EARTHY ENCOUNTERS: READINGS IN FEMINIST THEORY, POSTSTRUCTURALISM, AND CANADIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation draws out a point of resonance between Frantz Fanon’s and Luce Irigaray’s philosophies: Fanon and Irigaray demonstrate how the philosophy of difference – be it racial and/or sexual difference – and the philosophy of power relations – be it the analysis of patriarchy and/or colonialism – not only bring attention to racialized and gendered others, they also bring attention to land and the earth. In both authors’ works, abstract, homogenous empty space comes to the foreground, filled with the matter that constitutes it: earth, air, and land. The dissertation draws on Fanon’s and Irigaray’s treatment of space to reconsider central concepts that circulate in poststructuralist feminist thought: power, discourse, interiority, subjectivity, and sexuality. I read these concepts within the context of Canadian settler colonialism to foreground the politics of space. Most centrally, I argue that alongside the forms of power Michel Foucault analyzed at length exists another form of power, geopower, the force relations that transform the earth. I describe geopower through an analysis of the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. Ultimately, “Earthly Encounters” contributes to feminist, anti-racist thought by bringing attention not simply to sexual or racial difference but also to the material differences that make up our world: animal, plant, and mineral.
Acknowledgments

It was hot and humid, and I was nineteen. The first day of college. I didn’t want to take “Intro to Feminist Theory,” but I was a philosophy/math student, which meant that I had to fulfill a requirement in either ethics or politics. “Intro to Feminist Theory” fit my schedule. Begrudgingly, I waited for the boys in “Military History” to leave the classroom, and then I filed in, taking one of their seats. At least there was A/C. The professor explained that we were to learn about all sorts of feminisms, and we were dismissed. But I didn’t leave.

I remember this clearly, but I’m still unsure whence this came: “Could I write my final paper about gender, space, and the earth?” I asked the professor. She looked at me, a little bewildered. This was the first day of school. But she shrugged,

“Sure…Well, we’ll see.”

I didn’t write that paper in 1999. Twelve years later, here it finally is.

I want to thank, first and foremost, those feminist theorists, both inside and outside the academy, who have made my life as I know it possible. I am indebted to those who have thought, fought, and loved. Thank you.

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Laurie Marhoefer was patient enough to put up with me – even love me and make me smile – throughout the PhD. Thank you. She has made me recognize that life is more than just work and that I already value more than intelligence. These six years have taken us from Highland Park to Toronto, Princeton, Ithaca, New York City, Berlin, Montreal, Washington D.C., Syracuse, and finally to Rutgers’ University Inn (not to mention
Niahm’s, Agatha and Allison’s, Anahi’s, and Ginny’s). We have become adept at packing and unpacking boxes and suitcases, and in the process we have collected a Ph.D each. I’m proud of our work. Although Oxford will be the next place this project will take me, I hope that we may one day find a home together in a place we both want to live, write, and teach.

Ce projet est dévoué à ma grand-mère, Charlotte Lavoie Pinsonnault. C’est elle qui m’écoutait lors de mes études au primaire et au secondaire comme si j’avais quelque chose d’important à dire. C’est elle qui me tenait en haut regard, et c’est dans sa présence que j’ai développé le désir de questionner et de lire. Mémé n’a pas eu la chance de poursuivre des hautes études, mais je n’ai aucun doute qu’elle était brillante.
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Introduction: Earthly Encounters

Luce Irigaray and Frantz Fanon make up an unlikely pair with which to begin a dissertation. Both authors are Francophone philosophers and psychoanalysts, but they seem to share little else - short of significant potential disagreement. Indeed, each could be used to develop critiques of the other. For instance, Fanon’s imagined nation, comprised of new men walking in each others’ company, is in Darieck Scott’s terms “masculinist at the core of its conception” (61). For Fanon, women represent the danger of miscegenation; as a result, as Rey Chow argues, their admission to the nation of black men would put this community at risk. Women’s sexual autonomy, humans’ debt to our maternal body, the recognition of sexual difference as the starting point for the development of a new culture - all key concepts in Irigaray’s writing - have no role in Fanon’s model for decolonization.

In turn, the racial politics of Irigaray’s philosophy have been called into question. Irigaray’s claims are bold: she not only argues that sexual difference is universal, she also insists that the key to the development ethical and just worlds is the elaboration of a culture of sexual difference. She claims, for example, that “our behaviours with respect to difference of races, of cultures, of generations, etc. often results from a lack of cultivation of our sexual instincts, our most basic instincts in relating with the other(s)” (Conversations 82). Critics see this focus on sexual difference as symptomatic of racial privilege.1 Irigaray also has the tendency, as Penelope Deutscher argues, to idealize non-Western culture. In Between East and West, for example, Irigaray upholds “Indian”

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1 See the interviews in Conversations for examples of this suggestion, especially pages 17, 81.
culture as providing a useful counterpoint to European understandings of nature, the elements, and embodiment. Here, Irigaray seems “too sure in her ability to listen to and represent a culture depicted as other” (Deutscher 142). Whereas Irigaray reads the idealization of femininity within patriarchy as indicative of the lack of the culture of sexual difference, she sees in her representation of “the East” an instance of manifested, positive difference. Deutscher conjectures that had Irigaray seriously engaged with Fanon’s work, she would have been forced to consider the ambivalence of racialized identities that are constructed within unequal structures of power, such as colonialism. Decolonization for Fanon requires the creation of new identities; it is not about the affirmation of existing identities – hence Fanon’s apprehension towards the Négritude poets (*Black Skin, White Masks* 122-140) – but about the development of the new: “we must make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man” (*The Wretched of the Earth* 239)

However, notwithstanding the real tensions between Fanon’s and Irigaray’s writing, their work resonates. And it is here, in this tense overlay, that this dissertation finds its beginning. Read together, Fanon and Irigaray demonstrate how the philosophy of difference – be it racial and/or sexual difference – and the philosophy of power relations – be it the analysis of patriarchy and/or colonialism – not only bring attention to racialized and gendered others, they also bring attention to land and the earth. And it is precisely this latter attention, an underexplored connection between Fanon’s and Irigaray’s thought, that this dissertation seeks to elaborate.

The relation between sexual difference and the earth is clear in Irigaray’s writing. It begins in Irigaray’s claim in *An Ethic of Sexual Difference* that the “transition to a new
“age” of sexual difference “requires a change in our perception and conception of space-time, the inhabiting of places, and of containers, or envelopes of identity” (7). Each of these concepts has been developed in the masculine and has been used to deny sexual difference. Traditionally in philosophy, Irigaray explains, “the feminine is experienced as space ... while the masculine is experienced as time” (7). In turn, time, as Irigaray finds in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, comes to stand for the “interiority of the subject itself, and space, its exteriority” (7). Thus, time and space, masculine and feminine, get mapped on a distinction between mind and body. Even more, the “maternal-feminine … serves as an envelope, a container” (10). But her “status as envelope” has not been thought through, and as a result, the maternal-feminine’s difference becomes erased; she is but the starting point for man’s identity. In this model, “the maternal-feminine remains the place separated from ‘its’ own place” (10). She is the place for man’s emergence but does not come into her own and hence remains without place. The maternal-feminine becomes a threat to man. She disturbs his place; she castrates. She creates “artificial” envelops for herself: clothing, makeup, jewels (11). She gives man the “texture of spatiality” (11). In exchange, “he buys her a house, even shuts her up in it” (11).

Thus, An Ethic of Sexual Difference argues that space, place and envelopes, interiority and exteriority need to be rethought for the emergence of a culture of sexual difference. Irigaray’s work on the elements (especially water, earth, and air) in Marine Lover: Of Friedrich Nietzsche, Elemental Passions, The Forgetting of Air In Martin Heidegger, and To Be Two are integral to this rethinking. In To Be Two, for example, Irigaray wonders whether a feminine subject can enter a relationship with a masculine subject through the earth, which Irigaray feminizes. She writes, addressing a masculine
subject, “Can I enter a relationship with you through her [the earth] – safeguarding her, cultivating her, purifying the air that she gives?” (8). In such passages, Irigaray calls attention to the location of ethics as potentially contributing to development of an ethical relation. This location becomes a third term through which encountering consciousnesses can connect. Yet this location is not an empty place: Irigaray fills it with the atmosphere of the earth. Earth becomes a place, with an envelope that she gives to herself: her air. In turn, this envelope passes between, inside, and outside of the encountering consciousnesses. Air enters and exits us; upon this movement, our life depends. Thus, air is the envelope the earth gives herself, but in turn the earth envelops both masculine and feminine subjects, all the while entering and exiting them. Thinking about this envelope reframes the masculinist understandings of containers, space, and place An Ethics of Sexual Difference describes. Instead of empty space awaiting man’s towers and place as woman, unrecognized but threatening, Irigaray offers earth and her air. The envelope is not the starting point for man’s identity: rather, the earth’s envelope passes through our bodies. We intimately share that which is not ours.

Likewise, integral to Fanon’s work on racialization, colonial structures of power, and the process of decolonization is his insistence that colonial power works primarily through its manipulation of space. The Wretched of the Earth brings attention to the geography of the colonized world: in effect, Fanon claims that this world can be most clearly understood by “penetrating its geographical configuration” (3). Colonization

2 In this paragraph, I adopt Irigaray’s language that feminizes the earth.
3 Ato Sekyi-Out argues that Fanon’s focus on spatiality “prefigures Foucault’s criticism of Marxism’s ‘devaluation of space’ in its critical vocabulary.” Whereas a Marxist would focus on the freeing of time from its capitalist structuring, giving time and thus work and action back to the worker, Fanon attempts to free space – to create places within which the black man can act. To challenge colonialism is to usurp its “coercive structuring of space as the defining reality of social domination, indeed of social being” (Sekyi-Out 76).
builds a Manichean “world divided in two”: the “native” sector and the European sector (3). This world orders human beings spatially according to race. In turn, this spatial order becomes constitutive of colonial subjectivities. The “colonial subject,” Fanon explains, “is a man penned in” (15). To be a colonial subject is to be trapped, to feel claustrophobic in the cramped “native quarters” (4). The colonial man therefore dreams of “jumping, swimming, running, and climbing” (15). Containment produces muscular tension, an unfulfilled desire to move of which one dreams. But Fanon does not only describe the spatiality of colonial power relations, he also brings attention to land. He argues that land is a central value for the colonized: land, not an abstract value of equality or freedom; these are white values that have not been put into practice but that are often held by the colonial élite. In their place, land becomes the “most essential value” because access to land may “provide bread” and hence sustain life. Land provides “naturally, dignity” (9). This is not “human dignity,” Fanon clarifies, but the dignity of life: the dignity of not being “arrested, beaten, and starved” (9). This dignity does not draw upon an ideal of the rational human who is equal to all others but rather upon a valuation of life in all its forms, the value, we may argue, of bare life.

Thus, while Irigaray challenges patriarchy and writes a philosophy of sexual difference and Fanon challenges colonialism, writing a philosophy of racial difference, both consider space and place, bringing attention to earth and her air in Irigaray’s case

4 During decolonization, “the colonized masses thumb their noses at these very values,” Fanon claims, “showering them with insults and vomit them up” (8).

5 I borrow this term from Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Agamben draws the concept of bare life or zoē from Ancient Greek philosophy, which distinguished two different forms of life: bios, “the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group,” (1) and zoē, “the simple fact of living common to all living beings” (1). Agamben traces the ways in which politics constitutes itself by including bare life or zoē as excluded. However, in some passages in Fanon’s writing, politics relates to bare life differently. Rather than founding the city of men in the exclusion of mere living, that is, on the basis of an additional capacity such as language or reason, Fanon’s polis founds itself with musculature, food, and movement. Bare life is not included as excluded but is rather foundational.
and to land in Fanon’s. In both instances, abstract space, homogenous empty space, (to rephrase Walter Benjamin’s phrase), space as a container for matter, space as mere background, space as passive medium, comes to the foreground, filled with the matter that constitutes it: earth, her air, and land.

Such foregrounding is this dissertation’s primary goal. “Earthly Encounters” asks: do central concepts that circulate in the overlapping interdisciplinary fields of women’s and gender studies, ethnic studies, postcolonial studies, cultural studies, American studies, and Canadian studies – concepts such as power, subjectivity, sexuality, discourse, interiority and the outside - background earth? How? And how can I reframe these concepts bringing earth to the foreground?6

These questions are critical to the development of feminist, anti-racist philosophy, and it is not incidental that Irigaray’s and Fanon’s writing overlap here. In For Space, Doreen Massey argues that difference requires space. For differences to exist coevally, these differences must be spatially separated from (though perhaps touching) one another.7 Massey’s argument assumes that place, in its smallest unit, is self-same, or, in other words, that in a given moment, two entities cannot occupy the same exact place unless these entities were identical to one another. Her contention implies that “any serious recognition of multiplicity and heterogeneity itself depends on a recognition of spatiality” (11). This argument can help to understand why the philosophies of gender and race, philosophies intent on making difference visible, bring attention to space:

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6 I use the terms “earth” and “land” borrowing from Irigaray and Fanon respectively, but these two words do not refer the same thing. “Land” indexes a relation between the earth and humans. For Fanon, land is that which can “provide bread” (9); it is the earth in its potential to provide nutrition and shelter to humans. In contrast, “earth” consists in the forces and materiality that constitute the space of life on this planet.

7 Cf. Irigaray’s “Place, Interval” in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. For Irigaray, touching can only occur across an interval, an “intermediary” between boundaries (48). Touch occurs as this interval approaches zero when, through locomotion, “skins come into contact” (48). In this framework, the interval is suffused by sexuality, by desire for the interval’s overcoming.
difference requires spatiality. But whereas Massey argues that space is “the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity” (10), I argue that space is not a sphere of possibility. Space, instead, is constituted by the existence, in Massey’s terms, of “multiplicity.”

In other words, this dissertation moves away from the understanding of space that Edward Casey traces to modern European philosophy and that Cartesian space best encapsulates. With Descartes, space becomes mapable upon axes, and objects can change from one position to another without transforming space itself. Space then becomes framed as homogenous, equivalent to the “void” (Casey 198 – 199). Such an understanding of space resonates with Massey’s definition of space as a “sphere of possibility.” Casey, along with many other geographers and philosophers, has argued that this understanding of space is insufficient. Fanon’s work provides a strong example of this argument: Fanon’s description of the colonized world in The Wretched of the Earth shows how space is not neutral. Access to movement across space is hampered or facilitated depending upon the power relations that imbue it. Even more, Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks shows that one’s experience of the body is entangled in one’s experience of space; the two cannot be clearly separated. From this, it follows that space is not a container within which bodies circulate; bodies and spatiality emerge together. In short, Fanon moves away from a geometric or empirical understanding of space. Instead, he brings our attention to its lived experience.

Building on this tradition, “Earthly Encounters” turns from using space as a fundamental category for analysis to focusing on the earth. Clearly, these approaches

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8 For famous examples other than Fanon, see David Harvey’s Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, Doreen Massey’s Space, Place and Gender, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Gillian Rose’s Feminism and Geography, and Edward Soja’s Postmodern Geographies.
overlap, but thinking about earth first as opposed to space brings my attention to the material entities that fill – or indeed constitute – our worlds. This is different from Fanon’s attention to the lived experience of space; my goal here is not to write a phenomenology of (racialized) spatiality. Instead, I am drawing from a different strand of Fanon’s work: his claim that land because it can provide food is a central value to decolonization. This overlaps with Irigaray: both philosophers repudiate abstract, empty space and offer instead material entities: land, earth, or air. Following these thinkers, “Earthly Encounters” brings attention to the materialities – roads, air, lakes, and storms that fill the spaces of our lives. But “fill” here is not exactly the right word. By moving from “space” to “earth,” I am suggesting that there is no space, no neutral space, no plane or axis or dimensionality of space within which entities appear. Instead, the entities appearing and moving are that which constitutes what might be understood as space. Space emerges with the entities that fill it; therefore, these entities do not fill it so much as make it up, extend it, constitute it. By “earth,” I mean to capture this idea. “Land” overlaps with earth but has an additional stipulation: constituted by the material entities that extend it, lands are segments of the earth that sustain human lives. Because “land” is partially made up of the earth, I focus here primarily on the larger concept, earth.

Thus, beginning with “earth” rather than space indexes a form of materialism that challenges the understanding of space as a neutral medium and as an abstract dimensionality within which entities appear. In addition, this approach builds on feminist philosophy and the philosophy of race to make difference visible. The differences,

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9 By drawing out this aspect of Fanon’s work, I add to Sekyi-Out’s analysis of spatiality in Fanon.
however, become rocks, water and trees, animals and insects. These entities enter philosophical discourse not only as a background to human lives but as forceful agents that humans engage with. Even more, I show the mutual dependencies of differences upon one another. This builds on feminist theory’s long insistence that the self or the subject is dependent upon the other(s) that it repudiates. But in this case, the other does not remain human or even animal, as Judith Butler has recently enlarged her ethical universe. Instead, rocks, snow, and rivers enter; these become constitutive of this universe and are the differences that appear when “earth” is brought to the foreground.

It is with this understanding of “earth” that I return to my central questions: do concepts that circulate in the overlapping interdisciplinary fields of women’s and gender studies, ethnic studies, postcolonial studies, cultural studies, American studies, and Canadian studies – concepts such as power, subjectivity, sexuality, discourse, interiority and the outside - background earth? How? And how can I reframe these concepts bringing earth to the foreground? As is now clear, asking these questions is part of a commitment to a feminist, anti-racist - one can even write “queer” - project of difference.

I - Geopower and the Forces that Transform the Earth

In order to answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on Michel Foucault’s understanding of power. Arguably, Foucault’s work has significantly influenced the interdisciplinary fields I engage, and his notions of power, especially biopower, disciplinary power, sovereign power, and governmentality, have created a paradigm for social and cultural criticism at large. At least three ideas of his have been particularly

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10 A critical question that then arises is whether ghosts or spirits inhabit the earth, and if they do, in what manner they exist and inhabit the earth.
11 Butler made this argument at a lecture she gave March 5, 2010, at the Columbia Law School’s “Symposium Honoring the Contributions of Judith Butler to the Scholarship and Practice of Gender and Sexuality Law.”
influential: first, power is not only repressive, it is productive. Power, in other words, does not only say “no.” In effect, it is more insidious and effective when it works through saying “yes.” Next, power is best understood from the bottom up, not the top down. Foucault encourages us to consider the minute, local, and particular force relations that go into the construction of larger networks of power or social structures. And finally, different forms of power can be described by focusing on their techniques and ends. There is no essence to power; what is interesting about power is not what it is but what it does and how.  

While Foucault’s approach to power has been extremely productive, “Earthly Encounters” argues that notwithstanding Foucault’s interest in the geography and architecture of power relations, he sometimes treats earth and land as a background in that he always folds their transformation into another form of power that has the human as its final target. This is especially ironic given Foucault’s critique of humanism. Thus, foregrounding land and the earth as Fanon’s and Irigaray’s philosophies suggest, makes visible a lacunae in Foucault’s work, a lacunae that gets adopted in the interdisciplinary scholarship that draws on his writing. In the place of this lacunae, I argue that alongside the forms of power that Foucault describes at length is another form of power, which I name “geopower.” Geopower involves the force relations that transform the earth. I describe geopower using the very method Foucault provides: I focus on its techniques and ends. I bring attention to the minute, to particular encounters (see chapter 2). I argue that geopower puts pressure not simply on the understanding of power that circulates in interdisciplinary scholarship. It also requires a rethinking of the outside (see chapter 1),

12 For elaborations of this understanding of power, see, for example, Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, especially the “Method” chapter from page 92 – 102.
discourse (see chapter 1), sexuality (see chapter 4), interiority (see chapter 3) and subjectivity (see chapter 5).

II - CANADIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM

To make geopower visible, my work couples readings of Foucault and his interlocutors with readings from the archive of Canadian settler colonialism. “Canadian settler colonialism” refers to a set of practices and institutions that emerged with European expansion but continue into the present day in the territory now referred to as “Canada.”

Settler colonialism entails an overhauling of the earth: architecture, urban planning, and engineering, come together to reshape the earth. Gardening and farming transform its flora. Literature, law, politics, the visual arts, and religion change its meaning. Geographers map it so that it is amenable both to political and economic interests. New laws come to organize the distribution of land, and a new economic system emerges, complete with the modes of transportation that make it possible. Colonized people’s modes of inhabiting the earth change, though certain knowledges, and many practices and rituals survive and are adapted. Aspects of indigenous life are taken up by the colonists both to ensure their survival in a new environment and as a form of appropriation that indigenizes them, thus legitimizing their presence in a particular place. In short, I turn my attention to settler colonialism because its analysis necessitates that earth and land be brought to the foreground; the power relations of settler colonialism are particularly intense there.

I focus on Canada partially because, by accident of birth, it is the archive I am most familiar with and whose work is most meaningful to me. However, there are other

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13 This definition departs from those historians who, upon hearing about my work, often insisted that “settler colonialism” (and indigenous sovereignty for that matter) is the stuff of the past.
good reasons for analyzing Canadian settler colonialism. As those who study Canada know well, earth and land are central to hegemonic Canadian nationalism, which has often defined Canadian identity by an attachment to “wilderness.” For example, the 1920s Group of Seven painters, along with Tom Thompson’s works that are associated with the group, are most well known for paintings of Algonquin Park and Northern Ontario. The Group of Seven was understood in its time as “finally” bringing about a Canadian form of modernism. Its portrayal of Canadian, non-urban space was seen as marking their art as Canadian. Canadian literature has been understood similarly. For instance, Northrop Frye, who is often credited with establishing the study of Canadian literature, argued in his 1971 monograph, The Bush Garden, that the “Canadian imaginary” is shaped by the vast and sparsely settled Canadian territory. Margaret Atwood, another central figure of Canadian culture, argued similarly. In her 1972 Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature, she claimed that the Canadian environment poses such a great threat to life that Canadian writing is a tool for survival. “Canadian” music partially follows suit: in 1967, Glenn Gould, one of the most celebrated Canadian classical musicians, launched the first of three parts of his “Solitude Trilogy.” This first part, “The Idea of North,” aired on the Canadian Broadcast Cooperation’s radio, and used music to explore what Gould felt was the solitude and isolation that characterizes the Far North. In short, Canadian music, like Canadian painting and Canadian literature, was framed around Canadian territory. More precisely, Canadian non-urban space has been understood as providing inspiration for the cultural production and identity that becomes marked as Canadian.

This trend, of course, has not gone without serious critique since race, class,
gender and indigenous politics are densely knotted throughout it. I read this Canadian cultural production as an expression of a dis-ease within the segment of the earth that becomes the territory of Canada. The representation of non-urban space within Canadian culture can be understood as an attempt to claim it as one’s own. This is a practice of taking possession that attempts to transform the possessor into the indigenous or to replace the indigenous with a supposedly better form of stewardship or care. In other words, this cultural production displaces indigenous nations while taking possession of the earth. It is in “conquering” the wilderness through paint, sound, and language that “the Canadian” emerges. I therefore see these cultural formations as part of the archive of settler colonialism: they are expressions of colonial dis-ease and attempts at consolidating settler possession.14

Because I have framed this project in relation to texts that are not written in the intellectual tradition of those nations indigenous to North America, my engagement with indigenous scholarship in my analysis of settler colonialism is especially careful. 15 I do not want to reproduce a colonial gaze that extracts knowledge in the service of the knowledge producer – in this case, a white feminist. But at the same time, I do not want to ignore the rich scholarship currently developing in the field of indigenous studies, work by scholars such as Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Andrea Smith, Robert Warrior, Glen Coulthard, and John Burrows. I also do not want to frame this work as providing “an indigenous voice.” This would contribute to the “ethnographic entrapment” Smith argues is common as scholars engage her to give “the indigenous” perspective. I seek then to

14 Although the relation to the earth they describe is not always one of possession or mastery so much as being affected, overwhelmed, or consumed.
15 For scholarship that shows the importance of engagement with indigenous history, literature, philosophy, religion, politics, and society from an indigenous intellectual tradition, see Robert Warrior, Craig S. Womack, Jace Weaver, and Daniel Heath Justice’s work about intellectual sovereignty.
write in the contact zone of settler colonialism.16 This means that I engage different
voices while paying attention to the power relations between them, while thinking about
my own positionality as a writer who engages them, and while questioning the modes in
which they are framed.

Thus, in short, this dissertation turns to the archive of Canadian settler
colonialism, paying special attention to the theme of earth, land, and territory that runs
across hegemonic, Canadian cultural production and engaging with indigenous studies’
critiques of colonial epistemologies and state politics.17 I see in the analysis and critique
of Canadian hegemonic culture a potential: the explicitness of questions of earth within
Canadian cultural production is an opportunity for thinking about the politics of settler
colonialism and for bringing the earth to the foreground. I force Foucault into an account
with the archive of settler colonialism; I bring earth to the foreground, and I make visible
a form of power that Foucault did not consider: geopower.

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16 I borrow this term “contact zone” from Mary-Louise Pratt’s Imperial Eyes (6). Chapter three returns to
this concept in greater detail.
17 My work therefore departs from the several recent studies of Canadian culture that portray the study of
earth and land as a theme that is at best finally overcome, and at worse, “an embarrassment” or “boring.”
For instance, Erin Manning argues that the debate concerning the “elusive nature of ‘Canadian identity’ and
its relationship to the landscape … can be a troubling and often terribly dull pastime in a country whose
regional diversity and racial complexity gives voice to much more compelling events” (“I am Canadian”).
Building on this judgment, in her book, Ephemeral Territories, Manning critiques Canadian nationalism’s
investment in territory and home by examining how cultural production, such as film and art, destabilizes
the nation-state’s imagination of itself as a bounded container. She celebrates the unheimlich, the in-
between, and the process of deterritorialization. Yet even though she names one chapter “Where the Zulu
Meets the Mohawk,” Manning recognizes in her preface that her text excludes “a reading of the native
presence in Canada” (ix). She claims that “the sheer distances that separate people in Canada make it
difficult to speak of any experience other than that of proximity” (ix). She adds, “In my case, this means
having little firsthand experience of what it is to be ‘native’ and ‘at home’” (x). Ironically, although
Manning attempts to unhinge the stability of territoriality, the excuse she gives for erasing “native
presence” depends upon territory: she refers to the “sheer distances” that constitute the Canadian landscape.
Magdalene Redekop performs a similar dynamic. In her essay on the production of “Canadian
National Literature,” she explains how many contemporary literary scholars are embarrassed by the
thematic stage of Canadian literary criticism, which explored the theme of geography. Implicitly, it seems
as though Redekop shares this embarrassment, but in her movement away from the discussion of earth,
territory, and land, she too erases indigenous politics, hailing Canada as a nation that welcomes “creative
invasion.”
III - INTERDISCIPLINARITY: A NOTE ON METHODS AND OBJECTS

By coupling philosophy with history, political theory, art history, and literature, my work at first appears multidisciplinary. However, I see this project as an interdisciplinary practice that has as its goal the creation of new concepts. This statement requires some unpacking.

From its inception, women’s studies articulated itself as interdisciplinary, and forty years later this has not largely changed. As Judith Allen and Sally Kitch point out, “the mission statements of many women’s studies programs and departments express the intention to generate and disseminate interdisciplinary knowledge” (282). There are many good reasons for this: feminist scholars argue that traditional disciplines have framed their object of analysis in a way that excludes women and gender from their scope of inquiry. Within this context, interdisciplinarity does not only provide a space for the study of women and gender, it also seems necessary in reflexive work that takes the disciplines themselves as objects of inquiry to analyze how women have been excluded and gender naturalized. This is the sort of interdisciplinarity Robyn Wiegman has in mind when she contends that women’s studies might teach students how “to think about the practices that have under-written disciplinary guarantees to knowledge” (518). Even more, feminists argue that the reality of women’s lives requires interdisciplinary research: psychic formations, as expressed and transformed through art, are partially a result of social structures, which themselves are political and historical. Interdisciplinarity therefore promises a more holistic approach that does not compartmentalize lives so as to master them accord to legitimate forms of knowledge.18 Overall, the claim is that to be

18 As Renate Klein writes, “since the drama of ‘life’ does not take place in a glass-womb, ... subject compartmentalization needs to be broken down in order to both study and survive” (75).
interdisciplinary is to eschew modernist divisions of knowledge, to reject the mastery these disciplines legitimize, and the power relations they back. To be interdisciplinary is to think creatively, anew. It is, as Allen and Kitch hope, to ask questions that disciplines have deemed unquestionable.

And yet, notwithstanding this history of women’s studies, recent publications about interdisciplinarity in women’s studies often lament the fact that departmental structures, journals, and research are often, at best, multidisciplinary not interdisciplinary. Most women’s studies departments are conglomerates of disciplinary-based scholars; “interdisciplinary” feminist journals publish feminist scholarship from multiple disciplines but leave the integration of these disciplines to the reader; research, if not grounded in a discipline, often uses multiple disciplines (say history and anthropology) and has trouble showing how these disciplines speak to one another. Quite simply, interdisciplinarity, though lauded by feminist scholars and valued at least in university rhetoric, remains rare and tentative.

This is partially because of the particular challenges interdisciplinarity poses. The potential of interdisciplinarity, as Vivian May summarizes, “continues to be stymied by lingering attachments to epistemologies of mastery, institutional formations reinforcing our marginality, and troubling desires for unity or singularity within the field of Women’s Studies” (137). These symptoms are present even in texts that seek to support the field. For example, articulating a desire for unity, Allen and Kitch contend that the field would be a “genuine … new ‘interdiscipline’” if it “created a new, intellectually coherent entity built upon a common vocabulary” (277). Whereas Allen and Kitch seek coherence and commonality, Susan Stanford Friedman seems worried that interdisciplinary mastery is
impossible. She writes, “the theoretical foundation of a Ph.D. program in women's studies depends upon the assumption that a single individual—whether student or teacher—can become sufficiently proficient in content areas and methodologies across the humanities, social sciences, sciences, and arts. I think this is an impossible and not even desirable dream” (318). The desire for unity, coherence, and commonality as well as Friedman’s desire for mastery are understandable given the pressures on the field to articulate itself as legitimate, but they likewise limit the potential for experimental interdisciplinary work.

While May’s arguments are convincing, I am troubled by any sharp distinction between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. When we argue that women’s and gender studies is multidisciplinary as opposed to interdisciplinary, we obey laws of propriety: English literature belongs to English, history to historians, concepts to philosophy, culture to anthropology. To have a group of scholars each trained in a discipline, say, philosophy, sociology, and history come together in a department is not interdisciplinary, we claim, but multidisciplinary. These scholars, we accept, “come from” or in some way “belong to” the disciplines. While this argument is powerful and deeply felt, it depends upon a respect of ownership. “Literature belongs to literary scholars.” Why conserve this organization of propriety?

In 1972, four years after the student protests in France, Roland Barthes wrote an opening essay to a collection of writing by junior scholars just finishing their dissertations. He argued that “in order to do interdisciplinary work, it is not enough to take a ‘subject’ (a theme) and to arrange two or three sciences around it. Interdisciplinary study consists in creating a new object, which belongs to no one” (72). In Barthes’
understanding, interdisciplinarity is not only about producing new objects of analysis. It is also about impropriety. It is to refuse that certain methods and objects belong to certain disciplines. In effect, to produce a coherent object of analysis is part and parcel of the process of taking propriety over it: both processes involve the creation of boundaries that separate the object out from others. Thus, interdisciplinarity is to refuse claims of ownership: not to take for itself, not to steal (though the analogy is tempting) but to refuse ownership for oneself as well.

Perhaps interdisciplinarity is easier to navigate in empirical projects that are more invested in the social sciences. In this sort of work, the object of analysis may appear defined and coherent in its very being. Women’s and gender studies is sometimes understood in this way. Women, gender, sexuality and sometimes race are taken as objects of analysis, objects that cannot be understood unless they are approached from many perspectives. The problem with such a framework is that it assumes that the object, “gender,” for instance, coheres across disciplinary boundaries - that “gender” remains the same no matter how we approach it. This positivism insists that an object exists in and of itself and can be defined and known without that knowledge shaping the object. The same argument is present in the claim that interdisciplinarity, unlike multidisciplinarity, addresses that which exists between or outside disciplinary objects of analysis. Such a framing of interdisciplinarity assumes that objects of analysis cohere in and of themselves, that interdisciplinarity addresses something that exists prior to analysis.

In contrast, I maintain that objects are shaped by the way in which we look at them. Interdisciplinary scholars may seek a coherent object of analysis. But maybe, notwithstanding this desire and notwithstanding the demands of professionalization, the
objects of analysis remain elusive. Unruly. Unbounded. Belonging to no one since it is unclear what they are in the first place. To begin with such incoherence may seem counter-productive to producing knowledge, to bringing something to light. But what if we understand interdisciplinarity less as the investigation of an object than a practice? A work in and of itself that creates affects and concepts, incites actions and generates questions? I perform my research but it does not belong to me. I assemble an object here that falls apart as it is moved elsewhere. The object belongs to no one because it cannot be transferred to someone. It is not a parcel to be bought or sold, given or taken. The object contingently appears through research-performance and holds together only because of and through this process of creation. It does not belong to me but is a by-product of this practice. Within this frame, “Earthly Encounters” can be understood as an interdisciplinary practice. Its goal is less of an in-depth study of a preexisting object than an attempt to create new concepts and objects.

IV - FROM THE OUTSIDE IN

A central question that emerges when trying to foreground earth and land is how to understand these entities. On the one hand, this dissertation challenges social and critical thought to encounter the materiality of the earth. On the other hand, my understanding of this materiality is partially a social and cultural construct and my representation of the earth could be seen as invested with its continued colonial use. This is especially clear when I consider the place of spirits in my understanding of the earth’s materiality. If the earth is inhabited by spirits, or if indigenous people have ontological and spiritual connections to the earth, then the transformation of the earth into a hydroelectric dam, for instance can be contested on several grounds – not simply
economic. Before I turn to the analysis of power in Foucault, the first chapter of this dissertation considers how to think about matter, earth, and land in the contact zone of settler colonialism. I approach this problem from the perspective of indigenous studies, science studies, and feminist poststructuralism, which has insisted over and again that there is no “outside” to discourse. Moving between these perspectives, I argue that representations of the earth are tied to its use, but that the earth is the condition for representation.

The second chapter begins the discussion of geopower. I argue that while Foucault’s understanding of power is attentive to spatiality, he does not treat the transformation of the earth as a form of power in itself. Such an omission would not be possible were Foucault to analyze settler colonialism, to which my discussion then turns. By taking the example of the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the nineteenth century, I argue that alongside the forms of power Foucault analyzed at length is another form of power, geopower, which involves force relations between human and non-humans that transform the earth.

My work then explains how geopower requires a rethinking of borders and boundaries. Since Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands, La Frontera* was read through the work of Jacques Derrida, feminist scholars have often seen borders as productive of interiorities. The border produces the inside. I argue, however, that this concept covers over the work of geopower: the transformation of the earth that marks it as an inside. I use several examples to make my point, such as the sovereignty patrol in the “Canadian” Arctic and John Burrows’ work on indigenous law in Canada. In addition, I provide a
rereading of Anzaldúa, arguing that her writing, unlike those who read her, does not fetishize the border, covering over the work of geopower.

The fourth chapter examines the implications of foregrounding the earth for thinking about sexuality. Through a reading of Lee Maracle’s *Ravensong* alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s “1848: Of the Refrain” and Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, I argue that while queer theorists have often understood sexuality in relation to norms, sexuality is a particularly intense site for the production of territory.

The fifth and final chapter turns to a discussion of subjectivity. I argue that geopower is a subjectifying force because the shape of the earth incites certain actions and feelings over others. This means that the subject does not only emerge in its recognition by another consciousness. Instead, subjectivity emerges in its relation to objects – most particularly, in relation to the shape of the earth. To make this argument, this chapter couples readings of Hegel, Althusser, and Butler with a discussion of Emily Carr’s attachment to the Pacific Northwest. I read this attachment in the context of settler colonial politics.

Overall, this dissertation consists in a sustained attempt to bring earth and land to the foreground. Instead of thinking with space as an empty frame, I suggest that matter’s emergence constitutes spatiality; in the place of space, I offer “earth” to capture this idea. Such an approach builds on Frantz Fanon and Luce Irigaray’s shared insight that the philosophy of difference requires not simply a reframing of space, but a turning towards the material entities that constitute it. In short, what emerges through these pages is a practice of a materialism of difference.
Chapter One: Lituya Bay and the “Outside”

Flanked by glaciers, Lituya Bay is a small inlet off the coast of the Gulf of Alaska. The bay is shaped as a “T:” its narrow entrance with steep, sloping sides opens onto two arms that extend approximately five kilometers. Because of the bay’s depth and its slim, shallow mouth, a strong tide moves its waters, and since the bay is located along the Fairweather fault, giant waves have repeatedly devastated its surrounding forest.

“There is no outside.”

Versions of this statement are by now common amongst feminist scholars influenced by poststructuralism. The arguments are well known: otherness cannot be represented without at the same time shoring up the self, framing the other in terms of the same.\(^{19}\) In a related narrative, there is no outside to discourse: the non-discursive is posited within discourse as that which stands before it.\(^{20}\) In yet another account, there is no outside to capitalism.\(^{21}\) Or there is no outside to power relations.\(^{22}\) While these arguments have undoubtedly been generative to feminist thought, this chapter seeks to reframe their hold: foregrounding the earth, the central project of this dissertation, requires this.

The central question in this chapter is how to think about Lituya Bay, the bay I described in the opening. I focus on this bay because I am inspired by Julie Cruikshank’s analysis of colonial encounters there. This chapter draws heavily on her work, *Do Glaciers Listen?*, to consider the question: is Lituya Bay “outside” discourse? Some

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19 See Chandra Mohanty’s “Under Western Eyes” and Gayatri Spivak “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
20 See Judith Butler’s *Bodies that Matter*.
21 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire*. Wendy Brown also made this argument in a lecture she gave at Cornell’s School of Criticism and Theory in 2008.
22 See Michel Foucault’s “Truth and Power.”
readers may expect that this site exemplifies a form of “wilderness” untouched by human presence; others may immediately be skeptical, arguing that such a framing of the bay says more about the discourse within which it appears than anything else. I argue that while every representation of the bay, including the description I began with, is embedded within particular discursive regimes, the earth in general and Lituya Bay in particular is nonetheless the condition of their representation.

This argument reworks the language of interiority and exteriority, inside and outside. Such language is entangled with the prioritization of epistemology and the concern with the limits of human knowledge. Within this tradition, the human knower has been figured as an interiority, and the question has become how this interiority can know that which is outside of it. As discourse has replaced the centrality of the human subject (with structuralism and psychoanalysis), discourse has also been figured as an “inside,” and the problem has remained quite similar: how can discourse “capture” that which is outside of it? Building on this argument, I suggest the following: in contrast to beginning with the human or discourse as interiorities, humans (and discourse) are “inside” the earth. The earth, in other words, is the “outside” within which human life and discourse exist.

I recognize that seeing the human and discourse as inside the earth appears surprising. Humans are on the earth. But “inside”? I stick with the preposition “inside” because I do not figure the earth as primarily solid land. To see the earth as solid land privileges particular modes of inhabiting it. My argument here follows from Epeli

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23 See, for instance, Descartes’ *Meditations* and Kant’s work on the phenomenal and the noumenal.
24 This builds on Doreen Massey’s argument: in order to think of spatiality and the differences it makes possible, we require a “shift of physical position, from an imagination of a textuality at which one looks, towards recognizing one’s place within continuous and multiple processes of emergence” (54).
Hau’ofa’s “Our Sea of Islands.” Hau’ofa demystifies the belief that people who live in Oceania reside on isolated, small islands. He writes,

If we look at the myths, legends and oral traditions, and the cosmologies of the peoples of Oceania, it will become evident that they did not conceive of their world in such microscopic proportions. Their universe comprised not only land surfaces, but the surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit it, the underworld with its fire-controlling and earth-shaking denizens, and the heavens above with their hierarchies of powerful gods and named stars and constellations that people could count on to guide their ways across the seas. Their world was anything but tiny. (7)

Rather than adopting the perspective of “continental men,” who see the Pacific nations as “islands in a far sea,” Hau’ofa offers a “more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality of their relationships” (7). He develops an understanding of the Pacific as a “sea of islands” (7). Inspired by this argument, I take a similar approach to the earth: I refuse the prioritization of solid land and see land in relationship both to the atmosphere that it touches and to the water around and within it. Earth then becomes a multiplicity of liquids, gases, solids, and spirits, organic and inorganic matter, living and nonliving that constitute the space in which humans – and other living beings - exist. Humans (and discourse), then, are in the earth. We do not live on it; we are immersed in it.

Beginning from this perspective, the problem is no longer how human interiorities come to know that which is outside of them. Instead, humans are within the earth. We affect it and are affected by it. In this view, knowledge no longer constitutes our primary mode of engaging the earth. We are affected by that which we do not know, and we intra-act with parts of the earth daily in ways that do not always produce conscious “knowledge.”25 This approach turns away from a focus on epistemology towards

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25 I use the term “intra-action” here borrowing from Karen Bard, who uses it to claim that, for instance, a subject and object does not exist prior to their encounter (as the term “interaction” would suggest), but rather emerge through their intra-action.
ontology. While multiple representations of the earth exist, each is made possible by particular intra-actions that incite them and make them possible. Thus, to Derrida’s « il n’y a pas de hors-texte, » (there is no outside of the text) I write, « Il n’y a pas de hors-terre » (there is no outside of the earth). This is not to deny that the earth has an outside, such as the universe, for instance. My argument instead is that life and representation in the forms with which I experience and know them are conditioned by the earth. In other words, my argument is simply that representation is not outside of the earth. From the perspective of the text, il n’y a pas de hors-terre.

To make this argument, this chapter begins by analyzing my description of Lituya Bay, drawing out the preconceptions embedded within it. I argue that discourse about Lituya Bay legitimizes particular truth games and potentially affects the bay itself. However, this does not mean that only discourse about the bay can be analyzed. Instead, reading Judith Butler’s understanding of materiality in Bodies that Matter, then Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway, and finally Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault, I argue that representations emerge through intra-actions with the bay, and that the bay is the condition of its representation. In other words, the bay in particular, but the earth more generally, is the outside without which meaning would not emerge.

Two final notes before proceeding: first, Lituya Bay is currently in the United States, but I work with it in the context of a project on Canadian settler colonialism to unhinge the border between the countries, making the point that their histories of colonization entwine and that the border is relatively recent. This is to unsettle the imaginary of settler colonialism with its defined nation states. In Native American and Indigenous studies, scholars and critics often return to the arbitrariness of the Canadian-
U.S. border, a border drawn across some nations’, such as the Iroquois’, territory.

Thomas King (Cherokee) sums up the point well. He writes, “I guess I’m supposed to say that I believe in the line that exists between the US and Canada, but for me it’s an imaginary line. It’s a line from somebody else’s imagination” (qtd. in Davidson, Walton and Andrews 13). King’s statement resonates with the history Cruikshank gives of the US – Canadian border near Lituya Bay. As Cruikshank explains, the border that first separated Russia from British North America was demarcated in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825: whereas the British claimed the Mackenzie Delta to the east, the Russians held the coastal panhandle. These areas were divided by the Saint Elias mountain range. With the Alaska purchase of 1867, the Russian section became American. Lituya Bay is just within this territory. However, the precise border between the US and Canada was only traced decades later in three successive boundary commissions and surveys.

Cruikshank notes how while stories of Lituya Bay describe intimate encounters between the French, Tlingit, American and British, in the archive that traces the development of this US - Canadian border, indigenous nations are conspicuously absent. Boundary survey reports, though “rich in measurements and records of instrumentation,” remain “thin on observations about human experience” (215). Cruikshank explains Harold Innis’ argument that “empires achieve control by monopolizing information and by routinely silencing local traditions that seem not to fit” (Cruikshank 221). Because oral traditions allow their participants to tell and retell stories, they remain flexible, open to reinterpretation and reframing, and thus maintaining the “potential to subvert imposed boundaries” (221). Cruikshank explains how while the Saint Elias divided Coastal Tlingit residents from their Athapaskan trading partners, in some areas of the range,
glaciers, such as those at the head of Lituya Bay served as throughways: routes for travel and trade. The boundary, though sometimes protected at others times seemed more permeable (Cruikshank 213 – 242). As this brief history demonstrates, Lituya Bay is in no way inherently American and its enclosure into this nation state intersects with the histories of Canadian settler colonialism. But naturalizing the border between Canada and the United States is part of a settler colonial mindset, one that hides indigenous nations’ territories.

Second, this chapter builds on recent work in philosophy, especially in feminist theory, that attempts to challenges poststructuralism’s endless attention to language without denying its important insights about the instability of meaning and without rejecting its sustained development of anti-foundationalist ethics and politics. Scholars such as Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, Rey Chow, Claire Colebrook, Elizabeth Grosz, Susan Hekman, and Jasbir Puar have taken different approaches to this question, but each have turned to a certain form of materialism, often drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s writing and sometimes turning to science. My work contributes to this emergent literature by thinking about materiality within the contact zone of settler colonialism where the politics of science and philosophy – that is, the politics of knowledge production – are evidently clear. Within this context, I cannot easily settle with Bennett’s “naïve ambition” to get at the vitality or force of objects by postponing a “genealogical critique of objects” and lingering in those moments of fascination with an object (Bennett 17). Naïveté, like common sense, too easily hides the epistemic framework that makes something naively true. In the contact zone of settler colonialism, such an approach is especially suspect because modes of understanding the
earth have real effects on the settlement of land claims and on assertions of sovereignty. Instead of a methodological naïveté that potentially hides epistemic frameworks, I turn to a practice that is more akin to feminist science studies and standpoint theory. That is, rather than seeing knowledge as extractable from the particular intra-actions within which it is developed, I pay attention to these intra-actions.

I - Lituya Bay

To open this discussion, I begin by unpacking how my description of Lituya Bay partakes in particular histories, discourses, and forms of knowledge. My goal here is to make clear that moving away from epistemology towards ontology does not do away with an attention to discourse. In effect, anticipating my critics, I intentionally overdo it. I want to hammer the point again and again: my representation of Lituya Bay is not “innocent.” No representation is. But that is not the end of the story.

Although not immediately apparent, Lituya Bay’s political, cultural, and social history is embedded within my portrayal of it. For instance, my description of the bay depends upon several proper names, “Lituya,” “Alaska,” and “Fairweather.” What is the history of these names? In 1886, Georges Emmons, Lieutenant of the U.S. Navy at the time, learned that Tlingit residents named the bay “Ltu’a,” which means “lake within the point” (Cruikshank 131). This name eventually took precedence over the French name, “Port des Français,” that Jean-François de La Pérouse gave it upon his landing in 1786. Now even this description of the origin of these names is symptomatic of settler colonialism: I showcase white men by naming Emmons and La Pérouse but leave “Tlingit residents” unspecified.

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26 See Donna Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” and the essays collected in Sandra Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Theory.
“Alaska,” in turn, is an anglicized version of the Aleut word “Alaxsxaq.” While the popular understanding is that the word (often written “Alyeska”) means “great land,” linguistic anthropologists suggest that in Aleut, the term means “the object toward which the action of the sea is directed” (Ransom 550 – 551). This suggests a relational understanding of land; Alaxsxaq exists in reference to the sea. Note that by turning to linguistic anthropology here, I frame the Aleut language as an anthropological and linguistic object, unlike the English language that surrounds the word “Alaska” in the passage.

“Fairweather” fault derives its name from Fairweather Mountain, which, according to the British Columbia Geographical Names Information System (BCGNIS) was named by James Cook in 1778 “presumably because of the good weather encountered at the time of his visit” (BCGNIS). Although the BCGNIS suggests that the mountain was named because of the weather upon Cook’s visit, another reading is also possible: the Tlingit name for the mountain is “Tsalxhaan,” and Tsalxhaan was and is used as a weather beacon to guide Tlingit boats (Cruikshank 231). Perhaps the use of the mountain to predict weather influenced Cook’s naming? Regardless, according to the BCGNIS, the name has been translated to “Beautemps” by La Pérouse in 1786, “Mte. Buen-tiempo” by Galiano in 1802, “G[ora] Fayerveder” by Captain Tebenkov, a member of the Imperial Russian Navy in 1852, and “Schönwetterberg” by Grewingk in 1850. Each of these names is a translation of Cook’s into another European language, which means that maps, diaries, and journals about the area circulated across Europe. That the name settled on “Fairweather” points to the dominant language of the nation-state in which the mountain became a part. However, even here, there is some dispute. Today,
although the mountain is mostly in the United States, its peak is in Canada, and the mountain is used to demarcate the US–Canadian border. It was established in 1907 as “Boundary Point 164” (Report of the International Boundary Commission 1952 175). But there was slight disagreement: when the Geographical Board of Canada labeled the mountain “Fairweather Mountain,” as opposed to the 1922 American naming, “Mount Fairweather,” the United States Board on Geographic Names decided to change the name to the Canadian version (BCGNIS). In short, embedded within the proper names used to describe Lituya Bay are political, cultural, and social histories of the Tlingit and Aleut nations, of European expansion, colonialism, and contact, and of the development of North American settler colonial states. My attempt to describe Lituya Bay participates in these histories’ discourse. My language clearly does not “capture” something absolutely “outside” from these human events but is entangled with it.

Even more, my description partakes of the discourse of modern science, with its particular set of rules that determine what counts as truth. By partaking in this truth regime, I necessarily reproduce and legitimate it. For instance, I use the measurement of “kilometers” to describe the length of the bay. But more importantly, I describe the bay without giving a sense of my position in relation to it and without considering the relation between humans and the bay that made this knowledge possible. Such a description is typical of a form of scientific knowledge that attempts to separate the knowing subject from the object known. Science transforms the bay into a “field” or an outdoor laboratory from which information can be collected all while trying to make the process by which this collection occurs invisible.27 The knowledge it produces is secular and it posits

27 For more about the transformation of the earth into a “field,” see Cruikshank, especially pages 27, 127, 149, and 271.
material entities, such as glaciers as inanimate. This process is key to the governance of settler colonialism that figures the earth as resource or potential location of settlement since it erases the relations between people and the earth. Again, here, the conclusion appears simple: “Lituya Bay” is not “outside” of anything. Quite the contrary, though not immediately apparent, my description of the bay legitimizes certain forms of knowledge over others and thus is entangled with particular uses or political mobilizations of the place as well – specifically, it is entangled with settler colonialism.

In Tlingit oral tradition, songs, and art, Lituya Bay is recounted as a site of tragedy: several canoes carrying Tlingit members of the L’uknaádi clan capsized, killing many. As Julie Cruikshank explains in her ethnography,

Either Tsalxaan had failed to give a sign, or the travelers had failed to heed it – interpretations are ambiguous in oral accounts that have been passed down. One boat escaped, and its members survived. Because of their devastating losses, this clan [L’uknaádi] claimed Tsalxaan as a crest that they say was paid for by the lives of their ancestors. The clan, dramatically reduced in numbers by the loss of its ablest men, eventually dispersed to other villages, where they continue to live today. The narrative remains crucial to L’uknaádi clan history. (133)

This history also provides an explanation for the arrival of Europeans to Lituya Bay: the French were attracted by the furs that fell from the capsized boats, and followed their floating trail to the bay. But while this story is remembered in song, oral history, and art, my opening description of Lituya Bay covers over the bay’s importance to L’uknaádi clan history. Knowledge of the strong tides and waves is partially dependent upon this story, yet my description of the bay extracts this from the human, and more particularly, Tlingit history within which it becomes apparent. In a word, I extract knowledge from the human-bay intra-actions that it emerges from.

Still more: my description of Lituya Bay is in written English. This recognition is not banal. It signals something about both the subject writing and the intended audience.
But more importantly, in comparison to the Tlingit language, English has many nouns yet lacks “verb forms that distinguish animate from inanimate subjects” (Cruikshank 2). Tlingit, in comparison, has fewer nouns but many verbs and hence the language employs action words to denote what English speakers would consider inanimate. As Cruikshank notes, “linguistic anthropologists discuss this ‘enlivening’ influence of the Tlingit verbs and how this results in ‘action-oriented naming’” (4). Conversely, my English here could be understood as “endeadening.” Indeed, I describe the length of the bay’s arms as five kilometers: though approximately five kilometers today, in 1786, the bay, according to La Pérouse, was approximately fifteen kilometers long (Cruikshank 130). The change is a result, so science and oral history tells us, of advancing glaciers. My description of Lituya Bay, however, does not consider this change: time becomes extracted from space as landscape, in English, becomes inanimate.

Finally, the appearance of the term “arms” to describe the bay’s width shows how my figuration of the bay places it in reference to human bodies. And my description of the bay as a “T” figures the bay as a letter in the Latin alphabet. This signals the primacy I give to written language, seeing the world in its image.

In short, this exposition shows how I cannot represent “Lituya Bay” without shaping that representation, partaking in certain discourses and neutralizing particular regimes of truth. More specifically, my description of the bay neutralizes Western scientific knowledge, a form of knowledge that is entangled with the techniques of settler colonialism. From this argument, it appears as though I have no access to the bay as it exists outside of discourse. This is the sort of argument that emerges from Judith Butler’s
work, in particular *Bodies That Matter*. I now turn to this text to argue that the framework it provides for thinking of the outside helps, but is not sufficient for thinking Lituya Bay.

II - **Bodies That Matter - Performativity and the “Outside”**

It may seem surprising to turn to Butler’s work within this context. *Bodies That Matter* responds to the reception of Butler’s influential *Gender Trouble*, specifically to the claim she makes at the end of this text that gender is performative. Butler is neither concerned with the politics of settler colonialism nor with the problem of how to figure the earth. But a central question throughout *Bodies That Matter* concerns the relation between discourse, signification, or language and matter or materiality: is materiality “outside” of discourse? Can we understand materiality as an effect of performativity without falling into a form of linguistic monism where all that is said to exist exists in language? Clearly, in my discussion of Lituya Bay, materiality is partially at issue: how are we to figure the bay’s matter, the bay as matter within discourse, without reducing materiality to discourse while recognizing that language is not a transparent medium or a simple mirror to “nature”?28 How are we to understand “matter” anyway? Is it animate? Does it smell?29

Butler frames her questions within the context of feminist theory, responding particularly to the concern that poststructuralist feminism fails to offer an account of the sexed body, which has served as a foundation for feminist politics. However, Butler’s work also significantly engages in another debate concerning the position of materiality

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28 However, as it will eventually come clear, there is a difference between thinking the earth and thinking materiality. By starting with the earth, the matter at hand becomes clearly the envelope of human life. This has implications for thinking through discourse and its outside.

29 I ask this question because of the stories Cruikshank collected and published in *Do Glaciers Listen?* This text features stories told by Kitty Smith, Annie Ned, and Angela Sidney, women born between 1890 – 1902, of Tlingit, Tagish, and Athapaskan parents living near the Alsek river, Hutshi Lakes, and Carcross. Smith’s, Ned’s and Sidney’s narratives all warn of the danger of frying fat or eating bacon near glaciers since glaciers take offence to the smell of such food.
in deconstruction. In effect, Butler demonstrates how the question of materiality in deconstruction cannot be thought without considering sexual difference because “matter” itself has been figured within phallogocentrism’s denial of sexual difference (52). This argument means that to take up the question of materiality in deconstruction is to take up the question of feminism.

Butler goes onto argue that the belief that “matter” stands outside of discourse, serving as its stable foundation, hides the politics of materiality itself. This means that that which is taken to be outside is not absolutely outside. Drawing on deconstruction, Butler claims that “the outside” is constitutive of the discursive, of the inside. She writes: “For there is an ‘outside’ to what is constructed by discourse, but this is not an absolute ‘outside,’ an ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive ‘outside,’ it is that which can only be thought – when it can – in relation to that discourse, at and as its most tenuous borders” (8). Against the metaphysics of presence, Butler maintains that the outside is not simply present – it is not an “ontological thereness.” It is not that which exists prior to discourse, unformed by it and not caught in its speech. Instead, it can only be thought in relation to discourse, at discourse’s borders. This outside is “constitutive” in that it is that which is excluded in the production and reproduction of a discursive regime. This outside, however, returns to haunt the discursive. Butler wishes to make visible the “constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, violence foreclosure, abjection and its disruptive return within the very terms of discursive legitimacy” (8). Although the outside is not absolute, it is necessary: “for every oppositional discourse will produce its outside, an outside that risks becoming installed as its non-signifying inscriptional space” (52).
Such understanding of the “outside” provides for Butler a telos for politics and thought. She explains, “The task is to refigure this necessary ‘outside’ as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome” (53). The outside, in this model, becomes that which, through politics, becomes slowly, partially included. It is this sort of drive that Butler puts to work in the final chapter of *Bodies that Matter*, “Critically Queer.” “Queer,” she argues, never fully represents those whom it purports to name; however, it is open to future resignification, as its outside partially becomes included under its purview. Butler clarifies that “radical and inclusive representability is not precisely the goal: to include, to speak as, to bring in every marginal and excluded position within a given discourse is to claim that a singular discourse meets its limits nowhere, that it can and will domesticate all signs of difference” (53). As a result, “of equal importance” is the continual recognition that a non-discursive, non-representable outside forever haunts the discursive, threatening its coherence (53). In short, *Bodies that Matter* argues that the “outside” can only ever be understood in reference to the “inside.” This implies that this “outside” has no existence on its own except within this dyad. Indeed, the “outside” is not absolutely outside: its positing is constitutive of the inside, which it returns to haunt. Politics can both seek to include the outside, all while coming to recognize that an outside endlessly disrupts it.

Such a framework does not really help for thinking about Lituya Bay. While my description of the bay shows that any reference to it is dependent upon the “inside” or upon discourse, it does not follow that the bay has no existence on its own except in relation to the discursive. However, Butler’s work is helpful in that it calls attention to the power relations or presuppositions that are embedded within any account of matter. In
In addition, two other helpful understandings of the outside hover in Butler’s text. While I do not imagine Butler would see these latter figurations of the outside as radically different, I do think they provide some useful contrast from the former. They are worth some attention because they help in the analysis of Lituya Bay.

The first is buried within the recognition that discourse is itself material: the signifier is composed of marks on a surface. Here, the material is not precisely the constitutive outside of the discursive. Instead, the discursive is formed from the material. Discourse then could be seen as an excess of the outside, an excess of materiality. This means that the outside is more than that which is posited as the necessary exclusion in the formation of an inside. Instead, the outside is what is manipulated in the creation of the inside. The outside is neither an absolute outside, a thereness that discourse can never touch, nor is it a constitutive exclusion. It is, rather, a condition of possibility, a materiality that is exceeded by meaning. The inside is an elaboration of the outside; we can imagine it as a spark that emerges from it.

A second, though related alternative to understanding the outside is buried in Butler’s discussion of materialization and performativity. The central claim here is that discourse is productive: “there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body” (10). Butler goes so far as to argue that materialization is an effect of discourse’s citation. That is, through the reiteration of norms, the body materializes itself. Within this framework of performativity, the outside could be seen as the doing of the inside. Why? If we see materiality as the outside and understand materiality as the effect of the citation and recitation of discourse (an inside), then it follows that the outside is produced in the citation and enactment of discourse, in
other words, in the doing of the inside. Within this model, the outside is not a field within which the inside materializes itself. Such an argument would imagine a field or stage that preexists that which appears on it rather than seeing this field as itself emerging with the entities that constitute it. The outside is also not the effect of the inside. It is not what has been “done” by the inside because this argument would posit the doing as a formative act that has already occurred. Instead, as Butler makes clear time and again, performativity is never complete. It must be cited and recited. Even more, Butler argues that performativity transforms notions of cause and effect: there is no cause that stands independent from its effect. There is no subject who acts. Rather, the subject is the effect of the acting. Likewise, then, the inside does not exist apart from its enactment, apart from its citation. The outside is not the effect of the inside; the outside is that which appears as the inside is done and redone. To read the outside in this way is to lose a sense of both an absolute outside and the constitutive outside. The outside is not the location of doing; it is not that which is excluded in the establishment of an inside; it is the doing or the acting of what becomes the inside. The outside, in other words, is no longer figured as a “place” but rather as an action performed again and again.

How does such a framework function in the context of the materiality of the earth, specifically in the contact zone of settler colonialism where representations of the earth have been embedded within colonial projects? How does it help in the analysis of Lituya Bay? My reading of Butler’s framework is helpful in two ways: first, Butler’s understanding of materialization suggests that matter is not fixed. It is the effect of a doing. In the context of Lituya Bay, recognizing that matter changes is necessary since the bay itself transforms through the encounter between, at least, ice, wind, water, and
humans. Second, Butler’s understanding of the effects of discourse is convincing. My opening description of Lituya Bay has potential performative effects on it. For instance, as I explain that it is the site of giant waves, readers may decide not to travel to or live by the bay. Other readers could be excited by this description of the bay. Seeking “adventure,” they may decide to travel there. Were I to describe the bay in terms of its potential resources, I may encourage its future “development.” Even more, my discussion of the bay could be used to legitimate a land claim, by showing that Tlingit people inhabited the bay prior to contact.

However, Butler’s understanding of materialization is not sufficient for thinking Lituya Bay. When Butler describes materialization, the power that she focuses on is discursive power (and especially norms as they are articulated in discourse or discourse to the extent that it is normative) and the matter that interests her is the body. She comes to argue that the body materializes itself through discourse’s citation and recitation. However, to follow this train of thought and argue that the bay is the effect of discourse’s citation is anthropocentric. My contention here depends upon connecting discourse with the human, seeing discourse if not as the product of humans, as entwined with human existence. And although I recognize that this contention could be called into question, I do not think that it is wrong within the context of Butler’s work - she only uses examples of human language and gesture. Therefore, while Butler’s analysis of discourse functions to de-center the human subject, positing the subject as an effect of discourse, to see in discourse’s citation the production of materiality reasserts a form of anthropocentrism
that sees the subject as the effect of something that has been seen (though mistakenly) as characteristic of the human.\textsuperscript{30}

This means that I do not want to understand the bay as the “doing of the inside.” Such a framework problematically treats all power as discursive power. The bay may partially be produced in the citation and enactment of discourse, but not only. Were there no discourse about the bay, it could still exist. Thus, while Lituya Bay may be partially produced as the inside is done (as discourse is enacted), the bay seems to be the effect of a lot more. Instead, if we start with a broader understanding of power and force, seeing power not simply as discursive power, we can begin to develop a different understanding of materiality that maintains Butler’s sense of matter’s contingency but that does not figure materialization as the result of discourse’s citation. This would recognize that the bay has not always been the same while insisting that its current arrangement is the result of the encounter at least between wind, water, temperature, glaciers, trees, humans, fish, and tectonic plates.

III - Karen Barad’s Philosophy-Physics

Part of Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway focuses on the limitations I have already outlined of Butler’s philosophy. Though indebted to Butler, Barad likewise argues that Butler’s account of materiality is limited because it focuses on “the production of human bodies (and only certain aspects of their production, at that)” (145). Even more, Butler only considers “human social practices” and implicitly suggests that “agency belongs only to the human domain” (145). Barad also argues that notwithstanding Foucault’s anti-humanism, his genealogy of the body, and Butler’s

following him, hides the historical development of the body’s forces, focusing instead on cultural, social, and political forces. The evolutionary development of the body has no role in his genealogy. In contrast, Barad seeks to make the agency of materiality visible. Matter is not inert and ahistorical, and social and cultural forces are not external to material forces either. Ultimately, the problem for Barad is that while Butler problematizes the nature/culture binary in her deconstruction of the sex/gender distinction, she likewise reasserts this binary in her account of the body’s materialization and in her theories of agency. As an alternative, Barad offers her theory of “agential realism.” I now turn to Barad because she provides a framework for my argument, « il n’y a pas de hors-terre. »

Meeting the Universe Halfway challenges representationalism, the belief that meaning and matter are separate entities, and that language, to be true, mirrors or corresponds to matter. Drawing on the philosopher of science Joseph Rouse, Barad argues that entangled in this belief is the “Cartesian division between the internal and the external that breaks along the line of the knowing subject (48). Within this tradition, the subject is seen as having easy access to the internal – that is, to its thoughts, to meaning - but the subject’s knowledge of the external, to matter outside of it, must be established. Barad attempts to break from this tradition, rejecting this topography. She argues that “we are a part of that nature that we seek to understand” (26). In other words, Barad rejects the belief in an outside position from which knowledge is developed. What she gives us instead is a “within”– its constant folding and refolding, and, as I will explain, a form of externality that remains internal.
Barad develops this argument through her reading of Niels Bohr, the quantum physicist. She examines Bohr’s gedanken (thought) experiment where an apparatus is used to determine the position and momentum of one electron. The problem here is that the very process of measurement affects the electron. Say light (a photon) is used to determine the electron’s position. As the photon encounters the electron, this electron’s movement and position will change. This means that it is impossible to measure the electron as separate from the agency of measurement, the photon. One solution to this problem is to determine the photon’s own position and momentum. In this case, we could determine the photon’s effect on the electron and hence calculate the electron’s position prior to measurement. This raises, however, a second problem: only the position or momentum of the photon can be calculated. Not both. Why? For the photon’s position to be known, the apparatus that “shoots it” has to be stable. It must remain in position. On the other hand, for the photon’s momentum to be determined, the apparatus from which it emerges has to be mobile, moving with the opposite momentum of the departing photon. This means that we can’t know the photon’s momentum and position at the same time, and thus that it is impossible to measure an electron’s position and momentum simultaneously, independent of the agent of measurement (Barad 97-131). In this model, knowing does not come from a position of externality from that which is known. The photon and the electron encounter one another. To “know” the electron, one must engage with it and shape it. Knowing is part of the world, not separate from it.

Barad draws many conclusions from this. Popular physics has understood this experiment as pointing to an epistemological principle: Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, which states that it is impossible to determine both the place and momentum of an electron. Against Heisenberg’s uncertainty, Barad argues that this experiment does not only have epistemological repercussions but also ontological ones. Drawing on Bohr, she offers a theory of indeterminacy: it is not simply that we cannot know an electron’s position and momentum at the same time. It is rather that an electron does not have such properties simultaneously. “Things” do not exist prior to their “intra-actions” (a term Barad uses instead of “interaction” because this latter term suggests at least two separate “things” encountering rather than the entanglement of the encounter). In the case of Bohr’s gedanken experiment, the electron and the photon do not have properties that are separate from one another. Instead, all we have is an intra-action between them. Barad concludes from this that phenomena, actual intra-actions, “are the basic units of existence” (333). “Phenomena” describes the wholeness of experimentation – that is, the fact that the agent of observation cannot be clearly separated from its object, and phenomena, for Barad, constitute the enfolding – not unfolding - of matter. When something “unfolds” it becomes laid out, straightened and clear. The essence that was tangled or folded within it emerges. In contrast, “enfolding” suggests a folding in, a twisting, a queering. In this model, there is no predictable nugget waiting to emerge. All we have is a becoming more complex. Thus, instead of seeing knowledge as determined from an outside, Barad suggests that knowledge requires an entanglement with that which is known, an entanglement that shapes both the agent of observation and the object of observation. These entanglements are part of the enfolding of matter.

31 In Deleuze’s reading of Foucault, folding is also important: the inside is a result of the folding of the outside. He writes, “the outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside” (96-97).
Even if Barad’s argument depends upon physics – the scientific knowledge that my analysis of “Lituya Bay” sought to problematize – her framework is helpful for thinking Lituya Bay. In effect, my opening analysis of the bay’s description is a rendering of this theory. By providing a history of the bay’s description, I bring attention to the material intra-actions through which its representation emerged. Discourse about Lituya Bay is not then an inside out of which I cannot escape. Instead, this discourse emerges from engagement with and around the bay. In other words, “il n’y a pas de hors-terre” - all we have are material entanglements or phenomena.

Yet externality still has a place in Barad’s philosophy-physics. Barad rejects both understandings of absolute exteriority, where, for instance, culture is seen as an external force that affects a passive nature, and understandings of absolute interiority, where nature is reduced to culture or matter to language. She argues that rejecting these two positions is also Butler’s goal in imagining a constitutive outside - that which lies beyond discourse, constituting discourse in its exclusion but continually returning to haunt it. Yet in Butler’s model, the constitutive outside exists in relation to discourse. For Barad, instead, the distinction between inside and outside, external and internal are the result of what she calls “constructed, agentially enacted, materially conditioned and embodied, contingent Bohrian cut between an object and the agencies of observations” (115). How are we to understand these “cuts?” Barad argues that the “cut” is a result of the material apparatus, the actual physical arrangement of matter that makes the experiment possible. Cuts, then are the result of the “material arrangement of which ‘we’ are a ‘part’” (178). But Barad does not explain these cuts with a specific example, and hence, they are difficult to understand. One thing that is clear is that for Barad, the cuts secure the
possibility for objectivity; they are related to a particular process of marking. Barad explains that “in Bohr’s account, objectivity requires accountability to ‘permanent marks – such as a spot on a photographic plate, caused by the impact of an electron – left on the bodies which define the experimental conditions’ (Bohr 1963c [1958 essay])” (120).

The point here is that phenomena effect material change. This change can be understood as a process of marking. For Bohr, when these marks are “read by a human observer, an unambiguous description of the phenomenon is made possible” (174). This description separates the subject, which is the cause of the material change or mark, from the agent of observation, the object that is marked. In other words, externality or a separation between the outside and the inside is established by an observer.

One point that is probably surprising here is the role of the “human observer.” As Barad explains, Bohr’s philosophy-physics is limited by anthropocentrism because it ultimately posits the human as the agent that enacts the Bohrian cut. In contrast, Barad attempts to model a posthumanist version of Bohr’s theory. She explains,

> In traditional humanist accounts, intelligibility requires an intellective agent (that to which something is intelligible), and intellection is framed as a specifically human capacity. But in my agential realist account, intelligibility is an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing articulation. It is not a human-dependent characteristic but a feature of the world in its differential becoming. (149)

Extrapolating from this argument, we can argue that whereas for Bohr, a cut is affected when a human reads the production of marks, for Barad, such a “reading” is not the result of a human intellect making the world’s materialization intelligible. Instead, intelligibility is a feature of the world itself. This point is critical: if Barad’s ontology is secured by a human observer, then in effect, against her explicit goal to move away from the anthropocentrism of both humanism and antihumanism, she ultimately frames the human (including herself) as separate from phenomena. Ultimately, I’m not sure how successful
Barad is in this respect because I remain unclear of how Barad figures intelligibility.\(^{32}\) I cannot but understand intelligibility in relation to a form of life that need not be human but that makes sense of the world. In this reading, I see the distinction between an inside and an outside as the effect of a living being – a third term in a material intra-action.

To be clear, this is not Barad’s understanding of intelligibility but my own. Barad wants to argue that intelligibility “is an ontological performance of the world” (379). This version of intelligibility differs from more common humanist accounts, such as Peter Dear’s. In The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World, Dear assumes that intelligibility is “dependent on particular human conceptions of what makes sense” (14). He argues that intelligibility is historical. Its assertions “can be understood only in the particular cultural settings that produce them” (14). Intelligibility then is a quality granted by a human intelligence faced with the world, and that which is intelligible depends upon this human’s cultural context. The associations Dear constructs between intelligibility, language, and morality likewise tie the intelligible to the human. He writes that “the unintelligible is simply the unspeakable” (14), and in his article “Intelligibility in Science,” Dear draws a simile between intelligible and moral value to argue that intelligibility is irreducible to other concepts. He explains,

‘Intelligibility’ is something that relates inextricably to its own self-evidence, in a way that resembles closely the internalization of moral values or norms of behavior. Above all, we must recognize that explaining conceptions of intelligibility in terms of other concepts is impossible, because basic conceptions of intelligibility, like basic senses of moral propriety, are foundational, not reducible to more fundamental principles from which they can be derived. (148)

\(^{32}\) Notwithstanding, I do find a second argument Barad makes in response to Bohr’s humanism convincing. Barad contends that human subjects are not separate from phenomena but instead “part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the world” (171). This means that humans are constituted, partially, through the intra-actions of phenomena. Humans are not separate from the world but distinguished from nonhumans in particular intra-actions.
By drawing an analogy between intelligibility and the “internalization of moral values” and by figuring the unintelligible as that which cannot be spoken, Dear frames intelligibility in relation to other capacities that have traditionally been seen as particularly human: the capacity for language and for moral judgment. In contrast, Barad’s model eschews such a humanist account. But how then to understand intelligibility? Barad argues that intelligibility is “not a human dependent characteristic but a feature of the world” (379 – 380). One of the points here that she wants to underline is that the human is not separate from the world but of it, and she wants to avoid assuming that a distinction between the human and the non-human exists prior to intelligibility when this distinction could indeed be seen as intelligibility’s effect. Barad goes on to use the example of brittlestars, brainless animals that nonetheless have a capacity for vision and that can release parts of their body (when they are being eaten or are trapped) and regenerate them (369 – 84). She contends that even though the brittlestar has no brain, aspects of the world are intelligible to them. Intelligibility is evident in the brittlestar’s responsiveness to the world: it is responsive both to light and to touch. And this is not just random responsiveness, but meaningful: it uses its vision to guide its movement, it releases parts of its body when in danger. For Barad, this responsiveness indexes that aspects of the world are intelligible to the brittlestar.

My argument is not far from Barad’s here. Intelligibility may be a feature of the world in its becoming, but only to the extent that that world includes living beings (such as the brittlestar). While Barad does not make this argument, it is, I think, implicit in her writing when she turns to the brittlestar and sees the recognition of intelligibility in the brittlestar’s purposeful responsiveness, a responsiveness that is purposeful for Barad.
because it is life-saving (here, Barad writes, that the brittlestar “responds [not simply in the sense of responding differently to different things that are out there but] in ways that matter. There are stakes – life-and-death-stakes – in getting it wrong” [380]). Were there no life, Barad could not argue that the response is purposeful, and hence by her own standards, she would not have an example of intelligibility. This is not to say that the brittlestar (or any other form of life) is not part of the “world” or is not material. It is, rather, just to argue, in Barad’s terms, that intelligibility may be a feature of the world, but only to the extent that that world includes living beings.

My argument here suggests a caveat to Barad’s materialism. Barad’s text begins, “matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder” (3). Without disagreeing with this claim, I want to suggest that Barad hides the place of life (the third term, if you like, that enacts the Bohrian cut) in the fusion between matter and meaning. Meaning has emerged on planet earth with the eruption of life. Though material entities not present on the earth could also have meaning, this meaning – in as much as life has only been found on this planet (so far) – only means in relation to living creatures whose being is inextricable from the earth. 33 This explains why I slide from Barad’s argument that there is no outside position to material phenomena to mine, which claims that there is no outside of the earth. Of course other planets exist. But the entanglement between matter and meaning require life, which to our current knowledge, is inextricable from the earth. It is not, then, that there is no outside to material phenomena, but rather, so far as meaning is concerned, there is no outside of the earth.

33 Even astronauts’ survival on the moon, for instance, requires the transportation of the earth’s atmosphere and equipment produced from the earth’s matter.
Thus, Barad provides a convincing theory about the entanglement between agents and objects of observations, one which suggests that there is not outside to these material phenomena. This is useful for thinking about representations of Lituya Bay: they follow from material intra-actions with the bay. However, Barad’s contention that intelligibility is an ontological feature of the world is not convincing. The solution, nonetheless, is not to recenter the human as the guarantor of intelligibility. Instead, we could argue that all forms of life make sense of the earth in their own way. Meaning thus emerges in life’s engagement with matter. Given that life as we know it is bound to planet earth, we can conclude, in distinction to Barad’s claim that matter and meaning are inextricably bound, that the earth and meaning are bound. Meaning is not outside the earth but of it. In other words, the earth is the condition for its representation.

**IV - Deleuze’s Outside**

In contrast to Barad’s foreclosure of life, Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Foucault sees its importance. Deleuze’s work resonates with both Butler’s and Barad’s since he draws on Foucault to rework understandings of the “inside” and “outside,” the “internal” and the “external.” His reading also establishes a relation between matter and meaning, and like Barad’s, it could be used to build a critique of Butler – specifically, her understanding of discourse and her prioritization of discursive power over other forms of power. In this last section of the chapter, I turn to Deleuze to finalize my argument.

Whereas Butler figures discourse as an interiority, Deleuze’s reading of Foucault models discourse as an exteriority. This means that discourse does not enclose anything. Instead, both the discursive and the non-discursive are dispersions - either of statements or of the “visible.” The discursive does not establish itself as an interiority through the
exclusion of the non-discursive. These two “strata” (the discursive and the non-discursive) are knowable “environments” of either language or light. Subtending these strata, Deleuze argues, is a “diagram,” which Deleuze characterizes as “a map of relations between forces” (36). The diagram is the “distribution of the power to affect and be affected” (73), a spatial and temporal dispersal of forces. Both the discursive and the non-discursive are the effect of the actualization of these forces; they are the effect of the spatial distribution of forces’ encounters with one another.

These forces, Deleuze argues, come from the “outside.” Deleuze figures the outside as “an opening on to a future” (89). The outside is not; it becomes. It is a non-place of mutation (85). Because it is always changing, emerging, and mutating, the outside can never be known. Deleuze goes so far as to write that “power relations are therefore not known” (74). Perhaps they are inferred from the strata that actualize them, but they always exceed this actualization because they remained unformed. One way to understand Deleuze’s outside is as an eruption of contingency or temporality that transforms historical formations. Another way is to link it with an understanding of life. Deleuze explains, “is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault’s thought culminates?” (93). Life, in this model, is that which resists power. It is a “vital power that cannot be confined within species” (92).

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34 The “outside” is likewise the instigator of thought. In distinction from “knowing,” Deleuze offers “thinking.” Thought, he draws from Foucault, “addresses itself to an outside that has no form” (87). To think then is to touch beyond that which can be seen and that which is spoken. It is to “reach the non-stratified” (87). Thinking occurs “in the interstice or the disjunction between seeing and speaking” (87). To think is not to “incorporate ‘everything,’” as a dialectician may have it. It does not “depend on a beautiful interiority that would reunite the visible and the articulable elements” (87). Instead, it is “carried under the intrusion of an outside that eats into the interval and forces or dismembers the internal” (87). In other words, thought occurs as a result of a problem, as a result of the eruption of the outside, an eruption that
Deleuze’s framework is helpful because it neither falls into a linguistic monism nor does it suggest that the world is the effect of the materialization of discourse. Instead, discourse becomes the effect of force relations, which themselves are not discursive. However, Deleuze’s reading of Foucault requires a leap of sorts: his suggestion that power relations cannot be known runs counter to feminist scholarship that is intent on making power relations visible. This becomes especially clear as we compare Butler’s approach to Deleuze’s: Butler is concerned with the limits of knowledge. She argues that we can only think the outside in relation to discourse. For Butler, the epistemological provides the model for thinking ontology. We cannot know the non-discursive except through discourse and hence, its existence as the non-discursive is posited by discourse as such. Deleuze, in contrast, posits an ontology that remains unknowable, but instigates thought. In this model, the epistemological does not provide the limits for the ontological, but the ontological provokes thinking. Nonetheless, Deleuze’s ontology is not a return to the metaphysics of presence, since the diagram is not but becomes. While Deleuze offers a form of Kantianism, where there exists an outside that cannot be known, this outside is not an ontological “thereness” outside the boundaries of discourse. Instead, it is a spatial and temporal incitation that gives rise to discursive and non-discursive formations. The discursive contingency that is so important to Butler becomes, in Deleuze’s work, the contingency of force relations themselves. Thus, we can understand Deleuze’s argument less as a radical difference from Butler’s model than as an expansion of Butler’s understanding of power: instead of seeing force on the model of discursive power, transforms the stratified or “eats into the interval” between the visible and the articulable. To think is to reach for this outside, not to puzzle within.
Deleuze asks us to understand the discursive (and the non-discursive), as the stratification of power relations’ distribution of force.

Deleuze’s writing also resonates with Barad’s. At first, Barad’s work may seem preferable to Deleuze’s in that she figures matter as changing. In Deleuze’s model, forces are that which change: the visible and the articulable are sedimentations of forces’ actualizations. However, the distinction between forces and matter is not clear. Deleuze’s forces are indeed material – the outside, he writes is a “moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings” (96-97). This material, however, since it is moving is punctured by a virtuality. On this reading, Barad’s and Deleuze’s models appear quite similar. Whereas Deleuze gives us the “outside,” unformed forces whose actualization produce two exteriorities (the visible and the articulable), Barad gives us the iterative enfolding of matter in its ongoing intra-actions, intra-actions that are separable through Bohrian cuts. For Barad, matter and meaning are inextricable from these intra-actions. For Deleuze, the visible and the articulable are both sedimentations of forces’ actualization, the actualization of the outside. Reading Barad and Deleuze together, we can argue that the outside, or matter in Barad’s terms, is the field of intra-actions or force relations that produce or actualize multiple beings – both the visible and the articulable. But this outside is not simply matter as something that is stable but rather as something that is becoming or moving.

Deleuze nonetheless departs from Barad in that he sees this field as animated by life. And because this field for Deleuze is composed of mutating materialities, including life, I want to suggest that the “outside” in his work could be understood as the “earth,” a concept to which he does not turn to in his reading of Foucault. The earth, as matter plus
life, is moving. It is “animated by peristaltic movements” (96). It is the condition of representation or the condition of the articulable – just as the articulable, in Deleuze’s model, is the actualization of the “outside.” But the earth, as the outside, is not. It is marked by a futurity, a becoming.

Drawing on this argument, we could argue that while different representations of Lituya Bay exist, these representations are entangled with particular intra-actions with the bay, intra-actions that constitute the being of the bay differently. In Deleuze’s terms, these representations actualize force relations. Humans – glacier – water- wind-word. In their entangled encounter, these entities partially and mutually shape one another. For instance, the direction and strength of a breeze depends upon the temperature of the water, land, and glaciers around the bay. None of these entities are made up of one, undivided force. They are themselves the effect of encounters, phenomena, or relationships. But representations of the bay - or the articulable - follow from the sedimentation of force relations. And representation would not be possible were it not for the outside, the earth. In a word, representation is inextricable from the earth (that combination of life and matter) that makes it possible.

This chapter set out to trouble the distinction between the inside and the outside that has been embedded in feminist theory’s abiding interest in epistemology. So long as we begin with the subject (or discourse) as a form of interiority, the problem becomes how this interiority can know that which is outside of it. In contrast, drawing on Butler, Barad, and Deleuze, I argue that knowing does not come from a place of separation from the earth but rather through one’s engagement with it. For instance, my exposition of my description of Lituya Bay sought to make explicit the multiple the engagements from
which it arose. I name the field of these engagements as the earth, and I argue that the earth – a moving matter inhabited by life - could be understood as Deleuze’s “outside.” Finally, I argue that representation, the articulable, or meaning are not separate from matter, and matter is not outside them. Rather, representation is made possible by the earth. The earth, in other words, is the condition for its representation.

While this chapter has not focused on theories of sexual difference or notions of gender, its argument is clearly indebted to (and attempts to contribute to) feminist theory. Feminist philosophy has long critiqued the Cartesian subject. It has understood Descartes’ prioritization of reason, his understanding of the “I” as a thinking thing, and his mind/body dualism as contributing to gender hierarchies. Feminist theorists have attempted to articulated different understandings of humans, ones that see the human as necessarily embodied and as sexually differentiated. But my contention here is that a form of Cartesianism has remained in feminist prioritizations of epistemology, specifically in the argument that there is no “outside.” This notion has reproduced Descartes’ topology of the internal consciousness and the external world. Instead, I argue that human embodiment is inextricable from the earth; our existence is bound to it. And thus, representation, the internal, and consciousness are not only inseparable from the human body, they are also conditioned by the earth – that outside whose enfolding constitutes life.
Chapter Two: Geopower

Sometime around 1887, this photograph of Isapomuxika or “Crowfoot,” chief of the Siksikáwa, was taken. The image follows the convention of portraiture at the time: although some portraits’ subjects faced the camera, many looked off to the side. But the image breaks from other conventions of its period. Isapomuxika wears a button-down vest over what appears to be a woolen shirt; in other words, the picture does not attempt to capture Isapomuxika as “authentic” or “traditional.” This is especially clear in comparison to another photograph of Isapomuxika taken in Québec City a year before (on the right). In this earlier image, Isapomuxika wears skins, moccasins, a beaded pouch, and a bandolier. He is photographed in front of a backdrop that makes him appear as if he is outside, in “nature.” This earlier portrait could be understood as an ethnographic attempt to capture the “dying

35 The CPR archives, in which I found this photograph, is unsure of who took it. See “Chief Crowfoot (NS19724)” Canadian Pacific Archives. Web. 5 Nov. 2010. <http://www8.cpr.ca/cms/English/General+Public/Heritage/Photo+Gallery/People/default.htm>
36 Cf. other portraits, collected in the McCord Museum’s digital archives, taken in the Livernois studio in Québec City during the same decade: http://www.mccord-museum.qc.ca.
race.” The later photograph is different. In effect, this second image rests in stark contrast to the many photographs Canadian and American settlers took of indigenous people at that time.37

Isapomuxika’s 1887 photograph is striking because it portrays him as a potential traveler on the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR), after he was already a critic of the road. A chain, following the opposite direction of his gaze, hangs over his shoulder. This chain holds a tag: the lifetime pass W. C. Van Horne, then general manager of the CPR, gave Isapomuxika in Montréal in September, 1886, for unlimited train rides. That year, Isapomuxika was traveling by railroad through Montréal, Québec City, and Ottawa. He was invited to the capital by the Canadian government to celebrate the erection of a monument in honor of Joseph Brant, a Kanien’Kahake leader. By inviting “loyal” leaders of the western First Nations to the capital for the unveiling of the monument, government officials hoped to show the strength of the growing Dominion and to harness its continued support by Western indigenous nations. Indeed, Isapomuxika was said to be “loyal” to the Queen: he had not joined Louis Riel, the Métis leader who led the North-West Rebellions of 1884-1885.38 Isapomuxika had also agreed that the CPR cross the northern part of the newly formed Blackfoot reservation.39 Cecil E. Denny, the Indian Agent in charge of the reserve at that time, had told Isapomuxika that the railroad would be used to bring food to the Siksikáwa. This food was desperately needed: the Siksikáwa suffered because of the dwindling population of buffalo and the shortage of government

37 See, for instance, Victor Boesen, Florence Curtis Graybill, and Edward Sheriff Curtis’ Visions of a Vanishing Race.
38 In this rebellion, Métis people challenged the sovereignty of the Canadian Dominion in the territories newly purchased from the Hudson Bay Company.
39 I use the term “Blackfeet” here because this is the name that was used to designate the reservation – the reserve is Blackfoot territory, territory negotiated with Anglphone settler-colony, otherwise, I use the name “Siksikáwa.”
rations, which had been promised in the 1877 Treaty 7, when the reserve was first created. Within this context, it makes sense that Isapomuxika would agree to the railroad in exchange for food (Dempsey 149 – 150). However, by the time this portrait was taken, Isapomuxika already regretted his decision: the smoke given off by the steam engine disturbed his breathing, and railway sparks caused prairie fires. Even more, the road was not being used to transport the government rations promised in Treaty 7, and the train had certainly not restored the already decimated population of buffalo. The CPR was even being used to parade federal troops, in an attempt to intimidate Métis and indigenous people in the hope of preventing further rebellion. Thus, Isapomuxika “became an outspoken critic of the railway and refused to co-operate further with its representatives” (Dempsey 149). Yet when Van Horne gave him the pass in 1886, “no mention was made of the misery and problems the railway had caused the Blackfoot tribe” (Dempsey 203).

So when Isapomuxika’s photograph was taken the following year, light captured a man made into a potential traveler on a railroad whose construction he clearly regretted. The pass he wears attempts to place him within the modes of circulation that produce the territory of the settler colonial state. The photograph could be seen as an attempt to portray Isapomuxika as a citizen of this state, where being a citizen means to travel along particular paths using particular forms of transportation. But whereas the pass moves in one direction, placed over his left shoulder, Isapomuxika looks to another, over to his right. CPR brings him to one place; Isapomuxika appears to be going elsewhere.

The CPR, whose dynamics are partially caught within this image, provides a ripe example of the workings of geopower, a form of power that underlies the two forms of
power that Michel Foucault analyzes at length, sovereign power and biopower.⁴⁰

Geopower physically transforms the earth through techniques such as urban planning, architecture, engineering, agriculture, and surveying -- but also through digging, logging, and marking territory. Whereas biopower makes the population it seeks to manage visible and sovereign power makes the sovereign visible, geopower brings attention to the earth. But it does not necessarily make the earth visible. To prioritize vision would misleadingly develop an understanding of geopower around humans’ transformation of the earth. Instead, geopower develops knowledge of the earth, but through scent, touch, sound, and sight. The analysis of geopower shows that power relations are not only operative between humans: multiple forms of life transform the earth. Geopower therefore puts pressure on Foucauldian understandings of power themselves.

To make this argument, this chapter begins with an analysis of Foucault’s work on power. I argue that Foucault’s writing is characterized by an abiding interest in space, and that his notion of power is, itself, spatial. However, with the exception of Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault enfolds the power relations involved in the transformation of the earth into power relations that have the human as their target. In contrast, I call the power relations that transform the earth “geopower,” I suggest that geopower subtends both biopower and sovereign power, and I argue that the analysis of settler colonialism brings attention to geopower.

⁴⁰ Across the body of his work, Foucault is not always consistent in his terminology. In this chapter, I understand “biopower” to “designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life” (The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 143). Biopower has two faces: the first, disciplinary power, trains and hierarchizes individual bodies. The second, biopolitics, work on the level of the population, tracing birth and mortality rates, public health and life expectancy. In short, disciplinary power and biopolitics constitute the two faces of biopower (The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 139).
My work then turns to the analysis of settler colonialism, taking the construction of the CPR as my main point of reference. Historians widely agree that the CPR was instrumental to the production of the territory of Canada.\textsuperscript{41} Promised by Parliament to British Columbia in 1871 as incentive to join the newly formed Dominion, it took until 1885 to finish. Its construction involved not simply the actual building of the track, but also an extensive survey as well as the construction of towns, farms, and hotels along the track’s way. A massive project, CPR opened the “west” for colonial settlement. It transformed the earth into capital and changed the distribution of life across the land. But my goal in this second section is not to give a history of the railway. Rather, by using the example of the railway, I examine the contours of geopower, detailing its mechanisms.

I – **FOUCAULT’S THEORY OF POWER, SPACE, AND THE “EARTH”**

Foucault’s work has influenced many scholars who study geography and architecture.\textsuperscript{42} This is no surprise: Foucault’s writing is filled with spatial arguments. Foucault’s self-proclaimed “spatial obsessions” provide him with a method to get at power relations (“Questions on Geography” 69). For example, in his 1976 interview with the editors of *Hérodote*, he explains how focusing on space has historically been understood as anti-historical. Space, he details, has been seen as atemporal, “fixed … undialectical … immobile” (70). In contrast, Foucault argues that the analysis of space allows him to understand the power relations embedded within the history of knowledge production. He explains,

\textsuperscript{41}For histories of the railway, see Pierre Berton, D’Alton Coleman, John Eagle, Leslie Fournier, James Hedges, Harold Innis and A. A. Otter.

\textsuperscript{42}Foucault’s work, for instance, is even included in the 1998 reader *Architectural Theory Since 1968*. For a good overview of his influence on geography, see Margo Huxley’s “Space and Government: Governmentality and Geography.”
Metaphorising the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality. Endeavoring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power. (“Questions on Geography” 69-70)

An archeology of knowledge that focuses on the transformations of discourse across time would reproduce a form of Hegelian idealism, wherein an individual consciousness develops over time. In the place of such analysis, Foucault uses spatial “metaphors” (70). This allows him to begin his analyses with power relations rather than with individual consciousness because instead of starting with one entity, such as consciousness that changes over time, he begins with a multiplicity of force relations that produce different entities, which in turn change over time. Resonating with my argument in chapter one, Foucault begins with an externality, force or power relations, rather than an entity or interiority, such as the individual. Spatial metaphors allow him to get at this externality, to get at a multiplicity of forces.

But it is not only spatial metaphors that Foucault finds useful. Analyses of space are also important to his work. Foucault is interested in how sovereign power and biopower “actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of discourse” (“Questions of Geography” 69). In effect, it is partially by studying how the production of knowledge transforms the “soil” that Foucault traces the power relations embedded within discourse. For instance, Foucault’s historicization of the human sciences links the history of discourse with the physical construction of institutions, such as psychiatric hospitals, schools, military barracks, and prisons, which make the production of discourse possible. Foucault studies the techniques of power embedded within these architectures, techniques that directly touch and shape the human bodies that
inhabit these places. By studying space, Foucault therefore can trace the relation between power and knowledge. He shows how knowledge is dependent upon spatial practices. Space thus becomes a hinge between power and knowledge. It is the medium between the two central concepts whose link characterizes Foucault’s work.

Even more, Foucault sometimes understands power as inherently spatial. Many consider Foucault as the philosopher of power—although Foucault himself would never agree that he provides a theory of power. Instead, Foucault insists that his writing is interested in the effects of power, the technologies that power uses, and the chains in which it circulates. Foucault’s understanding of the spatiality of power is especially clear in “Society Must Be Defended.” In this text, Foucault both espouses and traces a history of the belief that “power is war, the continuation of war by other means” (“Society Must Be Defended” 15). Seeing power relations as a series of warlike relations, Foucault suggests that power is inherently spatial. Although some wars are not fought over territory, the force relations involved in war have, throughout history, involved the manipulation of space. War entails the eradication of an adversary from a shared space or the transgression of what is seen as a boundary of an adversary’s space. It sometimes involves hiding from an opponent, seeking an opponent out, or surprising an opponent. War opens space to certain forms of mobility and, at other times, closes space in, producing internment. War opens pathways and constricts movement. Its practice is spatial.

Foucault also brings attention to the frontier, the location where opponents meet. He traces the history of the understanding of power as a form of war to the beginning of

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43 For recent work on Foucault and power see Alain Beaulieu and David Gabbard, Dan Beer, Barry Hindess, Ladelle McWhorter, Jeffrey Nealon, Joyce Schuld, and John Smith.
the seventeenth century, after the State developed a monopoly on war, and war was sent to the frontier. Paradoxically, Foucault argues that at this same time, a new discourse emerged that describes the social body in a state of a permanent war because it is cross hatched by power relations. Within this discourse, war encapsulates the “eradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power” (49). The frontier of war, the State’s frontier, becomes internal to the social body itself. In other words, a multiplicity of frontiers, borders, or lines where forces meet infuse the social body. Battlefronts emerge throughout society (51). These frontiers are the location of power relations. They are sites where at least two unlike forces meet each other.

A spatial argument is embedded within this understanding of power. Power relations produce, at least momentarily, a binarization of space – or, when multiple forces meet, space is fragmented. In addition, a site of encounter or a point of pressure emerges. Thus, Foucault’s analysis of power not only considers the spatiality of power relations in order to understanding the connection between power and knowledge. Foucault’s understanding of power itself, especially in “Society Must Be Defended,” is fundamentally spatial: power produces borders or frontiers that divide space.

However, although Foucault analyzes the spatiality of power relations, he often subsumes the manipulation of space under another form of power, whose target is not the earth itself. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault’s analysis of space, or more specifically of architecture, traces a movement from sovereign power to disciplinary power, one of the poles of biopower. Foucault uses Jeremy Bentham’s model of the panopticon, an ideal prison, to encapsulate disciplinary power. A panopticon is a prison with cells arranged in a circle around a central watch tower. This architecture inculcates a
feeling amongst prisoners that a singular gaze constantly surveys them. Inmates then internalize this gaze, regulating their own conduct accordingly. With this example, Foucault argues that a different form of punishment, and hence a new form of power, disciplinary power, emerged in eighteenth-century Europe. Whereas illegalities were once punished in a spectacle that made visible the strength of the sovereign, in this case, prisoners are made visible, watched in minute detail. A self-regulating, self-surveying population is formed. The architecture of the panopticon allows for the interned prisoners to be studied, producing a class of men, criminals. This architecture becomes inseparable from the development of a human science: criminology. Thus, Foucault’s analysis of the panopticon focuses on power relations between humans that partially get worked through the transformation of space. Foucault is not interested in the transformation of the earth, the actual construction of the panopticon (were it constructed), the displacement of the matter that would be used to build it. He does not ask what was in the location of the panopticon before it would have been built. In other words, Foucault does not investigate how the panopticon would actually be constructed, only what would follow its construction.

I worry that such a framework risks colluding with the colonial imaginary that legitimizes the appropriation of the earth by describing colonies as empty. Countless examples of Europeans describing North America as a “waste land” fill the North American colonial archive. North America is seen as unused and often unusable. But describing it in these terms legitimizes its appropriation. For example, in his Second Treatise on Government, John Locke argues that the earth is only made valuable through a certain form of human labor: agriculture. In order to encourage and protect this
production of value, property rights ought to be granted to those parcels of the earth that have been worked. This argument, as James Tully convincingly shows, is a direct assault on indigenous sovereignty since it dismisses “the planning, coordination, skills, and activities involved in native hunting, gathering, trapping, fishing, and non-sedentary agriculture, which took thousands of years to develop and take a lifetime for each generation to acquire and pass on” (156). Such a dismissal legitimizes the expropriation of indigenous land since this form of labor-that-is-not-labor is seen as not meriting the protection of property rights.\footnote{Locke had interest in this expropriation. As secretary to Lord Shaftesbury, to the Lord Proprietors of Carolina, and to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Locke had responsibilities and knowledge about the North American colonies. He was also a land owner in Carolina and had investments in the British Indian Company. He helped to write Carolina’s constitution and its agrarian laws, and was part of the reform that produced Virginia. See David Armitage, Barbara Arneil, and James Tully.} Without agriculture, North America is seen as a “waste land,” an empty sphere of possibility with no legitimate claims on it.\footnote{Actually, there were forms of indigenous agriculture – and John Locke was aware of this (see Tully).} Such an understanding of the earth as lacking value resonates with an understanding of space as a sphere of possibility, an emptiness waiting to be filled. Both imaginaries see either the earth or space as lacking a presence. Each is the sphere of possibility for something else. This resonates with Foucault. Although he does not figure space as empty, when he writes about the power relations of the panopticon, he does not consider the relations that would go into the actual construction of it, and he does not ask what would have been in the place before its construction. As a result, space implicitly becomes a sphere of possibility.

Albeit, one might want to argue that the context in which Foucault writes is significantly different from, in this case, Locke’s context. In other words, the politics that would be involved in the construction of the panopticon in France are different from
those involved in the transformation of the earth with colonialism and settler colonialism. But regardless, Foucault makes room for, but does not answer, the following questions: does transforming the materiality around us, that is, the materiality of the earth, constitute a form of power? Are power relations only between humans? Or even only between living forms? Foucault argues time and again that the human is not the locust through which power acts. The human is a product of power relations. And yet, although Foucault makes this argument, he does not draw out its implications. For the most part, Foucault focuses on power relations that target human lives.

In “Question of Geography,” Foucault does acknowledge an intersection between the “sciences of nature and man” (75). He sees scientific and social scientific inquiry both as administrative, political schemes (74). This provides an opening for thinking about knowledge of the earth as critical to power relations involved in its transformation. In addition, Foucault’s argument in this interview that an “excessive insistence” on State power “leads to the risk of overlooking all the mechanisms and effects of power which don’t pass directly via the State apparatus” (72-3) likewise provides an opening for thinking about power relations that do not center human beings. But notwithstanding this interview, Foucault’s analyses of power focus on humans as its object. Even in “Questions of Geography,” Foucault explains how spatial metaphors are integral to his analysis of the power relations of knowledge production. Space becomes a metaphor for describing power relations about human knowledge that also constitute the human. In

\[\text{Indeed, Gayatri Spivak, Ann Laura Stoler, and Edward Said have all shown how although Foucault’s work is useful in the analysis of colonialism, if his analyses of power grappled most significantly with colonialism, then he would have to tell a different story about power’s history. See “Can the Subaltern Speak?”}, \textit{ Race and the Education of Desire}, \textit{ and Orientalism}.\]
other words, while Foucault provides a starting point for the analysis of geopower, he
does not have the chance to elaborate this implication of his arguments.

In contrast, I want to argue that power does not only involve inter-human
relations. Power relations are constituted by forces’ encounters: when one force meets
another, when one force resists or even encounters another, a power relation is formed.
True, for there to be a power relation, Foucault explains in “The Subject and Power,”
there must be resistance. There must be a competition of forces. But this still does not
mean that power only involves inter-human relations, since not only humans can resist. A
beaver resists capture, a current resists the force of a paddle against it, and the crystalline
rock of the Canadian Shield resists the laying of railroad tracks. To argue that resistance
exists in these contexts is not to anthropomorphize or to endow any form of intentionality
to rocks, currents, or beavers. Resistance is not located within an intention so much as
within the existence of a competing force. Resistance emerges when one force meets
another, putting pressure against it. This means that power relations cannot be limited
simply to relations between humans. The relations between multiple species and the
forces of different elements of the earth, relations that physically transform the earth, are
also constitutive of power relations.

We can name these power relations geopower. Geopower materially shapes the
earth, especially its surface. It overlaps with both biopower and sovereign power, but is
different from each since it works with its own techniques. Geopower produces the
sovereign’s territory. It is prior to the circulation of right that characterizes sovereign
power because it makes this circulation possible. Likewise, geopower underlies

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47 Framing resistance in this way goes around the difficult question of agency, which is often identified
with resistance but intertwined with intentionality.
biopower. To manage a population, to encourage its life, requires the transformation of the earth around it. Biopower involves the management of viruses and bacteria, cougars and bears, corn and potatoes. It requires the construction of shelters and pathways. Therefore, biopower depends upon the transformation of the earth, and this transformation which makes it possible is effected through geopower.

Thus, in short, while Foucault offers a spatial understanding of power, for the most part, he hides the power relations involved in the transformation of the earth. This transformation constitutes a form of power, geopower. Finally, geopower puts pressure on the concept of power itself, demonstrating how power relations are not only operative between humans.

Before turning to the analysis of geopower itself, I need to recognize one important exception to my argument about Foucault. For the most part, Foucault analyzes the spatiality of power relations but does not consider the transformation of the earth itself as a form of power relation. However, in his more recently published lectures, *Security, Population, Territory*, his argument is a bit different. In these lectures, Foucault introduces a model of governance, security or governmentality. He begins with the concept of “the milieu,” drawing from Lamarck, who borrowed the notion from Newton. A milieu, Foucault explains, “is what is needed to account for action at a distance of one body on another. It is therefore the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates” (21). The milieu consists of “a set of natural givens – river, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera” (21). With security, populations are not controlled so much as managed, partially through the management of the milieu. In effect, the understanding of “population” becomes
physically bound to the earth. A population, in this model, is a “multiplicity of 
individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to 
the materiality within which they live” (21). Security then depends on a “number of 
material givens” (19). The question is not, as it is with sovereignty, how a territory can be 
produced with a capital at its center and the circulation of law. Nor is the question, as it is 
with biopower, how a population can be made visible, monitored and trained. Instead, the 
question becomes how certain forms of circulation, within a given space, can foster life. 
In turn, the space within which power acts becomes filled in with the elements that 
constitute the earth. My understanding of geopower is close to this description of power 
since I bring focus to the transformation of the earth and to the production of modes of 
circulation across it. But in contrast to Foucault, I draw out the posthumanist implications 
of his argument.

II - The Features of Geopower and the CPR

Geopower is fundamental to colonialism and settler colonialism, processes that 
involve extracting resources from the earth, transforming the earth to support some lives 
(not only human lives) over others, and producing modes of circulation through which 
sovereign power and biopower can then travel. In the section that follows, I detail some 
features of geopower through an analysis of the construction of the CPR. I have chosen to 
analyze this construction because the CPR is instrumental to Canadian settler 
colonialism. John A. MacDonald, the first Canadian prime minister, promised the road to 
British Columbia in 1871 as an incentive to join the Confederacy. But the CPR’s 
construction was halted in 1873 following a parliamentary scandal where MacDonald
was accused of having taken bribes from railway contractors. In addition to the scandal, the railway was also put on hold since many thought it was too expensive. Some suggested that the line meet the already constructed American road in Minnesota, reaching the Pacific and then heading up the coast through the United States. But when the existing part of the railroad was used by Canadian federal troops to put down the North-West rebellions quickly, the public and parliament were increasingly convinced of the benefits of having a Canadian road: federal troops could not have passed through the United States. The CPR thus gained backing and was finally completed in 1885.

The railroad did not only require the construction of tracks. The CPR was an explicit attempt to encourage colonization. Its construction was accompanied by the wide expansion of settler colonialism in the prairies, Rockies, and British Columbia, and it launched intense debate of how to distribute and organize land in the West: the CPR was given an extensive land grant, and the government maintained for itself alternate plots of land, whose value increased with the construction of the road. These plots could then be sold, which would help to finance the road’s construction. The road attempted to make the land it connected “valuable,” where valuable meant usable for capitalist agriculture, and its construction entailed the building of towns and villages along its way. CPR also produced its clients by bringing people to Canada: it ran passenger ships that brought settlers to Canada from Europe, it built farms to sell to new colonists, and it constructed hotels to develop Canadian tourism. It also imported a large labor force from China. In short, the CPR, by encouraging colonization and providing a mode of transportation for it, became central to the expansion of settler colonialism and the production of Canada.
The construction of this railroad brings certain features of geopower to light: (1) Geopower involves force relations between organisms, organic and inorganic matter; (2) Geopower does not work on an infinitely malleable “earth,” but rather with specific features that are always already there; (3) Geopower subtends both biopower and sovereign power; (4) Geopower does not only involve human labor but rather a choreography of the multiple species’ work; and (5) Geopower depends upon an attentiveness to the earth and is entangled in certain forms of knowledge. The following section of this chapter analyzes each of these features in turn.

1. **Geopower involves force relations between organisms, organic and inorganic matter.**

   The construction of the CPR involves multiple examples of geopower, that is, of the transformation of the earth, especially the earth’s surface, by life. The railroad’s creation required “rock and earth excavation, [...] tunneling, masonry, bridging” (Fleming 60). It entailed the construction of “ballasting, permanent way, rolling stock, stations, shops, snow sheds and fences” (Fleming 61). Its formation worked on and changed the earth, opening it to new lines of circulation, transforming the animal and plant life it sustains, and altering, at times, the earth’s topology, by building tunnels or blasting through rock.

   The force relations connected with geopower comprise in relations between organisms, organic and inorganic matter. For instance, snow sheds were (and are) meant to block avalanches from the railway. In this case, the snow shed, a construction by a human (an organism), sometimes meets snow, inorganic matter, pushing against it. The

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48 I borrow this language of “choreography” between humans and animals from Lynda Birke, Mette Bryld, and Nina Lykke’s “Animal Performances,” 173.
snow shed changes the probability of snow’s distribution on the earth’s surface by potentially resisting the force of moving snow. At times, the shed resists the snow’s mass, but at other times, the force it exerts breaks the shed and snow comes to block the road.

Geopower, in this example, involves a force relation between humans, who build the shed anticipating the problem avalanches might pose, and snow that slides as a result of precipitation, changes in temperature, rock and ice fall, or even a mountain goat running across a hill in the distance. The construction of the snow shed is an example of geopower since it involves the transformation of the earth, specifically the distribution of snow on its surface, by its living inhabitants. And as this case clearly illustrates, geopower does not only involve force relations between humans but also relations between life and inorganic matter.

2. Geopower does not work on an infinitely malleable earth, but rather with specific features that are always already there.

When parliamentarians promised to British Columbia a trans-Canadian railroad within ten years of its joining the Dominion, they set themselves a formidable task: not only would the railway have to go through the Rocky mountains and the Cascade mountains, it would also have to traverse the land north of Lake Superior, thick with mossy bogs. Human labor could transform the earth, but this transformation was not from nothing. The earth had particular features, sometimes helping the work and other times inhibiting it. As Sir Sanford Fleming, chief engineer of the CPR wrote in his 1877 annual report, “the Cascade chain, which rises between the central plateau on the one side and the coast on the other, presents everywhere formidable difficulties” (Fleming 32). The “Woodland region,” north of Lake Superior was rocky, and covered by “dense thickets”
In comparison, the flat prairies were seen as perfect for the railway. As one parliamentarian debated, “nature seems to have adapted the prairie for the railroad; it was the natural road of the prairie” (1482). This shows how transforming the earth through the construction of the CPR required the transformation of an already existing materiality.

However, when building the CPR, a real tension emerged, a tension that is endemic to settler colonialism. This tension existed between on the one hand, paying attentive to geology, climate, and flora, and on the other, treating the earth as an empty field of possibility, through which the railway was to be built. In the first case, the quality of the soil, the climate, the plant and animal life, the rivers and mountains both made possible and resisted the railway’s construction. For example, R.M. Rylatt, who worked as part of a surveying team in the Rocky mountains from 1871-1873, describes how rivers, mud holes, mountains, deep snow, and the density of the forest often make it challenging to pass. Specific features of the earth make Rylatt’s work difficult, but some of these same features also make it easier: surveyors, for instance, divided the terrain using natural landmarks, most especially rivers. The 1877 CPR report lists, over nine pages, the different areas surveyed, and over and again rivers serve as primary markers. The surveyors worked “along the whole extent of the River North Thompson, … along River South Thompson to Lake Shuswap” and “River Columbia from its source, near the 50th parallel to Boat Encampment, near the Athabasca Pass” (Fleming 4). Rivers not only divide land but can also help orientate life in space. They were also used as pathways. Fleming, for instance, reports that it is “possible to reach the coast from Kamloops by the course and outlet of the Rivers Thompson and Frazer, the line terminating at an excellent
harbour on Burrard Inlet” (Fleming 13). Rivers both block the surveyors, as Rylatt’s accounts of crossing frigid, turbulent water recount, and also serve as important landmarks and means of transportation. The rivers fill out the space through which the railway would traverse. Thus, the engineers and surveyors of the railroad were, necessarily, attentive to the features of the earth - the mountains, rivers, and soil that partially constitute the earth. These features both inhibit the work and make it possible.

On the other hand, there existed a fantasy that the land, especially in the prairies, was uniform, an empty field of possibility. In this case, particularities of the earth are glossed over. For example, Fleming’s report includes a map of town plots (Fleming 100), emptied of any specificity of the place in which they would be constructed. This design, reproduced on the left, was a template, infinitely repeatable, a model settlement not attuned to the earth’s actuality. This reproducibility became a source of some contention, since the Department of the Interior had to clarify that the Chief Engineer’s proposal for laying out farm lots could “only apply to those parts of the Province or Territory where the line does not pass through settlements, or intersect

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49 In addition to waterways, Fleming also paid attention to the quality of the land and its feasibility for agriculture. This too implies that direct attention was paid to the land itself. Fleming includes a table of the number of acres of land capable of cultivation or grazing, and compares it to the total area available in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland (Fleming 80). Agriculture was seen as a practice that could be transported from one place to another, though the success of this transportation did depend upon the “character of the country” (Fleming 79).
Half-breed lands; and, further, must be subject to any legal rights of the Hudson’s Bay Company respecting the one-twentieth of their lands, as allotted to them under the Dominion Lands Act” (Fleming 92). The Department of the Interior is concerned with the legal designation of land and human settlements that pre-exist the railway. But it still does not get to the materiality of the earth – the streams, animal homes, rocks and trees that already fill the space. Although town plans fantasized of an empty, homogenous space, a town’s actual construction would necessarily encounter the material particularity of the earth.

The map below, also from Fleming’s report, provides another example of settler colonialism’s representation of the earth. Notice how pathways or modes of circulation – lakes, rivers, and the projected railroad (represented by the diagonal line in the left corner) – are the only features marked. Everywhere else, the earth appears homogenous: empty, repeatable squares, measured by a grid.
Thus, geopower does not work with an empty, infinitely malleable earth. Geopower instead must pay attention to the earth, treating space as full, and transforming what is already there. However, settler colonialism involves a tension between on the one hand engaging with this materiality and on the other hand, denying its particularity.

3. Geopower subtends both biopower and sovereign power.

As I have already suggested, both biopower and sovereign power require the transformation and management of the earth. This means that they each depend upon geopower. The relation between biopower and geopower was clear to parliamentarians who debated in March 28, 1878 the Colonization Railway Bill. For example, David Mills, liberal member of parliament who worked as both Minister of the Interior and Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs from 1876 - 1878, argued that “the Government did not propose to say to the population: ‘You must go to this or that particular locality.’ They knew by the experience of the progressive settlement and development of the adjoining country, … how largely railway accommodation contributed to the progress of colonization and settlement” (Bradley 1479). Drawing data from the United States, Mills correlates population growth to miles of railway constructed. He summarizes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Average increase of Population per year</th>
<th>Miles of Railway Construction per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>51,900</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bradley 1480)
These statistics, according to Mills, show that “there was an intimate connection between the progress of railway construction and the progressive settlement of a country” (Bradley 1480). Although the Colonization Bill targeted population, this target was reached through acting upon the earth rather than directly upon the population. Biopower, in other words, utilized geopower: transform the earth by constructing a railway and the development of a particular population will ensue.

Similarly, sovereign power also depends upon geopower since geopower physically produces its territory. Geopower allows for law to circulate within a space by easing the transportation the sovereign’s sword and making it visible. For instance, as I have already explained, the Canadian government used the new railway to display its troops, intimidating indigenous and Métis people into accepting its sovereignty. Governor Dewdey, however, complained that “the Indians … seem not at all afraid of the solders. All that display of troops along the C.P.R. line … has not yet convinced them that the government is powerful” (qtd. in Dempsey 191). In this case, the railway opened the earth to a certain mode of circulation through which the sovereign sword and law circulate. The transformation of the earth, geopower, constructs sovereign power’s territory – though the earth’s inhabitants may protest.

This sovereign’s territory is, clearly, not a territory for all. Geopower transforms the earth so that it supports some lives over others. It creates a sovereign territory within which a selected population’s life is supported over and against other lives. For example, when debating the Colonization Railway Bill, Joseph Ryan, member of parliament for Marquette, made a distinction between the “children of half-breeds” to whom 1,400,000 had been “given” to “extinguish the Indian title to lands” and the “actual settlers” who
“more than any others, were entitled to consideration and fostering care” (Bradley 1484). For Ryan, the railroad bill ought to benefit these “actual settlers,” making the land valuable for them. Ryan made clear that the railway was not built for the Métis. In blunt, violent prose, Rylatt is also explicit that the territory produced by the railway is not for all humans. In his memoir, he explains that the “Indian herd” is slowly being wiped “off the face of the earth” (164). With the “projected Railroads, more wedges of civilization are being inserted through their very midst, and the end may not be just yet, but it will assuredly soon be” (164). Most horrifying is that Rylatt wrote his memoir in 1885, while working on the Quinaielt Reservation, where he had been a clerk and teacher of First Nations’ children. As a teacher, he saw his previous work on the railway as bringing the extermination of indigenous peoples: “The white race are inheriting their territories instead of their children,” he explains, and he is thankful that indigenous people’s “strength is waning fast” (131). “The day,” he writes, “is not far distant … when the happy hunting grounds shall have received the last of their race. I am much of the Missourian’s belief, ‘dead Indians only, are good Indians’” (131). Rylatt is desirous of the Assiniboine’s deer and moose skin clothing (121); he writes, “There is a charm in the fringed and betasseled and jaunty air this suit gives one, that induces us more than any thing else to donn it” (139). And he enjoys their pemican – boiled down pieces of moose and buffalo preserved in fat - “I should desire nothing better than a limited supply of Pemican with me when travelling” (121). Rylatt’s narrative is filled with examples of European, Chinese, and African-Canadian men being helped by indigenous people to navigate and survive in the mountains. However, although Rylatt’s life working for CPR clearly depends upon indigenous knowledge and work, and although he eventually
teaches indigenous students, he sees his own work on the railway as “thankfully”
bringing their end.

Thus, the transformation of the earth is explicitly designed to make some lives
possible and others more difficult, if still existing at all. This is also clear as we return to
Isapomuxika’s relationship to the railway. Although the Indian Agent, Denny, had told
Isapomuxika that the railway would be used to bring rations to the Siksikáwa, as time
progressed, it became increasingly clear to Isapomuxika that the railway was not built to
benefit his life. In fact, when he fell seriously ill during an erysipelas epidemic in 1883,
he blamed the train’s smoke. Unsure if he was to survive, his supporters suggested that
they go tear up the tracks that went through tribal land. The Royal Canadian Mountain
Police (RCMP) heard of this plan, and sent a representative to “look after him.”
Isapomuxika did recover, but railroad sparks continued to cause prairie fires, and trains
killed tribal horses. Isapomuxika became increasingly angry about the construction of the
CPR. The train was not only of little value to Isapomuxika, but it harmed the Siksikáwa
nation. Isapomuxika argued that the “Canadian Pacific Railway said that the road
running through the reserve would not do any damage to them [the Siksikáwa]… but it
had” (qtd. in Dempsey 149). The railway did not foster the Siksikáwa population; this
population was outside of the fostering of life typical of biopower. At the same time, the
railway was productive of the territory of settler colonialism’s sovereignty. It connected
Ottawa to the Blackfoot Reservation, attempting to make the center of the Reservation’s
politics elsewhere, in Ottawa. It encouraged new paths of circulation, paths that
threatened Siksikáwa sovereignty by easing the movement of the RCMP, federal troops,
and government officials to tribal lands. The CPR brought the sovereign’s sword. It
produced the territory through which the settler colony’s sovereignty circulates.

Geopower, in other words, or the transformation of the earth underlies sovereign power as well.

4. Geopower does not only involve human labor but rather choreographies of the multiple species’ work.

Humans are in no way the only organisms who transform the earth. Such transformations are pervasive amongst organisms at large. We – organisms - leave traces of ourselves, we construct the places in which we live, and we produce territories marked by our passing. Beavers, termites, moles, and bacteria all transform the places where they live. Even more, humans’ and animals’ territories depend upon one another. Sometimes, the territory of one paves the way for the territory of another. At other times, species becomes spatially diffuse: the presence of one means the other must leave.

In the case of the construction of the CPR, humans’ transformation of the earth depended upon the labor of other species. As he describes in his memoir, Rylatt shares his work with cats, horses, cows, mules, dogs, ravens, coyotes, rabbits, caribou, mink, martin, muskrat, panthers, wolves, bears, ducks, mountain goats, and deer. These animals play a large role in his narrative. He is worried by the health of the mules that carry 300 pounds on their saddle (13), he is trouble by the starving horse his voyage home depends upon, and he is upset when his dog drowns in icy water (127). Rylatt identifies with his cat, reading in its meow a call for “Maria,” who, he surmises, is as far away as his own wife (62). Cats, dogs, mules, and horses perform both emotional and physical labor that goes into the construction of CPR. But wild animals also play a role: a grouse Rylatt meets takes advantage of the men’s presence (perhaps because their fires and their size
keep away animals that would hunt it). The bird becomes “a favorite with the men at once” (59). In this instance, the grouse’s territory becomes dependent upon the humans’ and vice versa, in as much as the men enjoy its company, feeling at home in its presence. The surveyors also follow animal trails (Rylatt 192). Animals’ circulation provides pathways through which the men travel, making it possible to survey the Rocky mountains for the eventual construction of CPR. Thus, humans’ transformation of the earth does not only involve human labor. Animals also transform the earth, and human labor is often dependent upon theirs.

But animals also pose a challenge to the construction of the railway. F.A. Talbot, a historian who wrote during the first half of the twentieth century, tells the story of engineers building a track through Jasper Park. The line traverses a swamp, that turns out to be a beaver colony. Workmen break through their dam, using dynamite, clearing some of the water, which allows them to lay the foundations for the track. But the beavers quickly repair the dam, and the water starts to rise again: “Time after time they were flooded out in this manner, for the animals always succeeded in discovering the cause of the water around their home falling below the critical level” (Talbot 196). In this case, the beavers and humans struggle against one another. Geopower emerges in the force relation between them.

Mosquitoes also pose difficulties to the CPR’s construction: for instance, mosquitoes cause Rylatt to miss a meal: “the mosquitoes fairly drove me to bed supperless,” he writes, “they got into my eyes and nostrils; and when I opened my mouth to bestow my blessing, they were hurrying down my throat to meet it” (Rylatt 86-87). Wild animals also prey on the surveyors’ companion animals: panthers eat dogs, bears
hurt horses (though men chew on mountain goats). Thus, geopower entails the choreography of multiple species whose territories sometimes rely on co-presence and at other times require distance. In the economy of eating and being eaten, the territory of the eater depends upon the presence of the organism eaten, whereas the eaten seeks out a space where the eater is not also present.

5. Geopower entails knowledge about the earth.

In order to transform the earth, life must develop some sort of knowledge of it so that its transformation is effective. In the case of the construction of CPR, this especially involved surveying: making the earth visible, measuring it, and organizing it according to geometric calculations. Trees, which block light and hence lines of visibility, made this difficult. As Fleming notes, “the topographical features and the adaptability to railway purposes of a country covered with woods, and imperfectly known, can only be ascertained by patient and persistent efforts. The view is much obstructed by the growth which covers the surface. The axe must generally be used to admit of observations being made for even a few hundred feet” (Fleming 57). Surveying the earth requires changing it by cutting down trees to allow for visibility. Thus, the survey does not only create a representation of the earth; it also materially transforms its surface. In Karen Barad’s terms, knowledge of the earth requires an intra-action with it, such that the knower and known become entangled.

The survey, as Fleming explains, involved five stages, each with its own techniques and instruments for measuring and organizing the earth onto a grid. In the first stage, which Fleming calls “exploration,” barometers ascertained altitude. “Horizontal distance” was measured by
keeping track of the time it took to get from one place to another or with the use of a “micrometer” (Fleming 3). In other words, in this first stage, earth becomes mapable on a two dimensional Cartesian plane measuring, horizontally, distance from a starting point and vertically, height above sea water. A map, reproduced on the left (with a close-up on the bottom right) provides a visual representation of such a plane. This diagram of the projected railway visualizes what can best be understood as a cross-section of the earth: where mountains, the names of particular places, and the distance from a point of origin are denoted. In the second stage, the exploratory survey, sight lines are produced by cutting through the forest and thicket “in order to pierce them and obtain measurements, horizontal and vertical, as a ground work for further operations” (Fleming 3). In this case, the earth’s surface becomes transformed so that light can easily travel across it. This second stage is followed by a revised survey and then a “trial location survey,” where tangents are laid down along a line for eventual tracks. In the final location survey, every effort is “made to throw out all objectionable features” (Fleming 4). A line is established that is most amenable to the railroad.
Although the survey required the movement of human and animal bodies (animals transport equipment, men, and food, and provide companionship and meat), these bodies do not appear in the resulting representations of the earth. The survey aims for a form of scientific objectivity where the producer of knowledge is separated from and does not appear within that which is known. As a result, there is a stark contrast between the final reports from the surveys and the multiple diaries or travel narratives that are included in their appendix. Take, for example, the report written by Henry A. F. Macleod, a surveyor who worked in the Western prairies and Rocky mountains in 1876. The report begins with a narrative of his travels. He describes his preparations for his trip and his travels to the survey and telegraph line, where he arrives on August 7. He writes of this place, “The grass was so heavy, and the country so hilly that it told very much upon my horses” (338). He then arrives at Battleford, where he meets other white men, some of who suffer from scurvy. The narrative continues, constantly including the dates of his travels, descriptions of the earth across which he moves, and details about the people and animals he meets. But as such narratives are transformed into measurements of distance and altitude, the bodies, experience, and encounters in space are excluded from the representation. Temporality also disappears. Space is no longer something through which the surveyor moves. Instead, the earth becomes perceptible in a glance, at one moment. It is mapped. In the diaries, space is permeated by that which constitutes it. In the latter representation, space becomes an empty medium. Temperature, precipitation, mosquitoes, animals, and humans disappear from the landscape, just as space becomes atemporal, capable of being experienced and understood in one moment or in one glance.
We could read these human representations of the earth as gendered, but I am worried that by claiming that the earth becomes feminized, I am in effect reproducing a discourse that I seek to displace. Take, for example, the following passage from Frederick A. Talbot’s 1912 history about the construction of the trans-Canadian railroad. He writes,

> The average person speaks lightly about the backwoods of Canada … But when one, like myself, has penetrated the wilderness, has torn the veil of romance and adventure aside roughly, revealing prodigious difficulties of every description, perils untold, privations unheard of, and a silence and loneliness that bludgeons the senses into inactivity, then the picture assumes a totally different aspect and colouring. (Talbot 45)

Talbot uses sexually charged language to describe his travels in the “backwoods of Canada.” He has “penetrated the wilderness,” and he has “torn the veil of romance and adventure aside roughly,” but notwithstanding his aggressive sexual prowess, he finds, in the end, “loneliness” leading to “inactivity.” The virile, brave explorer does not find a match up to his game. This is, for Talbot, a disappointing encounter. It easy to argue that in this passage, the historian performs a form of masculinity that likewise feminizes the earth. However, why read this passage in this way? Do I not, as the reader, make the connections between Talbot’s description of the woods with femininity? Do I not reproduce a form of heteronormativity in my reading that assumes that that which is being penetrated is, in effect, feminine? Could this not be a homoerotic scene? My reading is more interested in complicating the discourse that takes the earth as feminine than in reproducing it.

Thus, in the case of the construction of CPR, geopower is entangled with a series of overlapping forms of knowledge, surveying techniques, along with engineering, planning, and geology. These forms of knowledge produce particular representations of
the earth, representations that make it amenable to the CPR’s construction, and hence to the eventual circulation of the sovereignty of the settler colonial state.

Although Foucault was interested in the relationship between power and knowledge, his analyses focus primarily on the human sciences, those forms of knowledge that constitute the human as its object of knowledge: criminology, psychology, sexology, linguistics, and economics. As Siobhan Somerville has shown, these sciences were integral to imperialism and colonialism. For instance, sexology was not only concerned with sexual behavior, but was also part of eugenic discourse and the construction of race. However, although these human sciences are key to understanding imperialism, colonialism, and settler colonialism, geopower is also integral to these processes, and as a result, so are its corresponding forms of knowledge. Even more, in as much as geopower underlies sovereign power and biopower, the descriptions of the earth produced by geopower’s knowledge production become rudiments for these latter forms of power.

In short, power does not simply involve relations between humans. As various organisms transform the earth upon which they live, power relations emerge between organisms, organic and inorganic matter. These power relations can be understood as “geopower.” Geopower underlies the two forms of power that Foucault described at length: sovereign power and biopower. And, just like biopower, geopower is entangled in particular forms of knowledge that create specific representations of that which it targets.

50 For an analysis of the entanglement of the discipline of geography with imperialism, see David Harvey’s “On the History and Present Condition of Geography: An Historical Materialist Manifesto,” p. 108 – 120.
51 See Julie Cruikshank’s Do Glaciers Listen? for a wonderful example of competing accounts of glaciers in the Pacific North-West and their implications for settler colonialism and indigenous sovereignty.
In the following chapter, I continue to develop the understanding of geopower, this time reading its implications on feminist models of borders, boundaries, and interiorities.

III – CHRISTIAN FRAMES

In 1888, Ross Photography, based in Calgary, mounted Isapomuxika’s photograph into a Christmas and New Year’s card. The greeting frames Isapomuxika with holly, English ivy, and mistletoe, ribbons and bows. The good wishes “A Merry Christmas” and “Happy New Year” lie above and below his image, and scrawled on the bottom right – presumably only on this copy - is a handwritten addition, “Crowfoot Blackfoot chief.”

The effect is chilling: violent and depersonalizing. Isapomuxika’s photograph becomes a household image that is sold, bought, and then given. His photograph becomes contained within signs of a Christian holiday and the Christian calendar. It then circulates among Anglophone Christians. It finally lands in the McCord Museum, a museum in Montreal dedicated to Canadian history. In a word, Isapomuxika’s image is made domestic.
Who would buy this card? Why? And to whom would they send it? What did the image mean to those who consumed it? What does it mean today?

To a contemporary audience, this card is especially surprising. We expect such greetings to figure scenes that are somehow related to Christmas. However, in North America and England, popular holiday cards in the nineteenth century often included images that were not particularly tied to Christmas. As Ernest Dudley Chase explains in his history of Christmas cards, “Very little holly was used and, although we do find pictures of the scene in the manger and others of a religious nature, they are far outshone by landscapes, children, flowers, kittens, fairies, heads, birds, animals, even fish and reptiles in every conceivable design” (12). In this context, the photograph’s inclusion in a Christmas card may not be as odd as it first seems.

This is especially clear when we read the photograph in relation to the frame of mistletoe, holly, and ivy. These three plants are symbols of Christmas because they are evergreen, and as a result, they embody consistency, permanence, and continuity. Holly, ivy, and mistletoe encapsulate life’s resilience throughout the winter. “Chief Crowfoot” may have been given a similar meaning. To Calgarians who read the newspaper, “Chief Crowfoot” could have been a familiar name. In 1877, ten years before this card was made, Isapomuxika had signed Treaty 7 with the Queen, granting to the state “all the rights, titles and privileges whatsoever” to Blackfoot territory. He had not joined the Louis Riel rebellion, and he permitted the railroad to go through the Blackfoot Reservation. In 1886, the year before this card was made, his name appeared in the national newspaper, The Globe, three times. On September 8, one article recounted a speech by Sir John A. Macdonald. In this talk, Macdonald explains how he “had seen the
Indians of the plains, woods, and mountains. He had had a very interesting and pleasant conversation with Crowfoot, chief of the Blackfeet, who reminded him of the telegram he had sent to Ottawa during the rebellion, assuring the Government of his loyalty (“Brotherhood Had Been Enlarged”). On October 11, “Crowfoot” is on the front page of *The Globe*. This time, he is in Ottawa, and he attends a “high mass at the cathedral.” “Crowfoot” visits the Governor General and General Middleton, but tired, “will leave for home to-morrow” (“Crowfoot Wants to Go Home”). In another article, this time, November 4, the question arises whether “Crowfoot” supports the Conservative government (“Political Intelligence”). Almost a year later, “Crowfoot” appears again, and this time, the story is only slightly different. Representing Ottawa, Col. Hershmer goes to the Blackfeet reservation to make an arrest, but he is stopped by the Lieutenant-Governor on his way, who suggests that he does not enter the reservation ready to use violence. Instead, he ought to “parley with Crowfoot, the chief, and his advisors” (“About Town”). The Colonel, however, does not heed to this plan.

In each of these stories, “Crowfoot” is figured as cooperating or potentially cooperating with the Canadian government. Across these examples, he becomes emblematic of an indigenous leader who seems to support the Canadian state. With this apparent support, “Canada” can be framed less as a break from indigenous sovereignty than as its development. “Chief Crowfoot” thus resonates with the holy, ivy, and mistletoe. He becomes a sign of the continuity, consistency, or permanence. But the context within which he “cooperates” is rendered invisible: this figuration of
Isapomuxika says little of the starvation and the threat of violence that shaped his decisions.\textsuperscript{52}

Isapomuxika negotiates the forces of settler colonialism, forces that frame him in this greeting. As someone who never became Christian (Dempsey 24), it is unlikely that he was happy that his picture was used to celebrate Christmas or to mark the change of year according to the Gregorian calendar. Contained within this frame, his image circulates as a greeting, a gift meant to bond the giver and receiver with good feeling. This exchange of cards is a performance of kinship; those who receive the card are part of the community of well wishes. Isapomuxika’s image is used for its exchange value within this economy of good feeling. As his photograph circulates amongst Anglophone Christians, he becomes a sign of the Dominion’s continuity and persistence. The card circulates amongst those who are seen at the center of the nation, along those pathways such as the CPR that make the nation possible, but that threaten Isapomuxika’s life.

\textsuperscript{52} See Hugh Dempsey’s biography for many such examples.
Chapter Three: Borders and Boundaries

Since the 1980s, feminist scholars have often conceptualized identity, the body, and the nation-state as boundary projects: each is a form of interiority, produced by a boundary that delimits what is inside and distinguishes it from the outside. But geopower, this chapter argues, works in what comes to be understood as “within” a territory. It produces territory through a range of technologies such as forestry, agriculture, city planning, performance, mapping, violence and law. The “withiness” of territory in this case is defined more by a repetition across space than by a boundary that encloses a space. This means that rather than understanding territory as an interiority, territory could rather be framed as a form of exteriority, the site of forces’ encounter.

This chapter develops such an understanding of topology through a comparative reading of Jacques Derrida, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze. I have chosen these writers because they are exemplary of different positions that could be used to explain territory. The first position, which I locate in Derrida’s work, has been taken up widely in feminist theory. It is the position that claims that interiority is a product of boundaries. In this model, a territory could be understood as a form of interiority that is established through a border. When translated to the analysis of the earth, this model, I will argue, cannot sufficiently account for the power relations through which territory is produced. In effect, this model of interiority covers up both the excesses of the earth and the work that goes into the production of borders and

53 See, for example, Judith Butler’s *Bodies that Matter*, Diana Fuss’s “Inside/Out,” and Caren Kaplan’s “The Politics of Location as Transnational Feminist Practice.” This argument does not mean that all boundaries produce interiorities. One can, for instance, draw a line in the sand without producing an “inside.” Boundaries do not always produce interiorities, but all interiorities are produced through borders and boundaries. I thank Agatha Beins for making this clear. The argument has also been influential in postcolonial studies. See, for instance, Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture*. 
boundaries. The second position, which I will develop from Deleuze and Guattari’s and Anzaldúa’s writing is closer to capturing a mode of thinking that allows for an analysis of geopower. This model refigures territory less as a form of interiority than as the result of the encounter between forces.

The chapter begins by explaining Derrida’s emphasis on borders and boundaries, arguing that elements of his thought have been shared by many feminist scholars such as Caren Kaplan and Judith Butler. I then give an example from John Borrows’ Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law to show how seeing borders and boundaries as productive of territory covers up the power relations involved in settler colonialism. Finally, I turn to Deleuze and Guattari to argue that their model of territory formation makes visible the production of territory, and I show how their model resonates with Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera. Ultimately, this chapter concludes that geopower challenges feminist scholars to rethink territory, moving away from the border to the multiple power relations that produce territory such that territory itself is no longer even understood as an “inside.”

I - Deconstruction and the Border

The concept that borders are productive of interiority is embedded in Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence. Take, for instance, Derrida’s essay, “Différance.” Derrida first read this essay to the Société française de philosophie in January, 1968. In the same year, this text was published both in the association’s journal as well as in Tel Quel. The text is a classic articulation of deconstruction that captures its mode of thought and introduces philosophy to différance. In this essay, Derrida calls into question the understanding that signs are deferred presences that stand in for things, such as their
meaning or referent (9). Rather than understanding the sign as a substitute for an original presence, Derrida reads Ferdinand de Saussure to argue that signs have as their “origin” différance. In Saussure’s model, Derrida explains, language consists of “differences without positive terms” (qtd. in Derrida 11). This is true of both the signified (a concept or meaning) and the signifier (the material, physical mark or sound). Derrida names this play of differences “différance” (11). It is here that Derrida intervenes in Saussure’s structuralism and develops what has come to be known as a poststructuralist argument. “Différance” is the origin (that is not an origin) of difference. It is an origin since it is a movement that makes possible the constitution of differences. However, it is not an origin since it itself is never simply present or full. It does not exist prior to differences, but is a play or movement that makes differences possible. Whereas Saussure argues that differences emerge from a “linguistic system” (qtd. in Derrida 11), for Derrida, differences are possible because of the play that différance, itself a movement, sets into motion. In the place of a system, then, Derrida offers movement, and in this way, his model departs from structuralism.

This early articulation of deconstruction brings attention to intervals, borders, and the in-between. By drawing attention to the difference between signs, Derrida argues that meaning is not located within a sign itself but rather in signs’ difference from others. But this explanation does not go far enough: Derrida is not simply interested in that which is between signs, as though signs existed, producing a space in between them. Rather, he is interested in the condition of differentiation. Nonetheless, in his explanation of différance as both a spacing and temporalization, the crucial place of borders in his philosophy is clear. Derrida introduces différance as an “assemblage” (3) of temporal
deferment, delay, or detour, and the more common difference, non-identity or otherness. Whereas the first indexes *différance*’s temporization, the latter indexes a spacing, the creation of a space between elements (8). These two aspects of *différance* are, for Derrida, entangled with one another. This is especially clear in Derrida’s analysis of the present. For the present to be the present, he argues, the present must be distinguished from that which it is not: the future and the past. An “interval,” he argues, “must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself” (13). But, Derrida continues, “this interval that constitues it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself” (13). Why? Derrida writes that it is “by the same token” that the present is divided itself. Perhaps Derrida means that each present moment has a beginning and an end; it is, therefore, divisible between its beginning and end. It is divided by an interval. The interval itself that divides the future from the past is divided by an interval. In other words, the present is divided from itself.  

It is here that the notion of a border or boundary appears within “Différance.” The border, in this case an interval, distinguishes the present both from that which it is not and from the present itself. I read this present as a form of interiority because it is bounded and distinguished from its others, from its exterior – the past and the future. This is the

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54 The concept of the interval is important in Irigaray’s work as well. As Rebecca Hill explains, Irigaray posits the interval of sexual difference in relation to the “bodies of woman and man here and now” (Hill 128). Yet this interval is not simply a gap within homogenous space. Instead, the interval “always remains in play as an excessive locus to the past and the future” (Hill 128). What does this mean? The interval here could be read as the emergence of temporality in space, or as the abyss between matter and memory. This is the case in Dorothea Olkowski’s reading of Irigaray’s interval through Henri Bergson. Olkowski explains Bergson’s concept of the interval as the moment between perception and action – the moment where memory intervenes in one’s reaction such that the future remains unpredictable. In this reading, the interval is “the gap between what is perceived and felt and what is acted” (Olkowski 84). It is an opening which allows for differences to emerge with unpredictable acts. Following Olkowski, we can take Bergson’s concept back to Irigaray: the interval or gap between man and woman is not a void but rather a potentiality for creative action.
becoming-space of time that Derrida references. In this model, an interior has the appearance of being self-same, but is in effect differentiated from itself.

Not only does Derrida argue that difference, intervals, or borders both allow for and disrupt presence, he more provocatively suggests that *différance* is the condition for Being that unsettles the presence of presence itself. Derrida elaborates this position in his critique of Heidegger in *Spurs*/*Éperons*, a critique that he begins explaining at the end of “Différerance,” but that becomes clearer in this other work. I briefly outline this argument not simply to provide a second example of borders and boundaries in Derrida, but also because of the text’s familiarity in feminist theory.

In *Spurs*, Derrida analyzes sexual difference and “woman” through a reading of Nietzsche. Published in 1978, Derrida’s text acknowledges feminism by insisting, against Heidegger, that woman and sexual difference are important to Nietzsche’s understanding of truth, as well as to any analysis of Being. What’s most interesting for my purposes here is the way *Spurs* argues that the question of what Derrida calls “propriation,” which is both a conglomerate of appropriation and expropriation, is embedded within the question of sexual difference and ontology. This is relevant to my analysis of borders since entangled in Derrida’s discussion of property is the question of boundaries. Propriation involves that which is proper, that which refers to the self, that which belongs to a person or an object. “J’ai ma propre table,” I have my own table. But the French adjective “propre” also means “clean.” To be clean is to be within boundaries. Ownership and cleanliness: the space of the proper, which is the field of propriation, is striated, organized. This striation allows for the possibility of drawing boundaries.

Therefore, when Derrida writes that propriation is entangled in ontology and sexual

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55 See Mary Douglas’s *Purity and Danger*. 
difference, he suggests that the possibility and contingency of boundedness engender beings and sexual difference. The logic of this argument proceeds as follows: since Being only ever shows itself in beings, and since beings are differentiated from one another, we need the potentiality for difference, *différance* or propriation, prior to the emergence of Being. Bringing this argument to the question of sexual difference, we need the possibility of differentiation for sexual difference to emerge. In this model, boundedness, propriation, borders and boundaries are logically prior to both Being and sexual difference. And yet, at the same time, Derrida argues that propriation is itself a “sexual operation” (111). We would not have sexual difference or Being without the (unstable) boundaries that make it possible, without propriation, and yet at the same time, propriation is itself, for Derrida, sexual. This means that it remains undecidable whether sexual difference is prior to *différance* or not.  

But the point I want to underline here is quite simple: in his analysis of both ontology and sexual difference, the question of boundaries remains critical.

One could argue here that Derrida is making less of an ontological argument than an epistemological argument. Derrida argues that Being can only ever spoken through language. Understanding Being through language means that Being is dependent upon or subsequent to the more fundamental *différance* that makes language (as a system of differences) possible. In this case, the point is less about the being of Being and more about our access to Being through language. But while Derrida does insist on the importance of language, he likewise argues that propriation is prior to the question of

56 For an elaboration of this debate about whether différance is logically prior to sexual difference in *Spurs* or not, see Elizabeth Grosz’s “Ontology and Equivocation: Derrida’s Politics of Sexual Difference,” Drucilla Cornell’s *Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law*, and Rosi Braidotti’s *Patterns of Dissonance*. 
truth. In as much as epistemology is sometimes concerned with truth, this suggestion implies that we cannot simply conclude that Derrida’s argument is epistemological because he argues that propriation is prior to questions of truth, prior to epistemology. The argument remains ontological (or even pre-ontological, that is, before the question of being): the possibility of boundaries is logically prior to Being’s emergence.

In brief, Derrida’s analysis of sexual difference, ontology, and semiotics draws out how the possibility of differentiation or propriation, which he understands as the possibility of boundaries, borders, and intervals is prior to the question of identity, being, and meaning. Even more, given the primacy of *différance* in Derrida’s model, identity, being, and meaning come to be differentiated from themselves, finding their origin in an origin that is never present, finding an openness in their contingent existence.

II - BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES IN FEMINIST THEORY

Arguing that borders, boundaries, and intervals are productive has been popular not only among feminist scholars who explicitly draw on poststructuralism, but also within the field of women’s and gender studies at large. To detail some of these positions, in this next section, I provide three examples of feminist theorists, who, when analyzing the nation-state, the body, or property, each take the perimeter, the border, the interval, or the space in-between as productive of an interior. These feminist theorists’ work is compelling because they show how what is taken as the interior is not self-same. The problem, however, is that they overly focus on the creation of borders as productive of interiority; when taken to the example of the creation of territory, this mode of thought covers over the work of geopower. To be clear, my goal here is certainly not to trace Derrida’s direct influence on the field, but rather to suggest that a form of boundary
thinking is pervasive to the field. I will eventually come to argue that this model of understanding interiority is not sufficient for the analysis of geopower.

My discussion begins with Caren Kaplan’s “The Politics of Location as Transnational Feminist Practice,” published in Scattered Hegemonies in 1994. This collection, edited by Kaplan and Inderpal Grewal, was influential to the development of transnational feminism, a feminism that looks outside of the United States and that analyzes the transnational flows of people, capital, and ideas that circulate through locations. Part of this initial formulation of the transnational involved reframing “postmodernism” from what Kaplan and Grewal see as an aesthetic discourse written primarily by white men to a political discourse that originates in the non-Western world and develops a strong critique of Eurocentrism. Whereas the former de-authorizes feminist concerns with identity and structural inequality, the latter opens feminism to transnational alliances. In other words, Kaplan and Grewal were interested in recovering postmodernism from itself and using it for the purposes of a transnational feminist project.

Kaplan’s “The Politics of Location as Transnational Feminist Practice” consists in a central piece of this project. Developing a critique of the shortcomings of Adrienne Rich’s “The Politics of Location,” Kaplan attempts to develop a middle ground between postmodernist valorizations of movement and multiplicity, and detailed work on historicization and location. The problem is to develop a non-essentialist politics of location. Drawing on Gloria Anzaldúa, Kaplan sees theorizing from the borderland as a potential solution: specificity and history are respected as life in spaces of tension,
multiplicity, and contradiction is analyzed. Kaplan writes: “looking at the border or boundary as a zone that deconstructs its difference through historicization does not revive either an elasticized postmodern ‘play’ of difference or a feminist standpoint epistemology based on a fixed, universalized notion of gender. Rather, as Gloria Anzaldúa’s work shows us, “borderlands” generate the complicated knowledge of nuanced identities, the micro-subjectivities that cannot be essentialized or overgeneralized” (Kaplan 150). In other words, studying borderlands allows for a non-essentialist, historically specific study of identity.

Thus, Kaplan joined many other feminists of her time who drew on Anzaldúa’s interest in borderland consciousness: consciousness that develops in those spaces in-between, where cultures and peoples encounter one another, often in highly asymmetrical power relations. Drawing on Donna Haraway, Kaplan argues that “Haraway’s description of borders as ‘productive of meanings and bodies’ encourages us to think about boundaries as specific kinds of locations” (Kaplan 150). While this emphasizes the border as a site in itself for analysis, this citation smuggles in a second understanding of borders as well. Borders produce “meanings and bodies,” in other words, identities. This evokes the formulation of borders in Derrida’s writing, where identity, meanings and bodies are figured as the effect of boundaries (and where these very boundaries deconstruct the entities they produce).

57 I first show how poststructuralist feminist read Anzaldúa, but this chapter later returns to her text to provide a second reading. For other examples of postmodern and poststructuralist feminist readings on Anzaldúa, see Diana Fuss’s Identification Papers and Donna Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with postmodern feminism’s treatment of Anzaldúa’s writing, and the tension between women of color feminism and postmodern feminism, see Yvonne Yabro-Bejerano’s “Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands / La Frontera: Cultural Studies, ‘Difference,’ and the Non-Unitary Subject.”
What is interesting for my purposes here is that while Kaplan uses Haraway to suggest a productive understanding of borders, Haraway’s own text reads differently. The passage from which Kaplan cites reads, in Haraway, as follows: “What boundaries provisionally contain remains generative, productive of meanings and bodies” (Haraway 201). This points to something quite different from Kaplan’s reading. For Kaplan, borders produce “meanings and bodies,” but for Haraway that which borders “provisionally contain” are productive.

Kaplan’s reading of Haraway is not surprising, but familiar in feminist theorizing that takes the border as productive of interiority. The border produces meaning, bodies, and identities. Such a mode of thought is also present in Judith Butler’s canonical *Gender Trouble*, a text whose formulation of gender as performative has been cited and recited. Although Butler argues that gender is consolidated in the repeated performance of gestures, acts, and desires, she also understands the body as a boundary project. Mobilizing poststructuralism’s interest in language, she argues that the distinction between the inside and outside of a body makes “sense only with reference to a mediating boundary that strives for stability” (170). Butler figures this distinction between inside and outside as a distinction in language. She writes, “regardless of the compelling metaphors of the spatial distinctions of inner and outer, they remain linguistic terms that facilitate and articulate a set of fantasies, feared and desired” (170). Inner and outer are thus understood as discursive terms, produced in the social workings of the psyche. Butler here is drawing of Julia Kristeva’s rereading of Jacques Lacan in *Power of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Her argument nonetheless echoes Derrida’s writing, where the analysis of Being becomes entangled with the analysis of language. “Inner”
and “outer” are linguistic terms, whose meaning only makes sense in reference to a border between them, a border that does not remain stable. Thus, although Kaplan’s text focuses on the borders of nation-states, and Butler here is more interested in the borders of the body, both echo Derrida to argue that the edge defines the inside.

Notably, in this passage of *Gender Trouble*, Butler also cites from Julia Kristeva’s *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Before moving to a final example of a feminist theorist who highlights borders and boundaries, I want to briefly explain Butler’s reading of Kristeva because it is slightly different from Derrida’s position. In Butler’s reading of Kristeva, the distinction between the inside and outside of a body is forged when something that comes to be alien is expelled from a body. Butler writes, “The boundary of the body as well as the distinction between internal and external is established through the ejection and transvaluation of something originally part of identity into a defiling otherness” (170). Butler cites from Kristeva’s description:

> Nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me from the mother and father who proffer it. “I” want none of that element, sign of their desire; “I” do not want to listen, “I” do not assimilate it, “I” expel it. But since food is not an “other” for “me,” who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself. (qtd. in Butler 169-170)

Kristeva’s model is different from Derrida’s since it recognizes the work – spitting, expulsing, abjecting- conducted to transform that which comes to be inside to make it an “inside.” This model gets somewhat closer to the sort of analysis necessary for the discussion of geopower. However, it still does not go far enough since it focuses primarily on the process of expulsion. Though certainly geopower may produce territory through expulsion, I will argue that many more mechanisms are involved as well.
Ed Cohen’s “A Body Worth Having?: Or, A System of Natural Governance,” provides a third and final example of feminist understanding of borders. His text historicizes the idea of a discrete body. Finding in the British Habeas Corpus legislation that secures the body as one’s own property, Cohen argues that borders are essential to property. He writes: “In order for something – or some thing - to be someone’s – or some one’s – property, the boundary that has been drawn around it must be defensible” (107). Although Cohen’s interest in property makes his reading significantly different from Butler’s above, both agree that the inside of the body, or the inside, for Cohen, of any property, is defined by its perimeter. For Cohen, quite simply, boundedness “underlines all acts of appropriation” (107). Producing a limit and distinguishing one space from another creates property. Thus, Cohen’s model of boundaries overlaps with both Kaplan’s and Butler’s: though interested in property as opposed to the state or the psychic boundaries of the body, Cohen, like Kaplan and Butler, takes the boundary as defining of the center.

In short, analyzing the productivities of borders and boundaries has provided feminist scholarship with a framework for a wide range of analysis. Within this paradigm, meaning, the body, and property are each seen as boundary projects. They are created with a border that distinguishes an interior from their excluded, exterior others. Such an understanding of boundaries is appealing to feminism’s suspicion of essentialism. It provides a way of understanding how identity, selfhood, and meaning are produced through a process of boundary-drawing, rather than given. This model also provides a method with which to show how interiorities are dependent upon that which they exclude. This offers feminist critiques of identity politics with a mode of explaining
how exclusions are foundational to the formation of a collectivity. For instance, not only is “man” produced through the exclusion of “woman,” but the category “woman” itself involves a whole range of exclusions, from queer, trans and intersex subjectivities to subjectivities for whom gender, or an abstract (i.e. white, middle-class) form of gender, appears less important than other markers of identity. And still more: focusing on the boundary has also allowed feminist theory to develop its critique of liberalism’s abstract individual: if selfhood and identity are boundary projects, then individuals are, in effect, relational beings who foreclose their fundamental dependence upon that which they exclude to define themselves. And finally, taking the border as a primary site of analysis has encouraged feminist scholars to study the borders of nation-states, making visible the state’s constitutive violent exclusions.

**III - THE PROBLEM WITH BORDER-THOUGHT**

However, this model of thinking the border is not sufficient to explain the formation of territory. When used to analyze the territory of a nation-state, for instance, border thinking covers over the work of geopower. This is not to say that borders do not have any role in establishing territory. It is rather to argue that although the border does play a role, it is in no way sufficient. This next section provides some examples to make this argument.

I begin through a discussion of John Borrows’ *Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law*.\(^{58}\) Borrows’ monograph argues that a tradition of

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\(^{58}\) I struggle here over whether I ought to identify Borrows’ tribal affiliation (Anishinabe) or not. It is customary within the field of Native American and indigenous studies to identify tribal affiliation, but I am skeptical of the ways such a recognition posits the indigenous subject as outside modernity, as a non-liberal subject. To recognize tribal affiliation of an academic can be seen as an attempt to capture the subject, totalizing identity within a tribe rather than making visible the contradictions and tensions of a subject in relation to tribal identity. What especially worries me in recognizing tribal affiliation is the way that a scholar becomes seemingly submerged within tribal identity, such that some readers expect that she speaks
indigenous law pre-exists Canadian law, and is embedded within indigenous nations’
traditional stories. These stories could be understood as a series of cases for Canadian
case law. My discussion of Borrows however focuses on his introduction, where he
provides a description of the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto, drawing
attention to the place itself where he conducted part of his study. This introduction offers
many examples of geopower, examples that cannot be explained when we take borders as
productive of interiorities. I quote sections of this opening at length, reluctant to edit out
any of the details Borrows provides (and yet editing nonetheless):

The University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law is situated on Philosopher’s Walk, a
quiet footpath that winds its way among some of the city’s grandest buildings.
Philosopher’s Walk is a place of both visible and hidden power. At its mid-point,
between Bloor Street and Hoskin Avenue, stands the law school. Climbing the
short hill east from this part of the Walk, you approach the school’s three-story,
pillared side entrance. Going through its doors and down the hall you encounter
oak paneling, fifteen-foot ceilings, and opulently adorned rooms. The walls of
these rooms, adorned with portraits of deans who later became university
presidents, Supreme and appellate Court judges, and members of the Order of
Canada, testify that this place is an important source of economic and political
strength. […]

(only) from the standpoint that the discourse of race, ethnicity, or nation places her within. This is to police
the subject, to make sure that she speaks from the right place, a place that I may already think I know. On
the other hand, to not include tribal membership is to erase particularity, to attempt to produce liberal
subjects. It is to erase forms of affiliation and belonging in the model of assimilationist, liberal politics,
such as the White Papers, written by the Canadian government in 1969 under the direction of Jean Chrétien
and Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Both choices present limitations. Like Helen Hoy in her text, Should I Read
This?, I thought of recognizing the nationality or ethnicity or race of each author I cite so as to not
particularize indigenous subjects, but this results in long lists, “Irish-Polish-Jewish-Catholic-Canadian.”
Such lists demonstrate the constitutive impurity within which we emerge as subjects, and they aim at a
form of capture that I’m not sure is ever possible or desirable.

At the first international Native American and Indigenous Studies Conference held in Athens,
Georgia in 2008, scholars struggled over this question over and again. Some, such as Andrea Smith and
Kēhauulani Kauanui, challenged the necessity to recognize tribal affiliation: when they were asked to
recognize themselves (often by men who do not work at universities) their legitimacy as authentic knowers
of indigenous politics was questioned perhaps because of their queer or feminist stances as well as their
attachment to North American universities. Begrudgingly, however, they would often concede to the
question, giving the information desired. The politics of authenticity is itself deeply embedded within the
colonial governance of indigenous people, where deserving subjects are seen as those who are authentically
indigenous, and tribal nations themselves sometimes investigate claims of belonging when scholars’ work
challenges their own forms of governance. For the moment, my best response to this problematic is simply
to recognize it, to write this footnote.
The law school is made up of two grand former residences, Flavelle House and Falconer Hall. These structures, built in a classical Greco-Roman style, were originally occupied by wealthy-businessmen. […]

The two houses of the University of Toronto law school are built on a ravine that was once a headwater and home to spawning salmon and trout. The school has displaced this earlier presence with the green space now known as Philosopher’s Walk. Buried far beneath it is a stream, known to the Anishinabek as Ziibiing and later to the settlers as Taddle Creek. If followed to its mouth this stream led to Wonscodonahk, where Queen’s Quay now stands, on the Lake Ontario shoreline. By covering living reminders of a previous landscape, the system of planning and architecture that created the law school have nearly erased the Ojibway people’s relationship with this place. (ix – x)

This description shows how the territory that comes to be named “Canada” is literally built, transformed materially through urban planning, architecture, and naming. The earth comes to bear different associations through this constructed landscape. The law school’s physical presence references Classical Greece and Rome, figures for the origin of “Western civilization.” Its adorned walls refer to that which it itself propagates: the power of Canadian law. What we have, then, is a form of environment built in order to secure the continued power of Canadian law in this location. This is the physical presence for the performative power of law. Borrows’ description shows how the production of the territory of the Canadian nation-state is entangled with actually physically transforming the earth. Canadian law is not a disembodied process of discourse production: it involves the physical construction of buildings, portraits, walkways, and street signs that make references to Europe, all while grounding itself in North America. Such a material transformation is integral to the production of the territory of a settler colonial state, where a physical and symbolic overhaul of the earth is necessary. This means that Borrows’ description of the law school at the University of Toronto is not simply a metaphor for how Canadian law hides indigenous law. The point he makes is
stronger: such an enactment of geopower is part of the history of Canadian colonialism and Canadian law (which is inseparable from the history of colonialism).

Even more: Borrows’ description of the University of Toronto is itself an enactment of geopower, the attempt for decolonization. By recounting the multiple presences in this place, Borrows produces for his audience multiple readings of this place. He makes visible the indigenous presence at the University. The point for Borrows is not to romanticize a natural order that has been disturbed through human construction. Instead, he is arguing that the Philosopher’s walk, which itself is a green space, transformed the organization of space that marks the territory as Anishinabek territory.

For my purposes here, Borrows’ description is important because it shows one example of how the territory of settler colonies is not simply produced through the creation of boundaries. In as much as the territory of the nation-state could be considered an “interiority,” this interiority is less a boundary project and more the effect of physical transformation or construction in what comes to be seen as within.

One, of course, could argue that the law school itself is productive of multiple boundaries: the cadastral mapping of Toronto, which divided and organized the earth, the construction of the walls of the building, the creation of the borders of a canvas on which to paint. But if this were the case, how would we explain filling in Ziibiing or Taddle Creek? And how could we make the point that it is not only the frame that produces the Canadian nation-state, but also the portraits that are painted within? These images, this matter, the architecture of the building, the names that it is given, in other words, the material content within is that which produces the territory of the settler colonial nation-state, not only the borders that draw a perimeter of this territory.
In effect, although it is true that borders are especially intense sites for the production of national territory, to focus solely on the borders of Canada as productive of its territories can itself be read as a fetish, which covers over the material transformation that produces the territory of the nation state. This reading makes sense from a capacious understanding of both the Freudian and Marxist fetish. In a psychoanalytic framework, a fetish is an object a little boy focuses on to hide the potential of castration, to hide woman’s lack. In this model, to focus on the recognized international border of Canada as that which is productive of its territory can be seen as a fetish in that it covers over lack. In this case, the lack is the otherness that remains ever present within the territory of the Canadian nation-state, the land which is not taken up by geopower in ways that produce it as national territory: land that indigenous people produce as integral to their nation, areas of Quebec that are embedded within the identity of the Québec, such as the many provincial parks called “National Parks” in Quebec or the Bibliothèque et Archive I du Québec, recently constructed in downtown Montreal, or even the territory of squirrels who bury their food, and finally and critically, the ways in which the earth can never be contained (earthquakes, storms, and volcanic eruptions which show how the earth can always exceed its production as referential of a nation-state). These spaces are similar because they each index one form of inhabitation, one mode of making sense and shaping the earth, which does not work to produce the territory of the Canadian nation-state. To see these entities as forms of lack, however, is to already write from the perspective of the nation-state. These spaces signify lack only in as much what is expected is the totality.

59 I do not write “Quebec” or “Québec” consistently here because to name this territory in either French or English is to embed it within one nationalist project or another. Ironically, my performance of bilingualism here is itself likewise a project of nation-building: Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s insistence on bilingualism cannot but haunt my writing.
or omnipresence of the territory of nation-states. This is similar to woman’s “lack” in psychoanalysis: women lack only from the perspective of phallocentrism. Instead, we could see “lack” as an excess. Border theory covers over the excess of the earth, the excess of territories that exist over and above the territory of the nation-state, just as the Freudian fetish covers over woman’s excess.

From a Marxist perspective, the border can likewise be seen as a fetish. A fetishized object, in this view, is an object that appears as having value in and of itself, independent of the human labor that went into its production. The border, then, can be seen as a Marxist fetish in that it covers over the production of the territory of Canada. The border is fetishized as itself producing the territory. This mystifies the work within to materially produce this territory, the human labor that transforms the earth. When the border is seen as producing the territory of the nation-state, we treat the border as though it itself had value in the creation of the territory of the nation-state, rather than the work that allowed for its production and continue re-production.

That the border can be read a fetish is especially clear in cases where borders are murky. Take the recent attempt to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, when, in 2007, Russia submerged a flag 4,200 meters below sea level at the North Pole. Even before this event, Stephen Harper’s Conservative government had already worked to assert northern sovereignty, attempting to enclose land and ice into the form of the nation-state. Harper increased Canadian military presence in the North, developed northern national parks, supported scientific research related to northern natural resources, and funded a “sovereignty patrol”: a group of “Rangers” who, dressed in Maple-leaf red suits, parades Canadian flags in the Arctic (“PM Starts Fight for North”).
In this case, the Canadian state produces its territory through marking it with signs of the nation. Any threat to the parade of national symbols in the north constitutes not simply a threat to Canada’s use of the land, but also a threat to the very claim that the state has a right over the land. In other words, placing national symbols in the Arctic, studying the Arctic, and building national parks, are all attempts of geopower to produce Canadian territory. This production works less through the insistence that this land is part of Canada’s borders, less, then, on insisting on the border to produce the territory, and more through physically and symbolically transforming the earth. This makes it clear that to focus on borders would, in effect, cover over the work on the inside to produce a territory. It is not simply the border that consolidates it.60

In brief, it is not sufficient to model territory as an interiority that is produced in the formation of a boundary or border around it. Such a model figures territory as a form of property, excluding other modes of inhabitation from the outset and fetishizing borders. Feminist theorists were right to bring attention to the otherness embedded in the self. But they brought too much attention to the border as the primary technique in the creation of an interiority – the self, the body, the nation-state. Instead, I argue that territory is produced through the multiple workings of geopower, which physically transform the earth.

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60 Perhaps thinking in terms of borders consolidates the discourse of property as inevitable, thus contributing to the project of settler colonialism. In the section on Derrida that I quoted above and in the paragraph on Cohen’s work, I argued the propriation and property involve the drawing of boundaries. Rather than departing from such an understanding of property, my suggestion is that such an understanding of property makes sense, but when territory is understood as a border-project, this model consolidates property and its boundaries as the only form of inhabiting the earth. My analysis could be understood in similar terms to Karena Shaw’s argument in *Indigeneity and Political Theory*. Shaw argues that the field of international relations takes the form of the nation-state for granted, thus excluding from the outset considerations of Canadian indigenous politics that do not, for the most part, conform to the form of the nation-state. Similarly, I wonder whether beginning with borders takes for granted a certain mode of inhabiting the earth: ones based on property that involve enclosure and border control.
**IV - Moving Towards Deleuze and Guattari’s Topography**

In contrast to feminist poststructuralists’ and Derrida’s understanding of borders and boundaries, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari provide a model that can better grasp the working of geopower. In this last section, I outline some features of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought that can help to reconsider the formation of interiorities, and I read it in conjunction with Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera*.

However, before jumping into Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, I want to briefly flag that my turning to these philosophers in this context is troubling: why look to other European philosophers, given that my examples above were about the colonization of North America? Why not turn to an indigenous philosopher such as Dale Turner or Taiaiake Alfred? Am I covertly suggesting that North America provides the matter of analysis, whereas Europe provides the ideas? What sort of division of labor am requiring of my sources? Is this a racial division of labor?

I have struggled endlessly with these questions, rejecting any argument I can make to legitimize myself as untruthful. I have remained likewise suspicious of the “solution” to turn to an indigenous story or an indigenous scholar because of the danger of romanticizing such texts, treating them as authentic expressions of indigeneity. I remain directed towards European philosophy. Why?

I want to argue that it makes sense to turn to Deleuze and Guattari because Derrida himself cites Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in “Différance,” the text that this chapter began examining. Starting from this point of intertextuality, I can demonstrate the different directions of 1960s and 70s French readings of Nietzsche:
Derrida’s against Deleuze’s. But to use Derrida’s citation of Deleuze to legitimize my choice is not truthful: I could easily argue that rather than take Derrida’s citation as authorizing my interest, it would be more interesting to look at what Derrida does not cite, to look at the exclusions of his archive.

The best argument I can make troubles the relationship between philosophy and example: rather than turning to Deleuze and Guattari to provide a model for thinking geopower, the study of settler colonialism provides a context which makes apparent the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s alternate topology. This argument is productive because rather than using Deleuze and Guattari to analyze the politics of settler colonialism, these politics make visible one aspect of the importance of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing. Still, a problem remains here: I could argue that I am extracting the resources of a colony for the purposes of European philosophy. I can imagine readers remaining, understandably, skeptical of this framework. But to make this argument, I have to assume that the philosophy I describe is properly European, whereas my analysis of Canada is the analysis of a settler colony. These assumptions miss how settler-colonies are already what Mary-Louise Pratt has called “contact zones.” For Pratt, a contact zone is a “space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict” (6).

Reading European philosophy in North America is to read it within a contact zone, where it is not clear that the project of philosophy remains “European.” There is less of a separateness or apartheid between colonizer and colonized than a “copresence” (7) within

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61 The best representation of these readings is collected in David B. Allison’s *New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation.*
asymmetrical power relations. My point, then, is to show the use of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts in the analysis of settler colonialism and the formation of territory. This requires thinking in the contact zone, being attentive to the power relations within which knowledge is thought without insisting that thought stay in its place. In short, if I am extracting natural resources, it is to make visible the workings of power in settler colonialism.

V - Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la philosophie

My analysis of Deleuze and Guattari begins between Derrida and Deleuze. As I have already mentioned, Derrida cites Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in the essay “Différance.” While Derrida sees Deleuze as supporting his own argument, my reading of Deleuze makes visible a central difference between the two philosophers.

Derrida reads Deleuze’s understanding of Nietzsche in line with his critique of Being and his understanding of *différance*. The passage I am interested in here concerns Nietzsche’s philosophy of force. Just as in his discussion of signs, Derrida writes that “there would be no force in general without the difference between forces” (17). This means that force itself is “never present” (17). Rather, forces consist in a “play of differences and quantities” (17). Derrida names the movement between forces, just as the movement between signs, *différance* (18). He thus finds in Nietzsche’s analysis of force a similar point to his own: philosophy has been indifferent to difference.

In his passage on Nietzsche, Derrida cites Deleuze’s reading of the philosopher. Returning to Deleuze’s text, however, we can find that the two authors differ. The passage that Derrida cites is Deleuze’s argument that Nietzsche describes two kinds of

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62 For the analysis of the apartheid of thought that is sometimes policed in feminist theory, see Chela Sandoval’s *Methodology of the Oppressed*. 
forces: active and reactive forces. Although it is true that Deleuze writes, as Derrida quotes, “the *difference* of quantity is the essence of force, the relation of force to force,” (17), we need not see this analysis of force as positing a similar ontology to Derrida’s, characterized by the play of *différance* and the continual impossibility of presence.

Returning to Deleuze’s text, it becomes clear that for Deleuze, although forces are differential in that their essence depends upon the difference of quantity between them, this difference only emerges upon an encounter of two or more forces, rather than simply through their difference. In Derrida’s analysis of the present, as we have seen, for the present to be present, an interval must separate it from the future and the past. Ironically, this same principle of identity functions in Derrida as a principle of self-difference: the interval that divides the present from its others likewise divides the present from itself. In contrast, in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, forces are not differentiated by an interval between them. Rather Deleuze analyzes how the quality and quantity of forces emerge in the encounter between them: it is a touching, an encounter, rather than a separation, an interval, which differentiates forces from one another. It is the pressure they enact on each other when they meet rather than an interval between them that constitutes their essence. This pressure exists, at least as a potentiality, prior to the encounter: Deleuze argues that when two forces encounter each other, forces do not lose the strength that is proper to them: “aucune force ne renonce à sa puissance propre” (46). 63 Forces have a

63 The relationship between quantity and quality in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is difficult. Deleuze examines what may appear as a tension in Nietzsche’s work. On the one hand, Nietzsche argues that forces can be characterized primarily by their quantity. On the other hand, he argues that a quantitative understanding of forces remains abstract, incomplete or ambiguous (49). Deleuze explains this apparent contradiction as follows: although forces differ from one another in terms of quantity, this quantity is not qualitatively the same. In other words, there is no universal unit of measurement with which to measure forces. This is because difference in quantity affects a difference in quality. Quality, then is not separable from the difference of quantity, and this difference is its essence. Quality remains different from quantity because there is something in it that cannot be equated.
strength that is proper to them, a strength that exists at the very least as a potentiality before their encounter with other forces. We are already then in striated space: the space of the proper. Therefore, in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, unlike Derrida’s reading of Deleuze’s or his own Nietzsche, forces are less characterized by the movement or play of *différance* than by the pressure they enact on one another in their encounters. In other words, Deleuze and Derrida write about two different kinds of difference. For Derrida, *différance* is a precondition to Being, a precondition, then, to the existence of forces: “there would be no force in general without the difference between forces” (17). For Deleuze, while forces relate to other forces and therefore we must have the possibility of differentiation for them to exist, still more is needed: forces must encounter one another. This means that they must share a presence; they must touch. *Différance* then is not sufficient for Deleuze’s difference to emerge: we also need a site of contact, a site of exertion and tension. The place of *différance* in Deleuze’s framework is more the position he gives to chance or contingency, the potentiality of different forces coming into relation with each other. But it is less this chance that characterizes forces than their actual encounters with one another. It is only in these encounters that they gain an essence as active or passive. Thus, whereas Derrida subsumes Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in to his understanding of *différance*, Deleuze’s reading may be read differently: he does not privilege presence, as Derrida critiques, or the interval, as in the case in Derrida’s writing. Instead what is privileged in this model is the chance encounter, the act of exertion.

This encounter, for Deleuze, produces bodies. The body is not produced through the consolidation of boundaries. Rather, the body is itself a site of encounter. Deleuze writes, “every relationship of forces constitutes a body – whether it is chemical,
biological, social or political” (40). Rather than understanding the body as a field of forces, a “medium” within which forces circulate, Deleuze insists that “all reality is already quantity of force” (40). In this view, we begin with forces, each with their own strength. There is no container, no passive medium within which force circulates. Instead, the body itself becomes the effect of forces encounters with one another, the result of the pressure they enact.

One could argue that this location of encounter is a place of boundaries, the space in-between two entities. In this model, the border would remain a critical location for investigation, just as in Derrida’s writing, and therefore Deleuze’s work would not index a significant departure from Derrida’s. But such an argument misses the crucial point that in Deleuze’s model, the body is not produced as its interior is distinguished from its exterior. The body is not produced as a border between it and its others is consolidated. Rather, the body becomes simply a site of forces’ encounters. In other words, the body is nothing but an aggregate of pressure points, a form of exteriority in as much as it is the result of forces pushing against other forces.

VI – REREADING ANZALDÚA

In effect, Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy resonates with Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Fronteras. Before outlining Deleuze and Guattari’s model of territory formation, I turn to a reading of Anzaldúa because her writing significantly influenced feminist scholarship to bring attention to borders and boundaries. However, although at

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64 For work on postmodern feminism and Anzaldúa, see Diana Fuss’s Identity Papers and Donna Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. For work on Chicana feminism, see Sonia Saldivar-Hull’s “Feminism on the Border: From Gender Politics to Geopolitics,” Emma Pérez’s The Decolonial Imaginary, and Norma Alarcón’s “Chicana Feminism: In the Tracks of ‘the’ Native Woman,” as well as her “Anzaldúa’s Fronteras: Inscribing Gynetics.” For her influence on postcolonial feminism, see Ambreen Hai’s “Border Work, Border Trouble: Postcolonial Feminism and the Ayah in Bapsi Sidhwa's Cracking India” and Ian Barnard’s “Gloria Anzaldúa’s Queer Mestisaje.” Finally, for a discussion of Anzaldúa in the
times Anzaldúa develops an understanding of borders that is quite similar to
deconstruction and to those transnational and poststructuralist models that I described
above, (for instance, Anzaldúa writes that “border are set up to define the places that are
safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them” [3]), for the most part, Anzaldúa provides
us with an alternative, one that reverberates with Deleuze and Guattari.

Anzaldúa does not take the border as the origin of identity, but rather as the
location where forces encounter one another. Take the beginning of *Borderlands/La
Frontera*, for instance. Anzaldúa writes:

Wind tugging at my sleeve
feet sinking into the sand
I stand at the edge where earth touches ocean
where the two overlap
a gentle coming together
at other times and place a violent clash. (1)

In this early passage of the text, Anzaldúa presents two boundaries: the boundary
between elements (the wind and the sand) and herself or her clothing (her sleeve and her
feet), and the boundary between the earth and the ocean. These sites do not clearly
delimit a distinction between one and the other but rather are borderlands – areas defined
as places of encounter and mixing. This is clearest in Anzaldúa’s description of the earth
touching the ocean: “the two overlap” (1). But this mixing is also present between the
wind and the sleeve as well as the feet and the sand: the feet sink into the sand, becoming
submerged within the sandiness. The feet, in other words, become sandy, and the sand,
feety. Similarly, as the wind tugs against the sleeve, the sleeve is animated by the wind,
such that the sleeve cannot be easily distinguished from the wind that is embodied in its

context of queer disability studies, see Todd R. Ramlow’s “Bodies in the Borderlands: Gloria Anzaldúa’s
and David Wojnarowicz’s Mobility Machines.”
movement. Conversely, the wind also comes to take on elements of the sleeve, in that the wind manifests itself in the movement of the sleeve.\[65\]

One may want to argue that this intermingling is not parallel as I have described it: it is the water, some may argue, that touches the sand since it is the water that moves towards it. Likewise, it is the wind that touches the sleeve, the wind that moves. But against this reading, we could say that the sand breaks the water’s movement, pushing against it rather than dissipating with its force. Similarly, the sleeve alters the wind’s movement, exerting some force, albeit limited, against it. In other words, these borderlands are sites of uneven force relations, where the encounter between forces creates a body.

The borders between English and Spanish in Anzaldúa’s writing, as well as between the United States and Mexico could be understood similarly. Take, for instance, the poem with which Anzaldúa opens her text. Although it is primarily in English, Anzaldúa intersperses italicized, Spanish phrases into the text, and she ends the poem with an entire stanza written in Spanish. Anzaldúa does not translate the English into the Spanish or vice versa. Rather she writes particular phrases in Spanish and others in English, suggesting that the meaning is affected by the language in which a phrase is spoken. In other words, that Anzaldúa does not translate one language into the other implies that each language bares a meaning, or perhaps captures an emotion, in excess of its signification. The text itself becomes a borderland of the encounter and intermingling.

\[65\] The poem with which Anzaldúa opens her text also presents similar images: Anzaldúa writes of the “stark silhouette of houses gutted by waves” (1), of “cliffs crumbling into the sea” (1), of “the tangy smell of the sea seeping into me” (2). Each of these images, like the previous ones, suggests modes of mixing. They are similar to the encounter between feet and sand, wind and sleeve.
of these languages. Anzaldúa’s writing performs the borderland that it describes: it is the creation of a “body,” produced in the encounter between forces.

The borderlands between Mexico and the United States can be understood similarly. Anzaldúa describes this border as a fence, constructed by a gritty wire that has “rusted by 139 years / of the salty breath of the sea” (2). Even this border, then, is physically touched by elements of the earth and comes to bare qualities of that which surrounds it. Even more, Anzaldúa figures the barbed wire as the site where “Tijuana touches San Diego” (2). In other words, this is not a boundary from which Tijuana and San Diego are produced in an opposition established through drawing a boundary. Instead, the boundary is the location where the two touch one another. The borderland is the place of this touching and resulting intermingling. Thus, rather than taking the boundary as productive of identity, Anzaldúa posits forces: wind, feet, sleeves, water, sand, English, Spanish, Mexico and the United States. She describes the borderland as a place of encounter between these forces.

Translating this understanding of borderlands to the analysis of territory, I want to claim that between Derrida and Anzaldúa, or between Derrida and Deleuze, two modes of understanding force relations emerge, alongside two different directions with which one could understand territory formation. In the Derridean model where forces are characterized by the play of différance, territories could be understood as forces in themselves that differ from other territories. The place of the border that separates one territory from the next would be a crucial site for analysis in this model since the border is both inside and outside the territories it divides. The border is that which defines the essence of the territory. But to fetishize the border misses the work conducted to produce
these territories. Thinking in terms of force, we can instead understand a territory as a product of the encounter of forces. With Deleuze, the body is produced in the encounter between forces, and with Anzaldúa, the borderland is figured similarly: it is characterized by the touch of disparate forces. The same, I want to suggest, could be said of territories. Deleuze and Guattari’s text, “1837: Of the Refrain,” to which I now turn, makes this point clear.

**VII - 1837: OF THE REFRAIN**

The chapter “1837: Of the Refrain” from *A Thousand Plateaus* analyzes, with multiple examples about animals, the process by which territories are created. The chapter is dense with concepts: my analysis will extract just a few, focusing on those that are most pertinent to my discussion. Deleuze and Guattari do not model territory as an interiority so much as an assemblages of different milieus: milieus that take the position of interior milieus, exterior milieus, milieus that are in-between, and those that are adjacent.

“1837: Of the Refrain” outlines three different moments in the process of territory formation: the creation of a milieu, the production of territories, and, finally, the deterritorialization that comes with every territorialization. In the first moment, a center or a heart is formed within chaos through the repetition of a song or rhythm. This is the formation of a milieu. A milieu is an environment, a context. Deleuze and Guattari give the example of a child producing a milieu. The child, lost in the dark, takes shelter and finds his way by singing a song. This song, Deleuze and Guattari write, “is like a rough sketch of a claiming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos” (311). The rough sketch, produced through a song in the middle of chaos, consists in a fragile
milieu, a center and context for the child. Deleuze and Guattari may choose a child to give their example in order to give a sense of the simplicity and fragility of this first stage of territorialization. The child is alone in this model; no parent helps to produce the milieu, no social formations have already produced a territory within which the child circulates. This model may therefore seem to posit problematically an individual, who, coming into the world by himself, creates his world independently.

But the second moment Deleuze and Guattari describe of territorialization provides a useful model for the discussion of territory. Territories, Deleuze and Guattari narrate, are produced through an assemblage, arrangement or series of connections between milieus. Territories organize milieus into a topology. Territories involve, then, not simply an interior, but the organization of space into an interior, exterior, in-between and adjacent. It is this part of Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter that is most useful to my analysis. Although Deleuze and Guattari write that to produce a territory, it is “necessary to draw a circle” around the fragile center of the milieu, they immediately add, “many, very diverse, components have a part in this, landmarks and marks of all kinds” (311). So although boundaries are important, a whole range of “components” that have had a part in this. These components consist in signatures. A signature is produced when a creature arranges color, sound, or texture in the world, marking the earth as a territory that refers back to itself. In other words, a signature produces the earth so that it exists in reference to a creature. The resultant space organizes milieus into a territory. Deleuze and Guattari give countless examples in this section not simply of the creation of human territories, but more often, of the formation of animal territories. For instance, they write, “The brown stagemaker (*Scenopoetes dentirostris*) lays down landmarks each morning
by dropping leaves it pick from its tree, and then turning them upside down so the paler underside stands out against the dirt: inversion produces a matter of expression” (315). These matters of expression, these signatures, territorialize milieus, producing interiorities and exteriorities. Expression, in this case, does not mean that the stagemaker externalizes its internal emotions through the arrangement of the leaves. There is nothing in Deleuze and Guattari’s text to suggest such an understanding of expression. Instead, “expression” in this context is a referential relationship where the leaves express the stagemaker – the leaves are a mark of the stagemaker. They take on a consistency or a repeated style that shows the creature’s presence even when it is not there. This territory does not depend on other species necessarily recognizing the signatures. In effect, Deleuze and Guattari’s argument shows how within the very same piece of the earth, multiple territories may coexist: the territory of a bird may also overlap with the territory of a dog and the territory of a human. The earth then is written and rewritten, expressed as multiple territories. What is most useful in this understanding of territory is the insistence on the importance of signatures, especially of sound, but also of color and other visibilities, in the formation of a territory. Rather than seeing the border as productive of territory, Deleuze and Guattari make visible the multiple components that produce a territory that is marked by the consistent repetition of expression.

In contrast to the Derridean ontology that begins with *différance* as the condition of differentiation and focuses on the borders as productive, Deleuze and Guattari offer a model of territory formation that begin with forces. They write that territorialization “has always been a question of forces, designated either as forces of chaos,” in the case of the formation of milieus, “or forces of the earth,” in the case of the creation of territories
(346). However, these forces are not grasped “directly as forces but as reflected in relations between matter and form” (346). We do not perceive forces themselves, but rather matter and form. Bringing this back to the example of the stagemaker, and drawing on the analysis of forces from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, we could argue that when the stagemaker turns leaves upside down, the forces that embody the leaf meet those which embody the animal. The animal marks the leaf in reference to itself. Territorialization, in other words, is the effect of forces’ encounters wherein a body, in this case a territory, is produced when it is marked in reference to another.

These concepts can help to defetishize feminist attention on the border, making visible the multiple processes that produce territories. Deleuze and Guattari’s model also works to unhinge the imaginary of nation-state territories, which sees the earth as enclosed within nation-states. Rather, the earth comes to bare many different signatures, it is marked into multiple territories, including the signature of the nation-state. These signatures produce the territory of the nation-state rather than express a territory already consolidated by international borders.

I have argued that when we focus on borders as productive of territory, feminist theory risks making invisible the work that creates territories and hiding the excessive, multiple territorializations of the earth. The challenge for feminist thought becomes to neither consolidate property-based modes of inhabitation nor human-centered modes of modeling the earth by rethinking the production of territory. Politics begins before boundaries are drawn, in the markings, sounds, colors and textures with which we leave our signatures around us. Territory is less a form of interiority than the result of the encounter between forces.
Chapter Four: Sexuality and Territory in *Ravensong*

*A Canadian is Someone Who Knows How to Make Love in A Canoe.*
- Attributed to Pierre Berton in 1973 by Dick Brown

The myth that Canadians are defined by their capacity to “make love in a canoe” is widespread within Anglo-Canadian culture. Attributed to Pierre Berton, the writer, journalist and editor who published over fifty monographs about Canadian culture and worked to establish the English Canadian national magazine, *Macleans*, this phrase not only defines Canadians (in jest), but is credited to someone who worked to produce “Canadianess” throughout his career. The phrase is repeated time and again on the Canadian Broadcast Corporation and in the Canadian national press. In 2009 *The Globe and Mail*, a national, English paper published out of Toronto, ran an online article in tribute to “National Canoe Day,” citing Berton. That same year, the Canadian Canoe Museum also cited Berton, explained that Phil Chester, a poet from Ottawa Valley added an important caveat to Berton – “anyone can make love in a canoe, it's a Canadian who knows enough to remove the centre thwart” – and then gave a “list of lessons about love and marriage that come from canoes and canoeing” (“Canoe Theory: Love in a Canoe”). Yet although several scholars have analyzed the mythology of the canoe, its choice location for national sex remains dismissed - a bad joke.66

I open this interlude with this phrase since it ties together, in a sentence, sexuality with the production of territory. To have sex in a canoe is to feel so comfortable on moving water, in a vehicle of colonization and nation building, but also a sign of

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66 See Jamie Benedickson’s *Idleness, Water and a Canoe*, Misao Dean’s “The Centennial Voyageur Canoe Pageant as Historical Re-enactment,” Hugh MacLennan’s *Seven Rivers of Canada*, and James Raffan’s *Fire in the Bones: Bill Mason and the Canadian Canoeing Tradition*. 
indigeneity, as to have sex in it without tipping. This is the utmost expression of indigenization: not only using a canoe with skill, but “making love” in it. The choice of Berton’s phrase, “making love,” suggests a productive form of sex – a making of something. This turn of phrase deems it appropriate for popular consumption and indexes that although this is technically public sex, it is not unbridled. Therefore, within a history of colonial discourse that has framed indigenous people as sexually promiscuous, the phrase suggests that Canadians are sexual appropriate, all while knowing how to have sex in a canoe.

The choice of Berton’s language also suggests something about the space around the canoe: the scene of “making love” is a scene if not of domesticity, at least of privacy. To make love in a canoe, then, is to make a claim about the space surrounding the boat: the lake or river is claimed as uninhabited, or at least sparsely occupied, such that even without walls and without legal boundaries, it can become private. Thus “making love” in a canoe claims the space around the canoe as one’s own, at least for the moment, and Canadianess is defined by a physical capacity for claiming, through sex, space that is deemed unoccupied. It is also significant that Burton’s phrase defines Canadianess as someone “in the know.” He does not say that a Canadian makes love in a canoe, but rather than a Canadian knows how to. The difference between knowledge and action is telling. While drawing on the fur trade through the invocation of the canoe, the phrase likewise separates Canada from its economic history by replacing knowledge for action, a movement that coincides with Canadian economy’s movement towards a service economy. In other words, by writing that Canadians know how to make love in a canoe,

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67 See the essays collected in the second section of Myra Rutherford and Katie Pickles’ *Contact Zones: Aboriginal and Settler Women in Canada’s Colonial Past.*
Burton also suggests that Canadians – though still dependent on the extraction of natural resources – likewise are post-fordist in as much as they are characterized by knowing.

I – TERRITORIALITY IN *THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY*

_AT ISSUE IS NOT A MOVEMENT BENT ON PUSHING RUDER SEX BACK INTO SOME OBSCURE AND INACCESSIBLE REGION, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, A PROCESS THAT SPREADS IT OVER THE SURFACE OF THINGS AND BODIES. (THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1 72)_

Sexuality can also be read as territorializing in Foucault’s work, although at first, this does not seem to be the case. In the model of sexuality that Foucault displaces, European sexuality is said to be “carefully confined” in “the home” (3). Since the Victorian period, Foucault writes, “a single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space as well as at the heart of every household, but it was a utilitarian and fertile one: the parents’ bedroom” (3). The story of sexual repression is the story of a spatial distribution of sexuality, a distribution that produces particular places. The parents’ bedroom becomes the place for reproductive sex in the same moment when the bourgeois home becomes the private space protected by liberal theory and distinguished from the public realm of politics. Foucault’s disruption of the repressive hypothesis remaps this spatial distribution of sexuality. Against the repressive hypothesis, Foucault claims that sexuality has not been silenced. Instead, since the seventeenth century, Europeans have been incited to speak of sex. There has been a proliferation of discourses of sexuality, a proliferation of speech which is not to be confused with sexual freedom. Through these discourses, sexuality comes to be the object of biopower.

The importance Foucault gives to speech in his analysis highlights its spatial dimension. Recall Deleuze and Guattari’s “1837: Of the Refrain.” In this text, sound is a particularly powerful force of territorialization and deterritorialization. Taking Deleuze
and Guattari’s insight to this reading of *The History of Sexuality*, we can argue that a territory is produced by the “nearly infinite task of telling – telling oneself and another, as often as possible, everything that might concern the interplay of innumerable pleasures, sensations, and thoughts which, through the body and the soul had some affinity with sex” (20). What are the features of this territory? First, we are in the space of boundedness. Sexy speech is not homogenously distributed in space. It coagulates in nodes, producing places that come to be understood as private, though they are in no way autonomous from the public. For example, sex is put into discourse within the confessional or in the therapeutic office. The private or the space inside the confessional, the doctor’s office, do not predate the public, but are effects of the spatial distribution of sexuality. This distribution consists in a territory, a striated territory marked by the incessant whisper of sex.

A second feature of this territory is that it is punctured by perverse interiorities who find pleasure in externalizing their internal truth through language. Foucault writes there has been an “implantation of multiple perversions” (48). Although the implantation of perversions does not involve an actual planting into the earth, the language of “implantation” suggests the imposition of fixity and is at the very least a spatial metaphor. Foucault indeed writes that this implantation solidified an “entire sexual mosaic,” which consisted of discrete, “local sexualities” (48), each stuck to particular “age [and] place” (48). From this, I want to suggest that the territory defined through sexy speech is also marked by peculiar form of flag: polymorphous, confessing and perverse sexualities. These flags are akin to geysers or volcanoes: deep holes that
continuously erupt and spread themselves, in this case, through language. The space around these holes, then, comes to be filled by the language they excrete.

The flags of polymorphous sexualities are both visible and caressed. This points to a third and final feature of the territory of sexuality’s deployment: it is marked by “lines of indefinite penetration” (47). This territory is not full of dark corners and impenetrable walls: rather it is cross-hatched by techniques and technologies for making itself visible and accessible. These lines of visibility and touch, such as the confessional or techniques of the social sciences, allow for the observation of sexualities and the proximity of power and pleasure. Power, Foucault argues, actually contacts bodies, “caressing them with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatizing troubled moments” (44). In enveloping the sexual body, power comes to mark this body in reference to itself: it uses these bodies to mark its territory.

Thus, in Foucault’s work, the territory of sexuality’s deployment is filled with the incessant whisper of sexualities that coagulates in particular nodes. It is cross-hatched by infinite lines of visibility and touch, and punctured by the externalizing depths of sexual identities. Although it may appear that Foucault’s analysis of sexuality moves the discussion of biopower away from a concern with space, place, and territory, in effect, *The History of Sexuality* maps a social geography of sexuality.

II - Sexuality as a Means of Territorialization

This chapter argues that sexuality is a particularly intense site for the production of territory. Indeed, the organization and management of sexuality has overlapped with the transmission of citizenship and belonging. For instance, as Brenda Cossman traces, whereas citizenship was once implicitly heterosexual, a new form of sexual citizenship is
Cossman argues that citizenship is no longer distributed along a gay/straight dichotomy, but rather, upon self-disciplined, private and domesticated sex (2–3). In this case, citizenship is still constituted through discourses of “good” and “bad” sexualities, only what counts as good and bad are becoming reorganized.

In addition, sexuality is not only implicated in citizenship, sexuality has also been used to distinguish between private and public space. For instance, as Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner argue in “Sex in Public,” heterosexual culture frames the proper place of sex and intimacy in the private realm. In effect, drawing on Foucault and Habermas, Berlant and Warner argue that a “hegemonic public has founded itself by a privatization of sex and the sexualization of private personhood” (363). The distribution of sexuality comes to establish the distinction between the private and the public, and the private person, the self, becomes the locus of sexuality. However, Berlant and Warner argue that “although the intimate relations of private personhood appear to be the realm of sexuality itself, allowing ‘sex in public’ to appear like matter out of place, intimacy is itself publicly mediated” (358). That is, while it may appear that sexuality is in the private realm, this zone of privacy is public protected, and the public realm complete with “nationality, the state, and the law; commerce; medicine; and education; as well as […] the conventions and affects of narrativity, romance, and other protected spaces of culture” are suffused by heteronormativity. Within this context, queer counter-publics are not simply about non-heterosexual sexual practices. They also have the potential to create new publics that reframe intimacy’s proper private place, and thus rework the public/private distinction itself.

68 Most broadly, Cossman construes citizenship as a “set of rights and practices denoting membership and belonging in a nation state” (5).
As Berlant and Warner’s argument suggests, sexuality has not only been used to distinguish public from private space, it has also functioned to produce a topography of the self, whereby one’s interior, innermost private space is the space of sexual desire. This topography depends upon understanding the self as an interior. As Charles Taylor traces,

> We think of our thoughts, ideas, or feelings as being ‘within’ us, while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are ‘without.’ […] the unconscious is for us within, and we think of the depths of the unsaid, the unsayable, the powerful inchoate feelings and affinities and fears which dispute with us the control of our lives, as inner. We are creatures with inner depths; with partly unexplored and dark interiors. (111)

In his *Sources of the Self*, Taylor traces the history of what he understands as the “modern notion of the self,” which is “related to, one might say constituted by, a certain sense […] of inwardness” (111). Taylor locates the emergence of this inward self with Augustine. He explains, whereas Augustine uses many of the same oppositions as Plato, such as “spirit/matter, higher/lower, eternal/temporal, immutable/changing,” what is striking in Augustine’s writing is that he describes these oppositions “centrally and essentially in terms of inner/outer” (129). According to Taylor, for Augustine, the path to God is not a path towards an exterior heaven, towards the Platonic light. The path, instead, is inward.

But Augustine’s *Confessions*, I want to argue, are not so clear. While Taylor does not write about the place of sexuality in the topography of the self, in the *Confessions*, Augustine narrates his discovery of the inward path to God as likewise a transformation of this interiority, one that purges it of its sexual desire. Against Taylor’s reading, I suggest that the distinction between the higher and the lower in Augustine is not simply a distinction between the inner and the outer. Before his moment of conversion, Augustine claims that his “inner self was a house divided against itself” (170). Augustine was in
anguish. Looking back on this experience he claims that “there are two wills in us, because neither by itself is the whole will, and each possesses what the other lacks” (172). One will is “the higher part,” and this part “aspires after eternal bliss” (175). The other part, the “lower self,” is “held back by the love of temporal pleasure” (175). Thus against Taylor’s reading, both the higher and the lower exist within. Now, in the famous scene in the garden, when Augustine is called upon to read Scripture, his divided will becomes unitary. Augustine’s “lower self” is purged. He writes, addressing God, “you converted me to yourself, so that I no longer desired a wife or placed any hope in this world but stood firmly upon the rule of faith” (178–179). Because Augustine is explicit that he no longer desires a wife, we may read the lower, purged self as a will to sexuality. Likewise, “hope in this world” could be seen as a desire to procreate, to bear humans whose life will continue in this world after one’s own. Thus, whereas Taylor writes that Augustine’s inwardness is the path to God, I want to claim that inwardness is likewise the scene of sexuality. In effect, the Godly interiority only becomes so when purged by sexuality, and thus, its Godliness could be understood only in relation to the sexual that it excludes. In this sense, then, interiority for Augustine is not simply the higher self, but rather it is the scene of a divided soul—a struggle over sexuality, and the inwardness that characterizes the self may be the scene of sexual desire.

My reading here suggests that something like “sexuality” existed in the fourth century, and this is a claim that careful historians of sexuality would dismiss as ahistorical. Yet, without turning to Augustine, we could still make the argument that sexuality has a privileged role in the constitution of the interiority of the self. We could draw here on Freud, and on the central role he puts on sexuality in the unconscious’s
depths, or we could draw on Foucault, citing how his study of sexuality turned into a study of selfhood and practices of self relation. Thus, sexuality, entangled in citizenship and in the distinction between the private and the public is likewise called upon in the topography of the self.

Finally, sexual practices have been used as a mode of marking the earth, producing territory. For instance, in Gabriel Giorgi’s analysis of gay tourism in Madrid, gay visibility becomes a form of transnational territory-formation, which is taken to index modernity. In short, sexuality has been used to distinguish between private and public space, it has been called upon in the organization of citizenship and in models of the self, and through being seen, it has marked territories.

Although claiming that sexuality is entangled with territory is in no way novel, this relationship has often been down played in queer studies. For instance, although Radclyffe Hall’s canonical text, The Well of Loneliness, has been cited as foundational to the establishment of British lesbian identity (if not also a transnational lesbian identity), little has been written about the text’s anxiety concerning the inheritance of property, a central theme of the novel. The book’s category of the invert is deeply embedded within a larger discourse, legal system, and socio-economic structure whereby inheritance and citizenship are organized around the institution of heterosexual marriage and reproduction. When Stephen Gordon’s attachment to her beloved home Moreton is analyzed, it is seen as a sign of Hall’s nationalism, conservatism, and class, rather than as having anything to say about sexuality itself. But is it incidental that the territorializations that constitute class and nation mobilize sexuality in their production?

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69 For a reading of the significance of Hall’s novel to lesbian identity, see Laura Doan’s Fashioning Sapphism.
70 See, for instance, Heather Love’s discussion of the novel in Feeling Backwards.
Is there something about the way sexuality in particular has been assembled that ties it to the earth?

Although Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter “1837: Of the Refrain” does not answer these questions, the text, like *The Well of Loneliness*, provides many examples of the intersections between sexuality and territorialization. As the previous chapter explained, for Deleuze and Guattari, a territory is produced through an expression, a “signature” that marks earth, such as the urine of a dog (315). In other words, repeated signatures or expressive marks left across the surface of the earth transform chaos into territories. This transformation is the process of territorialization. What is especially interesting for my purposes here is that “1837: Of the Refrain” provides many examples of territorialization that use the vocabulary of sex and sexuality to mark territory. However, Deleuze and Guattari ultimately argue that there exists “quite variable relations between sexuality and the territory, as if sexuality were keeping ‘its distance’” (325). Sexuality, Deleuze and Guattari maintain, is both a territorializing and deterritorializing function. I disagree. Or rather, I use Deleuze and Guattari’s claims against themselves: the authors argue that every deterritorialization involves a territorialization; therefore, while sexuality may be involved in both, it does not keep “its distance” from territory (although sexuality may keep its distance from other sexual activity). Instead sexuality is an intense channel for the organization, production, and reproduction of territory. Sexuality may dislodge previous territorializations, yet this is not because it is keeping its distance from territory.

To develop this argument, I turn to Lee Maracle’s 1997 oracle *Ravensong*. I argue that recognizing the intersection between sexuality and territory challenges queer theory,
specifically, Lee Edelman’s *No Future*. *Ravensong* figures a backward looking reproductive futurity that works to produce indigenous territory and sovereignty.

**III - Indigenous Sovereignty, Sexuality, and Territory in *Ravensong***

*Ravensong* tells the story of Stacey, a seventeen year old co-Salish student, who lives with her family on a reservation forty kilometers north of Vancouver. This reservation is separated by a river and joined by a bridge to a mostly Catholic, European-Canadian town, Maillardville, where Stacey goes to high school. Throughout the text, Stacey struggles with making sense of the sexual norms that differentiate the two places within which she travels. She is troubled when a student in her school commits suicide after being shunned for having had sexual relations with another student. Preoccupied with Polly’s death, Stacey spends time watching fish in the river between the unnamed reservation and Maillardville, thinking about the role of sex in the survival of species and making sense of the sexuality of her family members. Stacey’s narrative shows that by recognizing the intersection of territory and sexuality, queer studies can come to complicate the mode in which scholars such as Lee Edelman have understood reproductive futurity (the belief in a redemptive futurity, symbolized in the beloved figure of the child). *Ravensong* shows that reproductive futurism, which is not necessarily heteronormative, can be productive of territory, and can be used as a tool to resist colonization.

Before beginning my argument, I want to acknowledge that my reading of *Ravensong* within this theoretical apparatus may appear troubling. In the field of Native American and Indigenous literary study, scholars remain skeptical of applying European models to the analysis of indigenous writing. As Jace Weaver, Robert Warrior, Craig Womack, and
Daniel Heath Justice argue, indigenous intellectual sovereignty requires the production of indigenous theory, and the study of the literatures of indigenous people ought to be framed within the national contexts within which they were written. While such work is clearly important to the future of indigenous literary studies that supports indigenous sovereignty, I am less concerned with developing a nationalist reading of *Ravensong* than in reading it within the contact zone of North American settler colonialism, and since the text itself is set within this contact zone, the theoretical apparatus I bring is likewise one marked by contact. That is, though I read the text in reference to theoretical concepts that were not developed in the study of North American colonialism, I do not insist that these concepts simply be applied to the novel. Rather, I read *Ravensong* as theory to draw out the concepts that the text develops, and I show the modes in which this theory develops criticisms of the non-indigenous models. This method of reading attends to Maracle’s own goal, as she explains in *Oratory*, to write theory in story. *Ravensong* translates the indigenous oral tradition of storytelling to a form of written literature that remains especially important for the ideas or concepts that it develops. Thus, I engage Maracle as a theorist within the contact zone. I read her oratory for the concepts that it develops.

*Ravensong* can be read as a coming-of-age story: it begins with Stacey as a high school student completing her final year and ends with her departure to university: “Stacey got on the bus and waved. That was it” (196). Following this ending, Maracle adds a two-page Epilogue, which figures Stacey, twenty-five years later. We learn here that Stacey now has a son, but that she was never allowed to open the school she had wanted. Stacey has therefore “developed” from hopeful student to mother.
However, while *Ravensong* can be read as a coming-of-age story, the text resists the hegemonic narrative of this story. *Ravensong* is not the story of an initiation into heterosexual coupledom. Both the narrative and Stacey recognize the possibility of this plot line, but refuse it. For instance, although Stacey asks herself “when would her body come alive over someone?” (180), Maracle never answers this question. One may even want to argue that Maracle figures Stacey as “queer.” In this reading, one could cite Stacey’s awkward feeling that, as a single student, she is no longer a peer to her cousins who are already mothers. This could be read as Stacey’s acknowledgement of her embeddedness in a queer form of temporality, which departs from a normative heterosexual life span.\(^\text{71}\) Even more, one could argue that Maracle describes Stacey as attracted both to men and women: she is attracted to Madeline, a Manitoba Saulteaux woman living on the reservation, although she also finds it hard to avert her eyes, in one scene, from some men who are shoveling, “backs glistening with sweat” (13). Captivated by this “ritual of male physicality,” Stacey feels “some small ray of light” flicker “in the pit of her stomach” (13). Such passages could be read as evidence that Stacey does not fit within an easy hetero/homo binary. And finally, Stacey’s company in the Epilogue could be read as an intimation of queerness: although the Epilogue figures Stacey as having a son, the text makes it seem as though she has spent the winter with her son, her sister (Celia), her mother, and a friend, Rena. But for her son, she has been in the company of women. Maracle writes: “it took all winter for Celia, Stacey, Momma and Rena to recount that summer. Young Jacob sat in silence listening to the women” (197). Although Stacey is friends with Rena, it is unclear why she should be included in this group of women. Within the narrative, Rena, a co-Salish woman, lives with a German

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\(^\text{71}\) See work by Judith Halberstam and Elizabeth Freeman for explorations of “queer time.”
woman, Judy, on the reservation in a lesbian-like relationship.72 Stacey is friends with them. But where is “German Judy” in this Epilogue? And why is Rena with Stacey, her mother, sister and son? Does Stacey have a husband? Who is the father of her son? These questions are not answered in the text, and a reader who desires to see Stacey as “queer” could easily cite these “absences” as proof of her queerness.

However, to simply read Stacey as “queer” in this way is to miss how the text complicates queer studies. It is to simply apply queer theory to Ravensong and to reproduce those forms of analysis that Warrior, Weaver, and Womack warn against. In contrast, Mark Rifkin’s “Romancing Kinship: A Queer Reading of Indian Education and Zitkala-Sa’s American Indian Stories” provides a starting point to complicate this prior reading.73 In his analysis of nineteenth century U.S. policy concerning indigenous education and land tenure, Rifkin argues that “questions of kinship, residency, and land tenure lie at the unspoken center of the heteronorm, which itself then can be understood as always already bound up in racializing and imperial projects” (28). This argument complicates simplistic understandings of heteronormativity that do not tie sexual politics to the racialized politics of the nation. Rifkin traces how U.S. federal boarding schools’ attempt to educate indigenous children into companionship, heterosexual marriage was part of the concerted effort to “detribalize” indigenous people in the nineteenth century, breaking up native kinship and indigenous landholding. This means that education into compulsory heterosexuality itself has been key to the “splintering of tribal territory into single-family households” (29). Embedding heterosexuality within questions of land

72 See Judith Bennett for this term, “lesbian-like.”
73 For other work on indigeneity and queer studies, see the essays collected in the recent special issue of GLQ, edited by Daniel Heath Justice, Mark Rifkin and Betthany Schneider, “Sexuality, Nationality, Indigeneity” (2010).
tenure, Rifkin also comes to argue that “traditional romantic or erotic relationships between men and women in native societies are not heterosexual. … The heterosexual imaginary is just as inappropriate and obfuscatory in considerations of native marriage, family, and procreation as it is in treatment of more ‘queer’ topics, such as transvestism and homosexuality” (28). This argument complicates the ways in which queer studies has understood heteronormativity as it stands in relation to homosexuality. Rifkin shows how heterosexuality is not only about the reproductive couple, it is not simply about bio – or disciplinary power. But it is also entangled with modes of organizing land tenure and of producing national sovereignty.

Reading *Ravensong* within this framework provides a more nuanced understanding of queerness in the text. Stacey is quite aware of the entanglement of land tenure and sexuality. For instance, she refuses to date a white boy, Steve, because she does not want to end up like her cousin, Shelly, who upon marrying a white boy “had to move off the reserve – not an Indian anymore” (70). Shelly is later divorced, and Maracle explains that “the last Stacey heard was that ‘welfare’ had [Shelly’s] … kids and she was living down on the skids in Vancouver” (70). Rather than embedding Stacey’s refusal of Steve’s advances within a discourse of romance (whether Stacey “likes” Steve or not), Maracle articulates Stacey’s desire in relation to her access to land: the character navigates Canada’s colonial administration of sexuality, which, with the Indian Act of 1869 defined a woman’s status based on her husband’s, such that a woman and her children lost their Indian status if she married a non-Indian man. 74 Instead of the discourse of romance (either its refusal or acceptance), Stacey’s thoughts are embedded within the effects of

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74 See Sylvia Van Kirk, p. 5.
colonialism’s law. She is not refusing heterosexuality so much as refusing to lose her legal status as Indian, a status that gives her claims to the reservation.

Even more, although Stacey has a child in the Epilogue, she neither fits easily within Lee Edelman’s analysis of “reproductive futurism” nor with what he understands as a queer refusal: “fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we are collectively terrorized” (29). On the one hand, Ravensong appears invested in nativism, invested in reproductive futurism. For instance, Ravensong ends with Celia, Stacey’s sister, lamenting the loss of “childless children” (198): “she could not stop recounting the numbers of dead babies from epidemic after epidemic and multiplying the numbers of children whose babies would have had … Whole lineages wiped out. Hundreds became thousands. The loss filled the sound of grief” (198). This passage mourns particularly the loss of babies rather than adults. It rests in stark contrast to the earlier claim in the text that focusing on the loss of babies is particularly white. Stacey contends “that white people couldn’t conceive the depth of loss their old people represented – their significance to the villagers escaped them, so they could not empathize with their passing” (94). Compared to this earlier passage, Celia’s mourning the loss of infant life shows a departure from Stacey’s prior valuation of age towards something more similar to what Ravensong describes as white people’s prioritization of babies. This hints at a form of pro-natalism, an investment, though not the state’s, in reproductive futurism.75

Stacey also feels a duty to have children. As I already explained, following Polly’s suicide, she often stops to watch fish swimming in the river that divides the reservation from the town. Contemplating these fish, Stacey remembers salmon spawning in the

75 See Mary-Ellen Kelm’s Colonizing Bodies for more about the growth of pro-natalism among indigenous populations in British Columbia, especially page 6.
Adams River run: “The mate had first heaved swimmer, heavy with eggs, over the falls, then focused on the task of getting himself over. He would have died trying” (61). Although the fish risk their life to reproduce, Stacey understands this risk as an affirmation of life rather than its sacrifice. Thinking about the fish, she wonders whether “some white people had no roots in the creative process, so could not imagine being that devoted to staying alive. If you have only yourself as a start and end point, life becomes a pretense at continuum” (61). The fish will die reproducing, but because their act allows for future life, Stacey understands this process as a devotion to “staying alive” (61). The population of salmon becomes more important than the individual salmon. Watching the fish, Stacey comes to feel a “sense of duty she could not explain, but she suspected that white folks lacked this sensibility” (61). Stacey’s father, she believes, expects no less of his children: the risking of life for the sake of life.

What are we to make of this understanding life, population, individuality, sacrifice, sexuality and death? Ought we be horrified by the knot between these concepts? The idea that dying is necessary to bring new birth is central to the narrative of Ravensong. For instance, the story suggests that Raven, the Co-Salish trickster figure, is not only responsible for bringing the ‘flu, but also for colonialism itself: both the ‘flu and colonialism are attempts by Raven to heal the earth and Europeans. Helen Hoy reads this idea as “audacious and provocative, even potentially inflammatory” in as much as it posits “the historical pain … [of] European conquest and subsequent epidemics in Native country as necessary evils. […] Such a reading of history risks absolving Euro-Canadians of responsibility for colonization and racist oppression. It risks also seeming to facilitate Native assimilation or to undermine the radical sovereignty for the First Nations” (6).
Hoy argues that while positing epidemics and conquest as Raven’s responsibility is clearly dangerous, it simultaneously consists in a revisionist account of Euro-American history, one which restores agency to the First Nations. In other words, this understanding of colonialism reverses the civilizing mission and its attempt to legitimize colonialism: Europeans arrive in North America in order to be taught by indigenous people. However, Maracle’s story goes still further. As a revisionist account of history, *Ravensong* does not only restore agency to the First Nations, like Hoy argues. It also troubles the secular framework for understanding that Hoy herself deploys. That is, the book posits Raven as an agent. By placing Raven as the agent responsible for the ‘flu and colonialism, Maracle figures life as the field for Raven’s play. But Raven is not transcendental to the field in which she circulates. The text describes Raven not simply as an agent who is embodied in the form of a bird, but also as a quality that humans possess and sometimes lack. Unlike the sovereign who transforms life into the sign of itself marked potentially by its violence, Raven is itself part of life. She does not mark life but exists within and among it. Even more, although Raven attempts to bring change through sacrifice, it is unclear whether this sacrifice will be effective. This means that Raven may bring the epidemic, but she is unable to predict its effects. She can only hope that it will help to bridge a gulf between white settlers and the co-Salish people. This suggests that although life becomes the field for Raven’s play, life remains unpredictable, in excess of that which attempts to frame it.

Nonetheless, the idea remains within the oratory that life must be risked or even sacrificed for it to endure. But this does not make it Hegelian: in *Ravensong*, consciousness does not risk life to show that which is not essential to it. Quite the
contrary - life is risked to show what precisely is essential to it: its liveliness, a liveliness that exists on the level of relations of kin or descent. *Ravensong* suggests that heterosexual reproduction is needed for survival (but childcare need not be organized within heterosexual, nuclear households). But to read this as a symptom of reproductive futurism is too easy. For Edelman, “what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively—to insist that the future stop here”(31). The “us” whom Edelman addresses are those for whom being anti-child is indeed anti-normative. Within the biopolitical promotion of life, Edelman’s politics may indeed be disruptive, but in the margins of biopolitic’s promotion of life, it becomes simply suicidal. Maracle makes visible the devastation of life following the introduction of various diseases to North America through colonial expansion as well as the relative indifference that Canadian state and white health care professionals showed towards indigenous loss of life. This thematizes, in other words, the “letting die” that reoccurs within the biopolitical management of life, a “letting die” that resembles sovereign killing, though functions through active inaction that sometimes makes itself invisible.

Within this context, reproductive futurism or even futurism is itself anti-normative. But this futurism is not only forward looking: it also looks backwards, haunted by the ghosts of past generations. Throughout the text, both Stacey and her sister, Celia, are haunted by their ancestors – but not simply those to whom they are related by blood, those from whom they descend, but also those who shared their lives with their ancestors, and those who lived in the space on which their reservation now stands. The presence of these ancestors is embedded within the territory. For instance, *Ravensong* opens, “from the depths of the sound Raven sang a deep wind song, melancholy green” (9). This
opening immediately sets the location of the narrative in a territory marked by the sound of Raven. As Raven’s song spirals “out from its small beginning in larger and larger concentric circles,” a territory extends, including wind, who blows “the song toward cedar,” who picks “up the tune,” that encourages cloud to rush “to the sound’s centre” (9). The sound goes out to the world to come back to a center. With this return, cloud crashes “on the hillside while Raven” begins to weep (9). By tracing the path of a song as it goes out, Maracle sets the scene of the novel: it is a territory within which Raven’s song resonates. This is indigenous territory – not because of human boundaries but rather because of the non-human sound that radiates throughout it.

This sound provides a pathway to the past. The opening continues, “below cedar a small girl sat. … The song played about with the images inside. She stared blankly at some indefinable spot while the river became the sea, the shore line shifted to a beach she couldn’t remember seeing, the little houses of today faded. In their place stood the bighouses of the past. Carved double-headed sea serpents guarded the entrance to the village of wolf clan” (10). The song brings Celia the village of her ancestors. Sound forms a territory that connects the present to the past, forming a people bound not only by descent but also by the territory within which the song plays.76

Within this context, Ravensong’s investment in population is not simply an investment in (heterosexual) reproductive futurity. Rather, population is a connection of

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76 This beginning is similar to the opening of Eden Robinson’s Monkey Beach, a novel also set on native land in the Pacific Northwest Coast. Monkey Beach begins: “Six crows sit in our greengage tree. Half-awake, I hear them speak to me in Haisla. La’es, they say, La’es, la’es” (1). Similar to Ravensong’s beginning, this opening scene likewise depicts a non-secular territory, where crows speak Haisla. Sound immediately establishes nationally specific territory: Haisla territory. Yet it is not a human who creates this territory, but six crows. This territory then gives way to a specific temporality: on the second page, we find an “Elvis clock” that claims it is seven thirty, though “it’s always either an hour ahead or an hour behind” (2). The character jokes: “It’s on Indian time” (2). Indigenous territory, Monkey Beach alongside Ravensong suggests, has a different temporality to the developmental narrative of the Canadian capitalist state, complete with its timelines and clocks.
living beings heard through a territory that resonates across time. The past does not disappear but collects into the present to produce territory, to claim indigenous sovereignty. This implies that reproductive futurism is not necessarily normative; it can challenge colonization, producing indigenous territory marked by the echo of previous generations.

IV – Sexuality, Territory, and the Raven’s Song

How can we read Maracle beside Deleuze and Guattari? “1837: Of the Refrain” suggests that territoriality reorganizes functions, such as sexuality (316). The authors write, “Functions in a territory are not primary; they presuppose a territory-producing expressiveness. In this sense, the territory, and the functions performed within it, are products of territorialization” (315). The authors give the example of aggressiveness. They summarize Lorenz’s thesis that aggressiveness forms the basis of territory, such that an “instinct of aggression” explains the creation of territories. But this thesis, Deleuze and Guattari argue, presupposes territory. An animal’s territorial aggression requires a territory over which to become aggressive about. Territoriality cannot be explained by the functions performed in territory. Rather, “the T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody” (316). This suggests that sexuality does not explain territoriality, but rather that territoriality reorganizes sexuality.

We can, however, read Deleuze and Guattari’s text against themselves, and Elizabeth Grosz’s Chaos, Territory, Art intimates at such a reading. Deleuze and Guattari argue that territory is a product of the emergence of expressiveness or signature and quality -- in other words, of art. Grosz goes still further. Reading Deleuze, Deleuze and
Guattari together, and Irigaray, she ties artistic expressiveness to sexuality. She writes, “art is the sexualization of survival or, equally, sexuality is the rendering artistic, the exploration of the excessiveness of nature” (*Chaos, Territory, Art* 11). Grosz’s understanding of sexuality here does not see sexuality as “functional;” sexual selection, as opposed to natural selection, involves attractiveness that is not necessarily tied to fitness. Instead, with sexual selection, it is the alluring that is selected. In this reading, it is not simply art that produces territory, but art does so in its mangle with sexual attractiveness. While territorialization may transform functions, such as sexuality, the creation of territory, in this view, is always already sexual.

In some ways, Maracle’s oratory seems to agree: the organization of territory affects sexuality; it shapes whom Stacey considers possibly attractive. But Raven’s music is different from the music of sexual attraction. Whereas Grosz reads expressiveness as sexually alluring and thus sees territory as not only reorganizing sexuality but also as sexual itself, in *Ravensong*, the territorializing expression, Raven’s song, is difficult to read in this framework. Raven is not a creature of natural or sexual selection. Raven’s song constitutes territory, spreading over the earth and overcoming its inhabitants, but the world of *Ravensong* is not secular. Thus, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari, territorialization is the effect of animals’ actions, and for Grosz, territory’s expressive signatures are sexual, for Maracle, territoriality is different: the effect of Raven’s song.
Chapter Five: Geopower and the Subject

In 1931, Emily Carr, a British Columbian painter, changed the subject matter of her work. Whereas since 1907 she had been painting images of indigenous villages and totems on Vancouver Island, in the beginning of the nineteen thirties, she moved her attention towards landscapes that no longer included Co-Salish, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Kwakwaka’wakw, Haida, Tlingit, and Gitxsan art and architecture. Both Lawren Harris, a Canadian painter and friend of Carr’s, and Carr herself understood the transformation as a sign that she had found her own particular vision: in the movement away from indigenous art and architecture towards the forests of British Columbia, Carr, they believed, came “into her own.” Why? 77

Carr’s parents were white, middle-class, and English. So English that although they had met in San Francisco, they traveled to England to get married (Blanchard 17). Returning to North America and settling in Victoria, the Carrs appreciated Victoria’s staunch appraisal of all things English. There, the “British flag flew even more proudly, if possible, than it did over England itself” (Blanchard 18). But throughout her life, Carr felt stifled by Victoria’s social, Victorian mores. Intent on becoming an artist, she went to art school in San Francisco, later in England, and finally, exposing herself to modernism, in France. Throughout her journeys, she remained emotionally and aesthetically tied to Vancouver Island. Thus, notwithstanding the ridicule she faced from Victoria’s

77 When art historians have studied Carr, they have either focused on her representation of indigenous art or her later work with forests. Little attention has been given to Carr’s transition from one period to the next. When the transition between these two periods is considered, historians have largely adopted Harris’s and Carr’s own interpretation. An exception here is Gerta Moray’s “Emily Carr and the Traffic in Native Images.” Moray argues that Carr’s transformation is entangled with her production of a national, as opposed to British Columbian art. I draw on Moray in the following reading.
conservative elite, Carr settled on Vancouver Island: she finally bought a caravan and traveled up-island, painting indigenous villages, totem poles, and finally, the forest. And it was with the forest that she claimed to find her voice.

Harris argued that Carr found herself with the forest because totems were themselves art and therefore difficult to use as inspiration for another art. So long as she painted totems, he believed that Carr’s work would remain derivative (Moray 82). Carr agreed. She found that the forest allowed her to better express herself. She writes of this period, “I had become more interested in woods than in villages. In them I was finding something that was peculiarly my own. While working on the Indian stuff I felt a little that I was but copying the Indian idiom instead of expressing my own feelings” (Carr 254). In painting images of the woods while she was in the woods, Carr understood herself as becoming an artist with a visual style of her own that authentically expresses her own feelings. At issue here is ownership: Carr finds something that is her “own;” she comes to express her “own” feelings. Overlapping with romantic ideals of artistic production, Carr’s statement depends upon an understanding of herself as self-possessed, as having her own feeling, and then as finding a vision that is her own. Carr does not possess the forest in fee simple (which is the way most land is owned in common law). She does not draw a boundary around a parcel of land, transforming it into capital so that it can be sold. Instead, she finds outside of herself something that is, “peculiarly,” already hers and through which she can express her interiority.

But it is not exactly “peculiar” that Carr should feel this way. Her feelings of ownership had government support. In 1920, British Columbia passed the Indian Lands Settlement Act, which, contrary to the Indian Act of 1876, allowed for reservations to be
“cut-off” without the consent of indigenous people. In 1926, Chief W. Pierrish of Neskonith traveled to London in attempt to petition the crown, circumventing the government of B.C. to establish land claims in the province. The High Commissioner of Canada turned him back. In 1927, the Canadian government dismissed the land claims made by the Allied Indian Tribes of B.C.. That same year, the government passed a law that made it illegal to raise funds to support land claims (effectively banning land claims altogether). It also prohibited meetings of more than three indigenous people off reservations.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore, although Carr writes that it was “peculiar” that she felt the forest was hers, the decade leading up to her feeling this way was filled with a history of law and policy that fostered this feeling by expanding settler colonialism and legally protecting colonists’ ownership of land.

That Carr finds a form of ownership in the forest is symptomatic of what Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls “possessive whiteness”: the feeling that naturalizes the territory of the settler colony as a white possession.\textsuperscript{79} National identity, which overlaps with possessive whiteness, also plays a role in producing the forest as Carr’s. Throughout her autobiography, \textit{Growing Pains}, Carr over and again identifies herself as \textit{Canadian}. For instance, an English doctor tells Carr that she is losing her Canadian accent in England. Carr then writes, “Bless you, doctor, for the warning!

\textsuperscript{78} For the details of this history, see Cole Harris’s \textit{Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia}.

\textsuperscript{79} See Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s “The Possessive Logic of Patriarchal White Sovereignty: The High Court and the Yorta Yorta Decision” and “Terra Nullius and the Possessive Logic of Patriarchal Whiteness: Race and Law Matters.”
Unconsciously I’d tried to be less different from the other students, - I who had seen many Canadian-born girls go to England to be educated and come back more English than the English. I had despised them for it. I was grateful for the doctor’s visit and I swore to myself I would go home to Canada as Canadian as I left her” (Carr 108).

Recognizing herself as Canadian, Carr becomes intent on producing a Canadian art. Carr thus falls in line with the Ontarian Group of Seven painters (such as Lawren Harris) who, in painting the landscape of Northern Ontario, understood themselves as producing a national art. Depicting signs of indigenous life in the Pacific Northwest marked Carr’s paintings as regional. The ocean, which since she lived on Vancouver Island was all around her, would have likewise marked her worked as British Columbian. There is no ocean in Ontario, but trees, albeit different in kind, reappear. Thus, by representing the forest with no overt signs of indigenous art and by not painting the ocean, Carr created art that resembles the nationalistic art of her contemporaries. She becomes an “authentic” artist as she becomes a Canadian one. “A subject in her own right.” A subject, that is, constituted within the logic of the settler colony, its nationalism and its possessive whiteness.

But it is not simply possessive whiteness and national identity that makes Carr feel as though the forest is hers. Carr is also attentive to the sensation of being within the forest, and she comes to identify strongly with this sensation; she even comes to see her life as dependent upon it, blaming her poor health in London on her “Canadian” constitution. It is the sensation of the forest that she tries to capture in her paintings. Her artistic process depends not only upon sight but also touch, taste, and a form of sensation
that exceeds these altogether. She describes, for instance, the difference between her outdoor and indoor sketch classes in San Francisco. She writes:

Indoors we munched and chewed our subjects. Fingertips roamed objects, feeling for bumps and depressions. We tested textures, observed contours. [...] Outdoor sketching was as much longing as labour. Atmosphere, space cannot be touched, bullied like the vegetables of still life or like the plaster casts. These space things asked to be felt not with fingertips but with one’s whole self. (26)

To paint the outdoors, Carr suggests that she must feel it with her “whole self.” She must be physically immersed in it and sense it completely. This sensation is crucial to Carr’s art. For example, she refuses abstraction, explaining that she was “not ready” for it. Instead, she writes, “I clung to earth and her dear shapes, her density, her herbage, her juice. I wanted her volume, and I wanted to hear her throb” (260). In such homoerotic passages, Carr provides the impression that the forest becomes peculiarly hers because being in the forest incites the sensations that she comes to identify with. In other words, Carr is subjected to the forest: the forest, as it encounters her body, produces particular sensations that come to constitute her. In turn, because of possessive whiteness and nationalism, she is then able to take these sensations as her own, to see them as comfortable and as supportive of her life.

We can also understand this as a particularly gendered experience of the forest. Rather than taking control over it through her gaze, Carr is touched by the forest through being in it. Thus, all while Carr’s forest paintings portray the earth as though it is inhabited by only one human, the artist who looks, they need not be read as fantasies of control. Rather, they try to capture the sensation of being in a particular place;

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80 That landscape painting attempts to capture something more than just a visual image is one of the reasons Ed Casey gives for its relative late development in Western art. Borrowing from J.J. Gibson, landscape, her writes, is “circumambient” (6). It is all around us and not just an image in the eye. This is especially difficult for an artist, for how is she to “contain something as overflowing as landscape within the very particular confines of a painting?” (7).
nonetheless, that Carr can identify with this sensation as her own is mediated by
whiteness and national identity.

In brief, the organization of the earth affects Carr. Carr senses the forest. This
sensation is geopower affecting her body, and it indexes the ways in which we are
subjected by geopower. This subjection is mediated by race, class, gender, and sexuality
but cannot be reduced to these human relations. It has an effect of its own.

II – SUBJECTED TO THE EARTH

How is the subject connected to the earth? What role does geopower play in the
constitution of the subject?81 If the subject does not pre-exist power relations but is an
effect of them, what happens to this understanding of the subject when we argue that
geopower - that is, the set of force relations involved in life’s transformation of the earth

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81 Influenced by Luce Irigaray’s “Any Theory of the ‘Subject’ Has Always Been Appropriated by the
‘Masculine,’” I am suspicious that any universal, such as “the subject,” is in fact a particular, universalized
because of its status as a norm or as the dominant - universalized, then, on the basis of and in preservation
of the power relations that constitute it as dominant. This means that the universal hides particularities, that
it covers over difference. Within such a field, to write of “the subject” in general appears at best risky and
at worse necessarily false and politically conservative. To the extent that “subjects” emerge in the world,
they are always specied, raced, classed, gendered, etc. The subject is not. There are, instead, multiple
subjects that are not the same as one another. But I am unclear that the solution in this context is to think
about particular subjects. Say to get around the false universal, I decided to focus my analysis around
white, settler-colonial subjectivity, in twentieth-century Canada. Even if I specified species, race, history,
place, and nation-state, this form of subjectivity would remain an abstraction: what of gender, sexuality,
and ability? Language? Region? Ethnicity? Family-relations? Unless I were to focus on a singular
“subject,” my analysis would remain abstract, a universal (and hence false). Is the answer then to write of a
singular subject? To pick a particular one? This one cat. Although this approach is compelling, it too does
not provide a solution. What about the cat would I write? What of the cat’s existence might tell us
something of its subjectivity? For me to write about subjectivity at all requires a concept of the subject, an
abstraction from particularity. To avoid all abstraction is to avoid thinking of subjectivity itself. This means
that if this chapter is about subjectivity it is, by definition, about an abstraction and must take the risk of the
universal, informed by the critiques of universalism. This is similar to Gayatri Spivak’s “strategic
essentialism.” Spivak argues that invoking “women” as an not-particularized universal is sometimes a
necessary tool for politics and for thought. Spivak first made this claim at a time (in the 1980s) when much
of American academic feminism fell into a practice of finding and dismantling essentialism. In contrast,
Spivak argued feminists use essentialism strategically while maintaining a critical perspective on it. She
explained that deconstruction in practice does not do away with essentialisms but rather recognizes both
their necessity and danger. See Spivak’s interview with Ellen Rooney, “In a Word: Interview” in Outside in
the Teaching Machine, p. 10 and also her interview with Elizabeth Grosz “Criticism, Feminism, and The
works alongside sovereign power and biopower? Does our understanding of the subject’s emergence change? Is the very concept of subjectivity transformed?82

This chapter argues that by giving shape to the earth, geopower incites certain actions and sensations and inhibits others. This means that the subject is subjected to geopower - that is, it is limited and enabled by the field in which its action occurs. Against a discursive understanding of the subject as a position in language and against an understanding of the subject that sees it as an effect of recognition, this chapter contends that the subject can also be seen to come into being through its intra-action with the earth, as actions and passions are incited by the body’s emergence within the earth.83 This implies that struggles over land use are likewise struggles over sensation and hence forms of subjectivity.

Within this framework, there is no reason to argue that only human beings are subjects.84 This contention follows from my analysis of geopower in chapter two. This

82 By focusing on the subject, I depart from the essays collected in Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman’s edited collection, Material Feminisms. Alaimo and Hekman hail “material feminisms,” feminist thought that remains dissatisfied with poststructuralism’s endless attention to discourse. But although Hekman and Alaimo insist, along with several of the authors in their collection, that agency need not be tied to the human, material feminisms have not, for the most part, been carried over to the analysis of the subject. Rather than investigate subjectivity, the point of reference for many material feminists remains the “body”: scholars develop accounts of how bodies cannot be separated from the places they inhabit. The body is materialized in its interaction with place, in its habitats. I worry, however, that focusing on the body in this context runs the danger of reintroducing a nature/culture binary because the body within hegemonic discourse is seen as “natural” and hence its immersion on the earth is not surprising. In contrast, I want to argue that in as much as the subject is a living being, it remains affected by geopower, by the forces involved in the transformation of the earth.
83 This does not mean that norms and law do not play a role in the regulation of action. In other terms, I certainly do not want to argue that disciplinary power and sovereign power do not play a role in subjectification. My argument rather is that geopower also plays a role.
84 In making this statement, I want to avoid the question of consciousness – or rather, I see the subject as defined by its position within power relations rather than by its consciousness. I am influenced here by Norma Alarcón’s “The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism.” Alarcón identifies how Anglo-American feminists, while often citing This Bridge Called My Back (hereafter cited as Bridge), tend to negate differences between women by returning to a common denominator, “women,” defined in opposition to white men. This mode of thinking hides the analysis of how one becomes a woman not simply in relation to white men but also in relation to other women. Most centrally, Alarcón explains how gender emerges not only in a culture structured by sexual difference, but
earlier chapter developed a material understanding of agency that bracketed the question of intentionality and saw agency in the exertion of force. But the argument for a non-anthropocentric account of agency problematizes the distinction between subjects and objects: if subjects are defined by agency, does not the granting of agency to entities that are not alive suggest that these entities ought to be considered as subjects? Are “objects” that are not alive, such as snow for instance “subjects?” My ensuing discussion will show how when subjectivity is understood as a position within power relations, it need no longer be tied solely to the human.

Questioning the presupposition that subjectivity is, by definition, human is especially necessary within the contact zone of settler-colonialism. As Julie Cruikshank’s Do Glaciers Listen? traces, while French travel narratives of the eighteenth century figure glaciers as inanimate and non-sentient, Tlingit oral tradition frames glaciers as sentient beings, emotionally responsive to human action. Cruikshank in effect argues that while European and Indigenous modes of understanding the world are often posited against one another, they may in effect be more similar than they appear. For instance, during the little Ice Age of the nineteenth century, Europeans in France tried to fight
advancing glaciers, approaching them with swords and leaving offerings to them - treating them, in other words, as sentient. The point here is that while we may presume that only humans are subjects, this understanding of the world is not necessary (and is tied to Enlightenment rationality). Thus, leaving the question of consciousness aside, this chapter does not assume that only humans are subjects. Rather, I define subjectivity as a paradoxical state of being: the subject is subjected to forces that are “external” to it, and yet, this subjection allows it to act. To be a subject is not simply both to be affected and to affect: it is the condition where being affected is the precondition for taking effect. And the subject is not only sometimes affected by biopower and sovereign power: subjects are also differentially subjected to and subjectified by geopower.

This argument builds on Rosi Braidotti’s work in *Transpositions*. Braidotti argues, drawing on Deleuze, Guattari, and Simondon, that “the subject is an ecological entity” (41). For Braidotti, this has five implications: First, the body is marked by its “interdependence with its environment” (41). This environment includes technology. Second, the “environmentally bound subject is a collective entity” (41), which means for Braidotti that it is “plugged into and connected to a variety of possible sources and forces” (41). For instance, it “transforms its (natural, social, human, or technological) environment constantly” (41). Third, the subject’s interdependence with the environment raises ethical questions that take into account cross-species interactions. Fourth, the subject’s temporality is marked by evolution: the subject is located both within the time of individual memories and the time of the “genetic code” (42). And finally, fifth, consciousness does not necessarily coincide with subjectivity (42). Grounding Braidotti’s approach is her valuation of *zoe*, “the generative vitality of non- or pre-human
or animal life” (37). Giorgio Agamben links zoe to death, arguing that sovereign power reduces human life to zoe so that it can be killed. For Braidotti, to focus on death in this way is a habit of thought embedded within Heidegger’s legacy, a legacy that seeks to understand life through an analysis of its finitude. In contrast, rather than thinking of zoe as a “becoming corpse,” Braidotti argues that zoe is generative. She writes of the “positivity” of zoe and she claims that it is always already there. This affirmation of zoe is tied to her understanding that the subject is ecological. The affirmation of zoe requires the “overturning of anthropocentrism as the bottom line of the critique of subjectivity” (40). When we consider the subject as alive, as animated with zoe then we cannot but see it as intimately affected by the environment around it. Braidotti makes many large, interesting claims here, but she moves quickly. While she states that the subject is “territorially based” (41), she does not draw out what she means by this. I see this chapter, then, as building on Braidotti’s argument by providing more detail of how we can understand the subject in relation to the space around it. I do no draw the same conclusions as Braidotti, however, and although Braidotti advocates moving away from a Hegelian approach, I turn back to this tradition, reading it anew. It may seem surprising that I turn to this dialectical tradition, but my reasoning here is tactical: by finding geopower where one might least expect it – that is, in Hegel’s idealism – I seek to make an especially compelling case for its relevance to thinking subjectivity. Therefore, this chapter reads Hegel and some of those he influenced: Marx, Althusser, and Butler. I show how while none of these theorists make explicit the effects of geopower on the subject, implicit in their writing is, at the very least, a place for them, and I examine how
by transforming the earth, geopower affects the subject, inciting certain feelings over others, making possible particular actions over others.

**III - Turning Towards (And Then Away Again) From Hegel**

Throughout the twentieth-century, the discourse of recognition, as developed through the reception of Alexandre Kojève's reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, has been one of the touchstones for thinking subjectivity. In this following section, I argue that at first, Hegel seems to treat the space between subjects and objects as well as the location between subjects’ encounter with one another as a void. However, upon closer thought, I argue that this void is itself descriptive of a particular formation of the earth: one which fosters the subject’s life. This means that geopower plays an implicit role in the *Phenomenology*.

Before I proceed, I need to clarify that Hegel defines the subject as self-consciousness, and sees nature as that which must be overcome for self-consciousness to emerge. In other words, Hegel is interested in the subject in as much as the subject is self-conscious. He characterizes the subject both by a direction of thought (inwards) and an object of thought (itself). I start by making this point here because my eventual arguments about the effects of geopower on the subject will move towards a different understanding of the subject. In fact, investigating the production of the subject is inseparable from providing an account of what subjectivity is. Thus, while I begin with Hegel here, I will eventually move away from his model.

At first, it seems as though Hegel treats that which is between subjects and objects and that which is between subjects as a void, and his phenomenology progresses as this void becomes internalized. In effect, these two aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, his
understanding that a void stands between subjects and objects and the continual internalization of this void, resembles the workings of colonialism, which often claims that land is empty or void to justify its appropriation or internalization. These two features of Hegel’s thought are especially clear in paragraph 37 of the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel summarizes the framework of Spirit’s movement from sense-certainty all the way to Absolute Knowledge: oppositions are sublated (destroyed, preserved, and uplifted) over and again as the negative between the “I” and its object move each beyond themselves. Hegel is interested in the “disparity” in consciousness between the “I” and its object (or “substance”), between the “I” and that which it is conscious of or hides from itself. This disparity, Hegel argues, can be understood as the “negative in general” (21). He compares this negativity to what the Ancient Greeks understood as the void. But this void is likewise, for Hegel, the “principle of movement” (21). It is that which moves both the subject, the “I,” and its object or substance to overcome their opposition such that Spirit comes to recognize itself in “absolute otherness” (14). Hegel is interested in how although at first this negativity appears between the “I” and its object, it is later found to be “just as much the disparity of the substance with itself” (21). Thus, the negative between subject and object is in effect a disparity not only within consciousness, but also within substance. When this is revealed, Hegel announces, substance itself becomes subject (because subject is defined by its essential negativity) and Spirit makes “its existence identical with its essence” (21). In other words, the object of consciousness becomes consciousness itself so Being becomes “absolutely mediated” and “self-like” (21). As this finally develops, the

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85 For a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology in the context of Empire – and the Haitian revolution in particular - see Susan Buck-Morss’ “Hegel and Haiti.”
“Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded” (21). In short, Hegel’s understanding of negativity not only figures this principle of movement as a void, but also continuously internalizes and transforms this void. He understands the difference between the “I” and its object as a nothingness that is always contained either between two entities or within an entity. The Phenomenology reaches its zenith when difference is found no longer between; all we have is identity or a “within-ess” where no movement is necessary.

In addition, Hegel’s discussion of the encounter between self-consciousnesses also treats the location within which they meet as bearing no effect on their meeting. Hegel argues that “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (110). It is only in being recognized by another consciousness that self-consciousness emerges. In other words, in the Hegelian understanding of subjectivity, an understanding that still shapes feminist thought, as well as policies of multiculturalism, the subject is understood as emerging in relation to other subjects. To be a subject is to be among other subjects. One cannot be a subject without other subjects, and even more strongly, to be a subject is to be in a relation with another subject, a relation where the subject recognizes the other as subject. Because Hegel prioritizes subject-subject relations in the production of self-consciousness, the location of their encounter is insignificant to its development. To introduce location would be to introduce objects or things in as much as this location would be defined by the arrangement of objects or things that constitute it.

This means that Hegel’s Phenomenology first appears to not consider how location affects the encounter between subjects and objects or how the location of consciousnesses’ encounter makes a different to the process of recognition. In addition,
Hegel figures the difference between the subject and its object as a void, and the
*Phenomenology* progresses as this void is internalized and increasingly minimized.

Reading Hegel in this way, I am compelled to ask: what happens if rather than conceiving
the disparity between the “I” and its object as within consciousness, we understand this
disparity as a spatial extension that locates the (embodied) “I” and its object as apart from
each other? Could this not help us to understand how the negativity Hegel posits allows
for movement (which is here reframed as spatial)? Then, even more, what happens if we
understand this spatiality not as an empty space, a void or a negativity, but rather as those
elements of the earth whose existence as a multiplicity of differing (and deferring) beings
engender space? Could we not then be reminded by Karl Marx’s reversal of Hegel, his
insistence that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” and
understand that this space between the “I” and its object consists in the condition for the
emergence and continued existence of the “I” as a living being? In this model, rather than
a negativity between “I” and its object, we are left with the materiality in which and
through which the “I” finds and produces its means of subsistence. The “I,” as an
embodied, living being, comes to find itself as one element amongst others, immersed in
an externality that differs and defers from itself, but upon which its life depends.

Nonetheless, rather than dismiss Hegel for not thinking about the subject’s
immersion in the earth, in effect, hints of geopower do weave their way through Hegel’s
master/slave dialectic. For instance, when Hegel writes of the encounter between
consciousnesses, the earth and the history of events that it supports is made a background
to the consciousnesses on the foreground. This means that self-consciousness does not
only achieve “its satisfaction … in another self-consciousness” (110). It also means that
self-consciousness can only emerge when the conditions of the earth make it such that consciousness’s life is not in danger, when the forces of the earth do not impinge on the subject’s life. If this were not the case, the earth could not be put in the background. Even more, unless the earth fostered the subject’s life, it would not be possible for the subject to stake its life in the battle with an encountering consciousness. Its life would already be understood as contingent. Thus according to Hegel, for self-consciousness to emerge, the earth must become a background to encountering consciousnesses. These consciousnesses cannot experience the earth’s forces as a threat to their life, or even as something requiring attention. Both consciousnesses must be in a place where their being-there can appear incidental.

The second point to make here is about work. Although at first Hegel writes that self-consciousness only finds its realization through being recognized in another self-consciousness, when the master-slave dialectic plays itself out, the relation between consciousness and the “thing” becomes crucial. The battle between the encountering consciousnesses produces two forms of consciousness: the bondsman who recoils, holding on to his life, and the lord who does not turn back from the battle. The lord exists for himself, but he is mediated through the bondsman, whose existence is bound up with “thinghood in general” (115). Hegel explains that the bondsman works on things, producing them for the lord’s satisfaction. This implies that whereas the bondsman works on things, the master annihilates them. Through work, unlike through consumption,

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86 Bill Brown clarifies the distinction between the “thing” and the “object” in his essay “Thing Theory.” He argues that whereas “we look through objects (to see … what they disclose about us)” (4), the “thing” indexes a materiality that does not center the human. He claims that objects assert themselves as things when “they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls” (5). This implies that a thing “names less an object than a particular subject-object relation” where the object shows that its being exceeds its human use.
“fleetingness [is] staved off” (118). Thus, as the bondsman works, he comes to find himself outside of himself in the thing that he has shaped. The lord, in contrast, lacks this experience.

Much has been made of this passage – for instance in his reading of Hegel, Marx suggests that what is most “outstanding” in the Phenomenology is how Hegel “grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own labour” (Marx 112). While drawing on this same passage, I would like to go somewhere a little different. It is not just that through work, consciousness shapes the thing, finding itself outside of itself. But it is also that through work, the bondsman could partake in geopower, transforming the earth and constituting the place within which he lives. This suggests that as creatures shape the earth, engaging with and partaking in geopower, they likewise find themselves outside of themselves, leaving traces of themselves within the places where they have existed. To transform the earth could then be read as a method for “staving off fleetingness,” a method for maintaining a sense of presence in absence (which, amounts perhaps to a form of earthly existence after death). Even more, resonating with chapter three, in leaving traces of himself or transforming the earth, the bondsman could be read as creating a territory, signing the earth so that a parcel of it refers back to himself. In this reading, we could argue that Hegel’s self-consciousness is territorial: its development makes background the earth as though its life did not depend upon it, and then transforms this earth so that it bares signs of itself. 87

87 Cf. with Jean Baudrillard’s claim in Simulacra and Simulations that whereas non-human animals are territorial, humans are not, and as a result, humans possess an unconscious.
This reading, however, largely departs from Hegel. Most critically, although I have used Hegel’s terms, “consciousness” and “self-consciousness,” in order to get at the subject’s relation to the earth and the effects of geopower on the subject’s emergence, I have moved away from Hegel’s idealism and have posited a consciousness whose life depends upon its material immersion within the earth. Rather than continue working against Hegel’s idealism, I now turn to a Marxist philosopher, Althusser, whose work, like Hegel’s has also shaped theorizations of subjectivity.

**IV - ALTHUSser AND THE STREET OF INTERPELLATION**

Although Althusser is a committed materialist, his work is influenced by Hegel’s. More specifically, Althusser builds on Lacan’s mirror stage, a reworking of Hegel’s theory of recognition. Nonetheless, notwithstanding his Hegelian vestiges, Althusser provides a better starting point for the analysis of geopower and subjectivity than Hegel. Elspeth Probyn goes so far as to argue that Althusser’s theory of the subject is a “cornerstone in thinking about the spatial nature of subjectivity” (Probyn 291). She shows how “Althusser’s account of ideology compels us to consider closely the material contexts which allow and delimit our individual and collective performance of selves” (291). While I use Probyn’s argument to begin this discussion, as I have explained in the introduction, I move away from using space as a central analytic towards “earth” so as to bring attention to the material entities that constitute the spaces within which life exists. Reading Althusser, I come to argue that by transforming the earth, geopower incites some

88 Althusser perhaps overstates his point as he argues that ideas (and hence ideology) are material. In “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses,” he writes, “where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.” (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ ideology.htm; last visited, May 25, 2010.)
actions and feelings over others: geopower could therefore be understood as a subjectifying force in and of itself. To make this case, I not only draw on Althusser but also turn to Butler’s reading of Althusser in *The Psychic Life of Power*. Ultimately, the model of the subject that I offer differs from both theorists’ accounts.

In his “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus,” Althusser argues that the subject emerges as it is hailed or interpellated in and by ideology. In effect, ideology, Althusser clarifies, has no being other than in its existence in the form of the subject, and even more, to be a subject is to be an ideological subject. It is to recognize oneself as within a set of practices that reproduce relations of production. Althusser dramatizes the scene of interpellation within which the subject emerges: the often-cited passage from his essay asks us to image an individual, who, while walking down a street, is called by the police, “Hey, you there!” (7). Althusser explains, “Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him” (7). Within this scene, the individual becomes a subject when he recognizes himself addressed by the police and turns around becoming subject to the police’s hail.

When Judith Butler reads this scene twenty-seven years later, she argues that Althusser does not adequately explain why the individual on the street turns around. Althusser merely writes, “experience shows that the practical telecommunication of

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89 This argument is inspired by Robin Bernstein’s “Dances with Things: Material Culture and the Performance of Race.” In a captivating examination of how bodies’ interactions with “scriptive objects” have constitute race, Bernstein argues that “interpellation occurs not only or even mainly through verbal demands followed by bodily actions, as in Althusser’s scenario, but through encounter in the material world: dances between people and things” (73). My chapter draws out the implications of this argument for thinking about geopower, the earth, and subjectivity.
hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man” (7). For Butler, this phenomenon sheds light on the structure within which the subject emerges. She suggests that individuals have a prior openness to the law, an openness that limits the capacity to critique law. This openness follows from our desire to be beheld by and to behold the face of authority because our continued social existence, to which we are narcissistically attached, depends upon being recognized by it. In other words, we desire the law because we are passionately attached to our social existence, an existence that is only made possible in the terms of or in the embrace of the law (112). We are thus compelled to turn, to recognize ourselves in the law or the police’s speech.

But our continued existence depends upon more than its recognition in the law or, in other terms, more than its readability in relation to social norms. This argument pivots on our understanding of “existence,” an understanding that is unclear in Butler’s reading of Althusser. If the subject’s existence is reducible to its social existence, then perhaps its readability within law and norms is sufficient to its existence. However, if the subject’s existence is more expansive, then clearly it depends upon much more. Butler writes that the subject’s continued existence is dependent upon its submission. But she qualifies this survival as “psychic” and “social.” She writes of a “social existence” and of “social life.” Even more, she describes the subject as a position in discourse: the subject is the “I,” the first person perspective. In such passages, it appears as though the subject’s social existence is separable from its existence per se. There is “mere” existence and then there is social existence and social life. Social existence does not depend upon what Rosi Braidotti (and Agamben) calls “zoe”: “the generative vitality of non- or pre-human or animal life” (37). In Braidotti’s terms, Butler is interested in bios: that part of life that is
political and discursive (37). She is interested in life to the extent that it is intelligible; she is not interested in existence per se, but only existence that is conferred recognition. Butler would probably respond to such an argument claiming that zoe is not pre-discursive but rather is established within discourse as that which exists prior to the social. The concept of zoe as the vitality of non- or pre-human life is itself retroactively established as “pre” with the emergence of bios and hence this zoe/bios distinction is itself part of the organization of life as we currently know it. This means that the subject’s zoe and bios are constitutive of its social existence. But does this mean that existence is always social? In other words, can I exist without socially existing and is being recognized the only means of becoming social, of becoming existent? The challenge of this question is partially linguistic: the “I” in this sentence refers to me in as much as I occupy the position of the subject in discourse. In other words, the “I” always already exists socially. Nonetheless, I want to argue that Butler herself makes space for thinking of an existence that is not social and that does not require recognition. She asks what would happen when the subject “desires something other than its continued ‘social existence,’” risking its “life - in its current organization” for something new to emerge (29). This framework opens a possibility of a different form of existence: either an existence that is not social or an existence which transforms the norms that confer intelligibility. In both cases, this implies that “life” must be more than how it appears in its current organization such that it can end without its existence ending. In other words, while the subject is a social category, its existence exceeds this sociality.

Returning then to Butler’s reading of Althusser, we could argue that that subject’s existence is not merely dependent upon its legal or social recognition. The subject is also
dependent upon the food that it eats, the air that it breathes, and the temperature within it which it lives. To be a subject is to be subjected not only to law or to norms, but also to the weather, to earthquakes, and to mountains. In other words, the subject does not only emerge in its subjection to sovereign power and biopower: it is also subjected to geopower.

Such an understanding of the subject returns to some elements of Marx’s materialism. In his critique of Hegel, Marx moves away from treating the subject as self-consciousness towards understanding the subject as a “corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature” (Marx 115). This “corporeal man” does not stand in a void: Marx defines him with his feet on solid ground, with the atmosphere passing through him in his breath. This description is clearly both gendered and ableist: Marx provides us a masculinist account of the subject, an account that is invested in the body’s normative capacity. His description of “man” places him standing, erect, with his feet “firmly” planted. But Marx’s account is still useful in that he shows how a materialist understanding of the subject is attuned to the body’s dependence upon and immersion within the earth. Even more, Marx argues that corporeal man is “a being who is objective, acts objectively” (115). Man is not only subject; he is also an object. He can create objects “because he is established by objects” (115). For Marx, this means that man is a “natural being” (115). He both acts and is acted upon or “suffers,” in Marx’s terms.

However, Marx denigrates nature unlike the understanding of the subject that I seek develop here. For example, the passage from which I cited above continues: ““but

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90 Introducing these terms here brings Foucault into my discussion of Althusser and Butler, but I don’t want to immediately pursue this path, though I will return to it later in this chapter.
man is not merely a natural being: he is a *human* natural being” (116). He explains:

“neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the *human* being. And as everything natural has to have its *beginning*, *man* too has his act of coming-to-be – *history* .... History is the true natural history of man” (117). In this argument, Marx distinguishes nature from the historical and ties history to the coming to being of man. Nature, in other words, is not historical; man’s existence is. Even more, in “The German Ideology,” Marx distinguishes humans from other animals in a way that stands in tension with my understanding of geopower. Marx argues that humans

“*produce* their means of subsistence” (159) and “by producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life” (159). In this logic, it is humans, not other animals, bacteria, or plants, that shape our material life. In contrast, my understanding of biopower suggests that all life forms partake in this production.

Nonetheless, drawing upon an understanding of the subject as material, active, and suffering, I now return to Althusser’s essay to consider first whether geopower implicitly plays a role in his account of interpellation and second, whether this role can complicate Butler’s explanation of the desire for law. Althusser’s dramatization of interpellation takes place on a street. The individual who becomes subjectified walks along this street, in a given direction, such that when he is hailed, he turns around. This means that the individual is already subject to a particular organization of the earth: the town or city street. By walking down the street, the individual is already subjected to this street.

How does this subjection affect the individual? To walk along a street is to be subject to its lines of mobility: the direction of the pathway, the rhythm of the fellow
walkers. I might jay walk, I might decide to lie down on the pavement, but force relations prevent me from doing so: I seek to avoid the force of a car upon my body, of a pedestrian’s foot upon my head. It is not only norms and law that keep me from using the sidewalk in any way that I wish: the physical organization of the sidewalk and street also incites particular movements. Walking, in comparison to driving, gives me a more direct feeling of being immersed in the street. I am not in a car which is then on the street, but rather, my body physically touches the street and shares in its scent, sound, temperature, and humidity. In addition, on the street, I am visible. Unless I were to duck into a laneway, the city or town sidewalk does not provide many places for me to exist unseen. The street is also, most likely, named. Knowing this name may give me a sense of the character of the place through which I walk. It may put me in relation to the past, make me feel part of one history as opposed to another. I am, in short, subjectified by the street: I am subject to its pathway, subject to its pavement, subject to its lines of mobility, but I am also subject: the street allows me to move and I could always move otherwise on it.91

This reading does not depart from Althusser’s arguments in any significant way. First, Althusser argues that his narrative is misleading because individuals are always already subjects. This means that as I insist that the individual is already a subject by walking down the street, I am not departing from Althusser’s account. In addition, by bringing attention to the street, my argument highlights how the ideological practices Althusser writes about are coupled with particular constellations of the earth. This is

91 There is an extensive body of literature on the effects of walking in the city. Much of this work has focused on the figure of the flâneur, especially as he walks through Paris. A good essay that brings together much of this research, but does not overly focus on flânerie and upon which I draw is David Macauley’s “Walking the City: An Essay on Peripatetic Practices and Politics.” For a reading of the gendered nature of the walk, see Deborah Epstein Nord’s *Walking the Victorian Streets: Women, Representation, and the City.*
implicit in his writing. For instance, Althusser argues that practices are embedded within
“the material existence of an ideological apparatus, be it only a small part of that
apparatus: a small mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports’ club, a
school day, and political party meeting, etc” (4). These practices are each tied to the
places in which they are held: the church, the sports’ club, the school, the meeting house.
These places make possible and incite practice through their material configuration. In
other words, these practices are coupled with particular arrangements of the earth.

However, I also depart from Althusser here, moving away from the language of
ideology to the language of power. This is because I am influenced by Foucault’s critique
of ideology. For Foucault, the concept of ideology is problematic for three reasons: first,
ideology is assumed to stand in contrast to reality or truth. Althusser argues that ideology
is external to science and the real, to which Marxist criticism must strive. In contrast, for
Foucault, truth is not external to power, but rather a force in and of itself, produced
through relations of force. Foucault also argues that the concept of ideology is
problematic because he claims that it refers to and thus assumes the subject and its
consciousness. Materialism, according to Foucault, would be better to address power and
the body as opposed to ideology and the subject. And finally, Foucault argues that
ideology “stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its
infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant” (Foucault Power/Knowledge 118).
Ideology, in this model, is seen as epiphenomenal: it emerges as a result of the economic
base, capitalist relations of production. It is especially for this last reason that I follow
Foucault and turn to the language of power, not ideology. Rather than begin with a
structure, capitalism, and trace the ideology that expresses it, I begin with local analyses
of the material operations of power. This is to trace power relations from the bottom up rather than from the top down.\textsuperscript{92}

Therefore, rather than arguing that the subject is interpellated by ideology, my reading of Althusser has aimed to show that the subject is also subjected as \textit{zoe} to geopower because the organization of the earth incites certain actions and feelings over others. This argument potentially expands the understanding of the subject to non-human creatures. Although both laws and norms affect animal and plant life, it is easier to see how the organization of the earth affects these living forms. In addition, this argument has also moved away from an understanding of the subject as defined through \textit{recognition}. Following from the Marxist understanding of the subject, yet moving away from its anthropocentrism and its denigration of nature to history, I contend that the subject is characterized by its position in a paradoxical relationship: it is subjected to forces “outside” of it, but this subjection makes its own action possible. In Marx’s terms, the subject is “active” and “suffering.”

In effect, it is ironic that Canadian thought and policy has relied so heavily on the understanding of the subject embedded in Hegel’s and Althusser’s philosophy given that this subject is defined in its recognition by another self-consciousness, but Canadian culture, as the example of Emily Carr showed, has relied heavily on the relation between the subject and the earth to define the subject. Regardless, this chapter has argued that the subject does not simply emerge through subject-subject relations. It is not simply an effect of sovereign power, biopower, or disciplinary power. Instead, the subject is also positioned by geopower, as the

\textsuperscript{92} For a critique of Foucault’s turn away from ideology, see Slavoj Žižek’s “The Spectre of Ideology.”
transformation of the earth incites certain sensations and actions over others. These sensations and actions are not universally shared – norms, law, and identity give shape to them, but nonetheless, they are prompted by the organization of the earth and the body’s place within it. Geopower could thus be understood as a force of subjectification in itself: the shape of the earth provokes specific actions (which then – at least partially – creates different bodies) and spurs certain feelings. In other words, the effects of geopower exert a force to which subjects are subjected, and through this subjection, the subject comes to act.
Conclusion: Difference and the Train

« L’identité linguistique n’est pas celle de l’habit, c’est celle de l’express et de la rue » (Saussure 152). *Linguistic identity is not the identity of the suit, but the identity of the train and the street.* So argues Saussure in his influential *Cours de linguistique générale.* Saussure explains that we give two trains that leave twenty-four hours from one another the same identity: the 8:45 Geneva-Paris train. No matter if the train has a different locomotive, different wagons, different staff -- no matter if everything is different, “in our eyes,” Saussure writes, it is the same train (151). The same goes for a street. If Sixth Avenue were demolished and rebuilt, we would say it was Sixth Avenue. This is because the identity of both the train and the street is not “purely material” (151). Instead, both the train and the street are constituted by their “relative situation” (151). Their identity is determined as a result of their difference from other trains and streets. This is not the case with a suit, according to Saussure. Say my suit was stolen, and I found it on the racks of a second hand store. It would still be the same suit: my suit. This is an entity that uniquely resides in its materiality: “dans la substance inerte, le drap, la doublure ... etc” (152). Language, Saussure contends, functions similarly to the train and the street – not the suit. For example, every time I use the word “Messieurs,” I introduce a new phonic and psychological act. What links two uses of the same word does not lie in a material identity or in a similar sense. Instead, “Messieurs” remains the same word because of its difference from other words. Linguistic identity, like the identity of streets and trains, is differential.

Is it significant that the examples Saussure likens to language concern instances where the earth has been transformed to facilitate certain forms of mobility across it? Is it...
significant that for the 8:45 Geneva-Paris train to remain, “in our eyes,” this train, the forces that transform the earth must not significantly alter the track? For if the train derailed, this 8:45 train would not remain indifferent. It would become the 8:45 train that derailed. The “November 20, 2010 train.” In other words, the transformation of the earth could change the identity of the train. By extension, does the transformation of the earth similarly alter linguistic identity? For if indeed linguistic identity is like the train’s, and the train remains identical to itself so long as the earth and its transformation remains background to it, then perhaps linguistic identity, like the train, does not only depend upon difference from other terms, but also upon the earth’s constellation.

“Earthly Encounters” set out to examine how taking into account the transformation of the earth under Canadian settler colonialism puts pressure on key concepts that circulate in feminist thought: power, interiority, the “outside,” sexuality, and subjectivity. I argued that Michel Foucault’s work on power makes a form of power that he does not schematize visible: geopower. Geopower involves the set of force relations that transform the earth. The analysis of geopower suggests that interiorities are not simply produced in the creation of a border: they are also produced as that which comes to be marked as the “inside” is materially transformed. This transformation has effects on subjectivity since the shape of the earth incites some actions and sensations over others. In other words, geopower, the force relations that transform the earth, could be understood as a subjectifying force in itself. If this dissertation is successful, as my introduction claimed, what emerges across its pages is a “materialism of difference.”

93 One of the limitations of this dissertation is that it centers planet earth as a mode for thinking of space. Were I to open the analysis to more galactic thinking, my discussions, for instance of meaning’s entanglement with the earth, would have to be reconsidered.
these last concluding pages, I detail what I mean by this phrase and place it in the context of feminist thought.

Thinking about difference has sometimes given way to a form of idealism. For instance, in Mark Currie’s introduction to the concept of difference, he suggests that “difference” is a powerful concept because it implies that words are not “passive reflectors” of the world (5). Instead, “differences,” he claims, “are not properties of the objective world being described as much as they are properties of the language describing the world” (5). Currie does not ground this claim in any particular thinker (to which his book then turns), but if this is indeed the case, the concept of difference seems to deny to “the world” the capacity of differentiation.

It is such an understanding of difference that has shaped some versions of feminist social constructionism, which has argued that gender is constructed. In this view, to use Currie’s vocabulary, the difference between men and women is viewed not as a property “of the objective world” but rather as a property “of the language describing the world.” The materiality of the body is not then seen as a forceful agent. Instead, culture shapes matter. Nature is both passive and dangerous, for if differences are “natural,” the worry follows that gender inequalities are legitimate and unchangeable. Within this paradigm, to the extent that differences become a part of the world, they are the effect of the materialization of social and cultural norms. Following this train of thought, feminist poststructuralists throughout the eighties and nineties sought to seek out and “problematize” any hidden essentialism, any claim of “natural” differences.

This framework shaped the Anglophone reception of Luce Irigaray’s writing during the 1980s. Many feminists argued that Irigaray was “essentialist” because she
problematically grounded her politics and ethics in the female body – her two lips and her
capacity to bear children. However, as Margaret Whitford explains, by the early 1990s,
“the binary pair essentialism/antiessentialism ha[d] been put into question. This enable[d]
essentialism to be interpreted as a position rather than as an ontology, and Irigaray to be
interpreted as a strategist … rather than as an obscurantist prophet of essential biological
or psychical difference” (qtd. in Stone 60). In her interview with Pheng Cheah and
Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler presents herself as just such a reader of Irigaray. Butler
explains that in the early eighties, she was not interested in Irigaray because, she says,
“she seemed to me to be an essentialist and that was a term we used quite easily then,
when we thought we knew what it meant” (19). Yet as she kept reading Irigaray, she
understood “that whatever the feminine was for [Irigaray], it was not a substance, not a
spiritual reality that might be isolated, but it had something to do with [a] strange practice
of reading, one in which she was reading texts that she was not authorized to read” (19).
In this framework, just like in Whitford’s characterization of Irigaray’s later reception,
the feminine becomes a position from which to read, troubling the simply
essentialist/non-essentialist binary. Drucilla Cornell similarly defends Irigaray from
essentialism. Cornell explains that she was attracted by Irigaray’s “unabashed utopianism
that she associated with the feminine within sexual difference” (20). Cornell continues,

I did not see Irigaray at all as an essentialist. If anything, the feminine was a kind
of radical otherness to any conception of the real or reality. More than anything
else, here I found someone who was deploying the feminine unashamedly in a
utopian manner, saying that there is a beyond to whatever kind of concept of
sense we have. And without that beyond being articulated, endlessly breaking up
the real, we can’t even get to a different kind of ethics. (20)

Here, Cornell posits the feminine within sexual difference against the real. The feminine
is utopian and hence does not exist in any place, but drawing upon it opens the real to
something new: a new ethics. Both Cornell’s and Butler’s reading share the contention that Irigaray’s feminine for Irigaray is not a substance, so much as a practice, a position, or utopian vision. This way of understanding Irigaray fits well into the framework of social constructionism that understands differences as socially or culturally elaborated.

However, as Alison Stone argues, such a reading of Irigaray hides the many times when Irigaray posits herself as a realist and frames “sexual difference as ‘real’ or as a ‘natural reality’” (Stone 61). Stone examines how “although Irigaray regards sexual difference as a natural feature of bodies, […] she does not ultimately define bodies by the durable physical properties upon which scientists concentrate” (70). Irigaray claims to be making an ontological rather than empirical argument, and she frames this ontology against the “metaphysics of solidity,” replacing it with a “metaphysics of rhythms and fluids” such that rather than seeing substances as solid, she seems them as processes or fluids. Thus, rather than positing the feminine as simply a utopian vision, a horizon of possibility, or a position, the feminine here becomes a fluid or rhythm of the world. Irigaray’s work can therefore be read in a way that significantly challenges social constructionism to see sexual difference as ontological.

This dissertation is inspired by such a framework. Contemporary feminists are reworking social constructionism, arguing that matter or nature is agentic and dynamic, and that society or culture are but elaborations of nature.94 I see this work as overlapping with contemporary feminist cultural critics who are turning towards the analysis of affect, moving away from studying meaning and representation towards sensations that are not

94 See Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman’s Material Feminisms, Elizabeth Grosz’s Time Travels, Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway, Adriana Cavarero’s “Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference,” and Elizabeth Ann Wilson’s Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body.
necessarily mediated by consciousness but felt on the body. Together, these two directions of feminist theory could be understood as the elaboration of a feminist materialism, a feminism the works with but pushes beyond poststructuralism.

I find two reasons for this turn in feminist thought especially compelling: first, feminists have long shown how the distinction between nature and culture is entangled with hierarchies of both gender and race. As social constructionists reaffirmed the distinction between nature and culture, they missed the opportunity to challenge the social hierarchies entangled with this binary. Second, understanding matter as passive develops an anthropocentric account of the world, which sees agency only in human-based practices. A feminism truly committed to difference must develop an ontology that seeks to make room for multiple agencies: animals, insect, and plants.

My account of geopower, as well as my analysis of representation, interiority, and subjectivity seeks to make room for these multiple agencies. Humans are not the only creatures who transform the earth. Instead, the earth changes with multiple species’ acts. In turn, the constitution of the earth affects the development of future species.

But what does “difference” mean in this context? Is difference less a property “of the objective world being described” than a property “of the language describing the world” (Currie 5)? While Saussure may be considered a thinker of difference, key to twentieth-century philosophy’s attempts to prioritize difference over identity, his understanding of the train (and perhaps of language) could be seen as covering over difference itself. Ironically, as Currie contends, relational theories of identity (such as Saussure’s argument that “in language there are only differences, and no positive terms”) deny difference (Currie 13). An 8:45 train is a constellation of elements: a singularity, not

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95 See Patricia Clough’s *The Affective Turn* and Jasbir Puar’s *Terrorist Assemblages*. 
even a particular of the general. In effect, Saussure’s comparison between the train and language is puzzling. For while he claims to be comparing language to streets and trains, in effect, we may want to argue that he compares language to language. It is not the street or train that interests him but rather how we name them, how they appear in our eyes.

We could, instead, move away from Saussure’s work to develop a different understanding of difference. Irigaray’s work on sexual difference and Stone’s reading of her realism provide one touchstone to begin such thought. Deleuze’s work on difference in *Difference and Repetition* read alongside his *Bergsonism*, most especially the chapter “Élan Vital as Movement of Differentiation,” provides another. In the paragraphs that follow, I explain Deleuze’s theory of difference to then return to Irigaray, reading the two philosophers together.

Deleuze’s reading of Bergson describes the élan vital as a movement of differentiation. The resultant understanding of difference does not figure difference as something between identities but rather as a positivity, the effect of a creative actualization. Deleuze distinguishes actualization from realization. Realization occurs through resemblance and limitation. The real is in the image of the possible that it realizes. Only existence is added to it. But not all of the possibilities are realized. This is the function of limitation. In effect, Deleuze argues that although we say that the real resembles the possible, in contrast, the possible is formed in retroaction: it is an image of the real. In this model of realization, all is already given.

In contrast to the possible, Deleuze offers the virtual, and in contrast to realization, he describes actualization. Unlike realization, actualization does not function through resemblance and limitation. Instead, it works through difference and divergence.
Even more, actualization does not follow from the decomposition of an impure composite. For instance, actualization does not follow when a composite, space-time, for instance, is separated into two: space and time. Instead, actualization is the result of the differentiation of a simple or a pure virtual. There is no impure composite but rather a unity that is actualized in a process of creative differentiation. Evolution, for example, and its élan vital are processes not of realization but rather of actualization. They are creative. This implies that life is not pre-formed. It is not determined. It is not the elaboration of an existing impure composite. Instead, it is the productive creation of differentiation (“Élan Vital as Movement of Differentiation” 165 – 171).

This section of *Bergsonism* can help to clarify *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze opens this latter text by explaining that repetition is not generalization. At first, this distinction is not intuitive: why would repetition be confused with generalization? But *Bergsonism* can help here. This text provides a diagram that summarizes differentiation, taken from Bergson’s own *Creative Evolution* (“Élan Vital as Movement of Differentiation” 172). This diagram begins with memory-duration that gets split into matter and life. Life, in turn, is differentiated into plant and animal. The diagram then continues to differentiate plants and animals. One might want to argue that the category of “life” is a general category for both plants and animals. But such a generality would be an impure composite. This would reduce plants and animals to the realization of the possible (life). Plants and animals would not be the result of a differentiation but rather the result of a realization through resemblance and limitation. Instead, we can see plants and animals as forms of repetition. In this case, this is a repetition of a series and in the
repetition of terms (plants, animals) we have a difference. It is through the differentiation or actualization of life that plants and animals emerge.

This temporal thinking offers a unique way of understanding difference. For instance, Deleuze explains that if we focus on actualized forms, such as “plant” and “animal,” we may see one as the negative of the other, one as the inversion of the other. This would figure difference in the negative. Difference would be something that exists between identities. Instead, Deleuze argues that we ought to focus on life’s actualization into these forms. Difference becomes temporal. It emerges through actualization. Plant and animal are not categories of the general “life,” but series: repetitions with difference.

Another example that Deleuze offers for thinking difference is lightening in the sky. He repeats the idea that difference is not something between things: it is not negative. Instead,

imagine that which distinguishes itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. (Difference and Repetition 28)

Lighting differentiates itself from the sky. Difference here is an act. One way to understand the example of difference is to read it in dialogue with Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, which takes the example of lightning to argue that there is no doer behind the deed. Nietzsche argues that lightning does not flash: there is no subject that does the deed of flashing. Instead, lightning is flashing. All we have is the doing (Nietzsche 45). As lightning distinguishes itself from the sky, we do not have an identity that is distinguishing itself in an act of flashing. All we have is this flashing, and this flashing, this doing, is an actualization, a differentiation that makes determination possible. The lightening emerges through an actualization. But it “trails” the sky behind
it. The lightening, we say, is still in the sky, it is of the sky. It is a determination of the sky. The sky does not distinguish itself from the lightening. This is much like plants and animals in relation to life: life does not distinguish itself from plants or animals, but these are determinations of life.

The train could be read similarly. Returning to Saussure’s example, the 8:45 Geneva-Paris train repeats itself, daily perhaps, but with a difference each time. Its actualization brings a determination of each specific trip. Difference emerges less in the difference between the 8:45 train and other trains than in the actualization of the train. This actualization depends upon the shape of the earth. As such, the actualization of the train is entangled with the process of geopower – the force relations that transform the earth.

Drawing on this discussion, I can now explain how it is that this dissertation develops a materialism of difference. “Earthly Encounters” practiced a form of materialism of difference in its understanding of the earth. Instead of starting with an empty frame, space, this dissertation brought attention to the materialities that constitute the spaces of human life: that is, to the earth. I did not figure the earth as one but rather as a transforming field constituted by disparate materialities and forces. Thus, I operated in a field of determination: not a void, not an abyss, not a field of indifference, not “space,” but instead, a transforming and dynamic set of becomings.

96 Within the context of settler colonialism, this discourse may understandably raise concern. As Todd May argues, Deleuze posits difference as an ethical value (May 175). Therefore, by drawing on Deleuze, am I arguing that the transformation of the earth under settler colonialism is good in itself? Am I claiming that this transformation consists in the evolution of the élan vital? No – in effect, such a position is only tenable if we imagine pre- and post-contact indigenous modes of inhabiting the earth as characterized by consistency or the lack of change and we argue that European settler colonialism brought transformation. This clearly is not the case.
Working with this materialism of differences had implications for feminist theory: first, this practice decentered the understanding of discourse that became prominent with feminist poststructuralism. Instead of framing this project as an analysis of different representations of the earth, I argued that the earth is the condition of representation. In other words, representation could be understood as an actualization of the earth. Next, I argued that the materiality of the earth cannot be simply contained through borders. Instead, this materiality is dynamic and the multiple life forms on the earth produce overlapping territories.

A final question then remains: how does Deleuze’s understanding of difference rest beside Irigaray’s? Whereas Irigaray prioritizes sexual difference over other differences, Deleuze writes of differentiation as a process. However, the two philosophers share a sensitivity that does not reduce difference to language or to culture. Instead, refusing any simple nature/culture distinction, Deleuze’s and Irigaray’s theories of difference provide a starting point from which to see difference as an ontological property of the earth in its fluid and dynamic becomings.
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