areas of crime and disorder.

Beginning in 2007 and borrowing from the earlier idea of “Same Cop, Same Neighborhood” (or beat integrity) and from Commissioner Davis’ time as Superintendent in Lowell, MA, the SST are now involved in 13 neighborhoods throughout Boston (i.e.,
violent crime hotspots, as directed by crime mapping techniques). Patrol officers in these teams maximize their positive interactions with citizens in high crime neighborhoods by patrolling on foot and bicycle, attending various community functions, and by working with citizens to respond to specific problems of crime and disorder. Their visibility serves not only as a deterrent to those who would wish to disturb the evolving control mechanisms in the neighborhood, but as reassurance to citizens who expect to see a police presence and who view the BPD as a legitimate source of assistance, and as a necessary form of formal social control in otherwise disorderly neighborhoods.

BOS_05 details the officers’ experiences as members of the SST:

The Safe Street Teams, a lot of our younger, aggressive officers are in that and they’re realizing that there’s more than just runnin’ and gunnin’. It’s getting out there, riding bicycles, talking to people in the busier districts to working with their issues and staying in that spot where they’re seeing the patterns and the times that things happen or the people who belong and the people who don’t, the crimes that are happening and how they prevent them, how do they help stop them, work with different community groups, whatever issue it may be. But yeah, the younger officers always wants that--they’re going to always strive to maybe go to a drug unit or a gang unit or some other unit to do something different.

The deputy’s excerpt corresponds to this researcher’s observations of a captains’ meeting, in which the captains in attendance agreed that many young officers are not suited to work with the SST because they do not appreciate the work the teams do. In other words, the captains believe the younger officers prefer the “runnin’ and gunnin’” aspects of police work. The deputy’s discussion also echoes observations from a meeting of the SST commanders who valued having the same officers in the same neighborhoods doing “hot spot policing,” “at the problem locations and at the right times.” Similarly, the

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4 See Braga & Bond (2008) for a more in-depth explanation of the Safe Street Teams’ Lowell, MA ascendants.
captains enjoyed having officers take ownership of a small geographic location, which, they report, allows the officers to focus on specific problems. Finally, observations during a walk-a-long in one of the SST areas revealed the genuine relationships the officer had with various people during the walk. The amount of knowledge that the officer and citizens had of each other’s lives and their discussions on various community programs and detailed neighborhood happenings evidence the authenticity of these relationships. The officer gave numerous examples of the payout of the BPD’s relationships with that neighborhood. These relationships create knowledge sharing and empathy and give officers an understanding of the social geography of these hot spot areas, thereby facilitating neighborhood-specific, community based responses to problems of crime and disorder. BOS_10 details the work of the SST:

They’re very proactive. It’s a hand picked group of guys who wanna do some good police work; they give us good numbers, and the key to why it works so well is ‘cause these guys are very accountable for what happens in their area....They’re very in tune with what’s going on in their sectors, and their sector is not a huge sector because keep in mind they’re on bicycles, but it’s a pretty big sector; it runs from the downtown crossing right into the district area, so it’s about 8 or 10 blocks. We’d love it to be smaller, but that problem, again, the hot spot area, was pretty big, so you can’t focus it more on the area. They do focus mostly on the downtown crossing on the later part of the afternoon to the early evening; that’s been very effective. If you had that ability at all time, to have a group of dedicated officers, whether they be on bicycles, motorcycles, you name it, segways if they went that way, any type of mechanism where they’re not on a car....Focusing on those areas where you’re having problems really seems to help.

Though beat integrity and police collaboration with citizens to define a variety of problems and responses to those problems in areas of crime and disorder hot spots are features of the SST, the remaining patrol force works under a similar neighborhood and citizen interaction focus. BOS_13 reports:
I think it’s just talkin’ to people, talkin’ to the community, and listenin’ to what their needs are, because just because we’re the police, and we’re here, doesn’t mean that we know what’s goin’ on, and what the issues are in different communities, and the thing is, different communities have different issues, especially with a city like Boston which is very divided. Like, in West Roxbury, their needs might be very different than Roxbury is, given the populations in those two areas. So, you have to talk to people and find out, what are their needs, not tell them what you wanna do for them, but tell me what you need from me. This will build a good relationship....Before we just went and did police work and responded to calls, then see you later! Now it’s like, almost, we go to different meetings, different functions, like this [cookout] today.

He continues, discussing the role of quality of life enforcement and the need to place that enforcement within its proper neighborhood context:

I think it’s a very positive role because those little things are the ones that bother people the most, although they know around the corner somebody may get shot or whatever, they know that that’s gonna happen, but, little things that we have control of, like quality of life things, a dirty lot, or dirty street, or a light that’s missin’ somewhere, those kind of things are the things that affect people the most. A bad neighbor that’s always playin’ loud music at all times of the day and night, those are the things that really affect people’s lives, and if we take care of that it makes a big difference, and you make a friend in the community. Quality of life is number one....Every community has their own idea of what quality of life is.

BOS_09 adds, “It’s the quality of life issues that’s driving them crazy. Not the things that happen to a particular person, but the things that affect the greatest amount of people.”

Working with the community to define problems generates a police response to quality of life concerns. Field Interrogation Observation (FIO) forms, Code 19’s (also known as “walk and talks”), the Reporting Area Project5 (RAP), the SOT, SST, attendance at community meetings, a biannual survey of citizens, and data management and analysis technologies assist the BPD’s efforts in measuring and implementing solutions to crime.

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5 The Reporting Area Project expands on the “walk and talks” by assigning patrol officers to small, geographic areas in which they must spend at least one hour of their patrol time interacting with citizens and solving problems.
and disorder problems (as defined by the community), and evidence the BPD’s efforts to reduce crime and enhance relationships with the community.

The FIO forms and Code 19’s are carry overs from the 1990s push for community policing and are meant to increase the quantity and quality of police interactions with citizens. The FIO forms document these interactions and any information gained from the interaction, and Code 19’s and the RAP provide ways for patrol officers to call in their time to dispatch, making the walk and talk a viable and formally acceptable method of patrol. Technology’s used in CompStat, the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) and the Real Time Crime Center assist the BPD in measuring the outcomes of their work and in focusing police efforts on high risk people and places.

BOS_11 describes some new technologies and the institution of the BRIC and RTCC:

The ShotSpotter, identifies locations of gunfire, the development of the Boston Regional Intelligence Center in 2005, as a central depository for analyzing and evaluating and distributing information to the department. Most recently, the Real Time Crime Center, which monitors different locations in the city, has had positive benefits for the department. Cameras in the neighborhoods, things like that have played a part. I think sometimes they’re looked at as these new silver bullets to deal with crime, and I don’t think it’s that, but it’s a good addition that allows for a timely response to some issues of crime in neighborhoods.

Bos_06 explains how the data gathered and analyzed by these technologies help to focus BPD resources on hot spots:

You know what I think is pretty effective, hot spots through crime analysis. We have a unit downstairs, they take all that information as it becomes available. That information is sent back to the different commanders, they have their meetings on it. You know exactly where your problems are, you don’t have to guess. Anytime something happens, we have that information right from the computer. I open up my computer now and I can tell you what’s going on in any
parts of the city. The hot spots, know where they are, now let’s develop a strategy. What do we need to do here, what’s going on here. You got shots fired, got drugs, you got petty theft, you got people stealing cars and stripping them, whatever the problem happens to be, where they’re happening at. And you’ve identified those so-called hot spots. Now you have resources. Put together a plan or strategy, how you’re going to deal with it....I think that whole concept of hot spots, identifying the hot spots and developing strategies and the resources to deal with those problems. And don’t forget, always involve working with the community, you still have your community meetings, you still have your crime watchers, you still are working with a lot of your outside agencies, parole, probation, you name it. Depends on what the issues are will determine what resources you need to deal with it. It starts from the top and you have a commissioner that’s committed to it, the chief’s committed to it, your zone commanders are committed to it, your captain’s committed to it. So it goes right down. And then they are held accountable, we have a crime analysis meeting [CompStat], you sit there and you have explain what you do, if you’re having a problem some place, what did you do about it and what do you need?

These technologies give the BPD detailed information on incidents; this information is then used to make decisions about tactics and resource deployment to hot spots. Respondents discuss other uses for these technologies: computerized report writing that save officers time and in-car mobile data terminals that increase patrol officers’ access to information. The time and information gained from these technologies improves the patrol response to neighborhood problems. BOS_07 sums up the incongruity of technology’s role in community relationship building:

Well, I think so much of that [the ‘community-oriented policing philosophy’] is relationship based. I mean, can we take the information the community gives us and use technology to try to categorize it and sort it and spit it back out in a meaningful way, can we develop strategies through technology? Yeah, I guess so. We can analyze crime trends and crime data and stuff like that so, I don’t know. Those things are very valuable, but I don’t know that they enhance community oriented policing more than just the attitude of the officer or again, about discretion of what’s he going to do with his time, and the relationships that he forms....

The abilities of these technologies to receive, store and process large amounts of
information is indeed valuable to police work. New technologies also give supervisors insight into how their patrol officers spend their time, which can be used to train an officer in how to spend his or her time problem solving and interacting with citizens. BOS_03 adds, “Technology will help us, but it’s really understanding your people, the people you service.” Both respondents identify the danger of losing the interpersonal basis of their work and the need for officers to properly use their discretion and form meaningful relationships with citizens. Finally, these technologies help the BPD in reporting their “performance statistics.”

For example, the SST tracks numbers of moving violations arrests, FIOs and city ordinance violations in reporting changes in Part I and Part II crimes. For the SST, the FIOS and ordinance violations “are used quite a bit because that’s their strategy on the so-called ‘broken windows,’ the public drinking and the panhandling, along those lines” (BOS_10). The BPD is still searching for ways, however, to measure the relationship building aspects of police work. As BOS_03 says, “Most of the things we measure are things that we can count. It’s much more difficult to measure the intangibles.” Regarding CompStat, BOS_13 says, “CompStat doesn’t measure the things that we’re talking about, community policing type of things, and that’s what [one high ranking BPD official] is trying to get to.” BOS_01 adds,

It’s based on building relationships. Ordinarily in police work, we measure cops on how many arrests did you make, how many tags did you do, how many motor vehicle stops did you make, how many stops to people did you make on the street where you filled out a field interrogation observation form and you pat for someone (if you thought you needed to) for weapons. Which one of those is most liked by the citizens, when we arrest them, when we give them a parking ticket, when we cost them money on a moving ticket and they got to pay their insurance
higher, or when you’re walking down the street with your girlfriend and I stop you and ask you questions about whether you committed a crime and pat, frisk you? None. That’s what we measure at CompStat. Where are the arrests, where are the tags, where are the FIOs? We don’t measure how many community contacts you have, how many positive things have you done for the community, how many community meetings did you attend, how many disputes did you mediate and resolved without law enforcement action being taken, how many friends have you made out there? The minute you pin this badge on your chest, you get all the enemies you need in the world, so my challenge is try to and get my cops to go out there and make some friends....You make a lot more friends talking to people and being kind, than you do making arrests....We’ve never trained cops on that. We’ve never trained a cop how to walk into a store, cold, say, “Hello, my name is Officer Jones,” and talk to the store owner and say, “I’m assigned on here. I’m vested in the community. I want to do what’s right to keep it safe here, what do you need me to do to work with you as a store owner?” We don’t train them to do that....So then try and build a relationship with the community when they’re only experience with a police officer is they’re getting a ticket, they’re getting arrested, or they’re getting tagged, and the ‘cops never come in....’ We don’t blame the soldiers for war, we blame the cops for crime. So since we get the blame, let’s take ownership of it, and it’s tough to blame me if you and I are working on it together. And then you realize, “No, [he’s] a good guy, it’s not him, it’s just these kids. And he’s down here, and when I call him he’s here, and I’ve talked to him about the problem, he’s addressed it, and, the judges let the kid go, or probation failed, but I feel like the police are a partner with me” Once we build that relationship then that’s one down, we got to hopefully tell two more friends, and two more friends, and two more friends ‘til it builds. So I think we have to look at how we look at good cops, how we define a good cop. No one, until recently, have we started defining good cops, the officer who’s working with the kids and the community doing community service. We don’t give out medals for that. We give out medals for getting guns, and engaged in shootouts and getting kilos, we don’t give out medals for taking kids to summer camp, and teaching kids how to write a resume, and talking to gang kid in a mediation out of not going over and retaliating and trying to get himself focused on positive stuff.

This respondent explains the various interactions the BPD has with its citizens, and the affects of those interactions on BPD-citizen relationships. He suggests that new training, department recognition, and new ways of measuring police work can facilitate a more neighborhood-based, citizen-focused function.

The BPD recognizes the need to officially measure and reward these community-
oriented tactics. Respondents discuss new ways the BPD is exploring to do this. They include, encouraging detectives to conduct Code 19’s, displaying Code 19 totals during CompStat, and recognizing at CompStat sworn and non-sworn BPD personnel who “have done a good job, or have done something to help with the community,” (BOS_13) besides the traditional “runnin’ and gunnin’” acknowledgments that police departments traditionally offer.

This section explored the tactical, technological, and measurement manifestations of the BPD’s deeply held commitment to the community policing philosophy (of which the CPS strategy and broken windows policing are implied). Specifically, Boston’s Street Outreach Team and Safe Street Teams represent aspects of broken windows policing including, proactively responding to problems of disorder using a variety of tactics, beat integrity, citizen interaction, technology and data processes to manage, support, and sharpen these tactics and explorations into new ways of measuring and valuing the community-related work that the BPD does. The following section examines the BPD’s relationship with citizens, community groups and other city agencies in fulfilling it mission to fight crime, reduce disorder, and enhance the quality of life, while maintaining high levels of legitimacy.

**External relationships and legitimacy.** Legitimacy and relationships with the external environment go hand in hand. The BPD’s claim of a community-oriented function presumes fruitful working relationships with individuals and groups within the city (or at least an attempt to create such relationships). These relationships are not only a means to the crime and disorder reduction and quality of life enhancing function of the
BPD, but also an end in themselves. Data from this study reveal how the BPD has built on their relationship building mechanisms from the 1990s to find new ways of relating to and working with a number of external entities.

*Creating partnerships with the community is not difficult, it's maintaining it over time.* The BPD’s collaborations with numerous law enforcement and social service agencies and community and church groups contributed to the precipitous decline in youth violence in mid-1990s Boston. Braga *et al.* (2008) highlight the BPD’s challenges in maintaining the successful collaborations of the 1990s amidst serious cases of internal corruption, a loss of sworn personnel, organizational restructuring, internal conflict in community groups involved with the Ten Point Coalition, and a subsequent rise in juvenile gang violence. After this unraveling of the “Boston Miracle,” the BPD adapts what it views as the successful elements of their past strategies to the most recent environment in which it operates. These renewed relationships with citizens and continued successful collaborations with a variety of groups signify the BPD’s road to legitimization and lend credence to their use of people- and place-specific tactics in supporting their stated function to fight crime, reduce disorder and enhance the quality of life in Boston.

Just prior to Commissioner Davis’ tenure at the BPD, a series of arrests of BPD police officers involved in illegal drugs, accusations of widespread drug use (i.e., steroids) by BPD personnel, allegations of mishandled internal investigations, rising violence and increased feelings that the BPD did not promote and recruit adequate numbers of racial minorities corresponded to residents’ feelings of no confidence in the
BPD’s ability to prevent and solve crimes, as documented by the BPD’s own community survey (Pulavarti, Bernadeau, Kenney, & Savage, 2007; Bernstein, 2008; More Police Problems, 2008). Upon taking office, Commissioner Davis, recognizing the need to be more responsive to the community impulse (and charged by the mayor with reducing violence and enhancing community relationships), discussed his commitment to the community policing philosophy as one that is not only a “specialized program,” but one that ensures all units within the BPD “operate with a community-policing philosophy” (O’Brien, 2007).

BOS_11 discusses the BPD’s experience with building community relationships:

Making sure that you’re always working on building relations with the community, and building trust; we do a good job on balancing all those things, but really, there’s no down time in it. It’s continuous work, really. Creating partnerships with the community and other agencies is not difficult, but it’s maintaining it over time, and keeping a high level of operation....It’s really 1 or 2% of the population that will take the most time on these type of issues, and working with DYS and probation, parole, the district attorney’s officer, the U.S. attorney’s office, those partnerships are critical in dealing with issues of gang violence....And then, even working with families, we’ve started a couple of bodies around the ideas of working with families that are generationally involved with crime, and then, again, the more you look at this, the more complex these issues become, and the more need there is to, I think expand the way you look at issues of crime and how you should be dealing with them. I think we’ve taken a job description that I think 20 years ago was more focused on arrests for the most, and really expanded on that, and understanding that, these issues need to be dealt with, but with a wide range of agencies if they can make a difference. We’re not there yet, but we’re, we’re getting there.

The respondent notices the changing strength of the many relationships the BPD has with other law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, community groups and families, and realizes the BPD’s role as one that is not simply to arrest individuals, but to work with the community to respond to a range of community issues. Interview and archival
data posit other mechanisms that support the BPD in working (and building relationships) with the community: expanding the community service officer within each district, training in the academy, a BPD blog and Twitter site, a Text-a-Tip program, attending community meetings to receive advice and feedback about BPD efforts, and the SST. As BOS_05 states,

> We can call anything any different programs, we can put all these elaborate names on them, theories and different strategies, but the plan is, working with the community, working with your neighbors, in development, using the resources....

This “relationship based” focus of the BPD is evidenced more specifically in patrol officers’ designated areas of responsibility (or the RAP). As BOS_12 reports, in response to a question on the BPD’s responsibilities,

> Well, obviously respond to crime, respond to issues within their designated areas. The way it’s been set up basically, is everybody has their beat, their areas of responsibility. Not only are they supposed to recognize the criminal aspect of it, but the conditions, and things that cause them. Dealing with some of the business people, property managers, housing, developments, people who run them, find out actually where the problem issue is at and what can be done to make them better. We’re kind of reaching out to a lot of community groups.

These improved community relationships not only assist with crime prevention efforts but also help after a crime is committed. For instance, respondents note how positive relationships come into play, after an egregious crime or BPD mishap, to ease tensions in the community and to more quickly rebound from such incidents. BOS_07 says, “I think there’s community leaders that we could reach out to explain what happened, to ask for time to correct the situation.”

BOS_11 explains how the BPD focus on “high propensity kids” and Impact
meetings represent a more law-enforcement bend to these collaborations. They also signal a return to the successful collaborative and “pulling levers” approach of the BPD that led to the “Boston Miracle,” reflect a decentralization of power to captains (who are responsible for decisions about how and when to intervene), and again evidence the BPD’s attempts to focus on high risk people and places. In cases where the BPD feels they have “done all we can with the carrot on” these repeat offenders (or, “impact points”), officers, based on information shared at bi-weekly Impact meetings, may use “minor arrests” to get a potential violent crime suspect (or victim) off the street. He states,

> We work hand in hand with the housing officers, the Safe Street Teams, the street workers, the federal prosecutor’s office....We’ll work with parole, we’ll work with probation, and a lot of these kids are on probation....Sometimes, our unit doesn’t make minor arrests, just because of so many things going on, we have a lot of guys tied up with constant minor arrests, but you do it periodically, because it might be the trigger that flips the switch for violation of probation and it may seem punitive in nature, but, it’s not done just to jam a kid up, it’s to jam up a kid who’s high propensity kids, a kid who’s probably gonna get himself shot. You have these shootings and you kind of know who’s involved and individuals most likely to retaliate. If you can get them off, then you sometimes put out those fires, if you have a hard time getting them locked up, and it just starts snowballing.

Though this unit (i.e., the Youth Violence Strike Force) will collaborate with various agencies to provide a “carrot” to known high propensity for violence individuals, it also acts as the strong arm of law enforcement when information leads the officers to believe that putting an individual in jail will reduce the person’s likelihood of being a violent offender or victim. Arrest for a minor offense triggers a known offender’s violation of probation or parole conditions and, in turn, prevents (or at least delays) a violent act or acts. The YVSF’s regular tactical-planning and information-sharing Impact meetings
represent the BPD’s attempt to institutionalize the “pulling levers” approach of Operation CeaseFire, made famous in the 1990s.

Respondents consistently report the exchange of information that occurs between the BPD and the community, and between the BPD and other agencies. This information exchange creates relationships that assist the BPD in doing their jobs and increase BPD legitimacy in the community. The relationships that individual officers make with community members serve as the basis for citizen judgments about the BPD. As discussed previously, BOS_01 explains how community members who have positive relationships with BPD personnel will be less quick to negatively judge the BPD when scandal occurs.

Though the most recent BPD community survey data are not available, the dearth of newspaper and interview data revealing strained BPD relations with the community suggests that the BPD has built on its community policing foundation and increased their legitimacy within the community by improving working relationships with the community, decreasing violent crime rates, and by having the oversight and support of an external citizen review board (Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel, 2009). This section has shown the forms these relationships take in the BPD and how the BPD has reached back to their successful efforts of the 1990s in building relationships with the community. The following section describes issues in receiving and managing demands for Boston police services and highlights issues in maintaining perceptions of public safety while reducing a reliance on traditional ways of handling this demand.

**Demand entrance and demand management.** Increased interactions with the
community have the potential to increase the demand for police service through interpersonal avenues of communication. Or they might even raise community expectations regarding a department’s rapid response to calls for service as citizens come to believe an officer should always be nearby. This section explores the BPD’s experience balancing their community policing philosophy with traditional law enforcement demands on their time.

*It’s always a fine balance between answering their radio calls and dealing with issues.* Building relationships with the community takes time, whether a patrol officer building a one-on-one relationship with a citizen during a “walk and talk” or a detective attending a multi-agency information sharing meeting. For most patrol officers, the time they have to put in to building relationships is secondary to responding to calls for service. Though training in problem-solving at the academy, “walk and talks,” the STT, the SOT and the RAP encourage BPD officers to take time to work with the community, it remains up to the individual officer’s discretion and capabilities to use that time wisely. As one police supervisor tells his officers,

> You have a certain amount of time—you have to write reports, you got to answer calls, you got to bring the car over to the shop; there’s all kinds of things you have to do, but ultimately, you’re going to have a lot of free time. And that’s going to determine the kind of police officer you’re going to be, is how you handle your free time, the decision making you make, the discretion that you use, that right there is sort of like the core of the community policing, the rest you just have to put up with (BOS_09).

Additionally, one respondent discusses how technology (e.g., communication and CAD systems) gives supervisors a clearer picture of how their officers spend their time responding to calls for service. This information gives supervisors ammunition to help
their officers see that they have the time to partake in these community building activities (when not responding to the radio). Another respondent, however, describes the reality faced by officers who must respond to calls for service while also trying to work with the community:

You can only be so proactive. My district is a perfect example. We answered 77,000 radio calls last year, it’s the most in the city, so that’s the reactive. So, the majority of the work of the patrol officers in the cruiser is still somewhat reactive. We’re trying our best to shift that over, but it’s hard to do it when you have minimum staffing levels, and you have to answer X amount of calls, all day long, and tryin’ to get them on some of their free time, which there’s still free time available, but the way the free time is broken down, it’s not spread out all as much as we would like it to be. It would be great if we just had 4 hours of calls and four hours of free time. But you get forty minutes of good time, and then 15 to 20 minutes of down time, you continue that throughout the day, and that’s where you come up with your 40%. They don’t really have as much free time as you would think to really go out and target some of these things. So, we’re still kind of married to the radio response, and the other officers aren’t, so even though they’ll listen to the radio, and they will get calls from the dispatcher who knows they’re in a certain area, he’ll call them on certain things, and then another call may come in, they’ll jump on that call, because it’s in their area of concern (BOS_10).

The respondent acknowledges the common perception that patrol officers have a large percentage of “free time” and points out that how that free time is allocated (i.e., by dispatching officers to respond to calls for service) can determine the quality of the officer’s community building responses, regardless of how motivated an officer may be.

The demands placed on police time by calls to 9-1-1 rose steadily from 2004 to 2009. Figure 5.4 shows the overall increase in total calls from 2004 to 2009 and the decrease in calls between 2008 and 2009. Though the reason for the decline in calls for service warrants further investigation, it is possible that the BPD’s renewed reliance on community interactions (in the form of “walk and talks,” community meetings, RAP,
Constituent Response Teams and the other programs mentioned) proactively absorb some of these issues that would have otherwise been handled by the BPD’s patrol officers reactively responding to calls for service.

![Figure 5.4 BPD Total Calls for Service by Year, 2004-2009](image)

Constituent Response Teams (CRT), created by Mayor Menino in 2009, are collaborations between the BPD and other city agencies aimed at analyzing data on problems of disorder and quality of life to proactively and comprehensively respond to these problems. The SST and SOT, already discussed, represent units whose main responsibility is to proactively interact with citizens to prevent (and respond to) problems. These units have the authority, resources and time to receive and manage the demand that arises for their service in their (geographic and content) areas. BOS_12 explains,
The guys in the blue and whites, the uniform guys, they do it [make referrals to other agencies] to a limited degree, just because they’re busy on certain radio calls. They’re not really given the same kind of leeway we have in Safe Street Teams. The Safe Street Teams are basically on the bikes, they don’t get a lot of radio calls, they aren’t being pulled all over the place where the uniforms, got cars, and the service calls are wrapping you up in the one man cars. So, you’ve got walkin’ beat guys, they’re comparable to the Safe Street Teams.

The respondent notes the benefit of having officers assigned to the SST and to walking beats, where they are freed from responding to many calls for service. BOS_01 adds,

Now we have 13 teams of six officers and a supervisor walking in the hot spot areas, all driven by our crime data, and that’s it, that’s their job. We don’t take them and put them in the wagon, we don’t take them and put them to watch prisoners one night if we’re short. Every night, it’s those officers. Now if they’re on vacation we don’t replace them, but those guys, “You own it. You own this geographical area, you deal with everything in there. Speeding cars, drug dealing, homicides, you own it all.”

Technology and meaningfully organized data on crime and disorder hot spots served as the initial reason for allocating these resources to those specific parts of the city. A captain explains how direct input from the community and mapping technologies guide the BPD’s ongoing allocation of resources:

I think we’ve gotten more into lookin’ to proactive type policing where we’re targeting hot spots in response to hot spots based on crime mapping, and input from other sources, the community, community meetings and complaints from the various constituents, we tend to target things in response to that (BOS_10).

In addition to units that have the leeway to get involved with the community, the BPD encourages all of its patrol officers to proactively work with citizens. These interactions inevitably place a demand on the officer’s time—whether by stopping an individual for a low level offense in a high crime area or conversing with a local business owner about problems affecting his patrons. The Reporting Area Project and Code 19’s
(“walk and talks”) encourage all officers to take the time to get involved with the community. BOS_05 notes the difficulty in getting the personnel to understand the need to balance the radio and community responsibilities:

We’re trying to make them do their Code 19’s, get out, talk to people in the community, go to community meetings. It’s always a fine balance between answering their radio calls and dealing with issues. But making sure they stay within their sector in dealing with their problem areas, that’s what we’re trying to instill now, dealing with issues and the really hot spot areas of the city at every district.

This section has shown how the BPD, famously driven by their community policing philosophy, manages citizens demands for police response to calls for service while also allotting the resources for their patrol officers to proactively respond to citizens concerns. The Reporting Area Project, Code 19’s, Safe Street Teams, Street Outreach Teams and Constituent Response Teams assist the BPD in getting their personnel to spend more time interacting with citizens. These interactions exemplify and assist with broken windows policing by giving patrol officers the time to respond to lower level offenses and to define neighborhood specific problems. The final section in the BPD case study explores the organizational structure and administrative processes that may or may not contribute to the BPD’s efforts at broken windows policing in the CPS era.

Organizational structure and administrative processes. Applying a community policing philosophy that relies on interactions and collaborations with citizens and other agencies should coincide with changes in the structure and administrative processes of a police department. This section explores the role of BPD’s Boston Regional Intelligence
Center (BRIC) and the CompStat process in increasing information sharing between detectives and patrol officers and in pushing accountability down to the district level.

*That’s yours; you’re responsible for it; you’re accountable for it; fix it.* The SST are a prime example of patrol officers being made accountable for the problems in their limited geographic area. Individuals in the SST maintain responsibility over their given areas and have the supervisory support to spend their time proactively working within those areas to solve problems. Though captains and commanders familiar with the SST initially mentioned issues surrounding the supervision of the SST (i.e., the ability of commanders to select certain individuals for the specific job) and a disconnect between the captains’ and commissioner’s understandings of the SST mission, the teams essentially follow a decentralized model. Similarly, district detectives investigate most crimes within their districts, but seem to have a hybrid supervisory and accountability structure whereby detectives are housed in the districts, report to the Bureau of Investigative Services and “respect what we call the detail to our district” (BOS_10).

Respondents discuss the information sharing capabilities of detectives and patrol officers and recognize that both groups have unique skills and abilities to access and use valuable information about criminals and crime and disorder problems. BOS_01 discusses the traditionally lack of information sharing between the two groups and then offers a recent example of how a patrol officer on the SST received information from a citizen and then gave that information to the district drug detective supervisor. He reports,

The challenge there is territorial and a lot of the things [that] can be successful to arrest, or in prosecutions that can help get some people off the street that are interfering with the quality of life is good information, so people tend to hoard information. Patrol force would keep it to themselves because they want to make
the arrest, detectives would keep it to themselves because they want to make the arrest. I think we’ve worked hard to try and say, “Look, why don’t we all make the arrest so whatever you have for information investigatively, whatever we have information from the person walking down the street, let’s work together to get it done.” Do we have instances where that’s not happening? Sure. But I think we have a ton of instances where it is happening, where the goal is to get the problem out of the area, and there’s sense of ownership for both the detectives and a sense of ownership for the officers.

He concludes his example with a prescription also mentioned by other respondents--to reward the patrol officer by involving him in the ongoing investigation (for example, holding an observation post since the area is, after all, one in which the officer already frequents). Another respondent discusses how he will use overtime (when available) to reward patrol officers for sharing information and to give the officers the time to continue working on the case. This develops information sharing between the two groups. Respondents also mention other means of encouraging information sharing between and among patrol officers and detectives that include, meetings with detectives and detective supervisors from gang and drug units and representatives from homicide and district investigations, informal conversations that occur after detectives attend roll calls with patrol officers, information shared by the BRIC and discussions at CompStat.

BOS_10 explains how the realtime reports offered by the BRIC assists his personnel in getting information from the detectives to patrol officers on a frequent basis:

The BRIC, the supervisors all read it. We have the detective supervisors, and basically their responsibility is when a flyer comes out that we’re lookin’ for a certain guy that pertains to our district or even remotely, they’ll make up several copies, and they’ll mention it at roll call. We don’t so much hand it our individual, but we’ll put a stack of them on the desk and they’ll grab them. Watch out for this guy, watch out for that guy. It happens on robberies, happens on car breaks, or things like that. We get the information to the BRIC; they get back to us a nice flyer, with nice pictures. They’ll take the crime mapping portion of it, and put that
on the one piece document. We’ll have a description of the problem, a little map of where it’s happening, if we have any type of indication of time of day. That gets handed out and the guys, they’ll take that, and it’s very helpful. That’s what I mentioned earlier, where it took weeks before, we could get that in hours now. In most cases, the very next day we’ll get somethin’ back from the BRIC. The detectives are responsible for getting that out, and they’ve done a great job.

When needed, the BRIC can get information to all relevant personnel about a specific problem place or problem person. Then, the avenues of communication discussed earlier help to enrich each other’s understanding of a problem. Finally, CompStat helps personnel to “coordinate on trends and patterns of investigations” and to “paint the big picture, the broad picture of what is going on” by bringing together representatives from drug and gang units, district detectives, specialized units and the uniformed branch (BOS_11).

In addition to CompStat’s role in facilitating information sharing, respondents also view it as a setting for holding commanders accountable. BOS_11 describes CompStat as fulfilling the role of an “accountability process at the district level” and as an Open problem process, not a punitive process, but the expectations are clear on whether it’s lookin’ to reduce crime by 10% or looking to how we deal with the issue of gangs, how we work with schools, whatever the priority might be for that particular district, there are discussions about what the best way to go about that is, and then make a clear message that once the meeting’s over, that you’ve got to deal with that issue.

BOS_02 discusses both the accountability and information sharing function of the CompStat process: “I see it as accountability, but it’s also good to share information with folks across the board of what’s working and what’s not working.” All of these factors contribute to the BPD’s move toward getting officers to take ownership of specific areas
and indicate the BPD’s focus on high risk people and places. As BOS_01 explains, officers feel

“This is my sector, it’s like my home. You can’t do robberies in my home because it...” it affects you personally. And we’re starting to see officers who have that personal attachment to that geographical area cause we’ve told them, “That’s yours, your responsible for it, you’re accountable for it. We’ll give you the resources to fix it, fix it.” And when they feel like they got support and do they own it, then they take pride in it. We used to do a good job of putting a ton of resources in the areas, and we put out the fire. Whenever the next fire came, we would take those resources and put them someplace else. So, hey, all I’m doing is putting out fires, that’s all I’m supposed to do. Now we’ve told officers, “No, put out the fire here, and you make sure it doesn’t go on fire again.”

The respondent reflects on the feeling of ownership that officers can feel when they take seriously their areas of responsibility and captures the BPD’s view of a problem-solving function (as opposed to simply responding to calls).

This section has shown how, conducive to implementing broken windows policing, the BPD’s organizational structure and administrative processes give personnel the resources, authority and accountability to maintain responsibility in geographic areas. Furthermore, the BPD recognizes the value of increasing consistent information sharing practices between detectives and patrol officers. Personnel explore different ways that the BPD can encourage these working relationships. These include the bi-weekly CompStat meetings and the data analysis and preparation capabilities of the BRIC. The final chapter of this research discusses implications of these case studies for the individual police departments and gives suggestions on how this research adds to the body of knowledge concerning broken windows policing in the CPS era.
Chapter 6: Analysis

This chapter first describes the process by which the magnitude of change in the police departments was analyzed and then presents the analysis of each department’s shift toward the CPS organizational strategy, breaking each down into the various elements of organizational strategy.

Magnitude of Organizational Change

As explained in Chapter 2, this section borrows from Moore et al. (1999) and Eck and Stern (1992) to discuss Newark, Boston and Milwaukee’s manifestations of the CPS strategy (in which broken windows policing is a tactic) by positing the extent to which this research reveals definite changes in the elements of organizational strategy as discussed in Chapter 1 (i.e., legitimacy, function, organizational structure, administrative processes, external relationships, demand entrance, demand management, tactics, technologies, and outcomes). Each department reflects varying degrees of the magnitude of implementation of the CPS strategy, as evidenced by changes in the specific elements of organizational strategy. Though Chapter 1 discusses the many dimensions of each element, this research focused on only the most salient dimensions that arose in the various data sources. This study’s assessment of the police departments’ magnitude of change, must be interpreted in relation to the dimensions of those elements that came out in this study.

The magnitude of change regarding the police departments’ organizational strategies is assessed based on the discussion of each of the elements in Chapter 1. Previous research has posited the various characteristics of a police department’s
organizational strategy, generally, and has specifically explicated various aspects of police organizations following a CPS strategy. Table 6.1, then, places the elements of the police departments’ organizational strategies in one of five categories: Low, Low-Medium, Medium, Medium-High, or High, based on the degree to which this research uncovers the police department’s manner of change and the degree of perceived institutionalization of change (overall and specifically, with each element). For example, an assessment of a Low magnitude of change in the external relationships element of a police department’s organizational strategy means that this study uncovered few robust data on the police department’s moves towards social, political and economic conditions that would indicate a move toward CPS in that element of their organizational strategy. This mode of assessment allows the reader to understand the most salient experiences of each police department alone and (when understood in the context of the research findings in Chapters 3, 4, and 5) to make comparisons between departments as they relate to the specific elements of organizational strategy.

Then, after each discussion of the department’s magnitude of organizational change, Table 6.2, Table 6.3, and Table 6.4 show the individual police departments’ key shifts relating to the elements of organizational strategy (as specifically regards the tactic of broken windows policing in the CPS strategy). Again, these tables reflect only the most salient factors that arose in this study’s exploration of the department’s change in the elements of their organizational strategies and are simplifications of general trends in the police departments’ organizational strategies (from where they were coming and to where they show signs of heading). The tables show that none of the police departments
in this study had the exact experiences or views of how best to police their communities. However, a display of the actual changes in each department that led to this study’s findings of the magnitude of change regarding their organizational strategy gives practitioners a base from which to formulate innovations in their own departments and offers researchers particular shifts in police departments that may warrant further analysis when exploring their own areas of inquiry.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 Magnitude of Organizational Change</th>
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<td>Boston</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
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<td>Administrative Processes</td>
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<td>External Relationships</td>
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<td>Demand Entrance</td>
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<td>Demand Management</td>
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<td>Tactics</td>
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<td>Technology</td>
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<td>Measurements</td>
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<td>OVERALL</td>
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Newark Police Department. The undulations of Newark’s policing experiences in the CPS era are well documented and include, at different times, implementations of certain elements of the CPS organizational strategy (e.g., foot patrol tactics, decentralized
decision making administrative processes, and team policing) (Kelling, 1981; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Liebman, 2007). This study reveals important steps in the beginning stages of institutionalizing the CPS strategy and in using broken windows policing tactics.

The previous chapter discussed the illegitimating effects of NPD’s relationship to politicians and citizens. It also explained the NPD’s most recent attempts at regaining legitimacy with the community and reported on a community survey that suggested the NPD was making strides in this area. To that end, technology is used to organize relevant data regarding community problems, to allocate police resources, and to communicate this information to citizens. This serves as an objective justification for why police act in certain locations and is important in Newark where they use aggressive order maintenance policing (i.e., blue summonses) to interact with citizens to prevent more serious crimes. Additionally, the NPD is maintaining and improving working relationships with a number of community groups and law enforcement agencies. Though the NPD’s magnitude of change regarding its relationship to the community is associated with a medium degree of organizational change, the NPD still has a low-medium magnitude of change in its legitimacy.

Though NPD’s interview and survey respondents mention fostering respect with the community and enhancing the quality of life in Newark, violent crime is indeed the NPD’s top priority. The NPD emphasizes quality of life enforcement as a road to preventing violent crime. When performed correctly (i.e., professionally and courteously) and effectively (that is, resulting in a crime decline or enhanced quality of life), these
interactions can positively influence citizen perceptions of the NPD. Interviews with command staff, survey data from line personnel, and observations of CompStat meetings reveal the NPD’s championing of quality of life enforcement as a means of interacting with citizens in high crime areas. This suggests a high degree of organizational change regarding broken windows policing tactics. However, interviews with NPD personnel (as discussed in Chapter 3) reveal that the NPD must include ways (e.g., training and supervision) to get their personnel to see the precise purpose of these interactions (i.e., to send a message about neighborhood control and to gain information about criminals and problems in specific areas). Using citizen interactions and formal meetings with the community to define neighborhood specific problems of crime and disorder will further embed high functional and tactical aspects of the CPS strategy. Until then, the NPD reflects a medium magnitude of organizational change regarding their function and tactics.

Additionally, while the NPD’s use of mapping, data analysis, online social networking, computerized records management systems, the community survey and a considerable reliance on measuring quality of life offenses mark a move toward the CPS strategy, they have room to explore more definitive ties to technologies and measurements that more closely relate to the relationship building and quality of life-enhancing ideals of the CPS strategy (for example, a systematic assessment [e.g., survey] of citizens’ perceptions of their police department and of neighborhood levels of crime and disorder, or using technologies to organize citizen groups and to inform those groups of neighborhood problems). Until then, the NPD receives a low-medium degree of
organizational change related to their community how and what they measure and a medium magnitude of change relating to their use of technology.

This study examines the NPD’s administrative processes and organizational structure, focusing on the relationship between the patrol and investigative divisions, personnel hiring and promotional considerations, changes in bureaus and task forces and the ability of the NPD to pushdown authority to the lower levels of the organization. The NPD approach to responding to their drug and gang problem through the Narcotics Enforcement Teams and Conditions Units at the neighborhood level and the Centralized Narcotics Division signify a recognition of the need to respond to problems at the neighborhood level by organizing efforts and combatting the upper-levels of drug distribution rings and gangs. Additionally, the NPD gave precinct detectives the authority to handle all crimes (except for the shooting incidents), and through the “CompStat philosophy” pushed authority down to the district captains, encouraging them to implement more area-specific responses in their districts. Similarly, the use of blue summonses to cite citizens for lower-level offenses encourages patrol officers to interact with citizens for such offenses, giving them more discretionary patrol time. Until future examinations bear out the institutionalization of these changes (and even though the NPD has taken specific steps toward the CPS strategy), the administrative processes and organizational structure of the NPD’s organizational strategy is associated with a Low-Medium magnitude of change.

Lastly, there is a definitive move in the NPD away from relying on the Communications Division in placing demands on police time, and toward using data on
crime and disorder problems to allocate police resources. This move is used by the NPD to give precinct commanders information that assists them in making tactical decisions and in allocating resources, and shows that the NPD is undoubtedly on the appropriate path to implementing a CPS strategy. Nonetheless, until the NPD finds ways to organize the other elements of their CPS organizational strategy (i.e., external relationships, measurements) in support of their demand processes, the NPD in this study is associated with a low-medium magnitude of change with regard to their demand entrance and a medium magnitude of change regarding their demand management.

To conclude, the NPD represents an organization that, despite encountering obstacles, is working diligently to bring about a solid implementation of the CPS strategy. The NPD’s politically-motivated and violence-driven history sets it behind the other two police departments (in this study) in moving toward that strategy, and demonstrates immediate changes that can take hold in an organization during the early stages of implementing a CPS organizational strategy. Table 6.2 displays specific moves in the elements of the NPD’s organizational strategy. After positing the magnitude of organizational change in the MPD and the BPD, this chapter turns to a more substantive discussion of the facilitators and inhibitors to change in the police departments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Element (From-To)</th>
<th>Table 6.2 NPD’s Changes in Organizational Strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Perceptions of corrupting relationships between the NPD and local politicians</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A community survey, crime reductions and a belief that politics is being taken out of policing help to legitimize the NPD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Fighting crime; building community relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting crime; responding to an array of problems; improving community relations; enhancing the quality of life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Police Director and Police Chief; no NET or Conditions Unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abolished the office of Police Chief; organized criminal investigations based on the geographic reach of the crime (i.e., Centralized Narcotics, NET and the Conditions Unit);</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Processes</td>
<td>A punitive CompStat process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A problem-solving CompStat process that moves accountability to captains; weekly intelligence meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Relationships</td>
<td>Established community outreach programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Task forces with other LE agencies; increase community outreach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Reliance on calls for service to 9-1-1; queue goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Differential response rating for calls to service; moving focus from Communications Division; no attention to queue goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Zero-tolerance policing; car patrols; arrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on interacting with citizens; blue summonses; FIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>No computerized records management system; no MDTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime mapping and analysis; computerized RMS; MDTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes and measurements</td>
<td>Crime reduction; arrests and citations; queue goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime reduction; a community survey; quality of life citations; FIO reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Milwaukee Police Department.** The MPD’s most recent enterprise in implementing a CPS organizational strategy stems from the efforts of an outsider chief and follows a brief period of tumult that weakened relations between the MPD and the community. This provided an opportunity (and an expectation) for change. As Chapter 4 displayed, Chief Flynn capitalized on this chance to implement historic change in the MPD.

In his swearing in speech, Chief Flynn made no secret of his desire to bring change to the MPD. The citizens of Milwaukee, as evidenced by the *Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel’s* Violent Crime roundtable, were ready for change, and the MPD recommitted itself to building working partnerships with the community. To assist in these efforts, the MPD relied on increasing their attention to lower level offenses, working with the community to problem-solve, and using technology to provide meaningful data to guide and focus their efforts. The data reveal a decisive understanding of the CPS focus of the MPD (and, therefore, a medium-high magnitude of change in the MPD function). Shifts in their tactical efforts support this.

Using data to drive tactical decisions (with an emphasis on stopping citizens for lower level offenses), the technologies used in the CompStat process, daily crime briefings, and the Neighborhood Task Force clearly represent a police department that implements broken windows policing in the CPS strategy. These meetings, department archives, uses of technology, and observations show that the upper levels of the MPD understand the purpose of these moves. The exploratory survey data suggest a similar understanding at the lower levels of the MPD of the value of these technologies, sector
integrity, and formal meetings with the community. Data sources also show an evolving understanding of the nature of discretion in the daily activities of police work, which is vital to properly implementing broken windows policing. Evidence is lacking, however, of the appropriate measurement mechanisms for gauging the MPD’s success in fostering these relationships and enhancing the quality of life for Milwaukeeans, as is implied by the CPS strategy. In toto, though, these reveal a strong adherence to CPS principles that will continue to move the MPD toward an even greater implementation of this strategy.

These tactics and technologies, along with a more transparent disciplinary process, lower crime numbers, and an amicable political environment also work to instill legitimate relationships with the community, indicating an organizational adoption of CPS. These tactics, executed with the community’s well-being at the forefront, increase citizens views of the MPD by demonstrating the MPD’s success and focusing efforts on the specific problems (i.e., locations, people) that the community believes warrant police attention. The “gardener’s” approach to policing, then, fits with the MPD’s intention to implement broken windows policing within the current strategy. For these reasons, the MPD is associated with a medium-high magnitude of change regarding their external relationships, tactics and technologies, and a low-medium magnitude of change in their outcome measurements.

The changes discussed thus far require (or at least are assisted by) consequent structural and administrative procedural changes. Specifically, the creation of the NTF, the new CompStat process, the Intelligence Fusion Center, the Differential Police Response unit, redistricting, the CIB reorganization, decentralizing certain investigative
units, and daily crime meetings create the structure and environment for the MPD’s CPS strategy. These changes free up police time, encourage a cleaner intelligence sharing process, increase interactions between the MPD and the community, move accountability to the district level and focus efforts at the neighborhood level, and represent the MPD’s high degree of structural change and medium-high magnitude of changes regarding their administrative processes.

Finally, the shifts in the MPD’s other CPS elements suggest a natural shift in the manner in which demand enters the organization. The MPD’s proposition to move toward a community-based, data-driven, neighborhood-level, problem-solving and the organizational changes discussed reflect a move toward freeing up patrol officer time from responding to calls for service and increasing the amount of positive interactions the MPD has with its citizens. Demand, then, has a greater chance to enter the organization through these informal and formal community contacts, instead of calls for service to the MPD. Furthermore, new technologies throughout the MPD and in patrol cars place data-driven demand on the MPD as their discretion and analysis sees fit. Demand entrance, then, is associated with a medium magnitude of change, while the ways the MPD manages demand demonstrate a medium-high magnitude of change.

The MPD’s history reflects a gradual move toward the CPS strategy and varying levels of broken windows policing over time. This previous experience readied the MPD and the community for more productive working relationships with each other. This study shows, then, the MPD’s ability to institute rapid and substantial change toward a CPS organizational strategy. Table 5.3 shows some of those specific shifts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Element (From-To)</th>
<th>Table 6.3 MPD’s Changes in Organizational Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>A series of cases in which police officers misused their power; the MPD had gotten away from positively interacting with citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood Policing Plans, community outreach and favorable political conditions lend legitimacy to the MPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function</strong></td>
<td>Emphasizing community relations; reducing violent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A data-driven approach to CPS to reduce levels of crime and fear and to enhance the quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Structure</strong></td>
<td>Centralized detectives; no Intelligence Fusion Center or Differential Police Response unit; beefed up specialized units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Move toward decentralizing detectives; created the IFC and DPR; took personnel from specialized units to create the Neighborhood Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative Processes</strong></td>
<td>No CompStat process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem-solving at weekly CompStat; daily crime briefings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External Relationships</strong></td>
<td>Lack of community outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Social] media campaigns; implementing the NPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand</strong></td>
<td>Reliance on calls for service to 9-1-1; No structured DPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPR; data drives decisions on deployment and resource allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactics</strong></td>
<td>Zero-tolerance policing; arrests and citations; investigate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uses realtime data to inform decisions to stop citizens for low-level offenses; emphasize discretion and adherence to values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td>No coordination of data or geographic mapping technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IFC; SmartBoards; daily and weekly crime mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes and measurements</strong></td>
<td>Crime reduction; enhanced quality of life; arrests and citations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime reduction; a citizen satisfaction survey; solving and preventing problems</td>
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</table>
Boston Police Department. Commissioner Ed Davis was brought into the BPD over two insiders (the heads of the investigative and patrol units) to control Boston’s crime rate and to restore the BPD’s working relationships with the community. Coming off his experience as Superintendent in Lowell, Massachusetts, Commissioner Davis vowed to return the BPD to a neighborhood-level function, indicative of a CPS organization. This section shows how the BPD used newly created units, cutting-edge intelligence analysis systems, and a reemphasis on positive community interactions to reestablish their relationships with the community in fighting crime and disorder in Boston.

Commissioner Davis affirmed his commitment to having the “community policing philosophy” inform all the actions and decisions of the BPD. The data show that the BPD does in fact work with the community to define a wide range of problems and to respond with a variety of solutions. Though the BPD functions to reduce crime, it also works to lower the fear of crime and enhance citizens’ quality of life. For this study, the BPD’s function reflects a medium-high degree of change. The following sections show support for the BPD’s crime fighting, community building function.

Proactively increasing contacts with citizens forms the basis of many of the BPD’s tactics. The Safe Street Teams, the Street Outreach Team and beat integrity exemplify ways that the BPD proactively and sustainedly interacts with citizens. Bicycle and foot patrols and mandated “walk and talks” enhance these operations. The state-of-

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1 It is worth noting that prior to the appointment of the new commissioner, these two leaders were seen as having professional differences in carrying out the BPD’s function, which possibly contributed to the Mayor’s decision.
the-art Boston Regional Intelligence Center, the Real Time Crime Center and mobile data terminals maximize the payoff from these tactics by organizing data and disseminating large amounts of useful and timely information. These data are used to assist in deployment decisions and to hold police personnel accountable. This research finds that along with index crimes, city ordinance violations and a bi-annual public safety survey, the BPD is looking for ways to measure and acknowledge the community-building efforts of its personnel. The BPD’s tactics and measurements, as evidenced in this study, are associated with a medium-high magnitude of change, while their use of technologies reflects a high magnitude of change. The BPD’s community relationships are discussed next.

Additional ways in which the BPD works to build problem-solving relationships with law enforcement and community groups include, Constituent Response Teams, Neighborhood Advisory Councils, Operation CeaseFire, and district based violence prevention meetings. Maintaining beat integrity (through their Reporting Area Project) and making officers responsible for interacting with citizens in crime and disorder hot spots (e.g., “walk and talks” or, Code 19s) instills this relationship-building function in police officers and, when done appropriately, lends legitimacy to the BPD in the community. The community ombudsman’s oversight of the BPD’s external complaint process gives further authenticity to the BPD’s efforts to build community relationships and legitimacy. For these reasons, this study finds the BPD’s legitimacy reflects a medium degree of organizational change, while its external relationships evidence a medium-high degree of change.
Increasing the interactions police personnel have with citizens necessarily leads one to inquire how demand will enter and be managed by the organization. Once personnel receive information via the various above-mentioned collaborations, what avenues do they have for managing and acting on that demand for their service? Using communication and CAD technologies to better grasp how patrol officers spend their time gives the BPD and their personnel the ability to see exactly how much time an officer has to get involved in community building activities. The Code 19s (“walk and talks”) deepen the BPD’s commitment to freeing officers from responding to calls for service to encourage them to positively interact with the community. Furthermore, the SST, SOT, and RAP are ways of getting police officers to proactively respond to individual areas’ concerns, allowing them to work within those communities’ already established avenues for responding to local problems. The use of technology to organize and interpret large amounts of data further manages the officers’ time by offering information on which to act and accountability to solving problems. Together, these efforts allow the BPD to manage emergency calls for their service as well as the on-going neighborhood specific problems affecting their citizens, and evidence a police department whose organization is implementing a medium-high magnitude of change regarding the demand entrance and demand management elements of the CPS strategy.

Finally, a discussion of the BPD’s structure and processes reveals how the BPD’s BRIC and CompStat process increase information sharing processes within the organization and push accountability and authority down to the lower level of the police
Respondents describe the CompStat process as helping personnel to see similar trends across districts and as holding district captains accountable for crime in their area. These indicate a problem-solving element at the higher levels of the BPD. At the lower levels of the organization, mostly informal interactions and the use of daily information from the BRIC encourage both the patrol and investigative units to work together in maintaining responsibility for their geographic areas. Also, the establishment of separate units whose sole responsibility is to community problem-solve illuminates the BPD’s buy-in to such a strategy. This research finds that these and the other elements of organizational strategy assist in getting personnel to take ownership of their areas, thereby positively contributing to a police department’s adaptation of the CPS strategy and demonstrating a medium-high magnitude of change in its organizational structure and a medium degree of change in its administrative processes.

The BPD’s popularly successful past with community policing set the foundation for this study’s exploration of the BPD’s current attempt to rebuild these CPS relationships. As summarized in Table 6.4, new technologies, external oversight, significant units dedicated to CPS and more favorable attitudes toward intra-organizational and community collaborations strengthen the necessary elements for the BPD’s shift toward CPS.

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2 As personnel note, accountability without authority can be counterproductive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Element (From-To)</th>
<th>Table 6.4 BPD’s Changes in Organizational Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>The community losing faith in the BPD as a result of scandals and rising violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regaining citizens trust by re-instituting effective community collaborations; external oversight of the BPD’s complaint process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Emphasizes violent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A renewed focus on building CPS relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
<td>No patrol officers or sergeants assigned specifically to CPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approximately 13 Safe Street Teams doing CPS in crime and disorder hot spots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Processes</td>
<td>A distinct Intelligence Unit and Office of Research and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formed the Boston Regional Intelligence Center and Real Time Crime Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Relationships</td>
<td>The unraveling of collaborations with other criminal justice agencies and community groups, which defined the “Boston Miracle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revived those collaborations (e.g., CeaseFire, Impact, SST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Reliance on calls for service to 9-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing proactive avenues by which demand enters and is managed by the organization (e.g., SST, Street Outreach Team, Citizen Response Team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Lack of formal time for officers to solve problems with citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandatory “walk and talks” and the SST and SOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>A need to organize the varied sources of intelligence and data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The BRIC and RTCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes and measurements</td>
<td>Crime reduction; citizen surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime reduction; citizen surveys; increasing efforts to recognize officers’ efforts at working with the community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While discussing the nature and magnitude of specific shifts in each of the police departments and offering specific manifestations of those changes in each department, this and previous sections also suggest particular inhibitors and facilitators to doing broken windows policing in the CPS strategy. The final chapter discusses the insight that these departments offer regarding such factors, continues with an explanation of the facilitators of and inhibitors to change within the police departments, provides information for police departments moving in similar directions, and concludes with suggestions for future research.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The research findings in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 use interviews with (and surveys of) police personnel, observations of police activities, internal and external archival data sources (organized within the framework of the elements of organizational strategy) to describe the police departments’ experiences with CPS and broken windows policing. They offer insight into different ways of interpreting and implementing the most recent police organizational strategy and suggest specific ways of adapting to these general changes. This chapter illuminates the facilitators of and inhibitors to change within the police departments as discussed in the building of each case in prior chapters, discusses the implications of the current research on police departments, and concludes with suggestions for future research. In the end, this chapter demonstrates how the current research adds to the knowledge base of policing organizational strategies, moving beyond previous studies of police organizational change and enhancing understandings of the role of police executive leadership in implementing broken windows policing in the CPS era.

Inhibitors and Facilitators to Broken Windows Policing within the CPS Strategy

Chapter 1 discusses previous research into inhibitors and facilitators to change in organizations, and then specifically focuses on police organizations as they adopt community-oriented strategies. This section explains these facilitators and inhibitors in light of this study’s police departments’ experiences. While lending support for previous research, the current findings offer new insight into police personnel’s views and the police organizations’ adaptations of broken windows policing in the CPS strategy. Themes of police leadership, organizational restructuring, police-citizen interactions,
problem-solving and crime and disorder hot spots policing are discussed.

Leadership in police organizations.

The experiences of the police departments in this study, as relayed by many of the interview respondents, are located within the context of their executive police leaders. When giving a brief history of their police department, respondents delineate their organization’s focus in terms of the executive police leader in charge at the time. For example, in giving a brief history of his time at the NPD, EWR_05 says, “I came on [the force] under former Director Sylester....By 1995, the department was (disciplinary wise) somewhat out of control, so we brought in Director Santiago....As time goes on, there’s a change in political leadership, there’s a change in police leadership.” The findings on the various elements of the police departments’ organizational strategies also suggest the influence of police leaders in changing the various aspects of their police organization.

Bayley and Skolnick (1986) implicate multiple aspects of police executive leadership in successful police innovations. The current research supports their findings and adds to them by demonstrating the utility of bringing in reform police chiefs from the outside, as did all the police departments in this study. Domanick (2010) refers to each of these leaders in their current capacities as “entrepreneurial police leaders.” Upon further examination of his list, one notes that nine of the ten chiefs on his list were brought in from outside of the organization. Bringing in proven entrepreneurial outside police leaders gave them credibility with their personnel, created an anticipatory environment of change (in which police personnel and the community knew change was coming and were at once apprehensive and excited for what that change could mean for them), and
gave these new members of the department the ability to enlist the police departments’ already established and respected leaders (some of whom had also been in the running for the police leaders’ positions). For these police departments, which were also coming off of various departmental and community crises, these outside entrepreneurial leaders acted as a reset button. Furthermore, the rules and agreements governing retirement and personnel moves at the highest levels of the police departments obviated the concern that passed-over or obstinate police officials might obstruct innovation. These findings have both police contractual, union and political implications.

These entrepreneurial outside leaders also prove to be open to innovative ideas from within and outside their department. Internal self-surveys in the NPD and the MPD serve to gather information about the strengths and weaknesses of the organization, give personnel an avenue by which to have their voices heard and present police leaders with a sense of personnel’s ideas, views and values. Such surveys and the MPD’s Leadership in Police Organizations blog show rudimentary aspects of shared leadership and hint at an important avenue in implementing a CPS strategy. From the outside, it is clear that each of these leaders studies the policing research as it relates to their responsibilities and consults with leading police academics. The leaders’ and organizations’ commitment to

1 The reader will recall that in Newark, Director McCarthy (the civilian leader of the NPD) took steps with city leaders to abolish the chief of police position, strengthening his ability to lead. This move was within the confines of the authorities that municipalities have in New Jersey and was upheld by the courts.

2 The Leadership in Police Organizations offers training to interested MPD personnel and trains all personnel who go through the program to be leaders in each of their positions. This training is based on the principle that all personnel can be leaders in their organization and is another way of infusing the organization’s values to their personnel.

3 This study discusses some of the results of each police department’s and police executive leader’s professional relationships (i.e., consulting) with one of the author’s of the original broken windows thesis, George Kelling.
innovation (including new ways of solving problems) is also evidenced in the organizations’ changes in organizational structure.

**Organizational restructuring in police organizations.**

Research (Bayley & Skolnick, 1986; Moore *et al.*, 1999; Kim & Maugborne, 2003) examines the effects of police executives on other facilitators (and inhibitors) to implementing organizational strategies. This study shows how the police departments created new entities and processes within their organizations to facilitate change and to respond to what would have otherwise been inhibitors to CPS organizational change. Examples from each department include, the improved (and in the MPD’s case, new) CompStat process and internal department surveys in both the MPD and the NPD, the NPD’s High Risk for Violence list, Fugitive Apprehension Teams and Violent Enterprise Strategy Task Force, the MPD’s Neighborhood Task Force, Differential Police Response and Intelligence Fusion Center, and the BPD’s Boston Regional Intelligence Center, Real Time Crime Center, Safe Streets Teams, Street Outreach Team and Constituent Response Teams. A variety of these moves include support for police personnel doing broken windows policing (i.e., responding to quality of life offenses). These moves produce the physical and infrastructural changes that facilitate such policing.

For example, this research shows how the organizations’ leaders use CompStat to instill a problem-solving mentality at the higher levels of their police department, hold commanders accountable and transmit the values of the command staff to other police managers. Chief Flynn introduced CompStat to the MPD. Director McCarthy in Newark instituted marked differences in how CompStat proceeded under his direction. In addition
to only holding CompStat only as needed, interviews with personnel (and observations of CompStat meetings) describe the process under Director McCarthy as less confrontational, more about problem-solving and focusing on increased interactions with citizens for minor offenses. Within both police departments, the police executive leaders make efforts to reinforce their views on the trajectory of their police department (for instance, by continually reminding officers in attendance of the purpose of the CompStat exercise) and guide the CompStat meeting in the problem-solving process (that is, by asking pointed questions about and commenting on their commanders’ actions, responses to problems and reasoning).

The entrepreneurial leaders’ organizational change goals of the CompStat process are facilitated by changes in their organizations’ structure and the activities in which the organizations are involved. In this study, the organizations’ structure and activities evidence both a crime control and CPS focus, with increasing emphasis being placed on CPS as a saturating, organization-wide strategy (not simply a specialized unit as part of the organization). Though the NPD’s HRV, FAT and VEST emphasize their violent crime efforts, in conjunction with the Narcotics Enforcement Teams, Conditions Units and the decentralized investigations of some crimes, these systems further the CPS strategy of the NPD by recognizing the multiple levels of (and by targeting efforts at) the crime and disorder problems facing its citizens. Similarly, Boston’s SST and SOU and the MPD’s NTF and DPR represent structural changes that facilitate broken windows policing in a CPS strategy. The new data organization and dissemination technologies assist the departments in allocating resources and differentiating among responsibilities. These
shifts facilitate a move toward a CPS organizational strategy by assisting police departments in balancing the traditional demands on their time (to fight violent crime) with community building and proactive responses to disorder and low-level offending. Furthermore, personnel within these departments relayed how these types of moves offered both formal and informal settings in which to share information and build intradepartmental working relationships. These relationships reflect, and gain buy-in for, the CPS strategy⁴ and help to breakdown the often cited inhibition of the police subculture.

So far, this section has shown how entrepreneurial police executives and specific organizational restructuring facilitate police departments’ implementations of broken windows policing in the CPS strategy. A more distinct discussion of the nuances of broken windows policing follows, focusing on how the previously mentioned changes facilitate an evolving understanding of this policing tactic in the CPS era and offering personnel’s views on the inhibitors and facilitators of the two.

**Interacting with citizens.**

The November 2010 and February 2011 issues of *Criminology & Public Policy* provide commentaries and analyses of the efforts of local police departments in policing crime and disorder through hot spot and broken windows policing. Articles within these issues explore questions about how police allocate resources, how police carry out these tactics and how police affect levels of crime and disorder. The current research contributes to the understanding of the strengths, challenges and activities facing police

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⁴ In addition, of course, to the primary function of building community relationships, for which many of these shifts were intended.
today. Specifically, the following paragraphs illustrate issues in police discretion and accountability, the use of quality of life citations, ways of informally and formally training personnel and necessary measurements for police departments implementing broken windows policing. This discussion will enlighten readers to the realities of policing in the three departments and offer a more precise understanding of reasonable steps forward in responding to the recent concerns of scholars and practitioners about the policing profession.

Broken windows policing in the CPS era requires police organizations to recognize police officer discretion, train officers in the proper use of that discretion and hold police personnel accountable for their actions and for their results. Interviews with police personnel reveal the effects that broken windows policing can have on community relationships and crime levels, and suggest ways to most effectively implement broken windows policing as part of a CPS strategy. Though the police departments in this study continue to emphasize their role in arresting criminals and fighting crime, they explicitly discuss the need to maintain legitimate working relationships with citizens and the role that broken windows policing can play in fulfilling both of those functions. In moving from a traditionally held zero-tolerance approach to responding to lower-level offenses, the police departments illustrate a more thoughtful and informed approach to interacting with citizens who violate such offenses and cite other reasons for stopping a person for such an offense (reasons that move beyond simply citing or arresting an individual). These beliefs are reinforced by the police executives at daily and weekly meetings with commanders (e.g., daily crime briefings, CompStat). Possible beneficial outcomes of
professionally interacting with citizens on such grounds include improved community relationships, increased information gathering capabilities and reduced levels of crime.

The notion that stopping citizens for quality of life and low-level offenses can improve community relations assumes that officers are trained in the proper use of discretion, that the responding officers professionally interact with citizens, and that the police department transparently and thoroughly investigates citizen allegations of officer wrongdoing. Citizens’ perceptions of police department legitimacy are likely to increase when these interactions concur with overall crime declines. The traditional view of broken windows policing discusses the role of reducing disorder as a way of controlling potential criminal behavior. This research shows that police personnel view their departments’ response to lower level offenses as a means of increasing law abiding citizens’ views of their police departments and as an effective stepping stone in the fight against crime. Earning and maintaining legitimacy with the community is an essential part to a successful implementation of broken windows in the CPS era.

Though interviews with department personnel suggest a few ways their departments train their personnel to professionally interact with citizens, each department would benefit from including more in-depth trainings on the merit of professional citizen interactions, the role that quality of life offenses play in the community and as regards the police function, and ways to use those interactions to observe or gain information on

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5 Order, then, sometimes viewed as a socially constructed reality privy to only certain groups, is assumed as a desirable trait in all communities. That is, all citizens, when given the choice, would choose prostitution-, graffiti-, litter-, and intimidating panhandler- free neighborhoods over ones in which those elements are abundant.
potential involvement in other more serious crimes.\textsuperscript{6} Though this research reveals that CompStat and other administrative functions facilitate the upper-level command staffs’ grasp of these concepts, survey data reflect a less thorough understanding of these mechanisms at the lower-levels of the police organizations. Getting police officers to understand these points should move them away from viewing their response to such offenses as simply a numbers game, in which arrests and citations are the end. The key, as this research shows, is getting officers to see what is behind those numbers.

Interviews with command level personnel suggest ways to get all levels of the organization to buy into these ideas. Some suggest their department use CompStat to reach other levels of the organization, since they believe it successfully reaches the intended personnel. They offer having regular attendees bring a subordinate to a CompStat meeting and inviting line officers to CompStat to acknowledge them for their community building or information gathering endeavors as ways of reinforcing the organization’s views (Moore, 1992). Regarding the role of citizen interactions, supervisors must learn about the value of such stops and acknowledge what they indicate (and do not indicate) about the work their officers do.

In addition to formal training, new technologies assist department personnel in informally teaching others about this new role. Personnel within the departments show how data and communication technologies allow supervisors to explain the who, what, when, where, why and how of their actions. Doing this clarifies for those involved the

\textsuperscript{6} For instance, the NPD has no training for how their officers are to use the “blue summonses,” while the BPD includes problem-solving as part of their officers’ training and trains some officers in dealing with street populations.
reason and merit of the tactic and facilitates a shared understanding of their mission (and
how they will respond to it). It also serves as a response to officers and supervisors who
would argue that there is not enough time to be responding to such low level crimes and
disorder; access to data on how officers spend their time gives supervisors the
opportunity to discuss with their officers ways in which that time could be used in a way
that is more consistent with broken windows policing and CPS.

New technologies and greater access to data also give personnel better
information in deciding when and how to interact with a citizen (facilitating more finely
tuned tactical executions),\textsuperscript{7} and assist the department in holding its personnel
accountable. The tactic of interacting with citizens (on the basis of a low level offense) to
garner information of more serious wrong doing is grounded in the fact that individuals
involved in serious illegalities are often involved in other, less serious offending. The
challenge for police, then, is to focus on those people and places that account for the most
serious offending. Many of the items discussed in this chapter (i.e., building positive
community relationships, technologies, and crime and disorder reductions) assist police
in their desire to not be viewed as harassing entire communities or neighborhoods. Then,
upon deciding to engage a citizen, the officer’s proper use of discretion is paramount.

Police departments must find the balance between supporting officer discretion
and maintaining strict accountability. Commanders should be given the ability to apply
innovative strategies, while being held accountable for failing to adequately explain their

\textsuperscript{7} That is, where, when, how and with whom should such tactics should be used.
Likewise, patrol officers should be encouraged to use their discretion in carrying out the various tactics, and should expect to be held accountable for the improper use of that discretion and (ideally) for a small geographic area of responsibility. As the experience of the MPD shows, the process of encouraging police officer discretion and using multiple data sources to inform their decision-making guides officers in the proper use of their discretion and offers impersonal, standard ways of correcting officers who improperly use their discretion. Just as citizens expect investigations of their complaints of officer wrongdoing to be fair and thorough, this study shows that police personnel need to perceive the same. Thorough investigations and reasonable repercussions show police officers that their department backs them when needed, coaches them when necessary and will punish them when warranted, thereby encouraging officers to use their discretion (DiFonzo & Bordia, 1998; Appelbaum et al., 1999; Adams et al., 2002).

This view of broken windows policing within the CPS strategy demonstrates a move toward instilling the problem-solving focus at all levels of the police department. All three of the police departments in this study evidence signs of problem-solving at the upper-levels (e.g., through CompStat and crime meetings) and all have varying degrees of specialized units and teams whose main focus is CPS (a part of which entails broken windows policing), but the current challenge facing the police profession is getting all police personnel to understand their role in the CPS strategy (or as one respondent says,

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8 Respondents also note the importance of having the authority and resources granted to the personnel who are to be held accountable for others’ performance. As one respondent notes, “Accountability without authority is torture!”
“The challenge for us is just to...empower the officers at the front lines to be problem solvers within the community” [BOS_11]).

One prominent aspect of organization-wide problem-solving in this research is the working relationships between detectives and patrol officers. A number of idioms come to mind when assessing the traditional information-sharing relationships (or lack thereof) between these two groups (for example, “Robbing Peter to pay Paul,” “The left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing”) (Haggerty & Diedrich, 2008). However, all three police departments in this study have made moves to counter these common issues, suggesting a reliance on getting these two groups to work together on an ongoing basis. Chapter 4 discusses the MPD’s recent move to decentralize investigations and to reallocate some responsibilities of the patrol and detective bureaus. The move was intended to make better investigators of all police personnel and to facilitate information sharing between the two groups. This research has shown the organizational changes and the informal (and formal) training sessions that facilitate an institutionalization of these behaviors (i.e., housing detectives in precincts, weekly meetings, joint roll calls and rewarding patrol officers by involving them in investigations in which they offered valuable intelligence).

Finally, the three police departments recognize new measurements and outcomes that are in line with (and facilitate) an implementation of broken windows policing in the CPS strategy. Previously mentioned issues involving supervision of police and holding them accountable speak to the ways a police department measures their personnel’s efforts and outcomes. As respondents note, “If it doesn’t get written down on paper, it
never happened” (MKE_15), and, “You have to be able to tell [officers] how that [change] affects their experience, how that affects their job performance, how they’re going to be judged on it with meaningful metrics” (BOS_07). People work based on what gets counted, documented, and rewarded. Creating new outcomes and measurements can change the work environment for a police department’s personnel, assist the department in making tactical decisions and can even shield the police department from accusations that would hurt their legitimacy with the community (Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1983; Sparrow, 1988; Alpert & Moore, 1997). Prime examples from this study include the NPD’s and MPD’s surveys of both department personnel and community members, the BPD public safety survey, the departments’ emphasis on quality of life in various crime meetings, citations for low-level offenses (or city ordinance violations), and in Milwaukee, documentation of traffic stops in which no action at all is taken (to monitor and prevent possible racial discrepancies in police decisions to stop citizens).

**Implications for police organizations.**

This discussion has revealed practical implications for police departments implementing broken windows policing in the CPS era. The following are principles (rooted in this study’s exploration of police practice, police personnel’s views of their departments, and in the current policing literature) for effectively implementing broken windows policing as part of CPS:

1. Interact with citizens in as many positive ways as possible (e.g., community meetings, citizen academies, community education and crime prevention activities, informally in the community, and via online social media). The views
that citizens have of their police departments in these situations will help to counter negative views that may arise when a citizen (inevitably) views a police officer’s actions as inappropriate. Train police officers to interact with citizens in these circumstances and in the constitutional, professional, respectful, and information-gathering ways of engaging citizens who violate lower-level offenses in known high crime areas. Use these negative interactions to portray the police department’s professionalism and encourage officers to use discretion in citing an individual for a lower-level offense.

Some may argue that increasing police presence and police activity in high crime areas equates to discrimination based on race or socioeconomic status. However, society views police as the formal social control mechanism in neighborhoods that lack informal ways of maintaining order and safety. The social contract theory in which our society’s relationship to its government (i.e., police) is founded balances the needs for public security with individual liberties. Since we know violent and other serious crimes cluster differentially across geographies we must accept that the government’s role in maintaining public security will respond to the parallel threat its people face. That is why police must act with the utmost professionalism and discretion and with the most concise intelligence in hand when interacting with citizens for low-level offenses. All citizens should be respected by (and respect) the police, only the criminals should fear them. In conjunction with the established, positive community relationships and the success of reducing crime levels and enhancing citizens’ quality of life (and
making citizens aware of that), police departments can find that balance of enforcing laws and building community.

2. Make building positive community relationships part of your police officers’ daily responsibilities. We know that the majority of all police-citizen interactions are citizen-initiated and that most serious crimes that come to police attention do so because a citizen took the initiative to inform the police department of the crime. Enhancing the police ability to build fruitful relationships with the community will increase the community’s perceptions of their police department and aid law enforcement in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting crimes. Furthermore, formally training police officers in ways to detect behaviors that indicate involvement or knowledge of more serious wrongdoing can help the police department focus on lawbreaking individuals and assist officers in using their discretion. Then, as this study explored, police departments must find ways to give police officers the necessary time to be involved in such activities. In the end, police officers’ experience within their neighborhoods, the use of real-time data and other technologies, and police training can be used to more precisely respond to serious criminals.

3. The police department should be geographically organized to support CPS, allowing police personnel to engage in problem-solving efforts congruent to their

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9 Anecdotally, a number of recent, high-profile criminal disasters could have been (or were) averted when local law enforcement encountered the wrongdoers for lower-level offenses (i.e., 9/11 hijacker Ziah Jarrah was stopped by Maryland State Police for speeding; suspected Tucson shooter Jared Lee Loughner was stopped by an officer with the Arizona Game and Fish Department after he ran a red light; and the attempted car bombing of Times Square that was noticed by a citizen who reported their suspicions to a NYPD patrol officer).
geographic areas of concern. Patrol officers and detectives should collaborate to proactively respond to local concerns, prevent crime, and to investigate serious crimes when necessary. This research illustrated a number of ways to formally and informally facilitate these relationships between patrol officers and investigators. Maintaining sector integrity in this way assists police personnel in learning about their area’s norms and gives officers additional and more precise information as they carry out their daily tactics, respond to a neighborhood’s problems, and investigate wrongdoing.

Along with these moves, police departments should maintain the centralized investigations of crimes that extend across (or beyond) the city’s geography, while keeping open lines of communication with district-level detectives. The use of ad hoc task forces and programs that focus on proven repeat offenders will also benefit a police department as it balances both its crime fighting and CPS responsibilities. Continued communication between those involved in the centralized activities and personnel at the local level can provide beneficial information to both parties in fulfilling their duties. As discussed in this research, technology plays a pivotal role in this process.

4. For the CPS strategy to take hold, police departments must recognize, reward and measure the outcomes associated with this innovative function. Numbers of citations or arrests for low-level offenses alone do not accurately reflect the units of police work under broken windows policing within the CPS era. Police departments and communities must negotiate sufficient ways of measuring
successful outcomes of police. One fundamental tool used to gauge police departments’ efforts with the community is a community survey. The survey in Boston was the most extensive of the three departments and explored citizens’ perceptions of police misconduct, effectiveness in reducing and solving crime and their concerns about crime and disorder in their neighborhoods. The MPD, on the other hand, used a customer satisfaction survey when implementing the new Differential Police Response unit. This survey served both as an outlet for concerned citizens to voice their displeasure and as a check for the police department to ensure the quality of their service. On a more regular basis, police departments can use processes similar to the CompStat meetings discussed in this research to hold police accountable for working with the community to define and solve problems (e.g., at roll call). As in the other points of this research, technology is an invaluable tool in fulfilling these principles.

5. Police executive leadership matters. Though police organizations benefit from their personnel’s exhibitions of leadership at all levels of the organization, this study has revealed the enormous influence of entrepreneurial police executive leadership on all aspects of the departments’ organizational strategies. The police executive both symbolically and literally leads his organization in working with their personnel and the community to set an agenda for the police department on both a daily and long-term basis. The police executive’s ability to send his vision throughout the organization is aided by his position as facilitator of daily and weekly command level meetings, his use of media, and his power to send written
orders throughout the organization and to make procedural and structural changes (mechanisms that are found in most police departments in the United States). As surfaced in the exploration of the departments’ organizational strategies, however, the success of the police executive in making marked and rapid change depends on the leader’s ability to navigate the political territories of their police department and their city. This route is facilitated by a number of actions including, taking counsel with individuals from within and outside of their departments and cities, acting transparently, supporting their personnel, and receiving input from affected groups (e.g., unions, police commission, other units) before proceeding with change ideas.

Limitations and Future Research

The expansiveness of this research, conducted by one researcher, affords many opportunities for refining. These findings are a snapshot of the vast activities of the organizations (as observed by the researcher) during a few points in their recent experiences of change (Manning, 2008). Chapter 2 includes an in-depth discussion of this study’s weaknesses, including the purposive and convenient sample of the three research sites and the lack of a random survey sample of police personnel within the cites. Future research should certainly explore other departments’ experiences implementing broken windows policing in this new strategy and should include a random sample of the police departments’ personnel when administering the survey. Future research may also benefit from multiple researchers analyzing the qualitative data to check for inter-rater reliability (as a “solidification instrument”) (Marques & McCall, 2005, p. 439). Finally, though this
researcher had wide access to department personnel, the audio-recorded interviews in this research focus almost exclusively on command level personnel. Ideally, other research would have the time, resources and numbers of researchers to allow for sit-downs with personnel at all ranks of the organization.

Because of this research, future studies should attempt to obtain a survey sample representative of personnel at all ranks of the police departments to explore more defined variations in police personnel’s views of broken windows policing, and then attempt to account for that variation (e.g., do rank, years of experience, division and race explain these differences?). In this research it is likely that the interviews from command level personnel would differ from line personnel (i.e., as a result of past and current work experiences, age, or nostalgia). Therefore, this study uses the other data sources in this study to triangulate the interview data and presents the findings with a view towards exploring what is and positing what could be. Similarly, future explorations should include community surveys or focus groups to get a more direct understanding of citizen views of the police department. Though this research accessed police department files and thousands of online newspaper and blog articles, a more systematic and operationally relevant collection and review of citizens’ perceptions would enrich similar topics.

Lastly, this research explores many avenues through which the three departments fulfill their responsibilities to their cities. Yet, it does not offer an exhaustive exploration of these avenues or other factors relevant to such change (i.e., the role of unions, budgetary concerns). Prospective research could apply similar or different methods to examine any of the phenomena in this study more closely, in these or other police
departments (e.g., the relationship between new police training in citizen interactions and citizens’ perceptions of police personnel, crime and disorder; the role of new technologies in police work; the effect of improved information sharing among police personnel on reduced levels of crime and disorder; the effect of differential police response to calls for service on citizen perceptions and levels of crime; or, the outcomes of police interacting with citizens for lower-level offenses), or they may wish to explore these other factors that could not make it into this research.

Summary

This study examined three medium- to large- sized city police departments to examine how each implements broken windows policing within the CPS strategy. Though both the tactic and strategy have influenced policing for decades, they manifest differently across police departments and across time. This research presented findings from three police departments’ recent experiences to show effective (and sometimes rapid) ways of instituting changes that are in line with broken windows and CPS policing (these include, organizational restructuring, tactical planning meetings, renewed relationships with the community, a reliance on new outcome measurements, and personnel’s conceptions of the need to work with citizens in fulfilling their duties).

Though it is difficult to divine the single most relevant change in each department, the following are this study’s best attempt to do so: the NPD’s problem-solving CompStat process that focuses on the relationship between low level offending and more serious crimes; among the many drastic changes in the MPD, the Neighborhood Task Force sticks out as representing a judicious allocation of personnel in line with the
CPS; and, lastly, the BPD’s prior experience in CPS gave the department new areas in which to improve. The most pertinent improvement in this study of broken windows policing in the CPS for the BPD is the establishment of the Safe Street Teams, which set up patrol units (supervised by a sergeant) whose sole purpose was to problem-solve in hot spots of crime and disorder.

This research also explored police personnel’s views on change and their police departments’ role in their cities. Though interview data and survey data suggest there may be differences (by rank) in the magnitude of personnel’s views on relationships between crime, disorder and the police role in combatting both, the findings suggest a widespread acceptance and an evolving understanding of those relationships, the need to work with the community in solving problems, and the importance of responding to low-level offenses. The police departments in this study understand the function of broken windows policing within this strategy as one that uncovers information about a neighborhood’s problems, improves citizens’ perceptions of their police department and allows for a multitude of responses to those problems (including, when warranted, zero tolerance policing). Therefore, researchers’ and practitioners’ commonly held conceptions of broken windows policing as solely zero-tolerance neglect the nuance of the tactic and should be resigned to the 20th century.

This study lends itself as a springboard for future research of police organizational strategies and the broken windows policing tactic. By suggesting possible relationships between a myriad of organizational and policing realities and by reconceptualizing the police profession’s views of broken windows policing, this study offers future researchers
and police leaders new ways of thinking about academic and practical applications of implementing broken windows policing in the CPS strategy.
References


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Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing (July 1996). Citywide Strategic Plan, a report prepared for the City of Boston.


Appendix A
Letter sent to contact person within the organization, setting up initial interviews within the police department.

Dear [Contact]:

As we discussed, I met with my dissertation committee and am set to begin my study on the "Shifting Organizational Strategies of Police Departments Implementing Broken Windows Policing." I will be conducting case studies of police departments in Boston, Milwaukee, Newark.

I anticipate spending a solid week in each of the cities over the next few months and would like to plan a visit to Milwaukee from [a period of one work week] (depending, of course, on the availability of people within your department). I have attached a rough draft of my research proposal to give you a better idea of the types of personnel and data that will be helpful to building my case study of [city police department].

Please let me know if that week works for you and for the key personnel in the department. I would like to spend that time interviewing key personnel, gathering archival data, and analyzing any data (archives) that I could not take with me from the department. Individuals who have been with the department for at least ten years and who have a varied experience within the department would be most beneficial to this research.

Also, if permitted, I would like to observe any weekly crime meetings, planning meetings, community meetings, etc. that you think would be interesting and useful in gaining a more holistic understanding of [city police department]. I would also like to access any documents (i.e., chief's bulletins, memoranda of understandings, annual reports, directives, actions plans, etc.) that are not available online from the [city police department] website or that I could not take with me from the department.

Please call or e-mail with any questions, concerns, or requests. Thank you in advance for your assistance. I look forward to seeing you and [city police department] soon.

Thank You,

Michael J. Jenkins
Appendix B
Police Department Personnel Interview Guide

Shifting Organizational Strategies of Police Departments
Implementing Broken Windows Policing

Hi, thank you for meeting with me today. My name is Michael Jenkins. I am conducting case studies of three cities’ police departments to better understand how police departments’ organizational strategies shift to accommodate the implementation of broken windows policing. In addition to gathering archival data (i.e., annual reports, chief’s directives, action plans, and newspaper articles), I am conducting in-depth interviews with key police personnel familiar with the recent history of their police departments.

You do not have to talk about anything that makes you feel uncomfortable and we can end our discussion anytime. I will keep all of your answers strictly private and will not share what you say with the people who you refer (if you chose to do so). The information gathered from our conversation will be helpful to police administrators, police line personnel, politicians, and, consequently, society. Do you have any questions?

I would like to spend just a few minutes asking you some basic information.

· What is the interviewee’s sex? M/F

1. What is your age? ________

2. What is your race? ______________

3. Where do you currently reside? (city and state)
   a. city _____________________
   b. state ____________________

4. How long have you worked for a police organization? ______________
   a. How long have you worked for the current police department? ________

5. What positions have you held during your policing career? ______________
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
   a. What positions have you held within this current police department?
   ________________________________________________________________
   b. What is your current position in the department?
6. What are your titles/positions and for approximately how long did you have each?

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Now I would like to discuss with you your perspective on how you view your police department.

What does your department do and how does your department measure and document the work that it does?

Probes: What’s the most important function of your department?

What types of crime most influences how the department carries out its responsibilities?

What effect does your department have on crime and/or disorder?

What types of reports, statements, press conferences, etc. does the department relay to the community and/or local politicians?

What is the number one challenge facing your department?

How does the current structure of the department affect the work that you and the other officers do?

What changes have you seen in the department in response to implementing new ways of fulfilling its responsibilities?
Can you tell me about your experience working in this current police department?

Probes: Describe how the various positions you’ve held over the years fit in to the police department.

How do you think the police organization viewed the various roles/positions you’ve held?

What type of support did you receive from the department and/or the community in fulfilling the duties of your position?

To what person, entity, group, or ideal did you feel most responsible to when fulfilling the duties of your positions?

To what person, entity, group, or ideal was/is the department most responsible to when fulfilling its duties?

What has been the most significant event, policy, law, mission statement, goal, etc. in changing how your department carries out its duties?

How has the department worked with other agencies, community groups, citizens, and local politicians?

Please discuss the various philosophies, assumptions, values, and/or mindsets that you think drove/drive the department in fulfilling its duties.

Probes: Are there any media campaigns or common sayings that permeate the work that you did/are doing?

Were there any incidents (e.g., crime waves, corruption scandal, political battles) that made the department reevaluate and reflect on how it viewed its function?

How do you think the mission of the department has changed/is changing?

What stated goals or missions of the department did/do you think are most and least influential in your department?

How does the department’s shifting strategies affect the work that you do?

Tell me about a time when your own values came into conflict with those of the department.

How comfortable are you sharing your ideas with your superiors? How confident are you that your ideas will be considered and maybe even acted upon?
If you could be police executive for a day, what changes would you make in the department?

Probes: What do you think is/was the best change the department has made?

What do you think is/was the worst change the department has made?

Is there anything the department does that does not serve the overall purpose of the department?

Is there anything you think the department should do that it does not?

What barriers are there to the department’s effectively and efficiently fulfilling its responsibilities?

Is there any additional information that you would like to tell me about that we might not have discussed? Also, do you have any questions for me?

Thank you again so much for sharing your experiences and helping me to better understand your police organization.
Appendix C
Survey of Police Department Personnel Views of their Police Departments

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Michael Jenkins, who is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University. The purpose of this research is to determine how police personnel view the mission of their police department.

Sworn personnel from police departments in Boston, Milwaukee, and Newark (NJ) will be offered the survey. Each individual's participation will last approximately 10-15 minutes. The study procedures include completing a paper and pencil survey of 12 questions.

This research is anonymous. That means I will not record any information about you that could identify you. I will not record your name, address, phone number, date of birth, etc. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. The research team and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept for at least three years.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. You may enjoy the experience of sharing your thoughts about your police department and of knowing that your participation in this study will assist your department (and others) in implementing policing strategies. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are not comfortable.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact me at:
Rutgers School of Criminal Justice
123 Washington St.
Newark, NJ 07102
Office: 570.941.5908
Michaelj123@gmail.com

or you can contact my faculty adviser Dr. George Kelling at:
Rutgers School of Criminal Justice
123 Washington St.
Newark, NJ 07102
Office: 973.353.5923
glkell@aol.com

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator at Rutgers University at:
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
3 Rutgers Plaza
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559
Tel: 732-932-0150 ext. 2104
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

You may want a copy of this consent form for your records. If so, please ask me for a copy.

By participating in this study/these procedures, you agree to be a study subject.
Police Department Mission

1. In the space below, please state your understanding of the current mission of your police department.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
Police Department Personnel Views of the Mission of the Police Department
This section lists items relating to the function and mission of some police departments.

2. Please indicate how important each of the following items is to the overall mission of your police department. Please circle one under each item.

Aggressive enforcement of quality of life violations (i.e., panhandling, noise, public urination).
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know

Community meetings in which community members and police work together to identify problems and create solutions in their neighborhood.
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know

Police collaborate with the community and other municipal agencies to combat physical disorder (i.e., abandoned houses, broken down vehicles, graffiti).
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know

Patrol officers maintain responsibility over a limited geographic area (i.e., sector integrity).
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know

Detectives maintain responsibility over a limited geographic area (i.e., sector integrity).
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know

The police force represents the racial/ethnic makeup of the community in which they police.
Not at all important Somewhat important Very important I don't know
Police Department Personnel Views of the Mission of the Police Department

3. Please indicate how important each of the following items is to the overall mission of your police department. Please circle one under each item.

Increasing the number of arrests and citations.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Increasing the number of field interrogations.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Increasing the number of traffic violations.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Rapid response to calls for service.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Patrols are done on foot, bicycle, or segway.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Patrols are done in a car.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

CompStat process.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know

Crime-mapping.
Not at all important    Somewhat important    Very important    I don't know
Police Department Personnel Views of Crime and Disorder

This section lists statements regarding crime and disorder.

4. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements. Please circle one under each item.

Disorder and fear of crime are strongly linked.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

My police department takes citizens' perceptions of rising crime seriously, even when the actual crime rate is decreasing.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

My police department is involved in making disorderly neighborhoods more orderly.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Different neighborhoods have different rules for what is considered civil (or orderly) behavior.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Untended disorder leads to the breakdown of community controls.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Areas where community controls break down are vulnerable to criminal invasion.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

My police department's role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Different neighborhoods have different capacities to manage disorder.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know
Police Department Personnel Views of Crime and Disorder

5. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following statements. Please circle one under each item.

Patrol officers establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their district or precinct.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Detectives establish positive relationships with many of the citizens within their district or precinct.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Patrol officers regularly share information with detectives regarding crimes, criminals, or neighborhood conditions.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Detectives regularly share information with patrol officers regarding crimes, criminals, or neighborhood conditions.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Stopping someone for a quality of life summons or to enforce a city ordinance is an effective way to get information about crime or criminals in the area.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

If an officer observes someone violating a quality of life or city ordinance, that officer should issue a summons.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know

Police officers are too busy to worry about issuing summonses for violations of quality of life or city ordinances.
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  I don’t know
Demographic and Background Information

Please circle one under each item.

6. What is your gender?
   Male
   Female

7. What is your age?
   21-24
   25-29
   30-34
   35-39
   40-44
   45-49
   50-54
   55-59
   60 or older

8. With which race/ethnicity do you most closely identify?
   Black and/or African American
   Hispanic, or Latino/Latina
   White, non-hispanic
   Asian/Pacific Islander
   Native American/Eskimo/Aleut
   Middle Eastern/East Indian
   Other (please specify)

9. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
   High school graduate or G.E.D.
   Some college courses, but no degree attained
   Associate's degree
   BA or BS degree
   Some graduate courses beyond the BA or BS
   Graduate degree
Demographic and Background Information cont…
Please circle one under each item.

10. For how long have you been a sworn police officer in your current police department? Please round up to the nearest year.

1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-35 years
more than 35 years

11. What is your rank?

Patrol officer
Sergeant
Lieutenant
Captain
Other (please specify)

12. In which assignment have you spent most of your last five years with this department (or during your total time in the department if less than five years)?

In patrol
In investigations
Other (please specify)

Thank you for completing this survey!
😊
Appendix D
Chain of Evidence
(Coding Rationale)

6/7/2010 7:23 PM
I began coding interviews in January 2010 in preparation for a presentation on work done on this project in the Milwaukee Police Department. I began with the first set of interviews from July 2009 (MKE 1-13), coding each individually for emergent themes. They included (community, community oriented policing, discretion, ineffective, political context, resistance to change, resources, scandal, broken windows policing, IA, leadership, patrol and investigative divide, restructure, technology and data, and training. This followed from the initial observations of the police departments and the responses from the semi-structured interview guide. I then followed this approach with the first round of interviews from the other two sites (BPD and NPD).

After reconceptualizing my research I decided it would be best to go back, review, and recode all interviews (including, coding for the first time, interviews obtained from my second visits to the police departments) with a coding scheme that borrows from literature in organizational change in police departments (i.e., kelling and moore).

6/7/2010 7:33 PM
I begin coding all interviews from both rounds of PD visits with these 8 new elements of organizational strategy in mind (legitimacy, admin process, demand entrance, demand management, external relationships, organizational structure, police function, tactics/tech/outcomes). I will code these as tree nodes and will also pay attention to other possible themes (including those for which I've already coded). I've collapsed some of the older nodes as child nodes of the new 8 parent nodes.

First I will go back into the free nodes for which I've already coded and code the data with the 8 new nodes in mind. Then, I will begin coding each interview individually, beginning with milwaukee (I am most familiar with the data from this site). I will code each interview for all 8 nodes (unless this becomes unmanageable).
6/8/2010 7:54 PM
While maintaining the original free nodes in the tree nodes, I also collapsed some of those original free nodes into the new tree node coding scheme. So, today I began reviewing the first set of nodes that I had collapsed into the new nodes to make sure the coding within each still belonged in there. The nodes that were collapsed from the old free nodes are listed in the tree nodes beginning with "XRE_OLD." When I merged them with the new coding scheme, I renamed them (mostly maintaining their name, minus the XRE_OLD).

6/8/2010 8:04 PM
Finished reviewing IA and Leadership; will continue with Resistance to change, Training, Political context, etc. then move on to coding each interview from the beginning, inserting interview notes (as memos?), making externals for archival data and for interviews that were not audio-recorded (i.e., chief flynn, director mccarthy, etc.)

6/29/2010 12:12 PM
Created a new tree node "xn_GENERAL" to place bits of data that may be of general interest.
Also, pasted some old nodes into the new coding scheme. They include, XRE_OLD_Community, XRE_OLD_Resources, and XRE_OLD_Scandal

7/5/2010 10:29 AM
I have finished coding all EWR interviews and have 3-4 interviews each left for MKE and BOS to transcribe and code.
Created new tree child nodes under parent tree nodes, into which I will break down coding from the parent tree nodes into these new child nodes that include CompStat, Culture, Community, Resources, Union, and Measurement. I will begin today to recode the parent tree nodes into the new child tree nodes.
7/7/2010 8:08 PM
I have broken down "Administrative Processes" into the CompStat and Culture child tree nodes and did the same for "External Relationships" and the Community, Resources, and Union child tree nodes. Cleaning data--> I also went and did a Word Search for the word "Union" and overlaid that search with coding stripes of the Union node to check for accuracy. I then went back and coded the few pieces of data that should have been coded at Union. I will do the same for all other nodes as I finish cleaning up that data at this stage. Next task = code parent tree node "tactics/technology/outcomes" to a child tree node "Measurement;" code parent tree node "Organizational Structure" to a child tree node "personnel," and check all remaining tree nodes by doing a text search of code words.

7/19/2010 8:06 PM
finished coding all parent tree nodes into the newest child tree nodes as described above. I will begin checking/cleaning all remaining tree nodes by doing a text search of code words.

*21 Nodes Total*
1. CompStat
   CompStat
   comstat
   com-stat
   comp-stat
   CAD
   CAM
   real-time data
   data analysis
   mapping
   gis
   arcview
   computer statistics
   computer stats
   intel
2. Culture
   environment
   feeling
   belief
   believe
   informal
   value
   attitude
   decision-making
     climate
       morale
3. Internal affairs
   complaints
   IA

-->Finished checking to this point 7/19/2010 11:48 PM <--

4. Leadership
   leader
   vision
   chief
   manage
   administration
   command
   director
   commission

5. Resistance to change
   resist
   hinder
   hindrance
   barrier
   difficult
   impede
6. Training
   academy
educate
inservice
instruct
teach
7. Demand entrance
   discretion
9-1-1
communications
ownership
community meeting
interact
reactive
proactive
sell
market
8. Demand management
   discretion
9-1-1
communications
ownership
community meeting
interact
reactive
proactive
sell
market
9. Community
   public
citizen
10. Political context
    politic
    mayor
    commission
scandal
counsel/council

-->Finished checking to this point 7/20/2010 10:35 PM <--

11. Resources
   money
   economy
   economics
   finances
   funding
   tax
   wage
   salary
   expensive
   expense
   cheap
   budget

12. Union
   labor

13. Legitimacy
   legit
   authority
   authoriz
   mandate
   power
   charge
       accountable

14. Patrol and Investigation
   corroborate
   collaborate

15. Personnel
   hire
   fire
   promote
   apply
   recruit
16. Restructure
decentralization
para-military
specialization
militar
centralization

17. Police function
mission
charge
function
goal
business
purpose
value

18. Broken Windows
zero-tolerance
quality of life
discretion
summons
sector/beat integrity
field interrogation
foot patrol
community interaction
decentralization
disorder
perception
community control
maintain order
ordinance
low-level
ownership

-->Finished checking to this point 7/21/2010 9:58 PM <--
19. Outcomes
   statistics
   satisfaction
   result
   metric
20. Tactics
   strateg
   philosoph
   problem oriented policing
   problem solving
   intel
   arrest
   patrol
   foot
   [community] contacts
   [community] interaction
21. Technology
   mapping
   smart boards
   RMS
   TARU
   data
   computer

7/23/2010 11:35 PM
Finished checking all nodes.
I merged demand entrance and demand entrance into one node ("Demand")
because they were almost identically coded to the same references within the
original sources.
Printed all places in EWR interviews that were coded for BWP.

Then, for EWR, I ran queries in which I crossed BWP by groupings of
nodes:
(Admin Process) 1. BWP x CompStat or culture or ia or leadership or
resistance or training
(Dem;Fun; Leg) 2. BWP x demand or function or legitimacy
(Ex Relation) 3. BWP x community or political context or resources or union
(Org Structure) 4. BWP x patrol/investigation or personnel or restructure (tac; tech; out) 5. BWP x outcomes or tactics or technology

I will print these out and use them as the basis for beginning my analysis of EWR. I will supplement this analysis with readings of archival documents (i.e., General orders and newspaper articles) then add to the analysis the survey of the department.

The newest version of the nodes (with their corresponding codes) follows:

1. CompStat
   CompStat
   comstat
   com-stat
   comp-stat
   CAD
   CAM
   real-time data
   data analysis
   mapping
   gis
   arcview
   computer statistics
   computer stats
   intel

2. Culture
   environment
   feeling
   belief
   believe
   informal
   value
   attitude
   decision-making
   climate
   morale
3. Internal affairs
   complaints
   IA
4. Leadership
   leader
   vision
   chief
   manage
   administration
   command
   director
   commission
5. Resistance to change
   resist
   hinder
   hindrance
   barrier
   difficult
   imped
6. Training
   academy
   educate
   inservice
   instruct
   teach
7. Demand
   discretion
   9-1-1
   communications
   ownership
   community meeting
   interact
   reactive
   proactive
   sell
market

8. Community
   public
citizen

9. Political context
   politic
   mayor
   commission
   scandal
   counsel
   council

10. Resources
    money
    economy
    economics
    finances
    funding
    tax
    wage
    salary
    expensive
    expense
    cheap
    budget

11. Union
    labor

12. Legitimacy
    legit
    authority
    authorize
    mandate
    power
    charge
    accountable
13. Patrol and Investigation
   corroborate
   collaborate

14. Personnel
   hire
   fire
   promote
   apply
   recruit
   staff

15. Restructure
   decentralization
   para-military
   specialization
   military
   centralization

16. Police function
   mission
   charge
   function
   goal
   business
   purpose
   value

17. Broken Windows
   zero-tolerance
   quality of life
   discretion
   summons
   sector/beat integrity
   field interrogation
   foot patrol
   community interaction
   decentralization
   disorder
perception
community control
maintain order
ordinance
low-level
ownership

18. Outcomes
statistics
satisfaction
result
metric

19. Tactics
strategy
philosophy
problem oriented policing
problem solving
intel
arrest
patrol
foot
[community] contacts
[community] interaction

20. Technology
mapping
smart boards
RMS
TARU
data
computer

*Nearly 150 codes searched to check the above nodes.*
7/25/2010 12:39 AM
printed all EWR_BWPx_______ queries (5 total).
Then decided it would be better to copy/paste important parts of each query into a DOC to better organize the data for analysis. So far, I've gone through EWR 10; I will begin EWR11 next (reference 5)
7/26/2010 9:24 PM Finished reorganizing EWR_BWPxAdminProcess

8/1/2010 7:12 PM
After reorganizing almost all of the above-listed 5 queries, I realized I need to account for those areas of the data that may be coded only to BWP, to fully account for all of the BWP data. So, I ran a query of all EWR data in which ONLY BWP was coded. Pieces of data came back and I chose even fewer (two) of those to add to the query "EWR_BWPxTacTechOutcomes"

8/27/2010 11:10 AM
I began the analysis of the BWP node by all other nodes, using the breakdown of the 5 above-listed queries:
(Admin Process) 1. BWP x CompStat or culture or ia or leadership or resistance or training
(Dem;Fun; Leg)  2. BWP x demand or function or legitimacy
(Ex Relation) 3. BWP x community or political context or resources or union
(Org Structure) 4. BWP x patrol/investigation or personnel or restructure
(tac;tech;out) 5. BWP x outcomes or tactics or technology

I color-coded each of the queries by interview (e.x. EWR_05 is green; EWR_06 is blue)
Appendix E
Breakdown of Nodes for Newark Analysis

1. Legitimacy
   a. Negative views
   b. Positive views
      i. Gaining legitimacy

2. Function
   c. Reduce crime
   d. Enhance quality of life

3. Organizational structure
   e. Patrol/Investigations
   f. Personnel
   g. Restructuring

4. Administrative processes
   h. Leadership
      i. Support of BWP
         1. Santiago
         2. Tutela
         3. McCarthy
      ii. Communication
   i. Resistance to change
      i. Overcoming resistance
         1. McCarthy
   j. Culture
   k. Internal affairs
   l. Training
   m. CompStat
      i. Communication

5. External relationships
   n. Community
   o. Political context
   p. Resources
   q. Union

6. Demand management
   r. Community contacts
   s. Calls for service
   t. Technology/data

7. Tactics/technology/outcomes
   u. Tactics
   v. Technology/data
   w. Outcomes
Vita

Michael Joseph Jenkins


2002  Graduated from West Scranton High School, Scranton, Pennsylvania.

2006  B.A., University of Scranton, Scranton, Pennsylvania; Majored in Criminal Justice and Philosophy.

2006-08  Case Manager for the New Jersey Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative, Police Institute, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

2006-09  Research Assistant for Operation CeaseFire, Police Institute, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

2007-08  Research Assistant for evaluation of the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

2007-08  Research Assistant, study on Latino Former Prisoner Reintegration, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

2007-08  Student Representative, Student Government Association, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey

2008  Research Assistant on National Institute of Justice grant proposal, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

2008  M.A., Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey

2008-09  Lecturer, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey


2009-11  Lecturer, University of Scranton, Scranton, Pennsylvania

2011  Ph.D. in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University