THESE PEOPLE DEPRIVED OF THIS COUNTRY:
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING AMONG INDIANS OF NEPALI DESCENT

by

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and approved by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Language and the Politics of Belonging among Indians of Nepali Descent

By CHELSEA L. BOOTH

Dissertation Director:
Dr. Laura M. Ahearn

This dissertation explores the way ‘language,’ like other forms of social designations—e.g. race, ethnicity, or caste—gains meaning through social, legal, and linguistic practices and ideologies. Indians of Nepali descent have lived and worked in the Darjeeling hills for more than 150 years yet are, throughout India, often labeled as ‘foreigners,’ ‘tribals,’ and ‘squatters.’ They also speak Nepali, a major factor that contributes to such perceptions despite their Indian citizenship. To counteract these labels and those discriminatory policies and practices they have incited, the Indian Nepali community in Darjeeling founded an organization in 1972 whose goal was the constitutional recognition of Nepali a national language of India. This recognition would, they argued, lead to an acceptance of their language and, more importantly, the recognition of their Indian citizenship. Although the Nepali language was finally included in the constitution in 1992, the anticipated social, political, and legal acceptance of the community was not forthcoming. Continuing discrimination, along with economic and political shifts in the region, has led to significant changes in the linguistic practices and language ideologies
among Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling—most notably the increasing, and conflicted, use of English that was only visible when both ethnographic and linguistic methods (matched-guise test) were utilized.
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1.0 Introduction

Consider the following three descriptions of linguistic practices, language ideologies, and social belonging among Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling, India:

(1) In late July 2005, while I was sitting at an internet café in Darjeeling, India, a teenage girl walked in to meet the young woman sitting next to me. After asking for tea and finding a chair, she sat down next to her friend and began discussing her day: assignments from classes at a local college, mutual friends she encountered since last meeting her friend. Then, finishing that business, she began asking the other young woman about her brother’s friend, Daju. Until this point, I had been focusing on my own work and trying not to listen to her rapid-fire and rather loud discussion. Suddenly, however, I realized what I was hearing; a style of code-mixing of English and Nepali quite different from that often used by Darjeeling residents over the age of 30 and very different from that I had heard used in Nepal:

   Sunita, if you see your brother, खुरा गर्ने उँग, just सोइने, ‘do you know Daju?’, ठीक?

   [Sunita, if you see your brother, kurā garne ā saṅga, just sodhne, ‘do you know Daju,’ ṭīk?]

   [Sunita, if you see your brother, talk with him, just ask [him], ‘do you know Daju,’ ok?]¹

(2) Two years later, in the middle of the 2007 monsoon, I visited a school in the tea plantation valleys outside Darjeeling town during preparations for a linguistic survey and matched-guise test.² My research assistant, Maya, and I, after meeting with the principal, were shown in to the teachers’ lounge where we could rest and wait for the rain to subside. The rain continued to pour and so we talked to the teachers as they came in for their tea break. A few were very animated and wanted to know all about the research—from how I became interested in Darjeeling to what I would possibly do with an anthropology degree—while others listened intently to our

¹ The young women, of course, knew that Sunita’s brother was acquainted with Daju—she was trying to find a way for Sunita to broach the subject with her brother without too much embarrassment.

² This survey, the matched-guise technique, and the results from both will be explored further in chapter 5.
discussions. As the minutes passed, more of the teachers became interested in our conversation and we began comparing notes on the education system in India and the US, literature, the politics of translation, and the Nepali language. Suddenly, the history instructor—a Bengali man from the plains and, other than me, the only non-Nepali in the room—interrupted us. He had been sitting quietly, reading his newspaper during most of the conversation and I think we were all a little shocked when he spoke. It was time, he said loudly, for me to understand something about this place. “Darjeeling is 100 years behind the rest of West Bengal,” because the Bengali renaissance advanced Bengalis light years ahead of the “tribal” people living in this area. “All the accompanying benefits that came with it [the Bengali renaissance] are only now trickling up to the hill region and so people here are 100 years behind. These people never had a renaissance, and are still trying to catch up.” One of the teachers told me later that this is what Nepalis believe is the typical ‘plains’ perspective about the hill region. But at that point, no one moved. No one spoke. We all just sat, drinking our tea, as the man talked on and on about the backwardness of Nepalis while the monsoon rains droned in the background.

(3) In the fall of 2007, I was sitting in the home of my favorite couple, Rajesh and Mala Rai. I often discussed my research with Uncle Rajesh, a former Gurkha soldier in the British army. He had served in Brunei for years and was a proud, sensitive man. His wife, Auntie Mala, remains an inspiration for me. Her feisty strength and welcoming heart meant that their house became my home as well. One afternoon in the late monsoon, over tea and plates of Auntie’s steaming momos, Uncle and I discussed the situation of Indians of Nepali descent in India. He was in a melancholy mood; the political situation in Darjeeling was deteriorating and the last few

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3 This conversation took place in a mixture of English and Nepali. Unless I specify otherwise in this dissertation, it should be assumed that the conversation took place in English.
4 This conversation occurred only a few months before Subash Ghisingh, long-time leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and pejoratively known in Darjeeling town as ‘Maharajah of the Hills,’ was deposed by
months’ strikes and unrest had started to take a toll on us all. I had picked up a book of stories written by local authors a few days earlier and was interested to know what he thought about them. The collection was full of beautiful but deeply sad stories. One author, in particular, I knew to be a jolly storyteller who would ask his wife to feed me tea and cakes while I laughed myself silly at his stories. Yet his writing was very different. As I was telling Uncle Rajesh about my observations, he rested his tea cup on the table and said:

Our stories are sad because we are unlucky to be born Nepali. People around the world know of brave Gurkha soldiers. But we are forced to go and sell ourselves because we are hungry—mentally, spiritually, and physically. No one is stamped on their forehead by god to be brave and kill people. No one wants to die or kill people—but we have sold ourselves. This is not bravery. We just want to kill the hunger….The problem is that we have no options after 150 years. My father wanted things to change, [for us to] become teachers, doctors, etc. But things haven’t changed….We leave [the three] hill subdivisions and are nothing….We just want equal opportunities [like] other [peoples]. Not special consideration, just equal opportunities. But people see us—and see bravery [and] hard-working stereotypes.

—Darjeeling, 16 August 2007

The following pages are my attempt to understand what I observed in Darjeeling. Boys and girls with a perfect grasp of English sitting at tea shops next to people from the plains of India who said these same young people were “100 years behind.” The pain of social and political exclusion that existed simultaneously with a fierce pride in the nation of India.

Guided by what I discovered during my 14 months of research in Darjeeling from 2005 and 2007—in conversations, interviews, documents, and surveys—I approach these issues through the lens of language. Language was the vehicle through which the Akhīl Bhāratyia

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5 While some of my interviews were tape recorded, this was not. Rajesh was in a thoughtful mood, had long pauses between sentences, and was speaking in English and so I could record his words verbatim; this is the only instance in this work where I directly quote without the use of a tape recorder. Due to the sensitive nature of my research—as I will explain more fully below—I only directly quote if I am sure the individual being quoted cannot be identified.
Nepāli Bhāsā Samītī [अक्षिप भारतीय नेपाली भाषा समिति, All-Indian Nepali Language Committee] attempted to gain social recognition of an Indian identity for Indians of Nepali descent through the inclusion of the Nepali language into the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The Nepali Language Committee, time and time again, stressed to the government and the population of India that recognition of the language was vital to Indians of Nepali descent because of discriminatory practices and policies of state and national governments. Recognition of the language, they argued, would remind all that they were Indian citizens. In a 1983 letter to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, they argued that “a writer or any correspondent while addressing to [sic] the Nepali people as ‘minorities,’ ‘foreign citizens,’ ‘illegal immigrants,’ and ‘intruders’ hurts the sentiments of the people.”

Recognition of the Nepali language was considered vital and, even today, local pride in the language and literature produced by Indians writing in Nepali is evident; this, however, does not mean the Nepali language is the only language spoken by Darjeeling residents. Many of the young people with whom I spent much of my time in Darjeeling seemed more comfortable speaking in English in many, but not all, social situations. I met no one who, if they had the money to pay for an English-medium school, would send their children to a Nepali-medium school. So how can we understand this complex history and, at least, surface-level contradictions?

Although I have chosen to approach this web of meanings through the lens of language, this research is clearly not only, or even primarily, about language. It is about citizenship, politics, regional and global economic shifts, and social and legal belonging as these elements are understood in the everyday, lived experiences of people like Sunita and Uncle Rajesh. In the

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6 The naming of the All-India Nepali Language Committee (ABNBS) is not without complexity in Darjeeling. When I refer to the “Nepali Language Committee” or “Language Committee,” I mean ABNBS.
7 ABNBS, File—5th Conference—Dooars, 8-10 June 1984 (2), img_08-img_15.
case of Darjeeling residents, such ideologies and discourses are often understood and experienced through language. My work is also part of an expanding literature on Nepalis in India—some focus on migration from Nepal to India (see Blaikie, et. al. 2002; Gurung 2001; Müller-Böker and Thieme 2007; Thieme 2006), 8 citizenship rights of Bhutanese residents and citizens of Nepali descent (see Carrick 2008), while this, and other more recent scholarship, explores the situation of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling (see Middleton 2008; Sen 2008). There have been few ethnographic pieces on Indians of Nepali descent; Timsina (1992) and Sonntag (2005) were written based on secondary sources and “literary works” (Timsina 1992: 8; see also Thieme 2006). 9 These works also assume a direct connection between ethnicity and language—presumably those who speak Nepali are Nepali and those who are Nepali speak it (see Timsina 1992; Sonntag 2005). In what follows here, I do not assume such a connection and will explore why such language ideologies are so prevalent in these accounts.

1.1 Argument and Intervention

Attention to language ideologies is helpful for scholars who seek a site in which broad conceptual categories such as “transnational migration,” “identity,” “political discourse,” and “globalization” are dialogically constructed and resisted through everyday language use. This approach also explicitly links microlevel practices with macrolevel discourses and structures. When we investigate questions relating to large, and sometimes unwieldy, ideologies and

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8 Thieme’s work analyzes the situation of Nepali migrants who live in Delhi including their motivations for migration—economic, social, medical, security, and education primary among them (see 2006, especially chapter 6). In the case of these migrants, “often Indians do not call them by name but only call them ‘caukidār’ (watchman) or ‘bahādur’ (‘brave—the brave one’). The Nepalese have become famous for being brave because of the history of the Gorkhā soldiers. However this fame is fading, inter alia because of an increasing number of newspaper articles about untrustworthy Nepalese domestic workers, and this often becomes a generalization for the whole Nepali community” (Thieme 2006: 105). Although Thieme means the whole Nepali citizen migrant community in India, I found that few Indians differentiated between Indian citizens of Nepali descent and Nepali citizens living in India. Negative attributes associated with one community was applied to the other. For research on the migration of Nepalis to Japan, see Yamanaka 2000, 2001.

9 Timsina does note that he is a Nepali, “born in Darjeeling” and so, presumably, analyzes the secondary material through that lens (1992: 8).
discourses like citizenship, the myriad forms of social difference and the law, language is a fruitful site to turn to in order to understand one concrete way in which individuals experience, understand, and negotiate these social facts. While a more linguistically inclined analysis—exploring the precise phonological or lexical differences between Darjeeling Nepali and Nepal Nepali—would provide one kind of data, it is the ideas and practices surrounding language as a kind of social difference that I explore (c.f. Irvine and Gal 2000).

In the following dissertation, I will make one methodological argument, and three interconnected theoretical arguments about language ideologies and linguistic anthropology as well as contribute to the scholarship on Indians of Nepali descent. Less is known about Indians of Nepali descent and their history than many other minority groups, and yet their history and engagement with the Indian state are crucial to a broader understanding of citizenship, identity, and nation building in India.

My methodological argument is that, within linguistic anthropology, the use of a matched-guise test as part of a broader research agenda can be invaluable. This is particularly true of research on language ideologies although it could be applicable elsewhere as well. More importantly, the contextualization of matched-guise research with ethnographic findings is vital; this is one aspect that many studies utilizing the matched-guise technique lack. In terms of my own work, without the matched-guise test and linguistic survey the intensely conflicted understandings about language, social and legal belonging in India, and identity among Indians of Nepali descent would have been less obvious. Yet relying on the linguistic data alone would have provided only a partial picture, without the complex historical and cultural contextualization or the connection of local language ideologies to national policy and law. Such contextualization of the matched-guise data will only strengthen conclusions drawn from them.
In the case of young Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling, for example, an affective connection to Nepali exists simultaneously with language choices emerging from the social and political hardships they face when speaking that language. While older individuals explicitly reported their displeasure with the younger generations’ use of English as well as their concern that the Nepali language was being infected by the corrupting influence of English, younger individuals’ beliefs were more complicated. Although some agreed that English was corrupting the Nepali language, their concerns with social acceptance, success in education, the ability to find employment, and accessing their legal citizenship rights superseded their concerns about the language. In Darjeeling, social and legal identity is often framed in terms of mobility and transcending racializing and racialized discourses; language is a fruitful site to look for the ways in which this occurs. It was the matched guise test results that, in conjunction with the ethnographic and archival research, have enabled me to arrive at a deeper understanding of the multiple, often contradictory, language ideologies among Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling.

Two of my three theoretical arguments concern the study of language ideologies. As Kroskrity has argued, language ideologies are “constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group,” are numerous and overlapping, help individuals “mediate between social structures and forms of talk,” and are an important aspect in the “creation and representation of various social and cultural identities” (2004: 501-509). He also notes that “members may display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies” (2004: 505). It is this last aspect—at the end of the continuum in the realm of more unconscious language ideologies—that has been understudied within scholarship on language ideologies. This research attempts to address this lacuna by drawing on results from the matched-guise test and demonstrating that not only are
there ‘varying degrees of awareness,’ but that conscious and unconscious language ideologies may emphasize different aspects of the local linguistic landscape. Although the results from the 2007 test in Darjeeling appear to be contradictory on some levels, I believe they are, in fact, highlighting different cultural and political spheres.

My second theoretical intervention is to interject an approach derived from Critical Race Theory and Racial Formation Theory—which connect legal and political meanings of race with the the lived experiences of race—into the study of language ideologies in India. It is clear, in this dissertation, that the intersections between the top-down structures and the everyday lived experiences of those who have been excluded economically and politically are fruitful sites to explore how difference is produced and experienced (c.f. Bhabha 1990; Spivak 1987; Young 1990). I have turned largely to the concept of language ideologies to explain the ways individuals experience, understand, and negotiate social and linguistic fields within the dialectic between large-scale structures and individual practices (Blommaert and Verschueren 1992, 1998; Errington 1992; 1998; Kulick 1992, 1998; Woolard 1992 and 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). The concept of language ideologies has been particularly helpful in my quest to understand why the Indian Nepali community turned to language as a way to gain recognition for their citizenship; such a turn is not self-evident and is a product of the particular social, linguistic, political, and social contexts in which they live. It is primarily through the lens of language ideologies that I connect these threads because language ideologies, as a theoretical construct, can bridge micro level speech acts and interactions with their mid-and macro level contexts, including those structures of inequality. Language ideologies also highlight the actual process through which individuals engage with and experience the world around them.

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10 I believe that Critical Race Theory and Racial Formation Theory, both first developed in the US context, are applicable well beyond that context. See Chapter Two for a further discussion of both.
My third argument answers Jan Blommaert’s call to explore the “historiography” of language ideologies (1999:1):

What makes the difference between a successful language ideology—and one that becomes dominant—and other, less successful ones? What is the connection between language ideologies and broader political and ideological developments in a society? How did we arrive at our contemporary views and perspectives on language and our assessments of current linguistic situations?

To answer these and other questions, I use the Nepali Language Committee documents I fortuitously discovered, legal decisions, parliamentary debates, and more recent recollections of these histories in addition to current practices and ideologies. This will, however, be a career-long attempt to understand the historiography of language ideologies and practices among Nepali-speakers in Darjeeling. What you read in the following is the beginning of that process.

It is clear, from what follows, that disagreements about language among and about Indians of Nepali descent have little to do with ‘language.’ Instead, these disagreements have more to do with issues of social and political exclusion and attempts by various factions within the Indian Nepali community to counteract that exclusion. In order to understand how this process worked, I have emphasized the social and political meanings of language as a social category that ties individuals and groups to a legal framework; these social and political meanings inflect that legal framework with particular meanings (including racialized evaluations). Debates about the nomenclature of the ‘Nepali’ language have occurred over the past two hundred years; for the past thirty years they appear superficially to be about the political maneuverings of a political party in Darjeeling. However, the debates speak to much deeper divides about how history is defined, what it means to ‘be a Nepali,’ and language ideologies surrounding the language itself and its use.
These arguments about the language came to a head during parliamentary debates about the inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution in 1992. These parliamentary debates were one site where local language ideologies in Darjeeling intersected with national level language politics of nation-building, language planning, security, and history. The community of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling expected benefits from their language’s recognition in the constitution; these benefits never materialized. The absence of changes, in fact, led the community to turn away from both the Indian Government and the Nepali language as the vehicle of their belonging. Instead, parents turned to English-medium schools and pushed their children to learn English. This, they believed, would be the path to success and security and is one reason why younger people use English more than their parents. In large part, these parents believe, as many in the community do, that language can be used to address the social and political inequalities they face by emphasizing their education and proficiency in a high status language. English, here, is associated with highly educated elite (and often urban) individuals rather than any social, religious, or political group.

Using these perspectives—language ideologies, social and political structures of inequality, and language shifts—I have isolated crucial threads in a complex web of changes and ideologies that exist within Darjeeling that are couched within broader language politics in India.

1.2 Darjeeling, West Bengal, India

The town of Darjeeling is located in the state of West Bengal in a small finger of land between Nepal (14 miles to the west), Sikkim (3 miles to the north), Bhutan (35 miles to the east), and Bangladesh (35 miles to the south/southwest). In the past 216 years, Darjeeling District has been claimed by Sikkim (until 1789), Nepal (until 1817), and the British East India Company, which, after taking control of the area from Nepal, returned sovereignty to Sikkim.
The area was ceded again to the East India Company after a conflict with Sikkim in 1835 for the “establishment of a sanitarium for the convalescent servants” of the company (Bhanja 1993: 18).

Figure 1—India (research focus highlighted). Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/india/india_map.gif.
Figure 2— West Bengal, India (research focus highlighted). Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/westbengal/westbengal-district-map.gif
Figure 3—Darjeeling ("Darjiling") District. Four main areas of ethnographic and historical research: Darjeeling ("Darjiling"), Kalimpong ("Kalimpang"), Kurseong ("Karsiyang"), and Gangtok, Sikkim. Source: http://www.banglarmukh.com/E-Gov/English/MapOfState/New%20Maplist/darjeeling.jpg.
Once the East India Company (re)gained control of Darjeeling, Nepali nationals were encouraged to immigrate for the economic and agricultural development of the region.\textsuperscript{11} Workers were needed to meet the increasing demands for Darjeeling tea, and Nepalis were considered more suitable for tea cultivation than local groups such as the Lepcha. By British estimations, Nepali people had been farming on hill terraces in the Kathmandu Valley for thousands of years, and so the cultural practices and technical skills necessary to work in tea plantations were already ingrained and would not need to be taught. During this period, before 1861, the area was designated a “non-regulated area” and after 1874 was declared a Scheduled District (Kaushik 2007: 18).\textsuperscript{12} Migration from eastern Nepal to Darjeeling was more common and began nearly a century earlier than those from Eastern Nepal to Kathmandu (Hoffmann 1997: 60-61). Until 1950, Darjeeling was the most common migration site for those living in Eastern Nepal, in large part, because it was the “main economic centre of the Eastern Himalaya” (1997: 63).\textsuperscript{13}

More recently, Nepalis recruited into the British army were frequently stationed in, or retired to, Darjeeling, a practice that continues today in the Indian Army. The city and surrounding district is largely populated by the descendents of those Nepali nationals who migrated to the area over the past 200 or so years (who will be referred to as Indians of Nepali descent throughout this work) as well as Nepali nationals who migrated during their lifetime (designated in the following text as Nepalis; for discussion of Nepali migration to India, see Gurung 2001, Hoffmann 2001; Müller-Böker and Thieme 2007; Seddon et. al., 2007; Thieme

\textsuperscript{11} Out migration from Nepal to India began at least 200 years ago (Thieme 2006: 12), although migration to Darjeeling began a bit later.
\textsuperscript{12} Both designations meant that Darjeeling was, for much of its history, “kept outside the ambit of general laws in operation in the rest of India” (Kaushik 2007: 18).
\textsuperscript{13} Hoffman notes four reasons for the importance of Darjeeling: its location as summer residence of the governor of Bengal (1997: 63-64), the road that linked the plains to Darjeeling because of the governor’s residence (1997: 64), the extensive tea cultivation in the area (1997: 64), and the international alpinism movement which began in the 1860s and made Darjeeling its “Himalayan centre” (1997: 64).
and Müller-Böker 2010). Darjeeling district, according to the 2001 census, had a total population of 1,605,900.\textsuperscript{14}

The historical narrative of this area is under debate and what I presented above should be examined critically. Some argue that Nepalis were the “original inhabitants” of the area and the borders shifted over them while other scholars and politicians make the case that Nepalis migrated to the area after tea cultivation began (see Kaushik 2007 for a full description of these debates over the history; see also Kar 1999, Magar 1994; Nath 2003 for various versions of the history). There are a number of printing presses in the Darjeeling Hills and so local intellectuals often publish works regarding the history of the area, of Nepalis in India, and the Nepali language in India. The history has also been explored by historians and political scientists in India, Nepal, England, and the United States. Most every side of the history is contentious—the history of migration from Nepal to India (see Kansakar 1982, Timsina 1992)—including justifications for the importance of Indians of Nepali descent to the Indian nation-state as well as the number of Nepali migrants to the country.\textsuperscript{15} These justifications typically, however, fall into a two categories; 1) the importance of ‘Gurkha’ soldiers\textsuperscript{16} to British, and independent, India; 2) the strategic importance of the Darjeeling area to India.\textsuperscript{17} The narrative of the area’s history as I have presented above is designed to provide an overview and introduction to the complex and contentious reading of historical events. It is in no way an attempt at an authoritative version.

\textsuperscript{14} This includes 826,334 men and 779,566 women.
\textsuperscript{15} Thieme estimates that 10-24\% of the total population of Nepal migrates outside the country for work; compare this number to the official government estimation of 5\% (2006: 18). This number includes the approximately 200,000 women and girls in the sex industry in India (2006: 19).
\textsuperscript{16} For example, Kar argues that there are “several justifications for the various kinds of demands of the Gorkhas or other ethnic Groups (sic) living in the Darjeeling Districts :--1) Never even in the darkest days when Germany was winning in the West and Japan had conquered Burma in the second world war did the Gorkhas domiciled in British India for a moment doubt that the ultimate victory would lie on the side of the United Nations; never did the Gorkhas waver in their loyalty and their determination to fight the Axis powers” (1999:18). See also Onta 1996a, 1996b.
\textsuperscript{17} Kar believes that “[a]ll passes in the Himalayas, from the Eastern Border of Nepal to Burma, fall in the region” of Eastern India (1999:18).
The debates over history provide telling insights into current political maneuverings and ideologies and few insights into what actually occurred or what it all meant to those who lived those events or those who recall them today.

Residents of Darjeeling are not only of Nepali descent; the city’s history of immigration means there reside many speakers of Hindi, Bengali, Bihari, Tibetan, and various other languages. The city, as a major tourist destination, is popular among Indians from the plains, particularly Bengali speakers from urban West Bengal. Because of this long history of multicultural and multilingual residents and visitors, it is common for words and grammatical structures of these languages to be used even by those Indians of Nepali descent who represent themselves as monolingual speakers of Nepali. Such linguistic syncretism is common in Darjeeling, and although I observed Hindi, Bengali, English, and Tibetan words being used by Nepali speakers, the language ideologies only identified the incorporation of English as the marker of “improper” Nepali language use (see also Hill 1999; Makihara 2004). English itself holds contradictory roles within this multicultural space. Among residents of Nepali descent, English was ideologically highlighted as a negative influence on the Nepali language spoken in this area. I was told that Darjeeling Nepali was not pakkā [real or authentic] Nepali (as compared to the Nepali spoken in Nepal) because the frequency of English used within Nepali utterances in Darjeeling. Borrowings from other languages are not highlighted in the same way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic Population of Darjeeling in 1971</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
<th>Nepali/Gorkhali</th>
<th>Lepcha</th>
<th>Bhutia</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sadar</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>92.92</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimpong</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>87.83</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurseong</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>87.08</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>9.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siliguri</td>
<td>51.88</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>40.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.77</td>
<td>58.41</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>18.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Taken from *Gorkhaland Revisited* (2007) by Anupma Kaushik, pg. 143.
The use of English, however, is often represented by Nepalis, particularly young Nepalis, as a positive linguistic choice that allows them to navigate the precarious social terrain more successfully than using Nepali alone would allow. This is in spite of the long and incredibly contentious history of the English language within South Asia. English, for these young people, is associated with a class of educated, relatively elite individuals rather than any particular ethnic, regional, or religious group and so may be used without overt associations to any social group in conversation. Nepalis have been typically slotted relatively low in the social and caste hierarchies. They have been, and continue to be, represented as only suitable for marginal positions within the greater nation-state, such as guards, housemaids, and sex workers. With tourists from the plains of India who visit Darjeeling, therefore, Nepalis use English to posit a situation in which their superior use of the English language counteracts perceived social deficiencies that are often used as justification for what Nepalis view as discriminatory government and social policies. Indian Nepalis in Darjeeling, as well as those outside the area, believe they are not considered as Indian as other Indian citizens.

1.3 Positionality

My path to Darjeeling and, by extension, this project, was a bumpy one. When I first entered graduate school, I intended to conduct research on language politics and development practices in Southern Nepal where I had been a Peace Corps volunteer. The increasing violence of the Maoist revolution meant that my next research trip during the winter of 2004/2005 was

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18 As Kaushik notes, “mainstream historians in India…project Nepalis as stooges of British Government [which] created a country wide contempt for them” (2007: 31). He argues that this is directly tied to the “deploy[ment of] Gorkha soldiers to gun down unarmed freedom fighters at Jalian Wala-Bagh in Amritsar in 1919 and again against the Quit India Movement participants in 1942” (2007: 31). They were also part of the forces that were used to fight the sepoys during the First War of Independence in 1857 (also known as the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and the Sepoy Mutiny).

19 The occasional slip even in few scholarly works on the subjects of Indians of Nepali descent occurs. For example, in the forward to Timsina 1992, the writer notes that Nepalis—meaning Indian citizens of Nepali descent—“feel insecure because of their socio-economic backwardness and political alienation vis-à-vis Indian people” (Timsina 1992: v). Note, he did not say other Indian people but, rather, Indian people.
confined to the Kathmandu valley. It became clear that, given my interest in language politics, the uncertain future of Nepal meant that I needed to find a new location. Generous funding from Princeton University’s Program in Urbanization and Migration and Office of Population Research, and various Rutgers departments and offices—the Graduate School’s Special Opportunity Grant, South Asian Studies Program’s Research and Travel Grant, and the Department of Anthropology’s Bigel fellowship—meant I could explore the possibilities of India.

I first visited India in the summer of 2005. Although I briefly considered New Delhi and Calcutta as research locations, it was immediately clear that Darjeeling would allow me to utilize the language skills I had acquired in Nepal while also providing fascinating new research directions. At the time, however, I was completely unaware of the Nepali language movement and much of what forms the center of the following chapters. I had expected to study code-switching and identity politics in Darjeeling, yet when I arrived in February 2007, the unusually cold winter meant that most people who were able to leave the city had done so. The rest of us remained and largely stayed indoors, wrapped in layer upon layer of clothing and drinking hot tea. This cold winter also meant that few tourists visited the area. Shops that catered to these tourists—meant to be the ethnographic center of my original project on code-switching—were shuttered closed. Instead, I began talking to my neighbors, desperately trying to find a new project. Many of the people who remained in the area during these first few months were retired soldiers and civil servants. They had made enough money during their years of service to afford gas heaters, warm clothing, and thick blankets, which made the frigid days bearable.

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20 As I walked around the city, looking at the closed shops and trying to figure out a new project, I had my first anthropological epiphany—anthropologists can create a research agenda out of anything, unless there are no people. Although there were people in the city, they seemed to me to be doing nothing linguistic. It was simply too cold to talk.
Although these same people became central to my research on language politics and the Nepali language movement, they were not the ones who told me of the movement. I first learned of the Language Committee’s existence through a long-time Darjeeling resident, a Muslim Kashmiri merchant. When he heard of my project, we discussed the history of languages in the area; who spoken what, when certain languages had appeared in the area, and what it meant for certain languages to be spoken in specific places in the city. He then mentioned the fundraising efforts by the Nepali Language Committee as if he assumed I knew of their existence. When I said, “the who?” he began rifling through some papers on his desk. He had just cleaned out the desk and, he sadly told me, threw away some of their public announcements. But, he said, you must know of them. In the following year, he was one of only two non-politicians who would talk about their direct experiences with the movement in Darjeeling. The first was a former president of the Nepali Language Committee and a driving personality behind the movement. The other was a woman who participated in the movement but asked that I never give any identifying information about her. I interviewed over 100 other individuals explicitly about the movement; most would tell me what I came to describe as the ‘official narrative’ of the events. I would often start interviews in a more open-ended manner; it was necessary, as I discovered over the months, to perform my knowledge of local events, including very clear statements that I had no stake in the politics of the area. Unless individuals knew I was aware of the local history, they would almost never discuss their own experiences or, rather, they would provide the ‘official narrative’ of what occurred. I believe this ‘official narrative’ was a version of events that ‘everyone’ knew and, therefore, safer to recount. Personal experiences could be traced to individuals while the official narrative belongs to all and, at the same time, no one.

When individuals not directly connected to the language committee were interviewed,
they would either direct me to the leaders of the movement—local intelligentsia, politicians, and other public officials—or, more frequently, they would provide documents. Documents, as written evidence of past events, represent two ideologies common in the community. First, they were considered the authoritative representation of events: newspaper clippings, public notices, circulars, memoranda, and (rarely) books. In fact, these were presented to me as ‘the history’—personal reflections, experiences, and memories were almost entirely dismissed. The dismissal of oral evidence by local residents mirrors the Indian government’s dismissal of orality as important to cases for inclusion in the Eighth Schedule of the constitution as well as in the government’s definition of ‘major’ languages of India.

While the authority of literary/written sources as important locally is undeniable, this was not the only reason that, when asked for their experiences, individuals most often gave public documents. The other reason relates to the political party in power at the time—the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF). Although most events occurred between 15 to 40 years prior to my 2007 research, individuals were hesitant to talk about their own involvement in support of the Nepali Language Committee and, more broadly, the Nepali language movement because of the personal and political dislike and active aggression by Subash Ghisingh, the leader of the GNLF. Only one woman, active in the movement but not part of the committee, would discuss in depth her personal experiences. This woman was very old and had no family left, which, I believe, was the reason she felt free to speak. For others—younger, with families left for Ghisingh and his party members to victimize—even my promises to protect their identity did not make them consider putting themselves in danger. I was also well aware of the danger and would not push. Rather than turning me away, they steered me to evidence that would help me while
also providing them with a plausible denial that they had talked to me and provided evidence to me.\(^{21}\)

All people, whether scholars or not, carry with them certain assumptions, biases, and language ideologies. I am no different. Some assumptions, as anthropologists, we pick up from those with whom we work. These may not be representative of a broader societal norm but are, nonetheless, powerful. While in Darjeeling, I heard time and time again how the GNLF and Subash Ghisingh used violence and fear to consolidate their hold on power. This was not surprising considering I was working with supporters of the Nepali Language Committee as well as working primarily in the city of Darjeeling. By 2007, Ghisingh’s remaining support had been principally in the more rural areas of the region. His support from Darjeeling town had greatly diminished and individuals were much more comfortable in speaking out against him and his activities than they had been in 2005 when I first visited the city. Therefore, much of what I learned about Ghisingh and his followers were from their opponents. In my interactions with GNLF members, it was clear that some only publically supported him and were fearful to be discovered helping my research; they often provided documents and not stories that I am able to share. Others were openly antagonistic to my project. At an art show during 2007, I was discussing my project with a man to whom I had just been introduced. I was unaware that he was an active member of the GNLF and, although I always tried to be sensitive to the nomenclature politics of the area (see chapters three and four for details), I called the language spoken by Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling, ‘Nepali,’ instead of the name used by Ghisingh and some of his supporters, ‘Gorkhali.’ The man began yelling at me and, although I tried to

\(^{21}\) Such documents were at one point available and so it could be argued that I received the sources from any number of people or even libraries. The older woman I mentioned on the previous page was even concerned: as I was preparing to leave, she said that she hoped no one figured out she was the one who spoke to me because she was afraid people would come and “break her glasses.” I was utterly confused by her comment and, as my assistant Maya and I walked back to town, I asked her what the woman had meant. Maya explained that it was her way of politely telling me that people would hurt her if they knew she had spoken to me.
apologize and explain why I had called the language ‘Nepali,’ was openly antagonistic whenever I saw him in the future.

Because of the political sensitivity of the nomenclature arguments in Darjeeling, I rarely provide direct quotes and do not provide full descriptions of individuals and their stories. I cannot take the risk that they could be identified; what they told me, of course, informs all of my analyses and readings of events in the following pages. This is also true of the documents of the Nepali Language Committee; although I was given permission to use them by a former president, I only share those documents that are not traceable to any individual. In future research projects, I will attempt to find the individuals who wrote some of the documents but this was not always possible for this research project.

In terms of my theoretical assumptions, I assume that language is meaningful—not only as a method of communicating messages but also socially meaningful. I place myself squarely in a line of scholars who analyze language not for the sake of understanding the grammatical or phonological structure of a language but who, rather, see language as a way of exploring the concrete ways individuals and groups of people understand themselves and the world around them every day.22 Instead of studying the minutiae of Nepali language use in Darjeeling, for example, I focus on ideas about language to explore how Indians of Nepali descent understand and engage their social, economic, and political place in India. I also use the lens of language to explore the ways Indians of Nepali descent have organized themselves in response to historical conditions and political/legislative actions. As Gaenszle notes, “Nepali residents in Banaras” and, I would argue, Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling and throughout India, “are more and more forced to make a decision: what is your citizenship, what is your ‘true’ identity?” (Gaenszle

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22 Although this list includes many scholars, I most often look to the scholarship of Ahearn, Blommaert, Duranti, Gal, Irvine, Kroskrity, Schieffelin, Silverstein, and Urciuoli.
in press: 79). It is through language I approach these questions of citizenship and identity/belonging; it is also within the context of language politics of India that I understand these issues. I explore these below; but, it is also important to note that I am aware that I am a native speaker of English from the US and not an Indian academic. This did not seem terribly problematic for the residents of Darjeeling with whom I interacted. But I am profoundly aware of the politics of English in India and do not make my conclusions about the use of English in Darjeeling lightly.

1.4 Language Politics in India

In order to understand my approach to issues of language, citizenship, belonging, and law in India, it is crucial to explore the history of language politics in India. It is a gross understatement to say that India has a long and complicated history of language politics; invasions, colonization, consolidation, reorganization, and the vast number of languages spoken (see table two below) in the country means any attempt at a comprehensive overview will be lacking. The large bodies of literature dedicated to language politics in India emerge, in part, because of the desire to manage the country’s intense multilingualism. As is clear in table two below, the twenty-two Scheduled (or ‘national’) languages of India are spoken by approximately 96.55% of the population. Although these twenty-two languages are reported to be spoken by

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23 I was even, to my surprise, two times identified as a post-colonial subject. In both instances, I was asked how I felt to be a member of the first of England’s colonies to revolt and win independence. The first time it happened, I was struck dumb; I have never, even once, considered myself to be a postcolonial subject and thought the man was joking. After it happened again, months later, I was able to construct at least a reply.

24 See Cavet 1998, especially pages 125-131 for a discussion of multilingualism and how countries ‘manage it.’ Political Scientist Selma Sonntag argues that, although India appears to be “remarkably] simil[ar] in ethnolinguistic configurations” to “unstable” places like Eastern Europe—which she likens to an “explosive power keg”—the situation is, on the ground, quite different. She highlights the case of Indians of Nepali descent in North India; while “India engages in nation-building and its national minorities such as the Nepali speakers in Darjeeling having a nearby homeland (in this case, Nepal) toward which appeal for protection and identification may be directed. Yet in India, rather than making such an appeal, the national minority is bending over backwards to become part of the mainstream nation!” (Sonntag 2002: 173-4). This dissertation will explain, in part, the conditions under which this ‘bending over backwards’ was, in fact, cultivated by Indian government policies regarding language since Independence.
96.55% of the population, there are, as reported by Ethnologue, 438 “living languages” in India (Lewis 2009). Since a comprehensive overview would require volumes to explore, I will instead focus on a few areas of scholarship on language politics in India that are foundational to understanding what I describe later in this dissertation. In short, I focus on the planning of languages in India—debates about the use of Hindi as a ‘national’ language, the complex relationship between indigenous languages and English, and how these led to the organization of, and amendments to, the Indian constitution. I briefly explore comparative language movements in India, particularly Sindhi because it was central to the way Nepali language activists argued their case.25

25 Other central concerns of language politics in India include language planning and development (see Annamalai 1994, 2001; Dua 1990; for the case of Marathi as a specific example of language planning and what it means for a language to be ’planned’ in India, see Kelkar 1994), language ‘identity’ (Khubchandani 1994), language policy on education (Agnihotri and Khanna 1994; Annamalai 2001; Krishnmurti 1986, 1990; Pattanayak 1981, 1994; Srivastava 1990), language standardization (Chatterjee and Chatterjee 1979), language policy of mass media (for the specific case of Hindi, see Mukherjee 1994; see also Dua 1994a; Pattanayak 1994), literacy (Srivastava and Gupta 1990), and policy regarding language use within the government (see Gupta, Abbi, and Aggarwal 1995; Koul 1994a).
Language Distribution of India (Eighth Schedule Languages)\textsuperscript{26}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Hindi</td>
<td>41.03%</td>
<td>422,048,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bengali</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>83,369,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Telugu</td>
<td>7.19%</td>
<td>74,002,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Marathi</td>
<td>6.99%</td>
<td>71,936,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tamil</td>
<td>5.91%</td>
<td>60,793,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Urdu</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
<td>51,536,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Gujarati</td>
<td>4.48%</td>
<td>46,091,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Kannada</td>
<td>3.69%</td>
<td>37,924,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Malayalam</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
<td>33,066,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oriya</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
<td>33,017,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Punjabi</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>29,102,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Assamese</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>13,168,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Maithili</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>12,179,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Santali</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td>6,469,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Kashmiri</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>5,527,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Nepali</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>2,871,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sindhi</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>2,535,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Konkani</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>2,489,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dogri</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>2,282,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Manipuri</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>1,466,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Bodo</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>1,350,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sanskrit</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>14,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>993,245,089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Total population and percentage of Eighth Schedule languages.

1.4.1 Planning languages, planning nations.

Language politics are rarely only about language and are certainly not a recent phenomenon in South Asia.\textsuperscript{27} Such politics draw on a wide variety of language ideologies and highlight a complex web of meaning—“relations to…[the] past, their sense of history, the

\textsuperscript{26} This data was taken from the 2001 Indian census. For population numbers and percentages for all 122 languages recorded in the 2001 census, see Appendix W.

\textsuperscript{27} While “separate ethnic collectivities based on distinctively different languages have existed for centuries…the emergence of language demands on public authorities is of relatively recent origin,” due largely to the political organization of South Asia into smaller subdivisions like nations and states after Independence (Das Gupta 1975: 472).
assumptions on which their social relations are based, their posture towards the period of European colonialism, the pattern of existing social inequalities and the means advocated for leveling them and, finally, the course of politics and social change in their contemporary phase” (Tambiah 1967: 217; see also Koul 1994b). These connections among language, identity, and politics are neither self-evident nor inevitable. After 1947, arguments about language directly affected “participation of the common man in the political process, for equality before the law and for employment” (Tambiah 1967: 216) and were, during Independence, directly tied to “communalism, i.e. the conflictual relations between the majority Hindus and the national minority of Muslims, and infuse India-Pakistan relations” (Sonntag 2002: 175). These arguments also influenced the writing of the new Indian Constitution.

The question of official status of languages during the writing of the constitution was a contentious subject. It was clear that the constitution would have to mandate something about language; however, “[s]ince there was no consensus on the content of national language policy, what the constitution offers represents a compromise” (Das Gupta 1975: 478). First, the sheer number of languages meant, again, that not all could be given official status; therefore, certain languages would be given ‘national’ status while ‘official’ status was reserved for the languages of government, Hindi and English. The specific section in the constitution regarding language

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28 In the case of Indian language politics, Dasgupta argues that linguistic difference or “language loyalties are not likely to pose problems for national policy makers unless there are compelling campaigns to use them in public spaces for realizing certain community objectives” (2003: 34). For further reading about language planning elsewhere, see Rubin, et. al., 1977. Das Gupta also argues that, at Independence, language was far behind religion as the salient social difference (1975). After Partition, when now-Bangladesh was still part of Pakistan, he believes that “the people of East Pakistan saw themselves as Pakistanis first and Bengalis secondarily. At that time, their greatest perceived enemy was the Bengali-speaking Hindus of East Bengal. Language served no bond at all” (Das Gupta 1975: 471).

29 Das Gupta argues, years later, that the “conciliative tone of the language provisions of the constitution, not surprisingly, reflected an important institutional inheritance that may be significant for an understanding of the conflict over the relative status of languages and the policy outcomes in the formative years of the nation and later” (2003: 31). I explore the on-the-ground effects of the Eighth Schedule more fully in the rest of this dissertation.
was the Eighth Schedule.\textsuperscript{30} When this Schedule was being draw up by the Constituent Assembly, discussions did not explicitly articulate criteria by which languages could be included; rather they focused on “(1) Hindi or Hindustani as the official language, (2) the period of transition from English to the official language, and (3) the use of Hindi numerals or international numerals” (Krishnamurti 1995: 10).\textsuperscript{31}

The question of Hindi/Hindustani was less about the language—or rather languages, since the legal designation ‘Hindi’ collapses within in a variety of languages and has changed significantly since 1947\textsuperscript{32}—and more about what would be the link language between the people of the newly formed Indian nation. As Gayatri Spivak notes:

The extreme edge of Hindi as the ‘national language’ is a peculiar concoction with a heavily Sanskritized artificial idiom whose most notable confection is the speech of the flight attendants on Indian airplane flights. By contrast, Hindi as it is spoken and written is enriched with many Arabic and Persian loan-words...in spite of efforts at Sanskritization, much of the language of legal procedure in India comes, understandably, from court Persian (1990: 233-234).

Even the choice of Hindi as the official language to replace English at Independence was not always clear during this process. It was argued that it would/should serve as a linkage language “despite the fact that it neither had the prestige associated with some other Indian languages, nor was it spoken as mother tongue by more than a third of the national population” (Das Gupta 1975: 480). Advocates of Hindi argued that it should become “a medium of the composite

\textsuperscript{30} For an explanation of the motivations, history, and philosophy behind the Eighth Schedule, see Gupta, Abbi, and Aggarwal 1995; Khubchandani 1995; Mallikarjun 1995. For further discussion of the broader implications of the Eighth Schedule, see Dua 1995, Khullar 1995.

\textsuperscript{31} Das Gupta discusses the distinction between official languages—used in legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the government—and national languages—which, he argues, are the languages of a “political, social, and cultural entity” (1966: 39; see also Ayyub 1965). See also Handa 1983: 3-4 as referenced in Krishnamurti 1995:10, Pattanayak 1995.

\textsuperscript{32} The language legally designated as Hindi “involved the absorption of a multiplicity of local languages, dialects, mother tongues, whatever one wants to call them” (Brass 2004: 354). A similar process occurred in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century with Urdu (see 2004: 355) and for everyday purposes, both Urdu and Hindi could be collapsed under the category ‘Hindustani.’ It was at the literary or ‘high’ levels that these two diverged dramatically—or so some have argued.
culture of India (Krishnamurti 1995: 19) both because of the number of speakers and because it was “not very different from other North Indian languages,” although, conversely, “fundamentally different from southern languages” (Tambiah 1967: 230). The Hindi language was certainly not the self-evident choice; while Hindi is often reported to have the highest number of speakers of any language spoken in India, Das Gupta notes that, for census purposes, Hindi is a “composite name that covers a wide linguistic area, including hundreds of communities whose members are historically accustomed to reporting their linguistic identity by other names….the power of policy makers to categorize and enumerate in ways that serve them has had a major impact on the politics of recognizing the differences among Hindi, Hindustani, and Urdu” (Das Gupta 2003: 26). The census is used, Mahapatra argues, to ‘contain’ the intense multilingualism of India by “restricting it to a list of 105 languages/mother tongues” (1990: 33).

How would it accomplish this goal? Krishmurti argues that since “[l]inguistic expression—words, phrases, styles—goes from one language to another through bilingualism…[i]f there were many bilinguals into other Indian languages among the Hindi speakers, they would be the carriers of borrowing from the other Indian languages into Hindi” (1995:19). However, this has not been the case because, he believes, the three language formula education system in Hindi-speaking states has failed, in part, because “[a]ll translations from and into Hindi are done by scholars of other languages…[and] consequently during the past 44 years Hindi has hardly absorbed any elements from the other non-Hindi (Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, etc.) languages” (1995: 19). Presumably the absorption of ‘elements’ from other language would have assisted Hindi becoming a true link language between the peoples of India.

For further discussion see Dua 1992 (as cited in Das Gupta 2003: 26, footnote 13) and Appadurai 1993 (cited in Das Gupta 2003: 27, footnote 15). Further research on the actual practices of collecting census data in India regarding language is sorely needed.

33 See also Sadana 2007: 314 for a discussion of the politics and hegemony of Hindi; see Das Gupta 1977 for discussion of planning of Hindi at federal and state (Uttar Pradesh) levels, which is similar elsewhere for other language planning efforts. Remarkably, “some of the strongest advocates of Hindi during the nationalist movement…were non-Hindi speakers” (Das Gupta 1975: 480; see also 2003: 35). Other nationalist leaders included Kashub Chandra Sen (Bromo Samaj), native speaker of Bengali, and Dayananda Saraswati (Arya Samaj), native speaker of Gujarati as well as B.G. Tilak, native speaker of Marathi, and Subhas Chandra Bose, Bengali, as well as the often cited example of Mahatma Gandhi (Dasgupta 2003: 35) as nationalist leaders who supported Hindi as a national language. Dasgupta cites Myrdal 1968 and Breton 1997 for further reading on the “different uses” of ‘lingualism.’ It is also important to note that, although they supported the use of Hindi as the national language of India, this was “with the expectation that it [Hindi] would widen itself to reduce the stylistic distance from the Hindustani and Urdu varieties and be receptive to the influences from other Indian languages” (2003: 35). These expectations were laid out, in part, in Article 351 of the Constitution—see Appendix C. For further discussion of the flexibility of the constitution regarding language rights, see Das Gupta 2003: 35.
This restriction has been accomplished by only compiling certain numbers about languages—in effect, erasing the other languages. For example, the “1961 census presented data on all the 1,652 mother tongues—a complete inventory with statistics for individual mother tongues. The 1971 census, however, thought it fit to present statistics on only the 15 scheduled languages (inclusive of mother tongues grouped under each…) and 91 other languages/mother tongues…including a category called ‘other mother tongues’…[the census] mentions a total of 132 languages/mother tongues without statistics for individual mother tongues” (Mahapatra 1990: 9).

This kind of legal and ideological erasure is not unusual and part of larger processes of erasure that often occur within politics and language; “a language is simply a dialect that has an army and a navy” (quoted in Irvine and Gal 2000: 35). Irvine and Gal have identified erasure as one of three semiotic processes through which language ideologies are created. Within representations of census results for language, erasure is the process of simplification in which people, language categories, or linguistic practices are made “invisible” and those “[f]acts…inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (2000: 38). In the case of the Indian census, it is this process of erasure of difference that allows the intense multilingualism of the country to be simplified for the census document. This

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36 In the 2001 census, there were 122 language categories although certain languages enumerated under these categories were, for political reasons, included as supplementary numbers rather than full ‘languages.’ For example, the category of ‘Tamil,’ a south Indian language, includes reported languages of “Kaikadi,” “Tamil,” “Yerukala/Yerukula,” and “Others.” Hindi, in this same census, includes 49 subordinate ‘languages,’ as well as nearly 15 million individuals under the “others” category. Some of these languages represent those Das Gupta mentioned above, those groups who are “historically accustomed to reporting their linguistic identity by other names,” (2003: 26) such as Bhojpuri. Responses for ‘Hindi’ were, in fact, only 61% (257,919,635) out of the total responses included in the larger category of ‘Hindi’ for census purposes (422,048,642). This is still much larger than the next largest category, Bengali (83,369,769). See chapter two for further discussion of the politics of the census.

37 The other two are iconization and fractal recursivity. The process of iconization connects linguistic practices and socially meaningful (or highlighted) qualities of a group; this process makes it seem as if a “linguistic feature,” such as an accent or use of a particular vocabulary, “somehow depict[s] or display[s] a social groups’ inherent nature or essence” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). Fractal recursivity “involves the project of an opposition” from one “level of relationship, onto some other level” (2000: 38). This projection is not defined or fixed and the alterity and “mimesis they suggest cannot be more than partial” (2000: 38).
process, however, is clearly under debate and partial; the way languages are represented has changed in every census for at least the past 60 years.

While writing the constitution, concerns about linguistic difference (both in practice and in ideologies) between north India and south India became paramount. South Indian languages are unrelated to Hindi and other North Indian languages and while “[i]n the north, Muslims and their form of Hindi-Urdu were characterized as foreign; in the south, it was Brahmanic, Sanskritic culture [from the north] that was so defined” (Brass 2004: 356). This distinction led, in part, to the status of English as an official language being continued past Independence. Although the most vocal resistance to Hindi emerged from the South, there were also pockets of resistance elsewhere (see Das Gupta 1966: 50-52).

Magan P. Desai, for example, wrote impassioned arguments against English, including what to do with regard to English language education and the ways it disconnects those who learn the language from the ‘common man’ (see 1956: 1-22):

English India was only a microscopic minority in the great ocean of India’s illiterate crores. However, they harp on these old slogans, forgetting that the so-called unity through English was, like the Brahminical unity of a superior caste born through Sanskrit, only of English educated aristocracy lording over the millions of India in collusion with

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38 For a fascinating analysis of the way in which Sanskrit has been used, more recently, as a way to ‘rediscover’ a unifying Indian language, see Hastings 2003, 2008. His research, centered in the South Indian city of Banglaore, explores a collection of Sanskrit revival organizations with strong ties to Hindu nationalist groups. The leader of one organization, Ca. Mu. Krishna Shastry, argues that Sanskrit “once was the language of “all Indians” irrespective of caste, class, regional origin, or religion, and it should be so again” (Hastings 2008: 25). The way in which these groups represent the need for a united India, by “invoke[ing] a generalized, primordial ‘Hindu’ cultural heritage,” are similar to some of the Hindu nationalist organizations by “seizing upon a vision of a homogeneous Indian history” (Hastings 2003: 512). As we see from the past 100 years of language politics, Hindi was originally conceived of as the language that would unite a divided India. However, the backlash even today against the ‘imposition’ of Hindi on non-Hindi speaking groups means that the Hindi language is no longer able to act as a unifying force in the country. It is clear, from Hastings’ research, that some have turned to Sanskrit to fill this role.

39 See chapter four and five for further discussion of the politics of English use.

40 The resistance to political moves against the use of the English language continue: as will be clear in chapter four, which detail parliamentary debates in 1992, the tensions between North and South India have not dissipated entirely.
the order established by their English overlords. What good came to us through English was in spite of them and only as its by-product (Desai 1956: 16).\textsuperscript{41}

In the end, for a “variety of reasons, including the popular rejection of Hindi by the South, English became more deeply entrenched in the postcolonial government bureaucracy and also became the official language of higher education” (Sadana 2007: 314).\textsuperscript{42}

While these other issues, like defining Hindi, were important during the initial drawing of the constitution, they were less important during the drafting of the Eighth Schedule. The ‘Schedules’ of the constitution deal with designation of languages as having official government protection (see chapter three and four for further explanation). While these were the only elements and rights expressly protected by the Eighth Schedule, there were other goals. One was to highlight the original 14 major languages of India as of the drafting of the constitution.

However, “[i]n a country where members of five language families—Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burman, and Andamanese exist and number in the vicinity of 1650…how and why did the makers of the Constitution select 14 languages to begin with? What was the logic?” (Gupta and Abbi 1995:2).\textsuperscript{43}

While Krishnamurti believes that the original languages eventually chosen for inclusion in the Eighth Schedule were chosen because they were “major languages with literary traditions,

\textsuperscript{41} Desai’s writings also explored the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis (1956: 14-178), which will be further explored in chapter 3, as well as what the national language of India should have been and in what script (1956: 23-44).

\textsuperscript{42} Phillipson notes that “English functions as a Pan-Indian language, particularly among élite groups, despite the impressive spread of Hindi since Independence in many part of the country and in spite of the consolidation of the dominant language in each state” (Phillipson 1992: 29; see also Khubchandani 1983). The spread of, and opposition to, English is a common occurrence outside India as well (see Phillipson 1992). For a discussion of the ‘transition’ from English to Hindi in post-Independence India, see Das Gupta 1966 (especially chapter 6).

\textsuperscript{43} Such questions continue to plague discussions of languages to include in the schedule and were asked time and time again by members of many language movements, including the Nepali Language Movement. Gupta and Abbi explained their reasons for raising the question of how the languages were chosen: “[If it was] based on the demographic criterion of the number of speakers that each language had or the geographical spread of a language…[t]hen why is it that Sanskrit with about 2500 speakers finds a place in the [Eighth Schedule] while several tribal languages like Béli and Santhali with millions of speakers do not” (1995:2). It is clear that such decisions emerged from a field of language ideologies regarding status of both languages and speakers of those languages, history, and unity of the nation.
having scripts of their own, and already in use in newspapers and the radio…[and were] the
total and undisputed candidates for inclusion” (1995: 10, emphasis mine),44 others note the
process was less clear.45 Something reported to be ‘natural’ or ‘undisputed’ is often a reflection
of more unconscious language ideologies; in this case, the privileging of literary, written
languages that could be used to reach individuals through mass media instead of utilizing
localized, oral traditions is clear.46 What may not have been clear to the drafters of the
constituent was what their ideas about language would force future generations—including
groups of people who did not share their language ideologies—to do. In order to make a case that
their language deserved protection and recognition from the central government, speakers of oral
languages were forced to either create or ‘rediscover’ writing systems and demonstrate long,
glorious traditions of literature. In the case of the Nepali Language Movement, dictionaries were
written, translations of Hindu epics were provided and references to Nepal/Nepali were
highlighted in these same epics.

One reason for such a diverse case to be made was the lack of clear requirements for
inclusion in the Eighth Schedule. Some argued that status as a language recognized by the
Sahitya Akademi was important for Eighth Schedule inclusion, while others said it was not.47 No
requirement for population of speakers, number of books, or presence of literary tradition exists

44 Krishnamurti makes the same claim about Sindhi (1995: 15) and describes the inclusion of “Gorkhali or
Nepali”—they are labeled differently in various places in his article—as solely a “political concession given to the
Nepalis of the Himalayan West Bengal” (1995:15). It is important to be clear that there were other languages that
would have fit in the schedule if these were the official criteria of the schedule—including the Nepali language. He
also notes that K.M Munshi and Jawaharlal Nehru ‘insisted’ that Sanskrit and Urdu were added to the original lineup
45 Those languages considered “underdeveloped or non-literary…were simply ignored by the constitution-makers,
although certain provisions were made for their speakers” (Tambiah 1967: 217). The divide between ‘literary’ and
non-literary languages are not as clear-cut as represented—the literacy rate in India was 1951 was 16.1% (1967:
227). Therefore, while great bodies of literature existed the number of people who were unable to read them blurs
the line between literary and non-literary. This designation also ignores the oral traditions—some involving
incredibly long epics.
46 See chapters 3 and 4 for further discussion.
47 For a discussion of the social and political meanings of recognition by the Sahitya Akademi, see Sadana 2007:
314.
and, in part because the criteria for inclusion were unclear, the Eighth Schedule has been a site of contention for groups who wanted to gain constitutional status for their languages. Much of the focus of national language politics since Independence has been focused on how to ‘deal’ with minority language speakers. Some within the government moved to implement the provisions of Eighth Schedule protections through the reorganization of states on linguistic lines.\(^{48}\) As Tambiah notes, linguism—the movement to divide states along linguistic divisions—arose after Independence and created a paradoxical situation in which “precisely when the old order was being loosened [as] a consequence of new economic activities, increased communication and mobility of peoples was taking place, that language also became the badge of political and social affinity between persons who never before expressed their collective consciousness on such a scale or in such terms” (1967: 234).

However, the flexibility of this schedule and unclear directives regarding criteria for inclusion have created an interesting context for language rights and activism. On the one hand, the government may have actually created a situation that protects the integrity of the nation because there is no hard line policy toward official languages; as the situation of the nation changes, the government changes. Contrast this to the case of language politics and policy in Pakistan—the creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan was, in part, due to hardline government policies regarding language (see Musa 1996). On the other hand, as Gupta and Abbi argue;

\[\text{rather than ensuring any semblance of equality, the [Eighth Schedule] has succeeded only in creating new cleavages, new hierarchies and new conflicts...[it] has accorded differential status to Indian languages and this discriminatory dispensation, in turn, has been reflected in differential institutional and societal support for and attitudes towards different languages within the policy (1995:5).}\]

\(^{48}\) This is discussed in depth in chapter three. See also Kumar 1998 (especially chapter 5).
This national engagement with language—and the ‘discriminatory dispensation’ of rights—has meant that there are similarities among the various language movements that have taken place since the 1950s.\(^{49}\) The movement for the recognition of Sindhi—which was added to the Eighth Schedule in 1967 (see Daswani 1979, 1989)—was not unlike the Nepali Language Movement. While Nehru “assured the community that the non-inclusion [of their language] in the Eighth Schedule would not stand in the way of the development of the Sindhi language,” he simultaneously voiced his concerns that adding languages to the Eighth Schedule would “open the door to infinite controversy and conflict (Daswani 1979: 64). In a move almost identical to those that occurred during the Nepali language movement, an MP in the Rajya Sabha presented a private member’s bill for the inclusion of Sindhi in the Eighth Schedule but withdrew it when the government promised to introduce an official government bill to Parliament (1979: 65). The case of Sindhi speakers after recognition is similar to those of Indians of Nepali descent and Daswani’s observations are remarkably similar to those I made during my research in Darjeeling. He noted that third generation Indian Sindhis—the young people of his time—“realiz[ed]…that their language performs a limited role in intra-group communication, and it, in no way, contributes to their economic survival” (1797:68). Just like Indians of Nepali descent, “the recognition of Sindhi in India was motivated by the just apprehension of the community that they would suffer discrimination in the absence of such a recognition. The demand of the community was a demand for sustenance of the Sindhi culture and language, and, equally for the members of the community as Indians” (1979: 68).

While the Eighth Schedule has been used to unequally distribute rights to certain groups, it has also, Gupta and Abbi argue, created a “new hierarchical ordering of languages” in which

\(^{49}\) For discussion of Maithili, Rajasthani, and Pahari language movements, see Misra 1979; for Santhali movement, see Mahapatra 1979.
English “transcends and is above” the Eighth Schedule (1995: 6). They call English a “supra language, ranking higher than any Indian languages” (1995: 6). English continued, after 1965, to have co-official status, in large part due to the “rioting, arson, and suicides as a protest against the ‘imposition’ of Hindi” in South India (Tambiah 1967: 231). While most protests were in the south, there were other pockets of resistance to Hindi including the North East and West Bengal. Tambiah argues that protests for English were really just protests against Hindi—not only from linguistic chauvinism or a desire to preserve cultural autonomy, but also from economic considerations” including civil service positions” (Tambiah 1967: 231). Other scholars argue that the “development of English…caus[ed] the underdevelopment of Indian languages” (Annamalai 1994: 7). This means that all uses of English—whether within education, government, business, or the social world—are potential sites for intense, sensitive, and emotionally charged reactions.

It is within this landscape that I write about Indians of Nepali descent—when I discuss their language ideologies and practices regarding English, it is clear to me that their engagements with English run, in some ways, counter to the broader politics of English in India. When Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling told me that they believed English did not ‘belong’ to any caste, ethnic or religious group, they were responding to local ideologies about English. Their experiences with and understandings of English are, of course, part of the national conversation of language politics.

I also hope to contribute to the growing literature emerging from linguistic anthropology in India. There is a growing interest in language politics among linguistic anthropologists; my work will contribute to our understanding of ‘language’ (as a category of social and legal belonging), citizenship, and language ideologies. Adi Hastings’s work explores the reimagining of ‘Sanskrit’ as a unifying lingua franca that will bridge the intense complexity of religion, caste,
ethnicity, and languages in India (see 2003, 2008). Another linguistic anthropologist who explores language politics in India, Chaise LaDousa, has focused on education and understanding the ways state intervention in education is part of broader politics on language (2007). Schooling in India follows a “three-language formula” that directs that students be taught Hindi, English, and at least one other Indian language. LaDousa’s work explores the ways in which arguments over the language of education are couched within broader ideologies about these two languages in the political and economic context of India since economic liberalization and the “explosion” of the middle class in the 1980s (2006; see also 2002, 2004). LaDousa argues that,

People who belong to the middle class envision a world in which a choice between education in Hindi or English matters to a child’s future. “Medium” thus has become a convenient and compelling means of making evaluative judgments about others or oneself in Banaras and has come to represent a choice between two possible trajectories for the life of the child, the family, or the nation (2006: 37).

It is within this milieu of language politics—those pertaining to and emerging from the creation of constitutional mandates about language, arguments in north and south India about the meanings of English and Hindi, and educational practices—that I write about Darjeeling. It is clear from the broad scholarship on language politics that attention to law is crucial to understanding how languages are used and understood in India; in the following pages, I explore the lived experiences of, and attempts to engage with, law, legislature, and citizenship by Indians of Nepali descent.

1.5 Mixed Method Approach

All projects concerning language are complex and should, I believe, be pursued from a variety of perspectives, utilizing methods not dependent on one discipline alone if the project warrants it. For a project such as this, a mixed method approach was necessary and provided a fascinating—
and often contradictory—mix of findings. In the following sections, I discuss the methods I utilized and why the combination was so fruitful.

1.5.1 Ethnographic

For anthropologists, ethnographic methods most often form the center of our work; this study was no different. Much of my time was spent watching and asking questions about the quotidian practices and events I saw around me. Since my interest is focused on language and belonging, a particularly interesting setting was the area of Chowrasta and Mall Road. Here, tourists from West Bengal, the rest of India, and even foreign visitors wandered, buying tea and looking at the mountains. They spent the warm early monsoon days bargaining over goods or just walking up Mall Road and around Chowrasta. It was here I watched local Nepali residents interacting with Bengalis, Marwaris, Biharis, and other groups from the plains. I learned the complex negotiations of language choice, how behaviors were understood as ‘typical’ of certain groups, and how my presence as a foreigner (बिदेशी—bidešī) was used to change the terms of interaction. I also sat with college-age friends at a variety of restaurants and tea stalls. We watched the tourists and discussed every topic imaginable. We most often spoke in the local mix of Nepali and English, although English was just as common.50

50 The only exception to this occurred one afternoon at a local restaurant/bakery. My companions and I had been drinking lime sodas and laughing when a very wealthy Bengali couple sat at the next table. They appeared to be on their honeymoon—she was wearing a beautiful and ornate sari, dripping with jewelry, and henna on her hands and feet. As we continued to laugh and talk, they began shooting disapproving glances in our direction and whispering. Quickly, and for the first time with this group of young women, all English dropped out of the conversation. We finished our drinks while speaking Nepali only. I asked my friend, after we had left, what happened. She just shrugged. I suspect that it was more important for the young women in my company to make it clear to the couple that an English-speaking foreigner had taken the time to learn the Nepali language than to speak as they would when we were alone or around other Nepali speakers.
Figure 4: Photo of Chowrasta, Monsoon 2005

Figure 5: Chowrasta, 3 September 2007 (during Prashant Tamang’s visit)
Outside the tourist zone, I participated in a variety of public and private events. Compared to the villages in which I had lived and worked in Nepal, the urban landscape meant it was much more difficult to penetrate both private homes and social groups. While in the outskirts of Darjeeling, I was unable to get past a single house without being invited in for tea and conversation. In the urban areas, it was difficult for me to catch even good friends at home. Therefore, most of my interviews occurred in offices or tea shops.

The discussion of all elements of this dissertation is informed by interviews with and documents produced by members of the Nepali Language Committee. I will not be quoting most of them directly because they are still alive and to do so would put them at potential risk.

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51 The tourist season in 2007 was significantly less crowded than it was in 2005 when this photo was taken.
1.5.2 Archival/Historical

Although they now play an important role in the research, I discovered the bulk of the historical documents pertaining to the Language Committee almost by accident. One of the men from my community was a member of a local social service organization. When he and I first met early in my research, he informed me that in the storage space of their building was some “items about language.” I had been down this road a number of times with many other people, and it typically ended with a pile of moldy school books or dictionaries. I assumed this time was no different, and so I didn’t pursue these particular items since I was just beginning a large survey in Darjeeling.

Months later, I was interviewing the former president and founder of the Language Committee in his office. I asked him if he had any documents from the movement. He said he did not, but that all the documents from the movement had been boxed and placed in the storage space of that same local social service organization. He had for years meant to visit that room
and make copies of the documents, but his work kept him so busy that he had been unable to do so. He agreed to introduce me to the current head of the organization and ask him to make the documents available.

My research assistant and I headed down to the organization and secured permission to photograph the documents. We set up our cameras in the meeting room and for a month during the height of the monsoon photographed boxes upon boxes of documents. In all, we took nearly 20,000 digital images of documents such as Committee meeting minutes from all over India, publications, photographs, transcripts of meetings with politicians (including Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai), local announcements, and memoranda. The archive also included an almost complete collection of Hāmro Bhāsā, the publication of the Committee that circulated in the Darjeeling hills for 20 years. This publication disseminated the dealings of the Committee, articles pertaining to the language movement and Nepalis in India, editorials, and letters from readers. It served as a major node around which Nepali ‘language lovers’ gathered. I have not completed a full index of these documents and will do so in subsequent publications.

1.5.3 Linguistic Survey and Matched-Guise Test

The matched-guise technique offers scholars of language, particularly those who study language ideologies, a unique lens into those unconscious ideas that may not be apparent in interviews or participant observation (see chapter 2 for further discussion of language ideologies). The technique was originally devised by Lambert, et. al., and published in their 1960 study as a way to ascertain individual’s language attitudes, including what we would now call language ideologies. Using this method, I gathered over 800 data points from each of 625 respondents; in total, I have approximately 500,000 data points pertaining to language use and attitudes, family history, education, economic status, and a host of other topics. A detailed
description of the method and results from the linguistic survey and matched-guise test are fully detailed in chapter five.

1.5 Chapter Overview

This introduction and chapter two provide the ethnographic, historical, and theoretical foundations that influenced my research. Chapter two, “Key Theoretical Approaches and Concepts,” explores the varied bodies of literature I draw on to understand language and belonging among Indians of Nepali descent—language and power, language ideologies, theorizing social difference in South Asia, Critical Race Theory, and Racial Formation theory.

Chapter three, “Differing Visions of our Glorious Future,” explores the debates about nomenclature of the language spoken by Indians of Nepali descent. These disagreements appear, on the surface, to be purely about political maneuverings of the GNLF [Gorkha National Liberation Front] during the violent ethnonationalist Gorkhaland movement in the 1980s. However, these debates speak to much deeper divides about how history is defined, what it means to ‘be’ a Nepali and language ideologies surrounding the language itself and its use. I will also discuss the linguistic reorganization of states in India during the last half century in order to demonstrate precisely why language remains so politically contentious. This chapter also provides a foundation for chapter four, “Language Has Never Become a Bone of Contention.” This chapter focuses on the parliamentary debates in 1992 regarding the inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule in the *Lok Sabha* [Lower House of the Indian Parliament], especially on the disagreements between the Member of Parliament from Sikkim, Dil Kumari Bhandari, and the MP from Darjeeling, Inderjit Khuller. These debates were one site where local language ideologies in Darjeeling intersected with national level language politics of nation-building, language planning, security, and history.
Chapter five, “Language Attitudes,” returns to Darjeeling and the results of a linguistic survey and matched-guise test conducted in the fall of 2007 in an attempt to find another way of understanding the current linguistic landscape. This landscape was deeply affected by the decisions on the Lok Sabha as well as the deeper history of language and belonging in Darjeeling.

In the final chapter, I discuss the importance of exploring language politics in India from both macro-level policies as well as the lived experiences of those who are affected by such policies. It is through these different perspectives—historical, ethnographic, and linguistic—that a fuller picture of the intersection of belonging and language becomes clear. Using any one of these perspectives would provide an interesting, albeit partial, understanding. Using all allows us to begin to capture the complexity that is part of the everyday experiences of Indians of Nepali descent.
Chapter 2   Key Theoretical Approaches and Concepts

“We thus came to the conclusion that our project would fail if we addressed it to a narrow range of specialists, because we would then, in spite of any protestations to the contrary, be reproducing the same atomistic … practices that are bounded by epistemologies and disciplines” (Bauman and Briggs 2003: xiii).

In order to understand the ways in which ethnographic, political, and linguistic theoretical approaches connect and inform this project, it is vital to ground any reading of the following evidence within a wide range of theories and key terms. I draw primarily on three kinds of literature—social difference in South Asia and beyond, language and power (and language ideologies), and linguistic theories and methods—because it is important not just to bridge macro-level social processes with micro-level linguistic practices by directly applying one level of theory to another; rather we must actively engage with the ways in which large scale processes and discourses are enacted and understood through language and social experiences.

2.1 Theorizing Social Difference

Anthropological research on social difference in South Asia was, until recently, dominated by the study of caste. While I focus on finding new ways to engage social difference that attend to inequalities in power and economic status, history, and legal institutions and frameworks in India, it is first important to understand the scholarship on caste to make clear why I have chosen to break away from this approach.

2.1.1 Early caste research in India

Caste was initially used by early anthropologists as a way to understand how local kinship systems connected to and ordered the broader social world in South Asia. It was presented as the primary organizing principle of a structural, ritual, and religious-based civil society in India. Most anthropological works on caste during the late 19th and early to mid-20th
century positioned it as the central reference point in everyday life in India although a reference point explicitly separated from governance and politics and positioned firmly in the realm of civil society and kinship studies (see Davis 1941). While my study does not explore caste directly, an understanding of how broader social difference is understood is crucial.

While caste was the primary focus of social research during this period, what is meant by the English word “caste” is slippery. In South Asian languages, there are more distinctions within what the word “caste” has been used to indicate: varna, which has been variously glossed as caste or color; jātī, translated as subcaste by Jayal (see 2006) but elsewhere as tribe, caste, ethnic group, descent group (see Berreman 1971) or nation (see Guneratne 2002). Jayas argues that some anthropologists have shown that “jātī affiliation is the concrete one experienced in everyday practice, [while] the varna affiliation is more symbolic” (2006:27). Both jātī and varna are connected in their use in both personal and local connections and, more broadly, in political organizing. Within the Indian constitution, those outside the four varnas of the caste system are given special status as “Scheduled Caste,” although official documents assume a direct connection between caste and Hinduism and strip Scheduled status and benefits from anyone converting from Hinduism to another religion. On the symbolic level of varna, there are traditionally four castes—usually reckoned as Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors and political leaders), Vaishyas (traders and farmers) and Shudras (servants)—plus those Dalits (‘untouchables’) who are outside the caste system entirely. However, when one begins to include the number of subcastes—Jayal puts the number at two to three thousand (2006:27)—and then

52 Caste was the system which hierarchically ranked groups of people and preserved the ranking of the highest group (Brahmins) through religious ideology and practice. For Kingsley Davis, India presented an interesting case study for kinship because explicit and implicit understandings of marriage created a system of contradictions that should have undermined the integrity of the system but did not. In the community in which Davis worked, marriage was considered the mechanism through which castes were separated. Individuals were not permitted to marry outside their own caste or subcaste in official community narratives. Yet he found regular transgressions that were not only accepted but were, in some cases, preferred (1941).
considers the actual social and economic sites in which these groups function, it becomes
difficult to make generalizations. There are also instances of economic superiority of lower caste
groups which raise their status. To complicate the situation even further, although Buddhism,
Christianity, Islam, and Sikkhism are officially “egalitarian” religions, there is evidence of caste-
like systems within them as well.53

By the late 1950s, the vast amount of data emerging from kinship-based caste studies led
to attempts to find the organizing principle of caste as a sort of pan-Indian theory of social
difference. McKim Marriott argued that these many theories of caste fell into two general
patterns—attributational and interactional.54 In attributational theories, the status of one’s caste was
explicitly linked to perceptions of behavior; a group exhibits characteristics which were valued
as “high and pure” or “low and polluted” then slotted into the appropriately ranked category
(Marriott 1959: 92).55 Interactional theories, on the other hand, focused on the system of
interactions between groups by emphasizing not static states of purity and impurity (as in the
attributational theory) but rather the process of purification (Marriott 1959:96-7). In other words, a
caste ranked highest attains its rank based on the quality and type of interactions between groups
rather than the inherent qualities of the groups (see Bailey 1957, Marriott 1952, and Mayer

53 Among Muslims in India, see Gaborieau 1993 [2003]; within the Christian community in India, see Frykenberg
54 Célestin Bouglé believed the ideology of caste had three underlying laws: 1) separation of groups maintained
through marriage and food prohibitions, 2) hierarchy of such groups, and 3) the explicit connection of each caste to
an occupation (Bouglé 1971 as quoted in Raheja 1988:500). Bouglé’s perspective maintained the separation of caste
from politics and was based primarily on data emerging from earlier kinship studies.
55 See also Davis 1949, Srinivas 1955, and Stevenson 1954. Such a theory allows for caste mobility upward and
downward since changing one’s behavior should change one’s status. Yet research demonstrated that such attempts
were rarely, if ever, successful (see Srinivas 1955). In some instances, high-ranking castes actually behaved in
‘polluting’ ways—e.g. eating meat—that should have damaged their purity and, therefore, their ranking. It did not,
however, do so in practice (Marriott 1959:94). This theory also did not consider which criteria are more heavily
emphasized when ranking behaviors—e.g. occupation, diet—nor did it explain how similarly behaving castes could
be ranked differently as they often were on the ground (1959:95-6). Marriott argued that such was the problem with
utilizing a top-down theoretical approach (not dissimilar to the one Dumont would crystallized seven years later).
While both Marriott and Bouglé attempted a pan-Indian theory of social difference, neither perspective was widely accepted by scholars of South Asia. It was only with the publication of Louis Dumont’s 1966 *Homo Hierarchicus* that such a macro-level theory became widely accepted. This text was revolutionary within social theory because it revitalized discussions of caste at a time when, “American cultural particularism, British structural-functionalism, and French Structuralism had come to a rather dull standoff” regarding research on caste (Appadurai 1988:41-2). Scholarship on caste before Dumont had also marked caste as a fundamentally hierarchical religious institution and had even tried to classify the system in terms of broader but still local “relational properties [of] separation, hierarchy, and interdependence” (Appadurai 1988:42). Dumont’s work broke from these previous understandings of caste (as locally-based emic understandings of caste) to a top-down approach that separated the abstract theory of hierarchy from the concrete practice of caste.59

Even while Dumont’s approach was being hailed as revolutionary and reinvigorating to

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56 There were no claims of universality in the interactional theory of caste and Marriott believed that the caste system in South India might have been more attributional while those in North India, where his own research was conducted, was more interactional. The differences between the theories might have also emerged as a result of emphasis: scholars who used an attributional approach more often focused on the extremes in the system such as Brahmins and Dalits (untouchables). For example, Michael Moffatt analyzed Dalit religious beliefs and practices to demonstrate that their understanding of the caste system was not disconnected from the broader ideologies and practices of a more universal caste system even though they gained no benefits from it, as was suggested by Berreman (1971) and Mencher (1974) (see Moffatt 1979). Such attributional approaches did use the more religious Hinduism-based varna system rather than theories of difference emerging from local context. This might have been, according to Marriott, related to the urban educated elites’ (Indians or colonial officials, he does not clarify) need to generalize and simplify the complexity in interactions of village life. This is another theme that emerges nearly twenty-five years later in the post-colonial critiques of theories of caste.

57 While Dumont found Marriott’s and Bouglé’s work interesting, he believed that Marriott reduced the “hierarchical principle to the conditions presumed necessary for its manifestation” (1980 [1966]:91) and that the three laws proposed by Bouglé were actually part of a broader theory of purity and not an overarching theory by itself (Raheja 1988:500).

58 See also Appadurai 1986a, Dirks 1987, and Marriott 1969.

59 His approach also explicitly disconnected secular governments from the ordered religious system which doomed these governments to “perpetual disorder” (Marriott 1969:1166). Through the lens of postcolonial critique, we can see this separation as one way in which the colonial government demarcated the religious/kinship based organization of Indian life from their own jurisdiction of the political government. This was used as justification for colonial rule since the Indian people were so ‘lacking’ in political order. See also Béteille 2006.
the study of the caste system and social difference in South Asia, critiques quickly emerged.

Scholars within anthropology pointed to Dumont’s reliance on classical philosophy (both Sanskritic and Western) and literature rather than historical or empirical research (Marriott 1969:1167). It should also be noted that over fifty years before Dumont’s research scholars had recognized that, in some areas, different castes or groups were lumped together in varnas drawn from the Sanskrit tradition that varied from the ways similar groups were included elsewhere.60

Others criticized Dumont on both methodological and theoretical grounds.61 Dumont was also admonished for first demonstrating that castes and jātīs could be separated, then immediately turning to describe “Hindu society [as] something with an essential nature. Dynamic processes were said to animate the whole, but they were self-generating and continuous over time,” and somehow removed from the influences of time, political upheaval, colonialism, and history (Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma 1994:4).62

Anthropologists during the time Dumont’s theory held sway struggled to bridge the divide between these theoretical visions of the caste system and what they found in their own ethnographic research.63 Some argued that Dumont was misguided in his top-down approach and believed the Sanskritic varna system was only tangentially connected to the actual experiences of caste (Mandelbaum 1970 as quoted in Leach 1971:14). Others believed that any macro-level engagement with the caste system over-emphasized a totalizing system that left no room for agency, individuality, or social change and failed to recognize caste as “institutionalized

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60 See Crooke 1914.
61 See Khare 1971, 2006a, 2006b; Madan 2006a [1994], 2006b[2001].
62 Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma specifically criticized Dumont for only allowing two ideological underpinnings of social life: hierarchical and individualistic, “the traditional and the modern” (1994:4). They also questioned the motivations of advocates of this vision of the social world in India (meaning Brahmins) and those who are indoctrinated into such a system. Although “Brahmans [sic] will routinely claim superior ritual purity and some non-Brahmans [sic] will be convinced by their claims…others regard them [Brahmins] as polluted by the need to accept the sin offerings of those who hire their ritual services” (1994:7).
63 See Chatterjee 2006 [1993].
inequality...guarantee[ing] different access to the valued things of life” (Berreman 1971:21).\textsuperscript{64}

The Dumontian perspective on caste also ignored tribes and other groups who, although not part of Hindu caste system, were part of the social structure.\textsuperscript{65} These groups, from Dumont’s perspective, were dismissed as having little contact or minimal influence on the Hindu caste system.\textsuperscript{66} However totalizing his vision of the caste system, Dumont is still widely credited with helping shift the focus of research away from only family and kinship studies to a broader social context.\textsuperscript{67} While some of these critiques were later rediscovered and applied by Subaltern Studies scholars, it must be noted that Dumont’s work did represent a shift in both methodology and theory. Rather than presenting a fragmented vision of India, he attempted to find the overarching principles that connected with practice of this particular kind of difference.

Anthropologists used their own ethnographic sites to demonstrate the ways in which the social, lived reality of difference was much more complicated than an overarching theory of difference could grasp. For example, Gerald Berreman’s research focused on the experiences and strategies of those living in a heterogeneous urban area in Northern India. Berreman focused his research on four questions: 1) which social categories/identities did people identify as being locally salient, 2) what behaviors or characteristics were linked to different social categories/identities, 3) how are people marked or read as belonging to one of these categories/identities, and 4) how are the answers to the first three questions linked to interactions between individuals of different categories/identities. While Berreman found groups broadly defined in terms of religion, “regional-linguistic-national-racial groups,” caste, or “social class, lifestyle,

\textsuperscript{64} See also Singer and Cohn 1968. Berreman also believed that Dumont’s perspective on caste was a very Brahminic perspective that took the view from the top as the view of all. Others questioned the understanding of Brahmin as priest, particularly in light of the importance Dumont placed on the religious authority-secular power dichotomy (see Heesterman 1971).

\textsuperscript{65} These groups, from Dumont’s perspective, were dismissed as having little contact and minimal influence on the Hindu caste system (see Von Fürer-Haimendorf 1971).

\textsuperscript{66} See Von Fürer-Haimendorf 1971

\textsuperscript{67} See Uberoi 2006 [1993].
occupation” (1972:569), he concluded that these categories held so many internal distinctions that any analysis must include specific and contextual details. Such categories may have shared certain elements with groups and contexts elsewhere, but the actual usage and impact on social relations would, Berreman believed, vary considerably. He also found that “[m]ost of the indicators are assumed to be intrinsic to groups or categories; in fact they are often manipulated” depending on what a particular situation required and how changing such ‘indicators’ would either positively or negatively affect interactions (1972:570, emphasis in original).

Interest in the caste system drove research outside India as well. In Nepal, András Höfer’s work demonstrated the connections between the government’s desire to bring all groups within Nepal under the principle of caste and perceived threats from incursions into Nepal’s territory by the British Raj in India. As part of efforts to organize a collective ‘Nepali’ identity that would somehow counteract the British Raj, the Nepali government drafted the Muluki Ain, a legal document that collapsed all kinds of social difference into one organized caste system. This organization was no easy task—writers of the document were working to incorporate three “historically and regionally autonomous caste hierarchies” within the various ethnic groups into five overarching castes (2004 [1979]:8). While scholars of caste like Dumont erased the

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68 For example, within the category “Hindu,” distinctions were made between “sects by primary deity or mode of worship” and “sects by philosophical and textual tradition,” then again by caste and/or jātī (Berreman 1972:569). This perspective is not surprising from an anthropological perspective.

69 Höfer notes that the separation between caste and ethnic group in Nepal occurred only after “Western research and administration” (2004 [1979]:110). Before this time, social difference was conceived of in local and ephemeral terms.

70 The three hierarchies to which Höfer refers were the Newar (a group living predominately in urban areas in the Kathmandu Valley), the Parbatiya (hill people), and those living in southern Nepal (2004 [1979]:8), although the position of many of these groups were never “precisely determined” (2004 [1979]:9). It is important to note that all groups were nonetheless placed within the system rather than outside it, no matter how indeterminate their position was. While some scholars have defined ‘ethnic group’ within Nepal as analogous to the Indian ‘tribal’ category, Höfer emphasizes that within the Muluki Ain, jātī was used for three different phenomenon—caste and ethnic groups (2004 [1979]:10), status groups within ‘castes,’ and as a legal status under the law (86).

71 These five “overarching castes” were, from highest to lowest, “Wearers of the holy cord” (which subsumed Brahmin and so-called ‘warrior’ castes), non-enslavable alcohol drinkers, impure but ‘touchable’ castes (these included many of the Newar groups and Europeans), and untouchable castes (Höfer 2004 [1979]: 9).
gendered aspects of caste, Höfer notes that, within the Nepali caste system, a woman’s purity and
ritual status were “much more vulnerable” than that of a man (55).  

2.1.2 Postcolonial and subaltern perspectives on caste

Research on caste and social difference was radically re-oriented during the late 1970s and early 1980s with the rise of postcolonial theory and Subaltern Studies. Both schools of thought explicitly tied early anthropology in India to colonial projects of cataloguing and understanding its new subjects. During this period, caste was refigured as a product of colonial rule/organization and only one way of understanding the complex social fields found within India. Instead of being studied on its own, caste was recontextualized within India’s colonial history, with particular focus to the intersection of colonial and indigenous forms of knowledge. These works pushed theorizing social difference in South Asia beyond just caste or, rather, beyond only one perspective on caste by reading against the grain of colonial records and early ethnographies to ‘reclaim’ alternative perspectives and voices. Most important, they shifted discussions of social difference more broadly toward a historically situated study that attended to power, inequality, and gender.

2.1.3 Colonial institutions and the caste system

For those within and influenced by the theorizing of Subaltern Studies and postcolonial

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72 Various theories exist to explain this difference—women take in semen (which is polluting) and therefore are affected more by sexual relations (Stevenson 1954 as quoted in Höfer 2004 [1979]:55), or that close contact with a women (as a site of impurities such as birth and menstruation and an “object of lust”) threatened the purity of an idealized “Brahminic…asceticism” which mandated separation from earthly pleasures (Bennett 1976 as quoted in Höfer 2004 [1979]:55).  
73 See Sarana and Sinha 1976.  
74 See Mathur 2000, Bose 2006.  
75 Scholars have also applied the idea of ‘caste’ outside the South Asian context as well. Berreman (1960) compares racial politics in the US with those of castes in India. The concept has also been used in debates about West African groups as well (see Conrad and Frank 1995, Richter 1980, Todd 1997, and Vaughan 1970), although some argue this application is highly problematic (Dilley 2000).
theory, the caste system as Dumont and others in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century described it was substantially modified or even ‘invented’ during the colonial period. C.J. Fuller believed caste was a pre-colonial system of controlling land and agricultural products. This system was, he argues, so influenced by British understanding of Sanskrit tradition that by Independence it resembled the varna system more than before colonization (Fuller 1977). For Nicholas Dirks, colonization introduced new ways of theorizing the relationships among government, politics, and civil society in India while also freezing or traditionalizing local customs (1989).76 For those within Subaltern Studies and postcolonial theory, fruitful questions to ask included—How did the relationships among government, politics, and civil society connect with the lived experience of governance? Through which institutions were such identities and subjectivities created, recreated, and understood? To answer these questions, some scholars focused on the roles and outcomes of the colonial census while others highlighted the use of the census to raise awareness of group solidarity and identity which “ignite[d] communitarian and nationalist identity that…undermin[ed] colonial rule” (Appadurai 1993:317).

Bernard Cohn argues that during colonization, the census contributed to a western-influenced objectification of culture (1984).77 This process occurred by highlighting aspects of social life and law important to colonial officials—e.g. boundaries of villages, the definition of ‘community’ as possessing a minimum number of individuals, boundaries and descriptions of the

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76 One way in which local beliefs were set down and traditionalized emerges from the kind of evidence of the caste system on which colonial officials relied for their descriptions. Gloria Raheja argues that the oral evidence gathered by colonial officials about the caste system were actually proverbs presented as socially authorized speech by local residents. When these proverbs were removed from their context as fluid oral speech, they were frozen in time as ‘traditional’ (1996). In short, colonial discourse and practices ‘invented’ caste, although the shift into the postcolonial era did little to diminish the significance of caste in research and social life for many within India. Nicholas Dirks demonstrated that such discourses and practices created caste and, more broadly, social difference in contradictory ways through institutions and through politicizing certain identities that helped shape colonial subjectivities (see also Raheja 1996; Stoler 1989, 2000a, 2000b).

77 In India, see Dirks 2001, especially pages 198-227; in Nepal, see Guneratne 1998. Nicholas Dirks argued that the census conducted by the colonial administration was used to separate ‘politics’ from ‘the people,’ thereby justifying their ownership of politics and the modern. This was achieved by labeling caste as part of religion rather than politics (see Dirks 2001:61).
caste system—rather than those aspects of life important to local residents. For Cohn, such totalizing projects were not dissimilar from, and contributed to, the increasing importance in finding more global ways to classify social organization and difference in India (such as Dumont’s theory of caste). 78

Using archival records and anthropological, sociological, and colonial texts from the earliest Portuguese records of their first contact in the 16th century to laws and writings after Independence, Nicholas Dirks traced what he believed was the making of caste with the British colonial project. 79 He did not, however, believe the British ‘invented’ the caste system, as some scholars claim. Rather, the diverse and varying forms of social order that existed at the time of colonization were incompatible with the British need to order their territory and, so, the many forms of social organization were collapsed under the umbrella term caste. 80

2.1.4 Alternative perspectives of social difference

While castes (associated with religion) were placed under the jurisdiction of civil society rather than politics during colonialism, scholars in Subaltern Studies have rightly noted that caste is no longer a “substitute for civil society” but instead is now a “specifically postcolonial version of political society” (Chatterjee 2000 as cited in Dirks 2001:16). Following this line of reasoning, they believe that Dumont and those who followed him unwisely separated power and the use and propagation of that power from studies of hierarchy since they are, in reality, intimately

78 However, the connections between the census and social change and structure were not unidirectional nor self-evident. The census, Cohn argues, affected individuals' perceptions by asking people “who they were and what their social and cultural system was,” although its effects may have been more likely to affect census takers and officials who enacted policy based on this version of reality than those participating in the census (1984:43; see also Appadurai 1993, Barrier 1981).

79 In earlier writings about caste, such as those by Dumont, the phenomenon was marked by its explicit connections with religious traditions and as antithetical to western individualism. As Dirks notes, Dumont utterly dismissed the possibility that hierarchy might actually be the ‘natural’ state of order for human groups or that it may, in fact, be “foundational for most societies” (2001:4). While scholars and politicians have argued and variously represented caste—as religious, social, economic, tyrannical, community-based, anti-community—the one constant has been the belief that to understand India, one must engage with caste.

80 Dirks also connects this systemization of social difference to the organization of various religious forms under the umbrella term ‘Hinduism’ (2001: 7).
intertwined (Dirks 2001; see also 1987).\footnote{For a rather different approach, see Marriott 1976.} Scholarship on caste before the insights of postcolonial theory and Subaltern Studies often erased the role of the state and shut down a discursive space within the discipline to question the hegemony of a solitary caste system or even “to insist on cultural variability and difference within India” (Dirks 1989:44).\footnote{Dirks explored caste’s political aspects as a corrective to the overemphasis of religion and to “underscore the social fact that caste structure, ritual form, and political processes [are] all dependent on relations of power” (1989:45). The emphasis on caste as hierarchical religious institution rested on two kinds of authority. First, the privileging of written traditions of Sanskrit emerging from Brahminical traditions were not always the most widely known or accepted version of ‘tradition.’ When colonial officials discovered that many “natives” were unaware of the written laws/traditions, they set up colleges to educate them (see Raheja 1988:498). The second was the simultaneous “misinterpret[ation] and devalue[ation] [of] indigenous ideas of sovereignty and authority” (Rajeja 1988:498). While Hindu and Mughal rulers derived much of their authority from gift exchange, including land, between ‘king’ and subordinate political figures, the British interpreted this exchange as merely bribery—transforming a “complex indigenous transactional logic, informed by ritually elaborate notions of sovereignty…[into] a purely instrumental logic” (1988:499). This was possible through the way colonial officials gathered data regarding castes. Knowledge gained from data collection provided these officials with a model for behavior and expectations—if someone is Brahmin, then one should/could expect certain behaviors in general and in relation to individuals of other castes. Yet these same officials were so focused distinguishing between groups and rarely, if ever, on the interactions between castes that the conclusions based on such partial data could be nothing but partial themselves.} Valentine Daniel was an early critic of the overemphasis on caste within studies of social difference in South Asia. He believed not that caste as a theoretical construct should be set aside but, rather, that it was only one of many ways to organize oneself or group in relation to others.\footnote{See Daniel 1985. Daniel chooses another way to view social life—through what he termed “ethnochemical substances” and their “ability to mix and separate, to transform and be transformed, to establish intersubstantial relationships of compatibility and incompatibility, to be in states of equilibrium and disequilibrium, and to possess variable degrees of fluidity and combinability” as a way to understand the complex and contradictory ways daily life was experienced by those with whom he worked in Southern India (Daniel 1984:3).} Others, such as Partha Chatterjee, questioned the ability of a unitary theory of social difference, such as caste, to adequately explain the complexity of Indian society (2006 [1993]:169).\footnote{Chatterjee noted that, within a theory like Dumont’s, there were a number of inherent contradictions. The caste system was premised and dependent on the separation between the castes in spite of their dependence on one another. High castes relied on lower castes to perform duties that would ritually pollute them. Although Dumont united these contradictions through *dharma* as the religious and social order stemming from various religious traditions, Chatterjee criticized this as “inadequate and one-sided” because the very process of uniting the contradictions erased the complexity of the system (Chatterjee 2006 [1993]:171).} Arjun Appadurai marked Dumont’s work as the last major piece of scholarship that placed the analysis of caste at its center (1986a: 745) and part of the “creation” of India in western imagery that
utilized sociological and anthropological theorizing to situate practices in India as the “extreme of the human capability to fetishized inequality” in opposition to western epistemologies (1986a:745).\(^{85}\) For these scholars, caste was a term applied to social difference in South Asia by those outside the continent with little regard for a holistic understanding of the worldview, philosophy, and cultural ideologies of those within India.\(^{86}\) The use of the theory of caste was viewed as yet another way that Eurocentric forms of theorizing misinterpreted social systems and was, for Gupta, epitomized by the separation between state and civil society so common in theories of India.\(^{87}\) Within such conversations about theorizing social difference in South Asia was a growing dissatisfaction with ‘caste’ as the theoretical construct determining research of India. Hierarchy and, by extension, caste had become explicitly associated with India—a “simple theoretical handle” that became “metonym and surrogate for…the society as a whole” (Appadurai 1986b: 357).\(^{88}\) This approach had become hegemonic and limited research and theorizing of social difference in South Asia—anthropologists and other scholars had become so entrenched in the Dumontian perspective of India that they continued to engage with his perspective even if in disagreement. In the end, scholarship on South Asia was seen as being in

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\(^{85}\) Appadurai highlighted three texts—E. Valentine Daniel’s *Fluid Signs* (1984), R.S. Khare’s *The Untouchable as Himself* (1985), and Ashis Nandy’s *The Intimate Enemy* (1984)—as indicative of the move away from Western-oriented (and originating) theories to understand India. Each introduced complexity, agency, and a focus on lived experiences and challenged the notion that caste and hierarchy were necessarily central to theorizing the experience of those living in South Asia. See also Asad 1973, Carrier 1992, Said 1979, Sax 1998, Thomas 1991.

\(^{86}\) McKim Marriott pointed to a lack of recognition within “the west” of forms of theorizing emerging from elsewhere and closed his paper with this final comment—“If Indian sciences are developed, however, one may at least be able to choose whether to practice with alien and often inappropriate concepts or with indigenous, appropriate ones” (1990:34). Other ways of viewing the world than those categories and theories that emerged from outside India—such as Marx’s base-superstructure, Weber’s class and status groups, or even ‘individual,’ ‘class,’ ‘authority,’ or ‘religion’—have had their validity questioned. Marriott takes even hierarchy as alien to an Indian ethnoscience because “it’s naively one-dimensional participation in the three-dimensional Hindu semantic space” (1990:30)—and in this, demonstrates what he believes was the Orientalist position of Dumont’s widely accepted view of India.

\(^{87}\) See Gupta 1995.

\(^{88}\) Appadurai’s other examples were Chinese filial piety, shame/honor cultures in the Mediterranean, and *compadrazgo* in Latin America. See also Appadurai 1988, Das 2006 [1995]; Raheja 1988.
real danger of marginalization as “the land of caste” (Dirks 1989: 44).\textsuperscript{89}

The solution to the overemphasis on caste was simply to broaden the focus; in the past 20 years, scholars have emphasized the processes through which experiences of difference crosscut gender, race, ethnicity, class, religion, as well as regional and linguistic differences and caste.\textsuperscript{90} This more recent turn shifted from caste to the complex ways in which difference, hierarchy, and equality are experienced and understood. In many ways, this shift is part of a larger paradigmatic turn toward a focus on identity and cultural politics.\textsuperscript{91} Identity politics within India must be situated within discourses on human rights and the effects of globalization and liberalization on identity and social difference\textsuperscript{92} as well as the role of modernity, nation-building projects, violence and ethnic conflict, and issues of anthropological representation.\textsuperscript{93} It has also become legally and politically contentious to define groups—such as dalits and so-called tribal groups—by their social and economic exclusion or by their “ritual and social exclusion” in India (Dirks 2001: 217).\textsuperscript{94}

Vincanne Adams demonstrates that ethnicity is not a stable referent, divorced from social and political concerns, and may be used by those who have been ethnicized in particular ways (1996). In Nepal, for example, western ideas about Sherpa ethnicity introduced during India’s

\textsuperscript{89} However, scholars were applying caste as a theory of difference elsewhere. Berreman (1960) and Béteille (1990b) compared caste in India and race in the United States as two forms of inequality that have very similar gendered effects, including sexual violence between high-ranking men and low-ranking women and the shared notions of women as the carriers of purity.

\textsuperscript{90} See also Chandra 2000; Fuller 1996; Hancock 1995; Khare 2006a, 2006b [1998]; Mohanty and Tandon 2006. Béteille’s reasons were differed from these concerns. A focus on the family would be theoretically fruitful because, he argued, the normative value of caste was debatable while the family remains as both social fact and social institution (1992: 14). In this way, he returned to a focus that Dumont and others were trying to escape with their focus on caste. Béteille’s turn is problematic in the uncritical way in which he posits ‘the family’ as some sort of homogenous, hegemonic entity.


\textsuperscript{92} See Mahapatra 2006.

\textsuperscript{93} See Mathur 2000.

\textsuperscript{94} Nicholas Dirks notes that caste remains important in India, particularly its use as a political basis for social change and caste identity based on ‘nationalist’ movements. U.S. concerns for affirmative action are echoed here: groups and individuals may get financial and political benefits by claiming a particular identity but, in turn, may be “incriminate[d]…socially” (2001:219) and that such emphasis on caste draws attention away from class distinctions in spite of the intimate intertwining of social difference and class (see Dirks 2001:237).
colonization played a role in ‘creating’ a Sherpa identity as porters, loyal friends, strong, ethical, noble, etc. Sherpas did not simply accept this identity but rather used it to further their own objectives. Adams’s concerns are not about the authenticity or inauthenticity of their identity but, rather, about different ways of viewing the connections between ethnicity, identity, and history. Niraja Gopal Jayal argues that in India, and South Asia more broadly, groups resist attempts to categorize them within a “single ethnic structure,” when linguistic, religious, caste and tribal differences are considered (Jayal 2006: xv) because these differences are “largely crosscutting rather than reinforcing”; the multiple, simultaneously held ‘memberships’ each person or group in a particular location holds defy the kinds of classifications found in other areas and bodies of theory. For example, not all members of a religion speak the same language or are even members of the same caste, tribe, sect, gender, class, state, or ethnicity. This multitude of difference makes organizing around lines other than caste or religion difficult, since in the past these have been the markers of difference that made a difference—the Indian constitution and legal system demarcated “forward castes on the one hand and backward and scheduled castes on the other” (Jayal 2006: xv). Religion has also been politicized since before Independence, and Hindu ‘nationalist’ movements in recent years have pushed the Indian government to declare India a Hindu, rather than multicultural/secular, state.

2.1.5 Tribal Status in India

Adams departs from Homi Bhaba’s criticisms of the ‘mimicry’ of colonialism and chose instead to use mimesis—not “copying” but “ontological becoming via the representation” (1996:n21). As Adams says, “Mockery [in Homi Bhaba’s sense] ridicules the colonizer and hopes to eliminate him or her, but seduction enfolds the Westerner and the Sherpas he or she meets—a desire not to eliminate those who construct these discourses, but rather to keep them around” (1996: 21). Such representations do entail some violence; however, these do not necessarily need to be repressive, or even if they are, need not only be repressive. In other instances, individuals from different Nepali ethnic groups have represented themselves as ‘Gurkhas’ to gain access to employment in the British and Indian armies.

Jayal does exclude gender from the analysis, partly because this project emerges from a series exploring public institutions, those “national legislatures, cabinets and the bureaucracy” (2006:1), in multi-ethnic societies that emphasized categories governments use to convey certain rights. In this case, the rights were religion, caste, and language rather than those on the basis of gender.
For this dissertation, the legal and social classification ‘tribe’ is more applicable than those of caste. Tribe, in India, is both a social and legal classification. Niraja Gopal Jayal notes that this particular designation emerged as distinct from caste only in the colonial period. So-called ‘tribal’ peoples were marked as isolated, indigenous, often forest-dwelling and, in terms of 19th century social evolutionist theorizing, in the primitive stage of development (Jayal 2006: 37). These earlier ideas about tribes have filtered through time and space and are still commonly held ideas about groups that are now legally classified as tribes.97 Today, they are often represented as living in isolation, and practicing their own religion, and using their own language, although such representations have been challenged by scholars.98

Ninety percent of people classified as ‘tribal’ live in nine states in north-eastern, eastern, and central India (Jayal 2006: 39), including Darjeeling.99 Protections mandated by law for Scheduled Tribes include development measures which are supposed to provide a number of protections: money for economic development, education, and healthcare, anti-discrimination rules providing quota systems for seats in national, state, and local governments, admission at state universities and colleges as well as employment in government jobs “in accordance with their [the tribal groups’] proportion in the population” (Jayal 2006: 69).100 Tribes are also given some level of political autonomy in local politics and a “grievance-redressal” option for addressing issues with state and/or national government (Jayal 2006: 70). Although protected like Scheduled Castes, there is nothing like the connection between Scheduled Caste and

97 Some Indians of Nepali descent, including Sherpas and Tamangs, are classified as tribes although the majority (as of 2010) are not. This has to do, in part, with these groups’ ability to meet the Indian government’s definition of ‘tribal.’
99 Some tribal groups in these areas have even been explicitly criminalized by law (see Bates 1995:10; Pandian 2009).
100 While these special benefits are meant to improve the lot of tribal peoples in India, members of Schedule Tribes earn, on average, only 76% of the national average and have a literacy rate of 39.3% while the national average is 53.5% (see Jayal 2006: 40-41).
Hinduism—if a Scheduled Tribe member converts from Hinduism, they do not lose their benefits because this status is “based on ethnicity rather than religion” (Jayal 2006: 30).

Studies of difference in India have thus moved from an emphasis on caste to the broader social framework in which such difference is produced—gender, class, race, ethnicity, and tribal status. In the following sections, I explore those theories which have been critical in complementing South Asian scholarship on these many forms of social difference.

2.1.6 The Census

Scholars of South Asia, and beyond, have turned to the census to interrogate the ways in which racial, ethnic, and linguistic categories have been interpreted, created, and negotiated by individuals and governments. The census, which measures a “particular kind of politicized social construction reality,” emerged during the development of states in which “statistically depict[ing] collective identities” is a visible way in which these states categorize and understand its subjects” (Kertzer and Arel 2002: 3). This effort connects scientific ways of ‘knowing’ an objective reality with the subjective lived experiences of those whom the census categorized. The objective authority claimed to be granted by such scientific projects cloaks the political power which is gained or lost through setting a particular version of reality as the authorized

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101 Attempts to introduce quota systems to integrate Scheduled Tribes and Castes have met with widespread protests. Scholars note that such quotas would selectively benefit certain groups or only specific people or collectivities within the group, while others point out that quotas work against the vision of a democratic India. Béteille has even argued that caste is “no longer a tangible reality in contemporary India, except on a political level, and that there are no longer good reasons for invoking it on a social level” (Béteille 1990a, as quoted in Heuzé 1991:7). While this is a position not shared by many academics, it has become popular among social activists. Béteille’s comments ignore the continuing salience of caste-based discrimination that many throughout the subcontinent continue to experience as well as continuing to divide civil society from the political sphere. It may work as a political position for some, but is a theoretical and methodological disavowal of empirically available evidence.

102 Categorization includes the way individuals are assigned by the state to static, mutually exclusive collective categories with little or no overlap, shutting down any assumption of “social links as complex and social groupings [as] situational” or relational (Kertzer and Arel 2002b:6).

103 Kertzer and Arel note that some believe the role of the census is to find those categories that already exist in the social realm (2002b: 19). Such “statistical realism” is closely related to primordialist notions of identity and, although it has been replaced in certain disciplines within the social sciences, remains a common theme in the field of demography (2002b: 19).
version.\textsuperscript{104} Scholarship on the census has demonstrated that authority given to such versions of reality, and the fields of power in which they are immersed, cannot be understood as emerging from a hegemonic, monolithic state. The state must be examined as a collection of individuals, groups, and interests that relate to and connect with each other and the broader population involved in such projects. These interests are often conflicting and relate to the connection between “group recognition in the census…[and] entitlement to certain rights” (Kertzer and Arel 2002b: 30). These entitlements may be the direct awarding of state funds or, in the case of minority languages, authorizing those languages to be used in educational institutions and business supported by the government (see chapters 3-5 especially).\textsuperscript{105} Other entitlements are premised on the ability of individuals to be counted as citizens and, in such cases, scholars must ask how residence is defined and how individuals or groups are constructed as legitimate or illegitimate in terms of political policy, rights, or obligations.\textsuperscript{106} Scholars like Melissa Nobles argue that the census is a product of a racializing discourse which, in turn, affects public policy and highlights the role of the census bureau as a site where this co-construction occurs (Nobles 2002).\textsuperscript{107} Those identities authorized by the census have been used to generate official

\textsuperscript{104} For example, policy in France regarding social collective identities very clearly states that the acknowledgement of any identity other than “French” as citizen opens up opportunities for divisiveness and discrimination. Therefore, the government refuses to count its citizens by nation, race, or ethnicity in an effort to circumvent any attempt to politicize identity (Blum 2002). This refusal shuts down an important avenue for redress for those who experience discrimination, since the official line is that there can be no discrimination based on categories that do not exist for the state. Such policies also reflect a historically situated understanding of assimilation of former colonial subjects that is now applied to all immigrants (see Amselle 2003; Blum 2002). The Indian constitution prohibits all discrimination on the basis of “religious, race, caste, sex, [or] place of birth” (article 15, §1), yet reserves spaces for various groups, e.g. Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes (art. 15, §4; see also Jain 2000).


\textsuperscript{106} See Abramson 2002, Goldscheider 2002.

\textsuperscript{107} Melissa Nobles’s 2002 work, through her comparison of the United States and Brazil, demonstrates the ways by which census bureaus in both countries participated in the constructions of race and racial discourse in spite of the differences in each country’s “experience” with race. In both countries, she argues, race was central to the project of the census. However, there was a shift from questions about race and citizenship status in the United States—reflected in the categories of free white, free black, and slave—to ancestry, both racial and national—e.g. black, mulatto (before 1920), Chinese, Indian, etc. In Brazil, the categories have remained predominantly about phenotypic ‘color’ from the late 19th century to the most recent census. Nobles’s work is instructive in the attention given to the actual procedures and processes though which the census is created and administered. This is of special interest to
documents directly implicated in violence against individuals where particular identities were marked. Further discussion of this kind of impact emerging from the collecting of census data can be found in chapter three of this dissertation.

The census in India must be taken seriously as both a site of intervention for various government actors and interests and a visible way in which politicized identities like tribe, caste, and ethnicity are initially deployed by the government and then enveloped in a network of social relations, reworked, and made socially meaningful. Such identities are relatively static in legal terms and categories; yet socially, they are relational categories whose importance only emerges within interactions in which meaning is dialogically produced. It is therefore important to understand the role of the census—including the collection of its data—as one part of the way identities may be politicized and difference produced.

Also crucial is an exploration of social difference more broadly through institutions like law, all the while interrogating the role and origin of such institutions as created and recreated by those same heterogeneous actors and interests. Critical Race Theory, a perspective emerging from theorizing race in the United States, highlights those important processes and practices of differentiation within social, political, and legal institutions and can thus shed light on social India, a country in which the census is often administered by individuals who ultimately make choices about how people are categorized—including their ethnicity and language. In Darjeeling, there have been many charges made against the government regarding how language and identity are categorized in the census. During the last census, it was said, representatives from the government marked individuals as speaking their ‘mother’ language (one of the ethnic languages like Limbu, Rai, Magar, Tharu, etc) rather than the Nepali language so that the government could make the argument that Nepali speakers were not in the majority in Darjeeling.

Such instances—including the use of birth certificates in Nazi Germany, South African identification papers, and identity cards in Rwanda that labeled the possessor as Hutu or Tutsi—connect individuals to this process of objectification of difference. There has been, however, a lack of scholarship on the “relationship between state-enshrined identities on personal documents and collective identity formation or...between categories used on the census and in private documents” (Kertzer and Arel 2002:5). One project that attempts to address this lack explores the connection between state sanctioned identities in Burundi and Rwanda, connecting colonial and postcolonial identity politics with wars and genocide in both countries (Uvin 2002). Such essentialized identities were overlaid on a relatively heterogeneous population while also taken up and “invoked by local people themselves—alongside deeply essentialist interpretations” (Uvin 2002: 148). Jan Blommaert’s 2009 article, which explores the case of a Rwandan refugee and his attempts to gain asylum in the UK which are complicated by his linguistic repertoire, is another excellent project which bridges state-sanctioned identities with personal experiences.
differentiation in South Asia.

2.1.7 Critical Race Theory

While few scholars of South Asia apply Critical Race Theory (CRT) to their work, I have found it helpful in critically analyzing the intersection of legal frameworks and the production of social difference. In Darjeeling, where legal definitions of ‘tribal status’ or ‘general population’ have perceptible effects on residents’ ability to access higher education, funding for such education, and employment opportunities, law is not and cannot be separated from socially situated understandings of self, community, history, or nation.

CRT began as an attempt by legal scholars such as Derrick Bell, Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and Kimberle Crenshaw to discover why racial reforms in the United States after the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s were so slow to change racialized discourses and ideologies (Delgado 1995a, 1995b; Delgado and Stefancic 1994; Taylor 1998; Williams 1991; see also Bell 1987, 1992a, 1992b).\(^{109}\) CRT privileges experience, often through storytelling, and perceptions of people of color as a corrective to the normative perspective of whiteness, experience, or history (see Delgado 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Olivas 1995 [1990]; Taylor 1998; Torrres and Milun 1995 [1990]). This normative perspective is not typically understood as one viewpoint among many by those within the hegemonic perspective (whites), but rather is naturalized as “the truth” (Taylor 1998: 122; see also Grillo and Wildman 1995 [1991]).\(^{110}\) There are a number of general themes in research utilizing CRT. Racism is believed to be a normal part of life as not just individualized actions or experiences but a

\(^{109}\) The founders of Critical Race Theory drew from critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, and social and political philosophy (Delgado 1995b: xiv).

\(^{110}\) An example presented by Grillo and Wildman occurred within discussions of university curricula and the incorporation of multiple perspectives. At a meeting of the legal society at their university, someone in the audience questioned the ability of a university to include such perspectives without disturbing the “canon.” The authors note the “premise that the material the questioner saw as most relevant to his own life was central and “canonized,” while all other reading was peripheral and, hence, dispensable” (Grillo and Wildman 1995 [1991]: 567).
“reflection of the larger, structural, and institutional fact of white hegemony” (Taylor 1998: 122-123; see also Delgado 1995b: xiv). CRT scholars no longer see the law as the vehicle through which change can occur because it too is embroiled within the structural and institutional racialized hegemony (Taylor 1998: 123; see also Bell 1980, 1992b; Johnson 1988; Lawrence 1987; Spann 1995 [1990]). Whites are also seen to act against racism only when it benefits them, and even whites with less economic capital will employ the social capital of “whiteness” in relation to blacks in the United States (Bell 1995b [1988]; see also Bell, et. al. 1997 [1990]; Delgado 1995a: Taylor 1998).111

Robert A. Williams, Jr., highlights three ways for liberalized governments112 and societies to understand and engage with difference: assimilation, multiculturalism, and extermination. Within multiculturalist discourse, tribal (ethnic, racial) sovereignty is dangerous because different perspectives must be acknowledged (1995a [1989]: 100). These perspectives have the potential to be irreconcilable within the government framework and policies because they destroy the vision of a fully democratic state. In the case of Native American groups, for example, legal policies were used to “justify…[white society’s] privileges of aggression…by stressing tribalism’s incompatibility with the superior values and norms of white civilization” (Williams 1995 [1989]: 107; see also Cleaver 1997 [1995]).

This perspective is particularly relevant to my own work in India. Although the Indian government officially supports a multiculturalist perspective, there are certain groups within the nation-state that are not included. Many of the people with whom I work believe they suffer from

111 Some critique early formulations of CRT because “whites” and “blacks” are not homogeneous, mutually exclusive groups that believe or act in predetermined ways (Taylor 1998: 124).
112 Many CRT scholars are dissatisfied with liberalism—in which liberty is held as the highest value in political ideology and discourse (see Hume 2000 [1739]; Locke 1960; Smith 1994 [1776]; 2000 [1759]). Derrick Bell challenges the notion that the United States is in a “Post-Racial Epoch,” by exploring the hypothetical invasion of the U.S by space traders who offer goods in return for all blacks in the country (1995a [1990]).
exclusion in any vision of the Indian state and therefore are not provided with infrastructure support—road repair, clean water, regular electricity, or access to education. Whether this is because of their association with a neighboring nation-state or their traditionally low position in the social hierarchy in India, Indians of Nepali descent are a counterexample to the Indian government’s claims of a multicultural, all-inclusive nation. Lessons from CRT are not entirely applicable in South Asia; social and biological difference in the U.S. and South Asia are quite different and have emerged from very different historical contexts. Attention, however, to the intersection between difference and law/policy is crucial to understanding the ethnographic realities in Darjeeling.

Scholars within CRT, for example, emphasize that verbal abuse and marking on the basis of difference in individual interactions are not only about race, but also status, class, personhood, and the socially perceived deficiency of an individual or group when compared to some idealized standard (Delgado 1995d [1982]: 160). Delgado believes that individuals have internalized such societal standards and “thus often are hypersensitive and anticipate pain at the prospect of contact with ‘normals’” (1995d [1982]: 160). These “standards” are often ideologies and discourses popularly deployed to justify treatment of certain groups, such as those images of “docile, cheerful, and content” blacks during slavery in the United States (Delgado and Stefancic 1995b: 219; see also Fredrickson 1997 [1988]). Such racializing or difference highlighting remarks show contradictions in the U.S. between the “ideals of egalitarianism” and democracy and the actual lived experience of some of its members (Delgado 1995d [1982]: 161), not unlike India and, particularly, Indians of Nepali descent.

113 During my fieldwork among Nepalis of Indian descent in Darjeeling during the summer of 2005, I found these same ideas held in reference to Bengali- and Hindi-speaking residents of the plains of India. Many Nepali speakers with whom I spoke mentioned their hesitation to speak their native language—Nepali—in front of such people and if possible, would use English in such interactions to counteract commonly held stereotypes of Nepalis as backward and uneducated. As Delgado notes, “racial stigmatization injures its victims’ relationships with others” (1995c [1982]: 160).
Haney López asks two questions about the legal construction of race. First, is law enforcement ideology and how does it define race? Second, how conscious are the participants (lawyers, judges, legislators) of the process (Haney López 1996). He argues for a shift away from viewing law as monolithic to a vision of it as a process that involves a connected, but not coordinated, effort. These legal practices do reinforce already available ideas of race, and sometimes create new categories (see also Haney López 1995a [1994]). However, because there is no monolithic law it may do both simultaneously. Race in law is not necessarily positive or negative in effect—the question is really about how such constructions assist in “attain[ing] or frustrate[ing]…social justice” (Haney López 1996: 115). Since this particular perspective approaches the study of race as a social process from a legal lens, Haney López and other scholars within Critical Race studies use legal cases as data although they question the usefulness of “prerequisite cases”—those explicitly judging racial categorization of individuals—for understanding legal perspectives of race (Haney López 1996: 112). Such cases were out of the ordinary and must be considered in the “historical context,” although he does not explicitly state what such a context would be for his purposes (Haney López 1996: 112). While precedent, in legal terms, must be historically contextualized, it cannot be dismissed in the face of social

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114 Ian Haney López, professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, places himself within the body of Latino/a Critical Theory, a subfield of CRT. He is also part of Critical White Studies (CWS), a branch emerging from CRT that interrogates the ways whiteness is morally understood, deployed, and negotiated within the United States (1996; see also Butler 1993; Frankenberg 1992; Haney López 1995b, 1997; Hartigan 1999a, 1999b, 2006; Hill 1999; hooks 1992; Lipsitz 1998; Morrison 1993; Ninivaggi 2001; Perea 2000).

115 Haney López also points out that law “encompasses a set of institutions, actors, and ideas,” and includes “a wealth of interdependent but ill-coordinated social practices” (1996:114).

116 Precedent played an important role in the social activism and language rights movements among Indians of Nepali descent in India. In the push to be declared a Scheduled Caste (under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution), the Nepali Language movement’s work to add Nepali to the Eighth Schedule as an official language of India, as well as recent efforts to be declared a Scheduled Tribe, Indians of Nepali descent often drew on examples from other groups who were successful in their petitions for such status. In 2005, leaders within the community in Darjeeling began asking residents to behave in ways that mimicked these other groups’ efforts. For example, Subash Ghisingh, head of the GNLF, decreed that statues of gods and goddesses were not longer to be used in festivals and temples. Rather, stones were to be worshiped because he felt it conveyed to outside government officials to “tribalness” of the Nepali people. Although some local people disagreed with the policy, many reported understanding the motivations behind it—drawing on legal precedent that, they believed, would increase their chances of success.
movements whose very existence and tactics rest on preexisting categories and laws.

Law does not just ‘reflect’ the social categories of the time, but also plays a role in creating racial categories. Within such a framework, we first must interrogate how law and race intersect. Is the meaning of ‘law’ centered on the enforcement of pre-existing rules only? If this is its sole purpose, how then can such “devices define race” (Haney López 1996: 113)? If we understand law as controlling or coercive, it does highlight the “actual rules” that have explicitly focused, in the US and elsewhere, on certain physical features and characteristics (Haney López 1996: 116). These features were endowed with (legal) racial significance and have shaped perceptions of race through reinforcement of categories. This perspective of law also highlights race as a rule-based criteria for citizenship. So, Haney López believes, “in the name of racially regulating behavior, laws created racial categories” (1996:119). Law is part of the broader environment in which it was created, and is not only about enforcement or coercion. However, in light of its coercive elements, law is effective in moving from simple enforcement to changing perceptions and the construction of ideologies. Within this view of law, “legal rules have been constructed out of a broad universe of possibilities, but people clothe these relations within the illusion of necessity” (1996: 123). Laws, as products of particular legal challenges and cases, become naturalized, and through this naturalization become ideology by erasing the connections between law and power.

Law also defines particular social identities and makes such identities legitimate in the sense that they have “institutional support” (Haney López 1996: 124). For example, in census

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117 Within US law, these are particularly obvious in naturalization and immigration cases, but also in antimiscegenation laws before 1967. These laws made legal (marital) relationships between people of different racial groups, or performing ceremonies for such unions, illegal. The US Supreme Court made such laws illegal in 1967, although Alabama still had such a law on the books until November 2000. In the case of India, consider arguments that the British Raj ‘created’ caste.

118 Indians of Nepali descent have been broken up into various groups through the census. Only some groups are considered scheduled castes and given special facilities.
categories, legal challenges by Native American groups, or even fights for antidiscrimination legislation, individuals are pushed to “frame their identities in terms of the racial categories recognized by law” before the case begins or before filling out a census form (Haney López 1996: 125). Laws have also helped universalize (at least within the scope of jurisdiction) local, context-bound definitions to the broader social-legal field: e.g. legal racial categories of White-Black-Native American were used in cases involving South Asians, Chinese, and other groups not envisioned in earlier case rulings or legislation.

The ideological slants of law demonstrate a problem in law—current cases must rely on legal precedent. Cases argued today often rely on the authority granted by cases from as far back as the 1800s. In this way, law is backward, not forward, looking and therefore “often fails to grasp new forms of identity” (Haney López 1996: 128; see also Delgado and Stefancic 1995a [1989]). Law is, therefore, both enforcement of rules and ideology.119

Virginia Domínguez, a scholar within Critical White Studies (a subset of Critical Race Theory), shares themes and some methods with CRT, but focuses on both ethnography as well as legal cases.120 Her emphasis on social identity highlights it as not just self-perception, individual choice, or “who we are genetically,” but who we are “public[ally] affirm[ed] to be” (Domínguez

119 Haney López questions how conscious those within the system who create the law are of their own roles as constructed by, and constructing, race.
120 Although the majority of CWS occurs through and in the United States, David Theo Goldberg’s research explores whiteness and resistance in South Africa (1997, see also work by David M. Hughes). For Goldberg, explicit racism is more quickly dealt with than implicit, since implicit racism is much less visible or even denied. In these instances, reactions and attempts to change the situation are often “taken as so much paranoia, hypersensitivity, or lack of a sense of humor” (1997: 635; for further discussion on implicit and explicit racism through direct and indirect indexicality in language, see Hill 2008). These reactions may be connected to concerns of one’s own position, or even misrecognition of the current and changing forms of racism. He likens the campaign against such racisms and forms of exclusion to a guerrilla war and the changing tactics and venues. In South Africa, Goldberg notes the deployment of racial stereotypes as both part of, and changing, the structure of racialization: “Slow work and malingering undermined the plantation economy but [was used to create] the stereotype of laziness; slave destruction of property fueled the stereotype of incompetence; self-mutilation increased labor costs but steel[ed] the stereotype of barbarianism. Rap songs about ghetto violence, gangs, and cop killing empower the (un)censored rage of racially marginalized youth as they reinforce status quo stereotypes of a vulgar and undisciplined underclass” (Goldberg 1997: 637-638). In each instance, resistance and rage were resignified within dominant white society to demonstrate the lacking in slave culture, then black culture after Apartheid.
For Martha R. Mahoney, racialization is always in flux, always “in formation,” as are the meanings and content of privilege (1997 [1995]: 330). It is never a “fixed and frozen artifact,” and is constantly being resignified, deplored, experienced, and set up in relation to other racialized identities around it (Mahoney 1997 [1995]: 220).

Lessons from Critical Race Theory and Critical White Studies may be applied elsewhere, particularly their emphasis on engaging with law as part of the framework that structures and is structured by the lived experience of race. These lessons are vital to understanding how the meanings of social and legal citizenship and linguistic practices of Indians of Nepali descent shift through time and gain their significance. Yet this, or any other, kind of social and linguistic difference does not only emerge from or engage with law. There are ideologies of racialized difference and history that emerge from the social and connect with not only legal engagements with identity, but also the broader social framework of difference in which law is immersed. One approach I have found instructive in understanding this framework is Racial Formation Theory. This theory both highlights the historically contingent ways difference is understood and moves beyond analysis of only one category of difference (such as race) to include other social and economic ways in which difference is institutionally reproduced through ideologies immersed in broader power relationships. It also adds to the lessons drawn from theorizing the census and law more broadly to help me analyze my own ethnographic data.

2.1.8 Racial Formation Theory

Racial Formation Theory has been used by social scientists as a tool to incorporate ideologies of racialized difference, structure, and history into their analysis of social difference.

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121 Domínguez focuses on Louisiana from the late eighteenth century until the mid-1990s. She argues that looking at both individual choice and the public affirmation of an identity is an important distinction to make, particularly as she struggled to understand a setting in which she must “explain how an individual could one day be white and the next day black” (Domínguez 1997:10; see also Wright 1997 [1995]).
(see De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003; Ramos-Zayas 2003a, 2003b, 2001). From the perspective of Racial Formation, first introduced by Michael Omi and Howard Winant, race is “an element of social structure rather than an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion” (1994: 55). As a process with no biological basis, the formation of categories of social difference is bound to a specific historical context that constitutes the way such racialized categories are “created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (1994: 55). As a process, it is also no accident and involves specific “projects” linked to the organization and ruling of civil society (1994: 56).

Racial Formation Theory connects legal and political meanings of race with the lived experiences as part of the evolution of hegemony. These lived experiences include the “idea" of race: categorizing the world by expectations and the social order around which these expectations are organized—we anticipate that phenotypic difference will translate into cultural or “social differences” (Omi and Winant 1994: 60).

Socialization into these ideological webs of knowledge, or “commonsense,” necessitates an understanding of social, historical, economic meanings. The study of race must also include ideology, structure, and history since racial formation intersects with “other axes of oppression and difference…along which politics is organized today” (1994: 66-67). This linking of ideology and structure, they believe, corrects

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122 Before the introduction of this perspective, there were three paradigms used in social theory to analyze racialized discrimination: ethnicity, class, and nation. The ethnicity paradigm first emerged as a corrective to the racialized views and biological emphasis by stressing ethnicity as cultural difference (Omi and Winant 1994: 14-24). The class paradigm presented racial inequality as emerging from those material and economic conditions and relations between groups (1994: 25-37). The nation paradigm focused on difference, as the ‘nation,’ as a product of colonial conditions (1994: 38-51). This last paradigm does bridge micro- to macro-scales, and attempts to explain the complex social and structural web in which race and racialized/racializing discourses are produced and understood.

123 Omi and Winant do not deny the salience of racial discourses, only the biological basis for racialized difference (1994: 55).

124 At the macrolevel, meanings of race are produced and negotiated through, for example, discussions of (collective) race in legal reform movements of welfare programs and government policies. On a microlevel, the assigning of individual social identities and the belief that one’s behavior toward another is based on that assumption of race means understanding their potential for acting in some way (Omi and Winant 1994).

125 The authors are particularly interested applying Gramsci’s hegemony as commonsense used to maintain a social order which is advantageous to the particular classes or groups (see Omi and Winant 1994:67).
discussions of racism that place it into the category of either ideology or structure. Within Racial Formation Theory, race is explicitly separated from racism; by focusing on projects, we find that not all racial projects are racist. A project is racist “if and only if it creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories,” meaning there must be a link between racial essentialism and the “social structures of domination” (1994:71-72).

Drawing on Racial Formation theory, Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Mirón, and Jonathan Xavier Inda note that theorizing about race has often generalized and ignored specific economic and social changes (1999: 1). The discursive concept of race has been so emptied of situatedness that it has become a “vacuous concept capable of multiple meanings” always about power and domination (1999: 6). Since it is capable of multiple meanings, and is no longer biological, the concept of race may be framed as culture, tradition, or lifestyle differences that are destructive to the harmony of a particular society. Yet if race or difference as social fact is

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126 Racism is, for them, “a matter of beliefs, attitudes, doctrine, and discourse” (Omi and Winant 1994:74).
127 In this view, racism is based on “economic stratification, residential segregation, and other institutionalized forms of inequality” which, in turn, create ideologies and discourses of racism (Omi and Winant 1996: 74). Such debates, they believe, are “fundamentally misguided” because racism emerges as a co-construction of both ideology and structure—and most racist projects have elements of both, making the field “messy” (1994:74-5). Others have defined racist discourse as the “use of ethnic categorizations,” around “biological, cultural, religious, linguistic, or territorially-based boundaries…as signifiers of a fixed, deterministic genealogical difference of “the Other”’; these discourses are used to justify exclusionary (and/or exploitative) practices directed at this ‘othered’ group” (Yuval-Davis 1999: 113).
128 Racial awareness is an acknowledgement of the differences of power and experience. Racial essentialism links these differences to an individual/collective identity. Omi and Winant do not explicitly define what they mean by ‘essentializing,’ which is a concept subjective enough to cause serious problems in a work without ethnographic data to ground it.
129 For example, in the US, race has been biological, determinant of behavior and identity, mutually exclusive, homogeneous, divisive, hierarchical, and unchangeable (Torres et. al. 1999: 2). The authors believe that race is an organizing and classification system that has been naturalized and “gives social relations the façade of long duration…reducing, essentializing and fixing difference” (Torres et. al. 1999:5).
130 The authors push for an understanding of race as “always actively constructed” at the locus of political, economic, and social factors although they do not wish to defend race as an analytical necessity simply because its ideological presence in lived experience (Torres et. Al. 1999:11). They believe those studies that do assume this necessity are another example of the way “in which the academy in the US continues to racialized the world” (Miles and Torres 1999: 33). They prefer to reintroduce a consideration of class into the analysis of race (see also Miles 1988, 1989).
pushed aside, there is a danger of erasing the specifically racialized injustices and experiences.\textsuperscript{131} Difference is produced and understood relationally and situationally, and any attempt to simplify such a field would erase the site of difference production and the actual ways in which it emerges.\textsuperscript{132}

Some applications of Racial Formation Theory have explored how racism, economics, and politics interact with each other and push against the notion that racism is always binary; there must always be one winner and one loser, and those people who explicitly support “colorblind” policies are, themselves, antiracist (Small 1999: 48). This perspective allows those seemingly unracialized factors—e.g. fights for access to school, housing, government positions—to be analyzed as part of the larger framework of power relationships.\textsuperscript{133} The powerful organizing tool of shared experience is used to enact social change within a dialogic system of racialized and racializing structures and ideologies.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131} Miles and Torres do not deny that racism exists, only that any simplistic (academic) vision of these differences and productions of difference are singular with one “object and [one] victim” (1999:26).
\textsuperscript{132} Some scholars believe that discussions of difference—in terms of a “predetermined set of analytical categories: race, ethnicity, class”—cannot be completely reduced to only difference (Martin 1994 as quoted in Zinn and Dill 1999: 104). While Zinn and Dill agree, they believe a focus on difference is a theoretical necessity because these differences are the “primary organizing principles of a society which locates and positions groups within that society’s opportunity structures” (1999: 104).
\textsuperscript{133} For Small, attention to the process of racialization decenters the focus away from the relationship between distinct ‘biological’ groups and toward factors of “economics, politics, power [and toward] the ways in which structures, images, and ideologies operate to sustain inequality and injustice” (1999:49). These factors include wealth/income, housing, mortgage lending success (and interest rates), predominance of racialized people in media representations, and racialized spaces in the U.S. He also explores the contextual, rather than hegemonic, creations and understandings of racialized groups through the “structures, images, and ideologies” that create and maintain barriers between groups and the way groups “embrace,” exploit, and negotiate assumptions of difference to “compete and succeed” (1999:50).
\textsuperscript{134} Scholars, within a Marxist framework of race, have pointed to the erasure of class in analyses of race within the power-laden political context (Solomos and Back 1999: 69; see also Hall 1980; Miles 1988, 1989). However, a vision that reduces difference to class is not theoretically productive, or even accurate (Solomos and Back 1999: 69). Like Omi and Winant’s view of ideological representations in racialization, Solomos and Back view racialization as not only a state-driven set of regulations or prohibitions, but also social contestation (Solomos and Back 1999: 69-70; See also Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1982; Gilroy 1987; Solomos 1988, 1989). Solomos and Black push for the inclusion of those areas that have been excluded, actively or incidentally, such as cultural and identity politics. The importance of literature, film, and popular representations on the construction of difference demonstrate that these experiences “cannot be reduced to economic, political, or class relations” as some Marxist scholars have suggested (Solomos and Black 1999:74). Such simplification ignored the way that economic, political
2.1.9 Language and race in linguistic anthropology

Scholarship on race and language within linguistic anthropology has produced powerful ethnographic evidence of the way this dialogic system of structures and ideologies is productive on the ground. Earlier works often focused on language and race as part of broader concerns of what Hill and Mannheim call the “dialectic among structure, practice, and ideology” and the way the indexical functions of language connect these three (1992: 396; see also Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Urciuoli argues that language and race are used to co-construct a landscape in which such indexical connections are meaningful, since “until these connections are drawn and linked to a larger set of political and economic structures, one does not have the analytic wherewithal to show how linguistic identities come to be deployed as they are” (1995: 526). Such linguistic identities can, and often are, indexically linked to racial identities while simultaneously being used resist or reform those same racialized identities (see Goodwin and Alim 2010); or, as Anderson argues, when “individuals link linguistic behavior and social categories, they contribute to and shape the social construction of race as a (supposedly) legitimate category of linguistic value and social differentiation” (2009: 108). For example, Dominican Americans—whom Bailey describes as “both Hispanic and largely of African descent”—use specific linguistic practices as part of the “[e]veryday enactment of a Dominican identity…involve[ing] negotiating multiple and conflicting ascriptions of identity and resisting U.S. black-white racial categorization” (2001a: 190). Among second generation Dominicans, the

and class relations are themselves understood within fields of cultural and identity politics. These relations are not preexisting structures on which culture is overlaid.

135 Hill and Mannheim look to linguistic relativity as a mechanism through which the dialectal relationship between structure, practice, and ideology work (Hill and Mannheim 1992: 387).
137 As Urciuoli argues, individuals “act in ways that are taken as ‘having’ a language, which is equated to ‘belonging’ to an origin group” (1995: 525). This belief, that people speak a certain way will also ‘be’ or act in a certain way is a strong language ideology that has been problematized by linguistic anthropologists. By this logic, for example, only African Americans speak the way
linguistic identity of ‘Spanish speaker’ is preferred to a racialized identity of ‘black’: these second generation Dominicans “who are phenotypically indistinguishable from African Americans, for example, “speak Spanish” in order to counter others’ assumptions that they are African American” (2001a: 191). While these projects explicitly deal with the everyday practices of engaging race and language, other scholars focus on the use of language in state-driven colonial projects (see Errington 2001).

Within linguistic anthropology, scholars are more and more drawing directly from the lessons of Critical Race Theory and Racial Formation Theory. Jane Hill, for instance, has extensively explored the language of race and racialization over the past 20 years and called anthropology to explore issues of race as part of its (four field) engagement with the human experience. Hill’s analysis of Mock Spanish demonstrates the ways that racialization projects utilize both direct and indirect indexicality (see 1998). Her most recent work, The Everyday Language of White Racism, explores the discursive practices and ideologies of racism and, ethnographically, the lessons of Critical Race Theory. She argues that, although contradictions exist in the everyday lives of individuals of all races, whites often “handle contradictions” by erasing the “contradictory evidence” (2008: 5; see also Gal and Irvine 1995). These folk

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138 Although they work to ‘counter’ these assumptions, these second generation Dominicans identify with the African Americans in their community; they “share a structural position characterized by low-income, segregated neighborhoods, substandard schools, and nonwhite/African-descent phenotypic ascription” and their “affiliation is reflected and reconstituted in part through extensive adoption of lexical and syntactic forms of African American English, which serves many young Dominican Americans as a language of resistance to dominate disparaging discourses” (Bailey 2001a: 191). This is yet another example of the complicated and, in some cases, seemingly contradictory ways in which race, language, and practices interact.

139 She notes that, as part of our shared disciplinary history, “[o]ur intellectual ancestors include both founders of scientific racism and important pioneers of the antiracism movement” (1998: 680). Her findings are reminiscent of Urciuoli 1995.

140 To illustrate this example, she introduces a sentence ‘invented’ by Stanley Lieberson, a sociologist: “Americans are still prejudiced against blacks” (Hill 2009: 5). In Lieberson’s study of racism, he found that “Whites seldom notice the contradiction in this statement,” in spite of African Americans make up 12% of the U.S. population. These same white respondents, were shocked by this statement: “Americans still make less money than do whites” (Lieberson 1985: 128 as cited in Hill 2009: 5). As Hill notes, the white respondents were shocked because “whites” could no longer “stand metonymically for ‘Americans’” (2009: 5). I would be interested to see more specifics about
theories about race are then reproduced and become constituent aspects of racializing discourses and ideologies which are used to construct “whiteness.” Ana Celia Zentella, when looking at Latino/as in the US noted similar processes by which ‘whiteness,’ with “standard English as its voice box,” becomes the “unmarked, normal, and natural order in the United States (2003: 51; see also Urciuoli 1996; Zentella 1997).”

Valentina Pagliai, drawing on Racial Formation Theory, argues that racist talk in conversation is co-constructed through the interaction; participants, through what she calls a “spiral effect,” subtly acknowledge the racist dialogue in a way that both “increase[es] racialization” and “afford the speakers a sense of ‘being on the right side’ as they produce increasingly racist and discriminatory statements” (2009: 563). Her findings will be helpful in understanding the processes by which “race talk” occurs—those discursive practices about race. Race talk, although often overt, can also include the silencing of these same discursive practices.

All theorizing of difference must be positioned vis-à-vis discourses of race in the local/historical and broader (national) context in which the specific details are sometimes lost when generalizing (Solomos and Back 1999: 73). Such theorizing must not separate local forms from the broader framework because the way cultural symbols can be appropriated and resignified cannot exclude either side (see also Gilroy 1990; Hewitt 1986; Jones 1988).

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the ‘white’ individuals within the study; a homogenous category ‘white’ would be, in my opinion, as theoretically unproductive as an undifferentiated category of “black” or “latino/a.” If we are to, as we should, denaturalize ‘whiteness,’ then interrogating it in the same way we do other kinds of difference would be ideal.

Work on AAE in the US have long presented similar results (see also Hill 2010; Morgan 1994, 2002).

For Pagliai, this “conversational agreement” is central to racializing discourses: the agreement “inevitably works at reinforcing racializing or racist discourses already present in the society, by reproducing them and creating consent around them” (2009: 576).

See Anderson 2008; Castagno 2008; McIlhenny 2001; Palmer 2010; Pollack 2004; Roberts, et. al. 2008; Schaffer and Skinner 2009. The majority of these studies draw their evidence from the experiences of children in schools. Although not explicitly analyzing race talk, I would include Urciuoli’s 2009 article about discourses of multiculturalism in higher education in this section as well.
Difference is not only about top-down structures or discourses, but is also created and experienced by those who have been dominated and excluded economically, socially, and/or politically (see Bhabha 1990; Spivak 1987; Young 1990 as cited in Solomos and Back 1999: 74).  

One example of an ethnographic based project that has salience for this dissertation is France Winddance Twine’s work exploring the intervention points where Brazilians can “transform their nation into a real democracia racial” (1998:3). Although a great deal of research on race has been conducted in Brazil, few have engaged with experiences of race including how faith in Brazil’s racial democracy remains even in the face of what Twine considered to be extensive and continuing counterevidence emerging from non-elite populations, such as Afro Brazilians (1998:6). The idea of “racism” used by scholars and the

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144 One study that has particular relevance to my project is that of Louis Mirón (1999). Mirón focuses on the classroom and education system as a site where racialized identities are negotiated. The way children are socialized into ethnicized or racialized identities is a social process reflecting both individual and collective identity in relation to other individual or collective identities (Mirón 1999:80-81). In my own work, schools play an important role in the socialization of children into linguistic practices and language ideologies, particularly with the increasing desire of parents to send their children to English medium schools. In a future project, it would be fruitful to directly study the specific ways children are socialized in these schools.

145 Early scholarly evidence of “The Racial Democracy Myth” emerged from Gilberto Freyre’s 1933 piece “Casa Grandee Senzala” (translated into English as The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization [Twine 1998:6, footnote 2]). In it, Freyre presented what Twine calls a “sanitized version” of colonization and slavery in Brazil in which he emphasized the role of enslaved Africans and indigenous Indian groups played in Brazil’s cultural and social development to the exclusion of the ways in which they were subjugated and subjected to intense racialized discrimination and violence (1998:6). A decade later, the belief that the “negro” population was not only not discriminated against, but that as a result of the “unexpressed national policy” of assimilation and miscegenation would soon disappear into the “total population” of Brazil was common in American sociology (1998:7). For Twine, this marked the beginning of the obsession of Western scholarship on Brazil as a successful racial democracy as opposed to the situation in the U.S. and South Africa (the other two favorites in the scholarship of race.) This ‘obsession’ is not unlike that of hierarchy in India. For nearly 50 years, this emphasis on racial democracy in both scholarly and public discourse has served, in the Twine’s opinion, to hijack efforts to sustain anti-racist movements. She also believes that the survival strategies—including silence and avoidance—of Afro-Brazilians may actually have contributed to the propagation of racial inequalities. Her research specifically “highlights the practices of …[those] morally opposed to racism” within the contradictory field of racism and tries to fine explanations as to why anti-racist movements have failed and sites where such movements could draw support (1998:11).

146 What she sees as coping mechanisms—including erasing Afro-Brazilians contribution in Brazils’ history including slavery (‘slavery may have happened elsewhere in Brazil, but not here’ mentality), individualizing the experience, withdrawing/avoidance of situations where interactions with Euro-Brazilians, and silence—work to
“racism” used by Brazilians are not the same because “commonsense definitions of racism [held by Brazilians] may exclude more complex and covert forms” of what she, as a scholar, would label racism (1998:32).\textsuperscript{147} Racism was defined by Brazilians as the “absolute social exclusion of blacks from Euro-Brazilian households,” more similar to the patterns of segregation in the US (1998:44), and anti-racism as the absence of official, legal prohibitions to their inclusion rather than social exclusion. Therefore, her markers of racism—including the “aesthetic hierarchies” in terms of hair, nose, skin, and general “attractiveness” as well as admittance to secondary education and employment opportunities—often differed with with whom she worked.\textsuperscript{148}

The analysis of race as both structure and discourse are useful for research on difference in India in various ways. Racial Formation Theory, and others, bridges structure and ideology to include institutional and cultural structures and representations of social difference. It is also crucial to consider the specific historical conditions in which the ideas of and construction of social difference and the political field within which these ideas and constructions are understood and deployed. Most importantly for South Asia, such an approach allows for seemingly unracialized factors to be analyzed as part of the larger framework of power relations emerging from both social categories of difference such as caste and legal frameworks that shape and are shaped by such power relations. This approach is particulary crucial for studies of language in India.

\textsuperscript{147} For example, Euro-Brazilian elites “adopt” Afro-Brazilian children (especially girls) who then act as care givers or unpaid domestic staff. Both sides couch this in terms of familial relationships and point to this closeness as an example of anti-racism by contrasting it to former (formal) social segregation between the two. However, the author notes that these young women are almost never sent to school. Twine takes this as a sign that Euro-Americans “assu[me] that black children are ideally suited for menial labor rather than education” (1998: 37). Euro-Brazilian men presented their sexual interest in mulattas as proof of their anti-racist perspective. She also find racist evidence in the absence of “Afro-Brazilians and dark-skinned people, except as ‘traditional Africans’ in textbooks…[in] the classroom” and on television programs (1998:55).

\textsuperscript{148} She notes that few Afro-Brazilians are admitted or complete secondary education, yet people still held up the lack of official barriers to their holding influential positions as evidence of anti-racism. The absence of Afro-Brazilians in those positions was often instead couched in economic terms—they don’t have power because they are poor.
Although these bodies of literature—caste, census, critical race theory/critical whiteness studies, racial formation theory, and language and race—emerge from very different historical and ethnographic trajectories, they may all be used to understand the complex framework and lived experience of social difference in complementary ways. Although not typically used in conjunction with each other, I have found the intersection most helpful in my own field work and analysis. In the case of Darjeeling, sole attention to caste or even social difference would ignore the intersection between structures of inequality stemming from government policies and practices including the census, infrastructure construction (roads, electricity, clean water), and law. Yet these structures are in turn influenced by ideologies and social beliefs and practices. The theories in this work each focus on a different area in which power and difference are created, deployed and understood and all are useful in contextualizing the lived experience of difference those people with whom I work.

2.2 Mediating Social Difference and Linguistic Practice

While the earlier terms (caste, tribe, census, critical race theory, and racial formation theory) begin to bridge macro- and micro-level discourses and structures, I couch my own research within scholarship on language and power, specifically language ideologies, to explore lived experiences and practices within these macro-level processes.

2.2.1 Language and Power

The study of connections among language, thought, culture, and later, power, have been central to a great deal of anthropological work since the beginning of American anthropology. Whether focusing on language and cognition, sources of data, socialization, or later, ideology and power, these works focus on the relationships between individuals and the social world around them. Franz Boas was interested in this relationship, although he dismissed what we
would now call language ideologies as ‘secondary rationalizations’ that were only useful to psychologists (see Boas 1910). He believed that members of particular culture groups attach evaluative, often moral, judgments about linguistic perspectives and beliefs; however, these judgments are part of the mechanism of cultural transmission and socialization, not the culture itself. The draw of linguistic data—phonological, morphological, syntactic and, to a certain extent, semantic—was, for Boas, in its unconscious origin and the usefulness of this ‘unconscious’ way of explaining and interpreting cultural phenomena since “linguistic classifications never rise into consciousness” (Boas 1963[1911]:67).

Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf took up Boas’s interest in the connections among language, culture, and thought. For Sapir, language might appear to be purely referential and separate from culture, but in actuality language “completely interpenetrates” culture and could even substitute for behavior (1985b [1933]: 11). Echoing Boas, he noted that language is

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149 For Franz Boas, language, like culture, was not deterministically tied (biologically or otherwise) to groups of people. As Stocking (1966) noted, Boas attributed different attitudes or ways of understanding the world as culturally inflected learned perspectives. Such perspectives are acquired through socialization and habitual practice and become unconscious ways of negotiating through the multitude of signs and possible meanings of behavior. This is the first way in which language and power are connected—learned perspectives in and through language structure constitute and remake reality (Philips 1999: 194). For Boas, these unconscious practices were transmitted through mimicking behavior and “buttressed by ethnically tainted secondary rationalizations” (Stocking 1966: 877). As part of a scientific ethnological study, however, these folk theories or “common sense” ideas about language and culture were not reliable sources of data for Boas, even those held by interpreters and native research assistants. The field of ethnology, he believed, requires a knowledge of field languages to mediate issues of interpretation associated with interpreters and native research assistants, since the focus of ethnological research was, in Boas’s view, the internal logic of a society or language, not what people say about themselves or their language. This internal logic was only available to those who have the training to break away from the patterns imposed on them by their own culture—we are all, according to Boas, “incarcerated by culture—except for anthropologists” (Bauman and Briggs 2003: 282). Boas’s project of ethnoclassification was his attempt to differentiate between the “primary cultural classification” and secondary rationalizations (see also Silverstein 1979: 195). Boas also emphasizes the communicative role of speech (1963 [1911]: 27). In this view, the connection between language and thought does not determine the way individuals view the world, but does influence perspectives and culturally inflected ways of understanding that world. Yet, for Boas, language and culture are two separate entities, requiring similar study, but not connected and co-influencing (see Bauman and Briggs 2003: 259). This belief produced a tension between Boas’s confidence that an objective reality exists which a scholar need only discover, and his understanding of the world as varied and historically contingent. In Boas’s study of Native American languages, he noted that language is not designed to accurately or objectively portray life and experience, although there are certain emphases or categories which he correlates to the “chief interests” of a culture (Boas 1963 [1911]: 26).

150 This foreshadows the arguments made later about the usefulness of language ideologies precisely because such classifications rarely rise to consciousness; when they do, they are often partial.
intimately tied to socialization and is part of the connection of linguistic structure to those speakers who use the language as part of naturally occurring conversation. Yet there is no direct connection between the “form of a language and the form of the culture of those who speak it” (Sapir 1985b [1933]: 26). Rather, the connections are unconscious in terms of predisposing speakers to understand the world in certain ways.\textsuperscript{151} Language, in this perspective, is dependent on the context in which it was used to gain fuller understanding. As Sapir noted, “the same external message is differently interpreted” depending on the emotional or psychological state of the speaker, the relationship between the speaker and listener(s), and the tone or mood, all of which “inform the spoken words with a significance which completely transcends their normal value” (1985b [1933]: 10). It is within this middle ground—between language as grammatically-governed performance and individual speech—that we should look for links between forms of speech and cultural concepts like nationalist or ethnic sentiments, registers of formality/politeness, gender, or other types of social difference and hierarchy (see also Sapir 1985a). This is precisely the location where scholars of language and power more broadly look for links as well, including those who use language ideologies.

Benjamin Whorf’s work delved more explicitly into the connections between language and thought.\textsuperscript{152} The links between those patterns of thought prompted by certain linguistically

\textsuperscript{151} For example, speakers of some languages must assign a gender to what in English is known as “stone,” while other languages (e.g. Chippewa) must first determine if it is animate or inanimate (Sapir 1985c [1924]: 158). In English, there is only one second-person singular pronoun—“you.” In other languages, such as Nepali, a speaker must choose from three, or even four, ways of saying “you” before producing grammatically-correct sentences. Such grammatical choices are required to be a fully competent participant in a language, yet they are not deterministic. These elements gather to form a system which allows for a collective understanding of the world that both helps and hinders our expression of the way we understand the world around us by creating and mediating our experience.

\textsuperscript{152} His interest in language emerged while working as a fire insurance adjustor investigating claims caused not by negligence but by a disjunction between what was expected and what occurred. For example, a man tossed a cigarette in an “empty” gasoline drum and believed this act would not cause an explosion; however, vapors in the gasoline drum did explode. Another thought that removing a kettle of boiling varnish from the heat source would stop the varnish from igniting: it ignited anyway. An employee of a company considered a pool of water a safe place to flick a cigarette, only to discover the pool of water actually contained decomposing organic material which quickly caught fire (Whorf 1964 [1939]). In each case, he notes that speakers of SAE (Standard Average
mediated forms of understanding the world, such as analogies, and the assumed outcome represented, for Whorf, an important way in which language, thought, and culture are connected.\textsuperscript{153} Associations between language, thought, and culture within Sapir’s and Whorf’s theorizing are necessary to understand the ways that language—as a combination of meaningful sounds used for communication—is used in culturally specific ways that have associations to cultural constructions of inequality, difference, and power. Although the lexicon is one place to look for the connections between language, culture, and thought, grammatical structures appear to have a deeper and more lasting effect (Whorf 1964 [1939]: 146).\textsuperscript{154} Whorf, like Boas before him, understood the relationship between the structure of language and those representations or rationalizations given by speakers as distorted (see Silverstein 1979: 194).\textsuperscript{155}

It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that connections between language and culture and speech as social practice, were again recognized as crucial to understanding language and power (Hymes 1962, Silverstein 1976a: 11; see also 2000). The removal of speech from the social context in which it is used and understood further had distanced the study of language by

European)languages are prompted to specific lines of logic or thinking based on the “analogies of the linguistic formula in which the situation is spoken of, and [how] it is analyzed, classified, and allotted its place in the world” (Whorf 1964 [1939]: 137). Although I use SAE in explaining Whorf’s argument, this should by no means be taken as my acceptance of the premise that we can collapse the differences among most Indo-European languages found in Europe in order to make broader arguments about the connections between cognition and linguistic practice. I believe that the argument that language does have some influence on thought and perception (and vice versa) is a valid one, although I do disagree with the manner in which he makes this argument.

\textsuperscript{153} In the example of the gasoline drum, empty was taken to mean that there were no materials in the barrel. It had no visible contents, but it was clearly not empty in the sense that no danger was present from its contents.

\textsuperscript{154} Whorf compared spatial metaphors used to refer to nonspatial situations in SAE while in Hopi, quality and quantity of experience are expressed differently. He also explored the connections between verb conjugations and the perception of time; SAE has past, present, and future tenses that construct a linear vision of time, while in Hopi verb conjugations and time are understood differently. For Whorf, such evidence suggested important connections between language, thought, and culture which could, and should, be studied.

\textsuperscript{155} For example, a common Western philosophical rationalization is that language is mainly referential; that is, language is mapped on a preexisting reality and its main function is to describe that reality with little interference, disruption, or modification in meaning. Even Whorf’s notion that that grammar related to a speaker’s representations of the world or experience ‘out there’ is a particular rationalization of the role of grammar as separate from experience (see Silverstein 1979: 193-194). None are deterministically wrapped up in the language structure and are, therefore, distortions or misrepresentations. Whorf’s emphasis here was on the ways that language and experience are connected, although possibly distorted, and the ways such connections affect worldview, thought, and culture (see also Hill and Mannheim 1992).
linguists and linguistic anthropologists from the study of social behavior and culture conducted by sociocultural anthropologists.\textsuperscript{156} This separation, in Silverstein’s view, caused problems both for scholars of language and of culture. He accused linguists of the time of uncritically accepting the preeminent role of language as self-directing and relatively unrelated to the world around it. On the other hand, he believed that sociocultural anthropologists based their research findings on an uncritical acceptance of “native ideology as though it were an accurate ‘scientific’ picture of the relation of language form to social context” (1979: 204). Silverstein, therefore, saw the goal of his research to recover such lost forms of data in the service of a new understanding of language, culture, and power. At this same time, he did not applaud all attempts to reconnect the study of language and culture.\textsuperscript{157} The only way to emerge from these theoretical and methodological extremes, Silverstein argued, was to find a way of systematizing the analysis of what mediates between linguistic form and structure on the one hand, and culture and the context in which that language is used and understood on the other (Silverstein 1979: 205). He attempted to connect language, with particular attention to its non-referential qualities, with questions of ideology (1979: 194, see also 1992). The connection between language and power was, for

\textsuperscript{156} Alessandro Duranti argues that after Franz Boas consolidated American anthropology—by including archaeology, cultural, linguistic, and biological anthropology—linguistic anthropology ceased to be a discipline of inquiry in its own right. He believes that the skills linguistic anthropologists contributed were used primarily to educate sociocultural graduate students in the languages necessary to conduct their fieldwork. As a result, some linguistic anthropologists, such as Sapir, encouraged their students to pursue degrees in linguistics departments or made that move themselves (see Duranti 2003: 232-3).

\textsuperscript{157} For example, he was critical of the imposition of linguistic methodologies and perspectives on cultural analysis, such as structuralism’s emphasis on the grammar-like structure of culture. He also believed that cultural and linguistic anthropologists emphasized the referential qualities of language, which is only one of the many qualities or functions of language (see Jakobson 1960 for his six functions of language, only one of which is referential). Paul Kroskrity has noted that during this time, theorizing of language was dominated by a reflectionist paradigm in which language is believed to be “epiphenomenal, removed from the social structures and processes as well as the cultural artifacts and activities produced by members; it thus merely reflects the ‘real’ world” (Kroskrity 2000a: 347). Others include the ability of language to construct the social world, indirectly allude to emotional states, or underscore hierarchy. Silverstein believed that scholars of language had not fully explored these, and other, non-referential functions of speech, and have therefore removed language use from its context. On the other hand, those studying culture and the broader context in which language is used and understood had not, in his opinion, fully explored the importance of language as the microlevel negotiation and production of macrolevel processes, discourses, and ideologies (Silverstein 1976a: 20-21).
Silverstein, evident in the way that language is used not only to describe the world, but also to “presuppose (or reflect) and create (or fashion) a good deal of social reality by the very activity of using language” (1979: 194). Speakers “collude” to create a social reality that may not necessarily exist outside their own assumptions that it does so (see McDermott and Tylbor 1995; Goffman 1981). Such collusion is a powerful social tool in the shaping or remaking of a culturally situated reality. The fashioning of society through language involves historical processes through which such ideas about language are formed and institutionalized, and highlights the inherently power-laden field in which this process occurs. For Silverstein, this fashioning of social reality is conducted in large part through commonly held notions about language and its users—language ideologies.

The study of language and power has also been heavily influenced by scholars working in Marxist economics, sociology, and literary criticism. These interpretations of ideology and its deployments have played an important role in the study language and power not only as a fruitful theoretical tool, but also as a point of departure for many early language ideology texts that used an explicitly Marxist approach to language. For Raymond Williams, ideology may be understood, in part, as those beliefs held by particular groups (or classes) which are distinct from “true or scientific knowledge” (1977: 55). This ‘false consciousness’ version of ideology idealizes and separates ‘consciousness’ from the material processes out of which it emerges.

The most recent incarnation of the study of language and power—language ideologies—

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158 For McDermott and Tylbor, collusion “refers to how members of any social must constantly help each other to posit a particular state of affairs, even when such a state would be in no way at hand without everyone so proceeding” (1995: 219). For these authors, an utterance “preserve[es] and organiz[es] the conditions for its own interpretation as a constitutive element of social scene” (1995: 229). For Goffman, on the other hand, collusion occurs when utterances have explicitly multiple levels of meaning only meant for certain participants: “Collusion is accomplished variously; by concealing the subordinate communication, by affecting that the words the excolluded can’t hear are innocuous, or by using allusive words ostensibly meant for all participants, but whose additional meaning will be caught by only some” (Goffman 1981: 34).

159 This is similar to the distinction between secondary rationalizations and those underlying structures that Boas believed were the true focus of anthropological theorizing.
is premised on an important departure from earlier ideas of language as either secondary rationalization or underlying structure (e.g. Boas) and the negative version of ideology as false consciousness as separated from the true material processes and conditions of society (see also Errington 1999). Early language ideological research often focused on validating this departure from secondary rationalizations, underlying structure, or false consciousness, while more recent works utilize a more neutral version of ideology. This neutral version is the generalized way in which meaning is fashioned in a social framework (Williams 1977: 55, see also Errington 2000). In this neutral version, ideology has become associated with knowledge of the “real material conditions and relationships” among things—ideas, goods, people (Williams 1977: 128; see also Williams 1983 [1976]). It can also be the system of understandings, or the production of these understandings or meanings. Ideology expands beyond individual conceptions and understandings of the world to that which is bigger, broader and more into the realm of superstructure. It is that which organizes the world with a vision broader than we individuals can grasp, or of which we are even aware.\(^{160}\)

The insights of Mikhail Bakhtin are also foundational to a deeper understanding of language and power, particularly in his attention to the inherent connections between language and the social world in which the utterance is found:

\(^{160}\) Antonio Gramsci also emphasized the political nature of language as one vehicle through which power is diffused—including the normalization or standardization of grammar—and revealed that even folklore or “common-sense” is a particular ideology. He argued that the relationship between the intellectuals and the production of ideology is mediated by the complex of superstructures in which intellectuals are functionaries. Gramsci also believed that language indexes other social issues and is part of the mechanism through which cultural hegemony is disseminated and reproduced (Gramsci 1985: 183-4; see also Smith 2004), since hegemony is premised on groups of people who must necessarily conform, or be called on to conform, to a particular account of culture (Gramsci 1971: 350). Folklore—those ‘common-sense’ visions of the social world which contributed to both the organization of that world and a separation from the ‘official’ or hegemonic visions—is one place in which scholarly attention could be focused, because it is precisely where such visions of the world are naturalized, in often contradictory ways, and sustain the rationale of a group (Gramsci 1985: 189, see also 1971: 419-423). He believed such conceptualizations of the world should be considered seriously, since these hegemonic views, and their associations to the dominant group’s “culture” (Gramsci 1985: 194), are one of the tools that maintain the very separation between kinds of people (1985: 191; see also Knauf 1996).
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. (Bakhtin 1981: 276)

In *Discourse in the Novel*, he deploys the term “heteroglossia”—those multiple, simultaneous voices or discourses that overlap and compete in any utterance—as a way of reintegrating the social aspects of language (Bakhtin 1981: 263-273; see also Steinglass 1998; Stewart 1983; Wertsch 1985). Speakers rely on the malleable and plastic qualities of language, and different language structures, in order to invoke a series of indexes, connections, and disjunctures (see also Hill 1995; Knauf 1996). Any attempt to disentangle such language use from the social forms in which it occurs is impossible, as all “conversation is full of transmissions and interpretations of other people’s words” (Bakhtin 1981: 338). Nothing in language is neutral; for example, double-voiced discourse directly connects the immediate speech act with another’s words, thereby taking the utterance beyond the immediate context of speech (Bakhtin 1981: 324).

Pierre Bourdieu’s work has also been used by scholars of language and power, particularly his concepts of “doxa,” “misrecognition,” and “symbolic power” as ways to connect immediate speech acts with the environment in which they occur. His writings about language extend into new terrain the scholarship of theorists who explore the dialectic relationship between structures and action as part of Practice Theory. Cultural ideas in the realm of the doxa are the unquestioned, naturalized, and assumed behaviors and beliefs that do not rise to the realm

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161 For example, I wrote the previous sentence, but it is not mine alone: it is also interwoven with Bakhtin’s thoughts about language, those thoughts about Bakhtin communicated to me by my adviser, and the comments of others with whom I have spoken about Bakhtin. I could have made a similar statement about language drawing on the textual authority of another scholar, but instead choose Bakhtin because of the way it references a specific intellectual genealogy. Such echoing is often used in parody, irony, and scholarly writing and includes both the immediate speaker (and the context in which that speaker is found) and the “refracted” speech of the original author (Bakhtin 1981: 324; see also 2002).
of discourse (see Bourdieu 1977b). By objectifying those subjective experiences into the realm of the natural, the status quo remains unquestioned, thereby reproducing current power relationships (see also Thompson 1984: 49). Yet there exists within a society those who question beliefs or practices in the realm of doxa; this act of questioning raises such beliefs to the level of discourse. These individuals or groups are, for Bourdieu, often those with the least capital and therefore the least likely to have a stake in the status quo. Such members of a society will, by their very questioning of the system, undermine those naturalized and unexamined beliefs in the doxa. This heterodoxy—those “strategies of subversion” (Thompson 1984: 49)—forces those dominant within the society to create discursive justifications (orthodoxy) for the current conditions.162

Bourdieu’s scholarship on symbolic violence highlights the ideological and symbolic ways in which hierarchy and domination are propagated not through physical means or threats, but through misrecognized authority and complicity. Misrecognition is also important to understanding his ideas about language and power. In terms of language, misrecognition is the process by which speakers acknowledge a particular version of language as the authorized and valued form of language and fail to see that it need not be so (Bourdieu 1991: 170). The process of misrecognition must, by definition, attend to the social context by situating any utterance within the social framework in which particular versions of language are ranked and authorized by speakers.163

Symbolic violence is, for Bourdieu, “built into the institution itself” (Thompson 1984:

162 As Thompson notes, many with these subversive ideas believe they are changing the system, yet with their participation “in the struggle they help to reproduce the very game whose rules have become the object of dispute” (1984: 50).

163 Bourdieu criticized the “interactionist,” or conversational analysis, approach to the study of language because practitioners hold that the only relevant context for understanding a particular utterance is the previous utterance and not the broader social field in which it was spoken. Such an approach misses the process of misrecognition in speech and its importance to understanding the use and relevance for linguistic practice.
and he often focused on the importance of institutions such as educational institutions, family, law, and governments in the process of social reproduction and domination. Louis Althusser also connected the reproduction of ideology to the subjection and socialization of groups through ideological apparatuses, such as the education system, law, family relations, politics, labor unions, and the media (1971: 133, 143)—all areas in which research on language and power have focused, particular those on language ideologies (see also Mertz 1992, 1998).

2.2.2 Language Ideologies

It was not until the early 1990s that the actual term “language ideologies” was introduced into linguistic anthropology to study language and power. These are, at their broadest level, ideas about language (spoken or written, in the abstract or in particular usages) that shape and are shaped by relations of power in a social and historical context (see Philips 1999: 195-6). Such cultural conceptions of language connect microlevel speech acts, such as those taking place

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164 Althusser’s reinclusion of cultural aspects of society—bringing superstructure into the infrastructure—mark an important reinvigoration of Marxism and one area in which his works are influential within studies of language and power. He also noted that all great philosophers and their theories (including Marx, Lacan, Hegel, Lukacs, Gramsci, and Sartre) were immersed in their own ideological fields, situated in culturally and socially inflected ways of viewing the world (Poster 1974; see also Bauman and Briggs 2000).

165 Within language ideology literature, no consensus has been reached about the definition, although some include the following (Woolard 1998a:4; see also Silverstein 1998): “shared bodies of common sense notions about the nature of language in the world” (Rumsey 1990:346), “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (Silverstein 1979:193), “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine 1989:255), “self-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group” (Heath 1989:53). These four definitions are similar, but the nuance of each is connected to the author’s understanding of language emphasized by a particular group’s language ideologies. Rumsey (1990) emphasized the cultural notions or justifications for language as social practice, while Silverstein (1979) focused on grammatical structures and the rationalizations for grammatical use of language. Heath’s description highlights the role of language ideologies in demarcating the boundaries around groups. Finally, Irvine is most explicit about situating language ideologies within political and moral fields of difference (and, often, inequality). These differences in use reflect each scholars’ particular research agenda and site, and add to the growing understanding of the connections between language and power through the lens of language ideologies.

166 While this body of literature is relatively new, there has been an important shift in the theoretical focus. The earlier core works that use language ideologies—those emerging from an issue of the journal Pragmatics which gathered papers presented at a symposium held at the American Anthropological Association’s annual meeting in November 1991—specifically and explicitly linked their projects to a break from the negative versions of ideology that devalued popular rationalizations of ‘false consciousness’ and those social theories which followed Boas’ dismissal of ‘secondary rationalizations.’ Research after these core works either take language ideologies as a valid point of departure or use the more neutral version of ideology, meaning the more generalized way that meaning is fashioned in a social framework (William 1977:55; see also Errington 2000).
between speakers or within families and communities, with macrolevel processes of nation-building, gender ideology, and language planning and revitalization, among others. By explicitly exploring the role of language in such processes and bridging and linking the micro and macro, attention to language ideologies is helpful for scholars who seek a context in which broad conceptual categories such as “transnational migration,” “identity,” “political discourse,” and “globalization” are dialogically constructed, and resisted through everyday language use (see Duranti 1990).  

Language ideologies incorporate two previously distinct ways of understanding language and the social world by including both linguistic practice and actual use with those ‘secondary rationalizations’ or commonly-held notions about how language use is tied to social ideas and structures. When such notions were included in ethnographic works prior to this point, they were often “presented as cultural givens rather than understood as having any connection to political-economic factors (Kroskrity 2000b: 7). But whether they are tied to the speech of mono- or multilingual speakers, or to code-switching or mixing, language ideologies “are not only about language. Rather, such ideologies envision and enact links of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology” (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 55-6; see also Kroskity 1992, 1998; Woolard 1998a). These diverse understandings of language represent the “incomplete, or ‘partially successful,’ attempts to rationalize language usage; such rationalizations are typically multiple, context-bound, and necessarily constructed from the

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167 Researchers studying how language is situated in political fields of power relations use a variety of terms: linguistic ideology, language ideology, and ideologies of language. ‘Linguistic ideology’ and ‘language ideology’ are often used in the body of literature in linguistic anthropology dealing with the relations between metalinguistic notions of language and linguistic structures and on speakers as a whole. This body emerged from, and emphasizes, Michael Silverstein’s metapragmatics, “which encompasses implicit and explicit commentary on and signaling about language-in-use” (Woolard 1998a:4). ‘Ideologies of language’ often emerge from “the recently burgeoning historiography of public discourse on language...[and] include the scientific ideologies of professional linguistics,” with a focus on the ideas about language rather than speakers themselves (Woolard 1998a:4). However, these distinctions are not deterministic and are occasionally used conterminously in the same research project.
sociocultural experience of the speaker” (Kroskrity 2004:496; see also Irvine 1989). Speakers’ judgments about the language use of particular categories of persons are vital to exploring both individual and collective understandings of language users’ position vis-à-vis one another and the state (see Eisenlohr 2004, 2007; Irvine 2004; Kroskrity 1992, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 1998; Turin 2004; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). By connecting language use with identity, speakers layer their own history and meaning on places, creating and demarcating boundaries that have tangible effects on linguistic practices and perceptions of others within them (Bakhtin 1981; Bender 2002:S104; Urciuoli 1991:8). Speakers may also be persuaded to conform to notions of linguistic or ethnic “authenticity” (Urciuoli 1996:11), or even to create public solidarity with, or resistance to, attempts of coerced conformity to a majority language or ethnic identity (see also Blommaert 2005; Duranti 1994, 1997a, 2001, 2004). For speakers, language may also be used as a “cover for discriminatory practices that cannot be overtly implemented” (Milroy 2001:64; see also Grillo 1989); it may also influence the “scientific” enumerating of citizens (see Arel 2002; Kertzner and Arel 2002a, 2002b; Leeman 2004) or even effect legal cases through the authority of linguists and those presented as having some linguistic expertise (see Haviland 2003). In all cases, language ideology is inherent in understandings of language in relation to politics, identity, and social relations.

For researchers, language ideologies also address the methodological and theoretical issues of constructing a speech community169 and are tied, by some, to globalization and a

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168 Such connections, referred to as iconicity or iconization, change “the relationship between an indexical linguistic form and a social group, with the effect that it appears to be an iconic representation of that group and is imbued with the same social characteristics (laziness, sloppiness, immorality, elegance, intelligence)” (Milroy 2001:66).

decline in economic hegemony\textsuperscript{170} and the political economy of the nation state.\textsuperscript{171} Perhaps most importantly, they offer “new ways to explore the connections between the immediacy of social practice and the ongoing construction of enduring social and cultural worlds…[and in] recognizing the role of language ideologies at macro, median and micro levels of linguistic performance” (Peterson 2003:21-38).

There are a number of advantages to using the concept of language ideologies in the current incarnation of theorizing language and power by including the complex and overlapping nature of the social world. Paul Kroskrity notes that there are five features of language ideologies. First, language ideologies are “constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group” (Kroskrity 2004:501).\textsuperscript{172} Rather than understanding these ideas about appropriate language use as purely cultural preferences, this situates such beliefs in the power relationships within and between groups.\textsuperscript{173} Second, since there is such a multiplicity of perspectives, language ideologies can reveal an uneven distribution of acceptance or even awareness of such ideas about language (Kroskrity 2004:505).\textsuperscript{174} Third, language ideologies are “multiple because of the plurality of meaningful social divisions (class, gender, elites, generations, and so on) within sociocultural groups that have the potential to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group membership” (2004:503).\textsuperscript{175} Fourth, they do this work of connecting linguistic practices with social valuations “by constituting those linguistic and discursive forms

\textsuperscript{170} See Friedman 2003.
\textsuperscript{171} See Gal 1989.
\textsuperscript{172} Kroskrity continues: “A member’s notions of what is ‘true,’ ‘morally good,’ or ‘aesthetically pleasing’ about language and discourse are grounded in social experience and often demonstrably tied to political-economic interests. These notions often underlie attempts to use language as the site at which to promote, protect, and legitimate those interests” (2004:501).
\textsuperscript{173} See also Phillips 1992 and 1998.
\textsuperscript{174} Kroskrity notes that this represents a break from Silverstein’s notion of language ideology. Silverstein emphasized the metalinguistic commentary on grammar and linguistic structures, while Kroskrity includes that social use of language that may not necessarily be tied with such structures (Kroskrity 2000b: 18-19). See also Kroskrity 2000b: 18, 2000c.
\textsuperscript{175} He believes that language ideologies are “thus grounded in social experience which is never uniformly distributed throughout polities of any scale” (Kroskrity 2004:503).
as indexically tied to features in their sociocultural experiences” (2004:507) and, in this way, are used in the “creation and representation of various social and cultural identities” (2004:509). Finally, language ideologies are not only objects of study, but are themselves understandings of language particular to that theoretical, historical, and political moment:

The fact that anthropological understandings of language are rooted in empirical study does not make them less ideological than other ways of understanding language. Indeed, the very fact that we can authorize our positions in this way involves an ideology that privileges the empirical over the commonsensical (for common sense, although always practical, is rarely empirical) (Peterson 2003: 22).

The core literature of language ideologies are those earlier works which emphasized the rationalization of the term—breaking away from those theoretical and methodological dismissals of both ‘secondary rationalizations’ (c.f. Boas) and ‘false consciousness’ (ideology)—and explicitly justified their analyses by noting the ways in which a focus on language ideologies deepened their ethnographic data (for an overview of this perspective, see Kroskrity 2000; Woolard 1992 and 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). These core works explored the usefulness of language ideologies, both methodologically and theoretically, in understanding language, gender, and a host of social practices including the use of honorifics (Irvine 1992,

176 Individuals, “in constructing language ideologies, display the influence of their consciousness in their selection of features of both linguistic and social systems that they do distinguish and in the linkages between systems that they construct” (Kroskrity 2004:507)
177 Language is used in these cases “as the key to naturalizing the boundaries of social groups...[l]anguage-ideological research counters or complements this focus on shared linguistic forms by reminding us that when language is used in the making of national or ethnic identities, the unity achieved is underlain by patterns of linguistic stratification which subordinates those groups who do not command the standard” (Kroskrity 2004:509).
178 For example, as Silverstein has shown, Benedict Anderson’s use of language in *Imagined Communities* was itself a product of a particular language ideology (see Silverstein 2000). For Anderson, the rise of nationalism is predicated on a literate society in which print capital is central to notions of community and self-identity (see Anderson 1991 [1983]: 67-82). He also reproduces Herderian notions of the connection between nation and language, specifically that multilingualism is a ‘problem’ for the nation (Anderson 1991 [1983], 1996; Habermas 1996; see also Herder 1968). These two emphases in his work reflect his own language ideologies: 1) he privileges literate traditions over oral in terms of nationalism, and 2) there is no linguistic reason why multilingualism is dangerous for the rise of nationalism, nor are nation and language necessarily correlated.
reproduction of social relations (Briggs 1992a, 1992b, 1998), respect and nostalgia (Hill 1992, 1998), and language shift (Kulick 1992, 1998). Some focused on more macro-level concerns such as language and the state; Blommaert and Verschueren explored the way associations between language and nation affected nationalist ideologies in Europe (1992, 1998) while Joseph Errington focused on the context in which Indonesian was declared a state language in the newly formed nation of Indonesia (1992, 1998). Language ideologies are not focused only on spoken languages, but on written as well. For Bambi Schieffelin, literacy and

179 Judith Irvine (1992, 1998) notes that to understand honorific language use—those grammatical or lexical forms specifically used to convey respect or deference for those above the speaker, or the opposite for those of lower rank than the speaker—evidence must not be gathered only from those linguistic structures. Rather, the social and political framework in which those linguistic structures are used in addition to those ideological justifications for particular forms of honorific use must be considered to more fully understand its use (see also Agha 1998).

180 Charles Briggs, drawing on theories of social reproduction emerging from Bourdieu’s research in language and power as well as Gramsci’s focus on hegemony and the politics of culture, believes that social relations are reproduced and naturalized through language ideologies, including those gendered notions of language use and power (1992a). For studies of language, gender is not solely a social category; it is also a grammatical or indexical category allowing or facilitating referential belonging and exclusion (Briggs 1992b, 1998; see also Silverstein 1985). As Briggs notes, “the study of women’s and men’s discourse is…unlikely to tell us very much about gender…unless rights to speak, to listen, to extract, interpret, and reuse words are examined with respect to their social, cultural and political significance” (1992b: 356; see also 1998).

181 Here, language use is ideologically constructed in such a way to unproblematically connect such language use to a mutually exclusive identity. The evidence they provide, they believe, reveals the disjuncture between popular (nationalist) language ideologies and actual language use within the often multilingual setting of Europe (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 208). They take this disjuncture as an important way in which attention to language ideologies is a vital departure from previous forms of theorizing that were less fruitful.

182 This language shift, away from the multitude of locally used (and politically attached) forms of language to the less-political (in the sense that it was not ideologically attached to any particular group within the new nation-state of Indonesia), Indonesian language is most fruitfully analyzed, Errington believes, within the framework of language ideologies (1992, 1998). This is particularly important within the discursive creation of the new nation-state and its subjects—the Indonesian language, as part of the naturalizing of the Indonesian state’s way of understanding the world, helps create a doxa in which assumptions about connectivity, development, and modernity are deployed. Political concerns and ideological associations between language and groups of people are not often considered within studies of language shift emerging from linguistics. Yet in this instance, an analysis without such a consideration would miss the important linguistic implications of social and political frameworks of power.

183 Rutherford’s study on literacy in Indonesia is one example of the political importance of the written language. He finds that among residents of Biak, Irian Jaya, Indonesia, the same word (amber) is constructed as Westerner, civil servant, non-Irianese Indonesian, “but above all it refers to men and women who have gained recognition and respect” (Rutherford 2000: 313). Such respect is often cultivated through writing, with Indonesian seen as the “literate” language. Mothers use the national language (Indonesian) with children at home, “leaving the mother tongue for conversations amongst themselves” while Biak, the local language, “remains the language of singing, storytelling, and scolding” (2000: 319). Authenticity, and by extension reliability, is constructed by residents as naturally tied to the written word, and anything of “substance” or “importance” involves the incorporation of writing—particularly when remembering the past. Rutherford writes: “The written word was considered evidence of the veracity of a narrative, like the old songs that some informants sang to me or the named rock formations that others showed me in order to validate their versions of local myths. The most reliable sources were old foreign
written languages are embedded in the same ideological, political, and economic processes as spoken languages and may be just as socially transformative.\textsuperscript{184} More recent works on language ideologies have focused on gender (Chernela 2003; Inoue 2004b), the politics of language use and language use in politics (Hill 2000a; Omoniyi 2003; Philips 2000; Rutherford 2000), language ideologies in institutions (Flowers 2000; LaDousa 2005; Leeman 2004; Jaffe 1999; Olivo 2003; Valdés, et. al. 2003; see also Shameen 2002), space and metaphor (Gal 2005) and on language rights, loss, and revitalization (England 2003; Errington 2003; Friedman 2003; Jaffe 1999; Mascia-Lees and Lees 2003; Whitely 2003).\textsuperscript{185}

While all such research uses language ideologies as an analytical tool to explain social relations, Susan Gal asks, how are they effective? How is language, in the abstract, thought to work in each context?\textsuperscript{186} She suggests three ways language and social forms connect through monographs, Biaks told me, because their authors knew the ‘old people’ before they all died” (2000: 320). This sense of written language as the authentic marks, by extension, all texts as inalienable possessions which not only represent the past, but also are believed to counteract against the potential for change or the “threat of loss.” By privileging texts, persons may imagine themselves as “future ancestors,” whose words will connect the past to the future, while the spoken word has no such potential.

\textsuperscript{184} For example, in the kreyòl language of Haiti, the letters w, k, and y are ideologically connected with “non-Latin” languages, especially English. For this reason, those wanting to emphasize the linguistic—read social, political, economic—connections between kreyòl and French have attempted to remove them from the orthography of kreyòl (Schieffelin and Douchet 1998: 304-5, see also Schieffelin and Douchet 1992, 1994). This kind of language shift is not connected to anything inherent in the grammar of the spoken language; rather, this shift is occurring because of ideological connections. See also Ahearn 2000, 2001a; Barton and Hall 2000; Baynham 1995; Collins 1995; Graves 1991; Jaffe 2000a, 2000b; Romaine 2005; Schieffelin 2000; Winer 1990.

\textsuperscript{185} Power is at the center of many discussions within language rights discourse. Some believe the process of language rights is “intrinsically counterhegemonic…[it] counterposes subaltern groups, often in internally undifferentiated blocs, against the dominant state power” (Whitley 2003:712). In the push for rights, language has become a “detachable, portable…commodity that may be alienable and circulate” and, therefore, must be visible and objectifiable (2003:713). In addition, an increasing emphasis on written language has devalued the role of oral languages within the nation-state ideal of proper connections between culture, community, and language because most languages in authority within nation-states have written languages—e.g. English, Hindi, Chinese, Russian. While these issues are clearly salient for Indians of Nepali descent, Joseph Errington believes most linguistic studies of language change and loss have ignored the connections between such change and cultural, social, economic, and ideological processes (2003:723; see also Swigart 2000), something I hope to remedy, in small part, with this project.

\textsuperscript{186} Susan Gal, in this same work, highlights the need for scholars to attend to the ways language ideologies become “dominant…more authoritative or credible than others, if only temporarily and partially” as well on the multiplicity of contested and “rarely monolithic, nor always stable” nature of language ideologies (1998:320-321; see also Gal 1992, and Irvine and Gal 2000 for ethnographic explorations of these processes).
semiotic forms: iconization, recursiveness, and erasure (1998: 327-329). The process of iconization transforms linguistic varieties into practices which are thought to embody the natural essence of a group of speakers. Recursivity, or what Gal and Irvine later term “fractal recursivity,” projects ideas from one level of speech or social relations to another. Finally, erasure is the process by which groups are made invisible by a particular ideology, in many cases by simplifying the social or linguistic context (Gal 1998:328). Assumptions about the nature of language as homogenous leads to the invisibility of alternative uses or user and language ideologies are effective precisely because they can be used to change the perception of what is natural through these processes.

For this dissertation, insights from research on language ideologies about language shift, literacy and written languages, formation and maintenance of the nation state, and standardization are particularly salient because of the connections between linguistic practices and the political, legal, and social contexts in which those practices are embedded. In the case of official narratives of language defining, as was the case in India pertaining to the Nepali Language Movement, for groups and languages “marginal not only to dominant languages but...
also to dominant language ideologies,” the use of descriptive linguistic techniques may assist in fostering the sort of recognition that is difficult to find for many oral languages (Errington 2003: 730). Yet description is not enough when trying to understand the ways in which such language shift and change is occurring:

[An]thropologists concerned with language loss cannot simply return to the days of the ‘salvage paradigm’ …they also [must] consider what happens when we attempt to apply particular ideologies to real-life situations …[and include] from various perspectives, the complexity of working out strategies regarding language loss and revitalization, both on the part of the anthropologists and on the part of speakers of threatened languages (Mascia-Lees and Lees 2003: 711).

In the case of Mayan languages, like the Basque language movement and Nepali Language Movement in India, linguists and language ‘experts’ played an important role in the process of cultural and linguistic revitalization by standardizing the language, increasing calls for widespread literacy programs and state-supported education, and “act[ing] as critics and protagonists in the establishment and diffusion of language ideologies that foster language retention” (England 2003: 736; see also Collins 1998).

191 This was certainly the case early in the Nepali Language Movement in spite of the language having a script.
192 While language loss and endangerment have been explored in a variety of fields, these have tended to emphasize such loss and endangerment as a “world problem, involving macroprocesses that encompass and transform local speech communities from outside inward” rather than including both inward- and outward-looking processes (Nevins 2004: 269). For example, M. Eleanor Nevins notes that language transformation and loss among speakers of White Mountain Apache is most often ideologically constructed as occurring due to the political and economic hegemony of English. Language “experts” from outside a community may conflict with the internal understandings of language, or even previously held sources of linguistic authority within the group. Nevins demonstrates how these conflicts “between standards of communicative competence associated with ‘expert’ and local rhetorics…and the social and political relationships entailed by each, are key to understanding the controversies surrounding a local Apache program” (2004: 270). The Apache program was introduced to counteract local language “loss;” however, although the program was believed necessary by the state to strengthen the speech community and prevent its total loss, local Apaches “responded to such programs with ambivalence…many support[ed] putting Apache on equal footing with English,” while others believed such programs threatened “to replace Apache pedagogical practices and to undermine relations of authority between younger and older Apache generations” (2004: 270). Two conflicting language ideologies regarding language loss intersected: (1) community norms of Apache “cultural values of speaking” and family communication, and (2) international discourse about language loss, revitalization, and endangerment (Nevins 2004: 272). However, since the tribe is required to maintain an active participation in their relationship with the U.S. government, the language programs “involve recasting the local language community’s imagining of itself in terms of Western-derived institutions and ideas…The structure of grant funding, the bureaucracy of the educational system, and status of Apache as both a minority language and the language of the Apache nation all prejudice funding in favor of language preservation programs that are legitimized within Western
Scholarship focusing on language ideologies experienced in and through institutions such as schools and the collection of census data is in large part a continuation of the focus on institutions used to reproduce and socialize individuals into particular relationships with the hegemony of the state (see Althusser 1971, Bourdieu 1991). Classrooms also represent a site where individuals are socialized into particular ways of engaging with language, including written language, outside the home and family (see Heath 2001 [1982]; Philips 2001 [1970]). Educational institutions are a place where notions of proper language use, and therefore, appropriateness of behavior are learned, negotiated, and resisted by individuals (Mertz 1998). In many of the following examples, the education system is ideologically created and actively maintained as a monolingual/monoglossic setting.

Education has the “ability to organize symbolic capital by training students in a particular type of language,” although that symbolic capital may differ between the local students and their parents and the government which creates education guidelines (LaDousa 2005: 468). In India during the 1960s, for example, the government introduced the three-language formula in order to facilitate linguistic exchange between the various linguistic areas of the country. This three-language formula posits an ideal of Hindi as the national language, English as the international language, and a local or district language as the third. However, LaDousa shows how local understandings of this policy position Hindi and English in opposition, “setting students, families, and employees along different social and economic trajectories” (2005: 460). Parents,

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193 In Hindi, rāṣṭrabhāṣā (LaDousa 2005:460).
194 In Hindi, antarrāṣṭrabhāṣā (LaDousa 2005:460).
195 In this case, the third language, Bhojpuri, was viewed by residents as a “house language (ghar kī bhāṣā) or village language (gāv kī bhāṣā)” (LaDousa 2005:462). Its status as such a language made its use in schools “utterly ridiculous” by local standards, and therefore, LaDousa focuses the remainder of the article of Hindi and English.
pushing their children to learn English without the inclusion of other codes, such as Hindi or the local language, send them outside their home communities because it is believed that such pure education is unavailable in this area. This particular form of English is very important for those parents who want their children to get into university, secure government jobs, or go overseas. These notions about the role of English are similar to what I discovered in Darjeeling during my ethnographic research in 2005 and 2007 (see chapter five).

Notions of ‘proper’ language use which label certain languages standard or non-standard are disseminated through a variety of ways, including the education system, and are often connected to the formation and maintenance of the nation-state by the iconization of the past and time itself (Cavanaugh 2004; Inoue 2004a, 2004b; Irvine and Gal 2000; Woolard 2004). In the United States, the standard code as the ‘proper’ way to speak is associated with a geographical location (e.g. the northern Midwest) rather than social group (e.g. middle-class whites). The English standard is a register which indexes class rather than location and has traditionally had a minimal number of speakers. As Milroy notes, “popular perceptions [of standard language] involve accent in Britain but not in the United States, where standardness appears to be essentially the avoidance of particular socially marked grammatical and lexical forms” (2001: 56–61).

196 Lesley Milroy explored the ways language users are believed to possess “standard, nonstandard, problematic, or inadequate” linguistic skills in the US and Britain and how this is tied up with historical processes of migration, education, and economics (2001:56; for a more comprehensive sociolinguistic study of heteroglossia in England and France, see Grillo 1989). For example, speakers in both countries believe that accurate codes exist within the variety of ways the English language is spoken. This code, what Milroy labels as the standard language ideology, “provides a rationale for language-based discrimination against marginalized social groups” (2001:57). In both countries, concerns about the preferred code have been used in situations when “some social phenomenon or problem is suddenly foregrounded in public discourse and discussed in an obsessive, alarmist manner as if it betokened some imminent catastrophe” (Cameron 1995:82 as quoted in Milroy 2001:57). Examples of the most recent moral panic included concerns of “immigration, communism, overpopulation, pornography, single mothers on welfare, and pit bull terriers” (Milroy 2001:57). Moral panic about language has been generated through debates about grammar education in the U.K., and Ebonics and the English-Only movement in the US.

197 This code has been labeled by Milroy as “mainstream United States English” (MUSE). It is considered the unmarked code and has been variously described as “colorless”, “characterless”, and its speakers as having “no accent” (2001:58-61).

198 Referred to in linguistic circles as ‘received pronunciation’ (RP) it has also variously described as “Oxford English,” “BBC English,” or “the Queen’s English” (2001:58).
people find it easier to specify what is not standard than what is; in a sense, the standard of popular perception is what is left behind when all the nonstandard varieties spoken by disparaged persons such as Valley Girls, Hillbillies, Southerners, New Yorkers, African Americans, Asians, Mexican Americans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans are set aside (Milroy 2001: 59; see also Lippi-Green 1997).

Many of these speech varieties are closely tied to historical divisions “between a dichotomized urban, progressive North and an illiterate, rural, conservative, slave-owning South” or, in the case of New York, a perceived gathering point and first contact with immigrants (Milroy 2001: 60).¹⁹⁹

But how, precisely, can we connect the spoken with discourses and ideologies? In order to understand this connection, I draw on scholarship on indexicality and linguistic syncretism to connect theories of the social world to a microlevel linguistic analysis.

2.3 Engaging Linguistic Practices

For this study, there are two key concepts that help us understand the way that linguistic forms (spoken and written speech) connect to macro-discourses like race, nationality, class, and other forms of social belonging—essentially, the mechanisms that allow language ideologies to ‘work.’ While I focus below on indexicality and linguistic syncretism, a further discussion of linguistic methods (including the matched-guise technique) and principles behind such methods can be found in chapter 5.

2.3.1 Indexicality

Indexicality is the quality of human languages that allows us to connect words to objects in the natural world and ideas in the social world. Just as there is no innate connection between

¹⁹⁹ During the 18th-century, patterns of internal migration in the US created a larger area of linguistic contact than was possible in Europe and the “association between aristocratic speech and the ‘best’ speech persisted and was unacceptable to early American thinkers” (Milroy 2001:61).
the word ‘tree’ and the green leafy plant outside my window (as opposed to both the hundreds of other kinds of plants that look nothing like the one outside my window and yet are classified as ‘tree’ and other words that mean ‘tree’—rūkh, árbol, mti, baum), there is nothing in a person’s use of words like ain’t, y’all, or to boldly go rather than to go boldly that connects them to a particular social class or education level. Yet, in everyday speech, particular lexical and grammatical choices index such social ideas.

Much of the early work on indexicality draws from Charles Peirce’s typology of signs and Roman Jakobson’s work on deixis—even today, interest in indexicality for linguists rests largely in pronouns (I, he, she) and deictics (here, there, that, tomorrow). Michael Silverstein brought together these ideas about the qualities of language and expanded them so that current uses of indexicality go “beyond spatiotemporal coordinates to include social reference in both its presupposing and creating force” (Duranti 1997b:346; see also Silverstein 1976). For research within linguistic anthropology—and this study in particular—indexicality is crucial because of the way speech connects to social ideas like social belonging. It may help us understand how honorifics connect grammatical forms to notions of politeness (see Agha 1993 for a discussion of honorifics in Lhasa Tibetan), the relationship between space, body position, and community (see Duranti 1997b), time and history (see Eisenlohr 2004; Inoue 2004a, 2004b, Irvine 2004), and racialized notions of language use (see Anderson 2008, Hill 1999, Urciuoli 2009).

2.3.2 Linguistic Syncretism

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200 William Hanks uses the following example of the indexicality of pronouns: “If I utter ‘I want you to have this’ while handing over a book to Madeleine, the forms ‘I, you, this’ are indexical because they must be interpreted in relation to the situation of the utterance” (2000:124). In another setting, ‘I, you, this’ would have a different meaning. For further exploration, see Hanks 1990.

201 All these words require an understanding of the context in order for the meaning of the word to become clear.

202 Further afield from this study, but interesting nonetheless, is Vincent Crapanzano’s use of indexicality to understand Freud’s notion of transference (1981).
Linguistic syncretism occurs in settings of language mixing and complexity; it is most easily observable in multilingual settings and those in which language shift is occurring but it does occur elsewhere. Syncretism allows speakers to emphasize or de-emphasize particular indexical meanings (such as in-group identity and solidarity) in a context in which the boundaries between languages are less discrete and allow for a variety of linguistic choices. As Miki Makihara notes for multilingual speakers on Rapa Nui (Easter Island), syncretism “describes the interactional norm and ‘practical,’ as opposed to ‘discursive’…consciousness of the language users who allow and expect bilingual simultaneities and demonstrate accommodation toward speakers of varying bilingual competence and preference” (2004:530; for a discussion of ‘discursive’ consciousness, see Giddens 1984). The question remains, as Jane Hill asks, “[why] are some of these histories retrievable and contestable by particular interlocutors in particular interactional moments, while others are not” (2000b: 244)—for example, why are certain forms of Nepali-English codeswitching acceptable, such as using English nouns and transforming them into verbs by using the verb garnu (meaning ‘to do’), but other forms, i.e. Nepali verbs with English conjugations, are almost unheard of.

2.4 Conclusion

I have found these theoretical approaches and key concepts presented above crucial to understand the complex field of meanings that frame any analysis of the Nepali language movement and the subsequent linguistic shifts. While these bodies of literature emerge from very different historical and ethnographic trajectories, they may all be used to understand the complex framework and lived experience of social difference in complimentary ways. I have found the

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203 I would argue linguistic syncretism could occur even in seemingly monolingual settings. They may be less obviously highlighted in language ideologies, but are there nonetheless.

intersection most helpful in my own preparations for field work and analysis because each highlights a different way the highly racialized experiences of Indians of Nepali descent can be understood—legally, structurally, politically, socially, and linguistically. In the case of Darjeeling, sole attention to ethnic, caste, or even social difference would ignore the intersection between structures of inequality stemming from government policies and practices including the census, infrastructure construction (roads, electricity, clean water), and law. Yet these structures are in turn influenced by ideologies and social beliefs and practices. Without attention to language and the everyday interactions between Indians of Nepali descent and other groups, we would miss the ways they use the variety of ethnically-linked linguistic identities to resist and reform those same identities. Social difference in India, Racial Formation Theory, Critical Race Theory, and scholarship on language and power each focus on a different area in which power and difference are created, deployed and understood and all are useful in contextualizing the lived experience of difference those people with whom I work.
Chapter 3  Differing Visions of our Glorious Future

The goal of this chapter is to explore both the complicated history of naming the language spoken by Indians of Nepali descent in India—‘Nepali’ or ‘Gorkhali’—as well as present a possible explanation for why language—as a point of political organizing around identity and political engagement in the state—continued to be crucial for politics in Darjeeling while becoming less important in other parts of India.

In order to understand how the broader context of governmental intervention into language, in conjunction with local language ideologies in Darjeeling, led to the debates about what to call the language of Indians of Nepali descent, we must first understand three points: 1) the ethnographic and political landscape in which nomenclature arguments are politically, rather than linguistically meaningful; 2) why the linguistic reorganization of states in India dissipated much of the political steam of language politics elsewhere but not Darjeeling; and 3) how different factions in Darjeeling used language—language as political ideology rather than actual linguistic practice—as a way to gain recognition by the government and, eventually, political and social recognition as a productive and important ethnic group within India. The different factions, at different times, focused their efforts on various legal acts: the linguistic reorganization of states in the 1950s, the 1961 Official Language Act of 1961 in which the state of West Bengal made the Nepali language the official language of the three hill subdivisions, the 1988 creation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, the 1992 inclusion of Nepali into the Indian constitution. The following narrative is only a brief outline of what occurred—focusing on representative events rather than tracing the full history—but necessary to understand the various ways in which ideologies connect arguments about nomenclature to citizenship issues, security,
the social application of law, and access to other rights such as education and employment.

While the machinations and minutiae of the broader political landscape of India are well beyond the scope of this chapter, they nonetheless were the context in which local ideas about language were understood, created, and deployed.

As I will explore in the pages below, issues of nomenclature have a long history in Darjeeling; today, the arguments are over whether to call the language ‘Nepali’ or ‘Gorkhali.’ In short, few people argue that the two are linguistically different yet I met no one who believed the arguments about the two were unimportant. But who champions which and why? In this next section, I will explain how and why the arguments over nomenclature are politically, not linguistically, meaningful.

3.1 A rose or a “thorny cactus?”

During the parliamentary debates over whether to include Nepali in the constitution of India as a national language, Inderjit Khuller, member of Parliament (MP) from Darjeeling and champion of the ‘Gorkhali’ label, argued his point with Shakespeare:

Shakespeare once said, “What is in a name,” and hastened to add: “A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” [section omitted] Alas, this does not hold good insofar as a language is concerned. A language by any other name may not only not smell as sweet but could, intact [in fact], turn out to be a thorny cactus.

The ‘thorny cactus,’ in Darjeeling, was what to call the language spoken by Indians of Nepali descent. Those who argue for “Gorkhali” were generally Subash Ghisingh, leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front—the political party at the forefront of the 1980s Gorkhaland

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1 This is detailed in chapter four.
2 Lok Sabha proceedings (lower house of Indian Parliament), 8 May 1992. These words were spoken by Inderjit Khuller, MP from Darjeeling and representative of the perspective on the language championed by Subash Ghisingh, leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front and, after 1988, chair of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.
movement in Darjeeling\textsuperscript{3}—and Chairman of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council as well as his supporters. Ghisingh was deposed as leader in November/December 2007; therefore, observations about him are colored by the fact that I was conducting my research in the last years of his tenure. Ghisingh and his supporters were often represented by Darjeeling city residents as violent and prone to retaliation if they felt slighted.\textsuperscript{4} Therefore, those individuals who were either against his ideas about the language or in support of calling it ‘Nepali’ were often silent in public (as will become clear later). This made figuring out who supported calling the language ‘Nepali’ more difficult; some were former members of the Nepali Language Committee, some were anti-Ghisingh and would oppose anything he championed. In general, based on my ethnographic research, that the majority of residents in Darjeeling were either disinterested in the entire argument or in favor (in private) of calling the language ‘Nepali.’ But the situation is rather complicated and so, I hope, a few ethnographic vignettes will provide a glimpse into the everyday negotiations regarding the nomenclature.

“Nepali” and “Gorkhali” are used simultaneously at public events or, in schools, used in different respects. Schools often have Nepali departments or programs; however, I met a number of people who pointed out, without irony, that they may be Nepali departments but that they teach “Gorkhā Bhāsā” [Gorkha Language]. Local quizzes, like game shows, are put on by the Education Departments of schools and are given bilingually in English and Nepali. A man involved with the events remembered at one quiz, Ghisingh said “Nepali” instead of Gorkhali and then “had to put his tongue back in.” At a public rally sponsored by AGSU (All Gorkha Student Union) in Darjeeling town, April 2007, the president of the organization gave a speech

\textsuperscript{3} For a detailed history of the Gorkhaland movement, see Hazarika 1995; Samanta 2000; Sarkar and Bhaumik 2000; and Subba1992. Subba presents a short history of the ways both terms, in addition to others throughout history, have been used as synonyms for the same language. He argues that, among other factors, Ghisingh choose Gorkhali and the central government was quick to accept it was to “jeopardise (sic) the much apprehended myth of ‘Greater Nepal’ which is still alive in the minds of our parliamentarians and assembly members” (Subba 1992: 72).

\textsuperscript{4} During my research in 2007, it was clear that he retained support in the more rural areas like tea plantations.
in which he called for Nepalis to take a leadership role in local colleges and argued for the need for a university in the area. After his speech was over, a series of music performances followed. The fourth singer, a young man in jeans, khaki jacket, and a ponytail had written a song about the unity of the Nepali people; the chorus was “ḥāmi sabāi Gorkhāli” [We are all Gorkhāli].

Most people I knew tried to stay out of the debates. Mr. Joshi, who works for a publishing house in Darjeeling, believed that the distinction between the two was a “political gimmick” used for short-term political gains. The politicians, he says, didn’t know the history of the language and so they manipulated the people. Ghisingh had his own perspective about “Gorkha”—since he was pushing for Gorkhaland—but others assumed that his arguments were based on ‘history.’ “This distinction just doesn’t make sense now.” The whole separation of the language is “not even worth a debate,” but has been very difficult, Joshi said, for those who love the language because literature and language studies have “taken a back seat” in these times of political turmoil. “Diplomatic people,” he said, don’t make overt choices—they don’t label their books, writings, or even label the language in which the book was written. That way, he believes, they can write what they need to without worrying about the consequences. Ghisingh should have kept to politics and “he has not been forgiven nor should be forgiven for what he’s done,” both to the language and to Darjeeling. People can’t stand up to him because, he said, they are still afraid.5

His final description of the difference between Nepali and Gorkhali is what most people with whom I spoke had articulated. The difference between Nepali and Gorkhali is like the difference between calling your mother āmā or mummā.6 “Both mean mother, but one is close to

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5 He believed that Ghisingh’s more recent focus on religion was his “escape route” from what he’d done because he is “getting old and had nothing else and nothing else to offer the Darjeeling people.” At this point, he said, “we need political stability, not religion.”

6 In American English, it could be like the difference between calling your mother, “mom” or “mommy.”
India and one is close to the heart.” For Mr. Joshi, the two languages indexically connect nomenclature with very different social landscapes. Gorkhali is associated with the community’s Indian citizenship; Nepali, however, was associated with the more complex intersection of affective connections to family, locality, and history.

3.1.1 Data and source material

In order to connect the macrolevel political landscape with the local Darjeeling one, I rely primarily on two kinds of sources—ethnographic and historical/scholarly. These two broad categories of information often provided contradictory readings of local events and how they connect to national politics. It is precisely this complexity that makes this subject both so interesting and so important to understand what comes in chapter four; i.e. advocating adding Nepali to the 8th Schedule of the constitution, local interpretations of national policy, and current linguistic practices.

The historical material not found in scholarly articles was taken from boxes of documents produced and gathered by the Akhīl Bhāratyia Nepāli Bhāsā Samītī [अखील भारतीय नेपाली भाषा समिति, All Indian Nepali Language Committee; referred to in the remainder of the chapter as the Language Committee]. Members of the committee collected many kinds of documents pertaining to their push to have their language added to the 8th schedule of the constitution as well as the debates about nomenclature: government publications regarding the Nepali language and Indians of Nepali descent, GNLF pamphlets about language and the Gorkhaland struggle, newspaper articles from throughout South Asia, letters between members of the Language Committee and government officials, letters from so-called ‘language lovers’ in the community, as well as scholarly materials about language. These documents are not only useful as historical evidence; collectively, they represent those themes the committee members believed were important and
would help them address concerns about the Nepali language and people in India. Since the wide range of sources cannot be covered in this chapter alone, I’ve chosen to highland general themes and texts that were either mentioned repeatedly or help explain the important ideological differences between arguments by supporters of ‘Nepali’ and those of ‘Gorkhali.’

The ethnographic evidence was gathered during research visits to Darjeeling and Sikkim in 2005 and 2007, although it is important to note that there was little direct evidence to gather regarding the debates between languages because of the political repression and the sensitivity of the history of nomenclature in the area. When asked outright, most people would say that they didn’t remember, that it wasn’t important, they didn’t know anything about language, etc. On occasion—in private discussions with very close friends or with people who believed they couldn’t be hurt by what they told me or the GNLF—I was told that the GNLF’s arguments that the name of the language was ‘Gorkhali’ was obviously a “political trick” and something that made Nepali people look “foolish.” But overall, it was a topic people clearly preferred not to discuss openly. Exceptions to this were rare, but instructive; my experiences with what to name the language during the matched-guise test at local colleges (chapter five) caused an uproar as well as those occasions when I ‘slipped’ and choose one of the language names during discussions with supporters of the then-political regime. It was these instances that the still-simmering anger and fear emerged. These silences demonstrate how keenly the past is felt and how socially meaningful the language issue remains to Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling.

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7 It is important to keep in mind the time period and location in which I completed this research; by 2007, Ghisingh was becoming less and less popular in Darjeeling town. When I first visited in 2005, there were whispers against him but people were, at least publicly, supporting him for the most part. When I returned in 2007, I was shocked at the change. Men in the streets were discussing his failings and, in many cases, wishing he would be deposed (although inevitably one person in the group would remind the company that it was dangerous to say such things in public). Ghisingh was still popular in the tea plantations and villages but this support was insufficient to keep Ghisingh in power once the GJMM (Gorkha Janmukti Morcha) began to challenge him in October 2007. Therefore, many of my findings turned up strongly anti-Ghisingh sentiment, including the remembrances of the past. If I had conducted research in the tea plantations, for example, I would have discovered very different attitudes.
3.2 By any other name…

The naming in and of languages is politically sensitive not only in the Darjeeling hills or South Asia. In the former Yugoslavia, debates over the nature of, and names, the languages spoken in the area began after the country split; since these languages (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin) are now divided by political boundaries, are they dialects, discrete languages, or language ‘varieties’?8

There has been considerable research on other varieties of linguistic naming—onomastics9 (Bokhorst-Heng and Wee 2007; Huang 2007; Makoni, Makoni, and Mashiri 2007; Ramoniené 2007); orthography (Schieffelin and Doucet 1994; Watanabe 2007; Zhao and Baldauf, Jr. 2007); place names (Hodges 2007; Huang 2007); gendered naming practices (Pauwels and Winter 2007); and even nomenclature of racial and ethnic groups (Laversuch 2007; Urciuoli 1996). Research, particularly ethnographic research, on the everyday politics and meanings of naming languages is comparatively less explored.

In Darjeeling, the division between ‘Nepali’ and ‘Gorkhali’ is not about language standardization;10 until recently, most people seemed to agree that the two referred to the same language. There are, over the past few years, a few proponents who have argued that ‘Nepali’ is the language spoken in Nepal (also known as pakkā Nepali, meaning ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ Nepali) and ‘Gorkhali’ is the language spoken in Darjeeling. This, interestingly, directly contradicts earlier arguments during the Nepali Language Movement that Gorkhali emerged from the Gorkha district in Western Nepal and, therefore, the Gorkhali language was not the language of

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8 For full discussion of the Serbia-Croatian case, see Okey 2005, see also Banac 1984, Bugarski 2004, Ceh and Harder 2005, Donia and Fine 1994, and Ingrao 2003. Ahearn (2001) includes these and other cases, such as Swedish and Norwegian, as representative of the broader politics of nomenclature.
9 Onomastics is the study of the use, history, and origin of proper names.
10 For discussion of the politics of language planning and standardization, see Wilks and Brick 2001.
Indians of Nepali descent. Regardless, the divide over what to call the language reflects a long and conflicted political history that subsumes language ideologies, national politics and nation building, and the shifting terms of citizenship in India. These debates have, since the 1980s and the creation of the GNLF by Subash Ghisingh, become solidified as opposing political and ideological positions. To label the language using one or the other terms indexes a particular ideological slant on the place of Indians of Nepali descent within the larger nation-state, an allegiance to a particular political party, and a specific vision of the history—and future—of both the language and the community.

Why does nomenclature matter so much when discussing language or ethnicity in India? What would the actual impact be, or have been, of changing the name of the language from Nepali to Nepali/Gorkhali or Gorkhali or the name of the ethnicity from Nepali to Gorkha? Kumar has argued that nomenclature debates have a particular salience within both Indian politics and journalism (1998: 92); however, the question remains—how did these local language ideologies emerge? In order to understand the current political and linguistic landscape, we must understand both 1) the politics of language in India and 2) the history of nomenclature in the Darjeeling hills.

3.3 Language Politics in India

Language politics are complicated anywhere; but in India, where hundreds of languages are spoken, the political landscape for language is particularly complex. The issue of nomenclature has occasionally been at issue, but language politics are more broadly about access to rights and protections. I will discuss the push for the constitutional recognition of Nepali, and what that entailed, more fully in chapter 4. But first, it is crucial that we understand the context in which such rights were deemed necessary.

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11 I am thinking of the debates over Hindustani-Hindi-Urdu in the early to mid-twentieth century.
Interest in language politics, not surprisingly, spans various disciplinary boundaries—linguistics, anthropology, sociology, political science, demography, history. These perspectives on language politics are helpful to understand the multifaceted and intensely complicated case of India; however, the way such politics ‘work’ in India often flies in the face of theories emerging from evidence gathered in Europe and the US over the past 300 years. J.G. Herder, for example, argued very early on that there is (or should be) a direct connection between a nation and its language, not languages. This monoglot ideology (Silverstein 1996), although powerful in terms of western philosophy and political theory, are “belied by the reality of so many multilingual nations and individuals around the world” (Ahearn 2011). This description of the linguistic landscape in Hyderabad could be, with different languages, a description of the situation in much of India, including Darjeeling:

The average educated person in Hyderabad may use Telugu at home, Sanskrit at the temple, English as the university, Urdu in business, etc. He or she may also know other varieties of Telegu, or Kannada, Tamil or Malayalam for reading, dealing with servants, or other purposes. Many south Asians have active control over what amounts to complex linguistic repertoires drawn from different languages and varieties. In societies such as these, multilingualism is not an incidental feature of language use, but a central factor and an organizing force in everyday life. In most parts of India, monolingualism would be problematic relative to the norms and expectations about the number of languages and varieties a person needs in order to manage the everyday things a normal person has to do (Romaine 2001: 517 as quoted in Ahearn 2011).

In spite of so much evidence to the contrary, this very powerful monoglot language ideology has, as Bauman and Briggs so eloquently argued, “played a central role in creating the modernist project” (2003: 299).

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12 The approach emerging from each discipline is also quite different. For example, the study of language politics in Political Science focuses on “attempts by governments and/or linguistic groups to affect, officially or unofficially, changes in the language used in a society” (Laitin 1988: 289).

13 Or, in his words, “[f]or every distinct community is a nation, having its own national culture as it has its own language” (J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture. 1969. F.M. Barnard, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 284). For an interesting intellectual and philosophical history of ‘nationalism’ (including its connections to language), see Benedict Anderson’s “Introduction” to Mapping the Nation (Gopal Balakrishnan, editor. 1996. New York: Verso). For further exploration of Herder’s language philosophy as representative of his local and personal language ideologies, see Silverstein 2000b.
Although linguistic anthropologists have been arguing for years that the monoglot ideology is not representative of the lived experiences of most people in the world, the ideology remained important is many other areas of scholarship. For example, while discussing the importance of interjecting political science and political theory into the study of language politics—a point on which the author and I entirely agree—Laitin compared the situation in India to that of 16th century France. The multiplicity of languages in early France, he argued, was reined in during the 16th century in favor of a monolingual state. However “in the study of contemporary India, we often read that the multiplicity of languages explains why Hindi has been so slow in its official progress. A comparative theoretical framework would lead us to ask: Has India really been slower than France? Or, how can a multiplicity of languages explain failure in India when it was overcome in France?” (Laitin 1988: 290; emphasis mine). This is one challenge when discussing language politics from a macrolevel; a tendency to place the emphasis on political organization, elites, and language ideologies rather than the actual practice of language politics. Together, both macro- and microlevel research are necessary in order to describe this thing we call ‘language politics.’ When they are disconnect, we run the danger of uninformed comparisons based on a language ideology that linguistic homogeneity is not only necessary, but also more ‘advanced’ than multilingualism. The notion that 1) the goal point of any nation is, or should be, monolingualism, since “a common medium of linguistic exchange is a crucial ingredient of rationalization and therefore statebuilding” (Laitin 1988: 290) and that 2) any nation that is either unable to achieve, or does not aspire to, monolingualism has failed are dangerous and unproductive assumptions to make. Even the notion that a government is entitled,

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14 His own language ideologies about monolingualism are remarkably close to Herder’s: “[l]anguage is perhaps the core component in our understanding of a ‘nation.’ A nation is ‘an imagined community,’ and this suggests that its members are able to communicate with each other. Hence they probably share a common language” (1988: 289).

15 He makes an interesting argument regarding the reason Hindi has yet to become the ‘link language’ it was envisioned to be (see Laitin 1989).
or required, to have immediate linguistic access to all linguistically interchangeable citizens is a language ideology. More importantly, they do not attend to the complicated relationship that politics and language have in India.

It is also vital to also remember that while scholarship on language and the nation are relatively future-oriented and based, ideally, on research of both ideology and practice, governments and law are notoriously oriented toward the past. This has been amply demonstrated by scholars within Critical Race Theory in regards to policy on race; for example, since the practice of the law is based on precedent, a kind of authority founded on previous rulings. As Haney López argued for cases where individual’s racial identity was being determined, lawyers and judges used this authority, granted by precedent, by relying on cases from as early as the 1800s.\footnote{I cannot imagine those same lawyers and judges involved in these cases would have argued that social conditions were the same in the early 1800s as they were in the mid-twentieth century. Yet as legal precedent, these cases were considered more authoritative than what the individual whose race was being determined believed.} Law and the governance based on these laws is, therefore, “often fails to grasp new forms of identity” (Haney López 1996: 128; refer to chapter two for a fuller description of the lessons of Critical Race Theory). When we consider language as a form of social difference within the law, these lessons are just as applicable.

3.3.1 Linguistic Reorganization of States

During the 1950s, the Indian government—responding to protests throughout India, decided to reorganize nearly the entire country based on linguistic divisions. This “linguistic reorganization of states” was an attempt by the Indian government to productively engage with the complex relationship between politics and language. In this instance, as with most of this dissertation, I use ‘language’ to refer to both \textit{linguistic practices} (i.e. the language(s) an individual speaks within a variety of speech communities) and \textit{language ideologies} about linguistic practices and their ideological/political connections to the social world. These two are
often assumed, in India and elsewhere, to be essentially the same. This is precisely why language ideologies are so powerful politically and socially—the way they naturalize socially constructed practices.

Although the reorganization of states was not enacted until the mid-1950s, it was dealing with much older issues. At Independence, the British-controlled provinces were divided between India and Pakistan and, at least officially, the princely states were given the ‘choice’ of joining India or Pakistan. Most did join, or were heavily encouraged to join, one country. This, however, created a patchwork of states—some larger than many countries and others isolated within larger states. This was particularly true of the formerly princely states.

Joseph Schwartzberg—creator of the *Historical Atlas of South Asia*—produced a series of maps in his 1985 article on the linguistic reorganization of states that illustrate both why this reorganization was so politically successful for most of the country and why, I argue, that it failed the Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling. As Schwartzberg noted, by the 1971 census, well after the linguistic reorganization was finished, only 2.7% of the population of India lived in districts in which the predominant language spoken in the district differed from that of the state in which the district was located (1985: 155). The article, although a bit dated in certain areas, nonetheless outlines the political and social pressure from the 1920s to redraw political boundaries to reunite separated linguistically similar populations.

For this chapter, I focus specifically on the maps he produced rather than the bulk of his argument which was to “attempt a dispassionate summary and assessment” of the process of linguistic reorganization, the factors behind certain decisions, and his assessment of future changed that could be made (1985: 155). The maps are based on census data and although the

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17 By the 1971 census, well after the linguistic reorganization was finished, only 2.7% of the population of India lived in districts in which the predominant language spoken in that district differed from the predominant language in the state.
difficulties associated with the use of census data has been long established (see Cohn 1984, 1996; even Schwartzberg’s 1981 chapter on the census in British India explores these challenges), they provide, in this case, an interesting perspective on what is often overly confusing and complicated.

The results of the census are particularly sensitive in Darjeeling, where there are still active discussions of the locally contentious 1931 census. Census takers were accused of enumerating the languages spoken in the area in such a way as to divide the Nepali community. For example, many Indian Nepalis were, I was told, multilingual, speaking Nepali as well as their ‘ethnic’ languages like Tamang, Limbu, etc. Instead of labeling them as speaking Nepali which would show the Nepali people as the majority in the district, they were asked to write down their ethnic language. This means that instead of, say, 60% of the district marked as Nepali, there would be 10% Tamang, 20% Rai, 10% Magar, etc. This particular argument was made about many of the census results from the past 100 years. While in Darjeeling in 2007, I visited the District Library to find a copy of the 1931 census both for my own research purposes and because I had been told that the West Bengal government had made it impossible to access a copy in the Darjeeling hills. The census was ‘unavailable,’ at every official government office I visited—district library, magistrate’s office, etc. The reasons varied—the copy was damaged in a flood a few years ago, someone never returned the copy, the government never sent it—and even I began to feel suspicious. I finally tracked down a copy, purchased by a private individual. He asked that we meet at his house early in the morning, when no one would see me there and allowed me to take the bound copy for a few hours to copy it. When I went to his home, before most people were out of their houses, he was visibly sweating when he passed the documents to me. When I asked him why it was so important that no one know that he have a copy or that he
provided me with access, he replied, “You know the politics of this area. You know why.” I wasn’t sure if he meant the GNLF, state government, national government, of a combination of all three, but I know he was afraid. Yet the notion that I make the ‘truth’ known was common in all my experiences about language and politics in Darjeeling.

Although I recognize the problematic nature of using census data, the maps provide a different and telling perspective about the ways in which language activism declined after the linguistic reorganization of states. Figure 1 shows the political boundaries of British India—both British-controlled provinces and princely states and the percentage of linguistic minorities as taken from the 1931 census. Compare West Bengal in figure 1—which at that time had a total minority population of 7.4% of the state population—with that of Figure 2 which shows district divisions. West Bengal may have been predominantly Bengali speaking but the Darjeeling district was the only district in the state in which the “[n]umerically predominant language of [the] district differs from that of the province.” Throughout British India, situations in which individuals and groups lived in districts in which the common languages spoken were different from the language(s) spoken by the ruler were almost the norm rather than the exception. Figure 3 shows that little had changed in 1941 both for Darjeeling and India more broadly. By the 1951 census—Figure 4—India had gained independence and the state boundaries had shifted somewhat. There remained, however, huge sections of the country in which the “numerically predominant language of the district differ[ed] from that of the state.”

It was in the 1950s that the pace of change increased. The States Reorganization Commission was created in December 1953 and although their report was not brought into law until November 1st, 1956, some changes were made while they deliberate: e.g. Andhra was created out of Madras in 1953, Bilaspur was incorporated into Himachal Pradesh in 1954, and
Chandernagore joined West Bengal in 1955. Except for Assam, Orissa, and West Bengal in the east, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the North, and Jammu and Kashmir in the Northwest, all other states had some changes. Figures 5 and 6 show the remarkable changes in the prevalence of linguistic minorities in states after the 1956 reorganization as reflected in the 1961 and 1971 censuses. In both maps, it is evident that people in the majority of districts in India speak the state language.¹⁸

¹⁸ Schwartzberg’s maps and article do not distinguish if ‘speaking’ a language means it is an individual’s primary language, level of fluency, etc. This is, of course, one of the challenges associated with using census data.
Figure 1: Linguistic Minorities as a Percentage of Provincial Population in British India [1931]. The state of West Bengali is highlighted with a box.

19 This chart is reproduced from figure 1 in Schwartzenberg 1985.
Figure 2: Linguistic Minority Districts of British India [1931]²⁰

²⁰ Reproduced from Schwartzberg 1985, figure 2.
Figure 3: Linguistic Minority Districts of British India [1941]\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) Reproduced from Schwartzberg 1985, figure 5.
Figure 4: Linguistic Minority Districts of India [1951]22

22 Reproduced from Schwartzberg 1985, figure 7.
There have been changes to the organization of states since the 1970s not discussed in Schwartzberg’s article and I have marked them on Figure 6. Some of these changes were on the basis of the vast linguistic differences between these areas and the majority population of the

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23 Reproduced from Schwartzberg 1985, figure 9.
state. Beginning from the east, the two highlighted sections of Bihar merged with other districts in southern Bihar and became the state of Jharkhand in 2000 (see figure 7 for a 2010 map of India). Also in 2000, the southern portion of Madhya Pradesh was taken and created the new state of Chhatisgarh. However, other areas in which “numerically predominant language of district differs from that of state,” similar changes did not occur. The majority—including Betul district (Madhya Pradesh), Anantapur district (Andhra Pradesh), Nilgiris district (Tamil Nadu), Jhabua district (Madhya Pradesh), Banswara and Dungarpur districts (Rajasthan), and Dang district (Gujarat)—are largely “tribal” districts. These areas are also economically disadvantaged and, in some cases, politically isolated from the rest of the state. It is clear that areas in which minority language issues are confronted on a nearly daily basis are predominantly ‘tribal,’ impoverished (or, at least not thriving) and, therefore, seem less able to fight for the rights they believe are being denied. This precisely describes Darjeeling.

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24 These were formerly the 16 Chhattisgarhi-speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh. Also in 2000, the state of Uttaranchal was formed from Uttar Pradesh; it was renamed in 2007 to its official name of Uttarkhand.

25 In the Betul district (Madhya Pradesh), of the total district population—1,395,175 as reported in the 2001 census—39.4% are ‘tribal’ (549,907).

26 Anantapur district (Andhra Pradesh), is designated as an ‘economically backward’ area.

27 Nilgiris district (Tamil Nadu) is a largely tribal area; Toda, Badaga, and Panija languages are regularly spoken (Ethnologue—India).

28 Jhabua district (Madhya Pradesh) is a predominantly tribal district—85% of a total population of 1,394,561 as of the 2001 census. Forty-seven percent of the population live below the poverty line (Jhabua Statistical Profile, jhabua.nic.in/factfile.htm).

29 Both Banswara and Dungarpur districts are largely tribal. Of a total population of 1,107,643 in the 2001 census of the Dungarpur district, 65.1% were listed as scheduled tribes (721,487). The district is also 92.70% rural (dungarpur.nic.in).
Figure 6: Linguistic Minority Districts of India [1972]30

30 Reproduced from Schwartzberg 1985, figure 11.
Figure 7: Map of India [2010].
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the case of Darjeeling and the narratives of language politics, how they connect to broader political economic trends, and why language rights remain an issue in Darjeeling. I argue that the central issue in all these areas is the difference between ‘ideal’ law—law that is passed, and assumed by many in the government, to be followed to the letter—and the practice of the law. The daily effects of law in Darjeeling are quite different from the ideal that laws have set out.

3.4 Politics of nomenclature in Darjeeling

Not surprisingly, there are numerous overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, narratives regarding nomenclature and language politics in the Darjeeling hills, the bulk of which I explore in the following sections below. Much of the difference, at least on the ground in Darjeeling, can be explained by membership in political parties—or, rather, affiliation to the particular ideological position championed by one group or the other. But there are also competing narratives emerging from scholarly accounts—both Indian and American\textsuperscript{31}—state and national government reports, and newspaper articles. I make not attempt to grant authority to any particular narrative; I will, however, present the overlapping and sometimes contradictory strands as all ways of interpreting the very complex matters of language politics in Darjeeling below.

3.4.1 Narratives of language politics in Darjeeling

What do we call the language spoken by the people of Darjeeling? This question is not—contrary to some accounts—a question that emerged in the 1970s. Indians of Nepali descent arrived from Nepal to India around the time the English developed an intense interest in the

\textsuperscript{31}The scholarly accounts of events in Darjeeling are sparse and those that do exist are often from either a very macrolevel perspective—typically political science—or are from scholars who have not attempted to understand the situation using the internal logic of the area. While imposing external ways of understand the world are not considered problematic in some kinds of scholarship, I am trained as an anthropologist and believe that many kinds of knowledge—American scholarly, Indian scholarly, Darjeeling intellectual, and Darjeeling ‘everyday’—can be helpful in the quest to understand the context.
people and languages of the Indian subcontinent and Himalayas. Therefore, the topic of what to call languages spoken in the mountains of what is now Nepal and northern India is evident in travel writings, linguistic surveys, and military accounts of the 18th and 19th century as the English and their allies attempted to understand the dizzying complexity of the people they hoped to control: purbatiya, khaskura, gorkha bhasa, parbate, purbutti (Kirkpatrick 1811: 220), parbatiya, Gorkhali, Parbattia. Magar (1994) adds ‘bhasha’ [literally “language”] to the list and describes a 19th century document which calls the language “Girirajabhasha or the speech of the kingdom of the mountain” (Pradhan 1984 as quoted in Magar 1994: 50). The British East India Company became particularly interested in Nepal after the Anglo-Gurkha war from 1814-1816. It was at this time the Company first gained control of Darjeeling and began its interest in tea cultivation and the use of Nepalis in the area. Knowledge of Nepal and the languages spoken by Nepalis in Darjeeling was crucial to the company agents’ ability to run the tea plantations and their workers. Hodgson, writing originally from 1828 to 1838 in a series of articles for the Bengal Asiatic Society’s journal, describes the languages of Nepal (1874: 1-2):

> Within the mountainous parts of the limits of the modern kingdom of Nepaul, there are thirteen distinct and strongly-marked dialects spoken. These are the Khas or Parbattia, the Magar, the Gurung, the Sunwar, the Kachari, the Haiyu, the Chepang, the Kasunda, the Múrmí, the Newar, the Kiranti, the Limbuan, and the Lapachan….At present the several tribes or clans to which these dialects are appropriated, can hardly speak intelligibly to each other….

> The only language of Southern origin [meaning India] spoken in these Hills is the Khas or Parbattia—an Indian Prakrit, brought into them by colonies from below (twelfth to fifteenth century of Christ) and now so generally diffused, that, in the provinces West of the Kali river, it has nearly eradicated the vernacular tongues, and, though less prevalent

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32 Kirkpatrick describes the people who speak this language as “Purbutties, or mountaineers…. [the] Purbutti dialect is evidently a derivative from the Sanscrit [sic], agreeing very closely with the various idioms of Behar, Oude [now located in Uttar Pradesh, just south of the current border between India and Nepal]” (221). He provides a short vocabulary list compiled of ‘Purbutti’ compiled in 1793 which, although the spellings vary widely, is close to Wright’s vocabulary published in 1877.

33 For examples of the reports of Nepal and the languages spoken in the region from the time when the British ruled India, see Hodgson 1874, Kirkpatrick 1811, Northey and Morris 1928, especially chapter seven.
in the provinces East of that river, it has, even in them, as far as the Trisul Ganga, divided the empire of speech almost equally with the local mother tongues....

His writings—along with other non-Nepalis from that era including Daniel Wright’s introductory sketch to the translation of the History of Nepal (1877), Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India (1916), and Turner’s A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language (1931), provide a narrative of the history of both the Nepali/Gorkhali people in Nepal and the language spoken by these same people. These narratives, particularly Turner’s, often emerge as authorizing sources during the Nepali Language Movement and the Gorkhaland movement, although, as will become clear, they are interpreted differently ways depending on one’s political slant.

In the early 20th century, the languages spoken in Darjeeling were still called various names. Published in 1907, the Darjeeling Gazetteer reported that:

The dominant race in Darjeeling is the Nepalese...Nearly one-fifth of the population speak Khas, i.e. Nepali Hindi, or as it is sometimes generically called Pahariya or Parbatiya...Khas or Khas Kura has gradually spread throughout Nepal and beyond its borders. It is gradually outstaging the various tribal dialects, and is now current as a lingua franca both in the principality of Nepal and the polyglot district of Darjeeling (quoted in “An Introduction to Nepali Language,” nd., p. 3).

34 Hodgson continues: “Few persons except Brahmans and professional scribes or Khardars are regularly taught the Parbattia language; but most gentlemen speak, and many read and write it with ease and correctness (1874, ‘The Languages of Nepaul,’ 2). Later, he also describes the history of Gorkha in a way almost identical to what Ghisingh and the GNLF argued 150 years later: During the 12th century, “the tide of Mussulman conquest and bigotry continued to sweep multitudes of the Brahmans into the proximate hills” and there they found native groups and women with whom they had children (as Hodgson says, “the Brahmans had sensual passions to gratify, as well as ambition”). It was through this mixing, of Indians to the south with native groups from what is now Nepal, that gave rise to what we now call the Nepali language, or so the GNLF would argue. The language spoken by these people, ‘Khas’ was a “corrupt dialect of Hindi” while the seat of these Khas people was Gorkha (Hodgson 1874, ‘On the Military Tribes of Nepal,’ 37-40).

35 The title page notes this history was translated “from the Parbatiya,” and is later described as the “Vansāvalī or Genealogical History of Nepal, according to the Buddhist recension” (1877: vi). In Wright’s introductory sketch, he notes that the royal family of Gorkha is “said to be of Rājpūt descent” (25) and that they “claim to be descended from that of Udaipūr” (25, footnote 1), currently located in southern Rajasthan in India. He also places the language spoken by the Gorkhas as “Parbatiyā...a modern dialect of the Sanskrit” and written in the Devanagari script (27). Based on the limited vocabulary Wright presents in appendix VI, what he calls Parbatiyā has largely the same vocabulary of the Nepali spoken today.

36 For one prominent example that was produced by the Nepali Language Committee, see Appendix R—“An Introduction to Nepali Language and a Case for Its Recognition.”
What to call the language and the people of the Darjeeling hills was, not surprisingly, important to the colonial officials. Tea cultivation in the hills was a major economic preoccupation, in addition to the ‘healthful qualities’ attributed to the area; it was, therefore, considered important to understand the people who lived in the area. Language, as well as ethnic and racial designation, was thought to be a useful characteristic in the categorization of people and was not necessarily based on the group’s actual linguistic practices.

But what did those people think about themselves? They were not simply tea plantation workers and Gurkha soldiers with no thought to their place in the broader society in which they lived. In the next sections, we explore local interpretations of events in India and how they reflected and were incorporated into local systems of meaning.

3.4.2 Pre-Gorkhaland (1900-1970s)

In the Darjeeling area, even as outsiders—scholars, travelers, colonial officials—wrote of the area and the languages spoken by its residents, Darjeeling residents were already staking their claim to label themselves the way they wanted. In 1917, the Hillmen’s Association—composed of various local ethnic groups including Lepchas, Bhutias, and Nepalis—articulated the thoughts of local residents about their place in Bengal province. Many of their concerns are still shared by local residents; primarily that the districts of Darjeeling should not be part of Bengal because of the cultural and linguistic differences between those in the hills and those in the plains:37

_We live in an absolutely different world from the rest of the people of Bengal._ Geographically no greater contrast is possible than that between the Mountainous Darjeeling District and the plains of Bengal. Racially there is an equal dissimilarity for the great mass of our population is Mongolian38 and akin to the peoples beyond the

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37 There are also echoes of 19th and early 20th century notions of race in these memoranda.
38 This notion that certain Nepali ethnic groups are racially connected is not something that died out in the 20th century. As Susan Hangen has demonstrated in her work on the new Mongol National Organization in eastern Nepal, the racial category of “Mongol” is being used to unite different Nepali ethnic groups in their opposition to the
Himalayas rather than those of India. Historically we have until recent years lived a life entirely apart. The Darjeeling District except the Kalimpong Sub-division was gifted or annexed from the Kingdom of Sikkim last century; the Kalimpong Sub-Division and the Dooars were Bhutanese till about fifty years ago and the Nepalese have immigrated from Nepal in recent years. Religiously we are, as regards the Lepchas and the races of Tibetan origin as well as number of Nepali castes, quite distinct from the people of the plains and even the religious customs of the Nepalese who are classed as Hindus very largely from those of the Hindus of Bengal. **Linguistically we have no alliance with the rest of Bengal. Even the lingua franca of our course and schools is Hindi and not Bengali, while the great mass of the workers in the tea gardens of the Dooars and the Tarai [Terai—plains] are immigrants from Bihar and Orissa and Nepal which fact in addition to the geographical and historical arguments makes it natural and fitting that the Tea District of the Dooars should be linked up with the Darjeeling District rather than Bengal.** (Moktan 2004: 91)[emphasis mine]

Memos continued from the Hillman’s association from this time through the 1940s. Some voiced concerns of what would happen to Indian Nepalis in the Darjeeling hills if the area was merged with the “rest of India….so far the Gurkhas have been able to evolve on their own lines of civilization under the protection of the British Government but unless some special reservations are made for the Gurkhas in the new constitution it would be extremely difficult for them to preserve their social solidarity” (Hillmen’s Association Memorandum sent 25 October 1930 as quoted in Moktan 2004: 93).
The All India Gorkha League was formed in 1943 and continued the Hillmen’s Association’s earlier aims of securing a (protected) place within the soon to be independent India (for further exploration of the All India Gorkha League’s early years, see Singh and Singh 1987). At a mass meeting held in Darjeeling on 15 May 1943 to inaugurate the League, 2,000 women, men, children, and Gurkha soldiers from as far away as Calcutta journeyed to Darjeeling to hear speeches by members of the League on a variety of topics: “the civilisation, tradition and culture of the Gurkhas….citizenship and the rights and duties of Gurkhas as citizens in India….the responsibility of mothers in the uplift of the Gurkha nation….brief history of the Gurkha army and [it was] explained why the Gurkhas in India must support the Allies in the war from freedom against Hitlerism” (Singh and Singh 1987: 2-3). After the crowds heard these speeches—which, other than the issues of Allied support, are remarkably like speeches at mass gatherings today—members of the League proposed the following resolution:

Resolved that in view of the fact that the condition of the Gurkhas spread throughout India is very deplorable and that the political status of the Gurkhas in India is uncertain and the future of the Gurkhas is at stake, an organization named THE ALL INDIA GURKHA LEAGUE be formed at this mass meeting of the Gurkhas in all respect and particularly to establish the political rights of the Gurkhas in India after the war or whenever any political change takes place in India and further to mobilise the Gurkhas and support the Allies in the war effort. (Singh and Singh 1987: 3).

The formation of this organization in 1943 speaks to the apprehension felt by Indians of Nepali descent; concerns about recognition of their rights, protection of their culture and language, and how to ensure their fair treatment. As will become clear later in the chapter, that these concerns were often dismissed was one of the foundations to the Gorkhaland movement. Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling, during this time, were represented by the Indian media to be surprisingly all they could for the Independence movement. But, he said, even this doesn’t erase the mistrust caused by their loyalty to the British 150 years before.

41 For example, in the 1940s the All India Gorkha League called for Calcutta University to recognize the Nepali language as a “major vernacular” of India (Kar 1999: 17).
suspicious of acts and resolutions offered by state and national governments; the longer history of failed government policies and failed recognition of Indians of Nepali descent as full citizens begin, in part, to explain why they remain suspicious of official government acts.

The acts and regulations from the 1940s until the 1980s were varied: the confusion at Independence over the political boundaries in the area, the linguistic reorganization of states which did nothing for local residents, and even the Official Language Act of 1961 in which the state of West Bengal made Nepali and Bengali, together, the official languages of the three hill subdivisions (see appendix T for the text of this act and figure 8 for a district map of West Bengal). Although there were laws and regulations which were supposed to encourage the widespread acceptance of the Nepali language in government offices and courts, enforcement of the 1961 Official Language Act in particular was spotty at best. After it was clear to local politicians and residents that enforcement of this act was nearly nonexistent, many decided that it was time to appeal their case directly to the national government of India.

In May 1967, after an All India Gorkha League conference, a public notice on the subject of the Nepali language was published. It had only been 4 years since Sindhi became the first new language added to the Eighth Schedule of the constitution and so the reasons given for that language’s inclusion became part of the discourse about political recognition of languages:

(a) Nepali language is a well developed language not inferior to other languages already recognised under the Eighth Scheduled [sic] of the constitution. In matter of population also we are not far behind from the population speaking languages that have been recently added on to the 8th Schedule. This also can be affirmed that it is a progressive language. It should, therefore, be given a place along with other languages in the 8th Schedule….

(b) The link language between State head-quarters and the district of Darjeeling should be English (quoted in Kar 1999: 19).

42 It is interesting that they explicitly argued for English, rather than Bengali, be the link language between the Darjeeling area and the state of West Bengal. This is reminiscent of the reaction to the imposition of Hindi on southern India (see Introduction).
While the All India Gorkha League and other organizations worked toward social recognition and rights, the linguistic reorganization of states meant that language as a political issue was given less focus after the organization was completed throughout the rest of India.

Figure 8: Districts of West Bengal.
Very few scholars have directly explored the Nepali-Gorkhali divide in the Darjeeling hills; one notable exception is political scientist Selma Sonntag. Her focus on the political, rather than “cultural…primordial [or] emotional dimensions” of official language movements, emphasized the role of community elites (1995: 91). She also argued that, at the time when other groups were asking for state status on the basis of language—before the linguistic reorganization of states—Nepalis in Darjeeling “petitioned for separate administrative status from [the state of] West Bengal” (Sonntag 2002:169). However, the “West Bengal State government hesitated” in giving official status to Nepali in the 3 hill subdivisions using, as “justification…the 1951 census figures, which were dubiously low for Nepali speakers. With the 1961 census depicting much more ‘realistic’ figures, the West Bengal State government relented and amended its official language act in order to designate Nepali as an official language” (2002: 169). While this status was officially enacted with the West Bengal Official Language Act of 1961, Sonntag noted that “implementation was lackluster” (2002: 169) early on and most Darjeeling residents with whom I spoke in 2005 and 2007 say it is today almost nonexistent.

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43 Sonntag, in this article, noted that the study of ethnicity and politics directly speaks to language politics and that, at least among political scientists, debates between primordialists and instrumentalists steered much of the research in recent years. She placed herself within the instrumentalists and argues that “official language[s] are used in political strategies pursued by emerging elites...with the goal of replac[ing] the existing established elites at the center of political power” (1995: 92). She argued that the official language movements are “perceived by the emerging elites as aiding in the achievement of this goal, by realigning the population along cleavage lines different from the cleavage lines that divide the society under the existing political power structure” (1995:92). I would argue that this might have been true later in the Nepali language movement, particularly in the last few years when the Chief Minister of Sikkim took over the push from the Nepali Language Committee activists in Darjeeling, but that early on the Nepali Language Committee was not attempting to gain political or economic power. Later in the movement, when the fights between the ‘Nepali’ language supporters and the ‘Gorkhali’ language supporters during the Gorkhaland movement (as explored later in this chapter), her insights are absolutely correct.

44 See also Datta 1993, Samanta 1996: 84-85, and Timsina 1992: 38, all quoted in Sonntag 2002. Others, like Kar, have argued that the friction between the inhabitants of the 3 hill subdivisions of Darjeeling and the majority Bengali-speaking population from the plains is not surprising: “Ethnicity and absence of homogeneity may cause tensions within a State. Darjeeling is an example in this respect. Here, we get people whose racial characteristics are distinct and they cannot be compared with the person living in the plains. Residents of the area speak a language of their own while their local condition and aspirations are widely divergent from the vast majority of people living in West Bengal” (1999: 2). Although I would agree that there are cultural and linguistic differences between the people living in the hills and those in the plains, I would argue the situation in Darjeeling has more to do with the political and economic history of this state as opposed to any ‘racial’ or even fundamental cultural differences.
Court cases are argued in English, district officers speak Bengali or English, and even attempts to enforce the act are met with resistance by these non-local government employees. As Sonntag so eloquently argues, “the state indeed respond[ed] to democratic pressure, but its responses are cosmetic—not necessarily because it is ‘playing politics,’ but because of limited resources. It is easy to pass a state act officializing a language, but it is much harder to staff health centers with health providers who ‘have overcome the language difficulty and have sympathy for rural hill people,’ as the Committee recommended” (2002: 1969).45 Whether the state’s limited resources or political maneuvering is to blame, the results are the same: local people see an ineffective state government, either unable or unwilling to enforce a law designed to provide protection for them and their language. The failure to protect the use of Nepali language through something as simple as providing Nepali-language typewriters to the District Magistrate’s office crippled the everyday attempts to enforce the Language Act of 1961.

It was in light of this history of increasing discontent regarding non-compliance of government acts (linguistic and otherwise) that the All India Nepali Language Committee was formed in 1971. Since the state government had been unable to guarantee the daily rights of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling, the Language Committee members decided, at the committee’s inception, to focus instead on the national government. Sindhi speakers had been able to convince the government to add their language to the 8th schedule in 1967 and, the committee members argued, there are more Indians of Nepali descent in India than Sindhi speakers so the government would, of course, support their language demands (see chapter 4 for further discussion of the reasoning behind this move). They also believed that recognition of

45 She continues: “the state government’s unwillingness or inability to meet basic infrastructure and transportation needs or to develop sustainable cottage industries, despite the Committee’s recommendations to do so, reaffirmed the continuation of the Committee’s observation that most of these schools were poorly staffed and attended, with little prospect for employment or upward mobility for those who did attend” (Sonntag 2002:169-170).
their language on the national level would force the state government to enforce the 1961 language act.

While it is easy to place blame on the nonimplementation of the West Bengal Official Language Act squarely with the state government, I found that local residents had different, more complex interpretations of events. Some did blame the state government and argued that since Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling are essentially crippled from the start and that all the work in the world will not lead to success: linguistically because most don’t speak Bengali, politically because they are marginalized in favor of wealthier groups, socially because they are inevitably slotted very low on the social hierarchy. Others, largely teachers in the area, said that the best and brightest of Darjeeling could compete if they were given an equal chance. But, as one woman said to me, all her good students left Darjeeling as soon as they could. “So,” she said, “who is left to help Darjeeling?” Others, particularly many young people, wanted to know how using the Nepali language would help them succeed. As one young man laughingly said, “If I speak only Nepali, where can I get a job? Darjeeling? Kalimpong? Maybe Nepal or Sikkim. But if I speak English, I can go anywhere in the world.”

A former member of the Language Committee and head of a local social service organization, Mr. Lama had a more pessimistic view of the language situation:

In the year 1961, the government granted that along with Bengali language, Nepali language could be used as an official language. The Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee] had a sub-committee “Nepali Bhasa Prayog Gara” [Use Nepali Language]. The [language committee] members went to every shop, every store and asked the people to change store signs by including Nepali language along with the English version. They went to government offices, they asked the drivers of cars to change the number plate [license plate] into Nepali. [The Nepali Language Committee] appealed to the government offices, arranged…meetings, and also asked the government officers to use Nepali language in their files. When people didn’t listen to their requests, the youths of [the language committee] took ladders and threw black paint over the English language signs and also on the car number plates. Overnight things changed—people started writing Nepali on the signs and on the number plates. The officers said that the chief
secretary had not issued any official order so they couldn’t implement Nepali language in [the] government offices. [The Language Committee] got it done. Nepali typewriters were ordered and the government opened a Nepali cell to teach Nepali to the non-Nepali speaking officers. These officers were given stipends for learning the language…[Language Committee] members also assessed the functioning of the [government] offices, but to their utter dismay people still continued to write in English. Our people still continued to write in English! They complained that they didn’t have technical words in Nepali. The [Language Committee] suggested that they could write the English word in Nepali script [devanagri script] and that there was no need to consult a dictionary. [The Language Committee] consulted the Information Department [of the District Magistrate’s office] and came up with a booklet of Nepali technical words. People still said that ‘we find it easier to write in English.’ They didn’t change their attitude. We are to be blamed and no one else.46

He also asked that, since I was conducting research on language in Darjeeling and was more able than local residents to get answers from the government, I find out if the Nepali language was allowed in the Darjeeling Municipal government at all. Was it used for applications, naming of files, etc? And why, he wanted to know, wouldn’t we want to use Nepali in the government offices since they would “generate employment for local people.” I never could give him a satisfactory answer because I was unable to get definitive answers to any of his questions.47

What the scholarly and more macrolevel interpretations of local events miss is that language politics in Darjeeling is not only about Nepali and Bengali and certainly not only about the practice of language. Since the 1970s, English had become increasingly important and more and more children are being educated in it. Language ideologies about Bengali, Nepali, and speaking Hindi or Bengali with a Nepali ‘accent’ were also important factors (see chapter five for further explanations). It was in this context of increasing economic pressure to the region, increasing tensions between Nepalis and the West Bengal government due, in part to the non-

46 Interview 17 July 2007.
47 He also told me about the switch over in the language of ration cards from Bengali to Nepali. Ration cards are very important documents to local residents because they are used for passport residential certificates and for buying food at a subsided rate from local ration stores.
implementation of the 1961 Language Act, that Ghisingh and his Gorkhaland movement took hold.

3.4.3 GNLF and Gorkhaland Movement (1980s)

Although the GNLF, Subash Ghisingh, and the Gorkhaland movement became famous in the 1980s, the roots of the movement and Ghisingh’s demands lay in earlier times as demonstrated in the previous section. The following is by no means an overview of the GNLF and the Gorkhaland movement; other scholars have more comprehensively attended to them (for work specifically focused on the GNLF, Gorkhaland Movement, and the DGHC, see Samanta 1996; Sarkar and Bhaumik 2000; Subba 1992)

A representative narrative of Ghisingh and the GNLF, as told by many scholars and reporters, is as follows (in a section tellingly titled ‘Neighbours, Secret Affairs’):

The GNLF upsurge that traumatized the tea gardens and pleasant, rain-swept hills of Darjeeling for more than three years in part owed its spark to a migratory problem: refugees driven out of Assam and especially Meghalaya, during anti-Nepali riots of the 1980s….Ghisingh saw in the influx an opportunity to let loose his brand of nationalism: the Nepalese, whom he liked to call Gurkhas, were unsafe in India and needed a homeland where they could run their own destinies. He sought that homeland in the Darjeeling hills, triggering an onslaught on Communist Party cadres as well as Bengalis, who were accused, not illogically, of dominating and pauperizing the hills. The Bengali politician and bureaucrat had long controlled the purse-strings and political power in the region, operating out of distant Calcutta. They looked upon the Nepalis as a rather slow-witted community that was good enough for physical labour, an image that stung the Nepalis (Hazarika 1995: 300).

Narratives of this type—that the unrest was largely due to Ghisingh’s manipulation of events—miss some crucial aspects of the cultural, linguistic, and political context in Darjeeling.

Selma Sonntag argues that it was within the context of a “muddled set of language demands” (2002: 170) from the wide variety of organizations—All India Gorkha League and the All India Nepali Language Committee were probably the most effective but certainly not the

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48 Hazarika earlier described Ghisingh as “an untutored pulp novelist” (1995: 299).
only ones—that Ghisingh emerged as leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF).\(^{49}\)

Although Sonntag characterizes these many groups as “rather ephemeral cultural-linguistic groups formed to demand federal recognition of Nepali by seeking its inclusion” (2002: 170)\(^{50}\) in the 8\(^{th}\) Schedule, many were long standing organizations who had been formed long before the demands for federal recognition were solidified. I would describe both the All India Gorkha League and the All India Nepali Language Committee, if they are the groups to whom she refers, as anything but ‘ephemeral’ compared to some of the other less organized groups.

Ghisingh’s desire to be seen as the mouthpiece of Indians of Nepali descent was not self-evident for most of the community in Darjeeling and beyond Darjeeling. While Darjeeling represents the most commonly represented ‘home’ of Indians of Nepali descent in India, they live in large numbers throughout India. He may have been the most visible/vocal/recognized representative of this group, but not everyone acknowledged him as leader and it was this that led him to argue for a number of his demands in a particular way. It was, I would argue, his precarious station as ‘mouthpiece’ for the Indian Nepali Community that contributed to his arguments about Gorkhaland. As far as the language demands, many with whom I spoke in Darjeeling and elsewhere explicitly argued that Ghisingh clearly knew nothing about ‘language.’ For these people, the Nepali Language Committee and other organizations headed by so-called intellectuals were considered the home for the language demand. It is also important to recognize that, early in his career at head of the GNLF, Ghisingh had enlisted the help of the Nepali

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\(^{49}\) Ghisingh was born in Mirik, Darjeeling on 22 June 1936. He attended primary school at the Singbuli tea estate and then St. Robert’s school in Darjeeling until class 9 (9\(^{th}\) grade). He then “joined the Indian Army as a soldier in the 8\(^{th}\) Gorkha Rifles in 1953. He saw action in Nagaland and completed his schooling in Punjab while his unit was posted there. His first literary work, *Kopila*, a book of poems, was published while he was still in the army. By the time he gave up writing in 1976, he had published 21 books….He was discharged from the army in 1958 and returned to Darjeeling to join the Government College to complete his graduation” (Magar 1994: 86). For a variety of reasons, I was unable to interview Ghisingh during my research.

\(^{50}\) She also notes that there were other groups which made these same language demands included various West Bengal governments run by the CPI(M), national political coalitions, and the Sikkim Government (2002: 170-171).
Language Committee and essentially appointed them in charge of language demands. It was only when he needed to distance the Indians of Nepali descent from their cousins in Nepal on a linguistic basis—that Nepali was an Indian language—that he began to take over the language push by July 1987. Actual events in Darjeeling were significantly more complicated and Ghisingh’s reasons less clear than presented in popular accounts, media, and scholarly articles. According to Sonntag,

Ghisingh’s [sic] strategy [during the mid-1980s] was to explicitly repel the affront that the Nepalese in India, and by extension, the Nepali language, were foreigners. Nepali was indeed a foreign language, he declared; but Nepali was not spoken by the people of Darjeeling. Gorkha Bhasa, or Gorkhali, was the language of the Darjeeling area and it was an Indian language (see Dey, 1992). Historically Gorkha Bhasa is one of several terms, along with Gorkhali, Khas Kura, Parbatiya, and Nepali, that have been used to designate the Indo-Aryan language of the southern flank of the Himalayas (Hutt, 1998, pp. 32-33; Gurung 1991, pp. 55-56). By distinguishing a ‘Gorkha’ language…from Nepali, Ghisingh distances himself politically from the Sikkimese language demands and portrayed a ‘more Indian than thou’ image. (2002: 171)

Ghisingh had even, at times, “threatened to evict Nepalis from Indian soil by force and launch the agitation for the recognition of Gorkhalis rather than the Nepalis as Indian citizens” (Kumar 1998: 92).

During interviews in Darjeeling during my research trip in 2007, however, I discovered evidence that Ghisingh’s political career was much less coherent than often presented in the

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51 This is not to say that the Language Committee stopped their support for the GNLF. At this time, you could not ‘be Nepali’ and not support the GNLF. Even as they worked against the GNLF’s demands for ‘Gorkhali,’ the Language Committee was recorded as supporting the GNLF demands: “GNLF demand legitimate, says Nepali Bhasa Samity” (The Hindu, 1 January 1987 as cited in Kar 1999: 26). Some language activists also point to this moment as an example of Ghisingh’s early anti-intellectualism, something he was notorious for as the Gorkhaland movement matured. Others argued that he resented the more popular writers associated with the Language Committee who ‘looked down’ on him and his writing. Also prevalent during the 1980s, once Ghisingh began championing ‘Gorkhali,’ were pamphlets circulating his earlier statements in favor of Nepali. For example, early in his career he was active in the Blue Flag Brigade (Nilo Jhanda) in Darjeeling and, during that period, said that “I was born a Nepali. I will live like a Nepali and I will die a Nepali; even the soil I am to be buried in, will be Nepali” (quoted in Kumar 1991: 94).

52 He was also known to reference the specter of Greater Nepal—the notion that factions within Nepal were trying to expand Nepal’s political boundaries to what they were in the 18th century (which would include Darjeeling and Sikkim)—as reason why the Indian government needed to take him and the GNLF seriously (see Dixit 2003, Kumar 1998: 93; see also chapter 4 for further discussion).
press and scholarship on Darjeeling. Writings and individuals’ remembrances of the events of the 1980s were, not surprisingly, inflected with what has occurred since. For example, most members of the Language Committee remembered an entirely antagonistic relationship between their organization and that of Subash Ghisingh, the GNLF. This contentious relationship was also a consistent thread in interviews with Darjeeling residents who lived there during the 1980s.

However, newspaper reports and letters between the leadership of the Nepali Language Committee and the GNLF from that time tell a very different story.

For a time, Ghisingh publically announced that the Language Committee was the only group he authorized to fight for the Nepali language. In a public announcement published on 26 December 1986, Ghisingh declared that:

[N]ow onwards the question of the recognition of the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule of India’s constitution, only All India Nepali Bhasha Samiti [Nepali Language Committee] will spearhead the movement. Other political parties and organizations will not be allowed to correspond with and submit memorandums to the Central Government. They can not use Nepali language issue to further their own interests and obstruct the Samiti [Committee]. The GNLF announces the demand for Nepali language is exclusively the demand of All India Nepali Bhasha Samiti. The other political parties can fight the language issue only by means of suggestions and support.

53 There were a few exceptions. During an interview with Vishal, a member within the Nepali Language Committee who, in recent years had thrown his support behind Ghisingh and the GNLF, remembered that Ghisingh wanted to be a leader and to “crush Gorkhaism.” He recalled a public event in the early 1970s where Ghisingh said “we are Nepalese, not Gorkhas.” This member of the Language Committee believes that Ghisingh “rediscovered the Gorkha idea in 1981 at a time when the “identity crisis” of Indians of Nepali descent started to deteriorate. But even after Ghisingh’s rediscovery of the Gorkha idea, the GNLF and Language Committee worked closely together or, as Vishal said, they were “side by side. Back then, nomenclature and racial identity” were the same. He blames the beginning of the feud between Ghisingh and the Language Committee on another man; Dambar Singh Gurung: Gurung was a “lamb,” but “in his rotten brain, he made us Gorkha.” This was the only time I heard this; Ghisingh is most often cited as the source of the Gorkha vs Nepali split. At the end of our conversation, he turned to the subject of language and argued that Indian Nepali and Nepal Nepali language are “not separated” although they are “mildaina” [don’t agree/are incompatible]. He repeatedly stressed that “when we write, we can understand Assam Nepali, Nepal Nepali, etc. But when [they are] spoken it is very different.”

54 This was reprinted in English in “Why Nepali: A Case for the Recognition of Nepali Language in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution” which was published by the Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad in August 1992. I am unsure in what language the original was published: during this period, many public announcements by the GNLF and Nepali Language Committee were published in both English and Nepali. During a series of interviews with a former president of the Nepali Language Committee, he remembered the same announcement and meetings between himself and Ghisingh regarding GNLF support for the Language Committee. It was shortly after, he said, that Ghisingh’s anti-intellectualism and increasing desires for power began to erode their relationship.
Only 8 months later, then-president of the Committee, Prem Kumar Allay, wrote a letter to Ghisingh to remind the GNLF head of his words in support of their cause and promising their support to him:  

In 19 July 1987 with the members of ABNBS [the Language Committee], you have said that the demand of Nepali language will be included in the memoranda which will be presented on 22 July 1987 by the GNLF to the Prime Minister….in [announcements made on] 26 December 1986, you clearly stated that “only the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee] can lead in the question of including Nepali language here after in the Indian Constitution’s 8th Schedule. Other political parties and foundations cannot make the demand of Nepali language as their own demand and to put obstacles in front of the Nepali Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]. The GNLF declares that the demand of Nepali language is fully a demand of ABNBS. The other political parties and foundations are expected to agree only in the question of suggestion and support [“]….[I]t will not be wrong of you to raise the question about the demand of language in the memoranda. The [Committee] heartily welcomes your ideas.

The memorandum the GNLF was planning to present to the Prime Minster was circulated by the GNLF in both Nepali and English in Darjeeling and, I assume, also sent to the Prime Minister. It did not, however, include support for the Language Committee; instead, the memorandum reminded the government of the systematic non-implementation of the West Bengal Official Language Act of 1961 and asked;

We admit that the Nepali language will not be included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, but the Gorkha language can easily be included in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution without any obligation. Therefore, the Gorkha language must be included in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution by an immediate Act of the Government of India. [Public memorandum, 22 July 1987]

Ghisingh and the GNLF had turned away from the Nepali language and those who supported it. Sonntag argues that Ghisingh was not demanding “for usage of Nepali…but for the symbolic recognition of Gorkha Bhasa as a bona fide Indian language by its inclusion” in the 8th Schedule.

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55 I believe the president sent this letter precisely because he had heard rumors of the Memorandum’s contents and suspected that Ghisingh was going back on their previous agreement.
of the constitution despite the “negligible practical” yet greatly “symbolic significance” of status as an 8th Schedule language (2002: 171).56

Although the Language Committee members remember fighting Ghisingh as much as they could, one man who was neither a member of the committee or the GNLF remembered that the committee treated the “Gorkhali issue in a very soft manner;” meaning they did not publically push Ghisingh on the matter and acquiesced when he decided to advocate for Gorkhali instead of Nepali. They, of course, had no idea what was in the future, he said. At the time, everything Ghisingh said was supported without question by all Nepalis. “Everyone had to support Gorkhaland and they didn’t think about questioning him on anything.” Yet, he said, Ghisingh “blundered” by going into language and literature as these were not his areas. In the beginning, as he said before, there was “blind support,” but no one could have guessed that Ghisingh would begin to “manipulate history.”57

56 She also argues that Ghisingh’s fears regarding the 1950 Indo-Nepal treaty (see Appendix E) and its residence claims were based on his worry that the treaty “could be interpreted as conferring only residency rights for the Nepali speakers of Darjeeling, thus opening the door to expulsion and exclusion as had happened to the Nepali speakers further east” (2002: 171; see also Nath 2003). For example, then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Darjeeling in December 1986. He “declared that the Nepalis who were in India before the signing of the treaty (Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950) should be considered citizens of Nepal” (Timsina 1992: 51-52). This raised issues for the Nepalis living in other areas where different agreements had already been reached such as in “Assam...[where] the cut-off date of March 1971 had already been agreed upon under the Assam accord. The status of those in Sikkim would also become indetermined because the territory was merged with India only in 1975. While in Nagaland the cut-off year is 31 December 1940” (1992: 51). This is yet another example of the misrecognition of the widespread nature of the Indian Nepali community; what Nag calls the “Fei-isation” of Indians of Nepali descent, the “ignorance of the Nepalis as an equal partner in the history of the region” (2003: 184). His point of departure is what he calls a “quaint tradition in Confucian China of terming the rebels as Fei by which a person was declared to be a non-person” (2003: 184). It is also one of the reasons Ghisingh attempted to bring issues in the Northeast under his purview. As Sonntag argues, Ghisingh “wanted explicit and secure Indian citizenship rights for the Darjeeling Gorkhas, who were neither Nepali speakers nor ‘Nepalese’” in part because of the uneven understanding of the Indian Nepali community (2002: 172). Magar notes that although “a minor [issue] in comparison to that from Bangladesh,” the GNLF exploited the “illegal infiltration of ‘Nepalis’” during the unrest in Assam during the mid-1980s although “most of [those]...illegally staying and working in the coal mines of Jowai Hills were citizens of Nepal and not Indian citizens” (1994: 94).

57 Ghisingh’s claims against intellectuals and their disconnect from the people of Darjeeling is reminiscent of Gramsci’s argument that “the intellectual element ‘knows’ but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel...The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned...in other words that the intellectual can be an intellectual...if distinct and separate from the people-nation, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical situation and connecting them dialectically to
Many outside the GNLF believed that arguments to change the name of the language would divide the community. C.K. Shrestha, then secretary of the Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad, wrote to a Nepali literary organization in the mid-1980s in Meghalaya discussing the problem over the divide. He likened the divide between Nepali and Gorkhali to that created when the British divided the subcontinent into India and Pakistan; a situation, he believed, that sowed the “seed of discontent” in the area. If the government allowed the name of the language to be both, he foresaw the same future for the Nepali people of India.

In a pamphlet titled “Why Nepali?”—published by one of the organizations in Sikkim headed by Nar Bahadur Bhandari, then Chief Minister of Sikkim and husband of MP Dil Kumari Bhandari, the demand for Gorkhali was tied to the workings of democracy (see chapter four for further explanations of the arguments at that time in the Lok Sabha). In the forward to the pamphlet, Nar Bahadur Bhandari argued that “[it] is rather very unfortunate that some of the so-called [sic] custodians of democratic and constitutional values have been lending political credence to such diabolical rhetorics and equally damaging activities of the GNLF.” He also said that “they are bent on changing the entire course of right history and heritage of Nepali language and literature…[and in] the process, they have blatantly discarded all the cardinal principles of a civilized society.”

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58 In an article about indigenous rights in the north east, the author noted that N.B. Bhandari and Subash Ghisingh “fell apart on the issue of language in the early nineties, when Mr. Bhandari was championing the cause of the Nepali language and Mr. Ghising [sic] was demanding for legislation of Gorkhali language. Both languages are essentially the same and only their nomenclature had become the cause of discord” (North East News Agency 2004).

59 He also, in his forward, labels the Nepali language as an ‘Indian language’ based on “history”—“It is the centuries old history of Nepali language and literature that substantiates its Indian origin and its staggering contribution to the making of a colourful canvas of Indian literacy and cultural heritage” This is an argument that is still made today; and article published in 2009 in the online newspaper ‘Darjeeling Times’ provided a similar history of the language and quoted linguists and historians (Wangdi 2009).
It is less clear what the citizens of Darjeeling not directly affiliated with one of the camps thought at the time about this fight over nomenclature. What people remember was largely about the fighting between the groups and that very little changed in their daily lives. One man, a former supporter of Ghisingh and the GNLF, remembered that Ghisingh told them that if they used ‘Nepali’ language, the Indian government would follow the direction of Bhutan and kick the Nepalis out of India.\footnote{This man was one of the few to express skepticism about intellectuals, like Mahendra P. Lama (see Lama 1988). It is not just the politicians, but even intellectuals cannot be trusted, he said. “You never know what these people are doing. They can show things,” presumably documents and other pieces of authoritative knowledge, “because of the kind of access they have, but you can’t always trust them.”}

### 3.5 Implications and Conclusions

The 1992 parliamentary debates about the inclusion of the Nepali language in the Indian constitution as well as the aftermath of the inclusion for people in Darjeeling will be detailed at length in chapter 4. But it is important to note that scholars and watchers of events in the Darjeeling hills seemed surprised that there was controversy over the language even after it was finally added to the 8th Schedule. I can only assume this confusion rested on the belief that what was really at stake was linguistic accommodation for individuals who speak Nepali—ability to take university entrance or civil service exams in Nepali, for example. While these were important to local residents, the symbolic acceptance of an Indian Nepali identity was much more important. What that identity should be—its history, its symbolism—was still very much a subject for debate, even after the language was recognized.

In the end, these arguments about nomenclature were not about language if, by language, we mean socially meaningful phonemes strung together to create meaning. What both sides, proponents of Nepali and Gorkhali, were fighting about was much more complicated—citizenship rights, social acceptance, an authoritative version of ‘history,’ and who had the right
to represent the community. It was also a case that government officials, at least acted, as if they expected that laws previously passed were being enforced. When Indians of Nepali descent continued to complain, they were accused of being agitators, of promoting balkanization. Yet from the perspective of the community, they were simply asking for current law to be enforced. This disjuncture between *ideal* law—laws which are passed and assumed by government officials to be followed—and the actual *practice* of the law was and continues to be at the heart of the community’s agitation.
Chapter 4  Language has never become a bone of contention

This chapter takes its name from a statement made during the third day of parliamentary debates, 8 May 1992, when the House continued discussion on the bill to include Nepali and Manipuri as national languages with legal [constitutional] protection. First to speak that day was Manoranjan Bhakta, MP\(^1\) from Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In his speech, he praised efforts to change the country’s language policy and reminded the body that for the unity and integrity of the country, minority languages must be taken seriously: “We have three-language formula, First-Hindi, second-English, and third-own mother tongue, all these three languages are also compulsory. If someone wants to receive education through his mother tongue, he has no problem. Therefore, language has never become a bone of contention” [Emphasis added].\(^2\)

It seems to me, however, that language has been nothing but a bone of contention and, after my experiences in Darjeeling and Sikkim, I was utterly shocked by this statement. States have been reorganized by the central government in 1956 on the basis of language—a process that many minority groups in the country still seek to extend today. I have seen parents pound on tables in frustration at school exams with grammatical mistakes that made comprehension of the question a futile pursuit and, therefore, passing the exam impossible.\(^3\) How were their children, they asked, supposed to succeed in life if they failed their exams?

In 2007, I sat in a cold darkened kitchen while an older woman tried to remember “her”

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\(^1\) Member of Parliament.


\(^3\) One man in Darjeeling reported that he had obtained a copy of an exam in Nepali that he, and others who saw it, believed was written by a native speaker of Bengali with a Nepali dictionary and little practical knowledge of Nepali. This belief rested on the ‘feeling’ of the language in the exam—it was essentially the Bengali exam translated word-for-word using the Nepali dictionary. He offered to let me see the exam, but the increasingly dangerous political situation meant that his visits to the town of Darjeeling became less frequent. I was unable to get a copy of the exam before leaving the country, but I have no reason to doubt him. He was not the only person to tell of exams and texts like this.
language, the language of her mother’s Tamang family. I drank two cups of tea before she finally gave up, and looked sadly at her daughter who is more fluent in English than Nepali and only knows a handful of kinship terms in Tamang. Thirty-five years after the members of the Nepali Language Committee\(^4\) began their movement and fifteen years after the language was finally included in the constitution, members of the original organization remember with anger and deeply-felt hurt the comments made about the Nepali language by Morarji Desai, former Prime Minister of India, public officials, even the Member of Parliament from Darjeeling, Inder Jit Khuller. A woman in her 70’s, first mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, recounted the ‘disturbances’ in Darjeeling during the 1980’s over what to call the Nepali language (“Nepali” or “Gorkhali”) and asked that I never describe her, her home or neighborhood, or give her name. She was afraid, she said, of having people come and “break her glasses.” After we left her house, my dear friend and research assistant told me that the woman was being polite. She really meant that she was afraid for her life if people remembered that she or her family were ever involved in the movement.

These and hundreds of other incidents have led me to believe that language is nothing but contentious in Darjeeling, at least.

On another level, however, the MP’s statement is accurate. In the legislature, as the place where laws are born and ratified, he was attempting to posit India as a multilingual nation where all citizens, regardless of their language(s), would be free to be educated and live using their language(s) of choice. This was a theme to which the MPs returned regularly; it was also common in publications about so-called minority languages like Nepali. This theme—that India is home to thousands of languages and that it should be considered a superior kind of democracy because so many languages are officially sanctioned by the government—has found its way into

\(^4\) Akhil Bhārātiya Nepālī Bhāṣā Samiti, All-India Nepali Language Committee. Commonly known as ABNBS.
political discourse as well as everyday conversations in places like Darjeeling. In these local settings, I heard this notion used to justify why certain groups should be given Scheduled Tribe status, why particular ethnic groups should not be given this status, and why people of Nepali descent should be considered Indian and not Nepali (or vice versa). These parliamentary debates, then, are crucial to understanding how such macrolevel discourses (on topics such as democracy, citizenship, national security) intersect with language use among Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling. The debates also provide a window into the MPs’ own experiences with, and ideas about, language, which in turn influenced these macrolevel discourses.

The associations carried by a given language certainly are contentious. When people speak, their words not only convey information but index their class, age, regional background, education, emotional state, and a host of other associations. The intimate connections between the way people speak and these social forms of belonging also mean that the affective connection to language easily becomes a highly charged, politically contentious issue, as is clear in the following analysis of the parliamentary debates in 1992.

Also clear in the debates, although not the focus of this chapter, were certain discursive themes: the danger of ignoring peaceful movements for a democracy, integration of minorities and the integrity of the nation, the creation of a particular version of history, discussions of the theory versus the practice of democracy, the definition of a language and its role for both ‘the people’ and the government—what is foreign, what is native, language as a vehicle for unity and development, and language as culture/history/tradition—and the role of Hindi and Sanskrit as both languages of importance and the cornerstone of the nation. Each topic is presented by the MPs as the government’s role in defining, protecting, or creating the nation; the topics are also, however, about people’s experiences with the government, ideologies enacted through and about
language. These discourses are also not natural although they are naturalized as those commonsense connections. Not one MP makes connections between language and gender, religious devotion, or individual personhood—all connections that have been made in other contexts.5

The Eighth Schedule of the Indian constitution is the section in which national languages are granted legal status in India; this status allows citizens to take, for example, university entrance exams or civil service exams in these so-called ‘national’ languages. See section 4.2 below for a more detailed explanation of the legal and social meanings of the Eighth Schedule.6 The constitutional amendment to add Manipuri and Nepali languages to the Eighth Schedule was first introduced to the lower house of the Indian parliament on 10 April 1992 during the 10th Session of the Lok Sabha.7 The debates began on that day and continued on 24 April, 8 May, and 19 August; the bill was ultimately passed on 20 August 1992.8 The secondary literature on these debates is almost non-existent. Therefore, excerpts will be lengthy to provide debates for scholarly literature.9

This chapter explores the bill’s presentation to the house by MP Dil Kumari Bhandari (representative from Gangtok, Sikkim), the rebuttal by MP Inder Jit Khuller (representative from Darjeeling, West Bengal), and the general house discussion, which focused on the nature and

5 The broader discursive themes within the debates were particular, salient for the moment, and connected to their local context. However, because many of these discursive themes were discussed and, in some cases, enacted in Parliament as part of the legislative process, any previously local ways of understanding become codified—or could be seen as authorized—as the government’s perspective.
6 For the history of the Eighth Schedule and the implications for broader India, see chapter one.
7 Many Nepalis in Darjeeling remembered Anand Singh Thapa from Dehra Dun as the first person to raise the issue. In 1956, he wrote to the then-President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, asking for the Nepali language to be added to the 8th Schedule.
8 The Lok Sabha is the lower house of the Indian parliament, also known as the ‘House of the People.’ The upper house is the Rajya Sabha, or Council of States.
9 The language of the debates varied; when MP Khullar and MP Bhandari speak, they used English almost exclusively. In some cases, the original language in which an MP spoke is difficult to discover. The publically available texts of the parliamentary debates are either translated into English or Hindi. The original copy, with the MPs original language choices, is housed in the Parliamentary library “for purposes of record and reference only” (Lok Sabha information page: http://164.100347.132/LssNew/debates/debatelok.aspx. Accessed 4 August 2010).
categorization of languages and naturalized the connections among language, ethnic belonging and the democratic nation-building project in India. In the end, the bill passed; but not before MPs threatened to fast until death while another nearly broke with his party (which would have meant his expulsion) while trying to argue his points. These debates, although explicitly about language, also illuminate ideologies and discourses of citizenship, social belonging, the production of difference, and also highlight the processes by which the theory of democracy melds into the practice of democracy.

4.1 Key Players

Although there are many important individuals involved in these parliamentary debates, two were central to the process. Dil Kumari Bhandari (MP from Gangtok, Sikkim) and Inder Jit Khuller (MP from Darjeeling, West Bengal) represented two of the largest and most politically vocal concentrations of Indian Nepalis in India.

MP Dil Kumari Bhandari was born in Darjeeling District on 14 May 1949. She has been a teacher, social worker, and journalist as well as Member of Parliament from Gangtok. I had read and heard about MP Bhandari before I met her. Her contributions to the parliamentary debates about Nepali demonstrated a passion for language, a no-nonsense attitude, and a knack for eloquent argumentation that gave me pause when asking her for an interview. I was visiting Sikkim in mid-November 2007 in to track down members of the Gangtok branch of the Language Committee and to meet with MP Bhandari’s husband, the former Chief Minister of Sikkim. My research assistant, Maya, and I found her home on November 17 and were led

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10 She was first elected to the 8th Lok Sabha in December 1984 and, during that time, was a member of the Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Home Affairs, member of BOFOR’s committee, as well as a member of the Sikkim Sangram Parishad. She was reelected to the 9th Lok Sabha in December 1989. She was also the Chairman of the State Social Welfare Advisory Board for Sikkim (1980 to 1984), Chairperson of the Sikkim Film Corporation, President of the Academy of Fine Arts, Sikkim, and was awarded the Lok Shree award for social service by the Institute of Economic Studies of India (1989) (Personal communication, 11 January 2010, Dr. Antony P.J., Lok Sabha Secretariat).
upstairs to wait for her in a sitting room.

My first question to her was about her early days and what the situation in Darjeeling and Sikkim was when she was young. She recalled the first stirrings of language recognition activism when she was young:

The people of Darjeeling, they wanted recognition of the language in the state. That was a great movement. I remember my parents going to the Darjeeling Market [and] the Raj Bhawan…where the then-Chief Minister, Mr. B.C. Roy, was residing. He had said something that 'it can't be done,' [recognition of Nepali as an official language of West Bengal] so they had gone there…and that turned out to be a huge success.

I think, to my memory, it was the biggest rally, first rally I have seen. So that was the beginning. Then, in [my] very young mind, it was ingrained that language was very important for us and why we needed language to be recognized by the state government or the authority.

This rally was, presumably, in favor of what became the 1961 West Bengali Official Language Act—in which Nepali became the co-official language of the Darjeeling sub-divisions. After moving to Sikkim, getting married and teaching in what she remembers as the “far-flung areas of Sikkim,” she and her husband were transferred to Gangtok. She remembers that between 1972 and 1979 the language movement was focused in Darjeeling. But after Sikkim became part of India in 1975, a branch of the Nepali Language Committee was formed in Gangtok since the state had a majority of Nepali speakers. She was president of this branch at the time her husband became the Chief Minister of Sikkim. He was, as the first Nepali Chief Minister, in a position to help the committee in his travels as a government officer. She was first elected to the Lok Sabha in 1985.

Although MP Khuller\(^\text{11}\) represented the Darjeeling constituency in the Lok Sabha debates, he was not, in fact, from Darjeeling, nor is he Nepali. Born in 1927 in Shimla (Himachal Pradesh), he attended St. Stephens College and received an M.A. in Economics from the Delhi

\(^{11}\) Sometimes spelled “Khullar,” also commonly known as Inder Jit [without the last name].
School of Economics, Delhi University. He began his career as a journalist based in Delhi with the Indian News and Feature Alliance (Samanta 2000: 168). Khuller is known in Darjeeling as the journalist who acted as intermediary between Rajiv Gandhi (Prime Minister from October 1984 until 1989), and Subash Ghisingh, head of the ethnonationalist Gorkhaland movement during the tense period of the mid 1980s. Ghisingh and Khuller grew increasingly close after the Gorkhaland movement began to wind down, and it was said, that as a reward for his help with the movement, Ghisingh and the GNLF supported Khuller’s run as the Congress candidate from Darjeeling. Khuller won the seat in both 1989 and 1991 (Samanta 2000: 173).

Few people mentioned him during my time in Darjeeling, and when they did, his name was not just Inder Jit, but “Inderjit Khuller, that Punjabi from Delhi.” He is not remembered fondly by those people who did speak of him; in an interview I conducted with a man who worked at the Darjeeling Municipality during the late 1980s and 1990s, he said Khuller knew “nothing” about Nepali language or culture. The man also remembered Khuller as a “puppet” of Ghisingh, the leader of the GNLF. The two “made all hill people fools” because, the man sighed, “everything is possible here in politics.” These sentiments were shared by most people when I asked them about Khuller.

Since there was considerable tension between the GNLF, based in Darjeeling and headed by Subash Ghisingh (who demanded that the language be called “Gorkhali” rather than

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12 Personal communication, 5 February 2009. K.K. Dutta, Joint Director, Lok Sabha Secretariat.
13 Some said that he was sent as an emissary to Subash Ghisingh by Rajiv Gandhi, while others said that Ghisingh recruited him because he was close to Gandhi.
14 During his time in the 9th Lok Sabha, Khuller was a member of the Rules Committee (1990), member of the Committee on Environment and Forests (1990), and member of the Consultative Committee for the Ministry of External Affairs. Once reelected to the 10th Lok Sabha, he became a member of the Executive Committee of the Congress (I) Party and Convenor of the Subcommittee to “suggest measures to tone up its functioning.” Personal communication, 5 February 2009. K.K. Dutta, Joint Director, Lok Sabha Secretariat.
15 I attempted to meet Mr. Khuller during December 2007 in Delhi, but was unable to make contact with him before I left the country.
“Nepali”\textsuperscript{16}, and the Nepali Language Committee (whose members supported calling the language “Nepali”), the supporters of ‘Nepali’ language had channeled their efforts toward Mrs. Bhandari and the political establishment in Sikkim. As the other MP from a Nepali-majority area and the only state with a majority-Nepali population, she was viewed as the best hope for supporters of Nepali.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{4.2 Language and the Indian Constitution (8\textsuperscript{th} Schedule)}

The 8\textsuperscript{th} schedule of the Indian constitution is the section in which national languages of India are outlined and guaranteed legal protection and ‘development.’ The treatment of these languages is summarized in the 1968 Official Language Resolution.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{quote}
2. WHEREAS the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution specifies 14 major languages of India besides Hindi, and it is necessary in the interest of the educational and cultural advancement of the country that concerted measures should be taken for the full development of these languages;

The House resolves that a programme shall be prepared and implemented by the Government of India, in collaboration with the State Governments for the coordinated development of all these languages, alongside Hindi so that they grow rapidly in richness and become effective means of communicating modern knowledge;
\end{quote}

The original configuration of the Eighth Schedule included fourteen languages: Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. In 1967, the 21\textsuperscript{st} amendment to the Indian constitution added Sindhi to

\textsuperscript{16} See chapter three for further discussion of the ideological and political positions regarding nomenclature differences between ‘Nepali’ and ‘Gorkhali.’

\textsuperscript{17} In addition to MP Bhandari and MP Khuller, a number of other persons emerged from these debates as advocates for including the Nepali language in the 8\textsuperscript{th} Schedule. The speaker of the house was Shivraj Patil, Congress (I) MP from Latu, Maharashtra. Lal K. Advani also featured prominently in the debates. He was, in 1992, leader of the opposition party (BJP) and MP from Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Mohan Singh, Samajwadi Party (SP), was MP from Deoria, Uttar Pradesh. MP Singh was elected to the \textit{Lok Sabha} in 1991 and was, from 1991 until 1994, Deputy Chief Whip, Janta Dal Parliamentary Party. Saifudding Choudhury was the CPI (M) MP from Katwas, West Bengal, while A. Charles (Congress [I]) was the MP from Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. The bill itself was presented as including Manipuri and Nepali. However, the majority of the discussion centered around Nepali rather than Manipuri. Some MPs mentioned other languages that could be included, Konkani, Dogri, Santhali, Maithili, Khasi, Rajasthani, and Bhojpuri.

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix I for full text of the resolution.
the list. Between 1967 and 1992, there were not changes to the Schedule although there had been attempts to present bills to the Parliament on behavior of various languages, including Nepali.

It was hoped by many in the Nepali community that the addition of the Nepali language to this list would bring educational and governmental benefits to the community. Hindi and English were explicitly mentioned in the 1968 Language Resolution as “compulsory” languages for government service, but all citizens are able to take the government service exam in 8th Schedule languages:

(a) that compulsory knowledge of either Hindi or English shall be required at the stage of selection of candidates for recruitment to the Union services or posts except in respect of any special services or posts for which a high standard of knowledge of English alone or Hindi alone, or both, as the case may be, is considered essential for the satisfactory performance of the duties of any such service or post; and
(b) that all the languages included in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution and English shall be permitted as alternative media for the All India and higher Central Services examinations after ascertaining the views of the Union Public Service Commission on the future scheme of the examinations, the procedural aspects and the timing.

Government positions are considered the best avenue to financial security, and many in the Nepali community believed it was crucial that they be allowed to take the exam in their own language. The 8th Schedule also dictates the languages students may use for college entrance exams given by the Department of Higher Education. The notion that three languages and education in them cover the diversity of languages and degrees of multilingualism, however, is not applicable in Darjeeling. First, my ethnographic research demonstrates that most people speak between three and eight languages in the course of their days – although some may in fact

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19 See appendix E for a complete listing of the 8th Schedule, from its original version through the 3rd revision of it made in 2003.
20 All parliamentary debates, and government resolutions are reprinted verbatim.
21 Government of India, 1968 Official Language Resolution; see Appendix I.
22 This is particularly true for young people in the Darjeeling area. Previously stable industries like the tea industry are no longer as viable for life-long employment, and military service is less attractive than before for a variety of reasons.
speak more. Second, the definition of ‘mother tongue’ varies widely. For some, it is the language which an individual speaks most fluently. In others, it is the language of one’s ancestors or the language used in the home—and has little connection with linguistic skill.

In both the Parliamentary debates and public/intellectual discussions of the 8th Schedule languages, two themes emerged. First, there has been, since the Schedule was written, a preference for ‘scientifically’ and ‘empirically’ based definitions of languages rather than the definition based on the way languages are used in daily practice; this means that linguists’ definitions of languages were considered of paramount importance. There was little mention of the process of defining these languages, which is often contentious and more about power and politics than linguistics. Second, there was a clear anti-code-switching theme. Languages were considered ‘pure’ only when they could be shown to have few outside influences. This was a common thread in both the official discussions of the 8th Schedule and continues today in Darjeeling. Despite this frequently expressed language ideology, such linguistic syncretism in the form of code-switching between Nepali and English is the norm rather than the exception, even among individuals who self-report as monolingual speakers of Nepali.

4.2.1 Private Member’s Bill to include Nepali and Manipuri in the 8th Schedule

The bill itself was presented to the Lower House of Parliament by Dil Kumari Bhandari on Friday, 10 April 1992, during the 10th Lok Sabha. She remembered there being multiple

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23 For example, the lumping of Cantonese and Mandarin under the umbrella of ‘Chinese.’ For further discussion of the arbitrary nature of the identification of languages, see Childs 2006, Greenberg 2004.


25 See chapter 5 for a further discussion of defining languages in Darjeeling and the difficulty disentangling words as belonging to only one language.

26 During this particular session, Congress (I) held the majority with 252 members. The Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) led the Opposition with 121 members. Other major parties were Janata Dal with 63 members, Communist Party of India (Marxist) with 36 members, Communist Party of India with 14 members, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam with 12, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha with 7, and the Telugu Desam Party with 7. The remaining 43 seats
bills regarding the addition of languages to the 8th Schedule in 1992; “I was not the only one who presented [or] introduced the bill….it was really, really lucky” that her bill was the one taken up. The final two and a half hours of Parliamentary business on Fridays were given for Private Members’ Bills and other issues. Once leave was given for the bill to be introduced, the Chair of the House, Shivraj Patil, gave those two hours for discussion and, since there was only a short time left, asked for all those who wished to speak be “very, very brief” in light of the short time. However, the discussion was not confined to 10 April—it continued on 24 April, 8 May, 19 August, and the bill was finally put to a vote on 20 August 1992. During the 10 April session, and before discussion on the actual bill began, there was disagreement about the nature of the bill and whether it was appropriate to bring the bill as a Private Member’s bill as opposed to waiting for the government to propose the amendment. This had been sore subject for former Nepali Language Committee members and supporters because they remembered the multiple times in the past when delegations from the government asked officials and MPs to withdraw their bills for the Nepali language so that the government could propose the amendment. As the committee members repeatedly pointed out, once the bills were withdrawn the government did nothing. So during the debates in 1992, MPs refused to withdraw the bill on the grounds of government precedent.

4.3 Parliamentary Debates—10 April 1992 (Day One)

As soon as the bill was introduced by MP Bhandari, the Minister of State in the Ministry
of Parliamentary Affairs and Minister of State in the Ministry of Law, Justice, and Company Affairs, Rangarajan Kumaramangalam, stood to report that “there is a general feeling and unanimity on this issue.”

MP Khuller disagreed and immediately intervened:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I support your view that we should not jump the gun. Certain views have been expressed about unanimity. I am not so terribly sure [about] the unanimity because the Constituency from where I come has a particular view on the matter.

Without engaging MP Khuller, or even acknowledging his interjection, MP Bhandari began her presentation by asking to speak in Nepali, “which is understandable by all the people who speak Hindi.” The Hindi language is central to the constitution; in fact, Article 351 of the Constitution explicitly calls for the development of Hindi:

351. Directive for development of the Hindi language.—It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.

Therefore, the connection between Nepali and Hindi is an important one—if all Hindi speakers can understand Nepali, the argument is that the two languages are connected and that Nepali can be used to support the propagation of Hindi. This connection also supports her right to speak Nepali on the floor of the house. Although MP Bhandari spoke for a few lines in Nepali, however, she introduced the actual bill in English.

4.3.1 MP Bhandari presents her argument

MP Bhandari first characterized the bill to include Nepali and Manipuri into the Eighth Schedule.
Schedule as “simple, non-controversial and most imperative in nature.” Schedule as “simple, non-controversial and most imperative in nature.”33 This sort of bill, she reminded the House, had been presented before; sometimes the bills were withdrawn when the government had informally agreed to include it without the Private Member’s bill. Other times, she said, the bill had been voted on and not passed.34 She blamed the bill’s failure in the latter situation on party politics since these bills had all been introduced by the opposition.

In her explanation of the bill, she first attempted to establish the bill’s authority as supported broadly by members of parliament, prime ministers, ministers, political leaders, and the All-India Official Language Conference. One hundred and four members of Parliament, she said, from all parties signed a letter to the Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar35 while the Minister of Human Resources Development, Arjun Singh, highlighted the “irony that this language has not yet been given constitutional recognition” in his address to the All-India Official Language Conference in 1991.36 The conference had voted unanimously to include Nepali in the 8th Schedule. The extensive support by “great individuals” and their importance to the political authority of the bill continued to be expressed in the April 10th debate.37 MP Bhandari reminded the house that Jaya Prakash Narayan had written to the former Prime Minister Morarji Desai about the Nepali language: “I feel that inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule may help the process of cultural integration of the Nepali speaking population within the national

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33 10 April 1992 Lok Sabha debates. I am unsure if this is accurate, but if it were, it would buttress Bhandari’s claims that including the Nepali language in the 8th Schedule would work to “secure [the] enrichment” of Hindi, as stated in article 351.

34 In the 10 April 1992 edition of Hamro Bhasa (a magazine published by the Nepali Language Committee), an editorial detailed other attempts at constitutional recognition: after debates on 13 and 27th June 1980 (Private Member’s bill introduced by Chitta Basu), the Central Government assured the member that they would “immediately” support the bill and asked him to withdraw his so that the government could introduce their own bill. The editorial notes that another Private Member’s bill was introduced by Community Party (Marxist) MP, Satya Gopal Mishra, with debates on 15 and 29 March 1985. Obviously, nothing came of either of these bills.

35 I was unable to meet with Chandra Shekhar during my fieldwork in 2007 as he was diagnosed with cancer and died in July of 2007. I also have not seen a copy of this letter with 104 signatures, but it is possible that there is a copy within the Nepali Language Committee documents which I have yet to find.

36 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates.

37 These great individuals included linguists and other language experts.
This theme of integration, whether emotional, cultural, or political, was a common thread in these debates for many MPs. Opinions elicited from so-called ‘great individuals’ were important not only in the debates, but the broader ethnonationalist movement that preceded the debates. “Scientific” understandings and categorizations of languages were presented as the authoritative way of understanding language. The Nepali language movement began, in part, because activists were told that the only way their language would be considered a ‘language’ was if they provide written documentation of it. Orality and naturally occurring uses of the language were completely dismissed as non-authoritative. The government and its representatives only allowed ‘expert’ opinions to be introduced; linguists, scholars, and the taxonomic connections between languages were paramount.

After MP Bhandari established the national consensus on the issue of the inclusion of the Nepali language in the constitution, she returned to the issue of integrating Nepalis into the nation, quoting from a letter written by Dr. Ratnakar Pandey (MP of the Rajya Sahba) to S.B. Chavan (then-Home Minister) asking for this bill to be passed for national and nationalist reasons: “I request you to maintain national unity and integrity…It will be a historical step aimed at serving the national interest.” One way in which this bill would maintain the integrity of the nation, Bhandari argued, was through the close linguistic relationship between Nepali and Hindi:

In Article 351 of the Constitution, it has been stated that these languages will be included in the Eighth Schedule which will ultimately help in the development of Hindi. For further development of Hindi and enrichment of Hindi it is very necessary to include Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule not only because the Nepali language has its origin in Sanskrit but also it is written in Devnagari Script. In fact, according to the eminent

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38 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
39 These themes are also common in Darjeeling among language activists; see chapter 3.
40 This also becomes important as a discursive theme of the MPs during the broader debates.
41 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates. See also appendix R, “Case for Constitutional Recognition of Nepali, Eighth Schedule, What are the Norms?”
linguist of the country, prof. Mamwar Singh, I quote:

‘This aspect of Nepali language is both unique and unparallel which can act as a catalyst to the development of Hindi.’

Prof. S. Chakladharan from Calcutta, Prof. R.N. Srivastava, and Prof. Namwar Singh, while addressing the All-India Conference of Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad last month at the Constitution Club, New Delhi, said that the inclusion of Nepali language in the Eight Schedule will not only help the emotional integration of the people speaking this language but also help to enrich Hindi. 42

MP Bhandari finished her speech with three arguments. First, she discussed the 8th Schedule’s purpose, which she believed was intended to reflect the situation of the country at it evolved; it is and was intended to be part of the living character of the country, a sentiment also expressed by many other language advocates:

I only reiterate that this thought should be instantly concretised as a policy directive. So far in the past, the Government have been putting forward...senseless arguments against the extension of the Eighth Schedule. If inclusion of languages in the Eighth Schedule is not important, then why Eighth Schedule? If the Eighth schedule is to be there—and I feel it has to be there—there should be logical criteria for inclusion of more languages. In fact, the Eighth Schedule represents the changing and varied character of cultural development in the country. It is dynamic and not static. That is why the Eighth Schedule should also change in both spirit and content.43

Her second argument was that the linguistic importance and worthiness of the Nepali language was clearly established by authorities on the subject. She reminded the house that the Literary Academy (Sahitya Akademi) had recognized Nepali as a literary language on the basis of its “(i) socio-linguistic aspect: (ii) literary aspect; (iii) educational, administrative, and political

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42 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates. Emphasis added.
43 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates. I would argue that a lack of specific criteria for inclusion of languages into the 8th Schedule worked in favor of the government in a few ways. First, it meant that the party in power (or parties wanting power) could promise to help groups in exchange for votes for years. In the case of the Nepali Language Movement, this vote gathering worked for over 30 years. Second, the lack of criteria means that each successive group in power can overrule the ‘criteria’ for inclusion presented by the previous government and, therefore, change the frame of the movement. This could, and did in the case of the Nepali Language Movement, mean that groups will answer all questions and meet the requirements of one government only to find the terms shifting in the tenure of the next government.
aspect.”\textsuperscript{44} In addition, she cites Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, a Bengali linguist often quoted by Nepali language advocates.\textsuperscript{45}

I quote: ‘The tale of languages that really has an important place in India is reduced considerably, we can say that we have some 15 literary languages only for whole of India.’ He listed them as Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu besides two more that is English and Sanskrit have a special place.\textsuperscript{46}

Finally, she argued, Nepali must be recognized as not only a worthy language but also an autochthonous Indian language that literally sprung from the soil not the current geopolitical nation-state. It emerged long before nations began claiming languages:\textsuperscript{47} “Nepali is an Indian language….This language has its birth in India, the North-West part of India, to be precise, when there was no present-day Nepal as a political entity.”\textsuperscript{48} If the language is an Indian language, it

\textsuperscript{44} 10 April 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\textsuperscript{45} She describes Dr. Chatterjee as an “internationally renowned scholar and linguist of India.” His name and opinion of the Nepali language appear in nearly every official document presented by the Nepali Language Committee.\textsuperscript{46} 10 April 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates. At the time of these debates, all the languages mentioned had been included in the 8th schedule except the Nepali language. Sindhi was not in the original constitutional drafting, but had been added with the 21st Amendment to the Constitution in 1967. English has never appeared in the 8th schedule although it does have special status.
\textsuperscript{47} It also appears that India exists somehow out of time in MP Bhandari’s comments. The idea that India predates Nepal is a source of disagreement among some Nepalis in Darjeeling and often emerged during discussions of religion—the historical Buddha’s (Gautama Buddha) birthplace is remembered as Lumbini, in Southern Nepal not far from where I was stationed as a Peace Corps volunteer. Nepal there, and in Darjeeling, occasionally reported Indians disputing their claim on this location. They bristled at the notion that Lumbini had ever belonged to India, particularly during the Buddha’s lifetime between 400 and 500 BCE. Other MPs also took up the thread of narrating a history for Nepalis in India. Although each of the legislators reported that there should be no debate on the ‘Indianness’ of Indian Nepalis, this is belied by the intense effort to represent the people and their language as emerging originally from India and as contributing to India in significant ways. During the second day of debates, MP Advani traced the history of Nepalis in India: “History of India is witness to this fact that a very big part of Nepal was made a part of India by the English through treaty with Gorkhas for their luxury and comforts. They also gave a very large part of India to Nepal as a consequence for the treaty. As a result of that treaty, the entire region of Kumaon Garhwal and Himachal in North India and the Terai region of Nepal adjacent to Gorakhpur and Bihar has close relationship with U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] and Bihar. Nepali is spoken in this entire region.” This history is the official narrative of the political shifting of borders but it is by no means uncontested. Another MP, on 24 April, discussed the history of Nepalis in the fight for freedom from the British: “if Nepali is not an Indian language, to say so, it is as good as to say that Nepalis are not Indians. Can you say that? They are very much in the mainstream. They are the proud citizens of this country. We can never forget the great leadership given by the Nepalis during the freedom struggle. They are the flesh and blood of the country and my honest conviction is that as quickly as possible they should be brought into the mainstream of the country.” It is interesting that during these debates, no one attempts to refute the idea that Nepalis (as Gurkha soldiers) were used explicitly by the British colonial authority during and after the Rebellion of 1857 (also known as the First War of Independence or the Sepoy Mutiny) because of their loyalty to the colonial government.\textsuperscript{48} 10 April 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
cannot be foreign. This line of reasoning extends to people as well. If the language is an Indian language, it cannot be a foreign language. If Indians of Nepali descent speak an Indian language, they cannot then be foreigners.

The question of the nature of Nepali language had been troublesome for language advocates since early in the process, particularly during Morarji Desai’s time as Prime Minister from 1977 to 1979. After a 29 September 1977 meeting between the Nepali Language Committee members and Desai, the head office of the Language Committee wrote a letter containing a copy of a public circular with the transcript of that meeting. Although the copy I recovered was part of those sent to branches of the Language Committee throughout India, it was printed (in Nepali) to be circulated to all Nepali speaking people in India. Excerpts of the transcript are reproduced below (see appendix V for the full text):

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—Can we know what kind of difficulty will arise if Nepali language is included in the 8th schedule

PM [Prime Minister, Morarji Desai]—Should I give the reason for every decision I make? If we include this language, we have to open doors for other tribal languages.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—But Nepali is a developed language which has also been recognized by Sahitya Akademi [Literary Academy, in New Delhi]. It is also one of the official languages in West Bengal, even in Sikkim 75% of the population have Nepali as their mother language. A bill proposing the inclusion of Nepali in the 8th Schedule has already been passed in the legislative assembly of Bengal, Sikkim is also doing the same...

PM—Whatever facilities have been given to you should make you satisfied. Sahitya Akademi can recognize even a foreign language. If you talk on the basis of recognition given by Sahitya Akademi, should I cancel the recognition. I can do it very easily.

49 Although many Prime Ministers and other public figures have questioned the Indianness of Nepalis born in India, Morarji Desai was particularly acerbic in his criticism of the Language Committee’s arguments
50 The writer of the circular sets the stage for the interview: “Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bhasa Samiti [All India Nepali Language Committee] were met by the Prime Minister in his own secretarial office, South Block, New Delhi, at 1:50 pm on the 29th of Sept 1977 for the interview. Among the representatives there were members of different regions such as 6 from Darjeeling, 3 from Sikkim, 3 from Megalaya, 3 from Mizoram, 3 from Uttar Pradesh, 1 from Himachal Pradesh and 5 from Delhi which made the total of 27 members. The representative body was headed by the samiti’s [committee’s] General Secretary, Mr. Prem Kumar Allay. The Prime Minister was in his office with two of his stenographers” (emphasis mine).
Nepalis in Darjeeling District of West Bengal have enough benefits.

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—But we have come not only from Darjeeling, Nepali speaking Indians are not only in Darjeeling but also in other states such as Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram, Megalaya, everywhere.

PM—*Mizoram has its own problems, do you want to add another? Wherever you are, you should learn the language of that place and live in harmony.*

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—Because our language is not included in the 8th schedule, we have to refrain from many benefits. Let’s forget about other things even for the simple income of tax inspector exam, a candidate can write the answers only in the scheduled languages. We are away from many such benefits and we feel suppressed.

PM—*Wherever you are, you have to harmonize with the people there. If not, you have to remain suppressed.*

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—That will prevent emotional unity, inclusion of our language in the 8th Schedule will increase the emotional bonding.

PM—That means such emotion has not come within you

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—We feel insecure until our language is not included in the 8th schedule. *We met the former Prime Minister five times. The former government told us that it was to erase such feelings of insecurity among the Sindhis that their language was added in the 8th Schedule.*

PM—If the former government had given you fake hopes, I don’t want to do the same. I say it clearly that it cannot be done. It’s the mistake of the former government to give constitutional status to Sindhi language. I would not have done that mistake had I been there. You must have been encouraged by the inclusion of Sindhi in the 8th Schedule.

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—That’s true, because the struggle to include both the languages started in the same period. When Sindhi language was included, their population was 7 lakhs [700,000]. We are almost 50 lakhs [5 million].

PM—*I am doubtful about your population. Let’s assume for a while, its 50 lakhs [5 million]. In a country with 60 crore [600 million] population, it’s negligible. You know that there are many Hindi speakers in Nepal, why doesn’t the Nepal government recognize Hindi.*

**Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]**—We are Indian. We have no concern about Nepal. For us, Nepal is as foreign as China, America, or Russia. Nepali is not a foreign language. Linguists like Suniti Kumar Chatterjee has also counted Nepali as before as 1956 as one of the main literary languages.
PM—Apart from Sindhi and Sanskrit, other languages included in the 8th Schedule are spoken in at least one of the Indian states. *Again, your language cannot be compared with Sindhi. Sindhis are Indians*, after the partition of the country they have come to India. *You have come after being enrolled in the army or through other means and settled in different places.* Should I stop the enrollment of Nepalis in the Indian army?

In spite of sentiments like those of Morarji Desai, MP Bhandari believed the question of the ‘Indianness’ of the Nepali language had been definitively answered when the Ministry of Home Affairs was asked about the language’s status in December 1991 and they “stated that Nepali was not treated as a foreign language.” The Ministry of External Affairs also affirmed the Indian nature of the language in a letter, quoted by MP Bhandari:

“The Ministry of External Affairs have no objection to the proposal for inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule since this is an *internal* issue which does not involve our relations with Nepali [Nepal] with which this ministry is concerned.”

She reminded the MPs that Nepali was spoken as a first language of Indian citizens in a number of states, not only West Bengal and Sikkim, but also throughout the Northeast, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. In addition, “Nepali is spoken by many more as their second language.” This particular argument both picks up on criticisms that Nepali is a language with few speakers in India, like those expressed above by Morarji Desai, and, more importantly, that Darjeeling is the main home of Nepalis. If Darjeeling is not the only place where Nepali is spoken, then MP Khuller’s claim to represent Nepalis as their political representative in the *Lok Sabha* could be destabilized.

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51 This implies that Nepalis are all Nepal citizens not Indian citizens of Nepali descent.
52 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates.
53 MP Bhandari does not say to whom the letter was addressed. She only says, “We have received a reply.” This could be one of the many Nepali organizations to which she belonged at the time. It could also be a letter to the government of Sikkim, since her husband was Chief Minister at the time of these debates. This could be in reaction to a number of comments from government officials about the place of Hindi in Nepal. For example, during a meeting on 29 September 1977 between then-Prime Minister Morarji Desai and 27 representatives of the Nepali Language Committee (from Darjeeling, Sikkim, Megalaya, Mizoram, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Delhi), PM Desai asked the members of the committee why he should support the recognition of Nepali in India when the Nepal government refused to recognize Hindi as an official language: “You know that there are many Hindi speakers in Nepal, why doesn’t the Nepal government recognize Hindi?” (File #1 ka—1972-1977, img_08-img_10).
54 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates.
MP Bhandari then outlined the last of her main arguments, what she saw as the role language plays in an individual’s life as well as its importance to the Nepali community. This statement not only represents language ideologies—that language is both affective and apolitical—but also appears to be another attempt to undercut MP Khuller’s, and the GNLF’s, distinction and argument between “Nepali” and “Gorkhali”:

Language has very important place in one’s life. This involves so much of emotional issue in fact the whole existence of a person is not a correct thing to play cheap gimmicks. It [if] I indulge in such cheap gimmicks, posterity will never forgive. I, for that matter all the people who speak Nepali languages, are not that weak that we will change the name of our mother tongue merely by suggestions of some ignorant and fabricated arguments put forward by some vested interests.”

The conclusion of MP Bhandari’s presentation of the bill focused primarily on the official status of Nepali in various states—it was the official language of the state of Sikkim and of the 3 hill-subdivisions of the Darjeeling area of West Bengal. She also reminded the body that the State Legislative Assemblies of West Bengal, Tripura, Sikkim and now very recently Himachal Pradesh, have passed unanimous resolutions for inclusion of Nepali language in the 8th Schedule. No other language, even those listed in the 8th Schedule have this kind of support. Of course, it was not necessary for them to show such support at the time when recognitions were conferred upon them.

She ended her presentation by asking the house to support the bill because Nepalis, she reminds them, have made significant contributions to the building of India and have done so without resorting to violence:

It goes to the credit of Nepali speaking people of India that despite being strategically

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56 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates. MP Bhandari’s use of ‘Nepali languages’ is particularly interesting in the context of these debates. Although Nepali is the only ‘Nepali’ language (meaning belonging to Nepali people), Nepalis speak a number of languages.

57 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates.

58 She also presented statements by Subash Ghisingh, leader of the GNLF, from the early 1970s in which he labels Indian Nepalis as Nepalis and not Gorkhas. Two were in English and one in Nepali; all are attributed to speeches he made in 1973. “*Hami Gorkhali Hoina*” [We are not Gorkhali], “*Hami Nepali*” [We are Nepali], and “We are Nepalis and can preserve our language and culture by remaining Nepali” (10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates). If he did, in fact, say these statements in 1973, then this was long before the Gorkhaland movement as well as before he took up the role of ‘freedom fighter’ and then leader of the GNLF. I have not yet been able to independently verify that he said these phrases; they were, however, widely circulated within the Darjeeling hills during my research.
scattered all over the country, they have made uninterrupted and substantial contribution right since the freedom struggle to give this robust shape to Modern India. Our contributions have distinct mark on India’s cultural and literary heritage and on all other aspects. More than four decade long movement of Nepali language has been the most peaceful movement. This shows our commitment towards the democratic process and integrity of the nation.\(^5^9\)

These points addressed criticisms from earlier in the language movement. First, the argument had been made that Nepalis were predominantly settled in Darjeeling and Sikkim. MP Bhandari used her speech to remind the legislators that Nepalis live throughout India. Second, rather than being ‘foreigners,’ Nepalis had contributed productively to the freedom of India. Their peaceful faith in the democratic process had not caused the problems for the Indian state that other, more violent movements, had caused. With this, MP Bhandari relinquished the floor.

4.3.2 General discussion—10 April 1992

After MP Bhandari finished her initial presentation of the bill, Lal K. Advani, leader of the Opposition Party (BJP) and MP from Gandhinagar (Gujarat), spoke in favor of the bill. He used his platform to remind the house of the process by which Sindhi was included in the 8th schedule in 1967. A main obstacle to that process was an argument which had also been made about the current Nepali proposal:

It was argued that we had included only those language [in the 8th schedule during the original constitutional drafting in 1950] to which were spoken by majority of people in any State and recognised as the official language of that State….We people used to argue that Sanskrit was neither spoken in any State nor was the official language of any State. But it has been recognised. Those days, English was not the official language of any State. It was made official language when Nagaland and Mizoram were formed. At that time, English and Sanskrit language were not official languages of any State.\(^6^0\)

He also used his speech to attempt to bridge the divide between those who advocated calling it “Nepali” language (MP Bhandari and the Language Committee) and those who advocated calling it “Gorkhali” language (MP Inter Jit Khuller and the GNLF):

\(^{5^9}\) 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates.
\(^{6^0}\) 10 April 1992, *Lok Sabha* debates.
[M]y hon. Colleagues Shri Inder Jit may have some objection in my calling it as Nepali. He has a logic behind this argument. You may call it Gorkhali, I don’t have any objection. Nepal is a separate country. Therefore, Nepali is a foreign language so we should not include it as such rather we should call it Gorkhali.61

MP Advani recanted this belief that Gorkhali is the most appropriate name for the language in the next Lok Sabha discussion on 24 April, but at this moment he was trying to argue that the name of the language was unimportant. Instead, there was support for the language of Indian Nepalis, whatever the name: “I am not fighting for the word, I am fighting for the language.”62

MP Advani’s presentation focused on past legislative precedent and the dangers of not including languages in the 8th Schedule. He also claimed to be “surprised” by MP Khuller’s belief that there was not agreement on the issue of the Nepali language. Although the house was scheduled to adjourn in less than 15 minutes, the MPs began arguing about the status of Nepali, Gorkhali, and whether the Nepali language was foreign. The exchange centered on MP Khuller, who first interrupted MP Advani and then began debating directly with MP Bhandari.

In the following section of the debates, quoted at length below,63 MP Khuller disagrees with an MP from West Bengal about what the Bengali language is called in Bangladesh. Khuller says they call it Bangladeshi to differentiate it from the language spoken in West Bengal. Various MPs interrupt and disagree about the nature of changing the nomenclature of languages to suit political purposes. Bhandari points out that the suggestion to change the name of the Nepali language is being made in the house by the “non-Nepali man who belongs to the state in which people do not speak Nepali.” (Khuller is Punjabi and spends most of his time in Delhi where Nepali is not spoken regularly.) The Chair interrupted and said that during British occupation of the subcontinent, the language was known as Gorkhali and was changed after they

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61 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
62 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
63 10 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates. This excerpt of the transcript is reprinted verbatim.
left. An MP supports the Chair’s ‘authoritative’ knowledge of the language because, he reminds the house, the Chair served in the Army (presumably with Nepalis, but the MP does not say this). The Chair agrees, and interestingly, supports his agreement by presenting personal experiences with the Nepali language—“I served in Gorkha regiment for 15 years and I think I can speak as good Gorkhali or Nepali as Mrs. Bhandari.” This is an interesting comment and, I believe, a reference to MP Bhandari’s use of English in the debates rather than Nepali. She speaks fluent Nepali as well as perfect English.

**SHRI INDERJIT [KHULLER]:** There is no dispute on language. We have full respect for the language. People speak the same language but the rest of the things which I have to say, I shall say afterwards. As you spoke about the name. The word ‘Nepali’ is identified with the nationality of another country. That is why when Morarji Desai was the Prime Minister and when people said that the Nepali language should…

[Interruptions]…

**SHRI CHITA BASU** (Barsat): Bangladesh is a sovereign country. But in Bangladesh, Bengali is the official language. Bengali is the official language of the State of West Bengal also.

**SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]:** In Bangladesh, they can call it as Bangladeshi.

[Interruptions]…

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** I would like to apprise Mr. Inder Jit that while speaking I had narrated from the reply of the Home Minister that they have said that it is not a foreign language. This is the language of the people of India.

**SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]:** I will have my chance to speak. The Leader of the Opposition was gracious enough to yield to enable me to make a very simple point that there is total respect for Bhasa [language]. There is no problem for the Bhasa [language].

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** It is very unfortunate. Is it that we Nepali speaking people have to change today the nomenclature of our language simply at the suggestion of the non-Nepali man who belongs to the state in which people do not speak Nepali?

**MR. CHAIRMAN:** He is entirely in agreement with your point of view.

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** It is very unfair on his part. It is not very fair
on his part. We won’t take it lying down.

**MR. CHAIRMAN:** At the time of the British, I think it was known as Gorkhali. But after British left, it has been renamed Nepali.

**SHRI LAL. K. ADVANI:** Mr. Chairman has served the Army and he is aware of it. I know all this.

**MR. CHAIRMAN:** I served in Gorkha regiment for 15 years and I think I can speak as good Gorkhali or Nepali as Mrs. Bhandari.

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** Mr. Chairman, by saying one thing, I would like to dispel your illusion. Today, in Darjeeling, which is represented by our friend Shri Inder Jit[jji, very few people are saying that this language should be known as ‘Gorkhali.’ I do not believe this that everyone is saying this but only some people are saying that it should be called the ‘Gorkha’ language. What is the logic behind it, it should be called Gorkhali or Gorkha language.

They are saying that by calling it Nepali, every Indian thinks that we are Nepali nationals whereas if we call it Gorkhali we will be known as Indians. You yourself tell us, you just said that you worked in the Gorkha regiment for 15 years. You please tell us in all the Gorkhas of the Gorkha regiment are Indians? How many percent are Indians?64 Most of the people are Nepali nationals, then will they be considered Indians only if they speak the Gorkha language and if we speak Nepali, shall we be considered to be Nepalis?

The day ended with more disagreement about Gorkhali and Nepali; the Chair eventually cut the debate short and adjourned the house for the day.

**4.4 Parliamentary Debates—24 April 1992 (Day Two)**

Between the 10th and the 24th of April, language activists, MP Bhandari, and other supporters of the movement met with Members of Parliament to clarify their position and some of the arguments that they been unable to make the first day of debates.65 In particular, they wanted to clarify the significance of the nomenclature of the language [see chapter three] to the Indian Nepali people and the politics behind that disagreement. In the past, divisions within the community were used as justification for why the language should not have been recognized and,

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64 Many soldiers within the Gurkha regiments of the Indian army are comprised of Nepal nationals (see Banskota 1994; Caplan 1991, 1993; Des Chene 1991, 1993).
65 I am reasonably certain that MP Khuller and other representatives of the GNLF did the same, but I have no evidence of their efforts.
I believe, they were attempting to shut down this criticism quietly before the public debates in the house on the April 24th.

When Parliamentary debate resumed on the 24th, MP Inder Jit Khuller was not in attendance. The MPs from various locations throughout India seemed to take advantage of his absence to discuss the national implications of changing the 8th schedule rather than those more specific to Indian Nepalis and Darjeeling. Some focused on the fiscal responsibility of the government if it was changed, while others wanted to discuss the legal and social ramifications of including more languages. Others used the time to clarify their position on the disagreement between naming the language ‘Nepali’ or ‘Gorkhali’ and to discuss their concerns that if peaceful movements were not allowed to be successful that there would be a danger of encouraging violence as the only means for success.

The arguments about the integrity of the nation and its connection to integration of minorities were especially important to a number of MPs. In this way, the unity of the country was tied directly to integrating the multiplicity of ethnicities, religions, and languages into some sort of overarching framework. The argument was often that by including and recognizing languages in some official or legal capacity, the multitude would be brought together by acknowledging and validating the emotional connection to language. MP Choudhury, during the debates on the 24th of April, argued that “a language should be the vehicle of unity. We cannot allow this language question to bring disunity in our country.” In response to criticisms about increasing the number of languages in the 8th Schedule, he said that the government should not be concerned about demands to have languages included: “We should not be afraid of that; we are not going to lose by that. We have to allow flourishing of the genuine aspirations of the people and by that way only we will be helping this country’s unity to be strengthened; and all

66 I have no knowledge of why he was not that during this day.
the achievements that we had in the past would really make further achievement with the rich heritage that we have to carry forward for new civilization” (24 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates). MP Advani argued that since culture and language are inherently tied to a people, officially recognizing that language would help integrate the people into the body of democratic India:

> So the language issue is also one of the reasons for the present day attack on the federal structure of the country. Rich and long history and tradition of a language should not be the only criteria for including it into the Eighth Schedule of the constitution. Regional languages must be considered for inclusion in the constitution as they are the mirror of cultural heritage, history, and traditions of the region. If we want the unity of the country also to maintain harmony in the country, we must include these two main languages of Eastern India in the Constitution. It will help the culture and heritage of that region mingle with the mainstream Indian culture” (24 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates).

MP Choudhury also argued against imposing languages from the national level on minority groups because, again, the connections between a culture and its language mean that when a language is threatened, a culture is threatened.

> We believe that we should keep our unity and integrity intact. If we give due recognition to all such languages, then what harm that will do? We have a wrong notion. We have a wrong way of thinking that only by an authoritarian imposition of this language of that language, we can really safeguard the unity and integrity of our country. No, by forcibly imposing a privilege on a particular language and denying that same privilege to other languages we are not helping to keep the unity and integrity intact. We are not helping unity to grow. We are really helping disunity to spread among the people.67

Some MPs even tied the protection of minorities and a mixed or “composite” heritage as the foundation for an Indian democracy:

> Sir, ours is a great country. There are different languages, thousands of languages and different dialects, different traits and different cultures. Though we claim to have a composite culture as our heritage, it is our responsibility and duty to protect the identity of every small group, however small it may be. Then only the unity and diversity which is the essence of the source of our democracy can be built up.68

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67 24 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
68 MP A. Charles, 24 April Lok Sabha debates. He goes on to say that “I am sure that if this great step is undertaken, those ten million people—they are already in the mainstream and they have contributed so much in building up this country—will be the forefront to see that this great country march toward the 21st century as a great country, giving a lead to the whole world.” The “ten million people” seem to be Indians of Nepali descent. Finding the number of Indians of Nepali descent is difficult; census numbers have been, in the past, been inaccurate. For example, when numbers of self-reported Nepali speakers from the 1981 and 1991 censuses are compared, there
MP Syed Shahabuddin (Kishanganj) articulates these languages ideologies more clearly:

I recall at this moment the question of inclusion of additional languages in the Eighth Schedule has been raised in the Parliament in many ways….There has been a stock reply from the Government which has lost its cutting edge today. It is no longer relevant. In fact, it was never convincing. The Government’s argument has always been [‘]well all language are national languages.[‘] We want all languages to develop. But, then all languages need not be in the Eighth Schedule.

It is this discrimination which has caused a political situation in the country….The question of language is not just a question of language. It is not just a linguistic question; it is an emotional question; it is a sentimental question; it is a psychological question; it is a national question. For all of us, the sweetest language is one in which our mother has sung us the [lullabies]. Our sweetest language is one in which we first spoke out, first articulated ourselves[,] first uttered a few words. There cannot be anything more personal than that.

Therefore, if a citizen gets a feeling in a ploy linguistic a state [sic] like ours that his language is not being treated as an equal language[,] is not being given its due, is not being recognized, this surely hurts him. We must as co-citizens appreciate that feeling, appreciate that sentiment and do everything possible, for us to remove that sting from his heart, and make his [him] feel absolutely at east [ease], feel equal and assure him that he cannot be discriminated again [against?]. Today, we are at the threshold of a new age in the world what has been called the age of ethnicity and when you consider that ethnic identity of any social group more than anything else is the language. Therefore, it is not surprising that all languages demand recognition, all linguistic groups demand equality at the bar of the nation."}

Another MP referred back to Jawaharlal Nehru—a leader in the movement for Independence, first Prime Minister of the country, and father of Indira Gandhi—to establish a political precedent. As MP Chitta Basu notes:

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made his position regarding language a little more flexible. What did he say? He said, ‘the list of the language in the Eighth Schedule is not completely exhaustive.’

was a 52.62% increase between 1981 and 1991 (see Appendix O for full details). This compared to a reported decrease between 1971 and 1981 (4.17%) and an increase between 1991 and 2001 of 38.29%. In addition, there are Indians of Nepali descent who do not speak Nepali.

24 April 1992, Lok Sabha debates. He also tied the protection of identity, though language, to India’s nation building projects—“This is the way nations are built. This is the way national unity is established. This is the way the national integration is reinforced[;] not by negligence, not by omission and not by disrespect to peoples’ sentiments.”
My feeling is every language is a national language. There cannot be a regional language; there cannot be a national language because[] in the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, each language has its own history, development, assimilation and expansion. Each language has its own vocabulary, pattern of expression, construction, etc., which distinctive characteristics. Therefore, every language should be treated equally and on the basis of equality, they should have the respect of the people of the country as a whole and that respect should be shown by the Constitution itself. That can alone strengthen the oneness, that can alone strengthen the sense of unity and that can alone build up India as a multilingual, multiethnic, united, strong, prosperous and forward[-]thinking nation.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{4.5 Parliamentary Debates—8 May 1992 (Day Three)}

The third day of the debates continued much like the previous two, with one major exception: MP Khuller had returned. Before he spoke, two other MPs presented their arguments which were similar to the previous day, as they focused on national issues rather than the Nepali/Gorkhali language issue specifically. However, after MP Khuller presented his case, most MPs responded, at least in part, to his framing of the issue rather than following the broader (national) themes they had presented on April 24\textsuperscript{th} when he had not been present.

\textit{2.5.1 MP Khuller presents his argument}

After the second MP concluded his supportive case for the language, MP Khuller took the floor. He began with an appeal to the integrity and unity of the Indian state:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am grateful to you for giving me an opportunity to speak on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill which is of great interest to more than eight to ten lakh [800,00 to 1,000,000] of people of my constituency of Darjeeling and carries far-reaching implications for the future of India, its integrity and unity.\textsuperscript{71}

He next expressed surprise and “concern” at the widespread support for the bill in its current form (as Nepali language) from so many sides and presented the authoritative version of the language as Gorkhali or Gorkha language that was championed by the GNLF and Subash Ghisingh:

Many friends from all sides of the House have already spoken on the Bill. I have heard all

\textsuperscript{70} 24 April 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\textsuperscript{71} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
of them with much interest. And if I might add, in some cases, with not a little concern.

Some here may be surprised at my use of the word ‘concern.’ Candidly, Sir, I have chosen to do so deliberately, I feel concerned because I find that some of the speeches sadly reflect what I have often described as the bane of present day India, a crisis of casualness. I get the feeling that adequate thought has not been given to the proposal to include Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule. Regrettably, the approach of some friends appears to be rather casual. Major developments have taken place in the Darjeeling hills over the past few years. Surprisingly and regrettably, these have not been taken into account. Some friends have also slurred over recent developments which must be kept in mind before we take a decision on the legislation before us, a Bill which is not as simple as it appears to be [in] regard to the proposal for the inclusion of the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule.

This second portion of his appeal is particularly interesting in light of his role as MP from Darjeeling. As noted earlier, MP Khuller was not Nepali, nor did he grow up in the Darjeeling area. As a “Punjabi from Delhi,” as he was labeled by Nepalis in Darjeeling, Khuller did not have access to the same emotional or ethnic ties to the language and could therefore not speak for Nepalis as one of them. He did, however, represent a significant portion of the Nepali population of India as their democratically elected Member of Parliament. But Darjeeling was not, and is to this day not, the only site of residence for Indians of Nepali descent. This fact clearly caused problems for MP Khuller’s authority, particularly in light of the controversy between Gorkhali and Nepali as labels for the language. For his line of reasoning and authority as representative of Indian Nepalis, Darjeeling must be constructed, and accepted by those present, as the center of Indian Nepalis:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, this Bill needs to be viewed in the first place in the light of the agitation launched by the Gorkha National Liberation Front and its leader, Mr. Subash Ghisingh for the establishment of Gorkhaland early in 1986 and its culmination in the

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72 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
73 When I asked why they would elect someone not from Darjeeling to Parliament, I was most often given one of two reasons: 1) He was the candidate supported by the GNLF and the GNLF enjoyed wide support in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 2) he was considered to be close to, and enmeshed with, the power brokers in New Delhi. It was, therefore, assumed that he was going to be able achieve much more for the Nepali people that other MPs in the past.
This agitation was not just for a separate State of Gorkha and within India’s borders. Sir, it was a battle for identity by the Gorkhas of the Darjeeling hill areas who had come to India with the ceded land—as also a battle by the Gorkha National Liberation Front for forging a common national political platform for the ‘settled Gorkhas’ all over India.

Mr. Ghisingh and his supporters were not prepared to be labeled as Nepalis and, in effect, have the words “reciprocal Nepalls [Nepalis]” permanently inscribed on their foreheads under Article VII of the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950. This article provides and I quote: ‘The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant on reciprocal basis to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce and privileges of a similar matter.’

They, therefore, asserted that they were Indians and not Nepalis and demanded that they be formally recognised as Indians. In other words…

(Interruptions) Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am not yielding. I didn’t not object when Mr. Upadhyay talked in terms of ‘We, the Nepalis…’ (Interruptions).  

The transcripts, unfortunately, do not tell us who was interrupting and how long these interruptions lasted. They did occur frequently during MP Khuller’s speech, reflecting the MPs perception that his speech was controversial and, sometimes, factually inaccurate. After the Chair calms the room, MP Khuller continued:

They, therefore asserted that they were Indians and not Nepalis and demanded that they be formally recognized as Indians. In other words, they draw a sharp and clear distinction between those who were ‘settled Gorkhas’ of India and Indians and those who were Nepali nationals residing in India in accordance with Article VII of the Indo-Nepal Treaty and described as ‘reciprocal Nepalis.’ Basically thy [they] were eager to make one thing clear. They were will [sic] and truly Indians and had nothing to do whatsoever with Nepali [Nepal].

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74 I believe he has once again confused the August 22, 1988 Tripartite accord (appendix U) with the August 23, 1988 Memorandum of Settlement between the GNLF and the Central Government (appendix B). The Tripartite agreement—between the Central Government, State of West Bengal, and the GNLF—signed on August 22nd, was the agreement that created the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC).

75 By ‘ceded land,’ he means the Darjeeling Hills’ history of possession by Nepal (ceded to the British East India company as of the 1815 Treaty of Segauli, appendix G) and Sikkim (before it was taken back by the British East India company in 1835). He could also be referring to the ownership of Kalimpong by the Bhutanese kings until the mid-19th century before they ceded it to the British (in the Treaty of Sinchula, 11 November 1865) after the Indo-Bhutan War.


77 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
This part of the speech was dedicated to cutting ties with Nepal and is an interesting move considering that the issue at hand—inclusion of the Nepali language into the Indian constitution—is directly, or rather legally, concerned with India not Nepal. MP Khuller next draws the body’s attention to the legal notification issued on 23 August 1988 by the Government of India which he believed proves that “settled Gorkhas” were Indian citizens. The distinction was drawn between ‘Nepalis,’ who would speak the Nepali language and are citizens of Nepal wherever they reside, and “settled Gorkhas” who presumably speak Gorkhali and are Indian citizens wherever they reside: “To cut a long story short. Mr. Ghising [Ghisingh] and the GNLF tought [fought] hard and won their battle for identity. The Government of India acknowledged that Mr. Ghising [Ghisingh] and the ‘settled Gorkhas’ of India were Indian citizens.”

MP Khuller then quoted, at length, the legal notification that clarified the citizenship of Indians of Nepali descent and refocused the discussion on the label of the autonomous government of the Darjeeling region. This governing body, the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (commonly known as the DGHC), was explicitly named for the ‘Gorkhas’ rather than ‘Nepalis:’

Importantly and significantly the GNLF and its leaders did not rest at that. They Insisted that the proposed Darjeeling Hill Council, which was to be an autonomous body and a little host of the full-fledges State demanded by them, be called the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. The West Bengal Government objected to including the word ‘Gorkha’ in the name of Hill council. Eventually, Shri Buta Singh, the then Home Minister, and I as one privileged to play the role of a mediator in the thorny and highly emotive dispute, were able to persuade both the then Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, and the West Bengal Chief Minister, Mr. Jyoti Basu, to accede to the GNLF demand and give the proposed Council the name of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.

The GNLF and Its supporters In the Darjeeling Hill areas as also in the adjoining areas of Alipur Dooars are today proud of their Indian citizenship and identify. They are happy to have drawn a clear and sharp distinction between themselves as Indians and those who

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78 Not unlike PM Desai’s comments.
79 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
are ‘reciprocal Nepalis.’ They do not wish to be seen as having any link, even remotely, with Nepal and are eager to ensure that there is no scope for any doubt in regard to their commitment to their motherland India.81

After arguing that the governing body in the Darjeeling hills has been named by the central government after the ‘Gorkhali’ citizens of India (who wish to disavow their Nepali heritage but not language), MP Khuller turned to the question of language.

The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council and its Executive took another significant step to assert their Indian Identity and separateness from Nepal. Both formally declared ‘Gorkha Bhasha’ [Gorkha language] as their official language. This, it needs to be noted, was done by Mr. Ghisingh and his council at a time when some leaders in the region have been busy campaigning in a big way for the inclusion of Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule as one of Indian’s National languages.82

The “leaders” to whom he refers were in large part the Nepali Language Committee, although there were other organizations in the Darjeeling hills region as well as the state of Sikkim who joined the Language Committee in the fight to have Nepali be included.83

At this pause, the Chair proposed to extend the discussion of the bill since the allotted time had expired. A number of members seconded the motion and MP Khuller continued. From this point on, there were frequent attempts to interrupt his speech:

“We must be clear ‘about certain fundamental while viewing the Constitution Amendment bill before us’ The Nepali language is today officially the national language of Nepal even as the Kingdom has many other languages spoken by Its various communities as the Rais, the Limbus and the Gurungs.84 I am told that Nepal had formally no national language until Kathmandu applied for the membership of the United Nations. Earlier, the ruling circles in Kathmandu used the Khas language. Subsequently, the name was changed to Parbatia or the language spoken In [sic] the hills.

(Interuptions) Shrimati Dil Kumari Bhandari can reply at the end.

Please give me a patient hearing. Thereafter, it was called Gorkha Bhasha [Gorkha

81 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
82 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates. I have been unable to find a copy of a public announcement or memorandum in which ‘Gorkha’ was declared the official language of the DGHC or the DGHC executive council; I had heard many times, during my field research, that this declaration did take place.
83 Although the Nepali Language Committee appears to be the largest (in terms of numbers of members and distribution in India), there were ethnic and literary organizations who supported the movement.
84 Rais, Limbus, and Gurungs are ethnic groups in Nepal that also have many members living throughout India.
language] till Nepali language in Newari script was formally declared as the Kingdom’s national language.

The Nepali language is at present not only the national language of Nepal, it is also the language of all the Nepalis abroad, including lakhs [hundreds of thousands] residing and working in India in accordance with Article VII of the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950. In sharp contrast, Gorkha Bhasa, according to the GNLF and my understanding of the Darjeeling Accord, is the language of the ‘settled Gorkahs’ of India who have been accepted as Indian citizens under the Accord and have been declared to be such by the Government of India Gazette Notification of August 28, 1988.

(Interruptions). I am not yielding.

MR. CHAIRMAN: No disturbance Please.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI (Sikkim): Sir, he is misleading the House.

MR. CHAIRMAN: You can reply and lead the House properly.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: The distinction between them is clear and marked—a distinction which we must underline and emphasize in India’s best national interest and that of its unity and integrity. Shakespeare once said ‘What is in a name’ and hastened to add: ‘A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: You translate it in Gorkha language.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Alas, this does not hold good insofar as a language is concerned A language by any other name may not only not smell as sweet but could, intact [in fact], turn out to be a thorny cactus.

He continued to emphasize the Darjeeling area as the center of the Nepali population of India

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85 I cannot be entirely sure to what Khuller is referring when he says ‘Nepali language in Newari script.’ Newari is a Tibeto-Burman language that was originally written with the Ranjana script which was derived from the Brahmi script. In 1909, however, the Ranjana script was discarded and replaced with the Devanagari script (Eagle 2000:30). The abandonment of Newari in favor of Nepali as the official language of the Nepal government has been a politically sensitive topic for the Newar people I have known since first visiting Nepal in 2002. In the interim Nepal constitution drafted in 2007, only Nepali is the only official language (Part I, article 5, § 2) although all “languages spoken as the mother tongue in Nepal are the national languages of Nepal” (Part I, article 5, § 1). I am unsure if Khuller was attempting to draw another distinction between the ‘Nepali’ language in Nepal and the ‘Gorkhali’ language in India. As far as the “Gorkha” language, if he means the language of the Gorkha political establishment that expanded from the area called Gorkha in Nepal to a larger area throughout the Himalayas, then that is also possible. The “Khas” language is also present in Nepal as well as “Parbatia,” but it is difficult to disentangle the changes in nomenclature and language change and shift through the past five hundred or a thousand years of history (see chapter 3). My goal here is to explain the possibilities of his statements and not to attribute authority. This ambiguity may also explain MP Bhandari’s repeated attempts to interrupt Khuller.

86 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
throughout his speech but never once responded to MP Bhandari’s request to translate
Shakespeare into Gorkhali. This was a request that was often made to supporters of labeling the
language Gorkhali—the assumption on the part of Nepali supporters was that if the Gorkhali
supporters could be forced to agree that there was no observable ‘linguistic’ difference, then the
name of the language did not matter.

MP Khuller then picked up a thread common in these debates—that of defining ‘great’
languages, those worthy of status in the 8th Schedule, as those that have a written script and those
that are spoken by many people who identify the language as an important aspect of their
identity. This part of the debates also highlights the role of the state in defining people and
languages and also includes a section in which Khuller counteracts MP Bhandari’s claims that he
does not ‘speak for’ the Nepali people. His argument is, in short, that he was elected by the
people of Darjeeling and that the leader of the political authority in Darjeeling (Ghisingh as head
of the GNLF) supports him; that same leader, he argues, as representative of the political
authority, opposes the inclusion of the ‘Nepali’ language over the ‘Gorkha’ language:

Everyone in the Darjeeling hill areas has, for instance, great respect—I want you to note,
Sir—and love for the Gorkha bhasha [Gorkha language], presently described erroneously
by some people as Nepali. They also have affection and regard for the Script. But they
Are not prepared to call it Nepali language as the name is identified with the nationality
of Another country, namely, Nepali… (Interruptions).

Sir, the Members are entitled to their views. I have my views. In fact, the GNLF strongly
opposes… (Interruptions). Mr. Chitta Basu, when have you joined the Congress Party? If
you want to join, please apply for it. We will then consider.

Sir, It is my privilege to represent Darjeeling and its Gorkha[Gorkhas?] here. It is my
privilege and my duty to put forward their point of view. It may be acceptable to people,
imay not be acceptable to Members, but I have a right to express my view very freely
and forthrightly, and this is all I seek.

In fact, the GNLF strongly opposes the legislative enacted by the West Bengal Assembly
declaring Nepali as one of the State languages.
It also opposes its demand that the Centre should include Nepali in the Eighth Schedule. They want the State Act amended and the words ‘Gorkha Bhasha’ substituted for Nepali language. This was, indeed, my own stand also when I successfully contested the Lok Sabha polls of 1989 and 1991- the first at the invitation of the GNLF as its candidate and the second as a Congress(I) candidate with the full backing of the GNLF., The point is ...

MR. CHARIMAN: It is not proper to Interrupt the hon. Member.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Mr. Upadhay [sic], you have gone on record about your views on Nepali I am not goint [going] to enter into any acrmony [acrimony] now and I want to keep that out.

I would like to Inform the House, and more especially fellow- Members of the Congress(I), that the last poll for the Lok Sabha and the West Bengal Assembly was fought on the basis of a clear and firm understanding between the Congress(I), then heroically led by the late Rajiv Gandhi, and the GNLF. Both the parties backed each others[’] candidates ...

MR. CHAIRMAN: You can make your point at the end.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Specifically, the GNLF not only supported my candidature for the Lok Sabha but also the Congress(I) candidates for the West Bengal Assembly constituencies of Siliguri, Phansidewa was, is lampur and Chopra in the plains (Interruptions). Sir, the hon. Member, the mover, will have a chance to rebut all my arguments.

Would the lady Member be generous enough and gracious enough to give me a patient hearing? At the end of it she can spurn all my arguments. It is up to her, but she must give me a patient hearing.

The Congress-I, for its part, fully supported the GNLF candidates for the West Bengal Assembly from the hill constituencies of Darjeeling, Kurseang [Kurseong] and Kalimpong. The GNLF won all the three Assembly seats, defeating in one case a Minister in Jyoti Basu's Government. Importantly, the GNLF put forward In its manifesto its strong opposition to the declaration of Nepali language as an official language of West Bengal and demanded that the name Nepali be substituted by Gorkha Bhasha.87

After connecting his demand for Gorkha language with the political connections that he and the GNLF believed made them the representatives of the Nepali people in India on all matters political and linguistic, he returned to the issue of identity. In this portion, he highlighted the

87 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
unusual status Nepal has in relation to India and argued that the ‘Nepali’ language cannot and should not be included in the constitution because it is the language of Nepal citizens living in India:

This leads us to the pertinent question: Would it be right and proper for the Parliament of India to Include among the national languages listed in the Eighth Schedule of our Constitution the Nepali language which is the language of the ‘reciprocal Nepali’ people in India—persons who are here today and could be gone tomorrow. We can Include the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule only if these Nepalis [Nepalis] come to be declared as Indian citizens as in the case of the ‘settled Gorkhas’ of India under the Darjeeling Accord of August 23, 1988 between the GNLF and the Government of India.

[section omitted]

There should be no question at all of including the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule until and unless the ‘reciprocal Nepalis’ are formally and officially designated as Indians through a Gazette Notification of the Government of India. Declaration of any language as a State language does not necessarily give the language the status and acceptability of a national language. The mover of the Bill should try to get the ‘reciprocal Nepalis’ declared as Indians first.88

His argument above rests on the assumption (a widely held language ideology not only in India but beyond as well) that language is an inherent part of identity and citizenship and that language produces nationalism. According to MP Kuller’s view, people who call their language ‘Nepali’ are associating themselves with the country of Nepal. These people, in this argument, cannot be trusted as true citizens of India. They have not proven their allegiance to the country and, until they do, the ‘Nepali’ language it tainted by their otherness.

MP Kuller weaves this argument into another about Nepal’s aspirations to regain territory they held before the British empire expanded and their wars with that empire:

Mr. Chairman, Sir, I have already taken a lot of time of this august House. But I seek your indulgence for a little longer as I am the only Member presenting the other side of the coin in regard to the Nepali language.89 The entire exercise of those who are

88 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
89 His point is apt: by this time in the debates, other MPs who had, on the first day of debates, spoken in favor of calling the language ‘Gorkha’ language no longer publically supported him and his party (Congress [I]) was soon to support the inclusion of ‘Nepali,’ not ‘Gorkhali.’
reciprocal Nepalis’ and are demanding inclusion of the 'Nepali language' in the Eighth Schedule is to enable those people to claim that they are Nepalis and to that extent virtually exercise dual nationality. Would this be in our national interest at a time when leftist and other forces in Nepal are stridently urging Kathmandu to reclaim the Darjeeling hill areas up to Teesta river as its territory? In my view, we cannot deal with this serious matter rightly or casually. (interruptions)90

The concept of ‘Greater Nepal’ has been used as a rallying point for Nepali nationalists (see Nepal 2007, Sharma 1988) and Nepali Maoists (see Siddiqui 2005), among others. Their argument was that the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, article VIII, nullified any treaties that were made between the British Government and Nepal (see appendix F for the full text of the Indo-Nepal Treaty). Therefore, they would argue, the 1815 treaty of Segauli, which was brokered between the British government of India and the Kingdom of Nepal as the end of the Gurkha War (also known as the Anglo-Nepalese War or the Anglo-Gurkha War91), no longer pertained. That treaty ceded portions of the Nepal-held territory to the East India Company92 and this presumably means that the territory should be, within this argument, given back to Nepal. Differentiating India from its neighbors is crucial for the integrity of the nation—in this perspective—and this project of differentiation involves drawing sharp distinctions between countries in both physical boundaries (borders), but also its citizens and the languages they speak. Khuller made this point by drawing not only on the specter of ‘Greater Nepal’ but also reminding the body of recent efforts by the Government of India to distinguish between itself and its neighbors:

Therefore, I urge with all the emphasis at my command that if the language of the Gorkhas of India is to be included in the Eighth Schedule then that language will have to be the "Gorkha Bhasha" [Gorkha language] and not the Nepali language. My suggestion would emphasize and underline the Indian identity of the Gorkha Bhasha [Gorkha language] as against the foreign identity of the Nepali language. I might add that the suggestion I am making is not a new proposition. We have in the past drawn up a sharp and meaningful distinction between various common languages spoken along our northern and other borders. We have given these languages on our side of the borders

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91 For further discussion of the Anglo-Gurkha war, see Bernardo 1999.
92 See appendix H for the full text of the 1815 Treaty of Segauli.
Indian names and Indian Identity.\textsuperscript{93}

Khuller then gave evidence about languages on various borders—Ladakh, Sikkim, Lakshdweep, and West Bengal—and how they are named differently on either side of a border in order to distinguish the language, people, and, presumably, the loyalty of each.

He ends this argument by citing the case of Urdu, national language of Pakistan and one of the original 8\textsuperscript{th} Schedule languages:

Two other points require to be made in this context. First, today we are proud to have Urdu as one of our national languages. It is a fine and beautiful language which I chose as my Indian language for graduate studies. Urdu is also the national language of Pakistan.

This enables the people of both our countries to share the joys of ghazals\textsuperscript{94} and mushairas.\textsuperscript{95} But I ask: Would we in India have included Urdu in the Eighth Schedule of our Constitution if the language had been called Pakistani? Hence the rationale behind GNLF's strong objection to the inclusion of Nepali as one of India's national languages in the Eighth Schedule. There would be no problem today if Nepal too had given or were to give to its national language the name ‘Gorkha Bhasha’ which, like Urdu or, for that matter, English is not identified with any nationality (interruptions).\textsuperscript{96}

Not only the Indian Government, MP Khuller reminds the body, but also the British colonial authority worked to separate India from Nepal:

The second point is, as we all know, the British Raj greatly respected the prowess and fighting qualities of the Nepalis. Consequently, they recruited them in large numbers for their [their] Army under the Raj- and continued to do so even after Independence. Importantly, however, they called these men Gorkhas and the troops as Gorkha regiments and Gorkha troops etc. They also called the Nepali language spoken and written by these Gorkha troops as Gorkhali, a point made by Col. Ram Singh on April 10 last when he happened to be in the Chair.

Why? The answer is not far to seek. They did this because they wanted to draw a clear distinction [distinction] between their own Gorkha troops and those of Nepal?\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{93} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ghazals} are a poetic form of verse practiced in Iran, Pakistan, and India.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Mushairas} are a cultural tradition in Pakistan and India where poets gather to perform their works.
\textsuperscript{96} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates. These comments also raise the first explicit mention of English as less political than other languages within these debates. See chapter five for a further discussion of language ideologies around English for Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling.
\textsuperscript{97} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates. Khuller makes an interesting point, considering he is arguing that ‘Gorkha’ is a more authentically Indian ethnicity and language than Nepali.
MP Khuller began to wind down his speech by listing the history of high ranking government officials who he believed rightly opposed the Nepali language’s addition into the constitution. He reminds the body that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi refused to accept the demands for Nepali’s addition to the Constitution and that Prime Minister Morarji Desai (in 1977) told a delegation of the Language Committee that “Nepali is a foreign language.” Even when Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, Khuller continued, she again refused their claim. “The issue is not,” Khuller reminded the body, “as simple as has been made out [by] the mover and its supporters. It has serious, indeed, grave implications.”

Khuller’s argument was accurate in the sense that Gandhi and Desai did oppose the language’s inclusion. It was, however, not necessarily (or only) because of the connections of Nepali language to Nepal. It is clear that some of the disagreements with government officials had to do with the broader context of India and its security. For example, during one of the meetings between then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Nepali Language Committee, she was also grappling with an increasingly problematic Kashmir and in another, was only a few months away from declaring the Emergency on 25 June 1975. Morarji Desai was openly antagonistic to the Language Committee members during their visit to him as discussed earlier in this chapter, although I have no knowledge of the specific circumstances surrounding that particular meeting. MP Khuller believed, regardless of the context, that these statements represented a recurrent theme of anti-Nepal (but pro-Gorkhali?) sentiment in the Indian

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98 He told the body that he would be winding down his speech, but then continued beyond what many other MPs and the Speaker thought was appropriate judging by the interruptions and, eventually, the Speaker’s decision to expunge the rest of his remarks. The speech in total was 4284 words; the speaker first attempted to stop him at 3,237 words. The total time length of his speech is difficult to quantify because there are not time markers on the transcript and the many interruptions slowed down the proceedings. For many reasons, a video of the proceedings would clarify many details.

99 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates. Their respective reasons for denying the addition of Nepali to the 8th Schedule were not identical.

100 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
government.

The importance of Nepalis “asserting” their Indian identity and having that identity as clearly separate from and unconnected to Nepal, as he next narrated, was a matter of grave importance for the security of India.\(^{101}\) Indian Nepalis could be easily duped into representing themselves as Nepal Nepalis, and it was the Indian government’s responsibility to protect them, he argued. In addition, because there was not a clear distinction between the two groups, he continued, it would be easy for Nepal Nepalis to take advantage of that blurry category and avail themselves of rights of Indian citizens:

All that I have ventured to put forward also needs to be seen in the light of a significant but little-known experience [sic] in the Darjeeling hills. Quiet and clandestine efforts were made during the last census operation to get the people to declare themselves as Nepalls [Nepalis] Instead of Indians.\(^{102}\) They were also sought to be persuaded through various familiar means and pressures to declare Nepali as their language in preference to Gorkha Bhasha [Gorkha language]. In fact, we discovered during the last general election that many "reciprocal "nepalis'' had managed to get their names included in the electoral rolls and had voted. This issue was subsequently taken up by Mr. Ghisingh [Ghisingh] with the Chief Election Commissioner in my presence in a letter personally delivered to Mr. Seshan on July 18, 1991.

Sri, as I said earlier, It is lime [time] to pause and ponder. We must avoid doing something in haste and then repent at leisure. Nothing must be done which goes against

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\(^{101}\) In the past, there had been arguments emerging from Darjeeling that Indians of Nepali descent would be useful to Indian security; in the early twentieth century, local residents argued that that Darjeeling Nepalis would be reliable defenders of the frontier and not, as had been speculated by outsiders, as agents of insurrection and balkanization. In the 1917 memorandum presented to the colonial government by the Hillman’s Association—quoted at length in chapter three—contained a section pertaining to this very subject. They argued that the “District has an important disproportionate to its area in that it is vital frontier district. Our people are the natural guardians of the frontier and we would welcome the privilege of keeping ourselves ever ready to fulfill this function. A small but significant incident, illustrative (in this connection) of the drawback from our relations with the organisation suited to the plains, is found in the recent call for recruits for Indian Defence. Very few [from the plains] felt able to respond because of large periods of training at centres in the Hills, [and] we are convinced that volunteers in large numbers would have been forthcoming and we are confident that, if the Government wished it, [that] practically all the able bodied men of our hill communities could be enlisted in a Force to defend the Frontier” (Moktan 2004: 92).

\(^{102}\) I heard an entirely different interpretation of this event. I was told repeatedly that the efforts to have individuals mark their language as ‘Nepali’ was in specific reaction to events during the previous census. The census takers, I was told, would ask people what their ‘mother language’ was and would not write down Nepali in an attempt to show the fragmented nature of the hill population. If the population of Darjeeling was (for example) 10% Newari speakers, 15% Rai speakers, 15% Tamang speakers, 10% Chhetri speakers, and 10% other rather than 60% Nepali, then the Bengalis would constitute the majority, or so it was argued. However, if all Nepali ethnicities were marked as speaking Nepali, then they would be clearly shown as the majority of the three hill sub-divisions. A further explanation and analysis of the census data can be found in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
the letter and spirit of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Conical [Council] Accord and the Gazette notification of the Government of India, dated August 23, 1988 according Indian citizenship only to the "settled Gorkhas" and not to the "reciprocal Nepalis." Nothing must also be done which suits the surreptitious strategy of those who are working for Greater Nepal from within our country and from across the border.

Sir, the talk of Greater Nepal is not the figment of anyone's Imagination. The threat, however feeble today, is very much there.

Remember, there are powerful forces who have not reconciled to the merger of Sikkim with India. There are also powerful forces who want to stop India from becoming strong and playing its due role in the comity of Nations. Let not history accuse this Lok Sabha of doing something which goes against our best national interest and could very well put a question mark over India's integrity along its strategic and sensitive northern borders. We can ignore this warning only at our peril.103

At this point in the speech, MPs began to interrupt Khuller after almost every sentence.

An MP from Howrah asked the Chair how it was possible for him to speak for so long when there were others waiting.104 Khuller attempted to read a telegram sent by the GLNF President, Subash Ghisingh. The Chair directed him not to quote the telegram and conclude his remarks quickly. Khuller did not quote the telegram, but began to outline the contents of the telegram at length. MP Bhandari then interrupted and asked for the Chairman’s support. The Chair requested that Khuller conclude because there were other MPs prepared to comment. Khuller, however, again began speaking. After more arguing, the Chair turned to the record keeper and said that, “Nothing will go on record…nothing will go on record now.”105 This is not the last time the record of MP Khuller’s comments was expunged during these parliamentary debates.

4.5.2 General Discussion (10 April 1992)

Since MP Khuller was disallowed from further input, others in the house stepped forward to participate in the debate on the bill. MP Yaima Singh Yumnam (Inner Manipur), turned the debate toward the Manipur language which was part of the bill at hand. Before he shifted the

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103 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
104 Include note about restricting length (emailed Lok Sabha secretariat, 4 August 2010).
105 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
terms of the debate, however, Yumnam disagreed with some of Khuller’s evidence and provided alternative interpretations of the language issue among Indians of Nepali descent. Khuller, Yumnam said, was “very clever” and “trying to mislead the House by pointing out some irrelevant points in regard to this Indiana [Indian]-Nepali treaty.” As the MP from Manipur, which had a large Nepali population, he had his own experience with speakers of the language.

I would like to mention one instance. In Manipur, there are many Gorkhalis in Assam Rifles. When we ask them ‘What is your language’. "they simply say" Our language is Nepali." It is very clear. There might be Gorkhalis but their language is Nepali.

It is very clear. In Manipur, there are hundreds of thousands of Gurkhas. They say that their language is Nepali.

I do not know how Mr. InderJit [Khuller] manages to make treaties out of this. I leave it to the hon. Member In charge of the Bill to refute all that.

After MP Yumnam concluded, MP Bhogendra Jha continued. MP Jha represented Madhubani, Bihar which is located on the India-Nepal border, just south of Janakpur, Nepal. In his speech, MP Jha expressed his support for the bill and then began to explore the history of language in India and the importance of Hindi and Maithili languages. Mid-way through his speech, Jha directly responded to MP Khuller’s presentation:

My friend Shri Inder Jit has called Nepal a foreign country. Before the treaty of Sugrdi [Segauli] between Britishers and Nepal, according to which Britishers divided Nepal, my ancestors used to study there. He himself has now gone to Darjeeling. He made such a long speech which was not needed. This erudition was not needed.

This erudition was not needed. Nepal is an independent country. We have to give full respect to an Independent country. It is our friendly country. Our. History, Geography, Nature, Culture and language is same. So why we should be afraid of Nepali language. It will work as a link language and as abridge [sic] between the people of two countries. Why do we take it as language which will disunite the country? Even then, I do not want

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106 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
107 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates. The remainder of MP Yumnam’s speech outlined the history of the Manipuri language and the situation in that state.
108 MP Jha died on 20 January 2009. He had been a member of the CPI and had been elected to the Lok Sabha 5 times: 4th Lok Sabha (4 March 1967-27 December 1970), 5th Lok Sabha (15 March 1971-18 January 1977), 7th Lok Sabha (10 January 1980-31 December 1984), 9th Lok Sabha (31 December 1984-27 November 1989), and the 10th Lok Sabha (20 June 1991-10 May 1996). His constituency is located in an area where Maithili is widely spoken.
to be adamant on it. It all the people of Darjeelieg [Darjeeling] and Sikkim want to give it some other name, I would be happy but there is no need of such a erudition.\textsuperscript{109}

For MP Jha, language was not something that divides but rather something that connects people. He made the same argument for Maithili, a language spoken in northern India and southern Nepal.\textsuperscript{110} He continued his argument about including the Maithili language and outlined the history and ‘richness’ of the language. MP Jha ended his speech by expressing the importance of including Nepali and Manipuri as part of the constitution:

> It will not be a surprise for our country having the population of more than 85 crore [850 million], because languages are the heritage of culture and the backbone of social life. The inclusion of these languages will make our country more prosperous and strong. No country can be stronger by repressing any mother tongue. It will weaken our unity and particularly when there is an external threat to our unity and integrity from foreign dividing forces.

In the end I would like to point out to Shri Indarjit Gupta\textsuperscript{111} that there will be no objection if his voters from Darjiling [Darjeeling] and people of Sikkim decide to change the name. But don't create a foreign phenomena towards Nepali by constantly saying it a foreign language. The language is the same either you say it Nepali or Gorkhali, therefore 'foreign' world should not be used in it and the hon. Minister should assure the House about it.\textsuperscript{112}

In the remaining minutes of the day’s discussion, various MPs took the floor to present their vision of the role of language for nation building and other topics. A few MPs directly responded to MP Khuller’s reasoning. For example, MP Professor Susanta Chakraborty, Howrah, said that:

> It is an inspiration to those who recognized the oneness of our country, the greatness of our country. And, at the same time, it is a lesern [lesson] for those who want our country to be divided, who demand and echo the voice of GNLF and want that the unity that is there in India should be destroyed.\textsuperscript{113}

MP Chakraborty then presented the reasons why Nepali should be included in the 8\textsuperscript{th} Schedule—

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{109} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\textsuperscript{110} Maithili was not included in the 8\textsuperscript{th} Schedule until the 92\textsuperscript{nd} Amendment to the constitution in 2003.
\textsuperscript{111} It appears that MP Jha had confused MP Inder Jit Khuller, Congress(I) MP from Darjeeling, West Bengal, with MP Indrajit Gupta, CPI MP from Midnapore, West Bengal. MP Gupta had yet to present his speech to the house, and when he did, he was in support of the bill for Nepali language, not Gorkhali.
\textsuperscript{112} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\textsuperscript{113} 8 May 1992, \textit{Lok Sabha} debates.
\end{footnotesize}
Nepalis would feel that included in the country and that the language itself is a great language—and then concluded by refuting Khuller’s argument about the foreignness of languages:

We are almost speaking in one voice except Shri Inderjit, who echoed the voice - I have already said-of Shri Subash Ghising, who regarded that Nepali is a foreign language. If it is regarded in this way, then, Bengali which is the official language of Bangladesh can also be regarded as a foreign language in our country. That is not the case. That logic cannot go too far. That analogy cannot go too far. Sir, I would request Shri Under [Inder] Jit [Khuller] to reconsider his views. I would again request the Home Minister to give thought over this matter. Already the students are agitating and fasting. We have already heard that some persons are in a dying condition. This cannot go on. India cannot be divided like this. To make it united, we should do justice to the just aspirations of the people.

At this point, the house voted to extend the bill’s discussions for another two hours since there remained many members who wished to add their voice to the bill. Following this vote, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, M.M. Jacob questions the legality of the procedure and criteria for adding languages to the 8th Schedule. He asked if the criteria related to state languages or the Literary Academy’s list of literary languages. He also suggests that the 8th Schedule could be eliminated entirely since “[a]ll languages will receive attention and proper care in this country.” MP Bhandari then interjected, believing that he was using this as an argument against the bill and the Nepali language. The Chair interrupted her and clarified MP Jacob’s position in favor of the language. Jacob returned to this speech and the issue of the 8th schedule. The schedule itself, he believes, is problematic because all languages should or could be developed and yet “This is a

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114 There may be references to these hunger strikes in the Language Committee Documents, but I have been unable to find them so far. They were never mentioned in my conversations with Darjeeling residents in 2007; the only hunger strike I was told about took place at New Delhi’s Boat Club from the 19th to the 25th of February, 1984. I do not doubt that there were hunger strikes; but I will, in future research, explore this point more fully.
115 Early in the debates, MPs expressed concern about reports of young people in Manipur going on a hunger strike because their language had not been added to the 8th Schedule. This statement may be referring to those students.
116 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
117 He mentions Nepali for Sikkim, Konkani for Goa, Manipuri in Manipur, and then lists Rajasthani, Konkani, Dogri, Bhojpuri, Maithili, Bodo, Nepali, Gorkhali, and Nicobari. Of these languages, Konkani was added during the passage of this bill (71st Amendment in 1992) while Dogri, Bodo, and Maithili were added with the 92nd Amendment (2003) to the 8th Schedule.
118 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
country with 1600 languages and dialects. You cannot forget it and the government must clarify its position on languages and the 8th Schedule. Such discussion about the nature and role of the 8th Schedule is not surprising—requests for clarification on the exact ‘meaning’ of the Schedule emerged nearly every time it was mentioned. As discussed in the introduction, the flexibility of this schedule and unclear directives regarding the Schedule have created a context in which there is no hard line policy toward official languages; as the situation of the nation changes, the government changes. This means that even MPs do not have a clear understanding of the government’s position on 8th Schedule languages.

With this, the Chair adjourns the meeting until 11 May. Because of various delays, however, discussions on Nepali language did not return until the 19th of August, one day before the last session of the 10th Lok Sabha on the 20th.

4.6 Parliamentary Debates—19 August 1992 (Day Four)

In the months between the May 8th debates and when they picked up again on August 19th, tensions ran high in the Darjeeling Hills and Sikkim. The Nepali Language Committee and local residents worked to keep attention on the bill by members of parliament and other government officials. MP Bhandari, in our 2007 interview, remembered the opposition to the bill:

MP Bhandari: So towards the end I can say, it was really really type of tension and worry for me. Because Minister had promised he will get it through, list the bill. But here his senior minister, he was playing this game and our own people were playing as their, as their puppets. I won't say puppet, but they were willing to play that game. So it was really really worrisome for me. So, and in the House when the final day was approaching, I went to Shankarrao Chavan, SB Chavan's place. He was in his office. Normally we always ask for appointment and go. But I was worried, so I just walked in. And he was there, Inderjit Khuller was also sitting there [unintelligible]

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119 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
120 She remembered Shankarrao Bhaurao Chavan, Home Minister of India, “very much against [the bill], you see. And, already in Sikkim, people like Mr. Chamling [Dr. Pawan Chamling, future Chief Minister of Sikkim and political rival to her husband, Nar Bahadur Bhandari]. He had already started playing in the hands of these divisive forces. So he had [been] going in the villages and spreading, sort of, ‘Why Mr. Bhandari is spending Sikkim’s money for the recognition of Nepali language’ and all. So he had already started playing in the hands of these divisive forces” (interview, 17 November 2007).
C. Booth: They were just sitting there together?

**MP Bhandari:** Together, because they [unintelligible] part of the same party. And, being the senior journalist he had that [unintelligible] with their party as well as senior journalist. He had that, full access to them. So I walked in and asked him, ke, like, "How's this going to end soon?" Only three more days left. No, two more days left, and you haven't done anything. So he looks at me and tells me, "Mrs. Bhandari, I'm ready to do it. But your people, Darjeeling, they are saying Gorkha. And there are so many other things are coming up. So maybe I'll bring bill for only Manipuri and Konkani.” I was, yeah, I was really devastated.

It was just 18th evening, so I went to the house. Then I wanted support from the Left Front Party, na? But you know, few Left MPs were sitting in the house. Normally in the afternoon, there are very little attendance. So I went in, nobody was there, senior leaders, I wanted to tell them, this has been said by the senior Minister. That day, some [unintelligible] was [unintelligible] in [unintelligible] Market Hall, so everybody had gone there. So I was really upset also. So I went to MP Advani's office [Lal Krishna Advani, then MP from Gandhinagar, Gujarat], fortunately he was sitting there. Someone was sitting there, I went there and waited for some time. Then I just barged in his office and told him that 'now, look in front of you, the Home Minister of the State promised us that they will bring the bill in this session. But there are only two days and now the senior leader is saying these things.' So he said, 'No, they can't do this.' He [Advani] tried to call him [Chavan] but the phone was engaged, so he told me, 'You convey this to all the senior leaders, also I'll talk to Chavan-ji.” Then I went there, being without [unintelligible], nobody was there. I was rather dejected. What should I do? Then I came home, then talked to people. Then I telephoned all the people; here, Darjeeling, here, Dehra Dun, everywhere. If anything happens tomorrow, we have to rally there. So you have to come in support in a big way, so [unintelligible] Nepali speaking people are there. So they said yes. Many of them had already come down to Delhi also because there were only two days and government had already promised.

The next day was the fourth, and last, day of the debates. MP Bhandari remembered going to the house five or ten minutes late that day because of the events of the day before and, “when I entered the lobby, somebody was shouting for me, ‘where are you? Already [the debates have started….][the] opposition leaders are pressing for it.’ And everybody was looking [for me].”

This day’s debates were the first time that the MPs, at least publically, highlighted MP Khuller’s overt allegiance to the GNLF head, Subash Ghisingh, rather than to his party (Congress [I]) agenda and agreement with other parties. An MP from Bolpur, West Bengal,
Somnath Chatterjee, begins the day’s business by reminding the speaker that there are only two days remaining in the parliamentary debates. He also pointed out that the government agreed to put forth the bill for the inclusion of Nepali language during this session of parliament. MP Khuller intervenes and insists that there is not a unanimous agreement about the bill:

**SHRI INDERJIT [KHULLER]** (Darjeeling): No. There is no unanimity at all.

(Interruptions) I say there is no unanimity. I question this.

**SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE:** I said unanimity among the parties. His party is not objecting to it. He should be allotted a separate seat!

**SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]:** My party has not agreed to it.

**SHRI CHITTA BASU** (Barasat): His party has agreed to it.

(Interruptions)

**SHRI BASUDEB ACHARIA** (Bankura): How can you differ with your party's stand?

**SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]:** There is no unanimity. (Interruptions)

The MPs continued to express their disbelief that MP Khuller refused to agree with what his party has clearly decided—to support the bill. Party positions are decided upon before the vote and, if an MP argues or votes against the party position they may be expelled from the party per the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.\(^{121}\) After revisiting this point several times and criticizing the government for not adding the bill to the day’s agenda, MP Khuller took the floor again to

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\(^{121}\) 19 August 1992, *Lok Sabha* Debates.

\(^{122}\) Popularly known as the Anti-Defection Act (personal communication, Indrani Chatterjee. 4 August 2010), the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, titled “Provisions as to Disqualification on Ground of Defection,” is very clear on matters of voting: a “member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House—a) if he has voluntarily gives up [sic] his membership of such political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which be belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days of such voting or abstention” (Constitution of India, Tenth Schedule). This act put Khuller in a difficult position; his party (Congress [I]) had agreed to the bill, but the political leader in Darjeeling, Subash Ghisingh, who had essentially orchestrated Khuller’s election from Darjeeling was against it. This could explain why he argued so vociferously during this last day before the vote and yet voted to pass the bill the next day.
revisit his argument from the previous session: The language should be Gorkhali because the

Indian government signed a formal agreement with the GNLF in 1988

Mr. Speaker, Sir, the first point I would like to make is that so far as I am concerned there
is no unanimity in the matter in the House ... (Interruptions)... It is my privilege to
represent Darjeeling constituency in this House. The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council has
formally declared that its official language is Gorkha Bhasha. They represent eight to ten
lakhs of people [800,000 to 1 million]. In addition to this may I point out that on August
23, 1988 a solemn agreement was reached between the GNLF and the Government of
India, headed by Rajiv Gandhi. Mr. Buta Singh was then the Home Minister and happily
now he is present in the House. In this memorandum of Settlement it was clearly
acknowledged that the Gorkha language is the language ...

(Interruptions).

Can I have your protection? I seek you [your] protection from the Sikkim lady [MP
Bhandari]

(Interruptions)... I would beg of the House to give me a patient hearing. On the 23rd of
August 1988 a solemn agreement was reached between the GNLF and the Government of
India. It was signed by Shri Subhash Ghising on one side and Shri Buta Singh and the
Home Secretary on the other.

The third paragraph of this agreement clearly states: Inclusion of Gorkha Language in
the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.

This proposal was not pushed at our request. But the fact that the language of the
Gorkhas of Darjeeling Hill is Gorkha Language was acknowledged in this memorandum
of settlement. Therefore I beg to submit that any attempt to deflect and deviate from
this memorandum of settlement would amount to repudiating what Rajiv Gandhi and his
Government did. Therefore I beg of the Government to understand and make it clear. Are
they prepared to repudiate what Shri Rajiv Gandhi did and agreed to in 1988? I would ask
you to have a look at the memorandum of settlement. (Interruptions)

You read the memorandum of settlement. Your friends are speaking in absolute
ignorance. Do not speak in ignorance. I would request Sardar Buta Singhji to tell us if
there is any doubt. [my emphasis is italicized]

The agreement between the Government of India and the GNLF signed on August 23rd
stated nothing about the inclusion of Gorkha into the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution;
in fact, although its title was “Inclusion of Gorkha Language in Eighth Schedule of the

123 There is no mention of language in either memorandum.
Constitution,” the body of the text said precisely the opposite (that the government would *not* include more languages, including Gorkha language or any other) in the Eighth Schedule:124

**INCLUSION OF GORKHA LANGUAGE IN EIGHTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION**

The Government of India is of the view that inclusion of more languages in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution would create repercussions and reactions. It is the endeavour of the Government to develop the cultural and literary heritage of all languages irrespective of their inclusion in the Eighth Schedule. This position was accepted.125

It is possible that the disjuncture between his claims and the actual text of the (widely circulated and read) memorandum was one of the causes of the many interruptions. At this point, MP Khuller attempted to make an argument about Jammu and Kashmir—a very contentious subject and one that was almost entirely expunged from the records.

What remained was the following:

Their leaders [in Jammu] said that if you are going to include Nepali, which is a foreign language (interruptions) Sir, I maintain that Nepali is a foreign language…(interruptions) it is a foreign language (interruptions)

The transcripts note that “at this stage, Shrimati Dil Kumari Bhandari came and sat on the floor near the Table [of the Speaker].” In my 2007 interview with MP Bhandari, she recalled this moment of the debates:

**MP Bhandari:** [After arriving late and being called] I rushed in…as I entered Inderjit started. Then, I thought, I had to speak, so I moved forward. And I sat there [and] I just tried to jot down my points and all, *nā?* My points are there [on the paper]. I did not hear anything, I just heard that, something, 'foreign language.' And I lost my control, Inder Jit Khuller said “Sir, I maintain that Nepali is a foreign language.”126

I don't know what happened. I rushed to the well. Then I was banging [unintelligible]. So I was asking whether this is the view expressed independently by Inderjit or this is the view of the government. Because you had promised me that you have considered Nepali

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124 Full text of the 23 August 1988 Memorandum is available in appendix B.
126 Interesting that, 15 years after these events occurred, she remembered his exact words.
language is Indian language and you will be bringing the bill in this session. But tomorrow [is] the last day of the house this session and you haven't done anything and your party man is saying this.

Then the whole house was shouting at Inderjit, at him. And I said, no, nothing doing. Your man is saying this is [a] foreign language and you are saying something else. [unintelligible] I sat down on the well. So I had a plain paper, like a, I had just entered and I didn't think what to speak and all, so I was holding down my points, na? So I had a plain paper, then, I don't know, suddenly it came to my head that I have to write down. Then I wrote, fast unto death. So I played to the gallery also. [laughs]

**C.Booth:** [laughs]

**MP Bhandari:** Fast unto death, because [unintelligible] Then, I was sitting there, [unintelligible] silence for a moment. Then there was this, all the noise, no? I couldn't make out who was saying what. Then, suddenly, all the [unintelligible] MPs, they converged. They were trying to [laughs] coax me to get up and go to my seat and all. Then, suddenly, Mamata Banerjee [MP Kumari Mamata Banerjee, Congress (I) MP from Calcutta South (West Bengal)], she normally wraps up her sari like this, you know? She was wiping my eyes; I did not realize tears were also...

**C.Booth:** Oh.

**MP Bhandari:** I didn't know, I was so agitated and whatever. So then I was rather taken aback that, this is not done, not a good way to do things. So, I was a bit shy also, like really, I felt really, embarrassed about myself [laughs]

**C.Booth:** [laughs]

**MP Bhandari:** Like, I always tell my children, nā, from the very very beginning, we are brought up like that, my mother, so same thing I used to tell my daughters, children. That it's not good to show your emotions in public. You should not cry in front of all these [unintelligible, laughs].

And there I was, in the middle of Lok Sabha, I was really embarrassed. Then, speaker, you might have seen the transcription, he said very good words. He pleaded me to go back to my seat. Then I went to my seat and then [unintelligible] then Inderjit wanted to speak something but the whole house was against him. [laughs] Telling him to sit down, sit down.

The reason so many were telling him to ‘sit down’ was not only because of his comments about Nepali language being foreign; they were also because of subsequent comments and reaction to statement by Devendra Prasad Yadav, MP from Jhanjharpur (Bihar) that English was only “the
Britishers’ language, a language of slavery” (see transcript below). MPs from Southern India demanded apologies because they would not use Hindi and preferred English. MP Khuller demanded protection from MP Bhandari and MP Bhandari threatened to fast until death on the Parliament floor. Significant portions of the transcript were expunged as ordered by the Chair, mainly statements made by MP Khuller. The utter confusion and uproariousness of these debates is difficult to capture in written text:

SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES (Muzaffarpur [Bihar]): You are yourself speaking in English**(Interruptions)

SHRI DEVENDRA PRASAD YADAV (Jhanjharpur [Bihar]): He is himself speaking in English which is Britishers' language, a language of slavery.

[section omitted]

SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD: Sir, let me be very clear that the hon. Member is speaking on his behalf and not on behalf of the Government. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Shrimati Bhandari, I will allow you to speak. (Interruptions)

[At this stage, Shri Yaima Singh Yumnam came and sat on the floor near the Table]

(Interruptions)

SHRI YAIMA SINGH YUMNAM (Inner Manipur): Sir, I also join her [MP Bhandari].

(Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: If you sit down I will allow. (Interruptions)

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127 Earlier in the debates, on April 24th, some of these same MPs had mentioned English when discussing the Nepali language and its 'foreign' status. MP Choudhury from Katwal noted that while “Shri Subash…may say that Nepali should not be included in the Eighth Schedule because it is spoken in a foreign country. This is a very wrong argument. Then English originated as a foreign language could not be included in the Eighth Schedule.” On that same day, Syed Shahabuddin disagrees that the Nepali language is foreign because “I find that in at least one State in the Union the majority of the Nepalese-speaking people. In that sense, please permit me to say, I do not even consider English a foreign language any more. There are people in India whose mother tongue is English….All languages belong to man and in the case of human language, we cannot, sort of draw a line cutting mankind across. For example, shall U.S.A. discard English because English language’s original home is England? I just gave you the example of Canada which embraced French.” (Lok Sabha debates, 24 April 1991). MP Chitta Basu also noted that “A person can be an Indian national by birth, by dissent, by registration, and naturalization under the provisions of the Citizenship right under the particular law of our country. The question whether he speaks Nepali or Bengali or any other language is not a criterion for citizenship of the country….Anybody who is an Indian citizen can speak any language and that language is not a criterion to decide about his citizenship” (Lok Sabha debates, 24 April 1991). See chapter 1 for further discussion of the politics of language between north and south India.
MR. SPEAKER: I will allow. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Please take your seat. Shri Inder Jit, you also sit down please. Shrimati Bhandari, you also please go to your seat for two minutes. I will give you time to speak. Please take your seat.

There is no need of so many people coming here. Please, do not make an uproar like this ... Why do not you sit down? Members should not assemble like this. Ms. Malini, you also go, please. I shall replain [sic] to you. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: I will allow you. Please take your seat.

**Expunged as ordered by the Chair**

(Interruptions) Why do you not take your seat? Please take your seats. Everything will be all right. Please take your seats. (Interruptions)

At this stage, Shri Yaima Singh Yumnam went back to his seat (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Shrimati Bhandari, please go back to your seat. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: I will make her understand. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Let me talk to her please. (Interruptions)

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI (Sikkim): If I have to face such an insult in my own country, I will observe fast to death in this House, Sir. I will observe fast unto death in this House, if I have to face this sort of an insult and that too from a Member belonging to the ruling party. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: We respect your feelings; we respect your emotions.

Every language which is spoken in our country is respectable. We all like it. It is as much our language as yours. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Please go back to your seat. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: I will allow you to speak. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: This is going to the other side. Ms. Malini, please take your seat. Mr. Rao, you sit down please. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mr. Rao, this is going to the other side please. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: You are causing harm to the cause itself. Please sit down.

(Interruptions)
SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD: Will you allow motion speak? (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mrs Bhandari, may I talk to you please? (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: You speak from the seat.

SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD: Sir, let me tell you very clearly on behalf of the Government that Nepali is not a foreign language.

Whatever the hon. Member was saying, he was saying in his personal capacity as Member of the Parliament from that particular constituency. He has not been speaking on behalf of the Government. He is a Member of Parliament from that constituency. So, he has a right to say his views. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Now the matter ends. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: All of you, sit down please.

SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD: He has a right to vindicate his views. It does not necessarily mean the views of the Government. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: You should go back to your seat. I am requesting you (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mrs. Bhandari, this is not necessary. (Interruptions)

SHRI SOBHANADREESWARA RAO VADDE (Vijayawada): Please tell the hon. Member to withdraw his remarks. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Will you take your seat? (Interruptions) I will allow you to speak. Not like this. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: You cannot bamboozle him also like that.

SHRI BASUDEB ACHARIA: Sir, we want to know whether he is going to withdraw. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Let us finalise the issue properly. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Thank you, Mrs. Bhandari. (Interruptions)

SHRI BASUDEB ACHARIA: Do not allow him to speak now. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: First of all, all of you please sit down. Do not compel me to say in a louder voice. Please have pity on me. (Interruptions)

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128 The Anti-Defection Act (Tenth Schedule) only legislates a member’s voting, not their ability to voice their own opinions in the House.
MR. SPEAKER: Look, this language issue is a very emotional and sensitive one. Nevertheless, he said it. Again you stood up. I cannot talk to each and every body. Please sit down. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mr. Lokanthji when I am on my legs you please sit down. Please understand that the language issue is a very sensitive issue... (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Please sit down. (Interruptions)

At this stage, Shrimati Dil Kumari Bhandari went back to her seat.

SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE: Why don't you hear? (Interruptions) This is a fit case for a separate seat. [Translation]

MR. SPEAKER: Arrangements will be made on their requests. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Please deal with the issue in such a manner as it may have no repercussions. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad, I think, you have said something now. Is that enough?

SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD: At this stage, that is enough. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mrs. Bhandari, I will allow you. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Please see that whatever you are saying, you are not understanding that You please sit down. If you refer to English it would adversely affect the southern regions of the country you please understand the issue and then speak. Please sit down. You are not understanding as to what you are speaking and what effects it will have. We respect all the languages. We do not give step-[]motherly treatment to any language. We try to adopt everything that is good in any of the languages. (Interruptions)

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Sir, he should withdraw his comment that Nepali is a foreign language.

MR. SPEAKER: I will allow you.

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129 I believe he is referring to Khuller.
130 It is unclear what was going on spatially during this episode; video would help, but I have yet been unable to locate a copy.
131 This comment comes in light of the earlier statement by Devendra Prasad Yadav (Bihar) who said that English “is [the] Britishers’ language, a language of slavery.” See chapter one for more discussion of the north India/south India divide regarding English.
SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: But he should first withdraw his comment. Sir. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: The Government has already stated that it does not treat Nepali language as a foreign language.

He has said it. (Interruptions)

SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE: Sir, I am on a point of order. If it is not a foreign language, then the allegation made by the Member who spoke earlier pretending to be from the Congress Party [meaning MP Khuller], should be expunged. Sir, he has insulted the sentiments and feelings of a large number of people in this country and all of us. So, that should be expunged from record.

MR. SPEAKER: Somnathji, I will look into it. (Interruptions)

SHRI NITISH KUMAR: Mr. Speaker, Sir, Shri Indrajeet is speaking in such a tone as can create tension in the country. He is exploiting [exploiting] the people of Darjeeling. He should make his speech either in Nepali or in Gorkhali language. Such representatives are responsible for creating tension in the country.

They also should speak in Gorkhali language. Why is he speaking in English? (Interruptions)

SHRI NIRMAL KANTI CHATTERJEE: Sir, unless he withdraws his remark, he should not be allowed to speak. He has to withdraw that statement. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Mr. Nirmal, please do not go beyond a limit. I have said that I will look into it. Do not stretch it too much. (Interruptions)

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must have a chance to speak... (Interruptions)... I wish to make it quite clear that I have no intention at all of hurting the feelings of Mrs. Bhandari. I have known her for long. We have been friends. I certainly do not wish to hurt her feelings, I have merely stated whatever I was told in Jammu. I agree with what the Parliamentary Affairs Minister has said. I am not speaking on behalf of the Government. I am speaking on behalf of my constituency, putting forward the views of my constituency. (Interruptions)

SHRI CHHEDI PASWAN: Mr. Speaker, Sir, we do not want to hear him in English. He should speak either in Hindi or in Gorkha language. We would not like to hear him in English. (Interruptions)

SHRI HANNAN MOLLAH (Uluberia): You are speaking on behalf of those who want to break the unity of this country. (Interruptions)

SHRI TARIT BARAN TOPDAR (Barrackpore): This is a seditious remark.
SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: This is not a seditious remark...(Interruptions)...Mr. Speaker, I have only one more point to make.

It is true that the Home Minister convened a meeting of all the national parties to work out a consensus. It is also true and I am told that a consensus was reached. But my complaint is that in reaching this consensus, a certain mockery of democracy was made. The party which represents Darjeeling, the party which won all the three seats nashing [sic] up the CPI (M) MLAs and its candidates there, is the Gorkha National Liberation Front. But Sir, their views were not considered. The views of the Gorkha National Liberation Front were completely ignored.132

SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE: Sir, he is misleading the House deliberately. And in this way, the country's unity is being broken, (Interruptions)

After the house calmed, MP Bhandari asked the speaker to allow her to interject before MP Khuller continued:

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: No, Sir, I would like to speak before him. You please give me just half-a-minute.

MR. SPEAKER: Inder Jit-[j], you should yield to the lady member when she is intervening.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: I am always willing to yield to Shrimati Dil Kumari Bhandari. It she lets me know, I shall gladly yield.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Sir, I am also hundred per cent for the members, right to speak in the House, but in the name of right to speak in the House a Member cannot mislead the House. Shri InderJit [Khuller] is misleading the House.

MR. SPEAKER: I will look into the matter.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Sir, I will not allow him to do that because I do not think that there is any rule which allow Inder Jitji [Khuller] to mislead the House and the country. If there is any Gorkha language and any Gorkha literature, let him produce and then I will see.

MR. SPEAKER: I would like to say that when a particular sentence was spoken here, tears trickled down your eyes. That is not an easy thing. In think it is because of the feelings you have for the nationality and for the language. We respect it and I have no doubt that the House and the Government will respect it. You should not have any doubt about that.

MP Kuller then continued, returning to his earlier argument that he, as representative of the

132 This is precisely MP Khuller’s difficult position, in a nutshell.
GNLF which represented the Nepali people, was the authority on the subject and that before any agreement could be reached. When he finished, MP Bhandari took the floor and, by drawing extensively on her emotional and ethnic ties to the language and attempting to undercut Khuller’s authority from Darjeeling, argued her point again:

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** Mr. Speaker, Sir, I am sorry that I was swept away in my emotion and in the process, I showed emotions very wrongly. I am sorry for that.

**MR. SPEAKER:** No. You did it correctly. We respect it. You please know it that the entire House respects your tears and your emotions about this language and the nationality.

[section omitted in which she discusses the 20 Private Members Bills she found that pertained to Nepali language and the various literary and political supporters who call the language ‘Nepali’ rather than ‘Gorkhali’]

I know and you might have observed also that my esteemed friend Shri Indrajit Khuller does not know even whether the term is Gorkha Basha or Gorkhali; when if he knew or since when it became Gorkhali Basha, I do not know. Even now, if you go to the Library and look for the reference you will find that Nepali word always used; nowhere Gorkha word was used. It is being coined by few people for their political expediency, a handful of people.

Recently, from Darjeeling all the leaders of the political parties have signed one statement and sent it to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister; all the political parties except GNLF, and GNLF in his own letter, Subhash Ghising has written to the Prime Minister that in Darjeeling there are eight to ten lakh people; in Darjeeling, there is a the Congress Party; there is also the BJP; there is also CPI; then there are CPI (M), Forward Bloc, Gorkha Pranta Parishad, and recently formed Gorkha Democratic Front. All these parties are supporting Nepali language; and there was difference of opinion within the GNLF also; and one MLA was expelled from the party because he was supporting Nepali language.

**MR. SPEAKER:** The topic is that the Bill should be introduced.

**SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI:** Not only that, in 1991 when the census was carried out for mother tongue, as per report, 99 percent of the people of Darjeeling

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133 He also expressed “great regret” that even his “friends” were calling Nepali a national language of India. His next statements echoed those of Morarji Desai 15 years earlier: “Even, as all my friends here today feel proud in calling Nepali as a national language, they should know the position of the Hindi language in Nepal. A language which is spoken by 40% of the people of Nepal is not accepted there either as an official language or as a national language. I think we must bear this in mind.”
registered themselves their mother tongue as Nepali. So, many people were physically intimidated for that by GNLF.

But through their embarrassment, they found out that, even GNLF Councillors their household people, even their wives, parents, they had registered themselves their mother tongue as Nepali.

I was born in Darjeeling. Shri Inderjit visits Darjeeling rarely. (Interruptions)

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: If you invite me, I shall be happy to accompany you to Darjeeling. (Interruptions)

SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE (Bolpur): Why should she? (Interruptions)

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Is it a parliamentary term? (Interruptions) I know the feelings of the people of Darjeeling. I have seen my parents, my grand-parents and other people of my village. They went in a procession to Darjeeling town because we live in tea garden; from there, the people used to go up the hills to reach Darjeeling town shouting.

[I’ve omitted the transcript that is supposed to be slogans ‘shouted’ in Nepali but is transcribed in such a way that I cannot decipher it]

Then the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Shri B.C.Roy was not consenting for this, only after Pandit Nehru intervened, he came to terms. So, our people were shouting.

"Bisi [B.C.] Roy bhasha khoi." [B.C. Roy, where is (our) language?]

[section omitted, undecipherable]

These slogans still ring in my ears. He does not know all these things.

[Interruptions] I am sure, for that matter, he cannot speak in his Punjabi language with that emotion with which I can speak in my language, because he can speak in English only; he does not know his own mother tongue; that much can say I am sure about it.

[section omitted; MP Bhandari discussed the belief by some that Kalimpong was still part of Bhutan]

SHRI HARCHAND SINGH (Ropar): She [MP Bhandari] is advocating for Nepali and is speaking in English....(Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: Madam, do not reply to him. Not necessary to reply this. He is an elderly man, saying some good things.
SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Sir, during the course of my speech, I had already thanked the Government for taking moral and just steps. I had also withdrawn my Bill before it.

There was unanimity so I thought it would get pass. Except for one Member, all the others had supported this Bill. Even now, I do not want to impress anything on anybody, like as my esteemed colleague Shri Inderjit [Khuller] is saying that there is a Gurkha Bhasha [Gurkha language] and he wants to call my Bhasha [language] as Gurkha Bhasha. I want to say, before the House that our country men have every right to know what we are doing here.

MR. SPEAKER: Madam, please conclude.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: I will produce works of Nepali literature though it is already proved that Nepali literature is rich.

MR. SPEAKER: No, the question is not that it should not be there; it is about the Bill.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: I want to say one more thing that I can produce 16-17 books written in Nepali by Shri Subhash Ghisingh and an encyclopaedia of Indian Literature brought out by the Sahitya Academy where Shri Ghisingh has been entered as a Nepali Writer. When it was published, he was so happy that he bought 40 copies of that volume. It cost Rs. 400 per volume. He was so happy that he wanted to distribute it among his friends.

MR. SPEAKER: I think it is adulatory so I am allowing this. I hope that it is not defamatory.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: Even the Indian Constitution is written in Nepali.

MR. SPEAKER: No, please, there are many other subjects which the Members want.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: I would like to ask my friend Shri Inder Jit if he can produce one book written by Shri Ghisingh in Gorkhali. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: No, No. A lot of time will be wanted in interruptions.

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Is it fair to mislead the House in regard to what Shri Ghisingh stands for when that gentleman is not present here? She cannot take his name.

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: I want to ask him if he can produce one book written by Shri Ghisingh in Gorkhali. (Interruptions)

MR. SPEAKER: I will allow you. (Interruptions)
MR. SPEAKER: Madam, may I request you to conclude? There are other Members who want to raise many other issues. We have already given one hour's time to this. Please do it a little briefly quickly, please.

SHRI SOMNATHCHATTERJEE: What is the Government's decision? What is the Government doing? (Interruptions)

SHRIMATI DIL KUMARI BHANDARI: This amply proves that there is no language called Gorkhali, or Gorkah bhasha [Gorkha language] as such. So, I would like to know from the Government-as they had promised on the floor of the House, and they had given an assurance that a Bill would be brought in this session itself, the word 'itself' was used-whether they are introducing the Bill in this session itself. I want an assurance on this.

After more MPs interject, the Speaker of the House turns the discussion to the next point for discussion (the need to renovate the Jagannath Temple in Puri, Orissa).

4.7 Parliamentary Debates—20 August 1992 (Day Five)

The bill was voted on and unanimously passed on 20 August 1992. Before the final vote, MP Khuller attempted to again to explain his displeasure with the vote:

SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]: Sir, as a disciplined Member of the Congress party, I accept the decision of the majority of the party and the Government to bring forward this Bill. Nevertheless, I would like to make a few points and record my protest.

My first point is my great disappointment with all sections of the House, particularly with the leader of the Opposition as well as the leaders of other parties who have once again thrown all conventions to the winds in their anxiety to play politics and past forward politically motivated bill. They have completely jettisoned the healthy principle where under. This Constitution Amendment Bill should have been referred to a Joint Select Committee or at least a Select Committee. I cannot see the great urgency of pushing this Bill by suspending all our rules and throwing all conventions overboard.

Heavens would not have fallen nor heavens would have been gained. Sir, I would therefore, still plead that the sensible thing to do would have been [transcript cuts off here] 134

He was then interrupted and another MP notes that after the Speaker has cleared the lobbies for a vote, “only the procedure of voting can take place and there can be no debate.” The speaker pointed out that this particular day’s vote is unusual and so he will

134 20 August 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
give more time because, although a number of MPs want to cut the debate short, the speaker believed that “we should not shut out his say. Please bear in mind the sensitive nature of the subject.”

Khuller continued, mentioning that more languages began demanding their inclusion in the Eighth Schedule since the debates on this bill commenced months ago. More MPs interrupt him, one asking if Khuller is “speaking on behalf of the party to which he belongs or on his own.” Khuller then reads the actual text of the August 23 1988 settlement which he had mis-remembered the day before but argued that the government used the term ‘Gorkha’ language in the memorandum.\textsuperscript{135} He then put to the house that the whole issue of the Eighth Schedule was problematic:

**SHRI INDER JIT [KHULLER]:** The point which I want to make is about the question on 8th Schedule. I am not sure to what extent it serves any utility. I would like the government to include all the languages of the country in this schedule and give them total encouragement rather than limit the list to a few languages. In fact, the Eighth Schedule has created many problems, sparked off many agitations. We should therefore, have to take a fresh look at it and decide whether it is really serving any purpose.

Article 351 of the Constitution, under which the Eighth Schedule comes, relates to a directive for the development of Hindi language.

This Article also states that the Union should secure the enrichment of Hindi by using expressions used in Hindustani and in the other Eighth Schedule languages. So, why do we limit the enrichment of Hindi only to a few languages.

I would finally and in conclusion, in bowing to your wishes, say that the Government has not been adequately fair to Gorkha Bhasha I support this Bill but with strong reservations and under strong protest.

So, I would again urge Mr. Chavan, in his concluding remarks, to make this point clear and give adequate importance to Gorkha Bhasha.

(Interruptions)....... as the official language of the Darjeeling Hill areas.

At this point, he was interrupted and not allowed to speak again. Soon after, the vote was

\textsuperscript{135} See appendix B.
called; when the vote was first counted, the final tally was 321 to 1. However, the 1 vote against was a mistake and was not MP Khuller’s vote. He had, in the end, voted with his party to pass the bill to include Nepali and Manipuri in the Eighth Schedule of the constitution.

4.8 Darjeeling response to 8th Schedule inclusion

Newspaper reports detailed events as the parliamentary debates were coming to a close: “fresh language controversy gripped the sensitive Darjeeling Hills a week after New Delhi granted constitutional recognition to Nepali. Ironically, the root cause of the new conflict has been Union Home Minister Mr. S. B. Chavan’s speech to Parliament while introducing an official Bill conferring Constitutional Status to Nepali, Manipuri, and Konkani on August 20” (Telegraph—Calcutta edition, 19 August 1992 as cited in Kar 1999: 32). It may not have been clear to outsiders why S.B. Chavan’s speech was so controversial:136 however, among local language activists in Darjeeling and Sikkim, it was clear that he was working with Ghisingh’s representative, Inderjit Khuller to champion ‘Gorkhali’ or ‘Gorkha’ as the language of Indians of Nepali descent (see above for MP Bhandari walking in on Khuller and Chavan together during deliberations on the bill).

What was also clear to local residents was that no matter the outcome—if the language was recognized as Nepali, Nepali/Gorkhali, Gorkhali, or not at all—there would be clashes in the Darjeeling area. A first-hand account of August 20th, 1992:

On the 20th of August 1992, the Indian Parliament was in its last day of the Monsoon Session. The Nepali language was to be incorporated in the eighth schedule of the

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136 In his speech introducing the bill, he did say “While including Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule, Government has also noted that in some areas this language is known as ‘Gorkha Bhasha’ and in the Census operations, other nomenclatures, such as ‘Gorkhali,’ ‘Gorkhi’, ‘Gurkhiya,’ ‘Khaskura’ or ‘Naipali’ have also been used” (August 20 Lok Sabha Debates, http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/lsdeb/ls10/ses4/0120089201.htm. Accessed 9 May 2007). However, this news article was published on the 19th of August, the day before he made his speech introducing the bill. So I am unsure as to what the article was referring although it is also possible that they had access to the speech or that the date of the newspaper was incorrect in the original text.
Constitution and to do so it was the last day, perhaps the last chance for the dreams of millions of Nepalese to come true. The entire Darjeeling town right since the early morning was holding her breath for the inevitable. The environment was filled with a sense of rather gloom and fear. Why? Because the town was the headquarters of the movement fighting towards the recognition of the language, it was also the headquarters of those who opposed it. It was thence, certain that whatever the decision that would be taken in the Parliament, a clash was just waiting to happen.

The Sumeru Manch, centre of all political meetings and celebration in the town was already crowded by political leaders in favor of the recognition of the Nepalese language. The leaders also keeping the populace briefed of what was taking place in the Parliament was continuously giving speeches…. [When they learned the language was to be recognized, a] wave of celebration exploded simultaneously and people started dancing in the street, shopkeepers distributing sweets and songs being sung. However, as a massive celebration had just been started, a group of almost 9 to 10 cars filled with youth arrived and started raising slogan against the Nepali language [presumably these were GNLF supporters]. Immediately, the situation turned explosive as the youth who were celebrating now confronted them. Even the leaders of both the groups started to confront each other (Biswas and Roy 2003: 214-213).

That evening, supporters of ‘Gorkhali’ vandalized the homes of prominent Nepali Language Committee members, and a bomb was thrown in the home of a former president of the Committee. This kind of anger seemed surprising, and even illogical, to outsiders. But it had become a part of the lives of those who challenged Ghisingh’s authority. Nepali language supporters, in a locally produced pamphlet published just as these bombings, condemned Ghisingh and his supporters for “[u]sing terror tactics, intimidating scholars and intellectuals and even alleged[ly] beheading the bust of [the] first Nepali Poet Bhanubhakta Acharya in Darjeeling.” They called these “acts of cowardice and extreme frustration of socalled [sic] Gorkha Bhasha [language] protagonists.”

After calm reclaimed the city, some changes happened quickly. Although the supporters of ‘Nepali’ had been successful in having their version of the language recognized by the state, they had never risen to political power. Ghisingh and the GNLF still ran the area and, since being a supporter of Nepali would not have ingratiated anyone with those in power, they had never
joined. The Nepali Language Committee’s central offices were moved to Dehra Dun, 1,500 miles to the west and the site of a large number of Indians of Nepali descent who were not subject to Ghisingh’s supporters’ violence.\footnote{I was unable to visit Dehra Dun during my 2007 visit, but I was told by a former president of the Language Committee that it is still there although its level of activity is under question. The records of the Language Committee from 1972 to 1992 were not moved with the central office and were still in Darjeeling in 2007.}

But what of the Language Committee members? One remembered that, since the funds for the movement came from regular people, members had to go back to their own jobs and families. “We are not rich people” and so we had to “get back to our lives.”\footnote{What she actually said was, “We are not rich people, [although] Sindhi people were.” There were many instances, even in 2007, where Language Committee members spoke about how they wished their situation could have been more like the Sindhis.} Another man, who worked as a translator, remembered that no one could “express anything” after 1992, due to the “confusion” between Nepali and Gorkhali “caused by politicians.”\footnote{6 May 2007 interview. He also said that the deputy secretary of the Nepali Sahitya Adademi in Delhi told him that all regional languages in India are destined to die, not just Nepali. He also recounted the story of a friend who visited the Sahitya Akademi in Delhi. The man found a computer file there about languages and intellectuals from various 8th Schedule languages. His friend said that, for the list of Nepali intellectuals and writers, there were none listed and so, shocked, asked someone working there why there were no Indian Nepali intellectuals listed. The man told him that Darjeeling was ‘unable’ to produce intellectuals (e.g. linguists, translators, etc) who could defend, criticize, translate, and talk about Indian Nepali literature to the broader public.} There were no celebrations in town for the recognition of the language and today, few people remember these events.

The few who actively remembered them had mixed feelings. One man, an ex-army officer, reacted in anger when I asked him about the events of 1992. He said that the Nepali people in Darjeeling were “diverted toward bhāsā [language] movement” and advised wrongly. “What is the result of the Eighth Schedule status? Nothing! We should have gone for statehood.”\footnote{This man does not like MP Bhandari or her more recent political “behavior;” his comments were, in some instances, remarkably like what the GNLF had released about other organizations in the area that challenged their supremacy. This man never overtly supported one party or another in front of me; however, he did become the topic of conversation in an interview I did months later. He was accused, by another interviewee, of asking various social and literary organizations in town to change the ‘Nepali’ in their names to ‘Gorkhali.’ It was not his fault, I was told; “we followed blindly at that time.”} Another man, down in the tea plantations, believed that the Nepali Language Movement couldn’t influence people because there wasn’t enough public awareness of the issues
and of what was going on at the national scale.\textsuperscript{141} It seemed that he supported the Language Movement in the hopes that they could use Nepali. Then he asked me, “unless we have a state, where will we use the language.” This argument would rely on a state which was run by, and for, Nepali-speakers. Some in the community pointed to Sikkim as an example of a state where Nepali is spoken; some even remarked that joining Sikkim would help the community of Nepali speakers in the Darjeeling hills.\textsuperscript{142}

Another man with whom I spoke in Darjeeling town, only vaguely remembered the movement. In his opinion, the movement only really affected “offices” and certainly “didn’t help ordinary people.” Others strongly disagreed; the grandson of a prominent intellectual remembered his grandfather urging the Language Committee to plan ahead:

Before the language was recognized, things weren’t easy, but after recognition it is [was] even worse. [Grandfather] was concerned about this very thing, and so wrote a 16-page pamphlet—in English because he wanted the bureaucrats to be aware of it—outlining the implications of the Eighth Schedule after recognition.

His grandfather wanted the community to be ready with civil service exams \textit{in Nepali} and all those other areas in which Nepali could be used—university entrance exams, for example—so that they could be implemented immediately after Eighth Schedule status was granted. The grandson believes that the main problem is that of “identity,” stemming from poor treatment by the state and national government. “Our ancestors were very simple-minded” and couldn’t foresee these problems with governments. Early on, he said, they blundered by being totally dependent on Nepal for education, literature, and language because the government now uses that evidence to ‘prove’ they have allegiances toward Nepal. However, “we must be recognized

\textsuperscript{141} The majority of my work was conducted in Darjeeling town, where support for Ghisingh and the GNLF was waning in 2007. The support of the GNLF in the tea plantations and in villages was often much stronger; this man was neither for nor against anyone.

\textsuperscript{142} Many of these same people argued that although merging with Sikkim (the state to the north predominantly populated by Nepali speakers) would be good for the community, that Darjeeling town would suffer. Reasons ranged from political (it would no longer be the capital) to economic (tourists would go more easily to Sikkim) to ecological (the government of Sikkim has taken environmental concerns very seriously).
as Nepali by India.” Those that push for a ‘Gorkha’ identity are emphasizing only one aspect of Nepali-ness; that of Gorkha soldiers. Yet, he argues, “Gorkha is not our sole identity.” Indians of Nepali descent are just that—Indians, descended from Nepalis. But they are many things and capable of many things. “Limiting us to one identity” is not a positive step, in spite of the government’s attempts to force them to do so. When the language was declared official on 20 August 1992, “more than 50% of people” were completely unaware that the language was up for recognition. They were “blindfolded.”143 When the language was “declared, the samiti [Language Committee] members went to Chowk Bazaar [a main market area in town]. They wanted to celebrate whole heartedly” but had to be suspicious. Their stance was, “let’s celebrate fast in case the GNLF or DGHC would attack. There was no [public] procession.” The recognition of the language “should have happened earlier, before the GNLF.” Instead, it went into the “wastepaper basket.”144 It saddened him, and others, that even now, local residents can’t celebrate the inclusion of Nepali in the constitution “in a grand manner.” There are small events, but he believed that such a momentous occasion should be celebrated by “all speakers of Nepali. Yet, there is fear. Even the Sammelan [the Nepali Sahitya Sammelan, Nepali Literary Meeting organization] can’t do big things because the DGHC will interfere. Groups cannot even go after those facilities [funding] available from the state and national governments because the DGHC will interfere.”145 In spite of this, the Nepali Language Movement “should be remembered because it was the only movement in history that has united all Nepalis in India.”

143 It is important to note that the events of 1992 were experienced by local people as part of a longer history of failed attempts to gain legal recognition of their language.
144 I think he wanted to say ‘in the crapper,’ or something like that, but he took about 15 seconds to come up with this saying and then laughed, seemingly embarrassed by his original thought.
145 Literary criticism was considered crucial to improving the status of the language by those interested in language and the status of the Nepali language; their arguments were similar to Gramsci’s arguments about language, philosophy, and criticism (c.f. 1971, particular ‘The Study of Philosophy’).
4.9 Conclusion

The parliamentary debates about the addition of the Nepali language into the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution are crucial to understanding the argument of this dissertation for a number of reasons. First, they were the culmination of the Nepali Language Committee and other organizations’ efforts toward the Nepali language. Second, although these debates were seen as the endpoint for many within the Nepali community (meaning the language would be recognized and there would be no further issues about their use of the language or the questioning of their identity), the debates foreshadowed the difficulties of the implementation process. The community of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling expected benefits from their language’s recognition in the constitution. These benefits never materialized. The absence of changes, in fact, led the community to turn away both from the Indian government and the Nepali language as the vehicle of their belonging. Instead, parents turned to English-medium schools and pushed their children to learn English. This, they believed, would be the path to success and security since the government had failed them. This failure led many to believe that they could never succeed if they spoke Nepali since this language has always been tied to a group with little access to power in India. Languages other than English also came to be seen as too political because all were associated with different ethnic or regional groups. Moreover, since they have a Nepali accent when they speak Hindi or Bengali, many Indians of Nepali descent who live outside the Darjeeling area refuse to speak those languages as well. Since there is a long history of English use in Darjeeling, Nepalis from this area believe they have (and are believed to have) superior skills in this language.

The goal of this chapter has been, in part, to explore the intersection between local and national level understandings of language, citizenship and belonging. How can we understand
linguistic shifts as part of a larger framework of political, legal, social, and economic processes? It is only through careful attention to the negotiations among law, social life, and language that we can understand the processes by which language shift occurs. One way to accomplish this is to study the current linguistic landscape in light of these events and their implications; the next chapter explores just that.
Chapter 5   Language Attitudes

As we saw in the last chapter, language ideologies and laws emerging from legal, social, and political fields have influenced the ability of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling to use the Nepali language; although the language has national (constitutional) and state status as an official language of the three hill-subdivisions, it is important to understand what this means on the ground for Indians of Nepali descent.

In Darjeeling, Indians of Nepali descent are clearly not the only occupants of this complex linguistic landscape. It is a daunting task to disentangle the many layers of social belonging in a multiethnic, multilingual city like Darjeeling. As I have explored in the previous chapters, the overlapping and simultaneous nature of languages and social belonging in such a site requires attention to linguistic, social, and political concerns alike—this includes the intersecting ethnic and linguistic divisions. Darjeeling is home to Nepali speakers as well as Tibetans, Bengalis, Marwaris, Biharis, and nationals from Bhutan and Nepal. In such a location, the linguistic landscape is complicated, to say the least, and provides methodological and theoretical challenges when attempting to understand how residents negotiate this complex social, economic, legal, political, and linguistic field. Such complexity was particularly evident when considering language ideologies about Nepali and English. Individuals so often represented English as the language they turned to in order to succeed in life; however, as I learned from the matched-guise test—a method emerging from linguistics and social psychology—individuals’ more explicit language ideologies and practices are inflected with their more unconscious language ideologies. I would have been unaware of how conflicted attitudes were had I not conducted this matched-guise test; how and why this was so is the primary goal of this chapter.
5.1 Matched-guise research

The matched-guise technique offers scholars of language, particularly those who study language ideologies, a unique lens into those unconscious ideas that may not be apparent in interviews or participant observation [see chapter 2 for further discussion of language ideologies]. While many language ideologies are overt, as Kroskrite notes, members of a community will “display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies” (2004: 505). Therefore, any well-constructed research on language ideologies must gather evidence regarding both conscious/overt language ideologies, taken from ethnographic evidence, as well as the more unconscious ideas about language. The matched-guise technique, in conjunction with ethnographic data, is ideal for such a goal.

The technique was originally devised by Lambert, et. al., and published in their 1960 study as a way to ascertain individuals’ language attitudes—what we would now call language ideologies—about a variety of topics. The technique counters what is of doubtful validity for linguists and social psychologists: self-reported data (see Fasold 1984: 147). Anthropologists

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1 Although not all members of a community will display the same level of awareness of language ideologies, it can still be said that language ideologies are numerous, overlapping, connect the social realm with linguistic practices, are “constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group,” and are an important aspect of identities (Kroskrite 2004: 501-509). It is not surprising, therefore, that certain members of a community will have different understandings of any language ideology. For example, members of a dominant group may not recognize their language ideologies about subordinate groups, but these subordinate groups are often very aware of them or, at least of their effects.

2 Matched-guise tests have been used to gather data relating to language variety (for French and English in Quebec, see Bourhis 1984; for a French-American English comparison see Lambert et al. 1975; for minority languages in Cameroon, see Kouega 2008; for Hindi and English in New Delhi, see Vaish 2009; for English, Afrikaans, and Xhosa in South Africa, see De Klerk and Bosch 1995; for English and French creole on St. Lucia, see Lieberman 1978; for Putonghua, Cantonese, and English in post-colonial Hong Kong, see Lia 2007; and for Putonghua, Korean, and Tibetan in China, see Zhou 2000), dialect differences (for discussion of American English dialect differences, see Purnell et al. 1999; for literary and standard spoken Tamil in Singapore, see Saravanam et al. 2007; for Greek Cypriot, see Papapavlou 1998), language shift (see Bettoni and Gibbons 1988), or other linguistic variation (for racialization of accents, see Billings 2005, Johnson and Buttnery 1982; ethnicization of accents, see Riches and Fody 1989; speech speed between New Zealand English and American English, see Ray and Zhan 199; perceived sexual orientation, see Smyth et al. 2003; perception and gender stereotypes, see Strand 1999; social class and regionality in France, see Paltridge and Giles 1984).

3 See also Cooper and Fishman 1974, Edwards 1999. The technique is also being used for analysis of the clinical encounter (see Carson, et. al. 2004, Street 2001).
focusing on language, including this anthropologist, would consider such self-reported notions and reactions to be valuable but only one aspect of a larger methodological vision that also includes analysis of naturally occurring conversation, participant observation, and matched-guise tests.

The method, in short, involves gathering audio recordings from individuals and then playing them back to respondents who rank these recordings on the basis of a number of qualities. Its name, “matched-guise,” comes from the use of multiple recordings from each individual but presenting them as new recordings each time. In my study, for example, four individuals recorded a total of twelve audio samples. When we played the recordings for respondents, they were only told that they would be listening to twelve recordings and not that the recordings were done by only four individuals. This way, the variability of speakers’ voices (in terms of pleasantness, gender, age, etc.) can be controlled for.

While the method provides a complement to other forms of data, it is important to be clear that there are a number of problems associated with the sole use of this method. One problem with solely employing the matched-guise technique is the artificial nature of using pre-recorded text rather than naturally occurring conversation. Since the goal of the technique is to control for all variables (such as voice quality, topic, age, gender), a ‘pure’ test demands that each speaker read the same passage in each language. This is accomplished by the researcher providing the text, ideally in consultation with a number of native speakers. However, this “introduces one variable as it controls another; the speakers may be judged as performers of

\[\text{\footnotesize 4} \text{ A few more recent works use written stimuli; see Buchstaller 2006. For a study on non-standard orthographies using the matched-guise technique, see Jaffe and Walton 2000.}
readings” rather than as speakers of the language (Fasold 1984: 153). Some scholars avoid this problem by departing from the script structure and instead having speakers talk about a theme such as weather (d’Angeljan and Tucker 1973) or national landmarks (El-Dash and Tucker 1975). As recording technology has improved, other scholars have manipulated the naturally occurring speech by adding or deleting portions of a naturally occurring conversation; for example, Kathryn Campbell-Kibler deleted and inserted –in and –ing in her research on regional identities in the US (2008; see also 2005). Still others have expanded the speech sample by asking speakers to perform multiple kinds of linguistic tasks; Smyth et. al. (2003) asked speakers to read a scientific paragraph, a dramatic paragraph, and then respond to an open-ended question.

While controlling for variables is crucial for a few aspects of the method, other scholars have also noted that there has yet been little research that traces how “differences in personality, mood, situational goals, or other interpersonal factors may contribute to listener perceptions” (Campbell-Kibler 2008:638; see also Bradac, Cargile, and Hallett 2001). In her research into valuations of (ING) by university students in California and North Carolina, Campbell-Kibler demonstrates that the variability in responses was both about the linguistic variable itself as well as pointing to “a difference in how the listeners incorporate their understandings of the variable

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7 Bonnie Urciuoli performed a linguistic survey inspired by the matched guise technique while exploring issues of bilingualism and language ideologies about race and class in New York city; she notes that, while inspired by matched guise research, her survey was “not meant to be formally analyzed or quantified” (1996: 134, n4).
8 As in, the difference between jumping and jumpin’. Connor (2008) notes that other innovations in the creation of matched guise tests include computer animation and voice-dubbing.
9 Responses to the open-ended question were screened “to ensure that the content of [the speaker’s response to the open-ended question] did not explicitly reveal the sexual identity of the speaker (e.g. by reference to the sex of romantic or sexual partners), and that it did not refer to stereotypical gay or straight behavior (e.g. lack of familiarity with sports)” (Smyth, et. al. 2003).
into their image of the speaker” (2008:638, see also 2005).\footnote{Campbell-Kibler believes this “show(s) that listeners use the process of listening to exploit (consciously or automatically) the multiple meanings available for a given piece of socially significant linguistic structure” (2008:638-9).} A related issue is the limited applicability of the test results beyond the context of the testing site and time, which highlights the differences between naturally occurring conversation and the more artificial laboratory qualities of the test (Ciscel 2007).

Individuals’ language ideologies have demonstrated effects even on comprehension of the speech and ideas about the “social groups speakers are members of (or, are believed to be members of) have an influence on how their language varieties are perceived” (Niedzielski 1999:62; see also Beeb 1981, Thakerar and Giles 1981, Williams, et. al., 1976 as cited in Niedzielski 1999:62).\footnote{Niedzielski posited the following arguments about the connection between language ideologies—what she calls “social information” and stereotypes—and perception: “(a) Listeners use social information just as they use visual and other information to create or calibrate the phonological space of speakers, (b) stereotypes about given language varieties affect the way in which listeners calibrate the phonological space of speakers of those varieties; and (c) people’s stereotypes about their own variety can be inaccurate, and the phonological space calibrated for members of their own speech community reflects this inaccuracy” (1999:63).} Donald Rubin, in his study of the factors that influence US undergraduates’ perception of nonnative English-speaking teaching assistants, constructed his matched guise test by randomly assigning undergraduates into four groups. The first group listened to a short science lecture while looking at a photograph of a ‘Caucasian’ woman, the second heard a humanities lecture while looking at a photograph of an ‘Asian’ (Chinese) woman.\footnote{The ‘science’ lecture was about helium scarcity while the ‘humanities’ lecture was about the Mahabharata (Rubin 1992:515).} The third group listened to the same science lecture while looking at the photograph of the ‘Caucasian’ woman while the last group listened to the same humanities lecture while looking at the photograph of the ‘Asian’ (Chinese) woman.\footnote{Rubin notes that to “avoid confounding ethnicity with physical attractiveness, both models were similarly dressed, were of similar size and hair style, and were photographed in the same setting and pose (standing at a lectern in front of a chalkboard). No differences between the photographs in rated physical attractiveness were found in any uses of these photographs (although other factors like speech topic sometimes exerted significant effects on judgments of attractiveness)” (1992: 514-515).} All lectures had been read by the
same native English speaker from central Ohio “who was well regarded by her own undergraduate students for especially effective and clear classroom delivery” (Rubin 1992: 515). After listening to the lecture while looking at the photograph, students were then given a comprehension test. Results from this test demonstrated that they not only ‘heard’ accent differences (Asian vs. White American) but that their comprehension of the lecture was “undermined by identifying (visually) the instructor as Asian” (1992:519).

All of this research demonstrates that the influence of language ideologies is so powerful, and often completely unconscious, that scholarship attending to connections between language and larger forms of social difference must find a way to gather data on both reported and unconscious language ideologies.

While there are limitations to using this method, research has also demonstrated that the matched-guise test will, in some cases, provide results very different from those discovered in ethnographic research or projects using questionnaires. In their research on loanwords into Indonesian, researchers discovered that individuals’ self-reported favorable attitudes toward so-called ‘western’ loanwords; however, their matched guise test of those same individuals discovered the exact opposite (Hassal, et al. 2008); this is similar to what I found and will be explained below. In Hans Ladegaard’s research on the connection of language attitudes and linguistic practices, he found that qualitative research methods found no significant correlation between the two. However, the matched-guise test and questionnaire supported his belief that there was a connection (2000).

Given these illuminating and valuable results from well-crafted matched-guise tests, I decided to combine this approach with data gathered from ethnographic and historical research. This combination of methods proved crucial to understanding the complexity of the linguistic
landscape in Darjeeling. In some cases, as will become clear later, the results of the matched-guise test directly confirmed what I discovered in the ethnographic research. In other cases, it highlighted a more complex and, in some cases, conflicted, linguistic landscape than was evident from the ethnographic data alone. For these reasons, I believe that the matched-guise technique is a valuable research method when combined with other complementary methods, such as participant observation, interviews, and analysis of naturally occurring conversation.

5.2 Matched-Guise test in Darjeeling, India

Because I wanted to choose qualities for the matched-guise survey that had clear salience in the local context for as wide a range of individuals as possible, I did not compose the test itself until I had completed seven months of ethnographic research— in Darjeeling in 2005 and 2007, in addition to research in the Kathmandu valley during 2005. I also vetted the qualities with a number of people to ensure, as much as possible, that I was not imposing my own ideas about language onto the local linguistic landscape. In addition to Darjeeling-specific terms, I included a number of qualities taken from other matched-guise research (e.g. Bilaniuk 2006; Ciscel 2007).

The process of constructing the test itself was extremely illuminating, as it brought to my attention several important language ideologies. I first attempted to write the entire test in Nepali only, rather than in a combination of Nepali and English (the eventual form that the test took— see Appendix J), but a number of factors made this goal impossible. First, the Nepali version of the qualities to be tested was not always the most commonly used in conversation; in some cases, local young people had never heard the ‘dictionary’ Nepali word. Second, language ideologies that people held regarding the written version of Nepali—that it must be the ‘intellectual,’ ‘dictionary,’ or pakkā (meaning real, genuine, or authentic and is associated with a broadly

14 Language ideologies—discovered through ethnographic methods as well as the matched-guise test—are a useful site to discover the actual processes by which large, and sometimes unwieldy, discourses about gender, power, globalization, nationalism, morality, and the like, may be concretized.
constructed Nepal or Kathmandu dialect)—clash with what people use in their everyday lives. This is connected to a similar ideology about the spoken language as well. Residents of Darjeeling are not only of Nepali descent; the city’s history of immigration means there reside many speakers of Hindi, Bengali, Bihari, Tibetan, and various other languages. The city, as a major tourist destination, is popular among Indians from the plains, particularly Bengali speakers from urban West Bengal. As a result of this history of multicultural and multilingual residents and visitors, it is common for words and grammatical structures of these languages to be used even by those Indians of Nepali descent who represent themselves as monolingual speakers of Nepali. Such linguistic syncretism is common in Darjeeling, and although I observed Hindi, Bengali, English, and Tibetan words being used by Nepali speakers, the language ideologies most often highlighted the use of English, rather than these other languages, as the marker of “improper” Nepali language use (see also Hill 1999; Makihara 2004). English itself holds contradictory roles within this multicultural space. Among Darjeeling residents of Nepali descent, English was ideologically highlighted as a negative influence on the Nepali language spoken in the area. I was often told that Darjeeling Nepali was not *pakka* Nepali as compared to the Nepali spoken in Nepal because the frequency of English used within Nepali utterances in Darjeeling.\(^{15}\)

These ideologies of *pakka*, or “authentic” Nepali from Nepal, versus the spoken Nepali in Darjeeling also spill over into public meetings; during my fieldwork, I attended a program on 4 March 2007 given to celebrate the beginning of a film to be shot in Darjeeling, using Nepali

\(^{15}\) Borrowings from other languages are not highlighted in the same way. One young man with whom I spoke considered Darjeeling Nepali “street” Nepali, a creative language which took what it needed from other languages to create a richer, more descriptive language than is possible using any language by itself. For other examples of linguistic practices deemed ‘impure,’ see research on Sheng [Swahili and English] (Mazrui 1995, Spyropoulos 1987, and Myers-Scotton 1993), Spanglish [Spanish and English] (Hill 2005, 1998), or surzhyk [Russian and Ukrainian] (see Bilaniuk 2004; 2006).
actors and in the Nepali language. The film, *Result KeBhāyo*[रिजल्ट के भयो], was to be about

![Banner for film release, "Result KeBhāyo."](image)

**Figure 1: Banner for film release, "Result KeBhāyo."**

Darjeeling life. I had only been back to Darjeeling for a few months and was still working on
transitioning from the version of Nepali I had learned in Southern Nepal and Kathmandu to that
of Darjeeling. My anxiety about this shift was heightened when I realized I was only
understanding about a quarter of what was said. The vocabulary was unfamiliar as well as some
of the verb conjugations. It was particularly striking because the main speaker and master of
ceremonies was the nephew of my landlord and lived in the same house I did. We spoke multiple
times a day and I rarely had difficulty understanding his Nepali except in those moments of
excitement when his sentences flowed too quickly for me to follow. But on this crisp February
day, he was speaking slowly and loudly for the crowd.

After about 10 minutes, I turned to the daughter of the house who would quickly become
my closest friend and research assistant. “Maya,” I whispered, “what is he saying? I can’t
understand him!” She smiled and said, “Neither do most people. He’s using pakkā [real/authentic] Nepali. That’s why people always ask him to speak.” At such public events, she went on to say, when one is required to speak in front of a group, “proper, grammatical” Nepali is required.\(^\text{16}\) Not only did she not understand some of what he was saying, she expressed no discomfort or even surprise that he would not be using the everyday Nepali of Darjeeling.\(^\text{17}\)

This particular language ideology about the use of pakkā Nepali in public events and in written materials meant that when I attempted to use the everyday Nepali version of the qualities used in Darjeeling, the test was not taken seriously. Those with whom I discussed the early versions of the test even expressed concern that no principal of a college would allow me to distribute it because it showed that I “didn’t understand” the Nepali language. I considered using the everyday words anyway with an explanation of why I had chosen to do so; one of the features of language ideologies, however, is their naturalized quality and so even attempting to circumvent them by utilizing my outsider status was disruptive and distracting. A decision to use the local version and an explanation proved so distracting that, in the end, I used the pakkā Nepali word for the Nepali and the English word used locally in spite of the difficulty in contextualizing the problematic and political act of translation. For example, young people most often use proudy or “proud” instead of ghamandī (प्रमण्डी).\(^\text{18}\) I included both the “proper” pakkā Nepali word and the English word in use locally so that they would understand what was being asked of them and I could satisfy local principals that I “understood” Nepali.

The qualities I chose for the matched-guise test were a mixture of those used in other

\(^\text{16}\) Events like this also contain the least amount of English compared to everyday conversations. In this case, the only time it was appropriate was when the main speaker started explaining to me, in English, what was going on at that event.

\(^\text{17}\) She noted that older people, writers, and people originally from Nepal might, but that many “regular” young people would not.

\(^\text{18}\) While Turner’s Nepali dictionary spells this word as प्रमण्डी, everyone in Darjeeling with whom I shared the qualities list spelled it प्रमण्डी.
scholars’ matched-guise tests and those taken from the locally culturally salient terms – information I derived, in other words, from my ethnographic research. These qualities are as follows: pleasant [फरसाईलो], intelligent [जानु], honest [हमानदार], hardworking [मेहन्ती], happy [खुशी], cultured [सम्मथ], authoritative [गहिक्लो], friendly [मिलनसार], proud/proudly [घमन्दी], rich [पनी], poor [गरीब], hard-hearted [कठोर], traditional [परम्परागती], modern [आधुनिक], and educated [शिक्षित]. Each quality is broadly associated with a particular group or kind of person. In the sections below, when the results of the test are presented, the cultural and ideological associations often made with these qualities will be explored in more detail.

Once I chose the qualities, the next task was to find representative speakers (broadly constructed) of the three groups that were most central to the research project: urban Darjeeling Nepali speakers, rural Darjeeling Nepali speakers who regularly visited or lived in the city, and Bengali speakers who lived in the area. To limit the variability of the voices, I identified four young women between the ages of 18 and 35 who had no immediately distinguishing features in their voices (such as a lisp). Speaker A is a native Bengali speaker who moved to Darjeeling after marriage. She is the least educated of the group although she is the only one who regularly spoke all four languages (Bengali, English, Hindi, and Nepali) in her job. Speaker B is a native Nepali speaker who grew up in a village in the district but is highly educated and is thought to speak a more urban version of Nepali. She is also regularly mistaken for a native speaker of English and Hindi. Speaker C grew up and was educated in urban Darjeeling. In her profession, she uses all four languages, although not on a daily basis. In the end, I did not use her recording for English because of issues with the quality of the recording. Finally, speaker D grew up in a village in the Darjeeling district, although she attends college in town. While she is a native speaker of Nepali, I was unable to use her recording in Nepali because there was background
noise inaudible during the recording process but was very evident when played back.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker A</td>
<td>L1 Bengali speaker; moved to Darjeeling from a village in the plains of rural West Bengal after marriage; least educated; helps husband in their small business; regularly speaks all four languages although is least strong in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker B</td>
<td>L1 Nepali and English speaker; originally from village but is thought to speak a more ‘urban’ version of Nepali; educated outside West Bengal; teaches at college in the hill region; mistaken for native speaker of English and Hindi as well as Nepali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker C</td>
<td>L1 Nepali speaker; Urban Darjeeling Nepali; professional; finished degree at local college; uses all four languages in her professional life although not on a daily basis; is least strong in Bengali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker D</td>
<td>L1 Nepali speaker; rural Darjeeling Nepali; student at local Darjeeling college; very shy and quiet; strong spoken English but only after she becomes comfortable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Speaker qualities and description (all women were between 18 and 30 years old).**

The test was limited to one hour; the number of recordings was therefore kept to twelve so that respondents would be able to complete the survey after the recordings. A distribution of speakers’ recordings can be found in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Nepali</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Hindi</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaker A</td>
<td>R5</td>
<td>R11</td>
<td>R2</td>
<td>R8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker B</td>
<td>R1</td>
<td>R7</td>
<td>R12</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker C</td>
<td>R10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>R6</td>
<td>R4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker D</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>R3</td>
<td>R9</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Language and Speaker Distribution.** ‘R1’ means recording one.

The goal of the matched-guise test is to attempt to find hearers’ unconscious ideas about language. The hearers were not, therefore, told that multiple recordings were made in different
languages by the same speaker; rather, they were only informed that they would be hearing
twelve recordings and that they would need to rank each recording from 0, meaning not at all, to
4, meaning very, for each of the 15 qualities. This also meant that recordings made by one
speaker were distributed throughout the test rather than played in order. The recordings were
made with Nepali, English, Hindi, and Bengali versions of the following text [the full text of
each language can be found in Appendix I]:

Darjeeling tea is world famous for its unique and pleasant flavor. This is due to
many factors, including its geographical location, elevation, fertile soil, and
climate. The first tea seeds were brought from China. Those seeds were planted in
Lebong and other parts of Darjeeling. The mature plants were then transferred to
different parts of Darjeeling for cultivation. These locations were later known as
tea gardens. Every year, tourists pour into Darjeeling to visit the tea gardens and
enjoy this high quality tea.

The process of developing the test—writing the text, translating various parts to English and to
Nepali, discussing the text with individuals from various walks of life in Darjeeling—was
incredibly useful and taught me much of which I would have been unaware had I not decided to
collaborate with individuals on a product rather than discussing general ideas and ideologies or
even eliciting responses about common situations. Through the process, it became clear that
certain language ideologies had a wider acceptance such as certain words or ways of speaking
and whether they were pakkā, ideologies about written versus spoken Nepali, etc. In the end,
even the process of developing the products used in the test was a fruitful way to expand the
ethnographic research.
5.2.1 Format and composition of fall 2007 Darjeeling survey

The matched-guise test conducted in fall 2007 was the first half of a larger survey about language attitudes in Darjeeling.\footnote{See appendix J for the full test and survey in Nepali and English.} I gathered over 800 data points from each of the 625 respondents.\footnote{This means I have approximately 500,000 data points from this running of the test in fall 2007. In the future, I would like to conduct the same test among Nepali speakers in Nepal and other sites in India.} After the traditional matched-guise test was given—which will be explained below—a survey section was dedicated to general biographical information and questions about language. Biographical questions included gender, age, residence information, profession (of self and parents), ethnicity, and the native languages of self, mother, father, and grandparents. It also included the level of education and the medium of instruction of the school they attended. These questions were important not only to help gauge knowledge of a language but also a student’s economic status or, rather, the economic status of his/her family. English medium schools are typically more expensive than Nepali medium schools, particularly government schools, which are thought to be less well run and of lower academic standards.

The last part of the survey contained questions about language knowledge and fluency in additional forms. The biographical section asked individuals to report about “native language(s)” and “other language(s) you speak well.” Question 16 asked participants to evaluate their ability to understand, speak, read, and write in Nepali/Gorkhali, English, Bengali, and Hindi. There were also three blank spaces for participants to write in additional languages to rank. Language ability was ranked on a scale from 0 (none) to 3 (perfectly).

Question 17 asked students to report about the frequency of language use in particular locations and situations from 0 (never) to 3 (always). I provided the categories of Nepali/Gorkhali, English, Hindi, Bengali, and Other. Participants often wrote in the name of the language they ranked in the other category, although some did leave the category blank.
Locations and situations were:

- At home with parents and elders
- At home with friends
- At school
- At work
- At the market or shops
- While watching films
- When reading newspapers
- At restaurants
- At get-togethers
- When interacting with desi\(^{21}\) (Indian) tourists
- When interacting with bideshi\(^{22}\) (foreign) tourists

These categories were chosen to get a mix of self-reported language patterns: parents’ language use, medium of school, literacy practices, economic associations with languages, and personal language preferences. Finally, the survey ended with more open-ended questions about language use in Darjeeling and among Indians of Nepali descent:

- What is your opinion about the current language situation in Darjeeling?
- What is the status and situation of Nepali/Gorkhali language within India?
- What is the status and situation of Nepali/Gorkhali people in India?

The last two questions provided options for answers although there was additional space for comments:

- In your opinion, what is the relationship between Nepal Nepali and Darjeeling Nepali/Gorkhali?\(^{23}\)
  a) They are the same language.
  b) Darjeeling Nepali/Gorkhali is a dialect with a separate history.
  c) They are two separate languages.

- In your opinion, in West Bengal, there should be:
  a) One official language—Bengali
  b) One official language—Hindi

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\(^{21}\) In Nepal, this is written desi (देसी, meaning ‘native,’ or, in this context, other Indian citizens); in Darjeeling, it is pronounced and written “deshi.”

\(^{22}\) In Nepal, this is written bidesi (बिडेसी, literally meaning ‘stranger’ or ‘foreigner’); in Darjeeling, it is pronounced and written “bideshi.”

\(^{23}\) This question provided interesting data for future analysis on how these college students define languages.
c) One official language—English

d) Two official languages—Bengali and Nepali/Gorkhali

e) Other (with a section to write in their choices)

Since there are various perspectives both about the genealogy of the language spoken in Darjeeling and the political place of language in the state of West Bengal, I included the answers to these questions I had most commonly been given during the ethnographic research. A number of individuals wrote in additional answers to the questions as well as those who simply left these last two questions blank. They were on the back page and I believe some participants did not realize they were there. In addition, some were more than ready to leave after sitting with this survey for an hour.

The bulk of this chapter deals with the first section of the test/survey. The matched-guise test began when respondents listened to a series of 12 recordings. During the first recording, respondents were asked to rank each quality on a scale from 0, meaning not at all, to 4, meaning very [see Appendix J for a reproduction of the actual test questions]. For example, ranking for the quality “pleasant” (pharsāilo, फरसाईलो):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>not at all</th>
<th>not very</th>
<th>average</th>
<th>rather</th>
<th>very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>शून्य</td>
<td>केइही</td>
<td>अंदामा</td>
<td>मध्यम</td>
<td>अधिकलम</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>के के</td>
<td>के के</td>
<td>के के</td>
<td>के के</td>
<td>के के</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After ranking the qualities, the participant was asked to answer two questions: 1) ‘Would you like this person (and why),’ and, 2) ‘what is the ethnicity of this person.’ These questions had no guided answers so that participants would need to supply their own categories and reasoning for these answers. These questions were repeated another 11 times for the other 11 recordings. After the recordings were finished, participants then ranked the importance of each trait from the matched-guise test when ‘making friends.’ I added this question in order to find those traits that had the most social and personal salience and those that did not. Traits were
ranked from 1, meaning not important, to 3, meaning very important.

The results of this test expanded my data and understanding on current language ideologies and practices among college students in the Darjeeling area. Although I originally planned to include only those students who were native Nepali speakers from the Darjeeling area, I ended up including students from throughout South Asia and speakers of many native languages for reasons I will explain below. Comparing the results from different populations which, for the purposes of this chapter, are divided by self-reported, native language, provided a very interesting lens into the complex linguistic landscape of Darjeeling.

5.2.2 Ethnographic description of the matched-guise technique

Before I describe the results of the test, it is important that I explain the context in which the tests were conducted. As discussed in chapter three, language politics in Darjeeling meant that my choice of nomenclature was a sensitive part of the project. I therefore present two different experiences of preparing to conduct the matched-guise test as a way to both explain the way these sensitivities play out in everyday life as well as to provide an ethnographic description of the technique itself. Few researchers who conduct matched-guise tests also provide ethnographic descriptions of how the test was conducted, something I hope to remedy with this description.

On September 10th, 2007, Maya, my research assistant, and I ventured to two colleges to discuss with the heads of each conducting the survey and matched-guise test at their schools. The first, a religious Christian school headed by a formidable Father-scholar, and the second, a government school with little funding, could not have been more different in spite of their very close proximity.

The day was a usual Darjeeling September morning—the air warm and clear with the
bright sun reflecting off the mountains and promising a hot day. The principal of the religious school had agreed to meet with us between 10:30 and 11:00. Wanting to be punctual, we set out earlier than necessary to catch the shared taxi in the middle of the Darjeeling bazaar. Unfortunately, we rode in an unusually slow taxi and so our arrival at the front gate of the school wasn’t until 11:00. This would typically not have been a problem; often when arriving at an agreed upon time, Maya and I would end up waiting through two cups of tea and plates of biscuits—meaning thirty minutes or more. This school and this father, however, were quite different. Since we hadn’t arrived on time, Father took a meeting with someone else at the school. Maya and I sat on a bench outside his office and, although I never attended a religious school and was never sent to the principal’s office at my own school, I found myself looking at the religious icons and feeling like I was about eight years old. The hallway was dark and the bench, increasingly uncomfortable. The longer we waited the more nervous I became.

When we were finally ushered into his office, things did not begin well. Of medium height, Father cut an imposing figure in his robes, salt-and-pepper hair, and glasses. He listened intently and carefully, inevitably returning my own narrative with a comment that demonstrated a keen and well honed intellect. Maya had made the first contact with him via phone and although she was always well prepared to talk about the research, I believe he was confused by her description of the test. Since most individuals I met with regarding the test were not scholars, Maya and I had crafted a description that we both used which followed some very specific guidelines. First, we did not describe it as a ‘test’ to the principals, teachers, or students. When we called it a ‘test’ initially, it was met with a great deal of anxiety by all parties reflecting the high stakes of testing in schools in India. We therefore decided to call it a survey. Second, we would not go into overly specific details about the test; we described it as a survey that asked
about the students’ attitudes and ideas about language. For most people, that description was sufficient. However, Father holds a doctorate from a major university in Southern India and could never be described as ‘most people.’ He had lived in the area for 25 years and was particularly interested in the production and dissipation of alternative forms of knowledge. He also had a background in linguistics and not only quizzed me on my training, but also the statistical methodology I would use for the analysis and recommended using particular software to analyze the data. This depth and breadth of knowledge meant that our simplistic, but usually sufficient, description of the test and its purpose was not only insufficient but led him to believe (or I think he believed) that I was ill-prepared to do this kind of research. He and the school have often been a target for researchers looking for sites and, given his reaction, I can only imagine the kinds of scholars who had preceded me. It was only after I demonstrated my knowledge of the very technical theoretical concepts that form the basis of some of the language attitude and language ideology research, my belief in triangulating methods, the anonymous nature of the survey, my extensive collaboration with Darjeeling residents, as well as concerns over how my research could potentially be received that Father seemed to finally warm to me.\textsuperscript{24} The conversation ended with an in-depth discussion of the broader theoretical implications of my research that left me spinning.

After our conversation, Father took us to a few rooms that could be used for the survey that we had agreed would take place on the 13\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} of September. The survey on the 13\textsuperscript{th} would consist of the boarders (students who lived at the school) while the 14\textsuperscript{th} would be the day students from the local Darjeeling area. Although the school has been running in the Darjeeling area since the 1930s, it was only recently that local ‘day’ students were accepted. The school has

\textsuperscript{24} My conversations with Father about language, the production of knowledge, and social and legal underpinnings of linguistic difference in India were instructive and very helpful in my crafting of this project.
students from six states in India as well as those from Bhutan and Nepal and is a different kind of school than the government schools. The campus is set off the main road with impeccably maintained buildings and grounds. Inside, the halls are very quiet; no children hanging around and no one outside smoking. Walking around the building with Father, the only sounds were the gentle slap of our shoes on the floor and the occasional voices of teachers drifting through the empty hallways.

A few days later, we visited a government-run college to discuss the test; this experience could not have been more different from the religious school—large potholes around the grounds, buildings covered in dirt and crumbled debris, broken bits of who knows what scattered around. There also seemed to be more students hanging around outside, talking and smoking, than were inside. We arrived in the middle of the afternoon after walking down a series of dangerously ill-maintained roads that made all travel on them a bone-rattling adventure. The clouds were gathering for what would become an epic late-monsoon downpour. The principal was very kind, if overworked, and gave us permission to conduct the test at his school which was populated by children from the tea gardens and other rural areas in the valley. After our meeting, he took us to the teachers’ lounge to meet the faculty. Maya left for a few minutes and I sat and talked with the faculty there.

The room was small, with a wooden table in the middle and wooden chairs lining the outside. There was barely enough room for the chairs to sit around the table, and when the bodies of teachers and researchers were added, navigation was impossible. If you were sitting across from the door, as I was, you were essentially trapped. The room was painted that special greenish blue that I had never seen until visiting the Himalayas and the one window with its dingy curtain did little to brighten the room. As the teachers began filtering in, we started the conversation by
discussing the survey and test; I wanted the teachers to know what I would be doing in terms of my broader research goals\textsuperscript{25} and I was interested in hearing their comments and reactions on it. While we waited for tea it became clear that the results were mixed and for reasons I had not anticipated. While most were very enthusiastic about the research and the survey, a few expressed concern about the test. One recurring theme was that although I had the principal’s permission, I really needed to talk to the head of the Nepali department before I actually conducted the test because, they said, my choice of nomenclature. For the survey and test, I decided to write “Nepali/Gorkhali” [नेपाली/गोरखाली] each time the language came up. For example, the directions say: “You will hear a tape-recording of a text read by 12 people. All of them read the same text in Nepali/Gorkhali, English, Bengali, and Hindi. [तपाईले एउटा टेप्रेकार्डिया सुन्नुहुन्छ जस्माउँदा पाठ धेरैँ धेरैँभित्रहरू १२पतेका छन्। जो एउटा पाठ नेपाली/गोरखाली, अङ्ग्रेजी, बंगला, र हिन्दी भाषामामिलिएका छन्।]” Question 23 of the survey also asks, “In your opinion, what is the relationship between Nepal Nepali and Darjeeling Nepali/Gorkhali? [तपाईले विचारनेपालेको नेपाली भाषा र दाङ्जिलिङ्को नेपाली/गोरखाली भाषामामिलिए संबन्ध छ।]\textsuperscript{26} This choice came after months of consideration since I had originally decided to call it ‘Nepali’ partly because it is what the Indian government labeled the language during the 1993 parliamentary debates and partly because ‘Gorkhali’ is so associated with the GNLF. So, in the end, I decided to call the language Nepali/Gorkhali (see chapter three for further explanation of why this was crucial).

Until this particular day, this choice had never been remarked upon by those who had

\textsuperscript{25} I did not, however, discuss the specifics of the test with them; instead, I focused on why I was interested in the students’ ideas about language.

\textsuperscript{26} In the \textit{pakka} Nepali, as defined in Turner’s 1931 dictionary, \textit{sambandha} [संबन्ध] means “alliance, affinity, connection; relationship by marriage” (589).
seen the test, at least openly. Two teachers were worried and seemed incredibly nervous; one even said that we “must” talk to the head of the Nepali department at the college. He was reported to be very pro-Gorkhali and “could cause some problems” if he wasn’t happy about the survey regardless of what the principal of the school had decided. I pushed the teachers further and asked what they meant. How could something like the name of a language matter? What does this mean for you? They said that Gorkhali was a political identity that “became confused and now there is no real clarity about the situation.” The same teacher who believed I should talk to the head of the Nepali department kept saying over and over again that this was a “very serious issue, people are nervous about it,” and that we needed to be “careful.” At this point I started to get a little unsettled. I had some difficulty in the past with politically minded individuals taking exception to my research and what I was doing. I was also very aware that while I could easily leave Darjeeling, Maya and her family (as well as others with whom I was associated) were in a more perilous position. In this situation, since Maya was there and many of the teachers knew her family, I needed to do some damage control. I let the teachers know that I had made this choice for a few reasons; ‘Nepali/Gorkhali’ was the way it had been discussed in Parliament, it was how it was in most of the official notifications I had seen, and that I hoped, someday, to conduct this same survey in Nepal. There, the label ‘Gorkhali’ would mean something entirely different. Although one teacher calmed a little, she never really seemed comfortable with the whole idea of my presence or the survey itself. The other teachers thought the survey was a wonderful idea and that it was so important to do a study like this. We had no issues on the day we gave the test at this school, in spite of what we had been warned about.
5.3 Results

The 625 respondents ranged in age from 16 to 27, although most were between 18 and 23 (see figure 4 below). Of this group, 29% were male (179), 60% were female (373), with 11% (72) not responding or providing an unclear answer. Self-reported native languages (L1) included Nepali, Hindi, Bengali, English, Dzongkha, Bhutia, Marwari, Mech, Bhojpuri, Tibetan, Urdu, Lepcha, Bhore, Anya, Mizo, Malayam, Santal, Oraon, Tamil, Oriya, Sadri, Rai, Punjabi, Khania, Rabha, Munda, Khasi, Sherpa, Drukpa, Mangdeep, Sikkimese, Kurtoep, and Sharchop.

![Figure 4: Birth year and age range of respondents [n=625]](image)

5.3.1 Statistical significance of results

Findings for the matched guise test were analyzed (using a $t$-test) and provided a range of statistically significant results for the $t$-test; for this study, I take $p<.001$ to be highly statistically significant, $p<.01$ as statistically significant, and $p<.15$ as moderately significant. Certain qualities, such as ‘modern,’ had a high degree of statistical significance; 7 of 13 of the

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27This section is, in part, taken from Booth 2009. Special thanks to the participants of SALSA 2009 and my fellow presenters at the 2009 AAA panel “Linguistic Citizenship: Ideologies of Language Practice and the End/s of the Nation” in Philadelphia for their valuable comments and insights on various aspects of this research.
comparisons between pairs of voices (or ‘guises’) were highly significant (p<.001), 1 was significant (p<.01), and 3 were moderately significant. Others, like, ‘poor,’ demonstrated that the voices I choose did not produce statistically significant results; no results for ‘poor’ were highly significant or significant, and only three were moderately significant. The majority of the results for ‘poor,’ 10 out of 13 voice comparisons, were not significant at all (p>.15). Figure 5 provides all significance for the qualities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Highly Significant p&lt; .001</th>
<th>Significant p&lt;.01</th>
<th>Moderately Significant p&lt;.15</th>
<th>Not Significant p&gt; .15</th>
<th>% of results with statistical significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intelligent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Modern</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Educated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Proud/Proudy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Honest</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hardworking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultured</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pleasant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Authoritative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Happy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Friendly</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Traditional</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Rich</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Hard-hearted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Poor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5:** Ranking of statistical significance of qualities based on t-test results [Ranked first by total % of statistical significance (highly through moderately significant), then by Highly Significant, Significant, Moderately Significant, etc.].

The most significant results were for ‘intelligent,’ ‘modern,’ ‘educated,’ and ‘proud/proudy’

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28 There are a total of 13 comparisons for each quality when I conducted the t-test because, although there are 12 recordings, these comparisons are based on an individual’s recordings being compared to each other. For ‘intelligent,’ for example, speaker A was recorded in Nepali, English, Hindi, and Bengali, speaker B in Nepali, English, and Hindi, speaker C in Nepali, Hindi, and Bengali, and speaker D in English and Hindi. This means there are 13 comparisons: 1) speaker A Nepali and English, 2) speaker A Nepali and Hindi, 3) speaker A Nepali and Bengali, 4) speaker A English and Hindi, 5) speaker A English and Bengali, 6) speaker A Hindi and Bengali, 7) speaker B Nepali and English, 8) speaker B Nepali and Hindi, 9) speaker B English and Hindi, 10) speaker C Nepali and Hindi, 11) speaker C Nepali and Bengali, 12) speaker C Hindi and Bengali, and 13) speaker D English and Hindi.

29 I am not surprised by this result; none of the women I recorded for this study were poor and all had at least some education. Their voices, therefore, must not have indexed poverty to the listeners.
(76.9% of their returns had statistically significant p-values of p<.15). For this chapter, I’ve considered these results as well as those qualities that emerged as being ethnographically meaningful and elected to explore in depth the quality *proudy*; although the quality ‘intelligent’ had the most highly significant results (8 with p<.001), it was not a quality that presented itself in the ethnographic results and my goal in this chapter is to combine the matched-guise results with ethnographic results. *Proudy* was the most ethnographically significant quality that was related directly to notions of belonging and citizenship for Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling.  

5.3.2 *Proudy*

*Proudy* is a term that does not directly correlate with the English word ‘proud,’ although they are loosely related. The results of this quality, overall, had high statistical significance and also highlight the complexity of the linguistic landscape for Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling. In Darjeeling and the surrounding area, *proudy* is a term with negative connotations that is most often applied to someone who is not ‘simple’ or ‘humble.’ It can be glossed roughly as ‘conceited’ or ‘uppity’ and is often used as follows:

1. “I don’t like her, she speaks in proudy way”
2. “This person is not much cultured and very proudy”

The word is often used when referring to individuals who have left Darjeeling and have returned dressing and speaking differently from before they left. It may also be used for a young woman who wears only westernized clothing and not the kurtā, or tunic, worn by many adult women in Darjeeling town and most of the surrounding rural area. The term can also be used about those who refuse to use their ‘own’ language, particularly among friends and family of the same ethnic

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30 I italicize *proudy* in this chapter because, in the ethnographic context, it was not highlighted as an English word (as will become clear in the section below).

31 I will elaborate on the findings of the other qualities in future publications.

32 These examples are taken directly from answers to question 16 of the recording page: “Would you like this person?” All answers here were originally in English and were in no way modified from the original.
group. This term would be used, for example, for native Nepali speakers who use primarily English with their Nepali-speaking friends. Proudly may also be used for members of other ethnic groups. While conducting initial research about language choice and code-switching in the Darjeeling tourist industry, I heard the term used to describe Bengalis and other visitors to the area who treated Indians of Nepali descent as low on the social and economic hierarchy. From the ethnographic evidence it is clear that this is, therefore, not a positive quality.

So what does the matched-guise technique tell us with regard to the language ideologies about the quality proudly? When analyzing results from the entire survey population [n=625] as shown in Figure 6, none of the speakers’ scores were very high on the 0 to 4 scale. Proudly is only associated with the Nepali language two times and both with Speaker A. In every other case, the language with the higher score was Bengali, Hindi, or English. These languages, in other words, were nearly always ranked as more proudly than when the same speaker spoke Nepali. It is interesting to note that when compared to speakers of other languages, Bengali speakers were always ranked more proudly. This directly supports my ethnographic findings; individuals speaking Nepali would rarely be accused of being proudly regardless of their ethnicity; an exception could be, for example, if a native Bengali speaker used the Nepali language, as was the case for speaker A, she could be labeled as proudly because of her Bengali accent. As I detailed in the introduction to this dissertation—in the vignette with the Bengali teacher in the Nepali school who “explained” to the Nepali teachers and I why Darjeeling was 100 years behind the rest of the state—the economic, social, and political differences between Nepali-speakers and Bengali-speakers would strongly contribute to the labeling of a Bengali-speaker as proudly.33 Within the tourist industry, where young Nepali are in daily contact with Bengali-speakers from West Bengal, Bengalis were often described as “insensitive,”

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33 This was particularly true of Bengali-speaking tourists from urban West Bengal.
“dominating,” *kathtor* [कठोर], meaning “hard-hearted,” “cruel,” “harsh,” or “unfeeling,” and regularly “underestimating [the] Nepali people.”

Depending on the context, however, a Bengali who was speaking Nepali could also be viewed as not *proudly* specifically because they were speaking Nepali rather than Bengali. However, this case would depend on the social relationship between the speaker and hearer. A close social relationship between the two could cause the social relationship and closeness to be privileged over the general, overt ideologies about accent. Since the speaker is unknown to the respondents in this test, is it not surprising that accent supersedes context.

In figure 6, scores for comparisons between each speaker’s recordings are presented. To arrive at the numbers, I took the mean of the scores (based on *t*-test results) for each speaker’s recording in a particular language and then compared the mean of each speaker’s recording in each language with the others. Speaker A’s recordings in four languages (Nepali, English, Hindi, and Bengali) has six comparisons: Nepali-English, Nepali-Hindi, Nepali-Bengali, English-Hindi, English-Bengali, Hindi-Bengali. Speaker B recorded in three languages (Nepali, English, and Hindi) and has three comparisons: Nepali-English, Nepali-Hindi, and English-Hindi. Speaker C also recorded in three languages (Nepali, Hindi, and Bengali) and has three comparisons: Nepali-Hindi, Nepali-Bengali, and Hindi-Bengali. Speaker D recorded in two languages (English and Hindi) and, therefore, has only one comparison: English-Hindi. Therefore, figure 6 shows 13 total comparisons for the 12 recorded languages.

To make reading the chart easier to read, I marked the higher score in bold.

---

34 This man runs a store in Chowrasta and made an interesting class distinction between ‘kinds’ of Bengali people. He believed that people from Calcutta are “ok” but as you get away from the city, the people get worse and are “undisciplined.” As our conversation progressed, it became clear that he liked rich urban Bengalis but had very clear prejudices against more rural people. Another man, who ran a shop along the same road, agreed with this assertion that Bengalis are “hard-hearted” to Nepalis but, he said, “they are very ruthless even within their own community.” I suspect that we may be seeing cultural differences in play within the economic, political, and social landscape of West Bengal as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Statistical Significance</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>Moderately significant</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>Moderately significant</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A Bengali 1.43</td>
<td>Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>0.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A Bengali 1.43</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>Highly significant</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A Bengali 1.43</td>
<td>Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>Highly significant</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>B English 1.55</td>
<td>Nepali 1.13</td>
<td>Highly significant</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>B Hindi 1.46</td>
<td>Nepali 1.13</td>
<td>Highly significant</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>B English 1.55</td>
<td>Hindi 1.46</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>C Hindi 1.30</td>
<td>Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>0.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>C Bengali 1.44</td>
<td>Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>C Bengali 1.44</td>
<td>Hindi 1.30</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>D English 1.61</td>
<td>Hindi 1.37</td>
<td>Highly significant</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6: Score comparison for whole sample [n=625] on 0 to 4 scale.**

From these comparisons, a few points emerge. As I stated before, none of the women were ranked high on the scale for *proudly*; the highest, Speaker D’s recording in English (in line 13), was 1.61 out of 4. Second, the results from the ranking of these recordings provided statistically significant results for all but three occasions: 1) the comparison of speaker A’s recordings in English and Hindi, 2) the comparison of speaker B’s recordings of English and Hindi, and 3) the comparison of speaker C’s recordings of Nepali and Bengali.

For the whole sample population (n=625), recordings in Nepali were most often ranked as less *proudly* than other languages (see comparisons 3, 7, 8, 10, 11 in figure 6); recordings were ranked more *proudly* only two times in comparison to other languages (see comparisons 1 and 2). Bengali recordings, however, were always ranked more *proudly* (see comparisons 3, 5, 6, 11, and 12 in figure 6). I would have, given the ethnographic evidence, expected both of these results; speaker A is a native Bengali speaker, and it is possible that her Bengali accent leads respondents to believe that she would behave as Nepalis expect tourists to behave.

The results for English were more mixed, but still illuminating. To make this clearer, I
have reproduced only those comparisons between English and other languages from figure 6 in figure 7. Recordings in English were ranked more *proudy* in three cases (see comparisons 1, 2, and 3 in figure 7) but less *proudy* in three cases (see comparisons 4, 5, and 6 in figure 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less <em>proudy</em></th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. English more</td>
<td>English 1.55</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. English more</td>
<td>English 1.55</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. English more</td>
<td>English 1.61</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. English less</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. English less</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. English less</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7: Comparisons for recordings in English (more/less *proudy*; n=625).**

I suspect these results were more mixed than previous comparisons for a few reasons. All instances when recordings in English were ranked as less *proudy* were results for speaker A, a native Bengali speaker with less education than the other women. Although she does speak the four target languages daily, it is possible that since she learned Nepali, English, and Hindi in her daily life, rather than in a school, we are seeing the influence of language ideologies about *pakkā* or ‘proper’/‘dictionary’ English. However, there are a few other possible explanations. In comparison 4 of figure 7 (Nepali and English), we have a native Bengali speaker recording in Nepali and English; it is very possible that she was ranked as more *proudy* due to her Bengali accent in English. This accent would have been ideologically highlighted while she spoke Nepali but less so when she spoke English. Therefore, the ranking of her recording in English as less *proudy*, given the ethnographic context, is less surprising. This could also account for the ranking of her recording in English as less *proudy* than her recording in Bengali (see comparison 6, figure 7). In this case, she is a native speaker of Bengali speaking Bengali; it is possible, since the respondents did not have a personal relationship with her, that they assumed she was a Bengali-speaking tourist. The final case where the recording in English was ranked less *proudy*
than another language, in this case Hindi, the difference in the scores is miniscule, and the p-value for the comparison is .640, meaning that there is a 64% chance that these results were arrived at by chance (see comparison 5 in figure 7). Finally, it is also possible that since these comparisons include self-reported native speakers of other languages—including English—that these results are due to various community’s language ideologies interacting.

For the recordings in Hindi, results were also more mixed, but in general are mixed in ways expected given the ethnographic context. Recordings in Hindi were ranked as more proudy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score 1</th>
<th>Language + Score 2</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hindi more</td>
<td>Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>English 1.14</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hindi more</td>
<td>Hindi 1.46</td>
<td>Nepali 1.13</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>Nepali 1.26</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi 1.17</td>
<td>Bengali 1.43</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi 1.46</td>
<td>English 1.55</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi 1.30</td>
<td>Bengali 1.44</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi 1.37</td>
<td>English 1.61</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: Comparisons for recordings in Hindi (more/less proudy; n=625).

than other languages in only three cases (see comparisons 1-3 in figure 8). Two of these cases, 1 and 3, show no statistical significance and, in both cases, had a greater than 50% probability that the readings were the result of chance. For comparison 1 (figure 8), I would have expected Hindi, in this case, to be considered less proudy than English – but the difference in the scores turned out to be only .03. Comparisons 2 and 3, on the other hand, are exactly what I would have expected based on local language ideologies among Nepali-speakers. The comparisons in which Hindi was ranked as less proudy than the other languages also followed community language ideologies. In only one case (comparison 4 of figure 8) was Hindi ranked less proudy than Nepali; this recording, if you will remember, was performed by a native Bengali speaker with a good grasp of Hindi—meaning she is doubly marked as an outsider. The other comparisons (5-8 of figure 8) were instances when Hindi was being compared to either English or Bengali. In the
ethnographic context in Darjeeling, use of both English and/or Bengali can be indicative of *proudly* behavior.

In order to grasp a clearer picture of the results from the Nepali-speaking community in Darjeeling, I further subdivided the respondents along the lines of self-reported native languages. Within the subgroup of only Nepali as their ‘mother tongue’ \([n=396]\),\(^{35}\) we find the following results (the higher score is in bold):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Statistical Sig.</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 A</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 A</td>
<td>Hindi 1.21</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 A</td>
<td>Bengali 1.40</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 A</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Hindi 1.21</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 A</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Bengali 1.40</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 A</td>
<td>Bengali 1.40</td>
<td>Hindi 1.21</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 B</td>
<td>English 1.45</td>
<td>Nepali 1.08</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 B</td>
<td>Hindi 1.43</td>
<td>Nepali 1.08</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 B</td>
<td>English 1.45</td>
<td>Hindi 1.43</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>0.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 C</td>
<td>Hindi 1.28</td>
<td>Nepali 1.20</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 C</td>
<td>Bengali 1.45</td>
<td>Nepali 1.20</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 C</td>
<td>Bengali 1.45</td>
<td>Hindi 1.28</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 D</td>
<td>English 1.57</td>
<td>Hindi 1.37</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: *Proudly* score comparison for L1 Nepali only \([n=396]\) on 0 to 4 scale.

While the results for the whole sample were interesting, the results emerging from the Nepali respondents is quite striking; Nepali is never ranked as more *proudly* than other languages and English is always ranked more *proudly* than other languages for those who self-reported their first language as Nepali only. This can be seen more clearly when each language is presented individually. When we look at scores for Nepali recordings only, it is clear that Nepali-speakers never ranked recordings in Nepali as sounding more *proudly*:

\(^{35}\) Other groupings were those individuals who reported Nepali as well as other languages as their ‘mother language’ \([n=70]\), and those who reported no Nepali as their native language \([n=134]\).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepali more</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>Moderately sig. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>Hindi 1.21</td>
<td>.863</td>
<td>Not sig. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>Bengali 1.40</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>Significant A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.08</td>
<td>English 1.45</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig. B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.08</td>
<td>Hindi 1.43</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Significant B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.20</td>
<td>Hindi 1.28</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>Not sig. C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.20</td>
<td>Bengali 1.45</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>Significant C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10: Comparisons for recordings in Nepali (more/less proudy; L1 Nepali only, n=396).**

Based on the ethnographic evidence, I would have expected Nepali to be considered (in most cases) less proudy except in the case of the native Bengali speaker; she, I thought, would be considered proudy because of her Bengali accent and because the respondents did not have a social relationship with her. However, it is clear that individuals speaking in Nepali, regardless of their native language or accent, are never considered more proudy when compared to speakers of other languages.

On the other extreme, we see that recordings in English are always ranked more proudy than all other languages; this is regardless of native language or accent of the speaker:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English more</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Nepali 1.19</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>Moderately sig. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. English more</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Hindi 1.21</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>Moderately sig. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. English more</td>
<td>English 1.90</td>
<td>Bengali 1.40</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig. A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. English more</td>
<td>English 1.45</td>
<td>Nepali 1.08</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig. B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. English more</td>
<td>English 1.45</td>
<td>Hindi 1.45</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>Not sig. B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. English more</td>
<td>English 1.57</td>
<td>Hindi 1.37</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>Moderately sig. D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11: Comparisons for recordings in English (more/less proudy; L1 Nepali only, n=396).**

Based on the ethnographic evidence regarding use and attitudes toward English, I would have expected many, but not all the respondents to rank recordings in English as more proudy.
This is, for me, the most exciting result from this matched-guise test, in part because it is vastly different from—but not contradictory to—the ethnographic data.

In interviews, conversations, and observations around Darjeeling, metalinguistic commentary about English was common; how important it was for education and employment, pride that so many Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling were skilled in the language, and that, for many young people, they were starting even to “dream in English.” In part, positive attitudes toward English were represented as a pragmatic choice because the failure by the government to support the Nepali language. It is important to remember that, in 2007, local residents had been fighting for the right to speak and use their language in official ways in Darjeeling for over 50 years. Time and time again, different official proclamations were made declaring that the language was to be used in the hills; the 1961 West Bengal Official Language Act made the language the official language of the three hill-subdivisions. In 1988, the founding of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council was supposed to allow Nepalis to administer their own affairs. And in 1992, the Nepali language was added to the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. As far as many people which whom I spoke were concerned, all three of these official acts failed the Nepali people. Therefore, instead of hoping that their government—local, state, or national—would help them succeed in life, they turned to linguistic skills. In these cases, the focus was often on leaving Darjeeling; however, there were areas within the community in which English language skills were required. One young man who worked at a permanent tourist shop on Chowrasta told me that he would “be fired [if I don’t speak English] because English is

36 During a conversation about the use of Nepali and English, one young woman told me that, in spite of what people say, most young people in India use English much more than their parents and “powerful people” would hope. “Even in Shah Rukh Khan’s Kaun Banega Crorepati [Indian version of ‘Who Wants to be a Millionaire’],” she exclaimed, “the questions are in Hindi, but the young people answer in English!” As far as I could see when I watched the show, the questions were in English as well and some people, when calling a friend on the show, would translate it into Hindi. However, although I am a fan of Shah Rukh Khan, I have only seen a handful of episodes and so cannot speak with any certainty.
required.” In a survey of these 36 shops and dokāns [दोकान्, or informal stall/booth] on the same street, 31 of 38 workers self-reported (and were observed) speaking English. Within the formal shops—which most often cater to bideshi and rich deshi tourists—everyone was observed and self-reported that they spoke English but that some did not speak Nepali. On the other hand, all individuals working in the dokāns [informal shops] reported that they could (and were observed) speaking Nepali, although 7 of the 17 working in these shops reported not speaking English.

While English was often described as a language that brought success, positive attitudes toward the language were not universal; older individuals explicitly reported their displeasure with the younger generation’s use of English as well as their concern that Nepali was being “infected” by the corrupting influence of English; as one parent noted, although English is an international language and his children use “maximum” English, he speaks to them in Nepali at home because they need to know how to speak it properly from an older speaker since languages like English are “infiltrating Nepali like a slow poison.” While older residents were less positive, I met no one in my time in Darjeeling who would not send their children to an English language school if they had the money to do so. One parent argued that while he “loved” his language, he knows that his children must compete on a “national level” with all other Indians; this means

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37 In the 36 stores and dokāns [stalls], the full distribution of languages spoken was: Nepali (36 of 38), Hindi (33 of 38), English (31 of 38), Bengali (28 of 38), Tibetan (3 of 38), Urdu (3 of 38), Kashmiri (2 of 38), Punjabi (2 of 38), Newari (2 of 38), Bhojpuri (2 of 38), Tamang (1 of 38), Hariyani (1 of 38), Bihari (1 of 38), and Gujarati (1 of 38). To see the distribution of languages spoken by individuals, see Appendix S
38 Within the formal shops, there were only two women working out of the 19 shops I surveyed; there were at least five women running the informal dokāns [stalls].
39 In this case, the problem was not about the English language; rather, it was about the mixing of languages.
40 I realize this, in many cases, was a pragmatic rather than affective choice. This may also be a reflection of what many people believe are terrible education standards in Nepali language schools in the area; these same individuals blamed this on the West Bengal government for appointing teachers to the Nepali language schools who did not, themselves, speak Nepali. Time and time again, I heard stories about exams in Nepali that were “grammatically incoherent” in Nepali but, when compared with Bengali, were clearly direct translations from Bengali to Nepali with no regard for the meaning of the translation. I was told that local writers and parents wrote articles to newspapers asking the government to respond, but to no avail.
that, since “Nepali isn’t spoken outside the region, and there aren’t many jobs here,” these pressures are “crushing our language.”

In general, individuals from Darjeeling town\textsuperscript{41} presented very positive evaluations of English regardless of their ability to speak the language;\textsuperscript{42} however, there were hints toward a more complicated linguistic landscape within these evaluations. Individuals did note that expressing overt preferences for English over Nepali could signify a disassociation with one’s people; this was most often evident in discussing the shift from an Indian English accent, lexicon, etc., to other English accents that must be “put on” while working in call centers. This was described by one woman as “putting on a false identity” which would lead to an “identity crisis.”\textsuperscript{43}

It is clear from this data that while people may consciously and pragmatically turn to English for certain situations, there remain attitudes—less conscious, in some cases—that highlight speakers of English as most likely to be \textit{proud}. But something else began to emerge from the data as well; a clear hierarchy of languages in terms of their \textit{proudy}ness. In the case of Hindi, in figure 12, recordings in Hindi are ranked as 1) only more \textit{proudy} than Nepali in three of three comparisons, and 2) always less \textit{proudy} than English and Bengali in five of five comparisons:

\textsuperscript{41} The bulk of my research was conducted within the urban area of Darjeeling and I am not claiming that my observations and conclusions of language ideologies and practices apply outside this area. In fact, it was clear during my visits to more rural areas (i.e. tea plantations), that significantly more Nepali, and less English, was spoken in these areas. In the future, I hope to conduct a follow-up of this matched-guise test in addition to ethnographic research in these areas.

\textsuperscript{42} I had only one interview where someone under 20 bemoaned the widespread use of English. She was introduced to me by a former Language Committee member as someone who was still “fighting” for Nepali language. We talked over momos and tea one afternoon in the fall and she detailed what she wanted to do at her school to encourage young people to remember their language. It is interesting to note, however, that the majority of our conversation took place in English. On the other extreme, I had another interview with a man in his 50s or 60s who was angry at the way people approached learning English. “People,” he said, are only using English for “survival…but it should be used beyond that.”

\textsuperscript{43} Associations with Indian English were often represented as a more positive choice than learning American or British English. Local writers often lauded Indian English literature as written in English with the “feeling” of Nepali, Hindi, Bengali, or whatever Indian language the author spoke as their mother tongue.
Of these results, I am not surprised to see that there are three statistically insignificant comparisons (comparison 1, Hindi-Nepali; comparison 2, Hindi-Nepali; and 6, Hindi-English); none of the women speaking were native speakers of Hindi although speaker B was often mistaken for one. This may explain why her recording (comparison 2) were highly statistically significant. I am surprised, however, that the comparisons present such a stark contrast and that recordings in Hindi were ranked less *proudly* than only Nepali. This may reflect the groups in Darjeeling who speak Hindi; many of the merchants in the market who bring their produce up from the plains speak Hindi. However, my research focused on Bengali, Nepali, and English and so I was not explicitly gathering data on local language ideologies about Hindi.

The results for Bengali demonstrate that, within the hierarchy of languages, recordings in Bengali were ranked more *proudly* than Nepali and Hindi and only less *proudly* than English (see figure 13). All the results were statistically significant and were what I would have expected from the ethnographic data:
Figure 13: Comparisons for recordings in Bengali (more/less *proud*; L1 Nepali only, n=396).

Based on these results, there is a clear linguistic hierarchy of languages that emerges from the results for *proud*; individuals speaking in Nepali are least *proud*, followed by Hindi, then Bengali, and finally, English.

![Linguistic Hierarchy of proud](image)

Figure 14: Linguistic Hierarchy of *proud*, L1 Nepali only, n=396.

Within the group who self-reported their L1 as Nepali only, recordings in Nepali were ranked least *proud* in 7 of 7 comparisons. Recordings in Hindi were ranked more *proud* than Nepali in 3 of 3 comparisons and less *proud* than Bengali and English in 5 of 5 comparisons. Recordings in Bengali were ranked more *proud* than Hindi and Nepali in 4 of 4 comparisons and less than in English in 1 of 1 comparison. Finally, recordings in English were ranked more proud than all other languages in 6 of 6 comparisons, and less *proud* than no languages.
While results for self-reported L1 Nepali language speakers provided compelling evidence, it is important to look at other groups’ results for the same matched-guise test. For those respondents who marked their L1 (“mother tongue”) as Nepali in addition to other languages, the most common combinations of languages for the 69 individuals are reproduced in figure 15. These languages are not surprising: Nepali, Bengali, Hindi, and English are the most common languages in Darjeeling (and why they were the languages included in the matched-guise test). Bhutia is a language spoken by those Indians of Nepali descent whose ancestors migrated from Tibet to Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-reported L1 languages</th>
<th>Number out of 69 individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, Hindi</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, Bengali, Hindi</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, Hindi, English</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, Bengali, Hindi, English</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, English</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali, Bhutia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15: Breakdown of self-reported L1 for those who reported L1 as Nepali plus other.

Of the 69 individuals, 61 self-reported their ethnicity as Nepali; this includes all ethnic distinctions within this category, i.e. Rai, Tamang, Chhetri, Thapa, Gorkha, Gurung, Bhutia, etc. The eight who self-identified as speaking Nepali as one of their mother languages but did not mark a Nepali ethnicity includes the following individuals (figure 16):

**Figure 16: Ethnically non-Nepali Nepali language speakers included in L1 Nepali plus other languages.**

For this group, the results were much more mixed than for those who self-identified as having Nepali only as their ‘mother tongue.’ Of these seven comparisons for Nepali, only two are statistically significant (comparison 4, Nepali-Bengali; comparison 7, Nepali-Bengali) and both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nepali more</td>
<td>Nepali 1.21</td>
<td>English 1.17</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nepali more</td>
<td>Nepali 1.21</td>
<td>Hindi 1.12</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.21</td>
<td>Bengali 1.32</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 1.22</td>
<td>Hindi 1.44</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 0.97</td>
<td>Hindi 1.10</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nepali less</td>
<td>Nepali 0.97</td>
<td>Bengali 1.64</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17: Comparisons for recordings in Nepali (more/less proudy; L1 Nepali + others, n=69).**

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45 A term for those formerly known as “untouchables.”
46 Scheduled tribe from the Northeastern part of India.
47 Spoken by Oraon people in many states throughout India, particularly the central and eastern states.
48 Unclear, but could mean ‘Sadri,’ a language related to Oriya and Bengali and spoken throughout Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and Assam in India.
49 Scheduled tribe in Assam.
marked Nepali as less *proud* than Bengali. The two comparisons in which the recording in Nepali was ranked more *proud* than another language (comparison 1, Nepali-English; comparison 2, Nepali-Hindi) were both said by speaker A, the sole native Bengali speaker. As was the case earlier, it is possible that her Bengali accent was highlighted by the respondents. Otherwise, I would have expected the recordings of Nepali to be ranked as less *proud* as was the case with the L1 Nepali only [n=396] group.

In comparisons for recordings in English, we again see only two of any statistical significance (comparison 2, English-Nepali; comparison 6, English-Bengali). As in previous rankings, I expected recordings in English to be ranked as more *proud* than other languages. In this case, the two comparisons in which the recording in English was ranked less *proud* were comparison 5 (English-Nepali) and comparison 6 (English-Bengali); both were recorded by speaker A (native Bengali speaker). I suspect her accent led to the results for English and Nepali, but as will be seen in the next results, there could be other factors at play.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less <em>proud</em></th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. English more</td>
<td>English 1.17</td>
<td>Hindi 1.12</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. English more</td>
<td>English 1.71</td>
<td>Nepali 1.22</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>Moderately sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. English more</td>
<td>English 1.71</td>
<td>Hindi 1.44</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. English more</td>
<td>English 1.52</td>
<td>Hindi 1.26</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. English less</td>
<td>English 1.17</td>
<td>Nepali 1.21</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. English less</td>
<td>English 1.17</td>
<td>Bengali 1.32</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 18: Comparisons for recordings in English (more/less proud; L1 Nepali + others, n=69).*

The results for Hindi were even less statistically significant than English and Nepali; only one comparison (7, Hindi-Bengali) was significant:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hindi more</td>
<td>Hindi1.44</td>
<td>Nepali1.22</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hindi more</td>
<td>Hindi1.10</td>
<td>Nepali0.97</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.12</td>
<td>Nepali1.21</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.12</td>
<td>English1.17</td>
<td>.748</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.12</td>
<td>Bengali1.32</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.44</td>
<td>English1.71</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.10</td>
<td>Bengali1.64</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hindi less</td>
<td>Hindi1.26</td>
<td>English1.52</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: Comparisons for recordings in Hindi (more/less proudy; L1 Nepali + others, n=69).

Within these comparisons, Hindi is always less proudy than Bengali and English and more proudy for two of three comparisons with Nepali. However, these results are not statistically significant and, given my ethnographic research did not consist of in-depth analysis of Hindi, I am unable to further contextualize these results. The scores for Bengali, on the other hand, do match with the results for the results for L1 Nepali only:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More/Less proudy</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>Language + Score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Statistical sig.</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bengali more</td>
<td>Bengali1.32</td>
<td>Nepali1.21</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bengali more</td>
<td>Bengali1.32</td>
<td>English1.17</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bengali more</td>
<td>Bengali1.32</td>
<td>Hindi1.12</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>Not sig.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bengali more</td>
<td>Bengali1.64</td>
<td>Nepali0.97</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bengali more</td>
<td>Bengali1.64</td>
<td>Hindi1.10</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Highly sig.</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Bengali less</td>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
<td><strong>none</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Comparisons for recordings in Bengali (more/less proudy; L1 Nepali + others, n=69).

In both groups—L1 Nepali only and L1 Nepali + others—recordings in Bengali always ranked more proudy than all other recordings. The results for L1 Nepali + other languages show that there are some differences in language ideologies between those who self-reported the Nepali language as their ‘mother tongue’ and those who include other languages. This could be an area for future research in the area; exploring, in detail, how individuals explicitly and implicitly define and understand ‘mother tongue’ and how this could affect language ideologies. I anticipate, based on the ethnographic research and written results for the matched-guise test and
linguistic survey, that the multilingual abilities of parents (and the language ideologies they hold about those languages) would have an effect on children’s attitudes toward speakers of the languages they speak or understand. I would also anticipate that students who regularly speak languages other than Nepali and English in their daily lives would be in regular contact with non-Nepalis; in some cases, the social relationships individuals have counteract certain social and linguistic stereotypes that more monolingual or bilingual speakers might have. However, those individuals who regularly have negative interactions with non-Nepalis in Darjeeling—young people attempting to get birth certificates and travel documents from non-Nepali government officials, for example—could further entrench an individual’s language ideologies. I hope to conduct research in these areas in the future.

5.4 Conclusion and implications

These findings reflect the importance of combining ethnographic methods with the matched-guise technique. Without the matched-guise results, I could have arrived at vastly different conclusions regarding language ideologies about Nepali and English. The ethnographic results pointed to more explicitly positive, and fewer negative, associations with English. From the ethnographic data, it was clear that the use of English was represented by Nepalis, particularly young Nepalis, as a positive and empowering linguistic choice that allowed them to navigate the precarious social terrain more successfully than using Nepali along would allow. This is in spite of the long and incredibly contentious history of the English language in South Asia (see chapter 1). English, for these young people, was associated with a class of educated, relatively elite individuals rather than any particular ethnic, regional, or religious group and so it

50 This process, for one individual I knew, took nearly two years, dozens of trips to government offices in Darjeeling and Calcutta, and discrimination and ill treatment of the individual by government officials. She was, on a number of instances, told that “her people” were foreigners and, therefore, she needed to go to the Nepal government to get her birth certificate and visas.
could be used without overt associations to any social group in conversation. Since Nepalis have been typically slotted relatively low in the social and caste hierarchies and represented as only suitable for marginal positions within the greater nation-state such as guards, housemaids, and sex workers, using the Nepali language often brings immediate negative responses from interlocutors. Whether they are interacting with tourists from the plains in Darjeeling or are living and working in cities throughout India, Nepalis use English to posit a situation in which their superior use of the English language counteracts supposed social deficiencies that are often used as justification for what Nepalis view as discriminatory practices and structures.

Beliefs about the use of English, reported by college students and younger adults, were in general more explicitly positive than those of older adults. These young people did not see English as corrupting the Nepali language or, rather, their concerns with social acceptance, success in education, and the ability to find employment superseded their concerns about languages. English, although problematic and politically contentious, appears to be the language of those who want to leave Darjeeling or, at least improve their standing in life. The quality of proudly is directly associated with such persons.

While the use of English in India is contentious in many political and academic circles, it is clear that it plays an important role in the lives of those who feel, and are represented by others to be, at a linguistic, social, or economic disadvantage. While some politicians and academics, particularly those from North India, associate English with India’s colonial past, the language is not always ‘foreign’ or associated with England. As we saw in chapter four, English ‘means’ different things to different groups; for some, as MP Khuller argued, “English is not identified with any nationality.” For many Indians of Nepali descent, their use of English helps them transcend what they see as a long history of double-talk and broken promises by state and

51 8 May 1992, Lok Sabha debates.
national governments. They must, on a daily basis, negotiate as individuals within this history and many have turned to English to help them perform those negotiations.

As the matched-guise results demonstrate, however, the meanings associated with use of Nepali and English is not without complexity and contradictions. Obviously, the sole use of a matched-guise test would have provided few of the complex cultural understandings of qualities like *proud*, or the roles that the languages play in the actual practice of daily life. In short, the results of the matched-guise test are illuminating, but relying on them as the primary source of data would have been partial at best when considered alongside the ethnographic research and historical data. With the combination of methods, such language ideologies expressed in the test may be connected to macro-level trends, including the effects of the political movement to add Nepali to the constitution as well as state and national shifts in economic opportunities.

It is also clear that the matched-guise technique provides a fruitful method for scholars of language ideologies in large part because it is a unique way to gather data about the more unconscious levels of language ideologies. Ethnographic and archival data can provide the more explicit and conscious levels, as well as trace the historiography of such ideologies. Yet without the more unconscious levels, such analyses and the theorizing based on them would be partial. On the other hand, research that only takes its data from matched-guise tests would be lacking in the broader social meanings. It is only when utilizing the combination of all forms—when evidence from the matched-guise technique complements and deepens the ethnographic and historical material, and vice versa—that we can begin to understand the complex linguistic landscape of a place like Darjeeling.
Chapter 6  “Our Future is Uncertain”

6.1 Same story, new players

At the end of my fieldwork in 2007, the political situation became more unstable in Darjeeling; a new political party, the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJMM), was founded at the beginning of October 2007 by Bimal Gurung. Gurung, a former leader within the Darjeeling branch of the GNLF, left (or was removed from, depending on who tells the story) the GNLF in early October 2007 for ‘anti-party activities,’ including overt criticisms of Ghisingh.52 He quickly formed the GJMM and he and his party began calling publically for Ghisingh’s removal. The situation became more precarious as the days went on; strikes became more frequent and clashes between the GNLF and GJMM meant that daily life was almost entirely disrupted. By mid-November, dueling strikes began.53 The opposition parties (including the GJMM) called for a strike for four days, only to have the GNLF call a strike in protest. Then, the opposition parties revoked their strike and spoke publically, and loudly, about the unfairness of the GNLF strike. On 22 November, the situation became so confusing that few knew what to do. A woman I knew who sold fried food near the main tourist area in town, approximately 10 minutes from my home, went to her stall to work. She believed, as many of us did, that the strikes were off. First, the GJMM supporters came by her stall to ‘discuss’ with her about staying open. She was told that it was a ‘very, very good idea’ that she stay open that day. Minutes later, GNLF supporters came by to ‘discuss’ with her about closing her shop. Their discussion, however, included prominent

52 An article on DarjeelingTimes.com, published on 5 October 2007, reported Gurung’s departure and published statements by Deepak Gurung, then Darjeeling Branch Committee president of the GNLF about Bimal Gurung and his relationship with the GNLF. The same article included details of simultaneous calls for a new revolution for Gorkhaland by Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League (ABGL); the ABGL leader fell out with Gurung by 2010 and was murdered in the middle of Darjeeling town on 21 May 2010 by GJMM-sponsored killers.

53 This was in the lead-up to a Parliamentary vote on the Sixth Schedule status of the Darjeeling hills that was to take place in December but was never voted on; such status would have created a “tribal” area in which local councils would essentially self-govern. This Schedule was originally framed for the development of so-called tribal areas in northeastern India.
displays of *khukuri*, the curved cutting blade traditionally carried by Gurkha soldiers, and so she quickly closed shop and went home.

It was also clear, after security forces began questioning people I knew about my research with particular emphasis on the documents I had collected, that I needed to leave Darjeeling sooner than expected. I had originally planned to stay until mid-December and then go to New Delhi for a few weeks to conduct interviews with former members of the language committee and to attempt to track down Inderjit Khuller. I quickly realized, however, that between the increasingly violent strikes, the attempted murder of a politician who lived next-door to my research assistant, and increased interest in my research by both GNLF and GJMM supporters that I needed to leave a few weeks early. Since my research assistant had also been a subject of interest, I asked her family if they would mind if she accompanied me to New Delhi. Her aunt lived there, and my research assistant had attended college in the area so she had family and friends she could visit. We also had interviews to conduct and she knew the city much better than I; more importantly, we could do all this while also staying out of sight and reach of the local party officials. In the end, we left Darjeeling by a back road, avoiding the town and ensuring that few saw us leave.

I was unsure then, as I am now, why I had been so free to conduct research for most of my time there; what changed? Had I talked to the wrong people? Had I not talked to the correct people? My uncertainty regarding the political implications of my work for the people with whom I worked and lived is the primary reason why—in spite of my interest in language and my belief that we, as anthropologists, must attend to the actual practices and language people use—I use so few direct quote and describe so few people.

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54 I was never entirely sure who was interested in what I had found. I had been repeatedly warned about the GNLF, but assumed that I had been careful. As soon as the political situation became more precarious, however, it was clear that there were many people who wanted to know more about what I had found.
As time passed, I began to believe that my research had been forgotten. Then, in the summer of 2008, I learned that people close to me had been pressured to join the GJMM and that my research assistant’s family agreed that she should leave Darjeeling. Since that time, the situation has been in flux. Madan Tamang, the leader of the Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League, was murdered mid-morning on a busy street of Darjeeling town on 21 May 2010, reportedly by GJMM-sponsored killers. In August 2010, reports surfaced that Ghisingh could be returning to Darjeeling after being run out by Gurung in June/July 2008 and that the central and state governments preferred dealing with Ghisingh (a known entity) rather than Gurung.

6.2 These people deprived of this country

In this dissertation, I have explored both the history of language ideologies held by Indians of Nepali descent and, through a matched guise test, attempted to understand the more unconscious levels of community language ideologies.

Chapter one and two outlined the foundations— theoretical, historical, and ethnographic— for understanding the landscape in which my work occurs. Chapter three explored the debates about nomenclature of the ‘Nepali’ language over the past two hundred years with special emphasis on the past 40 years. These disagreements appear, on the surface, to be purely about political maneuverings of the GNLF [Gorkha National Liberation Front] during the violent ethnonationalist Gorkhaland movement in the 1980s. However, the debates speak to much deeper divides about how history is defined, what it means to ‘be’ a Nepali, and language ideologies surrounding the language itself and its use. This history included the linguistic reorganization of states in India since the 1950s.

Building on chapter three, chapter four focused on the parliamentary debates regarding the inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule in the Lok Sabha [Lower House of the Indian
Parliament], especially on the disagreements between the Member of Parliament from Sikkim, Dil Kumari Bhandari, and the MP from Darjeeling, Inderjit Khuller. These debates were one site where local language ideologies in Darjeeling intersected with national level language politics of nation-building, language planning, security, and history. The community of Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling also expected benefits from their language’s recognition in the constitution. These benefits never materialized. The absence of changes, in fact, led the community to turn away both from the Indian government and the Nepali language as the vehicle of their belonging. Instead, parents turned to English-medium schools and pushed their children to learn English. This, they believed, would be the path to success and security since the government had failed them. This failure led many to believe that they could never succeed if they spoke Nepali since this language has always been tied to a group with little access to power in India.

Chapter five returned the lens to Darjeeling and the results of a linguistic survey and matched-guise test conducted in the fall of 2007 as a way to explore the effects of the ideological and discursive topics discussed in chapter four. Proudly, a quality most often used when referring to individuals who refuse to use their ‘own’ language, particularly among friends and family of the same ethnic group. Analysis of the matched-guise test results in conjunction with ethnographic research demonstrated that the use of English was represented by Nepalis, particularly young Nepalis, as a positive and empowering linguistic choice that allowed them to navigate the precarious social terrain more successfully than using Nepali along would allow while also being a factor in attributions of proudly.

6.3 Contributions

I am not attempting to make a simple causal argument between state politics and policies and language use and change in Darjeeling; instead, I have tried to isolate crucial threads in a
complex web of changes and ideologies. The tracings of these threads, through historical representations of the Nepali language and the political arguments utilizing those representations (see chapter three) to parliamentary debates about the nature of language and citizenship in India (chapter four), involve only part of the larger story of hope and despair within the Indian Nepali community. The continued efforts by Indians of Nepali descent to repeatedly engage the Indian government – their government – as a way to enter into the Indian mainstream is, in a way, a story of hope; hope of an inclusive society, hope that the most recent approach to engaging with the Indian government and other Indian people will lead to a level playing field. Yet, as scholars within Critical Race Theory have argued, the normative perspective is not understood as one viewpoint among many by those within the hegemonic perspective, in this case, majority language proponents, state, and national government officials. Instead, this hegemonic perspective is naturalized as the Truth (Grillo and Wildman 1995 [1992]; Taylor 1998). Grillo and Wildman tell of discussions of university curricula and the incorporation of multiple perspectives on history, literature, and scholarship. An audience member questioned the ability of the university to include such perspectives without disturbing the “canon.” The authors note the “presumption that the material the questioner saw as most relevant to his own life was central and ‘canonized,’ while all other readings were peripheral and, hence, dispensable” (1995 [1991]: 567). I contend that that the arguments about language, citizenship, and rights by Indians of Nepali descent have been dismissed in similar ways, as peripheral to the goals of the state of West Bengal and the national government of India. Just as CRT scholars argued that law was no longer the vehicle through which change could occur—because the law is embroiled within the structural and institutional racialized hegemony (Taylor 1998)\textsuperscript{55}—Indians of Nepali descent have also turned away from government and legal redress toward individualized social practices that

\textsuperscript{55} See also Bell 1980, 1992; Johnson 1988; Lawrence 1987; Spann 1995 [1990].
include education in English. Many of the people with whom I work believe they suffer from exclusion in any vision of the Indian state and therefore are not provided with infrastructure support—road repair, clean water, regular electricity, or access to education. Whether this is because of their association with a neighboring nation-state or their traditionally low position in the social hierarchy in India, Indians of Nepali descent are a counterexample to the Indian government’s claims of a multicultural, all-inclusive nation.

It is clear, in this dissertation, that the intersections between the top-down structures and the everyday lived experiences of those who have been excluded economically and politically are fruitful sites to explore how difference is produced and experienced (c.f. Bhabha 1990; Spivak 1987; Young 1990). I have turned largely to the concept of language ideologies to explain the ways individuals experience, understand, and negotiate social and linguistic fields within the dialectic between large-scale structures and individual practices (Blommaert and Verschueren 1992, 1998; Errington 1992; 1998; Kulick 1992, 1998; Woolard 1992 and 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). The concept of language ideologies has been particularly helpful in my quest to understand why the Indian Nepali community turned to language as a way to gain recognition for their citizenship; such a turn is not self evident and is a product of the particular social, linguistic, political, and social contexts in which they live. It is primarily through the lens of language ideologies that I connect the threads of these contexts because language ideologies, as a theoretical construct, can bridge micro level speech acts and interactions with their mid-and macro level contexts. Language ideologies also highlight the actual process through which individuals engage with and experience the world around them.

This dissertation also traces, over several centuries, language ideologies surrounding nomenclature and the ‘nature’ of language in Darjeeling (c.f. Blommaert 1999: 1). As
Blommaert asked,

What makes the difference between a successful language ideology—and one that becomes dominant—and other, less successful ones? What is the connection between language ideologies and broader political and ideological developments in a society? How did we arrive at our contemporary views and perspectives on language and our assessments of current linguistic situations?

In Darjeeling, one difference between a successful language ideology and the less successful ones are those which have, in the end, proven to be more helpful in the quest of Indians of Nepali descent to be recognized as full citizens of India. For example, positive valuations of English and associations of English use and the ability to more fully experience ones’ citizenship rights have been, long term, more successful than those language ideologies which linked English use to a colonial authority. These more ‘successful’ language ideologies are directly connected to political and economic changes in India—reorganization of states on the basis of language, ideological highlighting of economic migrants from Nepal, as well as ideological and discursive changes regarding citizenship and the role(s) language plays in them all.

It seems, however, that the increase in the use of English within the Indian Nepali community in Darjeeling has brought with it additional conflicts within the community and links up to broader arguments about the changing role of English in India (c.f. Annamalai 2001; Das Gupta 1993; Dua 1994; Rajan 1992; Sonntag 2000, 2003a; Spivak 1987). It is also clear that ideologies of English and so-called vernacular languages are intimately connected with ideologies of nation, citizenship, and the future of India (c.f. LaDousa 2005, 2007). As Sadana argues,

The very fact that political constituencies may be defined in terms of language makes language and literary production a measure of cultural and political authenticity. Hindi is not only the language of the home, the street, and popular culture (e.g. films, television serials, pulp and literary fiction, and poetry) but also the language of conversation and asides in the very spaces where English is most entrenched: government halls and university campuses. Knowing English fluently provides innumerable social and
economic advantages, but it always exists alongside Hindi or other bhasha languages” (Sadana 2007: 215).

In this dissertation, I hope to contribute to the broader literature on English in India as well as expand our understanding of minority language politics in India. In the case of Indians of Nepali descent, identity seems to be framed in terms of mobility and the transcending of racializing and racialized discourses of language (as a social category).

6.4 Future directions

These People Deprived of This Country is the first step in a broader research agenda about Indians of Nepali descent in Darjeeling. My future research will certainly expand on these findings and explore a few themes in more depth. First, I plan to expand on the gendered aspects of language ideologies and practices in Darjeeling. Although I have chosen to focus on other areas in this dissertation, the gendered language ideologies about nation and language use are also important (Briggs 1992b, 1998; Kulick 1992; 1998). During my dissertation research in 2005 and 2007, I focused primarily on politically active adults (mainly men) and college students (mainly female); my future research will expand to include older women and, as much as is possible, younger men.56

I will also shift focus to a further analysis of interactions in the tourist spaces. During an interview with a shop worker, for example, we discussed how local residents interacted with each other in these spaces. He noted that young people come into his store and pretend they are unable to speak Nepali, only English. He stated that they would “put on” an accent, as if they did not know Nepali. These practices are remarkably similar to those, I was told, that have been forced on Indians of Nepali descent outside Darjeeling; they are, in those spaces, less able to

56 This will be significantly easier to accomplish as I age; I had issues (sexual advances, among them) with younger men in large part because I was an unmarried woman who appeared to many to be younger than my actual age. Research with these young men will become less difficult, I assume, when I become an ‘auntie,’ or of their mothers’ generation.
speak Nepali not only for linguistic reasons (Nepali is not widely spoken outside Darjeeling) but also because they could not be heard speaking with a Nepali accent without experiencing serious discrimination. So, what is it about this multiethnic, multilingual tourist space that becomes a microcosm of national debates about citizenship, personhood, and class? As discussed in chapter five, the differences between Darjeeling Nepali and pakkā Nepali will complicate the category of ‘Nepali’ language; it will also be illuminating to explore the contrasts between where Nepali is spoken and where it is not, or cannot be, spoken. In Darjeeling, since Nepali speakers are in the majority, these choices will set up an interesting comparison with Indians of Nepali descent elsewhere. Outside Darjeeling, Nepali speakers are less likely to have the option to speak Nepali in public spaces since they are living in other majority language areas. Darjeeling, however, allows Nepali speakers to use their languages in ideologically significant ways. This will also open up research area outside Darjeeling: those experiences, ideologies, and practices of Nepalis living in, for example, New Delhi. Looking beyond Darjeeling would also provide a comparative perspective on the internal divisions within the Indian Nepali community.

I also hope to expand my research to include Indians of Nepali descent outside of Darjeeling—those experiences, ideologies, and practices of Nepalis living in, for example, New Delhi. This would allow me to explore how Nepalis, and their language use, fit into the Hindu nationalist vision of a Hindi nation (c.f. Bhatt 2001; Hancock 1995; Hansen 1999; Hastings 2003, 2008; LaDousa 2006). Many Nepalis are Hindu, yet seem to be linguistically and politically incompatible with the Hindu nationalist vision of India’s future. This would be an area of research for other anthropologists in India who study non-majority Hindu peoples to explore.

I would like to expand my own analysis of language use among Indians of Nepali descent in both Darjeeling and beyond, including a further exploration of language ideologies about
pakkā Nepali; what, precisely, makes certain forms of spoken and written Nepali ‘authentic’ and why is this sort of authenticity important within the spheres of language ideologies? What impact does context, the individual who is speaking/writing, or gender make? Further administration of my matched guise test in different locations—among Indians of Nepali descent in Calcutta or New Delhi as well as in Nepal—would also be productive. These internal, yet international, divisions regarding the Nepali spoken in Nepal and that spoken in different areas in India would be a very interesting area for future research by the linguistic and cultural anthropologists who work on language (c.f. Ahearn 2001; Turin 2004). There has been almost no research on the differences in terms of linguistic practice and language ideologies in the different communities of Indians of Nepali descent; an important topic for many within the Indian Nepali community. Although their fight for recognition by the Indian government and other Indian groups meant that they most often present a united, and homogeneous, front, the differences between groups in various states throughout India were agreed to be considerable. I was often told by Nepali speakers in Darjeeling that they can understand the Nepali language written by those living further east (i.e. Meghalaya), but that their spoken language was vastly different.

Another area of research I hope to explore is how individuals explicitly and implicitly define and understand the definition of ‘mother tongue’ and how this affects language ideologies. I anticipate, based on the ethnographic research and written results for the matched-guise test and linguistic survey, that the multilingual abilities of parents (and the language ideologies they hold about those languages) would have an effect on children’s attitudes toward speakers of the languages they speak or understand. I would also anticipate that students who regularly speak languages other than Nepali and English in their daily lives would be in regular contact with non-Nepalis; in some cases, the social relationships individuals have counteract certain social and
linguistic stereotypes that more monolingual or bilingual speakers might have. However, those individuals who regularly have negative interactions with non-Nepalis in Darjeeling—young people attempting to get birth certificates and travel documents from non-Nepali government officials, for example⁵⁷—could further entrench an individual’s language ideologies.

I would also like to explore the groups within West Bengal, like Bangla O Bangla Bhasa Banchao Committee (BOBBBC) in Siliguri (near Darjeeling), who are vocally and, in many cases, vitriolically anti-Nepali. These groups have existed for years throughout the state, but have gained momentum with Bimal Gurung’s new push for Gorkhaland. Groups like the BOBBBC⁵⁸ have raised many arguments against Indians of Nepali descent that were common throughout the past 50 years. An article, written by Dr. M. Majumdar, leader of the BOBBBC and posted on their website, includes points ranging from citizenship issues to those about the mistrust Indians of Nepali descent have for Bengalis. He argues, for example, that Indians of Nepali descent are really Nepal citizens who have “infiltrated” West Bengal in a “clear conspiracy to outnumber the local inhabitants by incessant clandestine infiltration.”⁵⁹ He also argues that leadership in Darjeeling is preaching “hatred towards the plains people which has now resulted in intense...

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⁵⁷ This process, for one individual I knew, took nearly two years, dozens of trips to government offices in Darjeeling and Calcutta, and discrimination and ill treatment of the individual by government officials. She was, on a number of instances, told that “her people” were foreigners and, therefore, she needed to go to the Nepal government to get her birth certificate and visas.

⁵⁸ This group argues, in particular, for the preservation of the Bengali language. Dr. S Mukherjee writes, on the BOBBBC website, that the “Indian Bengalis feel that we are on the brink of loosing [sic] our language. We feel insulted and threatened by the decision of our national government to put the interests of the majority Hindi community first, neglecting our right of self-identity, our cultural, social, and religious distinction, subjugating our language to a subordinate status, in Bengali speaking West Bengal itself” (Why Should We Fight To Preserve Our Mother Tongue, http://banglabanchao.org/whyfightforbengali.aspx, accessed 19 August 2010). I suspect endangered language status will not be forthcoming; Bengali is second only to Hindi in the number of speakers at, as of the 2001 census, 83.4 million speakers. These claims are part of a larger worldwide trend of utilizing discourses of language endangerment in multilingual contexts (c.f. Heller and Duchêne 2007).

⁵⁹ Dr. Majumdar argues that Ghisingh “increased the Nepali population in the hills by encouraging foreign Nepali infiltration from Nepal and giving shelter to…foreign Nepali refutes ousted from Bhutan, Assam, Megalaya, etc. He encouraged new Nepali dominated areas by occupying fallow lands, forest lands, not only in the hills but also in the plains where the Nepali population has since increased exponentially well beyond what would be expected by natural births” (http://banglabanchao.org/gorkhaland.aspx).
enmity and mutual distrust,” which, presumably, did not exist before. The group also raises the issue of ‘Greater Nepal’ (see chapter 4). I believe a view of the minority politics in West Bengal requires further investigation into such groups; how do claims by Indians of Nepali descent counteract what these groups believe is the true future of West Bengal? What do they think about the evidence contrary to their claims about citizenship of Indians of Nepali descent.

Finally, I will be more completely analyzing the documents produced by the Nepali Language Movement. I gathered approximately 20,000 document images ranging from letters written between Language Committee members from various branch offices, letters written by supporters and opponents to the main Committee office in Darjeeling, meeting minutes (including annual conferences held throughout India), transcripts of meetings with government officials, opinion books signed and commented in by participants of hunger strikes and other programs led by the Language Committee, newspaper articles and press releases, brochures, literary works, and publications designed to be sent to non-Nepali speakers. They also include a magazine, Hāmro Bhāṣa (Our Language), published by the Language Committee from 1972 until the Nepali language was recognized in 1992. This magazine included letters from Nepali speakers and supporters of the Nepali language, stores and poetry, editorials, political analysis, and announcements about Committee activities. These documents are crucial to understanding how the movement was understood at the time it was progressing and the way various groups within the Indian Nepali community interacted with each other. A closer analysis of these works will allow me to explore how language ideologies and approaches to the community’s quest for citizenship shifted over time as well as their thoughts on and reactions to certain key events in

60 The Nepali Language Committee had branches throughout North and Northeast India: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Delhi, Manipur, Megalaya, Nagaland, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, and throughout West Bengal.
the community’s history; the forcible removal of Indians of Nepali descent from their homes in Meghalaya in 1987 and the Gorkhaland movement in the mid-1980s in Darjeeling.

Each aspect of these future research directions is important to expand our understanding about minority politics in India, how language ideologies ‘work,’ and the ways discourses about security, borders, nationalism, and language connect in the production of social difference for minority groups in India.

6.5 An elegy for hope

In the end, what can the experiences of Indian Nepalis teach us about belonging and language in India? I am reminded of a conversation I had, at the end of the 2007 monsoon, with a friend during a performance of cultural dances in the Topiary Gardens at the top of the ridge. It was around four in the afternoon, and the rain had cleared. There were regular performances of “folk” dances of the various Nepali groups put on for the Indian tourists who visit Darjeeling during the heat of the summer. The Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council has sponsored dances here since October 2003 and they pay the dancers a small stipend, give them food, and housing. The dancers, however,

are not allowed to dance for other groups and can perform only for those events sanctioned by the DGHC.

The grounds on which the dances are performed were perfectly manicured; a large flat lawn surrounded by trees, lights, and benches with the perimeter as a path to walk around the entire garden. It is quite lovely and I am sure the view is breathtaking when not shrouded in the late monsoon mists. On the far end, away from the performance space, is a temple around a large status of Shiva. I was surprised to find a statue of Shiva in a space sponsored by Ghisingh and the GNLF; he had decided in the years just prior to my research that since Nepali people were
tribal, they should worship stones rather than the traditional figures used. Many people were having their photo taken near the statue but, I was told, Darjeeling residents consider this space to be too ‘new’ for it to be considered really holy. However, it was important to “stop by to say hello” while we were there because Ghisingh’s supporters were watching. As we walked, my friend and I talked about the state of Darjeeling, politics, and language. He likened Darjeeling to a rusting chair; “the foundation is there” but it is “dying” and falling apart because of lack of maintenance. The infighting between groups and politicians, he said, means that people are being “distracted” from the goal of improving the lives of regular Nepalis. Then, he leaned in and began speaking very quietly, and this is what he said: while politicians are focused on fighting about whether to call the language Nepali or Gorkhali, arguing if “we Nepali people” are

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61 The anti-Indian Nepali groups in West Bengal take this as a reason why Nepalis are not tribal: “The Nepalese inhabitants of...[Darjeeling] are traditionally idolators belonging to the ‘Shaiba’ Hindu community, despite their fraudulent claims of worshiping ‘Stone’ instead of the goddess Durga....The GNLF chief and previously DGHC chairman, Subhas[h] Ghisingh, tried to perpetuate the fraud by organising mock worship of Stones etc. He even went further and banned any form of idolatry in the hills and prohibited Durga puja [worship]” within Darjeeling (http://banglabanchao.org/gorkhaland.aspx).
Gorkhas or Nepalis, debating about who best represents the Nepali people, we, and our city, are rusting away. Regular people have limited access to water, education, and jobs while the politicians focus on our “identity.” Identity, he said, is important. But, then, “so is survival.”
## Appendix A
### Acronyms and Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABGL</td>
<td>Akhīl Bhāratyia Gorkha League</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABNBS</td>
<td>Akhīl Bhāratyia Nepāli Bhāsā Samītī</td>
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<td></td>
<td>अखिल भारतीय नेपाली भाषा समिति</td>
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<td></td>
<td>All India Nepali Language Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIGL</td>
<td>All India Gorkha League</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janta Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI (M)</td>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRM</td>
<td>Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGHC</td>
<td>Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GJMM</td>
<td>Gorkha Janmukhti Morcha</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNLF</td>
<td>Gorkha National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Gorkha Rashtriya Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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Appendix B
Memorandum of Settlement between GNLF and Central Government of India
25 July 1988
[Signed 23 August 1988]¹

The demands of the GNLF having been considered by the Government of India in a meeting between Shri Buta Singh, Union Home Minister and Shri Subash Ghising[h], President, GNLF at New Delhi on 25.7.1988, it is hereby agreed between Government of India and GNLF as below:

1. CITIZENSHIP ISSUE

   The question of citizenship of the Gorkhas will be clarified through the issue of a Gazette Notification by Government of India.

2. INDIAN GORKHA REGIMENT

   As regards raising a separate Indian Gorkha Regiment, the policy of the Government of India of not having any regiment raised on class composition was acknowledged. However, it was clarified that it is not obligatory for Indian Gorkhas to join only specified Gorkha Regiments and that they have the option to join the regiments of their choice. To this extent suitable instructions will be issues by the Army Headquarters.

3. INCLUSION OF GORKHA LANGUAGE IN EIGHTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION

   The Government of India is of the view that inclusion of more languages in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution would create repercussions and reactions. It is the endeavour of the Government to develop the cultural and literary heritage of all languages irrespective of their inclusion in the Eighth Schedule. This position was accepted.

4. The GNLF hereby agrees to withdraw the movement and all agitational activities in this regard.

¹ Reproduced from Moktan 2004: 155. It was signed in New Delhi on 23 August 1988.
Appendix C
Constitution of India (selections)

Part XVII
Official Language

Chapter I
LANGUAGE OF THE UNION

343. Official language of the Union.— (1) The official language of the union shall be Hindi in Devanagari script.

The form of numerals to be used for the official purposes of the Union shall be in the international form of Indian numerals.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before such commencement:

Provided that the Presidents may, during the said period, order authorize the use of the Hindi language in addition to the English language and of the Devanagari form of numerals in addition to the international form of Indian numerals for any of the official purposes of the Union.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, Parliament may by law provide for the use, after the said period of fifteen years, of—

(a) the English language, or

(b) the Devanagari form of numerals,

for such purposes as may be specified in the law.

344. Commission and Committee of Parliament on official language.—(1) The President shall, at the expiration of five years from the commencement of this Constitution and thereafter at the expiration of ten years from such commencement, by order constitute a Commission which shall consist of a Chairman and such other members representing the different languages specified in the Eighth Schedule as the President may appoint, and the order shall define the procedure to be followed by the Commission.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Commission to make recommendations to the President as to—

(a) the progressive use of the Hindi language for the official purposes of the Union;

(b) restrictions on the use of the English language for all or any of the official purposes of the Union;

(c) the language to be used for all or any of the purposes mentioned in article 348;

(d) the form of numerals to be used for any one or more specified purposes of the Union;

(e) any other matter referred to the Commission by the President as regards the official language of the Union and the language for communication between the Union and a State or between one State and another and their use.
(3) In making their recommendations under clause (2), the Commission shall have due regard to the industrial, cultural and scientific advancement of India, and the just claims and the interests of persons belonging to the non-Hindi speaking areas in regard to the public services.

(4) There shall be constituted a Committee consisting of thirty members, of whom twenty shall be members of the House of the People and ten shall be members of the Council of States to be elected respectively by the members of the House of the People and the Members of the Council of States in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.

(5) It shall be the duty of the Committee to examine the recommendations of the Commission constituted under clause (1) and to report to the President their opinion thereon.

(6) Notwithstanding anything in article 343, the President may, after consideration of the report referred to in clause (5), issue directions in accordance with the whole or any part of that report.

Chapter II
REGIONAL LANGUAGES

345. Official language or languages of a State.—Subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes of that State:

Provided that, until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides by law, the English language shall continue to be used for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.

346. Official language for communication between one State and another or between a State and the Union.—The language for the time being authorised for use in the Union for official purposes shall be the official language for communication between one State and another State and the Union:

Provided that if two or more States agree that Hindi language should be the official language for communication between such States, that language may be used for such communication.

347. Special provision relating to language spoken by a section of the population of a State.—On a demand being made in the behalf of the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a State desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that State, direct that such language shall also be officially recognised throughout that State or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify.

Chapter IV
SPECIAL DIRECTIVES

350. Language to be used in representations for redress of grievances.—Every person shall be entitled to submit a representation for the redress of any grievance to any officer or authority of the Union or a State in any of the languages used in the Union or in the State, as the case may be.
350A. Facilities for instruction in mother-tongue at primary stage.—It shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups; and the President may issue such directions to any State as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities.

350B. Special Officer for linguistic minorities.—(1) There shall be a Special Officer for linguistic minorities to be appointed by the President.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under this Constitution and report to the President upon those matters at such intervals as the President may direct, and the President shall cause all such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament, and sent to the Governments of the States concerned.

351. Directive for development of the Hindi language.—It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.

\[2\text{ This was added by the Constitution Act (Seventh Amendment), 1956, sec. 21 (w.e.f.1-11-1956).}\]
Appendix D
8th Schedule

Original 8th Schedule

1. Assamese
2. Bengali
3. Gujarati
4. Hindi
5. Kannada
6. Kashmiri
7. Malayalam
8. Marathi
9. Oriya
10. Punjabi
11. Sanskrit
12. Tamil
13. Telugu
14. Urdu

1967 (21st Amendment)— Sindhi

1992 (71st Amendment)— Konkani
                       Manipuri
                       Nepali

2003 (92nd Amendment)— Bodo
                       Dogri
                       Maithili
                       Santhali
Appendix E
Indo-Nepal Treaty
31 July 1950

The Government of India and the Government of Nepali recognizing the ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries for centuries;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;

Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely, the Government of India, his Excellency SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, Ambassador of India in Nepal; The Government of Nepal, MOHAN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme-Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, who having examined each other’s credentials and found them good and in due form having agreed as follows:

Article I
There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other

Article II
The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

Article III
In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article I the two Governments agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions.

The representatives and such of these staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by International law on a reciprocal basis. Provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with each Government.

Article IV
The Two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice Consuls and other consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other’s territory as may be agreed to.

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Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents shall be provided with exequatur or authorization of their appointment. Such exequatur or authorization liable to be withdrawn which issued to, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated whenever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other state.

**Article V**
The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

**Article VI**
Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to the participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

**Article VII**
The Government of India and Nepal agree to grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of a similar nature.

**Article VIII**
So far as matters with herein are concerned, the Treaty cancels all previous treaties, agreements, and engagements entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

**Article IX**
This treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

**Article X**
The Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year’s notice.

Done in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July, 1950
Appendix F
Gazette notification of the Government of India
Issued 23 August 1988 on the subject of Nepali/Gorkhali citizenship status in India and clarifying the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty

Whereas it has come to the notice of the Central Government that there have been some misconceptions about the citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution of India of Certain classes of persons commonly known as Gorkhas, who had settled in India at such commencement.

And whereas it is considered necessary to clear such misconceptions; it is hereby clarified as follows:

(1) As from the commencement of the Constitution, that is as from 26.1.1950, every Gorkha, who had his domicile in the territory of India, that is In [sic] the territories which on 26.1.1950 became part of or constituted the territory of India as defined in Article 1(2) of the Constitution of India; and
   a. Who was born in the territory of India;
   b. Either of whose parents was born in the territory of India;
   c. Who had been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years before such commencement;

   Shall be a citizen of India as provided in article 5 of the Constitution of India;

(2) No such person is referred to in paragraph (1) above shall be a citizen of India or be deemed to be a citizen of India if he has voluntarily acquired to citizenship of any foreign State as provided in article 9 of the Constitution of India.

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Appendix G
Treaty of Segauli (also known as Segowlee)\(^5\)

1815

TREATY of PEACE between the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND MAHA RAJAH BIRKRAM SAH, Rajah of Nipal, settled between LIEUTENANT-COLONEL Bradshaw on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS, EARL of MOIRA, KNIGHT of the MOST NOBLE ORDER of the GARTER, one of HIS MAJESTY’S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by SREE GOOROO GUJRAJ MISER and CHUNDER SEEKUR OPEDEEA on the part of MAHA RAJAH GIRMAUN JODE BIKRAM SAH BAHAUDER, SHUMSHEER JUNG, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nipal. –2\(^{nd}\) December 1815.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two State, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon:—

**ARTICLE 1**

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

**ARTICLE 2**

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two States before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

**ARTICLE 3**

The Rajah of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company in perpetuity all the undermentioned territories, viz.—

First—The whole of the low lands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti

Secondly—The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Bootwul Khass) lying between the Rapti and the Gunduck.

Thirdly—The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and Coosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourthly—All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.

Fifthly—All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarcote leading from Morung into the hills, together with the

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territory lying between that Pass and Nagree. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gurkha troops within forty days from this date.

**ARTICLE 4**

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer [sic] by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees [200,000 rupees] per annum on such Chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunnud shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-General for the pensions respectively.

**ARTICLE 5**

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the West of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

**ARTICLE 6**

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any difference shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government by which award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.

**ARTICLE 7**

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

**ARTICLE 8**

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the order [sic].

**ARTICLE 9**

This treaty, consisting of Nine Articles, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver the ratification of the Governor-General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segowlee [sic], on the 2nd day of December 1815.

Signed—Paris Bradwhaw, Lt.—Col, P.A.

Received this treaty from Chunder Seekur Opedeea, Agent on the part of the Rajah of Nipal, in the valley of Muckwaunpoor, at half-past two o’clock p.m. on the 4th of March 1816, and delivered to him the Counterpart Treaty on behalf of the British Government.

Signed—D.D. Ochterlony,
Agent, Governor-General
Appendix H
1968 Official Language Resolution

The following Government Resolution, as adopted by both Houses of Parliament, is hereby published for general information:

RESOLUTION

Whereas under article 343 of the Constitution, Hindi shall be the official language of the Union, and under article 351 thereof it is the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi Language and to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India;

This House resolves that a more intensive and comprehensive programme shall be prepared and implemented by the Government of India for accelerating the spread and development of Hindi and its progressive use for the various official purposes of the Union and an annual assessment report giving details of the measures taken and the progress achieved shall be laid on the Table of both Houses of Parliament and sent to all State Governments;

2. WHEREAS the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution specifies 14 major languages of India besides Hindi, and it is necessary in the interest of the educational and cultural advancement of the country that concerted measures should be taken for the full development of these languages;

The House resolves that a programme shall be prepared and implemented by the Government of India, in collaboration with the State Governments for the coordinated development of all these languages, alongside Hindi so that they grow rapidly in richness and become effective means of communicating modern knowledge;

3. WHEREAS it is necessary for promoting the sense of unity and facilitating communication between people in different parts of the country that effective steps should be taken for implementing fully in all States the three-language formula evolved by the Government of India in consultation with the State Government;

This House resolves that arrangements should be made in accordance with that formula for the study of a modern Indian language, preferably one of the Southern languages, apart from Hindi and English in the Hindi speaking areas and of Hindi along with the regional languages and English in the non-Hindi speaking areas;

4. And whereas it is necessary to ensure that the just claims and interest of people belonging to different parts of the country in regard to the public services of the Union are fully safeguarded:

This House resolves –

(a) that compulsory knowledge of either Hindi or English shall be required at the stage of selection of candidates for recruitment to the Union services or posts except in respect of

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any special services or posts for which a high standard of knowledge of English alone or Hindi alone, or both, as the case may be, is considered essential for the satisfactory performance of the duties of any such service or post; and

(b) that all the languages included in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution and English shall be permitted as alternative media for the All India and higher Central Services examinations after ascertaining the views of the Union Public Service Commission on the future scheme of the examinations, the procedural aspects and the timing.
Appendix I
Matched-Guise Recording Text

English
Darjeeling tea is world famous for its unique and pleasant flavor. This is due to many factors including its geographical location, elevation, fertile soil, and climate. The first tea seeds were brought from China. Those seeds were planted in Lebong and other parts of Darjeeling. The mature plants were then transferred to different parts of Darjeeling for cultivation. These locations were later known as tea gardens. Every year, tourists pour into Darjeeling to visit the tea gardens and enjoy this high quality tea.

Nepali—नेपाली
आनन्ददायक स्वाद अनि छै किसीको बासनाको निमित दार्जीलिङ्को चिया विश्व प्रसिद्ध
छ। यसो हुनाको प्रमुख कारगरहुँ यङ्गाको भौगोलिक वातावरण पहाडको उँचाईमा माटो अनि स्वस्थ जलवायु छन्। येहाँ चियाको बिउँ पहिलोपटक चिनाविट त्वाइएको हो।
परिक्षणको रुपमा ती बिउँहुँको रोपी लेबोङ्ग अनि दार्जीलिङ्का अन्य ठाउँहुँमा गरियो।
हर्किएका बिस्वासहरुलाई ती ठाउँहुँबाट सानोतिनो रबेनीको उदेश्यले दार्जीलिङ्का अन्य भेककिर सारिने काम भयो। बिनेँ भेकहरुलाई पछिबाट चियाबागणको रुपमा जानिएक थाल्यो।
बर्मेसी दार्जीलिङ्का ओईरो लग्यने गरेका दुर्स्टहरुले चियाबागणको अवलोकन गरी यङ्गाको उच्चस्तरिय चियाको स्वाद किएर आनन्दित हुने गर्न।

Bengali Text
हंडाजिलिंडर का पाया आंशिक मुख्य उपयोग और अलग विकसीमक (प्रकारक) झुंजन के लिए बिजली सामग्री है।

इसका मुख्य कारण इसे जंगल (प्रवाल) के बीच जोतक कायम रखने पहुँचे उपचार और हवायं आवाज (खेल) एवं संस्करण जनावं है। शब्दों के बिना इस पहले पिल्ले के हेथर से लाता होय आ।

पहले परिसर के दूत बिनका स्वीकरता (रापन) धर्मों और हंडाजिलिंडर का हार्मोन स्थानरा में बिनका शामी डाव विहंग गौरव चकला शाया। इन लोगों की रैलिया अरुंधति (बाँध) दे हंडाजिलिंडर का सुन्दर बिलोका में स्थानत्त्व बिनका शाया। इसी अवधि के लाखों में प्रामाणिक बिनका शाया।

भारत विदेश का भाई न्याय न्यायवादी नृत्य का महत्त्व बिलोका में भारतीय विपुलिकों का भविष्य गिंह लगाना है और इसके बिनका शाया। हंडाजिलिंडर एवं विलोका के अवसर क्रिया देखते जब आनन्द क्या आते हैं?
Appendix J
Matched Guise Test

Questionnaire:

Please do **not** write your name anywhere on this paper—your answers will remain anonymous.

I thank you in advance for your patience and help with this research!

प्रश्नावली:

यस फारममा तपाईंको नाम लेख्नुहोस्। तपाईंले दिएका प्रतिक्रियाहरू गुप्त रहनेछन्।

यस अनुसन्धानकार्यप्रति प्रदान गर्नुभएको ध्येयता र सहयोगको निमित म अग्रिम धन्यवाद टकाउदछु।

Location of Test/ जाँचको थान__________________________

Section One: Voice and the Person

You will hear a tape-recording of a text read by 12 people. All of them read the same text in Nepali/Gorkhali, English, Bengali, and Hindi. We are interested in your impressions about the person from their voice. Please indicate your responses on this form.

पाहिलो भाषा: आवाज्र र अज्ञात व्यक्ति

तपाईंले एउटा टेप रेकर्डिङ सुन्नुहुन्छ जसमा एउटा पाठ घरैं व्यक्तिहरूले १२ पटेका छन्। यो एउटा पाठ नेपाली/गोरखाली, अंग्रेजी, बंगला, र हिन्दी भाषाहरूमा पटिएका छ। यस फारममा तपाईंको प्रतिक्रिया जनाउनु होस्।
In your opinion, to what extent is this person / तपाईको विचारमा यो व्यक्ति कस्तो छ?

**Recording 1 । रेकर्डिङ 1**

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</table>

16. Would you like this person? Why?/ के तपाई यो व्यक्तिलाई मनपराउनुहुन्छ किन?  
17. Ethnicity of this person?/पस व्यक्ति कुन जनजातिलिम समुदाय दल को हो?

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7 This page of the test was repeated an additional 11 times; one for each of the recordings.
How important is each trait to you when making new friends?
कूने नयाँ साथी बनाउँदा तर दिएका गुणहरू कतिको प्रभावशाली छन्?

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<td>5. Happy/ सुमिति</td>
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<td>14. Modern/ आधुनिक</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Educated/ शिक्षित</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section Two: General Biographical Information and Questions on Language.

2) Birth year/ जन्म साल: ________________________________________________

3) Place of birth/ जन्म स्थान: ________________________________________________

4) Where did you live as a child/ तपाई सानो छंदा कहाँ बस्नु थियो?

   In the village/ गाउँमा                  In the city/ शहरमा

5) Where do you live now (name of village, neighborhood, city)?

   तपाई कहाँ बस्नु हुन्छ? गाउँखिचमकर्पो नाइँ: ________________________________________________

6) Your Profession/ तपाईको पेशा: ________________________________________________

7) Your father’s profession/ तपाईको बाबुको पेशा: ________________________________________________

8) Your mother’s profession/ तपाईको आमाको पेशा: ________________________________________________

9) Ethnicity/ जात जातिसमुदाय: ________________________________________________

10) Your native language(s)/ तपाईको स्थानीय स्वदेशी भाषाहरु: ________________________________________________

   11) Other languages you speak well/ अन्य भाषाहरु जुन तपाई राम्री बोल्नुहुन्छ: ________________________________

   12) Your mother’s language(s)/ तपाईको आमाले बोल्ने भाषाहरु: ________________________________________________

   13) Your father’s language(s)/ तपाईको बाबुले बोल्ने भाषाहरु: ________________________________________________

   14) Your grandparents’ language(s): तपाईको बाजेन बोझ्ले बोल्ने भाषाहरु: ________________________________

   15) Level of Education (please check one)/ शैक्षिक स्तर ठीक शब्दमा चिन्न लगाउनुहोस।

   Primary Level/ प्राथमिक स्तर ________________________________________________

   High School Level/ माध्यमिक स्तर ________________________________________________

   Higher Secondary Level (Class 11 and 12)/ उच्च माध्यमिक स्तर ________________________________________________

   Graduation (college)/ उपाध्याय एसन ________________________________________________
16) Which medium school did you attend? (please check one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Speak</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Write</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepali/Gorkhani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English/आँग्रेजी</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindi/हिंदी</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali/बंग्ला</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/अन्य</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17) Please evaluate your own ability to understand, speak, read, and write in each language:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Speak</th>
<th>Read</th>
<th>Write</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepali/Gorkhani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali/नेपाली/गोर्क्हाली</td>
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<tr>
<td>English/आँग्रेजी</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bengali/बंग्ला</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindi/हिंदी</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other/अन्य</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/अन्य</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which language(s) would you like to learn? Why?

18) How often do you use each language in each situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Nepali/Gorkhali</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Hindi</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At home with parents and elders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At home with friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At home with children and youths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the market or shops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While watching films</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When reading newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0—never / कहिल्ले पनि प्रयोग गर्नु हुन्छ
2—sometimes / कहिल्ले काहिँ प्रयोग गर्नु हुन्छ
1—rarely / कम मात्रामा प्रयोग गर्नु हुन्छ
e—always / सभेप्रयोग गर्नु हुन्छ
At restaurants

At get-togethers

When interacting with deshi tourists

When interacting with bideshi tourists

19) In which language do you prefer to watch films? कृपया बताइए आपने फिल्में किस भाषा में देखने पसंद करते हैं?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nepali/Gorkhali</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Hindi</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नेपाली/गोर्खाली</td>
<td>अंग्रेजी</td>
<td>हिंदी</td>
<td>बंगाली</td>
<td>अन्य</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20) What is your opinion about the current language situation in Darjeeling?

21) What is the status and situation of Nepali/Gorkhali language within India?

22) What is the status and situation of Nepali/Gorkhali people in India?

23) In your opinion, what is the relationship between Nepal Nepali and Darjeeling Nepali/Gorkhali?

a) They are the same language. यी एउटै भाषा हुन्।
b) Darjeeling Nepali/Gorkhali is a dialect with a separate history.

(c) They are two separate languages.

Comments/टिप्पणी गर्नुहोसः:

24) In your opinion, in West Bengal, there should be:

तपाईंको विचारमा पश्चिम बंगालमा को हनु पर्छ:

a) one official language—Bengali/एउटा सरकारी भाषा—बंगाली

b) one official language—Hindi/एउटा सरकारी भाषा—हिन्दी

c) one official language—English/एउटा सरकारी भाषा—अङ्ग्रेजी

d) two official languages—Bengali and Nepali/Gorkhali/बंगाली र नेपालीधृष्ट्स्वारी

e) other/अन्य

Comments/टिप्पणी गर्नुहोसः:
Appendix K
Nepali Language and the Nepali Speaking Indians
Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of West Bengal
(No Date)

Nepali-speaking Indians have demanded the inclusion of Nepali language in the 8th Schedule of Constitution. A large segment of the Nepali speaking people inhabiting this country are settled in the three hill subdivisions of Darjeeling in West Bengal. A survey of the cultural and linguistic history of this country will provide ample proof to the fact that Nepali language belongs to the languages of the Indo-Aryan family and is one of the literary languages of India spoken by a sizeable section of the inhabitants in this country. The Left Front Government, therefore, found the claim for inclusion of Nepali language in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution to be justified and moved a resolution for lending support to this claim in the State Legislative Assembly at the earliest opportunity. The Assembly unanimously passed the resolution recommending that the Nepali language should find its rightful place in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution.

Rabindranath Tagore has rightly described India as a great ocean of humanity where peoples of diverse origins, creeds and language groups have comingled to contributed to a composite Indian culture. Different peoples have followed different routes to immigrate to India from times immemorial and no single tribe or people deserves the exclusive description of being truly Indian. As a matter of fact, no tribe or people can be called real autochtons (sic) of India, and no definite dateline can be fixed for designating a group of immigrants as Indians and other non-Indians on a chronological basis.

As far as the word Nepali is concerned, it connotes a language, the citizen of Nepal and the speaker of the Nepali language anywhere. The Nepalis as a people are the product of a long process of acculturation between peoples of Indian origin and tribes of Mongoloid and Austric (sic) origins. The Nepali language, a speech of Indo-Aryan origin and written in Devnagri (sic) scripts, has bound them together and this language has given them a distinct group consciousness or nationality feeling. The language, known as Nepali today, was called Khas Kura or the language of the Khasas and also Parbatiya or the language of the hill peoples. As it came to be widely used by the Gorkha conquerers (sic) of Nepal, it also came to be known as Gorkhali.

Much before Nepal had taken its present shape, the speakers of the language called Nepali now, had already spread over northern and northeastern regions that form parts of India today. It is also to be remembered that India had also not taken its present shape then as it was politically divided into a number of kingdoms having unstable frontiers.

The Nepali-speaking Indians have concentrated inhabitation in the hill sub-divisions of West Bengal and are also scattered in the Dooars area of Jalpaiguri district. They have been living in the hills of Darjeeling since they formed parts of Sikkim and then Nepal before the British annexed the region. Nepali tribes of different ethnic origins like the Limbus, Rais, Tamangs and others were already settled in these areas and Sikkim for centuries. Many historical
records prove this fact. It is also well attested by the observations of famous botanist Joseph Dalton Hooker, who visited Darjeeling and the adjoining areas in 1844.

The annexation of Darjeeling by the British and the subsequent tea plantation attracted a large number of people, especially from Eastern Nepal as these parts were closely connected previously and, secondly, the migration of high caste plainsmen from India to Nepal had initiated a process of usurpation which had become more acute in eastern Nepal after its conquest by the Gorkha King of Rajpur origin.

There are also records to show that Nepalis had made permanent settlements in Assam long before it was conquered by the British in 1828. Clearing the forests and bringing the land under their plough they became first rate agriculturists and many of them made permanent settlements also in the areas where the British had established their military cantonments since Gorkhas (Nepalis) were encouraged to join the British Indian army from 1814. To cite on (sic) example, the History of the 8th Gorkha Rifles 1824-1829 records ‘Shilong in 1867 could not have shown any resemblances (sic) to the charming cantonment and civil station known to so many……Capt. Kalu Thapa, who marched into Shillong with the 44th Ghorkha (sic) Battalion, when asked what it was like those days replies, ‘There was not a rat there.’ W.W. Hunter in his Statistical Account of Assam writes, ‘Shillong in 1827 had only 1363 inhabitants. The cantonments were occupied by the 43rd. Regiment of the Assam Light Infantry with three outposts. The strength was nine European officers, sixteen native commissioned officers, 772 fighting men and 58 paid camp followers and non-combatants.’ The 43rd. Light Infantry was latter (sic) renamed 7th Gorkha Rifles. Numerically greater than in the Darjeeling district, but dispersed over a wide area, the Nepal-speaking peoples inhabit the present states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya and Mizoram.

A large number of Nepalis live in the Doon valley and the adjoining areas of Uttar Pradesh. They are there since the region was ceded to the British by Nepal after the Anglo-Nepal war of 1814-16. Following the example of the British, many Indian Rajas like those of Kashmir and Ranjit Singh of Punjab also recruited the Nepalis (sic) in their armies and Police forces. Since then many Nepalis have become permanent settlers in a few areas of Kashmir and Punjab too.

As agriculturists, soldiers and labourers (sic), the Nepalis have been living permanently in many parts of India for centuries and to call them ‘foreigner’ only because the language spoken by them came to be known as Nepali after the rise of an independent kingdom of Nepal would be historically incorrect. A Japanese scholar has rightly observed, ‘Nepali is a kind of linguafranca (sic) used widely through the Himalayan area.’ The Nepalis, in the context of India should not be understood as citizen of Nepal, but a distinct Indian Nationality as Bengalis, Gujaratis, Marathis, Kashmiris and others. The Nepali language is the very basis of this nationality in the plural society of India.

Nepali-speaking Indians have been playing a constructive role in the process of nation-building for centuries in this country. Their labours and toils in the fields, factories and different other occupations apart, they also took part in the freedom struggle in many parts of the country. A few of them were active during the days of Swadeshi struggle and also had their connections
with the terrorist activities in Bengal. The non-cooperation movement spread to the Darjeeling hills under the leadership of Dalbahadur Giri, whose death immediately after his release from jail was condoled by the Nagpur Congress under the presidency of Mahatma Gandhi in 1924. Similarly many Napalis in Varanasi, Dehradun and Assam joined the national movement. A detailed description of their participation would need a separate treatise.

Large number of India Napalis who had become Japanese prisoners of war in the east during the Second World War joined the Indian National Army under Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and fought against the British. Two distinguished names are those of Major Dalbahaur Thapa and Capt. Durga Malla of INA, they deserve special mention here. Both of them were captured by the British. Malla was hanged on 25th August, 1944 and Thapa on 9th March 1945 at the Delhi Jail, a year before the famous Red Fort trial started.

Many Nepali soldiers of the INA from Dehradun, Darjeeling and other places of India were imprisoned. Many survivors among them have received tamra-patras given to freedom fighters. An eminent INA soldier, Ram Singh Thakuri made his name as the composer of tunes of many famous national songs, Sare Jahan Se acha (sic) Hindustan hamara and others of the INA to be called as the court musician of the Azad Hind Government. Innumerable names of Nepalis who joined the INA, fought for freedom of this county and imprisoned, can be cited.

If the Indian Nepalis participated in the work of nation-building prior to 1947, they have equally been active in this task since we achieved independence. Their role as soldiers in the Indian army of free India has remained equally distinguished. In various Indo-Pak wars and the border conflict of 1962, the Nepalis have laid down their lives for the defense of this nation. Many of them were awarded chakras for their exemplary bravery in the battle. Major Dhan Singh Thapa of 8th Gorkha Rifles, now a Lt. Col., was even awarded the highest military decoration, Param Vira Chakra.

In this connection, it is to be remembered that when the Indian contingents of the U.N. troops reached Congo in 1962, Moise Tshombe, also suffering from similar misconception, described the Gorkha (Nepali) soldiers of our contingent as ‘hired soldiers’. But the Government of India, through V.K. Krishna Menon, the then Minister of Defence, categorically stated that all the Gorkha soldiers serving in the Indian army are first rate citizens of India.

The role of Gorkha soldiers in the communal riots of Calcutta in 1946 was highly praised by the army officers then. That they have kept their tradition high has been highlighted by the recent reports of the Jamshedpur communal riots.

Historically when the Nepali speaking people in this country can be shown as first rate Indians, is it logical to call their mother-tongue a foreign language? Dr. Tripathi, a member of the Official Language Commission constituted in 1955, remarked that for a language to be called Indian, it was not essential for it to have originated in India, its wide use in India would suffice. To call Nepali foreign is not proper: not only because it is spoken by millions of Indians, but also because the history of its development is closely connected with the history of this country.
That language called Nepali today was not known by this name previously has been pointed out earlier. Hindi also was not called so till late nineteenth century and Bengal was simply called Prakrit till the sixteenth century. Nepali, as stated above, is also known as Khas Kura or the language of the Khas, an ancient frontier tribe of Aryan speech that finds mention in the epics in the puranas, Kalhana’s Rajatarangini and in many Graeco-Roman writings. Nepali is called so because it was derived from a Middle Indo-Aryan speech named Khasa Apabhramsa or Khasa prakrit as Bengali, Maithili, Oriya, and Assamese were derived from Magadhi Prakrit Gujarati from Sauraseni, Marathi from Maharashtri Prakrit. Many scholar propound a different view that Nepali is derived from Sauraseni. But Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee believed after Grierson that the hill languages were developed from Khas Prakrit and recent researches and discoveries of Old Nepali documents dated since 1336 A.D. have fully corroborated the opinions of these eminent linguists.

In this context, it should also be noted here that of the 106 mother tongues identified in India, 64 have been grouped with the Eighth Schedule languages, 42 of them being grouped with Hindi alone. Garhwali is one of these 42 mother tongues and the Census of 1971 itself recommends that ‘Nepali and Garhwali figures should be collectively represented’ as there is very close affinity between them.

Nepali, like other languages of Indo-Aryan family is derived from a speech of which the earliest documents is the Rig Veda. R.L. Turner in his A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language, 1931, explains that the Indo-Aryan Languages along the Southern face of the Himalaya have certain common features because ‘these languages were carried into their present habitats by the migration of Khas from their earlier home from the north-east.’ Grierson (Linguistic Sruvey of India, Vol. IX, part 4) remarks that by the time of the composition of Markandeya puranas, the Khasa had already reached Nepal and Darjeeling. Nepali was spoken not only in the region which went to and form (sic) the present kingdom of Nepal in the eighteenth century.

Varanasi, Darjeeling and many other places in india (sic) have remained literary and cultural centres of Nepali for Centuries. The first grammer (sic) of Nepali was publihed in 1920, by Lt. J.A. Ayton, Assistant Professor in the College of Fort William, Calcutta. It is to be noted here that Dr. Gilchrist also published the first Hindi grammar in the same year. It is said that the era of modern Bengali prose was begun since the foundation of the Fort William College and Serampore Mission. The first Nepali Bible was published from Serampore in 1821. Nepali, like other modern Indian languages emerged in the eleventh century and had a paralled (sic) development with other Indian languages. Dr. Suniti Chatterjee simplifies the linguistic picture of India in his LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES OF MODERN INDIA (p. 8 and 46) thus: ‘The tale of languages that really have an important place in the cultural and political life of the community in India is reduced considerably: we can say that we have now some 15 Literary Languages only for the whole of India. These are Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu; besides two more, English and Sanskrit, which have special place.’

The Indian Constitution is a means for nation-building, and the constitutional recognition of Nepali will but help this process. The recognition of 15 languages in the Eighth Schedule has
not led to the disintegration of India into fifteen politically independent units and the argument that the recognition of other languages will lead to the disintegration of the Country does not stand to reason. When the bill for the recognition of Sindhi was introduced in Parliament in 1967 one of the members rightly said, “In a polyglot country like ours it is possible to conceive of language as a great disrupter to the unity of the Country; but it is also possible to conceive of language as a cementing force for the national integration of the Country.”

Dr. Suniti Chatterjee had written in his Note on the Official Language Commission, 1956 that “Other Indian Languages are to be added in the Eighth Schedule following the wishes of their speakers, and their importance, e.g., Sindhi and Nepali (Gorkhali or Khas Kura or Parbatiya)”. Another member had also the Parliament when Sindhi was being included, “Sentimentally I think they are right. Morally, it is our duty to respond.” Let us feel it our duty to respond in the case of Nepali too, so that this language in the Constitution shall give psychological and emotional satisfaction to its speakers who are none other than our own fellow Indians.
Hon’ble Shri. Buta Singh  
Union Home Minister,  
NEW DELHI.  
23 November 1987

Your Honour,

The GNLF has always abided by its word and has never violated the Gentlemen’s Agreement between the Central Government of India, the GNLF and the Government of West Bengal, to find out a peaceful solution on the problems of the Gorkhas of Darjeeling, Dooars and Siliguri areas but the CPI(M) Government of West Bengal did not keep its word and deliberately violated the said Agreement which has gone directly against the process of finding a peaceful solution when the dialogue was going on between the GNLF and the Central Government of India. The CPI(M) Government of West Bengal did not keep its word and deliberately violated the said Agreement which has gone directly against the process of finding a peaceful solution when the dialogue was going on between the GNLF and the Central Government of India. The CPI(M) Government of West Bengal has never been in favour of a peaceful settlement on the problems of the Gorkhas of the said areas, but the Leftist Government of West Bengal only wants to take revenge with the GNLF by provoking, terrorizing, arresting, torturing, and killing the innocent people with the help of the Central Forces: because, the GNLF has almost totally uprooted the Red Flag from the hill areas of Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Kurseong, and other parts of North Bengal including Sikkim. This is the main reason why the GNLF has always insisted upon the Central Government of India for immediate removal of the Central Forces from the said areas as they are always being misused on the peal and on the baseless allegations that the GNLF is committing violence in the hills. And, further, the CPI(M) Government of West Bengal has freely supplied arms and ammunition to its cadre to kill innocent GNLF people in order to save the Red Flag in the hill areas.

Now, further, under no circumstances, the simple and gullible Gorkhas of Darjeeling will again be converted into the Red Flag in the interests of the Gorkhas and in the greater national interests so as to save our religion, culture and rich heritage from the cruel and undesirable influence of the anti-God, anti-Goddess, anti-religion, anti-culture and anti-traditional heritage CPI(M) led Government of West Bengal. Because the CPI(M) Government of West Bengal has already set fire to many Hindu temples and has also defiled places of public worship in different places of Darjeeling hill areas.
Appendix M
Gazette Notification Regarding the Amendment of Constitution

The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section I

New Delhi, Tuesday, September 1, 1992.

Separate paging is given to this part in order that it may be titled as a separate compilation

Ministry of Law, Justice, and Company Affairs (Legislative Department)
New Delhi, the 1st September 1992/Bhadra 10, 1914 (Saka)

The following Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on the 31st August, 1992, and is hereby published for general information:—

THE CONSTITUTION (SEVENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT) Act, 1992

31st August 1992

An Act further to amend the Constitution of India

Be it enacted by Parliament in the Forty-third Year of the Republic of India as follows:—

1. This Act may be called the Constitution (Seventy-first Amendment) Act, 1992.
2. In the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution,—
   a. existing entry 7 shall be renumbered as entry 8, and below entry 8 as so re-numbered, the entry “7. Konkani” shall be inserted;
   b. existing entry 8 shall be re-numbered as entry 10, and before entry 10 as so re-numbered the entry “9. Manipuri” shall be inserted;
   c. existing entries 9 to 15 shall be re-numbered as entries 12 to 18 respectively, and before entry 12 as so re-numbered the entry “11. Nepali” shall be inserted.

K. L. Mohanpuria
Sect. to the Govt. of India

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8 File #13 (ka)—Darjeeling District—1987, img_01.
## Appendix N
Scheduled Languages in Descending Order of Speakers’ Population

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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>36.99</td>
<td>38.74</td>
<td>Hindi(^\text{10}) 39.29</td>
<td>Hindi (^\text{9}) 41.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>Bengali 8.30</td>
<td>Bengali 8.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
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<td>7.61</td>
<td>Telugu 7.87</td>
<td>Telugu 7.19</td>
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<td>4.72</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>Gujarati 4.85</td>
<td>Gujarati 4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>Kannada 3.91</td>
<td>Kannada 3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kannada</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>Malayalam 3.62</td>
<td>Malayalam 3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>Oriya 3.35</td>
<td>Oriya 3.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>Punjabi 2.79</td>
<td>Punjabi 2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assamese</td>
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<td>0.65</td>
<td>Assamese 1.56</td>
<td>Assamese 1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maithili</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Maithili 0.93</td>
<td>Maithili 1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santali</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>Santali 0.62</td>
<td>Santali 0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Nepali 0.25</td>
<td>Nepali 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Sindhi 0.25</td>
<td>Nepali 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkani</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Nepali 0.20</td>
<td>Konkani 0.21</td>
<td>Saindhi 0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipuri</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>Manipuri 1.14</td>
<td>Bodo 0.15</td>
<td>Konkani 1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogri</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Sanskrit 0.00</td>
<td>Manipuri 0.15</td>
<td>Dogri 0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipuri</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Assamese 0.13</td>
<td>Sanskrit 0.01</td>
<td>Manipuri 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>Bodo 0.10</td>
<td>Kashmiri 0.01</td>
<td>Bodo 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>Dogri 0.00</td>
<td>Sanskrit 0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^10\) Note on Chart: “The change in Hindi percentage in 1991 from the published percentage in 1991 is due to the exclusion of Maithili from Hindi.” This change occurred after the original numbers were published in 1991.

\(^11\) Note on Chart: “Bodo, Dogri, Maithili, and Santali have been included as Scheduled languages from 2001 Census following the 100th Amendment of the Constitution of India.”

\(^12\) Note on Chart: “Konkani, Manipuri and Nepali are appearing as Scheduled languages since 1991 following the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India.”

\(^13\) These numbers are not available because the census was not conducted in these areas “due to disturbed conditions.”
### Appendix O

**Growth of Scheduled Languages [1971 to 2001]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number of self reported speakers</th>
<th>Percentage increase</th>
<th>1971-81</th>
<th>1981-91</th>
<th>1991-2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assamese</td>
<td>8,959,558</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>13,079,696</td>
<td>13,168,484</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>44,792,312</td>
<td>51,298,319</td>
<td>69,595,738</td>
<td>83,369,769</td>
<td>14.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo</td>
<td>556,576</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>1,221,881</td>
<td>1,350,478</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogri</td>
<td>1,299,143</td>
<td>1,530,616</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>2,282,589</td>
<td>17.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>25,865,012</td>
<td>33,063,267</td>
<td>40,673,814</td>
<td>46,091,617</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>2,495,487</td>
<td>3,176,975</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>5,527,698</td>
<td>27.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkani</td>
<td>1,508,432</td>
<td>1,570,108</td>
<td>1,760,670</td>
<td>2,489,015</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maithili</td>
<td>21,710,649</td>
<td>25,697,146</td>
<td>32,753,676</td>
<td>37,924,011</td>
<td>18.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>2,495,487</td>
<td>3,176,975</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>5,527,698</td>
<td>27.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipuri</td>
<td>1,508,432</td>
<td>1,570,108</td>
<td>1,760,670</td>
<td>2,489,015</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>21,710,649</td>
<td>25,697,146</td>
<td>32,753,676</td>
<td>37,924,011</td>
<td>18.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipuri</td>
<td>791,714</td>
<td>901,407</td>
<td>1,270,216</td>
<td>1,466,705</td>
<td>13.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>41,765,190</td>
<td>49,452,922</td>
<td>62,481,681</td>
<td>71,936,894</td>
<td>18.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepali</td>
<td>1,419,835</td>
<td>1,360,636</td>
<td>2,076,645</td>
<td>2,871,749</td>
<td>-4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>19,863,198</td>
<td>23,021,528</td>
<td>28,061,313</td>
<td>33,017,446</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>6,106</td>
<td>49,736</td>
<td>14,135</td>
<td>176.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santhali</td>
<td>3,786,899</td>
<td>4,332,511</td>
<td>5,216,325</td>
<td>6,469,600</td>
<td>14.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>1,676,875</td>
<td>2,044,389</td>
<td>2,122,848</td>
<td>2,535,485</td>
<td>21.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>37,690,106</td>
<td>53,006,368</td>
<td>60,793,814</td>
<td>74,002,856</td>
<td>14.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>44,756,923</td>
<td>50,624,611</td>
<td>66,017,615</td>
<td>74,002,856</td>
<td>13.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>28,620,895</td>
<td>34,941,435</td>
<td>43,406,932</td>
<td>51,536,111</td>
<td>22.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

14 Census notes: “Full figures for Tamil, Assamese and Bodo for 1981 are not available as the census records for Tamil Nadu were lost due to floods and the 1981 census was not conducted in Assam due to the disturbed conditions then prevailing there. Therefore, the decadal percentage increase of Tamil and Assamese and Bodo are not given” (Census of India, Statement 7 “Growth of Scheduled Languages”).

15 Census notes: “Full figures for Kashmiri and Dogri for 1991 are not available as the 1991 census was not conducted in Jammu and Kashmir due to disturbed conditions. Therefore, the decadal percentage increase of Kashmiri is not given” (Census of India, Statement 7 “Growth of Scheduled Languages”).

16 Census notes: “For Hindi the published figures in 1971, 1981, and 1991 differ due to the exclusion of Maithili figure from Hindi. Maithili is included in Scheduled Languages in 2001 following the 100th Amendment of the Constitution of India” (Census of India, Statement 7 “Growth of Scheduled Languages”). However, the Constitution states that Maithili was added by the 92nd amendment in 2003 (Constitution of India, 8th Schedule).

17 I cannot imagine that there was a 50% increase in the Nepali-speaking population during this 10 year period; clearly, something else was going on.
Appendix P

Speaker distribution by state or union territory
[Distribution of 10,000 persons by language, Nepali speakers only shown, in descending order]¹⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Union Territory</th>
<th>Nepali Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>6,298¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttarakhand</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daman and Diu</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadra and Nagar Haveli</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andaman and Nicobar Islands</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pondicherry</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhattisgarh</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakshadweep</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁸ Numbers are taken from the 1991 census, Statement—3 [Distribution of 10,000 persons by language—India, states and union territories—1991]. Accessed online at www.censusindia.gov.in. 8 January 2010.

¹⁹ This means that out of 10,000 people in the state of Sikkim, 6,298 marked their language as Nepali in the 1991 census.
Appendix Q
Case for Constitutional Recognition of Nepali:
Eighth Schedule—What are the Norms? 20

[Inside Cover]
Other Indian Languages are to be added in this (Eighth) Schedule, following the wishes of their speakers, and their importance, e.g. Sindhi and Nepali.

--Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji

[Page 1]
That the fifteen Indian languages included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution have to all intents and purposes been recognised as national languages is made abundantly clear by statements made by people in the top echelon of power; but what is much more plain is the fact that a number of equally important Indian languages, eminently qualifying for inclusion, have been in the most arbitrary manner kept out of the Schedule.

In the most arbitrary manner, yes.

What are the criteria, one may justly ask, for the Union Government’s including some languages and not including others in the Eighth Schedule? A study of the every varying explanations, if they can be called explanations, handed out at different times by the Government at the Centre reveals a disconcerting lack of constancy. Shiftiness is no virtue of any government. Constancy in regard to the application of constitutional provisions is of the essence of a democratic government system.

Examining Art. 351 which is the main governs the Eighth Schedule one gains a clear understanding that those Indian languages as from which Hindi as official language of the Union can for its enrichment assimilate forms, styles and expressions and can on which draw for its vocabulary too, are to be included in the Eighth Schedule. The scheduled languages have to be languages contributing to make Hindi as official language of the Union usable and acceptable throughout the length and breadth of the Republic.

[page 2]
Such a language Nepali undoubtedly is. Both by virtue of its being an independent and outstanding member of the Indo-Aryan family of languages and numerical strength, the number of Indian Nepalese people well exceeding the 50 lakhs mark.

As circumstance proceeding from the past and accruing in the present has it, Indian Nepalese linguistic minority presents in itself a case to authenticate the Government’s attitude and policy towards minorities.

20 Published by the All-India Nepali Bhasha Samiti, Darjeeling, West Bengal. No date.
Unfortunately for Indian Nepalis, and for them who feel the need of putting their languages in the Eighth Schedule, the Union Government has taken recourse to a contorted way of thinking.

As far back as 2nd August 1968, the Union Home Minister in his reply to a question put by Shri Jyotirmoy Basu in the Lok Sabha stated that the Government “in wider national interests” would not further enlarge the Eighth Schedule.

The-wIDER-national interests theme found an echo against in the Lok Sabha in the replies made by the Minister of State for Home Affairs on the same issue on 7th August, 1970.

The Minister would not indicate, let alone itemize, what the mythical presumption ‘wider national interests’ was. Was it not a cloak to perpetuate some vested interests? How could the wider (sic) national interest’ be said to have served when close to one-half of Indian people comprising of constitutionally un-recognised languages speaking communities were made to labour against impediments and hindrances of every description? How wide is ‘wider national interest,’ one wonders.

And then there have been variations of the theme.

To a delegation led by Nepali Bhasa Samiti which met the then Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, at New Delhi on 15th April 1972, it was made out that the question of inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule needed to be examined from the standpoint of “security.”

The delegation pointed out that the issue was being made unnecessarily complicated.

Pressed for elaborating the point as what did Smt. Gandhi actually mean by relating the issue to ‘security’ she, when the Samiti delegation met her the second time six months later at Darjeeling, explained the plaguing enigma by expressing her apprehension that according constitutional recognition to Nepali at that juncture would hasten others to mount similar demands.

That was evading taking decision and seeking refuge in status quoism. Languages like persons should be recognised as they come of age.

Pointed questions by members of the delegation eliied [sic] further welcome clarifications from Smt. Gandhi that the Central Government did not look at Nepalis as a foreign language, (that the Central Government viewed it so was only rumour spread by interested parties to sow dissension in border areas, she said) and that the Government of India had no reason to doubt the political loyalty of Indian Nepalis towards the constituted authority of the country. Smt. Gandhi granted alright that the Nepalese demand merited dueful consideration.

But it has to be found out as how could the ‘security’ strain of thinking be forcibly dragged in, and requirement of Article 351 and aspect of security—by all means, two disparate considerations—hitchted (sic) together.
That tagging ‘security’ on to Article 351, as the earlier move to smother a minority-demand by conjuring up ‘wider national interests’ confirmed our fear that extra-constitutional calculations were being brought into play while constitutional stipulations were conveniently given a go-by.

Should not one think in terms of moving the Supreme Court on this count?

Smt. Gandhi all along counselled patience. In the meeting held in the Parliament House on 24th March 1973 which the Samiti attended, she made it known that she was seized of the matter and that the ‘van’ was surely moving ahead (‘Gari aage bar rahi hai’).

The Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, in its meeting held on 3rd December 1974, recognised Nepali as one of the Indian literary languages.

The General Election 1977 overnight changed the political scene in the country.

A delegation of Nepali Bhasa Samiti waited on the Prime Minister, Shri Morarji Desai, at new Delhi on 29th September 1977. To their amazement and dismay the delegated found Shri Desai oddly ill-informed and ill-briefed on the Nepalese demand. How could a Prime Minister in his right mind try to brow-beat a delegation by threatening to order disbanding of Gorkha regiments in the Indian army, to bring about derecognition of Nepali by the Sahitya Akademi baffles understanding. But then in a reply he was shortly made to make to questions tabled by Shri Saugata Roy in the Parliament Shri Desai roundly disclaimed having said anything resembling all that.

Refusing to be stilled or silenced, Indian Nepalis, confident of endurance of their struggle to outline many a Government and Prime Minister, met at Darjeeling and promptly re-cast the All-India Nepali Bhasa Samiti. The Janata Party, the congress, the CPI (M), the CPI, the Gorkha League joined the Samiti. Nepalese social, cultural, literary and academic organizations have all along been the unfailing supports of the Samiti.

Shri Morarji Desai’s replies indeed caused wide-spread resentment amongst Nepalis in India. In all actuality, a flammable situation was gone through. One owed it to the wide and fearless helmsmanship exercised by the All-India Nepali Bhasa Samiti that no untoward outbreak was allowed to take place.

An engulfing sense of general resentment and indignation was channeled by staging on the 11th December the Bikshob Diwas (The Protest Day) in the form of massive solemn demonstrations that reverberated through seven of the North-Eastern States.

[Page 5]
The State Legislative Assembly of Sikkim adopted unanimously on 11th October 1977, an official resolution urging upon the Union Government to include Nepali in the Eighth Schedule and thus to accord Nepali its rightful status as a national language.

Nepalis make up 77% of the total population of Sikkim. Nepali language besides its being the first official language (Bhutia and Lepcha being the other two) is the lingua franca of the State.

Even before that on 2nd July 1977, the West Bengal Legislative Assembly adopted a similar resolution moving the Centre to include Nepali in the Eighth Schedule.

The Second All-India Conference (Biennial) of the Nepali Bhasa Samiti was held at Darjeeling, West Bengal on 14th-16th April, 1978.

Letters wishing success of the conference were received from Shri A. B. A. Ghani Khanchoudhury, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee Minister of External Affairs, Shri Buddhadev Bhattacharjee Information Minister W.B., Shri Chandra Sekher, Shri C. Rajeswar Rao, Shri D.D. Pugh CM Meghalaya, Shri E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Prof. Hiren Mukherjee, Smt. Indira Gandhi, Shri Jyoti Basu CM West Bengal, Shri Lhendup Dorji Khangsharpa CM Sikkim, Shri Nripen Chakraborty CM Tripura, Shri Piloo Mody, Shri Shanta Kumar CM Himachal Pradesh, Prof. Umashanker Joshi President Sahitya Akademi.

The Conference concluded with a fifty thousand strong grand rally and, amongst other resolutions, formation of an all-India federation Sambaidhanik Manyatakangshi Bharatiya Bhasa Samiti (Committee of Indian Languages Demanding Constitutional Recognition) to jointly work for inclusion in the Eighth Schedule of Dogri, Konkani, Maithili, Manipuri, Nepali, Rajasthani and such other Indian languages as will later join the federation. Eminent scholars representing the languages attended the Conference.

Formation of the joint committee significantly demonstrated that no fewer than ten crores of Indian people would endorse the legitimacy of demand of the six languages.

[page 6]

Here we would like to make it clear that the Nepalese movement is not directed against any person, party, language or Government.

The movement is directed against discriminatory deprival of constitutional recognition to Nepali language. It is directed against the process of increasingly heaping upon us all forms of disadvantages and indignity only for failure on our part to secure a berth for Nepali language in the all-important Eighth Schedule.

Here again it will not be out of place to correct a misconception that persists which is rather deliberately fostered regarding the genesis of Indian Nepalis. They who claim to be delivers of the past and yet describe Indian Nepalis in Darjeeling, Sikkim, Dooars and adjacent areas as “Settlers” betray their animosity and blatant ignorance of history of the region. The Rongs (Lepchas) and the Jongs (Limbus) were no other than a Nepalese tribe that has comimgled with
other Nepalese tribes, such as the Magars originally inhabiting the area around Magarjong in the district of Darjeeling, to make up Nepali nationality in India. The Khasas were one more such tribe and an important one in that the Nepali language has evolved from Khas speech. You have it on the authority of Grierson (Linguistic Survey of India, Vol. IX, Pt. IV.) that “by the time of the composition of this work (Markandeya Purana composted in the Gupta Age) the Khasas had already reached Nepal and Darjeeling, where they are still a numerous body.”

This region changed hands several times. Finally in 1816 as a result of the Nepal-British War, the region was annexed.

Do you want only to grab land in this Nepalese region and throw out the Nepalese people? Keep them perpetually under conquest and subjugation? For that is what the Union Government’s refusal to accept the legitimate Nepalese demand amounts to.

[page 7]

Situations—persecutory situations—exist in India to-day where Indian Nepalis are made to leave the place having been (officially) branded ‘foreigners’ and that for their not being speakers of any Eighth-Scheduled language. Instances are not wanting of Indian Nepalis not being allowed to register themselves as voters. A comparative study of figures for Nepalese population and Nepalese voters in the districts in Northern States will bear this out.

Nepalis in tens of thousands are prevented from returning Nepali as their mother tongue for the Census. Proof, if proof be needed, can be adduced. How does one explain the fact that the 1961-71 dicennial growth rate for the country as a while being 24.66 per cent it is in respect of Indian Nepalis 62 per cent? Clearly the 1961 Census figures for Indian Nepalis did not accord with facts.

We feel that no government machinery will be, despite its best wishes and efforts, able to effectively implement or enforce for Indian Nepalis the safeguards for minorities preserved in the Constitution unless Nepali is given constitutional recognition.

The Union Government had better not changed stances and shifted grounds. The latest addition on the list of variations of the theme is of “practicability”. How is it that admitting only 15 languages in the Schedule is practicable and not 16, or 21? The plea rings patently hollow.

We must cry a halt to inconsistency and arbitrariness in Government dealings.

The Union Government owes it to the nation to prescribe norms for including languages in the Eighth Schedule.

[page 8]

Does a language have to have a State? A sizeable population? A rich literature?....? If linguistic Statehood be the criterion, Nepali is official language in two States—West Bengal and Sikkim. If the size of population is the criterion there are more than 60 lakhs Indian nationals speaking
Nepali as their first and second language. Going even by the 1961 Census figures Nepalese population far exceeded the Sindhi in 1967 when language of the latter was granted recognition in the Eighth Schedule. As regards development of Nepalese literature it suffices to say that the Sahitya Akademi has recognised it.

The All-India Nepali Bhasha Samiti proposes that languages as have been recognised by the Sahitya Akademi be accorded constitutional recognition as national languages by the Union Government.

Thus we have pleaded for bringing about an atmosphere of positiveness and security in the country.

All-India Nepali Bhasa Samiti
Appendix R

An Introduction to Nepali Language and a Case for Its Constitutional Recognition
[Selections]^{21}

Origin and Development of the Nepali Language (page 6)

Nepali was known by various names at different periods of its history. A probe into these names helps us trace its history in proper perspective.

Originally Nepali was known as the Khas Kura—or the speech of the Khasas, people who find mention in the Mahabarata, Puranas, Kalhana’s Rajtarangini, the works of many ancient Greek and Roman writers and a number of Indian epigraphs. Almost everywhere they are shown as a people inhabiting the north-western parts of the Indian sub-continent. Some scholars opine that the word Khas is found in many place-names, e.g. Kashmir, Kashgar, Hindu Kush, of the region. The Tibetan name for Kashmiris is Khacche (Khasa). In Garhwal the name Khasparjiya is retained for the language of the people. The Newars, the Tibeto-Burman speaking autochtones of the Kathmandu valley, which valley along was called Nepal in the past, still call the Nepali language as Khay-bhay or the Khas speech.

G.A. Grierson, R. L. Turner, Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee and some others observe that the cause of all the Indo-Aryan speeches along the sub-Himalayan belt having distinct common traits is the fact that their having been carried into their present habitats by the migration of the Khasas from their earlier home in the northeast.

Similarities in the languages from Chamba to Nepal led another linguistic, Bains, to call them Pahari or the speeches of the hills. He divided them broadly into three groups, namely Western Pahari of the Punjab Himalayas, Central Pahari of Garhwal-Kumaun and Eastern Pahari or Nepali. A closer resemblance between the Garhwali and Nepali languages has been underlined by the Census Report of 1971 which says that the figures of the speaker of these two languages should be collectively represented.

Scholars are divided in their opinions as to which Middle Indo-Aryan or Prakrit gave birth to these languages. One opinion is that it was derived from Saurasani. Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee and a few others hold that they must have been derived from Khasa Apabhramsa or Khas Prakrit.

Many archaeological finds, by Guiseppe Tucci, the renowned orientalist of Italy, and other researches and corroborative narrations in Tibetan texts indisputably establish that by the twelfth century A.D. a large Khasa kingdom, comprising parts of South Western Tibet, Garhwal and the area which forms parts of the present Western Nepal, had come into being. Its early rulers with ‘challa’ name-endings were Buddhists. In a Sanskrit inscription found at Bodhagaya, one of these kings, Asokachalla, calls himself ‘Khasarajadhiraja’ or lord of the Khasa kingdom. It is dated Circa 1274 A.D.

^{21} Published by the Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad, no date. All footnotes are reproduced from the original text and all italics, bold, and spellings are reproduced exactly as printed.
Asokachalla’s descendants have left a number of inscriptions also in a language which even a cursory reading establishes, has a close resemblance to modern Nepali. This inscriptive language has now been accepted as one derived from the old Khasa speech and is taken as proto-Nepali. The earliest extant inscription of the kind so far has been dated 1259 Saka era or 1337 A.D.

In all probability the Khasa language was spoken over a wide area of the north west in the remote past. A scholar even says that it was also spoken in the Madra country (Lahore region) during the Mahabharata period and Kunti, the mother of the Pandavas, was Khasa-speaker." Grierson also notes that by the time of the composition of the Markandeya Purana, the Khasa speaking people must have reached Nepal and Darjeeling.

Be that as it may, we should note that this language was in use in India for centuries before the emergence of the present kingdom of Nepal and the Republic of India.

The Khasas, who had migrated to the present Western Nepal, carried with them their language and Khas Kura or the Khasa speech spread in Nepal. The once powerful Khasa Kingdom began to decline from the fifteenth century. A cause of this decline was the pressure put on it by the emigrants from Rajputana and western India who sought the refuge of the hills when invaded by the Muslims. The Khasas, under pressure, moved toward the east. Many of them found employment under the Newar kings of the Kathmandu or Nepal valley and neighbouring principalities. Royal edicts addressed by a Newar king to the Khasas in the latter’s language evinces their settlement in the Nepal valley in the seventeenth century.

The Khasa kingdom yielded place to a number of petty fiefdoms and principalities. A few of such princesdom were carved out by the emigrants who claimed Rajput decent. In course of time such emigrants had also accepted the principal language of the area or the Khasa language. The eastward movement of the Khasas gradually spread their language in the regions predominated by Tibeto-Burman speaking tribes like Magars, Gurungs, Newars and later in the areas of Tamangs, Sunwars, Sherpas, Kiratis, or Rais, Limbus, and Lepchas. T.W. Clark, reader in Bengali in the University of London, sums up, “….the eastern movement of the Khas continued. In the 17th century Nepali, Khas bhasha as it was probably known then, was in official use in the Court of Kathmandu, and there is some evidence that in the 18th Century it was being spoken in Dhankuta (in the present day Eastern Nepal) and probably also in Sikkim.”

A process of accultuation between the Indo-Aryan speakers and the Tibeto-Burman speakers had begun centuries before the conquests by the small kingdom of Gorkha who claimed Rajput descent and forged the present kingdom of Nepal. As the Tibeto-Gurman speeches like Newari, Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Sunawar and others were mutually unintelligible, it was but natural for the Khasa speech to serve as the common medium of communication between such groups. Rightly has one scholar remarked, “Nepali was the genuine speech of the country much more earlier than the Gorkha invasion.”

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22 Hariram Joshi, Pratibha Darsan (Hindi).
The kingdom of Gorkha had been carved out of the Magar-Gurun region by Dravya Shah, who claimed Rajput descent, in 1559. Sanskritists tend to derive the name of the place, Gorkha, from ‘go raksha’ protection of the cow’ and also from the fact that the temple of Gorakhnath, the famous Indian siddha, had been established there. However, other scholars derived the name from a Tibeto-Gurman word ‘garkha, meaning a settlement or village.

The ascendency of the House of Gorkha at the cost of its neighbours began during the reign of Prithvinarayan Shah (reigned 1743-75). His dream of conquering there city-kingsdoms of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhadgaon in the Nepal valley, made rich by the Tibet trade of the Newars and marked for their affluence and architectural splendour, was realised in 1769-70. Prithvinarayan shifted his headquarters to Kathmandu in 1771. Thus his territorial expansion came to be known as Nepal.

The Gorkha conquests continued under the descendants of Prithvinarayan. More Tibeto-Burman regions in the east and the fiefdoms and principalities risen on the ashes of the old Khasa kingdom in the west were subjugated. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the new kingdom of Nepal under Gorkha had stretched from the river Satlaj in the west to the river Tista in the east.

A clash between the growing Gorkha power and the equally ambitious British was imminent. The Anglo-Nepal war broke out in 1814. By the treaty of Sugauli in 1815 Nepal had to cede the recently conquered territories between the Satlaj and the Mahakali in the west and the Sikkim territories, of which Darjeeling was a part, from the Singelila range and the river Mechi to the River Tista in the east. This face also explains why there are sizable numbers of Nepali speaking people in Dehradun region in the west and Darjeeling and Sikkim in the east.

The use of the Khasa speech by its original speakers as the first language and by the Tibeto-Burman speaking tribes as their second language in the areas which were amalgamated by the conquests of Gorkha as Nepal gave the language its prevalent name, Nepali, just five years after the Anglo-Nepal war, J.A. Ayton, an Assistant Professor of Fort William College in Calcutta published the first grammar of this language as A Grammar of the Nepalese Language (1820). It was in the same year that Dr. Gilchrist of Fort William College brought out the first Hindi grammar.

The language, however, continued to be known by other names like Parbate, either meaning a speech of the hill people or because of its prevalence in Parbata, a part of the old Khas kingdom, Pahari, and Khas Kura. Bhanubhakta Acharya (1814-69), the composer of the Nepali Ramayana, who is regarded as the national poet of the Nepali speaking world, called this language simply as bhasha. It was like Bengali being known as Prakrit until the seventeenth century.

Some years before Bhanubhakta’s birth, Colonel William Kirkpatrick, who had visited the newly formed kingdom of Nepal, collected 550 Nepali words and published them in 1811. However, he calls the language Parbate. But long back, an Italian, Cassiano Beligatti, who published his Alphabutum from Rome in 1771, had mentioned Nepali in it as a major language.

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25 W. Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, London 1811, says ‘purbutti.’
William Carey (1761-1843) of the Serampore Mission notes Nepali as one of the thirty three important languages of India. The Nepali bible, published by the Serampore Mission in 1821, is the first Nepali book in the whole of which is printed in the devanagri. Earlier only Nepali sentences in Ayton’s grammar were printed in this script.

A very keen and careful observer who collected the history of Nepal and the principalities amalgamated in it, Frances B. Hamilton, observed in 1802-03, “The language spoken by the mountain Hindus in the vicinity of Kathmandu, is usually called the Parbatiya bhasha, or mountain dialect, but west from the capital, it is more commonly known by the name of Khas basha, or dialect of the Khas country, because it seems to have been first introduced into the territory of that name….and it is making rapid progress in extinguishing the aboriginal dialect of the mountains.”26 Brian Houghton Hodgson, the erudite British Resident at Kathmandu for many years, counted in 1823 “thirteen distinct and strongly marked dialects” in the “mountainous parts of the limits of the present kingdom of Nepali” and listed them as “the khas or Parbattia, Magar, the Gurung, the Sunwar, the Kachari, the Haiyu, the Chepang, the Kesunda, the Murmi (Tamang), the Newar, the Kiranti, the Limbuan and the Lapchen.”27

Early writers of the language like Shaktiballabh Aryal called it ‘lokabhasha’ or the ‘language of the common folk’ in 1789, while another called it ‘rajbhasha’ or ‘royal language.’ The Nepali language was at times designated as ‘Gorkhali’ or ‘Gurkhali’ for two reasons.

First, the British power had to contend with the kingdom of Gorkha, then at the height of the career of conquest. As the kingdom of Nepal was forged by Gorkha, the British mistook all the hardy people from the hills, whether belonging to Gorkha or subjugated by it, as the Gorkhas. The British, who started recruiting hillmen from Nepal in the British Indian army since 1815, called their recruits ‘Gurkhas’. This name has thus become a synonymous of the soldier and also the security personnel in many parts of India. Why only India? Even today in Jumla, Doti, and their neighbourhood in western Nepal, once parts of the Khasa kingdom, the word implies the political domination of Gorkha. By Gorkha the people of that region mean government official from Kathmandu or an officer deputed by the ‘Gorkha Raj.’ The following comment of C.J. Morris is illuminating, “The Western Dominion is inhabited by the Doti and other tribes who are not pure Gurkhas.”28

The British army officers gave the name Gurkhal or Gorkhali to the language. However, T.W. Clark says, “The language of the Gorkhalis was Nepali.”29 C.J. Morris also writes, “with the exception of certain tribes nearly all Gurkhas are bilingual. In addition to their tribal languages, which belong to the group known as Tibeto-Burman, they speak Nepali, which is the lingua franca of the country, with varying degrees of efficiency.”30 It is clear that the word ‘Gurkha’ thus generally stood for a recruit from Nepal. The situation is aptly described by Byron Farewell. He wrote in 1984, most tribes even have their own language, the lingua franca of Nepal is Nepalese (or Gurkhali, as it is called in the army), but prior to the mid-1930s many

26 Francis B. Hamilton, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal, Edinburgh, 1819, p. 16.
recruits could not speak it, and even today there are a few who speak only their tribal language and must learn Gorkhali in the army.”

The second reason why the name Gorkhali for the language was used by some writers in the second half of the nineteenth century was to register the reality of the political domination of Gorkha. It meant socio-economic domination of the high caste Bramans and Kshatriyas, popularly called Bahuns and Chettris over the other ethnolinguistic groups. As a matter of fact the rise of Gorkha was due to their brawn and brain. The Tibeto-Burman tribes often dub Nepali as ‘bahun-Chhetri ko-kura’ or the language of the two high castes. As a mark of their domination some of the high caste ruling elites began to call the language Gorkhali. The Nepali government, also called the ‘Gorkha Raj,’ seems to have patronised the practice. Thus this name has a narrower connotation.

In the case of the Indian Nepalese, a vast majority of whom are the descendants of the Tibeto-Burman speakers, the Nepali language has become their first language or the mother language. Thus Nepali has become, for various historical reasons, the very basis for an Indian subnationality. If Nepali is called rashtra bhasha or the State language in Nepal, the Indian Nepalese call it their jatiya bhasha to mean the language of the subnationality in the multi-lingual India, a nation of many sub-nationalities.

Till 1927 the Bengal government called the language as ‘Nepalese Pahariya or Khaskura. The Nepali Sahitya Sammelan, founded at Darjeeling in 1924, unanimously resolved to move the government for changing to name simply as Nepali. The demand was accepted by issuing a Government Notification No. 11499 A on 30 July 1927. The Calcutta University used to call the language as ‘Nepali Parbattiya.’ The Nepali Sahitya Sammelan in its meeting of 30 April 1932, “resolved that Nepali is the only right term to denote the language in question.” The University accepted it.

An Unnecessary Controversy

An attempt to impose arbitrarily the name Gorkha in place of Nepali to denote the language is being made in certain quarters on the ground that Nepali is related to a foreign country, Nepal. It is argued that India must distinguish themselves from Nepal and Nepali by assuming the name Gorkha for themselves and their language! It is preposterous to say that those who speak Gorkha language are loyal to India and the people who call their language Nepali are not Indians and are anti-nationals! At times it is also being said to the less informed people that Gorkha and Nepali are two separate and distinct languages!

It is a totally different matter if someone is making a move to sabotage the demand for the constitutional recognition of Nepali by creating confusions. However, the linguists and scholars, both Nepali and non-Nepali, who know the history of the language and also about Nepali-speaking Indians understand the folly of the argument which has but mischief lurking behind it. Several strong arguments and historical facts may be cited to demolish such a stand.

31 Byron Farwell, Gurkhas London 1984, p. 22.
If Nepali and Gorkhali are two separate languages let the protagonists of the Gorkha name translate any Nepali sentence into Gorkha and show the world the difference between the two.

Secondly, what is Gorkha? Where is it? Is it in India? Gorkha is situated about one hundred kilometres to the west of Kathmandu. C.J. Morris wrote decades back, ‘The term Gorkha should rightly be applied only to the inhabitants of the place of the name and their descendents.’\(^{32}\) The dictionary compiled by the Royal Nepal Academy gives the meanings of Gorkha and Gorkhali\(^{33}\) as “Gorkha-I. The name of a district in the Gandaki region of the Western Development Zone of Nepal” and “Gorkha-I. An inhabitant of Gorkha; of Gorkha. 2. A resident of the district of Gorkha. 3. A name given by foreigners to the Nepalis in view of their bravery.”

It is a well known fact that till recent times the State power of Nepal was known there as “Gorkha Raj.” The name of the official daily of Nepal is Gorkhapatra and the highest State honour awarded by the government of the country is designated ‘Gorkha Dakshina bahu’ or ‘the Right Hand of Gorkha.’ The recruits from Nepal in the British army are called ‘British Gurkhas.’ The State literary committee, appointed by the Government of Nepal in 1920, for controlling and censoring all matters for publication was named Gorkha Bhasha Pracharini Samiti.

An author writes, “Until the 1920s the most commonly used name for this language was Gorkhali or, in its anglicised form, ‘Gurkha.’ Indeed, it seems that the ruling elites of unified Nepal favoured and even actively encouraged the use of this term. Gorkhali and Gorkha Bhasha were names which were directly related to their more recent origins.”\(^{34}\) He also adds, “Many Nepalese, especially for whom it is not a mother-tongue, still use terms as Gorkhali, Parbatiya and even Khas kura for the Nepali language, just as many of them still use the name Nepal only to refer to the Kathmandu valley.”\(^{35}\)

How can then one say that the name Gorkha is not related to a foreign country Nepal? The arguments like, the place called Gorakhpur can give Indian identity to the Gorkhas is marked by their sheer puerility. If that be so, there is a place called Nepalganj in the South 24 Pargana district of West Bengal. There are also many Bangali gentlemen bearing the name Nepal, for example, Nepal Roy, Nepal Bhattacharya. Do they have a sense of belonging to Nepal then?

Scores of books have been written on the Gurkhas but nowhere in them one finds any description of the Indian Nepalis. All such books are about the people of Nepal. To give a few important titles: Gurkhas, in the Indian Army Handbooks series, by E. Vansittart (1906) and C. J. Morriss (1933 revised 1936, reprint 1942) describe principal areas of Nepal from where recruits usually came to the depots in India; their tribal and clan names, and their manners and customs; The Gurkhas; Their Manners, Customs and country (London 1928) by W.B. Northey and C.J.

\(^{32}\) C.J. Morris, Gurkhas, p. 38.


\(^{35}\) Ibid, p. 34.

The English language was a potent weapon in the hands of Gandhiji. Nehru, Patel and other national leaders in their fight against the foreign rulers whose mother tongue was English. Did anyone dare to call our national leaders anti-national and the name of English been changed in India, or, for that matter, anywhere else in the world? Loyalty to one’s country depends on one’s mentality, not the language one uses. A language often transcends political frontiers and becomes the common property of many nations. Bengali, Urdu, Panjabi, Sindhi, Tamil are a few languages shared by India and other countries of the Sub-Continent, namely, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Why, pray, in the case of Nepali only a confusion is being made up by vested interests?

It should also be remembered that since the very first census in 1871 the predominant population of Darjeeling are shown as Nepalese. Under the title Nepalese were enumerated both the caste Hindus and the Tibeto-Burman speaking tribes like Magar, Gurung, Newar, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, etc. C.F. Magarth’s first Census of the Darjeeling district in 1871-72 states, “The Nepalis….form 34 percent of population of the District.” The figure 33,211 of the Nepalis included only 51 persons who were enumerated as Gurkha. All subsequent Census Reports and accounts of Darjeeling have described these people as Nepalese. The Census of 1941, as given in the Darjeeling Gazetteer of 1947 (p. 65), records that of the total population of 3,76,810 the Nepalese under whom Magar, Gurung, Newar, Tamang and other were listed, numbered 2,54,608, that is, about 68 per cent. No one seems to have enumerated himself as a Gorkha. The *Census 1951 West Bengal District Handbooks* shows that out of the total population of 3,19,635 these Nepalese numbered 2,90,000. No one entered himself as a Gorkha. Since 1935, when Darjeeling was made a partially excluded area, the Nepalese there have been participated in elections. Sri Ari Bahadur Gurung was even a signatory to the Constitution of India as a member of the Constituent Assembly. Many Nepalese have become legislator and ministers of West Bengal. Were they not Indian nationals?

Generations of Indian Nepalese have been making their contributions to the process of nation-building in the task of protecting this nation, earning encomiums for their gallantry, a sense of duty and selfless service. India fought wars with China and Pakistan. Was there any case of any Indian Nepali fleeing from his duty or showing disloyalty to the country?

The name Nepali for the language has now been universally accepted. Nepali is taught in many universities of India. The Sahitya Akademi, the apex literary body of the nation has recognised Nepali as a major literary language of India. Nepali is an official language of the state of Sikkim. It is also recognised by the West Bengal Official Language Act of 1961. The Resolutions of the Legislative Assemblies of West Bengal, Sikkim, and Tripura have strongly

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37 Ibid, p. 45.
recommended the inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. The All India Nepali Bhasha Sammelan, held at Gangtok on 11th and 12th June 1990 and attended by about a thousand delegates from different parts of the country, from Jammu-Kashmir to Manipur, and also by seven members of Parliament representing national political parties like the Congress (I), Janta Dal, Bharatiya Janta Party, Communist Party of India (Marxist), Forward Bloc, was unanimous in its resolution to fight for the inclusion of Nepali in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution.

Why this demand? Since 1956 innumerable memoranda have been submitted to the Union Government, many Members of Parliament raised this demand on the floors of both the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha. The movement for the constitutional recognition of Nepali was spearheaded by the All India Nepali Bhasha Samiti since 1972 through many vicissitudes, and now the Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Parishad, founded by the All India Nepali Bhasha Sammelan at Gangtok on 12 June 1990, with its Chairman as Sri Nar Bahadur Bhandari, the Honourable Chief Minister of Sikkim, has set the constitutional recognition of Nepali as its principal objective.
## Appendix S

### Self-Reported Language Distribution of Tourist Shop Workers [n=38]<sup>38</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shop TOTALS</th>
<th>Out of 21 individuals</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>8 other languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>How interviewed</th>
<th>Nepali</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Hindi</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
<th>Other languages</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>X&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Alone</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Tamang</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>yes</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>Kashmiri, Punjabi, Urdu</td>
</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>With #16</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Urdu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>With #15</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>With #18</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>38</sup> I interviewed 38 individuals in 36 shops and informal *dokāns* [stalls].

<sup>39</sup> An “X” means the individual did not self-report to speak that language.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Hindi</th>
<th>Bengali</th>
<th>Other languages</th>
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<td>yes</td>
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<td>Tibetan</td>
</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Alone</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dokān TOTALS* | Out of 21 individuals ➞ 17 | 10 | 16 | 15 | 3 other languages |

**FULL SURVEY TOTALS** | Out of 38 individuals ➞ 36 | 31 | 33 | 28 | 10 other languages |
Appendix T
West Bengal Official Language Act of 1961
Selection

GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL
LAW DEPARTMENT
LEGISLATIVE

WEST BENGAL ACT XXIX OF 1961
THE WEST BENGAL OFFICIAL LANGUAGE ACT, 1961
(PASSED BY THE WEST BENGAL LEGISLATURE)


An act to provide for the adoption of the Bengali Language as the language to be used for the official purposes of the State of West Bengal including purposes of legislation.

It is hereby enacted in the Twelfth year of the Republic of India, by the Legislature of West Bengal as follows:

1. Short title and extent:
   (i) This Act may be called the West Bengal Official Language Act, 1961.
   (ii) It extends to the whole of West Bengal.

2. Language or Languages to be used for official purposes of the State. With effect from such date, not later than two years from the date of commencement of this Act, as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint in this behalf:

   (a) In the three hill subdivisions of the district of Darjeeling, namely, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong, the Bengali Language and the Nepali Language, and
   (b) elsewhere, the Bengali Language, shall be the language or languages to be used for the official purposes of the State of West Bengal, referred to in the West Bengal Official Act, 1961.

(West Bengal Act XXIV of 1961)

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40 Reproduced from Samanta 2000, Appendix H.
Appendix U

Settlement and creation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council
22 August 1988

The demands of the GNLF have been considered by the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal and consequent upon the tripartite meeting between Shri Buta Singh, Union Home Minister, Shri Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of West Bengal and Shri Subash Ghisingh, President, GNLF at New Delhi on 25.7.1988, it is hereby agreed between Government of India, Government of West Bengal, and GNLF as below.

1. SEPARATE STATE OF GORKHALAND

In the overall national interest and in response to Prime Minister’s call, the GNLF agree to drop the demand for a separate State of Gorkhaland. For the social, economic, educational and cultural advancement of the people residing in the Hill areas of Darjeeling district, it was agreed to have an autonomous Hill Council to be set up under a State Act. The salient features of the Hill Council would be as follows:

(i) The name of the council will be ‘Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.’

(ii) The Council will cover the three hill sub-divisions of Darjeeling district, namely, Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Kurseong, plus the Mouzas of Lohagarh T.C., Lohagarh Forest, Eangmohan, Barachenga, Panighata, Choto Adalpur, Paharu, Sukna Forest, Sukna Part-I, Pantapati Forest-I, Mahanadi Forest, Champasari Forest and Salbari Chhart Part-II within Siliguri subdivision.

(iii) The State Government agrees to lease to the Council after it is formed, or acquire for it the use of such land as may be required and necessary for administrative and developmental purposes, anywhere in the State and in particular in or around ‘Darjeeling More’ in Siliguri sub-division.

(iv) The executive powers of the Council will cover the following subjects subject to the provisions of the Central and State laws:-

(1) the allotment, occupation or use, or setting apart, of land other than any land which is a reserved forest, for the purpose of agriculture or grazing, or for residential or other non-agricultural purposes, or for any other purpose likely to promote the interest of the inhabitants of any village, locality or town;

(2) the management of any forest, not being a reserved forest;

(3) the use of any canal or watercourse for the purpose of agriculture;

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41 Reproduced from Moktan 2004: 152-154. There are various versions of this agreement in circulation; most differ in minor areas like verb tense and spelling/number errors, i.e. the difference between ‘Salbari Chhat Part I’ (Chadha 2005: 491), ‘Salbari Chhat Part II’ (Sarkar and Bhaumik 2000: 181), and ‘Salbari Chhart Part II’ (Moktan 2004: 152).’ I have marked those areas of disagreement with [sic].
(4) agriculture;
(5) public health and sanitation, hospital and dispensaries;
(6) tourism;
(7) vocational training;
(8) public works-development and planning;
(9) construction and maintenance of all roads except National highways and State highways;
(10) transport and development of transport;
(11) management of burials and burial grounds, cremation and cremation grounds;
(12) preservation, protection and improvement of livestock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practice;
(13) pounds and the prevention of cattle trespass;
(14) water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankment, water storage;
(15) fisheries;
(16) management of markets and fairs not being already managed by Municipal authorities, Panchayat Samiti or Gram Panchayats;
(17) education-primary, secondary and higher secondary;
(18) works, lands and buildings vested in or in the lawful possession of the Council;
(19) small scale and cottage industries.

(v) The Council shall exercise general powers or supervision over Panchayat Samities, Gram Panchayats and Municipalities falling within the area of the Council’s jurisdiction.42

(vi) The General Council will have a total of 42 members out of which 28 will be elected and the rest nominated by the State Government.

(vii) There will be an Executive Council and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the General Council will be ex-officio [members] of the Executive Council with the Chairman of the General Council functioning as the Chief Executive Councillor. The Chief Executive Councillor will nominate 5 members to the Executive Council from out of the elected members of the Council and the State Government will nominate 2 members to the Executive Council from out of the non-official nominated members of the General Council.

(viii) The Chairman of the General Council cum Chief Executive Councillor will have the ex-officio status and privileges of a Minister in the Council of Ministers in the State.

42 “The Council shall exercise the general powers of supervision over Panchayats and Municipalities falling within the area of the Council’s jurisdiction” (Chadha 2005: 492).
(ix) The Bill for setting up the Hill Council will be introduced and passed in a [special] session of the State Legislature which has been summoned. The election to the Hill Council will be held by the 15th December, 1988.

2. RESTORATION OF NORMALCY:

(i) Review of pending criminal cases:
It is agreed that a review will be done by the State Government of all the cases registered under various laws against persons involved in the GNLF agitation. Action will be taken, in the light of the review, not to proceed with prosecution in all cases except those charged with murder. Release of persons in custody will follow with withdrawal of cases. This review will be completed within 15 days of signing of this agreement.

(ii) Action against Government servants:
The State Government agrees to withdraw all cases of disciplinary action taken against employees in the context of the agitation. There will be no victimisation of Government servants.

(iii) The GNLF agrees to issue a call to its cadre [sic] for the surrender of all authorised arms to the district administration. It will be made clear in the call that such surrenders made voluntarily within the prescribed date will not attract any prosecution.

(iv) The GNLF hereby agrees to withdraw all agitational activities and to extend full cooperation to the administration for the maintenance of peace and normalisation of the political process in the hill areas of Darjeeling.
Appendix V
Interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai43
29 September 1977

Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bhasa Samiti [All India Nepali Language Committee]
Head Office: Darjeeling

Interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Moraji Desai

According to [in response to] the telegram from Mr. Moraji Desai, dated 20 September 1977, the representatives of various regions of Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bhasa Samiti [All India Nepali Language Committee] were met by the Prime Minister in his own secretarial office, South Block, New Delhi, at 1:50 pm on the 29th of Sept 1977 for the interview. Among the representatives there were members of different regions such as 6 from Darjeeling, 3 from Sikkim, 3 from Megalaya, 3 from Mizoram, 3 from Uttar Pradesh, 1 from Himachal Pradesh and 5 from Delhi which made the total of 27 members. The representative body was headed by the samiti’s [committee’s] General Secretary, Mr. Prem Kumar Allay. The Prime Minister was in his office with two of his stenographers. The exact interview between the samiti [committee] and the Prime Minister is given below:

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—(After presenting the reminder to the Prime Minister).
We thank you for giving us this interview. The representatives of Indian Nepalis from the different states of India hope that you will consider our demand sympathetically. With your permission, we would like to read this memorandum to you.

PM—No need to read it, I will read it myself (after giving a glance to the memorandum). This is not the first representative body for the demand of Nepali language. I told the former representative bodies also that this cannot be done. I tell you too that I am not in favor of expanding the Eighth Schedule.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—Can we know what kind of difficulty will arise if Nepali language is included in the 8th schedule

PM—Should I give the reason for every decision I make? If we include this language, we have to open doors for other tribal languages.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—But Nepali is a developed language which has also been recognized by Sahitya Akademi [Literary Academy, in New Delhi]. It is also one of the official languages in West Bengal, even in Sikkim 75% of the population have Nepali as their mother language. A bill proposing the inclusion of Nepali in the 8th Schedule has already been passed in the legislative assembly of Bengal, Sikkim is also doing the same...

PM—Whatever facilities have been given to you should make you satisfied. Sahitya Akademi

43 In Language Committee documents, file #1 फ़ोटो—1972-1977.
can recognize even a foreign language. If you talk on the basis of recognition given by Sahitya Akademi, should I cancel the recognition. I can do it very easily. Nepalis in Darjeeling District of West Bengal have enough benefits.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—But we have come not only from Darjeeling. Nepali speaking Indians are not only in Darjeeling but also in other states such as Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram, Megalaya, everywhere.

PM—Mizoram has its own problems, do you want to add another? Wherever you are, you should learn the language of that place and live in harmony.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—Because our language is not included in the 8th schedule, we have to refrain from many benefits. Let’s forget about other things even for the simple income of tax inspector exam, a candidate can write the answers only in the scheduled languages. We are away from many such benefits and we feel suppressed.

PM—Wherever you are, you have to harmonize with the people there. If not, you have to remain suppressed.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—That will prevent emotional unity, inclusion of our language in the 8th Schedule will increase the emotional bonding.

PM—that means such emotion has not come within you

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—We feel insecure until our language is not included in the 8th schedule. We met the former Prime Minister five times. The former government told us that it was to erase such feelings of insecurity among the Sindhis that their language was added in the 8th Schedule.

PM—If the former government had given you fake hopes, I don't want to do the same. I say it clearly that it cannot be done. It’s the mistake of the former government to give constitutional status to Sindhi language. I would not have done that mistake had I been there. You must have been encouraged by the inclusion of Sindhi in the 8th Schedule.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—That’s true, because the struggle to include both the languages started in the same period. When Sindhi language was included, their populations was 7 lakhs [700,000]. We are almost 50 lakhs [5 million].

PM—I am doubtful about your population. Let’s assume for a while, its 50 lakhs [5 million]. In a country with 60 crore population [600 million], it’s negligible. You know that there are many Hindi speakers in Nepal, why doesn't the Nepal government recognize Hindi.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—We are Indian. We have no concern about Nepal. For us, Nepal is as foreign as China, America, or Russia. Nepali is not a foreign language. Linguists like Suniti Kumar Chatterjee has also counted Nepali as before as 1956 as one of the main literary languages.
PM—Apart from Sindhi and Sanskrit, other languages included in the 8th Schedule are spoken in at least one of the Indian states. Again, your language cannot be compared with Sindhi. Sindhis are Indians, after the partition of the country they have come to India. You have come after being enrolled in the army or through other means and settled in different places. Should I stop the enrollment of Nepalis in the Indian army?

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—If a state is required in order to get a place in the 8th schedule, then Nepali is one of the official languages of West Bengal. Sikkim has also decided to make it one of the state languages. Sikkim's official language can only be Nepali. One proposal, requesting the central government to include Nepali in the 8th schedule is also being passed by Sikkim.

PM—You should learn the official language of the state—I am not in favor of including any other language in the 8th Schedule. I have told your representative body that it can't be done and if another body comes with the same demand, I will again say no

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—Sir, since you have not decided to include Nepali in the 8th Schedule...

PM—If you want to place other points, the points I make would make would be extremely bitter and sad for you.

Bhasa Samiti [Language Committee]—Anyways, thank you for the interview.

PM—You need not thank me since I could not satisfy you all.
### Appendix W
#### 2001 Census Results
##### Language

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<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percent of Total Population</th>
<th>Number of Speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eighth Schedule Languages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Hindi</td>
<td>41.03%</td>
<td>422,048,642</td>
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<tr>
<td>2  Bengali</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3  Telugu</td>
<td>7.19%</td>
<td>74,002,856</td>
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<tr>
<td>4  Marathi</td>
<td>6.99%</td>
<td>71,936,894</td>
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<tr>
<td>5  Tamil</td>
<td>5.91%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Urdu</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
<td>51,536,111</td>
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<td>7  Gujarati</td>
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<td>8  Kannada</td>
<td>3.69%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9  Malayalam</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Oriya</td>
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<td>11 Punjabi</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Assamese</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Santali</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16 Nepali</td>
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<td>17 Sindhi</td>
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<td>21 Bodo</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Sanskrit</td>
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<td><strong>Non-Eighth Schedule Languages</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Bhili/Bhilodi</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>9,582,957</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Gondi</td>
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<td>27 Tulu</td>
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<tr>
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<td>29 Mundari</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
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<td>Language</td>
<td>Percent of Total Population</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tripuri</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Lushi/Mizo</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Halabi</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Korku</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Miri/Mishing</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Munda</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Karbi/Mikir</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Koya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Ao</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Savara</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Konyak</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Kharia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>English</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Malto</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Nissi/Dafla</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Adi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Thado</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Lotha</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Coorgi/Kodagu</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rabha</td>
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<td>Angami</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Kolami</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Khond/Kondh</td>
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<td>Sangtam</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Percent of Total Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Chakru/Chokri</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bishnupuriya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kinnauri</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Paite</td>
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<td>Chang</td>
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<td>Rengma</td>
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<td>Konda</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kuki</td>
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<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Arabic/Arbi</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Parji</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lepcha</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Wancho</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>85</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Kheimmnungan</td>
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<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Nicobarese</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Percent of Total Population</td>
<td>Number of Speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>103 Deori</td>
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<td>27,960</td>
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<td>104 Lalung</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>27,072</td>
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<td>26,262</td>
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<td>23,708</td>
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<td>108 Anal</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>23,191</td>
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<td>22,646</td>
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<td>110 Maring</td>
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<td>20,857</td>
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<td>112 Balti</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>118 Rai</td>
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<tr>
<td>119 Persian</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 Afghani/Kabuli/Pashto</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>11,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122 Simte</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,026,847,940</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population of India</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,028,737,436</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

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There is a discrepancy in the numbers between the total of all languages reported and the total population. This is due, in part, to certain areas being excluded from the census (e.g. districts in Manipur). Ethnologue also lists 438 “living languages” for India (Lewis 2009); most are included under the language categories above.
Bibliography


—. In press. Emergent Nationalism, Citizenship, and Belonging: Nepalis in Banaras.


Curriculum Vitae

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Education

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Publications


“Country is my Mother, Language is my Soul.” October 2009. Anthropology News (Association for Political and Legal Anthropology Section), 50.