Rethinking Pan-Africanism in the AU (African Union)-led Regional Integration of Africa: Identity Politics in the Diaspora Involvement, Afro-Arab Relations and Indian Ocean Islands

by

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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African regional integration has its ideological roots in Pan-Africanism, which aims for the unity of African states and African people on the continent and in the diaspora. In terms of the institutional development, the formation of the AU in 2003 has been positively viewed as a big step forward for a deeper integration among its member states. Critically, I argue that Pan-Africanism can be divided to the two conceptual dimensions that are: 1) racial-cultural affinity; and 2) geographical connection. In the racial-cultural dimension, Pan-Africanism is deemed to engender pride and solidarity among Blacks inside and outside the continent. In the geographical discourse, racial and cultural diversity within the continent is subject to the notion of Africa as a single regional bloc.

In the post-Cold War global politics the identity issue appears to be a determinant factor in maintaining global/regional security and arguably promoting regional integration. A major objective of my research is to analyze the two different dimensions of Pan-Africanism and assess their ideological influence on the institutionalization of the AU-led regional integration of Africa. Specifically, my research seeks to answer the two
major research questions that follow: 1) Can African diasporas play any significant role in the AU-led integration process?; and 2) How have the intergovernmental relations among the member states of the Northern Arab region, sub-Saharan Black African region and Indian Ocean region shaped the institutional development process of the AU-led African integration? The topic of African identity appears to receive little attention, or is presupposed as Black African identity. Therefore, my dissertation attempts to explore this under-theorized issue, applying racial-cultural state identity as an analytical tool in discussing the AU-led African regional integration.

In terms of research methodologies, this research consists of: 1) Relevant literature review; 2) Primary and secondary data analysis; 3) Historical and contemporary document analysis; 4) Archival research at the AU Archives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and 5) Data collection through interviews with the AU officials and diplomats of African states and donor states in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and New York.
Africa is my second home. I had worked for three years in Mombasa, Kenya as a Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer, which was established and has been run by the Japanese government with a similar objective of the US Peace Corps. As a young Japanese woman with a positive outlook and adventurous mind, but without comprehensive knowledge on Africa, my encounter with the continent was full of joy, excitement and amazement. My old days in Kenya became pleasant and beautiful memories, which I have always cherished and treasured.

Yet, I have to admit that I was nothing more than *muzungu* (meaning foreigner in Kiswahili), even though my work as an environmental conservation educator involved a lot of grass-roots level interactions and activities. After all, I was on the secure and privileged side of socio-economic divide in Kenya, which only *muzungu* and a small circle of wealthy Kenyans belonged to. As many other Japanese volunteers experienced, I was struggling to readjust myself and settle down with my emotional and moral dilemma. In the Japanese society during my childhood and early adulthood, class struggle was almost a taboo subject. People seemed to enjoy a fair share of economic prosperity, which Japan had achieved after the World War II. Regardless of my family’s humble background and rural origin, I always believed that the world is full of wonderful opportunities, which everyone is entitled to enjoy. I just have to work hard to be competent. I will get a chance eventually.

Such optimistic naivety crashed when I stepped on the land of Africa. Ordinary Kenyans had to go through day-to-day survival with a limited social safety net. They had
to struggle to secure basic livelihoods and access to public health care and education. Injustice, power abuse and corruption were mounting everywhere. Kenya during the period of my residence, from 1997 to 2000, was like a capitalist hyena, roaming and eating up people left behind and exposed to vulnerability and poverty.

Toward the end of my volunteer service, I felt uncomfortable of working to preserve the beautiful nature and wildlife in Kenya. Millions of foreign aid dollars were used to protect elephants and other endangered species, which were seen as more valuable than poor locals by the Kenyan government in promoting nature tourism in Kenya. Nature-loving European settlers, whom I met through my work, seemed to be eager to share their affection and wealth with wildlife animals, but not with poor Kenyans. I felt that I was part of feeding the whole system of capitalist hyena. This moral awareness made me decide to pursue my study further. I wanted to find the best way to be truthful to myself. That is the only way I can be truthful to my homeland Kenya and Africa.

One of my Kenyan friends once told me, “Africa must unite.” He was on the other side of divide, insecure and under-privileged. He lost some of his family members as the family could not afford to pay for medical treatment. The illness was curable, but poverty killed them. He shared with me his aspiration to reform the entire system of Kenya and advocated for African unity. He understood that this is not just a Kenyan problem. It is an African problem. Colonialism divided and exploited Africa. Burdens of colonial legacy have been and will be on African men and women’s shoulders.
We, Asians, do not advocate for Asian unity. Nobody says, “Asia must unite.” But, Africans do. They often do. Another good friend of mine proudly declared, “I am African, born in Ghana.” I have never told people, “I am Asian, born in Japan.” I am Asian, and I am Japanese. Yet, these two identities do not have any meaningful linkage or relevance. My Japanese identity gives me a sense of pride and dignity. I do not need Asian identity to complement this.

Asian regionalism in East and Southeast Asia does exist and has been promoted. Asian countries try to enhance economic and political cooperation among themselves. However, Pan-Asian ideology does not exist and is unlikely to emerge. In my view, Asian regionalism is envisaged in the scope of inter-governmental relations and multilateral institution building. Asian countries do not need such ideology as Pan-Asianism to advance regional integration.

At the individual level, I certainly feel comfortable of being around with other Asian people, Chinese, Filipinos, Korean and Thai to name few. We share culture and traditions. I love Asian food. I like traveling to Asian countries. Nonetheless, this sense of affinity does not necessarily translate into cultural Pan-Asianism per se.

Given its origin and history, Pan-Africanism is distinctive political ideology and cultural and intellectual phenomenon. How has Pan-African ideology emerged and evolved? What are the implications of Pan-Africanism for contemporary Africa and African diasporas? My scholarly enquire stems from these simple questions.

My first fieldwork at the African Union (AU) Commission in the summer 2006 helped me to identify some under-researched issues pertaining to Pan-Africanism and
African regional integration. It has been a great joy to explore my dissertation topic, which examines the racial-cultural and geographic aspects of Pan-Africanism and their ideological impacts on the AU-led regional integration of Africa. I hope this work will contribute to the scholarship of African regional studies and help Africanist researchers and students to rethink Pan-Africanism as my research suggests.

Taking this opportunity, I convey my deep gratitude to the Division of Global Affairs (DGA), Rutgers Newark, the State University of New Jersey, who had financially supported my first four-year Ph.D study with Teaching Assistantship and Dissertation Fellowship. I also express my sincere appreciation to the Political Science Department, Rutgers Newark, who awarded Virginia M. Walsh Memorial Fund Award to me in May 2008. This award helped me to finance the expense of my fieldwork in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in the summer 2008.

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I express my sincere gratitude to the AU Commission, who allowed me to conduct fieldwork in the summers 2006 and 2008. Special thanks must go to Mr. Geoffrey Mugumya, a former Director of Peace and Security Department, and Mr. Ben Kioko, Director of Department of Legal Council, both of whom had given supervision
and kind support to my fieldwork at the AU Commission. I also thank Dr. Admore Kambuzi and Ms. Aissatou Hayatou-Tall at the AU Peace and Security Department for sharing their views and insights on the issues of peace and security in Africa. I also appreciate enormous support given by Mr. Sirak at the AU Archives. Besides those distinguished individuals, I had been supported by numerous officials and staff members at the AU Commission during my fieldwork. I am also indebted to the supervision and support given by the Embassy of Japan to Ethiopia and the AU. I especially thank Mr. Masaki Morimoto, a former First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan, for his guidance and support to my fieldwork. Without warm hospitality and tremendous support I had received from them, my fieldwork in Addis Ababa in the summers 2006 and 2008 would have not been accomplished.

I also appreciate friendship, encouragement and support given by my fellow DGA classmates and colleagues. I will treasure our friendship and camaraderie for the rest of my academic and personal life. Your success is my success.

Last but not least, I wholeheartedly thank my family and extended family, who have allowed me to pursue my Ph.D study far away from my home and have supported me always with love and faith.

This work therefore is dedicated to all individuals who have supported my doctorate study and dissertation research as well as my fellow Pan-Africanists who have been and will be striving for the unity of Africa.
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List of Acronyms

AAPC - All-African Peoples Conference
AAUC - African American Unity Caucus
ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ACS - American Colonization Society
ACSRT - African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AFRICOM - United States African Command
AGOA - African Growth and Opportunity Act
AMIS - African Union Mission in the Sudan
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
ANC - African National Congress
ASA - Africa-South America Summit
ASACOF - Africa-South America Cooperative Forum
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF - African Standby Force
AU - African Union
AUA - African Union Authority
AUCSPWG - AU-Civil Society Organizations Provisional Working Group
AUG - African Union Government
AU PSC - African Union Peace and Security Council
ACAA - Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
CAR - Central African Republic
CARICOM - Caribbean Community
CECPA - Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement
CEN-SAD - Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFA - Constituency for Africa
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CIAD - Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora
CIDO - Citizens and Diaspora Directorate
COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSSDCA - Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
DPA - Darfur Peace Agreement
DOM - *departement d’outre mer*
EAC - East African Community
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC - Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
ELF - Eritrean Liberation Front
EPZ - Export Processing Zone
EU - European Union
FLAM - Front for the Liberation of Africans in Mauritania
FLS - Front Line States
FUC - United Front for Change

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GEAR - Growth, Employment and Redistribution

GoNU - Government of National Unity

GoSS - Government of Southern Sudan

G4 - Group of 4

IAF - Inter-African Force

ICC - International Criminal Court

IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IOC - Indian Ocean Commission

IR - International Relations

ISS - Institute for Security Studies

JEM - Justice and Equality Movement

LAS - League of Arab States

LDCs - Least Developed Countries

MAES - Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros

MIOC - Observer Mission in the Comoros

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEPAD - New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NRC - National Reconciliation Congress

NRF - the National Redemption Front

OAU - Organization of African Unity

OCAM - African and Malagasy Common Organization
ODA - Official Development Assistance
OIF - International Organization of the Francophonie
OLMEE - OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
PAA - Pan-African Association
POLISARIO Front - Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro
RDFF - Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces
RECs - Regional Economic Communities
RTA - Regional Trade Agreement
SACU - South African Customs Union
SADC - Southern African Development Community
SADR - Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s
SANU - Sudan African National Union
SFDA - Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SLM/A - Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPPF - Seychelles People’s Progressive Front
SSLM - Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
TFG - Transitional Federal Government
TFI - Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP - Transitional Federal Parliment
UFLD - United Front for Liberation and Development
UIC - Union of Islamic Courts

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Chapter I: Introduction
Elaboration of the Argument and Research Inquiries

The idea of African integration has been developed and embraced by Pan-Africanists who believe that integration promotes economic growth, alleviates poverty and maintains peace and security among African states. For instance, integration is expected to promote inter-governmental cooperation, facilitate policy harmonization and create a united front for international negotiations for foreign aid, trade liberalization and security issues. The unification of African states, the final stage of integration, serves as a shared dream for Pan-African politicians, intellectuals and activists, who strive to overcome the negative legacy of slavery and colonialism and to eliminate continuing racism, oppression and exploitation against Africans and their descendants in the diaspora. Therefore, in essence, African integration has its ideological roots in Pan-Africanism defined as “a political and cultural phenomenon that regards Africa, Africans, and African descendants abroad as a unit (Esedebe 1994: 5).”

With respect to the institutional development of African integration, the formation of the African Union (AU) as a replacement for the preceding OAU (Organization of African Unity) in 2003 has been positively viewed as a big step forward for a deeper political and economic integration of the fifty three AU member states. According to its Constitutive Act, the AU possesses a continent-wide mandate to achieve such broad objectives as political and socio-economic integration, enhancement of peace and security, coordination of policies of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance (2000). Significantly, the concept of African unity appears to be accepted as a shared goal for African sovereign states at least in the rhetorical context. The AU Commission defines one of the
objectives of African unity as the elimination of colonial borders and frontiers. They also maintain that “political integration should be the *raison-d’être* of the African Union, the objective being to achieve a United States of Africa (federation or confederation) in the long run (AU Commission 2004: 20).” Although the time frame for this ultimate goal does not seem to have been specified, solid integration in all aspects of continental governance is a shared objective for the AU member states. Certainly, the AU has its ideological and institutional origin in the historical Pan-African movement. For instance, according to the preamble of the AU constitutive Act, the heads of member states agreed to establish the AU, being

INSPIRED by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States (2000).

Critically, I argue that Pan-Africanism can be divided to the two conceptual dimensions defined as 1) racial and cultural affinity and 2) geographical connections. The reason why I employ the term racial-cultural affinity stems from my understanding of race and racial groupings from the perspective of a highly intricate socialization process. Although the popular discourse tends to view a racial group as a physically distinguishable population that springs from a common ancestral origin, such perception is not always correct.

For instance, Arabs as a racial group/identity is a product of the centuries-long Arabization (genealogically, culturally and/or linguistically) and Islamization process in the Middle East and parts of Africa. According to Dawn (1988), the ancestral origin of Arabs is considered to derive from the Semitic inhabitants in the eastern Fertile Crescent.
The spread of Arabs and the Arabic language seems to have been further advanced by the Islamic expansion in Arabia and to Africa. Importantly, the primacy of Arabic language over race in the integration of peoples and the creation of Arab societies was largely accepted (70). Somewhat contradictory to this linguistic ground of Arab identity is Somalia's state characteristic as a non-Arabic speaking Arab state. Buo (1975) argues that Somalia, which is not generally considered to be an Arab country, is a member of the League of Arab States (LAS). If membership of the LAS qualifies a state as Arab, then Somalia is an Arab state (46). Along with this line of argument, I use the term racial-cultural affinity, taking the socially constructed aspect of race and racial groupings into account.

In terms of the racial-cultural dimension, Pan-Africanism is deemed to engender pride and solidarity among sub-Saharan Black Africans and Black African diasporas outside the continent. For instance, from a diaspora’s perspective, W.E.B. DuBois argues that the Pan-African movement is intended to promote intellectual activities among all peoples of African descent in order to achieve “the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro people (as cited in Esedebe 1994: 3).” Similarly, William B. Ackah (1999) writes, “Pan-Africanism as an idea/movement has for the past three centuries and even further back in time, thrown up personalities and ideas that have given diverse groups of black people a sense of being and purpose (2).”

Indeed, it is assumed that the formation and evolution of the Pan-African movement was largely owed to ideological and intellectual contributions from Black elites, who considered Black racial solidarity and cultural pride to be a source of moral persuasion for Black people to challenge Western White supremacy within and outside
the African continent. Prominent African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah, and
diaspora scholars, such as W.E.B. DuBois, collaboratively contributed to the creation and
development of the movement in the political, cultural and intellectual realms. It was a
trans-Atlantic Black racial empowerment movement for Black Africans and Black
African diasporas, who struggled to gain political independence in colonial Africa and to
end slavery and achieve civil rights and justice in America. In fact, the preceding
episodes of Black solidarity helped to bring such significant political achievements as the
end of slavery, independence of African colonies, racial justice in US society and more
recently the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa.

Nonetheless, I would argue that today’s academic inquiries about the Pan-African
movement appear to be less vigorous than in previous times, when the aforesaid political
goals were framed by the Pan-Africanist leaders and later achieved. In fact, African
integration and unification remain an unaccomplished goal in the Pan-African movement.
Pan-Africanists regard the existing territorial borders as a negative heritage of Western
colonialism that divided the continent into colonies with no relevance to traditional ruling
systems and ethnic based patterns of settlement. In this view, the aspiration of African
states for integration can be seen as a rational response according to post-colonial African
states, many of which are characterized by political instability, economic stagnation and
highly fragmented societies.

In this racial-cultural dimension of Pan-Africanism, a question arises: Can
African diasporas play any significant role in the AU-led integration process? (Research
Question I) It is important to remember that the AU is an inter-governmental
organization, whose mandates and policies are confined within the state-centered
international agreements and order. Therefore, diasporas, whose citizenship status has no affiliation with African states, are automatically excluded from the formal constituency of the AU-led integration. Nonetheless, for the last couple of years, the AU has developed quite remarkable diaspora involvement schemes under the leadership of Senegal and South Africa. For instance, Senegal suggested that African diasporas should be officially recognized as the AU’s sixth region in addition to the other five regions of Western, Central, Eastern, Southern and Northern Africa. Furthermore, the AU tries to develop its institutional partnership with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) that consist of large African diaspora communities. It is also true that through lobbying groups and humanitarian organizations in affluent Western societies, African diasporas have been able to wield some influence on African Affairs. For example, Africare, TransAfrica Forum and the Constituency for Africa are Washington D.C. based African diaspora organizations that try to help alleviate human suffering in Africa.

Paradoxically, however, in this Black racial-cultural discourse of Pan-Africanism, Arabs and other non-Black populations in the continent are alienated, despite the fact that the geographic notion of Pan-Africa is meant to integrate all states and peoples of the continent. In fact, in the geographic dimension of African integration, racial and cultural diversity within the continent, such as Northern Arabs and sub-Saharan Black Africans, is subject to the notion of Africa as a single regional unit. Indeed, the principle of the AU-led African integration relates to inter-governmental political and economic cooperation and harmonization, based on the idea of African regionalism. Africa or Africaness is mentioned only in the geographic context, but not as a racial term in any AU official
documents. In fact, the fifty three AU member states include Northern African Arab states, namely Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, as well as Indian Ocean island countries, such as Mauritius, in which people of Black Africa are not the most predominant racial group.

In the post-Cold War global politics, it is generally assumed that the identity issue has become a determining factor in maintaining global/regional security and arguably promoting regional political and economic integration. For instance, Samuel Huntington (1996) asserts that the most intense cultural conflicts may occur “along the fault lines between civilizations”, while countries with civilizational affinities cooperate politically and economically. He goes on to say that intergovernmental organizations whose memberships are based on cultural similarity, as the European Union (EU) is, are able to advance their integration initiatives far more successfully than those that attempt to transcend cultural differences (28). In terms of an enlargement of the EU, Huntington (1996) asserts that while East European and Baltic states that share the Christian and Western cultural backgrounds are moving toward membership of the EU, European powers do not want the neighboring Muslim states of Turkey and Bosnia to join (126).

In fact, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the former President of France, made a clear statement to Le Monde on November 2, 2002 about Turkey’s historical and cultural incompatibility for the EU membership. He emphasized that it would be “the end of the Union” since Turkey was “a country that is close to Europe but not a European country (as cited in Deringil 2007: 709).” It is also true that the geographic boundaries of Europe have never been static and the Mediterranean world can be characterized by cultural and civilizational hybrids. Nonetheless, on-going debates on Turkey’s accession to the EU
certainly reflect an unsettled view of what Turkey’s state identity is: Turkey in Europe or Asia? Or more critically, “Turkey in Europe but not of Europe? (Deringil 2007: 709-710)"

Importantly, in Huntington’s (1996) view, religion (not ethnicity or race) is a determinant factor for civilizational affinity. He argues that people who are identified with the same ethnicity and language but with the different religions may fight against each other as seen in Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, people of the same race can be split by civilization, while people of diverse races can be unified by civilization. For example, the world’s great missionary religions, Christianity and Islam, have integrated societies of different races. Huntington also asserts, “The crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, not physical size, head shapes, and skin colors (42).”

In terms of civilizational grouping in the African continent, Huntington (1996) divides the continent into 1) the Islamic civilization comprising the Northern region together with the East coastal region and 2) the African civilization (possibly) in sub-Saharan Africa with its potential core state as South Africa (47). In Huntington’s (1996) view, the Islamic civilization includes Northern Arab states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara, Afro-Arab borderland states of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad (Northern part) and Sudan (Northern part) and the Horn of Africa comprising Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. Some parts of Black Africa are also included, namely, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Nigeria (Northern part), where Islam is the dominant religion. In the African East Coast, Swahili societies
of Kenya and Tanzania that have Afro-Arab cross-fertilized culture with strong Islamic influence are categorized as part of the Islamic civilization (Map 1.3).

Religious identity, such as Muslim or Christian, has been an important factor in maintaining peace and security in Africa, and that is especially true for some religiously but not racially divisive countries like Nigeria. However, my research regards racial-cultural state identity as a key analytical tool in discussing the institutionalization process of the AU-led African integration. This approach stems from my observation of the inter-governmental relations among Northern Arab states and sub-Saharan Black African states during my fieldwork at the AU Commission in June-August 2006. Through my interviews with the AU officials and diplomats of African states and donor states, I noticed that there was some degree of vigilance and distrust among Northern Arab states and sub-Saharan Black African states in terms of developing a sense of African regional solidarity and identity that can serve as an ideological foundation of the AU.

Indeed, the tension between the Arab world and Black Africa has its root in the historical Afro-Arab relations. According to Mazrui (1975), the two worlds have been connected by economic and cultural interactions for at least twelve centuries. In the secular sphere, Arabs have played two major roles in the land of Black Africa, first as perpetuators of African enslavement, and then in the 20th century as comrades in African liberation from Western colonialism (725). Mazrui writes that the inconsistent nature of Arab friendship and influence in Black Africa has produced frictions between the two groups. Historical connections have implanted a memory of Arabs as “both conquerors and liberators, both traders in slaves and purveyors of new ideas (as cited in Nadelmann 1981: 209).”
In particular, we can find great impacts of the historical Arab domination over Black Africans on today’s security situations in the so-called Afro-Arab borderlands. Slavery and slavery-like practice committed by Arabs against Black Africans have been reported in the most contentious Afro-Arab borderlands, namely Mauritania and Sudan. Prah (2004) argues that in many senses, Mauritania and Sudan are the flashpoints of the Afro-Arab civilizational clash. According to the geographic locations of the LAS member states on the African continent, the Arab world ends on the equator at the boundary between Sudan and Uganda. On the Indian Ocean islands the Arab world extends to south of the equator at the 11th degree latitude, where Comoros is located (page number unavailable).

Conceptually and practically, how to reconcile Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism has been a major concern for Pan-African integrationists. Yusuf Fadi Hasan argues that the African nationalist movement began and remained as a secular one. The earliest stage of the movement largely owed its success to contributions from Black Americans, who were struggling for racial equality and advocating for African unity that was meant to be negritude centered. After the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, the movement was shifted to Africa, but largely kept out of North Africa. Furthermore, some Pan-African leaders saw the unity of Black Africa first before the integration of North Arab Africa (as cited in Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable). According to Akinsanya (1976), some Black African leaders insisted that a priority should be given to unify Black Africa, while others assumed that Arab internal quarrels would only cause unnecessary frictions in the Pan-African movement (517). Mazrui (2003) expresses a similar view, arguing that there are two different levels of Pan-
Africanism that are 1) sub-continental and 2) trans-Saharan. The former sought the unification of only Black African states, while the latter led to the creation of the OAU on the basis of Afro-Arabism (page number unavailable).

In the discourse of Pan-Arabism, the LAS is an organizational manifestation of Arab unity. That idea, according to Khadduri (1946), initially emerged, when the various Arab national groups under the Ottoman Empire organized insurgency against the Turkish domination (756). The LAS was created in 1945 and currently comprises twenty-two member states in the Middle Eastern, North African and Indian Ocean regions. Insightfully, Khadduri (1946) points out that the LAS is neither an international organization nor a regional league in a strict sense since the LAS asserts a distinctive national character that is Arab states (770). In fact, non-Arab states in the region, namely, Iran, Israel and Turkey, are not members of the LAS. Based on these findings, it is fair to argue that state identity often becomes an important element in regional grouping.

Perhaps, one of the most intricate issues existing between the AU and the LAS is their membership duplication. Some of the North African Arab states, namely Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, have memberships in both the AU and the LAS, so do some states in the Afro-Arab borderlands and the Horn of Africa, such as Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. In the Indian Ocean, Comoros with strong Swahili and Islamic influence has also a double membership. Due to its organizational nature and a membership that is not based on shared identity as such, the AU seems to be inherently vulnerable to a question of relevance and the internal division of the Arab world and Black Africa. Furthermore, this factor appears to be a challenge in constructing and reinforcing regional identity as “Africa”. Therefore, in the geographic facet of Pan-
Africanism, a question arises: How have the intergovernmental relations among the member states of the Northern Arab region, sub-Sahara Black African region and Indian Ocean region shaped the institutional development process of the AU-led African integration? (Research Question II)

It is important to acknowledge that various political, security and economic factors might be accounted for the outcomes of regional integration process. From realists’ point of view, national interests and power projection of hegemonic states may help to create a regional organization that is authorized to conduct certain tasks that individual states are unable to perform. Seen in this light, the notion of core-periphery within the region seems to be the most useful analytical approach. Nevertheless, in my research design, I divide the AU member states into the three groups of 1) Northern Arab states, 2) sub-Saharan Black African states and 3) the Indian Ocean island states, taking account of the geographic location and racial-cultural state identity. Although European identity is one of the most popular topics in the public and academic debates over European integration, it appears that the topic of African identity receives little attention, or is presupposed as Black African identity. Therefore, my research attempts to explore this under-theorized issue by applying racial-cultural state identity as an analytical tool in discussing the AU-led African integration.

Among the recent scholarships of international relations (IR), there is a tendency to give more attentions and credibility to the role of identity in an analysis of foreign policy formation and interstate cooperation. According to Horowitz, there was a significant increase of the number of articles about identity among the major IR journals around 1995 (as cited in Ashizawa 2008: 571). Ashizawa (2008) defines state identity in
the context of IR as “what the country is and what it represents”. She goes on to say that like individual identity, state identity might be “formed and modified over time through relations and interactions with other states.” Therefore, state identity is “not just a descriptive characteristic of state.” It is a “social and relational conception referring to the state in a way to reflect the existence, or identity, of others (most likely other states) (575).” Likewise, in constructivists’ thinking, “interstate relations are contingent on the way identity is constructed (Hinnebusch 2002a: 2).” In her excellent research on Libya’s foreign policy, Deeb (1991) emphasizes that foreign policy should be analyzed “as part of a larger system of states linked by geographical proximity, cultural affinity, and a sense of identity”. This approach helps us to understand foreign policy outcomes in the discourse in which they are determined (192). Ashizawa (2008) thoughtfully theorizes that “a conception of state identity provides policymakers with a particular value, which sometimes becomes the dominant value, and hence, defines the preference of state foreign policy.” Although she admits that identity-based values do not always result in the determinant of foreign policy, they sometimes do. This insight leads us to a new research inquiry about identity, which is “when and under what conditions identity becomes the determinant of foreign policy, when identity matters (581-582).”

In fact, racial-cultural state identity has often become the determinant of foreign policies of African states over time. The best example is President Nasser’s attempt to solidify his pan-Arab leadership among Arab states in the 1950s and the 1960s. According to Lorenz (1990), a former Egyptian foreign minister in Nasser’s regime assumed that the emotional side of Nasser’s Arabism might have come in part from his clan’s Arab tribal origin. Nasser’s ancestral clan settled in the village of Beni Morr,
which was named after Beni Morr tribe of the Hejaz in Arabia, in the late 17th century. On one hand, the hard and strategic interests that drove Nasser’s Pan-Arab policy were attributable to the importance of Eastern Arab countries, especially Palestine and Syria, to Egypt in confrontation of Israel (23-24). In the post-Nasser Egyptian society, the Israel-Palestine issue has remained a key foreign policy agenda and created a sense of resentment against the Egyptian government that is an important ally of the US and maintains diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.

In the realm of Black Africa, until the dismantling of apartheid, Black liberation was a core value of the Front Line States (FLS) of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which adopted a confrontational stance against apartheid South Africa. Among Southern African states, there is a sense of common destiny that stems from the legacy of bloody and lengthy Black liberation struggles. African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa greatly owed the neighboring Black fellow states political and material support during the apartheid era. So-called “quiet diplomacy” of Mbeki regime in handling with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe is to some extent a corollary of the shared history of Black liberation struggles against White minority rules in these two countries. In this sense, racial-cultural state identity becomes the determinant of foreign policy, when it matters in a particular historical, ideological and geo-strategic context.

Furthermore, the governments and dissident groups often manipulate racial-cultural identity to gain support from either side (Arab or Black Africa) in order to achieve their political goals. This pattern of maneuver has been often used in the prolonged conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The clearest example is Eritrea’s inclination
toward the Arab-Islamic world in order to counter-balance the influence of Ethiopia in the Horn. According to Akinsanya (1976), many Arab states backed Eritrea’s independence struggle against Ethiopia with a hope of having the whole Red Sea region under the Arab-Islamic influence (527). Ethiopia has hosted the OAU-AU Headquarters since the creation of the OAU in 1963 and had served as a member of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) since its establishment in 2004 until January 2010. Because of this Ethiopia’s leading role in the AU politics, Eritrea is leaning toward the LAS, obtaining an observer’s status of the LAS and being almost invisible in the AU politics.

In terms of the utility of racial-cultural state identity in an analysis of the economic aspect of African regional integration, there seems to be a challenge arising since foreign economic policy seems to be less affected by identity politics than the political and security aspects of foreign policy. Key economic and trade factors, such as comparative advantage, commodity complementarity, industrial diversification and transportation networks, are considered to be the determinant of the promotion of regional economic integration. Nonetheless, in the context of African regional integration, economic issues and political-security issues are inseparable since, as often emphasized, if there is no peace, there is no development.

A political-economic linkage in the formation of regional integration arrangement is suggested by Schiff and Winters (1998). They argue that there seems to be the potential link between the promotion of trade and the pursuit of non-economic political and social agendas in developing countries’ decision to participate in regional integration. In many cases, declaration that regional integration is politically driven is used to disqualify economic calculations to the debate, with the consequence being that
economically less desirable policy options are often preferred to more desirable ones.

Regional integration is also used for international diplomacy. Firstly, some agreements help to stabilize the region and thus to diminish the possibility that migrants or conflicts will spill across borders. Secondly, regional blocs respond to outside threats by strengthening relations among the integrating member states. Thirdly, regional integration among previously confronting states can potentially decrease tensions (178, 185).

A linkage between political-security concerns and economic interests in regional integration arrangement can be found in a series of Libya-led regional integration initiatives. According to Solomon and Swart (2005), Gaddafi enthusiastically promoted Arab unity and came up with a number of proposals for regional integration (471). For instance, in the early 1970s, Gaddafi suggested a federation between Libya with first Sudan and then Egypt (Ogunbadejo 1986: 34-35). Throughout the course of the late 20th century, Gaddafi’s aspiration for Arab-Islamic unity had never diminished. He proposed for union with Tunisia in 1974, with Syria in 1980, Chad in 1981, with Morocco in 1984, with Algeria in 1987 and with Sudan again in 1990, but all eventually failed (Solomon and Swart 2005: 471). In addition to the interests in improving diplomatic relations with Libya, the fact that oil-rich but labor-scarce Libya and its neighboring countries could economically cooperate in a complementary fashion encouraged the neighboring countries to consider participating in these proposed integration initiatives. Deeb (1991) identifies Libya’s primary foreign policy objectives as the security of the regime and the country’s territorial sovereignty. To achieve these objectives, Gaddafi manipulated ideology, such as Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic, and attempted to promote bilateral and
trilateral integration with neighboring states and the other states outside Northern Africa (189, 192).

Therefore, I argue that racial-cultural affinity is often embraced by policy-making elites in the declaration and promotion of regional integration. Nonetheless, racial-cultural affinity does not always function as a stimulus to deepening integration, when other economic, political and security factors override the expected benefits of integration. A good example is the dissolution of East African Community (EAC) among Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1977, when the Cold War ideological rivalry between Kenya and Tanzania curtailed integrational efforts between these two countries, which have similar ethnic, cultural and linguistic heritages.

Hence, my research puts a focus on how and under what conditions racial-cultural state identity manifests and affects the policy-making process of the AU-led African integration. For clarification, my research is not designed to prove that racial-cultural state identity is the overriding factor among other possible variables in explaining the different patterns and outcomes of African integration. Rather, my research explores how racial-cultural state identity becomes relevant to some important agendas in the AU-led integration process. To reemphasize, a major objective of my research is to analyze the two different dimensions (racial-cultural and geographic) of Pan-Africanism and assess their ideological influence on the institutionalization of the AU-led political and economic integration of Africa (Thesis Statement). As I argued, Black racial-cultural identity is a premise of theoretical and empirical argument of Pan-Africanism. Therefore, it is rational to use racial-cultural state identity as an analytical approach in examining the
AU-led African integration, for which Pan-Africanism serves as an ideological foundation.

Besides the Arab world and Black Africa, I consider the Indian Ocean island countries, namely, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, as having different racial-cultural state identity. The rationale behind this is their hybrid and heterogeneous racial-cultural composition. For instance, the racial-cultural characteristic of Seychelles is hybrid, and the Creoles of Black African and White European origins make up more than 98 percent of the total population (Jane’s Information Group 2008). As for Mauritius, where ethnic Indo-Mauritians account for about two thirds of the total population (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2010), it is well-known that their foreign policy tends to ally with that of India, which is the core state of the Hindu civilization. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean island states’ geographic isolation from the African continent makes their state identity less African from both self-identification and international recognition perspectives. In addition, due to their small territorial and population sizes as so-called micro-states, their state identity is likely to be indecisive and barely recognized in the global political arena. Nonetheless, persistent political turmoil in Comoros and the AU’s peace-keeping support to the country for the last decade reminds us of the importance of cooperation for peace and security in the pan-African arrangement, incorporating the Indian Ocean island states.

On the other hand, some Indian Ocean island states’ economic performances that are based on such sectors as tourism, fishing and farming are far more successful than those of sub-Saharan Black African states. For instance, as of estimation in 2009, the figures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity per capita of
Mauritius and Seychelles are $12,900 and $20,800, which are much higher than the figures of the majority of sub-Saharan African states (CIA 2010).

In terms of trade, the major trade partners of those Indian Ocean island states are not African states, but developed economies in North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania although a small share of intra-regional trade of global trade is also operative for most African states. This less dynamic intra-regional trade pattern is more apparent in the destination of export.

Table 1.1: Country Trade Structure by Main Region of Destination and Origin in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Developed Countries (%)</th>
<th>African Countries (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comoros (EX)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros (IM)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar (EX)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar (IM)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius (EX)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius (IM)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles (EX)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles (IM)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EX = Export, IM = Import


Taking these political and economic factors into account, it is reasonable to ask to what extent those Indian Ocean island states need political and economic cooperation from sub-Saharan African states and Northern Arab states under the auspices of the AU. Unlike North Arab states that may opt for being identified with the Arab world, it is uncommon to categorize the Indian Ocean region as a formal regional bloc. This
tendency is empirically proved by a small number of regional studies of this particular region and the absence of strong regional integration initiative.

A more relevant integration arrangement in this region is the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The IOC was established in 1984 and at present consists of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Reunion (an overseas department of France). The four island states and Reunion have a lot in common in the context of the French-ruled colonial history and consequent cultural and social composition. These island countries are also connected by the same type of populations through slave trade and post-slavery labor migration. According to some reports, some of the major challenges that the IOC has been facing recently are the different levels of socio-economic development of the member states and larger regional integration initiatives, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), which are expected to bring more significant economic benefits (Courier ACP-EU 2003: 18-19).

It is important to mention that most academic inquiries fail to include this region in their analysis of Pan-Africanism and African integration even though Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles have been member states of the OAU-AU. Therefore, this research is intended to fill this gap and reveal a unique position of this region in the AU-led regional integration.

Research Methodologies and Outline

This research consists of:

1) Relevant literature review

2) Primary and secondary data analysis
3) Historical and contemporary document analysis

4) Archival research at the AU Archives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

5) Data collection through interviews with the AU officials and diplomats of African states and donor states in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and New York.

In this research, qualitative interviews are conducted in order to gather relevant information, data and documents in an informal and open-ended conversational setting. This research’s interviews do not involve the use of rigidly structured questionnaires. Rather, flexible and interactive interviews with a general plan of inquiry and certain topics to be covered are conducted.

It is important to mention that I am fully aware of a potential risk of bias and difficulty that might be involved in information gathering through interviews due to my outsider’s status, namely non-African racial and citizenship status and affinity with an American educational institute. In order to overcome this potential problem, I diversify my information sources as much as possible, reaching out to many officials, and gather other evidence that supports information obtained through interviews.

In terms of confidentiality and anonymity pertaining to interviews, the name of a respondent and the date of an interview are withheld upon a respondent’s request. A respondent’s general title or capacity, such as an AU official, as well as the period of fieldwork when an interview is conducted, such as summer 2008, are indicated in order to underscore the value and credibility of information, but not to the extent that a respondent’s identity can be discovered.

This dissertation consists of seven chapters with Chapter I as an introduction.
In Chapter II, I elaborate a historical analysis of the racial-cultural aspect of Pan-Africanism that can be articulated as Black racial-cultural pride, solidarity and nationalism across the Atlantic Ocean. Then, I discuss the historical transition of diasporas’ political involvement in African affairs in general and African integration in particular from the era of the OAU to the AU. A focus is placed on the current political environment that may offer political spaces and opportunities for diasporas to influence the AU-led African integration process.

Chapter III explores the historical Afro-Arab relations before and during the OAU era and their impacts on the ideological and institutional evolution of the unity of Africa. This Chapter also reveals the impacts of the historical Arab domination over Black Africans on the current security situations in the Afro-Arab borderlands. A comparative analysis of Pan-Africanism with its institutional manifestation as the OAU and Pan-Arabism with its organizational formation as the LAS is also elaborated in this part.

In Chapter IV, I analyze the current pattern of Afro-Arab cooperation toward the unification of Africa and reveal how and under what conditions racial-cultural state identity (Arab or Black African) manifests and affects the policy-making process of the AU-led African regional integration. In particular, a focus is placed on the roles of AU’s big five states (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa), who bear the large share of financial costs of African integration and attempt to take a leading role in the AU politics.

Chapter V is designed to discuss the AU-led conflict management in the Horn of Africa and Sudan and to examine the role of Afro/Arab identity in the conflicts and the geopolitical implication of the conflicts in this region to the broader Afro-Arab relations.
in Africa. I firstly analyze the role of Ethiopia as the regional and continental core state and explain the nature and pattern of the conflicts in this region. Secondly, I explore the AU’s peacekeeping initiative in the north-south conflict and Darfur crisis in Sudan, considering sustainable peace in Sudan as the touchstone of continental Afro-Arab coexistence.

To illuminate Pan-African ideology in the discourse of racial-cultural hybridity and diversity, Chapter VI examines the role of Indian Ocean island member states in the AU politics. Their geographic isolation from the continent coupled with their hybrid and diverse racial-cultural state identity place these island states in a unique position in the discourse of African regional politics. This Chapter discusses how state identity has been developed in Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles over time and examines the role of racial-cultural identity in domestic politics and foreign policy of these island states.

To conclude, Chapter VII synthesizes research findings and makes a comprehensive argument of racial-cultural identity politics in the AU-led African regional integration. This Chapter makes a conclusive discussion to answer the two major research questions.
Chapter II: African Diasporas in the AU-led African Regional Integration: Analysis of the Racial-Cultural Dimension of Pan-Africanism
Historical Overview: The Origin and Evolution of the Pan-African Movement

Pan-Africanism is a two centuries-old ideological form of activism promoted by politicians, intellectuals and activists in Africa and the Black diaspora. V. Bakpetu Thompson views Pan-Africanism as a form of resistance, in which Africans and others of African descent have been engaged from the time of their encounter with the Western world. He also asserts that Pan-Africanism is a movement to rehabilitate African cultural values and to aim at the political unification of the African continent (as cited in Esedebe 1994: 4). P. Olisanwuche Esedebe (1994) nicely defines Pan-Africanism as “a political and cultural phenomenon that regards Africa, Africans, and African descendants abroad as a unit (5).”

The conceptual origin of Pan-Africanism can be traced back to the abolitionist movement that emerged in the 18th century in the New World. Esedebe (1994) identifies the origin of Pan-African thinking in the year 1776, when the declaration of American independence expressed a reaction against the oppression of colored and racial doctrines that marked the era of abolitionist movement. In spite of the implication of civil rights for all in the principles of the American Revolution, Blacks continued to suffer discrimination and disability due to their race. In the Philadelphia (US) Constitution, a Black slave was regarded as being equal to three-fifths of a person (8-9).

Despairing of attaining the equal status with other racial groups in the New World, Black Americans began to think seriously of returning to their motherland. Paul Cuffe, a half-native American and half-Black Boston merchant, launched an emigration campaign to Sierra Leone. One of his aims was to save Africa from the scourge of slavery by helping native Africans to build a sound economy based on local resources
(Esedebe 1994: 8-9). Lynch reveals that Cuffe also founded the Friendly Society of Sierra Leone to open a channel of interaction between Sierra Leone and Negro America (as cited in Esedebe 1994: 9). According to Fishel, Cuffe, after his return from Sierra Leone, seized the opportunity to establish the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1816 to finance the repatriation of free blacks to Africa (as cited in Esedebe 1994: 9). Although this trans-Atlantic repatriation campaign placed a great emphasis on the creation of a hospitable colony and asylum to oppressed Blacks in the New World, according to Esedebe (1994), some supporters of ACS had genuine interests in the revitalization of Africa through evangelization and condemnation of the slave trade (10). McLeod’s studies indicate that White Americans (especially the males) saw the growing free black population as a menace to their sexual security. Hence, the establishment of the ACS can be viewed as a direct response to the need to limit the number of free Blacks (as cited in Esedebe 1994: 11-12). The back-to-Africa campaign also appealed to people of African descent in the West Indies. Among them, Olaudah Equiano, also known as Gustavus Vasa, helped organizing the emigration of some freed Blacks to Sierra Leone (Esedebe 1994: 12-13).

In sum, the earliest idea of Pan-Africanism placed a great focus on catering to the special needs of free Blacks in the New World, and it had little to do with the liberation of colonial Africa and its people. Nonetheless, the idea of dignity and self-respect of Blacks sought its roots and origin in Africa, and the fledging idea of Pan-Africanism was further developed and expanded during the course of 19th and 20th centuries.
Among West Indians of African descent, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore had played major roles in the formation and promotion of all-African ideology (Shepperson 1962: 349-350).

Blyden was born in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands in 1832 and emigrated to Liberia when he was eighteen years old. Through his intellectual, political and diplomatic careers, he dedicated his life to the advancement of the Black race. Blyden believed that the only way to promote respect for the people of the Black race was to create partially Westernized new African states. He considered Liberia, the Black American colony which was created in 1822 and gained independence in 1847, to be the model and core of West African states, which he expected to prosper with the support of Blacks in the New World (Lynch 1971: xii)

Blyden worked hard to foster pride in the culture and history of the Black race in order for Anglophone West Africans to gain the sense of belonging to one West African community that was meant to transcend the ethnic boundaries. He condemned the European missionaries’ attempts to completely Westernize Africans and called for the development of the “African Personality”. This phrase was later popularized by Kwame Nkruma’s Pan-African campaign (Lynch 1971: xxii-xxiii, xxx). Blyden proudly writes:

Every race has a soul, and the soul of a race finds expression in its institutions…I would rather be a member of the African race now [he was writing in 1888] than a Greek in the time of Alexander, a Roman in the Augustan period, or an Anglo-Saxon in the nineteenth century (as cited in Oliver and Atmore 1981: 223).

As one of the most prominent individuals of the Black race at that time, Blyden had influenced many Black nationalists in both Africa and the New World. Marcus
Garvey, the Jamaican “Black Moses” and had led the Back-to-Africa Movement in the US in the 1920s, was one of them (Lynch 1971: xxxiv).

Garvey was born in Jamaica in 1887. Unlike other Black leaders at that time, he was proud of his color and took a lead in awakening racial consciousness among Blacks. He argued that Black people should embrace their inherent characteristics and stop imitating White people. Garvey insisted that Blacks should be proud of their color, features and hair and maintain Black racial purity instead of being hybrid with Whites and other races (Thurman 2003: 273-274, 279).

To mobilize Black masses in the New World and build a viable Black nation in Africa, Garvey organized the Universal Negro Improvement Association (U.N.I.A) in New York City in 1917, and soon became the most popular Black leader in the US during the early 1920s (Rogers 1955: 158). Thurman (2003) describes Garvey as the first Black leader to capture the aspiration of the masses, with his slogan and project appealing more to the ordinary Blacks than to the Black intellectuals or the White Philanthropists (272).

Based on the idea of “Africa for the Africans” Garvey called for transforming Africa to a “Negro Empire”, where every Black man, whether he was born in the New World or in Africa, would have equal opportunity and cooperate with one another in the interests of the Black race (Garvey 1967: 70-72). According to Duchein, although Garvey had never used the term Pan-Africa, he indeed envisioned and tried to build a Pan-African nation. In his autobiography, Kwame Nkrumah wrote that *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* influenced him most during his stay in the US (as cited in Shepperson 1962: 348).
George Padmore was born in Trinidad probably in the year 1902. His admiration for Edward Blyden and Black racial pride were apparent in the episode that he named his first and only daughter Blyden after the most prominent West Indian at that time, as Padmore thought (Hooker 1967: 2, 4-5). Hooker (1967) details Padmore’s ideological shift from “communism to Pan-Africanism”, which was based on Padmore’s view that the liberation of the working class could be advanced only through inter-racial solidarity. Jomo Kenyatta, later to become the first President of Kenya, and Nkrumah became close friends of Padmore during the period when the Pan-African Congress took place in Manchester, England in 1945. Padmore was also a strong supporter for Nkrumah to create a West African Federation and ultimately United States of Africa based on a socialist model (9, 87, 94, 100).

According to Esedebe, the first attempt to institutionalize Pan-Africanism can be found either at the 1893 Congress on Africa in Chicago or at the formation of the African Association in London in 1897 (as cited in Murithi 2005: 23). Adi and Sherwood demonstrate that in each instance, the term “Pan-African” was widely used to signify the solidarity of people of African origin. In 1900, the first Pan-African Conference was held in London, which was followed by the creation of a new organization called Pan-African Association (PAA) (as cited in Murithi 2005: 23). According to Mathurin, some key objectives of PAA were to secure rights of African diasporas, promote industrial, commercial and educational development among Africans, lobby for pro-Black legislation and improve the conditions of African communities in Africa, America, the British Empire and other parts of the world (as cited in Murithi 2005: 23).
Among Pan-Africanists in that era, W.E.B. DuBois argued for the need to agitate for the rights denied to Africans in America and elsewhere (as cited in Murithi 2005: 23). DuBois was born in Massachusetts soon after the Civil War. He was a Harvard educated mulatto of African, European and Native American ancestry. In contrast to Garvey’s mass-based popularity, DuBois’ leadership was confined within the intellectuals and elites. Somewhat haughty and reserved, he did not have magnetic personality to attract massive followers (Rogers 1955: 155)

During the course of the 1920s and 1930s, DuBois organized a series of Pan-African Congresses, where common sufferings and shared cultural backgrounds of Blacks in the New World and Africa were emphasized (Oliver and Atmore 1981: 223). Rogers (1955) reveals that there was the overwhelming influence of DuBois among the officers and organizers of the congresses. Hence, it is fair to argue that none of the Pan-African Congresses could ever have been conducted without DuBois’ contribution (156).

Unlike Garvey, whose Pan-African view was overtly racialized, DuBois was not intended to pursue African racialism. He rather considered the problems of Black people on both sides of the Atlantic as part of a world struggle of the under-privileged for liberation and justice (Oliver and Atmore 1981: 223). Yet, Shepperson and Price argue that both Garvey and DuBois were striving for the shared objective, which was “to raise the status of the Negro, mentally and spiritually, in his own eyes and in the eyes of the world at large (as cited in Oliver and Atmore 1981: 223).”

Oliver and Atmore (1981) reveal that many Africans from the British African colonies, who were studying in the US, were excited by these Pan-African ideas and activism. Nevertheless, until the Second World War, the majority of participants at the
Pan-African Congresses were Black Americans. It was not until the late 1940s when indigenous Africans themselves took over DuBois’ campaign and fully adopted all different strands of thought from the Black leaders in the New World. The influence of Black diaspora leaders for the formation of modern African nationalism was crucial. While Africa was still politically and culturally divided by the tribal lines, Blacks in the New World were already detribalized (222-224). From a similar perspective, Shepperson (1962) argues that the concept of African unity appears to have been the creation of Black leaders in the New World, if not “foreigners”, certainly “outsiders” to Africa (349).

Murithi (2005) reveals that Kwame Nkrumah, who was then a student at the University of London as well as the Vice-President of the West African Student’s Union, was one of the organizers of the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester. Significantly, the 1945 Congress was the first political forum where African colonies asserted their will for independence. The Congress proposed resolutions advocating for self-rule by people in African colonies. Besides, the Congress drafted the “Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World”, which urges for the solidarity of the colonized against Western imperialism. Eventually, many of the resolutions were implemented over decades with African colonies attaining their political independence (24).

Adi and Sherwood write that Ghana gained independence in 1957 with Nkrumah as the first President. He posited that the independence of Ghana would be meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of the continent of Africa (as cited in Murithi 2005: 24). At his speech at All-African Peoples Conference (AAPC) in Accra, Ghana in 1958, Nkrumah pledged his country’s commitment to the liberation struggles in the entire continent. In Nkrumah’s vision, AAPC was to serve as the foundation for the future
OAU, which was later established in 1963 (as cited in Murithi 2005: 24). Significantly, AAPC predicted that the former imperial forces would attempt to maintain their influence through neo-colonial structures and manipulative agitations of ethnic and religious claims within the African continent (Murithi 2005: 24).

Remarkably, the African independence movements in the 1940s-1970s coincided with a series of Black American insurgencies, with their peak in the 1960s. Philosophically and strategically, there was a clear linkage between these two movements under the overarching ideology of Pan-Africanism. For example, in his speech at Ibadan University in Nigeria in 1964, Malcom X stated that:

I urged that Africa’s independent nations needed to see the necessity of helping to bring the Afro-American’s case before the United Nations…I said that physically we Afro-Americans might remain in America, fighting for our Constitutional rights, but that philosophically and culturally we Afro-Americans badly needed to ‘return’ to Africa – and to develop a working unity in the framework of Pan Africanism (as cited in Walters 1993: 57).

Malcom X also argued that the assertion of those African leaders, who established the OAU, was a model for Black Americans to achieve the same objective of attaining freedom and independence for people of African origin, first in the US and eventually in the entire Western World. At the OAU Summit in July 1964, Malcom X told the leaders of newly independent African countries that “our problems are your problems…you will never be recognized as free human beings until and unless we are also recognized and treated as human beings (as cited in Walters 1993: 58).”

Based on these findings, I identify Black racial solidarity and Black nationalism as two core values that integrated particular problems and incidents into the historical Pan-African movement, whose peak period was between the 1940s and the 1960s. To
emphasize, as long as the perception and treatment of Blacks as inferior and second-class citizens continue somewhere, Blacks anywhere also suffer. In fact, the universal eradication of racism and oppression against Black people was one of the major goals of the Pan-African movement throughout its centuries-long history. In this sense, trans-Atlantic Black racial solidarity served as the ideological foundation and persuasion among Blacks to challenge White supremacy in Africa and the rest of the world.

Likewise, each African colony’s struggle was patronized by a broader political ideology of Black nationalism that called for the independence of all African colonies from Western rules, as Kwame Nkrumah assertively declared. On the US side, some Black leaders allied their positions with the African liberation movements in particular and the Third World solidarity in general. For instance, Stokely Carmichael of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee recognized the relevance of the colonial framework to the Black American situation, arguing that “the struggle for Black Power in the United States is the struggle to free these colonies from external domination” and that “… the struggle to free these internal colonies relates to the struggles of imperialism around the world (as cited in Walters 1993: 60).” David D. Dickson (1996) also asserts that nationalism has been an important element of Black American political ideology. Its aspirations have included DuBois’ idea of African diaspora kinship, Marcus Garvey’s initiative of Back-to-Africa Movement, and the civil rights and Black Power movements in the 1960s and onwards (146). In short, Walters (1993) nicely suggests that

Pan-Africanism is viewed as the highest form (international expression) of Black nationalism, so that it, too, logically constitutes an ‘inevitable response’ to the similar oppression of African peoples around the world. This development was inevitable in that the common experience of Black people at the bottom of most
societies around the world has given a ‘liberative’ content to the concept of Pan-
Africanism which defines its overall mission (320).

From these speeches and writings, we can agree that the causes of sufferings of
Black people were perceived to lie in the polarized White-Black racial discourse.
Therefore, the ideological cultivation of Black racial solidarity and Black nationalism
was a rational response to systemic racism, oppression and exploitation against Blacks in
Africa and the rest of the world. The African liberation movement and civil rights
movement in the US were linked up under the shared values of Black racial solidarity and
Black nationalism. These two racial ideologies constituted Pan-Africanism that was the
highest organizing principle that responded to struggles of Africans and African
diasporas.

Walters (1993) details that political movements became dormant in the late 1970s,
and as the dynamism of Black insurgency declined, so did the Pan-African activism (83).
In the period of post-colonial and post-civil rights movement from the late 1970s to the
early 1990s, the most crucial remaining agenda in the Pan-African community was
systematic racial discrimination and oppression against the Black population in apartheid
South Africa. As apartheid was a racially stratified socio-economic system, in which
Blacks were exploited at the bottom of the hierarchy, Africans and African diasporas
viewed apartheid as a normative threat to the principle of racial equality and justice,
which ought to be universally embraced. For instance, R. Payne demonstrates that in a
1985 survey, 85 percent of African Americans affirmed their support for Black South
Africans in their resistance against the apartheid government (as cited in Dickson 1996: 146).
In terms of the linkage between Black racial struggles in South Africa and the US, Walters (1993) argues that

In the South African case the influence of African Americans was felt through the force of their own Black Power movement which struck a sensitive cord in the Black Consciousness movement within South Africa, thus helping to legitimize the concept both within South Africa and abroad (332).

In addition to this conceptual aspect of solidarity, the African American community constituted major anti-apartheid movement supporters outside the African continent. For instance, Walters (1993) reveals that political mobilization of American citizens to condemn apartheid in the mid 1980s was originally led by the African American community that built a resourceful organization and developed strategies. The result was the passage of anti-apartheid legislation. Prior to this legislation, the civil rights movement led to the Voting Rights Act that produced Black elected officials. These elected officials contributed to the passage of anti-apartheid legislation and legislation bringing millions of dollars in appropriations to relieve droughts and famines in Africa (339).

Randall Robinson of TransAfrica details that after the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) passed in Congress over President Reagan’s veto in 1986, Pretoria shifted its policy toward the ending of apartheid, releasing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, legalizing anti-apartheid organizations, repealing key apartheid laws and having negotiations with Black leaders for the transition to democracy (as cited in Shain 1994-1995: 834-835). Shain (1994-1995) argues that activism for Black South African struggle injected African Americans into the politics and values of US foreign policy, as the diaspora lobby successfully established a connection between its own issue
and “the American creed of freedom and democracy.” Indeed, the linkage between the Black civil rights movement and anti-apartheid activism was strengthened during the presidency of Reagan, who was considered by Black leaders to be unconcerned about civil rights and apartheid issues (834-835, 837).

African American involvement in the anti-apartheid movement from the late 1970s to the early 1990s was also contextualized as a trans-national expression of their domestic civil rights activism. Shain (1995) writes that

Apartheid became a rallying cry for the rejuvenation of the political activism of the 1960s, as black Americans organized as insiders to set the American conscience back on track…The ‘domestication’ of apartheid was complete; then Senate majority leader Bob Dole even acknowledged that the issue of sanctions [against South Africa] had ‘now become a domestic civil rights issue’ (page number unavailable).

Indeed, the anti-apartheid struggle was part of the trans-Atlantic Black nationalist movement that aimed to bring democratic rule to South Africa and to achieve racial equality and justice in the US. Significantly, Pan-Africanism with two major values of Black racial solidarity and Black nationalism served as a moral and ideological persuasion for diasporas to participate in the anti-apartheid movement that in return helped revive Black Power, consciousness and pride that were fertilized in the 1960s civil rights movement.

In terms of the leverage of the diaspora lobby for US foreign policy, Martin Weil articulates that “Blacks as blacks may identify with Africa, but it is only as Americans that they can change United States policy in Africa (as cited in Shain 1994-1995: 836).” Compared to African diasporas in the Global South, namely the Caribbean and Latin America, where the governments have little diplomatic weight with African countries, the
prominence of African American lobbying activities stems from its political access to the most powerful state in the world, the US. Although Western European countries still retain political and economic influence on African countries, African diasporas in European countries are relatively small in number and are unable to form effective political constituencies in order to put pressure on their governments. Richard Langhorne, however, points out that this tendency is less true in the UK (personal communication, August 1, 2009).

From the era of the abolition movement in the 18th century to the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1970s-1990s, Black racial solidarity and Black nationalism were embraced and culminated under the leadership of Pan-Africanist leaders in Africa and America. In general, this previous era can be characterized as Black struggle against White domination, which took the forms of slavery, colonialism, racism and apartheid rule. In this sense, the common enemy for the Pan-African community was oppressive White rules in colonial Africa, the Americas and apartheid South Africa. In each case, there was systematic racial oppression and exploitation against the mass Blacks. Therefore, such asymmetrical White-Black relations led to the emergence and expansion of trans-Atlantic Pan-African movement in order to achieve racial equality and justice in Africa and in the diaspora.

Contemporary Pan-African Movement in the *de jure* Color-Free World

Due to significant contributions from Pan-African activism, *de jure* racism has been almost eradicated in the post-apartheid contemporary world, although *de facto* socio-economic disparity between Whites and Blacks has largely continued.
Furthermore, in today’s global politics, it is less legitimate to emphasize Black racial solidarity in dealing with non-color based oppression. For instance, in post-colonial African countries, the source of people’s political and economic sufferings is no longer ruthless White rulers, but their fellow Black dictators and autocrats. The major issues confronting African people today are economic stagnation, civil strife, non-democratic rule, corruption, ethnic animosity, gender inequality and environmental destruction that are not racially based problems stemming from White-Black relations. From an African diasporas’ perspective, the poor political and economic performance of post-independence African states is hardly seen as the source of empowerment of people of African origin. In his critical analysis of Pan-Africanism, William B. Ackah (1999) writes that “Africa is in trouble. The vision of Pan-Africanism and the reality of Africa are two separate entities (18).”

Moreover, as the African diaspora community in the US has become larger and diversified with newly arrived immigrants directly from Africa or via the Caribbean or Latin America, the concept of Black racial identity becomes more obscure and complex than before. Some figures indicate that as of 2002 there were more than 1 million African immigrants in the US, rapidly increasing from only about 364,000 in 1990. Racial identity debates over Barak Obama, the 44th US President, well illustrate the tension between African Americans and newly arrived immigrants from Africa. Louis Chude-Sokei (2007) at the University of California Santa Cruz writes in Los Angeles Times that:

He [Barak Obama] is biracial, but not white; black, but not African American; American but not African…Among African Americans, discussions about his racial identity typically vacillate between the ideologically charged options of
‘black’ versus ‘not black enough’ or between ‘black’ and ‘black, but not like us’…Since 1990, about 50,000 Africans have come to the United States annually… They add to the steady influx of black immigrants from other continents and the Caribbean, and those who have been in the United States for generations but who don’t racially and culturally define themselves as African American. These blacks feel cramped by the narrowness of American racial politics, in which ‘blackness’ has not just defined one’s skin color but has served as a code word for African American…They also are less responsive to American racial traumas, which helps explain why some civil rights leaders are unsure of Obama’s loyalties to African American causes. Because his political ‘blackness’ is independent of their sanction and emerges from outside their histories, it threatens their cultural and political authority.

Even within the African diaspora community, Black as one racial category is no more plausible to explain intricate and unresolved racial problems in US society. Ironically, less rigid is the fact that the White-Black racial division becomes in today’s American and global politics, more fragmented racial identity and pride of Black become. After all, the contemporary Pan-African community does not have a racially objectified single common enemy as such. In this circumstance, questions we may ask are: Is it still feasible to deal with sufferings of Black brothers and sisters in the ideology of Pan-Africanism? Does dismantling of the common enemy mean the victorious dissolution of the Pan-African movement? Are Black racial pride and solidarity viable only in the cultural and intellectual spheres?

Pondering on these questions, I argue that today’s world is not truly color-free as de facto racial inequality within a society (ex. economic disparity between Whites and Blacks in the US) and among countries (ex. White-dominated Global North and non-White-dominated Global South) largely continue. In particular, Africa has remained the most impoverished and most marginalized continent in the past and present. In May 1991 then General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria stated that
Africa and the majority of its people bear the sad status of being historically the most exploited, the most dependent, the most vulnerable, and now increasingly, the most internationally isolated, marginalized, and the least well governed (as cited in Ackah 1999: 64).

According to Ackah (1999), a constant negative image of Africa and African people threatens the self-esteem of intellectuals of African origin in the Western world. Therefore, “if the image of the African is under attack then the diaspora also is under attack and must fight back (61, 107).”

I assume that today’s Pan-African movement is in the transition from the previous racially exclusive activism into a racially unbiased political integration process with the trends of humanitarianism and democratic regionalism. Although racial identity as Black African origin continues to be an important element in the neo-Pan-African movement, the constituencies of the movement may include the wider-ranged stakeholders.

a) Humanitarianism

Diasporas’ contributions to humanitarian assistance to their mother continent take the forms of foreign policy lobbying and direct humanitarian activities in Africa. In the next section, I discuss foreign policy lobbying activism of African Americans and their policy shift over the last few decades.

William Minter (1997) argues that in terms of constituencies of African issues, an ancestral linkage to Africa is a very important element for potential mobilization of individual stakeholders. However, he also emphasizes that “it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Whatever the racial or ethnic background, some people will be involved and others not.” He goes on to say that among African-specific organizations in
the US, TransAfrica, Africare, International Foundation for Education and Self-Help and Constituency for Africa are specifically based in the African American community (page number unavailable).

Among them, TransAfrica is the oldest and largest lobby group with a close affiliation with the Congressional Black Caucus for African and Caribbean agendas. Schraeder views the establishment of TransAfrica in July 1977 as the most significant event for the institutionalization of black political activism in the US foreign policy sphere. Under the leadership of Randall Robinson, the organization mobilized the support of other major Black organizations and coordinated grassroots outreach programs to mobilize African American support for TransAfrica’s foreign policy initiatives, especially for the issue of South Africa (as cited in Shain 1994-1995: 837). According to Sterling Johnson (1998), TransAfrica’s mission is to promote public understanding of current economic, political and social issues that shape the US foreign policy toward African and the Caribbean countries. Their past initiatives included protest against Clinton’s decision to repatriate Black refugees from Haiti, monthly journal publication on issues related to the US-Africa relations and forums aiming to increase the African-American representation in international careers (173, 175).

Some critics of TransAfrica warned that TransAfrica was “too liberal and too sympathetic” toward the leaders in the Third World, and they tended to overlook some African leaders’ domestic records (as cited in Johnson 1998: 176). According to Shain (1994-1995), during the Cold War, African American organizations allied with some African governments that were ideologically incompatible with democracy as a way of impeding the American “imperialist intervention” through non-democratic proxies. This
was the case in the civil conflict of Angola, in which Black American organizations supported the Angolan Marxist government against the US-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. However, since the end of the Cold War, the rationale for allying with the rule of Black dictatorship or single-party revolutionary regime has been rapidly losing its appeal to the White House and to the African American community alike. Consequently, the US State Department, assumingly influenced by TransAfrica’s lobbying, began calling for African governments to promote democracy, if they do not, threatening them with economic penalties (840). Insightfully, Shain (1994-1995) points out that “for African-Americans the opposition to black dictatorial rule is relatively safe, as the homeland is symbolic and the consequences of a home government’s retaliation are virtually nonexistent (840).”

An ideological shift from radical Black nationalism to color-unbiased advocacy for humanitarianism and democracy is also found in another evidence. For instance, in the 1990s Representative Donald M. Payne, a New Jersey Democrat and head of the Congressional Black Caucus at that time, condemned the Nigerian military regime, stating:

We must isolate Nigeria, politically, socially and economically in the same way we were able to isolate South Africa and Haiti. You change the colour and there is not much distinction between the South African situation of the past and Nigeria today, except you don’t have people discriminated against as a group simply on the basis of their skin color (as cited in Johnson 1998: 177).

Currently, some key agendas of TransAfrica’s foreign policy recommendation to the Obama Administration and the US congress are; 1) to demilitarize Africa through arms control and reversing the decision to establish the United States African Command (AFRICOM); 2) to advocate for debt cancellation for African countries; 3) to stop
imposing ideologically-driven conditionality on development models; 4) to review the US relations with repressive regimes in Africa, namely Algeria, Egypt and Ethiopia; 5) to promote multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives, including the AU’s activities in Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan; 6) to advance democracy with consistent criteria and so on (TransAfrica Forum 2009: 42-45).

Constituency for Africa (CFA) was established in 1990 as a bipartisan organization to educate and mobilize the US public on issues related to Africa. Some key agendas that CFA has focused on are controlling the AIDS pandemic in Africa and increasing trade between the US and Africa. In specific terms, CFA lobbied for the passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which guarantees the duty-free access for certain commodities from Africa to the US market. In 2002 CFA launched the African American Unity Caucus (AAUC) program, which is a non-partisan coalition of leaders and organizations of African descent to deal with the issues that affect Africa and African diasporas. The AAUC has been trying to strengthen high-level contacts with African governments and regional organizations, including the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Constituency for Africa 2009).

For the Congressional Black Caucus, alleviating the massive human sufferings in Darfur, Sudan, has been one of the major humanitarian agendas for the last few years. Prior to his presidency, Barack Obama had served as a member of the Congressional Black Caucus as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on Africa. During his term as a US Senator, he was well known for his advocacy for US support in order to stop human sufferings in Africa. For instance, Obama and Sam Brownback, a Republican senator from Kansas, made a policy proposal entitled “Policy Adrift on Darfur.” In their
proposal, they suggested that only the US, collaborating with other key states, was in a position to persuade the Sudanese government to alter its ways. They further proposed that the Bush administration should shift its approach in order to deal with the mounting difficulties in conflict management of the Darfur Crisis. Specifically, they urged the US to help transform the AU’s peacekeeping force into “a sizable, effective multinational force (Obama and Brownsback 2005: A25).”

Obama has a direct ancestral root in Kenya, and the election of Obama as the first Black President in US history was overwhelmingly applauded by African people and African diasporas all over the world. His political prominence may help to revitalize the spirit of trans-Atlantic Pan-Africanism in today’s more racially integrated global world.

In short, the triumph of democracy in the post-Cold War global politics coupled with grave concerns about oppressive rule, human rights violation and economic mismanagement caused by Black African dictatorship made African diasporal activism shift their policy emphasis from Black solidarity and Black nationalism to a broader humanitarian advocacy. Hence, the policy shift of the American side of the Pan-African movement was a rational response to the political climate change in the global society for the last few decades. Their racially motivated political patronage of the non-democratic Black rules in Africa lost its ideological appeal in the emergence of the American creed of democracy and human rights protection. Although Black racial-cultural affinity remains a primary ground for diasporas to advocate for African causes as a collective voice, their identity-driven activism should neither contradict nor undermine the principles of democracy, humanitarianism and human rights protection. The focus of African American activism is to promote these universally embraced norms for
economic, political and social development of Africa. By so doing, their collective voice is able to make use of pluralistic political opportunities in the US in expanding and advancing the contemporary Pan-African movement.

b) Democratic Regionalism

The OAU was established as an inter-governmental regional organization that had little interactions with African civil societies. In his criticism against Black elites-owned Pan-Africanism, Ackah (1999) argues that one of the grounds why Pan-Africanism has failed in Africa is because it did not present a sense of being or objective that was pertinent to the ordinary African people. Instead of articulating the needs and situations of the African continent, Pan-African identity was derived from the concerns of Westernized Black elites. He goes on to say that regional formations in Africa are characterized as bureaucratic and undemocratic; therefore, most Africans have no connection to them. Nonetheless, ordinary Africans must have an active role to play in the development process of their countries and supra-state institutions. Otherwise, there is a danger of creating “alien institutions that have no roots or staying power in the society (103, 106).”

In 2003 the AU replaced the OAU with one of its objectives being to develop the AU-civil society relations. The AU Constitutive Act (2000) Article 4 (c) ensures “participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.” Furthermore, the Pan-African Parliament was established “in order to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent.” Nonetheless, its parliament members are political appointees of the member states.
Compared to the European Parliament, whose members are directly elected by European people in the EU member states, how legitimately and effectively the Pan-African Parliament can deal with the needs and concerns of African people remains dubious.

To observers of African politics, non-democratic institutional features of the AU may not appear to be astonishing due to the under-development of democratic rule in many African states. Nevertheless, in the discourse of Pan-African activism, a lack of political access and opportunities for mass populations in the AU system may not qualify the AU-led African integration as an institutionalized form of the Pan-African movement. A potential danger might be state-dominated political and economic integration that does not benefit the majority of African people.

Seen in this light, if the AU can provide more political access and opportunities for Africans and African diasporas, its democratic regionalism might become a legitimate institutional direction that appeals to the wide-ranging stakeholders inside and outside Africa. Therefore, how to develop more democratic instruments and organs and to promote the active participation of African citizens and diasporas is a main challenge that the AU is confronting. Being pressured by African civil societies and donor states/organizations, the AU has been making some noteworthy efforts to democratize itself. It is important to acknowledge that the AU’s democratization efforts have coincided with the trend shift of African diasporal activism that now places a focus on such principles as democracy, humanitarianism and human rights protection.
The AU under Democratization Reform: From State-Centered to Popular Participation

Since its creation the AU has developed some instruments and organs in order to strengthen the linkage between the AU and African people. The AU created the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) to facilitate the participation of African citizens and diasporas in the various AU activities. The idea of CIDO has its roots in the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) Declaration in 1991 that gave a prominent role to civil societies and urged the enhancement of popular participation and democratization. The CSSDCA Unit was created within the OAU Secretariat to facilitate cooperation between civil societies and the OAU. The CSSDCA Unit was transformed to the CIDO within the Bureau of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The AU Constitutive Act decided to establish the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) to promote civil society participation in the AU. The first OAU/AU-Civil Society Conference was held in June 2001 that adopted a framework for structured consultations between civil societies and the OAU. One year after, the second AU-Civil Society Conference was held in June 2002 that created the AU-Civil Society Organizations Provisional Working Group (AUCSPWG) that includes the membership from the five African regions of West, Central, East, South and North as well as from the diaspora. On March 24, 2005 the Interim ECOSOCC was launched with Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai as its Presiding Officer. The Interim ECOSOCC with a two-year mandate has aimed to facilitate elections toward the creation of the Permanent ECOSOCC Assembly. On October 31, 2007 the election of eight continental civil society representatives to the ECOSOCC General Assembly was conducted (AU Internal Document).
In terms of diaspora participation, some diaspora groups in the US and other countries have been allowed to attend the biannual AU Summits with observer status. The AU organized the Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora (CIAD I) under the theme of “Africa in the XXI Century: Integration and Renaissance” in Dakar, Senegal on October 6-9, 2004 on the initiative of Libya and Senegal (Asante 2006: 169-170). In close cooperation with the AU, the Brazilian government hosted the CIAD II under the theme of “The Diaspora and African Renaissance” in Salvador-Bahia on July 12-14, 2006. According to the AU press release, the conference derives its inspiration from “the need for a people-driven African Community predicated on participation and partnership with all segments of society” as well as “the strategic vision and mission of the African Union, which seeks to create a dynamic and prosperous Union driven by its people.” It is also mentioned that

the search for African rebirth or renaissance has again come to emphasize the revival of the role of intellectuals in building Africa’s awareness, forging a clear continental identity and exploring ways and means of projecting a reinvigorated African image and influence in a rapidly changing and complex world (AU Communication and Information Division 2006: 1).

Molefi Kete Asante (2006) underscores the important role that President Lula da Silva of Brazil took in the CIAD II. Lula da Silva called for closer relationships between African countries and Brazil and valued the significance of African character in his country. In the domestic arena, Lula da Silva made a major change in “the rhetoric of the nation” and advocated for an affirmative action in the educational system. Brazil is the country with the largest Black population in the Americas, and approximately half of the total population are African descendants. Nonetheless, Blacks account for less than 5
percent in the tertiary education, and even less in faculty at colleges and universities (171, 174).

In terms of institutionalization of diaspora participation within the AU system, the AU is an inter-governmental organization, whose mandates and policies are confined within the state-centered international agreements and order. Hence, diasporas, whose citizenship status has no affiliation with African countries, appear to be automatically excluded from the formal constituency of the AU-led African regional integration. Nonetheless, for the last couple of years, the AU has developed remarkable diaspora involvement schemes under the leadership of Senegal and South Africa. There was an amendment to the AU Constitutive Act to legitimize and promote African diaspora participation in AU activities. Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2003) Article 3 (q) defines one of the objectives of the Union shall be to: “invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our Continent, in the building of the African Union.”

More progressively, Senegal suggested that African diasporas should be officially recognized as the AU’s sixth region in addition to the five regions of Western, Central, Eastern, Southern and Northern Africa. The idea of the sixth region is still at the phase of conceptual formation and therefore has not yielded any actual policy implementation, such as granting special visa or citizenship status to African diasporas. Nonetheless, the idea of African diasporas as the AU’s sixth region has been embraced in the circle of Pan-Africanists. For example, on January 27, 2009, Jean Ping, the current Chairperson of the AU Commission, welcomed the inauguration of President Barack Obama, whom he
considered “belongs to the 6th region of the African Union – the African diaspora (AU Communication and Information Division 2009).”

Besides, the CFA announces that the AAUC under the auspices of the CFA has organized advocacy and awareness campaign to promote the participation of African Americans in the newly recognized AU’s sixth region (Constituency for Africa 2009).

The main reason why Senegal took the sixth region initiative stemmed from the country’s Pan-Africanist foreign policy under the leadership of President Abdoulaye Wade. Wade is well known for his decisive and radical Pan-Africanist stance and often co-sponsors some integration proposals with Gaddafi of Libya. It is indeed Wade’s long dream for African countries to unite in order to challenge the issues pertaining to neo-colonialism. Jean Ping (2007) reveals that Wade has even declared that he was ready to become “the governor of Senegal” in the context of the future “United States of Africa (16).”

As regards the definition of African diasporas, who now constitute the AU’s sixth region, Jimmi Adisa at the CIDO explained that there was an expert meeting that discussed how to define the term African diasporas with respect to the AU’s diaspora involvement initiative. The expert meeting defined African diasporas as those who are 1) people of African descent living outside the African continent and 2) willing to contribute to the development of Africa and the AU (personal communication, August 15, 2008). In my interpretation, as the AU is an Afro-Arab entity, race-based definition was avoided, and the term African diaspora was defined in the context of “geographic” notions of Africa that consists of Northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Besides Black African
diasporas, Arab diasporas from Africa, such as French citizens of Tunisian descent and Egyptian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia are all recognized as “African diasporas” constituting the AU’s sixth region.

Nevertheless, in the Western world, people of Arab descent, especially those who practice Islam, have their own special issues to deal with, such as negative stereotype, xenophobia and racial profile against Arab Muslims. Mixing Arabs and Black Africans together in the non-racial category of “African diaspora” seems to create confusion and ambiguity in framing and pursuing advocacy agendas. In response to my query, one AU official commented that there seemed to be an implicit consensus for prioritizing Black African causes within the AU, and therefore an emphasis has been put on the issues of Black African diasporas so far (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

Interestingly, however, there have been some Northern Arab states’ efforts to alter this Black-first racial ideology and political culture of the AU. From their perspective, as long as the AU has an Afro-Arab basis, the AU-sponsored African diaspora initiative should accommodate the needs and concerns of not only Black African diasporas but also Arab African diasporas. For instance, with financial support from South Africa, the CIDO has been working on the establishment of the Regional Consultative Committees in order to strengthen the AU-diasporas liaison in the regions, where large African diaspora communities exist. In addition to the Americas and Europe, where a large number of Black African diasporas reside, the Middle East, Gulf States, Oceania and Asia are also considered as African diaspora-receiving regions in order to integrate the diverse communities of African diasporas.
In my interview, one AU official explained that the inclusion of these regions was in fact Egypt’s initiative. In preparation for the 1st AU African Diaspora Summit to be held in Johannesburg on October 7-10, 2008 (later postponed), Egypt insisted that the Middle East, Gulf States, Oceania and Asia should be also recognized as the African diaspora-receiving regions. This proposal was adopted at the 12th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council on January 25-29, 2008 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). Population-wise, Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world and the third largest in the African continent with a great number of Egyptian migrants all over the world. Some studies indicate that in the US, as of 2002, Egyptian immigrants were the second largest group from the African continent (approximately 108,000) after the Nigerian immigrant group (approximately 139,500) (Grieco 2004). Furthermore, Egyptian migrant workers comprise large segments of labor forces in oil-rich Gulf states. Nemat Shafik reveals that one out of three Egyptian migrant workers went to Iraq in the 1980s. There were at least 1.25 million Egyptians in Iraq alone before the Gulf War (1999: 291). By the mid 1990s, about two million Egyptian migrants worked in the six Gulf countries, including one million in Saudi Arabia (Migration News 1995).

Moreover, the AU tries to develop its institutional partnership with the CARICOM and the UNASUR that contain large Black African diaspora communities. TransAfrica (2009) indicates that Brazil, with approximately half of the population being of African descent, and Colombia, with about a quarter of the population being African origin, both surpass the US in percentages of the Black population (40). The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that more than a quarter of Latin America’s
population is of African origin, while other studies put the numbers as much as over one-third (as cited in TransAfrica 2009: 40). This type of inter-regional partnership can be understood in the context of South-South cooperation, in which investment, trade and technology transfer among developing countries in the Global South are seen as an alternative development model to conventional North-South cooperation.

It is noteworthy that Africa-South America regional partnership was led by the two Black African powerhouses of Nigeria and South Africa. Their initiative seems to be driven by their intention to strengthen South-South alignment, in which emerging economies in the Global South are expected to take a leading role in coordinating policies among developing countries in multilateral forums and negotiations. Related to inter-regional South-South cooperation, there is an element of neo-liberal economic opportunism for institutionalization of diaspora participation within the AU system in today’s interconnected world, where the exchanges of ideas, labors, commodities and capitals are conducted in the global scale. Economic-oriented diaspora-involvement initiative seems to make more sense to meet the socio-economic needs of African people, while trans-Atlantic Black activism needs to redirect its strategy in today’s de jure color-free global politics.

Neoliberal Economic Pan-Africanism?: Mobilization of Capital and Human Resources through Africa-African Diaspora Cooperation

Africa has been the exporting continent of human resources to the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and other parts of the planet through slavery, political asylum, displacement and voluntary migration. With respect to voluntary migration, Africa is often cited as the place to be most affected by the brain drain phenomenon, in which
knowledge and skills that African elites have obtained tend to drain to industrialized
countries in the Global North. For example, Pond and McPake’s studies on migration of
African health professionals reveal that in 2003 nearly a quarter of the newly trained
foreign physicians registered with the UK’s National Health Service came from sub-
Saharan Africa (as cited in Siddiqi 2008: 15). Furthermore, on average 20 percent of the
sub-Saharan African college-educated population work in industrialized countries, while
less than 10 percent of similar groups from South Asia (Siddiqi 2008: 15).

Instead of trying to stop the brain drain phenomenon, African countries now seek
an alternative way to integrate their diasporas’ intellectual and capital resources through
strengthening the Africa-African diasporas linkage. In today’s globally interconnected
world, communication, transportation and transaction are much easier, faster and cheaper
than in previous eras. Therefore, the role of African diasporas as investors,
entrepreneurs, developers, consultants and other business professionals is increasingly
important in capital mobilization, business development and community support in
Africa. For example, The Ethiopian Herald (2008b) reports that in July 2008 the World
Bank pledged a grant of $487,000 in order to support the AU’s African diaspora program.
This grant was expected to help the AU Permanent Observer Mission in the US to
develop productive relationships with African diasporas in the Americas. The major
objectives are; strengthening knowledge sharing and coordination between the AU and
diasporas; developing a database of diasporal individuals and networks; helping resource
mobilization from diasporas; and advocating for African diasporal causes in bilateral and
multilateral forums (Front Page, 9). In respect to the AU’s efforts to develop the AU-
diaspora linkage, the next section discusses some economic rationales for mobilization of
African diasporas in promoting socio-economic development of African countries and societies.

a) Remittances from African Migrants

Remittances from African migrant workers in wealthy industrialized countries have been dramatically increasing over time. These neo-African diasporas have direct ancestral roots in particular African countries as the first, second or even third generation of African descent. Nonetheless, the majority of them may have lost citizenship status of their mother countries, and this naturalization tendency seems to be prevalent among neo-African diasporas as African citizenship offers much less socio-economic benefits than, say, American, British or French citizenship. For instance, among over one million African immigrants in the US in 2002, one out of three became a naturalized US citizen (Grieco 2004). Hence, giving some special status to foreign citizens of African descent allows them to maximize their physical and capital mobility and helps them to provide more investment, entrepreneurship and community support to Africa.

The remittance boom is certainly a global phenomenon. Moin Siddiqi (2008) writes that globalization, propelled by economic liberalization, has led to a massive volume of cross-border migration and a surge in remittance flows for the last two decades (14). The World Bank estimates that remittances sent home by cross-border migrants were $276 billions in 2006, compared to $193 billions in 2005 and more than double the level in 2001. In terms of Africa’s share, the UN’s figures indicate that sub-Saharan Africa received more than $20 billions in 2006. Nonetheless, as these figures reflected only transfers via official channels, the true value of remittances through unrecorded
transactions should be much higher. In particular, some studies indicate that informal remittances to sub-Saharan Africa represent 45-65 percent of official statistics, compared to only 5-10 percent in South America (as cited in Siddiqi 2008: 14).

According to the World Bank, in 2006 the top five recipient countries of remittances in nominal dollar terms were Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, Uganda and Senegal. Nevertheless, relative to GDP, the top recipients are rather smaller states, namely Lesotho, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo, with remittances respectively comprising 28 percent, 12 percent, 8 percent and 6 percent of GDP. Remarkably, for Cape Verde, Comoros, Lesotho and Uganda, remittances since 2000 have accounted on average for more than 25 percent of export earnings. Furthermore, in Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Swaziland and Togo, remittances are always higher than Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, in some countries, greater than foreign direct investments. The beneficial effects of remittances are made mostly at the microeconomic levels, such as households and communities. Remittances increased household consumption and investment in human capital, namely education and health care. In general, higher remittances are reported during financial recess or natural disasters in receiving countries. Besides, remittances constitute an inexpensive source of financing the account deficit on balance of payments for some sub-Saharan African countries, namely, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo (as cited in Siddiqi 2008: 14-15). The UN Development Program report 2005 indicates that the prospect to save from remittances among households can be as much as 40 percent. Hence, the challenge for African policymakers is to how channel these private savings into productive investment rather than to expensive imports of consumer products (as cited in Siddiqi 2008: 16).
In fact, how to utilize African immigrants’ remittances for development of Africa was supposed to be one of the major agendas at the first AU African Diaspora Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa on October 7-10, 2008. The Summit, however, was postponed due to the domestic political circumstances in South Africa at that time. Among various diaspora-involved socio-economic development agendas, the Summit was intended to discuss how to utilize remittances to finance development projects and investment in Africa and how to create effective ways and means of channeling remittances to the continent at minimum cost (South African Government Information 2008).

b) Historical Tourism

For African diasporas, whose ancestral links to Africa dates back to slavery, their concerns and interests toward Africa are presumably less personal than those of neo-diasporas. Given the long distance and expensive travel costs to Africa, the vast majority of African diasporas do not have direct and personal contacts with the mother continent. Hence, Africa remains a remote and imaginary ancestral homeland for people of African origin inherited as a result of the legacy of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

However, it is also true that educated, professional and middle-class segments of the African American population constitute a major visitor group for historical tourism in some Western African countries. According to Bruner (1996), in 1993, among 17,091 visitors to Elmina Castle in Ghana, North Americans were the third largest group (12.3 percent), after residents in Ghana (67 percent) and Europeans (12.5 percent). Blacks in the diaspora, including many African Americans, are an important and growing segment
of the visitors (290). Lee expresses that for Black diasporas a return to the slave forts is a “necessary act of self-realization”, and “the spirits of the Diaspora are somehow tied to these historic structures (as cited in Bruner 1996: 291).” In this sense, diaspora visitors are not tourists on vacation, but rather pilgrims traveling to reconnect with their lost motherland and native culture (Hasty 2002: 57). Although African slaves were extracted from the wider regions of Western and Central Africa to the New World, politically stable and Anglophone Gambia and Ghana seem to champion the African roots-seeking tourism campaign. Francophone West African countries and Nigeria (with its notoriety for political volatility and inhospitable society) are greatly disadvantaged in competing in a relatively small slave trade-related historical tourism market.

The importance of historical tourism in Gambia and Ghana for their fragile economies cannot be overlooked. Hassoum Ceesay argues that Gambia was one of the regions to be most destructively affected by the slave trade due to its proximity to the Niumi and Badibu Rivers (2008: 2). Some studies on the slave trade in the Chesapeake Bay region of the US estimate that almost two thirds of slaves, who arrived in the Chesapeake region, came from the region now constituting Gambia, Senegal and Sierra Leone (as cited in Ceesay 2008: 4). In his best-seller novel, *Roots*, Alex Haley traced back his ancestral origin in a Mandinka village in Gambia, where Kunta Kinte, his ancestor of several generations back, was abducted and trafficked by slave hunters. The Gambian government has been promoting “the Roots Homecoming Festival”, which is a weeklong annual celebration of African heritage, including music, dance, excursions, workshops and other activities designed to facilitate visitors of African descent to discover their roots. Tourism in Gambia is the fastest-growing industry of the economy,
contributing 12 percent of GDP and providing employment for over 100,000 locals (Gambia Statehouse 2009). The travel sector accounts for as much as 60 percent of Gambia’s total commercial service exports in 2009, while 46.1 percent in Senegal, 34 percent in Nigeria, 15.6 percent in Togo and 13.9 percent in Cote d’Ivoire in the same year (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2011).

In Ghana, tourism is also a promising economic sector and is the third largest foreign exchange source after gold and cocoa. The number of tourists to Ghana has been increasing steadily, about 85,000 in 1995, 304,860 in 1997 and 325,438 in 1998, with an increase of revenue from tourism more than fifteen-fold during the same period (Ghana Embassy in Denmark 2009). In 2009 the travel sector accounts for 56.2 percent of Ghana’s total commercial service exports (WTO 2011). The Ghanaian government identifies the country’s main tourist attractions as its history and heritage, such as coastal castles, grim relics of the mid-Atlantic slave trade and many local festivals (Ghana Embassy in Denmark 2009).

Indeed, Black diasporas have played an important role in the development of Ghana’s historical tourism. For instance, Imahkus Vienna Robinson, an African American from New York, and her husband moved permanently to Ghana and established One Africa Productions, whose mission is dedicated to the reunification of African diasporas with Africans. They conduct performances in the dungeons of Elmina Castle, mainly for African American visitors. Furthermore, in May 1994, among 500 members of the African Travel Association met at a convention in Ghana, many of them were American representatives. Tours and visits to the slave castles were organized with the aim of conscious marketing and advertising (Bruner 1996: 294).
Hasty (2002) explains how the Ghanaian government has tried hard to attract
Black diaspora visitors to the country’s annual festivals, Pan-African events and
commemorative monuments through what she calls “emancipation tourism” campaign.
In fact, it was President Jerry Rawlings’ idea to introduce “Emancipation Day” in Ghana
and organize related events to attract Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean tourists after
his official visit to Jamaica in 1998 (48).

In pursuit of a more tangible redemption than historical tourism, diaspora visitors
and residents lobbied the government of Ghana for passing law to facilitate the
“repatriation” of Black diasporas. In November 1999, the government ratified Act 573,
granting the “right of abode” to diasporas, who wish to settle in Ghana. Another
prospective legislation would guarantee dual citizenship to diaspora residents (Hasty

Hasty (2002) makes an ideological distinction between the previous Pan-African
politics and its present-day version. She argues that the latter stems from “the
contemporary pragmatism of free-market wealth generation.” Diasporas’ legal claim for
the right of return and settlement in Ghana includes dual citizenship, the right to freedom
of travel and active participation in both African and Western political and economic
activities (58). In fact, by acquiring their diasporal entitlement to their imaginary
motherland, diasporas are able to maximize their wealth-creating opportunities as highly
mobile trans-national actors. Hasty (2002) nicely points out that for the Ghanaian
government and society, Pan-African events like Emancipation Day are meant to
transform “occasional pilgrimage into long-term flows of capital and expertise (59).”
The tragic legacy of trans-Atlantic slave trade has been one of the major issues that the AU and its member states have been working on in cooperation with the Caribbean countries and diaspora organizations. For example, the AU organized the Expert Group Meeting on Slavery and Follow up to the World Conference Against Racism on June 10-13, 2008 in Banjul, Gambia. Among the recommendations that the Meeting made, it was suggested that an International Committee for Reparations and Restitution be established under the auspices of the AU in cooperation with the member states, African civil societies, African diasporas and other interested individuals and organizations. Significantly, the Meeting also called for the promotion of freedom of movement of African diasporas within the AU member states by deregulating visa requirements, such as “five-year honorary citizenship visas” for diasporas. This idea is expected to increase foreign currency revenues through tourism from diasporas. There was also a discussion within the AU to bestow honorary citizenship on prominent individuals in the diaspora (AU Expert Group Meeting 2008: 14-15).

To summarize, in the contemporary Pan-African movement, humanitarianism and democratic regionalism seem to become central values that replaced the previous principles of Black racial solidarity and Black nationalism. For African governments and the AU, there seems to be neo-liberal economic rationale for recognizing and institutionalizing the role of diasporas for socio-economic development of Africa. Capital, expertise and networks that Western-born or/and Western-educated diasporas possess are seen as valuable resources in promoting investment, business development and community support in African countries and societies. In return, diasporas have laid
claim to such legal rights as dual citizenship in order to maximize their mobility and political and economic opportunities in a trans-national fashion.

Interestingly, as the AU becomes more institutionally developed and internationally recognized, its Afro-Arab features make Black-first racial ideology inappropriate. In the discourse of the AU’s diaspora initiative, Arab African and Black African diasporas now all qualify as “African diasporas.” This new trend seems to make the Pan-African community of the 21st century a more racially diverse and politically dynamic entity although Black racial ideology seems to remain an important value in Pan-African ideology.
Chapter III: The Afro-Arab Relations before and during the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Era: Analysis of the Geographic Dimension of Pan-Africanism
Historical Afro-Arab Relations: Slavery, Arab-Islamic Expansionism and Comrades in African Liberation

Africans and Arabs are immediate neighbors on the planet, and the major cultural and national groups on the African continent with relations originated from antiquity (Prah 2004: page number unavailable). Using the case of Zanzibar, Wai (1983) describes the African-Arab relations using three major points. He argues that first, Arab relations with Africa prior to the colonial interregnum were essentially exploitative; second, psychological complexes and scars remain to this day below the Sahara; and third, African conversion to Islam has produced little unity among the converts and the conveyors of the religion (190-191).

The contacts between Arabs and Black Africans have been largely asymmetrical, in which Arabs have conquered Africa, enslaved Africans and imposed their religion (Islam) and language (Arabic). They have viewed themselves as superior as the conveyors of a higher civilization and tended to be patronizing toward those considered as inferior (Wai 1983: 189).

Importantly, Islamic influence on the continent has created mixed results with respect to the Afro-Arab relations. Nadelmann (1981) argues that Islamization in Africa, where 20-25 percent of the total population practice Islam, has produced a sense of affiliation and religious brotherhood between African Muslims and Arabs (210). Indeed, Kaba reveals that in the 1970s, Islamic African countries accounted for almost half of the membership of the Islamic Conferences (20 out of 40-42) and 40 percent of the total membership of the OAU (as cited in Nadelmann 1981: 210). Yet, Islamization of the continent has proved to be a contentious factor in African affairs, engendering fears of “Pakistanism”, producing divisions over the Eritrean secessionist cause against Ethiopia.
and other conflicts and leading to Muslim domination over Christians orchestrated by such Muslim dictators as Idi Amin of Uganda and Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic (Nadelmann 1981: 210). Therefore, it is fair to assume that Islamic penetration into Black Africa deepened the Afro-Arab connection in a way that enabled Arabs to magnify their influence over Black Africans, while Black Africa became more fragmented and divided by Muslim/Christian religious identity.

Prah reveals that while European colonialism, which was consolidated in the 19th century, consequently and partly diminished, leaving in place post-colonial entities after independence, the Arab penetration was characterized as denationalization, Arabization and Islamization of African people. This Arab expansionist pattern has been the most evident in such Afro-Arab borderland countries as Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Sudan (as cited in Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable). In response, many Africans tend to consider Arabs as “cunning, crafty, dishonest and untrustworthy”, not least because their cultural and racial arrogance revives painful memories of the atrocity of slave traders in the affected region (Wai 1983: 189).

As regards the historical Arab-led slavery of Africans, Bulcha estimates that more than 17 million Africans were sold to the Middle East and Asia between the 6th and 20th centuries (as cited in Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable). Nonetheless, while the trans-Atlantic slave trade has been the focus of continuing struggles for redemption, Nyaba insists that trans-Sahara slavery has been either overlooked, mitigated or totally denied on the false sense that Arabs were “brothers in Islam”, equally colonized and exploited by Western rules and joined the liberation struggles of the African continent (as cited in Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable).
unavailable. Especially, Muslim academicians of both Arabs and Africans are reluctant
to talk about the Arab-led slave trade. Likewise, Islamic clergy are quite defensive on
this issue (Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable).

What is worse, Arab-led African enslavement is not merely inhumane legacy
from the preceding era, but also an on-going atrocity that threatens peace and security in
the Afro-Arab borderlands. In particular, slavery and slavery-like practice committed by
Arabs against Black Africans have been reported in the most contentious Afro-Arab
borderland countries, namely Mauritania and Sudan. For example, Diallo argues that, in
Mauritania, racism and its most atrocious feature, slavery, are still prevalent. He points
out that:

Our country was the last on earth to declare slavery illegal in 1980 and the only
state which still refuses to take any measures to end slavery. This is because the
very foundation of Mauritanian regime is based on de facto apartheid and slavery.
Thus the regime has adamantly refused to legalize the anti-slavery (SOS-Slaves)
and the Mauritanian Association of Human Rights together with the Front for the
Liberation of Africans in Mauritania (FLAM). The government regards those
who work for democracy, human rights and the emancipation of slaves as
enemies of the state (as cited in Prah 2004: page number unavailable).

This state-backed type of slavery against Black Africans is also prevalent in
Sudan. For instance, there have been the widespread and frequent incidents of abduction,
confinement, forced labor, forced marriage and human trafficking in Sudan since the
1980s. Some investigative reports reveal that modern slavery in Sudan is considered to
be the state-involved systematic human rights violation, in which southern Black
Sudanese are abducted and exploited by northern Arab raiders, known as muraheleen,
whose armament and violent attacks are allegedly supported by the Arab dominated
Sudanese government. Raids are directed mostly at the Dinka group, which is accused of
supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the southern
insurgency confronting Khartoum. Although the government of Sudan acknowledges the widespread incidents of abduction and exploitation against Black Sudanese during the prolonged north-south civil war, they carefully avoid calling it slavery (Human Rights Watch 2002), as that has an implicit connotation of institutionalization and systematization of those criminal offences.

As the practices of slavery in Mauritania and Sudan exemplify, the Afro-Arab borderland is a place, where fierce racism and racial oppression against Black Africans have been rampant. According to Prah (2004), the highly insecure Afro-Arab borderland lies in areas straddling Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan (page number unavailable). Salam Diakite at the University of Mali argues that attitudes of racial arrogance of the non-Black community (Moors and Arabs) toward Blacks (Soninkes, Fulanis, Wolofs and Tukulors) along the Mauritanian borders on one hand and, on the other, the use of racist terms and the identification that the different ethnic populations in the northern regions of Mali have of each other, have created a sense of mistrust and insecurity that hinders sustainable peace and economic development of the regions concerned (as cited in Prah 2004: page number unavailable).

It is also true that the Afro-Arab borderland is a region, where great geopolitical significance has been placed since time immemorial. For instance, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, British historians, argue, “the idea that the security of Egypt depended upon the defence of the Upper Nile was as old as the Pyramids.” Likewise, the British Foreign and Colonial office put great significance on the security of the Nile Valley. Robinson and Gallagher stressed the effect of this policy on Lord Salisbury, who in 1889 declared that, if Britain was to rule Egypt, she could not allow any other European
imperial powers to acquire any part of the Nile basin region. They succeeded in that and by so doing Salisbury took a crucial decision for British rule in Africa that was to solidify its commitment in both Egypt and East Africa (as cited in Mazrui 1975: 726). The policy of the security of the Nile Valley continued in British official strategy even after the Second World War. When the Egyptian revolution occurred in 1952, the British colonial administration in Sudan felt the shock waves. Concern about the effect of the Egyptian revolution was widely felt among White administrators and settlers in Black Africa in the Nile basin region (Mazrui 1975: 726-727).

Significantly, Egypt’s inclination to political radicalism in the middle of the twentieth century led to short-lived Afro-Arab alliance in the African liberation movements against the Western colonial powers. According to Mazrui (1975), Arab nations took a more confrontational position toward the international stratification system, and most of them curtailed links with their former colonial powers, more decisively than did African and Asian states. Algeria, Egypt and Syria took leading roles in the Third World liberation movements. In particular, Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt played a leading role in the decolonization of the African continent. Nasser gave propaganda and material support to numerous nationalistic and dissident insurgencies in sub-Saharan African colonies. The Egyptian government also offered educational opportunities to African students in the wide-ranging subjects. Some scholarships were provided for militant rebels from colonies like Cameroon, Kenya and South Africa (727, 733).

Furthermore, Sankari demonstrates that in the field of economic development, Egypt took an initiative in strengthening the linkage between the Arab world and Africa, signing economic agreements that aimed at establishing the African Common Market, the

On one hand, Mazrui (1975) argues that Algeria, another radical Arab state on the continent, was seen as more profoundly Pan-African rather than simply Pan-Islamic. Because of its radical political orientation, Algeria was more committed than other oil-producing Arab countries to the Third World solidarity regardless of Islamic affiliation. With regards to support for the Southern African liberation struggle, Algeria was more supportive than many of Arab and Black African states (740). In fact, Algeria was a strong opponent of apartheid and played an influential role at the United Nations (UN) Special Committee against Apartheid and as the Chair of the UN General Assembly in 1974. That mission was performed by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria’s then Foreign Minister, who led to the suspension of apartheid South Africa from the Assembly (Jhazbhay 2004: 159).

Dawisha argues that after Nasser seized power through the Egyptian Revolution, he emphasized a number of politically relevant identities of Egypt, namely Arab, Islamic and African (as cited in Karawan 2002: 157). Although Nasser embraced Egypt’s African identity, he criticized the preceding Wafd party under the monarchy for its foreign policy that lacked vision and focused primarily on the Egypt-Sudan relations. In Nasser’s view, the “correct” orientation of Egypt should be on the east and northeast based on the historical account and political dynamism (Karawan 2002: 157-158). Unsurprisingly, therefore, Nasser’s vision of Afro-Arab solidarity was hierarchical rather than an equal partnership. In his Philosophy of Revolution, Nasser described the role of
Egypt in African liberation as a sort of latter-day version of the “white man’s burden”, referring to Egypt’s “manifest destiny” and “civilizing mission” in the “interior of the Dark Continent.” Nasser writes that:

We cannot under any condition, even if we wanted to, stand aloof from the terrible and terrifying battle now raging in the heart of that Continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason – we ourselves are in Africa. Surely the people of Africa will continue to look to us – we who are the guardians of the Continent’s northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the Continent and the outside world. We certainly cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility to help to our utmost in spreading the light of knowledge and civilization up to the very depth of the virgin jungles of the Continent (as cited in Akinsanya 1976: 512-513).

Nasser’s Arab-centric view on Pan-African solidarity was somewhat tolerated by Black Africans, who perceived Arabs as brothers of Islam and comrades of African liberation struggle. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that Afro-Arab alliance led by Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was to some extent a corollary of the international ideological rivalry during the Cold War and the Middle Eastern crisis, in which the Israel-Palestine issue became a major concern for Arab countries. For instance, Mazrui (1975) argues that, Nkrumah with a radical political orientation was less likely to see the Sahara desert as a political division. Indeed, the desert was diminishing politically. Nonetheless, Nkrumah’s support for Arab countries was somewhat undermined, particularly due to Israeli economic assistance to Ghana. Besides Nkrumah, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Modibo Keïta of Mali and socialist Julius Nyerere of Tanzania were also willing to support the Arab cause, though with some ambivalence (728).

According to Mazrui (1975), another important factor underlying the Afro-Arab alliance was the Israel-apartheid South Africa ties. Indeed, contributions from South
African Jews accounted for the second largest foreign private financial increment to
Israel. The South African government threatened that, if Israel provided financial
assistance to the African liberation struggles, the funds that Israel annually received from
South African Jews would no longer be allowed to leave South Africa. Besides, White
settlers in Rhodesia openly identified themselves as “the Israelis of Africa”, surrounded
by unfriendly and less prominent neighbors. At the same time, both South Africa and
Rhodesia attempted to attract as many White immigrants as possible to their countries
(729-730, 732).

Notably, Arab countries, including Algeria, Egypt and Libya, were supporting the
Black liberation cause in South Africa years before Black Africa decided to treat Israel as
a common enemy and condemn the situation in Palestine (Mazrui 1975: 739). Tunisia
also extended its support to anti-apartheid struggles. According to Jhazbhay (2004), the
Tunisian government granted a Tunisian passport to late ANC President Oliver Tambo
when the apartheid regime refused to issue a South African passport for him. In contrast,
Morocco strengthened military and other ties with the apartheid government. Arms
provided by South Africa were used in Morocco’s fight against the POLISARIO (Popular
Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) Front in the Western Sahara
territory (159, 163).

Wai (1983) writes that Zionism and apartheid eventually became synonymous in
the propaganda of Afro-Arab alliance (196). In effect, by November 13, 1973, twenty
nine Black African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, while only Lesotho,
Malawi, Mauritius and Swaziland, all of which heavily relied on South Africa, still
maintained relations with the Jewish state. Furthermore, during the period of 1973-80,
the OAU and the great majority of Black African states at the UN supported numerous Arab-sponsored resolutions that condemned Israel and Zionism, equating them with South Africa and its apartheid policy (Nadelmann 1981: 200-201, 216).

Nonetheless, Black Africa’s anti-Israel foreign policy was met with little economic reward from the oil-rich Arab states. Some researchers reveal that some Black African states severed relations with Israel due to Arab pressure and money rather than conviction, yet only a few African states received Arab economic assistance, and Black Africa’s demonstration of Afro-Arab solidarity in the Yom Kippur War resulted in little reciprocal Arab generosity. During the Oil Crisis, African countries expected oil supplies to be guaranteed with a lower price so that their meager foreign exchange revenues would not be exhausted. But these hopes were misplaced (as cited in Akinsanya 1976: 525-526). Short-lived Afro-Arab alliance in African liberation was eventually abandoned in 1979, when the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was signed (Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable).

Furthermore, according to Akinsanya (1976), the injection of Arab agendas into Pan-African politics not only alienated Black African states but also became a source of friction between Arab and Black African states (521). *West African Pilot* (Nigerian Newspaper) writes that Arabs always put their own agendas before those of Africa’s. Some Arab states, especially Egypt [under Nasser], always used Pan-African or Afro-Asian Conferences to accuse Israel as an “imperialist base” in Africa (as cited in Akinsanya 1976: 517). After all, compared to Arab states, Black African countries could do little to influence the international relations in the Middle East (Akinsanya 1976: 521). In 1974, two major possible functions of the OAU were manifested in terms of the Afro-
Arab relations. It became a forum, where Arabs would be able to influence Black Africans politically, and it evolved into an organ, where Black Africans might seek economic assistance from the Arab world (Mazrui 1975: 739). Wai (1983) nicely summarizes the Arab intentions in Black Africa, arguing that:

For many Arabs, sub-Saharan Africa suffers from an ideological vacuum, and could be brought within the Arab fold through cultural and religious penetration, regional diplomacy and, whenever possible, financial inducements to support pan-Arab policy orientations…In this context, Africa is still viewed as a sort of geopolitical and cultural hinterland, and Arab rivalries prey upon African political processes and internal struggles. The result is a callous disregard for African territorial integrity, and escalation of political violence in the Horn of Africa, Chad, and Western Sahara, and a search for status rewards not only within the Arab world, but also within the competitive arena of the security concerns and rivalries of the super-powers (193-194).

Correspondingly, Black Africans tended to have deep skepticism and fear of Arab intervention into African politics. In the earliest stage of Pan-African movement on the continent, when only a handful of African states gained or sustained political independence, it was quite obvious that Nasser naturally appeared to be a leading role in the African inter-governmental relations. Nonetheless, Ismael argues that, as the statesman of the first Black African colony to gain independence, Nkrumah attempted to mobilize the Pan-African movement as a way to curtail Nasser’s position and intention in Africa (as cited in Akinsanya 1976: 514-515).” For instance, Akinsanya (1976) reveals that throughout 1958 the continental leadership rivalry between Nasser and Nkrumah emerged and became intense. Radio Cairo propaganda explicitly accused Nkrumah of cooperation with Israel, while Nkrumah expressed warning against “direct Egyptian expansionism or indirect Communist penetration of African areas through a willing Egypt.” Furthermore, Ghana’s decision to create a “nucleus for a Union of African States” with Guinea was deemed a challenge to Nasser’s leadership in Africa. Although
Nkrumah stated his belief in “Afro-Arab nationalism” when he visited Cairo in January 1959, his vision of African unification was confined to Black Africa. Indeed, Nasser was not invited to any unification talks, and Nasser’s attempts in African affairs were largely ignored by Nkrumah in his *Africa Must Unite* (514-515).

Conceptually and practically, how to reconcile Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism was a major challenge for Pan-African integrationists. Yusuf Fadi Hasan argues that the African nationalist movement started and remained as a secular one. The earliest stage of the movement largely owed its success to contributions from Black Americans, who were struggling for racial equality and advocating for an African unity that was meant to be negritude-centered. After the 1945 Manchester Congress, the movement was shifted to Africa, but was kept out of North Africa (as cited in Bankie, publication year and page number unavailable). According to Akinsanya (1976), Black African leaders like President Senghor of Senegal and Chief Awolowo of Nigeria insisted that a priority should be given to unify Black Africa, while others assumed that Arab internal quarrels would only cause unnecessary frictions in the Pan-African movement (517). Mazrui (2003) expresses a similar view, arguing that there are two different levels of Pan-Africanism that are 1) sub-continental and 2) trans-Saharan. The former sought the unification of only Black African states, while the latter led to the creation of the OAU on the basis of Afro-Arabism (page number unavailable).

On the other hand, Wai (1983) argues that, under the racial and cultural ideology of Pan-Arabism and the concept of an Arab nation, Arab leaders attempted to expand their influence on the African continent. They became increasingly sensitive to opportunities for reinforcing their national and regional influence in the Cold War
international rivalry. The result was opportunistic behavior that undermined a vision of Afro-Arab collaboration. Although the principle of Pan-Arabism is “radical in its rhetoric and divisive in its application”, it became the political currency and provided the ideological focus that shaped Arabs’ views and relations with the rest of the world (194).

In terms of the religious aspect of Arab expansionism, Bankie refers to the Yusuf Fadi’s remark that “I could not separate Islam from Arabism. The former is the vehicle for the latter. Furthermore, Islam is the spiritual base of Arab culture.” Bankie goes on to assert that the significance of this Arab Islamic expansionism, widely found in the Afro-Arab borderland, is that “Islam as an expansionist spiritual trend comes clothed in Arab culture, so much so that the two are inseparable (publication year and page number unavailable).” In sharp contrast to Pan-Arabism that is based on the cultural and religious affinity, in Wai’s view (1983), Pan-Africanism focuses on geographic linkage as a basis for unity instead of racial or cultural identity (194).

In the discourse of Pan-Arabism, the LAS was an organizational manifestation of Arab unity. That idea, according to Khadduri (1946), initially emerged, when the various Arab national groups under the Ottoman Empire organized insurgency against the Turkish domination (756). The LAS was created in 1945 and currently comprises twenty-two member states in the Middle Eastern, North African and Indian Ocean regions. Insightfully, Khadduri (1946) points out that the LAS is neither an international organization nor a regional league in a strict sense since the LAS asserts a distinctive national character that is Arab states (770). Similarly, Prah (2004) argues that the LAS is not a geographic-based organization, but rather “a national, cultural, linguistic and
historical entity (page number unavailable)”. In fact, non-Arab states in the region, namely, Iran, Israel and Turkey, are not members of the LAS.

Perhaps, one of the most intricate issues that existed between the OAU and the LAS was their membership duplication. Some of the North African Arab states, namely Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, had memberships in both the OAU and the LAS, so did some states in the Afro-Arab borderlands and the Horn of Africa, such as Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. In the Indian Ocean, Comoros with strong Swahili and Islamic influence had also a double membership.

Importantly, while the LAS was based on shared racial-cultural affinity, the membership of the OAU was open to any sovereign states within and surrounding the African continent. Wai (1983) insightfully argues that:

The question, therefore, arises to whether the O.A.U. should not become exclusively and authentically a black African political organization, just as the Arab League is exclusively an Arab club. If Zaire, or Kenya, or Tanzania cannot join the Arab League, why should Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco be members of the O.A.U.? Being on the African continent should not be the sole criterion for membership, because this renders the O.A.U. increasingly less relevant and less substantive than it might be otherwise (199).

Due to its organizational nature and membership that is not based on racial-cultural affinity as such, the OAU was inherently vulnerable to a question of relevance as well as the internal division of the Arab world and Black Africa. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that Black Africa is neither a civilizational hinterland nor ideological vacuum. In their review of the subject, the AU Commission (2004) writes that Sub-Saharan Africa created a series of ancient civilizations, firstly Koush [or Kush], contemporary with that of Assyrians, then the period of Christian Nubia and Axum. Then, we have Tekrour [or Takrur], Ghana, Kanem and other empires and kingdoms (7).
In terms of the ideological development, there has been Black racial Pan-African ideology that calls for African unity in order to depart from the negative legacy of slavery and colonialism as well as eradicate continuing racism, oppression and exploitation against Blacks inside and outside the continent. Therefore, how to reconcile historical and continuing Afro-Arab tensions on the continent and to integrate the two worlds was a major challenge that the OAU confronted. Bankie asserts that:

Afro-Arab relations will remain distorted so long as Arabia considers Black Africa a civilization vacuum and so long as Africans in general remain indifferent…Arabia needs to confront the historical dimensions of slavery rather than pretending its non-existence (publication year and page number unavailable).

Prah (2004) also argues that:

Africans and Arabs need to create platforms and bases for a civilizational dialogue, which will help to advance mutual understanding and foster coexistence in peace and prosperity. For as long as one party regards the other as a ‘civilization vacuum’ which needs to be occupied civilationally, there is little hope for long term peace on this continent (page number unavailable).

Based on these arguments, some scholars treat Black Africa and the Arab world as different civilizational entities and consider the Afro-Arab relations as hierarchical, where Arabs have long oppressed and exploited Africans, particularly in the Afro-Arab borderlands. It is also true that the land of Black Africa was seen as a frontier by Arab-Islamic expansionists, who have forcibly advanced Islamization and Arabization. Indeed, Arab-led systematic discrimination and oppression against Black Africans in Mauritania and Sudan well exemplify the Arab-Islamic expansionist intent toward Black Africans on African soil.
Conflicts in Mauritania and Sudan: Flashpoints of Afro-Arab Tension

Straddling the junction between the Northern Arab world and Southern Black Africa, Mauritania and Sudan are highly contentious and insecure Afro-Arab borderland countries, where the Arab domination over Black Africans in the political, economic and social spheres has been a major impediment to harmonious co-existence of Arabs and Black Africans. Therefore, Mauritania and Sudan tend to be seen as the embarrassing illustration of Afro-Arab friction rather than the linkage between the two worlds. Their geographic locations at the crossroads of Northern Africa and Southern Africa coupled with the Afro-Arab racial-cultural composition make their state identity and regional belonging quite ambivalent. Their marginal positions both in the Arab world and Black Africa urged the Arab-led regime in power to consolidate its Arab status, while Black Africa remained an important regional base for geopolitical and diplomatic maneuver.

According to Eagleton (1965), with independence of Mauritania, Arab countries hesitated to recognize Mauritania partly due to Morocco’s sovereign claim to the entire territory of Mauritania based on the historical account. Some doubts remained even after the independence in 1960, and there was no unanimous view on Mauritania’s position in the Arab, Islamic and African worlds. In 1960, the only Arab state that recognized and supported Mauritania was Tunisia. However, Mauritania later succeeded in the enlargement of recognition and alienation of Morocco on the Mauritanian question, supported by newly independent Black African states and some major Western powers. For Black African countries, Mauritania was seen as a buffer zone, a conduit to the Arab north, an advocate for the rights of Blacks and a potential ally in regional and international forums. Moktar ould Daddah, Mauritania’s first President, often
emphasized Mauritania’s assertion as a “trait d’union” (hyphen or bridge) between the Arab world and Black Africa, and there was a rational basis for this claim (45-46, 51).

Sudan’s Arabic name, ‘al-sudaan, literally means “the blacks”, and this racialized notion of the country’s name illuminates Sudan’s unique Arab identity. In his analysis of Black Arabs in Sudan, Mazrui (1973) writes that there is a wide range of skin colors and physical features among Arabs in Sudan, who constitute over half of the total population. Generally speaking, Sudanese Arabs are much darker than Arabs in north of the Sahara and the Arabian peninsula. While the linguistic definition of Arab is an important element (more than half of the total Sudanese population speak Arabic as their mother tongue), many of the northern Sudanese are a population of “Arabized Africans” through the cultural and linguistic assimilation into the Arab-Islamic civilization (55, 68).

Deng (1995) has a similar view on Arab identity in Sudan, arguing that so-called Arab north has significant African elements, which it shares with the African south in Sudan. Hence, northern identity in Sudan is a product of Arab-Islamic assimilation, while southern identity is resistance against the northern domination. Therefore, African identity is the common denominator, on which Sudan’s national identity can be built. Nonetheless, for the Sudanese Arabs, the sense of pride and dignity can be gained only from their self-identified Arab-Islamic heritage. As a consequence, African identity was dismissed as backward and primitive and used to justify the enslavement of Africans (14, 22, 353). The north-south divisive view was also evident in the British colonial policy for Sudan. Deng (1995) argues that the British colonial administrators regarded the north and the south as incompatible cultural-religious entities, and therefore administered them separately. In fact, the south was envisaged more in the context of East Africa than in the
national framework of colonial Sudan. They even considered that the south might eventually be merged with one of the East African colonies (11).

‘Abd Al-Rahim (1973) highlights Sudan’s unique Afro-Arab identity, arguing that none of other Afro-Arab borderland countries represents an Afro-Arab entity to the same extent or in the same way as Sudan. For example, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Somalia are predominantly Islamic and therefore closely linked with the Arab world, but none of these countries is either entirely or partly Arabic speaking like Sudan (30). To respond to ‘Abd Al-Rahim’s analysis, I argue that the Afro-Arab identity of Sudan is quite different from that of Mauritania, which is partly Arabic speaking, but mostly Islamic. In Sudan, northern Muslim/southern Christian religious identity has further deepened the Arab-African division and made a compromise between the Islamist-government and secularist rebel groups unattainable. Likewise, Deng (1995) argues that religion and race relations are inseparable since Islam in Sudan is closely associated with Arabism that is a “racial, ethnic, and cultural phenomenon (16)” Mansour Khalid nicely summarizes that:

The Sudanese conflict is about national self-identification. It is a cultural problem… There is still no consensus among Sudanese as to what kind of country Sudan is. Are we Arabs? Are we Africans? Are we Afro-Arabs? Are we Muslims? What is Sudan and what does it mean to be Sudanese? (as cited in Deng 1995: 348).

Both Mauritania and Sudan have been ruled by a series of authoritarian Arab-Islamic regimes that have forcibly advanced Arabization (in both countries) and Islamization (in Sudan) among Black African populations in their southern territories. While marginalizing and subordinating the non-Arab groups, the Arab-dominated
regimes in the two countries have sought to reinforce their Arab state identity through various Arabization policies.

Human Rights Watch (1994) reports that in Mauritania tensions between Beydanes of Arab-Berber descent, also known as White Moors, and Blacks were increased as the Beydanes-dominated government pursued policies favoring Arab culture and language. Arabization was imposed to marginalize the Black ethnic groups and to shape most aspects of Mauritanian society: education, language (with Arabic replacing French in a new constitution passed in July 1991), the administration of justice at both civil and religious courts, employment, access to credits and loans and so on (1-2, 102).

Likewise, in Sudan, the Arab-dominated government has sought to pursue the policy of Arabization and Islamization toward the southern populations in order to attain national unity through uniformity since the independence in 1956 (Deng 1990: 597). The most recent round of north-south conflict began in 1983 after President Gaafar Nimeiri repealed the regional autonomy of the south and imposed Islamic law (shari’a) throughout the country (Martin 2002: 111).

As part of the Arabization process of the state, the governments of Mauritania and Sudan have tried to strengthen their relations with the Arab states. The two countries gained the membership of the LAS, Mauritania in 1973 and Sudan in 1956, and have often sought political and financial support from oil-producing Arab states in order to sustain their Arab-Islamic authoritarian rule and perpetuate the northern Arab domination over southern Black Africans in all aspects of society. For instance, Garba Diallo details alleged Arab expansionist conspiracy in the systematic oppression of Black Africans in Mauritania and Sudan. After Mauritania joined the LAS, the Mauritanian government
adopted a hostile course of action toward its Black population. For the training of Mauritanian military personnel, Iraq was chosen on the ground of Mauritania’s allegiance to the Pan-Arabist principle of the Baath Party. Iraq also supplied mustard gas, which was used in southern Sudan (as cited in Bankie 2006: 42).

Some studies indicate that in Mauritania, after the failed coup plot by Black military officers in 1987 and the following 1989-92 ethnic purges against Blacks, a group of dominantly Arabic-speaking officers, who were trained in such Arab countries as Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Syria, considered themselves as “guardians of the privileges of Arab-Berbers threatened by a ‘Black Peril’ ”. Furthermore, after the loss of his first wife in 1990, President Ould Taya soon became a decisive Arab nationalist and championed Arab identity of Mauritania. He began to consider his mission in life as to maintain national unity and to defend Arabness of his country against a series of plots by his political enemies (N’Diaye 2006: 429, 434).

According to Deng (1995), under the leadership of Muhammed Ahmed Mahjoub, who had served as the Sudan’s Prime Minister between 1965 and 1969, Sudan received arms, ammunition and funds from such Arab countries as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to win the civil war against the south. Mahjoub even attempted to champion the Arab cause, declaring war against Israel along with the rest of Arab states at the outbreak of the Six-Day War of 1967 (354, 357-358). Bona Malwal, a member of Sudan’s Parliament from the south, attacked this Mahjoub’s foreign policy action as nothing but absurd. While Sudan was in a state of internal war, which Mahjoub was unable to win or end, how could Sudan be able to go for an external war? Malwal regarded the war against Israel as racial based (that could be paralleled to the north-south
civil war) although his assertion was refuted by Mahjoub, who insisted that Arabism was not racism but cultural; therefore war against Israel was a war to save Arab culture (as cited in Deng 1995: 357).

Some investigative reports reveal that the Egyptian troops were actively involved in the Sudan’s civil war, while Cairo played a vital role in soliciting material support from other Arab states on behalf of Khartoum (as cited in Wai 1981: 134). When President Nimeiri signed the Addis Ababa Agreement with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1972, extremists in Arab countries saw this peace process as a defeat for Sudan’s Arab identity since Sudan was no longer able to support the radical Arab position (Deng 1995: 363). After Umar al-Bashir took power in 1989, the government has tried to reinforce its Islamic orientation, harboring Osama bin Laden and developing its ties with Iraq and Libya, both of which provided moral and material support for the government’s war against the southern rebels (Martin 2002: 112-114)

Deng (1995) shed light on the question why Arab-Islamic fundamentalism and extremism have been persistent in Sudan’s domestic and foreign policy. He nicely argues that Sudan’s marginal position in the Arab world led to create “the compensational intensities of Sudanese identification with Arabism and the Arab cause”. Arab pride in Sudan is a much more fervent aspiration than it is within the Arab world that Sudanese Arabs desperately want to belong to. This imbalance may trigger a sense of extremism that is imbedded in the revivalist or fundamentalist movement in Sudan (356, 380).

In effect, Mauritania and Sudan became highly insecure Afro-Arab border countries, where systematic Arab-led discrimination and opposition against Black Africans have been prevalent. Furthermore, the unilateral Arabization forces under the
Arab-led authoritarian regimes in the two countries have created suspicion and tension between the Arab world and Black Africa and complicated the inter-regional relations between the two worlds.

Indeed, transnational Black African identity has been a concern for the Arab-dominated Mauritanian government that has tried to reinforce Mauritania’s Arab state identity since independence. Some studies indicate that the country was deeply divided on the question of independence from French rule. Many of the Moors favored a union with Morocco, while many of the Blacks supported a merger with Senegal and Mali (Human Rights Watch 1994: 8). According to N’Diaye (2006), while Taya regime was accused of its authoritarian rule, a couple of neighboring regimes of good governance and democracy were emerging. In 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was elected President of Senegal, ending the nearly two-decade rule of Abdou Diouf. In Mali, Amadou Toumani Toure came back to power through a competitive, transparent and free election in 2002. These incidents created hope in democratization efforts in West Africa. These events also “shone an unwelcome light on the unappealing Mauritanian exception”, made more striking by President Wade’s careless statements. In return, Taya created a crisis between the two countries, threatening to deport thousands of Senegalese living in Mauritania. When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted policies to strengthen democratic accountability for the member states, Mauritania simply withdrew from the ECOWAS in 2000. This decision also confirmed a geo-strategic policy of Mauritania that left Black Africa and moved toward the Maghreb, where Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were better company for Taya regime that repressed its opposition,
marginalized the Black African populations and sustained total control over the domestic political system (427).

Likewise, Deng (1990) argues that the decades-long north-south civil war in Sudan made the country unable to live up to its expected role as an “Afro-Arab microcosm” and a linkage between the African continent and the Middle East. Indeed, Sudan has been increasingly seen as an embarrassment in the Afro-Arab relations (596, 598). Woodward reveals that while Mahjoub pursued the Arab cause in his foreign policy and his army killed Black Africans in the southern territory, Sudan’s African neighbors became less cooperative to the Sudanese government and tended openly or clandestinely to support the Anya Nya, the military wing of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) (as cited in Deng 1995: 360).

Nonetheless, it seems that the scale of Black African support to the southern Sudanese struggle never matched that of Arab support to Khartoum. Tandon and Pinyewa argue that the southern secessionist movement had hardly received support from Black African states for a long period of time. While many of the southern Sudanese groups are ethnically linked to the northern Ugandans, such as the Lango that President Obote of Uganda is a member of, Obote tended to take a supportive stance to the Sudanese government and remained antagonistic toward the southern Sudanese leaders (as cited in Wai 1981: 130). This was attributable to the fact that Khartoum provided substantial financial support to Obote regime and to lesser extent the linkage between the opposition party in Uganda and the southern Sudanese politicians through affiliation with the Catholic Church. Similarly, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania did not extend the same
support as he provided for Biafra in Nigeria to the southern Sudanese cause (Wai 1981: 132-133).

Notably, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi was one of few African leaders to support the southern Sudanese struggle. He openly condemned Khartoum for its hostile policy against the southern populations and criticized the other African heads of state for their silence on the Afro-Arab conflict in Sudan. Nevertheless, Malawi was too far away to offer asylum to the Anya-Nya and too poor to provide any material support (Wai 1981: 137-138). Besides, Mengistu of Ethiopia was the most committed ally of the SPLM/A. The Mengistu regime was long fighting against the Eritrean secessionist movement that was backed by the Sudanese government (Deng 1995: 383).

In general, the OAU proved to be ineffective in dealing with the Afro-Arab conflicts in Mauritania and Sudan. One of the major reasons for this was the OAU’s policy of maintaining the colonial borders of newly independent African states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Wai (1981) argues that among African states the notion of self-determination has been operative only within the discourse of liberation of African colonies from the Western rule. Therefore, secession, which may lead to further “Balkanization” of Africa, has been considered to be illegitimate (127). This assertion is empirically supported. Eritrean independence from Ethiopia was the only successful secession case in Africa during the OAU era. Anti-colonialism and anti-racism in the context of White-Black relations were major ideological values embedded in the OAU. Ironically, however, its Afro-Arab organizational features made it difficult for the OAU to condemn Arab-led oppression and exploitation of Black Africans on the continent.
Human Rights Watch (1994) writes that the OAU established a subcommittee to facilitate mediation between Mauritania and Senegal after the border dispute between the two countries in 1989. Nonetheless, the subcommittee put a focus only on the international dimension of the dispute, such as resuming diplomatic relations, reopening postal, telecommunication and air-transportation links and restoring security in the border region. The subcommittee failed to address the human rights issues in the conflict and did not consider human rights violation against Black Africans to be relevant to the negotiations (164). Nonetheless, the OAU mediation during the course of 1989-1991 ended the Mauritania-Senegal dispute at least in the context of bilateral relations (Walraven 1999: 295, Table 7.1).

In the case of north-south conflict in Sudan, Wai (1981) argues that while Arab states considered Sudan as a strategically important conduit for Arab influence into Africa, sub-Saharan African states viewed the civil war in Sudan as similar to other domestic conflicts on the continent (127). The OAU intervened only in the later phase of conflict and was not able to bring any significant peace-making result (Walraven 1999: 295, Table 7.1).

In sum, the Afro-Arab conflicts in Mauritania and Sudan well illustrate the unequal Afro-Arab relations. The Arab-led religious, linguistic and cultural penetration of Black Africa made these two civilizations deeply but hierarchically connected. As has been evident in Mauritania and Sudan, Arab-Islamic expansionism has been a major feature of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s foreign policy adventurism in Africa. In fact, Gaddafi has played a controversial role in the Afro-Arab relations on the continent for the last few
decades. Hence, there is a need for an analysis of his expansionist attempts and their divisive consequences on peace and security of Africa.

The Role of Gaddafi in the Afro-Arab Relations: Arab-Islamic Expansionism, Military Interventionism and Oil-Dollar Diplomacy

Oye Ogunbadejo (1986) articulates that, by any standard, no other Third World leader in recent periods has received as much notoriety for foreign policy adventurism as Gaddafi of Libya (33). According to Solomon and Swart (2005), Libya’s foreign policy has been to a large extent determined by the personality of Gaddafi, who is viewed as an “irrational megalomaniac, whose hegemonic ambitions are limitless and who lacks all sense of perspective and reality (469)”. Gaddafi’s military adventurism and interventionism for the last few decades secured him such notorious titles as “rogue criminal” (in the words of Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State), “reckless adventurer” (branded by Fidel Castro of Cuba) and “the mad dog of the Middle East” (coined by President Ronald Reagan). President Nimeiri of Sudan dismissed Gaddafi as someone having “a split personality – both evil (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 469).”

In effect, Gaddafi’s adventurist foreign policy has often put him in confrontation with the Western powers and other African countries. As D. Geldenhuys nicely describes, Libya was a small state with an ambitious foreign policy. Above all else, Gaddafi wanted Libya to be a regional hegemon (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 471). In Ronen’s view, Libya’s foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has been “the jewel in its foreign policy crown” and has greatly contributed to magnifying Gaddafi’s influence both domestically and internationally (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 470).
Gaddafi’s foreign policy orientation was soon manifested after he took power by overthrowing the Libyan monarchy in 1969. According to Solomon and Swart (2005), Gaddafi’s policy focus in Africa was initially coupled with a period of intense and fervent Arab nationalism. He ardently promoted Arab unity and came up with a number of proposals to promote regional integration (471). For instance, in the early 1970s Gaddafi suggested a federation between Libya, first with Sudan and then Egypt. Although these proposals did not yield any result, Gaddafi never gave up his belief that the three countries had a historical mission to promote the Arab cause and Islamic solidarity and to jointly hold an uncompromisingly stance against Israel (Ogunbadejo 1986: 34-35).

Throughout the period of the late twentieth century, Gaddafi’s aspiration for Arab-Islamic unity had never diminished. He proposed a union with Tunisia in 1974, Syria in 1980, Chad in 1981, Morocco in 1984, Algeria in 1987 and Sudan again in 1990, but all eventually failed. In particular, one of his more ambitious and frequently addressed intentions was the formation of a Saharan Islamic state that would integrate about 100 million Muslims in a region extending to the southern edges of the Sahara (Solomon and Swart 2005: 471).

Alexander describes Gaddafi as an “Arab nationalist of the Nasirite brand (as cited in Deeb 1991: 7-8)”, and Gaddafi’s foreign policy during his early years in power was strongly motivated by ideological orientations (Deeb 1991: 8). Arnold (1996) reveals that Nasser of Egypt was Gaddafi’s hero, and the Qur’an and Nasser’s *Philosophy of Revolution* were the two books that inspired Gaddafi most (1). While Nasser’s vision of Afro-Arab solidarity was driven by the Arab version of “white man’s burden”, Gaddafi
had also prejudiced attitudes toward the Black race. In The Green Book, Gaddafi’s Islamic-Socialist manifesto published in 1976, Gaddafi writes that:

The black race is now in a very backward social position. But such backwardness helps to bring about numerical superiority of the blacks because their low standard of living has protected them from getting to know the means and ways of birth control and family planning. Also their backward social traditions are a reason why there is no limit to marriage, leading to their unlimited growth, while the population of other races has decreased because of birth control, restrictions on marriage and continuous occupation in work, unlike the blacks who are sluggish in a climate which is always hot (as cited in Arnold 1996: 21).

While Gaddafi portrays people of the Black race as “backward” and “sluggish”, he defines the duties for Arabs as “To adhere to virtue, the essence of religion, and the noble Arab traits” and “To explain the need for Arab unity and call for it” in The Green Book (as cited in Arnold 1996: 13). Therefore, Arab-Islamic expansionism appears to be an ideologically rational foreign policy for Gaddafi to impose on his Black African neighboring states.

Another significant feature of Gaddafi’s foreign policy was its radical revolutionary activism. According to Huliaras, in the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi provided either financial or military assistance to the African regimes, which he was allied with, or offered more clandestine support to the liberation or opposition groups. Gaddafi’s primary involvement in African affairs was intended to liberating African colonies, opposing the apartheid regime and spreading Islam (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 471). Arnold (1996) reveals that Gaddafi’s influence in Africa became more salient in 1973, when he played a leading role in isolating Israel from its friendly African states. In fact, Gaddafi insisted on responsibility for the break in diplomatic relations between Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Niger and Mali with Israel and boasted to Le Monde that “We have reduced the Zionist State to the level of Taiwan (70).”
Furthermore, Gaddafi has been well-known for his decisively anti-Western propaganda and military actions. According to Ogunbadejo (1986), Libya has relentlessly attempted to undermine the pro-Western regimes in such countries as Niger, Senegal and Tunisia. In fact, in August 1983, Captain Thomas Sankara, who was allegedly backed up by the Libyan leader, overthrew the pro-Western President, Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, in nearby Upper Volta, thereafter renamed Burkina Faso. Consequently, some moderate and conservative African states were driven to seek support from the Western powers, notably France, the US and Israel. The US increased bilateral aid and military assistance to its good African friends, namely [Sadat’s] Egypt, Chad, Liberia, Morocco, Somalia, Nimeiri’s Sudan, Tunisia and Zaire, in order to empower them to resist Soviet-Libya-inspired insurgency (44, 62-63).

In particular, *Africa Report* details that after Libya-involved assassination attempt against the Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1981, Doe paid a visit to Israel in August 1983 as the first sub-Saharan African leader to do so in twelve years. At the end of the visit, Israel pledged the military and intelligence assistance to Doe to counter Libyan subversive activities in Africa. In effect, on agendas of ideological nature, some radical African states, such as Ghana and Burkina Faso, were allied with Libya in casting anti-American votes at the UN in the mid-1980s (as cited in Ogunbadejo 1986: 59-60, 66). On the other hand, in order to sustain the African way of consensus-building diplomacy, the African bloc carefully avoided tabling issues that were viewed as “divisive” at the international forum, including Libya’s state-sponsored international terrorism and Libya’s occupation of parts of Chadian territory, on which African states themselves were deeply divided (Ogunbadejo 1986: 55, 66).
Furthermore, Gaddafi’s military adventurism was greatly attributable to his enormous drive for hegemonic aggression. For instance, Kathryn Sturman (2003) writes that, under Gaddafi’s dictatorship, Libya has been in confrontation with almost all of its neighboring countries over the years. Libya had a four-day war with Egypt in 1977 as well as territorial disputes with Algeria, Niger and Tunisia. There was a series of failed invasions of Chad in the 1980s (109-110). After all, as Solomon and Swart (2005) nicely articulate, the vulnerability of Libya’s foreign policy has been its highly authoritarian feature, mostly due to “Gaddafi’s almost larger-than-life personality.” Indeed, Gaddafi dismissed alliances and friends without hesitation when they were no longer seen as useful and switched sides easily if it were for Libya’s national interest (476-477).

As regards Gaddafi’s military interventionism in the context of Afro-Arab relations, Akinsanya (1976) asserts that Gaddafi created suspicions about Arab expansionist intentions among Black African countries. For instance, Gaddafi deployed Libyan armed forces in September 1972 in order to back up President Idi Amin of Uganda against an alleged “Zionist” invasion from Tanzania (527). Gaddafi considered Uganda’s common border with the southern Sudan to be strategic since his regime was often threatened by insurgency based in Sudan. According to Deeb (1991), in his speech on October 7, 1972, Gaddafi stated that the southern Sudanese rebels, who had risen in revolt against Khartoum, had their base in Uganda during the Obote era. In this sense, Uganda was Sudan’s lower base. In return for Gaddafi’s support, Amin severed his relations with Israel and began to express strong pro-Arab sentiments. This legitimized Gaddafi’s propaganda that he had intervened in Uganda for the sake of the Arab cause (85). The deployment of Libyan troops to Uganda with the tacit approval of Egypt
implied the possibility of political and military intervention by Arab states in purely Black African affairs (Akinsanya 1976: 527).

_Africa Contemporary Record_ indicates that Gaddafi mercilessly forced the late President Tombalbaye of Chad to obey Arab wishes, even in issues of internal security. The French government could not respond to Tombalbaye’s request for financial and military assistance that was necessary to maintain the country during a devastating drought and to continue his military campaign against the rebel group that received substantial support from Libya and Algeria. In effect, Tombalbaye ended up asking Gaddafi for a loan of 23,000m CFA francs, in return for breaking Chad’s diplomatic relations with Israel. Likewise, President Diori of Niger, who was under enormous pressure to secure financial assistance during the severe drought period, was forced to suspend Niger’s relations with Israel in January 1973 in exchange for better relations with the Arab world, particularly with Libya (as cited in Akinsanya 1976: 527).

Perhaps, the troublesome Libya-Chad relations are the best examples to illustrate Gaddafi’s Arab-Islamic expansionist intension in the Sahel region. In fact, Chad was the country to be most affected in this respect. The geostrategic importance of Chad to Libya partly stems from the historical connection between the two countries. John Wright details that the links of the Fezzan and to some extent Cyrenaica, the two major provinces in Libya, with the lands that now constitute Chad were developed in the late nineteenth century through a revivalist Islamic movement led by Sayyid bin ‘Ali al-Sanussi to Chad (as cited in Deeb 1991: 26). Nelson indicates that in the 1960s, Arabs were the second largest ethnic group in Chad and accounted for 14 percent of the total population. Two of the three main ethnic groups that constitute the Arab population in Chad seem to having
come from Libya either directly from the Fezzan or via the Fezzan from Tripolitania (as cited in Deeb 1991: 26). Furthermore, Said Samatar points out that Gaddafi’s clan group, Gaddafa, also reside in the Chadian territory. This fact might be one of the reasons why Gaddafi has relentlessly intervened in Chadian affairs (personal communication, March 26, 2009).

Lemarchand asserts that Chad’s significance for Gaddafi became clear both from the failed attempt to overthrow Gaddafi in 1970 by a Libyan rebel group that was based in Chad and from the Israeli presence in Chad (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 474). Some studies indicate that in August 1971, there was a coup attempt against Tombalbaye who accused Gaddafi of having been involved in the plot. Tombalbaye claimed that Gaddafi’s ultimate goal was to annex the northern part of Chad and exploit its minerals (Deeb 1991: 83). Tombalbaye’s fear came true when Libyan military invaded the Aouzou Oasis in January 1973. Bernard Lanne writes that within a few months, Libyan troops built a military post in the Aouzou Oasis, followed by the settlement of Libyan civilians. Food and Libyan identity cards were distributed to the inhabitants. Eventually, the Aouzou Strip was annexed to the municipality of Kufra of the Khalij province of Libya (as cited in Deeb 1991: 84).

According to Deeb (1991), Gaddafi declared a Libya-Chad merger in January 1981 in order to perpetuate and legitimize his power and the presence of Libyan troops in Chad. He again claimed that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Libya. Occupying the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad meant that no anti-Gaddafi forces could enter Libya from Libya’s southern border (132). Nourredine asserts that Gaddafi’s interest in the Aouzou Strip might have stemmed from his desire to gain control of the uranium reserves for both
economic and political reasons (as cited in Deeb 1991: 132). According to Norland, in the 1980s, Libya built a new 2.5 mile-long runway in Quadi Doum, in the center of Chad’s northern region, for the Libyan aircraft base less than 500 miles from the capital city of Chad. Equally important were Libyan flags over administrative buildings, the requirement that people speak only Arabic and the imposition of Libyan-style Islamic practice in the occupied region (as cited in Ogunbadejo 1986: 48).

Libya’s expansionist policy in Africa in general and Chad in particular caused growing French and American opposition, partly due to their worries that success in Chad would encourage Gaddafi to intervene elsewhere (Solomon and Swart 2005: 474). St John points out that many African leaders were also afraid that Libya would use the occupation of Chad to reinforce its influence in the Sahel region and West Africa (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 474). Consequently, by January 1981, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal broke diplomatic relations with Libya (Solomon and Swart 2005: 474). Furthermore, on January 14, 1981, in Lome, Togo, under the initiative of Nigeria, twelve leaders of the OAU member states denounced the idea of Libya-Chad merger and proposed the Inter-African Force (IAF) to maintain peace in Chad. Libya-Chad conflict was finally ended on May 31, 1994, when the two countries signed a joint communiqué that returned the Aozou Strip to Chad (Arnold 1996: 75, 78).

While many experts on Libya claim the centrality of Arab nationalism and Islamic expansionism in Gaddafi’s foreign policy, Deeb (1991) identifies Libya’s primary foreign policy objectives as the security of the regime and the country’s territorial sovereignty. To achieve these objectives, Gaddafi manipulated ideology, such as Pan-Arab and Pan-
Islamic, and attempted to promote bilateral and trilateral integration with neighboring states and the other states outside Northern Africa (189, 192).

Similarly, Arnold (1996) highlights the inconsistency and volatility of Gaddafi’s foreign policy. For instance, Gaddafi once supported the SPLA, which comprises of Christian or animist southern Sudanese, in confrontation of the Muslim dominated Nimeiri regime. This foreign policy action seems to be contradictory to Gaddafi’s desire to see the propagation of Islam (67). Besides, after 1978 Libya supported the Christian-led Ethiopian government against Nimeiri of Sudan (Deeb 1991: 8). In his speech on March 2, 1984, Gaddafi justified Libya’s support to the southern Sudan and Ethiopia on the ground of revolutionary solidarity. He stated that “with the revolutionary forces in Ethiopia, in the Arab homeland, the revolution in Libya has decided to ally itself with the revolution in the southern Sudan (as cited in Ogunbadejo, 1986: 37).” Arnold (1996) suggests that the changes that have taken place in Gaddafi’s “target” countries should be taken into account when we try to understand why Gaddafi has changed his tactics and allies with little hesitation (67). For example, Deeb (1991) argues that when Gaddafi upset Nimeiri by supporting the SPLA and Ethiopia, Libya-Sudan relations were worsened by the two factors; 1) the defense pact between Egypt and Sudan in July 1976, which was viewed by Gaddafi as military alliance against Libya; and 2) Sudan and Egypt’s support to Chadian resistance against Libya’s military occupation of northern Chad (106, 121).

Zartman and Kluge shed light on these puzzles, arguing that Gaddafi is a pragmatic man, whose foreign policy is “a policy of opportunity” rather than based on constant principles (as cited in Deeb 1991: 8). As Deeb (1991) nicely summarizes,
national interests sometimes overrode ideological factors, such as Arab, Islamic or revolutionary, in Libya’s foreign policy toward its neighboring states in Northern Africa and some states in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, where Libya found vital geostrategic interests. On the other hand, Islamic ideology and revolutionary socialism tended to be the determinants of Gaddafi’s foreign policy toward the other states in Africa and the rest of the Third World (8-9).

Besides its military power, Libya’s foreign policy adventurism is bolstered by its oil wealth; therefore, Gaddafi’s diplomatic style is often called “chequebook diplomacy (Solomon and Swart 2005: 477)” or “petro-dollar diplomacy (Sturman 2003: 109)” and has been significantly effective in putting great pressure on economically-handicapped Black African states. Solomon and Swart (2005) write that the amount, instrumentality and allocation of Libyan foreign aid between 1973 and 1980 are closely linked with Gaddafi’s diplomatic triumphs (477). For instance, Africa Now reports that when Gaddafi had difficulty in hosting the OAU Summit in 1982 due to some member states boycotting it under American pressure, he gave reluctant states an oil donation – “a euphemism for a bribe” – if they traveled to Tripoli (as cited in Ogunbadejo 1986: 53). According to Newsweek, he even proposed that Libya might be willing to assist the OAU by paying some of the outstanding unpaid dues of $16 million from the member states (as cited in Ogunbadejo 1986: 53).

More recently, Gaddafi’s oil-dollar diplomacy resulted in the establishment of the Libya sponsored Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which is one of the major African RECs. Under Gaddafi’s initiative, CEN-SAD was created by the original six members of Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger and Sudan in 1998. The
secretariat of CEN-SAD is located in Tripoli, Libya. According to Struman (2003), whereas overlapping membership is a problematic characteristic of all African RECs, CEN-SAD cannot be considered to have a North African core membership. As of the year 2003, among the eighteen members, eight belonged to ECOWAS, two to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and five to the COMESA. Therefore, the only meaningful common ground for many of the members seems to be the patronage of Libya (111). In fact, Panapress reported that in August 2002, a US$25 million loan was granted to Sudan by the African Bank for Development and Commerce for the CEN-SAD based in Tripoli. A week before the fifth CEN-SAD conference took place in Niamey, Niger, on March 16, 2003, Gaddafi promised to invest US$100 million in micro-finance projects in Niger (as cited in Sturman 2003: 111).

In sum, Gaddafi’s role in the past Afro-Arab relations can be described as 1) a menacing Arab-Islamic expansionist, 2) an influential regional player, who relentlessly intervened in Black African internal affairs and 3) a generous patron, who offered substantial funds for African regional organizations and states. In this view, using its affluent military and financial resources, Libya contributed to keeping the status-quo or further reinforcing the asymmetrical Afro-Arab relations, in which Arabs were conquerors as well as conveyors of new ideas and technologies to Black Africans. Although Gaddafi’s megalomaniac intentions and actions in Black Africa were not necessarily consistent with the broader Arab will on African affairs (indeed the Arab world as a cohesive regional group is quite questionable), undeniably Gaddafi alone was a powerful regional actor, who was able to shape the outcome of Afro-Arab inter-regional politics and Black African internal affairs.
Nonetheless, since the late 1990s Gaddafì has rather expressed an aspiration to Africanize Arabs (Hawas 2004: 25). Libya began to identify itself more toward Africa than the Middle East since it would be able to wield more influence in the former, where most states are politically vulnerable and economically weak. For instance, R. Takeyh writes that, in March 1999, the Libyan leader presented his new Pan-African manifesto, declaring “I have no time to lose talking with Arabs, I now talk Pan-Africanism and African Unity!” Clearly Gaddafì set his focus on Africa once his influence began to decline in the Arab world (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 479). Provocatively, at the Amman Summit of the LAS in March 2001, Gaddafì proclaimed, “the third of the Arab community living outside Africa should move in with the two-thirds on the continent and join the African Union ‘which is the only space we have (as cited in Prah 2004)’.” On October 24, 2002 Gaddafì even declared his will to renounce Libya’s LAS membership. Nonetheless, Libya has remained a member state of the LAS since then.

From a geopolitical perspective, Deeb (1991) argues that many of Libya’s foreign policy decisions were determined by the country’s uncomfortable position between the Maghreb (means west in Arabic) and the Mashriq (east) in the Arab world. Unlike Algeria and Saudi Arabia, each of which is located in the center of one region, Libya is in the periphery of the two regions. In fact, in the historical and cultural context, Cyrenaica, the province in the eastern territory of Libya, is considered to be part of the Mashriq, whilst Tripolitania and the Fezzan are perceived in the context of the Maghreb (11, 41-42). It appears that Libya’s marginal geographic location at the crossroads of Eastern and Western Arab as well as a series of failed Libya-sponsored Pan-Arab proposals motivated
Notably, Solomon and Swart (2005) argue that, after the long isolation and marginalization, Gaddafi was in great need of a new base of foreign policy support, and Africa was willing and able to assist Libya’s full come back to the international political stage. Previously notorious as a rogue dictator and sponsor of international terrorism, Gaddafi has begun a quest to rejoin the international community as an important ally and partner. Libya’s attempts to become a reliable player are apparent in its efforts to advance African unity and its recent decision to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction (470). Takeyh (2001) nicely articulates that Gaddafi had to accept “the passing of the age of revolutions and the arrival of the age of globalization” to remain internationally relevant (64). Takeyh further reveals that in the 1990s Libya increased its efforts to bring peace in Africa, helping end the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and sending Libyan envoys to the peace talks on Sierra Leone in Togo in 1999. Hence, the 1990s witnessed a trend shift toward the promotion of regional cooperation through a more constructive participation in multilateral approaches and mediation in African conflicts (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 476).

In response, Black African states embraced Gaddafi’s efforts and helped him to change his international image and role from rogue to virtuous. Iqbal Jhazbhay (2004) explains that, while the UN sanctions were still imposed on Libya, Nelson Mandela visited Libya to negotiate the Lockerbie deal. Mandela insistently defended his relations with Gaddafi, arguing that none of the world powers could choose South Africa’s friends (161). Likewise, according to Hawas (2004), the fact that several African leaders tried to
break the UN sanctions against Libya throughout the 1990s made Gaddafì to re-think the Afro-Arab relations (34). Another noteworthy episode is African support for Libya’s appointment as the Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). According to Marian Tupy (2003), it was indeed South Africa that actively supported Libya’s candidacy. South African diplomats at the UN recommended Libya for the chairmanship and then took an initiative to mobilize the necessary votes from African and Arab states. When the US undermined the tradition of electing the Chair by acclamation and forced a vote on the issue, the South African Ambassador to the UN described the American action as “regrettable (page number unavailable).” Eventually, on January 20, 2003, Najat al-Hajjaji, the Libyan Ambassador to the UN, was elected as the Chair of the UNHRC for a one-year term (Solomon and Swart 2005: 483).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that Gaddafì’s efforts to become a peacemaker in Africa and the rest of the world have remained dubious due to his alleged involvement in ousting President Patasse of the Central African Republic (Sturman 2003: 111) in 2002 as well as in attempting to assassinate a key member of the Saudi royal family (Solomon and Swart 2005: 488) in 2004. In addition, its illiberal domestic institutional system and poor human rights record do not qualify Libya as the vanguard of human rights protection, regardless of its success in gaining the chairmanship of the UNHRC. However, the role of Gaddafì as a radical African integrationist as well as a founding father of the AU is undeniably significant in the context of Pan-African solidarity, bridging a gap between the Arab world and Black Africa.
The Maghreb and Black Africa: Interstate Rivalry in Northern Africa and the Western Sahara Question at the OAU

Besides Libya, Algeria has been an influential Maghreb country in the intergovernmental politics on the continent. While Libya often adopted a confrontational stance against its neighboring African countries in a unilateral manner, Algeria’s relations with Black African states were generally confined in either bilateral or multilateral cooperation, in which the OAU was a main regional forum. According to Touval and Zartman, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zaire were the most influential mediators to settle conflicts in Africa under the auspices of the OAU (as cited in Walraven 1999: 278). Interestingly, these states’ prominence was more pronounced continentally than in the regional patterns (Walraven 1999: 71). Furthermore, Mortimer (1999) argues that Algeria often took an international leadership role in order to legitimize the regime among the domestic public (179). In fact, Algeria has been a leading country in major international and regional movements, such as the Non-Aligned movement and African liberation movement.

Because of its bloody and lengthy independence struggle against France that ruled Algeria for more than one hundred thirty years, anti-colonialism, liberation and self-determination became the core values of Algeria’s foreign policy in the post-colonial nation-building process. In effect, Algeria has been consistently sympathetic and supportive to Black liberation struggles, which makes Algeria appear to be a “selfless” friend of Black Africans, as one AU official comments in my interview (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2006). Nonetheless, Algeria’s support for the Black liberation movement seems to be only operative in the discourse of White-Black
relations, given its unwavering support to Khartoum in the war against the southern Black rebels in Sudan.

In my analysis, besides the aforesaid values, Algeria’s geographic position, which shares the borders with the two Afro-Arab borderland countries of Mali and Niger, as well as the interstate rivalry in Northern Africa seem to be important factors to consolidate Algeria’s pro-Black African foreign policy. In a sharp contrast to Sudan, Mali and Niger are Black African-ruled countries, while Arabs account for a substantial portion of the populations. Said Samatar points out that this is partly because Black Africans had closer interactions with Europeans and enjoyed better educational opportunities than their Arab counterparts in the colonial era. This colonial setting created the segments of Black African elites in the two countries after independence (personal communication, March 26, 2009). Although Algeria’s relations with Mali and Niger have been largely friendly, unrest of the trans-border ethnic groups is a shared concern of the three governments. Therefore, Black Africa has been a geo-strategically important region for Algeria to a lesser degree than it is for Libya, whose security was often threatened by the rebel groups in exile in such Afro-Arab border countries as Chad and Sudan.

From a geopolitical perspective, the other two Maghreb states of Morocco and Tunisia are less likely to be affected than Algeria and Libya by the security and political situations of Afro-Arab border countries. Among the Maghreb countries, Morocco and Tunisia tend to be envisaged more in the context of the Mediterranean region than the Middle East, due to their geographic locations in the Western edge of the Arab world and their conservative and pro-Western foreign policies. Morocco’s Arabic name is ‘al
morocco, literally means “the west” in Arabic that indicates the exact location of Morocco in the Arab world. Notably, according to Pace (2008), Morocco applied for membership of the EU in 1987, although the application was rejected on the ground that Morocco was not an European country and, therefore, could not join the EU (160).

Morocco shares borders with Algeria, Mauritania and the Western Sahara, with all of whom Morocco invoked territorial disputes. Morocco had a border clash with Algeria in October 1963, while it once laid sovereign claim to the entire territory of Mauritania. Grimaud reveals that because of Algeria and Tunisia’s active diplomatic campaign, Morocco finally recognized Mauritania at the Islamic Summit in Rabat in September 1969 (as cited in Deeb 1991: 62). Morocco’s occupation of the Western Sahara has continued until today. Indeed, Morocco’s expansionist policy toward its neighboring countries has been a major security concern in maintaining peace in the Maghreb and Western Sahel region throughout the post-colonial history. In the Morocco-Mauritania relations, Morocco’s dominance in the political, economic and military aspects was unarguable, whereas Morocco-Algeria rivalry is a major regional feature that shapes the power balance in the Maghreb. For Tunisia, whose territory is surrounded by only Algeria and Libya, sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to become its foreign policy focus. Furthermore, Tunisia’s moderate foreign policy and limited state capacity to project its power on the continent make frictions between Tunisia and Black Africa less visible.

One of the important features of the Maghreb regional politics is its equal power distribution. Except for Tunisia, the power balance among Algeria, Libya and Morocco appears to be even without a regional hegemon. In terms of territorial size, the sizes of
Algeria and Libya are more or less comparable, while Morocco’s occupation of the Western Sahara makes Morocco less disadvantaged in this respect. Although oil-rich Libya is much more affluent than any other Maghreb states in terms of GDP per capita, its small population has been Libya’s Achilles’ heel in securing manpower for economic and military activities. Libya’s economic activities have relied on a large number of immigrant workers from other Arab and African countries. Besides, Cordesman (2004) reveals that Libya has never been able to secure enough manpower to utilize more than half of the military equipment it purchased (64).

Table 3.1: Some Facts of the Maghreb States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial size (sq km)</td>
<td>2,381,741</td>
<td>1,759,540</td>
<td>446,550</td>
<td>163,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (July 2010 est.)</td>
<td>34,586,184</td>
<td>(※) 6,461,454</td>
<td>31,627,428</td>
<td>10,589,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP purchasing power parity (US$ billions, 2009 est.)</td>
<td>241.00</td>
<td>84.92</td>
<td>145.40</td>
<td>95.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP purchasing power parity per capita (US$, 2009 est.)</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>9,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(※) Includes 166,510 non-Libyan nationals

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The World Factbook (2010)

Table 3.2: Military Sizes of the Maghreb States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Average Military Expenditures 1997-2002 (US$ Millions)</td>
<td>2,816.67</td>
<td>1,143.67</td>
<td>1,516.67</td>
<td>353.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Regular Manpower in Military Forces</td>
<td>127,500</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>196,300</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower in Paramilitary</td>
<td>181,200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower in Reserve</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These regional features accompanied by the expansionist policies of Libya and Morocco inevitably increased the sense of insecurity and competition among the Maghreb states. For example, Cordesman (2004) details that Algeria had developed a network of roads and facilities in its border areas so that its armed forces would be able to deploy and fight against either Libya or Morocco (84). Algeria often complained about Moroccan negligence in preventing weapons or rebel groups from crossing the border, while Morocco has suspected Algerian covert operation against its monarchy (Mortimer 1999: 184). For Morocco, Algeria was a major external threat, and Morocco’s military spending was largely attributable to its war against the POLISARIO Front in the Western Sahara, regional rivalry, bureaucratic momentum and the quest for status and prestige (Cordesman 2004: 73). Some news media indicate that during his early years in power, Gaddafi openly criticized the Moroccan monarchy as corrupt and immoral and in conspiracy with the Western powers and Israel. On the second attempt to overthrow King Hassan II in August 1972, the King unequivocally accused Libya of sponsoring and arming the Moroccan rebels (as cited in Deeb 1991: 86). Tunisia’s military power has been confined only for a defensive purpose, and its only major threat has been Libya (Cordesman 2004: 109).

As a result, the region has witnessed a series of failed cooperation and integration initiatives for the last few decades. For example, some news media report that when President Houari Boumediene of Algeria proposed the merger of Algeria and Tunisia in 1972, Tunisia refused the proposal on a political ground. In January 1974, Libya and Tunisia announced the union of the two countries as the Islamic Arab Republic (as cited in Deeb 1991: 77, 100). In response, Algeria threatened Tunisia with military
intervention if Tunisia went through the union since a Libya-Tunisian bloc was not a desirable regional alignment for Algeria when the country was going to confront Morocco over the Western Sahara territory. In December 1975, Algeria and Libya entered a mutual defense pact, the Hassi Mas’ud Treaty, that made Algeria Libya’s principal protector and regional ally (Deeb 1991: 101-102, 104-105). Some news media reveal that Libya invited Tunisia to join the tripartite federation that was to include Algeria in June 1978. Tunisia’s refusal to join the federation was one of the major reasons for the Libyan-backed military attack on Gafsa in Tunisia in 1980 (as cited in Deeb 1991: 123). In the end, the Algerian-Libyan merger never materialized. Some studies reveal that when the Algerian-Tunisian Treaty of Brotherhood and Concord was announced in March 1983, Libya and Morocco began working on improving their bilateral relations. In June 1983 Gaddafi promised to pull out Libya’s support for the POLISARIO. The Arab-African Federation, which was formed by Libya and Morocco in August 1984, angered Algeria. Algeria perceived that the Libya-Morocco alliance was based on confrontation against Algeria. In sum, alignments and realignments were made whenever any of the regional powers was considered to be dominant and a threat to the other countries in the Maghreb (Deeb 1991: 102, 150, 152).

Mortimer (1999) details that for Algeria, which is the geopolitical core of any Maghreb development, the idea of “Great Maghreb” was a geopolitical strategy for dealing with the Western Sahara issue rather than a project for economic integration. Therefore, tension between Algeria and Morocco brought the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which was founded in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco, to a standstill. On the other hand, Tunisia, which is the smallest state in the Maghreb system,
considered the UMA as a sort of protective mechanism and attempted to take an initiative in developing the UMA. In short, the UMA has never been able to transform itself into a meaningful multilateral entity (178-179, 186). Because of these contesting regional features, some of the Maghreb states tended to use Black Africa as a geo-strategic and diplomatic leverage to counter-balance the influence of their rival states. This tendency has been most obvious in Libya’s foreign policy since the late 1990s and Algeria’s foreign policy throughout its post-independence history.

Perhaps, the Western Sahara issue is the best example to illustrate the inter-governmental rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria used Black Africa as a main regional base to challenge Moroccan expansionism on African soil. The OAU was an important political forum for Algeria, which provided propaganda and military support to the POLISARIO Front in resistance against Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara territory. In fact, the reason why Morocco left the OAU was attributable to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s (SADR) accession to the OAU in 1984.

Notably, the Western Sahara question was one of the most divisive issues in the OAU history. Naldi (1999) reveals that when the SADR applied for a membership of the OAU in 1980, it created considerable opposition among the member states. Thus, the OAU Secretary General initially rejected the application in order to prevent the OAU from disintegrating (62). Nonetheless, according to The Guardian, the SADR later succeeded to gain the necessary number of votes in accordance with the OAU’s rule for the membership admission. Morocco coupled with some other members showed their intention to withdraw from the OAU if such a decision was made. Several states decided not to participate in further OAU sessions until the SADR was expelled, and at least a
third of the OAU members planned to boycott the Tripoli Summit scheduled in August 1982. President Moi of Kenya, the OAU Chairman at that time, considered the admission of the SADR as “the most serious challenge to the survival of the OAU (as cited in Naldi 1999: 66-67)”.

Keesing’s reports that thirty so-called radical states worked together to make the Tripoli Summit take place by the end of 1982. Eventually, the Summit adopted the Tripoli Declaration that affirmed support for the SADR (as cited in Naldi 1999: 68). As most Southern African states underwent lengthy and bloody liberation struggles against the European and White-minority rules, they provided propaganda support to the SADR based on the principle of self-determination. For example, The Herald (Zimbabwean government’s newspaper) reports that Zimbabwe viewed Morocco’s claim as “immoral” and based on “greed and a touch of megalomania (as cited in Walraven 1999: 259).”

Keesing’s writes that many OAU member states feared that the Western Sahara issue would further polarize the continent between moderate and radical groups, although the Western Sahara issue was viewed primarily as “an Arab conflict” and marginal to the broader and more pressing problems confronting Africa (as cited in Naldi 1999: 68). Some African newspapers report that in 1984, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, one of Morocco’s allies, died. In the same year, even Mauritania, [which once laid sovereign claim to part of the Western Sahara], recognized the SADR, so did the military regime of Thomas Sankara of Upper Volta. By the end of 1984, twenty-nine states supported the SADR’s accession while opponents numbered twenty-one. Just before the OAU Addis Ababa Summit that was scheduled to take place in November 1984, Nigeria decided to support the SADR, which had a positive influence on those who were still indecisive (as
cited in Walraven 1999: 262). According to *Keesing’s*, when the SADR was to formally take its seat as the fifty-first member of the OAU at the Addis Ababa Summit, Morocco reiterated its threat to withdraw from the OAU. Nonetheless, Morocco’s stance was only supported by Zaire, who boycotted the Summit to protest (as cited in Naldi 1999: 70).

Recognition of the SADR by the OAU member states worsened Morocco’s relations with many African states. For example, Kinfe Abraham (2004), a late political science professor at the Addis Ababa University, reveals that the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Ethiopia soured when Ethiopia supported the resolutions of the UN, the Non-Aligned movement and the OAU that affirmed the right of the people of the Western Sahara in 1974. Morocco-Ethiopia diplomatic relations had not been resumed until February 1997 (170-171).

The SADR has never been admitted to the LAS due to Morocco’s political weight in the Arab world. As a consequence, Zoubir (1999) details that while Algeria has used Africa for supporting the SADR, Morocco continues to seek support from the Western powers and the Gulf monarchies. For Algerians, Western Sahara is both a political and psychological matter. Algeria’s intervention in the Western Sahara conflict was motivated largely by geopolitical concern. Within the minds of Algerian political-military elites, fears of Morocco’s irredentist claims over Algerian territory still remain real (202-203). In fact, after the liberation of Southern African countries from the European and White minority rules and subsequent admission to the OAU, Morocco was the only African state being excluded from the OAU on the continent. The exclusion from the OAU hindered Morocco from fully participating in African regional politics while Algeria often took a leading role at the OAU. Given this disadvantageous
consequence for Morocco, the SADR’s accession to the OAU and Morocco’s withdrawal from the OAU can be seen as Algeria’s diplomatic triumph over Moroccan expansionism on African soil. Yet, the prospect of reconciliation between Morocco and the SADR over the Western Sahara has remained uncertain.

Another important factor that shapes the Maghreb regional politics is the influence of Egypt. Egypt is the most populous Arab country (constitutes about one third of the total Arab population) and located in the heart of the Middle Eastern regional system that consists of the Mashriq (Eastern Arab) and the Maghreb (Western Arab). It has been the cultural and intellectual capital of the Arab-Islamic civilization, and has produced a number of prominent intellectuals, writers, artists, politicians and international leaders. Egypt has been a key player in the Israel-Palestine peace process, which has been one of the most crucial agendas in the Middle Eastern politics. Because of their geographic locations, the Maghreb states are less affected by the Middle Eastern crisis than Egypt, which hosts the Secretariat of the LAS and whose former foreign minister, Amr Moussa, has served as the Secretary General of the LAS since 2001. Lorenz (1990) underscores Egypt’s dominant role in the LAS since its inception. The covenant of the LAS was first drafted in Alexandria in 1944, its first meeting took place in Cairo in March 1945 and its first Secretary General was Egyptian (20). Although Egypt’s membership had been suspended between 1979 and 1989 as a sanction against Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, Egypt was readmitted to the LAS in 1989, and the Secretariat was returned from Tunis to Cairo in the same year.

Although Northern African states are culturally and historically connected to the Arab world, they are also part of the Mediterranean and African regional systems.
Among the Northern African countries, Egypt’s Arab state identity seems to be quite secured in both the internal and external perceptions, while the Maghreb states tend to have multiple identities in the trans-national and trans-regional dimensions. Mediterranean state identity, which has many Southern European elements, is strong in Tunisia and to lesser extent in Morocco, while Algeria and Libya adopted the policy of anti-Western influence and promoted Arabization of the state and society in their post-independence nation building processes. Nonetheless, Algeria had undergone the longest colonial rule in the Maghreb region, and its Arab state identity has been in the process of construction and often threatened by Berber claims and unrest. While the Berber factor is a shared concern among all Maghreb states, Algeria facing civil war is the country to be most affected in this respect.

Importantly, the Maghreb states have tended to isolate Egypt in the sphere of Northern African politics in a collective manner. For example, some news media report that when the Libyan coup in 1969 led to close ties among Egypt, Libya and Sudan (as cited in Deeb 1991: 61), the other Maghreb leaders considered this Egyptian-led bloc on the eastern side of the Maghreb as a serious threat that urged them to form a bloc themselves (Deeb 1991: 62). Exclusion of Egypt from the Maghreb politics continued. Although Egypt applied to the membership of the UMA in 1994, the country has remained outside the UMA. In my interview, one Northern African diplomat reveals that the Maghreb states did not want to admit Egypt into this Maghreb political entity because of Egypt’s dominant position in Northern Africa and the country’s uneasy relations with the Maghreb (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).
Egypt’s foreign policy has been largely Middle Eastern oriented, and Africa seems to be its lowest priority among the regions that Egypt belongs to. For example, in his article on Egypt’s foreign policy, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1982), a former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Egypt as well as a former UN Secretary General, describes Egypt as “the central power in the Middle East”, given its crucial role in shaping major developments and events in the region during the course of nineteenth and twentieth centuries (770). Lorenz (1990) argues that public opinions and foreign policy in Mubarak’s Egypt have leaned toward the identification with the interests of other Arab countries not necessarily based on the noble idea of Pan-Arabism, but rather economic and political interests. Many Egyptians believe that an appealing reason for Arab integration is the imbalance in resource distribution and demographics between Egypt and its neighboring countries (119-120). Some studies indicate that reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world without prejudice against the Egypt-Israel link was a priority of Mubarak’s foreign policy. Thus, Egypt’s readmission to the LAS in 1989 was Mubarak’s diplomatic triumph in this respect. With the fear of Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab oil producing states expected Egypt to take a role of moderator and stabilizer in the Arab world. Mubarak worked hard to establish good relations with all Arab countries and promoted its large and well-equipped army as a deterrent force against potential menaces from Israel and Iran (Hinnebusch 2002b: 107).

Boutros-Ghali (1982) regards Egypt-Sudan relations and [related to this] the Nile Basin as the two vital interests of Egypt’s foreign policy toward Africa, although he emphasizes that Egypt’s African policy is more inclusive, mentioning some technical and financial assistance that Egypt provides to sub-Saharan African countries (782-784).
Okumu (2005) underscores the marginality of Africa in Egypt’s foreign policy. He argues that over the years Egypt has paid more attention to the Middle Eastern agendas, especially the Palestinian issue, than to African affairs. Many observers of Egypt’s foreign policy toward Africa have found that Egypt’s main concern for Africa is the waters of the Nile but nothing else. Many Africans criticize how Egyptians consider themselves as being “non-Africans (19).”

Therefore, it is fair to argue that if the priority of Egypt’s foreign policy is to solidifying its status of a leading statesman in the Arab world, no wonder why Libya and Algeria seek their political base in Black Africa in order to counter-balance the influence of Egypt in Northern African politics. In this respect, the institutional development and politics of the OAU, which was on an Afro-Arab basis, were to some extent shaped by the geopolitical interests of Northern Arab states toward Black Africa. Libya, since the late 1990s, and Algeria have tended to see Black Africa as an alternative regional bloc, from which they expected to gain support in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, Egypt’s foreign policy focus was oriented toward the Middle East while Morocco remained outside the OAU politics.
Chapter IV: Afro-Arab Cooperation toward the Unification of Africa: Revival of Afro-Arab Solidarity or Clash of Civilizations?
Establishment of the African Union (AU): Diverse Interests and Visions of the Founding Fathers

It has been widely acknowledged that the replacement of the OAU by the AU was led by the most decisive integrationist states at that time: South Africa, Nigeria and Libya. As it is true for any regional integration initiative, progressive regional integration is not possible unless some core states take an initiative in decision-making and very importantly offer funds for integration policies and projects. In the case of African regional integration, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya, who had their own interests and visions for African integration, played important roles in this respect. More precisely, Thomas Kwasi Tieku (2004) claims that the decision of Mbeki and Obasanjo to reform the OAU to pursue their new foreign policy objectives and Gaddafi’s intention to use the OAU as a forum to rehabilitate himself and his country after the lengthy isolation from the international scene led to the replacement of the OAU with the AU (251).

According to Vale and Maseko, in 1996 South Africa adopted a neo-liberal economic policy called “Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)”, which was designed to attract foreign investment and strengthen the country’s competitiveness in the global market (as cited in Tieku 2004: 253). In order to improve the country’s image as a “protector of rights”, including property rights, and to make South Africa a role-model for democratization and economic liberalization in Africa, human rights and democratization became the core agendas of the country’s foreign policy (Tieku 2004: 253). However, Landsberg reveals that Mbeki’s strong advocacy for liberal democracy and his open denouncement of undemocratic regimes in Africa frustrated some African
statesmen, many of whom had backed the ANC and provided it with sanctuary during the apartheid era (as cited in Tieku 2004: 254). In order to advance African democratization without intensifying anti-Mbeki sentiments among the African leaders, Mbeki chose to place the neo-liberal agenda in a broader transformationalist context. Instead of accusing illiberal regimes in Africa, he intended to reform the OAU, which was often criticized by the Western media as a “dictators’ club”, and managed to move the OAU to take a number of major pro-democratic policies. The first attempted to redirect the OAU to become a strong and democratic organization. The second condemned member states whose governments seized power through unconstitutional means. The third required the OAU to assist military regimes in Africa to move toward a democratic rule (Tieku 2004: 254-255).

On the other hand, in his reform plan to give guidelines for governance in African countries, Obasanjo of Nigeria wanted to reorient the OAU so that it would become the central organ to deal with Africa’s security, stability and development concerns. The principles of the reform plan are articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding on the CSSDCA, which was adopted at the OAU Durban Summit in July 2002. The reform plan provides criteria for judging the conducts of African leaders in four thematic fields: security, stability, development and cooperation. For security, the reform plan urges African statesmen to promote security as both a human security concern and an interdependent issue. It implies that peace and security in Africa is a collective responsibility of all African governments and proposes that sovereignty should no longer provide the shield behind which African rulers abuse their citizens. Furthermore, the reform guidelines call upon African leaders to involve civil society organizations in the
continent-wide decision-making process and to allow them to act as the main actor to challenge security, stability, development and cooperation issues on the continent (Tieku 2004: 255-257).

Noteworthily, Adebajo reveals that Obasanjo’s enthusiasm to make CSSDCA a viable mechanism in the continental governance stemmed from strong domestic political pressures. When Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party government took power, domestic opposition to Nigeria’s peacekeeping activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone was at its peak. The fact that the country was spending $1 million a day for the peace mission of the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone provoked so much public denouncement that a substantial reduction in Nigeria’s commitment in Sierra Leone became imperative (as cited in Tieku 2004: 258-259). According to Inamete, Obasanjo regime suggested integrating CSSDCA mechanism into the OAU so that the continental institution would be able to take a central role in the resolution and management of conflicts in Africa. As a consequence, the costs of future African peacekeeping activities could also be shared by other well-endowed African states (as cited in Tieku 2004: 259-260).

Gaddafi hosted the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, on September 6-9, 1999 in order to discuss how to make the OAU effective (Tieku 2004: 260). Huliaras argues that Gaddafi wanted to use the Summit to demonstrate his full comeback to the geopolitics of Black Africa and to highlight his commitment to the Pan-African project (as cited in Tieku 2004: 261). According to De Waal, He shocked 33 African leaders who attended the Summit, presenting his “United States of Africa” proposal. It entailed the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single armed
force and a common continent-wide currency (as cited in Tieku 2004: 261).

Unsurprisingly, most of the heads of state viewed Gaddafi’s proposal as too radical and extremely ambitious. Among them, South Africa was the strongest opponent to the idea of “United States of Africa”. Consequently, the constitutive legal document for the creation of the AU, which was adopted at the Lome Summit in June 2000, included none of the elements of the “United States of Africa”. Likewise, the launching of the AU took place on July 9, 2002 without deliberation of Gaddafi’s proposal (Tieku 2004: 262-263).

Eventually, nonetheless, two clauses that can be credited to Gaddafi were included in the amendment approved at the AU Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on February 3, 2003. The first is the extension of grounds for the AU’s intervention to include critical threats to legitimate order to maintain peace and stability. The second is to prevent the AU member states from renouncing their memberships (Tieku 2004: 265). According to Munusamy, Gaddafi also convinced the other African leaders to change the date of Africa Day from May 25 to September 9, the day when the declaration to establish the AU was made in Sirte, Libya (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 481).

Gaddafi’s efforts to lead the continental integration process can be also found in the establishment of the NEPAD that later became part of the AU system. Its website explains that the NEPAD was established on October 23, 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria. Its strategic framework document arose from a mandate given by the OAU to the five initiating heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for the continent. The OAU Summit in July 2001 formally adopted the strategic framework document (NEPAD 2006). According to Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004), NEPAD calls upon African governments to
make efforts to attract foreign investment and to mobilize local capital. It also gives a priority to building continent-wide infrastructures of transportation, information and communication technologies, water and energy. Its ambitious goals are to achieve a seven percent annual growth rate, a four percent African share in the world trade and, as projected in the UN Millennium Goals, a decrease of poverty by half by 2015 (148).

As one of the founding fathers of the AU, Gaddafi attempted to secure his position in the formation process of the NEPAD. Fabricius reveals that Gaddafi was appointed as a member of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Steering Committee of the NEPAD, in which the members were tasked with implementing the principles of democracy, good governance and human rights in the institutional framework of the NEPAD (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 480). Many viewed this as a maneuver to ease Libyan ire at being excluded from the group of leading African states at the core of the NEPAD (Solomon and Swart 2005: 480). Nonetheless, according to Munusamy, Gaddafi gave a mocking attack on the African recovery plan initiated by Mbeki, Obasanjo and other key African leaders, when he criticized the NEPAD as a project of the “former colonizers and racists (as cited in Solomon and Swart 2005: 480).” In fact, Gaddafi tried to impose an almost authoritarian leadership role onto the new bodies of the AU and the NEPAD. His active involvement in the AU and irrational statements and policy announcements since its inception may have damaged the reputation of the AU and the NEPAD and left him alienated with certain segments of African leadership, who do not yield to his views (Solomon and Swart 2005: 480).

Jhazbhay (2004) analyzes the roles of Algeria and Egypt, two of the five initiating members in charge of launching the NEPAD, in relation to South Africa. Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, well known for his anti-apartheid support to Black South African struggles, was one of the founding troika of African heads of state on the NEPAD steering committee. Given the historical ties between Algeria and South Africa, it is unsurprising that post-apartheid relations between these two countries have been conducted at the presidential level. A good chemistry and historical bond exist between Bouteflika and Mbeki. South Africa offered its expertise to help Algeria with economic development, internal political mediation and gender issues. South Africa also gave Algeria assistance in its bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). In terms of Egypt, South Africa has not been convinced by the commitment of Egypt to the Pan-African causes. Mbeki was frustrated by President Mubarak’s claim for being a key player in the NEPAD, but not attending meetings of the steering implementation committees (158-159).

Importantly, the establishment of the AU, which has more extensive and progressive mandates than the OAU, is positively seen as a big step forward to advance continental integration with a potential revival of Afro-Arab solidarity. As the founding story of the AU implies, the institutional framework of the AU is likely to be shaped by interests of the major African powers, who take a lead in the intergovernmental negotiations and agreements. Throughout the formation process, the two major Black African powers of Nigeria and South Africa sought to inject their foreign policy and economic agendas into the architecture of the AU, while Libya attempted to use the AU as an organizational base to help the rehabilitation of the Libyan leader and his country after the long international isolation.

Somewhat surprisingly, inputs from other Northern African powers, namely Algeria and Egypt, were less significant in sharp contrast to their leading roles in the
establishment of the OAU and African independence movements. In the Algeria-South Africa’s relations, South Africa proves to be an expertise provider to Algeria in the fields of economic development, trade liberalization and other social and political affairs. In post-colonial and post-apartheid Africa, Black African states outnumber Northern Arab states, and there is no longer the common enemy of Western colonialism as such. In this sense, the political significance and influence of Northern Arab states to Black Africa have declined, although there still remains a significant economic disparity between the two regions in a collective fashion. In fact, the economic chasm between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly reflected in the current financial structure of the AU. The affluent Northern Arab states of Algeria, Egypt and Libya together with the two Black African powers of Nigeria and South Africa account for a great share of the financial contributions to the AU. Can significant financial contributions from Northern Arab states be interpreted as signaling their strong political will and stake in African integration? What is an implication of the AU’s financial architecture to the current Afro-Arab relations on the continent? To answer these questions, the next part analyzes the AU’s financial structure and its reform process so far.

Financial Structure of the AU: Who Will Lead and Pay for African Integration?

Since its creation in 2002, the AU has been making efforts to develop its institutional identity and capacity as the supreme authority of African regional integration. Nonetheless, due to its budgetary deficit, resulting from outstanding financial contributions from the member states, implementation of integration policies and projects are often delayed, and as a result, the effectiveness of the AU is greatly constrained. After the three-year transitional period from the OAU to the AU, the AU
member states approved the substantially increased AU’s operational and program budgets for the year 2005. The total budget of 2005 amounted to US$158,384,000 consisting of the operational budget of $63,000,000 and the program budget of $95,384,000. (AU Executive Council 2005a). In principle, the operational budget is to cover the AU’s regular administrative costs and to be shared among the member states on the basis of the AU’s scale of assessment. The program budget is to be funded by the AU international partners (donor countries and organizations) and the member states on a voluntary basis in order to implement various AU policies and projects. Such an ambitious financial expansion plan was attributable to the increasingly significant role of the AU, mainly in the field of peace and security and the leadership of powerful African states whose political and economic interests favored more progressive continental integration. Remarkably, in my interview with Ben Kioko, Director of Legal Counsel at the AU, he explained that the AU’s budget for 2005 was more than triple the OAU’s yearly budget, which was less than US$50 million prior to the year 2002 (personal communication, July 17, 2006).

In practice, nonetheless, the AU’s ambitious budgetary expansion has never been followed up by the member states due to their weak political will and limited financial capacity. For instance, Maxwell Mkwezalamba, the AU Commissioner for Economic Affairs, describes that, on average, only about 40 percent of mandatory contributions is collected on time every year. For example, in 2005, only US$36 million out of US$63 million of assessed contributions, representing about 57 percent, was collected by the end of year. Furthermore, the program budget of US$95 million was insufficiently funded, since the AU partners could not meet their commitments (2006 Mkwezalamba: 2-3).
In fact, this binary budgetary structure is considered to be very problematic in terms of policy/project implementation and African ownership of the AU. As long as the program budget is dependent on voluntary contributions, mainly from the AU partners, great uncertainty and inconsistence of project implementation will continue, and the AU will remain a highly ineffective continental bureaucracy with its end being its existence. Furthermore, financial dependency on foreign donors curtails a sense of African ownership of continental integration and, as a result, institutional autonomy and discretion, which are fundamental characteristics of supra-state authority, will be hardly developed.

To solve these problems, in June 2006 in Banjul, Gambia, the AU Executive Council recommended that “the Union Shall have one integrated budget.” However, the Council clarified that this would not “entail a budgetary increase that could affect the contributing capacity of Member States.” It was also declared that “the formula of the integrated budget should not be considered as the mechanical merger of the two parts of the budget (operating cost and programme budget).” The real purpose of budgetary integration was to require the member states to fund “selected top priority programmes/projects” on the basis of the scale of assessment, while “the remaining programme cost will be financed by voluntary contributions of Member States and partners (AU Executive Council, 2006b: 1-2).”

In fact, this budgetary reform was led by the leadership of South Africa, which was proud of its leading role in African integration. At the AU Executive Council on January 19, 2006 in Khartoum Sudan, South Africa addressed its opposition to the separation of the budget into assessed part and voluntary part. They proposed that “the
overall budget should be assessed to AU Member States… This is the only approach that would ensure African ownership of the AU Programmes (AU Executive Council, 2006a).” South Africa’s initiative in this issue can be analyzed in respect to the AU’s scale of assessment, which is based on such economic indicators as gross national income, external debt and per capita income of each member state. In compliance with the assessment, the AU big five states of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa are responsible to share 75 percent (15 percent each) of the AU operational budget (AU Executive Council, 2005c). As of June 2007, the so-called second tier AU member states also account for a significant share: Tunisia (2.96 percent), Sudan (1.86 percent), Zimbabwe (1.77 percent), Cameroon (1.54 percent), Cote D’ivoire (1.61 percent), Kenya (1.44 percent) and Tanzania (1.09 percent).

In my interpretation, it appears that South Africa, which had already possessed financial capacity to pay for some prioritized AU projects, desired to institutionalize this financial initiative in the AU structure, bringing it together with four other powerful African states. Gradual budgetary integration seems to be theoretically plausible in facilitating financial mobilization among the member states, especially affluent ones, and reinforcing African ownership of the AU projects. Significantly, South Africa and Nigeria have been generous voluntary contributors to the AU’s program budget. For instance, South Africa and Nigeria donated US$11,825,572 and US$10 millions respectively to the 2005 program budget (AU Executive Council, 2006a).

Furthermore, one AU official explained that South Africa initially offered to bear more than 25 percent share of the AU operational budget, which indeed reflects the real economic capacity of the country in relation to the other member states. The rest of the
AU member states considered this South Africa’s generosity to be politically unacceptable in ensuring the collective ownership of the AU. When the quota of 15 percent each for the AU big five states was proposed in the negotiation process, South Africa agreed with the proposal, followed by Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Egypt. In sharp contrast, Egypt has fulfilled its financial obligation to the AU quite unwillingly (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). To reemphasize, Egypt was the last state to agree to accept the suggested share of 15 percent among the AU big five states. In addition, some diplomatic intelligence source reveals that Egypt has not been content with the way the AU Commission conducts budgeting and auditing. To closely scrutinize the AU Commission’s budgetary proposal, Egypt sent the delegates of financial expert to the AU Addis Ababa Summit in January 2007 (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). Tunisia has a similar attitude. The quota of Tunisia was significantly decreased from 4.14 percent in 2005 to 2.96 percent in 2007 after the negotiation between the country and the AU Commission. Important to mention, unlike the EU that gives more voting power to the members who make major financial contributions to the EU, the AU has a one vote for one member principle that does not grant any privilege to the AU big five states in terms of decision-making.

Based on these findings, it is fair to argue that the AU is unevenly funded by the member states, due to the significant economic chasms among them. In the context of Afro-Arab relations, four better-off Northern Arab states (Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) are responsible for 47.96 percent of the AU operation budget, while the two Black African powers of Nigeria and South Africa account for 30 percent, with the rest of member states collectively responsible for 22.04 percent. This distributional pattern is
somewhat justified by the economic situation of the African continent, in which richer Northern Arab states are expected to bear financial burdens of African integration. Hence, the asymmetrical relationship of Arabs as “givers” and Africans as “receivers” has continued in terms of financing the AU. In this view, the next question we may ask is whether or not there are substantial economic and political benefits that Northern Arab states can expect out of the AU-led African integration. Will their substantial financial contributions be paid off eventually? If so, how and in what fields of African integration?

In the case of the EU, benefits of regional economic integration are considered to be significant for both rich West European states, who bear the most financial burdens of integration, and poor East European states, who are required to meet certain economic and political conditions to be fully integrated into the EU. Furthermore, as hot debates over the Turkey’s membership application to the EU imply, cultural and historical affinity as “Europe” is an important institutional identity imbedded in the EU. Conservatively speaking, therefore, the admittance of Muslim Turkey to this European elitist organization appears to be unlikely within a foreseeable future.

On the other hand, the OAU was created as an all-inclusive regional organization, whose membership was open to any sovereign states within and surrounding the African continent. As a consequent, cultural and historical affinity as “Africa” is absent, and the continent is often divided into the Northern Arab world and Sub-Saharan Black Africa when scholars and policy makers conceptually and empirically analyze Africa. Moreover, contrary to European integration that is more economic-orientated than political or security-centered, the international significance of the AU is concentrated in the field of
peace and security. Seen in this light, in the next part, I will explore what security issues matter in the discourse of Afro-Arab relations and what are intentions of Northern Arab states toward the AU-led peace and security management on the continent.

**Afro-Arab Cooperation for Peace and Security in Africa: Bridging the North-South Gap?**

In the post-Rwanda genocide international politics, there has been an urgent need to strengthen the African regional capacity to deal with peace and security issues on the continent. In fact, the AU is expected to play a leading role to stop on-going conflicts, such as Darfur crisis, with the internationally embraced idea of African ownership of African problems. The international political reality underling this regionalization trend is that most non-African states are unwilling to offer military deployments for conflicts in Africa. Hence, any further action using force is likely to be born first by the AU or other sub-regional organizations, including the ECOMOG, which is the peace-keeping organ of the ECOWAS.

Indeed, African norms of humanitarian intervention have been institutionalized in the AU system. According to Udombana (2005), the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in 2000 was a watershed in the solidarity of African leaders to design new collective machinery for continental peace and security. The Act promised to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law.” Most significantly, the Act permits the humanitarian intervention right in respect to breaches of international criminal law. It entitles the AU the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and
stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council (1167-1168).

The AU also allows member states to request intervention from the union to restore peace and security (Udombana 2005: 1167-1168).

In order to implement those peacekeeping legal instruments, the AU has developed some significant operational machineries for the last few years. The AU PSC, which was established in May 2004, is one of them. The AU PSC is the main decision-making organ for conflict prevention and management among the AU member states. According to Golaszinski (2004), at the AU Executive Council in March 2004, fifteen member states were elected as the initial AU PSC members. Five members, one per region (Western, Central, Eastern, Southern and Northern Africa), were elected for a three-year term, with ten others for a two-year term (2). Nigeria (Western), Gabon (Central), Ethiopia (Eastern), South Africa (Southern) and Algeria (Northern) were elected for a three-year term; Ghana, Senegal and Togo (Western), Cameroon and Congo Republic (Central), Kenya and Sudan (Eastern), Lesotho and Mozambique (Southern) and Libya (Northern) were elected for a two-year term. The regional allocation of the two-year term membership follows the formula of 4 (Western) – 3 (Central) – 3 (Eastern) – 3 (Southern) – 2 (Northern) based on the number of member states in each region. The International Crisis Group (2005) details that to give the AU PSC the means to deploy peace-keeping missions in the member states, the AU is constructing the African Standby Force (ASF), to be comprised of multi-disciplinary contingents or regional brigades. The AU PSC also has the Peace Fund (1), which is funded by the regular AU budget, voluntary contributions from the member states and other sources.
In fact, Northern Arab states have great stakes in intervening in conflicts in the Afro-Arab borderlands, such as conflicts in Sudan, because of their geographic proximity, geo-strategic interests and cultural-religious ties with Arabs in the affected region. This tendency has been most apparent in foreign policy of Libya. It is important to notice that the LAS has not developed effective regional peacekeeping instruments and mechanisms due to its informal institutional structure and lack of political will among the member states. Therefore, being part of the AU-led African peace and security management, Northern Arab states are able to closely monitor the conflicting situations in the Afro-Arab borderlands and manipulate peacekeeping strategies and operations that the AU has mandate. In this sense, as one donor state diplomat comments, Northern Arab states’ intentions in African integration are directed more toward monitoring and controlling African affairs than genuine integrationist efforts (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2006). Along with this line of argument, the following section discusses the AU’ initiative for the UN Security Council (UNSC) reform, in which racial-cultural state identity of Arab or Black African manifests and shapes the reform initiative process.

The AU-led UN Security Council Reform: Who Will Represent Africa?

State identity of Arab or Black African became an issue in the AU’s initiative for the UNSC reform, in which Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa competed against one another over the two permanent African representative seats. The Group of 4 (G4), comprising of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, came up with a UNSC reform proposal, in which they suggest that Africa should have two permanent seats at a reformed UNSC. A rationale behind this is that more than two thirds of the peace and security agendas that have been discussed at the UNSC for the last decade or so are African issues.
Furthermore, the African region has more than 50 sovereign states that are slightly less than one third of the total UN membership.

In response to this G4’s initiative, the AU adopted “the Ezulwini Consensus - the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations” at the AU Executive Council 7th Extraordinary Session in March 2005 in Addis Ababa. In terms of the UNSC reform, the Consensus insists that Africa should be fully represented in the decision-making process of the UN especially at the UNSC. In order to attain the full representation of Africa at the UNSC, Africa should have “not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto as well as five non-permanent seats.” Regarding how to choose the African representatives, the Consensus makes it clear that:

The African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council. The question of the criteria for the selection of African members of the Security Council should be a matter for the AU to determine, taking into consideration the representative nature and capacity of those chosen (AU Executive Council 2005b: 9-10).

Taking account of African regional politics and each member state’s military power, economic capacity and diplomatic weight in the world, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are apparently the three strongest candidates, although Kenya and Senegal also expressed their aspirations to become the African candidates. Nevertheless, to choose two out of these three African powers appears to be an impossible task that the AU is responsible for. Egypt laid claim that one of the two African representatives should be a Northern African country since Africa is an Afro-Arab regional bloc. On the other hand, among Black African states, there is a widely shared view that the two permanent seats should be taken by two sub-Saharan African states since Northern African state’s claim
to be an African representative in this crucial security matter is considered to be illegitimate. Provocatively, according to Okumu (2005), Davo Oluwemi-Kusa, who was a close confidante of President Obasanjo, dismissed Egypt and South Africa on the ground that they are not “black enough” to represent Africa at a reformed UNSC, while Nigeria has “true blacks (21).” As the historical and contemporary Afro-Arab frictions imply, Northern Arab states tend to identify themselves more toward the Middle East than Africa in the cultural and geopolitical contexts, with a notable exception of Gaddafi’s whimsical favoritism toward Africa. To emphasize again, most of Arab states in Africa are members of both the AU and the LAS, and there are state identity and compliance issues related to this.

In particular, Jhazbhay (2004) argues that Egypt’s commitment to African cause has been questioned at the highest level by most African leaders, including South Africa. President Mubarak had not attended the OAU-AU Summits for many years since the assassination attempt against him during the OAU Addis Ababa Summit in 1995 [until the AU Sharm-el Sheikh Summit in June-July 2008 in Egypt]. However, Mubarak laid claim to be part of the enlarged NEPAD Steering Committee when it was extended by the original two members [of Senegal and South Africa]. He also wanted to be part of the AU’s NEPAD implementation group, even though he has never attended its meetings. Indeed, South Africa views that “they [Egyptians] are Africans only when it suits them – such as in their bid for the 2010 soccer World Cup (158-159, 163-164).”

So far, Egypt’s role in the AU internal politics has proved to be marginal. Until the last election of the AU Commissioners in 2008 that elected the first Egyptian AU Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, there had been no Egyptian national serving
for a high-rank position (Commissioner or Director) at the AU Commission. Some AU officials commented that this was largely due to the lack of focus and commitment of the Egyptian government for African politics and the AU-led African regional integration (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). This is quite ironic, given the fact that Egypt contributes 15 percent of the AU operational budget annually.

During the AU Addis Ababa Summit on January 31 – February 2, 2008, Kheir Eldin Abdel Latif Mohamed, who was the Assistant Foreign Minister for Finance and Administration of Egypt, lost the election of the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission (the second highest position at the AU Commission) against a Kenyan candidate, Erastus J.O. Mwencha, who was the Secretary General of the COMESA. The AU Commission consists of the Chairperson of Commission, the Deputy Chairperson of Commission, and the eight Commissioners for the specialized sectors: (1) Peace and Security; (2) Political Affairs; (3) Infrastructure and Energy; (4) Social Affairs; (5) Human Resources, Science and Technology; (6) Trade and Industry; (7) Rural Economy and Agriculture; and (8) Economic Affairs. Since the creation of the OAU, the highest administrative position (the OAU Secretary General / the Chairperson of the AU Commission) has never been taken by Northern African states. Notably, the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission was the highest administrative position at the OAU-AU, which a Northern Arab country (Egypt) attempted to undertake.

Knowing its unpopularity among Black African countries, Egypt attempted to gain support from the Arab states in specific and the international community in general to become one of the two African permanent representatives at a reformed UNSC. For example, Egypt convinced the other LAS members to adopt a Communiqué that states
the LAS supports Egypt’s efforts to become a permanent member of the UNSC at the LAS Summit in Algè on March 19-23, 2005. In fact, Egypt’s efforts to become an Africa’s representative met interests of the Eastern Arab states that had no chance to gain a UNSC permanent membership through any diplomatic channels since a so-called Arab-Islamic representation was absent in the G4’s UNSC reform proposal. Some diplomatic intelligence source indicates that in adoption of the Communiqué at the LAS Algè Summit, Egypt first convinced the Eastern Arab states, and then presented the draft of Declaration to the Maghreb states. To avoid a friction with the Eastern Arab states, Algeria and Libya reluctantly accepted the Declaration (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2006).

As a powerful Northern African state with Arab-Islamic affinity, Egypt is expected to represent the broader Arab will and interests at a reformed UNSC. Egypt has clandestinely sought a way to choose two African permanent representatives at the UN General Assembly by voting since its international reputation in the fields of peace, security and democracy appears to be rated higher (but not so significantly) than that of Nigeria. Nonetheless, through my interviews, some African and donor state diplomats point out that the international network of Jewish lobby might mobilize political clouts worldwide in order to block the Egypt’s attempt because of the country’s great stake in the Israel-Palestine issue (identity withheld on source’s request). Obviously, this Egypt’s diplomatic maneuver is contradictory to the Ezulwini Consensus that authorizes the AU to be responsible for the selection of the Africa’s representatives. Driven by its own national interest rather than allegiance to the African consensus, Egypt’s status as an African state remains largely questionable and shaky.
While Egypt has sought regional support from Arab states in the Middle East, South Africa and Nigeria have tried to develop inter-regional partnership with South American countries, where a large number of Black African diasporas reside. Asante (2006) considers a sizable delegation of South Africa at the CIAD II in Salvador-Bahia, Brazil as a signal of South Africa’s intention to strengthen the South-South axis of the two countries (174). The regional hegemon of South Africa tends to send a larger delegation than other African countries to the AU-sponsored conferences and symposiums. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that during the CIAD II was held in July, 2006, the G4 countries conducted an active diplomatic campaign to advance the UNSC reform initiative with cooperation of Nigeria and South Africa, both of which were seen by the G4 as potential African permanent representatives.

Nigeria has also attempted to champion Africa-South America cooperation as part of its foreign policy strategy in order to become one of the African representative at a reformed UNSC. Nigeria hosted the 1st Africa-South America Summit (ASA) in Abuja on November 26-30, 2006. In the Abuja Resolution on Africa-South America Cooperative Forum (ASACOF), which was adopted at the ASA, the heads of state of Africa and South America decide to “commit ourselves to deepening and strengthening the historical and cultural linkages which exist among our peoples”. Obasanjo succeeded to incorporate the statement “CALLING For an urgent reform of the Security Council…and supporting its enlargement in order to make it more broadly representative for the developing countries…” in the Declaration of the 1st Africa-South America Summit. To follow up, Nigeria and Brazil were designated to coordinate the activities of the ASACOF.
Noteworthily, Algeria and Libya have attempted to block the AU-led UNSC reform initiative in general and Egypt’s ambition in specific. For these two powerful Maghreb states, Egypt’s acquisition of the UNSC permanent membership cannot be acceptable since it will grant more geopolitical and diplomatic leverages to Egypt that is one of the regional powers in Northern Africa. Some diplomatic intelligence source reveals that Algeria’s active role as a “reform spoiler” upset the G4 that desperately needed African consensus for the reform initiative. As a result, Tokyo withdrew one of the ODA project proposals for Algeria during the time when the reform initiative was at the critical stage. Algeria later decided to support the AU’s position on the UNSC reform (perhaps assuming that it would not succeed), while Libya continued to put anti-reform pressure on other African states. In fact, the leadership of Alfa Omar Konare, the Chairperson of the AU Commissioner from 2003 to 2007, for the reform process was curtailed by Gaddafi’s pressure. Konare was a former President of Mali, which has regularly received financial assistance from Libya (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

It is fair to acknowledge that not only Northern Arab states but also some Black African states have acted as “spoilers” (although less decisively) in the process of reform initiative partly due to their uneasy relations with Nigeria. For example, Benin and Nigeria share the 770 km-long border and had a territorial dispute over Yoruba-inhabited area of Benin based on the account of irredentism in 1960. Cameroon had a confrontation with Nigeria over a disputed peninsula in 1994. Hence, Nigeria’s acquisition of the UNSC permanent membership was seen as a potential threat to territorial integrity of these two neighboring countries. Besides, some Western and
Central African states have expressed their concerns for Nigeria’s domestic problems, such as political instability and weak governance, which are likely to have cross-border effects on the neighboring states. If internally unconsolidated Nigeria becomes one of the African representatives at a reformed UNSC, Nigeria may end up being a hegemonic threat rather than a reliable peacemaker in the region.

On the other hand, Ghana has actively supported Nigeria’s acquisition because of its close bilateral relations with Nigeria in the Western African region, where Francophone countries are dominant. In addition to its significant diplomatic weight in Africa, Ghana was the chair state for the Ezulwini Consensus, which was adopted in March 2005. As Obasanjo was the Chairperson of the AU in the same year, Ghana and Nigeria jointly facilitated the UNSC reform process in that year. Obasanjo called and hosted the Extraordinary Session of the AU Summit on August 4, 2005 to gain support from the other AU member states for the AU-G4-led UNSC reform initiative. This Nigeria-Ghana coalition was perceived as a nuisance by Egypt. In response, Egypt supported President al-Bashir’ aspiration to become the AU Chairperson in 2006, hoping to lead the UNSC reform initiative under the Sudan-Egypt leadership. Sudan hosted the AU Summit in January 2006 in Khartoum, and al-Bashir was ready to take the AU chairmanship in that year. Nonetheless, due to the strong international pressure (especially from the US) against al-Bashir, African leaders decided to elect Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo as the AU Chairperson for year 2006.

Indeed, many Black African states still consider Nigeria to be a better choice than Egypt, whose state identity and foreign policy are not African-oriented at all. In my interview, one Nigerian diplomat affirms that Nigeria’s foreign policy has been
consistently African-centered and given a high priority to the West African affairs (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). This assertion is empirically supported. Nigeria has been an active mediator and major peacekeeping troop contributor for African conflicts under the auspices of the ECOMOG and the OAU-AU. Furthermore, while most of Francophone African countries have continued to rely on France as a major capital provider for economic development and security ally since independence, Aluko argues that Nigeria and Tanzania embarked on policies of self-reliance and African regional economic cooperation as early as the 1980s. Another important historical background for Nigeria’s Africa-first foreign policy is that the White minority regimes in Africa together with some Western powers supported the secessionist movement in the Biafra War (as cited in Walraven 1999: 53, 55).

In terms of South Africa, greatly owing political and material support to its fellow African states during the apartheid era, it is unsurprising that the ANC-led regime adopted Africa-focused foreign policy upon seizing power. In “Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa” issued in March 1994, the ANC defined seven principles in the conduct of the country’s new foreign policy. Among them, the two principles read that “a belief that South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect the interests of Africa” and “a belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation (as cited in Pere and Nieuwkerk 2002: 175)”.

Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) nicely articulate South Africa’s foreign policy under Mbeki’s leadership as a pendulum swinging between realist and moral internationalism (195). As South Africa is a major exporter to its neighboring countries,
regional economic integration through such institutional arrangements as the SADC and the South African Customs Union (SACU) is likely to solidify South Africa’s trade dominance in the region. Therefore, in realist thinking, promoting regional economic and political integration is rational foreign policy for South Africa to pursue. In the aspect of moral internationalism, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) describe that Mbeki, who was the ANC’s chief diplomat in exile, is a very skilled diplomat and international statesman. He is also visionary, promoting a policy framework based on the idea of “Africa Renaissance” that seeks a revival of the continent by reinforcing African initiative to solve African problems (190).

Such South Africa’s two-fold foreign policy is clearly reflected in its controversial arms sales practice toward other African countries. Van Nieuwkerk reveals that South Africa has exported arms to Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan and others African countries, and its dubious arm sales record is strongly disapproved by South African public (as cited in Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 184). South Africa’s Foreign Minister Selebi makes it clear that foreign policy is about making choices. Hence, South Africa sells arms, but does not use human rights as conditionality for trade (as cited in Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 179). To summarize, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) nicely describe South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa as “about making the continent safe to do business (179).”

For South Africa, neo-liberal economic interest seems to be a major determinant of its foreign policy, so does a sense of identity. For example, Jhazbhay (2004) argues that the ANC-led government has reflected its historical Black liberation experience on its foreign relations with the countries concerned (156). In my interview, one South
African AU official pointed out that racial identity has remained an important agenda in the country’s internal politics and foreign relations due to the tragic legacy of apartheid (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). In Jhazbhay’s view (2004), while the leaders in North Africa appear to have a political identity crisis (African, Arab or Mediterranean), South Africa has no doubt a core state identity, African (166).

In sum, Mbeki’s leadership in the creation of the AU and South Africa’s significant financial contribution to the AU budget can be credited as Mbeki’s Pan-Africanist efforts. Furthermore, South Africa’s prestige as the most powerful African state seems to be well-established within and outside Africa. Hence, South Africa’s hegemonic position as an African representative is unlikely to be challenged, while Egypt’s shaky African status and Nigeria’s domestic problems leave them behind as less qualified candidates.

Although it was reaffirmed the Ezulwini Consensus as Africa’s one voice in the closing speech of the AU Banjul Summit in June-July 2006 by the Gambian President Alhagie Yahya Jammeh, some AU officials as well as diplomats of the G4 states regrettably consider the Ezulwini Consensus to be a failure that has yielded no significant result and progress. After all, regional identity and collectiveness as “Africa” are underdeveloped, and Black African countries tend to skeptically view Northern Arab states’ (especially Egypt’s) “African status”, when it comes to collective geopolitical matters.
“Maghrebization” of African Regional Integration?: Algeria’s Leading Role in the AU-led Peace and Security Cooperation and Gaddafi’s AU Chairmanship in 2009

In sharp contrast to Egypt’s marginal role in African regional security cooperation, Algeria, which is a regional power in the Maghreb, seems to be successful in its quest to play a leading role in maintaining peace and security on the continent. Quite significantly, the position of the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security has been taken by Algerians for two consecutive terms. The first Commissioner was Djinnit Said, who was a career diplomat and had long served for peace, security and political affairs at the OAU-AU. The second and incumbent Commissioner is Ramtane Lamamra, who is a former Algerian Ambassador to the UN. Among the eight specialized sectors of the AU Commission, Peace and Security is unarguably the most important sector, for which the AU receives substantial funds and support from the donor states and organizations. In accordance with the AU internal rules pertaining to the election of the AU Commissioners, in January 2008 Algeria and Egypt had to compete against each other since each region can only have two Commissioners at the same time, with one of them must be a woman. Since both Egypt and Algeria’s candidates were men, the other member states had to decide whether they want to have an Egyptian Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission or Algerian Commissioner for Peace and Security. Unsurprisingly, Algeria won a bid. After Ramtane Lamamra was elected as the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Elham Mahmood Ahmed Ibrahim, who was an Egyptian female candidate for the Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy won the election and became the first Egyptian Commissioner at the AU.
In addition, Algeria had served as a member of the AU PSC for two consecutive terms (three-year each) since its creation in 2004 until January 2010. Among 53 member states of the AU, only Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon and Nigeria were given a privilege to serve a three-year term in a row at the AU PSC. In 2004 South Africa was elected for the first three-year term from the Southern African bloc and later replaced by Angola, which is another military power in the region, in 2007. Therefore, it is fair to argue that Algeria seems to be more favorably viewed and supported by Black African states than any other Northern African states when it comes to regional cooperation for peace and security in Africa.

Like Egypt, Tunisia’s African status is skeptically viewed by Black African countries. President Ben Ali has not attended the OAU-AU Summits since 1994, even the ones hosted by the Northern African member states, such as Sharm el Sheik Summit in Egypt in June-July 2008. While President Ali has been apathetic toward the AU politics, according to Mortimer (1999), he has been present at every Summit of the UMA and attempted to host the Secretariat of the UMA when the Secretariat of the LAS was about to return to Cairo from Tunis (179, 182).

Morocco is the only African state that is excluded from the AU membership as a result of its withdrawal from the OAU in 1984, when the SADR took its seat at the OAU. In my interview, one Northern African diplomat explains that Morocco now understands its disadvantageous position of being outside the AU since this exclusion hinders the country from fully participating in African regional politics. Morocco may seek a way to join the AU, although this is not an officially announced decision yet (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). As solving the Western Sahara dispute is a sort of
precondition for Morocco to join the AU, the prospect of Morocco’s accession to the AU remains uncertain. Even if Morocco joins the AU, it will take a long time for the country to reestablish its status and influence in the AU politics, while its rival states of Algeria and Libya have been major contributors to the OAU-AU.

Another important regional political factor related to Western Sahara is Egypt’s position. Since Egypt has supported Morocco on the Western Saharan question, the SADR casts an anti-Egypt vote in coalition with Algeria at the AU elections both at the North African regional and continental levels. In the AU system, the member states are divided into the five regional groups of West, Central, East, South and North. In the Northern group, there are only six member states, which are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, the SADR and Tunisia. The AU Commission reports that the coup d’etat of August 6, 2008 led to an unconstitutional regime change in Mauritania. Since then, the country had been under the AU sanction, which deprived the right to vote at the AU elections, until August 2009, when the suspension was lifted by a decision of the special session of the AU Assembly (AU 2009b: 21). Therefore, the SADR’s position tends to become a casting vote that is always against Egypt. This regional political feature further privileges Algeria in Algeria-Egypt rivalry in the AU politics.

Perhaps, the most significant and recent episode pertaining to Gaddafi’s Pan-African integrationist efforts is his chairmanship of the AU in year 2009. The AU chairmanship is undertaken by a head of the AU member state on an annual and regional rotation. Within a region, such political factors as state capacity, domestic situation and regional/international leadership are taken into account for the election of the AU Chairperson. So far, the AU chairmanship has been undertaken by such prominent
African leaders as Thabo Mbeki of South Africa in 2002-2003, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique in 2003-2004, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in 2004-2006, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Republic of Congo in 2006-2007, John Kufuor of Ghana in 2007-2008, Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania in 2008-2009, and Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi in 2010-2011. Important to mention, when Kufuor took the AU chairmanship in 2007, Ghana hosted the AU Summit in June-July in the same year. These two significant events further boosted commemorative atmosphere among people of Ghana in celebrating the 50th anniversary of Ghana’s independence in 2007. At the International Studies Association Annual Convention on February 15, 2009, Ali Mazrui pointed out that the year 2009 was the 40th anniversary of Libyan revolution that brought Gaddafi to power. Hence, Gaddafi’s AU chairmanship can be understood as to crown his long-surviving regime and outstanding political weight in Africa. In June 2009, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, who had been in power since 1976, passed away. As a result, Gaddafi became the longest-ruling head of state on the continent in the same year when he was chairing the AU.

Gaddafi, who holds the absolute power in Libya, is able to project his radical integrationist vision externally and internally with a high degree of autonomy and discretion. In addition, Libya is an oil-producing affluent country that helps Gaddafi to decisively advance his “United States of Africa” project, providing funds for the AU, the CEN-SAD and other regional initiatives. In contrast, the pursuit of integration policies of Mbeki of democratic South Africa and Obasanjo of Nigeria under democratization pressure was to some extent constrained by domestic oppositions. Toward the end of Mbeki administration, South Africa began taking a gradualist approach for African
integration, so did Nigeria under late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, who lacked international/regional leadership and vision compared to Obasanjo.

Gaddafi was actively engaged in the AU activities, paying a visit to the AU Commission twice in February and March 2009 in order to closely monitor the programs and activities of the AU Commission and to promote the implementation of policies adopted at the AU Summits (AU 2009a). Gaddafi also succeeded to host the 13th AU Summit in Sirte, Libya on July 1-3, 2009 after the AU had decided not to have the Summit in Antananavaro, Madagascar due to the unconstitutional regime change and political unrest in Madagascar at that time. Gadaffi’s chairmanship in 2009 helped lead the AU-led African integration to the next stage that is the creation of the African Union Authority (AUA). Among the observers of the AU, including myself, the creation of the AUA is seen as the third watershed of African integration after the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (1st) and the creation of the AU in 2003 (2nd). Undoubtedly, Gaddafi and Wade of Senegal are the two foremost proponents of the creation of the AUA.

At the AU Abuja Summit in January 2005, Libya presented a proposal for the creation of the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Transport and Communications, Foreign Trade and the cancellation of customs and harmonization of custom tariffs among the member states. At the AU Sirte Summit in July 2005, the African leaders decided to establish the Committee of Heads of State to be chaired by Obasanjo to work on the structure, procedure and timeframe to realize this initiative. At the AU Banjul Summit in July 2006, Obasanjo presented the report entitled “Study on an African Union Government towards the United States of Africa (AU Report on AUG Implementation Modalities 2006: 3,4,7)”.
The grand debate on the creation of the African Union Government (AUG) was a major agenda at the AU Accra Summit on July 1-3, 2007. *Daily Guide* (Ghanaian Newspaper) reports that in order to conduct the AUG campaign among people and leaders in Western Africa, Gaddafi and 500 Libyan delegates formed a caravan and traveled in 109 vehicles from Tripoli to Accra, visiting Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote Divore on the way (2007). The Libyan delegation was warmly received by the masses and marked Gaddafi’s “United States of Africa” manifesto on the land of West Africa. According to *Daily Graphic* (Ghanaian Newspaper), Gaddafi proudly addressed that “they [African people he encountered during the road journey] are calling for the immediate establishment of a union government and they must be listened to (2007a: 16).”

Nonetheless, at the AU Accra Summit, no meaningful consensus was reached between the radical group of Libya, Senegal, Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Guinea and Liberia and the gradualist group of South Africa, Nigeria under Yar’Adua, Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda and the rest of African states. *Daily Graphic* reports that Ghana took a middle ground and prodded the other heads of state to reach a consensus (2007b). It is assumed that those Western African member states that supported Gaddafi’s initiative in the radical group have received substantial financial assistance from Libya. Eventually, the African leaders adopted the Accra Declaration (instead of Decision) on the African Union Government that fails to set the timeframe for the creation of the AUG.

At the AU Addis Ababa Summit on February 1-3, 2009, the AU member states decided to transform the AU Commission into the AUA as part of the AUG initiative (AU Assembly 2009b). In order to work on the modalities of the transformation of the
AU Commission into the AUA, Gaddafi hosted the 12th Extraordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (foreign ministerial-level) in Tripoli on April 15-16, 2009. Gaddafi insisted that the debate should not focus on the semantic difference between the titles “Union Government” or “Union Authority” and emphasized that “what is important is the substance of the debate (AU Press Release, 2009).” In his speech at the Session, Gaddafi brought up the notion of African nationalism, stating “we are all Africans belonging to the same nation; this single African nation”. He criticized the preceding AU Chairpersons, arguing “the Chairpersons before me are concerned with countries and have not time to oversee the work of the Union or to do anything for the Union (AU Executive Council 2009).

To summarize, Algeria’s commitment to the OAU-AU politics has granted Algeria a fair amount of diplomatic leverages to shape African regional politics and integration in a way to curtail the influence of Egypt and Morocco. Likewise, Gaddafi’s chairmanship of the AU in 2009 has helped solidify his status as the most decisive Pan-African statesman and further advance his unity of Africa project. In this sense, Algeria and Libya “Maghrebinize” the AU-led African regional integration as a way to amplify their influence in Africa and achieve their foreign policy objectives. This trend may help bridge the North-South gap and revive Afro-Arab solidarity in contemporary Africa. Undoubtedly, Gaddafi’s integrationist leadership has been a major driving force to accelerate African integration through the institutional transformation from the AU Commission to the AUA. However, I argue that similar to the historical Afro-Arab relations, the current pattern of Afro-Arab partnership toward African integration remains hierarchical. This is because while Northern Arab states have a privilege to choose the
Middle East or Africa as their main regional base, most Black African states are unable to penetrate politics of Northern Africa due to their limited state capacity. In this sense, Black Africa seems to remain a geopolitical hinterland, where Northern Arab states are able to conduct diplomatic and geo-strategic maneuver with a relative ease. Furthermore, post-Gaddafi Libya is likely to make a major foreign policy shift that may not see African integration as a priority. This volatility and uncertainty of Libyan leadership is a major unpredictable factor in the future Afro-Arab cooperation toward the unity of Africa.
Chapter V: The AU-led Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa and Sudan:
Afro/Arab Identity in the Geo-strategic Context
This chapter explores the AU-led conflict management in the Horn of Africa and Sudan and discusses the role of Afro/Arab identity in the conflicts and its geopolitical implications of the conflicts in this specific region to the broader Afro-Arab relations on the continent. It appears that one of the major reasons why the Horn of Africa and Sudan remain war-endemic is because this Afro-Arab border region is the place where Arab countries have vital geo-strategic interests, and therefore, attempt to expand their Arab-Islamic influence through intervention. In fact, in the Horn of Africa and Sudan, conflicting groups and countries often manipulate Afro/Arab identity to gain bilateral/regional patronage. This regional feature further complicates and intensifies the conflicting situations, for which the AU has been making peacekeeping efforts. To begin with, this chapter examines the role of Ethiopia as the regional and continental core, followed by an analysis of the north-south conflict and Darfur crisis in Sudan.

**Ethiopia as the Regional and Continental Core State: Ethiopia’s Risen Geopolitical Stature as a Result of Islamic Extremism and Global War on Terror**

Ethiopia has the wealth of historical heritage and is the only African country to have been independent without succumbing to the European colonial powers except for the decade-long Italian occupation in the mid 20th century. It is the second most populous African country after Nigeria and one of Africa’s military powers. Foltz and Bienen’s assessment of African military powers indicates that, judging from the records of intervention, Egypt and South Africa had the most competitive external fighting capacity, followed by Morocco, Nigeria and Ethiopia as of the 1980s (as cited in Walraven 1999: 67). As of 1997 Ethiopia had the fifth largest armed force personnel after Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Sudan, and its military expenditures were ranked the
top 15th on the continent (Allcountries.org 2006). Given these facts, it is not surprising that Ethiopia has been the regional core of the Horn of Africa, which is one of the most destabilized and insecure parts of the continent. Even in the context of continent-wide multilateral politics in Africa, Ethiopia’s leading position has been well established.

The creation of the OAU in 1963 was largely owed to the diplomatic endeavors of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who in the view of many Western scholars saved African unity from the ideological split between the radical Casablanca group and the moderate Monrovia group. Furthermore, Walraven (1999) asserts that Ethiopia continued to be one of the most influential actors in the inter-governmental relations during the OAU era. Haile Selassie enjoyed great prestige among the African leaders and therefore often mediated the disputes in Africa, by being called upon or on his own initiative (278). Because of the Emperor’s prominent status in the international and regional politics as well as the absence of European colonialism in the land of Ethiopia, which illuminates the notion of African nationalism, it was less controversial for the founding fathers of the OAU to choose Addis Ababa as the location of the OAU Secretariat.

The OAU Secretariat and later the AU Commission have remained in Addis Ababa notwithstanding its underdeveloped socio-economic infrastructures compared to other fancy African capital cities and Gaddafi’s relentless solicitations to relocate the AU Commission to Sirte, Libya. Sirte is a major Mediterranean coastal city close to Gaddafi’s birthplace and also known as a battleground of Libyan resistance against Italian occupation in the early 20th century. Furthermore, Ethiopia had been serving as a
member of the AU PSC for two consecutive terms (three years each) since its establishment in 2004 until January 2010.

Because of Ethiopia’s leading role in the OAU-AU politics, Eritrea has been leaning toward the LAS, obtaining an observer’s status of the LAS in 2003 and being almost invisible in the AU politics. The heads of the AU member states meet biannually in January-February at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and June-July in another host country. Eritrea has been absent at Addis Ababa Summits. In addition, the AU Sirte Summit on July 1-3, 2009 decided to impose sanctions on Eritrea due to the country’s failure to pay its quota of financial contribution to the AU (AU Assembly 2009a: 1). Moreover, Eritrea declared its withdrawal from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is a major REC in the Horn of Africa.

Knowing its advantageous political weight at the OAU-AU, Ethiopia has tended to use the OAU-AU as a main multilateral forum in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives especially on the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, and lately on Somalia. For example, Festus Aboagye (2001), a Ghanaian colonel, who served for the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) during the 1998-2000 border conflict reveals that when the first serious operational setback took place at the second UN-OAU Military Coordination Commission meeting in December 2000, the Ethiopian authority wrote to the OAU Secretary General, while the Eritrean authority appealed to the UN Secretary General. Ethiopia insisted on the primary role of the OAU [over the UN] in monitoring the ceasefire during the negotiation process although the OAU’s capacity of accomplishing such a mandate was questionable (page number unavailable).
It is widely known that such Arab states as Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria had supported Eritrea’s independence movement in order to curtail the influence of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa and have the whole Red Sea region under Arab-Islamic influence (Akinsanya 1976: 527). Sudan had been also a major supporter of the Eritrean cause, while Ethiopia under President Mengistu had backed the southern Sudanese insurgency against Khartoum (Deng 1995: 383). Abraham (2004) writes that Ethiopia recognized Israel in October 1961. In the same year the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was created in exile in Cairo. After the diplomatic reconciliation between Ethiopia and Egypt and the creation of the OAU, President Nasser of Egypt closed the ELF office in Cairo in June 1963. Then, the center of the exiled Eritrean leadership relocated to Damascus, Syria (xix, xx). In 1972, *al-Ahram* (Egyptian newspaper) asserts that the Red Sea is the Arab Sea “as all states dominating it are Arab” excluding Ethiopia from the list of the littoral states and stirred up the feelings of resentment among Ethiopians (as cited in Bondestam 1980: 67).

Likewise, Clapham argues that the Horn of Africa is characterized by confrontations between the central Ethiopian highlands and the Muslim-dominated lowlands and coastal areas (as cited in Lyons 1992: 155). In Zartman’s view, Ethiopia does not unite the Horn, but is rather an isolated country in the middle of hostile neighbors (as cited in Lyons 1992: 155-156). In turn, Ethiopia’s attempts to develop its security in these contesting situations are viewed as a threat by the neighboring countries. Indeed, the regional system of the Horn is constructed around mutual fears and historical animosities (Lyons 1992: 156). For instance, the Derg regime called the Somali invasion of the Ogaden area [in the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78] as an Arab-led *jihad*. Mengistu
asserted that “reactionary” Arab governments “have launched a campaign to turn world Moslems against Ethiopia by misleading them in the name of religion (as cited in Lyons 1992: 162)”. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s support for the largely non-Muslim southern Sudanese rebels was consistent with the country’s strategy of deterring encirclement by Islamic forces, while Eritrean secessionists often emphasized their Islamic heritage and appealed to Khartoum (Lyons 1992: 179).

Hence, the Arab support to the Eritrean secessionist cause is generally understood in the context of religious solidarity between Arab Muslims in Northern Africa and Arabia and the largely Muslim ELF against Ethiopia. Nonetheless, this type of assumption fails to consider the complex socio-religious reality of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Said Samatar, a prominent Somali-Ethiopian historian, explains that the religious and cultural compositions of Eritrea and Ethiopia are, in fact, quite similar. Approximately half of the population practice Islam, while the rest follow the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other denominations in these two countries. Nonetheless, state identity, which reflects the notion of sociological majority rather than numerical majority, of Ethiopia and Eritrea has been Christian because Christian highlanders have long dominated Muslim lowlanders (personal communication, March 26, 2009).

Unlike the OAU-AU that is geographic based, the membership of the LAS is identity-based. In this sense, quite interestingly, Eritrea’s state identity has been under geopolitical conversion from Christian Habsha to Muslim Arab in order to gain more diplomatic and financial support from Arab states in its continuing confrontation with Ethiopia. Nonetheless, Abraham (2004) negatively views the likelihood of Eritrea’s admission to the LAS due to the country’s ties with Israel and contentious relations with
Sudan and Yemen (257-258). Like Eritrea, Ethiopia has significant Semitic and Arab-Islamic elements in its history and culture, and therefore, its racial-cultural state identity tends to be perceived in a different way by the rest of Black African countries. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s Black African state identity seems to be geopolitically reinforced through the country’s unwavering commitment and contribution to the OAU-AU.

It is important to emphasize that Ethiopia’s political prestige on the continent is operative more in the context of perception rather than the embarrassing socio-economic reality of the country. Compared to the other military powers on the continent, namely, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan, the economic capacity of Ethiopia is far more constrained without any lucrative extraction sector or sound manufacturing base. In fact, several socio-economic indicators rank Ethiopia at the bottom among the African military powers.

Table 5.1: Some Facts of the African Military Powers

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<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
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<tr>
<td>GDP purchasing power parity (US$ billion, 2009 est.)</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>468.7</td>
<td>77.36</td>
<td>84.92</td>
<td>145.4</td>
<td>341.1</td>
<td>504.6</td>
<td>92.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP purchasing power parity per capita (US$, 2009 est.)</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Indices Rankings 2010 (1st – 169th)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In fact, the development of Ethiopia’s armed forces heavily relied on the assistance of external powers, which valued the geopolitical importance of Ethiopia-Eritrea in the Red Sea region. Although all African military powers have been more or less reliant on foreign assistance, Ethiopia is the most dependent country in this respect. Said Samatar points out that under Emperor Haile Selassie Ethiopia had received a substantial amount of military aid from the US, about 80 percent of the total military aid from the US to the entire continent of Africa (personal communication, March 26, 2009). Under the socialist Derg regime, the Soviet Union and its allied states in the Eastern bloc were the major military suppliers and advisors to Ethiopia, which was considered as geopolitically and ideologically significant for the Soviet-led Eastern bloc.

In the post-Cold War contemporary world, Ethiopia’s Christian state identity in the sea of Muslim countries seems to be an important asset of the country in its quest for securing foreign assistance and maintaining the status of regional and continental statesman. Seen in this light, the rise of Islamic extremism and global war on terrorism are the newly emerging political dimensions that shape the intergovernmental relations and the prospect of peacemaking in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has championed the global coalition against terrorism and consolidated its role as an important ally of the US and other Western powers in the efforts to deter the expansion of Islamic extremism in the Horn. Samatar (2002) writes, “The wily Zennawi [the Prime Minister of Ethiopia] has used (and continues to use) al-Itihaad effectively to milk the fundamentalist-paranoid American cash cow (8).”

Cliffe (2005) asserts that the Christian right-wing constituency in the US was quite influential in lobbying the Bush Administration, which tried to pursue its own
agenda of a holy crusade against Islam in the Horn that is composed of people of multi-faiths (152). Although Ethiopia’s Christian state identity is not the only criterion to designate Ethiopia as a reliable ally of the West, it allows Ethiopia to pursue the policy of anti-Islamic extremism with less domestic and international political constraints. On the other hand, in Muslim African countries, the Islamic factor is often viewed as a ground for legitimacy or illegitimacy of the regime in power as the on-going civil wars in Algeria and Sudan exemplify. Furthermore, the Islamic cause has an international dimension and often affects intergovernmental relations among and beyond the Muslim countries.

Ethiopia and Israel have been connected by historical interactions and Judaic influence since time immemorial. This is quite striking, given the fact that the relations between the other African states and Israel have been ideologically or/and economically based, and are therefore susceptible to changes in the political and economic climates. Abraham (2004) reveals that Ethio-Israeli relations were cordial under the rule of Haile Selassie, whose [legendary] lineage can be traced back to the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon some three millennia ago (203). According to Lyons (1992), Israel’s main geo-strategic interest in the Horn is to secure access to the Red Sea. Sharing fear of Pan-Arabism and hostile Arab neighbors, Haile Selassie and Israel cooperated as allies. Ethiopia under Haile Selassie received training from Israel in anti-insurgency techniques in order to fight against the Eritrean guerrillas (187). Bilateral relations soured after the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, but began improving toward the end of the Derg regime. Ethiopian Falashas (Ethiopian Jews) were airlifted and emigrated to Israel via Operations Moses and Solomon in 1989 and 1991. Importantly, this unique Ethio-Israeli link was a source of concern for Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries (Abraham 2004: 82, 203-
Seen in the context of the US-Israel alliance and Judeo-Christian connection, Ethiopia’s Christian state identity seems to be an important element in consolidating the US-Ethiopia-led coalition against radical Islamism in the Horn.

According to Martin (2002), in 1996 the US closed its embassy in Khartoum and imposed sanctions (as did the UN Security Council) on Sudan to condemn Sudan’s involvement in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt on his participation at the OAU Addis Ababa Summit in 1995. After the Islamic terrorist attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, the US bombed a pharmaceutical factory in the suburb of Khartoum, claiming that the factory was producing chemical weapons (115-116). Because of Sudan’s connection to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the US regarded Sudan as a state that sponsors terrorism. Abraham (2004) asserts that Ethiopia’s decisive action on the terrorists’ attempt on Mubarak’s life on Ethiopian soil helped its quest to become an important ally of the West in the global war on terrorism (188). The Ethiopian Herald (2008a) reports that at a press conference on July 1, 2008 Donald Yamamoto, the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, commended Ethiopia’s positive role in regional peace and security and described Ethiopian troops as probably the most qualified and disciplined in sub-Saharan Africa (front page).

In Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which was determined to establish an Islamist government in Somalia, is seen by the Western powers (the US particularly), Ethiopia and Kenya (another pro-Western and Christian-ruled country in the region) as a menace to peacemaking and long-term national reconstruction in Somalia. Ethiopia has been heavily involved in the Somali conflict, sending its troops to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and fighting against the Somali Islamists from the end of
2006 to the end of 2008. Ethiopian military, condemned by fighting factions and looked down upon by Somali people, was allegedly responsible for a large number of civilian deaths in Somalia. What makes the situation worse is the historical animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia’s state identity as the only Christian state in the Horn makes its battles against the Somali Islamists look like a clash of civilizations. Problematically, the AU’s position toward Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia appears to be inconsistent. For example, in the Joint Communiqué of the AU, the LAS and the IGAD on December 27, 2006, the three organizations called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia (AU 2006). Nonetheless, toward the end of Ethiopian military intervention, the AU PSC pays tribute to Ethiopia for its sacrifices by maintaining its troops for peace restoration in Somalia for two years (AU PSC 2008h : 3).

Indeed, the logic that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” has gained political traction currency in the Horn. Eritrea openly supports the Somali Islamists in order to destabilize the US-Ethiopia-backed TFG. Even though Eritrea is a resource-constrained country, it seems to be providing material support to the Somali Islamists. The question then is who finances Eritrea? According to the report of the AU Commission, upon the establishment of the UIC in Somalia, President Abdullahi Yusuf of the TFG claimed that the UIC was connected to international terrorist groups and received material support from foreign forces (AU PSC 2007b: 3). Furthermore, the US government designated al-Shabaab, a Somali Islamist militant group linked to the UIC, as a terrorist organization (AU PSC 2008e: 3). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that the UIC and al-Shabaab are the first political coalition in Somalia that is able to bring different clan and sub-clan groups together after the central government collapsed in the late 1980s.
According to *BBC News*, *al-Shabaab* carried out the twin terrorist attacks targeting people gathering to watch the World Cup final game in Kampala, Uganda on July 11, 2010. About 5,000 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers are deployed to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and *al-Shabaab* once threatened to attack Kampala. During the AU Kampala Summit on July 25-27, 2010, which was overshadowed by the attacks, the AU decided to increase the AMISOM peacekeeping force by 4,000 troops (*BBC News* 2010a and 2010b).

Within the international diplomatic community in Addis Ababa, it is widely assumed that Wahhabists, who are an influential Islamic group based in Saudi Arabia, and some Arab states, allegedly Libya and Qatar, clandestinely provide support to the Somali Islamists through Eritrea. In its report of November 2006, the UN Somali Sanction Monitoring Group claimed that Eritrea was involved in channeling weapons and equipment to the UIC from such countries as Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria (as cited in Healy and Plaut 2007: 10). In its meeting on May 22, 2009, the AU PSC called for the UNSC to take necessary measures, such as sanctions on all foreign actors, especially Eritrea, who has provided support to the rebel groups with a purpose of destabilizing Somalia (AU PSC 2009b: 2 and AU 2009b: 12).

On the other hand, Arab states have been actively involved in the mediation and reconciliation among the fighting parties in Somalia. For example, in January 2006, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen invited President Yusuf and Shariff Hassan, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) Speaker, to Aden that resulted in the signing of the Aden Declaration between the two parties (AU PSC 2006d: 2-3). According to the report of the AU Commission, the LAS brokered the three rounds of negotiation between the
TFG and the UIC in Khartoum in 2006. At the third round of negotiations from October 30 to November 3, 2006 the UIC set conditionalities that included “the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia and that Kenya should not co-chair the sessions.” During the same period, the UIC declared *jihad* against Ethiopia (AU PSC 2007b: 2-3). The AU Commission also reports that on September 16, 2007, under the auspices of King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, the Somali leaders traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and signed an agreement on the implementation of the recommendations made by the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC), although the agreement was rejected by the opposition groups, including the UIC. From September 6 to 13, 2007 the various opposition groups, including the UIC, met in Asmara, Eritrea, which they called “a parallel congress (AU PSC 2008a: 3).”

Due to its geographic proximity to Somalia across the Gulf of Aden, Yemen seems to be the Arab country most affected by insecurity and instability in Somalia. While acts of piracy are a serious threat to maritime security in the region, the AU PSC information note on the situation in Somalia reveals that the number of Somali refugees trying to cross the Gulf of Aden toward Yemen has ever been increasing. About 8,000 Somalis arrived at the Yemeni shore in the first quarter of 2008 (AU PSC 2008e: 6). Eritrea conducted military attacks against the Yemeni-held islands in the Red Sea in 1995, and Eritrea-Yemen relations have remained contentious. As a result, Yemen tends to have close ties with Ethiopia and was the only Arab state that officially supported the Ethiopian-led peace process in Somalia as of July 2007. *AU Echo* (AU Newsletter) reports that in order to assist the AU-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Yemen offered to train and finance 10,000 Somali troops in January 2009 (2009: 1).
To reemphasize, although Eritrea’s state identity is not necessarily Arab or even Muslim, its anti-Ethiopian stance qualifies it as an important partner of some Arab-Islamic countries and groups in their efforts to counter-balance the US-Ethiopia alliance in the Horn. Nonetheless, Cliffe (2005) asserts that Ethiopia’s influence on Somalia was always more significant than Eritrea. Besides the fact that Eritrea is much smaller, it has no common border with Somalia. Ethiopia has a porous one that divides Somali people and has been insecure and conflict endemic for decades (156). As international intervention has lost its focus on restoring peace in Somalia, a real obstacle to the peace process seems to be the conflicting interests of regional and international actors, who use Somalia as a battleground for proxy war. That makes meaningful negotiation, reconciliation and sustainable peace in Somalia impossible. Similarly, in his analysis of the regional system of the Horn, Cliffe (2005) argues that:

The context and the manoeuvrings have also served to reinforce the islamicisation of existing conflicts, as different movements and regimes have been dubbed as supportive of terrorism by their opponents. Such trends make the long-term peace and even survival of the multi-faith states in the region more problematic (164).

In terms of regional efforts to end on-going conflicts in the Horn, the IGAD and the AU are the two primary regional organizations that have mandates to facilitate the peace process. The IGAD is a main multilateral framework in the Horn and currently consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda with its Secretariat in Djibouti. The IGAD is an officially recognized REC by the AU and therefore has a close organizational linkage with the AU. The AU Commission reports that in early July 2006, the AU-IGAD fact-finding mission traveled to Somalia (AU PSC 2007b: 5). The AU deployed the AMISOM in March, 2007 with an initial six months mandate to support the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts toward the stabilization and
reconciliation, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and create conducive conditions for long-term peace and development in Somalia (AU PSC 2007a: 2).

For ungoverned Somalia, where external efforts to restore peace and order have all failed for the last few decades, there is a lack of international attention, and intervention as a matter of fact has a main challenge for peacemaking in Somalia. For example, since January 2007, the AU has repeatedly urged the UNSC, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to authorize a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia and emphasized that the AU was acting on behalf of the broader international community by providing a peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AU PSC 2007a: 3). Nonetheless, there has been no real progress in authorizing a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, while the AMISOM mandate was extended until the mid-January, 2010 (AU 2009b: 1).

Problematically, the cordial economic and security relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia have further marginalized Eritrea, and this was one of the reasons why Eritrea decided to leave the IGAD, in which Djibouti-Ethiopia alliance has played a major role. According to *Fortune* (Ethiopia’s newspaper) (2008), Araya Desta, Eritrea’s Ambassador to the UN, accused Djibouti of being a “Trojan Horse” for Ethiopia and the US (29). In fact, uneasy relations among Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan have curtailed the effectiveness and more problematically legitimacy of the IGAD. It appears that Eritrea triggered a border clash with Djibouti in Ras Doumeira in June 2008 with the aim of disrupting a series of technical inter-Somali talks that were led by Ethiopia and hosted by Djibouti. In my interview, one security analyst based in Addis Ababa assumes that as Eritrea could not conduct military attacks against Ethiopia directly, it seems that Eritrea
invaded Djibouti. By so doing, Eritrea signaled its aggressive intention to the entire region and larger international community at a minimum risk. For Djibouti, this incidence helped underscore its geo-strategic significance in the Horn (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

At the AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh from June 24 to July 1, 2008, the AU PSC issued a communiqué that strongly condemned Eritrea’s military attack against Djibouti and demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the occupied land. In the same communiqué, the AU PSC commended Djibouti’s cooperation for the AU mission toward the peaceful resolution of the crisis, while expressing a deep concern about Eritrea’s refusal to receive the AU mission (AU PSC 2008f: 1). In response, Eritrea boycotted the Sharm-el Sheikh Summit and sent a statement of protest to the AU PSC. At the special session of the AU Assembly on August 30-31, 2009, the African heads of state expressed their grave concern for the absence of Eritrea’s efforts in the implementation of its relevant decisions and UNSC Resolution 1862 regarding the Eritrea-Djibouti conflict and called Eritrea to immediately and fully comply with the requirements (AU 2009b: 19).

Cliffe (2005) reveals that trade between Ethiopia and Djibouti doubled in a year after the outset of Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict [in 1998], and Ethiopia’s decision to boycott the Eritrean ports. Ethiopia’s reliance on the port of Djibouti provided Djibouti with some political weight in its relation with Ethiopia. In late 1998 and 1999, there was an idea of union or confederation between Ethiopia and Djibouti, which was initially proposed by Djibouti and later taken seriously by Ethiopia. The Ethiopian authority also positively viewed the political transition in Djibouti; President Guelleh, who was born in
Ethiopia and speaks Amharic, succeeded his uncle in April 1999 (158). As the smallest state in the Horn, Djibouti’s geo-political significance is to a large extent determined by the relationship between landlocked Ethiopia and Eritrea that has a much longer coastal line than Djibouti. From Eritrea’s perspective, Djibouti is able to attract massive foreign direct investments from the Gulf states, such as the Red Sea bridge project across the Mandab Strait from Djibouti to Yemen, at the expense of political and economic marginalization of Eritrea on the African shore of the Red Sea.

Furthermore, Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen (2007) reveal that after the 9/11 attack the US has sent more than 1,500 troops to Djibouti to conduct civil-affairs programs and help gather information on suspected terrorists and allocated $100 million per annum to facilitate counter-terrorism activities by local authorities (65). Therefore, the coalition against terror is a great opportunity for Djibouti to demonstrate that it can be a reliable ally of the Western powers. Nonetheless, Ahmed Dini Ahmed, a major opposition leader and devout Muslim, asserted that the war against terror in the Horn might create a sense of resentment among fellow Muslims and a backlash in Djibouti (as cited in anonymous 2005: 176).

Importantly, the spread of Islamic extremism is a shared concern among some other AU member states, whose regimes in power are often challenged by Islamic insurgency. In particular, Algeria has taken an initiating role in implementing counter-terrorism policy in the AU system. Algeria hosted the inter-governmental high level meeting on the prevention and combating of terrorism in Algiers in September 2002 that resulted in the adoption of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism in Africa. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was inaugurated in October, 2004 in Algiers (AU PSC 2006g).

In sum, the policy of anti-Islamic extremism and counter-terrorism has become a major security agenda in the conflict endemic Horn of Africa, although the pursuit of this policy by the US-Ethiopia-Djibouti coalition appears to further radicalize some Islamist factions in Somalia and isolate Eritrea from the multilateral efforts for counter-terrorism and peacemaking in the Horn. What makes the situation more complicated is the ambiguous attitudes of Arab states in terms of how to deal with the radical Islamists in the region. Although Islamic extremism is a shared concern among both the conservative Arab monarchies and the revolutionary Arab regimes, the Arab governments are aware that they will be able to have a fair amount of political leverage on an Islamist regime in Somalia, where the previous international efforts for peacemaking and national rebuilding have yield no significant result. Establishing a secularist government backed by the US and Ethiopia in Somalia will certainly give more political weight to non-Arab and non-Muslim Ethiopia in the region, while a secession of the southern Sudan will be another setback in keeping the Horn under the Arab-Islamic influence. Such a scenario will be a nightmare for Egypt in terms of keeping the status quo of the Nile water flow and undermining the influence of Ethiopia in the Nile basin region. Therefore, Arab states may continue to clandestinely support the radical Islamists in Somalia as a way to challenge the US-Ethiopia-led peace initiative, which is seen as a geo-strategic loss for them.

Meanwhile, the regional and international isolation of Eritrea and the country’s ties to the radical Islamists in Somalia remain major obstacles for the AU and the IGAD
in their efforts to harmonize the intergovernmental relations and restore peace and security in the Horn. Having any meaningful discussion on the Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia dispute was difficult at the AU PSC, where Ethiopia had been serving as a member since its inception until January 2010 and sometimes chairing the sessions. Therefore, Eritrea is likely to regard the AU PSC and other AU-led peace forums as nothing but pro-Ethiopian.

**AU’s Peacekeeping Efforts in Sudan: Territorial Integrity of Sudan as the Touchstone of Continental Afro-Arab Coexistence**

The north-south civil war and Darfur crisis in Sudan are some of the most devastating conflicts in contemporary Africa and often described as inter-civilizational strife between Arabs and Black Africans. This assertion seems to be more plausible for the north-south conflict, where predominantly Black Christian southerners rose in revolt against Arab Muslim northerners. In the case of Darfur, making an Arab/African distinction is more difficult partly due to the fact that Darfurians are largely Muslims and partly Arabic-speaking.

In his remark at the UNSC on December 21, 2009, Thabo Mbeki, former South African President serving as the Chairperson of the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, addressed that Sudan crisis essentially arose from the power and wealth concentration in Khartoum that resulted in the underdevelopment, impoverishment and marginalization of the periphery, including the Darfur region (Mbeki 2009: 4). According to O’Fahey (2004), one of the root causes of the current Darfur conflict can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when prolonged droughts accelerated desertification in northern and central Darfur that created more ecological pressure on water and grazing
resources to be shared by various ethnic groups. The militarization of the conflict began when Prime Minister al-Mahdi decided to supply arms to Baqqara (Arabic-speaking cattle nomads) of southern Darfur to defend themselves against the SPLA. Then, Baqqara began to turn the guns on their rival groups, including Fur and Masalit (non-Arab sedentary farmers). The SPLA aggravated the situation by attempting to open a “front” in Southern Darfur. Meanwhile, Arab tribal militias, first called muraheleen, later janjaweed, became out of control (24, 26, 27).

Alex de Waal writes that Libyan military interventionism and militant Arabism in the 1980s were two toxic factors to further deform the socio-political landscape of the Darfur region. During the Libya-Chad territorial conflict over the Aouzou Strip, Libya recruited discontented Sahelian Arabs and Tuaregs, armed them and trained them as an “Islamic Legion.” Some of the Arabs recruited were from Darfur. By the late 1980s, Libya suffered crushing defeat and dismantled the Legion. However, its well-trained and armed Arab supremacists, Janjaweed, were among those patronized by Libya (as cited in Gberie 2004: 4). In addition, a part of janjaweed consists of nationals from Chad, Niger and Mauritania that makes the return and resettlement of Darfurian refugees quite difficult unless those trans-border Arab militias are demobilized and disarmed (AU PSC 2008d: 13).

While the Sudanese government and the SPLA were negotiating the ceasefire in 2003, two rebel movements emerged in the Darfur region. Gberie (2004) writes that the Darfur Liberation Front, later renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), secular and “black nationalist”, was launched in 2003. Another rebel movement, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), appeared soon after in Darfur and formed a loose
alliance with the SLM/A to fight against Khartoum. In April 2003, the two groups conducted a massive offense against the government forces, attacking the el Fasher airport and destroying several military aircraft. They also kidnapped a Sudanese Air Force General (6).

In terms of the racial-cultural dimension of the Darfur conflict, O’Fahey (2004) points out that racist attitudes historically targeted toward slaves or “enslaveable” peoples have been redirected to the sedentary non-Arab groups (27). For example, in attacks, Khartoum-backed forces quite often made such statements as “the Fur are slaves, we will kill them.”; “You are Zaghawa tribes, you are slaves.”; “You are Masalit. Why do you come here, why do you take our grass? You will not take anything today (ICC 2008: 9).”

 Nonetheless, Arab/Black distinction is neither rigid nor static in Darfur. For instance, a successful Fur farmer would invest in cattle and be able to cross the ethnic line and “become” Baqqara, and within a few generations his descendants would identify themselves as genealogically Arabs. Language itself cannot be an ethnic marker either. Birged and Berti lost their own ethnic languages during the last century. They are now Arabic-speaking, but do not consider themselves as Arabs (O’Fahey 2004: 24). Furthermore, there is little physical difference between the ethnic groups in Darfur as a result of generations of intermarriage. Not all Arab groups are affiliated with Janjaweed, and some Arab populations have been targeted. Nevertheless, most of the victims are people of non-Arab Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa (CQ Global Researcher 2008: 247), and both the JEM and the SLM/A mainly recruit from these three ethnic groups (ICC 2008: 3). Lusk nicely articulates that “It’s not about ethnic supremacy. If the so-called Arabs don’t help the government, it will kill them, too. It’s just renting them (as cited in CQ
The International Criminal Court (ICC) (2008) reports that the al-Bashir regime reinforced the idea of polarization between the ethnic groups allied with the government, whom they considered as “Arabs”, and the three groups (Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa), whom they perceived as threats and labeled “Africans (3)”. Moreover, the AU Commission reports that as the Darfur conflict has been prolonged and deteriorated, the rebel groups have became more fragmented, diverging from the original two (the JEM and the SLM/A) to more than twenty as of November 2007 (AU PSC 2008d: 5). Furthermore, there have been increasing inter/intra ethnic clashes and leadership crisis within the same rebel groups. For example, the AU Commission reveals that as of July 2009 inter-ethnic strife among the Arab populations, including Fellata and Gimir, in Southern Darfur was the single largest cause of deaths for the last twelve months (AU PSC 2009c: 8). As a result, such a simplistic and dichotomous explanation of Darfur crisis as Black African rebels against the Arab dominated Sudanese government has become less meaningful.

In terms of the cross-border impacts of the conflicts in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Egypt and Libya, all of which share borders with Sudan, appear to be the most affected countries and therefore have great stakes in intervening. The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2007) reveals that the CAR was suffering severe poverty and labeled by the UN’s Office of Humanitarian Assistance as “one of the world’s most neglected emergencies.” The spillover of rebels, arms and violence, along with the influx of refugees from the Sudan’s western border has aggravated these emergencies. As most of the CAR’s territory is ungovernable space, it is quite attractive to foreign rebel groups seeking either refuge or unchecked transit points. For example,
the CAR was a safe haven for the SPLA, whereas Sudanese military used the CAR as a
ground for attacks against the SPLA (2, 9, 29).

As the Darfur conflict has escalated, it seems to turn more and more into a proxy
war between Chad and Sudan. According to the US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations (2007), Chad and Sudan have a complicated relationship that is affected by the
subordination of national loyalties to ethnic or clan loyalties. The ethnic allegiance
seems to be the cause of Chadian support for some Darfurian rebel groups. President
Deby and many Chadian elites are members of Zaghawa, which dominates some rebel
groups in Darfur. In fact, Deby came to power in 1990 through military insurgency
based in Darfur, where he was backed by Sudanese Zaghawa. At the outbreak of the
Darfur conflict, Deby cooperated with Khartoum, sending 800 troops to Darfur to fight
against the rebels and brokering the first ceasefire negotiation between Khartoum and the
rebel groups. Nonetheless, his divisive policy led to a coup attempt by senior Zaghawa
military officers, who were discontent over Deby’s lack of support to Zaghawa in Darfur
and his ties with Khartoum. Deby gave up his stance of neutrality, and Khartoum
welcomed all opposition groups against Deby. Some JEM elements have been reportedly
fighting along with the Chadian military against the Chadian rebels, while the Chadian
rebels and Janjaweed operating outside Sudan have been conducting frequent attacks in
eastern Chad since October 2005 (8, 23, 27-28).

For Egypt, any secessionist attempt that threatens the Arab dominated al-Bashir
regime, which has close ties with Cairo, is unacceptable. The territorial integrity of
Sudan, especially the unity of north-south Sudan, is a vital interest of Egypt in respect of
the status quo of the Nile water flow. Unlike the Arab-Islamic northern Sudan, the
southern Sudan has little historical and racial-cultural affinity with Egypt. A newly independent southern Sudan may lay claim to a large share of the Nile water with lesser political constrains than Khartoum has in its relation to Egypt.

For Libya, on-going civil war in Darfur, which stretches over the Chad-Sudan border region, has great geopolitical implications for its quest to keep the security of Chad under Libyan influence. Historically, controlling the porous borders and trans-border rebel groups has been a major security agenda for the governments in the Sahel region. One aspect of Gaddafi’s diplomatic weight is his unique capacity to bring the hardliners to the peace process, by providing them with a safe haven with lesser international political pressure. Senator Prendergast at the hearing before the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs implies that Libya has allegedly provided the rebel groups in Chad and Sudan with money and arms (as cited in the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007: 34).

With political and financial support from other international organizations and donor states, the AU has been facilitating peacemaking and reconciliation for the conflicts in Sudan. The decades-long north-south conflict supposedly ended when the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. According to the report of the AU Commission, the AU is one of the guarantors of the CPA. The CPA established the two governments, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), ensures the power and wealth sharing between the two Governments and grants the GoSS a right to secede after [the national election in April 2010 and] the referendum for the self-determination in 2011. Notably, the CPA was


designed and is to be implemented in such a manner that it makes the unity of the Sudan an attractive option.” In July 2003, in anticipation of the signing of the CPA, the AU Executive Council formed the Committee on the Post-conflict Reconstruction of the Sudan that consists of South Africa (Chair), Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan (AU PSC 2007f: 1, 9).

There have been some major obstacles in properly and punctually implementing the CPA. Oil revenue sharing is one of them. The AU Commission reports that there have been some disagreements on the amount of oil production and revenue sharing between the two Governments. Furthermore, there have been some disputes on the boundaries demarcating the oil-producing areas. The GoSS is also accountable for some corruption problems (AU PSC 2007f: 6). Moreover, Martin (2002) points out that politics in the southern Sudan has long been plagued by the deep internal divisions and fear of Dinka domination in a way demonstrated by late John Garang’s leadership in the SPLM/A (122). In addition, the continuation of Darfur conflict is likely to hamper the implementation of the CPA since no single part of Sudan can enjoy sustainable peace as long as other regions are engulfed in violence and instability (AU PSC 2006a: 31). In particular, the prolonged conflict in Darfur was considered to undermine the prospects for a fair national election in April 2010, which was one of the crucial elements in the CPA. With the population of more than four millions, South Darfur is now the second most populous state after Khartoum (AU PSC 2009c: 4, 10).

In terms of the regional efforts to normalize the Chad-Sudan relations, Libya has been playing a major role in mediation and reconciliation between the two countries. According to the AU Commission’s report, Libya hosted a mini-Summit to discuss the
Chad-Sudan issue that led to the adoption of the Tripoli Declaration and Agreement on February 8, 2006. Its provisions include non-interference in internal affairs, putting an end to support to the armed groups in the other country, restoration of the friendly bilateral relations, ceasing the hostile media campaign and so on. The Ministerial Follow-up Committee, comprising Libya, the Republic of Congo (the AU Chair at that time), Burkina Faso, CAR, Sudan and Chad with the participation of the AU Commission and the CEN-SAD Secretary General, met in Tripoli on March 3, 2006 (AU PSC 2006c: 1-2).

Nonetheless, the AU Commission reports that on April 13, 2006, the United Front for Change (FUC), a coalition of Chadian rebels, allegedly backed and armed by the Sudanese government, attacked N’djamena and the town of Adre in Eastern Chad. Chad immediately broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Sudan and closed the Chad-Sudan borders. The Sudanese government denied its involvement in these attacks and accused Chad of continuing to harbor and arm rebel groups opposed to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which was signed between the government of Sudan and the SLM/A Minni Minawi in Abuja, Nigeria on May 5, 2006 (AU PSC 2007c: 1-2).

On the sidelines of the AU Banjul Summit in July 2006, Gaddafi facilitated a dialogue between Deby and al-Bashir that resulted in a visit of a Chadian delegation to Khartoum on July 10-11, 2006 and a reciprocal visit of a Sudanese delegation to N’djamena on July 25, 2006. Consequently, the Chadian government took a series of actions to arrest members of the SLM/A and JEM residing in Chad. The attempts to develop rapprochement between the FUC and N’djamena also emerged during the same period (AU PSC 2007c: 2-3).
In October 2006, the Chadian rebel groups resumed intensified military attacks in the eastern Chad. In response, Gaddafi called the Summit of Six, comprising Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, CAR, Chad and Sudan on November 21, 2006 in Tripoli and emphasized the need for full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. Gaddafi also brokered the peace agreement between N’djamena and the FUC, which was signed in Tripoli on December 24, 2006 (AU PSC 2007c: 4-6). The tension between the two countries has remained high with insecurity along their shared borders. The Chadian government claimed that the villages of Tiero and Marena were attacked by Janjaweed from Sudan on March 31, 2007 and launched the counter attacks against them on April 4, 2007. As an aftermath of these events, Libya sent a delegation to N’djamena on April 11, 2007 and sponsored a series of peace agreements between N’djamena and the Chadian rebels in the second half of 2007 (AU PSC 2008c: 1-3).

On the other hand, Gaddafi has allegedly provided support to some Darfurian rebel groups, including non-signatories to the DPA. Indeed, he has played a controversial role as both facilitator and spoiler in the peace process for Darfur. According to the report of the AU Commission, some leaders of the rebel movements in Darfur, so-called Group of 11, attempted to boycott the peace talks to be convened in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007, expressing their reservations about the venue (AU PSC 2008d: 3, 14). Furthermore, some diplomatic intelligence source indicates that Libya and Egypt have allegedly provided janjaweed with financial and military support (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

Eritrea has also backed some rebel groups in Darfur. The AU Commission reports that during the 5th Round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur in Abuja,
Nigeria from June 10 to July 5, 2005, the delegation of the Sudanese government contested the presence of Eritrea. As a result, Eritrea’s role was reduced to the bilateral consultations between itself and the Darfurian rebel groups at the round (AU PSC 2006a: 2). Furthermore, the National Redemption Front (NRF), a coalition of three Darfurian rebel groups that were opposed to the DPA, was established in Asmara on June 30, 2006. Due to their hostile activities against the DPA, the Sudanese government declared the NRF a terrorist organization and provided a list of their members to be arrested by Interpol (AU PSC 2006f: 6).

More precisely, some diplomatic intelligence source reveals that among the non-signatory groups of the DPA, there have been some tensions between the two factions, which are respectively backed by Tripoli and Asmara. As of August 2007, the Tripoli faction included the United Front for Liberation and Development (UFLD), SLM/A Sharif Harir and the Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces (RDFF), while the Asmara group consisted of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), SLM/A Abdul Shafi, SLM/A Abudalla Yahya and the JEM (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

Importantly, Libya and Qatar seem to be allies in this factional rivalry. During March 3-15, 2009 in Tripoli, five rebel groups from Darfur signed the Tripoli Pact to engage in the Doha peace talks to be hosted by Qatar. On June 28-29, 2009, the mediation led by Qatar resulted in meetings with the groups of Tripoli faction that later enlarged to include the additional movements of United Revolutionary Force Front (URFF), SLA-Khamis Abdallah, SLA-Juba, JEM-Idrees Azrag, SLA-Unity, SLA-Mainstream and United Resistance Front (URF) of Bahr Idriss Abu Garda. The
mediation urged those rebel groups to cooperate and ideally to create a united front with the assistance of Libya and to reach out to the JEM and SLA-Abdel Wahid. Prior to this, the mediation supported by Qatar led to peace talks between Khartoum and the JEM that resulted in the signing of the Goodwill and Confidence Building Agreement on February 17, 2009 (AU PSC 2009c: 3-4)

Perhaps, Gaddafi’s intervention in the Darfur crisis is driven by his hegemonic ambition as it has been always evident in his foreign policy adventurism in Africa. By manipulatively supporting the various conflicting parties, Gaddafi is able to magnify his influence on the wide-ranged stakeholders in Chad and Sudan and have the Libya-Chad-Sudan border region under his close scrutiny. Samatar assumes that Eritrea’s involvement in the Darfur conflict might be motivated by its confrontational stance against Ethiopia that has now close ties with Khartoum (personal communication, March 26, 2009).

Although I agree with Samatar’s assumption, I further suppose that some Arab states might be behind Asmara for the purpose of undermining the peace process for Darfur. Since the successful implementation of the CPA to a large extent depends on the national integrity of Sudan and the stability of al-Bashir regime, which is a party to the CPA, the Darfur conflict can be used as a legitimate excuse by the Sudanese government to delay the implementation of the CPA or even revoke the CPA itself. As a southern secession will be a great geo-strategic loss for Khartoum, Cairo and perhaps some other Arab states, tragically and ironically the continuation and deterioration of the Darfur conflict might be the way they want to undermine the CPA.
The political implication of the southern Sudan secession for Black African countries is equally important. If southern Sudan secedes, it will be the second secession case after Eritrea in postcolonial Africa, and more attempts may follow. Besides, there is a secessionist movement in Somaliland, and remarkably Somaliland is the most peaceful and well-governed part of chaotic Somalia. In fact, in 2006 some AU member states, including Nigeria, proposed to discuss the recognition of Somaliland, although Somaliland’s application to participating in the AU Banjul Summit in June-July 2006 was rejected. Hence, it appears that the Horn of Africa is a region where secessionist attempts gain a certain degree of legitimacy and regional/international support, while previous sub-Saharan African secessionist struggles, including Biafra, all failed.

At his lecture at Rutgers University-Newark, Patrick R.D. Hayford, the Director of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa at the UN, stated that many African leaders were hoping that southern Sudan would decide not to secede as a result of the successful implementation of the CPA and full reconciliation between the north and the south (April 9, 2009). Hence, it seems that the principle of territorial integrity of post-colonial African states overrides the Black African cause against Arab supremacy in Sudan. It is quite ironic in the context of Afro-Arab relations and power balance in Africa.

One of the noteworthy trends in the peace process in Darfur is Khartoum’s intention to promote an African regional initiative over the international intervention led by the UN and the Western powers. The AU Commission reports that the Sudanese government opposed the transfer of peacekeeping responsibility from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to the UN, calling for strengthening the logistic and operative capacity of the AMIS and even pledging financial assistance to sustain the
AMIS operation. This Sudanese government’s position was supported by some Arab ethnic group leaders in Darfur. Khartoum claims that retaining “African character” is essential in the peacekeeping operation, given the fact that Darfur is an Islamic society, and therefore caution has to be made in any attempt to handover the mission to the UN (AU PSC 2006b: 9 and AU PSC 2006e: 13).

The Sudanese government even brought the notion of anti-colonialism in its argument. Lam Akol, the Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister, claims that “the continent, having come out of colonialism, should be able to solve its problems by itself.” Therefore, the replacement of the AMIS with the UN would reflect badly on the aspiration of Africans to solve their own problems, which the AMIS is meant to showcase. He goes on to say that the AU might be subjected to [foreign] pressure, but its decision should be driven by Africa’s best interests (AU PSC 2006b: 1, 9-10).

Khartoum also secured support from the LAS in order to sustain the AU-led peacekeeping initiative in Darfur. In his letter to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Amr Mousa, the Secretary General of the LAS, writes that at the extraordinary session of the Council of the LAS on August 20, 2006 the LAS reassured the need for the AU to pursue its peacemaking efforts in Darfur. If the decision to end the AMIS mandate at the end of September 2006 was due to funding and logistical constrains, the LAS was ready to assist (AU PSC 2006f: 19, 21). Consequently, in September 2006, the LAS announced that it would contribute US$50 million, including US$6.75 million by Qatar, to enable the AMIS to complete its mandate until the end of 2006 (AU PSC 2006h: 7). Eventually, the Sudanese government agreed to accept the Addis Ababa conclusions regarding the transition from the AMIS to the UN operation, which was endorsed at the AU PSC on
November 30, 2006 in Abuja. The conclusions ensure the retention of the “African character” in the AU-UN hybrid operation. For example, the Force Commander, who should be an African, shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in consultation with the UN Secretary General (AU PSC 2007e: 2).

On the other hand, the JEM and the SLM/A have often requested the UN or even North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for an intervention in order to stop the killing of civilians and protect the internally displaced persons. In its statement on February 27, 2006, the JEM stated that the protection of civilians should be a matter of top priority notwithstanding the government’s opposition to the expected transition from the AMIS to the UN-led operation (AU PSC 2006b: 2). In my interview, one Army General of a donor country suggested that Khartoum’s real intention to maintain “African character” in the peacekeeping operation in Darfur might be to minimize the Western intervention and constrain the effectiveness and scale of the operation in Darfur (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). In effect, there has been no significant progress in ending the conflict, and insecurity and human sufferings continue in Darfur. Ironically, however, Sudan’s diplomatic maneuver has helped reinforce the norm and practice of African solution for African conflict funded by oil dollars from the wealthy Arab states.

Sudan’s attempt to “Africanize” the peace process for Darfur is also reflected in the way it handles the decisions of the ICC on the situation in Darfur. In its resolution 1593 adopted on March 31, 2005, the UNSC decided to refer the Darfur case to the ICC. After investigation, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a prosecutor of the ICC, concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that al-Bashir bears criminal responsibility for the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by members of the state apparatus, the army and the Militia/Janjaweed, all of whom are under his absolute control (ICC 2008: 1). Accordingly, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in March 2009.

In fact, the AU and the LAS are the two main regional forums that have provided al-Bashir with propaganda and diplomatic support against the ICC decision. Although in its communiqué issued at the meeting on July 21, 2008 the AU PSC reiterates “AU’s unflinching commitment to combating impunity” and condemns “the gross violations of human rights in Darfur”, it expresses its opposition to the ICC’s indictment of the Sudanese President. The AU PSC reaffirms “AU’s concern with the misuse of indictments against African leaders”, recalls “the principle of the presumption of innocence”, stresses “the need for international justice to be conducted in a transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of double standard” and requests the UNSC to defer the process initiated by the ICC, considering the need to ensure that “the ongoing peace efforts are not jeopardized” and the fact that “a prosecution may not be in the interest of the victims and justice (AU PSC 2008g: 1-2).” The rationale for this was that al-Bashir might lose an incentive to conduct a national election scheduled to take place in April 2010. This was because he might find it difficult to run the election campaign, being indicted by the ICC. Furthermore, at the AU Sirte Summit on July 1-3, 2009, the African leaders decided not to cooperate with the ICC pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute relating to immunities for the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese President (AU Assembly 2009a: 2).
Furthermore, at the UNSC on July 28, 2008, Libya and South Africa, supported by China and Russia, appealed to suspend the ICC’s indictment of the Sudanese President for one year. The Sudan’s Ambassador to the UN commended Libya and South Africa’s efforts at the UNSC, criticized the ICC’s decision as “an insult to the whole continent” and accused the ICC prosecutor as “a screwdriver in the workshop of double standards (as cited in The Daily Monitor 2008b).” In its statement, Sudan’s Permanent Mission to the AU attacks the ICC’s prosecution of al-Bashir by describing it as “politically motivated” and “new wave of imperialism and hegemony.” It also states that “The manipulations of the ICC Prosecutor are intended to hamper the African Union initiatives…My government remains committed and open to African initiatives and solutions (2008: 2, 9).”

The perception of double standard is also found among African diplomats and researchers, who are dealing with the conflicts in Darfur. Mehari Taddele Maru, Executive Director of African Rally for Peace and Development, writes that “the ICC seems strong on the weaker countries in Africa. All of the four investigations and indictments by ICC are African cases [the CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Uganda].” This is quite ironic given the fact that “ICC’s Rome Statute is ratified by 106 countries, the majorities of them are from Africa (2008: 18).” On a similar ground, at the seminar of the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on the ICC and Sudan on July 21, 2008 in Addis Ababa, which I attended, one participant claimed that the ICC should be renamed the ACC (African Criminal Court).

Furthermore, the same type of argument has been elaborated by the member states of the LAS. In a joint statement issued at the end of the Qatar Summit in March 2009,
the LAS declares that “We stress our solidarity with Sudan and our rejection of the ICC
decision.” President Assad of Syria claimed that those criminals who had “committed
massacres and atrocities in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon” should be arrested first (BBC
News 2009b). Gaddafi accuses the indictment of being an “attempt [by the West] to
recolonise their former colonies” and labels the ICC as a “new form of world terrorism
(BBC News 2009a)”. As of April 2009, the Sudanese President disregarded the warrant
by visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Libya and Qatar, all of which are not signatories to the ICC
Rome Statute. Only three member states of the LAS, Jordan, Comoros and Djibouti, are
parties to the ICC Rome Statute (BBC News 2009c). The Daily Monitor reports that the
ICC’s decision “set off alarm bells in Arab capitals that fear it may showcase a new form
of Western meddling in Arab affairs.” Diaa Rashwan, Cairo-based political analyst,
argues that in public perception al-Bashir represents Arab legitimacy and dignity (2008a).

Although both the AU and the LAS are opposed to the ICC’s indictment of the
Sudanese leader, the AU seems to be more concerned about the negative impacts of the
ICC’s indictment of al-Bashir, which is likely to lead to regime instability and power
vacuum, on the on-going AU-led peace initiative in Sudan. On the other hand, it appears
that the LAS considers the ICC’s decision to be an issue of Arab sovereignty and pride.
As the debate over the transition from the AMIS to the UN operation indicates, both the
AU and the LAS have tried to promote the African regional initiative for peacemaking in
Sudan, in which the AU is a primary peacekeeping operator with the LAS as a major
financial provider. The both African and Arab states seem to be united in challenging the
ICC’s prosecution of the Sudanese leader, bringing the notion of double standard and bias
against leaders in Africa and the Arab world.
To reemphasize, both African and Arab states do not want to see the southern Sudanese secession, although southern voters overwhelmingly chose to secede at the 2011 referendum. Indeed, southern Sudanese independence will be a geo-strategic loss for Arab countries and a normative challenge for African states in maintaining the principle of territorial integrity demarcated by the colonial borders. Taking these vital interests into account, African and Arab countries have a common ground for facilitating the peace process in Sudan. The ideal scenario will be the peaceful north-south reconciliation of Sudan and restoration of peace in Darfur, for which the regime stability of Sudan is arguably a precondition. To conclude, one AU official insightfully commented that if Africans and Arabs cannot live in mutual prosperity in Sudan, then peaceful Afro-Arab coexistence in Africa will never be achieved (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).
Chapter VI: Identity Politics in the Indian Ocean Island States: Pan-Africanism in the Discourse of Racial-Cultural Hybridity and Diversity
With regards to the Indian Ocean island countries in the discourse of Pan-Africanism, their geographic isolation from the African continent and their hybrid and heterogeneous racial-cultural compositions make their state identity less African in terms of self-perception and international recognition perspectives. Jean Houbert, a prominent political scientist from Mauritius, insightfully argues that international organizations and area studies on them (including this research) are keen to categorize countries of the world as belonging to this or that continent. Yet, the continents represent a much smaller part of the world than the sea. The sea covers more than 70 percent of the surface of planet earth. The Pacific alone is larger than all continents put together. We misnamed earth. It should be “planet sea.” Furthermore, the prevailing winds and currents of the Indian Ocean make the islands turn away from the nearest continent, Africa. Until relatively recent times, it was easier for human beings to navigate across the Indian Ocean from east to west than to travel a short distance from Africa. Therefore, state identity of the Indian Ocean island countries is oceanic rather than continental (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

Houbert conceptualizes Africa as continental and the Indian Ocean island countries as oceanic and questions the relevancy and importance of Africa and its organizational entity, the AU, to these island states (personal communication, January 18, 2009). On the African continent, the Sahara desert is often seen as a political and cultural gap rather than a connection. As a consequence, Northern Africa is usually categorized as part of the Middle East instead of Africa in the discourse of regional studies. Likewise, in Houbert’s view, the Indian Ocean region is a separate sphere from the continental Africa. Throughout history, maritime and commercial interests of the sea powers,
namely France, the UK and the US, have shaped the economic, political and social conditions of these island countries through colonization (France and the UK) and post-colonial militarization (the US). Diego Garcia, which is one of the islands of Chagos and former dependency of Mauritius, houses the most important US naval and air force base outside the continental America. Furthermore, France has retained sovereignty in Reunion as a *departement d’outre mer* (DOM), and therefore, Reunion is an integral part of the EU. Seen in this light, Mauritius, which is a next door to Reunion, is geographically much closer to the EU than the AU. Mayotte, one of the islands of the Comoro archipelago, is not yet a DOM, but heading that direction (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

Furthermore, Houbert argues that African influence in the Indian Ocean island countries is narrowly confined in the racial sense through forcible trafficking of Black Africans to the islands through slavery. As slaves were brought to the islands not as family groups but as individuals, the cultural features of Black Africa had little chance of surviving. In the racial hierarchy of Mauritian and Seychellois societies, Whiteness is most privileged, while Blackness is placed at the bottom, with people of mixed race and Asian descendents belonging somewhere between. What is worse, among people on the Indian Ocean islands, Africa is negatively perceived as the continent of poverty, dictatorship, civil war, genocide and HIV-AIDS endemics mainly due to the influence of Western-controlled mass media. Hence, self-claimed racial-cultural identity of the populations [including people of African descent] of these islands is questionably African (personal communication, January 18, 2009).
In response to Houbert’s argument, I assert that African racial-cultural identity in the Indian Ocean Island countries, if any, is diasporal rather than indigenous. Therefore, a conceptual distinction should be made between the continental-indigenous African identity and oceanic-diasporal African identity. Nonetheless, even in the discipline of African diasporal studies, Alpers (2003) claims that a focus is disproportionately placed on the Atlantic world, while the Indian Ocean region is largely neglected. This is mainly attributable to the lack of Western educational opportunities for African diasporas in the Indian Ocean region and different historical paths that hindered the creation of any diasporal awareness in the region (19, 42).

In terms of regional grouping, Houbert argues that the meaning of being part of the AU for the Indian Ocean island states is insignificant, while the other intra/inter regional arrangements, such as the IOC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), seem to bring more tangible socio-economic benefits to these states (personal communication, January 18, 2009). The IOC activities are funded by a substantial aid package from the EU (Courier ACP-EU 2003: 20), and the ACP guarantees lower tariff rates to the commodities from the ACP countries to the EU market. Houbert’s assertion is right to some extent since none of the Indian Ocean island countries has adequate state capacity and diplomatic weight to shape the institutional development process of the AU. Hence, their foreign policy objectives are less likely to be injected into the AU instruments and organs, while the African regional powers of Libya, Nigeria and South Africa tend to take a leading role in promoting certain policies and projects at the AU.
On the other hand, some studies indicate that one of the major challenges that the IOC is currently facing is the comparative trade advantages of more inclusive regional initiatives, such as the COMESA and the SADC (Courier ACP-EU 2003: 19), both of which are designed to create larger common markets among African countries. Furthermore, in the field of peace and security, persistent political turmoil in Comoros and the AU’s peacekeeping efforts to the country for the last decade reminds us of the importance of Pan-African regional cooperation, incorporating the Indian Ocean island countries. Furthermore, political unrest and unconstitutional regime change in Madagascar in March 2009 certainly signified the role of the AU, whose Constitutive Act condemns any sort of unconstitutional regime change among its member states.

Therefore, while the previous chapters explore the Afro-Arab organizational features of the AU, this chapter investigates the continental-oceanic aspect of the AU, which is an under-theorized and under-scrutinized topic in African regional studies. In fact, most academic inquiries fail to include this region in their analyses of African regional integration even though Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles have been member states of the AU. Therefore, this study attempts to fill this gap, by examining the role of racial-cultural identity in domestic politics and foreign policy of these Indian Ocean island states and revealing a unique position of these states in the AU-led African regional integration.

Comoros: the OAU-AU Regional Peacekeeping Efforts on the Islands of Afro-Arab Hybrid Heritage

The state of Comoros consists of three major islands of Grande Comore (or Njazidja), Moheli (or Mwali) and Anjouan (or Nzwani). According to Houbert, Mayotte
island was the capital of the archipelago of Comoros during the French colonial era and has remained under French rule after the independence of Comoros (personal communication, January 18, 2009). According to Medeiros (2003), Comoros was named after *el-komor* (the moon) in Arabic (60).

Some studies indicate that the arrival of Shirazi Arabs from Persia in the 15th and 16th centuries led to the early period of development of the archipelago. They brought a version of Sunni Islam that belongs to the school of Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii, a scholar from Mecca in the eighth century. The first Europeans to arrive in the archipelago were Portuguese in 1505, around the same period as Shirazi Arabs. The Comoro islands first appeared on European maps in 1527. Within a century of early Shirazi settlement, Comoros became an important center for the Arab-led slave trade. In 1785 Sakalava from Madagascar began coming to Comoros to steal slaves. In 1841 the Sakalava King Andriantsouli, who had claimed his sultanate on Mayotte, ceded the island to France. Within two decades, an estimated 40 percent of the island’s population was slaves used for French owned plantations or as domestic servants. At that period, there were three rigid social classes: the elites of Shirazi origin, a middle class of free people and slaves (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 7-8). France had colonized Comoros since 1841 until 1975, when Comoros achieved independence.

Today’s Comoro inhabitants are therefore a mixture of people of the Indian Ocean littoral with African, Malagasy and Arabic heritages (Ottenheimer and Ottenheimer 1994: 3). Notably, Islam is the official religion of the country, and over 95 percent of the population follow Sunni Islam (*Africa Research Bulletin* 2007: 17173). Interestingly, French racial-cultural heritage in the Comoro society appears to be less significant
compared to other former French colonies in the Indian Ocean. Prior to the European settlement and colonization in Comoros, early Arab settlers had established the Arab-Islamic socio-political structure and cultural practice throughout the archipelago. This condition hindered French settlers from deeply Creolizing the archipelago through inter-marriage, religious conversion and cultural penetration.

In fact, the racial-cultural composition of Comoros is quite similar to that of Swahili societies of the East African coast with cross-fertilized Afro-Arab heritage and Islamic influence. For instance, the major local language of Shikomoro is closely related to Kiswahili, which is a Bantu-Arabic blend. Medeiros (2003) writes that since ancient times, Comoros has been part of the Swahili cultural space (60). Houbert underscores that Zanzibar, which was the center of Swahili city-states in East Africa, had played an important role in slave trade and other affairs in Comoros throughout the pre-European colonial era (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

Regardless of its hybrid Afro-Arab heritage, the historical legacy of Arab-led enslavement of Africans continues to privilege Arabs over Africans. According to some studies, the racial-cultural roots explain the class structure of today’s Comoro society. The class division is more apparent in urban areas, where the sultanic influence is the strongest. The higher social classes are “people of the palace”, who are descended from the Arab sultans. The lower social classes are descendants from servants or slaves of the sultans. The largest class is called “wangawana” (free people) or “wandru wa ntsi” (people of the earth). Within this class, people are organized in a hierarchical fashion by the family stature, quarter or village (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 104).
Due to the country’s Arab-Islamic affinity that is stronger in the circle of political and economic elites of Arab origin, Comoros has a more Arab-Islamic orientation in its foreign policy compared to its neighboring island states of Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. Some studies indicate that the Comoro government has promoted strong relationships with conservative and oil-rich Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Comoros has often received foreign aid from these countries and regional financial institutions funded by these states, namely the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Comoros has been a member of the LAS since 1993, although its application was initially denied in 1977 (Library of Congress 1994a). Notably, the LAS provided $400,000 to the AU-led electoral support mission in Comoros in 2004 (AU PSC 2004: 1-2). They also offered a substantial financial assistance for the deployment of the AU-led Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) in 2007 (AU PSC 2007d: 1-2).

In November 2000, Azali Assoumani, the Comoro President at that time, visited Gaddafi of Libya and officially thanked him for his “inspiration.” Assoumani praised Gaddafi as “a role model for implementing the people’s authority.” Gaddafi in return provided medical aid to Comoros in December 2000 (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 60). The close ties between Libya and Comoros have been well maintained. Notwithstanding its geographic remoteness, Comoros is a member state of Libya-sponsored CEN-SAD, whose Secretariat is located in Tripoli, Libya. The CEN-SAD is not a regional organization in a strict sense since its membership distribution accounts for a large part of Africa well beyond the Sahel-Saharan region. According to my interview with one AU official, a real purpose of the CEN-SAD activities appear to mobilize its
member states’ support for Gaddafi-led African regional integration initiatives. Seen in this light, the Arab-Islamic connection between Libya and Comoros might be one of the grounds why Libya invited Comoros to join the CEN-SAD (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

More recently, however, there is a growing link between Comoros and Iran that has raised some concerns among the international community and Comoro nationals, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims. Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, the incumbent President of Comoros, studied Islamic theology in Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia and is commonly referred to as “Ayatollah”. During the election primaries in April 2005 in Anjouan, Sambi pledged his support for the creation of an Islamic government. In fact, there is a growing fear that Iran’s influence will lead Comoros to become a safe haven for Islamic fundamentalists. Barely two years since Sambi took power, groups affiliated with the Shia sect opened Koranic schools in Grande Comore and Anjouan. In addition, a youth training center in Moroni has been renamed the Khomeini Foundation. In the economic field, in 2007 Sambi made an agreement with Teheran to authorize Iranians to fish in Comoro territorial waters (*Africa Research Bulletin* 2007: 17173).

In terms of its relations with other African countries, Comoros and African countries have been linked by the fluctuating pattern of political cooperation and military intervention since its independence. Among them, South Africa has played an important role in shaping the country’s foreign and domestic affairs over time. During the apartheid time, some key Black African states, with the notable example of Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, made clear its anti-apartheid position under the auspices of the OAU. In fact, some studies suggest that the socialist regime of Tanzania wanted to keep
Comoros away from the Western influence by providing military assistance to President Ali Soilih [who was in power between 1975 and 1978]. Tanzania deployed about 100 military advisers to the archipelago to train the army and the Commander Moissi. However, Tanzania lacked resources to keep a long-term influence on the armed forces in Comoros (Library of Congress 1994a).

As a small island state handicapped by socio-economic underdevelopment and consistent political instability, post-independence Comoros tended to rely on the apartheid regime of South Africa that was a hegemonic economic and military power in the Indian Ocean region. It is reported that from 1979 to 1989, under President Ahmed Abdallah, Comoro relations with apartheid South Africa were very close. Bob Denard, a South African-based French mercenary, became a leader of Presidential Guard in Comoros. He helped to launch air links and a strong economic partnership between Comoros and South Africa [that was under heavy political and economic pressure due to the international sanction]. Around that time the role of France was largely replaced by South Africa. It is widely believed that the apartheid regime was involved in organizing a number of coups and coup attempts in Comoros including the coup in 1979 that brought Abdallah to power (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 60). In the late 1980s, Comoros was used as a transit point for arms shipment from South Africa to Iran and Mozambican National Resistance rebel movement in Mozambique (Library of Congress 1994a). Nonetheless, with the end of the Cold War, the dismantling of apartheid and the death of Abdallah in 1989, Comoro relations with South Africa soured (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 60).
Since its independence Comoros has been plagued by a series of military coups and secessionist attempts. Some studies reveal that the three main islands of Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan are separate administrative entities with governors and elected councils that together constitute the government of Comoros (Ottenheimer and Ottenheimer 1994: 6-7). The president is the head of state to be elected by direct universal suffrage. The presidency rotates every four years among the elected presidents from the three major islands. Partly due to the loose political union among islands coupled with the relative isolation of the peoples by island, so-called island identity has become more nationalistic over time (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 53, 103).

Another important element in Comoro politics is the status of Mayotte, over which France has retained sovereignty. Houbert explains that since Mayotte was the capital island of Comoros during the French colonial period, people in Mayotte were more assimilated to French culture and identity than people on the other islands. At the election for independence, the three islands of Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan voted for independence, while Mayotte decided to remain under French rule. Since then, there have been several elections and referenda, and each time the voters of Mayotte overwhelmingly decided that they wanted to retain a French status. What Mayotte people really want is to become a DOM like Reunion. Although Paris prefers to see Mayotte to be reintegrated with the other three islands in a pro-French Comoro state, French constitution does not allow Paris to ignore the democratically expressed will of Mayotte people. Unsurprisingly, the standard of living in Mayotte is much higher than the other three islands of Comoros. This factor attracts illegal immigrants to Mayotte and more problematically leads a secessionist attempt in one island and another in hope that France
would give them the same French status as Mayotte. After all, the state of archipelago must have means to compensate and overcome separatist tendencies in each island. Comoros, one of the poorest countries in the Third World, has a long way to consolidate Comoro national identity and territorial integrity (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

A series of Comoro crises has been a major security agenda of the OAU-AU for the last decade. In order to maintain peace and order in the country, the OAU and later AU have played a significant role in mediation and peacekeeping. For instance, the OAU sponsored a reconciliation conference in 1997 in order to support the Comoro government led by Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim, who declared a state of emergency, having been threatened by separatist movements in Anjouan and Moheli. The OAU sent regional observers from Egypt, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia to help maintaining peace and order in the archipelago in the same year. On April 23, 1999, in Antananarivo, Madagascar, the Comoro government and Anjouan secessionist leaders reached an agreement that would increase the autonomy of Anjouan and Moheli islands. The OAU was a broker of the Antananarivo Agreement. The OAU observers stayed in Comoros to support the implementation of the Antananarivo Agreement. Because of continued failures at negotiating between Anjouan and Moheli secessionist leaders, the OAU strengthened the existing sanction on Anjouan trade and shut phone service to and from the island (Country Watch Incorporated 2007a: 13-15, 59).

Notably, post-apartheid South Africa has played a major role in coordinating and funding the OAU-AU peacekeeping missions in Comoros. For instance, South Africa was designated as a coordinating country of regional efforts in Comoros and led several
observer missions to the islands. In 2004 they donated 5 million Rand (equivalent to $748,369) to the AU Peace Fund to assist the reconciliation process in Comoros (AU PSC 2004: 1-2). As a dominant regional power, South Africa was the only AU member state that voluntarily contributed funds for this purpose.

Some other African countries in the Indian Ocean region have also supported the AU peacekeeping activities in Comoros. Under the leadership of a South African military officer, Madagascar and Mozambique participated in the AU Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) during March and June 2004 (AU PSC 2004: 4). Tanzania contributed a company of 200 soldiers to the MAES in May 2007. That is the largest military personnel contribution in the mission. Tanzania also participated in “Operation Democracy in the Comoros” which was an AU-led military intervention into Anjouan that began on March 11, 2008 (AU PSC 2008b: 4).

It is fair to argue that the AU peacekeeping efforts in Comoros for the last decade are the most notable Pan-African integration project that has helped to deepen the link between Comoros and continental African states. Although financial assistance and Islamic religious-cultural influence from the Arab world and Iran should not be underestimated, the Middle Eastern region lacks a collective security mechanism within the framework of the LAS. As a result, the AU became the most legitimate regional organization to intervene to the political crisis in Comoros.

Compared to other conflict endemic African countries with the Afro-Arab heritage, such as Sudan and Mauritania, where the Arab domination over Black Africans appears to be a major cause of injustice and disunity, the Afro-Arab division seems to be irrelevant to explain the causes of Comoro crisis. For instance, a Comoro AU official,
whom I interviewed with, denied the Afro-Arab tension in the Comoro society (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). To support this opinion, consistent separatist claims that have threatened the unity and integrity of Comoros are based on island identity and allegiance that crosscut the Afro-Arab or ethnic division as such.

In general, Swahili societies of the Afro-Arab racial-cultural blend are more tolerant than Western societies in terms of racial identification and consequent prejudice and discrimination. Based on my three-year working experience in Mombasa, Kenya, which is one of the major Swahili cities in the East African coast, I argue that it is almost impossible and meaningless to distinguish between Arabs and Africans in a Swahili society. This is because racial-cultural hybridity is a norm rather than an exception. Although the socio-economic well-being of descendents of Arab sultans and their related families continue in Swahili societies, this is not rigidly associated with the racial line, but rather follows the paternal lineage. For instance, Ali Mazrui (2003), a world-renowned Swahili scholar from Mombasa, identifies himself as “genealogical Afrabian”, being proud of his Afro-Arab roots (6). Mazrui (1986) writes that the biological process of Arabization is facilitated by intermarriage and the upward lineage system of the Arab world. If the father of a child is an Arab, then the child is considered to be an Arab, regardless of the racial background of the mother. This lineage practice can be articulated as “ascending miscegenation” since the child ascends to the more privileged parent of Arab origin (90).

To summarize, there seems to be little implication of Afro-Arab heritage of the Comoro society for the prolonged political instability and insecurity in the country. The Arab upward lineage system and the tolerant racial perception of Swahili society allow
Comoro people to have blend identity of Afro-Arab without any significant political and economic impacts on their lives. President Sambi’s inclination toward the Arab-Islamic world and Iran seems to create some concerns in the religious aspect, such as Sunni v. Shia and modernity v. fundamentalism, but not in a way to undermine the African racial-cultural roots among Comorians. Furthermore, the fluctuating pattern of Comoros - South Africa relations for the last few decades implies that African racial-cultural affinity has not been an explanatory factor to shape the bilateral relations, although more decisive African states were united against apartheid South Africa on the common ground of anti-racism and anti-Western colonialism. Because of its political instability and socio-economic underdevelopment, Comoros to some extent continues to rely on the influential role that post-apartheid South Africa has played in the Indian Ocean region.

**Madagascar: Malagasy Identity as the Malayo-Polynesian Prototype**

Among the four Indian Ocean island states, Madagascar is unique for its racial-cultural heritage that has been influenced by the Malayo-Indonesian origin since time immemorial. According to Bradt and Brown (1993), Madagascar is the world’s fourth largest island, which is located approximately 400 kilometers off the East African coast. It is assumed that around 2,000 years ago the people of today as Indonesia arrived in their outrigger canoes and settled in the island. They brought their language, culture and staple food: rice. Malagasy language, therefore, belongs to the Malayo-Polynesian family. The first Europeans to arrive in the island were Portuguese in 1500. By the early 18th century, Madagascar became a haven for pirates and slave traders (xiii-xiv). There was a two-way traffic of slaves. Malagasy slaves were captured by Arabs and Europeans especially during the 18th century and sent to other Indian Ocean islands and the New World, while
Malagasy themselves also imported slaves from the African coast (Heseltine 1971: 66-67). During the French colonial period, Madagascar was a sort of half way point between the French colonies in West Africa and those in South-East Asia and the Pacific (Oliver and Atmore 1994: 234).

According to Heseltine (1971), it appears that there was a notable Arab-Islamic penetration in the Middle Ages on the island. Arab settlements continued until the early arrival of European visitors. These Arabs left remarkable traces in the Malagasy language, such as the names of months and days of the week, as well as in magical and divination practices. However, their religious influence was not so remarkable. Today’s Muslim communities in Madagascar are of either Comoro or Pakistani origin. Although other cultural elements have been added to the island through immigration from Africa and Arabia, these are all secondary to the primacy of Malayo-Polynesian culture and language (51, 61-62).

Some research results indicate that a number of racial types exist in Madagascar, ranging from the type closely resembling Malays or Javanese to individuals who resemble both African and Melanesian. Between these two categories, there is an intermediate group that is the most widespread (Heseltine 1971: 51). Mack (1986) details that although people of Asian heritage are found throughout the country, African physical characteristics are in the majority (15). From a linguistic point of view, 20 percent of the vocabulary of Malagasy language comes from the Bantu languages (Newitt 2003: 82).

Houbert argues that there is a caste-like hierarchy existing in the Malagasy society although it is possible for an individual of low caste to gain a high social status through achievements in the modern political and economic fields. Merina, the largest group of
Malagasy with physical features inherited from the Indonesian ancestry, tend to live on the high plateau. Andria, the highest caste among Merina, still inhabit the central plateau and intra-marry among themselves. On the other hand, groups of African slave descent belong to the lowest caste of the society and tend to have more Negroid physical features than people of the higher caste. Nonetheless, while Malagasy society is characterized as rigidly hierarchical, Madagascar is a culturally unified country as “Great Island” with a single island-wide language and common practices (personal communication, January 18, 2009). In short, the Malagasy stratified social system privileges the Malayo-Polynesian racial-cultural heritage, while African physical features appear to be dominant throughout the country. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the Malayo-Polynesian group can be seen as a sociological majority, who have developed and reinforced Malagasy cultural norms and practices based on the primacy of Malayo-Polynesian heritage.

According to Houbert, the French colonial rulers displaced the high caste Malagasy ruling group. Later in de-colonization, French favored the coastal groups, who belonged to the lower castes, and eventually transferred political power to them. After the independence in 1960, political power had long remained in the hands of groups from the coast, but people of the higher castes in the high plateau retained a good deal of economic wealth and social prestige. The presidential election of Marc Ravalomanana in 2002 marked a shift of political power from the lower castes in the coast back to the higher castes in the high plateau. This is why the election of Ravalomanana triggered almost a civil war in the Malagasy society (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

In addition to these unique racial-cultural components, its geographic separation from the African continent led to create distinctive Malagasy state identity. Compared to
the other micro island states in the Indian Ocean, Madagascar has a huge territorial size, about 1,600 kilometers long and 560 kilometers at its widest point, (Bradt and Brown 1993: xiii) and a large population, approximately 21,282,000 (CIA 2010) that characterizes Madagascar as not a fully African continental state, but a potential regional power notwithstanding its lower level of socio-economic development.

In their historical analysis on the Madagascar-Africa relations, Oliver and Atmore (1994) argue that the political isolation of Madagascar from the continent of Africa began to be ceased during the Second World War. During the war, there was the occupation of British forces on part of the island, and many of the soldiers were from Africa. After the war, Malagasy students in France encountered Francophone students from West Africa, to whom they felt closer than to the South-East Asians. Most importantly, the timing of Madagascar’s independence struggle coincided with a wider African liberation movement, but not with the Asian one (234).

In December 1967 African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) was established among newly independent Francophone African countries with a main objective as to promote cooperation for economic, social, technical and cultural development. Madagascar was one of the fourteen founding members of the OCAM (Osmanczyk and Mango 2003: 34). Jean Pierre Rakotoarivony, the Malagasy Ambassador to Ethiopia and the AU, commented that as the name OCAM implies, Madagascar was not considered to be fully integrated into the continental Africa in terms of regional grouping at that time (personal communication, August 12, 2008). Nevertheless, Houbert points out that at the establishment of the OCAM, the regime of Madagascar remained heavily reliant on France, so did the other former French colonies
in Western and Central Africa. The regime of Madagascar was more at home at a conservative and French-speaking organization like the OCAM rather than at the OAU, which was seen to be radical and dominated by Anglophone African countries at that time (personal communication, January 18, 2009). Oliver and Atmore (1994) consider Madagascar’s accession to the OCAM and OAU to be an important political incidence that made the country, built by ancient colonists from across the Indian Ocean, to be at last assimilated into Africa (235).

During the OAU time, Madagascar’s relations with other African states were largely determined by its ideological orientation. Some studies indicate that Madagascar with a radical inclination in the early 1970s cut the developed ties with apartheid South Africa and strengthened its relations with radical African states, such as Algeria and Libya. Madagascar provided the liberation struggles in South Africa and the Western Sahara with support. Nonetheless, Madagascar eventually decreased its political activities in Africa. Partly this was a corollary of the redirection of state focus for its economic survival. Besides that, the internal divisions of the OAU members and the collapse of socialist alliance in the Horn of Africa led to certain disillusionment (Covell 1987: 155-156). Some argue that during the 1980s, Madagascar-South African relations continued to be strained. Although there was a series of tension between the two countries, South Africa never really threatened Madagascar, largely because they feared international condemnation (Library of Congress 1994b).

Interestingly, in post-Cold War global politics, Madagascar’s foreign and economic policies seem to reflect its unique racial-cultural heritage as well as off-continent geographic location, both of which make Madagascar a bridge between Asia
and Africa. For instance, Ambassador Rakotoarivony explained that in 2002, when President Ravalomanana seized power, he attempted to promote Malagasy economic links with Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It was easy for him to do so since a large portion of the Malagasy population have ancestral roots in Indonesia and Malaysia. President Ravalomanana himself is Malayo-Polynesian descent. Nonetheless, in a geographic sense, Madagascar belongs to Africa (only 400 kilometers away from the East African coast) not Asia. Madagascar continues to be an active member of the AU, the COMESA and the SADC (personal communication, August 12, 2008). Therefore, President Ravalomanana seems to consider practical factors in addition to historical factors in his thinking of regional belonging.

Madagascar’s dilemma over Asian or African state identity was manifested in another interesting foreign policy episode. One AU official, whom I interviewed with, commented that in 2002 in response to the AU’s decision against the process of presidential election in Madagascar, Ravalomanana declared that Madagascar would leave the AU and opt for joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, this was just a propagandistic statement that did not result in any foreign policy action (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). Although off-continent Madagascar has developed its unique “Great Island” identity that is based on the Malayo-Polynesian prototype, researchers and policy makers are likely to categorize Madagascar as part of sub-Saharan Africa mainly due to the country’s lower level of socio-economic development.

Noteworthily, Madagascar had played an active role in the AU-led peacekeeping activities in Comoros. In Madagascar there is a substantial minority group of Comoro
origin especially in the northwest region of the country. The two countries are linked by
the history of slavery and recent migrations of Comorians to Madagascar for seeking
business and educational opportunities. Ambassador Rakotoarivony explained that
Malagasy consider Comorians as their brothers and sisters since the two countries have
a bond of kinship. We can find Malagasy names among many Comorians. Interestingly,
such kinship was the main reason why Madagascar hesitated to offer a troop contribution
to the AU-led military intervention in Anjouan, Comoros. President Ravalomanana
wanted to avoid a situation, in which Malagasy soldiers have to shoot their Comoro
brothers even for a peacekeeping purpose (personal communication, August 12, 2008).
Nonetheless, Houbert counter-argues that Malagasy society is generally against
foreigners acquiring land. Comoro immigrants, who settled in the area of Majunga on the
Malagasy west coast, were often rounded up and expelled when they were not simply
killed off (personal communication, January 18, 2009). In sum, due to the geographic
proximity, historical connection and human migration between the two countries,
Madagascar is the country to be most affected by persistent political turmoil in Comoros.
Therefore, Madagascar tends to have great stake in participating in the AU-led peace and
security activities for the Comoro crisis.

More recently, Madagascar itself has undergone political unrest since the
beginning of 2009. In its communiqué on March 20, 2009, the AU PSC reported that
Ravalomanana resigned due to pressures from the civilian opposition and Malagasy
armed forces in March 2009. The transfer of power from Ravalomanana to Andry
Rajoelina, who took the Office of the President, was made in violation of the Malagasy
Constitution. The AU PSC condemned this unconstitutional change of government and
suspended Madagascar from participating in the AU activities until the constitutional order is restored. The AU PSC also called upon all member states and the international community to condemn the unconstitutional regime change in Madagascar and to refrain from any action to comfort the illegal regime in the country (AU PSC 2009a: 1). The AU and the International Joint Mediation Team (the AU, the SADC, International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) and the UN) sponsored the meeting of the leaders of the four Malagasy political movements during August 5-10, 2009 in Maputo, Mozambique that led to the signing by the leaders of the four movements of the Transitional Charter and the Complementary Agreements. The meeting was led by former President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, who also served as the chair of the SADC Mediation Team for Madagascar (AU PSC 2009d: 2 and AU 2009d: 18).

This political incidence seems to signify the role of the AU and the SADC in maintaining peace and stability in Madagascar and the Indian Ocean region, while Asian countries’ involvement in this field is quite marginal. Although the supremacy of Malayo-Polynesian roots in Malagasy culture and identity seems to continue, the AU seems to be a primary regional organization which promotes the rule of law and democracy and is able to help restore peace and order in Madagascar.

**Mauritius: Little India on a Creole Island**

The islands of Mauritius are located in the southwest region of the Indian Ocean. The major island is called Mauritius and lies over 1,600 kilometers east of the African continent and 800 kilometers east of Madagascar. Portuguese arrived in Mauritius in the early 16th century and gave the name “the Mascarenes” to the three islands of Mauritius, Reunion [now a DOM of France] and Rodrigues [now a dependency of Mauritius]
Mauritius had been totally uninhabited until European colonization (Houbert, personal communication, June 14, 2009).

During the thriving period of French monarchy rule in the 18th century, slaves were imported from the African East coast, and they eventually became the largest segment of the total population. During the period when the islands were under the French East India Company rule, most of the slaves came from Madagascar and some from West Africa, where the company had a base off the coast of present-day Senegal. In the early 19th century, the islands fell under British rule that abolished slavery in the same period. By the mid-1850s, the islands became the largest sugar producing cite among the British colonies. The sugar industry was labor intensive that needed a massive labor force in addition to freed slaves. Nearly 450,000 indentured laborers arrived from India by 1909, and the majority of them never returned home (Bennett and Bennett 1992: xv, xvi).

One of the unique features of Mauritius is the fact that as nearly 70 percent of the country’s population are Indian descent. According to the census in 1990, dividing Indian descendants into Hindus and Muslims, Hindus accounted for 535,028 of the total Mauritius’ population of 1,056,660 (as cited in Dinan, Nababsing and Mathur 1999: 74). About 28 percent of Mauritians identify themselves as either Coloreds or Creoles, while those of French and Chinese origins respectively account for one to two percent of the population (Eisenlohr 2006: 28).

According to Houbert, the meaning of Creole(s) has changed a great deal over time and varies among the Indian Ocean islands. Originally it meant individuals of European descent born on the islands. Then, by extension Creole came to mean all those
born on the islands, including Black slaves and White masters. Even animals born on the islands were called Creole animals as opposed to imported ones. In Mauritius, in recent times, the term Creole tends to be used for people of African and Malagasy descent. However, the word Creole also means a language, the Creole language. In recent years, in Mauritius, the spelling Kreol tends to be used for the language and Creole for the social group (personal communication, June 14, 2009).

In terms of racial grouping and its socio-economic implication for the Mauritian society, the terms “Coloreds” and “Creoles” are used as different meanings although such differentiation is nothing but a social construct. Boswell (2006) writes that in French the term free Colored people has great social implications. It places those who are lighter-skinned higher up in “the pigmentocracy of Mauritius.” They systematically detach themselves from those who appear to be more Negroid [hence labeled as Creoles] in social interactions and political activism (56). The middle-class Coloreds are largely Westernized and hold jobs in teaching, journalism and other intellectual professions (Dinan, Nababsing and Mathur 1999: 88-89).

In contrast, individuals whose physical features resemble the visual stereotype of Creoles, such as dark-skinned and Negroid features, tend to suffer discriminatory treatment and abuse in public (Boswell 2006: 57). Creoles tend to be less-organized and less-educated and constitute a pool of cheap labor. The most impoverished sections of the Mauritian society are generally found among the Creole communities (Dinan, Nababsing and Mathur 1999: 89). Boswell (2006) argues that the prevalence of poverty, social problems and political alienation among the Creole populations led to “le malaise Creole” and is viewed as “a primordial element of Creole personality (2).”
In Houbert’s view, while Madagascar has caste-like racial/ethnic hierarchy, in Mauritius, there are both caste proper and a caste-like structure. Among Mauritians of Indian descent, who practice Hinduism, caste exists and is still important. Within the Colored and Creole sections of the Mauritian society, there are caste-like perception and practice based on the skin color and other phenotypical features [that privilege Colored over Creoles] (personal communication, June 14, 2009).

The post-colonial nation-building process of Mauritius was greatly shaped by its unique racial-cultural demography. According to Eriksen (1998) many non-Hindus feared that post-independence Mauritius would fall under the Hindu political domination. In fact, in the 1967 elections, 44 percent of the Mauritian population voted against independence (151). Houbert argues that although decolonization transferred political power from British to Mauritians of Indian ancestry through universal suffrage, economic wealth and social privilege remained with White Mauritians. The principal losers were Black Creoles (personal communication, January 18, 2009). In fact, all Prime Ministers since independence were Hindu-Mauritians with the exception of Paul Beranger, who served as the Prime Minister from September 2003 to July 2005. The most crucial positions in the government continued to be dominated by Hindus of north Indian origin (Eisenlohr 2006: 33).

In his explanation of the occupational stereotypes in the Mauritian society, Eriksen (1998) writes that even though every occupation is open to everyone in principle, the reproduction of social and cultural distinctions along ethnic boundaries is embedded in the division of labor. For instance, White-Mauritians own the most crucial means of production (the sugar plantations), while Sino-Mauritians control the retail sector and
were the de facto founders of Export Processing Zone (EPZ) factories. Hindus have a virtual monopoly in the state apparatus, and some Muslims are dominant in business. For historical reasons, Coloreds are influential in the mass media and cultural life, while the working-class Creoles are virtually powerless in the whole society. Patronage in politics remains strong (55, 63-64). Based on these findings, it appears that ethnicity and race function as determinant variables in analyzing the heterogeneous Mauritian society, where dark-skinned Creoles remain at the bottom of the ethnic/racial hierarchy.

The impact of ethnic-based politics on Mauritian foreign policy is suggested by Laville (2002). Members of the Indian-Mauritian community are likely to foster political and economic links with India, while Sino-Mauritians tend to promote trade bonds with the East Asian economic powers. Historical ties with the former colonial powers of Britain and France have been maintained by European business elites in the country. On the other hand, Mauritian’s involvement in Africa through various regional initiatives seems to have little to do with the interests of the Creole community. This might be attributable to the fact that there are few Creole individuals serving at the state institutions, including parliament, where foreign policy decisions are made (92-94, 105).

In fact, it appears that the impoverished segments of Creole communities have benefited much less from the country’s economic miracle that was achieved through export-oriented economic diversification. According to Carroll and Carroll (2000), although there has been the overall improvement in the living standard and quality of life among almost all groups of the Mauritian society, income distribution has been done in favor of the better off. For instance, between 1991-92 and 1996-7, the share of total national income distributed to the poorest 20 percent of the total population decreased
from 6.4 percent to 5.9 percent, while the share channeled to the richest 20 percent increased from 43.5 percent to 46.2 percent (31, 35). Houbert asserts that the recent development of beach resort tourism in Mauritius has further marginalized the Creole fisherman community as the beach hotels have taken over the use of lagoons for water-sports. Today, dark-skinned Creole fishermen are the poorest among the impoverished category of the Mauritian society (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

In order to challenge the dominant racial ideology that is operationalized by negative perception and discriminatory treatment against Creoles, Pan-African consciousness and movement have emerged in the contemporary Mauritian society. For example, Boswell (2006) asserts that in certain Creole communities, young Creoles began to identify themselves with African diasporas as a way of reviving an “Africanized Creole identity.” Young Creole activists propagate the need to emphasize their African ancestry, by not straightening their hair or growing dreadlocks (4, 58). Furthermore, since the mid-1980s, Creoles have developed a new form of *sega* dance, which is a blend of *sega* and reggae and called *seggae* (Boswell 2006: 65). Gaetan Benoit suggests that *sega* dance was brought by slaves of Malagasy origin (as cited in Boswell 2006: 61). *Sega* was long perceived as barbaric by White-Mauritians and non-White middle class individuals and associated with the lowest segment of Creoles. By developing and embracing *seggae*, Creoles have reconstructed their identity not only as a distinctive group in the Mauritian society, but also as a trans-national African diaspora group. The lyrics of *seggae* encourage a psychological “return” to Africa. A “return” can be achieved by embracing their African origin and refusing the normative conventions of Mauritian society (Boswell 2006: 62, 66-67). Likewise, Laville (2002) argues that a
large number of Creoles are turning to Africa to reconstruct their cultural identity and lobby the Mauritian government to assist in the facilitation of interaction and cooperation with African countries and people (92).

In response to this Pan-African Creole activism, the Mauritian government has provided financial and political support in restoring the Creole-Africa linkage. Some studies report that the Afro-Mauritian Cultural Centre was established in 1986 and was the only one to be fully funded by the Mauritian government. Its main goal is to promote Creole culture and seek the roots of the Creole population in the neighboring countries from which they were taken. This has been a very challenging task due to the absence of historical records and the frequent incidents of political unrest in the countries of origin, namely Madagascar and Mozambique (Dinan, Nababsing and Mathur 1999: 93).

Furthermore, in 1998 the mayor of Port Louis in Mauritius established links with cities that had the legacy of slavery and invited representatives from West Africa and the Caribbean to address their peoples’ struggles in slavery and colonialism (Boswell 2006: 7). Furthermore, during her anthropological fieldwork in Mauritius in 1999, Laville (2002) witnessed that the South African High Commissioner to Mauritius (a Black man) attended a community gathering of Creoles in a village on the eastern coast of the island as the guest of honor. He promised to help the Creole Mauritians in their struggle to overcome the social and economic marginalization in the country (108).

In terms of Mauritius’ state identity, Eriksen (1998) argues that the country cannot be deemed as an African country proper notwithstanding its geographic proximity to the continent. Although about 30 percent of its population are African or Malagasy descent, the socio-cultural structure in the country is very different from that in African
states. Besides, Mauritius is excluded from many maps of Africa. In the majority of African historical literature, the country is absent from the index (11).

In his conceptual analysis of Mauritius’ position in today’s global world, N. L. Aumeerally (2005) at the University of Mauritius argues that the advertising practice in the Asia/Pacific, including the advertisement of Air Mauritius, emphasizes the image of Mauritius as “an intermediate geographic, economic and cultural space between the two continents [of Africa and Asia] (163).” Financial Times of September 27, 1994 depicts Mauritius as “Tiger in Paradise” (as cited in Aumeerally 2005: 161) that implies the cause of Mauritius’ recent economic success as its Asian roots that have values of discipline and parsimony. However, the government’s intention to promote the country as an “Asian” site further reinforces the differentiation between the Asian and African groups of the population with respect to their disposition towards development and modernity and contribution to the prosperity of the country (Aumeerally 2005: 169, 174). Western publications also tend to differentiate Mauritius’ proximity to Africa and its non-African cultural values. As a result, the Mauritian “miracle” becomes irrelevant to a standardized African world (Aumeerally 2005: 176). The Economist writes that “the only other African country [apart from Ghana] where a democratically elected government has been turned out in an election is Mauritius, which is …African by location rather than by culture (as cited in Aumeerally 2005: 176).” Miles (1999) also rejects the comparability of Mauritius’ political success with African countries on account of the country’s “island status” and the ethnic origins of the people (94).

In terms of Mauritius’ foreign relations, the former colonial powers of the UK and France remain the country’s important partners. With regards to trade in particular, as of
1998 the UK and France were the destinations of 34 percent and 18 percent of total exports of Mauritius respectively (Laville 2002: 104). As of 2009, the EU was the destination of 69.1 percent of Mauritius’ merchandise exports, followed by the US (8.2 percent), Madagascar (6.4 percent), South Africa (4.5 percent) and Seychelles (1.6 percent) (WTO 2011). In terms of the cultural ties, the media and local elites are overwhelmingly Francophone in language and identification while the British model is embedded in the parliament, educational system and judiciary (Miles 1999: 95).

Laville (2002) argues that since the 1990s culture and identity have become important for foreign policy making in Mauritius, and this is most apparent in the country’s cultural and economic ties with India (105). Notably, this trend is coincided with the rise of India as a growing economy in the world and a regional power in the Indian Ocean. Strong connections between Mauritius and India at the highest political level are found in the fields of foreign affairs and economic cooperation. Ancestral kinship is often embraced in speeches of the governmental officials of the two countries. For instance, during his official visit to Mauritius in March 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh praised the recent Mauritian economic miracle, by addressing that:

    We in India rejoice in the success of Mauritius, particularly because of the many bonds of kinship which we share with you…Indian immigrants have traveled far and wide to seek a livelihood in distant lands but they are never distant from our minds or from our affections…On behalf of the Government and people of India, I would like to pledge the continued friendship and commitment to the well being and prosperity of Mauritius (as cited in Rediff.com 2005).

India tends to view Mauritius as “Little India”, where its diasporas dominate the state institutions and apparatus. Remarkably, in his statement for the media in April 2005 the Prime Minister Sign commented that “India is a vibrant and successful democracy committed to plural values. Mauritius, with its talented and successful Mauritien Indian
community, represents those same values (Press Information Bureau Government of India 2005).” Along with this line of argument, it is very true that Mauritius is the most consolidated democracy in the Indian Ocean region and even in the African region notwithstanding its diverse ethno-political configuration.

After Prime Minister Sign’s visit to Mauritius in March 2005, the two governments held the first meeting on a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) in August 2005. The joint statement issued by the two governments addresses that the bilateral relations based on shared cultural heritage and bonds of kinship have been very close and warm. India finds great significance in its relationship with Mauritius that is fully reciprocated by Mauritius (bilaterals.org 2005). Remarkably, Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Mauritius was his first bilateral engagement abroad. In return, in October 2005 Navinchandra Ramgoolam, Mauritian Prime Minister, visited India as his first bilateral visit after he took power (High Commission of India 2005).

Furthermore, India has been a generous financial and material provider for Mauritius in the field of defense and security as well as a consistent supporter for Mauritius’ effort to restore sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago (High Commission of India 2005). The Indian navy has patrolled the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mauritius (Houbert, personal communication, January 18, 2009) as Mauritius seems to lack naval and coast guard capacity for the monitoring of its vast maritime zone. In return, the Mauritian government has offered long-standing support for India’s ambition to gain a permanent seat at a reformed UNSC. Currently, Mauritius grants visa exemptions to Indian nationals with certain conditions (High Commission of India 2005). Related to
this, some studies indicate that the number of Indian visitors to Mauritius has jumped by 50 percent from 2003 to 2007 (Vines and Oruitemeka 2008: 10).

Indeed, among the Indian Ocean rim states, Mauritius appears to be India’s most important economic and strategic partner. Some studies demonstrate that under the CECPA, foreign direct investment to India has been increasingly channeled via Mauritius since there is no capital gains tax in either country for the sale of shares in an Indian company by a Mauritian company. As a result, Mauritius has become the single largest foreign investor in India, contributing $1.9 billion during the 2007 June quarter (Vines and Oruitemeka 2008: 10). Furthermore, as of 2009, India was the second largest merchandise supplier to Mauritius, accounting for 18.9 percent of total merchandise imports to Mauritius, after the EU (26.4 percent) (WTO 2011).

Robert Kaplan (2009) highlights the geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for India in its great-power struggle against China. The Indian Ocean accounts for half the global container traffic. Furthermore, more than two thirds of the total traffic of petroleum products passes across the Indian Ocean on the way from the Middle East to the Pacific. World’s energy demands are estimated to increase by 45 percent between 2006 and 2030 with almost half of the growth in demand will come from India and China (page number unavailable). In this sense, India tends to see Mauritius as an economic and strategic gateway to the African side of the Indian Ocean rim, where China’s influence is also alarmingly expanding.

In terms of the country’s relations to other African countries and the OAU-AU, I argue that Mauritius has been a fairly visible actor in regional politics, although Mauritius is considered to be neither a regional power nor a leading Pan-Africanist. Mauritius has
paid its quota of financial contribution to the AU regularly. The government of Mauritius even proposed to host the African Court of Justice that is a judiciary organ of the AU although they lost a bid against Tanzania, which already had a court facility of former International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda in Arusha for a newly created African Court of Justice. Mauritius’ objective to host the Court is viewed by other African states as to increase its tourism revenue by catering for air-transport and accommodation to African delegates. However, Mauritius’ excellent records of rule of law, governance and human rights protection certainly qualify its candidacy as the host of the Court.

Although the Mauritius-India link has been increasingly important in the country’s foreign economic policy, Mauritius’ economic ties with other African countries have been also developed. Sadequa Rahim, a Mauritian AU official, commented that South Africa is one of the major investors in the country, while Mauritius has invested in the agricultural sector of Mozambique and Madagascar. As one of the world’s most densely populated countries without a landmass, Mauritius needs to secure food supply for its growing population. Hence, neighboring African countries with large agricultural production capacity appear to be ideal destinations of Mauritius’ investment (personal communication, July 29, 2008).

Similarly, Laville (2002) emphasizes the increasing significance of the economic linkage between Mauritius and Southern Africa. Post-apartheid South Africa emerged as an economic powerhouse of the SADC, and this new regional alignment urged Mauritius to reestablish economic and political links with South Africa. The economic imperative of Mauritius can be understood in its development of partnerships with the neighboring countries. Hence, the major objective of regional integration is to create a larger
economic zone to attract foreign direct investment (107). In this instance, McDougall suggests that Mauritius wants to become an offshore center to channel investment and provide financial services to the Southern African region. Therefore, the SADC is considered to be the most important regional initiative by Mauritius (as cited in Laville 2002: 107). Furthermore, Bunwaree and Peedoly indicate that after Mauritius joined the COMESA, the country’s export to the COMESA member states rose from Rs 11 million in 1986 to Rs 1.5 billion in 1996 (as cited in Kothari and Wilkinson 2008: 10)

Houbert suggests that some Mauritian politicians sometimes identify Mauritius with Africa in both the regional and global dimensions, and there is an element of economic opportunism for this. For example, Mauritius is a beneficiary country of the AGOA, which is a unilateral free trade act of the US. To benefit under the AGOA, the goods must be produced entirely with raw materials from Africa. An exception is made for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) so that they can benefit from the AGOA concession even if they use raw materials from non-African suppliers. Mauritius is not a LDC and imports raw materials for its textile production from China, India and other non-African countries. Nevertheless, Mauritian politicians have succeeded in persuading the US to allow the country to benefit from the AGOA for the export of its textile goods to the US market (personal communication, January 18, 2009).

In sum, Mauritius has a goal-specific strategic orientation in its effort toward African regional integration despite its assumingly “non-African” background for its recent economic miracle. Under the leadership of democratic government, Mauritius’ well-developed domestic institutions, strong private sectors and competitive labor forces might be able to facilitate the process of regional integration with African countries. In
response to a question about Mauritius’ regional belonging by Omar Ben Yedder at
*African Banker*, Rama Sithanen, Mauritian Finance Minister, stated that “*We are African
geographically and politically…We strongly support regional integration to alleviate
poverty and to accelerate the integration of Africa into the world economy* (Yedder 2008:
20, emphasis mine).” Mannick nicely summarizes the principle of Mauritian foreign
policy, arguing that its geographic isolation and lack of natural resources urge Mauritius
to cooperate “with all friendly countries, East or West, in the interests of the prosperity of
the People (as cited in Laville 2002: 102).”

**Seychelles – Invisible Creole Island in African Regional Integration**

The archipelago of Seychelles is formed by 115 islands with the largest granitic
island of Mahe. Mahe lies a few degrees south of the Equator, 1,800 kilometers east of
Mombasa, Kenya, 3,300 kilometers south west of Bombay, India and 1,100 kilometers
north of Madagascar (Bennett 1993: xiii-xiv). It is assumed that Phoenicians, Malays and
Arabs visited Seychelles, but the islands largely remained uninhabited until the 17th
century (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 99). Vasco da Gama sighted the Amirantes,
the coral islets that lie south-west of Mahe in 1502. Although the British East India
Company made its first visit to the islands in 1609, French showed stronger interest
during the 18th century and claimed her possession in 1756. French named the islands
*Sechelles* after an influential French family. In 1810 Britain seized and established her
sovereignty over the *ile de France*, the islands in the south-west Indian Ocean that
included Seychelles. However, the British did not have strong interest in settling on or
developing these islands. Rather, they needed them to secure the sea-route to India and
hinder France from creating naval bases in the region. From that time until 1872
Seychelles was administered from Mauritius under the British Empire (Bennett 1993: xiii-xv). Under French and British rules, Seychelles was a transit point for slaves from Africa. It was this importing of slaves to the islands that created the mixed descent population. Seychelles was also a place of exile for West African chiefs, who fought against British rule (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 7).

Seychelles achieved independence in 1976 with James Mancham as the President and France-Albert Rene as the Prime Minister. Barely a year after independence Mancham was ousted in a coup d’etat that brought Rene to power. Rene became the President and introduced a one-party system with a strong revolutionary and socialist line (Bennett 1993: xiii-xv, xvii-xviii). As the leader of the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF), Rene had ruled the country until 2004 when he resigned and was succeeded by James Michel with the continuation of the SPPF in power (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 15).

Ellis (1996) reveals that since independence Seychelles had long been subject to international diplomatic and military maneuvers, including covert actions, due to the country’s strategic location. Seychelles was an asset both in the US-Soviet rivalry in the Indian Ocean and South Africa’s quest for regional hegemony (166). From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Seychelles’ relations with other African states were largely determined by the Cold War ideological division. Bennett (1993) argues that Rene’s radical socialist orientation was favorably viewed by most members of the OAU in the 1970s. Without the OAU’ support, the country would have been more isolated from the international community (xvii). Besides, the government of Seychelles dismissed the
apartheid policy of South Africa and joined the OAU’s initiative for trade sanctions (Library of Congress 1994c).

As it was the case for Comoros, apartheid South Africa and socialist Tanzania were the two major African countries to shape domestic politics and foreign affairs of Seychelles in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, some studies reveal that Tanzanian soldiers were the ones who led the coup against Mancham together with a make-shift army of Seychellois. After Rene seized power, he brought in 400 Tanzanian soldiers to help him build an army (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 8).

In November 1979, mercenaries who were recruited in South Africa landed in Seychelles with an attempt to overthrow Rene. Some evidence suggests that the US and France were directly involved in the plot. The coup attempt failed, but the mercenaries managed to escape from the islands (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 9). Allen suggests that after that incidence, the government of Seychelles expelled French military advisors and replaced them with Tanzanians and Algerians (as cited in Ellis 1996: 168). On November 25, 1981 another coup attempt was made by South Africa-recruited mercenaries, who arrived at the Seychelles international airport as tourists. The plot was foiled, and the mercenaries hijacked an Air India jet (leaving five mercenaries behind) and returned to South Africa, where they were arrested. The leader of the failed coup was Michael Hoare, an Irish mercenary, who made his name in Congo. He later testified that the coup plot was endorsed by the South African Cabinet and that weapons were given by South African Military Intelligence (Ellis 1996: 173). A series of plots against Rene urged him to seek further military assistance from Tanzania under Julius Nyerere. In 1982 some Seychellois soldiers mutinied against their senior officers. Their
insurgency was quickly put down with the assistance of the Tanzanian garrison (Bennett 1993: xviii).

Regardless of Rene’s socialist leaning, the government claimed to be non-aligned (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 9-10). As Rene was well aware that Western tourists were Seychelles’ most important source of foreign currency revenue, he tried to maintain good relations with both the Western powers and socialist countries, where his political sympathy laid (Ellis 1996: 168).

In terms of the racial-cultural demography, the inhabitants of Seychelles today are less diverse than those of Mauritius, where a large number of indentured laborers came from India to work in French owned sugar plantations. Seychelles’ rocky and precipitous terrain was not suitable for sugar cultivation. Thus, the population in today’s Seychelles is predominantly Creoles of mixed race with a small number of French and Asian descendants (Bennett 1993: xv-xvi). Seychellois culture is a blend of French and African influences, and Creole is the mother tongue of 94 percent of people (US Department of State 2008). Creole is the first official language in addition to English (2rd) and French (3rd) (Library of Congress 1994c). Noteworthily, among Creole island countries, Seychelles is the only country, where the Creole language is adopted as the official language (Houbert 2003: 162). Like Mauritius, Seychelles had remained totally uninhabited until the European arrival and settlement that made these two countries distinguished from Comoros and Madagascar, both of which had already human inhabitants and their own cultures before European colonization (Houbert, personal communication, June 14, 2009).
Creole linguistic nationalism together with the government’s egalitarian socio-economic policy seem to help its people to have a sense of unity and belonging to the state across the racial-cultural barriers. In particular, Creoles in Seychelles, who are the majority in number, seem to be fully integrated into the whole society without being marginalized compared to their counterparts in Mauritius, where Creole linguistic nationalism has never been developed, and Creoles are minority in number. In the electoral sphere, Houbert (2003) asserts that “unlike Mauritius, where universal suffrage meant that the real electoral prize was the Indian vote, in Seychelles it meant the support of the black Creoles (163).” In the socio-economic aspect, some studies indicate that grand blanc planter families, who are descendants of the early French settlers, consist of a separate group, but under the decades-long socialist regime, they no longer have the power and prestige they used to have (Library of Congress 1994c).

Nonetheless, race remains an important component in the identification of social status among Seychellois. Some studies suggest that “color” is one of several indicators of social status that operate in Seychellois society. Despite the fact that almost all Seychellois are racially mixed, light complexion is still considered to be a status feature because authority in Seychelles has been traditionally dominated by French plantation owners or managers and later by British officials (Library of Congress 1994c). According to anthropologist Burton Benedict, skin color is classified by the terms blanc (white), rouge (red) or noir (black). However, economic success and material possession are equally important indicators of status. Individuals with light pigmentation are likely to enjoy greater prestige, but skin color does not reliably determine a social standing or position in society. It is deemed as advantageous to marry a lighter-skinned person, but a
wealthy man or woman with dark complexion may not face such discrimination. Tensions based on color are almost unknown, and individuals of different colors mingle freely in schools, workplaces and social gatherings (as cited in Library of Congress 1994c).

Based on these findings, it is fair to argue that racial-cultural diversity is not a divisive factor in Seychellois politics and society, and racial identity has little political and economic effects on people’s life. As a result, it appears that there seems to be no political motive for Seychellois to promote an ancestral link to any country or region, including the continent of Africa.

In terms of Seychelles’ role in regional politics in the Indian Ocean and Africa, I argue that the country’s role and contribution are marginal. Some studies reveal that Seychelles has failed to pay its dues to the UN that resulted in the suspension of right to vote at the UN in March 2001 (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 58). Since 1992, Seychelles has failed to pay its quota of financial contribution to the OAU-AU, and as of May 2007, the total amount of the country’s outstanding contribution reached as much as $1,967,746.92 (AU 2007). As a result, Seychelles has been under the AU sanction for many years. The AU sanctions include the suspension of right to vote and speak at the AU Summits as well as the suspension of staff recruitment. As of June 2007, there was no Seychellois staff working at the AU, although a quota of 4 staff members has been allocated to Seychelles if the country pays off its accumulated arrears. Furthermore, for many years Seychelles has not sent its head of state to the biannual AU Summits, although most of the AU members have been always represented by their heads of state.
Seychelles’ lack of interest in regional integration is evident in other initiatives. One government official from the Indian Ocean region explained that in the late 1980s, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles launched a joint commission for the free movement of people and goods. Within one year, Seychelles withdrew from the commission due to a larger inflow of people and goods to the country than outflow that resulted in a substantial loss in the government revenue (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008). Moreover, in 2003 Seychelles withdrew from the SADC in association with economic reform requirements (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 57). The same governmental official from the Indian Ocean region commented that Seychelles’ inability to pay its dues to the SADC was one of the reasons for its withdrawal. Furthermore, Seychelles has difficulty in catching up with its scheduled dues to the IOC (identity withheld on source’s request, summer 2008).

Considering Seychelles’ better-off economic position in comparison with other countries in the Indian Ocean and Africa, the country’s poor record of financial contribution to the various regional integration initiatives seems to be unexpected. For instance, as of estimation in 2009, the figure of GDP Purchasing Power Parity per capita of Seychelles is $20,800, while the figures of Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius are $1,000, $1,000 and $12,900 respectively (CIA 2010). Kothari and Wilkinson’s studies (2008) highlight some structural problems of the Seychellois economy, such as the domination of foreign ownership in the tourism and fisheries industries and (related to this) long running foreign exchange problems (18, 21). Nonetheless, it is fair to argue that Seychelles’ failure to pay its dues to these regional organizations is attributable to its lack of national interest in regional integration and cooperation. Critically speaking,
Seychelles may not consider itself as an important actor in regional politics. In contrast, economically handicapped Madagascar has been actively engaged in the AU-led conflict management in Comoros, while the remote island state of Mauritius attempted to become the juridical capital of an integrated Africa.

Another major reason for Seychelles’ passive attitude toward African integration stems from its under-developed state structure. Seychelles has weak domestic institutions, and the government appears to lack a long-term strategic vision and policy in the regional and global dimensions. Some of Seychelles’ foreign and economic policies are apparently shortsighted and under-scrutinized, and their consequences are quite harmful to the country’s international reputation.

*Indian Ocean Newsletter* writes that Seychelles became the first socialist tax haven country soon after Rene took power (as cited in Ellis 1996: 169). Since then, there have been numerous rumors that Seychelles was used for drug trafficking and money laundering. In the mid 1980s there was evidence indicating Rene’s direct involvement in a drug-trafficking case (Ellis 1996: 191). According to *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, a court case in France in 1986 demonstrates that a company registered in the Seychelles’ offshore center was used to conduct some arms deals, possibly in an attempt to supply nuclear material for Libya. In November 1995 Seychellois National Assembly passed a legislation that would guarantee immunity from criminal prosecution for any foreign national investing $10 million or more in the country (as cited in Ellis 1996: 192). According to *Sunday Times* (London), the Director of Britain’s Serious Fraud Office stated that it would be “the perfect present for drug barons, fraudsters and money launderers (as cited in Ellis 1996: 192)”.
As Houbert underscores, Seychelles is very small even among small states. The total population of Seychelles, approximately 88,000, is less than half of the population in Port Louis, the capital city of Mauritius (personal communication, January 18, 2009). Hence, the country seems to lack human resources to plan and pursue sound foreign policy in a strategic and long-term vision. Furthermore, its micro-state vulnerability in the global South disposes Seychelles as an attractive off-shore cite for criminal activities and unaccountable transactions as the movement of people, goods and capitals are increasingly globalized.

Seychelles’ economic structure and trade pattern also make African regional integration less important to the country. It is reported that tourism and fishing are the country’s two major economic sectors. The service sector that includes transport, communications, commerce and tourism accounts for almost 70 percent of GDP in recent years (US Department of State 2008). Tourism alone provides 15 percent of the total formal employment, and employment in other sectors, such as construction, banking and transportation, heavily relies on the tourism industry. In 1991 France was the main source of tourists, followed by the UK, Germany, Italy and South Africa. About 80 percent of the tourists to Seychelles are from Europe. Additionally, Europeans are deemed as the most lucrative in terms of length of stay and per capita spending in the country (Library of Congress 1994c). Seychelles is well-known for its beautiful landscape that makes the islands a very appealing destination for beach vacation. Some studies indicate that the remote location of the country is a perfect destination for romantic gateways rather than family beach resort. Hence, the government has worked
with the private sectors to promote the already high-end luxury hotel facilities (Country Watch Incorporated 2007b: 12).

In terms of the Seychelles’ trade pattern with other countries, France had been the main destination of Seychelles’ exports for many years, accounting for more than 60 percent of the total exports from Seychelles. In the early 1990s, the country’s trade pattern shifted dramatically in favor of the UK (52.7 percent of the total exports), followed by France (22.8 percent) and Reunion of French DOM (13.6 percent) (Library of Congress 1994c). With regards to merchandise imports to Seychelles as of 2009, the EU, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were main suppliers, accounting for 29.7 percent, 16.7 percent and 14.5 percent of total imports to the country, followed by Singapore (8.2 percent) and South Africa (6.2 percent) (WTO 2011). Since 1987, canned tuna has been a main export product in addition to fresh and frozen fish, copra, cinnamon bark and shark fins (Library of Congress 1994c). In 2001 Seychelles exported 98 percent of its processed tuna products to the EU, which accounted for 11 percent of the EU market (Kothari and Wilkinson 2008: 13). Both Reunion and Mauritius are the main consumers of Seychelles’ frozen fish (Library of Congress 1994c).

Although a small share of intra-regional trade of global trade is also operative for most African states, Seychelles’ economy heavily relies on its luxurious tourism sector for its export and employment. Although South Africa is an important trade partner of Seychelles, costly and comprehensive regional integration initiatives are not seen as an effective means by Seychelles to boost its economy that is already more prosperous than most of African countries. In addition, in the post-Cold War contemporary world, there is no major external security threat to Seychelles. In racially and socio-economically
egalitarian Seychellois society, its social problems, such as unemployment and alcoholism, are not race-based problems, while in Mauritius certain social issues are apparently racialized and labeled as *le malaise Creole*. Furthermore, domestic politics in Seychelles has been relatively stable although there are some challenges in democratic consolidation. In sharp contrast, many African states have serious problems of social fragmentation and political instability and greatly need African regional cooperation for peace and security as the cases of Comoros and Madagascar exemplify.

**Discussion**

Because of their hybrid and diverse racial-cultural compositions as well as off-continental geographic locations, state identity of Indian Ocean island countries is not truly African from both self-perception and international recognition perspectives. Their state identity and regional belonging appear to be shaped by such factors as Arab-Islamic influence (in Comoros), ancestral kinship (Madagascar and Mauritius), economic and trade structure (Mauritius and Seychelles) and security situation (Comoros and Madagascar) that may encourage (or discourage) the state to identify itself as a member of African regional bloc.

With regards to Comoros, as it is operative for Northern African countries, Arab-Islamic influence may create divided regional allegiances to Black Africa and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the Afro-Arab tension seems to be less visible in the Comoro society with Swahili influence, and the causes of prolonged political turmoil are rather attributable to nationalistic island identity and claims. Although the oil-rich Arab world is able to offer financial support to bring back peace to Comoros, the actual peacekeeping operations can be only done by the AU that is mandated to intervene to the Comoro crisis.
Furthermore, I argue that Arab intervention to the conflict in Comoros seems to be less operative for two reasons. Firstly, the country has little geo-strategic significance to the Arab states and the rest of the world. Secondly, Comoros is an archipelago country, and its conflict is largely self-contained with little cross-border effects to the neighboring countries. On the other hand, Arab intervention to the Horn of Africa and Sudan is an important inter-regional factor that complicates the conflicting situations.

Notwithstanding its hybrid Afro-Asian racial-cultural roots, Malagasy culture is grounded on the Malayo-Polynesian prototype although there is some evidence of African and Arab-Islamic contributions. Madagascar’s dilemma over Asian or African state identity was often manifested in its foreign policy under President Ravalomanana, who has the Malayo-Polynesian ancestry of higher caste. Nonetheless, due to its geographic proximity to the African continent coupled with its poor socio-economic conditions, Madagascar is more likely than any other Indian Ocean island countries to be categorized as part of sub-Saharan Africa by researchers and policymakers of African affairs.

The recent economic miracle of Mauritius is usually explained with reference to its Asian cultural values, while the Mauritius-India links in the fields of business, trade and security have been strengthened based on ancestral kinship. In a social environment, where Creole identity is undermined and Creoles are placed at the bottom of racial hierarchy, Creole Mauritians have developed Africanized Creole identity in a way to embrace its African roots and to identify themselves as African diasporas in a transnational fashion. In response, the Mauritian government has provided financial and
diplomatic assistance to the Creole community in restoring their cultural and historical links with their mother continent.

For Seychelles, the mixed heritages of Africa, Europe and Asia are core features of its Creole state identity. Under the socialist regime with egalitarian policy, the class division and racial/ethnic tension have seldom become major political agendas. As a politically stable middle-income country in the Indian Ocean, it appears that Seychelles does not find any relevancy and necessity to be actively engaged in African regional politics and integration.

In sum, racial-cultural politics is manifested in quite different ways in these four island countries since each country has its own unique history, racial-cultural dynamism, state policy and economic structure. Africaness both in the geographic and racial-cultural senses might be embraced or undermined depending on an issue and circumstance. In reality, people in Africa comprise of individuals of diverse racial-cultural backgrounds although Black African pride and solidarity remain important ideology in African politics. In this view, this comparative study leads us to rethink Africaness and African identity and to underscore the unique role that these Indian Ocean island states play in the development of African regional identity and advancement of the AU-led regional integration of Africa.
Chapter VII: Conclusion
This research explores the two dimensions of Pan-Africanism, which I define 1) racial-cultural affinity and 2) geographical connection, and discusses the ideological influence on the institutionalization of the AU-led regional integration of Africa. In specific, this research is designed to answer the two major research questions that follow: 1) Can African diasporas play any significant role in the AU-led regional integration process?; and 2) How have the intergovernmental relations among the member states of the Northern Arab region, sub-Saharan Black African region and Indian Ocean region shaped the institutional development process of the AU-led African integration?

Chapter II examines the racial-cultural dimension of Pan-Africanism and reveals that Black solidarity and nationalism were the core values of the historical Pan-African movement. The preceding Pan-African movement was a trans-Atlantic Black-racial movement to mobilize people of the Black race and to challenge White domination, which took the forms of racism, slavery, colonialism and apartheid rule.

In the post-apartheid contemporary world, *de jure* racism has virtually vanished, although *de facto* socio-economic disparity between Whites and Blacks has largely continued. Moreover, in today’s *de jure* color free world, it is illegitimate to emphasize Black racial solidarity in dealing with issues that are not color-based oppression and exploitation as such.

In US society, as the African diaspora community has become larger and diversified with newly arrived Black immigrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, Black racial identity becomes more ambiguous and complex than before. Consequently, Black as one racial group is no more plausible to explain intricate and
unresolved racial problems in US society. After all, for the contemporary Pan-African community, there is no longer a racially objectified single common enemy as such.

This research argues that today’s Pan-African movement is in the transition from the preceding racially exclusive activism to a racially unbiased political integration process and identifies humanitarianism and democratic regionalism as two emerging trends in the movement. Although Black racial-cultural identity remains a primary ground for diasporas to engage in the African causes, their identity-driven activism should neither contradict nor undermine the principles of democracy, humanitarianism and human rights protection. The focus of their activism is to promote these universally embraced values for the sake of socio-economic development and well-being of societies and people in Africa. By so doing, their collective voice can make use of pluralistic political opportunities in the US and help expand and advance the contemporary Pan-African movement.

In terms of democratic regionalism, one of the major objectives in replacing the OAU with the AU was to promote the civil society participation, including African diasporas, in African regional integration. Importantly, the AU’s efforts to democratize itself have coincided with the trend shift of African diasporal activism that now places a focus on democracy, humanitarianism and human rights protection. For the last few years, the AU has developed remarkable diaspora involvement initiatives under the leadership of Senegal and South Africa.

To answer the first research question, whether African diasporas can play any significant role in the AU-led regional integration process, I argue that the role that
diasporas is expected to take is more economic-oriented than politically driven. For the African states and the AU, there seems to be neo-liberal economic rationale for recognizing and institutionalizing the role of diasporas for socio-economic development of Africa. Capital, expertise and networks that Western-born or/and Western-educated diasporas possess are seen as valuable assets in promoting investment, business development and community support in Africa. In return, diasporas lay claim to such legal right as dual citizenship in order to maximize their mobility and political and economic opportunities in a trans-national fashion.

Interestingly, as the AU becomes more institutionally developed and internationally recognized, its diverse racial-cultural features make Black-first racial ideology inappropriate. In the AU’s diaspora initiative, Arab African and Black African diasporas now all qualify as “African diasporas.” This new trend seems to make the Pan-African community of the 21st century a more racially diverse and politically dynamic entity although Black racial ideology seems to remain an important value in Pan-Africanism.

Chapter III is designed to analyze the geographic dimension of Pan-Africanism, using the case of historical Afro-Arab relations before and during the OAU time and their impacts on the ideological and institutional evolution of unity of Africa. Major events and developments in the historical Afro-Arab relations include Arab-led enslavement of Black Africans, Arab-Islamic expansionism and Afro-Arab solidarity in the African liberation movement. In particular, the root causes of instability and insecurity of the Afro-Arab border countries, such as Mauritania and Sudan, can be traced back to centuries-long Arab domination over Black Africans. Slavery and slavery-like practice
engaged by Arabs against Black Africans continue in Mauritania and Sudan and threaten peace and security in these two countries. Therefore, Mauritania and Sudan are often seen as a failure of Afro-Arab coexistence instead of a bridge between the two worlds.

Egyptian revolution followed by Nasser’s radical political activism led to short-lived Afro-Arab alliance in the African liberation movement. Egypt under Nasser took a leading role in decolonization of Africa and supported various independence movements. Likewise, Algeria, having achieved independence after lengthy and bloody liberation struggles, was sympathetic to and allied with the Black African cause. Nonetheless, Nasser’s vision of Afro-Arab alliance was envisaged as hierarchical rather than an equal partnership, and he advocated for Egypt’s civilizing mission in the land of Black Africa.

Nkrumah of Ghana attempted to promote African unity as a way to curtail Nasser’s role. Besides, African leaders were neither able to fill the North-South gap on the continent nor reconcile Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism in both conceptual and practical senses. While Pan-Arabism is based on Arab racial-cultural affinity and the idea of Arab nationalism, Pan-Africanism in the discourse of African unity focuses on a geographic linkage instead of shared identity. As a result, the OAU became inherently vulnerable to a question of relevance and the internal division of the Arab world and Black Africa.

Arab-Islamic expansionism in the Afro-Arab borderlands shaped the Afro-Arab relations in a way that enabled Arabs to amplify their influence on Black Africans. Arab-Islamic expansionism has been a major feature of Gaddafi’s foreign policy toward Africa, and he has long played a controversial role in the Afro-Arab relations. Gaddafi’s adventurist foreign policy and military intervention have often put him in confrontation
with other African countries, and Chad was the country to be most affected in this respect. Besides its military power, Libya’s foreign policy adventurism is bolstered by its oil wealth, and Libya’s oil-dollar diplomacy has been remarkably effective in putting pressure on economically-handicapped Black African states. Hence, using its affluent military and financial resources, Libya has contributed to further reinforcing the unequal Afro-Arab relations.

Nonetheless, in the late 1990s Libya began to identify itself more toward Africa than the Arab world since it would be able to wield more influence in the former. Furthermore, the 1990s witnessed a major shift in Libya’s foreign policy that resulted in the country’s engagement in regional cooperation via multilateral approaches. Black African countries embraced Libya’s efforts and helped Libya to fully come back to the international political scene after the long isolation.

Including Libya, Northern African countries’ geopolitical interests toward Black Africa had shaped the institutional development and politics of the OAU. One of the important features of the Maghreb politics is its equal power distribution. This feature accompanied by the expansionist policies of Libya and Morocco inevitably increased the sense of insecurity and competition in the region. As a result, some Northern African states tended to use Black Africa as a geo-strategic and diplomatic leverage to counterbalance the influence of their rival states. This tendency has been most obvious in Libya’s foreign policy since the late 1990s and Algeria’s foreign policy throughout its post-colonial history.

The OAU was an important regional forum for Algeria, which backed the POLISARIO Front in resistance against Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara.
Morocco’s exclusion from the OAU hindered the country from fully participating in African regional politics, while Algeria often took a leading role at the OAU. Given this disadvantageous consequence for Morocco, the SADR’s accession to the OAU and Morocco’s withdrawal from the OAU can be seen as Algeria’s diplomatic triumph over Moroccan expansionism on African soil.

Egypt’s foreign policy was oriented toward the Middle East. Africa was not a focus for Egypt’s foreign policy, and the country’s main concerns toward Africa are Egypt-Sudan relations and the waters of the Nile. Seen in this light, if the priority of Egypt’s foreign policy is to reinforce its status of a leading statesman in the Arab world, no wonder why Libya and Algeria seek their political base in Black Africa in order to counter-balance the influence of Egypt in Northern African politics.

Unequal Afro-Arab relations were the most controversial and divisive factor in shaping the ideological and institutional development of African unity. Although Afro-Arab solidarity had been maintained during the OAU time, the major motives for Northern Arab countries to be part of Pan-African politics seemed to be their geopolitical and foreign policy interests toward Black Africa rather than aspiration for the unity of Africa.

For Black African states, Northern Arab countries were major supporters for their liberation struggles against colonial and White minority rules. This Arab patronage was an important factor in sustaining Afro-Arab solidarity and Afro-Arab features of the OAU. Seen in this light, Black Africa was a policy-taker rather than policy-maker, and this pattern illuminates the hierarchical Afro-Arab intergovernmental relations during the OAU time.
To answer my second research question, this research explores the intergovernmental relations among the AU member states of the Northern Arab region, sub-Saharan Black African region and Indian Ocean region throughout the institutional development process of the AU. Chapter IV analyzes the current trend of Afro-Arab cooperation toward the unity of Africa and reveals how and under what conditions racial-cultural state identity (Arab or Black African) manifests and affects the policy-making process of the AU-led African regional integration.

The replacement of the OAU by the AU was led by the most decisive integrationist states at that time. The two Black African powers of Nigeria and South Africa attempted to inject their foreign policy and economic agendas into the structure of the AU, while Libya sought to use the AU as a regional base to help its return to the international political arena.

Contributions from Algeria and Egypt were less significant in sharp contrast to their leading roles in the establishment of the OAU and African liberation movements. In post-colonial Africa, Black African states outnumber Northern Arab states, and there is no longer the common enemy of Western colonial rule as such. Hence, the political stature and influence of Northern Arab states to Black Africa have diminished, although there still remains economic disparity between the two regions in a collective fashion.

The economic gap between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly reflected in the financial structure of the AU. As of 2007 four better-off Northern Arab states of Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia were responsible to cover almost half the AU operation budget, while the two Black African powers of Nigeria and South Africa accounted for 30 percent, with the rest of member states collectively responsible for less
than quarter. Remarkably, Nigeria and South Africa have tried to reshape the Afro-Arab power balance in financing the AU, voluntarily making generous donations to the AU program budget.

Contrary to European integration that is more economic-orientated than political or security-centered, the international significance of the AU is concentrated in the field of peace and security. Indeed, Northern Arab states have great stakes in intervening in conflicts in the Afro-Arab borderlands. Being part of the AU, they are able to closely monitor the conflicting situations and to manipulate peacekeeping strategies and operations that the AU has mandate. Hence, it seems that Northern Arab states’ intentions for African integration are oriented more toward monitoring and controlling African affairs than genuine integrationist efforts.

Among important security matters in Africa, racial-cultural state identity of Arab or Black African manifests and shapes the outcome of the AU-led UNSC reform initiative, in which Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa compete against one another over the two permanent African representative seats. Egypt insists that one of the two African representatives should be a Northern African country since Africa is an Afro-Arab regional bloc. On the other hand, Black African states want the two permanent seats to be taken by two sub-Saharan African states since a Northern African state’s claim to be an African representative in this crucial security matter is considered to be illegitimate.

Egypt’s commitment to African cause has been questioned by African leaders and observers of African affairs. In addition, Egypt’s role in the AU internal politics has proved to be marginal. Knowing its unpopularity among Black African states, Egypt has attempted to gain support from the Arab states and the international community in order
to become one of the two African permanent representatives at a reformed UNSC. In particular, Eastern Arab states have supported Egypt’s efforts, expecting Egypt to represent the Arab-Islamic will at a reformed UNSC.

On the other hand, South Africa and Nigeria have tried to develop inter-regional partnership with South American countries, where a large number of Black African diasporas reside. Among the AU member states, Ghana and Nigeria jointly facilitated the UNSC reform process in the year 2005, while Egypt supported President al-Bashir’ intention to become the AU Chairperson in 2006, hoping to lead the UNSC reform initiative under the Sudan-Egypt coalition.

Many Black African states still consider Nigeria to be a better choice than Egypt, whose state identity and foreign policy are not African-oriented at all. In contrast, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been consistently African-centered and given a high priority to the West African affairs. South Africa’s prestige as the most dominant regional power seems to be well-established within and outside Africa, and its qualification for an African representative is unlikely to be challenged.

The AU-led UNSC reform initiative is considered to be a failure that has not yielded any significant result and progress. After all, regional identity and collectiveness as “Africa” are underdeveloped, and Black African countries tend to skeptically view Northern Arab states’ (especially Egypt’s) “African status”, when it comes to collective geopolitical matters.

This research argues that there is a trend of “Maghrebization” of African regional integration. Algeria has taken a leading role in the AU-led peace and security cooperation, while Gaddafi has championed African unity, taking the AU chairmanship
in year 2009. Algeria’s commitment to the AU politics has granted Algeria a fair amount of diplomatic leverage to shape African regional politics in a way to undermine the influence of Egypt and Morocco. Likewise, Gaddafi’s chairmanship of the AU in 2009 helped solidify his status as the most decisive Pan-African leader and further advance his unity of Africa project. Maghrebization of African regional integration may help bridge the North-South gap and revive Afro-Arab solidarity in contemporary Africa.

However, I argue that similar to the historical Afro-Arab relations, the current pattern of Afro-Arab partnership remains hierarchical. While Northern Arab states have a privilege to choose the Middle East or Africa as their main regional base, most Black African states are unable to penetrate politics of Northern Africa due to their limited state capacity. Therefore, Black Africa seems to remain a geopolitical hinterland, where Northern Arab states are able to conduct diplomatic and geo-strategic maneuver with a relative ease. Furthermore, post-Gaddafi Libya is likely to make a major foreign policy shift that may not see African integration as a priority. This volatility and uncertainty of Libyan leadership is a major unpredictable factor in future Afro-Arab cooperation toward the unity of Africa.

Chapter V discusses the AU-led conflict management in the Horn of Africa and Sudan and examines the role of Afro/Arab identity in the conflicts and the geopolitical implication of the conflicts in this region to the broader Afro-Arab relations in Africa. I argue that one of the major reasons why the Horn of Africa and Sudan remain war-endemic is because Arab countries have vital geo-strategic interests in this region and attempt to expand their Arab-Islamic influence through intervention. Indeed, in this Afro-Arab border region, conflicting groups and countries often manipulate Afro/Arab
identity to gain bilateral/regional patronage. This feature further complicates and intensifies the conflicting situations, for which the AU has been making peacekeeping efforts.

The rise of Islamic extremism and global war on terror are the newly emerging political agendas that shape the intergovernmental relations and the prospect of peacemaking in the Horn. Ethiopia projects itself as a Black African Christian state and has been fighting against the Somali Islamists to protect the secularist TFG in Somalia. Ethiopia’s state identity as the only Christian state in the Horn makes its battles against the Somali Islamists look like a clash of civilizations. Eritrea openly supports the Somali Islamists in order to destabilize the US-Ethiopia-backed TFG. It seems that Saudi-based Wahhabists and some Arab states clandestinely back the Somali Islamists through Eritrea. Hence, Ethiopia’s Christian state identity seems to be an important asset of the country in championing the global coalition against terrorism and consolidating its role as an important ally of the Western powers.

Although Islamic extremism is a shared concern among the Arab governments, it is also true that they will be able to have a fair amount of political leverage on Islamist groups in Somalia. Establishing a secularist government backed by the US and Ethiopia in Somalia will certainly give more political weight to non-Arab and non-Muslim Ethiopia, while a secession of the southern Sudan will be another setback in keeping the Horn under the Arab-Islamic influence. Such a scenario will be a nightmare for Egypt in terms of keeping the status quo of the Nile water flow and undermining the influence of Ethiopia in the Nile basin region. Therefore, Arab states may continue to clandestinely
support the radical Islamists in Somalia as a way to challenge the US-Ethiopia-led peace initiative, which is seen as a geo-strategic loss for them.

The north-south civil war and Darfur crisis in Sudan are often described as inter-civilizational conflicts between Arabs and Black Africans. This assertion seems to be more plausible for the north-south conflict, where predominantly Black Christian southerners rose in revolt against Arab Muslim northerners. In the case of Darfur, making an Arab/African distinction is more difficult partly due to the fact that Darfurians are largely Muslims and partly Arabic-speaking. Moreover, Arab/African distinction is neither rigid nor static in Darfur. Although not all Arab groups are associated with Janjaweed, most of the victims are people of non-Arab groups. The Sudanese government has reinforced the division between the Arab ethnic groups allied with the government and the African groups, whom they objectify as the threats.

In terms of the cross-border impacts of the conflicts in Sudan, CAR, Chad, Egypt and Libya appear to be the most affected countries and therefore have great stakes in intervention. Regarding the impacts of Darfur crisis on the north-south conflict, the successful implementation of the CPA to a large extent depends on the national integrity of Sudan and the stability of al-Bashir regime, which is a party to the CPA. Hence, the Darfur conflict can be used as a legitimate excuse by the Sudanese government to delay the implementation of the CPA. As a possible southern secession will be a great geo-strategic loss for Khartoum, Cairo and perhaps some other Arab states, tragically and ironically the continuation and deterioration of the Darfur conflict might be the way they want to undermine the CPA.
The political implication of the southern Sudan secession for Black African countries is equally important. If southern Sudan secedes, it will be the second secession case after Eritrea in postcolonial Africa, and more attempts may follow. Besides, there is a secessionist movement in Somaliland, which is the most peaceful and well-governed part of chaotic Somalia. Therefore, it appears that the Horn of Africa is a region where secessionist attempts gain a certain degree of legitimacy and regional/international support, while the previous sub-Saharan African secessionist struggles, including Biafra, all failed. African leaders expect that southern Sudan will not secede as a consequence of the successful implementation of the CPA and full reconciliation between the north and the south. In this sense, the principle of territorial integrity of post-colonial African states seems to override the Black African cause against Arab supremacy in Africa. This is quite ironic in the context of Afro-Arab relations and power balance in Africa.

Both African and Arab states do not want to see the southern Sudanese secession, although southern Sudanese overwhelmingly expressed their will to secede at the 2011 referendum. Taking these vital interests into account, African and Arab countries have a common ground for facilitating the peace process in Sudan. The ideal scenario will be the peaceful north-south reconciliation of Sudan and restoration of peace in Darfur. In this thinking, creating sustainable peace in Sudan is a touchstone for harmonious Afro-Arab coexistence and integration in Africa.

To illuminate Pan-African ideology in the discourse of racial-cultural hybridity and diversity and to investigate the continental-oceanic aspect of the AU, Chapter VI examines the role of the Indian Ocean island member states in the AU politics. Their geographic isolation from the continent coupled with their hybrid and diverse racial-
cultural state identity place these island states in a unique position in African regional politics. This research discusses how state identity has been developed in Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles over time and assesses the role of racial-cultural identity in domestic politics and foreign policy of these island states in a comparative fashion.

This research argues that state identity and regional belonging of these island states appear to be shaped by such factors as Arab-Islamic influence (Comoros), ancestral kinship (Madagascar and Mauritius), economic and trade structure (Mauritius and Seychelles) and security situation (Comoros and Madagascar) that may encourage (or discourage) the state to identify itself as a member of African regional bloc.

With regards to Comoros, as it is operative for Northern African countries, Arab-Islamic influence may create divided regional allegiances to Black Africa and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the Afro-Arab tension seems to be less visible in the Comoro society, and the causes of prolonged political turmoil are rather attributable to nationalistic island identity and claims. Although oil-rich Arab states are able to offer financial support to restore peace in Comoros, the actual peacekeeping operations can be only conducted by the AU that is mandated to intervene to the Comoro crisis. Hence, it is fair to argue that the AU peacekeeping efforts in Comoros for the last decade is the most notable Pan-African integration project that has helped to deepen the link between Comoros and continental African states.

Notwithstanding its hybrid Afro-Asian roots, Malagasy culture is grounded on the Malayo-Polynesian prototype although there is some evidence of African and Arab-Islamic contributions. Madagascar’s dilemma over Asian or African state identity was
often manifested in its foreign policy under President Ravalomanana, who has the Malayo-Polynesian ancestry of higher caste. Nonetheless, due to its geographic proximity to the African continent coupled with its poor socio-economic conditions, Madagascar is more likely than any other Indian Ocean island countries to be categorized as part of sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, political unrest and unconstitutional regime change in Madagascar in 2009 certainly signified the peace-making role of the AU and the urgency of Pan-African regional cooperation in the fields of peace and security, incorporating the Indian Ocean island countries.

The recent economic miracle of Mauritius is usually explained with reference to its Asian cultural values, while the Mauritius-India links in the fields of economic and security have been strengthened based on ancestral kinship. In a social environment, where Creole identity is undermined and Creoles are placed at the bottom of racial hierarchy, Creole Mauritians have developed Africanized Creole identity in a way to embrace its African roots and to identify themselves as African diasporas in a transnational fashion. In response, the Mauritian government has provided financial and diplomatic assistance to the Creole community in restoring their cultural and historical links with their mother continent. Mauritius has been a fairly visible actor in the AU politics, and its government has a goal-specific strategic orientation in the effort toward African regional integration. Under the leadership of democratic government, Mauritius’ well-developed domestic institutions, strong private sectors and competitive labor forces might be able to help the process of regional integration with other African countries.

For Seychelles, the mixed heritages of Africa, Europe and Asia are core features of its Creole state identity. Under the socialist regime with egalitarian policy, the class
division and racial/ethnic tension have seldom become pressing political agendas. As a politically stable middle-income country in the Indian Ocean, it appears that Seychelles does not find any relevancy and necessity to be actively engaged in African regional politics and integration. Although a small share of intra-regional trade of global trade is operative for most African states, Seychelles’ economy heavily relies on its luxurious tourism sector, which targets mainly European tourists, for its export and employment. Hence, costly and comprehensive regional integration initiatives are not seen as an effective means by Seychelles to boost its economy that is already more prosperous than most of African countries. Critically, due to its under-developed state structure and limited state capacity, Seychelles may not consider itself as an important actor in African regional politics.

Racial-cultural identity politics is manifested in quite different ways in these four island countries since each country has its own unique history, racial-cultural dynamism, state policy and economic structure. Africaness both in the geographic and racial-cultural senses might be embraced or undermined depending on an issue and circumstance. In reality, people in Africa comprise of individuals of diverse racial-cultural backgrounds although Black African pride and solidarity remain important notions in African regional politics. Seen in this light, this comparative study leads us to rethink Africaness and African identity and to underscore the unique role that these Indian Ocean island states play in the development of African regional identity and the advancement of the AU-led regional integration of Africa.

African regional identity has been in the process of construction, reinforcement and popularization under the AU-led regional integration initiative. To reemphasize,
societies and countries in Africa consist of people of diverse racial-cultural backgrounds. Therefore, Black African identity, which is a premise of racial-cultural facet of Pan-Africanism, cannot be an officially embraced notion in promoting the AU-led African regional integration. As the AU becomes more institutionally developed and internationally recognized, its diverse racial-cultural features make Black-first racial ideology inappropriate and illegitimate. In this thinking, the major ideological challenge the AU is facing is how to reinforce African regional solidarity and identity, integrating people, societies and countries of heterogeneous heritages.

In rethinking Pan-Africanism in the AU-led regional integration of Africa, I argue that a shared objective is to accelerate regional political and economic integration and to ultimately achieve the unity of Africa, for which African diasporas are expected to take a more significant role. Seen in this light, the AU-led African unity project is to integrate the two dimensions of Pan-Africanism, which are Black racial-cultural affinity and a geographical linkage.

Yet, integration of the two different aspects of Pan-Africanism is not a new phenomenon. How to reconcile the two facets of Pan-Africanism often became a controversy in the establishment and development of the OAU. In the historical Pan-African movement, a motive to promote Afro-Arab alliance was to fight against colonial and White minority rules and to attain the liberation of Africa. In the contemporary Pan-African ideology and movement, a rationale is to advance African regional integration for the sake of development, peace and security in Africa.

Unequal Afro-Arab relations at both the inter-state and inter-group levels have been the most contentious and disruptive factor in developing the regional solidarity and
identity as Africa over time. Nevertheless, throughout the OAU and AU eras, both Northern Arab states (except for Morocco) and Black African states have been engaged in the OAU-AU-led Pan-African politics and integration efforts. As the AU becomes more institutionally developed and internationally recognized, it is highly unlikely for any member states to withdraw from the AU in a foreseeable feature. Therefore, societies and states comprising people of diverse racial-cultural heritages in Africa are bound by the AU-led Pan-African project. In this thinking, it is fair to argue that there has been embedded Pan-Africanism in the formation and conduction of foreign policies of African states. Cooperation and integration are not a choice, but reality and common destiny. Indeed, African unity has been and will be a shared dream and goal for people of the Pan-African community, who strive to achieve prosperous and peaceful Africa.
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