WHAT ARE THE LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM TURKEY’S
TRANSNATIONAL OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION EXPERIENCES
by
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ABSTRACT

WHAT ARE THE LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM TURKEY’S TRANSNATIONAL OPERATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION EXPERIENCES

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Although transnational organized crime and terrorism are not new, they are becoming increasingly intersected. Their combined activities threaten today’s globalized world, making police collaboration across national borders more crucial than ever. As a consequence, bilateral and multilateral collaborations among national law enforcement agencies are increasing, and multinational police organizations are expanding their operations in order to cope more effectively with transnational crimes and terror.

This dissertation explores the parameters of operational police cooperation across borders, by examining Turkey’s policing relationships with other states as well as with international police cooperation organizations. Understanding how trans-border police cooperation works in practice, including what enhances or hinders such cooperation at the grassroots level, is the main objective of this study. The research methodology involved interviews with police professionals who had working experiences in these areas.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Interpol’s Automated Search Facility</td>
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<td>BKA</td>
<td>The Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Customs Information Systems</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<td>DNA</td>
<td>Deoxyribonucleic Acid</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>Interpol’s Fusion Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPO</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCM</td>
<td>Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOM</td>
<td>Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCB</td>
<td>National Central Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECI</td>
<td>Southeast European Cooperative Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELEC</td>
<td>Southeast European Law Enforcement Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECS</td>
<td>Europol’s computer system</td>
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TNP  Turkish National Police
U.K.  United Kingdom
UN   United Nations
UNDOC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S.  The United States
USA  The United States of America
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Introduction

Although a direct, causal relationship between globalization and threats to public safety is hard to establish, anecdotal evidences suggest that trans-border criminal groups have found more fertile conditions to improve and expand their operations as national borders have grown more porous. In addition to this supra-territoriality, advanced communication technologies further eased their illegal activities across the world. Terrorists, drug smugglers, human traffickers, as well as financial and cyber criminals—among others—have exploited globalization to develop more sophisticated operations that pose security threats to both developed and developing nations.

Largely owing to these newly arising security concerns, security concepts have been changing and states are required to work together for their common protection. They are challenged to maximize the benefits of globalization in cooperative fighting against transnational criminality. As a result, new international regional policing organizations emerged and many of them have proven to be highly promising in promoting transnational policing. On the other hand, bilateral policing treaties continued to be used as states’ pragmatic instruments for confronting cross-border criminality.

This research study aimed to provide insight into the bilateral and multilateral settings of operational police cooperation from the perspectives of practitioners working/worked in the field. In doing so, it aimed to contribute to the literature by exploring various dimensions of international police cooperation practices. In this respect,
police professionals’ opinions and experiences in this particular area were examined through in-depth interviews. Interviewees included experienced practitioners from the Turkish National Police organization as well as police professionals working for Interpol, Europol and SECI organizations. Hence, it is also a unique study in terms of reflecting the human interface of transnational police cooperation on the ground.

The study’s findings can be summarized as follow: In the present situation, there is a parallel globalization of transnational crimes as seen in various realms of contemporary life. As criminal groups communicate with each other and cut across borders easily in order to perpetrate their crimes, national law enforcement agencies look for better forms of cooperation to combat their illicit activities. However, national borders are not always so permeable for multi-party law enforcement operations. That is to say, traditional barriers such as varying national regulations, systemic barriers and differing priorities prevent police cooperation from being practiced smoothly at the grassroots level. Nevertheless, such difficulties are not likely to slow police cooperation down drastically, because police practitioners know that immediate solutions for such difficulties are not in their power.

Looking at the question from a general perspective, this study also concludes that the existence of mutual trust between the cooperating parties is always perceived as the backbone of operational police cooperation. Exchanging rapid and reliable information is also an essential part of cooperation process. Besides following formal procedures, fraternal police cooperation is widely used in police cooperation. This is especially because police practitioners constantly engage in a search for alternative forms of
cooperation in order to overcome emerging difficulties and to ease cooperation practices on a daily basis.

**Statement of Problem**

It has become an absolute necessity for nation states to confront transnational crimes in a cooperative manner. This is particularly because transnational criminal groups started to operate across the borders with the mindset of multinational enterprises. They are now capable of acquiring and using the latest communication technologies and of extending their illicit activities into various jurisdictions with their sophisticated networks of terrorism, trafficking, smuggling and the like. They adjust themselves to the changing conditions quickly with their soft structures. Thus, particularly in underdeveloped countries, they can easily evade the efforts of law enforcement agencies, while national law enforcement forces are often encumbered by strict bureaucratic barriers, rigid organizational structures and sovereignty concerns.¹

In response to these emerging challenges, international police cooperation has been developing steadily in the last decades. In particular, regional police organizations have proliferated, with growing support from their membership in response to the increasingly threatening nature of transnational criminality. This enabled them to enlarge their personnel sizes and to expand their jurisdictions. Interpol, as an example of global size police cooperation, has been striving to both enhance its technical capacity and eliminate regional barriers. On the other hand, bilateral policing treaties have also been

growing in importance in both formal and informal ways, especially in addressing the shared crime problems between bordering countries.

Now, the problem that needs to be addressed is how national police organizations can cooperate in confronting this growing phenomenon. What may be the best practices of police cooperation in dealing with transcendent crime and terrorism? What are the common formal and informal ways used as well as the common difficulties encountered in daily practices of international police cooperation? What are the most determinant factors of police cooperation, and why? How do police agencies as well as individual police liaison officers communicate and interact with each other? More importantly, how and why do they trust each other?

Turkey, with its unique geographical location and cultural heritage, plays a bridging role in many respects between Asia and Europe. This strategic position greatly improves and diversifies her political, cultural and security relations with a wide range of countries in both East and West. Turkey’s location also has made it a transit country for drug smuggling, human trafficking and other illicit activities. Therefore, looking at the issue of transnational policing through Turkey’s experiences should help illustrate the above-noted parameters of transnational policing.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study is to explore the parameters of international operational police cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels. In essence, it reveals the human interface of international police cooperation. That is to say, it examines transnational operational policing through the experiences, opinions and interpretations of
police professionals who have/had operational experiences in foreign jurisdictions as well as the viewpoints of police professionals who work/worked for Interpol, Europol and SECI organizations. Therefore, findings of the study largely rely on the lessons learned from cooperative police operations in foreign jurisdictions.

In order to address the above-stated issues of international operational police cooperation, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with professional practitioners working in the operational departments of the Turkish National Police (TNP), police professionals working for the above mentioned international police organizations, Turkey’s police liaison officers working abroad, as well as with foreign police liaison officers working in Turkey. Besides interviewing professional police practitioners, official documents relating to cooperation agreements, minutes of official meetings, and reports pertaining to outcomes of trans-border joint operations were also reviewed.

**Significance of the Study**

The significance of this research study lies in its methodology of investigating transnational policing practices from the perspectives of police practitioners. Although the existing literature offers significant information on the issues surrounding international operational police cooperation in general, there is often limited coverage of the daily practices of police professionals working in the field. In order to address this gap in police cooperation, this study examined the viewpoints of practitioners in the field and largely relied on the analysis of their responses in its findings.

There is no question that in today’s densely interconnected and heavily interdependent world, “transnational networks have become more extensive, intensive
and faster flowing.” Contemporary global transformations have growing impacts on distant localities.² National trade and border regulations have become more flexible. This provided further loopholes for criminal groups, thereby allowing them to exploit local laws in order to generate vast profits for their transnational networks. New crime areas such as cyber crimes and asymmetric warfare emerged. On the other hand, transnational policing certainly did not stay out of these contemporary transformations. Both bilateral and multilateral policing mechanisms marked remarkable progress in cooperative fighting against international criminality.

The relevance of this study to transnational policing is its potential to increase understanding of how police cooperation works in the field. Is transnational policing dynamic enough and effective enough to tackle trans-border crimes? Is it an effective response to transnational criminality? It is beyond doubt that national police agencies as well as multilateral police organizations are steadily improving themselves and enlarging the scope of their operations in order to be more effective in fighting all forms of transnational crimes. However, the question remains; what can be done for better police cooperation? Therefore, addressing these emerging issues of transnational policing may have some policy implications on the future practices of transnational police cooperation.

**Research Question**

Determining the research topic involves two requirements. First, identifying the problem that needs to be researched, and second, narrowing the problem down to a workable project. This is more challenging for qualitative researchers because it is not

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easy to structure the research problem easily in qualitative research. Qualitative research usually starts with a broad question even without having predefined concepts which makes it open to discoveries but also daunting especially for new researchers.  

In this study, the primary research question is: “**What are the lessons that can be learned from Turkey’s transnational operational police cooperation experiences?**” This question is investigated by using a case study methodology. The study also explores secondary questions generated by the primary question that relate to specific aspects of international police cooperation experiences at both bilateral and multilateral levels. It primarily attempts to answer the secondary questions and then, analyzes the answers in order to address the general research question in a sequential manner.

**Secondary questions**

The following secondary questions were posed in order to further illuminate the subject matter:

1. What factors determine the priority cooperation areas in transnational policing?
2. What are the common problems (cultural, technical, and bureaucratic) encountered in transnational policing?
3. What are the parameters of reciprocity and mutual trust in international police cooperation?
4. What role do fraternal (informal) links play within formal police cooperation?
5. What are the characteristics of international police cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels?

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6. What are the impacts of international politics and cooperation agreements on transnational police cooperation?

Definitions of Terms

*International police cooperation*

International police cooperation basically refers to “the communication of information on request and the coordination of police operations on criminal matters.” In other words, international police cooperation is a cooperative mechanism facilitating trans-border police activity in preventing or combating crimes that involve more than one state. It may be established as bilateral, regional or multilateral frameworks.

*Bilateral police cooperation*

Bilateral police cooperation refers to police to police cooperation based on an agreement between two countries in policing matters on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity. It is particularly exercised by the neighboring countries that have cultural and political ties as well as common crime problems.

*Regional police cooperation*

Regional police cooperation, as exemplified by Europol and SECI, establishes links across a number of countries who share a common geographic space, common regulations and common crime problems. Countries such as European Union (EU) members or SECI members fit such category.

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**Multilateral police cooperation**

Multilateral police cooperation is a globally oriented form of policing that is open to the membership of all countries. Interpol is the only such multinational and global police organization, with a current membership of 187 countries.\(^5\)

**Transnational crime**

Transnational crime refers to “any criminal activity concerning more than one country, either because of the nature of the crime committed, or because of the identity or behavior of the criminal or his accomplices.”\(^6\) More specifically, characteristics of transnational crime are determined in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes as follows:

- It is committed in more than one State;
- It is committed in one State, but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State;
- It is committed in one state but involves a criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State;
- It is committed in one state but has substantial effects on another State.\(^7\)

**Researcher’s personal experiences**

The researcher was motivated to conduct this study primarily by cultural and technical difficulties he experienced while serving as a Turkish officer assigned to some international policing missions under the auspices of United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Such missions are temporary mandates established in former conflict zones for a distinct time period. They are supposed to end when reconciliation is accomplished throughout the mission areas.

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This differs from transnational operational police cooperation, which is a continuing effort and requires progressive development over time in order to serve as an effective instrument against criminality.

In the mission areas it came to the researcher observation that civilian police were performing their duties in accordance with standard operation procedures. Despite this fact, problems were inevitable. Officers from different cultural and policing backgrounds were thrown together throughout the mission area. Speaking in different accents of mission language was always a barrier. As a matter of fact, such problems are typical of peacekeeping operations as a whole.\(^8\)

The logical question was: If such problems were unavoidable even under standardized circumstances of non-operational policing missions, how did police professionals who worked in different jurisdictions and cooperated for operational purposes cope with the barriers of transnational policing on the ground?

In order to research the study topic using police practitioners’ field experiences and their interpretations, the researcher pursued the following approach in conducting interviews. He began by interviewing Turkish police professionals, since he investigated the research phenomenon mainly through Turkish experience. Then, he examined foreign police professionals’ viewpoints in order to examine the subject from the viewpoints of outsiders. He also interviewed professionals who were working for regional and international police cooperation organizations in an effort to look at the researched area through multilateral cooperation settings.

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Overview of the Study

The textual structure of the study is composed of 8 chapters. Chapter I presents an introductory review of the study. The purpose and significance of the study, the main and secondary research questions, and the definitions of some terms used in the study are briefly explained in this chapter.

Chapter II provides a review of the existing literature about transnational operational police cooperation. Theoretical approaches to international relations and international law enforcement cooperation in particular are analyzed. Changing patterns of global security in the globalized world as well as the spread of transnational crimes and the expansion of bilateral and multilateral police cooperation in the same era are discussed. In addition, Interpol, Europol and SECI as the principal multilateral forms of police cooperation are explained briefly.

Chapter III describes the research design used in the study. The research strategy, how the problem was defined, the criteria for selecting the cases, units of analyses, how the data were collected, how the interview protocol was constructed, how the data was analyzed, how the research concepts were emerged, as well as the validity and reliability issues, are explained in this section.

Chapter IV investigates what factors shape the priority cooperation areas in transnational policing. It discusses whether crime types affect the formation of priority cooperation areas. Questions discussed include: why some common crimes become more compelling over the time whereas some others stay less compelling; in what ways police practitioners’ opinions on cooperative issues converge or diverge; and whether this poses any difficulty to transnational policing are also discussed.
Chapter V investigates the common barriers encountered in daily practices of operational police cooperation as seen through the respondents’ interpretations. What are those common problems? Why do police practitioners criticize each other and how do they cope with those emerging difficulties? More importantly, in what ways do those common problems impact police cooperation?

Chapter VI analyses the role of informal, described here as “fraternal,” police cooperation. The questions discussed, based on the perceptions of interviewees, include how friendly relations lead to development of fraternal cooperation among police professionals, why such cooperation is needed as an instrument of cooperation, and how fraternal cooperation and mutual trust correlate with each other.

Chapter VII examines how transnational police cooperation is practiced at bilateral and multilateral settings, and how it is affected by international politics and agreements. Questions discussed in this context include: Do police professionals cooperate on operational issues exclusively depending on international relations and agreements, or do they seek to go beyond such political frameworks on daily bases? How and to what extent are their cooperative relations shaped by international politics and agreements?

Chapter VIII summarizes all the discussions laid out in the conceptual analyses. Finally, it provides an overall conclusion based on the preliminary findings of each concept. This chapter also reflects the policy implications that can be derived from the analyses as well as the limitations of the study.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Crimes, in particular organized crimes, are increasingly transcending the scope of local authorities and becoming a transnational phenomenon. This makes it impossible for national security forces to succeed in dealing with this rising threat by depending solely on their own resources. Therefore, law enforcement agencies are developing new approaches, and in particular finding ways to cooperate in tackling transnational criminality. Advanced communication technologies and new policing techniques increasingly reveal the trans-border links of organized criminal groups, thereby heightening the international law enforcement community’s awareness of the need for more cooperation.

In this context, all global and regional police organizations as well as mutual police collaborations have the common objective of fighting transnational organized crime and terrorism. States sign new security and cooperation agreements with each other in order to increase mutual benefits in combating common crimes while on the other hand, multilateral police organizations, as the other form of police cooperation, constantly strive to become more effective in combating transnational criminality.

Theoretical Considerations

In the modern world, which is largely defined by globalization, newly emerging multifaceted and interrelated threats impose a requirement on states to redefine their security concepts. This does not mean that globalization has completely changed
international relations. Rather, it has altered the ways in which international security relations are channeled. In this sense, globalization has not only facilitated the spread of technological expertise and universal norms, but has also enabled the proliferation of non-state actors such as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations. Therefore, in response to newly emerging asymmetric threats, more complex and cooperative reactions involving new alliances of international institutions and law enforcement organizations are required. International police cooperation has surely been undergoing rearrangements parallel to these emerging dynamics of the evolving global era.¹

**A. Neorealist approach**

There is no doubt that Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory was influential in defining international relations until late 1980s. Schools of international relations concentrated on the “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures” which determined state behaviors. International organizations, in this sense, received little attention by neorealist scholars.² Such organizations were perceived to be grounds for the political maneuvers of state actors. That means they exist only to serve the interests of states. Even students of international governance used to study international organizations through this statist perspective; they were not seen as independent actors in international political arena.

Friedrichs (2008) argues from a realist perspective that international police cooperation would be quite difficult since policing is closely associated with states’

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“monopoly of the legitimate use of force” or simply because of the sovereignty concerns of nation states. Contrary to this view, liberal internationalists approach the issue of police cooperation from the perspective of commercial theory. That is to say, the rising security concerns of states may have positive effects on states to cooperate in policing matters. Friedrichs (2008) also argues from a normative perspective that domestically or internationally developed norms influence states to cooperate with other states. Similarly, the theory of institutionalism suggests that institutions also have significant effects on states’ international cooperative relations.  

**B. Liberal approach**

Liberal approach, on the other hand, regards international organizations as entities that can usefully facilitate cooperation among states and promote liberal values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They say that the strength of international organizations depends on adherence to these values. Other scholars take a different view, perceiving international organizations through Max Weber’s organizational theory that defines organizations as bureaucracies with their own rules and authority. In this view, international organizations are merely projections of national bureaucracies on an international level. In this sense, they are double edged swords: while they usually produce useful services, they may in some instances produce “undesired and self-defeating outcomes” when managing international crisis.}

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3 Friedrichs, J. (2008). *Fighting terrorism and drugs; Europe and international police cooperation* (pp. 31-35). Abingdon, Oxon, United Kingdom: Routledge.

C. Constructivist approach

The constructivist approach defines international organizations as autonomous actors, and provides broader explanations for their power practices and their evolutionary shifts over the time, and even for their failures. In this view, international organizations usually act as autonomous bureaucracies and impose necessary changes over their respective environments. They may adapt new circumstances over the time and change themselves even against the desires of their members. Sometimes they undertake new international tasks, adopt new rules to fit, and carry out new missions without getting the approval of their membership. This can result in progress, but in some cases their efforts are defeated by overly bureaucratic and resistant structures.5

Transnational advocacy networks are remarkable examples, in this sense, showing how international civilian networks and organizations may be effective in contemporary world politics. These networks may involve economic firms, networks of scientists and experts, networks of activists, nongovernmental organizations, research groups, media organs or any other professional group bound together by shared values and principles. They are in constant interaction with each other as well as with state actors. They contribute to the improvement of social and cultural norms in addressing common issues like environmental protection, human rights, animal rights and the like. They have effective channels of exchanging information and services for their common purposes.

With this in mind, they have the ability to mobilize information strategically, and to affect the decision-making processes of powerful organizations and governmental authorities. They constantly increase their influence in regional or international politics. These non-state actors do not possess power in a traditional sense, but use the “power of

5 Ibid.
their information, ideas and strategies” in order to affect state policies. “They provide information that would not otherwise be available, from sources that might not otherwise be heard” as well as make such information available for activist groups separated from each other geographically.6

**D. Harmonization theory**

Nadelmann (1997), in his “harmonization” theory, emphasizes the issue of eliminating friction among cooperating law enforcement agencies. He contends that all multilateral cooperative policing initiatives basically strive to help law enforcement agencies overcome the disagreements arising from “conflicting sovereignties, political tensions, and differences among law enforcement systems.” In doing so, they try to establish a kind of consensus among criminal law systems which can create a new framework for enhancing international police cooperation.

Nadelmann’s harmonization theory incorporates three processes: “(1) regularization of relations among different law enforcement agencies; (2) accommodation among systems that retain their essential differences; and (3) homogenization of systems toward a common norm.” In his view, international law enforcement institutions ultimately aim to increase the similarities among law enforcement systems based on the assumption: “like systems are better able to communicate and collaborate than unlike systems.” Therefore, he envisages that future police cooperation will improve in more

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specific policing areas such as “criminalistics, hostage negotiations, homicide investigations, communications, and the like.”

On the other hand, Nadelmann’s harmonization theory is confronted by a counter idea saying that harmonization of “definitions, practices and norms” would not be useful for police cooperation in any way. First of all it may prevent innovative practices of police cooperation. Secondly, it may restrict the capacity of learning from others’ policing practices as well as restricts the capacity of taking advantages of opportunities offered by different legal systems. Thirdly, harmonization inevitably leads to bureaucratization which is one of the most common obstacles of police cooperation. In this context, “trust building and respect of other’s practice” prevails as the most effective instrument of transnational police cooperation.

Changing Patterns of Global Security

The modern world has become heavily interconnected and interdependent as a result of noteworthy advances in communication systems and transportation facilities. This global reach had unquestionable impacts on traditional security perceptions. Security concept has been shifted from “national security” to “global security.” That has transformed security into an “international public good” for all nations rather than being just a domestic concern of nation states. This enables policymakers to address

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transnational organized criminal groups who operate like international entrepreneurs in the contemporary world, threatening the security of all.\(^9\)

Political conditions have also changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world, divided by two rival superpowers, has vanished. This major shift in the current international system created a political gap within Eastern Europe. Subsequently, this political gap was filled to some degree with some Eastern European countries’ integration with the European Union.

The collapse of the Former Yugoslav Republic and the emergence of new states within its former territories, in the 1990s, was certainly another major political shift that caused further loopholes in the security of Southeast Europe. Yugoslav Republic’s partition was not a peaceful dissolution leaving behind harsh ethnic clashes and political disputes. As a result of this political turmoil, security conditions notoriously deteriorated in the region. The newly emerging states’ failure in establishing effective control within their borders enabled transnational criminal groups to access more fertile conditions in the region. Consequently, Former Yugoslav territories have become the most convenient routes for human smuggling and drug trafficking into the EU territories.

On the other hand, the nature of terrorism has changed following the period of bipolar world. Terrorist organizations networked linearly and operated horizontally across the globe in this new era. In particular, Al Qaeda type terrorist groups have changed their operation strategies and have started massive, destructive and mortal attacks. The primary goal, in these attacks, was killing as many people as possible from their enemy side rather than publicizing their struggle all over the world. This new phase of terrorism called as

“Apocalyptic Terrorism.” With this aspect, Okwui Enwezor calls globalization as “the terrible nearness of distant places.” Robert J. Samuelson, on the other hand, says: “We have gone from a world of small and understandable risks to a world of huge and imponderable dangers.”

In the former era, security was traditionally conceived in military terms and even often as a rivalry between states. However, political instability in weak states, economic collapse and environmental issues has joined with global crime to change our views of security challenges. Non-military threats are now high on the agenda in the foreseeable future. As the recent financial crisis shows, countries have become much more vulnerable to the cascading effects of instability encountered anywhere in the world.

This new era, on the other hand, has also encouraged international cooperation as a way of confronting the new transnational security landscape. International security cooperation is no longer associated with Cold War concepts like “balance of power,” “deterrence,” “containment” or “hegemonic stability.” Instead, security has been redefined as the collective security of the global community. It is now perceived as requiring wider international cooperation, and multilateralism has become a major instrument for government actions. This has helped re-define the roles international organizations in assuring global security.

A close relationship between globalization and global security has been established which takes into account it’s the dynamics of global communication,

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12 Ibid.
diffusion of power, and interdependence. The operative terms today are “economic openness,” “political transparency,” and “global culture.” Inevitably, these global trends help multilateral organizations flourish as well as become more effective in international politics. These non-state actors foster universal norms and principles and thereby increase the interaction among different nations and cultures all of which leads logically to cooperation in the security field.\textsuperscript{14}

It is also noteworthy that in a contrasting view, global proximity does not improve cooperation and security, but increases the possibility of conflict. It can undermine human rights and labor standards, and create environmental dangers. More pointedly, it can provide fruitful conditions for the proliferation of transnational criminal groups. Thus, it causes frustration and insecurity throughout the world. No matter how these notions cohere or contrast, globalization offers increasingly complex channels through which international actors exercise power. Therefore, there is a close relationship between globalization and global security.\textsuperscript{15}

**Parallel Globalization of Transnational Crimes**

Concern about international activities of organized crime is perhaps as old as the establishment of a sovereign state system. But the new face of global terrorism and crime that emerged in the early 1990s has caused significant new threats to emerge. Criminal and terror groups have become more sophisticated: they have developed decentralized and flexible networks with autonomous components that have made it much harder for


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
national security forces, using their own limited domestic resources, to detect and interdict them.\textsuperscript{16}

In the 1990s, the nature of international terrorism has been changed considerably. Its objectives varied ranging from “anti-abortion activists, animal rights activists, anti-globalization activists, and religious activists.”\textsuperscript{17} In particular, Al Qaeda-type terrorist groups with their linearly and horizontally operating networks showed that they could target any state across the globe. They have been able to target even developed countries by shrewdly exploiting their vulnerabilities in a world of more open borders and mass travel. Arguably began with the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, it showed that powerful states no longer had a monopoly on the projection of power. Interestingly enough, the perpetrators of 9/11 terrorist attacks did not come from the “Third World” but came from the Third World spaces which globalization imported into the Western World.”\textsuperscript{18} That is to say the perpetrators of the attacks were not the people leaving in the third world countries. They were the people originally from third world countries but were grown in the ghettos of some Western cities.

Several developments have accelerated the expansion of transnational organized crime networks. For example, cheaper and faster global communication and transportation facilities have made it easier for many criminal or terrorist actors to move undetected around the world. It is no longer possible for security forces to track all telephone and internet communications as well as container transportations in real time.


Criminal actors in particular have been able to exploit this weakness to expand the scope of their smuggling activities. And they are as flexible as any multinational business, looking for opportunities that carry the lowest risk and offer the highest profit.19

Economic globalization certainly helped the globalization of crime. The new enabling factors include not only advances in transportation systems, but also tremendous growth in trading activities, more porous borders that are oriented towards attracting foreign trade and investments and the facilities to undertake rapid financial transactions in huge amounts. These factors have made traditional border controls ineffective. It has become easier to hide illicit movements of goods and people among legitimate forms of transportation. Detrimental impacts of global markets on local economies as well as weakly regulated global markets have all offered loopholes that allow illegal transnational activities to flourish.

It must also be noted that besides the emerging impacts of globalization on transnational organized crime, there is also a close association between organized crime and crime opportunity. Looking at the phenomenon from “Crime opportunity theory” (Cohen & Felson, 1979) greatly helps to explain the modus operandi of organized crime across borders. Jan J. M. van Dijk states that organized crime is more likely to flourish in “moderately poor countries rather than desperately poor countries.”20 In other words, desperately poor countries are not so profitable for organized crime groups, because people are already deprived economically and thereby offer a less lucrative market. On the other hand, moderately poor countries provide more suitable grounds for the

convergence of motivated offenders and criminal opportunities. Low risk of detection is certainly another factor favoring organized crime groups in this respect.\(^{21}\)

As for the role that political conditions play in the rise of transnational crime, it is beyond doubt that countries, ruled by politically fragile governments or by failed states, often serve as safe havens. Corruption, inefficient and nontransparent and irresponsible state institutions, absence of the rule of law, poorly paid and trained law enforcement, and poorly protected borders create sanctuaries in which criminal groups can develop their operational bases. In particular, politically instable nations or countries marked by ethnic conflict are a lucrative market. Local warlords can use the arms smuggling and drug-trafficking activities of crime groups to their own profit and benefit.\(^{22}\)

It is also noteworthy that especially the criminal groups operating across neighboring countries easily challenge national border controls because; they have ethnic or national ties with the other side of borders and use this loyalty or solidarity in their illegal trans-border activities. Transnational criminality with this nature threats countries’ stability and social order by debilitating governmental institutions through illegitimate ways such as corruption. They eventually move their illegitimate profits into legitimate business areas and thereby increasing their revenues constantly. As a result, social values of democratic societies are seriously challenged by transnational criminality.\(^{23}\)

The above discussions make clear how easily transnational organized criminal groups have adapted to the economic, political and technological developments of globalization. Abandoning their hierarchical patterns of organization in favor of cellular

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
structure, they have learned to act like legitimate multi-national enterprises. Larger groups have been able to developing specialized units for drug smuggling, human trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering, forgery of documents, and the like. All these various units act in a converged and coordinated manner when carrying out illegal businesses. They present a profound challenge to law enforcement.24

Parallel Globalization of Transnational Policing

A. Historical perspective

Transnational police cooperation dates back to the late 19th century, when a number of European countries and the United States began to exchange photographs and fingerprints of criminals wanted for various crimes on their home territories.25 Interpol, founded in 1914, was the first example of how such cooperation was institutionalized, and it has remained the dominant model. From the beginning, law enforcement agencies employed advances in information technology -from the telephone to the fax machine- to strengthen their cooperation across borders. And the cooperation continues to keep pace with information technology developments today, and often drives police agencies to collaborate and network in new ways.26

Nevertheless, international police cooperation received little political attention in the few decades following the World War II. It was mostly regarded by states as a minor aspect of police operations and as a means of limited technical exchange. That changed,


however, by the 1970s. Governments began to pay more attention to developing international standards for policing principles, practices and training as they were faced with a new generation of criminals that operated simultaneously in several countries, or were able to avoid capture by fleeing across borders. As transnational criminal groups increased their sophistication, straining the resources of national law enforcement forces, multilateral police cooperation began to move higher on the agenda.²⁷

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks unquestionably marked a turning point in the internationalization of policing. Security concepts were re-defined according to the imperatives of a global anti-terrorism campaign. In the years following this catastrophe, transnational policing greatly accelerated and deepened. The pre-existing distinction between internal and external policing almost disappeared. The idea of eliminating the barriers of interagency cooperation and expanding transnational policing in every possible aspect has prevailed in international community. Thus, national police agencies will be able to work together in a collaborative manner similar to the cooperation of domestic police departments within national borders. In this manner, transnational policing was not perceived as an instrument simply for responding to global terrorism but envisioned as a “much broader criminal law enforcement agenda at the regional and global levels.”²⁸

It is also notable that September 11-type attacks, as well as rising anxieties about the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-state actors have become policing concerns rather than just military matters. This newly arising security concept

has further accelerated trans-border police collaborations. U.S. law enforcement agencies certainly played a pioneer role in most of these cooperative initiatives. In particular the U.S.-led global terrorism campaign was prioritized across the world. Federally funded antiterrorism training seminars increased from less than 1,000 per year to almost 5,000 in 2002. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), on the other hand, put a new emphasis on narco-terrorism and focused on investigating the links between drug trafficking and terrorism.\(^{29}\)

In the new security context, international police cooperation has also remarkably improved in the transatlantic axis despite the growing discrepancy between the U.S. and some EU members over the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq. The U.S. governments undoubtedly utilized the September 11 attacks to convince EU authorities for more ambitious transatlantic police cooperation. Thus, cooperation agreements in the areas of “border controls, criminal justice cooperation, and immigration and asylum policy” were signed between the U.S. and the EU authorities. Accordingly, U.S. law enforcement agencies were allowed to access Europol databases despite conflicting with the data protection laws of European countries. Further, they acquired the right to screen US-bound airline passengers as well as U.S.-bound ships departing from European ports.\(^{30}\)

**B. Globalization impact**

Transnational networks have become faster, deeper, wider and cheaper. Advanced communication technologies and transportation systems, the end of the Cold War era, easier movement across national borders, tremendous increases in the amount of financial and commercial transactions, and the resulting emergence of increasingly interdependent

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 198, 199.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 218-222.
international markets have also been transforming the policing area. Tremendous advances in personal communications via internet and mobile phones have made distant localities increasingly connected to each other.\(^3\)

International police cooperation was not immune from these arising waves of globalization. Today’s intensively interconnected world not only eased trans-border criminal collaborations, but also it dramatically smoothed direct communication and collaboration among police professionals in investigating trans-border crimes. Thus, the bureaucratic and political barriers to police cooperation have considerably decreased. Second, fraternal police cooperation within formal cooperation has been remarkably improved chiefly because of the direct communications established among police agencies as well as among individual police practitioners.

Police cooperation has continued to widen and deepen in this global age. National police agencies are engaging in new regional and international police cooperation organizations, as well as constantly expanding their liaising networks. For instance, in the U.S. alone, the FBI and DEA together have about 150 liaison officers across the world. Likewise, international police organizations such as Interpol, Europol and SECI are constantly enlarging their operational scopes by signing new strategic agreements with individual states all over the world as well as establishing liaison relationships with other transnational police organizations.

Police cooperation is, on the other hand, deepening particularly in the form of “global metropolitan policing.” As transnational crimes created new pressure on metropolitan police forces, the formation of formal and informal networks among them

noticeably increased around the world. The New York Police Department’s new project of international liaison program and the Joint Investigation Teams in European Police cooperation are two notable examples. In this way, police professionals develop and share “experts systems of knowledge” with fellow counterparts in other police agencies. These short-term collaborations are usually conducted through unilaterally deployed liaison officers focusing on investigating specific crimes.\textsuperscript{32}

International police cooperation within the European Union has also deepened. The increasing collaboration among EU member states resulted in the development of the “European arrest warrant,” replacing the traditional system of extradition. Europol multiplied the number of its specialists in counterterrorism. “Eurojust” became operational for assisting investigations of cross-border crimes, and for facilitating coordination between judicial and legal authorities of member states. Another remarkable future projection of police cooperation in Europe is the common border management of the EU countries. All of these cooperative instruments have faced political and technical obstacles that need to be dealt with by respective EU institutions in the context of integration.\textsuperscript{33}

It is also important to note that, contrary to common assumption, the rise of transnational organized crime and terrorism are not the only reasons for transnational police cooperation. Other forces are driving police cooperation. As mentioned above, national borders are more porous, national economies are interdependent, and conditions of poverty, hunger, and unemployment are driving mass migration across borders. No


matter what factors are effective in this respect, it is obvious that governments are reorganizing their institutions accordingly. And police organizations must similarly keep pace with the ongoing transformations of our shrinking world.34

**Overview of International Police Cooperation**

International police cooperation is a progressive process. It involves several steps when combating transnational criminality. It requires an effective information exchange regarding the basic facts of trans-border crimes, such as the accurate definition of criminal incidents, the exact description of suspects and victims, as well as proper documentation of cases. Cooperating agencies must be frank and open for mutual assistance during joint investigations. Information subject to share in this process must be accurate and be exchanged in timely manner.

At the operational level in particular, trans-border police to police cooperation develops in a progressive way. It is usually a direct and tight communication between the cooperating parties and continues until the end of trans-border investigations in the form of mutual assistance. At operational investigation level police cooperation involves collaboration, collecting evidences, interviewing victims of crime, and detaining and extraditing suspects at the policing level. At the prosecutorial level, it involves exchanging ragotory letters, transporting witnesses for court appearances, arranging the testimony of investigative officers at trials, and briefing judges about suspects’ criminal background and the like.35

Balzer (2003) lists the fundamentals of trans-border police cooperation as follows: “shared perception” of emerging crime threats which is important for determining the common objectives of police cooperation; the employment of experienced and qualified practitioners which is essential for ensuring the quality of cooperative works; adequate legislative and budgetary support that are always needed for legitimacy and stability of police cooperation; and finally the maintenance of regular communication between police authorities of cooperating agencies that it is vital for getting in collaboration at anytime needed. He argues that in the absence of any of these conditions, efficient police cooperation cannot be possible.\textsuperscript{36}

International police cooperation is a sensitive issue chiefly because investigating criminal offenses is perceived as a prerogative of sovereignty. That always has an impact not only on the organization of police cooperation mechanisms, but on decisions about how far such cooperation can be allowed to go. Mostly because of such political concerns, multinational police collaborations are limited to the regular exchange of information and the coordination of policing strategies. In this regard, Deflem (2004) says that “the greater extent to which national police institutions have gained a position of institutional independence from their respective political centers, the greater is the chance that those institutions are in a position to engage in international cooperation.”\textsuperscript{37}

International police cooperation may include various forms of police operations such as: “technical assistance, prevention and upholding public order, and criminal

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
investigations.” Technical assistance involves the exchange of information, training, and financial support. Cooperation in upholding public order is a preventive police operation that usually takes place between neighboring countries during public events, such as athletic competitions. Trans-border criminal investigations—the most important form of international police cooperation and the main focus of this study—involves the exchange of operational purpose information and the coordination of criminal investigations.

**Obstacles to International Police Cooperation**

States have increasingly recognized the seriousness of transnational criminality and, at the same time, the importance of police cooperation in combating the phenomenon. The current instruments of transnational police cooperation are highly promising, but they are still complicated by slow-moving bureaucracies, political concerns, and even by internal problems of state institutions. Information and intelligence sharing is traditionally considered a sensitive area in police cooperation, chiefly because of national, political and ideological concerns. While such cooperation always needs extra caution and must be accompanied with mutual trust, police officials usually try to overcome this barrier by establishing private networking channels that bypass government hierarchies.

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The discrepancies between major legal systems; Common Law, Civil Law and Islamic Law may also cause problems especially when cross-border investigations proceed from policing level to judicial level. For instance, in the common law systems, attorney generals are appointed by political authority and they may not have a judge status, whereas their counterparts in the civil law systems come from judicial bureaucracy and they have judge status. That means when an attorney general of a common law system makes a judicial request to a judicial authority of a civil law system, it is likely to be refused since the request letter must contain the signature of a judge. Moreover, in common law countries, judicial officers usually involve themselves in the final stage of judicial investigations; whereas in civil law countries, judicial officers (prosecutors) are actively involved throughout the entire investigation process. That means if a common law state requests judicial assistance during the initial investigation, it is also likely to be refused by the civil law state since the case is still under police investigation.\(^4\)

International police cooperation is a complex process with its various dimensions. It requires several provisions to be established and sustained. That is why it may be disrupted quickly when any of those conditions are absent. As discussed by Roth (2005) in detail, difficulties in police cooperation may arise from diverging perceptions of criminality, different languages, different legal systems, varying working hours and policing practices, political instability, cultural differences, and even from different physical conditions such as countries’ distances from each other. All these factors may

have determinative effects on the quality of police cooperation when investigating the trans-border crimes.\textsuperscript{42}

International police cooperation is especially challenged when it involves law enforcement agencies of underdeveloped or developing countries. Countries in transition from socialism to capitalism still have many loopholes in their legal systems that have provided opportunities for money laundering, and widespread corruption. In particular, police in developed countries shy away from cooperating with law enforcement agencies where corruption is systemic.

Sometimes, even varying economic and military levels of cooperating countries can obstruct police cooperation as, for example, in the relationship between the U.S. States and Mexico (which is also influenced by the high level of corruption in Mexican federal and state police). American law enforcement, with its highly trained personnel and cutting-edge technology, is often placed in a superior position when it conducts joint operations with Mexican police. This has aroused Mexican sensitivities over sovereignty, and in turn has made cooperation especially difficult.\textsuperscript{43}

Structural differences between police organizations are also a problem. Police officers are often uncertain about who their counterparts are in other national agencies, particularly when those agencies are decentralized. For instance, there are thousands of local police agencies in the U.S. (as well as several federal agencies), making it confusing for non-U.S. law enforcements to establish channels appropriate to their specific case needs and thereby creating the danger of miscommunication. Such communication problems may sometimes create discomforts on non-U.S. law enforcement agencies.


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
Furthermore, different time zones, different computer systems and different languages hinder real-time communication between law enforcement agencies. The language barrier is a major challenge, since translating judicial orders and terms can result in missed signals or a complete breakdown in cooperation. Various technical obstacles also arise as a result of prosecution procedures. This leads to problems such as a lack of mutual trust between the parties, limited expectations of success, and an absence of clarity about where petitions for cooperation must be addressed. Furthermore, in several cases, public prosecutors are not familiar with the procedures and regulations required for establishing international criminal assistance. This is more critical to judicial cooperation, which often depends upon timely action.44

Extradition which is an effective instrument of international legal assistance in criminal matters and thereby an important tool of international police cooperation, has generated special problems. States may extradite suspected persons or criminals according to a mutual agreement or principle of reciprocity. However, in practice, some states may have reservations about reciprocity because of differences in the way cases are handled in courts. Some states that do not have the death penalty are reluctant to extradite suspects to states that do. Further barriers to cooperation are created by different sentencing standards for the same crime, by requests for extradition of suspects charged with political crimes that are not recognized as such by the collaborating country, and by perceptions that a requesting country may not provide a fair trial.45


Apart from these obstacles, there are some other shortcomings of international police cooperation. Bayley (2005) contends that police agencies of underdeveloped countries or countries in political transition often receive technical assistance from international policing organizations or developed countries. Thus, the quality of police cooperation with those countries is aimed to improve further. However, sometimes such assistance programs lack strategic planning according to planned objectives and thereby not providing the desired outcome in improving the capacity of the police agencies in transition. On the other hand, international assistance programs are usually prepared by the donor countries or organizations as standard packages so that they can be applied in any country. However, this is also a potential risk that they may not fit the local conditions of recipient countries. It is also worth to note that technical assistances supplied to police agencies of poor countries must be used in a productive way. In this respect countries assisting at bilateral level are often reluctant to be compelling on the recipient agencies because of the concern that it may jeopardize the existing cooperative policing activities. International policing organizations are similarly cautious not to be perceived as unwanted entities within the domestic territories of recipient police agencies.46

**Bilateral and Multilateral Policing Instruments**

First of all, the legal footing for international police cooperation rests on bilateral or multilateral treaties. These international legal instruments may establish either operational cooperation in combating transnational crimes or judicial procedures for

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bringing trans-border criminals to justice. Bilateral policing agreements are the earliest instruments regulating the mutual legal assistance between two states. In contrast, multilateral policing agreements are signed by several states and provide a greater level of cooperation to their signatories. All these agreements, while created primarily for the needs of cooperating states, are also compatible with provisions of universal human rights.47

Bilateral agreements are prepared mainly for the specific needs of cooperating parties, especially when differences between the legal systems of cooperating states need to be overcome. However, multilateral policing agreements are relatively more inclusive instruments in terms of functionality. In this manner, they may replace several bilateral agreements in benefiting their signatories. They may contribute more to territorial stability since they represent the shared intentions of cooperating states. They may be more preventive in trans-border criminal matters since they cover the entire territories of cooperating countries. On the other hand, they usually require permanent bodies in order to become operational, thus requiring greater resource investments.48

Bilateral agreements are the basic instruments through which states express their concerns over common crimes and declare their shared commitment to combating those crimes. Criminal areas encompassed by the cooperation agreement are specifically stated in the proposals. Further, common characteristics of each crime field as well as under what conditions the cooperation mechanism will work are clearly explained in the agreement texts. Finally, the burdens placed on the cooperating parties and procedures for how the treaties will be utilized for combating crimes are all explained in the cooperation

48 Ibid.
agreements. Crimes such as drug smuggling, terrorism, illegal immigration, organized crime, money laundering, document forgery, nuclear trafficking, and weapons smuggling are the usual subjects of bilateral agreements.

**Bilateral Police Cooperation**

Bilateral police cooperation is the most common form of international police cooperation. It is established mostly for operational purposes and becomes instrumental through bilateral agreements. The agreements may exist for many years, or they may last until a specific problem is solved. Mutuality of interests and reciprocity are the essential elements of bilateral police cooperation. Several shared facts such as “historical, ideological, social, and economic ties” may also motivate states to cooperate mutually in policing matters. Geographical proximity and the prevalence of common crimes in cooperating countries are other significant factors in this regard. Bilateral agreements usually aim at framing the “scope, structure, duration, and extent” of police cooperation. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a significant example of bilateral police cooperation, with its 78 liaison officers deployed in 56 countries.49

Bilateral police cooperation may be carried out through formal or informal means of police-to-police contacts, particularly between neighboring countries. Trustworthiness is an essential tool. Liaison officers play a crucial role, in this regard. They are the human interface between law enforcement agencies of cooperating states. That is why states assign new liaison officers abroad as the scope of police cooperation expands over new countries. Liaison officers not only play an official representational role but also they

facilitate the flow of requests between cooperating countries for “information, evidence, interrogations, searches, arrests, and extraditions.”

Establishing direct contact between police agencies is especially essential in getting more effective results from operational cooperation. This is chiefly because direct communication accelerates joint operations. Further, it ensures that the decision to conduct joint operations is mutually agreed, which helps increase mutual trust. In bilateral cooperation, investigators can regularly contact each other and update the exchanged information pertaining to ongoing investigations. Face-to-face meetings are other effective instruments. Also third-country law enforcement teams can be invited to participate in joint investigations when operations extend to those countries. Thus, a kind of “investigative consortium” can be formed as each investigative team carries out one part of an operation.

**Liaison officers**

Liaising in policing issues first began with the deployment of French agents to the United States in the late 1970s. This project was launched under an agreement signed between the U.S. and French governments in the wake of the United Nations Convention on Narcotics. In this early period, liaison officers were tasked with combating drug trafficking; but in the latter years, police liaising expanded to other countries and encompassed further policing areas. Over the time, it has become an effective tool of police cooperation both at bilateral and multilateral forms. In today’s transnational

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policing, liaison officers working under the umbrella of Europol or SECI-type regional organizations identify themselves as information brokers, and play a key role in exchanging information and intelligence.

Police liaisons in foreign jurisdictions basically maintain the continuous flow of information between their own agencies and hosting country agencies. As the human face of police cooperation, they usually develop close relations with their counterparts and have good knowledge about the legal systems and cultures of host countries. Therefore, they can play crucial roles in joint operations by channeling incoming and outgoing information requests to the appropriate departments of cooperating agencies in real time.53

Liaison officers have also become an increasingly effective instrument of multilateral police cooperation in recent years. Particularly in Europol and SECI-type regional police cooperation initiatives, liaison officers have started to act as information brokers. This is principally because such regional organizations are suitable platforms for face-to-face interactions between police professionals, and can help develop professional solidarity over time. As a result of this human interface, national or political concerns of their respective countries are eased by the professional solidarity that develops from working a number of cases together.54

Europol Headquarters is a remarkable example in his regard. Liaison officers stationed under the umbrella of a regional police organization may often go beyond the limits of bilateral cooperation. Even as they pass information to their respective national

agencies, they “function as part of a mini-police of Europe.” Working together under the Europol umbrella gives European liaison officers a common European idea and thereby reinforcing the mutual trust them. This unique characteristic of Europol not only accelerates the exchange of information between member-state police agencies but also greatly facilitates conducting joint operations throughout European territories.\textsuperscript{55}

It is also worth noting that formal police cooperation is often supplemented by informal police-to-police cooperation, or by informal mutual assistance among police liaison officers. This trend has developed in recent years. Some countries, such as Japan, often use informal bilateral police cooperation in responding to transnational crimes. This fraternal cooperation is usually exercised through information exchanges generated by personal contacts developed between the respective officers of various law enforcement agencies, or between the liaison officers deployed to other countries or to some regional police cooperation centers. Such informal contacts between the practitioners mature over time and eventually lead to official cooperation agreements between states.\textsuperscript{56}

On the other hand, the role of liaison officers is not always straightforward. They are occasionally constrained by the political and cultural concerns of hosting countries. It is also a fact that liaison officers do not have any investigative authority in the foreign jurisdictions where they work. That is why liaison officers often have to cope with various frustrations arising from the legal or cultural conditions of host countries.

Nevertheless, bilateral liaisons are much favored by police agencies since they provide

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

direct and timely assistance especially when investigating specific cases such as drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{57}

Multilateral Police Cooperation

Parallel to developments in multilateral police cooperation, there has been an exponential growth in both the number and scope of international policing organizations. Some of them operate in regional scopes such as Europol, Schengen Information System, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Police Association, the South African Police association, the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center. Some others have a global reach. These include Interpol, the United Nations Police Division, the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, and the World Customs Organization. All these multiparty policing instruments have the common task of sharing information for operational purposes.\textsuperscript{58}

Multilateralism exists when three or more states commit themselves to collective action in addressing common problems or opportunities. It “coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for class or actions.”\textsuperscript{59} It can be classified as an institutional structure in international relations. With this in mind, member states are supposed to follow the rules for all matters falling under the jurisdiction of multilateral

institutions. In response, multilateral organizations are expected to distribute equivalent benefits to their membership.

International organizations, as one specific form of multilateralism, have gained modest importance in the security field, despite being a relatively recent phenomenon in global politics. This is partly because of individual states’ inability to effectively address the emerging trans-boundary security issues. This weakness appears to be one of the underlying sources of the difficulty in combating transnational criminality. In this context, international police cooperation organizations have been demonstrating that they can be more effective in orchestrating collaborative action against trans-border organized crimes. Although the principle objective of such organizations is to maintain peace and security among nation states, they have gradually assumed new roles in a number of issues ranging from local conflicts to transnational criminality.\(^{60}\)

As international organizations proved successful in addressing various international emergency situations, they increasingly assumed the roles of states in international issues. Peace building efforts after interethnic conflicts such as in Bosnia and Kosovo, reconciliation efforts in former crisis areas such as Macedonia, human relief efforts after massive natural disasters such as in Indonesia can be accounted as the recent exemplary cases in this regard. In particular since the early 1990s, international organizations have been active in various international issues: intervening in domestic economies, developing environmental regimes, producing regulations for the wellbeing of refugees, engaging in peacekeeping even nation-building operations. With their bureaucratic structures and decision-making procedures of their own, they have developed and implemented new policies for intervention; and as they have enlarged their

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\(^{60}\) Ibid.
scope, they have increasingly become autonomous in making decisions and conducting operations independent of their members.\textsuperscript{61}

However, international organizations have not been immune to criticism. Some argue there is inadequate democratic accountability and transparency in both their decision-making process and the implementation of policy. As these large organizations come to have a greater impact on international politics, the lack of such accountability represents a potential danger to both democracy and the traditional Westphalian concept of state sovereignty, and the danger is aggravated by the increasing number of issues that are put on the agenda of international organizations. In sum, multilateral actors can not only profoundly affect the dynamics of international politics; they can alter traditional concepts of power and global security.\textsuperscript{62}

As mentioned earlier, Interpol, Europol, and SECI are examined in this research study as the multilateral settings of operational police cooperation. Below is the brief review of the literature about their functionality in transnational policing.

**Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization)**

Interpol, the largest international police cooperation organization in the world, with a current membership of 188 states, emerged as a cooperative initiative of police chiefs. Since its renaming in 1956 as International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)


or shortly as Interpol, it has expanded beyond Europe and became a truly worldwide police cooperation organization.\textsuperscript{63}

Interpol enables the exchange of operational information in preventing crimes as well as in identifying, locating and arresting criminals.\textsuperscript{64} Furthermore, it analyses data to identify current and future trends of criminality. Its information sharing service is available for the member state agencies to communicate with each other directly.\textsuperscript{65}

Interpol has neither its own police force nor executive police powers to conduct operations within member countries unless a member state law enforcement agency requests investigative assistance from Interpol. Although its mission is defined by its constitution to include all ordinary crimes, “international crime” is often stressed by Interpol authorities as their main mission.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{A. Interpol’s core functions}

Interpol’s secure and sophisticated global police communication system, known as I-24/7 and works 24 hrs a day, provides real-time confidential transmissions of “text messages, high-resolution images, photographs, or fingerprints” pertaining to international investigations to all member state police agencies (National Central Bureaus), its regional offices, and other international policing organizations.\textsuperscript{67} This network also enables National Central Bureaus (NCB) to access each others’ national


data bases. Interpol headquarters also circulate information notices about wanted persons to all NCBs as required. Interpol’s Automated Search Facility (ASF) enables NCBs to search for international records on people. Thus, police officers have access to criminal information such as arrest warrants, stolen travel documents, and stolen vehicles all over the world. They can collect and disseminate criminal information through the same system and thereby respond to assistance requests coming from domestic or international agencies.

B. Interpol’s operational support services

In the area of fighting drug trafficking, Interpol’s X.400 telecommunications system connects member state police agencies and enables them to share real time information. This is important for cutting through the bureaucratic barriers hindering police cooperation and supporting criminal investigations actively. Interpol in its operational support services focuses on organized criminal activities across borders, such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, armed robbery, and counterfeiting and money laundering. Interpol’s “Project Millennium”, launched in 1999 with the participation of

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39 member states, has been a remarkable example showing how Interpol has become a “global coordinator” and service provider in combating international criminality.\(^\text{72}\)

As for fighting terrorism, Interpol’s Fusion Task Force (FTF) identifies terrorist groups and their membership, collects and shares information and intelligence with member states, provides analytical support, and improves the capacity of member states in addressing terrorism threats and organized crime. In fighting against trafficking human beings, Interpol examines the types of the documents used in illegal border crossings and it explores the strategies followed by traffickers. This information is passed on accordingly to member countries.\(^\text{73}\)

Interpol’s Command and C-ordination Center also coordinates operations other than its six priority crime areas depending on the emerging needs of member states. For instance, upon Monaca’s request, Interpol established a working group on Pink Panthers, a very well known gang organization, emerged from the Balkans and was carrying out a series of jewel robberies across the world. All evidences (DNA data, fingerprint scans, and telephone numbers) about the Panthers were collected by the Interpol detectives and checked against Interpol and Europol databases. Eventually, the efforts paid off and perhaps more than 20 Panther members are now imprisoned in Western Europe.\(^\text{74}\)

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**Europol (European Police Office)**

Europol came into existence with the Treaty on European Union in 1975 and became fully operational in 1999. Its mission is defined in the treaty as:

Police cooperation for the purpose of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking, and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office.  

Since its creation, Europol’s role has continued to expand with notable achievements on its record and the evolution of security concepts inside and outside the EU. The rise in drug trafficking through Europe during the 1980s, along with the continuous terror threat, particularly the new global face of terrorism in the 1990s, created an added incentive for cooperation on Europe’s internal security and thereby provided the context for the expansion of Europol.

**A. Europol’s core functions**

Europol does not have executive policing power alike Interpol. It is primarily concerned with “illicit trafficking in drugs, vehicles, and human beings, including child pornography, forgery of money, money-laundering, and terrorism.” Under this framework, Europol core functions consist of providing information to national police organizations, coordinating their investigative operations, establishing a computer database for the purposes of providing analysis that national police forces could use to

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develop investigative strategies, and analyzing and assisting the training of member-state police forces in strategies for combating drug trafficking, for applying the latest forensics techniques, and for record-keeping.\textsuperscript{79}

Europol’s computer system (TECS), with three major databases, plays an important role in cooperation. The first database is the Europol Information System, which stores information relating to persons suspected of committing crimes or who are considered likely to commit crime. The second database collects analysis about criminal information and criminal profiles. The third database basically contains a comprehensive index of information stored in the first two databases.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{B. Europol’s operational support services}

In preventing terrorism; Europol has an operational center providing real-time information on terrorism to its membership 24 hrs a day. It provides member states’ police agencies with data and analysis on the activities of terrorist groups, as well as coordinating their counter-terrorism operations and participating in joint investigations as a collaborative organization.\textsuperscript{81} Europol has also the authority to request any member state to start an investigation in a certain case. Thus, besides its supportive role, Europol can also act as an initiator and coordinator of the investigations. That is why some experts argue that Europol is shifting its role from “support capacity” to “central capacity,” leading to speculation that Europol will become a European “FBI” in the future.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79} Occhipinti, D. J. (2003), \textit{The Politics of EU Police Cooperation; Toward a European FBI?} (p. 61). The USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
In preventing drug trafficking; Europol’s cooperative projects are mainly carried out through the provision of expert and analytical support. It carries out support activities such as wiretapping and undercover operations in ongoing drug investigations. Europol Computer Systems play a significant role in this regard with its “Analysis Work Files,” containing thousands of incident records as well as with its “Information System” containing millions of criminal records.83

As for the efforts for preventing vehicle trafficking Europol controls the European Vehicle Identification Database, which stores identification information on different types and models of vehicles as well as the updated descriptions and images of vehicle registration documents from 40 countries of the European continent. This information pool has been very beneficial in detecting vehicle forgeries across European territories.84

In other crime areas as well Europol’s supportive activities to its membership mostly consist of technical equipment and expert advisers. For instance, Europol’s expertise in the analysis of counterfeited documents and other technical forgeries as well as its ability to compile analytic information about criminal networks and their modus operandi have proved crucial in joint operations.85

Europol has also been tasked with establishing a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-border crimes including human trafficking and child pornography within EU territory.86 Its technical supports and cooperative efforts continue in some other areas such as preventing Euro counterfeiting, money laundering and

nuclear trafficking. Although Europol is mainly concerned with EU territories, it has been expanding its cooperative activities beyond EU territories. The primary reason for such expansion is the necessity for combating trans-border crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and money laundering at a global level. For instance, The Europol-Interpol agreement calls for the exchange of operational, strategic, and technical information as well as calls for the co-ordination of activities, development of common action plans, training and scientific research and deployment of liaison officers.\(^{87}\)

**SECI (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative)**

SECI is another international organization that became operational in 1999 with the aim of coordinating international police cooperation among 13 Southeast European countries. As a cooperative regional police organization, SECI operates support services for its membership similar to the services Interpol and Europol prove their members. It facilitates the rapid and secure exchange of information among law enforcement agencies. It coordinates trans-border police operations in the region by gathering and utilizing the resources of member states.\(^{88}\)

SECI is unique in terms of providing direct cooperation between police and customs organizations in combating transnational criminality. It is staffed by police professionals and costumes officers coming from the member countries. It originally emerged as an initiative to promote cooperation among the countries of the region particularly in economic and environmental areas. Thus, countries of the region would be


better prepared to integrate into the European Union. However, latterly it came out to be a cooperative initiative on security issues. Since then several other European countries as well as United States and Canada have been given observer status at the organization headquarters in Bucharest, Romania. Joining Interpol and the World Customs Organization since 2000, the development of SEC’s priority crime areas has paralleled the interests of both Interpol and Europol.

**SECI’s operational support services**

As for operational support activities, SECI has developed seven “Task Forces” to address various types of trans-border criminality, including drug smuggling, human trafficking, stolen vehicles, customs fraud, financial and computer crimes, terrorism, and container security. In addition to its operational cooperation services, SECI center provides information services such as publishing and circulating reports by its analysts about specific organized crime areas.

Despite being relatively a new organization, SECI marked some remarkable achievements in coordinating region wide investigations. ‘Operation Mirage’ in 2003 can be accounted as a notable example in this regard in which SECI provided intelligence, strategic analysis and expertise. SECI has seven task forces. Each of them operates in fighting different crime areas such as illicit drug trafficking, smuggling and fraud,

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91 Ibid.

financial and computer crimes, vehicle trafficking, terrorism, narco-terrorism, container security and the like.\textsuperscript{93}

As seen in the above review of the literature, all three multilateral policing organizations carry out quite similar missions within different scopes. They have neither executive policing power nor the right to conduct operations within member countries on their own. In common, they facilitate communication as well as facilitate the exchange of operationally purposed strategic and technical information among law enforcement agencies.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Method

This is an exploratory “multiple case study,” researched qualitatively. The main research question as well as the secondary questions of the study is designed in “what” question and in its derivative forms. Yin (2003) argues that if research questions focus mainly on “what” questions, “It will be a justifiable rationale for conducting an exploratory study.”¹ There may be several reasons for choosing qualitative research, but the one that most motivates a researcher is to “move beyond the known and enter into the world of participants, to see the world from their perspective and in doing so to make discoveries that will contribute to the development of empirical knowledge.”²

It should be noted that the full scope of contemporary transnational operational police cooperation, as well as the jurisdictional boundaries of international police cooperation organizations, remains uncertain. Therefore, the information needed to answer the research questions was gathered mostly through in-depth interviews with police professionals working in the field of international operational police cooperation. Document analysis was also used to a limited degree, insofar as the researcher was allowed to access them.

In this context, Turkey’s cooperative police relations with Interpol, Europol, and SECI, as well as with other mutually cooperated countries, were examined through the

perceptions of police practitioners who had working experiences in the field. How and in what ways do these police organizations work to enhance international law enforcement cooperation? In-depth interviews, publicly available documents and annual activity reports of the relevant international policing organizations comprised the data source of the research.

![Convergence of evidence](image)

*Figure 1. Convergence of evidence.*

The study investigates the contemporary set of issues of international police cooperation rather than the sequence of historical developments of police cooperation. In order to do that, multiple sources of evidence were used. The major strength of case studies is their reliance on multiple sources of evidence. Comparing and analyzing these sources helped determine the facts about the selected cases as illustrated in Figure 1. This
produced a case study data base. Then, all the compiled evidence was collected along with the derivatives relevant to the study topic in order to reach final conclusions.\(^3\)

Comparative analysis is useful for demonstrating the variations and similarities between selected cases. Comparative analysis has the “capacity to render the invisible visible.” Comparative analysis is also very helpful in discovering any flaws in the researcher’s conceptualization, and in determining the limits of applicability of the research concepts. It can also prevent the researcher from making false generalizations by orienting him away from “overly particular explanations to more general ones where this is appropriate.”\(^4\) In this study, too, the researcher investigates in what ways cooperative policing relations converge or diverge with each other, both at bilateral and multilateral levels of cooperation.

**Selecting the Cases**

Interpol, Europol, SECI and Turkey’s bilateral police cooperation with individual states were selected as the cases of this study since they were considered to be the major parties cooperating with Turkey on policing matters. International police cooperation initiatives are categorized in two groups as “multilateral” and “bilateral.” In this respect, Interpol, Europol and SECI fall in the multilateral group, and Turkey’s mutual policing relations with individual states fall in the bilateral group. The research primarily focused on examining Turkey’s cooperative policing relations with these international policing organizations as well as with countries that have concluded bilateral agreements.

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Although Interpol, Europol and SECI have different mandates, membership sizes, organizational structures, and operational tactics, none of them in common has its own police force as well as operational power. All were established by member states to facilitate international police cooperation in combating transnational criminal groups. Bilateral co-operation agreements, too, have parallel missions of enhancing the fight against common crimes between the cooperating countries. The common ground between these collaborative machines provides a comparative basis to draw conclusions about their contributions to their memberships, as well as to the TNP in combating transnational criminality.

**Concepts derived from data**

At the first stage of the following concepts/themes came out as the prominent issues in transnational operational police cooperation:

- Establishing priority areas of international police cooperation;
- Identifying common problems encountered in transnational policing;
- Developing mutual trust and fraternal cooperation within the formal structures;
- Operation of police cooperation at bilateral and multilateral settings;
- Impacts of international politics and agreements on police cooperation;

Finally, the study makes an “analytic generalization”\(^5\) about how international police cooperation in combating transnational criminality works in practice as well as makes suggestions about the things to do for better operational police cooperation.

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**Theoretical Sampling**

Experienced police professionals in transnational policing were chosen as the target population in order to investigate above noted issues/concepts of operational police cooperation. In-depth interviews were conducted with 62 police practitioners from Turkish police, from Interpol, Europol, and SECI organizations as well as among the foreign police liaison officers stationed in Turkey. Interviewees were chosen among the practitioners who were currently serving or ever served in an international policing capacity. Foreign practitioners were chosen from the countries or international policing organizations with which Turkey had intensive cooperative policing relations. This is because of the practical reason that the researcher examined police cooperation through Turkey’s transnational policing experiences.

Non-random sampling method was used when selecting interview group. This is because; it was not practical and almost impossible to make random sampling and interview police practitioners from all over the world. Also the practices and priorities of police cooperation widely diverge in different regions of the world. Therefore, the researcher made a pilot study and examined operational police cooperation through Turkey’s cooperative experiences in European-Asian axis including the US. Respondents were selected non-randomly at the convenience of the researcher. Interviewees were reached in a snowballing way. Corbin & Strauss (2008) explain theoretical sampling as:

What makes theoretical sampling different from conventional methods of sampling is that it is responsive to the data rather than being established before the research begins. This responsive approach makes sampling open and flexible. Concepts are derived from data during analysis and questions about those concepts drive the next round of data collection. The research process feeds on itself. It simply keeps moving forward, driven by its own power. Also, rather than being used to verify or test hypothesis about concepts, theoretical sampling is about discovering relevant concepts and their properties and dimensions. In this
form of research, the researcher is like a detective. He or she follows the leads of concepts, never quite certain where they will lead, but always open to what might be uncovered.”

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2. Mapping the interviewees according to their relevance to the research.**

**Profile of the respondents**

In total, 62 officers were interviewed in order to investigate the research area. Below is the short description profiling of those interviewed people.

1. Of those 62 interviewees, 41 were interviewed within the frame of bilateral cooperation.

1.1. Of those 41 officers, 24 were the TNP officers.

1.1.1. 9 of them were working / worked for the anti-smuggling and organized crime department; stationed in Ankara, Turkey; holding

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supervisory positions; assigned for operational tasks including trans-border joint ones.

1.1.2. 3 of them were working for the anti-drug department; stationed in Istanbul, Turkey; holding supervisory positions; assigned for operational tasks including trans-border joint ones.

1.1.3. 2 of them were working for the intelligence department stationed in Ankara, Turkey; holding supervisory positions; assigned for operational tasks including trans-border joint ones.

1.1.4. 6 of them were working for varying departments including anti-terror; foreigners, borders and immigration, and cyber crime; stationed in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey; holding supervisory positions; tasked for operational duties including trans-border ones.

1.1.5. Four officers were working / worked as liaison officers in some European countries; holding supervisory positions; assigned for exchanging operational purposes information exchange.

1.2. Of those 41 officers, 17 were foreign officers.

1.2.1. 10 of them were European liaison officers stationed in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey; assigned for liaising between their respective agencies and the TNP.

1.2.2. 7 of them were Asian, Middle Eastern and American countries; stationed in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey; assigned for liaising between their respective agencies and the TNP.
2. Of those 62 respondents, 21 were interviewed within the frame of multilateral cooperation.

2.1. Of those 21 officers, 9 were Interpol officers.

2.1.1. 7 of them were Interpol NCB officers; stationed in Ankara, Turkey; holding supervisory positions; assigned for coordinating the cooperation between the TNP and Interpol center.

2.1.2. 2 of them were working at the Interpol center in Lion, France; holding supervisory positions; assigned for coordination of cooperation between Interpol center and national police agencies.

2.2. Only 1 of them was Europol liaison officer; stationed abroad; assigned for liaising between Europol and the host country.

2.3. 11 of them were SECI liaison officers; stationed at the SECI center in Bucharest, Romania; assigned for liaising between their agencies and Southeast European Countries.

As outlined above, in total 62 police professionals were interviewed. Among them; 24 Turkish police practitioners represent the larger pool of roughly 140 practitioners who are experienced in trans-border joint police investigations. Most of them are employed in the central headquarters in Ankara while some of them work in Istanbul.

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7 This is the estimated figure obtained from the department of Anti-Smuggling and Combating organized Crime Department.
Seventeen out of 59\(^8\) foreign liaison officers were interviewed. Most of them work in Ankara while a few of them work in Istanbul. Eleven out of 26 SECI liaison officers were interviewed. They all work at the SECI center in Bucharest, Romania. Nine Interpol officers were interviewed, and they do not represent any larger group since Interpol does not have such liaising service. They were chosen as interviewees as long as they related to the research topic and could be reached by the researcher himself. Some of them work at the Interpol Center in Lyon, France, and others work at the Interpol NCB office in Ankara. Only one liaison officer from Europol was interviewed since Europol does not have any operational cooperation, yet, with Turkey. The researcher had some difficulties in both reaching and interviewing the people working in these international organizations.

Corbin & Strauss (2008) further discuss that researchers sample people and control variables in conventional sampling methods, whereas in theoretical sampling, researchers do not sample people but concepts. This is because; the researcher purposefully looks for indicators of those concepts so that he/she might examine the data to discover how concepts vary under different conditions. Unlike conventional sampling methods, the researcher does not collect the entire data before beginning the analysis. Rather, analysis begins after the first day of data gathering. Thus,

“Data collection leads to analysis. Analysis leads to concepts. Concepts generate questions. Questions lead to more data collection so that the researcher might learn more about those concepts. This circular process continues until the research reaches the point of saturation; that is, the point in the research when all the concepts are well defined and explained.”\(^9\)

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\(^8\) This is the figure obtained from the Accreditation Office of the Foreign Relations Department.

In this study, interviews were conducted in two time periods. In the first phase, the researcher interviewed Turkish police practitioners in order to find out Turkey’s perspective on operational police cooperation with international policing organizations as well as with national police organizations. In the second phase, he interviewed foreign police practitioners in order to see how they viewed police cooperation in general as well as the cooperation with Turkey in particular. As the interviews proceeded, new probe questions arose and were addressed to other interviewees in order to make more insight into transnational operational police cooperation.

Study Plan

First of all, the literature about newly emerging threats to global security and the changing security concepts accordingly were examined. Also the literature and other open sources such as websites of Interpol, Europol, and SECI were searched in order to understand their organizational structures as well as their operational activities. Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral policing relations were, too, searched through publicly available documents. Herein, it should be noted that there is a scarcity of literature specifically addressing the quality of Turkey’s existing cooperative policing relations with the above mentioned organizations. Therefore, the researcher hopes to develop new material through his interviews that examines existing police to police relations conducted by the TNP officers.

In this research, the main criterion for exploring the distinguishing characteristics of operational police cooperation is to understand their operational contributions to trans-border police investigations. Operational contribution, in this context, refers to supportive
activities such as exchanging information through permanent communication among cooperating countries, providing operational analysis and strategic crime analysis, and providing technical assistance as well as technical experts. It doesn’t refer to the use of executive police power in cooperating countries. Transnational criminality refers to organized crimes such as terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, financial and high-tech crimes, fugitives, and property crimes. These crimes are commonly considered as the most threatening forms of transnational organized crimes and form the basis of this research study.

Validity and Reliability Concerns

A. Constructing validity

It is widely accepted that the quality of qualitative research should be evaluated but there is little consensus about how to do it. However, it does not mean that the findings of qualitative research cannot be scientific. “Elegant and innovative thinking can be balanced with reasonable claims, presentation of evidence and the critical application of methods.”\(^{10}\) Or validity can be ensured if the research “accurately represents those features of the phenomena that are intended to describe, explain or theorize.”\(^{11}\)

In qualitative studies, validity is reinforced by making triangulation with other data sources. The researcher compares multiple data sources to check the consistency of emerging trends. In this study, too, additional data sources such as literature and documentary data pertaining to the issues of operational police cooperation were used, as


well the annual reports published by the Turkish National Police and international policing organizations were researched in order to collect adequate evidences and construct the validity.

**B. Internal and external validities**

The raw data was analyzed based on the above mentioned concepts derived from the Interviews in order to establish internal validity. The essence of respondents’ explanation was derived and built in a meaningful and convergent manner in the process of analyzing the data. Rival opinions were also given place in explanation-buildings. Logic models such as making graphs and diagrams were also used in order to establish patterns of analyses. Finally, the researcher made comparisons between the established patterns in order to reach useful conclusions arising out of pattern matching. In doing so, he aimed at identifying if separate data sources were pointing to parallel conclusions, which would enhance the internal reliability of the study.

As for testing the external validity of a case study, the question to be addressed is “whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study.”\(^\text{12}\) The findings of an individually investigated case are used to apply in investigating another case study in a replicating manner in order to reach a generalization. Herein it is also noteworthy that unlike survey studies’ reliance on statistical generalization, case studies rely on analytical generalization. However, in qualitative studies, the generalizability of the research is weak mainly because, little known or poorly understood areas are researched as well as unique research methods are used.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, the major weakness

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of qualitative studies is that their results may not be generalizable to other situations due to unique methods applied or smallness of sample research groups in their sizes.

Likewise, the greater weakness of a case study comes from the possibility that the case studied may be atypical or even unique in some unknown way.

**C. Reliability**

The goal of reliability is to eliminate the “errors and biases in a study”. The question is: “if a later investigator followed the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions.”\(^{14}\) In order to minimize such possible errors and biases, the researcher of this study; too, followed the necessary data collection procedures such as using case study protocols when conducting interviews and developing case study database at the end of the interviews.

**Data Collection Process**

Interpol, Europol, SECI and Turkey’s bilateral police cooperation with individual states were used as the units of analysis. In this frame, the subjects of study were ranking police officers, worked or were still working in the police departments of intelligence, Interpol, Europol, anti-terrorism, anti-smuggling and organized crime, foreigners & borders and immigration departments of the TNP headquarters in Ankara. Additional subjects were Turkish police liaison officers deployed overseas, and foreign police liaison officers stationed in Turkey. Finally, police professionals working at Interpol, Europol, and SECI centers were part of the subjects of the study.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
Selected interviewees were mid-level police managers who administered operational police units and had been involved in trans-border joint investigations with their foreign counterparts. In these in-depth interviews, the researcher hoped to get a real sense of what really worked versus what did not work when carrying out joint operations across borders. Conducted interviews were supplemented with documents analysis relating to Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral cooperative policing relations.

A. Informed consent procedure

Before starting interviews, interviewees were given written consent statements in which the researcher’s identity, the aim of the interviews, the topic of the research, the style of the questions, issues relating to confidentiality, whether talking might include any risk for interviewees or not, the researcher’s legitimate authorization given by the university’s institutional review board to conduct interviews, were all explained clearly in the consent statements (see Appendix 2). Interviewees were also asked in a separate written consent statement whether they had consented to allow their voices recorded with a voice recorder. When they did not consent to voice record, the researcher continued interviews by jotting down what interviewees said (see Appendix 3).

B. Conducting interviews

Interviews were semi-structured in order to enable the researcher “to explore, probe and ask questions that elucidate and illuminate that particular subject.”\(^{15}\) They were conducted either face to face or via mail/email/telephone. Although the researcher preliminarily decided whom to interview and contacted them in advance, he reached some other interviewees in a snowballing way. That means sometimes, he was led to new

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interview subjects by references received from previous interviewees. Nonetheless, subjects who were reached via snowballing were, too, the practitioners falling under the sampled groups. Therefore, theoretical sampling was not affected from the limited use of snowballing method. Interviews were conducted in the places at the interviewees’ convenience like office environments, cafes, tea gardens and the like.

C. Interview questions

Questions that qualitative research seeks to answer fall into four broad categories, “contextual, diagnostic, evaluative, and strategic.”16 In this study, evaluative questions, which examine the quality of performances or services, provided by the research subjects, are important in order to assess how bilateral and multilateral police collaborations contribute to transnational policing.

Interview questions were open-ended and discussed in a conversational manner. They primarily related to the research interest. Interviewees were not asked questions in a sequential manner since some questions did not apply to some of their positions directly; nor were they led towards certain directions by the researcher so that their statements can provide more corroborative evidences for the interest of the research. Moreover, before the interviews, the researcher clearly explained to the interviewees that it was not a structured questionnaire which meant they could talk about similar or even different issues within the concept of transnational operational police cooperation. Thus, the researcher tried to prevent interviews from turning into structured questionnaire.

The selected cases were investigated with different set of questions. Each set of questions included both the same literal questions and different inferential questions. In

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16 Ritchie, J. & Spencer, L. (2002). Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. In M. Huberman & M. Miles (Eds.), The qualitative researcher’s companion (pp. 305-330), California: Sage publications.
other words, previously determined literal questions were accompanied with probe questions in order to make further insights into the selected cases. In effect, the planned questions not only kept the researcher on the right track as the interviews progressed but helped to generate appropriate probe questions. Sometimes, questions were modified when posed to specific interviewees or individual cases without changing the main course of the interview. Questions can be seen in the Appendices 5, 6, and 7.

D. Probe Questions

Probe questions were used to further examine cooperatively conducted major international police operations. The method used was to first establish what major multilateral and bilateral level cooperated police operations were carried out within the crime fields of terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and property crimes in the last decade. Then, in addition to the standard interview questions, the researcher probed further in an effort to establish how such trans-border operations were launched; why they were considered success or failure; and how the cooperation mechanisms worked during the operations.

Conceptualizing the Data

In qualitative research, analyzing the data is indeed a journey. Analysis starts from the very beginning of interviews with the open coding of data which is a kind of “brainstorming approach to data.” That means the researcher leaves the data open for all potential concepts arising out of the data. Then, he “scrutinizes the data in an attempt to understand the essence of what is being expressed in the raw data”. In other words, this
progressive journey usually starts from the ground level. Finally, the researcher defines the major themes and concepts coming out of the data.\textsuperscript{17}

In this study, too, the preliminary review of the interview data was made in order to determine the prevailing concepts (organize data). Then, the information acquired from interview data was placed in different categories on a matrix developed by the researcher. Also a flow chart was developed in order to show the data examination. Then, the frequency of occurrence of concepts arising from the interview data was tabulated on the matrix. Then, the consistencies and inconsistencies among the tabulations were examined in order to understand the relationships between the derived concepts. Finally, the acquired information was put in an order to make analytical interpretations.\textsuperscript{18}

At this early stage, the following major concepts/categories surfaced in the data:

- Priority cooperation areas in police cooperation
- Common problems encountered in police cooperation
- Reciprocity and mutual trust in police cooperation
- Informal cooperation within formal cooperation
- Cooperation at bilateral and multilateral settings
- International politics, agreements and police cooperation

\textbf{Coding the Data}

“Coding requires thinking outside the box. It means putting aside preconceived notions about what the researcher expects to find in the research and letting the data and


interpretation of it guide analysis.”\textsuperscript{19} In other words, coding is not just a matter of extracting material from the raw data and using it as labels of the concepts of the study. Rather, it involves allowing the data itself to determine the appropriate concepts. Coding continues in a progressive way until the researcher reaches a saturation level. Saturation level means developing all categories by acquiring sufficient data.\textsuperscript{20}

The raw data under these major concepts/categories/themes was coded by using a qualitative research program: NVivo-8. Coding the data continued progressively. That means the researcher continued coding the data in “tree coding” which meant he also built up the subcategories of these major categories. Further, the axial coding was made between the categories to define the ways they related to each other.\textsuperscript{21} Open coding and axial coding went hand in hand. That means similarities and differences were compared based on the incidents by asking questions such as: In what ways is international police cooperation similar to or different at bilateral and multilateral settings? Thus, the categories were elaborated by crosscutting or relating them to each other and thereby furthering the analysis to the point of making generalizations.

**Analyzing the Data**

Analyzing case study evidence presents some difficulties, mainly because of this method’s weakly defined analyzing strategies and techniques. “Pattern matching,” “explanation building,” “time-series analysis,” “logic models,” and “cross-case


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 195.
synthesis‖ are the prevailing specific techniques for analyzing case studies.\textsuperscript{22} These analyzing techniques are implemented through specific steps such as “examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining evidence,”\textsuperscript{23} in order to derive empirical conclusions. Computer applications, on the other hand, have become a functional tool in applying these analytical techniques, especially for coding and categorizing the interview transcripts and other written materials.\textsuperscript{24}

In this study, data analysis was structured on content analysis. Content analysis includes analyzing interview transcripts and publicly available official documents. Research evidence was analyzed by using the “pattern matching” technique, which included “examining, categorizing, tabulating, and testing” stages. The researcher put the information gathered from interview texts and official documents in certain categories. Then, he looked for similarities between the arrays. This categorization was made according to patterns consisting of repeated words, terms, themes, and recurrent meanings acquired from the interview texts. Computer program NVivo-8 was used for this analyzing purpose.

The findings of the study were mostly based on the information acquired through the interviews. There were no multiple choice questions, in order to allow the subjects free range in evaluating cooperation on combating common crimes such as terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, financial and high-tech crime, fugitives, and property crimes. This enabled a comparative evaluation of international police organizations, based on analyzing their efforts in supporting national police agencies in

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 126.  
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 128.
investigating trans-border crimes. In addition, organizational structures and operational activities of selected cases were examined in detail through publicly available informative documents and activity reports published on their official websites.

The data obtained from the interview transcripts and document analysis was used to explore current issues in international police cooperation. Crime areas covered by trans-border police cooperation, states’ expectations of the results of such co-operation, common obstacles encountered in police cooperation, conditions for better police cooperation, and several other relevant issues were explored through analyzing the data. The research concluded with recommendations, policy implications, and suggestions for future studies.
CHAPTER IV

General Remarks on the Analyses

This study neither aims to measure the success of international operational police cooperation nor judges the performances of national police agencies in cross-national joint investigations. Rather, it investigates operational police cooperation itself; Its changing parameters, its differing priorities, its barriers and disputes, its formal and informal modes, as well as its bilateral and multilateral level implementations, by examining the opinions and experiences of police practitioners. Frequent citations and quotations from interviews are given place in the analyses in order to provide more insight about the research phenomenon from insiders’ perspectives, but not to judge the performance of individual national police forces.

As stated earlier, in order to understand the bilateral police cooperation framework; Turkish police practitioners’ interactions with their foreign counterparts as well as Turkey-based foreign liaison officers’ interactions with their Turkish counterparts and among themselves during operational purpose collaborations were investigated. As for understanding multilateral forms of cooperation, Turkey’s policing relations with Interpol, Europol and SECI as well as the interaction among the police professionals liaising under these multilateral policing organizations in particular under the SECI organization were investigated.
Concept-1: Priority Cooperation Areas in Transnational Policing

In this chapter, perceptions and interpretations of police practitioners are examined in order to understand whether the priorities of operational police cooperation changes according to types of crimes. The chapter investigates issues such as the prevailing factors that cause such changes; why some common crimes become more compelling over the time whereas some others stay less compelling; in what ways do police practitioners’ opinions on cooperative issues converge or diverge; and whether this poses any difficulty to transnational policing in practical terms. Frequent citations and quotations from interviews are made in order to provide more insight about the emerging issues of police cooperation, but not to defend or criticize any of the parties of police cooperation.

![Graph showing percentage of respondents' expressions about how priorities of police cooperation vary according to crime types.]

Figure 3. Percentage of respondents’ expressions about how priorities of police cooperation vary according to crime types.

As shown in Figure 3, states’ cooperation priorities diverge significantly according to type of crimes. The overwhelming majority of interviewees underlined that
common crimes across borders formed the priority cooperation areas in transnational operational police cooperation. States first explore whether they have any mutual interest in cooperating in any policing area and, second, they look for how much their interests overlap with other states’ interests in such cooperation.

Looking at the issue from this standpoint, combating drug trafficking, terrorism and human trafficking were articulated as the areas in transnational policing most conducive to cooperation. These priority cooperation areas are followed by financial crimes, property crimes and additional forms of organized crimes that are of common concern in contemporary transnational policing. These priority cooperation areas, on the other hand, change over time depending on newly emerging crime trends such as cyber crimes, bio terrorism, and even environmental crimes.

A. Cyber crimes as the rising phenomenon

Before beginning the analysis, it will be informative to look at cyber crime through respondents’ viewpoints in order to grasp how international police cooperation has become a crucial in this challenging area, as computer and information technologies have became an integral part of daily life. Although the lowest number of respondents (11%) listed this as a priority for police cooperation (Figure 3), it will be the most compelling crime area in the foreseeable future. The reason it was given the least ratio is that many respondents avoid discussing what they consider a subject that remains largely unknown to them.

However, some Western and Turkish professionals strongly emphasized that cyber crimes were rapidly becoming the number-one issue facing the international policing community. This is because the amount and the value of data transacted in the cyber
space have been dramatically increasing. In particular, financial transactions are mostly done online, making the digital world very attractive for criminal groups. As a result, the common axiom, “crime chases money,” continues to apply to this field, as the dramatic spread of cyber crime has become a worldwide security concern.

Cyber crimes cannot be fought successfully without effective transnational police cooperation, even if individual police agencies are well equipped with advanced technologies. For example, trans-border smuggling mostly takes place between neighboring countries or between countries where there is intensive human travel, as for example, between Turkey and Germany. This is not the case when crimes are perpetrated in the cyber space because territory has no more significance in the digital world. Countries have become equally distant from each other because of today’s advanced electronic communications. The Internet enables offenders sitting in country ‘A,’ to commit crimes in the country ‘B’ that victimize someone from country ‘C’. Even when an online perpetrated crime affects citizens of one country, the evidence may appear in an internet service provider located in another country.

Many interviewees emphasized that crime perpetration has been shifting from physical environment to digital world. In fact, cyber crimes were committed by individual offenders in the past; whereas in the present era, they are often perpetrated by professional organized criminal groups who are capable of employing the talents of cyber experts. To be more precise, some people in this transnational underground market deal with producing credit card skimming devices. Some deal with placing those devices in ATM machines and copying credit card information. Others use this information for checking credit cards “(check CC)” and discovering the monetary values of those copied
credit card accounts. Then, gang leaders may either sell the information of those skimmed cards in the credit card black markets or reproduce them in order to reuse for illegal withdrawals from ATM machines.

Cyber crimes have certainly boosted international police cooperation. Developed-country police organizations have not only improved their own technical and legal capacities to deal with this area of criminal activity, but consider it important to support anti-cybercrime works in developing or underdeveloped country police because of the concern that their country may also be targeted by such crimes at any time. Also noteworthy is the fact that in order to draft proper requests for cooperation, law enforcement forces share knowledge about how cyber crimes are addressed in each other’s national criminal codes.

There have been some exemplary operations carried out by Turkish police in collaboration with the FBI and other police agencies in combating cyber crimes. For instance, in 2008, ‘ChaO,’ a former fugitive who was a skimmer producer as well as the ruler of the dark market, and had been wanted by the FBI for years, was successfully apprehended by Turkish police upon a successful intelligence exchange with the FBI. Operation ZOTOP, in 2005, was another remarkable operation in this area. A virus program, written by a Moroccan hacker, was distributed by a Turkish hacker to 110 countries. Some American firms were the primary targets of this virus program. The FBI exchanged the offender’s IP address with Turkish police. Turkish police detected his location and captured him in Turkey. Then, the operation extended to Morocco where the producer of the virus program was apprehended, too.

As one Western interviewee makes clear in his words:
As for cyber crimes, we are no longer talking about self motivated individual criminals in cyber space as it was in the past. On the contrary, there are illegal sectors producing virus programs for hackers. That means there are illegal digital forums. They bring ‘demands’ and ‘offers’ together and are closed to all outsiders unless they have at least three references from the trusted people of this dark market.

There is an effective networking among these illegal digital forums, and they can exchange rapid information 24 hours a day. Whenever a group member has difficulty in his/her illicit work he/she asks for help via their digital forums and can get real-time information support from any extension of this global dark market.

Returning to the challenges of international police cooperation in cyber space, it is first of all important to note that financial crimes are not the only illicit activities perpetrated in cyber space. Many other crimes ranging from document forgeries to terrorist activities have shifted from the physical environment to the digital world. Cyber crimes can be committed instantly compared to other crimes perpetrated in the physical world. Therefore, immediate action as well as instant police cooperation is needed when combating them. However, there is as yet no system that enables instant police collaboration when any hacker makes a black money transaction from one country to another.

Moreover, current police cooperation in combating cyber crimes is often dependent on traditional forms of cooperation and thus very limited and slow-moving. As illustrated by one Turkish practitioner:

Imagine that there is a website run in the USA and includes crime elements. Imagine that both the operator and victim of this website live in Turkey. In order to track the offender of this crime down, the IP addresses of this website can be given to Turkish police by American police via judicial cooperation.

That means the information needed must be requested by exchanging a rogatory letter based on a court decision. Without such a letter, neither the Turkish police request
for such information nor the American police response to that request is possible. This makes it very difficult to have timely responses when cooperating on combating cyber crimes.

Another Turkish respondent regards the possibility of police cooperation under such circumstances:

Imagine one suspect who lives in Turkey but bilks a bank out in the USA by committing internet payment fraud and therefore is wanted by the police agencies of both countries. In such cases, police officials from both countries should come together and match whatever they have in their hands pointing the suspect and thereby tracking him/her down.

Otherwise, the respondent adds, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible; to conduct joint operations against cyber criminals in the real time they commit crimes in the digital world. It is quite clear from these comments that police practitioners today must be able to cooperate with each other as swiftly and in as targeted a manner as possible in order to cope with the high-pressure challenges of cooperation. Real-time information flow channels (online communication and conference) must be established.

B. Drug trafficking as the most common crime

Looking at the shifting priorities of police cooperation from the perspectives of police professionals, it is noteworthy that combating drug trafficking is the highest priority cooperation area with the ratio of 61% in transnational policing (Figure 3). This is because all countries perceive drug trafficking as a common threat. This international political consensus contributes enormously to cooperative measures against the drug problem, in the sense that national police agencies make it a priority. However, police agencies’ contributions to cooperative efforts in this area certainly diverge, depending on their allocated resources and state policies. As one Western liaison officer noted, “For
instance, it wouldn’t be realistic to expect both Afghanistan and Germany to make the
same contribution to cooperative fighting against drug problem.”

On the other hand, drug trafficking is a matter of “supply-demand” in the words of
a Western interviewee. For example, some European states see drug use as a public health
problem and deal with the phenomenon through harm-reduction methods rather than
banning it completely. In such countries like the Netherlands, drug use is legitimate to a
limited degree as part of their national drug policies. That means as long as there are
demands for drugs; it will continue to be supplied to those countries from various
destinations ranging from Asia to South America. As one Western liaison officer puts it
interestingly, “Yes, in those countries, drugs are sold in controlled amounts through the
front doors of certified shops but nobody knows what is happening through the back
doors of same shops.”

However, in many other countries, drug use is approached through more policing
measures. Therefore, handling, keeping, using and trading narcotics are strictly forbidden
in those countries. Such varying policies and policing practices also generate some
inevitable criticisms among police practitioners of the countries where drug use is strictly
forbidden and the countries where drug use is allowed in a controlled way. Police
practitioners including some Western liaison officers say that they fight illicit drugs in
every aspect including trafficking, trading, handling, keeping and using of it in order to
eradicate its supply and marketing everywhere. However, in the countries where
controlled drug use is free, police officers do not pay much attention to street use of drugs
unless it is traded or handled in large amounts. This undoubtedly encourages drug
traffickers to keep running illicit drug business and thereby making preventive policing measures inefficient in those countries.

There is also mutual criticism between Western and Turkish police authorities. Western authorities understandably claim that most of the heroin originating in the Middle East and Far East heroin is trafficked via Turkey. Further, they blame Turkish police for not doing enough to prevent this illicit business. Turkish practitioners, on the other hand, find this unfair. They contend that the criticism of Turkish police fails to take into account Turkey’s position as a transit hub for drug trafficking routes, as the map below demonstrates.¹


**Figure 4.** Global heroin flows of Asian origins (UNDOC)²


² Ibid.
Also citing the same UN report Turkish practitioners defend themselves that, every year, they capture more heroin than the total amount captured across Europe (See Table 1).³

Table 1

2008 Global Opium, Heroin and Morphine Seizures (UNDOC)⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Estimated amount of heroin+morphine flow (mt)</th>
<th>Average heroin+morphine seizures (mt)</th>
<th>Percent of estimated flow intercepted (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.R. of Iran</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Europe (Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Romania, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rest of Europe (except Russian Federation)</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midde East&amp; Gulf countries (except I.R. of Iran)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of S, E &amp; SE Asia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Ibid, p. 43.
⁴ Ibid, 47.
They further argue that it is more effective to reduce drug consumption in target countries than to concentrate on curbing trafficking or production in source countries. This is because drug trafficking is a “supply-demand issue”. As long as narcotics are demanded in Western countries, traffickers will find a way to bring them in—and Turkey will continue to be used as a transit point despite all preventive efforts. Hence, they maintain that Turkey should be considered more of a transit country than a source of drug trafficking.

On the other hand, other Turkish narcotic officers note that while heroin is smuggled from East to West, synthetic drugs and pornographic productions flow in the opposite direction. This is because the production technologies for producing synthetic drugs as well as advanced film techniques for pornographic videos are available in Western countries. Therefore, echoing Western condemnations of Turkey’s ineffectiveness in the battle against heroin trafficking, Turkish practitioners contend that their Western counterparts are not working effectively enough to stop the trafficking of synthetic drugs and pornography originating in the West. Regardless of whether the allegations on both sides have any basis in fact, this type of mutual blame-finding is a persistent feature of interagency police cooperation.

On the other hand, countries’ exposure to different trans-border criminalities at varying levels is another factor affecting the quality of interagency police cooperation. For instance, Turkey intensifies her cooperative efforts in combating terrorism and narcotics. However, while her demands of cooperation against drug trafficking are positively received by the international law enforcement community, her calls for
cooperating against terrorism do not enjoy the same international willingness, since other states are neither exposed nor vulnerable to the same threat. China, for example, interestingly enough looks for ways to develop her cooperative relations with Turkey against terrorism despite the great distance between two countries. As expressed by an Asian liaison officer:

> China is very interested in Turkey’s experiences in fighting terrorism. Also some terrorist groups, listed by the UN as terrorist organizations, have many links to Turkey because of the history, culture, geography etc.* Drug is the second biggest concern for China.

As another example, U.S. federal police agencies have more intensive cooperation with South and Central American law enforcement agencies in narcotics and money laundering than other Western states. This is because most of the drug trafficked into the U.S. comes from those countries.

Spain, despite being another remote country from Turkey, finds common grounds for cooperating with the TNP in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism. This is also because the heroin trafficking route passing through Turkey extends to Spain. At the same time, the cocaine trafficking route starting in South America and reaching to Spain via Portugal extends to Istanbul, where the drugs are re-shipped to the final destination countries. Because of Spain’s location at the intersection of drug trafficking routes, the respective liaison officer said that many Turkish citizens living in Spain were involved in drug trafficking. Cooperating with the TNP against this growing problem has therefore become a priority for Spanish law enforcement.

Same respondent also underlined that Spanish police greatly sympathized with Turkish police’s fight against terrorism and effectively cooperated with them in that regard because they had terrorism problem in their domestic territories, too.
In recent years, a considerable rise in operational cooperation between Iranian and Turkish police agencies has been observed again because of emerging priorities of cooperation. Although both nations’ police agencies traditionally did not have operational cooperation, because of their irreconcilable ideologies and political systems, there has been a significant and marked improvement in operational police cooperation due to their growing shared security concerns. There is an increasing parallel between Turkey’s long standing exposure to the terror threat from Iraqi side, as well as to drugs trafficked from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran’s exposure to the same threats. This common ground creates a rapprochement between the politicians as well as between the two national police agencies in operational issues. One Turkish liaison officer defined the situation in this way: “If you want to have good cooperation, the windows you mutually look through must see each other.”

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5 KCM, 2009 annual report of Narcotic Crimes.
It is also noteworthy that drug trafficking is by its nature a trans-border crime because of its transcending dimensions, such as production, smuggling and marketing. Hence it requires a collaboration involving source, transit and target country police agencies.

Police agencies’ cooperation strategies and priorities may change over the time depending on the arising circumstances of these stages. For example, Saudi Arabia and some other Arabian Gulf countries have increasingly been exposed to synthetic drugs coming from the West. In an effort to fight this rising problem more effectively, police agencies of those countries have considerably intensified their cooperative relations with Turkish police. What is more, it was noted by one interviewee that in 2000s, Turkey beside her transit position in drug trafficking also became source country in producing synthetic drugs. These emerging developments have also impacted the formation of priority cooperation areas in transnational policing.

Sometimes, cooperation priorities may change depending on states,’ security policies and risk analysis. As it is seen in the case of fighting drug problem, some states approach drug use from the standpoint of public health, whereas some others approach it from more repressive standpoint. Therefore, some states choose to focus their cooperative efforts on combating wholesale drug trafficking of drug rather than fighting street-level use. Similarly, some states concentrate their collaborative efforts on combating heroin and cocaine, whereas others focus on synthetic drugs. Some other countries such as Turkey are making efforts to draw the attention of international community to narco-terrorism. This has won growing acceptance from European as well as U.S. law enforcement agencies.
C. Terrorism with its global face

Terrorism, especially with its new global face, has become a serious international concern in the recent decades. 32% of respondents expressed it as the priority cooperation area in transnational policing (Figure 3). Therefore, not only has it been coming to the fore as another area of increased cooperation, but it has led to disputes. For countries such as Turkey, terror is still a serious problem while some others simply do not have terrorism problem and are therefore reluctant to cooperate on terrorism issues. Some other countries may have even different political or judicial concerns in this respect.

For instance, although EU political authorities already declared the PKK as a terrorist group, some member states see it as a political question and therefore not binding for their own judicial mechanism. When it comes to police or judicial cooperation in combating terrorism, they approach the issue in accordance with their respective legislation or judicial decisions. Moreover, outlawing a terror organization does not mean outlawing all its subsidiary organs. Thus, although the PKK terror organization was outlawed in many European countries, supportive organs continue to operate legally. Closing these terror-related associations is regarded by some European states as banning civilian organizations.

Lack of mutual understanding is undoubtedly another factor causing these ongoing debates. One Scandinavian police professional makes the following points:

For example, The PKK is not an issue for Scandinavian countries because it doesn’t pose a threat for them. We know that they are in our countries. We know they collect and send money to the PKK camps in the east. We know in Turkey, it is a big problem. Therefore, it is also important to bring the attentions of Scandinavian states on this issue. And also we have a serious problem namely Hell’s Angels which is a big motorcycle gang group. We will make Turkish police authorities aware of this group. They have just set up two clubs in Istanbul and Izmir. And when I first asked Turkish police officials some questions about this
gang group about a half year ago, it just didn’t make sense for them. And I said to them: it is a very well known big criminal group across Europe. Now, I am organizing some mutual study visits to draw the attention of Turkish police officials more on this matter.

The same interviewee also noted that liaison officers were crucial in developing mutual understanding on such issues, since they can provide fuller briefings to their counterparts in host countries. Using the example of the PKK, he noted that western colleagues might not consider civilian associations with connections to the PKK as serious threats since they are not committing crimes in those countries. Even if they collect money from shop owners for the PKK activities, which is against the law, it is not easy to prove in court. In such situations, mutual enlightenment between the cooperating police agencies is essential.

For example, the PKK’s unofficial television channel Roj TV currently has permission to broadcast from Denmark but their studios are still in Brussels and they use a video link to make their broadcast in Denmark. Turkish authorities, on the other hand, failed to submit sufficient evidence to Danish authorities regarding the illegal broadcasts of Roj TV. Once, Turkish police provided 400 hours of video tapes as an evidence for Roj TV illegal broadcast supporting the PKK terror, Danish police authorities found it too long to examine forensically which was perceived by Turkish police authorities as if Danish side was ignoring their investigation requests. This lack of mutual understanding was eventually corrected through follow-up meetings between the two sides, and Roj TV broadcasts are still under investigation.

In some countries, anti-terrorism roles are assigned to military forces or, interestingly enough, to intelligence departments. In some others, the intelligence task is not carried out by police but by military personnel. This institutional difference in dealing
with terrorism also challenges foreign police professionals because it is harder for them to contact and cooperate with such non-police agencies on combating terrorism than to do it with their police counterparts.

Likewise, the absence of threat can slow down police cooperation. For example, Turkey, as a member of SECI, led the establishment of the Terrorism Task Force under the SECI umbrella in order to get this organization to take more initiative in coordinating the fight against terrorism. However, this unit couldn’t become successful over the time because member states did not have much of a terrorism problem. Majority of member state law enforcement authorities think that SECI is not the right organization to deal with terrorism-related issues and should instead place its priority on other transnational organized crime areas. Likewise, several other controversial issues are articulated by police professionals. The question; whether these ongoing debates really obstruct operational police cooperation in practical terms will be discussed in the conclusion.

Nonetheless, despite such hindrances, it is safe to say that interagency police cooperation on fighting terrorism is steadily growing. For instance, the principle issue for Turkey when it comes to cooperation in the fight against terrorism is not only to stop its illegal operations but to eradicate its financial supports in Europe. In this sense, there has been a growing acceptance of cooperative operations against the PKK among several European law enforcement agencies. This is partly because of Turkey’s persuasive efforts and partly because of some European states’ overlapping interests in this regard. To be more precise, large amounts of money are flowing out of Europe every year with the aim of financing terrorism and that money outflow is indeed not appreciated by several European states. On the other hand, for many European states and especially for the
United States, religiously motivated violence and radicalism and specifically the Al-Qaida international terrorist network is the biggest threat. These are the emerging conditions which makes the fight against terrorism a priority cooperation area in transnational policing.

Several respondents mentioned that as states’ above-noted priorities in combating terrorism overlapped each other, police cooperation marked a steady improvement in this area. Few Turkish police practitioners in this respect noted that Turkish police raided many Al-Qaida cells and apprehended many key militants in recent years. During those successful operations, not only did Turkish police terror units obtain lots of information about the modus operandi of Al-Qaida network but also they became experienced in how to tackle the network’s terrorist activities. Thereupon, having realized the overlapping benefits in cooperating against terrorism, British, French and some other European law enforcement agencies have become very eager to share information with Turkish police about ethnic, ideological and religiously motivated terrorism.

Accordingly, face-to-face regular meetings between Turkish and British police agencies have noticeably increased. Upon exchanging a great deal of information during these operational work meetings, British police launched several effective operations against the PKK’s illicit activities in the U.K. Similarly, French law enforcement agencies started a series of operations against the PKK’s subordinate organizations as well as against the extensions of other extremist leftist groups living in France but supporting illegal violent activities in Turkey. These occurred in response to this operational support as well as unconditional information exchange. Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain are other European countries where several cascading operations were conducted against the
PKK’s subsidiary organs that recruit people, collect money, and make illegal broadcast for terrorist organization in those countries.

Turkey’s priority in cooperating with Western states against terrorism is, to repeat the point above, to cut the logistic support coming from the European countries to the PKK. On the other hand, her priority in cooperating with Eastern states against terrorism is to eliminate the military support for the PKK. In this context, Turkish police’s interests intersect with Western law enforcement agencies’ need for information about the Al-Qaida terror network. Therefore, in response to investigative support from Western law enforcement agencies, Turkish police share their experiences and information about Al-Qaida cells and operations with Western police agencies as well as with the U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. Turkish police on the other hand, provide training support for respective police units of Eastern country police agencies in the areas of fighting terrorism and drug trafficking in order to further develop policing relations with them.

**D. Human trafficking as constantly rising problem**

Illegal migration from Eastern countries to Western countries was mentioned as the second biggest priority cooperation area by the 42% of respondents; predominantly by the Western liaison officers (Figure 3). This is another seriously growing concern for European countries and the U.S. They publish annual reports evaluating the performances of source (Asian) countries and transit countries like Turkey and Ukraine in preventing illegal migration. In doing so, they try to apply an indirect pressure on those states in order to get them do more in preventing illegal immigration. However, those source countries do not have such concerns. From their perspective, those illegal immigrants who got themselves smuggled into the Western countries simply reached better life
conditions. Political pressures as well do not mean much for those source countries because; they are not concerned about becoming a European Union member or having good relations with the U.S. in the foreseeable future.

Turkey, as in several other issues, is mixed up in such affairs due to her transit location as well as due to her future expectation of EU membership. She is often criticized by European countries for not applying pressure on Eastern countries to prevent human smuggling. However, when Turkish police officials bring up these issues when meeting with Eastern country police authorities or in other international meetings, they realize that those source country police authorities do not see combating human smuggling as a serious issue of trans-border police cooperation.

On the other hand, Turkish police officials raise some counter questions to their Western counterparts. As one practitioner voiced, “Why should we struggle for convincing Eastern countries to do more in combating human smuggling? Yes, Turkey is a transit country but she is neither source nor a target country of smuggling drug and human beings.” Even the fake identities and travel documents, used by illegal immigrants, are produced mostly in the Balkan countries. Therefore, trafficking or smuggling crimes are actually occurring or starting in those countries but not in Turkey. What is more, they say that Turkey shouldn’t be left alone and must be supported politically and financially by Western states when negotiating illegal migration problem with Eastern states.

Western states see human trafficking as a security concern that has been growing seriously for decades. Therefore, Western police agencies have been striving to prioritize transnational police cooperation in the struggle against human trafficking and smuggling.
Turkey keeps her transit position on the routes of human trafficking like drug trafficking, whereas Western countries are targeted mostly by human trafficking and illegal migration. Several Western liaison officers articulated this problem as highly likely to be the primary security problem for Western countries in the future. One European liaison officer noted, “European countries who are exposed to illegal migration relatively more, are trying to stop human trafficking before it reaches their territories such as in Turkey. Therefore, police cooperation in this area is more pushed ahead by those countries.”

In an effort to stop illegal immigration in Turkey or in some North African countries, some European states offer technical support to those countries. For instance, countries such as Italy offer to place container screening machines on Turkey’s western border gates. They also submit plans and projects to Turkish authorities in order to build detention camps for captured illegal migrants either in Turkey or on the way of smuggling from Turkey to some European countries. Turkey, for the time being, agreed to the construction of five detention camps, each with the capacity of 750 persons, in her territories on the condition that two-thirds of the costs would be paid by European countries. Countries such as Italy, Spain, and France are the natural gateways into the EU territories, and are much more exposed to illegal immigrant coming from both Asian and African routes. Therefore, for those countries, cooperation against illegal migration is the primary concern in transnational policing.

In addition to the areas of cooperation discussed above, ordinary crimes as well may become priority cooperation areas in police cooperation between the countries where human travel is so intensive. In Germany alone, there are 3.5 million Turkish citizens residing in the country today. The total number of Turkish citizens in EU countries
accounts more than 5 million. On the other hand, only from Germany more than 4 million people travel to Turkey every year either for touristic or for other purposes. Number of people travelling to Turkey from other countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Moldavia has also been dramatically increasing. As a result of this interconnection, ordinary crimes such as thefts, robbery, murders, and other property crimes perpetrated against individual citizens are steadily increasing every year. Therefore, interagency police cooperation between those respective countries may also place a priority on cooperation to preventing and investigate ordinary crimes perpetrated against individual citizens.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Requests (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECI</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corruption has emerged as another international concern in transnational policing. Particularly in the years following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Interpol has established a connection between transnational organized crime and law enforcement

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6 Quoted from the 2009 annual information bulletin of TNP Department of Interpol Europol-Sirene.
corruption. In an effort to support fighting this concern more effectively, Interpol established an International Corruption Academy in Vienna where police professionals from various national police agencies are trained on how to cope more effectively with corruption in various law enforcement agencies. As one Western liaison officer asserted, corruption is associated with several other crimes and institutions. For instance, it is highly unlikely to commit credit card fraud without getting the support of other public institutions. Fraud is not only a policing issue but involves other public institutions as well. This may have some cascading ramifications in fighting other crime areas subject to police cooperation. In this sense, cooperation is another existing concern in international operational police cooperation.

In addition to the priority cooperation areas discussed above, there are certainly other types of crimes that generate increased cooperation among police agencies. Cyber crimes, credit card fraud and bioterrorism are growing global concerns of international police cooperation. Container security is another increasing cooperation area especially between the law enforcement agencies of countries such as the U.S. and Holland. Interestingly enough, environmental crimes are another area of today’s transnational policing. For example, SECI is preparing to establish a new task force in order to deal specifically with the problem of contamination of the Danube River.

**Findings of the Concept-1**

As seen in the above discussions, states’ priorities in transnational policing can diverge widely, according to the factors that are broadly portrayed in the above analytic discussions. These diverging priorities cause many debates, even disputes and mutual blame-calling, as well as pre-judgments among police practitioners.
However, it is interesting to note that police professionals do not view these existing disputes as concrete barriers to operational police cooperation. When it comes to police cooperation, the vast majority of police professionals are quite cautious about distinguishing between ongoing disputes and cooperating on joint investigations on the ground. This is because they know that such potential problems are not caused by any malicious intention on the part of cooperating parties but are more likely the result of problems outside their professional activities. They also know that there are no immediate solutions to such controversial issues and therefore, improvements in police cooperation must often occur at the grassroots level.

Being aware of the difficulty of resolving the larger problems outlined here, police practitioners try to find ways of working with each other rather than closing the door to any cooperation at all. One Eastern liaison officer said that the illegitimacy of conducting controlled delivery drug operations in his country was certainly an obstacle in cooperative police operations, but he could have nothing to do in that regard except reporting it to his state authorities. Therefore, it is hard to talk about any crisis of confidence arising from the differences in legislation or the negative impact of controversial issues.

The conducted interviews suggest that the rising trends in transnational criminality are the major determinants of priority cooperation areas in transnational policing. In other words, the more transnational crimes become compelling, the more fighting them becomes an area of priority cooperation in transnational policing, or vice versa. In the first situation, crimes are seen as common problems to be fought cooperatively by national law enforcement agencies. In the second situation, crimes are
seen as more of a domestic problem; thus fighting them does not enjoy much international participation.

For instance, drug trafficking has been a compelling crime for states for decades. It is widely accepted as a crime against humanity. Therefore, fighting it attracts relatively more active international participation. Terrorism as well used to be called a common problem for humanity; but in reality it is often viewed as a local or political issue in the international community and thereby did not attract much active international cooperation. However, terrorism’s global character has now made it a much more urgent priority for multi-state collaboration. There are some difficulties when it comes to cooperation on a regional basis. This is demonstrated by Turkey’s fruitless efforts to mobilize the member countries of the SECI organization for more collaboration against terrorism. Illegal migration has already been a serious problem for Western countries, but it has not become the kind of compelling issue for all states as discussed above.

On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, in parallel with the wide use of cyberspace, the perpetration of several types of crimes—particularly financial crimes—is shifting from physical space to cyber space. This is another area that is swiftly becoming a priority issue that compels interagency police cooperation, regardless of territorial boundaries. However, cybercrimes were still given the least ratio as the priority cooperation area in transnational policing. This is because, in general, issues pertaining to digital world are a recent and therefore unknown phenomenon for most police practitioners. Moreover, understanding how crimes are perpetrated in digital space and especially knowing how to cooperate against cyber crimes requires specialized knowledge. Although national police agencies have been catching up in acquiring
information technologies, their anti-cybercrime departments are still in progress. In some Balkan and Eastern countries, such units have not yet been established.

On the other hand, operationally purposed police cooperation in cyber space is different in its parameters, compared to traditional police cooperation in other operational areas. The substructure and practical experience needed for operating in this area is far less developed than the approaches for combating drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking and other criminal areas. While most practitioners accept that trans-border police cooperation is needed in fighting cyber crimes, they do not know how and what to do about it. Certainly there have been successful joint operations, as demonstrated by the examples above, but cooperation in this area has not yet been institutionalized.

Interviews also suggest that there will be other priority cooperation areas in international police cooperation. Many respondents envision a future of transnational policing that enables all notional police agencies to have permanent communication with each other, like various branches of a worldwide police organization. Tremendous advances in communication technologies, including the ability to maintain a permanent and reliable communication network among police agencies, as well as the spreading diversity of trans-border crimes, contributed to this opinion by police professionals. They say that in today’s shrinking world, even individual crimes may become a priority of cooperation. Considering these facts, cooperating against all crime areas is becoming equally important for transnational policing.

On the other hand, there is a close association between the patterns of operational police cooperation and the development levels of states. Looking from Turkey’s cooperation experiences, it is safe to say that police cooperation is getting more
sophisticated from East to West or from less developed countries to developed countries. Cooperative relations with Western countries are more demanding and multifarious than the relations with Eastern countries. Consequently, conducting joint operations with Western countries is easier than conducting with Eastern countries. Interestingly enough one liaison officer of Turkey's one Eastern neighbor country made the same point.
CHAPTER V

Concept-2: Common Barriers to Police Cooperation

Police cooperation has been in continuous improvement both in general and in operational terms. However, this does not mean that it is progressing in a smooth way. In this section, the researcher looks for common barriers encountered in daily practices of operational police cooperation. What are those common problems? Why do police practitioners criticize each other and how do they cope with those emerging difficulties? More importantly, in what ways do those common problems impact police cooperation?

This analysis chapter neither contains judgments about the quality of any organization nor provides concrete generalizations about the parameters of police cooperation based on respondents’ personal views. Rather, it scrutinizes the research phenomenon through police practitioners’ perspectives; experiences, opinions, feelings, and interpretations. Therefore, their expressions are often reflected throughout the analytic descriptions below. In fact, this is the essence of this study to look at the phenomenon through police professionals’ world.

A. Legislative and systemic barriers

The biggest hurdle to transnational police cooperation pointed out by the 71% of respondents is different laws and legal systems of cooperating states (Figure 6). Information exchange, protection of personal data, physical or electronic surveillance (wiretapping), and working systems of judicial mechanisms, as well as definitions of some serious crimes, are all defined and regulated differently by national legal systems. This divergence inevitably hinders international police cooperation. But it is also
unavoidable, because national states structure their legal systems according to their own needs and cultural values. This is the most challenging side of international operational police cooperation as stated in most of the interviews.

![Figure 6. Percentage of respondents’ expressions about the existence of varying common problems in transnational operational police cooperation.](image)

In the fight against drug trafficking, for example, two policing tactics prevail: “wiretapping” and “controlled delivery operations.” Wiretapping has become much harder than it used to be because of tightened regulations to protect privacy. Today, in many countries, wiretapping can only be done with court approval. Even when an ongoing trans-border investigation extends to a third country, investigators still need to get a separate court decision for a new wiretapping in that country. In the view of police practitioners, this is another time-consuming process, and it especially affects urgent cases. It requires exchanging another rogatory letter each time a new country is included as part of an ongoing investigation.
Sometimes, even if cooperative operations are conducted successfully, there may still be some emerging disputes between judicial authorities of originating and destination countries. For example, the judicial organ of a country where a joint operation started may ask the judicial organ of the country where the operation ended to return the arrested suspects as well as the seized drug substances so that the suspects can be tried and the drug substances can be destroyed in the originating country. Although such jurisdictional conflicts are usually settled in reasonable ways by respecting mutual sovereignty concerns of cooperating states, they may still have some obstructive impacts on transnational police cooperation.

The absence of data-protection laws is another obstacle hindering operational purpose police cooperation. Some states regulate personal data protection in details, whereas others do not have such regulations since it is still a double-sided issue for them. To be more precise, putting personal data protection under strict regulations will have parallel ramifications in other legislation areas. Personal rights will be paid more respect by state authorities as a result of raised democratic standards such as accountability and transparency of state departments. Storing personal data will be allowed only under certain conditions for a limited period and will then be terminated. However, especially in developing countries, state authorities do not feel themselves ready to face such challenges because of state security concerns. This hesitation not surprisingly leads to a lack of trust between developed and developing countries’ judicial authorities. Police agencies of developed Western countries do not want to entrust personal information to their counterparts in developing Asian or Middle Eastern or African countries because of their worry that sensitive information, exchanged for policing purposes may be misused.
due to lack of adequate personal data protection regulations. This is a major issue in police cooperation between the U.S. and Canada, too. Therefore, despite the great willingness of police practitioners for further police cooperation, operational joint investigations between those police agencies couldn’t achieve much progress.

The absence of standardized personal data protection practices among even those states that have data protection regulations also impacts police cooperation. One Western respondent reports that when a drug carrier is captured in one country, many liaison officers assume that those people literally travel to every country as part of their trafficking activity. Liaison officers say it is, therefore, important to share such suspects’ identities and police records immediately. With such information, foreign liaison officers may assemble other parts of the puzzle that they can get from their respective agencies. Thus, the ongoing investigation may enlarge to a transnational scope and eventually may result in the collapse of an entire transnational drug trafficking network. However, some police agencies’ reluctance to share such personal information due to strict data protection regulations may occasionally hamper police cooperation.

Another difficulty, often encountered in information sharing, is defining which materials are evidential or which are not evidential in different legal systems. One Western liaison officer notes:

Perhaps one problem we have in our country is interceptions of telephones are not evidential; it is just intelligence, whereas here in Turkey, it is evidential. So for that reason the stringent thing with that is it causes problem like we are not allowed to give such materials to Turkey’s side which means in that case Turkey’s legislation does not allow Turkish police to share their telephone interception with us since it will not be used as evidence in our investigation procedure.

In such situations wiretapping materials are exchanged between police practitioners just for informational purpose. However, it does not have evidential value
according to legal procedures, but in practical terms it is a recurring barrier to operational police cooperation between the countries such as the UK and Turkey.

Police investigation is naturally an initial step to a final judicial investigation. Therefore, there is a tight correlation between these two stages but still the differences arising from judicial procedures may also cause some unexpected problems. As exemplified by a Western practitioner:

In the Netherlands, suspects have the right to access lawyer anytime during the entire investigation as an important requirement of fair trial. Any failure in implementing this rule may result with the unconditional release of suspect. Although it is almost same in Turkish judicial system, it is also required that lawyers must be registered in a bar association as a certified lawyer so that he/she can provide legal advice during investigations. Therefore, when a Dutch citizen becomes the subject of a judicial investigation in Turkey and his/her lawyer comes to Turkey to defend him/her, Turkish judicial system does not allow that lawyer to participate actively in the trials at the court level since he/she is not registered in any bar association in Turkey.

Indeed, Turkey’s legal regulations allow such foreign lawyers to enter trials and defend his/her client, as well as ask any pertinent questions. However, this can only be done by submitting the questions in a written way through the public prosecutor or another lawyer registered in Turkey but not by the foreign lawyer himself/herself directly. This often causes discontents on the Dutch side. Even though police agencies of the two countries have several successful joint operations, the final judicial stage of cooperation slows down the process because of the above-noted concerns.

On the other hand, the uncertainty of the boundaries between police cooperation and judicial cooperation was stated by some respondents to be another occasional barrier faced in transnational policing. To be more precise, in daily practices of police to police cooperation, practitioners often share information with each other directly for policing purposes. Such information exchange may not happen in the same smoothness when
cooperative police investigations proceed up to court level. This is because; judicial organs usually exchange trial purpose information via rogatory letters. However, it is almost impossible to determine to what extent information share should be accounted as policing purpose exchange or as judicial purpose exchange.

Although there is an established precedent distinguishing between policing purpose information share and judicial purpose information exchange, there are still divergent practices in this regard. For example, some police agencies share judicial records of persons for policing purposes, whereas some others share such information only for judicial purposes upon rogatory letters. This is also mainly because of every state’s own needs, legal regulations and cultural codes. However, putting aside some emerging difficulties in this area, police professionals don’t favor detailed official amendments in this area. They say that framing the cooperation with written documents will narrow the maneuvering space of police practitioners especially when conducting joint investigations.

Some respondents also note that when the requirements of police cooperation are not fulfilled by one of the cooperating parties; the reciprocity mechanism as a legitimate sanction is already there to be used in such situations. However, the reciprocity mechanism alone is not always adequate to cope with such emerging difficulties of police cooperation. One Turkish practitioner came up with the following suggestion in this respect:

All police agencies should declare their annual charts showing what information they can share versus what information they cannot share with others. In return, they will be able to receive information from other police agencies in the same categories that they declared in their annual charts as a result of the reciprocity principle.
It is also noteworthy from interviewees’ viewpoint that the international dilemma of arriving at a common definition of certain crimes imposes limits on interagency police cooperation. There is no universally accepted common definition of terrorism. To use Interpol as an example, its constitution strictly forbids the agency to intervene in any investigation of “political, military, religious or racial character”. This is certainly reasonable and essential for Interpol’s professionalism in its operations. However, the crimes that fall under these categories significantly change according to various legal systems. Such discrepancies in legal systems may disrupt the extradition of suspects even though states have extradition treaties with each other.

For instance, Turkey has extradition treaties with more than 40 countries; predominantly with Western countries as well as she is the signatory of the European Convention on Extradition (See Table 3). However, her extradition requests of 158 terrorists from various states within last ten years have been positively responded with the extradition of only 15 terrorists. 80 of pending requests were simply rejected and all others (about 60) were even not responded by the requested states. That means Turkey

Table 3  
*Fugitives extradited to Turkey in the last ten years*¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries having extradition treaty with Turkey</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of terror fugitives requested by Turkey for extradition</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of terror fugitives extradited to Turkey</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of extradition requests rejected</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of extradition requests even not responded</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

gets only one out of ten of her extradition requests responded positively despite existence of red notices issued by Interpol or diffusion notices issued via Interpol channels for

¹ Quoted from the 2009 annual information bulletin of TNP Department of Interpol Europol-Sirene.
those suspects’ provisional arrests. No matter how much rejecting or not responding those extradition requests base on reasonable grounds, they cause occasional disruptions in interagency police cooperation. One Turkish practitioner narrates the following interesting case in this respect:

In 1996, a famous businessman was assassinated by a militant of an extremist leftist terrorist group in Turkey. The murderer was identified by the Turkish police shortly after the incident and subsequently, Interpol issued a red notice with a view of suspect’s arrest and extradition because of involving in a terror crime. The suspect was arrested in Belgium. However, Belgium authorities rejected the suspect’s extradition to Turkey because of the existing death penalty in Turkey.

In the following years, Turkey abolished the death penalty and submitted a new request to Belgium authorities for the extradition of the murder suspect. Interestingly enough, Belgium authorities this time refused the extradition because the gun used in the assassination was not an automatic gun and thus, according to the 1977 Strasbourg agreement could only be classified as a political crime rather than a terror crime. As a result, they again refused the extradition, since the assassination was classified as a political crime. In 2005, Belgium enacted a new anti-terrorism law which enabled the alleged murderer to be classified as a terror suspect. However, they once again did not execute the extradition on the grounds that the crime was committed before the adoption of new legislation and the suspect therefore possessed the right to benefit from the previous law. This pending case between two countries caused a great distrust on Turkey’s side and certainly jeopardized police cooperation as well. Interpol, on the other hand, has nothing to do in such disputes except issuing red notices, because its decisions are not binding for its membership.
B. Technical barriers

Technical barriers were highlighted by 48% of the respondents as another common problem in interagency police cooperation (Figure 6). The multi-headed structure of police organizations was cited as one such serious challenge in this area. In some countries, such as Turkey, internal security forces such as the police, gendarmerie, customs and coastal security are all structured under different directorships. As law enforcement forces, police organization is structured under ministry of internal affairs and covers city centers; gendarmerie organization is structured under general staff of armed forces with its logistical support and staff recruitment but works under ministry internal affairs and covers rural areas. Similarly coastal security is structured under navy but works under ministry of internal affairs and covers territorial waters. Such organizational and jurisdictional divisions make it difficult for foreign security agencies to distinguish which security organization should be contacted for what crime.

The partition of internal security forces based on jurisdictional territories is also often criticized as another hindrance of police cooperation. In some other countries, the large number of separate law enforcement organizations complicates efforts of cooperation. For example, there are thousands of separate law enforcement organizations in the U.S. Even in a small country like the Netherlands, there are 26 different law enforcement organizations. Each Netherlands agency is independent and can reach out on its own to develop cooperative agreements with foreign police agencies. Therefore, when foreign police officials need to contact Dutch police authorities for an investigative purpose, it is almost impossible for them to address their requests to the appropriate police agency since they cannot know their jurisdictional borders. Foreign liaison officers
certainly play an important role in overcoming such barriers, but this is not enough to make cooperative relations smoothly in all aspects.

Similarly, the absence of an interagency data network among decentralized law enforcement forces noticeably slows down police cooperation. This technical obstacle worsens the cooperation when it overlaps with institutional conservatism. That is to say, information itself is often perceived as power by various police departments. Therefore, sometimes, law enforcement agencies prefer keeping information in their hands rather than sharing it with other agencies and thereby utilizing it for investigative purposes. Nonetheless, The French gendarmerie and police agencies’ integrated and efficient interagency information sharing system was told as an exception in this regard by few Western liaison officers.

Another technical problem often faced in police cooperation concerns the exchange of information about the identities of prepaid mobile phone users. In many countries, even if the prepaid phone lines are tapped for investigative purposes, their users cannot be identified because the telecommunication systems do not provide the identities of prepaid users recorded in the system. Therefore, in such countries, criminals mostly communicate by using prepaid phone communications. As a result, requests to wiretap prepaid phone communications usually cannot be fulfilled by them because of the systemic divergence. This may also cause disappointment to the requesting agency.

In Japan, Interestingly enough, even the records of surveillance cameras installed in public domains for public safety are protected by privacy regulations. They cannot be used for investigative purposes without judicial permission. In many other countries, however, police agencies efficiently use public safety camera records for investigative
purposes. At the same time, existing laws are always subject to change. For instance, Romania, upon a recent revision on her relevant law, declared that it would no longer share the personal identities of people communicating on the Internet or telephone for investigative purposes without having a valid court decision. Turkey responded with a declaration that it would enforce reciprocity against Romania.

These emerging systemic differences cause problems in trans-border joint investigations. Sometimes, information requests for criminal records of suspects, vehicle plate numbers, telephone numbers, travel records, and personal identities may not be answered by the requested side when they violate systemic requirements. Even sometimes, lack of mutual awareness of such systemic differences may cause cooperating parties to accuse each other of not being responsive and cooperative in trans-border joint operations.

Another specific problem occasionally encountered in police cooperation is the loss of contact between former liaison officers departed from host country and the new ones relieved them. Many states deploy new liaison officers before their predecessors leave the host country. Thus, new officers can adjust to their new missions while taking advantage of the accumulated knowledge and experiences of their predecessors during the transition period. Without this overlap, it requires a huge effort to re-learn the critical experiences and knowledge necessary to do their jobs well. This especially becomes a serious concern when there is an ongoing joint operation. Therefore, such interruptions in cooperative police relations are not appreciated and are often subject to criticism in multilateral police cooperation settings.
As for the physical conditions of working environment, some interviewees stress that the host countries should provide foreign liaison officers with adequate office space in the host country police headquarters. The German Federal Police Headquarters (BKA) was given as an excellent example in this regard. Liaison officers in Germany have their own offices in the BKA. Their computers are linked to the internal computer network of the hosting police agency. They have clearance to walk in any office in the headquarters. However, this is not the case in many other countries. Liaison officers are not allowed to have contact with certain police departments due either to a shortage of space or security concerns.

In addition to the concerns described above, some interviewees noted that newly appointed liaison officers are sometimes not fully briefed about the organizational culture of the host country police agencies. As one respondent puts it:

Can you imagine? I have been here for two years and I did not know that operational police divisions such as combating terror department, combating drug smuggling and organized crimes departments work under the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor with respect to their operational investigations. Therefore, they are usually reluctant to exchange information in order not to have problems with the prosecutor as their judicial chief. We learned all these situational facts by ourselves over the time.

However, the researcher himself observed that in practical terms, foreign liaison officers can often easily walk in and out of those operational departments and ask their counterparts about any information they needed for investigative purposes.

Countries’ development levels as well as the quality of personnel employed in police cooperation are important, too. Interpol and other multilateral police cooperation organizations are increasingly developing their service standards. However, some member countries stay behind particularly in adapting and applying those new technical applications. Interpol as a global-scale police cooperation devotes a large effort to
providing the technical and logistical support required to develop the capacities of backward police agencies. Law enforcement agencies showing outstanding performance in applying all Interpol service standards are often held up to other member countries by Interpol as examples of best practices. However, it is not that easy to maintain even the basic standards of policing worldwide, and many law enforcement forces still have a long way to go.

One respondent narrated a striking story in this regard. One Turkish citizen had been wanted with an Interpol red notice decades ago as the suspect of a crime. Latterly, he was captured and tried. He was released after serving his prison sentence. Then, about 30 years later, he traveled to a neighboring country in order to watch a football match played between the two countries. There, he was recaptured by the police on the authority of the Interpol red notice. Turkish police immediately stepped in and notified the country’s police agency that the detainee had already completed his sentence and should have been released immediately. However, the detainee was still kept in jail for one month and it took an intervention at the political level to effect his release. This problem arose because that country police agency was not in touch with Interpol properly and had not updated its data base accordingly.

Budget shortages were also mentioned as another major barrier, especially in multilateral policing organizations. One SECI liaison officer says:

You know everything is connected with money. Especially in international joint investigations, if you don’t have enough money, you cannot call 20 people from different countries, and set a regional level joint operation. So this is one shortage we face here but which is not in our hands. To me, here, first, the sufficient budget must be separated for analyzing the risk indictors. Then the budgetary priorities must be determined accordingly.
It is also important to note at this point that the most attractive side of regional police organizations for member countries is developing regional projects in their centers against regional crimes. Such projects are usually organized by regional police organizations largely depending on their financial resources. Therefore, the quality of police cooperation under the umbrella of regional police cooperation organizations is closely associated with their budgetary possibilities.

C. Impacts of domestic affairs

Countries’ internal affairs, on the other hand, were mentioned by 35.5% of the respondents to have hindering affects on transnational operational police cooperation (Figure 6). Some respondents emphasized that the quality of international police cooperation was also closely associated with states’ internal affairs. As discussed earlier, legislative infrastructure, technical capacities of organizations, as well as the qualifications of personnel, are all essential instruments of international police cooperation.

In addition to these fundamentals, it is important for national police agencies to have an effective internal coordination among their respective departments for their operational success as well as for their institutional reliability in trans-border police cooperation. However, maintaining such an internal consistency may not always be possible. Most liaison officers and Turkish practitioners noted that this is chiefly because operational police units such as terror or drug units prefer to carry on their trans-border relations with a more result-oriented approach and therefore, prefer direct police to police contacts in an effort to obtain quicker results in joint operations. Meanwhile, non-
Such varying institutional attitudes in trans-border relations may cause internal frictions among different units of one national police agency and may eventually harm the quality of police cooperation across borders. To be more precise, while one police unit says that reciprocity must be used against a certain foreign police agency because of an earlier failure to cooperate, another police unit may say that it will keep cooperating with that police agency directly for the sake of some other ongoing joint operations. As a result, domestic police units may not support each other adequately in other trans-border operations. This may have a serious impact on the quality of trans-border police cooperation.

One interviewee narrated an interesting story in this regard. A Turkish-based organized crime network involved in the illegal trafficking of human beings and produced fake travel documents to assist in the illegal transportation of people from Eastern countries to Europe. A joint investigation was started by two national police agencies in Europe. Latterly, another police agency became involved in this cooperative investigation. After a time, upon some new developments, these police organizations decided to place this investigation under the umbrella of SECI, which happily took charge. The first operational meeting was held under the auspices of SECI and all tasks arising from the investigation were divided among the participatory police agencies with a deadline of completion set six months later. Accordingly, the narrator’s agency was supposed to tap some telephone numbers, detect the connections between those telephone communications and finally, submit it as a report to the SECI center before the next
meeting. SECI analysts would then assemble all parts of the puzzle and provide a picture of the traffickers’ communication network and illegal activities. The joint operation would be launched simultaneously in all respective countries under the coordination of SECI.

This operation involved the Department of Anti-smuggling and Organized Crime, the Foreign Relations Department, and the liaison officer deployed at the SECI center. However, somehow, the narrator, from The Department of Foreigners and Combating Illegal Immigration was assigned to attend the second operational meeting just a few days before the start of the second meeting. He felt something was going on wrong, but followed the instructions anyway. Before going to the SECI center, he found out that almost nothing was done by the respective units of his police organization in fulfilling the obligations promised at the first meeting. What is more, he couldn’t reach his country’s respective liaison officer before the meeting since he was away from the SECI center on vacation.

As soon as the second working meeting started the SECI analyst said that all the cooperating parties fulfilled their obligations except the narrator’s agency. After completing his presentation of the analysis, he further said that the results of the analysis could have been more reliable if the part of the task given to the narrator’s agency was done properly. Subsequently, the SECI’s director opened the discussion part of the meeting and raised the first question to the narrator (continuing in his words):

Could you please, tell us why your police agency didn’t do the part of the work that they had been assigned to? All other participants in the meeting room was looking at me and wondering what I would say. I couldn’t put forward any reasonable excuse because; first, I was assigned to participate in the meeting just couple of days ago and second, I was actually not the right person to be there. It
was the moment like being tried in an international tribunal for me. I never ever remember falling in such a difficult position in my life.

The narrator offered a general explanation, saying that his agency was an important partner of the SECI organization and would certainly like to make every contribution possible to SECI operations but unfortunately in this case it complete its assigned tasks because it had been overwhelmed with operational work at home. And finally, he asked the director for additional time to complete their work. This was understandably an unsatisfactory answer. Some participants said, “Then, why did your colleagues give promises on behalf your national police agency? These works should have been completed three months ago.” Anyway, the representatives of the countries who had originally started that operational investigation intervened and comforted the narrator, saying, as he recalled, “That is okay, sometimes, such unintentional problems may occur. Now let’s focus on what we can do from now on.”

They decided to proceed forward and in the following days, the rest of the operation was launched, with a partial success. The narrator’s agency eventually fulfilled its commitments in the following months and the part of the operation was completed in his country, too. However, from the cooperation standpoint he said it was a failure for his police organization.

Having returned frustrated from the meeting, the narrator searched for the causes of such an unpleasant situation. He found, first of all, that there had been a lack of consultation among the respective police units at the very beginning. The liaison officer at the SECI center had agreed to take in the joint operation on his own initiative and subsequently, informed the foreign relations department about the situation. The Foreign relations department approved his decision, but the anti-smuggling unit, which was the
real operational unit, was unhappy with that *fait accompli*. Second, the lack of consultation inevitably caused a lack of coordination between the same police units. As a result a separate team had not been established for that operational purpose. A judicial investigation was not opened, and a number other shortcomings followed each other and eventually resulted in such a failure.

Internal matters of countries such as, political instability, technological shortages, terrorism problem, and financial deficiencies are certainly other obstacles to international police cooperation. One U.S. federal agent said, “In some countries, drug cartels are feeding state officials and politicians.” One Turkish liaison officer said, “Someone who is a former mafia leader in the past may be seen as minister of internal affairs in the next government cabinet.” A Western liaison officer said, “For instance, you are going to a country for a work meeting, you see that they still use the technology and equipments of 20 years before.” Another Western liaison officer said, “Yes, police cooperation is either directly or indirectly affected by political affairs. For instance, you are carrying out a joint operation. The other party does not wait until the operation matures. They just conduct early arrests and seizures, because they want to show how they are successful in combating crimes to their respective political authorities.”

Interagency police cooperation is affected not only by countries’ domestic political conditions or by interstate political relations as discussed above, but also is hampered by the interference of political authorities in policing issues. Such political interference prevents police agencies’ institutionalization. As noted by one practitioner:

As an example in … (country A), narcotics police and the organized crime police authorities have been changing almost every year depending on the political structure of the country and it could be very difficult for their counterparts to follow the chances of these posts and make it more difficult to continue
cooperating on incomplete operational works. Same situation is also exists in countries … (B, C, D, E) and other countries. When we consider how important it is to work with experienced staff for more success, permanent employment of experts in certain policing posts is essential.

In such countries where political intervention is a major problem, police officials adjust their positions and policing priorities according to domestic political environment of their country rather than focusing on international cooperation and on combating transnational criminality in more professional manner.

**D. Unprofessional conducts**

Police liaison officers are certainly an important instrument of police cooperation. Understandably, they follow the interests of their respective states in host countries. This cannot be accounted as an obstacle to police cooperation. However, 4 Western liaison officers as well as 3 SECI liaison officers said that it was important for host country police agencies to determine their priorities in police cooperation properly so that the liaison officers can act accordingly. Similarly, 5 practitioners working in the TNP operational units underlined that various units of host country police agencies should be consistent in sharing what information should be shared with liaison officers and to what extent. Thus, when liaison officers can’t acquire information from one police department, they shouldn’t be able to go to another department and get the same information from there. Otherwise, cooperative relations may result in undesirable outcomes.

Another TNP officer noted that in such uncertain situations, some liaison officers may exaggerate their liaising activities until contacting some local people illegally and using them as undercover informants in the host country. As a result, they may face severe accusations of spying in the host country by the local police authorities. Such unprofessional and illegal conducts may seriously jeopardize the mutual trust as well as
the quality of cooperation between the cooperating agencies. He said this had, indeed, happened in Turkey couple of times.

Frequent changes in police employment for political reasons have already been discussed earlier as one specific obstacle to police cooperation. Such instabilities in policing may also cause unprofessional attitudes. For instance, having in mind such frequent changes in high level police employments, liaison officers may take the opportunity to go to higher-level police officials rather than dealing with their counterparts in addressing their requests. In this way, they may aim to either acquire information that they couldn’t get it previously or to get a quick and swift response to their request. The newly appointed police managers may approach such inappropriate requests more graciously and generously for the sake of developing cooperative relations. However, this may also cause some discomfort to lower-level experienced police professionals, who may provide insufficient or even false information even as they obey the instructions of their superior officers. One respondent amazingly worded it as: “In such cases, I give couple of aspirins (false or lacking information) to the requester and he thinks he got the exact pills (right information) he need, but indeed not.”

Sometimes, diverging working cultures of police organizations are a problem in police cooperation. One Turkish liaison officer to a Western country provided an interesting example of this. Once, his agency was conducting a drug operation in collaboration with three Western countries. The operation was matured with the evidence collected and the expectation was that approximately 200 kg of heroin would be seized. One day, a police officer of the host country informed him that the third country’s police stopped the physical surveillance on Friday evening because of the coming of weekend.
The narrator said he couldn’t believe what he heard but unfortunately it was true. Then, he raised the question: “How can you trust their professionalism again in future operations?” He continued with another interesting story:

We detected that one employee of our embassy abroad had some connections with the Albanian mafia. I requested the host country police agency to tap that person’s telephone conversations but they tapped all phone lines of the embassy including the one used by the ambassador himself/herself. Anyhow, we just closed the case before becoming a diplomatic crisis between two states. You must be very careful when cooperating with them next time.

Liaison officers, on the other hand, are essential instruments of transnational policing in terms of ensuring both mutual understanding and proper coordination of operational cooperation. However, it was noted by 3 Western and 1 Turkish liaison officers that some states may not consider their role to be so important. In such situations, even the assigned liaison officers may prioritize enjoying the profits of liaising mission such as saving money rather than fulfilling the requirements of police cooperation in host countries. Such unprofessional approaches to liaising mission are usually noticed quickly by international law enforcement community. This causes police agencies to lose the confidence of other police organizations, as continuity and professionalism are essential qualifications of international police cooperation.

Controlled delivery operations are accepted as the most effective way to combat drug trafficking by all liaison officers and Turkish police professionals. They are also significant examples of police professionalism in operational cooperation practices. Drug trafficking routes pass through several countries ranging from east to west or vice versa. Sometimes, collective requirements of controlled delivery operations are not fulfilled in a professional way in particular by some Balkan police agencies involved. Although they are notified in advance that the illegal narcotic will be transported via their jurisdictional
territories as part of an ongoing controlled delivery operation, they still disrupt the operation by raiding the transportation and seizing the drugs halfway.

As a result of such unprofessional interruptions, the entire trafficking network cannot be uncovered and destroyed. Such problems are caused either by the absence of controlled delivery regulation as seen in some Eastern countries, or by the attitudes of practitioners who say, “I don’t care about controlled delivery or whatever it is. I capture the smuggled drugs wherever I detect it” as one interviewee recounted. The same respondent provided another example in which an agreement with the police of one European country police to conduct a controlled delivery was broken when they disrupted the operation and seized the drug 100 kilometers before reaching the final destination without notifying them. He adds, “Now that they would disrupt the operation like that, why did we conduct a joint operation with them? We could have done the same thing, too. These are unprofessional practices that jeopardize mutual trust.”

Another major issue in police cooperation is getting an efficient response from the other side. Efficient response is identified by one Western interviewee as “getting good and timely information.” Good information means the received intelligence matches what it is supposed to be doing. The same interviewee highlights it as:

Imagine that you have been running the operation for 6 months and there is no arrest or seizure because of an intelligence failure or simply because of late response. Such failures de-motivate the teams for future joint operations. If one of us doesn’t share the information despite the fact that we have been waiting too long for that information and eventually missed the opportunity to finalize the operation as expected…. This is the real and biggest threat for police cooperation.

If such disruptions occur because of the lack of sophisticated legislation, that is understandable to some extent. But if they happen due to carelessness or ignorance of the other side, then it reflects a real breakdown in police cooperation. Liaison officers
underline that no matter what the subject of an information request, it must be answered in a timely manner. Another Eastern European respondent gave the following example:

Once, two citizens of a country applied for permanent residence in our country. We asked their state to send us their judicial records as part of the formal procedure to be followed. It was a simple request that could have been answered within a couple of days but the response came 8 months later. That was too long. Another time, we investigated a murder case with the police of same country, they responded to all our requests very quickly and we finalized the investigation within a month. Can you imagine?

He added that police cooperation shouldn’t change according to the type of crime or the nature of the information requested. Cooperating parties should always take information requests seriously so that they can maintain a consistent quality of cooperation.

It is also worth noting that when, some European state police agencies open an investigation, they prefer to carry out its transcending extensions as well by themselves. Therefore, they often use rogatory letters in order to complete the parts of their investigations that extend to other countries. This is usually because the concerns they have that some police agencies may not carry out the parts of investigations falling under their jurisdictions in a professional way either because of their unprofessionalism, their technical inadequacies, or because of the absence of human rights standards in those countries. This may create crises of confidence between the cooperating agencies and even sometimes leading the requested party to refuse to respond to a rogatory letter on the “excuse” that it does not contain sufficient evidence to take any action.

E. Cultural and bureaucratic barriers

Cultural differences and bureaucratic factors were also noted by 48% of the respondents as barriers slowing the interagency police cooperation down (Figure 6). It should be noted that a nation’s cultural values influences its legal system, which closely
affects trans-border police cooperation. For instance, while combating trans-border drug trafficking is the area of transnational policing that experiences the greatest cooperation; a change in a state’s approach to the criminalization of drugs can have a major impact. 5 Western liaison officers, 2 U.S. federal agents and 3 Turkish practitioners working in operational units noted that while in some countries the possession of even small amounts of marijuana was banned, controlled drug use was now accepted in countries like the Netherlands. States may approach drug use from the standpoint of public health, which leads to a more flexible, harm-reduction policy that concentrates on the rehabilitation of drug users. Such states tolerate drug use to a limited degree while focusing instead on combating drug production and trafficking though this poses challenges to narcotics-control efforts.

Not only such differences between national cultures, but also the different organizational cultures of domestic security organizations may slow operational cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies. For example, interestingly enough almost all foreign liaison officers working in Turkey noted that national police organization in Turkey was highly modernized and open for trans-border cooperative relations, whereas gendarmerie and coastal organizations were more closed for cooperative relations as well as highly conservative to exchange information due to their military characteristics. Several liaison officers stated that it was almost impossible to get any information from gendarmerie departments for investigative purposes.

Rapid information exchange is always crucial for effective police cooperation; yet constant delays in responding to incoming requests because of bureaucratic rigidity continue to be a major handicap in interagency police cooperation. Many interviewees
from east to west note that this is not because of the lack of willingness to cooperate among law enforcement professionals, but due to the slow pace of decision-making in other state departments, particularly in the judiciary. Several interviewees also say that the bureaucracies in Eastern countries have prevented the needed improvements more in police cooperation.

Even police practitioners from different police agencies acknowledge that working together on urgent investigative operations represents the front line of fighting transnational criminality. However, for judicial authorities this may not be a primary concern in transnational policing. One Turkish liaison officer to a Western country noted that one Turkish mafia leader was able to travel across seven European countries for years despite the existence of a court warrant for his arrest and an Interpol bulletin calling for his capture. No matter how hard they tried, the liaison officers in those countries couldn’t get judicial approval for a wiretapping operation they believed was necessary to apprehend the wanted fugitive. It was because of not persuading judicial authorities to do that. Eventually, he with the advice of his counterpart as well as with the assistance of a prosecutor reached the judicial minister of the host country and convinced him to approve the wiretapping. Anyhow, the fugitive was finally arrested in another way without having to use the wiretapping permission.

A rigid management hierarchy is another special barrier to cooperation between central police authorities. As noted by a Western respondent: “They have highly educated ranked officers but they are not responsible for anything. You always have to ask seniors and even sometimes, it goes up to the minister himself.” In some other management systems, in particular Western police organizations, things are much more flexible. Lower
level-officers can take more initiative. This barrier becomes problematic when urgent decisions are needed. Sometimes, it takes a lot time just to get even a small amount of statistical information from central authorities. Nonetheless, several liaison officers accept that this is because of the bureaucratic process of systems rather than personal attitudes of police practitioners.

Information requests for investigative purposes by means of rogatory letters represent another instrument for police cooperation. However, since such letters must pass through time-consuming layers of bureaucracy, the instrument may not always work efficiently. Police officials often prefer sending collected evidence directly to the requesting police agency so that the other side can start its investigation right away. This is usually accepted by police authorities as being more effective in dealing with transnational criminality.

**Findings of the Concept-2**

Despite many hindrances that are experienced in the daily practices of transnational policing, police professionals all emphasize that international police cooperation should continue growing across the world. They all say that as police practitioners, they understand each other very well. They know how transnational organized crime groups have been networking with each other and expanding their activities all over the world. Therefore, police cooperation must continue developing in every aspect.

They also highlight that police professionals shouldn’t simply wait for a better legislative substructure. Rather, they should strive to overcome the barriers of police
cooperation in their daily cooperative relations. Otherwise, transnational police cooperation will inevitably fail to catch up with the networking of transnational organized crime groups.

Problems that jeopardize mutual trust between cooperating agencies or even sometimes terminate the cooperation abruptly are usually caused by misconduct in specific investigative cases or by the misuse of critical information shared for critical investigations. In other words, the greatest threat to police cooperation comes from unprofessional conduct in cooperative operations. Such conduct not only disrupts cooperation in practical terms but also jeopardizes long-term mutual trust, which is considered the backbone of police cooperation by all respondents. Mutual trust makes cooperating agencies feel that they can continue relying on each other in the future. That is why, especially during joint operations, practitioners strictly try to stay away from any unprofessional behavior that may cause their counterparts to lose confidence in them.

It is important to see that although 71% of the interviewees (Figure 6) viewed legislative and systemic differences as the most common barriers to international operational police cooperation, it does not mean that the more states have parallel regulations, the fewer obstacles are faced in police cooperation. Contrarily, some interviewees noted that despite the fact that the EU states had quite similar laws, there were still many difficulties experienced in police cooperation within EU territories. Again this is because of the fragile nature of the police cooperation itself. That is to say, even if interagency police cooperation is regulated in a detailed way, it can still be disrupted at any time when an unexpected difficulty arises.
First of all, it is almost impossible to frame operational police cooperation under certain regulations because every crime incident occurs under different circumstances and needs to be investigated according to its own conditions. Second and more important, again because of the same reason, memorandum of understandings, security and cooperation agreements are mostly designed to include general rules rather than determining every detail of police cooperation. Third, cooperation agreements usually include how cooperating parties can assist each other and what can be shared rather than how they have to cooperate or what has to be shared under the terms and conditions of police cooperation agreements.

That is why, in practice, the implementation of cooperation agreements largely depends on police professionals’ discretion which is indeed true for police work in general, too. Cooperating parties always want to ensure that everything goes all right with any ongoing joint investigation. Operational police cooperation is thus usually reinforced with extra supportive instruments such as arranging mutual operational purpose visits or working meetings, using liaison officers and the like. This is especially a concern during initial stages of joint operations because at this early stage, joint investigations can stop at any time due to lack of sufficient evidence or due to any other judicial reason. In such unexpected situations, police professionals are not in a hurry to use reciprocity. Instead, they usually approach the problem in the following way, as explained by one Western interviewee: “Wait a minute, this is an exceptional situation; let’s find a way out of this problem.”

In such difficulties, if necessary, an immediate team of professionals can be formed and sent right away to the respective country where an ongoing joint investigation
is about to stop. Thus, the cooperating parties can keep each better informed with the goal of continuing and implementing the joint investigation. Therefore, close human contact is always essential especially in operationally purposed police cooperation.
CHAPTER VI

Concept-3: Fraternal Cooperation and Mutual Trust in Transnational Policing

This section investigates the role of informal police cooperation within formal police cooperation. Questions addressed through the perceptions of respondents include: how friendly relations lead to the development of fraternal cooperation among police professionals; why this is needed as an instrument of cooperation; and the relationship between fraternal cooperation and mutual trust.

Although the opinions of practitioners from all strata are portrayed as much as possible, the examples provided in the analytic discussions illustrate Turkish police experiences. This is because the study investigates the researched area mainly from Turkish experience and because the researcher observed that Turkish police practitioners provided relatively more exemplary cases than other liaison officers. Foreign liaison officers, too, made broad coverage, but provided fewer cases to illustrate their comments. The researcher’s conclusion is not based solely on these case examples. Rather, he relies on the essence of all the explanations provided by the respondents and makes generalizations accordingly.

A. Fraternal cooperation in transnational policing

Fraternal cooperation was highlighted as an important facilitator of operational police cooperation. 87% of the respondents working in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation settings accepted the existence and importance of fraternal cooperation in transnational policing (See Figure 7). On the other hand, 11% of the respondents—predominantly the ones working for Interpol, including one Western Liaison officer—
accepted friendly relations in police cooperation but remained skeptical about using them in cooperative operations. Their concerns as well are discussed below.

**Figure 7.** Percentage of respondents mentioned the importance various factors in police cooperation.

It can be understood from the expressions of interviewed practitioners that friendly relations develop in both formal and informal settings of police interactions. International police conferences, meetings, workshops, study visits, and training programs are the formal occasions where police practitioners learn about each other’s working systems and policing tactics. On the other hand, socialization among police liaison officers in foreign jurisdictions, such as getting together at dining parties, participating in sporting activities, and paying courtesy visits to each other in office environments, are the informal settings of police cooperation. Many practitioners said that such sympathetic channels eventually open the way for fraternal cooperation.

Above all, successful joint operations are the most effective drivers of fraternal police cooperation. To be more precise, successful joint operations are followed up by invitations from police practitioners to their foreign counterparts for assessment meetings
in their countries, or even for vacations. In such a relaxed atmosphere, not only do they
develop friendship but also take the opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from past
joint operations. Discussions may include evaluations of shortcomings in previous
operations, how future operations can be improved and exchanges of information about
the key points in each other’s legal systems that need to be addressed when making
investigative requests. Such informal conversations can even, when needed, focus on how
unofficial investigative requests can be fit into official formats so that ongoing joint
operations are not disrupted by legitimate barriers.

One Turkish practitioner provided an interesting example of how such informal
exchanges of investigative information may dramatically increase fraternal police
cooperation between respective units of different national police agencies. An operational
unit of the Turkish National Police (TNP) was wiretapping the leader of a transnational
organized crime group. The suspect used to live in Dubai, but latterly he was discovered
living in Amsterdam. One day, Turkish police also detected that he sent a courier to
Istanbul. There, the courier met some people and returned to Amsterdam. The Turkish
police suspected they were dealing with an illicit drug business but could not prove it
definitively because of the lack of sufficient concrete evidence.

They thought that the Dutch police might help, since the suspects were living in
Amsterdam. Having no direct communication with the Dutch police, the respective TNP
unit sent an email message to the Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department
(KOM) in Ankara explaining the situation and asking them to request help from The
Dutch police agency. According to the narrator, if they were able to confirm their
suspicions that the suspects were engaging in serious crime, they would upgrade their
initial investigation. If not, they would just close the case. KOM forwarded their email message to the Dutch police, and provided them with the flight information of the aforementioned courier returning to Amsterdam.

The Dutch police apprehended the courier as soon as he arrived in Amsterdam. But the TNP did not receive any informative message back from the Dutch police regarding the activities of suspects for some time. The narrator said, “We almost forgot about the case, supposing that the case was not that much serious.” Nonetheless, a couple of months later, the Dutch police sent a message to Turkish authorities, saying that in accordance with the information they had received from the KOM about the aforementioned mafia leader and his accomplices, they had started an initial investigation against those suspected people. When the evidence matured sufficiently, they raided an apartment in Amsterdam and arrested several people as well as confiscated many weapons, a large amount of ammunition, bombs ready to explode, drugs, cash, and a list of targets for assassination.

In the course of their investigation, The Netherlands police discovered the structure of a transnational organized crime network which operated like an octopus in several countries including Turkey. They expressed a desire to continue working with Turkish police and they invited inspectors from the TNP to The Netherlands for follow-up meetings. In those meetings, Dutch police investigators thanked the TNP inspectors for alerting them to such a serious criminal group. In return for this support, they shared copies of all the evidence they had acquired during their investigations with Turkish inspectors. What is more, they did it informally because it would have been very time consuming to share the evidence through formal channels. From then on, both police
agencies continued to informally share information, while being careful to pursue their official (judicial) investigations according to the evidence collected.

In the following days, the KOM department hosted an international informative meeting involving police representatives from eight countries. There, Turkish practitioners shared the relevant parts of the information they had about that transnational organized crime network so that all respective police agencies could launch their own operations in their jurisdictions. The narrator added that this single investigative cooperation with the Dutch police contributed immensely to both formal and informal cooperation as well as to building trust between the police agencies of the two countries.

Several respondents pointed out that unconditional support in investigative operations has a powerful impact on the development of mutual trust and fraternal cooperation in transnational policing. Another Turkish practitioner narrated the following interesting example. Turkish police (TNP) had been chasing a mafia leader who was living in some European countries. At one point, they learned that the mafia boss had traveled from Germany to Romania. Then, the TNP pushed the button for his capture and made a formal request through SECI for Romanian police cooperation. Upon getting the approval from Romanian police, several TNP investigators flew to SECI center, where they shared all the information they had about the wanted mafia leader with the Romanian police liaison officer.

After some time had passed when no action appeared to have been taken by the Romanians in arresting the mafia leader, the Turkish police requested a follow-up meeting with Romanian police authorities at the SECI center. At the meeting, Romanian
police officials said that they were still waiting for some information and documents that were needed for apprehending the suspect. The narrator says at this point:

We had provided them with all necessary information including the name and address of their fly-by-night company, plate numbers, telephone numbers etc. I mean if we were given such details, we could have captured any person within maximum couple of days.

In the meantime, Romanian police officials gave them the name of a suspect who had perpetrated purse-snatching a few times in Romania and then escaped to Istanbul. They were asked if they had Interpol red notice for the purse-snatcher’s capture. They said they did not, but it was processing. The TNP investigators took the personal details of the suspect and captured him the next day. Romanian police officials seemed to be shocked by the speed of the capture. The TNP officials asked them to send the rogatory letter right away for the extradition of the arrestee. They said that it would take some time to do that and asked if it were possible to hand over the person directly. The TNP officers then applied their deportation procedure instead of extraditing him by rogatory letter, on the grounds that the arrestee lacked proper documentation of travel, and delivered him to the Romanian police.

Meanwhile, the TNP officers kept asking the Romanians when they would apprehend the mafia leader. The TNP officers spoke with the Romanian intelligence department, which promised to share any information coming to their attention relating to the activities and arrest of the wanted mafia leader. At the same time, the TNP officers also detected that another fugitive responsible for the European financial affairs of the terrorist group PKK was living at a Romanian address, and passed on the information to Romanian police, who swiftly captured the person and delivered him to the TNP officers.
through exactly the same way used by the TNP officers when handing over of the aforementioned purse snatcher to the Romanian police.

This mutual collaboration immediately boosted the mutual trust between two country police agencies. As a consequence, fraternal cooperation rose to such a level that when the TNP officers were again in Romania for another follow-up meeting, they took the opportunity to launch an informal search for the wanted mafia leader. Within a few days, they located the fugitive and immediately informed the Romanian police, who captured the wanted mafia leader. They questioned the suspects together with the TNP officers, which was normally not possible. This successful joint operation was followed by a number of related operations and eventually the entire mafia organization was collapsed. The success of this collaborative operation also raised the reputation of SECI, since this represented its first successful coordination.

In a similar case, an operational unit of the TNP was requested by the Ukrainian police to arrest two Ukrainian mafia leaders living in Turkey. Turkish police arrested the wanted persons and handed them over to the Ukrainians, along with a detailed presentation explaining how they had captured them. This successful cooperation paid off when Turkish police later requested the Ukrainians to arrest and extradite a Turkish mafia leader living in Ukraine. The Ukrainian police executed the Turkish police request without any hesitation. Moreover, they included Turkish detectives in the suspect’s questioning at police headquarters, which was normally impossible in a foreign jurisdiction.

Likewise, one Western interviewee noted that following the capture of another Turkish mafia leader in France together with French police. French police officers invited
Turkish police officers to wait in a room next to the interrogation room, and handed over the personal belongings of the arrestee to the Turkish officers. This came about entirely due to the existence of a trusting relationship between the two police agencies. Another Turkish practitioner continued as follows:

In the 1990s, we showed the same solidarity to the Bulgarian, Albanian, Ukrainian and several other countries’ police practitioners. When we noticed that they were lacking some equipment, we provided them with laptops, digital photo cameras etc. in order to establish a direct communication between us.

He also said that they conducted several other joint operations in the same way. What is more, they eventually completed the formalities of those operations. In other words, they carried on formal and informal relations hand in hand during those joint operations which provided them with a great advantage in apprehending their targets quickly.

In such situations, police agencies are always careful not to risk sharing critical information in inappropriate ways. However, for the sake of ongoing investigations, when police are willing to take a measured risk in exchanging information, it has spectacular effects on developing fraternal cooperation. That is why many police professionals contend that they cannot think of good police cooperation without having friendly relations, mutual trust and fraternal cooperation among police professionals.

Table 4

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<th>Respondents’ Views Who Favor Fraternal Cooperation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fraternal cooperation is important to get effective responses to information requests</td>
<td>32/54 = 59%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fraternal cooperation is an important part of formal police cooperation</td>
<td>38/54 = 70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fraternal cooperation does not make official agreements unnecessary</td>
<td>30/54 = 56%</td>
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More than half of the respondents (59%) favoring fraternal cooperation noted that fraternal cooperation was also important in order to get effective responses to information requests (Table 4). In particular, when sensitive information such as personal records is requested from one side for policing purposes, the other side may still want to be sure of the purpose of such request even if it was made according to official formalities. Sometimes, such skepticism may further affect the quality of information provided in response to those requests. However, if there are good relations between the cooperating agencies, police professionals feel more confident in exchanging information. They know each other well, and they treat the investigative requests coming from each other with the same seriousness and diligence as they bring to their own work.

One SECI liaison officer noted, “We should stand on the official ground of cooperation unofficially. This is often inescapable especially during joint operations. When such accordance is established between the practitioners, then transnational cooperation becomes even smoother than domestic cooperation.” Such explanations suggest that human relations still play an essential role in police cooperation in terms of both eliminating prejudices and establishing trust among different national police agencies. Police use the same language everywhere in the world as long as political, economic, social and cultural concerns are not allowed to interfere in police cooperation.

Several police professionals liaising at both bilateral and multilateral levels explained fraternal police cooperation as one purpose of their liaising activities in foreign jurisdictions. They often pointed out the advantage of developing friendly relations with their colleagues in host countries and having face to face discussions with them about cooperative investigations. Another Western liaison officer specified it as:
Even sometimes, we obtain some information through friendly relations that cannot be used for investigation files but for policing purposes. For example, we can share the user identification of a telephone number for preliminary police investigation. If we need such information for investigative purpose, we request it through official channels. And this must be obeyed strictly.

Such anecdotes gives us the notion that police colleagues often use each other as contact points for acquiring even details of specific cases. On the other hand, it was also very noticeable in the interviews that when interviewees mentioned the importance of fraternal cooperation, they also underlined that such close relationships must not be misused. In other words, the more friendly relations improve in police cooperation, the more mutual trust becomes a sensitive issue.

Fraternal cooperation is also very much valued as a way of accelerating information exchange. Sometimes, it is possible to get something done via sympathetic channels within couple of minutes instead of a week it might have taken if formal channels were used. Therefore, almost all respondents viewed fraternal cooperation as an inseparable part of formal police cooperation. As clarified by a Western liaison officer:

You cannot work always with concrete rules. Police work for 24 hrs and you can never know when you will need urgent information. Therefore, as police, we must be open to each other any time of the day. Friendly relations are always more convenient for us.

Interestingly enough, several practitioners say that in some urgent cases, they respond to incoming requests by telephone and complete the paperwork afterwards.

Police practitioners apply such informal methods especially when they are challenged by time concern. For example when they detain a foreign citizen, the duration of detention cannot be more than 24 hours. Therefore, getting information regarding detainees’ judicial records or confirming their identity or telephone numbers or plate numbers from their country within 24 hours becomes critical. One foreign liaison officer
recalled a case in which two Ukrainian girls called their family from Turkey and said that they were kidnapped in Antalya for prostitution. Their families immediately reported the case to Ukrainian police, who alerted the Turkish liaison officer in Ukraine. He passed the information to Antalya Police, who immediately took action. They located the victims using telephone signals and rescued them immediately after. The case closed within half a day. Such immediate responses to emerging requests dramatically increase both mutual satisfaction and the quality of cooperation between cooperating agencies.

Friendly relations and correspondingly fraternal cooperation also operate as a kind of mutual assurance mechanism in police cooperation. When there is hesitation by one side about sharing requested information, respective liaison officers who have good relations with their counterparts at the requesting side immediately step into the process and assure their respective agency that the requested information can be shared safely. One SECI liaison officer says, “To me, friendly relations come first in police cooperation. Without police friendship we cannot talk about police cooperation.” In some occasions, liaison officers sit down together with their counterparts in more relaxed settings, and discuss about some actual problems in order to find out possible solutions. Sometimes they even arrange joint operations with their counterparts in the host country. This would not be possible without fraternal cooperation and mutual trust between cooperating parties.

Therefore, liaison officers define police cooperation as interacting with their colleagues not only during office hours but also during their free times so that they can share experiences and strengthen personal relationships. This is accepted as an important
part of police cooperation by 70% of the professionals who favor fraternal cooperation in transnational policing (Table 4). Another SECI liaison officer exemplifies:

For example, we had a joint investigation of trafficking in human beings last year. Eighteen professionals participated in the meeting. Following the official meeting, I invited everybody to my apartment. We dined until midnight and developed a very good friendship among us. Now, whenever we need a help from any of us, we just say: ‘No problem just give me a call then, I will do my best to be helpful’. This is because we know each other very well and thereby trust each other very much. We have face to face connection which goes hand in hand with the formal relations.

More than half of the respondents (56%) emphasized that fraternal cooperation does not make official agreements unnecessary (Table 4). On the contrary, cooperation agreements are essential to provide legitimacy to cooperative activities. Police practitioners do not necessarily expect such official instruments to regulate police cooperation in all details but they see official agreements as the legal base or umbrella of police cooperation. In this context, fraternal cooperation is an important way of filling the gaps left by legal instruments of cooperation. It also means whatever is done within the context of fraternal cooperation must be based on legal norms. As noted by an FBI agent:

Fraternal cooperation works very well but at the same time, you have to be very careful because it is also a shaky area. First of all, your request must base on a legitimate ground. Otherwise, you are likely to cause some unintended consequences between the cooperating agencies.

On the other hand, a minority of (11%) respondents pointed out the potential risks of fraternal cooperation (Figure 7). While conceding its advantages, they also noted that friendly relations were subject to misuse at any time. Going even further, they said that if formal cooperation was working in an efficient way, it was better to stay away from fraternal cooperation. This is because when liaison officers cannot get the information they need by means of formal channels, they try to get it by using their personal contacts in the host country police agencies. This can raise doubts about the ethical aspect of the
cooperation as well as about the reputation of the police agencies represented by such liaison officers in the host countries. That is because liaison officers are considered to be the mirrors of their respective agencies. If they have good relations with their foreign counterparts, it automatically reflects on the quality of cooperation they coordinate in foreign jurisdictions. For example, the ability of a liaison officer to be able to make appointments with his foreign counterparts whenever necessary is an important indicator of the quality of cooperation his/her respective police agency.

**B. Mutual trust**

Trust is accepted as another main determinant factor in international police cooperation by 98% of the respondents (Figure 7). It is very much identified with fraternal cooperation. Many respondents state that mutual trust goes hand in hand with fraternal cooperation. In transnational police cooperation, like fraternal cooperation trust depends on many variables. Although trust is mostly established and improved depending on individual cases and personal behavior in police cooperation like fraternal cooperation, its success may also depend on some institutional factors.

However, when it comes to face-to-face cooperative policing relations such as interactions between liaison officers and their counterparts in host countries, or interactions among the liaison officers working under SECI-type international policing organizations, fraternal cooperation versus losing mutual trust or professionalism versus unprofessionalism are now the overriding parameters of police cooperation. That is to say, when one of the cooperating parties becomes convinced that their information request was not responded satisfactorily, it can lead to a confidence crisis rather than
simply applying reciprocity between the two parties. As one Western respondent elucidates:

Of course, it does not mean that everything is working very well on our side. Sometimes, we also push our local colleagues: ‘Listen, if you don’t give them this information, we can never get any information from them in the future.’ This is how we sometimes persuade our local guys to provide information to the host country police. But such issues are usually individual cases and we are normally tightly connected and need each other.

In this example, the expression “we can never get any information” can be understood as the emergence of a confidence crisis between the cooperating police agencies.

One SECI liaison officer exemplified the development of fraternal cooperation at the SECI center in this way:

For instance, when I was passing an information request coming from my police agency to the Moldavian liaison officer at the SECI center, he was taking the message as if it was coming from me but not from Turkish police. There, sometimes, our fellowship was getting ahead of the names of our national police agencies. We were paying courtesy family visits to each other even sometimes, to our countries. Thus, our cooperative activities were speeding up tremendously. Sometimes, we were making every effort in order to get an answer even for small requests coming from our colleagues over there.

Parallel to this, another SECI liaison officer said, “I mean even sometimes, I receive the information requests by telephone and I help the requesting party because I know I will receive the formal request latterly.”

It was also noted by many liaison officers (60%) that operational capacities of national police agencies significantly mattered to operational police cooperation (Figure 9). Using the latest technologies and modern investigation tactics have helped raise both the reputation and the reliability of cooperating police agencies. For instance, 14 Western liaison officers pointed out the remarkable progress in Turkish police’s technical capacity and professional conducts compared to 10-15 years ago. It has considerably increased its
reputation compared to its recent past and became a credible partner especially in cooperating against terrorism. That is why Turkish police professionals working in terror department say that their evidencing for how some civilian associations affiliate with the PKK terrorist groups, how they finance terrorism by exploiting the resources of Western societies, as well as how they engage in other organized crime activities such as drug trafficking are now more accepted by Western police agencies.

In addition to the factors cited above as facilitating fraternal police cooperation, majority of the respondents (78%) draw the attention to the common police subculture (Figure 7). They emphasize that police use a universal language everywhere in the world. The main dynamic of this subculture is the commonality of police work which is basically the fight between good and evil. Police fight against criminality all over the world. That is why police officers everywhere understand each other very well regardless of their cultural, national or political identities. So this was also often mentioned as one major potential reason for the strong solidarity among police members all over the world.

On the other hand, as an example of decreasing trust between two police agencies, a series of murders between 2001-2005 in one Western country that left eight Turkish citizens dead, all by the same gun, has not resulted in any progress towards solving the case, despite the continuous efforts of police. What is more, the police in that country requested a vast amount of information relating to many Turkish citizens from Turkish police in an effort to enlighten the cases. After a certain period, Turkish police officials became skeptical about those constant information requests. When they asked why they were asking so much information about so many people, the police agency failed to provide sufficient responses. Thereupon, Turkish police stopped providing information
directly and asked them to send rogatory letters for further information requests. In this case, we can clearly talk about the decreasing trust between the two police agencies.

Another example recounted by a Turkish police practitioner concerned a wholesaler of forged credit cards who was detected in an Eastern European country by the U.S. Secret Service. One day, the Secret Service informed the Turkish police that this important figure of the underground market was heading to Turkey on holiday. They asked Turkish police to arrest him at an appropriate time during his stay in Turkey and to give them the passwords as well as the copies of the suspects’ personal computers. Turkish police immediately took the action and the suspect was arrested and all the information requested was provided to the Secret Service as agreed.

However, two mistakes were made by the Secret Service agents before and after the operation that eventually jeopardized the mutual trust between respective units of two police agencies. First, the Secret Service agents tried to conduct physical surveillance and observation as well as taking photos before the operation was launched, though they were warned not to conduct such operational activities in a foreign jurisdiction. Second, although the Secret Service was provided with copies of all evidence just for policing purposes, they used it for judicial investigation. These unwanted actions inevitably jeopardized the existing trust between the two agencies. Turkish police eventually refused to extradite the arrestee, putting forward the reason that he would be tried in Turkey for his illegal activities, even though the operation had begun with the intention of handing him over to the Secret Service.

In another case involving a Turkish liaison officer and a host country police agency in Europe, the confidence crisis went up to such a level that the host country
police agency wiretapped the liaison officer for a certain period of time. They suspected that the liaison officer was leaking information from their organization to an organized crime group. In response to this treatment, the liaison officer froze relations with the host country police agency. However, they eventually found out that the information had been leaked not by the liaison officer but by one of the officers inside their own agency. They eventually corrected the relations with the aforementioned liaison officer and began to include him in their most confidential units to the extent that sometimes, when they wiretapped a Turkish citizen living in that country, they consulted with the liaison officer for help in translating as well as analyzing the telephone conversations.

C. Reciprocity in transnational policing

Reciprocity, on the other hand, is reported to be an important instrument in transnational policing by 11% of the respondents (Figure 7). It is not frequently used compared to trust in police cooperation. It is usually applied as a state policy when investigative requests are not responded to by the requested party due to some legal restrictions. This is because, sometimes, one of the cooperating agencies may be reluctant to share information in some specific areas because of political, legislative or systemic reasons. Such barriers in interagency cooperation even may be accepted by police officials as understandable to some degree since their application is limited to specific issues subject to reciprocity. That means cooperation in other policing areas may continue as usual. Therefore, in practical terms, losing reciprocity may not be as destructive as losing the mutual trust among the cooperating police agencies.

With this in mind, reciprocity was indeed not mentioned by police professionals as a major problem in the daily practices of trans-border police cooperation. 5 liaison
officers as well as 4 SECI liaison officers identified the threat of reciprocity as a totally unprofessional part of today’s transnational policing practices. As one Western liaison officer worded:

I think that is totally unprofessional attitude. I would say that for any failure of cooperation we can’t keep it back to you in any case and that is not the appropriate way of cooperation particularly in police cooperation. What we do usually is we show what we have in our hands and say if we got more; we will tell you more on this issue and this is the appropriate way of developing mutual trust. But saying: ‘If you don’t do this for us this time, then next time we will not keep going on with you’ is totally unprofessional.

It can be derived from such words that reciprocity is not appreciated particularly in face to face relations in police cooperation. That is why many liaison officers define their missions not only as pursuing their requests to be responded by their counterparts but also as working with their counterparts to solve the relevant issues of cooperative policing.

Nonetheless, it is still hard to state that reciprocity is totally useless in police cooperation. One SECI liaison officer made the following point: “Sure, sometimes, reciprocity is unavoidable. Imagine that you keep sharing information unilaterally with the other side, whereas they constantly ignore your requests. How long can you keep going like that?”

It is also notable that some police professionals describe police cooperation as a different culture. Once it starts, it goes on within its distinctive parameters. However, it is sometimes unavoidably affected by emerging political tensions between states which are indeed hated by many practitioners. For example, until recently, political relations between Turkey and Greece were traditionally tense, thereby hampering police cooperation between their respective police agencies. Greece also does not have effective police cooperation because of the political tension that the word ‘Macedonia’ is used by
Macedonian state as the official name of the country. Similarly Greece does not approve of Georgia’s SECI membership because of Georgia’s recognition of the Macedonian state as “Macedonia.” All such politically originated problems also trigger the reciprocity in police cooperation among these states, though their liaison officers have excellent personal relations with each other.

On the other hand, it is also important to note that reciprocity as an instrument of sanction in police cooperation is more preferred in distance cooperation. Distance cooperation refers to communication and cooperation without having direct human interaction. Exchanging information via rogatory letters, or sending investigative requests via Interpol-type transnational police organizations are all means of distance cooperation. In transnational policing, at some police agencies may not respond to incoming requests in a timely manner or they may turn the incoming request down due to a reason that is not acceptable for the requesting agency, or not reply at all. This may happen because of a variety of reasons ranging from interstate political reasons to language barriers.

In such situations, police agencies whose requests were turned down usually keep the records of such failures in special files. When they receive any request coming from those not-responding police agencies no matter what subject it contains, they simply put the reciprocity in front of them and say, “First you answer our request then, we will look what we can do for your request,” in the words of one Western interviewee. Another Balkan liaison officer put the words in this respect: “If you ignore them, they will ignore you.” This mechanism is often used by Interpol National Central Bureaus (NCB) because Interpol is already a global size and very much bureaucratized. As one SECI liaison officer mentioned, “Today, it is very difficult to organize a joint operation under the
coordination of Interpol. Even sometimes, it takes months to publish a red notice via Interpol.”

Another example of using reciprocity in distance police cooperation involved a transnational police operation to interdict an illegal import of goods from Malaysia to Turkey. The Turkish police wrote a rogatory letter through Interpol to Malaysian police. They asked about the existence of some commercial companies in Malaysia, but could not get any response. They rewrote the letter, but again there was no response. The respective police official was frustrated and made clear that “when they request our help in any way, we will certainly apply reciprocity to them.”

It is quite obvious in the above discussions that the reciprocity mechanism is more used in the absence of direct human interactions in police cooperation. On the other hand, in police cooperation settings where there are direct human interactions such as employing liaison officers in foreign jurisdictions or liaison officers coming from various police agencies and working together under the umbrella of same regional size police organizations, reciprocity is not regarded as important or even necessary. Several police liaison officers said that that there was no need for reciprocity because that is why they were assigned to foreign jurisdictions. One respondent at the SECI center said, “I do not think we need to use reciprocity here because, here, everybody trusts each other and does his work in a professional manner.”
Findings of the Concept-3

Fraternal cooperation and mutual trust go hand-in-hand in transnational policing because; they always develop in tandem with each other. In many trans-border cooperative investigations where fraternal police cooperation was effective, mutual trust appeared to be the crucial dynamic of fraternal police cooperation. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss fraternal police cooperation separately from mutual trust in cross-national operational police cooperation.

The overwhelming majority (98%) of the interviewees notes that when mutual trust established strongly in police cooperation (Figure 7), police practitioners usually go beyond the usual limits of cooperation in such situations and support each other immensely in joint investigations. They develop a kind of common language saying: “Let’s do it like we did the last time,” in words of one respondent. Therefore, it is possible to say that mutual trust is always the most crucial dynamic of police cooperation and it can open almost every door when established properly between the cooperating parties. However, it is also fragile; it can collapse any time, resulting in the disruption of an entire program of cooperation. This is because the more that cooperating parties entrust intelligence and information to each other, the more they become sensitive to misconduct or suspicious acts that could violate that mutual trust.

It should be clear from the above discussions and examples that transnational operational police cooperation practices largely depend on practitioners’ discretion. This is chiefly because the boundaries of operational police cooperation are not detailed in cooperation agreements. To be more precise, cooperation agreements mainly contain general suggestions like what cooperating parties can mutually do in combating
transnational criminality. Therefore, implementing the requirements of cooperation agreements on the ground, such as what cannot be done within the framework of cooperation or, more importantly, how cooperative policing should be practiced largely depends on practitioners’ discretion.

In fact, it may not be feasible or even sometimes possible to regulate all possible parameters of operational police cooperation in the text of an agreement. Several practitioners in this respect maintain that the way to effectively fight transnational criminality is not through detailed regulations but through effective police cooperation. A relative majority of respondents say that if there is an agreement or even a memorandum of understanding between the cooperating agencies containing some general terms and conditions, that is sufficient to serve as the legal base of operational cooperation. These respondents believe that putting rest of the requirements of operational cooperation into practice should be left to the discretions of practitioners of the field.

Police professionals argue that transnational police cooperation must go parallel to the global networking of transnational criminal groups in today’s shrunken world. That is to say, if transnational criminal groups are organizing themselves in such a way that they can manage their overlapping global interests in various illicit business areas, police agencies should cooperate with each other solely with the same focus, regardless of national, political, racial or religious concerns.

It is commonly accepted that the shifting trends in transnational criminality such as the dramatic rise of cyber crimes have created a corresponding requirement on the part of police to work together. The interviewed practitioners say they know very well what is needed in combating transnational criminality; hence, operational police cooperation
should largely depend on the discretion of police practitioners. This prevailing view in the international law enforcement community has had an inevitable impact on the dynamics of international operational police cooperation.

As illustrated by the cases cited above, fraternal cooperation in parallel with friendly relations has become an important instrument of transnational operational police cooperation. That means the relationships between individuals are key to daily cooperation practices. Mutual trust has become an essential parameter of fraternal cooperation. Therefore, anything that can facilitate mutual trust between the cooperating parties has become critical to police cooperation. These rising parameters of operational cooperation have not only been decisive in bilateral cooperation settings but also in multilateral cooperation settings such as Europol and SECI centers, where liaison officers work like information brokers.

In this sense, it is also interesting to note that police practitioners’ appreciation for the improving relations that came about as a result of liaising activities went hand in hand with pride for the outstanding results achieved by their joint investigations. That is not to say they were making a conscious correlation between friendly relations and the successful works they achieved during their cooperative activities. However, the unconscious reality appearing behind such expressions was the tight correlation between police friendship and police cooperation. That is to say friendly relations were boosting the motivation for cooperation. And it was also true the other way around: the desire for cooperation motivated friendly relations among police practitioners.

In this context, it is safe to say that mutual trust between the cooperating parties is the crucial parameter of police cooperation. In order to maintain mutual trust in
operational police cooperation particularly in SECI-type multilateral organizations, not only do liaising officers attach great importance to their friendly relations but they also respond to information requests with great care. Certainly the basic motivation behind this is maintaining the quality of cooperation. They also do not want to lose each other’s confidence, which is often expressed by liaison officers as ‘professionalism’. Reciprocity, on the other hand, exists as another important legitimate tool of international police cooperation but becomes effective more in distance cooperation as an institutional attitude. Therefore, the reciprocity mechanism is not much favored by most professionals in face-to-face police cooperation practices.
CHAPTER VII

Concept-4: Forms of Police Cooperation & Impacts of International Politics

This chapter examines police professionals’ viewpoints about how transnational police cooperation is practiced at bilateral and multilateral settings as well as how it is impacted by international politics and agreements. Do police professionals cooperate on operational issues exclusively depending on international relations and agreements, or do they seek to go beyond such political frameworks on a daily basis? How and to what extent are their cooperative relations shaped by international politics and agreements? Analytical discussions reflect the essence of the respondents’ viewpoints rather than the researcher’s own comments.

![Figure 8. Percentage of respondents’ expressions about the forms of international operational police cooperation.](image)
Bilateral Police Cooperation

A. Direct contact.

Police work by its nature can be defined as a constant pursuit of criminals. Criminals look for ways to escape law enforcement authorities, while police find ways to track them down. Trans-border police cooperation forms an essential part of this work. Looking at police cooperation from professionals’ view, two fundamentals; mutual trust and speedy communication come to the forefront. Among the Respondents’ 85.5% viewed bilateral police cooperation as a way of accelerating information exchange as well as a means of increasing mutual trust between police agencies (Figure 8). Besides, as human movements across borders have intensified so have crimes against individual foreigners raised. This requires direct police-to-police communication and cooperation on more specific incidents between respective subunits of various police organizations. In this context, 76% of the respondents stressed the importance of deepening bilateral police cooperation (Figure 8).

Joint operations conducted within the context of bilateral police cooperation usually target specific crimes and criminals. Besides the successes achieved at the end, these target-oriented operations also prepare cooperating police agencies better for future operations. After joint operations, police officials usually come together for follow-up discussions and address what they lacked during the operations and what should be done for coping with those problems in future operations. In this manner, cooperating police units develop a mutual relationship which assists them in further investigations. As one retired TNP officer worded:

When we were chasing some mafia leaders in some Balkan countries, we had some difficulties in real time communication with our counterparts in those
countries due to their lacking in technical equipments. Thereupon, we supplied them with laptops, digital photo cameras etc. Thus, we established a direct real time connection as well as caught a terrific ambiance of cooperation with them.

On the other hand, 92% of the respondents articulate that cooperative policing relations must be free from traditional restrictions such as time, place, legal procedures and the like (Figure 8). Further, cooperative relations must continue not only during joint operations but also in other occasions with the intention of exchanging ideas and information. This is because the usual formal communication channels such as Interpol may not meet the emerging needs of cooperation in some urgent cases. For example, when one police agency informs another country’s police agency through Interpol channels about ongoing illegal drug trafficking, it may be too late for the informed side to intercept the traffickers before reaching their destinations. Another retired TNP narcotic police officer praised their communication with Georgian narcotic police as: “We were calling each other directly and exchanging information as we needed.” Thus, a kind of common language and mutual understanding develops among the cooperating police professionals over time.

Not only does police cooperation need to widen across borders, but also it needs to deepen in certain crime areas in the face of today’s mounting criminality. Respondents’ 76% liaising at bilateral or multilateral levels noted that the closer some respective police subdivisions can ally themselves with each other in some specific crime areas, the more likely they will achieve success (Figure 8). This is chiefly because of the major benefit they gain from rapid information exchange relating to specific policing issues. One Eastern country police practitioner noted: “When a police unit detects an ongoing criminality, they should instantly share its possible transcending extensions with their
respective foreign counterparts so that they can launch simultaneous operations in their jurisdictions.”

Otherwise, it may be too late to wait until an operation is finalized in one country and until foreign counterparts are informed about the possible extensions of the operation to their jurisdictions. It is a fact that when an organized criminal group is targeted by police in one country, it quickly alerts its transnational allies against possible cascading police operations in those countries. Therefore, national police agencies are usually not in a rush to conduct such operations in their own ways. Rather, they first prefer to communicate with their respective foreign counterparts about the parts of operations relating to them and then launch collaborative operations with them.

B. Liaising activity.

Liaison officers undoubtedly play the crucial role in simultaneous trans-border police operations. For example, when a police operation in Turkey extends to some other countries, liaison officers in those countries are immediately invited to the relevant TNP unit in order to set up a simultaneous joint operation. However, it is also a fact that all states do not assign police liaison officers to every country. For instance, TNP has only six police liaison officers in foreign jurisdictions while Spain has 80. The DEA alone has more than 100 liaison officers in various countries. Moreover, although police professionals see liaison officers as an essential instrument of police cooperation, they are not content with focusing just on those officers; rather, over time, they try to communicate directly with their foreign counterparts during joint operations.

Liaison officers consider operational police cooperation as working together with other agencies like they were different branches of the same police organization. This is
because the more police agencies exchange information and conduct joint operations, the more the quality of cooperation between them increases. Even in some cooperative investigations, police practitioners prefer to go beyond direct communication and arrange face-to-face meetings. In such operational work meetings, practitioners mutually enlighten each other about their accomplishments and expectations about ongoing joint investigations.

Such meetings also serve as shortcuts for the informal exchange of evidence, thus avoiding more formal procedures. Accordingly, each side may use such evidence as if they collected it themselves, thereby allowing them to open separate investigations in their own jurisdictions. One European liaison officer defined the process this way:

We are trying to get beyond the barriers to track the criminals down. To some extent, information exchange can be done even without waiting for paperwork. Paperwork can be done latterly and that is another way of establishing mutual trust between the cooperating sides.

Respondents’ 71% viewed liaison officers as the human face of transnational operational police cooperation (Figure 8). They provide each other with further information about their operational work as well as make necessary confirmations and corrections in order to prevent possible misunderstandings during the normal course of communication. For example, one European liaison officer noted that he and four other Western liaison officers were recently invited to the TNP’s Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department (KOM) in connection with a drug trafficking operation. The drug was reported to be concealed in a vehicle. The information was passed to the respective units of their police agencies right after the meeting. Then, each police organization carried out the part of the operation involving them. It was a successful
operation and was coordinated nicely. Such rapid and detailed information exchanges undoubtedly increase the quality of collaborative operations.

Looking at the necessity of liaising in transnational policing through the views of police professionals, further details are worth noting. First, transnational police cooperation is not independent of cultural and political factors. Such factors may either appear as facilitators or as barriers to cooperative investigations on the ground. Further, the requesting side in police cooperation is always supposed to be more cautious than the requested side, hence the information subject to request is usually sensitive. Because of this sensitive nature of police cooperation, it is always easy and possible for the requested side to say: “Sorry our legal system doesn’t allow us to share this and that, which is indeed usually a diplomatic way of ignoring other side’s help request,” as stated by one former Turkish liaison officer.

In this manner, liaison officers unquestionably play essential roles in dealing with emerging issues of police cooperation such as learning about cultural, political and legislative factors in the host country and applying that knowledge. Liaising work also includes bridging information exchange, following up on completed paperwork, heading off possible frictions, correcting misunderstandings, and alleviating any other concerns that might arise between the cooperating agencies. It is often articulated by interviewees that the importance or urgency of help requests may sometimes not be taken seriously by the requested side when they are submitted through written communications. In such situations, liaison officers, as the human face of police cooperation, intervene in the process, applying pressure at policing levels in host countries as required in order to get an effective response.
Liaison officers are also important in terms of arranging and orchestrating interactions between cooperating police agencies. They provide their respective police agencies with advice about the legal systems of host countries, the organizational structure of their police agencies, and the cultural behavior of police practitioners. One EU state liaison officer noted:

Whenever a police delegation from my agency comes to Turkey for an official visit, I brief them about how Turkish police progressed in professionalism during the last 10-15 years. I tell them: “You can share with them everything. Even if you cannot share some information with them, tell them so openly. Otherwise, they smell very well when you hide something from them. That is the way we deal with each other and it works.”

The work of liaison officers is not limited to facilitating cooperative relations. They also act as police ambassadors in foreign jurisdictions in terms of developing good relations with other police liaison officers as well as with host country police professionals. Maintaining mutual trust during some emerging crisis should also be noted in this regard.

One European liaison officer narrated an exemplary case in this regard. Accordingly, one female Turkish citizen who was running a kindergarten and living in the Netherlands was stabbed to death. Another Turk living in the same country was found dead somewhere else in the same week. Two other Turks, one male and a female, were stabbed in a train station in another neighborhood of the same area in the same week. The male died and the female sustained a serious injury. Coincidentally enough, another male Turk who came to Turkey from The Netherlands was found stabbed to death in his home in Turkey in the same week.

These serial incidents immediately and deeply concerned Turkish authorities. Police officials wondered whether these deaths represented an episode of xenophobic
violence against Turks in The Netherlands. They requested an urgent written and verbal explanation from Dutch authorities, including from Dutch police liaison officers working in Turkey. In response, the respective Dutch liaison officer alerted his national police authorities right away and obtained an official statement, declaring that although the murders and attacks happened in the same week, they were nothing more than a coincidence. The statement said there was no indication of xenophobic violence against Turkish people living in The Netherlands.

Nevertheless, liaison officers continued to provide Turkish police officials with follow-up information about the details of each incident. This case demonstrates that police liaison officers may play important roles in terms of alleviating emerging anxieties when such unexpected developments occur, thereby maintaining mutual trust between cooperating police agencies.

On the other hand, in particular some European liaison officers stressed that more institutionalization was needed in cooperative policing relations in order to deal with arising instabilities of transnational policing. For instance, some operational units of two police agencies may conduct successful joint operations whereas in some other cooperation areas liaison officers encounter several problems until getting the work done. When things are set the right way, liaison officers usually fade from the scene and those units continue cooperating with each other directly. In this context, liaison officers are the people usually dealing with problems of police cooperation. In an effort to develop permanent solutions for problems caused by cultural, political, legislative or technical reasons, they arrange formal negotiations as well as organize visits between respective police agencies.
Sometimes, foreign liaison officers working in Turkey organize informal meetings among themselves. In such relaxed gatherings, they discuss common problems they face in daily cooperative relations and try to find appropriate ways out of those problems. This is because problems arising from operational cooperation are usually referred to respective liaison officers to be handled. Issues of police cooperation are explored in general as a means of developing more sustainable solutions for emerging problems. On the other hand, police practitioners who work in operational units and have direct communication with their foreign counterparts focus more on specific issues relating to their joint operations. They do not care how cooperative relations work in other areas. Even the completion of paperwork following joint operations is carried out by liaison officers.

Liaison officers also facilitate bilateral police cooperation by channeling information requests coming from their respective police agencies to the appropriate departments of the host country police agency. This is important in terms of preventing official letters from going to the wrong place. In this regard one European liaison officer explained:

I go to the relevant department of the host country police agency and talk to them about my formal request. I check with them by asking whether my request is legitimate and reasonable for them or not. If I get the green light, I prepare my formal request. So usually it is person-to-person work which is very important in order to make the other party understand the issue precisely.

In urgent cases, such face-to-face explanations become more important in terms of convincing other side about the urgency of the request and making clear what is needed.

Bilateral police cooperation involves constant interaction between the cooperating parties. Although having shared security concerns is the major factor in establishing
bilateral police cooperation, liaison officers may also play significant roles in both improving cooperative relations further and in overcoming the emerging difficulties of cooperative policing practices. French liaison officers’ efforts to improve cooperative policing relations between Turkey and France illustrate this. They organized several meetings and mutual study visits between the two country’s police agencies. Judicial authorities as well were involved as needed in the process.

As a result, mutual understanding between the policing and judicial authorities of both countries reached a high level as a result of French liaison officers’ mediating efforts. French authorities understood Turkey’s priority concerns about the illicit activities of the PKK terrorist organization in France. Turkish authorities on the other hand, understood the need for information on the French side about the activities and tactics of the Al-Qaida network. In the last two years, French law enforcement forces constantly targeted the PKK terror organization’s financial resources in France, and contrary to limited past cooperation practices, they unconditionally supported Turkish police with the information they had obtained from those operations. Turkish police in return provided them with substantial information about Al-Qaida cells and activities.

**Multilateral Police Cooperation Settings**

**A. Interpol**

Interpol is the only example of multilateral police cooperation with a global reach, as well as the most sophisticated cooperation channel in transnational policing. It offers a variety of support services, such as distributing criminal search notices, stimulating
information exchange among all national law enforcement agencies and providing ongoing transnational police investigations with technical support.

With its current security strategy of basing the security on global frame and ensuring the widest police cooperation across the world, Interpol is constantly strengthening its cooperation ties with all national and regional police cooperation initiatives. It has access to data bases held by Europol, SECI, Customs Information Systems (CIS) and the like. On the other hand, linking with Europol data bases still requires extra permission of the respective states that are the original sources of the requested information.

Almost half of the (5) Interpol officers stated that Interpol was necessary especially for police cooperation between countries that are remote from each other, for example, those which are situated continents apart. That is to say, when police agencies of such countries are beyond the reach of usual channels of bilateral or regional police cooperation, Interpol’s help is essential. Many of those agencies prefer communicating through Interpol channels. Such channels are also widely used by police agencies of neighboring countries that do not have close relations, but need to cooperate on some operational investigations. This is because Interpol channels still work much quicker, and are preferable compared to traditional government-to-government communication. Interpol still fills a major gap in transnational policing, though it has been often criticized for its slow performance in urgent joint investigations.

Officers also noted that Interpol’s cooperation efforts were not limited to information exchange. Its Incident Response Teams help identify victims in natural disasters, and its Major Events Support Teams visit the sites of serious incidents
anywhere in the world upon the requests of respective states. In such cases, Interpol’s high technology sources and data bases are critical. The United Nations refers to this special Interpol assistance in its 2006 global strategic document for combating terrorism. So does the Organization for Security and Corporation in Europe (OSCE), which recommends that member states use Interpol’s data sources more effectively. These are all clear indicators of Interpol’s importance in transnational policing.

One interviewee explained how Interpol search notices were prepared in practice as follow:

When a fugitive X is decided to be searched at international level with a view of extradition to our country, our NCB diffuses an instant message to all member states through the I-24/7 system requesting the search and arrest of the fugitive. Upon this request, Interpol General Secretariat publishes a red notice. However, this procedure usually takes some time. That is why before Interpol disseminates an ‘Interpol red notice’, requesting states usually circulate diffusion messages through Interpol channels for the provisional arrest of fugitives in order to avoid the time delays in the process of publishing red notices.

However, this implementation is inherently limited. Some states do not recognize diffusion messages and wait until receiving Interpol red notices in order to act.

On the other hand, Interpol is often criticized by several Eastern and Western liaison officers (57%) for its lack of dynamism in stimulating information exchange between the cooperating agencies (Figure 8). They say that particularly in urgent cases, Interpol is not very efficient in getting member states to respond to pending information requests in a timely fashion. While its real-time communication system (I-24/7) operates 24 hours a day, delays still occur. This is because of its highly bureaucratized rules and regulations, as well as because of member states’ lack of responsiveness to the information requests channeled by Interpol.
That is why they say that bilateral or regional police cooperation is more preferable for conducting joint investigations. Interpol is used for more routine works such as distributing Interpol notices about fugitives, and confirming the identities of real persons or checking legal personalities (institutions, commercial companies etc.) for their whereabouts in other countries. Interpol as well, possibly because of similar reasons, concentrates its cooperative efforts on providing technical services. This involves, among other things, establishing constant communication among its membership, publishing Interpol notices about fugitives, supporting trans-border investigations with its forensic capacities, preparing training programs, and setting service standards for member state law enforcement forces.

However, this does not mean that Interpol’s help is unimportant. On the contrary, it is still the major facilitator of police cooperation across the world. It is much faster than traditional inter-governmental correspondence. As stated earlier, it enables member state law enforcement agencies to access a wide range of databases that contain information about known criminals, fingerprints, DNA profiles, as well as lost or stolen travel documents. Interpol is essential especially for facilitating police cooperation between countries that are not regularly involved in transnational police cooperation.

One Interpol NCB worker in Turkey exemplified Interpol’s importance with the following case:

Couple of days ago, an Azerbaijani businessman came to us and reported that some persons broke into his apartment last night. They tied me up and robbed all my valuable documents including passport and bankbook. He also added that he had plenty of bills of exchanges in some London banks and the offenders might take them illegally. We immediately notified the Interpol NCB in London. They alerted the respective banks in London and the victim’s accounts were frozen right away. Thus, a possible illegal money transaction was prevented as an early precaution.
This example shows how sometimes Interpol organization is essential for facilitating police cooperation between remote countries.

**B. SECI**

When conducting operational projects within a region, the above-mentioned lack of responsiveness relatively decreases among the member states of regional police cooperation organizations. Europol and SECI-type regional organizations focus on providing more operational support services to their member states. They are not organized worldwide and thereby are not weighed down by Interpol-style bureaucracy. Cooperative relations within these regional organizations are largely based on interactions among the liaison officers, whereas within Interpol headquarters, as said by an Interpol worker: “People do not see each other much. Cooperative relations are mostly carried out by official correspondences.”

Regional police cooperation organizations are prized to be the best practices of operational cooperation by both SECI liaison officers and some Turkish practitioners. Police representatives from all member states come together under the umbrella of these organizations mainly for exchanging operational information. This provides a unique opportunity for accelerating operational police cooperation as well as for making it more effective.

However, it does not mean that operational police cooperation is coordinated flawlessly on the regional level. Although the present cooperation under the coordination of SECI is highly appreciated by member-state liaison officers, it is still far from meeting the expectations of respective police agencies. From liaisons’ perspective, this is mainly because of the concerns of secrecy and sovereignty that often hinder an operationally
purposed information exchange. There are also discrepancies between the methods used by different police agencies and police cooperation organizations in combating organized crimes such as drug trafficking and human trafficking.

At the center of SECI-type regional police cooperation organizations, police professionals mostly exchange information which stays within the context of police cooperation and does not require a rogatory letter. Such information exchange may include checking the identities of persons suspected of involvement with human or drug trafficking, or tracking the identities of asylum seekers in the police records of other side. Such inquiries are usually verbal information requests among the police liaison officers working under regional police cooperation organizations. As a result of these initial investigations, respective police agencies may launch joint operations.

One Turkish police professional narrated the following case in this regard:

Operation SIRIN in 2007 was a remarkable collaborative operation between Turkish and Romanian police agencies. Romanian police detected an organized crime group trafficking illicit drugs from Eastern countries to Western countries. They informed Turkish police that the leaders of the illegal network were predominantly Turks. Thereupon, police officials of both police agencies agreed to conduct a joint investigation. Work meetings were held. Telephones were tapped in both countries and the wiretapping transcripts were exchanged between two sides. All these preparatory works were financed and coordinated by SECI organization. When the right time came, simultaneous operations were conducted in both countries and consequently the entire drug network was collapsed. SECI officials held a press conference upon this successful joint operation and awarded the respective police units of both country police agencies.

Another service, provided at the SECI center, is preparing crime analysis and risk assessments. SECI officers work on how drug trafficking routes change according to seasons and the type of illicit drugs, how source and target countries change according to type of illicit drugs, what common ways are used for trafficking illicit drug between those source and target countries, what latest modus operandis are used for hiding and
transporting illicit drugs and the like. After preparing an analysis of such crimes and reaching a consensus among member state police agencies, these regional police cooperation organizations may initiate region-wide cooperative operations within the territories of their memberships.

Sometimes, when an ongoing operation in one SECI country extends to other SECI countries, their respective liaison officers at the SECI center are immediately notified about the situation. Liaison officers first negotiate among themselves and refer the issue to their respective police agencies. Information flows back in the same way. Such communications may result in carrying the operation to a regional level with the coordination of the SECI center. In this process, making necessary analyses, getting member states’ approval for region-wide operations and coordinating all preparatory meetings are usually carried out by the SECI center. The SECI director made the following assessment: “At the beginning, SECI was focusing on more operational purpose information exchange with certain countries about some certain cases. Latterly, this implementation changed and we began to organize more region wide cooperative investigations.”

On the other hand, SECI is very much appreciated by the liaison officers for its dynamism. It can develop new strategies according the emerging needs of its member states. In the Balkan countries for example, smuggling illegal or fake goods across borders is as much of a concern as trafficking drugs or human beings. That is why SECI employs customs liaison officers to organize and facilitate cooperation in this area. Currently SECI is also preparing to establish an Environmental Crimes Task Force in order to address contamination of the Danube River, which is of increasing concern to
some member states. On the basis of these examples, it is safe to say that it is much easier for regional police cooperation organizations to redesign their strategic priorities according to the emerging needs of their member states.

SECI respondents also emphasize that the more effectively SECI addresses the emerging needs of member states, the greater will it be to its influence. Some SECI liaison officers maintain that when one member state police agency sends an information request to another one through SECI channels, it is usually taken more seriously by the requested side. Nonetheless, this is not only because of SECI’s growing influence on its member states, but also because of the human face factor or putting it differently, the direct interaction among SECI liaison officers. One SECI liaison officer notes:

The most important thing here is we practically and physically know each other, and that makes the point. When we receive a request from our police agencies, we immediately press our relevant colleague here and he presses the SECI focal point in his country in order to get quick response to the pending request. That is how it works. Otherwise, writing letters and messages without knowing each other will be more difficult and bureaucratic.

In particular during controlled-delivery operations, during which real-time information exchange is critical, SECI liaison officers may even skip SECI focal points and contact directly to their national operational units in order to maximize the speed of information flow.

SECI center also helps remove the difficulties caused by varying regulations and operational behaviors of member state police agencies. Such difficulties are to some extent overcome in bilateral policing relations; but they become more challenging during multilateral joint investigations such as controlled delivery operations. In such situations, police practitioners often have difficulty in getting in touch with appropriate officers on the other side. SECI liaison officers are the people to handle such problems. They
establish the initial connections between the relevant units from cooperating police agencies and the rest of communication continues directly between those cooperating units during multilateral collaborations.

SECI’s dynamic structure also involves other public organizations to participate in police cooperation under its umbrella. In this respect, SECI has developed close cooperative relations with the Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group. Public prosecutors from member states have been invited to the preparatory meetings for joint investigations. Liaison officers note that this has proved very useful in terms of getting prosecutors to know each other, as well as getting them involved in entire processes of joint investigations. As worded by a SECI liaison officer:

As police we can exchange information but sometimes, we cannot exchange evidence, since a rogatory letter is required to do that. Therefore, involving prosecutors in the cooperation process will certainly accelerate getting quick responses to rogatory letters and thereby exchanging evidences.

C. Europol

Europol is another international regional police cooperation organization. It has two different functions. First, as an organization similar to Interpol, it represents 27 member states, with representatives at both Interpol and SECI centers as well as liaison officers in some countries such as the U.S. As such, it implements strategic and operational support agreements with several states other than EU member states. As an organization, it has databases as broadly explained in the literature. It develops regional operational projects in combating certain crime areas such as terror, narcotics, human trafficking, illegal immigration, fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, motor-vehicle theft, stolen art works, auto and motorcycle gangs, and child pornography. It also supports member-
state law enforcement agencies with analysis and operational procedures during the implementation of these projects.

Second. Europol employs a liaison officer network very similar to the one used by SECI. Those liaison officers are not employees of Europol, but represent their respective law enforcement agencies at the Europol center. Their liaising activities at Europol headquarters are exactly the same as what SECI liaison officers do at SECI headquarters. One Europol liaison officer described the activities in this way: “I would say if you walk through the corridors of Europol center, it is fantastically friendly. Everyone is open for exchanging information and this has developed tremendously over the years.” In this manner, Europol has developed a more sophisticated mechanism that partially resembles Interpol and is also similar to SECI.

Europol possesses highly sophisticated data bases containing records about crime suspects, criminals, work files, and the like. However, Europol is not fully autonomous in storing and sharing the information, because information exchange is a very sensitive issue in practice. It is also because of the common European idea that all executive law enforcement activities and all information-sharing are carried out by respective member states. Therefore, Europol is not fully on its own in sharing information with EU member states and non-European states such as the U.S. It does not even have full access to all member states’ criminal data bases. As one Europol liaison officer noted: “Because we always respect what the member states want to do. If some of them do not want to share some information with some other member or non-member states, they have full right to do that.”
Europol developed data-handling codes and confidentiality rules which make it possible to share information, though member states still can put some limitations on the information they provided. In the words of a Europol liaison officer, “Every nation can use this information except this or that nation due to some reasons. So in no way can Europol oblige them to share information.” To some extent, this represents a positive factor for member states, in the sense that all decision-making and information sharing is in their hands. But it is also a weakness, as noted by one respondent: “How come a member state can hide information from another member state in a common project?” Europol has no authority to force its members to sharing information. Indeed, such weaknesses are evident in international police cooperation organizations, as discussed earlier.

This doesn’t mean that Europol is not a significant factor in facilitating international police cooperation. On the contrary, some (4) European liaison officers noted that Europol leads in sharing information as well as in using advanced techniques. They say that the number of requests for cooperation, as well as cooperative activities, has grown tremendously over the last ten years. Nevertheless, Europol would like to expand its role to cover operational cooperation. The Schengen Agreement already allows cross-border operations under certain conditions. As said by a European liaison officer: “Europol is always pushing the border a bit more and gaining ground. It is gaining more confidence of member states to become more operational in the future.”

Nonetheless, such hopes are not likely to be realized any time soon. Almost all EU state liaison officers working in Turkey commented that the dominant idea in Europe remained strengthening the police cooperation while leaving the executive power to the
nation states. They foresaw that in the foreseeable future, there was no possibility that any transnational EU agency will be empowered to make arrests within in the Europol member states.

Nonetheless, Europol has the authority to start operational joint projects with its joint investigation teams under its current framework. This is viewed by European liaison officers as Europol’s indirect way of influencing member-state law enforcement forces. However, it is also a fact that in practical terms, conducting common operational projects are mostly suggested and initiated by member states. Europol takes them over and conducts them on behalf of those member states as circumstances require. Indeed, this is the basic idea for establishing joint investigation teams. On this point, one Europol liaison officer notes: “But it would be better for Europol to start operational projects depending on the requests coming from member states because, in that way Europol will have more willingness as well as supportive commitments of members in its operational activities.”

As for joint operational projects decided and initiated at Europol headquarters, Europol invites member state law enforcement forces to participate in those projects; but it is then totally up to invited states’ decisive assessments whether to participate in Europol initiated projects or not. When a positive response is received, Europol may submit a feasibility document to those states in order to check whether they have adequate resources to join such cooperative common projects. The Europol liaison officer says, “I mean it is a kind of checking if it is possible for participatory states to commit themselves to provide enough resources and information etc.”
The Europol liaison officer also noted that Europol’s two-layer governing structure made it to some degree stronger than SECI in terms of gaining the support of member-state law enforcement forces in implementing common projects. To be more precise, its management board is formed mostly by the heads of member-state law enforcement agencies. This has been an influential factor in implementing Europol’s common projects. At the same time, the heads of Europol’s national units also push their national law enforcement agencies to support and participate in Europol’s common projects.

Europol, on the other hand, have indirect influence on member states who do not want to participate in Europol’s operational projects. Again as worded by the Europol liaison officer:

Say, five member states participate in a child pornography project of Europol. Say such organized crime has links with another six countries. So when implementing the project, those participatory states may ask other linked states to support Europol’s child pornography project. If those states still say that they are not interested in supporting such a project, they may be bombarded with questions after a time, saying that: come on guys, many links of these organized crimes are extending to your countries and you should do something. Following such pressures, those unwilling states reassess their decisions and participate in Europol’s such operations.

Here we observe a kind of neighborhood pressure in order to get more participation in Europol’s joint operations and it works to some level.

**International Politics**

International police cooperation is not independent from international politics. Cooperative relations between national police agencies may increase or decrease depending on the trends of political relations between states. About 58% of the respondents commented on the impacts of international politics on transnational policing
For instance, in 2001, the United States published a report about human smuggling in the world. In this report, Turkey’s efforts in preventing illegal immigration were assessed as a complete failure. Although Turkey stated that several arguments laid out in the report were groundless allegations, the report was still taken seriously in Turkey. Officials of both states came together and discussed better ways of combating human trafficking and smuggling. As one outcome of these negotiations, the U.S. government agreed to provide financial support to help Turkey increase its resources in preventing illegal immigration.

**Figure 9.** Percentage of respondents’ expressions about the impacts of international politics on operational police cooperation.

One European liaison officer, speaking about recent developments in Turkish-French political relations, said political relations between the two states had declined almost to the level of suspension because of the French government’s reservations about Turkey’s EU membership. Military and police relations between the two states were
unavoidably affected by these deteriorating relations. Nevertheless, in the last two years, French law enforcement forces began to provide Turkish police with unconditional support in combating the PKK terror network in Europe. These flourishing policing relations helped improve relations at the political level. The Turkish Prime Minister eventually sent to the French President a letter praising French law enforcement efforts in combating the PKK terrorism in Europe. A French liaison officer commented: “It shouldn’t be forgotten that law enforcement cooperation is an important tool among other issues of technical cooperation between the states.”

Not only international politics but cultural relations and even geographical circumstances may have impacts on police cooperation. One Turkish officer noted that Turkey is situated between the source and target countries of human smuggling and drug trafficking. In this context, Turkey has already developed policing relations with European countries as well as with some Arabic countries as the target countries of those transnational organized crimes. However, she couldn’t develop the same cooperative policing relations with the countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan who are known to be the sources of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorism and so forth.

Looking for reasons for the slow progress in Turkey’s policing relations with these source countries, some political and situational conditions come to the forefront. For instance, despite being bordering countries, cooperative policing relations between Turkey and Iran have only recently begun to flourish. Turkish police professionals highlighted a number of reasons for the delay in the improvement of operational police cooperation between two country police agencies.
Following the Iranian revolution, Turkey’s and Iran’s political identities came into conflict with each other. Iran had the intention of exporting its Shi’a version of Islam to many countries in the region, including Turkey. At the same time, Turkey, because of her traditional pro-western foreign policies, sided with the U.S., Europe and Israel. This caused friction between Turkey and Iran. The Iranians believed that any policing information provided to Turkey would automatically end up in the hands of the U.S. and Israeli authorities. Turkish authorities on the other hand thought that Iran was not only targeting Turkey’s secular regime but also harboring some PKK terrorist groups in her territories.

Such threat perceptions, which lasted for more than two decades, prevented the development of bilateral relations, including operational police cooperation. Nonetheless, as political conditions and foreign political strategies changed over time, those traditional threat perceptions became groundless. Iran started storming the PKK groups in both Iranian and Iraqi territories more effectively. Turkey largely stopped accusing Iran of exporting its religious ideology. These developments resulted in the reestablishment of mutual trust and a rapprochement, which was reflected in policing relations as well.

States’ internal political affairs, their changing foreign policies, security strategies and threat perceptions may also have fluctuating affects on cross-national police cooperation. For instance, in the past, Turkish foreign policy used to be carried out in the hands of elites. “Within that status quo police cooperation was nothing more than securing diplomatic missions abroad” worded by another practitioner. However, the new Turkish government initiated new foreign policy strategies. The core of those strategies is the concept of “zero problem” with the neighboring countries, including the terror
problem. This new foreign strategy significantly mobilized both Turkish police and other neighboring country law enforcement agencies to cooperate on solving long-standing security problems.

International political relations affect cooperative relations between law enforcement agencies. Sometimes the reverse is true as well. As international security cooperation has become essential for countries, it has become an accelerating tool for strengthening international diplomatic relations. SECI liaison officers noted that as a regional security initiative SECI has facilitated regional cooperation in other areas. The important point here is that cooperating in security area is accepted by all states as a strategic necessity. As member-state authorities prove their determination in security cooperation, the generated ambiance in this area eventually leads the diplomatic relations into other cooperation areas.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that there have been enormous advances in the tools of police communication. About 60% of the respondents mentioned that advanced communication technologies had an inevitable impact on police cooperation (Figure 9).

One Western liaison officer explained it this way:

Now, for example, we have direct computer link with some national police agencies which was impossible in the past. Just sending a suspect’s picture or a letter was taking few months in the past whereas now it is a matter of few seconds to make the same transmission. You can make instant communication with the other side, when you need. Today, visual data transfer is possible. Online color presentations are possible. Investigation files are exchanged in digital forms.

These advanced communication tools inevitably and significantly push transnational police cooperation forward.

SECI liaison officers also commented that SECI would be transformed from its current structure into a new formation as SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement
Center) in the near future. The draft proposal for such transformation has already been prepared and proposes the creation of SELEC’s own criminal databases. This will be achieved with Europol’s advices and technical contributions. Thus, SECI aims to play a more effective role in transnational police cooperation with its newly expanded mission.

This transformation will not only benefit member states but also will help Western states. U.S. federal law enforcement agencies have already a considerable weight at the SECI center and they want to be more effective in the Balkans through the new SELEC. In particular Europol wants to support SELEC in order to benefit from it as a regional center in the future. On the other hand, Turkey, as an SECI member, objects Europol’s such expectations in return for Europol’s rejecting to have operational cooperation with Turkey due to Turkey’s failure in making necessary legislations. Thus, the SECI has become a kind of contention platform for Turkish police and Europol authorities. As seen in such examples, even multilateral police cooperation initiatives are not immune to international politics.

Further examples were provided by the respondents in this view. For instance, another SECI liaison officer explained that Georgia’s application to become an SECI member has been blocked by Macedonia because; Georgia did not originally recognize Macedonia’s independence with its chosen name ‘Macedonia.’ Greece has been reluctant to respond to cooperation requests coming from Macedonia for the same reason. Greece argues that Macedonia’s official name must be the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, both on the waiting list to become SECI members, have encountered reservations about their memberships due to some other political concerns. These international political matters were all provided by
some liaison officers as examples of the impact of international politics on transnational policing.

**Situational conditions**

Most states accept certain transnational crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration as common problems and agree on the need for cooperative fighting. However, it is also a fact that when cooperating on fighting these common crimes, some states do not want to participate in the entire process of cooperation, but only at some certain stages with what they are primarily concerned. Therefore, states’ diverging priorities may sometimes cause them to accuse each other of not doing enough to cooperate in the fight against trans-border criminality. For instance, some EU states criticize Greece for not preventing illegal immigration into EU countries. Greece accuses Turkey of the same thing and has tightened her border with Turkey, while loosening the border controls with Western countries and thereby ignoring illegal crossings from Greece to European countries. It was also same for Austria when she was the frontline of EU territories.

On the other hand, Turkey considers itself to be a victim because of its position as a transit hub between west and east. What is more, Turkish authorities hardly ever get an effective response to cooperation requests made to the authorities of Eastern countries where most trans-border crimes originate. This is chiefly because those countries have different priorities, such as addressing terrorism, famine, and poverty. Some of them are even failed states, and lack adequate facilities to fight terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling and other problems. However, these transnational crimes mostly target Western countries and have therefore become primary concerns for them.
Turkey’s continuous efforts to draw SECI into more active cooperation against terrorism form another example for how changing security priorities may impact international police cooperation. Initially, SECI member states were quite reluctant to engage in cooperation against terrorism. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, they approved establishing the Terrorism Task Force within SECI under the leadership of Turkey. However, this task force did almost nothing except hold annual meetings and make threat assessments. This is mainly because terrorism is not a priority issue for SECI member states. On the other hand, Turkey cooperates effectively with the U.S. government on combating terrorism; including real-time intelligence exchange since fighting terrorism is a primary concern for both countries. These are all situational conditions that have an inevitable impact on operational police cooperation.

Another situational condition affected international police cooperation has been the emerging conceptual difference in the field of combating drug trafficking. This conceptual difference turns on the question of the link between terrorism and some other organized crimes, in particular drug trafficking. Today, a new concept narco-terrorism has been introduced to the international law enforcement community. It was discussed in details during the UN conventions on organized crime, held in Vienna in 2000-2002. Some Western states advocate fighting organized crime separately without interfering with other crimes such as terrorism. Some other states argue that there are links between terrorism and drug trafficking. But the latter arguments did not receive much support until the September 11 attacks. Interestingly enough, the UN Security Council underlined the importance of the linkage between terrorism and organized crimes in its resolution No.1373 on 28 September, 2001. One Turkish Liaison officer remarked: “Now this
fashionable term ‘narco-terrorism’ entered into international law enforcement
terminology but with the absence of being understood seriously.”

Five liaison officers also commented that war conditions had an absolute impact
on the exchange of information within the context of operational police cooperation. In
their view, sharing information with U.S. law enforcement practitioners was not as easy
as among the European law enforcement agencies. One European liaison officer
contends:

Of course we shouldn’t forget that the U.S. is at war. So they are quite afraid of
any information going to the wrong way. We have problems in receiving
information from the U.S. law enforcement agencies even though sometimes I
know the person on the other side. In Europe, if I know someone and trust him, I
get the information I need because we trust each other.

It is apparent from these comments that international police cooperation is
directly affected by war politics.

Another European liaison officer connects the above-mentioned difficulties in
getting information from U.S. law enforcement officials to his belief that, as a
superpower, the U.S. wants to retain superiority in police cooperation practices as well.
They do not want to risk losing any credibility as a result of giving information to a
wrong person or in a wrong way. Interestingly he also commented that U.S. law
enforcement officials preferred to trade information, rather than share it in a fraternal
manner. He explained it this way: “…if you give me this, I will give you that and this is
not how Europol works.” Fraternal cooperation practices are not likely to be used when
cooperating with the U.S. law enforcement authorities.
Functions of Agreements

The great majority (83%) of the respondents mentioned that agreements were always needed as the legal bases of operational police cooperation (Figure 9). This is chiefly because both formal and informal cooperation in transnational policing can be enhanced through formal treaties and agreements. International agreements and treaties have unquestionably reinforced transnational police cooperation. For instance, the “1961 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics” introduced illicit drug trafficking to the global agenda by declaring it a common problem for all nations. Although many respondents attribute the success of operational police cooperation to the technical capacities and training level of practitioners, and to good relations between law enforcement forces, these factors become meaningless in transnational police cooperation without the legal infrastructure provided by official agreements and treaties.

Contrary to common belief that the more international agreements are binding the more they are effective, several respondents (68%) pointed out that a binding agreement did not lead to more effective results in practical terms (Figure 9). To be more precise, bilateral and multilateral agreements are important in terms of demonstrating the political will of cooperating parties to work together on issues subject to police cooperation. While these agreements provide an official framework for collaboration, in order to be fully effective cooperation in practice depends on maintaining good diplomatic, social and fraternal relations, as well as on effective communication and mutual trust.

A European police professional expressed his view about the contribution of interstate agreements to daily base police cooperation practices in this way:

Irrelevant. Even sometimes signatories of security cooperation agreements do not know under what they put their signatures. Cooperation agreements are nothing
more than showing the political willingness of authorities for cooperating in respective policing areas. In many cases, practitioners know that there is an agreement as a legal infrastructure for their cooperative work but they usually do not care what is detailed in those legal frameworks.

This is because security cooperation agreements are usually designed at abstract levels.

Another European professional added: “I think the more treaties are flexible, the more police cooperation will be successful.” This is because of the complexities and sudden changes encountered by police practitioners during cooperative operations. For example, controlled delivery operations require very detailed arrangements and real-time communication, as well as instant rearrangements depending on emerging conditions. Therefore, it is very hard for operational police units to follow concrete rules and regulations during such operations. The same practitioner continued: “Instead, we sit down and decide what to do depending on the arising circumstances. If you have a broad legal framework, that will give you space to make necessary maneuvers during joint operations.” That is why political authorities usually prefer signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) rather than signing intergovernmental binding treaties.

It can also be understood from that MOUs demonstrate the mutual will of cooperation and include some general rules about the tools and boundaries of security cooperation. Intergovernmental agreements on the other hand are products of more intensive political negotiations and contain more detailed regulations. They are usually more binding at institutional level, and load more burdens on political authorities. Memorandums of understandings, on the other hand, are usually standard formatted documents and are not as binding on signatories. Therefore, political authorities usually tend to sign such MOUs instead of political agreements in the area of police cooperation.
That is why states sign many more MOUs than political agreements or official treaties for operational police cooperation.

Contrary to the above-mentioned views, 18% of the respondents noted that it was important to have more regulatory agreements in operational police cooperation (Figure 9). One Western Liaison officer voiced: “Thus, the rules of police cooperation would be known better by cooperating sides and thereby exchanging operational purpose information more effectively.” Therefore, he added, it is better to get police cooperation agreements more binding for cooperating agencies. One European liaison officer said, “I know several liaison officers do not accept the accelerating effects of more binding agreements on operational police cooperation but in fact, it is the matter of how agreement documents are prepared.” He meant that the success of operational police cooperation depends on what cooperation agreements contain and how they regulate cooperation practices.

One Turkish liaison officer, on the other hand, pointed at another side of the issue. Accordingly, police practitioners pay more attention to their national legislation than to international police cooperation agreements when conducting cooperative operations. The way states approach trans-border crimes is also as important as international agreements. This is another reason why memorandums of understanding are preferred to detailed cooperation agreements in transnational policing. It also explains why mutual trust, mutual understanding, common interest, fraternal relations and other facilitative factors are important in operational police cooperation. The same practitioner on the other hand underlines that issues such as where and how exchanged personal data will be used should be regulated in police cooperation agreements in a detailed way.
Interestingly enough, another European liaison officer made a distinction between the implementation of cooperation agreements at the policing and judicial levels. More accurately, he argues that cooperation agreements should be more flexible at the policing level so that police practitioners can make more maneuvers and spontaneous collaborative decisions when carrying out initial joint investigations. Then, when operational police investigations proceed to the judicial level, cooperation agreements should contain more detailed regulations in order to prevent possible controversies over issues such as where the arrestees will be detained and tried, how the evidences will be exchanged, and to what extent, and how, shared information will be used at the judicial level. This is important because no matter what evidence is collected during joint investigations, it must be utilized effectively at the judicial level.

It is also worth noting that another reason why practitioners do not care about cooperation agreements during joint investigations relates to the nature of operational activities. Police operations, in particular trans-border joint operations, include very specific elements, whereas police cooperation agreements include more general rules and regulations. For example, combating illicit drug trafficking includes several steps such as making an analysis, exchanging information, using undercover operatives, engaging in hot pursuit, and conducting the operation. A specific operation may also be linked to other trans-border crimes such as money laundering, financing terrorism, synthetic drugs and so forth. It is almost impossible to regulate all these necessary details pertaining to such complex operations in police cooperation agreements.

Emphasizing another side of the issue, one Turkish police professional commented that producing international police cooperation agreements in a detailed way
would be more useful on the condition that they are supported by sanction mechanisms. However, imposing sanctions in operational police cooperation is rare, except when applying reciprocity when needed. Some respondents pointed out that in some cases the use of reciprocity might not even provide the desired results. Therefore, successful trans-border police operations largely depend on mutual goodwill rather than on strictly regulated and binding cooperation agreements. Nonetheless, several respondents stated that police cooperation agreements should reflect the concerns of cooperating parties rather than spelling out the details about what should be done and how it should be done within the context of operational cooperation.

**Findings of the Concept-4**

It can be inferred from the above analytic discussions that direct and instant communication prevails as the major advantage of bilateral police cooperation. Along with real-time communication, establishing trustworthiness between cooperating agencies is certainly another major factor. However, it is also evident from the above discussions that having an effective bilateral teamwork with some countries or in some policing areas does not mean that bilateral cooperation works very well at all times. On the contrary, it is still quite changeable, depending on some specific policing areas or security priorities of cooperating states. That is why the need for more standardization and institutionalization in the practices of bilateral police cooperation was also emphasized by the respondents.

Interestingly enough the vast majority respondents favor improving friendly relations and thereby using shortcuts or other informal approaches to bilateral police
cooperation for the sake of successful joint operations. This is because of the wide acceptance that informal, in other words, fraternal cooperation practices enable rapid information exchange and creates mutual trust. Mutual trust, on the other hand, is defined by respondents as the backbone criterion of police cooperation.

Operational police cooperation is constantly deepening at the bilateral level and widening at the multilateral level. That means focusing on combating terrorism, narcotics, trafficking and smuggling crimes and thereby achieving quick results in those specific areas is the primary concern in bilateral cooperation. When it comes to multilateral police cooperation, even though the cooperation areas can be quite similar to or the same as the priorities of bilateral cooperation, the primary concern is to spread the cooperation as much as possible. The goal is to involve increasing numbers of national law enforcement agencies in common projects. This is not only essential for building effective collaboration against transnational criminality but also for gaining the support of member states for multilateral police cooperation organizations.

On the other hand, liaison officers’ facilitative roles relatively change at both bilateral and multilateral cooperation settings. In bilateral practices of police cooperation, they help enable respective units of cooperating agencies to communicate with each other directly. Then they fade from the scene and strive for improving cooperation in other fields. Arranging work meetings, organizing study visits, and dealing with pending problems are among their activities aimed at deepening operational cooperation in other policing areas. In other words, in bilateral police cooperation, liaison officers usually participate in the process until the communication and cooperation are established between the cooperating sides.
In multilateral practices of police cooperation, liaison officers act more like information brokers. They usually engage in the entire cooperative investigations more actively. They are always needed as key contact persons especially at the centers of regional police cooperation organizations. Their primary concern is not to improve police cooperation in every possible aspect as is done in bilateral cooperation, but to exercise best practices of cooperation in individual cases where such requests are made. They usually continue engaging in active cooperation until the end of joint investigations. They work as actors of police cooperation rather than acting as facilitators.

Europol and SECI-type regional police cooperation organizations look highly promising in terms of coordinating regional operations and providing liaison service at their headquarters. By assigning one liaison officer to the centers of regional police organizations, police agencies can have instant communication with all member-state law enforcement agencies. What is more, regional organizations are more dynamic in producing new region-wide operational projects and thereby addressing regional security problems more affectively. Thus, they gain the support of their member states while avoiding conflict with them.

Regional police organizations also play effective roles in alerting their member states against the rising threat of trans-border crimes and drawing them into the fighting process more actively. This is important because states—in particular Western states—prefer combating organized criminal groups in a collaborative manner rather than depending on their individual resources. This is because; when the struggle against trans-border crimes is left to the discretion of individual states, some may perform less well than others either because of lacking adequate resources or because of changing priorities.
It can also be inferred that, on one hand, Interpol, as a global police cooperation organization should continue developing its worldwide services because of the transcending nature of criminality. On the other hand, it is also a fact that as multilateral cooperation organizations grow in size, they lose their dynamism and become more oriented to providing technical services such as speedy communication, forensic supports, expert teams and the like. Therefore, more regional cooperation organizations along with more tightened communication among them are needed in order to fill cooperation gap around the world. Interpol’s and Europol’s liaison officer employments at SECI headquarters may suggest a good example in this respect.

Based on the respondents’ viewpoints, it may be concluded that operational police cooperation appears to follow a rising pattern starting from cooperation, in terms of profitability increase, through intergovernmental correspondence; through Interpol; through regional organizations; through bilateral relations. In this context, profitability means getting quick and effective responses to all pertaining requests in cooperative investigations. All these cooperation mechanisms certainly play significant roles in their operational domains. However, if we compare them based on practitioners’ satisfaction with their contribution to operational cooperation, they can be placed in such an order.

Looking at police professionals’ experiences and perceptions, it is obvious that transnational police cooperation is not free from the impact of international politics. It is also clear that trans-border security concerns are always a key component of interstate relations. Interagency police cooperation is one element of international security and therefore is inevitably affected by international politics. In this context, police cooperation may also play a precursor role in developing intergovernmental relations, as
demonstrated by the warm-up in Turkish-French political relations following
collaboration between the two countries’ police agencies. This is due to the prominence
of security relations in international politics.

There are also situational conditions affecting transnational police cooperation. It
is a fact that Western countries are attractive destinations for illegal immigration and are
also attractive markets for drug trafficking. On the other side, Eastern countries suffer
from poverty, political instability and crises in authority. These factual conditions drive
the dynamic of transnational crime. Furthermore, countries such as Turkey, Ukraine
located between the East and Western have become transit hubs for international
criminals. Since police professionals are on the front lines of fighting international
criminality, they are strongly in favor of improving police cooperation under any
circumstances. But it is inevitable for transnational policing to be affected by these
situational conditions.

International agreements are essential to transnational policing. They constitute
the legal base for cooperative relations. Police professionals look to international
agreements to provide the basis for formal cooperative activities as well as for developing
fraternal cooperation. Such agreements function as a kind of insurance for police
practitioners against problems that may arise in the course of their daily cooperative
activities. Nonetheless, international agreements cannot alone guarantee the success of
operational police cooperation. Rather, successful cooperative police operations are
attributed to the other factors discussed earlier.

Police professionals prefer international agreements that are more flexible at the
policing level. This has nothing to do with allowing arbitrary conduct. It is because of the
complexity of their work. They wish to create more maneuvering space for their cooperative activities in combating transnational criminality. For the same reason, international agreements should reflect the specific concerns of cooperating parties while keeping the boundaries of police cooperation flexible. When conducting cooperative investigations, practitioners usually look for what cannot be done according to their national legislation rather than looking for what should be done within the context of cooperative investigations.

On the other hand, it is preferable that international agreements include more detailed regulations at the level of judicial cooperation to reflect the fact that a police investigation has matured to the point of developing evidence that can be acted upon in courts, and therefore more concrete procedures are required for sharing evidence, determining the legal acceptability of suspects’ statements, deciding how indicted criminals will be tried and where they will serve their sentences, among others.

Looking at operational police cooperation overall, it can also be concluded that, although many respondents have made clear there were a number of difficulties in cooperative policing across borders, the barriers created by international politics or international agreements are ultimately not that much disruptive to transnational police cooperation.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

As stated earlier, this study was neither assertive about examining transnational police cooperation from a global perspective, which was indeed not practical in its application, nor made universal inferences about transnational policing. Rather, it approached the research phenomenon by scrutinizing the practices of operational police cooperation between the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the national law enforcement agencies of some Western and Eastern countries as well as some regional and international police organizations. Thus, it aimed at drawing lessons for transnational policing by researching police cooperation from a regional perspective. Nevertheless, some other police professionals who did not have direct contact with the TNP officers were interviewed, too, in an effort to bring alternative perspectives to the researched area.

In order to address the above subject, the researcher interviewed a variety of police professionals who had in common operational experiences in transnational policing. Interviewees provided numerous interesting anecdotes regarding the facts as well as fundamentals of their cooperative activities. Despite the researcher’s written assurance, people who were still working actively in operational departments were more cautious in their explanations, likely because; they feared disclosing operational details. However, those who were no longer working actively in operational departments and were no longer bound by rules of confidentiality, were more open minded in sharing their opinions and experiences.
It also came to the researcher’s attention during the interviews that there was a relative difference between the responses of liaison officers coming from Western and Eastern countries. This was possibly because; Turkey’s policing relations with Western countries improved significantly with its long background. Therefore, Western liaison officers were much more demanding and did not hesitate to criticize the shortcomings of existing cooperation. On the other hand, Turkey’s policing cooperation with Eastern countries are still in its infancy. Therefore, Eastern liaison officers were making more general and optimistic evaluations, and were not that much critical in their explanations about the existing cooperation with Turkey.

![Figure 10](image)

*Figure 10.* Overall chart reflecting the findings of the study.

First of all, this study revealed the common idea existing in the international policing community that transnational police cooperation has become essential in all operational areas. Now that criminal groups cut across the borders easily and operate in
all areas of illicit business, national law enforcement agencies as well should be able to
develop rapid and collaborative actions against trans-border criminal groups. When doing
so, traditional barriers such as national borders and regulations should no longer bar
collaborative policing projects. This highly correlates with the discussions of both
parallel globalization of transnational policing and parallel globalization of transnational
-crimes laid out in the literature.

The study also supported the idea that there was a direct correlation between the
quality of transnational policing and the use of advanced information technologies by
national law enforcement agencies. As the technology is adopted effectively and the
capacity for fighting trans-border crimes increases technically, national law enforcement
agencies look at organized criminality beyond territorial boundaries and view its
transcending dimensions more clearly. As a result, they feel the need for more
collaboration in all policing areas. This supports the argument: “…cooperation continues
to keep pace with information technology developments today, and often drives police
agencies to collaborate and network in new ways”.¹

The quality of trans-border police cooperation also tightly correlated with speedy
information exchange. The quicker police professionals receive information from their
foreign counterparts during joint investigations, the greater the increase in cooperation
and mutual trust between the allied agencies. The reverse is also true: neglect of
information requests by requested agencies by putting forth some bureaucratic barriers or
some other legal excuses will have an adverse effect on the improvement of operational

Criminology, 38(3), 485-503.
cooperation; and such cooperation will be more likely to remain at a formal and routine level.

On the other hand, it is understood that the priorities of transnational policing are mostly determined by the trends in transnational criminality. That means the more a transnational crime becomes compelling, the more fighting it becomes a priority cooperation area in transnational policing. Putting it the other way, the less compelling a transnational crime, the less likely fighting it will be pursued through cooperative transnational policing. In the first situation, crimes are seen as common problems to be confronted cooperatively by national law enforcement agencies. In the second situation, crimes are seen as more of a domestic problem, and therefore fighting them does not attract much international collaborative interest.

For instance, drug trafficking, widely accepted as a crime against humanity, has been a compelling threat for decades. Therefore, fighting illicit drug trafficking attracts relatively more active international participation. Terrorism, especially with its new global face, has also become a much more compelling motive for cooperation across borders than it was in the past, though there are still some difficulties in mobilizing active international cooperative action to combat it. On the other hand, in parallel with the wide use of cyberspace, financial crimes and several other domestic crimes have become more compelling. Therefore, cooperative fighting in all crime areas is becoming equally important for national law enforcement agencies.

Globalization theory suggests that global integration results from the intensive flow of resources, information, and people across national boundaries. Similarly, this study foresees that permanent communication networks among national police agencies
will result in a kind of integration similar to the various branches of a worldwide police organization. The capacity of advanced communication technologies to maintain a permanent and reliable communication among police agencies as well as the spreading and diversifying nature of trans-border crimes created this notion among police professionals.

On the other hand, the study suggests that the fruitfulness of interagency police cooperation is closely associated with the developmental levels of cooperating states. At least looking at the issue through the mirror of TNP’s cooperation experiences with both Eastern and Western police agencies, it is safe to argue that police cooperation is getting more sophisticated and more demanding, ranging from Western countries to Eastern countries; in other words, ranging from developed countries to less developed countries.

As seen in the above graph, legislative and systemic differences between organizational structures and operational tactics of national police forces are the most common observable barriers to interagency police cooperation. However, it does not mean that the more states have parallel regulations, the better police cooperation they will have. This is, indeed, because police cooperation is fragile by nature. As illustrated in the above graph, even if interagency police cooperation is regulated in a detailed way, it may still be disrupted at any time because of legislative, systemic, and cultural differences, or by bureaucratic and technical difficulties. Lack of mutual trust among cooperating agencies is another potential disruptive factor in this regard.

It is also understandable from the interviewees’ viewpoints that operational police cooperation cannot be framed under certain regulations since crimes occur under different conditions and therefore need to be investigated under their own conditions. A second and
more important reason, but deriving from the same concerns, is that memoranda of understanding and cooperation agreements are mostly prepared at an abstract level. They usually include general rules and regulations and give national law enforcement agencies a general framework for how to assist each other. They do not stipulate detailed rules for police cooperation, such as what to share or not share under the terms and conditions.

That is why, in practice, police cooperation agreements are implemented largely depending on police professionals’ discretion. That is also why operational police cooperation is usually reinforced with extra supportive instruments, such as increasing mutual trust by organizing mutual study visits, arranging working meetings, using liaison officers and the like. This is especially a concern during initial stages of joint operations. At this early stage, joint investigations can stop at any time due to lack of mutual trust, sufficient evidence, or other judicial requirements.

As illustrated in the above graph, informal police cooperation, with its varying elements such as ‘fraternal cooperation’, ‘mutual trust’ and ‘common police culture’ is pretty much favored by the respondents. In particular ‘mutual trust’ appears to be the most important criterion in international police cooperation with the ratio of 98% of the respondents’ support (Figure 10). This is because the more that police practitioners prefer informal channels during their cooperative interactions; the more they gain the confidence of their foreign counterparts and become essential to the cooperation process.

Looking at the increasing prominence of informal interactions in transnational policing, two things arise. First, it is often beyond police practitioners’ abilities to overcome legislative, systemic, cultural, bureaucratic, and technical barriers of police cooperation. Second, imposing the reciprocity principle on other agencies as a sanction
power in order to reduce such chronic problems does not work well. Besides, practitioners do not favor such sanctions because they believe that they will need each other again in the future and therefore shouldn’t be in a rush to punish their foreign counterparts in such ways.

The above notion pushes police practitioners to seek out alternative ways of cooperation as a matter of course. In this context, avoiding bureaucratic procedures and obtaining quick results become the major factors motivating informal cooperation. When cooperating through informal/fraternal ways, practitioners often focus on shared objectives and cooperative achievements rather than getting stuck in problems they face on the ground. This pragmatic approach to cooperation causes the use of more discretionary power in cooperative relations and eventually creates the cycle: Successful joint operations encourage fraternal cooperation and fraternal cooperation open the way for further joint operations.

In this informal cooperation, building mutual trust instead of using reciprocity arises as the most important criterion for informal police cooperation. In other words, the more fraternal police cooperation increases, the more mutual trust rises as the sole safeguard of informal police cooperation. In this trustworthy atmosphere, police practitioners usually go beyond the usual limits of cooperation and support each other immensely for further joint investigations.

Fellowship and mutual trust in police cooperation also have something to do with the physical distance between cooperating foreign police colleagues. The more they are in close contact with each other, the more fraternity and mutual trust flourish among them. This is especially observed between liaison officers working in the same foreign
jurisdiction or between police professionals working in the same SECI or Europol type international organizations. Contrary to this, within Interpol where there is no close contact between police colleagues, informal cooperation and mutual trust are replaced by formal cooperation and information requests are made mostly through official channels.

On the other hand, police cooperation is always fragile by nature. This fragility exists even when there is an effective cooperation among police agencies. This is because; the more practitioners entrust information and intelligence to each other, the more they become sensitive to misuse of such information or to improper conduct arising from the use of such confidential information. It is also because of this fragility that practitioners use some extra driving factors in order to maintain mutual trust in their cooperative relations. They come together at working meetings in order to bring reasonable solutions to emerging problems. In such face to face occasions, they also socialize with each other and draw each other’s attention to their cooperative accomplishments rather than zeroing in on individual failures in cooperative relations.

These inferences correlate with Nadelmann’s (1997) “harmonization” theory cited above, which emphasizes the issue of eliminating friction among cooperating law enforcement agencies. According to his theory, all multilateral cooperative policing initiatives basically strive to help law enforcement agencies overcome disagreements arising from “conflicting sovereignties, political tensions, and differences among law enforcement systems.” In doing so, they try to establish a kind of consensus among criminal law systems which can create a new framework for enhancing international police cooperation.²

It appears that fraternal cooperation and mutual trust develop in tandem with each other in transnational policing. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss fraternal police cooperation independently from mutual trust in transnational policing. Police professionals argue that if transnational criminal groups are organizing themselves in such a way that they can trust one another and manage their overlapping global interests in various illicit business areas, police agencies should trust and cooperate with each other with the same focus, regardless of national, political, racial or religious concerns.

It is also worth noting that these rising parameters of transnational policing have not only been decisive in bilateral cooperation settings; but also in multilateral cooperation settings. In this sense, Europol and SECI centers are noted as exemplary places where liaison officers work like information brokers. Police practitioners’ appreciation for improving friendly relations goes hand in hand with pride in the outstanding results achieved by their joint investigations. That is not to say they make a conscious correlation between friendly relations and the success achieved during their cooperative activities. However, the unconscious reality appearing behind such expressions is the tight correlation between police friendship and police cooperation.

International operational police cooperation is, on the other hand, constantly deepening at bilateral level and widening at multilateral level. Bilateral police cooperation provides the major advantages of real-time communication and establishing trustworthiness between cooperating agencies. Focusing on fighting specific crimes such as narcotics, terrorism, and human trafficking and thereby achieving quick results in those areas is the primary concern in bilateral cooperation. At multilateral cooperation settings, the primary concern is to broaden operational police cooperation across the
regions as much as possible, though cooperation areas can be quite similar to-or the same as-the priorities of bilateral cooperation. The goal is to involve increasing numbers of national law enforcement agencies in cooperative policing against transnational criminality.

Liaison Officers’ facilitative roles in this context show a relative change at bilateral and multilateral cooperation settings. In bilateral police cooperation, they accelerate the direct communication and collaboration between the respective units of cooperating agencies. They also strive for deepening operational cooperation in other policing areas by arranging work meetings, organizing study visits, and dealing with pending problems among their respective agencies. They usually participate in the cooperation process only until the desired interaction is established between the practitioners of cooperating agencies.

This outcome highly correlates with the arguments in the literature relating to importance of establishing direct contact between police agencies. This is because direct communication accelerates joint operations as well as helps increase mutual trust between cooperating agencies. Investigators can regularly contact each other and update the information; they exchanged pertaining to ongoing investigations. Face-to-face meetings are other effective instruments of this process. Also third-country law enforcement teams can be invited to such joint operations as operations extend to their countries. Thus, a kind of “investigative consortium” can be formed as each investigative team carries out one part of an operation.3

In multilateral cooperation settings, liaison officers act more like information brokers. They are key contact persons at the centers of regional police cooperation organizations. Unlike the short-term composing roles of bilateral liaison officers, they participate in joint investigations more actively and keep transferring information between the cooperating agencies during the entire process. They work as actors of operational cooperation rather than as facilitators of police cooperation. In this context, Europol and SECI-type regional police organizations provides the best practices of multilateral liaising activities in the contemporary transnational policing.

These findings highly correlate with the arguments about liaising activities at multilateral cooperation settings. Europol and SECI type Regional police cooperation organizations provide a suitable platform for liaising officers’ face-to-face interactions, thereby helping them develop a professional solidarity among themselves. As a result of this human interface, national or political concerns of their respective countries are eased by the professional solidarity that develops from working a number of cases together. They often go beyond the limits of bilateral cooperation and work together with the common European idea. This unique characteristic of regional police cooperation organizations greatly facilitates conducting joint operations across their territorial boundaries.4

These inferences also correlate with the arguments about bilateral and multilateral agreements laid out in the literature. Bilateral agreements mainly addresses the specific needs of cooperating parties, especially when differences between the legal systems of cooperating states need to be overcome. However, multilateral policing agreements are

relatively more inclusive instruments in terms of functionality. In this manner, they may replace several bilateral agreements in benefiting their signatories. They may contribute more to territorial stability since they represent the common objectives of cooperating states. Additionally, they may be more preventive in trans-border criminal matters since they cover the entire territories of cooperating countries.5

Regional police organizations, on the other hand, play an important role in orchestrating collaborative efforts for addressing the rise in transnational criminality. This is important because states, in particular Western states, prefer combating organized criminal groups in a collaborative manner rather than leaving it to discretion of individual states. This is because some states may not fulfill their responsibilities in this particular area well enough because of their inadequate resources or different security priorities. In this regard, regional police cooperation organizations play essential roles in terms of filling the deficiencies of their member states, as well as drawing them into the cooperation process more actively.

This corresponds with the discussions about international organizations in the literature; International organizations, as one specific form of multilateralism, have already become important actors in the security field. This is because of some states’ inability or inefficiency in dealing with arising trans-border issues including transnational criminality. International organizations have, on the other hand, increasingly demonstrated that they can address trans-border issues more effectively than individual

states. Thus, they have gradually assumed new roles in a number of issues ranging from local conflicts to transnational criminality.\(^6\)

The idea; transnational policing is not free from the impacts of international politics is also supported by the study. Trans-border security concerns constitute an important part of interstate relations. Therefore, trans-border police cooperation as one part of international security affairs is inevitably influenced by international politics. There are also situational factors impacting transnational police cooperation. It is a fact that Eastern countries suffer from poverty, political instability and crises in authority. These conditions drive transnational criminality from Eastern countries to Western countries. In the meantime, countries such as Turkey and Ukraine, which are located between the East and West, are becoming the transit hubs for international criminals. These are inevitable impacts of situational conditions on transnational policing.

International agreements are, on the other hand, essential to transnational policing in the sense that they constitute the legal base for cooperative policing relations. They function as a kind of insurance for police practitioners against problems that may arise in the course of their daily cooperative activities. Nonetheless, international agreements cannot alone guarantee the success of operational police cooperation. Rather, successful cooperative police operations are attributed to the other factors discussed earlier.

Police professionals prefer international agreements that are more flexible at the policing level. This is not because of their wish to create a framework for arbitrary conduct, but because of the complexity of their work. They wish to create more

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maneuvering space for their cooperative activities in combating transnational criminality. For this reason they prefer international agreements to reflect specific concerns of cooperating parties while keeping the boundaries of police cooperation flexible. That is why, when conducting cooperative investigations, police practitioners usually look for what cannot be done according to their national legislation, rather than looking for what should be done within the context of cooperative investigations.

As a result, transnational operational police cooperation continues to widen and deepen in parallel with globalization waves in the global age. Today’s intensively interconnected and deeply interdependent world not only smoothed transnational policing but also eased transnational criminality. Police cooperation has certainly been taking its share from these emerging developments at bilateral and multilateral levels as well as in formal and informal ways of cross national police cooperation. Police professionals who practice interagency cooperation on the ground look for ways to cut across all boundaries in order to catch up on fighting transnational criminality.

It is also understandable from the essence of above discussions that getting quick and reliable responses to information requests and developing mutual trust along with fraternal cooperation are perceived as fundamentals of contemporary transnational policing. In this context, police professionals view Europol and SECI type regional police cooperation centers as the most convenient places in terms of practicing above mentioned essentials of police cooperation in an ideal way.

Looking all these inferences from more abstract level, the relationship between varying parameters of trans-border police cooperation can be formulated with the following explanation building:
Figure 11. Explanation building for international police cooperation

Police cooperation is fragile by nature due to sovereignty concerns (states’ monopoly in using legitimate force)

Difficult to frame it within concrete borders due to complexity of cooperative works and therefore should be flexible and free from traditional barriers

This increases practitioners’ discretionary use of power

International agreements are necessary as legal base of cooperation

International agreements should be More flexible

Mutual trust becomes the most important criterion for police cooperation

As mutual trust increases, cooperation becomes more sensitive
(The more practitioners entrust confidential information and intelligence to each other, the more they become sensitive to the misuse of such information)

Cooperation needs to be reinforced with extra supportive instruments (Pillars)

- Police subculture (Professional solidarity)
- Quick & reliable information
- Fraternal cooperation
- Avoid unprofessional conducts
- Avoiding the confidence of other side
- Do not create excuses based on legislative & systemic differences

This study suggests that these regional police cooperation centers can be modeled within the scope of individual countries, too, as country level interagency police cooperation centers (Figure 12). Foreign liaison officers who are assigned to individual countries can be stationed under the umbrella of those country level cooperation centers. Further, they can be connected to the departments of host country police agencies as well as to their respective police agencies with secured communication channels. Thus, foreign police officers will be provided with a convenient atmosphere for their liaising works in those host countries.

As a result, besides liaising between their respective agencies and host country police agencies, liaison officers can exchange real time information with each other like
information brokers under the umbrella of those newly established cooperation centers. In the latter stages of cooperation, such cooperation centers can also be tightly connected to each other to achieve communicating real time operational purpose policing information across the world.

*Figure 12. Process model: International police cooperation*


**Strengths and Limitations of the Study**

As noted by Yin (2003)\(^7\) the interview is a target-oriented method of investigating the cases under study. That means the investigator directly focuses on the case study topic. The strength of such interviews lies in the fact that they provide insightful inferences about the cases under investigation. In this study, too, the researcher expected interviews to provide an insight about how international police cooperation is happening in practical terms. Documents and annual reports were used as much as they were accessed as supplementary methods of this research study. They contained exact details about the incidents happening within the context of international police cooperation, and offered substantial knowledge about the facts of police cooperation. Furthermore, they were stable sources for collecting data and can be reviewed repeatedly.

On the other hand, the case study method has limitations along with the above-mentioned strengths. Scholars often have concerns pertaining to the method’s validity, generalizability and reliability. Interviews, in particular, may be biased due to poorly constructed questions. The interviewee may also provide answers that he/she thinks the interviewer wants to hear. Documents and archival records also have limitations, since privacy concerns restrict access to such material that may be relevant to the study.\(^8\)

In this study, in an effort to overcome above mentioned limitations, although the interview data constituted main data source, some official reports and archival data were reviewed to the extent they were allowed to be accessed. Second, interviewees were chosen from different police departments rather than a single one, as noted earlier. Third, international police cooperation was investigated in at least four areas: terrorism, drug

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\(^8\) Ibid.
smuggling, human trafficking, and property crimes. Fourth, foreigners who worked as police liaison officers in Turkey as well as the representatives from each of the selected international police organizations were interviewed.

The study investigated the researched area mostly through police practitioners’ perspectives. Hence, its findings largely relied on lessons learned from their daily cross-border policing activities. It should also be noted that the researcher looked at operational police cooperation through Turkey’s cooperation experiences as stated in the main research question. This inevitably gave weight to Turkey-centric discussions in the analysis, and certainly poses a limitation to the study. However, it was also a fact that it was practically not feasible to research international police cooperation from a general global perspective.

Another limitation of the study was the scarcity of official reports and archival data pertaining to the research area. This is due to uniqueness of the study, which investigated transnational policing from the standpoint of human interface. There were no adequate and accessible written sources addressing this area, and only a very limited number of official documents and reports could be used as an alternative data source.

**Policy Implications for Future Studies**

This is a case study researched qualitatively. For the most part, it relied on interview texts as well as relied on documentary sources to a limited degree in making its analyses. This research study can be extended with further research conducts by using multiple research designs. However, as mentioned above the availability and accessibility of empirical data for such research is highly restricted. This is especially because of the
principle of parsimony that is born by both police agencies and police practitioners due to security concerns.

Nonetheless, the following steps can be taken for future studies:

- The data of the research can be expanded to include both police to police and regional police collaborations practiced in other parts of the world.
- Respondents can be asked more culturally sensitive questions when conducting future interviews.
- Multi-disciplinary research designs such as surveys or analysis of quantitative data and conceptual analysis of qualitative data can be conducted.
- It is also a necessity to gather statistical data about operational purpose police cooperation along with examining the personal experiences and perceptions of police professionals working for police cooperation.
- Cross national police cooperation diverges greatly depending on crime types. Therefore, it should be researched from the standpoint of specific crimes rather than being researched from a general aspect.
- It would also be very useful to research how regional police cooperation organizations can be sampled in all countries so that police practitioners can work like information brokers everywhere in the world.

Such expansions of data sources as well as implementing additional research designs can help better understanding the parameters of transnational operational police cooperation.
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Appendix-1: Letter of Intent

Dear Sir/Madam;

My name is Huseyin Ors; police superintendent in the Turkish National Police and currently studying doctoral program at dissertation level in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in the USA.

For your kind information that my doctoral dissertation is about international operational police cooperation. More specifically, it is: “What are the lessons that can be learned from the ongoing practices of international operational police cooperation in combating transnational crimes?” In this context, I will be looking for the following general questions:

- How does international operational police cooperation works in practice?
- How do police agencies communicate with each other?
- What factors affect international police cooperation positively or negatively on the ground?
- What are the cultural and technical difficulties encountered in international operational police cooperation and how are they dealt with?
- How has operational police cooperation been developing in particular over the last decade? and the like.
- How about the roles of police liaison officers in coordinating transnational police cooperation?

In order to find out the facts about such questions, I will be examining the knowledge, experiences, opinions, perceptions and interpretations of police professionals working in international police organizations such as Interpol, Europol, SECI or police
professionals (liaison officers in particular) who are engaging in formal or informal cooperative police relations with other law enforcement agencies of individual countries.

Also for your information that my research has already been approved by the Institutional Review Board of my university. That means I can give a written guarantee to all interviewees that I will keep the information, obtained from them, strictly confidential and will use them only for the purpose of my dissertation study but for nothing else. Any additional information regarding my research study can also be obtained from Prof. Dr. Norman Samuels who is chairing my dissertation study at his email: samuelsn@andromeda.rutgers.edu or phone: 001973 3533287

Yours sincerely

Huseyin ORS
PhD Student
Division of Global Affairs
Rutgers University / New Jersey / USA
Contact details: hors@pegasus.rutgers.edu
Cell Phone : 001 973 333 1533
Appendix-2: Consent Statement

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by me, Huseyin Ors. I am a doctoral student at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in the USA. The purpose of this research is to explore: How much has Turkey been benefiting from multilateral police organizations and bilateral policing collaborations in combating transnational criminality? Around 30 subjects between the ages of 25-50 years old are expected participate in this study. And each individual’s participation will last approximately 1-2 hours.

The study procedures include the following: the language of the interview will be in Turkish/English. You will be asked open-ended questions which are related to the objectives of this research; understanding the contributions of multilateral and bilateral police co-operations to Turkey in combating transnational crimes.

The research records will include some information about you, such as your name, position and institution, but will be kept confidential. Confidential means I will keep this information confidential/private by not allowing any individual to access the research data and keeping it in a secure location. The Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University and I are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. All study data will be kept until the research is officially approved by Rutgers University.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. You may not have any direct or indirect benefits from this study. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during
the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you don’t feel comfortable. Choosing to participate or not will not have any effect on the relations between you and the Turkish/American government.

If you have any questions about the study or study procedures, you may contact me by e-mail at hors@pegasus.rutgers.edu or you can contact my study coordinator, Dr. Norman Samuels, by e-mail at samuelsn@andromeda.rutgers.edu

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact the IRB Administrator, Michelle Gibel, at Rutgers University at:

Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
3 Rutgers Plaza, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8559
E-mail: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

Sign below if you agree to participate in this research study:

Subject (Print)__________________________________________________________

_____________________________________

Subject Signature_______________________________________________________ Date ____

_____________________________________

Principal Investigator Signature ______________________ Date ____________

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Appendix-3: Audiotape Addendum to Consent Form

You have already agreed to participate in a research study entitled: “How much has Turkey been benefiting from multilateral police organizations and bilateral policing collaborations in combating transnational criminality?” conducted by Huseyin Ors. You are asked for your permission to allow me to use audiotape (sound), as part of that research study. You do not have to agree to be recorded in order to participate in the main part of the study.

The recording(s) will be used for the analysis by the researcher. The recording(s) will include your name as the only identifier. The recording(s) will be stored in a locked file cabinet and linked with a code to subjects’ identity; and will be destroyed after three years of completion of this research.

Your signature on this form grants the investigator named above permission to record you as described above during participation in the above-referenced study. The investigator will not use the recording(s) for any other reason than that/those stated in the consent form without your written permission.

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

Sign below if you agree to be audio-taped during the interviews in this research study.

Subject (Print)___________________________________________

________________________

Subject Signature________________________________________

_________Date_______________________
Appendix-4: Introductory Explanation for Interviewees

This research is proposed to examine: how does operational police cooperation work in practice? What are the positive and negative factors affecting international police cooperation? What are the major benefits; states gain from international police cooperation? This research will apply to knowledge, experiences, opinions, perceptions and interpretations of police professionals who worked or currently working in international police organizations such as Interpol, Europol, SECI or of police professionals who experienced or experiencing formal or informal cooperative police relations with other law enforcement agencies of individual countries in order to address the above questions particularly, on the bases of combating transnational crimes: terrorism, narcotics, and trafficking or smuggling in human beings.

The study will attempt to address the above noted issues relating to international operational police cooperation by answering the questions specified below. However, please note that this is not a structured questionnaire. That means interviewees are not necessarily required to answer all below noted questions orderly. They may answer the questions in whole or in part or they may tell similar even different stories pertaining to practices of trans-border operational police cooperation on the ground from their own perspectives. Indeed these questions are prepared just to give an idea to the interviewees about what I am looking for in general. Probe questions may also be asked in addition to below noted ones. Interviewees will especially be appreciated giving examples from their experiences in cooperatively conducted trans-border police operations and telling about what went wrong or well during those operations. Talking about how operational police
cooperative relations have changed and developed over the time will also be very much contributive to the aim of the research. Thank you very much in advance for your supports.
Appendix-5: Interview Questions for Interpol

1- What does Interpol assume to do in facilitating international police cooperation and against what crime areas does it assist its membership?
   
   *Acıklaması:* Kisaca ve genel olarak; Interpol hangi alanlarda uluslararası polis istbirliğine katkıda bulunmayı hedeflemiş bulunmaktadır?

2- In practice, how does Interpol respond to member states’ assistance requests when combating transnational criminality?
   
   *Acıklaması:* Kisaca; Interpol uluslararası suçlarla mücadele ederken üye ülkelerin yardım taleplerine nasıl cevap verir? Yani bu yardımlaşma mekanizması pratikte nasıl çalışmaktadır?

3- How does Interpol set its task agenda, does it determine its cooperation priorities according to general needs of international police cooperation or according to emerging demands of member states?
   
   *Acıklaması:* Yine kisaca; Interpol faaliyet ajandasını nasıl oluşturur? Yani; Interpol işbirliği onceliklerini uluslararası polis işbirliğinin genel ihtiyaçlarına göre mı belirler yoksa üye ülkelerin değişen ve yeni ortaya çıkan ihtiyaçlara göre mı belirler?

4- What are the cultural, technical and bureaucratic barriers commonly encountered by Interpol when cooperating with member states?
   
   *Acıklaması:* Interpolun üye ülkelerle olan işbirliğinde en çok karşılaştılan kulturel, teknik ve bürokratik engeller nelerdir?
5- How did Interpol’s cooperative services evolve over the time and in what crime fields has it been making an effective cooperation, why?

_Aciklamasi:_ Interpol’ün uluslararası polis işbirliği alanındaki hizmetleri zamanla (ozellikle son 15-20 yılda) nasıl gelişti ve hangi suç alanlarında Interpol daha etkili bir işbirliği sergilemektedir, neden?

6- Do you think that the voluntary-based nature of international police cooperation poses any limitation on the quality of Interpol’s cooperation with its membership?
If so, what kinds of limitations are posed?

_Aciklamasi:_ Sizce, uluslararası polis işbirliğinin gonulluluk esasına dayalı olması Interpol’un üye ülkelerle olan işbirliğinin kalitesini olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir? Eger oleyse, bu durum polis işbirliğine ne gibi kısıtlamalar empoze etmektedir?

7- How do you think the establishment of Interpol’s sub regional bureaus affected the way in which Interpol addresses the emerging needs of member states?

_Aciklamasi:_ Sizce, Interpol’un bölgesel merkezlerinin kurulması Interpol’un üye ülkelerin işbirliği ihtiyaçlarını karşılanmasını nasıl etkilemiştir?

8- Do you think the quality of assistance provided by Interpol varies according the types of the crimes?

_Aciklamasi:_ Sizce Interpol’un sağlamış olduğu servisler suç cesitlerine göre değişiklik arzettişirmi?
9- How do varying, even sometimes, contracting national rules regulating operational police cooperation affect Interpol’s cooperative relations with the member state law enforcement agencies?

_Aciğlaması:_ Uye ülkelerin değişen hatta bazıları cinsel kuralları Interpol’un üye ülkeler polis organlarıyla olan işbirliği ilişkilerini nasıl etkilemektedir?

10- Do you think the scope of Interpol cooperation should comprise all sorts of transnational crimes or they should it stay specific to some serious forms of trans-border crimes?

_Aciğlaması:_ Sizce Interpl’un üye ülkelerle olan işbirliğinin çerçevesi tüm uluslararası suçları mı kapsamlıdırlı yoksa belirli bazı uluslararası ağır suçlarla sınırlı mı kalmalıdır?
Appendix-6: Interview Questions for SECI Liaison Officers

1- What does SECI assume to do in facilitating international police cooperation and against what crime areas does it assist its membership?

2- If there is a change in the pattern of police cooperation compared to past, what are the underpinning factors causing this change? (Crime patterns, technology, political concerns, diplomatic relations, economic conditions, attitudes of police officials to each other, etc.?)

3- In practice, how does SECI response to member states’ assistance requests when combating transnational criminality?

4- How does SECI set its task agenda, does it determine its cooperation priorities according to general needs of international police cooperation or according to emerging demands of member states?

5- What are the cultural, technical and bureaucratic barriers commonly encountered by SECI when cooperating with member states? (This is the most important question I am looking for)

6- How did SECI’s cooperative services evolve over the time and in what crime fields has it been making an effective cooperation, why? (This is an important question, too)
7- Do you think that the voluntary-based nature of international police cooperation poses any limitation on the quality of SECI's cooperation with its membership? If so, what kinds of limitations are posed?

8- Do you think the quality of assistance provided by SECI varies according to the types of the crimes?

9- Does informal (fraternal) police cooperation within the context of bilateral cooperation have a significant effect on establishing the mutual trust between the cooperating police agencies? Does it work always very well?

10- How do varying, even sometimes, contracting national rules regulating operational police cooperation affect SECI’s cooperative relations with the member state law enforcement agencies?

11- Do you think the scope of SECI cooperation should comprise all sorts of transnational crimes or should it stay specific to some serious forms of trans-border crimes?

12- What are the conditions police officials like most and what are the barriers police officials dislike most in mutual police relations? Put simply, what makes mutual police cooperation smoother?
Appendix-7: Questions for Bilateral Police Cooperation

1- What are the major crimes fields targeted by the mutual police cooperation with the country A?

*Acıklaması:* İkili polisiye isbirlikleriyle mücadele edilmesi hedeflenen balıca suç alanları nelerdir?

2- If there is a change in the pattern of police cooperation, what are the underpinning factors causing this change?

*Acıklaması:* Günümüz dünyasında eğer polisiye isbirliklerinin sahasında, yönünde, tarzında veya kapsamında geçmişe göre bazı değişiklikler varsa bunun basıca sebepleri yada faktörleri neler olabilir sizce?

3- What has changed in policing relations with the country A since the initiation of bilateral police cooperation?

*Acıklaması:* A ulkesi ile ikili polisiye isbirliği başlatıldığından bu yana polisiye iliskilerde ne gibi değişim ve gelişmeler yasandi?

4- What are the cultural, technical and bureaucratic barriers commonly encountered in operational level cooperative policing relations with the country A?

*Acıklaması:* A ulkesi ile olan operasyonel polisiye isbirliği bağlamında en çok karşılanan kulturel, teknik ve bürokratik engeller nelerdir?
5- How did the cooperative policing relations with the country A developed over the time and in what crime fields has this cooperation been working more effectively on the ground, why?

_Acıklaması:_ A ulkesi ile olan polisiye işbirliği ilişkileri zamanda nasıl bir gelisme seyri izledi ve bu işbirliği hali hazırda daha çok hangi suçlarla mücadele alanında daha etkili bir şekilde işlemektedir, neden?

6- Do you think that the more binding bilateral police cooperation agreements are more successful in operational cooperation?

_Acıklaması:_ Sizce polisiye işbirliği anlamları ne kadar çok baglayıcı olursa operasyonel işbirliği o kadar çok basarılı isler?

7- Do cooperating police agencies often change their attitudes towards the requirements of bilateral cooperation depending on the nature or the type of criminal activity involved?

_Acıklaması:_ Birbirleriyle ikili işbirliği içerisinde olan polis organizasyonlarının bu işbirliği kapsamındaki tutmaları suçların yapısı ve cesitlerine göre değişkenlik arzeder mi?

8- Does fraternal police cooperation within the context of bilateral cooperation have a significant effect on establishing the mutual trust between the cooperating police agencies?

_Acıklaması:_ Polislerin yabancı meslektaslariyla arkasa ilişkiler neticesi geliştirdikleri gayri resmi polisiye ilişkilerin polis organizasyonlarının aralarında karsılıklı güvenin oluşmasında kayda değer bir etkisi varmidir?
9- Can you make a comparison between formal and informal bilateral police cooperation in terms of their functionality and profitability for cooperating parties?

_Aciklamasi:_ Resmi ve arkadasca iliskiler netice olusan gaiyri resmi polisiye iliskiler arasinda ilerlik ve verimlilik bir karsilastirma yapabilir misiniz?

10- How about the impacts of geographical proximity on bilateral police cooperation? Do you think that bilateral cooperation between neighboring countries works better than bilateral cooperation between remote countries?

_Aciklamasi:_ Ulcilerin birbirlerine olan uzakliginin ikili polisiye isbirliklerinin uzerindeki etkisi hakkinda ne dersiniz. Ornegin sizce, komsu ulkeler arasindaki polisiye isbirlikleri birbirlerine daha uzak olan ulkeler arasindaki polisiye iliskilere gore daha mi iyi isler?

11- To what degree are bilateral and multilateral police collaborations supportive of or in conflict with each other in combating transnational crimes?

_Aciklamasi:_ Sizce uslulararasi sucla mucadelede ikili ve cok tarafli polisiye isbirlikleri arasinda ne dereceye kadar dayanisma yada catisma vardir?

12- What are the conditions police officials like most and what are the barriers police officials dislike most in mutual police relations? Put simply, what makes mutual police cooperation smoothest?

_Aciklamasi:_ Sizce ikili polisiye iliskilerde polis profesyonellerinin en coc sevdigi sartlar yada sevmedikleri engeller nelerdir, daha basit ifadesiyle ikili polisiye isbirliklerini ne gibi faktorler coc iyi isler hale getirir?
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