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MUSLIM DEMOCRATS:
MODERATING ISLAM, MODIFYING THE STATE

by

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written under the direction of
Professor Eric Davis

and approved by

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Abstract of the Dissertation

MUSLIM DEMOCRATS: MODERATING ISLAM, MODIFYING THE STATE

By DALIA FIKRY FAHMY

Dissertation Director:
Professor Eric Davis

What explains the increase in moderate Islamists movements in the Middle East? Why do Islamist movements at times adopt moderate strategies while others do not? What conditions facilitate Islamist ideological moderation? And finally, what effect does the integration of Islamists into the political arena have on the state? The central claim of this study is that the moderation of opposition movements is the outcome of political processes that involve the tension among three variables: political inclusion, internal organization of the movement, and ideological frames. Over time, the interaction of these affects the trajectory of an Islamist movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ultimately leading to sustained ideological change.
Dedication

To my parents, Dorria and Fikry Fahmy
Acknowledgements

One incurs many debts when writing a dissertation, and I have incurred countless debts that I may never be able to repay.

I began studying politics while an undergraduate in New York University. The faculty at NYU placed in me a love for all things political, for history, for people, and most importantly, for the lived experiences of the individual. To this end, I am indebted to Professors Michael Gilligan, Patrick Jackson, Timothy Mitchell, James Hsiung, and the late Mark Roelofs. They have all served as mentors and/or advisors in some capacity.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The success of the Muslim Brotherhood should not frighten anybody: we respect the rights of all religious and political groups. So much damage has been inflicted on the country over the past century because of despotism ad corruption that it would be impossible to embark on wider political reform and economic development without first repairing the damage to our basic institutions. Free and fair democratic elections are the first step along the path of reform toward a better future for Egypt and the entire region. We simply have no choice today but to reform.

— Khayrat al-Shatir, currently incarcerated Deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood

1.1 Introduction

Over the past decade, the political reform movement in much of the Middle East has been led by “Muslim Democrats” or Islamist political parties articulating a democratic political platform. Such reformers have emerged in countries on the extreme ends of the secular-to-theocratic scale, and attained the highest parliamentary seats in government. Reformers have emerged in the Islamic republic of Iran as members of the Reform Front (RF— Jebhe-ye Eslahat), they have also emerged in secular Turkey, as the Justice and Development party (JDP: also known as the AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), an offshoot of the Islamist movement. However reformers have emerged in pseudo-democracies/or under semi-authoritarian regimes as well, as either the strongest opposition parties, or as

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1 Khayrat al-Shatir, “No Need To Be Afraid of Us,” Guardian, November 23, 2005.

2 Since the rise of the AKP to the height political governance, they are often held to be the first example of an Islamic democratic political model.
members of the governing coalition. In Morocco, the Islamic movement, Justice and Development (or Al Adl w-al-Tanmia), participates in the political process, competing for votes, vying for seats—fairing well in elections, participating in the government, and learning to share power among the 23 parties currently represented in the Parliament. In Bahrain, the political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Minbar al-Ilsami) won 18 percent of the vote in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won 22 percent of the seats in the parliament in 2005. And in Iraq, the Dawaa Party (under Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari since April 2005, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki since May 2006) has been a partner to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution while integrating themselves in a political process established with the cooperation of the United States, producing a semblance of stability. Thus, what these experiments in moderate Islamist integration illustrate is that Islamists are forging spaces for political participation, albeit differently in different countries, that is resulting in Islamists attaining the title of “political reformers.” What remain unclear however are the mechanisms at play that are leading to such reform—or Islamist moderation.

1.2 Background and Questions

When it comes to the role of religion in politics and the participation of Islamist in the political process, the wrong questions have been asked. Much of the

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3 To date, the JD party is the only Islamist party in Morocco to be fully engaged in the political process.
4 Why the Dawaa Party in Iraq is very different from the Muslim Brotherhood, they remain a party that seeks to legitimize its political activity through concept frames rooted in religion.
scholarship on political Islam focuses on the viability of Islamists as a party, their questionable commitment to democracy, and the role that Islamic law takes in their version of statehood. Yet, the questions that need to be asked are questions that center on why Islamists are participating in political processes. How have the Islamists changed ideologically over time? What are the reasons behind their electoral success and the particular policies they adopt once they enter political institutions? The importance of asking the correct questions is highlighted by the increasing changes in ideas that are emerging in today’s Muslim Brotherhood. In this study, I propose that ideological change in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is a function of the interplay among three variables: political inclusion, internal makeup of the organization, and ideological frame choice.5 My study is informed by several specific questions (1) To what can the change within the Muslim Brotherhood be attributed? (2) Why are their articulations of change grounded in legal terms, rather than purely religious terms? (3) What institutional changes in the Muslim Brotherhood have emerged since their incorporation into the parliament as a bloc in 2005? (4) What does the future of democracy look like in Egypt, where the push for democracy by Islamists is articulated in both liberal and Islamic terms?

5 These variables are outlined in the “classical” literature on social movements. See: McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald eds. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
1.3 Understanding Islamist Strategy

Islamists have adopted different strategies in their attempts to bring about political change in the Middle East. While some choose violence and militancy as seen in the cases of Jama’ Islamiyya in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Mehdi Army in Iraq, to name a few, many more have emerged in the past decade articulating a Muslim Democratic Platform. Islamists in Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, Malaysia, and Indonesia and in Egypt are increasingly committed to legal mechanisms of participation, gradualism and constitutionalism. There are still others that shun politics all together, opting for a more grass roots approach to bringing about change—focusing on education, social reforms, and tarbiyya (raising ideal individuals). Such groups, found primarily in Morocco and Bangladesh (for example, the Tabilgh Jama), focus on the moral rejuvenation of society and don not believe in political participation or armed resistance.

While there are a variety of approaches taken by Islamists, diversity also exists within Islamist parties themselves. As chapter 6 illustrates, movements have their reformers and those that want to hold steadfastly to the old ideals, those that are focusing on current objectives, and those that are looking to strategically position themselves in the future, those that seek to remove the current regimes through direct confrontation, and those that prefer engagement. What is critically important to understand in the case of the modern Middle East, is how Islamists attempt to assert themselves in the political arena as a method of articulating their demands and grievances, and what the strategies they adopt in the process.
The emergence, and in several cases reemergence, of Islamists on the political stage in Middle East as serious competitors has forced states to adopt different strategies for dealing with these parties. In the case of several states, regimes first sought to harness the political energy of Islamists as a balance against the regimes’ leftist opposition. However, when Islamism continued to have its own momentum and empowered as a serious challengers to the state—either through elections (as in the case of the FIS in Algeria, or the AKP in Turkey) or through force (such as the 1979 Iranian revolution or the Taliban revolution in Afghanistan), such states responded with different strategies with which to offset the perceived Islamist threat. Some chose to repress it—such as, Tunisia during the 1990s, Algeria after 1992, and Syria in 1982, while others opted for limited inclusion—such as Jordan since the 1940s, Sudan since 1977, and Indonesia and Pakistan since their independence.\textsuperscript{6} Other states have chosen a mixed strategy of toleration and repression—such as, in the case of Egypt under the Mubarak regime.

Different state strategies produced a variety results, and none were consistent. In Tunisia and Syria, repression was successful at virtually erasing the Islamist opposition while in Algeria, repression resulted in intense and often violent standoffs with the regime. In Indonesia and Malaysia, political incorporation caused the Islamists to become viable members of the regime (and even the ruling party); while in the Pakistan, inclusion gave the Islamists prominence in society and

governance—especially the military. Yet in Egypt, a strategy of partial toleration and repression appears to have resulted in a relationship between Islamists and the state that affects both the nature the Islamists and also of the state.

To this end, the puzzle of Islamist strategy emerges—why some moderate, while others don’t. However, as seen above, Islamists strategies do not lend themselves to easy generalizations, for recognizing the diverse strategies of Islamist movements is easier that providing an explanation for why they take the trajectories they do. While previous theories on Islamist strategies focus on Islamists and their changing behavior, few have focused on *Islamists and their changing ideological orientation, or more importantly, the underlying causes or conditions that cause ideological reorientation—or in the case of Muslim Democrats, the underlying causes or conditions that encourage ideological moderation.*

This study attempts to do just that—to move beyond the theoretical impasse where the focus for so long on Islamists and their behavior, but also on Islamists and their changing ideology and the conditions that facilitate ideology change. By drawing on insights adopted from the social movement studies and democratization theories, this study aims to explain the development of Islamists as Muslim Democrats. By focusing on the ideological moderation of Muslim Democrats and the conditions under which ideological moderation occurs—this study aims to highlight changing Islamist strategies as a function of their changing relationship with the

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7 ibid.
1.4 Research Approach

This study relies on Peter Hall’s understanding of ‘systemic-process analysis’\(^8\) and Alexander George’s method of ‘structured and focused comparison.’\(^9\) For Hall, issues of timing, sequencing, complex interaction effects, and multiple causalities are important in highlighting complex ontological aspects of social phenomenon, such as moderation.\(^10\) For this approach, one identifies the relevant causal factors and how they operate in several theoretical approaches. From each theory, predictions are made about the patterns that are expected to be observed if the causal theory derived applies.\(^11\) After relevant observations are made, the patterns present in these observations are then inspected for consistency with the predictions of each of the relevant theories to determine which causal theory is superior to the others.\(^12\)

Structured and focused comparison involves a number of propositions being

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11 Ibid.

delineated, their underlying logic is explicated, and their validity tested through a systematic empirical investigation across a number of cases. This method does not solely rely on the comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also “investigate[s] and explain[s] the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.”13 To that end, the “approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to, the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions, the actual behavior that then occurs, the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior, and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.”14 The dependant variable, being level of moderation, can be researched in this regard for the Muslim Brotherhood has undergone several 'phases' on which moderation can be measured. In this regard Egypt is not a singular case.15 The method is ‘focused’ because it demarcates the parameters of inquiry to the few variables, and thus allows for the in-depth investigation of the interplay of the variables involved in the phenomenon under investigation. Thus, rather than take a strictly historical approach that does not begin with explicit propositions of cause and effect, the method utilized here sets out specific variables: political inclusion, organizational structure, and ideological frames.


14 ibid.

15 Comparisons with other movements and parties existing in Egypt will also be highlighted throughout the research. Particular focus will be given to Jamma’ Islamiyya (a more radical group) and Hizb al-Wasat, a (more moderate group).
Central to the method of structured, focused comparison is the attempt to ‘identify the intervening steps or cause-and-effect links between independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable’.\textsuperscript{16} This allows for the evaluation of causal processes that allow the researcher to move beyond the correlation of the dependent and independent variables, and to understand the underlying causal dynamics of a phenomenon within a single case over time.\textsuperscript{17} This method thus departs from quantitative analyses that draw causal inferences without explicating the process of causation. According to John Gerring the sharpest case studies are those that isolate within case variance.\textsuperscript{18} In this regard, variables can be closely analyzed in terms of how they change over time, and also how they in turn affect one another. In this regard, the case of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood cannot be seen as a single. For, as illustrated in chapter 3, the movement went through a period of social reform (1972-1979) to a period of confrontation (1980-1981) to a period of accommodation (1982-1991) to a period of direct confrontation (1992-1997) to a period of political confrontation (2005-2010). However, these periods witnessed different levels of moderation. This variation makes possible a comparative study that focuses on causal mechanisms and causal relations.

Identifying twenty-four definitions of ‘causal mechanisms’ in the literature,

James Mahoney finds little consensus on what is a ‘causal mechanism.’\textsuperscript{19} While much of the literature utilizes the term causal-mechanism to highlight intervening variables, Falleti\textsuperscript{20} finds that causal mechanisms are in fact, portable concepts that can be applied to other contexts because they identify relationships between conditions and outcomes.\textsuperscript{21}

Taken together these modes of inquiry attempt to balance \textit{breadth} versus \textit{depth} by taking an in depth look at a singular case, utilizing several time intervals for analysis.\textsuperscript{22} Although Islamist movements across the Muslim world offer a variety of cases from which we can draw to examine our theories about Islamist strategies, this study focuses attention on the movement whose emergence is regarded as the birth of Political Islam. This lack of breadth allows us to develop a more in-depth analysis of each relationship change between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state, to move beyond mere correlation of cause and effect toward understanding the causal mechanisms at work.

\footnotesize


\textsuperscript{22} John Gerring. “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?” \textit{American Political Science Review}. Vol. 98, no. 2, May 2004, pp. 341-354.
1.5 Why Egypt as a Case Study

Egypt remains a barometer by which to gauge the direction, theory, and development of secular, democratic and Islamist thinking in the Arab World. Historically, Egypt has produced the most influential Islamist theories, ideologies and activists. Egypt is interestingly situated between the West and the rest of the Middle East in several respects. On the domestic front, Egypt enjoys a viable civil society with a well-educated middle class, and yet internationally, Egypt receives a significant amount of US economic aid, all the while, its influences and serves as a model of Islamic activism around the world. During the past decade, moderate Islamist in Egypt have embraced a new “Muslim Democratic Trend” that sees democracy as having inherent Islamic principles and Islamic Democracy as the system of governance they strive for—moving away from a call for an Islamic State to an embrace of Islamic Democracy.23 They emphasize that there is no contradiction between Islamic and democratic principles. Thus, if political liberalization, pluralism, and subsequently the consolidation of democracy and democratic principles are to take place in the Middle East—it cannot happen without an understanding of the Egyptian case.

In this regard, Egypt offers the opportunity to study the interplay of ideas (both liberal and Islamic) and institutions, and how a rethinking/reanalysis of the

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23 As articulated in the 2007 party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in the 2011 platform of their official post-revolution political party, the Freedom and Justice Party.
developmental path can shed light on the role of Islamists in politics, and on the
democratic future of Egypt in particular, and the Arab World, writ large.

1.6 Concepts and Definitions

First, what defines Moderate Islamism (or Muslim Democrats)? Moderate
Islamism reflect a core set of values and principles that are grounded in two basic
themes: they are willing to participate in the political process within existing political
systems—meaning, not intending to overthrow or reform existing political systems (on
the contrary, many espouse the desire to become more democratic), and second, that
they are unwavering in their stance against violence. In this regard, “moderate” is
not a value judgment connoting the degree of religiosity. Rather it is a political
position that reflects the acceptance of participatory politics predicated on
democratic principles. Thus, moderate Islamists embrace the ideals of good
governance, transparency, political openness, rule of law, and freedoms of press,
association, assembly, and respect for human rights. In this regard, the moderate
Islamist trend is moving away from a call for an Islamic State to an embrace of
Islamic Democracy—or a civil state embedded in democratic principles that has an
Islamic reference point. This view sees Islam as having inherent democratic
principles and thus democracy as the system of governance they strive for.

Second, what is meant by moderation? Moderation entails a rethinking, or
reevaluations of the ideological repertoire from which Islamists draw their behavioral
justification. This includes the rethinking and reevaluations (and even the elimination) of core texts, the negation and or abandonment of past theorists and ideas, the inclusion of new ideas, modalities of thinking and new theorists, and the embrace of new of ideas. As chapter 4 highlights, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood ‘moderation’ entails the entry into politics, the commitment to democratic principles, as well as the re-thinking of past ideas (for example, those of Sayyid Qutb) the negation of past texts (much of those written by Fathi Yakan) the embrace of a new Islamist vision (as articulated by the Wasatiya ideology in Islam24), the inclusion of reformist thinkers into their ideological repertoire (these include: Fahmi Howedi, Kamal Aboul Maged, and Tariq al-Bishri), and the inclusion of a new generation of reformists (as depicted in chapter 6).

Third, what is meant by strategy? Strategy refers to the efforts consciously undertaken by movement organizations to acquire and allocate resources to achieve a stated goal. Strategy refers to planning that involves organizational structuring, ideological formulations, and programmatic steps to acquire resources and allocate them to best achieve the sought after objectives of the movement.25 For social movement theorists, strategies of movements are a function of the political environment from which they emerge and operate.26 This environment directly

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affects the mobilization structure of a movement as well as their ideological frames. Furthermore, Islamist strategies to effect social and political change are based on the interaction of three resources:

- **Organizational Resources**: Dedicated activists, experience, finances, and a body of recruits.
- **Ideological Resources**: The moral claims on which to justify action.
- **Institutional Resources**: Access to public office, access to state agencies and elites, and access to a political platform through official positions and media outlets.

While organizational resources provide Islamists with the ability to mobilize their constituents, ideological resources provide the ability to appeal to larger audiences with ideological legitimacy. The “moral authority to command people is an indispensable resource for aggrieved groups seeking to affect cognitive and behavioral changes in society or seeking to mobilize the broader public for elections.”

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or disruption.” 29 Institutional resources, “enable Islamists to publicize their goals and views through prominent channels, to exert pressure through elite ties, and initiate change through legislation.” 30 In the case of the Brotherhood, political campaigning and political alliances, not only facilitated legislative change during the 2005 parliamentary session, but these and other institutional resources served to further institutionalize the Muslim Brotherhood into the political landscape of Egypt (see chapter 5). Thus, Islamist strategies, therefore, refer to how Islamist use organizational, ideational and institutional resources to achieve stated goals.

1.7 The Argument

The central claim of this study is that the moderation of opposition movements is the outcome of political processes that involve the interaction among three variables: political inclusion, organizational makeup, and ideological frames. In this regard, political inclusion during important stages of an Islamist movement is a part of a dynamic process that acts on, and is acted upon by, organizational structures and as well as its ideological orientation. Over time, the interplay of inclusion, the organizational makeup and frames affects the trajectory of an Islamist movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

1.7.1 Political Inclusion

Since the early 1980s, social movement theorists have focused on the ‘political opportunity structure’ perspective of social movements. These include studies on the emergence and development of movements, how movements are sustained over time, and the strategies of movements. These scholars do not have a unifying definition on what political opportunity structures are and what shapes them. For Kitschelt, political opportunity structures are arrangements of formal configurations, resources, and historical instances that together shape the environment in which contentious movements emerge. For Tarrow, political opportunity structures are “consistent, but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements.” For Meyer, “Some forms of access present an opportunity, others a constraint.” In this regard social movements emerge and navigate within a structural framework that is in direct

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response to structural political opportunities. In authoritarian regimes, structural political opportunities often pressure strategies of accommodation and in other times confrontation based on need. However these strategies often affect different contentious parties differently. The literature on social movements and structural opportunities has yet to determine what conditions (accommodation versus confrontation) produce which effects (for example, moderation). For McAdam, political opportunities structures are “changes in the institutional features, informal political alignments, or receptive capacity of a given political system that significantly reduce the power disparity between a given challenging group and the state.”

While scholars define political opportunity structures differently, they do agree on its investigative importance. When it comes to the affects of political opportunity structures on collective action, Tarrow finds that collective action is best explained “as the collective response...to an expanding structure of opportunities,” often as a result of a crisis. While Tarrow describe movement behavior in an expanding political opportunity structure, Meyer and Staggenbarg find that contractions of political conditions can also facilitate collective action, especially when faced with increasing repression, movements will rally their


In this research, I utilize the narrowed definition of McAdam where he finds three dimensions of political opportunity: 1) the “relative openness or closure of a institutionalized politics system,” 2) the stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity,” and 3) the state’s propensity for repression.”\footnote{Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald eds. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1996, p. 27.} For McAdam a change in one or more of these dimensions will affect the timing of mobilization of a movement.\footnote{Ibid, p. 10.} However, there is no exact combination of factors that leads to mobilization or prevents it. In this regard understand group mobilization and behavior simply as a function of political opportunity structures is not enough.

Theories on opportunity structure, when discussed in light of the Middle East and Islamists, the strongest non-state actors in the region, tend to focus on the ‘inclusion leads to moderation’ aspect. Such theories highlight the ways in which political opportunities provide incentives for marginalized groups to enter the
political arena and “play by the rules.” The seminal works of Robert Putnam (1993), Anthony Downs (1957), Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (2003), and Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1997) have discussed the ways with which institutional constraints affect behavior—meaning, causality, when it comes to moderation is a function of inclusion that is mitigated by incentive for previously marginalized groups to participate. In her study of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mona Al-Ghobashy articulates this reading of inclusion leading to moderation, finding that the Brotherhood’s strategic participation in the political process, primarily in the electoral process, has led to rethinking of al-Banna’s position on political participation, and the denunciation of many of Qutb’s hard-line positions on integration.\(^{45}\) Similarly, in his study of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Omar Ashour sees that the move away from radical ideology is a result of inclusion that results in a strategic calculation to moderate.\(^{46}\) While the inclusion hypothesis does affect behavior and my ultimately affect how ideology is referenced, this theoretical framework is incomplete in that it does not capture long-term ideological change, nor does it capture why moderation continues in times of constraint as well as times of inclusion.

### 1.7.2 Organizational Structure

Organizational structure is also commonly referred to as the mobilizing structure of a movement. The two trends in this theory focus on one hand at


resource mobilization, and political process model on the other. In explaining the strategies of movements, resources mobilization theories tend to focus on material resources.\textsuperscript{47} However, the political process model highlights informal networks (family networks, voluntary associations, religious spaces), especially when formal institutions and channels are blocked. According to Tarrow, social movements involve three aspects of organization: 1) the formal organization—usually, the groups’ leadership, 2) collective action organization which focuses on confrontation with opponents, and 3) connective mobilization structures that link the two together, they operate both within the organization and within formal institutions.\textsuperscript{48}

For McAdam, et al. the organizational structure includes both formal and informal networks were the movement is able to mobilize its actors and also engage bystanders in collective action.\textsuperscript{49} These structures may also serve as access points to the formal structures. For this study, the movement’s mobilization structure includes the formal and informal networks available to the Muslim Brotherhood, which includes the formal structure of the Brotherhood, as well as, mosques, voluntary associations, and syndicates.

Literature that focus on the organizational structure of Islamists, highlight the role that key individuals play in the ideological reorientation of a movement or party. Building on Samuel Huntington’s focus on the political ‘learning’ of key


\textsuperscript{49} Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald eds. \textit{Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings}. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1996.
individuals from other democratic players, Carrie Wickham (2004) and Nancy Baremo (1992) differentiate between strategic calculations and political learning, where the latter is “the process through which people modify their political beliefs as a result of...dramatic changes in the environment.” While incentive and inclusion do matter for Wickham and Baremo, the critical variable is cross-ideational cooperation through inclusion that ultimately leads to the moderation of individuals that affect the organizational structure of the Islamists party or movement, thus resulting in moderation. In regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, while I argue that both inclusion and the affect of individuals on organizational structure matter, these alone fails to capture the historical legacy of ideological moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood has engaged with some feminist, secular, liberal and Coptic leaders, to date, none have joined the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. While there have been some opportunities for interaction with secularists in parliament, political appointments, in syndicates, professional organizations, and in the workings of various political committees there is little evidence that the MB has used these opportunities to forge a shared

52 Most notable here is Rafiq Habib, who continually defends the Muslim Brotherhood. Rafiq Habib’s popularity with the Muslim Brotherhood is reflected in the fact that, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Youth Forum, Sahatna, the official sponsor of State’s Incentive Award for youths awarded Coptic intellectual Dr. Rafiq Habib Youth Award. Dr. Rafiq Habib won first place while, in a popular vote carried out by Muslim Brotherhood youth. Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, President of The International Union for Muslim Scholars, finished third with 21 votes, actor Mohamed Sobhi ranked in fourth, followed by Islamist writer Fahmy Howeidi, and finally Dr. Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, the Secretary General of the International Union for Muslim Scholars. See: Ikhwanweb. “Dr. Rafiq Habib Wins Youth Award,” December 1, 2009. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=21891
ideological position. There are many forged shared political positions, but few reflect a shared ideological position. Thus, a third variable needs to be introduced, how Islamists reference or fame their ideological justification.

### 1.7.3 Ideological Frames

For many years the role of ideas and the resources of ideas were neglected in the social movement literature. For Samuel Huntington, moderation included both behavioral and ideological moderation, for ideas were seen as necessary to be aligned with the “rules of the game” as articulated by the regime.\(^5^3\) However the social constructionist approach that began in the 1980s emphasized how ideological frames are as equally important to material resources. According to Benford and Snow, the main goal of the framing perspective is “to specify the interactive processes by which frames are socially constructed, sustained, contested, and altered,” and how these frames affect mobilization.\(^5^4\) In this regard, a frame is an interpretive framework that makes events meaningful, and thus is able to organize experiences, guide action, and affect behavior.\(^5^5\)

Snow and Benford delineate three “core framing tasks”: 1) diagnosis, which entails identifying the problem at hand its causes, 2) prognosis, which entail

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\(^5^5\) Frames and ideology are often treated interchangeably, and this is acceptable in so far as they are tied to a concept frame. I thank Dr. Jan Kubik for this clarification.
suggesting a solution, and 3) motivation, which entails a movement to it is constituents that collective action will remedy the situation. In this regard, frames emerge as a results of a movement’s negotiations of “a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, before they make attributions regard who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and argue others to act in concert to affect change.” In the case of Egypt, the religious-political establishment blames the Egyptian regime, for the unjust/oppressive situation. However, the process of attributing blame does tend to cause internal schisms within movements, especially when injustice is attributed to the group leadership. This directly affects the mobilizing ability of frames.

In this regard, the framing literature points to several sets of variables that facilitate mobilization: 1) “problem identification and directions of locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, interpretive scope and influence, and degree of resonance.” 2) The broader the scope of problems that a group or movement can identify within its frames, the larger the pool sympathizers with be. 3) The more ideologically elastic the framers are the more successful a movement is at, “elaborating their grievances in terms of it basic problem-solving

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schema.”

For the Muslim Brotherhood, since its inception the movement’s banner of “Al-Islam Huwa Al-Hal (or Islam is the Solution)” has been the general elastic frame through which all other secondary frames are filtered.

Frames are “continuously being constituted, contested, reproduced, transformed and/or replaced during the course of social movement activity.”

Frames are also contested by “counter-framing movement” through the media, the state, and other opposition movements, intra-movement frame disagreements, on a frame’s content, how it is shaped or what its reference is, and the adaptability of frames across time. An analysis of the frames of the Muslim Brotherhood would be incomplete without an analysis of the intra-movement debates about which frames would remain, and which should be redefined, and which should be eliminated, as seen in the debate over the formation of a political party (chapter 4). Further contestation within the movement results over which is the beast frame to utilize to bring the message of the Brotherhood to the masses. For this study, frames are identified through an analysis of the words and slogan they have utilized overtime over specific issues, and how those have changed over time. Specific attention will also be made to the ways with which frames are redefined over time,

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and the ways with which they are used to accommodate both changing internal
demographic, leadership changes, and political inclusion.

1.8 Understanding Islamist Moderation

The literature on ideological the moderation of political parties identifies
ideological moderation as the centering of previously held beliefs reflecting a
convergence with mainstream political ideals. However, since moderation is a
relative term, where the beliefs and actions deemed moderate and normative in one
society can be seen as extreme in another, moderation needs to be taken in context.
In this regard, moderation, and specifically Islamic moderation, takes into account
the specific social and political context within which it actually ‘moderating.’
Thus, moderation of Islamist ideology in Egypt needs to take into account, the social
and political backdrop of Egypt, as well as their respective historical progression.
By taking both present context and historical progression, one can take both a
diachronic and synchronic view the ‘moderation’ of Islamist ideology, and thus
emerge with a sharper understanding of the causal mechanisms at work.

Islamist moderation has mostly been measured by the willingness of a group
to condemn violence and enter into institutionalized politics. Based on this

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63 This also applies to the moderation of the Christian Democratic Party, where historic and
religious differences between parties waned as a result of ideological moderation.
For a historical account of ideological moderation within the British Party System
through an analysis of party platforms from 1920s-1960s, see: David Robertson, A
Theory of Party Competition, New York: Wiley Press, 1976; and John Thomas,
“Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties,” in Peter Merkl, ed. Western

rudimentary framework, most modern-day Islamists have moderated in this
direction. The Muslim Brotherhood has come to validate their claims on political
participation as a path toward their goal of peaceful integration. Their statements
and behavior indicate that they respect the rules of the political game and act within
the constitutional framework of their states. While this movement has come to
believe in pluralism, civic engagement, and the rule of law, this has become
institutionalized within the Brotherhood and greatly affected by the degree of
political contestation permitted in Egypt.\textsuperscript{65}

Table 1.1 - Typology of Islamists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Reformist</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stance on Violence</td>
<td>Islamization of State and Society</td>
<td>Permissible</td>
<td>Reject Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance on Democracy</td>
<td>Oppose Democracy</td>
<td>Instrumental use of Democracy</td>
<td>Committed to Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance on Economy</td>
<td>No clear position</td>
<td>Protectionist</td>
<td>Liberal Economy</td>
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In this regard, the level of moderation is strongly associated with the level
political freedom, the political climate in the country, the religious context, and the

\textsuperscript{65} See: Khalil Al-Anani. \textit{The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World.}
cultural acceptance of the group. While most moderation theory rests on the
assumption that moderation is a function of more open cultural, religious and social
climates,\textsuperscript{66} this is does not explain why some groups within they same countries
moderate, and others do not. While it may be true that the extent to which Islamist
groups moderate is tied to the degree to which the regime respect democratic
values and allows political groups to participate in politics, this is does not account
for why Islamists moderate on some issues and not others, and the differing
methods and modalities of moderation.

\textsuperscript{66} Brownlee, Jason. \textit{Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization}. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007; Lucas, Russell. \textit{Institutions and the politics of Survival in
Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Changes, 1988-2001}. Binghamton: State
University of New York Press, 2005; Lust-Okar, Ellen. \textit{Structuring Conflict in the Arab
World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions}. New York: Cambridge university
Press, 2005; Magaloni, Beatriz. \textit{Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and
Its Demise in Mexico}. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Geddes, Barbara.
\textit{Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America}. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1994; Pripstein Posusney, Marsha. \textit{Labor and the State in Egypt:
Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring}. New York: Columbia University Press,
1997; and Schedler, Andreas, \textit{Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1:</td>
<td><strong>Increasing</strong> political opportunity, limited political liberalization, end of one party rule under Sadat</td>
<td><strong>Decreasing</strong> political opportunity in parliament and professional associations</td>
<td><strong>Increasing</strong> Political opportunity (Predicts regression, but not for MB)</td>
<td><strong>Decreasing</strong> political opportunity</td>
<td><strong>Increasing</strong> political opportunity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
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<td>IV2:</td>
<td>- Regrouping of leadership members from prison and exile</td>
<td>- Leadership is becoming hierarchical</td>
<td>- Engaged in Institutional Strategies to Islamize Society</td>
<td>- Growing fractionalization</td>
<td>- Increased representation of reformists in the Guidance Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>- Diffuse group</td>
<td>- Functional divisions of the movement established</td>
<td>- Establish new organizational divisions on human rights</td>
<td>- Internal rift on the role of the movement in politics</td>
<td>- Increasing articulation of dissent in public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make-up</td>
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<td>- Downward flow</td>
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<td>IV3:</td>
<td>- Dawa</td>
<td>- Islamization of State and Society</td>
<td>- Islamization of State and Society</td>
<td>- Islamization of State and Society</td>
<td>- Islam as a set of values</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>- Revival of Egypt</td>
<td>- Non-violence in the face of corruption</td>
<td>- Pluralism</td>
<td>- Narrative of non-violence, freedoms, respect for human right, economic and social reforms</td>
<td>- Democracy as a goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>- Apolitical and disengaged</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Gradualism</td>
<td>- Participation through democracy</td>
<td>- Shariah as one of several sources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Expanded its social welfare programs</td>
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<td>- Non-violence</td>
<td>- Participation through democracy</td>
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<td>Compariso</td>
<td>- Participation through Parliamentary</td>
<td>- Shariah as the source of legislation</td>
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<td>Jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>DV: Level</td>
<td><strong>Radicalism increasing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Radicalism increasing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Radicalism increasing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Radicalism increasing</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Moderation</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
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</table>

When one begins to look as the *ideology* and not just the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood as a discursive effect, there are several reasons they have moderated their ideology over the past two decades. Table 1.2 above, depicts the relationship between political inclusion, organizational structure and ideological...
frames. While moderation is to domestic strategies of the regime, the historic relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood to the regime, and the changing internal make-up of the Brotherhood, this alone does not capture why the Brotherhood moderates even in times of exclusion. Moderation theory’s main premise has been to explain the ways in which structural, institutional and organization factors affect or ‘moderate’ the behavior of ‘radical’ parties. In this regard, the theory is unidirectional in causality—offering an institutional explanation that prefers structures (or institutions) as the primary changers of the behavior of parties. This reading of moderation theory is echoed in much of the elite interest based theories on democratization and regime change.67 While a focus on elite interests within institutions, as the primary causal factor of party behavior may be sufficient in certain cases, political elites may behave differently under similar institutional constraints. Thus, a deeper understanding of the relationship between elite behavior and beliefs is essential.68 As Dahl finds, beliefs have a greater effect on


68 Especially when political participation as an Islamist in Egypt carries with an extremely high cost.
political actors than on ordinary people. Party behavior may change as a result of ‘neighborhood effects,’ seeing what is successful or not in neighboring countries with similar political constraints. Similarly party behavior may change as a result of political learning from past experiences, even in the absence of the same institutional constraints. Previous studies of Islamist party behavior, in particular, indicate that Islamist parties develop democratic tendencies even under authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, the process of ideological change cannot be reduced to a few causal factors, rather the process of ideological change—especially in terms of Islamic Political moderation—needs further conceptualization.

1.9 Conceptualizing Ideological Change—A New Model

Beliefs and ideas do not directly influence action or determine behavior. While beliefs do play a role, the role is not determinative, rather beliefs incline actors to behave in certain ways as well as diverge actors from acting in other ways. According to Douglass North, "We know all too little about the way such

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70 Kopstein and Reilly discuss neighbor effects and spatial dependence in their analysis of post-Soviet states and the effects of neighboring countries and international actors on a state’s domestic democratic and economic freedoms. See: Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post communist World,” World Politics 53, October 2000.


belief systems evolve”. Beliefs and ideas change for many reasons and evolve as actors engage in ‘meaning-making practices’ that create a dynamic relationship between social reality and culture. In this respect, religion “may sanction different maxims of conduct in different situations, and which is thus elastic and susceptible to accommodation.” Thus, understanding the ways in which beliefs affect, set-boundaries, or facilitate behavior is important to consider when conceptualizing ideological change. What is equally relevant is the further understanding that ideological development also emerges as a result of behavioral constraints placed on a movement or party. In this regard, it becomes essential to understand that the inclusion of an Islamist party, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, into the political process does not come simply as a result of a series of political openings regulated by the regime. Rather, their integration into politics and the moderation of their beliefs would not have occurred if they did not have the ‘ideological resources’ to conduct this ideological re-orientation. The existence of (and the increasing use of) mechanisms of consultations, the existence of an arena for the articulation of dissent, the entry of a new generation of activists, and the existence of ideological body of work that is malleable are critically important to understanding the behavioral changes of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, a history of ideological moderation is an essential component, and at times even a precursor to behavioral change even within the context of external constraints on behavior.


Thus, the linear model, Figure 1.1 (below) of behavior moderation that relies on institutional restraints is incomplete.

*Figure 1.1 – Standard Causal Mechanism*

![Diagram of causal mechanism](image)

Rather, the model I offer, Figure 1.2, (below) captures moments of political openings not just to see how opening affect opportunity structures (inclusion) but moreover how those are affected by changes in the public space, how they affect and are affected by interchanges with the opposition groups, and finally, how not just their behavior, but also their ideology changes.
While studies on the development of Islamist parties in the Arab world find that political opening on the part of the regime result in Islamists moderating \textit{behavior},\textsuperscript{76} what remains unarticulated and un-investigated is whether or not \textit{ideological} moderation occurs. Moderation of ideology entails a reconsideration of goals, a shift towards democratic principles as core ideological beliefs, not just tactical ones, and

shift towards pluralism both political and ideological. According to Wickham ideological moderation is found in publicly articulated ideas over time. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, there has been a remarkable change and an evolution in the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood over the past two decades. Although this development has been the source of much internal debate, it has resulted in a commitment by the Brotherhood to the political process and electoral participation that is inherent in a constitutional democracy. In this regard, by advocating for a credible space for democratic political contestation and the expansion of civil liberties, the Brotherhood has emerged as a leading voice for democratic change. By framing their position as “within” both the boundaries of Islam and predicated on the institutional need for a civil state (or Dawla Madaniyya) the Brotherhood is reflecting a major ideological shift—one that suspends the previous calls for the establishment of and Islamic state (or Dawla Islamiyya) to a call for the establishment of a civil state with an Islamic reference point (or Dawla Madaniyya bi Marjaiyya Islamiyya).

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1.10 Data Sources

This research project draws on various data sources. First, in order to situate the case in the Muslim Brotherhood within a broader framework of politics and society in Egypt and to provide a genealogy of Islamism in Egypt—this study utilized secondary data sources which included documents, analyses and studies performed by several scholars and think tanks both inside and outside the Arab world on the history and development of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the Egyptian State. Such background studies provide a historical context for the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also when taken as an aggregate, the secondary resources are essential for the development of more targeted research questions.

The second set of sources are a culmination of months of archival research conducted in 2005, 2008, and 2009 in Al-Ahram News Paper archives (the national state paper), the Al-Masri Al-Youm news paper archives, and the independent paper Al-Doustur the archives of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, the Ibn Khaldun Center for Strategic Studies, and Cairo Center Political Studies. These documents provided information on the progression, and at times perceived progression of the Muslim Brotherhood, the changing policies of the state, and the national discourse on the two by focusing specifically on opinion pieces written regularly by leading thinkers.

The third set of resources were gathered when I was given access to some published and unpublished documents of the Muslim Brotherhood while at both
their Parliamentary and Organizational offices during the July and August of 2008. These documents, coupled with archival research conducted at the National Parliamentary archive allowed for the development of two sets of data. First they provided documents and statements both published and unpublished that allowed for rich textual analysis of the development of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and strategy. These are highlighted in Chapter 4, that focuses on the ideological and strategic development of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as changes in their internal makeup that are highlighted in Chapter 6. Second, these data sources allowed for the construction of a data set in order to trace the political activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament—focusing primarily on the 2005 session of the parliament and its committees. The conclusions drawn in Chapter 5 are primarily derived from the data collected from these two sites.

Finally, both structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Center Party, politicians, academics and thinkers (See appendix 2 for questions). These interviews provide detailed answers to such questions about ideological and political changes of the Muslim Brotherhood. These interviews were essential for tracing the ideological progression of the Brotherhood, as well as allowing for direct questions on the political effects of such ideological change. These interviews last two to three hours each exists in tape-recorded form, which were then transcribed and translated. These questions are highlighted in chapter 4, which focuses on the ideological moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood.
1.11 Organization of the Chapters

Chapter 2 provides a background to nature of democratization and democratic prospects in the Arab world, as well as lays the conceptual framework for opposition under authoritarian regimes. Chapter 3, focuses on the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood from its inception, paying particular focus on the changing relationship the Brotherhood had (and had has) the state, and how the state develops policies and practices to deal with the changing dynamics of the Brotherhood. Chapter 4 delineates the ideological development of the Muslim Brotherhood. This chapter pays particular attention to the literature the looks at the Brotherhood’s behavior moderation and not also at ideological moderation. In this chapter, I argue that the behavioral moderation in the Brotherhood is first, preceded by an ideological moderation (or a function of ideological moderation—focusing on the changing ideological resources of the movement), and second, that political integration supports moderation. Chapter 5 highlights the political and institutional contributions of the Muslim Brotherhood and changes that result as of their entry into the political arena as a parliamentary bloc. Chapter 6, traces the changing internal dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood, from a movement predicated on charismatic linkages to a movement that internal changing due to a new generation of reformers. Finally, chapter 7 restates the case and highlights the causal linkages between the variables highlighted in the previous chapters, discusses the future directions this research may take, and the implications for understanding the role of Muslim Democrats in the democratization process in the Middle East.
Chapter 2: The Authoritarian State in the Middle East and Opposition

We are working within the framework of democracy, legally, with our hands tied.

— Saad Al-Katani head of the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc

Democracy is a lake that should be measured by its depth and wideness.

— Charles Tilly

2.1 Introduction

In attempting to understand the evolution and progression of an opposition movement, one must first analyze the political environment within which the opposition arises. While chapter 3 focuses on the historical relationship between the Brotherhood and the state, this chapter focuses on: the state of democracy in the Arab World and the nature of political participation and political opposition in an authoritarian regime and the implications of participation for democratization.

2.2 ‘Stalled’ Democratic Transition in the Arab World

Over the last three decades (since the mid-1970s) much of the scholarly debates in political science have centered on democratization as the focus of inquiry. Triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, a renewed interest in the

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78 Personal Interview, August 7, 2008. Cairo, audio-recording.
study of democratization and consolidation arose. This is due to the fact the
democratically elected governments began replacing authoritarian regimes at an
overwhelming rate. From the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 to the
opposition victory in Mexico in 2000, more than five-dozen democracies were
established or restored in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.\textsuperscript{80} In Latin
America and the Caribbean 90\% (or 30 of 33) states are now democratic, where
previously less than 40\% were. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Bloc, 70\%
(or 19) of its 27 states are now democratic, where previously none were considered
democratic. In Asia (excluding the Pacific Island States) the number of democracies
has risen from 5 out of 24 (or 21\%) in 1974 to 12 (or 50\%). And is sub-Saharan
Africa, the entered the third wave later than other regions, the 40\% (or 19 of 48) of
the states have become democratic, when previously only 6\% (or 3) were
considered democracies.\textsuperscript{81}

The absence of democracy in the Arab World if particularly troubling given
that fact that several Arab countries perform well on the variables associated with
democratic transition. Egypt meets the preconditions for democratic transition that
other countries have met that participated in the Third Wave. As depicted by the
table below that compares Egypt with five prominent participants in the Third wave
(Chile, Argentina, Hungary, India, and the Philippines) these countries meet the
requirement of democratic transition as articulated by Samuel Huntington’s \textit{Third


Wave,\textsuperscript{82} O’Donnel and Schmitter’s Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,\textsuperscript{83} and Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy,\textsuperscript{84} and Haggard and Kaufman’s The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.\textsuperscript{85} Each country is measured at the time of its transition. As depicted in table 2.1, Egypt meets ten of the preconditions placing it ahead of Argentina, India and the Philippines. Yet it remains unclear why Egypt enters the transition to democracy, and then stalls.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Precondition of Democracy Indictors\textsuperscript{86}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{82} Samuel Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press: 1991,


Table 2.1: Precondition of Democracy Indictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preconditions for Democratic Transition</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy Crisis</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-emergence of civil society</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of institutions for competition</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Economic Growth</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious doctrine that promotes political reform</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key external actors support democracy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration effects from other democratic transitions</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split hardliners/softliners</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong constituencies for political reform</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior experience with representative government</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/Capita &gt; $750 (1971)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low or decreasing inequality</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low sub cultural pluralism</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activists believe in the institutions/practices of polyarchy</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total “yes”</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Arab World, however seems to have entered the democratic “wave” and stalled, leaving the region pockmarked with autocracies, semi-authoritarian regimes, and unconsolidated democracies. Furthermore, among the Arab states, the average Freedom House ranking is 5.8 (out of a 1-7 scale with 7 being the highest

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level of constraints on freedom), while the rest of the world’s nation average 3.6. However, the Arab World (and much of the Levant) has seen changes in the recent past that have led to strong indigenous demands for greater democracy, for the end of “national security states” and authoritarianism, and to the questioning of regime legitimacy and regime authority, and calls for political pluralism, with seeming international support. Although, these demands have not led major experiments towards democratization or democratic consolidation, they have led small to steps in the direction of change towards political reform. The most recent revolutionary wave of that began in Tunisia in December of 2010 and spread to Egypt in January of 2011, resulting in 18 days of peaceful protest that was met with government repression and violence, that ultimately resulted in the toppling of the Mubarak regime, has further signaled the inherent desire for freedom and democracy in the peoples of the MENA region.

The contemporary Arab World has seen changes in several issue areas. (A) Legislative changes have led to increases in competitive elections and election monitoring, which have occurred in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco,

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89 This began with the end of the Cold War, where many of the autocratic rulers could no longer rely on the automatic support of major world powers.
91 These cases include: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen; the Arab Gulf States of Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia; and Turkey.
92 The ‘revolution’ has further spread to Libya, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
while parliaments have exercised power against ministers in Jordan and Morocco.\textsuperscript{93}

(B) \textit{Legal changes} have led to the emergence of independent judiciaries in Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco.\textsuperscript{94} Similarly, judges have emerged with greater independence to challenge executive power in Egypt,\textsuperscript{95} while legal changes have led to the emergence of various political parties. (C) \textit{Social changes}, have led to the emergence of civil society groups calling for greater reform have erupted in Lebanon, Morocco and Jordan, and most notably in Egypt—under the banner of \textit{Kifayah}, or \textit{Enough: The Egyptian Movement for Change}, and the \textit{April 6 Movement}.

Together these changes have led to the reorientation of movement that have risen to both challenge and constrain state power.\textsuperscript{96} In the case of Egypt, the new challengers that emerge to both constrain and challenge state power are found within the state apparatus and outside the state apparatus in civil society groups, such as the Islamist group—The Muslim Brotherhood. The base point of contention these two groups have with the regime is found in their articulation of political

\textsuperscript{93} See \textit{Arab Reform Bulletin}, Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for further discussion of these occurrences.


\textsuperscript{95} This occurred most notably during the 2005 election where judges were elections monitors, and in their questioning of the extension of emergency rule in Egypt during the spring of 2007, see chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{96} I will later argue that it is moderate Islamists that have been able to successfully bring about political liberalization to date. It is moderate Islamist, such as the modern-day Muslim Brotherhood, that have been able to successfully push for greater political liberalization. [In chapter 6, I discuss \textit{Hizb-Al- Wasat} (or the Center Party) and the effect of the Wassatiyya Ideology in Islam (of Ahmed Kamal Abul-Magd, Tariq Al-Bishiri, Fami Houwaidi, Muahmmed Al-Ghazali, and Yousuf Al-Qaradawi) on the direction modern-day Islamists have taken, noted most markedly in their youth,—especially in Egypt.] Although these moderates have been unable to ultimately unseat the increasing repressive Mubarak regime, they have been able to utilize the electoral process and work within the legal limits to institute critical political and legal reforms.
order—the Islamists have emerged as alternative to the regime that articulate their contention with the state in legal terms.

2.3 The Future of Democracy in the Arab World—Hybrid Regimes

The Arab world is seeing an increasing number of institutions emerging to challenge the state. In Egypt, the constitutional courts has emerged as a challenge and limit to the authority of the state, while these courts are products of the regime, they do not function as an extension of the regime, rather these courts function alongside the regime exercising legal constraint on it.97 Similarly, social organizations (schools, clinics, hospitals, syndicates, charities, and during elections operating as independent elections monitors) run by the Muslim Brotherhood function alongside the state apparatus, performing the same functions while providing an alternative. These parallel intuitions are the result of an authoritarian regime that allows for the semblance democratic openness. Scholars of authoritarianism, most notable, Levisky and Wey would characterize Egypt under Mubarak as neither a democracy nor an authoritarian regime, rather it is characterized as a hybrid regime. They characterize such hybrid regimes as competitive authoritarian regimes, where “competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exists and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents” abuse of

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the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.” Egypt has both an autocratic order—an executive with few formal checks on his authority, and a democratic order—institutions that are increasingly trying to constrain the state and increase governmental accountability—namely the parliament and the judiciary. However, what is most critical to this research project is the awareness that these democratic institutions that aim to constrain the power of the executive have the support of Islamist thinkers and Islamist groups, while also enjoying secular democratic support. In Egypt, “Islamic political and legal thought plays an increasingly important role in defining and legitimizing the institutional alternatives to autocracy.” Thus, an investigation into the future of hybrid regimes in the Arab world must account for the interplay of Islamic thought and democratic thought, and the interplay of Islamic institutions and democratic institutions, and their historical emergence.

Scholarship on regime hybridity has focused on the maneuvering of autocratic elites. This may be due to the fact that the elites see political reform is the only survival strategy they have in their arsenals. Thus, these steps towards reform are seen as calculated moves for regime survival. While others have focused

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100 ibid, p. 16

primarily on the role of elections, elections strategies and election manipulation. However, for Levitsky and Wey, hybrid regimes emerge through a combination of elite calculations, institutional change, and ideational competition. Thus, a focus on elite calculations, or a focus on electoral processes and manipulation does not successfully capture important aspects of hybrid regime change. What needs greater understanding, analysis and conceptualization are the ways in which institutional and ideational competition shape the development of regimes.

Recently, scholars of constitutionalism and the Arab World have begun to focus on constitutional development. Nathan Brown argues that a pre-existing distinctly Arab constitutional tradition that draws on Ottoman and Egyptian documents, while Bruce Rutherford highlights two distinctly competing constitutional orders, one grounded in Western Liberalism, and the other in Islamist articulations of constitutionalism. Yet, what remains to be further explored are

the ways in which both Islamic political and legal thought are playing an increasing role in defining and legitimizing political participation of opposition movements.

2.4 Political Participation Under Authoritarianism or Hybrid Regimes

According to Lisa Anderson, “examination of political opposition reveals a great deal not only about the society in which it develops but about the nature of the political authority it confronts.”106 This leads to several questions about the backdrop or framework within which opposition evolves from two perspectives: 1) What is the political setting within which political opposition operates, 2) What does the political opposition challenge, and 3) how does the nature of the challenge alter the political space.

It is difficult to analyze political participation under authoritarianism or in an authoritarian environment because the notion of participation evolved under the backdrop of democracies or under the study of democratic evolution. In order to understand political participation in authoritarian settings, a focus on the relationship between the state and its opposition and the nuances of that relationship is necessary. In this regard, the concept of participation is very much

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applicable in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, and is critical to understanding state-society relations and state-opposition relations.

The democratization literature places a strong link between participation and democratic rule. However, in much of the Middle East, participation does not occur under democratic rule. A puzzle emerges as to how far can concepts be stretched or how far can they travel from one situational backdrop to another.\textsuperscript{107} Traditionally, the concept of political participation has been linked to the notion of democratic rule.\textsuperscript{108} While political participation is an essential condition for the existence of a democratic order, the same cannot be said for an authoritarian order. Because the power to rule does not exchange hands and is not regularly placed under a type of election, sitting incumbents are not accountable to their populace, and by extension neither is the political decision-making of the incumbent held up to regular scrutiny. Thus, to maintain their firm grip on power, authoritarian incumbents limit the active involvement of their populace. And because autocrats don’t want to be accountable to their people, they don’t allow for political participation that is outside of their own control mechanisms. Based on these pretexts, scholars of democratization focus on the degree of political participation

\textsuperscript{107} Giovanni Sartori. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review. vol. 64. no. 4. 1970: pp. 1033–1053.

\textsuperscript{108} For example, in Robert Dahl’s seminal work, \textit{Polity: Participation and Opposition}, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) the subtitle highlights the inherent tie between the concepts of political participation for theories of democracy. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie place participation at the center of their argument (Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, \textit{Participation in American: Political Democracy and Social Equality}. New York, Harper and Row, 1972)
and the potential that some degree of participation may challenge the authoritarian status quo and trigger the start of a democratization process.\textsuperscript{109}

While it may be true that authoritarian leaders attempt to limit any meaningful political action from their citizenry, this does not mean that opposition does not exist. According to Huntington and Nelson, “The attitude of political elites towards political participation is in any society, probably the single most decisive factor influencing the nature of participation in that society.”\textsuperscript{110} In this regard, the notion of political participation is related to the power authority of the state. And because, the type of regime shapes the attitudes of rulers towards participation—they then in turn shape the form of participation.

Thus, when analyzing political participation in an authoritarian setting, one should move away from the debate of weather or not political participation exists, and instead look at the nature and form of the participation and thus it implications for state-society relations.\textsuperscript{111} Drawing upon the definition of participation offered by Huntington and Nelson, political participation is “an activity by private citizens


designed to influence governmental decision-making.\textsuperscript{112} In this regard, participation exists in various forms in Egypt.

According to Nazih Ayubi’s analysis of political activism in the Middle East, political activism in the Middle East takes on a defensive nature, “urban collective action in the traditional Middle East was usually distinctively reactive. Its purpose was not to advance new claims, but to resist the perceived or real new claims of others: the state, foreign powers, or members of a religious minority.”\textsuperscript{113} According to Assef Bayat’s study of political activism in the Middle East, he finds six types: “urban mass protest, trade unionism, community activism, social Islamism, nongovernmental organization and quiet encroachment.”\textsuperscript{114} Through the empirical chapters of this study, chapters 4-6, several forms of these types of activism can be identified in the context of political participation in Egypt. In the case of Egypt, urban mass protest carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Kifayah movement, among others, has become apart of the modern social landscape, trade unions and professional associations established under Nasser, are still very active sites of social and political participation, the increasing number of registered NGOs operating in Egypt, portray a vibrant civil society in Egypt.


“What constitutes a political act in one society may be nonpolitical in another, similarly an identical action may be defined by most people in a society as nonpolitical at one time, but as political in another.”115 When analyzing political participation in the Middle East this is important for most ‘participation’ is informal.116 In this regard the more informal political participation is, the deeper it is rooted in society. This leads to an increasing space of informal channels of communication and participation among peers for examples of a certain groups, neighborhood, or professional organization. In this regard, political liberalization does not necessarily lead to the expansion of political participation because political participation also exists in informal networks. Political liberalization has occurred in many countries in the Middle East, but it has taken on different forms. What is common in the recent ‘openings’ in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, Morocco and Jordan is that they resulted in the lifting of restrictions on the media, in legal reforms, the proliferation of NGOs, and resurgence of electoral politics, though without altering the authoritarian nature of the regimes concerned.117

Looking at standard indicators of liberalization, it becomes apparent that participation occurs even in times of both increasing and decreasing liberalization.

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By looking at the following two indicators in Egypt, economic, and social indicators, one finds *political* participation even at time of decreasing rankings in terms of economic and social participation indicators.

i. *Economic.* Economic competition

The World Economic Forum (WEF) identifies several indicators to assess the level of competition in an economy, such as the intensity of local competition, extent of market dominance, effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy, and ease of access to loans (see Table 2.2). According to the WEF’s qualitative evaluation of economies worldwide, Egypt is identified with less competition and the prevalence of market dominance by larger firms, whereas other countries in the Middle East, such as Morocco and Turkey fares better in terms of the prevalence of competition. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the Egyptian economy more closely with its lower levels of competition, dominance of big firms in the economy, high levels of effective protection and weak integration to the global economy—does not reflect stable economic liberalization. The most recent example of such crony relationships is the privatization of public enterprises to investors on loans provided by state banks and the continuation of “protective policies” effectively maintaining the monopolistic structure of an industry.\(^{118}\) Thus, the poor standing of Egypt on the economic competition indicators further illustrates that any activity under the backdrop of insufficient or opportunity structures both economically and politically

will affect understandings of moderation.

Table 2.2 - Economic Competition Indicators—Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rank (out of 134)</th>
<th>Score (1-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCI* 2008–2009</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI 2007–2008 (out of 131)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI 2006–2007 (out of 122)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic stability</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and primary education</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency enhancers</strong></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education and training</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods market efficiency</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor market efficiency</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial market sophistication</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological readiness</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market size</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovation and Sophistication Factors</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business sophistication</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Global Competitiveness Index

ii. Social. Democracy/Repression

As seen below in Table 2.3 Egypt continues to lag behind the democratizing world on democracy indicators. Freedom House, considers Egypt, ‘Not Free’ with political rights and civil liberties ranking extremely low. Transparency International places Egypt at 115 on a tally of the 180 most corrupt countries. In 2010, four major newspaper editors in Egypt were tried and convicted for insulting President Hosni Mubarak and defaming government officials.¹²⁰ Repression of

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bloggers, activists, and protesters continue to prevail in Egypt, through it Egypt’s security apparatus, which until 2010 held 17,000 political prisoners. \(^{121}\)

**Table 2.3 - Democracy/Repression Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking Body</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ranking Scale (best – worst possible)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Human Development Index</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1 – 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Rule of Law Index</td>
<td>51.9 (2007)</td>
<td>100 – 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Voice &amp; Accountability Index</td>
<td>11.5 (2007)</td>
<td>100 – 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency International</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1 – 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House: Freedom in the World</td>
<td>Status: Not Free</td>
<td>Free/Partly Free/Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Rights: 6</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 5</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy: Failed States Index</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>177 – 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What these indicators demonstrate, is the any democratic ideas emerging under these autocratic constraints are doing so also under the framework of some participation. Participation ultimately has an effect on moderation. This is further investigated in chapter 5 in light of increased political participation of opposition movements in Egypt. In Egypt, with increasing de-liberalization, participation is on the rise.

### 2.5 Towards a Conception of Political Participation

According to Giovanni Sartori, in the “dialectics of life, not only of politics, is that any position engenders an opposition, i.e., a counter position.”\(^{122}\)

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can include formal intuitional opposition, as well as, ‘hidden transcripts’ as
articulated by James C. Scott.\textsuperscript{123} Because of the various forms that opposition and
participation may take, so too can institutions. Institutions, for Helmke and Levitsky
are seen as “rules and procedures (formal and informal) that structure social
interaction by enabling actors behavior.”\textsuperscript{124} In this regard it is essential to
understand that the government and the governing system on the one hand and
opposition on the other hand shape one another.\textsuperscript{125} For Ellen Lust-Okar,
“incumbents cannot dictate their opponents’ actions, but they can influence them.
Through the rules they make and the institutions they establish, governments help
determine which opposition groups exist and how these groups interact with each
other.”\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, according to Lisa Anderson “the nature of political
opposition reflects the nature of political authority.”\textsuperscript{127} What this means for the
conceptualization of political participation is that first, opposition movements and
parties cannot be analyzed on their own, and must be taken as an emerging
relationship with the state or regime—this is illustrated and furthered in chapter 3.
Second, contention between the state and its opposition are important for state


\textsuperscript{125} Robert Dahl proposes five core conditions which basically shape the patterns of
oppositions: “constitutional structures and electoral systems; widely shared cultural
premises; specific subcultures; the record of grievances against the government;
and social and economic differences”; Robert Dahl, “Some Explanations,” in Robert


\textsuperscript{127} Lisa Anderson. “Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle
society relations—this is highlighted in chapter 5. And third, the changing
ideological frames that an opposition party utilizes to articulate its position vis-à-vis
the regime as also a function of that relationship with the state—this is illustrated in
chapter 4.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the state of democracy in the Arab World and the
nature of political participation and political opposition in an authoritarian regime
and the implications of participation for democratization. By highlighting the
importance of not looking at the opposition as a separate entity, but as an entity to
be understood through its historical interaction with the state—with an
understanding the participation under authoritarianism has an effect on the nature
of the opposition. To this end, the following chapter tests the first variable
independent variable, the political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood. By
highlighting the historical progression of the Muslim Brotherhood as the primary
opposition to the regime, the effects of the relationship both on the trajectory and
nature of the Brotherhood, as well as the effects this relationship has had on the
state can be investigated.
Chapter 3: The Historic Relationship between the State & the Brotherhood

The particular platforms and programs of both governments and their opposition...reflect a great variety of sources: ideological beliefs cultural heritages, historical norms, and economic interests. Opposition, however, has the unusual characteristic of being defined partly by what it opposes: it develops within and in opposition to an ideological institutional framework and, as such, reveals a great deal not only about what its own adherents but also about the individuals, policies, regimes, and states in authority...Except for institutionalized opposition in established democracies, all political opposition also illuminates the nature of regimes in power.128

3.1 Introduction

How has the Muslim Brotherhood been shaped by its relationship to the state? And conversely, how has the existence of the Brotherhood affected the behavior of the state? This chapter looks into the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood to provide a contextual historical analysis of the Brotherhood’s emergence as a popular movement, as well as, a key political actor, while also tracing the subsequently changing relationship the Brotherhood has with the state. This chapter pays particular attention to the consequences of the Brotherhood’s illegality on their goals and methods as an Islamist opposition movement. This chapter will not only attempt to answer the question of why Islamists have emerged

as the major opposition to the regime, but also focus on the role of the state in shaping the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood.

3.2 Why a Historiography of the Muslim Brotherhood?

In researching the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship to the state, one finds that after the publication of Richard Mitchell’s seminal work\(^{129}\) on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, very little has since been written on the historic relationship the Muslim Brotherhood has had with the state. And even less is written on the effects that the Muslim Brotherhood has had in shaping the state, and conversely the effects that the state has had on shaping the trajectory and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The intellectual focus for the past decade in particular has been the rise of Islamism and the role of the first mass movement in Islam.\(^{130}\) However, as Mitchell states at the outset of his work:


\(^{130}\) These include:


The Society of the Muslim Brothers grew...into one of the most important political contestants on the Egyptian scene. It membership became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian society. More important, it made effective inroads into the most sought-after of these groups—the civil servants and the students—and the most neglected and potentially powerful, the urban laborers and the peasants.\textsuperscript{131}

What needs further investigation is how does the emergence on the scene of such a large grassroots organization as a political actor affect politics and the state and then how does the experiences of this interaction shape the movement itself. While much of the writings of al-Banna and members of the Brotherhood do not emerge until the 1940s, their interaction with political leaders, the monarchy and their involvement in the anti-colonialism campaigns vis-à-vis the regime greatly shapes the historic trajectory of the Brotherhood.

There are a number of important reasons for the inclusion of historiography. First, ideology is not enough.\textsuperscript{132} While much of the rest of this research will focus on


the emergence and change in Brotherhood ideology, a complete understanding of their impact on the trajectory of Egypt must include an analysis of the particularities, the relationships and the alliances formed to illustrate why it was the Muslim Brotherhood that emerged as such a force. For example, Davis (1983) finds, while ideology is crucial, it is often tied to a social base. In this regard, ideology does matter, but there were several Islamic associations and youth movements at the time of the Brotherhood, but none emerged as successful or as enduring as the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, in order to further understand the emergence and successes as well as failures of the Brotherhood, one must also look into the conditions that led to their emergence. In this regard, the socio-economic and cultural factors of the time are also important. As Raymond William Baker states,

The determination of the potentialities of a concrete social situation (the key to arriving at appropriate standards for evaluating a given process of social change) can be a historical determination grounded in meaning-analysis.\(^{133}\)

Therefore, a historiography of the Muslim Brotherhood will enrich an understanding of the process of social and political change in Egypt.

Previous research has looked either insularly at the Muslim Brotherhood as an isolated actor,\(^{134}\) or at specific conditions that lead to its rise,\(^{135}\) namely the


deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the process of Westernization and secularization, the role of the religious establishment, the role of colonialism, and the role of a rapidly increasing educated middle-class. Neither of these approaches offers an accurate depiction of the relationship of the Brotherhood to the state. While general societal setting is important, its analysis is insufficient to explain the organization’s reform programs, its recruitment approach, the internal structure, or the class, social, religious, and political interest of its members. After a brief discussion of the state-society relations as an analytic frame, this chapter will analysis the role of this frame in understanding the emergence, role, and effects the brotherhood had (and continues to have) on political and the, as well as how this relationship has effected the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood.

### 3.3 State Theory: Why The ‘State-Society’ Approach

The study of the state has been and continues to be one of the key research programs of the comparative politics subfield. The last two decades or so has seen the disappearance of some states off the world map, as well as the emergence of new states—the consequences of which have shaped the domestic, regional and international environments, as well as the study of what causes such phenomena.

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\(^{135}\) For a discussion of the social and economic crisis as well as and the political and religious vacuum that existed in Egypt the provided a background of the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, see: James Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*. Washington: McGregor & Werner, Inc., 1950.
And while in scholarly circles the state has both come under assault and been summoned back, the state remains central to the study of comparative politics.\textsuperscript{136}

There are various ways with which to divide the approaches to the study of the state. The first set of approaches can be divided in terms of their concentration on the state versus on society, this criterion leads to: the “state-centered approach” which focuses on state autonomy,\textsuperscript{137} the “society-centered approach” which sees the state as socially embedded,\textsuperscript{138} and finally the “state-society approach” which focuses on a linkage between the state and society, which includes Joel Migdal’s State in Society\textsuperscript{139} approach, Timothy Mitchell’s “state effects”.\textsuperscript{140} This study will utilize the “state-society approach” to highlight the ways with which, the Egyptian State and aspects of Egyptian society affect one another.


\textsuperscript{137} This approach is predicated on the Webarian Model, where in contrast to Marx, the state posses goals distinct from the society over which it rules. Skocpol’s discussion of the state as autonomous from dominant class control is exemplary of this approach. See: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 29-31

\textsuperscript{138} This includes Pluralist State Theory that sees groups as the means of articulating interests of society and representing those interests to government—power is thus dispersed throughout society and not concentrated within the state (See Robert Dahl, Who Governs. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969; and also Marxist State Theory where in instrumentalist Marxism, the state is the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie” (The Communist Manifesto), and for structural Marxism the state is more autonomous, yet state intervention in the economy for example is always mediated through the balance of class forces. See Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB, 1973.

\textsuperscript{139} Joel Migdal, State in Society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001; and also Joel Migdal, ed. Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, for a discussion of how states and societies act in conjunction to both identity formation and in local practices.

While much of the research on the state analyzed above takes a state-centered approach, a new approach to the study of the state has been recently developed. According to Migdal, the “state-society approach” approach is influenced by several frameworks, namely, interpretive, cultural and Foucaultian approaches, that emphasize the role of social groupings in delineating the effectiveness of the state. While the statist approach and the systemic approaches to the study of the state usurped most of the debate, scholars like Migdal and Mitchell offer alternative approaches that aim at dealing specifically with the “elusive, porous, and mobile” nature of the state-society divide, thus problematizing the view of the state as the central political organization within in a given territory, that is the agency that sets and enforces binding rules among its citizens. Mitchell problematizes the boundaries of state and society, pointing to the Weberian definition of the state, as an organization that claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence does not tell us how the actual contours of this amorphous organization are drawn—thus, the state stands apart from society. He applies Foucault’s approach to state theory to conclude that “focusing on the state as essentially a phenomenon of decision making or policy is inadequate,” since the state is “as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which

141 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (1988)
create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society” and, consequently, “the state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organization or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called society.”

Migdal analyzes how the two influence one another, he is critical of the status of the state that “lists it apart form the rest of society” offering an analysis of the interactive struggles for domination between state and society and the social changes involved in those struggles. The aim of the state-in-society approach, is to show how limited definitions of the state do not adequately highlight the struggles over which ‘rules’ dictate how people live. For Migdal, these struggles determine how societies and states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring and organizing day-to-day life.

Migdal sees the importance of social groupings in and how they mitigate the “penetration and effectiveness of states” in many developing countries leading to mutual transformation. This is predicated on the existence of an environment of conflict and contestation of the two entities that find themselves struggling for survival and power. Within this struggle the state competes to maintain social control and domination through the development of strong state agencies to ensure the survival of the state. Thus, the state is a

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'field of power' marked by the use of threat and violence shaped by the image of a coherent, controlling organization in territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory and the actual practices of its 'multiple parts', an essential theoretical frame for understanding the relationship between the Brotherhood and the state.146

In this regard, an emphasis on state and society, rather than the state-centered or society-centered approaches of the past, results in an analysis of the state as a point in the continuous struggle between various forces in society.

The state-in-society model...zeros in on the conflict-laden interaction of multiple sets of formal and informal guide posts for how to behave that are promoted by different groupings in society. These multiple groupings, all of which use subtle and not so subtle rewards and sanctions—including at times out and out violence—try to get their way, comprise loose-knit informal collections of people as highly structured organizations with manifold resources at their disposal. In short all societies have on going battles among groups pushing different versions of how societies should behave. The nature and outcomes of these struggles give societies their distinctive structure and character.”147

3.4 The Emergence of Political Islam

While political Islam has had a myriad of manifestations, the political Islam in its participatory form that exists today in much of the MENA region and the Levant, finds its origin in the Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna saw his aim as to, “reform the hearts

and minds, to guide Muslims back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations of the and conduct created by European dominance.” 148 In Egypt, these views are attributed to the reformist thinkers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, his pupil Muhammad Abdu, 149 and Abdu’s pupil Rashid Rida. 150 These scholars argued that the success of Western domination in Muslim lands was due to the ignorance and fragmentation that had permeated Muslim lands. 151 According to Sami Zubaidah, the these scholars saw the failings of the Islamic Empire (particularly, the fall of the Ottoman Empire) as not due to any intrinsic features of Islam, but instead the failure of the Islamic Empire was due to the fact that Islam has been “subverted by the dynastic empires, and forgotten in the degeneration and corruption of religion in later centuries.” 152 For Fatimah Mernissi, this is reflected in spatial and linguistic dimensions of Muslim understandings of the other, and of concepts and societies deemed “un-Islamic.” She calls for a re-examining of accepted interpretations of


149 Muhammad Abdu (1865-1905) was educated at Al-Azhar University, and emphasized moderation due to the “universality of Islam.” He renounced rigidity and isolation and found that the Muslim World had much to learn from the lessons of Europe. Muhammad Abdu’s reform principles are based on his emphasis on free thought in understanding religion and seeking original sources in acquiring knowledge. Abdu maintained that religion must not be made into a barrier, separating men’s spirits from God-given abilities in the knowledge of the truth of the contingent world. Rather, religion must promote this very search, demanding respect for evidence and enjoining the utmost possible devotion and endeavor through all the worlds of knowledge. He considered that the study of the contingent world, the analysis of astronomical worlds and the diverse theories of stars in their courses, the dimensions of the world’s length and breadth, the sciences that study plants in their growth and animals in their quest to survive, that all of these and more belong with the relevant branches of learning and have been the area of much eager rivalry over their detailed investigation. Muhammed Abdu. Theology of Unity, trans. by Ishaq Musa’ad and Kenneth Cragg. Islamic Book Trust, 2004.


Islamic concepts, as well as tracing how such interpretations have come into play, making them negative, and how these affect behavior—and how these are far from the essence and spirit of Islam.\(^{153}\) Yet, for these reformists, Abdu in particular, the relationship between the ruler and the rules needed redefinition.\(^{154}\) The reformists, Abdu in particular, distinguishing between the people’s obedience to the government and the government’s justice to the people. In this regard, Abduh tried to separate political from religious reform. In his *Risalat al-Tawhid (Theology of Unity)*, Abduh says: “The Qur’an directs us, enjoining rational procedure and intellectual enquiry into the manifestations of the universe, and, as far as may be, into its particulars, so as to come by certainty in respect of the things to which it guides.” For him reform was in religious understanding, and knowledge acquisition and did not successfully translate into the realm of politics. They failed to translate the ideas of rational reform “into the field of political struggle or of incorporating them into the modern state.”\(^ {155}\) This has great influence on the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood. For found within the corpus of the founder, Hasan al-Banna, are the frustrations of the reformist thinkers, however al-Banna articulated them in as ideological framework for political activism. In the timeline of political Islam, the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood is marked as one of the first (if note the first) milestone of the shifting of Islamic reformist thinking into the arena of political activism.

3.5  **Pre-1928: Egypt Before the Formation of the Muslim Brotherhood**

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna was born on October 17, 1906 in the Egyptian village of Mahmoudiya, on the northern banks of the Nile River. His father, a graduate of al-Azhar, Ahmad al-Banna, was a respected religious scholar, who also eared a living as a watch repairman, which was customary for scholars to do. Al-Banna’s mother, Um al-Sa’d, the daughter of farmers was “intelligent, alert and strong-willed, if not obstinate.” She had a great impact on the curiosity of Al-Banna. At a young age, Al-Banna was enrolled in religious schools where he began to follow his father’s dual tracks. At the age of 12 he was moved out of religious schooling and into a state primary school. However, Al-Banna continued his religious training by joining a religious group called ‘The Society for Moral Behavior’ which held it members to a strict code of Islamic morality. At the age of 13, Al-Banna joined the Husafiyya order, a Sufi order that emphasized spirituality and obedience.

Al-Banna’s formative years were shaped by the social and political situation of the time. After a period of foreign domination, most notably by the British, during

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156 Hassan al-Banna’s father, Ahmed, was born in 1882 into a family of small landowners in the village of Shimshira on the westernmost branch of the Nile. This was the same year the British occupied Egypt at the beginning of the era of Lord Cromer. Cromer did not believe in public education, least of all for the peasant population. In his view, rural men and women, if they were to have any education at all, should be given a practical training designed to make them useful. Ahmed al-Banna rejected this vision of education and joined religious schools until he graduated from al-Azhar. Al-Azhar, established in the eleventh century, is the largest and most prestigious religious intuition in the world. See Gudrun Krämer. *Makers of the Muslim World: Hasan al-Banna*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009.

the 19th and early 20th century, the Egyptian economy was predominantly controlled by foreign investor and a new political elite that was increasingly adopting European mannerisms and customs. The political, economic and cultural imperialism by the British led to an increasing anti-European and anti-Western sentiment amongst Egyptians that eventually led to the 1881 uprising on the first of February in Alexandria. In response, on July 11, 1882, the British fleet attacked Alexandria, followed by the landing of 25,000 troops at Ismailia. From this point on, Britain effectively controlled Egypt.

Gradually, a nationalist movement began to emerge to counter the indirect rule of the British over Egypt. However, by the outbreak of the First World War the Nationalist Movement that had begun to decline had remerged. By the end of the war in 1919, the movement for Egyptian independence was gaining mass popularity, with Al-Banna, just 13, an active member of protests. And by 1922, the British officially declared Egyptian independence. Thus, Al-Banna’s formative years where shaped by foreign occupation and his participation in the successful resistance to the occupation.

Hassan al-Banna attended the Teachers’ Training College in Damanhour where he excelled. He refused a scholarship opportunity from Ministry of Education in Europe. Instead, al-Banna took up teaching and became an elementary teacher for al-Ismalih School on the west bank of the Suez Canal. However, the societal

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changes occurring in Egypt were so substantive that al-Banna remained on the social scene.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Egyptian society underwent substantial transformation. The population greatly increased from 1900-1922\textsuperscript{159} due to improvement in public hygiene. The population growth coupled with the increasing landlessness among the peasantry led to increased urbanization and the migration from villages to cities. The cities then witnessed an increasing complex society, where urban artisans flourished alongside a modern middle class of urban civil servants, professionals and industrial workers.\textsuperscript{160} Socially, cities were not just becoming more urban and complex, but they were also seen as becoming increasingly culturally Western—where cultural domination was seen as reflected in the intellectual ideas of élites who began to advocate ideals of liberalism calling for a move away from religious tradition. This period was fraught with much debate on social and religious issues.

During the 1920s the political and intellectual élite increasing articulated a secular modernist ideology with European images and ideas permeating Egyptian newspapers, magazines and books. The two major cities of Cairo and Alexandria developed Western style neighborhoods where nightclubs, cinemas and theaters

\textsuperscript{159} The population increased from 10,186,00 in 1900 to 13,551,000 in 1922. The World Bank. \textit{World Bank Development Indicators 2008}. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008.

flourished. The writings of the controversial scholar Ali Abd al-Raziq, who questioned the role and authenticity of Shariah in society\textsuperscript{161} along with Egyptian nationalist writers began increasingly articulating a secular, Egyptian national identity that found its origins in the pre-Islamic, paranoiac legacy of Egypt produced a counter hegemonic narrative to those articulated by Islamic scholars.\textsuperscript{162} This secular Egyptian national identity reduced Islam to a matter of personal conscience and devotion separate from public life.\textsuperscript{163} It was during this time of visible social change that Qassim Amin’s \textit{Tahrir Al-Mar’a} (The Liberation of Woman), published in 1899, caused intense debate on the role of religion in the public sphere. It was also during this time that the works of Al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida\textsuperscript{164} were circulating that called for an Islamic response to cultural Westernization by returning to the ‘true’ Islam.\textsuperscript{165} They held that Islam, when properly understood perfectly accorded with reason, science and technology, three


\textsuperscript{162} For a detailed discussion of this see Timothy Mitchell, \textit{Colonizing Egypt}. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.


\textsuperscript{164} Rashid Rida’s \textit{Journal al-Manar}, published from 1898 to 1935 made these ideas readily available to the masses.


Albert Hourani, \textit{Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798-1939}. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, Chapter IX.

trends that had increasingly conflicted with tradition during this time of rapid industrialization. Yet, their vision of Islam was not accepted by the masses, and most remained committed to either the more conservative teachings of the scholars of al-Azhar, or to adherence to Sufi orders. This tension, along with the Kemalist victory in Turkey seemed to place Egypt on the path of increased marginalization of religion from the public sphere, but this would not be the case.

3.6 Al-Banna and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as a Spiritual Movement

As a 22 year-old schoolteacher, al-Banna began to formalize his preaching, that emphasized the reorientation of Muslim Societies to a ‘pure’ Islamic order, into the formal organization of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, or the Muslim Brotherhood. Along with six other young laborers in Ismailiyya, a port city along the Suez, al-Banna states,

In March 1928, six brothers\(^{166}\) visited me at home, we gave our pledge and swore that we would live as brothers working for Islam and strive in its cause. One of us said: ‘What should we call ourselves? Should we form an association, a club or an organization?’ I said: ‘No! Let’s not worry about formalities, let’s concentrate on practical issues. We are brothers who work for Islam, so we are Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon (The Muslim Brothers).’ That was the birth of the first group of Al-Ikhwan, consisting of these six people who gathered around the principle. Under this name we started working with a clear and comprehensive understanding of Islam. As a result the Da’wah of Al-Ikhwan comprised all aspects of reformation of the Muslim Ummah.”\(^{167}\)

\(^{166}\) Hafez Abdel-Hamid, Ahmad Al-Hossary, Fuad Ibrahim, Abder-Rahman Hasab-Allah, Ismael Ezz and Zaki Al-Maghraby.

Without articulating a clear vision for the cause, or what the comprehensive understanding of Islam would practically look like, al-Banna’s vision for the movement began to unfold as a result of reactions to specific events.

From the start, while unclear in their mission, the Muslim Brotherhood exhibited the dual characteristics of an internal reform movement operating within the context of foreign occupation. Al-Banna and his colleagues focused on direct preaching in mosques and cafés, as opposed to other nationalist opposition groups who came into direct conflict with the establishment. Instead, the Brotherhood began a grass-roots movement preaching self-improvement, reformation, and the empowerment of the downtrodden. Quickly, within four years, this simple movement born out of a critical discourse of the establishment had established itself a vast network of civil service institutions including mosques, schools and factories.¹⁶⁸

The movement focused on social issues related to laborers until al-Banna’s transfer from Ismailiyya to a school in Cairo. This move also resulted in the move of the head quarters of the Muslim Brotherhood to Cairo. Faced with a different recruitment base, the Brotherhood began to heavily draw in university students and civil servants.¹⁶⁹ The newly recruited urban dwellers would then return to their


respective villages with this 'new' vision of an Islamic way of life. By the early 1930s, the Brotherhood had launched successful social programs in more than fifty localities in Cairo and established sixteen branch offices, each with a school, a social and athletic club (nadi) and a mosque.  

Similarly, membership in the brotherhood rapidly increased during the mid-1930s as students, civil servants, officers and soldiers joined. The Brotherhood also won recruits from the prominent Wafd party of Egypt, the Young Muslim Men’s Association (YMMA) and the Young Egypt Society.  

Awareness of the Brotherhood grew further and more widespread through the dissemination of Brotherhood publications of the 1930s and early 1940s. This was a deliberate strategy of the Brotherhood, where al-Banna saw to win new recruits the organization must pass through a stage of “communication and information dissemination”. This led to the establishment of the weekly periodical *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (1933-1938) edited by Hasan al-Banna and

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171 Founded by Saad Zaghloul the Wafd party (or "delegation") was an Egyptian nationalistic movement that came into existence in the aftermath of World War I with the goal of achieving the complete and total independence of Egypt.

172 *Jam’iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin* was founded in 1927 and within three years had around 15,000 members. The leader in the 1930s was Izz al-din Qassam who led a peasant revolt in the early 1930s. See Ahmed Abdalla. *The Student Movement and National Politics of Egypt 1923-1973*. Cairo: Egypt America University Cairo Press, 2008. P. 58

173 The Young Egypt Society was formed in 1933, and changed its name to the Young Party of Egypt in 1936, then to the Islamic Nationalist Party in 1940, and finally to the Socialist Party of Egypt in 1949, and was dissolved after the 1952 revolution. See: James P. Jankowski. *Egypt’s young rebels “Young Egypt,” 1933-1952*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.


Tantawi Jawahri, its successor *al-Khulud* (1938-1940), the more political *al-Nadhir* (1938-1940) edited by Mustafa Salih Ashmawi, and the bi-weekly *Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (1942-1954) presumably reaching larger audiences with the progression of time. The work and mission of the Muslim Brotherhood remained in the realm of religion and social welfare. They did not enter into discussions of politics or of engagement with the state until they held their third conference of 1935 and the fifth conference in 1939. In this conference they began discussing the increased recruitment of the brotherhood, the criterion of membership and the hierarchy and structure of the brotherhood. The hierarchy (see Appendix A) grew out of the athletic associations that the brotherhood grew out of and was established to forage inner loyalties within the society.

3.7 *Causes of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Expansion:*

Since its inception in 1928 the Brotherhood exhibited great expansion among youth and young professionals. Between 1929 and 1932, the movement grew from a singular group of to a movement that had five branch offices by 1930, fifteen by 1932 and three hundred by 1938. While exact membership figures are unknown,

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177 The first two were held in 1933. For a discussion of the first two conferences, see Mitchell, Richard P. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. pp. 13, 276. The first conference was held to discuss the expansive missionary activity in Egypt, the second was held to discuss the plan for the publications of the Brotherhood. The fourth conference in 1937 was held to discuss the celebration of the coronation of King Faruq.


the three hundred branches probably represented between 50 thousand and 150 thousand members.¹⁸⁰ This extremely rapid expansion can be explained through key strategies that the Muslim Brotherhood utilized.

The first strategy that was important in the growth and development of the Brotherhood is in the area of social services. The Brotherhood provided key services which included, education for boys and girls, affordable and/or free medical care, financial help and vocational training. But most critically, it served as a opportunity-network-structure that was able to facilitate the move of thousands of young upwardly mobile lower-middle class members who moved from the countryside to the cities and faced limited opportunities.¹⁸¹ The services provided young people, previously disenfranchised once they arrive in large cities, and provided them with the networks and facilities required to overcome the obstacles that challenged their prospects at ‘upward mobility.’¹⁸²

The ability of the Brotherhood to provide such services brought millions of Egyptians into contact with the Brotherhood, increasing its membership and popularized the Brotherhood’s vision of Egypt. More importantly, however, the simply ability of the Brotherhood to provide such social services on such an

expansive level, demonstrated its ability to deliver on social and economic promises to the Egyptian population.\textsuperscript{183} In this regard, the Brotherhood was seen as a “state within a state.”\textsuperscript{184} At the time of heightened socio-economic crisis in the 1930s and 1940s, the ability of the Brotherhood to provide much needed services added not only to the popularity of the Brotherhood, but also to its ability to challenge Egyptian government.\textsuperscript{185}

The second factor, which was important in the growth and development of the Brotherhood, was the Brotherhood’s ability to utilize the mosque.\textsuperscript{186} Because the government did not authorize large gatherings of people, the Mosque served as a space that was seen as free of government interference, and a safe place for large gatherings to occur, without the scrutiny of the authorities.\textsuperscript{187} Despite the governments control and monitoring of mosques, these sacred spaces greatly facilitated in the recruitment of new members. Mosques also gave the movement’s preachers an aura of respectability, which they might not have otherwise attained if they spoke during rallies in the street. Speeches within the mosque tied their call to Islam and further legitimized the movement in society. Thus, mosques were critical to the successful birth, growth and development of the Brotherhood, an institution

\textsuperscript{184} Al Ahram, July 7-13, 2005
\textsuperscript{187} Fathi Yakan. \textit{Manhajiyat al-imam al-shahid hasan albanna wa madaris al-ikhwan al-muslimin (The Methodology of the martyred Imam Hassan al Banna and the schools of the Muslim Brotherhood)}, Beirut, Risalah Publishers, 1998
\textsuperscript{187} Ikhwanweb, April 3, 2006
not available for secular groups.\textsuperscript{188} While the Brotherhood's leaders used numerous styles such as, street demonstrations and public rallies to mobilize the Egyptian people, the mosque remained the primary source of mobilization and recruitment throughout 1932-1954.\textsuperscript{189}

The third factor that led to the successful spread and growth of the Brotherhood was al-Banna himself. Seen as the charismatic leader of the movement, al-Banna became, and remains, in the eyes of the Brotherhood a source of guidance and emulation.\textsuperscript{190} Al-Banna's popularity allowed him special access to the palace through his position as a special advisor to the monarchy and thus by extension to the state. Al-Banna wrote numerous letters to the King and sent several memorandums to key government ministers. In them he emphasized several issues, which included giving the Palestinian cause more importance, and the need to include Islamic principles into the governing legal structure of Egypt, and to build greater ties with the "Islamic World."\textsuperscript{191} He also emphasized social issues such as increasing the minimum wage, improving working conditions, and the expansion of hospitals and clinics—especially for the poor.\textsuperscript{192} Al-Banna was


\textsuperscript{189} ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} ibid, Also, his is seen in the current rift within Brotherhood today, where the younger generation accuses the older generation of following al-Banna’s words as if they were religious revelations, and not the pontifications of a man. In this regard they call for re-orienting the vision of al-Banna to the current circumstance. More on this in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{191} The Muslim Brotherhood sent a large contingent to fight during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

extremely skillful in, “compromising between principle of social reform in the West and the principle of religion, but, naturally he colored with Western principles with a religious hue.”193

For example, al-Banna managed to juxtapose his movement against the two systems of Nazi-Fascism and communism, but also learn from their models. While he openly criticized the two systems, the Nazi-Fascists for their racial theory, which for al-Banna, “could only lead to a conflict of the human races for the sake of an illusion,” and the communists for, “their advocacy of communal ownership, the expropriations of individual property, and their destruction of religions.”194 For al-Banna, Islam does not recognize racial differences and did not consider man a materialistic mass devoid of religious feelings.195 However, al-Banna also relied on these ideological systems, adopting from the former a pyramidal structure of obedience and discipline, and an understanding of social-welfare predicated on the brotherhood of humanity and cooperation between classes without differentiation among people from the latter. However for al-Banna, these principles were already inherent in Islam, and needed to be the principles by which the Egyptian state would be re-envisioned.

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194 ibid.

Thus, through his ‘ideological role’ al-Banna communicated his reformist agenda onto the monarchy. This vision was further institutionalized after the entry of the Brotherhood into politics in the 1930s. As the Brotherhood become more politically involved, their movement shifted form its original focus on spiritual elevation to political activism. This would move beyond activism and into the realm of governance from the 80s onward.

3.8 The Muslim Brotherhood and Birth of Political Activism

After the formal establishment of the movement, the Brotherhood continued to focus on the religious mission and on social welfare programs until 1936 when the Brotherhood became ardent supporters of the six-month Palestinian strike against British occupation—which eventually led to the Great Palestinian Revolt.196 In support of their Palestinian brethren, the Muslim Brotherhood conducted a nation-wide fundraising campaign, and began a propaganda campaign against British occupation.197

This foray into politics the Muslim Brotherhood serves to illustrate the not just the Muslim Brotherhood taking a political stance, but the Muslim Brotherhood

taking a political stance vis-à-vis the state and its opposition forces. To date, Egyptian politics had been dominated by nationalist sentiment with an inward focus on Egyptian domestic affairs. The champion of this cause was Mustafa Kamil, a nationalist hero and founder of the National Party. Kamil’s famous statement, “If I weren’t an Egyptian, I would have wished to be an Egyptian,” is said to have inspired the Egyptian national anthem, *Biladi, Biladi* (my country, my country). As a result of growing nationalist the Brotherhood decided to align itself with a more pan-Arab position—a decidedly more secular ideology. They campaigned heavily for Pan-Arabism and through their campaigning and their support of the Palestinian cause, Pan-Arabism helped position Egypt as the leading defender of Arab rights in the region, and as the voice against the colonization of the Arab peoples.

By 1936, when King Faruq took over power his Father King Fuad, Egyptian politics was changing greatly at this critical moment. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were quickly gaining ground and the appointment of Ali Maher, a conservative Muslim, as prime minister from 1936-1940 further served to catapult the collusion between the two ideological tracks. As the tension between the Monarchy and the Wafd party continued to grow, the Prime Minister, a friend of al-Banna began emphasizing the religious orientation of the newly formed

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government. It was at this time that the Brotherhood held its fourth conference to celebrate the succession of King Faruq and strengthen its ties to the Monarchy.

This first foray into politics led to the first major division within the Brotherhood. Several members took the position that the Brotherhood should focus exclusively on religious and social issues and programs\textsuperscript{200} and not enter into politics (this schism continues as a source of debate in the future under the leadership of Hassan al-Hudaiby, the second General Guide after al-Banna,\textsuperscript{201} and is a major source of the rift that exists in the Brotherhood today). Another major rift over the political position of the Brotherhood occurred between al-Banna and his long time friend\textsuperscript{202} and vice-president of the Brotherhood Ahmed Sukkari.

Ahmed Sukkari, along time friend of al-Banna, and the political liaison officer of the Muslim Brotherhood had several chief contacts within the Wafd party. As political tension increased amongst opposition parties and the monarchy, several members of the Brotherhood called for a coalition with the Wafd party. While this was a minority view, even al-Banna had, "accepted the principle idea of a coalition of


\textsuperscript{201} Hassan al-Hudaiby was the second "General Guide" after Hasan al-Banna and author of \textit{Du’at la Qudat (Preachers, Not Judges)}. Cairo: Dar al-Tiba’ wa’1-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1977, where he discusses, among other things, this rift and the implications of it on the Brotherhood.

the Wafd would adopt the program and principles of the society.”\textsuperscript{203} Sukkari, however, felt that the Brotherhood could only emerge as a political power in Egypt if it allied itself with the (secularist) Wafd—this stemmed out of his vision that the Brotherhood would serve as the spiritual fulfillment of the Wafd—the only party with a popular following.\textsuperscript{204} Furthermore, Sukkari saw himself as the political leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, with al-Banna as the spiritual guide of the movement—Sukkari saw this as the ultimate union of the people’s interests.

This foray into politics resulted in two major events that would later lead to the demise of the Brotherhood for several years. First, the alliance with the Wafd on one hand would problemetize the relationship that the Brotherhood was also having with the palace—a relationship that was crucial for al-Banna to maintain. And second, this problemetized the leadership role of the Brotherhood. Was the leader a spiritual or political guide, and could he be both. The outlined distribution of power laid out in 1945 (see Appendix 1) were meant to disperse power and authority in the Brotherhood and decentralize it away from al-Banna. However, Sukkari’s questioning of the suspicious contacts of the Brotherhood with the palace (over an strategic alliance with the Wafd) and his claims to a political leadership role, led to the eventual dismissal of Sukkari from the Brotherhood in 1947.\textsuperscript{205} The departure

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of Sukkari,\textsuperscript{206} reflected a period of turmoil for the Brotherhood where the political and societal vision of the Brotherhood began to clash.

Thus, by the end of this initial phase, what emerges is a vision of the Muslim Brotherhood where their active political participation is on several levels. While they don’t reject the established political order of the Monarchy out-right, they do find it in need of Islamic moral and social reform.\textsuperscript{207} Although the popularity of the Brotherhood was in the religious social sphere, their stance on national issues furthered their popularity into the secular sphere. “Their constant defense of the national cause (Palestine, Suez, British evacuation) gained them respect and legitimacy on purely secular terms and beyond their own circle of sympathizers.”\textsuperscript{208} This led the Brotherhood to field candidates for the first time in the 1942 parliamentary elections. However due to government manipulation and British intervention, the Brotherhood lost miserable, not winning any seats despite their popularity and ever expanding base of support.\textsuperscript{209} As the popularity of the

\textsuperscript{206} It was not only the departure of Sukkari but also the ‘Abdin Affair and the departure of Ibrahim Hasan. The ‘Abdin affair refers to the secretary general of the Brotherhood and al-Banna’s brother-in-law ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Abdin who was accused of abusing his position. After, an investigative body was put together to decide the fate of ‘Abdin, he was voted out by a vote of 8 to 1. However, pressure from al-Banna to overturn this led to the eventual resignation of Ibrahim Hasan, one of the oldest members of the Brotherhood. Richard P. Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 53.


Brotherhood grew and expanded not only in different social spheres, but also into politics, the government crackdown on the brotherhood increased. By 1948, the government ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood, with the state prosecutors charging that "The organization, after it grew strong, assumed 'political goals', the secret apparatus was created and the rover group was trained to assist in the ultimate political goal of taking power."\(^{210}\)

The capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood to both mobilize popular support and grow into a successful organization meant that it was emerging as a political challenger to the state. The emerging position of the Brotherhood as a challenger to the state shaped its relationship to the state early on. The state develops a pattern if adopting tactics that are “cooperative” at times and “coercive” at time that begin to constitute a cycle that was not only maintained during the early period of the Brotherhood,\(^ {211}\) but this cycle endures today—greatly affecting the role of politicized Islam in the state.

### 3.9 The Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser:

The aftermath of the 1952 revolution and the make-up of the government under President Gamal Abdel Nasser had a direct impact on the development and trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood. The initial relationship of the Brotherhood with Nasser’s regime was a close and mutually beneficial one. However, after the

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initial successes of Nasser, and his desire to become a dictator, all perceived threats and former allies were to be eliminated. Under Nasser member of the Brotherhood were heavily persecuted and the movement was crushed through brute force. This brutality on the part of the regime, led to the movement of the Brotherhood towards an ideology that was more reactionary and more extreme in its view and interpretation. The extremist interpretations that emerged at this time, led to the more radical groups that emerged in the late 1960s.

From the start of his rule, Nasser formed some relations with the Brotherhood on the basis of mutual gains and ideological vision through the Revolutionary Council Command (RCC)\textsuperscript{212}. This new council comprised of former members of the Free Officers still had ties to the Brotherhood and wanted to bring members of the Brotherhood into the political fold by offering ministerial posts, in the hopes that this would led the RCC to co-opt the power and social appeal of the Brotherhood. According to Sami Gahwar’s \textit{The Silent One’s Speak Out},\textsuperscript{213} Nasser was not only initially supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, but he was a member of the


clandestine military organization of the Brotherhood, re-affirming his commitment a few times including on the eve of July 23, 1952.214

After failing to bring members of the Brotherhood into his cabinet, Nasser saw the Brotherhood as traitors. After the revolution the Brotherhood hierarchy began calling to elections to take place. Nasser saw the call for elections as a desire for the return of the Wafd Party rule. Nasser saw himself as the new and enduring leader of Egypt. In his Philosophy of the Revolution, written in 1953, Nasser articulated his idea that it would take a social revolution to develop Egypt.215 Nasser saw himself as the leader of the social revolution and one that would steer the country in modernity. Yet, Nasser’s social revolution did not really begin to take shape until the nineteen sixties.216

Nasser saw the effectiveness of the Brotherhood’s twenty-seven years of social and political activity as a threat to his new rule. He asks for the dissolving of

214 It is important to note that Nasser was a part of an Egyptian military unit that was under siege in 1948 in the Palestinian village of Falloujah, and was rescued by the paramilitary unit of the Muslim Brotherhood. This paramilitary unit sent thousands of fighters to Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The Brotherhood was able to fund this unit with the help of their alliance with Azzam Pasha, the head of the Arab League, and Salih Harb Pasha, head of the Young Muslim Men’s Association. The Egyptian Government under Nuqrashi allowed these paramilitary units to be trained by the government and funded by the Arab League. However, after the defeat of Egypt during the war, and the growing power of the Brotherhood, and the discovery of large weapons cashes, Prime Minister Nuqrashi dissolved the Brotherhood. This resulted in his assassination on December 28, 1948. For a discussion of these events see: Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Anuar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society. New York: Random House, 1968; and Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine question, 1928-1947. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998.


the Brotherhood, and is told that this is impossible—it was a movement that had
grown beyond the individuals at its helm. Nasser sees the calls for elections, the
lack of government involvement and the unwillingness to obey his commands on
the part of the Brotherhood, as political defiance. This begins the start of the
suppression of the Brotherhood.

3.9.1 Nasser, the Brotherhood, and Ideological Struggle

In, Nadav Safran’s classic work on Egyptian ideological development, he finds
that the leaders of the 1952 revolution had led to an ideological change in trajectory
by breaking, “the association of nationalism with the Western-model Liberal
constitutional regimes by abolishing the old political order.”217 He finds that this
break, coupled with the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, aimed at their
destruction, is a method of breaking the Brotherhods monopoly on symbols of
faith. Safran finds that the resulting product is a “new nationalism, which though it
feeds on Muslim emotion, is, nevertheless, intolerant of Muslim tradition whenever
that tradition seems to conflict with the course of desired modernization.”218
According to Gouda Abdel Khalek of the Tagammu’ Party (or the National
Progressive Unionist Party)219 this has had a negative affect not only on the

217 Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and
P. 255.
218 Ibid, p. 256.
219 The Tagammu’ Party (or the National Progressive Unionist Party) considered the
democratic socialist party of Egypt, has long defended the principles of the 1952
revolution. The official party website can be found at: www.al-ahaly.com/
ideological development of the nation, but more so on the political and economic development of Egypt. Dr. Abdel Khalek likened the 1952 revolution to an abortion, the political, social, and ideological developments of Egypt was aborted before they could develop and take hold...the constitutional development, the social development, the economic development, but also the ideological development shifted...and Egypt has yet to recover from this.\textsuperscript{220}

Dr. Abdel Khalek, like Safran sees this struggle over to cooption of ideology as a problem that had plagued Egypt. While Abdel Khalek argues that this control has led to a struggle that has come to deem religion in politics as the “scary, unknown boogieman” that is out to strangle the modernization of the country,\textsuperscript{221} Safran questions whether or not “leaders would be able to control religious impulse” in Egypt.\textsuperscript{222}

According to Leonard Binder, the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, from 1954-1955, was a “part of the post revolutionary struggle for power among several groups and factions that favored the overthrow of the monarchy.”\textsuperscript{223} This struggle had little to do with the struggle over the ideological trajectory of the state, and more to do with the struggle over power that in turn affected the religious establishment as well as the “Islamic” party—the Brotherhood. While Nasser’s

\textsuperscript{220} Dr. Gouda Abdel Khalek, economics professor at Cairo University, and one of the original founders of the leftist Taggamu Party of Egypt. Personal interview. North Brunswick, NJ, June 9, 2010.

\textsuperscript{221} Dr. Gouda Abdel Khalek, economics professor at Cairo University, and one of the original founders of the leftist Taggamu Party of Egypt. Personal interview. North Brunswick, NJ, June 9, 2010.


regime tried to both repress the Brotherhood and reform the religious
establishment Al-Azhar by bringing it under state control, a struggle over the
ways with which articulations of faith were pronounced in the public began to
emerge.

As Nasser cracked down on the Brotherhood, the Brotherhood still managed
to produce books, meet clandestinely, while those in prison regularly discussed and
debated the future of the Brotherhood. However, the brutal manner in which the
Nasser regime pursued the Brotherhood in the post-1954 era resulted in the birth of
what is often cited as the radical ideology of Sayyid Qutb.

224 For a discussion of the implications of the government take over of al-Azhar, see: Galal
Amin, What Ever Happened to the Egyptians?: A Social History of Egypt from 1950 to
225 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. London: Oxford University Press,
226 The Works of Sayyid Qutb include:

Literary: Mahammat al-Sha’ir fi’l-Hayah wa Shi’ir al-Jil al-Hadir (The Task of the Poet in Life
and the Poetry of the Contemporary Generation), 1933; al-Shati al-Majhul (The
Unknown Beach), 1935; Naqd Kitab: Mustaqbal al-Thaqafa fi Misr (Critique of a
Book by Taha Husain: the Future of Culture in Egypt), 1939; Al-Taswir al-Fanni fi’l-
Qu’ran (Artistic Imagery in the Qur’an), 1945; Al-Ayyaf al-Arba’a (The Four
Apparitions), 1945; Tiif min al-Qarya (A Child from the Village), 1946; Al-Madina al-
Mashura (The Enchanted City), 1946; Kutub wa Shakhisiyat (Books and
Personalities), 1946; Askwak (Thorns), 1947; Mashahid al-Qiyama fi’l-Qur’an
(Aspects of Resurrection in the Qur’an), 1946; Al-Naqd al-Adabi: Usuluhu wa
Manahiju (Literary Criticism: Its Foundation and Methods’), 1948.

Theoretical: Al-Adala al-itima’iya fi’l-Islam (Social Justice in Islam), 1949; Ma’arakat al-
Islam wa’l-Ra’s Maliiyya (The Battle Between Islam and Capitalism), 1951; Al-Salam
al-‘Alami wa’l-Islam (World Peace and Islam), 1951; Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of
the Qur’an), first installment 1954; Dirasat Isliamiyya (Islamic Studies), 1953;
Hadha’l-Din (This Religion is Islam), n.d. (after 1954); Al-Mustaqbal li-hadha’l-Din
(The Future of This Religion), n.d. (after 1954); Khasais al-Tasawwur al-Islami wa
Muqawamatuhu (The Characteristics and Values of Islamic Conduct), 1960; Al-Islam
wa Mushkilat al-Hadara (Islam and the Problems of Civilization), n.d. (after 1954);
Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq (Signposts on the Road, or Milestones), 1964; Khasa’is al-tasawwar
al-Ilsami wa-muqawwamathu (Basic Principles of Islamic Worldview), 1960 or
1962; The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics; Islam and Universal Peace.
founding father of Political Islam.\textsuperscript{227} After his travels to the US where he “sees liberalization first hand” he returns to Egypt and talks about the need to return to textual understandings of Islam. In this regard, he is a “strict constructionist” of Islam, where the strict constructionists want a literal reading of the constitution, Qutb wants a literal\textsuperscript{228} reading of the Quran.\textsuperscript{229} He sees Islam, as a social set up that takes the necessary action to liberate mankind, and that each person should work towards be a vicegerent or representative of this on earth. However, Qutb’s imprisonment under Nasser hardened his ideas, and his death in prison moved him into martyrdom.\textsuperscript{230} Qutb was imprisoned after being accused by the Nasserite regime of having ties to the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, he is subsequently sent to prison for fifteen years, of which he served ten. During his time in prison Qutb and other members of the Brotherhood were tortured and twenty-seven of them were put to death. Much scholarship that analyzes this time in the history of the Brotherhood tends to highlight on the prison years, the

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\textsuperscript{228} This designation of literal has great significance today, for the Muslim brotherhood is seen as divided into two camps, the Qutbists, who want a literal reading of the ideals of the movement, and the reformists, who advocate a new modern vision for the movement. This is discussed further in chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{229} Sayyid Qutb work has been divided into three periods. The earliest (1920-1947) centers on more literary works where he wrote poems, criticism, and novels. The second (1948-1954) constitutes his first militant Islamic period, when he wrote \textit{Social Justice in Islam}, the first parts of his Quran commentary, \textit{In the Shade of the Qur’an}, and numerous militant articles for journals. The third phase (1957-1966) is his prison years where he is said to have produced his most radical Islamist writing, including revisions of both \textit{Social Justice in Islam} and multiple volumes of \textit{In the Shade of the Qur’an}, along with his call to action, \textit{Milestones}.

\textsuperscript{230} There is a growing discourse on the implicit meanings embedded in Qutb’s writing, deeming them not radical as once perceived. See the work of Andrew F. March. “Taking People as They Are: Islam and a ‘Realistic Utopia’ in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 104, No. 1, February 2010. pp. 189-207,
repression, and focus on effects of prison in radicalizing Qutb, drawing from him the line is to connect his writing as the ideological root of “jihadist networks.”

While there has been increasing interest in Qutb’s work since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, his ideas are often categorized as either the ideologue of Islamic radicalism or as a victim of state persecution that led to the development of his “theology of liberation in reaction to his maltreatment.”

However what this a-historical approach suggests is that “Egypt’s largest Islamist movement has adopted a radical ideological stance,” during this time, but what is often overlooked is the internal debate within the Brotherhood and the historic and developing relationship the Brotherhood was forming with the state. While several scholars have questions this linear progression of the a-historic development of the Muslim Brotherhood, what remains to be further investigated.

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232 “Radical” is used to denote ideas, concepts, policies, and ideologies that promote sweeping and immediate political and social changes, usually brought about by extremist activities. In contrast, “moderate” is used to describe views that are not radical and therefore do not promote violent activities or terrorist actions. “Extremism,” “militancy,” “terrorism,” and the various adjectives related to these terms denote active use of political violence and terror, usually backed by radical ideology and with the aim of seizing political power or at least destabilizing the existing political and social system. The phrase “jihadist networks” describes cells, groups, organizations, and loose networks of extremists that understand the concept of jihad in a military and revolutionary sense, thus calling for a confrontation with existing state systems and society in order to establish an order deemed to be Islamic.


235 This time period also reflects several critical ideological and organization adjustments that are made—this is discussed further in chapter four.
While much of the discourse on the Brotherhood’s development focuses on the historical progression, there has been little written on the discussion within the organization, and between the organization and the state apparatus, and how these tensions have shaped the Brotherhood and reciprocally—the state.

This transformative nature of the relationship is highlighted in the historical moment of crisis that develops around the time of the death of Hasan al-Banna, the election (or by some accounts, appointment of Hassan al-Hudaybi), and the ideological rift developing within the brotherhood about its future and his perceived relationship with the state.

### 3.9.ii Crisis in the Brotherhood

In the late 1950s, an ideological rift emerged in the Brotherhood between the second "general guide" (al murshid al ‘am) Hasan al-Hudaybi and those in the Qutbist camp. Hassan al-Hudaybi took over the leadership of the Brotherhood after the assassination of its founder Hassan al-Banna in 1949. Much of the literature on the era of the Brotherhood under the leadership of al-Hudaybi focuses on the ideological gap within the Brotherhood after the death of al-Banna, the movement’s suppression, and the rise of the Qutb ideology. However, what is given little emphasis is the relationship that al-Hudaybi cultivates with the regime, as well as the emergence of his counter-discourse to that of Qutb.

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The period of crisis and dissolution lasted from 1954 to 1971. Al-Hudaybi is often critiqued for not offering real guidance to the Brotherhood, or alleviating the feeling of hopelessness that the masses felt after the death of Nasser. However, al-Hudaybi was dealing with the assassination of al-Banna, the dissolution order by the state, growing internal discontent with the direction of the Brotherhood, and the dissemination of Qutb’s ideology. Al-Hudaybi’s election was a strategic one vis-à-vis his relationship to the state. At the time, he was a formerly high-ranking representative of the judiciary, he had a lasting influence on state institutions and had many contacts in high level positions. Al-Hudaybi’s brother-in-law was the chief of the royal household, and had links to the palace. Thus, the decision to nominate, and then subsequently elect al-Hudaybi to lead the Brotherhood during this crucial time, was a highly controversial one, that deepened the increasing ideological rifts emerging in the Brotherhood, but was also a pragmatic one that had lasting effects on both the trajectory of the Brotherhood as well as the regime.

Al-Hudaybi’s selection was perceived as symbolic in nature. Al-Hudaybi was perceived by surviving members of the guidance bureau as someone that they could

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240 According to Zollner, there is no proof that the palace was involved in the nomination, however rumors suggest that the palace was involved in the nomination of al-Hudaybi. See: Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. p. 155, fn. 52.
continue to operate behind, and thus he was positioned as the new face of the
Brotherhood. According to Salah Shadi, the head of the security force of the Muslim
Brotherhood,

It is enough for us, if you are the symbol around which we
gather. It is then up to the Brothers to carry the burdens.241

This sentiment was not lost on al-Hudaybi, and thus he pursued his role of
leader in much more than a symbolic way—he endeavored to change the course of
the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi saw the Brotherhood and himself as not just
representing a certain cleavage in society, rather he saw his mission as a
representative of the interests of all Egyptians. Similarly, the political setting under
which al-Hudaybi emerged required him to reach out to various political actors. He
proceeded to maneuver the political arena strategically in light the persecution of
the Brotherhood. This engagement with politics especially with the monarchy
cause certain Brotherhood members to rally around the hardliners of the time.
However, al-Hudaybi took several critical steps that he envisioned would change the
direction of the Brotherhood.

According to Zollner, al-Hudaybi’s main aim was to change society, which in
his view was unaware of the political nature of Islamic belief.242 For him, political
change could only be realized when there was an awareness of an Islamic identity—

241 Salah Shadi in Jabir Rizq, Hasan al-Hudaybi, al-Imam al-Mumtahan (Hasan al-Hudaybi the
Quoted in Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi and
242 Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology. London and
and thus he focused on the need to develop an Islamic consciousness. For al-Hudaybi, the development of an Islamic consciousness is the only way to an Islamic society. In this regard, al-Hudaybi was against revolutionary overthrow—instead preaching gradual development from within. Thus his interpretation of the mission of the Brotherhood was education, the social engagement of the masses, as well as political participation in the system—yet this engagement is through the consciousness of individual believers.\footnote{This is the vision that the Brotherhood employs today. See: Ikhwanweb, the official website of the Muslim Brotherhood, English: http://ikhwanweb.com/ Arabic: http://ikhwanonline.com/Default.asp

According to Ibrahim Al-Hudaybi, great-grandson of second general guide Hassan al-Hudaybi and grandson of the fourth general guide al-Ma’moun al-Hudaybi, the Brotherhood sees the role of religion as the motivating element in a person’s life. Thus what distinguished western-style democracy for an Islamic democracy that the modern-day Muslim brotherhood seeks, is only what motivates individuals to act. Procedurally, both systems are identical, but what motivates me to go out to polls and vote in an Islamic democracy is different. Personal interview with \textit{Ibrahim El-Houdaybi}, Voice recording, Cairo. August 6, 2008.}

A fundamental change instituted by Al-Hudaybi was the dissolution of the Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood. He denounced the Secret Apparatus, stating that there is “nothing secret in the path of Allah.”\footnote{Roze al-Yousef, 1951, ed 1330, p.12 Roze al-Yousef has long been an Egyptian weekly news magazine, found online at http://www.rosaonline.net/} This position led him to be resented by many Qutb supporters within the Brotherhood who saw themselves in need of such a unit. But for Al-Hudaybi, this unit was counter to the mission of the Brotherhood. Similarly, al-Hudaybi began to cultivate political contacts with the regime, and frequented elite social circles. He was critiqued for this, for the Brotherhood had for long maintained an audience of young college-age recruits. His critiques saw his engagement of the regime and of political and social elites as a
compromise to the independence of the organization. The hard-liners were continually growing uncomfortable with these changes.

The internal rift was reflective of greater ideological divisions in the Brotherhood, some of which are highlighted in chapters 4 and 6, but according to Zollner, these divisions were reflective of a growing discomfort with the emergence of a political system of the liberal era—pre-1952.\(^\text{245}\) The emergence of this system required increasing political engagement, the emergence of political parties, and moreover, the development of a vision of the Brotherhood that was inherently inclusive. In his most controversial work, *Ma'alim fil-Tariq*,\(^\text{246}\) Qutb regards the regime and society as forms of *jahiliyya*\(^\text{247}\) that should be fought. This had been a critical revision of al-Banna’s ideology that Qutb justifies through his understanding of the changing context he found himself in. Reacting to the rise of the Qutbist ideology that was continuing to fill the increasing ideological gap within the Brotherhood, in 1969 al-Hudaybi writes his seminal work in which he emphasizes moderation, *Du'at la Qudat* (Preachers, Not Judges).\(^\text{248}\) In this work, which was first distributed among the Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi refutes Qutb’s ideology of strict adherence to narrow interpretations of faith and politics, and calls for moderation.


\(^{246}\) Sayid Qutb. *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq* (Signposts on the Road, or Milestones), 1964.

\(^{247}\) The word *jahiliyya* literally means ignorance. In Islamic history this terms refers to the time period before Islam, or more accurately to pre-Islamic Arabia. Thus, a *jahili* society is one that is ignorant of Islam. While there is no theological foundation in Islam for the declaration of war against a *jahili* society, Qutb sees this as a justified.

By 1971, an amnesty is called by the government and the Brotherhood is allowed to publicly and officially reestablish its work. With his son, who would later become sixth General Guide Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, by his side as the Brotherhood’s secretary and spokesman, the new public face of the Brotherhood is altered. This shift in the Brotherhood is reflected in the subsequent change in the perception of the Sadat regime towards the Brotherhood. In 1973, by the time of his death, although al-Hudaybi has very little political and social successes in comparison to his predecessor, he had achieved a major ideological success. His ideas on moderation and political and social engagement have guided subsequent general guides.\textsuperscript{249}

\textbf{3.10 The Muslim Brotherhood Under Sadat}

After Nasser’s sudden death in 1970, Sadat succeeded him as president. Unlike Nasser who saw the Brotherhood as his main political threat, for Sadat, it was

\textsuperscript{249} The general guides have been:
Founder & First General Guide: (1928–1949) Hassan al Banna;
Eighth General Guide: (16 January 2010 – present) Mohammed Badie

The second—seventh have been guided by the principles of al-Hudaybi, however the most recent guide is seen my younger Brotherhood members are returning to a Qutbist interpretation.

See: Abdel Rahman Ayysh’s one of the leading Brotherhood bloggers’ blog. Saturday, December 26, 2009, “The timeline of Qutbism Era starting!” http://2-b-egyptian.blogspot.com/

the leftist and the Nasserists that he saw the main obstacle to his consolidation of power. For Sadat, a break from past policies was necessary for him to move forwards and to cultivate a separate and distinct legacy from that of Nasser. Overcoming the leftist agenda left by Nasser entailed Sadat taking several critical steps. First, he removed Nasser’s old guard and dismantled the Arab Socialist Union,\textsuperscript{250} the sole political party created by Nasser, and replacing it with a multiparty system. Second, while Sadat did not outright legalize Islamist parties to participation in the political process, he did allow the return of the Muslim Brotherhood on several levels of the political and social spheres as a counter to the Nasserists. Thus, after repression of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser, newly elected President Anwar Sadat offered the Brotherhood a deal where the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood would be allowed to return. This ‘deal’ offered to the Brotherhood granted them access to society once again in return for their support against the regimes opposition that included both Islamist elements (seen as radical such as \textit{gama’ islammiyya}) and leftist secular elements (primarily comprised on Nasserites) all of whom apposed Sadat's reforms. During Sadat’s reign, violent extremist rhetoric was on the rise,\textsuperscript{251} with Sadat increasingly being seen as an ally of the West, and instituting economic and privatization reforms that were seen as

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{250} The Arab Socialist Union was founded in Egypt in December 1962 by Nasser as the country’s sole political party. Growing out of his Free Officers Movement, the party’s formation was just one part in Nasser's National Charter. The Charter set out an agenda of nationalization, agrarian reform and constitutional reform, which formed the basis of ASU policy. See: Rami Ginat. \textit{Egypt’s Incomplete Revolution: Lutfi Al-Khuli and Nasser’s Socialism in the 1960s}. New York, NY: Routledge, 1997.}


\end{footnotesize}
benefiting a new bourgeoisie—the *nouveau riche*. Strategically speaking, Sadat needed the Brotherhood on his side to counter both extremism and the public perception that he was an ally of the West. To that end, to a certain extent, the Brotherhood became “supported organizationally and financially by the authorities.”

After their repression under Nasser, the Brotherhood was easily revived due to their ongoing activities. However, their public absence coupled with the spread of Qutbist ideology led to the spread of underground Islamist activity. According to Leonard Binder,

> Many new local, and often small and secret organizations were founded after 1965, some of which challenged the vestige of the Ikhwān, and others of which simply did their own religious thing. Some were highly politicized and militant while others sought the comfort of fraternal association and consultation of mutual cooperation.

The growth of such groups is not only due to the Islamist ideological vacuum, but also due to Nasser’s *own* Islamist rhetoric. After the defeat of Egypt in 1967, Nasser resorted to Islamist slogans, “as if to rationalize the defeat by Israel.” These sentiments cultivated with the masses a sense of repression that left a fertile

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255 This narrative of oppression is reminiscent of the rhetoric that alludes the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 and has become associated in the Muslim psyche with the "shame" see: Eqbal Ahmed. *Confronting Empire* (with David Barsamian). Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000. This is the same rhetoric that binds “so
ground for the rise of Islamists ideology that emerged as a counter-narrative to the socialist ideology and policies of Nasser that was seen the reason for the failures of Egypt. Thus, the Islamist challenge to Nasserites and the leftists was quickly gaining ground. However Sadat needed the Brotherhood on another front—to combat increasing radicalization if Islamist ideology. Emerging with this background, Sadat needed a moderate ally. This adherence to Islamism by the masses was not due to a deep spiritual revival,\textsuperscript{256} “the majority of our generation were Islamists because of our disillusionment with Nasserism, but if things had worked out differently, most of us would have been Nasserites.”\textsuperscript{257}

Sadat’s most significant consolatory gesture towards the Brotherhood—that greatly affect the course of the state—was his release of thousands of Brotherhood prisoners, and his encouragement of exiled members to return home from all over the world. President Sadat himself instructed his advisor Mahmoud Mo’awad Jami’ to invite exiled members, such as Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi to return home, and to let, “bygones be bygones.”\textsuperscript{258} This signaled to the Brotherhood, that although they were not formally recognized, they were free to rebuild their organization without

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Dennis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob. \textit{Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State}. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. p. 44.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
government interference.\textsuperscript{259} In this regard, the state become instrumental in the “Islamic Revival.” However, due to the long period of repression and inactivity, the Brotherhood was struggling to rebuild and to find recruits.

While the Brotherhood entered a long period of rebuilding, it remained political inactive, concentrating on the organizational restructuring of the Brotherhood. Meanwhile, Sadat continued to politically, constitutionally, and economically restructure society. The dormancy of the Brotherhood continued until the advent of Sadat’s economic open-door-policy \textit{(infitah)}. The infitah policies were regarded by the masses as producing a vast socioeconomic gap between the rich elite that benefited from privatization and the influx of foreign goods, and the poor, who increasingly became the majority. By 1979, when Sadat signed the Camp David Peace accords with Israel, which resulted in Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League and Egypt’s economic and political isolation from the Arab world, Egyptians were growing increasingly weary of Sadat. This, coupled with the public absence of the Brotherhood, left room for the radical Islamist ideology of smaller radical militant groups to become increasingly vocal. By the end of 1979 when Sadat welcome the deposed Shah of Iran, after no other country would receive the Shah, Sadat was viewed as turning his back on the New Islamic Republic.

After being seen as a simple man from humble beginnings who would represent the poor and marginalized of Egypt, during the last years of Sadat’s reign

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
there were allegations of corruption against him and his family and growing civil unrest. In January 1977, a series of ‘bread riots’ erupted to protest Sadat's economic liberalization and specifically a government decree lifting price controls on basic necessities like bread.260 In response to the riots, Sadat imprisoned 1500 activists including the Coptic Orthodox Pope, Islamists, and intellectuals and activists of all ideological stripes.261 After the riots, prices were re-controlled, but the damage to Sadat’s image in the eyes of the masses was done.

As growing disfavor with the Sadat continued, so did the growth of radical Islamist groups. This disfavor led to the union of several small radical groups under the banner of Tanzim al-Jihad (Organization of Jihad), which emerged in 1977.262 The group was founded by Salim al-Rahal and Hasan Halawi who became famous after their violent attack on the Military Technical Academy in Cairo. By 1979, the groups was moving out of the suburbs and growing in Cairo under Mohammed Farag, and under the spiritual guidance of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. After the economic and social policy changes which were increasingly leading to social unrest, and the view of Sadat as an western ally, along with increasing crackdown of Sadat

on “al-Jama’s activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s culminates in his assassination by Jihad and the further militarization of Islamic politics.”  

While Nasser’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood left an ideological vacuum that facilitated the rise of radical Islamism, Sadat’s political decisions and policies further enhanced radical militant extremism—which ultimately led to Sadat’s assassination.

3.10.i The Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat’s Search for Legitimacy: Islam and the State

After much of the Brotherhood was released from prison, al-Hudaybi begins a project of the reconstruction of the Muslim Brotherhood. He holds a meeting in Saudi Arabia, during the pilgrimage season in Mecca in 1972 and 1973, of the group’s leaders in an effort to unify the Brotherhood leadership across the Middle East. During the pilgrimage of 1975, the Brotherhood convened a meeting for the Founding Committee (later called the International Shura Council) to complete their organizational structure amid a climate of division. These series of meetings where aimed at and re-directing the focus of the Brotherhood back to Egypt. This would to the reestablishment of the Brotherhood as a political actor in Egypt able to challenge the state’s power.

The time of restructuring and regrouping of the Brotherhood in the 1970s would be assisted through Sadat’s pursuit of legitimacy. Sadat realized the importance of religion in constructing a much-needed source of legitimacy. Learning from Nasser, who was aware of the powerful role of religion in constructing legitimacy, which led to the co-optation of religious institutions into the state, such as al-Azhar and Dar ul-Ifta,’ religious verdicts from Al Azhar were used to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign policy objectives.264 Subordinating al-Azhar to the state also allowed Nasser to balance the influence of the Brotherhood, which threatened to challenge the state’s powers and its structures.265 As Islam is the dominant religion in Egypt and the wider Middle East, it was politically expedient and shrewd by Nasser to use Islam in order to develop legitimacy to persist in power. Like Nasser, for Sadat the use of religion through Al-Azhar was politically strategic given the rise of Islamic consciousness in Egyptian society in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab defeat. Moreover, Islam was used by Sadat to project an image of religious piety towards the public. Sadat promoted himself as the "believing president" and was constantly seen at prayer, more and more.

The 1971 constitution stipulated that 'Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic is the official language and principles of the Islamic Shariah are a principal source of legislation'. Even more significant than the inclusion of this article into the constitution was the Egyptian state’s relationship to the Brotherhood. Sadat

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realized the importance of the Brotherhood in boosting the Islamic image of the state and acting as a counter balancing force to the leftist opposition in society.\textsuperscript{266} As a result, Sadat in the early 1970s developed a policy to accommodate the Brotherhood, in society. The Brotherhood was also allowed to reclaim its headquarters in Cairo, reconvene its regular meetings inside the mosques, activities on university campuses and recruitment of new members to the movement. Thus, the Brotherhood was allowed to re-enter society by the Egyptian state, which would start a new phase in the life of the movement. This new phase would result in the Brotherhood undergoing changes to its shape and character, leading to its participation in parliament, professional syndicates and the forming of party alliances- thus allowing the Brotherhood to construct a challenge to the state's powers and its structures in different arenas—this would shape the future relationships between the Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime.\textsuperscript{267}

\subsection{3.11 The Muslim Brotherhood Under Mubarak}

This section examines events over the last decade that precipitated the state’s move toward a strategy of confrontation in the 1990s with the Brotherhood. The reason the state took such strategies is directly related to the Brotherhood’s growing ability to expand its spheres of influence. The Brotherhood’s increased influence and its increasing public pronouncements against government positions


led to a comprehensive crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood’s most effective organizers and activists. This began Mubarak’s policy of dismembering the group to limit its inclusion in both politics and society.

As the standing vice president at the time of Sadat’s assassination, little room was left for Hosni Mubarak to transition into the seat of the president. Because of position as vice president, and immediate power turnover after Sadat’s death, the start of Mubarak’s reign was stable compared to those before him. However, what Mubarak faced was “something arguably more challenging...the existence of ideological, socioeconomic, and political disillusionment in Egypt.”268 Upon assuming the presidency on the fourteenth of October, 1981, Mubarak inherited a state that was dealing problems on three fronts. On the economic front, the aftermath of Nasser’s socialist experiment with a centrally planned economy that left the state in debt, and Sadat’s subsequent infitah (economic restructuring), which increased the state’s debt a produced a consumption boom of foreign goods that worked to undermine Egypt’s export-oriented industry.269 On the social front, the 1967 war and what was seen as Nasser’s failures, which ended with Israel’s occupation of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territories led to a disillusionment with the notions of Arab nationalism, Arab power, and Arab unity, with Egypt. Sadat’s subsequent peace treaty with Israel led to a feeling of alienation and


marginalization of Egyptians from the rest of the Arab world, when previously the enjoyed the status of the symbol of the Arab unity. Finally, on the political front, Mubarak inherited a newly constructed and under experimented with multiparty political arena that could potentially stand to challenge the status quo practices of authoritarian rule.

3.11.i The Muslim Brotherhood Under Mubarak—1981-1989—symbiosis

After the assassination of Anwar Sadat by militant extremists in 1981, the Mubarak regime undertook strategy of appeasement vis-à-vis the Brotherhood. Mubarak released much of the Brotherhood that was imprisoned under Sadat, including the General Guide, Umar al-Tilmisani, and began a relationship that meant to utilize the Brotherhood as a balance to the growing extremism in Egypt.270 Although, the Brotherhood was allowed to operate both politically and socially, as well as resume publication of their periodicals, by the regime, they remained an officially banned organization. After Mubarak came to power, the Brotherhood began making attempts at becoming a recognized political party. They applied for recognition in 1984 and again in 1987 after minor electoral victories, only to be turned down. Yet, during the 1980s the Brotherhood maintained a strategic relationship with the Mubarak regime—the Brotherhood would be allowed to

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270 Members of the Brotherhood were not the only political prisoners that were freed. During 1981 until January of 1982, the Mubarak regime employed a policy of selected release of political prisoners that were held under Sadat. Among them were: Hasanain Heikal and the leftist leaders Fuad Siraj al-Din, eleven members of the progressive Unionist Rally, Khaled Muhieddin head of the Nasserists, and the Marxist Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah. For a discussion of these releases, see: Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt The Prophet and Pharaoh. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2003, p. 244.
operate through grassroots social work as long they refrained from politically contesting the state, and voicing harsh criticism of Mubarak. Thus, for much of the 1980s, the brotherhood adopted a strategy of not challenging the state in political matters, rather they focused more so on the “improvement of society.”

Thus, the state adopted a policy of allowing the Brotherhood more exposure and a louder voice in the public sphere. This allowed the Brotherhood to not only to voice their positions on social issues, but also allowed them to compete publicly with their secular opposition. The regime hoped that this strategy would reveal the Brotherhood to be a weak movement with a social vision that would be opposed by the mainstream. However, this government strategy of challenging the popularity of the Brotherhood when it was not challenged by the state thereby exposing the Brotherhood as a weak movement, continued until 1984. After the 1984 alliance between the Brotherhood and the secular Wafd together during the parliamentary election, the collation made such significant political gains, that the regime could no longer continue to ignore the Brotherhood’s activities, see chapter 5.

The 1984 elections surprised not only the regime and political analysts, but also were unexpected for the Brotherhood. During the 1984 parliamentary

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elections, the Brotherhood fielded 22 candidates, and eight of them won seats. According to then Brotherhood General Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, "We would have been satisfied if only five of them won." 274 The Brotherhood’s surprise emergence on the political scene, through an alliance with a secular opposition groups, forced the regime to reconsider its position vis-à-vis the Brotherhood. According to Dia Rashwan, a prominent Egyptian journalist, the Brotherhood’s unexpected display of power, “alerted the regime to the potential political force of the Brotherhood and prompted it to closely examine the organization’s activities.”275 Much to the surprise of the regime, the Brotherhood was changing strategies. It would no longer focus on social issues and on the improvement of society—but the would also begin focusing their attention to the regime and critique government policy. According to the General Guide Omar al-Tilmassani,

We were completely serious when we joined in the elections. Our aim was to reach Parliament through a legal channel, the Ward Party, because People’s Assembly members enjoy parliamentary immunity. The brothers who will reach the Assembly will speak on behalf of the Brotherhood, will urge enforcement of the Islamic sharia laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of detention or torture. . . Now some of them [Muslim Brothers] are People’s Assembly members, watching the government and entitled to make it account for its actions. 276

While Brotherhood leaders continued to make such bold statements, they did very little else. Their efforts to introduce Shariah in parliamentary discussions were

often ignored—and thus their new parliamentary status did not offer them any new political power, and thus the regime remained un-threatened by the Brotherhood.277

3.11.ii A shift in strategy emerges...

The Brotherhood has adopted several strategies to gain both political and social influence. The first strategic position taking by the Brotherhood was active political involvement through gains that were to be made in the parliament. Similarly the Brotherhood also utilized a strategy of wining significant representation in prestigious Egyptian professional associations. However this new strategic focus on political involvement did not move the Brotherhood away from its long-standing commitments to social services.

However, since the small victory of 1984 did not result in any real political power, the Brotherhood changed strategies, and by the 1987 parliamentary elections, they allied with both the Liberal and the Liberal Socialist Parties. This alliance allowed for the three parties to collectively hold 36 seats, demonstrating the increasing popularity and influence of the Brotherhood among the electorate. This was not due to a singular strategy. As noted above, the Brotherhood utilized (and were allowed to by the regime) the professional syndicates, student unions and

faculty clubs to garner support, influence, and power. This strategy allowed the Brotherhood to spread its ideas and mission among the educated population of Egypt, thus allowing them to mobilize a constituency that not only resulted in electoral victories at the parliamentary level, but also at the local level. In 1986 the Brotherhood controlled the medical board, when they only held nine out of twenty-five seats in 1984 (see table 3.1 below). By the end of the decade, they controlled the associations of engineers, pharmacists, and by 1992, would hold the majority in the prestigious, and formerly secular, bar association.

Table 3.1: Muslim Brotherhood Representation on Councils of Professional Syndicates, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syndicate</th>
<th>Total Number of Council Members</th>
<th>Number of Islamists on Council</th>
<th>Percent of Islamists on Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>74%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The victories highlighted the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was growing in strength and influence among the populace throughout the social classes. These victories also highlighted the popular support of the Brotherhood, that would be

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reflected is freer elections were to follow. However, most significant become the realization that the Brotherhood had emerged as a formidable challenger to the regime. In this regard, Egyptian “politics as usual” was at stake.

In response to the victories of the Muslim Brotherhood in the syndicates, the regime began investigating the mechanisms and strategies by which the Brotherhood was gaining prominence. In a report commissioned by the Government, researcher Amani Qandil reported that the Brotherhood was using the syndicates as a platform to voice their opposition to the regime, and to establish themselves within an alternative system that stood in contrast to the unfair political system that denied them effective representation.281 The second reason Qandil highlights (shared by Davis, 1983) is the Brotherhood’s ability to relate to the lower middle class, and third, she sites their highly professional and organized methodology. A year after the report was issued, the government responded with Law 100 of 1993, which aimed to ‘guarantee’ democracy in the syndicate elections and to prevent the formation of an ‘organized minority’ (or al-'aqlia al-munazama) from dominating.282 According to the new law for elections to be considered valid they must have at least 50 percent turn out, if this did not occur elections could be re-run twice, while administration officials could appoint the interim seats.283 Law

No. 100 of 1993 was an obvious response to the success of the Brotherhood in syndicate elections.284

The growing societal influence of the Brotherhood would come to change the nature of its relationship with the regime. In April of 1989, the then interior minister Zaki Badr issued a statement that changed the tone of the relationship that the Brotherhood had enjoyed with the regime. He alleged that the presumed non-violent Muslim Brotherhood had links to radical Islamist groups, stating,

[T]he extremists are in fact a secret organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations. There is no conflict between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in fact a single association.285

This statement signaled the further intent of the regime to hinder and curtail the progress of the Brotherhood.

3.11.iii  The Brotherhood Under Mubarak—1990-2000 confrontation286

In 1990s the Muslim Brotherhood amplified their criticism of the government and its policies, redefining the nature of the Brotherhood as well as its relationship with the regime. What was once a movement focusing on social services was developing itself as a party with political ambitions. In 1990 the

286 Chapter 7 discusses the parliamentary behavior of the Brotherhood under Mubarak in greater detail.
Muslim Brotherhood to a clear position against the regime and joined the other opposition party al-Wafd in its boycott of the up-coming parliamentary elections because they were seen as flawed. In a joint statement released by the boycotting parties in October of 1990, they stated their refusal to, “contribute to the creation of a false democratic façade.” This stance was seen by some as aiming to embarrass the regime, when the world was increasing looking deeply at the future of the Middle Eastern leaders in the wake of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.

The Brotherhood took advantage of its control over many of the professional syndicates and established a Committee for Coordinating the Action of Syndicates (lagnat tanseeq al-'amal al-niqabi). The regime state responded by creating a Union for Professional Syndicates to offset any influence that the Committee might enjoy. The implications’ of this tit-for-tat game that the state and the Brotherhood play is that the state is increasingly seeing the Brotherhood as successfully using state intuitions to undermine the unchecked power of the regime. In a bold move, the Committee made a public statement in the lead up to the Gulf War in August of 1990 not only condemning the Western Presence in the region, but also holding the regime responsible for the safety of its citizens working in the

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289 For more on the relationship between the syndicates, the Committee for Coordinating the Action of Syndicates, and the Union for Professional Syndicates during the Gulf War, see: Amani Qandil, “Al-Naqabat al-mihanayya fi misr wa azmat al-khalij” (Professional Syndicates in Egypt and the Gulf War), in Mustafa Kamal Al-Sayyid, ed., Hata al-tansha harbun arabiyya-arabiyya ukhra (So that no other Arab-Arab War Errupts). Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, Egypt, 1992.
These statements were regarded by the regimes as a clear threat—indicating that the syndicates had overstepped their boundaries. In response the regime began a smear campaign against the signatories to the statements, and of “disloyalty” and “treason”. While the regime focused it security services on the work of the syndicates, it also responded the critical statements but forth by the Brotherhood about Egypt’s support of the West during the Gulf war, prompting Mubarak to declare, “Egypt is not a secular state but an Islamic one,” and that the regime would be representing the ‘correct understanding of Islam’. This statement signaled the growing influence that the Brotherhood had in the religious discourse of the state.

The Brotherhood continued to use professional associations to influence, not only its relationship to the regimes, but also to change it the nature of its relationship with its constituents. For example, in the professional associations, the Brotherhood began providing health insurance for the 25,000 members of Cairo’s medical association. Because syndicates symbolized essential core spaces where change was taking place, the Brotherhood invested its resources in these spaces.

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According to Ahmed Hassan, the Brotherhood main mechanism to build influences was its use of social services, the use of Islamic codes and symbols, and their charitable work.²⁹⁴ Through these services, charitable and voluntary associations the Brotherhood constituted a growing element of Egyptian civil society. This significant role in society assumed by the Brotherhood was not a role that the regime was willing to tolerate.²⁹⁵

3.12 Setting the Stage: The State Versus the Muslim Brotherhood

At 3:10 pm on October 12, 1992, an earthquake measuring 5.9 on the Richter scale devastated Cairo, a city of 1 million. Many victims were trampled to death, including children in the Cairo area who were killed as they rushed from swaying schools. However the state apparatus could not deal with the social demands, and rescuers struggled into the night to dig out survivors, provide alternative shelters, food and potable water. And with a President out of the country in China, the regime looked weak both locally and internationally. However, the Muslim Brotherhood through its own organizational structure, as well as through its power over the syndicates, emerged as heroes to the victims of the earthquake.

The success of the Brotherhood was attributed to several factors:


The psychological state created by unemployment generates a flood of anger...The young therefore turn to the most potent force in the community, the Islamist tendency, which largely embodies anger against the state and against the forces that made up the council of the bar association. The weakness of other political forces, the sterility of their arguments and their remoteness from the younger generation of lawyers have helped to create fertile ground for effective Islamist activity within the greatest bastion of liberal thought in Egypt.296

The social strategy of rescuing earthquake victims led to an opportunity for the Brotherhood to publicize their political ambitions. The fact that the Brotherhood has resources in rural areas and a presence in urban areas led to the effective distribution and rapid mobilization of there efforts in a manner that proved them to be more effective than the state. The mobilization success of the Brotherhood was noted both by CNN and the BBC, furthering the perception that the Brotherhood was growing in both power and numbers.

Along side the relief efforts of the Brotherhood, their political banners were displayed. The same political banners that displayed the Brotherhood slogan of “Al-Islam Huwa al-Hal” (or Islam is the Solution) that were used in the run of to the 1987 elections were once again displayed. According to ‘Esam Al-Aryan, the head of the Medical Syndicate and Brotherhood leader,

The head of security assured me that the government was happy with what we were doing, and encouraged me to continue to give people blankets and Shelter. However, was unhappy with out political banners and slogans. The Medical

syndicate accepted his orders to remove these banners, but unfortunately other Brothers, from outside the syndicate, would come put them up again.\textsuperscript{297}

What ultimately resulted from this incident was a struggle over who would be defining national identity.\textsuperscript{298}

This perceived threat by the regime of the Brotherhoods growing social and political influence and the 1990 boycott by the Brotherhood of the elections—seen as a negation of the political influence of the National Assembly. The increasing power of the Brotherhood through the syndicates facilitated the publication of various political publications and to hold several conferences and conduct studies under the guise of the syndicates and out of government censorship. In this regard, the Brotherhood used the syndicates—which were legally recognized by the state as the platform through which they articulated their political ideology, often calling into question their political and legal right to exist.

The increasing tension between the Brotherhood and the state also reflected a trend of increasing violence between Islamists and the state. As illustrated by the table below (table 3.2) increasing confrontation with the state in the form of direct confrontation, protests and even assassination attempts, coupled with a declining economy and a tourism industry that was increasingly threatened by increasing confrontation greatly contrasted with previous decades. Studies emerging at the


time report that in 1990 alone there were 115 deaths caused by direct confrontation between Islamists and the Egyptian security apparatus.
Table 3.2 Religious Confrontation (1980-1993)\textsuperscript{299}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Demonstrations</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Vandalism</th>
<th>Assassinations</th>
<th>Attempted Assassinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
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<td>1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1987 three high profile assassination attempts we made, two on former ministers of Internal Affairs, Al-Nawabi Ismail and Hasan Abu Basha and one on Makram Muhammad Ahmad, editor-in-chief of the weekly Al-Musawwar.\textsuperscript{300} In 1989 another former minister of Internal Affairs, Zaki Badr, was the target of a failed assassination attempt. In 1990, Rifat al-Mahgub president of the masjils al-sha`b (the parliament) was murdered. 1992 saw the assassination of Farag Fouda—an out spoken critic of religious extremism who tried to establish a new political party


For a list of assassinations and assassination attempts, see: Hala Mustafa. \textit{Al-Dawla wa al-harakat al-Islamiyya al-mu`arda byan al-muhadana al-muwawagaha fi ahday al-sadat wa Mubarak (The state and the Islamist Movements between acquiencene and confrontation in the time of Sadat and Mubarak)}. Cairo: Al-Mahrusa, 1995. P. 386.

in Egypt, *al-Mustakbal* "The Future Party" dedicated to a secular democratic state,

and the rise of extremism in Algeria that subsequently led to the assassination of the Algerian President Muhammad Boudiaf. In 1993 failed assassination attempts on two political officials Safwat al-Shariif, the minister of Information and Hasan al-Alfi, the minister of Interior, followed by an attempt on Atif Sidqi, the Prime Minister, and a bombing the heart of Cairo during the summer—where tourism peaks—led to a period of instability. This period of violence was seen as aiming to directly weaken the Egyptian political arena as well as the Egyptian economy. However, direct attacks on society occurred as well—with women emerging as a target of harassment if perceived as dressing inappropriately. Attacks on women are often seen as methods of social control, men are received as unable to protect their families. This is seen as furthering the state of insecurity felt by Egyptians at the time. This led to growing sentiment that the state could not guarantee public safety.

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301 Fouda was assassinated by two members of the Jamat Islamiyya which—led by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (the blind sheikh was sentenced to life in prison in the United States in 1996) declared Fouda an apostate. See: Ana Belén Soage, "An Egyptian Dissident’s Fate: Faraj Fawda and the Cost of Free Speech", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11:2, June 2007.


3.12.i Economic & Social Failure and Confrontation

During the 1990s the Egyptian government instantiate an economic reform policy, al-islah and al-iqtisadi that stood in stark contrast to the economic stabilization period of the 1980s. At the start of the 1990s, the Egyptian government was concerned with issues related to subsidiaries, interest rates, the exchange rate and treasury bonds. The 1991 agreements between the Egyptian government and the World Bank and IMF were meant to reduce budgetary and external imbalances. And over the next six years the regime made progress: inflation decreased from 20 percent to 4 percent, the Egyptian pound appreciated in value, foreign exchange reserves increased from $6 billion to $20 billion and the budgetary deficit decreased from 15 percent to about 1.3 percent of GDP. However, the regime was unable to translate macro level economic success at the micro level—relating to changing the every lives of the Egyptian people. According to USAID, during this time of macro level success, the percentage of poor in both the rural and urban rose from increased from 20.7 percent in 1990 to 44.3 in 1996. This dramatic increase—placing almost half of the population below the poverty line—is reflected in the increase in number of strikes and demonstrations as reflecting in table 3.2. Thus, although the regime had succeeded at instituting macro level economic success, they could not translate this at the micro level. This increase in economic instability and uncertainty, coupled with the increase in

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307 Ibid p. 150.
Islamist confrontation with the regime, further questioned the legitimacy of the regime and the extent to which they could provide both economic stability and security for the pollution.

According to Denis Sullivan, the state’s fear of social upheaval was one of the primary reasons why the political maintenance of the political status quo takes precedence over any economic objectives.\textsuperscript{308} Faced with confrontation at multiple sites in the 1990s, the regime finds itself suffering another legitimacy crisis. This is further exacerbated by the entrenchment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social legitimacy in various institutions in the social, political, and economic spheres. The regimes, refusal to recognize the Brotherhood officially, the success of the Brotherhood at the societal level, their efforts during the earthquake gave the Brotherhood a level of social legitimacy that they had not enjoyed before. This sense of social legitimacy further propels the Brotherhood into the political arena.

\subsection*{3.13 Conclusion}

The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood has had an influence on and been greatly influenced by history—a relationship that cannot be overlooked. As history is a chain of events whose present is understood in light of the past, similarly it future is elucidated by the present. What becomes apparent through a historical analysis of state-society relations is that the development of Islamist movements in

Egypt, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, is a byproduct of an ideological and political struggle between the Egyptian state—a leading state in the Middle East, and the Muslim Brotherhood—the largest opposition movement in the region. What this historical analysis has shown it that since its inception the Brotherhood has been responding to a series of historical challenges that have greatly shaped the movement, its trajectory, and its ideology. Similarly, the Brotherhood has had a profound affect on the trajectory, the policy and the nature of the Egyptian state. Understanding the nature of this relationship will shed light on the role, nature, and history of authoritarianism in Egypt, as well as the prospects for democracy and the future of democratization.

The struggle between the state and the Brotherhood has been a complex one. Starting with the development of the Brotherhood in the 1930s and 1940s in response to a particular set of forces—namely, colonialism and monarchical rule, followed by intense persecution under Nasser. Persecution was then followed by accommodation under Sadat, and the growth of militancy and extremism during the 1970s, and the return to the repression of the Brotherhood in the 1980s and 1990s. This period of repression was followed by some political liberalization during 2005, only to be followed by subsequent repression since 2007. This relationship has not only been multifaceted, it has had a dramatically affected the nature of state-society relations in Egypt as well as state-opposition relations. On the political front, the nature of the regime and the nature of the Brotherhood as a movement were not only shaping one another, but were also conversely affecting the nature and course
of political liberalization in Egypt. On the economic front, the nature of the
economic situation has a contributing affect to the spread of support for the
Brotherhood, and also greatly influences the government’s response to them.
Finally on the social and ideological front, both state and the Brotherhood struggle
over their ideological perception of the path Egyptian society should take. Thus,
what becomes apparent is that Egyptian state and the Brotherhood have both
emerged, developed, and continued to shape one another, moreover, together, their
relationship continues to shape the political, economic and social future of Egypt,
and therefore must be understood.

While much of the scholarship on political parties that focuses on the
inclusion of political parties in the political process, and how inclusion moderates
behavior, what the preceding chapter has illustrated, is that while inclusion in the
political process did affect the behavior of the Brotherhood, what it most significant
is the ways with which the Brotherhood began to distance themselves from the
influence of more radical ideas such as those of Qutb. In this regard, how behavior
effects ideological moderation is important, for the sequencing of events become a
critical component to understanding moderation. In this regard, history and the
record of interaction between the movement and the state is critical, however
sequencing and inclusion are not enough to explain moderation. Particular
attention needs to be paid to the ways with which the Brotherhood frame and
reframe their goals in religious terms to adapt to the changing times.
Chapter 4: The Moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood

We believe that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on everyone of its concerns and prescribing for it a solid rigorous order. It does not stand helpless before life’s problems, nor the steps one must take to improve mankind. Some people mistakenly understand by Islam something restricted to certain types of religious observances or spiritual exercise, and confine themselves and their understanding to these narrow areas determined by their limited grasp.

—Hasan al-Banna, founder and first General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood

We know all too little about the way such belief systems evolve.

—Douglass North

Beliefs and ideas change for many reasons and evolve as actors engage in ‘meaning-making practices’ that create a dynamic relationship between social reality and culture.

—Lisa Wedeen

4.1 Introduction:

Over the past decade Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has witnessed both a political ideological shift towards moderation. As moderate Islamist reformers, the Muslim Brotherhood has articulated a progressive political reform agenda that combines Islam and democracy as the method through which they envision establishing a “civic system with Islam as a frame of reference”. The aspired-for

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system would put into practice the mechanisms of democracy and preserve all principles, values and freedoms that the Brotherhood sees as intrinsic to Islam, including cultural, economic, social and political freedoms. In this regard, an ideological transition is occurring in their discourse. The old methods of regime confrontation have been replaced by moderate, open-minded and peaceful reform visions.

This shift is primarily reflected in the Brotherhood’s “Political Platform” (a draft copy was circulated in August of 2007), in public statements,312 personal interviews conducted with the leadership, and also in their political behavior during and after the 2005 elections, as well as their policy recommendations in the in the parliament. But, what are the causes of this moderation? Moreover, how had the Muslim Brotherhood’s model of governance been shaped by the constraints of the regime, and the entry of a social movement into politics? The political direction of the brotherhood has shifted due to an ideological change that is due to several factors: a strategy of organizational survival by the brotherhood with in the system of constraints under Egypt’s current regime, their entry into politics, and the integration and activism of younger brotherhood leaders. This ideological change has resulted in the brotherhood’s active electoral and political participation—even within Egypt’s limited democratic space.

312 The 2004 reform document, the 2005 and 2006 Parliamentary election platform, the 2007 Shura Council election platform, and their various media statements taken from Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Ahram, and Al-Khbar.
The key concern about the ‘moderation’ of the Muslim Brotherhood concerns not only the patterns of moderation, but the long-term commitments to moderation. The literature on the issue of moderation although fairly sizeable and extensive, the basic underlying argument is that moderation is often the result of previously marginalized parties becoming part of the ruling coalition and being faced with issues that face constituents. As Robert Putnam observes in his classic comparison of northern and southern Italy in *Making Democracy Work*, becoming apart of the government has a moderating influence even among those with radical agendas and ideologies. Moreover, Adam Przeworski, among others, argues that commitments to democracy are born out of immediate circumstance and environmental constraints, and not due to a true change in belief. Yet, does this argument hold for the ‘moderate Islamists’? What explains their moderation and why other Islamists continue to subscribe to a radical agenda?

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4.2 What is Moderation?

The ideological moderation of the political parties literature identifies ideological moderation as the ‘centering’ of previously held beliefs reflecting a convergence with mainstream political ideals.\footnote{This also applies to the moderation of the Christian Democratic Party, where historic and religious differences between parties waned as a result of ideological moderation. For a historical account of ideological moderation within the British Party System through an analysis of party platforms from 1920s-1960s, see: David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, New York: Wiley Press, 1976; and John Thomas, “Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties,” in Peter Merkl, ed. Western European Party Systems, New York: Free Press, 1980.} However, since moderation is a relative term, where the beliefs and actions deemed moderate and normative in one society can be seen as extreme in another, moderation needs to be taken in context. In this regard, moderation, and specifically Islamic moderation, takes into account the specific social and political context within which is it actually ‘moderating.’

Thus, moderation of Islamist ideology in Egypt needs to take into account, the social and political backdrop of Egypt, as well as their respective historical progression. By taking both present context and historical progression, one can both a diachronic and synchronic view the ‘moderation’ of Islamist ideology, and thus emerge with a sharper understanding of the causal mechanisms at work.

framework, most modern-day Islamists have moderated in this direction. The
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sees political participation as a path toward peaceful
integration and has moved towards a political agenda that embraces the ideas of
democracy and pluralism. However, how much of their progress has been affected
by their legal ban on the Muslim Brotherhood has yet to be determined. As
depicted in table 1.2 the Brotherhood, has consistently moved in the direction of
moderation.

While most moderation theory rests on the assumption that moderation is a
function of more open political systems, this is does not explain the variance
amongst Islamist moderation. While it may be true that the extent to which Islamist
groups’ moderation is greatly affected by the degree to which the regimes respect
democratic values and allow political groups to participate in politics, this is does
not account for why Islamists moderate on some issues and not others, and the
differing methods and modalities of moderation.

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Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political

Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007; Lucas, Russell. Institutions and the politics of Survival in
University of New York Press, 2005; Lust-Ocar, Ellen. Structuring Conflict in the Arab
World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions. New York: Cambridge university
Press, 2005; Magalnoi, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and
Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1994; Pripstein Posusney, Marsha. Labor and the State in Egypt:
Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring. New York: Columbia University Press,
1997; and Schedler, Andreas, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
4.3 Moderation as a political/electoral strategy

Much of the literature on Islamist groups and the reasons why they moderate, focus on political incentives to moderate. In this regard, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are rational actors looking to maximize their influence within the Egyptian political framework to increase their power. Thus, moderation is a response to electoral and political incentives that result in rewards—namely political power. However, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, moderation is seen to have two primary incentives. The first, is that it widens the electoral base of the brotherhood by attracting a broader ‘array’ of Muslims interested in preserving an Islamic ‘character’ in society, and second, moderation enables the brotherhood to participate in politics especially the electoral process. Entry into the electoral processes, especially on a broader platform allows the Muslim brotherhood to accomplish several important goals. Even in elections that are often marred by

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extensive fraud, moderation allows the Muslim Brotherhood to campaign in broader terms for mass appeal, with slogans and banners and campaign paraphernalia legally—as independents—displayed in public spaces. This allows the Muslim Brotherhood to appear stronger, and appear to have greater mass support, thus, rendering it more durable, and more difficult for the government to suppress. Another important achievement of moderation with regard to the electoral process is that moderation allows for the development of a campaign platform. This platform is seen as a mechanism by which the Brotherhood can further publicize its agenda, and challenge the regime on specific policy issues. Finally, moderation facilitates alliance with key political actors. The moderation of the brotherhood has allowed them to form alliances with key secular political actors, key members of the Coptic community, and fostering deeper relations with the leftist/socialist political party members. Essentially in a political setting where the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as illegal, these ties not only widen the Brotherhood’s base and mass appeal, but by forming alliance with legal parties, their political influence is broadened as well. Alliances also facilitate the relative

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322 The following chapter of this dissertation will illustrate how the entry into the parliament as the major opposition to the regime, allowed to the Muslim Brotherhood to challenge the regime on it policy issues, and NOT on ideological differences.

‘power’ of the Muslim brotherhood as a parliamentary bloc, and afford them greater access to media outlets as an opposition party to the ruling party. And finally, moderation brings the Muslim Brotherhood greater international attention as key members of the international democratic movement. With moderation, during the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood is able to harness greater attention for its cause, thus allowing the international human rights regime,\(^{324}\) calls for democratic opening,\(^{325}\) and Western government pressure on the ruling regime to loosen its reign on political opposition,\(^{326}\) to facilitate its entry into politics as a bulwark of reform.

Analyzing moderation within this framework allows for greater insight into what motives the Muslim Brotherhood to moderate, namely political incentives and building a greater political and social base. However, this framework of incentives or rewards as the motivation for ideological moderation does not offer a complete


\(^{325}\) This is most clearly illustrated by the attention of Washington based think tanks on the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.carnegieendowment.org; The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, www.csidonline.org; the Project on Middle east Democracy, http://pomed.org/; among others.

\(^{326}\) Statements made by Condoleezza Rice and President Bush for greater democratic opening in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections are often credited with the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2005.
explanation to the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, for the actual political rewards are often either uncertain, or seen as coming with too high a price, usually in the form of repression, detention, imprisonment, military tribunals, and torture. While there are differing opinions surrounding the different motivations of Islamists as rational actors,327 the “cost” of political engagement far outweighs the “rewards” as articulated by rational choice theorists.328 After the 2005 parliamentary success of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime applied a comprehensive strategy of limiting the Muslim Brotherhood, politically, economically, and legally through constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the regime continued to issue statements that it would not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to attain any meaningful power.329 It continues to imprison members of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau—as of March 10, 2010, seven of the sixteen members of the bureau330 are in detention, and facing closed military tribunals. The regime routinely manipulates elections it sees favoring members of the Brotherhood: these tactics include, harassing opposing candidates and their campaign workers, falsifying vote counts, doctoring


328 In Barbara Geddes’s Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America, Geddes argues that social science’s examination of the state should be from the perspective of individual’s autonomous use of state power to bring about political and economic changes. She argues that four types of political actors: presidents, legislators, party leaders, and state bureaucrats, use state power as rationally self-interested individuals. Basically that political actors use state power to benefit and further their political careers and/or pursue policy preferences independent of major social and economic groups. See: Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996.

329 At the end of the 2005-2006 parliamentary session, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif stated that, “we have let you [the Muslim Brotherhood] play the democratic game, but that you [the Muslim Brotherhood] would not be allowed to become a party.” A year later the Brotherhood issue their party platform.

330 The Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood is the highest executive office of the movement, which is made up of sixteen members who are elected by the Shura Council of the Movement.
voter registration rolls, holding worker permits of the electorate if an opposition vote is cast, and deploying security forces to prevent the electorate from reaching the polls.\textsuperscript{331} The regime also seized assets, closed business, and imprisoned anyone seen as providing financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood, including prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood that are wealthy businessmen, charging them with money laundering—charges that twenty-nine Brotherhood leaders faced during 2010.\textsuperscript{332} These include: deputy chairman of the Brotherhood Khairat al-Shatir, Hassan Malik, in addition to the inclusion of the Brotherhood’s international relations coordinator and businessman, Youssef Nada, who lives in Switzerland and who is wanted by the Egyptian authorities.\textsuperscript{333}

In addition, in 2007, the Egyptian government amended thirty-four constitutional clauses that were discreetly introduced in 2006. While these amendments were presented as aiming to increase the appearance of greater balance among the branches of government and of greater opportunities for political parties, in fact these amendments limit any real competition—keeping power concentrated in the hands of the executive branch and ruling party. One of the amended articles, “Revised Article 5” prevents the Brotherhood from forming a party based on the prohibition of religious parties formed on religious grounds. The

\textsuperscript{331} See: \textit{al-Masry Al-Youm 2003-2008}
legal argument made by the regime is that religious parties bolster sectarianism in Egypt. Together with ongoing arrests and financial asset seizures, the revisions were seen as the regime’s response to the Brotherhood’s electoral victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections. While prohibition of religiously based political parties had already existed, the revision the takes the prohibition farther than the prohibition of any party formed “on the basis of religion,” (or a religious reference—marji’ia) which had already existed in Egyptian law. However the new amendment forbids “any political activity,” and not only on a religious basis but “within any religious frame of reference.”334 This new wording is critical for two reasons: first, ‘any political’ activity is aimed at preventing members of the Muslim Brotherhood from seeking office as independent candidates—which is has been their overall strategy as a banned organization. This amendment is also aimed at preventing any alliances from crystallizing between members of the Brotherhood and other political parties, because of fear of such alliances being deemed unconstitutional. Members of together parties will in turn shy away from forming political alliance with such ‘toxic’ members, for they face the risk of having their party’s legal standing stripped—a risk that carries too great a cost. The great irony, however, it that Article 2 of the constitution states that the “principles of Islamic Law are the primary source of legislation.”335

334 Text of all the amendments: www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/arabic/appendixArabic.pdf
335 ibid
Second, the latter phrase of—marja’iyya in Arabic—is particularly important, as it is one used increasingly by some mainstream Islamist parties. Marja’iyya connotes having an Islamic reference point, indicating that, “everything we do is found in the framework of Islam.”\footnote{Personal interview with Dr. Mahmoud Izzat, Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, July 11, 2008 (tape recording). Since this interview, Dr. Izzat has become the deputy secretary general and on January 16, 2010 and has been in detention by the since February 8, 2010 with charges against that have changed overtime. See: Ahmed Al-Khateeb, “Tahqeeqat nayaabit amn al-dawla,” Al-Masry Al-Youm. February 11, 2010. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=243689} This is a wording chosen specifically by the regime because it targets head-on those that have chosen to moderate indicating the there at multiple versions of ‘Islamic’ modalities that will lead to the end result. The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, for example, says it is not a religious party but rather a party with a religious frame of reference, and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has also embraced this new articulation.\footnote{Amr Hamzawy. “Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents,” Carnegie Endowment Carnegie Paper, July 2008. www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?f_a=view&id=20314} The highly publicized release of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Party Platform’ leaked in 2007 revealed in its introductory chapter a move towards such moderation. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood has called for the establishment of an Islamic State, with Shariah at the law of the land. However, the 2007 draft platform revealed new wording, stating that the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate aim is the establishment of a civil state, with an Islamic reference point, or marja’iyya islamiyya.\footnote{Birnamij al-Hizb (The Draft Party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood that was leaked in July 2007) can be found at http://www.ikhwanonline.com/} This ideological shift embraces the utilization of previously considered ‘western’ modalities of
governance. The choice of the wording of the constitutional amendment is a direct undermining of the Muslim Brotherhood and their attempt at moderation and popular support. Indicating that the governing regime was not allowing for any allowance for moderation, rather the regime would response to moderation with the imposition of further constitutional constraints and limitations.

The Brotherhood’s response to these amendments was the accusation that the governing National Democratic Party references Islam as well. Thus, the real challenge that the Brotherhood presented, was not the use of religion in politics but their emergence as a strong opposition movement. This further reflects the fact that the regime was willing to manipulate the ‘rules of the game’ to ensure that Islamists would not become an integral part of the political system. Thus the benefits of moderation as delineated by the incentive driven literature on moderation does not fully capture the dynamics of at play in this case. The government’s rejection of the Moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as threatening to the regime. The regime then responds by “framing” the brotherhood as the enemy in disguise. While the social movement theory concept of framing processes offers another avenue to investigate the sources of Islamist moderation,

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339 This is not a new phenomenon, Muslim intellectuals such as Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida, and Jamal Addin Al-Afghani articulated these ideas centuries ago; and are regarded today as the founding fathers of political Islam.


by investigating the contests inherent in group framing processes and attempting to place these in the larger context of democratic and Islamic frames a dialectical relationship between increasingly moderate groups, the regime and processes of ‘frame’ contestation emerges.\textsuperscript{342}

In essence, by moderating and ‘playing by the rules of the game,’ the Muslim Brotherhood was rewarded not with political gains, but with intensified repression followed by constitutional amendments that further limited their political involvement. If the Brotherhood was driven by incentives, then the response to such drastic measures would be to either not moderate, to reduce their moderation, or conversely to radicalize. Moderation did not result in the gaining of power, rather it resulted in the reduction of income and material support followed by repression and imprisonment. A reduction in moderation or a strategic realignment or a return to conservatism did not ensue. Rather, the Muslim brotherhood continued to moderate its posture with regard to key issues, namely, the role of Shariah law and moral role of the state, role of the Shariah council, and the role of women and Copts in leadership positions.

The incentive-based argument fails in two respects: first, it fails to explain the pattern of moderation in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and second, it fails to explain why the brotherhood moderates on certain areas, but not in others.

\textsuperscript{342} This is discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter.
In this regard, the traditional view of the incentives driven understanding of Islamist moderation needs to be reconsidered.

4.4 Moderation as Survival

The moderation literature that sees moderation as survival is based on the argument of Mainwaring that sees the opposition as playing two simultaneous games with the regime.\textsuperscript{343} The first is an incentives-driven electoral game where the opposition enters electoral politics. There is an acknowledged limit to success in this game—but success is not the point, as much as public visibility is. The second is a game where the regime is directly engaged. For Mainwaring, this is where competition ensures that the Brotherhood will both survive in the public due to some increased visibility, as well as emerge as an organization able to contest the regime.\textsuperscript{344}

From this perspective, the Brotherhood’s aims to survive and increase legitimacy among the populace that comes to sympathize with the movement that is an atmosphere of increasing aggression by the regime. They would also aim to appear organizationally viable as well. Once a semblance of repression subsides, and


\textsuperscript{344} Mona El-Ghobashy has applied Mainwaring thesis to Egypt. See: Mona El-Ghobashy, ”The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 37, 2005.
a political opening returns, then they can return to a position of strength in the future. Because the goal is survival, then moderating positions vis-à-vis issues of Shariah would make the Brotherhood more viable and seemingly more in line with evolving society. In this regard the Muslim Brotherhood would be ‘signaling’ as it had in the past under Sadat, that they are breaking away from a past (i.e.: the condemnation of violence during the early stages of Sadat’s presidency) and able to embrace change. In this regard, the Brotherhood would not longer appear to be threatening the ideology and moral position of the regime, that has historical sought validation on religious grounds. And why the regime may want to rid itself of the nuisance of the Brotherhood, cracking down may give the Brotherhood more support, thus a semblance of accommodation may be a more desired result.

4.5 Moderation due to Strategic Learning

According to Augustus Richard Norton and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, moderation among some Islamist groups can be explained by a process of strategic learning that is predicated on the integration of secularists into the movement. This theory suggests that Islamists respond to electoral and other incentives by

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345 These positions may also be calculated to reduce the regime’s fear of a more competitive political process. In essence, the MB is showing that free and fair elections – in which the Brotherhood’s views could be widely aired – would not radically undermine the existing order.


forming new political organizations and coalitions. Due to the expansive nature of coalitions, they include secular reformers. And second, once they are members of these organizations, the views of Islamist leaders begin to moderate as a result of pursuing shared goals with their secular members.\textsuperscript{348} In her analysis of the Center Party in Egypt, Wickham traces the ideological moderation of this party as due to the inclusion of different voices within the organizational makeup of the party as leading to an increasing ideological change.\textsuperscript{349} She finds that because the Center Party was able to include Coptic members as well as female board members in its hierarchy, this led to ‘learning’ from others that further moderated the ideology of members of the Center party.

With regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, this argument fails on three fronts. First, this argument fails to capture the historical legacy of ideological moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood as demonstrated earlier. Second, strategic learning is less effective at explaining the Brotherhood’s moderation. Although the Brotherhood has engaged with some feminist, secular, liberal and Coptic leaders,\textsuperscript{350} to date, none have joined the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. While there have been some

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{349} include here al-Wasat’s membership, and constituency
\item\textsuperscript{350} Most notable here is Rafiq Habib, who continually defends the Muslim Brotherhood. Rafiq Habib’s popularity with the Muslim Brotherhood is reflected in the fact that, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Youth Forum, \textit{Sahatna}, the official sponsor of State’s Incentive Award for youths awarded Coptic intellectual Dr. Rafiq Habib Youth Award. Dr. Rafiq Habib won first place while, in a popular vote carried out by Muslim Brotherhood youth. Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, President of The International Union for Muslim Scholars, finished third with 21 votes, actor Mohamed Sobhi ranked in fourth, followed by Islamist writer Fahmy Howeidi, and finally Dr. Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, the Secretary General of the International Union for Muslim Scholars. See: Ikhwanweb. “Dr. Rafiq Habib Wins Youth Award,” December 1, 2009. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=21891
\end{itemize}
opportunities for interaction with secularists in parliament, political appointments, in syndicates, professional organizations, and in the workings of various political committees there is little evidence that the Brotherhood has used these opportunities to forge a shared *ideological* position.

Finally, this framework of moderation fails to recognize the growing influence of Wasatiyya Islam, or a centrist view of Islam—a movement that began to gain traction just four years before the articulations of a Wasat Party.351 The ideological ‘track’ of wasatiyya Islam is reflected in the recent writing on the emergence of an “Islamic Reformation.”352 Dr. Qaradawi, one of the leading Islamic reformist thinkers, thinks that one of the ways to break the government strangle hold on religious groups, is to allow for the formation of others that have differing ideologies. In encouraging the formation of the Wasat Party, an ideologically centrist party, Qaradawi saw the door for ideological renewal or *tajdid* opening because it was not usurped by one group.353

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4.6 **Moderation as a measure of Shariah**

Proponents of the “moderation by closeness to shari’ा” perspective, moderation of ideology is more likely to occur if there is not an official or clear stance with regards to shari’ा on the issue. Meaning, the greater the ideological debate with regards to shari’ा an issue falls, the more likely moderation will occur. For example, in her study of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Janine Clark argues that the capacity of Islamic groups to adjust their stance on a given issue is limited by the issue’s relationship to Shari’ा. If the issue in question is dealt with clearly by Shari’ा, the group is unable (or, less willing) to alter its position regardless of political incentives or the necessities of organizational survival.\(^{354}\) However this argument fails to capture the ideological differences within the Brotherhood as a whole.

The Ideological differences within the Muslim Brotherhood have both a historical legacy where different leaders articulated the goals and foci of the movement different from within a specific political context. And the internal debate has a modern context that are reflected in the technological age of blogging and face-book, where members of the Muslim Brotherhood voice grievances and articulate voices of dissent in public. (More on this in chapter 6).

\(^{354}\) Jenine Clark, ”The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan,” p. 555. This point is also made by Schwedler in her discussion of “boundaries of justifiable action” that limit ideological change in Jordan’s IAF and Yemen’s Islah party. She emphasizes that these boundaries can change in response to changes in political opportunity structures. Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, 150-153.
4.7 *Moderation due to Transparency of Internal Elections*

According to this body of literature, the more transparent and democratic the internal selection of leaders and candidates to lead is, the more likely the party is to embrace and promote progressive policies. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, their articulation and understanding of ‘external democracy’ for the benefit of the nation is not reflected in their internal application of democratic standards. While they have established a commitment to democracy as their primary means of seeking political and social capital, they have yet to embrace internal democracy as an effective means for managing internal differences and for enhancing their organizational efficacy. While it claims that to be internally democratic, the Muslim Brotherhood is not. They lack a clear system of checks and balances in its hierarchical structures but more critically they lack a culture of democracy within their ranks. While the charter of the Muslim Brotherhood calls for regular elections, the principle of transparency has not permeated into the hierarchy of the Brotherhood who have built a culture of unquestioned loyalty and obedience (sam’ and ta’a).

Yet, this lack of a democratic culture cannot be blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood alone. Egypt suffers from democratic stagnation that is found in all vestiges of its political institutions, and as a result has hindered the progress of most democratically oriented parties and organizations. Furthermore, the illegal status of the brotherhood has had the affect of turning the brotherhood underground several times for more than half a century.
While each of the aforementioned competing explanations do have some plausibility and do carry explanatory power, they do not provide adequate explanatory power to capture the picture of ideological moderation within the Muslim Brotherhood. A complete explanation must answer not only why the question of why the Muslim Brotherhood moderates, but a complete explanation must also answer the specific question of why it moderates in some areas but not in others. While the political incentives argument helps to answer the general question of why the Muslim Brotherhood moderates, it cannot explain the Muslim Brotherhood’s pattern of moderation. This does not mean that the incentives argument and other explanations are irrelevant, but they fail to explain moderation. In this regard, a close analysis of the changing internal makeup of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the relationship the Muslim Brotherhood has with regard to the regime is necessary.

4.8 The Conceptualization of Ideological Change

While behavior cannot be reduced to a series of causal factors, similarly it is not simply beliefs and ideas that directly influence action or determine behavior. While beliefs do play a role, the role is not determinative, rather beliefs incline actors to behave in certain ways as well as diverge actors from acting in other ways.355 Beliefs and ideas change for many reasons and evolve as actors engage in

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‘meaning-making practices’ that lead to a dialect affect between beliefs and experience.\textsuperscript{356} In this respect, religion, “may sanction different maxims of conduct in different situations, and which is thus elastic and susceptible to accommodation.”\textsuperscript{357} Thus, understanding the ways in which beliefs affect, set-boundaries, or facilitate behavior is important to consider when conceptualizing ideological change. What is equally relevant is the further understanding that ideological development also emerges as a result of behavioral constraints placed on a movement or party. In this regard, it becomes essential to understand that the integration of an Islamist party such as the Muslim Brotherhood into the political process does not come simply as a result of a series of political openings regulated by the regime, rather, their integration into politics and the moderation of their beliefs would not have occurred if they did not have the ‘ideological resources’ to conduct this ideological re-orientation. The existence of (and the increasing use of) mechanisms of consultations, the existence of an arena for the articulation of dissent, the entry of a new generation of activists, and the existence of ideological body of work that is malleable\textsuperscript{358} are critically important to understanding the behavioral changes of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, ideological moderation is a precursor to behavioral change even within the context of external constraints on behavior. Thus, the linear model, Figure 1.1 (in chapter 1) of behavior moderation that relies on institutional restraints is incomplete.


\textsuperscript{357} Lisa Wedeen. “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science.” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 96, no. 4, December 2002, pp. 713-728


\textsuperscript{358} As seen in the previous chapter
Rather, the model I offer, Figure 1.2, (in chapter 1) captures moments of political inclusion and exclusion to see ideological frames are affected by changes in the public arena, how they affect and are affected by interchanges with the opposition groups, and finally, how not just their behavior, but also their ideology changes.

4.9 Ideological Change and Moderation in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

While studies on the development of Islamist parties in the Arab world find that political opening on the part of the regime result in Islamists moderating behavior, what remains unarticulated and un-investigated is whether or not ideological moderation occurs. Moderation of ideology includes a shift towards democratic principles as core ideological beliefs, not just a ‘tactical’ shift, and shift towards pluralism both political and ideological. According to Wickham ideological moderation is found in publicly articulated ideas over time. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, there has been a remarkable change and an evolution in the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood over the past two decades. Although this development has been the source of much internal debate, it has resulted in a

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commitment by the Brotherhood to the political process and electoral participation that is inherent in a constitutional democracy. In this regard, Brotherhood was seen as a bulwark for democratic change because of their campaign for increased political participation. By framing their position as “within” both the boundaries of Islam and predicated on the institutional need for a civil state (or Dawla Madaniyya) the brotherhood is reflecting a major ideological shift—one that suspends the previous calls for the establishment of and Islamic state (or Dawla Islamiyya) to a call for the establishment of a civil state with an Islamic reference point (or Dawla Madaniyya bi Marjaiyya Islamiyya). But how does one measure this ideological moderation as an overall trend, and not just in insularly moments?

While leaders, groups, and elites who wield certain amounts of discursive power can assert a degree of hegemonic truth. This is not clear until the historical narrative is juxtaposed with the development of a social movement and how this movement ultimately plays a crucial role in determining a particular articulation of faith. In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and ideological change is a result of their historic experience, and the way they ascribe Islam differently at different moments is a function of their social existence.

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4.10 An ideological history of the Muslim Brotherhood

Since the late 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood has shifted from a model that emphasized movement to a model that emphasizes political activism predicated on the establishment of a political party. The development of this activist model, grounded in the teachings of al-Banna, as well as the ideological development of the Brotherhood did not develop linearly or in isolation, rather, they grew out of the tension and interactions that the Brotherhood has had with a non-democratic regime that has placed obstacles and constraints on political behavior. The ideological shifts of the Muslim Brotherhood align themselves with the political entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into electoral politics.

4.10.i The debate over political engagement

The Muslim Brotherhood has long had an ambivalent relationship with the language of their discourse. As they gradually entered the political arena they came to adopt more committed articulations of democracy. The issue of the commitment to democracy is often a point of internal dispute for the Brotherhood, due to the fluctuating stance of Hasan Al-Banna and the hostility with which Sayyid Qutb viewed democracy. Qutb objected to the idea of Western democracy seeing democracy as an attempt of trying to compromise between Western theories and Islamic ideals in an approach needed to be prohibited. In Qutb’s view, Islam should be completely separate from Jāhilī ideologies (ignorant frames of

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363 Ibid. p. 136.
For Qutb, Islam was the teleological modal that all other ideologies and social frames and theories should be modeled against. To this end, any step away from the natural order defines by God in the Quran would lead to social mischief. After his travels to the United States during the 1950s, he found democracy to be ungodly and outside of the bound of Islam. For Qutb, social order would be restored of through vicegerents or vanguards throughout the Muslim world who’s obligation it would be guide humanity back to the straight path, and to return morality to life that the West had long abandoned. For Qutb, these individuals would be responsible for elevating the religious consciousness of the people that were “lost in the world of materialism and moral decay.” To that end, it would take the emergence of a committed number of vicegerents to establish a true Islamic community. This exclusionary, proselytizing, ideological model became very attractive to some Brotherhood members who began to view democracy as outside of the Islamic ethos.

However, for Al-Banna, democracy was an equalizer for all humanity in terms of the role of individualism in society.

I once said, humorously, to an audience, "This prayer that we offer five times a day is nothing more than a daily exercise on a practical social system which contains the best of communism and democracy." In total surprise they asked: "How can that be?" I said that the best that the communist system has to offer is its promotion of equality, its attack on social classes, and its war on pride in private ownership

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364 Ibid. p. 21.
365 Ibid. p. 42.
366 Ibid. p. 7
367 Ibid. p. 12.
upon which class is based. All these elements are present and completely felt by a Muslim when he enters the mosque. For when he first enters the mosque he knows that this holy place belongs to Allah, and Allah alone, and that there is no difference between one who finds shelter in it and one who only passes through. In it there is no young or old, no lord or slave and no discrimination nor classification.

When the Mu’adhin intones, "The prayer is due, the prayer is due", the masses line up behind the Imam in one straight line as if they were one solid wall. Nobody bows before the Imam does, and no one prostrates before him. In every little movement the masses are obliged to follow the Imam and not to supersede him in any way. This is the best that any autocracy has to offer - everyone united, orderly and well organized.

However, the Imam does not act as he pleases. On the contrary, he himself is bound by the instructions and constitution of the prayer. If he should divert or make a mistake in a recitation or an action, it is upon the young boy, the old man and the women who prays behind him to correct his shortcomings. It is their every right to remind him, correct him and guide him to the right path during their prayer. Moreover, it is obligatory on the Imam, whoever he shall be, to bow down to the truth, and correct his mistake in the light of their instructions. There is nothing in democracy that is better than the virtues we have just cited.

Hence, what is in these man-made systems that elevates them above Islam when Islam has so marvelously blended the best of them together, to come up with one complete system?369

While, al-Banna emphasizes the importance of a democratic system, he consistently reiterates commitments to Islamic principles, as if to assuage claims of the encroachments of Western modalities of governance, namely democracy, on Islamic thought.

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Yet, al-Banna did not shy away from the political process, or the entry into politics. His claims of *la hizbiyya* (or “no, to party formation”) did not prevent the establishment of a political party in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although Al-Banna ran twice for parliamentary elections in Egypt, and although he made a point of stressing that the parliamentary and constitutional systems are, in principle, congruent with the tenets of an Islamic regime, he opposed the multi-party system and thought that such political pluralism threatened the Islamic unity necessary to restore the Caliphate. [Al-Banna] advocated a single party [system]...³⁷⁰

Historically, in the 20s to mid 30s, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna, did not take issue with the participation of his followers in electoral politics and encouraged members of the Brotherhood to take high positions in the state bureaucratic apparatus and institutions. Al-Banna ran and lost in parliamentary election during the 1942 and 1945 election cycles.³⁷¹ However, as the movement found itself increasing in confrontation with the regime, in the late 1930s and 40s, which ultimately led to the assassination of Al-Banna. After repression of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser, newly elected President Anwar Sadat offered the Brotherhood a deal where the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood would be allowed to return. This ‘deal’ offered to the Brotherhood granted them access to society once again in return for their support against the regime’s opposition that included both Islamist elements (seen as radical such as

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³⁷⁰ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. This was stated in a Friday sermon by Al-Qaradhawi’s Friday on June 4, 2004. See: http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=3321&version =1&template_id=104&parent_id=15#ÇâliebNÇöifiÈ%20ÇâbìpìÈ%20âë%20âë%20âï%20æ%20ÇâÔôÇ. To view excerpts from the speech via MEMRI’s TV Monitor Project, visit http://memritv.org/archives.asp?ACT=59&P1=129

³⁷¹ He reconciled electoral run with his calls for *la hizbiyya* by stating that his bids for election were not in the name of the Brotherhood.
gama’ islammiyya) and secular elements (primarily comprised on Nasserites) all of whom opposed Sadat’s reforms. During Sadat’s reign violent extremists rhetoric was on the rise, with Sadat increasing being seen as an ally of the west, and instituting economic and privatization reforms that were seen as benefiting a new class of bourgeoisie—the *nouveau riche*. Sadat needed the brotherhood to counter the radicals, and thus, the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood, began to improve.

For Umar al-Tilmissany, the third general guide of the Brotherhood, the decision to participate in the 1984 elections:

> When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near-recession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the neglectful.  

For religiously based movements, the establishment of an Islamist government is often seen as the greatest manifestation of their work, and ultimately their highest goal. The Brotherhood felt that in order to do so, they had to build an alliance. An

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374 However, while interviewing Dr. Mahoud Izzat, the then secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood, when I asked him, what is the most misunderstood about the Brotherhood, he answered, “the Brotherhood’s Islamic message is mistaken for a
alliance was built between the Brotherhood and the Labor Party.\footnote{What was soon billed as the “Islamist alliance” (al-tahaluf al-islami) was main point of contention during the 1987 elections, especially when the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated alliance distributed a booklet detailing its electoral program.\footnote{“The booklet stated that Copts are full citizens and that applying and codifying Shari’a is a long-range process not confined to Islamizing penal provisions but extending to the entire legal infrastructure.”\footnote{This ambiguity over Shariah and its role in the every day lives of Egyptians is a move away from the classical rhetoric of Islam is the Solution, or Al-Islam Huwa Al-Hal, and is a marker of the beginnings of the move away from the call for an Islamic State to the call for a Civil State by the Brotherhood.}

Since the mid-1990s the brotherhood has developed more concrete pronouncements of their commitment to politics and declared support for political parties while Hassan Al-Banna was stanchly against party politics often declaring \textit{la hizbiyya}, a clear rejection of the entry into politics in the form of party-politics. In response to the US Greater Middle East Initiative aimed at greater democratization

\textit{religious message, and the Brotherhood is therefore seen as promoting a religious state or a theocracy, but that is not the case, the Brotherhood wants to establish a civil state. This means that we do not want a system of divine appointment, or governance in the name of God, as understood by the West in its definition of a religious state. This is what Europe experienced and suffered from, and it is what ultimately fueled the rise of democracy. This is not the case with Islam, and this is what the West fails most to understand – the Islamic message.” Personal interview with Dr. Mahmoud Izzat, Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, July 11, 2008 (tape recording).}}

\footnote{The marginal Ahrar party also joined the alliance agreeing to 20% of power sharing, while the Brotherhood and the Labor party received 40% each.\footnote{Mona El-Ghobashy. "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers," \textit{International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies}, 2005, 37: 3, pp. 373-395.}}
in the region, the Brotherhood issued its own Reform Initiative, which states at the outset that the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to a “democratic, constitutional, parliamentary and presidential” political system, “in the frame work of Islamic principles.” Furthermore, in the 2007 draft Party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Birnaj al-Hizb*, the introductory chapter calls for the establishment of a civil state with democratic principles (and not an Islamic state).

While questions arise on the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy, it is evident that their ideological evolution moves in the direction of reform towards a general acceptance of the principles of democracy. In a four-hour interview I conducted on July 11, 2008 with Mahmoud Izzat, the then Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood, when asked about how he envisions government institutions to be prescribed by Islam, he stated:

“Islam has outlined basic foundations for the system of governance and they can be summarized as follows: 1) The nation [*Ummah*] is the source of authorities, 2) The ruler works for the nation (he is an employee of the nation), 3) The nation monitors the ruler and holds him accountable through institutions that each society finds suitable. The nation has the right to replace the ruler if he breaks his pact with it.

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378 Although this initiative has many critics, it did succeed in garnering the attention of the reformist movements in the Middle East. For a discussion of the problems of the initiative, see: Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway “Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start,” *Carnegie Policy Brief*. No. 29, March 2004.


380 Birnaj al-Hizb (The Draft Party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood that was leaked in July 2007) can be found at http://www.ikhwanonline.com/
“Governance is exercised through three separate authorities, which were clearly delineated in Islam: 1) The legislative authority, 2) The executive authority 3) The judicial authority.

“The legislative authority can have different forms. What is important is for it to be comprised of individuals elected by the people. These individuals are known in Islam as the decision-makers, and are also known ad parliamentarians who can be divided into one or two chambers with different names but the same basic function.

“The executive authority is charged with executing the legislation. It is not authorized to issue legislation away from the legislative authority. Any member of the people can resort to the judiciary to arbitrate any dispute that arises between the individual and the executive authority, which is bound by the judiciary’s rulings.

“This was a very short summary of the prescribed form of governance, which would be different in small states compared to larger ones and in technologically-advanced states compared to other states still in the early stages of development. This is the general outline that I feel would be suitable here in Egypt.”

When asked where power and sovereignty lie, Izzat did not state that they lie in the hands of God, as his ideological predecessors have states, rather he stated, it lies...

“With the nation. The nation is the people. This is the basic form of delegation in Islam. Islam is concerned with nation building, even Qur’anic prescriptions address the nation “O ye who believe,” and “O people.” This means that the nation is the source of authority.

When asked about democracy, Izzat stated,

“Democracy is a civilized outcome through which humanity tries to arrive at a system of life, not just a political system, but a system of life that guarantees maximum freedom and a balance between the different freedoms while encompassing the basic means of doing so. Democracy itself is based on elections that give the majority the right to determine priorities. In other words, when interests and opinions diverge, the means to adopt the necessary order or measure is determined by the majority, while the minority is obliged to submit to the view of the majority.
“However, democracy in and of itself cannot offer a solution to every problem. I consider democracy a good method in offering Islam to people so that the people’s selection of Islam is done democratically. But I do not think that democracy itself can decide certain matters and state what is right and what is wrong. In other words, it is a method of differentiation or a good analytical tool, so that as long as there is democracy, people will continue to search using the correct method. In the end however, for people to arrive at the truth, they must be presented with this truth, because humans’ minds have the capacity to discern right from wrong in material and ethical issues so long as these minds use proper democratic methods. This means that as long as the individual is searching for the truth or examining its elements, and as long as he works on this basis, then democracy is a great way to arrive at the truth. But as for the creation of the truth itself – the truth that I seek, democracy cannot create it alone.

“Democracy needs Islam to complete its message. The proponents of democracy themselves want to reach this message as well. I mean, if these individuals are searching for the truth, the method they are using is great indeed, for they are using scientific research, human inquiry, consultation, and the presentation and analysis of views, selecting the sound views while rejecting the unsound ones. Such methods are like the laws of physics, where you continue to research the laws using scientific methods until you verify them. Before [Isaac] Newton, we had no knowledge of the laws of physics. Newton introduced a scientific method that could arrive at these laws but he did not invent or create the laws themselves. This is what we want at the human level as well: Democracy is the right abstract method that searches for the basic law. It does not create this law but will arrive at it if it follows the right methodology.

“Therefore, we consider democracy a tool to reach the truth but not the source of this truth. Human beings’ minds evolved throughout time. One individual discovered the laws of physics. A hundred years later, another individual discovered another truth, and after 500 years yet another individual discovered another truth. This also happens in human sciences and at the human level. Before democracy, the feudal system prevailed. This means that humankind evolved until it reached that point and for centuries was unaware that democracy is the best option. Humankind suffered for many centuries because it did not use democracy, which means that democracy is the best means to achieve the ideal goal. I philosophized somewhat in my response, but I felt it necessary.”
For Izzat, on the one hand, democracy is seen as the ultimate equalizer, but then only as a modality or a tool, and not as a ‘source’ of truth. Whether the commitment of the brotherhood to democracy is genuine or tactical, their entry into politics and electoral activism has had an effect on them. The effects of the entry into politics and the engagement with the regime have not just moderated the ideas of the Brotherhood, but also altered the space of public debate, where any change is articulated in democratic terms.

When asked, “In the West, members of the Brotherhood are referred to as Muslim Democrats given their pursuit of democracy, do you accept this characterization?” Izzat replied,

“Islamic democracy is a more accurate definition, but it is important that we clearly explain Islam in order to avoid any distortion of this definition. You might say that a democracy exists that does not recognize religion, true, that it is one form of democracy, but there are also democracies that do recognize religion, and this takes us back to the issue of what is religion and what is Islam? I believe that this attribution, meaning the addition of the world Islam, offers a good definition.”

On an ideological level, any loyalties to Qutb’s rejection of electoral politics would have to be disavowed if participatory politics was seen by the Brotherhood as their new modus operandi. When asked if he has any antidemocratic inclinations, the Secretary General emphasized the problems of daily politics in Egypt, in which different actors and interest groups struggle to have their preferences translated into policy. On this level, the Brotherhood seems to have changed its objection to

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forming a party from the realm of principle to that of practice. For Izzat and others, there is “no ideological struggle or confrontation between Islam and the principles of democracy and political participation.” Yet, what Izzat stressed was the fact that the closed political environment in Egypt, under Mubarak, was preventing them from being fully included in the political process, and as such the freedoms associated with democracy had yet to be felt by the Brotherhood and its constituents.

4.10.ii Evolving Strategy of Secularization

While the Brotherhood has always had a certain level of involvement on the political scene, it was not until the 1980s that they became organized in their foray into parliamentary elections. A comparison of the pre-election programs of 1987, 2005 and 2006 will illustrate the emerging change of the Brotherhood not just in their position vis-à-vis democracy, but also on the economy. The 1987 pre-election program very little attention was paid to socio-economic issues. However, the text of the 2005 pre-election program dealt mainly with socio-economic issues ranging from development of industries to economic and political reform. Similarly the 2007 Draft Party Platform dealt heavily with economic and trade policy. The Draft Party Platform emphasized strong state intervention in the

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382 Only two points of the 1987 ten point pre-election program dealt with socio-economic issues.

economy so as to ensure the social welfare of the populations.\textsuperscript{384} This is meant to meet the goals outlined by what the movement calls an economic policy with an Islamic reference point (\textit{marjia’yya al-nizzam al-iqtisadi al-Islamy}) ensuring the government’s ability to protect against monopoly and exploitation. For al-Banna, the economy was to be protected from the colonial powers, thus no direct foreign investment was to be accepted.\textsuperscript{385} However, the Draft Party Platform finds foreign-direct-investments a measure of alleviating the economic backwardness and elevating Egypt’s rank on the World Bank’s report on global investment conditions.\textsuperscript{386}

While the Brotherhood would argue that their economic program is nothing more than a series of protections and reflects Islam's concern in all aspects of life, the reality as they change their focus to governance, they appeal to a greater spectrum of constituents, as well as project themselves as a group with relies on scripture, Islamic principles and \textit{sharia}, but can also articulate them through modalities of governance that don’t reference religion. However, while there is an increasing secularization of the movement’s agenda, there has not been as much reform towards the secularization of their ideology.

\textsuperscript{384} Muslim Brotherhood. “Birnamij al-Hizb” (The Draft Party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood that was leaked in July 2007) Ikhwanonline.com p. 59
\textsuperscript{386} Muslim Brotherhood. “Birnamij al-Hizb” (The Draft Party Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood that was leaked in July 2007) Ikhwanonline.com p. 71.
4.10.iii Sources of Legitimacy

The tension over whether or not to utilize a religious frame are further highlighted in the Brotherhoods articulations of legitimacy, not just the legitimacy of the regime, but how the Muslim Brotherhood articulates the legitimacy of the ruling regime in relation to themselves. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood articulated the legitimacy of rule in terms of adherence to Shariah law, where the legitimate authority is one that is al-Sulta al-Shar’iyya. However, according to Islamist scholar and proponent of Wasatiyya Islam Dr. Kamal Abul Al-Majd, authority in Islam is essentially articulated in terms of religious political authority. However, since the government and bureaucracy are essentially civil, their authority stems from the people.387 In this regard, authority in this context has is grounding in both religious teachings but also in terms of popular support—signaling a shift in the framing mechanism.

Professor Saif Abdul Fatah, an Islamist and lecturer at Cairo University’s Faculty of Politics, finds that historically, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims in Egypt have failed to articulate a sound understanding of the concept of *al-Sulta al-Shar’iyya*.388 He finds that the legitimacy of regimes in the Arab world, needs to be analyzed from three angles: “the ideological framework that gives the regime its identity”, “the manner in which power is assumed and the way the ‘social

contract’ is articulated between the state and society,” and finally practice—meaning a focus on the particular policies the regime pursues while in power.\textsuperscript{389} Tracing the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood vis-à-vis the regime and how they view the regime’s political and religious legitimacy is particularly important to understand the evolution of the Brotherhood’s ideology especially as the move from a religious movement to a party that desire recognition by the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood desires for recognition by the Egyptian regime under Mubarak, reflects the recognition of the legitimacy of the regime by the Brotherhood. This paradox that the Muslim Brotherhood finds itself in is reflected in their historical relationship to the regime.

\textbf{4.10.iv From a Movement to a Party?}

The heart of the internal debate that surrounds the movement’s entry into politics revolves around the primary mission of the Brotherhood. The primary mission of the Brotherhood as articulated by Hasan Al-Banna is \textit{da’wa}, or preaching. If the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is \textit{da’wa}, and therefore to make society more Islamic, then by extension one of their goals would also be to make the political system more Islamic. This posits several problems. First, what happens to a movement when it becomes a party in terms of inclusion. To become a member of the Brotherhood, you must make \textit{bay’ia} to the Brotherhood, where you profess you

commitment to Islamic work before God. This is a condition of entry in to the
Brotherhood. However, as the movement becomes a political party, anyone can
enter or join, without making this commitment to the Islamization of society.
Political parties, once registered, cannot exclude anyone that wants to join. This
point is clearly a sensitive area within the Brotherhood.

When I asked Mahmoud Izzat if there a difference between the Brotherhood
as a movement and the Brotherhood as a political party, he stated:

“The party is an instrument for political work, and politics are among
the Brotherhood’s interests. The Brotherhood believes in the message
of Islam, this all-encompassing religion that communicates morals,
principles, philosophies, technologies, and a legal code, all in addition
to politics. Our partisan work, or party, is an instrument for political
work, and we are convinced that it is a good man-made instrument,
and therefore, we admit that the party is one of many instruments for
political work, which is part of Islam as a whole, which in turn is our
message.”

When I asked him, if the Brotherhood is ever recognized as a political party, can
anyone simply join, he answered, “Yes, that is correct.”

However, when I asked Izzat if anyone wishing to join the Brotherhood as a
movement do so, he was less clear, making a distinction between those who support
the mission of the Brotherhood, and those who simply support their political work.

“Anyone who wants can join the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has
principles that it presents to people, they are not a secret, and this is
clear to see. All the Brotherhood’s principles are a matter of public
knowledge and are clearly understood by the people. They are listed
in specific documents that are available to the entire public, they are
posted on the internet, they are everywhere. Anyone who supports
the Brotherhood’s principles and the broad domain it operates in
would be a willing member of the Brotherhood. Those who only support our political work and wish to be part of it through our party may also join.”

Yet, as Islamist movements engage in politics, conflicting message start emerging from the political-party wing, and the movement wing. As a movement, they focus on moral issues that plague society, highlighting the evils that the movement is trying to alleviate. Yet, members of the political wing find themselves stressing an increasingly pragmatic rhetoric that stresses pluralism, or ta’dudiyya, and focusing on the bread and butter issues confronting society, like inflation, pollution, and education.

This is most apparent in the 2005 acquisition of the Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary bloc, of a separate building from the ideological apparatus several miles away al-Minya. The office of Kutlit al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen is a four-story building, with a separate media-meeting hall with street access. The building housed the offices of the 88 parliamentarians, and the Kitchen, the Madbakh. The madbakh is the brain of the organization, where many are gathering data, researching issues, drafting interventions, and debating talking points. Rarely will one here references to the articulations of Hasan al-Banna and his emphasis on da’wa. The issues debated and discussed revolve around the bread subsidies and the education system. The air was of full of energy and the rapid movement of people from one room to another. Hanging in the lobby are images of the Brotherhood sitting at their respective seats inside the parliament, or Majlis al-Sha’b.
Yet, a few miles away in the main office of the Muslim Brotherhood, in an inconspicuous building that faces the Nile River, where the General Guide, the Secretary General, and the members of the Guidance Bureau\(^{390}\) of the Brotherhood have their offices, the rooms are full of the elders of the movement. As I sat there several times in the summer of 2008 waiting for those I would be interviewing, the discussions were rather hushed, where people would remind one-another, that there was a visitor in their midst, signaling the years of repression the Brotherhood has faced that has created a long-standing air of mistrust of visitors. The discussion in the lobby often revolved around those that were currently in detention centers held by the regime. Hanging in the lobby are images of Hasan al-Banna, and the members of the first Shurah Council.

The contrast between the two office complexes is stark, in appearance, yet members still attempt to straddle both lines. For one Muslim Brotherhood member of Parliament, Dr. Hazem Farouk Mansour, form the Shoubra area of Cairo, he found that Dawa meant, “the involvement in politics.”\(^{391}\) But that was the last time religion was invoked in our discussion, for Mansour, his focus is on parliamentary reform. In February 2006 the government issued its annual Government Statement on Budgetary and Policy Priorities. Each parliamentarian is to have the floor for

\(^{390}\) More on the anatomy of the Guidance Bureau in Chapter 6

\(^{391}\) Interview with Dr. Hazem Farouk Mansour, Member of Parliament and the Ikhwan, August 3, 2008, Office of the Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc, Cairo. (While the Brotherhood not a registered political party, and the MB MPs ran as independents, on Dr. Mansour’s business card, it states: ‘Member of Parliament and the Ikhwan’


maximum of five minutes to respond to the document—as document that covers economic, agricultural, social, foreign policy, domestic affairs, among other things. The strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood was simple, to respond with a 300 page, published response. In their response, they accuse the government statement of being “devoid of any action plan for the future that is objective.”\textsuperscript{392} They accused the government of not have a real plan for the future of Egypt that outlines practical goals. “Brotherhood M.P.’s are attempting to transform the Egyptian parliament into a real legislative body, as well as an institution that represents citizens and a mechanism that keeps government accountable.”\textsuperscript{393}

The Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary program of action calls for freedom for all individuals, institutions, movements and parties and for the political system to be reflective of the people’s aspirations. They are not only part of the country’s reformist force, but they have undertaken the role or reformers in the parliament. Their reform agenda is predicated on democratic principles: the rule of law, good governance, government transparency and free and fair elections. A review of their reform agenda reflects their intention of using the parliament as a method of attaining reforms, namely, combating corruption, increasing freedoms, and educational reform.\textsuperscript{394} Although these reform initiatives are not new to the Muslim Brotherhood, they can be traced to its founder, Hasan Al-Banna,\textsuperscript{395} this is the first

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{392} Rad Kutlat Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen Fee Majlis al-Sha’b \\
\textsuperscript{393} Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher, “The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament,” \textit{MER 240} Fall 2006. \\
\textsuperscript{394} The reform initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament is available as www.ikhwanonline.com/article.asp?ID=5172&SectionID=0 \\
\textsuperscript{395} Mujama’ Al-Rasail Imam Hasan Albanna. Cairo: Muslim Books of Knowledge.
\end{footnotesize}
time however, Muslim Brotherhood members are participating actively in the Parliament. “All the problems of Egypt, social, political, and even prices, can be solved through political reform. If corruption is dealt with, then the parliament can be seen as a strong governing body. If there is a true transfer of power, from one power to another, then true change can occur.” Al-Katatni’s emphasis on political reform being the premier method of social improvement is a far cry of Islam is the Solution.

4.11 Conclusion

The trajectory of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the direction of moderation urges a return to empirical studies of Islamist groups and their interaction with their political contexts, and they ways those contexts affect the ideological frames that groups relay on to validate their behavior. While it is apparent by now that, parties adapt or moderate their platforms in response to electoral participation, yet the reasons for ideological moderation as a precursor to behavioral moderation remains under investigated. While participation in competitive politics reinforces moderation, Islamist parties are no exception—a majority of party organisms, regardless of ideology, modulate their organizational and ideological features to align with changing environmental cues and incentives. Moderation of Islamists cannot occur if the ideological resources, debates and social theories, that facilitate moderation were not a part of their ideological tradition.

396 Interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008.
Since, ideological frames are “continuously being constituted, contested, reproduced, transformed and/or replaced during the course of social movement activity.”\(^{397}\) As well as also contested by “counter-framing movement” through the media, the state, and other opposition movements, intra-movement frame disagreements, on a frame’s content, how it is shaped or what its reference is, and the adaptability of frames across time.\(^{398}\) In this regard, an analysis of the frames of the Muslim Brotherhood essential for they point to the mechanisms through which religious justification and references are made and then reconstituted in changing times. As highlighted about, intra-movement debates about which frames would remain, and which should be redefined, and which should be eliminated are essential to understand how ideology evolved over time. What this chapter illustrated is the ways with which both political inclusion and political oppression were refining the ideology of the Brotherhood through they way the referenced, framed and ultimately reframed Islam as their counter hegemonic discourse to the state.

These findings also highlight the need to trace the ideological history of the Brotherhood to measure their long term commitments to change, as well as how these commitments related to the regime’s own commitments to democratic

reform.\textsuperscript{399}

While one can argue that the possibility does exist that the shift in the Brotherhood is principally for the purposes of political gain, or that the reflected ideological shift in the writings, statements and interviews of the brotherhood are for public and scholarly consumption and do not reflect a genuine change, but the possibility remains that there is a true shift. A true shift in ideology is often reflected in behavior. The following chapter will address the political behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament.

Chapter 5: When Islamists parties compete electorally and win—Islamists and Participatory Politics

Note the problem of religion taken not into in the secular sense but in the secular sense of unity of faith between the conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct. But why call this unity of faith “religion” not “ideology,” of even frankly “politics”?

- Antonio Gramsci

5.1 Introduction

What happens when Islamists come to power? In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats in parliament (or 20%). This chapter aims to highlight the behavior of the Brotherhood in parliament. Did they push for “Islamist issues” or not? This chapter focuses on the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in political institutions, such as the parliament, within a framework of authoritarianism, where political participation vacillates between cooptation and control of parties, and contentious participation. The chapter begins by tracing the electoral history of the Brotherhood and the legal challenges they have faced. It is important to look at parliamentary elections and results, because both the government and the opposition take these elections quite seriously. Out of the eight election cycles that have taken place in Egypt since 1976, a boycott by the opposition has been rare, occurring only in 1990 and partly in 2010. The major questions that guide the inquiry in this chapter are: How do opponents challenge

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the regime within institutions that have been designed by the regime to limit the actions of opponents? And, how are institutions altered or affected by the inclusion of opposition parties?

5.2 Parliamentary Elections in Egypt

Parliamentary elections in Egypt first took place in November 1866, and the first multiparty elections were held in 1976.\(^{402}\) Since then eight parliamentary elections have been held: 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and most recently in 2010, (for complete electoral results by party, see table 5.2). While the semblance of regular and consecutive elections does exist in Egypt, the elections are far from truly free, fair, or competitive. And while the political parties and groups do range from secular liberals, leftist socialists, to Islamists, ultimate control of the parliament has remained in the hands of the National Democratic Party, the NDP. Furthermore, the parliament has historically served as a “rubber stamp” to the executive branches policies.\(^{403}\) To this end, the level of political liberalization cannot be measured directly through the existence of consecutive elections. As Dahl’s second stage of democratization—democratic consolidation—cites that the transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies starts when consecutive elections begin to occur (with full consolidations achieves after two consecutive


\(^{403}\) For more on the instrumental use of such state institutions see: Mona Makram Ebeid. “Egypt’s 2000 parliamentary elections,” Middle East Policy. 2001: Vol8, No.2, pp.32-43.
elections under full polyarchy). Like Dahl, most democratic theorists, whether  
they operationalize a minimalist definition of democracy or not, they find that  
political parties are the major component of democracy. In this regard, political  
parties are meant to represent the varied interests of the populations and develop  
competing policy proposals that provide the population with choices.

For Daniel Levine and Brian Crisp “hard-won stability can be put in jeopardy  
by rapid social change, institutional rigidity, and organizational complacency.”  
To this end, democratic decay is as important a concept to understand as democratic  
consolidation. And further consideration of such constraints that opposition parties  
find themselves—working within this backdrop of pendulum swings of the  
democratic consolidation—decay continuum becomes apparent when discussing  
the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament.

While political institutions do exist in Egypt, such institutions under an  
authoritarian backdrop do not perform the same functions as they do in  
democracies. The primary aim of institutions under an authoritarian regime are to

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ensure that state-society relations “can be controlled, where demands can be revealed without appearing as acts of resistance, where issues can be hammer out without undue public scrutiny, and where resulting agreements can be addressed in a legitimate form and publicized as such.”408 Thus, the function of such institutions under authoritarian regimes is not to check the authority of the executive, but rather these institutions under authoritarian regimes are meant to control society at large by controlling formal avenues of participation.

In this regard, political participation in formal institutions is a means of greater social control, through a limited space of contentious politics in a controlled environment.409 By their very nature, institutions are meant to have some degree of participation, yet because such institutions aim to co-opt dissenting voices by bringing them into such institutions, and then either repressing them, or changing institutional arrangements. Why then would regime opponents enter into the formal political arena? According to Jason Lyall, regime opponents enter into politics to “inflict costs on their leaders for failing to up hold

their...commitments.” But in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the opponents enter the political arena not only to attempt to hold the regime in power accountable, but also to utilize the formal institutions of the state to increase their visibility and legitimacy to the public and to ensure future institutional access.

Yet, much of the literature on institutions under authoritarian regimes, sees such institutions as the parliament, as forums that do little more than distribute rents or are irrelevant in terms of making policy concessions. When institutions are seen as insignificant, or little more than the rubber stamps of the regime, the inner workings of such institutions are often ignored. However, as the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood within state institutions has shown over the past decade, paying close attention to the inner workings of state institutions under authoritarian regimes is essential to understanding political participation in under such regimes. Looking at cooperation, strategies, and compromises made within institution like the parliament, highlights the conditions that may lead to future cooperation within authoritarian regimes.

The major questions that guide the inquiry in this chapter are: How do opponents challenge the regime within institutions that have been designed by the regime to limit the actions of opponents? And how are institutions altered or affected by the inclusion of opposition parties?

### 5.3 The Parliament as a Cite of Contestation

As alluded to earlier, parliaments and parliamentary elections are not only essential components of government, as they “essential for the formulation of national policies” but there are also the spaces through which national policy is meant to be checked as really in keeping with the national interest. Maye Kassem problematizes this assumption by claiming that parliaments serve the regime in power by essentially serving as an avenue for social control. However, parliaments are an avenue for the state contestation. Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg identify the characteristics of contentious relations between regime and opposition in Egypt: “The first is that access to parliament is the principal point of contention between government and opposition...[and] presidential legitimacy is largely a function of the representation of the opposition within the legislature: the fewer opposition MPs in parliament, the lower the level of presidential

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413 For more on the role of such legislative bodies, see Barrington Moore, Soviet politics: the Dilemma of Power: the Role of Ideas in Social Change. pp. 260-267.

legitimacy.” 415 In this regard, the Brotherhood can challenge the regime on ‘real’ issues as well as move their organizational model away from a protest movement to an opposition party. Yet, on the institutional level, the development and entry into politics by opposition movements also changes institutional design as well as the impact of the political arena.

The Egyptian parliament is a bicameral consisting of two chambers: the Majlis al-Sha’ab (‘People’s Assembly,’ a 454 seat lower house) 416 and the Majlis al-Shura (‘Consultative Council,’ a 264 seat upper house). The members of each house are elected for a period of five years, the Majlis al-Sha’ab in a central vote and the Majlis al-Shura in three electoral rounds within one term during each of which roughly one-third is elected. 417 According to the Egyptian constitution, the People’s Assembly, or parliament is a more powerful governance institution. 418 Founded in 1980, the Shura Council has limited legislative powers, where as the People’s Assembly (the Lower house of Parliament) has the final decision to pass laws. While the Shura Council has been described as a “retirement haven for burned-out top-level bureaucrats, ministers, and politicians” 419 it remains an important arena for cooptation. In the 2010 mid-term Shura Council Elections, the ruling party won 90

416 The People’s Assembly has 444 elected members plus an additional ten appointed by the president.
417 The total number of members in the Shura Council is 264, where the President appoints third of them. The other two thirds of the candidates are elected every three years.
percent of the seats, with only eight seats going to members of the thirteen competing parties, with none of the fourteen fielded Muslim Brotherhood candidates winning a seat.\footnote{Eiah Shalaby. “Egypt's Shura Council Elections Start off Amid Violations,” The Egyptian Dialogue Institute. http://edii.org.eg/index.php/top-news/420-egypts-shura-council-elections-start-off-amid-violations} Thus, the Shura Council, while an effective political institution, serves as a symbolic victory for the regime during its successive electoral victories.

While ridden with electoral corruptions and cooptation these institutions are seen as detrimental to the political viability of political parties. To that end, political struggles are mostly about representation in parliament—especially the people’s Assembly. This is not surprising in the case of the political parties because their fate is closely associated with these institutions. Electoral victories lead to prominent representation—the very same type of victory the Muslim Brotherhood attained during the 2005-2010 parliamentary session. The Muslim Brotherhood has also, during the course of its development from a social movement to a much political actor, placed great emphasis on the quest for participation in elections and parliament.

Although the Brotherhood faces a multitude of obstacles, they do possess an asset, apart from activism in the formal political institutions, which the other opposition forces do not have at their disposal—popular mass support tied to a historical legacy. However, one may contend that the participation in elections does
not increase the Brotherhood’s popularity because elections and the parliament are considerably discredited among the wider public. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski have argued that elections under authoritarianism are prone to intimidate the populace and remain a tool to show to the own people the power and control mechanisms of authoritarian incumbents. “Elections are intended to show that the dictatorship can make the dog perform tricks, that it can intimidate a substantial part of the population, so that any opposition is futile. Under dictatorship, everyone knows that their rulers are not selected through elections.”  

Why, then, should the Muslim Brotherhood, and other opposition forces, participate in elections and, as a consequence, provide some credit in the form of political legitimacy to these institutions?

What follows is a brief mapping of the parliamentary elections of the two decades prior to the 2005 elections, the institutional and constitutional changes that were made in an attempt to limit the opposition, as well as the altered political space once opposition movements seek entry into the formal institutions as political candidates.

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5.3.1 The Egyptian Parliament Elections 1980-2000—Constraints on Political Parties

The first multiparty elections were held in 1976, when President Sadat introduced multiparty elections in 1976, this we seen as a turn in the Egyptian political arena that would finally be more open. However, with Sadat’s decreasing popularity over March 26, 1979 peace-treaty signed with Israel, increasing opposition arose within the Parliament. In response, Sadat cancelled the 1976 Parliament, and called for new elections. However, after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, and the implementation of Emergency Law, the multiparty electoral process did not last long. Under Emergency Law, the restriction on freedom of assembly and freedoms of the press, democratic elections are close to impossible.

In August 1983, the Election Law 114 was issued, stipulating

the election of members of the People’s Assembly through party lists based on the proportional system, each party shall have its own list, and a single list cannot include candidates from more than one party. Each list should include a number of candidates equal to the number of seats up for election in a given district, and an equal number of alternate candidates.422

This system set- up of the Consultative Council—the Majlis Shura was different than before, a non-legislative consultative body established in 1980, under which elections followed the ‘winner-takes-all’ system.423 Under this system a party would take all the seats in each district if it won an absolute majority of the votes, no matter what the shared for others parties turned out to amount to. In 1984 the

423 ibid
Brotherhood join their long-standing ideological rivals, the ideologically and economically liberal Wafd political party. This led the Brotherhood to win 13 percent of the seats in parliament. This strategy placed the Brotherhood on a platform where it was now seen as a political opposition to Mubarak that had strategic and electoral viability.424

In a turn around, which was characteristic of the government at the time, the regime called such policies unconstitutional and in 1986 the Law 114 was deemed unconstitutional because it did not allow independent to stand as candidates. While in its previous form the law was meant to help build parties and bolster them electorally, in reality, it ended up marginalizing a large portion of the electoral pool—the independents who actually outnumbered the party candidates.

The electoral revision allowed for independents to run under party lists that had been previously co-opted by party members. As independents they could now form party lists, and as a result over 100 candidates ran for office as independents. However, this electoral success did not last long, as the government changed the electoral law just a few years later and issued Law no. 201 in 1990. The number of parliamentarians was now set at 444, based on a candidate-centered system, and all qualified persons were given the right to declare their candidacies without any

constraints. In practice, this did away with political parties—a key element in a developing society that dreamed of having representative political parties as one of the most important mechanisms for political development.

### 5.3.2 The Egyptian Parliament Elections 1980-2000—Opposition as Independents

The strength of political parties is often measured through elections results. And while the two-decade analysis of election results below is seen as a measure of the electoral viability and strength of a party, as seen above, in the case of Egypt, electoral outcomes also highlight the institutional changes that continue to occur with an authoritarian political system.

First, the institution of the parliament is seen as extremely irrelevant in affecting the lives of the citizenry. This perception of the parliament coupled with the weakness of political parties and extreme political apathy, has led to low voter turn out.

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Table 5.1: Voter Turnout 1976—2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>% of those who actually voted to the total number of those registered on the election list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the table above depicts the number of registered voters who actually vote, if the number of personal eligible to vote were added, the voter turnout percentages above who plummet. For example in 1995 the voter turnout is registered as almost 50 percent. However, the 50 percent is based on 21 million registered voters, while the number of eligible voters is 30 million. Taking this into account, the percentage of voter turnout would be reduced from 50 percent to 35 percent.\(^{427}\)


Table 5.2: Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 1984-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary elections</th>
<th>1984 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1987 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1990 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1995 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2000 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2005 # of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Booqott</td>
<td>1 .2</td>
<td>1 0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 1.1</td>
<td>5 1.1</td>
<td>6 1.3</td>
<td>2 0.4</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Arab Nasserite Party</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP alone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>1 0.2</td>
<td>17 3.7</td>
<td>88 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP/MB alliance</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wafd/MB alliance</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wafd Party Alone MB alone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent opposition</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>79 17.4</td>
<td>13 2.8</td>
<td>21 4.6</td>
<td>24 4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, during the 1984 and 1987 electoral cycles the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as a political player set the stage for potential of opposition candidates’ electoral viability. During these election cycles, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to forge important alliances with secular opposition forces. The success of such alliances that were predicated on both political and ideological compromises (as seen in the previous chapters) indicates the weakness of secular opposition forces—where by 2000 the Brotherhood alone had won more seats that those the allied with in the past. And by 2005, alliances nowhere to be seen and the Brotherhood had taken 20% of the parliamentary seats on their own.

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Third, after the 1990 ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court allowing candidates to run as independents, 2,134 candidates ran as independent while 541 ran as members of a party.\textsuperscript{429} However, about 1000 of those independent candidates ran as independents because their parties were boycotting the elections, or members of the NDP that were not nominated by their party.\textsuperscript{430} Out of the 177 independents that won seats, 98 were former members of the NDP that returned to their party after the elections—leaving the total number of actual independents that won seats at 79.\textsuperscript{431} The same ‘hijacking’ of independent status occurred during the 1995 elections where of the 3100 candidates running as independents, 1700 were actually members of the NDP. Of the 112 independent candidates that won seats in Parliament, 99 returned to the NDP (giving the NDP a total of 417 seats), leaving only 13 seats for independent candidates. This defection back to the NDP gave the NDP instead of 70 percent control of Parliament, but instead 91.8 percent.\textsuperscript{432} The same occurred in 2000 when of the 256 winning independent candidate, 218 joined the NDP—this shifted the representation of the NDP from 37.4 percent to 85.4 percent.\textsuperscript{433} During the 2005 elections, when the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 of the 112 independent seats, the Muslim Brotherhood along with the remaining 24

\textsuperscript{429} Al-Intikhabat Al-Parlamaniyya Fi Masr 1995, al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 1997.
\textsuperscript{430} Most opposition parties had chosen to boycott the 1990 elections (as most did in 2010) because of intimidation and the perception of electoral fraud.
\textsuperscript{432} Add to this the 10 appointed members of the Parliament that are given to the NDP, the total NDP representation rises to 94 percent. \textit{Al-Taqrir Al-Istratiji Al-Arbi—1995}, Al-Ahram Center For Political and Strategic Studies, 1996. p. 385.
\textsuperscript{433} Add to this the 10 appointed members of the Parliament that are given to the NDP, the total NDP representation rises to 87.6 percent. \textit{Al-Ahram Weekly}, November 23-29, 2000.
independents prohibited the NDP from capturing full control of the parliament.

**Table 5.3: Electoral Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Seats Contested</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2 (as independents)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>18 (under New Wafd party list)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>40 (as part of an alliance with the Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Liberal Party)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>160 (as independents)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70 (as independents)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>150 (as independents)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 The 2005 Parliamentary Elections

If electoral outcomes are at times almost certain, then why would opposition candidates and parties take parliamentary elections seriously? In Egypt, elections are taken very seriously and are prepared for with opposition parties distributing electoral platforms and vigorous campaigning often taking place in the public sphere—especially during the 2005 election cycle. What this indicates in the case of Egypt is that elections, the very essence of procedural democracy, serve as a

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moment of strategic interaction between the opposition and the state. And thus, elections are seen as a moment of the ability of opposition movements to directly oppose the state.

According to Magaloni, authoritarian regimes will enter into electoral competitions for strategic interests as well. These include utilizing the opportunity if campaigning to assert the national agenda, blanketing the public sphere with campaign paraphernalia, and reasserting themselves in the public square as the sources of stability. For Magaloni, this also increases the perceived relative strength of the regime by the public, and reminds the public of the power of regime. In Egypt, election cycles serve the regime by allowing it to reestablish its domination. This is accomplished through the campaigning cycle where the regime distributes economic resources to members with whom they share political and economic alliances.

While most Egyptians are aware of the corruption that surrounds the electoral process, the factor that keeps most Egyptians outside of the political process altogether is their fear of the regime and the punishment they might suffer at the hands of the regime if they are seen as active in opposition campaigning. A famous account of electoral corruption took place in the 2005 electoral cycle was documents by the Egyptian independent paper al-Masry Al-Youm, where they documented the surrounding of ballot boxes by armed government workers, the

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closer of polling stations, the switching of ballot boxes, and the stuffing of ballot boxes by government workers. There are three major types of electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime:

1) Vote buying, where bribery and patronage schemes to mobilize support are the norm, and thus a large percentage of Egyptian voters expect to receive material or other compensation for their vote, or vote as a result of direct and indirect government pressure. In this regaud the rural poor are likely to be more targeted rewards than others. In the case of the 2005 parliamentary elections, vote buying in the Bahariya Province and the Damhoun Province was rampant, with the price of a vote falling between 20 LE and 30 LE. According to Lisa Blaydes, during the 2005 election “vote buying techniques would have fallen entirely on the budget of the regime and party (rather than individual parliamentary candidates), regime and party representatives created the impression that economic sanction would be enforced for individuals who failed to turnout and vote.”

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436 **Afaaq Arabiya** November 16, 2005


438 **Al-Masry Al-Youm.** November 21 & 22, 2005.

2) *Police interference and intimidation.* To register to vote, Egyptians must report to police stations where voter registration cards are distributed by the security forces. Security forces in the Mansoura Province were ordered to confiscate government work papers from anyone registering to vote, in exchange for the voter registration card.\(^{440}\) The confiscation of work papers carries the cost of not only losing employment, but also the prevention of future employment, a price too costly for the average Egyptian that lives on a daily salary and not on a monthly income.

3) *Excluding monitors:* According to Al-Masry Al-Youm, although approximately 12,000 domestic monitors were trained to observe 50,000 polling stations, only a fraction of them was granted permission to do so. In past elections, the Higher Electoral Commission—which oversees the registration of domestic monitors—has used a strategy of restricting the number of authorizations. Even monitors who successfully obtain credentials are not granted access to polling and counting stations, in the June 2005 Shura Council election, many were denied access to these venues by security forces.\(^{441}\)

However, in spite of the constraints on the electoral process instituted by the regime, the election cycle proved quite successful for the opposition. By the end of

\(^{440}\) Personal interview with Mahmoud Muhammad, government laborer in the Mansoura Province. July 17, 2008.

the cycle 121, Islamist and non-Islamist opposition candidates had won seats in the parliament. This victory signaled to the regime as well as to the public, that there was a populous that was willing to sacrifice for the electoral process, and with neither purchased or intimidated by the regime, and neither were they passive. The national media coverage of these events further served as a signal to the population that the days of landslide victories by the regime were over when the political arena was slightly liberalized.

By the end of the 2005 parliamentary election cycle: the National Democratic Party won 311 seats, or 68.5 percent of the vote, the New Wafd Party won 6 seats or 1.3%, the Progressive National Unionist Party won 2 seats, or 0.4% of the vote, The Nasserist Party did not win any, independents won 24 seats or 4.6%, and the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats, or 20% (see table 5.2 above). With their relative successes in the 2005 elections that yielded them 1/5 of the seats in parliament, the Brotherhood was poised to finally make their political mark.

The 2005 elections proved to be a lesson for the effects of different electoral processes for the regime. When the regime did allow for more political openness in 2005, allowing for greater inclusion of opposition parties, the regime obviously underestimated the capacities of the Muslim Brotherhood. This shows that elections can become a viable arena of contention—in the least they have become a place for the opposition to fine-tune their programmatic distinctiveness and mobilization capacities both in front of their own constituency and to the regime. What the
Muslim Brotherhood accomplished in the 2005 parliamentary election was to posit itself as a credible candidate able to alter the seemingly passive nature of the political arena into a contentious one.

As a consequence, questions that had been reverberating in policy circles for decades on the direction that the Brotherhood would take once in power could now possibly be answered. Would the Muslim Brotherhood behave in the interest of furthering their Islamist agenda?

5.5  The Muslim Brotherhood and the 2005 legislative Assembly

The case of the 2005 electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood provides and insight to the question of what happens when Islamists win. Although their 2005 electoral platform focused on reform, right after their electoral victory, the Brotherhood issued a statement asserting that their top priority in parliament will be to press for general political reform in Egypt or Islah. The platform of Islah was seen as ambiguous. What would political reform look like? Whose interests would the reform serve? And was the Brotherhood cashing in on the reform platform of the Kifayah movement?\textsuperscript{442} The national newspaper Al-Ahram, as well as several other national papers\textsuperscript{443} began questioning the reform agenda of the Brotherhood, asking what exactly was to be reformed. The international media asked these questions as well. On December 8, 2005, The New York Times led with an article,

\textsuperscript{442} More in the Kifya Movement in Chapter 7.
\textsuperscript{443} These include: Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar; Al-Gomhorriya; and Rose al-Youssef
“Stirrings in the Desert—Islamists as Players: Will Politics Tame Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood?”\textsuperscript{444} Would the Muslim Brotherhood utilize their electoral success to push for the 'Islamization' of Egypt became the big question. The Brotherhood's behavior within the institution of the parliament paints a very different picture.

5.5.1 Participatory Strategy #1: Altering the political space by increasing productivity

In the 2005 election, 88 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were elected representing 21 of Egypt's 26 governorates, previously only 17 Muslim Brotherhood members were in parliament after the 2000 election.\textsuperscript{445} The 88—or the Brotherhood bloc as they came to be known—took their role in parliament and the power of parliament more seriously than the ruling party has in the past—with interesting consequences.\textsuperscript{446} The entire bloc—all 88—moved into a hotel in Cairo in order to be able to work and live together while the People’s Assembly was in session—most importantly, however, attend parliamentary sessions regularly. Their mere visibility in the parliament both challenged and changed the dynamic of what was otherwise a rubberstamp of the regime and not a powerful legislative body.\textsuperscript{447} “The parliament has been for so long just a rubber stamp on the actions of the President. The NDP has such a stronghold because of the joint-benefits the Party


\textsuperscript{446} ibid

\textsuperscript{447} ibid
has with the President. We intend to change that.”

Before the 2005 election fewer than 30 NDP members would be present by the end of a parliamentary session, today at least 100 must be present to outnumber the Muslim Brotherhood members. “Our presence in the parliament, and our persistence, dictates that a similar number of the National Party must be present, so the total number of members in parliament went from 30 to 200—allowing for real work and real debate to occur.”

Another consequence of the Muslim Brotherhood attendance is not only the attendance of NDP parliamentarians, but also in their level of preparedness—“...for the first time everyone comes ready to work.”

The Brotherhood parliamentarians sought to alter the image of the parliamentarian in the eyes of their constituents by becoming effective parliamentarians. Brotherhood Parliamentarians reform agenda aimed to expose the regime’s fraud. “Seats were not the goal,” says Mohamed El Biltagy, a Brotherhood parliamentarian from the Shubra Al Khema district, “active participation, getting people together for reform and change, that is the goal.”

Their first move was to ineract and meet with their constituents on a regular basis. According to member Dr. Hazem Farouq Mansour, “we want the people to see a

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448 Personal interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].
449 Personal interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].
450 Personal interview with Dr. Hazem Farouq Mansour (Muslim Brotherhood MP from Shubrah) August 3, 2008 [audio recording].
politician that interacts with his constituents on the street instead of avoiding them, a politician who reports to parliament in the morning and argues for the public’s demands—setting the example for productive.”

One example the effect of attendance existed in the Committee on Education. The Committee had 53 members, 12 of them are from the Muslim Brotherhood. In the attendance roster of the 19th Congress, the 12 members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the chair of the Committee, Sharif Amer, were the only MPs who regularly attend. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood MPs directly affect the discussion and implementation of draft proposals. According to the head of the 88, Dr. Katatni, this also occurs in the health, industry, and consumer protection committees.

The strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood seems quite simple—to be effectively distributed in committees so as to have an overall presence—they always have at least two Muslim Brotherhood MPs to participate in every discussion, and a tangible effect in a few committees—those that don’t garner great attendance. This participatory strategy from 2006-2008 led to a, “change in the work mechanism. Not only did our work become visible, but the [Parliament] become visible as an active legislative body.” This increased activity led to a change in media coverage of the Parliament. Before the increase presence of the Muslim Brotherhood bloc in the Parliament, a state-owned television station used to broadcast council sessions

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452 Personal interview with Dr. Hazem Farouq Mansour August 3, 2008 [audio recording].
453 “In 70-80 of committees the MB is in control of through their attendance.” This was told to me by Dr. Katatni. I have not been able to verify this yet.
454 Personal interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].
live, “but that was banned in order to prevent the public opinion from observing the conduct of the Muslim Brotherhood bloc in the council.”\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
Table 5.4: Party Representation in Parliamentary Committees\textsuperscript{456}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of MPs</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Arab/Affairs</th>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Constitutional Affairs</th>
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<td>18.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
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<td>17.6%</td>
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<th>Health Care</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>General Committee</th>
<th>Bureau of the Council</th>
<th>Budget</th>
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<td>Unincht</td>
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<th>Religious C.</th>
<th>Suggestions C.</th>
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<td>32.100%</td>
<td>20.100%</td>
<td>34.100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

During the 2006 legislative session the Brotherhood gained seats on twenty of the twenty-three legislative committees. However they took majority control over the following legislative committees Education, Executive Economic, Healthcare and Industry (see table 5.4 above). According to Al-Katatni,

“there is a certain aspect that goes unnoticed due to its poor coverage by the media, and that is our work in the council’s committees, which are considered the main kitchen in which laws are prepared for public debate. Usually, in 70-80% of these committees, we form the majority, not because of our representation in these committees, but because of our high attendance. They form the committees in such a way that the National Party always holds the majority, but the party’s deputies never attend, for example, I am on the Education Committee, which consists of at least 35 deputies, twelve of whom are from the Brotherhood, but I have not seen some committee members since the session started, they did not attend a single committee session, and many of them only attend when they are summoned to vote. However, Brotherhood deputies attend these sessions along with committee chairman Dr. Sharif Omar, the committee’s treasurer, and an Education Ministry undersecretary, and seldom does a deputy or two from the National Party attend.”

According to the minutes of the 2006 Parliamentary Assembly, Brotherhood MPs submitted over two hundred and seven questions and interpellations on education alone out of a total of two hundred and twenty-one equaling ninety-four percent of the work on the committee. While, the Brotherhood had forty-two percent representation on the committee, the NDP had fifty-three percent representation. For Al-Katatni, because of the consistent presence and attendance of the Brotherhood members, they were able to take part in discussing, drafting, and

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457 Personal interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].
addressing all the decisions and laws pertaining to this Education Committee.\textsuperscript{459}

This is also the case in the Health Committee, the Industry Committee, and Economic Committee. For Al-Katatni, the strategy was to ensure that the Brotherhood members were “well distributed among the committees, and yes, we have a relatively large presence in some of the committees that we see as important, and a smaller one in others, but our presence is effective.”\textsuperscript{460}

Due to the enormity of the undertaking the Brotherhood had set out accomplish, just days after election of the bloc, the Brotherhood filled a four-story building in the Minyal district of Cairo with experts and researchers on Parliamentary issues, dedicating entire floors to social, economic and political legislation.\textsuperscript{461} Symbolically, the building sits on a major road in a bustling neighborhood, signaling to both the regime and to the masses that the work of the Brotherhood was public. The first floor of the building has a reception area where guests were met, researchers were allowed access and media interviews were held.

\footnotetext{459}{The focus of the Brotherhood bloc on education revolved around the following issue areas. (1) Establishing a monitoring of curriculums for private and public institutions, teachers, students, and infrastructure. (2) They called for increasing research budgets of universities. (3) They traced the ineffectiveness of the government in combating illiteracy. (4) Called for amending teacher and administration pay to account for inflation. (5) Called for an incentive pay structure for teachers (6) they presented an initiative that sought to secure jobs for those who graduated from the college of education and development to work in the ministry of education and development. Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc. \textit{Adwaa ala adaa nuwwab al-ikhwan} (Spotlighting MB Parliamentary members performance) Cairo, 2010.}

\footnotetext{460}{Personal interview with Dr. Saad Al-Katatni (head of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood Bloc) Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].}

\footnotetext{461}{However in 2007 Eighteen Brotherhood legislative staffers drafting education and health-care reform bills were among the hundreds of Brother arrested. Charles Levinson, 'Brothers' in Egypt Present Two Faces,” \textit{The Wall Street Journal}. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704629004576135882819143872.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories}
A separate room for conferences (with a separate entrance) allowed Brotherhood to hold round table discussions, invite guests from various think tanks and universities to hold conferences, and tape statements made by Brotherhood parliamentarians that are regularly broadcast via the Internet. The Brotherhood Parliamentary bloc also launched its own website, nawabikhwan.org where information on their activity and voting behavior, video conferences can be witnessed, and taped broadcasts can be picked up by various media outlets. The website further signaled to the masses that the once private, underground organization was now public, with a presence that can be monitored by anyone interested. The group that ran on a platform of transparency had now, in the name of transparency, become the most visibly organized political actor in the country.

5.5.2 Participatory Strategy #2: Issue Areas

The secondary strategy of the Brotherhood bloc was to focuses on three primary issue areas one in the parliament: corruption, social services and political reform. The strategy of the brotherhood was two-pronged. They established early on that they would commit themselves to two levels of work, one that is riqabi, monitoring—where the previous work of the parliament would be reviewed for effectiveness, corruption and maintaining the national interest, and the other level is tashri’i—new proposals—where the Brotherhood bloc would propose discussions on new issues.462

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The task of closely investigating the legislative work of past assemblies (riqabi) while simultaneously establishing a work agenda for their present legislative session (tashri‘i) was an enormous undertaking for the Brotherhood. Uncovering the work of the past assemblies was seen as key to their primary goal as laid out by the electoral platform—reform and ending the culture of corruption.\(^{463}\) However they began a strategy of employing previously under utilized parliamentary tools to uncover the details of past proceedings.

5.5.2.i Parliamentary tools

There are three major tools at the disposal of parliamentarians with which they can navigate the political process and participate in the legislative process: questions, formal requests for information, and interpellations.\(^ {464}\)

1. The submission of questions is seen as the least effective tool at the disposal of a parliamentarian. Constitutionally, government ministers must answer questions submitted by parliamentarians. However, it is commonplace for questions to be ignored by ministers with no real repercussions taken. Although questions are registered, they are not considered part of the parliamentary discussion, and thus are used mainly by members of the NDP, since these questions are the least effective tool of control.\(^ {465}\)

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\(^{465}\) ibid.
(2) Parliamentarians in preparation for draft resolutions use formal requests for information. Such requests are stronger than questions, because they include an element of inquiry. The NDP uses this measure less, but opposition candidates use this measure as a mode of inquiry especially with regard to corruption.

(3) Interpellations are a parliamentary procedure of demanding that a government official explain some act or policy. The NDP has no recent record of using such interpellation. This tool, however, is used by members of the opposition, mostly by the Brotherhood members.\textsuperscript{466}

During the 1991-1995 parliamentary session, the opposition candidates in total submitted 226 questions requests and interpellations.\textsuperscript{467} The 2000-2005 parliamentary session, the seventeen Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentarians \textit{alone} used these intervention tools over 6000 times, and between 2006-2009 the Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentarians utilized these tool 23,000 times.\textsuperscript{468} Although the NDP held three-quarters of the seats and remained in control, the Brotherhood continued to issue questions and inquiries in their attempt to “implement the

principle of concurrence and balance between power and responsibility in the Egyptian political life.”

Table 5.5 Parliamentary inquires submitted and discussed in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inquires &amp; Questions Submitted</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>MB</th>
<th>Percent by MB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inquires &amp; Questions Discussed</td>
<td>2275</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈7000</td>
<td>3498</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What table 5.5 above shows is that the Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians, 20% of the parliament, conducted 50% of the parliamentary discussion—greatly impacting the work of the parliament while working within the constraints established by the regime. The electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood led to the awakening of a “sleepy parliament...for the first time parliament “took politics seriously.” As a result of the Brotherhood bloc, the was “attempting to transform the Egyptian parliament into a real legislative body, a well as an institution that represents citizens and a mechanism that keeps government accountable.”

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472 Ibid.
Table 5.6 Monitoring (Riqabi) Parliamentary Tools Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Formal Requests</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Interpolations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB (Boycott)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB (Boycott)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5.2.ii Riqabi’ Monitoring Ongoing Issues

During the 2005-2010 session the Brotherhood posited over 23,000 questions to the Parliaments as points of discussion. These questions centered around the monitoring of previous decisions tracing their implementation, revisiting previous bills that were passed that members of the Brotherhood bloc saw as not in the best interest of the state. The monitoring questions primarily focused on institutionalized corruption within the regime. The Brotherhood focused on three primary issue areas, constitutional amendments, the privatization of public lands, patron-client relations.

The Brotherhood’s use of parliamentary inquiry into the inner workings of the state highlight the ways with which the regime had been manipulating the political system that reinforces the centrality of the government through a network that includes both formal and informal patron-client relationships. As Amaney
Jamal explained through the case of the Palestinian National Authority, when the regime’s party—which is the state—permeated electoral, business and social linkages through a vertical network, if an organization didn’t support the regime, they were denied the space to represent their interests.\textsuperscript{473} Conversely, if an organization supported the regime, their leaders gained access to the benefits that enabled them to deliver services and favors to their members. To this end, the primary category of focus for the Brotherhood was corruption, and social and economic legislation.

5.5.2.ii.a \textit{Corruption, Social and Economic Legislation.}

The 2005 electoral platform of the Brotherhood highlighted social and economic reform as one the primary goals of their parliamentary work, if they were elected. After the Brotherhood’s electoral success, they focused heavily on social and economic reform by highlighting corruption and the government’s ties to business élitest-business élitesthat were also parliamentarians. There strategy was to first vote against the proposed budget as outlined by the previous session (a strategy that had always employed). They then pushed for further discussion of the budget line by line. To be able to do this they focus on getting as many members of the Brotherhood to sit on the Budgetary Committee. Within a few weeks, the Brotherhood members had taken 5 of the 26 seats of the Budgetary Committee (see 

table 5.4 above). 474 They then submitted a prepared document that itemized their points of concern with the budget.475

In the Brotherhood’s *Reply to the Budget* 476 document, they focused on strengthening the investment climate in Egypt. To do so, they concentrated on corruption, the privatization of public lands, rampant use of bribes that were negatively affecting Egypt’s investment climate. They highlighted that Egypt was not following lessons learned from East Asia and in Latin America that suggest that entrepreneurial groups in those countries were among the agents of building a strong economic climate. However, according to Hazem Mansour, Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian, crony capitalists that are inhibiting the Egyptian economy control the entrepreneurial class in Egypt—a departure for the Muslim Brotherhood on their previous economic positions. Big business (which they claim is made up largely of crony capitalists) is perhaps the largest obstacle to the investment climate. The Brotherhood cited prominent entrepreneurs in the country that are found in the leading bodies of the National Democratic Party. They cite the fact that six business owners occupy ministerial positions in the second cabinet of Dr. Ahmed Nazif, formed in September 2005 after the election of President Hosni Mubarak to a fifth term. And that there are close to 80 businessmen the Parliament that are members of the NDP.

474 Saad Al-Katatni highlighted this strategy to me in a personal interview. . The head of the Brotherhood’s Parliamentary Bloc. Cairo, August 4, 6, 2008 [audio recording].
476 Ibid
They itemized the legislative corruption that such NDP businessmen play apart of. Through parliamentary interpellations and requests for information, the Brotherhood uncovered that almost 80% of electric grid improvements had been made for the benefit of NDP businessmen. To this end, they proposed legislation that would revise the selling costs of electricity to the wealthiest businesses at reduces rates. They also uncovered privatization policies that appropriated profitable public enterprises and vast areas of state-owned lands to NDP businessmen. They also began inquiries into a small group of businessmen with political ties who had monopolies on iron and steel, cement and wood—most notably steel magnate and billionaire CEO of EzzSteel, Ahmed Ezz who had taken advantage of his position and virtually monopolized the production and import of steel in Egypt (more than 60% market share). While crony capitalism became the business for entrepreneurs, any legitimate project was doomed to fail. Such a alliance between the government and business resulted in little regulation and


478 Report # 340 by three parliamentarians led by Brotherhood committee member Hassan Hamid uncovered the sale of public arable land being sold in the wilderness are of Abu Zeniman, as well as mineral rich land in being sold in Ras Sidr.


480 Personal interview with Dr. Gouda Abdel Khalek. Professor of Economics at Cairo University, and one of the original founders of the leftist Taggamu Party of Egypt. June 9, 2010.
environmental standards that ultimately has an effect on the population, while the government turned a blind eye.\textsuperscript{481}

The Brotherhood’s parliamentarians also began the review of the tax code. Brotherhood Parliamentarians found that the six business owners in ministerial positions had not paid LE 60 Billion in taxes.\textsuperscript{482} The investigation into tax violations led the Brotherhood Parliamentarians within the Rewriting Income Tax Law Committee to call for, factoring in inflation, taxing capital gains on the stock market and on land sales, fighting tax evasion, fighting monopolization, fighting institutionalized corruption. To this end they proposed Amending Article 30 of Law no. 9/1983 on taxes and auctions, Amending Article 5 of Law no. 7 of 1991 on the sale of state property, amending the provisions of Law. No. 143 of 1981 concerning the sale of desert land, and amending article 128 of the Penal code of 1937 on tax collection.\textsuperscript{483} They also launched separate investigations into the privatization of public lands worth 500 Billion LE. One such land project, the Madinati land project, an area to the east of Cairo developed by Talaat Moustafa Group. Hisham Talaat Mustafa, the Chairman and head of the Talaat Moustafa Group was elected in 2004 to the Shura Council in the Parliament of Egypt. The investigation launched under Brotherhood parliamentarian Magdi Radi that highlighted government land had

\textsuperscript{481} Report # 447 submitted by Sabri Khalif Allah began an investigation into reports of health code violations by industries and suggested the formation of a health institute in Ismailia province that would track and treat cases related lack of business regulation.

\textsuperscript{482} Report # 341 submitted by Abduallah Jamal Al-Din

\textsuperscript{483} Majlis Al-Sha’ab. Schedule of Reports of the 2006 Proposals and Complaints. Cairo.
been sold to private companies for as little at $1 per square meter.\textsuperscript{484} The investigation found that “many of the biggest land deals in the country were made as direct allocations by the government.”\textsuperscript{485} The report not only highlighted the corruption but also the affects of this corruption on the middle and lower classes of Egypt in terms of diverted resources.

In the Brotherhood’s investigation into the corruption they noted that of the 80 million Egyptians, 2.1 million less that $1 per day, and 35.8 million have an income of less than less than $2 per day. They also highlighted the 12 million homeless Egyptians that live in graveyards and open spaces. While the Egyptian government received aid and allocated funds for the homeless, the Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc conducted four inquiries with regard of failure to deal with unemployment. Their investigations found that aid money does not reach the poor. For example, Brotherhood Parliamentarian Ala’ Abdel Moniem discovered 13 billion LE allocated for the poor were missing. After submitting his report and over 100 members of Parliament asked for this issue to be discussed and we denied. And on April 22, 2007 heated discussion emerged over the silence on missing allocated funds and the policies of secrecy or Saiyasit al-Khasa. During this discussion Ala’ Abdel Moniem pointed to 2.2 billion LE that were missing from housing subsidies for the poor, finding that this was an ongoing problem with 566 million missing in 2004, 800 million missing in 2005, and 1.01 billion missing in 2006. When he


threatened to name the list of beneficiaries, Ahmed Ezz cancelled the floor discussion.

Similar accounting inconsistencies were uncovered in the government pension accounts, with 1.2 million pounds missing in 2006, and 800 million missing from agriculture subsidies.486 This debate occurred again in 2008 when the bloc presented 104 questions and 12 interpellation on the import of expired food—primarily wheat—that had been authorized by businessmen close to the regime.487 In December of 2008, Brotherhood parliamentarian Mohsin R’adi posited questions to investigate international aid monies to develop education, agriculture, micro credit, and women’s empowerment that reached over 8 billion LE.488 The bloc also sent direct questions to the minister of finance Youssef Boutros-Ghali, on the mishandling of pension accounts and social security funds and the use of 270 billion LE from the Indemnities and Salaries fund to cover public debts.489 To this end the Brotherhood issued consideration for the budget that would include (1) reconsidering the minimum wage—that it should not go below 8% of the average


income, and should also not be less that $2/day/family member (2) Increasing pension and factoring in inflation and healthcare costs (3) having balanced budget without increasing the debt ceiling.\textsuperscript{490}

\section*{5.5.2.iii Tashri’ Proposing New Issues}

The second participatory strategy was at the level is \textit{tashri’i}—new proposals—where the Brotherhood bloc would propose discussions on new issues, and draft new bills on issues usually neglected by previous parliamentary sessions. These new issues centered on reform of political rights and amendments in legal affairs. During the 2006 session the Brotherhood Parliamentary bloc utilized the proposal of bills 145 times, while the NDP made on 23 proposals (see table 5.6 below) while the NDP made only 19 proposals only a decade earlier in 1996. The primary focus of the reform agenda began right after the elections with the issue of ensuring judicial independence. The government had began a practice of penalize judges that acted to independently of the regime. During the 2005 election, judges were appointed as election monitors to ensure that fraud was not committed. However, the elections were wrought with fraud, and several judges submitted reports of electoral fraud. One prominent case was that of Hesham el-Bastawissi, an

\textsuperscript{490} Muslim Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc. \textit{Adwaa ala adaa nuwwab al-ikhwan (Spotlighting MB Parliamentary members performance)} Cairo, 2010. In the Brotherhood’s Alternative Budget, they focused on several issue areas that were previously ignored. Privatization of land worth LE 500 Billion; LE 1.25 Billion that are left in private funds outside of the budget; Natural gas pipeline to be restored so that LE 10 Billion that goes to Butane tanks will be eliminate; Natural gas sold to Israeli at a loss of $18 Billion—sold at a set price of $6.8/barrel since Camp David; Improving the electric grid LE 1 Billion/year.
appeals court judge who faced disciplinary proceedings, by the regime in 2006. According to el-Bastawissi the proceedings were retaliation for his outspoken denouncements of fraud during the 2005 elections. "We are using our right to talk to the press, to tell people what happened during the parliamentary elections...the government wants to punish us, to keep us silent, so we won't talk about this."491

According to Tamir Moustafa, an independent judiciary is one of the only markers of democracy in Egypt.492 During this time the Brotherhood bloc proposed bills to increase the independence of the judiciary. During the 2006 session the NDP members made several proposals that would increas control over the judiciary, however the Brotherhood bloc not only rejecting the proposed amendments, they offers an alternative draft law.493 On March 7, 2006, Brotherhood parliamentarian Sobhi Saleh gave in a draft bill that claimed that Judges with the judiciary authority needed to remain neutral and independent of the regime.494 However, with an open debate on the Parliamentary floor, the NDP law was passed in its original form.495 In 2007 when the NDP proposed and quietly passed the amendment of 34 articles,

article 88 on judicial supervision of elections was amended leading to perhaps the most significant change, from the viewpoint of political participation. Before, the wording of the amendment was “complete judiciary supervision of elections,” after, it changed to “only partial judiciary supervision of elections.”

Table 5.7  Proposal (Tashri’) Parliamentary Tools Used—Proposed Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Affiliation of source of proposed bill</th>
<th>Number of proposed bills</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB(Boycott)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB(Boycott)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUPP</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(82 approved and sent to working committees)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They also sought to present bills and draft laws pertaining to the formation legalization and support of political parties. During the 2006 session the Brotherhood remained an unofficial party and the Democratic Front Party of Osama al-Ghazali Harb and the Center Party, a more moderate offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, that under Mubarak, had its application for official recognition as a political party rejected. Parties are legalized and recognized through the authority of the governmental organization called the Political Parties Affairs.


Committee—a committee under control of the NDP under the Constitutional Affairs committee, of which 74% are NDP members (see table 5.4)\(^{498}\). One of the Brotherhood proposals was also for the publication and dissemination of party papers that the Law of the Press And Publications limits.\(^{499}\) While the proposed bill did make it to the floor for discussion, the 2005 Political Parties Law remained unchanged. As a result, the Democratic Party Front Party placed their support behind the Brotherhood Parliamentarians.\(^{500}\)

The Brotherhood next efforts were concentrated on protecting civil liberties.\(^{501}\) To that end, they proposed the Law of Prosecutorial Procedures.\(^{502}\) And in April 2006, the legislation limiting detention in cases where indictments were not made was amended to limit 3 months.\(^{503}\) They also included clauses that would explain what detention actually would mean, as a way to protect civil liberties.\(^{504}\)


\(^{500}\) Yihya Al-Gamal. “Gamal Mubarak laysa lahu sha’biyya fe al-sharia’ (Gamal Mubarak does not have a following in the street)” *Al-Dustor*. Cairo: January 23, 2008 p. 6

\(^{501}\) Where they were helped by members of the Tagamu’ Party, according to Gouda Abdel-Khalek.


 Freedoms of association and assembly also become apart of the parliamentary
discussion as a measure of strengthening civil society. In 2009, parliamentarian
Muhsin Radi proposed a draft law to cancel Article 190 of Law 58/1937, which
forbids journalists from publishing the procedures and decisions of tribunals
“deemed destructive to the public order and citizens’ morality.”\textsuperscript{505} For the Bloc that
fact that the article remained unchanged led reflected the limitation placed on free
press,\textsuperscript{506} but “also violates the constitution, which states that all tribunals are
public—as per article 169 of the Egyptian constitution.”\textsuperscript{507}

5.5.3 The Brotherhood Parliamentary Bloc on Religious issues

After the election of the 88 Brotherhood members, and their subsequent 43.5
percent representation (10 out of 23) on the control on the Religious Affairs
Committee (see table 5.4) the expectation was that the Brotherhood would advocate
greater regulation of the cinema industry, push for the censorship of books, block

\textsuperscript{505} Nathan Brown J. & Amr Hamzawy. “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist

\textsuperscript{506} ‘Abdullah Shehata, “radi yaqtaarih mashru’a qanun yulaghi hazr al-nashr” (Radi Suggests a
Law to Abolish Censorship), Nowab Ikhwan, February 27, 2009,

\textsuperscript{507} Nathan Brown J. & Amr Hamzawy. “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist
international satellite reception, and call for the veiling of women. However, the Brotherhood did not push for such measures, during the 2005 session instead insisted on their platform of reform—islah.

However, the Brotherhood’s moral and religious emphasis was not reflected in their parliamentary work. This was not the case previously. For example, during the 2000-2005 session the Brotherhood presented discussions on whether or not Bahí’a (members of an Islamic Sect that originates from Iran) were real Muslims. They argued that those of unrecognized faiths “cannot describe themselves as followers of a religion in official documents when it’s not technically a religion.” Legalization was being proposed by Brotherhood parliamentarians at the time to have the national identification cards of Bahia’s with a dash next to religion, and not have the word ‘Muslim’ appear. In 2001, Brotherhood parliamentarians also wanted al-Azhar to review all public school textbooks to ensure nothing was antithetical to Islam.

The religious agenda of the Brotherhood during the 2005-2010 assembly did not reflect its past. During 2005 session the Brotherhood pushed for two major

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issues: the reform of Al-Azhar and the creation of Islamic banking provisions. On this issue of institutionalizing Islamic Interest-free banking, a Brotherhood member presented a draft law to change the nature of the Law of the Central Bank, to treat the central bank of Egypt as apart from the commercial banking system. He argued that Egypt should move away from interested based model of banking and embrace an Islamic model.\textsuperscript{512} The proposed amendment to the Law of the Central Bank was categorically rejected.

On the issue of Al-Azhar, the Brotherhood’s main goal was to return the independence of Al-Azhar and to eliminate government control of the institution.\textsuperscript{513} To this end, in 2008, the Brotherhood bloc issued several questions accusing the government of deliberately undermining al-Azhar University by closing several of its schools and by the development of its curriculum.\textsuperscript{514} The undermining of al-Azhar University as a religious establishment has been documented,\textsuperscript{515} for the Brotherhood, Al-Azhar should have a greater independent role in the future of Egypt. This is extremely important for the Brotherhood, because after the August 2007 circulation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Draft Party Platform, one of the points of contention highlighted by policy analysts and think tanks was the issue of the

\textsuperscript{512} Muhammed Salah “Taghyeer Kanoon Al-Bank Al-Dawli” (Changes to the Domestic Banking Laws) Al-Masri Al-Youm. April 23, 2008. P. 4

\textsuperscript{513} The Brotherhood stills argues for this measure post-revolution


\textsuperscript{515} For a discussion of the undermining of Al-Azhar after the government took control of it under Sadat, see: Galal Amin, What Ever Happened to the Egyptians. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2000.
The proposed Shariah Council sparked much debate amongst analysts and within the Brotherhood. When I interviewed the Brotherhood leadership in 2008, I quoted the text of the one of the most cited critiques of the Brotherhood’s platform by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.\textsuperscript{516} Referring to the Draft platform, they authors state:

It called for the creation of a council of religious scholars—a new body that would be elected by the full complement of religious scholars in the country and serve to advise the legislative and executive branches in matters of religious law. The passage on the council also suggested that the new body might have the authority to comment on a wide variety of legislative and executive acts and that its word would be binding—and not merely advisory—in matters in which it felt the shari’a rule at stake was definitive and not subject to divergent interpretations.

According to Essam Al-Aryan\textsuperscript{517}

The religious council was profoundly scrutinized within the Brotherhood: First of all, it was misunderstood, and second, it was proposed as a consultative body. Following internal deliberations, it was decided that this entire council would be integrated into Al-Azhar, and that a review would be conducted of Al-Azhar’s role in society as a body that guards and upholds the principles of shari’ah, determines what is constant and absolute and what is contentious, offers an opinion, and guarantees the purity of shari’ah in service of all Muslims, not just the state, rather, the entire world, and one that is not counted among the state’s constitutional bodies. There was confusion on this matter.

An agreement has almost been reached to move all material pertaining to this matter to the section addressing the Al-Azhar, its


\textsuperscript{517} Essam Al-Aryan, Spokesman of the Ikhwan Personal Interview July 31, 2008. [audio recording]
restructuring, the revival of the senior scholars commission, and other affairs. This commission played a known role in the past that is defined by the law. However, we are in favor of a constitutional civil state in which legislations are passed by parliament, and legislative oversight is conducted strictly to the supreme constitutional court.

The fact that the Brotherhood intends to utilize Al-Azhar as a religious body separate from the state for moral oversight requires Al-Azhar to be seen as an independent body and not a rubber stamp on the regime, as it is today. In this regard the debate over Al-Azhar is tied to an unclear vision on the role of religion in the formulation of the state.518

5.6 Conclusion

There were two main foci in this chapter: tracing how opponents challenge the regime within institutions that have been designed by the regime to limit the actions of opponents: tracing how are institutions altered or affected by the inclusion of opposition parties. Through the above discussion on constitutional change to limit the electoral viability of opposition candidates, we see how the regime is willing to change the nature of state institutions to curb opposition. However, through the electoral strategies of the opposition, they manage to play within the altered rule of the game to attain a limited electoral victory. Once in Parliament, how does the opposition behave? While the integration of the Brotherhood did increase the productivity of the institution, the behavior of the Brotherhood in Parliament reflected not only the interplay of the Brotherhood within the institutional limits of

the state, but also the interplay of their with the shifting ideological frames of the
Brotherhood. What these two variables together highlight is that although inclusion
and ideological frames are critical to the moderation of the Brotherhood, the
internal organization of the Brotherhood matters as well.

The following chapter will highlight the changing internal dynamics of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the effects of their organizational resources on the
moderation of the Brotherhood as well as the ways with which the internal changing
demographic also critically affects the ideological trajectory and moderation of the
Brotherhood.
Chapter 6: The Generational Divide—The Old Guard Vs the New

Islam does not force anyone to embrace it. It is a message that spreads among the people. It is just a guide to all matters of life, but is also something that one carries in their heart. Why would politics involve religion? What does religion have to do with political matters, with the state, or with the economy? This is the real dilemma -- the Brotherhood’s Islamic message is mistaken for a religious message, and the Brotherhood is therefore seen as promoting a religious state or a theocracy, but that is not the case, the Brotherhood wants to establish a civil state.

— Mahmoud Izzat, Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood

On the difference between democracy and Islamic democracy: “Procedurally, nothing. The only difference is that the choices I make at the ballot box may reflect my religious conviction, other than that, democracy equals democracy no matter what descriptor you place in front of it.”


“The younger Brothers have a more moderate interpretation of religion in the public. They want to democratize...they advocate for equal citizenship...they want to open up society. The narrative of opportunistic Islamists is too simplistic, these young people have a more pluralistic vision for their country.”

— Wael Abass of the Youth Wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

6.1 Introduction

How does Egypt’s changing political and social landscape affect the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal makeup? How does the changing internal makeup of the Brotherhood affect their ideology and relationship with the state? While the
previous chapters directly discuss the changing history, ideology, and political and electoral strategies of the Brotherhood, this chapter focuses on the internal make up of the brotherhood and how it has changed over the years—leading not only to a generational divide, but also to an ideological divide. The chapter begins by highlighting the demographic context of Egypt today and increasing roll of youth in politics due to growing youth frustrations. The demographic context also manifests inside the Brotherhood.

Differences in political and religious belief, and their relationship to the state and how they manifest, as the opposition are further complicated by the generational divide amongst Egypt’s Islamists. While the generational divide is a reflections of the greater generational divide found in Egypt writ large, amongst Islamist parties and within the parties themselves, the vision is further complicated by differing visions on the future based on past experience. Within the Muslim Brotherhood, the generational divide reflects the division between younger Islamists who are committed to a populist, integrationist vision of politics while the older generation finds itself still committed to the rigidly centralized, top-down model of Islamist political culture.

6.2 **Egyptian Youth: Between Politics and Religion**

The role of youth in the struggle against the regime is important to understand. Much like women who opposed the Egyptian regime during the 1920s and turned to religion as a form of resistance seeing religious self-enhancement as
their chosen method to confront the regime,\textsuperscript{519} Egyptian youth fall under the same modality of behavior. Egyptian youth, as they begin to articulate the assertion of their aspirations, find themselves in the heart of the struggle of politics and religion. Because in Egypt the moral authority—primarily seen as the Muslim Brotherhood—and formal authority do not converge, Muslim youth find themselves caught between these two authoritative bodies in the ways with which they will articulate their aspirations.\textsuperscript{520} When the greatest opposition to the regime is the Islamist party, the youth often find themselves either rejecting politics and religion all together, or embracing the resistance of the regime in religious terms. Thus, the struggle causes youth to articulate their grievances with the regime in the guise of religion.

Yet, coupled with the renewed emphasis on religion, Egyptian youth also find themselves progressing towards the embrace of democratic values. Through increasing technological advances, globalization, and the ever increasing world of telecommunication that Egypt finds itself in, the youth a articulating their grievances with the regime from both a religious and a democratic frame. Thus, the marriage of Islam and democracy in Egypt is not just a result of the ideological moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also a result of the ideological push from below—where the activist youth also begin to articulate their grievances be


\textsuperscript{520} The exact opposite is seen in Iran, where the moral and political authority converge in the seat of the regime. This gives the youth an ability to formulate a “revolutionary” collective identity that stands against both authorities. See Asif Bayat, \textit{Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn}. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
developing an alternative counter-hegemonic discourse, that was not just articulated in terms of Islamic values, but also in terms of global democratic values—as seen during the 25 January revolution.

Much like the rest of the Arab world, Egypt is experiencing a youth bulge. According to USAID, 31.3% of the Egyptian population is between the ages if 10-24,\textsuperscript{521} with a median age of 24.8 years.\textsuperscript{522}

\textit{Figure 6.1: Age of the Egyptian Population 1950-2050}\textsuperscript{523}

While the Egyptian youth has been historically characterized as passive, since 2004, this demographic—nearly one-third of Egypt's 80 million residences—has become more politically engaged. 2005 saw in increase in political activity amongst Egyptian youth and more NGOs concentrating on Egyptian youth were registered.\textsuperscript{524}

\textsuperscript{522} Central Intelligence Agency. \textit{The World Fact Book}. “Country Profile: Egypt.”
\url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html}
\textsuperscript{524} Such as the Federation of Egyptian Youth NGOs. \url{http://www.nahdetmasr.org/youth-fed}
youth activism increased. While, in the past, the primary focus of Egyptian youth activism focused on access to education, jobs, and marriage costs, the focus shifted in 2005 to youth activism that is centered on the development of a political consciousness. Egyptian youth increased began expressing demands for increased political participation and representation, respect for human rights, and increased freedoms for expression and personal liberties. This increase in political activism grew exponentially with the entry of many youth into the cyber realm. This entry into cyberspace, primarily through blogs and social networking cites allowed Egyptian youth to join the global discussion on freedom, human rights and democratization, all the while by-passing the Egyptian regime.

6.3 Roots of Egyptian Youth Frustration

The current “youth bulge” that exists in Egypt is the highest proportion of youth to adults in the region’s history. Yet, the Egyptian regime has been unable to capitalize on the existence of a young, educated workforce. According to the World Bank, Egypt is experiencing a “demographic window of opportunity.” The demographic window of opportunity is defined as having a large working-age population and low dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is the ratio of the economically dependent population (0-14 and over 65) to those who are

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525 With a special focus on activism that concentrates on youth inclusion 
http://www.shababinclusion.org/section/about(links

productive (15-64).\textsuperscript{527} Because Egypt has a large dependency ration, youth find themselves with limited prospects. According to Jacques Vallin, developing countries will should reach a point where the proportion of adults of working age will find investment for future economic and social systems easier than before.\textsuperscript{528} Egypt is not only unable to capitalize on having such a young pool of workers, according to the International Labor Office, among youth, Egypt has an unemployment rate of 21 percent for males, and 40 percent for females, while this is reflective of the greater Middle East, these rates are the highest compared to other regions of the world.\textsuperscript{529}

\textbf{Table 6.1: Gender Disparity in Labor Market for Youth 16-29\textsuperscript{530}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government employee</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned enterprise worker</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal private wage worker</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal private regular wage worker</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular wage worker</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family worker</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Employed</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Ragui and Barsoum, the greatest challenges that youth face are:

finding jobs, having financial resources to support getting married, overcrowding in

\textsuperscript{528} Vallin, Jacques. "The Demographic Window—An opportunity to be seized" \textit{Asian Population Studies} 1.2, 2005.
schools, and a lack of employment opportunities especially for young women.\textsuperscript{531} They find that, while previous generations of youth in the Egypt benefited from free education and state support these state institution not only have not adapted to changing times, but they no longer function as they used to. They also find that during the period from 1965 to 2003, whereas Egypt spent 5 percent of its GDP on education, most less developed Latin American countries were spending 3 percent.\textsuperscript{532} These challenges leave youth dependent on their families well into adulthood.

The issues surrounding marriage in the Middle East is of utmost importance because marriage and family formation is a major passageway for the transition of young people into adulthood. In the region today, nearly 50 percent of men between the ages of 25 and 29 years are unmarried, compared with 23 percent in Asia and 31 percent in Latin America.\textsuperscript{533} According to Diane Singerman, the financial costs make marriage a burden as well as an economic hardship resulting in a delay in the age of marriage for both men and women.

What these statistics reveal is a large youth population that is frustrated at many levels. Thus, the rise in youth taking an active role in their political future is

\textsuperscript{532} ibid  
significant, but this rise reflected in youth utilizing traditional routes to voice
grievances, such as joining political parties or unions and syndicates,\textsuperscript{534} as their
parents did. Rather the feeling that “our government, our representatives, and our
for fathers have let us down, and no longer reflect our interests,”\textsuperscript{535} has led Egyptian
youth to utilize alternative means to voice their grievances, become politically
aware, and politically engaged.

\textbf{6.4 Youth Activism on the Rise—The Kifayah Effect}

Youth activism in Egypt has been on the rise since 2000. This wave of youth
activism in Egypt finds its roots forming during the 2000 Palestinian intifada when
hundreds of university and school students mobilized in solidarity with the
Palestinians. However, with the politicians focusing on constitutional in 2004 the
concerns of the youth also shifted. After The international declaration by
Condoleezza Rice on the future of a democratic Egypt, the focus of youth moved
towards the calling for increased spaces for participation, and greater government
transparency.\textsuperscript{536} This movement towards an inward looking politics took shape
when thousands of young activists joined new movements such as \textit{Kifayah}\textsuperscript{537} and
began publicly entering the political street. What Kifayah succeeded in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{535} Personal interview with Tharwat Al-Kherbawy. Judge, Member of Kifayah Leadership and critic of the Muslim Brotherhood. July 4, 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{536} For more on this see the writing of Dina Shehata in the \textit{Arab Reform Bulletin}
\item \textsuperscript{537} \textit{Kifayah} is the unofficial slogan of the Egyptian Movement for Change—\textit{al-harakah al-
Masiyya min aqi al-taghyyir}. The party website can be found at:
\url{http://www.harakamasria.org/}
\end{itemize}
accomplishing was that it forced open the space of public debate—moving beyond the measured, moderate demands of the existing political parties, the highly regulated Egyptian political system, to call for sweeping and radical and systemic changes.\textsuperscript{538} This call began to embolden other groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Ghad party to enter into a political environment that tested the limits of the regime. According to Dina Shehata, the effects of this time period can be isolated in four ways:

1) Through protests, this movement was able to attracted both national and international attention by broke with many of the taboos that had characterized public life in Egypt for several decades by focusing on domestic as opposed to foreign policy issues.

2) They staged popular demonstrations in public areas without official permission, thereby challenging a long-standing ban on popular demonstrations outside university campuses.

3) Third, they raised slogans that directly attacked the president and the security establishment also challenging a long-standing taboo against directly criticizing these ‘sovereign’ institutions.

4) Finally, protestors used news forms of protest such as candle light vigils that helped attract attention.\textsuperscript{539}

Public displays of activism especially in the realm of politics contributed to the shift in focus of protest from the international political scene to the domestic political arena. The Kifayah movement has inspired the call for pro-democratic

\textsuperscript{538} This is due to the fact the member of the Muslim Brotherhood began joining the youth protest movement and Kifayah, shortly before their regained commitment to politics.

\textsuperscript{539} Dina Shehata, “Youth Activism in Egypt,” Arab Reform Brief from the Arab Reform Initiative, October 2008, p. 5.
changes, the centering of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the realignment of some political movements on non-Sectarian lines—namely through the formation of The Centrist Party or *Hizb Al-Wasat*.

And while some Egyptian analysts see Kifayah as “secular” positing it against the Muslim Brotherhood, this view of Kifayah, is not only reductionist, but in light the of the January 25, 2011 Egyptian revolution, fails to capture the roots of Egyptian youth frustration. As highlighted earlier, Egyptian youth find themselves caught between an oppressive authoritarian regime and its religious opposition. In this regard, any opposition movement will be seen at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Kifayah is neither concerned with identity or a single issue, such as the removal of the Mubarak regime. According to the literature on new social movement, Kifayah does contain one important aspect—it is a movement of dissent that endeavors to catalyze the transformation of Egypt towards democracy. Politically its strategy is to highlight the barrenness of the political landscape in Egypt, and the role party politics plays in the weakness of the opposition. In this regard, Kifayah holds all parties and movements accountable. It is in this regard that it critiques the Muslim Brotherhood.

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What Kifayah has highlighted since it inception is that political institutions and institutional mechanisms are corrupt and thus are in need of reform. Because Kifayah doesn’t focus on a single issue—it is ideologically diverse and draws on a multiplicity of voices. In this regard it is differentiated from Islamists movements like the Brotherhood by transcending a single ideology and embracing the ideological pluralism of Egypt. This embrace of pluralism, and the subsequent success of the Kifayah movement during 2003-2005, where the historically first political protest calling for regime accountability took place—put the Brotherhood on notice that they now had a competitor in message, and for their young constituents. The marriage of pluralism and youth activism was changing not only the political and social landscape, but also changing the dynamics of protest in Egypt. For decades the Muslim Brotherhood was the most successful movement at mobilizing young people to take to the streets. However Kifayah emerged to challenge that paradigm. Ultimately the differences between the Brotherhood and Kifayah would come to force the Brotherhood to further change. While the Brotherhood could fill the streets of Cairo with thousands of young Brothers (and Sisters) within hours of a directive, they could not mobilize non-Brothers to join them. According to Al-Khribawy, “not a single person would get off the sidewalk and join them,” speaking of the Brotherhood, “they can fill the street, but they

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cannot move the street.” Kifayah could. Kifayah was able to attract the average Egyptian citizen to get off the sidewalk and join their street protest. And thus, a very different model of mobilization (outside of Islamist opposition) was taking hold—one that was predicated on youth activism. The role of youth activism and the emergence of Kifayah on the political and social scene, has had an effect on the generational divide found within the Muslim Brotherhood. The following sections of this chapter, the generational divide within the Muslim Brotherhood.

6.5 Generational Anatomy of the Brotherhood

The generational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has been fixed since the founding of the movement. Born in the backdrop oppression and resistance, it has always been predicated on the two pillars of obedience, sama’ (listening) and ta’ah (obeying). Based on this notion of strict obedience, even if decisions were open to discussion, decision taken had to be adhered to with no outward expressions of decent. Information and decision-making flows top-down throughout the channels of the brotherhood matrix. This matrix evolved through the secret and clandestine nature of the banned opposition movement that was not able to move information up-and-down the channels of the movement, rather orders came form above and were met with strict adherence. While the

545 Personal interview with Tharwat Al-Kherbawy. Judge, Member of Kifya Leadership and critic of the Muslim Brotherhood. July 4, 2008.
546 Iman Yehya, “Sana min omr Kefaya, sana helwa ya gamil” (“One Year Old, Happy Birthday Kefaya”), Al Karama, January 24, 2006.
547 See discussion surrounding Ma’moun al-Hudaiby in Chapter 3
brotherhood claims to be an openly transparent organization today, due to continued government crackdown, detentions, and military tribunals for any activities seen as threatening to the regime, the brotherhood maintains a semi-secretive nature today. Thus, important decisions are made without open oversight from within the structure itself, and often the decisions made do not reflect the overall sentiment of the members of the movement. Often, decisions made reflect the opinions of the core leaders present—most of who are more conservative (concerned with preserving the founding vision and integrity of the organization)—at the time decisions are made, and thus dissenting voices are either silenced or all together disregarded due to their exclusion.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau where the ideological leadership of the Brotherhood sits has shifted greatly in demographics overtime. As noted in table 6.2 below, the first generation of the Bureau was more traditionally educated in Al-Azhar. As indicated in Chapter 3, the founder Hassan Al-Banna and his colleagues were schoolteachers who came from working class backgrounds from rural villages. They were traditionally educated in religious schools and either took up simple trades or become teachers themselves. However over time that Guidance Bureau has changed away from the model of the teacher with traditional training to one that is heavily reliant on physicians, and university professors trained in the hard sciences.\textsuperscript{548} This reliance on a leadership that is not only highly educated, but

\textsuperscript{548} For a discussion of the history of the Brotherhood’s membership and recruitment history see: Eric Davis. “Ideology, Social Class, and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt.” In
is also from the urban middle and upper classes, counters the literature on Islamism that places the focus on inquiry on disaffected sectors of Egyptian society—namely those drawn into movements—as poorer and less educated. Members of the current Guidance Bureau risk losing their academic appointments as professors, hospital privileges as physicians, as well as having their assets seized by the government for their ‘illegal’ activity as an unlicensed organization. In an interview with Saad Al-Katatny, the head of the Brotherhood in Parliament, he highlighted an alternative strategy employed by the regime, the targeting of Brotherhood family members as a means of attacking a member, “they might bloc the promotion of one’s child from assistant professor to full professor, and then the daughter will come home as say, this is all the fault of your work with the Brotherhood.” Due to the financial obstacles that face the Brotherhood members, an increasing number of those in places of authority are from wealthy families that are able to endure the impact of unemployment and extended detention, see table 6.2. This also frees up time for them to commit to the work of the Brotherhood.

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Table 6.2: Occupations of the MB Guidance Bureau 1934, 1953, 2009\textsuperscript{550}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man of religion</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban notable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar employee</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9**</td>
<td>11***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Three members in this category were teachers of religion  **One is a Professor of Arabic *** Six are professors of science, one is a professor of religion, and four are professors of medicine and also physicians (one is a surgeon)

Ideological differences within the Brotherhood cannot be simply reduced to generational differences, for differences in the ideological trajectory of the Brotherhood amongst its leadership do not have a single causal factor. However, looking into the generational experiences that different members of the Brotherhood have endured, particularly in the leadership, highlights several factors that affect the vision of each generation. According to Ibrahim Al-Houdaybi, there are several variables that determine one’s position in the Brotherhood, these include: age, origin, social class, education, position in the group, years in prison\textsuperscript{551} Using this criterion, there are three generations found in today’s brotherhood that reflect the differing ideological make-up of the brotherhood\textsuperscript{552}

\textsuperscript{550} This categories of this table as well as 1934 data and 1953 data were taken from, Eric Davis. “Ideology, Social Class, and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt.” In Said Amir Arjomand, ed., \textit{From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam}. Albany: SUNY Press, 1984 p. 142.

\textsuperscript{551} Personal interview, Cairo August 6, 2008 [Audio Recording]

\textsuperscript{552} These generational categories were confirmed to me by members of the Brotherhood, and are reflected in the writings of several scholars, namely Khalil Al-Anani. “The
Table 6.3 Members of the Current Guidance Bureau Elected in 2009


List of member furnished to be by Saad Al-Katatani, head of the 2005 parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years in Prison</th>
<th>Position in the Office</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Birdei</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9 Yrs (1965-1974), 75 days (1998), 3.75 Yrs (1999-2003)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman, The head of Student Section in the MB</td>
<td>College of Veterinary Medicine</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Ezzat</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9 Yrs (1965-1974), 6 Months (1993), 5 Yrs (1995)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>College of Medicine</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Medicine, Zagazig University</td>
<td>Beni Swif</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gom'a Amin</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6 Yrs (1965-1971), Few Months (1992)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>Faculty of Social Work</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Science, Cairo University</td>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashad Bayouni</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17 Yrs (1954-1971), 4.5 Months (1995), 2.5 Months (2002)</td>
<td>Official Spokesman, The head of Political Section in the MB</td>
<td>College of Science, Geology Department</td>
<td>Professor of Materials Engineering, University of Zagazig</td>
<td>Mansoua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaled Akhater</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4 months (1968), 1 Year (1992), 5 Yrs (1995-2000), 1 Year (2001), 7 Yrs (Dec, 2006-)</td>
<td>Former Secretary General</td>
<td>Engineering Faculty, and some bachelors</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Agriculture, Zagazig University</td>
<td>Mansoua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Mursi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Engineering Faculty</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Asiat University</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Gholbe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Engineering Faculty</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Monyeya University</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Hussein</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3 Yrs (1999-2002), 3 Yrs (2007-2010)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Deshr</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years in Prison</th>
<th>Position in the Office</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saad ElKhataw</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Few Months (1995, 2004)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>College of Science</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Science, Minia University - MP</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saad Elhoseiny</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Few Months (2004)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>College of Engineering, Civil Department</td>
<td>Consultant Physician</td>
<td>Mansoua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Abdelaahman Albar</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Few Months (2004, 2010)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>College of Medicine</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Medicine</td>
<td>Mansoua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Abdelrazek</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3 Yrs (2005, 2009)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Faculty of Theology</td>
<td>Professor, Faculty of Medicine</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostafa Alhosemey</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3 Yrs (1999-2002), 7 Months (2005), 3 Months (2007)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>College of Medicine, Tanta University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>College of Medicine, Tanta University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first and senior-most generation often referred to as the “Old Guard” or the generation of veterans because they endured the suppression of the Brotherhood during the 1950s and 60s under President Nasser. Members of this generation were either students of the first generation of the Muslim Brotherhood or were in prison together with the first generation, and either witnessed or were victims of torture at the hands of the regime. Members of this generation are over the age of 60, and their vision tends to be one of preserving the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Because many of them have spent upwards of 20 years in prison, their primary objective is the movement’s survival and the institutional preservation of the Brotherhood as a cohesive organization in the image of the first generation. The image of the first generation was predicated on the organization as a dawa movement—dawa meaning preaching. Where the movement was simply meant to institute the teachings of the founder, Hasan al-Banna, of tarbiyya (shaping/rearing individuals). This strict adherence to the writing and the ideas of the first generation often makes this generation seem intellectually rigid and closed, not open to alternative voices. Because the Brotherhood started out as a movement that was predicated on social service, the ‘Old Guard’ sees this as the Brotherhood’s main function in society. And thus the ‘Old Guard’ is resistant to the calls for engagement in politics—seen as loyal to original vision of the Brotherhood.
On my first visit to the office of the Guidance Bureau, the culture of suspicion of the first generation was apparent. The building that houses the office of the Guidance Bureau is on an inconspicuous street over looking the Nile, in Cairo’s Minyal district. There are no landmarks or signs that indicate the presence of the regime’s largest opposition group, or the notorious Brotherhood anywhere on the street, the building can easily be overlooked. Suspicion is overwhelming on the street, and as I approached the building, the doorman came out to ask me where I was going. I simply stated I was headed to the second floor. He asked me why, I said I had an appointment. He asked me with whom, I said with Dr. Mahmoud (I was meeting the then Secretary-General of the Brotherhood, Mahmoud Izzat, and I thought saying Mahmoud would be general enough so as not to attract attention). The doorman then declared to the whole street, “So you are going to visit the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood? Why didn’t you just say that? We have nothing to hide. Welcome to The Office of the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood (Maktab Al-Irshad).” This declaration alerted to those on the inside, as well as to the State Security Apparatus officers on the street, that I had arrived. The culture of suspicion was alive and well. Pictures of the first generation of members of the Bureau covered almost every wall. The original statements of Hasan Al-Banna, the founder were framed alongside verses from the Quran. The office had undergone recent renovations, the fine dust of construction was still settling. It seemed the office was

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554 I visited the main offices of Guidance Bureau office twice during the summer of 2008. The official meeting office (where press conferences and press appointments are held) twice, and the parliamentary headquarters of the Brotherhood twice)
trying to reflect both the traditions of the old Guard, as well as embrace the recent political changes that had taken the Brotherhood into politics.\textsuperscript{555}

The second generational group found in the Brotherhood is referred to as the reformist generation or \textit{islahiyoon}. Reformist members of the Brotherhood witnessed the Brotherhood’s return to the political arena in the 1970s after President Anwar al-Sadat released many Brothers from prison and pursued a more strategically positive relationship with the movement.\textsuperscript{556} As discussed in Chapter 3, the co-opting of the Brotherhood by the regime as an attempt to eradicated radical parties, namely the \textit{Jama’at Islamiyya} and \textit{Takfir and Hijrah}, led to an open political and social arena for the Brotherhood to expand their vision. The reformists, now in their 40s and 50s, are the generation who witnesses that renouncement of violence by the Brotherhood, and have made the commitment to engage in politics as a visionary element of the Brotherhood—“seeking to integrate the Brotherhood into the nation’s political life as a method of political reform.”\textsuperscript{557} These reformers are seen as ideologically aligned with the ideas of the second general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi, a lawyer, who published his seminal work

\textsuperscript{555} Most recently the “Old Guard” generation and those who conform to their ideological leaning have been referred to as the Qutbists. As highlighted in chapter 4, Sayyid Qutb as against political engagement and the establishment of a political party. He advocated for the use of dawa and the return to a ‘pure’ state of Islam, devoid of modernity. While his ideas become more radical and hardened during his prison years in the 1960, as are reflected in his book Milestones (also known as Signposts Along the Way), he remained steadfast in his denouncement of politics.


\textsuperscript{557} Personal Interview with Essam Essam Al-Erian, Spokesman of the Ikhwan July 31, 2008 [Audio Recording]
Preachers and Not Judges to counter the affects of Sayyid Qutb.\footnote{Hassan Al-Houdabi. Preachers and Not Judges (Duat la Qudat) Cairo, 1969.} According to Barabara Zolner\footnote{Barbara H. E. Zollner. The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.} Preachers, Not Judges was written to counter the writings of Sayyid Qutb and to counter Qutb’s claims that so-called Muslim governments were non-Islamic and that Jahiliyyah (or ignorance of Islam) must be abolished by "physical power and Jihad."\footnote{Qutb, Sayyid, Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq (Signposts on the Road, or Milestones), 1964. p. 55} For al-Hudaybi the mission of the Brother was dawa (preaching) and not ‘judging’ the religiosity of others. He saw the judgment of others as antithetical to the teachings of Islam and the collective takfir of society, rendering them apostates was leading the Islamic movements astray.\footnote{This was seen as an attack on Takfir and Hijrah and Jama‘at Islamiyya.}

The most visible representatives of this generation in the press and in the public are Essam al-Erian, the head of the Brotherhood’s politics committee and Saad al-Katatni, the head of the Brothers’ parliamentary bloc,\footnote{Both of whom I interviewed and spent extensive time with.} as well as many members of the Parliamentary Bloc. They see political engagement as the method by which to help society, and thus the calls of dawa are synonymous with the political process. For Essam al-Erian, “politics is an extention of my role on this earth as a good Muslim. I care about the future of my people and my country, so I must care about politics, it is as simple as that.”\footnote{Personal interview is Essam al-Erian August, 2008, Cairo [audiorecording]}

The third generational group, are the youth of the Brotherhood. Ranging in age from their teens to mid thirties, the youth, especially those form urban areas like
Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansoura, are much more intellectually curious and open than the elder Brothers. These are the Brothers that actively blog, monitor facebook groups, and were instrumental in the political campaigns and political protests that began in 2002. This group is more intellectually open and curious to alternate ideas and visions, because they not undergone the rigorous ideological indoctrination, they have not been deeply conditioned into the culture of secrecy, and they have been more publicly and political active. Brotherhood youth are increasingly intent on moving the Brotherhood towards the establishment of a political party.

In a round table discussion I held with five Brotherhood youth, I asked them what them what the greatest threat to the survival of the Brotherhood was.

One stated:

We suffer from two major threats: one is external, and one is internal. On the external front, we are systematically targeted and persecuted by the regime. We open a hospital, they tear it down, we perform charity work in rural areas, they tell the locals to fear us, we support political candidates campaigns, they arrest the printers of our flyers, and then arrest us, put us in the same cell. And now I am face to face with the one who got arrested because I asked him to print a campaign flyer. Forever, he will hate me, and I am telling him that I want to change the country because I love him as my brother. The regime wants to turn society against us.

\textbf{We also suffer from an internal threat.} We are like an elephant that moves very slowly, and so we are slow to change. The world is changing around us, and we are still in the first stages of ta'rif and taqween.\footnote{Held in Cairo, November 1, 2009} I don't want to shape society, I want to be a part of society. To do that we need to move away from the old teachings and talk about reality.

\footnote{This young Brother is referring to the three stages of the Dawa (or shaping society). Stage 1-Ta'rif (defining the vision) Stage 2-Taqween (forming/constructing the apparatus) and Stage 3-Tanfeeth (follow through). From “Raslat Al-Dawa, (The message of Dawa)” found in \textit{Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna}. Cairo: Dar al-Da’wa, New Legal Edition, 1990.}
The younger Brothers are asking for internal change and representation. When I asked Izzat, “Some people argue that you claim to want democracy when in fact, you need to be more democratic within, meaning that you see tyranny in Egypt and want democracy but are yourselves tyrannical. Is there democracy in the Muslim Brotherhood? And are there any voices within the Brotherhood?” He answered,

Yes, there is democracy within the Brotherhood, and I will tell you why. Shura (consultation) is part of the religion, no Muslim can fully embrace Islam without embracing shurah. The Brotherhood cannot afford to neglect shurah since that would just alienate the people, what I mean is that when I say that shurah is a virtue, then I am obligated to exhibit that virtue. I talk to all the young people who want to join the Brotherhood about the principles of Islam, including shurah, so if these people come to me and find that I do not observe shurah, they will simply walk away and turn to someone else. I do not have power over anyone, all I do is talk to people, I petition them, and they scrutinize me, if they see me practicing what I preach, they will stay with me, but if they find that I do not practice this democracy, they will leave me.

The Brotherhood even upholds democracy in prisons by allowing imprisoned members to elect their officials. They also bear the consequences of their democratic exercise, consequences in the form of more tyranny, violence, and coercion. Every time we find ourselves in a prison, we elect a group of officials, but by spying on us, (the prison’s administration) identifies this leadership and strives to isolate it from the rest of the group. It takes this group of officials and segregates it by transferring it to another prison out of its belief that the group will weaken once separated from its leadership, but the brothers simply elect other members.

Hence, we practice democracy under all circumstances and are willing to bear its consequences, whether at the internal level, such as when members only serve as officials for limited durations, or the external level, such as when the state pressures us in response to our democratic practice because it sees in it a source of great strength for the Brotherhood. If the Brotherhood does not implement democracy within itself, the people will simply view it that same they view the
government, and will ultimately walk away. There is no doubt a
democracy inside the Brotherhood.

While the young Brothers were well versed in the vocabulary of the Muslim
Brotherhood, their elders see them as not fully understanding the teachings of Al-
Banna. According the Izzat, “the solution to the problems facing society today must
be in the form of a reform project based on the foundations of Islam because there
can be no proper political reform without economic and moral reform too, and the
youth are integral in this.” When asked, about how reform takes place, Izzat
answered, “Our platform is very simple: Islam is the solution.” When asked to
explain how Islam is the solution, he responded:

Our platform is based on dialogue and advocacy. It is based on the
most important foundation of all: The foundation of the nation.
Hasan Al-Banna said this a long time ago: Reform starts with the
individual, it starts with reforming people themselves. These people
have qualities and they are very simple qualities. Anyone who wants
to learn about these qualities can read the Quran and read about the
qualities of the faithful. We want the qualities of the faithful to be
present in the people. If the people see something wrong with these
qualities, they can point it out and say “this quality is wrong, or this
quality is bad.” But we are very sure that everyone would find these
qualities acceptable.

We want this nation to enjoy a degree of commitment to these
qualities so that people would have Muslim households which would
be the building blocks of society. Such a society would be democratic
and would produce the suitable government. This is the form [of
statehood] we aspire to. This issue cannot be measured in our
lifetime and the West may not attach any importance to it because it is
a very basic matter that cannot be studied through scientific research.
It is basic because the nature of the interest we speak of may be
immediate or delayed. For example, I would head for the fridge
because I am hungry and want to eat. If I take something out of the
fridge and eat it immediately, I would feel satiated. But if I am
conducting a study, I would spend long hours working on it so that I
would be ready to discuss it and hope for a good outcome, but this
outcome might take months or years to happen. I enroll in a
university, for example, because I want to be qualified as an engineer in five years. Similarly, I save money in the bank for my children so that I can spend it on them when they grow up in – say – 20 years.

There are other interests that will be achieved after this life ends and these are very difficult to measure. People, however, must know that there are some things that will not happen in this generation for example. The United States plans for future generations, people in the USA are already searching for alternative sources of energy when oil runs out. They want to guarantee that they have natural resources. These efforts may extend for 20 years or for generations.

The difference for us is that we have issues that cannot be accomplished over several generations only or even in this life only but in the afterlife as well. We envisage this dimension as a basic element of reform. The reform process cannot be separated from man’s concept of the universe and man’s knowledge of what will become of this universe. The closer man gets to this truth, the deeper the reforms.566

Hearing this, the youth wanted explanation. One stated, “that is beautiful, but what do I do tomorrow, and the next day?” The roots of the youth generation within the Brotherhood mirrors the disconnect in vision. The youth see that Brotherhood as stagnant and more committed to their ideology than to the changing political and social landscape.567 The young generation of Brothers does not reject the teachings of Al-Banna or the arguments made by their elders. Rather they see the previous older generation as made unable to understand the changing dynamics on the ground. The younger generation sees the ‘Old Guard’ as fundamentally limited by their historic experience with the regime. Unlike the first generation, young

566 Personal Interview with Mahmoud Izzat, Secretary General of the Ikhwan, July 11, 2008. [Audiorecording]
Brothers claim that the main task of the movement is to build a democratic and civil state within Egypt and to do so internal change is essential.\textsuperscript{568}

\section*{6.6 The Impact of Generational Differences—A crisis of legitimacy}

For decades legitimate voices within the Brotherhood were seen as those that were members of the “first generation” or were in prison with the members of the first generation. However as the youth movement emerges at the forefront of change, and is able to successfully form coalitions and alliances with other youth members through their focus on a platform of Islah, or reform, both reform of the country and reform of the role of religion in politics—a crisis of legitimacy has begun to emerge. The legitimacy foraged through historical legacy of the ‘Old Guard’ is increasing being challenged by the political activity and success of the youth.

A major incident that galvanized the youth against their leadership since the 2005 electoral victory was the circulation of the 2007 Brotherhood’s Party Platform which contain several contentious elements, namely the exclusion of woman and Coptic Christians form running for the seat of the president.

\subsection*{6.6.1 The 2007 Draft Party Platform}

\textsuperscript{568} Personal interview with Abdel Rahman Ayyesh, Cairo, November 4, 2009.
As indicated earlier, he first half of 2005 was a politically more 'liberal' time where the Brotherhood was able to gain some political and social traction in society. The election of Mahdi Akef as the seventh General Guide, after the death of Al-Ma‘moun Al-Hudaybi, signaled an era of change. Akef was seen as the best candidate to unify the organization as he straddled the two emergent trends in the Brotherhood. Elected at the age of 76, Akef was from the “Old Guard” joining the Brotherhood at the age of 12, and was personally trained and taught by Hassan al-Banna. Yet, Akef was also from the reformist generation, in that he was active in the university recruitment agenda of the Brotherhood during the 1970s. Akef was seen as someone with historic legitimacy (being imprisoned by the regime for over twenty years), but also was an advocate of the reformist trend within the Brotherhood. Akef was also instrumental in appointing like-minded Brothers in positions of leadership, namely Essam Al-Erian, Mohammed Habib, and Khairat Al-Shatir to help develop the political agenda of the Brotherhood. Under this new leadership the Brotherhood published their “Reform Initiative,” in March 2004, and their campaign platform in October of 2005. They also began a media campaign under this new leadership, where information on their new political positions was


disseminated through their own newspaper, *Afaq Arabiyya*. Due to this increasing release of information from this one highly private organization, Brotherhood members were increasingly appearing on satellite TV stations, news broadcasts, and in international media shows.

By examining these information sources one can trace how the Brotherhood adapts the general principles of Islam to the specific conditions of contemporary Egypt. According to the *Reform Agenda*, the Brotherhood “seeks to create a republican system of government that is democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms with Islamic principles of service.”

These significant changes at a time of political opening, led Akef to be popular among the Brotherhood youth—a generation much more active in public affairs. Akef was also a member of the 1996 Wasat Project, which ultimately became the Wasat Party (or the Center Party). This party would be the public

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572 Managed by Badr Mohamed Badr, this weekly publication has long had a tenuous relationship with the state, periodically being shut down by the regime.

573 The Brotherhood began to appear on *Dream TV* (an independent Egyptian Satellite Station), *Al-Arabiyya* (from Dubai, UAE), *Al-Jazeera* (Doha, Qatar), as well as the *BBC* and *CNN International*.


The notion of republicanism in Islam is not foreign to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian reformer Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani stressed the importance of a republican form of government in his essay, “The Despotic Government,” published February 14, 1879. In it Al-Afghani stresses that republican government is “restricted Government” and this is he antithesis of an absolutist one.

representative of the Brotherhood. According to Nabil Abdel Fattah, a prominent journalist, the Wasat ideology “seems to balance the views of the younger generation and the founding generation.” But after the arrest of those members tied to the project, their subsequent trial (mahkamat Al-Wasat) a leadership crisis and an ideological rift led to the fragmenting off from the Wasat Party in to an ideologically separate entity that includes women and Copts in it leadership, most notable Rafiq Habib, the son of a prominent priest.

The Brotherhood’s entry into politics required them to have more direct answers and the necessary clarity that political engagement requires on specific issues. Despite major internal division on the vision of the political future of the Brotherhood, they produced their first ever Party Platform that was circulated in August of 2007. The release came after a period of regime crack down, where the Brotherhood saw over 5000 members imprisoned (a pattern that coined though 2010), and constitutional amendments that limited their power. Under the backdrop of government repression, the conservative voice seemed to take hold in the drafting of the platform. Thus the party platform was published with the

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580 Personal interview with Ibrahim al-Hudaybi, August 2008
controversial statements on the Shariah Council as an oversight body of the
Supreme Constitutional Court, and statement that women and Coptic Christians
could not run for the seat of the president.

These two clauses were angered not only the Brotherhood youth, but also did
not reflect the beliefs of many of the reformists. Guidance Bureau member ‘Abd al-
Mun‘im Abu al-Futuh (who has since left the Brotherhood), criticized these
controversial clauses, claiming that they did not represent the consensus of the
movement. Some, such as Guidance Bureau member Essam Al-Erian found that
these elements had been introduced in without the process of consultation and
consensus that are cited as the sources of the Brotherhood’s transparency.
According to reformist leaning, Essam Al-Arian, when asked, “If the president is
required to protect the faith of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, then why would a
non-Muslim president be incapable of that?”

I believe, and this is something I personally commented on
during the early stages of the platform’s conception, that the
religion and sex of the country’s president should not be made
into an issue, this was my opinion, because the nature of things
will give rise to the prevailing social culture, and this culture
can change with time. In religious and devout societies, cultural
changes are difficult. Cultures are stable. European countries
that have been separated from religion for a substantial period
of time could experience changes to their culture to the extent
that they start accepting matters that they had previously
rejected for religious considerations...

This is why I said that in view of the domestic environment, the
sentiments of non-Muslims, and regional and international
settings, all of which might object to such proposals, and given

581 Personal Interview with Essam Essam Al-Erian, Spokesman of the Ikhwan July 31, 2008
[Audio Recording]
the difficulty of incorporating this mater into a constitution, we should avoid the matter and leave it to the status quo, hence allowing for a natural outcome, especially since we suffer in a country that has no presidential elections. The people cannot choose their president, no, he is imposed on them, a person. If we give people the chance to vote, this would create more energy and produce a natural choice. However, the platform eventually reflected the standing culture, which is stable and difficult to change.

If this issue’s opponents were to examine the monarchies or emirates in the Arab world, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman, they would find that their monarchical constitutions restrict the throne’s bequeathment to a “Muslim male,” literally. These countries are welcomed by America and some, if not all of them enjoy American and European military support, meaning that there are no problems with these countries. This applies to other countries as well, in Spain, I think, the king has to be male, and that was also the case in Greece before it became a republic. Catholic countries are different from Protestant countries, to this very day, Catholic countries prohibit the ordainment of female priests, but a heated debate is raging in the Protestant Church over the ordainment of female bishops. This is an issue of culture. Our social culture is shaped by religion, and it is a stable culture that will be difficult to change, even centuries from now.

Al-Erian’s answer at the outset mentions his dissent on the issue, and then he proceeds to defend the platform as their public spokesperson. The issue of women and Copts in positions of leadership caused a major debate in the country on the sincerity of the Brotherhood to the commitment to equality and equal citizenship. As the dispute continued, a debate began to emerge over who would become the spokesperson of the Brotherhood. According to the Akif, the General Guide,

There are two points—women and Copts—on which the Brotherhood has taken a decision. This is not a matter for us but it is in the shari’a and religion. Experts in Islamic jurisprudence say that the Islamic state cannot have anyone at its head except a Muslim. It cannot have a woman at its head. This is a legal interpretation, but there are other legal
interpretations. It is for us, as members of the Brotherhood, to choose [the legal interpretation] but we do not bind others. We bind only the Muslim Brotherhood and not all Egyptians on what they are to believe. The ballot boxes will decide.\textsuperscript{582}

While the Bureau may feel like the preservation of this position in their platform may be correct on religious grounds, as well as an attempt to maintain the distinctive Islamic character of their party platform for fear of alienating their popular base as well as being seen as too pliable and quick to retreat on matters. However, for Al-Erian, the Brotherhood’s latest position is as follows: “This is a matter of choice, and we do not force it on the people. If the people accept it, we will endorse it, and if they reject it -- meaning that the people say, through a general referendum, that no, everyone should have the right to run for president -- then we as a Brotherhood accept that.”\textsuperscript{583} According to Habib, no matter what the outcome is, it “must remain clear that the Brotherhood is respectful of women and Christians.”\textsuperscript{584}

According to Sobhi Saleh, "We are talking about Imamah - leading the people in prayers...Islam gives women all the rights, but we are talking about the Imamah, which is one single post among eighty-two million. She has the right to be vice-president, or assistant to the president, or prime minister, or a minister, but is she going to deliver a Friday prayer sermon?"\textsuperscript{585} This debate has not satisfied the

\textsuperscript{583} Personal Interview with Essam Essam Al-Erian, Spokesman of the Ikhwan July 31, 2008 [Audio Recording]
\textsuperscript{585} “Competing Muslim Brotherhood visions for Egypt.” \textit{BBC Newsnight Online}. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9412967.stm
younger members of the Brotherhood. According to Muslim Brotherhood blogger, Abdul Rahman Ayyash, this must change. “They mix the argument about women and Copts being president, through the argument of Imamah,” (that a woman or a non-Muslim cannot lead a Muslim man in prayer), “but what was the last time you saw a leader of a country lead his country in prayer? This must change. This must change especially if the Brotherhood wants to be recognized as a legally inclusive political party, and most importantly if it wants to be taken seriously. The youth will leave.”

The Brotherhood youth became publically vocal during 2007, breaking the barrier of silence they had been accustomed to. In doing so, they publicly began criticizing the movement’s leadership and most critically, its perceived out-dated political and religious discourse. Amwaag Fi Bahr Al-Taghyeer (Waves in an Ocean of Change) established by a young Brother Mustafa al-Naggar focuses on opening the movement to alternative voices in order to make it a more effective political party. He is critical of the movement’s insistence on the marriage of religion and politics under the same umbrella, calling for their separation, where the social services become under the purview of the Guidance Bureau, and politics is maintained by the parliamentary office. The bloggers have since turned their focus on the internal structure of the Brotherhood, calling for internal reform and

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586 Personal Interview with Abdel Rahman Ayyash, blogger, and editor of the Brotherhood English website, ikhwanweb.com Also, The youth are a significant percentage of the Brotherhood.
587 http://2mwag.blogspot.com
transparency in decision making. Bloggers such as Moneim Mahmoud of Ana
Ikhwan (I am a Brother),589 along with Abd al-Rahman Ayyash of al-Gharib (The
Stranger).590

According the Moneim Mahmoud,

everyday I meet and interact with liberals, leftist, reformers, communists, and secularists, and we talk about getting our country back on track. If the Brotherhood wants to participate in this discussion on the ground, then they need to be able to speak ‘this’ language...communicate with these people. Quoting scripture won’t work here, being able to speak the langue of everyday politics of everyday people, so we can relate to each other in very much needed.”591

Moneim Mahmoud has frozen his membership, “I am out of the organizational
structure, but I still care about them, and I won’t stop speaking the truth about my
beliefs, this is what democracy is all about.”592

6.7 Conclusion

In his seminal work Democracy, Charles Tilly tackled the paradox of rapid de-
democratization versus slow democratization. He finds that in de-democratization
major splits in the leadership or ruling coalition precipitate drastic actions taken by

589 http://ana-ikhwan.blogspot.com
590 http://al-ghareeb.blogspot.com
592 ibid
these elite to restore their relative power.\textsuperscript{593} Similarly, Nancy Bermeo finds that politicians either choose dictatorship deliberately or place anti-democratic figures in charge of as a result of a lack of political aptitude.\textsuperscript{594} These very same arguments can be made for social movements. However, in this case, the Brotherhood is far from politically inept, since they have decided to steer the organization further in the direction of reform. For many Brotherhood youth, the ultimate model for the Brotherhood to follow is the AKP of Turkey, a country that appears to them to be fulfilling its economic and strategic potential under a Muslim government.

According to Abdullah Masoud, a 22-year old pharmacy student and Brotherhood member, "We want our freedom so that we can form political parties in a pluralist civil society - and you see some shining examples like Turkey and Malaysia. You cannot judge us until you give us the chance. We Islamists need a chance."\textsuperscript{595} While the AKP is ahead of the Brotherhood, having moved away from their own Islamist way origins to a more secular orientation,\textsuperscript{596} the Brotherhood is far from the model. The conception of democracy promoted by Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey was not for an Islamic democracy, but rather an ethical democracy, where democracy becomes a means for each individual to articulate

\textsuperscript{595} “Competing Muslim Brotherhood visions for Egypt." \textit{BBC Newsnight Online.}  
\url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9412967.stm}  
his/her own ethics. For the Brotherhood youth, this may by the model they aspire towards, but the political environment that led to the emergence of the AKP is very much different than the environment that the Brotherhood finds itself. Between political repression lies a massive bureaucratic organizational and generational divide, the Brotherhood finds itself bound by the limits of its organization and the vision they want to choose to follow.

While the preceding chapters highlighted the role of political inclusion and ideological frames and the ways with which they affect moderation, this chapter focused on the ways with which the internal dynamics of the Brotherhood further affected this moderation. In this regard internal debates fundamentally affect the ways with which ideology is referenced, the political and strategic trajectory of the movement, as well as behavior of the movement or party over time. What becomes apparent as a result of the shifting internal demographic of the Brotherhood and the internal debates among the changing hierarchy, is that internal makeup and organizational structure significantly affect moderation. As one saw in the internal debates on political participation, and the focus of the political action of the Brotherhood in the parliament, previously unimaginable political positions such as the formation of a political party, were not only reconsidered, but formerly unimaginable positions became not only imaginable, but religiously justified.

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What this reflects is the effects of the interplay of political inclusion, ideological frames, and also the changing internal makeup of the Brotherhood and how these three variables significantly reorder and restructure not only the behavior of the Brotherhood, but more so their ideological trajectory. What also became apparent through the preceding chapters is that, the interplay of these variables is not linear, but rather dynamic and interactive, for while inclusion does affect behavior and ideological frames that are ultimately a reflection of an ongoing internal debate, if such ideological changes were not gradual and put forth publically, they would not gain wide spread support.

Ultimately without public support of such changes, primarily by those that are inclined to the beliefs of the Brotherhood, as well as their constituents, then moderation would not only fall on deaf ears, but it would not be sustained over time. What is apparent from this chapter is that the changing internal demographics of the Brotherhood not only forced them to accept certain changing realities that they had to react to, but these changes also gave them the internal space to reach shared positions on issues that ultimately moved the Brotherhood in an accommodationist position that had to be ideologically grounded. In this regard, ideological change is not simply a result of behavioral change, but ideological change and moderation are the result of a dynamic interplay where behavior and ideas change simultaneously in a parallel manner for behavioral change ultimately requited religious justification—and thus a change in the ideological frame. In this regard, the Brotherhood can moderate both political and ideologically, acting on the decisions
reflective of internal debates—and ultimately appear more democratic and accommodating than the regime within which they exist.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis aims to explain Islamist moderation—looking specifically at the conditions that facilitate Islamist ideological moderation. It also focuses on what effect the integration of Islamists into the political arena has. The central claim of this study is that the moderation of opposition movements is the outcome of political processes that involve the interplay among three variables: inclusion, the internal makeup of the movement, and ideological frames and how they are reframed. Political inclusion and exclusion during important stages of an Islamist movement will affect organizational structures and as well as its ideological orientation. Over time, the interplay of opportunities, organizational structure and frames affects the trajectory of an Islamist movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally this thesis sought to explore the interplay of these variables within an institutional site—the parliaments to see what happened when Islamists win.

The Muslim Brotherhood was able utilize shifting political atmosphere—repression versus access to the formal political system—to contribute to the emergence and reemergence of the Brotherhood as a political power player. The empirical data found in chapters 3—6, demonstrate the ability of the Brotherhood to adapt to conditions of repression and openness through their interaction with and articulation of objective conditions. A limited view of the increasing
opportunities under Sadat and again in 2005 under Mubarak led the Brotherhood to see those very conditions as opportunities for action. While the moments of openness did exist, the opportunities are not enough without the Brotherhood’s interpretation of those sign as opportunities to reframe their positions. In this regard, the interpretive process of opportunities, and not just the opportunities themselves, facilitate a change in strategy. However, interpretive strategies and strategic changes of the Brotherhood, vis-à-vis strategic changes of the state, cannot alone explain moderation.

Aside from shifting opportunity structures, ideological frames also affected the moderation of the Brotherhood. As depicted in chapter 3, the Brotherhood has endured cycles of ideological moderation that has been contingent on the political and societal changes. While behavioral moderation has been studied in the past as a function of state behavior, the primary finding here is that ideological moderation and changes were according within the Brotherhood during these critical moments that allowed for such behavioral changes to occur. During the 1980s when Brotherhood members were debating the future of the movement, they were utilizing conflicting ideological frames (of integration into the political system versus retreat) of the very same ideological body of work. However, the dominant frame that emerged at the time was one that adopted political pluralism and human rights, epically when those frames resonated with the masses. During the 1990s and until today, as the Brotherhood adopted the frame of “Democracy is the Solution” as opposed to the more famous frame of “Islam is the Solution” this
signaled a great ideological shift, and questioned the extent to which a frame can be stretched or rearticulated. Unlike the ideological forefather, Sayyid Qutb who saw democracy as a part of jahiliyya (a reference to the pre-Islamic era of ignorance), the Brotherhood today views democracy as reflective of the concept of Shura (or consultation) in Islam, where pluralism and peaceful power-sharing as highlighted as democratic principles inherent in Islam. In this regard the Brotherhood has transformed its frames in relation to the regime, society, as well as political pluralism, in a manner that is both consistent with their ideological commitments, but also adaptive to the social and political narrative of the day. However, this would not have occurred if they did not have an ideological body of work that was malleable enough to accommodate the shifting frames, an attribute that sets them apart from radical Islamist movements and parties.

The changing internal makeup of the Brotherhood has further shaped the trajectory of the Brotherhood. The growing number reformers within the Brotherhood that is more progressive and less loyal to the organizational commitments and ideational nature of the first generation has significantly altered the trajectory of the Brotherhood both in their ideology—embracing the political process, and their behavior—actively pursing politics and political alliances. In this regard not only have political opportunities and ideological frames, but also a shifting organizational structure that must accommodate a changing constituency has greatly affected the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The interplay of the three variables has led to a change in the political space that affects the nature of political competition and the mechanisms though which politics is articulated, the ways with which religion is references, and the role of the movement in the shaping of the state. Looking specifically at the site of the parliament, it becomes apparent that once in office and faced with the test of governance—albeit limited, the interplay of the three variables further moderated the behavior of the Brotherhood, as well as altered the nature of that state institution. In this regard, not only do the three variables affect the nature of the opposition, but conversely they affect the nature of state institutions.

What they dynamic model offered in this research delineates is that sequential arguments that focus on moderation do not capture the roles of individuals within the Brotherhood, the changing nature of the group, the internal makeup of the group, and how they reference and frame their ideological commitments to the core values of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, by focusing in the internal dynamics of the group, less focus is given to the incentives to moderate as a result of inclusion. This reorientation not only highlights the role of those that actually participate in the ideological reframing of Brotherhood positions, and the ways with which they negotiate their references their references, but ultimately it highlights the struggle over ideas that evolve over time, and how this struggle leads to moderation, that in the case of the Brotherhood as had the ability to sustain, even in moments of political exclusion. In this regard, moderation is a process and not merely a category.
This understanding of moderation of Islamists raises questions with regard to how Islamist parties are studied, and also about the processes of democratization at play that are overlooked—namely what happens what Islamists are included as a part of the democratization process, instead of as an obstacle. This in-depth empirical study of a single case suggest that scholarly attention should be reoriented towards the how actors respond to and affect, conditions and structures that alter and inhabit political space in the Middle East, if we are to understand Islamist moderation. This study paid particular attention the internal dynamics of a particular group as well as the group’s interplay with the state, other political actors and its changing ideological referents. In this regard, the major contribution of this study was not only attempt to alter the conceptualization of Islamist change from linear to a more dynamic understanding of change, but also to open the door of inquiry to the dynamics of actors and how they are produced and reconstituted, how ideological/narrative space shapes political practice, and how the interplay of these variables facilitate not only change but also affect the ideological commitments of Islamists. In the end, this study attempts to provide insights into the process of inclusion, even if in an authoritarian context, and how inclusion is a part of the process of ideological moderation—but not the singular defining cause of moderation. In this regard, the values of the Brotherhood and their commitment to those values is not just a function of the political landscape, but is also a function of the internal makeup of the Brotherhood and the ideological commitments of core members to certain values, as seen in the debate over becoming a political party.
This results in an understand that moderation is a gradual metamorphosis that is the result of tension between three variables, political inclusion, ideological frames, and internal dynamics. To this end, this study also attempted to focus not just on behavioral change or ideological commitments of the Islamists, but to highlight the conditions that lead to both ideological change and those commitments to sustain.

The interplay of the variables isolated in this study can be replicated in other countries, through a focus on how states have different relations with their ideological parties. In this regard, an informed comparative analysis on the dependent variable—level of moderation—which would compare Islamist parties that have moderated over time, versus those that either have not moderated, or have radicalized, would be can be utilized to test the interplay of the three variables: political opportunities, mobilization structures, ideological frames. Alternatively a comparison of moderate Islamist groups found within different regimes will also test the interplay of the variables. For example, under authoritarian regimes of Iran: Reform Front (RF—Jebhe-ye Eslahat) is a moderate Islamist group. Under the secular regime of Turkey, the Justice and Development party (JDP/AKP) is a moderate Islamist group (more so a liberal Islamist group. Under democracies, in Morocco, Justice and Development (Al Adl Wal Tanmia), Bahrain, Muslim Brotherhood (al-Minbar al-Illsami), and Iraq, the Dawaa Party, can be investigated to see if regime type matters.
Finally, the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011, that led to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime on February 11, 2011, has rendered the analysis of this thesis even more timely. As internal political competition has increased since the revolution, with all official an unofficial parties vying for a political voice in shaping the future of Egyptian political life, all actors find themselves needing to articulate a new agenda for the future, especially with elections three months away. The once outlawed Muslim Brotherhood now has an official seat at the table, however, it is facing a crisis of legitimacy. Where legitimacy was once seen as in the hand of the ‘Old Guard’ of the generation, after the recent revolution led by the youth, legitimacy is now in the hands of those led the revolution. The youth of the Brotherhood have emerged as the new vanguards of the movement. However, the “Old Guard” has yet to accommodate the demands of the youth through new ideological frames that meet the demands of the youth movement of pluralism, minority rights, and of the secularization of political space.

Ultimately the greatest test of the viability of the Muslim Brotherhood will be its ability to adapt to a changing political and social landscape, its ability to reframe its ideological discourse to accommodate the increasing liberalism of its youth, and finally its ability to adapt its secretive bureaucratic structure in an increasingly open social arena. The institutional, political, and public space has been changed. Whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood can adapt will determine the future of its institutionalization in the state.
Appendix 1: Open Ended Interview Questions

For Members of the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau:

Q1: Tell us about yourself.

Q2: What attracted you to the message of the Muslim Brotherhood? When did it happen and how did it happen?

Q3: What is your position at the Brotherhood?

Q4: Do you think that most of the Egyptian people are happy with their lives?

Q5: What is the Egyptian people’s biggest problem today?

Q6: In your opinion, where does the solution to these problems lie?

Q7: What is the best formula for any government that preserves the interests of any people? How can such a government preserve these interests?

Q8: Does Islam prescribe a specific form for government institutions?

Q9: Who holds the power in this form of governance?

Q10: What does the word “democracy” mean to you?

Q11: Is the Egyptian Government moving closer to the model you have outlined and the form of democracy you described? Why?

Q12: What is the position of the existing judiciary in the matter?

Q13: In light of what you view as the deterioration of democracy, can democracy be achieved in Egypt? What measures are needed to accomplish it?

Q14: What is your role in reform and change?

Q15: Can you explain what you mean by “Islam is the solution?”

Q16: What publications and official documents does the Brotherhood draw its platform from?
Q17: Some people argue that you claim to want democracy when in fact, you need to be more democratic within, meaning that you see tyranny in Egypt and want democracy but are yourselves tyrannical. Is there democracy in the Muslim Brotherhood? And are there any voices within the Brotherhood?

Q18: Is there a difference between the Brotherhood as a movement and the Brotherhood as a political party?

Q19: The Brotherhood will naturally never be officially registered as a party, but if it ever is, can anyone simply join?

Q20: Can anyone wishing to join the Brotherhood as a movement do so?

Q21: Toward the end of last summer, you published your party’s political program and it resonated across the globe, but the world wants clarifications on a number of its aspects. First of all, will the religious council comprised of scholars have veto powers?

Q22: What is the one thing about the Brotherhood that people do not understand properly?

Q23: In the West, members of the Brotherhood are referred to as Muslim Democrats given their pursuit of an Islamic democracy, do you accept this characterization?

Q24: Final question. This is the question that scares people, the Brotherhood says in its political program that it wants freedom, but your motives for wanting freedom are what do you think people are scared of.
For Drafters of the Muslim Brotherhood Party Platform

Q1: In your party’s political platform, you say that you want a civil state, but how can a state be both civil and in charge of protecting religion?

Q2: Your political platform maintains that the state’s primary role is to serve and protect the people in a manner that reflects and respects their wishes, but if this role conflicts with the protection of religion, which takes precedence?

Q3: If the president is required to protect the faith of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, then why would a non-Muslim president be incapable of that?

Q4: Do you see the Copts as equal citizens?

Q5: Many Copts in Egypt are not convinced that you see them as equal to their Muslim counterparts. If you are unable to persuade the Copts in Egypt that you view them equally, then how can you convince the world?

Q6: Why does the party’s political platform constantly make it a point to define and describe women’s role in society? Is it necessary? How does the definition of gender-specified roles for men and women add to the platform?

Q7: You promote a free market economy, but then say that you will protect the rights of the poor, where do you draw the line between these contradicting concepts?

Q8: Please explain the Role of the Shariah Council that you have proposed as a review mechanism of the Constitutional Court?

Q9: When will the final draft of the Party Platform be issued?

Q10: What is the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood as a political party and the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement?

Q11: Why have you not tried to register the party officially, and when will you do so?

Q12: You presented a party platform without trying to register the party?

Q13: Why were these proposals packaged as a party platform, and why now?

Q14: Did you anticipate all this interest in your platform? How would you explain it?

Q15: The West refers to the Brotherhood as an Islamic democracy, do you accept this portrayal?
Q16: What are the traits of Islamic democracy and how does it differ from Western democracy?

Q17: In the term Islamic democracy, the word Islamic is used an adjective to describe democracy, do you accept that democracy is the basis and that Islamic democracy is simply one of it forms?

Q18: What would the main difference be in the lives of Muslims and non-Muslims under regular democracy and Islamic democracy, meaning: How will real life experiences be different under Islamic democracy?

Q19: In America, they say that the Brotherhood demands democracy and constantly speaks of it when it in fact does not practice democracy internally.

Q20: Since 1928, and up until three years ago, the Brotherhood spoke as one, but we are now starting to hear other voices in the Brotherhood saying things like “my opinion was so and so but we as a Brotherhood,” or “I had a different opinion but the Brotherhood’s opinion is so and so.” Is this a strategy, or did it suddenly emerge?

Q21: How do you view Egypt’s political future?

Q22: In your opinion, what is it that people most misunderstand about the Brotherhood?

Q23: What is the most important message you want to send to the West?

Q24: What is the most important message you have for the Egyptian people?
For Members of Parliament:

Q1: Can you tell me about yourself?

Q2: Why did you choose to operate under the Muslim Brotherhood umbrella?

Q3: What are the main problems facing the Egyptian people?

Q4: Do the Egyptian people feel that their problem lies in the lack of freedoms?

Q5: Do you think the Egyptian parliament is fulfilling its role in confronting the government?

Q6: Under this reality, and at the start of the 2005-2006 session, the Brotherhood submitted 7,000 requests to the council, half of which you yourself submitted. You continue to try despite all these efforts to diminish your role.

Q7: How can one determine your parliamentary bloc's impact inside the council?

Q8: What are the most important committees? And what is the Brotherhood's Representation on them?

Q9: How does the government change the rules of the game to undermine your influence in the council?

Q10: The Muslim Brotherhood bloc is a minority in the council, not a majority, yet the entire world is talking about you, why?

Q11: In 2006, one year into the parliament session, Ahmad Nazif said that "we let you play the democracy game, but we will not let you form a political party," however, a year later you announced the party's political platform, so what is your response to him?

Q12: What fundamental changes need to take place in Egypt for freedoms and democracy to be achieved?


Q14: What is the most important message you want to send to the Egyptian youth?

Q15: You spoke a lot about women and all the roles they can play, but the Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc consists of 88 men.
Appendix 2: Egyptian Political Parties and News Papers

Papers\textsuperscript{598}
- *Al-Ahram*: Daily, state-run, largest distribution in Egypt
- *Al-Akhbar*: Daily, state-run, second to Al-Ahram in institutional size
- *Al-Gomhorriya*: Daily, state-run
- *Rose al-Youssef*: Daily, state-run, close to the National Democratic Party’s Policies Secretariat
- *Al-Dostour*: Daily, privately owned
- *Al-Shorouk*: Daily, privately owned
- *Al-Wafd*: Daily, published by the liberal Wafd Party
- *Al-Arabi*: Weekly, published by the Arab Nasserist party
- *Youm7*: Weekly, privately owned
- *Sawt al-Umma*: Weekly, privately owned

Political Parties

*Licensed Political Parties*
- National Democratic Party
- New Wafd Party
- National Progressive Unionist (Tagammu’) Party
- The Nasserist Party
- Tomorrow (al-Ghad) Party
- Socialist Liberal (al-Ahrar) Party
- The Democratic Front Party
- National (Umma) Party
- Egyptian Arab Socialist Party
- Young Egypt Party
- The Green Party
- Democratic Unionist Party
- Social Solidarity Party
- National Conciliation or Accordance Party
- Egypt 2000 Party
- Democratic Generation (al-Geel) Party
- Free Social Constitutional Party
- Egypt Youth Party
- Democratic Peace Party
- The Conservative Party
- Free Republican Party
- People’s Democratic Party

\textsuperscript{598} As of October 2010
License Currently Suspended
• Social Justice Party
• (Socialist) Labor Party

Parties Seeking License
• Center (al-Wasat) Party
• The Dignity (al-Karama) Party
• The Reform and Development Party
• Liberal Egyptian Party
Appendix 3: Organizational Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood
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