BATTLING BISHOPS:
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN TRANSYLVANIA
ON THE EVE OF THE AUSGLEICH

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December 8, 1987

Owen Johnson
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In Memory of
Professor György Ránki
1930-1988
PREFACE

Keith Hitchins' *Orthodoxy and Nationality. Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) described the personality and achievements of a remarkable national leader who was also a bishop. The work includes a discussion of Saguna's relations with Greek Catholic Metropolitan Alexandru Sterca-Șulutiu, a no less remarkable leader who has received little attention from historians. American historiography has been even less aware of the contemporary prelates János Scitovszky, Lajos Haynald, Ioan Alexi and Iosif Papp-Szilágyi and their role in the political battles Hitchins described. This dissertation places the nations and religions of Transylvania in a context in which the relationship of religion and politics, and of bishops and clergymen of the various religions and ethnic groups, may be better understood.

The completion of this study owes a debt to scholars and institutions too numerous to list. The short list includes Professor Hitchins of the University of Illinois, whose works inspired my interest in Transylvania and set an imposing standard of scholarship, and various members of the Indiana University Department of History for their teaching. Among the latter, I must recognize a special debt to Professor György Ránki, who provided insightful but tolerant guidance, and Professor Denis Sinor, who added my name to
his long list of doctoral students and patiently supervised this dissertation to its conclusion. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) made possible a research stay of nearly one year each in Hungary and Romania. I especially appreciate the astute diplomacy of those who helped to secure my access to archives in Romania: Regina Kay as IREX desk officer for Romania, and the Romanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences. It was my privilege to enjoy the sponsorship and hospitality of the Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy in Budapest and the Institute of History and Archaeology in Cluj-Napoca. My official advisors in these places, Professors Peter Hanak and Ştefan Pascu, generously offered their time and influence. Ambrus Miskolczy and Simion Retegan were my expert and enthusiastic consultants on the nuts and bolts of research. Numerous archivists provided invaluable assistance. Down the final stretch of writing I received the assistance of a Mellon Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship from the Russian and East European Institute of Indiana University and a semester in Debrecen through the Indiana University-Lajos Kossuth University exchange. The services of the university libraries in Debrecen, at the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana and Indiana University, and especially extraordinary help by the Interlibrary Loan staff at the latter institution, are gratefully acknowledged. I must recognize a special debt to Simion Retegan for providing
detailed comments and Ruth Weening for stylistic editing of the final text. Peter Jörgensen of the Academic Computer Center, Colgate University, provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of the two maps. Finally, every graduate student should have a financial aid office as understanding as my parents have been. None of these people, nor the friends and colleagues in Hungary, Romania and elsewhere who also helped, are responsible for the interpretations, errors and (mis)translations I stubbornly retained through the various drafts of this work.

There is no completely satisfactory solution to the problem of the linguistic form of names to be used when writing about Transylvania in English. The consistent translation of all terms is only logical when writing in one of the indigenous languages. During the 1860s official correspondence in Transylvania was carried out in four languages (those of the three most numerous nationalities and Latin), using as many as four different names for Transylvanian localities. People of those times pragmatically translated the names of places and persons into the language they were using at the moment, and did not assume that the language one uses identifies the nationality of the subject. In view of the dominant conception of our day and as a shorthand which reflects the ethnic makeup of localities in the 1860s in most cases, I will use the following procedure. All districts and localities of the Szekler
region [Szekelyfold] will bear their Hungarian names, as
will all counties, royal free cities, privileged noble
towns, and market towns [vármegyék, szabad királyi
városok, kiváltságos nemes városok, and kiváltságos
mezővárosok] of the second major administrative category,
the Hungarian or noble counties. Districts and district
seats [Stuhle and Vororte, székek and
székhelyek] of the third region, the Fundus Regius
[Saxon region, Kiralyfold] bear their German names.
Finally, the two Romanian districts and all other localities
will be identified by the Romanian names which correspond to
modern usage. Geographic features bear their Romanian
names. Cities in Hungary bear their Hungarian names
regardless of their population. An exception to the last
rule is Karlowitz/Karlócza/Sremci Karlovci, which is known
in the English-language literature by its German name.
Alternative forms of names are given in a table on pages
xiii-xv. For personal names, I will use the form which
historians of that person's nationality most commonly
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ABBREVIATIONS

L. = Latin 
G. = German 
H. = Hungarian 
R. = Romanian 
n.s. = New Style (modern or Gregorian calendar) 
o.s. = Old Style (old or Julian calendar, used by the Orthodox) 
12 days difference in the nineteenth century 
(March 15, 1848 n.s. = March 3, 1848 o.s.) 

fl. = florins or Guldens = unit of currency in Austria Empire 

HHSA = Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Austria 
Informationsburo Elenchus = a grouping of police documents of similar subject matter under the document number (= Elenchus number) of the first document in the group 

AVA = Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Vienna, Austria 

MOL = Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives) Budapest, Hungary 
F 258 = Statthalterei in Siebenbürgen, Präsidialien (Presidial Papers of the Transylvanian Locumtenential Council) 
F 263 = Erdélyi visszaállított főkormányszék, Elnöki iratok (Transylvanian Gubernium, Presidial Papers) 
D 228 = Erdélyi udvari kancellária, Elnöki iratok (Transylvanian Court Chancellery, Presidial Papers) 
D 229 = Erdélyi udvari kancellária, Általános iratok (Transylvanian Court Chancellery, General Papers) 

OSzK = Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchényi Library) Budapest, Hungary 
Fol.Hung. 1722, 1723 Lajos Haynald papers 
Fol. Lat. 3952, 3954 

AS Alba Iulia, Cluj-Napoca, Sibiu = Arhivele Statului (State Archives) in these towns, Romania
AS Alba Iulia. MRU,CM = Mitropolia română unită, Cabinetul mitropolitului (Papers of the Greek Catholic Metropolitan)

AS Alba Iulia. MRU,FG = Mitropolia română unită, Fondul General (General papers of the Greek Catholic Metropolitanate)

Alba Iulia. ERC = Episcopia romano-catolică (Roman Catholic Bishopric)
(Cat.) = categoria in ERC; each year’s documents are filed in 38 subject categories

Sibiu. ABAOR, FS = Arhiva Bibliotecii Arhiepiscopiei Ortodoxe Române, Fondul Şaguna (Şaguna Papers in the Library of the Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese (Metropolitanate))

Sibiu. AMOR = Arhiva Mitropoliei Ortodoxe Române (Archive of the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate)


GBCS = George Baruş şi contemporanii săi Vols. I-VII. Bucureşti: Minerva, 1973-85

DSSS = Ion Dumitriu-Snagov, Le Saint-Siège et la Roumanie Moderne Roma: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1982
# TABLE OF TRANSLATIONS OF PLACE NAMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>German</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Districts and Counties</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alsó-Feher</td>
<td>Alba de Jos</td>
<td>Unterweissenburg</td>
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<td>Aranyos</td>
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<td>Belső-Szolnok</td>
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<td>Háromszék</td>
<td>Trei Scaune</td>
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<td>Hunyad</td>
<td>Hunedoară</td>
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<td>Kolozs</td>
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<td>Klausenburg</td>
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<td>Rupea</td>
<td>Reps</td>
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<td>Küküllő</td>
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<td>Kolkelburg</td>
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<td>Maros</td>
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<td>Medgyes</td>
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<td>Naszód</td>
<td>Násáud</td>
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<td>Miercurea Sibiului</td>
<td>Reussmarkt</td>
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<td>Újegyház</td>
<td>Nocrich</td>
<td>Leschkirch</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Privileged Towns outside the Fundus Regius</strong></td>
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<td>Abrudbánya</td>
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<td>Bereck</td>
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<td>Csíkszereda</td>
<td>Miercurea Ciuc</td>
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<td>Déva</td>
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<td>Fagarasch</td>
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<td>Gyulafehérvár</td>
<td>Alba Iulia</td>
<td>Karlsburg</td>
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<td>Illyefalva</td>
<td>Ilieni</td>
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<td>Mociu</td>
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<td>Strassburg</td>
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<td>Olăhfalu</td>
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<td>Sepsiszentgyörgy</td>
<td>Sfîntu Gheorghe</td>
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Note: The official Hungarian name of Gyulafehervár until 1867 was Karolyfehervár

3. Localities and Regions not Included in 1 or 2

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<td>Kanta</td>
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<td>Kassa</td>
<td>(Slovak: Košice)</td>
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<td>Kereszténysziget</td>
<td>Cristian</td>
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<td>Kézdipolyán</td>
<td>Poian</td>
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<td>Krakó</td>
<td>Cricău</td>
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<td>Küttfalva</td>
<td>Cut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lábfalva</td>
<td>Lelești</td>
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</table>

(Slovak: Košice)
3. Geographic Features

Maros R.  Mureș R.  Mieresch R.
Erceghység  Munții Apuseni  Erzgebirge
Olt R.  Olt. R.  Alt R.
Szamos R.  Someș R.  Samosch R.

xv
INTRODUCTION

Scholars generally accept the view of Oscar Jaszi and Robert A. Kann that religious affiliation was one of the integrating forces in the Habsburg monarchy and nationalism one of the disintegrating ones. The Habsburg dynasty and bureaucracy naturally sought to employ the centripetal forces at their disposal, among which the churches and a religiously inspired social conservatism were prominent. A major paradox of the monarchy in the nineteenth century is that nationalism arose in national groups whose churches and clergy retained an enormous intellectual and social influence and were themselves enmeshed in the national movements. Not only did the Habsburg court continue to rely on religious institutions for support, but it also sought to encourage and harness national movements for imperial ends. The latter policy would have fateful consequences for the monarchy itself. This complex interaction is at the center of this study.

Friedrich Engel-Janosi wrote with reference to the 1860s:

In later times it was primarily the parish clergy which was susceptible to political activity in the service of the oppositional, mostly Slavic nationalities. At the time of the Hungarian crisis, the bishops placed themselves at the disposal of the leaders of the national movements... A thorough portrayal of the national opposition of the bishops of the Transleithanian half of the empire would be very welcome.

One object of this study is to help fill the lacuna that Engel-Janosi points out. Although the focus is on Transylvania, its intense relations with other Habsburg territories and even with the Danubian Principalities require that these lands also be drawn into the picture.

Between 1860 and 1865 the decisive struggle was fought in the monarchy between the advocates of centralized court control and rule by the two most powerful national groups. The Austrian Germans and the Hungarians, seeking to establish and control parliamentary government in their halves of the monarchy, emerged victorious in the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich [Compromise] of 1867 after the fall of the liberal centralist regime two years earlier. Emperor Franz Joseph had reluctantly agreed in 1861 to grant a constitution with a central parliament (Reichsrat) composed of representatives of all provinces of the monarchy. The dominant Hungarian aristocracy in both Hungary and Transylvania refused to allow their diets to send deputies to the Reichsrat, thereby threatening the success of the new system. As in its earlier contests with Hungarian particularism, the court was

2. Österreich und der Vatikan 1846-1918 (Graz: Styria, 1958), 131.

able to enlist a powerful weapon in the struggle to preserve centralized rule: the appeal to the sentiments of the non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary and Transylvania.

A study of this period in the Habsburg province of Transylvania, with its Romanian, Hungarian and Saxon (German) populations, is instructive with respect to the new Habsburg strategy. This time the court went beyond the mere manipulation of national differences. To secure a Transylvanian diet that would send deputies to the Reichsrat, it awarded social benefits and political opportunities to the other nationalities that had lasting significance for the vitality of the national movements. It facilitated major improvements in minority language education, guaranteed the autonomy of the minorities' churches, and permanently broadened the political arena. To break the resistance of the Hungarian nobility, it replaced the corporative electoral law with a more liberal economic one. These benefits granted to the nationalities were in part an extension of the achievements of the revolution of 1848, but they went much further. Romanian gains in Hungary and Transylvania eventually undermined the national hegemony that Hungarian leaders demanded in 1848 and thought they had assured in 1867.

Recent studies have pointed out the importance of the

3. According to a calculation based on official statistics, the population of Transylvania in 1869 was 57% Romanian, 32% Hungarian and 10.5% German. Károly Keleti, Hazánk és népe a közgazdaság és társadalmi statisztika szempontjából (Pest: Athenaeum, 1871), 72.
clergy in the national movements of East European minorities which lacked a powerful aristocracy or middle class. Nationalism required ideology and propaganda, functions dependent on the intelligentsia. The clergy often was the dominant element of the intelligentsia in premodern societies. Only as the economic transformation progressed during the nineteenth century was society able to offer intellectual employment outside the church, as education, journalism and the professions expanded. Thus while clerical leadership was strongest among the socially disadvantaged nationalities—such as the Romanians, Slovaks, Slovenes, Estonians and Lithuanians—the clergy also played a major cultural and political role among Transylvania's Hungarians and Saxons. While the Hungarians and Saxons had their own aristocracy or middle class, the expansion of politics into the village inevitably involved the clergy. The latter were the most numerous element of the rural intelligentsia in each ethnic group. It was primarily the clergy who received higher education at distant foreign or domestic institutions. The cleric was often an adherent of nationalist ideology and corresponded regularly with church and civil authorities. In an era of restricted social and geographic

mobility, he provided a picture of the outside world through his sermons and less formal contacts with the villagers. Clerical leadership was strongest and survived the longest in relatively isolated or impoverished villages where the nation lacked a wealthier or better-educated aristocracy or middle class.

This study has profited from the recent renaissance of research and publication of Hungarian and Romanian church history. Church historiography was a dominant branch of the historical discipline among Romanians and Saxons during much of the nineteenth century, as typified by the works of Georg Daniel and Friedrich Teutsch and the many works about Šaguna. Hungarian church historiography reached a high level of sophistication during the period between the two world wars. Conditions for church history were unfavorable for most of the period after 1945, but have improved in the last fifteen years as both the Orthodox Church in Romania and the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary have established a modus vivendi with the state. The renaissance of ————

5. On the most important Romanian church historian of the interwar period, see Niessen, "Ioan Lupaș and the Cluj School of History Between the World Wars," Balkanistica 7 (1981-2), pp. 78-91.

6. Still interesting today from a theoretical standpoint are the articles in the church history yearbook Regnum by Tihamér Vanyó: "Hogyan írjuk meg egy egyházmegye történetét?" (1937), "A plébániátörténetírás módszertana" (1941), and "Az egyháztörténész szemhatára" (1943).

7. Most of the Romanian Orthodox bishoprics now publish journals that include historical articles, which tend to be apologetic and biographic. Romania hosted a meeting of the International Commission for Comparative Church History at the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Bucharest in 1980 and presented more than a third of the
Catholic church history in this century received specific encouragement from the Second Vatican Council and from the decision of Pope Paul VI in 1966 to open the archives of Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) to historical research. Two products of the improved atmosphere which have proven most useful for this study are the source publications of the Hungarian and Romanian citizens Lajos Lukács and Ion Dumitriu-Snagov.

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papers (Comite international des sciences historiques. XVe Congres international des sciences historiques. Bucarest, 10-17 aout 1980, Actes IV,2 (Bucarest: Academie, 1982), pp. 1133-40), but it is unclear whether this will stimulate church historiography in Romania. I have used Mircea Păcurariu’s recent survey of Romanian Orthodox church history: Istoria bisericii ortodoxe române III, București: Editura Institutului biblic și de misiune a Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane, 1981).

8. Part of the Vatican Archives for these years had been open previously, however. Most of the works on Hungarian Catholic church history surveyed by Jenő Gergely in "Disser-tationes Hungaricae ex Historia Ecclesiae (A magyar katolikus egyháztörténetírás újabb eredményeiről)," Századok 117,3 (1983), 647-66) appeared in Germany since 1966, and only a few in Hungary. During most of the period after 1945 church history was suppressed in Hungary even more thoroughly than in Romania, and political conditions still discourage the preoccupation of professional historians with church topics. Unlike the minority Reformed Church, the Catholic Church in Hungary offers no journals or professional training in the field of church history. The publication of Konrád Szántó’s A katolikus egyház története and the holding of a church history symposium in Hungary recently indicate the situation may be changing; see Konrad Szanto, "A katolikus egyháztörténetírásról," História 7,4 (1985), 30-31; Zsuzsanna Demeter and János Poto, "Egyháztörténeti szimpozion," Századok 119 (1985), 1346-8; and most recently Tihamér Vanyó, "Nemzeti egyháztörténetírásunk. Teljesítmények és feladatok," Századok 120 (1986), 678-705.

9. Lukács, The Vatican and Hungary 1846-1878 (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1981) and Dumitriu-Snagov, Le Saint- Siège et la Roumanie Moderne (Roma: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1982). There are several Hungarian Protestant journals in Hungary that publish historical articles, and two in Romania. Concerning recent Hungarian Reformed church historiography, see László Makkai, "Református történet-
Scholars in recent years have called for a departure from traditional church history that concentrated on the laudable activities of individual bishops and holy persons and underestimated the social dimension. The church as an institution necessarily had to consider material and political interests that can only be understood independent of theology. Furthermore, historical evidence is silent about the role of churches as an instrument of salvation. The believers' relationship to religion was a complex cultural and social phenomenon. Modern church historians have extended their interest to anthropology, sociology, and social movements.

Gabriel Adriányi has cited the churches' role as expressions of national identity, their original contributions to canon law, distinctive religious ethnography and missionary activity as special East European characteristics.

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10. This point was emphasized by the President of the American Society of Church History in a recent address: Henry Warner Bowden, "Ends and Means in Church History," Church History 54 (1985), 85.


These traits evolved in an environment of many nationalities and religions, where the variety of contacts reinforced separate identities. Both the ethnic and ecclesiastic dimension of the religious communities extended people's awareness beyond the village, the province and even the state borders. For politically conscious Hungarians in Transylvania in the 1860s, the decisive contest with Austrian absolutism was being fought in Hungary proper. The Saxon view of politics was influenced by the contemporary struggle for supremacy in Germany. The most significant political events for the Romanians during these same years were the unification of the Danubian Principalities in 1859 and the reforms of Prince Cuza in the following years. It is thus possible to speak of ethnic Transylvania as the center of three overlaid rings, three very different national contexts. Each church also represented a religious community that crossed political boundaries, and hence played its part in cultivating awareness of broader ethnic solidarities. International religious solidarities—Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant—were even more complex, but to some degree they undermined national exclusiveness.

Most of the historiography concerning Transylvania is nationalist in spirit or at least informed by a specific

13. The historian of the Transylvanian Saxon press noted this phenomenon in the preoccupations of the Saxon, Hungarian and Romanian press in our period: Weisenfeld, 4. Katherine Verdery observes a similar socioeconomic matrix: German merchants, Hungarian landowners, and Romanian peasants: Verdery, 195-229.
national perspective. Stefan Malfèr has noted the absence of a detailed investigation of Austrian policy toward Transylvania during the 1860s, and lamented the lack of a political history of Transylvania not written from the perspective of one of the three nationalities. The national historical traditions are limited by particularist concerns and lines of inquiry. A comparative approach is needed to overcome these limits. This study addresses the general phenomenon of clerical and religious influence in Transylvania, weighing the relative importance of secular and religious institutions, culture and social structure for this influence, and strives for a better understanding of Transylvanian Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian society and their churches.

The possibilities of statistical comparison of the type practiced by Hroch are limited in the case of Transylvania by the dearth of preliminary studies concerning the number, material support, and numerical significance within national intelligentsias of each nation's clergy. The national movements of Transylvanian Hungarians, Saxons and Romanians were of different types with respect to their dominant social classes. Hungarian nationalism was of the aristocratic type, Saxon nationalism bourgeois or middle class, and Romanian nationalism plebeian or clerical. Transylvanian

Romanian society was comparatively "incomplete," lacking an upper class like those of the other two nations.

Urban intellectuals increasingly challenged clerical leadership. In general the laicization of politics and culture---what sociologists call "secularization"---proceeded throughout the century. Not only were the state and lay institutions taking over many normative and educational functions as well as the control of the property of the church, which is the conventional legal sense of the term secularization. Officials and laymen also contested the influence and leadership of the church and clergy in social movements.

Various factors, however, partially offset this trend and restricted anticlericalism in Transylvania. Clergymen and church schools had long been the center of ethnic identity, as elsewhere in the monarchy. In addition, the Transylvanian constitution which existed up to 1848 had invested special authority in the churches, and their autonomy was largely respected even after 1867. The corporative constitution assured special status to the churches and clergy. It was revised during the 1860s to give greater weight to property, but the religiosity and preference for traditional institutions of Franz Joseph prolonged the

importance of the "clerical estate." In time not only was society secularized, but to a degree the churches were declericalized. The social and cultural influence of the clergy declined, and so did the public practice of religiosity among the educated population. Still, the churches retained considerable prestige as national institutions which were increasingly democratized and preoccupied with politics.

Not only the national traditions, but also the vast regional differences within Transylvania have made the study of Transylvanian history difficult. Three major regions existed: The Hungarian (or Noble) Counties, the Szekler region (Szekelyföld) and the Saxon region (Fundus Regius). In each the economy, constitutional structure, strength of the nobility and urban population, status of the peasantry, and the religious and nationality relations were different. These local factors were all the more important for social and political movements in an age of limited mobility and communication. Railways had yet to reach Transylvania, and the cost of a fifty-mile coach ride exceeded most subjects' annual income. Other regional differences arose from the location of geographic features and church centers. Just as the individual national movements should not be viewed in isolation from each other, so also the differences within nations deserve more attention than they have usually received. The atmosphere of the nationality conflict led politicians, and later historians, to emphasize national
unity, and understate divisions. The national idea was supposed to supercede regional and social interests.

The study of religious communities is well-suited to the understanding of ethnic politics in their concrete temporal, cultural and geographical settings. When politics is viewed from the unitary perspective of national ideologists, the complexity of society and also of interethnic relationships is obscured. Church history, with its diocesan and parish structure, can illuminate the cultural geography of the national movements. The study of clergymen as national leaders makes it possible to ascertain the extent and location of their "constituency" with greater accuracy than that of secular politicians.

The relationship of religion, liberalism, and nationalism in rural and ethnic politics is one question raised by Kann and Jászi. Another concerns the relationship of Catholicism and the Habsburg state. Their long symbiosis was based on a substantial commonality of conservative goals. At first glance the years after the Austrian Concordat of 1855 present an instance of extraordinary collaboration. In fact, Austria's tortuous path from ultramontane absolutism to liberal monarchy in the decade of the 1860s led to significant innovations in church-state relations. The second half of this dissertation gives special

attention to the complex involvement of the Catholic Church in these events as both a domestic and an international factor.

To understand the role of the churches one must investigate the institutional and social elites on which they exercised the greatest influence in the Habsburg political system. Histories of Hungary and Transylvania in the 1860s have given inadequate attention to the precise nature of this system, and consequently have conveyed misleading concepts of Austrian absolutism and the liberal Hungarian opposition. This is especially the case for Transylvania, with its system of social and ecclesiastic checks and balances that favored local conservative elites. These constitutional restrictions on absolute power bound the hands of Vienna’s erstwhile centralists, and paved the way for the conservative restoration known as the Ausgleich or Austro-Hungarian Compromise.

The nine chapters of this study proceed from an overview of secular politics, to a comparative examination of administrative regions and social and religious groups, to a detailed discussion of the politics of the Hungarian and Romanian Catholics, and finally a portrayal of various religious leaders’ attempts to strengthen their national leadership by securing the administrative separation of their ethnoreligious community from coreligionists of foreign ethnicity.

The first chapter traces certain aspects of the history
of the Habsburg monarchy in the twelve years after the revolution of 1848 that are relevant for an understanding of the importance of the clergy, Hungarian and Austrian liberalism, the Kossuth emigration and the Danubian Principalities for the policies of the Austrian government in Transylvania during the 1860s. The second chapter examines Transylvanian society and administration in terms of the traditional institutions that were reestablished in 1861. The third chapter builds on a knowledge of these structures to present the course of secular politics in the province from 1861 to 1863.

Chapter four is a comparative study of the major religious communities of Transylvania in terms of the training and material support of the parishes and schools, the nature of official and popular religious culture, and the relationship of education, liberalism and secularization. The large issues encountered in this chapter find more specific expression in the later chapters.

Chapters five and six are devoted to the Catholic Church. Chapter five examines the issues of ultramontanism and liberalism in the universal church, the nature of the Greek Catholic Church as a component of the Catholic Church, and the character of Catholic Church politics in Hungary during the 1850s and 1860s. Chapter six narrows the focus to the Transylvanian diocese, and in particular the activity of Bishop Lajos Haynald and various members of his diocesan clergy in the opposition to Austrian policy in the 1860s.
Chapters seven and eight focus on the religious and geographical divisions in Romanian politics and, specifically, within the Greek Catholic Church. Earlier chapters on social structure, secular and religious politics provide a basis for an understanding of a Romanian national movement that was far less united in purpose than is conventionally assumed.

The final chapter addresses one of the most characteristic strivings of ecclesiastic politics in the mid-nineteenth century, the organizational separation of ethnoreligious communities from perceived foreign rule. The Romanian Orthodox, Hungarian Catholics, Hungarian Reformed, and Armenian Catholics are at the center of the chapter. The expression of their concept of churches as alternative polities fittingly concludes the study.
The Revolution of 1848 brought improvements in the status of the peasantry in Transylvania. It also brought the union of Hungary and Transylvania, which provoked a civil war that was both social and ethnic in character. All three Transylvanian nationalities were dissatisfied with the absolutist regime that ensued after the end of the civil war in 1849. Hungarians suffered especially. Transylvanians made up a disproportionately high number of the Hungarian revolutionaries condemned to death by the Austrians: 199 of 666, or nearly twice Transylvania’s percentage of the population of Hungary. Social and national animosities had undoubtedly increased the dedication of the Transylvanian Hungarian nobility to the revolutionary government. The liquidation of the county administration after 1849 deprived them of their leading role, and most declined any positions in the absolutist administration. Romanians had suffered

1. Historians use the terms Revolution, War of Independence (Szabadságharc) and Civil War for the events of 1848-9 in the Hungarian lands. I consider the last of these the most accurate description of the year beginning in September, 1848 in Transylvania.
3. The bitterness of the struggle and the memories it left were symbolized by the destruction by Romanian peasants and guerillas of the Hungarian town of Nagyenyed and the murder of many townspeople of Zlatna. Vilmos Mátynás, Utazások Erdélyben (Budapest: Panorama, 1977), 55, 62, refers to mass graves of 700 persons in these two cases.
considerable human and material losses while fighting in the civil war on the side of the Austrians, but their hopes for national autonomy were frustrated. Saxons had also fought for the Habsburgs and suffered correspondingly, but witnessed the dissolution of the Fundus Regius during the decade of absolutism. The frequently repeated phrase "We received as reward what the Hungarians received as punishment" reflected the virtually equal suppression of autonomous political activity under absolutism.

The peasant emancipation legislation, administrative reform and Concordat enacted under absolutism were all calculated to strengthen the authority of the central government against internal adversaries in the empire. The

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4. The estimates of casualties are contradictory. According to Romanian accounts 40,000 Romanians died in 1848-49, 300 Orthodox churches, 100 villages were destroyed completely and 230 partially; Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 274 and ibid., Orthodoxy and Nationality. Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 78. Iosif Sterca-Şuluţiu accepted the 40,000 figure and estimated the corresponding Hungarian fatalities at 100,000 (a figure that seems extraordinarily high) -- "Din istoria munţilor apuseni," Gazeta Transilvaniei (1891), p. 18, cited by Ambrus Miskolczy, bibliographic annex to Erdély története III (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1986), 1805. An official Austrian estimate of civilian "victims of the Hungarian rebels" gave a total of 5405 Romanians out of 6112; Eduard Albert Bielz, Handbuch der Landeskunde Siebenbürgens (Hermannstadt: S. Filtsch, 1857), 149. With the much greater casualties from typhus and among the military, Bielz estimated 18,000 Transylvanians died during the civil war.

5. Two Saxon towns were burned by Szekler guard units during the civil war. While Saxon municipal life suffered the same limitations as those in other parts of Transylvania, it is also true that Saxons received disproportionately more positions in the absolutist administration than either the Hungarians or the Romanians.
adversaries of the regime were most numerous in Hungary and Transylvania. The prosecution of the Hungarian participants in the Revolution—about 120 were executed and 1500 sentenced to multiple years of imprisonment—achieved the short-term goal of pacification, but also the alienation of most politically conscious Hungarians. Most of the former leaders of Hungarian society, aristocrats, noblemen and urban intellectuals, withdrew from the administration into hostile passivity, or used the limited possibilities of the censored press to keep the memory of the revolution alive. Kossuth and the other revolutionary leaders in exile sought to discredit the Austrian regime, collaborate with other democratic emigres, and maintain their tenuous connection with the underground opposition in Hungary. The assassination attempt against the emperor Franz Joseph by a young Hungarian in February, 1853, it is true, had no connection with the emigration. But the abortive revolutionary conspiracy of József Makk in the previous year had ties to Kossuth and acted in his name.

The conspiracy was betrayed and a series of arrests

6. Deák, 333-5. Deák notes that those executed included "an astonishing number of Catholic priests." Of a list of 666 condemned Hungarian revolutionaries, two-thirds were soldiers, but 21 were Catholic priests or monks and eleven were Reformed ministers and preachers; ibid., 334-6.

7. As late as 1859, only 37 of the 83 highest posts in Hungary were occupied by natives of that country; Éva Somogyi, Az abszolutizmus és kiegyezés 1849-1867 (Budapest: Gondolat, 1981), 67.

followed, with twenty-five persons executed. The center of the movement was the Szekler region of Transylvania, and the conspirators hoped to coordinate the insurrection with an armed incursion from the Danubian Principalities. 

Some 600 were arrested in the Szekler region alone, including a surprisingly large number of clergymen and school teachers. The Roman Catholic Canon Mózes Keserű was implicated in Kolozsvár, but exonerated. Of 48 persons condemned to death, whose sentences were later commuted to five years or more, there were seventeen landowners, five lawyers, six Reformed [Calvinist] ministers, four students, two principals of Protestant secondary schools, two Catholic priests and one Unitarian minister. Correspondence concerning the conspiracy was discovered in the residence of a Reformed preacher and professor at the Reformed College in Marosvásárhely, the college was searched by the police and several students arrested. The Franciscan abbot-professors in Marosvásárhely and Csíksomlyó were also arrested. The abbot in Csíksomlyó was exonerated and released in

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9. Ibid., 51.

10. Somogyi, 84.


1854, but the abbot in Marosvasarhely and a village priest of Udvarhely district were condemned to death, later commuted to fifteen and eight years in prison, respectively.

The participation or implication of so many church or school leaders in the conspiracy suggests that sympathy for the emigre leaders or at least strong alienation were considerable even among those groups of society which one would expect to be the most conservative. The rapid liquidation of the conspiracy, however, demonstrated the formidable obstacle that Austrian police surveillance presented to such a movement. It became evident that a prospective insurrection would have a better chance of success if coordinated with foreign military action. Thus, as a result of the conspiracy's failure the emigre leaders devoted more of their attention to the search for allies among the existing states.

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Foreign Policy in the Decade of Absolutism

Diplomatic developments in the decade favored the Hungarian search for allies. Austria had been able to defeat the Hungarian War of Independence in 1849 largely

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14. Károlyi, Székely vértanúk 1854, 46; Egyed Hermann, A magyar katolikus papság az osztrák katonai diktatúra és az abszolutizmus idejében (Gödöllő: n.n., 1932), 71, 74-5. The abbot in Marosvásarhely, Rafael Andrássy, and the village priest, Mózes Pálffy, are not included in Orbán's list. All those imprisoned were set free as the result of the imperial amnesty of May, 1857-- Orbán, loc.cit. According to Ferenc Köös, the abbot in Csíksomlyó, Ignác Veress, was executed; introduction by György Beke, in Köös, Életem és emlékeim (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1971), 22.
thanks to the Russian military intervention resulting from the two powers' conservative solidarity in the Holy Alliance. As the result of the Crimean War (1853-56), the alliance came to an end. The new French policy of support for the expansionist designs of Piedmont-Sardinia put Austria on the defensive. This pressure as well as fears of Russian expansion in the Balkans caused Austria to side with Russia's enemies in the war and thereby force Russia to sue for peace. The experience embittered Russia, particularly its Foreign Minister Gorchakov, so that in succeeding years Russia alligned with Austria's adversary in northern Italy, France. Weakened by its military and diplomatic embarrassment in the war, Russia became a diplomatic auxiliary for French designs in succeeding years.

The first consequence of Austria's isolation was its defeat in the Danubian Principalities. In 1854 it had obliged Russia to end its occupation of these provinces, and subsequently occupied them herself for more than two years. Various Austrian actions seemed to indicate it desired to permanently annex the Principalities, like the article in an Austro-Prussian convention in 1854 which provided for the extension of the German federal defense system to include the Principalities. The Western press and diplomats discussed the possibility of Austrian annexation of the Principalities in exchange for compensation to France or

Sardinia in Italy. The international congress after the Crimean War in 1856 approved the Austrian demand for the end of the Russian protectorate over the Principalities, but also required the end of the Austrian occupation and the establishment of an all-European protectorate. Nervous about Romanian nationalism in the Principalities, Austria now worked for the restoration of Ottoman control and favored the conservative party. Officials in Transylvania feared the potential impact on the Romanians there.

For the Romanians in the Principalities, as for the Transylvanian Hungarians in 1848, the pervasive slogan was "Union": in this case, that of the Principalities. The circumstances under which the first stage of the union was achieved were even reminiscent of the Kolozsvár diet in 1848. Having been elected prince of Moldavia in January, 1859, Alexandru Ioan Cuza was then nominated by the liberals in the election in Wallachia two weeks later. It is likely


that this union was more popular than that of Transylvania and Hungary had been in 1848, but the conservative electoral assembly appeared likely to defeat Cuza. The liberals brought crowd pressure to bear on the assembly to elect him, just as the Hungarians of Kolozsvár had allegedly terrorized the Saxon deputies in 1848.

The double election of Cuza took place without, or in defiance of, foreign interference. It was a defeat for Austria because it was achieved by a popular movement and because the union could be expected to stimulate Romanian nationalism in Transylvania. France favored the union, and Russia was willing to tolerate it, in order to weaken Austria. This was also the decisive consideration for the Hungarian emigres and their emissary, the veteran of 1848-9 General Klapka. Becoming aware of the approaching war of France and Sardinia against Austria at the beginning of 1859, he raised the possibility of Hungarian participation in the action. Kossuth was reluctant, due in part to his well-founded skepticism concerning French intentions. Klapka won his approval for the idea only after concluding

\[\text{\begin{center}18. Berindei, 87-91; Gerald Bobango, The Emergence of the Romanian National State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 33-7; Barbara Jelavich, Russian and Formation of the Romanian National State 1821-1878 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 96-7. By an interesting coincidence, László Berzenczei, the agitator at the 1848 diet, was an emissary of the Hungarian emigration in the Principalities during these years. On the role of Berzenczei in 1848, see Miklós Asztalos, Kossuth Lajos kora és az erdélyi kérdés (Budapest: Collegium Transilvanicum, 1928), 121, and Carl Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Revolutionsjahren 1848-1849 (Bukarest: Akademie, 1967), 139.}\]
an agreement, in March, 1859, on collaboration between France and Prince Cuza. Local politics were to greatly complicate the application of the agreement. For the moment it was an impressive demonstration of the geopolitical possibilities of the French alliance. The perspective of the Transylvanian Hungarians was contradictory. Rumors of an invasion from Russia or the Principalities inspired insubordination among some Transylvanian Romanian peasants and miners. Fearing a recurrence of the events of 1849, many Hungarian landowners moved to the cities or even to Hungary.

The first central institution of the emigres, the Hungarian National Directory, was established in Paris on May 6, 1859, one week after the commencement of Franco-Austrian hostilities. The Directory-- composed of Kossuth, Klapka and László Teleki-- began the organization of a Hungarian Legion of 3500-4000 men within the Sardinian army, chiefly from Hungarian deserters and captives from the Austrian army. From the standpoint of the emigres, the

19. Lajos Lukács, Magyar politikai emigráció 1849-1867 (Budapest: Kossuth, 1984), 134-42. Klapka negotiated the agreement as the emissary of the French emperor. Contrary to Lukács, Vasile Curticăpeanu states that Cuza never signed the protocol of the agreement because he was dissatisfied with its vagueness on the question of Transylvania; "Alexandru Ioan Cuza și Transilvania," in Cuza Voda in memoriam (Iași: Junimea, 1973), 418-19.


21. Lukács, Magyar politikai emigráció, 147. The Franco-Sardinian troops facing Austria in Italy numbered about 320000; Joseph Redlich, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, I, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Der neue Geist-
minor part played by the Hungarian troops and the rapid conclusion of the armistice by France were a disappointment. The alliance of Hungarian troops with France and the desertion of two Hungarian infantry divisions under Franz Joseph's personal command were propaganda victories for the emigres, and helped to explain the rapid Austrian capitulation after the French victory at Solferino. The new Austrian Foreign Minister wrote later that fear of domestic unrest and a Hungarian uprising caused Franz Joseph to make peace when he did. The prospect of an armed insurrection was minimal, but the perception of the fragility of the political regime was accurate.

The Franco-Austrian war marked the high point of the emigration's military power. With the conclusion of peace, the Directory quickly realized that the Legion in northern Italy no longer had a purpose and dissolved it. The recent recruits from the Austrian army were allowed to return home where they could make a political impact. The renewal of hostilities against Austria that the Directory hoped for became increasingly unlikely, and the focus of Hungarian politics shifted again to the domestic front.

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Verlag, 1920), 175.
22. Szabad, Hungarian Political Trends, 75; Redlich, I, pt. 1, 753.
The Thaw

Austria conceded its military defeat and the loss of Lombardy and embarked on a course of internal retrenchment. The threat of a Hungarian uprising may account for the timing of the armistice, but the sources of the Austrian defeat were deeper. The unsuccessful foreign and domestic policies of the emperor since the revolution had led to the empire's progressive isolation and financial crisis. Franz Joseph made the dismissed Foreign Minister, Count Buol, responsible for his own disastrous policies, but was becoming aware of the exasperation in society at his own military despotism. A week after the armistice, the emperor issued his Laxenburg Manifesto pledging to

\[\text{dedicate my complete and uninterrupted attention and care to the successful solution of my task: to permanently establish Austria's internal welfare and external power through the purposeful development of its rich intellectual and material energies as well as through timely improvements in legislation and administration.}\]

The terse manifesto, revealing the nervous caution of an autocrat whose own policies were under attack, initiated a series of experiments with new policies. In August, the two ministers most responsible for administering the failed internal regime, Interior Minister Bach and Police Minister Kempen, were replaced. Bankers met the attempts of

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24. Buol left his successor, Count Rechberg, an extensive memorandum describing the state of opinion and a proposal for reform; Redlich, I, pt. 1, 462; the memorandum is in I, pt. 2, 234-40.
26. The Austrian Foreign Minister was simultaneously Minister des kaiserlichen Hauses with special access to the
Finance Minister Bruck to float new loans by calling for representative institutions to supervise public finances. The revelations about the desperate financial situation and unjust accusations of malfeasance drove Bruck to suicide in April, 1860. The emperor reluctantly surrendered to the calls for fiscal responsibility, announcing in March, 1860 the convocation of an assembly of imperial notables to discuss the matter, the expanded Reichsrat, in June, 1860.

While high officials in Vienna discussed the financial dilemma, the revival of political life in Hungary focussed on other issues. Office holders of Hungarian nationality were few and lacking in prestige, and freedom of the press severely limited. Therefore popular discontent found expression, already before the Laxenburg Manifesto, in the actions of Catholic prelates and a few wealthy landed owners. Cardinal Archbishop Scitovszky led the opposition of the Hungarian episcopate to the Concordat of 1855, which he viewed as an intrusion by the Archbishop of Vienna on Hungarian rights. Scitovszky's stance added to his prestige, but was in essence a narrowly ecclesiastical matter.

More significant in a secular sense was the address of 131 emperor and traditionally the leading minister in status. Rechberg also became the first Prime Minister since 1852, meaning that unlike Buol he would take a leading role in internal policy and in discussions in the Council of Ministers. Decisions of the Council would be by majority vote and binding on all the members. See Helmut Rumpler, "Ministerrat und Ministerratsprotokolle 1848 bis 1867. Behördengeschichtliche und aktenkundliche Analyse," in POM, Einleitungsband (Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1970), 56-7.

27. See Chapter V.
Hungarian notables during his visit to Hungary in May, 1857, calling in moderate terms for a change of policy. Scitovszky was the leading signatory to the document, and displeased the court even further by his organization of a mass pilgrimage to Mariazell in Austria in September of the same year. The long procession of 25000 persons, including 36 magnates, was the largest public assembly since the revolution. Ostensibly religious in nature, it impressed many contemporaries as an anti-Austrian patriotic demonstration because of Scitovszky's published and oral declarations, its size and the national costumes and number of the participants.

The other leading domestic figure of the early Hungarian political revival was Count István Széchenyi. The founder of the national revival in the 1820s enjoyed tremendous prestige despite his conflicts with Kossuth and emotional breakdown in 1848. Living in an asylum near Vienna, Széchenyi had recovered sufficiently by the end of 1856 to begin to write again. At the end of 1857 he began to

28. István Nemeskürty, Parázs a hamu alatt. Világostól Solferinóig (Budapest: Magvető, 1981), 210-17. Kempen wrote in his memoir that he unsuccessfully advocated Scitovszky's removal from his see as a result of this event. The most extensive published description is János Török, "Az évszázados Máriaczelli búcsú," Török János publicistikai és nemzetgazdasági némely dolgozatai (Pest: Rath Mór bizománya, 1858), 503-18; the same author also published two pastoral letters of Scitovszky concerning the pilgrimage, in Magyarország prímása. Közjogi és történeti vázolat, II (Pest: Laufer és Stolp, 1859), 265-81.

29. Kosáry, 60-1, implies that the new diplomatic situation after the Crimean War helped to inspire Széchenyi's recovery and renewed interest in politics, but he fails to demonstrate the connection. His clerical contacts may have been more significant. Széchenyi only began to write about foreign policy questions in May, 1857; 83 ff.
write what became the most important Hungarian polemical work of the decade in response to an apologia for Austrian absolutism. Széchenyi's bitterly satirical Blick auf den anonymen Rückblick appeared anonymously in London in July, 1859. The date of publication greatly increased the international impression it made. In Hungary the response to the work was overwhelmingly positive and contributed to the growth of the opposition, even though it is an exaggeration to state that it was responsible for the fall of Bach. Széchenyi maintained contact with a large number of opposition politicians during the crisis of 1859-60, including most of the conservative aristocrats, the retired Archbishop Lonovics, and even the future Austrian minister Schmerling, who visited him in December, 1859.

The Protestant Patent enacted for Hungary in September, 1859 served as a convenient pretext for open political action by the opposition. The newly permitted Reformed district synods were the first such public assemblies in Hungary since the revolution. Reformed bishops and aristocrats

30. It was a response to [Bernhard von Meyer], Rückblick auf die jüngste Entwicklungsperiode Ungarns (Wien, 1857). Jacint Rónay served as Széchenyi's intermediary with the publisher in London. The Benedictine monk was recommended to Széchenyi by József Lonovics, the former archbishop during the Revolution. Kosáry, 177-8.

31. The Austrian police mistakenly considered Szechenyi the leader of the Old Conservatives (See below). His general views and sympathies were close to the Old Conservatives, but his situation as a virtual prisoner in his asylum precluded his active leadership, and he did not consider it politically opportune to formulate a specific program of demands as did the Old Conservatives. Ibid., 218ff.

32. Ibid., 304.
crats protested against the Patent as contrary to church law, and were supported by many Catholics, including Cardinal Scitovszky. Public opinion may well have rejected any sort of legislation coming from Vienna. The court backed down, and the Patent was repealed in May, 1860.

Redlich writes:

> From week to week the discontent and public unrest increased... The impression increasingly made on the emperor and his closest advisors by Hungarian conditions would henceforth be the real driving force of internal policy in the empire. 34

The influence of the group of Hungarian magnates known as the Old Conservatives, led by Count Antal Szécsen, rose rapidly at this time. They convinced Franz Joseph, in March and April, 1860, to name a Hungarian as Governor of Hungary and to announce plans to restore the former county administration and diet, despite the opposition of two archdukes and of the majority of the Council of Ministers.

A series of Hungarian national celebrations in the winter of 1859-60 provided further opportunities for meetings, patriotic rhetoric and parades. One typical event was the founding of the Erdélyi Múzeum-Egylet [Transylvanian Museum Society], a cultural association of the Transylvanian Hungarians, in Kolozsvár in November, 1859. Dismissing allegations of disunity among the citizens of the country, the president of the society, Count Imre

33. Nemeskürty, 281.
34. Redlich, I. pt. 1, 490.
36. See Somogyi, 113.
Mikó, announced that Hungarian national feeling had never been stronger, and the new society would help to cultivate a unified sense of patriotism in all.

Kossuth's National Directory was beginning to establish ties with Hungarian radicals. Conservative aristocrats, however, quickly reasserted their leadership of the country, supplanting the absolutist officials. Several factors account for this. First, many of the Old Conservatives, while rejecting participation in the Habsburg administration, had maintained their contacts, sources of information and potential influence at the court. Second, from religious faith and family tradition they had strong ties to the hoffähig, socially influential church leadership. Third, aristocrats continued to dominate the leading bodies of such cultural organizations as the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The uncontested leader of the Transylvanian moderates, Imre Mikó, in 1860 formulated six basic principles which can serve as a summary of the group's attitudes: the cultivation of native Hungarian literature; national unity and a rejec-

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39. Mikó, "Irányeszmék," Budapešti szemle No. 8, 257-68; No. 9, 3-16, 257-71; No. 10, 5-20, 261-73; No. 11, 3-12 (1860). Zoltán Szász ("Az abszolutizmus kora Erdélyben (1848-1849)," in Erdély története 1830-tól napjainkig (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1986), 1448 and elsewhere) refers to Mikó as a "moderate liberal," but in the Transylvanian politics of 1860-63 his politics were closer to those of the conservatives than the liberals.
tion of "party spirit"; careful, traditional education; family values; the protection of landed property, national institutions and traditions, and historical consciousness; and the rejection of emigration as a form of disloyalty. Mikó's program was undeniably elitist and conservative, but in the context of 1860 it appeared a suitable blend of patriotism and prudence.

The widespread mourning of the tragic suicide of Szechenyi in April and the death of the Transylvanian Old Conservative leader Baron Sámuel Jósika provoked new demonstrations of national unity that seemed to confirm the leadership of the conservatives. Nearly 10,000 attended the funeral of Széchenyi in Hungary; smaller ceremonies commemorated him all over Transylvania, including in Romanian communities that remembered his tolerant views on nationality problems. The meeting of the Saxon Verein für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde in Bistritz in August, 1860 featured a series of speeches on Saxon national culture and patriotism. Baron József Eötvös attended the meeting, as he had that of the Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyet in November, on behalf of the Hungarian Academy. His dramatic speech, describing

40. Police harassment apparently caused Szechenyi's mind to come unhinged again. Public opinion was quick to accuse the police, unjustly, of murder; at any rate, his status as a martyr was assured. Szabad, "Önkényuralom," 651-2; Kosáry, 248-75.

41. Úrmössy, I 224-5. A similar episode was the Hungarian-Romanian fraternization at a celebration in Kolozsvár at the end of July (Ibid., I 229-30). But the refusal of Romanian Greek Catholic dean Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu (see Chapter VII) to attend was a foretaste of future conflicts; see Fekete-Negrutiu to Baruțiu, May 19, GBCS III, 161.
scholarship as a mountain on which all nations would join hands upon reaching the peak, appeared in newspapers throughout the country. It was, unfortunately, one of the last speeches of the "era of good feelings," of anti-absolutist solidarity.

The seeming unity of the opponents of absolutism arose in part from a virtual absence of public debate. Széchenyi’s Blick was exclusively negative and presented no program. On the other hand, Eotvos published a study in the same year, Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit Österreicths, which sought to reconcile dynastic and national interests by a federal system and a weak central parliament. The Hungarian press and most leaders rejected the work as contrary to Hungarian constitutional independence. The framework of an underground insurrectionary organization of the emigration was being laid in Hungary and Transylvania. Participants in the ceremonies welcoming Eötvös to the Szekler town of Székelyudvarhely in August, 1860 reported, among cheers for friendship between the peoples, isolated cheers for Kossuth and Garibaldi as well.

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44. Ürmössy, I, 219-22.
45. Kristóf, 27.
The Expanded Reichsrat

The opening of the expanded Reichsrat caused local politics in Hungary and Transylvania to fade temporarily into the background. Eötvös had by now revised his views and his new book, *Die Sonderstellung Ungarns vom Standpunkte der Einheit Deutschlands*, was closer to the views of Ferenc Deák, the architect of the eventual compromise. For this reason, Eötvös declined his invitation to the Reichsrat. Ironically, Eötvös' views of the previous year helped inspire the program of the aristocratic conservative majority in the assembly. The expanded Reichsrat (*verstärkter Reichsrat*) consisted of sixty members, eight from the original body plus officials, landowners, clergy and Chamber of Commerce members appointed by the emperor on the recommendation of the provincial governors. The emperor called upon the members to offer their advice on "important questions of general legislation and the normalization of the state budget."

Discussion in the body quickly turned from budgetary questions to the political reorganization of the empire. The majority position was presented by Count Clam of Bohemia and Count Szécsen and other aristocrats of Hungary. They proposed a federation of the "historical-political indivi-

46. The original Reichsrat (Imperial Council) was an advisory body with six Austrian and two Hungarian members established in 1851. Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 326.
47. Redlich, I, pt. 1, 489.
dualities" (the previously existing crown lands or provinces), equal with respect to each other and each with its autonomous corporative constitution and diet. The minority, led by the Viennese bureaucrats Count Nádasdy and Baron Lichtenfels, insisted that the granting of autonomy to the provinces would dangerously weaken central state power and Austria's international position. Furthermore, they argued, the federalists' insistence on the restoration of the old feudal constitution in the Austrian hereditary provinces (the future Cisleithania) was ahistorical and unrealistic because the estates there had enjoyed little power or autonomy for the better part of two centuries.

The constitutional demands of the federalists corresponded in large part to the minimum programs of their respective national movements opposing German bureaucratic centralism. These two camps would continue to face each other, in public debate and in that in the Council of Ministers, for the next several years. The divisions over the Austrian-Hungarian problem also continued. But the emperor's preference for aristocratic and bureaucratic members had artificially colored the deliberations from the outset, obscuring the ascendancy of liberal ideas in public opinion in all parts of the monarchy as the controls on the press began to be relaxed.

The federalists' program became the basis for a reorganization of the empire in October. The majority enjoyed by this party in the Reichsrat was not decisive in itself,
but rather Franz Joseph's personal decision, in spite of the views of his ministers, to accept the proposals of the federalists. The thoroughly surprised Council of Ministers had no choice but to accept the federalist October Diploma, which was promulgated on October 20. The Diploma was a sort of centralist constitution in the sense that the Reichsrat, expanded to 100 members, and the provincial diets were guaranteed participation (Mitwirkung) in legislation. Matters concerning the entire empire, primarily financial, must go before the Reichsrat, while all others were reserved for the diets. In a simultaneous letter to Rechberg as Prime Minister, Franz Joseph authorized the reestablishment of the Hungarian, Transylvanian and Croatian Court Chancelleries for all civil administration of these lands and the replacement of the former Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Culture by a Ministry of State, thus unifying under one ministry the administration of all the

49. Redlich, I, pt. 1, 612-22. He refers to the Diploma as a "coup d'état of the aristocracy against the bureaucracy." (623) The project of Count Emil Dessewffy of mid-September, which closely resembled the Diploma and accompanying measures, literally refers to the promulgation as a "coup d'état." (Deák Ferencz beszédei, Ed. Manó Kónyi, II (Budapest: Franklin, 1886), 244-69. The text of the Diploma is in Redlich II, pt. 2, 228-9 and Deák Ferencz beszédei, II, 273-5.

50. The imperial edict of July 17, 1860 had stipulated that all new taxes and expenditures, the increase of tax rates and duties, and all state loans and duties must be approved by the Reichsrat; Friedrich Walter, Österreichische Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte von 1500-1955 (Koln: Bohlau, 1972), 187.

51. Until November 20, 1861 the official name of the Croatian body was provisorisches kroatisch-slavonisches Hofdikasterium.
lands not subject to the restored chancelleries. The Minister of the Interior, Count Goluchowski, became the first Minister of State.

The public Hungarian response to the Diploma was negative almost from the beginning. As in the rejection of Bötvös' book of 1859, Deák and the most influential Hungarian newspapers rejected the authority, however limited, of the Reichsrat over Hungarian affairs and demanded the restoration of the laws of 1848. The application of the Diploma in the hereditary provinces required the issuance of new statutes for the operation of the diets and the election by them of deputies to the Reichsrat. The conservative aristocratic nature of the new statutes and the limited legislative powers granted to the Reichsrat aroused the dissatisfaction of the liberal Austrian press. Consequently Goluchowski became discredited and isolated in the Council of Ministers. On December 13, 1860 he resigned.

The Reichsrat had helped to create a misleading impression of the degree of moderation of the Hungarian politicians concerning the restoration of Hungarian constitutionalism, since the views of the Old Conservatives were actually unpopular. But the Reichsrat also gave voice to calls for the modification of the Hungarian constitution by non-

52. Szász, "Erdély az abszolutizmus korában" (1474) incorrectly states the chancelleries were subordinate to the Ministry of State as central government. As will become clear, the Ministry of State and the chancelleries were parallel and independent institutions.
Hungarians from the Hungarian lands. Three of these were Romanians: Baron Nicolae Petrino from Austrian Bukovina, Andrei Mocioni [Mocsonyi] from the Banat, and Orthodox Bishop Șaguna from Transylvania. In Șaguna's view, which was supported by his two Romanian colleagues, the program of the federalists was inadequate because the old order they favored benefitted only the Hungarian aristocracy and middle class. Rather, all provincial constitutions should be modified to guarantee the equality of nationalities and churches, their representation in the provincial and central governments, a free press, and the necessary strength of the central government.

The three Transylvanian members of the Reichsrat were Șaguna, Bogdán Jakabb, the Hungarian Mayor of Szamosújvár, and Karl Maager, a Saxon and president of the Chamber of Commerce in Kronstadt. Each presented what would become the dominant viewpoint of his nationality in Șaguna, Bogdán Jakabb, the Hungarian Mayor of Szamosújvár, and Karl Maager, a Saxon and president of the Chamber of Commerce in Kronstadt. Each presented what would become the dominant viewpoint of his nationality in

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54. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 98-100; Verhandlungen des österreichischen Verstarkten Reichsrates 1860 (Wien: Friedrich Manz, 1860; facsimile rpt., Wien: Verlag des Wissenschaftlichen Antiquariats H. Geyer, 1972) II, 284-7. Hitchins' statement (98) that Saguna rejected the positions of both the federalists and centralists is only partially correct. Autonomy should be recognized, but not in the way the federalists visualized. The very first of Saguna's ten stated principles for the reorganization of the monarchy was its unity; he stated explicitly that he supported the centralists' basic position, adding ironically, "Ich glaube, die Einheit der Monarchie ist schon in der That zur historisch-politischen Individualität gelangt." -- Verhandlungen, II 286. He abstained from the final voting on the federalist and centralist proposals, however. (Hitchins, op.cit., 101).

55. Like most citizens of Szamosújvár Jakabb was of Armenian origin, but his political views were essentially those of a conservative Hungarian.
succeeding years. Jakabb rejected the Romanians' call for national equality, as such a measure would effectively reduce the rights of a nation that had been enjoying them for centuries and undermine a constitution which had many praiseworthy aspects. Maager denounced the constitutional conservatism of Jakabb, and went even further than the centralists in the opposite direction. The Saxons had benefitted from their autonomous constitution in the past, but the financial situation and the requirements of the new age had made this constitution obsolete: Austria required a single constitution, representing all groups of the population, including urban citizens and peasants. He added rhetorically that he had stated his principles "although the stifled press is not even allowed to pronounce the word "constitution."

Maager's pronouncements made him an instant hero of the liberal press and bourgeoisie of Vienna. He was the only member of the Reichsrat to speak in favor of a liberal constitution, but Bruck and his successor in the Ministry of Finance, Ignaz von Plener, expressed similar ideas in the Council of Ministers in 1859-61. From personal conviction and their familiarity with financial circles, they concluded that Austria could only stabilize its credit situation if the German middle classes played a regular role in the

57. Ibid., I, 715-16, II, 295-97.
direction of imperial expeditures through a parliament. The implications of such liberal and financial motives and those of German nationalists and bureaucrats coincided to a large degree. For the German nationalists, alleged German cultural superiority and the contest for leadership in Germany were arguments for a liberal constitutional regime. The centralist bureaucrats believed in the progressive, civilizing role of the Austrian civil service and the dangers to the dynasty and the state posed by the national movements, especially that of the Hungarians.

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The Rise of Schmerling

The financial and bureaucratic arguments for centralism were serious ones for Franz Joseph, but balanced to a large degree by his dislike of the liberals. He had also by this time made a permanent commitment to constitutional restoration in Hungary, indeed toward dualism, by the Diploma, which was designated a "permanent and irrevocable fundamental state law." He felt special confidence in Count Szécsen, who thus became the most influential member of the Council of Ministers at the end of 1860. Szécsen's collaboration in the decision to dismiss Goluchowski and in the choice of his successor was therefore of great importance. Szécsen was a dynastic conservative and Hungarian patriot who believed that sufficient concessions must be made to the liberals to break the momentum of the more radical elements who really endangered the throne. One such concession to Hungary achieved through
The Austrian Empire in the 1860s
Szécsen's influence was the cession of the Banat and the Partium to Hungary on December 27, an action opposed by both the centralists and the Romanians.

Szécsen contributed to the choice of the German Schmerling as Goluchowski's successor. The choice did not indicate that the Emperor had abandoned the Hungarians, but was a desperate response to a contradictory situation that Szécsen also recognized. Szécsen realized that Austrian public opinion and that of the financiers required the appointment of some sort of liberal as Minister of State. Anton von Schmerling had elements in his past to satisfy all the influential factions in Vienna during the crisis of late 1860. His oppositional role in the 1840s, leadership in 1848 and his principled resignation from the office of Minister of Justice in 1851 attracted the liberals. German nationalists recalled his speeches in favor of German unity as speaker of the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848-49. Centralists noted that Schmerling was a moderate, law and order liberal who used the troops at his disposal in Frankfurt to quell disorders there in 1848. For Szécsen and the Old Conservatives, Schmerling had a mildly favorable reputation because of his denunciation of excessive Austrian brutality in the suppression of the Hungarians after 1849. They also hoped, quite mistakenly, that Schmerling's liberalism would

59. Mocioni had called on September 27 for the maintenance of the Banat's separateness. Verhandlungen, II, 110-3.
dampen the opposition of the liberals in Hungary.

A single passage in the Diploma provided a wedge for Austrian subversion of the new dualism. It stated the emperor's commitment to "the equality of our subjects before the law...[and] the independence of officeholding from estate and birth." Similarly, the emperor's letter on Transylvania to Rechberg of October 20 (the Transylvanian Court Chancellor had not yet been appointed) stated the peasant emancipation and the establishment of equal civil rights had made necessary a revision of the Transylvanian constitution. Austrian statesmen who were legally excluded after October 20 from authority over the lands subject to the Hungarian and Transylvanian Court Chancelleries would on occasion justify their intervention in Hungarian and Transylvanian affairs by these passages. In doing so they would be continuing the Austrian practice of championing some nationalities in order to counter Hungarian influence. This mentality was evident in the remark by Plener in the Council of Ministers in February, 1861 that if there was a choice between further concessions to Hungary and to the nationalities, Austria should choose the latter.

60. Writing from an Austrian perspective, Redlich argued that the decisive factor in the fall of Goluchowski and the appointment of Schmerling was the insistence of Plener on the necessity of establishing a government responsible to a parliament. Austrian public opinion regarded Schmerling as the indispensible minister in such a regime. Redlich, I, pt. 1, 680-90.
62. The text of the letter is in Deák Ferencz beszédei, II, 283-4.
63. Redlich I, pt. 1, 757.
The Transylvanian Romanian leadership had sent a delegation to Vienna to petition the court for equal political rights. They also called for the appointment of a Romanian as Transylvanian Court Chancellor, or at least of more Romanian high officials. Rechberg and Plener urged considerate treatment of the Romanians' demands because of the "annexationist agitation" in the Danubian Principalities.

There is no evidence that the delegation influenced the appointment of Schmerling as Goluchowski's replacement. The delegation did achieve two positive results: a small contingent of Romanians was appointed to the Court Chancellery and the Gubernium, and the court granted the Romanians' request for permission to hold a conference in January. The granting of permission was controversial. It was apparently granted orally by Schmerling. The new Transylvanian Court Chancellor, Baron Ferenc Kemény, claimed such an action by Schmerling was illegal since Transylvania was now subordinate to his own authority and not that of Schmerling.

Contrary to the Old Conservatives' expectation,


65. The Transylvanian Locumtenency [chief absolutist administrative body; Statthalterei, helytartóság] had previously been subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, which was now a component of the Ministry of State. Schmerling implicitly recognized the new relationship on February 12 when he forwarded the resolution of the two presidents of the Romanian conference, which had been sent to himself, to Kemény. MOL, D228. 1861/90.
schmerling quickly established himself as the leading figure in the Council of Ministers. Pressed by the financial problem, Franz Joseph could not remain indifferent to Schmerling's popularity with the Viennese middle class and central bureaucracy. Developments in Hungary were partly responsible for his ascendancy, as the Conservatives' misjudgement of public opinion there became increasingly evident. The conference of notables in Esztergom under the chairmanship of Cardinal Scitovszky on December 17-20 declared in favor of the electoral law of 1848 for the Hungarian Diet rather than that of 1608 which had been declared on October 20. It became clear that the prospective diet would reject the October Diploma after the reestablished county assemblies issued declarations in favor of the laws of 1848.

Conditions in Hungary seemed to confirm Schmerling's belief that the Diploma erred in surrendering too much central power, yet he insisted that it must be upheld. Most frustrating for Schmerling was the Diploma's administrative dualism. Was there still a central government for the internal affairs of the empire? The credit situation continued to demand concessions to the liberal middle class in the form of public control over expenditures, i.e. a parliament. The solution Schmerling proposed was to

66. Walter, 206.
67. Ibid., 199-202; Redlich, I, pt. 1, 711.
68. Plener recalled in 1901: "Man hat lange andere Gründe für den raschen Übergang Österreichs vom Oktoberdiplom zum Februarpatent gesucht. Tatsächlich waren dafür nur
expand the Reichsrat into a true imperial parliament with 353 members and much broader powers. Deputies to the Reichsrat would be selected by the restored diets of the crown lands. Such a central parliament was an even stronger limitation of Hungarian independence than the Diploma, but the Conservatives recognized the need for dramatic action. The size and powers of the new parliament, they hoped, would "impress" the Hungarian liberals on ideological grounds and cause them to moderate their opposition and negotiate with the government. Hence the Conservatives acceded to the passage of the new Reichsrat statute as part of the new imperial "constitution" or February Patent. But in view of Hungarian public opinion and the fact that Hungary and Transylvania, with 85 and 26 seats, would be in a permanent minority in the Reichsrat, the Hungarian Chancellor Vay refused to sign the Patent when it was promulgated in February 26.

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The Quasi-Dualist Regime in Vienna

The Diploma restored most important aspects of the historic constitution of Transylvania. The Patent, in addition, assigned a vital imperial function, the sending of

staatsfinanzielle Gründe massgebend."

Deák's despondent letter to his brother-in-law after his unsuccessful meeting with Franz Joseph on December 24 confirmed the desperateness of the empire's difficulties. The financial problem, he wrote, was perhaps the most difficult: "Az óriási terheket, akár együtt kezeljük azokat, akár megosztjuk, nem leszünk képesek elbírni... Az adósságokból pedig ki nem fogunk bújhatni, még akkor sem, ha a birodalom-tól elszaknánk..." (Deák Ferencz beszédei, II, 305-6).

deputies to the Reichrat, to the provincial diets. The political struggle arising from the restoration of the constitution and the preparations for the Transylvanian diet must be viewed in the light of the important political institutions. These were of three kinds: the central or court institutions in Vienna, the provincial government in Kolozsvár, and the autonomous administration of the Hungarian, Szekler, Saxon and Romanian counties and districts. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the central government in Vienna.

The center of the system was, of course, the Emperor. Franz Joseph, like other autocrats, was convinced of his duty to maintain his personal authority to the maximum degree; but he felt even more strongly his dynastic duty to maintain the European power and prestige of his monarchy. The central meaning of the "Austrian state and imperial problem" lies in the series of reluctant but coldly calculated concessions of his personal power by the emperor in order to preserve his stature in Europe. Beyond these basic principles, he was indifferent to political ideas. His major concessions-- the reestablishment of the Prime Ministership in August, 1859, the convocation of the expanded Reichsrat in June, 1860, the October Diploma and the restoration of Hungarian autonomy, the appointment of the "liberal" Schmerling and of Prime Minister Archduke Rainer, and the "constitution" of the February Patent in 1861-- all impinged upon adamantly expressed requisites of his imperial
prerogative, and each was accompanied by a declaration that no further concessions would be made. Similarly, the emperor was able to dismiss his most devoted agents with what struck some observers as a shameful lack of sentiment, but also stubbornly uphold his own reluctant concessions in the conviction of their necessity. Thus despite himself he voluntarily became a sort of constitutional monarch.

Franz Joseph sought to respect both his compromise with the Hungarian Old Conservatives and with the Austrian moderate liberals of Schmerling. These compromises were to a considerable extent contradictory, and hence neither side was satisfied with the result. The goal of unified leadership through the Council of Ministers, expressed in 1859, became elusive. The party of Schmerling and his allies was numerically dominant in the Council of Ministers, but many important measures concerning Hungary and Transylvania were not decided there, but only ratified. In difficult questions the emperor resorted to smaller consultations or "Ministerial Conferences": with the Hungarian ministers to decide on a policy opposed by the centralist ministers, or with a core of trusted centralist ministers when indiscretions by the ministers made a more intimate consultation on diplomatic, military or Hungarian matters desirable.

70. The sudden dismissal of General Gyulay in 1859, Schmerling in July, 1865 and the disgrace of General Lajos Benedek after the Battle of Königgrätz a year later are prime examples.
71. Rumpler, 70-1.
The Emperor's ambivalence meant that, in spite of his ultimate authority and chairmanship of most Council of Ministers sessions, the party alignments on the Council of Ministers were very important. Schmerling's allies were centralists by conviction and, in most cases, by virtue of the organs they headed which also enjoyed or could claim jurisdiction in the Hungarian lands. Only Plener, for reasons already noted, advocated ministerial responsibility in the liberal sense, but both he and Schmerling took a more conciliatory position than the emperor toward the Reichsrat concerning the responsibility of the ministers toward that body.

The members of Schmerling's coalition in the Council of Ministers were those people to whom Romanian and Saxon lobbyists in Vienna appealed for support. The financial and military administration of the Hungarian lands were subordinated directly to Plener's ministry and to the War Ministry of Count Degenfeld, and not to the Chancelleries. Between April, 1861 and April, 1862, these two ministries imposed the billeting of troops for the collection of delinquent taxes in the Hungarian lands. The Hungarian ministers agreed to the measure reluctantly, although recognizing its fiscal necessity, and strongly favored its termination a year later. The army was the most consistently central-

72. Ibid., 66-9.
73. The procedure was known as military execution. It entailed the peaceful quartering of troops on the property of a debtor until the debt was paid.
74. Military execution provoked vehement Hungarian com-
istic body of the Habsburg administration, and hence the object of special dislike among the Hungarians of Transylvania. The police in Hungary and Transylvania were technically subordinate to the Chancelleries, but reported to the Minister of Police, Baron Károly Mecséry. Mecséry referred to police reports in his statements in the Council of Ministers in support of centralist policies. The Emperor's "narrower conference" for sensitive matters consisted of Rechberg, Schmerling, often Degenfeld and Mecséry, and occasionally Pleiner.

A further ally of Schmerling in the Council of Ministers and potential support for the Romanians and Saxons was the President of the State Council [Staatsrat], Baron Thaddáus Peithner von Lichtenfels. Though not a voting member of the Council of Ministers, he was Schmerling's most assertive and consistent ally in his centralist course there and in the upper house of the Reichsrat. Lichtenfels was also the former teacher of the emperor, on whom he exercised a personal influence for many years. The State Council was

plaints in the summer of 1861, but was a dramatic success during a period of financial crisis. Degenfeld proposed its termination because of the harmful effect on military morale and because the measure had achieved its goal. Stefan Malfèr, "Steuerverweigerung und Militärexekution in Ungarn, 1860-1862," Österreichische Osthefte, 24 (1982), 326-7.


76. Rumpler, 70-1.

created on February 17, 1861 as a central advisory council neither superior nor subordinate to the Council of Ministers. The intrusive potential of the State Council, with its prescribed function of advising the Council of Ministers on legislation for the entire empire, disturbed the Hungarian ministers. Several councillors of the State Council were members from the Hungarian lands, including the Transylvanian Baron Karl von Geringer. Lichtenfels and the State Council prepared many memoranda for Schmerling on Hungarian affairs and presented them in the Council of Ministers.

Most of the other German ministers tended to side with Schmerling on the Hungarian issues, but took a less active interest and lacked any jurisdictional competence in that

78. The Vienna Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv uses the title jüngerer Staatsrat to distinguish the body from the more powerful Staatsrat that had existed from 1742 to 1801 and 1808 to 1848.

79. The Council of Ministers acceded to a request by Szécsen that a passage concerning the nationalities be dropped from the Staatsrat Reichsrat statute "weil man darauf den Anspruch würde stützen wollen, sämpliche Nationalitäten im Staatsrate repräsentiert zu sehen." POM, V, 1, 79 (February 17, 1861).

80. Geringer was born in Hermannstadt and his mother was a Saxon; Irmgard Martius, Grossösterreich und die Siebenbürger Sachsen 1848-1859 (München: Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1957), 31. Szabad, "Az önkényuralom kora," 454, states somewhat imprecisely that he was Saxon. After the Revolution he served as royal commissioner in Transylvania and Governor of Hungary in 1851-2. For the full membership of the State Council, see POM V, 1, 219 (March 23, 1861).

81. Redlich, II, 306-7. Rogge exaggerates the influence of the State Council, however, when he writes: "Also wieder eine Centralbehörde für das ganze Reich...Diese Körperschaft sollte die letzten Spuren des Dualismus erwischen, die noch von der Wiederherstellung der ungarischen Verfassung übriggeblieben waren." (II, 107).
part of the empire. Schmerling sought to strengthen his own position by insisting that officials forward legislative proposals to the emperor only through the Prime Minister. The emperor acceded to this demand through his edict of February 4. The appointment of Archduke Rainer as the new Prime Minister two days later further strengthened Schmerling's hand, as the Archduke was a centralist, President of the Reichsrat and known as a moderate liberal. Rainer never had the power or independence of a West European Prime Minister and could have no real conflict of interest with Franz Joseph. But he was a determined champion of the edict of February 4. By his memorandum of April 9, he helped convince Franz Joseph to reject Vay's request for regular direct access to the emperor. Unless the Hungarian Chancellor retained the same status in terms of access as the other ministers, Rainer argued, he would in effect constitute the head of an independent Hungarian government.

82. Schmerling's appeal, in the session of January 11, 1861, was possibly prompted by the hasty reunification of the Banat with Hungary on December 27 after Szécsen's personal intervention with the emperor; Rumpler, 60-1.

83. Redlich, II, 22.


85. Redlich, II, 21-4; Walter, 206. Helmut Rumpler rejects the conventional view of Rainer's appointment as strengthening the influence of Schmerling: he argues that Franz Joseph sought to undermine his previous liberal concessions and ease the negotiations with Hungary by gaining a
The position of Baron Vay and of the Minister without portfolio, Count Szécsen, was ambiguous. They owed their status to their ability to convince Franz Joseph that the restoration of limited Hungarian autonomy would preserve the empire from disorder and separatist movements. Soon the unpopularity of the Old Conservatives’ principles, and their inability to confine the opposition in Hungary within the desired limits, became evident. Consequently the prestige and influence of the Old Conservatives at court eroded. They desperately sought to recover it by a series of reluctant concessions to the demands of the opposition in Hungary in the hope of reasserting their influence there and stabilizing the system. The dominant noble politicians in Hungary demanded a restoration of not only the old constitution but also of the laws of 1848, and the Old Conservatives began to concede even these. After the negative response to the Diploma in Hungary, the Old Conservatives in the Esztergom conference called for a responsible ministry, territorial integrity, and the liberal electoral law of 1848. At the court, a part of these demands was almost immediately put into effect, with the reunion of the Banat and Vojvodina to Hungary and the specification of the 1848 electoral law for the election of county officials. The

Prime Minister whose familial subordination made him more pliable (61-3). But Schmerling’s differences with Rechberg suggest the retention of the latter as Prime Minister would have served these purposes better. A conservative informant complained that Rainer was "politisch ganz ergeben" vis à vis Schmerling. Redlich, II, 761.

86. Redlich, II, 39-41, 724-5.
demands of the new county assemblies in January, 1861, and even more of the Hungarian diet when it convened on April 6, demonstrated that these concessions had not achieved their goal. The Hungarian ministers' further concessions, namely the restoration of Hungarian civil and criminal law and, as noted above, of a Hungarian government, were prevented by the resistance of the other ministers.

The Hungarian opposition accepted the leadership of Ferenc Deák in the diet; it adopted his address to Franz Joseph insisting on the integrity of the 1848 laws, but accepting the rights of the monarch as Hungarian king and the possibility of legislative revision of the 1848 laws. The Hungarian ministers formally agreed with their German colleagues that the address was unacceptable; as the architects of the Diploma, they could not do otherwise. Yet they sought to prevent the proposed dissolution of the diet and the constitution through negotiation. In the tradition of the Hungarian estates' horsetrading with the Crown in past centuries, called Transaktionspolitik, they hoped to find a middle ground for the two sides to agree on. The German ministers rejected this tactic; Vay and Szécsen resigned on July 18, and the Hungarian diet was dissolved on August 22. Military courts took over many of the functions of the recently restored Hungarian courts, and Lieutenant-General

87. Ibid., II, 21-39.
88. According to Szécsen's later account, Deák was ready to accept the reply to the address which the Hungarian ministers formulated, but it was rejected by the German ministers.
Móric Pálffy became the Governor of Hungary.

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The Provisorium in Vienna and Hungary

The new regime in Hungary, the Provisorium, was a sort of victory for Schmerling and his allies, but at the cost of a setback for the liberal goals that had kept Schmerling in opposition during most of the previous decade. The attempt to lure the Hungarians into the Reichsrat had failed at least temporarily; the only constitutional basis on which the Reichsrat could now debate the imperial budget was by the invocation of the February Patent's emergency clause. The Hungarian ministers and officials who now took office were either bureaucrats of the Bach school or soldiers. Austrian liberals feared a restoration of the intensely Catholic regime of the 1850s. Catholic conservatiism enjoyed rising influence.

Resolutions of the Hungarian counties denounced the dissolution of the diet and the collection of taxes by military execution, and called for the resignation of all Hungarian officials. Cardinal Scitovszky, as prefect of


Esztergom county, took the lead in encouraging such measures, to the great annoyance of Franz Joseph, who called him to Vienna in order to reprimand him.

The new Hungarian ministers were Count Antal Forgách, former Governor of Bohemia, as Hungarian Court Chancellor and Count Móric Esterházy as the Minister without Portfolio. Esterházy was the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See during the negotiations leading to the Concordat, and arch-conservative and fervent Catholic who enjoyed close ties with the Emperor and the Nuncio. They accepted the dissolution of the municipalities in Hungary and the restoration of absolutism after November 5, 1861. Yet the unity of the newly constituted Council of Ministers was short-lived. The decisive reason seems to have been the emperor’s continued conviction of the necessity of compromise with Hungary. Count Esterházy quickly became his closest advisor, and both he and Count Forgách spoke regularly in the Council of Ministers of "protecting Hungarian sensibilities." Forgách sought, in effect, to extend the Conservatives’ Transaktionspolitik. His differences with Schmerling were well-known, being carried out publicly in the newspapers sponsored by the two men. The Austrian public was even more aware of the heightening rivalry between Schmerling and

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92. Redlich, II, 294-305.
93. Redlich identified these papers as the Botschafter of Vienna and the Sürgöny of Pest. Berzeviczy ("Schmerling és Forgách harca," Bécsi Magyar Történeti Intézet Évkönyve 3 (1933), 379) identifies Donauzeitung as Schmerling’s paper.
Rechberg, which surfaced in reports about their differences in the Council of Ministers and in debates between their press organs as well. These differences arose from three sources. Rechberg sympathized with the aristocratic opponents of Schmerling's policy in the Reichsrat for social and ideological reasons. Second, the Foreign Minister favored a more cautious, conciliatory policy than Schmerling on the German question. Finally, Rechberg was more moderate than Schmerling on the Hungarian question due to his concern for Austria's image in Europe as well as his aristocratic rapport with the Old Conservatives.

The Emperor's policies in Hungary gave evidence of his continued confidence in the Old Conservatives. Forgách scored a victory in November, 1862 when Franz Joseph accepted his proposal to grant a partial amnesty to political prisoners in Hungary without Schmerling's prior knowledge. A major crisis arose in the Council of Ministers in succeeding months over the compromise proposal formulated

94. Redlich, II, 760-3. The paper of the Austrian conservatives was the Vaterland (Redlich, II, 152).
95. Ibid., II, 742-3, 766-7; Somogyi, 24-9; Jelavich, Habsburg, 93-4. Rechberg was the President of the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt from 1855 to 1859. He favored collaboration with Prussia, and advocated the Austro-Prussian alliance on the Schleswig-Holstein question. Schmerling was a German nationalist, and persuaded Franz Joseph to lead the unsuccessful attempt to defeat Prussia at the Frankfurt Congress of Princes in August, 1863, despite Rechberg's objections. In his unpublished memoir, Schmerling claimed that disunity among the ministers on foreign and internal policy, not his own mistaken conceptions, was the chief cause of his regime's failure.—Somogyi, 25-6.
96. Redlich, II, 309.
by the chief judge of Hungary, the Judex Curiae (Országbíró) Count György Apponyi. Apponyi was the last Old Conservative to retain high office. Schmerling argued in January, 1862 that Apponyi's "remaining in office is impossible, since his presence in Pest is a [source of] continuous agitation against the government." Yet the emperor declined to dismiss him. Apponyi presented his reform plan, which in many respects resembled the eventual settlement of 1867, to the emperor at the beginning of 1863. Forgách, Esterházy and Rechberg favored the plan, but it was defeated due to the adamant opposition of Schmerling and his allies. Franz Joseph vetoed the plan when Schmerling threatened to resign. He was unprepared to rule Cisleithania without him. The emperor's government had, in a sense, become a constitutional one: however strongly they clashed, the two parties must remain in the Council of Ministers because of their "legitimate" responsibility for their respective halves of the monarchy. Through the decision of Franz Joseph, however, Schmerling's faction attained a stronger position in

97. POM, V, 3, 236 (January 1, 1862); ibid., Malfer, "Einleitung," xliii-xliv.
98. The complete plan is in Deák Ferencz beszédei, III, 223-35.
99. Schmerling wrote in his memoirs that Archduke Albrecht convinced the emperor to reject the plan. (Somogyi, 24) There is no other evidence to support the claim, but it is plausible. The Archduke had served as Civil and Military Governor of Hungary from 1851 to 1860, and two years later played a key role in the compromise negotiations with the Hungarians; László Csorba, "Újabb adatok a kiegyezés előkészítésének történetéhez," A magyar polgári átalakulás kérdései (Budapest: ELTE Bölcsészettudományi kara, 1984), 428-9.
Hungary and even, for a time, in foreign affairs. On Schmerling's insistence, Apponyi was also dismissed, on March 30, 1863.

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The casualties and devastation of the revolution and civil war of 1848-49 left a legacy of heightened national animosity in Transylvania. This was particularly the case for Hungarians, whose political class was almost unanimous in resenting the Austrian absolutist regime that followed. The abortive Hungarian revolt in Transylvania in 1852 convinced the opposition that external assistance was necessary for a successful insurrection. Austrian diplomatic isolation facilitated the rebels' search for allies: the France of Napoleon III and, ironically, the newly united Danubian Principalities of Prince Cuza offered their support. Hence Hungarian nationalism in Transylvania gained a volatile and contradictory connection with the new Romanian state south of the Carpathians.

The Austrian military and financial debacle in 1859 accentuated the importance of both the Hungarian opposition and of the Austrian advocates of liberal constitutionalism. Hungarian conservatives--aristocrats and Catholic prelates--won the accession of the Emperor to a federalist reform of the empire. In less than a year, the pendulum swung half the way back: in February, 1861 Anton von Schmerling secured the Emperor's approval of a centralist

100. Redlich, II, 309-29.
constitution, the February Patent. The pendulum swing was partial because the newly restored provincial autonomy remained, and because of the concomitant administrative dualism at the highest level. Franz Joseph himself was ambivalent on the question of dualism, and hence often allowed considerable play for the contending Austrian centralists and Hungarian conservatives in the Council of Ministers. Austrian centralists won one partial victory in late 1861 and another in 1863.

The defeat of the Old Conservatives’ compromise plan in 1863 brought with it also the victory, after a struggle that began in 1861, of Schmerling’s views on the Transylvanian question. Transylvania was also the subject of animated debate in the sessions of February and March, 1863. The debate involved several key issues: the constitutional restoration in Transylvania, provincial autonomy and the role assigned to Transylvania by the February Patent, and domestic and international aspects of the nationality question. The political and social movements in Transylvania functioned, in a sense, as a reflection of the liberal-aristocratic antithesis in the Council of Ministers.
CHAPTER TWO

TRANSYLVANIAN ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY

The constitutional independence of Transylvania signified by the restoration of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery in October, 1860 was a logical consequence of the Old Conservatives' stated intention to restore the "historical-political individualities" and the pre-1848 constitutions. Yet they had hoped, for reasons of nationalist ideology, that the union of Hungary and Transylvania in 1848 would be respected, and the popular clamor for the laws of 1848 and the union in particular caused them to favor the union even more strongly. Baron Kemény and Count Imre Mikó agreed only on December 9-10 to accept the positions of Transylvanian Court Chancellor and Governor, but with the stipulation that their positions were "provisional."

The German ministers opposed the union because they felt this would inordinately increase the influence of the Hungarians in the still unsettled affairs of the empire. They also contested the validity of the union law of 1848 because of the irregular circumstances of its approval by the king and its promulgation in 1848. They recalled from

1. Apponyi and Szécsen had argued in the Council of Ministers on October 16, 1860 for the union, but were opposed by Rechberg and Plener, and the emperor declared that the Transylvanian Court Chancellery would be restored. Redlich, I, 617.
2. Trócsányi, 645.
4. Schmerling in ibid., 464 (October 29, 1861).
1848-49 that the national minorities could provide a useful counterweight to the Hungarian claims, and hence they emphasized the known opposition of the Romanian and Saxon politicians to the union.

The Old Conservatives themselves recognized already before October 20 that more care must be taken than in 1848 to respect the desires of the nationalities in Transylvania. The emperor expanded on this idea in his letter to Rechberg of October 20, to which we have already referred. The peasant emancipation and the establishment of equal civil rights, he wrote, had made necessary a revision of the Transylvanian constitution. For this reason he called for the convocation of a conference "of various nationalities, religions, and classes" to discuss a reform of the electoral law which

corresponds to the needs of the formerly privileged nations, religions, and classes, but also the interests of those nations, religions and classes hitherto excluded from these political rights. 7

Kemeny thus undertook the "provisional" direction of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery under very different circumstances than his predecessors.

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5. Mecseiry in POM, V,1, 197 (March 21, 1861).
6. Emil Dessewffy's September, 1860 project for a federalist coup included an imperial edict to the Governor of Transylvania which recognized that the feudal privileges of the former landowners had been abolished. In light of the new circumstances, the Governor should establish a committee on the composition of the Transylvanian diet which would consider "all justified and sober desires of the various nationalities." Deák Ferencz beszédei, II, 249.
7. Ibid., II, 283-4.
The Court Chancellery

The Chancellery had been the leading political and administrative body for Transylvania since the final years of the seventeenth century. Like the Hungarian Court Chancellery and the Croatian-Illyrian Court Dikasterium/Chancellery, it had its seat in Vienna. Of the three offices, only the Hungarian Court Chancellor bore the title of minister and was hence entitled to regular, voting participation in the Council of Ministers. The Transylvanian Court Chancellor appeared in the Council of Ministers, like the others who were not regular members, only as a Referent, i.e. to provide information on matters within his competence.

Like the ministers, the Court Chancellor presented policy initiatives for higher approval through the presentation of alleruntertänigste Vorträge an den Kaiser via Archduke Rainer to the Emperor. Each Vortrag included an Entwurf zum allerhöchsten Entschluss for the emperor's approval, and the Emperor determined whether consultation in the Council or a Conference of Ministers was desirable before granting approval to the Entschluss.

The Chancellor directed the composition of Vorträge and of correspondence with coordinate and subordinate officials

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9. Mecséry and Szécsen successfully argued that Kemény should not be required to sign the February Patent since he was the head of a mere "administrative jurisdiction", and not a Landesminister. POM, V,1, 102 (February 24, 1861).
through a staff of approximately fifty men. The most impor-
tant of these were the four councillors; Kemény appointed
a Hungarian Roman Catholic, Hungarian Protestant, a Saxon
Lutheran and a Romanian Greek Catholic as councillors.
Each councillor had responsibility for certain categories of
affairs, and handled the relevant correspondence with the
assistance of a secretary and Konzipist of his own nation-
ality and religion. All matters, except sensitive ones
disposed of by the Chancellor with his personal secretary,
were presented orally and voted on by the councillors in
daily sessions of several hours presided over by the Chan-
cellar. In the case of disagreement on a major Entwurf for
the emperor, the minority position was recorded in a separate
Entwurf called the Separatvotum.

The Chancellery began operation on December 28, 1860.
On January 4 and 7 Schmerling and Lasser, the director of
his legal section (the former Ministry of Justice) informed
the Transylvanian Governor and Court of Appeals of their
subordination henceforth to the Chancellery. Count Mikó
accepted his appointment as constitutional Governor, but the

10. G. Hofrat, H. udvari tanácsos. Prior to 1848
there were six. The Romanians considered the number of
Romanians appointed by Kemény inadequate.
11. G. Hofsekretár, H. udvari titkár; G. Hofkonzipist,
H. udvari fogalmazó.
12. The description of Chancellery procedures, which were
established in the late eighteenth century, is from
Trócsányi, 43-51. The Chancellery had 52 regular (not
honorary) officials in 1863: Erdély Nagy-Fejedelemség tiszti
névtára az 1864-dik évre (Kolozsvár: A róm. kath. lyceum
könyvnyomdájában, 1864), 15-16.
13. The Hungarian Court Chancellery had begun operation
already on November 4-- Sashegyi, 373.
restoration of the historical form of Gubernium and counties was heavily debated in the Council of Ministers in January due to the rebelliousness of the restored counties in Hungary and the growing influence of Schmerling. Kemény's proposal was accepted, however, for the constitutional administration to take the place of the absolutist organs on 14 April 15, 1861. One of Kemény's first important tasks as Chancellor was the convocation of the consultative conference specified in the imperial rescript to Rechberg on October 20.

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The Conference in Gyulafehervar

The Transylvanian administration was going through a confused transition period. Baron Ferenc Kemény, the President of the diet in Kolozsvár in 1848, was appointed as Chancellor on November 29, 1860. Count Imre Mikó occupied his old office as head of the restored Transylvanian Gubernium or provincial government and began to organize his staff in Kolozsvár. Yet the absolutist Civil and Military Governor of Transylvania, Prince Friedrich von Liechtenstein, continued in office in Hermannstadt until April 21.

14. Ibid., 391-2. Sashegyi implies that the decision to restore the Transylvanian constitution had not yet been made when the matter came before the Council of Ministers, but Trócsányi, 645-6 shows this was not the case.

15. His official appointment came only on December 9; Rolf Kutschera, Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen 1688-1869 (Koln: Bohlau, 1985), 191, 197; Zsolt Trócsányi, Erdélyi kormányhatósági levéltárak (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1973), 645; Berzeviczy, Az abszolutizmus kora, III, 152.

16. During the transition period Kemény and Liechtenstein exchanged sporadic reports about general political and ad-
The task of the conference in Gyulafehérvár was the representation of all nationalities and classes at the forthcoming Transylvanian diet, i.e. the electoral law under which the deputies would be selected. Kemény's own views and the persons he chose to call to the conference assured that broader constitutional questions, rather than the electoral law, would dominate the discussion. Kemény sought to delay the conference, but finally convened it on February 17, 1861. The forty participants included 24 Hungarians, eight Saxons and eight Romanians—the latter, of course, far below their percentage of the population. A contemporary categorized eighteen of the Hungarian participants as conservatives, and only six as liberals. Hungarian liberals resented this imbalance and the unconstitutional role assigned to the conference. But like the conservatives in Hungary, those at the conference abandoned their own principles and supported the liberal demands. All the Hungarians supported the position presented in the speeches by the host Roman Catholic Bishop, Lajos Haynald, and the liberal leader, Count Domokos Teleki: that the laws of 1848 must be maintained, and that among these was the union of Hungary and Transylvania which made a new

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ministrative matters; MOL, D228, 1860-61. Trócsányi's description of the transition (645-6) does not discuss the hierarchical relationship of Schmerling and Kemény.  
17. Sashegyi, 392. 
18. The Hungarians were equally divided among three constitutional-administrative categories: the noble counties, the Hungarian towns and the Szekler districts—Szász, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdélyben," 1477.
Transylvanian diet both superfluous and illegal.

The views of the Saxons were less unanimous. Most of the Saxon political meetings in December and January supported the view expressed in the press of Hermannstadt, welcoming the Diploma and reserving approval of the union for the upcoming diet. Some of the borderland Saxon communities, however, favored the Hungarian party and the union, like Bistritz and Schässburg. The Kronstädt Zeitung (Kronstadt) spoke out in favor of the union, but wondered, after the publication of the names of those who had been invited to the conference, whether it was worthwhile for the Saxons to go since Kemény had guaranteed a majority for himself in advance. Three of the Saxons at the conference supported the motion of Haynald and Teleki. The five others supported the motion presented by Konrad Schmidt, which had been adopted by the Saxon national conference in Hermannstadt. Like the Hermannständter

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19. The Hermannständter Zeitung wrote on January 3, 1861 that the union was "verhängnisvoll für den Bestand der Rechte der Sächsischen Nation und ihrer deutschen Nationalität." p. 2.
20. I.e. on the border of the Fundus Regius (see below).
22. The town sent a 48-man delegation to Baron Eötvös in January with a declaration in favor of the union. Kronstädt Zeitung No. 6, January 11, 1861, p. 34.
24. Ioan Pușcariu, Notițe despre întâmplările contemporane (Sibiu: Tiparul tipografiei arhidieczane, 1913), 55; according to Ürmössy, only three supported Schmidt's motion, while the other two were absent from the final vote; Ürmössy, I, 264.
Zeitung, Schmidt accepted the validity of the 1848 laws, including the union, but argued that the union must be ratified by the diet. He offered a detailed proposal for the electoral law with an electoral base of 8 fl. and extra weight given to urban interests. Saxons, Hungarians and Romanians would be represented almost equally in the diet.

The Romanian view, like that of the Hungarians, was nearly unanimous by the time of the conference. The Romanian press welcomed the Diploma, and called for improved Romanian representation. This was the burden of two petitions sent to the emperor, the first on November 7 requesting permission to hold a national conference. A Romanian delegation of twenty spent the second half of November and most of December, 1860 in Vienna, meeting with Goluchowski, Kemeny, and Lasser, and presenting their petition to Franz Joseph on December 10. Permission to hold the conference was granted and several Romanians were appointed to the Chancellery during the delegation's stay in Vienna, though less than had been hoped.

25. Úrmössy, I, 259-60.
27. Şuluţiu led the delegation to Vienna and remained there until December 23. AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1861/123 contains the complete record of the delegation's work, including Şuluţiu's correspondence with Ţaguna. Contemporaries reported that Schmerling had granted permission for the conference orally, though Mikó and Kemény claimed he had no authority to grant such permission (Úrmössy I, 250-2).

While it is true that Schmerling sought to encourage the Romanian movement against the Hungarians, the question of legality was spurious since the Hungarians and Saxons were
The Romanian conference was held in Hermannstadt between January 13 and 16, n.s. The conference of 150 Transylvanian Romanians declared its adherence to the six points of the militant second Blaj Assembly of May, 1848, especially concerning the maintenance of Transylvanian autonomy, and approved a memorandum to Franz Joseph protesting against the ethnic balance of the personnel appointed by Kemény to his Chancellery. A Romanian National Committee was also appointed, headed by Şaguna and Greek Catholic Metropolitan Sulutiu. The conference devised an electoral law based on a minimum tax assessment of 5 fl., and elected a twenty-man permanent national committee. Sulutiu presented this program at the Gyulafehervar conference, and it was supported by all eight Romanian members.

Kemeny presented all three motions at the Ministers' Conference on March 14. He stated that all three were holding meetings without special permission.

29. Josan, "Documente," 540-1; Puşcariu, 52-4; Urmossy I, 251-4; Miklós Mester, Az autonóm Erdély és a román nemzetiségi követelések az 1863/64. évi nagyszebeni országgyűlésen (Budapest: Dunántúl Pécsi Egyetemi Könyvkiadó és Nyomda R.-T. Pécssett, 1936), 71-81. In addition to the official participants there were also several hundred spectators, including Romanian law students who gave vocal support to the nationalists. (Mester, op.cit., 74).
30. Only seven Romanians were present at the conference. The Greek Catholic dean of Gyulafehervár, Augustin Pop, was excluded at the insistence of Suluțiu because of his unionist views expressed at the national conference. (Ioan Puşcariu, 55). Both Pop and Court Secretary designate Dimitrie Moldovan were publicly recorded as having been "absent due to illness", Pop on the original protocol and Moldovan when he later published a speech as the Romanians' eighth participant. On Pop's relationship with Suluțiu and the nationalists, see Chapter VIII.
31. An unofficial protocol of the conference was
unacceptable: the Hungarian one because the emperor had ruled that the union must be deliberated upon by both the
Hungarian and Transylvanian diets, the Saxon and Romanian ones because they supplanted the electoral law valid in 1847, which had been passed by the diet of 1791. He added that the Romanian electoral proposal would not only be based on democratic principles, which are incompatible with monarchic ones, but was against all reason and would certainly lead to the collapse of any empire ruled by a monarch. He proposed instead a much more moderate electoral law, with a tax base of 8 fl. 40 kr. The debate in the Conference of Ministers on March 14 and 21 ended in stalemate. The question of political representation would remain the most explosive one in Transylvania. Schmerling and Lichtenfels found Kemény's proposal completely inadequate from the standpoint of the nationalities. Lasser complained that Kemény was consulting directly with the emperor concerning Transylvania, circumventing the Council of Ministers.

The controversy in the press over the speeches at Gyulafehérvár and the rumors of discord within the Council of Ministers itself were an inauspicious preliminary to the restoration of the constitutional administration. Two other

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published in German: Die Karlsburger Beratungen (Hermannstadt, 1861), and the speeches were published and commented on in most of the Transylvanian newspapers.

32. Yet at the conference Kemény and Mikó were among those who voted for this motion.
34. Ibid., II, 241-6. Persistent, unconfirmed press reports maintained that Schmerling and other German ministers threatened their resignation at this time; Redlich, II, 247; Rogge, II, 105.

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factors also complicated the transition. While Mikó began the organization of the Gubernium at the end of December and of the counties in succeeding weeks, the Locumtenency led by Civil and Military Governor Prince Friedrich von Liechtenstein continued in office until April 21. Liechtenstein was openly hostile to the Hungarian movement. Furthermore, the restored counties in Hungary began in January to enact resolutions demanding the restoration of all the laws of 1848 and calling on the population to withhold the payment of taxes. Such conditions made the task of Governor Mikó all the more difficult.

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The Constitutional Restoration

The Gubernium, like the constitutional Locumtenential Council in Hungary, was organized on the principle of the dicasterium. Its function was to carry out directives from the Chancellery, but by its composition it exercised a constitutional control function on the policies that were set for it. The representation of the Transylvanian

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37. The dicasteria were introduced in the Habsburg lands beginning in the fifteenth century to replace purely elective corporative bodies. With time they behaved increasingly like mere arms of the absolutist state, though the rationale of representation remained. See the articles "kormányszékek (dicasteriumok),"and "helytartótanács,"33-5, Magyar történeti fogalomgyűjtemény, I (Eger: Heves Megyei Levértár, 1980), 33-5, 488-9.. This explains Redlich’s remark that, through the dissolution of the corporative Locumtenential Council of Hungary in November, 1861, the Governor of Hungary became a "dictator". Redlich, II, 94-5, 185.
nationalities and religions among the Chancellery council-
lors in the 1860s was an ad hoc, exceptional arrangement; 
their representation and that of various Transylvanian in-
stitutions among the sixteen Gubernium councillors was 
specified in several laws of 1791. These required the 
greatest possible equality of the three dominant nations and 
four religions among the councillors, and also ex officio 
councillor status for the Roman Catholic Bishop, the Presi-
dent of the diet, the director of the provincial financial 
authority (whose office was subordinate to the Ministry of 
Finance), and the elected leader of the Saxons, the Comes 
The Gubernium had two sections, a political and a judicial 
 senate, each headed by a Vice President. The judicial 
 senate was the Transylvanian supreme court. 

Procedure in the Gubernium was similar to that in the 
Chancellery. The chief categories of officials were the 
same: councillors, secretaries and Konzipisten. Each 
councillor had responsibility for certain categories of 
affairs, and presented these with his proposal for action at 
the general sessions. These took place several times a week 
for four hours in the morning. The rule that the Governor 

38. J.H. Benigni von Mildenberg, Handbuch der Statistik 
und Geographie des Grossfürstenthums Siebenbürgen 
(Hermannstadt: W.H. Thierry's Buchhandlung, 1837), 97; 
Kutschera, 157. The diet was supposed to nominate candi-
dates for Chancellor, Governor and Gubernium councillors. 
From among these the emperor would appoint the respective 
officials, who were then subject to confirmation by the 
Diet. In the absence of a diet, the appointed Chancellor 
and Governor after 1861 were only "Presidents" of the Chan-
cellery and the Gubernium, and their confirmation was never 
brought before the diet in 1863-64. (Benigni, 96-7, 105.)
voted last on the councillors' proposals reinforced the decision-making authority of the councillors, but the Governor was required to present both the minority and majority opinions to the Chancellery.

Whatever the desire of the conservatives Kemény and Mikó to return to the system of 1848, circumstances made this impossible. First among these circumstances was the pressure at the court to appoint more Romanians. In his letter of December 21 to Kemény, the emperor repeated his instructions of October 20 to Rechberg concerning Transylvania. He called for the reappointment of the officials of 1848 on the provincial level, but also the appointment of members of the other nationalities wherever those of 1848 were unavailable. He also stipulated that churches and schools could determine their own official language, and participants in local assemblies choose the language of deliberation. Mikó’s eleven nominees as councillors on December 28, 1860 included three Romanians who had served in the absolutist Locumtenency of Transylvania. An equal number of subordinate Romanian officials were assigned to the Romanian councillors, and a proportionate number of Romanians appointed at the court of appeals (Erdélyi királyi ítélő tábla) in Marosvásárhely.

39. Trócsányi, 156-72; Kutschera, 164-5.
42. Ioan Pușcariu, 53. He indicates four Romanian
A press report of April 29, 1861 stated that the 92 officials of the Gubernium included 78 Hungarians, seven Saxons and seven Romanians. Naturally both Romanian and Saxon politicians were dissatisfied with these proportions.

Changes in the regional administration also gave the Romanians a somewhat better position than before 1848. The four military border regiments had been dissolved in 1851, and the local administration integrated with that of the surrounding area. For the Szeklers of the two regiments in Csík and Háromszék districts, the dissolution satisfied an old grievance, since the predominantly free Szekler population resented the imposition of military discipline and the limitations on the choice of education and profession. The Romanian perception of the border regiment system was much more positive, since many serfs gained greater economic autonomy and educational opportunities. Given the material and cultural progress the Romanians of the border regiments had made, their reintegration into Hungarian or Saxon-administered areas was problematic. A Romanian was placed at the head of the newly created district of Násáud, councillors, but the fourth, along with a Romanian Vice President, were only appointed during the Provisorium.


44. Samu Benkő, "Székely diákok harca a Habsburg-hatalommal a tanulás jogáért," in Sorsformáló értelem, 183-205. Disagreeing with the Szekler tradition that the entire nation resented the institution of the border regiments, Kutschera states that the local Szekler nobility spearheaded the violent resistance to militarization and "instigated" resistance by the peasantry. Kutschera, 227, 230.

which corresponded to the former Second Romanian Border Regiment. On the territory of the former First Romanian Border Regiment, a Romanian became the head of the district of Făgăraș, and the restored counties of Hunyad and Felső-Fehér including other parts of the former first regiment also received Romanian chiefs. The latter two, however, were noblemen bearing only moderate sympathy for the Romanian national movement. Major parts of the first regiment fell under Saxon administration. Romanian lay and church leaders protested the cession of the four counties of the Partium to Hungary between December, 1860 and March, 1861. These counties had Romanian majorities and a large Romanian nobility which could have increased the socio-economic weight of the Romanian population in Transylvania.

Kemény adopted the same principle for the restoration of the local administration as for that of the Gubernium: the officials of 1848 should be reappointed wherever possible, and the others with some consideration for the Romanians. In practice, the prefects (H. főispán, főkirálybíró, főkapitány) of the restored Hungarian and Romanian counties and districts were, with only the excep-


47. Ioan Pușcariu, 56; Retegan, "Lupta națională a românilor," 163.

48. Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 189.
tions mentioned above, Hungarian noblemen from a few outstanding families:

Table 1: Transylvanian Prefects Outside the Fundus Regius in 1861

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian counties</th>
<th>főispán</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alsó-Fehér</td>
<td>György Pogány</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belső-Szolnok</td>
<td>Farkas Véér</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboka</td>
<td>Baron Dániel Bánnffy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felső-Fehér</td>
<td>Augustin Láday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunyad</td>
<td>Baron Ferenc Nopcsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolozs</td>
<td>Count Ferenc Béldi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Küküllő</td>
<td>Count Farkas Bethlen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torda</td>
<td>Baron György Kemény</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romanian districts</th>
<th>főkapitány</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Făgăraș</td>
<td>Ioan Lemeni-Bran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Năsăud</td>
<td>Alexandru Bohătel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Szekler districts</th>
<th>főkirálybíró</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aranyos</td>
<td>Gergely Béldi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csík</td>
<td>Antal Mikó</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Háromszék</td>
<td>Count Dénes Kálnoky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maros</td>
<td>Count Mihály Toldalaghi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udvarhely</td>
<td>Gábor Dániel (49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the past, the prefects were royal appointees. Under them was the heart of the constitutional administration: the county and district general congregations. The chief task of the congregations was to elect the local administration, so the method of their selection was crucial. Kemény and Mikó had contradictory goals: to preserve the land from Hungarian radicalism by coopting the most responsible, moderate leaders, preserve Hungarian rule, but also placate at least some of the Romanians. Kemény’s solution, which we will discuss at length, was perhaps the most prudent one, but it satisfied nobody, least of all the Romanians.

An Austrian historian writing at the beginning of this century remarked that the restoration of the constitutional

49. The Saxons restored to the administration were, of course, generally not noblemen.
administration in Transylvania was a crucial mistake from the standpoint of the proclaimed equality of nationalities and the centralist February Patent. As we have seen, the centralists in Vienna were aware of the problem, but the Council of Ministers itself was divided. To understand the significance of the restoration and how the ruling nationalities were able to prevail despite inferior numbers, we need to consider how the administration was supposed to operate—legalism was a dominant trait of Hungarian politics—and the Transylvanian society that was subject to it.

***

Administration in the Noble Counties and Szekler Districts

The Transylvanian jurisdictions which existed for several hundred years up to 1849, and then from 1861 until the partial reorganization in 1876, can be grouped into three areas according to their location and administrative system: the Hungarian or noble counties (H. magyar nemes vármegyék, magyarok földje; G. Adelskomitaten), the Szekler region (H. székely székek, székelyföld), and the Saxon region (L. Fundus regius, G. sächsische Stühle und Distrikte, Königsboden, H. Királyföld). The organization of the two Romanian districts most closely resembled that of the counties, hence they are usually grouped with them. There were three Transylvanian censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian Counties</th>
<th>Romanian Districts</th>
<th>Fundus Regius</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Doboka</td>
<td></td>
<td>18. Reps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Torda</td>
<td>15. Udvarhely</td>
<td>23. Mühlburg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transylvania in the 1860s**

- **Moldavia**
- **Wallachia**
between 1850 and 1869, taken under very different circumstances:

Table 2: Transylvanian Population by Historic Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1857</th>
<th>1869</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noble counties</td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>1,167,145</td>
<td>1,292,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szekler region</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>400,534</td>
<td>427,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundus Regius</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>406,521</td>
<td>381,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
<td>1,974,530</td>
<td>2,101,727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chief official of the county or district, whom we shall designate as the prefect, was appointed by the monarch on the recommendation of the Gubernium. The prefect corresponded with the Gubernium and presided over the General Congregation. The congregation of each county or district traditionally met four times a year, and was composed of all noblemen owning noble (nontaxable) land in that county or district. It nominated three candidates for middle-level administrative and judicial offices (subordinate to the prefect) for appointment by the Gubernium, elected the

51. Wagner, Historisch- statistisches Ortsnamenbuch für Siebenbürgen (Köln: Böhlau, 1977), 163, 299, 351; Farkas Bethlen, "Adatok Erdély viszonyairól különös tekintettel az adózási rendszerre," Statisztikai és nemzetgazdasági közlemények 4 (1867), 13; Keleti, 69. Wagner and Bethlen recalculated the 1850 and 1857 censuses to correspond to the historical jurisdictions restored after 1861, and both subtracted the Partium since it was rejoined to Hungary in 1860-61.


István Deák prefers the English term lord lieutenant for főispán; Deák, 15. Unlike in two counties of Hungary, the office of prefect never accrued to certain church offices in Transylvania.

53. L. congregatio generalis sive marchalis; H. Ősgyűlés, közgyűlés; G. Markalkongration.

54. One from each of the Hungarian received religions: Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Unitarian.
others from the three nominees of the prefect for each position, and elected deputies to the diet. The congregation also supervised officials, debated matters of public concern, answered public and private petitions, and settled legal cases brought before it. The chief assistants of the prefect were the county judge and the prefect's deputy, who had certain police responsibilities. Each county or district was divided into several subdistricts, each headed by a szolgabíró who acted as head of the local nobility, judge and agent of the prefect.

The administration of the Szekler districts was very similar to that of the noble counties and districts. The same regulations applied to the functions of the congregations and officials. Two important distinctions were in the election of officials (there were no preliminary nominations by the prefect), and also in the broader eligibility for participation in the congregation, which included primarily landed noblemen but also representatives of the free

55. County judge = L. supremus judex nobilium, H. főbíró, G. Oberrichter; deputy prefect or subdistrict chief = L. vicecomes, H. alispán, G. Vicegespan; subdistrict = L. processus, H. járás; L. vicejudex noblium, H. szolgabíró, G. Stuhlsrichter, Unterrichter, R. jude cercual.

56. The prefect was called the főkirálybíró (L. supremus judex regius), his three to four deputies were alkirálybírák (L. vicejudex regius), and the counterpart of the szolgabíró was the dulló.
The different social structure helps to account for these administrative differences.

Historians have described the counties and Szekler districts as "autonomous noble republics." What was the size of the politically active population? Baritiu wrote that five percent of the Transylvanian population was noble, which was an even higher percentage of the population than in Poland. Others cite a figure of 30,000 noble families, which gives a slightly higher percentage. Calculations of their number were rare, since the landed nobility was not on the tax rolls and voting at the congregations was not formally recorded. The only Transylvanian census to record all the noble families, that of 1767, gave the following figures for landed (untaxed) noble, sandalled or poor noble (taxed), serf and free peasant families:

Table 3: Categories of Taxed Population in 1767

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Transylvania</th>
<th>Noble counties</th>
<th>Szekler region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landed</td>
<td>4,586</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandalled</td>
<td>12,811</td>
<td>6,202</td>
<td>3,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serfs: [a]</td>
<td>107,945</td>
<td>73,425</td>
<td>10,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[b]</td>
<td>45,495</td>
<td>53,705</td>
<td>3,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free peasants</td>
<td>55,247</td>
<td>2,814</td>
<td>16,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a = jobbágy; b = zsellér; see footnote 69.]

---

58. Victor Cheresteșiu, A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés 1848. majus 15-17. (Bukarest: Politikai kiadó, 1967), 67, 120. Benigni, 38-9, indicated 29,510 noble families (20,639 tax-free, 8449 sandalled, 422 Boerones) for 1772, for a total of 9.8% of all families. Csetri and Imreh fail to mention the tabulation of 1772. The sandalled nobleman (H. bocskoros nemes, kisnemes, R. nemes) was a poor nobleman who resembled the free peasant in all but judicial status.
Only landed noblemen were entitled to membership in the congregations in the noble counties and districts. If their number increased at the same rate as the rest of the Transylvanian population, there would have been an average of five to six hundred landed noblemen in each county and district in 1861. The sandalled nobility were eligible for all offices except those at the highest level. Calculations of noble electors in Transylvania in 1863 (57,303 in the noble counties and districts and the Szekler region) and 1869 (74,134 in all Transylvania) dropped the distinction between the landed and sandalled nobility. Upon comparison with the earlier proportions it appears that these figures are too high; they do, however, confirm the evidence in the 1767 census that noblemen were a much higher percentage of the population in the Szekler region.

The controversial Szekler military nobility accounts in large part for the regional variations and for the greater political participation in the Szekler region. Popular tradition maintained that all three classes of Szeklers were noblemen and free, though this was clearly no longer the case.

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61. Laws 12, 17, and 18 of 1791, in Die wichtigsten Verfassungsgesetze, 142-3, 147-9.
63. With a multiplier of five for each family, the data would produce a noble population between thirteen and eighteen percent of the total for all Transylvania.
case after the sixteenth century. Many Szeklers claimed that the civil equality granted by the revolution of 1848 extended political rights to all three orders. The rebelliousness of the lowest class, originally directed against the upper orders, became increasingly anti-Austrian, especially in the revolution in Háromszék in 1848-49. Political tradition and the larger size of the congregations thus made the Szekler districts more difficult for the government to manage in the 1860s.

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Peasant Society

We can distinguish political life in the counties and in the Szekler region not only by the size of the nobility and the composition of the congregations, but by the size of the formerly unfree population. Where it existed, serfdom left a bitter legacy of poverty and class resentment. The percentage of the taxed population of the noble counties and districts that were serfs rose to 92.4% in 1821; in 1848, 85.5% of the 1537 villages there were inhabited by serfs and

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65. Despite the limitation of the assemblies' membership to 100 in the Instruction of March 26 (see Chapter III) the assembly in Székelyudvarhely in 1861 had 1200 members--Orbán I, 14. But Orbán exaggerated when he wrote that "a székely köztársasági szervezet szellemében és politikai értelemben teljesen egyenlő volt minden székely, s tömegesen megjelenhetett a közügyek felett intézkedő ösgyűléseken vagy marchálisokon.", loc cit. Most lower class Szeklers were in fact excluded from politics.
feudally dependent miners. The polarization between the Hungarian aristocracy and the enserfed, mostly Romanian population was strongest here. In the Szekler region, the serfs (39% in 1821) were increasing and the free peasantry declining, but free peasants still constituted nearly one-third of the population, and three-quarters of the 435 villages were partly dependent and partly free.

The chief positive achievement of the revolution in Transylvania had been the peasant emancipation. As in Hungary, the emancipation law of June 6, 1848 abolished corvee on the landlord’s land by urbarial serfs, i.e. those serfs who paid taxes to the state on their land. These serfs gained unencumbered title to their land. Allodial serfs, those whose lands had not been taxed and hence remained the legal property of the landlords, were

66. Csetri and Imreh, 31; Ákos Egyed, "Adatok az erdélyi falu társadalmi tipológiájáhöz," in Egyed, Falu város civilizáció. Tanulmányok a jobbágyfelszabadítás és a kapitalizmus történetéből Erdélyben 1848-1914 (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1981), 18. Egyed lists the counties and Págáraș separately (half of the 65 villages in Págáraș were of the mixed dependent/free variety), and they were combined here. The district of Násáud had not yet been formed. In 1847, 80% of the taxed population in the noble counties were serfs—Miskolczy, "Erdély a reformkorban (1830-1848)," in Erdély története, III, 1213.

67. Csetri and Imreh, 36; Egyed, loc.cit. Here 56% of the taxpayers were serfs in 1847—Miskolczy, loc.cit.

68. Arguing with certain unnamed Romanian historians, Ákos Egyed insists that this, and not the nationality conflict, was the most lasting consequence of the revolution in Transylvania. Egyed, "A jobbágyrendszer megszüntetése 1848-ban Erdélyben," in Egyed, 68-9.

69. There were two categories of serfs: full or proper serfs (H. jobbágý, R. iobagi) and cottagers (G. Häusler, H. zsellérek, R. jeleri) depending on the amount of land they farmed and paid taxes on.
excluded from the emancipation. Nearly two-thirds of the Transylvanian peasantry, or 173,781 serf holdings, were emancipated in this way. The freed serfs accounted for 84% of the feudally dependent population in Transylvania in 1848. This represented a much higher percentage of the peasantry than in Hungary, where other types of holdings were more common. The remission of corvee was also a more dramatic gain than in Hungary, since twice or three times as much corvee was required for an equal amount of land in Transylvania.

The lack of a previous regulation of peasant and landlord holdings (urbarium), as existed in Hungary, and the tremendous regional variation in types of landholding added to the difficulty of the emancipation in Transylvania. Some of the freed serfs were able to take advantage of the unsettled conditions in the Revolution to successfully lay claim to even more land than they had possessed before. Many of these gains were called into question once order had been restored. The village forests and pastures, formerly shared with the landlord, and the allodial serfs’ lands were also under dispute. The imperial patents of 1853 for Hungary and 1854 for Transylvania stipulated the conditions for the

70. Josef A. von Grimm, Das Urbarialwesen in Siebenbürgen (Wien: Friedrich & Moritz Förster, 1863), 150; Egyed, "A jobbágyrendszer megszüntetése," 96-9; 78% according to Szász, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdélyben," 1457. 80% of the disencumbered land became Romanian property.
72. Cheresteșiu, A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés, 53.
emancipation of the allodial serfs and sought to resolve the problem of land ownership by establishing urbarial courts which would mediate the claims of the landlords and the freed serfs in each community. Due to the difficulties of documenting ownership in Transylvania, urbarial cases proceeded much more slowly there. In Hungary, land ownership in nearly half the emancipated villages had been regulated by private agreement or by the urbarial courts by 1864. In Transylvania, private agreements were much more unusual and the landlord or peasants requested court procedures in two-thirds of the cases. The Transylvanian courts began operation in 1858, but only actually began to decide cases in 1863, when the political struggle there had reached a crucial stage. By 1870 only 4% of the cases had been resolved. The fact that most of the former serfs were Romanians added to the political volatility of the problem. Some leading Romanian politicians provided their legal services to the peasants. Hungarian historians formerly alleged that the courts were partial to peasant claims, but most now agree that they favored the Hungarian landlords.

76. Albert Berzeviczy, Az abszolutizmus kora, II (Budapest: Franklin, 1925), 66 and István Nagy, A mezőgazdaság Magyarországon az abszolutizmus korában, 1849-
Regional variations in landholding exacerbated the land disputes. The disposition of the forests formerly used by the Romanian serfs of the Munții Apuseni and Hunyad county caused considerable unrest in the 1860s. The villagers of the military border regiments were legally free peasants, yet after the regiments were disbanded in 1851 many of them lost possession of their lands. In contrast to the mass emancipation in the Hungarian counties, most serfs of the Szekler region lost their land because it was declared to be alodial. Such social grievances provided fertile ground for political agitation in the 1860s. The peasant unrest, the good intentions of the liberal nobility in 1848, and imperial officials all contributed to the passage of the peasant emancipation of 1848 through 1854. Undeniably, the majority of the peasantry benefitted greatly, but vexing social questions remained unresolved.

The emancipation legislation of 1848-54 left many groups of peasants dissatisfied. Many of the freed serfs waited for urbarial courts to resolve their land claims; Saxons and Romanians disputed the lands of the former border regiments; most explosively, the Romanians of the Munții 1867 (Budapest: Franklin, 1944), 17, maintain the former view, and Rogge, I, 336, and Kovács, 101-23, maintain the latter view. 77. Ioan Pușcariu, 26-7. 78. Egyed, "Vázlatok a jobbágyfelszabadítás és zsellér-kérdés történetéről a Székelyföldön (1848-1896)," in Egyed, 102-25. As a result of this as well as general economic backwardness and political disaffection, there was steady Szekler emigration to other regions and countries throughout the second half of the century. See György Bozodi, Székely bánja (1943, 3rd ed.; Budapest: Magvető, 1985), 152-87.
Apuseni found themselves deprived of the forest lands that were very important for their livelihood, and the former Szekler serfs on the lands called siculica hereditas (székely örökség) were expropriated because this land was classified as allodial. The dispossessed Szeklers and the Romanian minority in the Szekler region, who were overwhelmingly former serfs, at times made common cause, but they were politically and numerically weak. The social question was more significant in the counties, the former land of serfdom, in the 1860s.

The counties contrast even more strongly with the social structure in the Fundus Regius. To refer to two indices cited for the noble and Szekler regions: more than two-thirds of the taxed family heads in the Fundus Regius in 1821 were free peasants, and fully 84% of the 271 villages in 1848 were of the free peasant type. Only one in 1242 persons in the Fundus Regius was a nobleman, compared to one in 34 in the noble counties and districts and one in seven in the Szekler region. There was a small (15%) serf

79. In contrast to the noble counties and districts, only one-third of the total population of the Szekler region were serfs. Yet only a small percentage of these were freed in 1848. At least half of those remaining were Szeklers (those on the siculica hereditas), but the remainder were Romanians. Egyed shows that half of the unfreed serfs in the Szekler region were praedalisták (124,9), and according to Orbán (II, 5-7, III, 6, 24-5) these were Romanians or Magyarized Romanians.

80. Csetri and Imreh, 41; Egyed, 18.

population in the Fundus Regius, but in most cases their collective "landlords" were the cities of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt.

We do not possess precise nationality statistics for Transylvania in the 1860s. Károly Keleti used the 1869 census to project the nationality statistics from elementary school admissions. His results are as follows:

Table 4: Nationalities in the Three Regions, 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>241,574</td>
<td>945,443</td>
<td>64,043</td>
<td>1,292,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>377,637</td>
<td>47,776</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>427,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>30,010</td>
<td>188,533</td>
<td>158,128</td>
<td>381,573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A= Noble counties; B= Szekler region; C= Fundus Regius

Thus more than four-fifths of the Romanians lived in the noble counties and districts, more than three-fifths of the Germans lived in the Fundus Regius, and more than half of the Hungarians in the Szekler region. The census data of the mid-nineteenth century do not permit a correlation of nationality with social class. But if one considers that

83. The census of 1850, (in MOL. F551, bundle 2) has never been published; excerpts are in Söllner and Bielz. It recorded both nationalities and religions, but according to the absolutist jurisdictions. The 1857 census, in Országis-mei tabellák..., records religions, but not nationalities. The same is true for the 1869 census, A magyar szent korona..., which at least uses the jurisdictions in effect after 1861.
84. Keleti, 72. Using the 1850 census, Miskolczy ("Erdély a reformkorban," 1196-7) calculated similar figures for the pre-1848 jurisdictions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>159,396</td>
<td>781,791</td>
<td>49,166</td>
<td>1,049,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>303,975</td>
<td>54,246</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>372,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>25,063</td>
<td>207,810</td>
<td>141,425</td>
<td>401,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>488,434</td>
<td>1,043,847</td>
<td>191,754</td>
<td>1,823,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A= Noble counties; B= Szekler region; C= Fundus regius; D= Total

85. Pál Balogh and Oskár Jászi performed such calculations at the beginning of the twentieth century, but due to
most townsmen and noblemen in the noble counties and districts were Hungarians, it is evident that the the categories of former serfs and Romanians were nearly contiguous in this area. The Szekler region was ethnically homogenous, and most of the former serfs were also Szeklers. The Romanians there were almost all former serfs, many of whom rapidly Magyarized after the emancipation in 1848.

The Saxon towns were more ethnically heterogeneous than the Hungarian ones. Saxons were represented disproportionally in urban trade. This was true even in the heterogeneous district of Kronstadt, where three-fourths of the 194 registered merchants in 1844 were Romanians, but the majority of workers were members of Saxon rather than Romanian guilds. The feudally dependent villages in the districts of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt were similar in ethnic composition to the surrounding countryside, predominantly Romanian but including many Saxons and Hungarians as rapid social change in the intervening period their data are of only limited relevance.

86. Orban, I 15, II 5-6, confirmed by Ferencz Kozma, A Székelyföld közgazdasági és közümlődési állapota (Budapest: Franklin, 1879), 76-7, referred to this Magyarization. Balogh wrote that many of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox communities of the Szekler region were exclusively Hungarian-speaking by the end of the nineteenth century; see Chapter VII.

87. Thomas Nagler, "Contribuția sașilor la dezvoltarea economica a Transilvaniei în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea și prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea," in Studii de istorie a naționalităților conlocuitoare din România și a înfrățirii lor cu națiunea română. Naționalitatea germană, II (București: Editura politică, 1981), 102. The Romanian merchants dominated the trade with the Romanian Principalities, which was the source of Kronstadt's wealth.
well. The numerous wealthy rural communities included Romanian ones that could afford to establish generous endowments for the education of village children in prestigious schools and even to buy military exemptions for the village. The greater wealth of the Romanians in the Fundus Regius brought them advantages in cultural and political organization, but probably made them more moderate than those in the counties.

***

Hungarian and Saxon Towns

The towns of the noble counties and Szekler districts were a further distinctive administrative and social category. They were of three types: royal free towns, privileged noble towns, and market towns. They were politically and juridically independent of the counties and districts which surrounded them. Officials were elected by the town citizens, who were a larger percentage of the population than the noblemen in the counties and districts, comprising all married home-owning males, but excluding the workers and servants. They elected the chief official, the

88. Göllner, "Reaktion und Vormärz," 266.
89. The Romanian village of Satulung in the district of Kronstadt boasted such a school foundation and military exemption.—Retegan, "Contribuții privind organizarea comunității sătești din Transilvania la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea," Anuarul Institutului de Istoria și Arheologie Cluj-Napoca 19 (1976), 197.
90. This explains in part the elevation of the Romanian merchant "village" (population 6012) of Reșinar to the rank of market town for the 1863 elections, and also the apportionment of two deputies for the surrounding subdistrict (Filialstuhl) of Săliște and Tâlmaciu. All three deputies elected were moderates.
permanent representative assembly, and town representatives to the diet. The twelve to one hundred members of the representative assembly represented the districts of the town and areas of economic administration. Its president was a sort of ombudsman, who also sat on the town council, but without voting. The most powerful body was the council. Its members were the mayor and ten councillors elected for life, and it acted collectively in much the same way as the Gubernium. The election of the centumviri and the councillors observed the equality of the three feudal nations and of those received religions present in the community.

In 1861 there were in the noble counties and the Szekler region five royal free towns, three privileged noble towns, and twelve market towns, with an average population of 4279. The noble towns were founded by noblemen who had taken up residence there, while the market towns derived their privileges partly from local economic importance.

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91. Mayor= L. judex primarius; H. főbíró; G. Oberrichter; assembly= L. electa communitas, centumviratus; H. választott közönség, külső tanács, nagytanács.
92. The president was L. orator, H. szónok; the town council was L. magistratus, senatus; H. belső tanács, kistanács; G. Rat.
93. "Városi önkormányzat," in Magyar történelmi fogalomgyűjtemény II, 1000-5; Benigni, 125-30; Kutschera, 37-8; Avram Andea, "Organizarea administrativă, dezvoltarea demografică și urbanistică," in Ștefan Pascu, ed., Istoria Clujului, 215-21. Unlike the other sources, Andea states that the councillors were elected annually.
94. Totals averaged from Országisimei tabellák Erdély nagyfejedelmség népessége viszonyairól, mint melléklet politicai felosztásában szükséges változtatások iránti törvényjavaslatokhoz [Title of fragment from 1857 census publication preserved in the Universitätsbibliothek, Vienna].
partly from the influence of the local landlords who dom-
inated them. Administratively the three categories differed
in the names and sizes of the administrative bodies and the
degree of aristocratic influence. The free towns elected
two deputies each to the diet, the others one each.

The towns of the noble counties and the Szekler dis-
tricts were important Hungarian political centers, in part
due to the liberal proclivities of the middle class and the
leadership role of the towns in high culture, but increas-
ingly so because of the Romanian preponderance in the
countryside of the noble counties. The towns were only 5.7% 
of the populations in the counties and Szekler region in
1850, but were overwhelmingly Hungarian. The results of the
elections of 1863 would accord the Hungarian towns the
symbolic leadership of the Hungarians in the counties which
the nobility lost in the elections in the counties themselves.

The administration of the Fundus Regius resembled that
of the Hungarian towns. All married, homeowning Saxon males
could vote for or be elected one of the fifty to one hundred
members of the representative assembly. Replacement members
were elected to the assembly from among three candidates put
forward by the town council. As in the royal free towns,
the assembly was led by an Orator, supervised economic
administration, and elected local council members. Councils
were elected in the rural localities by all landowning
freemen, and they or the village assembly elected the body
of local officials. The autonomy of small rural localities was more extensive than in the noble counties and Szekler region.

Unlike the councils in the Hungarian towns, those of the chief towns in the Saxon districts functioned simultaneously as the supreme body for the entire district. As in the Hungarian town councils, many senators had substantive areas of responsibility or Fachreferate within the city, but in addition many also had responsibility to periodically visit a number of subordinate communities (Stuhl- und Distriktsinspektorate). The senate upheld royal and local regulations in the localities of the district. Each community sent two representatives to the biannual district assembly, and the district seat sent six. This assembly elected the district's two deputies to the diet, and also the chief political and judicial official, mayor or prefect, of the district. For the election of district officials, members of the district seat's assembly were coopted into

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95. Assembly = ausserer Rat; Hundertschaft; Orator = Sprecher, Wortmann; the assembly and senate in the smaller localities were called the Altschaft and the Ortsvorstand or Gemeindeamt. For the above: Kutscher, 46-50.

96. The seat of a Saxon district was the Stuhlvorort or Distriktvorort. Only seven of the eleven district seats had elected town councils, and six of these had the rank of royal free towns. For these seven towns the Magistrat and Stuhlsamt were the same body.


98. Depending on local usage, the chief official was called the Bürgermeister, Stuhlrichter, Königsrichter, Distriktoberrichter, or Distriktrichter. Müller, 196.
the district assembly in sufficient number to equal those from the rest of the district.

A further peculiarity of the district assemblies was that each of the eleven sent two deputies to the annual or biannual assembly or Konflux of the Saxons, commonly referred to as the Universität. Unlike the other two ruling nations of Transylvania, the Saxons also had a chief official of their own, the Comes nationis saxonicae, appointed by the emperor from among three candidates agreed upon by the district assemblies and the Konflux. The Comes nominated three candidates for each senate position for election by the town assemblies, and three for each prefect for election by the district assemblies. The Comes was ex officio member of the Gubernium, and supervised the execution of imperial decrees in the Fundus Regius. The Comes and Konflux together constituted the Nationsuniversität (universitas nationis saxonicae), which in a formal but inconsistently applied sense was subordinate not to the Gubernium, but only to the Emperor.

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The traditional leading organs of administration for Transylvania, the Court Chancellery in Vienna and the Gubernium in Kolozsvar, were reestablished in 1860-61. Both bodies, but especially the Gubernium, were dicasteria,

99. Kutschera, 41-4; Benigni, 112-21; Müller, passim. The Privilegium Andreanum of 1224, confirmed on several occasions in the seventeenth century, arguably subordinated the Saxons directly to the king.
i.e. composed of officials who were simultaneously representatives of feudal corporations. Romanians were now added to these bodies as de facto representatives of their nation, but in numbers far below their percentage of the population.

Three regions of Transylvania had distinctive administrative forms and population, and each was the domain of one of the three feudal "nations": the noble counties of the Hungarians, the Szekler region, and the Fundus Regius of the Saxons. Hungarians and Szeklers spoke the same Hungarian language, shared the same political consciousness, and possessed a landed noble elite. The noble counties and Szekler region differed in important ways, however. The Hungarian nobility of the counties ruled a predominantly Romanian and formerly enserfed population that resented its underprivileged political and social position. The Szekler nobility was a larger percentage of its region's population, politics was more broadly based, and the population was overwhelmingly Hungarian-speaking and less polarized in a socioeconomic sense. Romanians constituted a small majority of the population of the Fundus Regius and enjoyed a far better socioeconomic position than their counterparts in the counties, but like the latter they were essentially excluded from the local administration. Saxon and Hungarian towns, even where they were ethnic islands in a Romanian sea, remained the political domain of the respective ruling nationalities.
This system of political and social privilege was at issue in the debate over the Transylvanian electoral law during these years. Constitutional law and geography were important considerations in the activity of not only politicians but, as we will see, the religious communities.
Hungarian-Romanian relations reached a crucial phase during the 1860s. Both Transylvania and the Danubian principalities were important arenas for this relationship. This chapter will trace the course of Transylvanian politics from 1861 to 1865, pointing out the role of Hungarians and Romanians outside the empire as well as in Transylvania and Hungary.

The threat posed by the Hungarian emigres and their domestic supporters was a weighty consideration in the decision to restore the constitution in Hungary and Transylvania in 1861. The emigres' apparent strength buttressed the Old Conservatives' call for concessions. On the other hand, the revelation that the moderates led by Ferenc Deák dominated the political opposition seemed to make concessions less urgent. The political activities of the national minorities had a sobering effect on the Hungarian leadership, undermining the influence of the radicals.

The declining influence of those Hungarians who supported the emigre leadership was similar in Transylvania.

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1. Redlich demonstrates the relevance of the radicals for the Old Conservatives' concession strategy. György Szabad stresses the importance of the Slovak Congress in June, 1861 for the victory of Deák's party in the diet. Political Trends, 108-16. Yet diplomatic developments, Italian politics, and most of all the capture and extradition of László Teleki in December, 1860 greatly weakened the emigres in this period.--Lukács, 170-94.
The strength of the party is difficult to judge. The numerous demonstrations in favor of the union with Hungary and the laws of 1848, held in March and April, 1861, included sporadic manifestations of Kossuthist sympathies. Demonstrators commemorating soldiers who had fought against Austria in 1848-49 waved the national flag and sang the revolutionary "Klapka march." Many supporters of the radicals were Hungarian school students, whose views were frowned upon by their more conservative teachers and schoolmates. This was the case at the hanging of a flag inscribed "1848" at the Reformed College in Kolozsvár on March 15, 1861. The Austrian commandant threatened to shoot the flag down, but the school principal and higher-born students prevailed on the radical to take the flag down. The Catholic priest in Csíksomlyó was investigated by the authorities after allegedly praising Kossuth and Garibaldi in a sermon in May. The return of Transylvanians who had served in the Hungarian Legion in Italy helped to increase the ranks of the radicals. Many were disillusioned by their experiences in Italy, but others were eager to join the oppositional movement at home.

2. The radicals at one such demonstration in Schassburg included Saxons and Romanians. Urmossy I, 268-71.
3. Lajos Sárkány, "Losonci Báró Bánffy Dezso emlékezete," and Lajos Réthy, "Széljegyzetek Br. Bánffy Dezsőről," Kolozsvári református kollégium értesítője 1911/12, 9-34 and 35-46. Sárkány maintained that Bánffy, one of the students and son of the prefect designate, was a leader of the radicals. Bánffy’s more plebeian classmate Réthy recalled Bánffy was one of the moderates in the incident.
4. See Chapter V.
5. The papers of Chancellor Kemény and his successor
As the chance of renewed war in Italy faded, the importance of the Principalities as a potential field of operation for the emigres increased. The Prime Minister of Moldavia from April, 1860 to February, 1861, Mihail Kogălniceanu, sympathized with the emigres. He gave refuge to thousands of Transylvanian Hungarian who entered Moldavia, including Berzenczey, the reputed leader of the Kossuthists in Transylvania. Arms depots and military camps were established for the emigres. Prince Cuza may not have had active knowledge of these arrangements, but the Wallachian government was also favorable to the emigres. It permitted the appearance of a Kossuthist newspaper in Hungarian from September to December, 1860. The arms shipment to the Principalities provided for in the agreement of 1859 was a fiasco, and weakened the position of Kogălniceanu. The shipment in five Italian ships in December, 1860 came to the attention of the great powers, who forced Cuza to sequester it.

contain regular reports from Mecséry on the return home of Legion members—MOL, D228 1861-63 passim.


8. Lukács, 162-3; Jelavich, Russia and the Formation, 125-6. The scandal of the Italian arms may explain the suppression of the Közlöny and the decision of many of the emigres to leave for Italy. Two groups totalling 295 left Galați for Italy in March and April, 1861 to enlist in the Legion after spending the winter in Moldavia.—Csetri, 35-6.

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The prospects for collaboration between the emigres and Prince Cuza deteriorated in the course of 1861. Klapka and the Prince concluded an agreement in January, 1861 concerning the storage of a portion of the Italian arms shipment that had been salvaged and the recognition of equal rights for the Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania. But under the influence of the "Dacoroman" party in Bucharest, the view became more prevalent that such assurances were inadequate. The Dacoromans included several influential Transylvanian Romanian emigres. The faction was strongly concerned with the affairs of Transylvania and sought, in the long run, its annexation by Romania. The Hungarian emigres were bound by personal conviction and the state of opinion among Hungarians at home to insist on the territorial integrity of Hungary. Their open letter to Garibaldi to this effect, in August, 1861, prompted outrage in the press of Bucharest.

While the Austrian police and military were concerned about the arms smuggling and clandestine propaganda of the Hungarian emigration, many aristocrats attributed Romanian radicalism to Dacoroman agitation from Bucharest. The prefect of Hunyad county, Baron Ferenc Nopcsa, wrote to Kemeny that the purpose of the Romanian opposition to elected

9. Lukács, 164; the text of the agreement is in Borsi-Kálmán, 11-14.
10. The Transylvanian-born Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian became a leading foreign policy advisor of Cuza and wrote a major memorandum to him in January, 1860 propounding these ideas. It is quoted at length in Borsi-Kálmán, 67-71.
11. Curticăpeanu, 422-5.
county officials was to obstruct any possibility of Hungarian-Romanian compromise in the county assembly of July 8, 1861. The goal was to create anarchy and facilitate the union of the county with neighboring Wallachia. He wrote that the leader of the conspiracy, Ioan Crainic, was a former Austrian officer who had been in Romania since April and was seeking a commission in Cuza's army. Nopcsa argued that the union of Transylvania with Hungary was the best way to defeat this secessionism. The correspondence of Baritiu with Bucharest during 1861 suggests that Crainic had little official support there, and that Transylvanian matters were considered an internal Austrian affair. Papiu-Ilarian himself wrote to some of the radicals in Transylvania offering his advice. The program he urged on them, and on the readers of his book published at the end of 1861, was not unification with the Principalities but support for the Austrian policy of Transylvanian autonomy versus demands for union with Hungary. The real significance of Dacoroman

12. Nopcsa to Kemény, Deva, July 11, 1861 (MOL D228, 1861/305). Nopcsa was a conservative aristocrat of Romanian origin.

13. Ioan Maiorescu, a Transylvanian emigre who became a high educational official in 1859, noted Crainic's visit to the Ministry of War in his letter to Baritiu of January 15/27, 1861. He remarked that due to the dislike for foreigners in the Walachian army Crainic had little prospect of being accepted there. In his letter of October 4/16, he stated that concord between the nationalities, not secession, was the proper objective. GBCS, I, 407-8, 411.

14. Letters to Iosif Hodoș and Ion Axente Sever, Iași, June 9 and October 16, 1861. Iosif Pervain and Ioan Chindriș, ed., Corespondența lui Alexandru Papiu Ilarian I (Cluj: Dacia, 1972), 106-9. Ilarian was surely aware that his letters might be read by the authorities. Nopcsa mentioned Axente as one of the radicals at the Deva assembly.
agitation in the Principalities lay in the weakening of Romanian collaboration with the Hungarian emigres. The material support sent to the Transylvanian Romanians by the principalities was negligible, and the sources of the Transylvanians' actions must be sought in internal conditions.

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Local Politics

The Old Conservatives could not hope to restore completely the pre-1848 organization of Transylvania in April, 1861. The revolution itself had brought innovations in county administration. The establishment of civil equality implied a broadening of the social composition of the administration. Yet the aristocracy feared that the new electoral law would enable commoners and non-Hungarians to gain control of the congregations. Law XVI of 1848 therefore provided for the one-time election of county commissions to supplant the congregations; but these were in fact similar in composition

Ilarian's book was The Constitutional Independence of Transylvania, published in several languages at the end of 1861 and beginning of 1862. On December 17 the Gubernium approved the recommendation of the Kronstadt police to not only permit the importation of the book but to encourage its distribution. Grigore Ploșteanu, "Mărturi privind biografia și opera lui Al. Papiu Ilarian," Vatra 1983 #2, p. 7.

15. In connection with a trip through Transylvania by Ilarian, Șaguna's inspector of schools, Paul Vasici, wrote Barițiu from Hermannstadt in January, 1861: "Declararea principelui Cuza în privința neutralității [on the Transylvanian question] au produs aicea cea mai placută înțipărirea. E bună și pentru noi, căci vor mai înceta a ne negri în colori posomorîte, cum sint inimile cele rele." GBCS, II, 53. The Hungarian allegations of irredentist influence were a source of embarrassment for the Transylvanian Romanians.
to the latter, only smaller. After considerable controversy in the Council of Ministers in 1861, Kemény secured imperial sanction for the restoration of this system. His provisional Instruction of late March called on the newly appointed prefects of the noble counties and Szekler districts to appoint commissions of fifty to one hundred members with "suitable" representation of all classes and religions. Kemény issued similar instructions to Franz Salmen, the Saxon Comes of 1848 who was restored to this function. Wherever possible, the senators and assembly members of 1848 should be restored to office, and replacements elected by the competent Saxon bodies.

The idea of appointing rather than electing the county and district commission members originated in 1848, but it became apparent that such commissions could not restore public confidence. Hungarian and Romanian politicians often agreed that the new commissions should be elected by county congregations including non-noble elements. Even so, the electoral assemblies were composed chiefly of landowners. Disregarding the provisional instructions, congregations met in Kolozs county and Făgăraș district in May and elected commissions with over 400 members, mostly Romanians in Făgăraș and Hungarians in Kolozsvár. Other congregations accepted the use of the Romanian language in local adminis-

They elected many Romanians to the commissions and to public office, though in numbers too small to correspond to the Romanian percentage of the population or to satisfy the Romanian politicians. The elected commissions routinely exceeded the specified limit of one hundred members. Clergymen led the Romanian opposition in several of the assemblies: Metropolitan Şuluţiu in Alsó-Fehér county, Greek Catholic dean Ioan Fekete Negruţiu in Kolozsvár, and the Orthodox dean Nicolae Crainic in Hunyad county. Everywhere except in the two Romanian districts, the Hungarian aristocracy dominated the proceedings, and in the majority of cases the officials of 1848 were restored to their former positions.

The Romanian movement was partly responsible for the failure of the government's plan. More important was the resistance of the nobility. Not only did it declare the Provisional Instructions illegal, as did the Romanians in several assemblies, but it denounced the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy and the prospective diet as well. Some assemblies even selected deputies to the diet in Pest, but Mikó acted energetically to prevent their appearance there. Resolutions interdicting the payment of taxes,

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18. Retegan notes, however, that in terms of the use of the Romanian language and the appointment of Romanian officials the assemblies were far more conciliatory than those of 1848. Ibid., 168-70.
19. Ibid., 171.
20. Mikó telegraphed Deák on May 9 that Franz Joseph had ordered him to prevent the Szekler deputies' participation "um jeden Preis"; Deak should read the text of this order to any that might arrive and ask them not to appear at the
labelled "Terrorismus der Behörden" by the Austrians, were also passed. The Hungarian leaders held a meeting in Kolozsvár. They agreed that without union with Hungary the regime was illegal, but that appointment to county offices might be accepted in order to facilitate the end of the absolutist regime and the eventual achievement of their goals.  

The ends and means of the Old Conservatives were contradictory, and the Chancellery and Gubernium found themselves in an anomalous position with respect to the Hungarian majorities in the assemblies. The latter declared the Chancellery and Gubernium illegal, sought to send deputies to the diet in Pest, disregarded procedural instructions and discouraged the payment of taxes. But two factors brought a considerable rapprochement between the counties and elected officials on the one hand and these superior officials: the increasing evidence that the Chancellery and the Gubernium were defending Hungarian interests against Viennese centralism, and the apparent collusion of the latter with Romanian demands which threatened all Hungarian noblemen, regardless of their constitutional views. 

The Gubernium moved reluctantly to the establishment of the Romanian district of Násáud, whose assembly met only four months after the imperial decree establishing the district in March, 1861. The Gubernium stubbornly refused to recognize the election of a predominantly Romanian body of diet. MOL F263. 1861/342; AS Cluj. Corespondenţa Mikó Imre, 1861/123.  

officials in Făgăraș, although the Hungarians were less than 5% of the population of the district. In the counties, on the other hand, the Gubernium resolutely upheld the decisions of committees and congregations despite protests against the inadequate representation of the majority Romanian population in the press and in petitions to the court.

The center of the Romanian resistance was, as in the past, the county of Alsó-Fehér. In these years considerable conservative-liberal collaboration developed among the county's Hungarian nobility. Alsó-Fehér was the most populous county of Transylvania, and like the others it was heavily Romanian. It also contained the seat of the Greek Catholic Archbishopric in Blaj, the Roman Catholic Bishopric in Gyulafehervár, and the Reformed College in Nagyenyed. All three were enormously wealthy, and the prelates and church officials, as major landowners, weighed heavily in county politics. The Romanians repeatedly demanded the election of county officials by a congregation similar to

22. Retegan, "Lupta," 179-81; Ürmössy's account of the events in Făgăraș, I, 283-6, is sarcastic and anti-Romanian.
23. Ibid., passim. As noted earlier, Baron Nopcsa's origins made his attitude more ambiguous than that of the other prefects. By admitting village representatives and all the village pastors to the county congregation he permitted a Romanian majority to form, and the Hungarian minority, though concurring with his opposition to the Romanian radicals, objected to the unconstitutional way in which he steamrolled both Romanian and Hungarian obstruction; MOL D228, 1861/305. The Nopcsa family was heavily in debt, and its petition to the Ministry of Finance for relief was under consideration throughout the summer of 1861; see POM V, 2, 113-15.
that which met in Hunyad in July. Led by Sulutiu, they
rejected the reelection of the commission of 1848 by the
county assembly in Nagyenyed on April 21-22. All the
Romanians elected there and in the local assemblies declined
to take their posts, while those Hungarians sent to replace
them were not recognized by the Romanians. A new
congregation called on June 26-27 met with similar failure,
and renewed attempts at general congregations on September 16
24
and October 17 were also boycotted by the Romanians.
Mikó repeatedly called for armed force in order to "restore
order," end extremist agitation and compel obedience to the
officials, but this was refused by the higher autho-
25
rieties.

The Saxon establishment, in contrast to the Hungarian
one, approved the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy,
with the sole exception of the district of Schässburg referred
to earlier. Five districts of the Fundus Regius had

25. On May 26 Degenfeld warned the Council of Ministers
that the use of the military "nur durch die Notwendigkeit
der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ruhe und Ordnung
bedingt, nicht aber von dem Einschreiten der Parteien um
Assistenz abhängig gemacht werde." POM V,2, p. 79. Mecséry
and Degenfeld personally assured Ioan Rațiu, who was in
Vienna as part of a delegation, that orders had been given
forbidding the use of the gendarmes and military against
Romanian opponents of the county administration. See his
letter of July 8 to Barițiu, in Keith Hitchins and Liviu
Maior, ed., Coresponența lui Ioan Rațiu cu George Barițiu
(1861-1892) (Cluj: Dacia, 1970), 57-8. Referring to the
widespread civil disobedience in Alsó-Fehér, the provincial
commander Lieutenant Field Marshal Montenuovo laconically
remarked in November that the prefect, György Pogány,
"scheint nicht mehr der Herr in seinem Hause zu seyn..." but
ignored the question of sending troops. Montenuovo to Miko,
in AS Cluj, Corespondența Mikó Imre 1861/220.
Saxon majorities, including Schassburg, and in these districts the restoration of the old oligarchy aroused far less Romanian objection than in the counties. But none of the other, predominantly Romanian districts elected more than three Romanian senators, and not many more to the assembly. The rural population was excluded from these elections. After a Romanian protest to the Emperor, a Romanian was added to the senate in Hermannstadt as inspector for the wealthy Romanian subdistrict of Săliște, but the local population refused to recognize him. A Romanian delegation to Salmen demanded half of the members of the Konflux, which had never included a single Romanian, for its nation; only four were granted. Mikó and Kemény responded more favorably to Romanian complaints against the Saxon restoration, even annulling the elections in two small, overwhelmingly Romanian districts. For reasons of imperial policy these complaints aroused little effective solicitude in Austrian circles.

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Kemeny and Schmerling

The decisive imperial question was the implementation of the February Patent through the convocation and completion of a Reichsrat enjoying sufficient public confidence

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26. Retegan, "Lupta," 181-5. The statement by Szász, "A megyékhez képest itt lényegesen rosszabb helyzetben voltak a románok." (1487) is partially correct, but misleading. Materially the Romanians were better off, and while it is true that their representation was truly less, so also were the social and political conflicts.
to approve the budget and improve the budget situation. The election of Reichsrat deputies by the diets of the Austrian hereditary provinces presented little difficulty, and the Reichsrat convened on May 1, 1861. Despite the flaws in parliamentary representation and prerogatives of the new body, the day marked a landmark in the history of Austrian constitutionalism. However, the incomplete membership of the Reichsrat was its great flaw. Article ten of the fundamental law accompanying the February Patent stated that only the Gesamtreichsrat (of all the lands) had competence in matters concerning the entire empire, especially the state budget. But only the engerer Reichsrat, or that of Cisleithania, convened on May 1. Thus the Reichsrat could legally fulfill the task which was its raison d’être only if the Hungarian lands could be induced to send their deputies, as well.

Not only the Hungarian, but also the Croatian diet had to be dissolved because of its refusal to send deputies to the Reichsrat. On the day of the passage of the Patent, the Emperor called on Kemény to report on the method of selecting deputies from Transylvania. Kemény requested the

27. The reaction of eyewitnesses and the Vienna press to the Emperor’s speech at the opening ceremony was enthusiastic. The state celebration included a high mass in the cathedral, cannon salutes, military parades and the ringing of all church bells in the city. Malfér, in his introduction to POM V,2, ix-x.

28. The Croats were originally less opposed to the Patent than the Hungarians, but finally refused to send deputies to the Reichsrat after repeated demands for the representation of the Military Frontier at the diet were rejected. Malfér, in POM V,3, xiv.
Gubernium’s opinion a month later, and the latter deliberated on the question on April 15, its first day of operation. The unanimous opinion of the ten councillors in attendance was that since the union law of 1848 was still valid, the plan to convocate the Transylvanian diet should be abandoned. Kemeny could thus claim to the Romanians that while he desired to convocate the diet, he was unable to do so against the opposition of the Gubernium.

In a formal sense, Kemény may have been correct. But beyond the question of legality, the composition of the prospective diet was crucial for the Hungarians. They had nothing to fear from a diet so composed that it would reject the Patent and insist on the union. Franz Joseph demanded that the electors include former serfs. In rejecting the proposals of the Gyulafehérvár conference in his Vortrag of March 4, Kemény proposed an electoral law that would preserve aristocratic hegemony. After a bitter debate in the Council of Ministers, Franz Joseph approved this proposal on March 24, and Kemény reported the decision to the

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29. The letters of Franz Joseph and of Kemeny and the opinion of the Gubernium are in Sándor, 135-9, 144-5, and MOL, D228 1861/153, 161.


31. Electors would be those entitled to vote by the law of 1791 (landed nobility in the noble counties and Szekler districts) plus 5070 of the emancipated serfs, based on a minimum tax assessment of 8 fl., most of the latter Romanians. Kemény tendentiously emphasized this Romanian majority, neglecting to mention the other electors, who were mostly Hungarians, or draw a total picture. Redlich II, 241-5; POM V,1, 164.
Gubernium two days later. By its decision of June 1 the Gubernium rejected this measure as well, stating that the law of 1791 cited by Kemeny was superceded by that of 1848. The later law provided for village representatives as well as a tax assessment category which would increase the total electorate in the noble counties and Szekler districts by 3600, but still leave a noble majority in the electorate.

The traditional Hungarian political class which would dominate the electorate was clearly opposed to the Patent and the Reichsrat. Schmerling and his allies therefore would not accept such an electoral law.

The report of Kemeny of March 4 had been lithographed for examination by the Council of Ministers. In the debate on March 14, all non-Hungarian members opposed Kemeny's proposal. These ministers demanded that Romanian representation be not merely piecemeal, but in a proportion much closer to their share of the Transylvanian population. The old constitution and electoral laws, if they prevented this, must be modified. However, after the restricted conference of March 21 the Emperor accepted Kemeny's proposal.

32. POM V, 1, 165; Sándor, 144-5.
33. Sándor, 146-51.
34. Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 260-1. A comparison of Kemeny's 5070 and 15,000 electors in the tax category cited by the Gubernium on October 3 (Sándor, 177) suggests-- it is not explicitly stated-- that two-thirds of those assessed at 8 fl. were landed noblemen. In the electorate of 110,000 in 1868 according to the 1848 law, two-thirds were noblemen. The third estate, the former serfs, constituted only 10.6%.
35. Rainer chaired the Council of Ministers on March
The Emperor may have been swayed by Szécsen's argument against the strategy of the Austrians: an electoral law introduced in absolutist fashion would only increase the Hungarian opposition, and it was dangerous and inadvisable to subvert the social structure through a radical electoral reform.

As the Transylvanian counties organized and issued their oppositional declarations, Schmerling conceded that it might be three months before the Transylvanian diet could convene. He therefore argued for the direct election of deputies to the Reichsrat in circumvention of the diet, but was defeated. The Hungarian ministers clearly sought to postpone the diet, whether from opposition to its convocation or in the hope that the political climate would later be more favorable to its success. On June 5 Szécsen defended the delay in the convocation of the diet on the

14, and seven ministers plus Lichtenfels opposed the proposal POM V,1, 148-54); only five were present (Rainer, Schmerling, Mecséry, Kemény, and Szécsen) at the decisive conference on March 21, chaired by the Emperor (Ibid., 196-9).

36. "Allein man müsse sich hüten, von Regierungs wegen die sozialen Verhältnisse umstürzen und aus übelverstandener Humanität die grosse Masse der Ungebildeten über die Gebildeten stellen zu wollen. Kemény added: "...wenn die Romanen auf dem Landtage die Majoritat erhielten, dies so viel hiesse, als das ganze Land der Willkür der zwei romanischen Bischöfe preiszugeben, welche bekanntlich einen unbeschränkten Einfluss auf die Bevölkerung üben." Redlich II, 245; POM, V,1, 197. This exaggeration reflected a common Hungarian perception.

37. The Council of Ministers session of April 26: Redlich II, 245-7; POM V,1, 300-3.

38. Redlich (II, 245) alleges the former, but there is more evidence for this in the case of Mikó than of Kemény. The Chancellor was apparently earnest in his commitment to the Emperor's expressed policy.
grounds that it would be divisive to call it while the Hungarian diet was in session. Kemény stated that the convocation required an imperial command. Upon the request of the Council of Ministers, Franz Joseph issued this command on July 29, calling for a report by August 10.

The mutual desire of the non-Hungarian ministers and of the Romanians for an increase in the representation of the latter made possible a sort of collaboration between them. At the beginning of June, the Romanian Permanent Committee empowered a deputation of three to represent the national interest at the court. Consequently Iacob Bologa, Ilie Măcelariu and Ioan Rațiu departed for Vienna on June 15. It is important not to exaggerate the influence which they exercised on events. Still, beginning with their imperial audience on July 1 they met with several of the German ministers and received encouraging responses to their specific proposals concerning the diet. Of greatest consequence was Schmerling’s decision, at the urging of the deputation, to confer with the Romanian Chancellery councillor Vasile Ladislau Pop. Schmerling assured

39. POM V,2, 104.
40. Ibid., 245-7, 259.
41. "Imprejurările creează astfel condițiile unei colaborări, cu caracter inegal și instabil, care va dura pînă în 1865, cînd negocierile dualiste, al căror pericol a existat în tot acest timp, devin publice."-- Retegan, 58.
42. Josan, "Documente inedite privind lupta națională a românilor din Transilvania în anul 1861," Apulum 17 (1979), 542.
43. Letters of July 1 to 30, in Corespondența Rațiu-Barițiu, 50-71; on this deputation see also Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 125-8.
Pop that the electoral law would have to be broadened and the number of Romanian voters increased.

When the Chancellery ratified Kemeny's plan for the diet on August 6, 1861, Pop dissented and presented a separate opinion. Consequently Kemeny's presentation to the Council of Ministers on August 24 included both proposals, which were debated on that day and again on September 9. The three principal disputed points were the place of convocation, the articles to be submitted for passage by the diet, and the electoral law. Kemeny proposed Kolozsvár as the site of the diet, and Pop, Hermannstadt. All German ministers preferred the Saxon Hermannstadt over Kolozsvár, where they claimed the Saxon and Romanian deputies would be terrorized. Schmerling and his allies also supported Pop's proposal of articles establishing the Romanians' legal equality and their status as a fourth constitutional nation (Inartikulierung), demanded already at Blaj in 1848 and at the Romanian conference in January. The electoral proposals agreed that the noble electorate should be supple-

44. Letters of July 18 and July 30, in Ibid., 65-6, 69-70. Little is known about the activity of the deputation in August, but apparently at least two of them remained in Vienna—Josan, 544. Szász (1490) credits the delegation with convincing Schmerling of the need to broaden the electoral law.

45. POM V,2, 360-4; MOL D228, 1861/322, 323.

46. The question of Inartikulierung was primarily a symbolic one, but the Transylvanian Romanians attached great importance to it. The Hungarians insisted that the declaration of civil equality in 1848 made the distinction of feudal nations irrelevant. The former practice of curial vote (vote by feudal nations) was at any rate abandoned in the statutes of the 1863 diet.
mented by one determined by tax assessment. Kemény’s minimum assessment of 8 fl. would exclude the head tax of 5 fl., and that of Pop would include it. After Schmerling, Mécésery and Rechberg arranged a group meeting with the Emperor, he accepted Pop’s proposal on September 11. A compromise was reached on the site of the diet, Mécésery suggesting Gyulafehérvar for this purpose. The Emperor’s acceptance of the proposal of Pop made the position of Kemény untenable, and he resigned on September 19.

The convocation of the diet still had to overcome the opposition of the Gubernium. Meeting in special session on October 3, the Gubernium approved a long address to the Emperor, citing many Transylvanian laws to demonstrate the

47. Franz Joseph had excluded the head tax in his Instruction of March 24 (Sándor, 145), but Lichtenfels argued that this was not a formal law and that the Emperor had later expressed the desire to modify it. POM V,2, 363-4.

48. According to the Romanian Chancellery Konzipist Puşcariu, the Emperor originally decided in favor of Kemény’s proposal, but then reversed himself. The protocol of the Council of Ministers indicate the contrary, however. -- Puşcariu, 57; Retegan, 58-9. Both writers indicate that the proposal of Gyulafehérvar came from Pop, but were apparently unaware of the private audience and Mécésery’s compromise proposal; see POM V,2, footnote p. 364. Retegan argues that Romanian contemporaries exaggerated the importance of Pop’s proposal. But from a procedural standpoint it was crucial.

49. Puşcariu, 57-8. Most Romanians denounced Kemény’s policies as anti-Romanian. Puşcariu insists he was forced out of office as the victim of Schmerling’s conflict with the Hungarian extremists, had good intentions toward the Romanians and was preferable to those who succeeded him in 1865.

50. The edict of convocation for November 4 was sent to the Gubernium on September 14; the text is in Sándor, 162-65.
illegality of the convocation and of the electoral law. Comparing the electoral law to that approved earlier, the address pointed out that the electorate would thereby increase more than ten times, to 160,000. The responsible elements of society would be fair game for "the ignorant, crude masses easily misled by demagogues and agitators."

This was an exaggeration, since the persons granted the vote by the new law were less than one-fourth of the adult male population. The three conservative Romanian councillors Aldulian, Dunca, and Lazăr issued a separate opinion agreeing with the constitutional stance of the majority, but urging that preparations be made for the diet anyway because it had been commanded. The sole Saxon councillor, Konrad Schmidt, gave a third opinion which was in complete agreement with the edict of convocation.

The defiant statement by the Gubernium must have left

51. On Bishop Haynald's exceptional participation in this session, see Chapter VI. The address of the Gubernium is in Sandor, 165-80.

52. "...ez által a volt jogosultak és egyéb érdekeknek a helyes monarchiai országlási elvek szerint el nem mellőzhető és meg nem semisíthető jogos befolyása a bujtogatók és izgatók által a leg könnyebben félrevezethető értetlen nyers tömegnek lenne predául kitéve." Sandor, 177-8.

53. According to various calculations in 1862 and 1863, the electorate in 1863 was between 70,563 and 97,915. The minimum tax assessment applied to noblemen as well. MOL D228, 1862/206, 414; 1863/828; Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 63, 257.

54. Sandor, 180-3. The Romanian separate vote was a weak compromise that satisfied no one; it aroused doubts at the court concerning the loyalty of the Romanians, and the Romanian deputation insisted repeatedly that it did not represent the views of the Romanian leadership and public opinion.-- Josan, 559-61.

the court temporarily undecided on what to do. The address only came before the Council of Ministers on October 19. In the meantime the Romanian Permanent Committee had decided on October 2 to send a new deputation to Vienna, led by Şuluţiu. It arrived on October 8, conferred frequently with the Romanians holding high office there, and regularly visited the Emperor and high officials until its departure from Vienna at the end of November.

Nationalist animosities reached a new height in Alsó-Fehér county. Romanian communities rejected the officials elected by the county congregations of September 16-17 and October 17, who for their part refused to collect taxes. Prefect Pogany and Governor Mikó appealed to Montenuovo for troops to restore order, but the latter refused. The alleged Romanian "agitators" were loyal subjects of the imperial government, wrote Montenuovo, while the congregation majorities had "openly expressed their sympathy for Garibaldi and consorts." He added, ironically, that troops were unavailable because they were employed elsewhere in tax execution. Many of the leaders of the Romanian civil disobedience were clergymen, and local Hungarian officials alleged they were receiving orders from the Archeepiscopal

56. POM V, 2, 446-52.
57. Puşcariu kept the official protocol of the deputation's activities; it is preserved in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM 709/1861, and published in Josan, 555-71.
Chancellery in Blaj. The charge may have been an attempt to undermine the prestige of Șuluțiu at a time when he was in Vienna, lobbying the court on behalf of the Romanians.

The first fruit of this lobbying was the well-informed, unfavorable reception given to the Gubernium address when it came before the Council of Ministers. The debate in the Council of Ministers was a virtual repeat of those of the previous month. The interim director of the Chancellery, Dániel Kabós, presented the address of the Gubernium, which he supported in many respects, and a dissenting opinion by Pop, which he attacked, and called for a delay of the diet until December 2. All ministers, including the Hungarians, rejected Kabós’ report; he was not invited back when the debate was resumed twelve days later, presided over by the Emperor. Schmerling gave the introductory report at this session, arguing that new leadership was necessary in the Chancellery and Gubernium before the diet could be convoked with a reasonable chance of success. The centralist former Minister of Justice Count Ferenc Nádasdy became the

59. Pogány to Mikó, October 30, in MOL, F263 1861/2585.
60. The comportment of the Gubernium would have exasperated the ministers in any case, but the information provided by the deputation helped the ministers to make up their minds on a matter not within their immediate expertise.
62. Franz Joseph decided on the spot that the convocation must be delayed until the necessary personnel changes and preparations had been made. Consequently the convocation only ensued in 1863.
new Chancellor, was confirmed in office on November 7 and raised to the rank of voting minister. After Mikó declared his reluctance to convocate the diet, Nádasdy recommended his dismissal. This was approved by the Council of Ministers on November 17, and enacted a week later. The new Governor, Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Ludwig Polliot-Crenneville, was appointed on November 26.

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The Transylvanian Provisorium

As in Hungary, the Provisorium replaced the conservative leaders in the Chancellery and provincial administration with an absolutist official and a soldier. Throughout the decade of absolutism Nádasdy served in high judicial posts in Hungary and in Vienna. Crenneville had an exclusively military training. He was considerably less independent in personality than Nádasdy, but with time he

63. POM V,3, 28-31. Schmerling remarked sharply: "Belangend den Grafen Mikó so sei es wohl unmöglich, mit einem solchen Gouverneur weiter zu regieren, der sich nicht bequemen will, in die Tendenzen der Regierung einzugehen, weshalb es dringend notwendig sei, ihm durch eine andere vertrauenswürdige Persönlichkeit zu ersetzen."--Ibid., 30. Mikó for his part was correct in stating that Hungarian opinion and the county administration would preclude a workable diet, and that Gyulafehérvár lacked the necessary facilities. Mikó's declaration is in Redlich II, 254-5.

64. POM V,3, session of November 22, 1861, pp. 43-44. To prepare for the diet Nádasdy proposed to place the administration of the land "in kräftige Hände," offering the post "einstweilen einem hohen Militär." He and Degenfeld settled on Crenneville, who was the brother of the Emperor's court adjutant, of French origin but possessing estates in Hungary and a good facility in Hungarian.

65. Szász, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdélyben," 1491. He states that compatriots considered him "the most hated Hungarian."
became involved in sterile jurisdictional struggles with Montenuovo and, beginning in 1865, with Nádasdy.

The disunity over Hungarian questions in the Council of Ministers also reemerged concerning Transylvania. After Nádasdy's report of November 17, Forgách warned against incautious action in Transylvania because this would undermine the officials' prestige in Hungary. He opposed Nádasdy's proposals for judicial reform, and he was absent when the administrative reforms were discussed two weeks later. As a minister, Nádasdy was clearly in a much stronger position than Kemény had been, and would prove to be Schmerling's strongest and most faithful ally in the Council of Ministers after Lichtenfels.

The essence of the Provisorium, as in Hungary, was the dissolution of the constitutional county assemblies where they had been successfully established in 1861. Nádasdy requested that the new administration strictly observe

66. Klima 92-5; Kutschera 308-9. The rivalry with Montenuovo was basically personal in nature and owing to the fact they were military men of identical rank, and not due to procedural confusion as Szász (1491) implies.

67. POM V, 3, 31. Plener thereupon remarked: "Übrigens wahrnehe er hieraus mit tiefem Bedauern, dass jene Einstimmigkeit und Einigkeit im Ministerrate auf diese Art nicht vorhanden sei, wie er sie nun erzielt sich gedacht habe."

68. Ibid., session of November 22 (45, 47); session of December 7 (94).

69. Redlich calls Lichtenfels "während der ganzen Dauer der Schmerlingschen Regierung... die stärkste Stütze des Staatsministers und seiner Politik" (II, 306), and Nádasdy "der getreue Knappe des Staatsministers... der womöglich noch zentralistischer dachte als sein Chef." (319) Chef should be understood, of course, in the sense of faction leader rather than administrative superior.
imperial regulations: it should not hinder the payment of taxes, and it should assist in military recruitment, uphold the Provisional Instruction of March 1861, and recognize the February Patent and take measures to facilitate the election of deputies to the Reichsrat. Dissolving the illegally constituted assemblies, Nádasdy proposed a new statute for the counties, approved by Franz Joseph on November 27 and definitively promulgated on December 12, 1861.

The new statute contained elements of the Provisional Instruction of March, 1861, liberal elements from the February Patent, and also openly absolutistic ones. Permanent commissions in the counties and districts would elect the local officials as they had in the past. Unlike the Instruction of March, 1861, the new statute prescribed membership in the commissions according to the principle of economic Interessenvertretung which Schmerling had established for the Reichsrat statute and the Diets in the hereditary provinces. Half the commission members would be elected by the large landowners, one-third to half would be elected by appointed representatives of the villages, and the remainder by the local chambers of commerce. Constitu-

70. POM V,3 (November 17), 29.
71. The debate on November 25 (Ibid., V,3, 61-4) concerned the general principles underlying the statute; the Chancellery decree of November 28 (1861/3895) is reproduced in Sándor, 219-22. On December 7 the Council of Ministers quickly approved the proposed electoral statute (POM, V,3, 94-6; the ensuing Chancellery decree of December 16 (1861/4095) and excerpts from the definitive regulation are in Sándor, 230-4. The complete county statute and electoral statute are in Sammlung der wichtigsten Staatsacten II, 98-122, and in the printed original in MOL D228 1862/258.
tional, military and financial matters, and instructions to
the Deputies to the diet, were excluded from the competence
of the commissions, and the prefects given nearly absolute
powers.

Even Hungarians in the opposition had to admit that the
Transylvanian Provisorium was much more moderate than that
in Hungary. No military courts were introduced, nor were
the police powers of the governor greatly increased.

With an eye toward the eventual success of the diet, one
hoped to limit Hungarian alienation to a necessary minimum.
The Hungarian opposition had in fact been less extreme than
in Hungary. Urmössy cited three reasons for the
increasing moderation of the Hungarian opposition at the end
of 1861: hope for support from the emigration faded as its
dependence on Cuza, who himself desired Transylvania, in-
creased; the course of the Hungarian diet prompted
Transylvanian Hungarians, as well, to see Deak as their
leader; and the threat posed by Romanian aspirations had a
sobering effect. In sum, "fear for one's nationality made
abhorrent the idea of revolution."

The response of the opposition to the Provisorium,

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72. Albert Berzeviczy, Az absolutizmus kora
Magyarországon III, 391.
73. Malfér, "Einleitung," in POM V,3, xlvii. Schmerling
argued on November 25 that the electoral statute "den Beweis
liefern wird, dass man nicht gesonnen ist, in Siebenbürgen,
wo eine so einstimmige Renitenz wie in Ungarn nicht
eingetreten ist, alles konstitutionelle Leben zu
suspendieren." POM V,3, 63.
74. "A nemzetiséget való féltés perhorreskálta a forra-
after nearly a year of defiant manifestoes and a final protest by the Gubernium on December 17, was moderate. The Hungarian prefects decided at a meeting in Kolozsvár in December to resign from their offices with the exception of Pogany, since the danger entailed by surrendering the leadership of Alsó-Fehér to a Romanian was considered unacceptable. About a third of the Gubernium councillors resigned or retired, and were replaced by other Hungarians, Romanians, and Saxons. Pop became one of the Vice Presidents of the Gubernium, but the Hungarians retained a majority of voting councillors. Most Hungarian prefects and county officials resigned in January, while the Romanians remained in office. To assist the recruitment of replacements, Crennerville secured an increase in the prefects' salaries. Two of the new prefects were Romanians, the county official Vasile Buteanu and the former Chancellery official Ioan Puşcariu. Outside of the Szekler region and Fundus Regius, six of the ten prefects were now Romanians. The other replacements for the aristocratic prefects of 1861 were veterans of the absolutist administration of the 1850s and people of lesser birth:

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75. The Gubernium resolution 1861/13,017, denouncing the Provisorium, is published in Sándor, 223-29.
76. Before the dismissal of Haynald (who rarely attended the Gubernium) in 1863, the division of Vice Presidents and councillors was ten Hungarians, five Romanians, and four Saxons. Tisztí névtár 1864, 17. Not all councillors were Referents, while some Referents were secretaries or lower functionaries. Trocsányi, 649-50.
77. POM V,3 (January 10, 1862), 186-7.
Table 5: Transylvanian Prefects Outside the Fundus Regius in the Provisorium

* carryover from 1861

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian counties</th>
<th>főispán/administrator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alsó-Fehér</td>
<td>*György Pogány</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belso-Szolnok</td>
<td>Daniel Pataki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboka</td>
<td>Vasile Buteanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felso-Fehér</td>
<td>*Augustin Láday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunyad</td>
<td>*Baron Ferenc Nopcsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolozs</td>
<td>Gusztáv Groisz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Küküllő</td>
<td>Ioan Pușcariu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torda</td>
<td>István Züllich</td>
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<tr>
<th>Romanian districts</th>
<th>fokapitany/administrator</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Făgăras</td>
<td>*Ioan Lemeni-Bran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Násáud</td>
<td>*Alexandru Bohátel</td>
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<tr>
<th>Szekler districts</th>
<th>fokiralybyiro/administrator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnnyos</td>
<td>József Dindár</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csík</td>
<td>Ádám Szabó</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Háromszék</td>
<td>Imre Dániel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maros</td>
<td>Albert Horváth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udvarhely</td>
<td>Gusztáv Lukacs (78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the first Romanian chief of a Saxon district was appointed, Ilie Mácelariu in Reussmarkt.

Many of the appointees were Romanians and Germans, but it is incorrect to argue, as did some Hungarian contemporaries, that nearly all the resigned officials were replaced by non-Hungarians, or even that Romanians dominated the Transylvanian administration under the Provisorium.

The property provisions in the county statute assured that Hungarians retained a comfortable majority in most county commissions, even if the prefect was a Romanian, and they put aside ideology to assure that their interests were

78. Prefects who had not been confirmed in office by the district assembly were officially known as administrators.

79. Úrmössy, II, 16; [Domokos Teleki], Siebenbürger und die österreichische Regierung in den letzten vier Jahren (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1865), 67-71.
protected. Many Hungarians were found to replace the officials who resigned. The number of Romanian civil servants in Transylvania doubled between 1860 and 1863, but still only numbered 300, or one-ninth of the total, in the latter year.

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Criticism of the Provisorium

Romanians made important gains at all levels of the administration, but less than they had hoped for in the fall while lobbying the court for the appointment of a Romanian as Chancellor or Governor. The Romanians' petition for the dismissal of Pogány, their greatest nemesis, was also disregarded. The conventional objection to the appointment of Romanians, the shortage of suitable individuals, remained valid. "Suitable" should be understood not only in terms of education and training, but also property and social outlook. The Saxons were more satisfactory in all these respects, and their loyalty to the court was unquestioned. There was no Provisorium in the Fundus Regius. The Saxons enjoyed an accretion of power during the

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80. Mester, 132.
82. Josan 546, 552; Retegan, op. cit., 54. The only Romanian whom the Council of Ministers considered for Chancellor on October 29 was Baron Nopcsa, who was not on the deputation's list. POM V, 2, 465.
83. The Romanians of Also-Fehér petitioned the Emperor for the dismissal of Pogány on September 9, 1861. The document was forwarded to Kemény the next day, who requested a report from Mikó. MOL D228 1861/348. Șuluțiu repeated the request in a letter to Nádasdy on January 1, 1862. Ibid., 1862/70.
provisorium which, relative to their percentage of the popu-
lation, was even greater than that of the Romanians.

The Schmerling years marked the high point of Saxon influence in Vienna. The number of Saxon councillors in the Gubernium and Chancellery increased, to four of nineteen in the former and two of five in the latter. Hungarian Chancellery councillors were thus in the minority for the first time. Baron Franz von Reichenstein, one of the new councillors, became Nádasdy's closest associate in the Chancellery and his deputy when he fell ill in the fall of 1863.

Possibly of equal importance for court politics was the appointment of a Saxon to head the imperial Press Management Bureau (Press-Leitungs-Büro). This body was under the authority of Mecséry from the time of its establishment in 1860, but then from May, 1861 under that of Schmerling. The Press Director, Count Eugen Drotlef von Friedenfels, supervised domestic and foreign press coverage and paid honoraria to journalist for articles favorable to the regime. According to his job description, he took orders from Schmerling, but was also entitled to operate "independently

84. Sashegyi, 392-3. Reichenstein's extensive correspondence with Nádasdy and Transylvanian politicians in 1863-64, preserved in Vienna, indicates he played a crucial role in the period. According to Szász (1491), some (unidentified) contemporaries viewed Reichenstein as "the evil spirit of the Chancellery."

85. Ernst Weisenfeld, Die Geschichte der politischen Publizistik bei den Siebenbürgern Sachsen (Limburg an der Lahn: Limburger Vereinsdruckerei, 1938), 73; POM V, 1, 82.
and on his own initiative." At the request of Schmerling, in March, 1862 the annual budget of the Press Bureau was quadrupled to 350,000 fl., most of this to be used for influencing domestic journals. Press questions frequently arose in the Council of Ministers, with Rechberg complaining about liberal attacks on the conservatives.

The Saxon municipalities, allied with the German language press, sought to prod the centralist forces to a more energetic revision of the Transylvanian constitution in 1862. Three grievances gave rise to particularly sharp criticism of the moderate Provisorium regime in the Saxon and Viennese press: the retention of Haynald in the Gubernium despite his public speeches against the Diploma and Patent, the Gubernium's unfavorable treatment of an address by the Saxon Konflux of March, 1862 to the Emperor, and the continued domination of the counties by the landed aristocracy under the new statute. Mecséry and Nadasdy ordered an investigation of the authors of the articles, but no measures were taken against them.

The address by the Konflux prompted a highly signifi-

86. Weisenfeld, 73. Friedenfels also became a council­lor in the Transylvanian Court Chancellery, replacing the retiring Count Salmen, in 1863.
87. POM V, 3, 303-4. At the end of 1862, Schmerling established a government press agency, the General­Korrespondenz aus Österreich, and recommended it for his colleagues' "gütige[n] Unterstützung und möglichst häufige[n] Benützung." Circular letter to Nádasdy, in MOL D228 1862/617.
88. Redlich II, 760-3.
89. MOL D228 1862/152, 208, 258, 275 (April through July, 1862). Chapter VI will devote special attention to Bishop Haynald.
cant debate, with the Saxons, not the Romanians, taking the lead in the struggle to modify the Provisorium. At the end of its session in November and December, 1861, the Konflux elected a committee of seven to prepare a bill concerning national equality in Transylvania. The committee report declared Transylvania an integral part of the empire and hence duty bound to send deputies to the Reichsrat. The rights of the Romanians would be guaranteed by the creation of a Romanian district, partly from the Fundus Regius but primarily from the counties, in addition to Hungarian, Szekler, and Saxon districts. The assembly accepted the report in February, and formulated it as an address to the Emperor on March 29, 1862. The address ended with the declaration that the proposals were made in consciousness of the Saxons’ ancestral mission of service ad retinendam coronam.

The proposal to reorganize the districts of Transylvania was highly controversial. The Hungarian Kolozsvári Közlöny, the Romanian press, and the minority vote of Lassel in the Konflux all rightly objected that the distribution of population in Transylvania precluded equitable ethnic boundaries. The Gubernium refused to forward

90. Before the convocation of the Konflux on November 25, Salmen was replaced as Comes by the more popular and energetic Schmidt, and promoted to the Chancellery.

91. The address, and the dissenting opinion by the deputy of Kronstadt, August Lassel, supporting the union with Hungary, are in Sándor, 243-61.

92. Urmossy II, 21-9; Retegan, "Interferențe politice româno-sâsești în perioada guvernării liberale (1860-1867)", in Studii de istorie a naționalităților conlocuitoare din România și a

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the address to the Emperor, but after a storm of protest by
the German press and the intervention of Schmerling the
Gubernium changed its position. On May 17 the Konflux
elected a deputation to lobby for its proposal at the court.
In June the delegation was celebrated with great fanfare by
the Viennese press, by Schmerling and his allies, and by the
German deputies in the Reichsrat. The Emperor approved
the request for a special Saxon court of appeals in
Hermannstadt and for salary increases for officials, but
gave no response to the remainder of the address. This
would come only after several more months of political
maneuvering.

Because of its tactical alliance with the Saxons the
Romanian movement in the Fundus Regius exercised moderation
in its calls for greater representation. This rationale was

93. The Viennese Ost-Deutsche Post of May 15 attributed
the retreat of the Gubernium to the power of the press,
adding: "Warum-- wenn es erlaubt ist, zu fragen-- wird von
der ungeheuren moralischen Macht [of the press] über die
reaktionären Pygmaen so gar kein Gebrauch gemacht, da doch
der Erfolg ein so leichter und sicherer ist?" This certain­
ly exaggerates the power of the press, but Nádasdy sent a
copy of the article to Crenneville. MOL D228 1862/208.

94. Friedrich Teutsch, Geschichte der Siebenbürger
Sachsen für das Sächsische Volk vol. 3 (Hermannstadt: W.
Krafft, 1910), 415-17.

95. Urmóssy mistakenly wrote that the Romanian Chancel­
Ier councilor Dimitrie Moldovan was "totally won over to
the Saxon cause." Moldovan and the two Hungarian council­
lors defeated a motion by the two Saxon councillors in June
that the Emperor should reply to the Saxons' legislative
proposals. Yet even the more general response adopted by
the majority on June 20 was rejected by the Emperor.
Urmóssy II, 38.
not operative in the counties, where the Hungarian-Romanian conflict continued despite the Provisorium and the delay in convening the county commissions until September, 1862. Peasant unrest led to vandalism of landlords’ forests in the second half of 1862, and the incidents continued for the next few years. Hungarian landowners and the Gubernium equally condemned such acts, but the position of the Gubernium was somewhat ambiguous since it was aware of the causes of the discontent and the involvement of many politically reliable Romanian parish priests. Thus the Gubernium appealed to the bishops to repudiate vandalism, but later rejected harsh police measures proposed by the landowners.

The rural unrest was connected in the mind of the aristocracy with the specter of "Dacoromanism". Many attributed the expropriation of land by rebellious peasants to Papiu-Ilarian’s allegation in his book that Transylvania was "a Romanian land," or ought to belong to the Romanians. It must at least be granted that the popular book and Romanian successes in the Principalities strengthened Romanian independence and militance. The formal unification of the Romanian Principalities in early 1862


97. The Gubernium’s letter to the bishops is in MOL F263 1861/3008 (December 18, 1861); concerning the police measures, see Kovács, Desfiintarea relațiilor feudale în Transilvania 94-5.

98. Ürmössy II, 40; Curticăeanu, 431.
was celebrated by the Romanian press, and the Romanians of Kronstadt sent a congratulatory delegation to Prince Cuza. The Principalities provided subsidies for Transylvanian Romanian education during these years.

Agents of the Hungarian emigration in the Principalities in 1862 reported that Dacoromanian sentiments were stronger, and readiness to collaborate with the Hungarians considerably less, than two years earlier. In view of this and the decreasing likelihood of a renewed Franco-Italian offensive, the emigre leaders sought new ways of overcoming Romanian hostility to their movement. In April, 1862 Klapka and Kossuth formulated a plan for a Danubian Confederation with a migrating central parliament as the goal of an Hungarian-Romanian-Croatian-Serbian revolutionary alliance. What was crucial for Hungarians and Romanians: Transylvania would constitute one of the autonomous constituent states in the confederation, in personal union with Hungary, if this were accepted by a plebiscite. Through a misunderstanding, the plan appeared in the Italian press on May 18, 1862. The publication was disastrous for the popularity of the emigres among Hungarians at home, a fact which Kossuth recognized immediately. The censors in Hungary recognized this also, and allowed publication and extensive criticism of the plan in the Hungarian press.

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beginning on June 6. To submit the Transylvanian union to a plebiscite was, in the eyes of the Hungarian nationalists, unforgivable. One radical wrote in his diary that "proclamations of this sort drive people to [the Austro-Hungarian] compromise... if I must enter a Reichsrat, then I'd rather go to the Germans in Vienna than to the Serbs in Belgrade." Klapka remarked prophetically:

If they [the Hungarians at home] are incapable of any concessions to the nationalities, then they shouldn't dream of independence, but come to an agreement with the Austrians. Under the paternal protection of the Habsburgs they can dispense with any concern for the Serbs and Romanians.

The Dualist system would indeed strengthen the hand of the Hungarians vis a vis the nationalities.

This fiasco, and dissension in the emigre leadership decisively lessened the threat of the radicals to the regime. In Transylvania, the surrender of Berzenczey to the Austrian authorities in June was demoralizing. A pro-Italian demonstration at the Reformed school in Fogaras in July was an isolated incident.

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102. Lukács, 202-23; the quotation is from Zoltán Szász, "Donaukonföderation oder Donaumonarchie. Eine Alternative zur ungarischen Politik im 19. Jahrhundert," in Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Anzeiger 116, number 15 (1979), 22-35. The Hungarian paper that published the plan was the Sürgöny of Pest, organ of the Old Conservatives. Because only Kossuth's name appeared on the text, the reputation in Hungary of coauthor Klapka suffered relatively little damage; Szász (1488-9) mistakenly assigns sole authorship to Kossuth.

103. Cited by Szász, 1472-3.

104. Lukács, 223-33; Urmössy II, 51-2.

105. The local commandant reported to Montenuovo on July 9 that the students waved Hungarian flags and banners inscribed "Viva i bravi fratelli della Lombardia" on the
In June and July Governor Crenneville conducted a tour of inspection in Transylvania. He reported that conditions were favorable for the convocation of the county commissions according to the statute of December, 1861. The new prefects had appointed their officials at the beginning of 1862. To prepare for the diet, Nádasdy believed they would need to demonstrate their ability to preside over the elected commissions and thereby secure a modicum of popular legitimacy for the appointed officials. The county commissions convened on September 25, 1862, and generally achieved this goal. Many commissions demanded a restoration of full legality, and at times the Romanians joined the Hungarian majority in opposition. This was a bearable result because the declarations were far more loyal and less radical than those issued by the counties in 1861. Even the oppositional addresses contained a different tone, calling for "the convocation of our lawful diet" (ambiguously, but probably that of Hungary) but also the "modification of the laws of 1848 [a reference to the union or the electoral law?] to the satisfaction of the various nationalities" and even agrarian legislation.

anniversary of the Austrian defeat in 1859. MOL D228 1862/299. The school was in the Hungarian-ruled market town of this name, not under the Romanian district administration.

106. MOL D228 1862/201, 233, 272, 277. Crenneville left Pop in charge of the Gubernium in his absence.

107. In his reply to Crenneville's seventy-page report on the commissions, Nádasdy expressed satisfaction that, "mit alleiniger Ausnahme des Thorda'er Komitatas, die Haltung der Beamten der Erwartung der Regierung entsprach"-- Nádasdy to Crenneville, October 20, in MOL D228 1862/507.

108. Address to the throne of Belső-Szolnok county (the
Archduke Rainer asked Nádasdy to report on the Saxon and Romanian petitions concerning the diet in the Council of Ministers on October 10. The report on the Romanian petition was very general, and occasioned little debate. Concerning the Saxons, the address of March 29 and the Chancellery's opinion of June 20 were finally presented formally to the Council of Ministers. They received a positive reception. The imperial decree of October 13 praised the constitutional principles expressed in the Saxon address, and ordered that measures be taken for the conviction of the diet as soon as possible.

Nádasdy submitted his proposals concerning the diet, including the electoral law that had been proposed by Vasile Pop and approved in September, 1861, and they passed on November 2, 1862. Later in the same month the Saxon and Romanian leaders were informed that preparations for the diet had begun. In December the Chancellery began to receive the electoral tables, calculated from the tax first commission to be convened), September 26, in Sandor, 268-74. Though the address insisted on the validity of the union and hence implied that only the Hungarian diet was a legal one, the the formulation was in other respects conciliatory. Úrmossy's portrayal of the commissions' sessions is misleading, particularly his statement that Nádasdy was confused and disappointed by the results. Úrmössy II, 92-103.

109. HHSA. Kabinettskanzlei 1862/3225= Council of Ministers 1862/1073. Nádasdy noted that the State Council had assisted him in the preparation of the decree. Rechberg, Forgáč and Esterházy demanded that the Emperor's name not be too closely associated with the Patent, diet and Reichsrat, but were only partially successful.
110. MOL D228 1862/544.
111. Úrmossy II, 65-6.
The Hungarian ministers and members of the Gubernium offered determined opposition to the execution of Nádasdy's plans. Romanian leaders petitioned on December 2 for permission to hold a national conference, like that held in 1861, in preparation for the diet. Both they and Nádasdy desired such a conference in order to assure political discipline and unity. The Gubernium resisted such permission, arguing that it would encourage the Hungarians to demand a similar conference and strengthen Daco-Romanian tendencies. The Council of Ministers and Emperor only conceded the holding of the conference in February, 1863.

The project of reform for Hungary of Apponyi and Forgách came before the Council of Ministers on March 11 and provoked more debate concerning the execution of the February Patent. Nádasdy declared that "if this program is accepted, all my efforts will have been in vain, for if the Transylvanians learn that the constitutional question is still undecided, then all that has been achieved will be destroyed." Schmerling supported him fully. Despite the recent initiatives concerning Transylvania, the Emperor apparently remained undecided about the diet. Concurring with the Hungarian ministers and Rechberg, he declared that

112. MOL D228 1862/615ff.
113. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 135.
Crenneville reported that the Szeklers in fact requested permission to hold a national conference of their own, but it was denied. Crenneville to Nádasdy, January 11, 1863, in MOL F264 1863/43.
114. Redlich II, 314; HHSA KZ 924.
the international situation was too dangerous to risk poisoning public opinion in Hungary by taking "drastic measures." Schmerling replied to Rechberg: "In the long run it is untenable to rule absolutely in one part of the empire and constitutionally in the other."— meaning that the Patent must finally be implemented ("durchgesetzt") in Transleithania. Faced with the threatened resignation of Schmerling and Nádasdy, the Emperor dropped the reform plan and on March 21 confirmed his approval of Nádasdy's proposal of November 2 concerning the diet.

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The Showdown in Transylvania

The new year brought intensified political activity in Transylvania. On January 14 the Saxon Konflux reconvened in Hermannstadt. The assembly approved six laws passed by the Reichsrat in 1862, subject to imperial sanction, in order that they might be applied in the Fundus Regius. As in the case of the previous year's assembly, Hungarian public opinion and the deputies from Kronstadt objected to this expansion of the legislative prerogatives of the Nationsuniversität. A further dissent from the generally progovernment tone of the assembly was the appeal by

115. Session of March 18: Redlich II, 317-21; HHSA KZ 1074.
116. On March 21 Nádasdy instructed the Chancellery to recommence its preparations for the diet, interrupted during the Council of Ministers debate, "mit thunlichster Beschleunigung." MOL D228 1862/544.
117. The protest declaration of March 31 by the assembly of the district of Kronstadt to the Nationsuniversität is in Sándor, 291-5.
Gubernium councillor Jakob Rannicher for the election of the comes, Konrad Schmidt, who had been appointed at the end of 1861.

The Chancellery sought, by a renewed convocation of the county commissions at the end of March, to strengthen the moderate Hungarian party. Replying to the address of Belso-Szolnok county of the previous September, the Chancellery responded carefully, in some cases positively, to its legislative proposals, but firmly rejected the claim to the continued legality of the union. The outcome of the commission sessions was similar to that in September: those under Romanian control formulated addresses supporting the central government, while the others repeated their usual constitutional standpoint. Some counties voted to confirm the appointed officials in office, but others refused. The alignment of the Hungarians and Romans relative to each other was inconsistent. The general tone was oppositional, but moderate. Once again Nádasdy found reason for mild optimism.

The remaining, and perhaps most unpredictable, component of the upcoming diet were the Romanians. Their

118. Ürmössy II, 79-84. Rannicher condemned Salmen's action in resigning before the Konflux could elect a replacement. Salmen resented the imputation of illegality at the end of his forty years as a Saxon official; see his letter to Lutheran Bishop Binder of March 15, 1863 in AS Sibiu. Episcopia evanghelica C.A. Fondul Superintendenţial, 1863/224.

119. As it frequently did in 1862-63, the Chancellery solicited opinions and revisions from the State Council; Ürmössy II, 91. The text of the reply to the county by the Gubernium on March 4 is in Sândor, 283-91.
pro-government, like those of the Saxons, were not in doubt, but their gains under the Provisorium fell far short of what they had hoped for. The Romanian bishops desired that their conference demonstrate the loyalty and unity of the nation, so that the court would recognize it as an ally. The government ignored a demand by the majority of the deputies that a civil rights bill be among the requested items of legislation, but in other respects the conference of April 20-23 fulfilled its purpose. It sent a delegation to Vienna, which was received very favorably there at the beginning of May.

Nádasdy openly stated the purpose of the diet in the Council of Ministers: "the Transylvanian diet should be so composed that the majority will be favorable to the government and send deputies to Vienna," the same principle which the centralists had proclaimed in 1861. The resolutions of the county commissions demonstrated that the county electoral laws of December, 1861 would not serve this purpose. The key had already been found, namely a lower tax base for the electoral law. The Chancellery and State Council prepared a new electoral law on this basis and rules of order, which were revised and approved by the Council of Ministers on April 9. They were promulgated on April 21.

120. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 136-8; Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 56; see Chapter VI.

121. Redlich II, 314.

122. The Council of Ministers had deputized a committee of five to prepare the final draft, and four of them were centralists: Mecséry, Nádasdy, Lichtenfels, Geringer;
The electoral law— which Forgách criticized for failing to take into account Transylvania's "historical conditions"— increased the electorate from 11,496 in 1848 to nearly 100,000. Four-fifths of the electorate were payers of 8 fl. or more in direct tax, regardless of birth. Less than one fourth of the Transylvanian nobility were admitted to the vote. For the remainder of the electorate, various categories of professionals, including teachers and the clergy, were automatically enfranchized for the first time. Of 40,692 voters registered in the eight counties, 28,559 or 70% were Romanians: an unprecedentedly high percentage, though still below their percentage of the population. The Romanians naturally enjoyed a secure majority of the electors in the two Romanian districts, and the Hungarians had the majority of the voters in the Szekler districts and the Hungarian towns, which voted separately for their deputies. Officials did not calculate the ethnic breakdown of the voters in the Fundus Regius, but the greater monetary wealth of the Saxons assured their dominance in the electorate there. The regalists (members

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Forgách was the fifth member. Redlich II, 329-30; HHSA Kabinettskanzlei, 1863/1372. 123. Redlich II, 330 cites Forgách's remark in the Council of Ministers. For the electorate in 1848 see Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 258-9, and in 1863 the voting records in MOL D228 1863/828. The source cited by Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, p. 138, on the size of the electorate accepted the tendentious estimates of 15,000 and 160,000 provided by the Gubernium in October, 1861. 124. Retegan, op. cit., 67, 257. According to Szász (1493), only one-fifth of the nobility was granted the vote.
appointed to the diet by the Emperor) had constituted two-thirds of the diet membership in 1848. They were now reduced to only forty, or one fourth of the members, over the objection of the Gubernium and of Forgách.

Unlike in the past, the deputies would not be bound by instructions from the county and municipal assemblies that elected them, but freely elected by electoral districts having an average population of 30,000 and by the voters of the privileged towns. The size of the districts varied greatly. The population per deputy in the Fundus Regius was much smaller than in the counties, thereby increasing the number of Saxon deputies. The electoral law and districts were designed to prevent any of the three nationalities from gaining an absolute majority. But the easier electoral requirements, increased number of deputies from the counties and the granting of deputies to several additional Romanian localities greatly improved the Romanian position compared to previous diets.

The supervision of the elections was in the hands of electoral commissions that were appointed by the county commissions and municipal assemblies. Due to the composition of the latter, Saxons and Hungarians dominated the

125. Redlich II, 331. Rogge reports the Gubernium majority proposed that Hungarian regalists be appointed in sufficient numbers to guarantee a Hungarian majority—Rogge II, 210. In practice only 34 regalists were actually named to the diet, divided equally among the three nationalities—Retegan, 78, op. cit.

126. Half of the voters were in the eight counties, but they elected only 33 deputies, while the Hungarian towns elected an equal number of deputies.
electoral commissions in most of the Fundus Regius and in 127
six of the eight counties. The Romanians also lacked the
social influence and electoral experience of their rivals,
who were more experienced politicians. For the Romanians,
the leadership provided elsewhere by the local officials and
the property owners was offered by the clergy.

Both Şuluţiu and Șaguna published pastoral letters to
their clergy in May concerning the elections. They ordered
the clergy to assemble the voters at the voting places, see
that they not divide their votes among more than one candi-
date, and that they resist Hungarian attempts to influence
128
their votes by threats or favors. The Hungarian and
Saxon bishops published no similar pastoral letters.

The Chancellery encouraged this organizing activity by
the Romanian clergy. Romanians alleged that the Hungarians
were seeking to lessen voter participation by claiming that
one voter could vote in the name of all the voters in one or
more villages, saving people the inconvenience of travel and
loss of work. Nádasdy wrote all eight bishops in
Transylvania on June 9 requesting that they urge all voters
129
in their churches to participate in the elections. Two

128. Ibid., 68-9. Şuluţiu's circular of May 11 is in AS
Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/393; that of Șaguna from late May
is published in Gh. Tulbure, Mitropolitul Șaguna. Opera
literară, scrisori pastorale, circulări școlare, diverse
(Sibiu: Tipografia arhidiecezane, 1938), 447-50.
129. MOL D228 1863/439. The eight bishops were Şuluţiu
and two of his suffragan bishops, Alexi of Szamosújvár and
Dobra of Lugos, Șaguna, Haynald, Binder, the Reformed Bishop
Bodola and the Unitarian Bishop Kriza.
of the Romanian bishops replied with assurances that they were taking the necessary measures. Şuluțiu apparently took primary responsibility for the Romanian voters in the counties. He issued another, even more detailed pastoral letter concerning the elections on June 15.

The Hungarian bishops apparently made no written response to Nádasdy's appeal. Bishop Binder was more forthcoming than his Hungarian colleagues. He sent a confidential letter to all the Lutheran deans, calling on them to use discretely all their influence to ensure the election of deputies "of proven loyalty to the government and to imperial unity." The centralist, pro-government attitude of the Saxon voters was only in doubt in the district of Kronstadt. Nádasdy wrote separately to the loyal Bishop Binder concerning the Hungarophile sentiments of the rural population there, accusing some of the Lutheran clergy of indifference to the government's desires. The dean of

130. Telegram of Șaguna to Nádasdy, June 12 (MOL D228 1863/455), letter of Dobra to Nádasdy, June 13 (MOL D228 1863/479), letter of Șaguna to Nádasdy, June 14 (MOL D228 1863/485). Bishop Alexi was mortally ill, and died on June 29.
131. Sándor, 297-300, and AS Alba Iulia, MRU FG 1863/449.
132. The letter of Nádasdy is preserved in Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/1587, (Categoría 35), and Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia reformatá, Püspöki levéltár 1863/529. Neither archive indicates any action was taken. The Unitarian Consistory does not indicate any action in connection with the election, and I was unable to view the personal papers of Bishop Kriza.
134. Nádasdy to Binder, June 3, in AS Sibiu, loc. cit. 1863/323, also in HHSA Nachlass Reichenstein. Box 1b, II Reservats-Präsidialakten 1863-65.
the most oppositional region of the district, Țara Birsei/Burzenland, reported that he called the Saxon clergy together and urged them to use their influence with their parishioners. They convinced the members of three parishes to vote for the government candidate, but failed in most of the others.

The Romanian and Saxon clergy were useful to the government in the electoral campaign. Following the explicit directives in the bishops' pastoral letters and personal instructions, the Romanian parish clergy assembled the largely illiterate voters, ordered them to vote for the candidate designated by the Permanent National Committee in Hermannstadt, and in many cases personally led them to the polling-places. The Hungarian press and contemporaries charged that the clergy controlled voting behavior by threats of anathema (afurisenie), but no impartial observers confirmed this and it was naturally denied by the Romanians.

The campaigning of the Saxon clergy was less controversial, in part because it rarely involved contests against the Hungarians but also because the greater education and wealth of the Saxon clergy and voters could not be denied. The Lutheran clergy were highly educated and used their oratorical skills effectively in collabora-

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136. Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 72-3; Ürmössy II, 113-14.
137. See Chapter IV.
tion with the lay professional politicians.

Hungarian cultural and political leadership was firmly in the hands of the nobility and its allies in the urban municipalities. But in the countryside, their higher education and moral leadership gave the Hungarian clergy considerable influence among those Hungarian peasant voters enfranchised for the first time. The Romanian press recorded cases in Alsó-Fehér where the Reformed clergy threatened Hungarian supporters of the Romanian candidate with exclusion from the congregation. A writer in the Szekler region reported that the Szekler voters—like the Romanians in other areas—entered Kézdivásárhely under the leadership of two local pastors, one Roman Catholic and one Reformed, holding a banner with the portrait of Count Imre Mikó, a local candidate.

The Gubernium reported the registered voters, turnout, and results of the election, which took place during the final days of June and the beginning of July. These are the aggregate results:

140. The report accompanied Crenneville's letter to Nádasdy of July 31 (Gubernium Presidium 1863/4072) in MOL D228 1863/828. The electoral data was missing for the Hungarian market town of Mócs and for one electoral district in the counties. I excluded two electoral districts in the counties from the averages because of incomplete data.
Table 6: Voting in the Election of 1863: Registered Voters, Turnout, and Deputies by Region and Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reg.v.</th>
<th>Voting Turnout</th>
<th>Dep</th>
<th>Reg.v/dep</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) 26 Hungarian Towns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Free Towns</td>
<td>2409</td>
<td>1466</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>240.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Noble Towns</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>215.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Market Towns</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1718</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4991</td>
<td>3399</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>161.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Noble Counties and Districts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Counties</td>
<td>46901</td>
<td>39145</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1421.2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rom. Distr.</td>
<td>4191</td>
<td>3269</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>838.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Szekler Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Districts</td>
<td>9104</td>
<td>6513</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>700.3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Fundus Regius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Free Towns</td>
<td>4807</td>
<td>3327</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>300.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Market Town</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Districts</td>
<td>18929</td>
<td>14512</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>757.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89031</td>
<td>70459</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>718.0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thanks to the differing size of the electoral districts and to the tax requirement, the Romanian deputies were fewer than the Romanian percentage of the population, and the Saxons more. The overrepresentation of the Saxons came at the expense of the Romanians in the Fundus Regius. The apportionment of mandates in the counties was equitable. From the Hungarian standpoint, however, the results in the counties were the most unprecedented and worrisome aspect of the election.

The high voter turnout in the huge electoral districts of the counties reflected the high level of politicization and discipline of the Romanian voters. The contest was social as well as national; the opposing candidates in many districts were a baron or count versus a commoner. The Romanian press reported that in some districts the Hungarian

141. The Romanians also hotly contested the elections in some of the market towns, most of which were Hungarian islands in Romanian surroundings.
peasantry voted for the Romanian candidate against the Hungarian aristocrat. The Romanians' success far exceeded their influence in the local administration, and gave a stronger "message" to the Hungarian opposition than had the introduction of the Provisorium.

After the nomination of 33 regalists, the proportions at the opening of the diet on July 15 were 58 Romanians, 56 Hungarians, and 44 Saxons. Fifteen Romanians and five Saxons were clergymen, and 36 Romanians and 22 Saxons were civil servants. The profile of the 44 Hungarian deputies was very different. Only one was a clergyman, seventeen bore the title of baron or count, and the leading families of Bethlen, Kemény, Mikó and Bánffy were represented by three members each. For the Hungarians, the prospect of constituting a minority in the diet had been the implicit, rarely expressed dilemma for the past two years beyond the customary rhetoric about constitutional legality. Would the

142. Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 73. The electoral data are inconclusive in this regard. In 21 electoral districts in the counties where identifiably Hungarian and Romanian candidates opposed each other, voter turnout was 84.7%, and 76.9% of the votes were cast for the Romanian candidate, while 70.2% of the registered electorate in the counties were Romanians. A higher rate of abstention by registered Hungarian voters could account for the difference, however.

143. The electoral committees of Alsó-Fehér denied the certification of the Romanians elected in four districts, but eventually certified three of them on orders from the Gubernium. Retegan, op. cit., 74-6; MOL D228 1863/828.

144. Retegan, op. cit., 78.

145. Szász, 1496. Ürmössy and Szász point out that only ten Romanian and Saxon members were independently employed. This contrasted with the Hungarian deputies, but only because the Hungarian politicians had been excluded from office or resigned during the Provisorium due to their political views.
Hungarians attend the diet to protect their interests there? The police reported in March that while the Hungarian radicals favored a boycott of the diet, Deák advised the Hungarians to attend. He reasoned that if the Hungarians behaved in a moderate fashion the prospects of a new Hungarian diet and a compromise solution might be improved.

The more radical Hungarians advocated a boycott of the diet, and they won out. On the eve of the diet, the deputies met in the Hermannstadt home of one of their number, Count Benedek Mikes, in the presence of the Hungarian opposition leaders Kálmán Tisza and Count Gyula Andrássy. Tisza and Andrássy advised the deputies not to enter the diet. The only known, abbreviated protocol of their meetings does not indicate the presence of Tisza or Andrássy. It demonstrates the boycotters' decisive motivation was that, as a minority in the diet, they feared they could not pass the legislation they desired. Their constitutional strictures were only an afterthought. Secret consultations of the Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian deputies at this time were unsuccessful. The Hungarian and Szekler deputies and eight of the eleven regalists issued declarations to the Emperor and to the diet announcing the

146. Mecséry to Nádasdy, March 23, 1863 in MOL D228 1863/182.
147. Szász, 1494-5. Contemporaries assumed that the politicians from Budapest instigated the boycott—Retegan, op. cit., 83; Ürmössy II, 117; Police of Kassa to Mecséry, July 31, in HHSA, Informationsbüro 1863/7235 (Elenschus 79).
149. Ioan Puşcăriu, 74-5.
boycott. The declarations, while couched in very loyal terms, insisted that the laws of 1848 and earlier were the only legal basis for constitutional liberty and for the rights of the nationalities.

The Emperor's immediate rejection of the boycott declaration apparently surprised the moderate leaders Haynald, Kemény, and Mikó, who had thought they could hope for support in high places. Imperial dissatisfaction centered particularly on Haynald, who was dismissed from his position on the Gubernium and pressured to resign from his episcopal see. At the end of December he finally did so.

The Hungarian arguments in favor of the boycott had little effect on the Saxons and Romanians. The Saxons of Kronstadt district, were, once again, an exception; their two deputies joined the Hungarian boycott. As proposed by Pop in August, 1861, the first three articles of legislation (königliche Propositionen) were for the constitutional equality (Inartikulierung) of the Romanian nation and religion, the use of the Hungarian, German, and Romanian languages in administration, and procedural matters at the diet. The passage of the first two bills in the course of August and September was a great symbolic victory for the

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150. Published in Sandor, 309-17.
151. The Viennese police reported special displeasure at the court at the behavior of Haynald--Report of August 3, in HHSA, Informationsbureau 1863/7347 (Elenschus 204). On the abdication of Haynald, see Chapter VI.
152. The articles were listed in the convocation rescript of April 21 (Sándor, 295-7) and in the opening speech from the throne presented on July 15 (Sándor, 330-8.
the Romanian national movement.

Despite this success, there were secret contacts between Romanian and Hungarian radicals in the summer of 1863. The police reported considerable sympathy for the Hungarian radicals among the Romanians of Máramaros county, north of Transylvania in Hungary. At the same time they reported the Romanians had received proclamations from Prince Cuza ordering them to support, if it took place, a Romanian insurrection aiming at the unification of Transylvania with Romania. Agitators reportedly distributed the proclamation in Transylvania and called on the Romanians to boycott the Reichsrat, but no copy of this proclamation has been preserved.

Renewed negotiations between Cuza and the Hungarian emigration seemed to provide a military basis for this threat. General Türr arrived in Bucharest and secured an audience with Cuza on May 28. His attempts to gain Romanian support for a small incursion into Transylvania were unsuccessful, however. Türr was unwilling to offer any guarantees concerning the Transylvanian Romanians, and Cuza made this a precondition of a military undertaking. Austrian speculations that the Hungarian emigres had conceded Cuza's


rule of Transylvania in exchange for full support of an
insurrection were apparently unfounded.

Differences did exist among the Romanian deputies con-
cerning the election of deputies to the Reichsrat. Austrian
police reported Türr secured the commitment of several
Romanian boiars in the Principalities to lobby in
Transylvania against participation there. The militant
faction in the diet, led by Şuluţiu, sought to delay the
election. Nádasdy and Reichenstein were very concerned
about the influence of Papiu-Ilarian, who visited
Hermannstadt in August and September, on this group. His
goal, Nádasdy wrote, was to either to prevent the election
of deputies to the Reichsrat or to exact a high price in
political gains for the Romanians. The factional
difference among the Romanians-- between the unconditional
centralists led by Şaguna and the nationalists under
Şuluţiu-- continued after Papiu’s departure from
Hermannstadt, however. Only after the passage of the

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155. This rumor was transmitted by the Austrian Consul in
Constantinople, Count Ludolf, on July 4 and repeated by
Rechberg in a letter of July 9: Bossy 356, 358; see also

156. Anonymous report appended to Mecséry to Nádasdy,
June 17, citing an intercepted letter of Türr-- HSHA
Informationsbüro 1863/5433 (Elenchus 344); Türr appealed to
the Romanians in the Daco-Romanian organ in Bucharest,
Românul, to refuse participation in the Reichsrat-- Szász,
1501.

157. Ploleşteanu, 7; Nadasdy to Reichenstein, September 7,
in HSHA, Nachlass Reichenstein. Box 1b, Korrespondenz
Reichensteins, besonders mit Nádasdy, number 11.

158. Anonymous report from the diet, September 13, in
Nachlass Reichenstein, Box 1b. II. Reservats-Präsidialakten
1863-65, number 52.
diet's priority legislation at the end of September was it possible to commence the election of deputies to the Reichsrat. In view of Austria's poor relations with Romania, it is difficult to credit a Moldavian aristocrat's claim that the Romanians entered the Reichsrat on instructions from Cuza. Cuza himself assured the Hungarian emigres a year later that he had never conducted "propaganda" among the Transylvanian Romanians.

The entry of the 26 Transylvanian deputies into the Lower House of the the Reichsrat on October 20, 1862 was the greatest, perhaps only substantial victory of Schmerling's Hungarian policy. By implementing the February

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159. The Emperor gave the order to commence the election of deputies to the Reichsrat on September 27--Sándor, 325-8. Șuluțiu chaired the committee which prepared the diet's response of October 5 to the imperial rescript.

160. Prince Dimitrie Cantacuzino, a Moldavian boyar with connections in Bucharest and Transylvania, informed an advisor of Schmerling that the Transylvanian Romanians "regarded Cuza as their prince," but assured him that Cuza had "instructed" the Romanians to enter the Reichsrat. Julius Fröbel, Ein Lebenslauf. Aufzeichnungen, Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse II (Stuttgart: Verlag der J. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1891), 301. Fröbel was Schmerling's most loyal jounalistic ally and advisor on German policy; see Redlich II, 384. Cantacuzino was Fröbel's brother in law, a moderate liberal with business ties to the Szekler region; see Imre, "Legăturile dintre Brețcu și Moldova în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea," in Viata cotidiana la secui (Bucuresti: Kriterion, 1982), 376-9. I have seen no evidence of such an instruction by Cuza other than the recollection by Frobel.


162. The deputies included thirteen Romanians (four clergymen), ten Saxons (one cleric) and three Hungarians (one cleric), and nine appointees to the Upper House. The latter included four bishops (Șaguna, Șuluțiu, Binder, and Titular Bishop Fogarasy). Kutschera, 131.
patent in Transylvania, he was able to proclaim that the Reichsrat was no longer "narrow," but represented the entire empire and was hence fully entitled to approve the budget and other empire-wide matters. The Transylvanian deputies soon realized the ambiguity of this victory and of their position in the Reichsrat. Schmerling faced growing opposition in that body, not only from conservative federalists who had criticized the Patent from the beginning but also from German liberals. They derisively referred to the pro-government loyalists as Schmerling's puppets ("Statisten"). Most of the Saxon and Romanian deputies remained on the side of the government, but a few Romanian and Saxon liberals joined the liberal opposition to Schmerling in the Reichsrat sessions of 1864-65.

The constitutional experiment in Transylvania continued until Schmerling's fall in June, 1865, but with no new initiatives. The Emperor nullified the mandates of the eight boycotting Hungarian regalists at the end of July, 1863. He ordered four successive rounds of elections to replace the boycotting deputies from August, 1863 to August, 1864. Despite considerable administrative pressure, the winners of the elections refused their seats in the diet in all but three cases. Bishop Haynald, once his status as a regalist had been revoked, won an election in the Armenian-Hungarian city of Erzsebetvaros, and declined his seat there,

163. Vortrag of Nádasdy, July 23, in MOL D228 1863/648; Szász 1497.
as well. The court found several new Hungarian regalists who agreed to take their seats, including the Unitarian dean of Rimetea, Antal Koronka, the Roman Catholic dean of Csíkrákos Jeremíás Eránosz, and the Roman Catholic Canon and Titular Bishop in Oradea, Mihály Fogarasy.

The prospects for a successful diet in Hungary and Croatia did not improve after the Austrian success in Transylvania. The lack of further progress undermined the Emperor's confidence in Schmerling, who was forced onto the defensive by the clericals and conservatives at court, the so-called "camarilla led by Móric Esterházy." Symbolic of this defensive posture, Schmerling was unable after mid-1863 to add to the modest list of liberal legislation he had sponsored in the Reichsrat in his first two years concerning justice, church affairs and education. His ability to control the Reichsrat had been his saving grace for Franz Joseph, so when this disintegrated he became expendable. As his star fell in the Reichsrat, it fell also at court.

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Anton von Schmerling sought to weaken the influence of

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164. Kutschera, 123 confuses Koronka with Gubernium counselor László Koronka and incorrectly refers to Eránosz as a Romanian, p. 131. On Eránosz and Fogarassy, see Chapter VI.
165. In May, 1863 a secular imperial education council was established under the direction of the former President of the Lower House of the Reichsrat. Ostensibly its competence included Transleithania, but it had little power there. As signs of Schmerling's declining influence in 1864 Rogge cites the dismissal of his ally Degenfeld, and the transfer of Schmerling's own brother, a high official in the War Ministry, out of Vienna. Rogge II, 198-200.
Hungarian radicalism in Transylvania by assuring the continued hegemony of the aristocracy in much of the province. This goal inspired the restoration of constitutional administration in the noble counties and Szekler districts in 1861, and also the relative moderation of the Transylvanian Provisorium (suspension of the constitution) by comparison to the Provisorium in Hungary.

Policymakers were also determined to secure the adherence of the Saxons and Romanians to the "February Constitution" or Patent of 1861. Therefore the autonomy of the Fundus Regius was restored, and under the Provisorium Saxons attained an unprecedented degree of influence in Vienna, on the provincial level and in local legislation. But the alliance with the Saxons was ultimately inadequate for Vienna's purposes, and the price of extending it to the Romanians was the expansion of the electorate. Debate on the electoral reform lasted more than two years. The law's enactment in April, 1863 ensured the Hungarians would be in the minority in the subsequent diet. This was the actual, though not the publicly admitted motivation for the Hungarian boycott of the diet in July, 1863. The potential collaboration of the Transylvanian Romanians with the increasingly independent Romania of Prince Cuza, and even with the Hungarian emigres, was an extra incentive for the concessions they were granted in 1862-62.

Bishops and clergymen played a prominent role in the electoral and dietal politics of 1863. An examination of
why this was the case must begin with a profile of the common features of the religious communities of Transylvania.
CHAPTER FOUR

CLERICAL CULTURE, POPULAR RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION

Introduction

The involvement of religious sentiment and the clergy in Transylvanian politics is much more extensive than a mere record of circulars, speeches, and electoral behavior would imply. Bishops, clergy and laity pursued institutional goals in society, and also intraecclesial objectives that could place them in conflict with each other. But where does politics stop and religion begin? All religious conviction, inasmuch as it brings adherence to an institution and social group and to an ethical system, involves social relations and activism. This chapter will investigate three important aspects of religious identity that are not overtly political, although all had political implications: the social position of the clergy, the relationship between official and popular religion, and the impact of liberalism and the new secular culture.

Religion forms the third structural element—after the secular administration and the socioeconomic strata—center of this study. The variety of forms that religion takes in society point out the necessity for a broad definition of the term. Religious identity implies acceptance of symbols, which are forms of expression "that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and
emotions, and impel men to action." Religion is a system of symbols which establishes a transcendent order of existence and by vividness compels the individual to accept it. It is religion's public ceremonial practices or ritual which make vivid and reinforce the conviction of the reality of its concepts. The connection of faith and ritual provides a partial explanation of the influence of the clergy-- the leader of public ceremonies-- in the different religious traditions. This definition is less relevant in those traditions which accord no prominent place to ritual. But generally, the distinctive symbols of the religious communities contribute to their confessional and ethnic identity, as groups of people who share certain religious experiences and attitudes toward existence.

The six major churches in Transylvania fall into two major categories, which Max Weber has labelled ritualistic or magical and rationalistic religion. Sacramental practices are a powerful element in the ritualistic religions, while the rationalistic religions consider ritual less essential and emphasize preaching. Mere preaching and theology are intellectual activities accessible to the laity,

while the public leadership of ritual is the special domain of the clergy. Consequently the "ritualistic" churches accord a greater role to their clergy in organization and everyday practice.

Succeeding chapters of my study of the clergy in politics will concentrate on the three "ritualistic" churches in Transylvania, the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Uniate) and Orthodox. These churches explicitly maintain the apostolic succession of the clergy, i.e. its uninterrupted descent from the early church through ordination by competent bishops. The clergy celebrated a complex liturgy in a foreign (Latin) or archaic vernacular language with strong symbolic and aesthetic elements and administered various sacraments. The pastor or bishop also had administrative responsibility for educational and economic matters in his jurisdiction. This multiple authority often made him the dominant personality in the local community and the intermediary of the secular administration. The responsibility of the Protestant ministers was almost exclusively pastoral, and his sacramental role much less. Economic and educational matters were under the administration of lay elders (G. _Curator_, H. _gondnok_, R. _curator_, gociman) and presbyteries or councils in the Protestant churches to a far greater degree than in the others.

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The Clergy in Society

The clergy in Transylvania, as conventionally defined, numbered 3694 in the Hungarian census of 1869-70. This number apparently did not include the roughly equal number of persons in subordinate clerical grades such as deacons and associate pastors or chaplains (H. kaplánok, segédlelkészek), or parish functionaries such as cantors, sacristans (H. egyházz-fiak) and bellringers and, assistant parsons (segédlelkészek) and preachers (Prediger). The episcopate and parish clergy of the more narrow definition were the more or less uncontested elite of the local religious communities, endowed with special training and religious authority. Despite this basic similarity, the churches’ clergy differed in terms of their selection, education, status, and financial means.

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Table 7: Churches and Clergy in Transylvania, 1850

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>A:D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Cath.</td>
<td>648,239</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>474.2</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>437.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>637,800</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>783.5</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>655.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>295,723</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>376.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Cath.</td>
<td>219,533</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1070.8</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitar.</td>
<td>46,008</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>434</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>198,774</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>738.9</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>671.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| A= Members; B= Parishes; C=Average Size; D=Clergymen 5

The method of selecting the parish clergy and bishops differed from the ritualistic to the Protestant churches, with the increasing employment of election in the latter group. Roman Catholic bishops were nominated by the monarch and confirmed by the Vatican, while the Greek Catholic synods (periodic assemblies of the leading diocesan clergy) nominated three candidates for bishop and the monarch was free to choose one of them. Orthodox synods as well as those of the Protestants elected the bishops, who were then confirmed by the monarch. Local clerical leaders (pastors, parsons) were generally nominated by the local congregations, except in the Roman Catholic Church. Various forms of clerical election was applied in Romanian parishes. Many

5. Pényes, Az ausztriai birodalom statistikája és földrajzi leírása, II, 22-7 and MOL, F551, "Landesübersicht [Census] vom Jahre 1850." Of the Roman Catholic clergymen, 221 were diocesan and 140 were members of religious orders; the latter were not assigned to individual parishes, and subtracting their number from column D the figure for the final column is 993.

6. Retegan informed me of instances in which the Greek Catholics of Násáud and Orthodox of Bran conducted formal elections of their pastors. Charles Boner reported in 1865 that Orthodox pastors were still chosen locally and then confirmed by the bishop: Charles Boner, Transylvania: its products and its people (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1865), 370. Seminary education and appointment by the bishop were becoming more general in this period, however. István Imreh notes that in practice church, state and local officials in the Szekler region guarded their right to

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parishes and congregations were economically supported to some degree by a patron (a landowner, local or state body that built and repaired the school and paid the salary of the priest, minister or teacher) who was entitled to name the presiding minister. About a quarter of the Roman Catholic, and a small percentage of the Greek Catholic, parishes were entitled to elect their pastors by right of their economic patronage.

Celibacy was required of the Roman Catholic clergy and practiced by a small minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, while the parish clergy of all the other churches was married. Clerical marriage contributed very often to the training, or at least nomination, of the clergy: when priests' and ministers' sons succeeded to their fathers' social status and position, election or appointment by the bishop was only a formality.

influence the elections there; A törvényhozó székely falu (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1983), 105-7.

7. Thirty of the 751 pastors in the Archdiocese of Blaj were celibate in 1862. Sterca-Șuțiu to Crenneville, January 31, 1862: AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1862/47. All but two of the fifteen canons of the two Greek Catholic Cathedral Chapters in Transylvania, the bishops, and the small number of monks in the Romanian churches were also celibate.

8. In 1865 there were at least 34 cases in the Greek Catholic Archdiocese of Blaj in which two or more pastors in the same deanery shared the same surname, and five cases in which the pastor and curate of a parish shared the same surname, out of 38 deaneries and 719 parishes-- Siematismulu veneratului cleru catholicu de ritu orientale alu Archidiecesei Metropolitane a Albei-Julie pre anulu dela nascerea lui Christosu 1865 (Blasiu: Tipariulu Seminariului Archidiecesanu, 1865). Variations of "Pop" and "Pap" were very common Romanian and Hungarian surnames. Two Unitarian church districts submitted complaints to the presbytery in 1859 concerning nepotism in the lay and clerical positions.
The "inheritance" of parishes was especially true in the case of the Romanian clergy, with its more limited economic means and educational opportunities. The first seminary for the Greek Catholic Romanians of Transylvania opened in Blaj in 1754, and a second one in 1760; a third one opened in 1859 at the seat of the new diocese of Szamosujvar. The course of studies at the Blaj seminary after the two there were united in the late eighteenth century was three years, increasing in 1832 to four years. The seminary did not produce sufficient priests for all the parishes, so that many (the so-called "moralists") were trained at simple two-year courses at rural schools or half-year courses in Blaj. As late as the 1850s a large proportion of the new appointments to parishes were "moralists." Until 1811 most Orthodox priests were trained at the scattered Orthodox monasteries in Transylvania, at Serbian ones or in the Danubian Principalities, or with their fathers. In 1811 the first Orthodox seminary courses were established in their districts, and it was debated at the assembly the next year, but the presbytery took no action. Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariana. Egyházképviseleti tanács jegyzőkönyve, 1861/93.


10. Biserica Romana Unita. Doua sute cinci zeci de ani de istorie (Madrid: Rivadeneydra, 1952), 111-12; A magyar-országi romanok egyházi, iskolai, közmuvelődési, közgazdasági intézményeinek és mozgalmainak ismertetése (Budapest: Urania, 1908), 50. Sulutiu reported in 1858 that his clergy divided into two very different groups according to training. He stated that more than thirty pastors in any one year were unqualified for their positions. Sulutiu to Minister Thun, December 3, 1858, in MOL. F258, 203. csomó, 1859/2238.
at the seat of the bishop in Hermannstadt, first with a
length of six months, after 1846 one year, after 1852 two
11 years, and after 1861 three years. No comprehensive
appraisal of the clergy’s educational level has been made.
That of the Greek Catholics may have been superior to that
of the Orthodox, but the differential was decreasing.

The educational level of the other churches’ clergy was
superior, due to longer courses and wealthier, better-
appointed seminaries. The seminary at the seat of the Roman
Catholic bishopric in Gyulafehérvár opened in 1753. In the
nineteenth century it had a four-year course of studies that
was required of most candidates for ordination and appoint-
12 ment to a parish in Transylvania. In the 1860s the
annual expenditure of the seminary for some forty seminarians
13 was over 20,000 fl. Candidates for the office of parson
(G. Pfarrer, H. lelkész) in the three Protestant churches
completed the four-year theological course of studies at one
of the Protestant secondary schools. The one Unitarian and
four Reformed "colleges" (Főtanodák) and two Reformed, two
Unitarian, and five or six Lutheran high schools (Gymnasien,

11. Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement, 142-3;
Pacurariu, 245-6. The tabulation of those studying for the
priesthood in 1844, possibly incomplete, was thirty-six
Greek Catholics, thirty-eight Roman Catholics, with four
outside the seminary, and sixty Orthodox, all outside the
Jahr 1844."
12. Antal Beke, Az Erdély egyházmegyei papnövelde történeti
vázlata (Károly-Fehérvár: Nyomtatott a püspöki könyvnyomdában,
1870), 25, 84.
13. Ibid., 77, 111.

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Közép-Tanodák) were the wealthiest and most prestigious educational institutions in Transylvania. Study at a Central European university was a virtual requirement for candidacy to the wealthiest congregations. Candidacy to the Lutheran and, after mid-century, the Orthodox positions required a number of years of previous teaching experience, as well. Charles Boner remarked that the Saxon professors and clergy were "the best-informed men in the country," required to study two or three years at a German university or in Vienna. The parsons, having first served as high school professors in some scholarly field, were the leading Saxon historians, ethnographers, and natural scientists.

14. Erdély Nagy-Fejedelemség hivatali tiszti névtára az 1864-dik évre, 108-17, Fenyes, 284 lists only the Unitarian and three of the Reformed colleges as Protestant theological institutes in Transylvania.


16. Boner, 53-6. Boner frequently stayed at Saxon parsonages during his travels, and praises them repeatedly. He enjoyed the financial support of the Austrian government and the assistance of local officials during his visit to Transylvania in 1863-64 as a correspondent of the London Daily News. Draft of letter from the Transylvanian Court Chancellery to Governor Crenneville and General Montenuovo, September 17, 1863, in AS Sibiu, Fondul Eugen Friedenfels, XIV/202 and ibid., Polizei-Direktion Hermannstadt, Passanten-Protocol pro 1862-1864: 1863/205 (October 10-19) and 1864/69 (April 19); Frobel, II, 217. Boner's professed astonishment at the fact that his arrival in a locality was often known in advance (eg. 422) may be disingenuous, and his sympathy for the Saxon political position and for the centralist regime is explicit. But contemporary and later Hungarian allegations that he was an "Austrian spy" (cf. Tibor Frank, The British Image of Hungary 1865/1870.
In all parishes and congregations, the school teachers and other employees were supervised by the pastor or parson. Conflicts between the two sides were common. Their training was very different, and in the case of the Romanians that of the teacher was often superior; yet the clergy controlled the school curriculum, facilities and salaries. The insistence of the lay intellectuals on educational progress, political differences and resentment of "clericalism" also played their part. Subordinate clergy were less mobile and more dependent on the pursestrings of the pastor, and occasionally complained of his miserliness to the bishop.

Prior to the revolution of 1848 the Catholic clergy of

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(Budapest: Department of English, L.Eotvos University, 1976), 104, 146, 314) do not reduce the value of his book for those aspects of Transylvanian society with which he was familiar.

17. Such disputes naturally multiplied during periods of political conflict such as the 1860s, and the archives reveal many during this period. The leading Saxon and Romanian writers of fiction about village life produced portrayals of the teacher's conflict with the clergy or with traditional attitudes, for example in Die Dorfschule (1866), by Michael Albert, and Impăcare (1916), by Ion Agarbiceanu; both writers were village clerymen. The Lutheran clergy was prominent among the authors and subjects of Saxon village fiction; see Michael Markel, "Zuordnungsfragen der siebenbürgischen Dorfliteratur," Transsylvanica 2. Studien zur deutschen Literatur aus Siebenbürgen (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1982), 9-70.

18. One such case is in the correspondence of Prediger Roth, parson Schullerus and Bishop Binder of September and November, 1861, in AS Sibiu. Episcopia Evanghelica C.A., Fondul superintendential. 1861/597; see also Boner, 296-7. Wealthier and more important congregations had as many as six Predigers, while small ones often had none. József Barsi reported that according to the 1869 census there were 475 Saxon clergymen, of whom almost half were Predigers. Barsi, "Az ágostai hitvallásu evangelicusok egyházi és iskolai ügyei Erdélyben," Statistikai és nemzetgazdasági közlemények 8 (1871), 136-58.
both rites enjoyed noble status, hence exemption from taxes. Later this distinction no longer obtained. Much more important for the economic status of the clergy were its sources of income, which varied according to political and local conditions as well as the peculiarities of each religion. A precise picture of clerical income is difficult because of this variety, but six types of economic support can be distinguished: canonic portions, tithes and tithe compensation by the state, patronage, church subsidies, emoluments or stola fees, and state subsidies.

A canonic portion was a generally small parcel of land whose income accrued to the pastor. In a general sense, all Roman Catholic parishes, all Lutheran in the Fundus Regius, the Greek Catholics and Protestants in many of the communities where they were the most numerous, and more rarely the Orthodox parishes possessed canonic portions. Legislation by the diet and Konflux, designed to improve the situation of the Romanian clergy, had provided for a canonic portion for every priest and minister. The measure was not carried out, however. In villages of mixed population the endowment of the Romanian parish tended to be much less than that of the Hungarian or Saxon one. The granting or expansion of the Romanian portion was a common demand by local activists in the 1860s. Where Romanian parishes possessed canonic

19. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 238. The Greek Catholic former serfs of Homorodalmas in the district of Udvarhely demanded the separation of part of the lands of the Unitarian congregation for itself in 1863; Sulutiu and Bishop Kriza instructed the rural deans of the clergy to

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portions, they tended to be smaller. At least one case is recorded where the village commons were divided equitably between two or more parishes for the support of their schools.

The Romanian churches also fared badly with the tithe and the state compensation which was paid after the abolition of the tithe in the 1848. According to medieval law the Catholic pastor received one tenth of parishioners' harvest. The tithe later extended also to the Protestant clergy, but was lessened in the counties at the expense of the landlord's tithe (nones) and supplanted in the Szekler region by a different payment in kind, the kepe (L. capetium), and its monetary equivalent, the oszpota. Only in the Fundus Regius did the tithe survive in its original form, and was paid to the Lutheran clergy by all residents regardless of religion. Thus all 262 Lutheran parishes enjoyed the tithe, a much smaller fraction of the

look into the matter-- Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariană. Egyházképviseleti tanács jegyzőkönyve, 1863/126, 165. The Romanian dean reported in March, 1863 that most of the clergy and parishes in his district were impoverished; AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1863/211. In response to a demand by the Orthodox parishes in Hermannstadt, the Saxon magistracy awarded 17 Joch [1 Joch= 1.42 acres] for a canonic portion in 1861, but the Romanians complained that this was inadequate-- correspondence of the pastors with Šaguna, in Sibiu. AMOR 1862/319.

20. The income of most Greek Catholic canonic portions near Bistritz in 1862 was between 32 and 63 fl.; Retegan, "Școlile sătești românești din zona Bistriței la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea," Marisia 11-12 (1981-82), 222.

21. The urbarial court of Kronstadt ruled in 1861 that the 137 Joch of commons (ürberi közseg) in Bodola, Háromszék district, be divided equally between the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Reformed schools. Sibiu. AMOR, 1861/268.
Reformed congregations, 39 of the 211 Roman Catholic, only seven of the Greek Catholic parishes, and very few of the Unitarian and Orthodox ones. By the final compensation settlement in the 1860s, each bishopric received bonds whose annual payments were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>390,647 fl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>62,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>47,055 30 kr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>16,582 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarians</td>
<td>1,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>60 30 (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interim payments made prior to the settlement in 1866 approximated the above proportions. The kepe continued to be collected during the 1860s. It was not a percentage of the harvest but a set amount that was as much as one-sixth of the harvest for the poorest people. This injustice prompted some Szeklers to convert to Orthodoxy because the less-endowed, itinerant Romanian clergy did not collect the kepe.

Patronage (L. patronatus) was a form of economic support practiced to some degree in the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic, but especially in the Reformed church, referred to earlier. It is reasonable to assume that patrons exercised an influence over the conduct of the pastors, though it is difficult to show evidence of this influence. Of the 211

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23. Elek Jakab, A királyföldi viszonyok ismertetése, I (Pest: Heckenast Gusztáv, 1871), 154-6. Jakab's work is polemical in intent (arguing for the end of the autonomy of the Fundus Regius) and in citing these figures he ignores the more varied sources of income enjoyed by the clergy of the other churches.
Roman Catholic parishes, 53 were supported by a patron; only 2.8% of the Greek Catholic parishes in Transylvania had patrons, but a much higher fraction of those in Hungary proper. Many of these were in the politically volatile territory of the imperial mining authorities of the Muntii Apuseni. While Greek Catholic parishes here received an annual subsidy of 150-200 fl. from the mining authorities, those of the Roman Catholics received as much as double or triple this amount. A form of patronage was widespread in all the communities of the Szekler region. They recognized the duty to provide not only a canonic portion for the parish, but to provide separate land for the pastor and teacher and to maintain their homes and the school.

Another special characteristic of the Catholic churches of both rites was that their bishops and cathedral chapters were among the greatest landowners of Transylvania. The annual income of the Roman Catholic bishopric properties, at nearly sixteen thousand fl., was the second highest in Alsó-Fehér county after that of the royal treasury; the Reformed College in Nagyenyed was third, the Archbishopric of Blaj was seventh, and the Roman Catholic Cathedral Chapter was eleventh. The bishops and canons of the cathedral chapters used this income to support the pastors and schools.

25. Draft of letter by Haynald to the Papal Nuncio, [August] 1863, in Alba Iulia. ERC. 1863/1935 (Cat. 1); Pâcurariu, 225.
27. Imreh, op. cit., 100-3.
28. Table "Alsófehérmegyei birtokok," in Alba Iulia. ERC. 1862/3028 (Cat. 37).
of the poorer parishes. The Catholic church also enjoyed
the exclusive use of various endowments for the subsidiza-
tion of parishes, which were, however, under the control of
the Habsburg authorities. Catholic laity and even the
bishops periodically agitated for the return of these
endowments to church control, but without success. The
Orthodox diocese also possessed several endowments which
were similarly controlled by the state.

Deriving much less benefit than the other churches from
these means of support, the Romanian priests also collected
a sort of tithe of their own called the lectical and also
stola fees paid in kind for liturgical services like bap-
tisms, marriages, and funerals. These parishes most often
lacked tithe compensation or canonic portions, and often
preferred a priest candidate who possessed land in the
village or nearby. The most important source of fees was
funerals; at this and other times, priests and even cantors
collected knotted sweetbreads and prescura, a half pound of
the latter from each parishioner per week. Prescura was a
special bread baked in the form of a cross; in the large

29. On the Romanian endowments, see Hitchins,
Orthodoxy and Nationality, 236, and Onisifor Ghibu,
Viata si organizatia bisericeasca si scolara in Transilvania
si Ungaria (București: Institutul de arte grafice "Nicolae
Stroilă", 1915), 52-5, 78-9. The summary by Ghibu is mis-
leading because many of the endowments were established
after 1867.

30. Retegan, "Școlile românești din zona Bistriței,"
222; Gergely Moldován, A románság, II (Nagybecskerek: Pleitz
Ferencz Pál, 1896), 22-3; Maria I. Negreaunu, Românii din
Tg.-Săcuesc și satele învecinate după condiția Bisericii
Ortodoxe din Tg.-Săcuesc (București: Institutul de Istorie
Națională din București, 1943), 19.
Romanian parishes of Zlatna in Also-Feher, as many as 25,000 prescura were collected per year in the late nineteenth century. Parishioners sometimes also worked one or two days a year on the priest’s land (clacă). As happened in other countries in the nineteenth century where priests were forced to take such measures by economic straits, some parishioners accused the clergy of avarice and a mingling of material with spiritual motives. Hungarians also complained about the collection of fees for funerals and weddings by the clergy, but this provided a much smaller portion of their churches’ income.

Measured in monetary terms, the Romanian parishes were certainly the poorest. The rare foreigner who made contact with the Romanian village clergy reported that its educational level, economic means and social pretentions were much more modest than those of its Hungarian and Saxon counterparts. The Orthodox clergy survived primarily by its liturgical fees, and at times even by physical labor. The Greek Catholic clergy was not much better off. The

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32. The poor Romanians of several villages in the Carpathians near Bistritz complained to Šaguna in July, 1861 that their pastor had doubled and tripled the charges for some services, and even cancelled services when the prescura was not forthcoming; Sibiu. AMOR, 1861/752. See also Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 357-9, and Gregory L. Freeze, The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 57-65.

33. Imreh, A törvényhozo székely falu, 104.

34. John Paget, Hungary and Transylvania; with some remarks on their condition, social, political, and economi-
failings of the clergy were likely greater than a bishop would admit publicly, so it is remarkable that Saguna admonished his clergy for careless dress and drunkenness.

Most Romanian parishes had annual monetary incomes of around 50 fl., and only a few urban parishes and regional vicariats enjoyed an income of from 200 to 500 fl. By contrast, the annual average of the tithe compensation alone for Saxon parishes was over 1000 fl., and many Unitarian congregations collected an equal amount in land rents.

One important consequence was in the ability of the churches

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35. Nicolau Popea, Archiepiscopul și metropolitul Andreiu Baron de Șaguna (Sibiu: Tipariul tipografiei archidiocesane, 1879), 162-5. Popea cites pastoral letters of 1846 and 1857; the latter is also in Tulbure, 428-30.
36. Conspectus parochiarum (Reports by all archdiocesan pastors on parish membership, income and schools) in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1862/533.
37. Jakab, loc. cit.; Financial balances of the Unitarian congregations in Roșia Montana and Abrudbánya for 1858-59, in Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariană. Egyházkep­viseleti tanács documents, 1861/140. Boner cites the salaries of two Saxon parsons, 1100 and 2200 fl., of which the minister paid one-tenth in taxes. In his only remark about the Hungarian clergy, he states that they were badly paid, receiving as little as 200 to 500 fl. per year; "The (Hungarian Reformed) Protestant church will not receive pay from the State, as by doing so it is thought its freedom might be circumscribed." Boner, 297, 446, 518.
and parishes to maintain schools in the national language. (See Tables 8, 9 below). The Romanian clergy was therefore at strong disadvantage in its political struggle with the other nationalities' clergy, let alone with the Hungarian aristocracy and Saxon middle class.

Nationalist ideology was one motive for the Romanian bishops' tactical alliance with the Austrian authorities in the 1860s; the opportunity for financial aid was another. In the 1863 state budget subsidies to the Romanian churches accounted for two-thirds of the expenditure of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery for religious and educational purposes. The subsidies subsequently distributed ranged from 50 to 100 fl., doubling the parish income in many cases. Yet there is no direct evidence to support the contemporary Hungarian claim that the Austrians paid Saguna 80,000 fl. for distribution among the clergy so that it would "seduce the people" to support the regime."

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38. Reports by the Finance Ministry on the budget proposals (Staatsvoranschlag) for 1862 and 1863, in MOL D228, 1862/153, 1863/23.

39. In granting 24,000 fl. for the support of the Orthodox clergy in 1861, the state specified that the grants for individual priests be no less than 50 fl., or more than 100 fl. each—Saguna's circular number 480 of May 28 (o.s.), in Tulbure, 442. The subsidy of 18,000 fl. to the Archdiocese of Blaj in 1863 was distributed to 212 different priests in amounts from 20 fl. to 100 fl., averaging 85 fl.; the list of the 212 grants is in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM, 784.

40. The charge was raised by a szolgábíró in Alsó-Fehér, Mihály Kölönte, on July 23, 1863. Kölönte's goal, according to the Orthodox pastor Ioan Benna, was to create fear among the people that the subsidies were only a means toward absolutist oppression. On August 20 Governor Crenневille ordered an interrogation of Kölönte and the Romanian eyewitnesses, and nothing more was heard of the matter. MOL. F263. 1863/4887. In November, 1861, Kölönte had
Given the electoral law of these years, the Romanian voters were at any rate the wealthiest components of Romanian villages and unlikely to be "bribed" by such small sums. The Roman Catholic bishopric was itself the recipient of a subsidy of 20,000 fl. for its clergy in October, 1863 and it is instructive to contrast the mode of its distribution: not in small grants to a large number of parishes, but in grants of 2000 to 4000 fl. to several parishes. The subsidy served not for general support, but for a few long-term construction projects.

Naturally, the imperial subsidies to the Romanians did influence the attitudes of their clergy and laity indirectly, particularly since many activists had a strong faith in the efficacy of education in improving the future of the nation. Bishop Haynald hoped to keep the dependence of his church on state subsidies to a minimum, but he worried that if he made public his opposition to the abolition of the kepe and the assumption of its redemption by the state this would be unpopular among the poorer Szeklers. In view of these political ramifications he sought to coordinate his position with that of the Reformed Church.

41. Alba Iulia. ERC 1863/2350 (Cat. 4).
42. Correspondence of Haynald and Ferenc Kemény (former Court Chancellor and Head Elder of the Reformed Church), October 10 and 15, 1863, in Alba Iulia. ERC 1863/2367 Cat. 37.

accused the Romanians of collecting weapons in preparation for an insurrection; AS Alba Iulia, Prefectura județului Alba de jos 1861/1417. Without any indication of his source, Zoltán Szász cites rumors that the Romanian clergy received the fantastic sum of 800,000 fl. to influence the voters—Szász, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdélyben," 1494.
The size of the parishes reflected their available income and the distribution of the population (see Table 7 above). A Roman Catholic pastor, since celibate, could live better on the same income. Due to their more elaborate liturgical practices, the eastern rite parishes also had to maintain (at least partially) personnel that were not generally included in calculations of the clergy. Gregory L. Freeze has argued in the case of the Russian church that Orthodoxy faced more formidable obstacles to economic rationalization in the nineteenth century than other churches because of the abundance of essential liturgical practices and married functionaries. Throughout Europe in the nineteenth century the parishioner-clergy ratios rose, but for most of the respective religious groups the ratios in Transylvania were considerably lower than in either western Europe or Russia during the same period. Thanks to their varied, generally superior economic support the churches in Transylvania could maintain more parish clergy than those elsewhere in Europe.

The clergy was well provided for partly because it had useful services to provide the state: supplying birth records to the military and warning the people against social disorder and draft evasion, publicizing health regulations and

43. Freeze, 64-5, 459.
44. The ratio for the Catholic clergy in France was 752 in 1848; for the Protestant clergy of northern Europe between 1847 and 1861 it ranged between 1054 and 3164; the ratio for Russian Orthodox parish priests (not including monks, who were very numerous) in 1860 was 1371. Comparative tables in Ibid., 64, 99.
praying for the Emperor. The "recovery" of the Empress (her return from one of her periodic estrangements from the Emperor) in 1862 presented an opportunity for both Sulutiu and Haynald to demonstrate their loyalty to the Emperor by ordering high masses. The annual Catholic high masses and Protestant services in honor of Franz Joseph's birthday on August 18 were political as well as religious rituals, which is evident from the controversies which surrounded them in the 1860s. The function of liturgy for the state was another consequence of the clergy's status as civil servants.

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Official Religion and Popular Religion

Civil duties aside, each pastor sought to inculcate the "official religion" or religious doctrine of his church.

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45. The Unitarian dean in Rimetea, Antal Koronka, responding to official complaints about the uncooperativeness of his clergy in providing birth records in April, 1863, claimed that the military was disrespectful in its dealings with them; the local (Torda county) officials and the presbytery took the side of the clergy. Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariană, Egyházképviseleti tanács jegyzőkönyve, 1863/113. Responding to an official appeal for the clergy to assist the military recruitment, Sulutiu repeated it in his pastoral letter of May 13, 1862-- in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1862/371. A year later, he announced an imperial amnesty for draft resisters who had taken refuge in the Romanian Principalities-- in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM 782. Most fugitives came from the southern regions, where the Orthodox predominated. Šaguna's circular of June 6 (o.s.), 1863 on the matter was an even stronger appeal to the resisters to return home; Sibiu. ABAOR, FS. 1845, 1849, 1869-70.

46. Alba Iulia. ERC 1862/2182 (Cat. 2), and declaration of the Cathedral Chapter of Blaj, in Budapest. MOL, D228. 1862/450.

47. Imreh, A törvényhozó székely falu, 103; See Chapter VIII.
"Popular religion" encompassed behavior patterns which 48 people developed out of "official religion." If the forms of popular religion do not offend official religion or clerical authority, the church may grant them its support. Hence the relationship between official and popular religion is generally a dynamic one, as each is nourished by the other. The strict separation of the two categories is also difficult. On the other hand, truly excrescent forms of popular religion, called folk beliefs, may be strongly religious expressions which meet with clerical condemnation.

The six Christian churches in Transylvania shared a basic religious culture founded on the Bible. Beyond the Bible, theological and political traditions in the churches provided differing answers to key questions which people were facing: nationalism and internationalism, lay and clerical influence, absolutism and liberty, conservatism and modernity. Roman Catholicism had a unique tradition of internationalism, Orthodoxy of conservation, and Unitarianism of liberal tendencies. The Protestant churches were prototypes for lay influence and for national identity, both tendencies on the rise everywhere in the nineteenth century.

Local conditions and political tradition, more than doctrine, lent clarity to the attributes or "meanings" of the churches in Transylvania. All these churches existed

49. This is the thesis of Bouritius, 117-65.
outside Transylvania as well. Their local emergence confirms the observation that in multiethnic or stratified societies, theological formulations can provide legitimacy and a pervasive identifying ethos for different social groups. The Protestant Konfessionsbildung in sixteenth-century Transylvania, by neatly separating the Hungarians and Saxons, fulfilled the same function. All six Christian churches in Transylvania were nearly homogeneous with respect to ethnicity: a fact of great significance in the nineteenth century, when nationality politics were of great import.

Transylvanian Unitarianism inspired political liberalism in such members as Sándor Bölöni Farkas and Elek Jakab by its emphasis on religious toleration and "salvation by character," its adversarial relationship with the Habsburg Catholic Restoration, and its ties with the liberal Unitarians of Great Britain and the United States. An English Unitarian missionary to Transylvania in 1859 also

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51. One of the earliest statistical analyses of the nationalities within the churches used the 1890 census. It showed that in each of the six churches within Transylvania one nationality comprised 89% or more of the total: Lutheran Germans, Hungarian Roman Catholics, Reformed and Unitarians, and Romanian Greek Catholics and Orthodox. Pál Balogh, A népfajok Magyarországon (Budapest: Magyar királyi Vállal- és Közoktatási Minisztérium, 1902), 1072-73.
served as an emissary of the Kossuth emigration there, and in 1861 the Unitarian College in Kolozsvár was the first school in Transylvania to teach English, in 1861. The experience of the Counterreformation also conditioned considerable anti-Habsburg sentiment and liberal activism among the Hungarian Reformed, prompting some Hungarian Catholic courtiers to argue after 1849 that the Revolution had essentially been the work of the Protestants. Many Reformed believed that the struggle for religious rights was one of the Protestant work ethic against ultramontane reaction. But it must be noted that Hungarian Reformed doctrine explicitly favored aristocratic control of the church through the presbyterial supervision and the patronage of congregations. The Lutheran church comprised almost all of the


53. Friedrich Walter, "Die Beteiligung der magyischen Protestanten in der Revolution 1848/49," in Gedenkschrift für Harald Steinacker (1875-1965) (München: Oldenbourg, 1966), 267-76; Friedrich Teutsch, Die kirchlichen Verhältnisse Siebenbürgens (Halle: Verlag von Eugen Strien, 1906), 14-18. Mór Ballagi, the editor of the Protestáns Egyházi és Iskolai Lapok of Budapest, was the leading spokesman in the 1860s of Reformed liberalism and the author of Die Protestantenfrage in Ungarn und die Politik Österreichs (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1860) and A Protestantizmus harca az ultramontanizmus ellen (Pest: Osterlamm Károly, 1867). The writer Lajos Tolnai, after serving as Reformed minister in Marosvásárhely from 1868 to 1884, wrote
Saxons. While it, too, had suffered from the Counterreformation, its strong German identity assured its political loyalty to the Viennese court. The establishment of a Transylvanian branch of the German Gustav Adolph Verein in 1861 to support the church there symbolized the fraternal bond with Greater Germany.

The political tradition, doctrine and practice of the three ritualistic churches contrasted in important ways with those of the Protestants. Succeeding chapters will show that all had a more or less comfortable relationship with the Habsburg authorities; in the case of the Orthodox, relations improved decidedly as the result of the Edict of Toleration of Joseph II in 1781. The most striking doctrinal commonality of these three churches, which contrasts with the Protestants, is in their interpretation of the "communion of saints" mentioned in the Apostles' Creed. While Protestants tend to limit the "saints" to those living in the Church, in the older interpretation the Church Militant (the living) appeals to the Church Triumphant (the saints in heaven) on behalf of the Church Suffering (in purgatory), while the Church Triumphant intercedes on behalf of the other two. Intercessional prayer has tremendous

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a biting satirical memoir about the church oligarchy there, A sötét világ (1894).


implications for iconography, popular piety, and pilgrimage practice.

Doctrinal differences between these three churches concern papal primacy, the *filioque* clause in the credal definition of the Trinity (rejected by the Orthodox), and veneration of statuary (only in Roman Catholicism) versus that of icons. Theologians have also contrasted the greater emphasis in Roman Catholicism on the Passion and suffering and the Orthodox themes of resurrection and future glory. Aside from papal primacy, these distinctions have no overt political significance, but function on the popular level as ambiguous group symbols. The similarities in religious practice are more evident.

Liturgical practice strongly divides the two groups of churches, but the ritualistic churches, to a lesser degree, as well. All celebrated the liturgy in the vernacular except for the Roman Catholics, who celebrated it in Latin. Ritual was minimal among the Unitarians and Reformed, but relatively greater among the Lutherans. The eastern rite liturgies (matins, vespers, Eucharist, and a vast number of festival ceremonies and common blessings) required some twenty different liturgical books for prayers, scriptural readings and chants. These were published in

57. The vernacular replaced Slavonic in the Romanian dioceses since at least the early eighteenth century, but became a subject of controversy among the Greek Catholics a century later; see Chapter VIII.
Romanian beginning in the seventeenth century, and old
copies have been found in very many of the Transylvanian
Romanian parishes. The Romanian Greek Catholic and
Orthodox liturgies differed in only minor details of wording
and music. The eastern rite, and to a lesser extent the
Roman Catholics, practiced a far greater number of ritual
blessings of food, animals, and buildings than is common
today. These in turn gave rise to theologically dubious lay
practices using holy water and foods, in which the ritual-
tic churches more closely resembled each other than they did
the Protestants.

Linguistic and ecclesiastic influences led to religious
syncretism among the Greek Catholics in particular. Contem-
poraries referred to the intrusion of Roman Catholic
practices after the Church Union. These practices included

58. It has been estimated that 2113 titles (in Slavic
and Romanian language), mostly liturgical, were published in
Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia between 1508 and 1830,
comprising as many as two million copies; 508 have been
found on the current territory of Alba county-- Doina Lupan,
"Circulația cărtii vechi românești în județul Alba," in
Episcopia Ortodoxa română de Alba Iulia, Indrumător pastoral
2 (1978), 127-30. András Cserbák argues that the lack of
Hungarian translations for ritual blessings accounts for the
dying out of many popular religious practices, and hence the
ethnic distinctiveness, of the Hungarian Greek Catholics,
because the religious basis of these practices became
obscure; "A magyar görög katolikus népi vallásosság művelődési
háttere," in Gábor Tuskes, ed., "Mert ezt Isten hagyta..."
Tanulmányok a népi vallásosság köréből (Budapest: Magvető,
1986), 300-2. Yet similar Roman Catholic practices survived
and resisted "rationalization" despite the Latin language of
ritual texts.

59. Ghibu, 71. Ghibu noted that in his time the Greek
Catholic priests delivered "incomparably more" sermons than
the Orthodox ones; Ibid., 74.

60. Elek Bartha, "A bizánci liturgia nyomai a
the neglect of the veneration of oriental saints, crosses, icons and gospel books, and the gradual adoption of Roman Catholic saints, statuary, side altars, pews and collection boxes in the churches, and of rosary and other prayer forms, Marian veneration and feast days, catechisms, and forms of address. Such syncretism was less widespread in Transylvania than among the Slavs and Romanians of northeastern Hungary, but all the more controversial because of the unstable numerical equilibrium between the Greek Catholics and Orthodox and the identification of "Latinism" with Hungarian influence there.

Church buildings were the physical and symbolic center of parish life, or, in the metaphor of Mircea Eliade, "the center of the world." In ancient religions and in Christian practice the church was the center of the religious community in this world, a cosmogonic symbol and an opening or gate into paradise. The eastern rite church opens the "imperial door" or Door of Paradise before the altar during the entire Easter week to express the Easter reading, "Christ rose from the grave and opened the doors of Paradise unto us." As "copy of the cosmos," the Byzantine church incarnates and at the same time sanctifies the world. The iconostasis in an eastern rite church is a window into heaven, or a

"meeting place of heaven and earth."

Many Transylvanian Romanian churches in 1860 were small, wooden structures, dark but often crowded with frescoes and icons illuminated eerily by flickering candles. The majority were built in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the Church Union expanded into new regions, but especially after many Orthodox churches and monasteries were destroyed by Austrian cannon during the religious revolt in Transylvania in 1756-61 and in the aftermath of the peasant revolt of 1784-85. Parishes were generally too poor to employ prestigious foreign painters for their decoration. Icons and frescoes during this period were typically painted by local artists, like the Grecu brothers in the area around Hermannstadt. Between 1800 and 1818, the Grecu brothers painted frescoes in many village churches. Perhaps the most remarkable frescoes are those in which Christ is tortured by the same methods as was the leader of the peasant revolt of 1514, in which a man carrying Christ’s cross wears Romanian peasant garb, and in which the Roman

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63. Ware, 276-8.
64. Of the 757 churches in the Archdiocese of Blaj in 1900, 415 were of wood; Șematismul veneratului cler al Arhidiecezei mitropolitanegreco-catolice române de Alba-Iulia și Făgăraș pe anul 1906 (Blaj: Tipografia seminariului arhidiecezană, 1906), 329. On the destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries see Silviu Dragomir, Istoria Desrobirii Religioase a Românilor din Ardeal în secolul XVIII, II (Sibiu: Editura și tiparul Tipografiel arhidiecezane, 1930), 234-42. A good brief description is Gábor Szinte, "Az erdélyi román fatemplomok" [1913], republished in Péter Sas, ed., Ödon Erdély. Művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok, II (Budapest: Magvető, 1986), 429-44.
soldiers wear the costume of Hungarian noblemen.

Different regions of Transylvania had their own icon workshops and characteristic styles, of which that in Nicula near the Greek Catholic episcopal see of Szamosujvar was the most important. Even more "popular" in form than the frescoes and icons on wood were the Transylvanian glass icons, not produced in any other land inhabited by Romanians. The artist portrayed religious scenes in a naive style on ordinary panes of glass, and sold the icons at markets or on the feast day for the patron saint of a church.

The relationship between of Romanian popular piety and folk art was especially vivid in the life of Picu Pâtrut (1818-72), an Orthodox sacristan, poet and miniaturist who lived in Saliste in southern Transylvania almost his entire life. He became a monk in the small monastery of Cheia in Moldavia in 1849 and returned to Saliste, living an ascetic life according to the rule of the Moldavian monastery of Neamț, teaching and serving the parish. In his lifetime he

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65. Ioan Fulea, "Biserici-monumente istorice, pictate de fratii Grecu," in Arhiepiscopia Sibiului-- pagini de istorie (Sibiu: Tiparul tipografiei eparchiale, 1981), 211-26 (with six illustrations); Pâcurariu, 315-20. A similar crucifixion scene was painted in 1809 in the wooden church at Sartás by an artist from Abrudbanya, the birthplace of Șuluțiu, in the Muntii Apuseni; I visited it in June, 1984. Secular influences may have caused a decline in church painting, at least among the Orthodox; Ghibu wrote, referring to these, "Aproape nici o biserică din cele cari s'au făcut între 1830 și 1900 nu e pictată. Opere de artă avem absolut putine." Ghibu confirmed the scarcity of old churches, but stated that the majority of churches were small, simple and devoid of art. He was probably less familiar with the Greek Catholic churches, which were far north of his south Transylvanian home.-- Ghibu, p. 29.
wrote roughly 500 verses, odes and ballads and produced some 34,000 miniatures, drawing chiefly on biblical stories, inspired by his personal piety and by Romanian animal husbandry and village life. None of his works were published during his lifetime, but his verses and religious plays were widely copied and performed, entering Romanian oral tradition anonymously. Only after his death did some of the most famous plays appear in print and his authorship of them become known.

Hungarian and Saxon churches, like the world of which they were "the center," presented a very different appearance. Many were the architectural monuments of Transylvanian Romanesque, Gothic, and Baroque that were visited and carefully described by all the nineteenth-century travellers. Just as the smoky, mystical wooden churches were at the center of the Romanian community, we must consider the fortified churches of the Saxons, Hungarians and Szeklers and the Catholic Baroque the most important symbols for the dominant nationalities. Almost all of the Saxon churches were of medieval origin and surrounded by their own walls and towers, while ten to fourteen fortified Szekler churches

66. Picu Pătruț. Miniaturi și poezie (București: Asociația România, 1985), with original verses and color miniatures by Pătruț, and studies by other authors.

67. Balázs Orbán described how Bishop Haynald "tricked" the Szekler parishioners of Csíkménessag into taking better care of their sixteenth-century winged altar by suggesting that he would remove it to Gyulafehervár for safekeeping; today it is in the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest. A Székelyföld leírása, II (Pest: Rath Mór, 1869), 41; see also Virgil Bierbauer, "A Székelyföld templomairól," [1942], in Sas, ed., II, 403-28.
existed during our period. The greatest period of the fortified churches' construction was the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time the Saxon settlements were regularly threatened by Turkish incursions; the inhabitants took refuge within the walls, which were equipped with granaries and apartments, for months at a time. The Saxons in the nineteenth century were conscious of the symbolic importance of the fortified churches; despite the general tendency to destroy "useless" walls elsewhere in Europe, this happened very rarely among the Saxons. In medium-sized towns like Biertan (the seat of the Lutheran bishop), Cristian and Cisnădie, they symbolized the colonizing and military past and Saxon self-sufficiency and conservatism. The stark Lutheran interiors allowed only the medieval altar pieces, Turkish rugs that were preserved as another military reminder, Latin and German inscriptions and the ubiquitous organs which made their appearance in the eighteenth century.

The restoration of Catholicism in the eighteenth century brought the expropriation of many Protestant churches for the revitalized Catholic parishes, but more importantly a major building program and the restyling of other churches' interiors. Pietas austriaca was the spiritual theme of the

Habsburg resurgence throughout the empire: the expansion of education by the teaching orders, the veneration of "Austrian" saints like St. John Nepomuk but most of all the propagation of Baroque art. Architecture, statuary, and painting, like the Habsburg military and officialdom, brought with them a powerful impression of the alliance between the dynasty and the universal church. The Transylvanian capital city of Kolozsvár, which surrendered this status periodically to Hermannstadt in the eighteenth century and then again in 1863-65, became the chief point of radiation for the Transylvanian Baroque. Many Roman Catholic, and even many Protestant, churches erected in the major cities of the province imitated the Jesuit, Franciscan and Minorite churches in Kolozsvár as did the Greek Catholic cathedral in Blaj. The Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches in Kolozsvár combined traditional Romanian and Baroque elements and also found imitators as the Romanians gained the right to reside in and erect churches in other major cities in this period. The Catholic pretension to a special relationship with the empire was confirmed by the Concordat in 1855, but, as we will see, this relationship had contradictory implications for Bishop Haynald.

Due to wealth or age, Saxon and Hungarian churches


70. Mircea Țoca, Clujul baroc (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1983), 116-25.
could afford European, hence less popular or local, artistic
decoration. Like the painters of Romanian glass icons,
local artists or merchants also sold parishioners such arti-
cles of home devotion as statuary (among the Catholics) and
pictures. In comparison to the Romanian material, there has
been little research on the religious folk art of the
Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania.

A pilgrimage shrine could have an influence on the
popular religion of an entire region or catchment area, 71
known by anthropologists as a Sakrallandschaft.
Pilgrimages were among the most striking points of contact
between official and popular religion in the ritualistic
churches. Hungarian pilgrimage places came about as the
result of a pledge of regular visitation and prayer by
individual lay people after they were saved from a disaster
like an epidemic or invasion or experienced a vision.
Church authorities, initially wary of claims about a vision
or miraculous picture, came to accept the pilgrimage as a
proper form of intercessional prayer directed toward a
saint. Yet the pilgrimage is a distinctive form of pious
activity in that it is initiated by individual lay persons
and does not require the participation of the clergy in most
of its stages. The pilgrimage is a temporary withdrawal or
escape from the tensions and divisions of the local commu-

71. The term originated with Georg Schreiber; cited by
Elek Bartha, A hitélet néprajzi vizsgálata egy zemléni
72. Sándor Bálint, "Adatok a magyar búcsújárás néprajzác-
hoz," Ethnographia 50 (1939), 193.
ty to a larger community represented by fellow believers from other localities. Each shrine has its principal festival dates, customs and historical themes. Pilgrims are bombarded with historical symbols and associations. It is important for us to examine the history of several Hungarian and Transylvanian pilgrimages for what they tell us about the self-perception of the Orthodox and Roman and Greek Catholic communities.

Like elsewhere in the world, the pilgrimages of Hungary and Transylvania in the mid-nineteenth century can be placed into four main categories: international, national, regional, and intervillage. Those with the widest geographical appeal attracted more pilgrims from the wealthiest classes, while those at the opposite end of the scale were pilgrimages of the local peasantry.

The principal shrines in Hungary and Transylvania, like most modern pilgrimages in other countries, were Marian shrines. Since the Council of Ephesus in the fifth century, Mary has been considered the leading saint and supreme intercessor with God. Hungary and Poland were the only countries in nineteenth-century Central Europe for which the

73. Turner, 7-9; the authors state that "...there is something inveterately populist, anarchical, even anticlerical, about pilgrimages in their very essence."--31-2.

74. Turner, 238-9. Their model is based on Catholic shrines of Western Europe and North America, but corresponds to a similar scheme for Hindu shrines in India.

75. Ibid., 148-52. The increase in Marian devotion and in the membership of female religious orders in nineteenth-century Transylvania, like elsewhere in Europe, accompanied the relative feminization of lay piety and religious personnel.
Virgin Mary held the status of patron saint. St. Stephen ascribed his victory to Mary, the "Great Lady of Hungary" and Maria Theresa gave Hungary the title Regnum Marianum in the eighteenth century. Most Hungarian coins struck between 1458 and 1848 carried the portrait of Mary with child on one side and the inscription Patrona Hungariae.

The most revered shrine of Austrian and Hungarian Catholics in the nineteenth century was Mariaville in Styria. The Hungarian King Lajos had dedicated a chapel to Our Lady of Hungary there in 1363 following a victory over the Turks. I noted in Chapter I the political significance of the pilgrimage there led by Scitovszky in 1857.

Two pilgrimage shrines of the Transylvanians belonged to the second category because of their broad geographical catchment area, social prestige and national symbolism: Csíksomlyó and Máriapócs. Csíksomlyó will be discussed in

76. Arnold Ipolyi, Magyar mythológia (Budapest: Zajti Ferencz, 1929), vol. 1, 80-1; Kornel Fux and Zsuzsanna Hölgyéne Angelotti, Magyar penzérmék és papírpénzek (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1981), 48-73; Emil Unger, "Szűz Mária alakja a magyar pénzeken," Vigilia 1987/5, 328-32. Turner notes that while Mary is the most universal saint, she "has in practice become, in each of her numerous images, exclusive patroness of a given community, region, city or nation. Wherever she has become such a symbol of xenophobic localism, political structure has subverted communitas."—171.

Chapter VI. The church in Máriapócs, a village now located in Szabolcs county of present-day Hungary, became a shrine after tears were reported on its painting of Mary in 1696 and 1715. Catholic Church and Habsburg officials confirmed the reports, and the church drew increasing numbers of pilgrims. In 1731 a Greek Catholic church was built there in Baroque style, and 25 years later a monastery for the Greek Catholic monks who played a major part in the administration of the pilgrimage. The veneration at Máriapócs was Austrian Baroque in origin, and it attracted Hungarian, Ruthenian and Romanian Catholics of both rites. All three peoples contributed their own customs to the ethnography of the pilgrimage, but their common worship was a major factor in the religious syncretism and Magyarization of the Greek Catholics in the surrounding area.

Máriapócs was the chief shrine for the more Hungarophile Romanian Greek Catholics of the diocese of Nagyvárad and bordering areas of Transylvania. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were several annual feasts attracting different social and ethnic categories of pilgrims, for an estimated total of 400,000 per year. Like at other Hungarian pilgrimages, pilgrims to Máriapócs brought-- or bought-- locally-made wax offertory figurines. Such large gatherings of people with time took on the character

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78. Cserbák, 304-5. The aesthetic aspect of monastery liturgies is important for their role as shrines, especially in the eastern rite. Outstanding icons and music heightened the religious experience.
of a modern carnival, with not only hymnsinging and prayers but also a heavy commerce in holy pictures and souvenirs.

There is little written record of the regional pilgrimages in Transylvania. Very little has been written about the pilgrimages frequented chiefly by Romanians. The attendance of many Hungarians of the wealthier classes at the national pilgrimages in Austria and Hungary attracted the attention of the secular, urban intellectuals. There were few wealthy Romanians, and they may have attended Hungarian shrines with an eye to their own prestige. Orthodox pilgrimage tradition generally centered around monasteries, yet most of the monasteries in Transylvania were destroyed in the eighteenth century. There are reports of two Greek Catholic Marian shrines which were regional pilgrimage centers for the Transylvanian Romanians, Bikszád in Máramaros county and Nicula, the site of the glass icon workshop near Szamosújvár. Each was the location of a medieval monastery predating the church union.

The history of the Hungarian regional pilgrimage on Szent-Anna-tó (Lake St. Anne) in the mountains between Csík and Haromszék merits examination because it illustrates several aspects of the relationship between folk belief, popular religion and the official church at a pilgrimage.

79. Bálint, 193-8; Cserbák, 305; Péter Hársfalvi, "A magyar Lourdes: Máriapócs," História 5, 5-6 (1983), 55-8. The article by Hársfalvi, and the report on Máriapócs by Oszkár Jászi in 1910 on which it is partly based, are ironic and anticlerical in tone.

80. Cserbák, 304. On Bikszád and Nicula, see Chapter VIII.
Some people believed that the Szeklers had built an altar to a pre-Christian god by the side of the lake. After the Christianization of the country the altar was destroyed, and a chapel dedicated to St. Anne built in its place. Another local legend explained the origin of the lake and the chapel differently. It stated that a local maiden, Anne, called down a curse on an oppressive landlord and his castle. Because the curse was justified, God destroyed the castle and created the lake in its place. As a result Anne built a chapel by the side of the lake and lived a holy life thereafter. The semiannual pilgrimages attracted twenty thousand people during some years in the nineteenth century. The officers corps of the Szekler border regiment participated in the pilgrimage procession, music and dances. The celebrations became increasingly disorderly, and finally the pilgrimage was banned. In 1860 a respected local seer (mondó ember) announced that the saint had appeared to him and declared that life in the Szekler region and the political situation in Hungary would not improve until the pilgrimage was revived. No clergymen responded to his announcement, but many people followed his call to assemble there on St. Anne’s day. He appealed to Haynald for the reestablishment of the pilgrimage, but without success.

81. Similarly, the Apostolic Visitor to the Csango region of Moldavia reported that one village pilgrimage there gave rise to disgraceful drunkenness and parodies of the Orthodox clergy. Giuseppe Tomassi to Cardinal Barnabo, December 10, 1858, in DSSS, 383-4.

82. Orbán, III (1869), 73-5. One version of the legend cited by Orbán appeared in the 1861 issue of the Háromszék
The Catholic pilgrimage to Borszék at the end of the resort season there on St. Stephen's day, August 20, was apparently less objectionable to the church authorities. Orbán remarks that "half the Gyergyó region" regularly attended.

Small-scale, intervillage pilgrimages, like the "valley shrines" of Spain, may relate most directly to the pilgrim's everyday life. The association with a lake or holy fountain and its pre-Christian tradition is common at shrines. Records of local pilgrimages are extremely rare, but it is known that the feast days of churches' patron saints frequently attracted visitors from outside the immediate parish. The sites of former Romanian monasteries that had been destroyed in the eighteenth century fall into this category; parish priests would appear there on such feast days to minister to the pilgrims. Such appears to have been the case with the Orthodox monastery church at Rimeți in an isolated gorge in the Munții Apuseni. The monastery was destroyed twice in the eighteenth century, when its monks rallied the people during the religious revolt of 1756-61, then again after the peasant revolt in 1785. The church was

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yearbook. Ipolyi, II, 254, noted the pilgrimage in passing. Johann Michael Salzer, a professor at the Gymnasium in Mediasch, visited the lake between 1855 and 1857. He wrote that the chapel was a ruin, but pilgrims still came there every year on St. Anne's day carrying crosses and wreaths of roses—Salzer, Reisebilder aus Siebenbürgen (Hermannstadt: Theodor Steinhaussen, 1860), 125.

83. Orbán, II, 121.

84. Turner, 239; William A. Christian, Jr., Person and God in a Spanish Valley (New York: Seminar Press, 1972), 61-78; Ipolyi, II, 248; Salzer, 124; Bálint, 196.
dedicated to the Spring of Healing or Spring of the Mother of God, the only Orthodox Marian feast during the week of Easter. On this day, people came to receive water from the fountain under the church that had been blessed by the local priest. The Roman Catholics near Toplița, in Torda county on the border of Csík, gathered during the nineteenth century at a newly built chapel near some old ruins on the feast of SS. Peter and Paul. The Szeklers believed that the ruins marked the site of a Hungarian monastery, but more likely they were the remains of a destroyed Orthodox monastery. The Romanians of several villages north of Reghin maintained the oral tradition of a medieval Orthodox monastery there, and annually assembled at its ruins on Pentecost.

A peculiarity of Transylvanian Orthodox piety was the


86. Orbán, II, 137. The latter conclusion was reached by the historian László Kováry. László Székely lists eleven other intervillage shrines in Csík and Gyergyó, with their pilgrimage dates: "A csíki székelyek aszkézise," Vigilia 42,3 (1977), 164.

87. Nicolae Feier, "Mănăstirea "Ruga" de la Gledin. Legenda sau istorie?" in Arhiepiscopia Ortodoxă Română a Vadului, Feleacului și Clujului, Indrumător bisericesc, misionar și patriot 8 (1985), 85-7. No such ruins could be identified by the author, but he cites three folk songs about the monastery’s founding.
veneration of shrines in the Romanian Principalities. Several monasteries and bishoprics in the valleys on the far slope of the Carpathians long exerted an influence in Transylvania, and were commonly visited by transhumant shepherds. The ballad of Master Manole, dealing with the medieval founding of the Argeș Monastery, was popular in Transylvania as well as Wallachia. The hermitage in the Ialomita gorge across the border from Kronstadt attracted many visitors from Transylvania, who ascribed healing powers to the monks there. In cases of incurable disease, wrote Salzer, the Ialomita hermitage was the last resort. He knew of a Romanian from near Mediasch who sold his livestock in 1856 to finance a pilgrimage to Ialomita with his ill son.

Transylvanian shrines were often also the sites of gatherings not strictly religious in nature, but that were important social events and interconfessional: health resorts and matchmaking fairs. Shrines often developed around springs, and in the case of Borszék the resort (of nineteenth-century provenance) and the shrine coincided. The most


89. Salzer, 183-4. Boner apparently visited the same hermitage (Boner, 281-2), but took a more lugubrious view of its inhabitants and their lifestyle.
important resort in nineteenth-century Transylvania, Előpatak in Háromszék, was not in itself a religious shrine. The cream of Transylvanian society congregated there each summer, including several bishops, and aristocrats and royalty from neighboring countries as well. The Romanian bishops would meet each other and their colleagues and other political leaders from south of the Carpathians. Prince Miloš Obrenović of Serbia spent much of his exile there and built an Orthodox church before his return to the throne in 1858. On the opposite end of the social scale, the matchmaking fair (leányvásár, tîrgul de fete) was a basic institution for both Hungarians and Romanians. It was the chief means for young peasants to meet marriageable counterparts from other villages. Two of the most important mating fairs were at the Greek Catholic pilgrimage to Máriapócs on the feast of the prophet Elijah, July 20, and in the Gaina range of the Munții Apuseni near the watershed of three rivers. Priests performed the betrothal ceremonies, which were accompanied by traditional dances and dramatic performances. Not only Hungarian Catholics, but Reformed as well often frequented the matchmaking fairs at nearby shrines.

The celebration of church feasts was a community event in ordinary villages as well as at the major shrines. The major church seasons and feasts--Advent and Christmas, New Years and Epiphany, Lent and Easter, and Pentecost--fear-

90. On the connection of Şaguna and Şuluţiu with Előpatak, see VIII-IX.
91. Balint, 198.
tured many popular customs, of which the most colorful were the dramatic presentations. Among the best-known were the nativity plays (bethlehemes játékok) performed by groups of ten Roman Catholic villagers in the Szekler region during the Christmas season. Somewhat similar were the Romanian Christmas plays, called Irozii (Kings or Magi). Picu Pătruț composed several between 1837 and 1841, which were widely performed thereafter. The Roman Catholic tradition of passion plays was unknown among the Romanians, but Pătruț wrote a Romanian passion play in 1852. It became known throughout the Săliște area and as far away as Blaj and Kronstadt.

Despite ethnic and local variations too numerous to mention, it is fair to emphasize the basic similarity of the religious themes. This was true especially in Transylvania, where the nationalities shared many customs that were unknown in Hungary proper. The clergy led public liturgical processions on the most important feast days, but

92. The performers were welcome in neighboring villages, including many Protestant ones, during Christmas week. In the Szekler Bethlehem play cited by Orbán (II, 151-6), the dialogue of the five shepherds includes many Romanian passages. Orbán explains this fact by the desire for a more realistic portrayal, since most shepherds in the region were Romanians. It is plausible that some of the players were partially Magyarized Greek Catholics; see Chapter VII.


94. Géza Roheim, Magyar néphit és népszokások (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1925), 334-9; Tekla Dömötör, Naptári ünnepek--népi színjátszás (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1979), 95. The Pentecost dances of the Lutheran Csangos south of Kronstadt (Roheim, 205-13) were unlike those of any other Hungarians, but similar to the Romanian călugă practiced in both Transylvania and south of the Carpathians.
other public processions of modern or older origin were also common. For instance, the young men of the town of Gyergyószentmiklós would mark the beginning of Lent by conducting the pastor from the rectory to church for the Ash Wednesday mass while singing the Rákóczi March, while every Easter the people of Szekler villages would conduct a procession around their crops and pray for a good harvest. These customs were most common among Roman Catholics, but also practiced by other communities. It is often difficult to determine whether they developed from pre-Christian practices or from Christian liturgies that the other religious groups later abandoned. Many holiday customs transcended ethnic differences, and in the case of the dramatic ones the dividing line was most often between the ritualistic churches and the Protestants.

From the fifteenth century on the Hungarians, regardless of religion, commonly used names for the months based on the church feasts. They were still common in Hungarian correspondence in the 1860s:

Most churches used the Gregorian calendar, but the Greek Catholics and Orthodox used the Julian calendar, which was twelve days later, for their liturgical cycle. This and other peculiarities of the liturgical calendar meant that the dates of religious feast days, the chief community celebrations, were different for the Romanians. Since baptism, confirmation, and as a rule weddings, Christening relations (Godparents) and elementary schools were separated according to religion, this meant that the Romanians shared almost no social events with the other nationalities. The disjuncture of calendars grows in significance if one considers that calendar customs are generally oriented toward large groups, hence community-building. The life-cycle customs, more strictly controlled by the churches, do not build community in the same way because they are performed for individuals, hence atomizing.

96. Dömötör, Naptári ünnepek, 52.

Differences in the church calendar also affected work practices, since the churches discouraged physical work on feast days and fasting often reduced the capacity to work. The eastern church had forty feast days in addition to Sundays when work was discouraged, and fast days, much more strict than even those of the Roman Catholics, comprised one third to over half of the year. Barițiu charged that the large number of holidays in the Romanian churches was an obstacle to economic and cultural progress. He appealed to the priests: "Dear fathers, let us not keep the people in blindness, let us not force them to observe the church holidays." County officials complained in 1862 that the Romanian clergy was encouraging people to believe that natural disasters could be prevented by abstaining from work on not only the established holy days, but others as well. Șuluțiu denounced such a view as "superstition" and assured his flock that diligence was the chief source of material well-


98. Ware, 304-7. Kligman cites a figure of 200 days (The Wedding of the Dead, 62); Boner, one-half (p. 426); Aurel Raduțiu's historical study yields a far lower figure for state-approved holidays: "Timp de lucru și zile de sărbătoare în Transilvania (sec. XVII-XVIII)," in Civilizație medievală și modernă românească. Studii istorice (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia, 1985), 215-33. Boner cited a contemporary writer's view that the harshness of Orthodox fasting led to a greater number of murders during Lent, and suggested that fasting "may also have something to do with the indolence of the people."

Such clerical admonitions against popular outgrowths of traditional Christian practices had become rare by the nineteenth century. Protestant ministers during the Reformation railed against identifiably Catholic or nonscriptural practices such as the dramatic presentations and the blessing of crops and buildings. Their sanctions were mostly successful, while the non-Protestant clergy was less disturbed by these practices and they survived in their communities. An ironic consequence was that Protestant villagers were sometimes not only attracted to the Catholic dramatic presentations for entertainment, but would resort to the services of the Catholic clergy for the blessing of crops, animals and buildings. Rituals for special circumstances appealed to the peasants' sense of magic, and they might go to churches other than their own if it did not offer satisfying rituals. For this reason many Hungarians and Saxons regarded masses or curses said by Romanian priests to be especially effective, and would request them in cases of great need or enmity.

100. Alsó-Fehér county to Crenneville, May 9, 1862; Crenneville to Şulutiu, May 10, 1862; pastoral letter of Şulutiu, July 28, 1862—AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/565.
102. Olga Nagy, "Vallásos élet Havadon. A népi vallásosság mint integráló erő," in Tüskes, ed., 502-3. A Hungarian ethnographer reported that Szeklers sometimes had an Orthodox mass said at the time of their Catholic wedding in order to "fix" it. Lajos Balázs, "Adatok a Csíkszentdomokosi lakodalom egykori hiedelemvilágához," in Acta Hargitensia I (Miercurea-Ciuc, 1980), 248. The practice may derive from the former religious adherence of the people involved, as the village earlier had a large number of
Many beliefs concerning curses, spirits and death were prevalent in rural society. Transylvanians of all nationalities and religions, for instance, continued during the 1860s to bury the dead with articles that would assist them on their journey to heaven: bread, candles, and money. Boner wrote that many Saxons and Szeklers believed in witches, while an Orthodox priest asserted that "the bad harvest was owing to the number of witches in the land, and it would not be better until they were exterminated."

Urban intellectuals viewed such customs scornfully, as superstitions. The case of the exhumation of a person believed to be a strigoi (witch) in August, 1862 is instructive. Members of the Romanian village of Peșteana in Hunyad county, which was suffering from a cattle plague, sought to right their misfortune by digging up the suspected person and impaling him. The prefect complained indignantly to Governor Crenneville about the incident, and he called on Șuluțiu to impress upon his clergy and people the shamefulness of the practice. Șuluțiu delivered the requested admonishment, after a delay of two months, in his circular of November 22. Describing the practice in detail, he concluded:

Magyarized Greek Catholics; see Chapter VII.

103. Roheim, 163-78; Boner, 368. Referring to the Romanian spells relating to the weather, the Saxon Friedrich Muller wrote in 1854 (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hexenglaubens und des Hexenprocesses in Siebenbürgen) that Romanian priests were experts in the prevention of hail; cited by Ovidiu Bîrlă, Ștoria folcloristicii românești (București: Editura enciclopedică română, 1974), 113.
Therefore we remind you and demand, as we have repeatedly in the past, to unceasingly ensure that such abuses, harmful to religion and compromising to our nation itself, not happen again. (104)

Whether or not Romanian clergymen of the type described by Boner were common, Şuľuţiu considered such incidents harmful to national prestige.

Church records of the period are not as informative about popular religion and folk beliefs as later ethnographic studies would lead one to hope. Higher education predisposed many clergymen to be unsympathetic to popular practices despite their rural origins. Popular dances, songs, and legends were often suspect because of the pre-Christian beliefs which underlay many of them. Hence the periodic church regulations against dancing and singing did not arise solely from moral Puritanism. Despite the vividness of Roman Catholic popular religion, it is interesting that Roman Catholic clergymen were less helpful to pioneer ethnographers than their colleagues in the other churches.

104. Letter of Crenneville to Şuľuţiu, September 18, 1862, and circular of Şuľuţiu, November 22. AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/962. There is no evidence here of further correspondence on the matter.

105. Ipolyi, a Catholic pastor in Pozsony county in Hungary, stated in his 1854 work that folk beliefs supplied the "basic text" of legends, ballads and fairy tales, and the sources for these tales subscribed to the beliefs even if they were ashamed to admit it. (I, 25). Olga Nagy found that the legends of saints' lives survived only in Catholic villages, since belief in them was a precondition for their maintenance in oral tradition (Nagy, 503).

106. Thus Ipolyi complained that his written requests to acquaintances for folk material received a very modest response. One correspondent wrote that "my nearly thirty letters on this matter had no success, [my] good friends even declined to reply to such requests..."--I, 31. János Kriza and his friends had little luck in their attempts to
A minority of clergymen did investigate ballads and superstitions and became the first ethnographers of their respective nations. Bishop Šaguna appealed to his clergy and teachers in an 1859 pastoral letter to send popular tales and songs to the ethnographer Marienescu. It is unclear how much assistance they provided him, since most of his data predated 1859. The typical method of collection was for the clergy and teachers to have students in the church schools collect material from their own villages. The interest in the spiritual world of uneducated common people was atypical for the intelligentsia in general, and several clerical pioneer ethnographers of the 1860s stood out also for their moderately liberal political views. Three of the most important were János Kriza, Ioan Micu Moldovan and Franz Obert.

The aristocratic establishment in the Erdélyi Múzeum-Egylet scornfully rejected the Unitarian minister János Kriza’s lecture in 1860 on popular Szekler ballads, and some complained about anti-aristocratic elements in the ballads he published in 1863. Yet in 1861, in what was considered a stunning upset, he was elected Unitarian Bishop. Most of his material came from Unitarian ministers and school-teachers. The presbytery disliked his preoccupation with collect Szekler ballads through the Catholic clergy between 1862 and 1866, and as a result Csík and Gyergyó are not represented in his publications. János Faragó, "János Kriza és a Vadrózsák," in Antal Árpád et al., Kriza János (Kolozsvár: Dacia, 1971), 105-7. 107. Birlea, 138; Tulbure, 226-7.
folk tales and sought to undermine it by giving him other things to do.

Franz Obert, a veteran of the revolution of 1848 in Leipzig and author of radical poetry, collected Romanian folk tales while serving as professor at the Lutheran Gymnasium in Mediasch and before becoming a village parson in 1860. Later he was elected to the Transylvanian diet and the Reichsrat, where he joined the liberal opposition and incurred the wrath of the Saxon establishment. Ioan Micu Moldovan was a Greek Catholic professor and later canon in Blaj who collected folk ballads beginning in 1862; he was also a supporter of the movement for lay participation in Greek Catholic church synods, and editor of the protocols of the synod of Blaj in 1868. Their intellectual preoccupations were symptomatic of their social and political attitudes.

A special case in the history of clerical ethnographers was the Moldavian Csango Catholic priest, Incze János

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108. Faragó, 100-105, 137-41. On Kriza’s election: Kelemen Gál, "Kriza János püspökéké választása," Keresztény Magvető 89 (1983), 163-70. It should be noted that the important mainstream Protestant intellectuals Imre Mikó and Pál Gyulai fully supported his work. A contemporary wrote concerning his deficient church leadership: "Igen ritka, becsületes, dérek ember, de véghetetlen gyenge, erélytelen püspök volt, aki a gyűléseken sokszor azt sem tudta, hogy mirol foly a tanácskozás." (Gál, 169).


110. Bîrlea, 198-200.
Petrás. Petrás (1813-86) studied in Eger, where he became a Minorite monk and was ordained in 1836. He returned to the Csango villages as a missionary, and served in a parish there from 1838 until his death. Coming into contact with the scholar Döbrentei from Pest, he sent many reports to the Hungarian Academy concerning Csango religious life, especially texts of hymns. Döbrentei published Petras' answers to his questionnaire on Csango life and fifty-two of his song texts in 1842. After 1868, Petrás was in regular contact with the Szent-László Társulat in Pest, and published many additional song texts.

Church social functions extended beyond liturgical or pious practices. All churches were a pillar of the social order in the traditional Transylvanian community. One example of this was the strict regulation of seating arrangements in most of the church buildings during liturgies. Men and women were segregated, and church functionaries, people of higher birth and other prestigious families enjoyed places of honor that could be inherited or purchased. Poor members of the community were seated in the rear or not at all. In a ritual context, this practice reflected and served to legitimate the stratified nature of the village or town, and therefore the civil authorities insisted on its observance. Greek Catholic churches in Transylvania also

112. On this society, see Chapter IX.
had pews with prescribed seating arrangements, but Orthodox churches were as a rule without pews. As the result of the peasant emancipation and increasing social mobility in the nineteenth century, many villages adopted seating by family rather than social category, while others were content to observe only the segregation of the sexes.

The churches sought to ensure the practice of baptism, church marriage and attendance at services by their members, but also acted in conjunction with the civil authorities to identify and punish adultery, theft, drunkenness, and the disturbance of the Sunday rest by dancing or rowdiness. The parish court (H. megyeszék) was very often the court of first instance, particularly in the religiously homogenous villages of the Szekler region. The civil authorities, for their part, considered the observance of religious norms a component of responsible citizenship. Those rare individuals who defied community censure by not attending church regularly or cohabited without church marriage were considered socially dangerous. In the military frontier, the authorities required attendance at matins, sermon, mass and

113. Ernő Tárkány Szűcs, Magyar jogi népszakások (Budapest: Gondolat, 1981), 100-3; Márton Tarisznyás, Gyergyó történeti néprajza (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1982), 236-7; Imreh, 118; Hans-Achim Schubert, Nachbarschaft und Modernisierung. Eine historische Soziologie traditionaler Lokalgruppen am Beispiel Siebenbürgens (Köln: Böhlau, 1980), 163; Fabini, 54; Boner, 64; Ware, 275-6. The presence of pews, very unusual in the Orthodox world, can be observed today in many old Transylvanian churches that were formerly Greek Catholic, like the Lipoveni church in Gyulafehérvár referred to in Chapter VIII.

114. The word megye, used elsewhere to denote county, often meant parish in the Szekler region.
vespers every Sunday, at Sunday school by the children, and confession at Eastertime. Attendance was also important because official announcements were often read after the service. The ringing of church bells at dawn, noon and sundown punctuated daily life in all communities. Many rural Romanian churches had not a bell but a wooden sounding board called a toaca.

The coherence of the church and village community was especially well-developed in the Fundus Regius through the system of Nachbarschaft. Each locality and parish contained several of these, which heightened religious, economic, and administrative cooperation on the most local level. The statute of each Nachbarschaft specified penalties for unethical and disorderly behavior in and outside the church. The Nachbarvater called all members to a Versöhnabend four times each year, where feuds and ill feelings were put aside in a quasiliturgical ceremony of Christian reconciliation. A German contemporary stated that the Nachbarschaft, which was common among the Romanians as well as the Saxons of the Fundus Regius, led to an admirable absence of criminality and begging, and to good cooperation

115. Imreh, A törvényhozó Székely falu, 99, 103-4, 108-16; Ibid., "Strămoși și moravuri în scaunul filial Cristur," in Viata cotidiană la Secui, 42-7; Tarisznyás, 240-1. The bell-ringer collected special fees when ringing to announce the death of a community member. In a poetic passage of his memoirs, Franz Obert recalled that the churchbells, near and far, of neighboring churches and villages often rang one after another, creating a peculiar sense of communion; "Lebenserinnerungen," ms. pp. 21-3, in AS Sibiu, Fondul Franz Obert.
between the clergy, elders and officials. While not contesting this picture, foreigners were struck by the villagers' uniformity of thought, collective spirit, and lack of individual spontaneity, particularly among the Saxons. There was no counterpart to the Nachbarschaft in the counties.

The punitive authority of the churches declined with time, but each parish and congregation still exercised a strong influence on the moral behavior of the villagers. This was especially true in the case of the Protestant churches, where liturgical practices played a relatively minor role. Presbytery records show that Reformed congregations exacted fines, public censure or, in the most grievous cases, the denial of the sacraments and virtual exclusion from the community. Lutheran parishes practiced public censure with the use of a "stone of shame" hung around the neck of the offender. In contrast to the relative weakness of ritual practices, the Reformed Church very successfully inculcated the Calvinist ethic of sobriety and diligence. The punishment of public penance, or eklézsiakövetés, was still not uncommon in the mid-nineteenth century and very powerful and feared in the Reformed congregations. Similar practices were more rarely recorded in Roman Catholic parishes.


118. Imreh, A törvényhozó székely falu, 111-12; Boner, 373; Olga Nagy, "A vallasos elet Havadon (A népi vallásosság
A more extreme form of sanction, anathema, was occasionally practiced in the ritualistic churches. Anathema or excommunication were rare in the Roman Catholic Church by the nineteenth century. But well-informed churchmen could hardly be ignorant of Pope Pius IX's writ of excommunication in 1860 against Italians who accepted civil office in the territories formerly ruled by the Pope:

...they have been excommunicated and fallen subject to the various other punishments of the Church... and we state the excommunication against them anew, as well as that in punishment they shall be deprived of every privilege, grace and favor they had been accorded by us or our predecessors, the Roman Popes... 119

Some sources unfriendly to the Romanian clergy charged that they practiced anathema or a curse against disobedient parishioners. Boner and Úrmosy wrote that the pastors controlled the voting in the electoral campaign of 1863 by the threefold solemn invocation of afurisenie (anathema) in church. Offenders were threatened with various forms of personal and family disaster including final damnation. 120


120. "...a ki ez ellen merészelt volna tenni: megnyomókodik, megsántul, siketül, vakul, gyermekileg szerencsétlen lesz, marhajából, vagyonából kipusztul s a csapások minden kigondolható nemi utolérik harmadizig; és végre a pokolban tüzes üstben szarvas ordogok fűzik meg."-- Lajos Úrmosy, Tizenhét év Erdély történetéből, II (Temesvár: Nyomtatott a Csanád-egyházmegyei könyvsajton, 1894.) Boner, 369, is less poetic: "Not only you, but your children will be cursed, if you vote for the Count-- words of the pope at B--, to those who voted at the elections for a well-known Hungarian nobleman, a man of great nobility. Those who did
Boner reported that in one sermon a Romanian priest told his hearers that a stone had fallen from heaven, and in it was a letter to Bishop Schaguna, in which God ordered him to tell the people, that if they did not fast and pray more regularly, and lead a better life, He would send an army of grasshoppers into the land...and they would destroy their harvests, and would afterwards attack them, and the people would not be able to shake them off.

Chided by the Lutheran parson for his exaggeration, the poapa replied:

"It is all very well for you to laugh, but your people are more sensible; mine are stupid; and when I set to work with them, I am forced to give hard blows...I must startle and frighten them. Were I to talk as you do, it would have no effect whatever."121

Such stories were denied by the Romanian press, and certainly fail to explain the Romanian electoral success in 1863. However, in view of oriental liturgical practices and the poverty of the Romanian flock they are plausible. No accounts have come down to us of politically motivated anathema by the Hungarian or Saxon clergy during this period. On the other hand "secular anathema," or the public ostracism of collaborators or political dissidents, was common. Schmerling's Hungarian allies became socially "impossible" in Hungary after 1867.

121. Boner, 368-9. Boner compared the "blind obedience" of the "grossly ignorant" clergy to that of the Catholic priests in Ireland.

122. A prime example is the Transylvanian journalist László König, who became very unpopular after publicly
The ability of the clergy to enforce its authority in society depended upon the recognized legitimacy of that authority. In one sense this was a formal legal distinction. The Transylvanian state provided its assistance in the enforcement of canon law in traditional society. The exclusivity of Catholic canon law was abandoned in the sixteenth century, and the parallelism of other churches’ canon law gradually recognized over the next three centuries, but all ecclesiastic jurisdiction in civil affairs was finally abolished only in 1895. Religious belief allowed considerable power to a curse, anathema or moral sanction. If a person feared the efficacy of such measures by the clergy or religious community, their power over him was real. Religious feeling in many ways enhanced the ability of the clergy to engage in nationalist politics. It remains to be seen how politics, and even religious feeling, worked during this time to undermine clerical authority.

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Secularization

Secularization was a central phenomenon in both western and central Europe, including Hungary, during the generation


124. Kligman documented the capacity of belief in spirits to cause illness, trances and healing during an archaic dance festival in southern Romania in the 1970s: Căluș, 66-83.
following 1848. Its meaning broadened beyond the original sense of state expropriation of church lands to encompass the areas of politics and culture. The term was very often polemical: for liberals it meant the liberation from church tutelage and obscurantism, while conservatives deplored it as de-Christianization and the renunciation of a fundamental cultural tradition. A useful definition is that of Peter L. Berger: "By secularization we mean the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols." In terms of mentality, "an increasing number of individuals... look upon the world or their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations." There is a third component of secularization that does not figure in this definition: beyond the loosening of institutional bonds and the change in personal outlook, theological and structural impulses, the "secularization of religion," transformed the churches themselves. The areas of education, the press, and politics offer evidence concerning secularization in


Hungarian religious writers of the mid-nineteenth century, both Protestant and Catholic, complained of declining attendance in church, hostility toward the clergy, a refusal to pay clerical tithes and salaries, and a neglect of religious education and prayer in the family. Bishop Bodola wrote in his circular of April 23, 1863 that "religious fervor-- not everywhere, and in everything, but generally-- has degenerated into Phariseeism, lukewarmness, or even icecoldness." He designated this problem as the chief concern of the Dés synod of the following June. Saxon and, more rarely, Romanian writers reported similar cases.

Education had an enormous influence on religious attitudes, since almost all schools were church-run. Even the state Gymnasium in Hermannstadt was still essentially a Catholic institution. Instructors were either clergymen or else closely supervised by the church. Where students at secondary schools came from various religious backgrounds, the local churches commonly provided instructors in religion for their coreligionists who were excused from instruction in the religion which controlled the school.


128. Documents concerning the 75 Orthodox pupils in the Roman Catholic and Lutheran schools in Kronstadt in 1860-61, in Sibiu, AMOR 1861/645.
Table 8: Elementary School Enrollment, 1860-65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Population:Pupil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Catholic</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>34,577</td>
<td>18.4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom. Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,563</td>
<td>16.4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>24,731</td>
<td>12.8:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>12.3:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>29,803</td>
<td>6.8:1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The very incomplete, only very roughly comparable comparable data for elementary school attendance permit the conclusion that the Lutherans were by far the most successful in enrolling the youth in elementary schools, the Reformed and Unitarians less so, and the three ritualistic churches least of all. This conclusion is confirmed by Karoly Keleti, who had access to unpublished data for 1869. He calculated that the percentage of Transylvanian school-age children who actually enrolled was 84% for the Lutherans, 48% for the Unitarians, 42% for the Reformed, 41% for the Roman Catholic, 35% for the Greek Catholic, and 31% for the Orthodox; according to nationality, 80% for Germans, 42% for Hungarians, and 33% for Romanians.

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130. Keleti, 373. The figures calculated by the Austrian authorities before 1848 were considerably higher, but except
mental explanation is the system of economic support for the schools referred to earlier. The geographic distribution of the population was also important. The urban concentration of the Hungarian Protestants and especially the Lutherans was greater, and this led to larger and wealthier congregations to support the schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Secondary School Enrollment, 1857</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: Pupils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The profile of secondary school attendance presents a hierarchy that differs in interesting ways from that for elementary school enrollment. In all cases the percentage of elementary school pupils who advanced to secondary school was low, but Greek Catholics were more than twice as likely for those of the Unitarian schools (80-84% enrollment) the hierarchy was similar to that presented by Keleti. See Miskolczy, "Erdély a reformkorban (1830-1848)," 1259.

131. According to Miskolczy, contemporaries blamed poverty for poor school attendance for a different reason: the poor peasants needed their children’s labor. Ibid., 1260. This in turn helps to account for the reluctance of the poor population to provide comparable material support for the schools, but also the limited capacity of poor villages to supply their schools even if they desired to do so. The two explanations are closely interrelated.

as Orthodox to attend secondary schools, while a far higher percentage of Roman Catholic youth attended secondary schools than in the case of the Protestants. In these cases the tremendous concentrated wealth of the Catholic bishoprics and schools, and the availability of the monastic clergy of the Latin rite as a teaching force, came into play. The consequence was that, in contrast to the general educational level of their population, Catholics constituted a disproportionately large segment of the educated elite among both the Romanians and Hungarians; in terms of education the Catholic community was polarized. Higher education brought exposure to religiously corrosive modern ideas, and it is reasonable to suppose that these proportions had implications for the degree of secularization.

Yet it is important to distinguish the nature of secularization among Catholics and Protestants. The Reformation served to "disenchant" the world, barring "mystery, miracle, and magic." Consequently, Berger writes, while "the Catholic lives in a world in which the sacred is mediated to him through a variety of channels... Protestantism served as a historically decisive prelude to secularization." Furthermore, those intellectual movements which hastened secu-

larization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, individualism, rationalism and liberalism, were much stronger in Protestant than in Catholic theology. But the high secondary school enrollment in the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches in Transylvania helped to close the gap between them and the Protestant intellectuals and was an important element in the conflict between religious conservatism and liberalism which succeeding chapters will discuss.

Our information about literacy in Transylvania confirms the picture presented by school enrollment. Literacy is a broader category than school enrollment because it is not strictly dependent on school attendance, and reflects the entire population rather than school-age children in a particular year. Evidence from before 1848 indicates that the more free the social and legal status of the population, the more likely it was to be literate. Keleti calculated a literacy rate (reading and writing) in Transylvania of 21.3% in 1869, as compared to 49.0% in Hungary proper. The urban population of Transylvania was far more literate (41.3%) than the rural (14.7%). Keleti did not calculate literacy according to religion, nationality or administrative region, but the percentages he publishes for the counties and districts confirm the relationship between social status and literacy:

Table 10: Illiteracy (No Reading, no Writing), 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noble Counties and Districts</th>
<th>Fundus Regius</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunyad 94.5% Torda 87.0%</td>
<td>Broos 83.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboka 93.2% Felső-Fehér 83.7%</td>
<td>Reussmarkt 81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belső-Szolnok 89.7% Küküllő 82.2%</td>
<td>Mühlbach 79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsó-Fehér 89.6% Násáud 81.7%</td>
<td>Leschkirch 68.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fágáras 87.7% Kolozs 80.9%</td>
<td>Hermannstadt 59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szekler Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csík 79.3</td>
<td>Grossschenk 50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aranyos 75.6</td>
<td>Kronstadt 49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maros 72.6</td>
<td>Reps 48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Háromszék 69.9</td>
<td>Bistritz 46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udvarhely 59.8</td>
<td>Schässburg 44.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six Saxon districts were in the medium range for Hungary and Transylvania combined, the Szekler region followed, while the ten noble counties and districts were among the eighteen jurisdictions with the highest illiteracy rate in all Hungary and Transylvania. Bearing in mind the distribution of nationalities and religions, it is evident that illiteracy was highest among the Romanian former serfs, lowest among the Saxons, in the intermediate range among the Hungarians but among these highest among the Roman Catholics, who predominated in Csík. The official figures from 1881 confirm this: 62.3% of the Germans in Transylvania could read and write, 31.4% of the Hungarians, and 8.9% of the Romanians.

What was the relationship of literacy and education to secularization? Contemporary Protestant clergymen and

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church writers seeking to hinder secularization tended to argue that the alienation from religion arose from a low cultural level and a superficial, hence vulnerable, understanding of the faith. Catholic clergy also recommended improved education to fight weak religious feeling ("indifference"), but with a special emphasis on the harmful liberal ideas that the schools must combat. The liberal Catholic Eötvös, on the other hand, blamed the alienation of lay Catholics on clericalism and the exclusion of the laity from church leadership.

In contrast to the tendency to see culture and education as the prime instruments against irreligion, some Protestants and Catholics pointed out that the devotion to religious belief and customs was greatest in various mountainous, isolated areas which also had a high rate of illiteracy. Coldness toward religion, observable in all geographic settings, was most common in the towns. It was even fashionable in many circles to consider scorn for the church "a sign of culture and refinement." Many historians and sociologists of other societies have observed that industry and market-oriented economic activity were the social locus of secularization. Hence men were more affected than women, middle-aged than young and old, urban than rural, industrial workers than traditional occupations, and Protestants and Jews than Catholics.

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139. Ibid., 214-15.
The dissatisfaction with religious education and the
demand for its improvement were not without basis. The
rationalist trend was dominant in Protestant theology, and
hence in the preparation of the Protestant clergy. Biblical
criticism and historical theology raised the scholarly stan-
dards of theology, but seemed to many to open the door to
relativism. Church history became the core of religious
instruction in general education as well. Social relations
and improvement became a principal rationale for church and
pastoral activity. Contemporaries reported a declining
level of piety and increasing worldliness of the clergy
itself, not only among Protestants but also, more rarely,
among Catholics as well. But the orientation of scholarship
and religious practice favored by the Catholic church lead-
ership was much more conservative.

The differing attitude of the Protestant clergy on the
one hand and the Catholic clergy and Austrian authorities on
the other toward modern ideas also emerged, paradoxically,
in respect to the connection between literacy and the Bible.
Surely the spreading of the Word could only reinforce reli-
gion. The Reformation's call for the more general availa-
bility of the Bible was by the nineteenth century finally
being put into effect, facilitated by mass literacy and
improved printing and transportation. The Protestant

de sociologie religieuse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1955), is the most important study in this regard.
141. Kósa, 218, 223, 226; on Catholicism in the mid-
nineteenth century, see Chapter V.
churches in Hungary published many new editions of the Bible, and welcomed the assistance in printing and distribution offered by the British and Foreign Bible Society (B.F.B.S.). But Habsburg authorities confiscated a shipment into Hungary by the B.F.B.S. in 1814, dissolved the newly founded Hungarian Bible Institute a few years later, and prohibited the importation of scriptures into Hungary in 1822. The Catholic clergy opposed the activity of the B.F.B.S., and the agents of the latter, with their stocks, were banished from the country between 1852 and 1867. Even in 1900, the B.F.B.S. reported concerning Hungary that "the Roman Catholic population were hostile, and little could be done among them." Pope Gregory XVI condemned Bible societies and warned against vernacular translations in his Encyclical *Inter Praecipuas* of 1844.

Churchmen were more uniformly open to the possibilities of religious influence offered by other printed media. The Lutheran head elder was traditionally also president of the premiere learned association of Transylvania, the *Verein für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, founded in 1840. The Reformed elder, Count Imre Mikó, headed the Hungarian counterpart of the Saxon group, the *Erdélyi Muzeum-Egylet*, established in


1859. Religious involvement was even greater in the Asociațiunea Transilvană pentru Literatu­ra Română și Cultura Poporului Român (ASTRA, founded in 1861); its founding co-presidents and active leaders were Bishop Șaguna and Greek Catholic Canon Timotei Cipariu. During the absolutist 1850s many educated Transylvanians directed their efforts toward the study of their nation's past. Major historical syntheses appeared in print, including some that remain important resources for the scholars of today. Church history was prominent, especially source publication. Most historians were also politicians of a liberal persuasion. Their works served not only to strengthen national consciousness on the eve of the 1860s, but also to legitimate the demands of the reformist elements in both secular and religious politics.

Historical research could have either a conservative or a reformist impact, and the same was true of journalism. Church-affiliated newspapers were established to present church affairs and combat irreligion, such as the Catholic

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144. Works of lasting significance by important figures in the 1860s included several by Georg Daniel Teutsch: Geschichte der Siebenburger Sachsen für das Sächsische Volk (1854 ff.), Das Zehntrecht der evangelischen Landeskirche A.B. in Siebenbürgen (1858), and Urkundenbuch der evangelischen Landeskirche in Siebenbürgen (1862 ff.); László Kováry, Erdély történelme (1859–66) and Erdély története 1848–49-ben (1861); Károly Veszely, Erdélyi egyháztörténelmi adatok (1860 ff.); Andrei Șaguna, Elementele dreptului canonic (1854) and Istoria bisericească (1860); and Alexandru Sterca-Șuluțiu, Istoria Horii și a poporului românesc din Munții Apuseni ai Ardealului (1856). Attempts to publish the last work were unsuccessful, and it circulated only in manuscript form; see Chapter VIII.
Religió and Idők Tanúja (Budapest), the Romanian Orthodox Telegraful Român (Hermannstadt, established 1853), and the Reformed Protestáns Egyházi és Iskolai Lap (Budapest, reestablished in 1858 after a ten-year interlude). The first three were not only confessional but conservative, while the latter represented a liberal standpoint on both secular and church affairs. One symptom of the politicization of religion in the 1860s was the proliferation of church periodicals, like the Lutheran Saxon dailies Schul- und Kirchenzeitung and Kirche und Schule (Hermannstadt, 1862) and the Romanian Greek Catholic daily Aurora Română (Vienna, 1863), as well as the yearbooks Keresztény Magvető (Unitarian, 1861), Erdélyi Református Anyaszentegyházmegye Névkönyve (Reformed, 1861) and Gyulafehérvári Füzetek (Roman Catholic, 1861). Most of the new publications were at least moderately liberal, devoting attention to such issues as popular education and administrative and electoral reform. Franz Obert’s Kirche und Schule was militantly reformist, polemizing with the secular press and its rival Lutheran paper until the latter was discontinued after an existence of only a few weeks.

The press was a major force in social change elsewhere in Europe at mid-century. Newspaper accounts created the possibility of vicarious, if not actual, political participation for the increasing reading public. If formerly the church had been the principal institution providing social identity, the press could now constitute a rival. Hence
contemporaries, including Pope Pius IX, felt that the press itself served to undermine religion. Even though the churches sought to use the press for their own ends, alternative, lay viewpoints came to dominate the press as a whole. Professional lay writers were writing about church matters from a non-clerical perspective, and often taking a critical attitude toward the institution.

It was also in our period that the terms clericalism and anticlericalism came into use in Western Europe. Anticlericalism, which sought to combat all clerical influence in society, was strongest in those predominantly Catholic countries, especially Italy, France, and Spain, where the Catholic clergy was a powerful ally of the politically embattled conservative aristocracy. Anticlericalism was rare in Transylvania, although here the share of the clergy in the entire intelligentsia, 21.9%, was far higher than anywhere in Hungary proper. Anticlericalism occurred most often in areas where lay intellectuals or the nobility constituted a rival elite. Elsewhere, the laity sought

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145. Chadwick, 37-43.
146. For a theoretical treatment of the problem of anticlericalism as well as a consideration of individual countries, see the articles in the special issue on anticlericalism of European Studies Review 13, 2 (1983).
147. The percentages for 1869 were calculated by János Maszu in "A hazai értelmiség fejlődésének néhány sajátossága a múlt század derekát követő évtizedekben," Magyar történeti tanulmányok 17 (1984), 38. Note that his definition of the intelligentsia is broader than the Western concept, which is limited chiefly to free professionals. It also includes professional (i.e. full-time) public and commercial officials.
148. The Romanian radical leader Simion Bărnutiu and some of his allies expressed resentment at the conservative attitude of the higher clergy during the early phase of the revolu-
to share in social leadership but could not deny the vital
collection of the clergy to ethnic solidarity.

The desire to share in the leadership of the churches
and schools, which generally stopped short of anti-clericalism, can be observed in all churches in Transylvania.
Formidable movements for electoral reform and organizational
statutes existed in both the Lutheran and Reformed church
districts. In these cases the lively press and synodal
debates contributed to the general liberal tendency in secular politics, as well. Similar electoral and statutory
demands arose, as we will see, in the three ritualistic
churches.

There were three chief sources for the church reformist
movements: spiritually inspired criticism of the existing
church, the broader liberal movement, and liberalism.
Pietist, Gallican and Eastern Orthodox attitudes toward lay
participation in church leadership had a largely complemen-
tary impact in Transylvania, where the pattern of secondary
school attendance assured that students of varying ethnic
and religious backgrounds would be exposed to these ideas.
Later, the Christian radicalism of Lamennais had considera-
ble appeal among Vormärz Hungarians and Romanians.
After being interrupted in the decade of absolutism, these
traditions revived during the 1860s. Their religious ori-
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tion of 1848; see Cheresteşiu, A balázsfalvi nemzeti gyűlés,
479; George Em. Marica et al., Ideologia generaţiei române
de la 1848 din Transilvania, 254-5.
149. See later chapters for more detailed treatment of
these ideas.

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gins lent them intraecclesial legitimacy, but liberalism and nationalism were more important driving forces in the substantial achievement of reformist goals during the decade.

The European liberal tradition unquestionably also influenced these movements. The conventional identification of Enlightenment thought with protoliberalism should not obscure the fact that the liberal movement emerged in opposition to the petrified Josephinian state of the early nineteenth century; both of these were in their own way heirs of the Enlightenment. The Catholic Enlightenment in Austria inspired a Febronian and church constitutional tendency with a certain social conscience, but not opposed to princely absolutism; but also a romantic individualism that resisted state tutelage of the church and of society.

The intellectuals frequently sought to restrict the influence of the clergy, but recognized the churches as a positive national force. The perpetuation of the national role of the churches took place at the same time as the secularization process continued. The role of the clergy in the intelligentsia of each nationality continued to decline, as did their role in politics. Between the 1840s and 1860s, the clergy declined from 31.3% to 14.4% of the intelligentsia in the Hungarian lands.

Meanwhile, lay involvement in education and in eccles-

151. Mazsu, op.cit., 36.
iastical administration led to increasing emphasis on secular criteria of effectiveness within each church. Clergymen increasingly conceived their function as much in terms of social betterment as in the salvation of their people. Religious values were often transferred to, and identified with, nationality. An extreme example is this statement in the organ of a Polish Roman Catholic bishop in 1861:

The chief duty of the clergy is to struggle for the reestablishment of the external and internal unity of Poland, and to use the power granted by faith and the Church, so that this power may be a certain path toward the victory of national freedom. (153)

Surveying his parish archives for the turbulent nineteenth century during the interwar period, the Roman Catholic pastor of Sibiu lamented that politics were decisive in the cases of religious conversions. Churches became identified in the popular consciousness with the nation they represented, and spirituality was less important than nationalism for religious identification.

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Ritual is one of the most important determinants of religious experience. The churches in Transylvania with a

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152. E.g. see Friedrich Teutsch, Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk, III, 386-7.
154. Adolf Vorbuchner, Historia Domus, II, 159, ms. in Sibiu, Parohia romano-catolica. Vorbuchner, who later became Bishop of Transylvania, was the author of the only popular history of the diocese: Az erdélyi püspökség (Brasso: Az Erdélyi Tudósító kiadása, 1925).
strong emphasis on ceremony and aesthetic experience, referred to by Max Weber as ritualistic churches, are the chief focus of the following chapters: the Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, and Orthodox. Ritual and doctrine provided for a far greater role of the clergy than was the case among the Protestants.

The clergy of the six Christian churches of the province can be distinguished according to its method of selection, training, and particularly economic support. The complex system of economic support included tithes, land allotments, church subsidies, emoluments, and state subsidies. The number of ecclesiastic personnel, the practice or non-practice of celibacy, and local peculiarities make a comparison difficult, but in general it may be said that the Saxon Lutheran clergy was the best educated and best provided for, and the Romanian Greek Catholic and Orthodox clergy the least well provided for.

The religious culture of the people may be characterized in terms of official and popular religion. Official religion consists of officially propagated doctrine and practices. The political tradition of the churches, which was largely determined by their relationship with the state, social position, and identity with one of the three principal ethnic groups of Transylvania, can also be considered part of official religion. Popular religion consists of practices evolving from official religion but not necessarily condoned by it. Formal art and architecture
were official sources of religious folk art. Popular religion was a source of commonalities among the ritualistic churches, especially through pilgrimage and dramatic customs. Many clergymen viewed popular religion with antagonism, but others with more democratic inclinations were among its pioneer observers.

The capacity of religion and the clergy to provide social and moral discipline declined with the process of secularization. Education and the press, albeit often sponsored by the churches, helped to undermine religiosity or respect for clerical prerogative. A comparison of religious, ethnic and geographic communities shows an approximate correlation between literacy, economic advancement, and lay activism. Secularization was at the root of much of the internal conflict in the ritualistic churches portrayed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER FIVE

CATHOLICISM BETWEEN ULTRAMONTANISM AND LIBERALISM

The striking confluence of nationalism and religious identity in the late nineteenth century was not typical in the earlier history of the Catholic Church, even in Hungary. The church was a decidedly hierarchical and international organization. The clergy closely supervised the moral life of believers through regular confession, preaching and the educational system. A bull of Pope Gregory XVI (1831-46) condemned all lay activism as akin to Protestantism. It was the role of the clergy to lead, the Pope declared, and of the believers to serve. The parish clergy, in turn, must be the obedient servant of the diocesan bishop and the Pope.

In the Roman Catholic liturgy as it was celebrated in the nineteenth century, the prescribed role of the laity was passe. The earlier idea of the Mass as a communal act, which has revived in our day, received little emphasis in the nineteenth century. Contemporaries remarked that the liturgy was viewed from afar, as an act of state symbolizing church authority, which the priest conducted in Latin with his back to the people. Those present at a festive high mass consisted of three distinct groups: the celebrating priests, the performing choir, and the attending believers who were often preoccupied with prayers for their own pri-

vate intentions. In some cases diocesan prayer books actually prescribed the forms of these "Mass devotions" for individual use.

It appears that the ritual reinforcement of the clergy's authority failed to stifle the religious autonomy of the believers. Piety could not be passive and remain meaningful. Hence religious practice moved into areas which, while encouraged by the official church, were more individualistic and less dependent upon clerical supervision than the Mass. Such practices included Eucharistic and Marian veneration and especially pilgrimages. In 1854 the Pope affirmed the-- long debated-- dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary; the contemporary international revival of pilgrimages received its strongest impulse in the Lourdes apparition in 1858. In 1856 the Pope proclaimed the feast of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. This veneration, also practiced earlier, similarly attained the proportions of an international movement. The practice of public processions also revived.

The revival of traditional religious practices was an

3. Mayer, 301, 360-2; Turner, 214-30; Roger Aubert, The Church in the Age of Liberalism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 218-9; Friedrich Heyer, The Catholic Church from 1648 to 1870 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969), 177-83. The Heart of Jesus cult, which had strong legitimist political associations in France in the 1860s, was present also among the Szekler Catholics, especially toward the end of the century; Aubert, 224; László Székely, "A csíki székelyek aszkézise," Vigilia 42,3 (1977), 161, 166.
important component of ultramontanism, a new phenomenon in
the nineteenth-century church. In the popular percep-
tion, the term signified a rejection of liberalism and of
state interference in church affairs, and a closer link of
each diocese to the Vatican. It was symbolized before all
by the Pope's Syllabus of Errors in 1864 and the proclama-
tion of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council in 1871.
The attacks on the secular power of the Papal States unques-
tionably played a role in the increasingly fanatical condem-
nation of liberal ideas and political movements by Pope Pius
IX (1846-78) after 1849. He sympathized with the patriotic
anti-Austrian tendencies of the early stages of the Italian
revolution in 1848, but when the republican forces in Rome
began to threaten his own position he moved his court to
Gaeta in the Kingdom of Naples in November, 1848. By the
time he returned to Rome eighteen months later, he had
become a determined adversary of modern liberalism and of
its ally, the Italian movement for national unification.
The successes of this movement in succeeding years placed
the Papal States on the political defensive and reinforced
the Pope's defiance of modern political thought.

It would be mistaken to suppose that Pius' experiences
and embittered anti-liberalism were the chief cause and

4. "The transformation of Catholicism by the ultramontane
movement: that is the content of the history of the Catholic
Church in the nineteenth century."-- Heyer, 151.

5. Aubert, 248-55; Lajos Lukács, A Vatikán és Magyaror-
szág 1846-1878. A Bécsi apostoli nunciúsok jelentéseiei és levél-
content of ultramontanism. This movement actually emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century in Catholic countries, especially France, in reaction against ideas of the Enlightenment and Gallicanism on the civil utility of religion and the control of the episcopacy by the state. The call for emancipation from state control through a closer link with the Holy See could be justified in anti-Gallican but socially inclusive terms, as it was in the early works of Lamennais. Lamennais' later works, which developed his original views beyond the limits of Papal tolerance, were popular among liberal Christians of Transylvania on the eve of 1848. The rejection of Gallicanism also involved the resurrection of older devotional practices, such as those we have referred to, which Gallicanism had sought to suppress on utilitarian grounds.

Pius IX favored ultramontanism, his chief biographer has written, because it seemed "the requisite for a rejuvenation of Catholic life." Unlike his predecessor, Pius was a pastoral priest rather than a scholar. He took an active interest in the pastoral concerns of individual bishoprics. He restored the diocesan bishops' former prac---

6. In his early phase, before he was condemned by Mirari Vos in 1832, Lamennais was "ultramontane and liberal at the same time."---Heyer, 135-8; see also Aubert, 5.


8. Aubert, 85.
tice of visits ad limina, and through his renowned charm he was largely successful in cultivating their personal loyalty to himself. Cardinal Manning of England remarked: "No pontiff from the beginning, in all the previous succession of two hundred and fifty-six popes, has ever so united the bishops with himself." During his pontificate Pius not only greatly increased his personal authority, that of the Apostolic Nunciatures and of the Papal Curia, but also improved the standards of clerical training and generally intensified religious life.

The less positive side of Pius’ pontificate is more generally recognized by historians. Long-term liberal trends within the church, both in the area of lay activism and in the opening toward modern and Protestant theology, were suppressed. Clerical primacy and the theological system of Thomas Aquinas were reaffirmed. Religious orders enjoyed increased influence, especially the Jesuits, whose

9. Heyer, 185-6; Marvin O’Connell, "Ultramontanism and Dupanloup: The Compromise of 1865," Church History 53,2 (1984), 200-17. According to O’Connell the ad limina visits typically took place every five years. These were in addition to the extraordinary synods which Pius convened: 206 bishops visited Rome on the occasion of the Marian definition in 1854, 265 for the commemoration of Japanese martyrs in 1862, and 500 for the 1800th anniversary of the martyrdom of St. Peter in 1867—Heyer, 185. The Romanian Greek Catholic bishops did not make ad limina visits, and when Şułuţiu and Alexi received invitations to Rome in 1862, they declined them—correspondence of de Luca, Şuлуţiu and Alexi, March 21-April 9, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU,FG 1862/217, 409.

10. Aubert, 86-9; Otto Weiss, "Der Ultramontanismus. Grundlagen - Vorgeschichte - Struktur," Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 41 (1978), 821-77 is insightful on the general problem of ultramontanism, though it deals chiefly with southern Germany.
well-written newspaper Civiltìà cattolica (1850-) became the official organ of Catholic conservatism. The new piety turned against rationalistic emphases of the Enlightenment. Its chief traits were more frequent reception of the sacraments, veneration of Mary and the saints, visions, and pilgrimages.

The papal offensive against liberal Catholicism reached a new stage in the early 1860s. The military successes of Garibaldi in 1860-1 accentuated the Vatican's defensive posture. Support for the secular power of the Pope was a criterion of international Catholic solidarity. In Hungary, for instance, the conservative priest and theologian of Transylvanian origin Tivadar Zerich published a work in defense of the Papal States which diocesan bishops recommended to their clergy. Bishop Haynald, like most bishops, issued a circular urging the faithful to pray for the welfare of the Papal States. Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans, one of the most liberal members of the French episcopate, attained European prominence through his defense of the Pope's temporal power. The Munich church historian Ignaz von Döllinger, on the other hand, aroused the displeasure of

11. Aubert, 283. J.C.H. Aveling, The Jesuits (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), 27, 316-18, notes the original liberal and conciliatory emphasis of the paper, which only became undeniably conservative by the mid-1860s.
13. Zerich's work was A Pápai fejedelemség és birtok, 1860; Fülöp Jákó Imecs, Erdély puszkomegye Kronikaja a XIX. században IV, 176 in Alba Iulia, Biblioteca Batthyaneum, ms. 719, cota IX-227. The printed circular of Haynald of February 22, 1860, in German, is in Budapest, OSzK, Fol.Lat. 3952, f. 195.
the Holy See by his sympathetic treatment of the assault on the Papal States in a lecture series he delivered in 1861.

One of Dupanloup's colleagues in France issued a circular in 1860 condemning the "errors of liberalism." The letter helped to inspire the Holy See's first draft of the Syllabus of Errors in June, 1861, which it secretly presented to the bishops assembled at the extraordinary synod a year later. A group of bishops, including Dupanloup and probably Haynald, convinced the Pope to delay the publication of the document as politically inopportune. Dupanloup's ally, the layman Montalembert, created a sensation at the Catholic Congress in Malines in August, 1863 by his liberal address "Catholicism and Freedom." The address helped convince the Pope of the need for action. Another stimulus was the liberal tendency in German theology, led by Dollinger. In September, 1863 the congress in Munich of German Catholic theologians of Germany, Austria and Switzerland openly challenged the conservative line favored by the Vatican. Pius strongly condemned the congress in a letter to the Archbishop of Munich on December 21.

Dupanloup spent most of the winter of 1863-64 in Rome defending the liberal cause and seeking to delay the proposed Syllabus. He was ultimately unsuccessful: in

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14. Aubert, 244-5, 286.
15. The speech was published in several languages, including Hungarian: Szabad egyház szabad államban (Pest: Emich Gusztáv, 1864).
16. O'Connell, 208-9; Heyer, 162-3; Aubert, 245-6.
December, 1864 the Holy See issued the encyclical *Quanta Cura* condemning rationalism, statism, socialism and nationalism, with the more extreme and better-known *Syllabus* appended to it. The hostile reaction of the European liberal press was immediate. Dupanloup published a pamphlet in response to the liberal attacks a month later. Partly by minimizing the doctrinal significance of the *Syllabus*, partly by demonstrating the extremism and hypothetical nature of the theses being condemned, he had considerable success in blunting the damage to the Catholic image. This damage was so considerable that not only 630 bishops, but the Pope himself thanked Dupanloup for his "clarification."

Ultramontanism, in the sense of a rejection of liberalism, reached its high point at this time and began its decline. The equally famous proclamation of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council five years later did not challenge the secular order as did the *Syllabus*. Thanks to the public revelations concerning the Council by Dollinger and his lay ally, Lord Acton, and the demonstrative opposition of most bishops of Austria-Hungary and the United States, the strength within the hierarchy of the

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17. O’Connell, 209-17; Heyer, 164-5; Aubert, 297-9. Aubert attributes greater success to Dupanloup’s pamphlet than Heyer, but the latter credits it for "salvaging a great deal for the Church." It is reasonable to suppose that Dupanloup also expressed his views on the Haynald affair (See Chapter VI) while in Rome.

18. This is the thesis of O’Connell, 200.
"liberal" element became known. The Council's formulation on infallibility was in fact a compromise solution. Infallibility was defined much more narrowly than the Pope himself had desired.

The Pope's more extreme formulations and the tactical alliances of his opponents should not obscure the essential difference between Catholic liberalism and secular liberalism. Dupanloup and Montalembert, and the somewhat analogous pair of Haynald and Eotvos in Hungary, were far more moderate on social and constitutional questions than the liberals who genuinely threatened the position of the church.

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Pius IX and the Eastern Rite

Another aspect of Ultramontanism involved very different ideological concerns, namely the quest to attract eastern-rite Christians to the Holy See. Sizable numbers of various nationalities practicing eastern rites were in union with Rome in the mid-nineteenth century, mostly in Europe but also in the Near East: primarily Ruthenians, Romanians, Armenians, and Arabs. Most Greek Catholic prelates were in the Near East, but the vast majority of the faithful were

21. Aubert, 286, 298; "Toward the end, Pius IX, who almost daily condemned liberalism as the "error of the century," was no longer able to see the radical difference between Catholic liberalism and liberalism as such."(298)
Ruthenians and Romanians. The four Ruthenian and Romanian bishops attending the Vatican Council ruled dioceses of more than two million souls, while the others represented less than a half million Greek Catholics. Most Greek Catholics were descendants of Orthodox believers whose bishops had accepted the church union.

Greek Catholic bishops, but especially minor clergy and the faithful generally resented the expansion of the narrow definition of church union by overzealous Roman Catholic missionaries and by Latin-rite clergymen of different nationality; such actions stimulated a countervailing movement of return to Orthodoxy. Pope Benedict XIV had participated as curial delegate in the Ruthenian council of Zamosc in 1720. Thirty years later he demonstrated his concern for the eastern rite in two encyclicals, one in 1755 and the other in 1756, instructing the clergy on the respect of the eastern rite and seeking to reassure Greek Catholics. The first of these, Allatae Sunt, concluded:

The Church does not require schismatics to abandon their rites when they return to Catholic unity, but only that they forswear and detest heresy. Its great desire is for the preservation, not the destruction, of different peoples-- in short, that all may be Catholic rather than all become Latin. (23

22. Constantin G. Patelos, Vatican I et les évèques uniates. Une étape éclairante de la politique romaine à l'égard des orientaux (1867-1870) (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1981), 376-77. Only half the eight Greek Catholic bishops of the monarchy were in attendance. There were 3.7 million Greek Catholics in the empire in 1846--Fényes, Az ausztriai birodalom statisztikája és földrajzi leírása, I, 46.

23. Allatae Sunt and the following encyclical, Ex Quo Primum, are in The Papal Encyclicals 1740-1878, 51-102.
Defenders of the eastern rite in the nineteenth century would appeal to these encyclicals against the perceived threat of "Latinization."

Roman interest in the East increased considerably in the nineteenth century. The first stimulus was the creation in 1815 of the Holy Alliance of a Catholic, Orthodox and a Lutheran monarch. The idea of European Christian unity attracted many thinkers in Russia and the rest of Europe, especially among the followers of a small group of Russian converts to Catholicism in Russia and the West. The response of the Holy See was a call for reunion with Rome, and not ecumenism in the modern sense. This was the essence of the encyclical *In suprema Petri Apostoli Sede* of 1848. It had very minor success, and its tone drew an indignant response from the Orthodox patriarchs.

The attraction to Rome drew more impetus from the emergence of the diplomatic Eastern Question than from the rather restricted spiritual movement. The decline of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the increased activity of Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic missionaries in competition with each other. Under European pressure the Porte conceded increased autonomy to the Christians in its decrees of 1839 and 1856, which in turn gave more freedom to the missionaries. The most promising Catholic union movements in succeeding years were among the Bulgarians in the Balkans.

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and the Armenians of Asia Minor. Polish agents played on the old Bulgarian Orthodox resentment of Phanariot influence to spark the Bulgarian movement. After Pius IX consecrated the leader of the movement as Greek Catholic archbishop in April, 1861, the number of converts reached 60,000 in a short time. The new archbishop was lured aboard a Russian ship and abducted only two months later. Subsequently the number of Bulgarian Greek Catholics to dwindle. On the other hand, the more steady growth among the Armenians led to the creation of six new bishoprics in 1850 and a rapid increase in the number of churches and schools.

The Ottoman Hatti-Humayun (decree) of 1856 provided for increased lay involvement of in elections and the administration of church property. The striving of Greek Catholics to assert their autonomy in this way involved them in a conflict with the Holy See concerning questions of canon law. In the Habsburg Empire, the Concordat and direct Roman influence increased the sensitivity of the Greek Catholics to Latinizing tendencies. In response to these developments, Pius IX sent the Benedictine Cardinal Pitra to Russia in 1859-60 to make a systematic study of eastern canon law. A further encouraging sign for those demanding a complete respect for the eastern rite was the creation of a section within the Congregatio de propaganda fidei for the

eastern rites in January, 1862. The encyclical declaring this action denounced accusations of Latinization, insisting that the diversity of rites "greatly enhances the dignity of the church itself." The declared purpose of the new commission was the furtherance of the church union and the "protection of the integrity" of the individual rites through the careful review of regular reports concerning their special problems to be submitted by the bishops. Each cardinal in the commission had expertise in a different oriental rite.

The greater pluralism and tolerance apparently presaged by the establishment of the commission did not come about. Some contemporaries remarked that the personality and views of the prefect of the commission, Cardinal Barnabo, were partly to blame. But as in the dispute over liberalism, the pope's impatience with local innovations was decisive. As we will see, the Romanians of Transylvania were responsible for many of these innovations. The memorandum of the Armenian Patriarch Hassun at the end of 1866 provided the occasion for an overt change of policy. The bull Reversurus of July, 1867 formally concerned only the Armenians. But it made a blanket declaration that the deplorable schism in the East was the consequence of ignorance, decadence, and lax discipline which must be corrected

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26. Aubert, 157; Patelos, 90. The encyclical of April 8, 1862, Amantissimus, is in The Papal Encyclicals, 363-7. It does not appear that any of the Romanian bishops attended the subsequent meeting to which it expressly invited them.
by regeneration along the lines dictated by Rome. The policy of the oriental commission in the preparations and deliberation of the succeeding Vatican Council was in the same spirit. Pius IX did not seek to alter liturgical rites, but he differed from many eastern prelates in his insistence that the integrity of rites did not also apply to discipline. Matters of church discipline—organization, celibacy, relations with the Orthodox, fasting and calendars—remained controversial.

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Catholicism and the Habsburg Monarchy

The internal situation of the Roman Catholic Church in the Habsburg Monarchy reflected most of the broader features already referred to, but also local historical traditions. To an even greater extent than elsewhere in Catholic Europe, the church in Austria and especially Hungary was closely tied to princely power already in the late Middle Ages. This connection became a virtual identity of interests in the hereditary provinces and the Habsburg-controlled part of Hungary during the Reformation and Thirty Years’ War. The Counterreformation allied with Habsburg absolutism, while the provincial noble estates which opposed the latter were generally Protestant. The Thirty Years’ War provided the pretext for the forceful suppression of Protestant estate

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power in Austria and Bohemia. In those parts of the Hungarian lands beyond the reach of Habsburg armies, the Hungarian patriotic tradition ascribed a prime leadership role to the Reformed aristocracy. The Austro-Hungarian conflict of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries was fought among the indigenous population between labanc (pro-Habsburg and Catholic) and kuruc (anti-Habsburg and often Reformed) guerilla forces. Their antithesis established an important sociocultural tradition in Hungarian society.

The Habsburg liberation of Hungary and Transylvania from the Turks at the end of the seventeenth century bore many of the marks of a hostile occupation; the feudal constitution was violated by the new overlords in many details. But this occupation also facilitated the victory of a significant, soon irrevocably powerful Catholic resurgence. According to Central European tradition and contemporary practice, the coexistence of several churches in a society implied partisan conflict. This was especially true for Transylvania. Describing the situation there at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Friedrich Teutsch wrote:

The Hungarian noble party, which was contiguous with the Calvinist party, was dominant; for here, like elsewhere, the religions were also political parties.

29. Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Siebenbürgen, II, 4. A striking example of this concept from the eighteenth century is in the pioneer work of the comparative history of religions, Geschichte der Religionsparteyen by Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, in which "Religions-
The Catholic "party" was numerically weak in eastern Hungary and especially in Transylvania. It was strengthened by the settlement of Catholic peasants, craftsmen, civil servants and soldiers, by various church unions, and by administrative measures which expressly favored the Catholic Church and the recatholicization of Protestants.

The Habsburgs settled numerous Catholic peoples in Hungary in the eighteenth century, but relatively few in Transylvania proper. Many of the new settlers in Transylvania were Orthodox Romanians. The church unions of the later seventeenth century (of the Ruthenians in 1649-89, the Armenians in 1684, and the Romanians in 1699-1701) at least temporarily decreased the number of Orthodox in Hungary and Transylvania by roughly one-half. In Transylvania, the Romanian church union increased several times the number of Catholic believers and their privileged clergy. The Austrian parteyen" are defined as "Gesellschaften, die sich über den gottesdienstlichen Lehrbegriff widersprechen." The 1766 edition of the work (Halle: bey Johann Justinus Gebauer) is in the Sibiu library of the Romanian ASTRA.

30. Concerning the research on eighteenth-century population changes see the introductory study by György Litván in Oszkár Jászi, A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzeti-ségi kérdés. Válogatás (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986), 25-7. The mass Catholic (Schwaben) settlement was chiefly in the Banat and Máramaros regions. Government-sponsored settlement in Transylvania totalled less than 10,000, and most of these were Protestants. Zsolt Trócsányi, rejecting the thesis that the Romanians were in the majority earlier, as well, has calculated there was an influx in the eighteenth century of roughly 350,000 Orthodox Romanians. Due to the migration of Hungarians westward, he concludes, the Romanian percentage of the population increased from one third to three fifths between 1712 and 1760. Trócsányi, "Új etnikai kép, új uralmi rendszer (1711-1770)," in Erdély története II (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1986), 975-81.
authorities facilitated the Catholic expropriation of many Protestant church buildings and schools. The dimensions of recatholicization, more than those of the church union, are difficult to estimate. A significant minority of Protestant noblemen converted, enjoying political benefits thereby, and the Protestant serfs on their estates more or less automatically converted with them.

The political motive was prominent in all of the church unions of East Central Europe in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. The greater or lesser degree of military coercion involved in the acts of union does not alter the fact that they arose essentially from the cultural reorientation of small nations' ruling clergy under the press of changing geopolitics. The rising power of Catholic Poland and Austria presented these clergies with the opportunity to exchange the domination of local Orthodox or Reformed aristocracies for that of a more distant hierarchy and state that promised social advantages. In the Ruthenian and Romanian unions, Hungarian princes and estates resisting Habsburg domination openly favored the Orthodox defense of tradition and were supported by the churchmen of the Danubian Principalities for this reason. They resented the union as a scheme by the Habsburgs to withdraw their Romanian serfs from religious and political subjection. The

church union virtually dissolved in the course of the anti-
Habsburg Rákóczi rebellion in 1703-11, when Rákóczi spon-
sored the election of a new Romanian Orthodox Archbishop.

The clergy united with Rome because it was promised release from serfdom and enjoyment of the same privileges as the Roman Catholic clergy. Active Austrian support was needed for the survival of the union because of the considerable influence of Russian-supported Serbian Orthodox agitators among the commoners. The church union vastly increased Romanian opportunities for higher education, with decisive results for the development of a national ideology and western-educated intelligentsia. It is tempting to censure the Ruthenian and Romanian clergy who concluded the unions because they placed their own social advancement above the popular adherence to Orthodoxy. Yet one should recall that religious and social elites everywhere pursued their interests with little regard for the popular will.

The Catholic nobility of Transylvania, settlers, indigenous and newly converted, enjoyed the energetic support of the court. By mid-century it had secured most of the


33. See Makkai, 130-55; Emanuel Turczynski Konfession und Nation. Zur Frügeschichte der serbischen und rumäni-
schen Nationsbildung (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1976), 116-34.

34. Octavian Bârlea presents a well-documented argument that the Romanian church union was the consequence of a genuine religious conversion; Bârlea, appendix to Wilhelm de Vries et al., Rom und die Patriarchate des Ostens (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1963), 223-35.
governorships and a majority in the Gubernium. The person-
nel of the court Chancellery became exclusively Catholic and
Catholic representation in the diet also greatly increased. 35
The former laws against Catholics were abolished.

In 1713 the Roman Catholic diocese received its first
resident bishop after nearly two centuries, when there were
only 30,000 Roman Catholics in Transylvania, or one-tenth
the number of Greek Catholics. 36 The revival of religious
orders and Catholic secondary education in succeeding years
helped to dramatically change the religious makeup of
Transylvania.

The Catholic revival came at the price of unprecedented
state interference in church affairs. An organ of the
Gubernium, the Catholica Commissio, supervised conversions,
the foundation of parishes, and the schools in general, from
1767 on. State interference in Catholic affairs, was a
general feature of Habsburg rule in the century following
the ascension of Maria Theresa in 1740. The policy was
accentuated under her son, Joseph II, after whom it has been
called Josephinism. Roman Catholicism remained the dominant
church, but imperial regulations "rationalized" liturgical
practices, dissolved many monasteries, centralized seminary
education, and restricted bishops' contact with the Holy

35. Trócsányi, op. cit., 1006-8.
36. Bârlea, Ostkirchliche Tradition und westlicher
Katholizismus. Die rumänische Kirche zwischen 1713-1727
(Monachii: [sn], 1966) (=Societas Academica Dacoromana, Acta
Historica, vol. 6), 13, citing a document in the Vatican
Archives from 1714.

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See. The placetum regium, right of the Habsburg ruler to prevent the publication by diocesan bishops of papal edicts, was more strictly enforced than previously, and the visitation of bishoprics by the Papal Nuncio forbidden. The ideology of Josephinism bore much in common with that of Gallicanism. Its ideal cleric was the pastor bonus, who was simultaneously guardian of public morality, educator in such matters as health and animal husbandry, and servant of the state. A decree of the Hungarian State Chancellery in 1792 referred to the priest as "a state official within the church." The ideal, by encouraging a more secular and individualist clergy, made it more susceptible to liberalism.

The Pope fought against state interference and the rationalist and utilitarian tenets of Josephinism just as he had fought against those of Gallicanism. Often the Holy See and the Habsburg authorities failed to agree on the appointments to vacant bishoprics. The continued vacancy of sees was actually advantageous to state finances: in such cases the financial authorities could and legally did claim the income from the respective diocese. In 1800 seven bishoprics in Hungary, representing half the Roman Catholics in the country, were vacant. The Primacy of Esztergom was

itself vacant for fifty-two years.

Josephinian church policy aroused a challenge in the form of an ideologically allied movement, Febronianism. The theology of the eighteenth-century Febronius (Nikolaus Johann von Hontheim) derived the right of diocesan administration from the Catholic monarch rather than the Pope. Expanding the church's doctrine of *canonica disciplina*, Febronius also placed a strong emphasis on the regular convocation of diocesan synods to monitor and improve the spiritual and material condition of the clergy. He even argued for the participation of the laity in the synods. Such synods could further the Josephinian ideal of the *pastor bonus*, but could also facilitate clerical solidarity in the face of the state.

A handful of Hungarian bishops in the early nineteenth century were Josephinians, subservient to the state but advocates of increased synodal activity. Sándor Rudnay, Bishop of Transylvania 1816-19 and Primate 1819-31, justified the long-delayed convocation of diocesan synods throughout the Hungarian lands in 1822 in Febronian terms. His successor in Transylvania, Ignác Szepessy (1820-28), was the most strongly Josephinian Hungarian bishop. In 1822 he promulgated a code of diocesan canon law on the eve of the convocation of the Transylvanian synod. It prescribed parliamentary procedure for the synod with majority voting, and

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entitled the canons and deans to hold the bishop responsible for statutory violations. Both provisions were departures from previous practice. Szepessy used his synod, and his appearance at the subsequent national synod, to restate his principles. The Habsburg court approved of his ideas, but denounced the unauthorized publication of his law code. The Holy See strongly disapproved of the synod's decrees, and forced Szepessy to invalidate them. The diocesan and national synods also revealed considerable dissatisfaction with the level of material support enjoyed by the clergy and proposed specific remedies. The Transylvanian synod voted significant reforms. The civil authorities simply ignored these acts, however, and allowed no further synods until 1848.

The decade of the national synod was also that of a modest ecumenical movement in Hungary, led among the Catholics by the theologian and Benedictine monk Izidor Guzmics. The movement had a nationalist element: in the national revival, many politicians and writers denounced confessional disunity as shameful and even dangerous in a time of national struggle. Liberal theological tenden-

42. Hermann, 401-5; Bertalan Bagossy, "A jozefinizmus hatása s az erdélyi egyházmegyék küzdelme ezek ellenére (1790-1847)," in Az erdélyi katholicizmus múltja és jelene (Dicsőszentmárton: Erzsébet Könyvnyomda Részvénytársaság, 1925), 184-5.
cies among the Protestants were a strong potential stimulus for Hungarian Catholics, especially in Transylvania. Most of the liberal leaders there were Protestants, and the Reformed Church itself served briefly as a rallying point for the liberal opposition.

Hungarian Reformed and Romanian Orthodox politics allied intermittently, for the last time, in the years before 1848. In the Transylvanian diet and counties the Hungarian opposition spoke out against the ongoing wave of Catholicization among the Romanian Orthodox. The Habsburg royal commissioner wrote to Vienna that the elevation of the Orthodox to "received" status would deprive the opposition of a fertile pretext for agitation. The growth of Romanian nationalism led to the willingness of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox bishops to cooperate in pursuit of national goals. Their petitions of 1791 (Supplex Libellus Valachorum) and 1834 that the Romanians be recognized as fourth constitutional nation failed due to overwhelming Hungarian opposition. They then sought to exploit Hungarian sympathy for the Orthodox to at least assuage some of this group's grievances. In 1837-8, and then again in 1842-3, they submitted petitions to the diet on behalf of the religious and political emancipation of the Orthodox in the

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44. Ambrus Miskolczy, "Erdély a reformkorban (1830-1848)," in Erdély története, III, 1272-5.
Fundus Regius. These, too, were unsuccessful, as the Hungarian opposition chose, for a change, to side with the conservative Saxon establishment. They united in the face of the long-term threat of Romanian emancipation.

Josephinian views among the Austrian and Hungarian clergy, though declining by the mid-nineteenth century, created a latent susceptibility to liberalism. In 1848, the episcopate sought its liberation from Josephinian state supervision. Under the newly established free press and parliaments, the political influence of the churches decreased considerably. The laity was less likely to look to the bishops and synods for the representation of their interests. The liberals' demand for freedom of religion and the reduction of Catholic influence on education and marriages put the clergy on the defensive. Liberal anticlericalism during the revolution was strongest in Vienna, where the Archbishop's residence was the target of protest demonstrations by his opponents. Such attacks were rare in Hungary and Transylvania, but the abolition of various Catholic Church privileges prompted countermeasures by the lower clergy and episcopate.

The revival of the synodal movement in 1848, and its occasional sanction by the episcopate, must be seen in the

light of this defensive posture. A minority of the clergy in Vienna followed the liberal theology of Anton Günther which grew out of the Josephinian tradition of synodalism and increasing the rights of the lower clergy. But most priests sought only "to defend themselves against street corner anticlericalism and to enhance their pastoral effectiveness in the chaos of the revolution." Even so, Archbishop Milde flatly rejected the reforms they proposed.

The threat to the church in the Hungarian lands was of a more coherent, material nature, and consequently a greater degree of agreement existed between the episcopate and the lower clergy concerning the response. Unlike in Austria, there was a large Protestant population, which sought to achieve civil rights and material support equal to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholics. The Protestants hoped for support from the state-managed Religionsfonds, which the Catholic bishops claimed was theirs alone. Several bishops sought the support of the laity as well as the lower clergy in their struggle by granting them a considerable voice in the synods they convened. Some of the clergy, for instance in the diocese of Vác, made such radical demands as

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50. The fund had been created by Joseph II for the support of the Roman Catholic clergy from the property of the monasteries he had dissolved.
the translation of the liturgy into Hungarian and the abolition of priestly celibacy. The situation was similar in Transylvania, except that there the Romanian demand at the assembly in Blaj in May, 1848 for annual national synods was an added impulse for the Roman Catholics to make similar demands.

The proposed reforms took the name in Hungary of Catholic Autonomy. The goal of the Hungarian Catholic Autonomy movement has been defined as "the attainment of self-administration for the Hungarian Catholic Church similar to that enjoyed by the Protestant denominations on the basis of the principle of religious equality declared by Law XX of 1848." Historians of the movement date its origin to the March 20, 1848 conference of the the Hungarian episcopate. As the participant Bishop Mihaly Fogarasy recorded, the diet's legislation for an independent Hungarian government and religious equality created a radically new situation for the church. "They understood the warning of political developments: that henceforth, faced with a freer constitution, the church must take a more independent position vis a vis the state." The church itself should take over the patronage rights enjoyed previously by the Catholic


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monarch: "It is impossible that we would desire that the ministerial government enjoy the same power over the Catholic Church... therefore the Catholic Church wishes to exercize the same rights conceded elsewhere by the freer constitutional institutions." Later he added that the church "is deprived of princely protection... and must resort to the protection of its own faithful."

The April Laws caught the Catholics unprepared, while the liberal government for its part was suspicious of Roman influence on the church and proposed to eliminate state subsidies. Many attributed the slow Catholic response to inadequate popular interest and proposed more frequent diocesan synods as one remedy. In May Father Janos Danielik used *Religió* to propagate the organization of a national "Catholic Institute", on the model of the English body of the same name. The Institute would be a network of deanery, diocesan and national councils with functions analogous to those of the Protestant synods. Several diocesan synods took up the same idea, but made little progress before the radicalization of the revolution and the deterioration of relations with the hierarchy and the Holy See undermined the possibility of Vatican approval. The revolution did establish the range of conceptions later associated with Catholic Autonomy: a means for the hierarchy to maintain the legal control of its property, in religious terms an antidote to

popular indifference and passivity, or finally the means
toward general democratization and the supercession of such
"archaic" institutions as priestly celibacy, monastic orders
and the Latin Mass.

The revolutionary government in Hungary named politi-
cally congenial bishops to four vacant sees in 1848. Due to
their political behavior during the revolution, these four
and several others were removed from their sees after the
defeat of the Revolution. The Holy See did not oppose the
dismissal of those appointed in 1848, whose confirmation
it had withheld, but insisted on the "voluntary" abdication
of four who had already been consecrated.

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The Concordat and Hungary

The previous chapter noted the dim view contemporaries
took of the state of religiosity in Hungary. Due to his
prominence in politics and culture it is of special interest
that József Eőtvös shared this view with respect to the
Catholic Church. He charged the clergy in particular with
apathy and indifference, and claimed the quality of Catholic
schools was possibly the worst in Europe. In sum,

55. Török, 31-48. It is true, as Lukacs points out,
that the bishops' initial support for synodalist claims was
only a tactical move. This does not justify the author's
doctrinaire assertion that synodality was therefore retro-
grade. It clearly represented an outgrowth of the liberal
tendency in Hungarian society. See Lukács, A Vatikán és
Magyarország, 57-9.

56. Heindl, 404-32. These abdications established the
procedure to be followed with Haynald in 1863. Alexander
Bach strongly advocated the procedure in 1849-50 as a com-
promise solution.
Our church conditions are extraordinarily sad, and a Catholic spirit is hardly observable at any other time, than in opposition to other denominations... In moments of great agitation there is nothing more dangerous than religious indifference, and I believe there is hardly another country in Europe where this property is so universal among the Catholics as here.  (57

Eötvös wrote to Montalembert at the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 that the only way to overcome the religious apathy of the Hungarian Catholics was to establish for them the same self-administration and lay participation already enjoyed by the Protestants. He emphasized the importance of this concept in his later letters to Montalembert and to the Hungarian bishops. His conception considerably predated this period. As Jenő Török has shown, he had laid down his ideas already in his masterpiece of political philosophy first published in 1851-4, The Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the Nineteenth Century upon the State.

The "ruling ideas" of Eötvös' treatise were liberty, equality and nationality. Since all three were characteristics of individuals, the chief task of the state was the guarantee of the liberty of the individual, and by means of the establishment of local autonomy. Religious autonomy superceded all other autonomies in importance, since it was at the most basic level of the individual's conscience.

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59. Hungarian title: A XIX. század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az állodalomra.
Eotvos believed, like the French liberal Catholics, that the ethics of Christianity made it the "religion of freedom," which should possess the means to protect the state and society from revolution, despotism, excessive nationalism and anarchy. Hence the strengthening of religious feeling was in the general interest. This was even more evident with Catholicism in the Habsburg monarchy, since beyond its ethical value it was the religion of most Slavs and a counterweight to the perceived threat of Russian Pan-Slavism. Eötvös recommended Autonomy in the double sense (self-administration and lay participation) to overcome what he argued was the poor state of Hungarian Catholicism.

Despite the ambivalent behavior of numerous bishops and clergy during the Revolution, the postrevolutionary Austrian regime viewed the Catholic Church as an important base of support. Catholic Hungarian aristocrats at the court sought to encourage this view, arguing that "Hungarian Protestantism is more dangerous to the unitary Austrian Monarchy than Magyarism." In the new situation the court sought the sincere and active support of the Roman Catholic bishops, 60

60. This summary of Eotvos' relevant ideas closely follows Jenő Török, 54-66; for his critique of nationalism, see Paul Bödy, Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870. A Study of Ideas of Individuality and Social Pluralism in Modern Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 66-74. Unlike most Hungarians, Eotvos believed the national minorities' churches should be strengthened, and hence he defended Romanian Orthodox church autonomy as an extension of his general conception of autonomy; see Bödy, 118.

hence it rapidly granted their request for conferences at which they could discuss their problems and formulate policy proposals. The Cisleithanian bishops convened in Vienna at the end of April, 1849 and the Hungarian bishops under the leadership of the newly named Primate of Esztergom, János Scitovszky, in August, 1850. The two conferences agreed on their basic demands, which clearly aimed at the weakening of Josephinian church policy.

Imperial legislation favorable to the church soon followed. The placetum was abolished and theological instruction returned to direct supervision by the bishops already in 1850, and two years later the law on Religionsstörung reinforced the civil authority of the lower clergy. Vienna still expected clergymen to inculcate loyalty to civil authority, but entrusted resolution of complaints in this regard to commissions composed of equal numbers of diocesan and Habsburg officials.

Negotiations began on a comprehensive treaty between Austria and the Vatican, the Concordat. It was was finally

62. Révész, 14-15; Lukács, A Vatikán és Magyarország, 90-1; Gabriel Adriányi, Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche zum österreichischen Konkordat von 1855 (Roma: [s.n.], 1963), 57-68.
63. Révész, 15-16; Leisching, 47. Ten years later the Transylvanian Hungarian opponents of Schmerling's policy, who generally rejected all "absolutist" legislation, used this law to prosecute the Romanian nationalist Axente Sever when he became embroiled in a dispute with a Magyarophile priest. See Chapter VIII.
64. Circular of the Governor of Transylvania, September 15, 1851, in AS Alba Iulia, Protopopiatul G.C. Alba Iulia. Pachet 8, Acte oficioase. 1851/8. This procedure no longer obtained in the 1860s.
concluded in 1855. From the beginning the Concordat was controversial from the beginning. It became the bete noir of the Austrian liberals, undermining the support they might have extended the regime for its pragmatic economic and administrative reforms. In the words of Robert A. Kann, the Concordat embodied "the true [i.e. repressive] spirit of the regime." He emphasized the unprecedented degree of church supervision over education and the jurisdiction of Catholic ecclesiastical courts in matrimonial matters. Liberals and Protestants denounced the Concordat as the oppressive alliance of an intolerant, ultramontane church with the absolutist state. The encyclical Singulari Quidem addressed to the bishops of the empire after the the Concordat was openly exclusivist and conservative. To fight the evil of religious indifference, bishops should

Saturate [the faithful] with the doctrine of Catholic truth more accurately each day... there can be no greater crime...than to divide the Church..., than to forget evangelical love and to combat with the furor of hostile discord the harmony of the people of God.

The encyclical denounced rationalism, and insisted that progress in the church consists solely of "the progress of faith, which is not change."

The negative view of the Concordat is accurate if one considers only school and matrimonial matters, although even

here the polemicists exaggerated matters and failed to note the non-application of the Concordat in many respects. In other respects the Concordat was complementary to the economic policy of the period and fulfilled a popular Catholic demand in 1848, the emancipation of the church. The church regained the freedom to administer its internal affairs which it had lost under Josephinism, and later liberal regimes never abridged this freedom. Prominent in this freedom was episcopal visitation of parishes and the holding of diocesan synods. *Singulari Quidem* strongly endorsed the holding of synods.

The imperial government conceded a lessening of its power over the church, but also hoped to strengthen the centralization of the empire with the help of the church. As the chief Austrian negotiator with the Vatican, the new Archbishop of Vienna, Joseph Othmar von Rauscher, stated: imperial unity requires unity within the church between Austria and Hungary, and "only the Holy See has the right and the authority to completely unite the Hungarian church with the Austrian church." Minister of the Interior Alexander Bach remarked, similarly, that it was hoped the Concordat would resolve the Italian and Hungarian questions by helping to overcome political and national prejudices. Austria conceded more to the church in the Concordat than it had originally intended, but considered this worthwhile in order

67. My interpretation here follows that of Boyer, 20-1.
68. These recommendations included the cautionary phrase "in conformity with the canonical prescriptions." *The Papal Encyclicals*, 342, 344.
to further the ecclesiastical integration of Hungary.

These intentions became known to the Hungarian episcopate in 1850, when it began to register its insistence on the previously existing regulations applying to the church in Hungary. Scitovszky traveled to Rome in October, 1854 and sought to limit the application of the prospective Concordat in Hungary. He argued that in Hungary, unlike in Austria, formal canonic procedures for marriages were still in full force, the bishops already had complete supervision over Catholic schools, and the testamentary rights of the bishops were not restricted as in Austria: hence the Concordat was unnecessary there. The views of Vienna prevailed, and Scitovszky's appeal was rejected. In a secret article appended to the Concordat, moreover, the state reserved for itself the right to punish bishops and clergymen guilty of crimes against the state, and suspended the considerable immunity (privilegium fori) the clergy had enjoyed in Hungary.

As with the later Protestant Patent and the administrative reforms of the 1860s, the state conceded more rights in Cisleithania than it had prior to 1848, but offered little improvement over the pre-1848 status in Hungary. The uniform application of the Concordat in Hungary meant a

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69. Leisching, 27-30; Rauscher is cited in Revesz, 15, and Bach in Adriányi, Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche, 30.
restriction of many rights claimed by the episcopate. The Hungarian episcopate publicly welcomed the Concordat after it was enacted, as in the given situation it undeniably improved the position of the church via a vis the state. In succeeding years the bishops enjoyed greater influence over church endowments, and the Concordat facilitated the convocation of provincial (for an archdiocese and its suffragans) synods in Esztergom in 1858 and Kalocsa in 1863 and diocesan synods in 1860 and 1863; their decisions were actually put into effect. The improvements still fell short of the bishops' desires.

The chief grievance of the Hungarian episcopate and of Catholic opinion against Austrian church policy and the Concordat concerned the prerogatives of the Primate. The Prince-Primate of Esztergom had been the second civil official of old-regime Hungary after the Palatine. As the head of the church, he presided over the national synod in 1822. The chief embodiment of his jurisdiction was his presidency

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71. Adriányi argues the Concordat granted the Hungarian episcopate less rights than it had enjoyed previously. Yet by his own calculation, twenty-one articles of the Concordat represented no change, six articles increased the canonic freedom of the bishops, and five decreased it. -- Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche, 119-21.

72. Ibid., 123, 130.

73. The synods, which enjoyed a higher canonical status than the less formal conferences in which the Hungarian bishops participated in Esztergom in 1850 and Vienna in 1856, passed religious regulations for the respective dioceses. Konrád Szántó, A katolikus egyház története, II (Budapest: Ecclesia, 1985), 407; János Karácsonyi, Magyarország egyháztörténete főbb vonásaiban 970-től 1900-ig (Veszprém: Egyházmegyei könyvnyomda, 1929), 268. (facsimile ed.: Budapest: Könyvertékesítő Vállalat, 1985).
of the highest ecclesiastical court of appeals in Hungary. The Primate actually exercised this judicial privilege in 1846, when the condemnation by his court of the radical professors at the Romanian school in Blaj led to their dismissal.

Nationality and confessional politics complemented each other in the policy toward the Primacy in the 1850s. Just as the Concordat served the antiliberal ideology of the ultramontane movement, hierarchical changes reflected the new activism with respect to the eastern rite. The Serbian and Romanian Orthodox bishops had proven effective champions of their respective nation's cause in 1848-9. Calling attention to the increased influence of Orthodoxy in Transylvania due to Šaguna, the Hungarian bishops' conference of 1850 recommended the elevation of the Romanian see in Blaj to the rank of archbishopric or metropolitanate. The Croatian see of Zagreb was raised to an archbishopric in 1852 with three suffragan bishops in Croatia and Slavonia, withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Kalocsa and subordinated directly to the Holy See. A year later, the Romanian see at Blaj was similarly separated from its subordination to the Primate, and two new Greek Catholic dioceses created. The will of the Holy See was evident, and Scitovszky voluntarily abdicated from his metropolitan rights over the Blaj see. The recognition by the papal

74. Adriányi, op. cit., 113.
75. Footnote in GBCS, III, 85.
76. Lukács, A Vatikán és Magyarország, 91, 96-7; DSSS,
bulls of hierarchical separation on ethnic lines was unpre-
cedented in Catholicism, and disturbing to Hungarians.

The direct subordination of the new Metropolitan of
Blaj, Sulutić, and his three suffragans to the Congregatio
de Propaganda fidei meant that the new Vatican eastern
policy would have a more direct impact on Romanian affairs.
Singulari Quidem reemphasized Rome's respect for the eastern
rite and called for regular reports by Greek Catholic bishops
to the congregation. The Pope hoped to bring about a
special Concordat for the Greek Catholics of the monarchy
and to send Cardinal Pitra to Blaj in 1858 as a first step
toward this goal. Neither plan was realized, but the Nuncio
took an active role in the delicate relations of Sulutić, Haynald and the authorities.

Archbishop Rauscher considered the Primacy a mere tra-
dition, without canonical status. As he wrote in a memoran-
dum in 1857: there is no indication of a subordination to
Esztergom in the papal bulls establishing the Archbishoprics

61-72. After 1867 Hungarian and Romanian Catholics disa-
greed as to whether Scitovszky had also renounced his rights
vis a vis Blaj as Primate, i.e. in public law; Elemér
Gyárfás, "A román görög katholikusok autonomiája,"
Katholikus Szemle, 19 (1905), 350-65.

77. The Holy See sought to console Scitovszky by naming
him in 1852 apostolic visitor (inspector) for the monasteries
of the provinces of Esztergom, Eger and Kalocsa for the
period of three years, and elevating him to the dignity of
Cardinal two years later.— Lukács, A Vatikan és Magyaror-
szág, 97; János Török, Magyarország primása, I, 260-1.
The apostolic visitorship reinforced Scitovszky's claim to
the Primacy, but his visits to the province of Kalocsa
prompted strong protests of interference by József Kunszt,
the Archbishop of Kalocsa.

78. The Papal Encyclicals, 344-5.
79. DSSSS, 137-8; see Chapter VIII.
The foundation of a Primatial authority, as the Archbishop of Esztergom demands, would establish a Hungarian national church: something the Holy See can desire no more than the foundation of a German Patriarchate, which has also been demanded. (80)

The Hungarian demand, he assereted, was basically political in nature. Only the newly achieved close union with Austria preserved Catholicism in Hungary from the persecution and plunder of revolution. Hungarian claims to exclusivity, unrestrained, were bound to provoke serious disorders.

The view of the Holy See was nearly the same. The Nuncio informed Scitovszky that the Concordat was the best alternative available to the church in Hungary. The Vatican accepted the juridical subordination to the Primate only of Eger, of the four archbishoprics. Due to the importance that Hungarian patriots attached to the Primatial dignity, however, it decided to forego any statement on the question in order to protect the prestige of the church in Hungary.

The office of Hungarian Primate was not mentioned in

80. On the initiatives for a German Primacy in 1806 and 1848, see Heyer, 114, and Aubert, 75.
81. "Gran’s Ansprüche auf eine Primatialgewalt über Ungarn und dessen vormalige Nebenländer," ms. in Vienna, Erzdiözesanarchiv. Bishofskaten Rauscher; see also Wolfsgruber, 147-8.
82. Adriányi, op. cit., 112-13; Lukács, A Vatikán és Magyarország, 107-8. Archbishop Kunszt denied his see had ever been dependent on Esztergom (Lukács, 108); one of his priests published a pamphlet in 1866 denying the Primate’s claims, but making no reference to the Archbishop of Vienna or the Concordat: József Kováts, A primási joghatóság és a kalocsaui érseki szék. Ellenészrevételek Dr. Frankl [Fraknői] Vilmos urnak "Adalékok" stb. cz. értekezésére (Pest: Elso magy. egyesületi könyvnyomda Fonda és Társai, 1866.)
the text of the Concordat. Yet in 1856 the imperial
government denied Scitovszky the right to hold a national
synod, and shortly thereafter abolished the Primatial ap-
peals court as well. Rauscher did not raise a formal
claim to the leadership of the episcopate in the entire
empire, but his undeniable influence at Court and with the
Vatican gave him de facto primacy among the bishops. Bishop
Haynald informally recognized his primacy when he requested
Rauscher's view on the application of two diocesan regula-
tions in the light of the Concordat. Rauscher took advan-
tage of the opportunity to reply to Haynald in a long letter
of February, 1857 which he also published.

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Hungarian Churchmen in the National Revival

Rauscher's assessment of Scitovszky's goal of a
"national church" was essentially accurate. Allied with
Hungary's Old Conservatives, he aspired to a sort of
national political leadership, to which the historic rights
of the Primacy gave him a reasonable claim. In 1850 his
name stood at the head of 131 signatories to a national
petition to the Emperor, in 1857 he handed a similar peti-
tion to Franz Joseph, and his leadership of the pilgrimage

84. Haynald to Rauscher, in German, February 6, 1856 and
printed reply by Rauscher, in Latin, February 21, 1857, in
Vienna, Erzdiözesanarchiv. Bischofsakten Rauscher. The
regulations in question were among those passed by the
controversial diocesan synod of 1822. Janka Wohl asserts,
in a generally reliable article, that Haynald had earlier
spoken out against the Concordat.— "Kardinal Haynald,"
Deutsche Revue, eine Monatschrift 17,1 (1892), 66.
to Mariazell in September, 1857 must be seen in the same 
light.

I have earlier discussed the role of Scitovszky in the 
constitutional restoration. Two other Hungarian priests who 
were prominent in this context were Archbishop Béla 
Bartakovics of Eger and Canon János Danielik of Eger. 
Bartakovics was an energetic and strongly patriotic pre-
late. In 1856 he repulsed attempts by the authorities 
to interfere in the administration of schools in his arch-
diocece. In 1859-60 he was prominent, like Scitovszky, 
in the Conservatives' patriotic manifestations, and was 
strongly criticized by the Nuncio for his public statements. 
At the fiftieth anniversary celebration of Scitovszky's 
ordination in November, 1859, Bartakovics declared that the 
absolutist regime in Hungary was illegal. Austrian 
displeasure was so strong that the Nuncio feared Bartakovics 
would be forced to resign from his see, and used his 
fluence to prevent any speech by him at the festive 

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85. Adriányi, op. cit., 48, 132; see Chapter I. 
86. Although he was one of the most important 
Archbishops of Eger, there has been no major biography of 
Bartakovics. The most substantial treatments are the article 
by János Perger, "Kis-Apponyi Bartakovics Béla egri érsek," 
in Emlékkönyv kis-apponyi Bartakovics Béla egri érsek arany-
misejénnek ünnepeire (Eger: Erseki lyceumí kny., 1865), and 
Lajos Haynald, Emlék-beszéd, melyet Kis-Apponyi Bartakovics 
Béla nagyméltóságú és főtisztelendő egri érseknek gyasz-
ünnepeyle alkalmavál mondott... (Eger: Lyceumí nyomda, 
1873), 30 p. The eulogy reveals no especially close rela-
tionship between the speaker and the deceased. Bartakovics 
sponsored the translation of many important Catholic works, 
including Bishop Ketteler's Die Arbeiterfrage und das 
Christentum (Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1864)-- Adriányi, Ungarn 
und das I. Vatikanum (Köln: Böhlau, 1975), 83. 
87. Perger, 33.
opening of the Erdélyi Múzeum-Egylet in Kolozsvár. Like Scitovszky, Bartakovics was ex officio prefect of the county where he resided.

Danielik was even more active, and more disturbing to the Nuncio. He was a canon in Eger since 1849, and for many years a close friend of Zsigmond Kemény, editor of the Deák-affiliated, moderate newspaper Pesti Napló. Between 1848 and 1855 Danielik edited the moderate but increasingly political Catholic paper, Religió. In 1857 he also joined the editorial board of the Pesti Napló. As Vice-President of the Szent István Társulat since 1854 and through his connections in the church he was able to rapidly increase the number of Catholic, aristocratic and clerical subscribers to the Pesti Napló. The President of the society became a leading financial supporter of the Pesti Napló. The paper strongly opposed the Concordat, and

88. Lukács, A Vatikán és Magyarország, 126.
89. The most complete biography of Danielik is by József Szvorenyi, Emlékbeszéd Danielik tiszteleti tagról (Budapest: Franklin, 1891), 35 p. On his political career, see László Csorba, "Újabb adatok a kiegyezés előkészítésének történetéhez," A magyar polgári átalakulás kérdései (Budapest: Az ELTE Bölcsészettudományi kara, 1984), 423-45 and ibid., "Nemzetélet és hitelet közös választján," Tanulmányok a polgárosodás jellegeiről az önkényuralom korában (forthcoming).
91. Geza Buzinkay, "A birodalomhű demokrata forradalmi-ságtól a nemzeti ellenállás forumáig: a Pesti Napló," in A magyar sajtó története II 1848-1867 1 (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1985), 373-76. Szvorenyi notes this society was the only Hungarian one (aside from the Academy) which continued to operate throughout the 1850s; Deák, Eötvös and others regularly participated in its assemblies. A study of the society also emphasizes its special political role in this
Danielik himself organized secret assemblies of the Concordat's clerical opponents in his Pest apartment. Among those in attendance were three bishops. The Nuncio claimed that Danielik was in contact with the emigration, and that he used the society and *Religio* to support the political opposition. In a polemic with the Reformed journalist Móric Ballagi, Danielik insisted that Catholicism was no less favorable to liberty than Protestantism.

The celebration of St. Stephen's Day (August 20) in 1860 provided an opportunity for a national religious demonstration reminiscent in some ways of the Mariazell expedition three years earlier, but more overtly political. The holiday had been celebrated in Vienna from the fifteenth century until 1849, but had then been banned. For Hungarians their first king symbolized not only the establishment of Catholicism in the kingdom, but the unity of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The press prepared the celebration with pamphlets and articles emphasizing the saint's national significance. Scitovszky led the public procession through Pest streets bedecked with national flags. In a speech, he declared that "King Stephen's 800-year-old land may be shaken temporarily, but not destroyed..." The celebration concluded with a banquet attended by the leading aristocrats and featuring a speech period: "A Szent István Társulat," in *op.cit.*

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by Count Gyula Andrássy. The church continued to organize such celebrations in succeeding years, both in Hungary and, from 1861, in Vienna as well.

Scitovszky, Bartakovics and Danielik were the most prominent Catholic clergymen participating in the protests against the Protestant Patent in 1859-60. The court did not nominate the Primate as one of the Hungarian members of the Expanded Reichsrat of 1860, although it nominated Rauscher, Saguna and the Croatian Bishop Strossmayer. Scitovszky, other prelates and the clergy welcomed the October Patent in both speeches and pastoral letters. The emperor recognized the Primate's symbolic leadership of the Hungarian struggle for constitutional restoration. When he summoned him to Vienna at the time of the Diploma's promulgation, he greeted him with the words: "You are the winner." ("On a győztes.")

The Emperor well knew that Szecsen's negotiating skill was more important than the symbolic leadership of Scitovszky for the granting of the Diploma. The Primate was less concerned than Szécsén with constitutional principles, but strongly concerned about the revolutionary threat to the political order and to the prestige of the church. By his public pronouncements he sought to increase the authority of the church, not only to further religious goals but also to

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outflank and disarm the radicals.

The foundation of the first Hungarian Catholic political daily newspaper at this time revealed the conservative strategy of the episcopate more clearly. *Idők Tanúja* began to appear in January, 1860. It proclaimed as its principles: God and country, religion and liberty. Prominent among its constitutional principles was the insistence on the union of Hungary and Transylvania. *Pesti Napló* attacked the new paper as an attempt to divide the nation. The President of the Szent István Társulat forbade the greeting to the new paper planned by the Tarsulat’s weekly, *Religió*; as a result the editor of *Religió* resigned. The new paper secured 1160 subscribers already at its inception, a high number but one-third that of *Pesti Napló*; more than half of these were clergymen. The editorial policy of *Idők Tanúja* was cautiously patriotic but conservative. Bishops wrote many of the articles, and recommended the paper to their clergy and believers. After the Vatican provided aid for the victims of a flood in Hungary in 1862,


98. János Sziklay, *Négyven év a katholicizmus történetéből. A "Magyar Állam" negyvenéves jubileuma. 1859-1899* (Budapest: Nyomtatott a Hunyadi Mátéjas-intézetben, 1899), 4-9, 13, 22. *Magyar Állam* was the paper’s successor.

the paper organized the first Peter's Pence collection in Hungarian history, which sent 13,000 fl. to Rome for the support of the Holy See.

Rumors circulated that İdők Tanúja received substantial subsidies from Michael Haas, the Bishop of Szatmár. Haas shared Rauscher's dislike of the patriotic wing of the Hungarian episcopate. At the beginning of 1860 he alleged that Danielik twice obstructed a motion of the Szent István Társulat to express support for the Papal States. One letter to Rauscher cited several examples of purported agitation against pro-Austrian clergy; Haas wrote that "they intend to intimidate all people loyal to the government, and spread discontent even by means of the church and school." Haas also communicated his pro-Austrian views to Archbishop Kunszt.

The revival of political life after 1859 also stimulated a renewed interest in Catholic Autonomy. The episcopate petitioned the authorities in 1850 and 1860 for the administration of Catholic foundations by a mixed commission. The Emperor actually promised the future fulfillment

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100. Sziklay, 23-5.
101. Ibid., 402.
102. Haas to Rauscher, January 17, 1860, in Vienna, Erzdiözesanarchiv. Bischofsakten Rauscher 1860. Despite his sharp tone, Haas was optimistic: "Die Opposition wird sich legen, sobald man aufhören wird auf Napoleon zu hoffen." To a degree he was correct. Haas' relationship with Danielik grew warmer in later years.
103. Haas' many personal letters to Kunszt, and those of the even more conservative Archbishop Haulik of Zagreb, are in Kalocsa. Főegyházmegyei Levéltár, Personalia. Kunszt József ersek privat-levelei.
of this request in April, 1860 but then took no further action. The public was barely aware of these unsuccessful efforts. In 1861 several county assemblies revived the call for Autonomy and the idea that it would increase popular concern for the welfare of the church. One assembly appealed to Bartakovics to support Autonomy, while others called for its legislative enactment by the diet.

The easing of censorship made possible a lively debate in the press about Catholic Autonomy. The editor of Ídők Tanúja, Antal Lónkay, came out in favor of lay participation in church economic administration in December, 1861, as an antidote to religious indifference. The most radical contribution to the debate was an anonymous pamphlet by a German of Hungary, Kirchliche Zeitfragen, in 1863. The author, possibly a minor clergyman, railed against the arbitrary power and inordinately high income of the bishops and many pastors, and demanded they be chosen by election and given a uniform income, and lay economic administration introduced. An anonymous rebuttal accepted the author's call for the holding of synods and election of bishops, but deplored his hostility to the higher clergy and impractical call for economic levelling. Vilmos Fraknói, who had

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105. Sziklay, 19.
earlier attacked the February Patent in Idők Tanúja, denounced the ideas of "democratia" and social equality as "evil spirits of the age." Catholicism's problems were the result of the struggle of good and evil, and the answer was a more effective Catholic press. Lónkay also modified his view in a conservative direction. Parish elections might be beneficial, he wrote in September, 1863. But the spirit of the age was the real source of the decline in religious faith, and the political rivalries characteristic of many Protestant congregations should be avoided. Yet for all his ecclesiastic conservatism, Lónkay was imprisoned for two weeks after attacking the decision of the Transylvanian deputies to enter the Reichsrat in 1863.

Under the Provisorium some Hungarian bishops continued the strategy of the previous decade of using their independent position to mediate between the contending parties, moderate their conflict, and strengthen the position of the church. Two different applications of this strategy were the comportment of József Kunszt and János Danielik.

In 1861 Danielik was appointed a councillor on the Hungarian Locumtenential Council with responsibility for church affairs, a post which he held until 1864. His leadership of the Szent István and Szent László

109. See Chapter IX.
societies made him one of the most prominent members of the patriotic wing of the Hungarian clergy. In the early months of 1862 he prepared the first detailed compromise plan of the Provisorium. Accepting the validity of both the Diploma and the Patent, he proposed a one-time constituent "Reichsrat ad hoc" of all the peoples of the empire. Its members would be partly elected by the provincial diets and partly appointed by the emperor, and its task would be to resolve the most pressing financial problems and establish a budgetary procedure for the future which local diets would then approve. The politicians he submitted it to in April did not see how it would be possible to replace the Reichsrat already in existence.

Archbishop Kunszt, the second-ranking prelate in the Hungarian hierarchy, submitted a less detailed compromise plan when Governor Pálffy requested his political views. Kunszt blamed the recent failures of the government in Hungary in 1861 on the system of county government, which left the path open to demagogy and class privilege. Like Danielik, he did not insist on Hungary's constitutional independence, but proposed a modification of the Patent according to guidelines to be voted by a special conference

110. "Politikai programmterv," Eger. Főegyházmegyei könyvtar, Ms. 2046/17. A German draft accompanying the project submits it for the "hohe Meinung auf geeignetem Wege" of an unidentified "Excellenz," possibly in Vienna. Danielik expected that a Hungarian government would be formed, but recognized the prerogatives of the Minister of State with respect to the Reichsrat. He proposed that the Transylvanian question be reserved for solution by a future diet.
of notables in Hungary. The conference would propose those modifications of the laws of 1848 dictated by the financial and military interests of the empire. He was pessimistic about the prospects of willing Hungarian participation in the Reichsrat, but expressed confidence that the loyalty of the empire's peoples would facilitate a solution, "no in equality, but in unity, not in unanimity, but in harmony." There was no recorded follow-up to the plan, perhaps because the Old Conservatives were no longer willing to expose themselves to public outrage. Pálffy rejoiced at having found one who shared his views, and on the eve of the provincial synod in Kalocsa in 1863 appealed to him to assure the moderation of the participating bishops in the interest of "the great issue of the compromise."

Cardinal Rauscher welcomed the February Patent as a measure in defense of central authority and German culture. Speaking in March, 1863 about the imperial unity which he believed the 1856 bishops' conference had symbolized within the church, he expressed the hope that this assembly "would soon find its counterpart in the political realm. In his attitude toward liberalism and constitutionalism, however,

112. Copy of Kunszt to Pálffy, January 31, in loc. cit. The letter indicates they had recently held an oral consultation at an unspecified location.
113. Pálffy to Kunszt, March 9, 1862 ("Ich bin glücklich, in Euer Excellenz einen politischen Gesinnungsgenossen gefunden zu haben...") and September 1, 1863 ("a kiegyenlítődés nagy kérdése"), in loc. cit.
114. Wolfsgruber, 168.
Rauscher shared some of Rechberg’s misgivings about Schmerling’s policy.

Schmerling and the Emperor were unwilling to abandon the Concordat, but showed some willingness to modify it in detail. A Protestant section in the Ministry of Culture was established for the first time in April, 1860, headed by the Saxon Joseph Andreas Zimmermann. The granting of an autonomous statute to the Austrian Protestants in April, 1861 violated, in the view of the Holy See, the special position of the church. Schmerling formally accepted the Reichsrat liberals’ demand for renegotiation of the Concordat in June, 1862, sending Bishop Joseph Fessler to the Vatican for this purpose in May, 1863. His negotiations lasted nearly a year, but bore little fruit. The mild Josephinism of Schmerling’s ideologist, Hans von Perthaler, sought to weaken the political power of the church but at the same time increase its administrative and spiritual autonomy in the interest of the freer development of society as a whole. Perthaler was confident that in freely organized

115. Ibid., 495-98.
116. Correspondence of Pius IX and Franz Joseph, in Friedrich Engel-Janosi, ed., Die politische Korrespondenz der Päpste mit den österreichischen Kaisern, 1804-1918, 258-9. The simultaneous statute of the Saxon Lutherans was very similar, and Zimmermann played an active role in both; see Teutsch, Geschichte der ev. Kirche in Siebenbürgen, II, 382-5.
117. Wolfsgruber, Kirchengeschichte Österreich-Ungarns (Wien: Heinrich Kirsch, 1909), 87. Fessler was commissioned by Rauscher to defend the Catholic position versus the liberals in the pamphlets Die Revision des Konkordats, Die Protestantenfrage in Österreich, and Zur Orientierung über die gemischten Ehen in Österreich.
church assemblies neither "the abstract Romish spirit of a few fanatical and pietistic bishops" and "the servile deference of others toward a brutal...government... [will prevail]... The deeper religion enters the soul, i.e. ceases to be [mere] tradition, and becomes a true inner necessity of life and experience, the stronger will be its special character, opposing the antinational tendency. Increasing nationalism in the churches, of course, had mixed blessings for the Austrian state. This opening to liberal Catholicism on the theoretical level could justify the court's generosity toward the non-Catholic churches yet occasional reliance on the Catholic episcopate's conservative instincts. Neither episcopate nor liberals found the compromise satisfactory.

Serving in the Locumtenental Council, Danielik was alert to the beginning of Schmerling's decline and the rise of the Esterházy "camarilla" in 1864. In June, 1864 he discussed the possibility of compromise negotiations with his friend Baron Antal Augusz, a former associate of Archduke Albrecht. Danielik visited numerous Vienna officials in November, proposed Augusz as negotiating partner, and advised his friend that winning over "an

119. On the conflict between the Austrian episcopate and the Reichsrat liberals under Schmerling, see Wolfsgruber, Kirchengeschichte, 86-88.
120. The discussion of the Danielik-Augusz negotiations is from Csorba, 423-45, based on their letters preserved in Eger and Szekszárd.
archduke" would improve their chances. As the result of Auguszˇ meeting with Albrecht, the fateful Augusz-Deák negotiations began in Pest on December 27, 1864. Thereafter Danielikˇs role was reduced to relaying information from Deák to Augusz while the latter was in Vienna. Danielikˇs role in the initiation of the compromise crowned the series of mediating efforts by Hungarian prelates. It is unimportant whether he took the first steps "alone." His countless connections with the Deák party and the Hungarian hierarchy made him an ideal intermediary on the Hungarian side, just like the church whose conservatism and dynastic loyalty consistently favored the middle way.

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The years of constitutional conflict in Hungary coincided with the decisive confrontation between ultramontanism and liberalism within the international Catholic Church. Pope Pius IX (1846-78) became increasingly conservative with the passing of the years as a consequence of his suffering at the hands of Italian liberal nationalism. His view of liberalism and nationalism as the twin errors of the age achieved classic formulation in the Syllabus of Errors, under consideration from 1860 on and finally published in 1864. Ultramontanism represented not only political conservatism, however, but also a revival of

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121. Due to financial embarrassments and health reasons Danielik withdrew from public life before the Compromise could be enacted, and devoted his remaining years to scholarship.
traditional Catholic piety. The Austrian state found it convenient to ally itself with the ultramontane movement through the Concordat of 1855. The church gained a repeal of many of the restrictions it had suffered since the eighteenth century, while the empire sought a Catholic Church that was an active agent of imperial unity.

The Holy See moved tentatively toward a Concordat with Austria's Greek Catholics, as well. Various Orthodox bishops had agreed to unions with Rome in the seventeenth century in order to secure the social advancement of their clergy. Rome and the empire were willing to facilitate this advancement for the sake of the universal church. However, the defense of the eastern rite brought Greek Catholics, especially Romanians, into conflict with the Holy See over questions of church discipline.

The Hungarian lands were a major arena of the contest between ultramontanism and liberal nationalism. Nationalism found expression in the episcopate's defense of the rights of the Primate vis a vis the Archbishop of Vienna and the resistance to Austrian absolutism in general as well as the political engagement of the Romanian bishops. Liberals saw the establishment of lay participation in administration in the so-called Catholic Autonomy as a response to the liberal spirit of the age and its perceived religious malaise. However, the dominant attitude of the Catholic episcopate was moderation and a quest for compromise rather than liberal reform.
CHAPTER SIX

BISHOP HAYNALD AND THE HUNGARIAN OPPOSITION

The Roman Catholic Church in Transylvania recovered under Habsburg rule much of the privileged position it had enjoyed prior to the Reformation. The diocese was established in 1003, subordinate to the Archbishop of Kalocsa. The first resident bishop since the sixteenth century took his seat in Gyulafehérvár in 1716, and became the only bishop in Transylvania to also enjoy the status of councillor on the Gubernium. The Transylvanian legislation prejudicial to the Catholics (prohibiting the residence of the bishop and canons in Transylvania, restricting church property ownership and the residence of religious orders, especially of the Jesuits) were repealed by the diet.

The favoritism shown toward Catholics was a long-term grievance of the Protestants. The Protestant estates complained repeatedly in the diet about the councillor status of the bishop. The Catholics pointed out that the elders of the Protestant consistoria, who in economic and educational matters enjoyed analogous powers in their churches, were also councillors. The official policy in the question of mixed marriages also favored the Catholic party, and was a permanent grievance of the other religious communities.

1. Mihály Bochkor, Az erdélyi katolikus autonómia (Kolozsvár: Ajtai K. Albert, 1911), 315-26; Mihály Fogarasy, Az Erdélyi Püspökről polgári tekintetben (Bécs: Strauss Antal özvegye, 1837), 41-53.
Finally, the Austrian Ministry of Culture decreed in 1854 that the bishop be officially titled "Bishop of Transylvania," in spite of earlier practice and prejudicial to the other bishops in Transylvania. Haynald demanded of Nádasdy in 1863 that this title be observed. The Chancellery and Holy See took the matter under renewed consideration, but confirmed the decree of 1854.

As in other Catholic dioceses, the bishop was administrative, spiritual and sacramental leader of the Catholic faithful and of the secular clergy, i.e. those not belonging to religious orders. He was assisted in the administration of diocesan schools and properties by his Cathedral Chapter of ten canons. In 1867 the diocese numbered 211 parishes, 150 branch parishes (filiae), and 265 diocesan priests. In addition, 177 monks and 39 nuns resided in 37 houses under the supervision of their respective monastic orders. By far the most numerous were the Conventual Franciscans, who resided in 23 houses and were active in pastoral care, education and the administration of the shrine of Csíksomlyó.

The diocese of Transylvania was by far the largest in

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3. The number of canons is from 1862. The 1848 schematismus states that the bishop had the right to nominate seven of the canons— an extremely high proportion— subject, of course, to royal approval; Bochkor, 337. The Cathedral Chapter enjoyed the extraordinary right of vetoing nominees for canonries, a right it exercised when Tivadar Zerich was proposed in 1858— Imecs, 139, 147.
4. Data from Religió, May 8, 1867, cited by Adriányi, Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum, 74.
area of the eighteen Roman Catholic dioceses in the Hungarian lands in area, comprising nearly the entire territory of the Grand Principality of Transylvania. The diocese was divided into sixteen deaneries, each headed by a dean (archdiaconus, főesperes) who was responsible to the bishop for the examination of conditions in his district's parishes through the conduct of periodic visits and presided over the district marriage tribunal and clerical assembly.

A unique characteristic of the Transylvanian diocese was the considerable degree of mixed lay-clerical administration on the local level. After the exile of the bishop, which was formalized by the diet in 1610, the prominent laymen and clergymen evolved a procedure by which matters not purely spiritual were administered, rather similarly to the Protestants, by officials elected at diocesan, district and parish assemblies. The procedure was guaranteed by the Transylvanian law code Aprobatae constitutiones of 1653.

Under Habsburg rule the function of the diocesan assembly (Status Catholicus) was continually restricted, and largely supplanted by the Catholica Commissio, established in 1766. Members of the commission were the Bishop (later a diocesan canon named by him) and the Catholic Gubernium councillors and secretaries. The commission regu-

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6. For a short history of the Status Catholicus, see Kiss and Sziklay, II, 889-91. In practice, its members consisted of Catholics accredited to the Transylvanian diet.
lated Catholic schools and school foundations up to 1848, and was reestablished at the same time as the Gubernium in 1861. The existence of the Catholica Commissio was a grievance of both Catholic and Protestant members of the diet in the Vormärz, who viewed it as a violation of the Catholics' right to administrative autonomy in school and property matters.

A mixed diocesan assembly convened in Kolozsvar at the end of August, 1848 under the presidency of Bishop Miklós Kovács. The 166 members were half ex officio and half elected, half clergy and half laymen. The assembly called for the restoration of annual diocesan synods. It also called, on the basis of Law XX, for the assumption of the financial administration of the diocese by a similarly composed annual Status Catholicus assembly and a 24-member permanent commission deputized by it to take over the function of the Catholica Commissio. With the outbreak of civil war, however, the project remained a dead letter. Under the new circumstances the government was even less willing to surrender control over diocesan finances. The radical assemblies of succeeding months, notably the synod in Marosvásárhely on May 29, 1849, challenged established

7. Bochkor, 368-78.
8. The complete protocol of the five-day assembly is published in Veszely, ed., Az erdélyi róm. kath. püspöki megye autonomiája, vagy is az 1711-től 1892-ig tartott erdélyi római katholikus státusgyűlések nevezetesebb tárgyalásainak, határozatainak, felterjesztéseinek és más ezekre vonatkozó okmányoknak gyűjteménye (Gyulafehérvárt: Ny. Papp Györgynél a püsp. lyc. könyvnyomdájában, 1893), 122-46.
religious practices but not state financial control.

Bishop Haynald argued to Mikó in 1861 for the restoration of the Status Catholicus rather than of the Catholica Commissio. He stated:

Your Excellency is familiar with the laws guaranteeing the self-administration of the churches... The basis of this request is none other than the just aspiration, deriving from my pastoral duty, to assure the autonomy of the Catholic Church by the execution of the laws, just as the other denominations have similarly aspired.

Count Mikó recognized the validity of Haynald's arguments, but reserved the renegotiation of the commission's status until after the resolution of the union question. The former chairman of the commission, Canon Mózes Keserű, was restored to this position and the commission recommenced operation in May, 1861. Nádasdy recommended the confirmation of Keserű's appointment, after originally criticizing the appointment because of Keserű's behavior vis à vis the constitutional government in 1848. The commission had responsibility for the state patronage of parishes and supervised the church foundations, the patronage of


10. Correspondence of Haynald with Keserű and Gubernium councillor Parkas Cserey, April and May, 1861, in Ibid., 1861/930, 1162 (Cat. 35).

11. Correspondence of Nádasdy and Haynald, January and February, 1862, with documents concerning Keserű's behavior in 1848-49: ibid., 1862-205, 375 (Cat. 12), and Vortrag of Nádasdy, January 29, in MOL D228 1862/73; see also Chapter I.
parishes by local communities and individuals and the property matters of the religious orders, and made nominations for those canon appointments which were within the prerogative of the crown.

The Chancellery proposed to the Gubernium 1863 that the Catholica Commissio would better fulfill its function if it were expanded, and requested its response to this proposal. Fogarasy's revelation of the proposal to the assembly of the Status Catholicus three years later drew the response that only the complete restoration of Autonomy would serve the interests of the church. The assembly protocol does not indicate whether Fogarasy revealed that the Gubernium then took the further step of suggesting the Catholica Commissio be replaced by an independent commission made up exclusively of laymen and completely independent of the Bishop.

The intrusion of the Gubernium on the operation of Catholic Autonomy under Habsburg rule was less on the local level. The bishops did not oppose the demands of the laity and the lower clergy for the retention of this autonomy, but rather participated in the increasingly rare Status Catholicus assemblies that protested against the activities of the Catholica Commissio. The diocesan synod held by

12. Bochkor, 349, 363 summarizes the nature of the commission's correspondence between 1861 and 1866.
14. Vasile Ladislau Pop to Ráduyl, May 31, 1864, in Alba Iulia, ERC. 1864/1233 (Cat. 4).
15. Bochkor was able to identify twenty-one Status Catholicus assemblies before 1866, but only three in the nineteenth century: 1810, 1811 and 1848— Ibid., 388.
Szepessy in 1822 formally recognized the existence of parish assemblies and the election of elders and other officials by them. The court refused to ratify the decisions of this synod. But parish archives confirm that many parishes had assemblies which met on a regular basis. In the Szekler region generally, the deans were entitled to convene assemblies of the clergy twice annually, and mixed parish assemblies elected a range of officials who assisted the clergy in the economic and religious tasks and directed the parishes' various pious and welfare societies. The state apparently did not interfere with the holding of such assemblies in the 1860s. The pastor of Csíkrákos was elected by a parish assembly in 1857, and that of Kolozsvár selected from among two nominees chosen by the parish assembly in 1864.

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The Decade of Absolutism

Haynald's immediate successor as Bishop was Miklós Kovács (Bishop 1827-52). His efforts on behalf of Hungarian-language elementary education earned him considerable respect in patriotic circles. He made no strong commitment to either side during the Transylvanian civil war of 1848-49,

16. Ibid., 383-5.
17. Ibid., 384-5, and Vorbuchner, Az erdélyi püspökség, 108-9. The city parish of Hermannstadt selected its first lay elder in 1788. Haynald approved a new statute for the parish in 1858; afterward the parish held one or two general assemblies annually and elected a twelve-member parish council—Vorbuchner, Historia Domus II, 220, 326-9, ms. in Sibiu, Parohia romano-catholica.
and hence was spared the administrative measures to which some other Hungarian bishops were subjected. At any rate, the military encirclement of Gyulafehérvár during the hostilities virtually prevented his communication with the diocese. Consequently the pastor of Kolozsvár, István Kedves, administered the diocese. The court named Haynald as auxiliary cum iure successionis of the elderly bishop a year before his death in October, 1852.

Haynald was born in 1816 in Szécsény, in central Hungary, to middle-class parents. After theological studies in Esztergom, Pozsony and Vienna, he served in a parish in Pest for two years, was theology professor in Esztergom 1842-46, travelled nearly a year in western Europe at the expense of the Primate, then played a leading role in the administration of the archdiocese of Esztergom during the revolution as chancellery director after his superiors, Primate János Hám and Vicar Capitular József Kunszt withdrew from public affairs. Haynald was suspended from his post by the Hungarian government in 1849 when he refused to promulgate its decree dethroning the Habsburg dynasty. Primate Scitovszky restored him to his former office, and he remained there until taking over the see of Transylvania.

The new bishop proved to be an energetic leader, conducting more than thirty tours of his diocese, intro-

21. Biographical information, unless otherwise noted, is from Dénes Szittyay, Haynald Lajos kalocsai biboros érsek élete (Kalocsa: Jurcsó nyomda, 1915).
ducing examinations for pastoral appointments, establishing numerous schools and school foundations. His dynastic loyalty had been a leading reason for his appointment. Yet he opposed the Concordat, and offered to resign in 1860 after clashing with the authorities over diocesan endowments. Contemporaries familiar with his behavior during this period described him as a militant Catholic and proselytizer. Saxon Lutheran leaders resented Haynald's 1853 regulation forbidding Catholics to attend Protestant elementary schools, his insistence on a Saxon guild's participation in Corpus Christi processions, and his fondness for the title "Bishop of Transylvania." The most objective judgement of his character by a contemporary is probably that of Police Minister Kempen, who described him after a meeting in 1856 as "young, fiery, perhaps rather effusive, and, as he himself said, candid." Governor Liechtenstein described him as "a proud and power-hungry prelate," whose defense of Catholic privileges concerning cemeteries and mixed marriages he strongly resented. Perhaps under the impression of his political transformation and public oratory beginning in 1861, he considered Haynald a political opportunist.

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Zerich allegedly referred to Haynald as "the weather-vane Transylvanian bishop." An observer of the Vatican Council described him as "a handsome, eloquent, gentle man, with physical warmth and attractiveness... full of ambition and conceit."

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Haynald in 1861

Haynald's political activity, like that of the other Hungarian prelates, increased rapidly after 1860. On the eve of the Esztergom conference in December, 1860, Eotvos urged him to come to Vienna and speak out in favor of the union with Hungary. He wrote that Haynald's declaration might have a decisive impact at the court. Haynald replied that he strongly favored the union, and promised to leave for Vienna as soon as his health permitted-- but then remained in Gyulaféhérvár. Haynald's pastoral letter of January 6, 1861 praised the restoration of the constitution by the October Diploma, but neglected to mention the union

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25. Liechtenstein wrote: "Ich glaube hier noch anführen zu sollen, dass Haynald, der unter dem absolutistischen System immer als Zelot auftrat, sehr duldsam wurde, als die konstitutionelle Regierungsform eingeführt wurde; die religiösen Anschauungen und Empfindungen dieses Kirchenfürsten unterlagen eben vollständig seinen ehrgeizigen Bestrebungen; da er nicht Papst werden konnte, wollte er wenigstens Primas von Ungarn werden."-- "Autobiographie des Prinzen Friedrich von Liechtenstein," Vaduz, Hausarchiv der regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein. Karton 239, ff. 645-47. The statement of Zerich ("a szélkakas erdélyi püspök") was reported by several priests and laymen of Hermannstadt who denounced Zerich to the bishop in April, 1863: Alba Iulia, ERC. 1863/800 (Cat. 13).

and called on the clergy to influence the people toward peaceful moderation. Haynald insisted to Eotvos that any leadership role he might take would not be influenced by a desire for popularity; as far as the Transylvanians were concerned,

here— in the land of Protestant intolerance— the most justified Catholic activity will always be unpopular. The Reformed are powerful, the Catholics willingly follow their lead.

The remark seems strangely modest in light of his later activity. But the tone he adopted in his January pastoral was truly not a popular one among the liberals.

Haynald was the host at the Gyulafehervár conference on February 11 and 12, housing most of the guests from out of town in his own residence and the residences of the canons. The Hungarians decided in advance that Haynald should speak first, and in favor of the union— as he did. His speech won him instant popularity among the Hungarians. He was greeted afterwards by a torchlight procession and

27. The correspondence of Haynald and Eötvös in November, 1860 appeared in Szittyay, 68-70; Haynald’s letter also appeared in Tóth, 476-7. The pastoral letter appeared in Kolozsvári Közlöny of February 12, 1861, was quoted partially by Szittyay, 70-1, and can also be found in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/160 (Cat. 4). Kemény praised Haynald for it in his letter of March 3, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/593 (Cat. 35). Haynald later insisted that he used his audience with the emperor in December to urge that he recognize the 1848 laws in principle, a position the emperor considered to be close to treason; Wohl, 66-7. His account seems self-serving; but Miksa Falk confirms the audience took place, shortly after one with Eötvös: Kor- és jellemrajzok (Budapest: Revai testvérek, 1893), 266.

28. The printed list of participants, with their place of accomodation written in, is in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/333 (Cat. 37).
spoke in similar terms to the assembled crowd. Károly Apor assured Mikó that Haynald was "completely won over to the cause," adding that his appearance at an audience with the emperor would be very helpful. Haynald left suddenly for Vienna on March 10 after receiving a telegraphic summons, probably from Kemény. His influence may well have helped Kemeny to secure imperial sanction for his Provisional Instruction on March 24.

The Nuncio accused Haynald and other Hungarian prelates of excessive permissiveness toward nationalistic tendencies. Haynald actually declined an appeal to respond publicly to personal attacks on him in the Romanian press. In the current agitated state of public opinion, he wrote, this would serve no useful purpose.

As a consequence of the restoration of the Transylvanian constitution, Mikó called upon Haynald to occupy his councillor's seat in the Gubernium. At Haynald's request, Mikó relieved him of the requirement of attendance, citing his residence in Gyulafehérvar and his participation in the diet in Pest. Haynald received a sizable salary

29. Kolozsvári Közlöny printed the text of Haynald's speech on February 16-17, 1861. Szittyay claims the local Romanians (possibly Augustin Pop; see Chapter VIII) organized the torchlight procession. The Romanian press condemned the speech.


31. De Luca to Antonelli, March 24, in Lukács, The Vatican, 543.

32. Adám Farkas to Haynald, March 18, with reference to an article in Gazeta Transilvaniei, and Haynald's reply sent from Gyulafehérvar, March 27, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/676 (Cat. 4).

33. Correspondence of Mikó and Haynald, March 31 to
as councillor, nonetheless. As a member of the Hungarian Roman Catholic episcopate, Haynald was named to the upper house in the diet. Consequently he spent much of April through June in Pest, staying with Kunszt in the residence of a mutual acquaintance, Antal Szántófy. Haynald was not the only Transylvanian member of the diet; Count Domokos Teleki, one of the leaders of the liberal opposition in the Transylvanian counties, attended by virtue of his estates in Hungary proper. Roman Catholic titular bishops, including Lonovics and Mihály Fogarasy, were invited, but Romanian bishops were not.

On June 17 Haynald delivered a speech of one and a half hours in support of Deák’s moderate oppositional motion. As in his speech of February, he declared his loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty but insisted on the continued legality of the Transylvanian union. Scitovszky personally congratu-

April 12, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/910 and 937 (Cat. 4), and MOL F263 1861/36. Haynald’s correspondence in Alba Iulia, ERC indicates the approximate dates of his stay in Pest and his stay at the resort in Teplice, Silesia in July.

34. Mikó to Haynald, June 26, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/1239 (Cat. 4), and MOL F263 1861/979.

35. Franz Joseph and the Hungarian Court Chancellery to Haynald, February 14, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/731 (Cat. 2).

36. Mikó was also invited, but declined due to his duties in the Gubernium.

37. The June 25 session of the upper house discussed the proposed invitation of Šulutiu, Greek Catholic Bishop of Lugos Alexandru Dobra, and Šaguna. Fogarasy argued against the proposal, but Lonovics called for discussion of the question by the Hungarian episcopate. Korunk (Kolozsvár), June 29, 1861.

38. The speech was published in Pesti Hirnök and Kolozsvári Közlöny and in pamphlet form: Haynald Lajos erdélyi püspök felsőházi beszédé az erdélyi unió tárgyaban (Junius 17en) (Pest: Emich Gusztáv, 1861), 36 p.; it is exhibit 2 in the Vortrag of December 4 in MOL D228 1861/478.
lated Haynald after the speech. As a result of his speeches on February and June he was acclaimed an honorary commission member by the counties and districts of Kővár on March 23, Maros on May 12, Csík on April 25, and Făgăraș on July 6. After his speech Haynald retired to the baths in Teplice, where he received word of the deadlock between the diet and the government.

Haynald’s suddenly acquired fame as a liberal bishop reached as far as Paris, where he was proclaimed the honorary president of the "Institut de l’Afrique," a society aiming at the abolition of slavery and the spread of Christianity in Africa, in August, 1861. The citation praised his "enlightened and generous spirit." One of the leading spirits of the new society was Bishop Dupanloup, who advocated the partition of Africa among the Christian nations.

Haynald’s contact with French liberal Catholics may have dated as early as his visit to Paris in 1846, when his

39. Szittyay, 81, citing Kolozsvári Közlöny No. 96, June 20.
40. Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/806, 1246, 1341 (Cat. 4), 1861/1049 (Cat. 35). The declaration from Făgăraș came during an interlude when Hungarians and Hungarophile were in control. The city council of Szamosújvár also sent its congratulations, on June 27; Ibid., 1861/1311 (Cat. 4).
41. Telegram, János Török to Haynald, July 30, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/1818 (Cat. 35): "...Mehrheit wahrscheinlich Adresse, gegen Beschluss, Permanenz, Vertagung."
42. Declaration to Haynald, August 5, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/1791 (Cat. 4).
sister was the tutor of Louis Philippe's grandson. The Eötvös connection was probably more significant. Eötvös was in regular correspondence with Montalembert, the leading French liberal Catholic, who was a close friend of Dupanloup. Following an invitation from Eotvos, Montalembert visited Vienna and Pest in 1861. He arrived in Pest on June 8, and was given a grand welcome by such leaders of that chamber as Scitovszky, Apponyi, Mailath and Lonovics. He attended many sessions of the diet, and probably witnessed Haynald's speech on June 17. The visit changed Montalembert's former skepticism toward the moderate Hungarian opposition to warm sympathy.

After the imperial decree convening the Transylvanian diet for November 4, 1861, Mikó wired Haynald to "come here and take up your activity as Gubernium councillor without delay." The councillors discussed the convocation decree in the session of October 3, Haynald taking advantage of a law of 1721 to speak first. He declared the decree illegal, and his motion to declare it illegal was accepted by the majority of the councillors. The Hungarian nobility of Also-Feher county sent a committee of thirty-one, 

44. Tóth, 474.
46. Mikó to Haynald, September 28, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/1860 (Cat. 4).
47. The law of 1721 stated that the Bishop as councillor was first Votant, "post Gubernatorem primam sessionem cum omni congruam praerogatio capit." Cited by Vortragof Nádasdy of December 11, 1861, in MOL D228 1861/478.
including three barons, two Roman Catholic priests and a
Reformed dean to Haynald's residence on October 31 to thank
him for his action.

Upon his appointment as Court Chancellor, Nádasdy sum-
moned Haynald to Vienna to explain his actions. He arrived
there on November 22. Upon his arrival he composed a writ-
ten account of his contribution to the session of October 3,
and presented it to Mikó, also in Vienna, for corroboration.
He presented his text to Nadasdy on November 24. He admit-
ted that he spoke first in the Gubernium after the decree
was presented there, but claimed that his view was "in
agreement with the Hungarian, Szekler and Romanian council-
ors." He rejected the argument of the centralist council-
lor Schmidt that Hungary's constitution had lapsed, adding:

The egotistical gentlemen of the Umsturzpartei
on the Seine and Dora fight against the gilded
parchments and extant treaties; Austria was re-
nowned for always seeking to protect them, and
this was the duty of the Gubernium as well.

It was by the right of the strong, which Schmidt defended,
that Austria's princely allies in Italy were deprived of
their thrones. Haynald admitted that his views differed
from those of the government (Ministerium, not Gubernium),
but feared the government's views would lead to the downfall
of the dynasty and of the monarchy. Instead, he argued that
the formal acceptance of the laws of 1848 was the only
solution. In that case he was confident that those articles

49. István Kemény and János Macskási (Roman Catholic
pastor of Teius) to Haynald, October 19, 26, and 28, in Alba
Iulia, ERC 1861/2074 (Cat. 37).
of the 1848 laws could be modified that were detrimental to the power of the monarchy, if approved by a diet of all the Hungarian lands, cosigned by the Hungarian ministers and sanctioned by the crowned king. Haynald would forfeit his moral authority as bishop if he changed his views with each change of government, becoming a "political chameleon," something the government could hardly desire. He reportedly offered his resignation, which Nádasdy declined.

Nádasdy reported to the Emperor that energetic action against Haynald was made difficult by the fact that he had received no rebuke for his published addresses of February and June, and that he was appointed Gubernium councillor fully six weeks after his address at the conference in Gyulafehérvár. Haynald threatened to undermine the function and prestige of the newly reorganized Gubernium. Therefore Nádasdy asked him confidentially to refrain from attending the Gubernium for the time being. The decree for which he secured imperial sanction fell short of even this measure, however: it stated that the emperor recognized his loyal sentiments, but insisted regretfully that his speeches of

50. The fifteen-page declaration, which was apparently also consulted by Fraknói and Szittyay, is in OSzK, Ms 882, where it is incorrectly identified as a letter of Haynald to Eötvös. Though Nádasdy is not mentioned in the text, the contents, language and form of address (Euer Excellenz) identify the document with certainty. The declaration is listed among the exhibits in MOL D228 1861/478, but is missing. There are no documents in the file 1861/2358 (Cat. 4) in Alba Iulia, ERC, entitled "Episcopi declaratio politica. Signatum 25a Novembr. 1861." [Fraknói], 70-72 summarizes the same declaration.

51. Szittyay, 86.
1861 were in contradiction with imperial policy. In the future he should strive to "support the good-intentioned views of the government, seeking to reconcile and pacify public passions by tactful, wise comportment."

Mikó resigned from the Gubernium after his own session with Nádasdy on November 24. Formally communicating his decision to Haynald, he congratulated him for his decisiveness: "You have defended the cause of the constitution with the courage worthy of the bishop of a great and powerful religion."

The Nuncio was indignant at Haynald's independent behavior in his interview with Nádasdy, and urged Antonelli to facilitate his divestment of all civil functions. But Antonelli and the Pope believed that the Holy See should not become involved in Haynald's purely civil activities. The Nuncio might, if the emperor desired it, encourage Haynald to refrain from attending the Gubernium. Haynald might also be summoned to Rome on the pretext of completing the report interrupted in 1859 by the beginning of the war. Nadasdy


53. [Fraknoi], 70-72.

54. De Luca to Antonelli, November 29, and Antonelli to De Luca, December 14, in Lukács, The Vatican, 548-53. De
asked Haynald's archbishop to use his influence with him. Kunszt was apparently still on warm terms with Haynald at the time of the diet in Pest. But four months later he shared the Nuncio's anxiety about the bishop's apparent radicalism, and confessed that his quest for an archbishopric had undermined their previously warm relationship. Acceding to the request of the Nuncio, Kunszt wrote Haynald, criticizing his comportment in the Gubernium and recommending his temporary withdrawal from politics as a means of restoring tranquillity. Haynald replied noncommittally that the distance of his residence prevented his regular attendance at the Gubernium in any case.

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Haynald under the Provisorium

Under the Provisorium Haynald was less outspoken, but still independent. He approved the printing of the oppositional *Kolozsvári Közlöny* by the Catholic high school press in Kolozsvár. He continued to insist on his right, in principle, to preside over the Gubernium in the Governor's absence, a right he exercised in the session of the Commis-

 Luca proposed similar measures against Scitovszky and Strossmayer, similarly rejected by Antonelli. Rechberg's letter to Bach of November 29 closely resembles that of De Luca—Adriányi, Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum, 391-2.

55. "Übersetzung eines Schreibens des Erzbischofs von Colocza 31. Dezember 1861" [to the Nuncio], in HHSA, Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton 1b. II. Reservat-Präsidenten 1863-1865. See Chapter IX concerning this project.

56. Copies of letters of Kunszt and Haynald, January 2 and January 31, 1862, in Ibid.

57. Correspondence of Keserü and Haynald, January 7 and 30, 1862, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1862/114 (Cat. 37).
sio Catholica of April 6, 1862. Crenneville conceded the correctness of his arguments.

The government considered nominating Haynald to the vacant Patriarchate of Venice as a means of removing him from Transylvania. Nádasdy completed his reform of local government in Transylvania in the early months of 1862, then presented Haynald with the imperial rescript of April 12 calling for his support of the government. Haynald solicited and received a vote of support from his Cathedral Chapter for his earlier actions.

The absolutist party in Vienna, despite all frustration with Haynald's recalcitrance, could not discount the considerable prestige Haynald enjoyed at the Vatican. This prestige derived in part from his personal and ecclesiastical qualities, and in part from the threats, repeatedly emphasized by Haynald, posed to Roman Catholicism in Transylvania by eastern-rite Catholics and Orthodox that only he was capable of combatting.

Haynald's personal relationship with the Pope and his increasingly important role in the Curia were a source of authority for him in Rome and also in Vienna. The pope's strong reliance on personal relationships with his bishops

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58. Correspondence of Haynald and Crenneville, November 24 and December 16, 1862 in Ibid., 1862/1666, 2900 (Cat. 4).
59. In his description of Haynald's trip to Rome in 1862, Canon Lönhart confirmed the rumors to this effect, circulating in Transylvania, on the basis of a conversation with the Archbishop of Udine. Lönhart, 246.
60. [Fraknói], 73-4.
worked to Haynald's advantage. Contemporaries marvelled at the bishop's cultivation and charm.

In May, 1862 Roman Catholic bishops from around the world travelled to Rome for the canonization of the Japanese martyrs. It was Haynald's second journey to Rome as bishop. The Pope greeted him warmly when they met privately for a half hour the day after his arrival on May 22. At a second private audience, Haynald submitted information supplementary to his report of 1859. The unofficial subject of the bishops' meeting was the preparation of a papal statement on liberalism, which was to become the Syllabus of Errors. Haynald, despite his relative youth, was named to the preparatory commission. He distinguished himself in the regular meetings, and when the commission produced both a conservative draft and a liberal one (by Dupanloup), he was elected to the committee of five entrusted with the composition of a compromise draft and wrote the final version of this draft himself. According to Lönhart several bishops thanked Haynald "for the exclusion of certain passages," which by the very nature of the document would indicate that he was one of those seeking to blunt the pope's anti-liberal fervor. The origins of Haynald's later collaboration with Dupanloup at the Vatican Council date from no later than this period, for the French bishop enthusiastically praised

62. Lönhart, 192-94.
him to his colleagues.

It would be a projection of later events to suppose any strong antithesis between the Curia and the "liberal" prelates present in Rome in 1862-63. Hence Haynald's performance in the doctrinal commission could only increase his stature there. His contacts with Franz Liszt and Augustin Theiner must be seen in the same light. Liszt hosted Haynald and several other bishops at a private concert on June 7, 1862. A week later, Haynald visited Theiner, the Vatican librarian who was an associate of Strossmayer.

Another contact of Haynald in Italy in 1862 is surprising for a prelate who had just composed a curial memorandum on the perils of liberalism, but it reflects his mediating position in Hungarian politics. After leaving Rome on June 24, Haynald was visited in Livorno by Count Sándor Teleki, the former leader of the Hungarian Legion in Italy. While Haynald and Teleki had "many different views," the bishop urged him to apply for permission to return to


64. Lönhart, 114-15. It is unclear whether Haynald's long friendship with the composer began at this time. Liszt had moved to Rome in 1861, entered an Italian monastery in 1863, and took religious vows in 1865--Paul Merrick, "A vallásos Liszt," Vigilia 51,9 (1986), 56.

Hungary. He submitted a petition by Teleki's mother on her son's behalf to the emperor, but without result.

Haynald's experiences in Italy may well have fuelled his resolve to maintain his own independence. Upon his return to Gyulafehérvár, he composed a lengthy circular. It concluded on a note drawn from recent events in Italy that was reminiscent of his declaration to Nádasdy, and it had implied relevance for Transylvania. In an age when selfish, arbitrary power make the sanctity of law and honor an object of scorn, he wrote, bishops who are aware of their duty are being dismissed from their posts and even imprisoned.

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On the Eve of the Diet

Nádasdy took up Haynald's case again at the beginning of 1863. He reminded Haynald of the Emperor's declarations to the Reichsrat, his declaration to Haynald of the previous April, and his positive reply to the Saxons and Romanians in October, 1862. He asked him "in the strictest confidence": could the emperor count on his support in the election of deputies to the Reichsrat? The Nuncio's deputy reported

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66. Introductory study by Elek Csetri, citing letter of Haynald to Teleki's mother, Mrs. János Teleki, and of Teleki to Mrs. János Teleki, August 12, 1862, in: Sándor Teleki, Emlékezzünk régiekről. Emlékezések és levelezés (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1973), 41-2, 472. Teleki had ceased his activity in the organized emigration a year earlier, but only received an amnesty and returned home in 1867.

67. July 26, 1862; printed copies in German and Hungarian are in Alba Iulia, ERC 1862/1999 (Cat. 1) and OSzk, Pol.Lat. 3952, ff. 193.

68. Nádasdy to Haynald, January 31, 1863; draft in MOL D228 1863/60 and original in OSzk Pol.Hung. 1722, 260 ff.
the letter to Rome. He stated that Haynald had become by force of circumstances "the natural leader of the Transylvanian Hungarians;" but if Haynald replied negatively to Nádasdy's letter then his participation in the Transylvanian Diet, or even the retention of his see, might be called into question.

The bishop travelled to Pest for consultations with Deák, Eötvös, and Danielik, and continued on to Vienna with Governor Pálffy. Danielik regretfully reported to an informant that Haynald continued to insist on the laws of 1848. He warned Haynald that if the Hungarian opposition was too inflexible this would backfire on the Hungarians and the church. Haynald spent more than a week in Vienna.

Then the bishop again solicited the opinion of his Chapter, and it again confirmed him in his previous position. This he reported to Nádasdy on February 26, 1863. The Pope, meanwhile, praised Haynald for his loyalty to the emperor and urged him to work for social concord. Haynald composed an apolitical stressing piety and the interests of the Holy See. At the same time he appealed to the Nuncio to

69. Giovanni Capri to Antonelli, February 23, in Lukács, The Vatican, 556-59.
70. Police Commissioner of Pest-Buda to Mecséry, February, 14, in HHSA, Informationsbüro, 1863/1132 (Elenchus 115).
71. "Bizonyos forrásból értesülvén, hogy Excellentiád... 10 napig Bécsbe mulat...," Károly Apor to Haynald, February 22, in Szittyay, 92.
72. [Fraknói], 74-5.
73. Pius IX to Haynald, February 14, and circular of March 20, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/703 (Cat. 1).
understand Transylvania's "special problems."

Schmerling's victory in the Council of Ministers emboldened Nádasdy to employ a new course of action against Haynald. He composed a 38-page memorandum to Rechberg, asking that he appeal to the Holy See "to intercede in asuitable fashion in this very important matter." His linkage of the church and central imperial authority was no doubt designed to appeal to the mind of Ambassador Bach in Rome:

As things stand, the Catholic Church is guaranteed protection and justice only by the Catholic sentiments of the Emperor. For none is it less fitting than for a Catholic bishop to work for the weakening of imperial power and the destruction of the imperial house.

Haynald should therefore be made to obey the clearly stated will of the Emperor.

Rechberg communicated this "matter of a very delicate

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74. Draft of Haynald to the Nuncio, March 26, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/748 (Cat. 1).
75. Alexander Bach was closely identified with the implementation of the Concordat as chief minister in the previous decade. He was Ambassador to the Holy See from July, 1859 to November, 1865. His dedication to the Concordat, growing conservatism and ostentatious religiosity made him persona gratissima of the Holy See. In the Reichsrat Rechberg was forced to defend him against liberal claims that he was more a defender of Vatican interests than those of Austria. Alois Hudal, Die österreichische Vatikanbotschaft, 1806-1918 (Munchen: Pohl & Co., 1952), 167, 178, 181.
76. Nádasdy to Rechberg, April 8, 1863, in HHSA, Administrative Registratur. F26 Bischofe 1861-1869, Faszikel 26: Bischof Haynald, Abdankung als Bischof von Siebenbürgen. Haynald may have learned what was afoot. Two days after Nádasdy's letter he sent an unspecified Viennese document from Gyulafehérvár to Kolozsvár for examination by several aristocrats; Haynald to Mikó, April 10, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Muzeul Ardelean. Corespondenta Mikó Imre, 1863/19.
nature" to Bach, hoping he would find a "salutary solution." Bach made his presentation to Antonelli on April 30. He argued that by aiding the restoration of the laws of 1848, Haynald was paving the way for the renunciation of the Concordat in Hungary and Transylvania. In effect, he stated, the Bishop was allowing himself to become the instrument of forces hostile to the empire and the church. He requested that the Holy See use its influence to assure that Haynald take no active initiatives in the upcoming diet.\(^{78}\)

Bach reported to Rechberg on May 23. The chief difficulties, he wrote, were the Holy See's reluctance to interfere in constitutional questions and the considerable popularity enjoyed by Haynald in Rome due to his performance there the previous year. The pope agreed to write to Haynald, however, through Mgr. Franchi, the Secretary of the Congregatio Negotiorum Ecclesiasticorum Extraordinariorum, the body which negotiated concordats with foreign states. Antonelli stressed that he could not give a specific directive to Haynald, since this would set an undesirable precedent and may rightly be regarded as improper by Haynald himself. The Nuncio transmitted the letter to Haynald at the beginning of June. It warned him of the dangers of his policy for the church as well as for his person, and recommended a conciliatory comportment in the diet.\(^{79}\)

77. Rechberg to Bach, April 18, loc.cit.
78. Bach to Antonelli, April 30, in DSSS, 548-51; French translation of the Italian original in HHSA, Administrative Registratur, loc. cit.
79. Draft of Rechberg to Nádasdy, June 2, in HHSA,
Haynald's nomination as regalist to the diet was approved.

De Luca, perhaps because he had seen Franchi's letter, seemed less optimistic than the Austrian officials about its effectiveness. On June 3 he sent a stronger letter to Rome, accompanied by Haynald's memorandum of May 12, 1862. The pursuit by Haynald of a more moderate policy was desirable, he wrote, in view of the far more numerous Romanian Greek Catholics. These Romanians might be attracted to union with predominantly Orthodox if they were provoked by Hungarian recalcitrance. He recommended that Haynald be made to abdicate from his bishopric and transferred to another Hungarian see. Haynald no doubt discussed this plan with de Luca en route to the bishops' synod commemorating the Council of Trent. Haynald and Franchi met in Trent. Haynald assured him that he could not change his thinking, "since it was shared by the clergy, magnates and other people of his diocese." He agreed to take a conciliatory position at the diet if he appeared there, and proposed as an alternative

Administrative Registratur, loc. cit. I was unable to locate Franchi's letter in either Alba Iulia, ERC; the OSzK; or the HHSA.


81. De Luca to Antonelli, June 3, in DSSS, 552-54.

82. Haynald was in Pest on June 15 when he wrote to Kalocsa concerning the provincial synod, and in Mittenwald in Tyrol on June 23 when he wrote to Crenneville. Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/1366 (Cat. 3) and 1505 (Cat. 4).
his transfer as coadjutor bishop in Kalocsa. Antonelli and
the Pope found this a desirable solution, and Bach recom-
mended its approval by the Austrian government as a way out
(Auskunftsmittel).

It will never be known whether Bach's Auskunftsmittel
would have succeeded, because its approval in Rome was
simultaneous with the denouement in Hermannstadt. Haynald
returned to Transylvania in the course of the elections
there. He arrived in Hermannstadt at the same time as the
other members of the diet. Crenneville reported on July
17th that the Hungarian members held their secret meeting
in the home of Count Mikes, and decided not to take the oath
of office as members. As was fitting for a Roman Catholic
bishop, Haynald celebrated a high mass in the presence of
the deputies to pray for the success of the diet before its
opening on July 15. At the opening session, on hearing the
contents of the convocation decree for the first time, they
held another, separate meeting. Haynald and Kemény reportedly
made the motion that the decree's denial of the validity of
the Leopoldine Diploma was grounds for boycott, and the
meeting accepted this view. The protocol of the secret
meeting notes that Haynald sat next to the chairman, Ferenc

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83. Bach to Rechberg, July 22 ("vertraulich"), received
August 2, in HHSA, Administrative Registratur, loc.cit.;
copy in MOL D228 1863/733.
84. Crenneville to Nádasdy, July 17 (received July 20),
in MOL D228 1863/678. Retegan (Dieta românească a
Transilvaniei, 83) mistakenly refers to the "mission" of
Count Mikes, implying he was one of those who had arrived
from Hungary.
Kemény. He spoke against taking the oath, as it would "serve no useful purpose." The protocol does not indicate whether he spoke at the meeting the next day which decided upon the boycott. Puşcariu wrote concerning the Hungarian-Romanian consultations on the eve of the diet:

"In this small circle we asked the question: "why don't you enter the diet, so we can make peace?" [Baron Albert] Bánffy replied: "We are not entering simply because we wish to avoid [entering] the Reichsrat." Bishop Haynald... told us: "Come to [the diet in] Pest, where we will guarantee all your national desires by law." Caracteristicon!"

The report had reached Vienna, which Crenneville had considered likely, that Haynald was seeking to convince Hungarian moderates that the emperor did not want them to enter the diet. Nádasdy immediately repudiated this view in a message to Haynald, stating that the Emperor expected him to attend. Haynald rejected this appeal when it was conveyed to him by Crenneville. Governor Crenneville, in Hermannstadt as royal commissioner for the diet, wrote that Haynald was "one of the emperor's most dangerous enemies," whom the government could make harmless only by sending out of the country.

86. Ioan Puşcariu, Notite, 75.
87. Draft of telegram from Nádasdy to Crenneville, July 19, telegram of Crenneville to Nádasdy, July 20, and draft of reply of the same day, in MOL D228 1863/674, 677.
88. Crenneville to Nádasdy, July 24, in MOL D228, 1863/712.
89. Copy of Crenneville to Nádasdy, July 20, in HHSA, Administrative Registratur, loc.cit. The Gubernium moved to Hermannstadt for the duration of the diet, so that Crenneville simultaneously directed both it and the diet. There were separate offices of the Gubernium presidium and the royal commissioner, however. (See Kutschera, 193, 309)
On July 22 the deputies held a final meeting at which they passed their boycott resolution, then paid their respects to Crenneville and left the city. On the grounds of Crenneville's report that Haynald not only disregarded the expressed intention of the emperor but also convinced many moderate deputies to follow his lead, Nádasdy recommended that his appointments as Gubernium councillor and as regalist be nullified. The Emperor approved his recommendation on July 23.

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Haynald's Abdication

After his dismissal from civil office, Haynald wrote Crenneville to request an audience with the Emperor, together with Kemény and Mikó, to present the declaration of account of the diplomatic history of the abdication follows the documents in HHSA, Administrative Registratur and in MOL; Ferenc Eckhart, "Egy nagy magyar főpap életéből," in Bécsi Magyar Történeti Intézet Évkönyve II (1932), 272-84, offers a good summary of the diplomatic aspects on the basis of the Administrative Registratur. Eckhart mistakenly identifies the royal commissioner with the Governor's brother, Lieutenant Field Marshal Franz von Crenneville. The latter was the Emperor's court adjutant, and by inference from this identification Eckhart exaggerates the significance of this letter as an indicator of the emperor's personal animosity toward Haynald. Barítiu, a participant in the diet, refers to Crenneville as "in tiera ca gubernatoru, la dieta ca commisariu plenipotentu"—Párti alese, III, 193.

90. Nádasdy Vortrag of July 23, in MOL D228, 1863/684, and Nádasdy to Rechberg, July 23, in HHSA, Administrative Registratur, loc. cit. According to a police report from Hermannstadt, Haynald assured the other deputies that the convocation of the Diet was not the emperor's policy, but that of the leading officials. Major von Semetkovzky to the Inspector-General of the Gendarmerie, August 27, in HHSA, Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton 1b, Reservat-Präsidialakten 1863-64. No. 47.
the boycotting deputies. As a sign of special imperial disfavor, he was denied the audience, although it was granted to the others. Remarkably, it appears that the three, as well as many other Hungarian politicians, were surprised by the strength of imperial dissatisfaction expressed to them by this decree and in the ensuing audience with Kemény and Mikó.

Nádasdy responded indignantly to Rechberg's recommendation of Bach's plan on August 4. He had recommended Haynald's appointment as regalist because of the false expectations Rechberg had aroused, he retorted. The situation had now changed radically; under the present circumstances Haynald's transfer to an archbishopric would seem like a reward. The outcome of the Haynald affair would have a significant impact on the political situation in the monarchy. The Bishop had strongly assaulted the personal authority of the Emperor through his actions, he concluded, and the Pope should be convinced of the need to move him to resign from his see. Rechberg took four weeks to

91. Haynald to Crenneville, July 24, 1863, in MOL D228, 1863/721. Crenneville had refused to accept the declaration, claiming that the signatories were only private citizens since they had never entered the diet—Crenneville to Haynald, July 27, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/2101 (Cat. 35).
respond. There was no hope, he stated flatly, of convincing the Pope to pressure Haynald to resign.

The sharpness of the exchange suggests there was a deadlock between the two ministers on the proper course of action. Nádasdy, for his part, had received assurances from Hungary and Transylvania that the censure of Haynald had made a powerful impression on Hungarian moderates. He therefore hoped that further action against him would also be effective. He devised two strategies: accusing the clergymen under Haynald's authority of oppositional activity, and grooming a possible successor to Haynald as bishop. The remainder of this chapters will investigate the application of these two strategies.

Before Nádasdy could implement his plan, Haynald gained a further boost to his ecclesiastical authority by his participation in the provincial synod in Kalocsa. The synod took place between September 8 and 19, 1863. Many Hungarians were convinced that Haynald arranged its timing in the hope that it would ratify his political position. Kunszt announced the convocation of the synod for September on April 24, three days after the convocation of the Transylvanian diet became certain through the promulgation of the new electoral law. Kunszt asked Haynald whether the

synod would interfere with his participation in the diet.  
Haynald replied ten days later that it would not.

Several other Transylvanians were invited, both members of
the Cathedral Chapter and of the religious orders.

At the height of Haynald's notoriety and official dis-
favor, Kunszt asked him to deliver the synod's customary
festive sermon. Governor Pálffy warned Kunszt against
the "unpleasant consequences" which would ensue if the youth
of Kalocsa carried out their plan to welcome Haynald with a
torchlight procession. Neither the published program nor the
official protocol indicate any special political content
to the proceedings. However, the reinforcement of
Haynald's ecclesiastical dignity could hardly have been
welcome to Nádasdy.

The tension between Haynald's clergy and the openly
"schwarzgelb" Austrian troops stationed in Transylvania

98. Correspondence of Kunszt and Haynald, April 24 and
May 4, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/1061 (Cat. 3).

99. The Chapter deputized Lajos Hubátsek, its customary
representative to the county commission, and Lönhart.
Chapter to Haynald, July 30, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/1841
(Cat. 3).

100. Kunszt to Haynald, August 2, in Alba Iulia ERC,
1863/1848 (Cat. 3).

101. Pálffy to Kunszt, September 2, in OSzK, Fol.Lat.
3954, f. 55. Nádasdy reported on the same day that Haynald
was apparently in Vienna. He saw his canonicus a latere,
Lönhart, several times in the Chancellery--Nádasdy to
Reichenstein, September 2, in HHSA, Nachlass Reichenstein.
Karton lb. Korrespondenz Reichensteins 1863-65, besonders
mit Nádasdy. No. 6.

102. Ordo Synodi Provincialis... (Coloczae: Malatin-
Holmeyer typographi Archi-Episcopales, 1863); Acta et
decreta concilii anno domini MDCCCLXIII pontificatus Pii
Papae IX decimo octavo in metropolitana ecclesia Colocensi
celebrati (Coloczae: Malatin-Holmeyer typographi Archi-
Episcopales, 1864).
fuelled the conflict between the Bishop and Gubernium. The authorities were highly sensitive to any political symbolism associated with the liturgical celebration of the Emperor's birthday every August 18. The presence of civil and military officials at such services was expected. Writing in Haynald's absence, Provost Ráduly rejected a military demand that the imperial anthem "Gott erhalte" he played at the mass in the city church of Hermannstadt in 1861, citing an 1858 regulation that prohibited this. Crenneville testily demanded an explanation when, following the chief mass in Kolozsvár in 1863, the organist broke into a rendition of the Prussian anthem. The elderly pastor, István Kedves, claimed he was in the sacristy when the playing took place, but then advised the organist to leave in a hurry to escape the soldiers' wrath. He added that Queen Victoria of England, Austria's ally, had nothing against the anthem, since she had ordered it played during the visit of the Prussian King.

According to Reichenstein, the total defeat of Haynald was vital for the government, and it should spare no effort to achieve it. Nádasdy urged him to exploit the various

103. Correspondence of Hermannstadt pastor Adalbert Weber and Ráduly, August, 1861, in Alba Iulia, ERC. 1861/1586 (Cat. 35). Ráduly's description of the planned celebration in Gyulafehérvár on the same day is unusually detailed-- Ibid., 1861/1628 (Cat. 2).
104. Correspondence of Crenneville, Ráduly, and Kedves, August 23 to September 3, 1863, in Ibid., 1863/2002 (Cat. 13).
clerical and school disputes between Haynald and the government, which should provide useful material against the bishop. At the end of August Crenneville wrote a strongly-worded letter to Haynald. He denounced the opposition's tactic of misleading the moderates with a false distinction between the views of the emperor and the policy of the government. He ordered Haynald to dismiss six priests and teachers who were among those he accused of political agitation: Károly Veszely in Gyulafehérvár, Karl Slovacsek in Broos, Pál Benkő in Csíkszereda, and three teachers in Csíksomlyó.

The government had already used this approach previously. Crenneville had involved the diocesan authorities since 1862 in the investigation of the Csík priest Pál Benkő. The endless testimony created such a mountain of paperwork that the Consistory, functioning as ecclesiastical court, complained to Haynald in exasperation. Haynald also ordered diocesan investigations of the persons named by Crenneville on this occasion. While they were in process, he issued a circular which echoed the unpleasantness of the experience. In it he urged the clergy to avoid political agitation because of the accusations, denunciations and investigations.

107. Crenneville to Haynald, August 29, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2000 (Cat. 13); draft in MOL F264 1863/989; copy in OSzK Fol.Lat. 3954, ff. 22-5; [Fraknói], 75-6.
108. Draft of Haynald to Crenneville, May 6, 1863, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/1088 (Cat. 13).
which it might attract.

In a long *Vortrag* on the Haynald question at the end of October, Nádasdy stated that, while Haynald constantly protested his loyalty to the monarch, he had become in fact "the most determined opponent" of the Emperor's policies, because he bore the chief responsibility for the Hungarian boycott of the diet. He claimed Haynald's leadership was responsible for the sympathy most Roman Catholic clergymen and teachers allegedly held for the opposition.

In October Crenneville interviewed Karoly Veszely, the most oppositional diocesan priest. He was a radical priest in Kronstadt during the revolution. In 1849 he edited the newspaper *Brassói Lap*, which supported the dethronement of the Habsburgs. Therein he published the radical decisions of the district synod in Marosvásárhely of May 29, 1849. The synod called for liturgy in the vernacular, the end of priestly celibacy, the election of the bishop's assistants, and the rejection of the bishop's appointment of István Kedves as his Vicar. Later, after a death sentence was

109. *Circulares ad Honorabilem Clerum*, October 12, 1863, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2230 (Cat. 35). Such a letter in Latin must have been meant for the eyes of Viennese and Roman authorities as much as his own clergy.

110. *Vortrag* of Nádasdy, October 31, 1863, in MOL D228, 1863/1031.

commuted to a life sentence, he was in prison for two years, but was freed through the intervention of the Bishop. Haynald appointed him to the Gyulafehérvár high school faculty in 1854, two years later he succeeded Kristóf Lukácsi as principal of the high school, and later became notary of the diocesan Consistory. He was an energetic principal, published historical studies, edited the two volumes which appeared of the Gyulafehérvári Füzetek in 1861 and 1862, and published many articles on church politics under a pseudonymn. One contemporary characterized Veszely as strongly devoted to public affairs, enthusiastic, liberal and open-minded, and possessing a good speaking knowledge of Romanian. Another recalled he made a stirring patriotic and constitutionalist address on the eve of the Gyulafehérvár conference in 1861. Veszely himself was not invited to the conference.

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112. On Lukácsi, see Chapter IX.
113. The most extensive published biography of Veszely, which neglects any reference to his political activity, is Ágost Zlamal, "Veszely Károly, 1820-1896," in Vencel Biró and Fortunát Boros, eds., Erdélyi katolikus nagyok (Kolozsvár: Szent Bonaventura könyvnyomda, 1941), 146-9; see also Szinnyei, Magyar irok élete és munkái XIV, 1173-4. Veszely's interesting journalistic writings have never been collected in an anthology. Many appeared pseudonymously in Religió and Idők Tanúja in the 1860s.
115. "...a nép szónoka Veszely Károly gymnasiumi igazgató volt, ki ruhazatával is értésünkre akarta adni, hogy dereng a "jobb kor" hajnala: magyarkát és kalpágot viselt." Kristóf Szongott, Szamosújvár szab. kír. város monografiája I (Szamosújvart: Todorán Endre "Aurora" könyvnyomdája, 1901), 168. The author was a student there at the time, and listened to the conference speeches through a side door.
Crenneville accused Veszely of agitating for the opposition in Csík in February, 1863, and of intimidating voters during the election in Gyulafehérvár, where he himself was a candidate to the diet. He was elected, and joined the Hungarian boycott. The Governor also alleged he had a corrupting influence on the youth as principal. Haynald assembled testimony to refute the accusations and mailed it to Crenneville, the Nuncio and Scitovszky in October, asking for the intervention of the latter two on his behalf. In his letters Haynald refused to act against Veszely without possessing clear evidence against him. In his own defense, he pointed out to the Governor that he had limited his public political statements to those occasions when official appointment had required him to take a position, that he had urged the clergy in December, 1861 to refrain from political agitation, and that on the advice of his Cathedral Chapter he had refrained from making a pastoral visit to the Szekler region in 1863 in order to avoid political complications. Indicative of Haynald's constitutional preoccupation at this time is his unorthodox reference to the Chapter in this context as his "episcopal senate."

116. The source of this accusation was apparently a police report from Hermannstadt of July 3, in HHSA Informationsbüro, 1863/6255 (Elenchus 344).

117. Haynald to Scitovszky, October 26, and copy of Haynald to Crenneville, October 13, in PL, Scitovszky János, Cat. D; 6. csomó: Erdély. 1863/4363, and two copies in OSzK Fol.Hung. 1722. Haynald removed the draft of his letter of October 22 to the Nuncio from Alba Iulia, ERC 1863/2500 (Cat. 13), four days later, according to the note there. The Nuncio forwarded the Veszely documents he had received to Nádasdy on October 19, and they are in MOL D228,
Scitovszky warmly defended Haynald before the Nuncio. He presented Haynald's case to many officials in Vienna, but not to Nádasdy, judging that only the Nuncio was competent to raise the issue with the Chancellor.

Clergymen and laity of Transylvania and Hungary were aware of the increasing pressure exerted on Haynald by the authorities. Several sent him expressions of support in the fall of 1863. Scitovszky had scant means of supporting the bishop in his Transylvanian affairs. He did take administrative action against Haynald's most vocal ecclesiastic critic, the Pest theology professor and priest of the Transylvanian diocese, Tivadar Zerich. The professor had embroiled Veszely in a long judicial procedure beginning in 1862 concerning allegedly impious statements by the latter in a lecture at the Pest university and in a historical publication. Veszely justified his controversial journey to the Szekler region in February, 1863 by claiming he had needed to gather corroborating testimony for this case.

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1863/1105.


120. Zerich to Haynald, December 24, 1861, with accompanying documentation, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1862/12 (Cat. 13); Zerich, Kritikai jegyzetek Veszéli [sic] Károly, Károly-Fejérvári helyettes gymansium igazgató-tanítónak Compilatioi és Felvilágosításaira (Pest: Beimmel J. és Kozma V., 1862), in ibid., 1862/149 (Cat. 13).
Zerich also worked in the interest of a like-minded priest from Transylvania also serving on the Pest faculty, Alajos Fülöp. Haynald solicited information on Zerich's journey to Transylvania at the end of 1862. He received numerous reports from the clergy on his contacts there and his intemperate remarks. An anonymous informant wrote to Schmerling that Haynald had mobilized Scitovszky against Zerich because the latter had presented the Nuncio with an exposé of Haynald's support for the radical clergy which could be a useful weapon for the government. Haynald informed Scitovszky that Zerich shared responsibility for the writing and distribution of a satirical pamphlet about his bishop, which described him as a "rascal" and "the tyrant of his clergy." He claimed Zerich also made disparaging remarks about the Hungarian episcopate in his lectures. Consequently Scitovszky ordered the non-renewal of Zerich's teaching appointment after its expiration in November, 1863. Zerich appealed unsuccessfully to the

121. Fülöp had been transferred from the parish of Marosvásárhely due to his conflict with Haynald's patriotic protege there, dean Ferenc Hoppe'. The documents of the Consistory's investigative commission, led by Ferenc Lönhart, are in Alba Iulia ERC, 1861/2592 (Cat. 13). Hoppe' claimed that the signatories of testimony against his loyal curate, György Pásztor, were "street people" bribed by "wealthy Armenians"-- Hoppe' to Haynald, November 25, 1861, in ibid., 1861/1877 (Cat. 13).

122. Draft of Haynald to Dean Eduard Möller, January 5, 1863, in Ibid., 1863/41 (Cat. 13.), and replies in Ibid., 1863/800 (Cat. 13). Haynald's letter also enquired about Zerich's efforts on Fülöp's behalf.

123. Schmerling sent a copy to Nádasdy with his letter of May 30, 1863, in HHSA, Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton 1b. II. Reservat-Präsidialakten 1863-65. No. 41. I found no other reference to this exposé.
Locumtenential Council for a reversal of the decision. He also wrote to Kunszt, denouncing Ráduly, Keserű, Veszely and others as "pernicious revolutionaries" and citing letters of Austrian officials and Şuluţiu in his own defense.

Due to Haynald's defiance— and perhaps his audacity in warning Crenneville that he would appeal against him "in the highest places"— the Emperor decided at last to call for Haynald's resignation. Bach was instructed to seek the assurance of the Holy See that it would accept the resignation. Bach succeeded, despite resistance among members of the Curia, but urged that the appearance of voluntariness in the resignation be maintained. The letter to Haynald calling for his resignation was sent by court adjutant Count Crenneville on December 2. Haynald agonized over his decision for most of the month. He showed his resignation to Count Leo Thun, the former Minister and leader of the Reichsrat conservatives. Thun felt the letter did not sufficiently stress the resignation's voluntariness and proposed an alternate draft. Haynald insisted on his original


126. Draft of Rechberg to Bach, November 16 ("geheim") in HHSA, Administrative Registratur, loc.cit.

127. Ciphered telegrams of Rechberg and Bach, November 28 and December 3, in Ibid.
draft, in which he noted that he was resigning to conform with the adjutant’s request. The first newspaper report of the resignation appeared in January and created a sensation. Haynald received many declarations of support for his position, but some Hungarians criticized the resignation as a surrender to the will of the government.

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The Szekler "Holy Land"

The chief locus of popular and clerical support for Haynald was the Szekler region, where two-thirds of Transylvanian Roman Catholics lived. For Haynald’s own political attitude, his social conservatism, association with the aristocratic opposition and geographic proximity in Gyulafehérvár to the heart of Romanian militancy were probably decisive. The politically active clergy and teachers of the Szekler region for whom Crenneville made Haynald responsible drew no small inspiration from their bishop’s actions and these defensive motives. At least as important for them were conditions peculiar to the Roman Catholics of the Szekler region which we have referred to in earlier sections: local political traditions, the autonomy of parish life, and the national-religious mystique of the monastery of Csíksomlyó.

128. [Fraknoi], 78; Thun to Haynald, December 26, in OSzK Fol.Hung. 1722. The draft of the resignation, addressed to Pius IX, is in OSzK Fol.Lat. 3954, and summarized by Eckhart, 281.
According to the *schematismus* of 1882, 62% of Transylvanian Roman Catholics lived in those five deaneries which were completely on the territory of the former Szekler region. Parallel with and even more striking than the livelier and more ethnically homogeneous political life of the region, the vast majority of the parishes here were maintained economically by the local town or village:

Table 11: Patronization of Szekler Parishes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deanery of Udvarhely</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Faithful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Kézdi and Orba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Gyeryó</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Felcsík</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Alcsk and Kászon</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>174,123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remainder of Diocese</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Faithful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>106,465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A= Municipality is patron and nominates pastor
B= Municipality is patron but cannot nominate pastor

The five Szekler deaneries also provided the bulk of the pilgrims to the shrine of Csíksomlyó. The deanery of Alcsík, comprising the southern third of the thoroughly Catholic district of Csík, was known popularly as the Holy Land (*Szentföld*): nearly every village bore the name of a saint, whose feast day attracted pilgrims from the surrounding area to the celebration at the parish church of the same name.

Csíksomlyó was the collective name for two villages in

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the Szekler district of Csík with a total population of 1114 in 1857. The Franciscan monastery there was founded in 1400. The pilgrimage practice formally dates back to 1556. Contemporaries considered the sixteenth-century wooden statue of Mary in the church miraculous because it survived the repeated destruction of the church by the Turks and Tatars and inspired the defenders against attack in 1597, 1694 and 1757. Miracles of healing were also attributed to the statue. The monastery and school were the spiritual center of the district, and a hiding-place for weapons in time of invasion or political conspiracy. The chief attractions for nineteenth-century pilgrims were the late medieval Salvator Chapel, popularly believed to have been built by St. Stephen, the St. Anthony Chapel commemorating the hiding-place of one of the monks during the Tatar attack of 1661, and the pilgrimage church, completed in its current Baroque form between 1804 and 1838, which contains the famous Marian statue.

The chief pilgrimage was at Pentecost, the seventh Sunday after Easter. In the mid-nineteenth century twenty to thirty thousand Hungarian pilgrims arrived on this day. Pilgrims travelled on foot for as long as a week from other parts of Transylvania and from Moldavia. The pilgrims from

132. Orbán, II, 16-20, surveys the eventful military history of Csíksomlyó. It is interesting to note that according to one writer thirty of thirty-nine churches in Csik had walls around them. Their military significance in the nineteenth century was probably minimal. Bierbauer, "A Székelyföld templomáiról," [1942], in Sas., ed., II, 425.
each village travelled together, dressed in festive attire, praying and singing hymns, their leader carrying a flag.
The pilgrims first ascended the steep path to the Salvator Chapel, often on their knees. A visit to the St. Anthony chapel was considered mandatory. Many of the pilgrims slept on the floor in the pilgrimage church, in other churches, in barns, or in the open air. Soup kitchens were available, but most local people considered it an honor to offer hospitality to the pilgrims. Many pilgrims were Csango Hungarians from Moldavia; the local parish annually provided part of its land as a place for the Moldavian pilgrims to sleep. The pilgrims had masses said for their village at the statue of Mary, the leader of the village contingent collecting the necessary money from among those present and those who had stayed home. The neighborhood rang with the sound of thousands of bells and singing voices. The festive liturgy was preceded by an outdoor procession, each village carrying its flag, and the Csangos in the lead. Pilgrims spent as many as four days in Csíksomlyó, and left before noon on Pentecost Sunday.

The Csíksomlyó monastery was unusual not only because of the pilgrimages there, but also because if was supported

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133. According to Orbán, the devotions in the Salvator Chapel as late as 1860 included bloody, bare-backed self-flagellation. Later, this "went out of style." op.cit., 13-14.
economically by several families. In 1848-49 many Csíksomlyó students served in the anti-Austrian forces, and an independentist newspaper was printed in the Franciscan high school. The Habsburg military occupied the school and only returned it to Franciscan administration in 1851. At the request of the teaching faculty, Haynald opened a teachers' training school in 1857, financed by contributions totalling 95,548 fl.-- a spectacular sum, nearly half of it from the private donations from the two deaneries of Felcsík and Alcsík.

The high school teachers, half of whom were diocesan and Franciscan clergymen, quickly asserted themselves in the district's revived political life after 1860. They organized a spectacular memorial service for Széchenyi in 1860; a year later two of them, Károly Antalfi and Imre Madár, were elected district notary and deputy notary when constitutional life was restored. At the beginning of the Provisorium the two officials resigned. Their opposition as laymen to the centralist regime was less disturbing to Vienna than that of pastor Pál Benkő in Csíkszereda. Clergymen were expected to preach loyalty to the monarch, and

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137. Fortunat Boros O.F.M., Csíksomlyó, a kegyhely (Kolozsvár: Szent Bonaventura, 1943), 122-3.
138. Bándi, 93.
Haynald was considered responsible for their actions.

Benkó was the most controversial spokesman of Hungarian militancy among the clergy of Csík. Franz Joseph received a report at the beginning of June, 1861 that Benkó had delivered a public address in favor of Garibaldi and Klapka. He ordered Kemény to investigate the matter immediately, and the Chancellor forwarded the order to Mikó. The resulting, rather perfunctory investigation by the local officials concluded that Benkó's sermon of the previous Sunday had been devoid of political content. The matter rested on the emperor's desk until the acting Chancellor secured his approval for the suspension of further investigations in October.

The rumors of Romanian arms caches in Alsó-Fehér county in November, 1861 had their counterpart in with respect to the Szeklers in Csík. As in the past, the monastic cloister in Csíksomlyó was an attractive hiding place. A police informant reported that 32,000 or even 40,000 arms had been distributed in Csík and in Háromszék, and that popular feeling was "revolutionary in the highest degree."

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139. Franz Joseph to Kemény, June 7, and draft of Kemény to Mikó, June 8, in MOL D228, 1861/249.
140. Prefect Antal Mikó to Imre Mikó, June 22, and Imre Mikó to Kemény, June 27, in MOL F263, 1861/999, D228, 1861/283. The prefect forwarded a text of the sermon in question, but it is missing from both locations.
141. Vortrag of Kemény, July 4, countersigned on October 19; Kabós to Imre Mikó, October 22, and draft of Imre Mikó to Antal Mikó, October 27, in MOL D228, 1861/376 and F263, 1861/2542.
142. Circular of Imre Mikó, November 24, 1861 (the day of his dismissal), in MOL F263. 1861/2713.
A weapons depot was alleged to exist in the Armenian village of Szépvíz. The head of the monastery in Csíksomlyó gave "evasive" answers when asked about the storage of arms there. The nearby parish of Csíkszentmiklós under the leadership of its elected pastor and elder, refused to pay taxes, and was subjected to tax execution.

The accusations of disloyalty against Benkó by local centralist officials revived in 1862. Benkó defended himself in a letter to Crenneville, but was attacked by the prefect of Csík. In December the Mayor of Csíkszereda, Elek Eróss, requested that Crenneville demand Benkó's transfer to another parish.

Haynald ordered a formal ecclesiastical investigation of Benkó by the dean of Felcsík, Jeremías Eránosz, with the assistance of pastor Márton Keresztes of Nagyboldogasszony.

143. Reports from Csíkszereda and Szépvíz, October 10 and 14, 1861, sent to Mecséry by the Austrian Consul in Galați and forwarded by him in copy to Rechberg, October 28; in HHSA, Actes de Haute Police, 1861/869 (Interna). My thanks to archivist Dr. Elizabeth Springer for special assistance with this unusual material.

144. Crenneville ordered the end of tax execution in response to a plea by Haynald on behalf of the parish; draft of Crenneville to the provincial treasurer, February 22, 1862, in MOL F262, 1862/902.

145. Benkó to Crenneville, August 28, and Prefect Ádám Szabó to Crenneville, October 23, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/107 (Cat. 13). The file "Causa querarum contra = Benkó Paulum" is a collection of fourteen relevant letters and documents, mostly in the original.

146. Draft of Crenneville to Haynald, December 19, 1862, in MOL F263, 1862/6500; Alba Iulia ERC, 1862/2936 (Cat. 13).

147. An Austrian intelligence report indicated Keresztes had abandoned his parish in 1849 to fight against Austria, then worked as a coachman, teacher and notary in Hungary until 1858, when he was arrested, then freed and restored to the diocese. Montenuovo to Mecséry, May 29, 1864, in HHSA.
They and others bombarded the Consistorium with documenta-
148
tion in the course of the spring. When Crenneville
complained about the delay in reaching a verdict, Haynald
revealed that conflicts and complaints among his own clergy
made a decision more difficult. Many of the clergy resented
the failure of the bishop to secure either regular compensa-
149
tion of the tithe as was enjoyed by the Saxon clergy or
regular subsidies from the Religionsfonds. People com-
plained that he had failed to restore the Kolozsvár law
course, abolished in 1849, in his eleven years as bishop.
Some complained about the rigidity of the Catholic marriage
laws they were required to uphold, but others that he did
not defend the rights of the clergy sufficiently. Benko for
his part refused to collaborate with Eranosz, requesting the
appointment of his ally Lajos Nagy, the dean of Alcsúk, in
his place.

Beyond the conflicts Haynald referred to, there were
differing political views among the clergy. Thus while
Crenneville's visit to Csúk in June, 1862 increased his
distrust of most of the clergy and teachers there, he also
praised Eranosz and Franciscan abbot Jukundián Simon for

Infoformationsbüro, 1864/5227 (Elenchus 158).
148. The Benkő file for January through June, 1863 is in
Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/107, 328, 793, 983, 1021, 1461, 1479
(Cat. 13).

149. Haynald claimed defensively that he had repeatedly
requested compensation, but his correspondence with Kemény
(See Chapter IV) indicates he was actually not eager to
end collection of the kepe.

150. Haynald to Crenneville, April 1, 1863, in MOL F263,
their loyalty and recommended they be decorated. A low-ranking clerical ally of Zerich denounced Lönhart, Veszely, Keresztes, Nagy, Hoppé and Kedves as 1848ers whose recent promotion was another sign of Haynald's sympathy for the opposition.

Prefect Ádám Szabó wrote Reichenstein that his district was difficult to govern because its thoroughly Catholic, chiefly Szekler population regarded the clergy as its "infallible oracle." The clergy and teachers, with only four or five honorable exceptions, followed Haynald's oppositional example. Szabo had little hope for the government party in the election to the diet, despite the good work of Eránosz, especially because of the influence of "Haynald's friend," Lajos Nagy. His pessimism was confirmed; it could not be otherwise, he lamented, "as long as the clergy

151. Draft to Ádám Szabó, August 12, 1862, in MOL F264, 1862/755. Crenneville praised them for their "loyale Gesinnungen sowie... Anhänglichkeit an die Regierung" and requested detailed information which could be used to justify their decoration.

152. Gergely Tomosvári, pastor of Bran, to Şaguna, August 18 and December 17, 1862, in Sibiu, ABAOR, FS. 1735 and 1788. Şaguna's reply to the first letter on August 31 promised to communicate his information to the authorities "bei einer nächsten als günstig dazu stellenden Gelegenheit."-- ibid., 1736. Tomosvári wrote similar letters to Schmerling on February 26 and August 3, 1863, who forwarded them to Nádasdy with praise for the priest's loyal sentiments on August 11. The Chancellor made no written reply to Schmerling or Tomosvári; MOL D228, 1863/1008. Tomosvári noted in the February letter that Eránosz had received the Franz-Joseph Orden. The letters reveal an emotional and ambitious individual, but their basic information is confirmed elsewhere.


154. Szabó to Reichenstein, June 9, in Ibid.
is under the protective aegis of the Concordat." Haynald remained the leader of the opposition, but he influenced his people through his example and trusted deputies and not through written instructions.

Crenneville reported after his visit to Csík in 1862 that the high school of Csíksomlyó was a hotbed of dangerous enemies of the regime, and the most dangerous was its priest-principal, Károly Horváth. The authorities briefly considered moving the entire school to Gyergyószentmiklos in order to rupture the faculty's ties with the local population, but then decided that the move might be counterproductive. In response to Crenneville's complaint about Horváth, Haynald questioned him at length and secured his written declaration of loyalty and moderation.

Horváth's declaration failed to satisfy the authorities for long. One of the teachers, a former army officer, began in May, 1862 to openly train students in the use of sabers. Officials accused him of training troops for Garibaldi, but he pleaded the lack of other equipment for physical education. When he learned of the report in 1863, the emperor took the unusual step of ordering the dismissal of three of

155. Szabó to Reichenstein, June 27, in ibid. Presumably he was referring to the guarantee of ecclesiastic jurisdiction for most clerical offenders.
156. Szabó to Reichenstein, July 23 and August 6, in Ibid.
158. Draft of Crenneville to Haynald, July 18, and reply by Haynald, August 18, in MOL F263. 1862/3414, 4159.
159. Bá ndi, 93.
the teachers involved. Crenneville replied, however, that he had determined already in the previous year that there was no basis for action against them.

The location of Csíksomlyó and the political situation beyond the border increased concerns about military conspiracy. Crenneville reported rumors of an immanent invasion from Moldavia by Hungarian emigres or Polish rebels in the spring. The political instability in Romania and the involvement of the Catholic clergy in the ongoing Polish revolt in Russian-ruled Poland undoubtedly lent credence to these reports. Officials were unable to definitely confirm reports of meetings of legionaires returning from Italy or of recruiting by the Polish rebels in the Csíksomlyó high school. They reported, however, that the bulk of the local clergy and professors abandoned a newly established casino (men’s club) along with Károly Horváth after the latter declared he would not be a member of the same club as an informant. He was referring to Elek Erőss, who had denounced Pál Benkő the previous December.

Most of the district clergy and teachers testified on Benkő’s behalf in his ecclesiastic investigation. Benkő appealed to Haynald against the accusations, and levelled

160. Franz Joseph to Nádasdy, February 27, 1863, with anonymous, undated report concerning the high school, and draft of Nádasdy to Crenneville, February 28, in MOL D228, 1863/110; Crenneville to Nádasdy, March 3, and Vortrag of Nádasdy of March 10, in MOL D228, 1863/127, 161.
161. Crenneville to Nádasdy, March 11, in MOL D228, 1863/152.
162. Crenneville to Nádasdy, April 7, 1863, in MOL D228, 1863/238.
his own charges against Eránosz and Erőss. The Consistory exonerated Benkő of the more serious charges concerning his moral and political comportment, only mildly rebuking him for the use of improper expressions in his public statements and irregularities in the collection of the stola. Shortly thereafter the Consistory also ruled in favor of Horváth and one of his professors concerning charges of corruption that had been levelled the previous December.

The dietal elections in Csíkszereda took place at the end of June. The electoral commission, presided over by Erőss, elected Benkő to the seven-man vote-collecting committee. Not only Benkő but also Erőss apparently campaigned for the successful opposition candidate, János Gecző. An official ascribed the chief responsibility for the election results to the campaigning of "the, with few exceptions, bad-spirited clergy." Consequently Nádasdy ordered a renewed attempt to secure the transfer of Benkő.

163. Benkő to Haynald, February 3, March 7, April 18 and 23, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/328, 1021, 1461 (Cat. 13). Declarations of April 7 and 13 in favor of Benkő, each with more than a hundred signatures, are in Ibid., 1863/2665 (Cat. 13).

164. Draft of Haynald to Crenneville, June 6, in Ibid., 1863/1346 (Cat. 13).

165. MOL F135. Diaetalia. 1863-64 országgyűlés, Országgyűlési iroda. 1863/64.

166. Cited in report of Crenneville to Nádasdy, July 11, missing from MOL D228, 1863/713 but cited extensively by Nádasdy in his Vortrag of October 31, in Ibid., 1863/1031. I could not locate the original report.

167. Draft of Nádasdy to Crenneville, August 13, in Ibid., 1863/713, the immediate stimulus for Crenneville's letter of August 29.
perhaps in punishment for Erőss' change of allegiance, he was sued for "false testimony" against Benkő. No doubt anxious about the invasion rumors and the popular response to the recently announced sanctions against Haynald, Crenneville sent a General Staff officer, First Lieutenant György Benedek, there as his personal emissary to "exercize a good influence."

The course of the elections in Alcsik was even more controversial. As in other rural electoral districts in the Szekler region, the Hungarian opposition had to contend with the desire of the peasantry for representation of its interests in the diet. Only two-thirds of those entitled to vote on June 26 did so, but the prefect in 1861, Antal Mikó, was elected with 170 votes. Dean Lajos Nagy welcomed the election result, declaring "in the name of the people" his regret that instead of the legal diet in Pest it was necessary to attend the diet in Hermannstadt. He hoped that Mikó would work in his new capacity for the restoration of the 1848 laws. Mikó joined the other elected Hungarian and Szekler deputies in the boycott declaration of July 22.

169. On the renewed invasion rumors at this time see Szabó to Reichenstein, July 23, in HHSA Nachlass Reichenstein, Karton 1a, Vertrauliche Briefe. The ciphered telegrams relating to Benedek's mysterious mission and the correspondence of Nádasdy and Degenfeld of August 6 and 9 are in MOL D228, 1863/727, 734. I was unable to discover any further mention of Benedek's mission.
170. General election results in MOL D228, 1863/828.
171. The speech of Nagy is described in "Követválasztási mozgalmak Erdélyben," Korunk, July 16, 1863.
New elections were held in Alcsík on August 14. The electoral committee president opened the voting at Csíkszentmarton by calling on the electors to vote for the candidate who would "serve the public good, the throne and the happiness of the country." A peasant of Csíkszentimre spoke out: why had their previous deputy come home so soon, rather than representing his voters at the diet? Several of those present seconded the questioner. Mikó replied with a peroration on the sacredness of the constitution, and read the boycott declaration aloud. The reading drew loud and repeated applause, particularly as the name of each signatory was read. The assembly voted to deposit copies of the declaration in all parish archives of the district. The voters, present in slightly smaller numbers than the previous month, then proceeded to reelect Mikó. The threat posed to the landed establishment by the peasant's indignant question was made evident by the bill presented by Romanian deputy Ioan Rațiu on behalf of former Szekler serfs at the diet on October 3. Hungarian deputies spared themselves the trouble of taking a position on such legislation.

Nadasdy ordered an investigation of the motion to place the boycott declaration in the parish archives. He was informed that Nagy was the leader of the "extremists," and that the motion was his idea. Crenneville called on Haynald

173. See Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 219-20.
174. Nádasdy to Crenneville, August 28, and draft of Crenneville to Szabó, August 31, in MOL F263, 1863/5181.
to reprimand Nagy for his behavior. Haynald reported that Nagy insisted he was not the instigator, but merely did not reject the universal request of those present (with the exception, presumably, of the peasant from Csíkszentimre). The Bishop asked Crenneville to protect his clergy against such "ill-intentioned insinuations and incriminations." Crenneville had the motion purged from the committee minutes and publicly declared invalid, but was unable to have the declaration removed from the parish archives.

No such complications occurred at the second election in Felcsik, held in Csíkrákos on August 14 under the watchful eye of dean Eránosz. Horváth and nine others complained to Haynald about electoral assembly president Szabo's allegedly sacriligious remark that it was unnecessary to interpret the Leopoldine Diploma of 1791 in a dualist sense, since "we don't interpret Holy Scripture as we did two hundred years ago, either." Yet here, too, the boycotting deputy was reelected.

Eránosz was named a regalist in the diet on August 22, and entered there on September 7; later, he entered the

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175. Szabó to Crenneville, September 3, and draft of Crenneville to Haynald, September 9, in MOL F263, 1863/5355.
176. Nagy to Haynald, September 20, and draft of Haynald to Crenneville, October 10, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2143 (Cat. 13); Haynald's letter is also in MOL F263, 1863/6277.
177. Draft of Haynald to Szabó, October 7, in MOL F263, 1863/5944.
178. Károly Horváth et al. to Haynald, September 1, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2113 (Cat. 13).
Reichsrat as well. The clergy was more commonly in solidarity with Haynald. According to Szabó, the clergy and its "soul," Haynald, bore the chief responsibility for the "terrorized mood and demoralization" of the population of Csík. 180 Haynald confirmed the Consistory's verdict on Benkő and stubbornly defended him

Haynald was less defiant with respect to the Csíksomlyó professors, though he insisted on his own authority over them. He was apparently disturbed by a long report by Simon on the politicized climate in the school. The Franciscan reported anti-dynastic remarks made by the students and by Horváth, and stated that portraits and biographies of Garibaldi were on sale there. Haynald finally responded to the repeated demands of Crenneville for an investigation of the prime culprits. He appointed Canon Lönhart and the dean of Udvarhely, József Csató, to conduct an investigation on behalf of the Consistory. One of Lönhart's first actions upon his arrival in Csík on November 25 was the confirmation of the replacement of Eránosz as dean of Felcsík three weeks earlier. The new dean was the pastor of Csíkszentmiklóš,

180. Conversation with Reichenstein on September 22, reported in the latter's letter to Nádasdy, September 23, in ibid.
181. Haynald to Crenneville, November 19, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2665 (Cat. 13), draft, and OSzK Fol.Lat. 3954, copy.
182. Simon to Haynald, November 14 (the document is heavily underlined by Haynald) and draft of Haynald to Csató, November 18, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1863/2660 (Cat. 13); Haynald to Lönhart, November 20, in Ibid., 1863/2870 (Cat. 13). Zerich emphasized to Kunszt that Lönhart had been one of the two notaries elected by the turbulent Kolozsvár synod of 1848. (See foot注 114.)
Imre Sánta. Sánta, though a Haynald loyalist, neglected to don the red sash of his new office until Lönhart urged him to do so, suggesting he was uncertain the authorities would uphold his appointment.

Lönhart wrote to Gyulafehérvár that the clergy in Csík, like he himself, was strongly behind the bishop. The Franciscan abbot of Csíksomlyó reported that Lönhart and Csató spent ten days there, but their investigation was rather perfunctory. "I suppose that Horváth is not pleased about the investigation," he wrote; at any rate, the teachers under investigation set a poor moral example, and "educate the youth poorly, in such a way that their generation will not thank them." The Consistory convened on December 10 and exonerated all three professors of the 

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183. Lönhart to István György, diocesan secretary, November 28; the postal police intercepted the letter and sent a translation to Reichenstein, who sent copies to Crennevill and Montenuovo. HHS, Informationsbüro. 1863/1171 (Elenchus 344) and MOL D228, 1863/1256. A year earlier, the Council of Ministers had rejected a bill for postal secrecy proposed by the Reichsrat, and none was enacted until 1870—POM V,4 (1986), 149-50. According to the parish chronicle, "a folytonos áskalatás és piszkozódás miatt [Éránosz'] helyzete tarthatatlanná válván, főpásztor öt ezen állásától felmentette...", but his successor was only elected after his death in 1881—Historia Domus Parochiae Csík Rákos, in Racul, Parohia romano-catolica. Éránosz complained of suffering administrative reprisals by Haynald; cited by Friedenfels in his letter to Nádasdy, July 6, 1864, in AS Sibiu, Fondul Eugen von Friedenfels, XIV/242. 184. Translations of intercepted letters of Lönhart to Haynald and to György, November 28, in HHS, Informationsbüro 1863/1171 (Elenchus 344) and MOL D228, 1863/1256. 185. Translation of intercepted letter from Kelemen Varga to Gergely Pál, December 10, sent to Reichenstein on December 25, in HHS, Informationsbüro, 1863/11785 (Elenchus 344).
political accusations. However, they found Horvath guilty of making imprudent statements unbefitting a priest and principal, and he was demoted to a teaching post at the Catholic high school in Kronstadt. János Ráduly, who had apparently assumed many of Haynald's duties as Vicar Capitular by this time, communicated these decisions to Crenneville on December 17 and 19.

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Responses to the Abdication

The most striking political event of December, 1863 in Hungary proper was the distribution of flyers by agents of the emigration announcing a soon to commence insurrection. The perpetrators were quickly arrested. No historian has suggested any connection between this movement and that in Transylvania in support of Bishop Haynald, and it seems unlikely. Still, the first newspaper announcement of Haynald's resignation on January 12, 1864 created a sensation among the clergy and the nobility. Haynald withdrew after his resignation to his birthplace in Szécsény, and Provost János Ráduly took over the administration of the diocese as Vicar Capitular. Rumors circulated of new plans to transfer Haynald to a different diocese. Apparently the most serious one was to appoint him as Papal Nuncio to

186. Crenneville to Chancellery, December 25, in MOL D228, 1863/1327. The fact that the principal of the Kronstadt high school was the Romanian Iacob Mureșanu undoubtedly increased the bitterness of the demotion for Horváth.

187. The announcement appeared simultaneously in the Pesti Napló and the Kolozsvári Közlöny; Szittyay, 97.
Mexico alongside the ill-fated brother of Franz Joseph, Emperor Maximilian. Haynald was a friend of the moderately liberal, anticlerical archduke, but wisely declined the Nunciature offer at the end of March.

Officials in Csík reported conspiratorial meetings in February of supporters of the emigration, led in Csíkszentgyörgy by Lajos Nagy. More substantial were the petitions to the Holy See that circulated in the Szekler region. They requested that Haynald’s resignation not be accepted because it was not voluntary. Eleven counts and nine barons, not all Catholic, signed one such petition. Haynald’s former secretary, István György, reportedly inspired another petition, which was signed by Keresztes, Sánta, Nagy, and other priests in the Szekler region. Its purported author was the dean of Háromszék, István Elekes, who read it to the clergy assembled for the elections in Kézdivásárhely on May 9. The Haynald question undoubtedly gave a spur to other expressions of opposition. A Franciscan monk from Csíksomlyó delivered an Easter sermon


189. Copy of Crenneville to Reichenstein, February 18, 1864, in HHSA Informationsbüro 1864/1984 (Elenchus 158).

190. Published in DSSS, 569-79. One of the signatories was Balázs Orbán. The signers forwarded the petition to Rome via Scitovszky. It is dated Kolozsvár, April 24, but the signature of Scitovszky is dated March 5, suggesting the Primate was its initiator.
attacking the, in his words, "illegal" regime. An emis-
sary of the Hungarian emigration reported after a visit to
the Szekler region in June that 80,000 men stood ready to
fight in an insurrection on 48 hours' notice.

Haynald himself later supported the allegations that
his resignation had not been voluntary when he wrote to a
friend in October, 1864 that "a higher power operating
against my will" forced him to resign. Falcinelli
argued this was the case, and therefore the Holy See with-
held its acceptance of the resignation. Both Scitovszky and
Kunszt advised the acceptance of Haynald's resignation. At
the end of April, the Pope summoned Haynald to Rome for
consultations. He left Szécsény in the greatest secrecy on
May 25.

Haynald brought his good relations in the Curia to bear
one more time. After he presented his case to the
Congregatio Negotiorum Ecclesiasticorum Extraordinarium,

191. Montenuovo to Mecsery, May 29, in HHSA Informations-
buro 1864/5227 (Elenschus 158), and Vortrag of Reichenstein,
June 5, in MOL D228, 1864/620 and HHSA, Cabinetskanzlei
1864/1700. Elekes was the pastor of Kézdi-Polyán, a village
only twenty miles from one of the crossing-points into
Moldavia.

192. Kupa Húmér to Klapka, July 20, 1864, in Borsi-

193. Haynald to Károly Torma, October 24, cited by Tóth,
477-8. Years later, speaking with Emperor Wilhelm I,
Haynald compared the case favorably with the situation of
the Church in Germany under the Kulturkampf. He stressed
that he was not condemned by any civil court, but only
requested to resign by Franz Joseph. Their conversation at
the resort in Ems was reported to Rome by the Nuncio:
Jacobini to Antonelli, August 9, 1876, in Lukács, The
Vatican and Hungary, 753-8.

194. Szittyay, 100.
that body concluded that his comportment was not only a question of political differences, but a legitimate defense of religious and confessional interests. Haynald again appealed to his supporter Falcinelli, sending him another long self-justifying memorandum on July 6. But the Austrians continued to insist on the acceptance of the resignation. The Pope finally relented, notifying Haynald on August 13 of his intention to accept the resignation. On September 22, 1864 he became a titular archbishop, and at the end of the year he took up a post in the same congregation to which he had recently pleaded his case.

Haynald spent more than two years in Rome as a curial archbishop. With the fall of Schmerling and his allies in the Hungarian lands Haynald quickly became a prime candidate to fill a vacant see in Hungary. In October, 1865 he accompanied Falcinelli on a visit to Esztergom. Still, he only received a Hungarian see, that of Kolocsa, when he was appointed on the strong recommendation of Minister József Eötvös in April, 1867. He proved an ally of Eotvos in many of his policies. His favor with Pius IX soon declined: first, for his mission to Rome on behalf of the Austrian effort to suspend the Concordat, then due to his role in the opposition minority at Vatican Council in 1869-70. He was

195. The Congregation’s memorandum of June 29 is in DSSS, 214-15.
196. Haynald’s memorandum and Rechberg’s note to Bach of July 13 are in Ibid., 574-80.
197. [Fraknői], 79-82.
198. Falcinelli to Antonelli, September 14 and October 18, 1865, in Lukács, The Vatican and Hungary, 572, 575-6.
one of the last Hungarian prelates to declare his acceptance of the Dogma of Infallibility after his return to his see. He was made a Cardinal by Pope Leo XIII in 1879.

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Mihály Fogarasy

The court strategy of cultivating the internal opposition to Haynald found useful instruments not only among his minor clergy and among the Armenians, but especially in the person of a distinguished canon in Nagyvárad who was a legitimate candidate to supplant Haynald as bishop. He reinforced his legitimacy vis a vis the court by his political performance, and then legitimized his appointment as bishop by his association with the accommodation to liberal Catholic trends in his diocese.

At the beginning of 1863, Baron Reichenstein contacted Mihály Fogarasy and requested his views on Transylvanian politics. Emboldened by Fogarasy's thoroughly loyal sentiments, he suggested his possible nomination as regalist to the Transylvanian diet, and eventually as bishop. Fogarasy took up the offer, slyly noting that his presence in the diet would place him in a relationship with Haynald that would be "anything but pleasant, implying he would deserve a reward."

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200. See Chapter IX.
201. Fogarasy to Reichenstein, January 15 and 17, 1863, in HHSN Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton 1a. Vertrauliche Briefe. Reichenstein was in Debrecen at the time on offi-
Fogarasy was born in Gyergyőszentmiklós to a Szekler family of minor noble origin in 1800. After theological studies in Gyulafehérvár and Vienna, he was ordained in Gyulafehérvár by Bishop Szepessy in October, 1823, shortly after the controversial diocesan synod. He had a distinguished career as a teacher, holding appointments at schools and seminaries in Hermannstadt, Gyulafehérvár, Kolozsvár, Vienna, Nagyvárad, and Pest. He published two remarkable works of political interest, one on the civil functions of the Transylvanian bishop and the other an anonymous record of the bishops' conferences of 1847-48, as well as a volume of his sermons. He was the founder of the Szent István Társulat, and its first head from 1847 to 1853. From 1838 he was a canon in Nagyvárad, and resided there permanently from 1853 on.

Despite his ambiguous record in 1848, Fogarasy was by the late 1850s a leading candidate for an episcopal appointment due to his outstanding ecclesiastical career. His private letter to Haynald in January, 1858 provides an

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cial business.
203. Kiss and Sziklay, I, 534-6.
204. Adriányi, Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum, 76; Mendlik, 145-7.
205. Aside from anonymous publication of the bishops' conference protocols, Fogarasy was chosen by the episcopate to deliver its unsuccessful memorandum to the court in November, 1848. Antal Meszlényi, A magyar katolikus egyház és az állam 1848/49-ben (Budapest: Szent-István Társulat, 1928), 159-60.
insight into his ambition. He asked Haynald to recommend him for the vacant see of Szatmár, "since I do not desire to secure a bishopric by any other means than by the intercession of the episcopate." Haynald probably disappointed him; Nádasdy noted in 1863 that a personal antipathy existed between them. Fogarasy was a serious candidate for the Bishopric of Csanad in 1860. At this time he was recommended for the post by two bishops and the Governor-General of Hungary, Archduke Albrecht. When another candidate was nonetheless selected, the Archduke instructed Minister Thun to give Fogarasy special consideration when a Hungarian diocese again became vacant.

The letters of Fogarasy to Reichenstein confirm the picture in his letter to Haynald of an ambitious churchman willing to subordinate his personal propriety to the goal of attaining the episcopal dignity. After the court decreed his appointment as regalist on August 14, 1863, he declared his support of "that wise policy which aims at the unity of Austria and makes the welfare of Transylvania and Hungary dependent on the power, greatness and prestige of the entire monarchy." He hoped he would soon have the opportunity to

206. Fogarasy to Haynald, January 10, 1858, in OSzK Fol.Hung. 1722.
207. The Chancellor wrote that Haynald might agree to exchange his see with that of Haas in order to keep it away from Fogarassy, who was his "Todfeind."-- Nádasdy to Reichenstein, September 8, 1863, in HHSN Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton lb. Korrespondenz Reichensteins 1863-65, besonders mit Nadasdy. No. 12.

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demonstrate his dedication to the empire by taking over Haynald's post on the Gubernium as well. Fogarasy was aware of the unpopularity of his participation in the diet; he delayed his journey to Hermannstadt for more than two weeks, and travelled through Kolozsvár in secrecy and with police protection, fearing demonstrations against himself. Yet he soon became despondent over the hostile Hungarian response to his actions, and remarked that he might decline to take a seat in the Reichsrat. Nádasdy's correspondent judged correctly that he would probably change his mind, reasoning that "sapientis est mutare consilium in melius."

The court was satisfied with Fogarasy's performance in the diet. Although he opposed the government's position in many of the debates, he lent the diet legitimacy by taking his own role in it seriously. He steadfastly defended the interests of diocesan property, church and schools, often in opposition to the Romanians. In the debates concerning an administrative reorganization or establishing local official languages on an ethnic basis, for instance, he insisted that the existing system be maintained. His proposal that the number of regalists be increased to fully one half of the

209. Fogarasy to Reichenstein, August 18, in HHSA Nachlass Reichenstein, Karton 1a. Vertrauliche Briefe.
210. Telegrams of Nádasdy and Fogarasy, August 28 to September 1, in MOL D228, 1863/878, 883, 1034; Kolozsvár police commissioner Mecséry, August 30, in HHSA Nachlass Reichenstein. Karton 1b. II. Reservat-Präsidialakten 1863-65. No. 44.
211. Anonymous reports to Nádasdy, October 4, 1863, in Ibid., No. 54, 55.

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membership of the diet was rejected by most members but welcomed by the Hungarian press. Most important for Vienna was his very presence in the diet and his demonstrated "truly priestly sentiments and unconditional loyalty to throne and state."

The Holy See was aware of Fogarasy's status as heir apparent to Haynald in the event of his resignation. The Nuncio, a partisan of the resigned bishop, sent a suspiciously one-sided report to Rome on the candidacy of Fogarasy. Therein he stated that Fogarasy had been an advocate of complete independence in 1848-49, which was not the case, and that his blatant ambition meant his appointment would be a disgrace to the church in Hungary. Later he added that Haynald's numerous supporters in Hungary and Transylvania would strongly resent Fogarasy's approval by Rome. Consequently the Holy See opposed Fogarasy's candidacy after it was proposed by Reichenstein. However, Scitovszky, Kunszt and other Hungarian bishops supported the candidacy of Fogarasy. Consequently Reichenstein renewed his proposal, and it was approved at the end of November, 1864.

212. Mester, 230, 247-9; Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 152-3, 193.
213. Vortrag of Reichenstein, July 31, 1864, loc. cit.
214. On December 19, 1863 Falcinelli reported to Antonelli Haynald's statement that Fogarasy had been promised his see and was an obedient supporter of the Schmerling system; letter in DSSS, 563, where the Nuncio is incorrectly identified as de Luca.
216. Adriányi, Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum, 75-6, citing
In the national question Fogarasy pursued a far more moderate line than his predecessor. Not only did he participate in the diet and Reichsrat, but he concluded an agreement with the Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Ioan Vancea, in 1873 concerning liturgical collaboration. Where clergy of the Latin rite were lacking, Greek Catholic priests could distribute the sacraments to Roman Catholics as well. The district assembly of Csik complained that the agreement increased the danger of the Romanianization of the Szeklers. The most remarkable innovation of Fogarasy's episcopacy, however, was the introduction of lay participation in diocesan administration, the so-called Transylvanian Catholic Autonomy, between 1866 and 1873.

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The Roman Catholic Church established a privileged position among the religious communities in Habsburg-ruled Transylvania in the eighteenth century. Educational and political inducements rapidly increased the number of Roman Catholic inhabitants. However, this growth came at the cost of state control of diocesan endowments through the Catholica Commissio, which supplanted the mixed body of clergy and laymen known as the Status Catholicus that had evolved in the years when the bishop was exiled from the land. Henceforth ecclesiastic reformers would demand the

restoration of the prerogatives of the Status Catholicus.

Lajos Haynald, a highly educated native of central Hungary, became Bishop of Transylvania in 1862. In the decade of absolutism he was a model ultramontane bishop. In 1861 he attained tremendous popularity among Hungarians by his pronouncements in favor of the union of Hungary and Transylvania. Allies of Schmerling saw in Haynald a powerful adversary because of his religious influence and his position as councillor on the Gubernium. Yet Haynald's prestige and influence in Rome, Vatican diplomacy and the ultramontane party in Vienna long protected him from dismissal. Haynald's role in the Hungarian deputies' decision to boycott the diet in 1863 convinced both the Emperor and, finally, the Pope of the desirability of Haynald's abdication. He complied with their expressed wish in December, 1863.

The authorities put pressure on Haynald through their investigation of oppositional clergymen under his authority. The chief center of oppositional activity by diocesan clergy was in the Szekler district of Csík. Parish autonomy, patronage, popular piety and the patriotic-religious mystique of the shrine and schools of Csiksomlyo created a unique milieu for resistance in the form of nationalist oratory, military conspiracy, and organized political activity.

Schmerling's men also undermined Haynald and his clerical allies through the promotion and eventual
appointment as his successor of the more moderate Mihály Fogarasy. Fogarasy helped legitimate Nádasdy's policies as regalist in the diet, although he also defended Hungarian interests there. As Bishop after 1865, Fogarasy made accommodation both to the liberals, in the resurrection of the Status Catholicus, and to Romanian Greek Catholics in the area of liturgical collaboration.
CHAPTER SEVEN

UNITY AND DIVISION IN ROMANIAN POLITICS

Religious division was a fundamental trait of Romanian politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historians and politicians have rightly pointed out the tendency of secular nationalism to overcome religious, cultural and regional differences in the Romanian nation. There was a growing sense of the desirability of political unity in the 1860s. This study takes a different perspective: that nationalism at times actually strengthened religious division by inspiring a rivalry in service to the national cause by alternative strategies. Religious differences were an important element in the politics of the 1860s. The political and cultural traditions which they represent in Romanian history continued to be significant later, and have received inadequate attention in historiography. Religious differences manifested themselves locally in the everyday questions of the church and school, and in the relationship between the clergy and lay leadership. These differences, like those between Anglican and Dissenters in Britain or Protestants and Catholics in Germany, were never "merely political in the sense of secular power."

The fortune of the church union among the Romanians fluctuated: social and educational advantages accorded to Catholics strengthened the movement for union, while the support of the Hungarian Reformed, Serbian and Russian sup-
port for Orthodoxy could exploit social tensions between the formerly Orthodox peasant masses and the Greek Catholic minor nobility and clergy. The dramatic fluctuation of the religious profile of the Romanian population illustrates this. With the conclusion of the church union all Transylvanian Romanians were nominally Greek Catholics. A half-century later, in the aftermath of the Orthodox revolts, an Austrian tabulation of 1762 recorded 127,712 Orthodox and only 25,174 Greek Catholic families in Transylvania, although most of the Romanian clergy were Greek Catholic. The edict of toleration of 1781 also favored the numerical recovery of Orthodoxy. By the eve of 1848 the Greek Catholics slightly outnumbered the Orthodox. Religious regulations and state policy favored the union movement, which secured a gain of roughly 30,000 souls in the years 1821-33 alone. In the half-century

1. See the cited works of Hitchins and Turczynski. On occasion both writers suggest that the two groups were of different rite. In terms, at least, of liturgy they shared the same rite; churchmen referred to a single eastern or Byzantine rite. Hitchins, Rumanian National Movement, 26, Turczynski, 143, 207, and Ibid., Von der Aufklärung zum Frühliberalismus. Politische Trägergruppen und deren Förderungs-katalog in Rumänien, (München: Oldenbourg, 1985), 158-9 make a misleading distinction between "Uniate" rite and Greek rite.

2. Silviu Dragomir, Istoria desrobirei religioase a românilor din Ardeal în secolul XVIII, II (Sibiu: Editura și tiparul tipografiei arhidiecezane, 1930), 284. Dragomir’s work is the definitive study on the revolts; more recently, see Hitchins, The Idea of Nation. The Romanians of Transylvania, 1691-1849 (Bucharest: Editura științifică și enciclopedică, 1985), 57-80. On the phenomenon of fluctuation, see also Turczynski, Konfession und Nation, 206-7.

before Saguna came to Transylvania in 1846, 124 Orthodox parishes went over to Rome, or as many as 100,000 souls. The papal bull establishing the metropolitanate in Blaj in 1853 recognized the fluidity of the situation, stating that the number of parishes in the archdiocese could be expected to fluctuate as the result of conversions.

Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Romanian nationalism sought to foster a national unity that overlooked religious division. The petitions submitted to the court by both bishops in 1792 (the Supplex Libellus Valachorum), 1834, and 1842 and similar actions by the laity were inspired by this ideal. Yet the reality of religious division could not be ignored, and not only religious partisans but liberal reformers sought to deal with it. Beyond the abstract desire for religious unity, however, Romanians could not agree on how this should be achieved concretely. The popular assembly at Blaj in 1848 included as its second, ambiguous demand the "freedom and independence of the Romanian church [sic]... the restoration of the Romanian metropolitanate and the annual general synod," the latter to be made up of both clerical and lay deputies.

Religious rivalry increased during the decade of ab-

4. Ilarion Pușcariu, Metropolia, 47, citing a study by Ioan Pușcariu.
7. Ibid., 173-82; Hitchins, The Idea of Nation, 187. According to Hitchins, the insertion of this article was at the initiative of Saguna-- Orthodoxy and Nationality, 178.
solutism. Several Romanian meetings of 1848-50 demanded the reestablishment of the Orthodox metropolitanate previously terminated by the church union. The strongly Catholic orientation of the absolutist government delayed the fulfillment of this demand. Conversely, the new Greek Catholic Bishop, soon Metropolitan Şuluţiu openly sought to unite all Romanians under Blaj. At the apparent suggestion of Austrian officials, Şuluţiu actually proposed that Șaguna become the Metropolitan in Blaj. After Șaguna refused this offer and Sulutiu took office, the new bishop called for the union with Rome of "all Romanians from the Tisza to the Black Sea and the Pindus Mountains." Șaguna refuted the appeal in a letter addressed to all Orthodox bishops. The Orthodox complained that the Greek Catholic clergy spread calumnies about them and pressured them to convert.

Șaguna established a diocesan publishing house in 1850 to compete with that in Blaj and also a political newspaper, Telegraful Român, in 1853. The paper rapidly captured the Orthodox readership of the Gazeta Transilvaniei of Kronstadt. At the instigation of the editor of the latter paper, Iacob Mureșan, Şuluţiu issued a circular to his

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8. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 193-6. The only known source of this episode is the apparently reliable memoir of Șaguna, Memoriile din anii 1846-1871 (Sibiu: Tipografia arhidiecezană, 1923), 44-53.


10. Pavel Vasici, an opponent of confessional strife, charged that the Greek Catholic dean of Hermannstadt said the Orthodox were "subject to the Serbian Metropolitan, who doesn't love them... and are tied to the Russians." Vasici to Barițiu, April 24, 1851, in GBCS, II, 30-3.
clergy in 1853 urging them to subscribe to the Gazeta Transilvaniei; Mureșan published this appeal. Both papers contributed to the religious polemic of the decade, but Gazeta Transilvaniei was unquestionably the more nationalistic and liberal of the two. The Telegraful Român, composed under Saguna's direct supervision, was decidedly conservative. Saguna finally forbade his clergy and faithful to read the Gazeta Transilvaniei in a circular in December, 1855. The Catholic Governor and his officials did not object to Şaguna's action. They rejected a complaint against it by Baritiu.

Şaguna enjoyed warm personal relations with Governor Schwarzenberg. Şulutiu complained repeatedly to Schwarzenberg about Şaguna's alleged calumnies of the Greek Catholics. Schwarzenberg labelled Sulutiu a "disturber of public peace" after he repeated his complaints in a circular in 1855. The Metropolitan defended his action to the Nuncio, identifying Şaguna as the source of the allegations against him. An official related the following episode to illustrate Şaguna's influence on the police. After an

11. Letters of Mureșan to Timotei Cipariu, January, 1853 to April, 1856, summarized in Ioana Botezan and Alexandru Matei, Arhiva personala Timotei Cipariu. Catalog (București: Direcția generală a Arhivelor statului, 1982), 265-71; a Cipariu letter to Mureșanu at the beginning of 1856 (Ibid., 393-4) refers to a Sulutiu circular repeating his earlier instruction; Hitchins, op. cit., 184, 234, 273-4, and the circular in Tulbure, 195-201.
Orthodox pastor near Kolozsvár converted to Catholicism with his flock in 1856, the gendarmes transported him to Hermannstadt. There Şaguna had him shorn of his beard, which was the sign of his vocation. He was only released from police detention after the intervention of Haynald.¹⁴ Minister of Culture Count Thun, on the other hand, was a militant Catholic who referred to the Orthodox as "rotten schismatics."

There was more incentive to overcome religious disunity in the 1860s. Not only lay politicians, but the bishops as well recognized the need to present a united front toward the other nationalities. Şaguna and Şuluţiu cosponsored a petition in 1857 to protest against a planned reorganization of Transylvania and to request tax relief for the Romanian clergy and for those who had suffered in 1848-9. The deputations led to Vienna by Şuluţiu in the fall of 1860 and 1861, the national conference in Hermannstadt in January, 1861 and the twenty-man national committee it elected were all scrupulously biconfessional in membership. The most vivid demonstration of the Romanian patriots' eagerness to put aside confessional differences was the grand reception,

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¹⁴. Thiemann to Bach, March 13 and 24, 1856, in Documente inedite privitoare la istoria Transilvaniei între 1848-1859, 173-6. Thiemann claimed to have reliable confirmation of the story.

¹⁵. Şaguna, 87. He writes that the successes of Catholic proselytism even included an Orthodox village in Moldavia, which converted in 1856, at the time of the Austrian occupation.

¹⁶. Petitions of December 30 and 31, 1857, in Ibid., 226-35.
carefully described in the press, that was accorded Șuluțiu when he arrived in Hermannstadt, the Orthodox center, after successfully leading the deputation in 1860. Șaguna's deputy and thirty law students on horseback, waving the Romanian colors, met Șuluțiu outside the city. Șuluțiu and Șaguna presented the same platform at the Gyulafehérvár conference in 1861. The bishops and clergy collaborated remarkably in the dietal elections in 1863, as well.

Șuluțiu became convinced in the course of his sojourn in Vienna at the end of 1860 that religious dissension was a liability for the national movement. He urged Barițiu and Dimitrie Moldovan, persons closer to Șaguna personally, to impress this necessity upon the Orthodox bishop. In May, 1861 Șaguna proposed an accord providing for reciprocity in four areas of religious life that were the source of discord in the village: mixed marriages, conversions, the liturgy, and mixed schools. Șuluțiu's only reservation concerned the procedure for the division of parish property in cases of conversion. Greek Catholic parishes possessed canonic portions (land allotments) far more often than Orthodox ones, hence reciprocity would favor the Orthodox. Alexi and Dobra were less favorable toward the accord than Șuluțiu,

17. Pavel Vasici to Barițiu, January 1, 1861, in GBCS, II, 50.
and more preoccupied with Catholic prerogatives. Șuluțiu implored Șaguna to understand the limits on his freedom of action: he had to contend with suffragan bishops, the Nuncio, the Pope, and other powerful people who "supervize me, watch my steps, and shackle my will, even my conscience without having a right to do so." Hence no agreement was reached.

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The Romanian Schools

Two main ecclesiastic issues continued to dog Greek Catholic-Orthodox relations in the 1860s: the schools and the Orthodox Metropolitanate. Education in the service of the nation was a major concern of the laity. According to a Hungarian press report in 1841, Orthodox primary schools in Transylvania numbered 299 in that year, but Greek Catholic ones were far fewer. The Orthodox schools were better supervized, while many of those of the Greek Catholics appear to have been amalgamated with those of the Roman Catholics since both of the latter were under the supervision of Bishop Kovács. Romanian primary education

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19. Șaguna’s draft, dated May 11 (o.s.), is in Sibiu, AMOR, 1861/420; it is published, with Șuluțiu’s response of February 22, 1862, in Popea, 120-5. Barițiu published Șaguna’s proposal, and summaries of the Greek Catholic responses, in Părti alese, III, 598-600. Șuluțiu’s views expressed to Alexi and Dobra, on June 15, are in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG Protocol 1861/378. The initiative for this attempt does not lie solely with Șaguna, as Popea states, but primary responsibility for its failure rests with the Catholics.

20. On the latter, see Chapter IX.

expanded rapidly in the decades following the revolution, from 371 Greek Catholic and 367 Orthodox schools in 1851 to 500 and 676 in 1858, to 767 and 704 in 1865, respectively. Historians have credited Saguna with energetic support of school development and been less favorable to Sulutiu in this respect. Major credit for the advances should be shared by the church-nominated, government-paid school inspectors, Gabriel Dorgo (1851-4) and Ioan Maior (1860-1, 1863-9) for the Greek Catholics and Pavel Vasici (1855-61, 1862-9) for the Orthodox.

The strictly confessional attitude of Saguna concerning the mixed schools aggravated Romanian nationalists, while Sulutiu was somewhat more flexible. After the ap-

\[\text{\si didactica\c{a}, 1971}, 13-32.\] Albu accepts the statement of the Erdélyi Hiradó that there were only fourteen Greek Catholic schools in 1841, but this seems too small a number. The number apparently did not include the border regiments, where many of the best Romanian Greek Catholic schools were located. There may also have been Romanian instruction in many of the Roman Catholic schools. Greek Catholic schools had numbered three hundred at the end of the previous century.  

\[\text{\textit{22. Ibid.}, 49-55; Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 261-8; Polverejan, 207-8.}\] Much more data have been published about the Orthodox than the Greek Catholic schools. Writers agree that the latter were inferior. Polverejan notes the available school statistics are often contradictory. Saguna's circular of August 2, 1862 (o.s.) gave the more conservative total of 600 schools; Tulbure, 319. The rapid growth of Greek Catholic schools recorded by Polverejan is incompatible with Albu's negative appraisal of Sulutiu's policies. After the transfer of Dorgo, Sulutiu tried unsuccessfully for years to secure the appointment of a replacement; two of his letters to Minister of Culture Thun from 1856 and 1857 are published in Ioana Botezan, "Trei documente din anii 1855-1857 referitoare la Timotei Cipariu," in \textit{Apulum} 16 (1978), 361-5. 

\[\text{\textit{23. According to Vasici, Sulutiu opposed mixed schools as well, criticizing a proposal of Grigore Mihali for this reason. Vasici to Baritiu, August 7, 1861, in GBCS II, 63. The editor of the correspondence mistakenly identifies the}\]
pointment of Maior in 1860, the two inspectors toured Transylvania together and established mixed or "national" schools in various communities where the respective parishes were too small to support separate schools efficiently. Șaguna and Sulutiu accepted this innovation in principle during their negotiations in 1861, but stipulated that administrative responsibility for each such school would rest with the pastor of the church most numerous among the pupils. Șaguna denounced the growing popularity of mixed "national" schools and their sponsorship by ASTRA in a long circular of September, 1862. Only schools founded by and administered by a single church were legal and enjoyed a legal guarantee against interference by the state, he declared. The Orthodox pastors in the Muntii Apuseni and the professors of the Orthodox gymnasium in Kronstadt welcomed Șaguna's declaration. The professors argued, however, that the confessional character should be mandatory only for primary schools.

The Magyarization of non-church schools after 1867 later vindicated Șaguna's position in the view of many nationalists, but it angered those who were eager to pool their resources for the establishment of new schools under the favorable political conditions of the Provisorium. Both

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reference as pertaining to Șaguna.
26. Fifteen priests to Șaguna, Abrudbányia, November 18, 1862 (o.s.), in AMOR, 1862/904; professors of Kronstadt to Șaguna, September 14, 1862 (o.s.), and reply by Șaguna, September 19, in ABAOR, FS. 1746-47.

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Vasici and Maior favored the "national" schools.

In both churches, laity and clergy clashed over school policy. Vasici and Maior were friends of their bishops who shared their often-expressed determination to improve Romanian education. But they were officials of the Locumtenency, and later of the Gubernium, who were critical of the bishops' insistence on church autonomy and the clerical administration of the schools. In some cases, particularly in Doboka county in 1862-63, the county officials actively supported the establishment of "national" schools under the auspices of ASTRA, though this was opposed by ASTRA's president, Şaguna. Vasici increasingly complained about the control of the schools by local clergymen who had little competence or interest in education. He argued in an official report in 1864 that the condition of the schools could only be improved if the state and municipalities, not just the clergy, took an active hand therein.

27. Governor Mikó had abolished the office of school inspector for the Romanians in April, 1861, under the pretext of restoring complete church control over the schools. He did, however, accede to the Romanian bishops' demand that Greek Catholic and Orthodox Gubernium counselors administer the endowments of the respective churches (Crenneville to Şulutiu, March 18, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1862/223). The emperor approved the reappointment of Vasici and Maior in October, 1862 and February, 1863, respectively. Hitchins (Orthodoxy and Nationality, 268) mistakenly writes that Vasici occupied office continuously.

28. Correspondence of Mihail Bohátel (a county official), Crenneville, and Şaguna, July, 1862-February, 1863, in Sibiu, ABAOR, FS, 1737-9, 1800-1. Bohátel was among the three persons nominated by Sulutiu for school councillor, considered to be "more zealous than anyone else"-- Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu to Baritiu, November 10, 1862, with footnote, in GBCS, III, 181-2.
He considered the clergy incompetent for this task, and in the absence of statutory synodal supervision in the church judged state intervention the only way to correct existing failings. His friendship with Şaguna soured when his views appeared in the press.

The severely critical speech of Blaj Provost Basil Rațiu in 1862, later published in the press, revealed serious failings in the Greek Catholic schools and clergy. Among the Greek Catholics, the lay-clerical rivalry was evident in the long and bitter dispute concerning the local schools between the Greek Catholic dean Mihail Crișan of Reghin and the nationalist landowner Ioan Pop Maior. Maior established a secondary school endowment with the collaboration of Romanians in several counties in 1863, but the projected school never materialized. The people and the patriotic dean of Târgu Lăpuș, Ioan Dragomir, succeeded in establishing a first-rate "national" school under the auspices of the diocese of

29. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 268; the report of Vasici is published in GBCS, II, 88-103, in the original German and a Romanian translation.

30. Cited in Baritius, Parti alese, III, 145-8; the speech was published in Gazeta Transilvaniei and Foaia Pentru Munte, Inima şi Literatura in 1862.

31. Maior to Cipariu, November 12, 1861, in AS Cluj, Fondul Timotei Cipariu, Corespondenţa, No. 1730; Retegan, "Un descendent al lui Petru Maior: Ioan Pop Maior din Reghin," in Stefan Metesc la 85 de ani (Cluj-Napoca: Arhivele statului Cluj-Napoca, 1977), 437-40; numerous documents in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG concerning his feud with Crișan in 1861-3. This Maior (1796-1877) should be distinguished from the school councillor (1827-1904), who was also for awhile councillor in the Section or Ministry of Justice in Schmerling's Ministry of State, and also from Ioan Maier (1782-1868), Greek Catholic dean at this time in Bistritz, another founder of schools.

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Szamosújvár in 1859, with an enrollment of over a hundred students from several counties, who continued on to many of the best high schools in Transylvania. There were equally famous schools in several wealthy Orthodox communities of southern Transylvania.

The persistence of the religious division in politics in a period of increasing secularism was due in large part to the numerical domination of the clergy in the Romanian intelligentsia. There are four principal statistical indices for this domination. Baritiu calculated that there were about 10,000 Romanians in the Hungarian lands in 1848 who could read and write, or half of one percent of all Romanians there, and that 4250 of these were clergymen.

From 1838 to 1865, clergymen constituted from 53% (1838) to 38% (1865) of the Transylvanian subscribers to the Romanian press of Kronstadt. Of 1028 Romanians born between 1780 and 1855 in the Habsburg lands and active in intellectual professions by 1880, 47% studied theology, 43% were clergymen.


men, and 24% were sons of a priest. Finally, a major Romanian petition to the emperor in 1866 garnered 1493 signatures, of which 554 were clergymen. The Romanian intellectuals' opposition to the clerical leadership of the national movement did not begin to bear fruit until after 1867. The rise of lay political leadership required not only the numerical growth of the lay intelligentsia but, as Turczynski has shown, the supercession of multinational religious loyalties (Konfessionsnationalitäten) by monoethnic ones.

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Confessional Politics in the Village

Religious division continued to characterize Transylvanian Romanian society in the 1860s despite the trend toward secular unity. Religious loyalties still fluctuated in the village, for reasons that evidently had as much to do with secular politics and personalities as with theology. An extreme case was that of nearly one hundred Romanian Orthodox from the village of Gusterita near Hermannstadt that expressed the desire to convert to Roman Catholicism (whose status as the church of the dynasty was

37. This recurrent theme of Hitchins' works is treated most concisely in "The Sacred Cult of Nationality: Rumanian Intellectuals and the Church in Transylvania, 1834-1869," in Studies on Romanian National Consciousness, 47-73.
38. Turczynski, Konfession und Nation, 259-72.
especially evident in the provincial seat of the military commandant) in 1861. The conversion of four other villages from one Romanian church to the other was the subject of extended investigation by the government and by Sulutiu and Saguna: Ghijasa de Sus in Felső-Fehér county, Cenade in Alsó-Fehér county near Blaj, Bucerdea Vinoasă in the same county near Gyulafehérvár, and Pelisor in the Saxon district of Leschkirch. The four cases illustrate the way in which religion, in combination with social and political differences, continued to divide Romanian villages.

The personality of the pastor was a major factor in these conversions. As Şuluţiu wrote in his report to Thun in 1858:

...it is not unusual for the people to propose for ordination as pastor the greatest idiot, threatening to convert to Orthodoxy, along with the candidate, if their desires are not respected. And, alas! they are received there with open arms; more than one parish has been lost for the Holy Union in this way.

To avoid this result, he was often forced to accept the weak parish candidate, as the lesser of two evils. Several celebrated village conversions preoccupied the diocesan chancelleries in the 1860s. The young Ioan Gregorovici, after being rejected for admission to the seminary in Blaj,

39. After several months of consideration, pastor Adalbert Weber rejected their request, his inscription noting simply "Ob politicas circumstantias ad finem non perducta res." They had also sought to convert in 1848; Sibiu, Parohia romano-catolică. Historia Domus, 209-10, 237-8; Documents in the same archive, 1861/427.

40. Şuluţiu to Thun, November 3, 1858, in MOL, F258. 203 csomó. 1859/2238.
was ordained an Orthodox priest. Though under civil investigation for larceny, he convinced the people of Ghijasa de Sus to convert and accept him as their priest. The pastor of Cenade, Basil Manovici, had become Greek Catholic in 1847, then converted back to Orthodoxy in 1861. The influence of the nationalist activist and Greek Catholic dean of Ighiu, Ioan Moldovan, was apparently decisive in the decision of the people of Bucerdea Vinoasă to convert from the "Greco-Oriental" to the "Greco-Occidental" religion. The new Greek Catholic priest in Pelișor, whom Șaguna called an "agitator," successfully proselytized among the poorer members of the village. The Orthodox pastor then denied the converts burial in the Orthodox cemetery plot.

Șaguna warned Șuluțiu against the dangers of religious indifference in these cases, emphasizing that personal resentment seemed to be a more important motive in many of them than religious conviction. Șuluțiu essentially justified the apparent ease with which villagers might move from one priest to another, replying that conversion was no tragedy, since Greek Catholics and Orthodox were all one nation and shared the same rite and dogma.

41. Correspondence of Șuluțiu, Șaguna, local clergy and officials, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/234, 302, 372, 814, 891, 1862/889.
42. Ibid., 1861/239, 284, 335, 434.
43. Ibid., 1862/64, 270, 385, and Sibiu, AMOR. 1861/346, 1862/243. The state and Șuluțiu never used the term "Greco-Occidental," employed in one declaration of the villagers with an apparently political connotation.
44. Șaguna to Șuluțiu, January 22, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/252.
45. Correspondence of Șaguna and Șuluțiu, February 15,
The competition for the loyalty of the villagers was especially intense in Hunyad county. As in Belső-Szolnok county and Făgăraș district, there was a large but impoverished Romanian nobility who enjoyed voting rights under the Hungarian electoral law but stood to lose them under that decreed in 1863, hence often allied with the Hungarians. The intra-Romanian conflict could become a religious one in mixed areas, and Hunyad was one of these areas. Most Romanians in the county were Orthodox, but the number of Greek Catholics grew dramatically in the nineteenth century. Most parishes of the new diocese of Lugos, which was created in 1853, converted in the course of the nineteenth century from Orthodoxy. These included Hunyad county, a part of the new diocese, with the exception of the older Vicariat of Hațeg. The Greek Catholic Vicars of Hațeg enjoyed a relatively large annual salary of 336 fl. from state-controlled endowments and were among the outstanding leaders of Transylvanian Romanian politics in the century.

Romanian noblemen outnumbered the former serfs who stood to be enfranchised by the electoral law of 1863 in most villages of Hațeg. They colluded with the county authorities to minimize the number of enfranchized peasants and increase their own vote. The Greek Catholic pastor

March 8 and May 16, 1862, in Ibid., 1862/385, and Sibiu, AMOR, 1862/243.
46. Ghibu, 80-1.
47. Jacob Radu, Istoria vicariatului greco-catolic al Hațegului (Lugoj: Tipografia "Gutenberg", 1913), 132-3 and passim.
48. Retegan, "Date statistice... privitoare la comitatul
of Grădiște in Hâțeg, Simion Pop Ulpian, scandalized the Gubernium and the Romanian national leadership by leading the Romanians in the county commission in 1862 in an anti-government alliance with the Hungarian opposition. Șaguna insisted Ulpian’s actions were an aberration from the desires of the Orthodox dean, the Greek Catholic vicar, and the Romanian people, made possible by the manipulations of Nopcsa. The prefect denied the mandate of the Orthodox dean when he was elected to the commission by a Greek Catholic village. Ulpian was promoted to dean in 1863, but died suddenly shortly thereafter, reportedly by poisoning.

Parishes in Hunyad and Făgăraș, objecting to the political views of their Orthodox pastors, threatened Șaguna with conversion to Catholicism. In at least one case the county officials encouraged this rebelliousness. In short, Romanian nationalists among the clergy and the commoners sought to overcome religious differences, but these differences often proved a useful instrument for the noble opposition.

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49. Correspondence of Crenneville, Ioan Rațiu, and Șaguna, October 10, 16, and 20, 1862, in Sibiu, ABAOR, FS, 1774, 1775, and 1777. Crenneville and Șuluțiu also corresponded on the matter, with the latter defending the political independence of his clergy; Crenneville to Șuluțiu, November 24, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 739.

50. Radu, 137-40, 213. Radu wrote that Ulpian had fought against the Hungarians in 1848, thereby incurring the enmity of the local nobility. His promotion in March, 1863 might indicate he had reverted to his earlier attitude.

51. Correspondence of officials, local clergy and parishioners of Certeju de sus and Sînpetru in Hunyad county and Vistra de jos in Făgăraș district with Șaguna, in Sibiu, AMOR, 1861/423, 793, 807, and Sibiu, ABAOR, FS. No. 1536.
In addition to these local considerations, the political-religious rivalry may be characterized in terms of political strategy. The contrast in style of leadership of Sulutiu and Saguna can be characterized as populist nationalism versus moderate, court-sponsored patriotism. Saguna distrusted the militant wing of Romanian politics, while Sulutiu courageously lent it his support on several occasions that will be discussed in this dissertation. The fundamental causes of this difference must be sought in the personalities of the bishops, institutional considerations, and the geographic distribution of the respective churches. I will discuss the first two in the remaining chapters.

Geography was a very significant source of the churches' different political orientation. The contrast in social structure and administration of Transylvania's regions was portrayed in an earlier chapter. This contrast compounded the other sources of conflict between the Romanian churches, as the following table demonstrates.

Table 12: Distribution of the Transylvanian Romanian Population by Religion, 1857

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counties + Vaslui District:</th>
<th>% of Trans. Population</th>
<th>% Romanians</th>
<th>G.Cath. (in all Transylvania)</th>
<th>Orthodox (in all Transylvania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>1,103,182</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>55.8(84.0) 44.2(60.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundus Regius + Făgăraș District:</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>470,485</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>19.1 (9.3) 80.9(35.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szekler Region:</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>400,534</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>60.4 (6.7) 39.4 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus 71.6% of the Romanians in Transylvania lived in the counties and Năsăud, and 84% of the Greek Catholics. The Orthodox were distributed more equally between the first and second region, though most of those in the counties were in Alsó-Fehér and Hunyad. But the Orthodox constituted 80.9% of the Romanians in the Fundus Regius and Făgăraș. The legacy of serfdom was by far stronger among the Greek Catholics, whose cultural centers, Blaj and the old parishes and schools of the Munții Apuseni were the hotbed of the Dacoroman nationalist ideology and of the peasant revolts. Orthodox society was a far more prosperous and politically moderate milieu, albeit closer to the Romanian Principalities. These factors also explain the already referred-to superiority of the Orthodox schools.

The distribution of the readership of the Romanian newspapers of Kronstadt reflects in part the same north-south, Greek Catholic-Orthodox division. Among the subscribers of the militant, social activist Barițiu-Mureșan papers Gazeta Transilvaniei and Foaie pentru Minte, Inima și Literatura, there were surprisingly few from the Orthodox centers of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt after the establishment of Telegraful Român in 1853. On the other hand, the villages and small towns of the northern and central counties were heavily represented. The readership of Gazeta Transilvaniei was heavily Greek Catholic, but not exclusively so; most importantly, its geographical, social and political profile was visibly different from that of the
conservative, frankly denominational Telegraful Român.

As a historian of journalism has noted, newspaper-readership groups, superceding corporate interests, became the precursors of partisan political constituencies. The logic of their situation drove Şułuţiu and his leading aides to identify with the constituency that found its expression in the Gazeta Transilvaniei.

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Şułuţiu and County Politics in 1861

His personal disposition and location placed Şułuţiu in the thick of county politics, an arena in which Saguna was far less involved. The Metropolitan's leadership of the deputation to Vienna at the end of 1860, then his militant speech at the government conference in Gyulafehérvár on February 11, 1861 set the tone for later events. Kemeny was so concerned about the Metropolitan's popularity that he asked him to discourage demonstrations on his behalf upon his arrival in Gyulafehérvár, a request to which Şułuţiu acceded. Şułuţiu delivered his two-hour speech in

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53. Marica, Studii de istoria şi sociologia culturii, I, 63-5; Nicolae Iorga, Istoria presei româneşti (Bucureşti: Sindicatul ziaristilor din Bucureşti, [1927]), 127. I know of no surveys of the readership of Telegraful Roman.
54. Weisenfeld, 3.
55. For a characterization of Şułuţiu, see Chapter VIII.
56. Kemeny's letter to Şułuţiu of February 6, 1861 is in Baritiu, 544-5, and Şułuţiu's reply of the following day in MOL D228, 1861/127. At the same time, Şułuţiu implored Kemeny to discourage anti-Romanian expressions in the Hungarian press of Kolozsvár. Baritiu (Părții alese, III, 91-2) attributes Kemeny's appeal to arrogance and a desire to exaggerate the radicalism of the Romanian crowds.
Romanian. With references to the medieval chronicles, he asserted the priority of the Romanian population on Transylvanian soil and its "hospitality" to the Hungarians, rejected the union with Hungary and the old electoral law, and demanded the recognition of the Romanians' equality and a new electoral law on the basis of historic rights and Christian justice. Șuluțiu had the speech published, and on May 7 sent copies to his clergy and suffragan bishops, instructing them to read them to their parishioners.

Simion Retegan calls the speech the most important statement of Romanian goals in the era, "the model and even source of inspiration of the Romanian speeches and protests occasioned by the reorganization of the Transylvanian administration."

To be sure, Șaguna raised similar points in his own speech which followed that of his colleague. Concerning the equality of the Romanian language in administration, he maintained that "Only the Old Testament holds the multiplicity of languages to be a punishment; the New Testament values it as a gift of the Holy Spirit."

57. Șuluțiu informed Șaguna of his intention to publish his speech in the Gazeta Transilvaniei and the Telegraful Român as well as in a separate edition of 2000 copies. Șaguna approved his initiative and even offered the services of his diocesan publishing house, for a fee— an offer Șuluțiu declined. Letters of Șuluțiu and Șaguna, February 12/24 and 17/29, in Sibiu, ABAOR 1487, 1488; Circular of Șuluțiu, May 7, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1861/285; Cuventarea Esclentiei S’ale Domnului Alecsandru Sterca Siiiutiu...tienuta in conferentiele rengicolare din Alba-Iulia in 11. Februarie 1861 (Brasiovu: Ioane Gott, 1861), 26 pp.

58. Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 43; Mester, Az autonóm Erdély, 85-103, summarizes the speech.

Șuluțiu composed a circular on April 1 exhorting his clergy to organize the Romanians for the election of "the most diligent and zealous patriots" in the prospective restoration of the constitutional administration. Yet he also urged that good relations with the Hungarians be maintained. Many Romanians objected to the resurrection of the county commissions of 1848 specified in the provisional instructions of March 26. These people argued the traditional county congregations would provide greater opportunity for Romanian participation and avert disputes over the participants to be appointed by the prefect. Șuluțiu made this argument when Pogany solicited names of prospective Romanian appointees two weeks before the convocation of the "preliminary county conference" of Alsó-Fehér county to be held April 25. The Hungarian majority of this conference voted to form a county commission in conformity with the provisional instructions, while the Romanian minority, led by Șuluțiu, withdrew in protest and refused to recognize the newly elected officials. The question of the union of

60. Text of circular in archdiocesan protocol book, AS Alba Iulia, MRU, 1861/189. Unlike with other circulars, no printed copy survives in the archive; hence it is possible, though not likely, that it was never issued. After receiving a letter of instructions dated April 6 from Baritiu, dean Grigore Mihali convoked the Greek Catholic clergy of the Munții Apuseni in a synod on April 12. Mihali to Baritiu, April 9, 1861, in GBCS, III, 112.

61. Correspondence of Șuluțiu and Pogany, April 10-11, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM, 722.

62. Retegan, "Lupta națională a românilor," 174. The Romanian majority of the riotous Făgăraș district assembly of April 16-17, led by Chancellery official Ioan Pușcariu, did not contest the legality of the new county statute.
Transylvania arose at the county assembly as well: the Hungarian majority demanded it, but Şuluţiu was determined to resist it. As he stated to Hungarian officials a month later: "If they impose the union, they may succeed, but we will use every available opportunity to dissolve it." This set the stage for the Romanians' controversial assembly in Blaj in May, on the anniversary of the Blaj assembly of 1848.

Mikó wrote Şuluţiu on May 18 to demand a clarification of reports that he had permitted a political assembly to take place in Blaj without prior official sanction. The governor had been informed that

on the fifteenth of this month a large popular assembly was held in Blaj, in which the Romanian intelligentsia came together not only from every part of the country, and the ignorant masses, but even from abroad; dangerous speeches were held by passionate individuals on the so-called Field of Liberty [site of the 1848 assembly], aiming at the agitation of the people...  

Hungarian officials reported that the perpetrator of the assembly was the radical landowner from Alsó-Fehér county, Ion Axente-Sever. He and his allies Iosif Hodoş and the Greek Catholic pastor of Roşia Montană in the Munţii Apuseni, Simion Balint, led a crowd of Romanians from Gyulafehérvár to Blaj on May 15. Romanians from surrounding areas also streamed in, and even two coaches with Romanian law students from Hermannstadt, leading the prefect to write with alarm

63. Cited by Albert Barcsay and Miklós Bíró to György Pogány, May 19, 1861, in MOL D228, 1861/235 and 236.
64. Mikó to Şuluţiu, May 18, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1861/295.
that "Blaj veritably looks now like it did in 1848." Axente and Balint held speeches in which they rejected the legality of the county commissions and charged that, once again, the Hungarians were seeking to "enslave" the Romanians. According to Măcelariu the Metropolitan was "thrown into confusion" by the assemblage of people, but the other Romanian leaders managed to maintain order and limit the subjects under discussion. Șuluțiu only reluctantly permitted the assembly demanded by the radicals. So great was popular discontent, he and Canon Papfalvi assured the Hungarian officials who visited them, that a county congregation must be conceded in order to calm them. Kemeny stated in his reports to the emperor that the crowd numbered in the thousands and included the radical emigres Bărunțiu and Laurian from Moldavia.

Șuluțiu indignantly rejected the Hungarian version of events. Like other Thursdays, the fifteenth was the day of the weekly fair, and the crowd was not much larger than

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65. The citation is from Pogany to Mikó, May 17, in MOL D228 1861/229; see also Dénes Imecs Imecsfalvi, assistant szolgabíró, to Pogany, May 17, in MOL D228 1861/229 and 235. According to eyewitness Ilie Măcelariu, only Axente and Hodoș spoke; Măcelariu to Baritiu, May 17, in GBCS, V, 193. 66. Măcelariu to Baritiu, loc. cit.; Albert Barcsay, county judge, and Miklós Bíró, assistant notary, to Pogany, May 19, in MOL D228 1861/235 and 236. 67. Vortrag of Kemeny, May 21, in MOL D228 1861/241. Urmossy and Retegan accept the estimate of several thousand participants; see Urmossy, I, 294, and Retegan, "Eforturi și realizări politice ale românilor din Transilvania în anii premergători dualismului," in Românii din Transilvania împotriva dualismului austro-ungar (1865-1900) (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia, 1978), 39. The presence of Bărunțiu and Laurian is very doubtful, not being mentioned by any other sources.
usual on that day. He estimated the number of educated
Romanians who had assembled after the customary morning
masses, litanies and blessing of water at no more than
sixty, of whom most were local clergy and only seventeen
were visitors from Alsó-Fehér county. They and perhaps 150
others did indeed assemble in the so-called Field of Liberty
and listen to two speeches, but Şuluţiu insisted that the
speakers exhorted listeners to pay taxes and obey official
regulations. He acknowledged that on the following day the
seventeen visitors and the local intelligentsia held a con-
ference at Şuluţiu’s residence. They proposed that the
government be asked to sanction the holding of a national
conference, and hinder the spread of the Hungarian movement
against the payment of taxes. He requested, finally, that
Mikó clear up the dangerously misleading rumors about the
meeting by sending an investigatory commission to Blaj.

On the fifteenth Şuluţiu wrote to Şaguna, presently in
Kolozsvár, in order to defuse the exaggerated reports he
feared would reach the city. He assured him the events of
the day were peaceful and more religious than political in
nature, but noted he would be pleased to inform him in
person if he cared to visit Blaj. The minutes of the
meeting of May 16 indicate Şuluţiu understated the tenor of

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68. Şuluţiu to Mikó, May 21; draft in AS Alba Iulia,
MRU,FG 1861/295, and MRU, CM, 695; original in MOL F263
1861/480.
69. Şuluţiu to Şaguna, May 15, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU,
Protocol book, 1861/293, and ABAOR,FS. 2817, marked by
Şuluţiu "cu grabă" (urgent).
the Romanian demands in his report to Mikó. The assembly called for the convocation of a congress of all the Romanians in the monarchy, advised Romanian civil servants to threaten resignation if their superiors were disloyal to the Emperor, declared that taxes should be paid, protested against Hungarian demonstrations honoring veterans of 1848-9, and asked that Romanian desires be submitted directly to the Emperor. The president of the assembly was Şuluţiu, and the 64 signatories included four canons and seventeen clergymen in all, several of them latter from the Munţii Apuseni.

The most radical demand of the assembly was the holding of a Romanian congress whose decisions would bind even the bishops. Şaguna arrived in Blaj on May 17. Papfalvi reported that, when Şaguna was addressed by Canon Alutan concerning the previous day's assembly, he replied:

I don't want to hear about your conference. I have my own independent views, according to which I wish to assure the welfare of my people and its rights; I don't want to subordinate my views to the passions of your people and see them undermined thereby.

The incident confirms other evidence of Şaguna's skeptical view of the radicals, though it is clear he was indeed

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70. "Protocolu din 16/4 Maiu 1861 care s'a scrisu în adunarea ce s'a tienutu in Blasiu suptu Presiedintia Escelentiei Sale D. Mitropolitu Alesandru Sterca Siulutiu ca unulu d’intr legiuitii presiedinti ai comisiunei permanente formate in adunarea nationale d’in la Januariu 1861," in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1861/387, and Sibiu, ABAOR,FS, 1497. The manuscript indicates the original wording of the protest against the Hungarian demonstrations was stronger than that finally agreed upon. Among the signatories were the radical laymen Axente, Hodoș and Gaetan.

71. Úrmössy, I, 295, citing a Romanian newspaper account.
interested in what had taken place. Eleven days later, Šaguna publicly criticized the holding of the assembly as an undisciplined improvisation.

Mikó forwarded Šuluţiu’s report to Kemény with the remark that he trusted his own officials more than Šuluţiu. But he took no further action, declining Šuluţiu’s proposal, as Mikó put it, to embark on "the distasteful and worrisome path of investigation." Both men were aware that, far from establishing the truth, such a procedure might have stirred emotions even further.

A week after the assembly in Blaj, Greek Catholic dean of Kolozsvár Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu led the Romanian opposition at the Kolozs county congregation. The congregational form of the assembly— it included representatives of the localities— was a concession to both the Hungarian and the Romanian opposition, but the Romanians were a small minority of the assembly. Negrutiu insisted that the congregation was illegal because the entire Romanian clergy ought to have been present. In the Romanian view, Transylvanian Law VI of 1744 invested their clergy with full rights of nobility,

72. Report of Barcsay and Búró, in MOL D228 1861/235 and 236. Măcelariu reported Šaguna returned to Hermannstadt "enchanted with Šuluţiu, but not with the canons... he praises the Metropolitan as never before." The two prelates had productive talks concerning the project for religious peace. See Măcelariu to Baritiu, May 21, in GBCS, V, 196.

73. Šaguna spoke at a conference of ten Romanian leaders in Hermannstadt; its protocol is in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/387.

74. "a kinyomozás kedvetlen és aggodalom [sic] ébreszto útja." Drafts of Mikó to Kemény and Šuluţiu, May 23, in MOL F263 1861/480, and original and copy, respectively, in MOL D228 1861/239.
hence membership in the congregations.

The civil disobedience of Romanians in rural localities of Alsó-Fehér county seemed even more to confirm Hungarian fears aroused by the Blaj assembly. Cîmpeni in the Munții Apuseni was the center of Romanian resistance, as it had been in 1848-9. An interesting letter of Haynald to Mikó on May 18 suggests he may have anticipated disturbances in Cîmpeni, perhaps having been warned by Augustin Pop. At the end of March Haynald ordered the transfer of the parish administrator of Boicza in Zărând county in the Partium, József Molnár, to Cîmpeni for "important and very urgent ecclesiastical reasons" (fontos és nagyon sürgős egyházi okok) in which he was confident the Gubernium would concur. Molnár rejected Haynald's transfer order, and Haynald in vain requested that the civil authorities escort him to Gyulafehérvár.

Two of the officials elected for Cîmpeni by the county

75. Retegan, "Lupta națională a românilor," 172, Ürmössy, I, 280-2, and "Cuventarea protop. Negruțiu in adunarea de comitatu din 23.V.61 in Clusiu," in Foia Pentru Minte, Inima, și Literatura, No. 22, 1861. Negruțiu also sent an account of the assembly to Barițiu for publication in the Gazeta Transilvaniei; it appeared on pp. 177-8 of the paper for 1861. See GBCS, III, 169. The law of 1744 indeed granted full noble rights to the Greek Catholic clergy, but it was never applied and, as the Hungarians correctly pointed out, Law XII of 1791 limited membership in the congregations to noblemen owning landed estates in the respective counties. See Die wichtigsten Verfassungsgrundgesetze des Grossfürstenthums Siebenbürgen von altersher bis in die Neuzeit, 103-4, 142-3.

76. Correspondence of Haynald, Mikó and Mailáth, May 18 to June 6, in MOL F263 1861/450 and Alba Iulia, ERC 1861/966, Cat. 13. The prefect of Zărând county at this time was the Romanian Ioan Pipoș.
commission on April 25-6 were Romanians who declined to occupy their offices; the third, the Hungarian János Apáthy, was warned en route by Romanians in Abrudbanya to turn back. The people of Cimpeni informed him on his arrival that they would refuse to recognize the county officials as long as the regime was "provisional" (pending a definitive ruling on the union with Hungary) but announced their determination to pay taxes to the imperial authorities and maintain order on their own. Their spokesmen were the Greek Catholic pastor Nicolae Begnescu and the Orthodox pastor Vasile Motora. After Pogany sent another official to Cimpeni, the Greek Catholic and Orthodox clergy and laity of the district of Cimpeni issued a defiant declaration to Apáthy and two other officials on May 28. They reaffirmed their conviction that the county commission of April 25-6 had been illegal, demanded the restoration of the pre-1848 county congregation system with the full participation of the clergy as noblemen, but also proclaimed their loyalty to the imperial authorities.

77. Apáthy to Pogany, May 20, in MOL F263 1861/481 (original), and AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/317 (copy); draft of Mikó to Kemény, May 23, in MOL F263 1861/481. Begnescu was a prominent participant in the events in Blaj; see Măcelariu to Baritiu, May 17, in GBCS, V, 193.

78. The original declaration is in MOL F263 1861/656, and it was published in Foaie Pentru Minte, Inima și Literatura, 1862, 177. The published declaration bears the title "Protestul celoru 11 comune din tienutulu Campeniului adresatu catra D. vice-not. comit. Arányi Bela, judele cercul. a cercului Zlatnei Ioane Boeru și subjudele Apáthi János." Both the original and the published declaration are in Romanian Cyrillic, which had gone out of use in the Blaj chancery but was still better understood by villagers than the Latin alphabet. The names of Arányi and Apáthy are given
Mikó forwarded Apáty's report on the events in Câmpeni to Şaguna and Şuluţiu and demanded an explanation. His letter to the former appealed, in a dignified manner, to the bishop's sense of constitutional legality; that to Şuluţiu was an impassioned appeal to his sense of responsibility and the need to avoid a repeat of the events of 1848. Şaguna pointed out that his clergy had also clashed with officials in the Fundus Regius. He urged Mikó to understand, as a fellow sufferer of the recently ended absolutist regime, that they were the unfortunate consequence of years of oppression. The Romanians were convinced that the convocation of county commissions was illegal. Şuluţiu promised he would do his best to maintain a proper respect for authority, but claimed the resistance in Câmpeni was the logical consequence of the regrettable comportment of the Hungarians at the county commission meeting the previous month. He insisted that only the convocation of a proper county assembly would bring peace.

Şuluţiu also issued an eloquent circular in response to

in the Latin alphabet, and that of Boer in Cyrillic. Boer was a nephew of Şuluţiu; see Măcelariu to Bariţiu, May 17, 1861, in GBCS, V, 194. The original manuscript copy bears the names of ninety signatories, including eleven priests.

79. Mikó to Şaguna, May 23, in Sibiu, ABAOR,FS 1509; draft in MOL D228 1861/245 and MOL F263 1861/481; Mikó to Şuluţiu, May 23, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/317, and draft in MOL F263 1861/481.

80. Şaguna to Mikó, May 26, in MOL F263 1861/578, draft in Sibiu, ABAOR,FS 1508, and copy in MOL D228 1861/245.

81. Draft of Şuluţiu to Pogány and Mikó, May 27, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1861/317, and copies in MOL D228, 1861/245.
the insubordination in Cîmpeni. He reminded people that while the present county officials were provisional they were sanctioned by the Emperor and should be obeyed. The time for free elections had not yet come:

Therefore I tell you, our Hungarian brothers as well as you, my beloved nation, that we should not nourish illusions and empty dreams, let us not build castles in the air, nor hope for mountains of gold; without true peace, friendship and brotherhood based on justice, decency and the perfect equality of all and equal political and civil rights, we can never prosper or assure the wellbeing of the homeland or our nations, which we so warmly desire!

Șuluțiu called for love, tolerance, and humility toward other nationalities, and even exhorted his people to refrain from unsanctioned public meetings. His good will was plainly evident in this circular, but his emphasis on equality could not help but sustain the Romanian resistance in the counties.

Kemeny persisted in his quest to make the Romanian bishops personally responsible for the maintenance of social peace. His proposal on May 21 that the Emperor admonish the bishops and place troops at the disposal of prefect Pogány to discourage further disorders prompted heated debate when it reached the Council of Ministers five days later. The Romanians' illegal assembly, stated Kemény, had "plunged the inhabitants of Transylvania of Hungarian, Szekler and Saxon nationality into fear and terror." The

82. Printed circular of May 28, 1861, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1861/320. Șaguna issued no circular on this occasion.
83. Vortrag of May 21, 1861, in MOL D228, 1861/241.
centralist ministers disputed the seriousness of the Blaj assembly, and pointed out its decisions were favorable to the imperial government. Kemény supplemented his case by informing his colleagues about the recent events in Cimpeni. Schmerling, Rechberg and Plener defended the Romanians' behavior, suggesting that their officials had resigned because the Hungarian county appointees were "traitors." But as Kemény argued in one Vortrag:

The circumstance that the commission in Alsó-Pehér county declared in favor of the union [with Hungary] cannot be approved, but neither can it justify the disobedience of the Romanians toward elected county officials.84

The emperor eventually decided against military measures, but authorized the admonishment of the bishops. On June 8 Kemény called on Ţuluţiu and Șaguna, in the name of the emperor, to use your influence on the Romanian population to ensure its continued tranquility and avoid every action which could arouse concern for the endangerment of the life and property on the part of the other inhabitants of the land.

In a second decree he pointed out that the county commissions had been authorized by the Provisional Instruction of March, and urged the bishops to see that elected Romanian officials perform their duty and not be discouraged from doing so by the clergy.

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84. Vortrag of June 4, in MOL D228, 1861/256.
85. POM V, 2, 76-9. He rejected Rechberg's proposal that the admonition be addressed to the bishops of all denominations but it is interesting to note that on June 7 Franz Joseph ordered Kemény to investigate the alleged radical sermon of Pál Benkő on May 26. See MOL D228. 1861/249.
86. Two letters of Kemény to Ţuluţiu and Șaguna, June 8: copies in MOL F263, 1861/ 947, and originals in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/414.
The support for the Romanians among influential Viennese officials caused Kemény to urge greater caution on his own subordinates. On June 4 Kemény received the unwelcome notification from Schmerling that the latter had secured approval of a subsidy of 25,000 fl. for the Transylvanian Orthodox. Forwarding copies of the remonstrations to Mikó, the Chancellor ordered him to communicate these to his subordinates and impress on Pogány and other officials of his county the need to "employ the greatest caution, avoiding any actions that might justify a grievance on the part of the Romanian people." Mikó forwarded the decrees to Pogány only after a delay of two weeks, but neglected to mention Kemény's call for tact.

The Romanians decided to send another deputation to Vienna in order to present their version of these events. The three laymen appointed as plenipotentiaries of the bishops and the Permanent Committee departed for Vienna on June 15. As Şuluțiu wrote to Vasile Ladislau Pop the next day, the deputation should seek to undermine the tale, spread by the Hungarians, that the Romanian activists were anarchists and disturbers of the peace. Pogány convened

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87. See MOL D228, 1861/348 and Chapter IV. Schmerling formally proposed the subsidy in his Vortrag of April 9, and the emperor approved it on May 29.

88. Kemény to Mikó, June 10, 1861, and draft of Miko to Pogány, June 23, in MOL F263, 1861/947.

89. A conference had been scheduled for May 17 in Hermannstadt, but was delayed due to the apparently unexpected events in Blaj and Alsó-Fehér county; see Şuluțiu to Saguna, May 9, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, Protocol book, 1861/286, and Şuluțiu to Barițiu, May 10, in GBCS, IV, 366. The protocols of the Romanians' conferences on the matter on
the commission in Alsó-Fehér county a second time on June 26-7. As in April the Romanians withdrew in protest, led by Şuluţiu, demanding the convocation of a congregation including the Romanians.

Şuluţiu responded privately to the admonition of June 8 in indignant letters to Mikó and Kemény on June 29. He repeated in even stronger terms the same arguments he had made repeatedly: that 1848-style county commissions were unacceptable, that the Romanians demanded county congregations, and that the law of 1744 entitled the Romanian clergy to participation in the congregations. It was an unfounded calumny to charge the Romanian clergy with "the most dangerous anarchy, insubordination, open revolt, Dacoroman and God knows what other tendencies...[and threaten them with] terrorist measures like imprisonment and military force."

The civil disobedience in Cîmpeni was the first of many similar incidents in the summer of 1861. Ferenc Nopcsa complained to Mikó about the alleged leadership of the Hunyad

May 28 through June 3, copies of the documents entrusted to the deputation, and the draft of Şuluţiu's letter to Pop are in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/387. Şuluţiu indignantly complained to Ştefan Moldovan that Şaguna had chosen the members of the deputation without consulting him—Şuluţiu to Moldovan, June 6, in AS Cluj-Napoca, Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan, No. 302. On the significance of the deputation, see Chapter III.

91. Şuluţiu to Kemény, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, Protocol book 1862/414, and Barişiu, Părţi alese, III, 505-11, from which this citation is taken. Barişiu mistakenly identified the date of the letter as September. Şuluţiu to Mikó, in AS Cluj-Napoca, Corespondenta Miko Imre, 1861/160. A note by Mikó indicates the letter was removed from the Gubernium archive on July 16.
county opposition by the Romanian clergy. He charged that the Greek Catholic Vicar of Hateg, Gavril Pop, stirred his people to resist the authorities by threatening them with anathema. The szolgabíró of Ighiu in Alsó-Fehér county described in an appeal to Poşány on April 24 the obstruction of his activity by the local clergy. He specified the local Greek Catholic pastor, Ioan Moldovan, as the ringleader. The Greek Catholic and Orthodox pastors together directed the passive resistance against the szolgabíró in the nearby Cricău. Complaints against the alleged agitation of the pastors of Ceanul Mic and Petreştii de Jos in Torda county moved Şulutiu to order investigations concerning them.

Instances of passive resistance and petitioning by the villagers of Alsó-Fehér county are numerous in the collection of peasant manifestoes published by Retegan. Parish clergy, Greek Catholic or Orthodox, were often the formulators and leading signators of petitions to the authori-

93. "Egyházi átokkal járta össze megyejét"—Nopcsa to Kemény, July 11, in MOL D228 1861/305. The Vicariat of Hateg was subordinate to the Bishop of Lugos, Alexandru Dobra. The Bishop supported Pop's claim that the clergy were obeying the law and loyal to the imperial (i.e. central) authorities. Dobra to Mikó, June 30, in MOL D228 1861/244.
94. Copy of szolgabíró László Vadadi to the county seat, May 24, in MOL D228 1861/244. After repeated appeals from the Gubernium Şulutiu called Moldovan to account on June 3; see AS Alba Iulia MRU,FG 1861/334.
95. Gubernium to Şulutiu, June 5, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU,FG 1861/414.
96. Documents of May 27 through August 1, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU,FG 1861/397, 442, 510.
ties. The role of the clergy in passive resistance and petitioning led to the charge of agitation (bujtoghátás), the unwarranted interference of the clergy in politics. As Barițiu pointed out in a newspaper article in August, the Hungarians frequently employed this word to imply that the Romanian politicians were reactionary, unconstitutional, and rebellious. The Greek Catholic clergy of the Munții Apuseni responded to these charges in a district synod held in Abrud at the end of July. Their declaration to Șuluțiu was signed by fifteen priests of the district. They declared that the clergy shared equal rights of citizenship with people of other nationalities. Their priestly mission might require them to conciliate these peoples or, at other times, to confront them:

We as priests must preach the holy gospel and in accordance with this establish and uphold peace between the peoples, inculcate love of one’s neighbors, and even enemies, and subordination to the emperor and the lawful officials... The priest and orator Aaron followed the call of Moses..., and beseeched the Pharaoh to free the Jews from slavery to the Egyptians; shouldn’t we therefore explain to our people what they are legally entitled to?

Hungarian prelates were recognized as political leaders, they pointed out, referring to Primate Scitovszky and Bishop Haynald. They implored, even challenged Sulutiu to defend the exercize of their rights to Mikó, imputing to the latter

the rationale: "beat the shepherd and you will scatter the sheep." Dean Gregore Mihali eventually resolved to present Romanian grievances concerning county administration in Vienna himself, departing at the end of August. Mihali and Axente led the Romanian group that, on September 9 or 10, presented a petition to the Emperor requesting the replacement of Pogany by a Romanian, the dissolution of the existing county commission, and the election of new county officials.

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Șulutiu and the Provisorium

The fall of Kemény in mid-September presented the Romanians with an opportunity, and Court Secretary Moldovan

99. "Adres'ă preotiloru dintre Munții Apuseni cătră S. Sa D. Metropolitatu in caus'ă dreptului loru politicu (Data in an. trecutu, cându li se denega dreptulu deconcetățianu; si se țienea de buitogătoi, cându apéra drepturile naționale)," in Foaie Pentru Minte, Inima și Literatura 25 (1862), no. 6, pp. 43-5, and no. 7, pp. 52-3. The address was voted by the clerical synod of the deanery of Bistra on July 28, 1861. The original protocol, sent to Sulutiu on September 20 by Mihali, is in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/639. The counterargument of a contemporary Hungarian is interesting: "Tisztelem a román clérusnál levo kitüno egyéneket, hanem hazam politikai lételét semminemű hierarchia hatalmába adni nem őhajtom...tiszteelve a román clérusnak polgári jogait, e tiszteletben annyira mégsem terjedhet, hogy megyei bizottmány-unkból conciliumot csinálni őhajtsak." Count Samu Wass to Baritiu, November 30, 1861, in George Barit magyar levelezése (Bukarest: Kriterion könyvkiadó, 1965), 52-3.

100. Mihali to Șulutiu, August 23, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/546.

101. Retegan, "Lupta națională," 177. His source is a pair of letters of Kemény that accompanied the petition, and identify the source only as "Romanians of Alsó-Fehér county." He was unable to locate the original document. See MOL, D228 1861/348. Mihali reported on his meetings in Vienna after his return without mentioning the petition; Mihali to Șulutiu, September 10, o.s., in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 720.
urged the leaders in Transylvania to lead another deputation to Vienna. He wrote Şuluţiu four letters in quick succession beginning on September 14. He and Court Konzipist Puşcariu also wrote Şaguna; as Puşcariu wrote, it was time for the Romanians to send "their heavy artillery" into the fray. Şaguna and Baritiu declined to come, citing illness, expenses, and-- most significant-- scepticism about the prudence of an all-out alliance with the centralists. Şuluţiu also hesitated, but agreed on October 2 to lead the new deputation. The next day he issued a circular instructing the clergy to assure disciplined popular participation in the dietal elections scheduled for November. The deputation-- Şuluţiu, the Greek Catholic lawyer Ioan Raţiu, and the Orthodox judge Ioan Bologa-- arrived in Vienna on October 8. Between October 9 and 30, Şuluţiu presided over twenty conferences composed of the members of the deputation, the four leading Romanian officials in Vienna, and other Romanians who happened to be in Vienna. The deputation visited various ministers and the

102. Josan, "Documente inedite," 545-7, 566-7. Şuluţiu took his decision at a conference of eleven Romanians, including six other Blaj clerics, at his residence; Josan publishes its protocol on pp. 553-4. Moldovan's letter to Şuluţiu of October 6, written before he learned of this decision, indicates the strong sense of urgency felt by the Court Secretary: Ioana Botezan, "Un document din anul 1861 privind strădăniile românilor din Transilvania de a cuceră drepturi politice," in Acta Musei Napocensis 15 (1978), 489-94.

103. Printed circular of October 4, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/663. The diet was subsequently postponed; Şaguna issued no circular in connection with the diet in 1861.

104. The protocol of these conferences, recorded by
emperor, and the conferences discussed lobbying strategy and prepared petitions and memoranda to be submitted to the officials. The deputation was received by the Emperor on October 31, and two weeks later submitted a list of Romanian regalists for the diet. The impact of the deputation on the momentous decisions of the officials during the period is moot. It was surely considerable, albeit they failed to secure the immediate convocation of the diet or the appointment of a Romanian as Transylvanian Court Chancellor.

Șuluțiu sought repeatedly to demonstrate his ultraloyalty to the emperor and the centralist regime. He strongly advocated an abortive project to subsidize the newspaper Österreichische Zeitung, which was closely affiliated with Schmerling, as spokesman of the Romanian position. Șaguna and Baritiu also refused to support this project. Bishop Alexi, alone of all the bishops, appealed to his clergy to contribute money for the proposed subsidy. Șuluțiu left

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Pușcariu, is preserved in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 709, and published in Josan, 555-71. The other regular members of the conference were Moldovan, Court Councillor Pop, and Ministerial Councillor (later School Inspector) Maior. Responding to a published appeal by the Permanent Committee, the Romanian clergy and laity contributed 1708 fl. for the expenses of the deputation and remitted them to Șaguna. See Sibiu, ABAOR, FS. 1603, 2822.

105. Josan, op.cit., 550-1, 569-70. Șaguna pointed out that Österreichische Zeitung had a small readership, while the more popular Ost und West had already published articles favorable to the Romanians. This paper received a subsidy from Orthodox Romanians in 1862, and Șuluțiu resented its support for the historical claims of the Orthodox. A. Mocioni to Șaguna, April 29 and June 6, 1862, in Sibiu, ABAOR, FS 1712, 1713; Draft of Șuluțiu to V.L. Pop, June 12, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 735.

106. His printed circular of November 20 is in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM, 709.
Vienna at the beginning of December satisfied with the views of the newly appointed Nadasdy and the promise of many new Romanian appointments. But Moldovan pointed out two months later that the results of the visit of "our old martyr" [Șuluțiu] fell far short of the Romanians’ earlier hopes.

The political movement in the Munții Apuseni and elsewhere in Transylvania was closely linked to social unrest, chiefly expressed in the devastation or cutting of forests owned by landowners or the imperial authorities in such places as Cricău and Cîmpeni. Accordingly the authorities called on the bishops "to instruct the people through [their]... clergy that they should not harm the property of others" under threat of police or military force. Șuluțiu complied with the authorities’ request in his circular of September 6, pointing out that the destruction or theft of others’ property was not only a mortal sin but a shame to the nation.

Mihali continued to encourage the passive resistance of

107. Josan, 571, concludes that the notation on Puscariu’s protocol indicating the deputation lasted until December 6 refers to Șuluțiu’s sojourn in Vienna; but in his letter of December 11 to Saguna, the Metropolitan stated that he departed from Vienna on December 1. See AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, Protocol book, 1861/779. Nádasdy was appointed on November 7 and visited in Vienna by Haynald on November 24. Șuluțiu expressed satisfaction with the results of the journey in his letter to Barițiu of November 13; see GBCS, IV, 371-3.


109. Mikó to Șuluțiu, August 19, 1861, and printed circular of September 6, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/567.
the mountaineers after his return from Vienna in September, 1861. The unrest of the Romanians in Alsó-Fehér county peaked in October; the Romanian leaders of the county assembly on October 17-18 included Begnescu and the Blaj professor Antonelli. The new governor, Count Crenneville, apparently accepted the Hungarian account of the degree of social disorder in the countryside when he arrived in Kolozsvár on December 7. The wastage of forests indeed continued into the Provisorium. Governor Crenneville issued a circular to all the bishops on December 18, 1861 which was similar in tone to that of July.

The action taken by the three Romanian bishops in Transylvania and by Haynald reflect characteristic differences in their attitudes toward the authorities and the social question. The first to respond was Haynald. His circular of December 23 urged the clergy to "track down the perpetrators" of the disturbances. In their sermons they should emphasize the immorality of such acts, but make no mention of the Gubernium's circular; outside the church, they should "seek and exploit every occasion" to mention the government circular. As a social conservative he was

110. Pogany to Mikó, October 30, in MOL, F263. 1861/2585.
111. Úrmóssy, I, 324-7. Úrmóssy's account, albeit not completely accurate, relates some of the Hungarian nobility's sense of panic. He mistakenly identifies Šulutiu as one of the leaders of a popular assembly in Gyulafehérvár on October 10.
112. Baritiu argued the Romanians were disproportionately blamed, for the violence was not one-sided; he cites cases, reported in the Romanian press, of Romanians murdered by Hungarians at this time. See Baritiu, Pârți alese, III, 125-7.
anxious to follow the government in the matter, but also
determined to separate the clergy's political and religious
functions. Şaguna issued his circular the next day, not
only requiring that the Gubernium's circular be presented
promptly and in church, but announcing that pastors and
deans would be fined who failed to do so. The circular
of Şuluţiu on December 26 not only urged the cessation of
the deprivations, calling them sinful and shameful. The
long circular also showed understanding for the poverty and
frustration of the people, urging them to rely on legal
recourse for their just grievances. Bishop Alexi wrote
in much the same sense as the others, but delayed issuing
his circular for more than three months.

Şuluţiu made a special stop in Kolozsvár on his return
from Vienna, personally welcoming Governor Crennevile when
he arrived there on December 6 and receiving assurances of
the new regime's desire to guarantee the equal rights of the
Romanian nation and its churches. His coach returned to

113. Draft of circular, December 23, in Alba Iulia, ERC,
1861/2512, Cat. 35.
114. Printed circular, December 12 o.s., in Sibiu, AMOR
1861/1064. The circular does not appear in Tulbure's col­
lection.
115. Printed circular, December 26, in AS Alba Iulia,
MRU, FG 1861/845.
116. Printed circular, March 2, 1862, in AS Cluj-Napoca,
EGCCG 1861/2312. On Alexi, see Chapter VIII.
117. Botezan, ms. "Aspecte din viaţa şi activitatea lui
Alexandru Sterca Şuluţiu în lumina documentelor de arhiva;"
draft of Şuluţiu's address to Crennville on December 6, in
AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 709. Two weeks later, a delegation
of mountaineers led by Mihali and Balint also visited
Crennville; Vasile Pop to Dimitrie Moldovan, December 20,
1861, in AS Alba Iulia. Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan, 1861/5.

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Blaj shortly afterward at the end of a journey that had taken him to many important Romanian centers, "a half-month in the cold and high winds": an impressive performance for a man of 71! Following the personal instructions of Nádasdy, he published a circular stressing the new regime's solicitude for the Romanians' welfare and urging respect for law and order and a friendly and peaceful attitude toward the Hungarians as well. Suluțiu added his own emphasis: there can be no reconciliation with the political principles of the Hungarians. Bishop Alexi issued a circular very similar in tone, but emphasizing the urgent need for the reorganization of the administration and convocation of the diet.

Shortly after assuming office, Crenneville received the new county statute, but also the resignations of many Hungarian prefects and other officials. The officials of


119. Printed circular of Suluțiu, December 16, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/801.


121. On the Provisorium in Transylvania, see Chapter III.
Alsó-Fehér remained in office. The statute and the situation in Alsó-Fehér county disappointed the Romanians. Sulutiu sought to capitalize on the relationship he had established with Crenneville and Nádasdy to appeal to them for an energetic reform of the counties, and especially of Alsó-Fehér county. He repeated earlier Romanian deputations’ request for the dismissal of Pogany, accusing him of judicial murder against the Romanians in 1848-9 and pointing out that the Romanians constituted 90% of the population of Alsó-Fehér county. Furthermore, he insisted that all counties with a Romanian majority should have a Romanian prefect. Finally, Şuluţiu protested against the preservation of the power of the Hungarian nobility under the new county statutes. He argued that the desirable goal of Transylvanian representation in the Reichsrat could only be achieved if a willing diet were elected, and the county statute would not produce it. Therefore he called for a new statute, according to which each nationality would be represented in county administration in proportion to its property, contribution to tax revenue and military recruits. It was in the power of the government to do this, Şuluţiu argued, and only by granting the equality of all peoples under the same liberal constitution would the government

122. Draft of Şuluţiu to Crenneville, January 21, 1862, and Şuluţiu to Nádasdy, January 23, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1861/5; the letter to Nádasdy is in MOL D228, 1862/70. The latter, the longer of the two, is cited in this paragraph.
123. In addition to Alsó-Fehér, Torda, Kolozs and Belső-Szolnok counties still did not have Romanian heads during the Provisorium despite their Romanian majorities.
attain its long-term goals.

Crenneville replied after two weeks, acknowledging the differences between Pogány and the population of his county. But he declined to comment on how they might be resolved, stating the matter was within Nádasdy's area of competence. There is no evidence that Nádasdy acted on Şulutiu's proposal. It is interesting to note that it preceded the criticism of the county statute in the German press.

Şulutiu continued to criticize the county statutes that had been approved in Vienna, as he had criticized the Provisional Instruction of 1861. He accepted appointment by Pogány to the county commission of Also-Feher as prescribed by the new statute, but simultaneously declared the statute to be contrary to the October Diploma and illegal.

While Şaguna was in Vienna on April 6, the Metropolitan convened the Permanent Committee and urged the Romanians to continue their opposition to the Hungarians in the counties. Crenneville feared a repeat of the previous year's popular assembly in Blaj in May, and appealed to Şulutiu to prevent it. The Metropolitan instructed local leaders in

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124. Crenneville to Şulutiu, February 8, 1862 (unnumbered letter) in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 729.
126. Unsigned, undated speeches, apparently by Şuluțiu and delivered at the session, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 731, 743. Barițiu acceded to Şuluțiu's request that the meeting not be announced publicly; see Şuluțiu to Barițiu, March 19, and footnotes, in GBCS, IV, 375-7, and AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1862/182. Şaguna was in Vienna lobbying for the Orthodox Metropolitanate from February through May.
this sense, but also insisted to Crenneville on the Romansians’ right of assembly and sharply rejected Hungarian charges of Romanian terrorism. The rumor was apparently unfounded; one local priest retorted that Crenneville was gullible and had been misled by his Hungarian advisors. No assembly actually took place.

The first public meetings of the county commissions under the new statute took place at the end of September, 1862. The county chiefs were able to prevent the passage of declarations unfavorable to the government in the case of every county but Belső-Szolnok. Šuluțiu believed the results confirmed his misgivings concerning the county statute, however. He himself was the leader of the loyal Romanians in the commission of Küküllő county. The commission was dominated, despite the efforts of Sulutiu and the new Romanian prefect, Ioan Pușcariu, by the Hungarian oppositional majority. Šuluțiu reminded Nádasdy that the


129. See Chapter III.

130. Josan, "Activitatea politica a lui Ioan Pușcariu in anii 1860-1861," Apulum 16 (1978), 385-86; protocol of the county commission, September 25, in Alba Iulia, Muzeul Unirii, Arhiva. Fondul Ioan Pușcariu, No. 6209. Crenneville rejected an appeal by Sulutiu to overturn the election of officials conducted by the commission there, pointing out that Puscariu had ratified it. Personal letter, Crenneville to Suluțiu, November 24, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM. 739.
county statute made the Hungarian majorities possible, and that everywhere these had been hostile to the government. Similarly, Șaguna assured Crenneville that "the government of his Majesty the Emperor can depend on the Romanian nation and clergy"; he insisted the county commission sessions had not proceeded satisfactorily because the statute did not give the loyal Romanian majority its proper weight. The difficulties of prefect Nopcsa in Hunyad county were the consequence of his decision to exclude such popular Romanian leaders as the Orthodox dean Ioan Rațiu and the Greek Catholic vicar Gavril Pop from the county commission. In this situation, Șuluțiu insisted, "the... government has no means of avoiding confusion and political anomalies or of carrying out its intentions except [by the convocation of] the Transylvanian diet." But the diet would be no more fruitful than the recently held commission meetings unless the proposals of the Romanian memorandum of the previous year concerning the electoral law were accepted.

Șuluțiu's letter was timely: three days after receiving it on October 15, Nádasdy secured the Emperor's decree that preparations for the convocation of the diet should commence. Șuluțiu announced the contents of this decree in his circular letter of November 21, noting that they were

131. Șuluțiu to Nádasdy, October 12, 1862, in MOL, D228 1862/497; draft of Șaguna to Crenneville, October 20 (o.s.), in ABAOR, FS. 1775.

132. The debate of Nádasdy's proposals concerning the Transylvanian diet and related matters in the Council of Ministers took place on October 10 and 13; see POM, V, 4, 265-70, 271-3, 280-3.
the long-awaited response to the Romanian petitions of November 7 and December 10, 1860, and of the National Conference of January 12-16, 1861. The two bishops moved quickly to request official approval for the convocation of a Romanian conference.

Nádasdy sent his confidential reply to Suluțiu via Dimitrie Moldovan. He replied in detail to the Metropolitan's criticism of the county statute, arguing it would eventually achieve the desired result. He also criticized the Romanians' idea of electoral law based on the proportion of each nationality's land ownership and contribution to taxes and recruitment, but suggested he would consider a more detailed proposal. Suluțiu's long response recommended a direct correspondence between the enlistments of each nation and their electors. Suluțiu also communicated his proposal to Moldovan. When Nádasdy did not reply and his policy seemed in danger of defeat in Vienna, the Metropolitan implored Moldovan to burn his letters to him.

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133. The Gubernium only transformed the imperial decree into a declaration to Șaguna and Suluțiu in its session of November 3; this letter is reproduced in Baritiu, Părtialese, III, 563-4. The printed circular is in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, 1862/942.

134. Moldovan to Suluțiu, October 18, 1862, in București, Biblioteca Academiei R.S.R. Manuscrisce romanesti, Colectia Baritiu. v. 999, ff. 91-99; no copy of the letter is preserved in AS Alba Iulia, MRU. Nádasdy referred to the electoral proposal presented by the Romanian delegation to the emperor on December 10, 1860 (AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1861/123, ff. 55-64), also demanded by the Romanian minority in the Belső-Szolnok county commission in September, 1862 (Ürmössy, II, 56).

135. Suluțiu to Nádasdy, November 30, 1862, in MOL, D228. 1862/599.
lest they be used against the Romanians by their enemies.
Șuluțiu's proposal was among those under consideration until
the electoral law was finally approved in April, 1863.

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Romanian Politics and Orthodoxy

The third important question in Romanian politics in 1862, after the county statute and the Orthodox Metropolitanate, was the proposal of the Saxon Konflux for a territorial repartition of Transylvania. The question of territorial repartition must be seen in the light of Andrei Săguna's leadership and the politics of the Fundus Regius. As noted earlier, the core of the Transylvanian Orthodox population was in the Fundus Regius. The dominant factors in the political orientation of this population were the authoritarian dynastic conservatism of Săguna and the tactical alliance of the Saxon politicians with the centralist party in Vienna. Consequently, Romanians in the Fundus Regius followed a more circumspect, less militant policy.

Orthodox clergymen were prominent among the local political leaders of the Romanians. The two most important allies of Săguna were Ioan Popasu, dean in Kronstadt, and Nicolae Popea, Săguna's administrative assistant and future biographer. Both participated in the Romanians' local as-

137. A notation on the back of Șuluțiu's letter indicates it was returned to the archive on April 12, 1863; MOL, D228. 1862/599.
138. On the Metropolitanate, see Chapter IX.
semblies, national conferences, various deputations, and the
diet. Among the more assertive local leaders were Ioan
Hannia, dean in Hermannstadt, and Nicolae Crainic, dean in
Dobra in Hunyad county.

Ioan Hannia was the leader of those Orthodox clergymen
who were most accessible to the liberal and nationalist
ideas of the laity. His relationship with Şaguna were
strained after 1848. The Hungarian revolutionary government
deposed Şaguna due to his collaboration with the Austrians,
and Hannia accepted his appointment as administrator of the
diocese in his place in May, 1849. On the eve of the
reestablishment of the constitutional administration in the
Fundus Regius in April, 1861, Hannia held a bold public
address in the presence of Comes Salmen on behalf of a
delegation of 84 local Romanians, in which he demanded equal
representation for his nation. The appointment of
Romanian officials fell far short of this, and the clergy
was outspoken in its dissatisfaction. Salmen may have had
Hannia especially in mind when he informed the senate in
Hermannstadt that any persons encouraging the resistance to
legally constituted authority, including the clergy, were

139. József Berde to Hannia, May 12, 1849, circular of
Hannia to the deans, May 13, and Şaguna’s denunciation of
the measure as illegal, in Ilarion Puşcariu, Metropolia
românilor ortodocşii din Ungaria şi Transilvania. Studiu
istoric despre reînfiinţarea metropoliei, dimpreună cu o
colecție de acte (Sibiu: Tiparul tipografiei
archidiecesane, 1900), Annex, 35-7.

140. Măcellariu to Barițiu, April 16, 1861, in GBCS, V,
192.
criminals who should be dealt with harshly. In a letter he also published, Şaguna rejected the insinuations against his clergy, demanded that Salmen name names, and insisted that the inadequate representation of the Romanians in the Fundus Regius was in violation of the October Diploma. However, he also warned his clergy against excessive political involvement. Salmen rejected Şaguna's demand that he identify the alleged agitators, pleading the "confidentiality of official correspondence"; Şaguna replied in even stronger terms, to the great displeasure of the Saxon press.

Outside the Fundus Regius, Nicolae Crainic was, with his son, Ioan, the leader of the Dacoroman tendency in Hunyad county. As such he drew the strong criticism of prefect Nopcsa. The prefect wrote that Crainic, "under the influence of his restless, fanatical son," agitated in 1861 against the officials. In the fall of the following year, the Dean convened an assembly of his church district without official permission and distributed its minutes to the public. Crainic also demanded in a sermon that

141. Salmen to the Hermannstadt senate, July 16, 1861; copies in ABAOR, FS, 1535, and AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM 718, with Şaguna's letter to Suluțiu of August 29.
142. Draft to Salmen, August 27, in ABAOR, FS, 1539; see also Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 129, 216.
143. Lupas, "Vieata și faptele," 307-8; Salmen to Şaguna, September 11, and Şaguna's reply, published with an accompanying editorial, in Siebenbürger Bote, September 25, 1861; in ABAOR, FS. 1548 and 1458, respectively.
144. See Chapter II; Nopcsa to Mikó, May 12 and July 11, 1861, in MOL D228. 1861/245, 305; a copy of the first letter is also in ABAOR, FS. 1503.
145. Nopcsa to Şaguna, undated [received February 15,
Romanian be made the language of county administration. A local official intervened, and Nopcsa filed an official complaint with Crenneville about the priest's comportment. He charged Crainic with breaking into a local jail and permitting several illegal assemblies, while Șaguna in reply charged the official with violating the sanctity of church services. Crainic was in conflict with more moderate Romanian patriots such as school inspector Pavel Vasici, Popea, and other members of his own family. Șaguna himself repeatedly rebuked him for tactlessness, immoderation, and violation of church regulations.

The examples of Hannia and Crainic demonstrate that militant members of the diocesan clergy included Orthodox as well as Greek Catholics. In general Șaguna, like Șuluțiu, defended those patriotic Romanian clergymen who were attacked by Hungarians due to their political activity. However, he was more circumspect than the Metropolitan, and allowed him to be their chief protector. He was more attentive than Șulutiu to the concerns of the Romanians of Hungary proper. His diocese, like the Metropolitanate of Blaj, did not extend beyond historical Transylvania, even

1863], in ABAOR, FS. 1813.

146. Draft Crenneville, November 9, 1862; to Nopcsa, February 19, 1863; and reply by Nopcsa, February 25, in ABAOR, FS. 1778, 1811, 1814, respectively.

147. Correspondence of Șaguna, Nicolae Crainic, and Alexandru Crainic, October, 1862 to March, 1863, in ABAOR, FS. 1776, 1826, 1831, 1832; collection of correspondence concerning Crainic, 1861-63, in AMOR, 1861/610. According to Vasici, the Crainic family-- the dean, sons and several relatives!-- dominated church affairs in Dobra; Vasici to Barițiu, April 9, 1863, in GBCS, II, 82.
But his role as the leader of the popular movement for ecclesiastic separation from the Serbs made him especially attentive to the Romanians of Hungary, three-fourths of whom were Orthodox. The majority of all Romanian Orthodox in the Hungarian lands prior to 1864 lived in the dioceses of Arad, Temesvár and Versecz as part of the Serbian Orthodox church province. The Romanians of Hungary participated in the Hungarian diet in 1861 and were less decisively opposed to the union of Hungary and Transylvania than their conationals in the latter province. They had a more favorable experience of Hungarian constitutionalism in the past, and hence were more receptive to the Hungarian arguments. The Romanian Orthodox often saw their chief ethnic adversary as the Serbs rather than the Hungarians. After 1867, finally, the Romanians of Hungary proper recognizing the leadership of Šaguna were the segment of the nation most inclined to participate in the political system of Hungary rather than boycott it, as did most Transylvanian Romanian politicians. The Greek Catholic

148. As Metropolitans, both prelates had suffragan bishoprics in Hungary proper.
149. My calculation is based on the census for 1890, but I consider it to be representative for the earlier period as well. It shows that 57.6% of the Romanian Orthodox were in Hungary proper, and that 77.8% of the Romanians in Hungary proper were Orthodox. See Balogh, 1072-3.
canon in Lugos, Ștefan Moldovan, probably had the political views of the Romanians of the Banat in mind when he wrote to Barițiu in 1862 that "I feel here, among our own, as a Transylvanian, as a Șulutian, as a Barițio-Mureșanian, etc., like a sheep among wolves..." He charged that the Orthodox clergy there was indifferent or opposed to the patriotic cause. Șaguna's reluctance to commit himself to an express condemnation of the union of Hungary and Transylvania in the Transylvanian diet must be seen in this context.

The Banat Romanians Andrei Mocșoni and Vincentiu Babeș, and Iosif Hodoș in the Partium county of Zărănd, all Orthodox, led a movement for the convocation of a congress and eventually the unification of all the Romanians in the Hungarian lands in 1861. Șaguna opposed the plan, considering it more prudent to emphasize the separate status of Transylvania. He also declined to invite the Banat Romanians to the Romanian conference in Hermannstadt in 1861. When an Orthodox village asked whether it should elect a deputy to the Hungarian diet a few months later, Șaguna instructed it not to do so. The Orthodox laity finally made a pragmatic decision in 1862 to unite behind Șaguna's quest

152. Letters of January 13 and July 10, 1862, in GBCS VI, 284-5.
154. Village of Nucet, in Felső-Fehér county, to Șaguna, June 6 (o.s.), 1861, and draft of reply by Șaguna, June 25, in ABAOR, FS. 1529.
for the Orthodox Metropolitanate. They recognized the sensitivity of the emperor to Hungarian political claims in Hungary proper, and accepted Şaguna's judgement of the situation and his leadership.

At the end of 1861 the Saxon Konflux presented a project for the reorganization of Transylvania according to ethnic regions. The debate on the project highlighted the complexity of Saxon-Romanian relations and the difficulty of Şaguna's position. Transylvanian Romanians in emigration were divided over the question: Bărnuţiu argued in its favor, but Papiu-Ilarion warned that it was not in the Romanians' interest. The three Romanian members of the Konflux requested the instruction of the Permanent Committee concerning the position they should take. Şaguna solicited Şuluţiu's opinion on behalf of the Committee. The Metropolitan declared against the project on the grounds that it would divide the Romanians and subject some of them to assimilation, because the destruction of the counties would poison Hungarian-Romanian relations, and because the excessive increase in the influence of the Germans would be unfavorable toward Transylvanian autonomy.

157. Şaguna to Şuluţiu, December 21, 1861, with the project of Konrad Schmidt; reply of Şuluţiu, December 27, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/846 and Protocol book; ABAOR, FS. 1675. Vasile Pop also rejected the project; Pop to Permanent Committee, December 31, 1861, in ABAOR, FS. 2822.
Some Romanians in the Fundus Regius felt otherwise. Baritiu contested the right of the Saxons to propose a reform for all of Transylvania, and he disliked the Saxon proposal. However, he urged that the future diet consider some sort of repartition. Konflux deputy Ioan Bologa devised a Romanian alternative plan, and Saguna took maps illustrating it with him when he travelled to Vienna in the spring of 1862. Advocates of the plan argued that it would win the support of the Saxons and Szeklers, and that the principle of national territories might be extended to Hungary proper. Where the Romanians remained in the minority they should be legally protected.

Most Romanians in the counties remained unfavorable to these plans. The Hungarians were in the minority in every county, but stood to remain in control of some of the counties under each proposal. The Chancellery eventually declined to rule on the Saxon project or any other, with Moldovan casting the swing vote against the Saxon councilors. In April of the following year, however, the government included administrative reorganization as the fifth legislative proposal for the diet. Sulutiu emphasized the importance of the issue when it finally came before the diet

158. Copy of Baritiu to Saguna, December 28, 1861, in ABAOR, FS. 2650.
160. Fetti still argued in favor of the plan in his letter of December 10, 1862; Ibid., 1862/21.
in 1864, and urged that no injustice be done to any nationality. The responsible committee appointed Ioan Pușcariu to revise the plan. He expressly rejected the idea of national territories, but proposed more homogeneous districts. The plan never came to a vote by the full house.

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Șuluțiu and Șaguna on the Eve of the Diet

Many Romanian nationalists resented the authoritarian leadership, conservatism and subservience to constituted authority of Șaguna. These traits seemed to be demonstrated by his role in the arrest of the pro-peasant agitator Katalin Varga in 1847 and in ousting the radical priest Joachim Băcilă from his parish in Gyulafehérvár in 1852. A Hungarian participant in the Gyulafehérvár conference in 1861 reported that Șaguna personally intimidated a Romanian participant who favored the motion of Haynald there.

Șaguna's emphasis on discipline could be justified by the


162. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 32-4, and Ioan Pleșa, "Ioachim Băcilă în revoluția din 1848-1849," Anuarul Institutului de istorie și arheologie Cluj-Napoca 11 (1978), 94-9. Șaguna was not alone among prominent Romanians in either of these actions, but clearly had a crucial role in them. After being expelled from his parish in 1852, Băcilă directed a multitude of petitions to Vienna as late as 1861, without result. He was also on bad terms with Axente, Dimitrie Moldovan, and Augustin Pop. A petition to Governor Schwarzenberg on behalf of Băcilă in May, 1858 was signed by forty-two Orthodox Romanians of Gyulafehérvár: Alba Iulia. Muzeul Unirii, Arhiva. No. 3605.

need for Romanian unity vis à vis the Hungarians, but Cipariu expressed great distrust for Ţaguna: "We know his policy, from the beginning up to today: a policy of personal interest, veiled at times under the pretext of nationality..." Ţaguna harshly rebuked the three Romanian delegates in Vienna in July, 1861 when he felt they were acting too boldly in support of Schmerling, ordering them to return immediately. As Raţiu wrote to Bariţiu, "Not even Abdul Aziz writes such letters to his slaves!" The delegates responded proudly that they had a right to think differently than Ţaguna, that they were not children, and that he was not infallible. Ilie Măcelariu and Ioan Hannia, opposed the bishop in an October, 1861 meeting of the Permanent Committee. Ţaguna insisted that the Committee should not publicly condemn the separate vote of the Magyarone Gubernium councillors, as Romanians in Vienna demanded. Măcellariu complained to Bariţiu of the "terrorism of Abdul," meaning Ţaguna.

The Austrians, and even Ţuluţiu, suspected Ţaguna of secret dealings with the Hungarians. Ţuluţiu sought to disperse this suspicion in his discussions with Austrian statesmen at the end of 1861. The police, mindful

164. Cipariu to Bariţiu, January 8, 1861, in GBCS IV, 335.
165. Ţaguna to Raţiu, Măcelariu, and Bologa, July 5, and their reply, July 15, in Bariţiu, Părţi alese, III, 593-7; Raţiu to Bariţiu, July 8, in Corespondenţa lui Ioan Raţiu cu George Bariţiu 1861-1892, 59.
166. Măcelariu to Bariţiu, October 29, 1861, in GBCS V, 197-98.
167. Ţuluţiu to Bariţiu, November 13, 1861, in GBCS IV,
of the reserved attitude toward the centralists of Şaguna and Baritiu at this time, credited Hungarian reports that the two were negotiating with the Hungarians about terms under which they might accept the union with Hungary.

Later Şuluţiu alleged that Şaguna was on friendly terms with Haynald, "the greatest enemy of my person and of our nation," and trusted the Hungarian more than he did Sulutiu. Şaguna reportedly distributed copies of Şuluţiu's protest against the Orthodox Metropolitanate, with the aim of embarrassing Şuluţiu and spreading religious discord. The Orthodox of Kronstadt consequently gave the Metropolitan a rude reception when he travelled through their city on the way to Előpatak. Moldovan considered this a disgraceful act in view of the Metropolitan's services to the nation in the two Vienna delegations; he sought to convince Şaguna that the Metropolitan was favorably inclined toward the Orthodox


168. Mecséry to Nádasdy, March 11, 1862, in HHSAs, Informationsbüro 1862/1553, Elenchus 356/842. The report drew a connection between such talks and the unionist sentiments of some Romanians in the Szekler region. Such an imputation may have arisen because Baritiu was Şaguna's deputy for several years beginning in June, 1861 in all matters concerning the bishopric's considerable stock holdings in the Kronstädtter Bergbau- und Hütten-Aktien-Verein and the Szent-Domokoscher Kupfergewerkschaft, both of which had considerable Hungarian participation and operated in the Szekler region. Şaguna's letters to Baritiu in Baritiu, Parti alese, III, 571-88 suggest this arrangement was purely economic and also survived the political falling-out of the two men in early 1863.

Fetti complained that it was impossible to undertake any political initiative without the express approval of Şaguna.

These frictions between Şulutiu and Şaguna did not prevent them from acting together to request permission, at the end of 1862, for the convocation of a new national conference. A new point of dispute arose almost immediately, however: whether the deputies to such a conference should be appointed by the bishops or elected locally. The latter was a popular demand in the Romanian press, which was sensitive to Hungarian accusations that the Romanians would become tools of absolutism: they desired a congress that would truly express the will of the nation. Şulutiu adopted this position at the end of January, 1863, but Şaguna rejected it. He maintained that such views were not shared by most Romanians; at any rate, the times required discipline and unanimity. The 150 members of the congress would consist of twenty-five clergymen and fifty laymen of each

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171. Fetti to Moldovan, June 5 and July 22, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan, 1862/13 and 16.
172. Correspondence of Şulutiu and Şaguna, November 18 to December 5, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG. 1862/942, 970, 998. On December 23 Şaguna sent an address for Creneville in this matter to Şulutiu, who forwarded it to the governor after adding his own signature to that of Şaguna. Şaguna to Şulutiu, December 23, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/998.
church. Şaguna appointed the Orthodox members, but Şuluṭiu ordered elections to be held of the members of his church. He specified to his clergy the number of members to be elected in each church district, but also the leading Greek Catholic officials who should be included among those elected.

Şuluṭiu’s action provoked great displeasure among the officials. Crenneville ordered him to call off the elections, but in vain. Nádasdy accused him of a breach of trust, since there had been no permission for elections to be held. Şuluṭiu responded that he had undertaken this step in the government’s own interest, in order that the conference should enjoy popular confidence. Şuluṭiu was correct in noting that he had similarly conducted elections for the conference in 1861, but those elections had created less of a stir because the absolutist censorship and administration were still in place. He argued less convincingly that he had honestly understood the official permission for the conference to allow for elections. He had in truth created a fait accompli for the authorities, to the delight of the Romanian liberals.

174. Circular and letters to Alexi, both of March 7, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/167.
175. Nádasdy to Şuluṭiu, March 24, reply by Şuluṭiu, March 29; and reply to this by Nádasdy, April 2; correspondence and telegrams of Crenneville and Nádasdy, March 24 to April 4, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/228, 290, and MOL D228, 1863/179, 188, 211, 213, 220. Şuluṭiu’s letter to Montenuovo of April 30 indicates that elections were in progress on that day; AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/192.
Șuluțiu suspected Șaguna of renewing the religious strife as a means of weakening his influence. This strife indeed had a renewed ideological tone due to the closer relations of Șuluțiu with the liberal wing led by Barițiu that developed during these weeks. The Metropolitan expressed his concern, after the Küküllő county commission assembly on March 23, for the Hungarian charges of Romanian servility. For this reason he asked, surprisingly, that Nádasdy reverse a decision of Saguna’s ally, the county administrator Ioan Pușcariu. Pușcariu declared the elections and declaration of the assembly invalid because of their oppositional tenor, but Șuluțiu argued they should be upheld as a concession to constitutionalism. His canonicus a latere, Fekete-Negrutiu, was an admirer of Barițiu. He assured him that he would see to his election in Blaj to the national conference should he have any difficulty in Kronstadt.

Negrutiu and Șuluțiu asked Barițiu and his allies to compose an agenda for the conference, and forwarded it to Șaguna in advance of the conference, suggesting it be published. Șaguna strongly objected to conceding such input to the laity. He insisted that the bishops should have sole

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177. Șuluțiu to Barițiu, March 10, in GBCS, IV, 379.
178. Șuluțiu to Nádasdy, April 17, 1863, in MOL D228, 1863/271; Pușcariu, Notițe despre întâmplăriile contemporane, 66; Urmössy, II, 99
179. Fekete-Negrutiu to Barițiu [ca. March 10], in GBCS III, 188.
180. Șuluțiu to Șaguna, March 21, and Barițiu to Șaguna, April 2, in ABAOR, FS. 2847, 2663.
control over the agenda of the conference and steer it in the interest of the government. These differences came into the open in the conference itself, which met in Hermannstadt between April 19 and 22. There were open disagreements between Şaguna, co-president of the conference with Şuluţiu, and Bariţiu, the secretary of the conference, when the latter proposed to add passages to the address to the throne demanding guarantees of various liberal freedoms. The conference finally approved an address which Şaguna found satisfactory, and elected a delegation to Vienna. Because of his open conflict with Şaguna and leading officials among the Romanians, Bariţiu declined to participate in the delegation. Raţiu wrote his friend: "The presidency of Abdul [at the conference] disgusted us to the utmost, and we implore you to not subject us to such things; we are not in Montenegro."

The delegation to Vienna was very well received by the Emperor, Schmerling and the people of Vienna on its arrival there on May 4. The ten-member delegation was led by Şaguna; Şuluţiu probably declined appointment to the delegation because of the consecration of his controversial sufragian bishop, Papp-Szilágyi, in Blaj on May 3. The

182. Raţiu to Baritiu, June 6, in Corespondența lui Ioan Raţiu, 74. The letter of Vasici to Baritiu, March 24 (GBCS II, 81) indicates the School Inspector had fallen out with Şaguna already prior to the conference.
183. Şuluţiu to Baritiu, GBCS IV, 383. On Papp-Szilágyi, see Ch. VIII. The Provost in Szamosújvár, Macedon
delegation unquestionably received instructions in Vienna concerning the approaching elections; Şuluţiu received written instructions from Moldovan and Crenneville. The councillor imparted detailed advice on how Şuluţiu might maximize the Romanian victories in the areas under his influence, while the Governor urged him to see that the clergy preserve national unity and avoid confessional divisiveness.  

Şuluţiu, Şaguna and Alexi quickly issued circulars instructing their clergy on the matter. Some Romanians found the explicitness of Şaguna's letter, which was also published in the press, embarrassing. The letter made specific reference to government regulations, ordered that it be read in church on three successive weeks, and that the deans specify the Romanian candidates. "These are things that should remain as secret as possible," Vasici wrote. Yet when the authorities appealed to the bishops once more with regard to the election, Şaguna merely reassured them about the good prospects. He noted that in addition to his circular and newspaper articles he had sent personal instructions to individual clergymen. It was Şuluţiu who issued a new, even

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Pop, took Şuluţiu's place on the delegation. Vasici noted Şaguna was "in ill temper at the time of departure"; letter to Baritiu, April 22, in GBCS, II, 83.


185. AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/393; Tulbure, 447-50; AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla. 1863/1239. The letters of Şuluţiu and Şaguna are also in Baritiu, Parti alese III, 173-80.

more specific letter of instruction to his clergy in response 187
to Nádasdy's appeal.

The Romanian voters generally did unite around one
candidate. In those rare instances when both candidates in
an electoral district were Romanians, however, the inevita-
ble defeat of one of them could lead to charges against the
conservative Şaguna. Şuluțiu and Şaguna agitated for
similar goals in the diet. There is evidence that they
differed in the degree of their militance as leaders within
the diet, but the matter goes beyond the purview of this
study.

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The Romanians of the Szekler Region

The Romanian minority of the Szekler Region was admit-
tedly not a major factor in these events, but its problems
are instructive concerning the relationship between reli-
gion, economics and politics. The eastern-rite

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187. Nádasdy to the bishops, June 9, with reply of
Şaguna, June 14, in ABAOR, FS. 1855, 1856, and MOL D229,
1863/485; and printed circular of Suluțiu, June 15, in AS
Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/449, and MOL D228, 1863/764; the
letter of Şulüțiu also appears in Okmánytár..., 297-300.

188. Axente believed that Şaguna had engineered the
defeat of the militant councillor Moldovan (himself
Orthodox, but a relative of Suluțiu) by Orthodox school
director Munteanu; Axente to Moldovan, in AS Cluj-Napoca.
Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan. No. 228.

189 Baritiu, Parti alese III, 190-221. See Chapter III.

190. Romanian polemical literature has recently revived
the thesis of the Romanian origin of much of the population
of the Szekler Region. Thus relevant parts of Milton G.
Lehrer's Transylvania. History and Reality (Romanian
language edition: 1944; first English language edition:
Silver Spring, Maryland: Bartleby Press, 1986) have been
republished in Romania.

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Christians, predominantly Romanians, constituted a small minority of the population of this region and of their respective churches and nationalities. Yet they differed from their coreligionists elsewhere in Transylvania in that a significant minority regarded themselves as Hungarians. The table illustrates these facts. My calculation used the data on religion in the 1869 census and Keleti's nationality figures based on a survey by the Hungarian Ministry of Education in the same year. I assume that non-Romanian eastern rite Christians in the Szekler region would be Hungarians, given the negligible number of Germans there:

Table 13: Eastern Rite Christians in the Szekler Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>a) GrCath</th>
<th>b) Orth</th>
<th>Rom</th>
<th>E.R. Hungarians (a + b - Rom)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maros</td>
<td>92,398</td>
<td>13,326</td>
<td>5,301</td>
<td>15,457</td>
<td>3170 (17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udvarhely</td>
<td>98,224</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>2549 (66.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csik</td>
<td>107,285</td>
<td>16,753</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10,287</td>
<td>6530 (39.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haromszek</td>
<td>110,055</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>13,890</td>
<td>12,446</td>
<td>3672 (22.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>407,962</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,249</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,128</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,921 (28.7%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicate that more one fourth of eastern rite Christian in the four districts identified themselves as Hungarians.

Economic, geographic, and political factors caused eastern rite Christians in the region to be susceptible to

191. Keleti, 69; A magyar korona országáiban az 1870. év elején végrehajtott népszámlálás eredményei a hasznos házi állatok kimutatásával együtt (Pest: Athenaeum, 1871), 60-1. I excluded the western Szekler district of Aranyos from my calculations because of the very different ethnic profile there. The Blaj catalogue of 1865 lists 11,587, 2330, 17,249 and 2796 Greek Catholics for Maros, Udvarhely, Csík and Haromszék districts, respectively, for a total of 33,962.
Magyarization. The poverty of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox parishes of the Szekler region did not distinguish them from those of the rest of Transylvania. The distinction was the fact that in two senses the Romanian population of the region had the character of a diaspora. First, it was geographically distant from the Transylvanian centers of Romanian population and ecclesiastic administration, and partly separated from them by a mountain range. Second, these parishes tended to be sparsely populated and extensive. Greek Catholic diocesan catalogues indicate many small church communities (filiae) in the Szekler region which were separated by ten miles or more from the parish seat where pastor, church and school were located. Poverty and sparseness of population undermined the willingness or ability of parishes to support their own, Romanian schools. The Greek Catholics of Csíklázárfa in southern Csík district twice petitioned Șulutiu in 1861 for

192. Sematismul veneratului cler al Archidiecesei metropolitane greco-catolice române de Alba Iulia și Făgăraș pe anul domnului 1900, de la sfînta unire 200 (Blaj: Tipografia seminarului Archi-dieceasului, 1900), 142-50, 210-17, 267-75. The seventy parishes of the four districts had 215 filiae in 1865, far above the average for the archdiocese; Siematismulu veneratului cleru catolicu de ritulu orientale alu archi-diecesei metropolitane a Albei-Julie pre anulu dela nascerea lui Christosu 1865 (Blasiu: Cu tipariului seminariului Archi-Diecesanu, [1865]), 117-34.

193. The seventy Greek Catholic parishes had only only twenty-four schools in 1865, while the Orthodox parishes in the same area had an equal number; Polverejan, table after 206. Only four of the thirty-five parishes ceded by the Archdiocese of Blaj to the new Hungarian diocese in 1912 had schools of their own; Schematismus venerabilis cleri dioecesis graeci rit. cath. Hajdúdorogensis ad annum domini 1918 (Nyiregyháza: Typis Alexii Joba, [1918]), 237-8.
the granting of a pastor, both times in Hungarian.

The Romanians' minority status magnified the stigma of their nationality arising from a disadvantaged economic status. A traveller reported in 1862 that a Greek Catholic from Csíkszentdomokos assured him he was "a real Romanian" because he paid his tithe to the priest with the beard; but added that he was a Szekler in the sense that he always spoke Hungarian because the Hungarians "might beat him if he spoke Romanian." In some cases the Romanians had to pay their tithe to the Hungarian priest. One villager remarked that since this was the case, it was unreasonable to maintain a priest of their own, as well. "We've already become Hungarians anyway, and the dean has ordered us not to keep a teacher either, but to send our children to the Hungarian school."

The tendency of the Romanians to Magyarize was greatest in the central sections of the Szekler region, further from the Carpathians and the Romanians of the counties. Here their

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194. Petitions dated May 18 and July 11, 1861, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/759. A Romanian historian states the village was founded by Romanians, who were subject to gradual Magyarization due to their isolation, and finally converted to Roman Catholicism under pressure from the authorities in 1910. According the catalogue of 1918, however, the parish was only established in 1862, and remained Greek Catholic. See Sabin Opreanu, Săcuizarea românilor prin religie (Cluj: Institutul de arte grafice "Ardealul", 1927, 26-30; Schematismus...1918, 159.
197. Ferencz Kozma, A Székelyföld közigazdasági és közművelődési állapota (Budapest: Franklin, 1879), 76-8.
economic dependence on the Szekler majority was greatest. The dispute over landholding between the Greek Catholic and Unitarian communities of Homoródalmás in Udvarhely district in 1863 is instructive. The Greek Catholic dean characterized the district's parishes as exceedingly poor and susceptible to Magyarization. His subordinate Ştefan Boer was responsible for over eight hundred souls scattered in twenty different villages, yet lacked a canonic portion. The Unitarians of Homoródalmás had exclusive rights to the village forest; the Greek Catholics numbered over four hundred, but their pastor, Ştefan Boer, could not obtain an allotment in Homoródalmás and was obliged to reside in Abásfalva, several miles away. The pastor and his dean sued the Unitarians with the support of the subdistrict dulló for a share of the forest and village treasury. The Romanians—described by the Unitarian Dean as "Gypsies, cottagers, serfs and such"—were forced to abandon their action, and the impertinent Szekler dulló resigned. The poor peasants of the village were the chief source of the work force in the nearby ironworks in Oláhfalu which employed over two hundred workers in this time. The Transylvanian drought of 1863 led to layoffs of iron workers as well as agricultural hardship.

198. Dean Alexandru Boer to Suluţiu, March 1 and 25, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/211, 442.
200. Lajos Vajda, A szentkeresztbányai vasgyártás
Similar cases of economic dependence leading to Magyarization are observable among the region's Orthodox, who resided primarily in Háromszék. Bishop Šaguna stated in a public session of the diet that an Orthodox visitor from the district had been able to address him in Romanian only with great difficulty. The example of the Orthodox village of Márcus, located in an exclave of Felső-Fehér county about ten miles from Sepsiszentgyörgy, is instructive. The impoverished villagers desired a Romanian as village notary. The local priest, Hristofor Dogariu, was the only literate member of the community and they were unable to offer a suitable salary to anyone else, so one group of villagers requested that Dogariu take on this duty. The priest was then accused by an opposing faction of alienating church land; one group accused the other of nepotism, scandalous behavior and favoring Hungarian interests. The long dispute between the rival factions was apparently personal, economic and political in nature. The Greek Catholics of the nearby village of Illyefalva lacked any priest at all, and requested one from Šuluțiu in a letter written in archaic Hungarian. The poverty and decline of the Orthodox com-

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201. Mester, Az autonóm Erdély, 240.
202. An interesting petition of the villagers to the county officials on behalf of Hristof Dogariu, February 26, 1862, is in Romanian with Hungarian orthography; Sibiu, AMOR. 1862/259. See also the investigation by dean Moga, and other correspondence, in Ibid., 1861/819, 1862/277, 358, 420 and 626.
203. Undated letter and reply in Hungarian, November 7, 1864, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1864/918 and Protocol book under the same number.
munity of Canta in Felső-Fehér county near Kézdivásárhely also illustrates the difficulties of the diaspora existence. It no longer had a resident pastor after mid-century, but was forced to support the travel expenses of a visiting priest. The language of documents and names for later years may be an indicator of the community's Magyarization.

A report reached Nádasdy in 1862 that many of the Romanians in the Szekler region were unfavorably disposed toward the government and would be willing to accept the union with Hungary under certain circumstances. The possibility of a break in the unity of the Romanian movement was highly disturbing to the authorities. During preparations for the dietal elections in the next year, a report stated that the Hungarian opposition in Csík would direct its greatest efforts at Gyergyószentmiklós "and those areas where Romanians reside." Two district officials denounced the Greek Catholic dean of Gyergyó, Aron Boer, in letters to Sulutiu. Prefect Szabó alleged that Boer ignored Sulutiu's circulars about the elections, and campaigned in favor of the Hungarian opposition in his own town and another village; his advisor on Romanian affairs, Ludovic Graur, levelled more detailed charges. He stated that the Romanian schools of Boer's district were neglected and teachers underpaid; Boer himself charged exorbitant fees for marriages.

204. Text and documents in Negreanu, passim.
206. Mecséry to Nádasdy, June 8, 1863, in HHSA Informa-
and allegedly considered himself a Hungarian. According to Graur he was a renegade, and should be replaced by a good Romanian. The Consistory in Blaj demanded an explanation from Boer, noting that unfavorable reports about him had also appeared in *Gazeta Transilvaniei*.

Boer protested his innocence of the charges levelled against him, sending written testimony by four of his pastors that stated he had carried out the Metropolitan's instructions with respect to the election. In requesting financial support for his parish, he noted that his annual salary was only 63 fl., and his district was the most extensive one in the archdiocese in terms of territory. The parish of Csíkszentdomokos, twenty miles from his own, had been without a pastor since 1862 and he had had to serve there, as well. Csíkszentdomokos, like Homoródalmás, was located near a major industrial establishment that provided employment for hundreds of poor peasants in good times, but fell on hard times during the drought of 1863.

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207. Szabó to Șuluțiu, August 7, and Graur to Șuluțiu, undated, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/653.
208. Canon Ioan Kirilla to Boer, September 18, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, draft signed by Kirilla, and Protocol book. 1863/651. Șuluțiu was at the diet at this time.
209. Boer to the Consistory, September 28, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/721. The affadvits sent by Boer are dated June 23 and 25, i.e. before the accusations had been levelled by Szabó and Graur.
210. Boer to the Consistory, three letters of November 24, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/909.
The data provided by Graur and the Blaj catalogue of 1865 actually confirm the official Hungarian ones from 1869 concerning the number of Hungarian Greek Catholics here. Graur stated there were 11,000 Romanians in the district, or only 64% of the Greek Catholics listed for the district in the catalogue.

The eastern rite Hungarians of Transylvania were as yet little affected by the incipient movement to secure the celebration of their liturgy in the Hungarian language or even separation from the Romanan church. Hungarian translations of this liturgy were prepared at the end of the eighteenth century, and Bishop Lemeni unsuccessfully requested permission for its use. The Hungarian Greek Catholics of eastern Hungary organized public assemblies in Hajdúdorog, north of Debrecen, first in May, 1863, and then a much larger assembly five years later. These actions were unsuccessful, and no Transylvanians attended the assemblies. The Magyarization process illustrated here and the nationalism of successive Hungarian governments changed this. Hungarian Greek Catholics more than doubled in number between 1880 and 1910, to 304,318--mostly, it should be noted, in eastern Hungary proper. In 1912 a

212. Boer to the Consistory, undated, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/653; Siematismulu...1865, 120.
213. István Pirígyi, A görökgatolikus magyarság története (Nyíregyháza: Görökgatolikus hittudományi főiskola, 1982), 102-11; Schematismus...1918, 14-18. It should be noted that Bishop Papp-Szilágyi, known in Transylvania as a Magyarone, was attacked by the Hungarian press for opposing the Hungarian movement.
214. A magyar szent korona országainak 1900. évi népszám-
new Hungarian Greek Catholic diocese of Hajdudorog was created by the separation of 163 parishes from the dioceses of Munkács, Eperjes, Szamosújvár, Nagyvárad, Lugos, Esztergom and Blaj. Only thirty-five of the parishes, with less than one-tenth of the total of 217,640, were from Transylvanian territory, all of these from the among the four church districts and seventy parishes in the Szekler districts discussed above. The ceded parishes included several of those referred to in connection with the 1860s; but five of the ceded parishes were, by Hungarian admission, still overwhelmingly Romanian in 1918. 215

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The emphasis by historians on the movement for national unification of the Transylvanian Romanians has obscured important cleavages along religious and geographic lines. The religious division only compounded the effect of the different social and political circumstances of Romanians in the north and south of Transylvania. Catholicization and resistance to it caused a fluctuation of religious identity in many villages. These conversion move-

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215. The catalogue of 1918 indicates the nationality of the members of each parish. The ceded parishes and filiae listed as Hungarian included Abásfalva, Homorodalmas, Gyergyószentmiklós, Csiklázarfalva, Csíkszentdomokos, and Illyefalva. Schematismus...1918, 156-99.
ments were a result of religious, socioeconomic and political motives that are difficult to separate.

Even in the 1860s, when leaders were increasingly convinced of the need for unity, the existing division between Greek Catholics of the north and Orthodox of the south was exacerbated by the rivalry of bishops and individual pastors in the expression of alternate strategies or nationalist militancy. The home of the Greek Catholics was the locus of greatest social and political antagonism between Hungarians and Romanians. Metropolitan Șuluțiu expressed greater militancy, openness to popular participation and willingness to pressure Schmerling and Nádasdy into an active political alliance with the Romanians. The Orthodox were more politically moderate because of their higher economic status and the tactical alliance with their greatest rivals, the Saxons. Șaguna was more authoritarian than Șuluțiu and preferred the strategy of disciplined service to imperial policy in exchange for more limited but secure concessions in ecclesiastic administration.

Bishops and lay politicians made fruitful efforts to overcome religious rivalry in the 1860s. An agreement regulated several areas of activity that gave rise to—or were a pretext for—discord in the village: mixed marriages, conversions, the liturgy, and mixed schools. Ecclesiastic regulations and the attitudes of the bishops undermined the agreement. This was especially the case in the matter of the schools. However, the bishops cooperated
in an impressive number of secular activities such as the deputations to Vienna, the Permanent National Committee, national conferences, ASTRA, and finally the election in 1863.

The chapter concludes with a study of Magyarization among the Greek Catholic and Orthodox parishes of the Szekler region. Poverty and dispersal reduced these parishes' ability to maintain Romanian schools. This phenomenon illustrates the close relationship between ethnicity, the schools and parish life.
Alexandru Sterca-$ulutiu (1794-1867) was one of the most important but most controversial leaders of the Transylvanian Romanians in the nineteenth century. Unlike his colleagues Haynald and $aguna, $ulutiu was a priest of very modest scholarly distinction whose entire clerical career prior to taking over his see consisted of pastoral work in rural Transylvanian parishes. By far the most senior of the three prelates, he was born in the town of Abrudbánya in the Munții Apuseni in 1794, pursued secondary and theological education in the nearby town of Zlatna and in Blaj and was ordained in 1814. From that year until 1836 he was the pastor of Bistra in his native region, then Vicar of Sâlaj until his election as bishop. He established many village schools during his tenure as dean in Bistra and Vicar of Salaj.

Shortly after his installation as vicar, Sulutiu addressed an appeal to Bishop Lemeni for the convocation of a synod to debate the national political program. In the synod itself, he assailed the privileges of the three ruling nations. During the crisis involving the Hungarian language bill in the diet, he published an appeal to the bishop calling for a national synod or congress with lay as well as clerical membership, which was rejected by Lemeni. In succeeding years, Sulutiu offered his moral and financial support to the militants in Blaj when they were indicted and condemned by ecclesiastic authorities. Sulutiu's role in the revolution is unclear, although in its earlier phases he apparently used his influence in the interest of moderation. He assured his county administrator that he would work to preserve calm. He proposed to the Blaj assembly conditions under which the union with Hungary could be accepted by the Romanians, and in a confidential letter to Baron Wesselényi expressed optimism concerning the future of the union and of Hungarian-Romanian relations.


For an understanding of Sulutiu's place in Greek Catholic history one must begin with a survey of his church's past. The Greek Catholics were troubled, even more than the other churches in our period, by the conflict between official religion and liberal-populist tendencies. The contentious history of the church union involved Roman Catholicism on the one hand and the appeal to eastern tradition on the other. The latter tendency was inspired among the Greek Catholic clergy by the failure to attain the social and political privileges promised by the union and by the supervision of their see by both a Jesuit theologian and the Hungarian Primate. The Orthodox revolts of the eighteenth century fuelled a popular desire to minimize departures from presumed eastern synodal and marriage traditions. One proponent of eastern traditions, Bishop Micu, was exiled in 1744; later advocates of this orientation were monks in Blaj who at the end of the eighteenth century formulated Romanian nationalist ideology and a Febronian or populist concept of the church. The monastic group was suppressed, and successive bishops were of the more cautious Latin mold. Still, the nationalist school remained influential in Blaj.

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5. Ion Negoitescu, "Biserica unită și școala ardeal-eană," Contrapunct (Cologne) 1985, no. 3, 10-1, 23. Negoitescu reviews an unspecified work by the Munich Romanian historian Octavian Bărlea which presents the eighteenth-century antithesis concerning the nature of the church union. Bărlea argues in de Vries, et al., 180 and 422, that the dichotomy was present already in 1701, and expressed henceforth in "verschiedene Auffassungen von der Kirchenordnung, die bald mehr synodal, bald stärker autori-
Micu set a striking precedent for the later reformers when he convened a diocesan synod in 1744 that included not only the clergy but also numerous laymen, peasants, and even Orthodox. He reported there on his advocacy of Romanian rights at the recent diet, and sought ratification of further steps. Many of those present made their adherence to the church union conditional on the Bishop's continued pursuit of the nationalist course. Micu's own clergy supported both his nationalist politics and the church union, but stipulated that the latter should not interfere with the maintainance of the "Wallachian pravilă" (canon law) in matters of church discipline. This stipulation was acceptable to neither Rome nor Vienna, which also rejected Clain's action of convening a church synod without the approval of his archbishop in Esztergom.

Bishop Micu's actions were an outgrowth of agitated times and practical politics. The three formulators of Romanian nationalist ideology in Blaj in the final decades of the eighteenth century—known collectively as the "Transylvanian School"—were Greek Catholic priests and monks who drew their ideas primarily from their own historical research and foreign writers of the Enlightenment: Samuil Micu, Gheorghe Sincai, and Petru Major. Their studies on the origins of the Romanians and the Romanians' tär geformt war."

purported place in the history of Transylvania spurred the Romanian national movement. Their nationalism found theological application under the influence of the Gallican and Febronian thinkers. The Transylvanian School's religious writings were published much later, if at all, but the manuscripts influenced teaching in Blaj by them and their successors.

Samuil Micu's chief contribution to religious thought was his translation between 1782 and 1799 of the earliest sections of the massive church history by the Gallican Claude Fleury; he also composed a shorter synthesis of the same work. The Roman Catholic diocesan library in Gyulafehervar provided the copy of the work he used throughout much of this period. The emphasis given here to the prerogatives of diocesan synods and the collectivity of the clergy became even more explicit in the works of Petru Maior, dean of Reghin 1784-1809. They demonstrate the strong influence on him of contemporary church writers and philosophers as the result of his studies in Rome and Vienna between 1774 and 1780. He then became a professor in Blaj, where he composed his virulent attack on Papal primacy and defense of Josephinism, Procanon, in 1783. The occasion was a sharp conflict at the Romanian bishopric between Roman and Josephinian tendencies. Against the absolutism of Bishop

Ioan Bob, Maior argued that the synod should be a constitutional legislative body, but the emperor should exercise a veto over its decisions. He even denied the validity of the Council of Florence, which was the canonical precedent for the Romanian church union, and favored the Romanians' return to Orthodoxy. He cited eastern canons in support of synodality. In his manuscript Protopopadichia (1795) Maior argued that rural deans enjoyed deliberative rights in diocesan synods equal to those of the bishops.

It is doubtful that these manuscripts of Maior were widely known, but they are interesting as the product of eastern tradition and of currents present in the rest of society. It is also more than likely that Maior propagated his ideas during his long service as a parish priest.


10. Teodor, "Ecouri janzeniste si galicane in cultura românească," in Interferente, 83-98. Teodor exaggerates the parallel between Febronianism and Jansenism. The latter was primarily a movement for ascetic spirituality rather than synodality.

11. Carol Capraș and Flaviu Popan minimize these writings' influence. They argue that Procanon was full of "youthful exaggerations" that Maior later ignored; its initial publication was the work of Bucharest Orthodox who sought to throw "straw in the clay even of confessional misunderstandings" by drawing renewed attention to "Papist" authoritarianism. Protopopadichia first appeared in the Greek Catholic journal of Vienna Sionul Românesc in 1865-6. "Biserica unită între anii 1700-1918," in Biserica română unită, 127. The chief biography of Maior was unavailable to me: Maria Protase, Petru Maior (București, 1973).
From 1809 until his death in 1821 Maior was editor of Romanian books at the university publishing house in Buda. There he published his greatest works, more moderate but more influential because they were published: a history of the Romanians in Transylvania up to the time of the Hungarian conquest that firmly maintained the thesis of Daco-Romanian continuity (editions in 1812, 1834, and 1883) and a church history of the Romanians (published in 1813). He moderated the anti-Catholic tendencies of his earlier writings, but also rejected confessional exclusivism and conceived of the Greek Catholic Church chiefly as a vehicle of Romanian political expression. His church history praises the enlightened attitude of those Greek Catholic deans who sought to overcome between Catholics and Orthodox, and cited approvingly instances where the laity and even clergy of one Romanian church willingly called on the services of the clergy of the other church for masses, funerals and confession. Such practices contrasted with the militant confessionalism of most Greek Catholic bishops. The book contains strikingly explicit condemnation of the ruling Bishop Bob for his alleged inattention to the well-being of the church, failure to use its economic means for the support of the clergy, and favoritism toward his own relatives.

Maior’s definition of the church union is instructive: "all Romanians of Transylvania united with Rome in faith,

12. Excerpts of the two works are in Ţcoala ardeleană, I, 863-905, and II, 164-95, respectively.
but not in law, for they have maintained the Greek law, always, after the union." Maior emphasized the insistence of the clergy in the synod of 1739 on the maintenance of everything in the oriental canon laws or pravila that did not explicitly contradict the church union. Romanian Orthodox often used the word law (legea) in much the same way as Hungarian Reformed used the word faith (hit): legea românească referred to Orthodoxy, and magyar hit to the Hungarian Reformed Church or Calvinism.

All but one Greek Catholic bishop down to and including Șuluțiu himself was a member of the Romanian gentry of the counties. This nobility was of modest means and on occasion not uninclined to champion the interests of the Romanian peasantry. More importantly, by ancestry as well as their constitutional position the Greek Catholic bishops were schooled in the tradition of county politics. How they should apply this tradition was controversial: in solidarity with other noblemen or with Hungarian coreligionists of the Roman rite, or as the champion of their underrepresented clergy or conationals.

Bishops Bob (1783-1830) and Ioan Lemeni (1832-49) did not share the militancy of the Transylvanian School. Bob had poor relations with his deans and monks; he denied these

groups their former position in the diocesan synod. He allowed the monastery to stagnate, and established a cathedral chapter in 1807 to provide the leading personnel for schools and administration in Blaj. Bob succeeded in interrupting the publication and dispersal of Maior’s church history in 1813, and then in sequestering the 1000 copies that remained in Maior’s possession at the time of his death. The opportunity to acquire individual copies aroused great interest among the Greek Catholic clergy in the two decades before 1848; the remainder of the sequestered volumes burned in a fire in Blaj in 1848-9. The ideas of the Transylvanian School were fundamental for the leaders of the revival of the Blaj schools in these years. For this group, including George Baritiu and Simeon Barnutiu, Petru Maior’s conception of the church as a popular rallying point for national struggle was very powerful. The chief formulation of this idea was an article by Barnutiu in 1843 which built on the ideas of Petru Maior concerning the eastern synodal tradition. He argued that government by the majority of a synod representing all members of the church should replace the absolutist regime of the bishop. Several

leading members of the clergy advocated an increased role for church synods, including Șuluțiu as Vicar of Sălaj. The judicial condemnation of Bărnuțiu and several supporters in 1845 brought the movement to an abrupt end. It revived in 1848.

The career of Lemeni as bishop ended in disgrace. He shared the sympathy of many other Greek Catholics for the liberal Hungarian opposition, whose championing of the peasant emancipation in the counties benefitted the Romanians. In 1848 he found himself in Kolozsvár after the outbreak of hostilities and, in a controversial pastoral letter of October, 1848, called on his people to obey the Hungarian authorities. Consequently the Austrian commander declared his dismissal from office. The diocese was administered by the Provost Simeon Crainic, one of the nationalist allies of Bărnuțiu who had been censured between 1844 and 1846. The Holy See and several leading clerics in Blaj continued to regard Lemeni as the canonical Bishop, and therefore resisted the Austrian insistence on his replacement. Șuluțiu painted Lemeni as a "supporter of the Hungarian rebellion," and this was partly responsible for the eventual acceptance of Lemeni's dismissal by the Holy See and Lemeni himself. The bishop agreed to resign from his see in 1850. The government then confirmed the choice by the electoral synod in Blaj of Șuluțiu as his successor.

18. Gyemánt, 166-71
Officials considered Şuluţiu a less consequential leader Haynald and Şaguna. Thus, Colonel Jankowsky in February, 1859 discounted Hungarian allegations of Şuluţiu’s Dacoroman sympathies, stating he was "a weak-willed old man." Almost three years later, Friedenfels did not even mention him in a survey of Transylvanian politics, referring to Canon Timotei Cipariu as the most significant leader in Blaj and a reliable supporter of the government. A letter of de Luca in 1858 characterized the Metropolitan as cunning and self-righteous, possessing "an agile mind, mediocre education and an uncommon ability to find the necessary means of attaining his goals." The voluminous political correspondence of the Metropolitan in the 1860s belies the view of his insignificance: there have been preserved twenty-three personal letters he wrote to Baritiu

1959, 96-7 and Heindl, "Die Wiener Nuntiatur," 423-6, cite a highly unfavorable account of Şuluţiu’s intrigue by Nuncio de Luca written in 1858. De Luca was surely influenced by the deposed bishop’s version of events, since Lemeni resided in Vienna until his death in 1861. Lemeni’s role in 1848 is controversial; several Romanian writers sought to exonerate him, but the documents published in GBCS, III, 144-51 demonstrate he compromised himself in the eyes of the Austrians. Virgil Şotropa, "Din actele și scrisorile episcopului Lemeni," Arhiva Șomeshiană 1937, no. 21, 528-66, shows that not only the Magyarophile Blaj Canon Papfalvi supported Lemeni, but also such nationalist allies of Şuluţiu in the 1860s as the later Canon in Iugos, Ştefan Moldovan and the dean in Kolozsvár, Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu.


22. Filip, "Il metropolita Alessandro Sterca Suluziu," 96; Ibiid., "Mitropolitul Alexandru S. Șuluțiu," in Buna vestire 8, 1-2 (1969), 16. De Luca also asserted that the scholar Canon Cipariu was the leading personality in the Greek Catholic clergy.
between 1860 and 1867, forty-six letters to Dimitrie Moldovan between 1857 and 1867, and an extensive correspondence with the Transylvanian Court Chancellors which includes many policy proposals affecting the broader issues of the period. Romanian militants regarded Ţuulţiu as their ally, frequently referring to him in their correspondence as "our good Metropolitan." Although Ţuulţiu lacked Haynald’s international contacts, he became an honorary vice president of the anti-slavery organization Institut d’Afrique several years before Haynald attained a similar honor.

Writing twenty years after Ţuulţiu’s death, Baritiu lamented the fact that no substantial biography of the Metropolitan had appeared, and that the numerous eulogies paid scant attention to his often tempestuous relations with Rome, the court, and the aristocracy. Vasile Popescu praised his dogged defense of eastern church traditions and national interests "in the conflicts he had, at the peril of his own well-being, with the apostolic see in Rome and the

23. The location of the original letters to Baritiu is unknown. They first appeared in Baritiu’s Parti alese, III, and were republished in GBCS, IV; but they are undoubtedly genuine. Moldovan was one of the highest Romanian officials of the period and, though Orthodox, married to Ţuulţiu’s niece. The letters to him are in AS Cluj-Napoca, Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan.

24. The published Baritiu correspondence contains numerous such references to Ţuulţiu.

25. Foreign Minister Buol-Schauenstein to Suluţiu, January 11, 1856 (announcing the granting of the title of wirklicher geheimer Staatsrat), in AS Cluj-Napoca. Fondul Alexandru Sterca-Ţuulţiu, No. 40; the French honor is also listed in Siematismulu... 1865, 1.

imperial government." These unstable relationships help to explain why potential biographers shied away from the task and highlight a basic characteristic of the man: unlike his predecessors and successors in Blaj and his colleagues in the other churches, he was a combative adherent of nationalist ideology and a poor diplomat. He was an anomaly, the only bishop or metropolitan in Blaj after the eighteenth century to represent the nationalist trend present within the Greek Catholic Church since its creation. He wrote historical studies arguing against Hungarian historical viewpoints or especially the presumed Latinizing intentions of the Holy See, most of which were deemed unpublishable because of their content or incompatibility with his official position.

Șuluțiu's The History of Horea and of the Romanian People of the Muntii Apuseni of Transylvania is most instructive concerning his political views. He completed the work in 1856, but could not secure the hoped-for publication in his lifetime. He consulted written sources, but also

28. The contrast with Șaguna is pointed out by Albu, 54, and evident from a comparison of the literary style of their official and personal correspondence as well: Șuluțiu's is righteous, effusive, often resentful, while that of Șaguna is more formal and tightly reasoned.
29. Gyémánt, 92, 100, and Baritiu, Părti alese, III, 462-3. Neither mentions Șuluțiu's study on the Armenians, referred to in Chapter IX. The introductory study to Fekete-Negruțiu's correspondence with Baritiu characterizes Șuluțiu as the Blaj bishop who was "the least contaminated by the dogmas of the Latin church."-- GBCS, III, 133.
30. The first complete publication of the study is "Istoria Horii și a poporului românesc din Muntii Apuseni ai
relied on the oral accounts of his father, who was a local priest during the peasant revolt of Horea, and of the people in whose midst he lived for nearly forty years. The work indicates that at the time of writing Șuluțiu shared the animosity of the mountaineers toward the aristocracy and the imperial mining authorities, but also their naive confidence in the Emperor. The specific problems and grievances described in the narrative, which ends in 1852, resemble those presented by local Romanians during the 1860s. He responded mildly when the clergy in his native region led a civil disobedience campaign and tax boycott against the Hungarian officials in May, 1861. The declaration of the recalcitrant villagers contained ideas that may have been inspired by Suluțiu's work on Horea.

After the elevation of the Blaj see to a metropolitanate, the new Greek Catholic dioceses of Szamosújvár and Lugos were created in 1855 and subordinated, along with the older diocese of Nagyvárad, to Blaj. Data from the diocesan catalogues of Blaj and Szamosújvár indicate three-fifths of Transylvanian Greek Catholics lived in the Archdiocese of Blaj, which was entirely in Transylvania. Most of the


remainder lived in the diocese of Szamosujvar, but the bulk of this diocese's population lay in Hungary proper.

Table 14: The Dioceses of Blaj and Szamosújvár

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Deaneries</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
<th>Filiae</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Szamosujvar in Hungary</td>
<td>418,349</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Transylvania</td>
<td>257,727</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaj</td>
<td>160,622</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>368,549</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the remaining Greek Catholics of Transylvania were in the much smaller diocese of Lugos. This new diocese had its seat in the Banat, but two-thirds of its population of nearly one hundred thousand were in Hunyad county. I referred in the last chapter to the special social and religious circumstances of Hăşeg in the Lugos diocese. There were important differences between the the Blaj archdiocese and the Transylvanian part of the diocese of Szamosújvár as well. In much of the Blaj archdiocese the population was mixed both ethnically and religiously, while a high percentage of the Greek Catholics lived in filiae, or diaspora communities unsupervised by a resident pastor and often lacking a school. The territory of the diocese of

32. Data from Siematismulu veneratului cleru catholicu de ritulu orientale alu archi-diecesei metropolitane a Albei-Julie... (Blasiu: Tipariulu seminariului archi-diecesanu, 1865) and Schematismus venerabilis cleri neo-erectae dioecesis Szamos-Ujvariensis gr. rit. cath... (Szamos-Ujváriní: Typis typographiae dioecesanei, 1867).

33. No catalogue for Lugos was available to me. I deduced the Transylvanian remnant by subtracting the Szamosujvar and Blaj totals from the 1869 total for Transylvania in Keleti, p. 342. Adriányi, Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum, p. 96, indicates the population of the diocese was 99,652 in 1868. This and the other diocesan totals are compatible with those in A katolikus Magyarország for the end of the century. Adriányi's totals for Szamosújvár and Blaj (pp. 91, 95) are far too low.
Szamosújvár was far more ethnically and religiously homogeneous, and well-supplied with clergy and schools.

Like the Roman Catholic bishops, the Greek Catholic ones were assisted by cathedral chapters (nominally ten canons in Blaj, six in Szamosújvár, and six in Lugos) and consistories. Parishes were grouped not only into deaneries (R. protopopiate) but also larger groupings of deaneries called archdeaneries and rural vicariats. The three rural vicars (vicars forane) were preeminent national leaders in historic centers of Romanian culture, namely Năsăud, Făgăraș, and Hășeg. They exercised the prerogatives of a deputy bishop over twenty to thirty thousand Romanians each. In terms of education, income and authority, the canons, vicars, and deans stood head and shoulders above the ordinary parish clergy. Parishes generally elected lay elders and employed several laymen in liturgical functions.

The remainder of this chapter will examine several key areas of Greek Catholic politics in which Șuluțiu played a central and controversial role: the Metropolitan's dispute with the Holy See concerning issues of canon law, the question of financial aid and the cathedral chapter in Blaj, disputes with the Hungarian and Romanian Catholic clergy of Transylvania, the special problems of the diocese of Szamosújvár, and the movement for the convocation of an

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34. The Vicariat of Sâlaj, formerly occupied by Șuluțiu, was in the Partium, and hence separated from Transylvania after 1861.
archdiocesan synod.

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Sterca-Șuluțiu, the Vatican, and "Latinism"

The adversarial attitude of Romanian nationalists toward the Holy See drew on the memory of the Orthodox revolts in the eighteenth century and the popular identification of Orthodoxy as the "Romanian law." This was compounded by the critical view of the Papacy among liberal thinkers in the nineteenth century. Many Greek Catholic intellectuals had studied in Blaj under Simion Bărnuțiu and his successor Aron Pumnul. These professors used as their basic philosophy texts the works of Wilhelm Traugott Krug. This German Kantian argued that religious and political liberalism were intimately related, and that "Protestantism [is] by its very nature religious and ecclesiastic liberalism." To be sure, Romanians rarely denounced "Papism" as such in print, but the transmission of Krug's hostility to the Catholic restoration preconditioned many clergymen as well as laity to be critical of the anti-liberal ultramontane Catholicism of the mid-nineteenth century.


36. Pompiliu Tecător, "Noi precizări în legatură cu iz-
Shortly after the conclusion of the Concordat, Minister of Culture Thun called the Catholic bishops of the empire to a conference in Vienna. The conception of Thun and Rauscher concerning the application of the Concordat dissatisfied Suluțiu and Cipariu. The Metropolitan protested directly to the Holy See in November, 1856 when the government issued an edict to all the bishops outlining its views of church discipline. Suluțiu wrote that the state had no right to interfere in the affairs of his church, that its Latinizing schemes would destroy the church union in its essence. He insisted on the limitation of the union to the four points of the Council of Florence, and stated that the basis of church discipline concerning synods and marriage law for the Romanian Greek Catholics had to be the Pravila (canon law code), citing the Târgoviște (Wallachia) edition of 1652. In the following weeks Suluțiu notified his clergy of the debate underway and requested their "discrete, gentle and respectful" written proposals concerning the best means of upholding the Pravila and the precise preconditions of the church union. Soon he informed the Holy See that the Vatican's plans had aroused unease among his clergy. He urged Rome to appreciate the difficulty of maintaining the

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voarele lucrărilor bărnuțene," in Ibid., Interferente iluministe europene, 101.

church union in the face of accusations by the "schismatics" that the eastern rite was being adulterated. He added that rumors of plans in Rome to institute celibacy among the clergy had aroused "panic" in his clergy. At the same time he appealed to his suffragan bishops to support his position.

Șuluțiu's protestations and discrete agitation began to have the desired effect. The Holy See rejected the protests of the Austrian ambassador in Rome against his comportment, and directed its attention to the issues raised by the Metropolitan. Șuluțiu sent a long memorandum to the Pope in March, 1858 complaining at the inadequate attention given to his rite in Rome and listing specific areas of church legislation wherein he should be consulted and improvements made.

The controversy over a newspaper article illustrates the sensitive state of Romanian relations with Rome at the time. The article by Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu denied the validity of the Concordat for the Romanians, denounced the three Romanian suffragan bishops who had publicly supported it, and demanded the observance of oriental canon law with respect to synods and marriages. Initially disturbed

39. Colloredo to Antonelli, March 6, 1857, and Antonelli to de Luca, March 22 and 30, in DSSS, 295-304.
41. The article, "Clus, in 9/21 martiu 1858," in Gazeta
by the article, Șuluțiu privately commended Negruțiu for its contents.

In the summer of 1858 the Holy See decided to send de Luca to Blaj for consultations. He left Vienna in August with four advisors, and passed through Lugoj and Alba Iulia before his arrival in Blaj on September 12. In the course of the nine-day conference with Șuluțiu, Alexi and Erdélyi, the Nuncio formed the very negative impression of the Metropolitan we have cited above. With respect to Șuluțiu's insistence on oriental church discipline, de Luca would later write that "Șuluțiu constantly confuses doctrine with discipline..." and that "it is a true misfortune for this church province to have such an archbishop at its head." The low opinion of Șuluțiu held by Rome surely hurt him in his rivalry with Haynald.

The mission did achieve an agreement whereby the Romanians accepted Latin procedures concerning certain categories of divorce. Though relatively less intense, the debate concerning divorce procedure continued in succeeding years. Austrian officials took an interest in Șuluțiu's

Transilvaniei 1858, pp. 89-90, 93-4, is summarized in GBCS, III, 133-4.
42. Fekete-Negruțiu to Baritiu, May 3, 1858, in Ibid., 158.
44. The positive assessment of the conference by DSSS, 138-9, disregards this dimension.
45. Documents 122 and 129 from AS Cluj-Napoca, Fondul Alexandru Sterca-Șuluțiu concerning marriage matters, from the years 1856 and 1857, were copied for Șuluțiu by one of his priests in September, 1863. Many deans demanded that district marriage tribunals under their own supervision be
canonical claims after observing the serious hearing Rome was giving him. In July, 1858, Thun ordered the Transylvanian officials to secure a copy of the *Pravila* for his own use.

The prestige of Şuluţiu in Rome fell considerably as the result of the controversy over his comportment at the celebration of the Emperor’s birthday in the bathing resort of Előpatak on August 18, 1861. The Romanians of this part of the Szekler region were overwhelmingly Orthodox, and the only Catholic church in the locality was a small Hungarian Roman Catholic chapel. Şuluţiu chose, in violation of canon law, to attend the mass at the Orthodox church. The Hungarians indignantly reported the incident to the press and to Haynald, who reported it in turn to the Nuncio. They charged Şuluţiu with avoiding the Catholic liturgy because the Orthodox church was more accessible to him in his fragile state of health. De Luca noted in his account to Rome that the...

46. Thun to Vice Governor Lebzeltern, July 25, 1858, in MOL. F258. 203. csomó. 1858/4296. Lebzeltern’s reply, six days later, noted that there was a copy in Baron Bruken-thal’s library in Hermannstadt, and probably another in the possession of Saguna.

47. Filip and Dumitriu-Snagov identify the feast as St. Stephen’s Day (August 20; see Chapter V), but place the incident on August 16. Filip, "Il Metropolită Alessandro Sterca Suluziu," 88; DSSS, 208. My account relies on Filip, 88-90, unless otherwise noted.

48. The press report was "Előpatak, aug. 18," in Korunk, August 24, 1861. It stated simply that "gyengélkedése miatt [Şuluţiu] kényteleníttetett a hozzá közelebb eső, de emelkedett helyen levő kath. templomot mellőzni és a g.n. egyesültekébe járni." A report from Előpatak on August 20, in the August 31 issue, described the St. Stephen’s Day celebration in the Roman Catholic chapel conducted by Tivadar Zerich, noting the absence of any Romanians in attendance.
Hungarians' eagerness to report the matter derived more from national animosity than from religious zeal. But Bishop Dobra condemned Șulutiu's action to the Nuncio, claiming Șulutiu was "hostile to the spirit of Catholicism."

Șulutiu responded at length to the brief reference in Korunk. He stated the small Catholic chapel would not have had any mass on August 18 if he had not prevailed upon Zerich to celebrate it there. Less than ten people were in attendance, and he considered it only natural that afterwards he attended the more populous and festive Orthodox liturgy. He impugned the loyalty of the Hungarians for giving much greater attention to their national holiday two days later. He defended his attendance of the Orthodox liturgy, "where they celebrate the holy liturgy in his [Șulutiu's] mother tongue, and per omnia, et in omnibus, with the same rite, ceremony, prayers and hymns." Nor did he count himself among those who believe that, "if they cross the threshold of another denomination's church, they commit as many sins as the pious words they utter within."

Indeed, "the Latin mother church itself recognizes that the clergy of the Greek non-united is good and valid, and possesses apostolic succession, that it celebrates a true liturgy, that it administers the seven sacraments validly, etc." Șulutiu defended his record of devotion to the

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Concerning St. Stephen's Day and Tivadar Zerich, see Chapters V-VI.

49. "Nyílttér," in Korunk, September 27, 1861. Șulutiu excused his absence from the St. Stephen's Day liturgy with a brief reference to his travel plans. Patelos, 9, cites
church in a letter to the Nuncio, attributing all contrary allegations to Hungarian animosity. The author of the articles denouncing him was none other than Károly Veszely, he stated, who had helped to make the Hungarian celebration in Előpatak on August 20 an anti-government demonstration. Şulutiu accused Haynald of inspiring the campaign against him. Nonetheless, the Vatican admonished him for the sin of *communicatio in divinis cum haereticis et schismaticis*, albeit it was "due more to... ignorance than to malice." Şuluţiu had also transgressed against the tentative "peace agreement" with Şaguna of the previous May. The agreement forbade attendance at each other's services by Greek Catholic and Orthodox priests "so that foreigners may not accuse us of religious indifference."

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Financial Aid and the Cathedral Chapter

De Luca’s mission to Transylvania stimulated Austrian interest in financial support for the clergy. Article 26 of

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part of the article from a report by the Nuncio. A rough draft is in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 704. Even a hundred years later, the Catholic Church decreed that "Divine Law forbids any common worship (communicatio in sacrís) which would damage the unity of the Church, or involve formal acceptance of falsehood or the danger of deviation in the faith, of scandal, or of indifferentism," explicitly approving common worship with the Orthodox only in exceptional circumstances. See "Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches" (1964), in *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 383-4.

50. Draft of Şuluţiu to the Nuncio, January 28, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1862/44. The Nuncio’s letter of January 18 enclosed a Latin translation of Şuluţiu’s article of September 27, probably supplied to him by Haynald.

the Concordat stipulated that state subsidies for parishes would be increased where this was necessary, and Greek Catholic pastors "provided for in the same way as those of the Latin rite." Şuluțiu submitted requests for a subsidy of 12,000 fl. to the Locumtenency in April and June, 1855. Two years later the Locumtenency proposed to Thun that the financial support of all local churches be surveyed and regulated. Finally in September, 1858 it invited Şuluțiu to report on this matter directly to Thun. Şuluțiu obliged with a letter of fifteen pages. He attributed the faults of the clergy to its poverty and lack of regulated income and the anomalous insistence of many parishes on the right to select their own pastors. He considered inadequate support the chief reason why he was forced to acquiesce in the nomination of incompetent pastors, and called urgently for aid. The Locumtenency consequently requested detailed recommendations from Şuluțiu and Alexi, and in July, 1859 recommended a subsidy of 20,000 fl. for their dioceses. As an afterthought, it also requested a report from Saguna, and in September recommended a subsidy of 25,000 fl. for the Orthodox clergy in Transylvania.

55. Şuluțiu to Thun, November 3, 1858, in MOL F258, 203. csomo, 1859/2238.
56. Thun to Liechtenstein, May 14, 1859, and Liechten-
Thun delayed the release of the subsidies because of the financial straits of the government itself, then suspended them indefinitely in 1860. In the following year the Viennese cultural authorities, now under the supervision of Schmerling's ministry, finally secured a subsidy for the Transylvanian Orthodox. Beginning in June of 1861 the Orthodox diocese received from 25,000 to 50,000 fl. annually for the support of the clergy, seminaries and personnel. Despite protests by Şuluțiu and the Nuncio, comparable subsidies were granted to the Greek Catholics only in 1863. In the projected Austrian budget for 1863, more than two-thirds of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery's expenditure for religious affairs went to the Romanian churches. The delay was further evidence of the

57. Thun to Liechtenstein, September 28, 1860, in Ibid., 1860/3453.
58. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 239; Schmerling to Kemény, June 4, 1861, in MOL D228, 1861/248. Kemény considered Schmerling's role in securing the subsidy for the Orthodox in 1861 an unwarranted interference in Transylvanian affairs, comparable to his approval of the Romanian conference at the beginning of the year.
59. Grigore Mihali to Şuluțiu, September 10, 1861, and Alexi to Şuluțiu, November 29, 1861, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 720, 724, and references in subsequent years. According to Alexi Suluțiu lobbied for the subsidy during his stay in Vienna. The subsidy of 30,000 fl. to the Greek Catholics of Transylvania was approved in January, 1863; Şuluțiu appointed Canon Cipariu to administer it. See AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG 1863/134, 518.
60. Printed pamphlet, Staats-Voranschlag des österreichischen Kaiserstaates für das Verwaltungsjahr 1863, in MOL D228, 1863/23. This total did not include the newly granted subsidy.
lukewarm attitude of the Vienna authorities toward Șuluțiu. The authorities also took up the question of the incomplete membership of the Cathedral Chapter in Blaj. The seven Blaj canons were the best-paid element of the Romanian clergy, enjoying an average salary of 1500 fl. Baritiu, no friend of ecclesiastic luxury, rejected charges that these positions were mere feudal sinecures. There is, he stated, "no other body in the country, ecclesiastic or secular, whose members... are concerned with more varied duties than the canons of Blaj." The canons sat on various archdiocesan bodies, administered educational affairs and the publishing house, taught in the Blaj schools, and were official advisors of the Metropolitan. Three canon stalls were nominally added in 1854 with the establishment of the Metropolitanate. Article 22 of the Concordat required the restoration, where it had lapsed, of the bishop's right to propose canons for nomination. This right applied to the vacant stalls in Blaj. As the result of an instruction from Thun in November, 1858, the Locumtenency called for Șuluțiu's nominations for the three new stalls as well as another which had become vacant. Șuluțiu submitted his proposals in April, 1859.

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61. Pârti alese, III, 147.
62. The canons' positions were called "stalls" by reason of the stalls reserved for their use in the choir of the cathedral. The position owed its origin in the Middle Ages to the goal of improving cathedral liturgies.
63. Weinzierl-Fischer, 255.
64. Draft of Liechtenstein to Thun, September 5, 1859, in MOL F258, csomó 203, 1859/2239.
Şuluțiu's eagerness to complete the membership of the Cathedral Chapter appears ironic in view of the earlier opposition to this institution on the part of canonic traditionalists and rural deans, who pointed out that cathedral chapters did not exist in the Orthodox Church. A partial explanation of the Metropolitan's attitude may be the opportunity offered by the Concordat for Şuluțiu to nominate his own candidates. More significant was Şuluțiu's desire to secure the benefit of the church endowment created by Bishop Bob for the support of the clergy and Cathedral Chapter when he created it in 1807. The Metropolitan and his Chapter protested against the disbursement by the Gubernium of endowment funds for the Roman Catholic Canon Keseru's post in the Gubernium and for awards to the Greek Catholic priests Simion Balint and Augustin Pop. The latter awards may have been a recognition of their loyalty to the Habsburgs in 1848-9, or it may have been an attempt by the court to assure the reliability of prominent leaders of the radical (Balint) and Hungarophile (Pop) tendency among the clergy. The Cathedral Chapter protested that the grant of 500 fl. to each of them had been made without asking the Chapter and could have been better used for small grants to the many needy clergymen. Şuluțiu maintained that the endowment ought to be subject to the exclusive control of the Chapter and himself. Yet he had to ask the Gubernium how much

65. Anton Vestemean to Cipariu, December 7, 1860, in AS Alba Iulia. Fondul Timotei Cipariu, 1860/18; memoranda of the State Council, June 8 and 10, in HHSAA, Jüngerer
money the endowment contained. He was anxious to know that
the salaries of the proposed canons would come from the
endowment.

A controversy over the marital status of the nominees
delayed the appointments until 1862. Liechtenstein argued
that only celibate priests should be considered because all
appointees up to that time were celibate and the cultural
level and morale of the Cathedral Chapter demanded it.
The Holy See also insisted on the observance of this tradi-
tion, citing Western canonical norms. Şuluţiu for his part
argued strongly that his married nominees should also be
considered. His presentation to the Nuncio stressed once
again the peculiarities of oriental canon law which required
an exception be made to Latin practices. He pointed out
that only thirty of the 751 clerics in the archdiocese were

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Staatsrat. 1861/215, 221; proposals of Archduke Rainer, July
2, and decisions by the Emperor of the next day, in HHSA,
Kabinettkskanzlei. 1861/2094; Vicar General Constantin Alutan
to Şulţiu, November 25, 1861, and copy of Şulţiu to
Crenneville, same day, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM, 703 and
716, respectively. A year later, the Gubernium insisted
that Bob's testament of 1828 left the endowment under state
control, yet part of the endowment was in fact administered
by the Chapter. Şulţiu repeated his previous argument;
correspondence of Crenneville and Şulţiu, November, 1862,
in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/4.

66. Locumtenency to Sulţiu, April 10, 1861, in AS Alba
Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/257; Sulţiu to Gubernium, September 6,
1861, in Ibid., Protocol book, 1861/566; Crenneville to
Şulţiu, January 27, 1862, in Ibid., documents, 1862/104.
Crenneville's letter enclosed an account of proposed expendi-
tures from the endowment for 1862: 27,618 fl., of which
14,417 fl. would go to the diocesan clergy, 11,032 fl. to
the Cathedral Chapter, and 262 fl. to Canon Keresü.

67. Draft of Liechtenstein to Thun, September 5, 1859,
in MOL. F258, 3. csomo, 1859/2239.

68. Copy of Sulţiu to the Nuncio, July 17, 1860, in AS
Alba Iulia, MRU, CM 684.
celibate. He appealed to Nádasdy "as a Catholic" to facilitate the nomination of married canons in order to strengthen the church union and contravert those who argued the state was seeking to "Latinize" the Greek Catholics.

The Holy See informed Vienna that it would refrain from taking a public position on the question of celibate canons because of the unfortunate public reaction this might provoke. Consequently the Council of Ministers divided equally in April, 1862 on the question of nominating a married canon for Lugos. Nádasdy and the State Council argued in favor of the married candidate "for both ecclesiastical and political reasons", but Forgáč against him. Franz Joseph accepted the latter's position, in part because Lugos was in Forgáč's jurisdiction.

The Metropolitan's efforts were crowned with success. On May 26 the Emperor nominated four new celibate canons for Blaj. More dramatically, in November, 1862 the married dean of Torda, Ilie Vlasa, was nominated by the Vienna

70. Suluțiu to Nádasdy, March 11, 1862, in MOL D228 1862/127; AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, Protocol book 1862/164. Fekete-Negrutiu himself opposed the appointment of married canons because they would create tension among the celibate clergy in Blaj. Negrutiu to Barițiu, May 3, 1858, in GBCS, III, 158. The footnote on p. 159 inaccurately states that the future Canons Mihali and Vestemean were also married.
71. Session of April 11, 1862, in POM V, 3, 387-9. While the non-voting members Lichtenfels and Geringer were seconded by Nádasdy, Plener, Mecséry and Degenfeld, Schmerling was absent from the session.
72. Suluțiu to Crenneville, June 14, acknowledging the four appointments; in AS Alba Iulia, MRU, FG, Protocol book 1862/469.
authorities with the approval of the Holy See. Șuluțiu thanked Nădasdy for the decision, which set aside "that sad care and pain that, notwithstanding all his virtues, capacities and merits, a married priest hitherto could not become a canon." His pride at this achievement was evident in the announcement in his circular of March 6, 1863.

The new canons were Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu, Ioan Chirila, Grigore Mihali, Anton Vestemean, and Vlasa. The new composition of the Cathedral Chapter signified a major change in the corps of leaders in Blaj. A published list of the canons, in order of ecclesiastic rank and salary in 1865 (following the intervening death of one of the ten) with their principal functions gives some idea of the new alignment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basil Ratiu</td>
<td>Provost, Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantin Alutan</td>
<td>Vicar General, Chief Judicial Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timotei Cipariu</td>
<td>Director of the High School, Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantin Papfalvi</td>
<td>Member of various commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu</td>
<td>Canonicus a latere, Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ioan Chirila</td>
<td>Director of Vocations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73. *Vortrag* of Nădasdy, November 12, 1862, in MOL D228 1862/576. In approving this measure, the Vatican insisted that a celibate majority be maintained in the Chapter. Antonelli to de Luca, November 28, 1862, in DSSS, 546-7.

74. Șuluțiu to Nădasdy, November 23, 1862, in MOL D228 1862/582.

75. Printed pastoral letter 1863/144, in AS Alba Iulia MRU,CM 782. A year later the Emperor ordered that the state reimburse the Bob Endowment for controversial grant of 1000 fl. to Balint and Pop. Nădasdy and Crenneville to Suluțiu, October 13 and November 17, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/850, 859.

76. Șuluțiu had listed Augustin Pop among his candidates for the chapter in 1859, but later withdrew his candidacy "ab illo tempore interventas rationes," substituting that of Vlasa. Șuluțiu to Crenneville, January 31, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Protocol book. 1862/47.
The older canons opposed the new appointments, presumably because of their different political and theological orientation. With the new members and Cipariu, the conservative remnants of Bishop Lemeni’s chapter now constituted a small minority. The addition of Negrutiu was clearly the most significant change. When he visited Blaj in June, 1862 to take the oath of office, the canons informed him that they would delay his salary until November. The new canon resolved that "just as I was the favorite, I think, of the people here in Kolozsvár, so too there, if I cannot do all my heart desires for the clergy and the nation it will not be my fault." Four months later, he proudly signed his letter to Baritiu canonicus a latere, or chief advisor to the Metropolitan."

The militant element of the Munții Apuseni also received important promotions. Dean Mihali came to Blaj as Canon and professor and Nicolae Begnescu, the pastor of Cîmpeni who led the singing of patriotic songs at the assembly in Blaj in 1861, became professor of music and liturgy. Șulutiu then granted the clergy of the district of Bistra permission to elect Mihali’s replacement, an unusual concession. They gratefully praised Șulutiu’s "lifelong struggle

77. Siematismulu... 1865, 3-6.
78. Draft of Șulutiu to Vasile Pop, June 12, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 735.
80. Negrutiu to Baritiu, October 28, in Ibid., 179-80.
for the ancestral church constitution." Not surprisingly, their choice fell on the hero of the region's struggle in 1848-9, Simion Balint.

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Șuluțiu, Haynald, and the Hungarophiles

The conflict between Șuluțiu and Haynald was religious, personal and political in nature. Clearly the Hungarian Bishop was aware of the debate over canon law between Blaj and Rome. In his appeal for the dignity of archbishop in 1859, he recognized the "faith, prudence and moderation" of the Greek Catholic bishops, but warned that the political dynamic of the situation increased the possibility of their gravitation toward the Orthodox of the Danubian Principalities. At the beginning of 1861 he submitted a far more detailed account of conditions among the Greek Catholics in response to a request by de Luca. Therein he accused the Romanian people and lower clergy not only of a tendency toward political unification, but also toward unification with their Orthodox conationals, and he disputed Sulutiu's claims concerning canon law, as well. He reiterated these allegations in later letters.

The emergence of Șuluțiu as a popular political figure

81. Augustin Colturu, District Notary, to Șuluțiu, September 18, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/802; circular of Balint, November 12, in Alba Iulia. Muzeul Unirii, Arhiva. 5235.
82. DSSS, 186, and document, p. 459. See Chapter IX.
83. Ibid., 208, and letters of Haynald to de Luca, January 4, 1861, Haynald to Capri, April 30, 1862, and Haynald to de Luca, May 12, 1862, in Ibid., 522-4, 536-44.
at the end of 1860 and at the national conference in Hermannstadt in January was only slightly less startling than that of Haynald at the same time. The two men clashed personally at the conference in Gyulafehérvár in February, 1861. Şuluţiu declined Haynald’s invitation to consult with him on the eve of the conference, he alone of all the participants refused accommodation in residence of the bishop or his canons, and even embarassed his host by bringing his own food to a banquet organized by Haynald. The keynote addresses at the conference by Haynald and Şuluţiu clearly set down clearly the positions of the opposing camps. Şuluţiu not only displeased the Hungarians by speaking militantly and in Romanian, but also charged that two medieval popes had incited the Hungarians to conquer the Romanian "schismatics." Haynald protested almost immediately to the Nuncio against the purported insult against the Catholic Church and the "anti-Catholic" attitude of the Metropolitan. Canon Lőnhart complained bitterly to Iacob Mureşianu against the sympathetic account of the Metropolitan’s allegations in the Romanian press, demanding that he publish a denunciation against the Metropolitan. He also translated translation the offending Romanian article it

84. Şuluţiu to Haynald, January 15, 1861, in Alba Iulia, ERC. 1861/15 (Cat. 3); printed table "A károlyfehérvári országos Tanácskozmányra egybegyült t. cz. vendégek Nevsora és szállása," Ibid., 1861/333 (Cat. 37); apparently reliable, anonymous ms. article beginning "Én azt gondolom...," in OSzK, Fol.Hung 1722.
85. DSSS, 206-7; the draft of Haynald’s letter, dated February 19, was moved from its place in Alba Iulia, ERC. 1861/386 (Cat. 4) to the Bishop’s "secret archive."
into Latin for consultation by his colleagues. To the credit of both Şuluţiu and Haynald, however, they were apparently alarmed by the vociferousness of the public controversy aroused by their actions. Haynald assured one correspondent that a public response to the Romanian allegations would only further agitate spirits, while Şuluţiu sought to reduce the impact of Haynald's protest by assuring the Nuncio that his remarks were of a secular political rather than religious nature and motivated by national differences. This was the conclusion reached by de Luca independently, who wrote in forwarding Haynald's letter to Antonelli of the two prelates' "illconcealed national aver-

A Hungarophile element within Şuluţiu's own clergy created difficulties for Şuluţiu that were out of proportion to the apparently small number of individuals involved. Four figures are of interest for the light they throw on key issues: dean Augustin Pop of Gyulafehérvár and Canon Papfalvi of Blaj with respect to relations with the Hungarian hierarchy and politicians, and, in the following sections of this chapter, Canon Ivan Gulovich of Szamosújvár for the problems of his diocese and Bishop Iosif Papp-Szilágyi of Nagyvárad


87. Correspondence of Farkas Ádám and Haynald, March 18 and 27, in Alba Iulia, ERC. 1861/676 (Cat. 4); Şuluţiu to de Luca, March 3, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Protocol book, 1861/112; Baritiu, Părți alese, III, 97-8; Filip, "Il Metropolità Alessandro Sterca Suluziu," 88.
Augustin Pop (1817-84) served as priest in Gyulafehérvár for five years beginning in 1840, then as teacher in Blaj before serving as dean in Gyulafehérvár 1849-70. As head of one of the thirty-eight deaneries in the archdiocese and pastor of the parish in the Lipoveni section of the city, he held one of the most sensitive pastoral positions from a political and religious standpoint. His parish was relatively well-off, boasting an income of 193 fl. in 1861 with a total membership of 1050 souls. Pop was a prominent figure in local Romanian politics, but due to his ambiguous political comportment Barițiu's correspondents often referred to him in the Hungarian manner, as "Pop Gusti." He gained special notoriety in 1861. Romanian nationalists accused him of being a "paid spy" of the Hungarians because of his numerous contacts with both sides; at the national conference in Hermannstadt he defended the legality of the Transylvanian electoral law of 1848. In an apparent attempt to further divide the Romanian camp, Baron Kemény nominated him for participation in the conference in Gyulafehérvár. Under pressure from Şulutiu, however, Pop stayed away from the conference under pretext of illness.

88. Biographical note in GBCS, III, 324. The archive of Pop's deanery office provides little insight into his political activity; see AS Alba Iulia. Protopopiatul G.C. Alba Iulia, Pachet 8.
89. Report by Pop, June 5, 1862, in "Conspectus parochiarum," AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/533. Pop's father had preceded him in this position.
90. An anonymous Hungarian report on the conference in Hermannstadt reported that "Pap Ágoston a fehérvári esperes
Pop's notoriety increased due to articles he published in the Hungarian press. An article by him in Pesti Napló argued in favor of political reconciliation between the Hungarians and Romanians and proposed the publication of a bilingual Hungarian-Romanian newspaper in Kolozsvár to this end. Romanian militants increasingly used the term "renegade" to refer to Romanians who were willing to work with the Hungarians, and considered Pop one of the prime offenders. Even the editor of the Gazeta Transilvaniei, Iacob Mureșianu, did not escape this charge because of his simultaneous position as director of the Roman Catholic high school in Kronstadt.

A prominent figure in Pop's parish in the 1860s was the member of the Romanian Permanent Committee and uncontested leader of the radical wing in Romanian politics, Ion Axente Sever. Sever had been a guerilla leader in 1848-9, for which he received a decoration from the Austrian government during the decade of absolutism. He accompanied the Romanian delegation led by Șulțiu to Vienna at the end of 1860, at which time he personally conferred with many of the leading

politicians, including Baron Kemény. He was among the militants at the subsequent conference in Hermannstadt; it is not surprising that Kemény did not nominate him for the conference in Gyulafehérvár. Axente turns up repeatedly in official reports and the press from succeeding months as a public agitator: he helped to organize the opposition at the Hunyad county assembly in Déva at the beginning of May; he organized the meeting in Gyulafehérvár on May 12 which fashioned plans for the assembly held in Blaj a few days later; throughout the summer he was one of the chief orators in Alsó-Fehér county; he reported to Gazeta Transilvaniei in July about the hostility of the peasantry toward the landlords; he defiantly declared his loyalty to the Emperor at the tense county assembly in Nagyenyed in October.

In July, 1861 Axente and other members of Pop’s parish accused their pastor of using parish funds for his personal ends. Șuluțiu ordered Grigore Mihali to investigate, and when Pop failed to file the required accounting of his expenditures by the beginning of 1862, Șuluțiu appointed Canon Papfalvi to head an investigatory commission that included his secretary, Ioan Pamfilie, and Ioan Moldovan of Ighiu. The membership of the parish was divided, and

92. Four detailed reports from Axente in Vienna to Barițiu, December 9 to 23, 1860, are preserved in București, BARSR. Msse. rom., no. 992.
93. Spiridon Fetti to Dimitrie Moldovan, undated, in AS Alba Iulia. Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan, 1861/6; Retegan, "Lupta națională a românilor," 175-7; reports and protocol of meeting of May 12 in Gyulafehérvár, in MOL F263. 1861/419, 470; Montenuovo to Mikó, October 27, in MOL F263. 1861/2579.
94. Șuluțiu to Mihali, July 29 and August 6; Șuluțiu to
both partisans and opponents of Pop sent petitions to Blaj. On the eve of Şuluţiu’s announcement, Pop an election for chief elder of the parish chose one of Pop’s allies. Soon after the commission’s arrival, itsupervized a new election that chose Axente as chief elder and his chief ally as treasurer.

The commission ruled on March 15 that, since Pop could not provide an accounting of his expenditures since 1849, he must repay the sum of 4135 fl. he had received during this period, or else be suspended from office. When Pop’s immediate appeal was unsuccessful, he appealed, through Bishop Haynald, to Primate Scitovszky. He claimed that his predecessor as pastor had never kept precise accounts of expenditures, and he had never received any instruction that he himself was required to do so. Recognizing the Primatial see as the court of second instance, he asked Scitovsky to review the case, or if necessary request the intercession of the Pope himself. Haynald supported the petition and ascribed the affair to "the ultra-Romanian party gathered around Axente, which the Archbishop is unable to resist."

Károly Veszely also pleaded on Pop’s behalf.

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Pop, January 8, 1862; Şuluţiu to Papfalvi, January 10, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Protocol book, 1861/ 477, 495, 862, 880.

95. Petition in favor of Pop, December 27, 1861; petition of Axente et al. undated; electoral protocol and announcement by Pop, January 7, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1864/769; letters of Şuluţiu to Pop and to the new parish council, March 11, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/165.

96. Two letters of Pop to Scitovszky, April 27, and personal letter in his own hand of Haynald to Scitovszky,
Scitovszky readily accepted this opportunity to not only assist an embattled Hungarophile but also strengthen his own prerogative as Primate. He asked Şuluţiu to submit the matter to renewed consideration by the suffragan Greek Catholic Consistory in Nagyvárad, a suggestion that Şuluţiu rejected. Scitovszky submitted his proposal with all relevant documents to the Nuncio. Almost simultaneously, Şuluţiu ordered Pop’s suspension and transferred his offices as pastor and dean to two other priests.

The Holy See authorized the new Bishop of Nagyvárad, Papp-Szilágyi, to consider Pop’s appeal. His Consistory recommended in October and December, 1863 that Pop should be restored to office. Şuluţiu rejected the jurisdiction of Nagyvárad in the case. Within a year, however, Pop was restored to office.

The actions of ecclesiastic courts in the Pop affair found their secular counterpart with respect to Axente. The administration of Alsó-Fehér county appointed under Mikó remained largely in place under the Provisorium, and re-

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98. Şuluţiu letters of June 17, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/492.
99. A later section of the chapter discusses Papp-Szilágyi.
100. Papp-Szilágyi to Şuluţiu, March 11, 1863; copy of Nuncio to Papp-Szilágyi, February 28, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/193; copies of consistory minutes of October 8 and December 5; draft of response by Şuluţiu, December 11, in loc. cit., 1863/928; additional correspondence in 1864/769.
peatedly too judicial action against the radical leader. Parish supporters of Pop denounced Axente to the Gubernium, accusing him of "church scandal and the disturbance of religion." On the eve of the commission's decision against the pastor, the Gubernium ordered an investigation. Later, he was accused with one other person of inciting lawlessness among the peasants of the Munții Apuseni, and arrested in spite of an order by the Gubernium to the contrary. Balint, Begnescu, Coltoru and others petitioned the Gubernium in September for Axente's release, and were seconded by Nádasdy, but he was released only at the beginning of 1863. Local Hungarian officials used his "criminal record" of the previous year as a pretext to deny him election to the diet in June, 1863.

Șuluțiu apparently had his own misgivings about the way in which ecclesiastic proceedings were used for partisan political ends. He rebuked Axente when the latter reported that an alleged misappropriation of candles was the needed corpus delicti against Pop:

The affair with the candles does not merit a major scandal; but I see that your two sides have come to blows, considering to be major matters and crimes things that in themselves are small, that do not constitute a canonic transgression that would justify a court case...

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101. Draft by Gubernium to City Council of Gyulafehérvár, March 14, 1862, in MOL F263. 1862/1146.
102. Draft by Gubernium to Pogány, September 1, 1862, in MOL F263. 1862/4268; petition on Axente's behalf, received September 9, in MOL F264. 1862/902; Crenneville to Nádasdy, November 28, and draft of response, December 11, in MOL D229. 1862/4846; Retegan, Dieta românească a Transilvaniei, 74,141.
Axente should be more tolerant in minor matters, and not trouble him (the Metropolitan) with them. Similarly, in connection with the dispute between the patriotic layman Ioan Pop Maior and his more conservative pastor, Mihail Crișan, he wrote:

We are forced to observe that animosity, personal hatred, and a vindictive spirit predominate [in this case] rather than the love of the common good, about which some are pleased to talk too much and do too little.104

The spirit of these letters seems to confirm Haynald's allegation that Șuluțiu was powerless to control the political struggles that took place on the local level.

Șuluțiu's greatest rivals within the Cathedral Chapter were Canons Alutan and Papfalvi. Papp-Szilágyi had the temerity to suggest Șuluțiu should propose the elderly Alutan as bishop of one his suffragan sees-- a presumption that Fekete-Negrutiu angrily rejected during a session of the Consistory. Canon Papfalvi's reputation as a Hungarophile was established in the 1840s, when he sided with Bishop Lemeni in opposing the radical camp. He did, indeed, serve as a reliable source of information for Hungarian officials investigating the events in Blaj in May, 1861. In September, 1861 he advised a confidant of the

103. Axente to Șuluțiu, with affidavits, February 25, o.s., and Șuluțiu to Axente, March 12, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/170.
106. Copy of Albert Barcsay and Miklós Bíró to Pogány,
Hungarian prefect that the best way of bringing about a compromise with the Romanians was to call a conference at which Hungarians and representative Romanians (i.e. not Hungarophiles) could negotiate as equals and conclude a binding agreement. He was hopeful that if the Hungarians recognized the existence of the Romanian nation, then the latter would accept the union with Hungary and the refusal to send deputies to the Reichsrat.  He denounced the procedure of the commission investigating Augustin Pop, headed by himself, in a conversation with Haynald in 1862. The bishop quoted Papfalvi as confessing that "certainly we are guilty to a large degree, for we never asked for an accounting from him [Pop]."  These revelations are not necessarily those of a "renegade," as the militants were accustomed to label Papfalvi or Pop. Papfalvi assured the officials in Blaj that he had been, and remained, a supporter of the constitutional legislation of 1848. Like many members of the Catholic clergy, he was a political moderate who sought to create the possibility of national reconciliation in an atmosphere in which dialogue and compromise were frowned upon.

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May 19, 1861, in MOL D228. 1861/236.
108. Haynald to Scitovszky, May 1, 1862, in Esztergom, PL Scitovszky, Cat. D., 6. csomó, Erdély. 1862/1869.
The Diocese of Szamosújvár

This diocese was created, as was that of Lugos, in 1853 as one of the three suffragan bishoprics of the new church province of Blaj. Of its 634 parishes and 410,000 souls in that year, 540 parishes and 350,000 souls were from the former diocese of Blaj, and the remainder from the primarily Ruthenian diocese of Munkács that had its seat in northeastern Hungary. The predominance of the Romanian population on the territory of the new diocese was— if possible— even greater than in the archdiocese, and the density and average size of the parishes was greater. The populist Greek Catholics maintained that oriental church law required the decentralization of marriage tribunals or consistories. Unlike the archdiocese of Blaj, the diocese of Szamosújvár contained not only a central consistory, larger in membership that in Blaj, but also three local consistories under the presidency of the three vicars forane in the diocese. Nearly one-fourth of the parishes were separated from the central diocesan administration in this way.

History as well as the already mentioned administrative structure distinguished the diocese of Szamosújvár. The Orthodox revolts and mass reconversions of the mid-eighteenth century did not reach the northern half of Transylvania that constituted the new diocese. Two positive consequences were the relative absence of confessional strife of the kind that

110. Schematismus venerabilis cleri neo-erectae diocesis Szamos-Újváriensis gr. rit. cath. pro anno a Christo nato 1867, vi-viii and passim.

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plagued the villages of the archdiocese and a more vigorous tradition of pilgrimage shrines. Monastic life and large scale pilgrimage virtually died out among both the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of the archdiocese. In the absence of destruction the revolts had caused elsewhere several minor monastic settlements or chapels in the new diocese survived as significant shrines: Bikszád (Bixad) and Moisei in Hungary proper, Nicula not far from the seat of the bishop, and Strimbul and Vad in Belső-Szolnok county. Only Bikszád was an active monastery in a formal canonical sense, with five monks in residence in 1867, and it was a popular goal of pilgrims. Second in importance was Nicula, which attracted more than ten thousand pilgrims of various churches and nationalities each year. It housed the most important workshop for glass icon painting in Transylvania, which must be considered a religious community sui generis.

Strimbul and Vad were old shrines of more local significance, but the latter was fully renovated during the period under discussion. A later writer stated that the veneration

111. The catalogue indicates there was one clerical administrator in Nicula in 1867. It is probably indicative of the popularity of the shrine that in 1875-9 the diocese erected a church with a height of more than 80 ft. (larger than the "cathedral" in Szamosújvár!) on the hill overlooking the old wooden church. Cleopa Nanu, Mănăstirea Nicula ([Cluj-Napoca]: Arhiepiscopia ortodoxă română a Vadului, Feleacului și Clujului, 1985), 13-24. Concerning the pilgrimage see also Balogh de Nemcsicz, Beatissima Virgo Maria Mater Dei qua Regina et Patrona Hungariarum, 522-3, and Ion Apostol Popescu, Arta icoanelor pe sticlă de la Nicula (București: Editura tineretului, 1969), 14-20.

112. Concerning all five shrines, see Schematismus...

1867, 3-4, 46, 73, 190-1.
of pilgrimage shrines by the people of the diocese was unrivalled by Romanian Greek Catholics anywhere else.

The Romanian historian's image of ecclesiastic Szamosujvar is far less distinct than that of Blaj. A Romanian bishop, cathedral chapter and seminary resided there only from 1856 to 1930; the city boasted neither a proper cathedral nor a full-high school such as that which existed in Blaj. The bishop resided in Kolozsvár from 1930 until the nominal dissolution of the diocese in 1948.

The remainder of this section will examine three controversial issues for the new diocese that derived from its location in northwestern Transylvania, straddling the Partium and two other counties of Hungary proper: the cession of the Partium to Hungary in 1860, relations between Romanians and Ruthenians [Ukrainians and Rusyns], and the proposals to move the residence of the bishop to another town.

Only half of the 525 parishes in the diocese in 1867 were in Transylvania proper, 168 were in the Partium, and 94 in Hungary proper. Bishop Ioan Alexi (1794-1863) was a native of one of the parishes of the Partium. He was a moderate but dedicated Romanian patriot of long standing, who published a popular Romanian grammar in 1826 and served

115. Schematismus...1867, passim.
for many years as a canon in Nagyvárad. Some of the early Romanian bishops in Nagyvárad were supporters of the Romanian national movement, but during Alexi's tenure there he witnessed an increasing Hungarian and "Latinizing" influence in the diocese due to the predominantly Hungarian environment, the powerful economic position of the Hungarian nobility and parishes and the training of the Romanian clergy in the same seminary as the Roman Catholics of the diocese. Bishop Erdeli of Nagyvárad excused his political moderation during the 1860s in a letter to Suluțiu in 1861 by referring to the "far less favorable conditions here."
The establishment of the new Romanian diocese directly to the east was in part an attempt to counterbalance the influence of Nagyvárad.

Most Romanian patriots reacted strongly to the announcement by the Hungarian commission on the Partium in April, 1861 that, with the annexation of this territory by Hungary, the 240 Greek Catholic parishes there would be ceded to the diocese of Nagyvárad. All but three of these parishes were in the Diocese of Szamosújvár. Vicar of Sălaj Dimitrie Coroianu, Suluțiu, and Alexi all protested against this uncanonical action. The Hungarian commission assured the Romanians that the cession had been approved "in the highest places."

Yet the protest was partially

117. Erdeli to Suluțiu, January 10, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 727.
118. Hungarian commission on the Partium to Suluțiu, April 8, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/222; Coroianu to
successful: Szamosújvár lost 109 parishes in the Partium, but retained 168, even after the cession of the Partium by Transylvania to Hungary.

Bishop Alexi did not protest directly to the authorities concerning the cession of parishes. But he assured Şuluţiu that his entire clergy resented the cession. He noted that the Austrian authorities had considered carefully the location of the new diocese at the time of its creation and considered it desirable that it be centered in Transylvania yet extend to parts of Hungary and the Partium as well. Relations with the Ruthenian diocese of Munkács and especially with the local Ruthenians were a central issue in his diocese.

The Ruthenian parishes and believers in the diocese of Szamosújvár were overwhelmingly in those districts of Hungary proper that were separated from the diocese of Munkács at the time of the creation of the diocese. The Ruthenian clergy and that of the diocese of Munkács in particular was strongly influenced by Hungarian culture and

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Alexi, April 1, Partium commission to Alexi, April 8, and Şuluţiu to Alexi, April 16, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla, 1861/806; Şuluţiu to the commission, draft in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1861/222 and copy in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla, 1861/874.


120. Alexi to Şuluţiu, April 24, 1861, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/289.
political ideas. Most of the parishes annexed from
this diocese were Romanian in character, but they included a
significant Ruthenian element. Local disputes between
Romanians and Ruthenians took various forms. The parish of
Lelești, north of Dés in Belső-Szolnok county, was roughly
divided between Romanian and Ruthenian members. The latter
group, led by the Ruthenian pastor, converted to Orthodoxy
in 1862 in resentment of the militant Romanian consciousness
of the others and with the encouragement of Orthodox agita-
tors. Diocesan authorities were able to restore peace by
appointing a more circumspect Romanian pastor, however.
A similar ethnic dispute in Hídvég/Máieriște in Kraszna
county involved the replacement of the Romanian teacher by a
Ruthenian one. In both cases, the correspondence of the
Ruthenian party is in Hungarian. The contest between
Romanians and Ruthenians over the control of parishes and
schools was especially sharp in Máramaros county. The
Vicariat of Máramaros was erected in 1861, with a separate
jurisdiction for the Ruthenian parishes. Alexi and the

121. Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National
Identity. Subcarpathian Rus, 1848-1948 (Cambridge: Harvard
122. Reports of the clergy and members of the parish,
April to November, 1863, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-
Catolică Cluj-Gherla, 1863/1722, 1724, 2109.
123. Parishoners' petitions and reports of Vicar Coroianu,
October, 1861 to February, 1862, in AS Cluj-Napoca.
Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla, 1862/400.
124. Vasile Capilnean, "Contribuții la cunoașterea preoc-
upărilor pentru înființarea de scoli medii românești în Baia
Mare și Seini, după Revoluția de la 1848," Marmăția 2
(1971), 161-73; Alexandru Filipasçu, Istoria Maramureșului
(București: "Universul", 1940), 191-7.

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Bishop of Munkács contested the status of many parishes in the area of mixed population. In response to an appeal by Alexi to Franz Joseph, a Romanian-Ruthenian commission met in August, 1862 in Szatmár to discuss the disputed parish of Máramarossziget.

Though Ruthenians were few in number in Transylvania proper, they are relevant for the church there in two respects. First, one of the canons in Szamosújvár was a Ruthenian, Ivan Gulovich, who was embroiled in an ugly personal dispute with Alexi that was a flashpoint for broader political issues; second, the dispute over the location of the bishop's residence involved the basic political and cultural orientation of the diocese.

Canon Gulovich was a contentious and spiteful individual, but his dispute with Alexi was not exclusively personal. He made himself one of the chief opponents of the new bishopric's location in Transylvania and, indirectly, of Alexi's adherence to the Romanian national cause. He was uncomfortable in Transylvania after his transfer from Munkács; he didn't know Romanian, and petitioned unsuccessfully for his transfer to Vienna, Galicia, or Hungary.


126. "Kolozsvár" [anonymous refutation of article below by Gulovich], Religio, 1861, 317. As head of the diocesan consistory that deliberated upon Gulovich's case in 1863, Papp-Szilágyi ruled that the language of the proceedings would be Latin since the canon did not understand Romanian. Copy of Papp-Szilágyi to Alexi, March 2, 1863, in AS Alba
In early January, 1861, he published an appeal in *Religio* for the transfer of the seat of the bishopric to the Hungarian town of Nagybánya or even the complete administrative separation of the parishes in Hungary from the new diocese. He wrote (incorrectly) that the parish of Szamosujvar had only 500 members, that Szamosujvar was at the border of the diocesan territory but Nagybánya at its center (neither one was very centrally located), that administrative buildings would be available less expensively in Nagybánya, and that the current extent of the diocese was not conducive to efficient administration.

In one of his petitions to the Emperor, Gulovich charged Alexi with financial malfeasance and insults to his own person. The Chancellery instructed Şulutiu to investigate the charges against Alexi. When Alexi answered his inquiry with a series of countercharges, the Metropolitan resolved to travel to Szamosujvar at the head of an investigatory commission at the beginning of October, 1862. The commission found

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Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/190.
127. Gulovich, "Szamosújvár, jan. 11-en", and "Szamosujvar," in *Religio*, 1861, 45-6, 91. The first article is signed "G.J., o.k.", the second "Gulovich János, Őrkanonok." The parish of Szamosújvár had 1200 members in 1867; *Schematismus...* 1867, 21.
128. Nádasdy, Gulovich and Alexi to Şulutiu, August and September, and record of interrogations, October, 6, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/642, 911; one subject of the investigation was surely the report by Fekete-Negrutiu in June that a canon from Szamosújvár was spreading scandal among the Romanians by stories that the Greek Catholic bishops had appealed against the granting of the Orthodox Metropolitanate; Şulutiu to Alexi, June 4, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolica Cluj-Gherla. 1862/1093, and AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Protocol book. 1862/449.

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Gulovich's charges groundless. In January, 1863 Ţuluţiu ruled that the Canon must be tried by a plenary diocesan consistory under the presidency of either Papp-Szilágyi or Dobra. Alexi chose Papp-Szilágyi as president of the consistory, and the well-known lawyer-politician Ioan Raţiu to represent himself. Papp-Szilágyi travelled to Szamosújvár immediately after his consecration in Blaj on May 3. The consistory reached a verdict after two days of deliberation. It found Gulovich guilty of calumny, barring him from further promotions and participation in the Consistory for the remainder of Alexi's lifetime and requiring that he apologize to Alexi for his conduct.

Alexi was ill during the months of preparation for the trial. He died on the eve of the diet, much shaken by the acrimonious dispute that attracted the attention of the authorities and the press. Disputes between the Romanian clergy and Gulovich continued under Alexi's successor, Vicar Capitular Macedon Pop. Pop had already travelled to Vienna as part of one delegation, assisted

129. Ţuluţiu to Alexi, January 26, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/25; draft of Alexi to Raţiu, March 22, and Elie Vlasa to Alexi, March 25, with numerous other documents relating to the case, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla. 1863/975; Papp-Szilágyi to Ţuluţiu, May 13, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/417.

130. In his letters of April 22 and June 19 he declined invitations to the consecration in Blaj and the diet due to "an illness of several months' duration"; AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla. 1863/939, 1386. He died on June 29; telegram from Crenneville to Nadasdy, July 1, 1863, in MOL. D228, 1863/570.

Șuluțiu in the investigation in 1862, and was an active member of the diet. Another important canon, Ștefan Biltiu, was indicted by the city fathers of Szamosújvár in 1862 because of his political activity; despite the intercession of Alexi, the legal senate of the Gubernium was still deliberating his case at the time of Alexi’s death.

Romanian groups petitioned for the right to elect Alexi’s successor as bishop. Șuluțiu proposed a list of four candidates to the see: Fekete-Negrutiu, Pop, Biltiu, and Coroianu. Vienna rejected all proposals, reserving the right of nomination for itself and postponing a decision.

In 1865 it nominated a moderate canon of Nagyvárad, Ioan Vancea, whom Șuluțiu opposed.

Advocates of a transfer of the seat of the diocese from Szamosújvár generally favored either Năsăud, in the Romanian district of the same name, or Nagybánya in Hungary proper. Petitions for the establishment of a bishopric in Nagybánya were circulated in 1790, 1802, and 1810, then again in 1860 and 1861. The authors of the most recent petitions were the city officials of Nagybánya and the clergy and laity of

132. Copy of petition of Alexi to Franz Joseph, December 1, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/1074; draft of Nádasdy to Crenneville, April 18, 1863, in MOL, D228. 1863/257; Vasile Pop to Alexi, June 17, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla. 1863/1386.

133. Șuluțiu forwarded to the Gubernium petitions for the election of the new bishop from the Consistory in Szamosújvár and the clergy of three regions of the diocese; letters in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/653, 731; correspondence and drafts of Șuluțiu and the Chancellery from 1863 and 1864, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 786; Dimitrie Moldovan to Vasile Pop, February 18, 1865, in AS Alba Iulia. Fondul Dimitrie Moldovan, 1865/36.
Máramaros. Franz Joseph declined to take any action on the matter, but the Locumtenential Council of Hungary informed Alexi at the end of 1862 that it was favorably inclined toward these petitions.

Alexi rejected all arguments for the move to Nagybanya. He noted that some advocates of the move feared the presence of a Romanian bishopric in Szamosújvár was an obstacle to the creation of an Armenian bishopric there. Alexi was less opposed to the idea of moving the bishopric to Násáud. A petition for the move to Násáud circulated on the eve of the creation of the new district of Násáud. Proponents of Násáud pointed out that it had been the chief cultural and political center of the Romanians of northern Transylvania since it became the seat of the Second Romanian Border Regiment in 1763. In 1867 it possessed the largest elementary and high schools in the diocese. The parishes of the Vicariat of Rodna, centered in Násáud, were so well-provided for that Alexi excluded the Vicariat from his request for parish aid in 1859. Vicar Grigore Moisil and his clergy

134. Clergy of the district of Nagybánya to Vancea, September 8, 1865, with accompanying documents, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 811.

135. Alexi to Şułuțiu, April 24, 1861, with excerpt from letter of Alexi to Liechtenstein, October 8, 1860, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/289. Concerning the Armenian question, see Chapter IX. Alexi quoted the Armenians' advocate, Zacharie Gabruș, who like Gulovich sent denunciations against Alexi to Vienna in 1862.

136. Correspondence of Franz Joseph, Kemény, and Liechtenstein concerning the Liechtenstein petition, March and April, 1861, in MOL. F258. 203. cs. 1861/1443 and MOL. D228. 1861/146.
were loyal supporters of the dynasty and of Schmerling.

The question of the relations between Ruthenians and Romanians in northeastern Hungary remained troublesome up to the eve of World War I. At times the Ruthenian Greek Catholics gravitated toward Russian Orthodoxy, as in the well-publicized "schismatic movement" of the last decade before the war; others supported the equally controversial Hungarian Greek Catholic bishopric of Hajdúdorog, created after lengthy antecedents in 1912. In both cases the Romanian clergy found itself in the difficult position of simultaneously seeking to preserve its ethnic identity, obedience to Rome and to oriental church law. The final section of the chapter will discuss this juggling act in the light of the question of synods.

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The Synodal Movement

The connection between church synods and popular political activism was well-established before reviving at the end of the 1850s. The Concordat and Rauscher's regulation concerning marriage tribunals prompted Šuluțiu to not only write repeatedly to the Holy See in defense of oriental canon law, but to make preparations for the convocation of a provincial synod. Clerical synods met in the deaneries

137. Draft of Liechtenstein to Thun, July 23, 1859, in MOL. F258, 203. cs. 1859/3302; Moisil et al. to Kemény, May 20, 1861, in MOL. D228. 1861/278; excerpt of report by prefect Bohátel on the religious celebration of the centennial of the establishment of the regiment, June 20, 1863, in MOL. D228. 1863/546.

of the diocese of Szamosújvár within weeks of the announce-
ment of the Nuncio's mission to Transylvania, in April, 1858. They gave voice to the clergy's many pressing con-
cerns with regard to schools and economic support as well as
the marriage tribunals. Șuluțiu and the other bishops argued strongly in favor of the synod while the Nuncio was in Transylvania. The war and instability of the following years delayed the granting of permission by Vienna and the Vatican.

The revival of the populist tradition and popular demands strongly influenced the bishops' request. Fekete-
Negruțiu published a militant defense of eastern church traditions in Gazeta Transilvaniei of March, 1858, on the eve of the preparatory synods. The Romanian journal of Kronstadt, Foaie pentru Minte, Inimă, și Literatură published thirteen articles concerning Greek Catholic synods between 1860 and 1864. Many articles warned of the danger to eastern traditions. One quoted a "high official" as assuring some younger clergymen in Blaj that "His Holi-
ness the Pope does not wish to change the Uniates' rite, discipline or customs; but the rumor [of a review of litur-
gical books] leads one to suspect this is sensim sine
sensu." In publishing a Hungarian translation of two such

139. AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-
Gherla. 1858/1560ff. I was unable to consult the documents in AS Alba Iulia, MRU for 1858.
140. George Em. Marica, Foaie pentru minte, inimă și
Romanian articles, Károly Veszely noted that the widespread anxiety and demand for synods among the Greek Catholics was taking on dangerous proportions. The Concordat did, indeed, require the holding of synods, but Veszely urged the Romanian bishops to pacify popular unease through a circular.

On the contrary, Şułuţiu did little to discourage the synodal movement. It was beyond his control, but his defense of the populist agenda encouraged the activists. Şułuţiu was above all conscious of the popular force of the religious rivalry: "at the first report that they are not upholding the Pravilá, [the Greek Catholics] go over to their brothers, where this is unchanged, i.e. the non-Uniates." Şaguna secured an imperial promise of the restoration of the Orthodox Metropolitanate in September, 1860, and held a synod with the participation of the laity a month later. Şułuţiu's chief argument for permission to convene a synod when he met the Nuncio in December, 1860 was the danger from the "schismatics." De Luca presented the request to the Holy See almost immediately, assuring Şułuţiu that the chances of success were good.

In order to address the specific questions the Nuncio had raised about the terms of the synod, Şuлуţiu convened a

142. Romanian article of 1860, translated by Veszely, op.cit., 297.
plenary consistory in mid-March, 1861 with the participation of all his canons and deans. The participants declared that the grave problems of parish finance, education, church buildings and discipline could only be decisively dealt with if the proposed synod included a sizable lay representation. Sulutiu made the same points in his letter to de Luca on the eve of the assembly, although he emphasized that doctrinal and sacramental matters must be reserved for exclusively clerical bodies. The Romanian bishops argued for the admission of the laity to the synods for a very practical reason: the laity could only be made to bear a greater share of the economic support of the parishes if it were made a party to decisions.

The Holy See informed Austria that it urgently desired the convocation of a Greek Catholic synod, to be held no later than the Orthodox one that was planned for the spring of 1861. Schmerling, aware that the Orthodox synod would be postponed and of the differing character of Saguna and Sulutiu, opposed the convocation. He wrote that the personality of the Metropolitan was an insufficient guarantee that the synod would remain within reasonable political and canonical bounds. The Holy See accepted Sulutiu’s ar-

146. Rechberg to Schmerling, March 5, 1861, and draft of
guments for the necessity of the synod, but shared many of the Austrians’ misgivings. The canonical justification for lay participation was weak. It should not be forgotten that the church was not of this world; all efforts should be made to avoid the disturbances the government rightly feared would result from the synod.

As he had in 1858, Bishop Alexi reacted prematurely to the news of an impending synod. Within weeks, he issued a pastoral letter announcing the diocesan synod would include two lay representatives from each parish, discuss organizational and financial matters, and be preceded by district synods. Ţuluţiu rebuked him for his hastiness; Alexi replied that, given the agitated state of lay opinion, he was in a difficult position and requested further instructions. No decision came from Vienna, however. Ţuluţiu even appealed to Governor Mikó to support his request, pointing out that such synods were normal in Mikó’s own church. Mikó’s Gubernium stated it had no objection to the synod, and his successor took the same position. But Ţuluţiu received contradictory reports concerning the likely decision in Vienna.

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Schmerling to Rechberg, March 25, in AVA. Neuer Kultus, Box 34: Ungarn. Siebenbürgeren, 2364/634.
147. Undated copy of note from Antonelli to de Luca, for communication to Franz Joseph, and de Luca to Ţuluţiu, March 9, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 716.
148. Draft of pastoral letter of April 18, Ţuluţiu to Alexi, April 19, and draft of reply by Alexi, April 20, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolică Cluj-Gherla. 1861/808.
Şulutiu approved the holding of preparatory district synods, and the archives have preserved the protocols of many of these. Some merely discussed economic affairs, and elected deputies to the diocesan synod; others issued declarations in support of Romanian political activity.

Şuluţiu finally informed his people in a circular of October 4, 1861 that the holding of diocesan synods, for which he had worked so long, would be postponed indefinitely because of the agitated state of public opinion. Districts should continue to make their concerns known, however, for instance in the question of marriage tribunals. Şulutiu cited no government ruling in support of his announcement, and it certainly fell short of satisfying the militants. In reporting on the district synod he had presided over, Grigore Elekes, pastor of Sânmartin de Cimpie in Kolozs county made a ringing justification for synods. Christianity and the

\[\text{Corespondenţa Mikó Imre. 1861/109; Crenneville to Nádasdy, January 11, 1862, with draft of Chancellery to Schmerling, April 10, 1862, in MOL D229. 1862/226. Vasile Pop was mildly optimistic: letter to Şulutiu, September 16, while Grigore Mihali was pessimistic: letter to Şulutiu, September 10, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 698 and 720. The editors of GBCS (III, 186) state that Mikó vetoed the synod, but in fact the chief obstacle was Schmerling.}

150. Protocol of the synod of the district of Cheseiu, June 6, of the district of Lăpuș, June 18, of the district of Bistra, July 29, and of the district of Hermannstadt, November 1, 1862, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolica Cluj-Gherla. 1861/1217, 2154, and AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1861/639 and 1862/1077. The synod of Lăpuș recorded much data about the local schools, applauded the behavior of the Romanian deputies in Pest, asked Şulutiu to convene a national congress, and symbolically elected Baritiu and Bărnutiu as its deputies to the larger synod.

nature of our church demand a representative constitution, he wrote. Bishops had a moral responsibility to explain why final permission for diocesan synods had not been granted. He claimed that both the Concordat and the new marriage regulations were illegal.

As on other occasions, we declare our opposition to the Concordat and the new marriage laws, entreat ing you: convocate the archdiocesan synod as soon as possible, and restore the deanery courts with all their attributes.152

The Nuncio, Hungarian bishops and the Catholic press were highly sensitive to the "schismatic danger" signified by the uncanonical and anti-Roman extremes that popular agitation gave rise to. The Romanian bishops generally argued that respect for the rights of the rural deans and oriental church discipline, adequate economic support for the parishes, and above all a properly supervised synod were the best way of lessening the attraction of Orthodoxy.

Şuluţiu had a premonition in the summer of 1862 that his star was falling rapidly in Rome. As he wrote to Vasile Pop, the first signs of this came in response to his insistence on oriental matrimonial law in 1856, his historical remarks at the conference in Gyulafehérvar in 1861, and the liturgical affair at Előpatak. Now, he alleged, there was

152. Elekes to Şuluţiu, November 25, 1861, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 726.
talk of assigning a coadjutor bishop to supervise him and using the Pop affair against him. He was certain that "the chain of the conspiracy reaches even into Blaj itself," as he had learned that his own Cathedral Chapter had denounced him to the Nuncio and Primate; evil stories were spread about him by "my implacable enemy H[aynald who is now] in Rome."

On January 19, 1863, gendarmes conducted a search for arms in two houses on Şuľuţiú's archdiocesan estate in Șpring and Cut in southern Alba-Feher county. Nine days later, a spectacular but vague report appeared in Gazeta Transilvaniei, signed "N....u". Many readers concluded that the search was aimed at the Metropolitan himself, or had even taken place in Blaj. So powerful was the public response that Crenneville ordered an immediate investigation. The investigation revealed that szolgabíró János Apáty--previously implicated in other incidents with the Romanian militants--suspected that estate manager Vasile Albini was hiding between twenty and 2000 guns on his premises, and ordered the search. No guns were found.

Albini suggested to Şuľuţiú that the search was in truth directed against the Metropolitan. He reported that Apáty's informant had been "a Romanian priest, an old

154. Draft of Şuľuţiú to Vasile Pop, June 12, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 735.
155. Correspondence of Crenneville, Nádasdy, and Mecséry, February 3-18, 1863, in MOL D228. 1863/64, 73, 81, 92.
156. Albini to Şuľuţiú, January 20, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 745.
man, learned, one of the leading Romanian priests," a possible allusion to Augustin Pop. He also stated he had overheard a remark by one of the gendarmes that under the present circumstances the Romanians "were no longer afraid" of the Hungarians, and this presumably would have to be changed. These reports may help to account for the indignant Romanian response to the incident.

Crenneville assured Şuluţiu that the search had not been directed against Şuluţiu himself. The information available to the gendarmes had seemed to justify a search, but he felt Apáty had acted hastily and ordered he be reprimanded. Canon Fekete-Negrutiu confirmed the authorities' suspicion that he had authored the press report. The Governor expressed his strong disapproval of the Canon's action, which he described as unjustified, tactless, and irresponsible. He demanded that Şuluţiu reprimand him.

Despite Crenneville's later assurances, the incident served as another indicator for Şuluţiu of his declining prestige.

The Holy See was more moved by the Hungarians' arguments than by those of the Romanians. It not only delayed the synod, but rejected Şuluţiu's proposal of his ideological allies for the vacant suffragan sees of Nagyvárad and Szamosújfár in 1862-5. The most fateful nom-

157. Albini to Şuluţiu, February 14 and 20, 1863, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 756 and 748.
159. Crenneville to Şuluţiu, February 12, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 748.
ination for Suluțiu and the populists was that of Iosif Papp-Szilágyi for Nagyvárad.

Bishop Erdeli of Nagyvárad died in July, 1862. Suluțiu favored Alexi or Dobra for the vacant see, but Scitovszky, the Holy See and the government favored Papp-Szilágyi for his loyalty to the crown and to Catholic tradition. As the Primate wrote in his letter of recommendation, a strong hand was needed in the vacant see because "the non-Uniate Romanians are trying everything, under the pretext of the national idea, to seduce the Uniate Romanians toward schism." The recommendation by Forgách stated Papp-Szilágyi was "the right man from the ecclesiastic standpoint, and had shown himself an energetic spokesman for the rights of the crown and public order in the county assemblies."

Fekete-Negruțiu and the Romanian press were unfavorably disposed toward Papp-Szilágyi. The nominee revealed his special mission in a letter to Suluțiu three months before his consecration. His devotion to Blaj, "the holy city, that center from which the true Romanian intelligentsia has spread into all areas populated by Romanians," was of a confessional rather than nationalist coloration: "The intelligentsia fears Roman Latinism, an empty fear! and does not

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160. The most recent biographical study of Papp-Szilágyi is Filip, "Iosif Pop-Sálâjeanul de Bâsești (1813-1873)," Buna Vestire 5,4 (1966), 1-4.
161. Draft of Scitovszky to Forgách, July 13, in Esztergom, PL. Scitovszky, Cat. D., 3. csomó: Nagyvárad (Gorög katholikus); Council of Ministers, session of October 23, in POM, V,4, 308.
fear Greek Calvinism and atheism..." He confided that he enjoyed the special confidence of the Foreign Ministry and the Nuncio. Not suprisingly, Şuluțiu rejected his proposal that Haynald concelebrate the mass of consecration in Blaj. Şuluțiu scored a partial victory, it is true, when he forestalled the appointee's plan to travel to Rome for consecration. The Metropolitan presided over the consecration in Blaj on May 3, 1863. The new bishop's homily upon taking up his see in Nagyvárad afterward was a ringing declaration of loyalty to Rome. He then travelled to Rome for consultations.

Papp-Szilágyi was a scholar of canon law who published an important work in the subject in 1862. He provoked a public controversy after his return from Rome by publishing a sharp attack on populist religious views in a circular of November, 1863. The idea that synods and representation were basic to religious life was more Protestant than Catholic, he charged. The proper remedy for the religious problems of the day was to fight religious indifference and increase piety among the believers. Şuluțiu appealed directly to Franz Joseph against this defiant action.

164. Papp-Szilágyi to Şuluțiu, April 27, in Ibid., 762; copy of Capri to Papp-Szilágyi, March 17, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia Greco-Catolicá Cluj-Gherla. 1863/939; Sermo per Josephum Papp-Szilágyi de Illyesfalva... Ocasione canonicae suae in sedem episcopalem introductionis die 17. may 1863 ad clerum dioecesanum habitus (M.-Varadini: Typis Aloysii Tichy, 1863).
165. Enchiridion Juris Ecclesiae Orientalis Catholicae, 1862 and 1880.
of his suffragan bishop. He accused him of incitement (Aufwiegelungen), adding that

...it is not so much that archepiscopal prestige and authority are humiliated hereby, as that in the current times [such actions] can easily provoke religious machinations... which can be harmful to the state and the Romanian nation, and dangerous for the holy [church] union itself.

Şuluţiu sent an appeal to the Nuncio, as well.

A violent but fruitless polemic between the two Romanian bishops ensued. Şuluţiu insisted that the religious discord within the nation would only be worsened unless one strove for concord and understanding. Papp-Szilágyi not only refused to revoke his circular as the Metropolitan demanded, but sent copies of it to the suffragan sees in Szamosújvár and Lugos. In a tirade against what he considered the irresponsible lack of leadership on the part of the late Bishop Alexi and his subordinate clergy, Papp-Szilágyi referred to the radical synod of Lăpuş as "putrid Calvinist excrement." Bishop Dobra anxiously sought to restore a measure of concord in relations between the prelates.

Popular pressure for a synod continued to find a posi-

166. Circular of Papp-Szilágyi, November 1, 1863, signed, provatively, "Sanctae Sedis Apostolicae auctoritate Episcopus Romanorum et Ruthenorum Dioceseos gr. ritus catholicorum Magnovaradiensis" [i.e. stressing the diocese contained Ruthenians as well as Romanians]; Şuluţiu to Nádasdy, February 9, 1864, and appeal to Franz Joseph of the same date; copy of letters to Nuncio and Papp-Szilágyi, February 9, in MOL D228. 1864/138.

167. Correspondence of Papp-Szilágyi, Şuluţiu, and Dobra, January and February, 1864, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1864/30, 86, 77, 117.
tive response among the clergy. Fekete-Negrutiu presided as Dean over the synod of the district of Blaj in March, 1864 that appealed eloquently for the granting of an archdiocesan synod in light of the Romanians’ services to the crown and the favors already granted to the Orthodox. The clerical synod of Cfanul Mare a few weeks later issued a similar appeal. Şuлуțiu once again began earnest preparations for an archdiocesan synod. It is probably impossible to assess whether, as Austrian officials judged, he did so primarily "under pressure from the laity."

Şuluțiu hoped to convene the synod on October 16, 1864, but was disappointed. On paper, preparations continued, with the participation of the suffragan bishops. Nothing was achieved before Şuлуțiu’s death in September, 1867.

The final three years of Şuluțiu’s life were a sad epilogue to the restless activity and significant achievements of earlier years. He repeatedly nominated his chief protege, Fekete-Negrutiu, for the vacant see in Szamosujvar. In fact, the Holy considered Negrutiu unacceptable for a bishop’s see because of his political and religious views. The Nuncio strongly reprimanded him at the end of 1864, while his name was still in nomination, because of his

168. Fekete-Negrutiu et al. to Sulutiu, March 7 and April 8, and Demetriu Szabó et al. March 31, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1864/339; printed protocol of the district synod of Blaj, March 7-8, in Ibid., 1863/357.


170. Correspondence of Papp-Szilágyi, Vancea, and others concerning preparations for the synod.
public denunciation of the Concordat and Roman marriage legislation. Rome may have decided at this time to hand over most of Şulutiu's prerogatives to a coadjutor bishop. It did not actually do so, but his influence visibly lessened. At the end of 1864, the Ministry of Finance delivered a blow that brought him to the edge of despair: by a rather obscure calculation, it announced that Sulutiu owed the state the immense sum of 44,450 fl. Sulutiu secured a release from the debt only by a long and abject appeal to the Emperor.

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For much of the history of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church a dichotomy existed between a pro-Roman or "Latinizing" tendency and a populist tendency that defended eastern traditions in such matters as deanery marriage tribunals and a married clergy. To the populist tradition was added in the late eighteenth century the Dacoroman nationalist conception and a Febronian emphasis on synodality. Alexandru Sterca-Şulutiu was the only Greek Catholic Metropolitan to represent the populist-nationalist tradition in his leadership of the church.

Sulutiu attained a reputation in Rome as an ill-educated fanatic for his stubborn defense of oriental

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171. Correspondence of Şulutiu and the Nuncio, March through September, 1865, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 807, 808, 812; the Nuncio to Fekete-Negrutiu, December 13, 1864, in Barițiu, Părti alese, III, 561-2.
172. DSSS, 211-12.
173. 31-page draft of Şulutiu to Franz Joseph, late 1864 or early 1865, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM. 790.
marriage law and synods. His most objectionable act from Rome's standpoint was his attendance at a public Orthodox liturgy in 1861. On the other hand, he attained positive ecclesiastical concessions from Vienna and Rome through the approval of state financial aid to his church and the appointment of canons of his choice, including one who was married.

The two outstanding areas in which Şuluţiu represented the populist position were in his struggle with Hungarians and Hungarophile Romanians and in his support of the movement for the holding of synods with lay participation. Haynald and Şuluţiu clashed at the conference in Gyulafehérvár in 1861; Augustin Pop of Gyulafehérvár, Canon Papfalvi of Blaj, Canon Ivan Gulo维奇 of Szamosújvár and Bishop Iosif Papp-Szilágyi of Nagyvárad all opposed the Dacoroman tendencies and favored a more conciliatory policy toward the Hungarians. The synodal movement reached its apogee in the 1860s. Şuluţiu and Bishop Alexi could hardly control it; but they placed themselves at its head by petitioning, unsuccessfully, for permission to hold the desired synods with lay participation.

Şuluţiu's ecclesiastical policy met repeated checks in his final years: through the promotion by Rome and Vienna of the ultramontane Papp-Szilágyi, the rejection of the synodal movement and of the proposed promotion to the episcopate of Şuluţiu's protege Fekete-Negruţiu, and the humiliating experience of a police search on Şuluţiu's estate and a
large debt assessment by the Ministry of Finance. The populist Greek Catholics, like the Dacoromans in secular politics, made significant gains in these years but also suffered setbacks that contrasted with their high expectations.
Perhaps the most characteristic expression of church politics in the region during this period was the striving of secular and religious leaders to bring the extent and autonomy of bishoprics more closely in line with ethnic constituencies. Such attempts were nourished by the ambitions of individual churchmen. They also enjoyed definite practical advantages for patriots and Habsburg statesmen. The ethnoreligious autonomies they sought were a compromise between the status quo and the radical principle of nation states. Unlike states, numerous autonomous ethnic churches could coexist on the same territory.

Earlier chapters noted the attainment of the Concordat, Romanian Greek Catholic and Croatian Roman Catholic archbishoprics as important successes of the tendency toward church autonomy in the 1850s. This chapter will discuss several similar movements which came to their fruition or denouement in the following decade: those of the Romanian Orthodox, Transylvanian Roman Catholics, a small group of Reformed Hungarian emigres, and the Armenian Catholics. They found existing ecclesiastic arrangements inadequate for their interests, and also sought more adequate political expression for their community than the secular administration could provide.
Romanian Orthodoxy

Traditional ties with the Russians, the Danubian Principalities and the Serbs distinguished the Romanian Orthodox from the Greek Catholics. The memory of Russian support for the Orthodox revolt in the previous century and the proximity of the Orthodox Danubian Principalities caused some Hungarians and even 1 Austrians to accuse the Orthodox of Pan-Slavic or foreign sympathies.

The Romanian press reported in August, 1862 the public whipping in Drasov in Alsó-Fehér county of a Romanian nun from the Moldavian monastery of Neamț by a drunken szolga-bíró who arbitrarily accused her of being a spy. She was a native of a neighboring village and on her way there at the time. A police official reported in 1858 that the Romanian calugări (monks) took their name from the monasteries of the Russian guberniia of Kaluga. He reported these monks "come to Transylvania from the Danubian Principalities every spring and circulate imperial ukazes issued in connection with the abolition of serfdom in Russia."

The report is unlikely and the etymology erroneous, although

1. This expression may seem anachronistic since Danilevskii's classic expression of Pan-Slavism appeared only in 1867. But Hungarians were already hypersensitive to the perceived threat of Slavic solidarity.

2. German translation and original of report in Telegraful Român, August 9, 1862 (o.s.), pp. 248-9, forwarded to Crenneville by Nádasdy, August 26. MOL D228, 1862/367. Crenneville ordered an investigation of the affair by Pogány; Crenneville to Nádasdy, August 29, in MOL D228, 1862/380.

3. Document cited by Weisenfeld, 82.
Neamț and neighboring monasteries did enjoy traditional ties with Russia and housed many Russian and Ukrainian monks even in the nineteenth century. Also mistaken was the police report in 1863 that "Russian money" was being spent in Transylvania to convince the Romanian peasants to oppose the sending of deputies to the Reichsrat. Such tales gained a degree of plausibility from the diplomatic estrangement of Russia and Austria and also from the fact that the Romanian colors (red, yellow, and blue), occasionally blandished by Romanian nationalists, were also those of imperial Russia. There were indeed considerable contacts between Russian and Romanian theologians, but the latter were almost exclusively in the Principalities and not Transylvania.

Contacts between the Transylvanian Orthodox and the Danubian Principalities were far more substantial than those with Russia. These contacts were considered legitimate, but

4. Pâcurariu, Istoria, III, 377. The staret of Neamț from 1779 to 1794 was a native of Poltava, Paisii Velichkovskii. He had a great impact on the monastic revival in Russia, especially in the Optina monastery near Kaluga; this was the connection between the two places. Paisii's ascetic teachings were as such hardly conducive to political involvement. See Suttner, "Kloster Neamt als Vermittler byzantinischer Literatur an der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert," in Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte der Rumänen, 271-7, and James Billington, The Icon and the Axe. An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (New York: Random House, 1966), 201-2.


6. For instance, it was reported that partisans of Fekete-Negrutiu used signs with his name, the national colors, and "October 20" inscribed on them. An informant in Hermannstadt to Mecséry, July 3, 1863, in HHSa, Informationsbüro, 1863/6255 (Elenchus 344).

were also controversial. A Hungarian emigre reported from Bucharest at the end of 1859 that a group of Orthodox clergymen there were among the most outspoken supporters of the Dacoroman orientation. They allegedly hoped to extend their influence over the wealthy Orthodox parishes in the Hungarian lands and were encouraged by a declaration by the Metropolitan of Bucharest that the Romanian Orthodox north of the border were all part of his flock. The perception is interesting, but it is doubtful that Metropolitan Nifon issued such a declaration. The bishops in the Danubian Principalities did not have any jurisdiction over Transylvania, but only a sort of symbolic patronage owing to the fact that they had consecrated and at times even nominated its bishops in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and then encouraged those resisting the subsequent church union. As late as the beginning of the nineteenth century the bishops in the Principalities maintained their traditional right to ordain clergy for Transylvania.

8. Letter of István Dunyov, December, 1859, cited by Borsi-Kálmán, Együttes vagy külön utakon, 88. I have seen no other indication of such a declaration, and Dunyov falsely identifies the Metropolitan.

9. Nifon was at odds with those Romanian prelates who had made nationalist declarations; see Antonie Plămădeală, "Episcopi ai Buzăului in cultura română," in ed. Plămădeală, Spiritualitate și istorie la întorsura Carpaților, II (Buzău: Editat de Sectorul cultural al Episcopiei Buzăului, 1983), 97, 119-22.

10. See Păcurariu, "Legăturile Bisericii Ortodoxe din Transilvania cu Țara Română și Moldova în secolele XVI-XVIII (Teza de Doctorat)," Mitropolia Ardealului 13, 1-3 (1968), 1-173.

Šaguna’s official contacts with his colleagues across the Carpathians were fairly limited. Most voluminous was his correspondence with the Bishop of Rîmnic, Calinic. Several of these letters concerned the case of a fugitive monk from Calinic’s diocese, which was directly south of Hermanstadt across the mountains. The monk sought recognition as pastor of a parish in Alsó-Fehér county, but Šaguna had him apprehended by the police and deported after he had spent a month in the country. He also warned the clergy of the southern districts to register every visiting foreign monk with the district dean. Other correspondence concerned the procurement of liturgical books and contributions for the construction of the cathedral in Hermanstadt. When Metropolitan Nifon travelled to Elòpatak in June, 1862 to take the waters, Šaguna ordered the local pastor to accord him all the honors of a visiting Orthodox prelate, within and outside the church and in the presence of all the local clergy. Nifon and Šaguna had

12. Lupaș, "Vieața și faptele," 316-17. Regarding Nifon, the author states simply that "he does not seem to have fully understood Šaguna’s plans." Concerning Calinic, who was declared a saint by the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1950, see Păcuraru, Istoria bisericiei ortodoxe române, III, 146-51.

13. Drafts of Šaguna to Calinic, the Chief of Police in Hermanstadt, and five district deans, and the Chief of Police to Šaguna, January, 1862, — ABAOR, FS 1686, 1686/1, 1691. 1692.


15. Correspondence of dean Ioan Moga and Šaguna, June 1-3 (o.s.) and Šaguna’s letter greeting Nifon, June 20, 1862 (o.s.), in ABAOR, FS 1717, 1718.
discussions in Kronstadt at the time of the ASTRA meeting there at the end of July.

The involvement of foreign governments and individuals in the Orthodox parishes and schools of Kronstadt was a sensitive question. The parish of St. Nicholas had a venerable tradition of supporting education and ties with the Principalities. Under its aegis Saguna established the Orthodox gymnasium in the city in 1850. The gymnasium received annual subsidies from the Gubernium, the city, and, beginning in 1860, from the governments of the two Danubian Principalities. The Hungarian government ratified this arrangement after 1867, but it became a matter of bitter controversy in later years.

Greek and Romanian merchants established the wealthy parish of the Holy Trinity in Kronstadt in the eighteenth century. As in other towns of Transylvania and eastern Hungary, their number declined with time. Ethnic Romanians in the city sought to gain control of the parish, supported by Bishop Saguna. The struggle over Holy Trinity parish lasted several decades. A Wallachian boyar and honorary

member of ASTRA, Prince Grigore Brâncoveanu, was the descendant of the founder of a parish endowment. He appealed to the Austrian and Hungarian authorities between 1858 and 1868, complaining of the failure of the Greeks to administer the endowment in the interest of Romanian education. In 1863 the Gubernium sent an investigative commission to the parish headed by the Referent for Orthodox affairs, Ioan Baloga. Șaguna considered the attempt of the commission to arbitrate the dispute a violation of his own prerogatives. His protest was so energetic that, on the eve of the dietal elections, the Chancellery abruptly terminated the activity of the commission in order to placate the bishop. The courts finally ruled in favor of the "Greeks" in 1886, and the parish joined the Serbian diocese of Budapest. Ironically, most of its members had assimilated linguistically with the Romanians by this time.

The Orthodox episcopate of the Principalities had many conflicts with Prince Cuza. Șaguna himself criticized the

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19. Brâncoveanu to Șaguna, undated letter and February 14 (o.s.), 1863, in ABAOR, FS 1807, 1836; Crenneville to Bologa, February 13, in Alba Iulia, Muzeul Unirii. Fondul Ioan Bologa, No. 5813. Brâncoveanu had earlier petitioned the Vienna authorities to approve a rail connection across the Carpathians; see POM, V, 3, 439-40, and V, 4, 47-9, 181-2. He was among the most conservative of Romanian politicians, a consistent opponent of Prince Cuza who participated in the conspiracy to oust him in 1866; see Borsi-Kálmán, "Klapka, Cuza és Arthur Seherthoss: 1864 (Szemelvények egy 19. századi magyar-román megegyezési kísérlet dokumentumai-ból)," Századok 119 (1985), 801.
20. Draft of Șaguna to Nádasdy, April 11, reply by Baron Reichenstein, June 4, and draft of reply by Șaguna, June 13, in ABAOR, FS 1491, 1850, 1852.
21. Ioan Pușcariu, Notite, 149.
double election of Cuza and opposed the unification of the Principalities in an article in *Telegraful Român*. The government deposed several bishops as the result of their opposition to liberal reforms, most importantly the Metropolitan of Moldavia in November, 1860. The two strongest supporters of the Prince's nationalist policies among the Prelates were the leaders of the diocese of Buzău, situated beyond the mountains southeast of Kronstadt. Bishop Filotei (1850-60) was born in a Transylvanian village near Kronstadt. He strongly supported the movement for the union of the Danubian Principalities, even urging his clergy to pray for its success in a pastoral letter in 1857. His successor, Dionisie Romano, was a native of Saliste near Hermannstadt with even stronger liberal and nationalist sympathies. He translated into Romanian and published in two editions (1848 and 1859) Lamennais' *Paroles d'un croyant*. He spent part of the year of revolutions in Transylvania, and became a friend of Saguna. As locum tenens in Buzau between 1860 and 1864 he supported the liberal nationalist and ecclesiastic policies of the government.

Grigore Brâncoveanu's ancestor, Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu, had established endowments in Kronstadt and in 1698 a monastery at Sîmbătă de Sus in the district of Făgăraș. Many of the monasteries and hermitages south and

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22. Bobango, 77. The article appeared in May, 1859.
24. Plămădeală, 82-100.
25. Ibid., 101-21.
east of the border were founded by Romanians from southern Transylvania. Older ones, particularly in the diocese of Rîmnic directly south of Hermannstadt, were repopulated, after their devastation by Osman Pasvan-Oglu in the early nineteenth century, in large part by Transylvanians. The monasteries of the Rîmnic region served as the chief strongholds of Tudor Vladimirescu during his nationalist uprising in 1821. A large number of these monasteries' monks, even abbots, were Transylvanians in the nineteenth century.

Many of the Romanian visitors to the Carpathian monasteries were transhumant shepherds. The number of transhumant shepherds was declining, but around 1860 still numbered 15-20,000, with perhaps half a million sheep. In many years more than half of the sheep registered as the property of Transylvanians grazed south of the Carpathians.


27. Turczynski, "Zur Kulturgeographie der Nationalbewegung im Südosten," 416, 419; Stefan Metes, Emigrari românești din Transilvania în secolele XIII-XX, 2nd ed. (București: Editura științifică și enciclopedică, 1977), 182-6. Grigore Brâncoveanu was the patron of several monasteries in the region; see the correspondence of Șaguna and Aron Florian, his administrator (of Transylvanian origin), June and July, 1859, in Lupaș, "Vieata și faptele," 478-84.

28. Miskolczy, "Erdély a reformkorban," 1204-5; Szász, "Gazdaság és társadalom a kapitalista átalakulás korában," 1537, both in Erdély története 1830-tól napjainkig. According to Szász the absolutist officials of Transylvania made it even easier for the shepherds to cross the frontier, so that "még a hatvánas évek elején is könnyebben jutott kilépő úti okmányokhoz egy pásztor, mint Erdély katolikus püspő;" implying Haynald encountered difficulty with his
They passed word of the availability of farm land there: some 80,000 Transylvanians, mostly Romanians, emigrated to the Principalities from 1758 to 1867, and perhaps 20,000 between 1850 and 1857 alone. New villages of Transylvanian Romanians extended as far south as the Danube. Of 12,159 citizens of Transylvania living in the Principalities in 1870, 62% were from the predominantly Orthodox districts of Hermannstadt, Făgăraş and Kronstadt.

An earlier chapter dealt with the role of the Carpathian monasteries in the religious practice of the Transylvanian Romanians. The number of monasteries and hermitages at any one time is very difficult to establish. According to one calculation there were 120 on the territory of the diocese of Buzău alone, albeit many were no longer functioning in our period. The density of monastic settlements in the area of the diocese closest to Transylvania was such that "some researchers have compared this region with Mount Athos."

The most important single Romanian monastery, in general and in its significance for Transylvania, was that of Neamţ in Moldavia, located northeast of the Szekler region. Neamţ was the center of the spiritual revival of Romanian monasticism in the eighteenth century. Then and later, the travel papers in 1859 and 1862.

30. Arhim. Nifon Stoica and Nicolae Stoicescu, "Așeză-
mântecele monahale din eparhia Buzăului-- în trecut și azi," in Spiritualitate și istorie la întorsura Carpaților, II, 268-76.
monastery provided many liturgical books for Transylvania and was a popular goal of pilgrims. Among the latter were two Greek Catholic men who requested "a proper [Orthodox] baptism" in the 1860s and later became monks there. All four abbots (starets) between 1823 and 1856 were Transylvanians. The last of these, Dionisie Romano, took over the leadership of the monastery in 1855. He was replaced by the government due to his nationalist sentiments, but left many disciples there.

The multifarious ties of the Transylvanian Orthodox with the Danubian Principalities ironically contributed more to the national awareness of all the Romanians in Transylvania than they did to the behavior of the Orthodox Church in Transylvanian politics. This was in part due to Șaguna’s conservative and authoritarian church leadership, and in part to tactical considerations concerning relations with the Saxons and especially to the quest for hierarchical separation from the Serbs.

The Serbian clergy gave important encouragement to the Romanian Orthodox resistance to the church union in the eighteenth century; toward the end of the century, Emperor Joseph II placed the Orthodox diocese of Transylvania under the protection of the Serbian Metropolitan of Karlowitz.


Serbian support against Catholic proselytism continued to be useful in the following period. Beginning about 1820, Romanian Orthodox clergymen and writers in the Banat began to agitate against what they saw as the attempt of the Serbian hierarchy to denationalize the Romanians. The desire for hierarchic separation had by 1846, when Šaguna took over the Transylvanian Orthodox see, become a genuine movement with its lay intellectual as well as clerical component.

Šaguna himself spent sixteen years in Serbian ecclesiastic surroundings before coming to Transylvania, where he was at first regarded by some as a Serb. He was not, of course, and despite his ties of friendship with the Serbian Metropolitan (from December, 1848 Patriarch) Rajacic he quickly placed himself at the head of the movement for a Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate independent of Karlowitz. In 1849 he submitted four petitions for the separation to the Vienna court and Rajačić. He cited early church canons to support his contention that the Orthodox Church was national in its very essence and hence ought to be organized according to nations. He also published a pamphlet ar-

33. Turczynski, Konfession und Nation, 245-50.
34. His chief canonical source was the passage in Apostolic Canon 34 stating that "The bishops of every nation shall recognize one of themselves as the first among them and regard him as their head..." There was indeed a tendency of Orthodox churches in the Balkans to organize according to nations. See also the memorandum of the Romanians to Thun in 1851, in Ilarion Pușcariu, Metropolia, Annex, 88-91, many similar petitions in the same volume, and the refutation of Šaguna's arguments by Bishop Hacman in his declaration to the synod in Karlowitz, September 14, 1864,
guing that the Romanian Metropolitanate of Gyulafehérvár (the diocese of Blaj bore the name of this city in its title) rightly belonged to the Orthodox. The diocesan synod convened in Hermannstadt in 1850, that of the diocese of Arad in Hungary proper in the same year, and Šaguna himself in several encounters with the Serbian hierarchy, repeated the demand. The bishop’s relations with the Serbs were henceforth strained. However, there was no break in official canonical relations. Šaguna continued to recognize his canonical subordination to Rajacic, despite his own claims to the contrary. The nationist argument that, as long as the Romanian Orthodox were subordinate to Karlowitz they would be vulnerable to Romanian Greek Catholic proselytism, was anything but effective in Vienna. Under the Catholic regime of Minister Thun and the Concordat, Serbian protection had its advantages for the church union.

Conditions became more favorable for the Orthodox after 1860. Šaguna raised the issue of the Metropolitanate while in Vienna for the Enlarged Reichsrat, as did the Romanian noblemen Andrei Mocioni of the Banat and Nicolae Petrinto of Bukovina. Rajačić not only refused, but sought to gain

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Annex, 252-85.

35. The excellent accounts of the struggle for the Metropolitanate by Romanian authors, and more recently by Hitchins, make a detailed study here unnecessary. See especially Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 173-86, and ibid., "Andreiu Šaguna and Joseph Rajačić: The Romanian and Serbian Churches in the Decade of Absolutism," in Revue des Études Sud-est Européennes 10 (1972), 120-49, and Studies on Romanian National Consciousness, 125-36. He does not examine the inconsistency of Šaguna’s canonical claims.
exclusive control for the Serbians over Orthodox questions in Thun's ministry. On the eve of the October Diploma, Franz Joseph agreed in principle to the establishment of a Romanian Metropolitanate. He directed the Orthodox bishops to regulate the matter in a general synod to be held in Karlowitz. The dioceses of Transylvania and Bukovina should convene synods to formulate their desires, and their bishops consult with each other. A few weeks later a diocesan synod in Hermannstadt repeated the request for the restoration of the Metropolitanate. In March, 1861 Schmerling also supported the Romanians' request. Chances for the Metropolitanate improved once again at the beginning of 1862, when Nádasdy ordered his subordinate Ioan Pușcariu to compose a detailed memorandum on the question. A Romanian Orthodox delegation including representatives from Transylvania, Banat, Hungary proper and Bukovina departed for Vienna, and presented a new petition to the Emperor on behalf of the Metropolitanate on March 15, 1862.

The actual granting of the Metropolitanate was delayed for more than three years because of the complex question of its territorial extent. Almost all the Romanian appeals

36. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 185-6. The petition of Șaguna, Mocioni, and Petrino is in Ilarion Pușcariu, Metropolia Românilor, Annex, 166-7.

37. Thun to Șaguna, September 30; a Romanian translation is in ibid., Annex, 168-8. Petition and address of the synod, October 26 (o.s.), in ibid., Annex, 168-76.


39. Ioan Pușcariu, Notite, 62; the address of the delegation, in Ilarion Pușcariu, Metropolia, Annex, 200-5.
from 1850 to 1862 spoke of a Metropolitanate that included Transylvania, the Banat, and the Austrian province of Bukovina. Bukovina was contiguous with areas in Hungary and Transylvania, Máramaros county and the districts of Násáud and Bistritz, that were included in the other dioceses. It had come under Habsburg rule in the late eighteenth century and, like the other dioceses, was subordinated to Karlowitz at this time. In his report for Nádasdy, Ioan Pușcariu prepared statistics on the dioceses of the prospective Metropolitanate. They are very approximate, but apparently reliable:

Table 15: Romanian Orthodox in the Empire, ca. 1862

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diocese</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hermannstadt</td>
<td>Trans</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>649,012</td>
<td>649,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>390,226</td>
<td>383,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versecz</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>293,556</td>
<td>245,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temesvár</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>463,679</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovina</td>
<td>Bukovina</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>339,976</td>
<td>202,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2793 2986 2,136,449 1,779,229 41

The differing circumstances of the three administrative units where the dioceses were situated in 1861-5—two of them part of the Hungarian crown, and one subordinated to Schmerling's own ministry—greatly complicated the decision

40. The petition of August, 1860 requested a Metropolitanate of the Romanian Orthodox of Transylvania and Hungary. Bukovina formed a part of Moldavia until 1775 and Austrian Galicia between 1787 and 1849, and today it is divided between Romania and the Soviet Union.

41. "Promemoria über die griechisch nicht unierte Hyerarchie der Romanen Österreichs;" Vienna, January 20, 1862, signed by Pușcariu. MOL D228. 1862/75. His census figures are from different years, and he uses inconsistent categories for parishes and clergy. Apparently no other historian has consulted the memorandum, which is 57 manuscript pages in length.
on the Romanians' petition. The demand for the Orthodox Metropolitanate, like that for a Greek Catholic Metropolitanate, had grown out of the Romanian nationalists' demand in 1848-9 for a political entity comprising all Romanians under Habsburg rule. Unlike in the case of the Greek Catholics, Orthodox Romanians also lived in a province that was not part of the Hungarian crown. The abandonment of the old constitutions in the 1850s momentarily favored such a transcendence of earlier frontiers. The project doubtless attracted Schmerling for the same reason, as another means of subverting the prerogatives of Vay and Kemény over the Hungarian lands. In his own argument in favor of the Metropolitanate in its largest form, Ioan Pușcariu argued that since the Romanians were a loyal people their administrative union in this form would be in the highest interest of the empire.

The Austrian centralists apparently supported the Romanian quest to secure the Metropolitanate in its largest extent. However, the opposition of the bishops concerned prevented this. Patriarch Rajačić called off the preparatory synod specified by Vienna after Šaguna announced his refusal to attend it; neither Šaguna nor Bishop Hacman of Bukovina would accept the other as Metropolitan of the Orthodox Romanians. According to Šaguna, Hacman was encouraged by circles in Vienna to claim the Metropolitanate for himself, while Nádasdy cited the attitude of Hacman as the chief

42. Ibid.
obstacle to the larger Metropolitanate. After Hacman informed Schmerling in June, 1861 and April, 1862 that he was opposed to the inclusion of his diocese in the proposed Metropolitanate, the Minister of State also abandoned his support for the larger Metropolitanate.

Whether or not Hacman was encouraged by Vienna to demand the Metropolitanate for himself, he had two substantive motives, beyond ambition, for resisting his subordination to Şaguna: the ethnic circumstances of his diocese and his interpretation of canon law concerning synods. The synod of Bukovina in February, 1861 noted that half the diocesan population was Romanian and half Slavic; "If we had to decide between Karlowitz and Gyulafehérvár, we would not agree. Some would go here, others there, so that justice for one would be injustice for another." Şaguna maintained that no more than a quarter of the diocese were Slavs, but the calculation of Ioan Puşcariu, cited above, indicates more than one third were Slavs.

Hacman showed little sympathy for the plans of the Romanian nationalists not only because of his own Ruthenian

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43. Ilarion Puşcariu, Metropolia, 81-2, citing Şaguna's 1861 pamphlet, Anforismos, 133-9, and Hacman to the Synod in Karlowitz, September 7, 1864, Annex, 248-9; Liechtenstein to Schmerling, January 28, 1861, in AVA, Neuer Kultus. A12, Generalien. PN 6891/CU 1863; Council of Ministers, sessions of November 25, 1862 and January 15, 1863, in HHSA, Kabinetts-Kanzlei. 1862/4072 (MRZ 1093) and 1863/214 (MRZ 1116).

44. Hacman to the synod in Karlowitz, September 14, 1864, in Ilarion Puşcariu, Metropolia, Annex, 284, and Şaguna to Nádasdy, July 26, 1863, in Ibid., Annex, 212, and MOL D228. 1863/986.
problem, but also because they were integrally related to church-constitutional strivings of the laity. The century-long association with the Serbian hierarchy in Karlowitz also brought Romanian Orthodoxy the experience of periodic church assemblies with heavy lay participation as an important national institution. The Serbian connection was probably most important for the constitutional impulse in the socially and religiously isolated Orthodox community in Transylvania. Their only precedent for lay participation came from the period of Reformed domination of the Transylvanian Orthodox in the seventeenth century. Many specific provisions of the organizational statute the Orthodox eventually adopted came directly from that which the Saxon Lutherans passed in 1861.

In 1848 Șaguna convened a diocesan synod composed, as he stated, in the canonical proportions of two-thirds laity, one-third clergy. This synod did not in fact meet. Șaguna’s synods in 1850 and 1860, however, had roughly half


46. Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality*, 56. Hitchins does not indicate the basis for this canonical claim. Vasile Mangra, the later Metropolitan, though supporting the two-thirds principle, could cite no canon to support it and stated it found no parallel in the rest of Orthodoxy; "Șaguna ca organizator constituțional," in *Mitropolitul Andreiu Baron de Șaguna*, 435-53.
lay and half clerical participation. Bishop Hacman convened a synod composed exclusively of the clergy, rejecting subordination to any other diocese and demanding a Metropolitanate for the Bukovina. The synod also charged that the participation of the laity in the synods was uncanonical and divisive. Romanian laymen and patriotic clergymen protested that Hacman’s procedure was autocratic and did not reflect the desires of the people. These laymen issued their own declarations in favor of a Metropolitanate of all Romanians in the empire, and collaborated with the Romanian actions in the Hungarian lands. Hacman published the decisions of the synod in March, 1861, and Șaguna refuted them in newspaper articles and a long pamphlet, Anhitorismos, already in 1861. In the pamphlet he expressly justified lay participation in his diocesan synods. Hacman’s opponents translated Anhitorismos into German and published it in Vienna with Șaguna’s approval.

The death of Rajacic in December, 1861 removed one obstacle to the achievement of the Romanian goals, and Vienna quickly named as his provisional replacement a bishop

47. Șaguna’s circulars of February 10, 1850 and October 3, 1860, in Tulbure, 227-8, 402-4. Șaguna published the protocol of both synods in Sibiu in 1860: Actele soboarelor bisericii greco-răsăritene din Ardeal din anii 1850 si 1860.

48. Ilarion Pușcariu, Metropolia, 80-1, 140-4; correspondence of Șaguna and George Hurmuzachi, March and April, 1862, Annex, 205-7. Turczynski misleadingly states that Romanian patriots and Austrian centralists opposed the proposal of Bukovinans at the end of 1860 for a "Romanian Metropolitanate in Austria;" in 1860-1 Romanians still commonly applied the term "Austria" to the entire empire. See Turczynski, "Orthodoxe und Unierte," in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, IV, 438-9.
who was not opposed to the granting of the Metropolitanate. In January, 1862 Nádasdy ordered Pușcariu to prepare his memorandum, and invited Șaguna to come to Vienna and discuss the matter. Andrei Mocioni organized two conferences of the Romanian Orthodox of the Banat, which resolved to send a delegation of Romanians from the entire Monarchy. Accepting the suggestion of Mocioni, Șaguna took the lead of the delegation. It arrived in Vienna at the beginning of March.

Catholic opposition further delayed the granting of the Metropolitanate. Informed about the delegation through press reports and other contacts, Suluțiu was at first resigned to the success of the Orthodox endeavor. But then in a letter concerning his Cathedral Chapter he appealed to Nádasdy "as a Catholic" to oppose the establishment of the Metropolitanate. He was finally moved to take more energetic action by stronglyworded appeals from his suffragan bishoprics in Nagyvárad and Lugoș. On May 9 he also appealed to the Emperor as a fellow Catholic to deny the Metropolitanate, and also denounced the project to the Nuncio. He also wrote a declaration against Șaguna for the signature of his suffragan bishops, in which he argued that the Orthodox Metropolitanate would be a major setback for the church union.

The bishops' protests prompted an intervention at the court by the Nuncio as well. They delayed discussion of the matter in the Council of Ministers until the end of 1862. Revelations in the Romanian press about the Greek Catholic bishops' action were very embarrassing for Sulutiu and his colleagues. They began ecclesiastic proceedings against a canon in Szamosújvár who was suspected of having revealed them.

After receiving the Romanians' petition and discussing it with Šaguna, the Emperor called on Schmerling, Nádasdy and Forgách to discuss the means of implementing it. All agreed that Bukovina could not be included in the new Metropolitanate; but both Schmerling and Forgách suggested that the question of territories to be included be left open for the time being. Nádasdy, on the other hand, proposed that a Metropolitanate be established that was limited for the time being ('"vorerst") to Transylvania. When the matter finally came before the Council of Ministers in November, all but Forgách, Esterházy and Rechberg

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Şulutiu from the Consistory in Nagyvárad, April 12, Provost Iosif Papp-Szilágyi of Nagyvárad, April 22, and Bishop Dobra of Lugos, April 30, and Suluţiu to Franz Joseph, the Nuncio and his suffragan bishops, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Documents and Protocol book. 1862/361.

51. Rechberg informed the Emperor of the Nuncio's protest on June 24, calling it "in hohem Grade beachtenswerth." HHSA, KZ 1862/1895. When Franz Joseph raised the issue in the Council of Ministers on July 1, Nádasdy requested a delay, and it only came up again on November 11. POM, V, 4, 79. On July 4 he sent the protests of the bishops and Nuncio to Forgách; MOL D228, 1862/265.

52. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 240-1; draft of Şulutiu to Alexi, June 4, and to Vasile Ladislau Pop, June 6, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/449 and MRU, CM. 735. Concerning the dissident canon, see Chapter VIII.

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supported Nádasdy's proposal. The strategy of the centralists was apparently to limit Šaguna's Metropolitanate to Transylvania and hence not create a new precedent for the union of Hungary and Transylvania. Mocioni suspected, and Romanian historians have confirmed, that the Austrians hoped to entice the Bishop of Arad and further divide the Romanians by creating an additional Romanian Metropolitanate for Hungary. This combination explains the ironic situation that in the Council of Ministers the Catholics Forgách, Esterházy and Rechberg championed the Metropolitanate of all Romanians in the Hungarian lands.

This is where the matter rested until the eve of the Transylvanian diet. On June 25, 1863 Franz Joseph declared his intention to grant the Romanian request. But he continued until September, 1864 to sustain Nádasdy's position that the inclusion of Hungarian territory was uncertain; Bukovina was not even mentioned. This was a delaying maneuver. Šaguna restated his demand that Hungary and Bukovina be included; in March, 1864 Vice Chancellor Reichenstein reiterated Nádasdy's question to Šaguna of the previous year as to whether Hungary should be included; the diocesan synod in Hermannstadt in the same month repeated the same Romanian

53. Session of November 25, 1862, in HHSA. Kabinettskanzlei. 1862/4072, MRZ 1093.
demands. At the long-awaited synod in Karlowitz in September, the Emperor finally took a stand by declaring through his royal commissioner that Bukovina would be excluded. More or less in compensation, the synod and Emperor approved the administrative separation of the Romanian Orthodox of the Hungarian lands from Karlowitz. In December, 1864 Franz Joseph approved the creation of a new Metropolitanate centered in Hermannstadt, with suffragan bishops in Arad and Karansebes.

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Haynald and the Latin Rite Archbishopric

The relationship of Roman Catholicism in Transylvania to the numerically dominant eastern-rite Christians there and in the neighboring Danubian Principalities was a question of religious, cultural, and political significance for both the Holy See and the Habsburg court. By virtue of this strategic question Bishop Haynald could argue that he was Catholicism's indispensible man in the region. This was his chief selling point in his quest to have his diocese raised to the rank of an archbishopric. His strategy, which was ultimately unsuccessful, needs to be understood in connection with Transylvanian Greek Catholic, Orthodox, and Armenian politics.

Haynald first publicly proposed the Transylvanian archbishopric in 1852, during his first visit to the Szekler parishes, and suggested Székelyudvarhely as the seat of a

56. Ilarion Pușcariu, 83-7, 144-53.
suffragan bishop subject to himself. He formally presented his proposal to the Pope on April 19, 1859.

The political tension in Hungary and in Austro-Italian relations may well have prompted the simultaneous journey of Haynald and the Croatian bishop-politician Strossmayer to Rome for the purpose of avoiding the need to take a public stance during the crisis. Sulutiu apparently suspected Haynald's talks with the Pope would bear on Romanian affairs. He wrote to him after his departure to urge that he defend their "mutual" Catholic interests and also to remind him of the Greek Catholics' special traditions, canon law and institutions which he (Sulutiu) needed, in his position, to take into account. Thun asked the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See to inform them that "His Majesty expects them to return to their dioceses in such serious times." With war threatening in Northern Italy, Haynald in fact returned to Gyulafehérvár immediately after his audience.


58. Haynald left Alba Iulia on February 25 and returned on May 26—Szittyay, 60; Ferenc Lőnhart, "Olasz-úti jegyzetek," Gyulafehérvári Füzetek II (1862), 178, 186-7; draft of Haynald to Liechtenstein, May 26, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1859/1795 (Cat. 4).

59. Sulutiu to Haynald, March 3, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1859/1603 (Cat. 3). The letter is in Sulutiu's hand and bears no chancery number.

60. Telegram of Thun to Colloredo, April 29, with letter of Colloredo to Haynald of April 30, in Alba Iulia, ERC 1859/1740 (Cat. 4); cited also by Szittyay, 60.

61. After his return to his see Pius IX urged him to act, in the given difficult circumstances, in the best
At his visit ad limina to Pius IX on May 22, Haynald presented a lengthy report on the state of his diocese. The report had eight parts: the history and economic standing of the diocese, the role and activities of the bishop, the parish clergy, religious orders, social and moral condition of the faithful, the clerical seminary, parishes and societies, and the general population. He made five specific proposals: concerning mixed marriages, apostasies, rebaptism of converted Unitarians, the Armenian Catholics’ request for a separate bishopric, and his own request for the office of archbishop. He cited the special conditions of the diocese to justify the latter request: the large area of the diocese and the dangers of apostasy due to intermixture with non-Catholic populations (in contrast to other dioceses, only three of the sixteen deaneries had a Roman Catholic majority in their territory), called for a strengthening of Roman Catholicism vis a vis the Greek rite as the bulwark against heresy and Romanian nationalism, and demanded the independence of the archdiocese from the Primate of Esztergom, who was not in a position to understand the special problems of Transylvania. Since Şulutiu was an archbishop, Haynald argued, he ought to be be one as well; he even claimed that Şulutiu desired to subordinate Haynald’s diocese to his own.

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interest of the church (probably a reference to the Italian situation) and of the faith—Pius IX to Haynald, June 13, 1859, in OSzK. Fol. Hung. 1722, f. 230.

62. The report is described in DSSS, 176-87, and published in the same work in the original Latin with the notes.
Haynald also presented his plan to Minister Thun on November 21, 1859. He assured the Pope and the court in Vienna that his hierarchical superior, Archbishop Kunszt, was not opposed to his archdiocesan scheme. Thun, however, cited the archbishop's opposition as a chief motive for his own coolness toward the plan. The Emperor's approval of the plan was lukewarm; he declared he would not oppose the scheme if it were favored by the Holy See. Thun argued that the new archbishopric would create an anomalous situation, and rejected Haynald's claim that Şuluţiu threatened his prerogatives. The attitude of the Emperor and of the Vatican fluctuated. A papal advisor recommended approval of the plan in November, 1860; Antonelli vacillated. Haynald used the occasion of his visit to Rome in May, 1862 to raise the issue again; this time he was able to submit Thun's favorable response of February, 1860 at the same time. The Papal Nuncio in Vienna concurred in many of Haynald's arguments concerning the need to strengthen Roman Catholicism in order to counterbalance the dangerous tendencies of the nationalities, especially of the Romanian Orthodox.

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appendixed by Haynald on May 22, 1862, on pp. 402-51. Şuluţiu complained that the Hungarian bishop treated him as his subordinate, although Şuluţiu felt Haynald ought to be his own suffragan--Şuluţiu to Crenneville, March 1, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, Protocol book. 1862/137.


64. DSSS, 188-9 and 464.

65. De Luca to Antonelli, March 17, 1862, in Lukács, The
Still, no action was taken.

Haynald and the nationalist wing of the Hungarian episcopate were worried not only about the threat to Hungarian and Catholic influence from the Romanians in Transylvania, but also in the Danubian Principalities. The proposal for the archbishopric contained the resurrection of the medieval bishopric of Milcov as a suffragan diocese. The diocese would be a "titular" one, but would clearly lay some claim to be the protector of the Roman Catholics, primarily Hungarians, in the Principalities. This claim was one chief motive for his proposal. He shared the concern of many Hungarian Catholics for the Moldavian Hungarians and believed his geopolitical position peculiarly suited him to be their defender.

The Roman Catholics of Moldavia numbered between 50,135 and 63,000 in 27 parishes in our period. Moldavia was

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Vatican and Hungary, 554-56.
66. DSSS, 187.
67. There is an obvious parallel to our own days, when the Catholic press of Hungary has taken a lively interest in the Catholic Hungarians of the Szekler region and Moldavia.
68. The first figure is from the report of the Apostolic visitor to Moldavia, Giuseppe Tomassi, to Cardinal Barnabo, December 10, 1858, in DSSS, 347. The second is from Ferenc Kovacs, who also estimated 20,000 Roman Catholics in Wallachia, three-fourths of them Hungarian: "Kovács Ferenc, károly-fehérvári hittanár úti-naplója, 1869," 53-4, 117-8, in Veszely, Imets és Kovács utazása Moldva-Olahhonban 1868 (Maros-Vásárhelyt: Ny. Imreh Sándor, 1870). Twentieth-century estimates of the Moldavian Hungarians' number vary from 50,000 to 120,000—Béla Gunda, "A moldvai magyarok néprajzi kutatása," in A határainkön kívüli magyar néprajzi kutatások (Budapest: Tudományos ismeretterjesztő társulat, 1984), 68-70. It is instructive to note that the Moldavian politician Kogálniceanu estimated the number of the Csangos in 1859 at 100,000, but asserted that they were only known as Hungarians because their clergy
a mission of the Conventual Franciscans (Minorites) headed by an Italian Vicar General in Iași, the capital of Moldavia. Of the 24 active pastors in 1858, eight were born in Hungary, seven in Italy, two in Transylvania, and the remainder in other countries. Most of the Catholics were speakers of Hungarian (Csangos), whereas the general population of the province was 97% Orthodox and Romanian-speaking. The language of the clergy was a divisive issue: most non-Hungarian priests spoke no Hungarian, while the Hungarian priests often spoke little Romanian. The recent Austrian military occupants had favored the Catholics, with the result that the surrounding population often branded the Csangos as unpatriotic. The Hungarian clergy scorned the Romanian language as that of the "schismatics" and even ridiculed the Orthodox clergy, which was itself active in the Romanian revival of these years. The Holy See deplored this national friction. It saw the chief purpose of the Moldavian mission as proselytism among the Orthodox, but this was impossible as long as Romanians regarded Catholicism as "the Hungarian

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was of this nationality. Borsi-Kálmán, "Mihail Kogălniceanu reformprogramjának magyar vonatkozásai," in A magyar polgári átalakulás kérdései (Budapest: Az ELTE Bölcsésztudományi kara, 1984), 369.

69. Tomassi letter, 358-72. The seat of the Hungarian Minorites was in Eger. They were the second-largest order in Transylvania. The monastery in Csíksomlyó was run by Observant Franciscans, the dominant religious order in Transylvania.

70. Kovács, loc.cit., states three-fourths were Csango-Hungarians. Tomassi’s account suggests Hungarians were at any rate very numerous. The Moldavian population is from DSSS, 50.

71. Ibid., 105-6.
religion." The Apostolic Visitor had a low opinion of most of the Hungarian pastors, and recommended their expulsion. He accused the Hungarian Minorites, like those in Bosnia at this time, of being excessively political. The Holy See's dissatisfaction with the Hungarian clergy in Romania led to the establishment of a Romanian hierarchy there in 1883-4.

Haynald visited a Csango parish in Moldavia during his journey to the Szekler region in 1855, and referred briefly to the experience in a letter to the Nuncio in April, 1856. János Danielik proposed, in 1858, the establishment of a Catholic society similar to the Szent István Társulat for the support of the Csangos. In March, 1860 the Csangos of an entire church district wrote to Scitovszky, asking him to present their complaints against the Italian bishop to the Vatican. Haynald joined the public supporters of Danielik's proposal. The new society, the Szent László Társulat, was formally established in May, 1861. Its first president, titular Archbishop József Lonovics, had proposed aid for Csangos already in 1845. In 1849 the Austrians had deprived him of his Hungarian see in punishment for his loyalty to the revolutionary government.

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72. Letter of Tomassi, 358-72, 377-8, 386-8. Among the nationalists whom he denounced were Incze Petras (see Chapter IV) and Ferenc Molnár, a diocesan priest from Transylvania who spoke no Romanian.
73. DSSS, 145-6.
74. The letter is cited by Kovács, from Veszely, Imets..., 84-85.
75. The letter is published in Kovács, 77-83.
Danielik was the chief author of the society's statutes. These described the goals of the society as the material support of the Holy See, aid for Catholic charities, and "aid for the establishment and support of educational and other charitable institutions for needy Catholics in the east of any rite, especially for Hungarians settled there."  

The society and its statutes received the sanction of Scitovszky, the Nuncio and the Locumtenential Council by the end of June, 1861. Monetary contributions had reached 4000 fl. by this time. Branches of the society were organized in more than 150 parishes by mid-1862, with more than 12,000 members. All Hungarian members of the episcopate offered their moral support, and the Romanian Greek Catholic bishops Erdeli and Alexi, as well. Through the intercession of Scitovszky, in March, 1863 the Pope announced a plenary indulgence for members of the society under certain conditions. Members totalled 27,000 and the amount donated by the society nearly 42,000 fl. by 1864. These figures were less impressive than those of similar charitable societies in France and Germany, but show that Hungarian Catholics were willing to make considerable financial sacrifices for the churches and parishes in Hungary and abroad, especially in the east.


77. I have relied here on the most thorough history of the society, József Szemes, A Szent László Társulat 1861-1941 (Veszprém: Egyházmegyei Könyvnyomda, 1942), 18-31.
The speeches delivered at the first formal meeting of the society belied its purely religious character: then, like in more recent times, the support of the Hungarian Csangos in Moldavia was a popular occasion for patriotic solidarity. The diplomatic position of the Cuza government in Romania and the activities of the Hungarian emigration there increased the complexity of the question.

The founders of the society were concerned about the danger of Romanianization under an ethnically indifferent Italian clergy, but possibly even more about Protestant influence. Hungarian Reformed in the Principalities numbered only 4830 in 1858, and most of these were in Wallachia. But this estimate is surprisingly low considering reports that considerably larger numbers of Hungarians from Transylvania entered the Principalities during the 1850s and 1860s. According to one estimate, the total Hungarian population there increased by as much as one fourth in these years. The motives for emigration were both economic and political, and many stood under the influence of the emigre leadership.

78. The speeches of Lonovics, Danielik, and Imre Szabó were published in Religió's eight-page supplement to the issue of May 22, 1861.


80. Meteș, 248. He cites Imecs, A székelyek és egy baj (Arad, 1863), p. 63, as stating that 14,000 Szeklers emigrated to Romania in 1862 alone, which seems to be an exag-
A Hungarian Reformed congregation existed in Bucharest from 1815 on. In 1855 the Reformed Church in Transylvania named Ferenc Koós, a veteran of the Hungarian forces that fought for Kossuth in 1848-9 and a minor participant in the Makk conspiracy. The minister was prudent and correct in his relations with the Austrian Consul, Baron Eder. At Koós' invitation, both Eder and Elena Cuza participated in the laying of the cornerstone of the new church of the Bucharest congregation in March, 1863. Yet the Austrians disliked his politics: he published the radical newspaper *Bukaresti Magyar Közlöny* in 1859-60 and associated with all the emigre leaders. His most active church elder, Lajos Seres, who was also prominent in the ceremony in March, 1863, was the emissary of the emigre leadership in Bucharest.

Another Hungarian Reformed missionary commissioned in Kolozsvár, Márton Czelder, arrived in Bucharest in January, 1861. He led congregations in Pitești, Ploiești, and Galați, and also travelled in the land even more than the energetic Koós. His intense patriotism secured him the popularity of many Hungarians there. Czelder was restless and am-

81. A long description of the dedication ceremony by Koós himself appeared in *Kolozsvári Közlöny*. On this and other aspects of his activity, see Koós, *Életem és emlékeim* (Bukarest: Kriterion kiadó, 1971), with foreword by György Beke, passim. This is an abridgement of the two-volume edition of 1890.

82. On the popularity of Czelder among the Csangos, see "Tusnádi Imets Fülöp Jakó gymn. igazgató-tanár úti-naplója, 1868," 133-9, in *Veszely, Imets és Kovács*; on his alleged proselytism of Hungarian Catholics, see "Ploest (Oláhország),"
bitious, and his relations with Koós soon soured. Baron Eder requested in 1862 that the Reformed Superintendent in Kolozsvár recall Czelder to Transylvania because of his religious (and presumably political) proselytizing activities. The authorities considered Czelder's "fund-raising" journey through Hungary and Transylvania in the first months of 1863 to be a mere pretext for "the purveyance of political correspondence" and contacts with "the ultramagyar party" and the Superintendent's more militant colleagues in the Reformed Church.

On the eve of the dietal elections in 1863, the synod of the Reformed Church in Transylvania, held in Dés, rejected the official accusations of Czelder's political activities. In recognition of his services, it declared him Reformed missionary for Moldavia as well. Baron Eder noted with alarm that this decree would result in more Reformed proselytism among the Moldavian Csangos.

Czelder's most notorious activities came beginning in 1864. The radicalization of the emigres under Klapka at this time led to a manifesto addressed to the Csangos in May, 1864. Czelder himself agitated among the Csangos. He assured an emissary of Klapka that he would do everything in his power to fulfill the general's commands, and that the

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junius 2-an," Religió 1861, 1. felev, p. 405.
83. Mecséry to Nádasdy, April 4, 1863, in MOL D228. 1863/226. Vienna, HHSV. Informationsbüro, 1862/Elenchus 8075 is a large file of reports on Czelder, many of them speculative and exaggerated in character, from 1862-67.
84. Mecséry to Nádasdy, August 5, 1863, with the German translation of an article from Kolozsvári Közlöny of July 2, in MOL D228 1863/835.
insurrection could count on five to six thousand men in 85 Romania. By the beginning of 1865, the Austrians were convinced of Czelder’s close ties with the radical 86 emigres. In May, 1865 Czelder declared himself Bishop of the "Free Hungarian Church in Romania," independent of the supervision of the Austrian consul and the Superintendent in Kolozsvár, and under the protection of the Cuza government. Reformed Superindentencies in Hungary and Transylvania divided concerning the legitimacy of his action, but eventually collaborated with the Austro-Hungarian authorities in his recall to Hungary after the Compromise.

Both Czelder and Koós were involved with the introduction of an arms shipment into Moldavia in 1866, at the time of the 88 Austro-Prussian war.

The political opportunities offered in the Principalities and the religious challenge posed by Czelder were certainly a factor in the popular appeal of the Szent László Társulat. The strengthening of Catholicism was a goal

86. Mecséry to Reichenstein, January 7, 1865, in MOL D228. 1865/41.
87. The Reformed Church in Transylvania published a collection of documents, Czelder Márton működése Romániában 1861-1869 (Kolozsvartt: Stein J., 1870), 128 p., but the best study on the subject is the previously cited 1940 work by Lajos Szabó. Neither consulted the Vienna police files or the personal papers of Czelder, which consist of three cartons deposited in the Reformed Church District Archives in Cluj in 1959. I saw no evidence here of Czelder’s connection or services to the Kossuth emigration, but the sympathies he felt for them are evident.
shared by the Habsburg authorities who regarded themselves as the patron power of the Catholic Church in the Balkans. The Hungarian episcopate's vocal support for the recently initiated church union among the Bulgarians also coincided with Austrian Balkan plans. Hungarian and Austrian liberals attacked the society for its determined defense of the Papal States. The Austrians also charged that the society provided a cover for subversive nationalist political activity. The only basis for the charge was the fact that the society provided an outlet for patriotic sentiment. It appears to have had little actual contact with the Principalities prior to the Ausgleich. Until then, the penetration of Hungarian Franciscans already referred to was more significant for the Csangos.

The interest in the Principalities revived when the Társulat sent a group of four priests and a layman to travel to Romania in 1868. On their return, the Transylvanian priests Veszely and Imets urged the meeting of the society in Győr to press for the Hungarian parishes' subordination to Hungarian bishops, either as vicariats of the Bishops of Csanad and of Transylvania or as sufragans of a

89. Since the Peace of Karlowitz (1699) Austria increasingly contested the role of France, the Turks' ally, as protector of the Balkan Catholics. See Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans. The church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 153, 167-71. The chief areas of Austrian influence were Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania; Frazee ignores the Danubian Principalities.

90. Szemes, 23, 28-9, cites an article in Donauzeitung attacking the speeches given at the Tarsulat's founding meeting, and an article in Die Presse of November 24, 1861. On the Bulgarian church union, see Chapter V.

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Transylvanian archdiocese, in order to better supply the parishes with Hungarian clergy. Action on the demand once again failed to materialize. The French Vicar General in Bucharest and the Romanian government there were hostile to the Hungarian travellers. Mgr. Pluym wrote Rome that they were interfering in the affairs of the local prelates and had political motives as well. The clergy and bishops in Győr were, while admittedly good-intentioned, "if not the collaborators" of the Hungarian government, "at the very least its docile and zealous instruments."

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The Armenian Problem

The Szekler region constituted the core and the most turbulent component of the Roman Catholic diocese. The Armenian Catholic community was a much smaller but surprisingly important contingent. The Armenian population of Transylvania in the mid-nineteenth century is difficult to establish, since much of it had ceased to speak Armenian. Its size was at least 5909 in 1857, 4711 in 1861, and 4120 in 1870, calculated from the membership of the four Armenian Catholic parishes: Szamosújvár, Erszébetváros, Gyergyószentmiklós, and Szépvíz, both of the latter in Csík. But

91. Imecs, in Veszely, Imets és Kovács, 111-17. The volume consists of a statistical study by Veszely and the travel descriptions of Kovács and Imecs. It is a mine of information about ecclesiastic and cultural conditions in the Principalities, especially among the Csangos.

Armenian merchants, officials, and military men lived in most cities, so that László Kőváry estimated 10,000 Armenians in Transylvania in 1847. The patron of all four parishes was the respective local municipality, which also elected the pastor, subject to episcopal confirmation. Armenian Catholics were disproportionately prominent in the diocesan clergy, regardless of their rite. The pastors of the three urban Armenian parishes, Kristof Lukácsi, Antal Merza, and Imre Csiki, were also district deans. They emphasized their separateness in our period by corresponding with Haynald in Latin. According to Lukácsi and Haynald, there were ten Armenian-rite priests in pastoral service in the diocese; no doubt many other Armenian clergymen did not fall into this category because they served as teachers or Latin-rite priests.

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93. For a good general introduction on the Armenians of Hungary and Transylvania, see László Gopcsa, "A magyarországi örményekről," in Erdélyi Múzeum 12 (1895), 375-82; János Kertész, "Az örmény kérdés bibliográfiája," in Magyar Kisebbség [ca. 1939], 242-8, 277-81, 303-13. On the statistics: Keleti, 342; László Gopcsa, "Az örmények Európában és különösen Ausztria-Magyarországon," part 2, in Armenia; Magyar-Örmény Havi Szemle (Szamosujvár), I (1887), 153-4. He cited Kovary's estimate from his Erdély statisztikája (1847), p. 191. Lukácsi's estimate of 16-20,000 seems exaggerated, but was also accepted by Szamosujvár in its petitions of these years; Lukácsi, Adalékok az erdélyi örmények történetéhez (Kolozsvárt: Rom. kath. lyceumi nyomda, 1867), 59. The 1861 total is from Haynald's letter to the Gubernium of October 27, 1861, in which he insisted there were in all 8000 Armenians in Transylvania; it is cited in Gubernium to Chancellery, January 24, 1862, in MOL D229, 1862/967.

94. Armenia identified Zerich and Veszely as Armenians, and Eranosz seems, on the basis of his name, to have been an Armenian.

95. Lukácsi, 72; Gergely Govrik, "A magyar-örmények," Armenia 2 (1888), 123, 179-80. The latter states there were
The chief distinguishing mark of the Armenian Catholics was their oriental, Armenian-language liturgy. Armenian Catholic clergy generally studied for the priesthood in the diocesan seminary in Gyulafehérvár, where an Armenian endowment supported the study of two seminarians per year since 1808. They were generally ordained by the Armenian Catholic Archbishops of Vienna or Lvov. They learned the Armenian liturgy by private arrangement, and if they passed a liturgical examination they were ordained in the Greek manner, i.e. with the placing of a high conical cap. In attire and beardlessness the Armenian clergy otherwise resembled those of the Latin rite. The Armenian parishes adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1758, but their fasting practices remained closer to those of the Romanians. The Armenians lived as alien settlers in Transylvania until 1840, when the diet granted them rights of citizenship, then in 1848 full equality.

The chief center of the Transylvanian Armenians was Szamosújvár in Belső-Szolnok county, also the seat of a Greek Catholic bishop. Armenian merchants, officials and clergy dominated the city council, and the city supported seventeen Armenian-rite priests in Transylvania.

96. Friedrich Teutsch, Die kirchlichen Verhältnisse Siebenburgens, 61-3; [Szongott], "Az örmény egyház Magyarországon," Armenia 8 (1894), 1-9. The seminary endowment apparently proved inadequate. According to Lukácsi three of the four Armenian pastors had studied at the seminary at their own expense, while the studies of the Latin-rite seminarians were paid for them by others-- Lukácsi, 29.
six or seven Armenian-rite priests. The pastor-dean of the Armenian parish was the unrivalled Armenian religious leader in the diocese: between 1856 and 1876, Kristóf Lukácsi.

Lukácsi was born in the nearby village of Beclean and studied in Szamosújvár, Gyulafehérvár, and Vienna before being ordained in Vienna in 1826. For eleven years he was a chaplain in Szamosújvár, then professor at the seminary in Gyulafehérvár until 1853, when he became the principal of the seminary. Already in the 1830s he published translations of Armenian documents concerning Hungarian history that he found during his research in the Armenian monastic archives in Venice. Due to his previous service in Szamosújvár, his distinguished career in Gyulafehérvár and the support he had lent to a recent Armenian petition to the bishop, he was elected pastor of Szamosújvár with great enthusiasm and near unanimity when the old pastor died in 1855. The electoral protocol states that the city council and assembly nominated Lukácsi "by general acclamation and with a triple hurrah." As was customary, the voters had to propose other candidates as well. The city council implored

98. Six signed a petition issued in 1860 (Szongott, Szamosújvár... I, 314), Haynald referred to six in his letter of October 27, 1861, and Szongott states the established custom was to support seven; Ibid., I, 394.

99. There is a good short biography of Lukácsi in Szinnyei, Magyar írók élete, 8 (Budapest: Hornyánszky Viktor, 1902), 119-21.

100. Lukács Bárány, "Emlékbeszéd," in the special issue of Armenia dedicated to Lukácsi, 7 (1893), citing Tudományos Gyűjtemény vol. 19, p. 7.
Haynald, however, in view of "the present circumstances of the Armenian nation" to "confirm the enthusiasm demonstrated for Lukácsi." Haynald assented, and confirmed the nomination.

The historic basis for the ecclesiastic grievance of the Transylvanian Armenians was their former possession of their own Armenian Catholic Bishop in Transylvania. Their Orthodox bishop Mennas accompanied them from Moldavia to Transylvania in 1672, and led the union with the Roman church twelve years later under the sponsorship of the Armenian Catholic Archbishop of Lvov. Mennas' successor, Verzereskul Oxendius, was bishop from 1690 to 1715. Verzereskul also practiced some of the functions of the Roman Catholic Bishop since the latter was absent from the diocese. When Verzereskul died and the Roman Catholic Bishop was restored to Gyulafehérvár in 1715, the new bishop proceeded to direct the affairs of the Armenian Catholic parishes as well. He argued that in the absence of the Armenian bishop his duties had devolved on himself. The two pastors of Szamosújvár from 1715 to 1736 bore the title of Dean of the Armenians (H. örmény esperes) and episcopal vicar. The Habsburg rulers ordered the reestablishment of the Armenian bishopric in 1737-8, then again in 1758, but

101. Szongott, Szamosújvár, I, 396-9, cites the election documents.
102. Szongott, Szamosújvár..., I, 267-9 argues that Verzereskul functioned as bishop of the Roman Catholics as well, but the diocesan history by Vorbuchner makes no mention of this.
this was not put into effect.

The Armenians raised the demand for the restoration of their bishopric in 1765, then again in 1848 and 1851. As the result of the progressive dispersal of the Armenian population, the limitation of the Armenian rite to four parishes, the establishment of Latin rite parishes as well in these communities and the requirement that offspring of mixed marriages be registered as Roman Catholics, the recorded number of Armenian Catholics declined by two-thirds in the course of the nineteenth century. The clergy of Szamosujvar petitioned Bishop Haynald in 1853 to permit the placement of Armenian-rite priests in parishes throughout the diocese, to end the measures limiting the practice of the rite, and to appoint a vicar for all the Armenians of the diocese in order to assure liturgical unity. Lukacsi, as a professor in Gyulafehérvár, wrote a supporting opinion, but Haynald made no reply to the petition. When the Armenian pastor of Szépvíz complained that some of his parishioners had been baptized in the Latin-rite, Haynald suggested that the pastor himself convert to the Latin rite. After recounting this incident, Lukácsi added bitterly: "A similar appeal was also addressed to me, about which I will

103. Lukácsi, 17-18; Szongott, Szamosújvár... , I, 300-5.
be silent, since it took the form of personal conversation and compromising pronouncements." Yet as the scholarly authority in Gyulafehérvár on Armenian questions, Lukácsi received several queries from Haynald concerning the petition of the Armenian clergy in the course of 1853.

Lukácsi’s evolving views on the Armenian question increased the significance of his election as pastor by acclamation and of his confirmation by Haynald. As pastor he added his own impulses to the already existing movement in Szamosújvár. According to a contemporary recalling an interview with Lukácsi twenty years later, the pastor declared the restoration of the Armenian bishopric to be his life’s goal. Lukácsi expressed this goal implicitly in his festive sermon in Szamosújvár’s Armenian cathedral on the Armenian national holiday, the feast of St. Gregory the Illuminator, in 1858. Surveying the history of the Armenians and the chances of bringing the benefits of the church union to the Armenian Orthodox, he cited Benedict XIV’s encyclical Allatae Sunt to the effect that eastern peoples need not fear the endangerment of rite and nationality through the church union. Lukácsi’s argumentation

106. Lukácsi, 63-5. The request by the city of Szamosújvár in 1851, rejected by Bishop Kovács, was cited by Haynald in his letter of October 27, 1861; see MOL D229, 1862/967.

107. János Temesváry, "Lukácsi Kristóf vezéreszméje," Armenia 7 (1893), 348-51. Temesváry, a eminent church historian, was by his own declaration also an Armenian.

108. Lukácsi, Emlékezetek az erdélyi örmények múlt életéből melyeket az örmények apostola Világosító Szent Gergely 1858-dik évi ünnepén a Szamosújvári örm..szertartasú templomban mondott egyházi beszédben eladott... (Becsben:
coincided precisely with the renewed efforts of Sulutiu and
of the Catholics of the Near East to defend their rite
against Latinization and of the papal statements on the
eastern rite in 1848 (In suprema Petri), 1854 (Neminem
Vestrum) and 1862 (Romani Pontifices) cited by Lukácsi.
The Armenian Catholic Primate of Constantinople Hassun wrote
Lukácsi in December, 1862 that his defense of the Armenian
rite was an inspiration for the union movement among the
Anatolian Armenians. French and Anatolian Armenian publica-
tions of 1856 described the rule of the Latin-rite bishop
over the Armenians in Transylvania as tyrannical.

The Armenian grievance concerning mixed marriages pro-
vided the first issue of public dispute between Lukácsi and
Haynald, in which both appealed for the support of the Holy
See. The bishop rejected Lukácsi's claims and defended the
procedure of the Latin rite pastor of Szamosújvár.
The Nuncio sided with Haynald, and urged the rejection of
the "indocile and irreverent ambitions" of Lukácsi.
The Szamosújvár city council appealed to the Armenian
Archbishop of Vienna for advice concerning the proper course

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Nyomtatott a Mechitaristák nyomdája betűivel, 1859), 27,
also published at nearly the same time in Religió and then
in Armenia 8 (1894), 296. The English text of Allatae Sunt
in The Papal Encyclicals does not contain the passage cited
by Lukácsi, though it contains similar ideas.

109. Only the second of these writings is in The Papal
Encyclicals, on pp. 319-25.

110. Lukácsi, Adalekot, 48, 55-7, 82; Hassun's letter was
also cited in Armenia 8 (1893), 380.

111. Haynald to Pius IX, September 13, 1858, in DSSS, 335-7.

112. De Luca to Cardinal Barnabo, October 9, 1858, in Ibid.,
339-40.
of action to defend Armenian interests. In accordance with instructions from the Archbishop, the city sent three petitions for the restoration of the bishopric to Szamosújvár's mayor Bogdán Jakabb, in Vienna for the sessions of the Expanded Reichsrat. He handed them to the general procurator of the Armenian monastic congregation for forwarding to the Emperor, Cardinal Barnabo and de Luca.

The publication of Lukácsi's long sermon in Religió in 1860 attracted the lively interest of Metropolitan Sulutiu. He wrote a study disputing some of Lukácsi's historical statements, but supporting his appeal for the restoration of the bishopric. It was a great shame, he wrote, that the Armenians had generally abandoned their own language, even in their homes, for Hungarian. He knew Lukácsi personally, and supported his appeal to the Holy See. Sulutiu failed to publish his article, however, and Bishop Alexi was cautious when Haynald requested his views concerning the spoken language of the Szamosújvár Armenians and their claims. Alexi replied that few of the Armenians understood any language but Hungarian, and the sermons ought to con-

114. The petitions of February 15 and July 6, 1860 are in Ibid., 312-19.
116. The decision that publication would be imprudent may have rested with Metropolitan Sulutiu or with the editor of Gazeta Transilvaniei, Iacob Mureșanu, who was also principal of a Roman Catholic high school.
continue to be held in that language. He declined to address the question of administrative changes, pleading his incompetence in the matter. It could hardly have been unknown to Alexi that Lukácsi deplored the establishment of the new Romanian bishopric in the city as a new obstacle to the restoration of the Armenian bishopric. Lukácsi argued that the Romanian bishopric increased the urgency of the Armenian restoration due to the danger of Romanianization.

Thun called for the Transylvanian Locumtenency's opinion on the proposed bishopric, which in turn elicited that of Haynald. Haynald replied only a year later, on October 27, 1861. He insisted that the Armenian Catholics had never had their own bishop, and had opposed the erection of a bishopric because of the expense involved. Without referring to the mixed marriage procedure, he insisted that the Roman Catholic bishop had always done his utmost to protect their rite. He rejected the claim for a bishopric, proposing a larger Armenian high school as a better means of protecting their nationality. A session of the Catholica Commissio, with six members in attendance and presided over by Crenneville, accepted the motion by Keserű to support Haynald's viewpoint.

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117. Alexi to Haynald, December 4, 1859 (unnumbered letter), in Alba Iulia ERC, 1859/4085 (Cat. 4).
118. Lukácsi, Adalékok, 77-8. Lukácsi argued that Szatmár county in Hungary and Năsăud were more suitable sites for the Romanian bishopric than Szamosújvár.
119. Lebzelnern (Deputy Governor) to Haynald, November 31, 1860, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1860/3574 (Cat. 4).
120. Gubernium to Chancellery, January 24, 1862, in MOL D229, 1862/967. The other members present were Kozma,
The Chancellery rejected the Gubernium's statement and the principle that Haynald's viewpoint was sufficient. "Since there is no doubt, on the basis of equality, that the associations of various faiths and rites may freely decide in matters concerning their own religious institutions," the views of the Armenian community itself, which Haynald had ignored, were decisive. The Gubernium should ask Szamosújvár about its means of material support for the new bishopric. The Gubernium communicated this request to the city after Haynald's departure for Rome in May. It noted it had received Haynald's opinion concerning the bishopric, but did not reveal what this was. Haynald argued, while in Rome, against the granting of the Armenians' request.

Disagreement arose among the Armenians on the proper course of action. The Council in Szamosújvár, rather than supplying the information requested by the Gubernium, re-

121. Referent Horváth deleted passages in the original which would have indicated any uncertainty about the Armenians' desires or historical claims. Draft by the Chancellery to the Gubernium, March 12, 1862, in MOL D229, 1862/967.

122. Gubernium to Szamosújvár city council, May 23, in Szongott, Szamosújvár I, 319-21. The document is signed only by the Greek Catholic Deputy Governor Pop and Orthodox Secretary Moga, suggesting that Crenneville had to alter the membership of the session in order to secure the desired result. Like all other documents from Szamosújvár published by Szongott, the letter is missing from the city council archives today (AS Cluj, Primária orasului Gherla).

quested a copy of Haynald's statement of 1861 "in order to 124 consider all sides of the matter." Antal Lászlóffy had become mayor of the city at the beginning of the Provisorium. He had apparently received promises from the Gubernium concerning the bishopric. Ivan Gulovich, the Ruthenian canon who was a rival of Bishop Alexi, apparently allied with Lászlóffy in the scheme in the hope of succeeding to Alexi's see. Crenneville travelled to Szamosujvar and collected a new petition in favor of the bishopric composed under the initiative of the ambitious Laszloffy. The petition, backdated, was published on July 17, but immedia- 127 tely denounced by the Council opposition. The Gubernium informed the Council that it could not supply a copy of Haynald's statement because it was "confidential."

The matter rested in this fashion until April, 1863, when the Gubernium called on the City Council to reply to the previous year's request. Lászlóffy convened the City Assembly on May 7. He impressed on it the urgency of the matter and the favorable prospects of the bishopric's

124. City Council to Gubernium, July 1, in Szongott, Szamosújvár I, 321.
125. Marton Voith (a member of the City Council opposition) to Haynald, July 18, in Alba Iulia ERC, 1862/3030 (Cat. 4).
126. Dávid Placsintár (another opposition Council member) to Haynald, July 20, in loc. cit. Placsintár assured Haynald that Lukácsi was not a part of the scheme, but rather hoped for the establishment of the vicariat under the continued jurisdiction of Haynald.
restoration. The Assembly elected a committee, headed by Lukacsi, to write a memorandum on the matter. On the eve of the election, however, the Council decided, rather than forwarding the completed committee report, to inform the Gubernium that a bishopric was unnecessary and they would settle for a vicariat. According to Lukácsi, the government promised the bishopric would be granted if the Armenians, "following the example of the other nationalities," would send a national delegation to Vienna. The Council majority rejected this idea, not wishing to be seen as separatists who were willing to desert the Hungarian cause and declare their loyalty to the unconstitutional regime in exchange for the granting of bishopric.

Mayor Lászlóffy proved, as regalist, one of the government's most loyal allies in the diet. After the bill recognizing the Romanian nation was passed, he proposed a similar law to declare the Armenians the fourth constitutional nation of Transylvania. The bill never came to a vote. Gubernium Councillor Jakabb reportedly proposed a renewed debate in the Gubernium concerning the Armenian bishopric, but only with the purpose of embarrassing Lászlóffy.

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129. Crenneville to City Council, April 30, 1863, and Assembly, committee protocols of May 7 and 10, June 2, in Szongott, Szamosújvár I, 322-7.
130. Lukacsi, 75-6.
133. Friedenfels to Nádasdy, June 29, 1864, in AS Sibiu, loc. cit.
The City Council opposition was disappointed in its hope that it would achieve its bishopric after the restoration of constitutionalism. The Council called on the three other Armenian localities to petition Minister Eötvös for the bishopric, and did the same, itself. No replies were ever received to these petitions. Hungarian Law XLIII of 1868 recognized the autonomy of the "Armenian Catholic Church," but the declaration had no binding force on the bishop or practical significance. Lukácsi travelled to Rome in 1872 and was well-received by Cardinal Barnabo. But he argued in vain that of the twenty-four Catholic dioceses and archdioceses in the east, only two had more than 20,000 souls, and that the Armenian Archbishopric of Lvov had only 7000. The entire pastoral clergy of the four Armenian parishes attended his funeral four years later.

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The quest for ecclesiastic autonomy along ethnic lines was characteristic of the period between revolution and

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134. Declarations and petitions of Szamosújvár, Szépvíz, Erzsébetváros, and Gyergyoszentmiklós, February 22, March 8, April 7 and 30, in Szongott, Szamosújvár I, 327-46.
137. Temesváry, 357. Szongott's Armenia was the chief advocate of the Armenian bishopric after Lukácsi's death. It was established in 1887 with the financial support of the Armenian Catholic Patriarch, and published until 1907, the year of Szongott's death. Transylvanian Romanians and Saxons occasionally deplored the "oppression" of the Armenian Catholics, e.g. Sulutiu, Friedrich Teutsch, and Gh[heorghe] C[iuhandu], "Un popor pierdut: Armenii din regatul ungar. O pagină încheiată din "evoluția" religioasă a statului ungar," Revista teologică (Sibiu) 6 (1912), 176-80, 214-18, which was unavailable to me.
compromise. The Romanian Greek Catholics attained this goal early in the decade of absolutism. The chapter examined several similar movements that reached a decisive stage in the 1860s and shared the fact that their ramifications spanned political boundaries.

The Romanian Orthodox community of the Hungarian lands was far less affected than the Greek Catholics by Dacoroman militancy and possessed in Șaguna a shrewd and moderate leader. Yet religious and even political ties with Russia, the Principalities, and Austrian Bukovina increased the sensitivity of the government to Romanian Orthodox petitions. This helps explain the willingness of Catholic Austria to concede the Romanian Orthodox demand for hierarchical separation from the Serbs of Hungary.

Roman Catholics of Transylvania were not subject to a hierarchy of foreign nationality, and enjoyed in Bishop Haynald an energetic national leader. Haynald set his sights on greater ecclesiastic independence in order to more effectively combat the perceived political and religious threat of the Romanians to Hungarian Catholics in both Transylvania and the Danubian Principalities. The Principalities were the home of increasing numbers of Hungarian emigres. The radical Hungarian Reformed missionary Márton Czelder sought not only to recruit supporters for the struggle against Austria, but to proselytize among Hungarian Catholics and establish a "free Hungarian church" independent of Austrian consular supervision. For all
these reasons Haynald's scheme for an archbishopric received serious consideration in Vienna and Rome, but was ultimately rejected.

Finally, the relatively minor movement of the Armenian Catholics within Transylvania demonstrates how Austria attempted to manipulate and exploit a small minority's resistance to ecclesiastic and ethnic assimilation. In each of these cases, political, ethnic and religious identity were all important motivating factors.
CONCLUSION

This study provides a new perspective on the problem of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, nationality politics and religious history during a crucial period in Transylvania and in the Habsburg monarchy as a whole. In order to achieve this new perspective it has presented several categories of material: the secular history of the monarchy and of the national movements as conventionally defined, the social and administrative framework that dominated Transylvanian politics, a comparative overview of the religious communities, and then especially the relationship of secular and religious politics in the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Orthodox Churches.

The survey of secular politics reveals the strong relationship of events and movements in Transylvania with those of Hungary proper, the monarchy as a whole, and the neighboring Danubian Principalities. Veterans of the revolutions of 1848-49 in Hungary and the Principalities found, as emigre conspirators, a modicum of common ground in their desire to defeat Austrian absolutism. At the end of the decade of absolutism both groups gained diplomatic and limited military support from the France of Napoleon III for their designs. Romanian 1848ers came to power in the Principalities in 1859; henceforth the Hungarians would seek to win them over to the plan of using the Principalities as a staging ground for an invasion of Transylvania. The
potential for such collaboration was a major imponderable of Austrian policy. Hungarian-Romanian differences over internal policy in Transylvania undermined the emigres' hopes.

Transylvania was a particularly agitated theater of the Hungarian war of independence of 1848-49. The fighting between Hungarians on the one hand and Romanians and Saxons on the other left a legacy of animosity and also three distinctive political ideologies. The Hungarian minority in Transylvania sought to perpetuate its social domination and restore its political preeminence through the union of Transylvania with Hungary and the promise of a moderate constitutional regime. Saxons wanted their local privileges preserved with the support of a centralist but liberalized Austrian empire. Romanians supported Transylvanian autonomy like the Saxons but demanded a radical rectification of their underprivileged position in society.

A study of the actual administration and social structure of Transylvania might seem to undermine the importance of the international influences outlined here. It is therefore important to note the far-ranging and finely tuned hierarchy of Austrian administration. Decisions concerning Transylvania taken by the Emperor and the deeply divided Council of Ministers were influenced by international as well as local Transylvanian politics. The arena of local politics was the counties and districts of Transylvania, consisting of three regions-- counties, Szekler
region and Fundus Regius—which each had its own characteristic administration, social structure and ethnic makeup.

The Austrian need for political allies within the new constitutional regime established in 1861 created an opportunity for Romanians and Saxons to increase their influence on Transylvanian affairs. As the result of their determined opposition to the Hungarians and their lobbying in Vienna, they received many key appointments in the administration, a revision of the electoral law and, in the case of the Romanians, unprecedented influence in the Transylvanian diet when it convened in 1863. Catholic and Orthodox clergymen were active in the struggles of the Hungarians and Romanians during these years.

The role of the clergy in society is examined in terms of its economic position, relationship with religious culture, and the changes associated with secularization. The parish priest was in most cases directly dependent for his subsistence on his believers through land allotments, tithes and liturgical fees, though church and state subsidies also provided some support. Saxon clergymen were the wealthiest, Hungarians less so, and Romanians the poorest, so that the availability of Austrian state subsidies had political significance for the Romanians. Catholic and Orthodox practice gave great importance to the liturgy. This reinforced the influence of the respective church’s clergy, but also encouraged popular devotional practices that occasionally brought the different religions
together. Economic advancement and literacy had a corrosive effect on religiosity and clerical influence, however.

This period experienced the peak of the contest in the Catholic Church between liberal and opposing ultramontane tendencies. The Austrian absolutist regime ironically concluded an alliance with the ultramontane church in 1855, the Concordat, but began a limited retreat from this policy in the following decade. Hungarian bishops were among the early opponents of the Concordat, who accurately saw in it a design to strengthen the political centralization of the empire with the help of the church. Individual Hungarian prelates, including Primate Scitovszky and Bishop Haynald of Transylvania, led the struggle against Austrian policies in the 1860s, while other, more circumspect bishops helped to pave the way for the Compromise. These conciliators among the bishops were assisted indirectly by the unfavorable attitude toward the centralist regime of some leading Catholic officials in Vienna.

Bishop Haynald emerged as one of the most important leaders of the Hungarian opposition. He was able to build on the administrative privileges and traditions of autonomy of Transylvanian Catholicism. Haynald played a central role in the Hungarian boycott of the diet in 1863. Catholic influence at the Viennese court and the esteem which the Pope held for Haynald could only delay his dismissal from office. The Catholics of the Szekler district of Csik
provided a political and religious base for the daring opposition of the local Catholic clergy to the government. Piety and patriotism were strikingly intermingled for the people.

The religious division within Transylvanian Romanian society was more significant than historians have generally recognized. Only with great difficulty were bishops and clergy able to engineer national unity on key political issues. Where Greek Catholics and Orthodox resided in the same village, politically and religiously inspired rivalry repeatedly gave rise to conversions or scandal. Greek Catholics lived primarily in the counties, where social and ethnic resentment toward the Hungarian nobility was a powerful motivating force. The center of Orthodox life was the Fundus Regius. Romanians in this region were more economically secure, less militant in their attitude toward the Hungarians and comparatively circumspect in their comportment toward their Saxon neighbors due to considerations of political strategy. The combative Greek Catholic Metropolitan Sterca-$\text{Ş}$uluţiu and shrewdly calculating Orthodox Bishop $\text{Ş}$aguna complemented the orientation of their respective constituencies. Regardless of other differences, however, the churches had difficulty averting the Magyarization of impoverished Romanian parishes in the Szekler region.

The liberal-ultramontane split among Catholics had its counterpart in the even older conflict within the Romanian
Greek Catholic Church between a "Latinizing" or pro-Roman orientation and a patriotic-populist tradition which defended the eastern rite vis a vis Rome and advocated a greater role for synods in order to increase lay influence. Sterca-Șulutiu was the only metropolitan to represent the latter tendency. Ecclesiastic controversy over Șulutiu explains why historians have devoted little attention to his career. He alienated Hungarians, Vienna and Rome, but nevertheless achieved significant political and ecclesiastic concessions from the latter two. He made a significant contribution to the Romanians' political struggle in the counties, to the granting of electoral reform and to the Romanian successes in 1863.

Romanian Greek Catholics in 1853 attained independence from the Hungarian-led Roman Catholic episcopate. Analogous movements took place among the Romanian Orthodox, Hungarian Roman Catholics, and smaller groups of Hungarian Reformed and Armenian Catholics. Șaguna successfully led the struggle for separation from the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy. Haynald failed in his project for a Transylvanian archdiocese with titular authority over Hungarians in the Principalities, although he made an energetic argument about the threat to the church of Romanian Orthodox and Hungarian Reformed proselytism. Separatist attempts by Reformed missionary Márton Czelder in the Principalities and Armenian pastor Kristóf Lukácsi in Szamosújvár serve to confirm the strong association of ethnic and religious identity in this
period.

One general conclusion of the study is the difficulty of separating religion and politics, and even more especially the churches from politics. As Pedro Ramet points out with respect to current Eastern Europe, "A truly apolitical church is virtually inconceivable, since as soon as one moves from liturgical rites to religious teaching, one is in the domain of social interests." The social interests of church leaders derive not only from the churches' doctrines, but also from the property administered by the bishops, their hierarchical responsibilities, and an awareness of the desires of their people. Apolitical religiosity among Christians is a misnomer because it implies, at the least, the acceptance of the inevitably political leadership of the hierarchy. People tend to make religion meaningful in their lives by relating its teaching not only to existential questions but to society as a whole. There is a necessary relationship with politics. But religious politics is never "mere" politics. It is difficult to extricate, for instance, the various motivations of a Christian who believes his religion will better prosper as the result of certain reforms, or who follows the secular leadership of his bishops, albeit it is justified in religious or moral terms.

The conditions under which Haynald, Sulutiu and Saguna

could assume the role of ethnic and political leaders or 2
"Balkan bishops" were different in each case. Haynald's
education and training as ecclesiastic functionary provided
him with close ties to the rest of the Hungarian Catholic
episcopate, Hofffähigkeit and compatibility with the
aristocracy. His elevation to leadership in provincial
politics as the spokesman of Transylvania's union with
Hungary was largely due to the constitutional privileges
attached to his office. The international position of the
church also worked in his favor, both because of his stature
in Rome and the delicacy of the Catholic question in the
Viennese court. The personalities of Şulüțiu and Şaguna
complemented the social structure of their constituencies.
With respect to the ruling elites, Şulüțiu was condemned to
the role of an outsider. By contrast, Şaguna came from a
merchant family in central Hungary not far from Haynald's
hometown, studied at the University of Pest together with
the future minister Eötvös, and enjoyed more cordial rela-
tions than Şulüțiu with both Haynald and Eötvös. Romanian
bishops had indeed been national leaders for centuries, and
would continue to be so until the end of Hungarian rule.

Roman Catholics were most intimately tied to the

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2. Charles J. Slovak, "J. D. Strossmayer as a Balkan
Bishop," Balkan Studies 18 (1967). 121-44. Slovak's model
of "Balkan bishop" is the Montenegrin prince-bishops who
were simultaneously political and religious leaders; he also
notes that the Ottoman millet system led to a union of the
two functions. Though he cites Saguna as a further example,
it is evident that circumstances in the Habsburg monarchy
were very different, despite certain similarities.
Habsburg state, and their nominal internationalism was best suited to highlight the conflict between religious orthodoxy and liberalism in this study. Ultramontanes and liberal Catholics were closer in ideology than the conflict between conservatives and liberals in secular politics would lead one to suspect, but represented phenomena analogous to their secular counterparts. They found their counterparts in all of the churches in Transylvania. Among committed churchmen, the problem of declining religiosity prompted a conservative response and a liberal one: either the spirit of the times was to blame, and should be fought more effectively; or alienation from religion was attributed to outmoded structures of authority in the church, which should be modified along liberal lines.

The newly appointed Archbishop of Kalocsa, Lajos Haynald, declared in November, 1867 "that we are living in the age of reforms, which can no more be avoided in the ecclesiastical, than in the political arena." All churches experienced this "age of reform" in the 1860s. The central issue of the religious reform movements was the administration of the economic and especially educational affairs of the churches by the religious communities themselves. The Habsburg state had taken over control of these affairs in the eighteenth century; laity and clergy, liberals and ultramontanes within the churches sought to end


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this tutelage. Movements for the establishment of constitutional statutes concerning economic and school administration achieved success for the Saxon Lutherans in 1861, the Romanian Orthodox in 1868, the Hungarian Reformed in 1868, and the Hungarian Roman Catholics in 1873. The "Organic Statute" approved for the Romanian Orthodox and the "Status Catholicus" of the Roman Catholics conceded a degree of lay influence in Transylvania unrivalled elsewhere in these churches. The most popular synodal movement of all, among Romanian Greek Catholics, ultimately failed due to the opposition of the Holy See and Austrian and Hungarian governments.

The findings of this study confirm four of Pedro Ramet's conclusions concerning religion and politics in Eastern Europe today. He wrote that: 1. Change in society creates pressure for change within religious organization; 2. Religious organizations are a powerful threat to weak regimes in ethnically heterogeneous societies; 3. Relations between church and state are not monolithic, but characterized by tactical alliances of factions within each; 4. Churches design their policies with a view toward institutional needs as they see them.

Nationalism and liberalism penetrated the churches like the societies of which they were a part. Before it regained

5. Ramet, 186-94.
its equilibrium through the enactment of the Ausgleich, the Habsburg state passed through a weakened transition stage during which the ethnic churches were important rival centers of power, especially in Transylvania. This study highlights many instance of factionalism within the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Austrian bureaucrats found welcome allies against Haynald among some of his conservative or Austrophile clergy, not to mention Sulutiu and his group among Romanian Greek Catholics. Against the latter, Primate Scitovszky and Bishop Haynald discreetly took the side of the Hungarophile wing of the Romanian clergy. All sides, of course, appealed to the Holy See. Factionalism was less evident under the disciplined regime of Bishop Saguna, but he did at times discipline nationalist clergymen of whose militance he disapproved. Certainly, no bishops lost sight of their institutional goals: with respect to proselytism, hierarchical independence, state subsidies, and of course the role of patriotic leadership. The traditional religiosity of social conformism was in decline. Consequently religion took on a more voluntaristic note, as individuals made conscious choices in view of their ethnic identity and political preferences. This change in religiosity was an incentive for the clergy to legitimate itself in patriotic terms.

Robert C. Binkley characterized the two decades between the defeat of the revolutions of 1848 and German unification as "the era of federative polity" in Central Europe.
Conservatives such as Lord Acton and moderate liberals such as Jozsef Eotvos warned against the threat that the absolute claims of the national state posed to local, ethnic and religious autonomies. According to these thinkers, the form of state that best guaranteed personal and cultural individuality as well as the essential unity of European civilization would be a federation. Binkley argues that the statecraft of Austria in particular, in seeking to buttress the German federation but also prevent the nationalist atomization of its own empire, was the most concrete expression of this thinking. The considerable vitality and appeal of ecclesiastic polities in the period portrayed in this study confirms this insight. The triumph of the national state was not only not inevitable, but in the case of Hungary the church autonomy that many of the nationalities attained in the 1860s helped to moderate the victory of Hungarian nationalism in 1867.

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- Associate Instructor, Indiana University, 1978-8 and 1981
- Visiting Assistant Professor, Colgate University, 1988--

Awards and Fellowships:
- Indiana University exchange in Debrecen, Spring 1987
- Mellon Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship, 1986-87
- International Research and Exchanges Board doctoral research scholarship, 1982-84: Romanian, ten months, and Hungary, eight months
- Fulbright-Hayes scholarship for Romania, 1982-83, declined
- National Resource Fellowship (F.L.A.S.) in Hungarian, 1979-80

Publications:
- "Ioan Lupaș and the Cluj School of History Between the World Wars," in Romanian in Vatra, September 1988, and in English in Balkanistica 7 (1981-82), 78-91