ORGANIZING FOR REGIME CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY UNIONISM
IN LOS ANGELES, 2000 - 2010

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Since the 1990s in Los Angeles, working class residents have crossed ethnic, religious, and spatial divides to form working class coalitions aimed at enacting social, economic, and environmental justice. This trend, referred to as community unionism, challenges elites’ narrow distribution of scarce public resources by fighting for community-driven reforms that advance the interests of broadly-shared prosperity (Tattersall, 2010; Reynolds, 1999).

Using document analysis and semi-structured interviews, I analyze three broad-based community-labor coalitions that emerged in Los Angeles between 2000 and 2010 to understand how urban governance has changed – both as a result of the progressive community’s recent coalition building efforts and as a result of the ways in which L.A.’s broader power structure, itself, has evolved. Specifically, I ask the following questions: (1) what factors account for the three coalitions’ emergence and relative success and (2) to what extent has a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful elite regime?
This case study of progressive, working class activism in Los Angeles conveys detailed interpretations of specific coalition phenomena and also offers broader theoretical implications about the contemporary nature of urban governance in America. I argue that a number of complex endogenous and exogenous factors significantly undermined the strength of L.A.’s elite governing coalition since the 1980s. Simultaneously, Los Angeles’ progressive community organized diligently to become an active player in the region’s governing coalition. There has not, however, been a distinct transition from an elite regime to a stable progressive regime. I conclude that L.A.’s progressive community may deepen its capacity to govern if it continues to: improve race relations, create a culture of authentic internal democracy, overcome resource constraints, coordinate progressive electoral politics, and bridge institutional fragmentation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION
Dissertation Overview

Heightened trade liberalization, capital mobility, labor market expansion, and technological change have fueled a period of rapid economic transformation across the globe (Brenner, 2004; DeFilippis, 2009; Imbroscio, 2010). In response to these trends, labor unions and community-based organizations (e.g., community development corporations, environmental justice organizations, faith-based groups, immigrant rights organizations, etc.) have organized campaigns promoting social, economic, and environmental justice in cities across the United States. This approach to progressive coalition building is called “community unionism” (also known as social movement unionism) – a term that describes the ways working class organizations form broad-based partnerships to challenge elites’ narrow distribution of power and resources in urban spaces (Tattersall, 2005).¹

In recent decades, Los Angeles’ working class residents have struggled to overcome the new economy’s mandate for service sector employees who are relegated to low-wage, non-benefit jobs. In fact, Los Angeles emerged as a pioneer of America’s burgeoning community unionism movement during the 1990s as a result of several successful working class campaigns, including Justice for Janitors and the Los Angeles living wage campaign (Gottlieb et al., 2005). This dissertation examines the composition and role of Los Angeles’ community unionism movement to understand how urban governance has changed in Los Angeles – both as a result of the progressive

¹ For the purpose of this dissertation, the term “working class” denotes those individuals in society who comprise the lowest tier of America’s economic strata. The term “elite” denotes individuals who comprise America’s highest economic strata.
community’s broad-based coalition building efforts and as a result of the ways in which L.A.’s broader power structure, itself, has changed.

Using document analysis and semi-structured interviews, I analyze three broad-based community-labor coalitions that emerged in Los Angeles between 2000 and 2010 to explicate the conditions under which progressive, working class collaborations may facilitate a greater degree of transparency, accountability, and equity at the local level by inserting themselves as powerful players in urban governing coalitions. This case study of progressive, working class activism in Los Angeles conveys detailed interpretations of specific coalition phenomena and offers broader theoretical implications about the contemporary nature of urban governance in America.

In the next section, I elucidate the ways in which the emerging realities of the new economy have presented new opportunities for a growing community unionism movement in the United States. Subsequently, I delineate this dissertation’s research questions, hypotheses, and significance. Finally, I provide an outline of the dissertation’s remaining chapters.

The New Economy, Urban Regimes, and Community Unionism

At the advent of this millennium, approximately half of the world’s population inhabited urban areas. As amalgamations of diverse demographic, political, economic, and cultural variables, cities offer a wealth of potential for individual and communal development. Yet, many cities across the world have been shaped by oppressive and exclusionary models of urban development. This is partially evidenced by the

2 In the context of this dissertation, the “progressive community” refers to the collective body of groups that work to promote issues of social, economic, and environmental justice through the political empowerment of working class people.
persistence of economic inequality, poverty, and high child mortality rates – indicators which highlight that far too many people are subjected to a substandard quality of life (United Nations, 2009).

Although it consistently experiences marked increases in aggregate economic growth, the United States faces rising unemployment, a rapidly shrinking middle class, and significant increases in household debt (Annie E. Casey, 2007). While income gains in the United States have primarily been concentrated at the highest echelon of society, the real wages of working-class Americans have remained stagnant for decades (Ehrenreich, 2008). Accordingly, a hegemonic, neo-liberal agenda has displaced the “Great Society’s” distributive norm of broadly-shared prosperity; today’s predominant economic model promotes capital accumulation that is narrowly-shared by the nation’s most privileged elites. For an increasing number of hard-working Americans, the promise of prosperity is simply a myth (Soja, 2010).

For decades, America’s federal, state, and local governments have supported exclusionary zoning policies, destructive redevelopment programs, and discriminatory educational and employment practices. As a result, many U.S. central cities, which are primarily comprised of people of color and new immigrants, are plagued by entrenched social, economic, and political disadvantages (Rubin, 2007; Scheweke, 2006; Wilson, 1996). While blue collar employment in industries like manufacturing historically provided a ladder to America’s middle class, many of today’s workers face bleak prospects of ever earning more than poverty-level wages, regardless of their tenure or performance on the job (Imbroscio, 1997; Kasarda, 1985). The problems of the working poor are further exacerbated by the country’s waning unionization rates and reduced
public supports (Lowell & Cornfield, 2007). Hence, most urban areas in the United States are epicenters for concentrated poverty, structural unemployment, and underemployment.

While some assert that a neutral, invisible hand and individual effort drive our modern capitalist economy, many political economists maintain that markets are institutions governed by socially-determined rules (Altonji & Blank, 1999; Bertrand et al., 2004; Podolny, 1993). Most often, the rules that govern markets are established by powerful elites, for powerful elites. Locally, these elites form “urban regimes” to advance their common interests (Stone, 1989).

Since Clarence Stone’s (1989) seminal book, Regime Politics, urban regime theory has emerged as the dominant paradigm for analyzing power and influence in urban areas (Imbroscio, 2010; Orr & Johnson, 2008). Urban regimes are the “informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989, p. 6). The urban regime concept acknowledges the interdependencies between the local state’s ability to create and implement policies (which may serve the interests of local business communities) and the local business community’s ability to generate and endow financial resources (which may serve the interests of the local state). According to Mossberger (2009):

The urban regime concept has described the formal and informal modes of collaboration between public and private sectors, arguing that the fragmentation of power between a market economy and popularly elected political institutions makes such cooperation necessary in order to realize important local policy goals. Regime analysis therefore touches fundamental questions of politics, such as the nature of power and the potential for democratic governance (p. 40).
Urban regimes, which have historically consisted of prominent public officials (such as mayors and public commissioners) and local business leaders (representing private sector interests such as real estate companies, law firms, utility companies, financial institutions, and retail franchises), collaborate to shape public decisions in ways that strategically benefit their constituents’ interests.

The relative effectiveness of regime participants depends on their ability to marshal the resources required to govern and forge sustainable alliances with prominent actors across various institutional bases (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1983). Thus, business elites most often assume privileged positions in urban regimes because of their access to financial and institutional resources (Stone, 1989). Yet, because poor and working class residents typically lack access to valuable financial and institutional resources, they are usually excluded as regime partners. The exclusion of poor and working class residents from governing coalitions almost always ensures that their interests and agendas are overlooked in public decision making (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003). Because the members of elite governing coalitions make important decisions regarding the agenda of the local state (e.g., land use decisions, public program funding, education policies, etc.), matters of social, economic, and environmental justice (i.e., who “wins” and “loses” due to the structures of power in society) are central to any discussion of urban regimes.

Historically, a plethora of working class movements have attempted to cultivate the institutional power required to reconfigure power relations in favor of disadvantaged communities (Piven & Cloward, 1978). While the goal of urban regime analysis is to explicate the formal and informal dynamics of civic cooperation that take place within governing coalitions, studies that consider the possibilities of regime change
overwhelmingly find that progressive, working class efforts to topple elite-dominated politics are rarely sustainable (Clavel, 1986; Ferman, 1996; Mossberger, 2009; Piven & Cloward, 1978; Rast, 2005). Therefore, an important, but unmet goal of urban regime analysis is to understand how more progressive regimes might be assembled and maintained (Imbroscio, 2010; Irazabal, 2009; Stone et al., 2001).

Listed in Table 1 are four common approaches to achieving social, economic, and environmental justice – community development, business unionism, community organizing, and community unionism. While this table admittedly oversimplifies many of the nuanced strengths and weaknesses entailed within each approach, I use this model to highlight my contention that community unionism (the dynamic activism waged by coalitions of community-based organizations, labor unions, environmental justice advocates, faith-based institutions, and other progressive groups) holds great potential for progressive social, economic, and environmental change – namely, because it synthesizes and builds upon the positive attributes of the other three approaches.

By building upon the strengths of community development, business unionism, and community organizing, community unionism: integrates organizing in both workplaces and the communities in which workers reside; is inclusive in its integration of various interest groups from of the broader progressive community; employs disruptive, yet strategic tactics; integrates both bottom-up and top-down processes of internal governance; and embraces a more radical political orientation aimed at the transformation of status quo economic and political arrangements.
Table 1. Approaches to Achieving Social, Economic & Environmental Justice

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Community Development</th>
<th>Business Unionism</th>
<th>Community Organizing</th>
<th>Community Unionism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Workplace</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community &amp; Workplace</td>
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<td>Synergies</td>
<td>Exclusive/Silos</td>
<td>Exclusive/Silos</td>
<td>Exclusive/Silos</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Actors</td>
<td>Community Development Organizations</td>
<td>Labor Unions</td>
<td>Community-Based Organizations</td>
<td>CBOs, Labor Unions, Environmental Groups, Immigrant Rights Groups, Faith-Based Groups, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Institutionalized</td>
<td>Institutionalized</td>
<td>Disruptive</td>
<td>Disruptive &amp; Innovative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Bottom-Up &amp; Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>Moderate/Liberal</td>
<td>Moderate/Liberal</td>
<td>Radical/Progressive</td>
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A basic assumption of community unionism efforts is that progressive organizations working in strategic partnerships (i.e., coalitions) are far more powerful together than in silos of isolation (Lipsig-Mumme, 2003). Thus, community unionism derives its strength from the synergies that are created from various sectors of the progressive community working together in coalition. Namely, community-union coalitions combine the radical political orientation of community organizing with the political and economic “muscle” of labor unions (which have not traditionally been engaged in community organizing) to build powerful collaborations that represent a broad range of justice-oriented interests (Tattersall, 2010). This approach to building working class coalitions is similar to Stone’s (1989) notion of how various elite interest groups coalesce into regimes to leverage their collective power in matters of urban governance. Hence, working class coalitions – like elite coalitions – can potentially build the personal and institutional relationships required to “make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989, p. 179).
The targets of community unionism’s strategic organizing campaigns typically include private firms, governmental entities, and other powerful institutions and people. Community unionism campaigns challenge powerful institutions’ and individuals’ narrow distribution of resources by fighting for community-controlled development reforms that advance the interests of broadly-shared prosperity (Reynolds, 1999). As a strategy of democratic political empowerment, community unionism seeks to enact concrete policies that promote economic, social, and environmental justice - particularly in working class communities (Reynolds, 2004; Wills, 2001). The ultimate goal, however, is to replace elite-controlled governance with community-controlled governance in order to engender more equitable and responsible policies and practices.

Equitable and responsible policies and practices include mechanisms such as living wages, community benefit policies, affordable housing, workers’ right to organize, universal health care, immigrant rights, local hiring standards, expanded apprenticeship and training programs, access to quality jobs, regulation of non-standard employment, environmental quality, responsible land use, and responsible contracting standards. Where they are successful, community-union coalitions cultivate the power to shape important public decisions regarding how human, material, and financial resources should be invested.

Over the past few decades, community unionism campaign victories have spread across the country. This has led researchers and activists to conclude that community unionism is not a fad, but a “movement” that possesses considerable potential for future growth and success (Brecher & Costello, 1990; Tattersall, 2010).
Research Questions and Hypotheses

The emerging economic, demographic, and social realities of the new economy have created new opportunities for urban scholars to consider the possibilities and limitations of regime change and working class empowerment at the local level (DeFilippis et al., 2010). For a number of reasons that will be addressed in a subsequent chapter, elites’ collective power has weakened in most large cities. And while elite interests have become increasingly fragmented, local resistance to elite-driven governance has simultaneously gained traction. In the context of the new economy, the rising number of community-labor coalition victories provides contemporary evidence that “capitalist places are the creations of the activists who push hard to alter how markets function, how prices are set, and how lives are affected” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 3). Such is the case of Los Angeles.

Home to an increasingly coordinated cluster of working class efforts (e.g., labor, environmental justice, immigrant rights, etc.), Los Angeles has been an incubator for numerous strategic coalitions among community-based organizations, labor unions, and other progressive groups. This dissertation employs case study research to investigate three community-labor coalitions that emerged in Los Angeles between 2000 and 2010. I ask the following two questions:

1) What factors account for the coalitions’ emergence and relative successes?
2) To what extent has a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful elite regime?

To address this dissertation’s main research questions, I adapt an evaluative framework suggested by Amanda Tattersall (2010) in her book Power in Coalition. The four measures Tattersall recommends to illuminate the various types of outcomes that
coalitions produce include: building a well-functioning coalition, increasing the capacity of participating organizations, influencing public and private decisions to win tangible outcomes, and shifting the political climate. Over the course of five research phases – document analysis, phone interviews, case selection and intensive case analysis, in-person interviews in Los Angeles, and data organization, synthesis, and analysis – I assess each of the three coalitions along Tattersall’s four measures. The methods chapter further details my research processes.

Fulton (1997) asserts that while L.A.’s elite regime was one of the strongest coalitions ever created, the regime collapsed in the 1980s and left a gaping void of power. Others, however, argue that the regime has not collapsed, but has weakened (Hendriks & Musso, 2004; Purcell, 2000). Thus, research has revealed a significant shift in L.A.’s power relations, but has yet to reach a clear consensus regarding the shift’s extent, nature, or reason for occurring.

My research will become part of a foundation in the literature that builds a consensus about the recent changes that have taken place in L.A. I contribute to the existing body of research by systematically analyzing: who exercises power and influence in decisions related to urban economic development, what intersecting and competing interests comprise L.A.’s power structure, and why the progressive movement has formed and evolved to its current state.

Based on the literature related to L.A.’s historical political economy, I assert that an elite regime dominated Los Angeles from the beginning of the twentieth century through the mid-1980s. In this case, leaders of working class organizations, especially unions and liberal parties, negotiated opportunistic deals with elites that promised general
benefits for workers, but elites’ promises remained largely unfilled. Beginning in the mid-1980s and through the end of the 2000s, L.A transitioned from an elite regime to a liberal regime. During this period of time, class compromises resembled stalemates where two groups of similar strength (elites and working class progressives) were strong enough to impose severe costs on the other, but neither side could definitively defeat the opponent. Therefore, the contending forces often agreed to compromises and concessions to refrain from mutual damage. Although the agreements may have been asymmetrical, the concessions were still significant (Wright, 2000). Yet, these compromises and concessions did not amount to a fundamental transformation from a liberal regime to a progressive regime.

If L.A. were to meet the full ideals of a progressive regime (i.e., lower class opportunity expansion as a primary objective), public and private projects would not be considered for approval without linkages and concessions (e.g., affordable housing, quality jobs, transportation, and public facilities); community empowerment and human development would be of primary concern (e.g., job training, community education, and authentic community participation in planning and policy decision-making); and democratic forms of governance and ownership would be instituted in the mainstream political economy. Although the normative ideal of a progressive regime was not fully achieved by 2010, I argue that L.A.’s progressive movement has come a long way in building its infrastructure and has immense potential to advance and institutionalize its agenda of progressive governance in the years ahead.
Dissertation Significance

This dissertation offers an original contribution to the fields of urban planning, policy, political science, labor studies, and urban geography by investigating (1) how globalized capital shapes and governs today’s cities, (2) the changing relationships among localities, the state, corporate elites, and urban social movements, (3) the extent to which community unionism serves as an effective empowerment model, and (4) the pitfalls and potentials of collaborative planning and coalition-building.

By altering the equations of economic and political power at all geospatial levels, elites have carved their position as the primary beneficiaries of global economic expansion. Locally, elite policy agendas have established and exacerbated environmental and public health hazards, urban poverty and economic inequality, and urban fiscal distress (Clavel & Wiewel, 1991; Fainstein et al., 1983; Harvey, 1973; Imbroscio, 1997; Krumholz, 1991; Leitner & Garner, 1993; Newman & Wyly, 2006). Moreover, globalization and federal devolution make the struggle of gaining economic parity increasingly difficult for working class communities. Hence, there is an urgent need for new ideas and practices that can both build community-level power and tap into local and global capital in ways that achieve just and sustainable cities (DeFilippis et al., 2010; Imbroscio, 2010; Wolf-Powers, 2009).

Fueled by delocalizing capital interests, insufficient alternatives to low-wage service sector jobs, innovative organizing strategies, demographic changes, and growing solidarity across community divides, Los Angeles is at the heart of a burgeoning working class movement for social, economic, and environmental justice. Although much of urban regime and power structure research identifies elite domination as a static and
pervasive reality, Los Angeles presents an emerging deviation to this rule. While this deviation is largely because of factors related to L.A.’s status as a global city (i.e., its susceptibility to the dynamics of economic restructuring and demographic change), Los Angeles is representative of changes that will occur in most U.S. cities during the next century. As a contemporary urban nexus of diverse peoples and cultures, Los Angeles serves as an ideal case. According to the authors of *The Next Los Angeles*, L.A. is where “the next generation of American progressive thought and action is being defined” (Gottlieb et al., 2005). The story of community unionism in Los Angeles contains important lessons about urban governance and the obstacles and opportunities entailed in advancing a progressive social change agenda. Urban scholarship lacks a current and thorough evaluation of L.A.’s community unionism movement, and this dissertation intends to fill that gap.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

This dissertation’s framework is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on urban power structures and the potentials of community unionism as a strategy for progressive regime change. Chapter 3 details methodological issues such as case selection, data collection, and data analysis. Chapter 4 explores the history of Los Angeles and illuminates the major demographic, economic, and political trends that created the openings for the rise of progressive coalition building in L.A.’s political economy. Chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively, present the cases of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice, and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. Chapter 8 concludes the
dissertation with a review of the three case studies, a presentation of the dissertation’s major research findings, an exploration of relevant implications, and a summary of research limitations and directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2:

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction

This dissertation adds to existing scholarship related to urban regimes, working class movement-building, and the politics of planning and policymaking by deconstructing the dynamics of Los Angeles’ community unionism movement and examining the possibilities of creating a more equitable and democratic alternative to elite control. The following pages outline two primary areas of literature that are central to this research project. The first section surveys the literature related to urban regimes and contemporary power structures. The second section explores the limitations and potentials of community unionism as a model of progressive, working-class mobilization that aims to shift the dynamics of historically-entrenched elite regimes. This literature review concludes with a discussion about the potential for new justice-oriented directions in urban planning and policymaking’s theories and practices.

Urban Power Structures

Understanding Urban Regimes

The following questions illuminate various aspects of urban power: Who rules cities? If some groups win in public decision-making, who loses and why? How does money influence democratic agenda-setting and policymaking in urban communities? Whose voices are suppressed? What is the local state’s capacity to meet citizens’ needs effectively? What should be the role of the local state in facilitating capital accumulation? How do local, national, and international economic and political processes interact to produce uneven development across urban areas? And what are the potentials and limitations of class-based social movements at the local scale? These
issues raise positive and normative questions about the intersection of power, economics, agency, and justice in America. As such, questions of urban power have substantive implications related to the lived experiences of humans and communities. Because the answers to these questions reflect a broad range of developmental outcomes – for individuals, communities, and society at-large – urban power is an important field of inquiry for social scientists.

American scholarship did not begin to examine urban power, exclusively, until the early twentieth century (Domhoff, 2006). Published in 1953 by sociologist Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, explored the configuration of power in Atlanta and used fields such as sociology and political science to initiate the critical study of power in urban spaces. Hunter contended that an exclusive group of business leaders dominated politics in Atlanta. Mills’ (1956) *The Power Elite* extended the analysis of elite governance to the scale of the United States by illuminating the interconnections that exist between the corporate, military, and political elite. While Mills raised the question of whether America’s democratic practices remained true to its democratic ideals, Dahl’s (1961) *Who Governs* espoused an opposite viewpoint based on his analysis of New Haven, Connecticut. Dahl argued that governance was not elite-dominated, but instead reflected our idealized notions of pluralistic democracy. While Dahl agreed that social and economic elite groups existed, he asserted that competing group interests equalized their influence. Ultimately, Dahl concluded that no specific group possessed the capacity to exercise power across the city’s diverse policy areas – which meant that New Haven embodied a pluralistic division of power. Yet, soon after Dahl’s research gained prominence, a number of Civil Rights Era power structure analyses substantiated the
theory of elite control (North American Congress on Latin America, 1970; Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 1959).

Since the early years of power structure research, reduced federal aid, population
decreases, weakened tax bases, and intensifying demands for public services have plagued
America’s urban centers. In response to these trends and the increasingly unpredictable
nature of private capital, local public officials have become more entrepreneurial in their
efforts to maintain fiscal solvency by engaging in competitive, growth-oriented economic
development strategies. These strategies illustrate how local governments attempt to
leverage their city’s assets in what appears to be a zero-sum game (Jessop, 1998).

Several theories have emerged to explain this elite-backed, development-centered
approach to managing and governing cities in the past two decades (Harvey, 1989;

The growth machine thesis asserts that elites in urban areas form “growth
machines” – consisting of developers, realtors, utility companies, mortgage companies,
retail franchises, and other private interest groups – that possess the electoral and
financial resources local politicians need to remain in power and advance their cities’
development agendas. Moreover, the growth machine thesis asserts that these “growth
machines” comprised of public and private elites dominate local decisions – giving
precedence to the “exchange value” (i.e., maximized private profit) of land development.
Although these machines operate under the guise of bolstering the local tax base for
cities’ collective good, the elite-dominated approach to economic development
disproportionately burdens the poor with residential displacement, inadequate public
services, environmental hazards, and other externalities. Burdened communities often
challenge growth machines by arguing that the “use value” (i.e., fulfilled human needs and improved quality of life) of development should take precedence over the “exchange value” of development (Logan and Molotch, 1987).

The most prominent approach to understanding urban power structures is elaborated in urban regime theory. The seminal *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988* by Clarence Stone (1989) further propelled power structure research in the mainstream of social science research. From the urban regime theory perspective, local elites form collaborative arrangements in order to assemble the resources and capacity required to govern urban areas. Following the idea of hegemony, Stone (1989) characterizes regimes’ political power as the “power to” shape outcomes (i.e., the capacity to act), rather than the explicit “power over” others (i.e., social control). Regime theorists refer to this “power to” approach as the social production model of urban power (Mossberger et al., 2001).

According to Stone, the goal of urban regime analysis is to explicate the internal dynamics of civic cooperation (i.e., coalition building and maintenance) and to understand the informal modes of coordination that occur across institutional boundaries (i.e., the state and the market). Regime theorists stress governing coalitions’ (i.e., regimes) influence in shaping local policy outcomes (DeFilippis, 1999).

Stone’s research of politics in Atlanta traced how a biracial, elite governing coalition (comprised of white business leaders, black middle class organizations, and elected officials) emerged over the course of repeated interactions to tackle the challenges of Atlanta’s growth and development. While members had different primary interests, Atlanta’s elite coalition maintained its cohesion over four decades by focusing on
downtown development and racial desegregation. Yet, in their efforts to act as “place entrepreneurs,” Stone found that Atlanta’s elites failed to address the increasing social and economic problems of Atlanta’s disadvantaged residents. This exclusion of disadvantaged populations’ issues was due to the difficulties entailed in organizing support for social justice (i.e., the lack of incentives for middle and upper classes to advocate on behalf of the poor and the lack of organizational capacity among the poor to advocate for themselves).

Since Stone’s seminal work (1989) on governance in Atlanta, urban regime theory has emerged as the dominant paradigm in urban politics. Over time, Stone and other scholars have developed typologies to explain the prevailing ideologies and approaches of local regimes. For example, Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) categorized regimes as directive (regime-planned, government-sponsored urban development; between 1950 and 1964), concessionary (regime-planned, government-sponsored urban development with concessions granted to lower-class residents; between 1965 and 1974), and conserving (elite regimes retracted concessions granted to lower-class residents in the context of unstable national and global economies; from 1975 and forward). Elkin (1987) characterized regimes as pluralist, federalist, and entrepreneurial. Stone’s (1993) typology of regimes included: maintenance regimes (government administrations that provide routine services, minimize taxes, and seek to maintain the status quo); development regimes (coordinated elite coalitions that promote growth through planning and land-use decisions); middle class progressive regimes (protect historic areas, preserve the environment, and stabilize housing values); and economic expansion regimes (invest in disadvantaged individuals to expand employment and prosperity). Drier et al. (2004)
developed a similar categorization, including: urban conservative regimes (public-private partnerships for profit-driven growth); urban liberal regimes (focus on expanding employment, opportunities, and services for the poor without directly challenging growth coalitions); and urban progressive regimes (focus on the economic and political empowerment of poor and working class people). More recently, Imboscio (2010) attempted to rectify the ‘false division of labor between the market and the state’ imbued in earlier regime typologies by contributing the following hypothetical regime types: community-based (alliance between community groups and progressive public officials); petty-bourgeois (regime comprised of the owners of small, local enterprises); and local-statist (strong-state regime supported by state-controlled accumulation efforts).

Collectively, these typologies provide an analytical basis for scholarship to examine the dynamics of urban power. In this dissertation, I employ various elements of the aforementioned typologies to develop my own integrated framework of contemporary urban regime types. As outlined in Table 2, I assert that elite regimes, which are dominated by the goals of the wealthy “capitalist class,” seek to promote growth and entrepreneurialism through public policies that increase the private profits of the local business community. Furthermore, elite regimes often rely on public subsidies to incentivize the investment of private capital. Next, I contend that a “homeowner class” that is concerned with enhancing quality of life issues, such as the protection of historic and cultural areas, the preservation of the environment, and the stabilization of housing values dominate middle-class liberal regimes. Lastly, I argue that progressive regimes, which are primarily oriented toward advancing the interests of the “working class,” promote the economic and political empowerment of poor and working class people.
Table 2. Urban Regime Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Elite Regime</th>
<th>Middle-Class Liberal Regime</th>
<th>Progressive Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist Class</td>
<td>Capitalist Class (Upper Strata)</td>
<td>Homeowner Class (Middle Strata)</td>
<td>Working Class (Lower Strata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>• Promote growth and entrepreneurialism through development initiatives that increase land values; Depend on public subsidies to incentivize private capital investment</td>
<td>• Promote the protection of historic/cultural areas, the preservation of the environment, and the stabilization of housing values</td>
<td>• Promote the economic and political empowerment of poor and working class people; Depend on living wages, universal healthcare, progressive taxation, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, I argue that as the American economy becomes increasingly bifurcated (and as the middle class population gradually amalgamates into the lower class), the interests of middle-class liberal regimes and progressive regimes are increasingly blurred. To provide a deeper understanding of trends related to urban regimes, the next sections elaborate the dynamics of the two most prevalent regime types found today – elite regimes and progressive regimes.

*The Inefficiencies of Elite-Dominated Development*

The problems of elite-dominated governance are most clearly demonstrated by examining state and local economic development strategies. As outlined in Table 2, elite-driven political entrepreneurialism often relies upon public subsidies to incentivize the investment of private capital for private profits. Thus, when local and state governments grant public subsidies to fund private development projects, such as big-box stores, sports stadiums, and luxury condominiums, the average taxpayer receives no tangible benefits (Weber, 2004).
One striking example of this entrepreneurial approach is Alabama’s incentive package for Mercedes-Benz, which included $112 million in infrastructure improvements, $30 million towards a training facility, $60 million for training, $8.7 million in tax abatements, and $39 million in various other incentives (Fisher and Peters, 1998). Although taxpayers funded the subsidy package, public officials offered the incentive without public input and without explicit commitments from Mercedes about tangible public benefits.

This example is not an anomaly. Research shows that state and local governments offer most economic development incentives as giveaways with little, if any public benefits, required in turn. A recent survey found that only 24 percent of economic development professionals implemented a systematic or quantitative method of evaluating the returns of public subsidy packages (Weber, 2004). This survey demonstrates that local governments are dangerously unaware of the actual costs and returns associated with incentive grants.

Economic development incentives are largely a function of tax codes, and they are not typically subject to public scrutiny (Buss, 2001). Therefore, private entities that receive these inducements often benefit without taxpayers’ knowledge or approval. Since local and state bodies often award incentives in the form of forgone taxes, rather than in direct cash payments, public bodies are prone to view tax incentives as “free” money. The state and local bodies that award incentives usually assume that the returns will be realized in the future through increased taxes and economic growth. However, there is not enough assurance in this assumption. If the costs outweigh the benefits, development incentives may create an inefficient negative-sum game.
In order for economic development incentives to strengthen urban economies, the benefits gained by communities receiving incentives must exceed the losses of alternative incentive uses. Peters and Fisher (2004) and Bartik (1991, 1994) determine that this condition is only met when incentives effectively target poorer, working class populations instead of residents of affluent and middle-income communities. However, economic development tools rarely target the “highest and best” uses – low income communities.

Tax increment financing (TIF) provides an example of the misdirected use of economic development policy. Used by almost every U.S. state and the District of Columbia, tax increment financing is one of the most popular tools used for economic development. The majority of early TIF statutes explicitly restricted their usage to “blighted” areas. This language presented a problem from the beginning because the threshold for “blight” has been difficult to establish and measure. Most often, the characterization of a “blighted” area was used by urban planners to raze (through eminent domain) urban “slums” because they posed “threats” to public health, safety, and morals. During the era of federally-sponsored urban renewal, blighted areas were systematically and antagonistically defined to promote the displacement (and gentrification) of low-income communities of color (Leroy, 2008).

The problems associated with using “blight” expanded in the 1980s, when many state courts decided to grant even greater discretion in the determination of areas that qualified for TIF through “blight”. Now, many states have lowered their TIF-eligibility blight restrictions to include areas that had not realized their “highest” potential for commercial use or tax revenue (Leroy, 2008). For instance, Good Jobs First’s policy
report (Talanker & Davis, 2003) documents the weakening of state “blight” statutes for tax increment financing and enterprise zones. The authors concluded that although tax increment financing and enterprise zones were initially intended to revitalize economically depressed areas, they have both morphed (to varying degrees) into programs used to siphon growth towards more affluent areas.

Tax increment financing increasingly develops suburbs – even though the areas usually already possess low tax rates and are high-growth areas (Leroy, 2008). Many suburbs provide TIFs primarily for big box retailers. A survey distributed to development officials in 471 California cities found that development and redevelopment’s first priority was not to provide quality jobs, but was to attract big box retailers (Lewis & Barbour, 1999). The presence of more national retailers, such as Wal-Mart, contribute to urban and suburban disparities because saturated suburban retailing typically destroys older malls and local shopping districts in central cities and older suburbs. The induced redistribution of business activity contributes to urban grayfields (large vacant properties in older areas), lower tax assessments of urban properties, and declining urban populations.

A recent report, *Rolling Back Property Tax Payments*, illustrates how big-box retailers such as Wal-Mart take advantage of local governments that provide location incentives (Mattera, Walter, Blain & Ruddick, 2007). The report details how frequently Wal-Mart challenges the assessed property values of its stores and distribution centers to reduce its tax liabilities to local communities. Tax assessment appeals on both real property (buildings and land) and business personal property (fixtures and equipment) were reviewed for more than 500 randomly selected U.S. stores (10 percent sample size)
and all 78 distribution centers (100 percent sample size). The research found that at least one assessment challenge was filed at 35 percent of stores and 40 percent of distribution centers. The assessment appeal win-rates were 45 percent for the stores sampled and 64 percent for all distribution centers. The authors note that these statistics may be a low estimate because they excluded appeals before 2005. They concluded that despite that fact that many store facilities received property tax abatements when they were originally built, future tax assessments were routinely challenged. Because the challenges were initiated at the corporate store level, the authors perceived the pursuit of reduced property taxes to be a systematic corporate policy.

Lower property taxes have major implications for urban communities, where the forgone tax revenue from Wal-Mart (and other big box retailers) should contribute to public education, police and fire protection, and other vital services. Instead, Wal-Mart’s consistent evasion of taxes reduces local service capacity and increases tax burdens for small businesses and residents.

Unsurprisingly, in a survey of local program managers, Gatti & Hoffman (2008) found that there are few standards and protocols that promote accountability in economic development. The authors concluded that accountability in economic development is often in conflict with the missions and practices of local economic development agencies. In self-defense, program managers expressed that a difficult balancing act occurs for agencies that engage in fast-paced, confidential negotiations with private establishments. Therefore, accountability and transparency to taxpayers often becomes a lesser priority to program managers.
Economic development managers’ inattention to accountability and transparency to taxpayers is often supported by top elected officials, who feel compelled to cater to the interests and “needs” of the private sector. Yet, elite-driven economic development strategies have important implications for democratic governance, distributive justice, and urban fiscal vitality. The fact that the competing goals of incentive provision and accountability are often not reconciled is a dangerous dilemma. In reference to the inefficiencies of elite-driven economic development, Scheweke (2006) writes:

The benefits from economic growth have not been widely shared. Wages have not reflected the increases in productivity. Union job premiums have shrunk. Those in the top income brackets have enjoyed large increases in their standards of living while poverty rates have climbed. There has been a major shift in the balance of power toward businesses, as unions have declined in their membership base, the number of deregulated markets has increased, and the government has reduced its policing of the labor market and its spending for federal safety net and training programs (p. 1).

Given the rapidly-changing nature of the U.S. economy, there is a need for a radical improvement in policies directed at local economic growth and job creation. Yet, there is little incentive for elites – which are largely responsible for promoting unaccountable economic development strategies – to reverse these trends. But it is important to note that as fiscal pressures continue to mount at the local and state levels (due to the current economic recession), elite regimes will face more difficulties justifying these inefficient strategies. And as elite regimes lose their ability to coordinate resources for private investment, they will arguably lose a degree of their historical power in urban politics.

Are Elite Regimes in Decline?

Are America’s historically powerful elite urban regimes deteriorating in today’s complex social and economic context? There is a growing body of evidence that
suggests that this may, in fact, be the case. For instance, in an article that illuminates the ideological and cultural impetus for regime formation, dissolution, and reconstruction, McGovern (2009) examines the recent conflict that emerged surrounding the development of Philadelphia’s waterfront. The debate surrounded Philadelphia’s governing regime’s plans to redevelop Penn’s Landing – a long stretch of waterfront property along the Delaware River – with publicly-subsidized commercial, residential, and retail developments. When critical members of the city’s growth coalition – The Philadelphia Inquirer and the University of Pennsylvania – began to publicly question the merits of this development scheme in 2002, the broad consensus for the waterfront vision began to disintegrate.

The defectors – Philadelphia’s most popular newspaper and its largest university – began hosting a series of public forums to facilitate discussions about the site’s future. The most active forum participants were the city’s growing population of well-educated, middle-class residents who had recently moved to Philadelphia to capitalize on its job opportunities and vibrant cultural scene. Advancing ideals such as cultural preservation and citizen involvement concerned them, and they were willing to “work with the city’s neighborhood groups to denounce the city’s market-driven, elite-dominated approach to development while demanding instead a comprehensive planning process with widespread popular participation that would safeguard public access and preserve civic space” (p. 664). Due to the oppositional movement’s intense pressure, Philadelphia’s city leaders agreed to suspend their plans for waterfront development and engage in a broader, more inclusive planning process.
According to McGovern, the Philadelphia waterfront case highlights activists’ capacity to induce more progressive directions in planning and policymaking. Whether the alternative approach can be characterized as progressive\(^3\), however, depends on the degree to which the city’s middle-class reform movement chooses to bridge racial, economic, and cultural barriers through coalitions with Philadelphia’s large population of poor and working-class residents of color. Regarding the limitations of an exclusive middle-class coalition, McGovern remarks:

> Such a governing coalition that neglected to include sizeable sectors of the city’s population would be seen as betraying its avowed commitment to popular empowerment and embracing a variant form of elite rule. Although the regime might continue to support an activist role for government, which would distinguish it from the previous privatist regime, many Philadelphians might reasonably conclude that one set of disconnected elites had simply replaced the former (p. 688).

Perhaps the most telling indication of whether this budding coalition will be both progressive and sustainable in the future is the extent to which its agenda translates into equitable economic development policies that benefit Philadelphia’s struggling lower class groups. The future seems promising, but McGovern suggests that ideological and cultural shifts have promoted the conditions necessary for a shift away from Philadelphia’s historically-corporatist regime.

In McGovern’s (2009) analysis, ideological shifts (the changing perspectives of two influential institutions) and demographic shifts (the growth of middle-class residents) proved to be of great significance. It is also important to note, however, that economic trends also played a critical role in providing the openings for potential regime change.

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\(^3\) According to McGovern, progressivism is conceived as (1) a vigorous public sector with (2) ample opportunities for citizens to participate in and influence political decision making that (3) results in equitable public policies benefiting a broad cross-section of the city’s population.
During the last half of the twentieth century, Philadelphia experienced a significant decline of its residents, jobs, and tax base. As each administration attempted to address the city’s chronic fiscal distress by cutting services and raising taxes, many of the city’s Fortune 500 companies and commercial offices fled the area. Additionally, corporate restructuring led to the buyout of most home-grown banks, which had historically served as critical engines in Philadelphia’s local economy.

As such, Adams (1991) states that in the 1950s, an alliance of civic-minded bankers, lawyers, and business people exercised elite leadership in Philadelphia. But contemporary business elites experience a drastically-reduced capacity to influence local planning and policymaking, as they have lost many influential members to the region’s suburban areas. With respect to the potential resurgence of elite leadership, Adams states:

In a city so balkanized as Philadelphia in the 1990’s, it is hard to imagine business reasserting its vaunted influence of the 1950’s, particularly since so many CEOs are transients sent into the city to manage branch offices of companies whose headquarters are elsewhere. Their stake in city politics is simply not as great as that of corporate heads 40 years ago (p. 39).

Ultimately, economic factors contributed to the weakening of the Philadelphia’s elite coalition, rendering the group relatively defenseless against more progressive opposition groups (McGovern, 2009).

Purcell (2000) provides further evidence that elite regimes may be in decline. In an article that explores the politics of growth in Los Angeles, Purcell examines the assertion that L.A.’s growth interests are increasingly incapable of securing the political coordination needed to accomplish their aims due to the following reasons: the fall of Mayor Tom Bradley’s pro-growth electoral regime; the decline of elite civic engagement due to the dynamics of globalization; the intense resistance of a middle-class slow-growth
coalition; the geographical fragmentation of local land-based interests; and the local government’s weakened capacity to operate as a strong partner for growth. Purcell’s article concludes that although L.A.’s growth machine has not completely collapsed, “the political consensus for growth [the ideology that growth is good for all] has eroded severely over the past 15 years by a variety of factors” (p. 85).

Similarly, as a result of economic restructuring and massive cutbacks in federal funding to urban areas, San Francisco’s growth regime began to decline in the 1980s (DeLeon, 1992). The 1986 passage of Proposition M – a restrictive growth control initiative – serves as a powerful indicator of elite decline in San Francisco. Comprised of neighborhood associations, environmental groups, small businesses, political clubs, ethnic minority groups, gay and lesbian organizations, tenant groups, and labor unions – San Francisco’s “slow-growth” coalition capitalized on the elite growth regime’s weakened status by organizing the political support needed to pass Proposition M. Furthermore, they were able to strategically secure control of San Francisco’s City Hall. In DeLeon’s view, however, San Francisco’s slow-growth coalition rose to power by default. While it successfully blocked the power of corporate elites to engage in unconstrained downtown development, the coalition lacked the necessary capacity to construct a sustainable progressive movement. Accordingly, the slow-growth coalition disintegrated in San Francisco’s 1991 mayoral campaign. This example highlights the fact that although a number of contextual factors may result in the decline of elite regimes, the ascension of stable progressive regimes is far from inevitable.

Heying (1997) makes an important contribution to the body of literature on elite decline in his insightful critique of Robert Putnam’s assertion that America’s reduced
civic involvement is primarily attributable to television and generational factors. On the contrary, Heying asserts that communities have become increasingly unstable due to economic restructuring and the resulting disconnections between corporate leadership and urban places. Specifically, Heying argues that economic transformations (i.e., corporate delocalization) in urban areas have diminished the capacities of (and incentives for) cohesive alliances of elite leaders to invest their time and resources in urban development. To support his argument, he provides empirical evidence drawn from a longitudinal study (1931, 1961, and 1991) conducted to assess changes in Atlanta’s elite regime activity.

Heying analyzes the structure of urban leadership, as reflected by the overlapping memberships across the governing boards of Atlanta’s top corporations, nonprofit institutions, and government commissions. He found that across each of the three periods (1931, 1961, and 1991), the core of civic leadership was dominated by the highest-ranking executives from locally-owned banks, life insurance companies, credit companies, and regional utility companies. While the composition of elite leadership was constant throughout the study periods, Heying notes that most indicators reached a high-point in 1961. For instance, the network density (i.e., the social cohesiveness of the local elite network), proportion and centrality of three-sector interlockers (i.e., the number of elites who sat on multiple boards across the private, nonprofit, and public sectors), and integration of elected officials (i.e., the proportion of politicians included in the elite networks) were significantly higher in 1961 than they were in either 1931 or 1991.

Why would this be the case? In 1931, a large number of small businesses dominated Atlanta’s corporate sector, but transportation and communication constraints
limited the Atlanta market. Also, Atlanta’s public and nonprofit sectors were highly underdeveloped in 1931. In 1961, however, corporate consolidations reduced the number of Atlanta-based businesses by 73 percent, which meant business leaders were more likely to be in contact with one another. And due to corporate consolidations, business leaders had a greater degree of power and resources than before. Additionally, Atlanta’s external corporate competition was limited, and there was an expanded degree of capacity in the local government (which received significant financial support from the federal government, primarily for transportation infrastructure and urban renewal investments). Heying also found that as opposed to both 1931 and 1991, an overwhelming majority of elites were born in Georgia (71%), lived in the same neighborhoods (74%), and shared common educational and professional backgrounds (79% with law degrees) in 1961.

By 1991, however, Atlanta had experienced major increases in mass retailing. This is important because executives of businesses that were not home-grown were largely excluded from Atlanta’s elite network. Moreover, the out-migration of many of the city’s corporate elites to surrounding suburbs contributed to a shift in the importance of the urban agenda – regional issues, in many cases, became more important. Finally, Heying concluded that delocalization suggests the elimination of place as an important factor in elite engagement. He also deduced that the sharp decline of Atlanta’s elite regime has likely had an adverse effect on the ability of local donation-dependent nonprofits to carry out their philanthropic missions. Seemingly, the fact that local nonprofits are no longer as beholden to their local private and public sectors indicates that
today’s politically-oriented nonprofits may have more success engaging in strategic organizing efforts.

The authors of an article that highlights the changing role of business leaders in American cities echo Heying’s sentiments about the declining influence of corporate elites (Hanson et al., 2010). This study examines what the authors term “CEO organizations” – elite-led economic development organizations that work to promote and govern their respective cities. Designed to intentionally organize a small, exclusive group of cities’ largest corporate leaders, “CEO organizations” are comprised solely of CEOs – individuals who could make “on the spot” commitments of their firm’s resources to for urban initiatives. Regarding the sheer power of these organizations, the authors state:

Once a course of action had been agreed upon, CEOs used their power to rebuild sections of town, influence the location of public facilities and development projects, make and break mayors, and allocate the resources of foundations they controlled to projects and programs they deemed worthy of support. In Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Cleveland, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Dallas they formed governing coalitions with mayors and managers to undertake major civic improvements. Even in cities where such governing regimes were transitory or unstable they were a force with which public officials had to reckon (p. 7).

Members’ influence flowed not only from their economic resources, but also from their firms’ long-term affiliations with the city and their personal loyalties to the city. Although these elite organizations had a long history of leadership in urban governance, that authors hypothesize that the power and influence of CEO organizations has recently declined in many urban areas. They attribute this phenomenon to a number of factors, including economic restructuring, deregulation, residential and commercial
suburbanization, urban fiscal distress, homegrown business failures, and intensifying social problems.

The authors assessed data from 19 metropolitan areas to measure the nature and extent of shifts in elite leadership. Regarding the weakening of once stable political infrastructures, the authors note that non-native executives have replaced a generation of hometown business titans who established their businesses and governing circles in cities where they had deep personal roots. In reference to this trend, the authors remark:

> On balance, local executives are now less engaged in civic life, are rotating cities more frequently and consequently less knowledgeable about their communities, and possess less autonomy to make local civic and financial commitments (p. 8).

The study’s findings confirm the transformative effects of restructuring in the banking industry on elite civic engagement:

> When Bank of America moved its headquarters from San Francisco to Charlotte, its representation on the Bay Area Council was shifted from the system CEO to the head of the California office, and the strong leadership the bank had provided in the business community was effectively lost (p. 10).

The study also verified the shift in CEO-led organizations’ focus from downtown issues to broader metropolitan issues. The authors found that while business leaders may still invest some resources in central cities, their attention is more divided geographically because they understand the increasing importance of sustaining an influential presence at the regional, state, and national (and sometimes international) levels. Yet, another institutional form has risen to the task of urban governance, according to the authors. Due to their sizable financial resources, the study finds that local foundations have gained a significant degree of power and prominence – although not equal to that of past governing elites; major foundations in Atlanta, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Kansas City,
Pittsburgh, Central Indiana, and Philadelphia possess the ability to exercise influence in the local development arena, if they choose.

Another major finding was that across the study’s 19 cities, governing alliances with mayors have weakened over time. According to the authors:

Of the cities where CEO-led alliances were a defining feature of city governance, we found no cases where interviewees felt the strength of the alliances had been sustained to the present day. In some places, there remains a good, even warm relationship between mayors and business leaders and their civic organizations. But even in these cities, it appears to depend heavily on the approach of the incumbent mayor toward business leadership. And because, over time, mayors have varied substantially in their ability to relate to CEOs, there has been growing disenchantment with the mayoralty. This trend coincides with the growing influence of community-based organizations and the reemergence of labor groups in city governance in some cities (see Reynolds, 2004; Turner & Cornfield, 2007) (p. 16).

An important caveat is that while CEO organizations’ relationships with mayors have become less important, their relationships with governors have become increasingly important.

The aforementioned literature illustrates the fact that now, more than ever, urban leadership and problem solving require a deep understanding of local and regional landscapes and effective strategic organizing to build and maintain robust alliances. Not only is the composition of elite urban regimes unstable, but also, the agenda for urban development is indeterminate. The potential for a fundamentally progressive reconstruction of urban regimes is, therefore, optimal in many U.S. cities.

**Progressive Regimes: Advancing a Normative Vision of Social and Economic Justice**

Due to the increasing evidence of elite regime decline, it is possible to believe that the achievement of a transformative, progressive paradigm shift in power across
America’s urban areas may be within reach. Moreover, instances of justice-oriented, working-class contestations to elite development agendas abound. Many times, these acts of resistance are based on the assumption that private developers who receive *public subsidies* to fund *private projects* have a public obligation to ensure that communities impacted by development projects share the benefits (e.g., affordable housing, quality jobs, and community facilities) of new developments. With few exceptions, however, the litany of urban literature illustrates that grassroots efforts to contest elite-driven political entrepreneurialism in urban development are rarely successful (Piven & Cloward, 1978). Thus, an important, but unmet goal of regime analysis is to understand how regimes change and more specifically, how progressive regimes can be constructed and maintained (Irazabal, 2005; Stone et al., 2001).

In practice, efforts to establish democratic, progressive governance demand a reframing of the traditional roles of citizens, professional administrators, and elected officials. Urban scholars have argued that acts of mass political resistance are required against the destruction of working class communities; these acts of resistance should be framed around communal identities and should ultimately allow urban inhabitants to construct more just cities (Irazabal, 2005; Fainstein, 1997; Purcell, 2000). Moreover, scholars suggest that professional administrators should serve as the facilitators of deliberative and democratic processes, and elected officials should ensure that their actions and decisions are reflective of working class interests (Clavel, 1986; Rast, 2009; Wolf-Powers, 2009). Historically, this reframing of roles has succeeded to varying degrees. Where successful, the deviation from conventional, pro-growth roles and

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4 This argument also extends to the use of public funds for the financing of public projects.
approaches has led researchers to refer to several cities and city administrations as “liberal” and/or “progressive.”

An early example of this research is Pierre Clavel’s (1986) precedent-setting book, *The Progressive City*. In *The Progressive City*, Clavel highlights the progressive municipal administrations of Hartford, Cleveland, Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Burlington in the 1970s and 1980s. According to Clavel, progressive cities are cities that possess responsive administrations and institutionalized participatory processes that are available to all residents. While the cities he examined did not fully realize this ideal, Berkeley came closest because of progressive university administrations’, faculty’s, and students’ efforts. Since Clavel’s research, a number of additional cities (including Boston, Ann Arbor, Madison, Boulder, Eugene, Cleveland, Chicago, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Palo Alto, and San Francisco) have been extolled for possessing varying degrees of political progressivism.

In *The Leftmost City: Power and Progressive Politics in Santa Cruz* (2008), Gendron and Domhoff explore the deviant case of Santa Cruz, California – where an unusual alliance of progressive activists began cultivating the political power to combat elite-based development agendas in the late 1960s. Gendron and Domhoff employ the case of Santa Cruz to critique four perspectives of urban power and politics – including public choice theory, Marxism, regime theory, and the growth machine theory. They conclude that the growth machine theory of urban power was most salient in Santa Cruz due to the contentious battles that arose between “exchange values” (i.e., real estate interests) and “use values” (i.e., community interests). These contestations are illuminated by the events that unfolded during the period of recovery from a massive
1989 earthquake, which afforded Santa Cruz the unique opportunity of reevaluating and reestablishing its goals and priorities for urban development. Yet, the private sector encountered significant fragmentation. While “place entrepreneurs” developed an agenda to maximize their profits via increased property values, small business interests advocated a non-corporate approach that prioritized speedy rebuilding. On the other hand, neighborhood activists – supported by environmental advocates and progressive faculty, students, and staff members from the University of California, Santa Cruz – won the attention and support of local elected officials (who were motivated by winning elections) in defeating the growth coalition’s plans for expanded downtown development. Over time, Santa Cruz’s progressive base managed to solidify and maintain a significant degree of political power.

Ferman’s *Challenging the Growth Machine* (1996) was novel in its attention to ‘non-elite’ neighborhood actors and politics as integral aspects of urban regimes. In her comparative study of Pittsburgh and Chicago, Ferman illustrates why Pittsburgh’s neighborhood activists were able to garner a greater level of political responsiveness to their concerns. She attributes cultural and institutional elements as influential factors in shaping the political structures of the two cities. Furthermore, Ferman illuminates how entrenched ward-based political machines, which viewed independent neighborhood activism as a threat to be overcome, encumbered neighborhood interests in Chicago.

In another dual-city study, Pierre Clavel’s *Activists in City Hall* (2010) considers the influential role of progressive politics during the mayoral administrations of Boston's Raymond Flynn and Chicago’s Harold Washington. Following Ferman’s inclusion of non-elites in power structure analysis, Clavel explores the dynamics between Boston and
Chicago’s elite regimes, neighborhood groups, academics, and progressive officials and administrators. The book examines these elected officials’ (who had relatively strong ties to community-based activists) efforts to maintain their commitments to public participation, progressive redistribution, and social movements despite the broader context of severely-declining federal aid to urban areas. Specifically, Clavel highlights Mayor Washington’s efforts to protect manufacturing jobs and to promote the training and hiring of low-income workers in Chicago and Mayor Flynn’s efforts to create affordable housing in Boston. Both mayors implemented their progressive visions for their cities by maintaining strong ties to active neighborhood power-bases. By incorporating community activists in the historically-exclusive processes of policymaking and public administration, Mayors Washington and Flynn advanced innovative and progressive agendas during their tenures.

Rast (2005) extends the literature on progressive regimes in his exploration of alternative economic development strategies in Chicago. The particular strategy under review was the Local Industrial Retention Initiative (LIRI), which Mayor Harold Washington’s administration introduced in 1983 as a partnership among community development corporations, local manufacturers, and city officials to address industrial retention and workforce development in Chicago. During Mayor Washington’s administration, the neighborhood groups that participated in the LIRI program were integrated into Chicago’s governing coalition as partners. The LIRI program was an attempt, on Washington’s behalf, to balance corporate-centered economic development strategies with community-oriented strategies. Since 1983, the program has undergone four principal stages:
Stage I was the pre-program period in which experimentation and organizing created the knowledge base and social capital that undergirds the program. Stage II encompassed the early years of the program, featuring policy advocacy and partial incorporation of LIRI groups into the governing coalition. Stage III was marked by a shift on the part of LIRI groups from organizing to the building of technical capacity, accompanied by a deepening partnership arrangement with city government. Stage IV featured a consolidation of power by city government over planning and development within the city’s industrial corridors, resulting in the marginalization of LIRI organizations.

According to Rast, the primary constraint of LIRI over time was the fact that a fundamental tension emerged between the goals of community development and the goals of community organizing. In reference to this contradiction, Rast cites Stoeker’s (2003) contention that:

Community organizing operates with a conflict worldview in which confrontation and protest are necessary to change inequitable relations of power. Community development, by contrast, is based on a consensus worldview characterized by cooperation and partnership. The challenge for CDCs is to bridge what he [Stoeker] calls the ‘development-organizing dialectic.’ In Chicago, the success of the LIRI program was contingent in part on the ability of CDCs to manage this tension.

While Chicago’s regime temporarily expanded to include community-based actors (their incorporation peaked in the mid-1990s), neighborhood activists ultimately failed to secure a lasting position in the governing coalition – primarily because the CDCs orchestrated LIRI’s adoption gradually shifted focus from leveraging their collective power through community organizing to developing the technical capacity to manage program operations (i.e., to fulfill contracts for industrial outreach and workforce development). Community activists became members of the governing coalition, but because of their stable status, they neglected the base-building activities that initially

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5 Other scholars (such as DeFilippis et al., 2010) highlight the ways in which the structural contradictions between capital and community often work to limit the potential of community development (i.e., program operation versus community organizing).
earned them a role in the coalition. Concurrently, the new Daley administration grew increasingly comfortable with neglecting the interests of community groups and excluding them from his inner circle. He no longer needed their support, as he had consolidated his own loyal corporate-based constituency over time. Thus, the neighborhood activists were essentially powerless without their strong community-rooted political base.

As Daley attempted to assume control over Chicago’s industrial planning and development decisions, he encountered very little opposition from the community groups that were once very well-organized. Ultimately, the relationship between community activists and the Daley administration shifted from partnership to political patronage, as community groups continued to receive CDBG funds for program administration, but no longer possessed a meaningful role in planning or policymaking.

In his assessment of the factors that account for the emergence and successful passage of living wage policies across American cities, Martin (2001) argues that there is significant ‘space for reform’ at the local scale. Martin’s article provides empirical evidence that the variations in living wage policies across the nation can be explained by the variations of political coalitions across urban areas and their connections to national networks. A primary objective of Martin’s analysis was to understand the conditions under which cities can pass redistributive policies without provoking capital flight. He found that living wage ordinances often “call the bluff” of businesses that threaten to relocate due to the enactment of progressive redistributive policies – particularly those businesses that have relatively immobile capital (e.g., those that rely heavily on city contracts as sources of income). Therefore, cities that possess the political will to impose
greater standards on local businesses (i.e., minimum wage mandates for employees) can often do so with ease, because of their strong bargaining position with the corporate sector. Another key finding of Martin’s study is the facilitative role that the U.S.’s federalist system plays in diffusing urban policies – the general autonomy of urban centers, local officials and activists possess a great deal of latitude when implementing innovative, progressive policies. According to Martin:

If the decentralization of the federal system permits progressive policies to diffuse across the city limits, progressives must be organized to take advantage of the opportunity that federalism presents. Without active intervention by progressives organized across cities, the same conditions that permit the diffusion of redistributive policies across political boundaries can also facilitate the diffusion of regressive and anti-labor policies.

Finally, Martin finds that the establishment and cultivation of strong, progressive national networks can have a major impact on the diffusion and promotion of progressive reforms at the local level. Many cities that had early successes in the living wage movement served as testing grounds and models for cities that subsequently adopted living wage policies. Martin often found that national nonprofit networks disseminated the lessons and best practices regarding living wage advocacy across municipal boundaries.

In their analysis of community resistance to Olympic-related growth in Los Angeles (1984), Atlanta (1996), and Salt Lake City (2002), Burbank, Heying, and Andranovich (2000) investigate the potential viability of antigrowth movements (as asserted by authors such as DeLeon). They hypothesize that:

If scholars who emphasize growth control as a challenge to regime theory are correct, development policy pursued by means of large-scale events, such as an Olympic games, should provide favorable conditions for growth opponents to coalesce into an antigrowth movement. On the other hand, if advocates of regime theory are correct, the presence of an active urban growth coalition means that the agenda of urban politics will largely
be set, and growth opponents may be able only to react to specific development proposals rather than stop or slow the entire growth enterprise.

Because Olympic bids require the expenditure of large amounts of public money, but only have a narrow set of payoffs, the authors anticipated that opposition groups would be well-organized. Although the three case studies varied in size, social composition, political structure, and time (their experiences spanned three decades), none of the cases presented a cohesive approach to opposition. While numerous citizen groups opposed various aspects of their cities’ Olympic-related development, their efforts were only intended to deflect negative consequences from specific sites. The authors concluded that because none of the cities presented significant evidence that robust antigrowth coalitions were present, each of the cases clearly fit into the pattern of opposition as piecemeal resistance. Ultimately, the study’s findings supported the regime theory argument that “opponents of an active growth regime face serious difficulties in attempting to overcome the preeminence of economic development.”

As illustrated in the above synopses, there is a long tradition of regime scholarship that considers the potential construction of progressive regimes. Cases of sustained, progressive dominance, however, are largely nonexistent in the literature. Again, if a coalition were to meet the full ideals of a progressive regime (i.e., lower class opportunity expansion as a primary objective) – public and private projects would not be considered for approval without linkages and concessions (e.g., affordable housing, quality jobs, transportation, and public facilities); community empowerment and human development would have more importance (e.g., job training, community education, and authentic community participation in planning and policy decision-making); and
democratic forms of governance and ownership would be instituted in the mainstream political economy.

**The Imperative of Identifying Transformative, Progressive Models**

According to Mossberger (2009), the body of literature that explores the possibilities of regime transformation suggests that “progressive agendas appear to be short-lived or limited in scope, particularly in the American political context where cities are largely dependent upon own-source revenues, and are therefore more sensitive to capital mobility” (p. 45). Yet, in the midst of this current context of economic, political, and demographic instability, it is quite likely that urban scholars will uncover some promising avenues if they maintain efforts to move beyond analyzing regimes (i.e., an explanatory goal) and towards explicating the conditions under which regimes change and can be more equitably reconstructed (i.e., a normative goal) (Imbroscio, 2010; Rast, 2005).

Fueled by delocalizing capital interests, insufficient alternatives to low-wage service sector jobs, innovative organizing strategies, demographic changes, and growing solidarity across community divides, many cities have experienced resurging progressive activism for social, economic, and environmental justice. As such, there are new opportunities to consider the possibilities for regime change and working class empowerment at the local level. According to DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge (2010):

> We are in a historical moment in which grassroots-led social change has become a possibility again. Even when the right-wing ideologies and related policies seemed impenetrable, critics and activists underscored the contradictions inherent in the hegemonic context. Thankfully and predictably, neither hegemony nor context is permanent (p. 165).
Thus, the planning and policy literature must explain how working class mobilizations can improve the material conditions of disadvantaged communities and their inhabitants, and facilitate transparency, accountability, and equity across local, state, and federal governance structures. To address this task, scholars must identify, describe, and interpret successful movement-building processes – revealing the ways in which nascent, small-scale movements are strategically developed into more unified and powerful movements (Goodwyn, 1978; Fine, 2006).

Since the late 1980s, dynamic alliances between community-based organizations and labor unions have been blossoming across diverse U.S. urban landscapes (Brecher and Costello, 1990). The emergence of broad-based mobilizations around issues of social justice, environmental justice and economic equity characterized this growing trend of “community unionism”. In the next section, I address the following questions: What is community unionism? What are its intended outcomes? What has led to its emergence? What factors determine whether alliances between communities and unions are effective at effectuating progressive regime transformation?

**Community Unionism: A Model of Regime Change?**

*Community Unionism Defined*

Broadly speaking, community unionism is a term that describes the various ways labor unions and community-based organizations collaborate to advance their collective interests (Tattersall, 2005). While the term ‘community’ most often refers to organized community groups, it can also include ‘communities of interest’, which are more diffuse than formal organizations, and may include groups such as young workers, immigrant
workers, and low-wage workers. Community unions exist in different sizes, forms, and degrees of resources. Community groups and labor unions both initiate the partnerships. Although the goals of community unions are also varied, they tend to target concerns directly related to community economic development and political empowerment for the benefit of working class people.

**The Origin and Evolution of Community Unionism**

Often driven by influential central labor councils, today’s community-union coalitions are increasing in number and are experiencing varying levels of success in their efforts to enact justice through urban reforms and regime change (Fine, 2005; Milkman, 2006; Reynolds, 2004; Sites, 2007; Wills, 2001). While community unionism has not received much coverage in the planning or policy literature, it is not a new concept.

Community unionism first took root in the U.S. before World War II, but largely dissipated after the war’s end. As noted by Brecher and Costello, community unionism reemerged in the late 1980s when coalitions of community and labor organizations across the country laid the necessary infrastructure to wage campaigns around mutually-important issues such as plant closures, affordable housing, living wages, public services, development subsidies, and environmental justice (Brecher and Costello, 1990; Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Clawson, 2003; Nissen, 2004; Fine, 2005).

There is a logical marriage between union organizing and community organizing. An account of recent organizing around equitable economic development illustrates this relationship. Applegate (2007) explains, “Community organizing to empower residents to gain the benefits of economic development initially initiated, even as it elaborated on,
labor organizing: mobilizing residents to bargain with and compel concessions from those controlling the development system” (p. 54). Thus, early conceptions of community organizing were heavily shaped by the foundations and practices of labor power built through “people power” in local communities.

In fact, Saul Alinsky, the “father” of community organizing, insisted that empowerment depended on the ability of residents (1) to identify the origins of the lack of control in their lives and (2) to build institutions girded with the power needed to overcome their powerlessness, subpar incomes, and living standards. As a graduate sociology student at the University of Chicago, Alinsky rejected prevailing theories of cultural deprivation and disorganization, which explained the inferior status of poor ethnic communities. This was largely because the organizing model of CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) unions intellectually influenced Alinsky. Inspired by their radical opposition, Alinsky believed that the poor needed to directly confront businesses and governments to gain control of their conditions.

In 1939, Alinsky created the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) – an inter-ethnic community organization supported by the local Catholic Church and Chicago’s meatpacking union – to force Chicago’s largest meatpackers to the negotiate with their workers. In 1940, Alinsky established the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to expand his model of working-class coalitions between community organizations and labor unions across the nation. Alinsky’s organizing model brought all forms of community resources under an umbrella “organization of organizations”; these overarching organizations allowed institutions to seriously consider community residents’ and workers’ concerns about inequality and their demands for justice. This adaptation of
the union-based collective bargaining process was, in Alinsky’s opinion, a perfect fit for overcoming community-level problems of unequal power relations. In 1959, Alinsky established The Woodlawn Organization in a black Chicago neighborhood. Woodlawn was so successful that it transcended the traditional victories of affordable housing, job training, quality jobs, and improved city services. As the first community organization with direct control over its renewal, The Woodlawn Organization strategy laid the groundwork for IAF organizations’ future efforts to assert direct control over the planning and implementation of economic development (Alinsky, 1972).

When the federal government developed the Community Action Program (CAP), Alinsky denied the program’s alignment with his own empowerment model of community-driven political reform. Instead, he decried CAP as a “gutless” program based on the Chicago School’s ideology of individual and cultural deficits. To a large degree, Alinsky’s criticisms of CAP were true - especially as Congress deviated from the goal of maximum community participation and, instead, mandated that CAP boards equally represent elected officials, business representatives, and community residents. This mandate, in effect, further diluted CAP’s potential to cultivate real community power and catalyze systematic change (O’Connor, 2001).

Other organizations influenced early community unionism, as well. Before World War II, labor unions sponsored cooperative housing developments, lobbied for rent controls, and advanced activist housing committees. In 1943, the UAW-CIO published a report critical of “the real estate, speculative building and allied interests as exploiting the worker’s need for shelter, and urging workers to push for housing through their unions, creating an organized mass market” (Botein, 2007, p. 802). While workforce housing
was one component of the coalition’s reform agenda, universal health insurance, full employment, and an increased minimum wage were also important issues. Congress’ passing of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which banned progressive Communist leaders from participating in the National Labor Relations Board, diffused the progressive mobilization around the coalition’s blueprint. According to some historians, the Taft-Hartley Act marked the transition of labor from a political force to an interest group (Katznelson, 1981).

**Federal Cooption and the Labor-Community Divide**

The labor movement’s influence in lobbying for the Housing Act of 1949, which created the urban renewal program of slum clearance, enabled the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgages. The Housing Act also authorized the funding of new public housing units, which illustrates a recurrent alignment between the building trades and the real estate industry (Botein, 2007). The United Automobile Workers (UAW), which had close affiliations with student-led community organizing projects in the 1960s, aimed to build a broad coalition “to continue the New Deal’s restructuring of U.S. political economy to achieve democratic controls over industry and economic development” (Applegate, p. 62). UAW leaders gained access to Johnson’s urban policy task force and became instrumental in the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and its Model Cities program.

Ultimately, these innovations, like CAP, did not significantly change power relations. In fact, potential community power and resources remained in the hands of the government, and left progressive community organizations in a position of paralysis -
operating as social service and development agencies, under the guise of empowerment through self-help. The unfulfilled promises of broad democratic controls over economic development eventually created a chasm between labor and community that, for decades, left the two pitted against each other. This opposition led to “civil rights and women’s groups pursuing legal actions against unions, with unions defending discriminatory practices; unions opposing the antiwar movement, with New Left attacks on unions as being part of the racist, imperialist Establishment” (Applegate, p. 64).

‘Business unionism’ soon began to gain its foothold as the dominant approach of the U.S. labor movement. Through business unionism, unions abandoned their broader goals of economic democracy, and instead focused on the advancement and protection of their unionized workers, who increasingly became part of America’s middle class through contract negotiations and enforcement. During this period of unprecedented national growth, business unionism’s narrow focus rested on the notion that the maintenance of a “free market” economy was mutually beneficial to both owners and laborers (Mantsios, 1998).

Meanwhile, rapidly proliferating community development corporations and financial institutions, as private- and government-sponsored institutions, also largely abandoned any form of militant organizing (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003) and increasingly focused on housing development. A number of empirical studies concluded that these community organizations failed at inducing any significant degree of community economic development (Applegate, 2007; Cummings, 2006; Eisenberg, 2000; McDevitt, 1997; Traynor, 1993; Stoeker, 1996). Notably, David Rusk (1999) evaluated census data from 1970 to 1990 in Brooklyn, New York’s Bedford-Stuyvesant
neighborhood (where one of the earliest CDCs was established) and found that increased poverty, decreased population, and deflated buying power had affected the area during that time. Upon expanding his analysis to a national sample of 43 other ‘exemplary’ CDCs, he determined that “the cities across the country served by the most successful CDCs as a group still became poorer, fell farther behind the regional income level, and lost real buying power” (p. 49). The few spots of regeneration he did find in CDC neighborhoods usually represented small pockets of gentrification located within larger areas of growing poverty and despair. This evidence caused Rusk to state, “The evidence of my experience is that, even in the midst of what is now a seven-year economic expansion, prosperity has not reached into the hearts of many of America’s ghettos and barrios. The good guys are not winning” (p. 62).

**Community Unionism’s Recent Resurgence**

In the last two decades, however, many community development organizations have returned to comprehensive strategies of community building; many have experimented with community organizing (Bratt, 1997; Keating 1997; Stoecker, 1996). Furthermore, national organizations such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), PICO (People Improving Communities through Organizing) Network, and the Gamaliel Foundation have navigated the system while concurrently cultivating meaningful, reform-oriented civic engagement among poor and working-class citizens (Swarts, 2008). Funded largely by supportive foundations, these and other organizations have worked to gain community control through resident trainings, needs
assessments, multilevel planning analyses, program implementation and monitoring, and
ownership and management of community assets.

The recent divides between workplace and community have narrowed as
coalitions in numerous urban areas have reached beyond the workplace to cultivate
broad-based political power that garners public and private respect (Fine, 2005;
Reynolds, 1999; Sites, 2007; Turner, 2007). The AFL-CIO’s new leadership and reform
agenda serve as prime examples of this reignited convergence.

Massive job losses, membership declines, major defeats in strikes, severe declines
in real wages, passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and
growing negative sentiments towards labor unions ignited labor leaders to call for a
transformative approach to movement revitalization. In 1995, John Sweeney (then head
of the fast-growing Service Employees International Union) used the platform of “A New
Voice for American Labor” to campaign for the AFL-CIO presidency. Sweeney criticized
the:

AFL-CIO as a ‘Washington-based institution concerned primarily with refining
policy positions’ instead of a ‘worker-based movement against greed,
multinational corporations, race-baiting, and labor-baiting politicians.’ He
charged that the American labor movement is ‘irrelevant to the vast majority of
unorganized workers in our country’ and added that he had deep suspicions that
‘we are becoming irrelevant to our own members’ (Brecher & Costello, 1998, p.
26).

As President, Sweeney’s New Voice program identified seven key objectives:

1. Organize at a pace and scale that is unprecedented
2. Build a new and progressive political movement of working people
3. Construct a labor movement that can change workers’ lives
4. Create a strong new progressive voice in American life
5. Renew and refocus our commitment to labor around the world
6. Lead a democratic movement that speaks for all American workers
7. Institutionalize the process of change
Apparently, the foundations upon which empowerment-oriented community organizations can unite with progressive labor unions are strong. Various factors contribute to this resurgence. Since the 1980s, government has outsourced responsibility for economic development oversight and governance to markets and has abandoned economic equality as policy priority. Thus, the New Deal foundations that built America’s strong middle class base have been undermined by a low-road approach to development. Similar to the turn of the twentieth century, low wage jobs, poor labor standards, and deteriorating quality of life are commonplace (Applegate, 2007). As immigrants, minorities, and female workers are progressively included in new organizing strategies like worker centers, an expanding immigrant and ethnic minority population has enhanced the potential for social unrest (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Sassen, 2001). Also, metropolitan areas provide promising possibilities for labor innovation and revitalization due to heightening obstacles at the national, sectoral, and firm levels (Gordon, 1999; Herod, 1998, Turner, 2007). During this period of unprecedented national growth, business unionism’s narrow focus rested on the notion that the maintenance of a “free market” economy was mutually beneficial to both owners and laborers (Mantsios, 1998). Conservative and neoliberal political dominance at the federal and state levels makes the local terrain, where social and economic problems are most directly felt and expressed, the most favorable arena for progressive policy reform (Applegate, 2007). Because devolution (the downscaling of state power) has increased the opportunities for local power blocs to transform state practices, communities are becoming more important strategic arenas for anti-neoliberal political projects (Brenner, 2004). Furthermore, the growth of localized service jobs provides community-based organizing efforts with
greater leverage for working class politics (DeFilippis, 2009). New strategies center around service sectors (such as health care, education, hospitality, and building services) and place-dependent industries (such as construction and transportation), which depend on localized factors such as regional labor markets, education and workforce development, infrastructure costs, quality of life, and regional consumer markets make community demands for development needs more compelling.

Margaret Weir (2004) argues that reversing the U.S.’s expanding economic inequality will require a revitalization of the labor movement. And with many of the historical barriers to collaboration now removed, unions and community organizations are focused on community-based empowerment agendas aimed at altering existing power structures and exercising control over the processes of local development. Applegate (2007) states:

Collaboration to control economic development for equitable outcomes would establish a new organizational foundation for unions and community-based development organizations to carry out their historic roles of expanding equality, enabling both institutions to expand the capacity and reach of their individual programs (p. 55).

If community-union coalitions are strategic, they hold the potential to reconfigure governance structures that have historically undermined organizing efforts’ ability to achieve economic justice for poor and working-class Americans.

**Determinants of Community Unionism’s Success**

Research has identified many factors that impact the potential and limitations of working class mobilization. Not surprisingly, one factor that has been viewed as important is the context-dependent history of organized labor (Fine, 2005; Sites, 2007;
Wolf-Powers, 2010). Turner (2007) created a typology of “frontier cities” (e.g., Los Angeles, Miami, San Jose, Nashville), which had weak labor movements until the 1990s and “union towns” (e.g., New York, Boston, Buffalo, Seattle), which built entrenched, powerful labor movements post-World War II. Beyond this, unions may or may not choose to pursue progressive strategies based on the presence of “bridge builders,” or activist-leaders who advance internal reform. Skilled activists often direct central labor councils, as the councils have become increasingly important in communities (Reynolds, 2004).

Another important factor is the inclusiveness of coalition membership (Gross, 2007; Salkin, 2007; Wolf-Powers, 2010). The U.S.’s civic-localist infrastructure leaves governance at the local level reliant on widespread mobilization among an array of allied groups within civil society. Unlike other countries, U.S. coalitions cannot depend on institutionalized channels of influence within government. The majority of the U.S. workforce is comprised of women and people of color, while white men now make-up the minority (Brecher & Costello, 1998; Gottlieb et al, 2005). The unemployed, underemployed, young, old, minorities, immigrants, and women present new opportunities for mobilizing new, progressive power blocs.

A community’s history of identity politics can potentially play an important role in defining strategic alliances (Turner & Cornfield, 2007). Linkages with progressive political organizations can inhibit or advance community unionism (Reynolds, 1999). The AFL-CIO’s national leadership has continued its unwavering support of the Democratic Party – even though Democratic leaders have repeatedly turned their backs on labor once elected. However, some local activists have developed more promising
strategies with progressive political organizations such as the Labor Party and the New Party (Brecher & Costello, 1998). Issue framing and resource mobilization are also extremely important. Discourses surrounding “wins” and “losses” in the local and national mainstream media (Krinsky & Reese, 2006), the ability to transform internal and external conflict (Krinsky & Reese, 2006; Salkin, 2007), and the ability to effectively mobilize resources (Reynolds, 1999; Tilly, 1978; Salkin, 2007; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) play large roles in movement’s success. The relative strength of multi-scalar organizing institutions, such as Partnership for Working Families, Jobs with Justice, Change to Win, AFL-CIO, ACORN, Right to the City, can fundamentally transform a weak infrastructure community into a strong one through technical assistance and capacity building (Sites, 2007; Stoecker, 1996; Swarts, 2008).

The local, state, and national political opportunity structures are also important to coalition success (Wolf-Powers, 2010). According to Turner (2007):

> It makes a difference whether institutions at the urban level are more open or more entrenched, but in either case strategic innovation by unions aims to exploit opportunity afforded by institutional openings, fragmentation, rigidity, loss of legitimacy, and conflicts among institutional officeholders and power brokers...Institutions are power structures that can provide elements of an opportunity structure – opportunities that when institutions lose cohesiveness or legitimacy – that can be used to challenge institutionally embedded power” (p. 4).

Opportunity structure has also been a central explanation in the social movement literature for why mobilization cycles emerge (Tarrow, 1998).

The aforementioned factors influence the effectiveness of working class mobilization efforts in the United States. And with many of the historical barriers to collaboration now lowered, unions and community organizations are more focused on community-based empowerment agendas aimed at altering power structures and
exercising control over the processes of local development. In reference to this potential, Applegate (2007) states:

Collaboration to control economic development for equitable outcomes would establish a new organizational foundation for unions and community-based development organizations to carry out their historic roles of expanding equality, enabling both institutions to expand the capacity and reach of their individual programs (p. 55).

Community-union coalitions may, in effect, reconfigure the power structures that have historically undermined the effectiveness of past organizing efforts. In today’s complex and turbulent environment, the implications of community unionism are more important than ever.

**Literature Synthesis and Implications**

If the problems of concentrated poverty, pervasive unemployment, physical blight, and fiscal distress will ever be truly addressed, uncritical support for elite-dominated, public-funded development cannot be sustained. Increased standards of accountability in local government are necessary and research must be conducted to better understand how new tools for accountability and transparency can ebb the tide of urban distress.

Implementing the model of community unionism, organizing may cultivate a greater degree of democracy, equity, accountability, and transparency in economic development. If organizing is effective, then community power can be built. And if community power is built, community-union coalitions can potentially reform elite-driven economic development, elevate the standards of land use decisions, elect progressive public servants, and implement public policies that promote job training,
affordable housing, clean environments, and quality local jobs. Moreover, because progressive organizations working together in strategic coalitions are more powerful together than they could ever be in isolation, the working class coalitions built through the processes of community unionism can potentially build the personal and institutional relationships required to displace elite regimes in urban governance.
CHAPTER 3:

METHODOLOGY
**Introduction**

By gaining an in-depth understanding of the internal characteristics of progressive coalition-building in Los Angeles, this project reveals the strengths and weaknesses of L.A.’s emerging community unionism movement. Furthermore, this research illuminates the potentials and limitations of rebalancing L.A.’s governance structure by increasing the power and influence of working class people and organizations. To achieve these aims, this dissertation investigates three broad-based community-labor coalitions that emerged in Los Angeles between 2000 and 2010, and answers the following questions:

1) What factors account for the coalitions’ emergence and relative success?
2) To what extent has a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the elitist agenda of L.A.’s historically powerful growth regime?

In the following pages, I provide a rationale for choosing a case study research design, selecting the case of Los Angeles (and the specific coalitions therein), and employing my chosen methods of data collection and analysis.

**Methodological Approach**

Case study research is intended to: organize dense information into vivid descriptions, refine theoretical approaches, and recommend avenues for future research (Stake, 1998). One of the primary advantages of case study research is that it provides more detailed and complete information than other research methods such as surveys. Furthermore, this approach facilitates the presentation of collected data using a wide variety of methods like interviews, surveys, document analysis, and observation (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). In this research project, I qualitatively analyze the case of Los Angeles’ emerging community unionism movement. To illuminate the idiosyncratic
and contextually-dependent nature of progressive organizing in Los Angeles, I integrate both endogenous (i.e., related to the case’s internal system) and exogenous (i.e., related to the case’s broader context) factors into my analysis. Because this dissertation examines detailed, qualitative dynamics, the case study approach best suits this project’s research demands.

While case study research has many advantages, it also has several limitations. For instance, because case studies take a descriptive (rather than explanatory) approach to illuminating real-world phenomena, they cannot be conducted under controlled conditions in a laboratory. Case study research is, therefore, unable to generate valid and reliable conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships. Another weakness of case study research is its limited ability to generalize findings. Because cases cannot depict the entire world, case studies must be specific and bounded, which significantly limits the extent to which they can represent a broader group or population. Also, there are ethical implications related to constructing accurate narrative depictions of phenomena. For example, case studies often rely on individuals’ abilities to accurately recall the details of past events, and research participants might unintentionally leave out important details. Additionally, because it is impossible to interview the entire population of Los Angeles about shifts in urban governance, my research is subject to problems of excluded data. The most appropriate way I can minimize misrepresentations and exclusions is to pay adequate attention to the triangulation of data (Seawright & Gerring, 2008; Stake, 1998; Yin, 2003).

**Case Selection**
Why the Case of Los Angeles?

This dissertation challenges the deterministic proposition of elite domination in urban governance and explores the possibilities of building broad-based, progressive coalitions at the local level. Therefore, it was essential to select a case (i.e., Los Angeles) that presented a potential deviation from the norm. Fueled by delocalizing capital interests, insufficient alternatives to low-wage service sector jobs, innovative organizing strategies, demographic changes, and growing solidarity across community divides, Los Angeles represents a burgeoning working class movement for social and economic justice. Although much of urban regime and power structure research portrays elite domination as a static and pervasive reality, the case of community unionism in Los Angeles presents an emerging deviation to this rule.

While this deviation is, arguably, largely due to factors related to L.A.’s status as a global city (i.e., its susceptibility to the dynamics of economic restructuring and demographic change), Los Angeles is representative of the changes that will occur in many U.S. cities during the next century. Several scholars argue that one must understand Los Angeles in order to understand the future of America (Davis, 1990; Dear, 2000; Gottlieb et al., 2005; Villa & Sanchez, 2005). For instance, the authors of The Next Los Angeles conclude:

Los Angeles is not merely a testing ground, but also ‘a forcing ground, a place where ideas, practice, and customs must prove their worth or be discarded.’ It is ‘a land of magical improvisation,’ a place that ‘creates its own past.’ Los Angeles, in fact, has continually reinvented itself and tested out new ideas. It is also the place that may help identify a new progressive politics in regions around the country and help set the standard for political and social change in years to come (Gottlieb et al., 2005, p. 1).
Over the past half century, Los Angeles has represented America’s diverse transformations – widening inequality, heightening immigration, sprawling fringes, escalating anti-growth sentiment, declining elite civic engagement, and intensifying labor struggles. Due to the forces of globalization, L.A. has experienced a sharp decline in its once-vibrant manufacturing industry, a vast expansion of low-wage service sector jobs, and a rapidly declining middle class base. Conceptualizations of how democratic and just cities may be created depend on our ability to thoroughly analyze spaces such as L.A., which is why serves as an ideal case for understanding the possibilities and limitations of elite regime change and progressive empowerment through community unionism at the local level.

**Why These Three Coalitions?**

The foundations of L.A.’s community unionism movement have built upon a number of influential coalitions that have materialized since the 1990s. I limited my efforts to three coalitions that emerged between 2000 and 2010 because I would not be able to completely and fairly represent all of the relevant cases that surfaced in the past two decades. I selected these three coalitions based on an initial phase of document analysis (to familiarize myself with the wide range of potential cases) and key informant telephone interviews (to narrow down the list of potential cases). More specifically, I chose the coalitions based on their representativeness (i.e., ability to reflect the broader population of community-labor coalitions in Los Angeles), inclusiveness (i.e., diversity of constituencies and interests represented), and influence (i.e., degree of importance in
synergizing L.A.’s community unionism movement). Based on these conditions, the following coalitions were selected for analysis in this dissertation:

1) Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Environmental and Economic Justice  
   *Key Outcome: L.A. Live CBA (2001)*

2) LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice  
   *Key Outcome: LAX Airport Expansion CBA (2004)*

3) Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports  
   *Key Outcome: Los Angeles and Long Beach Clean Trucks Program (2008)*

These coalitions represent past and ongoing working class campaigns that include a number of progressive sector (e.g., community-based organizations, labor unions, worker centers, faith-based organizations, environmental groups, etc.), private sector (e.g., real estate development firms, small business owners, private sector membership associations, etc.), and public sector (e.g., City Council, Mayor’s Office, L.A. Community Redevelopment Agency, Los Angeles World Airports, Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbor Commissions, etc.) entities and actors. While private and public sector interests are important to this study, progressive sector institutions and actors are the central focus of my work.

Although the three selected cases are useful in explicating specific dynamics related to progressive coalition building in Los Angeles, it is important to note that the three cases are all components of a much larger story, and do not encompass the complete narrative of working class mobilization in Los Angeles. Thus, this dissertation not only intensively analyzes the three aforementioned coalitions, but it also considers the broader dynamics of Los Angeles’ progressive movement and (briefly) identifies the integral components of L.A.’s power structure.

**Data Collection and Analysis**
To systematically address the study’s complex research questions, I intertwined the processes of data collection and data analysis. I used this approach to ensure (1) that the data I collected appropriately informed my analysis and (2) that my analysis, concurrently, informed the direction of my data collection (e.g., determining who to interview). This dissertation employed two methods of data collection – document analysis and key informant interviews.

From the beginning, I divided the study’s research processes into five distinct phases. First, I engaged in an initial process of document analysis. Next, I conducted key informant interviews over the phone. Third, I selected three coalitions for intensive analysis and familiarized myself with their details. Then, I spent several weeks in Los Angeles conducting in-person interviews. Lastly, I completed the process of data synthesis and analysis. The following pages outline the key processes of this research project.

**Phase I: Initial Document Analysis**

In the first phase of this research, I engaged in an extensive process of document analysis. The purpose of this first research phase was to familiarize myself with the extensive amount of information related to political, economic, demographic, and social trends in the history of Los Angeles (1900s through 2010). This analysis relied upon academic articles, books, newspaper articles, reports, websites, local newsletters, community blogs, planning documents, census data, economic statistics, and electoral data. Using these resources, I wrote notes and devised a detailed timeline to organize all germane issues. I outline my specific areas of review below.
To analyze L.A’s political and demographic context (specifically over the past decade, but broadly since the 1900s), I examined electoral results and core policy issue fault lines for constituencies; identified major demographic shifts; created socioeconomic profiles of Los Angeles and other important geographic areas for comparison; examined key public, private, and progressive powerbrokers’ backgrounds, affiliations, and allegiances; examined trends in campaign contributions; and researched local and state legislation supportive of accountable development (e.g., participation mandates, living wage policies, disclosure policies, claw-backs, etc.). I also explored legacies of progressive activism and political culture in Los Angeles.

In an effort to analyze Los Angeles County’s economy, I identified the county’s largest firms and employers; examined location quotients (industry concentrations); examined wage differentials by industry; identified changes in industrial employment; and examined key economic projections.

Finally, I read numerous books and articles that informed my understanding of the cultural, institutional, political, and economic changes that contributed to elite decline and progressive organization in Los Angeles to become more familiar with Los Angeles’ unique history of urban governance. I also read a range of reports, books, and articles specifically related to L.A.’s recent history of working class coalition-building. These sources guided my decision regarding which coalitions to use as case studies.

**Phase 2: Key Informant Phone Interviews for Case Selection and General Knowledge**

During this research process, I solicited as much information and guidance, from knowledgeable leaders (i.e., key informants) in L.A.’s progressive community as I could.
I relied heavily on these knowledgeable leaders to establish community buy-in, navigate critical relationships, and triangulate the validity of findings. Early on, I developed a list of key informants (e.g., scholars, activist leaders, reporters, etc.) who possessed detailed knowledge related to L.A.’s community unionism movement (based on names that stood out during the initial document analysis). I first contacted these key informants by email (to introduce myself and to request a phone interview), and later by telephone (to guide and inform the selection of this dissertation’s three intensive cases and broader themes related to the movement).

I spoke with twelve individuals over the phone. Phone interview questions included: What were the important fights (between elites and progressives) related to accountable development in L.A. between 2000 and 2010? What makes these particular campaigns/fights important? What institutions (private, public, nonprofit, etc.) and people exerted influence in these battles? What were their positions? How did they exert influence? Who won, and why? What key alliances and conflicts were exhibited across public-private-civic boundaries? Were the public and private sector (represented by involved agencies and people) centralized and unified or decentralized and fragmented in these cases? And what bodies and people were ultimately responsible for decision-making? Collectively, the key informants’ responses to these questions assisted in my selection of the three coalitions for intensive analysis. These interviewees also referred me to other individuals they thought I should speak to during my research trip to Los Angeles.

It is important to note that after speaking with these key informants, my original focus on L.A.’s “accountable development” movement (which I specified in my
dissertation proposal) needed to be reconsidered. Several interviewees commented that “accountable development” had only been used as an effective frame for the organizing that had happened. They advised me I should not characterize what was occurring on the ground as an accountable development movement. After my field visit to Los Angeles, I reshaped my framework to reflect L.A.’s progressive organizing as a working class “community unionism” movement – based on my person interpretations and interviewees’ advice.

**Phase 3: Document Analysis of Coalitions**

Once I finally selected the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice, and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports as my cases, I read as much as I could about them. The material I surveyed included reports, newspaper articles, editorials, journal articles, and online blogs. I took detailed notes about the specifics of each case in preparation for my field visit and in-person interviews. Based on these notes and my general questions and impressions, I developed protocols, tailored specifically to each coalition, for semi-structured interviews. I also created lists of potential interviewees for each coalition, and emailed these individuals to schedule interview times during my visit to Los Angeles.

**Phase 4: Semi-Structured Interviews and Data Organization**

I spent two weeks conducting interviews in Los Angeles in order to verify and extend my initial findings about the three coalitions and L.A.’s broader governance structure. The time I spent in the field allowed me to conduct in-person, semi-structured
interviews with nineteen key informants (e.g., coalition directors, coalition members, public and private decision-makers, etc.), who played various roles in the three coalitions. I intended for these interviews to corroborate the information derived from the initial phases of analysis and to generate new data.

To answer the dissertation’s main research questions, I adapted an evaluative framework suggested by Tattersall (2010) in her book *Power in Coalition*. Tattersall recommends four measures that can be used to illuminate the various types of outcomes that coalitions produce. I explored the first three measures – building a well-functioning coalition, increasing the capacity of participating organizations, and influencing public and private decisions to win tangible outcomes – through a series of interview questions to assess the factors that accounted for the coalitions’ emergence and relative success. Then I asked questions that informed my understanding of the extent to which a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the elitist agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful growth regime. Finally, I asked a broader set of questions related to the possibilities of regime change in Los Angeles.

While I took notes during the interviews, I also digitally recorded all of the conversations. Immediately following my fieldwork, I transcribed interviews, and coded and organized the data based on Tattersall’s four measures of coalition success.

**Phase 5: Final Analysis**

In the final analysis of each coalition, I identified the participating organizations and explored their individual backgrounds (e.g., membership scope and mission).
Regarding the broader coalition dynamics, I assessed issues such as: membership outreach; campaign strategy and design; framing; political and civic education; tactics and actions; event turnout; media, messaging, and communications; and leadership development. I also explored issues related to coalition management (e.g., communication, meetings, decision-making, conflict management), identified material and non-material resource flows (e.g., between coalition actors, from coalition actors to external actors such as political parties, and from funders to coalition actors), and explored oppositional forces (e.g., community, public, and private actors who resisted the coalition’s goals).

The potential for movement building and power realignments cannot be realized without the presence of core anchor organizations that recognize the need for a larger movement to engage and exercise political power. For each of the three coalitions, I identified core/anchor groups and assessed various aspects of the anchor organizations such as: motivations, histories, and relative power; internal capacity to devise and lead campaigns; scope (e.g., membership demographics and issues represented); trust (e.g., how the movement and broader community perceived these power brokers); vision (e.g., how leaders perceived future opportunities to advance the movement); and internal governance (e.g., leadership development and democratic governance).

In the next stage of analysis, I identified the institutional structures and the formal and informal mechanisms through which community unionism activists participated in urban governance. The general question was, “To what extent have the members of this movement inserted themselves in the governance structures of L.A.”? I assessed the development of governance capacity with the following criteria: outside activism and
governance (e.g., grassroots organizing and movement building at the base); inside
activism and governance (e.g., activism of allied insiders such as elected officials, council
members, city planners, city administrators); civic engagement (e.g., how campaign
activists insert themselves - formally and informally - in policy decisions); electoral
participation (e.g., expanding the electorate by building left-center platforms and
alliances); and personal relationships (e.g., within and across public-private-civic
boundaries). This analysis allowed me to determine how the emergence of the
community unionism movement has altered the broader governance of Los Angeles (i.e.,
changed decision making processes, increased transparency, expanded flow of
information, etc.).

Summary

This research project examines the composition and role of Los Angeles’
community-union coalitions in order to understand how governance has changed in Los
Angeles – both as a result of the progressive community’s broad-based coalition-building
efforts and as a result of the ways in which L.A.’s broader power structure, itself, has
changed. By using document analysis and key informant interviews, this dissertation
analyzes three broad-based community-labor coalitions that emerged in Los Angeles
between 2000 and 2010. This case study of progressive activism in Los Angeles conveys
detailed interpretations of specific coalition phenomena and also offers broader
theoretical implications about the contemporary nature of urban governance.
CHAPTER 4:

DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL TRENDS

IN LOS ANGELES
Historical Trends of Urban Governance in L.A.

Los Angeles became a Western mecca of international trade early in the twentieth century (Davis, 1990). In the 1900s, early city boosters actively recruited native-born rural whites to move to Los Angeles from the Midwest U.S. (Milkman, 2006). During the 1900s, four prominent political factions competed for power and influence over decisions in Los Angeles. First, Los Angeles’ early conservatives promoted private ownership of transportation and infrastructure, an aggressive real estate development, and resistance to European immigration. Also, conservatives were staunch in their desire to take an “open shop” approach to labor management (i.e., where workers are discouraged from joining or financially supporting unions at their places of work). The second group – the city’s early moderate reformers – promoted an agenda of good governance and efficient city management. Third, radical progressive reformers fought for an expanded role for government intervention in disputes between labor and capital. Lastly, Los Angeles’ emerging Socialist party and moderate labor progressives promoted social and economic justice through municipal planning and regulation. In the city’s 1911 and 1913 elections, more than forty percent of residents voted for Socialist candidates. But their fight to reform the city’s electoral representation rules (to ensure council seats for non-majority dissenting groups) lost to a strong counter-attack from L.A.’s business community (Gottlieb et al., 2005).

During the early 1900s, the Los Angeles Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Association (M&M) was one of nation’s leading anti-union organizations. M&M had

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6 It is important to note that L.A.’s native-born working class population was quite different from the working class population of the east coast – who formed union hierarchies based on ethnic (most often European) groups.
built a strong alliance with the Los Angeles Times and other conservative leaders who worked, collaboratively, to position Los Angeles as a growing “open shop” industrial town – in direct competition with the high-wage “union town” San Francisco. As such, growth leaders worked to keep wages twenty to thirty percent lower than San Francisco’s wages by ensuring the local labor movement’s disorganization. According to Stimson (1955), L.A.’s growth elite’s anti-union tactics included “open-shop declarations, lockouts, black lists, discharges of union members, agencies for the importation and employment of nonunion workers, financial help to struck firms, economic pressure on employers friendly to labor, legislative lobbying and the like” (p. 256). By 1910, only eight percent of California’s union members lived in Los Angeles, while 65 percent were in San Francisco. Eventually, a number of factors – including the 1910 union-led bombing of the Los Angeles Times building, an escalation in patriotic propaganda, and growing antipathy to antiwar sentiments – suppressed the rise of radical politics in Los Angeles (Milkman, 2006).

By the 1920s, Los Angeles was a well-known “company town” because of the Chamber of Commerce’s promotion of the city as the “Citadel of the Open Shop.” The chamber experienced success in attracting the production facilities of companies like Ford, General Motors, U.S. Steel, Goodyear, and Firestone. Yet, this expansion of the city’s manufacturing base was coupled with a massive population boom, increased dependence on imported energy and water, labor hostility, and overt racism against the city’s growing Black, Latino, and Asian populations.

The social and economic devastation caused by the Great Depression fueled a resurgence in progressive politics during the 1930s. Working class Angelenos formed
strong political coalitions, as they joined unions in unprecedented numbers and tenants’ rights organizations emerged to protect unemployed residents. However, the Los Angeles Police Department acted as an informal arm of business elites. The police department was instructed to break labor strikes and undermine all forms of progressive civil actions during this period. Also in the 1930s, a conservative media campaign financially supported by large Hollywood studios, the Los Angeles Times, big agriculture, and other business elites defeated Upton Sinclair’s popular, but unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign to “End Poverty in California” (Gottlieb et al., 2005).

With regard to the labor movement, the historically conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) overshadowed the historically-progressive Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in Los Angeles during the early twentieth century. During the 1940s, the white-dominated AFL-affiliated building trades won an agreement covering most of Southern California’s construction industry. Also, the AFL-affiliated Building Service Employees International Union (which had a more racially-diverse constituency) organized thousands of building service workers. By 1947, when the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act was passed, labor was a well-established group in Los Angeles, and the city’s “open shop” reputation no longer held true (Milkman, 2006).

Due to enormous population and employment increases (primarily in aircraft and other wartime industries), Los Angeles’ union membership peaked to 37 percent during the 1950s. The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor formed when six Los Angeles AFL central labor councils merged with L.A.’s county-wide CIO organization in 1959 (Frank & Wong, 2004). But at the end of the 1950s, the elite-backed Norris Paulson
ousted Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Brown – who was viciously attacked for his progressive public housing plan.

On the national level, the 1960s saw the rise and demise of the Black Panther Party, the spread of Vietnam protests, and the assassination of several civil rights leaders. Locally, the 1960s marked the end of organized labor’s elevated influence in Los Angeles, as business elites dismantled New Deal government regulations at the federal level. At the same time, with unprecedented federal urban renewal funding, urban planners bulldozed their way through a significant number of Los Angeles’ perfectly intact neighborhoods. The concurrent trends of rampant real estate speculation in the suburbs, disinvestment of L.A.’s urban core, racial discrimination in housing and labor markets, and police brutality in low-income neighborhoods fueled the 1965 Watts Riots - which resulted in further economic devastation and social fragmentation. And L.A.’s elite regime’s power was once again on the rise.

An exclusive group of Los Angeles’ elites worked diligently to expand and control the city’s downtown area in the midst of “explosive suburban growth.” They became preoccupied with attracting and cultivating cultural and recreational institutions, such as the Dodger Stadium, to Los Angeles. Gottlieb et al. (2005) state:

The inner circle of the city’s unelected power structure – a kind of shadow government – was a small, elite clique called the Committee of 25, formed in the early 1950s. They ran the city’s major business establishments and law firms. They controlled its foundations, its hospitals, its cultural institutions, and its universities. (The boards of USC and CalTech were their exclusive domain.) They sat on each other’s boards and gave to each other’s favorite charities. They had lunch downtown at the exclusive California Club and Jonathan Club, both off-limits to Jews, Blacks, and Latinos. (The Jewish moguls of the film industry might as well have been in another world as far as the city’s WASP business elite were concerned.) They were all men and, for the most part, Republican. They hated unions, supported the Cold War, opposed subsidized housing, disliked Jews, and
had little use for racial minorities. Their voice was the *Los Angeles Times*... They picked people to run for local and state public offices, spearheaded ‘blue-ribbon’ committees on the city’s future, and channeled philanthropic funds into cultural organizations that served the upper class and social service agencies that provided Band-aids for the poor (p. 137-138).

This informal coalition of L.A.’s business elites also created a city charter, which ensured extremely weak mayoral power so that unions, people of color, political parties, and other potentially subversive forces had a marginal influence on the political system. The “Committee of 25” established, in essence, a “mini-fiefdom,” where the city’s fifteen council members exercised almost unilateral control over development and contracting decisions. Furthermore, special district agencies such as the Community Redevelopment Agency, the Metropolitan Water District, and the Metropolitan Transportation Agency were granted significant powers over important decisions, but were not held responsible for providing the transparency and accountability expected of other public agencies.

Los Angeles’ strong pro-business foundations curtailed the number of challenges to the city’s elite growth machine throughout the 1970s. Elected in 1975 through the strength of a biracial coalition of Blacks and Jews, L.A.’s first black mayor, Tom Bradley, sustained an alliance with the region’s business elite and advanced an aggressive agenda of explosive downtown development (Gottlieb et al., 2005; Purcell, 2000). Even the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor played a game of insider politics and was actively at the table when development deals were made during Mayor Bradley’s twenty-year reign (Frank & Wong, 2004). Furthermore, a number of trends – including economic restructuring, international outsourcing of manufacturing jobs, heightened use of anti-union tactics like subcontracting and double-breasting, growing use of human resource management (which worked to preempt unions using a veneer of employer
fairness) – worked together to significantly reduce the power of unions. Thus, the elimination of pensions, employer-sponsored health insurance, livable wages, and job security reduced many jobs in L.A. to “sweatshop” conditions. When native Angelenos abandoned their jobs because of deteriorating labor standards, L.A.’s growing population of new immigrants typically replaced them. The continued integration of vulnerable immigrants (who often lacked formal education, financial resources, and legal documents) into L.A.’s workforce ultimately facilitated an escalation in illegal employment practices such as all-cash payments and unpaid overtime (Bernhardt et al., 2009; Milkman, 2006).

While a number of setbacks arose during the 1970s, Los Angeles’ progressive community also experienced several advances. For instance, low-income consumers of the Department of Water and Power began an environmentalist campaign for affordable utility rates; a growing tenants’ rights movement advanced an agenda of rent control in Los Angeles, Santa Monica, and West Hollywood; progressive media outlets such as L.A. Weekly, KPFK radio, Southern California Library for Social Studies Research, and Midnight Special Bookstore among others experienced growth and success; and organizations like the Liberty Hill Foundation and the ACLU worked to link various sectors of L.A.’s progressive community (Gottleib et al., 2005).

By the 1980s, although L.A. was home to a number of wealthy attorneys, entertainers, high-tech entrepreneurs, and others who had amassed great fortunes, their personal prosperity was largely independent of L.A.’s weakening economy. While the L.A. metropolitan area had been the largest manufacturing center in the country since the late 1970s, manufacturing employment declined with the onset of the early 1980s
recession (Davis, 1990). 7 The exodus of large corporations for less-expensive areas deeply impacted L.A.’s working class residents – particularly those employed in the defense manufacturing industry. According to Frank and Wong (2004):

> Until the 1980s, Los Angeles was headquarters to a host of Fortune 500 companies and other major businesses. Their leaders were the oligarchy of the downtown business interests. These companies, such as Hughes, Lockheed, Litton, the Atlantic Richfield Company, Security Pacific Bank, Great Western Bank, and even the *Los Angeles Times*, have been subjected to mergers, acquisitions, or closures. The heads of the remaining entertainment conglomerates, along with the major developers of the region, have largely replaced the old oligarchy at the seats of power. Construction, business services, the hospitality industry, and retail have all been greatly impacted by changes in the labor environment as union workers were replaced with contracted workers who were nonunion and foreign born (p. 155).

As many L.A. legal firms began to focus on establishing global offices, local finance and insurance firms merged with larger entities, local business elites were increasingly required to play roles on national and international stages. Also, when the *Los Angeles Times* chose to focus on becoming a reputable national paper, the resources it once devoted to local issues waned. The land-based growth regime that formerly controlled L.A.’s policy agenda had weakened, as a large amount of local property was owned by non-local investors who purchased massive amounts of land in the late 1980s (Fulton, 1997; Hendriks & Musso, 2004). Elected in 1975, Mayor Bradley’s political strength began to wane around 1985 when federal redevelopment funds declined and when a disgruntled group of affluent homeowner associations in peripheral areas of the city waged a robust slow-growth campaign (Purcell, 2000).

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7 Ronald Reagan, California’s former governor, largely facilitated L.A.’s strong manufacturing employment base with defense expenditures to California. Because the end of the Cold War coincided with the rise of elected presidents from southern states, many prime defense-related contracts began to favor sunbelt cities (Pastor, 2001; Frank & Wong, 2004).
The 1980s was also a time of major demographic shifts. By the end of the 80s, Los Angeles was named the “most multicultural city” in the country because the city became home to almost a quarter of the U.S.’s immigrants. There was significant activism related to immigrants rights, and particularly, Central American issues. There was also a rise of new Latino leaders in the labor movement (i.e., the L.A. County Federation of Labor) who demonstrated a commitment to expanding immigrant organizing. Due to their geographic distance from old-guard union leadership, L.A.’s new Latino labor leaders had the political space to explore innovative organizing strategies with new immigrant workers. At the same time that L.A.’s labor movement began to rebuild its strength at the local and state levels, environmental justice organizations campaigned to stop Mayor Bradley from siting hazardous waste incinerators in South and East L.A., which were low-income communities of color. Furthermore, a federal lawsuit allowed the Coalition for Clean Air to force the South Coast Air Quality Management District to begin taking measures to clean the region’s air (Gottlieb et al., 2005). And on the community organizing front, the Labor/Community Strategy Center founded the Bus Riders Union in 1989, which created a multiracial, anti-corporate movement in Southern California.

Los Angeles’ SEIU local union won a contract in 1990 as a result of its Justice for Janitors (JfJ) campaign, which provided the impetus for a new era of progressivism in Los Angeles. The Justice for Janitors campaign used the pioneering comprehensive campaign approach, which worked to “exercise union leverage on all key players in the local labor market to effectively take wages out of competition” (Milkman, 2006, p. 156). Because of the nature of the existing contracts with office cleaning firms, the campaign
avoided the conventional National Labor Relations Board election process. Instead, the group used the manpower of full-time strategic organizers, corporate researchers, and economists to uncover weaknesses in the janitorial industry’s ownership-management structure. The campaign applied legal tactics and filed public complaints to exert pressure on contractors, while also employing guerrilla-style, “in your face” media-oriented events (with large rank-and-file turnout and arrest rates) to embarrass building owners and cleaning firm owners about their unfair labor practices. These media-based tactics helped union organizers also put pressure on building tenants to urge building owners to negotiate with SEIU. It is important to note that L.A.’s JfJ campaign engaged in unprecedented outreach for support to political allies and community-based organizations. After two years of rigorous organizing, the determined immigrant janitors, many of which were undocumented Mexican and Central American workers, went on strike, endured brutal police beatings, and won union recognition. When the union’s constituency increased from 1,800 to 8,000 members in five years, the SEIU became one of most influential unions in Los Angeles (Milkman, 2006).

But L.A.’s 1992 riots revealed a much darker side of the city – racial divides among Blacks, Latinos, and Koreans and divisions among different socioeconomic classes. Regarding the 1992 riots, Pastor (2001) remarked, “What began as focused and largely African-American unrest in several flash points in South Central Los Angeles quickly became a city-wide and multiracial bread riot – or, as one activist labeled it, a ‘referendum on redevelopment’” (p. 260). As a result of the deaths and property losses the L.A. riots caused, Mayor Tom Bradley established Rebuild L.A. as a top-down,
private sector initiative – which only created a few token investments, loans, and jobs, and ultimately failed to rebuild the city’s devastated areas.

Founded by Anthony Thigpenn in 1993, Action for Grassroots Empowerment & Neighborhood Development Alternatives (AGENDA) intended to bridge the gap between L.A.’s progressive organizations and restless individuals on the ground. Thigpenn developed AGENDA’s mission based on his critique of what was wrong with the city’s progressive infrastructure: CDCs focused on service provision rather than organizing and empowerment, organizers focused on immediate interests rather than long-term agendas and strategies, and large policy questions remained unaddressed because shallow coalitions developed around issues with no real representation in constituent communities. Also in 1993, Maria Elena Durazo – the president of the hotel workers’ union (HERE Local 11) – founded the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy8 in order to create alliances between ethnic business owners and immigrant hotel workers; L.A.’s tourism industry marginalized both groups. LAANE’s broader goal was to cultivate a new Los Angeles economy that would be rooted in community standards and benefits, which reflected working residents’ needs. The Alameda Corridor Jobs Coalitions was another successful post-riot endeavor. Comprised of a coalition of churches and community organizations and assisted by the Center for Community Change, the group successfully lobbied for the training and placement of local residents into jobs on a new rail line that crossed through South Los Angeles. By the end of the decade, the Alameda Corridor program was the largest local hiring program of any public works project in the country (Pastor, 2001).

8 LAANE was originally named the Tourism Industry Development Council.
In addition to the aforementioned organizations, a significant number of programs, initiatives, and coalitions developed during the 1990s to advocate for social, economic, and environmental justice in Los Angeles. These organizations included: Communities for a Better Environment (which challenged the South Coast Air Quality Management District to derail market trading of pollution credits), Community Coalition, ACORN, L.A. Coalition to End Homelessness and Hunger, and Crystal Stairs. Many of these organizations worked to address issues such as food security, liquor store overabundance, affordable child-care, and poverty wages. Also, the Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) was founded to advocate for immigrant rights.

Politically, Mayor Bradley’s decision to not seek reelection in 1993 opened the door for Republican Richard Riordan’s pro-business, tough-on-crime platform. But Riordan’s plan to privatize the city’s workforce moved L.A.’s labor movement to action. The labor movement argued that firms that received public contracts and public subsidies should pay decent wages instead of contracting out poverty-level jobs. This argument evolved into the LAANE-backed living wage campaign, which ultimately experienced success at both the city and county levels during the 1990s.

Miguel Contreras was victorious in his campaign against the County Federation of Labor’s “old white guard” in a racially divisive election in 1996. Contreras became the first person of color to head the County Federation of Labor (the Fed). Around the same time of Contreras’ election, new leadership across L.A.’s labor movement began working in support of Contreras and his efforts at the Fed. Electorally, L.A.’s labor movement won a large number of key local and state battles during the 1990s. For
example, the Fed’s endorsement assisted labor-ally Antonio Villaraigosa in his campaign to become Speaker of the State Assembly. Furthermore, Fed-endorsed candidates brought Democratic control back to the California Assembly in the 1990s. These electoral successes provided the Fed with access to local, state, and national politics, which eventually proved to be very important for the broader progressive movement’s advancement. The labor movement largely achieved its track record of electoral wins through a strategy of targeted precinct walking, direct mailing, and voter registration for “occasionally voting and newly registered Latino voters.” (Frank & Wong, 2004, p. 160).

The contemplation of strategy was important not only to the labor movement, but also to members of L.A.’s broader progressive movement. During a conference for members of L.A.’s progressive community (which was held in 1998 at Occidental College), conference leaders attempted to invoke the progressive spirit of Upton Sinclair’s famous campaign for working class Californians by posing questions about the progressive community’s long-term strategy. According to Gottleib, Vallianatos, Freer, and Drier (2005):

The conference organizers also warned that the fragmentation of Progressive L.A. organizations and activists across the metropolitan area meant that the new century could witness a patchwork of progressivism with no unifying theme, agenda, or movement. The history of Progressive L.A. in the twentieth century – dynamic movements, important policy breakthroughs, and a wave of social action, but an inability to extend itself beyond the political moment to establish a more cohesive and continuing alternative to the dominant forces in the region – remained an invaluable, though ambiguous legacy” (p. 48).

While Los Angeles’ progressive community held great potential, it had to overcome its past patterns of fragmentation in order to be effective. As if institutional fragmentation
was not enough of a challenge, the progressive community also had to combat mounting issues in the broader economy.

**Economic and Demographic Trends in L.A.**

According to Pastor (2001), the global processes of deindustrialization, which led to the decline of traditional mass manufacturing jobs in L.A. during prior decades, resulted in a “bifurcated new economy.” The simultaneous dynamics of post-industrialization (i.e., the growth of high-tech industries and high-end services) and re-industrialization (i.e., the growth of low-wage manufacturing and contingent service employment) marred this new economic environment.

As illustrated in Figure 1, employment in manufacturing, which was nearly twenty percent of L.A.’s workforce in 1990, drastically decreased to 9.9 percent by 2010. Concurrently, employment in L.A.’s major service industries (i.e., educational and health services, construction, etc.) increased.
services, leisure and hospitality services, and government services) experienced relatively steady increases from 1990 to 2010. Also important is that several of the industries with the largest job growth (i.e., retail, leisure and hospitality, educational and health services, and construction) employed the highest proportion of workers in economic hardship.

Figure 2 highlights changes in annual unemployment rates (in Los Angeles County, California, and the United States) between 1976 and 2010. The economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s hit Los Angeles County harder than the state and country, as demonstrated by the sharp incline in unemployment during that period. According to Pastor (2001), "L.A. County held only 30 percent of the state’s population, but suffered over 70 percent of California’s job losses between 1991 and 1993" (p. 265). This rise in unemployment reflects the depth of the economic hardships that propelled L.A.’s 1992 riots.
Los Angeles County has experienced a rapid growth in its foreign-born population (primarily Latino and Asian). The U.S.’s foreign-born population was 11 percent in 2000, but was 26 percent in California and 33 percent in Los Angeles County. As mentioned earlier, this growth in L.A.’s immigrant population assisted the expansion of low-wage and unregulated employment in certain sectors of the local economy.

A closer assessment of demographics in Los Angeles County reveals a decline in the county’s White population (from 41 percent in 1990 to 29 percent in 2008) and a concurrent rise in the county’s Hispanic population (from 37 percent in 1990 to 48
percent in 2008). Changes in L.A.’s Black and Asian populations have been more modest. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2000), the distribution of L.A. County’s Hispanic population was 81.5 percent Mexican, 12 percent Central American, 3 percent South American, and 3.5 percent other Hispanic/Latino (e.g., Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, etc.). According to Halle (2003), public opinion towards immigrants in Los Angeles has grown increasingly favorable. As evidenced by the county’s strong Latino-labor political coalition, L.A.’s Latino population has wielded increasing political clout over time.

Despite L.A.’s striking economic and demographic transformations, the metropolitan region has maintained its stature as a “global city” (Sassen, 2001). In 2008, Forbes named Los Angeles the eighth “Most Economically Powerful City in the World” (Forbes, 2008). However, according to the statistics outlined in Table 3, L.A.’s fortunes have not trickled down to a large share of its residents.

According to American Community Survey data for 2008, thirty percent of L.A. County’s full-time workers earned an annual salary less than $25,000. 51 percent of homeowners and 49 percent of renters were burdened by housing costs that exceeded a
third of their monthly incomes. Furthermore, L.A.’s poverty rate was six percent above
the national average, its income inequality was the highest of all cities in California, and
it was home to more residents without health insurance than any other county in the
nation. With respect to racial economic trends, L.A. County’s African American and
Latino residents were two-and-a-half times more likely to live below the federal poverty
line than their white counterparts. And with respect to local state capacity, L.A. currently
faces unprecedented administrative challenges including massive layoffs, deep fiscal
deficits, limited credit, and increasing small business failures (LAANE, 2009).

**Recent Trends of Urban Governance in L.A.**

While Los Angeles has undergone substantial economic and demographic shifts
in the past few decades, it has also experienced significant changes in its governance
structure. With regard to this shift, Drier et al. (2001) writes:

During the past few decades, four major groups have contended for
political power to fill this vacuum of corporate leadership. The first are
major commercial and residential developers (and their law firms), who
seek zoning approvals and tax breaks and who, more than any other
constituency, fill campaign coffers with contributions. The second are a
wide variety of firms that do business with government agencies—
including the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the port, the airport,
the municipal utility, and the school district—and also litter the lists of
major campaign donors. A third group, a loose coalition of homeowner
associations and locally based business groups in the suburban San
Fernando Valley, has challenged what it considers City Hall’s focus on the
central business district and on low-income (predominantly black and
Latino) neighborhoods. In 2002, they waged a feisty, though ultimately
unsuccessful, effort to form a separate San Fernando Valley city. The
fourth political force has been a network of progressive labor unions,
community organizations, and environmental groups. If the 1992 civil
unrest had any positive outcome at all, it was the growing recognition by
the city’s progressive activists that they had to do a better job at
mobilizing grassroots groups to insist on political change, to work across
racial lines, and to build bridges between unions and community groups.
In fact, since the unrest, L.A. has become ground zero of effective union and community organizing. And the organizing has been bearing fruit.

The fourth political force reflects Los Angeles’ progressive, community unionism movement. Several scholars have asserted that L.A.’s progressive sector has worked to wage a robust community-based, worker-centered, multi-ethnic, and multi-interest movement for social and economic justice since the mid-1980s (Gottlieb et al., 2005; Milkman, 2006; Parks and Warren, 2009; Purcell, 2000; Tattersall, 2010). But how could a city with a notoriously deeply-entrenched elite regime be left with such a gaping political vacuum? And how was L.A.’s historically-fragmented progressive community able to defy the odds and seize this opportunity of elite decline to insert itself as a powerful player in matters of urban governance? This dissertation explores these, and other, critical questions.
CHAPTER 5:
THE FIGUEROA CORRIDOR COALITION FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE
CASE STUDY
FCCEJ Introduction

This chapter explores the emergence and relative success of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice by discussing the coalition’s campaign to secure a community benefits agreement for L.A. Live – a billion-dollar, multi-use complex, which the Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) proposed for development across the street from the Los Angeles’s Staples Center Arena in 2000.

During the Staples Center Arena’s initial development, AEG failed to address the concerns of the surrounding community. Staples Center’s development, therefore, resulted in significant gentrification, displacement, and unmitigated residential nuisances. When AEG announced Phase II of the Staples Center project (L.A. Live), the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) – a coalition comprised of hundreds of impacted residents and approximately thirty community organizations, faith groups, and labor unions – coalesced and demanded a community benefits agreement (CBA) from the project’s developer. In May of 2001, after months of engaging in a painstaking process of community organizing and private negotiations, FCCEJ won the nation’s first full-fledged CBA.

CBAs are private contracts that are typically negotiated between broad-based community coalitions and real estate developers to ensure that publicly subsidized development projects generate material benefits for their surrounding communities. The CBA provisions surrounding the L.A. Live development included affordable housing, living wages, priority hiring, job training, parks and recreational facilities, and a residential parking program.
The following pages examine how FCCEJ organized, brought L.A. Live’s developer to the table, and negotiated concessions for a project that would have provided nothing or little in the form of community mitigations and benefits without FCCEJ’s intervention. After providing a geographic, demographic, and historical profile of the Figueroa Corridor, this chapter analyzes four measures of FCCEJ’s efforts, including its ability to: create a well-functioning coalition, increase the capacity of its participating organizations, influence public and private decisions, and shape the broader political climate.

**FCCEJ Background**

*Figueroa Corridor for Sale: LA’s Downtown Arts and Education Corridor*

Los Angeles’ Figueroa Corridor has been marred by a long history of uneven development. As the southern-most anchor of the City of Los Angeles, Figueroa Corridor has been lauded “Los Angeles' Downtown Arts and Education Corridor” by local boosters and redevelopment officials. With L.A.’s downtown Convention Center as its northern entrance and the University of Southern California’s campus at its southern border, Figueroa Corridor spans a 2.5 mile stretch of Figueroa Street. The Figueroa Corridor is home to many well-known institutions, including: the University of Southern California (a private research university with a total of 37,000 students), the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (home of the USC Trojan football team and the 1932 and 1984 Olympics), Exposition Park (home of numerous museums and other cultural destinations), the Shrine Auditorium (host to the Emmys, Academy Awards, Grammys,
and other prominent awards programs), and the Staples Center (home to the Los Angeles Lakers, the Los Angeles Clippers, the Los Angeles Kings, and the Los Angeles Sparks).

While Figueroa Corridor boasts numerous civic institutions and tourist attractions, it is also a large residential area where there are many working-class neighborhoods and housing options for University of Southern California students.

According to the 2000 Census, the Figueroa Corridor (90015 zip code) had a total population of 15,367. The majority of residents (63 percent) were foreign-born residents, of which 87 percent originated from Latin America. Among the population aged 25 years or older, only 11 percent had a bachelor’s degree or higher, while 45 percent of the population had not finished ninth grade. Nearly half of Figueroa Corridor’s working-age residents were not in the labor force. Although the Census classified 54 percent of residents in the labor force, 13 percent of them were unemployed. The three largest employment industries for residents included manufacturing (31 percent); accommodations, food services, arts, and entertainment (10 percent); and retail (10 percent).
percent). With a median household income of $18,533, almost half of the residents (42 percent) fell below the poverty level in 2000. Moreover, rent consumed a large proportion of income – forty percent of the population spent more than thirty percent of their income on rent. Finally, undergraduate and graduate students comprised 21 percent of the area’s population, which is not surprising because of the Figueroa Corridor’s close proximity to the University of Southern California.

Located at the intersection of five redevelopment areas, Figueroa Corridor’s long-time residents fought for decades to maintain neighborhood stability in the face of intense displacement pressures. The Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) – the city agency charged with facilitating the transformation of Figueroa Corridor into L.A.’s primary sports and entertainment hub – does not often advance the interests of the area’s poor and working-class residents.

In an attempt to persuade the University of Southern California to remain at its South L.A. campus location in the 1960s, the CRA established a redevelopment area in the southern portion of Figueroa Corridor. This redevelopment area allowed USC to eliminate surrounding community “blight” by expanding its campus borders. State redevelopment laws empowered the CRA to designate “blighted” communities as redevelopment areas. The CRA had legal authorization to assemble private property through eminent domain and to publicly subsidize private development in redevelopment areas such as the Figueroa Corridor (Cummings, 2006).

Recently, the CRA facilitated a number of controversial projects in the Figueroa Corridor. After abandoning its commitment to build a commercial center (which was projected to create approximately 3,000 jobs for local residents), the CRA supported
USC’s efforts to purchase the property in order to develop a multi-million dollar sports arena for the university’s basketball and volleyball teams. With a real estate portfolio of over 100 properties (many of which have been recently devoted to student housing), USC is, by a wide margin, the largest landowner in the Figueroa Corridor. The university’s dominance is largely a result of the CRA’s efforts to promote the Figueroa Corridor as a suitable site for the wealthy, private institution.

Another critical site in the CRA’s plan to market Figueroa Corridor as a sports and entertainment hub is the Memorial Coliseum – a 90,000 seat stadium located south of the USC campus in Exposition Park. While the Coliseum is currently where USC’s football team plays, city officials have also been attempting to lure a National Football League franchise to the stadium (with a lucrative package of public subsidies) for the past decade.

Development pressures in the northern portion of the Figueroa Corridor have stemmed from the redevelopment of downtown Los Angeles. In 1997, Los Angeles developer Ed Roski Jr. and Denver billionaire Phillip Anschutz announced their plans to construct the 20,000-seat Staples Center. The Staples Center is a $375 million project developed by the L.A. Arena Land Company (a Roski–Anschutz partnership). It was financed with a complex public–private deal that included billionaire Rupert Murdoch’s Fox Group (which purchased a 40 percent interest in the arena) and a $70 million public subsidy (which included a $58 million loan from the City of Los Angeles and a $12 million grant from the CRA to assist with environmental approvals and the acquisition of thirty acres of property for parking). Upon its completion in 1999, the Staples Center reflected the local business community’s vision of downtown L.A. as an exciting
destination for affluent residents and tourists. However, the Staples Center’s development was not a “castle in the sky” for all local stakeholders. The Staples Center’s construction upset the fabric of Figueroa Corridor’s working-class community by causing widespread displacement among many long-time residents (Cummings, 2006).

Despite dissatisfaction among Figueroa Corridor residents, in May of 2000, the Anschutz Entertainment Group announced its plans for the development of Phase II of the Staples Center. According to the developers, Phase II – the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District (also known as L.A. Live) – would be a billion-dollar project located on a 27-acre site next to the Staples Center arena. Plans for L.A. Live entailed a forty-five story hotel (with 100 condominium units); two apartment towers (with a total of 800 units); a smaller high-end hotel; a 7,000-seat theater; a multiplex cinema; and six blocks of retail stores, restaurants, nightclubs, and offices. In addition to L.A. Live’s development, the City of Los Angeles planned a 250,000 square-foot expansion of the adjacent L.A. Convention Center. With public subsidies projected at $150 million, the City saw L.A. Live as a critical component to the success of L.A.’s downtown revitalization efforts (Gross et al, 2002; Salkin & Lavine, 2008: Wolf-Powers, 2010).

**Community and Labor Organizing in Figueroa Corridor**

Upon hearing about plans for the L.A. Live development, Figueroa Corridor residents became skeptical that the project would have a positive effect on their lives. In 1999, community-based organizations and unions attempted to work with the AEG (the developer) to establish living wage jobs, union neutrality, and provisions to remediate the impact of the Staples Center’s development on the local community. Upon receiving
valuable variances and subsidies from the city, however, AEG reneged on its verbal promises to unions and community groups (Baxamusa, 2008). Therefore, a significant amount of bitterness about the impact of the Staples Center arena lingered in surrounding neighborhoods. According to Kaye & Mendoza (2008):

> Multiple buildings of affordable housing were pulled down to accommodate the sprawling complex, displacing 200 families; maintenance deteriorated in those buildings whose owners hoped for a developer buyout; and residents of adjacent properties experienced dramatic rent increases, in some cases doubling. The asking price for homes tripled from the previous year (p. 2.5).

Furthermore, the large crowds that attended sporting and entertainment events at the Staples Center created major traffic, noise, public safety, pollution, and parking problems for local residents. To say the least, local residents were disappointed that developers and the city had ignored their interests.

Since its founding in 1995, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), a community-based nonprofit, has worked to build economic power for working class people in Figueroa Corridor through its efforts to coordinate the local community’s housing and labor demands on the University of Southern California (Rabonovitch, 2005). Namely, SAJE initiated the first collaborative organizing efforts between community and labor organizations in Figueroa Corridor, when 350 dining room workers (represented by HERE Local 11) demanded assurance from USC that the university would not subcontract their jobs out to lower-paid, non-union workers. Concurrently, USC’s janitors were attempting to unionize under the SEIU, but the university informed them that they would not be subcontracted if they did not unionize. When the janitors voted against the union, however, USC promptly subcontracted them. Sandra McNeil, who worked for SAJE at the time, stated:
For both sets of workers [janitors and dining room workers], the main issue was USC’s employee benefit of providing tuition remission for the children of employees, if the children academically qualified. So the fact that the lowest-paid workforces were being subcontracted and losing that benefit – that was a fight. There were other elements, but that was the main reason that the workers were fighting. Many had worked at USC as many as 15 years so they could send their children to this university. It was such an elemental issue which all of us in the community connected to at such a deep level. I just had my first baby at the time and I was like, that is so wrong at a human, ethical level. I know it’s a business decision, but it’s just wrong (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

In response to the protracted dining room workers’ labor dispute, SAJE decided to partner with Local 11 to form a community-labor coalition aimed at supporting the workers’ contract fight. Together in 1998, SAJE and Local 11 organized USC employees and students, local clergy, community activists, and neighborhood residents (Haas, 2002). With labor and community interests united, they named the group the “Coalition for a Responsible USC” and engaged in a series of protests in support of the union’s demands. For example, there was a large civil disobedience action at the L.A. Convention Center where the police arrested many coalition members (Koff, Interview, 2010). Los Angeles’ City Council amended its worker retention ordinance (to prevent contractors from firing workers within ninety days of contracting out their work), which settled the dispute between the university and dining room workers. USC retained the right to subcontract, but agreed to avoid doing so by participating in a consultation process with Local 11.

These labor disputes laid a foundation of solidarity between Figueroa Corridor’s community residents and L.A.’s local labor unions. Building solidarity between community interests and labor interests was a primary goal in the founding of the Coalition for a Responsible USC (and later FCCEJ). Haas remarked:

It was a way to build labor-community alliances by working on something together, and the thing we worked on together was the hotel workers
campaign. It was a way for people who didn’t like unions ideologically to experience union workers as people (Interview, 2010).

According to Cummings (2006), the:

USC campaign reinforced community–labor relationships, highlighting the common economic concerns of union and nonunion community residents and forging a sense of shared purpose among local block clubs, churches, and other community organizations that had not previously worked together (p. 316).

Create a Well-Functioning Coalition

Establishing the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice

Although several community leaders in Figueroa Corridor had begun to convene and discuss USC’s role as a real estate developer in the late 90s, they put that issue on the backburner until USC and the dining room workers resolved their conflict. Once the labor issues were settled, SAJE and the Coalition for a Responsible USC decided that they wanted to influence the future patterns of Figueroa Corridor’s development. To reflect their broadened mission, the Coalition for a Responsible USC changed its name to the “Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice” (FCCEJ – pronounced “Fickage”) on May 1, 1999.

During the time of FCCEJ’s early development, coalition leaders came across newspaper articles detailing new development plans for the Figueroa Corridor. Gilda Haas (then Executive Director of SAJE) stated, “None of us had been invited to the meetings we had read about, and they were supposedly highly-participatory” (Haas, Interview, 2010). According to David Koff, Local 11’s Strategic Research Analyst, when AEG made the initial proposals for L.A. Live, FCCEJ was out in front attempting to ensure that the plans respected Figueroa Corridor residents’ interests. He remarked:
The history was from the time the Convention Center itself had been built (way back), and then the expanded Convention Center back in the early 90s, to the Staples Center in the late 90s, it was one displacement after another. And so there was a history and a recollection, although a lot of the people who lived there had been moved out. There were still folks around them that knew the history, and it was a history that could be held up and said, ‘We’re not going to let this happen again’ (Koff, Interview, 2010).

With respect to the local residents’ history of coping with displacement, FCCEJ’s members had legitimacy in claiming that their concerns, which were the displacement of long-time residents, the availability of affordable housing, and the nuisances of tourism-related traffic and crime. What FCCEJ’s grassroots members did not possess, according to Koff, was the power (on their own) to cause the L.A. Live developers to take their concerns seriously.

**Building a Core and Developing a Strategy**

Labor became involved in the coalition shortly after FCCEJ’s grassroots leadership began communicating directly with AEG. Before the labor movement got involved, the developers would not assuage the coalition’s concerns. In response to AEG’s lack of interest in incorporating community input into the development plans, FCCEJ’s leadership and members prepared to wage warfare against the L.A. Live developers. But David Koff stated that Local 11 had a different perspective about what could and should be done:

So, there was a point at which Maria Elena [the President of Local 11 at the time] and others of us at the union who had already had these dealings and experiences with the developers thought that if there was a way to negotiate a deal, it was better than just getting into a fight in the streets. Had FCCEJ started demonstrations – which they were on the verge of doing – the likelihood was that they wouldn’t derail, but would probably only delay the development process [of L.A. Live]. So it was in the
interest of the hotel workers union that if the development was going to happen, the sooner it happened, the better – not just for the hotel workers, but for everybody else. But it had to happen in a certain way.

According to Local 11’s strategic philosophy, if the union could demand AEG’s attention without getting into an unproductive street fight, they could likely negotiate a better deal that would put people to work (in their hotels) sooner. Koff recounted how Local 11’s resolve in their initial labor dispute with AEG (surrounding Staples Center’s Phase I) established a degree of respect for the power of the labor movement in Los Angeles.

Regarding Phase I, Koff remarked:

When the people who represented Phil Anschutz and Tim Leiweke rode into town like cowboys in the late 90s, it was like they were going to show everybody how things were done. The labor movement was just like, ‘Who do they think they are?’ They never expected to meet the kind of resistance they got from Local 11 in labor negotiations. Maria Elena went toe-to-toe with Leiweke in those negotiations and it was brutal. Leiweke is – or at least he was – used to getting his own way and he was not getting that with Maria Elena.

When the developers revealed the proposal for L.A. Live, there was already a degree of mutual respect between the executives at AEG and Local 11. Since Local 11 had the benefit of negotiating with AEG during Phase I (Staples Center), the union felt it had leverage in bringing AEG to the table for Phase II (L.A. Live). Local 11 was skeptical, however, about its ability to enter talks with AEG once FCCEJ began public demonstrations, which would entail nasty, personalized attacks against AEG’s top executives.

At a strategy meeting for the County Federation of Labor (also known as the County Fed), Miguel Contreras, who was President of the County Fed at the time, spearheaded the decision to have labor join FCCEJ’s efforts. The five unions that would be attempting to secure union contracts at L.A. Live – HERE Local 11, SEIU Local 1877,
Operating Engineers Local 501, Teamsters Local 911, and the International Alliance of Local Stage Employees Local 33 – decided to lend their support to one another (in their individual contract disputes) and to FCCEJ (in their fight to address community impacts).

The collaboration between community and labor interests was a natural alliance since many of the five labor unions’ members were also residents of the Figueroa Corridor. Furthermore, since FCCEJ’s lead organization (SAJE) developed close ties with labor (HERE Local 11 and SEIU Local 1877) during earlier fights around USC, FCCEJ knew that labor would be a solid partner. According to SAJE’s Executive Director, Gilda Haas, FCCEJ recognized that labor’s ability to leverage the coalition’s political power would be critical – especially because they only had a small window of opportunity to intervene in L.A. Live’s development process. FCCEJ, therefore, welcomed Miguel Contreras’ offer to have the unions join their coalition for the L.A. Live campaign.

Under the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor’s leadership, each of the unions agreed that no single union would sign an agreement until the others (including FCCEJ’s community organizations) had an agreement to sign as well (Cummings, 2006; Haas, 2002). This unity impeded the developers from offering concessions to only one (or some) of the unions in an effort to lure them out of the coalition, and prevented the developers from using the typical “divide and conquer” strategy of pitting union organizing and community organizing against one another. This intra-labor and community-labor cooperation stood in marked contrast to earlier talks with AEG during the original Staples Center development, when there was no community-labor alliance and each of the unions negotiated its contract separately.
With an agreement about how FCCEJ would complement its grassroots (individual) membership-base, and the support of more influential institutions all in place, the coalition’s core group proceeded quickly in clarifying their collective goals.

Reflecting on the broadened coalition’s first meeting, Haas remarked:

We [FCCEJ and allied organizations] had been involved in the neighborhoods around USC and they [the CRA] were working on this commercial strip that went from downtown to USC – thirty blocks or something. So, we cared about the people and they cared about the real estate potential. So, we brought our grassroots members and some leaders of the key organizations together, and we put up a big map of the Figueroa Corridor and asked how we could engage people. Sandra McNeil was there, Maria Elena Durazo (who was the President of Local 11 at that time) was there, David Koff was there, Sister Diane [Executive Director of Esperanza Housing Corporation] was there – maybe about fifteen people total. They were the people we started to build working relationships with through the USC campaign. We asked everyone to locate themselves on the map and define what was important to their organizations. And you could see that everyone had an interest in a bigger coalition…So it was real (Haas, Interview, 2010).

Once the group’s common interests were clear, FCCEJ’s leaders focused on choosing an appropriate strategy to negotiate with AEG. The coalition determined that it would approach AEG about negotiating a community benefits agreement (CBA), which is a legally binding contract that requires developers to provide concrete benefits to the surrounding community (and often labor unions) in exchange for a coalition’s public support of the development (Gross et al, 2005). David Koff said, “We thought, ‘Why don’t we give it a shot? What is there to lose in proposing negotiations because the developer had no real alternatives.’” He continued, “Considering, the politics of L.A. at that point, the unions, and Local 11 in particular, were in a position to hamper, but also to
help get the development through.\(^9\) So, there was a real carrot out there as well as a stick” (Koff, Interview, 2010).

**Broadening Community Support**

In order to expand the community’s awareness of and support for the L.A. Live campaign, FCCEJ hosted a series of open dialogues for neighborhood residents and interested organizations. These meetings assisted the coalition in crystallizing a shared agenda for the campaign. Many of the community-based conversations revolved around grievances about USC’s encroachment on the local community, adverse conditions created by Phase I of the Staples Center development, and apprehensions surrounding the recently announced L.A. Live development.

According to Gilda Haas, SAJE hired an organizer who had worked as a tenant organizer for residents when the CRA’s redevelopment plans for Staples Center threatened to displace them. Therefore, SAJE’s organizer was very familiar with many residents who lived at the southern end of the Figueroa Corridor. But in order to develop a base among residents towards the downtown end of the Figueroa Corridor, the organizer and other volunteers went door-to-door in the northern region asking people what life was like since the Staples Center had been built. From the southern to the northern borders of the Corridor, residents were concerned about similar issues:

Nobody from the neighborhood can afford to go to a Lakers game, but people come to the games and drink and then they drive around the neighborhood drunk. Or if they have a concert at Staples, all the drug people come into the neighborhoods with the drug choice for tourists’ musical taste. And there used to be open space, but now there’s nowhere for community kids to go and play. They got rid of all the residential

\(^9\) During the late 1990s, labor had asserted its power in a number of successful and very public fights, such as the Justice for Janitors campaign and the Bus Riders Union campaign.
parking. So, if someone had a car and had to leave to go to the supermarket, when they came back and there was nowhere legal to park, they’d get a $60 ticket (Haas, Interview, 2010).

In addition to the nuisances associated with the Staples Center arena, residents were experiencing displacement as a result of USC’s transition from a commuter campus to a residential campus. Although the neighborhoods had experienced increasing property values for some time, residents were hit with a blow of displacement around 2000.

Regarding this trend, Sandra McNeil exclaimed:

Any time you talk to anyone from the neighborhood, they have stories about how they, their family members, or their neighbors have lost homes. Local investors have taken advantage of USC’s shortage of student housing by purchasing large quantities of buildings in the neighborhoods, kicking out families (much of the time illegally), and moving students into multi-unit apartments. Students in the surrounding luxury housing are now paying $1,000 a bed for a double. They’ll pay $2,000 per room in a four-bedroom suite, so there’s $4,000 a unit. People in the neighborhood who are supporting their families on minimum or below-minimum wages have not been able to compete. With such a large immigrant population in Figueroa Corridor, they’re often not only supporting their family here, but they’re also sending money back home to support extended families of whatever size in their home countries (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

As a result of their extensive community outreach, FCCEJ garnered additional organizations’ involvement. I have listed the various interest groups represented in FCCEJ’s broadened coalition in Table 4.

10 “It’s because the university still only provides housing for 20 percent of their students and the university has gained [in student population]. They just ranked 23rd on US News and World Report for large universities, so the ranking has been increasing, and they have one of the most diverse student populations in the country…and they are just one of the better schools. So they get a much higher caliber of students now, and the students don’t come from the valley and they don’t just drive in from mommy and daddy’s mansion [anymore]. I mean, honestly, that’s what it was. Very white, very wealthy. It used to be a lower-tier school where the kids of wealthy families who couldn’t get into better schools came. It was very old boy’s network. But in terms of the caliber and diversity of the students now, that’s changed tremendously” (McNeil, Interview, 2010).
### Table 4. FCCEJ’s Participating Organizations

#### Environmental & Public Health Organizations
- Clinica Oscar Romero
- Coalition for Community Health
- Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment
- Environmental Defense-Environmental Justice Project Office

#### Community Development & Service Organizations
- Blazers Youth Services
- Budlongand Jefferson Block Club
- Central American Resource Center (CARECEN)
- Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles (CCSLA)
- El Rescate
- Esperanza Community Housing Corporation
- Neighbors for an Improved Community
- St. John’s Well Child Center
- Canaan Housing Corporation

#### Labor Organizations
- Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) Local 11
- International Alliance of Local Stage Employees Local 33
- International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 911
- Operating Engineers Local 501
- Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1877
- Student Coalition Against Labor Exploitation (SCALE)

#### Faith-Based Organizations
- All People’s Christian Center
- Episcopal Church of St. Phillip the Evangelist
- Faithful Service Baptist Church
- Project Islamic Hope
- St. John’s Episcopal Church
- St. Mark’s Lutheran Church
- United University Church
- First United Methodist Church of Los Angeles
- St. Agnes Catholic Church

#### Intermediary & Advocacy Organizations
- Action for Grassroots Empowerment & Neighborhood Development Alternatives (AGENDA)
- Association for Community Organization Reform Now (ACORN)
- Coalition LA (COLA)
- Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA)
- Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LANNE)
- Strategic Actions for Just Economy (SAJE)
As the L.A. Live campaign took shape, FCCEJ garnered the support of more than thirty organizations and approximately 300 residents (Cummings, 2006). Reflecting a broad range of community concerns, FCCEJ consisted of student organizations, environmental justice groups, community organizing groups, community service organizations, churches, housing and community development organizations, health advocacy groups, immigrant rights groups, neighborhood groups, and labor unions. Most, though not all, of FCCEJ’s new participants resided (or were organizationally-based) in the Figueroa Corridor. Many of these organizations were familiar with one another because they had previously worked together when organizing USC’s employees (Romney, 2001).

FCCEJ’s new members agreed that the coalition should develop a united front to influence plans for the L.A. Live development. Although the new members were wary of trusting AEG after the developer broke its promises for Phase I of the Staples Center, they agreed that pursuing a CBA would be the appropriate course of action for L.A. Live (McNeil, Interview, 2010; Rabanovitch, 2005; Wolf-Powers, 2010).

**Anchor Organizations and Staff Resources**

In addition to Strategic Action for a Just Economy (SAJE), the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, and Environmental Defense are other nonprofit organizations that were consistently at the heart of FCCEJ’s efforts. Due to its political influence, the County Federation of Labor’s support of FCCEJ was also a central resource and point of leverage for the coalition.

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11 FCCEJ (as originally constituted by the individual, residential members of SAJE) expanded its base to facilitate the temporary membership of organizations that wanted to join the broader coalition surrounding the L.A. Live campaign. Organizational participation in FCCEJ was not a matter of agreeing to an official membership.
These organizations contributed a significant amount of staff time to the L.A. Live campaign. SAJE, for example, devoted two full-time staff members to FCCEJ’s organizing efforts. According to Sandra McNeil (who officially served as FCCEJ’s Campaign Coordinator), she and SAJE’s newly hired organizer worked many 60- and 70-hour work weeks during the campaign. Esperanza Community Housing Coalition’s and Coalition LA’s Executive Directors also contributed a significant amount of their time to FCCEJ. Other organizations committed half-time and quarter-time staff members, including the Environmental Justice Project Office of Environmental Defense, AGENDA, LAANE, the Coalition for Community Health (which no longer exists), and CHIRLA (for a brief time).

*Getting the Developers to the Table*

The coalition used a number of critical points of leverage to bring AEG to the negotiating table. In the summer of 2000, the Staples Center hosted the Democratic National Convention, and FCCEJ used this convention to elevate the profile of their cause. The Coalition embarked on a media awareness campaign revolving around the issues in the Figueroa Corridor. Attracting national and international media attention to their community during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) proved to be an extremely effective tactic. According to Rabonovitch (2005):

At the time, then-Mayor Richard Riordan – who was planning a run for governor of California – had boasted that the LA police would deal swiftly and harshly with any anti-globalization activism that might disrupt the convention. FCCEJ’s response was to take 80 members of the press core on a tour of the Figueroa Corridor – which surrounds the Staples Center – and demonstrate that the police activity was a hardship on the people who lived there, one which Riordan was insensitive to. They then tied this to a more general depiction of Riordan as neglectful of LA’s poor, especially
around downtown. Specifically, they argued that this type of aggressive police action wouldn’t happen if this were occurring in a wealthy, white neighborhood. Riordan reacted to this with anger in a press conference immediately afterwards and the exchange created enough political awareness around the neglect of LA’s downtown residents that city councilwoman Rita Walters got FCCEJ a meeting with Tim Leiweke, who runs the Staples Center development team, to address the community issues regarding the proposed LA Live (p.3).

After the DNC and other large, high-profile events hosted at Figueroa Corridor’s tourist destinations, FCCEJ held its first broad assembly meeting. At assembly meetings, the coalition members discussed their frustrations with the area’s event-related nuisances (e.g., traffic congestion, changed bus routes, drunken driving, vandalism, violence, and costly parking tickets). Emboldened by Riordan’s negative reaction to their media blitz, and encouraged by the increased political support of their efforts, FCCEJ left their first assembly meeting late in 2000 even more determined to force AEG to negotiate a CBA surrounding the L.A. Live development.

Another point of leverage FCCEJ used to its advantage was the political timing of their campaign. Mayoral term limits had recently been reduced to two four-year terms and Republican Mayor Richard Riordan – who had been an avid supporter of the L.A. Live project and who had pushed the planning commission to fast-track its permitting approvals – was scheduled to term-out of office July 1, 2001. The city was expecting a very close mayoral run-off election between two Democrats – James Hahn and Antonio Villaraigosa – who were strong pro-labor candidates (Padwa, 2001; Cummings, 2006). Moreover, L.A.’s City Council, which also backed L.A. Live, faced the end of six of its fifteen members’ (including council member Rita Walters, whose district encompassed L.A. Live) terms.
Because of these political uncertainties, AEG attempted to secure all necessary city entitlements before July 1, 2001. In reference to AEG’s political calculations, Gilda Haas remarked:

One of the things they [AEG] wanted to ensure was there would not be substantial community opposition. They wanted community support. Even if it was still going to be a slam dunk because politicians love developers, we [FCCEJ] could seriously slow them down (Interview, 2010).

Garnering FCCEJ’s support for the project was critical to AEG’s success. If FCCEJ presented opposition to L.A. Live’s construction before the 2001 elections ended, the project’s ability to progress would be in jeopardy (Rabinovitch, 2005).

L.A. Live’s progress was at risk only because of California’s legal framework. The state’s legal process, which allowed local governments to grant entitlement rights, strongly supported public participation rights (Cummings, 2006). The laws stipulate that all land use and building approvals must be considered and granted by the L.A. Planning Commission, and an appeals process had to be available through the City Council. In FCCEJ’s case, member organizations (particularly labor unions) possessed sufficient political connections (and credible arguments) to sway these political bodies. FCCEJ’s power was enough to increase uncertainty – and therefore, costs – for AEG. According to AEG’s Vice President of Community Affairs, Martha Saucedo:

The coalition approached us directly and was very aware that AEG wanted entitlements approvals for the Sports and Entertainment District across from Staples Center. They wanted AEG to also put forward very concrete ways in which they would make investments in the local communities that reflected the priorities of the local community (Interview, 2010).
Furthermore, because L.A. Live relied heavily on public subsidies, this portion of their financing was subject to City Council approvals, which ensured that coalition members could voice their opposition during public hearings.

FCCEJ’s access to legal representation provided one additional point of leverage that proved useful in bringing AEG to the negotiation table. LAANE retained Julian Gross to serve as the coalition’s primary attorney. Environmental Defense’s Jerilyn Lopez Mendoza and LAANE’s Madeline Janis Aparicio, who are both attorneys, provided legal guidance to the coalition. Also, Gilda Haas had a great degree of experience negotiating CRA agreements with banks in the past (Haas, Interview, 2010). When the coalition requested to enter contract negotiations with AEG, these collective resources contributed to FCCEJ’s legitimacy as an equal-weight partner at the table (Cummings, 2006; Kay & Mendoza, 2008).

**Developer’s Response**

While AEG initially stated that it would negotiate only with L.A.’s Community Redevelopment Agency, FCCEJ’s strength convinced the developer to directly address the coalition. Soon after the DNC media campaign, AEG sent a consultant to ‘make friends’ with FCCEJ. Several FCCEJ leaders agreed to meet with Tim Liewike (the CEO of AEG) and other AEG executives to discuss the future. Gilda Hass recounted:

One of the punch lines from the meeting was that Tim Liewike said, ‘In our last episode when we built the Staples Center, we didn’t really involve the community in the way we should have. We should have had more people upfront and this time we’re going to do it right.’ Everybody agreed with that, so our ears perked up and we were like, ‘Okay, you want to do it right, so have your people call our people’ (Haas, Interview, 2010).
After the initial meeting between AEG and FCCEJ’s leaders, FCCEJ held a broader coalition meeting and invited Leiweke to attend and address FCCEJ’s stakeholders’ concerns. Although approximately two hundred coalition members came to the meeting, Leiweke did not attend. When FCCEJ hosted a second coalition meeting and once again invited Leiweke, his second absence appalled community members. Rather than attending the meeting himself, Leiweke sent a few of his staff members instead. The two hundred residents who attended the meeting were disgusted by Leiweke’s disrespect, and they placed a placard on his empty chair and angrily addressed him despite his absence (Romney, 2001; McNeil, Interview, 2010).

By the end of 2000, FCCEJ’s members had become impatient with their unmet requests to meet with Leiweke. With FCCEJ poised to begin public protests and hold a press conference at City Hall, David Koff approached several individuals in the private sector to convince AEG to take FCCEJ seriously before the coalition decided to launch public opposition to the project (Rabinovitch, 2005). Koff had become an acquaintance of Chris Legeste – AEG’s political lobbyist – during the time Legeste worked for one of L.A.’s City Council members. According to Koff:

We had lunch together and I told him [Chris Legeste], ‘Look, you guys are going to have a lot of trouble if we don’t find a way to agree on something that takes care of the interests of the community as well as the five different unions who have an interest in the development – whose jobs would be created through the development. You’ve got the united labor movement against you, you’ve got the community organizations against you, you’ve got LAANE against you, and you put all that together and you have a big mountain to climb if you want to take us all on. On the other hand, if we can negotiate something that works for people, you guys will sail through the political process and the approval process’ (Koff, Interview, 2010).
Koff suggested that Legeste return to his clients and convey the political obstacles they would face if they chose to reject FCCEJ’s offer to enter negotiations for a CBA.

The overall sense of the development politics of L.A. on the progressive side was still not very well-developed. They [AEG executives] had no clue, really, as to what they would have run into, but Chris Legeste did because he had known us a lot longer. And the other point I remember making with him was, ‘Don’t come to these negotiations with some low-ball, stupid starting position. Surprise us. You’re going to get there anyway, so why drag it out until you’re forced to offer something that you might not have wanted to offer at the beginning? Why don’t you just come through at the beginning and let’s start there’ (Koff, Interview, 2010).

Because AEG was sensitive to negative publicity and potential project delays, the company finally began to take FCCEJ seriously. This direct challenge from the labor movement led AEG to agree to enter negotiations with FCCEJ. According to Cummings (2006):

The developer, which understood that organized labor’s influence with local government officials could jeopardize city approval of the deal in the event of labor strife, was eager to reach an accord with the unions that would move the project forward. Not concerned with FCCEJ as such, the developer was nevertheless forced to recognize the coalition’s concerns in order to garner the support of the unions that had come out behind FCCEJ’s efforts (p. 318).

AEG’s agreement to negotiate a CBA prevented the community’s campaign from escalating to protest and opposition. While many FCCEJ members were more accustomed to protest than they were to lengthy labor-style negotiations, a significant number of FCCEJ constituents were convinced that picket lines and other oppositional tactics would be a waste of resources if there was a viable alternative that would produce satisfactory outcomes.

To continue the process, AEG’s Senior Vice President and lead L.A. Live developer, Ted Tanner, met with over 200 coalition members and community residents
during a third open forum. Due to the impending city-wide elections, Tanner knew that he must obtain all necessary city entitlements by the end of June. Getting the community’s support and avoiding a protracted fight against the project, were “extremely important” goals to Tanner (Romney, 2001). During the meeting Tanner attended, attendees finally received the respect they felt they deserved. Although he did not speak Spanish fluently, Tanner delivered his PowerPoint presentation in Spanish. Gilda Haas (Interview, 2010) commented:

> At first, people a first thought he was joking because you could tell that it wasn’t his native language. But it was so respectful. He was really nervous and he read the PowerPoint in Spanish because most of the people there were Spanish speaking, and that was really a great thing to do.

The community members applauded Tanner’s presentation. At that point, both sides were prepared to enter into a formal negotiation process for a CBA.

**Moving Forward with Negotiations**

Before negotiations began between AEG and the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice, the FCCEJ developed a negotiating strategy and a negotiating team. The group selected five qualifying criteria to choose members of the negotiating team. One qualification stated that the individual needed to have negotiated successfully with a multinational corporation. This stipulation eliminated almost everyone except Gilda Haas and Madeline Janis-Aparicio. Another qualification stated that the individual must have a base of constituents to which he or she was accountable. They also decided that members of the negotiating team should have mastery of the subject areas that would be negotiated. The coalition was serious about using objective criteria to ensure that the
The selection process was not political and that people knew their roles. In reference to the final negotiating team, Cummings (2006) states:

The key members were SAJE’s [Executive Director] Gilda Haas and Madeline Janis-Aparicio, the Executive Director of LAANE. Although not an attorney, Haas, who had a Master’s degree in Urban Planning from UCLA, had started the CED [community economic development] unit at the Los Angeles Legal Aid Foundation. Janis-Aparicio was a non-practicing attorney who had previously done slum housing litigation and, after graduating from UCLA Law School, had worked as an associate at the Los Angeles firm of Latham & Watkins (which was representing the developer against FCCEJ in the CBA negotiations). Another lawyer on the negotiating team who played an important role was Jerilyn Lopez Mendoza, a graduate of UCLA Law School with law firm experience, who was an attorney in the Environmental Justice Project at Environmental Defense (p. 320).

At the beginning of the negotiation process, members of FCCEJ’s negotiating team felt that AEG did not take their demands seriously. As negotiations continued, however, AEG realized that whether the subject was housing, jobs, or community improvements and parks, each member of the team possessed a tremendous degree of expertise. Sister Diane Donohue (Executive Director of Esperanza Housing Corporation), for example, led negotiations related to affordable housing. “So, very quickly,” said Gilda Haas, “the developers realized that they were not dealing with people who were good at making noise, but lacked substance” (Interview, 2010)

FCCEJ was perceptive in seizing an opportunity to leverage the environmental impact review (EIR) process to their advantage during negotiations. In the fall of 2000, Environmental Defense L.A. – a nonprofit whose mission was to help low-income people and communities of color pursue environmental justice – approached FCCEJ about their desire to join the coalition. After reviewing AEG’s draft environmental impact report, which had been released in January 2001, Jerilyn Lopez Mendoza (the head of L.A.’s
Environmental Defense office) realized that among several inadequacies, the developers failed to include an energy impact component in their report. Highlighting the shortcomings in AEG’s draft EIR, FCEEJ submitted a comprehensive forty-six page response (that addressed the EIR) to the City Planning Commission in late February. The lack of an energy impact assessment was a significant oversight because California was experiencing a state-wide energy crisis at the time. FCCEJ’S response to the City Planning Commission forced AEG to hurriedly compose an energy plan and address other inadequacies in their report. This opportunity allowed FCCEJ to flex its legal muscle, as AEG could not afford to encounter a potentially time-consuming CEQA lawsuit from FCCEJ (Cummings, 2006; Rabinovitch, 2005).

**Creating Good Faith, Respect, and Trust across the Table**

In an effort to expedite the approvals process so the company could sell the project to potential tenants, AEG would often have Planning Commission meetings and City Council meetings held in the “same day, same time, and same room.” This strategy put FCCEJ in a delicate position because the coalition had not yet reached a contract with AEG. According to Gilda Haas (Interview, 2010):

> We [FCCEJ] would show up to testify and we would bring base. We didn’t want to give away the store, but we also didn’t want to infuriate these people we were negotiating with... So we said, ‘This is what we’re talking about, this is what we want, but we don’t have an agreement yet. When we do, we’ll be waiting for the discussion.’

According to several coalition members, managing the relationship with AEG was a balancing act. Still, the two parties cultivated a significant degree of respect and trust between them. David Koff (2010) recalled:
It was more like negotiations for a labor contract where people are there in good faith (which doesn’t happen as often as it should), but I think it was true that both sides were there in these negotiations in good faith. It wasn’t like AEG thought ‘we’re going to spend and waste the time and run these people around and try to split them.’ Again, the developers knew they weren’t going to be able to split the labor and community sides.

While efforts to determine an appropriate formula for affordable housing caused some tensions across the table, the negotiations never reached an impasse. But the coalition continued to have issues with Tim Leiweke. There were several times when Miguel Contreras had to talk to Tim Leiweke and engage in a “behind-the-scenes kind of handholding” to calm Leiweke down. As the President of the County Fed, Contreras had “an amazing relationship with everyone in the City of Los Angeles, from the Cardinal Mahoney to the developers, the heads of all the unions, and so many other people” (Koff, Interview, 2010) Koff laughed heartily as he recalled a telling moment in the negotiation process:

One time, there was something our side was absolutely not going to relent and so the lead guy for the developers [Ted Tanner] was there and he said he had to make a call to Tim Leiweke, who was either on an airplane or in an airport. So, he comes back and it was as if Leiweke had just hit the roof and said, ‘Fuck them! This is it. We’re finished!’ The guys who were representing the developers in the room said, ‘Yeah, he has those kinds of tantrums.’ So the dynamics of it were very interesting.

AEG’s Ted Tanner – who had experience with similar community negotiations earlier in his career as an architect in Philadelphia – received the praise of several negotiating team members (Romney, 2001). According to Sandra McNeil, the whole deal would have likely fallen apart if Ted Tanner had not been at the helm for AEG. She remarked:

He is someone who has integrity, and he was straightforward and respectful. He wanted to move the project, but he’s also just a good person. He had corporate interests to represent, so it’s not like he was accommodating to us, but if he said something, you could believe he wasn’t playing. He was serious with us. I continue to have respect for
him as a person, even though AEG as a corporation isn’t perfect. I wouldn’t say the same about the CEO [Leiweke]. I tried to deal with him in the beginning and he sent us Ted. And it’s like, ‘Ok, we’ll take Ted if Ted has the ability to make decisions.’ And he did, so we were happy. We couldn’t have dealt with Leiweke (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

Tanner seemingly understood and appreciated the interests of both sides. He was concerned about meeting FCCEJ’s demands without financially burdening L.A. Live or its tenants. Demonstrating his commitment to striking a fair balance, Tanner stated, "Our goal in continuing negotiations was to win true support and advocacy for the project. Their goal was the same—to see if we could make this project better and improve benefits for the community" (Romney, 2001).

Clearly, Tanner and the rest of AEG’s development team wanted to see their dream project come to fruition – largely because a successful L.A. Live project would bode well for the advancement of their careers. According to Koff, however, members of AEG’s team may have also experienced the intangible benefits associated with doing a good deed:

There was a point at which, I think, at least some of them [AEG representatives] realized this was a good thing and that they were actually doing something that was better than what they would have done had they been left to their own devices. Not all of them, but I think some of them realized that they were going to get the project that would have their names on it as architects, developers, and designers. They were going to get that, but they were also going to get something they hadn’t intended or expected to get. Some of them realized that it would be good for them to do this.

While negotiations were an overall success for the coalition, there was one issue that FCCEJ’s leadership still questioned. In Gilda Haas’ view, the coalition should have required AEG to have negotiations in the community instead of at AEG’s headquarters. The benefit to holding negotiations at the headquarters was that the coalition could
caucus as long as they needed to during negotiation sessions. AEG’s representatives could leave the conference room and return to work in their offices as the coalition’s negotiating team continued to discuss important issues.

A final factor that resulted in successful negotiation was the fact that the coalition insisted that AEG’s attorney be present during the majority of sessions so FCCEJ and AEG could make immediate decisions at the table without having to leave and consult with their legal representatives. By having both sets of lawyers at all negotiating meetings, the groups were able to immediately work through the final language of the contract.

Ultimately, both sides claimed to be satisfied with the negotiation process. In the end, AEG’s Martha Saucedo stated, “AEG felt very good about the final agreement that was reached” (Interview, 2010). And according to Rabinovitch (2005):

Though the negotiations were often tense, all parties reported that they preferred having a collaborative dynamic rather than one that was played out in the courts, through the media, or through political alliances alone. The process required less time, far less money, and produced results that, at worst, all parties could live with. It also produced a final product that all parties were invested in seeing succeed (p. 5).

On both sides of the table, negotiation participants felt a stronger degree of trust with one another over time. When asked whether AEG would take the same approach to community outreach with future developments, Saucedo remarked, “I think we would approach it in a similar way, in that it was nice to work with one entity that reflected the different aspects of the local community” (Interview, 2010).

*Balancing Internal Coalition Dynamics*
As mentioned earlier, the collaboration between community interests and labor organizations proved to be a critical factor in FCCEJ’s ability to meet its stated outcomes. While the collaboration was pivotal to success, it was also extremely monumental. Participants could not recall a time in the past when labor organizations in L.A. aligned themselves with one another and with community partners; the aligning factor was that both labor and community groups had not benefited during Phase I of the Staples Center’s development. During Phase II of development, labor agreed to enter contract negotiations collectively with one another and with FCCEJ’s community groups. This “all-for-one and one-for-all” approach to negotiations with AEG and between community and labor was truly a unique and unprecedented occasion (Rabinovitch, 2005).

The unity between community and labor interests in this case was impressive because “community organizations, in a lot of instances, have very specific and local concerns like local hiring – which may or may not be the equivalent of union hiring” (Koff, Interview, 2010). In the case of the L.A. Live campaign, however, FCCEJ’s lead community organizations’ (particularly SAJE and LAANE) previous relationships with unions made a strong community-labor collaborative effort possible. In reference to the importance of early relationship-building and agenda-bridging across community and labor boundaries, Sandra McNeil stated:

We got very strong support from the janitors union [SEIU 1877], in particular. Organizationally, their base leadership had a great deal of power and their E-board had supported the campaign at the executive level very early on. So, there was a real level of commitment to this other struggle of working class people that wasn’t about jobs. I think they had a lot of chutzpah in dealing with AEG, but they also had more beefs. When we [FCCEJ] were negotiating, they [SEIU 1877] were going through challenges in their contract negotiations. We backed them up very specifically in our negotiations and they backed us up at a later point. And all of that really pissed off AEG. I mean they got really angry about that,
really angry. We felt very, very supported by the service unions and 1877 in particular. And that overlap was important (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

While both organizing sectors presented a united front to AEG, coalition participants quickly shared that there were minor disagreements within the coalition. These differences typically were about the details regarding the extent of the community’s demands on AEG (i.e., agreeing on the specific elements of the CBA). When differences of opinion did arise, knowledge of the coalition’s primary leverage (the fact that AEG would not slight a united labor movement joined in solidarity with a united community organizing front) kept everyone aligned.

It is important to note that FCCEJ agreed early in the process that there would not be a final deal on the community benefits unless there was a deal for each union. Furthermore, the unions refused to cut a deal unless the community was happy as well (Koff, Interview, 2010).

When disagreements stymied the progress of the janitors’ union, community negotiators stood in unison with labor. In turn, labor chimed in on issues such as affordable housing, which affects their membership, but was not technically on their agenda. ‘I kept thinking of this as two airplanes approaching an airport at the same time,’ said David Koff, a hotel union research analyst who served as an official County Federation of Labor observer in the community negotiations. ‘The idea was to get both to make a soft landing at the same time.’ Labor sources said most of the core issues have been resolved, due in part to the coordinated approach to negotiations (Romney, 2001).

As a sign of the labor movement’s support for every party’s interests, Contreras designated David Koff, a Local 11 leader to attend all meetings held between FCCEJ, the unions, and AEG. Miguel Contreras’ decision to appoint Koff to be present in both labor and community negotiations proved to be insightful. Reflecting on the nature of the labor negotiations, Koff (Interview, 2010) shared:
Miguel asked me to serve as the coordinator and liaison with the five unions that were involved. Each of the unions had to negotiate its own contract. It wasn’t the kind of thing where like on the community side, they could come up with one agreement that every part of the community coalition was willing to accept. On the labor side, that was not the case at all. There was a hotel component, a food service component, the operating engineers, and the Teamsters were involved because of parking. Each union had to negotiate its own contract. The hotel workers had to get a card check neutrality agreement, whereas with other unions, it was a matter of extending existing contracts that the developers already had with those unions (where they were already employing existing members of those unions in other parts of the development). But there was no point at which any one of the unions said, ‘We’ve got what we want and we can’t hang out with you guys anymore.’ Every union hung in there until all of them had what they wanted.

Reflecting on his insights from sitting in the community’s negotiations, Koff stated:

On the community side, I think there were some issues and tensions that existed between the orientation of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition, and the unions and LAANE. As far as the living wage, housing, and parks agreements, there were areas where although the coalition ultimately accepted certain things, they weren’t completely satisfied.

My interview with Koff acknowledges an important issue. While labor’s participation in the coalition’s efforts provided a significant amount of political leverage, its participation also hindered the community’s ability to ultimately change direction and oppose the project outright if community groups felt AEG did not adequately address their needs.\footnote{This dilemma led AGENDA and Community Coalition to not sign the CBA as participating members of FCCEJ, but instead to sign as interested organizations.} Indeed, labor had a more direct stake in the project’s development because the project would create jobs for union members. Although committing to seeing the negotiations from start (the outset of the coalition-building efforts) to finish (a CBA) provided a sense of stability and trust among coalition participants, this commitment left little room for any coalition member to later oppose the project if they saw fit. According to SAJE’s Gilda Haas, “I think for Madeline and LAANE [and the labor movement], they really
wanted to do a CBA. But we just wanted to have the developer be accountable.” Haas continued by commenting that entertaining a CBA is, by far, not always the most appropriate way for disadvantaged communities to respond to development pressures.

Win Specific Outcomes

On May 30, 2001, the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice signed a community benefits agreement with the Anschutz Entertainment Group for AEG’s $1 billion L.A. Live project. Although other CBAs (such as the Hollywood and Highlands CBA) had been established, the L.A. Live CBA (often referred to as the “Staples CBA”) was the most comprehensive CBA signed to date in 2001. For this reason, the L.A. Live CBA has received national acclaim as an important precedent and model for responsible urban redevelopment.

The CBA’s provisions contained an unprecedented package of developer concessions to community and labor interests such as affordable housing, job quality, local hiring, community parking, and parks and recreation, which were the primary areas addressed in the agreement. I outline the CBA’s specific provisions in Table 5.

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<th>Table 5. Provisions of the L.A. Live CBA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living Wage Program</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developer ensures that 70 percent of the estimated 5,500 permanent jobs created by L.A. Live pay the City’s living wage. Jobs must pay $7.72 an hour with benefits, $8.97 without benefits, or be covered by a collective bargaining agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developer must notify FCCEJ Coalition at least 45 days before signing tenant lease agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- L.A. Live tenants are obligated to uphold these living wage standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Hiring and Job Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developer provides $100,000 in seed funding to establish a first source referral system to recruit targeted job applicants—giving priority to applicants who have been displaced by the project, who live within a three-mile radius of the project, or who reside in other low-income areas of the city—and refer them to project employers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employers, in turn, must provide notice of job openings to the First Source Referral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System and agree to hire only targeted job applicants for a designated period of time after notice of the jobs are provided. Employers who fill 50 percent of available jobs within a six-month period with targeted job applicants are deemed in compliance with the first source hiring policy.

**Affordable Housing**

- Developer “shall develop or cause to be developed affordable housing equal to 20 percent of the units constructed” within the project (100–160 affordable units in total). The units shall be targeted as follows: 30 percent to families earning 50 percent or less of Area Median Income (AMI); 35 percent to families earning from 51 to 60 percent of AMI; and 35 percent to families earning from 61 to 80 percent of AMI. Units may be built within the project area or off-site, provided that off-site housing is located “in redevelopment areas within a three-mile radius” of the Staples Center.
- Residents displaced by the Staples Center shall be given priority in housing selection.
- Developer must work cooperatively with community organizations to provide additional affordable housing by contributing up to $650,000 in three-year, interest-free loans to nonprofit housing developers that are building projects in the area.

**Parking Permit Area**

- Developer finances a residential parking permit district for surrounding neighborhoods (reserving street parking for residents), providing funding of $25,000 per year over five years.
- The city is charged with developing and implementing the program. Officials say this will be the first parking permit zone in a low-income neighborhood.

**Parks and Recreation**

- Developer provides between $50,000 and $75,000 to fund an assessment of the need for parks, open space, and recreational facilities in the community.
- Based on this community input, developer provides at least one million dollars for the creation and improvement of park and recreation facilities within a one mile radius of the L.A. Live development.

An *L.A. Times* article, published immediately after AEG and FCCEJ signed the agreement, quoted an impacted worker commented:

‘What we're hoping is to get work, to get housing, to have a better way of living,’ said Manuel Pacheco Galvan, who hopes to trade his job at a Hollywood market for one closer to home. ‘Almost everything we asked for we got. . . . In the beginning it didn't seem possible, but now we see that it's a reality. This will mean some change for all of us’ (Romney, 2001).

Not everyone was as enthusiastic about the agreement’s implications. SAJE’s Sandra McNeil remarked, “I remember May 31 we signed this agreement and we were exhausted. We didn’t have a big party, we didn’t jump up and down. I guess we were more ambivalent than LAANE about having the agreement” (McNeil, Interview, 2010).
In addition to the actual community benefits agreement, FCCEJ members signed a separate cooperation agreement pledging that they would not oppose L.A. Live’s project (Wolf-Powers, 2010). While AEG made important provisions, FCCEJ members released their right to oppose the project in any way (e.g., lawsuits, administrative actions, voicing public disapproval). Moreover, the terms of the agreement obligated FCCEJ to provide affirmative support for the project, which included issuing a press release and testifying in support of the project’s entitlement approvals. However, an issue arose when two organizations in the coalition refused to sign the CBA as members:

There was a split over the final terms of the agreement, with AGENDA and the Community Coalition refusing to sign on as Coalition members, citing the waiver of the right to oppose the project as incompatible with their organizational missions (Cummings, 2006, p. 321).

AEG was not happy with this change in direction, and the company did not want to remain obligated to fulfill its contractual responsibilities if members of FCCEJ were allowed to opt out of the agreement and resist the project. Labeling FCCEJ members who refused to sign the CBA as ‘Interested Organizations’ in the cooperation agreement (rather than as CBA signatories) solved the dilemma surrounding nonconforming FCCEJ members. If any of the Interested Organizations filed suit against the project, AEG would no longer be contractually bound to provide the promised community benefits.

Once all parties signed the CBA, the signatories worked for several months to secure land use and subsidy approvals from the CRA, the Planning Commission, and the City Council. Finally, AEG integrated the CBA into its development agreement with the City of Los Angeles (Kaye & Mendoza, 2008; Wolf-Powers, 2010). According to Cummings (2006):
Despite the timeliness of the CBA, the project itself did not receive the sought after approval before the July 1 political transition because newly elected City Council members asked for a delay so that they could review the deal. The city made a number of attempts to move the project forward, which culminated with the 2005 approval of a $177 million subsidy for the hotel, consisting of $110 to $140 million in foregone revenue from hotel bed taxes, $22 million in city loans, $10 million in public improvements, and $5 million in building fees.

FCCEJ – a coalition comprised of hundreds of impacted residents and approximately thirty community organizations, faith groups, and labor unions – successfully organized, brought AEG to the table, and negotiated extensive concessions for a project that would have, otherwise, provided nothing or little in the form of community mitigations and benefits. This example illustrates the potential and power of locally based collaborative action – even against a historical backdrop of elite power.

Increase Capacity of Participating Organizations

Participants of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition learned several lessons during the L.A. Live CBA campaign. The coalition’s strengths and shortcomings expanded other member organizations’ capacities. During the span of the campaign, several challenges associated with organizing and operating an expansive coalition emerged such as: working with limited resources, integrating diverse members in a balanced way, cultivating internal democracy, and bridging the gap between labor and community.

FCCEJ’s organizers experienced several challenges associated with balancing the various aspects of coalition work. The planning process’ timeframe that dictated L.A. Live approvals, forced FCCEJ to run a campaign in order to maintain pressure on the developer, negotiate five separate content areas in a very compacted time frame, and
address the needs of its organizational and individual membership base all at the same

Running a coalition, it’s just a lot. We did the best we could with what we

With limited resources and time, coalition leaders also had difficulties finding ways to

challenges related to including immigrants groups in the broader coalition, and including
differences in language, culture, education, and access to power and information. McNeil

you’re talking about executive directors [of nonprofit organizations] and

from executive directors and pastors of churches who are sitting around the table with folks who are low-wage workers. So we had to work to balance. But being in the midst of a campaign made it harder to give attention to those challenges and make it work.

The challenge of membership integration also affected membership selection for the

As mentioned earlier, coalition leaders used stringent criteria to guide

critical to develop a “dream negotiating team” because of time constraints. Having an

exclusive negotiating team of experts, however, was one of FCCEJ’s leaders’ biggest

regrets. According to McNeil:

The decision about the composition of the negotiating team was made in a very small room and it was mistake. I would never repeat that. It was almost all white and it was just totally carved out. None of the immigrant rights groups were represented.

Although the team’s exclusivity was a major shortcoming, FCCEJ’s leaders

acknowledged the need to match the coalition’s demands with areas of expertise for
negotiations. When asked whether or not there was any way a greater degree of training may have occurred to prepare community members to participate in decision-making, McNeil responded:

Sure, but how much time do you have? I’ve been working four years in affordable housing and there’s still a lot I don’t know...This is the challenge. Like, how do you form representative groups that have to make a level of decisions and people simply don’t have the time to deal with the detail of it? You can conceptualize and theorize about this all you want, but the reality is that everyone is insanely busy and we never have enough staff to do anything we do. And so, decisions do get made even when you don’t want them to get made. It just happens.

The coalition contends that it did not have sufficient time to prepare leaders to negotiate the technical aspects of the issues, nor did they have years to go back and forth for elongated iterations of the agreement. But to partially rectify the problem, FCCEJ gathered a group of community leaders who volunteered to observe all negotiation meetings, provide feedback regarding the issues on the negotiating table, and report the progress to the broader community. In reference to this solution, McNeil stated:

We almost completely missed the boat on having community representatives in the room. And then, praise the lord, we said, ‘What the fuck were we thinking? We almost missed the boat!’ So what we did was we organized a group of our leaders and it rotated. We always had an interpreter there at negotiations and we always had community leaders there in the room during negotiations. And those community leaders were the ones who always reported back to the 300 people in the coalition. And actually, that worked out well because they had a whole lot more credibility with local residents.

While representatives from the membership base participated in all negotiation sessions, they did not have seats at the table. Instead, they were negotiating observers and caucus participants. When the negotiating team caucused and the developer left the room, the community activists would join FCCEJ’s lead negotiators at the table for a discussion.
FCCEJ continued to convene the broader coalition during negotiations, but by the time the negotiating team went to coalition members for the final signatures, members had to primarily rely on the negotiating team to make appropriate decisions. There simply was not enough time to thoroughly involve everyone in detailed decision-making.

Another important lesson learned was the importance of building trust and respect, when cooperating with a private entity. Regarding this issue, McNeil said:

Personal relationships are important and have an impact. We had a really good relationship with Ted Tanner and the whole deal would have been entirely different if he had not been there. I don’t know if it would have happened. It certainly wouldn’t have happened in the same way. Ted is someone who has integrity, and he was straightforward and respectful. He wanted to move the project, but he’s also just a good person.

In addition to the respect individuals can garner across the table, McNeil referenced the importance of corporations and other institutions being trustworthy when she stated, “I think they’ve [AEG] continued to be concerned about their public perception as a corporation. I think they’ve been sensitive to that and they’ve followed through” (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

Considering the aforementioned constraints of time and resources, several coalition leaders felt disappointed that they were unable to cultivate a greater sense of internal democracy in the coalition. Gilda Haas, for example, noted the difference between educating and organizing members with the intention of community empowerment, versus mobilizing members for the purpose of garnering a large turnout. In addition to the coalition’s organizational members, SAJE involved hundreds of its individual members (community residents) in FCCEJ. Haas stated:

SAJE had assembly meetings so members could meet each other, and that was internal democracy, as opposed to mobilizing for the council meetings. We [SAJE] were the most concerned about having grassroots
participation. I think it turned out great, except that it was just the participation of our [SAJE’s] members. We were trying to figure out how to balance a coalition [of organizations] and [individual] membership and I don’t know if we ever figured it out.

From the beginning, SAJE was a grassroots-oriented, individual membership organization with a history of organizing people in particular communities and neighborhoods. After the L.A. Live campaign, SAJE had a renewed commitment to facilitating internal democracy. The idea of developing the Figueroa Corridor Land Trust (for which Sandra McNeil is currently the Executive Director), which SAJE and Esperanza established after the L.A. Live agreement, came from a group of community leaders that SAJE sent to the East Coast in 2002 to look at anti-displacement strategies.

When the leaders returned, they conveyed the importance of securing land – which was inspired by the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative. Established in 2005, the Figueroa Corridor Land Trust (FCLT) is a membership-controlled organization where its membership elects the Board of Directors. The group restricts board membership by income and geography, which illustrates the ways the FCLT is community-controlled. This focus on community control is partially an outgrowth of the shortcomings of the L.A. Live organizing (McNeil, Interview, 2010).

Another result of the L.A. Live campaign is linking housing and labor issues in the Figueroa Corridor Land Trust’s work. McNeil stated:

I think for me, I really learned from this experience the importance of connecting jobs and housing. A couple of months ago, we started getting hooked up on the jobs end. Now we have partners that will link the housing and jobs demands. Housing is our biggest challenge with USC and it’s where we come out of, so we really needed to bring in the jobs people because it’s a much easier ask to get USC to hire – much, much easier than getting a multi-million dollar loan fund for housing acquisition. So, that was a goal of mine and this is one of the outcomes – the ability to
approach the trade unions in a different way. And that was a result of me learning from this experience.

The hotel workers’ union – Local 11 – had a large role in influencing positive relationships between community and labor interests in the past years. Referencing this phenomenon, David Koff (Interview, 2010) commented:

The reason Local 11 was a part of the FCCEJ from the get-go is that Local 11 has never been an insular local. It’s defined itself in terms of who its members are and where its members live and what’s important to them, not just in the workplace, but everywhere else. So Local 11 has been in a number of coalitions and has lent its support to all kinds of community initiatives. The coalitions may indirectly benefit Local 11 members, but over time, the reciprocal relationships that have been built mean that the hotel workers have a huge community network of support.

This deep relationship-building contrasts the way labor and community use to relate to one another. In the past, according to Koff, when Local 11 was in a contract dispute and needed some assistance, the union would call community allies for “bodies on the street” or to help with transportation, which developed an admittedly shallow, ad-hock relationship. But in the early 90s, Local 11 made a conscious decision to extend itself as a long-term partner to the community. At the helm of the organization at the time, Maria Elena Durazo believed that if the union wanted community allies’ support, they had to reciprocate the offer.

While many of these lessons learned did not always directly build FCCEJ’s organizational members’ capacity by expanding financial resources or increasing staffing, community and labor alliances fostered the cultivation of significant institutional knowledge for the organizations involved.

How FCCEJ Has Shaped the Broader Political Climate
Leveraging Consolidated Power: Phase I versus Phase II

The case of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition illuminates important differences in the status of progressive politics in Los Angeles between the late 1990s and the early 2000s. During Phase I of the Staples Center’s development, the community’s response to the project was fragmented, reactive, and unimaginative. Furthermore, AEG was dismissive and single-minded in its response to community concerns. The actions of both sides (i.e., community and developer) during Phase I stand in marked contrast to the way things unfolded when the L.A. Live proposal was unveiled.

In the second phase, community and labor formed a united front in order to gain some control over the approvals process and to force AEG’s development to benefit the community. Moreover, executives at AEG agreed that they would be more thoughtful about addressing community impacts during the second phase of development.

A primary difference between the two phases was the commitment between labor and community interests to confront the developer in solidarity. Moreover, they advanced their interests strategically, with a keen focus on capitalizing on critical points of leverage. For instance, the coalition knew that active labor and community opposition to the project would reduce the speed of AEG’s approvals for land use variances and public subsidies, while AEG knew that fighting against a united front of hundreds of community residents and dozens of community, labor, faith-based, environmental, and immigrant rights organizations was not in their political interest. Due the diversity of interests represented and the number of people involved in FCCEJ, AEG could not ignore FCCEJ’s power.
Furthermore, FCCEJ was able to leverage its pool of collective resources, including staff time, legal assistance, the political clout of member organizations (e.g., labor unions), and membership turnout, during the campaign and negotiation phase. Collectively, these strengths resulted from a significant amount of base-building work and cross-sector collaboration, both prior to and during the L.A. Live campaign.

From the city’s perspective, L.A. Live presented a great opportunity to promote tourism and to generate the revenues needed to pay down bond debt on L.A.’s Convention Center. The city was not, however, willing to support the project in the face of union opposition. From AEG’s perspective, time was most important because they had a significant amount of money already invested in the project and they also had a lot of interests and commitments from people who wanted to open restaurants and retail shops in L.A. Live. Therefore, the time constraint AEG faced worked to FCCEJ’s advantage.

It is important to note that these numerous points of leverage would not have been recognized and capitalized upon if the aligned labor and community groups had not been perceptive enough to make sense of their political context. David Koff addressed the importance of strategic research in situations like the L.A. Live campaign:

There is no substitute for really, thoroughly understanding your opponent when you go into these things [campaigns involving large corporations]. It would seem natural, but research of the highest order is really necessary. The hotel workers union has developed strategic research as a weapon and a tool that it deploys everywhere, as its basis for success. So, we knew we had to know as much as we could about the other side.

Because the coalition took the time to understand the local political calculus at the time, FCCEJ understood the impact the organization could have if someone like Koff approached AEG’s lobbyist, Chris Legeste, in an attempt to bring the developer to the
negotiating table. FCCEJ also knew that both sides could approach the Convention Center’s Michael Collins from a neutral position. These two men, in particular, served as backchannels who proved to be critical in bringing everything together. According to Koff, however, these individuals were only accessible to them because the labor movement had demonstrated its power over time:

It wasn’t like we had just decided to get together on the labor side to tell them they had to pay attention to us. It wasn’t that way at all. So, it comes back to the importance in any community of persistence, organizing, and maintaining an organized presence. L.A. is a hell of a big place and the power structure is very, very resourceful. But there had been this history of the labor movement and the progressive movement, so we had depth and a track record. In the first meeting I had with Chris Legeste, I told him all the people they’d be doing battle with, and it was a significant and impressive lineup, to say the least. To his credit, he took it back to his bosses [at AEG] and persuaded them to enter into negotiations for a benefits package.

**Building Momentum beyond the L.A. Live CBA**

With respect to reshaping the political context for other progressive endeavors, FCCEJ’s success in negotiating the L.A. Live CBA provided a significant degree of momentum for similar campaigns in Los Angeles and across the country. Locally, several spin-off coalitions have been established among many of the participants of the L.A. Live campaign. For instance, the Share the Wealth Coalition (a joint effort by FCCEJ and the LA Coalition Hunger and Homelessness) has advocated for residential hotel tenants and has worked to expand affordable housing in L.A.’s downtown core. Also, following the L.A. Live CBA, many of the organizations involved in FCCEJ came together in other coalition reformations to negotiate similar community benefits agreements. In one such example, the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Economic Justice, comprised of several FCCEJ member organizations, reached an
agreement with Los Angeles World Airports that included a $500 million concessions package surrounding Los Angeles International Airport’s expansion in 2005; I examine this case in the following chapter.

Electorally, many of FCCEJ’s member organizations have worked together to support progressive candidates in political efforts, such as the campaigns to elect Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa in 2005 and 2009. FCCEJ participants have also been influential in City Council elections and decisions about important political appointments.

With regard to inducing lasting, progressive policy changes in Los Angeles, FCCEJ members have made recent attempts to institutionalize community benefits agreements through policy instruments called Community Impact Reports (CIR), which would ensure the provision of community benefits for large-scale, subsidized projects with major local impacts. While these efforts have not yet proven successful in L.A., CIRs have received widespread acceptance in areas such as San Jose and Emeryville, California (Cummings, 2006). Yet, Madeline Janis-Aparicio, Executive Director of the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, shared that as a result of the L.A. Live CBA’s success, community benefits are becoming an expected requirement for certain developments in L.A (Janis, Interview, 2010).

For many observers, the L.A. Live CBA victory reinforced the importance of working to find natural connections between housing, jobs, and the environment. With reference to community stakeholders who reside in low-income communities of color, Madeline Janis stated, “These are holistic people with holistic needs, and to have a developer take that into account is just amazing” (Janis, Interview, 2010). Some have cited FCCEJ’s efforts as one of the critical precursors to a broader national movement for
more progressive, equitable development. Since the City of Los Angeles adopted the L.A. Live CBA, dozens of CBAs (and community benefits provisions) have appeared in cities across the nation. The rise of CBAs has positively impacted the level of receptivity toward multi-sector organizing across the country.

Ultimately, the case of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition demonstrates the power of organized action for accountable, community-controlled development. While FCCEJ did not fundamentally overhaul L.A.’s political establishment, its impact on the broader political economy was both far-reaching and notable.
CHAPTER 6:
THE LAX COALITION FOR
ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE
CASE STUDY
LAX Coalition Introduction

Los Angeles’ local government officials had attempted to expand the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) since the 1990s. However, efforts to facilitate LAX’s expansion consistently encountered substantial opposition from (1) the residents of areas surrounding LAX (who argued that LAX’s nuisances imposed an unfair burden on their communities) and (2) the residents of Los Angeles’ neighboring cities (who argued that a regional approach should be taken to dispersing the benefits of airport expansion). When officials decided that funds for airport growth would be dispersed across the region, with the majority of expansion taking place at LAX, a diverse coalition of environmental justice groups, labor organizations, community development associations, faith-based groups, political clubs, advocacy organizations, and school districts banded together in solidarity to promote their respective and collective interests in the planning process surrounding LAX’s expansion.

Ultimately, the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice agreed to join Los Angeles World Airports in negotiations concerning mitigation measures to address adverse community impacts. They also discussed the provision of material benefits for the communities neighboring LAX. The resulting LAX community benefits agreement (CBA) included job training for local residents, first-source hiring, living wage requirements, soundproofing for local buildings, and environmental controls. Approved by L.A.’s City Council and the Federal Aviation Administration, the LAX CBA requires Los Angeles World Airports to incorporate the provisions of the CBA into all airport contracts, lease agreements, and permitting agreements.
This chapter examines the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice and its monumental negotiations for a community benefits agreement with the Los Angeles World Airports. The following section highlights the history of opposition against LAX’s expansion. Then, the origins and growth of the LAX Coalition are illuminated. Finally, an analysis of four critical elements of the LAX Coalition’s efforts is provided, including its ability to: create a well-functioning coalition, win specific outcomes, increase the capacity of participating organizations, and shape the broader political climate.

**LAX Coalition Background**

The Los Angeles International Airport’s origin dates back to 1928, when Los Angeles’ City Council selected 640 acres – approximately 16 miles southwest of L.A.’s downtown core – as the site for its new municipal airport. The airport was used for military flights during World War II and was opened to commercial airlines in 1946. Today, four communities border the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), including the City of Inglewood to the northeast, the City of El Segundo to the south, the unincorporated community of Lennox to the east, and the City of Los Angeles (specifically, the community of Westchester) to the north.

LAX is operated by Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) – an enterprise department of the City of Los Angeles which is governed by the L.A. mayor-appointed Board of Airport Commissioners. In 2009, LAX served a total of 56.5 million passengers, was ranked the seventh busiest airport in the world in terms of passengers, and placed thirteenth in the world in cargo tonnage. Boasting an annual economic impact of $60
billion, and with one in twenty jobs in the Southern California region directly or indirectly attributable to airport operations, LAX is a generator of significant economic activity (Los Angeles World Airports, 2010).

In the 1990’s, however, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan grew increasingly concerned that in order to remain competitive, LAX needed to expand. Although LAX’s current complex was constructed in 1961, its last improvements had not occurred since the early 1980’s, when $700 was invested in the airport in preparation for the 1984 Summer Olympics (Los Angeles World Airports, 2010). Due to its outdated terminals, LAX began losing ground in the burgeoning Asian air travel market to newer and more modern airports, such as San Francisco International Airport, in the late 1990’s (Oldham, 2007). Samson Mengistu, Deputy Executive Director of Administration for Los Angeles World Airports, remarked:

Shortly after the Olympics, there was a consensus that something had to happen at the LAX by way of expansion and modernization. We have, in terms of footprints, one of the smallest land masses for a major airport. The airport was handling 40 million passengers, but in the mid-80’s demand was pushing and the economy was pretty robust. There were some high predictions that the airport could serve between 70 and 100 million passengers in the coming years. So there was a need to do something about expanding the airport. But because many of the communities surrounding the airport wanted the building to take place somewhere else, major opposition was organized (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

Although a 1995 study indicated that LAX needed to expand to accommodate 98 million passengers annually by 2015, there was significant dissention regarding LAX’s role in meeting those increasing demands.

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13 LAX currently occupies 3,425 acres of land compared to Denver International Airport’s (the largest airport in the United States) 34,000 acres.
Broad political opposition to Riordan’s expansion plan was mounted by a coalition representing varied interests, ranging from LAX’s closest neighbors who had long expressed frustrations with the noise, pollution, and traffic impacts of LAX’s facilities to more distant communities that wanted future facility growth and improvements to be distributed more equally among the ten smaller airports in the region. These groups were dubbed ‘the NIMBYs and the wannabes’ in a 1999 *L.A. Times* article.

Although Mayor Riordan made LAX’s expansion a principal goal of his second term and said he was willing to negotiate a regional solution, his opponents felt Riordan’s regional compromise did not go far enough. Riordan conceded that the region’s other airports would be granted the opportunity to expand their facilities. Yet, the Mayor maintained that LAX (and thus, Los Angeles) would still, by far, be the largest

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14 LAX expansion opponents felt that if they could attract cargo flights to airports in cities such as San Bernardino, Riverside and Palmdale, they would build stronger local economies in those areas and provide communities directly surrounding LAX with relief from traffic, noise, and air pollution (Newton, 1999).
beneficiary of airport expansion. Thus, regional opponents hired attorneys to challenge Riordan’s plan to allocate most of the expansion to LAX (Newton, 1999).

Though he was nearing the end of his last term in office, Mayor Riordan was determined to see his Master Plan come to fruition. Riordan made a final push for the airport’s expansion by establishing an unprecedented 180-day public-comment period once LAWA released the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and the Draft LAX Master Plan early in 2001. During the six-month public-comment period, four environmental justice workshops (hosted by Environmental Defense) and three public hearings were held at City Hall to explain the complicated details of the massive technical reports to affected communities and to invite public feedback. But the opposition did not budge.

One of local residents’ primary concerns was the impact of aircrafts’ consistently disruptive noise on the motivation and cognitive abilities of children at the 20 schools and 14 preschools within a one-mile radius of LAX. At the hearings, principals from the affected schools testified that teachers were forced to stop speaking, as aircrafts flew overhead and caused their boarded-up windows to rattle almost every five minutes every school day (Baxamusa, 2008). Long-time community activist, Maria Verduzco stated, “We had some of the schools where they covered the windows because the noise was so bad, they had to. Some of them are trailers without windows. No windows were put in because of the noise from the planes. A lot of times, teachers open doors when it’s a nice day and it’s not hot. But there are no windows, so you can’t look in or out” (Verduzco, Interview, 2010).

15 School disruptions primarily affected Lennox and Inglewood.
In the meantime, Riordan’s second term expired. When Mayor James Hahn was voted into office in June, he added six additional public hearings to discuss the expansion plan. In response to the sustained opposition and heightened concerns after September 11, Hahn instructed LAWA to create another alternative that would accommodate 78 million passengers without constructing an additional runway and flight path pay increased attention to federal security regulations. Hahn’s new alternative required the construction of a remote terminal (approximately one mile east of the airport) to house all passenger and baggage check-in. A rail system would also be required to connect the main and remote terminals. Once environmental and security impact assessments were released for Hahn’s Enhanced Safety and Security Alternative, three environmental justice workshops were conducted (in Inglewood, Lennox, and South Los Angeles) and twelve public hearings were held throughout the region. Yet, residents and environmental groups remained disgruntled about the unmitigated noise, traffic, and air pollution impacts that would continue to affect half-a-million people, and labor groups were increasingly frustrated about their challenging negotiations with airport concessionaires. Expansion opponents threatened to litigate once again (Baxamusa, 2008). LAX’s expansion plans were, therefore, at a standstill.
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>December 1995</td>
<td>Phase I of the LAX Master Plan is completed. Research phase determines demand for air service by 2015 could reach 98 million annual passengers and 4.1 million annual tons of cargo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1996</td>
<td>Phase II of LAX Master Plan is initiated. Facility requirements are assessed and a total of 30 concepts are developed and reviewed by LAWA (then the Department of Airports) between February and November of 1996.</td>
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<td>June-July 1997</td>
<td>LAWA and the FAA issue Notice of Preparation/Notice of Intent to prepare EIS/EIR, followed by a series of public meetings to help define the scope of the EIS/EIR.</td>
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<td>January 2001</td>
<td>The Draft EIS/EIR and Draft LAX Master Plan are released. An unprecedented 180-day public comment period commences.</td>
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<td>May-August 2001</td>
<td>Four Environmental Justice Workshops are conducted in the neighboring communities of Inglewood, Lennox and South Los Angeles.</td>
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<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Three Public Hearings are held at L.A.’s City Hall to provide opportunity for the public to voice their comments on the Draft documents.</td>
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<td>July 2001</td>
<td>Newly elected Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn extends the public comment period 60 days and adds six additional Public Hearing dates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October-November 2001</td>
<td>Six additional Public Hearings are conducted. Public comment period on the Draft EIS/EIR and Draft LAX Master Plan officially closes on November 9th, concluding a 295-day review period.</td>
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<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Mayor Hahn directs LAWA to develop a new alternative focused on safety and security. Guidelines include accommodating approximately 78 MAP and 3 million annual tons (MAT) of cargo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2002-June 2003</td>
<td>Environmental and security impact assessments are conducted for the new Enhanced Safety and Security Alternative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>The Supplement to the Draft EIS/EIR and Draft LAX Master Plan Addendum are released. The public review and comment period commences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July-August 2003</td>
<td>Three additional Environmental Justice Workshops are conducted in the communities of Inglewood, Lennox and South Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>August-October 2003</td>
<td>Twelve Public Hearings are conducted throughout the region to provide opportunity for the public to voice their comments on the Supplement to the Draft EIS/EIR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>120-day public review and comment period for the Supplement to the Draft EIS/EIR concludes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Proposed Final LAX Master, Final Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and entitlements are released.</td>
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<td>May 2004</td>
<td>A Public Workshop was conducted to provide information on the Final EIR.</td>
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<td>May 2004</td>
<td>The Board of Airport Commissioners, the City Planning Commission and the Advisory Agency held a joint hearing to receive testimony from the public on the LAX Master Plan Program documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>The Board of Airport Commissioners, the City Planning Commission and the Advisory Agency approved the LAX Master Plan Program documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>Los Angeles City Council Planning Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee conducts public hearing and subsequently recommends approval of the Master Plan Program documents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>Los Angeles City Council Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources (CENR) Committee conducts public hearing and subsequently recommends approval of the Master Plan Program documents.</td>
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In April of 2004, the proposed Final LAX Master Plan and Final Environmental Impact Report were released by Mayor Hahn as a part of the General Plan for the City of Los Angeles. One of the plan’s six stated goals was to “acknowledge neighborhood context and promote compatibility between LAX and the surrounding neighborhoods” (LAWA, 2004, p. 3). The plan outlined the following guidelines to achieve this goal: (1) Minimize negative impacts to surrounding residential land uses; (2) Maximize the public benefits of airport development, particularly to adjacent land uses; (3) Provide opportunities for community participation in Master Plan Program decisions that could affect stakeholders by consultation with an LAX Master Plan Stakeholder Liaison who will communicate with stakeholders, including: adjacent residential and business communities; airline representatives; airport concessionaires; cargo and freight forwarders; labor representatives; business organizations and neighborhood councils. By Master Plan’s release in 2004, the City had spent approximately $147 million on a planning process that began almost ten years earlier. Mayor Hahn, therefore, knew that if he wanted his proposal for the LAX to move forward, the City would have to take a more aggressive approach to community participation – and the community was ripe for a different type of engagement.
As a result of the dozens of workshops and hearings that took place during the prior decade, a significant degree of trust and camaraderie had been cultivated among the affected community groups. During this period of time, two well-resourced organizations – the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and Environmental Defense – emerged as leaders that were dedicated to ensuring that surrounding communities would benefit from any expansion pursued at LAX. Jerilyn Lopez Mendoza, Policy Director for Environmental Defense, stated, “This community has been so heavily burdened, it deserves improvement. They deserve the jobs and they deserve the sound mitigation for their children and they deserve to breathe clean air” (Oldham, 2004). Both LAANE and Environmental Defense worked together in 2000 to establish the pioneering Staples Center CBA, so they naturally entertained the idea of developing a CBA for the LAX expansion project. Twenty-four groups formed the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice and agreed to negotiate a CBA with LAWA.

Rev. William Smart, who is currently LAANE’s Director of Training and Outreach, was hired by LAANE to build a coalition to negotiate the LAX CBA. In an interview at LAANE’s office, Rev. Smart reflected on the origins of the CBA: “At the time, the [L.A. County] Labor Federation President, Miguel Contreras, was also one of the board members at the airport. We went to him, and he thought it would be a great idea to do the CBA. Miguel brought the Mayor in and had a meeting with the Mayor, and Hahn said, ‘I like that.’” When asked whether Contreras had to make a hard sell to Mayor Hahn for the CBA, Smart commented on Contreras’ considerable political capital at the time. “Miguel was powerful leverage,” said Smart. “There wasn’t any doubt we were going into negotiations with the airport. The mayor appoints airport commissioners, and
he said, ‘Let’s do this.’ His people were in the room from the beginning of the negotiations” (Smart, Interview, 2010).

Airport officials, at Hahn’s request, entertained the CBA negotiations as a way to compromise with communities that had successfully opposed LAX’s expansion in the past. LAWA’s Deputy Executive Director of Administration remarked, “Mayor Hahn was entirely bought into the idea of what the coalition was trying to do. It is safe to say that the Mayor was the primary sponsor of the coalition. It was also obvious that almost all the council members supported the coalition” (Mengistu, Interview, 2010). Jim Ritchie, Deputy Executive Director of Long-Range Planning at LAWA stated, "We want to make friends out there every bit as much as they want to be friendly” (Oldham, 2004).

Create a Well-Functioning Coalition

Recruiting a Broad Scope of Interests

Like all LAANE campaigns, the effort surrounding the LAX CBA was staffed by a full-time director, researcher, and organizer. Together, the staff began recruiting potential coalition partners. Coalition Director, Rev. William Smart, stated, “There were people from certain organizations that always argued and litigated with the airport, so we went to them…Some said no, we want to fight” (Smart, Interview, 2010). But some communities, such as Lennox, historically lacked the resources to sue. Lennox is a high-unemployment, poverty-stricken community that lies adjacent to LAX. With a relatively small population of 22,950 residents, Lennox is located directly underneath the flight path of passenger planes that land at LAX (Census, 2000). Maria Verduzco –

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16 In 2000, nearly 90 percent of residents in Lennox were Latino and 31.5 percent of the population fell below the poverty rate (Census, 2000).
longtime community activist and President of the Lennox Coordinating Council explained that since Lennox is an unincorporated part of Los Angeles County, they have not had the monetary or legal resources of cities like Inglewood to sue the airport.

But Lennox has had a long history of interactions with LAX, which has been guided by a non-binding “good neighbor” policy. In reference to this history Verduzco stated, “So we have this thing with the airport, we want them to be good neighbors…We had minor success talking to the airport in the past. We were a forum for them to come and say different things they wanted to do at our meetings because they have to do outreach to the community. They’d politely tell us what they were planning and what they were hoping to do.” When asked whether she felt the airport took their concerns seriously, she replied, “They have asked for our input. Like at one time they were hoping to close off Lennox Boulevard just about where the freeway goes over.” According to Verduzco, the airport’s administrators wanted to create additional exits off Interstate 405 and construct off-ramps in Lennox. Verduzco said her primary concerns were the pollution and traffic such a plan would create in their community – an area with a high proportion of children and pedestrians. According to Verduzco, nine out of ten children who apply for sports teams in Lennox have asthma – a problem that is likely related to the high proportion of pollution-generating ground and air traffic in the community. “As it is,” she said, “with the freeway going through, it cuts off a lot of our streets. There are only two exits out of this area. One of the things I stipulated was we don’t want a lot of trucks going through Lennox Boulevard cause a lot of times they’ll try to bypass Century

17 The Lennox Coordinating Council is the organization that has been granted the authority by Los Angeles County to represent citizens’ interests (through residents’ various civic organizations) on the County level. This arrangement is necessary since, as an unincorporated community, Lennox lacks a formal city government.
and Imperial since the freeway lets out right here and they can avoid all that traffic when
they come through Lennox Boulevard.” Although the airport officials said they’d be back
when they had the final plans, Verduzco is satisfied that they haven’t raised the issue
since.

Verduzco was a member of the LAX Citizens’ Advisory Committee\(^\text{18}\) years
before the LAX Coalition formed. In recounting how the Lennox Coordinating Council
decided to join the coalition, she said, “They approached me and asked if we would like
to join them. I asked them to come to the meeting and present what they had so the
members could be informed and vote on it. My argument was ‘we can’t afford to do
anything on our own, so why not join with the communities that want to do this.’ So,
that’s how it started” (Verduzco, Interview, 2010).

In the 1980’s, the school districts of Lennox and Inglewood entered agreements
with LAWA that were designed to alleviate the impacts of LAX’s operations. The actions
taken since that time, however, were far from sufficient, yet they lacked the resources
needed to pursue litigation again in the 2000’s. The coalition’s organizers reached out to
both school districts to recruit them to the alliance. The Lennox School District decided
to join the coalition because the collaborative effort increased their leverage and
legitimacy in the eyes of city officials. "Our interest in joining the coalition was making
sure our voice was actually heard. Often we've had a lone voice that doesn't carry a lot of
clout," said Bruce McDaniel, Superintendent of the Lennox School District. He
continued, "Our issue primarily has to do with the effect of noise on learning. There are

\(^{18}\text{The LAX Citizens’ Advisory Committee is comprised of representatives from cities such as Hawthorne, Inglewood, Culver City, Marina Del Ray, Westchester, and other unincorporated county areas affected by the airport. Verduzco stated that the Mayor of L.A. founded the committee years ago to get airport stakeholders to discuss the airport’s plans. Advisory Committee members are appointed by the Mayors of their respective areas.}\)
studies that prove that kids growing up in schools that are adjacent to airports have learning loss” (Oldham, 2004). And although the City of Inglewood – another community adjacent to LAX – had been involved in the recent legal actions against LAX’s expansion, the Inglewood School District agreed to join the coalition in hopes that the CBA would be the vehicle through which they could update the old 1980’s agreement (Kaye & Mendoza, 2008).

The coalition organizers engaged in a rigorous process of recruitment to guarantee that affected community stakeholders would have access to a seat at the table and a voice in the conversation. “We convinced the school districts to join the coalition,” said Rev. Smart, “then, we just organized – going to different community organizations, faith based organizations, the City Council’s office.” Table 7 outlines the various stakeholder organizations that agreed to join the LAX Coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. LAX Coalition’s Participating Organizations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental &amp; Public Health Organizations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- California Environmental Rights Alliance</td>
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<td>- Coalition for Clean Air</td>
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<td>- Communities for a Better Environment</td>
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<td>- Community Coalition for Change</td>
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<td>- Environmental Defense/Environmental Justice Project</td>
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<td>- Natural Resources Defense Council</td>
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<td>- Physicians for Social Responsibility Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community Development &amp; Service Organizations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Community Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Inglewood Coalition for Drug and Violence Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Faith-Based Organizations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Inglewood Area Ministerial Association</td>
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<td>- Los Angeles Council of Churches</td>
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<td>- Nation of Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>- AME Minister’s Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>School Districts</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Inglewood Unified School District</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lennox School District</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Political Organizations
- Lennox Coordinating Council
- Inglewood Democratic Club

### Labor Organizations
- Service Employees International Union Local 1877
- Service Employees International Union Local 347
- Teamsters Local 911
- Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 11

### Intermediary & Advocacy Organizations
- Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy
- Action for Grassroots Empowerment & Neighborhood Development Alternatives

In reference to the breadth of interests recruited to join the coalition by September of 2003, Smart stated, “So all of the sudden in our first meeting, we have 25 representatives there and they all agreed that they’d rather negotiate rather than litigate. It was a mixture of stakeholders who were going to be directly impacted and those who usually fought the issue.”

**Defining a Negotiation Structure**

Once the broader coalition was formed, participants decided that they would approach negotiations with LAWA by dividing their concerns into three issue areas. According to the coalition’s negotiation plan, they chose to “negotiate by subject area in order to take advantage of expertise and to efficiently allocate the resources of each organization” (Smart, 2003). The Environment and Community sub-committee was tasked with negotiating everything related to environmental technology, environmental mitigations, environmental justice, and health programs. The Jobs and Small Business sub-committee was commissioned to negotiate all job access and training policies, labor standards, worker health issues, business opportunities, labor ordinance extensions, and
residential soundproofing. The Education sub-committee was responsible for negotiating settlements for the participating school districts.

Next, there was a need to select the individuals (e.g., community members, representatives from coalition organizations, and issues experts) who would serve on each of the three sub-committees. There were, however, rigorous demands on the individuals who volunteered. Not only would they need to invest a few hours each week in coalition deliberations regarding demands over the course of several months, but they would also have to commit to meeting one day every week with LAWA’s representatives during the lengthy negotiation process. “They asked for someone to be on the negotiating committee,” said Verduzco, “and one of the teachers said he wanted to do it so I said, ‘Ok, we’ll appoint you as our representative.’” But although the teacher would be free to participate in the discussions during his free time in the summer, the school district lacked the resources to compensate him for time off during the school year. According to Verduzco, “That’s when Dr. Smart asked me if I would do it.”

As a retired community activist who was deeply concerned about issues related to LAX’s expansion, Verduzco was extremely interested in participating in the negotiations. But she admitted that she was initially anxious about volunteering:

Dr. Smart said, ‘Why don’t you do it yourself?’ I said, ‘Oh my god, I don’t have a degree in anything!’ He says, ‘Why not, you can do it. Don’t be afraid, don’t be ashamed. Everybody will explain things to you you don’t understand. There’s a lot we don’t understand.’ And I thought to myself at the time, I’ll just go and learn. I’ll just sit there and not say anything. My husband said, ‘Uh-huh, I’d like to be a fly on the wall.’ Well, I was involved in everything that’s going on in the community so I knew a lot about the area, so I decided to volunteer (Verduzco, Interview, 2010).
When they began meeting in the fall of 2003, each of the sub-committees spent a great deal of time identifying the issues they wanted to bring to the negotiating table.

“We had three months of meetings before we got to negotiations,” said Rev. Smart. “To find issues, each of the three sub-committees did investigations, talked to people, and looked at different things to see what people would really want.” Once an adequate scope of issues was identified, the coalition developed a system to narrow down the list of final demands they would bring into the negotiating sessions. First, each demand was classified into one of the three negotiation sections and was assigned an appropriate priority level within that section. Second, each demand was expounded into a proposal (some items were bundled) that would be presented in negotiations. Then, each proposal item was assigned to two individuals who were prepared to serve as the lead and back-up negotiators for that issue. Finally, each item was strategically placed on the coalition’s internal negotiations agenda (Smart, 2003). By the conclusion of this process, the coalition decided on a total of 140 demands for negotiation.

In January of 2004, the LAX Coalition and LAWA initiated their nine month-long negotiation process with an introductory meeting. On the coalition’s side, every member of each negotiation team was present. LAWA’s attending representatives included Jim Ritchie, Sampson Mengistu (both Deputy Directors), Bob Gilbert (a consultant for the modernization plan), and several airport attorneys. After initial introductions were made, the meeting began with the following opening statement (developed by the coalition):

The LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice is made up of 25 organizations. We are a cross-section of educational systems, labor unions, grassroots community groups, and environmental justice organizations. We the members of the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice are representing communities that historically have had to live under egregious conditions
in the shadow of the airport. Don’t look at us as big business or some corporation, but look at us as the community attempting to work out situations and conditions with the airport, a public entity. These negotiations are the community meeting a public agency. This is important because that is saying that you recognize us as the people who live in the neighborhood who have a voice that you want to hear. Through this whole process let us remember that we are working together to improve a community that has been underrepresented. It is not about our egos, but it is about solutions (Smart, 2003).

After the opening statement, the coalition proposed several ground rules to guide the negotiation process. Following a brief discussion, all participants agreed that: (1) all proceedings would be confidential and discussed only with parties involved in the process; (2) each individual would be respectful of everyone involved, information would not be used against anyone, and all actions would be actions toward building trust in each other and in the process; and (3) the goal would be to have a win-win situation for everyone involved. Then, they moved into a discussion about how the negotiation teams would be structured. Table 8 details the coalition’s negotiation structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment &amp; Community</th>
<th>Jobs &amp; Small Business</th>
<th>Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rev. William Smart (LAANE)</td>
<td>Rev. William Smart (LAANE)</td>
<td>Rev. William Smart (LAANE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joe Lyou (CERA)</td>
<td>Susan Minato/Beatriz Silva (HERE Local 11)</td>
<td>Bruce McDaniel, Superintendent (Lennox Unified School District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Verduzco-Smith (Lennox Council)</td>
<td>Marqueece Dawson (Community Coalition)</td>
<td>Attorneys from Lennox and Inglewood School Districts</td>
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</table>

LAANE staff members, Rev. Smart and Nancy Cohen, were involved in all negotiation sessions. Rev. William Smart served as a consistent member of each negotiation team in order to manage negotiations, open and close each session, keep the process moving, call
caucus breaks, conduct negotiations team debriefs, and communicate with the coalition and key allies. Nancy Cohen, who served as the recorder in every negotiation session, was tasked with keeping records of each negotiation session, writing negotiation proposals, coordinating between writers and the lead negotiator on issues, preparing presenters on the details and context of the demands and proposals, maintaining the matrix of demands, scheduling negotiation sessions between the City and coalition, communicating (as needed) details and technical research issues related to the negotiations, and conducting research on issues arising in the negotiations.

The group agreed that the ultimate goal was to determine the final CBA components and language before the LAX Master Plan underwent a vote by the Airport Commission. To do so, they committed to meet one day a week and to negotiate the three categories on a phased timetable (i.e., environmental issues first, schools negotiations second, and economic issues last). Meetings typically took place Fridays from approximately 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. – times that would accommodate the participants’ work schedules.

From the perspective of coalition members, the negotiation process was well-structured, efficient, transparent, and empowering. Verduzco stated that while everyone participated in one unified negotiating group, having knowledgeable attorneys who were devoted to fighting for the community on the coalition’s side of the table was reassuring. It was nice to be able to rely on trained experts, such as Jerilyn Lopez-Mendoza and Joe Lyou, to take the lead in discussions – particularly on highly-technical environmental issues.
Regarding the negotiators’ accountability to their respective organizations, although they were given a great deal of leeway to make decisions in negotiations, they still took the pains of providing updates to the general coalition steering committee and requesting their feedback before making final agreements. According to Rev. Smart, “Everyone had people they had to check in with from the broader coalition. I had four groups I had to communicate with on a consistent basis” (Smart, Interview, 2010). 

Communications related to decision-making would primarily take place via telephone, but emails were often distributed throughout the coalition when the issues were technical in nature. The coalition’s recorder was diligent about recording negotiation sessions, transcribing the recordings, and distributing the notes. “I think they did a great job. They always made sure we had the information so I could pass it on,” said Verduzco. She continued, “Every time after the meeting, they would email all the information to us so we could take it to our respective meetings and share with members (Verduzco, Interview, 2010).

During negotiation sessions, both sides would often break into caucuses to check-in with each other. When they returned to the negotiating table with a decision, the decision was only a preliminary agreement. There were times toward the end of the nine months, however, when they did not always break for a caucus. “At times we’d make some cold decisions,” said Smart, “and when I’d look at Nancy, we’d whisper ‘let’s do it.’ But if we agreed to do something, everyone would still go back to their constituents and check-in.”

Upon leaving negotiation sessions, they spoke to their respective organizations for feedback and returned to the next meeting with finalized decisions. They would also, at
times, make calls from the table when they needed to make quick decisions. This was rare, however, as they wanted enough time to flesh things out with the broader coalition. The education negotiation sessions presented an exception to this process. Because the Superintendents and their attorneys were involved in each session, they made decisions in negotiations for their school boards to later approve.

Although the negotiations were well-structured, they were not without their moments of tension and frustration. Interestingly, it was the defined structure that seemed to assist both sides in getting through those difficult times when participants wondered whether the process was worth continuing. One of the biggest challenges, for example, took place at the beginning of negotiations when the coalition introduced their proposal for a youth skateboard park. But because federal law stipulates that money can only be invested in things directly associated with the airport, the coalition had to relinquish that particular request. According to both sides, however, the most heated debates surrounded environmental issues. LAWA Deputy Director, Sampson Mengistu, stated:

There were some days with the environmental discussions where we felt we were almost at an impasse. We felt we had gone as far as we could and there was no reason to continue. But there was a willingness to put that issue back, break the meeting, come back the next meeting not where we left off, but on another subject – something that was resolvable. I think the way it was designed from the beginning was helpful because the next subjects of negotiations helped to develop a little more trust and understanding. That prevented the negotiations from falling apart (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

Coalition members agreed that if the negotiations were designed to address one element and to come to a conclusion on that particular issue, things may have fallen apart. When rough patches were encountered, it was beneficial to table issues temporarily in order to allow tensions to diffuse.
Caucuses also proved to be a useful component of the negotiation structure. They afforded both sides an opportunity to walk away from tense discussions, regroup, and return with a regained composure. At one point, in particular, Rev. Smart said he almost walked away:

There was one time we were discussing something and I really got frustrated. They had this attorney named Claudia and she just irritated me. She kept saying, ‘You just can’t do that, you just can’t do that.’ When we broke, Jerilyn and Nancy looked at me and I thought to myself, ‘For the drama in everything, let’s walk.’ But when we got back, Claudia said the most profound thing that kept things going and was a real turning point in the process. She said, ‘I know what you want to do, I know where you want to go, let me try to help you get there.’ I don’t know what they talked about, but that was a turning point (Smart, Interview, 2010).

Ultimately, the structure of the negotiations provided the ideal conditions for coalition accountability, efficient procedures, thoughtful decisions, and level-headed interactions. Both sides consistently praised the negotiation structure for ‘carrying the day’ throughout the process.

Developing Good Faith, Respect, and Trust

It took a bit more than well-structured negotiations to hold the process together, however. The coalition initially came to the table with high aspirations, which was not always received well by LAWA’s representatives – especially in the beginning of negotiations. “We made a list comprised of the areas people said were important to them,” said Coalition member Verduzco, “and then, of course, you know we’re going to ask for the moon and hope we get a few stars on the way.” This ‘shooting for the moon’ caused LAWA to question whether the Coalition was actually negotiating in good faith. Mengistu stated (Interview, 2010):
The Coalition had some large organizations, such as NRDC and Environmental Fund, with track records of opposing major projects. So, initially, some of the tensions were born out of them not truly understanding our business. There were some desires and demands on their part that would be untenable from the operations standpoint. My recollection is the first month, it was very difficult.

As one would imagine, the Coalition also had its own reservations about the intentions of the LAWA representatives. Danny Tabor – a member of the Jobs and Small Business negotiating team – expressed his frustrations with LAWA’s seeming flippancy when he (Interview, 2010) said:

We were talking about things that would be enforceable from the beginning. So three months in, they realized they needed to have their attorneys at the table consistently. We weren’t trying to go through the whole list of items and then come up with a contract. We were negotiating key issues at every meeting. As a community, we had the experience with the Staples Center where in the beginning they would change the people who were at the table. We wanted the airport to maintain consistency in negotiations.

But as time progressed, some of the initial tensions naturally waned as each side grew better acquainted with the other. When asked what elements other than the structure kept negotiations from falling apart, Mengistu mentioned the importance of cultivating a genuine sense of trust and camaraderie across the table:

At times we’d have lunch brought in and there were inevitably light moments where personalities would arise…There’d be discussions about particulate matter being 5.0 or 2.5 and there’d be one or two people who would understand that discussion. The rest would keep the discussion broader, and some light moments would arise when discussions weren’t going anywhere. Personalities started emerging and I’d say by the middle of the negotiations, there was some trust that started to develop. It used to be that we’d ask them to leave so we could caucus or they’d ask us to leave. That started happening less and less, and we started to hash our separate issues out in the group (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

Rev. Smart mirrored Mengistu’s sentiments and highlighted the benefits of a lengthy negotiations process when he stated, “I didn’t like them. I felt like it was combat in the
beginning. But I think the longevity of the process caused us to really develop relationships” (Smart, Interview, 2010).

A certain degree of trust and respect also developed over time as members of the Coalition better familiarized themselves with the airport’s operating rules and procedures. “We knew what they had to do and that they needed us more than we needed them,” said Danny Tabor. “We said, ‘Here’s what we want to talk about, here’s what the federals say, here’s what your local commission says, and this is what we want it to say’” (Tabor, Interview, 2010). Samson Mengistu echoed the significance of the Coalition’s willingness to understand the airport’s constraints. He commented:

There was resolve on their [the Coalition’s] part to get something out of this and there was a level of frankness on their part. Outside the negotiation sessions that involved fairly senior members of the airport, they would start learning about the airport’s business by sitting down with the operations people. So, I give them credit for doing that and moderating their demands and desires to make them acceptable (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

While civil interactions across the table facilitated an effective negotiation process, the Coalition’s ability to maintain a high level of trust, respect, and camaraderie among its own members was equally important. One of the most critical keys to internal coalition success was the commitment every member-organization made to each other’s interests. Danny Tabor said, “We decided early that no one would leave the table until we all got our issues resolved. So, you weren’t able to get up and leave because the environmental issues had been agreed on. And this demonstrated a commitment to the broader goals” (Tabor, Interview, 2010).

In reference to whether there were ever potential threats of anyone co-opting or derailing the process, Verduzco stated, “No, because the meetings were very open.
LAANE’s staff was very dedicated to what we were doing…And there was nothing for them to gain because they were people working for LAANE.” This statement speaks to the legitimacy gained because the coalition’s lead organizers were full-time employees (rather than volunteers) of an organization whose mission was to advance social, economic, and environmental justice for affected residents. Regarding the threats of co-optation, Rev. Smart stated, “I think it [the negotiation process] was so huge, it went on for so long that even though the longevity of it made it more susceptible to that [co-optation] happening, the longevity made us stronger as a coalition.”

“Scaling Up”

In November of 2004, and after a long nine-month process, the Coalition concluded its negotiations with LAWA. Although reaching an agreement was a momentous occasion, both sides knew it was only a preliminary agreement until the Federal Aviation Administration granted its approval of the CBA – and FAA approval could present a significant roadblock to several aspects of the agreement.19 Philip J. Depoian, Senior Advisor on Aviation to Mayor Hahn, expressed his uncertainty about the likelihood of FAA approval when he stated, "I'm cautiously optimistic in some areas. Where I think there's gray, we could encourage the FAA to look at it [the borderline issues] in a different light" (Oldham, 2004).

In negotiations, LAWA’s executives gave coalition members no reason to be optimistic that the FAA would be supportive. Verduzco stated, “They [LAWA’s executives] went through the list of demands and said, ‘definitely not this, that, or that.’

19 The FAA is required to approve any deal that involves a City’s airport agency spending its money – which is often separate from the City’s general fund – on projects that are not on the airport’s immediate grounds.
The rest, we can definitely negotiate. On particular things, they said they’d have to talk to the FAA and the FAA is practically immovable” (Verduzco, Interview, 2010). According to Rev. Smart, the coalition responded to their skepticism with tenacity:

What we said was if there’s a disagreement with the FAA, we’ll go to Washington D.C. with you. And they took us up on that. In December of 2004, we all went to Washington. We had an agreement – a CBA – but we wanted the FAA to understand that some on them [the agreed-on items] were on the edge. The top FAA Administrator said she was excited that we had come. She said, ‘I’ve never seen this. Usually the citizens come fighting the airport. With the airport and citizens coming together, I’m going to do all I can to help (Smart, Interview, 2010).

The assessed worth of the finalized multi-issue community benefits agreement was approximately $500 million – an unparalleled scale and value. The CBA was the largest of its kind in the country. Regarding his thoughts about the final CBA, Mengistu remarked, “I did not have any expectation that there would be such broad scope that would come out of the process. It was unprecedented in its coverage” (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

With respect to the elements that created the conditions for successful negotiations between the LAX Coalition and LAWA, the negotiation structure, inter- and intra-group trust, and willingness to scale-up all proved to be significant.

Win Specific Outcomes

The LAX Master Plan

In December of 2004, the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners and the City Council approved the LAX Master Plan Program and Community Benefits Agreement. After releasing a Final Environmental Impact Statement, the FAA also issued its approval of the Master Plan the following May. According to a report published by
Good Jobs First and the California Partnership for Working Families, “The CBA has been hailed by both local policy-makers and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration as a model for future airport development nationally” (Gross, 2005, p. 15).

As the strategic framework for LAX’s future development, the LAX Master Plan outlined the modernization of LAX’s runway and taxiway system, the redevelopment of the terminal area, the improved access to the airport, and the enhancement of passenger safety, security, and convenience. LAWA’s Stakeholder Liaison Office released the following statement on its website:

The LAX Master Plan is the result of a great deal of thought and collaboration. LAWA spent more than 10 years in a planning process that was both exhaustive and inclusive. LAWA examined more than 30 alternatives and sought unprecedented public input. The LAX Master Plan is designed to balance the public’s call for no expansion and less impacts to their neighborhoods with the airport’s need to modernize and focus more intently on ground access, safety and security (http://www.ourlax.org/overview.cfm)

Although the LAX Master Plan promoted a regional solution to air transportation demand, most of the work targeted LAX’s facilities. The plan was specifically designed to allow LAX to accommodate approximately 78.9 million annual passengers, 3.1 million annual tons of cargo, and 2,300 daily operations by 2015 (LAWA, 2010). This Master Plan was a major win for advocates of growth for LAX.

**The LAX Community Benefits Agreement**

The negotiated CBA was a tremendous victory for affected residents – who had historically struggled to convince the airport to mitigate its adverse impacts and to
maximize its potential benefits. As an enforceable contract, the CBA provided residents with strong legal grounds to sue LAWA if the agreement’s provisions were not upheld.

The final agreement between the LAX Coalition and LAWA consists of four documents. The first portion, the Cooperation Agreement, outlines the legal framework of the agreement, including its conditions, commitments, and enforcement mechanisms. For instance, Section II-A of the Cooperation Agreement states, “LAWA shall include in contracts, leases, license and permitting agreements any and all provisions necessary to make applicable requirements of this Agreement legally effective with regard to contractors, subcontractors, leasees, licensees and permittees” (p. 5). Regarding the coalition’s obligations, Section III-C of the Cooperation Agreement says, “The Coalition covenants that it will not file, prosecute, bring, or advance any suit, claim, or legal action of any kind against LAWA or the FAA based upon any Released Claim” (p. 6). As such, the Cooperation Agreement addresses the responsibilities of both parties – LAWA and the LAX Coalition – and is legally binding in a court of law.

The second of the four documents is the Community Benefits Agreement. Table 9 outlines the negotiated and agreed-on benefits, studies, and mitigation efforts included in the CBA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Provisions of the LAX CBA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noise Mitigation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Increased funding for Airport Noise Mitigation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ End-of-Block Soundproofing</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Suspension of Aviation Easement</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ FAR Part 161 Study for Limitations on Nighttime Departures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development Benefits</strong></td>
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<td>▪ Job Training Program</td>
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<td>▪ Work Experience Programs</td>
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<td>▪ First Source Hiring Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Small Business Attraction and Retention Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Application of City Living Wage and Worker Retention Ordinances</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community Environmental/Health Studies</strong></td>
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As a resident of Lennox, Ms. Verduzco was eligible to have her house soundproofed. In reference to the work that was done as a result of the CBA, she stated (Interview, 2010):

You used to have to keep all your windows closed which was difficult during the summer. You still keep your windows closed, but the thing is they put in soundproofed windows and air conditioning, so you don’t have to open your windows during the summertime. And it’s as different as night and day. It was really, really bad. We’d have to turn our TV’s all the way up and constantly stop talking because there was a plane flying over our homes every 90 seconds. They were so close that I could go outside and look up and see the number of the airplane. I could read it.

She commented that many of her neighbors and residents in other communities have also benefitted from the noise mitigation.

The Settlement Agreement with the Inglewood Unified School District is the third document that came out of the negotiations. This Agreement details the conditions, commitments, and enforcement mechanisms that apply to both LAWA and the Inglewood Unified School District. Provisions in this settlement include: mitigation measures (not to exceed $118.5 million), such as the replacement of HVAC equipment
with pollution abatement, installation of double-paned windows and/or sound reduction windows and doors, roofing upgrades, renovated classrooms, and temporary classrooms during construction; security-related items such as education regarding the response of local law enforcement agencies, emergency response groups, and local communities to prepare for the threat of an airport-related emergency; and community programs, such as job training and academic programs.

The last document, the *Settlement Agreement with Lennox School District*, details the conditions, commitments, and enforcement mechanisms that apply to LAWA and Lennox School District. According to the Lennox settlement, LAWA agreed to fund mitigation measures (not to exceed $111 million), emergency preparation, and community programs similar to those included in the Inglewood settlement.

*Satisfaction with Outcomes*

Both the LAX Coalition and LAWA expressed satisfaction with the components of the final agreement. When asked whether he felt the Coalition received full and fair consideration from LAWA, Rev. Smart responded, “We got everything we could have gotten at that time, I think. There were some things like LEED buildings we wanted, but the costs kept going up. We felt they came to table in a good faith effort to give what they could” (Smart, Interview, 2010). Samson Mengistu – a LAWA Deputy Director – conceded that the airport’s executives were pleased, yet somewhat surprised at the outcomes of the process. He commented, “I wouldn’t be honest if I told you that we, on the airport side, expected the agreement would turn out to be so broad, comprehensive, and far-reaching” (Mengistu, Interview, 2010). While LAWA assumed the community
coalition would want ‘obvious things’ addressed (such as minimizing the impacts of noise and construction), they were delighted that the process actually strengthened many aspects of LAX’s Master Plan.

Ms. Verduzco’s response to the question of whether this process would have been possible in the past spoke to LAANE’s broader impact in Los Angeles. “You know, I never gave it much thought,” she said. “We [the Lennox Coordinating Council] just went along and tried to get the airport to do things here and there, get them to donate stuff and they’d throw us a bone once and awhile. But if there wasn’t a LAANE, this would not have happened for us.”

**Private Sector Response**

While L.A.’s business elites have historically contested redistributive policies aimed at enacting social, economic, and environmental justice, the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce did not oppose the LAX CBA. According to Mengistu, “They [the Chamber] generally support and like to see growth, and we were talking about 70, 80, 90 million passengers. The Chamber is always on the side of ‘bigger is better,’ but they have a tendency not to take community impact into consideration.” While business elites were not thrilled about the City embracing the CBA, they withheld their opposition to it because it was clear that the benefits agreement was the only avenue available to pursue airport expansion without encountering debilitating community resistance. Rev. Smart echoed, “The Chamber stayed away from it. We met with the Chamber a couple of times and they didn’t want to jeopardize the CBA because they wanted the airport modernized.”
LAX’s major airlines, on the other hand, “got into it in the end and said they weren’t going to be forced to pay” (Smart, Interview, 2010). Although the airlines made plain their disapproval of anything that would increase their expenses, their approval of the CBA was not required. Mengistu (Interview, 2010) stated:

If we had to get their approval, the airlines would be less inclined to embrace some of the agreements because, you know, they always look for the bottom line. One of the things [potential issues] was that the grounds equipment was mostly airline equipment, and one of the elements [of the CBA] was to convert all grounds equipment to clean electric fuel by a certain date. Their preference would be to take longer to convert to clean electric. So you would have been able to see that dynamic [of resistance] with the airlines if we had to get their approval.

The airlines’ approval was not required due to LAX’s financing model. According to Mengistu, LAX was fortunate that it is not financed based on a residual model – where the airport’s administrative office collects all the finances needed to run the airport from its airlines. Under the circumstances of the residual model, airlines have a significant say in accepting airport expenditures because airlines are immediately responsible for financing the expenditures. For example, if the airport’s administration wanted to sponsor a jobs training program, that expenditure would have to be approved by each of the airlines operating at the airport.

LAX is a compensatory model, however. Under the compensatory model, the airport is forced to shoulder most financial risks while the airlines’ obligations are minimal (they are charged standard fees). Had LAWA been required to secure the airlines’ approval, Mengistu stated, “That would have been challenging.”
**Political Opposition**

Although the LAX Coalition enjoyed substantial success in meeting its goals with the CBA, several critical community stakeholders refused to join the coalition because they wanted to maintain their rights to litigate against expansion. One of these groups – the Alliance to a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion (ARSAC) – was formed in 1995 to actively oppose Mayor Riordan’s expansion plans. The stated objective of ARSAC is:

To promote the use of our many regional commercial air transport resources...in solving the growing air traffic demand which as it stands today is concentrated almost completely at LAX and has become an overwhelming drain on the surrounding infrastructure as well as a security risk in today’s post 9-11 world. ARSAC is opposed to any plan that will increase the volume of air traffic at LAX; already the 3rd busiest airport in the world. ARSAC supports an alternative which includes expansion of at least one other airport in the region to provide a viable alternative to LAX. Alternate facilities must be in place in the event of an emergency. A regional solution is needed to maintain the economic vitality for all of Southern California as well as to preserve the quality of life and environment for residents and businesses in the communities that surround LAX (ARSAC website at http://www.regionalsolution.org).

Since its founding, ARSAC has lobbied to sway the political establishment in support of their regional approach. For instance, during James Hahn’s campaign for mayor in 2001, ARSAC convinced Hahn to sign a pledge of support for a regional strategy to airport expansion in exchange for ARSAC votes. Although Hahn won the election, ARSAC was disappointed when Hahn broke his commitment to the pledge.

In response to the Los Angeles Times’ Editorial Board’s reference to ARSAC and other opponents of LAX’s expansion as NIMBYs, ARSAC members responded to the newspaper in outrage. One member exclaimed:

It is absolutely unconscionable to call a community that has suffered the loss of thousands of homes to the drumbeat of LAX expansion a bunch of NIMBYs. After the last expansion of LAX for the 1984 Olympics these people you call NIMBYs *were promised in writing* that LAX would not
grow over 40 million annual passengers. They were promised that further growth in air traffic would be moved to regional airports. They were promised Palmdale Intercontinental Airport. The City of Los Angeles even bought the land at Palmdale. What got in the way of all these promises? Greed got in the way. It's that same greed that pushes for more air traffic, noise, soot, and air pollution over the heads of tens of thousands of residents living under the evermore crowded LAX flight path extending all the way out to Monterey Park.

In January of 2005, the Alliance for a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion, the City of Inglewood, the City of El Segundo, and the County of Los Angeles filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) lawsuit asserting that LAWA’s Environmental Impact Report was insufficient. Because their goal was to obstruct any expansion at LAX, these groups chose to exclude themselves from the CBA from the beginning of the coalition-building process. But filing under CEQA was a course of action that Coalition organizer Jerilyn Lopez-Mendoza had considered pursuing before the LAX Coalition chose to negotiate the CBA with LAWA. Mendoza felt that suing under CEQA would merely overturn the EIR (and require the completion of a new EIR), which would ultimately only postpone an inevitable project. The LAX Coalition, therefore, chose to negotiate a mutually-beneficial outcome for its participating members and the airport via a community benefits agreement. “Once the CEQA process is done, all of the juice is gone,” Lopez Mendoza said. “With the CBA, we would have a say in the implementation plan. We would have oversight and accountability” (Kaye & Mendoza, 2008). The suing entities, however, did not share Mendoza’s keen insight.

In the end, the plaintiffs entered a settlement (the LAX Master Plan Stipulated Settlement) with LAWA on February 16, 2005. The key provisions of the settlement (which provide funding to Inglewood, Los Angeles County, El Segundo and ARSAC, totaling $266 million over a 10-year period) are included in Table 10.
Table 10. Provisions of the LAX Master Plan
Stipulated Settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noise Mitigation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Accelerated noise mitigation for Inglewood, Los Angeles County and El Segundo</td>
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<tr>
<th>Traffic Mitigation/Aesthetic Benefits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Traffic mitigation for Inglewood and El Segundo</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Street removal and landscaping in the dunes west of Pershing Drive</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Street lighting in Westchester</td>
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<tr>
<th>Economic Development Benefits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Job training and increased airport job opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<th>Air Quality/Environmental Justice Benefits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ $60 million spent by LAWA on various air quality and environmental justice programs</td>
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<th>Reduction of Passenger Gates</th>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Discontinue passenger operations at ten narrow-body gates at the rate of two gates per year starting in 2010. This requirement will be in effect until 2020 unless LAX is serving less than 75 million annual passengers or if, through amendments to the Master Plan, LAX has 153 gates or less.</td>
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<th>Community-Based Planning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Create a prompt, community-based planning process to revisit and potentially replace controversial &quot;yellow light&quot; projects, such as the Manchester Square Ground Transportation Center, with alternative projects that increase airport efficiency and mitigate traffic, noise and pollution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Invite the Federal Aviation Administration, the Southern California Association of Governments, Southern California counties and airport operators to participate in a working group to plan for regional distribution of air traffic demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Develop a regional strategic planning initiative to encourage passenger and cargo activity at LAWA's other airports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Join a working group with ARSAC and Los Angeles City Council District 11 to seek input from interested parties on how LAWA can address the concerns of airport neighbors.</td>
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Source: http://www.ourlax.org/

In order to reach the settlement, the plaintiffs were forced to drop their state and federal suits.

Concurrently, in L.A.’s 2005 mayoral race, the Westchester-based ARSAC chose to back Antonio Villaraigosa’s candidacy (against Mayor Hahn) when Villaraigosa agreed to promote their regional airport expansion plan. After Villaraigosa won the election, he threw his support behind the proposed settlement agreement. In early 2006, final approval for the settlement was granted by: Mayor Villaraigosa; the City Councils of Los Angeles, Culver City, El Segundo and Inglewood; the Los Angeles County Board
of Supervisors; the Alliance for a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion; and the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners. Overcoming the legal opposition allowed LAWA to move forward with its planning and construction plans – although at a significantly slower pace.

Parties at the Coalition and LAWA were frustrated about the legal actions taken because although the litigants refused to join the CBA negotiations, they ultimately ended up agreeing to many of the CBA’s same provisions. According to Kaye and Mendoza (2008), “The political effects of this litigation, however, were negative for the Coalition and costly in terms of stimulating positive change. The stipulated settlement agreement took valuable city staff time and slowed down the implementation of the CBA, which already contained 90% of the wins in the stipulated settlement agreement” (p. 26).

Regarding an encounter she had with the Mayor of Inglewood, Verduzco (Interview, 2010) exclaimed, “And one time I saw him [Mayor Dorn] on the elevator at the airport and he said something about what they were going to do and I said, ‘Well that’s all in our agreement!’ They were just repeating what was in our agreement.” LAWA’s Mengistu (Interview, 2010) echoed a statement about the redundancy of the settlement negotiation process when he said, “It was more in the same vein, that rather than litigating these things, we were working with the community, working with our neighbors.”

Coalition members shared differing opinions about why key stakeholders, such as the City of Inglewood, demonstrated strong resistance to joining the Coalition. Inglewood resident and LAX Coalition member, Danny Tabor (Interview, 2010), stated, “Some Inglewood community members thought we were selling out and cooperating with the enemy.” According to Verduzco (Interview, 2010), “They didn’t join us because they
thought LAANE wasn’t going to get anywhere.” Rev. Smart recounted how Mayor Dorn attempted to place blame on the Coalition in a community meeting. “Mayor Dorn said, ‘You can’t have a group of folks negotiating for a whole city. Why didn’t they come to me?’ I had sat down with his Chief of Staff and everybody knew it,” said Smart.

In actuality, Mayor Dorn’s unwillingness to join the LAX Coalition is puzzling because in 1999, he and the Inglewood City Council adopted a resolution to have the City of Los Angeles provide Inglewood with at least $25 million a year to mitigate the increased noise, traffic, and air pollution – in exchange for the City’s support of LAX’s expansion (LA Times, 1999). Dorn stated, “The City of Inglewood is disproportionately impacted by aircraft noise and overflights.” He argued that because almost all of the 1,000 aircrafts that arrived at LAX every day descended over Inglewood to land, his City deserved $25 million each year. Back in 1999, Mayor Dorn promised to support LAX’s expansion if the money was granted to Inglewood and if the expansion would not result in additional flights over Inglewood.

According to Rev. Smart, a large impetus behind Mayor Dorn’s lack of cooperation in the LAX Coalition was Danny Tabor’s involvement in the coalition (Danny was, at the time, a member of Inglewood’s City Council). Interestingly, when Mayor Dorn was forced resign as a result of a conflict of interest scandal in 2010, Danny Tabor engaged in a campaign for the Mayor’s office and won the opportunity to complete Mayor Dorn’s unfinished term.

Increase the Capacity of Participating Organizations

The Benefits of Community Participation and Meetings
Because the airport was essentially forced to the negotiating table with the LAX Coalition, there was no real need to implement a grassroots organizing strategy. That is not to say that the community was not instrumental in getting the airport to the point where they were forced to come to the table, because they were particularly effective in their early resistance to LAWA’s unilateral expansion plans. It is to say, however, that they did not engage in acts of resistance from the outset, with the intention of mounting an organizing campaign to negotiate a CBA. The process of reaching a CBA occurred rather organically in this case.

The opportunities afforded for community participation in the early planning process, however, provided many of the community groups with a venue through which they were able to share their concerns with one another, cultivate a sense of trust and openness with one another, come to a common appreciation and respect for each other’s unique concerns, and develop a sense of solidarity in their resistance against LAWA’s authoritative planning process.

The dissemination of valuable information to impacted residents also assisted in cultivating the community’s capacity for a collaborative process. During the public planning process, Environmental Defense hosted a number of environmental justice workshops to educate surrounding communities about the extent of LAX’s impact. Once the groups came together and agreed to pursue the CBA, the Coalition sponsored several community meetings designed to gather a broad spectrum of demands to include in the negotiations.

During negotiations, meetings between the Coalition and LAWA were held every week, and broader coalition meetings were held at least once a month. These meetings
provided coalition members with a great deal of time to get to know each other personally and to familiarize themselves with one another’s professional issues.

Regarding the issue of cross-training, Danny Tabor (Interview, 2010) stated:

As we sat around the table and finally became the negotiating team, by the end of the first month, I could negotiate on environmental issues and I could negotiate on educational issues because I understood what they were trying to achieve. I understood their arguments and I could speak for them. So we all got to cross-train. Instead of tapping into an array of individual experts, we ended up being a team of experts with extra knowledge at our fingertips.

Long-time community activist, Ms. Verduzco – who was initially a bit skeptical about her value to the Coalition’s negotiating team due to her ‘lack of degrees’ – learned valuable lessons about herself, others, and the issues at hand. She remarked (Verduzco, Interview, 2010):

Of course I learned that I couldn’t keep my mouth shut! I learned not to be afraid of anything because the people in the Coalition and the people I met through them were all very, very helpful. They didn’t talk down to me or anything like that. I asked a question, ‘Exactly what does that mean?’ and I didn’t feel that bad anymore because the environmental stuff especially – a lot of it was very technical. Joe was very, very good and he’d explain in terms I could understand. And I learned a lot of things about the noise level, how they measure it, why some areas are higher than other areas, and what should be done about it.

Beyond community meetings and environmental justice workshops, there were several occasions when members of the Coalition’s 25 participating organizations all gathered at public hearings. According to Rev. Smart, the average turnout to these events was 75 members, while the largest turnout – approximately 250 members – occurred when the City Council made their final determination about the CBA’s approval.

When asked about internal challenges faced by the Coalition, Tabor suggested that the primary barrier was “getting groups to believe they could make a difference.”
Aside from that, internal relations were smooth. Ultimately, the Coalition’s participants developed and exhibited the capacity to work together on one accord for the promotion of their respective agendas.

**Lessons Learned**

Throughout the process, multiple lessons were learned on both sides of the table. These lessons helped to build the capacity of the participating organizations in various ways. While some of the lessons learned were conveyed in the paragraphs above, the following lessons proved to be equally important.

Coalition leader Rev. William Smart stressed the importance of due diligence in attempting to recruit all relevant stakeholders and documenting those efforts. He stated, “Fight to get before elected officials because they might turn on you. And do your best to produce a paper trail [proving] where you attempted to reach out to them.” Rev. Smart said he encountered difficulties with politicians on more than one occasion, and his experience with Councilman Bernard Parks illustrates the importance of maintaining thorough documentation. According to Smart, the CBA passed 14 to 1 and Councilman Parks was the only one who opposed the agreement. “Parks said his district had never been included,” said Smart, “but I went to them to ask who we should have to represent their district. I tried to show people records of where I went to him.”

Over the nine-month negotiation process, members of the Coalition’s three sub-committees developed new competencies, which ultimately made a significant impact on the capacities of their respective organizations. Verduzco, who was initially skeptical about her value to the team, stated, “It was really good education for me.”
Several participants paradoxically mentioned the importance of maintaining Coalition unity through self interest. Rev. Smart, for instance, stated, “I go all around the country and do training now, and one of the things I always say is one of the things we were able to do is get everyone’s self interest on the table. Self interest is not bad, it’s good. Every group wants something out of the process. As long as it’s not money, it’s good.” On the other side of the table, the Coalition’s solidarity made an impression on Deputy Director Mengistu. He marveled at the Coalition’s tenacity:

In the process, I learned that the coalition hadn’t worked together before. But they came determined. They knew they had the sponsorship of the Mayor’s Office and they were not going to let this opportunity pass. The main lesson was that if you put a group of well-meaning people together…even though you don’t have all the answers, you can search together to get it done (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

Tabor echoed similar sentiments. “Go in open-minded and always keep your eyes on the reason you’re there at the table,” stated Tabor. “Realize that you have awesome responsibility, but you’re not there for yourself.”

Although members of the LAX Coalition walked away from the process with increased knowledge and competencies, participants on the airport’s side also found the process to be valuable. For example, Mengistu commented that LAWA has not always received its due credit for attempting to be a good corporate citizen, but he also admitted that their previous efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts of the airport were not as comprehensive as they could have been. When asked what lessons LAWA learned that could be implemented in future negotiations with the community, Mengistu stated:

We have the benefit of that [LAX CBA] experience. We have a lot of things there that we can use as a model. I don’t want to leave you with the impression that the negotiations were perfect. It was not. There were some things that, for example, we addressed but had to be approved by the FAA, which it turned out was much more challenging. So you have that
experience. So now, you don’t waste your time on something that can’t be implemented. On the whole, our business has changed because of the economy, fuel costs, and all of that. So, there was a bit of inequity with what was put in place and what ultimately occurred in operations. So, that experience would help in being more efficient if we ever found ourselves in another round of expansion and negotiations.

In the end, Mengistu praised the negotiating structure. “When you negotiate one element, if you fall into a rough patch, you can park that and go to something resolvable,” he said. “At the end of the day, that format carried the day. So, we’d do it exactly the same way if we were to do it again – except we’d have the benefit of prior experience.”

How the LAX Coalition Shaped the Broader Political Climate

The Coalition’s Political Alliances

The sponsorship and support of various heavy-hitters in L.A.’s political structure proved to be a decisive element in ensuring that the Coalition could meet its goals. In the early 2000’s before his untimely death, Miguel Contreras – President of the L.A. County Federation of Labor – wielded a significant degree of political power in Los Angeles. As mentioned earlier, Contreras was instrumental in getting Mayor Hahn to bring LAWA to the table for CBA negotiations with the coalition. Because several of the County Federation’s member organizations were involved in negotiations, Contreras also played an active role in ensuring that the process remained on track. Detailing Contreras’ role, Rev. Smart said, “After every session, I’d immediately call to check-in with Miguel Contreras and tell him everything that happened. And that was a backdoor.” Smart expounded that although they consulted with Miguel after meetings, he provided them with autonomy and would never impose decisions on them.
The coalition had another key advocate in Councilwoman Janice Hahn (the sister of Mayor James Hahn) – who chaired the committee that oversaw the airport at the time. “We would get word to them [the city council committee] about our meetings and they decided to bring the airport in every week to their committee to ask how the CBA negotiation was going,” said Smart. “Sometimes if there were issues, we would plant questions with them to ask.”

The importance of the mayor and city council to the success of this process cannot be overstated. Both coalition members and LAWA representatives were clear about the fact that Mayor Hahn had asserted a non-negotiable mandate to create a CBA. In reference to this robust political sponsorship, Danny Tabor stated (Interview, 2010):

The Mayor’s office suggested they sit down with us initially. That’s what brought them to the table…And as I said, they would change people in the beginning, and other people would come to the meetings. They still weren’t taking us completely serious. So a couple of people from the Mayor’s office came and sat down at one of the sessions and asked why we weren’t making progress. The city council wasn’t going to approve the expansion plan with us still at the negotiating table. So the faster they settled with us, the better they were going to be. And ultimately as it turned out, we had to go to the city council and sell the CBA, which is what got them approval for the modernization plan.

Mengistu made a similar statement regarding how the weight of the political establishment’s mandate kept LAWA committed to the process. “…But we knew we had to get this done because of the Mayor,” Mengistu remarked, “So we knew that if we didn’t come to an agreement, it wasn’t going to be due to a lack of effort on our part” (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

When asked what kept Mayor Hahn devoted to seeing the negotiations through, several participants remarked that Hahn’s consensus-building was largely a matter of
politics. Mengistu, for instance, said Hahn’s support of the Coalition could be attributed to the fact that:

His cold political calculations were that their [the Coalition’s] support was necessary to carry the expansion through. But I think Mayor Hahn was a guy who just wants to make a lot of people happy. He’s not a person who’s going to ram something through, he wanted to build consensus. He saw the agreement as consensus. There are some good things for the community and those who in the past did not benefit. So, I think he’d tell you it was the right thing to do.

Regarding how the mayoral administrative change in 2005 affected the process, Mengistu continued:

Villaraigosa is the same kind of consensus builder. The coalition was not all-inclusive because the cities surrounding the airport were not a part of the coalition, so they were bringing their own lawsuits. One of the first things the Mayor was going to do coming into office was to settle the dispute we had with the entities.

While Villaraigosa was not fundamentally in disagreement with the CBA, according to Rev. Smart, he had a lot of supporters who were exposed to the expansion in Westchester. Although Villaraigosa supported the enforcement of the CBA, he also advocated more of a regional approach to the Master Plan in his efforts to settle the lawsuits against expansion. In reference to Villaraigosa’s support, Mrs. Verduzco stated, “At one time I remember Mayor Villaraigosa said, ‘You guys are asking for $3 million. Why don’t you ask for $5 million?’ We did and we got it. So, he was supportive because he could see what was going to be required for the soundproofing.”

While politics on the broader scale of the region had an important impact on the process, the politics of interpersonal relationships across the negotiating table was equally critical. Participants on both sides of the table acknowledged that they developed a
newfound respect for members of the ‘other side’ as negotiations progressed. Rev. Smart highlighted this phenomenon when he stated (Smart, Interview, 2010):

> It was strictly business from the beginning, but friendships eventually developed. I didn’t like the guy who was their [LAWA’s] consultant at the beginning. Now he’s the godfather of my baby. Jim Ritchie – I had suspicions of him, but we became friends. His mother died in the process and I went to the funeral. We became friends. It became more than just negotiations. All these [LAWA] staff were shocked because there was this caricature of me in their minds that I was the bad guy and they just couldn’t believe when things began to evolve.

Not only have the relationships that developed across the table cultivate trust and facilitate a successful negotiation process, but they have also affected the way members of the broader community – the business, environmental, labor, and nonprofit sectors – view themselves and the realm of potential relationships with each other.

**LAANE’s Influence**

According to coalition members and LAWA representatives alike, only one organization possessed the ability to recruit such a broad scope of interests and bring to bear all the elements that were required to assemble successful negotiations – the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy. Several individuals who volunteered to devote their time engaging in negotiations for the LAX CBA had been involved in prior LAANE campaigns. According to Ms. Verduzco, she had been involved with a LAANE campaign aimed at raising the jobs standards of service workers at hotels in the LAX vicinity.

Verduzco stated, “When they addressed the issue of hotel workers – that affects a lot of people in our community. So I would go to some meetings and there were some union people and others. It got me to be more involved too in the general area beyond Lennox” (Verduzco, Interview, 2010). As a result of this earlier involvement with LAANE, not
only did Verduzco broaden her activism beyond her immediate geographic territory, but she also expanded her network beyond the interest groups with which she normally interacted. Ultimately, she was impressed enough with LAANE to join another one of their campaigns.

Likewise, Danny Tabor was active in LAANE’s prior campaign to ensure that the residents of Inglewood were able to exercise control over the big box retailers (initially Wal-Mart) that sought to site new facilities in their neighborhoods. When Rev. Smart approached him about joining the LAX Coalition, Tabor did not hesitate – largely because of LAANE’s credibility and track record of success. “LAANE is an antagonist in the development process,” said Tabor, “because LAANE is developing, to an extent, capacity to create the communities we want.”

LAANE’s ability to recruit volunteers to participate in its numerous coalitions speaks to its ability to shape the broader political debate about matters of social, economic, and environmental justice. Furthermore, LAANE’s ability to secure consistent organizational partners from campaign to campaign speaks to its capacity to cultivate a sustainable institutional infrastructure. Many of the coalition partners involved in the L.A. Live CBA (such as Environmental Defense, AGENDA, and SEIU Local 1877) were also partners in the LAX CBA. Moreover, many members of the LAX Coalition participated in founding the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports, which is discussed in the following chapter.

Interestingly, LAANE’s presence and influence lent itself to increasing the capacity of the local state and business sector. LAANE’s strategy essentially moved the LAX expansion plans forward (a feat the public and private sectors were unable to
achieve alone) in an equity-conscious manner. Due to this power, LAANE and other organizations that participated in the LAX Coalition are increasingly seen as a force that public and private sector parties in the Los Angeles region must reckon with.

**Private Sector Resignation**

Rev. Smart attributed LAANE’s reach and influence to its laser-sharp focus on a number of critical industries throughout the Los Angeles region. “Creating good jobs, healthy communities, and clean environments – there are other organizations that have influence in those areas, but not in the spirit we’re working,” he stated. “We’ve identified industries, and we’re the only organization in L.A. targeting industries strategically.” This is a strength LAANE obviously brought into the LAX Coalition. LAWA’s Mengistu agreed that LAANE and affiliated progressive organizations have cultivated significant political capital among local business leaders. When asked about the private sector’s impression of the coalition-building efforts between labor, community-based, and environmental organizations, Mengistu mentioned (Interview, 2010):

> I think there seems to be a resignation on the business side that they have to provide some concessions. The L.A. Live is an example…and from what I see at some inaugural events I’ve been to, I see labor and the coalition [participating environmental and community organizations in the LAX campaign] a part of these things. That tells me they have some understanding or agreement. So, they are a constant presence in the city’s political fabric now and I think there is recognition in the business community that to make something happen in the City of Los Angeles, you have to partner with these groups.

There are groups, however, working specifically to combat the power of L.A.’s strengthening progressive movement. For instance, several years ago, the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce formed an arm called the L.A. County Federation of Business –
presumably to counter the influence of L.A.’s labor movement (i.e., the L.A. County Federation of Labor) and other organizations that advocate for social, environmental, and economic justice. Surprisingly, Mengistu couldn’t speak to the degree of the influence or effectiveness of the L.A. County Federation of Business due to their relative lack of visibility within the political landscape.

*Exerting Progressive Power: LAX Expansion 1984 versus 2004*

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the Los Angeles International Airport underwent its last major expansion two decades before (the adoption of the LAX CBA) in preparation for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The 1984 expansion project included the development of LAX’s International Terminal, Terminal One, a second-level roadway infrastructure, several multi-story parking structures. Although the 1984 expansion was a quite extensive undertaking, there was a general consensus regarding the merits of pursuing expansion at the airport. In fact, L.A.’s political leaders and business leaders worked together diligently to ensure that LAX’s 1984 expansion took place on schedule, without delays.

Speaking to an audience of business and civic leaders at L.A.’s City Hall in 1998, Carol Hallett (President and CEO of the influential Air Transportation Association, which represents the nation’s airlines), suggested that Los Angeles’ city officials and business leaders work together in a manner that reflected the alliance that existed for the 1984

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20 Although the LAX expansion was not contested in 1984, there was (1) environmental and residential opposition to an Olympic venue planned to be sited in the Sepulveda Basin and (2) residential and religious resistance to another Olympic venue that was scheduled to be located in Exposition Park. While the Sepulveda Basin development was ultimately relocated due to community resistance, the Exposition Park development went forward with minor concessions (Burbank et al, 2000).
Summer Olympics. Hallett implored, "We should look back to the future. We need to restart the old partnership" (Newton, 1998).

During the 1990s, however, Mayor Riordan promised to increase LAX’s landing fees to fund LAX’s expansion and the airlines were not pleased with that news. Furthermore, the labor unions that represented workers at LAX had garnered the support of Mayor Riordan in advocating for wage increases. So Riordan further upset airline officials when he suggested that the airlines increase the wages of certain workers, according to L.A.’s new living wage standards.

While the voices of labor unions and other progressive organizations were essentially absent during the 1980s expansion, they were loud and clear thereafter. This divergence between the politics of airport expansion in the 1980s versus the 1990s and 2000s speaks to the progressive community’s strengthening foothold in L.A.’s political structure. As demonstrated in the case of the LAX Coalition, the political influence of the progressive sector (particularly labor) grew significantly over the decades. Resultantly, the LAX Coalition earned the respect and recognition that the broader progressive community had been fighting to acquire since the 1990s.

In addition to the foundation that had been laid by prior progressive activities in Los Angeles, the LAX Coalition made a number of important strategic decisions that helped their cause. As mentioned in the analysis, the coalition recruited a diverse scope of interests, paid close attention to the structure of negotiations, cultivated trust and respect among coalition members, and built rapport with LAWA executives. The tangible provisions of the CBA were not the only outcomes that emerged from the process, as the negotiating process strengthened the competencies of participating organizations. Finally,
the LAX Coalition was able to shape the broader political climate through its political alliances.

The case of the LAX draws attention to the increasing acquiescence of L.A.’s business community to the power of community, labor, and environmental interests. Ultimately, the efforts of the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice reinforced the notion that L.A.’s progressive community was a force to be reckoned with.
CHAPTER 7:
THE COALITION FOR CLEAN AND SAFE PORTS
CASE STUDY
Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports Introduction

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are regional and national engines of economic activity that support more than 100,000 jobs in the five-county Southern California region (Port of Los Angeles, 2010). Yet, the trucking system that serves the ports’ operations has been found to adversely affect the surrounding communities through substantial diesel air pollution and a variety of other negative externalities. Research by the South Coast Air Quality Management District and the California Air Resources Board discovered that the more than two million people who live near the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach face greater health hazards than those who live elsewhere in the region (City of Los Angeles, 2009). The inefficiencies in the port trucking industry have significant economic implications as well. According to an estimate by the California Air Resources Board, Southern Californians pay between $100 million and $590 million annually in healthcare costs related to port truck pollution. This is a heavy burden for a state and region that is already plagued with mounting demands for various forms of public supports.

For more than four years, community residents, labor activists, and environmental and public health advocates in Los Angeles and Long Beach have engaged in an unlikely blue-green alliance to take on their port trucking industry. Under the umbrella of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports, these diverse community sectors have waged a fierce battle to reduce diesel pollution from port trucks and to ensure decent jobs for port truck drivers.

21 Those most vulnerable to the health risks of diesel pollution are children, whose lungs are still developing, and the elderly, who may have other serious health problems.
In 2008, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports reached a monumental victory when the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach adopted the San Pedro Bay Clean Truck Program. The Coalition has, however, encountered strong opposition from well-organized private interests. This chapter highlights the factors that account for the emergence, national expansion, and relative success of campaign’s coalition-building efforts. After providing a historical overview of the problems related to the port trucking industry in Los Angeles and Long Beach (and the nation, in general), this chapter provides an analysis of four measures of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Port’s efforts, including its ability to: create a well-functioning coalition, increase the capacity of participating organizations, influence public and private decisions, and shape the broader political climate.

Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports Background

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

More than a century ago, an entrepreneurial group of shippers, city boosters, railroad industrialists, and lumber tycoons began to develop the San Pedro Bay area in Southern California as a robust commercial harbor for Los Angeles’ expanding population. Between 1906 and 1909, the City of Los Angeles annexed San Pedro, the neighboring town of Wilmington, and a 16-mile narrow strip of land connecting L.A. to the Pacific coast. In December of 1907, the Los Angeles City Council officially established of the Port of Los Angeles (http://www.portoflosangeles.org). The Port of

22 The Los Angeles Clean Truck program (1) bans old, dirty trucks based on a phased timetable, (2) provides an incentive program for the replacement of old fleets, and (3) restricts port access to trucking companies that meet the obligations of concession contracts, including meeting environmental, employment, and operational standards.
Long Beach was founded on 800 acres of land adjacent to the Port of Los Angeles on June 24, 1911 (http://www.polb.com).

Geographically, the Port of Los Angeles is located in the San Pedro neighborhood of Los Angeles, approximately twenty miles south of downtown L.A. The adjacent Port of Long Beach is positioned about twenty-five miles south of downtown L.A. and less than two miles southwest of Downtown Long Beach.

**Figure 8: The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach**

The Port of Los Angeles falls under the jurisdiction of the City of Los Angeles, while the Port of Long Beach is controlled by the City of Long Beach. Each port is governed by a five-member Board of Harbor Commissioners, which is tasked with setting policies and managing operations related to the ports. Members of both harbor commissions are appointed and confirmed by their respective mayors and city councils.

Acting as a chief gateway for trade between U.S. and Asia, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are the largest and second-largest container ports in the United
States, respectively (American Association of Port Authorities, 2009). Collectively, the two ports qualify as the world’s fifth-largest port (American Association of Port Authorities, 2008). Each day, thousands of containers filled with items such as clothing, toys, shoes, electronics, cars, oil, and raw materials are handled at the ports (Hanson, 2010). The Los Angeles – Long Beach port complex boasts an extensive network of deep-water shipping channels, marine terminals, rail terminals, warehouses, wharves, and roadways. This infrastructure network is critical to meeting the ports’ massive transportation demands.

Directly and indirectly, the ports are linked to thousands of jobs throughout the Southern California region. One particular industry that employs a significant number of local residents is the port trucking sector (formally known as the drayage industry). Port truckers are tasked with the job of transporting containers from ports to warehouses and distribution centers (in the case of imports), and from warehouses and distribution centers to the ports (in the case of exports). While port truckers play a critical role in the efficiency of transportation logistics surrounding ports, critics state that port trucking is an industry plagued by unethical labor practices, environmental degradation, and serious public health hazards. According to many, deregulation is at the heart of the port trucking

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23 Based on total TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units).
24 The aggregate POLA-POLA ranking (14.2 million TEUs) follows Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Shenzhen.
25 Bensman states, “Port trucking is a small but important sector of the entire trucking industry. There are less than 100,000 port truckers who regularly haul containers to ports from warehouses and distribution centers, and vice versa. Usually, the warehouses and distribution centers are located within seventy-five miles of the port. At the warehouses and distribution centers, the freight is usually unloaded from the container (stripped). Most of the freight is re-loaded into trailers (for long-haul trucking), which are larger and cheaper to convey than containers transported by port truckers (short-haul trucking). The truck drivers who haul the trailers are part of a different sector of the trucking market than are the port truckers. Most of the more than 1.8 million truck drivers reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics are long-haul drivers” (2009b, p. 2).
industry’s shortcomings (Bensman, 2009a; Consumer Federation of California et al, 2008).

**Deregulation of the Port Trucking Industry**

In the early 1900s, truck drivers (represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters) won union agreements with Los Angeles’s largest trucking firms. The Teamsters’ local union in L.A. had approximately 500 members in 1907 (Milkman, 2006), but when an unsuccessful strike emboldened L.A.’s open-shop proponents, the Teamsters were left with only 35 members. L.A.’s open-shop advocates successfully suppressed unionization efforts in trucking and other industries throughout the southern California region through the 1930s.

Encouraged by the passage of New Deal legislation, the Teamsters established a new local in San Pedro, CA. By 1936, Teamster organizers had recruited approximately two thousand members. Yet, employer resistance against the Teamsters’ union expansion remained robust. To overcome opposition in the private sector (which was supported by many public sector actors), the Teamsters’ leadership decided to leverage the strength of strongly-unionized areas along the West Coast to gain widespread union recognition in Los Angeles. While the Teamsters were strong in San Francisco, Oakland, and Seattle, most freight was shipped (by water) into the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach and then transported (by truck) north to other Pacific Coast cities – where L.A. truckers typically exchanged freight with San Francisco, Oakland, and Seattle truckers. The 1935 Motor Carrier Act (which protected regional operating rights for unions)²⁶,

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²⁶ In the late 19th century, there was great public concern regarding the massive power and wealth of railroad corporations (Belzer, 2000). Corporate monopolies in the railroad industry set artificially-high
however, prohibited non-unionized Los Angeles trucking companies from crossing their regional boundaries if unionized trucking companies in northern cities rejected the freight exchange. Therefore, when L.A. trucking companies resisted unionization, they were prevented from running routes in union strongholds such as San Francisco. According to Garnel (1972):

> The M&M [Los Angeles Merchants’ and Manufacturers’ Association] and its ally, the Chamber of Commerce, marshaled the resources of the entire business community to fight a union in a single industry. The Teamsters would retaliate by marshaling the resources of all of its locals throughout the coastal states to bring pressure to bear on the employers in Los Angeles (p. 146).

The Teamsters engaged in a nine-week strike directed at Pacific Freight Lines (PFL), L.A.’s largest regional trucking company at the time. Although PFL was heavily supported by the business community, its bottom line was so severely affected by the strike that it decided to allow unionization in 1937. Several months after PFL caved to union pressure, the Motor Truck Association negotiated a monumental union-shop deal with the Teamsters for a master agreement that covered the entire southern California region. Fearful of suffering an economic and political backlash from L.A.’s powerful business community and shippers, the Motor Truck Association requested that their agreement with the Teamsters be kept a secret. As a result of this victory, the Teamsters’

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rates for some customers (e.g. individual customers) and low rates for others (e.g. politicians, large customers, long haul shippers). These competition-averse practices effectively drove smaller railroad companies out of business. In response to this business environment, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was passed to promote healthy competition by regulating rates and prohibiting price discrimination in the railroad industry (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 1987). The act also created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as the first independent regulatory agency of the U.S. federal government. The ICC was tasked with investigating and prosecuting cases against railroads that had been charged with conducting unfair business practices. Congress later passed the Motor Carrier Act in 1935 to extend the ICC’s regulatory powers to truck and bus companies – although enforcement was relatively weak (Belzer, 2000; Derthick & Quirk, 1985).

27 This form of “leap frog organizing” was later outlawed by Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. The top-down approach to gaining union recognition directly from employers is arguably cheaper and more effective than organizing to gain recognition through a worker voting process.
paying membership base in the L.A. area skyrocketed to more than twenty thousand in 1939.

In the 1950s, 83 percent of freight throughout the state of California was transported by truck and the Teamsters were the largest union in the United States. Relative to other unions, the Teamsters enjoyed great success in breaking the deeply-entrenched power of anti-union interests in Los Angeles. The Teamsters were one of the first unions to negotiate paid vacations, employer-paid health insurance, and other fringe benefits for their employees. But because Teamster port truck drivers who worked for the region’s largest firms maintained uniform wage rates (which were significantly higher than the rates of their smaller counterparts), many small firms and owner-operators in the industry went out of business, as they were unable to compete with the increasingly-concentrated large unionized trucking companies. Moreover, trade interest groups felt they were unnecessarily burdened by the ICC’s federal regulations.

In the 1970s, large retailers and shippers began to lobby Congress to deregulate the trucking industry in order to put an end to rate setting and route planning and to introduce new service and pricing options to the market (Bensman, 2009a). In 1980, the Motor Carrier Regulatory Reform and Modernization Act was passed by Congress to amend the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The 1980 Act deregulated the trucking industry by removing the regional and jurisdictional constraints of truck routes and by prohibiting the Interstate Commerce Commission from interfering with rate setting in the trucking industry. Ultimately, congressional and civil rights reformers supported the deregulation of the trucking industry in order to reduce shipping-related costs to consumers, to weaken
the market shares of dominating companies, and to expand job opportunities to
individuals interested in trucking careers (particularly African Americans).

As mentioned earlier, most port truckers were represented by the Teamsters prior
to 1980. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, however, drastically expanded the number of
(and competition among) low-cost, low-wage, non-unionized truck operations. The
number of independently-owned carriers doubled between 1980 and 1990. Once the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 passed, new trucking companies entered the industry and hired
drivers as independent contractors who were responsible for all of the risks and
responsibilities affiliated with owning and operating their trucks. These owner-operators
were not, according to critics, allowed to share in the successes and rewards of
independent business ownership. Bensman (2009a) illustrates this argument:

New companies entered the industry, hiring their drivers non-union. Established companies faltered. Some went non-union; others went out of business. The firms that triumphed adopted a new business model. They sold all or most of their trucks to the drivers, and then contracted with them on a per-load basis. The emerging independent contracting model meant trucking companies had few fixed costs, had no responsibility for workers’ compensation, social security, and unemployment insurance taxes, and were able to obtain drivers’ services without paying for health care costs or pension plans (p. 3).

As a result of industry deregulation in the 1980s, drastically-reduced transport expenses have since benefitted large retailers and shippers (Bensman, 2009b). In the past decades, reduced shipping rates have greatly facilitated the rapid expansion of global trade, particularly between China and west coast ports in the United States (such as the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach). The expansion of global trade has, in turn, increased demands for port trucking. According to Bensman (2009b), port trucks currently haul about 80 percent of the 50 million containers that move through American ports annually.
Although the deregulation of the entire trucking industry facilitated the replacement of regularly-employed drivers with independent contractors, port truckers endure some of the lowest pay rates and working conditions in the industry. Furthermore, industry deregulation created a number of unintended consequences for the economy, the environment, and for public health and safety. These byproducts are addressed in the following section.

**The Impacts of Port Trucking Deregulation**

The authors of *The Big Rig: Poverty, Pollution, and the Misclassification of Truck Drivers at America’s Ports* (Smith et al., 2010) employ a multi-methods approach to analyzing the working conditions of port truck drivers throughout the U.S. Their findings substantiate what deregulation critics have stated all along – that the ‘independent contractor’ status that is so pervasive throughout the nation’s port trucking industry fails to meet the Internal Revenue Service’s qualifications of what deems an individual as an independent business person. The study’s authors contend that port truck drivers are, therefore, the victims of employment misclassification. Table 11 highlights the study’s main findings.

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28 The study’s multi-method research design included: (a) an in-depth literature review covering the industry’s structure and economics; (b) a re-analysis and aggregation of 10 surveys of 2,183 workers at seven major ports; and (c) an analysis of the work arrangements of a diverse group of drivers and the firms they work for, drawing on exhaustive, original interviews and collected employment documents such as contracts, leases and policy manuals.
Table 11. Major Research Findings of ‘The Big Rig’

**The typical port truck driver is misclassified as an independent contractor**

- Port drivers are subject to strict behavioral controls. Trucking companies determine how, when, where, and in what sequence drivers work. They impose truck inspections, drug tests, and stringent reporting requirements. Drivers’ behavior is regularly monitored, evaluated, and disciplined.
- Port drivers are financially dependent on trucking companies that unilaterally control the rates that drivers are paid. Drivers work for one trucking company at a time, do not offer services to the general public, and are entirely dependent on that company for work. Like other low-wage employees, drivers’ only means for increasing their earnings is to work longer hours.
- Port drivers and their companies are tightly tied to each other. Drivers perform the essential (and most often sole) services of the trucking companies they work for. Drivers work for years for the same company; use company signs and permits; represent themselves to others as being from the company; and rarely offer their work independently of the company.
- Classification of drivers as independent contractors drives the economics of the port trucking industry
  - Based on surveys of 2,183 drivers in seven major ports, we estimate that 82 percent of the nation’s 110,000 port truck drivers are treated as independent contractors. Industry analysts identify independent contracting as the industry’s dominant business model which sets standards for all port drivers. Few other industries rely on anywhere near this proportion of independent contractors.
  - Through independent contracting agreements, leases, and other employment arrangements, trucking companies make drivers responsible for all truck-related expenses including purchase, fuel, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repair costs.
  - Port truck drivers work long hours for poverty-level wages. Among surveyed drivers, the average work week was 59 hours. Average net earnings before FICA, income, and other taxes was $28,783 per year for contractors and $35,000 per year for employees. Minimum wage violations appear to be widespread.
  - In driver surveys, independent contractors reported average net incomes 18 percent lower than employee drivers did. Independent contractors were two-and-a-half times less likely than employee drivers to have health insurance and almost three times less likely to have retirement benefits.

**The misclassification of drivers in port trucking can be directly linked to safety violations and the environmental and public health crises at the nation’s ports**

- The literature on the industry describes how economic pressures encourage widespread evasion of safety regulations. Drivers commonly use dangerous and illegal equipment. Safety limits on working hours and vehicle weights are routinely ignored.
- Industry observers have concluded that low-wage independent contractors bear the industry’s capital expenses by owning and operating the only equipment they can afford – the oldest diesel trucks on the road. The environmental and public health crises surrounding the nation’s ports are a direct result of the industry’s adoption of misclassification as a business model.

Source: *The Big Rig: Poverty, Pollution, and the Misclassification of Truck Drivers at America’s Ports* by Smith, Bensman & Marvy (2010).
Economic Impacts. Under the classification of self-employed contractors, drivers’ take-home earnings are diminished by the various expenses associated with owning their trucks, including the costs of fuel, insurance, truck leasing, truck maintenance, licenses, self-employment taxes, tolls, and parking fees (Smith et al., 2010). Yet, drivers are unable to determine their own route schedules and they are only paid by the load (waiting time accounts for up to half of the average work day and goes uncompensated). Among individuals surveyed in The Big Rig study, the average independent owner-port trucker works 59 hours a week, but only takes home $28,783 home pre-taxes (after paying for all truck-related expenses, such as fuel and maintenance). This means that the average independent ‘business owner’ makes $553.52 a week (in a 52-week year) and $9.38 an hour (in a 59-hour work week). Los Angeles County’s living wage requirement for full-time workers is $11.84 if health benefits are not included in pay. Independent owners’ take home pay of $9.38 falls $2.46 per hour below the county’s minimum living wage – a substantial difference. This does not leave much room for independent contractors to pay for federal and state self-employment taxes, sick or vacation time off, health benefits, or any other type of fringe benefit. It is not surprising, then, that only ten percent of drivers in L.A. County have health insurance. Moreover, a meager five percent of independent truck contractors possess retirement benefits (Bensman, 2009a; Zerolnick, 2007).

These employment conditions have unfortunate implications for the local economy. Many port truckers live in San Pedro, Wilmington, Los Angeles, Long Beach, and other areas surrounding the ports in L.A. County – and contribute to the make-up of high-poverty residential neighborhoods. Due to their poverty-level wages, they find it

29 Many neighborhoods in these areas are low-income communities of color, which raises issues of environmental and economic justice.
difficult to support their families and thus, must often rely on various forms of public
supports for necessities such as housing, food, and health care. Although they work more
than 40 hours a week, they are still unable to support themselves and their families. The
public supports their families require ultimately tax the public welfare system at multiple
levels. While their employers (i.e., the companies they should legally work for)
externalize the costs of business ownership (but enjoy the financial benefits), other
working-class taxpayers must foot the bill for port truckers’ poverty-level wages.

The problem shows no signs of reversing because consumerism is at an all-time
high, international trade continues to grow, and major U.S. ports have adopted expansion
plans to accommodate increasing cargo volumes. If the port trucking industry engages in
exploitative labor practices, is it surprising that the industry might also have an adverse
impact on the environment?

*Environmental & Public Health Impacts.* The poverty-level wages of
independent truck contractors have implications beyond the economic well-being of
truckers, their families, and their communities. Due to their poverty-level wages,
independent port truck drivers have, for decades, only been able to afford old, dirty,
diesel-emitting trucks. Diesel-emitting ‘dirty’ trucks are significant contributors to the
problems of pollution surrounding America’s ports. The authors of *Harboring Pollution*
state:

Marine ports in the United States are major hubs of economic activity and
major sources of pollution. Enormous ships with engines running on the
dirtiest fuel available, thousands of diesel truck visits per day, mile-long
trains with diesel locomotives hauling cargo, and other polluting
equipment and activities at marine ports cause an array of environmental
impacts that can seriously affect local communities and the environment
Los Angeles, which has long faced a visible problem with smog, is in serious noncompliance with federal air quality standards. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which attract more than 40,000 diesel trucks daily (estimated to increase to 120,000 daily by 2025), are primary contributors to this regional air quality issue. Air quality – an issue that cannot be geographically isolated – directly impacts the health outcomes of port workers, residents in surrounding communities, and the southern California region at-large.

Particulate matter pollution, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur oxides are all air pollutants that are directly associated with ports operations. This toxic mix of airborne pollutants can induce serious health risks such as asthma, lung disease, pneumonia, cardiovascular disease, severe allergies, respiratory distress, birth defects, and premature death. Additionally, when volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides combine in sunlight, they separate oxygen molecules in the air and form ozone - a reactive gas also known as smog. Not only does smog create an aesthetic challenge to cities such as Los Angeles, but it also can cause irreversible damage to the lungs, causing respiratory ailments including emphysema and chronic bronchitis. These health risks are even more salient in communities that directly surround the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. According to the authors of *Harboring Pollution* (2004), “residents of the adjacent communities of San Pedro and Wilmington are already plagued by severe acute (short-term) and chronic (long-term) respiratory illnesses, and suffer from some of the highest levels of cancer risk in the Los Angeles region” (p. 12).

Unfortunately, children are some of the hardest-hit victims of port trucking’s environmental hazards. Research has demonstrated that children who live near busy
trucking routes are more prone to experience wheezing, bronchitis, asthma, allergies, and an overall decrease in lung functioning (Duhme et al., 1996; Brunekreef et al., 1997). This may be the case in Los Angeles and Long Beach. Compared to a national average of eight percent, for example, fifteen percent of Long Beach children age seventeen and under have been diagnosed with asthma (Coalition for Clean Air & Natural Resources Defense Council, 2004). These health outcomes may adversely impact educational performance, as child exposure to particulate matter has been linked to higher rates of school absenteeism (Park et al., 2002).

Respiratory diseases, cancer, and other ailments associated with port operations present obvious externalities for surrounding communities. Yet, all related consequences are not quite so obvious. For families with limited access to health insurance options, for example, these pollution-induced health conditions may impose a significant financial burden as a result of increased healthcare expenses. Also, there are proven link between ports and poor water quality (The Ocean Conservancy, 2002).  

Forecasts predict that the logistics sector in the Los Angeles-Long Beach ports will triple by 2020. Thus, smog-forming emissions and diesel particulate pollution only stand to deepen in a region that is already heavily-saddled with poor air quality. Clearly, the adverse effects of port-related environmental hazards can only be curbed with serious policy action.

**Land Use & Nuisance Impacts.** Overall, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are significantly less efficient in land use – and, are thus, less productive – than their Asian counterparts (Machalaba, 2001). They are literally situated right next door to residential neighborhoods, schools, and playgrounds. The strikingly close proximity of

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30 Toxic waste from ships at ports is often dumped or leached into water, causing significant damage to water quality, marine life, and human health.
the ports’ industrial uses to their neighboring residential land uses is, of course, exacerbated by the critical health risks that result from the ports’ air pollutants. In addition to the aforementioned health risks, port operations create residential nuisances such as bright lights at night, loud noises around the clock, truck routes through neighborhoods, unattractive aesthetics, and traffic jams. These nuisances have been linked to hearing impairment, hypertension, sleep deprivation, disrupted biological rhythms, stress, and reduced performance levels (World Health Organization, 1999; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2003). Furthermore, ports’ noise and artificial lights have been found to disturb mammal behavior and well-being (Coalition for Clean Air & Natural Resources Defense Council, 2004; The Humane Society, 2003).

**Figure 9: POLA’s Encroachment on the Surrounding Community**

These issues can be somewhat abated by establishing sufficient land buffers between port operations and surrounding communities, by taking an approach to future port expansion that does not encroach on local neighborhoods, by adhering to a long-term land use management plan, and by involving local residents in the ports’ land use decisions.

*Summary of Impacts.* The environmental and public health implications having thousands of environmentally-hazardous trucks on the nation’s roads are criminal. In California alone, diesel pollution from the goods movement industry kills 3,700 people each year – more than the state’s homicide rate. Making the case that corporate
responsibility must extend to labor, local communities, and the broader environment, Politeo (2002) states:

The problem is a business climate that doesn’t hold up its ethical and social responsibilities – not to labor, not to neighborhoods, and not to the environment...It is not far-fetched to assume that when an industry is abusing the environment it is probably also abusing its workforce. So solving this problem means ensuring that business behaves responsibly in its environmental practices and its labor relations (p. 10).

According to many, the port trucking industry has, for decades, shifted the costs of business not only onto the shoulders of drivers – but also onto the backs of the broader public. As highlighted above, environmental externalities (e.g., excessive diesel emissions and adverse impacts on the local ecosystem and habitat); public health externalities (e.g., premature death and increased incidences of cancer and respiratory diseases); economic externalities (e.g., the public and private treatment of illnesses caused by dirty truck emissions, workday and school-day loss, public subsidies for the welfare benefits of drivers whose families must survive on poverty-level wages, and the lost wages and tax base in the communities where truck drivers reside); and public safety externalities (e.g., residential impacts from truck traffic and parking in local neighborhoods, jeopardized highway safety, and lax security standards at ports) can all be linked back to deregulation of the industry. The following section traces the origins of a broad-based collaborative effort to demand public and private accountability in responding to the issues related to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

Community and Labor Organizing around the POLA and POLB

In 2000, the South Coast Air Quality Management District released its second Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study, which alerted the broader public to the adverse
environmental and health impacts of port operations. This study not only found that the worst air quality in Southern California existed in communities inside and adjacent to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, but it also reported an alarming correlation between increased cancer rates and worsening air quality surrounding the ports (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2000). At the time, the port was projected to grow roughly four-fold over the subsequent twenty years in the San Pedro Bay area. The public health implications of such an expansion of the ports were quite obvious.

According to Tom Politeo of the Sierra Club’s Los Angeles Chapter, he and others coalesced to establish the Harbor Vision Task Force (HVTF) in January of 2001 because the culmination of these issues created an imperative for an expanded level of organization surrounding the threats of port expansion to air quality. Around the same time, Angelo Logan established the East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice and Jesse Marquez was organizing the Wilmington-based Coalition for a Safe Environment. However, while coordination strengthened among environmental advocates in ports communities, tension was fermenting between environmental activists – who wanted to stop port expansion at all costs – and labor activists – whose interests lay in promoting port expansion.

In 2001, for example, an ugly confrontation unfolded over the ports’ plans to raze and expand on San Pedro’s Knoll Hill – the last remaining of seven hills adjacent to the port. At a rally to protect the hill, residents, community leaders, environmentalists, and historical preservationists were confronted by upset union activists who argued that resistance from the environmental community was imposing project delays.

31 Numerous epidemiological studies have found that diesel exhaust increases cancer risks, including a 1999 California study found that diesel exhaust is responsible for 71 percent of the cancer risk from air pollution (Coalition for Clean Air & Natural Resources Defense Council, 2004).
Concurrently, the port acquired a block of land in Wilmington with the intent to expand the perimeter of the port immediately across the street from homes. Residents and environmental advocates resisted this expansion as well. Meanwhile, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Coalition for Clean Air (CCA) were partnering with environmental justice groups to file a lawsuit against the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) for failing to conduct the required Environmental Impact Report (EIR) before expanding facilities at a terminal leased by the China Shipping Holding Company. The California State Court of Appeals’ ruling, which favored the residents and environmental advocates, effectively stopped port expansions for several years.\(^\text{32}\)

According to NRDC’s Adrian Martinez, this monumental victory caused the ports to stop and recalculate their expansion strategies – they began drafting the San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan.

Predictably, these environmental wins were not well-received by labor. “So, here was the environmental movement, rising, flexing its muscle, stopping things,” stated Tom Politeo of the Harbor Vision Task Force, “and if you were a driver, a dock worker, or any of the occupations that derive income from working on the port or port expansion projects, you were threatened because projects were being stopped.” Participants of the HVTF agreed early on that it was important that they reach out to labor to begin working on the same side. In 2002, they invited representatives from the International Longshore

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\(^{32}\) This victory secured a settlement that required preparation of an EIR, a commitment to significant mitigation, and the payment of $50 million over a four-year period for environmental mitigation measures. As part of the settlement: all yard tractors at the terminal were required to run on alternative fuels; at least seventy percent of ships using the terminal were required to run on electric power – instead of diesel engines – while at berth; mitigation funds were allocated for $20 million in air quality improvements, $20 million for aesthetic improvements and parks, $10 million toward the replacement of old diesel trucks with cleaner-burning models, and $5 million for the retrofitting of tenants’ vessels for electric power. Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et. al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Stipulated Judgment, Case No. BS 070017, Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Mar 6, 2003.
and Warehouse Union (ILWU), the Teamsters, electrical workers, pipefitters, and others to a series of HVTF meetings to engage in conversations about collaborating across issues. These meetings assisted in acquainting labor and environmental activists, but they admittedly struggled to determine a project they could all coalesce around. Soon, they decided to work on advancing a bill to limit the amount of time that diesel trucks could remain idle in the residential streets of port communities. State Assemblyman Alan Lowenthal agreed to sponsor the bill – which was ultimately backed by the Sierra Club, the Teamsters, ILWU, and the Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma. When the bill was successfully passed, however, the industry simply relocated idling trucks onto the port property. This did nothing to fundamentally address the issues of pollution in surrounding communities, nor did it address the inefficient planning of trucking logistics. It did, remarkably, facilitate the emergence of a promising blue-green coalition.

**Create a Well-Functioning Coalition**

*Optimizing Political Opportunities*

Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa had an impressive record on environmental and labor issues in the CA State Assembly, so when he expressed interest in running in L.A.’s 2001 mayoral race, many members of the blue-green alliance campaigned to get him elected. After an unsuccessful initial run, Villaraigosa was elected as mayor of L.A. in 2005. Exhilarated by Villaraigosa’s victory, members from various activist communities formed Green L.A. – an environmental justice coalition established to lobby the mayor’s office on environmental issues, particularly the Clean Air Action Plan that was being drafted. By the end of 2005, Green L.A. had formed the Green L.A. Ports Work Group,
which brought together an expansive group of individuals and organizations concerned about the increasing health and environmental impacts of industrial pollution created by the planned expansions of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

A turning point in the history of the nascent blue-green alliance occurred when Nick Wiener, the National Campaigns Coordinator for Change to Win (CTW), sent an email to the National head of the Sierra Club suggesting that they work together on the ports issue in Los Angeles and Long Beach. At that point, local environmental and labor activists had come to a common understanding about their common agendas and were ripe for an expanded collaboration. According to Tom Politeo, “Change to Win rode into town like the Calvary with trumpets blaring. What they came to us with was not a new idea. By that time, it was an old idea to us. Having that kind of support and muscle behind it – that was new and wonderful” (Politeo, Interview, 2010).

During the fall of 2006, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) – a ‘think and act tank’ known for its innovative policy solutions and successful coalition building – hosted the first meeting of the Clean and Safe Ports (CSP) Coalition in Wilmington. LAANE’s Clean and Safe Ports Director, Patricia Castellanos stated (Interview, 2010):

Prior to LAANE coming on board and talking to potential partners, a strong group had been working on port issues for a long time. So the level of experience was pretty deep regarding the issues, from an environmental and health impact perspective. We knew the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach were going to adopt a Clean Air Action Plan and we knew one component of that was going to be the clean truck program. But, up until that point, most of what had been spoken of with regard to truck pollution was how to leverage public funds to turn over the fleet. There

33 Change to Win (CTW) is a national labor organization with four affiliated unions, including the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the United Farm Workers of America (UFW), and the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW).
was little mention of the worker impact. There was no element seeking to address the economic impacts of subsidizing an industry with low-wage workers. So, we talked to the partners about coming together to address trucking issues in a more comprehensive way.

The coalition didn’t waste time advancing their work. They conducted research, developed principles for port trucking, and began a series of briefings with port commissioners, port staff, mayoral staff, and city council staff.

*Prioritizing Bridge-Building and Develop Clear Decision Making Processes*

When LAANE entered the scene to solidify and expand the alliance, CSP Director Patricia Castellanos relied on LAANE’s existing relationships – particularly with groups who participated in the blue-green LAX Coalition (that LAANE developed to create the LAX Community Benefits Agreement). When asked about the initial approach to outreach, Castellanos said they cast a wide net and started with the organizations and individuals they knew and had worked with before. Then, it made sense to have conversations with anyone and everyone who would talk to them. One of the earliest coalition goals was to form a steering committee. Initially, they held regular coalition meetings with twenty to thirty people from different organizations. It soon became clear that things were progressing quickly, decisions needed to be made, and they needed to get feedback in a speedy manner and have a certain level of expertise. Members agreed on the need to develop a leadership structure, so they created a steering committee of organizational representatives who had the capacity to meet frequently to shape the coalition’s strategy and policy.

Ultimately, members of the steering committee included: the Sierra Club, HVTF, NRDC, the Coalition for Clean Air, LABACA, CHIRLA, the Teamsters/Change to Win,
the American Lung Association of California, East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice, San Pedro Democratic Club, the Teachers Association of Long Beach, and LAANE. The expanded coalition and solidified leadership structure was welcomed by groups that had been working on the issues since the beginning of the decade. Politeo stated (Interview, 2010):

Many of the same players from the HVTF and the Green L.A. Ports Work Group were at the table, but now we had a mission and we had somebody who was pushing for that mission – LAANE, CTW, and the Teamsters. It’s something we weren’t in a position to ask for ourselves. It’s like if you’re doing this, then what about the pipefitters, or those other labor guys? But here’s somebody coming in from outside to bring it all together, and I’d say there was a great amount of readiness (Politeo, Interview).

In efforts to build strong coalitions comprised of sectors of the progressive movement that have historically worked in isolated silos, the importance of including dedicated bridge-builders who are deeply committed to connecting the dots between divergent groups cannot be overstated. Highlighting this point, Politeo (2002) wrote:

Many labor problems are labor problems exactly because they are environmental problems first. Pesticides sprayed on our crops and the diesel smog from our ships, trucks and trains harm workers as much as they harm the earth. Many environmental problems are labor problems first. Low wages, for example, contribute to urban decay – which in turn fosters urban sprawl. But it seems many activists myopically view only their own part of big-picture problems. It’s a shame because the two movements share a lot of common ground” (p. 10).

In the case of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports, the steering committee (whose members represented both the environmental justice movement and the labor movement) was comprised of a number of people who had worked across causes before. For example, Sharon Cotrell of the HVTF environmental organization arranged the first meeting with Gary Smith of the Teamsters Ports Division. Sharon had been a Teamster at one point in her career. In turn, Gary Smith (Teamsters) had previously worked on
various public health issues. John Miller, M.D. – a retired ER doctor who is a Sierra Club life member who put himself through medical school working loading docks as a Teamster – coined the saying that port truck drivers are ‘sharecroppers on wheels.’

The steering committee agreed early on that everyone would have a part in shaping the desired policy and they would all commit to seeing the campaign through until their collective goals were fulfilled. In the words of Castellanos (Interview, 2010), “a partial victory was not a victory.” At times, the steering committee would meet every week, but they would typically convene every other week. The individuals on the steering committee had the full backing of their respective organizations to make executive decisions when the turnaround time for decisions was tight. But great effort was made to make decisions among the broader coalition members.

When it came to expanding the coalition’s organizational members, the coalition’s organizers would talk to anyone and everyone who seemed remotely interested in joining the campaign. Organizers met with resident associations, students, teachers, faith groups, and a variety of civic organizations. As listed in Table 12, members of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports represented a diverse array of environmental and public health organizations, community development and social service organizations, labor organizations, political organizations, faith-based organizations, and intermediary organizations.

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<th>Table 12. Clean &amp; Safe Ports Coalition Member Organizations</th>
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<td><strong>Environmental &amp; Public Health Organizations</strong></td>
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<td>• Coalition for Clean Air</td>
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<td>• Coalition for a Safe Environment</td>
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<td>• Communities for a Better Environment</td>
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<td>• Communities for Clean Ports</td>
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<td>• East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice</td>
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<td>• Long Beach Alliance for Children with Asthma</td>
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Coalition meetings were held once a month, during which time information was disseminated (from the steering committee), feedback was provided (from coalition members), and decisions were made (by all participants). In between steering committee and coalition meetings, email updates were sent frequently to maintain communication.
The President of the San Pedro Democratic Club stated, “There’s been really broad consensus on everything we’ve done. To some extent – although it’s all been good – we go to such great pains that it’s like we’ve flogged this horse enough already. But there’s been a real exhaustive effort to build consensus so we don’t split apart.”

Although the coalition was ultimately able to maintain unity, several partners stressed the difficulty of cultivating diverse coalitions when members do not acknowledge that there are complicated divisions within and across movements. For instance, how does an environmental activist call herself a ‘friend of labor’ when half the unions in a room oppose an environmentally-friendly project? How does a labor activist establish total coherence with environmental groups? He cannot. There could be a totally different alignment of stakeholder interests for any given project. The CSP Coalition has not seen the level of support they would like from the ILWU – which has neither supported nor opposed the coalition, but has primarily sat on its hands. In the end, every project is a throw of the dice that comes down to the issues being addressed (Politeo, Interview, 2010). Although several members sat on opposite ends of the table in the past issues, these groups chose to move beyond old grudges and find ways to work together for the future. It is clear that while groups that are only comfortable working in isolation will posture to protect their interests, movement-oriented organizations seek opportunities to meet on common ground and to find the most expansive combination of interests possible. Coalitions that are dedicated to winning proactively connect the dots between issues such as public safety, the environment, urban poverty, social justice – and (when they have the political capacity) often prevail against efforts to separate them.
Socioeconomic diversity is another important characteristic to highlight as it relates to intra-coalition differences. The racial composition of coalition participants is largely reflective of the broader Los Angeles region. Over the last few decades, while L.A’s Latino population has mushroomed to almost half of the total population, White and Black populations have declined. Likewise, Latinos are the best represented group in the coalition, followed by Whites, Blacks, and then Asians. This can also be attributed to the fact that the communities directly surrounding the ports are heavily populated by Latinos. There is a somewhat different dynamic, however, on the steering committee.

Castellanos said (Interview, 2010):

It is really interesting, because I find myself sitting in steering committee meetings sometimes and asking ‘How am I the only woman or one of the few people of color at the table?’ That’s why we find it important to do a lot of direct organizing in local communities because those are the people directly impacted – people of color and mothers raising children.

While racial diversity has been somewhat of a challenge, various age groups and classes (although primarily working and middle class) are well-represented. Particularly in the broader coalition membership, high school and college students have done a lot of direct lobbying and door-to-door organizing.

**Integrating Progressive Champions**

Early in the organizing process, the coalition successfully cultivated political backing from several important public figures. The fact that Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa was an ardent advocate for the coalition from the beginning – both on the local and national level – is undeniable. However, one coalition member felt the mayor was initially reluctant to provide his full political backing. Although Villaraigosa seemed to
be wholeheartedly in support of the coalition’s fundamental objectives, he seemed concerned that the coalition would not be strong enough and would fracture in front of him, so in the end he’d be left high and dry over something that was very politically risky. And it has been extremely risky. But neither the Mayor nor the coalition has left the other hanging. In reference to Mayor Villaraigosa’s support of the coalition, Madeline Janis, LAANE’s Executive Director remarked, “He’s done some amazing things. He’s been incredibly great on the ports issue. He’s been vilified terribly in the industry press, but he has stuck with us, he has stuck with the communities, and he has stuck with the workers. I think he should be seen as the ‘Environmental Mayor.’ He’s done more for the environment in five years than every prior mayoral administration combined” (Janis, Interview, 2010).

In addition to Mayor Villaraigosa, another one of the coalition’s earliest and strongest political supporters was Janice Hahn. Councilwoman Hahn represents the fifteenth district, which encompasses L.A.’s ports communities – San Pedro, Wilmington, Vinegar Hill, Harbor City, and the Harbor Gateway. Other early coalition supporters include Long Beach Councilwoman Tonia Reyes Uranga, Maria Elena Durazo of the L.A. County Federation of Labor, numerous faith leaders organized through Clergy and Laity United (CLUE), and a number of academics. Key decisions related to the Port of Los Angeles were made by the Port Commission of L.A. – a body of five commissioners who are appointed by the mayor to govern the port’s affairs. In response to the mayor’s influence over the commissioners, Castellanos states (Castellanos, Interview, 2010):

34 In 2008, the Port of L.A. was sued by the American Trucking Association with the backing of the National Retail Federation. So essentially, the trucking companies and multinational retailers such as Wal-Mart have used their resources to sue the City of L.A. over the coalition’s efforts.
I think it started before any of this, with Mayor Villaraigosa appointing commissioners who were aligned with his politics. And from the start of the campaign, we had a set of commissioners inclined to be more sympathetic to not just environmental issues, but also to working conditions and that was helpful.

Port Commissioners Jerilyn Lopez Mendoza (who had been involved in organizing the Staples CBA and the LAX CBA) and David Freeman, in particular, were strong coalition advocates (they may have actually been instrumental in getting the mayor on board). However, at times, the port was timid about overreaching its boundaries. They had been directed to establish an environmental program, but some commissioners and staff thought adding elements related to labor went beyond their regulatory authority - and would resultantly upset their customers. But the mayor made creating a ‘Greener L.A.’ a centerpiece of his agenda, and his administration saw the port as fertile ground for delivering on those environmental goals. When the port got stuck on certain issues, the coalition tried to deal directly with the commissioners as much as possible, but they likely had some additional nudging from the mayor.

**Addressing Internal Tensions**

Any group that stays together long enough will experience some degree of internal tensions. The CSP Coalition is no exception, but interestingly, partners could only point to one real point of friction. Not too long ago, the board of a member organization made a decision to honor a business owner for having the largest fleet of clean trucks in the area. The business, however, did not finance the new fleet itself. As is standard practice throughout the industry – the contract truck drivers bore the burden of investment, but reaped none of the return. Because this is the very labor practice the
coalition is working to combat, the partners were obviously disturbed. Although the coalition asked the organization to rescind their decision, they were too close to the fundraiser to make the change. The steering committee engaged in extensive deliberations about how to address the matter and there was marked disagreement. One member of the steering committee voiced that “at the end of the day, we need them to be on our side, so my take was we need to hug them tighter. We made plain our disfavor, but we acknowledged that we’re friends and our long-term goals are the same, so we need to keep communicating so if things come that aren’t in alignment we can deal with them head-on.” Other partners argued that the group should be permanently suspended. Ultimately, they agreed on a way to address the issue to prevent the opposition from taking advantage of a fractured coalition.

This is a potential difficulty of combining grassroots groups with corporate-driven organizations. Because the boards of larger organizations are not on the ground and directly involved in coalition processes, there is a greater likelihood that organizational decisions might conflict with the interests of the coalition. A comprehensive memorandum of understanding that all coalition participants sign might be one way to avoid such tensions.35

Increase the Capacity of Participating Organizations

Relying on Partners’ Expertise

As the coalition began developing its demands for the Clean Truck Program in 2006, there was a general agreement that they would rely upon each organizational member’s unique strengths and expertise to shape the policy. When it came to technical

35 Oakland’s CSP Coalition established a MOU.
issues related to the environment, they relied on environmental organizations. They depended on community residents when it came to organizing strategies. For instance, Change to Win and the Teamsters had done the most research about the trucking industry’s corporate structure across key port cities and they had significant insight regarding how to strategically position the coalition’s political efforts. Furthermore, CTW and the Teamsters provided a great deal of funding for the coalition’s efforts to complement foundation funding sources. The Natural Resources Defense Council was strong in devising political and legal strategies. The NRDC also provided an extremely valuable resource by representing the coalition’s interests in legal battles. Clergy and Laity United organized elected officials and business owners who had any affiliations in the various faith communities. It was a matter of bringing all the knowledge and capacities together to play-up partners’ strengths throughout the campaign. All participating organizations took ownership of some aspect of the campaign, which in turn, afforded them the opportunities to sharpen their leadership skills and to expand their knowledge of their respective areas of expertise.

Cultivating Organizational Capacities

Members of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports were strategically engaged in activities that expanded their knowledge of how to best engage in collaborative political action. Speaker trainings, direct lobbying trainings, and press trainings were all integrated into the campaign strategies so members could take advantage of opportunities to voice their unique perspectives. The coalition also valued the importance of bringing their diverse membership bases together to interact during these times of education and action.
For the first two to three years of the campaign, the average turnout to events was between 200 and 300 coalition members (approximately four times per year). While they could easily congregate around 200 members for mobilizations with a few days’ notice, the largest local turnouts consisted of around 400 activists. On a regular basis, however, the coalition turned out between 20 and 50 members every other week for commission meetings:

We engaged community members and had them come face-to-face with Harbor Commissioners in ways that never happened before. The scale of people we were consistently turning out for commission meetings was unheard of. And you could tell in the way Commissioners responded when a mom got up, when they were forced to listen to someone speak in translated Spanish, and when they had to listen to students from Wilmington High School. So this was all new. Principally, we wanted to make sure it was those communities at the forefront of our campaign (Castellanos, Interview, 2010).

In addition to the countless hearings in which members participated, coalition activities included broad-based meetings, organizing drives, personal meetings with public figures, family fairs, and a labor parade. Angelo Logan, the Executive Director of East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice stated that his members (and organization) have transferred the lessons they’ve learned from CSP Coalition activities and trainings to other areas of activism.

**Ensuring Adequate Staffing and Resources**

LAANE staff served a tremendous role in keeping the coalition’s momentum going through the various campaign phases. In 2006, four full-time LAANE staff members - including two co-directors, an organizer, and a researcher - were dedicated to the coalition’s development. Within a year, they moved to having one director, two
organizers, and two researchers. A third researcher was brought on staff in 2009. In response to the adequacy of staff resources, Patricia stated, “Staffing capacity is never adequate. You always know you can do much more if you have more staff and resources. It never compares to what the other side brings, which is frustrating” (Castellanos, Interview, 2010)

It was also essential to have a full-time staff member devoted to the campaign’s communications efforts. The current communications person is a CTW staff person. Early on, the coalition’s efforts were constantly featured in the local media – they’ve made the front page of the L.A. Times at least once, but the local editorials were less-than flattering. In L.A., they managed to get a few letters to the editor and one or two op-eds. Particularly in Long Beach’s Press Telegram, they had more than ten negative editorials and were unable to get through to the staff. The Long Beach media coined the coalition the ‘Unholy Alliance’ and printed NRDC’s number and asked readers to call them to get them back on track.

Had LAANE not taken this leadership role in heading the coalition’s administration, it would have been much more challenging for the coalition’s various participating organizations to focus on contributing in the ways that best compelled their membership bases to take action. Moreover, because member organizations were not obligated to address the daily, mundane tasks of coalition administration, they were able to engage in the ways that best served the capacity-enhancement their constituents (without placing a major strain on their internal resources). According to David Green of the San Pedro Democratic Association, there are obvious limits to the amount of time and financial resources that smaller organizations can contribute in such a demanding
campaign, so the balance between national-local and large-small organizations helped the coalition remain afloat since 2006. Green stated, “The opposition sites the Teamsters as what the game is really about, and to a great extent, the Teamsters do have a definite interest. We meet at the Teamsters local and they’ve helped with the financing and maintaining the momentum. But if it were just left up to us local people, we would have given up a long time ago.” Also, by maintaining a diverse group of organizational forms, the coalition has been able to overcome constraints of being categorized in one particular tax status (i.e., 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4)). These are truly benefits of coalition-building, as no one organization in the CSP Coalition had the internal capacity to bring these numerous assets to bear alone.

Win Specific Outcomes

The San Pedro Clean Trucks Program

In 2006, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach jointly released the San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan. The Clean Air Action Plan was developed to target the primary sources of air emissions at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, including ships, trains, trucks, and cargo handling equipment. The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports’ great victory was the establishment\textsuperscript{36} of the Los Angeles and Long Beach Clean Trucks Program. The Clean Truck Program is a central component of the San Pedro Bay Ports Clean Air Action Plan, which specifically enforces the reduction of air pollution from port operations.

\textsuperscript{36} Each port’s Board of Harbor Commissioners voted on the passage of their respective port’s Clean Trucks Program.
Acknowledging that diesel-powered port trucks are a major source of air toxicity, the Clean Trucks Program facilitated the replacement of about 16,000 old, polluting trucks with low-emission vehicles through the assistance of port-sponsored grant and loan subsidies. More specifically, the Clean Truck Program (1) banned old, dirty trucks based on a phased timetable, (2) provided an incentive program for the replacement of old fleets, and (3) restricted port access to trucking companies that meet the obligations of concession contracts, including meeting environmental, employment, and operational standards.

Table 13 details the phased timeline for the prohibition of old, diesel-emitting trucks at both ports. Pre-1989 trucks were banned beginning on October 1, 2008. In January of 2010, trucks manufactured between 1989 and 1993 were banned from both ports. Thereafter, the clean trucks program progressively bans all trucks that fail to meet 2007 emission standards by 2012.

| October 1, 2008 | All pre-1989 trucks were banned from entering the ports: The new trucks that replaced them generate emissions that are more than 90 percent lower than this oldest segment (pre-1989) of the truck fleet that serves the San Pedro Bay ports. |
| January 1, 2010 | 1989-1993 trucks were banned from the ports, in addition to 1994-2003 trucks that had not been retrofitted: Trucks with engine model years 1994 to 2003 were no longer allowed access to the ports unless they were equipped with a Level 3 verified diesel emission control system (a minimum 25 percent reduction in NOx emissions). |
| January 1, 2012 | All trucks that do not meet the 2007 Federal Clean Truck Emissions Standards will be banned from the ports |


In order to finance the $2 billion truck replacement program, the ports engaged in a $44 million “2007-Compliant Incentive Program.” Under the incentive program, the
ports agreed to temporarily levy a Clean Trucks Fee of $35 for each loaded twenty-foot equivalent container unit moved by a truck that failed to meet the 2007 emissions standards. The ports began to assess the fees – which were charged to cargo owners – on February 18, 2009, and they are set to sunset in 2012 when all port trucks have been replaced by models meeting 2007 standards. This incentive program provided trucking companies with $20,000 towards the purchase of each privately-funded, Environmental Protection Agency 2007-compliant truck that they put into service during the first year of the Clean Truck Program. During the 2009-2010 fiscal year $23 million in additional incentives were allocated to encourage private investment in trucks that run on natural gas or lithium battery electric power (City of Los Angeles, 2009).

These incentives have leveraged over $600 million in private investment toward the purchase and/or lease of more than 6,600 Clean Trucks currently operating at the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The impact of replacing thousands of diesel-emitting trucks at the ports with 6,600 Clean Trucks is the equivalent of removing the particulate matter emissions of nearly 200,000 cars from the highways of southern California over the course of one year.

Another important component of the Trucks Program was the establishment of a concessions program, which was intended to restrict port access strictly to trucking companies that meet the obligations of concession contracts. The concession program provided the ports with the means to have a direct relationship with all Licensed Motor Carriers. This direct relationship allowed the ports to exercise direct authority over Licensed Motor Carriers in ensuring that the safety, environmental, public health, and
employment impacts of port trucks could be monitored and regulated. Regarding the employee-mandate aspect of the concessions program, Zahniser states (2010):

Villaraigosa’s five appointees on the Los Angeles Harbor Commission voted in 2008 to require that each truck driver obtain a concession agreement from the City of Los Angeles. Those agreements included a provision, backed by the Teamsters Union, that truck drivers moving through the harbor must be employed by a trucking company.

The justification for establishing an employee-mandate was that truckers, as independent contractors, would not have access to the financial resources necessary to purchase/lease and maintain the low-emissions trucks mandated by the Clean Trucks Program. But because most port truckers are misclassified as independent contractors and it would be their legal responsibility to shoulder the financial burden of complying with the progressive polluting truck ban, many independent contractors would be driven out of work by default (i.e., an inability to adhere to the mandated standards). Alternatively, exempting financially-strapped drivers from being subject to the truck ban would defeat the environmental objectives of the Clean Truck Program because their dirty trucks would still be in operation. Admittedly, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters had an additional incentive to enact the employee-mandate because as legal employees of trucking companies (rather than independent contractors), thousands of truck drivers would be granted the freedom to organize under a representative union (such as the Teamsters) and advocate for better working conditions.

Gaining the status of regular employees in the Clean Trucks Program was a colossal victory for port truck drivers – who had been fighting to gain organizing rights since the trucking industry was deregulated in 1980.
Addressing Opposition in the Private Sector

In both Los Angeles and Long Beach, members of the private sector actively opposed the adoption of employee mandates in the Clean Trucks Program. During the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports’ multi-year campaign for the Clean Truck Program, a number of private sector interest groups expressed their opposition. These local, state, and national groups included the California Trucking Association (the state arm for the American Trucking Association), the Waterfront Coalition, the Coalition of Shippers and Retailers, the National Retail Federation, the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association, and individual shipping lines. According to Castellanos (Interview, 2010), the coalition’s efforts to win the support of port trucking companies were fruitless:

No segments of the private sector would support us publicly. We had conversations with individual trucking companies and owners who would tell us that we made absolute sense – it would level the playing field and stop the race to the bottom. They said they thought they could thrive in that environment. But they wouldn’t support it…They wouldn’t be the first to come out in support because the backlash from their customers, the shippers, would have been too great.

Several local organizations were particularly active in the public debate. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce (which had largely remained silent until it was evident that the CTP would be adopted) eventually came out in opposition of the employee mandate. And as the conversation progressed, different collaborative formations emerged in the private sector, such as the Harbor Truckers for a Sustainable Future (which brought together a lot of smaller trucking companies) and Future Ports (which is comprised of various chambers of commerce and economic development associations). However, the

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37 Future Ports’ strategic partners include: Bay Planning Coalition, Coalition for America’s Gateways & Trade Corridors, County of San Bernardino Economic Development Agency, Foreign Trade Association, Inland Empire Economic Partnership, Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles County Business Federation, Pasadena Chamber of Commerce,
Virginia-based American Trucking Association – by far, the coalition’s most vocal and powerful adversary – did not weigh in heavily until after the concessions program was adopted in 2008.

The American Trucking Association (ATA) – the largest national trade association for the trucking industry – is a federation of affiliated state trucking associations, conferences, and organizations that together represent more than 37,000 motor carrier members. In a testimony before a subcommittee of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee on May 5, 2010, Robert Digges, the American Trucking Association’s Jr. Vice President and Chief Counsel, explained the ATA’s position on the Clean Truck Program. Digges stated that the ATA felt the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports’ true, ulterior goal (organizing Teamsters members) was being camouflaged by its advocacy for environmental issues. He remarked:

It is most important to understand that this debate is not about clean air or reducing the ports’ environmental footprint in the LA basin…It is rather about the port driver. The vast majority (85% to 98%) of the trucks that currently service the Ports are not owned by a motor carrier. The trucks are owned by Independent Owner Operators (IOOs) that contract with the motor carriers for port container transport services. Many ATA members, in fact, use only IOO drivers, and they have no employee drivers…Under current law, IOOs cannot be organized. But, through the use and implementation of the POLA command and control concession contract, motor carriers wishing to remain in the port transportation-drayage business must agree to phase out the use of owner operators, hire only employee drivers, and buy-lease a new truck fleet to replace the trucks previously supplied by the IOOs. And, with a now mandated employee driver workforce, enter the Teamsters - these employee drivers can now be organized (Digges, 2010, p. 4).

In an effort to clarify the American Trucking Association’s position, Digges stated:

Regional Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, San Gabriel Valley Economic Partnership, Valley Industry & Commerce Association, and Wilmington Chamber of Commerce (Source: http://www.futureports.org/members.html)
Our aim then and now is not to block or hinder implementation of the truck retirement-clean air portions of these programs. What we are opposing is the use of a concession contract wherein the port grants to itself the sole discretion of selecting which otherwise federally qualified motor carriers can participate in port transportation services (p. 2). Moreover, we firmly believe that this concession program unlawfully re-regulates the port trucking industry to the detriment of motor carriers, shippers, other port stakeholders and the businesses and consumers that depend on the freight and products that move through America’s largest port complex. The additional, duplicative economic reregulation of the industry will add unnecessary costs, burdening the system and jeopardizing local jobs (p. 6).

Outraged by the passage of the Clean Trucks Program’s employee mandate, the ATA initiated litigation against the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (on July 28, 2008 in the U.S. District Court, Central District of Los Angeles). According to Digges, the POLA Concession Plan is preempted by federal statute:

Specifically, under F4A - 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), a political subdivision of a state ‘may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.’ The LA Concession Plan clearly is intended to control access into the port markets and will have a major impact on motor carrier rates and services…We believe that the POLA’s CTP plan to reshape and reregulate port truck transportation to favor resource-based operations utilizing much larger trucking companies that own their trucks and use only employee drivers is not only illegal and impractical, it is based on a total lack of knowledge regarding both port and truck transportation business operations throughout the country (p. 5).

The ATA’s argument essentially claimed that the CTP’s employee mandate was illegal because the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act restricts local governments from regulating the prices, routes, and services of trucking companies. The ATA received their desired ruling in 2009, when the U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously ruled that the ATA was correct. Thus, the Court rejected the Coalition for Clean and Safe Port’s claim that a ban on owner-operators was necessary to assist the port achieve its environmental and safety goals. The following month, the U.S. District Court, “following
the Court of Appeals’ instructions, granted a temporary injunction that halted most of the concession plan requirements, including: driver hiring preferences, motor carrier financial capability requirements, designated routes, off-street parking restrictions, and L.A.’s independent owner-operator ban. Soon after that, the Port of Long Beach settled the lawsuit against it” (Boyce, 2010). The ATA emerged victorious.

**Addressing Opposition in the Public Sector**

Although the coalition had encountered a devastating legal defeat, most coalition members and supporters dedicated themselves to overturning the injunction. Unlike Los Angeles’ Mayor Villaraigosa, who remained a steadfast supporter of the coalition’s efforts, the Mayor of Long Beach ultimately decided that the city’s Clean Trucks Program would only address the environmental – and not labor – issues in its Clean Trucks Program. In his testimony, Digges explained that Long Beach had agreed to do away with its ban on independent contractors:

> It is important to note that last October [2009] POLB and the ATA reached a Settlement negotiated between port officials, ATA and trucking industry representatives. The Settlement was based upon a new motor carrier registration process which replaced the POLB’s Concession Contract we were opposing in court. All motor carriers now wishing to perform drayage services at the POLB must, via the new Registration and Agreement Form, register with the Port and agree to provide certain operational information to assist the Port in monitoring motor carrier compliance with various safety, environmental, and security regulations pertaining to providing drayage services at the Port (Digges, 2010, p. 2).

The Port of Long Beach, therefore, never attempted to enact a concession agreement that required that port truckers be classified as regular employees and, if they so chose, to organize under the Teamsters. Regarding this decision, an overview of Long Beach’s Clean Truck Program on the POLB’s website states, “The Port of Long Beach
program offers flexibility and choice for the trucking industry. LMCs [Licensed Motor Carriers] will be allowed to use employee drivers, independent contractor drivers, or a combination of employee and contractor drivers – as they do now.” As a result of Long Beach’s settlement, the Port of Los Angeles became the sole defendant in the ATA’s lawsuit.

Naturally, members of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports were extremely disappointed about Long Beach’s surrender. Coalition partners possessed differing perspectives on why Long Beach’s Mayor Bob Foster eventually refused to enact the employee mandate. According to Castellanos (Interview, 2010):

At the end of the day, the Mayor just wasn’t with us. Certainly there were [port] commissioners that weren’t with us, but I believe if the mayor were on board, it would have been a different story. The mayor played a role in trying to divide the coalition. There were many indications he wasn’t in support although he continued to engage us…Just to say that he had listened. At one point he said, ‘It’s not my job to help the Teamsters get more members. My top priority is to protect the environment.’

In the opinion of some members, Long Beach’s political structure is much more beholden to industry than is L.A.’s, and in the opinion of others, Mayor Foster possesses a philosophical anti-union sentiment. Tom Politeo shared that Mayor Foster told them he didn’t have a problem with drivers becoming unionized, but he just didn’t want to be the mayor who had his hand on the switch when it happened.

Interestingly, several organizations that actively participated in the coalition shouldered considerable political pushback in Long Beach due to their activism. The Long Beach Coalition for Children with Asthma (LBACA), for example, faced antagonism. Also, the pastor of a Long Beach church who is affiliated with Clergy and Laity United (CLUE) had high-profile congregants express their disdain for his public
activism in the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. The situation was complicated by the fact that the congregants were also the church’s largest funders. CLUE organizer, Hal Steinberg remarked, “When you get pushback, if members pull out, a church can have a difficult time surviving, especially in these hard economic times. The pastor is still very involved, but it’s a balancing act. He has to know when to say things publicly and when to step back. His heart is there, but he has to be practical” (Steinberg, Interview, 2010).

Yet, one of the benefits of collaborative action lies in the fact that the scope and power of the various groups involved in a coalition provide somewhat of a cushion for individual partners who take heat for their involvement, because no member stands alone in the fight.

Long Beach’s failure to follow through on all aspects of the program can likely be attributed to a combination of factors. According to coalition members, it is clear that more grassroots organizing needs to take place in Long Beach to mobilize residents around this particular issue. Moreover, while L.A. communities (particularly the cities of San Pedro and Wilmington) have homes that are literally across the street from the port’s industrial facilities, Long Beach lacks that same residential proximity. Therefore, the same degree of community concern that arose in L.A. has not been cultivated in Long Beach – even though the health and economic impacts are the same at both ports.

Although the coalition was unable to get Mayor Foster on board with the employment mandate, coalition members expressed their satisfaction with their ability to impact the debate and lift the profile of the issue to get the public’s attention. There is still hope that ongoing organizing work will allow them to get a more progressive Long Beach policy passed.
How the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports Has Shaped the Broader Political Climate

Knowing When and How to Scale Up

Since The Port of L.A.’s Clean Truck Program was enacted in 2008, it has made significant advancements. But, as aforementioned, the American Trucking Association (ATA) legally attacked the CTP, arguing that the Concession Agreement was preempted under the Federal Motor Carrier Act (1980), as amended in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994. When the ATA enjoyed the success of getting a temporary injunction placed on the CTP, it became clear that L.A.’s coalition-building would need to scale up.

Other groups around the country had been working on port-related issues in their cities for quite some time, and the Teamsters and Change to Win (CTW) were interested in collaborating with these groups. About a year after the L.A. Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports developed, the Oakland Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports was established, organizations in New Jersey were beginning to explore the formation of their Clean and Healthy Ports Coalition, and CTW and Teamsters had staff on the ground in Seattle. Largely coordinated by LAANE’s national umbrella, technical assistance organization – the Partnership for Working Families – synergy to address environmental and economic issues across the nation’s largest ports was developing on both the east and west coasts. This synergy provided each coalition with a rational response to the concerns of the trucking industry. “We’d speak to private companies about our campaign,” said Castellanos, “and they’d say ‘If this is going to raise our costs or put us at a competitive disadvantage, it’s not feasible. We’re going to lose cargo business and everyone’s going
to go to Seattle.’ So we had a quick response to that because we were working across the country.”

Castellanos acknowledged that this argument was partially valid because there were not coalition partners in every port city of the country, and ultimately, industry will go where it’s cheapest to move cargo. Shipping costs are expensive without access to sophisticated infrastructure systems, which are already highly-developed in large port cities. It would take a major infusion of capital for smaller ports to compete and cause industry to relocate. By increasing the scale of CTP coalition organizing to the national Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports (at the ports of L.A., Oakland, and Seattle) and the Coalition for Healthy Ports (at the Port Authority of NY/NJ), Los Angeles leveraged the power of multi-scalar coalition-building. Each member of the national coalition sought to protect the legality of the victory won in L.A. in 2008 and to enact their own local Clean Truck Programs. In addition to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Port of Oakland have adopted clean truck programs designed to phase out their ports’ dirtiest diesel trucks (Lass, 2010).

There are numerous challenges inherent in efforts to link and coordinate locally-based coalitions on a national scale. For groups like L.A.’s coalition, that had been organized for years prior to the nationalization of the movement, there is a marked paradigm shift in moving from a culture of local activism – which requires considerable resources and energy in itself – to activism on a broader scale. The L.A. coalition had a major fight on their hands at the local level – dealing with two mayors, five commissioners at each port, 15 council members in Los Angeles, and 9 council members in Long Beach. Now that the national coalition is engaged in a fight for federal legislation
that requires 218 votes in Congress and 60 votes in the Senate, L.A. coalition members are facing several obstacles including: the fatigue from a long, arduous local fight; the change of pace in local versus federal decision making processes; the difficulty of making a federal fight ‘real’ to local residents and keeping them engaged; the inexperience local organizations have in fighting federal battles; the lack of a national organizational infrastructure for local partners; and the learning curve for staff in intermediary organizations like LAANE. The campaign has been nationalized since May of 2009, so L.A. partners have been engaged in a four year battle – a combination of three years locally and now more than one year at the national level. In reference to the implications of long fights, Castellanos stated:

Four years have gone by and in that time an economic recession has impacted nonprofits and families, so organizations have lost staff and funding and families have had to work more hours. There are organizational demands that limit people’s capacity to participate in the same way they had before – they are trying to figure out their role in the national fight because they’re local organizations and have not worked in Congress before…Staff turns over in organizations, so you have to bring new people into the movement and campaign veterans get tired. Long fights have their tolls, but remarkably, we’re still together.

While there is no formal decision-making structure at the national level (and meetings are held on an as-needed basis), strategy is primarily coordinated by groups with a national infrastructure and staff in Washington D.C., including the NRDC, Sierra Club, CTW, Teamsters, and the Partnership for Working Families (including LAANE, EBASE, GANE, and Puget Sound SAGE). While these organizations play a more significant role in legislative work, it is the responsibility of local coalitions to deliver their regions’ democratic delegations. The four coalitions continue to engage members in trainings to lobby Congress and to represent the coalition as spokespeople in various
venues. And there have been opportunities for local membership bases to connect to the federal campaign, such as the Advocacy Day in May of 2010 – in conjunction with the national Good Jobs, Green Jobs Conference – where activists from across the country met each other and participated in a day of coordinated lobbying on Capitol Hill. Each coalition is also engaged in letter-writing campaigns for federal legislation. Ultimately, Castellanos says, “We take a certain pride in making sure the issue remains alive here because the way we see it is that if the L.A. coalition isn’t pushing Congress, other people are going to say, ‘If you guys aren’t doing it, why should anyone else care?’”

Regarding the internal logic of building to scale, LAANE’s Madeline Janis commented that it’s important to acknowledge the fact that industry does not usually confine its sights to one city or geographic region – they see themselves as global, national, or at least state-wide. Janis, who was largely responsible for the development of the national Partnership for Working Families (PWF) network stated (Interview, 2010):

That’s why LAANE was so involved in forming PWF. But we also work with national unions almost in every case at this point. Our ideal is a partnership with a local union and a national union…so we’re looking at what other cities have good locals and have a potential for progressive politics that could develop the kind of capacity we have here to do these campaigns. What we don’t want to do is make it seem like because we did it here, all you have to do is put $20,000 into a campaign and you’re going to be successful in any city. It is not magic. It takes a lot of resources and a lot of time to win. It’s not so hard to launch…it’s much more difficult to grow and sustain.

**Leveraging Political Relationships at All Scales**

At the local level, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports has relied on two primary factors in its efforts to advance its agenda – progressive champions and a foundation of cross-sector collaboration. When asked whether the necessary elements
would have been aligned to provide the coalition the same degree of success a decade or two ago, Castellanos replied (Interview, 2010):

Probably not. Mayor Villaraigosa and his politics are a huge factor. Plus, twenty years ago, looking at where the environmental movement was and where the labor movement was – as separate movements, they weren’t at the place they are now where they’re willing to align behind one agenda. Maybe ten years ago, but even then, there was a lot of built-up tension.

On a broader scale, getting an edge in national politics is largely an inside game.

Therefore, the four local coalitions and their national partners have, together, worked diligently at multiple scales to mobilize political support and pressure. The president of the San Pedro Democratic Club stated (Green, Interview, 2010):

I called some of my friends who are Democratic activists who know members of Congress and asked them to make calls. For example, I have a friend in the Westchester Democratic Club who helped us get Representative Maxine Waters’ support. I serve on the board of the Carson-Torrance NAACP… the president, who is close to Representative Laura Richardson, convinced her to support us.

Castellanos stated that California’s Attorney General has been helpful in exposing labor abuses for the past three years by filing lawsuits against some of the most egregious trucking companies. As the campaign grew to a national level, it was critical to attract endorsers from areas around the country. In addition to Mayor Villaraigosa, Mayors Dellums (Oakland), McGinn (Seattle), Booker (Newark, NJ), Bloomberg (New York), and Stacy Ritter (Broward County, FL) are supporters. Also, the California Bay Area Air Quality Management District, the Port Authority of NY & NJ, and the Ports of Los Angeles, Seattle, and Oakland are all endorsers. Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) has been the coalition’s biggest champion for legislative changes at the federal level. The L.A. coalition is also working to lobby Senators Boxer and Pelosi for their support.
Reshaping Politics

In July of 2010, U.S. Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and more than sixty-seven co-sponsors introduced legislation entitled the Clean Ports Act of 2010 (H.R. 5967). The Clean Ports Act seeks to reduce truck-borne pollution in and around the nation’s ports. This legislation seeks to protect the authority of ports across the country to implement clean truck programs at their local discretion (Lass, 2010). Federal legislation is the very thing that the American Trucking Association was attempting to prevent in its efforts to thwart the employment mandates in Los Angeles and Long Beach. ATA’s Digges highlighted this potential risk in his testimony:

As Subcommittee members are aware, activities in California often serve to both initiate and shape state and federal programs and policies throughout the nation. For that reason, the debate and legal action surrounding the adoption of the POLA and POLB Clean Truck Programs (CTP) continues to be of utmost importance to motor carriers, shippers, retailers, other port stakeholders and consumers everywhere who depend on our maritime freight transportation system (Digges, 2010, p. 3).

The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports’ efforts to overturn the temporary injunction eventually proved to be fruitful. Late in the evening of August 26, 2010, U.S. District Judge Christina Snyder rejected the American Trucking Association’s legal claim that L.A.’s Clean Truck Program violated federal laws related to transportation safety and interstate commerce. In a tremendous victory for NRDC’s legal staff and the entire Clean and Safe Ports Coalition, the 2009 injunction imposed on the CTP was lifted. Snyder’s decision in the American Trucking Associations (ATA) v. City of Los Angeles (City) lawsuit labeled the labor concession agreements as a “business necessity” that allowed the port to protect its financial interests from lawsuits over diesel emissions, which would continue to stall expansion and put the port at a competitive disadvantage. The decision
allowed the enactment of all aspects of the Clean Truck Program, including the provision that truck drivers working at the port must be reclassified as standard employees – not independent contractors.

Supporters of Los Angeles’ Clean Truck Program were thrilled. Geraldine Knatz, the Executive Director of the Port of Los Angles, remarked:

Our ability to have direct enforcement of the truck bans and other important features of our concession agreements with the trucking companies that call at the Port of Los Angeles thousands of times a day will help provide a safer and secure trucking system for the long term (City of Los Angeles, Press Release, 2010).

In response to the decision, Mayor Villaraigosa proclaimed, “This decision is evidence that we are making real progress on growing and greening our Port. Now we can finally move forward with our Clean Truck Program, a model for ports around the nation,” (City of Los Angeles, Press Release, 2010). In an interview that took place several days after the injunction was lifted, LAANE’s Executive Director, Madeline Janis stated that the difficult work would be in making the victory real in people’s lives.

Unwilling to settle for a defeat, however, the American Trucking Association sought an appeal to Judge Snyder’s decision. On October 26, 2010, the District Court issued an order that temporarily enjoined the employee driver requirement in the Concession Agreement, pending the appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court. As a result, the Port of Los Angeles has been forced to refrain from enforcing the employee driver provision until the appeals process takes place (POLA, 2010).

Industry associations such as Los Angeles’ Harbor Trucking Association are preparing to ramp up their political activism to defeat the Coalition for Clean and Safe

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38 The Court allowed all other Concession Agreement requirements to be enforced, except the employee driver requirement.
Ports once and for all. In an organizational strategy statement, the Harbor Trucking Association outlined its plans to conduct an advocacy trip to Washington D.C. in January of 2011 to “educate our local delegation, members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and others on the recent efforts by Change to Win and related groups to derail the Clean Trucks Program. We will also highlight the use of intimidation through threat of misclassification suits and IRS audits that some members of the industry are using to advance the employee model” (Harbor Trucking Association, http://www.harbortruckers.com/).

Admittedly, Los Angeles’ Clean and Safe Ports Coalition, its sister coalitions around the country, and affiliated national unions are very serious about advancing what the Harbor Trucking Association referred to as the threat of regulatory intimidation (Trottman, 2010). Collectively, unions and their environmental and economic justice allies are working to compel the Obama administration to better regulate companies across all industries of the American economy that systematically misclassify workers as independent contractors rather than employees. This situation is particularly extreme in the construction, home health care, and transportation sectors, where misclassification arguably costs the federal government billions in unpaid taxes. Whether the Obama administration will pursue this avenue of regulation – and uplift the cause of America’s working- and middle-class citizens remains to be seen.
CHAPTER 8:

FINDINGS & CONCLUSION
Review of Cases

This dissertation examines three Los Angeles community-labor coalitions between 2000 and 2010 to understand (1) the factors that led to the coalitions’ emergence and relative success and (2) the extent to which a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the elite-driven agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful growth regime. Table 14 provides a brief overview of the main points related to the three coalitions.

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<th>Table 14. Summary Descriptions of Coalition Cases</th>
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<td><strong>Development Project/Industry</strong></td>
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<td>Figueroa Corridor Coalition</td>
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<td>LAX Coalition</td>
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<td>Coalition for Clean &amp; Safe Ports</td>
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<td><strong>Total Project Cost</strong></td>
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<td>$2.5 billion</td>
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<td>$2 billion truck replacement program</td>
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<td><strong>Public Subsidies</strong></td>
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<td>$58 million in city bonds; $12 million in redevelopment grants; $290 million in hotel tax rebates; $30 million in state housing bonds for streetscape improvements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicly-funded airport expansion project/Funding primarily from the Federal Aviation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>$44 million in public incentives for truck replacement ($20,000 for each $100,000 to $150,000 new truck purchased)</td>
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<td><strong>Primary Organizing Target</strong></td>
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<td>Anschutz Entertainment Group (Private)</td>
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<td>Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners (Public)</td>
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<td>Harbor Commissions for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Public)</td>
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<td><strong>Justice Orientation</strong></td>
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<td>July 2003 - November 2004</td>
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<td>January 2001 - Present</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Date Agreement Reached/Approved</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement reached with AEG May 31, 2001; LA City Council approved the project September 5, 2001</td>
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<td>Agreement reached with LAWA November 2004. December of 2004, the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners and the City Council approved the LAX Master Plan Program and Community Benefits Agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Los Angeles and Long Beach Clean Truck Programs were initially approved in October of 2008 (as part of the San Pedro Bay Clean Air Action Plan); Portions of LA’s program are currently tied up in litigation.</td>
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In the first case study, the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice coalesced to address the construction of the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District. L.A. Live, a mixed-use development consisting of high-end recreational,
commercial, and residential spaces, was surrounded by a working class community of color that had already been negatively impacted by the Staples Center’s development, University of Southern California’s expansion, and other tourism-related projects. As an extension of the Staples Center Arena, the city and developers projected L.A. Live to cost $2.5 billion. AEG, the project’s developer, lobbied the local and state government to receive approximately $390 million in public financing and incentives (e.g., bonds, grants, tax abatements, etc.) for the development. Anticipating that L.A. Live would be another publicly financed project that would not add value to the surrounding community, a coalition of 34 local organizations demanded specific concessions (e.g., affordable housing, jobs for local residents, community parks, and a residential parking program) from AEG in return for the coalition’s support in securing land-use variances and economic development subsidies. In essence, the coalition used Los Angeles’ entitlements process as leverage to negotiate with the developer. A total of two years transpired, from the beginning of the community organizing process to the time negotiations ended. The final outcome was a legally binding community benefits agreement between the Figueroa Corridor Coalition and AEG. Ultimately, the L.A. Live CBA was written into the development agreement between AEG and the City of Los Angeles.

In the second case study, the LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, and Educational Justice united to ensure that developers incorporated community interests in their plans to expand the Bradley International Terminal at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) – an undertaking that was projected to cost $11 billion. As a public project, the Federal Aviation Administration allocated the public funds to finance the
expansion. In discussions about LAX’s modernization plans, residents who lived in the communities surrounding LAX voiced their concerns that airport expansion would continue to burden them with negative externalities such as increased pollution, noise, and traffic. People who lived in cities across southern California wanted local officials to take a regional approach to airport expansion. This broader approach would not focus only on upgrading LAX, but would improve all of the region’s airports. For many years, persistent local and regional opposition prevented LAX’s expansion from moving forward. But once the LAX Coalition formed, coalition members agreed that they would provide political support for the airport’s expansion if the city agreed to address the coalition’s demands for economic, environmental, and educational concessions. Thus, negotiating a community benefits agreement would be a win-win solution for LAX and the local community. It took the LAX Coalition a total of 17 months, from the beginning of its organizing process to the day the agreement was reached, to fulfill its goals. The LAX Community Benefits Agreement garnered the support of the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners, the Los Angeles City Council, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Implementation and monitoring the CBA’s provisions remain ongoing.

The third case study explored the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports, which is a coalition that formed to promote an agenda of economic and environmental justice surrounding the port trucking industry in Los Angeles and Long Beach. With port operations expected to expand twenty-fold in the coming years, the port trucking industry was positioned to experience steady growth. But because companies overwhelmingly employ port truck drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, drivers are responsible for all of the expenses and liabilities of business ownership without receiving
the traditional benefits associated with business ownership to offset their liabilities. For instance, most port truck drivers work very long hours, receive poverty-level wages, and lack access to benefits such as healthcare, paid vacations, or pensions. Additionally, port truck drivers, not their employers, are responsible for all of the costs associated with owning and operating their trucks, including self-employment taxes, loan repayment, commercial licenses, truck maintenance, tolls, and fuel. As a result, most port truck drivers can only afford older models of trucks (which emit harmful diesel) for their work.

The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports waged a campaign to encourage the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to adopt and enforce a Clean Trucks Program in an effort to replace thousands of polluting trucks with newer trucks that release cleaner emissions. The Clean Trucks Program would also impose labor standards to ensure that employers classify port truckers as employees (rather than independent contractors). While the Harbor Commission of Los Angeles (guided by Mayor Villaraigosa) implemented a holistic program that addressed both jobs and the environment, Long Beach’s Harbor Commission adopted the environmental/truck replacement component, but failed to approve the jobs component (which required truckers’ classification as direct employees). Long Beach’s reluctance to enforce labor policy can be primarily attributed to the trucking and shipping industries’ power over Long Beach’s elected officials. These same private industry interests have engulfed the City of Los Angeles in litigation because of its firm stance on labor issues.

This organizing endeavor has been more than ten years in the making, as the early formation of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports initiated their efforts in 2001. Due to the continuing legal battle between the City of Los Angeles and the American Trucking
Association, efforts to implement the employee-mandate at the Port of Los Angeles are ongoing.

This brief review suggests that several commonalities exist across these cases. For example, none of the coalitions took a hardnosed, oppositional stance against the targeted developments. Instead, each coalition utilized its political leverage to promote a more democratic, equitable, and balanced approach to the developments in question. This approach led political commentator Harold Meyerson (1998) to refer to these left-labor coalitional efforts as alliances for “growth with equity.” Other commonalities exhibited across these cases include sizeable project costs and heavy reliance on taxpayer-funded public incentives. Furthermore, each of the coalitions engaged in protracted organizing and negotiating efforts and significantly depended on state and local environmental review requirements and planning entitlements processes for leverage. The following section seeks to answer the dissertation’s two primary research questions by providing a more in-depth analysis of the three cases under investigation.

**Research Findings: Question 1**

To answer the project’s main research questions, this dissertation adapts an evaluative framework suggested by Tattersall’s book *Power in Coalition* (2010). Tattersall recommends four measures of success that can be used to illuminate the various types of outcomes that coalitions produce. To fit this dissertation’s needs, I used the following measures as guidelines - building a well-functioning coalition, increasing the capacity of participating organizations, influencing public and private decisions to win tangible outcomes, and shaping the broader political climate. The following pages
explore the first three measures (i.e., building a well-functioning coalition, increasing the capacity of participating organizations, and influencing public and private decisions to win tangible outcomes) through the lens of the case studies in order to assess the factors that have accounted for the coalitions’ emergence and relative successes. This analysis answers the dissertation’s first research objective – identifying the factors that accounted for the coalitions’ emergence and relative success.

**Contributing Factor: Coalition Building**

Organizing in today’s complex environment faces diminishing resources, reduced civic participation, complicated political relationships, and worsening social and economic problems (DeFilippis et al., 2010). The demand to do more with less in the name of social, economic, and environmental justice, therefore, calls for the development of well-oiled progressive coalitions. Until recently, however, fragmentation across Los Angeles’ labor, environmental, and nonprofit sectors resulted in many organizations working disjointedly in isolated silos to achieve common goals. Yet, the coalitions examined in this dissertation (which consisted of labor, environmental, and community-based groups) experienced relative success in their attempts to cross wide historical cleavages in order to act collectively. The following paragraphs address what can be learned from their efforts to build strong, robust coalitions.

First, as outlined in Table 15, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) and Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) – two autonomous intermediary organizations that have been (to varying degrees) founded, governed, and financed by union locals in Los Angeles initiated and facilitated the coalitions (Nicholls, 2003).
This foundational integration of local labor unions has ensured that LAANE and SAJE maintain an explicit focus on advancing the struggle of working class people in their organizations’ missions and objectives. Furthermore, the presence of strong bridge-builders in the economic justice and environmental justice sectors has facilitated the incorporation of environmental activists and other segments of the progressive community into LAANE’s and SAJE’s coalition work. Highlighting the organization’s decision to take this approach, LAANE’s Executive Director stated, “We see ourselves as a labor organization – as a key piece of the glue between the labor movement, and community, environmental, progressive organizations of different kinds” (Janis,
Interview, 2010). By assuming the role of coalition facilitators, SAJE and LAANE have capitalized on opportunities to promote a broader agenda for L.A.’s working class residents, instead of focusing on a narrow set of interests and constituents. Executive leadership at LAANE and SAJE has been the driving force behind the organizations’ commitment to a broader social change agenda.

In 1993, Maria Elena Durazo (who was President of HERE Local 11 at the time) convinced Madeline Janis, LAANE’s co-founding Executive Director, to establish the Tourism Industry Development Council (LAANE’s previous name) in order to use public policy to help low-wage service workers take advantage of L.A.’s booming tourism industry. In reference to LAANE’s successful track record, Janis remarked, “It will have been seventeen years in November since we started LAANE. We’ve grown to forty-five staff members and seven or eight major programs. The fundamental keys to success are [having] a big vision with a very specific focus and [maintaining] a commitment to winning” (Janis, Interview, 2010). LAANE cultivated its power during the 1990s by leading a campaign that passed the nation’s first worker retention ordinance (which requires a firm to retain its existing workers for a certain period of time after changes in contractors take place) and spearheading a successful living wage campaign in the City and County of Los Angeles. According to labor historian Ruth Milkman, Janis has been adept at building LAANE’s capacity as a coalition builder due to the breadth of her prior experiences (Interview, 2010). After receiving her law degree from UCLA, Janis worked at the prestigious Latham & Watkins Law Firm, where she honed her knowledge of land use law and commercial litigation. Prior to founding LAANE, she served as the
Executive Director of the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN), where she led several successful policy campaigns.

Gilda Haas, SAJE’s founding Executive Director, also has extensive ties to various sectors of L.A.’s progressive community. For almost three decades, Haas has taught courses related to economic development at UCLA’s Department of Urban Planning. In the early 1990s, Haas helped establish UCLA’s Community Scholars Program (a reflective space for community and labor activists to cultivate their research and planning skills). Under Haas’ tenure, SAJE developed the nation’s first welfare-to-work bank account, organized a pioneering effort to criminalize slumlords, and established the Figueroa Corridor Community Land Trust. In 2007, Haas co-founded the Right to the City Alliance, a national coalition comprised of racial, economic, and environmental justice organizations.

Aside from LAANE and SAJE, several other organizations were core partners in the coalitions featured in this dissertation. For instance, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1877, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) Local 11, and the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor were involved in all three cases; Environmental Defense and AGENDA (Action for Grassroots Empowerment & Neighborhood Development Alternatives) were a part of the Figueroa Corridor and LAX Coalitions; Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) participated in the Figueroa Corridor and Clean and Safe Ports Coalitions; and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) played a significant role in the Clean and Safe Ports and LAX Coalition. The consistent participation of these and other organizations speaks to their leaders’ and members’ devotion to a broader political
change agenda. This is critical because, ultimately, the potential for movement building and power realignments cannot be realized without the consistent participation of anchor organizations across social justice sectors, and leadership that believes a larger movement is necessary in order to cultivate and exercise political power.

As demonstrated in the case studies, organizing the broadest possible scope of interests (which impact a diverse membership base) is another important aspect of progressive coalition building. A common pattern across the three cases was the initial establishment of a core group of coalition organizers (often in the form of a steering committee) and the subsequent outreach to other potential organizational partners. This approach seemed to work well, particularly because new coalition players smoothly integrated into the coalitions as relatively equal partners.

As outlined in Table 15, faith-based organizations and community development organizations comprised a significant part of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s membership because of the coalition’s strategic use of moral persuasion and its neighborhood-based orientation. The number of organizational participants represented in the LAX Coalition was smaller compared to the other two coalitions. The lower participation can be partially attributed to the fact that much of the organizing and outreach focused on communities that immediately surrounded the airport. But its strongest support came from environmental, labor, faith-based organizations. And unlike the other two coalitions, the LAX Coalition integrated school districts as participants, which increased its legitimacy in representing a diverse range of local interests. Yet, the

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39 Anchor organizations incorporate specific actors and institutions from two or more sectors of the progressive community into a single, vertically-integrated organization. Anchor organizations tend to share common financial supporters (i.e., funders) and institutional roots (i.e., founders), and they often evolve through the process of long-term interactions across personal and organizational networks (Nicholls, 2003).
LAX Coalition encountered some difficulties because several important stakeholder groups chose not to join the coalition. Some local stakeholders believed the coalition did not demand enough from LAWA and continued to oppose LAX’s expansion altogether.

Lastly, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports had the largest number of participants because the issues affected a more diverse range of groups (in terms of both geographic reach and scope of grievances). Furthermore, there was a general consensus amongst regional stakeholders about the strategies they would use. The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports included many Environmental and labor organizations, while faith-based participation was considerably lower. It is important to note that one of the two faith-based participants is Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE) – a coalition of faith leaders from diverse religious traditions – which LAANE founded.

For all coalitions, there were obvious benefits associated with having a wide array of interests represented including: expanded resources, access to a broad spectrum of specialized knowledge, increased legitimacy and political capacity, a more manageable division of labor, and a greater degree of accountability. However, the centrality of one important partner – the labor movement – to successful working class coalition building cannot be overstated.

The stability and capacity of any progressive movement ultimately depends on its relationship to the labor movement and, equally important, on the labor movement’s degree of internal capacity and collaboration. This is largely because the labor movement is the only sector of the progressive community that possesses an expansive, organized membership base that is able to put its full support behind a broader agenda of social change. According to HERE’s David Koff (Interview, 2010):
One of the reasons the country is in the state it is is because at one point, thirty to forty percent of the labor force was in unions and now, it’s about six or seven percent in the private sector. None of what has happened in L.A. would have been possible without the rebirth and strengthening of the local labor movement, which was literally done door-by-door, worker-by-worker, bringing people into the labor movement. Just because someone belongs to a union doesn’t mean that they’re organized, they can pay their dues, but that might be the extent of it. The rank and file leadership in the hotel workers union and other unions is so critical that if you took that out of the equation in L.A., I just don’t think that many of these [progressive, working class] victories would have been won.

The labor movement can only be relevant to broader political struggles if it is strategic and aggressive about organizing its rank and file. Where the masses of the labor movement are energized, progressive agendas are much more likely to be viable.

In the concluding chapter of *Urban Problems and Community Development*, Ferguson (1999) cites trust as a crucial factor at every stage of collective action, especially as members learn more about their partners. Ferguson suggests that four trust-related questions are typically critical in coalition dynamics, including:

Can I trust that my allies have *motives* compatible with mine, so that the alliance is likely to serve, not undermine, the interests that I represent? Can I trust that my allies are *competent* (or can become competent) to do their part of the alliance? Can I trust that my allies have sufficient will and resources to be *dependable*? Can I trust that my allies will be respectfully *collegial*? (p. 592).

Like Ferguson, organizational theorist, Walter Powell, contends that when there is a high probability that coalition participants will collaborate in the future, organizations are not only more likely to work well with others, but they are also increasingly willing to punish those who do not play well with others. Thus, when groups repeatedly participate in coalitions together, the quality of inter-organizational relationships becomes increasingly important and the reputation of potential coalition participants weighs heavily in outreach efforts (Powell, 1990).
This phenomenon of increasing organizational interdependence over time is demonstrated across the three cases, as particular partners—such as LAANE, SAJE, Environmental Defense, NRDC, and the County Federation of Labor—turned to each other for support upon initiating new campaigns before they looked to other organizations’ input. In interviews, coalition participants acknowledged that each subsequent partnership established a greater degree of trust and familiarity among core organizations.

It is important to note that the burden of establishing trust is even greater for lead coalition organizations. Janis readily admitted the difficulty when she commented, “I think humility is a really key component. We [LAANE] don’t always need to take credit…It’s much harder to build coalitions if you’re determined to be the shining star” (Janis, Interview, 2010). Manuel Pastor, a professor in USC’s Geography department, echoed sentiments about LAANE’s ability to remain humble and garner the trust of other progressive organizations in Los Angeles:

LAANE has really increased in size and influence…They’re involved in just about everything. I’d say in the wake of the civil unrest [Rodney King riots in 1992], these organizations were of relatively equal size, influence, and capacity to mobilize. Although LAANE has more recently become the big gorilla in the room, it is respected but not resented (Pastor, Interview, 2010).

Humility is also important for coalitions that experience a relative degree of success. The way a coalition handles early success sets the tone for the degree of trust available for subsequent initiatives. Thus, accumulated trust can positively or adversely affect the pool of organizations that are willing to join future coalitions.

Access to sufficient resources is another key element of successful coalition building. In all three case studies, staffing resources increased over time. The Figueroa
Corridor Coalition staffed a director and organizer; the LAX Coalition employed a
director, organizer, and researcher; and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports dedicated a
director, two organizers, two researchers, and a communications specialist. The
c coalitions’ use of staffing resources established a significant degree of productivity and
accountability. My assessment of the case studies suggests that coalitions must rely on a
diverse set of talents in order to wage successful campaigns.

Organizing a successful coalition requires specific leadership roles to address
every component of the campaign. Strategic researchers inform coalitions about the
nature of complex issues, the political terrain that has to be navigated, and the best
strategic approach to use. Organizers are needed to develop methods for direct base
building and coalition cultivation, while communications staff find creative ways to lift
the voices of impacted constituents. Also, policy analysts must determine how to
strategically connect desired policies to real politics. Finally, legal consultants assist in
risk management and the technical drafting of policies. In order to have access to
adequate resources, core coalition organizations must engage in comprehensive
fundraising activities. Due to the political complexities involved in organizing around
sensitive issues, funding should not be disproportionately reliant on one major source –
not foundations, grassroots constituents, unions, or local philanthropists; instead
coalitions should seek a diverse range of funding sources.

Coalition building is not easy work. A study that examined the factors related to
strong collaborations found that “it takes a significant amount of time, effort, and
resources to design, develop, build, manage, and maintain inter-organizational networks,
but the payoffs can be substantial” (Mattesich & Monsey, 1992). The stories of the
Figueroa Corridor Coalition, the LAX Coalition, and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports elaborate the challenges and rewards associated with cultivating robust coalitions. The next section highlights issues related to capacity building in the three cases.

**Contributing Factor: Capacity Building**

Much like coalition building, cultivating the internal and external capacity necessary for collective action is a painstaking process. Because today’s progressive coalitions assume significant responsibilities in their fights for social justice, they must possess sufficient levels of capacity to perform their work well.

It is critical that progressive coalitions are internally governed in a way that facilitates democratic involvement, political education, and leadership development at the grassroots level, which largely qualifies coalitions as being “progressive.” To cultivate democratic governance, the Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s leaders facilitated tenant organizing, and provided opportunities for members to participate in city council meetings, land use hearings, and meetings with the developer. Coalition events’ often had 200 members attend – most notably during the coalition’s earliest attempts to get AEG to recognize its concerns.

Yet, several coalition organizers expressed deep dissatisfaction with their ability to involve community members (in a meaningful way) in the nine month-long negotiation process with the developer; the organizers were not able to do so because of time constraints and the infeasibility of training residents in the areas of expertise required to negotiate in the best interest of the coalition. To compensate for the minimal grassroots participation, community representatives observed each negotiation meeting and
regularly conveyed what transpired to the broader coalition members. With regard to the
Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s overall strategy, grassroots members were initially
effective in voicing resistance to L.A. Live’s approval (which assisted in getting AEG to
the negotiating table), but the primary approach was largely top-down, as a team of
experts (primarily the executive directors of the coalition’s core organizations) made a
good share of strategic decisions and represented the community in the coalition’s
negotiations with AEG.

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Although the LAX Coalition used community resistance to LAX's expansion plans to help get Los Angeles World Airports’ administrators to the negotiating table, a group of (predominantly) professional experts represented the coalition in negotiations with LAWA (which also happened with the Figueroa Corridor Coalition). The LAX negotiating team was, however, more diverse than the Figueroa Corridor Coalition because the team included community members who did not possess specialized
technical expertise at the negotiating table. As a reflection of the smaller number of organizations involved in the LAX Coalition, the coalition’s largest turnouts were only approximately 75 members – primarily at city council meetings.

Out of the three case studies, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports promoted democratic governance the best. The ports coalition has been deliberate about balancing between grassroots organizing and professional advocacy. Since the coalition’s beginning, members have engaged in press and lobbying trainings and have participated in commission meetings, organizing drives, meetings with public figures, community events, and political advocacy in Washington D.C. At the local level, the highest event turnout has been approximately 400 members. Widespread community mobilization has been consistent throughout the campaign, which has helped influence public decision makers to support the coalition’s demands. And although decision-making and strategy development are often initiated at the steering committee level, coalition leaders make efforts to ensure that decisions are regularly approved by the broader membership base.

The Coalition for Clean and Safe Port’s efforts to promote a greater degree of democratic control illustrate the amount of learning that takes place over time, as coalition leaders and participants discover the best ways to adhere to best practices in promoting the capacities of member organizations and their constituents.

While top-heavy strategies often do not promote progressive coalition work, it is important to acknowledge that under certain constraints (i.e., time and financial constraints), a centralized leadership structure may be an essential condition for coalition success. According to Gershwin (2003):

Centralization [of coalition leadership] appears to facilitate both integration and coordination, something that decentralized systems have a
difficult time accomplishing because of the number of organizations and linkages involved. In addition, monitoring and control over activities and outcomes by the core agency [or steering committee] become possible once a network is centralized. Such control may be critical for encouraging otherwise autonomous agencies to act in ways that lead to system-level, as opposed to agency goals” (p. 16).

Regarding the scales of political activism across these cases, although members of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition only engaged in activism at the local level, the LAX and ports campaigns required coalition participants to engage in activism on both the local and federal levels. In fact, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports often participates in local and national activism. As the campaign progressed, it had to “scale up” to the appropriate level of decision making in order to overcome opposition from private interests. For the past two years, coalition members have participated in the Capitol Hill lobbying day during the annual Good Jobs, Green Jobs national conference in Washington D.C.

*Contributing Factor: Winning Outcomes*

Although increased capacity can be considered an intermediate outcome of coalition work, it is difficult to deny that concrete victories – ones that have a lasting, positive impact in constituents’ lives – are the successes of collaboration. Often, tangible outcomes provide proof of the extent to which coalition activities influence public and private decision making. In the case of this dissertation’s three case studies, each coalition was able to achieve notable victories.
As outlined in Table 17, the outcomes of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s efforts include a living wage program, local hiring and job training for disadvantaged residents, affordable housing, a residential parking district, and the creation of community parks. The LAX Coalition established noise mitigation measures, a living wage program, local hiring and job training for disadvantaged residents, air quality controls, environmental mitigations, and further evaluative studies. The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports’ Clean Trucks Program banned polluting trucks from the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (on a phased timetable); provided an incentive program to drivers who replaced their old trucks; and restricted port access to trucking companies that meet the obligations of concession contracts, including meeting environmental, employment, and operational standards (although Long Beach did not implement employment standards). \(^{40}\)

At first glance, these outcomes may seem impressive. But how pleased are coalition participants with the outcomes achieved? Regarding the overall satisfaction with the terms the coalitions won in each of the three cases, LAANE’s Madeline Janis said (Interview, 2010):

\(^{40}\) It is important to note that tangible outcome measures were significantly limited due to the fact that major project delays occurred in both the L.A. Live development and the LAX expansion projects.
You know, hindsight is twenty-twenty. I can’t think of anything we would have thought of in the moment that would have made the outcomes stronger; but after the fact, absolutely. The L.A. Live CBA is full of weaknesses. A lot of it is not that useful or implementable. And a lot of what came out of L.A. Live isn’t even in the agreement. The good jobs, percentage of union jobs, and AEG’s influence in moving other developers to see responsible development as the way to go, as something that has positive business implications – those are more indirect outcomes...There are things in the LAX CBA that could be stronger for sure, especially on the jobs side. We got stuck for years with the problem of this old agreement that the school districts had signed in 1980. It was a terrible agreement that prohibited them from ever getting money for an ungodly amount of time, even though the kids were really suffering in those schools. And then there were legal issues dealing with the FAA. In terms of the ports, there are things in the Clean Trucks Programs I wish we had written differently. But I think our coalition building has been pretty good and the coalition has stuck together all this time. A main reason for that [the port coalition’s resilience] is we have a lot of resources dedicated to it.

The following comments by SAJE’s Gilda Haas echoes Janis’ lack of complete satisfaction with the coalitions’ outcomes. But Haas’ statements also highlight a major tension embodied in organizing for growth with equity. In reference to the Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s outcomes, Haas remarked (Interview, 2010):

At the time – twelve years ago – no one had done anything like this before, so it was pioneering. If you look at it [the L.A. Live CBA] from Jerilyn’s [Environmental Defense’s] point of view, it advanced an environmental justice frame. If you look at it from Madeline’s [LAANE’s] frame, it advanced community benefits and labor’s interests. If you look at it from my [SAJE’s] perspective, it was a stepping stone. But we were somewhat ambivalent because it was not that was not what we wanted. We didn’t want the Staples Center. We wanted stuff that would serve the community. So, we got a piece of what we wanted, but AEG got everything they wanted. But when you look at it from the perspective of the community getting nothing, it was a big deal. And out of that organizing, LAANE used those relationships to do other things. The relationships in the LAX Coalition and the Ports Coalition came out of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition.
Regarding her personal sentiments about the L.A. Live CBA outcomes and the general merits of utilizing CBAs as tools in progressive campaigns, the Director of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition stated (Interview, 2010):

There’s a lot of it that I’m personally very critical of and I think there are very legitimate criticisms of the actual document and the implementation. And I think being inside of it, I have criticisms of the organizing process, but overall, in the right context, it’s [the CBA] a useful model. But it has to be the right context. We didn’t go to Staples to get a CBA. We went to deal with the fact that there was this multi-billion dollar investment coming into our neighborhood and we wanted to deal with it. And the result was in that moment, given the conditions, the CBA was the best response.

McNeil’s comment that CBAs must be context-appropriate highlights that each coalition had to make an important decision between taking an explicitly oppositional approach versus a concessionary approach. Under the oppositional approach, projects (i.e., construction of L.A. Live, expansion of LAX, and continued growth in the port trucking sector) could have been hindered from moving forward. Yet, if community resistance ultimately proved to be unable to thwart projects, the developments may have progressed without taking any significant measures to mitigate community impacts or provide community benefits. According to Local 11’s David Koff (Interview, 2010):

In the Staples Center deal, I think it came close to 50-50 [the balance of power between FCCEJ and AEG]. If the developers said, ‘Screw you, we’re going to do it our way,’ it’s quite possible that they wouldn’t have gotten the development. But they couldn’t afford to do that for their own reasons. Even if we had been weaker on our side, they would have had to make some accommodations because they were under too much pressure in terms of time. And for the people who want developments to get done in time, delay is more expensive than coming to some sort of terms. But the final [L.A. Live] deal that came out in the CBA was far better than it would have been if the developers had just said, ‘We have to sprinkle some largesse around to buy these people off.’ It was far better because we were organized. Yet there were other developments where one could say that if the labor movement or community organizations were opposed to them, they wouldn’t have happened at all.
By taking a conciliatory approach, the coalitions strategically positioned themselves to support developments that they may have not truly wanted in their communities, in exchange for mitigations and benefits that they probably would have not otherwise received.

While some critics may view the concessionary stance in this type of labor and community organizing to be extortionary (such as those who oppose the imposition of measures such as development linkage policies and impact fees), an alternative view is that coalitions promote an agenda of community mitigation measures, and community benefits serve indirectly as market regulators. These community-induced regulations therefore, assist public and private interests in solving their own problems. In reference to this dialectical tension, Manuel Pastor (Interview, 2010) explained:

Basically, what we have going on is we’ve got a fragmented business class and in that landscape, a lot of progressive organizations have been able to raise issues of accountable development – and they’ve found that they have the political space to raise them. They’re really solving business’ problems. In the Figueroa Corridor, for example, what would have happened is the developers would have been unable to develop without a community benefits agreement. In LAX, they were trying to expand that airport for some time and it wasn’t until there was a community benefits agreement that the LAX expansion could move forward because it convinced people who were in the surrounding communities to stop opposing it. And around the Clean and Safe Ports, the logistics industry is absolutely crucial to the economy of Southern California. Essentially, while labor was seeking to solve its problems of organizing more workers [port truck drivers], it essentially solved the business problem of having too much opposition to the expansion of the ports and port traffic by pushing for clean and safe ports. So, on the one hand, this is a signal of a fragmented business community that can’t solve their own problems. And on the other hand, it’s also a signal of a fairly empowered group of progressives.

Pastor’s comments regarding the political fragmentation of Los Angeles’ business community and the increasing influence of the city’s progressive community introduce
the issue of whether the coalitions under review have had an impact on the dynamics of power in Los Angeles. This leads us to the next section, which discusses the results of the dissertation’s second research question.

**Research Findings: Question 2**

I used Tattersall’s (2010) last measure (i.e., shaping the broader political climate) to resolve the second research objective – understanding the extent to which a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the elitist agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful growth regime.

First, I examine this question through the lens of the three case coalitions for insight. Then, I draw from a broader source of data to draw conclusions about the possibilities of regime change in Los Angeles.

**Did the Coalitions Shift the Broader Political Climate?**

According to Tattersall (2010), an important element of coalitions’ success is the degree to which they are able to “shape the broader political climate and the environment within which future campaigns can be fought” (p. 23). To a large extent, progressive coalitions’ political opportunities to inject themselves in urban governance depend on the relative strength and organization of the local business sector. If the business community is well-organized, as has been the case in Los Angeles and other major cities historically, subversive forces will have a much more difficult time altering power relations. On the other hand, if the business sector lacks a strong foundation of collaboration, a political vacuum may be available for alternative coalitions to wield power.
As detailed in Table 18, in the cases of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition and the LAX Coalition, the private sector remained practically silent about their support for or disapproval of the two community benefits agreements. In the ports case, certain segments of the private sector (i.e., primarily shippers and retailers) galvanized intense opposition against the portion of the Clean Trucks Program that imposed regulations on labor misclassification. A common thread across all cases, however, was the general change in attitude that occurred over time. Several coalition participants and their counterparts on the other side of the table commented on the fact that the coalitions were not immediately taken seriously as equal negotiating parties. It was only through the process of negotiations that the public and private representatives on the other side of the table gradually came to acknowledge and respect the competencies of their community-based negotiating partners. Not only did the coalitions’ organizing targets come to accept the coalitions’ value, but they also admitted that they appreciated many of the improvements that were made to their initial plans as a result of the coalitions’ input (particularly in the CBA cases).

<table>
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<th>Table 18. Shifting the Political Climate</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Figueroa Corridor Coalition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Private Sector Response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector did not intervene. After initially snubbing FCCEJ, AEG eventually responded favorably to unified community-labor front</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Major Opponents</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>None, but two coalition partners refused to sign the final agreement in order to maintain their right to suit AEG</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAX Coalition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector did not intervene because they wanted airport expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition for Clean &amp; Safe Ports</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>There was/is fierce private sector opposition to employee-mandate for truck drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Inglewood, City of El Segundo, County of Los Angeles, and the Alliance for a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion (ARSAC) wanted to stop LAX expansion and take a regional approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Trucking Association, LA Chamber of Commerce, Harbor Truckers for a Sustainable Future, Future Ports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Champions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
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<td>Sustained/Extended Relationships</td>
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It is clear that public and private sector interests in L.A. have come to view members of the progressive community (and especially broad-based, working-class coalitions) as the possessors of important political resources. For instance, after admitting that the LAX Master Plan was significantly improved due to the expertise of the LAX Coalition’s negotiating team, the Deputy Director of Operations for Los Angeles World Airports remarked, “I think there seems to be a resignation on the business side that they [private sector interests] have to provide some concessions…They [progressive coalitions] are a constant presence in the city’s political fabric now and I think there is a recognition on the business part that to make something happen in the City of Los Angeles, you have to partner with these groups” (Mengistu, Interview, 2010).

To a large degree, the ability of the progressive community to capitalize on openings in the political opportunity structure depends on coalitions’ scope and degree of cohesion (i.e., the effectiveness of their organizing). While no major external opponents obstructed the Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s efforts, two coalition partners ultimately refused to sign the final community benefits agreement because they wanted to maintain their legal rights to suit AEG. In the case of the LAX Coalition, the stakeholders in the surrounding area were initially extremely fragmented about the actions that should have been taken to address the expansion proposals. The cities of Inglewood and El Segundo,
the County of Los Angeles, and the Alliance for a Regional Solution to Airport Congestion (ARSAC) either wanted to stop LAX’s expansion altogether or take a regional approach to increasing air traffic. Although L.A.’s progressive community was extremely united behind the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports, the coalition encountered significant opposition from private sector entities such as the American Trucking Association, the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, Harbor Truckers for a Sustainable Future, and the Future Ports Coalition.

In all cases, several high-profile champions worked to advance the coalitions’ agendas. Miguel Contreras, head of the LA County Federation of Labor, was extremely influential in using his political connections for the Figueroa Corridor and LAX Coalition. Upon Contreras’ untimely death in 2005, his widow, Maria Elena Durazo (Contreras’ successor at the County Federation of Labor) exercised her political influence in support of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. This power couple (Miguel Contreras and Maria Elena Durazo) possessed extensive connections in the halls of local and state power and they unabashedly used their influence on behalf of Los Angeles’ working residents. Councilwoman Janice Hahn (sister to previous Mayor James Hahn) was an early, ardent supporter of both the LAX Coalition and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. This point of leverage has been critical because both the airport and the port lie within Hahn’s district and L.A.’s council people wield a great amount of power in the decisions that affect their jurisdictions. As detailed in the case studies, Los Angeles’ Mayors have also played key roles in advancing the agendas of the coalitions. In fact, Mayor James Hahn could be considered the chief advocate of the LAX Coalition. When
asked about the motivation behind Mayor Hahn’s strong support for the LAX Coalition, LAWA’s Mengistu remarked:

It was his cold political calculation that their [the LAX Coalition] support was instrumental in carrying the expansion through. But I also think Mayor Hahn was a guy who was not going to ram something through. He wanted to build consensus and he saw the agreement as consensus. There were some good things in the form of community benefits, so I think he’d tell you it was the right thing to do.

The Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports has found a loyal supporter in Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. Regarding the mayor’s commitment, Janis stated (Interview, 2010):

He [Mayor Villaraigosa] has done some amazing things. He’s been incredibly great with the ports. He’s been vilified in the industry press, but he has stuck with us. And in terms of our living wage ordinance for the service sector around the airport, he stuck with those workers and those communities through thick and thin. And there are other examples where he’s been really strong.

Each of the coalitions has made a significant impact on the local and national political context. The Figueroa Corridor Coalition’s L.A. Live CBA was the first CBA in the nation and has been used as a model around the country. Since the L.A. Live agreement in 2001, several CBAs were negotiated in L.A., including the NoHo Commons CBA, the LAX Airport Expansion CBA, and the Grand Avenue CBA. Additionally, the progressive groups in L.A. that pioneered and expanded CBAs have successfully advocated several accountable development policies, including a big-box retail policy, a construction careers policy, and a job retention policy. Moreover, after a decade of proliferation in cities across the country, experimentation with CBAs has produced a diversity of locally-determined provisions (including living wage requirements, local hiring preferences, job training, affordable housing, environmental remediation, green
space, recreation facilities, and child care clinics) (Annie E. Casey, 2007; Salkin, 2007; Wolf-Powers, 2010).

These “wins” are not minor, considering the fact that - due to the grossly imbalanced power dynamics of urban politics, stakeholders in low- and moderate-income communities have historically been on the losing end of urban redevelopment decisions (Ho, 2008). However, what is most remarkable is the fact that CBAs have motivated historically-divergent community sectors (i.e. local nonprofits, labor unions, and faith-based organizations) to abandon long-standing silos and leverage collective power through coalitions similar to the Figueroa Corridor Coalition across the nation.

In reference to overall influence, the LAX CBA has been the most expansive CBA in the country to-date. Many of the relationships cultivated in the LAX Coalition were carried over into the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports. Lastly, the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports has experienced the broadest impact, as litigation surrounding L.A.’s Clean Trucks Program has cultivated a national coalition for good jobs and clean environments surrounding the nation’s largest ports. The national Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports consists of more than 150 organizations around the country and is locally-rooted in port cities like L.A., such as Oakland, Seattle, Newark, and New York. Federal legislation in support of the coalition’s agenda was introduced in 2010 by Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and is being promoted by more than sixty Congressional co-sponsors.

When asked about how the three case study coalitions were able to build on each other, Madeline Janis explained:

L.A. Live, LAX, and the ports campaign represent a natural progression over time. As a result of those coalitions, we’ve [LAANE] come to our
current structure and analysis of what it’s going to take over a long period of time to win. It took a lot of experimentation, innovation, failures, and successes. When we started working on L.A. Live, we were just beginning to think about how we could make future development contribute to a better city. And how do we build campaigns around future developments that help us build our power? So LA Live was a result of a couple of years of work we had done around the Hollywood and Highland. When we joined FCCEJ, we suggested the CBA as a tool to deal with the concerns about potential negative impacts. We had already been talking about community benefits plans, but at that time, we were significantly focused on the tourism industry – we weren’t organized the same way we are now around sectors. When the LAX expansion modernization came up, we had built relationships with some environmentalists during L.A. Live and we brought those people to the table. We had been doing some organizing around Inglewood and Lennox, like Wal-Mart and Century Boulevard for years and the work at the airport itself, so we had the idea to do another CBA, which was a new way of looking at a potentially bad project. So, we built on the LA Live to negotiate the LAX CBA. By the time we got involved in the ports campaign in 2006, we had determined that we would be most efficient if we structured ourselves around industries. So the ports campaign was a new project in partnership with the Teamsters and Change to Win, which was about the trucking industry. Again, we brought a lot of the same people [from prior coalitions] to the table.

Janis’ statement suggests that progressive communities that engage in repeated collaboration, over time, achieve increasing returns for their efforts – particularly in the form of relationship building and institutional learning.

As these three cases of conflict, negotiation, and collaboration have inevitably brought the public, private, and civic sectors in closer contact with one another, it is important to reflect on the ways in which the sectors have related to one another. As explicated in the Figueroa Coalition Case, a great deal of mutual respect was established between the coalition and AEG’s lead developer, Ted Tanner. Beyond the negotiations process, AEG has served as an ambassador, extolling the benefits of CBAs for private sector actors. An even greater degree of rapport was established between LAX Coalition members and the Los Angeles World Airports’ executives. After engaging in months of
negotiations, each side found it easier move beyond simple vilifications of one another and actually developed personal and professional relationships that have lasted to this day. Airport executives agreed that they would engage in future negotiations with community representatives (although they preferred that all potential stakeholders be at the negotiating table to avoid dealing with separate groups, which was the case after the LAX CBA was signed and parties outside the coalition challenged them with litigation). While the ports campaign has cultivated a greater degree of trust between members of the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports and certain public officials in Los Angeles, relations between the coalition and private sector interest groups remain tense, at best.

Although the coalition members were able to build bonds with public and private sector actors, they were still careful to maintain a high degree of autonomy, avoid threats of cooptation, and remain steadfast in accurately reflecting and advancing the interests of working class residents. And ultimately, the relationships that were nurtured in the three cases cultivated political capital which can be drawn upon as resources in future progressive campaigns.

While the three examined coalitions illuminate certain case-specific dynamics related to progressive coalition building, it is important to note that the cases (although important) are only components of a much larger picture. They do not, in themselves (even if summed), convey the complete story of how the progressive community fits into L.A.’s broader spectrum of urban governance. The next section, therefore, briefly explores the broader dynamics of politics and power in Los Angeles.

*Openings in L.A.’s Broader Political Opportunity Structure*
In *Power in Movement*, Sidney Tarrow (1998) asserts that the viability of social movements is highly dependent on the nature of political opportunity structures. According to Tarrow, openings in political opportunity structures (which may potentially be capitalized on by strategic social movements) include increasing access to power, shifting political alignments, divisions among elites, influential allies, and strong grievances.

One of the primary political shifts that occurred in recent decades has been the transition of power that took place when the Tom Bradley won L.A.’s 1973 election. Prior to Mayor Bradley’s tenure, a largely white, corporate Republican axis of power was deeply rooted in downtown Los Angeles. The durability of this power structure was tested by the 1965 Watts riots, which made it impossible for anyone to ignore L.A.’s tense race relations and heightening economic disparities. In many ways, the Watts riots assisted Bradley in solidifying a biracial political alliance between Blacks and liberal Whites (primarily Jews) in Los Angeles. This political marriage was grounded in the power bases of the historically African American part of Los Angeles – South L.A. – and an ethnic community that had historically been shut out of the city’s political circles – Jews in L.A. (Sonenshein, 1993). Due to the recognition that L.A.’s old, conventional development strategy was not working effectively (as reflected in the Watts riots), Bradley’s vision for downtown development garnered a significant deal of support from the business community. The mayor’s downtown development strategy was based on the idea that targeted development in downtown L.A. would eventually “trickle down” to outlying, low-income neighborhoods. But by Bradley’s third term, it had become plainly clear that downtown development was not benefitting working class residents in a
meaningful way. The failures of Bradley’s economic development policies gave rise to innovative ideas and activities (which surfaced within L.A.’s progressive community), such as the promotion of strategies like linked development, which would use downtown development to benefit economically-disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Although there were some nascent attempts to mobilize behind a progressive agenda after the Watts riots, it wasn’t until the riots of 1992 occurred that L.A.’s progressive community devoted itself to taking coordinated, strategic action. Regarding the catalyst provided by the 1992 uprising surrounding the Rodney King incident, Manuel Pastor (Interview, 2010) stated:

The civil unrest in 1992 sort of crystallized the idea that as much as you wanted to blame Bradley for downtown development that didn’t incorporate people and offered little more than symbolic representation (meaning that African Americans and Latinos got into decision making and public employment during the Bradley era), or as much as you might blame the conservative regime of President George Bush, Sr., it was pretty clear that if you had people pissed off enough to burn down their own city and you hadn’t been able to channel that into anything progressive, there was something wrong with the progressive movement.

In essence, the 1992 riots gave birth to several new social change organizations in Los Angeles. Additionally, the riots adversely affected Mayor Bradley’s popularity with L.A. residents. In 1993, Bradley announced his retirement.

At the time, there was a marked decline in the influence of L.A.’s business elite. This was primarily fueled by the city’s rapid loss of Fortune 500 company headquarters and the rise of a fragmented, small business community that didn’t possess the adequate resources or capacities required to coordinate a solid agenda of private sector civic engagement. The fragmented response of the private sector after the 1992 diverged significantly from the cohesive actions taken by the business community post-Watts in
1965, when business elites knew that Bradley was the best person to champion their interests. Although there was an initial sense of confusion about who the business community should back, Richard Riordan was able to galvanize a sufficient degree of support (Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2001). Riordan, who was a wealthy attorney and business investor, was viewed by the private sector as someone who was capable of moving the city forward (Riordan’s campaign slogan was “tough enough to turn L.A. around”). Yet, because Riordan was also a Catholic who espoused to be devoted to an agenda of social justice, he was a palatable, pragmatic Republican candidate for L.A.’s largely Democratic political base (Milkman, 2010; Pastor, 2010). Riordan won a decisive victory in the city’s 1993 election.

Another important piece of the puzzle lays in the fact that the advancement of progressive thinking and action, the transition of power from Bradley to Riordan, and the general decline of elite influence in the early 1990s coincided with the revitalization of L.A.’s labor movement. Several labor unions in L.A. had begun to organize immigrant workers and develop leadership structures that were more representative of the city’s changing demographics. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, an important factor in determining whether robust community-labor alliances can be built is the context-dependent history of organized labor (Fine, 2005; Sites, 2007; Wolf-Powers, 2010). According to Turner’s (2007) typology, Los Angeles is classified as a “frontier city”, which means that it had a weak labor movement until the 1990s – as opposed to older industrial cities like New York, which developed a strong, entrenched (and often corrupt) labor movement after World War II. While Democratic Clubs and other potentially-progressive mediums of power had been almost nonexistent in L.A., labor has worked to
strategically insert itself as an influential player that would provide a counterbalance to the business community (Milkman, Interview, 2010). Due to its innovative approaches to organizing, visionary leaders, and earnest desire to incorporate immigrant communities and other sectors of the progressive community into its work, L.A.’s labor movement worked diligently to cultivate and exert its strength in the early 1990s. Regarding this rebirth of certain sector of L.A.’s labor movement, HERE Local 11’s Strategic Researcher, David Koff (Interview, 2010), commented:

In the late 80s, the leadership of the hotel workers union [HERE Local 11] was still a bunch of old white guys who were completely out of touch with the changing nature of the membership, which was increasingly immigrant and increasingly women who were housekeepers and room attendants. So when Maria Elena [Durazo] ran an insurgent campaign to become the head of the union in the late 80s that was the beginning of the change. The union had been decimated [under previous leadership] because there wasn’t any organizing going on in the hotels. By 1992, the union won this city-wide contract, the best contract it had in years and that proved to the power structure in L.A. that the hotel workers had to be taken seriously. It was a huge turning point.

While the rise in labor’s power was the product of a broad spectrum of visionary actors, two labor leaders stand out as being particularly influential. Miguel Contreras, who became a labor activist for United Farm Workers upon meeting Cesar Chavez in the 1960s, took the helm of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor in 1996. (Prior to assuming the leadership of the County Fed, Contreras had served as the National Organizer of Local 11 and as the Political Director of the County Fed.) The President of Local 11 (who happened to be Contreras’ wife), Maria Elena Durazo, also provided strong leadership for the labor movement. Contreras, Durazo, and numerous other players were strategic in their thinking about how to incorporate the labor movement into
L.A.’s broader power structure. In reference to their shift in consciousness, Koff continued:

So after the union won the contract in 1992, that’s when the leadership of Local 11 had some meetings and we realized that we had proof that we had the power we believed we had and we were able to make an impact on the power structure. So we asked ourselves, ‘Well, why should we stop? We’re just going to define ourselves as part of the economy of LA.’ One of the things we needed to do to make that happen was extend and add to our capacity. That is why LAANE was set up. It was separate from the union, but we saw it as a way to raise money from foundations and other sources for research and initiatives that were not [directly affiliated with] the labor movement or the hotel union, but an organization that was an activist think tank. Not just to put out white papers, but to work with, side by side, other progressive organizations and particularly the other unions. Because the goal of LAANE was to improve the economic and living conditions of working class residents in Los Angeles, and who were the members of the union? They were the same people. They [other progressive organizations] were working on their track and the unions had been working on their track. But there was a day where 8, 9, or 10 of us were sitting together in the regular strategy meeting and we decided we weren’t going to operate on the outside of L.A.’s political structure anymore. We were going to be part of this.

Contreras took calculated measures to promote labor’s position in the political landscape. For instance, he found common ground with Mayor Riordan (as fellow-Catholics) and established a strong working relationship with him, which proved to be critical to several of labor’s achievements during this period of movement revitalization (Milkman, Interview, 2010; Purcell, Interview, 2010).

The heated debate over California’s Proposition 187 ballot initiative in 1994 – which threatened to enact a statewide citizenship screening system to ban illegal immigrants from accessing public education, health care, and other social services – further emboldened Contreras and other progressive leaders to work from a position of power. According to labor historian Ruth Milkman (Interview, 2010):
When he [Contreras] saw the potential to mobilize immigrants politically and the reactive naturalization that occurred in response to Prop 187, Contreras saw that labor could be a real force in the political vacuum that had existed until then. Immigrants got scared and mobilized massive demonstrations. The ones who were legal and able to become citizens did so, and were able to vote. Before that, business [the business community] ran the show. Then suddenly this 800 pound gorilla [the labor movement] showed up. That’s really the story.

In the late 1990s, the foundation of L.A.’s progressive, coalition-based infrastructure was solidified, particularly due to the successful Justice for Janitors campaign and the victorious fight to pass the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance. The dynamics of power at the end of the 1990s can be characterized as such – an increasingly fragmented business regime (that was historically-dominant) and the rise of an increasingly cohesive progressive coalition, which capitalized on (and proactively facilitated) openings in the political opportunity structure to advance the interests of working class residents.

Yet, in the early 2000s, shifts in the broader political environment began to reflect ominous threats to the growth and sustainability of this progressive coalition. The incident that initiated these changes was the 2003 recall election of California governor Gray Davis and the rise of Davis’ successor, Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. In reference to this shift, Milkman remarked:

That’s when they [the labor movement] began to run into problems, less so in L.A., but statewide. When Schwarzenegger became governor, there were all these attacks on unions, and the whole landscape changed. In Los Angeles, it was a little better than the rest of the state, but the golden age for labor revitalization in L.A. took place between 1996 and 2003. And then California’s economy started to fall apart even before 2008. It’s hard to realize this, but in the late 1990s, California was a totally different place. Right now, it is bankruptcy central, but then, the state budget was in surplus. There was the Silicon Valley boom, the stock market boom, the housing development boom, and they didn’t know what to do with all of
that money. That was only 10 years ago and labor benefitted from that strong economy in the 90s.

Moreover, during L.A.’s “golden age of labor revitalization,” Democrats controlled both houses of the State Legislature and the Governor’s office. On the state level during that time, Los Angeles progressives were often successful in their efforts to pass legislation that advanced the interests of working class Californians. For instance, they passed the California Paid Family Leave bill and attempted to pass legislation that would prohibit the use of public money to fight unions (the policy was eventually struck down in court when the business community went after it). However, California’s progressive legislative coalition has been significantly eroded since Schwarzenegger took office. In addition to the deterioration of California’s statewide political coalition, infighting in the local and broader labor movement during the late 2000s began to undermine the progressive community’s political gains (Sidoti, 2009).

While the local, state, and national political and economic context in the latter half of the 2000s was not nearly as conducive to the expansion of L.A.’s progressive infrastructure as it was in the 1990s, continued efforts have been made to advance the progressive agenda. In an effort to explicate the dynamics of Los Angeles’ power structure throughout the 2000s in greater detail – and to specify the elements of the local state that shaped the opportunities and limitations of advancing the progressive agenda – the following section outlines influential actors and institutions that comprised L.A.’s public sector, private sector, and progressive sector between 2000 and 2010.

*The Power of the Public Sector*
Collectively, the power of the entities and actors that comprise L.A.’s public sector has been severely constrained in recent decades – as the city has had to respond to trends such as a retrenching federal government, major budgetary deficits, and mounting demands for collective consumption goods. These and other constraints have significantly weakened the local state’s capacity to act as a strong partner in the regime for growth.

*Mayor Villaraigosa.* After serving in the California State Assembly as the Speaker of the Assembly, Antonio Villaraigosa entered L.A.’s 2001 mayoral election, riding a wave of progressive enthusiasm. Although Villaraigosa lost the 2001 election to James Hahn, he was victorious against Hahn in the 2005 election. Regarding Villaraigosa’s ultimate electoral success, HERE’s David Koff (Interview, 2010) stated:

There was euphoria amongst his [Villaraigosa’s] supporters in the labor movement and elsewhere that this was an incipient revolution - a dream of our ballot box revolution. Although he wasn’t elected in 2001, the Villaraigosa campaign was like the froth on top of a river where the currents are very, very strong and flowing in a certain way. And sometimes the froth that builds up looks very pretty, but it dissipates. But that was not what happened after he lost in 2001. He was able to carry the strong currents over to the 2005 election, which was made possible by all this other stuff that had been going on for so many years at the grassroots and community level and with the unions. Although the currents didn’t carry him over the top in 2001, they did in 2005.

It is important to note that during Villaraigosa’s 2005 run, the labor movement (i.e., the County Federation of Labor) could not officially support his candidacy because Mayor Hahn had met the demands of labor during his term. Contreras and other labor leaders did not want labor to be viewed as a disloyal political partner.

As explained in an earlier chapter, there was a push to reform the L.A. City Charter in the early 2000s, which largely stripped L.A.’s City Council of its role as the
city’s primary governing body and provided the mayor with direct control over the city’s administration. Yet, the charter reform did not fully convert L.A.’s weak mayor system into a strong mayor system – it became more of a hybrid system (Purcell, 2002). After his election in 2005, Mayor Villaraigosa attempted to build consensus with the City Council. But Villaraigosa’s legacy as an effective progressive leader has been questioned over the course of his two terms (he was re-elected in 2009).

Early in his tenure, Villaraigosa was catapulted to center stage of the national political arena when he was featured on the cover of *Newsweek* in a May 30, 2005 article entitled “Latino Power,” which celebrated Villaraigosa’s success in energizing L.A.’s Latino voters and other elements of a progressive coalition. In an August 13, 2005 article in *Time*, Villaraigosa was named one of the country’s 25 most influential Latinos. Capitalizing on these opportunities for national exposure, however, Villaraigosa has been viewed by many as being overly-concerned with photo-ops, press conferences, and political appearances across the country and world. For instance, in a September 2008 article in the *LA Weekly*, the mayor was criticized for being distracted with an agenda of self-promotion (for his aspirations of becoming California’s next governor), and spending only eleven percent of his time performing work directly related to city business. Yet another feature – on the cover of the June 2009 issue of *Los Angeles Magazine* – bore a portrait of Mayor Villaraigosa with the title, ”Failure. So Much Promise, So Much Disappointment” blazoned across the page. Outside of his tactics of self-promotion, Villaraigosa’s personal issues with marital infidelity have adversely impacted his public image. Regarding these challenges, one interviewee (a city administrator who preferred to remain unnamed) stated:
When he came into office, there were high expectations of the Mayor and there was just so much energy. The Mayor had his own energy, he was out and about as opposed to James Hahn and there was this sense of bullishness that something good would happen in L.A., whether it was development, or reputation, or getting the city departments into good condition. But the Mayor – there’s something that happened in his personal life – and the economy was really bad. So you have the budget holes and he wasn’t able to do the things he wanted to do. Then there was sluggishness on the part of his administration and I think he really wanted to fuse his reputation back on solid footing. It seems he thought he’d do that by bringing in some of these business people and giving them unprecedented power so they could implement some changes.

Villaraigosa’s early progressive supporters have mixed opinions regarding his achievements. While many progressives feel that there has been greater accessibility to the channels of power in the local state under his tenure, others feel that he has not gone far enough in advancing the social change agenda on which he so adamantly campaigned.

Manuel Pastor (Interview, 2010) commented on Villaraigosa’s limitations as a mayor:

There’s a limited set of things he can do. There are left groups that tend to fall into the thinking that if only he had guts, they’d be okay. But a mayor can’t push too much politically. It’s like people say, ‘Why can’t Obama do x?’ Well, Obama can’t do more than we can organize and support him to do or force him to do. What’s interesting here is there’s a pretty smart group of progressive leaders who understand that very point…One thing that happens when people lose is they tend to get bitter and blame the other side. In a fight that SCOPE lost, Anthony Thigpen’s perspective was that they [SCOPE] weren’t strong enough.

According to Pastor, many progressive leaders acknowledge the fact that as a politically ambitious mayor of a large city, Villaraigosa is going to attempt to be development savvy. While he is expected to promote an agenda of progressive development policies (when made to do so through effective organization), it is also understood – especially in this difficult economic recession – that he is equally likely to attempt to make business interests comfortable by doing things like streamlining the permitting process and doing
the kinds of things that will get people to invest. In fact, most of his recent proposals have incorporated aspects of smart growth for downtown development.

But many progressives think Villaraigosa has gone too far to accommodate business interests, particularly after he recently received a wave of harsh public criticism. Regarding unmet expectations in the progressive community, Sandra McNeil (Interview, 2010) exclaimed:

And Villaraigosa - please! We’re all so disappointed in him it’s just a tragedy. What happened? I don’t know. It’s like he looks in the mirror too much and thinks about his political future. We all were so excited and backed him through two rounds. But he’s just not willing to move a progressive vision and put his weight behind things. It’s a huge lost opportunity. He had progressives, liberals, organized labor, and developers and he hasn’t done much with that. So we’re all very, very, very disenchanted.

According to Rev. Smart, Villaraigosa has also been unsuccessful in garnering the support of L.A.’s African American community. Many observers, like Smart, feel that over time, Villaraigosa has made a marked shift from the left to the right over time. Rev. Smart (Interview, 2010) argued:

Rather than taking the unions’ recommendations for a better city and making the necessary cuts to budget, he’s cutting jobs. I think that AFSME, who didn’t support him [in his campaigns] and are predominantly black, he cut a lot of those jobs. But people say he’s cut SEIU too. Why? Because of what the Fed [County Federation of Labor] did before - supporting Hahn in the election because he did everything labor asked. Antonio was our friend, but he [Mayor Hahn] had done everything labor asked. Miguel [Contreras] clearly understood you can’t let politicians think, ‘Ok, I go along with you with every legislation, but I can’t count on you when someone else jumps in an election.’ So, they [labor] had to support Hahn. Because Villaraigosa was planning to run for governor, he has aligned himself and brought in some people from the business community that have really steered him in a different direction, more to the right.
According to LAWA’s Mengistu, evidence of Villaraigosa’s recent political shift can be seen in his establishment of a business-oriented advisory committee more than a year ago. The group was comprised of “heavy hitters” in the business community – such as the head of one of the larger banks, a major airline, USC, and prominent developers and attorneys. Mengistu stated, “They may have shifted some of his positions, but it’s not covered in the local media. They may still be around, but I don’t know.”

Several individuals noted a correlation between the shift in Villaraigosa’s political leanings and Miguel Contreras’ untimely death in 2005. Antonio Villaraigosa had close personal ties to labor leaders Miguel Contreras and Maria Elena Durazo (Villaraigosa was a pallbearer in Contreras’ funeral). In reference to this relationship, Ruth Milkman (Interview, 2010) commented:

Miguel and Villaraigosa were very close for decades and there was this informal network of folks in the labor movement and politics. But that didn’t mean that nothing else mattered, because on the other hand, he had to run the city. And especially in times like these, when there’s very little money, there have been run-ins between the Mayor’s Office and labor because the city just can’t meet the demands that need to be met. Villaraigosa tends to be more in conflict with the public sector unions, who are negotiating directly with the city. Still, Villaraigosa and Maria Elena Durazo talk. I don’t know if they’re best friends, but they’re in constant communication and they influence each other.

Several interviewees suggested that if Villaraigosa had been elected in 2001, the momentum that would have gotten him elected would have been the momentum of the labor movement and the broader progressive community. But by 2005, he was much more of a conventional politician. A direct reflection of this shift lies in the fact that early during Mayor Villaraigosa’s second term, he waged an overhaul of several of his left-leaning department heads and replaced them with people from the private sector. While these changes created clashes across several departments, the Mayor has largely
sided with the agendas of his new administrators. Two examples of Villaraigosa’s overhaul can be seen in the L.A. Community Redevelopment Authority (CRA) and the Planning Department.

Villaraigosa’s initial pick for CRA Executive Director, Cecilia Estrolano, had taken innovative directions in leveraging private investment for community economic development until she stepped down from her position in 2010. (In the opinion of some observers, Estrolano was forced out.) With regard to the CRA’s new direction, Pastor (Interview, 2010) commented:

The CRA will take a creative turn because Cecilia was creative and innovative. What I heard from her is that it’s difficult to move an institution that big because you have a lot of civil servant types who aren’t creative about things like job training programs that reach out to youth. They had never done that before.

Another early Villaraigosa pick, Gail Goldberg, left the helm of L.A.’s Planning Department in 2010. Several interviewees mentioned that L.A.’s planning department is institutionally weak and has, historically, only played a minor role in addressing the region’s most pressing planning issues. Under Goldberg (an advocate of community-oriented planning), there were tensions between the desires of neighborhood interests and pro-development interests. The primary debates were over streamlining the permitting process, and updating specific and neighborhood plans. Mengistu (Interview, 2010) stated, “She said she was leaving on her own, but there was sort of an abrupt nature to it. It didn’t look like she had done everything she wanted to do.”

Villaraigosa also shook up his own staff, hiring a new Chief Deputy Mayor and Chief of Staff. Because job creation was a major centerpiece of his 2009 campaign, Mayor Villaraigosa felt that he should create a position for a “jobs czar” to ensure that
economic development was a top administrative priority across the city’s bureaucracy. For the jobs czar position, Villaraigosa hired billionaire private equity investor and merchant banker Austin Beutner to oversee “thirteen city departments, including Planning and Building and Safety as well as the Convention Center, the DWP, the airport and the harbor” (Rutten, 2010). Holding one of the highest positions of authority in L.A., Beutner agreed to a salary of only $1 a year. While the thirteen departments report directly to Beutner, Beutner is directly accountable to Villaraigosa.

Although Mayor Villaraigosa has been at the helm of leadership in Los Angeles for the majority of the past decade, it is important to note that he (like his predecessors) has faced significantly limited options as a result of the city’s weak-mayor system and because of the broader set of constraints that hamper the choices of local governments in the United States.

Los Angeles City Council. While there are other powerful players and institutions, there is a general consensus that the Los Angeles City Council is the most influential public body in L.A. The council is comprised of fifteen members who are elected from fifteen districts across the city. According to the authors of The Next Los Angeles, L.A.’s early elites established, in essence, a “mini-fiefdom” where the city’s fifteen council members exercised almost unilateral control over development and contracting decisions (Gottlieb et al., 2005). This structure has proved to be challenging for a number of reasons. Sandra McNeil (Interview, 2010), who is the current Executive Director of the Figueroa Corridor Community Land Trust, remarked:

The whole structure of city council is so challenging to us because they operate as their own little fiefdoms. So if you have a good relationship and are moving an effort that is supported by your district’s council person, you’re going to get it done. But if you’re trying to get something done
inside your district that’s opposed by your council person, you’re not going to get it done. So, that whole structure is ridiculous and it’s why since the old council president Ferraro – who was running city council for decades – after he died, the council has not worked as a cohesive body. It’s a little bit better under Garcetti than it has been in awhile, but it has not recovered its ability to function as a body. And when it was functioning as a body under Ferraro, and it wasn’t necessarily serving the interests of the people. But it functioned, they could make decisions together. And now, it’s like everyone gets their own area.

Koff (Interview, 2010), from HERE Local 11, echoed McNeil’s sentiments about the strength of the city council and explained how elements of the labor movement strategically took advantage of councilors’ power:

The political power structure is that the city council is really the most important body. The mayor is important, but not as strong as in other cities. By the late 1990s there were enough members of the city council who had either historical relationships with the labor movement. Almost all the Latino and African American members of the city council had close ties with the labor movement. The hotel workers, in particular, because there were so many issues the hotel workers union had to deal with when people wanted to build hotels as a part of new developments. The hotel workers had been involved in land use issues and approvals since the late 1980s. We had a lot of expertise about what the community redevelopment agency was all about, what the land use process was all about, what the various approvals were, and how to mount opposition or criticism that was not predicated on appealing to some elected official’s sense of obligation or duty to the labor movement, because in L.A. at some point in the 1980s there was a legal case that is referred to Golden State and it was a situation where some city council members had predicated awarding a contract to a taxi company on the company settling a labor dispute, and that is absolutely a no-no. The city paid a lot of money because of that. And what the hotel workers union and anyone who has worked with them in a coalition understands is that if you’re going to raise a question or put forward a position that such and such development shouldn’t get approval, you’ve got to make a case on the merits. You can’t just come up with some flimflam knowing that your friends on the land use committee are voting for it and, therefore, they’re going to support you automatically. It doesn’t work that way. I mean, ultimately, they may want to support you and they may take your interpretation rather than someone else’s, but you’ve still got to bring something that stands on merits...All this to say that by the late 90s, the power structure of L.A. and many, many members of the city council were certainly accessible to the labor movement.
As illustrated in Koff’s reflection, Local 11 developed a great degree of strategic experience dealing with L.A.’s city council over time. Based on her legal expertise, LAANE’s Madeline Janis also acknowledged the importance of maintaining the understanding that LAANE cannot simply throw money at the city council in order to get their objectives accomplished.

Arguably, the plans of the city’s early elites have backfired on current elites because gaining control over the group of highly-fragmented council members is a much more complicated endeavor than it was in the past.

*Los Angeles County Supervisors.* The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors is a five-member nonpartisan governing structure that wields an immense amount of power (i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial) over the county’s 9.5 million residents. In reference to this statistic, Pastor (Interview, 2010) stated, “Each of those Supervisors has more constituents than the typical U.S. Congressional District, so they wield enormous power.”

While the board is comprised of a “thin liberal majority,” County Supervisor Mark Ridley Thomas has been one of the progressive community’s primary allies since his election in 2007. Thomas, the first African American ever elected to the L.A. County Board of Supervisors, has provided a shift in the board’s leanings. According to Sandra McNeil (Interview, 2010), Mark “is not perfect, but he’s so much better. The ability to have someone at the county level is huge for us [progressives], and he’ll be there forever since they don’t go away. That was a very important win, getting Mark in.” Supervisor Thomas received strong backing from local labor unions, the Los Angeles County Democratic Party, and many elected officials.
Again, the consolidation of political power within this five-member board implies that campaign contributions, media exposure, and elite support play a disproportionately large role in elections. This illuminates the point that in order to exercise meaningful influence in Los Angeles’ broader political structure, groups must have access to extensive resources (Mollenkopf et al., 2001). Although a giant share of resources was concentrated in L.A.’s business community historically, in recent decades, the progressive community (anchored by the labor movement) has begun to cultivate its power in Los Angeles – as evidenced by Mark Ridley Thomas’ successful run.

_Other Influential Bodies_. The Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), and the Department of Water and Power (LADWP) are the City of Los Angeles’s three proprietary departments. As such, they operate as non-governmental agencies that provide social services with a profit motive. The fact that LAWA and POLA were discussed in this dissertation’s case studies demonstrates their centrality to planning issues of concern to the progressive community. Likewise, as the largest municipal utility in the United States, LADWP has an extensive impact on four million residents in L.A. and surrounding areas. According to Mengistu, “They [LADWP’s Board of Commissioners] seem to have their teeth in development issues as well. They’re pro-growth” (Interview, 2010).

When L.A.’s early elites established the city’s structure of governance in the 1950s, they established these proprietary departments and other special district authorities and granted them with significant powers, but they did not expect that these authorities would be held responsible for providing the transparency required of other public agencies (Gottlieb et al., 2005). This dissertation reflects a clear departure from that past,
as the working class coalitional efforts examined in the case studies proved largely successful in ensuring a much greater degree of accountability across these agencies.

*The Power of the Private Sector*

In an article that explores the politics of growth in Los Angeles, Purcell (2000) examines the assertion that L.A.’s growth interests are increasingly incapable of securing the political coordination needed to accomplish their aims. His article concludes that although L.A.’s growth machine has not collapsed, “the political consensus for growth [the ideology that growth is good for all] has eroded severely over the past 15 years by a variety of factors” (p. 85). In a recent interview, Koff (2010) echoes Purcell’s sentiments:

In the ‘good old days’ of L.A., every developer got what they wanted. The only opposition they had was other developers who wanted the same thing. So they would always fight with each other. But the development of downtown L.A. – the whole thing about Bunker Hill, urban renewal, and everything that happened in the post-war period in the 60s and 70s – nobody gave a shit about what was happening to the people on the ground [in working class neighborhoods]. So something has to have changed because these developers are no less plentiful, they have the same resources, they have all the money, but they now have to deal [with external opposition] whereas there was a time not too long ago in L.A. when they didn’t have to deal [with opposition] at all.

Yet, the agenda of growth proponents in L.A.’s business community has remained unchanged from prior decades. According to Rev. Smart (Interview, 2010):

They [L.A.’s business community] still think that you create an economy by creating opportunities from the top down and that you waste time attaching regulations, requirements, or benefits to [development] projects. To them, any job is a good job. Houses foreclosing and cars being repossessed have no bearing in their world.

If the pro-growth ideology is the same, what could account for the deterioration of the growth coalition’s power and influence? To illustrate the reasons why L.A.’s growth
coalition does not dominate the politics of land use in the way it used to, I build on Purcell’s (2000) contextual catalysts.

The first variable is the fall of Mayor Tom Bradley’s growth regime, which took place around 1985. Under Bradley’s reign, a stable growth coalition dominated L.A.’s politics between 1975 and 1985. The Bradley’s growth coalition was sustained by robust electoral coalition between Blacks and liberal Jews who worked with business interests to promote an aggressive downtown redevelopment campaign. This was facilitated by access to large amounts of federal urban renewal subsidies and a city council comprised of members who were funded by the same development interests that funded Bradley. Toward the end of the regime’s golden days, there was reduced access to property taxes (due to Proposition 13), federal withdrawal from urban spending priorities, and the rise of a slow-growth movement among affluent homeowner associations. Since the end of the Bradley era, subsequent mayors have had faced challenges cultivating electoral coalitions as strong as Bradley’s and have had a much more difficult time containing council-mayor tensions in city politics. With council members often taking a more fragmented approach to promoting growth and development in their own districts (rather than downtown as did Bradley), the fault lines in L.A.’s weak-mayor system began to become more apparent decades ago.

The second condition that set the stage for the deterioration of L.A.’s growth consensus is the globalization of land-based interests. On one hand, due to the realities of local bidding wars – globalization encourages a diversity of local interest groups (even progressives looking to secure good jobs for local residents) to support subsidy-driven economic development strategies. But on the other hand, when Los Angeles’ leading
private sector players are increasingly incorporated into the global economy, they spend far less time and resources maintaining the city’s historical growth consensus. Furthermore, as non-local firms (i.e., branch operations with weak personal affiliations to the city) make important decisions about capital investment in L.A., civic engagement and philanthropy decline. And finally, the delocalization of powerful local corporations disrupts the social linkages among elites that were once maintained by interactions across venues such as preschools, social clubs, charities, and churches in L.A.

The third factor – the emergence of a slow-growth coalition rooted in the affluent San Fernando Valley in the mid-1980s – has seriously challenged the growth coalition’s argument that growth is good for everyone. L.A.’s slow-growth constituents, who used ‘quality of life’ issues (i.e., noise, traffic, crowding) as the basis of their arguments, won a significant number of public battles against L.A.’s growth coalition and, thus, successfully challenged the growth coalitions’ claims that all growth benefits everyone.

The geographical fragmentation of L.A.’s land-based elite interests is the fourth condition for the decline of L.A.’s growth consensus. Due to Los Angeles’ sprawling, polycentric geography, there is marked fragmentation between growth interests that operate on a regional scale versus those that focus on a more parochial scale. This political fragmentation among growth elites is largely due to the lack of a strong growth-oriented regional institution that could potentially meet the needs of the region’s many geographic areas. For example, the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce boasts 1,600 member organizations. Yet, if there is little consistency in the membership and missions between the LA Chamber and other local Chambers, such as the Hollywood Chamber, the Chinese Chamber, the East Los Angeles Chamber, the Greater LA African
American Chamber, the Korean Chamber, the Industrial Council Chamber, the Century City Chamber, and the San Fernando Valley Chamber. If they are all working to combat oppositional (i.e., slow- or no-growth) forces individually, they are arguably not as efficient as they could be collectively.

Finally, because L.A.’s local government faces certain structural and economic challenges, its capacity to act as a strong partner for growth has diminished significantly. Los Angeles faces a crisis of legitimacy – which is reflected by increasing voter apathy in citywide elections and the numerous secession attempts that have surfaced across various areas of the city, such as the San Fernando Valley (based on charges that L.A.’s city government is inefficient and unresponsive to areas beyond downtown). The City also faces a crisis of capacity, as each of L.A.’s fifteen city council members has significant control over their specific districts’ land use decisions (and council members are increasingly loyal not to growth interests, but to the interests of their residential constituents). For example, another one of L.A.’s booster organizations is the Central City Association (CCA), which purposes itself with advocating for the downtown business community before the Los Angeles City Council, the County Board of Supervisors, and the State Legislature. According to several interviewees, the Central City Association is the archenemy of the progressive movement. The CCA is headed by a woman who is opposed to inclusionary zoning and any other progressive attachments to developments. In reference to the CCA’s President, Pastor (2010) remarked, “Her argument is you need to allow private industry to have free rein in order to get business going in downtown L.A.” Accordingly, Los Angeles City Councilwoman Jan Perry - who is over District 9, which encompasses most of L.A.’s downtown area – maintains close
ties with the Central City Association and typically supports its development agenda. Yet, other council people in other districts are more sympathetic to progressive interests. Due to this phenomenon, land use politics are highly variable across Los Angeles, which means that there is little consistency in the political landscape for growth interests.

One of L.A.’s most prominent philanthropists, billionaire real estate developer Eli Broad, began a foundation that is aimed at championing the cultural life and revitalization of downtown Los Angeles (in addition to other education-related goals). Broad falls one spot ahead of Donald Trump, as the eighth “most famous and powerful American whose campaign contributions result most often in victory” (Newsmeat, 2010). Yet, a quick scan of Broad’s campaign contributions in recent elections highlights an important fact – he seems to have thrown the majority of his financial backing behind candidates on the national scale. Broad’s non-local political involvement may partially reflect (or be in direct response to) his inability to move L.A.’s political structure. According to Pastor (Interview, 2010):

> Some of the biggest money in town is Eli Broad. But Broad can’t call his own shots either. He’s been working on Grand Ave [a major development project] and even it has a CBA attached to it. There just isn’t as much ability for business to completely call its own shots here anymore.

As mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, a small group of Los Angeles elites worked strategically to expand L.A.’s downtown area in the midst of explosive suburban growth through much of the twentieth century. This exclusive “Committee of 25” was preoccupied with: attracting and cultivating cultural and recreational amenities; running dominant businesses and law firms; maintaining positions on prominent boards; and controlling foundations, universities, and charities through donations. They created a city charter that ensured elite dominance and extremely weak mayoral power so that
unions, people of color, political parties, and other potentially combative forces could not exert excessive influence in the governance of Los Angeles (Gottlieb et al., 2005).

Today, wealthy and powerful elites have far from disappeared from the scenes of Los Angeles. But, for many of the aforesaid reasons, the solid “Committee of 25” that strategically governed the city through much of the twentieth century has dissipated.

**The Power of the Progressive Sector**

Since the late 1980s, a robust coalition of progressive players and institutions has steadily risen to prominence in Los Angeles. In a recent article, Nicholls (2003) outlines the formation this progressive ‘organizational infrastructure’ as the outcome of a series of local relational processes that occurred over time. He argues that actors from three distinct sectors of L.A.’s progressive community (i.e., community based organizations, labor organizations, and universities) were “responsible for creating innovative new links between themselves and others, functioning as precedent-setting moments for the subsequent formation of semi-institutionalized mechanisms” (p. 881). Based on this dissertation’s research, I support and extend Nicholls’ analysis of the composition of Los Angeles’ progressive community in the following section.41

*Environmental and Environmental Justice Organizations.* The inclusion of environmental advocates in the broader progressive community is a relatively new trend in Los Angeles. In the opinion of the Sierra Club’s Tom Politeo (2002), the historical

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41 While I cover some of the more prominent actors in L.A.’s progressive movement, many organizations are excluded due to the obvious limitations involved in developing an exhaustive analysis of every single organization that matters.
isolation of environmentalists is primarily due to the deep cleavages that have been created between labor and environmental activists:

The lobbies that support an ardent pro-business view characterize labor and environmental movements in a way that drives wedges between them. In this pro-biz view, the thick-headed union guys are only interested in their wage packages and have no concern for public health or safety...Similarly, it is the air-headed, upper-class enviros [environmentalists] who would rather hug a tree than see workers put food on their families’ plates – who deprive people of their jobs...As each group specializes in its own interest area without consideration for the other, friction is bound to follow (p. 10).

This splinter is reflected in the fact that the environmental sector did not factor into Nicholls’ progressive network composition in 2003. But almost a decade later, in reference to the integration of the environmental sector into L.A.’s broader progressive infrastructure, Milkman (Interview, 2010) remarked:

The labor-environmental alliance is very new. It had been fomenting for awhile, but the ports campaign cemented it. The old ports campaign – which was a straight, traditional union campaign – didn’t even try to do anything like this [incorporating environmental organizations]. Understanding the ports campaign’s failures of 1996, this Change to Win group took a page out of the hotel workers unions’ experience of reaching out to community organizations. The only way to win was to try this broader approach to coalition building [including environmentalists]. That part succeeded brilliantly, but whether they’ll get unionization out of the campaign remains to be seen.

The growing strength of the environmental sector cannot be divorced from the recent alignments that have taken place within L.A.’s environmental sector. In Los Angeles (and many other cities), straight-laced environmental groups (i.e., those concerned primarily with the ecological consequences of environmental degradation) and hard-lined environmental justice and public health organizations (i.e., those primarily concerned with the human impacts of environmental deterioration) have joined forces due to the growing recognition of the interconnections between their common causes. Furthermore,
the political realities of the day dictate that effective political action consolidate the two natural allies.

*Political Organizations.* In a comparison of immigrant political participation in the New York and Los Angeles, Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross (2001) uncovered several differences in the two metropolitan areas. The authors found that whereas the political landscape in New York City was dominated by well-organized party machinery, Los Angeles County’s political environment was weakly organized and largely nonpartisan. They attributed this weak political organization to the fact that Los Angeles has an open election system, which allows residents to cast votes for candidates from any political party. The open election system, in effect, weakens political parties’ grip over the electoral process and, thus, limits their general political power. According to Milkman, L.A.’s important political sectors include business democrats (those more likely to cave to pressures of the business community) and progressive democrats (those who take more radical stances); republicans do not play an important role in Los Angeles’s political landscape.

Since the organization of political parties is relatively weak, electoral coalitions, such as the Alliance of Local Leaders for Education, Registration, and Turn-out (ALLERT) have been formed to compensate. ALLERT was established as a 401(c4) in 2002. Its website states that it has “organized voter empowerment coalitions in the last eight election cycles with 14 organizations including AGENDA, the Community Coalition, SEIU Locals1877, 434B, and 99, the National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce, ACORN, the Labor Community Strategy Center, and AFSCME state council.” Since its founding, ALLERT has organized, trained, and mobilized over 500 precinct leaders
working in 371 voter precincts throughout Los Angeles. While this is a major accomplishment, ALLERT’s efforts have primarily targeted L.A.’s African American communities. Similar organizations exist across the city’s other ethnic enclaves.

A number of organizations in L.A.’s progressive community explicitly engage in political organizing strategies. One such organization is Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE). According to its website, SCOPE combines community organizing, leadership development, strategic alliance building, research, training and capacity building, and policy advocacy to build a powerful movement for social and economic justice at the local, state, and national levels. Action for Grassroots Empowerment & Neighborhood Development Alternatives (AGENDA), SCOPE’s community-based organizing vehicle in South Los Angeles, was founded by Anthony Thigpenn in 1993 – as a direct response to L.A.’s 1992 political unrest and the lack of a sufficient response on the part of L.A.’s progressive community. Since its founding, AGENDA has organized around issues such as welfare reform, job training for inner-city youth, and bridge-building across L.A.’s low-income communities.

Until its demise in 2009, the Association for Community Organization Reform Now (ACORN) was a consistent partner in L.A.’s progressive efforts. As an explicitly political organization, ACORN advocated for low- and moderate-income families by organizing around critical quality of life issues. In 2010, the former leadership of California’s state ACORN decided to break away from the national ACORN to launch an independent, California-controlled organization called the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE).
**Faith-Based Organizations.** One of L.A.’s most vocal faith-based organizations is Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE) – an interfaith worker justice organization that was founded in 1996. CLUE was instrumental in winning Los Angeles’ 1997 Living Wage campaign, it took a leadership role in the fight to prevent Wal-Mart from developing stores in the City of Inglewood during the early 2000s, and it contributed to several coalitions studied in this dissertation. It organizes campaign targets (such as city council members and business owners) based on their religious affiliations. The Los Angeles Chapter of CLUE consists of over 600 religious leaders and 1200 lay people. Its members include a broad range of ethnic and denominational constituencies, including Christian Evangelicals, Muslim leaders and mosques, various Jewish denominations, African-American denominations, Hispanic Pentecostals, and Korean congregations. Regarding CLUE’s standing in L.A.’s progressive community, Rev Smart (Interview, 2010) said:

> The thing about the CLUE model that is respected is [the fact that] it demands that they’re not a rent a collar service that comes out for a demonstration when you need a minister. CLUE demands to be a part of organizing strategy sessions and a co-partner in campaigns. That way, clergy have made real investments in the campaigns they join. This helps create a social justice movement because all major religions have some tenet of social justice.

Beyond CLUE, numerous Los Angeles faith-based organizations participate in progressive causes.

**Academic Institutions.** In reference to the deliberate bridge-building that has occurred between members of certain academic institutions in L.A. and the broader progressive movement, Nicholls (2003) commented:

> Only through such concerted efforts could systematic links between the university and the progressive community be forged, moving beyond the
more typical situation of fleeting personal relations between individual intellectuals and specific progressive actors (p. 885).

While his assessment of progressive allies in L.A.’s intellectual community most directly highlights the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), I argue that certain scholar-activists from the University of Southern California (USC) and Occidental College have become equally important to the progressive movement in recent years. Yet, UCLA continues to provide a significant degree of institutional support through its Labor Center, Urban Planning Department, and Community Scholars Program (Soja, 2010).

Established in 1964, UCLA’s Center for Labor Research and Education (the Labor Center) is housed under UCLA’s Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE). The Labor Center provides scholars and students alike with extensive connections to unions and workers. It also gives those in L.A.’s labor movement access to UCLA's resources and programs. Ruth Milkman, the prior director of UCLA’s IRLE, stated, “The Labor Center is really important...It becomes a kind of convening site for a lot of people.” The Labor Center is advised by a committee of approximately forty Southern California labor and community leaders, who represent more than one million members in the public and private sectors. While its main office is located on UCLA’s campus, the Labor Center also hosts a downtown office that is located only two blocks from the L.A. County Federation of Labor – amid most of L.A.’s union halls and worker centers.

UCLA’s Department of Urban Planning has, since the 1980s, been a rich resource for L.A.’s progressive community. Most notably, upon their appointments to the planning department in 1984, Gilda Haas and Jacqueline Leavitt developed the UCLA Community Scholars Program as a way to institutionalize relationships between UCLA and the
broaden the broader progressive community. Founded in 1991, the Community Scholars Program is a joint initiative of UCLA's Department of Urban Planning and the UCLA Labor Center that provides opportunities to community and labor leaders (regardless of their educational backgrounds) to participate in graduate-level applied research seminars. Utilizing this format, community scholars and graduate students are afforded the unique opportunity of working together. Upon completion of the two-semester program, community scholars receive a certificate of completion from the UCLA Urban Planning Department. While the Community Scholars Program has a long history of success in the progressive community, some feel that because the planning department has lost several important scholar-activists, it is currently much less engaged in progressive activism than it was in the 80s and 90s. Yet, according to Madeline Janis, almost all of LAANE's research staff members are graduates of UCLA’s planning program – so it has been a critical training ground for many in L.A.’s progressive movement.

Anchoring the University of Southern California’s progressive linkages, Manuel Pastor serves as Professor of Geography and American Studies & Ethnicity. He also serves as the Director of USC’s Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE) and as the Co-Director of USC’s Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration. Pastor is highly involved in L.A.’s civic life and he serves on the boards of multiple progressive organizations. At Occidental College, Peter Dreier is the Dr. E.P. Clapp Distinguished Professor of Politics and Director of the Urban & Environmental Policy Program. Dreier works closely with a broad range of community organizations, labor unions, and public interest organizations in Los Angeles. In 2005, Dreier co-authored The Next Los Angeles:
The Struggle for a Livable City with Occidental colleagues Regina Freer, Bob Gottlieb, and Mark Vallianatos – who are also rooted in L.A.’s progressive community.

Recently, numerous scholars have used Los Angeles as a research laboratory for studying the contemporary processes of urbanization, inequality, and injustice – as a direct challenge to the established Chicago School of urban theory. This group (known as the Los Angeles School of Urbanism) includes notable scholars such as Michael Dear, Mike Davis, John Friedmann, Paul Ong, Edward Soja, Raphael Sonenshein, Michael Storper, and Jennifer Wolch.

Immigrant Rights Organizations and Ethnic Media. In response to drastic demographic shifts and direct political threats to immigrants across the United States, a vibrant immigrant rights movement has emerged in Los Angeles. In recent years, L.A.’s immigrant rights organizations have become stronger and broader in their concerns, and the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) is a direct reflection of this growing influence. CHIRLA was founded in 1986 to advance the human and civil rights of immigrants and refugees in Los Angeles, to promote harmonious multi-ethnic and multi-racial relations, and to empower immigrants and their allies to build a more just society through coalition-building, advocacy, community education, and organizing. CHIRLA is a big player in the Los Angeles political landscape, as is a sleuth of other immigrant rights groups.

According to Milkman, L.A.’s immigrant media outlets complement the growing power of immigrant rights organizations. As the largest and second-largest Spanish-language networks in the nation, Univision and Telemundo are major players. In printed

**Labor Unions.** In recent decades, Los Angeles has been the site of innovative labor organizing – particularly among immigrant workers across the city’s expanding low-wage service sector jobs. In reference to L.A.’s unique opportunity to build a distinct type of labor movement, Pastor (Interview, 2010) stated:

> We don’t have the history of unions you have in New Jersey – such as craft union corruption – because we were an anti-union town for so long. And the momentum behind the labor movement in Southern California has been this organizing of immigrant workers, so L.A. was one of the first places to break through on unions becoming more amenable to immigrant workers and there were a lot of spectacular successes here like Justice for Janitors and that worked to build a different perception of labor. These successes also offered a different kind of racial politics in the sense that Latino immigrants are going to identify as Latinos, but it’s not their primary identity. They have a greater identification as workers because many hold an affinity to labor organizing from their home countries. So they don’t fuel the huge separation between labor, immigrants, and ethnicity.

Standing on the shoulders of their large immigrant membership bases, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1877 and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) Local 11, can easily be classified as progressive L.A.’s primary labor powerhouses. SEIU has reached its status as a result of its massive membership and successful campaigns (i.e., Justice for Janitors and home health care workers). SEIU’s organizing model has effectively forged ties between union organizers, workers, community activists, students, and political and religious leaders in Los Angeles (Cummings, 2008). HERE’s success has been derived from its strategic initiatives, such as the establishment of LAANE – which extends HERE’S influence outside the labor movement. Milkman stated, “The hotels in L.A. are not highly unionized like in New
York, but because of LAANE, which is very tightly tied to HERE and Maria Elena Durazo, who is the head of the County Fed (and comes out of HERE), HERE has disproportionate influence” (Interview, 2010).

Unlike L.A.’s service sector unions, its building trades unions have not historically been engaged in immigrant organizing or progressive causes, in general. This follows a national trend of craft unions being more racially exclusive and politically conservative. Yet, in reference to this history and the current changes that are taking place within many of the region’s building trades unions, Pastor (Interview, 2010) remarked:

A lot of the craft unions that were the traditionally racially-exclusive elements of the labor movement – a lot of those older union leaders are looking down at their sons and nephews who don’t want to become carpenters and plumbers. They’re realizing that to maintain their ranks, they need to reach into emerging, young populations of color. So, there’s been a lot of exciting things going on in building alliances with craft unions to develop apprenticeship programs for youth of color.

This trend is promising, especially because building trade jobs are generally higher-paying jobs than service sector jobs.

Finally, public sector unions and workers centers deserve recognition as important components of L.A.’s progressive labor forces. Collectively, L.A.’s labor unions are very active politically. Facilitated by the County Federation of Labor, member unions provide a rich resource for progressive democrats, as members come out in large numbers to do precinct walking in local, state, and national elections.

Progressive Donors. The importance of having dedicated donors that are sympathetic to the challenges involved in organizing for explicitly progressive goals cannot be overstated. Local foundations such as the Liberty Hill Foundation, the John
Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, the Rosalinde & Arthur Gilbert Foundation, and the Weingart Foundation are all leading supporters of progressive organizing in Los Angeles. State and national foundations also provide critical support for many of L.A.’s progressive initiatives.

**National Allies.** In an interview, Rev. Smart commented, “I don’t know how much credit those of us in L.A. can get [for building a strong progressive infrastructure] without looking at the contributions of other players around the nation” (2010). A primary ally to L.A.’s progressive movement has been the Partnership for Working Families. With more than twenty affiliated organizations (including LAANE) across the country, The Partnership assists workers and communities in their efforts to build local power and to reshape their local economies. On a national level, The Partnership lobbies for quality of life issues for working families, such as quality jobs, affordable housing, shared prosperity, and a healthy environment.

Another prominent national organization that factors into progressive activism in Los Angeles is Greg LeRoy’s Good Jobs First. Good Jobs First serves as a resource for grassroots organizations and public officials who want to join it in promoting an agenda of accountable development and smart growth for America’s working families.

Change to Win (CtW) is a national labor organization that consists of 5.5 million members who belong to four affiliated unions – the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United Farm Workers of America (UFW), United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW). As illustrated in the Clean and Safe Ports Coalition (as it threw its political weight and
financial resources behind the ports campaign), Change to Win is a force to be reckoned with in Los Angeles and at all geographic scales.

*Anchor Organizations.* According to Nicholls (2003), anchor organizations incorporate specific actors and institutions from two or more sectors of the progressive community into a single, vertically-integrated organization. Anchor organizations tend to share common financial supporters (i.e., funders) and institutional roots (i.e., founders) and they often evolve through the process of long-term interactions across personal and organizational networks. My research identifies two primary anchor organizations in Los Angeles’ progressive infrastructure – Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE).

Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) – has been integrally involved in several progressive initiatives in Los Angeles. Founded in 1996 by members of L.A.’s community (Anthony Thigpenn), academic (Gilda Haas), and labor (Maria Elena Durazo) sectors, SAJE’s mission is “to change public and corporate policy in a manner that provides concrete economic benefit to working-class people, increases the economic rights of working class people, and builds leadership through a movement for economic justice” (www.saje.net, 2011). Because SAJE underwent a leadership transition in 2009 (Executive Director Paulina Gonzalez succeeded Gilda Haas), the organization is in a transitional period. It is unclear whether SAJE will increase its capacity as an anchor organization in the future.

The Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) stands out as an organization that possesses an extraordinary degree of capacity in the area of coalition building. I, therefore, characterize it as the leading anchor organization in L.A.’s
progressive community. The individuals who had a hand in the founding of LAANE in 1993 include Gilda Haas (a lecturer at UCLA), Maria Elena Durazo (who was president of HERE Local 11), and LAANE’s current Executive Director, Madeline Janis (who was previously the director of an immigrants rights organization). Therefore, from its inception, LAANE was steeped in various institutions that comprised L.A.’s broader progressive community.

LAANE’s centrality in L.A.’s progressive infrastructure is illustrated in this dissertation’s three case studies. Although the Figueroa Corridor Coalition included a lot of grassroots community members and community-based groups, it can be argued that AEG would not have been willing to meet the coalition at the negotiating table without the weight of LAANE and LAANE’s chief collaborator – the County Federation of Labor. In both the LAX and Clean and Safe Ports Coalitions, LAANE’s leadership is obvious, as it served as the facilitator of the coalition building processes and, again, leveraged its own influence with the power of the labor movement. LAANE’s foundational and ongoing ties to the county’s labor movement are highlighted by the fact that when Mayor Hahn sought labor’s support, the Fed (County Federation of Labor) insisted that Hahn appoint LAANE’s Executive Director, Madeline Janis, to one of seven seats on the Community Redevelopment Agency’s Board of Commissioners. In a *L.A. Weekly* article, Harold Meyerson (2003) wrote:

The political clout LAANE brings to the table is not really its own. It belongs chiefly to the L.A. County Federation of Labor, whose election-day batting average is so high that local elected officials flout its agenda – which very much includes LAANE’s agenda – on virtual penalty of political death...A trip through the city’s corridors of power these days provides a clear indication of the effect LAANE has had over the past decade. ‘The debate is different now,’ says Janis-Aparicio. ‘Decision-makers talk about poverty and the lack of affordable housing, in city
council meetings, at commissions, even at the Chamber of Commerce.’ In a city of chutes, LAANE has assembled some ladders.

When LAANE initiatives are up for city council votes, they typically receive a large majority of members to support them. But, the fact that Long Beach did not follow through on the concessionaire part of the Clean Truck Program speaks to the limits of LAANE’s power in the broader region. Because they did not have a strong political presence in Long Beach, working with the city’s power structure has presented a problem. Yet, as LAANE has steadily increased its size and influence in Los Angeles, it has also cultivated trust in various corners of the progressive community. Regarding LAANE’s unique ability to balance power with responsibility, Pastor (Interview, 2010) stated:

I think LAANE has been aware that it has more power in the room than other groups in a good way. They don’t act like everyone is equal, and they feel that if you know everyone is not equal you should listen to everyone and incorporate their concerns and be humble. So, I think they’ve represented themselves well and have built alliances pursuing issues like neighborhood food deserts, which makes LAANE appear to be community-friendly. There is a wariness on the part of community organizations who don’t know what it means to work with labor unions…Are they going to at the last minute cut you out to protect their jobs and neglect things that might be important to communities. LAANE has stuck it out with community interests in general and that’s reciprocated with community group sticking with LAANE and labor interests. I don’t think that’s happened in many other cities, but it has happened here.

Milkman (Interview, 2010) expressed similar views:

LAANE is very respected in the city. Of course, the business crowd hates her [Madeline Janis] and wishes LAANE didn’t exist. She’s carved out this niche in the city and as long as the current political establishment is what it is, she has access to all the players. What happens when there’s a new political elite? Who knows? But she knows how to push the levers of power.
An example of the fact that LAANE has continued to expand its capacity as an anchor organization is its recent founding of Horizon Institute. Horizon Institute – a progressive think tank – is intended to serve as the intellectual arm of L.A.’s progressive community, while LAANE continues to serve as its political arm. The young Horizon Institute is working to “explore practical alternatives to the free market doctrines that have led to widespread economic and environmental damage, broken health care and retirement systems, and a decline in economic security that has impacted all but the most affluent” (www.horizon-institute.com, 2011).

Implications: The Future of L.A.’S Progressive Movement

Organizing for social change is a deeply relational endeavor. In the case of Los Angeles’s progressive community, the relationships that were examined in the selected coalitions have, in most cases, been cultivated over the span of nearly three decades. L.A.’s progressive activists have worked extremely hard to build power and to shape systems-change policies. It could easily be said that the progressive sector has managed to out-organize the private sector. According to Janis (Interview, 2010), “Some of them [business elite] talk to me,” she stated, “but mostly they talk about me. They feel like labor has taken over city hall, but it’s not really true. It’s not like the chamber and business associations don’t put huge resources into city hall. They’re just different kinds of resources. It’s money – a lot of money. But it’s not a lot of smarts, strategy, or people on the ground that we [the progressive community] have.”

While multi-sector bridge-building has proven to be relatively successful in Los Angeles’ progressive community, it should be acknowledged that the nature of
relationship-building in any given place is highly idiosyncratic and context-dependent (e.g., based on the equation of history, individual activists, resources, institutional capacities, etc.). It would, therefore, be difficult to generalize findings from this study of Los Angeles to other urban contexts.

It is also important to note that in today’s tough fiscal context, there is mounting pressure to strip any potentially progressive gains from working class people on all geographic scales. In the case of Los Angeles’ budget shortfall, the business community has enjoyed recent success in moving the pendulum back to the right in City Hall. But rather than developing innovative strategies, they are employing the same old hollow frame that L.A. needs to be more business-friendly by repealing taxes, cutting regulations, and combating the unions - who are the big, bad special interests. Any wins achieved by business elites must be tempered by an acknowledgement that L.A.’s historical consensus that ‘growth at any cost is good for all’ has likely been permanently destroyed by increased elite fragmentation, both geographically and politically. Moreover, the consensus for growth will never be the same due to the shifts in the consciousness that have taken place in the minds of many of L.A.’s working class residents. HERE’s David Koff (Interview, 2010) encapsulates this shift in a poignant statement:

The most powerful manifestations of the changes that have occurred in L.A.’s power structure can be seen in the workers. If you have room attendants and people who have been working at hotels and other places who truly understand what is at stake and who they are and their relationship with the bosses, so to speak, if they understand the way these folk understand it, that’s already a shift in power. Once people understand that they have power and freedom and they are actors who can speak for themselves, you can’t put it back in the bottle. It doesn’t go away. Ultimately, the power shifts in L.A. are due to the willingness of working class folks to put themselves on the line and to spend hours upon hours of
their time organizing co-workers. So, it starts from the bottom-up because without that, no matter how eloquent someone like Maria Elena might be, she can’t do it on her own. What we have is a real, organized constituency. And we’re not on the outside here trying to hammer our way in. We’re at the core of this whole thing [power structure] and we’re going to behave like it. We’re not going to behave like we’re poor supplicants who are just hoping to get some crumbs under the table. We’re a part of this and we can make things happen. We can stop things from happening, but we can also make things happen.

Yet, in order to increase its power, L.A.’s progressive community must not only work to build on the relationships that have been cultivated in past decades, but it must also navigate a number of complex challenges. I conclude that the ability of L.A.’s progressive community to deepen its reach in the local power structure depends on its ability to more effectively improve race relations, create a culture of authentic internal democracy, overcome resource constraints, coordinate progressive electoral politics, and bridge institutional fragmentation.

This dissertation set out to explore the dynamics of three progressive coalitions and to determine the extent to which a broad-based community-labor power bloc emerged, consolidated, and became robust enough to successfully challenge the elitist agenda of L.A.’s historically-powerful growth regime. Based on this dissertation’s research findings, I contend that a progressive power bloc has, indeed, been victorious in a significant number of challenges to L.A.’s elite regime. Yet, I do not suggest that the concurrent weakening of L.A.’s historically-entrenched regime and the emergence of a robust progressive coalition implies that any form of direct causation has taken place. Therefore, it cannot be stated that L.A.’s progressive community has conquered and overthrown L.A.’s elite regime. Rather, a number of complex internal and external factors undermined the strength of L.A.’s growth coalition and ultimately led to the
regime’s deterioration. At the same time, the progressive community organized diligently to insert itself into this political vacuum. However, there has not been a clear transition from L.A.’s historically-powerful growth regime to a stable progressive regime. In fact, the ability of any singular “regime” to coordinate the resources and capacity required to dictate all matters of urban governance in today’s complex urban landscape seems increasingly unlikely.

While there has been no definitive regime transformation, it is important to note that the selected coalitions’ campaigns span several planning and policy issues, including the subsidization of large-scale development projects, the regulation of environmental contaminants, the distribution of public goods and services, and the provision of quality jobs. The centrality of organizing for quality jobs in community unionism cannot be understated. The coalitions’ efforts to build a more equitable economy for Los Angeles span the metropolitan areas’ largest industries – transportation logistics, recreation and hospitality, construction, and airline services. Collectively, these industries account for hundreds of thousands of local jobs, which are filled by some of L.A.’s most disadvantaged residents. However, these sectors are far too often characterized by poverty-level wages, a lack of critical benefits, and substandard working conditions. Furthermore, they are the industries that are projected to grow at the highest rates in the coming years.

By raising the standards of these critical industries, L.A.’s community unionism movement is pushing the region closer to a more just and sustainable economy – one that is based on quality jobs, thriving communities, and a healthy environment.
Limitations and Future Research

While this dissertation tells the story of Los Angeles’ deteriorating elite regime, deepening progressive infrastructure, and waning local state, it possesses several limitations that provide fertile ground for future research. Namely, future research efforts may: systematically evaluate the implementation of the outcomes won by the three case coalitions; more carefully examine the role of race, ethnicity, gender, and other forms of identity in the development of L.A.’s progressive community (and in the decline of the city’s elite regime); more thoroughly examine the structure of L.A.’s current business coalition; engage in similar, longitudinal case studies in other cities to better understand the internal and external factors that account for the undermining of elite regimes; compare the findings from other cities to the case of Los Angeles; and employ quantitative analysis to determine how the material conditions of urban spaces like Los Angeles have changed in conjunction with regime shifts.
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