Take in from 1961 draft position marked in red brackets to begin at page 33. To the top of page 36.
Then begin at page 37 as marked and at page 39.
On a Saturday morning late in November 1956, some three weeks after President Eisenhower's re-election, Governor Sherman Adams phoned me in Brooklyn. The Governor was the right-hand man of the President, possessing very broad authority. He asked me if I could come to see him at the White House that morning. I said that I was in Brooklyn, and could not reach Washington until afternoon. He said that he did not know that he had reached me in Brooklyn; that Monday morning would be all right; could I come in then? I said "Yes," and we made an appointment for 8:00 a.m.

He said at the Monday morning meeting,"The President has a problem with these Hungarian refugees, and wants you to act as his representative in dealing with them." I said that of course I would do whatever the President wanted, but that I should like to accept under one condition - that I do the work without pay as I
My instant thought was that I would probably be presiding over the biggest concentration camp which ever existed in the United States. Yet I could not decline to do what the President asked, and that it would be harder to look at me if I was doing the work without pay as a humanitarian task. (I had learned this lesson from former President Hoover.)

The Governor Adams then asked me: "When..."
thought I could make a better success of an humanitarian job like this if I did it for free. The Governor said that he was sure that this would be satisfactory to the President. "When would I be ready to go to work?" I said, "Well, I am here." He said, "All right, there is an office upstairs." I went upstairs and went to work. This was all the formality there was except that some time later I received a notice appointing me as a Consultant.

Very shortly afterward, the Hungarian revolution had been brutally beaten down by Russian troops and tanks, and large numbers of those engaged in it - many of them with their wives and children - had escaped across the marshes into Austria. Within two or three months, this influx had totaled about 160,000, and the figure later went higher. The Austrian Government took them in, but could not handle them all. Other European countries had already taken
large numbers, for example, Switzerland 10,000, of which 6,000 were to be there temporarily only.

The U.S. had an authorized unfilled quota of about 6,500, and steps had already been taken to open Camp Kilmer for their temporary care. There had been criticism of the way things were handled at Kilmer, and of the inadequate action of the U.S. in meeting this pitiable emergency. Some of this was in the Scripps-Howard papers, but The New York Times, on November 26, had had a bitterly critical editorial. Such press criticism, I assume, led to the request of the President and Governor Adams to me to take over the problem.

I anticipated that large additional numbers of refugees would be brought in - people who were penniless, with no possessions but the clothes on their backs, and very few of whom would be able to speak English. It went through my mind very rapidly that I might
be running a concentration camp at Kilmer, and so be subject to
unpredictable criticism. However, there was nothing to do but
to take on the job.

After working without pay but on a full time basis during the
1956 Presidential campaign at the Headquarters of the Republican
National Committee, and after President Eisenhower's landslide
re-election, I had seen Governor Adams and had told him that I had
not done this campaign work with any idea of a Government job;
that I did not seek one and was not available for one; however,
that, if there were any chores for which I was needed, I would try
to do them. This undoubtedly led to the Governor's calling me for
the refugee job. This was certainly a more difficult "chore" than
anything I had anticipated.

The office in the White House, which was the only space available,
a secretary. I immediately drafted Harry Carter from the work which he was doing in the Pentagon to help me, and he was absolutely indispensable. However, he and his secretary made a real crowd of four in that small office.

The refugees were continuing to pour into Kilmer, where

some twenty Government and private voluntary agencies were milling around in inevitable confusion, although all were trying to do their best.

The President had directed the Army to run the feeding and care of the camp. On only a few days' notice they had made a good start considering the condition of the camp. General Sidney C. Wooten was in command.

A Mr. Garrity of the State Department at about that time returned from a short inspection trip in Austria, and recommended that an additional 15,000 of refugees be brought in as parolees
under an emergency provision of the Immigration Law. This was promptly approved by the President so that the total quota at that time jumped to 21,000, and I correctly anticipated that it would go much further. Key West had never had an experience like this crisis operation, and there were no precedents. The hard core of the problem was not untangling what the Times' editorial had called, "The Mess at Kilmer," though this had to be done, but how to find a way to resettle in America this mass of indigent strangers. In this we could not fail; neither did we know how to succeed.

The President, who was in Augusta, announced my appointment from there, and I was immediately in the middle of it as there was broad and enthusiastic press coverage of the appointment. However, the press was more confident than I was.

The steps taken within the next two weeks were all going on in a jumble of activities or were in formative stages at the same time.
My directive from the President was in substance to set up the machinery to handle this mass migration to the United States, and to coordinate the work of the voluntary agencies and of the Government Departments and agencies. As to all of them, I realized immediately that this could be done only by persuasive leadership, rather than by trying to order people around. | I needed a good man in an awful hurry to represent me at Kilmer as I was needed in Washington. Someone told me that the Ford Foundation had such a man. I telephoned Henry Ford, II, from the White House to get this man released for this purpose. The White House telephone is a wonderful thing, and Mr. Ford, who was in New York, came on the wire at once. I told him what we needed. He said, "I don't think the man you are asking for is the right man for the job, but I will get the right man for you." In about twenty minutes he called back to say that Mr. Leo Beebe was the man I needed; that he was the
Ford Company's Assistant Chief of Public Relations; that he was in Detroit, and had been instructed to go immediately to New York and meet Mr. Ford in the morning; and then would proceed directly to Washington. So Leo was on duty within twenty-four hours.

I realized that the only chance we had of resettling these people was to get the Americans to love the Hungarian Freedom Fighters for the next four or five months, and to that end I needed the highest powered Public Relations organization I could get.

In the Presidential campaign, I had recruited and worked successfully with Communications Counselors, Inc. (CCI), which was the Public Relations part of the large McCann, Erickson advertising agency. It was necessary to have them go to work at once but, while their out-of-pocket expenses could be paid from Government funds, I realized that we would be inviting trouble if we used Government funds to pay large fees to a public relations firm. If we did, I
could see vividly the day when somebody or some committee in Congress would howl to high heaven. So I pleaded with CCI to undertake this job as a public service for a flat fee of $40,000. I told them that I did not have the money, but would be responsible for getting it, and wanted them to go to work immediately. This they did. While no secret was made of this public relations project, we did not advertise it either. Consequently, nobody knew over the next period of several months how we obtained and maintained the tremendous, favorable, nationwide coverage about the Hungarian refugees in the press, magazine, television and radio media.

Dean Rusk, a friend and former colleague in the Pentagon where we had adjoining offices shortly after World War II, was President of Rockefeller Foundation. I went to him for help. He said that without Executive Committee approval, he could only give $10,000
of the $35,000 for which I asked. I thought we could make up
the balance of $25,000 in other ways. He immediately gave me
the $10,000, and obtained his Executive Committee's approval
to raise this to $35,000. But the Foundation's lawyers wanted a
ruling, or at least a letter, from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
that such a gift would not prejudice the Foundation's tax deductibility
status. Since by the time this question arose, I had the President's
Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief set up, it puzzled me how any
lawyer could think that a gift to the President's Refugee Relief
Committee of a mere $35,000 from the tremendous funds which the
Foundation had could possibly risk its tax deductibility status.

However, lawyers are lawyers.

I had another source of strength which helped me in many ways.

This lay in the warm friendship and vigorous cooperation of the
White House staff. This in turn was possible because they knew
I was not receiving any salary and because I emphasized the
purely temporary nature of my post there. This gave me complete
immunity to the jealousies which might so easily have developed
from a new boy barging into an exclusive club.

So with powerful help from the White House, I was able imme-
diately to see Mr. Fred Scribner, who was then Counsel for the
Secretary of the Treasury, and who was later Under Secretary.

I obtained the necessary ruling from the Bureau, but this took
time so for a period of six weeks or more I carried most of the
$40,000 on my cuff.

The minutes of the President's Committee approving the appoint-
ment of CCI showed that this was done on my assurance that I would
be personally responsible for the money. Mr. Walter Maguire of
Stamford, Connecticut, a friend of "Wild Bill" Donovan, and who
had been a client of mine in one case, contributed $2,500. Our
small family charitable corporation put in $1,500, and I think I got the remaining $1,000 from a small list of donors. But in some way we covered the CCI payment without my going into bankruptcy, and the most important thing of all was that, while this was going on, CCI was hard at work, and in fact we had turned the corner in resettling the refugees before we had the money to pay CCI's fee.

While I have recently read my own files and Harry Carter's files, I have not found the papers relating to CCI, so the above is from recollection.

Another virtually simultaneous step was getting General Joe Collins to help me. He certainly re-earned his famous sobriquet from World War II of "Lightning Joe." Nobody could have dealt with the Army, Air Force, Navy and Pentagon with the speed and effectiveness which Joe did. I had worked with General Collins in the Pentagon when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, and as soon as my appointment was announced he moved his friendship by a phone call—saying "I am sure that you have gotten yourself into trouble again. If I can help—"
Almost at the same time, I recruited Mr. Hallam Tuck, an old friend who had been in relief enterprises under Mr. Hoover off and on since World War I, and who for many years after World War II had been United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Mr. Hoover correctly said that Mr. Tuck was the best man there was in this field. He possessed breadth of experience, vigor, judgment, great prestige, and tact. He also recruited Major General Carl A. Hardigg, USA (Retired), who had been Mr. Tuck's Chief of Supply as High Commissioner for Refugees.

I started both of them off to Austria immediately for liaison with our Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, and to seek to coordinate in Austria activities of the U.S. voluntary agencies there which were acting as sponsors for Hungarian refugees coming to the U.S. I also asked Mr. Tuck to make a broad study of the Hungarian refugee problem as it looked in Austria.
The mission of Mr. Tuck and General Hardigg stemmed from my realization that, if I were to set up machinery and coordinate the voluntary and Government agencies dealing with Hungarian refugees coming to this country, the coordination had to start in Austria.

At the same time the above steps were being taken, I decided that the best machinery for coordination would be a President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief. This would bring together representatives of the voluntary agencies with my own efforts and those of General Collins, Mr. Beebe, and Mr. Tuck, and would have the great advantage of centralizing the work outside of the White House.

General Collins immediately found and rented for the Committee a suitable office at 1413 K Street, and recruited Mr. Carusi,
a former Commissioner of Immigration, as his assistant. At my request, the President designated General Collins as Vice Chairman and Director of the Committee's operations in Washington; Mr. Beebe as Vice Chairman for Kilmer but reporting to General Collins; and Mr. Tuck as Vice Chairman with duties for the time being in Austria.

To assure strong labor support, Mr. George Meany was invited to become a member, and accepted.

We also brought in the heads of the largest of the voluntary agencies sponsoring the refugees.

To cover the education field, we had the Provost of Columbia University.

We also had Mr. Charles Taft, who was the head of the Advisory Commission on Voluntary Agencies - a kind of super group which in a way represented all of the Agencies.
Of course, in undertaking this work, almost the first thing I had done was to see Mr. Herbert Hoover and obtain his advice. I endeavored to get him to serve as Honorary Chairman of the President's Committee, but he declined because he felt that enough was being done by the Administration for the Hungarian refugees. However, Mr. Hoover continued to help me with invaluable advice throughout the job.

We then recruited Mr. Lewis W. Douglas as the Honorary Chairman of the Committee, and he became so interested that he served actively in various meetings and with advice.

President Eisenhower's announcement of the appointment of the Committee was made from Augusta on December 12, 1956, and the Committee became immediately an effective operating agency. The machinery for coordination which I had been directed to set up was accordingly in full operation inside of two weeks of my
Prior to my appointment, the Hungarian refugees who had been brought to the U.S. had been transported by the International Committee for European Migration (ICEM). One of my first projects was to have the U.S. Air Force and Navy take over the largest possible part of the shipment of refugees to this country.

This had a very specific as well as a general purpose. In the forefront of my mind at all times in those early weeks was the unsolved problem as to how to resettle these refugees in America so as to avoid the nightmare of in effect a big concentration camp at Kilmer continuing indefinitely. Living over long periods in refugee camps had, I knew, been the lot of many, many refugees before, and such a result here would constitute a flat and glaring failure before the world in what should be a truly humanitarian effort. It would also be disastrous for the refugees
themselves. Every step which I took was therefore pointed toward resettlement, and this of course required the utmost in favorable publicity. The word "aerialift" had become associated with our "Berlin airlift." At a time when the Russian tanks and troops were ruthlessly shooting down the Hungarians, sending them to Siberia, or making captives of those still in their home country, this would obviously stimulate public interest in the care of the refugees, and that meant the resettlement of the refugees when they got here.

In this I was insistent that we use the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), which included Navy as well as Air Force transport planes. It then developed that the Navy had sea transports which could be used, and which in some ways would be most efficient, particularly as processing of the refugees could be done during the trip. We therefore set up three trips by naval transports.
It was of course essential that the airlift by military planes begin in Germany rather than Austria to avoid the danger of a Russian move should U.S. military planes in considerable numbers appear in Austria. This, however, was easy to arrange as ICEM could bus the refugees from Vienna or Salzburg to Munich.

In the arrangement for the air and sea lift General Collins was utterly invaluable, and carried the major part of the work, although I of course was in it all of the time also.

My first negotiations were with Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson, who was completely cooperative.

The Services were of course concerned that their own appropriations would not have to be invaded for this purpose. The President's Emergency Fund was adequate to cover any additional cost to the Services for this program. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), of which my friend John B. Hollister
was then the Director, was the administrator of the President's Emergency Fund, which was part of the Foreign Aid Program. I insisted on avoiding any delays through negotiation of the amounts of the cost by providing that these would be settled later by agreement between the Services and ICA at the direction of the Bureau of the Budget, and took the position that this was not part of my function.

The favorable publicity and the tremendous public interest in the Hungarian refugees were of course helpful factors in making the Military Services interested in sharing in this work, which they recognized as both a fine humanitarian action and as excellent publicity for themselves. However, before they seemed fully to realize this, they proposed chartering civilian planes for the shipment of the refugees. Apparently MATS was using such chartered planes to some degree at all times anyway. However, this was not what I wanted, as that
of course could be done just as well through ICEM. I wanted  
the Army and Navy planes themselves.

There was a reserve alert in effect which had tied up a substantial number of military planes, and I was able to get this lifted to make enough planes available for my purposes without MATS having to charter additional civilian planes. This broke one bottleneck.

I was also insistent that Navy planes as well as Air Force planes be used so that the public would see that all of the Services were in this relief project:— The Army on the ground at Kilmer, the Air Force and Navy in the airlift, and the Navy also in the sea lift, and this was done.

Military planes and ships were made available just as fast as refugees could be processed in Austria and be ready for shipment.
The first military plane reached Maguire Air Force base in Central New Jersey, To greet it, I had present the Acting Governor of New Jersey. A welcoming statement signed by President Eisenhower, with facsimile copies and a translation into Hungarian, was delivered to each refugee on the bus on the way from Maguire to Kilmer. I have in my files my draft of this statement, which contains in the right-hand corner the four most important letters: "O.K. D.D."

The first plane was greeted by a large collection of television operators, cameras, photographers, and reporters. The refugees - some of them carrying babies - came down to be greeted by a handshake by the Acting Governor and by me as the President's representative, among others.

In the general enthusiasm and excitement, some amusing incidents occurred. The Air Force scooped the President himself by telling
the press about its participation in the airlift before the President had announced it. However, this did no harm.

The Air Force also loaded one of its planes going East with half a plane load of reporters and photographers. When I got to Maguire Air Force base the morning of the arrival of the first plane load of refugees, I learned from the Commanding General that the first plane coming in had this cargo of reporters and photographers, and that they were going to be the first ones to get off. The plane was then circling the field. It was not hard to see what would happen if the first "refugees" which appeared on television turned out to be a bunch of American reporters.

Through the cooperation of the Commanding General, I got the message aloft to the plane to keep the reporters inside until the refugees had gotten off. So the ceremony went off completely successfully as planned, but it was a close call.
However, there were two or three Air Force planes and one Navy plane. I had insisted that in the first landing there be at least one Navy plane. However, due to some mistake, when they got to Newfoundland there was no Navy plane, and some bright individual, in order to carry out our instructions, held up the refugees in Newfoundland until the Navy could fly a plane from the U.S. up there. One reporter, who was on one of the flights, learned of the cause of this delay in Newfoundland, and told me that it was shocking. However, fortunately not too much of a story was made of it.

Stemming from my desire to get the utmost publicity from the airlift, I had arranged for Ambassador James B. Conant to fly from Northern Germany, Bonn or Berlin (I have forgotten in which place he was at the time) to Munich in order to give a personal send-off to the start of the airlift.
Dr. Conant had a private train, but no plane. So I asked a three-star General, who was in command of MATS, to arrange to get a plane to fly Dr. Conant to Munich for the ceremony, and then take him home. Harry Carter, shortly after that, received this remarkable message from someone speaking for the Commanding General of MATS: That he would be glad to do his best to get a plane to bring Mr. Voorhees' friend, Dr. Cohen, to Munich, and take him back to Germany. Dr. Conant may have had some fame in this country as the President of Harvard, as one of the persons who developed the atomic bomb, and as High Commissioner and Ambassador to Germany, but his fame had apparently not penetrated to the Commanding General of the Military Air Transport Service.

As to the sea transport, General Collins and the Navy acted so fast that, although it was a ten-day voyage to the U.S. from Bremerhaven, with approximately a two-day turn around there, and
of course a ten-day trip back, the first Navy transport reached
Brooklyn on January 1, and the second and third followed shortly
thereafter. ICEM arranged the transportation of the refugees
from Austria to Bremerhaven. The Red Cross had people aboard
each ship to give assistance. Medical care was provided.

Representatives of the Immigration and Public Health Services
were aboard as teams to do the processing and avert the congestion
which would have occurred at Kilmer by such large numbers arriving
at one time.

The ships were designed to carry about 2,100 troops. To
avoid overcrowding, we first reduced this to 1,700 refugees, and
later to about 1,500 because it developed that approximately one-
half of the refugees were women and children, and temporary canvass
partitions had to be set up to take care of them and to keep families
together on the ships.
When the first ship arrived on New Year's day, the temperature was just above zero. Yet these people, many of them poorly clad, stood out on the deck singing their national anthem, which they had of course been prevented from singing at home, and they literally sang their hearts out as the ship was tied up.

I recall seeing one grown boy in his shirt sleeves as I went aboard the ship to greet the refugees. I remember getting him inside away from the reporters or other eyes, and peeling off a sweater which I had worn under my coat and giving it to him without anybody being the wiser, and I do not think he knew who I was any- way.

This reception was a truly heart warming event. The Army was ready with busses for all the refugees. There were no formalities, and the whole business went off with great enthusiasm and, most important of all, no criticism.
There were of course extensive press stories and photographs about this mass migration. One incident was that the number of refugees who landed was one greater than the number who embarked at Bremerhaven. A baby was born as the ship was anchored off Staten Island, and became the first American citizen among the Hungarian refugees.

Two other Navy transports were enroute, and we were prepared to extend this service and could have done so successfully. However, Governor Adams gave instructions early in January not to use the sea lift further, and to bring the refugees in by plane. At the time, both General Collins and I felt that this was a mistake, but I think that our handling of it illustrates why our whole effort proved to be successful, which was that we were simply trying to do what the White House wanted done, and did so unquestioningly.
On the whole, therefore, the airlift and sea lift were a great success. Again and again we were told from refugee sources of the kindness and thoughtfulness to the refugees on the part of the Air Force and Navy crews on both its planes and ships. This was an expression of the tremendous emotional surge about these refugees, which was shared by America as a whole, and which lifted the entire operation from a routine procedure to one performed in almost a crusading spirit.

Another incident illustrates this: I happened to learn that President Eisenhower's plane, "The Columbine," was in Europe, and, with his permission, arranged to have it loaded with Hungarian refugees on its return flight. So the President's plane arrived on Christmas Day with its load of Hungarian refugees. This was another significant public relations move with unquestioned effect both here and abroad. It was easier to persuade people here to
take the Hungarians into their homes if the President was willing to use his personal plane to bring a lot of them here.

So many things were happening at the same time that it is impossible to make out of this any really orderly statement. Take, for example, the organization of the Kilmer operation; the arrangement to give the resettlement agencies the necessary financing; and Vice President Nixon's trip to Austria, and the intensive publicity. These could come in any order for they all were happening at once, and in a very real way each was a part of the other.

I will start with the organization at Kilmer: After the New York Times' editorial, "The Mess at Kilmer" above referred to, there was almost no criticism of the Kilmer operation. While everyone helped with a spirit which would be hard to duplicate, the primary person responsible for this success was Leo C. Beebe,
who was Vice Chairman at Kilmer of The President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief.

There were twenty-two Government and private agencies operating at Kilmer, all — as I have noted — reporting separately to their own people. Beebe divided these into the sponsoring agencies, that is, those which were doing resettlement; the Government agencies; and the cooperating agencies, such as the Red Cross, which were doing essential and effective work, but — at Kilmer at least — were not engaged in the actual resettlement.

Leo designated one assistant of his as a coordinator for each of these three groups, and had regular meetings with the active heads at Kilmer of all of the groups.

Although the organization was in effect substantially before January 7, 1957, Mr. Beebe published on that date an outline of the organization and work at Kilmer, with a formal organization chart;
flow charts pictured in cartoons; forms for offers of housing and employment; and a report on the refugees received and resettled.

We had appealed to IBM, which had sent down a team and a lot of equipment to help so that we could classify on IBM cards the skills, ages, and other necessary information as to the capabilities, of the refugees, and also the essential information as to the job and housing offers.

Although there was no interference with the agencies sponsoring resettlement - which from now on I will call the sponsoring agencies - all of this IBM material was given to them to assist in the incredible job of trying to find what to do for these enormous numbers of people.
Mr. Beebe's outline of January 7, 1957, above referred to, contains one column which more conspicuously than anything else shows the success of the operation.

In the first five days of December, the rate of refugees who left for resettlement was about 100 a day. In the last five days of the month, the numbers which left for resettlement were 823, 575, 542, 445 and 463.

The resettlement rate had increased by 500% in thirty days. By that time we knew that the hard core problem had been licked in that we could resettle the refugees, and that we would have no concentration camp.

The inflow of refugees, with the air lift and the three Navy transports, was so rapid that at one time the refugee population at Kilmer reached about 9,000, but it was rapidly cut down.
By February 1, 1957, 80% of all refugees had been resettled, and by May, when 32,075 refugees had passed through the Center, there were only 26 who were not at least temporarily resettled.
With complete safety, MATS (Military Air Transport Service) transported 13,120 refugees on 214 flights. MSTS (Military Sea Transport Service) transported 8,945 on five ocean voyages. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) transported 9,664 on 133 flights.

As the President's Committee said in its final report to President Eisenhower: "While Russian tanks were firing on Hungarians, U.S. military planes and ships were carrying many thousands of them to the safe haven of our free land. Like the Berlin airlift, the meaning of this operation was not lost on the peoples of the world."
One striking factor in the organization at Kilmer was the Red Cross operation. Tremendous quantities of second-hand clothing were sent in as one result of the nationwide excitement over the refugees. I learned from President Hoover, that ordinarily the most difficult and least worth while type of relief is second-hand clothing. However, at Kilmer the Red Cross in some way dealt with this successfully:— sorting the clothing; throwing away what was useless; separating the garments according to size and type for men, women and children; hanging them in a long barracks building, and letting each refugee take a free shopping trip through this department store. I have never seen more order brought out of greater chaos in less time.
While in one sense it is getting ahead of the story, the thoroughness with which Mr. Beebe and his team developed and operated the organization at Kilmer has one striking illustration: Realizing that this kind of thing might happen again, and that the lessons learned the hard way at Kilmer should not be lost, Mr. Beebe and his team developed a complete manual of the operation of such a center, a copy of which is in my files, and copies of which were of course distributed to places in Government and refugee relief where they would be most useful.

No statement about the organization at Kilmer can adequately do justice to what was done there, but I must at least mention General Sidney C. Wooten, the Commanding General. The speed with which he acted; his complete cooperation and his commonsense, were among the great factors which led to success. He was in
command of it all. Taking these tremendous numbers of people into these old broken-down buildings, cleaning up the buildings, painting where feasible, feeding the refugees well, and above all maintaining order with no harsh measures, is a great tribute to him — and also of course to the refugees as well.