Policing Domestic Violence: Case Study of Organizational Change in the Trenton Police Department, Trenton, New Jersey

by

Michele-Lynne Muni

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Criminal Justice

written under the direction of

Dean Todd Clear

and approved by

________________________

________________________

________________________

________________________

Newark, New Jersey

May 2012
Why and how do law enforcement agencies develop and change strategies to deal with the silent epidemic of domestic violence? Although academics discuss organizational change in the community policing literature, police department innovation needs further exploration. Outside community policing literature, there is a dearth of research that analyzes the process of changing law enforcement strategies, policies and procedures. Learning how police departments change policies to deal with victimization may offer other agencies valuable information relevant to implementing policies and overcoming obstacles. In 21st century policing, departments face many unprecedented challenges, like gang violence and terrorism. Sometimes departments prioritize preventing crimes, like street violence, guns, and drugs because these crimes are visible and immediately pressing. This category of crime takes priority over developing policies and strategies that prevent victimization that occurs outside of the public eye. The issue is that crime that occurs indoors, like domestic violence, can reach the public eye. Police officers suggest that studies in domestic violence are practical because they encounter domestic violence calls frequently and new information is useful.

This study worked within a case study design and an organizational change theoretical framework revealing the path taken by the Trenton, New Jersey Police Department (TPD) to change domestic violence strategies and carry out these policies. Four questions were explored: 1) Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on changing domestic violence policies; 2) How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies; 3) What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence; and 4) What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?

This study provides insight into how organizations make decisions to change and secondly how they implement change. Consistent with organizational literature, this research suggests that implementation of new domestic violence policies is contingent upon need. In general, this study suggested that external factors, domestic violence homicides, provided impetus for changing domestic violence strategies. Secondly, a change agent, dedicated supervisors, detectives, and interagency collaboration are important during implementation stages. Participants also suggested that victim support is increased through interagency collaborations and increased compliance/accountability. Finally, participants suggested that agencies implementing a domestic violence unit focus attention on a change agent; training and educating officers/public; and compliance and accountability. Furthermore, departments should scan data and analyze their current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance/accountability. Several participants also referenced the need for adequate manpower.
An unanticipated finding was the role of compulsion. Organizational change literature consistently points to the role of resistance in impeding change within organizations. At the Trenton Police Department, officers did not resist, instead they felt compelled to change. Most participants understood the reasons for changing domestic violence strategies. Several participants pointed to the increase in domestic violence homicides over a short period of time. In summary, from the observations of participants, the strengths of the new strategies included victim support, increased compliance/accountability, and improved collaborations.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Study Overview</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Research Questions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Contextual Background</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Summary: Study Purpose and Research Questions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on changing domestic violence policies?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Overview of Chapters</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Introduction</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Classical Theories</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Neoclassical Theories</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Contingency Theory</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Open and Closed Theories</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F. Police Department Organizational Change and Theoretical Application

G. Conclusions

III. Literature Review: Police Department Organizational Change

A. Introduction

B. Definition of innovation

C. Change within police departments

D. Organizational change conclusions

IV. Feminist Perspectives on Domestic Violence and Law Enforcement Strategies

A. Introduction

B. The woman's liberation movement

C. Prosecutor's Offices Traditional Perspectives Towards Domestic Violence

1. Protective orders

2. Mandatory arrest and no drop policies

D. Coordinated community responses to domestic violence

E. The decision to set in motion the CJ system/making the call to the police and the likelihood of response to domestic violence calls

1. Healthcare agencies and a coordinated community response

2. Paraprofessionals and a coordinated community response

F. Restorative Justice

G. Conclusions

V. Literature Review:

Changes in Law Enforcement Domestic Violence Strategies

A. Introduction

B. Impediments to change and the push towards mandatory arrest
C. Court proceedings and mandatory arrest ................................................................. 95
D. Protective orders and restraining orders ............................................................... 97
E. Domestic violence units ......................................................................................... 109
F. A coordinated community response ...................................................................... 114
   1. Recidivism and a community response to domestic violence ........................... 116
   2. Batterer's treatment programs and recidivism .................................................. 123
   3. A coordinated community response and systems theory .................................. 124
G. Crisis intervention teams ....................................................................................... 129
H. Leaving a violent relationship ............................................................................. 130
I. Literature review conclusions ............................................................................... 135

VI. Trenton Police Department (TPD) ...................................................................... 139
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 139
B. Brief history/study context ..................................................................................... 139
C. TPD's domestic violence unit .............................................................................. 142
D. The goal of the TPD's domestic violence unit and the process of implementing change. ................................................................. 147
E. Introduction to Domestic Violence Concepts ...................................................... 151
   1. Police Procedures ................................................................................................. 153
F. Collaborating Agencies: Womanspace and Mercer County Prosecutor's Office. 159
   1. Womanspace ....................................................................................................... 159
   2. Mercer County Prosecutor's Office ..................................................................... 161
G. Trenton Police Department Layoffs .................................................................... 163
H. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 168

VII. Research Methodology ...................................................................................... 169
A. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 169
1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................169
2. Case Study Method ............................................................................................................170
3. Trenton Police Department Study ..................................................................................170

B. Unit of Analysis: Sampling and Interviews ......................................................................171
   1. Unit of Analysis ..............................................................................................................171
   2. Sampling .......................................................................................................................172
   3. Interviews ....................................................................................................................174
   4. Interview Protocol ........................................................................................................176
   5. Revisions to the Original Protocol ................................................................................179
   6. Sampling Conversational Partners ..............................................................................180
      a. Trenton Police Department ......................................................................................180
      b. Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office ...........................................................................180
      c. Womanspace ............................................................................................................181
      d. Archival Data ...........................................................................................................181
      e. Conclusions ..............................................................................................................183

C. Research Design - Research Questions and "Designing the Analysis with Theory in Mind" ..........................................................184
   1. Introduction .................................................................................................................184
   2. Research Questions ......................................................................................................185
   3. Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................189
   4. Data Analysis Units and Themes ................................................................................190
      a. Data Analysis: Coding - Sorting Data .................................................................190
      b. Data Analysis: Coding and Building Themes .......................................................190
      c. Data Coding for the Trenton Police Department Study ......................................192
      d. Protecting Subjects - Institutional Review Boards ..............................................195
5. Strengths and Study Biases ................................................................. 197
   a. Case Studies .............................................................................. 197
   b. Sampling .................................................................................. 200
6. Summary Remarks ......................................................................... 201
VIII. Research Findings ..................................................................... 204
   A. Introduction .............................................................................. 204
   B. The hybrid approach, developing a classification framework .......... 204
      1. Research Question One ............................................................ 208
         a. Necessity ............................................................................ 209
            1. Scanning ......................................................................... 210
         b. Increase in Domestic Violence Homicides/Incidents .............. 211
         c. Media .................................................................................. 213
         d. Conclusions ......................................................................... 215
      2. Research Question Two .............................................................. 215
         a. Introduction .......................................................................... 215
         b. Commitment ......................................................................... 215
         c. Change agent ........................................................................ 217
         d. Planning meetings ................................................................. 218
         e. Proactivity ............................................................................. 219
            1. Analyzing .......................................................................... 219
            2. Responding ........................................................................ 220
         f. Ordered Change/Compulsion .................................................. 224
            1. Frustration/Revolving Door .................................................. 225
         g. Collaboration .......................................................................... 227
            1. Assessing ............................................................................ 228
h. Summary remarks ........................................................................................................229

3. Research Question Three .........................................................................................232

a. Incident Report Reviews ...........................................................................................232

b. Strengths and Weaknesses .......................................................................................238

   1. Compliance/Accountability .................................................................................238
   2. Collaborations ....................................................................................................240
   3. Victim Support ..................................................................................................243

C. Suggestions for Improvement .................................................................................246

4. Research Question Four .............................................................................................251

a. Introduction .............................................................................................................251

b. Factors Important in Implementing Change .............................................................252

   1. Change Agent ......................................................................................................253
   2. Top Down Orders/Compliance and Accountability .............................................254
   3. Collaborations ....................................................................................................255
   4. Education and Training ......................................................................................256
   5. Manpower .........................................................................................................258

C. Conclusions .............................................................................................................258

B. Experiences of Victim Advocates .........................................................................264

   1. Introduction ........................................................................................................264
   2. Rewarding ..........................................................................................................266
   3. Concerns for Victims .........................................................................................266
   4. Victims Fear for Safety ......................................................................................267
   5. Collaborations ....................................................................................................268
   6. Funding ...............................................................................................................270
   7. Manpower .........................................................................................................270
C. Research Analysis Summary .................................................................272

IX. Conclusions and Policy Implications ..................................................280

A. Introduction ..........................................................................................280

  1. Research Results Summary ...............................................................281

B. Policy Implications ...............................................................................282

C. Conclusions ..........................................................................................294

D. Obstacles and difficulties implementing change - research limitations and
   suggestions for future research ..............................................................298

   1. Implementing change at the Trenton Police Department .................298

Protection of Private Persons ....................................................................305

Works Cited ...............................................................................................306

Appendix A: TPD Management Protocol ..................................................326

Appendix B: TPD Police Officer Protocol .................................................331

Appendix C: Legal Protocol .......................................................................335

Appendix D: Victim Advocates .................................................................338

Vita ..............................................................................................................339
Table Titles

Table One: Sample .................................................................174
Table Two: External Factors Leading to Change ..................................211
Table Three: Implementing a Domestic Violence Unit .........................231
Table Four: Perceived Utility of the Domestic Violence Unit ..................249
Table Five: Factors Essential for Implementing Change .........................262
Table Six: Experiences of Victim Advocates - Womanspace ....................272
Table Seven: Data Matrix ..................................................................302
List of Illustrations

Concept Map One: Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies? .................................................215

Concept Map Two: How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies? ..................................................232

Concept Map Three: What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence? ..........................................................251

Concept Map Four: What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation? ...........................................................................................................263
Foreword: Brief Description of Groups and Agencies that Collaborate with the TPD

1. **Womanspace:** Womanspace is an advocacy organization that provides domestic violence victims from Mercer County with emergency services, counseling and support. The organization also provides prevention efforts through education and training residents and professionals.

2. **Domestic Violence Response Teams (DVRT):** In Mercer County Womanspace and the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office train DVRT volunteers. In New Jersey, according to state law, every municipality must orchestrate Domestic Violence Response Teams. DVRT volunteers respond to every reported domestic violence incident. Volunteers respond to either the hospital or the police department. In Trenton, dispatch calls the DVRT on receiving a domestic violence call.

3. **Children’s Futures:** The Trenton Police Department collaborated with the non-profit Mercer County organization Children’s Futures. In Trenton, Children’s Futures focuses primarily on improving the wellbeing of children and their families. The organization addresses a variety of parenting concerns as well as supporting programming that reduces gang violence, domestic violence, and substance abuse.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study developed from discussions with the Trenton Police Department. I would like to first and foremost thank the Trenton Police Department administrators for initiating discussions for this research and for their continued support. I would also like to thank the Trenton Police Department lieutenants, sergeants, detectives and officers who made this research possible. You made me feel welcome at the department and during DV Stat meetings. Each one of you made a significant difference and I appreciate your support despite the hardships the TPD experienced during my research. Moreover, thank you for your service to the community.

I would also like to thank the MCPO, especially the Domestic Violence Unit, for supporting my research. I sincerely appreciate MCPO inviting me to their domestic violence training at Princeton University Police Department. This training was extremely valuable to my research. Finally, I would like to thank the victim advocates from Womanspace. The commitment and support that you have shown to victims is admirable. I hope that this study emphasizes the importance of collaboration with groups like Womanspace in support of victims of domestic abuse.

I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Dean Todd Clear, Dr. Anthony Braga, Dr. Bonita Veysey, and Dr. Joanne Belknap. Each one of you taught me something about myself and my thought processes. Dr. Clear, thank you for being the best dissertation chair that I could ever have imagined. Your support and encouragement will never be forgotten. Dr. Braga, I sincerely thank you for your support and endless advice throughout this process. Drs. Veysey and Belknap, thank you for
helping me consider research outside of my comfort zone. I would also like to acknowledge Teresa Fontanez, Edith Laurencin, and Sandra Wright for answering questions about the graduate process and providing encouragement. Last but not least, I would like to thank SCJ’s world renowned librarian, Phyllis Schultz. Phyllis provided a home away from home during my years at Rutgers. She provided coffee, snacks, and a world of advice and support. The Rutgers library is truly the best library in the world because of Phyllis’ dedication. I will truly miss seeing all of you after graduation.

On a personal level, there are a number of people who made this dissertation survivable. This study would have stalled without my faith in God, knowing there is a higher power guiding my life, and prayers. Without the endless support and love of my family, especially my parents, David and Lynne, I could not have finished this document. There is no way I could ever repay them for the sacrifices they made for our family. I am eternally grateful for my parents for instilling an everlasting friendship between my sister, Danielle, and I. I could not have survived this dissertation without her love and sense of humor. Never once, during my entire graduate career, did she let me down when I needed her the most. To my new brother-in-law, Dennis, thank you for the support, friendship, and good advice you have given me throughout my years in graduate school. Thank you to my cousins, Sean and Scott and my Aunt Michele and Uncle Mark for providing endless distractions and laughter during this process.

Thank you to my grandparents, Elvira and Mike Muni and June and Fred Mason, for showing me the importance of faith, family and personal pride. I would also like to thank my uncle, retired Sergeant Joe Mason, for developing my interest in police work at an early age. I wish you all could be here to celebrate this milestone!
Rutgers University SCJ deserves special recognition for introducing me to a
group of friends I consider my sisters, specifically, in alphabetical order: Satenik
Margaryan, Marie Mele, RoseMarie Milinowitz, Melanie Neuilly, Jesy Pizarro Terrill,
and Kristen Zgoba. These girls have been at my side during the best of times and worst
of times. I truly am grateful for having each and every one of them in my life. My life
and who I am would be significantly different had I not met these girls. They are
exceptional women personally and professionally.

My friends from home have provided comfort and laughs throughout this long
process. Thank you, in alphabetical order, to: Sebastian DeAngelo, Mike Flynn, Alia
Malik, Mike and Juda Opacki, Jeannie Ortiz, Tom Parmalee, and Ed Torres. Sebastian,
thank you for your friendship, support, for keeping me company and focused during my
long lonely writing sessions, and reminding me that it is acceptable to have a life outside
of this dissertation process. Mike, you met me when I could barely tie my shoes. Thank
you for years of friendship, endless support, and advice. Alia, you are truly my twin.
Twenty years of friendship and many laughs, advice, and stress relieving Edison, Philly,
and NYC shopping/eating, and movie extravaganzas. Mike and Juda, thank you for the
years of friendship, laughter, and advice. Jeannie, thank you for knocking sense into me
during the most needed times. Eddie, thank you for teaching me all I know about street
gangs and for being a great friend. Tom, thank you for your friendship and helping edit
this document!!!

To the Friendly’s Morrisville, PA staff, specifically Joanne, Rob, Teresa, and
Virginia, thank you for the years of listening to my graduate school stories and for taking
my mind off of work.
I. INTRODUCTION

Why and how do law enforcement agencies develop and change strategies to deal with the silent epidemic of interpersonal violence (IPV), otherwise known as domestic violence? Although academics discuss organizational change in the community policing literature, police department innovation needs further exploration. Outside community policing literature, there is a dearth of research that analyzes the process of changing law enforcement strategies, policies and procedures. Research suggests that crime-fighting policies are often perceived as more important than service policies (Perrot and Taylor, 1995). Knowledge of how police departments change policies to deal with victimization may offer other agencies valuable information relevant to implementing policies and overcoming obstacles. In 21st century policing, departments face many unprecedented challenges, including gang violence and terrorism. Sometimes departments prioritize preventing crimes such as street violence, guns, and drugs because these crimes are visible and immediately pressing. This category of crime takes priority over developing policies and strategies that prevent victimization that occurs outside of the public eye. The issue is that escalation of crime that occurs indoors, like IPV, can reach the public eye.

Police officers suggest that studies in domestic violence are practical because they encounter domestic violence calls frequently and new information is useful. Townsend and colleagues (2005) found that although there have been some studies on a select few domestic violence programs; there is little national information on police efforts to respond to domestic violence calls. In the words of Friday and colleagues (2006), “Although considerable effort has been devoted to domestic violence research in recent
years, knowledge about the usefulness of specialized police units remains largely unexplored” (p. 12).

Few studies explore the organizational process of changing police department strategies and implementing domestic violence policies and procedures (Adler, 2002; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2011). Outside community policing literature, limited research examines. Instead, most studies focus on specific law enforcement tactics, i.e. the development of domestic violence legislation or the effectiveness of mandatory arrest and or restraining orders. A small amount of recent research has explored the effectiveness of domestic violence units and the effectiveness of police community partnerships in reducing domestic violence. Townsend et al. (2005) is one study that explored the implementation of domestic violence policies and procedures. They found that nationwide, larger departments are more likely to have established domestic violence policies. They are also more likely to have established more protocols for their 911 call-takers and dispatchers (Townsend et al., 2005). Criminologists need to focus attention and develop more research on the processes taken by departments to implement strategies or their perceived experiences implementing strategies, i.e. are policies fulfilling intended purposes.

A. Purpose of the Study

To fill the gap in the literature, this dissertation tells the story of the path taken by the Trenton, New Jersey Police Department (TPD) to change domestic violence strategies and carry out these policies. The domestic violence strategies in Trenton included, above all, developing and implementing a domestic violence unit with detectives focused on
domestic violence. Strategies included reviewing domestic violence incident reports, close collaboration with Womanspace and the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, and careful preparation of domestic violence packages by patrol officers.

The women’s rights movement, during the late 19th century, awakened society to crimes against women (Pleck, 1983). However, almost a century later, since about the 1970s, domestic violence has received more research attention (Pleck, 1983). Criminal justice literature thoroughly covers the victimization aspect of domestic violence. Focusing on victimization is important because it directs attention to needs of victims, while also stimulating funding opportunities for advocacy groups. However, it is important to pay equal attention to changing law enforcement strategies. Police are aware of the importance of these strategies, but researchers have missed the opportunity that this area of research affords. Domestic violence policing is embedded in a web of collaboration efforts between victims, prosecutor’s offices, and social services.

Understanding how police change strategies to deal with domestic violence may offer other agencies valuable information relevant to implementing policies and overcoming obstacles. Studying changing police strategies helps develop understanding of the interactions between victim advocates and the police. Academics and practitioners often overlook victim advocates. Advocates, however provide invaluable information to victims. Finally, focusing on changing police strategies provides the opportunity of exploring the benefits of working with prosecutor’s offices on domestic violence cases.
B. **Study Overview**

This research reveals the path taken by the TPD to change domestic violence strategies and carry out these policies. The study works within a case study design and an organizational change theoretical framework. A qualitative case study design using responsive interviewing is ideal as this research seeks an understanding of how domestic violence strategies help victims of domestic violence. In other words, the purpose of this research is to explain TPD’s experience in implementing its Domestic Violence Unit as a “whole in its real world context” (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). The study uses data such as official statistics, official documents, interviews with Trenton police officers, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office employees, and victim advocates.

Finally, the study of domestic violence is also embedded in a web of terms, sometimes making analysis difficult. For example, some jurisdictions categorize community street and barroom fights as domestic violence (Walker, 1999). Usually the term used depends on the field of the researcher (Melton and Belknap, 2003). Some individuals prefer family violence to domestic violence. Others use the terms interchangeably. The more recent term is interpersonal violence (IPV) or interpersonal abuse (Belknap and Potter, 2006). Limiting confusion, this study uses domestic violence and interpersonal violence interchangeably.

C. **Research Questions**

As indicated, this research seeks understanding of how and why the TPD decided to implement new domestic violence strategies. What was the process taken to implement the strategies? What knowledge was acquired while implementing the
policies, i.e. are policies fulfilling intended purposes? Finally, how are the results useful to other agencies that are changing policies? Since this study focuses on understanding the changing strategies of the TPD, the units of analysis were police officers, detectives, and supervisors from the TPD; prosecutors, detectives, and a victim advocate from the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office; and victim advocates from Womanspace’s Domestic Violence Victim Response Team. These individuals were selected because they come from 1.) different professional backgrounds; and 2.) have firsthand knowledge about the role of the TPD in implementing domestic violence strategies (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). These individuals offer the possibility of a more holistic picture of the role the TPD played in changing and implementing domestic violence strategies.

Innovation should be clear, as Greene (2004) noted, if change occurred, it should be visible. When studying organizational change, in a police department, an important concept to explore is whether “the core technology of police work” actually changed. Put another way, how did domestic violence strategies fundamentally change the nature of police work? Or, in other words, did the work of individuals “working in the trenches” fundamentally change? Another issue is whether communications with community agencies or other law enforcement agencies improved. For example, how did these agencies impact domestic violence strategies (Greene, 2004)? Finally, what was the perceived effect of the new strategies on city domestic violence?

On a broader conceptual level, understanding TPD’s changes in their domestic violence strategies could lead other agencies to adopt similar organizational tactics. The results of this research are applicable on a more macro or abstract level. For example, agencies outside law enforcement could borrow experiences ascertained from this study.
Therefore, this study is important for both practical and conceptual reasons. TPD will help shed light on the processes of organizational change in law enforcement. As Buzawa and Buzawa (2011) suggested, “Little attention has been focused on organizational commitment to change and what structural changes are made to ensure compliance” (p. 214). Focusing on organizational change is important because as Maguire (2003) suggested, the majority of published studies focus on the police officer and police work rather than the police organization. However, as indicated, the results from this study could also lead to a macro level of understanding of organizational change.

Secondly, it is hoped this study will help criminologists develop and expand on organizational change theories. In the context of this study, how did the TPD identify a problem in the workplace (Wilson, 1989) and subsequently develop solutions to the environmental problem? How did the TPD achieve its goals, what are some achievements made in the process, and what are some of the weaknesses of the new strategies (also see Graphia, 2010)?

Finally, the TPD study focuses on questions of real policy change that are often overlooked in the criminal justice setting. As Cochran (1992) indicated, “How to develop effective sanctioning policies and implement real change is one of the most serious, but also ignored, questions facing criminal justice in the United States” (p. 307). Moreover, the different criminal justice policy standpoints of legislators and practitioners are part of the problem in putting policy to practice (Cochran, 1992). Polices by legislators, for example, have focused on the political and symbolic position, for example we will fix the crime problem by “getting tough on crime” and improving public safety
concerns (Cochran, 1992). Those working within the criminal justice field focus on the budgetary issues and human relations issues, for example, does the agency have the resources to change and will staff resist change (Cochran, 1992)? As Graphia (2010) noted, “From a policy perspective, leaders want to ensure that precious financial and human capital are allocated and consumed wisely” (p. 141). However, administrators and policymakers also want to ensure that new strategies and procedures are allowing officers to “maximize their own ability to provide security and protection” (p. 141).

D. Contextual Background

According to domestic violence literature, police historically have considered domestic incidents as private issues (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Ford, 1983, Pleck, 1983). This view emanated from sixteenth century American and British society (Pleck, 1983). The family and home life were considered very private institutions (Pleck, 1983; Binder and Meeker, 1992). In Britain, literature implies that husbands regarded wives as business transactions (Pleck, 1983; Dobash and Dobash, 1981). For example, Pleck (1983) referred to women's slavery in marriage. When wives did not meet the job specifications an acceptable consequence included violence (Dobash and Dobash, 1981; Pleck, 1983). Moreover, if husbands helped wives with housework, they were chastised by the community for failing to uphold patriarchal authority (Dobash and Dobash, 1979 and 1981). According to Dobash and Dobash (1981), there were very few community limits on violence. These views were not limited to Britain, they spanned the globe.

Consequently the view that domestic incidents are private issues seeped into domestic violence policing. Dating to 19th century England, for example, police leaned
towards responded to public offices rather than domestic crimes, unless the crimes were serious (Dobash and Dobash, 1979 and 1981). This view emanated from societal views (Tomes, 1978). As Tomes (1978) explained:

"The police constable's efforts to monitor wife-beating served as an extension of the working-class community's methods. He intervened in a more official capacity, yet his techniques were very similar to neighbors'. Most constables came from working-class backgrounds, which undoubtedly shaped their views on the appropriate means to handle such cases. The constable's advantage over neighbors in controlling marital violence lay in his ability to back up his reproaches with the threat of jail" (P. 376).

Women tending to abused women were the trend in working class neighborhoods (Tomes, 1978). As Tomes (1978) noted these neighborhoods believed that husbands had the right to beat their wives, especially if she aggravated/provoked him. Neighbors only called police when the abuser met a certain threshold (Tomes, 1978). Tomes (1978) explained:

"The sight of a great deal blood, the use of a weapon, the age or infirmity of the wife, all were weighed against the prevailing custom of allowing a husband his rights. The community drew the line at murder; the fear of murder prompted action. They would call the police not because a man was beating his wife, but because they thought he was murdering her" (P. 376).

Moreover, women of the mid-19th century experienced similar fears as today's women when considering bringing an end to abuse (Tomes, 1978; Pleck, 1983). Pleck (1983) suggested that feminists, of the 19th century, attributed violence against women to "domestic tyranny." Tome (1978) suggested that, during the 19th century going to the police and swearing a warrant against a husband could prove very dangerous. For example, a woman had acid thrown on her by an angry husband after she obtained a judicial separation from him (Tomes, 1978). Many women during this period also failed
to testify in court because of fear of retaliation from their significant others (Tomes, 1978).

Buzawa and Buzawa (2003) suggested that historically victims and bystanders failed to report domestic violence incidents. Historically, many times, fear of retaliation, precluded victims from reporting IPV. For example, between 1978-1982, the National Crime Survey estimated that 32% of battered women were revictimized within 6 months after the reported assault (Langan and Innes, 1986; Hart, 1993). The most common reason that women did not report the crime to police was that the issue was a private matter (Langan and Innes, 1986). In 12 percent of cases, fear of retaliation was the reason that women did not report to police (Langan and Innes, 1986).

Additionally, police department policies contributed to low numbers of reported domestic violence incidents (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). Buzawa and Buzawa (2003) suggested that to maximize police resources and to use resources efficiently, dispatchers have typically screened calls according to importance (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Ford, 1983). In other words, the dispatchers sifted out “frivolous,” “inappropriate,” or “undesired” calls, leaving police response for the more important calls (Manning, 1992). In a domestic violence case, if the caller insisted that police respond, the police would either not respond or delay response (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Ford, 1983). According to Manning (1992), domestic violence calls were historically classified as a misdemeanor or a “low priority call.” Thus, another reason for delaying the response was that the event would be over with by the time police reached the dispute site (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Manning, 1992; Ford, 1983).
Another obstacle impeding change within the criminal justice system included law enforcement impressions that intervening in domestic violence incidents is not real policing (Stanko, 1989; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). When police responded to a domestic violence call, they either played a mediator role or separated the parties (Frederick, 2000). Moreover, research suggests that police typically do not receive a career promotion from good domestic violence policing (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). Career promotions arise from "knowledge of substantive criminal law, criminal procedures, and departmental policies" (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). Furthermore, police are putting themselves and the department at risk for civil suits for being overzealous and intervening in heated domestic affairs (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). According to literature, departments perceive domestic violence calls as dangerous, although the research is inconsistent in this area (Bowker, 1982; Straus, 1980; Parnas, 1967). Garner and Clemmer (1986) suggested, from a review of FBI data and seven independent studies that domestic violence policing is not as dangerous as other assignments, such as robbery (also see Hirschel et al., 1994).

Finally, departmental impediments are cited as reasons for slow responses to domestic violence incidents. For example, one major impediment was that domestic violence incidents were usually misdemeanors. Before the 1980s, arrests were only possible in misdemeanor cases when they occurred in front of officers or after the issuing of a warrant for the perpetrator’s arrest. Usually misdemeanors do not occur in an officer's presence. Moreover, classifying the assault as a misdemeanor could discourage women from moving forward with prosecution (Hart, 1983). Hart (1983) suggested, “When serious assaults are trivialized and charged as misdemeanors or cited as summary
offenses, victims of domestic violence may conclude that the costs and risks of prosecution outweigh the potential consequences for assailants. Thus battered women may lose interest in criminal prosecution” (P.627). In addition, police department computer information systems were either nonexistent or rudimentary. Consequently, the difficulty for police was in deciding the warrant status of the assailant (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1993). Furthermore, successful prosecution requires “credible victim testimony” (Frederick, 2000) and many victims are afraid to reunite with the defendant in court.

In the 1970s and 1980s, criminal justice system views about intervening in domestic violence incidents began changing. In 1977, Pennsylvania drafted the first domestic violence legislation called the Protection from Abuse Act. Since then, other states made advances in domestic violence laws and police intervention efforts (Straus et al., 1984; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). As discussed in chapters four and five, many of these efforts took the form of civil restraining orders and mandatory arrest strategies. As explained by Ferraro (1989 a,b), changes in statutory wording, like mandatory arrest, were a response to the fact that many domestic violence incidents fell into the category of misdemeanors. As Ferraro (1989 a,b) noted, the law prevented police from arresting batterers in misdemeanor cases, unless the crime occurred in front of the officer, an arrest warrant had been issued, or a citizen signed a complaint. Mandatory arrest laws expanded police powers to arrest (Ferraro, 1989 a,b).

In more recent years, efforts have taken the form of coordinated community intervention. Consequently, there is little academic evidence of the efficacy of these efforts (Worden, 2001). As Worden (2001) noted, “Coordinated community intervention
is widely heralded as the key to achieving better outcomes in cases involving violence within families, particularly violence between partners. On the surface, at least, the appeal of coordination is intuitive: people working together from different (and sometimes competing) bases of power and with different kinds of resources are more likely to improve the prospects for victims than are criminal justice agents or victim service providers working in isolation” (p. 1). In 1995, based on this rationale, the U.S. Congress allocated funding to communities that were willing to establish collaborative projects with law enforcement agencies, the court system, and community service advocates to address interpersonal violence (Post et al., 2010; Public Law 103-322, section 40261). The goal of Coordinated Community Response (CCRs) is to develop solutions for battered women or men other than shelter care and/or counseling (Post et al., 2010, p. 76). Ironically, however, the majority of CCR studies have focused on the offender’s needs rather than victim needs (Goodman and Epstein, 2005). CCR’s are discussed more fully in chapters four and five.

In summary, and as discussed further in chapters four and five, the criminal justice response to domestic violence occurred in a few stages. The first wave of change occurred during the 1970s and 1980s and was spurred by feminist activists, researchers, litigation, and statutory changes (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1992). Changes focused on domestic violence legislation. Buzawa and Buzawa (1992) suggested that one of the primary reasons for statutory changes in domestic violence legislation was to incite “more active criminal justice intervention” in these cases. The next stage occurred during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and built upon the first stage. This era saw improvements in federal domestic violence legislation, like the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994. Other innovations included mandatory arrest and improvements of restraining orders and domestic violence units within police departments. Many courts also implemented domestic violence courts. As detailed in chapter four, by the 1990s, every state and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes granting victims of domestic violence immediate protection (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Kane, 2000; Keilitz, 1994; Buzawa and Buzawa, 1992; Finn, 1980).

Indeed, domestic violence policies have drastically changed during the twentieth century. Yet, in the eyes of law enforcement, what is the perceived utility of these changes? As Townsend et al. (2005) stated, “Although selected programs across the country have been evaluated, no cross-sectional information has been gathered at the national level to examine local agency response to domestic violence calls” (p.1). A step in this direction is studying an individual police department and explaining the context of how the department changed and functioned through the eyes of police officers and those who work directly with police officers.

Overall, policing has changed drastically since Locke and Hobbes and has dramatically changed during the twentieth century. Yet the question is, as posed by Weisburd and Braga (2006), what are the dynamics of change? For instance, why did departments change policies and procedures? Moreover, what is the utility of new policies and procedures? Are they actually “adopted” by departments? Who was the change agent pushing for change? Why did they push for change? Were there impediments to change?

One explanation given for changing strategies and tactics is that old procedures were ineffective (Thompson, 2008). Organizational theories suggest that agencies change
when a problem exists with the current operation or there is a more efficient method of conducting business. Organizational theories would also suggest that agencies fail to carry out plans when the organization did not fully grasp the problem and/or intervention and acted too quickly to implement the new intervention and practices. The issue with not understanding the factors and processes involved in organizational change is that departments have to depend upon trial and error when trying to maximize change (Williams, 2003). That said, historically, police have changed their way of doing business when faced with uncertainties within dominant policing strategies.

E. **Summary: Purpose of the Study and Research Questions**

This case study examines process questions focusing on changing domestic violence strategies within the TPD and outcome questions focusing on the perceived utility of these strategies. The focus of this dissertation is developing an understanding of why and how the TPD implemented new domestic violence strategies, the process taken to implement the strategies, and the perceived utility of these strategies. Specifically, what has changed in domestic violence policing? Have communication and relationship conduits improved with other agencies seeking to curb domestic violence and help domestic violence victims? How have relationships changed? Are new strategies fulfilling their intended purposes? According to those working within the police department or closely collaborating with the police department are these strategies effective in helping to curb domestic violence? The TPD and this author hope the conclusions of this research will be useful to other police departments that are changing domestic violence policies and practices or implementing new strategies. Understanding how the organization coordinated change will help paint the picture of the processes of
organizational change. Stated another way, this research seeks to pull from Trenton’s experience and weaves this understanding into a macro understanding of organizational change. Thus this research is applicable to both law enforcement management and management as a whole.

Research questions were crafted to develop understanding of: why the TPD implemented new strategies; how it implemented the strategies; the perceived utility of the domestic violence strategies; and how the strategies can be applied on a macro level of organizational change. To examine innovation and change within domestic violence strategies at the TPD, this study has a few guiding research questions including:

1. **Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies?**

   In 2009, the TPD created a domestic violence unit after an increase in deadly domestic violence incidents. The purposes of the new strategies were to ensure that officers understood domestic violence duties and responsibilities as defined in the New Jersey Code, N.J.S.A – 2C: 25-1. Subsequently, the TPD distributed General Order 2009-03 – Domestic Violence Policy. The content of the general order included information such as: arrest responsibilities; seizure of weapons; execution of the domestic violence offense report; distributing domestic violence rights forms to victims; the domestic violence complaint and the temporary restraining order process; and, follow-up investigations. As explained in chapter six, the TPD’s domestic violence unit also focuses on identifying repeat victims and repeat offenders, charging offenders with more serious offenses, paying more attention to stalking and pushing for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders. Similar to George Kelling’s broken windows policing,
the idea behind the new unit was to pay attention to domestic violence “incidents” that could result in “bigger events.” Finally, a primary goal of the new unit and the new domestic violence strategies were to coordinate and facilitate communication between governmental agencies, such as Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and private organizations, such as Womanspace.

The first question is a process question. Incorporated within this question is dialogue on what leads a department to change policies and procedures. The question provides contextual explanations for changing departmental policies. Studying the process of implementation before examining the reasons for change is rather like putting the carriage before the horse or solving a murder without the facts. Understanding why the TPD changed policies sets the stage for the process taken to change policies. For agencies to change, the organization must understand its current role, the problem facing the current practices, and the role that the new intervention is to assume in correcting the problem. Without this knowledge, the agency will face a dead end and practices that fail to change. As Greene (2004) indicated, “Formal organizations (including police departments) are often seen as systems of planned, rational, and controlled activities stemming from myriad social interactions that are purposive and goal oriented” (p.36). Was change linked to a new set of values and beliefs related to domestic violence, to new innovative ideas, contingent on city violence, or all of the above?

Secondly and closely related to the first question,
2. How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?

The second question is also a process question. Who decided to make the policy decision to change strategies? Was the need for change established at the agency level or the community/citizen level? Incorporated within this question is dialogue on how the department strategically planned for change, who led the change, and who implemented the new policies. Did all employees agree on the necessity of changing strategies? Was there any resistance to change?

Organizational coordination is a key variable of this research question. Wilson (1989) suggested that understanding organizational coordination can help shed light on organizational management and change as a whole or in other words, at a macro level of analysis. More specifically, this question seeks to confirm whether the processes of organizational change follow the pattern set forth in prior literature. Buzawa and Buzawa (1992) suggested that organizational change occurs in “predicable and some ways essential stages.” The first stage is equivalent to the Weberian framework. As such, the bureaucratic “Herrschaft” (institution) is considered rational and more efficient. At the same time, however, agencies often reach a point when they realize that the rational approach is not working (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1992). As explained in chapter two, when this occurs, a few more variables enter into the equation, including agency contingencies and/or efforts to enhance the agency’s legitimacy. In summary, Buzawa and Buzawa (1992) remarked:

“At some point, perhaps in response to obvious shortcomings, the recognition arises that the classic pattern is inadequate. As bureaucracies tend to try to maintain their standard operating procedures and thereby resist change, the first efforts to change an organization’s behavior usually occur “from the top down” as a response to dramatic performance failures, often by legislative fiat or
administrative decree. Finally there often begins an incremental and, to observers, frustratingly slow process of changing behavior at the operational level” (p. viii).

Next,

3. **What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?**

The third question is an outcome question and examines the experiences of the TPD in implementing new policies. In other words, what changed? How do law enforcement officers and others who corroborate with the TPD perceive the new policy’s utility in assisting them in helping victims of domestic violence. Incorporated within the third question is information on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the TPD implemented.

Finally,

4. **What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?**

The final question is also an outcome question and seeks to determine how this research is applicable to other agencies that are changing policies. As explained later, this section seeks to elicit information to understand whether there is component of the new strategies that officers and others who collaborate with the TPD feel are problematic or act as impediments to helping domestic violence victims. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change.

Before summarizing the chapters of this study, it is worth noting that, according to literature, as recent as thirty years ago, society would have considered this study outlandish. The police concerned themselves with the public world, not the private world. Society believed that home was a family’s sanctum and the populace should not
interfere. As discussed throughout this document societal culture and police culture impeded policy attention from domestic violence. The more difficult task became changing cultural views. Changing culture, to police departments, often involves changing policies. However, as Stanko (1989) suggests, changing policies may not change the culture. This study suggests that changing culture involves a dedicated change agent, training and education, and compliance to orders (ordered change).

F. Overview of Chapters

The topical areas of literature chosen for this study provide a contextual background for this study. Based upon the topic of this study, this study reviews organizational change literature and domestic violence literature. More specifically, the literature review begins with a theoretical foundation for organizational change, transitions into a discussion on law enforcement organizational change, shifts to a discussion on feminist views and domestic violence policies, and ends with discussion on the historical changes in law enforcement domestic violence policies.

Chapter two describes the theoretical framework for this dissertation. The literature has clearly depicted the impediments to police organizational change. Yet, as indicated above, little is known about the dynamics of change. For example, why did departments decide to innovate, and why did they choose specific innovations? Organizational theories are the most pragmatic theoretical framework for understanding how police develop and change strategies to deal with the silent epidemic of domestic violence. The first section of this chapter discusses literature on the classical approach to organizational management. The second section explores the neoclassical approach. Weaved into this section are characteristics of the behavioral police management
paradigm. The next couple of sections of chapter two review literature on police management in the 21st Century. More specifically discussion focuses on contingency theory and systems theory. The final couple of sections of the chapter provide conclusions on applying organizational change theories to policing.

Chapter three reviews the literature on police department organizational change. The focus of this study is to develop an organizational understanding of why and how the TPD implemented new domestic violence strategies, the process taken to implement strategies, and the perceived utility of the strategies. Therefore, the literature review should provide contextual understanding of what is currently known about police organizational change. The first section of the chapter explores the difficult-to-define concept of innovation. The second section of the chapter reviews the literature discussing change within police departments. The content largely explores the movement toward community policing, problem-oriented policing, and Compstat. A good portion of time is spent discussing problem oriented policing and Compstat because the TPD applied these concepts when developing the Domestic Violence Unit and DV Stat. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as a tool to hold various stakeholders accountable and bring these agencies together to discuss domestic violence in Trenton. The final section of the chapter briefly summarizes what is known about organizational change in policing.

Chapter four begins by establishing the foundation for this study by exploring feminist perspectives on domestic violence law enforcement strategies. This chapter provides context for understanding the roots of this study. Without understanding the barriers women have experienced while trying to protect themselves, it becomes more difficult to develop a response to the problem.
Historically, society did not view domestic violence as a significant health problem (Zorza, 1992). The problem, according to society, was at home between family members. Not until the women's movement began advocating for domestic violence to be treated as a crime did views change. Nonetheless, as Frisch (2003) wrote, "much has changed in the criminal justice and community responses to domestic violence, and much has stayed the same" (Frisch, 2003). Frisch (2003) pointedly noted that criminalization and development of laws against domestic violence are crafted to fit within the traditional legal framework. This framework was designed to protect the community, but may not necessarily protect the victim (Frisch, 2003). Early domestic violence research focused attention on, for example, arrest and recidivism statistics (Sherman and Berk, 1984). Police responses, such as arrest isolate the incident from the larger context of domestic violence (Bowman, 1992; Zorza, 1992). Bowman (1992) implied that research that relies on statistics, yet fails to account for the voices of victims, loses rich detail with potential policy implications. Moreover, limiting studies to arrest statistics limits understanding of the relationship between the police and supportive services (Bowman, 1992).

Chapter five sets the stage for discussing the history of domestic violence strategies in law enforcement. This chapter reviews many of the ideas explored in chapters three and four. However, chapter five specifically details the changes that were made in law enforcement domestic violence policies. A historical account of law enforcement responses to domestic violence is laid out to give readers perspective on how domestic violence policies change. The goal is to provide a contextual framework of the evolution of law enforcement domestic violence policies. The hope is that this
framework will help readers develop a better understanding of the process of changing domestic violence policies at the TPD.

Chapter six establishes the context for this study by providing an overview of Trenton and the TPD. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of Trenton's history. The second section introduces Trenton's Domestic Violence Unit. The next section reviews important domestic violence concepts in New Jersey. The final sections explore police procedures, interagency collaborations, and TPD layoffs.

Chapter seven explains the research methodology. The first section of the chapter explains the rationale for qualitative research using a single-case study design. The second section of the chapter reviews the research questions for this study. Next discussed is the idea of “Designing the Analysis with Theory in Mind.” The next section describes the unit of analysis, sampling, and the interview process. The final section discusses data analysis, including coding and building themes, checking for accuracy, and building theory.

Chapter eight reviews the research findings. The first half of the chapter provides an account of the research results for each research question. The second section of the chapter explores the experiences of victim advocates in working with the victims and the TPD. The final section of this chapter is a summary analysis of the research findings.

Chapter nine concludes with policy implications. A number of lessons can be learned from this study. For example, in areas with the same characteristics as Trenton, New Jersey, perhaps an effective strategy in addressing and investigating domestic
violence is problem-oriented policing. Organizational change literature suggests that administrators plan for change by identifying contingencies. This study similarly found that it is important to understand local problems and tailor responses to fit those problems (also see Sampson, 2007). Moreover, supporting prior domestic violence literature, when tailoring responses to domestic violence, police departments should be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, like advocacy organizations (Sampson, 2007).

In summary, based on the results of this study and prior literature, departmental policies should include scanning data and analyzing current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance/accountability. Departments should also train/education employees on the new strategies. Finally, departments should cultivate collaborations with support agencies.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Introduction

In the past forty or more years, every sector of the criminal justice system, law enforcement, the courts, and corrections has experienced change. For example, law enforcement transitioned from the political era of policing to the law enforcement era, and then to the community oriented policing era. Sentencing has transitioned from a rehabilitative focus, to a punitive focus, back to a rehabilitative focus. Finally courts have experimented with plea-bargaining initiatives to reduce caseloads and prosecutor’s offices have experimented with community prosecution to improve community relations. Many times, this change is dynamic and often it is neither straightforward nor agreed on by other professionals or criminologists (for examples see: Martinson, 1974 and 1979; Alpert and Moore, 2001; Seider and Kadella, 2003; Willis, 2007).

Even though most people understand the surface meaning of reform and change, the pathway to change, as Wilson (1989) indicated, is complex. This research seeks understanding of how and why the TPD decided to implement new domestic violence strategies. Since this study focuses on understanding organizational change, this study applied organizational theories to guide the research. As Maguire (2003) explained:

“For those focusing on organizational behavior, the attitudes and behaviors of actors within organizations are the primary units of analysis. Academics from this group emerged primarily from psychology and management backgrounds. For those focusing on organization theory, organizations themselves – their processes, structures, and goals – are the primary unit of analysis. Academics from this group emerged primarily from sociology, public administration and political science backgrounds” (p. 10).
Organizational theories are presented here to provide a theoretical foundation for why organizations change. Many of the theoretical principles ascertained from organizational literature are applicable to this research, specifically classical theory, neoclassical theory, contingency theory, and systems theory. Finally, this study adopts a hybrid approach to theory development (Brixey et al., 2007). The hybrid approach combines both inductive and deductive analysis. This type of analysis uses literature and theory to develop a “classification framework” and then adds new categories that are inductively grounded in the data (grounded theory framework) (Brixey et al., 2007).

B. Classical Theories

Historically, theoretical literature on organizations focused on efficiency (Thompson, 2008). As Morgan (2006) pointed out, during the nineteenth century a number of individuals, including Frederick Taylor and Max Weber, attempted to develop a process leading to scientific management. The goal was to develop a management structure focused on efficiency, organization and mass production. Although history suggests that Taylor and Weber developed the tenets of organizational theory, Charles Babbage published the first scientific approach to organizational management (Morgan, 2006). Babbage underlined the importance of a management theory that focused on planning and a division of labor (Morgan, 2006).

Until the first half of the twentieth century, Taylor’s classical principles of rational scientific management predominated the business world (Morgan, 2006). Within management literature, Taylor is known as the “father of scientific management.” Scientific management created a closed system that emphasized efficiency through specialization and repetitiveness of job tasks, standards of operation, and control
(management) (Thompson, 1997). Taylor’s management approach separated industrial planning from the execution of strategies (Morgan, 2006). As Morgan (2006) pointedly noted, Taylor’s strategies separated the “hand” from the “brain.”

Weber applied Taylor’s idea to administration and coined the term “bureaucracy.” Organizational rationality, efficiency, a division of labor, and specialty of labor were, to Weber, important standards. The traditional distinguishing organizational framework of police departments was the Weberian bureaucracy, a closed system based on centralization, hierarchical rank, accountability, and specialization of duties (division of labor) (Thompson, 2008). The concept of core technologies cuts across the research on closed organizational systems. According to Thompson (2008), core technologies, in other words, the roles carried out by employees, are grounded within a closed systems framework. Every organization or agency is comprised of a “suborganization” or department/unit. This suborganization carries out the work of the agency and its tasks or technologies (Thompson, 2008). In relation to law enforcement, police maintain order, enforce the law, and process those accused of breaking the law.

C. Neoclassical Theories

Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, neoclassical theories challenged classical theories of management (Morgan, 2006). These challenges began with Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne Experiment. The results of this experiment suggested other aspects of the work environment determine efficiency (Morgan, 2006). For example, the Taylorist perspectives of scientific management and solving the “technical problem” do not account for work motivation. Organizational psychologists suggested that bureaucratic
models are counter to human nature and striving for “psychological success” (Argyris, 1964). As a result, organizational psychologists began exploring what motivates people to reach their fullest potential (Morgan, 2006, Mayo, 1933; Simon, 1945; Bernard, 1968). Their ideas were built on motivational theories such as those pioneered by Abraham Maslow (Morgan, 2006). Employees are most effective when individual needs are satisfied. Organizational psychologists suggested that employers provide employees with “autonomy, responsibility, and recognition” (Morgan, 2006). Organizational psychologists suggested modifying the bureaucratic model to create a job environment conducive to employee psychological needs (Morgan, 2006). This became known as human relations theory or human relations management.

Behavioral researchers in policing suggested that police work is more complex than originally believed (Roberg, 2000). Police officers “wear a number of different hats” they are law enforcers, order maintenance professionals, and provide social services to those in need of help (Wilson, 1968; Goldstein, 1979). During the 1970s, many police departments began experimenting with the human relations theory. This era coincided with the community relations movement. Theorists suggested departments transition from the bureaucratic hierarchical model toward a more open model emphasizing police discretion. The more open decentralized model would facilitate community relations and problem solving (Gaines and Worrall, 2011).

Classical and neoclassical theories set the stage for a theoretical paradigm that considers the environment of the agency (Morgan, 2006). In contrast to classical theories, contingency theorists suggest there is no best method of managing an agency. The mechanistic management approach, according to contingency theorists, fails to
account for uncertainty (Morgan, 2006). Similar to the neoclassical approach, contingency theorists underline the importance of an open system of management. According to contingency theory, institutional survival involves “looking inward” and listening to the organization's rational inner voice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Katz et al., 2002; Crank, 2003; Willis et al., 2007). In other words, success of an institution is dependent on efficiency and effectiveness (Crank and Langworthy, 1992).

D. Contingency Theory

Contingency theory is based upon an open systems framework. Contingency theorists suggest that agencies, like police departments, are affected by both internal politics and environmental contingencies, e.g. community politics, legislation, court decisions, etc (Thompson, 2008). The work the agency is responsible for completing (known in organizational literature as “technology”), is contingent upon external and internal factors (Thompson, 2008). Planning for contingencies, revamping policies and procedures and subsequent transition requires planning. Agencies and organizations may need to plan to train employees, plan for resistance from employees, and or plan for situations that could over tax the agency or organization. As Thompson (2008) indicated, “Organizations pointed toward emergencies, such as fire departments, attempt to level the need for their services by activities designed to prevent emergencies, and by emphasis on early detection so that demand is not allowed to grow to the point that would overtax the capacity of the organization” (p. 21).
E. Open and Closed Theories

Recognizing that organizations and people have needs illuminates how individuals depend on the environment for meeting needs. Open Systems Theory was developed by Ludwick von Bertalanffy during the 1920s. Unlike the classical theorists, who treated organizations as “a closed mechanical system,” the open systems approach focused on how agencies depend on the external environment for survival. Open systems are often portrayed as living organisms with a continual cycle of “input, internal transformation (throughput), output, and feedback (Morgan, 2006). These institutions are their own entities but depend on a grander system for survival. The organizational environment (general environment) according to Maguire (2003) is anything external to the agency. The environment could include, “funding agencies, raw materials, clients, potential employees, the media, politicians, rumors, legislation, and employee unions (Maguire, 2003, p.26). For police, the external environment includes the public, politicians, the media, legislation, other law enforcement agencies, courts, corrections, social agencies, etc. In order to maintain self-regulation and control, open systems constantly evaluate environmental contingencies, and they adjust procedures based upon threats.

The opposite of an open system is a closed system. As indicated earlier, predetermined organizational tasks are characteristic of closed agencies (Morgan, 2006). Morgan (2006) compared a closed system to towers, bridges, and clockwork toys with predetermined motions. A closed organizational system is not concerned with external contingencies, only the organization and its departments or suborganizations. The
suborganization carries out the tasks, or technologies, of the agency (Thompson, 2008). Closed-systems theorists suggest that employee efficiency and productivity could be increased if employees working “in the trenches” (the technical core) did not have to worry about input from people who fail to grasp the work of the suborganization. Theoretically, the organization would benefit from sealing the technical core from the noise of the outside world (Thompson, 2008). The traditional distinguishing organizational framework of police departments was the Weberian bureaucracy, a closed system based on centralization, hierarchical rank, accountability, and specialization of duties (division of labor) (Thompson, 2008).

In summary, organizational theories provide a pragmatic theoretical foundation for understanding why organizations change policies. As Dantzker (1999) suggested, when studying an organization, a window or framework for understanding change becomes important (also see Bolman and Deal, 1984).

F. Police Department Organizational Change and Theoretical Applications

Organizational theories provide a useful framework for understanding and answering this study’s research questions. For about 60 years, organizational structure has attracted the interest of researchers (Maguire, 2003). This research is in accordance with the sociological approach to the study of organizational change. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the sociological approach became established (Maguire, 2003). Reformers that focused on changing police organizational strategies consistently pointed to three general areas: the bureaucratic model (classical model); the democratic model (i.e. open systems), and the contingency model (Maguire, 2003). Recently theorists have pointed
toward a newer theoretical model, institutional theory, for explaining organizational change. Institutional theorists, according to Kraska (2004), focus on how organizations construct their own reality. As Donaldson (2001) suggested, “institutional theory emphasizes ritual more than rationality and processes of conformity, such as those to gain legitimacy with powerful outside bodies, even without gain to internal organizational effectiveness (also see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Contingency theory focuses on the inside, or the rational voice; institutional theory focuses beyond the boundaries of the institution, also looking for legitimacy from outsiders with vested interest in the organization.

The aforementioned theories focus on how police departments organize, plan, and lead change (Bendix, 1962; Gerth and Mills, 1958; Angell, 1971, Roberg et al. 2000). As Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) explained, a body of literature developed from the community policing literature that focused on police department organizational reform. This body of organizational change literature explored how police departments began changing, during the 1980s, from a mechanistic bureaucracy to a more open, organic model (Kuykendall and Roberg, 1982). The open organic model, according to Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) composed five core areas:

1. Generalization (a de-emphasis on specialization);
2. Collegial (vertical and horizontal management);
3. Power (location of knowledge could emanate from anywhere in the organization);
4. Situation oriented (problem solving at all levels of the organization); and
5. Goal oriented (the organization emphasizes commitment to goals and objectives).
This study uses the abovementioned organizational theories to help develop an understanding of police department organizational change. In other words, what theoretical model best explains why the TPD changed domestic violence strategies (Kraska, 2004)? How can theory make sense of this change? Organizational change theories provide groundwork for developing an understanding of why the Trenton Police Department changed its domestic violence strategies.

This study follows the lead of other qualitative researchers and aims to develop a middle-range theory. The process of changing strategies, procedures, and policies, is not discussed thoroughly in other areas of law enforcement such as domestic violence. The opportunity exists to paint the theoretical picture or an overarching explanation of how police develop and change strategies to deal with domestic violence. In light of what is already known theoretically about organizational change in police departments, through interviews this research aims to describe the nature and perceived effectiveness of police department strategic changes in dealing with the silent epidemic of domestic violence. This study also contributes to the gap of literature on how systems components network (e.g., law enforcement and social services) (Adler, 2002). The study theoretically explores how different components of the system unite with the goal of helping IPV victims.

In other words, the study adopts a hybrid approach to theory development (Brixey et al., 2007). The hybrid approach combines both inductive and deductive analysis. This type of analysis uses literature and theory to develop a “classification framework” and then adds new categories that are inductively grounded in the data (grounded theory
framework) (Brixey et al., 2007). The framework permits the researcher to review interviews and simultaneously study the literature and theory "to gain ideas on what themes and concepts for which to code, develop new concepts where appropriate, and then work out the definitions prior to doing the physical coding" (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, P. 221). In the case of this research, organizational change literature is a useful starting point for developing concepts and themes.

Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested that when building theory researchers remember the three distinct stages of theory development: the case-focused theory, the middle-level theory, and the grand theory. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005) the aim of the case-focused theory is dual. The first task is providing a theoretical explanation of what was learned through the interview process of a "specific circumstance," like for instance, "why an organization behaved the way it did.” The second task is suggesting how the case-specific theory could develop into a broader theoretical framework. Middle-level theory takes the case-specific theory one step further by exploring how far “the principles and processes” discovered in the case specific study might extend (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). For instance, theoretically, perhaps changing departmental domestic violence strategies resulted in a more effective response to domestic violence. Or, more broadly, perhaps there is a link between greater collaboration between the community, other law enforcement agencies and the police in pulling levers on chronic domestic violence offenders. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005) for this theme to be upgraded to a middle-level theory, the researcher must either compare other similar cases to the current case or link the findings from the current research to other published literature on the subject. Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested the majority of qualitative research aims
to develop a middle-level theory “that builds on what was learned from the interviewing and then speaks to issues present in the literature” (p.231). Finally, grand theories offer an overarching and comprehensive explanation that addresses several different perspectives and issues with “implications” across time and geographic space (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

G. Conclusions

Organizational change theories provide a framework for answering this study’s research questions. As explained, this study adopts a hybrid approach to theory development (Brixey et al., 2007). The hybrid approach combines both inductive and deductive analysis. This type of analysis uses literature and theory to develop a classification framework and then adds new categories that are inductively grounded in the data (grounded theory framework) (Brixey et al., 2007). The framework permits the researcher to review interviews and simultaneously study the literature and theory "to gain ideas on what themes and concepts for which to code, develop new concepts where appropriate, and then work out the definitions prior to doing the physical coding" (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, P. 221). In the case of this research, police department organizational change literature is a useful starting point for developing concepts and themes.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW – POLICE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

A. Introduction

Police organizational change literature is a practical starting point for understanding how police change strategies to deal with domestic violence. Generally speaking, people are uncomfortable with change because it is mysterious, yet often necessary (Knight, 1967). As Washington Irving is quoted as saying, “There is a certain relief in change, even though it could be from bad to worse! As I have often found in traveling in a stagecoach, that it is often a comfort to shift one’s position, and be bruised in a new place.” Change usually occurs when a specific tactic or process is not working properly and an organization develops new ideas (Pierce and Delbeq, 1977). According to Pierce and Delbeq (1977), the organizational change literature is full of process models describing innovation. However, most process models begin the same, with awareness of the opportunity for change, followed by ideas and concepts and a decision phase on whether to implement the change (Pierce and Delbeq, 1977). Reviewing police department organizational change literature and impediments to changing strategies is a good starting point for studying the process of changing domestic violence strategies. A few of the more recent and prominent changes made within police departments include decentralization with community policing and problem-oriented policing and tactics like Compstat.

B. Definition of Innovation

Despite the large number of articles and books on innovation, the literature has yet to monolithically define innovation. There are two predominant definitions of the concept of innovation (Chen and Wang, 2005). The one school suggested by Thompson
(1965) is that innovation is, “the generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas, processes, products, or services” (p. 2). Similarly, Becker and Whistler (1967) suggested that one flaw of the organizational literature is that it does not “make distinctions between innovation, invention, change or adaptation” (p. 462). According to Becker and Whistler (1967) this distinction is critical. Invention is generating new ideas, and innovation is the process of implementing change, which potentially is dependent upon time and place. Put differently, the innovating agency may not be the implementing agency, but it should still receive credit for discovering the innovation. Becker and Whistler (1967) defined innovation as, “the first or early use of an idea by one of a set of organizations with similar goals” (p.463; see Pierce and Delbeq, 1977 for a similar definition).

Other organizational researchers, such as Knight (1967) weave innovation and borrowing innovative ideas together in one definition of innovation. Knight (1967) defines innovation as “the adoption of a change which is new to an organization and to the relevant environments” (p.478; also see Zaltman et al. 1973 and Chen and Wang, 2005). In other words, although the innovation may have occurred first in another setting, it is now occurring in the implementing agency and is still considered innovative to the implementing agency.

C. Change within police departments

Without a doubt, generating new ideas and the process of implementing change is mysterious. Those who work in governmental agencies or private agencies, with a number of competing values, understand the complexity of changing strategies or policies (Pierce, 1977). For example, Roberg (2000) indicated, probably the most common
“characteristic of change” is people’s resistance to change (Stanko, 1989, p.54). Employees may resist new interventions because they fear “economic loss, loss of status, loss of friends or associates, or job satisfaction” (Twain, 1983). Thus, administrators must prepare for resistance (Stanko, 1989, p.54).

Furthermore, if the change affects the solidarity of a unit or agency, people will be more skeptical of the change (Twain, 1983). Additionally, individuals most affected by the new intervention may resist change because the new technology that goes with the new intervention requires a new skill that they may find daunting (Twain, 1983). Administrators must be able to rebut these fears for the intervention to be successful.

Changing any program or policy involves psychological, social, or technical resistance (Twain, 1983). Pragmatically when changing organizational strategies, management should train employees and or develop specialized units that concentrate their efforts on understanding dynamic issues, such as domestic violence.

During dynamic states of affairs, like domestic violence or terrorism, organizations and agencies develop specialized departments. At times, a unit cannot produce change on its own, which begets involving similar departments or units. For example, according to Thompson (2008), “Under norms of rationality, organizations group positions to minimize coordination costs” (p. 57). The community policing literature provides a more recent example of the process of innovation and change within a police department. One insight from community policing is that the department should include officers when implementing change.

In general and as suggested in chapter two, people understand that Max Weber and his bureaucracy were the bricklayers for the organizational framework for police
departments. Bureaucracy consists of a few salient characteristics: a rigid hierarchical structure, strong centralized control, a division of labor, standard operating procedures and unit of command (Roberg, et al., 2000). In policing, the framework supported crime control while protecting against corrupt police practices. The issue with Weber’s model is that it stifled organizational change (Thompson, 1965). This model insisted that police follow rules without using discretion. In a sense, as denoted by Bittner (1970), police officers were “crime soldiers” or in other words, “soldier bureaucrats.” Community policing and problem-oriented policing is the cold chisel that began chipping a hole into the bureaucracy. That said, however, the bureaucratic hole can easily be mortared if upper management in the department is not motivated or committed to change departmental values (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986).

Zhao et al. (1995) in his review of the literature identified a few key components of community policing, including a set of new values and beliefs related to public order, decentralization, broadening officer decision making opportunities, building relationships between the police and the community, and problem solving. In other words, community policing and problem-oriented policing depend on decentralization and officer problem solving skills (Weisburd et al., 1988). Jack Greene (2004) noted that “To the extent that the larger institution of policing is philosophically and strategically shifting toward community policing and problem-oriented policing philosophies, we should be able to observe a broadening of the police service domain to a wider and more inclusive audience, and increased emphasis on crime prevention as opposed to crime suppression” (p. 37). Overall, however, the literature appears to suggest that widespread change within police departments toward, for instance, the community policing, problem-oriented
policing and Compstat strategies is indeterminate (Roth et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 1995; Rosenbaum and Wilkenson, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2006 for a discussion on the effectiveness of Compstat; Weisburd et al., 2008).

Literature suggests a number of reasons for uncertainties and impediments like resistance from middle management and line officers, community resistance, and community concerns that community-oriented policing is soft on crime (Weisburd et al., 2008; Rosenbaum and Wilkenson, 2004; Roth et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 1995).

In the fall of 1996 and the summers of 1998 and 2000, Roth et al., (2004) evaluated the COPS Program using a probability sample of municipal and county law enforcement agencies. Their study focused on the extent to which police departments adopted “(a) tactics for partnership building, (b) problem oriented policing, and (c) crime prevention, plus (d) organizational mechanisms they set up to support these three goals” (p. 4). In terms of organizational change, the survey measured whether:

- Departments formed a joint task force
- Departments formed alternative response methods
- Departments formed neighborhood patrol boundaries
- Departments formed mission/visions/values
- Departments formed beat integrity
- Departments formed a team approach
- Departments formed a community voice
- Departments allowed for more officer discretion
- Departments formed multiagency boundaries
- Departments revised employee evaluation

Results of the survey indicated that in large departments, between 1995 and 1998, “all ten of the organizational practices” had become statistically more widespread (Roth et al., 2004). However, between 1998 and 2000, the trend reversed except for agencies that changed employee evaluations, mission statements, had dispatch rules to strengthen beat
integrity, and set beat boundaries. Employee evaluation measures slightly increased while the other three practices remained constant (Roth et al., 2004). The opposite proved true in small departments. Between 1995 and 1998, departments experienced a small amount of change, while between 1998 and 2000, departments “accelerated rapidly” (Roth et al., 2004). In summary changes made, according to Roth and colleagues (2004), were those intended to signal change in the community’s eyes, i.e. revised mission statements, new performance review for community policing officers, more time in the field, and more discretion to handle immediate problems. Moreover, as Jack Greene (2004) noted, “Although their report identified many ongoing changes in police tactics, as well as some structural changes, questions of institutional shift are more difficult to draw from this report” (Greene, 2004, p. 38).

Zhao and his colleagues (1995) used survey data of police chiefs in the United States to explore the extent of implementation of community policing tactics and impediments to change. They measured the presence of change through the use of a number of different measures of community policing strategies that literature identified, including a reorientation to crime prevention, officer training, educating the public, block watches, storefront stations, special task units, etc. (Zhao et al., 1995, p. 417). Zhao et al. (1995) found that there were overall improvements in performance skills of officers, middle manager skills on COP principles, and police community relations. However, according to Zhao et al. (1995) departments also indicated a few impediments to change, including:

- officer impediments, like resistance from middle management and line officers, confusion of the meaning of COP, problems with line-level accountability, COP is “soft on crime,” etc.;
• community impediments, like community resistance, community concern that COP is soft on crime, etc.;

• transition impediment, like problems balancing foot patrol while maintaining emergency response times.

Rosenbaum and Wilkinson (2006) conducted a six-year study of Aurora and Joliet, two Midwestern cities with substantial crime problems. The study aimed to determine whether “changes in organizational, management style, and training programs would enlarge and enrich the line officers’ job, as well as create a supportive work environment” (p. 82). The authors showed that significant organizational changes were accomplished. However, there was inconclusive evidence of changes among officers.

As Rosebaum and Wilkinson (2006) wrote:

“The case histories of these two departments, developed through extensive fieldwork, point to a substantial amount of planning, training, leadership, coordination, and commitment on the part of the change agents. Each managed to overcome major obstacles to bring about real reforms. Although much work remained to be done at the conclusion of the study, a lot had been accomplished. Despite these efforts over six years, the impact of these changes on police personnel remains limited and, in fact, may have reached a peak in the middle of the project” (p. 101).

The lack of change in these departments could be due to internal police department issues such as leadership changes, personnel turnover and many demands on resources and political issues (Rosebaum and Wilkinson, 2006).

In terms of changing law enforcement strategies, Braga and Weisburd (2006) explored whether Goldstein’s problem-oriented policing model is practical in the field or whether shallow problem solving practices can be an effective tool in the field. They concluded from their review of the problem-oriented policing literature that shallow problem solving practices can be an effective tool in the field. Examples of shallow
problem solving tactics by police include systematic drug crackdowns and stop-and-frisk tactics, which can be practical in preventing crimes in specific places (Braga and Weisburd, 2006). Braga and Weisburd (2006) concluded that it is unlikely for police departments to expand their problem-oriented policing strategies significantly in the near future for a couple of reasons. First, the Weberian framework of many police departments stifles creativity, innovation, and change (also see Willis et al., 2004; Thompson, 1965; and Bittner, 1970). Secondly, those who want to maintain a traditional crime-fighting model of policing may engage in organized opposition.

Adding to the police organizational change literature, Willis and his colleagues (2007) identified patterns that explained why Compstat was implemented in Lowell, Massachusetts; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Newark, New Jersey. The research also explored whether two theoretical frameworks from the organizational literature, technical/rational theory and institutional theory could explain the decision to adopt Compstat.

Very briefly, before explaining the results of the Willis et al. (2007) study, Compstat is a technology that helps police organizations solve crime problems. In 1994, Bill Bratton introduced Compstat meetings to the New York Police Department. Compstat stands for compared statistics (Silverman, 2006). As its name suggests, middle management and upper management would study crime trends to ensure that they understood the problems within their particular regions. The Compstat process focuses on maintaining: 1.) Accurate data on crime patterns; 2.) real time data on crime patterns. Crime is dynamic, thus patterns and behaviors change daily; 3.) Timely data to hold officers and supervisors accountable for handling crime in their patrol areas; and 4.)
visible data (McDonald et al., 2004). Or as Silverman (2006) indicated, Compstat is most known for its visible components, including “up-to-date computerized crime data, crime analysis, and advanced crime matting as the bases for regularized, interactive crime strategy meetings which hold managers accountable for specific crime strategies and solutions in their areas” (p. 268). However, part of the intrigue of Compstat during the problem-oriented policing era is that it argued for more decision making at the line level.

Compstat’s objective was to increase police productivity while reducing crime. It is important to note that Compstat’s roots reach far deeper than surface level crime statistics. According to Silverman (2006) the reengineering process, including decentralization, management accountability, and teamwork, began before Bill Bratton became police commissioner of the New York Police Department. Bratton, however, was the spark that ignited the re-engineering process. Bratton and his team completed a cultural diagnostic of the department, studying the mission and objectives of the department and what obstacles hindered goal achievement (Silverman, 2006). They added Compstat, compared statistics technology that oiled the department’s wheels, thus helping police identify and deal with specific crime problems. Through identifying crime patterns through crime statistics, police were able to develop solutions that aimed to solve underlying problems, not simply the symptoms of the problem (Silverman, 2006).

Some researchers, question whether Compstat actually re-engineered the manner in which police do business. One group of researchers suggested that Compstat simply added electrical current to the bureaucratic paramilitary model of control (POLICE FOUNDATION, Weisburd et al., 2006). Another group of researchers, including Willis
et al., (2007) suggested that Compstat simply legitimized to the public that police were vigilant in fighting crime.

The findings from the Willis et al. (2007) study provided support for institutional theory more so than the technical rational model. Overall, according to Willis et al. (2007) departments implemented Compstat to demonstrate to the community that they were fighting crime. With that said, however, Compstat did appear to provide some support for the technical/rational model in terms of crime fighting, accountability, and data analysis (Willis et al., 2007). Nonetheless, however, as Willis and colleagues (2007) noted, a technical rational response requires organizational knowledge of the effectiveness of the technology. Moreover and most importantly, implementation also involves organizational knowledge of whether the technology will work within the specific organization (Willis et al., 2007). At the time the three cities implemented Compstat, there were no studies available that demonstrated Compstat’s effectiveness (Willis et al., 2007).

As Willis et al. (2007) noted:

“COMPSTAT did appear to reinforce the police mission on fighting crime, to hold middle managers more accountable for their performance, and to advance the use of crime data in decisionmaking…..However, these departments’ uncritical acceptance of a standard, untested COMPSTAT model will suggest to more skeptical observers that COMPSTAT is merely a shift from one set of institutional forms to another – not an actual reengineering” (p.177).

Finally, Weisburd and his colleagues (2008) using a stratified national sample explored the extent to which police departments implemented the various components of Compstat. The mail survey was sent to departments with more than 100 sworn officers and to a sample of 100 departments with 50-99 officers (Weisburd et al., 2008). In terms
of organizational change and implementing Compstat, the research focused on two questions:

1. Is Compstat a strategy that departments use to identify themselves with new and innovative policing practices; or

2. Do the departments that implement Compstat follow the basic components of Compstat?

The national results suggested that Compstat has spread quickly, and police departments believed that they had implemented most of the core elements of the Compstat program (Weisburd, et al., 2008). However, when the research probed for more detailed information on implementation the results indicated that implementation was less certain. Implementation was more developed in areas such as internal accountability and data driven analysis but less certain in the important area of problem solving and giving line officers more discretion (Weisburd et al., 2008). As Weisburd et al. (2008) noted, "it is interesting to note that a much smaller proportion of these departments utilize crime mapping or statistical analysis for Compstat meetings" (p. 35). According to Weisburd et al. (2008) the beauty of the Compstat process is that it uses new technologies such as crime mapping and trend analyses and does not tamper with the hierarchical policing pyramid, instead it strengthens the pyramid.

D. Organizational Change Conclusions

As indicated, change is mysterious. Those who work in governmental agencies or private agencies, with several competing values, understand the complexity of changing strategies or policies (Pierce, 1977). Resistance to change is another common characteristic of change (Stanko, 1989, p.54). Employees may resist new interventions because they fear “economic loss, loss of status, loss of friends or associates, or job
satisfaction” (Twain, 1983). Overall, literature suggesting that widespread change within police departments in line with the models of community policing, problem-oriented policing and Compstat is indeterminate (Roth et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 1995; Rosenbaum and Wilkenson, 2004; Braga and Weisburd, 2006; Weisburd et al., 2008). The literature points toward a number of reasons for the uncertainties and impediments including:

- whether a true institutional shift in policing strategies occurred;
- organizational impediments such as resistance from middle management and line officers;
- community impediments such as community resistance and community concerns that COP is soft on crime.

Thus, administrators must prepare for resistance. The key to effective innovation is strong management. Administrators must be able to rebut fears for interventions to be successful.
A. Introduction

This chapter is important because it provides the foundation for this study. Without understanding the barriers women have experienced while trying to protect themselves, it becomes more difficult to develop a response to the problem.

Intimate partner violence spans the globe and is considered a significant public health problem (WHO, 2010). Over the past few decades, women's organizations have made strides in pressuring governments to consider domestic violence as a human rights issue rather than a psychological, legal or social issue (Walker, 1999). According to Adler (2002), a person’s view of domestic violence and their response depends on their job’s priorities. She stated:

“DV programs consider DV as a human and civil rights violation and focus on crisis intervention and victim advocacy. The judicial system regards DV as a crime against the state and focuses on abuser sanctioning and victim protection. The health care system considers DV as a public health issue and screens and treats victims. The social service system sees DV as family crisis and thus offers family and child protection services” (p. 209).

Historically, society did not view domestic violence as a significant health problem. Not until the women’s movement began pushing for domestic violence to be treated as a crime did views change. As a result, legislation began changing, victims filed lawsuits, and research was conducted. This chapter considers the ambivalent concerns of feminists with domestic violence legislation.

Violence is not limited to physical assault, but also includes psychological, sexual, financial, and spiritual attacks, as well as stalking (Belknap, 2007; Desmarais et al.,
Recent estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) suggested that in 1999 there were 791,210 violent crimes committed against a current or former spouse. Of the 791,210 violent crimes, 85% were committed against women (671,110 victimizations). Younger women were more likely to experience victimization from an intimate partner. The rates of victimization are as follows:

- Per capita rate: 6 per 1,000
- 16-24: 16 per 1,000
- 25-34: 9 per 1,000

Women ages 35-49 experienced more homicides at the hands of their partners. These estimates suggest that domestic violence is a social health problem. Straus et al. (1980) suggested that, for some, marriage or for that matter other types of intimate relationships is a hitting license (Straus, 1980; Townsend et al., 2005).

Thomas et al. (2010) is one of the few studies comparing victimization of adolescent girls to victimization of young adult women. They found that IPV increases dramatically between the ages of 15-22 years. However, despite the fact that absolute risk is lower for adolescent victims, adolescent victims are no less likely and sometimes more likely to punched, kicked, knocked to the ground, or choked (Thomas et al., 2010). Interestingly, as age increases the chances of violence being charged IPV aggravated assault decreases. Adolescent youth in this study were more likely to be victims of IPV aggravated assault than any other age group (Thomas et al., 2010). Thomas et al. (2010) cautioned that based on the results of this study, healthcare providers should begin screening all women for IPV beginning in adolescence. Another policy implication of
this study is that states without restraining order rights for adolescence should begin developing laws (Thomas et al., 2010).

Despite statistics suggesting that women experience victimization more often than men, more recent reports are suggesting that men and women are victimized at similar rates by domestic partners (Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000; Straus, 2006). However, as Melton and Belknap (2003) pointedly noted in their review of the literature, national surveys could skew the results. Melton and Belknap (2003) suggested that "using national samples and the CTS (Conflict Tactics Scale) to measure IPV then, it appears that IPV is not a problem of violence against women by their intimate partners but rather a problem best described as “family violence” or even “husband beating" (P.332).

Additionally, according to Melton and Belknap (2003) feminists suggest the design of the CTS is inherently flawed in favor of "family violence." Using national data could also skew the context of the domestic disturbance (Melton and Belknap, 2003). Melton and Belknap (2003) explored the context of police reports that involved "female batterers" in a large Midwestern city. The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods. In some cases the qualitative data provided much richer detail, on gender differences, than the quantitative check mark police reports (Melton and Belknap, 2003). Thus the Melton and Belknap (2003) study highlighted the need for more detailed studies exploring gender and the context in which IPV occurs.

More specifically, Melton and Belknap's (2003) data supported previous research that suggests that IPV offenders are more likely males than females. Moreover, supporting prior research this study's data suggested that men are more violent than women and more frequently use threats of violence. Females, however, are more often
involved in cross complaints. Melton and Belknap (2003) explained that it is difficult to determine whether women were more likely, than similarly situated men, to use violence in self defense. According to police reports, however, females suggested self defense more often than men (Melton and Belknap, 2003). Interestingly, females were more likely than males to use a weapon. Melton and Belknap (2003) rationalized that weaponry could be used to balance the biological strength differences.

Research also suggests that victimization does not end with the attack. Because of fear and trauma from the victimization, victims are also likely to suffer from chronic health problems such as headaches, back pain, and central nervous system problems such as seizures (Campbell, 2002; Plichta, 2004). About 10 years of research suggests that children of domestic violence victims are also victimized either directly or indirectly. English et al. (2003) found in their review of the literature that in about 40 to 48 percent of the homes in which there is a maltreated related child fatality, domestic violence was also present. Wolak and Finkelhor (1998) in their review of the domestic violence literature suggested youth who witness domestic violence are more likely to have behavioral problems, emotional problems, physical ailments, or cognitive problems (also see Townsend, 2005). Campbell and Lewandowski (1997) suggested that domestic violence indirectly affects children. A child’s health and poor behavior can be attributed to a family’s dysfunction (Campbell and Lewandowski, 1997; Wolak and Finkelhor; Townsend, 2005). A couple of studies have also linked adult and or adolescent criminality to child abuse, maltreatment and or neglect (Smith and Thornberry, 1995; Widom and Maxfield, 2001).
Parnas (1993) suggested there were three periods that led to changing law enforcement and the public’s views towards domestic violence, thus resulting in mandatory arrests and no drop policies. The three areas included: litigation, research findings, and the feminist social movement. This section focuses on concerns of the feminist movement. The battered women’s movement stemmed from concerns for safety and shelter for victims of abuse (Hanna, 1996). Women’s rights groups and feminists were among the mavericks pushing for changes in police domestic abuse strategies and policies. According to Coker (2001), feminists experienced ambivalence towards the police and domestic violence policies. As late as 1974, “battered women” were not part of any agency’s prevention agenda (Schechter, 1982). Schechter (1982) remarked that during the 1970s battered women’s advocates were incognizant of the Pandora’s Box they opened and the extent of the problem. This section explores some of the reasons for feminist concerns with mandatory policies.

B. The Women’s Liberation Movement

During the late 19th century, feminists initiated the fight for rights of women against crimes of violence at home (Pleck, 1983). Still, however, until the 1970s, articles within the *Journal of Marriage and Family Therapy* did not recognize violence (Schechter, 1982). During this early era, several sociological, criminological, and psychological articles espoused a theory that women precipitated violence (Schechter, 1982). The 1970s women’s liberation movement set the stage for the anti-rape movement and the battered women’s movement (Schechter, 1982). The women’s liberation movement called attention to policy implications of battered women
(Schechter, 1982). This movement led to forming battered women’s shelters, domestic violence hotlines, and crisis centers (Schechter, 1982).

The rape crisis center developed into a “path breaking” project for the battered women’s movement (Schechter, 1982). This movement exposed that women are not responsible for victimization and led into a new theoretical understanding of rape and victimization (Schechter, 1982). This new understanding pushed agencies into developing a more understanding view of victims (Schechter, 1982). Advocates pushed for new police arrest and evidence gathering procedures. Other advocates worked at changing criminal legislation procedures. As Schechter (1982) explained, the anti-rape movement set the foundation for changing public and political consciousness towards victimization.

The battered women’s movement also emerged during the 1970s and focused on the trials and tribulations of women seeking refuge and shelter from abuse (Schechter, 1982 and Grau et al., 1985; Dobash and Dobash, 1992). Before this period of time, society rarely viewed violence between intimate partners as illegal or important (Jones and Belknap, 1999; Hanna, 1996). Schechter (1982) suggested that police failure to respond is a common thread of concern among victims. Police would not “come when called” (Schechter, 1982). Through victim advocacy, awareness grew that victims were not provided with satisfactory legal services (Grau et al., 1985). According to Grau et al. (1985) women were provided with “inadequate police response, discouragement in efforts to prosecute, and civil and criminal legislation that did not provide sufficient protection for the victim” (Schechter, 1982; Grau et al., 1985, p. 14; Stanko, 1989). Police told victims, "There is nothing that we can do; it’s a family matter, go to family
court tomorrow” (Schechter, 1982). Victims were not escorted to the hospital or provided detailed information about victim services (Schechter, 1982).

A common theme among women, as indicate above is that police fail to respond when called. Wolf et al. (2003) studied the reasons for women failing to call police for IPV (also see Stanko, 1989). Similar to the discussion above, women in the Wolf et al. (2003) study pointed to three themes for failing to call the police:

1. Situational/personal factors (the perception that abuse must have proof; rape and injuries to private parts of the body; cultural attitudes; victim's emotional state; batterer prevented the victim from calling the police; or police homophobia);

2. Victims' fears/negative experiences with police responses (batterer was not arrested in the past; the police believed the victim was the batterer/dual arrest; race/socioeconomic status; homophobia affected response time; language barrier.

3. Fears of possible repercussions (offenders receive little penalty; the batterer may retaliate; children could be removed by social services).

The battered women’s movement battled society and worked legislatively, urging politicians for a “stronger criminal response” (Schechter, 1982; Coker, 2001). For example, many states began developing mandatory policies and civil restraining order legislation (Grau et al., 1985). Assault and battery is either a misdemeanor or a felony crime. Departments viewed domestic violence incidents as misdemeanor crimes. Historically, police did not have power to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor crime without a warrant or unless the crime occurred in front of officers. Schechter (1982) quoted a lawyer’s view during the women’s movement: “In battered women’s cases, the police tend to view serious attacks as misdemeanors rather than felonies so you must specify in legislation that the police may arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor offense” (Schechter, 1982, p. 159). As a result of the women’s movement, courts began
issuing protective orders to women, and several states expanded police power to arrest in domestic violence cases (Schechter, 1982). Prosecutor's offices also began changing their views towards domestic violence cases. This section explores the original views of prosecutor's offices towards domestic violence and then transitions to discussion on protective orders and mandatory arrest and no drop policies.

C. Prosecutor's Offices and Perspectives Towards Domestic Violence

Traditionally, prosecutor's offices and judges had similar feelings toward domestic violence cases as police departments. Martin (1978) suggested similar to police departments, prosecutors and judges "count stitches and witnesses" before they accept a domestic violence case. In other words, the contemplation focuses on whether there is a winning case (Martin, 1978). Moreover, many times prosecutor's offices discouraged victims to pursue cases (Fagan, 1996). Victims could be discouraged because of lack of witnesses, evidence, or diversion (Elliot, 1989; Fagan, 1996).

When defendants were found guilty, judges would typically sentence the offender lightly with either a: warning, a small fine, or probation (Martin, 1978). Light sentencing could be due to the court views of women within the IPV incident (Fields, 1978). As Fields (1978) suggested, "The legal system fails to protect wives. It assumes that battered wives are guilty parties who have provoked, deserved, and wanted the attacks that they have suffered" (P. 30). Before the late 1970s and 1980s, prosecutor's offices sought to reduce domestic violence cases through diversion to community dispute centers and social workers (Fields, 1978). Prosecutors did not reward good detective work. Prosecutors ignored detective work and focused on diversion (Fields, 1978). As Fields (1978) explained, nonprosecution conveys to police departments that good police work is...
not rewarded; and explains to wives that their husbands are more important. Moreover, low rates of prosecution violate the tenets of deterrence theory because it reduces the likelihood of a harsh and timely punishment (Fagan, 1996).

A. Protective orders

 Advocates expressed grave concerns, during the battered women’s movement about the court’s apathetic view of protective orders (Schechter, 1982). Courts only granted a protective order to women who filed for divorce (Schechter, 1982). Some victims did not express interest in a divorce. They simply wanted the abuse to stop (Schechter, 1982). Unmarried women had little recourse other than criminal court (Schechter, 1982). Schechter (1982) explained that in her experience with the Family Court in New York, the court worked to keep the family together, despite difficulties. Schechter (1982) explained, “Only rarely did they exercise their authority to remove an abusive man from the home; women and their children, therefore, bore the burden of leaving (Schechter, 1982, p. 163). Yet, in many states women who left their families because of abuse often faced abandonment claims during child custody hearings (Schechter, 1982). For example, Schechter (1982) stated, “Facing the maddening logic of sexist double-binds, women then discovered that desertion charges were used against them in child custody battles. New Jersey, therefore, adopted specific legislation stating that abuse is a defense to any action alleging desertion (Schechter, 1982, p. 165).”

 Many times the court would suggest counseling, which obviously does not guarantee the victim’s safety (Schechter, 1982). During the 1970s, the criminal justice system and family therapists viewed mediation and joint counseling as an effective conduit in repairing relationships (Schechter, 1996; Wanless, 1996). Additionally, for
example, according to Schechter (1982) even if a judge ordered a protective order, he would also urge counseling. Because of the women’s movement, many states began enacting laws that stated it was the abuser’s burden to leave the home rather than the victim’s burden. Other women used murder or manslaughter as a conduit to stop violence. These women found themselves in prison (Schechter, 1982). As Schechter (1982) stated, “Until the anti-rape and battered women’s movements, few people knew about the thousands of women in jail for killing their male partners. Respectfully and carefully, defense committees spent hours explaining battered women’s unique needs and circumstances to sympathetic reporters around the country” (Schechter, 1982, p. 172). Protective orders are discussed in more detail in chapter five.

B. Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Policies

Two controversial criminal justice reforms developed from the battered women’s movement: mandatory arrest and no drop prosecution (Coker, 2001). (These policies are discussed in more detail in chapter five.) Specifically, as noted by Jones and Belknap (1999) there are a few critical events that led to a “stronger criminal response.” Three landmark court cases, Scott v. Hart (1976); Bruno v. Codd (1977) and Thurman v. City of Torrington (1984) goaded changes in the respective police department’s domestic violence policies. Secondly, the feminist movement pushed for strengthening the criminal response through mandatory arrest (Jones and Belknap, 1999). Finally, scholarly research resulted in changing domestic violence polices. New domestic violence policies drew heavily from the Sherman and Berk (1984) Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment. For example, The U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence (1984) referenced the Sherman report (Gelles, 1996). This act resulted in states
developing legislation, civil or criminal, focusing on domestic violence. The laws helped develop shelters for battered women, “protective orders, specialized police training, altered arrest requirements, charging guidelines, and treatment programs” (Dobash and Dobash, 1992; Parnas, 1993). However, as noted by Frisch (1992), despite the importance of the Sherman report in the literature, the real impetus for reforms occurred prior to 1983 with legal cases and the feminist movement. Before 1983 advocates were pushing for equal justice under the law (Frisch, 1992).

There are several grave concerns that feminists have with policies such as mandatory arrest and no drop prosecution (Stark, 2004; Goodman and Epstein, 2005; Coker, 2001; Jones and Belknap, 1999; Hanna, 1996). Feminists advocated for changes in policies while raising attention that domestic violence is a crime and a manifestation of gender inequality (Hanna, 1996). Consequently, as noted by Hanna (1996), these theories cannot respond to many “real life problems.” One such concern is that mandatory arrest may “overestimate the protection the criminal justice system affords” (Coker, 2001). According to feminists, mandatory policies are a double-edged sword. The sword offers protection and ensures that professionals take domestic violence seriously; all the while it also has the potential of causing danger (Mills, 1999). As Coker (2001) explained, giving victims the choice of whether to pursue criminal charges is akin to giving the choice to batterers (Coker, 2001). Mandatory policies eliminate this choice.

Erez and Belknap (1998); and Goodman and Epstein (2005) suggested that mandatory policies “reproduce emotional abuse” instead of empowering victims to leave the abusive relationship. Moreover, the policy's inflexibility could appear as indifferent
to the victim's voice (Erez and Belknap, 1998; Goodman and Epstein, 2005). This
perceived indifference could lead the victim to possibly avoid contacting police in the
future (Goodman and Epstein, 2005). In the words of Goodman and Epstein (2005):

"No-drop policies also allow a district attorney little leeway in situations where a
victim fears, realistically, that prosecution will provoke the batterer into
retaliatory abuse against her; the district attorney may even subpoena the victim
and force her to testify. This inflexibility thwarts a survivor's efforts to regain
control over her life, move past abusive experiences, and protect herself from
future violence. Such a victim may also be far less likely to contact police or
prosecutors in the future, ultimately leaving her more trapped than ever in her
violent home" (P.481).

Goodman and Epstein (2005); Erez and Belknap (1998); and Hanna (1996) further
explained that domestic violence cases are “far more complicated” than traditional
feminist theory recognizes (Hanna, 1996). Hanna (1996) explained:

“The real world experiences of abused women and the prosecutors and judges
responsible for their cases are far more complex than traditional feminist theory
has recognized. We must be aware of how conflicting feminist ideologies shape
our policy choices. Simply renaming domestic violence a public crime in order to
justify mandated participation neither dissolves the theoretical dilemma posed by
the public/private distinction nor eases the burden of the difficult choices lawyers
and judges inevitably must make” (Hanna, 1996, p. 1877; also see Erez and

According to Coker (2001), however, assuming the criminal justice system offers
the best chances of reducing future assaults fails to consider whether victims have the
resources to pursue criminal charges (Coker, 2001). Also, there is no guarantee that
prosecution will prevent violence (Coker, 2001). Coker (2001) pointedly noted, “A
woman who opposes prosecution is taking a calculated risk, as is the woman who
actively pursues prosecution. Neither she, nor the judge or the prosecutor, can know with
certainty which action will result in less violence. The problem is not that the batterer’s
coercion is not real, but rather that it is not always clear that the criminal justice system
offers a better alternative” (Coker, 2001, p. 826). Mills (1999) points to the Sherman (1984) report suggesting that arrest may increase revictimization for certain offenders (Stark, 2004; Mills, 1999; Sherman, 1984). Frisch (2002), on the other hand, advocates that arrest offers women a very short window of opportunity to seek safety. For many victims, the arrest may be the first opportunity for safety (Frisch, 2002).

Advocate views of no drop polices are rooted in feminist theories. No drop policies require that victims press charges against the perpetrator after the police issue a complaint. In other words, prosecuting all “legally sufficient” domestic cases despite whether the victim agreed to prosecution (Smith et al., 2001). According to Hanna (1996), throughout jurisdictions in the United States, there are hard policies and soft policies. In hard policy jurisdictions, prosecutor’s offices go forward with prosecution regardless of the victim’s wishes. In soft policy jurisdictions, prosecutors do not force prosecution. Instead, the victim is provided support services and encouraged to participate (Hanna, 1996). Soft policies incorporate the feminist principle that women should decide to stop the abuse on their own and criminal justice agencies/advocates should listen to victims (Hanna, 1996). In soft policy jurisdictions women are typically not subpoenaed to court or arrested for failing to testify. Hanna (1996) raised an important point, "Just how far should the state go in forcing women to participate before dismissing charges remains an issue of intense debate ” (Hanna, 1996, p. 1865)?

Feminist theory suggests that when the state rationalizes that domestic violence is a private matter and thus dismisses a domestic violence case, it is condoning violence. Advocates of no drop policies suggest that policies take the burden off the victim (Hanna, 1996; also see Hartmann and Belknap, 2003). According to advocates, no drop policies
also reduce the risk of the offender intimidating the victim (Hanna, 1996). However, at the same time, no drop prosecution policies run the risk of the arrest of domestic violence victims for noncompliance (Coker, 2001; Hanna, 1996).

Some feminists worry that no drop policies “disempower” women from deciding to stop the abuse on their own (Coker, 2001). This view is based on the feminist principle valuing women’s autonomy and promoting empowerment (Hanna, 1996). This view espouses the idea that state power has the unintended consequences of punishing victims for the offender’s transgressions (Coker, 2001; Hanna, 1996). Those that present this view suggest pro-prosecution policies may lead to an unintended consequence, that is, women thinking twice before calling the police. Hanna (1996) suggested that this view assumes that people consider the consequences before calling emergency services, 911. Hanna (1996) explained that in her experience, from listening to 911 tapes, women call 911 when they are in dire need of help. In other words, victims are not thinking about the consequences. Furthermore, this view does not account for bystanders that call the police. Finally, perhaps victims do not want to face their batterers in court but still desire justice.

Soft domestic violence polices are at odds with criminologists who maintain a social control perspective on domestic violence policies. These individuals suggest that no drop polices benefit society as a whole (Coker, 2001; Hanna, 1996). For example, Hanna (1996) noted, “if a given case is not prosecuted due to the woman’s reluctance, does the decision come at the expense of the public good of punishing criminal conduct and deterring future violence? Striking the balance between the particular and the general is far more complex in practice than any strand of feminist theory might suggest”
(Hanna, 1996, p. 1855). Some feminists, like Hanna (1996), suggest that mandated prosecution is a better choice than dismissing cases when women decide against criminal prosecution (also see Waneless, 1996). Hanna (1996) noted that if society is serious about ending violence against women, despite the risk, no drop polices are a potential answer. Additionally, no drop polices will portray a general and specific message to offenders that domestic violence is not tolerated (Hanna, 1996, p. 1890). These policies also have the potential of preventing future acts of violence on the victim, children of the victim, and perhaps future victims (Hanna, 1996).

Despite the rising use of mandatory policies and the obvious concerns, little research has focused on the opinions of the victims when implementing these policies (Zorza, 1992; Smith, 2000). Smith (2000) studied whether domestic violence victims support mandatory policies, perceptions of the benefits, and the effect of the policies on future reporting of domestic abuse. In 1998, the executive directors of the Coalition against Domestic Violence in each state were sent a letter asking for participation in this study. Eight states agreed to participate and distribute surveys to women in battered women's shelters. The study resulted in 241 surveys.

The Smith (2000) study concluded that generally women support mandatory arrest, no-drop policies, and medical reporting requirements. Conversely, fewer women believe that mandatory laws will benefit them individually (Smith, 2000). Finally, the third finding raises concerns. Women reported that mandatory laws would reduce their likelihood of reporting future acts of IPV (Smith, 2000). Smith (2000) rationalized that women could have developed a learned helplessness response (Walker, 1984). In other words, after years of abuse the victim perceives that abuse is unstoppable. The victim
may support the laws, but perceives that laws will not benefit them personally (Smith, 2000). Alternatively, another possibility for the negative findings is that mandatory policies may infringe on victim goals. For example, women may use arrest or prosecution as leverage (Smith, 2000). Thus, they may not want their husbands arrested; instead they rather use the policy as leverage to stop the abuse. In terms of medical treatment, women were more likely to want "treatment" than to want action taken against their significant other (Smith, 2000).

Departmental policies and dual arrests are concerns of other advocates. There is little research available on dual domestic violence arrests. However, research suggests that when police cannot decide who is at fault, they sometimes arrest both parties. Dual arrests could occur for several reasons: 1.) the police could not determine the primary aggressor; 2.) poor training; or 3.) police resentment of mandatory laws; 4.) political/organizational pressure and cultural norms; 5.) situational factors like drugs/alcohol, or weapons (Wanless, 1996; Houry et al., 2006; Hirschel, 2008). Hirschel (2008) pointedly noted that in some jurisdictions officers are discouraged from viewing women as aggressors. Thus in these jurisdictions officers arrest both parties.

In some jurisdictions with mandatory arrest, police have arrested both the victim and the offender (Wanless, 1996; Martin, 1997; Muftic and Bouffard, 1997). Researchers expected after the implementation of mandatory policies, arrests for males would increase (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002). However, researchers were surprised when female arrests also increased (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002). DeLeon-Granados et al (2008) studied the negative consequences of mandatory arrest laws in California. The authors derived their longitudinal felony domestic violence data from 58 counties in
California from 1987 to 2000 (DeLeon-Granados et al., 2008). Data suggested that arrests for women grew disproportionately during this time period (DeLeon-Granados et al., 2008). According to DeLeon-Granados (2008), women comprised 5 percent of all domestic violence arrests in 1987, and in 2000, women comprised 18 percent of all domestic violence arrests.

According to advocates, the problem with dual arrests for victims is that they suffer several negative consequences (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002). As noted by Hirschel and Buzawa (2002):

“She or he loses all the rights and privileges attendant to the victim determination, such as transportation to a safe location, temporary housing in a shelter for battered persons, issuance of a restraining order, and participation in victim assistance and empowerment programs. She or he may lose employment, incur financial hardship, lose custody of children, and be reluctant to call the police to report subsequent abuse despite a possible increase in danger from the abuser” (p. 1459).

Research also suggests that when police arrest both the victim and their victimizers they are less likely to call the police in a future attack (Abel and Suh, 1987).

Martin (1997), in the first study of dual arrests, examined the characteristics of couples involved with dual arrests in Connecticut. The data were drawn from a population of 4,138 disposed family violence cases, 448 arrest records and 90 prosecutor’s files (Martin, 1997; Hirschel, 2008). About 33 percent of the cases disposed were dual arrests (Martin, 1997). Data suggested that dual arrests were more likely to involve drugs and alcohol (Martin, 1997; also see Hirschel, 2007). The data suggested that some Connecticut police departments encouraged dual arrest policies (Martin, 1997). Prosecutors suggested that police should leave decision making to the courts (Martin, 1997). As explained by Martin (1997): “Prosecutors argue that the police
should not make the determination of ultimate culpability but instead identify all defendants and allow the court to determine guilt, including a self-defense protection against prosecution when appropriate” (Martin, 1997, p. 154). Moreover, in other police departments, police refused to exercise discretion and arrested all involved in the domestic dispute (Martin, 1997).

Hirschel (2007) found in his review of 25 police departments in four states that dual arrests were more likely when the couples were intimate partners, the offender remained at the scene, and the incident occurred in a large city. Dual arrests were less likely when officers had been called to the home in the past, the offender was white, and the primary aggressor was male (Hirschel, 2007).

Wanless (1996) suggested that careful statutory wording and training helps in minimizing the chances of dual arrest. In 1985, Washington State enacted the first “predominant aggressor” legislation (Hirschel and Buzawa, 2002). Since this time, according to research, a number of states are working with victim advocates to develop a “dominant aggressor policy” (DeLeon-Granados et al., 2006).

D. Coordinated Community Response

With recognition that police efforts alone are not entirely effective public policies have started incorporating a coordinated response to domestic violence (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). As Frisch (2002) noted, “Despite the absence of long-term deterrence among marginal offenders, the fact that the studies indicated a potential short-term deterrent effect on those previously undeterred offenders should be considered a positive effect, and the temporary period of non-violence should be viewed as a window of opportunity for other interventions” (p.83). Frisch (2002) concluded that after arrest, the
role of the police diminishes. Therefore, other agencies, i.e., prosecution, batterers’
tervention programs, probation, etc. must begin taking responsibility (Frisch, 2002).

Advocates also suggest that police are only as effective as their counterparts in the
criminal justice system (Murphy, 1998). As Murphy et al. (1998) suggested:

"Coordination of various interventions may be as important as the specific
procedures used within each system component, because the intervention system
can break down at many points. Effective arrest policies, for example, may have
only limited effects on future behavior if charges are dropped or prosecution is
otherwise ineffective."

Moreover, for example, Wanless (1996) referenced the Public Education
Coordinator for the Massachusetts Coalition of Battered Women's Service Groups
suggesting that police cannot be accountable for failing to protect battered women if the
rest of the system fails. In other words, mandatory arrest cannot protect against lax
charging, prosecution and sentencing (Wanless, 1996). Thus, the offender may feel
justified to continue victimizing (Wanless, 1996). A joint response would guard against
this potential flaw. Abel and Suh (1987) suggest that combatting domestic violence also
involves a “strong cooperative effort” between social agencies and the criminal justice
system.

Law enforcement agencies, health care workers, and university researchers are
beginning to understand the dynamics of domestic violence. Leaving an abuse
relationship is complex. Simply suggesting that women choose to remain in abusive
relationships ignores the familial and structural obstacles impeding the victim from
leaving (Ferraro, 1989 a,b; Hart, 1993; Sullivan and Bybee, 1999; Belknap and Hartman,
2000; Frisch, 2001; Meyer, 2011). For example, as Hart (1993) noted: "Criminal justice
system personnel too often believe that battered women will be safer and less exposed to
life-jeopardizing violence once they are separated from the offender and once prosecution
has commenced. Quite to the contrary, evidence of the gravity of violence inflicted after separation of the couple is substantial" (P. 626).

Fleury-Steiner (2006) suggested that a recent body of literature supports the role of coordinated services (a coordinated community response – CCR) within the victim’s community (also see Coker, 2001). A supportive community infrastructure includes a network of community agencies available for helping victims in need (Shepard, 1999). The network is an interagency response that also provides services that protect the victim from the offender (Shepard, 1999). For example services include: emergency housing, confidential victim-directed court advocacy, support and education groups, and financial assistance to help women separate from the abuser (Shepard, 1999, p. 116). As Coker (2001) noted, advocates have two important roles, they are: 1.) institutional reformers – “monitoring police, prosecutor, and judicial responses to domestic violence”; 2.) advocates for women.

Shepard (2001) noted there is evidence to suggest that coordinated responses result in better outcomes. In recent years, more information is available on coordinated community responses to domestic violence. Battered women’s advocates also suggest that implementation of institutional reform, should not occur “without an infrastructure of community services in place” (Coker, 2001; Shepard, 1999). Coker (2001) suggested that a coordinated community response “offers a balance between state control (for battered women’s benefit) and protection of individual women” (Coker, 2001, p. 848). There are a number of objectives suggested for coordinated community responses to domestic violence (Adler, 2002). Adler (2002) suggested various objectives include: 1.) increased system efficiency; 2.) differentiation of services; 3.) assurance that victims
receive necessary services and suffer less; 4.) increased victim safety; and 5.) increased accountability of batterers (judicial response)" (p. 203).

Historically domestic violence research has focused on outcomes rather than processes for initiating help (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2006). To activate a coordinated community response, the police must be aware of the incident (Bachman and Coker, 1995; Fluery-Steiner et al., 2006). As Fluery-Steiner et al. (2006) explained, “understanding women’s decisions to contact the police and participate in the criminal legal system is in itself crucial to developing policies and programs to end violence against women.” Policies and programs are only as good as the information that is available to police. Reluctance to call the police will limit police investigations and limit the deterrent value of the criminal justice system (Bachman and Coker, 1995; Fluery-Steiner, et al., 2006). As Bachman and Coker (1995) suggested,

"By not reporting an incident of domestic violence, this eliminates the possibility that an abuser will be arrested or convicted. This may, in turn, reduce the perceived likelihood that domestic violence in general, will be punished. If abusers and would-be-abusers perceive the likelihood of apprehension from authorities as low, this can only serve to undermine any deterrent value the legal system may have in preventing domestic violence" (P. 92).

E. The decision to set in motion the criminal justice system - making the call to the police and the likelihood of arrest

Bowker (1982) published one of the first studies to explore factors related to when IPV victims initiate the criminal justice system and their perceptions of the police. Data consisted of 146 in-depth interviews of women who had been violence free for one year (Bowker, 1982). Participants were recruited from southeastern Wisconsin newspaper advertisements, posters, speeches, and appearances on radio and television. Interview topics included: 1.) background characteristics of the victim and significant
other; 2.) social embeddedness; 3.) the frequency, severity, and pattern of violence; 4.) previous strategies used to cease the violence; and 5.) the conditions and characteristics of terminating the violence (Bowker, 1982).

The results of the Bowker (1982) study suggested violence and wanting to cease the violence as reasons for calling the police. On average, according to victims, police responded in about 13 minutes. According to Bowker (1982) women called police more frequently if they were from a low socio-economic background, were involved in a poor marital relationship, and the batterer imposed severe violence on the victim. In general, Bowker's (1982) data supported feminist contentions that police have lax views towards responding to domestic violence incidents. For example, according to Bowker (1982), wives asked the police to arrest in 82% of the incidents, but police arrested in only 14% of the cases. Thus, women expressed a relatively negative view of police responses (Bowker, 1982). One interesting finding is that women with more severe injuries gave police higher success ratings (Bowker, 1982). This suggests that police take victims more seriously that possess physical signs of abuse. Bowker (1982) suggested more sophisticated training on domestic violence counseling.

Bachman and Coker (1995) published one of the first studies to explore factors related to when IPV victims initiate the criminal justice system. Data were derived from the National Crime Victimization Survey from 1987-1992. A number of questions were studied, including: 1.) the extent to which IPV victims report crimes to the police; 2) the extent to which police report to IPV calls for service; 3.) whether police arrive and the time it takes to service the call; and 4.) the odds of the batterer being arrested (Bachman and Coker, 1995).
Bachman and Coker (1995) concluded that a number of factors affect the probability of offenders being formally sanctioned. Briefly, the victim's injuries increase the likelihood of arrest, the offender's history of violence decrease the likelihood of arrest, and being African American increases the likelihood of arrest.

One of the more interesting findings, of the Bachman and Coker (1995) study is that women who were first time victims were more likely to call the police. Likewise, police were more likely to arrest first time offenders. This finding suggests that early intervention programs with advocates and batterers programs could be potentially useful. Moreover further supporting this suggestion, results indicate that previously victimized women were less likely to report crimes to the police (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Bachman and Coker (1995) applied Walker's (1979) theory to explain this finding. Walker (1979) suggested that women that experience repeated cycles of victimization develop a "learned helplessness" or a "psychological paralysis" towards the victimizations (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Women who experienced injuries were also more likely to report that police arrested the batterer. Interestingly, the findings did not suggest that police were more likely to arrest offenders with a violent history (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Bachman and Coker (1995) also used Walker's (1979) results to explain their finding. Walker (1979) suggested that IPV recidivists learn to work the system. In other words, when the police arrive at the scene experienced offenders have an ability to communicate remorse and repentance toward the victim (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Bowker (1982) simultaneously challenged Walker (1979) and provided evidence for Walker (1979). Bowker's (1982) study suggested that in 29% of the incidents, men were verbally abusive to both his wife and the police; 21% calmed down...
and agreed to stop the violence; 14% were calm in the presence of police, but continued violence later; and 14% were arrested by the police and threatened the wife with violence if she continued with the case.

In concluding, Bachman and Coker (1995) suggested, perhaps the odds of being arrested for recidivists decreases because of their veteran experience with the police. This fact is disturbing because those women, who are more likely to experience injury, are usually repeat victims (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Furthermore, according to the data, repeat IPV victims are the least likely to report crimes and when they report, police are less likely to arrest their batterers (Bachman and Coker, 1995). Consequently, Bachman and Coker (1995) suggested that coordinated community responses could be important strategies in helping women initiate the criminal justice system.

Belknap (1995) explored police arrest preferences in response to women battering cases. Her sample consisted of 324 law enforcement officers in a large Midwestern metropolitan area. At the time of the study, the area did not have a domestic violence pro-arrest policy (Belknap, 1995). However, according to Belknap (1995), the state encouraged officers to arrest for signs of abuse. One of the more interesting findings of the Belknap (1995) study suggested that departmental affiliation contributed to officer decision making (county sheriffs v. city police). County police held more conservative views and perceived that police should not interfere with family affairs. Nonetheless, city police were less likely to arrest at the scene because they perceived the victim would drop charges. Thus, as Belknap (1995) noted, "the subculture of the department and/or the training and recruitment are vital in shaping officers' beliefs and behaviors" (p.54). Another interesting finding, supporting the link between experience and decision making,
suggests that more experienced officers were more likely to arrest when they believed the victim would drop charges. However, the majority suggested that they had little faith that the victim knew what they wanted when they requested the arrest of their significant other (Belknap, 1995).

Belknap's (1995) results supported feminist conclusions that police do not take women battering seriously (Belkap, 1995). The majority of officers supported mediation over more formal options, such as arrest (Belknap, 1995). Additionally, officers perceived that offender's rights were often overlooked in favor of the victim (Belknap, 1995). In summary, Belknap's (1995) results suggested that police are most likely to arrest when there are signs of injury, followed by whether the officer witnessed the violence, whether there were prior calls to the address, the presence of alcohol, whether a neighbor called, and whether there were other calls waiting for response. Moreover, officers from an ethnic background or a lower socioeconomic status suggested that discrimination occurs in police decisions to arrest (Belknap, 1995).

Belknap and Hartman (2000) highlighted that most of the current research on police responses to battered women have focused on surveys conducted by the police. Another method of exploring police responses to IPV is to ask victim advocates about police responses (also see Stanko, 1989). Belknap and Hartman (2000) surveyed shelter workers and hotline workers to explore reasons why women called the police and the manner in which the police responded. The analysis consisted of 259 surveys collected between 1993 and 1994.

Data suggested that physical (non-sexual) assault ranked number one for reasons for calling the police. Threats of violence were another reason suggested for calling the
police. Advocates suggested that police were willing to discuss options, but suggested that there is nothing that they can do in a “threat” situation. An interesting finding of the Belknap and Hartman (2000) study suggested that police respond more favorably to victims taking refuge at shelters rather than those who call the 24-hour hotline. Belknap and Hartman (2000) rationalized that the women taking refuge in the shelter are most likely the more serious cases. Thus, the police could have more compassion for victims actively stepping out of the relationship. Alternatively, the 24-hour advocates may not have had as much time or resources to carefully fill out the assessment of police responses for this study. Departments that had a pro-arrest policy were also rated more favorably among victim advocates. These officers took more time with victims and were sensitive to discussing their needs and options. Police also responded quickly when weapons were involved. Three factors that typically did not influence police response were sexual assaults (women were directed to the prosecutor’s office), property damage, or a violated restraining order.

Overall, a couple of policy implications that (Belknap, 1995) and Belknap and Hartman (2000) suggested, based on their results, included increased attention to the importance of battering of women and increased familiarity with victim advocacy groups and more training to understand the dynamics of IPV. The failure to understand the dynamics of IPV is not limited to the United States (Stanko, 1989; Meyer, 2011). Meyer (2011) found similar perceptions in his Australian study.

Fluery-Steiner et al. (2006) also studied the factors involved with victims reinitiating the criminal justice system (either the police, prosecutorial, or court system) after another act of violence. They found that women are more cautious about calling the
police if they are financially dependent on the batterer. An important finding of Fleury-Steiner et al. (2006) is that nearly 19% of victims were reabused by the batterer before the end of the case. Thus, this constitutes victim tampering, which is rarely every prosecuted by the courts (Fleury-Steiner et al. (2006). As Fleury-Steiner and colleagues (2006) warned, “And when the perpetrator gets away with these acts, this sends a powerful message not only to him but also to the victim as well about the level of protection the criminal legal system is prepared to offer. It is not surprising, then, that women who had experienced this abuse before the court case closed were less likely to intend to use the criminal legal system if abuse continued” (P.338).

Meyer (2011) examined victim’s perceptions when seeking IPV related support and protection from the criminal justice system. His sample consisted of 29 in-depth interviews with victims in Southeast Queensland. Data suggested that victims contacted the police and were generally dissatisfied with police responses. According to Meyer (2011) women perceived that police lacked interest or understanding (also see Belknap, 1995). As a result, the police failed to meet the victim’s need of support and protection. Moreover, there is reluctance in the law enforcement community to collaborate with non-law enforcement agencies. Thus, as Meyer (2011) highlights, this finding underscores the need for specialized IPV training of police officers, judges, and magistrates, along with greater collaborations between criminal justice agencies and women’s advocates. Thus, based on the studies above, the question then becomes, how does society persuade IPV victims to report crimes against them? DePrince et al. (2012) is one of the first studies that explores CCR programs geared to victims rather than offenders and suggests that outreach could be effective in empowering victims to leave batterers.
DePrince et al. (2012) is one of the few studies that explores the effectiveness of a CCR program that is geared towards victims rather than offenders. As noted earlier, the majority of CCR programs are more geared to offenders rather than victims (DePrince et al., 2012; Gooman and Epstein, 2005). DePrince and colleagues (2012) used a longitudinal randomized design to study whether the effectiveness of a community based outreach program versus a more traditional referral system. For those assigned to a community based outreach program, outreach workers contacted the victim via telephone to assess their needs (DePrince et al., 2012). Once the risk assessment was completed the victim was placed in the most appropriate community based agency. On the other hand, for those assigned to the control group, the referral condition, a victim advocate called women to make a program suggestion. Thus, the burden to call the community agency transferred to the victim, if they desired (DePrince et al., 2012).

Results suggested that women within the treatment group were less likely to report PTSD and depressive symptoms. Secondly ethnic women experienced significant decreases in fear. As DePrince et al. (2012) noted, given the overrepresentation of ethnic victims, outreach could be a valuable policy implication for reducing fear and engaging victims in the criminal justice process. Additionally, CCR’s were less effective for women physically, but not economically, dependent on the offender. Finally, CCR’s did not reduce the likelihood of physical abuse. At first glance, this finding would appear counterintuitive to the goals of a CCR program. CCR programs are intended to help empower women and help them leave abusive relationships. However, as DePrince et al. (2012) rationalized, CCR programs have the potential of helping women “exert control over decisions to engage with the legal system and to seek services and/or other support
that may mitigate symptoms. Women, however, cannot control their partners’ behaviors” (P. 219).

Recently, along with law enforcement, health care agencies and paraprofessionals are coordinating their responses to domestic violence.

1. Health care agencies and a coordinated response to domestic violence

Health care agencies have highlighted the importance of a coordinated response to domestic violence (Krasnoff and Moscati, 2002). Krasnoff and Moscati (2002) recognized that a number of individuals presenting in emergency rooms were not assessed for interpersonal violence (IPV). They developed a coordinated intervention between the hospital and social services targeting IPV. Part of the intervention included developing a screening tool for emergency department personnel to screen for domestic violence. Once the individual screened positive or suggested they were abused, crisis center advocates were called to speak with victims (Krasnoff and Moscati, 2002). Results suggested that 85% of the IPV victims accepted the offer to speak with a victim advocate and more than half followed up with advocates after the initial meeting (Krasnoff and Moscati, 2002). Furthermore, more than half of the victims presented between the hours of 3 PM to 7 AM, when hospital social services are not available (Krasnoff and Moscati, 2002).

2. Paraprofessionals and a coordinated community response to domestic violence

In recent years, university researchers have explored the role of paraprofessionals in helping IPV victims. Sullivan and Bybee (1999) provided support for paraprofessionals acting in the role of change agents for victims of domestic violence.
Sullivan and Bybee (1999) suggested that previous research has not explored strategies to help women from leaving abusive relationships. Sullivan and Bybee (1999) designed their study based on the results of a pilot study, by Sullivan (1991). Sullivan (1991) concluded community advocates could act as change agents for victims. The goals of Sullivan and Bybee (1999) included: 1.) implementing and evaluating a program to increase victim's access to community resources and support and 2.) exploring whether intervention decreases victimization. Participants were recruited from a Midwestern shelter for victims of IPV. The sample included 278 women who were interviewed six times over two years. The design involved a ten week post shelter intervention in which highly trained college paraprofessionals worked with victims.

Victim advocacy involved five steps: 1.) Assessment 2.) Intervention; 3.) Monitoring; 4.) Secondary Implementation; and 5.) Termination. Assessment involved meeting victims, listening to them, and helping them develop achievable goals. Intervention involved helping women meet their goals through the help of community resources. The third step focused on monitoring whether victims were meeting their goals. The fourth step involved implementing a secondary plan if victims were not meeting goals. The final step involved weaning victims from advocates. Sullivan and Bybee (1999) found that over the two year study, women who worked with advocates experienced "increased quality of life, higher social support, less depressive symptoms, and increased effectiveness in obtaining resources compared with women in the control condition" (Pp. 49-50). Women in the experimental group experienced less abuse at every interview except the 6 month follow-up. However, this increase was still less than the control group. Sullivan and Bybee (1999) suggested that increases could have been a
result of the termination of the advocate or women taking control of their lives. In the
words of Sullivan and Bybee (1999) "It could also be the case that women who had
worked with advocates were making more visible strides away from the relationship
compared with women in the control group, which may have led some batterers to exert
even more violence and control against them" (p. 51).

Similar to Sullivan (1999) and Sullivan and Bybee (1999), Sullivan et al. (2002)
explored the strengths of expanding the role of paraprofessionals to working with both
women and their children. Sullivan et al. (2002) hypothesized that both mothers and their
children would benefit from the research. Moreover, there is limited research available
exploring the benefits of support and educational groups for children who are victims of
domestic abuse (Sullivan et al., 2002). Participants were recruited from a mid-sized
urban city, either after they left a domestic violence shelter, when they obtained services
from a community based family service organization, or when they obtained services
from a state Social Services department (Sullivan et al., 2002). Families that agreed to
participate in the study were randomly assigned to the experimental group. This group
received free services of a trained paraprofessional for 16 weeks. Moreover, 80 children
participated in a 10-week support and education group (Sullivan et al., 2002).

Sullivan et al. (2002) provided preliminary support for family based interventions
(Sullivan et al., 2002). Similar to Sullivan and Bybee (1999), women who participated in
the advocacy group experienced less depressive symptoms and more self esteem than
women in the control group. Unlike Sullivan and Bybee (1999), quality of life was not
statistically significant, although women reported higher quality of life than the control
group (Sullivan et al., 2002). Children who received the advocacy intervention
experienced increased self-competence. However, in terms of self-competence, children
in the comparison group remained unchanged (Sullivan et al., 2002). Interestingly, the
youth that received the advocacy intervention imparted the support they received in
athletic events with other youth. Sullivan et al. (2002) explained:

"During a feedback session regarding the strengths of the support and education
group, facilitators reflected on how children supported one another during such physical
activities, even those children who did not run as quickly or who were less
athletic. The facilitators noted how different this was from their experience in other
contexts, in which children were likely to be teased by others" (Pp. 930-931).

The impact of a coordinated community response to reduce domestic violence is
discussed in more detail in chapter five (also see Fluery-Steiner 2006). The next section
transitions to restorative justice initiatives in domestic violence policing.

F. Restorative Justice

During the 1970s and 1980s, feminists opposed the idea of mediation. The
criminal justice system and family therapists viewed mediation and joint counseling as an
effective conduit in repairing relationships (Schechter, 1996; Wanless, 1996). These
tactics, however, failed to consider the criminality of the event and more importantly the
traumatizing nature of the event (Wanless, 1996). Late in the twentieth century,
restorative justice strategies were introduced as a potential method of dealing with
domestic violence (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). As suggested by Presser and Gaarder

Hudson (2002) suggests there is a two-part argument for restorative justice in
domestic violence cases. First there is the alleged failure of the criminal justice system
in providing effective solutions in sexual assault cases (Hudson, 2002). Secondly,
proponents of restorative justice are usually individuals that have fought for penal
diversion (Hudson, 2002). As Hudson (2002) stated, “The case for restorative justice instead of formal criminal justice for gendered and sexualized violence usually starts with the failings of the latter” (Hudson, 2002, p. 622). For example, in cases in which there is no witness and, the victim does not appear in court, the legal system is likely to fail (Hudson, 2002). However, as Hudson (2002) indicated, whether restorative justice is an answer is questionable. One underlying theme, according to Hudson (2002), of proponents of restorative justice is that it empowers the victim. Confronting the incident forces the victim and offender to realize that “the harm is real” (Hudson, 2002).

Mediation, as noted by Presser and Gaarder (2000) is consistent with the feminist view of empowering the victim. Also as noted by Coker (2006), “Feminist hopes for justice in domestic violence cases include safety and empowerment for the individual victim, and changes in the cultural and political conditions that support battering. (Restorative Justice) RJ may be able to play a key role in this endeavor” (Coker, 2006, Pp. 67-68). Finally, restorative justice views community support as central in preventing domestic violence (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). Community participation is an important part of restorative justice procedures (Presser and Gaarder, 2000).

Presser and Gaarder (2000) in their review of the literature evaluated the potential of restorative justice programs in reducing domestic violence. They suggested that critics unfairly label restorative justice programs as “mediation strategies” despite being fundamentally different. The restorative justice movement involves more than mediation. The strategies also involve family group counseling or sentencing circles (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). However, the most common strategies involve victim-offender mediation and family group counseling (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). Overall,
these strategies bring victims and offenders and their family and friends together to identify the problem and resolve the issues (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). The victim chooses whether to participate in restorative justice procedures or to take legal recourse. The victim also chooses the “support persons” that engage in the restorative justice proceedings (Presser and Gaarder, 2000). In this sense, “the victim is empowered” in that he or she is given the option of participation (Presser and Gaarder 2000).

Belknap and McDonald (2010) studied the perceptions of judges toward sentencing circles. Twenty-seven judges in a large western province were interviewed about their experiences with and attitudes towards domestic violence (Belknap and McDonald, 2010). They found that almost all the judges believed that sentencing circles could be effective in domestic violence cases. The judges reasoned that sentencing circles are valuable because the community becomes involved and the public becomes aware of the violence (Belknap and McDonald, 2010). Judges also suggested that sentencing circles were useful when the defendants wanted to reunite with their significant others (Belknap and McDonald, 2010). For example, in official court proceedings, if the judge lifted the no contact order, a limited window of opportunity existed to sentence or further address the abuse” (Belknap and McDonald, 2010).

Sentencing circles, according to some judges, were a method of holding the offender accountable to the community (Belknap and McDonald, 2010). According to Belknap and McDonald (2010), data also suggested that some judges believed that sentencing circles are a method of addressing the root cause of domestic violence. Additionally, data underscored the importance of guaranteeing victim consent and incorporating victim support into the proceedings. Judges highlighted that communities
using sentencing circles must understand the time commitment involved in addressing domestic violence cases. Finally, proceedings should underscore the importance of completing court ordered voluntary programs (Belknap and McDonald, 2010).

Many feminists are skeptical of mediation’s potential in helping victims of domestic violence (Walker, 1985). Feminists suggest that mediation, once again, could lead to “privatizing family law problems” (Walker, 1985). Presser and Gaarder (2000) warned there are caveats to restorative justice strategies. Chief among these caveats are that domestic violence policing could revert to pre-1980s policing (Presser and Gaarder, 2000; also see Belknap and McDonald, 2010). Belknap and McDonald (2010), however, pointed out the inconsistency between restorative justice strategies and the “move to treat” domestic violence cases more seriously. Belknap and McDonald (2010) also suggested that common criticism of restorative justice, among their sample included: proceedings are resource consuming and time consuming, the circle supports the defendant more than the victim, and the proceedings may not prevent domestic violence. Furthermore, as Stark (2004) cautioned mediation type programs must be vigilant of the potential of women being goaded into compromising their own voices for that of their significant others.

Rather than reconciling the relationship, the focus of restorative justice proceedings should be on “coming to terms with the past, punishing wrongdoers, and providing some measure of reparation to victims” (Presser and Gaarder, 2000; also see Hudson, 2002). Hudson (2002) suggested that casting away the diversionary stigma of restorative justice projects entails using effective rehabilitative programs and resources.
G. Conclusions

The idea that domestic violence is a private issue is a major obstacle that feminists worked to overcome. Feminists suggested the most common argument for mandatory polices are that they “send a message” that domestic violence is a crime and is an important societal problem (Coker, 2001). Unlike the traditional view, domestic violence is not an individual problem (Coker, 2001). Many states include mandatory policies within their legislation. According to Wanless (1996), major proponents of mandatory arrest laws in New Jersey included the New Jersey Coalition against Domestic Violence, other women's organizations, and the Administrative Office of the Courts. Husbands’ and father’s rights groups opposed the bill (Wanless, 1996).

Proponents of mandatory arrests also suggest that laws “remove the decision to arrest from the victim” (Stark, 2004; Wanless, 1996). Victims are afraid and often find it difficult to make an informed decision about arrest (Wanless, 1996). Mandatory laws protect victims from making this decision (Wanless, 1996). Advocates also suggest that mandatory laws empower victims in stopping abuse. The victim called the police and mandatory laws require police to arrest -beginning the process of stopping abuse (Wanless, 1996).

Some opponents of mandatory laws defend civil rights of suspects (Wanless, 1996). These opponents suggest that victims will use the system for retaliation “for some other grievance” when in fact violence had not occurred (Wanless, 1996). Wanless (1996) suggested the fear is unfounded because, despite mandatory laws, police still need probable cause to arrest a suspect. Some feminists also oppose mandatory arrest laws because they limit the victim’s decision-making powers. As Wanless (1996) explained,
“The opponents believe mandatory arrest further erodes victims' self-esteem and contributes to their sense of helplessness by usurping their control. They advocate leaving both the arrest and prosecution decisions to the victim” (Wanless, 1996, p. 548).

Others are concerned with departmental policy and dual arrests. When police cannot determine who is at fault, they sometimes arrest both parties. In some jurisdictions with mandatory arrest, police have arrested both the victim and the offender (Wanless, 1996; Martin, 1997). This could occur for several reasons: 1.) the police could not determine the primary aggressor; 2.) poor training on dual arrests; or 3.) police resentment of mandatory laws; 4.) political/organizational pressure and cultural norms; 5.) situational factors like drugs/alcohol, or weapons (Wanless, 1996; Houry et al., 2006; Hirschel, 2008). Hirschel (2008) pointedly noted that in some jurisdictions officers are discouraged from viewing women as aggressor. Thus in these jurisdictions officers arrest both parties. Some research suggests that women who were arrested with their victimizers are less likely to call the police in a future attack (Abel and Suh, 1987).

In the past, mediation and joint counseling were considered effective choices in repairing a violent relationship. These tactics, however, failed to consider the criminality of the event and more importantly the traumatizing nature of the event (Wanless, 1996). As Wanless (1996) suggested, joint counseling and mediation allow the offender to place rose-colored blinders over their eyes. Counseling and joint mediation creates an atmosphere of denial. The offender denies the behavior and suggests the victim provoked the attack (Walker 1985). As a result, largely because of the work of victim advocates, mandatory policies were created to protect victims against these views (Wanless, 1996).
However, despite expanded arrest power, studies suggest that police still use mediation tactics rather than arrest procedures (Wanless, 1996, p. 541).
V. LITERATURE REVIEW:
CHANGES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES

A. Introduction

Over the past few decades the criminal justice response to domestic violence has changed drastically (Peterson, 2003). The women’s movement, lawsuits, and domestic violence research led to changing police domestic violence strategies (Jones and Belknap, 1999; Peterson, 2003). Traditionally, as noted by Peterson (2003), police, prosecutors, and judges treated domestic violence more leniently than other crimes (Jones and Belknap, 1999). In the United States, change began with police departments (Peterson, 2003). During the 1980s, changes in police department domestic violence policy represented some of the most significant changes in police practices within the past few decades. For example, police began using proarrest strategies rather than mediation tactics (Peterson, 2003).

Historically, the domestic violence strategies of prosecutor's offices were also lenient. Prosecutor’s offices were less willing to prosecute domestic violence cases because victims were often unwilling to cooperate (Peterson, 2003). Victims were fearful that cooperation could lead to more severe battering, loss of economic support, or the hope of repairing the relationship (Peterson, 2003). After police departments implemented proarrest policies, prosecutor’s offices began implementing no drop prosecution policies and evidence-based prosecution (Peterson, 2003). This chapter outlines major changes that were made in departmental policies.
Before the 1970s, many states followed English common law, which required that police witness a misdemeanor before making an arrest (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). In other words, police had little official recourse when responding to a domestic violence call (Reuland, 2006). If police did not witness the misdemeanor, they could not take any official action, including arresting the perpetrator. Since 1977 and the first legislation in Pennsylvania, the Protection from Abuse Act, numerous advances were made by other states that passed domestic violence laws. As indicated in chapter one, by the late 1970s, political efforts set in motion initiatives to reform domestic violence legislation and police intervention (Straus et al., 1984; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). For example, the feminist and women’s movement accused the criminal justice system of “cavalierly” handling domestic violence incidents, even violent incidents, and this needed to change (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Buzawa and Buzawa, 1992). They claimed, for instance, that domestic violence calls are low on the totem pole of police priorities, that police delay responses to domestic violence calls, and that they avoid arrest in favor of restoring order (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003, Gelles, 1996; Ford, 1983, Strauss, 1980). Moreover, in terms of changing policies based upon contingency, three landmark court cases goaded changes in their respective police department's domestic violence policies:

- 1976: Scott v. Hart - Oakland, California Police Department;
- 1977: Bruno v. Codd - New York City Police Department; and
- 1984: Thurman v. City of Torrington - Torrington, Connecticut

Police department policies appeared to change overnight in the early 1980s, after the publication of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman and Berk 1984). As Gelles (1996) pointedly noted:
“It is unusual, if not unprecedented in the social sciences, when empirical research results combine with social advocacy, popular political agendas, public support, and conventional wisdom to bring about a change in social policy and social action. Yet, this is exactly what occurred with regard to the implementation of mandatory arrest procedures in instances of domestic violence” (p. 30).

Within months of the Sherman report, as discussed below, police departments across the nation began to implement mandatory and presumptive arrest policies (Cohn and Sherman, 1987; Gelles, 1996). Whether or not police changed policies for deterrence or liability concerns is debatable (Frisch, 2002). Within days of the publication, however, the New York City Police Department Commissioner issued a new policy for domestic violence arrests (Gelles, 1996). Furthermore, four years later 176 cities across the nation were using some form of domestic violence arrest policy (Gelles, 1996). To fully appreciate the nature of this change, one must consider the factors that were inhibiting changing domestic violence policies within police departments.

B. Impediments to change and the push toward mandatory arrests

Until the 1970s and early 1980s, organizational impediments to change such as state law hampered a police officer’s arrest powers in misdemeanor cases, including domestic violence (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001). Many states had reserved arrest policies for misdemeanor crimes, including domestic violence. Unless the officer witnessed the crime or a felony occurred, an arrest was denied and the responsibility turned to the victim for initiating and signing a complaint (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001 and Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). Berk and Sherman (1988) suggested that another reason that police did not intervene in domestic violence situations was because it was rarely prosecuted to the full extent of the law because of confusion regarding “what is best” for the victim and his or her family. For example, Ford (1983) studied the process of invoking the Marion
County, Indiana, criminal justice system in a domestic case in the 1970s (1978). Data included official records of Marion County Police, Marion County Prosecutor’s Office, and court records; interviews with police officers, prosecutors, judges; interviews with 19 victims and 30 informal conversations with victims who summoned the police for help or considered prosecution (Ford, 1983).

Ford (1983) found that dispatchers typically did not dispatch an officer unless evidence of a felony existed, or in other words, evidence of violence. After an arrest, if no evidence of violence existed, the dispatcher advised the victim to file a report with the prosecutor’s office. Moreover, police rarely arrested an individual accused of domestic violence unless they witnessed the incident. If after the offender was arrested police relayed incomplete information to the victim on how to follow through with a complaint, the victim could not proceed with the complaint (Ford, 1983). As Ford (1983) pointed out, “If, for example, officers did not explain the procedure for obtaining a warrant or if they gave her misinformation (such as "this is a civil matter" and "the Prosecutor will not give you a warrant if you are married"), the victim was unlikely to make the effort to "go downtown" (p.466). When a complaint was filed, 60 percent of the 325 cases studied were put on hold and only 32 percent of the victims returned to file an affidavit (Ford, 1983). A “hold” refers to a three-day cooling off period for the victim and offender (Ford, 1983).

According to Buzawa and Buzawa (2001), another organizational impediment to reform was that police departments maintained inadequate record systems stymieing their ability to determine if the offender was a domestic violence recidivist, thus begetting an arrest. Finally, there were not enough resources in many departments to deal with
“weekend evening” domestic violence incidents (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001). Police gave precedence to crimes such as “drunk driving, bar fights, gang incidents, loud parties, crimes including, breaking and entering, robberies and certain other assaults” (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001, p. 218). Finally, police suggested that their focus on restoring order while maintaining control minimized the risk to the officer and to the offender (Zorza, 1992). Similar to the early views on community policing, police maintained a cynical view toward domestic violence (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001). Their working domain, in other words their job responsibilities, did not include “social work tasks” (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2001 and see Thompson, 2008 for a discussion on domains).

The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman and Berk, 1984) appeared to have an unprecedented effect on domestic violence policies throughout the nation (Gelles, 1996). Sherman and Berk (1984) conducted the first true experiment on the deterrent effect of discretionary arrest for domestic violence incidents. They were also among the first advocates of discretionary arrest. Sherman and Berk (1984) drew their data from police calls for service from the Minneapolis Police Department. The treatment group included those who were arrested and the comparison groups included separation and intervention by the officer (for instance, mediating and mentoring). The results of the study indicated that 26 percent of offenders separated from the victim compared to the 13 percent arrested, who committed a future act of domestic violence. Moreover, there was little evidence of retributive action taken by the offender toward the victim once released from jail. Sherman and Berk (1984), however, advocated that arrest policies refrain from mandating that officers arrest offenders. Domestic violence incidents are dynamic and require officer discretion. Since Sherman and Berk (1984),
subsequent reports explored whether discretionary arrest policies or mandatory arrest
policies affected successive reports of domestic violence incidents.

As Gelles (1996) suggested, in many police departments throughout the nation,
domestic violence policy changes were made within days or months of the Sherman and
Berk (1984) report. Moreover, there was widespread acceptance of the study results and
willingness to quickly put the results into action by changing domestic violence policies
(Gelles, 1996). Changes were accomplished at extraordinary speed. In the words of
Gelles (1996): “consider the likelihood of social science research on the death penalty
leading states to abolish the death penalty weeks after the study results were released on a
television news show” (Gelles, 1996, pp. 31-32). The question is why were the results
widely accepted? The study was a case study of one city with no replication results.
Theoretically, Sherman and Berk (1984), as pointed out by Gelles (1996), could have
suggested that changes were contingent upon the study’s scientific rigor. As Gelles
(1996) noted,

“The fact that the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment was a field
experiment with random assignment certainly made the study results far more
compelling than the results of either uncontrolled experiments or social surveys
that attempt to make causal inferences from cross-sectional data. Clearly, the
apparent strength of the study design made the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment a strong piece of research” (P. 32).

In reality, however, changing policies could have been based upon contingency or
could have resulted from institutional reasons for instance, political symbolism (also see
Manning, 1996). Buzawa and Buzawa (2001) reviewed the historical changes to
legislation. They suggested that in the 1970s and 1980s, criminal justice system views
about intervening in domestic violence incidents began changing. For example, before
the 1970s, woman could not even apply for a civil restraining order unless they were simultaneously going to apply for divorce (Fagan, 1996). Moreover, if the protection orders were available, protection was weak (Fagan, 1996). Penalties were minor and the orders were not available on an emergency basis (Fagan, 1996).

Another important factor that resulted in changing domestic violence polices and drew heavily from the Sherman and Berk (1984) Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment was the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence (1984) (Gelles, 1996). This act resulted in states developing legislation, civil or criminal, focusing on domestic violence. The laws helped develop shelters for battered women, “protective orders, specialized police training, altered arrest requirements, charging guidelines, and treatment programs” (Parnas, 1993). According to Buzawa and Buzawa (2003), it appears, however, that this Act consisted of mere lip service because of conservative opposition. Thus, funding for implementation of new state policies and practices did not materialize until the mid 1990s (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003).

Despite the number of initiatives that Sherman and Berk (1984) spurred, a number of questions were still unanswered. Moreover, the study gave rise to extensive methodological criticisms. Gelles (1996) rightly observed that on the surface, the “sweeping changes” toward more “aggressive and effective police intervention would seem “gratifying.” However, when Sherman and Berk’s (1984) study is closely examined, the results become more “sobering” (Gelles, 1996). A number of significant problems faced the Sherman and Berk (1984) study (see Berk and Sherman, 1988). To begin, the experiment faced external validity issues as it was a case study of one city. Moreover, the Sherman and Berk (1984) study by its very design, working with officers
in the field, could have violated the “assumptions of random assignment” (Gelles, 1996). For instance, if an officer anticipated a treatment and he found that treatment unacceptable, he could have circumvented the experiment (Berk and Sherman, 1988). As Berk and Sherman (1988) suggested, if the officers really wanted to undermine the study, they could have certainly violated the assumptions of random assignment. Berk and Sherman (1988) argued, however, that it was unlikely that the officers would purposely set out to undermine the project since they volunteered for involvement in a year-long research project. Finally, as Gelles (1996) indicated, the Sherman and Berk (1984) study also faced significant missing data. As a result of issues with validity, the National Institute of Justice funded a replication of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Project.

Sherman et al. (1992) is one of the more well known replications of the 1984 Minneapolis study. As indicated, the National Institute of Justice funded a replication, the Spousal Assault Replication Project (SARP) in Omaha, Nebraska; Charlotte, North Carolina; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Miami, Florida; and Colorado Springs, Colorado. The results of this study, however, provided policy makers with more questions than solid answers (for example see Bowman, 1992). Unlike the original report, the replication suggested that mandatory arrest could be counterproductive in preventing future acts of domestic violence. Sometimes, arrest increases the risk of domestic violence, especially in people with little stake in conformity (Sherman et al., 1992; Paternoster et al., 1997; Maxwell et al., 2001). In other cases, arrest escalates violence (Sherman et al., 1992). Finally in cases in which the offender has a “stake in conformity,” arrest could reduce the likelihood of reoffending (Sherman et al., 1992; Maxwell et al., 2001). Sherman and colleagues (1992) recommended discretionary arrest rather than mandatory arrest. They
also recommended the use of warrantless arrests when probable cause exists for a misdemeanor assault and mobilizing services for victims, for instance referrals to shelters or detoxification centers (Sherman et al., 1992).

Lerman (1992) pointedly observed the aforementioned replication studies provide a limited measure of deterrence without exploring other interventions. Arrest alone could be an aggravating factor. Arrest combined with other interventions, on the other hand, could act a deterrent. As Lerman (1992) explained, "Will arrest produce a demonstrable deterrent effect when combined with prosecution, incarceration, treatment for the abuser, shelter and other services for the victim and her children, and other court orders addressing contact, custody, support and other issues" (P.224)?

Real reforms to the federal government’s efforts in domestic violence legislation began during the 1990s with The Violence against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The VAWA promised Native American tribes, states, and local government’s monies to strengthen their domestic violence laws, including the creation of mandatory or pro-arrest policies (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). The VAWA helped push the creation of no drop policies and police mandatory arrest policies. No drop policies require that victims press charges against the perpetrator after the police issue a complaint. In other words, prosecuting all “legally sufficient” domestic cases despite whether the victim agreed to prosecution (Smith et al., 2001). In states that honor mandatory arrest policies, police must arrest the alleged suspect of domestic violence, notwithstanding the victim’s wishes. The effectiveness of full-enforcement polices, such as mandatory arrest and no-drop policies are controversial.
Townsend (2005) summarized the mandatory arrest literature. The results inferred from their review are that there are positive aspects of mandatory arrest policies (also see Phillips and Sabol, 2010 and Zorza, 1992). The victim is separated from the offender, thus perhaps thwarting future acts of violence. Moreover, a mandatory arrest policy suggests to the public that society does not tolerate abusive behavior in general (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). That said, and as indicated earlier, there are also a number of negative aspects of mandatory arrest policies. The following is from Townsend’s (2005) summary of the literature on negative aspects of mandatory arrest policies:

- Assumes that domestic violence behavior can be changed via arrest.
- May affect the victim financially.
- May increase violence or retaliation.
- May increase the victim’s likelihood to reoffend.
- May increase the likelihood of dual arrests (both parties in the domestic abuse are arrested).

The mid 1990s saw the elimination of statutory limitations. Sometimes the laws were as simplistic as allowing a police officer to make “warrantless arrests for a non-witnessed domestic violence related misdemeanor assault” (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003, p. 109). This time period also saw the improvement of temporary restraining orders (TROs) and the revision of domestic violence legislation. Additionally, during the 1990s, many states proposed and enacted anti-stalking legislation after a number of cases in which women with restraining orders were killed by stalkers (Melton, 2007; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003, p.116; Coleman, 1997).
C. Court Proceedings and Mandatory Arrest

With post mandatory arrest policies, there is no doubt more offenders were processed through criminal court. There is question, however, about whether prosecutors seriously move forward with the cases (Hartman and Belknap, 2003). There is evidence that prosecutors and judges may mirror police responses and attempt to talk victims out of pursuing charges (Hartman and Belknap, 2003). Consequently, as indicated by Erez and Belknap (1998) the attitudes and opinions of criminal justice personnel could be “harmful and demoralizing” to victims. Negative words by these individuals underscore victims’ “powerlessness and helplessness” (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Compared to the number of articles published on law enforcement’s response to domestic violence, little comparative attention focuses on the court system (Hartman and Belknap, 2003).

Erez and Belknap (1998) is one of the first studies to explore the perceptions of prosecutors and defense attorneys in terms of domestic violence court procedures. Sixty-two prosecutors and defense attorneys were interviewed in six counties in northeastern Ohio. Erez and Belknap’s (1998) data suggested the most common defense included presenting battering as “mutually combative” and as a necessity out of self-defense. Moreover, data suggested that prosecutors and defense attorneys view dynamics of battering quite differently (Erez and Belknap, 1998). To begin, prosecutors and defense attorneys viewed a victim’s failure to cooperate differently. Erez and Belknap (1998) suggested prosecutors believed that reasons for failure to cooperate were due to concern for the defendant and family rather than fear. Victims on the other hand suggested that failure to cooperate equated with fear. Attorneys also view sentences as appropriate whereas victims perceive sentences as lenient (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Consequently,
the view by prosecutors could lead victims to perceive court personnel as indifferent leading to demoralizing feelings (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Accordingly, they could be less likely to initiate court proceeding in the future (Erez and Belknap, 1998).

Erez and Belknap (1998) found that prosecutors and defense attorneys also view victim injuries differently. Prosecutors suggested victims minimized injuries, while defense attorneys minimized the injury to the victim. Defense attorneys suggested the injuries were the result of an accident rather than an assault (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Finally, data suggested that defense attorneys portray victims as exaggerating incidents for the sake of ulterior motives (Erez and Belknap, 1998).

Prosecutors, according to Erez and Belknap (1998) viewed mandatory procedures favorably because they forced “unwilling witnesses/victims into court.” Defense attorneys, however, opposed the policies. As Erez and Belknap (1998) noted, “The reasons attorneys provided for preferring a particular policy were often colored by stereotypical views of the women victimized by battering, minimizing the danger present in abusive relationships and portraying the victims as manipulative, devious and ready to exploit the law for their own self-interest” (Erez and Belknap, 1998, p. 224). Finally, some prosecutors and defense attorneys suggested that mandatory policies could lead some women to manipulate the system for ulterior motives (Erez and Belknap, 2000). As Erez and Belknap (1998) explained, this type of perception contributes to the “promotion and perpetuation” of violence. In a sense, it is a reinforced battering by the court system.
Hartman and Belknap (2003) explored the perceptions of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys and the factors considered during the prosecution and conviction of defendants. Data consisted of 62 in-depth interviews and questionnaires of municipal court personnel in a large urban area in the Midwest (Hartman and Belknap, 2003).

Results of the Hartman and Belknap (2003) study suggested that legal variables are the most influential factor in court proceedings (Hartman and Belknap, 2003). Surprisingly, views of victim advocates and batterer treatment programs are less influential factors (Hartman and Belknap, 2003). Despite the belief that legal variables are an important factor in court proceedings, court personnel suggested that victim input is also an important factor in proceedings. This is devastating for women who do not want to appear in court. As Hartman and Belknap (2003) suggested, future policy implications should consider developing measures to proceed without victim testimony. For example, some jurisdictions in the United States are experimenting with evidenced-based prosecution. Evidence-based prosecution places emphasis on police reports, victim impact statements, and evidence without the need for victim testimony.

D. Protective Orders/Restraining Orders

As indicated, along with mandatory arrest policies and or proarrest policies, criminal justice system responses also include restraining orders (Ko, 2002). Restraining orders are also called injunctive orders, protective orders or “stay-away” orders (Ko, 2002). Injunctive orders, such as protective orders and restraining orders are important for a number of reasons. They provide the only solution for victims who do not wish to have their significant other’s arrested and prosecuted criminally (Finn, 1989). Moreover,
it is the only solution for “abuse that is not criminal” such as intimidation or harassment (Finn, 1989). TRO’s are also the only solution for “misdemeanor crimes with insufficient evidence for charging or conviction” such as threats or shoving (Finn, 1989, p. 44). Indeed, a foremost purpose of restraining orders is that they provide immediate relief to victims of domestic violence (Ko, 2002).

Despite the importance of these injunctions, they have a relatively recent role in court proceedings (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). Before the 1970s, courts were reluctant to sign an injunctive order because judges considered this task secondary to their primary role of deciding matters of law and trying issues of fact (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). As Buzawa and Buzawa (2003) noted, restraining orders were limited because judges used the higher standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the respondent posed a definite threat of danger to the complainant. The higher threshold of proof was required because judges were concerned with infringing on the respondent’s constitutional rights. As Buzawa and Buzawa (2003) noted, prosecutors and judges “remain acutely aware of the limited authority to issue prior restraints on conduct without notice, and (they are) also aware of the danger of infringing on a respondent’s constitutional rights” (p. 234). As a result, victims typically had to file for divorce to be eligible for an injunctive order (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). By the 1990s, this view began changing and every state and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes granting victims immediate protection against domestic violence (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Kane, 2000; Keilitz, 1994; Finn, 1989).

Although the available research does not demonstrate consistent preventative benefits of restraining orders and suggests that they may exacerbate violence, there is a
body of literature shedding light on the effectiveness of restraining orders. Six studies are consistently cited within the domestic violence literature that discusses restraining orders (Carlson et al., 1999; Keilitz et al., 1997; Klein, 1996; Harrell and Smith, 1996; Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992; and Grau et al., 1985). Three of these studies suggested that women were abused shortly after the issuance of a restraining order (Klein, 1996; Harrell and Smith, 1996; Grau et al., 1985). The other three studies suggested that restraining orders were effective for a good majority of the population (Carlson et al., 1999; Keilitz et al., 1997; Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992).

Klein reviewed court data from 663 restraining order cases in Quincy, Massachusetts and tracked the cases for two years. He found that nearly half of the offenders committed a new act of abuse within two years of the restraining order. Moreover, offenders with active criminal backgrounds were more likely to reabuse after the issuance of a restraining order (Klein, 1996).

Harrell and Smith (1996) examined the effectiveness of temporary restraining orders in protecting victims from further abuse. The study is based on a sample of women who petitioned for temporary restraining orders and were issued orders in the first nine months of 1991 in Boulder, Colorado, and Denver, Colorado. The authors interviewed 365 women three months and 12 months after the issuance of the order. Overall, the authors concluded that having a permanent order did not deter violence. Furthermore, the authors found that the greater the level of resistance in court toward the order, the greater the likelihood of revictimization (Harrell and Smith, 1996).
When abuse occurred three months after the issuance of an order, a large majority of women elected not to call the police. Between the first and second interviews, 155 women reported more problems with the perpetrators (155 women). Half of these women did not report violations to the police, while the other half called the police. The majority (approximately 60 percent) of these women did not call the police because they believed they could stop the men from “bothering them” (Harrell and Smith, 1996). Of the women with permanent protection orders, 30 percent said that calling the police would “do no good” (Harrell and Smith, 1996). Finally, according to the authors (Harrell and Smith, 1996), calls to the police because of violations of restraining orders were high, but arrests were low.

Grau et al. (1985) also examined the effectiveness of civil restraining orders in protecting victims from further abuse. Their study presented data from an analysis of 270 interviews with women four months after partaking in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration’s Family Violence Demonstration Project. The intervention sites were located in four states: Florida, Vermont, North Carolina, and Ohio (Grau et al., 1985). Interviewers asked women about their experiences obtaining restraining orders and the usefulness of these orders. The research design compared revictimization of women with restraining orders to women without restraining orders, post project intervention.

Overall, the authors concluded that restraining orders are most effective when there is a less pervasive history of violence and when the perpetrator is less violent (Grau et al., 1985). Furthermore, victims with financial ties to the perpetrator are less likely to seek help through a restraining order (Grau et al., 1985). When the women were interviewed and asked about the efficacy of the restraining orders, responses were mixed:
26 percent concluded that restraining orders were not effective at all, 2 percent stated that it was too soon to determine effectiveness, 29 percent concluded that orders were somewhat effective, and 43 percent concluded that orders were very effective in preventing future violence (Grau et al., 1985). Despite victim contentment with the orders, the authors concluded, statistically, that restraining orders are not effective in reducing future violence but may be effective in curtailing abuse (verbal threats or harassment) when the prior history of abuse was less severe (Grau et al., 1985).

Other studies on the efficacy of restraining orders concluded that orders are effective. For instance, Carlson et al. (1999) studied court and police records of 210 women who applied for protective orders (restraining orders), between 1990 and 1992, in Travis County, Texas. The design followed the women two years before and two years following the issuance of the restraining order. The data suggested that for most women, a significant drop in the likelihood of physical violence occurred following the order (Carlson et al., 1999). At the same time, similar to Grau et al. (1995), data suggested the presence of a restraining order does not impact the rate of abuse for those who remain violent. As Carlson et al. (1999) explained:

“For the 142 couples who reported physical violence prior to the PO, the average number of reported incidents was 1.58. For the 49 cases indicated violence had occurred after the PO, the average number of incidents was 1.59. Therefore, it appears that the PO affects whether a person chooses to be violent or not, but it does not impact the average rate of abuse for those who remain violent” (p. 215).

Unlike Harrell and Smith (1996), those who applied for permanent restraining orders experienced significantly less revictimization than those who obtained temporary restraining orders. Additionally, unlike Klein (1996), men with prior criminal histories
were less likely to revictimize their victims (Carlson et al., 1999). However, African-American women and those on the lower economic echelon were more likely to experience revictimization (Carlson et al., 1999). Moreover, women with children were more likely to experience revictimization (Carlson et al., 1999).

Under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, Keilitz et al. (1997) studied the effectiveness of protective orders in: Wilmington, Delaware; Denver, Colorado; and Washington D.C. The authors defined effectiveness in terms of 1.) improvement in quality of life after the issuance of a protective order and 2.) continued problems after the issuance of the protective order (Keilitz et al., 1997). The authors obtained data from a few sources: 1.) initial telephone interviews of 285 women who applied for protective orders (restraining orders) about one month after they applied for either a temporary restraining order or a permanent restraining order; 2.) six month follow-up interviews with 177 of the women; 3.) civil case reviews of the women who participated in the study; 4.) criminal histories of the men who were named in the protective order (Keilitz et al., 1997). The authors also obtained interview data from interviews with judges, other court personnel, victim service representatives, police, and prosecutors and from observations of hearings (Keilitz et al., 1997). Data indicated that the majority of the assailants had a criminal background. Furthermore, similar to Carlson et al. (1999), data suggested that civil protection orders are valuable in reducing the amount of physical and psychological abuse. Moreover, the data available suggested that temporary protective orders are useful even if the victim did not obtain a protective order. If the assailant had a violent crime record, the victim was less likely to experience re-abuse. However, at the
same time, if the abuser had a greater number of arrests, the victim was more likely to experience problems with the protective order.

In terms of official handling of domestic violence, Keilitz and colleagues (1997) suggested a number of areas in which the justice system could improve services for domestic violence victims. To begin, in the majority of cases, victims do not use the contempt process. The authors suggest that court employees could provide more information about this type of victim service to victims. Secondly, according to the authors, law enforcement agencies could do more to assist “prosecutors in developing cases for prosecution, to arrest perpetrators, and to help victims access the civil protection order process” (Keilitz et al., 1997). The authors also suggested that police should be more aggressive in developing probable cause to arrest abusers (Keilitz et al., 1997). In the majority of study sites, police came to the scene of the domestic dispute. However, according to the data, once police arrived at the scene their actions were more complacent (Keilitz et al., 1997). More specifically,

- Police interviewed victims on average in 51 percent of the cities;
- Took notes on average in 65.9 percent of the cities;
- Arrested assailants on average in 61.1 percent of the cities (55 percent in Delaware; 87 percent in Denver; and 41 percent in DC;
- On average, in 66.1 percent of the cities, police informed victims about civil protection orders;
- On average, in 60.4 percent of the cities, police informed victims about civil protection order procedures (56.9 percent in Delaware; 53.6 percent in Denver; and 70.8 percent in Washington D.C.);
- On average in 47.1 percent of the cities, victims found police helpful (Keilitz et al., 1997).
Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) explored whether temporary restraining orders could deter abusive behavior. The authors used a qualitative design. After a woman obtained a TRO, the author asked the individual if she would be willing to be interviewed for a study on temporary restraining orders. If the individual agreed, she was interviewed the following week. Moreover, one or two months after the individuals received the TRO, the authors conducted a follow-up phone interview (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) also obtained the individual’s court affidavit upon the individual’s permission. The interview focused on a few core areas 1.) women’s views of the police response; 2.) the perception of the judge and their attorneys; 3.) their perception of the usefulness of the temporary restraining order; and 4) demographic information of the women and their batterers (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992).

The Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) sample included 30 women who obtained temporary restraining orders between October and November 1986 from the New Haven Family Court. The authors found that during the two month follow-up period, the majority of the men (63 percent) adhered to the terms of the TRO. Moreover, during the follow-up period 66 percent of the women were free from beatings or threatening remarks by their partners. Grau and colleagues (1984) uncovered similar results during their four month follow-up period. Recall, as stated earlier and by Chaudhuri and Daly (1992), in Grau et al.’s (1984) findings, there was an “overall nonabuse rate of 44 percent, but the rate was better for women who had suffered less-severe prior injury (56%)” (p. 238). Thus, Grau et al (1984) suggested that TROs are most effective for women who suffer less severe injuries and more effective for curbing verbal threats and harassing behavior (also see Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). Moreover, TROs empowered
women who were economically and emotionally independent (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). According to the authors, for these women, the TRO was the first step in ending the abusive relationship (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). Finally, as for the legal experience, a woman felt more comfortable with attorneys who identified with their pain and showed compassion. As Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) remarked, legal advocates cannot be expected to be “friends or emotionally buffers” for all of their domestic violence clients. However many women desire that act of kindness (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992). Indeed, “What a judge and counsel say in court and in chambers has important consequences for how a woman can redefine herself and change her situation and for how a violent man can change his behavior” (p. 246).

Similar to Keilitz and colleagues (1997), Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) found that police could have been more aggressive in their response to domestic violence victims. That is not to say that police did not respond. According to the authors, after the women obtained a TRO, the police were quick to respond but not to arrest. In the words of Chaudhuri and Daly (1992):

“First, police officers did not consider threats or other forms of verbal harassment to be “real” TRO violations. Although the police always came when called, once at the scene, the officers expressed frustration and anger at the women for having called them, according to two women. Second, just four of the eight batterers were arrested, two at the scene and two on arrest warrants. The four others fled before the police arrived, and although a warrant was issued for their arrest, they were not arrested during the two-month follow-up period” (p. 241).

The authors suggested that, like other jurisdictions, historically police did not spend time tracking down domestic violence TRO violators, except for the serious felony cases (Chaudhuri and Daly, 1992).
More recently, Ko (2002) reviewed the handful of studies on the effectiveness of restraining orders and arrest policies and concluded the data are inconclusive. According to Ko (2002), restraining orders will deter some offenders and are less likely to deter offenders that have little stake in conformity (Ko, 2002). In other words, offenders who have a criminal or substance abuse background or have been involved with the victim for a short period of time are more likely to reoffend (Ko, 2002; Grau et al., 1985). Moreover, restraining orders are more likely to deter offenders in cases that “involve less severe prior injury or less violent batterers” (Ko, 2002, p. 384). Additionally, in the studies that Ko (2002) reviewed, whether the victim has children, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are factors that signal risk for re-abuse, despite the issuance of a restraining order.

Much of the past restraining order research has focused on the role of restraining orders and their effectiveness. However, there is limited understanding of the contextual jurisdictional differences of the restraining order process (Logan et al., 2005). As Logan et al. (2005) explained, "The experiences of rural and urban women may be very different in navigating the protective order process because of unique constraints emerging from the environment" (P.878).

Logan et al. (1995) used multiple sources of data to gain a better perspective on the variations in the restraining orders process, including barriers faced by victims. The Logan et al. (1995) sample included three rural towns and one urban city as defined by the 2000 census. Data included: a.)Kentucky state police data; b.)court docket data; c.) key informant interviews; d.) focus group results from women who did not currently have protective orders; and e.) individual interviews with women granted protective orders.
(Logan et al., 1995, P.878). More specifically, key informants comprised: a.) judges, law enforcement, court clerks, and prosecutors; b.) other mental health professionals, health care, hospital services, and social services; and c.) victim advocates, shelter staff, and attorneys specializing in victims services (Logan et al., 1995, p. 879).

The authors found a number of similar responses for reasons for obtaining a restraining order, reasons for not receiving a restraining order, factors contributing to dismissal, and dropping a protective order. The contextual differences, however, became evident after exploring the process and specific victimization tactics.

Rural women experienced more barriers in obtaining protective orders and enforcing orders. More specifically, in rural areas there were: a.) higher rates of failure to serve the order; b.) costs for obtaining the order, despite state laws regulating charging for a protective order; c.) required to hand deliver orders for judges to sign; d.) few advocates to explain the process for filing the order; and e.) more frequent violations of protective orders. According to the data, there were also variations in victimization tactics. For example, rural victims were more likely to experience stalking, isolation from family and friends, limiting access to funds/money, threats of violence, and broken bones. Logan et al. (1995) rationalized that the variations in victimization tactics could be because the majority of rural women were married or because of gender stereotypes in more rural areas.

Finally, there were similarities between urban and rural areas. The top three reasons for obtaining a restraining order, according to both rural and urban women are safety, need to stop the abuse, and fear. Secondly, the fact that a restraining order is "a
piece of paper” and nothing more than a "piece of paper" caused frustration among both rural and urban women. Women also suggested that the level of involvement of both the police and the victim influences the effectiveness of the order. However, rural women listed serving the order as more of a problem than urban women. Key informants suggested that a huge barrier, to filing and obtaining a restraining order, is lack of resources.

In conclusion, exploring the role and effectiveness of restraining orders is important as they serve thousands of women and are one of the most widely used strategies to reduce future violence. In fact, the National Violence against Women Survey (2002) indicated that annually 1,131,999 victims of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking obtain protective or restraining orders. According to the survey, 60 percent of these orders are violated. These numbers are important, in light of the fact that victims usually obtain protective orders as an act of desperation and not early intervention. Secondly, understanding the role and effectiveness of restraining orders is important because a routine responsibility of police officers is enforcing these orders. As indicated by a legal series bulletin by the Office for Victims of Crime restraining orders are only effective when the restrained party is convinced the order will be enforced. Furthermore, they can prove "harmful to victims by creating a false sense of security" (Gillis, 2002, p.1). Finally, exploring the issues with restraining orders is important because despite the fact that approximately 20% of U.S. women experiencing interpersonal violence and obtain a civil protection order, their effectiveness is unclear (Holt et al., 2002). A contributing reason for ambiguous results, as indicated by Carlson and colleagues (1999) could be the different lengths of follow-up periods. As Carlson
and colleagues (1999) pointed out, "Not surprisingly, the two studies which used shorter follow-up periods found lower rates of re-abuse" (p. 206). The studies referred to by Carlson and colleagues (1999) were Chaudhuri and Daly (1992) and Grau et al (1985).

Another reason for ambiguous results is that very few traditionally cited studies, other than Grau et al., (1985) used a comparison group of women that did not obtain a restraining order (also see Carlson et al., 1999; Holt, 2002; and Ko, 2002). Finally, as Ko (2002) pointedly noted the majority of the studies reviewing efficacy occurred during the 1980s, when the criminal justice system was beginning to pay closer attention to domestic violence. In the words of Ko (2002), “Since the restraining order studies were conducted, new legislation has been implemented on the state and federal levels to resolve problems and further improve the institutional and procedural responses to domestic violence” (p. 381). Thus, improvements in the system could perhaps improve the efficacy of restraining orders in terms of enforcement (Ko, 2002).

E. Domestic Violence Units

As indicated earlier, several researchers have pointed out that domestic violence related calls for service constitute the “single largest category” of calls received by law enforcement agencies (Klein, 2009; Friday et al. 2006). In response, some larger police departments have developed specialized units comprised of detectives and counselors/social workers (Morley and Mullender, 1994; Friday et al. 2006). According to Friday et al., (2006), however, it is not clear how many police departments nationwide have developed specialized domestic violence units. However, according to a national study by Townsend et al. (2005), 11 percent of police departments have a specialized
domestic violence unit. A determining factor as to whether a department has a domestic violence unit is the size of the department (Townsend et al., 2005). These departments are also more likely to have victim advocates working within the police department (Townsend et al., 2005). There is a gap in academic literature exploring the effectiveness of these units and how they operate (Friday et al., 2006). Friday et al., (2006) is one of the only studies that empirically examines the impact of domestic violence units. Several reviews of domestic violence units have suggested that police departments focus their attention on repeat calls for domestic violence (Morley and Mullender, 1994; Sherman and Strang, 1996; Farrell and Buckley, 1999; Pennell and Burke, 2002). As Farrell and Buckley (1999) pointed out, “Any preventative impact of the domestic violence unit would therefore by expected to show up in repeated calls to these same households rather than in the overall level of calls – which, as with the levels of most crime, is influenced by factors largely independent of the police” (p.44).

In one of the earliest reviews of domestic violence units, Farrell and Buckley (1999) evaluated the effectiveness of the Merseyside Police Domestic Violence Unit in England. Initially, when all domestic violence calls for service were compared between the comparison year and the study year, the domestic violence unit appeared to have no effect. However, once repeat victimizations were considered, domestic violence calls for service decreased. Still, however, once chronic domestic violence calls were considered, the data suggest the domestic violence unit did not have a preventative impact for the most persistent cases (Farrell and Buckley, 1999, p. 49). As a result, Farrell and Buckley (1999) suggest that a more efficient use of police resources would be to concentrate upon the “chronic cases” of domestic violence (Farrell and Buckley, 1999, p. 51).
Pennell and Burke (2002) conducted a process evaluation exploring how well the San Diego Sheriff’s Department implemented its domestic violence unit. The department created the unit to respond to domestic violence calls for service and was funded by the Office of Justice Programs’ Violence against Women Grants Office. Evidence suggested that a centralized unit with extensive training has the potential to positively impact domestic violence cases. The department updated domestic violence policies and procedures and then trained officers on the policies and procedures. These procedures were mirrored after the countywide protocol (Pennell and Burke, 2002).

Training on the updated policies resulted in officers arresting offenders despite the wishes of the victims. As Pennell and Burke (2002) indicated, “Cases involving 'no arrest' due to victims’ wishes declined from 23 percent to 7%, consistent with the protocol” (p. 30). More specifically, domestic violence specialization “increased the number of arrests, filings for prosecution, and documentation on crime reports” (Pennell and Burke, 2002, p. 38). Indeed, training resulted in better documentation on incident reports, thus leading to arrest and referrals for prosecution. Secondly training helped officers provide victims with more information about their rights as victims in terms of what resources are available to them in the community (Pennell and Burke, 2002). In the words of Pennell and Burke (2002):

“The findings suggested that many victims were better informed about their rights and the resources available to them after being contacted by the sheriff's personnel. As first responders, law enforcement officers in the field must be well-informed to advise victims. This suggests the continuous need for training of future officers in the police academy. Follow-up training is also suggested on a periodic basis, particularly when new laws related to partner violence are enacted. The following variables were suggested as important ones for determining how well an agency is responding to reports of partner violence” (p.38).
An important finding of the Pennell and Burke (2002) study that has not been extensively reported elsewhere is detective burnout. The dynamics of domestic violence cases create different issues for law enforcement officers compared to other violent crimes (Pennell and Burke, 2002). According to a sergeant in the study, understanding that burnout is a real possibility and it's important to suggest that officers who display characteristics of burnout take time off (Pennell and Burke, 2002).

In their analysis of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police Department’s domestic violence unit, Friday and colleagues (2006) studied the effectiveness of the unit. The department created the unit to decrease repeat victimization and if repeat victimization did occur, to reduce the severity of the incident (Friday et al., 2006). The process evaluation indicated that the department succeeded in assigning the DV unit with the most violent cases and reducing the severity of repeat victimizations. The authors concluded with recommendations for improving the functioning of the unit, like more training for officers on the importance of providing more detailed and accurate police reports and collaborating with police liaisons, volunteers, and victim advocates (Friday et al., 2006, p. 60)

Friday and colleagues (2006) found the Charlotte Police Department assigned the Domestic Violence Unit (DV Unit) repeat victimization cases and more serious cases. The multivariate analysis indicated that DV Unit cases were more likely to involve aggravated assault, gun threats, minor and major injuries, more likely to involve several personal harm measures such as verbal threats, kidnapping/hostage taking and behavior that results in hospitalization (Friday et al., 2006). Moreover, the DV Unit had a higher
rate of case clearance than the patrol unit. However, their success could be an artifact of having detectives assigned to the case (Friday et al., 2006). The logistic regression indicated that offenders investigated by the domestic violence were significantly less likely to recidivate than cases handled by patrol officers (Friday et al., 2006). Furthermore, the DV Unit is more likely to charge for a violation of a protective order, like a restraining order (Friday et al., 2006).

As for victims, the logistic regression indicated that being assigned to the DV Unit or having a DV counselor did not significantly reduce the chances of being revictimized (Friday et al., 2006). However, it was associated with “lower personal harm in the future” (Friday et al., 2006). In summary, Friday and colleagues (2006) suggested that being assigned to the DV Unit reduces the chances of the offender recidivating and also lowers the levels of personal harm to the victim. Moreover, those who were revictimized were more likely to call the police. This finding could indicate that victims had confidence in the police and were more encouraged to call the police early (Friday et al., 2006).

An important observation of Friday and colleagues (2006) is that police departments cannot change the pattern of violence; it takes a village. For instance, Friday et al. (2006) recommended better coordination between the Charlotte Police Department and the District Attorney’s Office. The District Attorney’s Office received training on strategies for prosecuting cases when victims were uncooperative as well as training on how to build cases based on officer testimony. These trainings led to a change in philosophies and a more aggressive “no tolerance policy” on domestic violence. However, according to Friday and colleagues (2006), collaboration with the police
department still needed improvement. For instance, although the DV Unit collected more evidence than patrol, it had a higher proportion of cases declined for prosecution (Friday et al., 2006). In the words of Friday and colleagues,

“Investigation is needed into the significantly large number of voluntary dismissals by the DA’s Office to determine ways the police can assist in decreasing this number or ways the court system and process needs to be altered to make defendants accountable. Officers need either more training in or increased sensitivity to evidence-based prosecution standards. The physical evidence required for post-incident arrests with a warrant is too often lacking and warrants are not being issued” (p.61).

F. A Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Violence

Battered women’s advocates suggest that implementation of institutional reform, should not occur “without an infrastructure of community services in place” (Coker, 2001; Shepard, 1999; Lerman, 1992). As Lerman (1992) observed while discussing the Sherman study:

"One cannot simply initiate one intervention (arrest) in a community and expect to eradicate domestic violence. If the premise of these studies was that making an arrest would stop the violence, the sociologists need only have asked a few advocates whether that was a valid premise. It is the experience of many programs which provide services to battered women that one cannot so much as make a dent in the rate of domestic violence without a coordinated response by the law enforcement, social service and mental health system" (P.220).

With recognition that police efforts alone are not entirely effective public policies have started developing a supportive community infrastructure for victims (Bouffard and and Muftic, 2007). A supportive community infrastructure includes a network of community agencies available for helping victims in need (Shepard, 1999). The network is an interagency response that also provides services that protect the victim from the offender (Shepard, 1999). For example services include: emergency housing, confidential victim-directed court advocacy, support and education groups, and financial
assistance to help women separate from the abuser (Shepard, 1999, p. 116). As Coker (2001) noted, advocates have two important roles, which are: 1.) institutional reformers – “monitoring police, prosecutor, and judicial responses to domestic violence”; 2.) advocates for women. Coker (2001) suggested that a coordinated community response offers a balance between state intervention (for battered women’s benefit) and protecting individual women (Coker, 2001, p. 848).

The Office of Victims Services and the Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) has contributed billions of dollars to victim services, with some of the monies being dedicated to training and technical assistance to law enforcement (Townsend, et al., 2005). However, by the 1990s, little information existed discussing the benefits of police collaborating with community members in response to domestic violence (Reuland et al., 2006). As a result, the COPS Office funded the development of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) “to explore the nature, function, and impact of these police-community partnerships to produce guidance for policy makers on partnerships focused on domestic violence” (Reuland et al., 2006).

Using PERF data, Reuland et al. (2006) aimed to provide a better understanding of how police, the courts, emergency medical services, shelter providers, and counselors combine their resources in a collaborative effort to respond to domestic violence. PERF surveyed and interviewed almost 80 percent of the 345 COPS-funded agencies and almost 90% of the 63 agencies recommended by the Regional Community Policing Institutes or state domestic violence coalition directors. They provided evidence that law enforcement and community agency collaboration significantly facilitates victim advocacy and safety (Reuland et al., 2006). According to Reuland and colleagues, three
major partnership models included coalitions, coordinated community responses, and response partnerships.

According to Reuland et al. (2006), officer buy-in, uncooperative victims, incessant domestic violence calls and funding for shelter care were among the greatest obstacles for police departments to overcome (Reuland et al., 2006). Reuland and colleagues (2006) suggested:

“Because of these difficulties in attitudes and resistance to change, having the proper staff in the partnership positions is especially critical. In addition, as communities focus on improving their response, the number of calls can increase, thereby increasing the workload, which can then cause difficulties in staffing levels. These issues contribute to why many agencies faced barriers related to inadequate staffing, staffing changes, and turnover” (p.43).

A critical mistake, according to police departments, in addressing domestic violence is failing to “partner with the community” (Reuland et al., 2006). As noted by Reuland and colleagues (2006):

“Police sources believe that partnerships overcome some of their inherent limitations in addressing domestic violence effectively. Once the agency has committed to partnering to address domestic violence, another critical mistake is to pick the wrong law enforcement or advocacy staff to work on the partnership team. For example, agencies should steer away from selecting individuals who do not have personality characteristics suitable for sharing responsibility for the scene and/or providing care for victims” (p. 35).

The next few sections explore research on the effects of coordinated community responses to domestic violence.

1. **Recidivism and a coordinated community response to domestic violence**

Typically evaluations of coordinated responses to domestic violence have focused on individual behavior, i.e. recidivism rather than coordinated intervention (Shepard, 2002; Salazar et al., 2007). As Muftic and Bouffard (2006) indicated, research exploring
recidivism of CCR’s have generally found support for the model (Murphy et al., 1998; Shepard et al., 2002; Syers and Edleson, 1992; Steinman, 1991; and Tolman and Weisz, 1995). According to Steinman (1991), the combination of arrest policies and intervention results in less recidivism. Or as Muftic and Bouffard (2006) explained, coordinated community response objectives are usually met “through combination of several components, including preferred or mandatory arrest policies, aggressive prosecution of offenders, advocacy of services for victims, and treatment services” (also see Steinman, 1991) (p. 48). Recall that objectives include as Adler (2002) suggested 1.) increased system efficiency; 2.) differentiation of services; 3.) assurance that victims receive necessary services and suffer less; 4.) increased victim safety; and 5.) increased accountability of batterers (judicial response)” (p. 203).

Murphy et al. (1998) studied whether elements of a coordinated community response to domestic violence (key prosecution and post prosecution variables) were related to reduced recidivism after 12-18 months after adjudication. The study sample consisted of men charged with domestic violence related offenses between January and August 2004 (Murphy et al., 1998). Follow-up data was available until September 2005 (Murphy et al., 1998). The outcome measures were recidivism for battery and related offenses, i.e., violation of a restraining order.

Murphy et al. (1998) concluded that case outcome probation, suspended sentences, ex parte orders, and orders to drug and alcohol counseling were not individually associated with lower recidivism (Murphy et al., 1998). However, the coordinated efforts of prosecution, probation, and court ordered counseling were associated with significant reductions in recidivism (Murphy et al., 1998). Moreover,
increased rates of recidivism were correlated with greater intervention. Consequently, only 4% of the sample population received the greatest intervention (Murphy et al., 1998). Murphy et al. (1998) concluded that results provide encouraging support for coordinated community interventions. However, as Bouffard and Muftic (2007) pointedly noted, there are a number of limitations to the Murphy et al. (1998) study. Official records were the only source of data, it was a non-experimental design, and the statistical power was low, only 4% of the population experienced the complete intervention (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007).

Shepard et al. (2002) also explored whether coordinated community responses reduce recidivism in Duluth, Minnesota. The study used a quasi-experimental design (non-equivalent comparison group), comparing offenders who successfully completed treatment to those who failed to complete treatment (Shepard et al., 2002).

The Shepard et al. (2002) sample included men who volunteered or were court ordered to attend the Domestic Violence Intervention Project (DAIP) during 1994, 1996, 1997, and the first 6 months of 1998. Shepard et al. (2002) designed the project to compare the pre-intervention period (1994) to a pilot year (1996) and two intervention periods (1997 and 1998). The 1994 sample, the pre-intervention group, included individuals who participated in the DAIP. DAIP consisted of collaborations between battered women’s advocates, police, prosecutors, probation officers, judges, and rehabilitation services (Shepard et al., 2002). The purpose of DAIP was to monitor cases as they moved through the criminal justice system insuring that policies and procedures were followed (Shepard et al., 2002). As indicated, in 1996, DAIP developed a few enhancements to the program, the Enhanced Domestic Abuse Intervention Projection
As Shepard et al. (2002) noted, "The EDAIP expanded the coordinated community response with the use of danger assessment tools, a probation-sentencing matrix, and a computerized monitoring system called the Domestic Abuse Information Network.

Shepard et al. (2002) provided support for EDAIP. Recidivism rates were not lower for the pilot year, but were lower for men who entered the program in 1997 and 1998. However, according to Shepard et al., 2002, the results did not reach significant differences when 1994 and 1997 were compared at 18 months. Shepard et al. (2002) noted, however, that results were in the expected direction and approached statistical significance. According to Shepard et al. (2002) there were steady declines in recidivism during the three years after implementation. Data from all years suggested two variables that were significantly related to recidivism: the offender being mandated to the program and the offender failing to complete the program (Shepard et al., 2002). As Bouffard and Muftic (2007), noted, "While this result might seem to suggest the effectiveness of this approach, the failure of this study design to adequately control for selection effects (i.e., those who complete may be inherently less likely to recidivate independent of any treatment effect), this study's conclusions should also be interpreted with caution" (p.356).

Finally, Shepard et al. (2002) highlights some of the problems that could occur when implementing a new program, which could skew results. In 1997 and 1998 when the program was to be fully implemented, interventions were not always put into effect (Shepard et al., 2002). For example, the police documented danger assessments in a little more than one third of the cases, woman's advocates in 95% of the cases and probation...
officers applied the sentencing matrix in a little over half of the cases (Shepard et al., 2002).

Briefly, Syers and Edleson (1992) examined the impact of the Minneapolis Intervention Project (MIP) on recidivism. Data consisted of victim interviews and archival data. Results suggested that offenders who were arrested and ordered to attend treatment were the less likely to recidivate than those not arrested and those who were arrested but not required to attend treatment. Similarly, in their study of the Dupage County, Illinois Domestic Violence Protocol, Tolman and Weisz (1995) found that batterers did not recidivate after 18 months. Consequently, this study did not study the effects of probation, mandates to batterer treatment or jail (Tolman and Weisz, 1995).

Harrell and his colleagues (2007), using funding from the National Institute of Justice evaluated the impact of a coordinated community response to reduce domestic violence in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The objectives were dual: 1.) to test the project’s impact on reducing recidivism and increasing victim safety and offender accountability; and 2.) to learn from the experiences of the project sites in implementing a coordinated community response against domestic violence (Harrell et al., 2007). Project staff interviewed 1,034 victims (526 from project sites and 508 from comparison sites) two months after disposition and 914 victims 11 months after disposition. Project staff also interviewed 454 offenders (229 from the project sites and 225 from the comparison sites) two months after disposition and 366 eleven months after disposition.

The Harrell and colleagues (2007) study focused on the judicial and law enforcement response coordinated with a community services response (Harrell et al., 2007). The project applied the lessons learned from previous domestic violence studies on police,
prosecution, the courts and community responses and tested these ideas at three sites: Dorchester, Massachusetts, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Washtenaw County, Michigan.

Law enforcement focused their efforts on intensive training, improved evidence collection, protection order enforcement, and innovations in interagency collaboration. Prosecutors focused on holding offenders accountable through specialized units and or vertical prosecution. The courts specially trained judges in domestic violence proceedings and developed procedures for expediting hearings or violation petitions (Harrell et al. 2007). The conceptual framework included three core elements:

1. “Uniform and consistent initial responses to domestic violence offenses, including: a.) proarrest policies, b.) arrest of primary aggressor, and c.) a coordinated response by law enforcement and victim’s advocates.

2. Coordinated victim advocacy and services, including: a.) contact by victim’s advocates as soon as possible after the domestic violence call, b.) an individualized “safety plan” for the victim and children (if appropriate), and c.) provision of needed services such as shelters, protection orders, and safety planning.

3. Strong offender accountability and oversight, including: a.) intensive court based supervision, b.) referral to appropriate batterer intervention programs, and c.) administrative and judicial sanctions and incentives to influence offender behavior” (Harrell et al., 2007, p. 29).

The results suggested that victims who received services were satisfied with the quality. Results suggested that there were no significant differences between the project sites and the comparison sites. In terms of criminal justice responses, victims in all sites were satisfied with the response of police, prosecutors, and the courts. However, there were no significant differences between project sites and comparison sites. Victims reported significantly lower rates of new interpersonal violence. Moreover, the project had its strongest effects when offenders were young, had more arrests, victims had a
support system, victims and offenders did not have children, and the relationship between
the victim and the offender was short in duration (less than three years) (Harrell et al.,
2007). Victims offered a few suggestions for police in terms of responding to domestic
violence cases (Harrell et al., 2007):

1. Responding quickly shows concern for the victim’s safety.
2. Avoid engaging in conversations that may provoke retaliation against the victim,
i.e. asking the victim if they want the perpetrator arrested.
3. Do not trivialize or blame the victim.
4. Consistently enforce protective orders.

On the other hand, offenders complained that police quickly determined the aggressor, despite conflicting evidence. They also asked for police to treat them with respect, despite whether they may or may not be guilty (Harrell et al., 2007). The evaluation suggested that the project did increase offender accountability and attendance at batterer intervention programs. However the project did not reduce the likelihood that the offender would be rearrested (Harrell et al., 2007; also see Post et al., 2010 – data from the Post and colleagues study suggested that there was little evidence that CCRs could prevent IPV).

The process evaluation suggested that agencies improved system responses, especially in the courts, increased system collaboration and coordination, maintained consistency in responding to domestic violence cases, and improved practices for investigating and prosecuting cases. Data sharing is one important area that proved inadequate and could be useful for other states implementing this type of project. The project sites were unable to develop data systems that would allow sharing between and across justice agencies and community providers (Harrell et al., 2007).
2. **Batterer’s treatment programs and recidivism**

Muftic and Bouffard (2007) suggested from their review of the literature that the majority of studies that have examined batterer treatment programs, without the components of CCR, have resulted in recidivism. Babcock and Steiner (1999) followed a sample of batterers over two years to determine whether a batterer’s treatment program effectively reduced recidivism. They used a quasi-experimental design and their sample included 387 men. Batterers were divided into three groups, those that were court mandated into domestic violence treatment, those that were court mandated into domestic violence treatment and substance abuse treatment, and those that did not finish treatment and were sent to jail.

Babcock and Steiner (1999) concluded that jail time did not reduce the risk of domestic violence recidivism. In fact, batterers who had their probation revoked and were sent to jail instead of treatment were more likely to reoffend (Babcock and Steiner, 1999). Finally, treatment had a small effect on recidivism. Moreover, most batterers failed to attend treatment. Surprisingly they were not sanctioned for failure to attend. That said, Babcock and Steiner (1999) suggested that the program may have been more successful had repercussions been reinforced. As noted by Babcock and Steiner (1999), “The failure of the majority of batterers to complete treatment despite the fact that it was court-ordered renders questionable the potency of the coordinated community response to batterers’ treatment. Contrary to the findings of Harrell et al. (2007) and Post et al. (2010), Babcock and Steiner (2009) suggested that treatment may be most effective when
offered as one component in a well-orchestrated, coordinated community response with consistent, legal consequences for non-compliance with treatment” (p.55)

3. **A coordinated community response and systems theory**

Adler (2002) added to domestic violence literature by developing an ideal model for exploring how the links among system components unite to process domestic violence cases. The majority of IPV evaluation literature focuses on the effectiveness of certain components of IPV programs (Adler, 2002). Adler's (2002) study, on the other hand, advocates examining the entire system (law enforcement and social services) and how the system unites in support of victims. As Adler (2002) explained, "The modeling approach to evaluation planning intends to provide a framework for an evaluation that identifies the organizational structures, communication channels, service provision activities, and legal procedures in the system that help and hinder the way cases are processed" (P. 204).

The research sites in this study included a domestic violence shelter, the Baltimore Police Department, the Department of Social Services, the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee, and a Baltimore hospital. The results of Adler's (2002) qualitative study concluded with suggestions for researchers exploring the process of how agencies network to form a system benefiting IPV. She highlighted that subsequent research should focus on understanding the key mechanisms underlying changes within systems rather than examining every link. For example, who are the liaisons that partner in more than one system thus providing a "bridge" between the agencies?

Adler (2002) concluded that philosophies of the various agencies were quite different. Adler (2002) pointedly noted:
"Whereas the DV programs come from a vantage point of crisis intervention and victim empowerment, the law enforcement process and the judicial system rely on sanctioning and punitive strategies targeted on the abuser. Both the health care system (public health approach and treatment model) and social services (family crisis model) are involved in short-term crisis management. The approaches to, and solutions offered for, DV vary based on different definitions of the problem - is DV considered to be a crisis for the victim and/or family, a crime of the abuser, a treatable behavioral disorder, or a public health issue" (P. 209)? Adler (2002) suggested that, in Baltimore, despite the ties between the legal system and the DV programs, coordination with other agencies were weak. Possible inhibiting factors were: barriers related to jurisdiction, regional authority, procedural differences, and funding competition (Adler, 2002). This study recommended that any program focused on coordinated responses must develop liaisons that can develop, 'bridges,' thus ensuring continuity of care (Adler, 2002). As Adler (2002) summarized, "Although formal ties may exist in theory among the agencies, they may not be sufficiently well-developed in practice, which in turn may lead to failure to meet victim needs. These issues can only be examined when the entire system is considered" (P. 212).

Salazar et al. (2007) also explored whether CCR's could create an "infrastructure" facilitating systems-level change at the community level. Two counties in Georgia served as the test sites to determine whether CCR's effectively increased criminal justice sanctions (arrests, prosecutions, convictions, sentencing, and referrals to batterers intervention programs (Salazar et al., 2007). Similar to Adler (2002), the study suggested that evaluating systems change within communities is difficult. Unlike traditional social science methods for analyzing change in individuals, there are not as many tools for assessing changes within systems (Salazar et al., 2007).
The results of this study also suggest that priorities and culture of individual agencies may influence the effectiveness of CCR's. There were significant increases in male arrests, in both counties, attributed to the CCR. In one county, prosecutions also increased. Thus, it appears that law enforcement may be more likely to make an arrest if the DA is more likely to prosecute (Salazar et al., 2007). Consequently, however, results also suggested that in one police department, arrests of females also increased (Salazar et al., 2007). For example, in the words of Salazar et al. (2007), "Specifically, the Sheriff expressed to MSV staff that he did not agree with MSV's political analysis of domestic violence and that in many instances he felt that women provoked their abuse and were often the primary offenders" (P. 639). Moreover, in this same county, prosecutions did not significantly decrease. However, the data did suggest a downward trend for females (Salazar et al., 2007). The district attorney in this county held a strong view towards domestic violence thus believing that men should be held accountable instead of blaming the victim (Salazar et al., 2007). The alternative view is that this county did not have enough staff to prosecute all cases (Salazar et al., 2007). Moreover, in this county judges did not significantly change sentencing practices. However, in the other county more men were sentenced to probation and to attend a batterer's intervention program in one county. In summary, Salazar et al. (2007) concluded, "Overall, the findings provide some cautious optimism for the advocates of CCR. Not surprisingly, systems change and its measurement proved difficult, but both efforts resulted in some success" (P. 640).

Similar to Adler (2002) and Salazar et al. (2007), Bouffard and Muftic (2007) examined the processes and the outcomes of a CCR in a small urban area in the upper Midwest. They examined recidivism records of 131 male domestic violence offenders.
The study examined factors related to: 1.) appearing at the program for initial screening; 2.) being recommended for an intensive domestic violence program/CCR type program based on a domestic violence screening tool; 3.) completing the program; 4.) completing the court order; 5.) post program recidivism (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007).

Bouffard and Muftic’s (2007) questioned the appropriateness of CCR’s for repeat offenders. (Also see Muftic and Bouffard, 2007 this study questioned the efficacy of CCR programs for females as females are typically in need of advocacy and empowerment programming rather than sanctioning and treatment.) The results of Bouffard and Muftic (2007) indicated that there are certain characteristics of offenders who comply with certain components of community based assessment and treatment (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). For example, repeat offenders, overall, were less likely to appear for intake interviews and were more likely to recidivate (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). Secondly, the DVI screening tool predicted a few variables that predicted being recommended for treatment. More specifically, according to Bouffard and Muftic (2007) “those individuals with higher levels of education, less serious criminal records (e.g., no prior domestic violence arrests) and current criminal charges (e.g., misdemeanor B), and having received a deferred imposition sentence decreased the likelihood of being deemed “in need” of such treatment by the clinicians in the community” (P.364). The results indicated that individuals failed to complete the program and the court order if the individual suffered co-existing substance abuse issues.

Consequently, there is no indication that more intervention components led to decreased recidivism (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). The study failed to demonstrate that combined interventions reduces recidivism (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). The authors
concluded that the overall the CCR model could be philosophically appropriate. However, the treatment aspect may not have included components that would lead to impacts on recidivism (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). This study explored the effectiveness of the 24-week intensive program and did not explore the content of or quality of the programs (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). In other words, the domestic violence screening tool predicted offenders who would complete the domestic violence treatment program. However, the program could possibly be improved by adding components that would target co-existing drug and alcohol problems (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). Moreover, according to the results of this study, deferred sentences may undermine the efforts to hold offenders accountable. For example, although those receiving deferred sentences appeared to be less serious and theoretically more likely to comply with conditions of deferment, they were more likely to recidivate (Bouffard and Muftic, 2007). In terms of holding offenders accountable, Bledsoe et al. (2007) found that CCRs led to holding offenders more accountable.

Finally, like the above studies, Klevens et al. (2008) provides optimism for CCR’s. Klevens et al. (2008) suggested, as the aforementioned studies, that evaluation of CCR’s are limited to the process with little to no attention to the coordination of the programs or their structure. This study explored the relationship between specific CCR components and victim contact with IPV services in 10 CCR’s (Klevens et al., 2008). The study concluded that IPV did not increase, but contact with IPV services significantly increased. In the areas correlated with higher rates of contact with IPV services, attention was focused on linking goals and priorities to community needs as
well as coordinating services and informing the community about the frequency of IPV in their community (Klevens et al., 2008).

In summary, on a systems level CCR’s are demonstrating the potential of helping victims of domestic violence. Thus, based on the aforementioned studies it appears that future CCR programs should focus on the theoretical aspects of systems theory: coordinating services, developing liaisons between services, and developing specific goals and priorities based upon the community's needs.

G. Crisis Intervention Teams

One of the major contributions that Bard and Berkowitz (1970) made to domestic violence policing was training police in family violence intervention. Their training was supported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Selected officers trained for 160 hours in dealing with the needs of family members in crisis situations (Bard and Berkowitz, 1970). Officers collaborated with family crisis specialists who were trained in clinical psychology. Despite the positive findings of Bard and Berkowitz (1970) on their own study’s demonstration site, subsequent studies questioned the effectiveness of using police officers in crisis intervention situations (Liebman and Schwartz, 1973). About 20 years after the Bard and Berkowitz (1970) study, the Office of Justice Programs and the Violence Against Women Grants Office (VAWGO) created the first federal grant program, STOP (Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors). STOP created funding to develop and train officers and develop efficient strategies of investigating domestic violence cases (Little et al., 1998).
The idea of crisis intervention teams were reintroduced during the twenty-first century. Casey and Colleagues (2007) explored the idea of officers and battered women’s advocates working in teams and conducting home-visits after a domestic incident. Officers and advocates provided women and children with legal advice, practical advice, and psychological and crisis mental health education. The treatment group resulted in significantly fewer calls for police services (Casey et al., 2007).

Stover et al. (2008) and Stover et al. (2009) also explored the effectiveness of police advocacy home intervention projects. New Haven, Connecticut’s, Domestic Violence Home Intervention Project (DVHI) teamed up police officers and domestic violence advocates who would provide home-based visits within 72 hours to families who experienced a domestic incident. Similar to Casey et al., (2007), the project offered women a combination of a safety network, police services, legal services, psychological issues, crisis mental health, and follow-up services. Project police officers received specialized training on the effects of domestic violence on children. The advocates are trained in “basic domestic violence issues, crisis intervention, and child development principles” (Stover et al., 2008 and Stover et al., 2009). The results were contingent on ethnicity of the advocate and victim and severity of the charges. Hispanic women paired with Hispanic advocates took advantage of the services offered by the advocate more so than African American or Caucasian women (Stover et al., 2008 and Stover et al., 2009).

H. Leaving a violent relationship

Another matter for police to consider when developing domestic violence policies is what happens when women try to leave an abusive relationship (Erez and Belknap,
Police are often frustrated when responding to domestic violence incidents because victims regularly return to the violent relationship. As Erez and Belknap (1998) explained, “And at the time that women (and often their children) are facing increased danger, they often also encounter police, prosecutors, and judges who are 'sick of battered women returning to their abusers, or offer little assistance in avoiding further abuse' (Erez and Belknap, 1998, p. 251). Prosecutors become frustrated with domestic violence cases because victims are often unwilling to cooperate in criminal proceedings (Erez and Belknap, 1998, p. 251; also see Hartman and Belknap, 2003). Victims are either afraid, depend on the offender financially, or do not want their significant others to go to jail (Hartman and Belknap, 2003). Hartman and Belknap (2003), however, found that victims are far less likely not to testify than portrayed in the literature. Forty percent of the victims that they studied willingly testified.

Erez and Belknap (1998) explored victim’s perceptions of the criminal justice response. Their sample included 50 surveys of women who were affiliated with the Victim Assistance Program of the prosecutor’s offices in two counties in Ohio (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Erez and Belknap’s (1998) data suggested that 90% of the victims initiated contact with the criminal justice system. In 67% of the cases, this was not the first time that victims contacted the criminal justice system. Many times, the victim experienced injuries as a result of the attack (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Almost 100% of the victims suggested that they cooperated with police and prosecutors requests for information (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Moreover, almost 50% of victims suggested that they testified in court. When asked why they did not cooperate, victims were most likely to indicate fear of the defendant, ineffectiveness of the system, or fear for children.
Victims responded that they proceeded with the complaint to protect their family and “enough is enough.” Others suggested it was easier to proceed with the support of family and friends. Erez and Belknap (1998) concluded that the responses of criminal justice practitioners are important in helping victims move forward. As Erez and Belknap (1998) pointedly noted:

“The results also show that the attitudes, comments, opinions or assumptions of criminal processing personnel who deal with battered women can be, and often are, harmful and demoralizing to victims. Inappropriate or inadequate system's responses may cause battered women a deeper despair than the abuse itself. Negative comments or discouraging attitudes by criminal processing agents underline victims' powerlessness and helplessness.”

Finally, Erez and Belknap (1998) suggested that women were not uniform in their responses as to how they participated in the criminal justice system. Some women wanted the choice as to whether to proceed, others would rather be subpoenaed to court. In other words, the response to domestic violence is complex, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution (Erez and Belknap, 1998). Responses should be tailored to the specific incident and the parties of the incident.

Another factor to consider when exploring what happens when women try to leave an abusive relationship is who do they turn to when they leave for support (Meyer, 2011)? This question is explored more in the next chapter on feminist perspectives of domestic violence. For example, do individuals who disclose abuse more likely to perceive that the abuse is not going to stop (Belknap et al., 2009). Or are those who fail to disclose abuse more like to blame themselves for the abuse (Belknap et al., 2009). Typically police and prosecutors were not perceived as supportive of domestic violence
victims. As a result, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of changes were made in law enforcement and prosecutorial domestic violence procedures.

Belknap and colleagues (2009) qualitatively considered the aforementioned question by collectively exploring how institutional support (formal - law enforcement, social service agencies, victim advocates, medical professionals, etc.) and social support (informal - friends, family, neighbors, co-workers, etc.) compare to one another. The majority of prior literature focuses on either informal or formal support. In summary, the goal of Belknap et al. (2009) included discovering who women turn to for support, the level of support that they receive, and how support is related to severity of abuse and their personal characteristics, i.e. mental health (also see Bowker, 1982). Data consisted of intensive interviews with 158 women from three jurisdictions in the United States: a Midwestern county; a western suburb; and a large western urban area.

The results of the Belknap et al. (2009) suggested that 100 percent of the women knew about the abuse. The social support individuals most commonly reported were relatives and friends, followed by neighbors and coworkers/classmates (Belknap et al., 2009; also see Meyer, 2010). On the other hand, the most common institutional support reported were police and prosecutors followed by victim advocates, other legal advisors, doctors/nurses, counselors/therapists, protection order advocates, shelter workers, and religious leaders (Belknap et al., 2009). Consistent with prior literature, this study also found that police and prosecutors rated among the most unsupportive group of all potential supporters. As Belknap and colleagues (2009) indicated:

"After this gap between prosecutors, other legal advisors, and the police, the next grouping of unsupportive sources included relatives, neighbors, victim advocates, shelter workers, protection order advocates, coworkers/classmates, and nurses/doctors. Notably, none of the women reported their counselors/therapists
as unsupportive, and only 3% of the women reported their religious leaders as unsupportive" (P.390).

Two variables were significantly related to the level of social and institutional support. Women who were older received more support than their younger counterparts. Despite receiving more support older women experienced more problems with mental health (Belknap et al., 2009). As explained by Belknap and colleagues (2009), this finding could indicate that older women have been with abusers over an extended period of time and are mentally drained. Secondly, women who were still with their abusers received significantly less institutional support from victim advocates, shelter workers, protection order advocates, and prosecutors.

Two variables affected a women's level of mental health problems: age and income. As indicated the older the women the more issues reported with mental health. Women at the lower end of the socioeconomic strata reported more issues with mental health. Thus indicating that those higher on the socioeconomic scale have more resources to deal with the abuse (Belknap et al., 2009). Finally, the severity of abuse is significantly related to who knew about the abuse and the level of support. The more serious the abuse, the more likely that relatives, friends, neighbors, doctors/nurses, religious leaders, police, protection order advocates, and prosecutors knew about the abuse. Interestingly, however, the women experiencing the most abuse reported the least support from police.

Similar to the studies above, Meyer (2010) studies how and why victims seek and do not seek help after a domestic violence incident. Data for the study were derived from the International Violence against Women Survey (IVAWS). According to Meyer (2010) this is a national random sample of 6,600 women living in Australia. Like the studies
above, Meyer (2010) found that women were more likely to seek help from informal sources. Moreover, married women are more likely to seek help from both formal and informal sources. However, factors such as having a high socio-economic status often impeded women from seeking help. One positive finding from Meyer (2010) is that women were more likely to contact help if their children witnessed the violence. Thus, as Meyer (2010) noted, "While victims may not necessarily always seek the help they require to protect themselves, their likelihood of accessing different sources of support increases when their children have to witness the abuse" (p. 724).

I. Literature Review Conclusions

The landmarks of change that occurred during the 1970s included political initiatives and legal liability, which eventually led to training police in domestic violence intervention. These efforts led to initiatives implemented during the 1980s, including mandatory arrest policies or proarrest policies, treatment programs for abusive spouses, counseling and relief programs for victims and restraining orders for victims. As Erez and King (2000) noted, the most recent trends to overcome the difficulties in responding to domestic violence include “removing arrest and prosecution decisions from battered women, increasing the use of restraining orders, and implementing batterer treatment programs as sanctions” (Erez and King, 2000, p. 211).

Training police officers on domestic violence and developing units is a fairly recent action. According to Liebman and Schwartz (1973) as of 1966 no law enforcement agency within the United States maintained domestic violence training programs. By the end of the 1970s, a handful of jurisdictions in the United States began revising laws, department policies, and training officers in domestic violence laws and procedures (Little et al., 1998). Landmarks of change during the 1980s included
research studies, such as the Minneapolis, Minnesota, domestic violence project, advocating for domestic violence reform and specific and general deterrence strategies, such as mandatory arrests (Sherman and Berk, 1984; Fagan, 1996). Studies on police intervention efforts tend to address domestic violence in terms of the effects of domestic violence strategies on arrest and conviction on recidivism (Sherman and Berk, 1984). More recent studies have examined the association between coordinated intervention efforts in addressing domestic violence and arrest and conviction (Syers and Edleson, 1992). Yet, as noted by Worden (2001) it is controversial whether arrest actually reduces the odds of repeat victimization and recidivism (Berk, 1992; Sherman, 1992; Fagan, 1989).

Despite legislative changes, some scholars, like Zorza (1992) suggested that police departments were forced to change their views on domestic violence or risk losing control and respect. Strauss et al. (1984) and Buzawa and Buzawa (2003) suggested domestic violence reform began by accident. In the 1970s, women met to discuss their issues, and they found that they were not the only people dealing with domestic violence. The issue they faced was getting police departments onboard with reforming domestic violence policing. Police historically have viewed themselves as crime fighters and not social workers. Domestic violence was a private matter. Thus, for change to occur, police had to recognize the importance of becoming involved in domestic violence incidents. Producing effective results required an intimate understanding of the problem, domestic violence, as well as understanding the nature of the problems inherent within current policies. Without a clear understanding of the problem, developing effective, new strategies is more difficult.
Domestic violence policy changed against the backdrop of political initiatives, legal liability, and the 1980s with mandatory arrests and research advocating for domestic violence reform. Today, most police departments have policies directing officers on how to handle domestic violence cases (Worden, 2001). Consequently, however, according to Buzawa and Buzawa (2003), many researchers still believe that the culture of policing continues to permeate police departments, which inhibit real change. These researchers suggest that, “police tend to dismiss out of hand results of research that contradicts preconceived attitudes and instead rely on street experience” (p. 226). Other researchers have also discussed the influence of norms and rules on system change. For instance, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued there are highly institutionalized rules and norms that “function as highly rationalized myths that are binding on particular organizations” (p. 343). Thus, if this hypothesis is true, officers indeed may revert to traditional beliefs, despite training (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003).

Theoretically, when effecting change, organizations should train employees and or develop specialized units that concentrate their efforts on understanding dynamic issues, such as domestic violence. That said, according to Thompson (2008), “Under norms of rationality, organizations group positions to minimize coordination costs” and they establish links with similar units (p. 57). In other words, during dynamic states of affairs, like domestic violence or terrorism, organizations and agencies develop specialized departments. At times, a unit cannot produce change on its own, which begets involving similar departments or units.

Moreover, revamping policies and or procedures and subsequent transition requires planning. Agencies and organizations may need to plan to train employees, plan for
resistance from employees, and or plan for situations that could “over-tax” the agency or organization. As Thompson (2008) indicated, “Organizations pointed toward emergencies, such as fire departments, attempt to level the need for their services by activities designed to prevent emergencies, and by emphasis on early detection so that demand is not allowed to grow to the point that would overtax the capacity of the organization” (p. 21).

Employees may also resist new interventions because they fear “economic loss, loss of status, loss of friends or associates, or job satisfaction” (Twain, 1983). Thus, administrators must prepare for resistance. As indicated earlier, Buzawa and Buzawa (2001) suggested that police historically have disliked responding to domestic violence incidents for several reasons:

- Organizational impediments
- Lack of adequate training on domestic violence issues
- Cynicism
- Officer safety

Furthermore, if change affects the solidarity of a unit or agency, people will be more skeptical of change (Twain, 1983 and also see Bradshaw, 1999 for a discussion on the exaggerated predictions of economic catastrophe in military towns due to the closure of military bases). Additionally, individuals most affected by the new intervention may resist change because the new technology that goes with the new intervention requires a new skill that they may find daunting (Twain, 1983). Administrators must be able to rebut these fears for the intervention to be successful. Changing any program or policy involves psychological, social, or technical resistance (Twain, 1983; Stanko, 1989, p.54).
VI. TRENTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

A. Introduction

This chapter sets the contextual stage in which this study is embedded. Before delving into the study plan, it is important to understand some of the reasons suggested for changing domestic violence strategies. In order to provide full meaning to the new strategies, this chapter explains New Jersey domestic violence strategies, police procedures, and the collaborating stakeholders. The first half of this chapter ends with a discussion on police layoffs. In the midst of preparing for this study’s data collection, the Trenton Police Department laid off a significant number of the department’s officers.

B. Brief History – Study Context

Trenton is a moderately sized historic city in the United States. George Washington won his first military victory of the American Revolution at Trenton. Trenton was also once a major manufacturer of steel, rubber, wire, rope, linoleum, and ceramics. As a result, one of the free bridges in Trenton still carries the slogan, “Trenton Makes, the World Takes.” In colonial and Revolutionary War times, Trenton was a hub for trade because it was one of the major stopping points along the stagecoach line from New York to Philadelphia (Podmore, 1964). At one time, Trenton was considered as a possible home for the nation's capital.

In 2000, New Jersey had the highest population density in the United States. New Jersey’s population in 2000 was 8,414,350 people. In 2010, Trenton was home to 84,913 people. The city’s population was only 1 percent of New Jersey’s total population.
Despite only being 1% of New Jersey’s total population, today Trenton is the seventh largest city in New Jersey behind: Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Elizabeth, Edison, and Toms River (city data.com; http://www.citypopulation.de/USA-NewJersey.html, downloaded on May 11, 2011). Trenton, New Jersey, however, is not ethnically diverse. The population is largely African-American, Hispanic, or Caucasian. In 2009, about half of the population was African-American (48.4%), about one third was Hispanic (33%), and about one sixth of the population was Caucasian (16.6%) (city data.com; http://www.city-data.com/poverty/poverty-Trenton-New-Jersey.html; downloaded on May 11, 2011). Moreover, in 2009, almost 27% of the city’s population was living below the poverty level compared with 9% of the state’s population that was living below the poverty level (city data.com; http://www.city-data.com/poverty/poverty-Trenton-New-Jersey.html; downloaded on March 21, 2011).

Behind its glory of being a historic landmark in local and American history, there is a grim undertone experienced especially by those living in Trenton and the suburbs. Recently, Trenton has acquired the reputation as one of the most dangerous cities in the United States (Zdan, 2010), which the Trenton Police Department is diligently working to correct. The city also has a quiet social epidemic of domestic violence. That said, in 1991, the New Jersey state legislature recognized domestic violence as a serious social problem and enacted NJSA 25-17 – The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1990. While conducting research before the act was passed, the legislature discovered that thousands of state residents were beaten or killed by their spouses or cohabitants. Moreover, a significant number of pregnant women were killed by their significant others.
As indicated earlier, several researchers have pointed out that domestic violence related calls for service constitute the “single largest category” of calls received by law enforcement agencies (Klein, 2009; Friday et al., 2006). Nearly one in four U.S. women report being a victim of domestic abuse by either a current spouse or former spouse (Domestic Violence Training, August 13 and 14, 2011). In New Jersey, women account for the majority of domestic violence (76 percent) calls for service. This is not to diminish the fact that men are also victims of domestic abuse. Moreover, although domestic violence does not occur on a regular frequency, according to the New Jersey Crime Reports, in New Jersey an act of domestic violence occurs every 7 minutes and 8 seconds (New Jersey Crime Reports, 2009). Within this alarming statistic is an even more sobering reality – a “prime time” exists for domestic violence incidents. According to statistics compiled in the 27-year period between 1982-2009, the “prime time” or “red zone” is 8 p.m. to 12 midnight, 365 days a year. However, at least in New Jersey, Sunday adds new meaning to the term “Bloody Sunday.” According to the New Jersey Crime Reports, Sunday is the most common day for calls for service (New Jersey Crime Reports, 2009).

In response to the large number of calls for service, some larger police departments have developed specialized units comprised of detectives and counselor/social workers (Friday et al., 2006). As Friday et al. (2006) indicated, “With goals of breaking cycles of family violence, it is recognized that domestic violence cases requires more than just effective investigation. The roles of these units include
investigating serious domestic violence cases, interacting with service and treatment agencies to prevent further violence and to assist victims, training officers, victims and community members, and acting as a liaison for officers” (p.10).

C. Trenton Police Department’s Domestic Violence Unit

Since at least 2005, in Trenton, domestic violence investigations were handled by the Special Victims Unit, which also handled aggravated assaults (non-life threatening), bias crimes, kidnapping, interference with custody, stalking, and terroristic threats. In 2009, Trenton officials unofficially called domestic violence the “quiet crisis.” As a result, in 2009, Mayor Tony Mack formed the Domestic and Sexual Violence Commission, which never fully began until January 2010. The goal of the commission, comprised of Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and the Pan-Hellenic Council, was to help unite organizations against city violence. Mack formed the Commission after a domestic gunshot incident that left a 17 year old in critical condition. The girl’s boyfriend, the shooter, suggested the gun accidentally fired during an argument. In 2010, Womanspace, helped launch Tony Mack’s Domestic and Sexual Violence Commission. The Commission includes representatives from the state, the county, and local organizations (Zdan, 2011).

In 2009, the TPD recognized a need to intensify operations against domestic violence and formed a new domestic violence unit. The TPD recognized that although the department was following the state regulated domestic violence mandates, its achievements in terms of dealing with the domestic violence problem needed improvement. For example, according to the TPD and local news, there were eight
domestic violence murders in 2009, and according to a local paper, four of these murders occurred within 46 days of each other (Mickle, 2010). This represented:

- 44% of the city’s total homicides (8 domestic violence homicides in Trenton/18 homicides within the city of Trenton); and

- 20 percent of the state’s total domestic violence homicides (8 domestic violence homicides in Trenton/39 state domestic violence homicides).

Moreover, in 2009, the year the TPD decided to implement strategies, there were 2,021 domestic violence calls for service and 1,702 domestic violence police reports submitted. Of the 1,702 domestic violence police reports submitted, 93 percent of the reports submitted were for disorderly persons offenses (1,580) and seven percent were for indictable offenses (123). As a result, the TPD formed a new unit of proactive detectives who collaborate with prosecutors from Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and trained volunteers from Womanspace. These two organizations are discussed a little later in this section.

In 2010, after the implementation of the TPD's strategies, despite the city’s 1,563 domestic calls for service, 1,634 domestic violence police reports submitted, and 15 city homicides there were no domestic violence homicides. Of the 1,634 domestic violence police reports submitted, 90 percent of the reports submitted were for disorderly persons offenses (1,473) and ten percent were for indictable offenses (170). A critic, however, may suggest that in 2010 violent domestic violence rates were down throughout New Jersey. For example, the 2010 New Jersey State Police Crime Reports suggested:

"Twenty-six percent (19,169) of all domestic violence complaints resulted in injury. This is a decrease of 2 percent when compared to the 19,564 that occurred in 2009;
Domestic violence offenses involving a gun decreased 13 percent when compared to 2009.

Serious injuries were reported in 1,459 offenses, a decrease of less than one-half of one percent when compared to the 1,461 reported in 2009."

Despite the state numbers, in Trenton, between 2009 and 2010 there were also:

- 458 fewer domestic calls for service;
- 68 fewer domestic violence police reports submitted;
- almost a 10 percent increase in domestic violence arrests;
- almost a 10 percent increase in requests for temporary restraining orders.

Furthermore, after the TPD implemented the domestic violence unit in 2009, a number of patterns emerged from the data. A component of the new strategies included enforcing domestic violence laws. Therefore, data should indicate an increase in domestic violence warrants. Data should also reflect an increase in services to victims. The following data are based on the total number of domestic violence reports submitted. Between 2009 and 2010 data suggested a four percent increase in domestic violence warrants issued, a nine percent increase in restraining orders issued, and a four percent increase in Domestic Violence Response Team calls for service (callbacks).

In July 2011, the TPD experienced a significant number of officer layoffs. Despite the negative feelings about the layoffs, the police department continued its domestic violence enforcement efforts. During the first six months of 2011, there were 776 calls for service for domestic violence and 815 domestic violence police reports submitted. Of the 815 domestic violence police reports submitted, 97 percent of the reports submitted were for disorderly persons offenses (756) and eight percent were for
indictable offenses (69). There were no domestic violence homicides. Between January and July 2011, data suggested a one percent increase in domestic violence warrants issued from 2010. In other words, in 2010, of the total number of domestic violence reports submitted, 32 percent of these reports resulted in a domestic violence warrant being submitted. Between January and July 2011, 33 percent of the reports submitted resulted in a domestic violence warrant being submitted. The number of temporary restraining orders issued between January and July 2011 are on par with 2010 numbers. Between January and July 2011, 17 percent of domestic violence reports submitted resulted in the issuance of a restraining order. The number of DVRT callbacks are also on par with 2010 numbers. In 2010, 21 percent of domestic violence reports submitted resulted in a DVRT callback. Between January 2011 and July 2011, 13 percent of domestic violence reports submitted resulted in a DVRT response.

The information accumulated through this dissertation seems to suggest the TPD strategies developed contingent of environmental pressures, crime and commitment to the community. Former administrators led the change in TPD’s domestic violence strategies. A former administrator collaborated with the current administration to set the initiative in motion. The TPD indicated the unit was developed for the purposes of focusing on domestic violence. According to S1, from the TPD, informal meetings were convened for discussion on how to ensure compliance with N.J.S.A. 2C-25 and the departmental mandates. Meeting participants discussed reporting standards; this discussion is ongoing and changing. They also discussed which crimes the domestic violence unit would target. Instead of looking at only indictable offenses, as stated in N.J.S.A 2C-25, the department decided to focus on every crime. According S1, from the TPD, “The TPD
were going to collect statistics and use statistics to correct issues and find where the holes are in domestic violence investigations. Statistics allow the department to identify where cases are falling through the cracks and to correct the issues." Meeting participants also discussed how the department could bring other agencies to the drawing board to determine, “how we could better serve the community.”

A number of TPD employees agreed that domestic violence initiatives were very important to administration. Since about 2003, administrators had been pushing for a domestic violence unit. About the same time that one of the administrators began pushing for a domestic violence unit, he developed relationships with Mercer County’s Domestic Violence Response Team (Womanspace). Womanspace is an advocacy group for battered women. Moreover, in 2006, a TPD employee contacted an administrator within the department with the request to develop a system to track domestic violence cases. This system would provide a mechanism for smoother data collection and data review during DV-Stat meetings. The devised plan also included follow-up, including contact of victims, the assignment of domestic violence warrants to Special Operations (TAC), Patrol Bureau/CIB for action, the scheduling of cases to be reviewed during DV-Stat, and the intercommunications with outside agencies in preparation of DV-Stat. DV-Stat is wrapped up in the idea of Compstat.

As explained in chapter three, Compstat stands for compared statistics (Silverman, 2006). As its name suggests, middle management and upper management would study crime trends to ensure that they understood the problems within their particular regions. DV-Stat follows the same type of idea. As S3, from the TPD, indicated “The purpose of DV-Stat is to bring different agencies together to discuss
domestic violence cases and to review and compare monthly statistics on domestic violence." In the words of S2, from the TPD, “We are more efficient than we have ever been in following domestic violence cases. DV-Stat has been extremely helpful in terms of statistics. We never kept statistics before. DV-Stat has helped us develop a better understanding of what we are seeing overall in terms of restraining orders filed, the presence of children at the scene of domestic violence calls, the number of referrals to outreach agencies, and the number of repeat offenders.”

D. The goal of the DV Unit and the process of implementation change

When implementing the unit, the department began studying the process taken in domestic violence cases, or “how things were being done.” The review concluded there were several underlying factors involved in domestic violence investigations. To begin, many times the offender had a prior record of domestic violence, secondly follow-ups rarely occurred, and finally spot checks revealed the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some police report. Therefore, after the TPD developed the new domestic violence squad of police detectives, it enacted General Order 2009-03, the Domestic Violence Policy, effective May 5, 2009.

The purpose of General Order 2009-03 was to ensure that TPD officers were aware of how they were required to handle domestic violence complaints under N.J.S.A 2C: 25-1 (TPD, General Order 2009-03). General Order 2009-03 fleshes out the domestic violence enforcement guidelines. The guidelines are based on state law, court rules, and the Domestic Violence Procedures Manual that was developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Attorney General through the Division of Criminal Justice (see Division of Criminal Justice, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/dvpolrsp.htm,
downloaded on May 17, 2011). General Order 2009-03 additionally provides guidance to officers with regard to administrative requirements.

The goal of the DV Unit was to prevent victims from being caught up in a cycle of violence (harassing, pushing, slapping, kicking, punching, strangling, and possibly death). TPD officers were retrained in domestic violence procedures to ensure that the officers understood domestic violence investigation guidelines. If domestic violence victims were afraid to sign domestic violence complaints, the department supported officers signing a complaint against the suspected perpetrator.

TPD administrators explained to officers the importance of the new strategies. The department expected that DV packages were completed accurately, completely, and expediently. As explained by one line supervisor, officers are expected to follow a number of steps:

1. Complete the incident report
2. Have the report reviewed by the immediate supervisor
3. Submit the domestic violence package to the domestic violence unit (arrestee history; victim notification form, domestic violence incident review checklist, and the police report).

- Domestic violence unit completes additional checks on the victim and the defendant. Detectives determine whether additional charges could be filed. Detectives also identify additional services for victims. For example, they may reach out to Womanspace….Hey, this individual has been a victim five times, what can we do?

---

1 Cycle of Violence: Walker (1979) explained that IPV victims are not constantly abused. There are three stages of abuse: 1.) the tension building phase; 2.) the explosion or acute battering incident; 3.) and the honeymoon phase - the calm before the next storm. According to Walker (1979) there is no way of determining the duration of each of these stages. The stage discussed above is the second stage - the explosion or acute battering incident.
Administrators explained the importance of accurate and complete police reports to officers, as well as the importance of providing victims with support information. As indicated, administrators recognized that after the initial report was filed, follow-ups rarely occurred. For instance, did victims receive proper instructions about help? Did they receive information about outreach providers, court, etc.?

Additionally, the TPD administration designed a safeguard to ensure the accuracy of domestic violence incident reports. To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the incident reports, Domestic Violence Unit detectives randomly reviewed about 10% of the domestic violence incident reports. The review’s purpose was shedding light on whether the offender, perhaps unknown to the victim, had a prior record of domestic incidents. Administrators concluded they should be exploring why certain individuals are repeat victims. Initial spot checks revealed that some disorderly person’s cases should have been indictable. Through follow-up of indictable domestic violence incident reports and spot checks of nonindictable cases, the department began pushing for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders.

During follow-up incident report reviews, detectives reviewed patterns of offenders to see whether they could charge the suspected batterer with more serious crimes, such as stalking. Moreover, in the words of S2, from the TPD, “(TPD) wanted to ensure that efforts were focused on the offender’s domestic violence history and what occurred in court.” S2 explained that in the past, the court released offenders and the police department would receive no explanation. Officers would run into an accused domestic violence offender on the street and wonder how and why the court released the accused. This caused frustration on the part of officers. The department also attempted
charging offenders with endangering the welfare of a youth, if youth were present. This was a tactic used to show the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office how serious the TPD was in terms of domestic violence.

Warrant sweeps is another step the TPD has taken in following up on offenders of domestic violence cases. The TPD collaborates with the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal Marshalls on warrant sweeps. According to S2, from the TPD, one of the purposes of these sweeps was to “make sure that the word got out to the community, offenders, and victims alike, that domestic violence is a priority to the Trenton Police Department.”

In summary, the TPD's domestic violence unit, as indicated above, focuses on identifying repeat victims and repeat offenders, charging offenders with more serious offenses, paying more attention to patterns, such as stalking and pushing for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders. In 1989, stalking came into the limelight after the shooting death of actress Rebecca Shaeffer by an overly infatuated fan (Coleman, 1997; Melton, 2007). In 1990, California passed the first state anti-stalking law (Coleman, 1987). Stalking is defined as the willful repeated and malicious following or harassing of another person (Belknap, 2007; Melton, 2007; Coleman, 1987). New Jersey statutes define stalking as:


a. As used in this act:
   (1) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly
conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.

Recent research has brought attention upon the link between IPV and stalking (Melton, 2007; Belknap, 2007; Coleman, 1989). As a result law enforcement agencies and criminologists are beginning to pay closer attention to the correlation between stalking and intimate partner abuse (Melton, 2007; Belknap, 2007). Similar to George Kelling’s broken windows policing, the idea behind the new unit was to pay attention to domestic violence “incidents” that could result in “bigger events.” The department expected that DV packages were completed accurately, completely, and expediently. Officers at the scene were to explain and provide information about services and victim rights to the victim. Officers were to follow state mandates and departmental mandates. DV stat convened monthly and DV police reports would be reviewed at meetings.

E. Introduction to Domestic Violence Concepts

New Jersey domestic violence legislation is found within N.J.S.A 2C: 25-17 – 35 - The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991. Section 2C of the New Jersey Statutes is New Jersey’s criminal code. Section 2C defines domestic violence and sets forth provisions for training officers and judicial staff in the procedures and enforcement of domestic violence law, arresting those accused of domestic violence, seizing weapons, disseminating information to domestic violence victims about filing for a temporary restraining order or filing a criminal complaint, and filing police reports. According to N.J.S.A 2C: 25-18, the act’s purpose is to ensure to domestic violence victims that they are being provided the “maximum protection from abuse that the law can provide.” In this regard, the legislature in 2C: 25-18 pointed out:
that even though many of the existing criminal statutes are applicable to acts of domestic violence, previous societal attitudes concerning domestic violence have affected the response of our law enforcement and judicial systems, resulting in these acts receiving different treatment from similar crimes when they occur in a domestic context. The Legislature finds that battered adults presently experience substantial difficulty in gaining access to protection from the judicial system, particularly due to that system’s inability to generate a prompt response in an emergency situation.”

Therefore, the role of the police and the courts, according 2C 25-18, is to enforce domestic violence legislation while simultaneously protecting the victim.

In New Jersey, domestic violence is defined as a pattern of controlling behavior, physical, sexual or psychological, between intimate partners (Domestic Violence Training, September 13 and 14, 2011). New Jersey’s criminal code defines domestic violence as the commission of one of the following crimes against the victim by the defendant: homicide, assault, terroristic threats, kidnapping, criminal restraint, false imprisonment, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, lewdness, criminal mischief, burglary, criminal trespass, harassment, and stalking (The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq.). Also, according to The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, a victim of domestic violence refers to any person:

1. “who is 18 years of age or older, or
2. who is an emancipated minor, and who has been subjected to domestic violence by:
   a. spouse
   b. former spouse
   c. any other person who is a present or former household member, OR
3. who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person:
   a. with whom the victim has a child in common, or
   b. with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnant, or
4. who, regardless of age, has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship.
a. A victim may be below the age of 18.
b. The domestic violence assailant must be over the age of 18 or emancipated at the time of the offense”


Interestingly, the New Jersey state statute never defines household member (Domestic Violence Training, September 13 and 14, 2011). As a result, when hearing cases, the court looks to case law to determine who is covered under household member. Typically, the court has ruled that the more family like the setting, the more likely the individuals are covered under the domestic violence statute (Domestic Violence Training, Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). Thus, this includes individuals living together in a dorm on a college campus (Domestic Violence Training, Sept. 13 and 14, 2011).

1. Police Procedures

The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act requires that all law enforcement agencies in New Jersey develop procedures for complying with the act. In New Jersey when officers respond to a domestic violence incident finding probable cause of abuse, they are mandated to arrest and sign a complaint pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C: 25-21:

1. There are visible signs of injury.
2. A warrant is in effect.
3. A restraining order was violated.
4. There is evidence of the use of a weapon in the domestic violence incident.

“Signs of injury” is very liberally construed. For example, if the victim indicates that she “feels” pain, then officers should arrest the suspect (Personal Contact; Aug. 20, 2011; Domestic Violence Training, Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). Arrangements should also be made for the victim to receive treatment (Domestic Violence Training, Sept. 13 and 14,
Moreover, if a victim refuses treatment, the refusal should be noted in the police report (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011).

Although conditions of arrest are specific, an officer still has authority to arrest and or sign a criminal complaint “when there is probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed, but where none of the conditions” set above were met (N.J.S.A 2C: 25-21). In New Jersey, after arresting an offender, there are a number of forms, pursuant to The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 1990 that officers must complete. These forms are in addition to officer field notes. They include the official police report, the supplementary domestic violence arrest report, victim notification forms, and the temporary restraining order form.

In terms of field notes, at the scene, the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office recommends that officers take complete notes using the writing ritual of who, what, when, where and how to describe the setting (Domestic Violence Training; Aug. 13 and 14, 2011). Initial observations are important as well as any “heat of the moment” utterances of the victim (Domestic Violence Training; Aug. 13 and 14, 2011). This information can become very useful in court as evidence because people tend to speak the truth when they need help (Domestic Violence Training; Aug. 13 and 14, 2011). Officers should also speak with victims, suspects and witnesses, including children who witnessed the violence. No parental permission is needed when speaking to juveniles because they are not juvenile delinquents (Domestic Violence Training; Aug. 13 and 14, 2011). If children witness an aggravated assault, the suspect could be charged with endangering the welfare of a child (Domestic Violence Training; Aug. 13 and 14, 2011).
The supplementary domestic violence arrest report includes specific information on the victim, the offender, and offense information. This information is forwarded to the New Jersey State Police for data collection purposes. Secondly, when either a criminal or domestic violence complaint is signed, arresting officers must complete the confidential information victim notification form before surrendering an offender to the jail (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011; Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, 2008). Most jails will not take the offender unless the form is completed (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). This information is not used for discovery in court. The purpose of this form is to record information about the victim and the offense so that the victim is notified when the offender posts bail.

Finally, pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act, officers must inform the victim about his/her rights; ask whether medical attention is necessary; whether he or she would like to return to headquarters to file for a temporary restraining order (TRO); and if he or she would like to return to headquarters with the officer to speak with a victim advocate from Womanspace. If the victim does not desire to go to headquarters, information should be provided to the victim on victim services. During regular business hours, victims are referred to the Superior Court Family Division to file a domestic violence complaint (Domestic Violence Procedural Manual, 2008). When a criminal complaint is also filed, it must be filed separately through the Criminal/Municipal Courts (Domestic Violence Procedural Manual, 2008). Additionally, in New Jersey, if the victim needs immediate assistance and the courts are closed, law enforcement officers will contact the “on-call municipal court judge by telephone” (Trenton Police Department General Order # 2009-03).
Civil restraining orders, as discussed in chapter five, are a frequent response by the judiciary to domestic assault (Kane, 2000). In New Jersey, restraining orders require that the offender refrain from contacting the victim or face civil or criminal penalties (N.J.S.A 2C; 25-19 and Mamalian, 2002). The first page of the TRO form is the domestic violence complaint, which also includes the narrative (Trenton Police Department, General Order # 2009-03 and downloaded Sept. 14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf). The narrative is extremely important because it details the events of the domestic violence incident (downloaded on September 14, 2011 from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf). Moreover, in New Jersey, when assistant prosecutors review the case file in preparation for the bail hearing, the complaint may be the only information available at that time (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). As the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice (no date) noted within its training guide, "The officer should attempt to obtain detailed information to establish the relevant facts to support the alleged criminal offense committed by the defendant against the victim. This portion of the form establishes the legal basis for the domestic violence complaint" (downloaded Sept.14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf).

There are several blocks within the temporary restraining order form that police officers must carefully complete. The blocks include information such as the defendant's criminal history, domestic violence history, whether the defendant possesses weapons, etc. The second section of the report is the request for relief on behalf of the victim. For example, the victim could request the court bar the offender from child visitation privileges, request monetary relief, or request the possession of “certain personal
property," etc. (downloaded Sept. 14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-
violece/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf). Officers must remember that if these blocks are not completely filled out during the temporary restraining order period, they will not be addressed during the final restraining order period (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011).

The domestic violence complaint is filed with the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court (N.J.S.A 2C; 25-28). The police officer enters the information electronically. The official domestic violence report and the victim notification form must be attached to the TRO and forwarded to the judge (Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, 2008). After the information is entered, the police officer notifies the judge. The judge swears the police officer and victim into court. The judge then decides whether to issue a temporary restraining order.

The TRO provides the victim temporary relief from the offender. Usually 10 days after the complaint is filed, the accused and the victim appear in court for a domestic violence hearing to determine the need for a final order of protection (NJSA 2C; 25-28). The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence and the court considers:

1. “The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse;
2. The existence of immediate danger to person or property;
3. The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;
4. The best interests of the victim and any child;
5. In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; and
6. The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction.”


on May 19, 2011).

In New Jersey, final restraining orders (FRO) are permanent; a victim never has to reapply for an extension. Furthermore, if the victim moves or travels to another area of the country, the FRO is still active and the destination jurisdiction must recognize the order (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). The defendant can petition to have the order removed, for instance if there is no longer a threat, e.g. the victim dies (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011).

As indicated in chapter five, violations of restraining orders frequently occur. In New Jersey, if an offender violates a restraining order, officers can charge the offender with contempt, N.J.S.A 2C: 29-9(b). When the contact is not criminal, contempt is a disorderly persons (offense. If the contact is criminal, contempt is considered a fourth degree offense (Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). In the age of technology, victims may have issues with offenders consistently leaving text messages or phone messages, if the victim has proof of these texts, officers could charge the offender with a disorderly violation of 2C:29-9 (b) (Domestic Violence Training, Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). In point of fact, more than one in four stalking victims reports some type of cyberstalking (Baurn et al., 2009; Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011). In 83 percent of the cases, stalkers utilized email and in 35% of the cases stalkers utilized instant messaging (Baurn et al., 2009; Domestic Violence Training; Sept. 13 and 14, 2011).

Finally, when officers respond to a domestic violence “job” and find probable
cause that domestic violence occurred, N.J.S.A 2C: 25-21 requires that officers question victims on the presence of weapons within the household (downloaded Sept. 14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf). Weapons must be relinquished to officers. The purpose of officers securing possession of the suspect’s weapons is to protect the victim or children from “any harm which could result in a highly emotional incident and which the parties would later regret” (downloaded Sept. 14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf). If the victim possesses weapons, officers must secure these weapons. If a suspect violates this order he or she can be charged with firearms offenses. Within 45 days, the offender can petition the court to return weapons (downloaded Sept. 14, 2011, from www.njpdresources.org/dom-violence/dv-tro-trng-guide.pdf).

F. Collaborating Agencies: Womanspace and Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office

1. Womanspace

Womanspace is a nonprofit organization, in New Jersey, that offers support services to victims of domestic abuse (http://www.womanspace.org/; Winter, 2011; downloaded March 18, 2011). For more than 33 years, Womanspace has provided a safe haven for women from victimization by their significant others (http://www.womanspace.org/; Winter, 2011; downloaded March 18, 2011). Today, Womanspace is the only agency that provides temporary and long-term transitional housing for women who are victims of domestic abuse and or sexual abuse (http://www.womanspace.org/; Winter, 2011; downloaded March 18, 2011). The purpose of transitional housing is helping victims out of an abusive relationship. Many times victims are afraid of leaving the relationship because they are dependent on their
significant others for shelter and financial support (http://www.womanspace.org/; Winter, 2011; downloaded on March 18, 2011).

Womanspace also coordinates the Domestic Violence Victim Response Team (DVVRT). Each municipality and city in Mercer County has a DVVRT. The DVVRT is comprised of trained volunteers. Team members are trained for 80 hours on responding to domestic violence victims. The role of the DVRT is providing domestic violence victims information on counseling, criminal charges, and restraining orders (http://www.mercercountyprosecutor.com/our-units/domestic-violence-unit, downloaded Aug. 29, 2011).

After a domestic violence victim is brought to police headquarters, the police are required to contact Womanspace. DVVRT volunteers meet with victims at the police department and provide information and support at the time of a reported incident or upon request (http://www.womanspace.org/our-programs/programs-and-services/emergency-services/the-domestic-violence-victim-response-team/, downloaded Sept. 3, 2011).

Volunteers provide emotional support to victims. Just as importantly, they explain to victims that they have rights under the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act. Moreover volunteers ensure that victims accurately explained the domestic violence incident completely to police. Domestic violence is very emotional and heated. Advocates try to calm down victims and organize their thoughts, without using leading questions. The purpose is to help the victim avoid omitting important information to police. The importance of victim advocacy is affirmed in the literature. Hart (1993) suggested that:

"Victim advocacy is a key component in the prosecution of domestic violence. Battered women who find themselves abruptly thrust into the legal system
because of the violence of their partners are swamped with new information, sometimes are dislocated, and invariably are confronted with increased demands for family management in this acute crisis situation. It is critical that victims have an identified contact person within the district attorney's office who can provide information about the criminal process and offer referral to supportive services" (P. 632).

In Trenton, victims are supported by Womanspace as well as the victim advocate from Mercer County Prosecutor's Office.

2. Mercer County Prosecutor's Office

The purpose of Mercer County Prosecutor’s (MCPO) Domestic Violence Unit is holding the offender accountable for his/her acts of violence and providing victim advocacy (http://www.mercercountyprosecutor.com/our-units/domestic-violence-unit, downloaded on August 29, 2011).

MCPO prosecutes domestic violence cases vertically and use evidenced based prosecution. In other words, they also pursue prosecution despite uncooperative victims or unavailable victims. As its website suggested, “(T)he unit prosecutes cases vertically, seeks to pursue matters despite uncooperative or unavailable victims, provides victims with support throughout the criminal justice process, and educates the community in the dynamics of domestic violence and its prevention” (http://www.mercercountyprosecutor.com/our-units/domestic-violence-unit, downloaded Aug. 29, 2011). The unit is responsible for prosecuting indictable cases ranging from attempted homicide to burglary and terroristic threats. Other responsibilities of the unit include:

- Prosecuting indictable violations of restraining orders;
- “Handling forfeiture or return of firearms and other weapons seized during the investigation of domestic violence incidents”;

• Providing domestic violence training on prevention and response to local police
departments and Womanspace;

• Providing community outreach on domestic violence prevention through radio, at

The unit is comprised of assistant prosecutors, detectives and a victim witness
advocate. The role of the advocate is similar to the role of Womanspace advocates. As
the MCPO website indicated:

“The advocate meets with victims to provide assistance, information, emotional
support, advocacy and referrals to additional services such as temporary shelter or
counseling as appropriate. The advocate can assist victims with safety needs by
offering a free 911 cell phone and/or help obtaining an ADT alarm pendant. The
advocate can also accompany victims to court, assist with New Jersey Victims of
Crime Compensation Office claim applications, and explain the criminal justice

G. Trenton PD Layoffs

“There is no pressure on an institution like that which threatens its personnel and
municipalities are no exception to this rule……Nevertheless, the gravest threats of
layoffs are in fiscally endangered cities” – David Stanley (1977).

As evoked in the next few paragraphs, layoffs of employees are typically the last
resort, after “short-term alternatives”, because they result in three types of resistance
(Stanley, 1977). According to Stanley (1977) the first type of resistance comes from
employees who are laid off. The second type of resistance comes from citizens because
of cuts in services. More importantly, layoffs are “bad economics” because they add to
the “unemployment rate of an already depressed locality.” Finally, people are reluctant
to cause others to lose their jobs.
Along with crime, Trenton has a battle with the budget. Trenton has a budget deficit of $9.3 million. A memo distributed by the mayor’s office and dated July 26, 2011, (Office of the Mayor press release, July 26, 2011) indicated:

“The Administration presented a budget update to council on July 1, 2011 that reflected a $9.3 million shortfall for the FY 12 budget based on an anticipated reduction in State aid and increased costs for contractual salary increases, health benefits, pensions and debt service.”

In an attempt to reduce the budget deficit, Trenton’s mayor decided to reduce the workforce of the city, including police. The plan cut a third of the police force taking the Trenton Police Department back to 1932 staffing levels (Fair, August 19, 2011).

According to the mayor’s memo, the city employs 1,360 people (city and utility). Eleven percent of the city’s employees are potentially affected by the mayor’s plan, 7% of which are from the Trenton Police Department. More specifically in terms of the Trenton Police Department’s layoffs, the mayor’s plan suggests:

“A total of 108 uniformed employees will be laid off at an estimated savings of: $4,135,847.

a. Reduction of 1 Police Captain, 8 Lieutenants, 20 Sergeants.

The abovementioned layoffs are not the only cuts that the city has experienced in the last couple of years. According to a July memo distributed by the Mayor’s Office, “In January 2009, the City executed a layoff plan whereby 64 employees were laid off. In November 2010, the City executed another layoff plan whereby 85 employees were laid off and 39 were demoted” (Office of the Mayor press release, July 26, 2011). However, no police were laid off.
The reality of the 2011 layoffs has brought up another question: Will the department be able to maintain proactive crime prevention approaches? For example, last year’s contingency plan included the possible elimination of two proactive units that have been successful (D’Aquila, 2010), the Trenton Anti-Crime unit (TAC) and the Vice Unit (Fair, 2011). Moreover, will they be able to meet organizational goals (also see Skogan, 1976)? In the words of Lt. Mark Keiffer, the president of the police Superior Officers Association, “Since 2009, 40 officers have resigned and retired…..So we’re already down 40 officers… It’s really taking a step back for policing…You’re going to take policing back to the 1950s, where we just respond to 911 calls. It’s going to severely hamper our tactical operations, our follow-ups, our investigations” (Fair and Zdan, 2011).

In Camden the layoffs of 168 police officers led to the decrease in detectives’ time spent on investigations and the disbandment of the “widely praised” bicycle unit (Goldstein, 2011; Giambusso, Aug.16, 2011). Camden hired back 75 officers, but it’s notorious for having one of the highest crime rates in the country (Giambusso, Aug.16, 2011). In Newark, after the layoffs of 13 percent or 163 officers of the Newark Police Department, crime drastically increased. The 1970s was the last time Newark experienced such drastic downsizing (Giambusso, Aug. 16, 2011). According to an article in the Newark Star Ledger, crime increased 21% in the first quarter of 2011, with a 71 percent increase in murders, and a decrease in arrests (Newark Star Ledger, 2011). However, as the Newark Star Ledger pointedly noted, it is hard to determine whether crime statistics are simply regressing to the mean after a huge drop in crime the year before.
City executives can also look to the economic turbulence during the 1970s that led to massive layoffs and violence. A number of articles exploring the effects of layoffs used data from the late 1960s and 1970s data (for example, see Ohlin, 1968; Skogan, 1976; Stanley, 1977). As Stanley (1977) indicated, “In 1975 both lawsuits and violence resulted from order-of-layoff problems for Detroit police officers” (p.516).

The purpose of academic papers is to provide factual information rather than forecasting events. Yet, discussing the future of proactive law enforcement approaches in a time of economic downturn and officer manpower shortages appears appropriate. Layoffs lead into questions of efficiency and effectiveness. Effectiveness refers to how well organizations process tasks. As Skogan (1976) suggested, “In the terminology of systems analysis, they are organizations which convert a large proportion of their task-related inputs into desired outcomes (Skogan, 1976, p. 278). On the other hand, the phrase, “more for the money,” relates to efficiency (Skogan, 1976, p. 278). Efficiency relates to “processing” organizational problems. Or in the words of Skogan (1976), efficiency is “defined in terms of processing costs. Efficient agencies are those which convert inputs into outputs with less organizational effort. Whatever their effectiveness, efficient organizations give us “more for our money” (Skogan, 1976, p. 278).

What level of efficiency or effectiveness could society expect from police departments when they are functioning with significantly scarce resources? The Trenton Police Department’s Domestic Violence Unit prides itself on keeping monthly statistics and tracking repeat offenders and victims. Developing information systems takes time. Trenton, like other police departments are short on detectives, police officers, and civilian staff. The question presents itself; will departments be able to sustain proactive crime
prevention approaches? At the same time, perhaps data systems could make better use of scarce resources. However, how could departments that do not have enough resources to keep police officers on staff fund advanced computer systems? The unfortunate possibility is cutting proactive crime prevention approaches, such as the domestic violence unit, DV Stat, and Compstat from tactical plans.

A possible area where shortages could affect policing is in 911 responses. News reports suggest that Camden, New Jersey, experienced a delay in 911 responses after a significant reduction of their police force. In the words of Goldstein (2011):

“after the layoffs of 163 police officers, Camden is feeling the impact. Callers to 911 who report things like home burglaries or car break-ins are asked to file a report over the phone or at police headquarters; officers rarely respond in person. ‘If it doesn’t need a gun and a badge at that location,’ officers are not sent, the city’s police chief, J. Scott Thomson, said last week.”


Critics would suggest that filling out reports over the phone or at headquarters may be more efficient than having an officer report to the home (see Skogan, 1976). As Sherman and colleagues (2003) found in their analysis of the literature, the majority of victims, even those of serious offenses, do not report crimes immediately. Thus, if the victim delays reporting, there is little chance that officers will catch the offender on the scene (Sherman et al., 2003). At the same time, however, asking the victim to fill out paperwork at the station or via phone may reduce the victim’s legitimacy or confidence in the police.
Another issue in New Jersey, Trenton being no exception, is that a lot of police officers are reaching their mandatory retirement age. For example, the recruiting period between 1985 and 1988 is one of the largest in New Jersey State Police (NJSP) (Megerian, 2010). With the booming economy, there were 834 troopers from nine academy classes that joined the NJSP ranks (Megerian, 2010). Consequently, today a large number of these troopers are facing mandatory retirement age. As David Jones, president of the State Troopers Fraternal Association indicated, “We could have 20% of the force go out the door in the next couple of years, and we’re working short already” (Megerian, 2010). In the final analysis, the state’s municipalities will also face a number of officers retiring and being laid off. Moreover, those who are laid off are usually younger officers because of civil service rules and “last-in first-out provisions.” In other words, those who were hired last are typically the first officers laid off.

Finally, as a side note, New Jersey faces not only police manpower shortages in a number of closely bordering dangerous cities, such as Newark, Paterson, Irvington, Camden, and Trenton, but also a shortage in ammunition (Police.One.com, June 5, 2011). The war in the Middle East has left local law enforcement agencies “feeling the squeeze when they go to order ammunition (Police.One.com, June 5, 2011).

H. Conclusions

Bayley (1996) noted, although criminals might not notice reductions in police manpower, they surely would notice if there are no police. The question, then begs itself, where does the threshold lie (Bayley, 1996)? Is half as many police reaching the breaking point or is a reduction of one third of the police department crossing the
threshold to danger (Bayley, 1996)? As Mastrofski and colleagues (2010) suggested, “Evidence indicates that the police, the “guardians” of interest, can have a preventive effect on crime simply by being present at a hot spot with sufficient frequency and duration” (p. 255). Thus, even if crime rates do not increase, departments facing serious manpower shortage will not be capable of maintaining focused proactive crime prevention strategies that are focused on specific tasks, places, and people. As stated earlier, the potential of regressing to a 1950s mindset of reactive policing is a reality. In the words of Lawrence Sherman (2003)

“The more police we have, the less crime there will be. While citizens and public officials often espouse that view, social scientists often claim the opposite extreme: that police make only minimal contributions to crime prevention in the context of far more powerful social institutions, like the family and labor markets. The truth appears to lie in between. Whether additional police prevent crime may depend on how well they are focused on specific objectives, tasks, places, times and people. Most of all, it may depend upon putting police where serious crime is concentrated, at the times it is most likely to occur: policing focused on risk factors.”

In concluding this section, the question for the Trenton Police Department, in terms of budget cuts, is whether it will be able to maintain its proactive domestic violence strategies despite cutbacks. In September 2011, the department discontinued DV Stat. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as a tool to bring together various stakeholders to discuss domestic violence in the city of Trenton. During meetings stakeholders discussed monthly domestic violence statistics, specific cases, and ideas for prevention and outreach. As indicated, the venture for Trenton is whether it can continue to analyze and collect domestic violence data and collaborate with stakeholders despite significantly fewer staff and the discontinuation of DV Stat. Secondly, Trenton should try and ferret out a method of reestablishing DV Stat despite significantly fewer staff.
VII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Methodology

1. Introduction

The purpose of this exploratory study utilizing responsive interviewing is to understand law enforcement officer’s perceptions and experiences with implementing a city police department’s domestic violence strategies. The primary focus is to understand why the Trenton Police Department changed its domestic violence strategies, how it implemented the strategies, and the perceptions of law enforcement officers in terms of the new strategies. Thus, a case study design utilizing police department official documents and interview transcripts are proposed to analyze and respond to the following research questions:

1. Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies?

2. What type of police department dynamics are involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?

3. What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?

4. What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the rationale of using a case study design and includes a discussion on the purposes of designing the analysis with organizational theory in mind. The next section introduces the research and operationalizes the research questions. The following section discusses the unit of analysis and data sources. The final section of this chapter is dedicated to thoroughly fleshing out the analytical strategy of this research project, including a discussion on the study’s strengths and biases.
2. **Case Study Method**

Qualitative research begins with in-depth inquiry, developing details, and finding interrelationships or patterns from the details. Qualitative inquiry ends with developing hypotheses and theories. As Patton (2002), stated, qualitative researchers “may be open to whatever emerges from the data, a discovery, or inductive approach. After the inquiry reveals patterns and major dimensions of interest, analysis focuses on verifying and elucidating what appears to be emerging – a more deductively oriented approach to data collection and analysis” (253).

A case study design utilizing responsive interviewing is proposed because the goal of this research is to study and develop a holistic understanding from the perspective of police officers and others who directly collaborate with the TPD, of how the new strategies are assisting in helping victims of domestic violence. In other words, the purpose of this research is to explain TPD’s experience in implementing domestic violence strategies as a “whole in its real world context” (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). As Yin (2009) indicated, the case study design allows the researcher to retain the “holistic and meaningful characteristics” of workplace phenomena such as organizational and managerial processes.

3. **The Trenton Police Department Study**

In January, discussions began with the TPD to conduct research on its new domestic violence strategies. In February 2011, the department wrote a letter to Rutgers University supporting this research. After receiving support from the TPD, the research
A proposal was submitted to the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University which approved the research in August 2011.

Data collection subsequently began in August 2011. As indicated, the objective of this study is to understand holistically, from the perspective of police officers and others who directly collaborate with the TPD, how the new strategies assist in helping victims of domestic violence.

B. **Unit of Analysis, Sampling and Interviews**

1. **Unit of Analysis**

Studies that have evaluated domestic violence units use the incident or repeat victimization as the unit of analysis (Friday et al., 2006; Farrel and Buckley, 1999). The unit of analysis of this dissertation is similar to studies in the past in that it focuses on organizations themselves and their processes, structures, and goals. This dissertation, however, deviates from prior studies in that its units of analysis were TPD officers; Mercer County Prosecutor's Office prosecutors, detectives and a victim advocate; and Womanspace's Domestic Violence Response Team volunteers. Instead of focusing on the effectiveness of the domestic violence unit by studying incidents, this dissertation explores whether the new domestic violence strategies have changed business as usual within the TPD.

As indicated, the case study is of the TPD’s domestic violence policies and procedures. The units of analysis of this research study are police officers, detectives, and supervisors from the TPD; prosecutors, detectives, and a victim advocate from the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office; and victim advocates from Womanspace’s Domestic
Violence Victim Response Team. These individuals were selected because they come from 1.) different professional backgrounds; and 2.) have firsthand knowledge about the role of the TPD in implementing domestic violence strategies (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). That said, these individuals offer the possibility of a more holistic picture of the role the TPD played in changing and implementing domestic violence strategies.

2. **Sampling**

Similar to the methods used by other qualitative researchers, this study did not specify the sample size. The sample size for qualitative research is typically determined once the data are, as Glaser and Strauss (1967) coined, saturated. In other words, data collection has reached the extent where further collection would not result in new or significant findings (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Marshall, 1996). Through judgmental sampling and “chain referral,” this study identified employees who worked and experienced the changes in domestic violence strategies at the TPD and those that were fundamentally involved in the development of these strategies (Watters and Biernacki, 1989; Marshall, 1996 for judgmental sampling). Judgmental sampling involves selecting individuals who would be most capable of answering the research questions (Marshall, 1996). This type of sampling helps ensure that the sample is comprised of a group that is representative of the population and thus reliable. During the interview employees were asked whether they could refer other employees or former employees that may be able to provide valuable information.

Data collection began immediately after approval from the Institutional Review Board in August 2011. The investigator pre-tested the interview protocol on the first
five interviewees. Based on these interviews, the investigator dropped or added questions to the interview protocol. The investigator dropped the question asking respondents to define domestic violence because respondents consistently pointed to the N.J. Code of Criminal Justice. Therefore, this question did not lend information to the investigator. The investigator changed, “Do you think the department won support for the unit from the community?” to “Do you think that victims are more satisfied?” This question provoked more discussion.

The investigator worked with the TPD to set up an additional seven interviews with available detectives and police officers. The investigator also worked with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office to set up interviews with assistant prosecutors, victim advocates, and the detectives within the domestic violence unit. Finally the primary investigator worked with Womanspace to set up interviews with victim advocates.

This study resulted in twenty interviews. The individuals were from all ranks and agencies. Originally, the TPD’s Domestic Violence Unit consisted of two detectives and a sergeant. Today, the unit consists of one part-time detective and a sergeant who is responsible for other tasks in addition to supervising the Domestic Violence Unit. The investigator interviewed each member of the Trenton Police Department's Domestic Violence Unit, prior and current. Within the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) two assistant prosecutors, two detectives, and one victim witness advocate work together to gather evidence and bring domestic violence cases to court. The investigator interviewed each member of the domestic violence working group at MCPO. However,
one assistant prosecutor and one detective began working at the MCPO after the TPD implemented its Domestic Violence Unit and strategies. Some information provided in these interviews, however, proved useful as participants shared information similar to other respondents. Finally, interviews lasted between 30 minutes to an hour with an average time of 39 minutes. Police department interviews lasted longer than Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and Womanspace interviews. The average TPD interview lasted 42.5 minutes.

The table below describes the individuals interviewed.

Table 1: Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>Trenton Police Department</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>Trenton Police Department</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Trenton Police Department</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Trenton Police Department</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting Director</td>
<td>Trenton Police Department</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective</td>
<td>Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Prosecutor</td>
<td>Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Advocate</td>
<td>Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womanspace</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Interviews

Since the majority of data for this study are derived from interviews, for the study to gain credibility, the “conversational partners” needed to have: 1.) different professional
backgrounds; and 2.) firsthand knowledge about the role of the TPD in implementing
indicated, the research must convince the reader the interviewee (the “conversational
partner”) is knowledgeable and that evidence is accurate and does not have “an
unintended slant.” Qualitative researchers have offered additional guidelines for
qualitative interviewing (Lofland et al., 2006; Padgett, 2008).

Padgett (2008) underscored the importance of a minimally structured interview.
Minimally structured interviews allow for a more open relationship between the
interviewer and the participant (Padgett, 2008; also see Lofland et al., 2006). This type
of structure allows for the interviewer to maintain a student status, learning what the
participant has to offer. At the same time, however, the minimally structured interview
preserves the interview’s organizational integrity.

Secondly and closely associated with the aforementioned point, an interview
guide also helps maintain the interview’s organizational integrity (Padgett, 2008; also see
Lofland et al., 2006). Using an interview guide helps the interviewer to topically
structure the interview. This approach maintains the interview’s clarity and ensures that
the interviewer covers all of the main points. As Padgett (2008) pointed out, “Typically,
the interview guide reveals the study’s key domains (i.e., classes of information from
which a variety of questions could be asked, some prepared in advance and others elicited
through probes)” (p. 103). In the case of this research, organizational change literature
served as a useful starting point for developing domains.
Further, sequencing of questions and the flexibility of interviews is important (Padgett, 2008; Lofland et al., 2006). In order to elicit as much information as possible from the participant the interviewer must build trust and help them feel at ease. That said the interviewer needs flexibility to skip questions if the participant does not feel comfortable answering the question, or would rather come back to the question later on in the interview (Padgett, 2008).

Finally, as noted by Padgett (2008) and Loftland et al. (2006), probing is an essential component of the qualitative interview. Probing gives the interviewer peace of mind by ensuring that their data are accurate. Probing allows the interviewer to ask the participant more questions to clarify concepts that might be unclear or fuzzy. As Padgett (2008) suggested, probing can be used to "go deeper," "go back," "clarify," "steer," or "contrast" (p. 111; also see Rubin and Rubin (2005) for a discussion on interview depth, detail, and vividness). Or as Rubin and Rubin (2005) pointed out, "In the responsive interviewing, model, you are looking for depth and detail, vivid and nuanced answers, rich with thematic material. If you are not getting answers with those characteristics, you may need to alter your wording or spend more time building trust" (p. 129).

4. Interview Protocol

The interview guide covered a few main topic areas: 1.) General Questions 2.) Leading Change; 3.) Implementing Change 4.) Providing Context 5.) Strengths and Weaknesses of Organizational Change; 6.) Processes of Organizational Change. These categories were developed for the purposes of incorporating the concepts of organizational change within the interview and crafting questions that answer the
research questions. As indicated earlier, to fully answer the project’s research questions, the research plan must incorporate either the concepts or the events within the research questions (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

The interview protocol section titled *General Questions* was designed to lead into the interview with light conversation while at the same time providing contextual background information about the officer and domestic violence calls. The second section, *Leading Change* was designed to paint a picture of the experience that led the TPD to “energize” change (Kotter and Cohen, 2002). The section was designed to answer the research question, “Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies?” This question is a process question. Thus, the design of this section of the protocol focused on the development of questions that would elicit how the department led employees to believe that there was a need for change. As explained in chapter one, for agencies to change, the organization must understand its current role, the problem facing the current practices, and the role that the new intervention is to assume in correcting the problem. Without this knowledge, the agency will face a dead end and practices that fail to change.

The third section of the interview protocol, *Providing Context*, was designed to provide depth to interviews. This section specifically aimed to, as Rubin and Rubin (2005) explained, go “beyond the superficial.” The TPD changed its strategies because of an increase in domestic violence homicides. However, according to officers, what specifically changed and what was specifically affected?
The fourth section of the interview protocol, *Implementing Change* was designed to answer the second research question, “*How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?*” This question is an outcome question, thus the design of this section of the interview focused on: 1.) how the department strategically planned for change and; 2.) who led the change. This section explored who the guiding group leading change was within the TPD, as well as how this guiding group began implementing changing strategies. As Kotter and Cohen (2002) underscored, “Large scale change does not happen well without a powerful guiding force. A fragmented management team cannot do the job, even if the individual members are strong people” (p. 41). A powerful group guiding change is comprised of two characteristics: the “right people” and teamwork (Kotter and Cohen, 2002). The right individuals do not imply the management team. The group simply must include people who understand that change must occur, have a vision and strategies for moving ahead, and have credibility within the organization and management/leadership skills (Kotter and Cohen, 2002).

The fifth section of the interview protocol, *strengths and weaknesses of organizational change* was designed to answer the third research question that was explained earlier in this chapter, “*What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?*” This question is an outcome question, thus the design of this section of the interview focused on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the TPD implemented. Secondly, did officers and others who collaborate directly with the TPD buy into the strategy’s ability in
assisting them in helping victims of domestic violence? Moreover, did they believe change was necessary?

The final section of the interview protocol, *Processes of Organizational Change*, was designed to answer the research question that is based on a macro level of analysis, "What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?" This section seeks to elicit information to understand whether there are components of the new strategies that officers and others who collaborate with the TPD feel are problematic or impediments to helping domestic violence victims. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change.

5. **Revisions to the Original Protocols**

As indicated, after the first five police department interviews, it became apparent that certain questions provided no real information. The questions deleted are rooted in the law and thus the answers are easily accessible in the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. The deleted questions added space for interview questions that provided more depth and detail. The original interviews for the volunteers of Womanspace also went through some revisions. The director of Womanspace reviewed the interviews and felt the volunteers could not answer the original questions about the process of changing strategies at the TPD. The volunteers did not participate in the process of changing strategies. The director, however, permitted interviewing volunteers about their experiences as a domestic violence advocate. Understanding the role of Womanspace and the police department in domestic violence strategies is a key component of this research. As a result, revisions made to volunteer interviews included adding questions
on experiences and roles of advocacy. Secondly, revisions included deleting questions centered on the process of changing domestic violence strategies at the TPD.

6. **Sampling Conversational Partners**

   a. **Trenton Police Department Police Officers, Detectives, and Supervisors**

   The most pragmatic sampling design is beginning with detectives and supervisors who work within TPD’s Domestic Violence Unit. The reason this strategy is pragmatic is that these employees are most familiar with domestic violence strategies. Moreover, detectives and supervisors are most familiar with other agencies and individuals who collaborate with the unit, thus providing for chain referrals and additional data. At the same time, although a person’s position might assume that he or she is familiar with new strategies or policies and practices, familiarity may not be enough to provide detailed information. However, as Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested, the best strategy in choosing interviewees is to “choose a person who is in the appropriate position and then after interviewing him or her decide if you have obtained the information you needed” (p. 66).

   b. **Sampling Conversational Partners – Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office**

   The second logical starting point for interviewing those with information on the TPD’s domestic violence strategies is Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office prosecutors who handle domestic violence cases. This is another logical starting point because prosecutors offer an alternative view to police officers. Prosecutors may be able to provide information, from their perspective, in terms of what the new strategies provide
or do not provide. For instance, perhaps the new strategies resulted in more domestic
violence charges being reported to the prosecutor’s office without substantial evidence.

However, interviewing prosecutors also helps improve the thoroughness of the
data collection process. Police officers may provide information within their interviews
that lead the researcher to a certain theory. Prosecutors could either support with
evidence or discredit. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) indicated, “Thoroughness involves
carefully backing up each explanation you offer with evidence from your interviews. If
you cannot find evidence, or if the results do not hold up in a variety of situations, you do
not report them” (p. 70).

Finally, interviewing prosecutors helps provide an opportunity for developing
new concepts, themes, and theories that would not be possible with only interviews with
police officers. As indicated earlier, reality is complex and “to accurately portray that
complexity, you need to gather contradictory or overlapping perceptions and nuanced
understandings that different individuals hold” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.67).

c. **Sampling Conversational Partners – Womanspace**

The third logical starting point for interviewing those with information on the
Trenton Police Department’s domestic violence strategies is Womanspace and its
Domestic Violence Response Team. Womanspace is a nonprofit agency that provides an
array of domestic violence services to individuals who have suffered either domestic and
or sexual violence. The Domestic Violence Victim Response Team (DVVRT) is a
collaborative effort between Womanspace, law enforcement, and community members.
DVVRT comprehensively trains volunteers to advocate for domestic victims in their time
of need. DVRT advocates meet with victims at the police department and provide information and support at the time of a reported incident or upon request (Womanspace; http://www.womanspace.org/our-programs/programs-and-services/emergency-services/the-domestic-violence-victim-response-team/). Downloaded April 6, 2011). This is another logical starting point because advocates offer an alternative view to police officers and prosecutors. People who advocate for victims are likely to have different views than police officers and prosecutors. Victim advocates may be able to provide information, from their perspective, in terms of what the new strategies provide or do not provide in terms of victim services. Again, as indicated earlier, reality is complex and “to accurately portray that complexity, you need to gather contradictory or overlapping perceptions and nuanced understandings that different individuals hold” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.67).

d. Archival Data

Another logical starting point for understanding how the TPD developed its Domestic Violence Unit is through studying implementation letters, newspaper articles, pamphlets and reports. Supervisors wrote letters to executives in the department explaining the purpose of implementing a Domestic Violence Unit. The department gave the investigator access to these letters. Other sources of information used in this study included newspaper articles about the implementation process. Online annual reports from the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office provided an explanation of the role of the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office’s Domestic Violence Unit. Womanspace also provided several online pamphlets explaining the purpose of the Domestic Violence
Response Team. The investigator used these sources of information to provide contextual explanation to coded interview data.

e. Conclusions

In summary, as indicated, the majority of this data for this dissertation were collected using open ended semi-structured interviews. Other sources of data included data from the domestic violence unit and letters, between supervisors, discussing implementing the domestic violence unit. Furthermore, the department invited this dissertation’s author to monthly DV Stat meetings. The meetings were held the second Wednesday of each month. The department felt the author would more fully understand the new strategies by attending meetings. The author attended monthly meetings between the months of February 2011 and June 2011. In July 2011, the department laid off a third of department police officers and could no longer hold these meetings. Additionally, the author of this dissertation attended a two day training on domestic violence for police officers offered by the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office.

Data collection was conducted for eight months between February 2011 (DV Stat meetings) to October 2011. Almost 14 hours of interviews were conducted, not including the number of hours spent at DV Stat meetings and the two-day domestic violence training. Interviews were conducted with participants from the TPD, the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office, and Womanspace from July 2011 to October 2011.
C. Research Design – Research Questions and “Designing the Analysis with Theory in Mind”

1. Introduction

The first step of any research project is transforming a problem into a viable research project. The second step is deciding whether to state formal hypotheses or less formally state research questions. If there is not enough information available to “draw hypotheses to test,” the alternative is less formally stating the research questions (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). As Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested, less formally stating the research questions allows the researcher to remain open to whatever develops during depth-interviewing. This strategy allows research questions to metamorphose as new concepts and themes present themselves during interviewing (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Therefore, the best strategy for this dissertation is using depth-interviewing and leaving open the research questions. As indicated earlier, few studies explore the role of the police department in changing strategies to implement domestic violence policies and procedures. In this case, since there is little information on the relationship between changing strategies and the process of implementing the policies and procedures, it is logical to formulate less formal research questions. Thus, the usefulness of depth interviewing is that the researcher can probe for new information to help solve practical research problems (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

Rubin and Rubin (2005) also suggested that when developing a qualitative research project, the wise consider the final analysis in the beginning stages of research. For instance, is the research planning to analyze concepts about how people view their job ethos? Or is the purpose of research to elicit information on the commencement of
certain events, like understanding the causes of war and who instigated the war? In either of these cases, to solve the research puzzle, the research plan must incorporate either the concepts or the events within the research questions (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

Furthermore, to discover the mechanisms that link cause and effect and whether the theory maintains credibility, investigation needs to focus on various themes and individual perspectives (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Rubin and Rubin (2005) pointedly remarked, “The philosophy of responsive interviewing suggests that reality is complex; to accurately portray that complexity, you need to gather contradictory or overlapping perceptions and nuanced understandings that different individuals hold” (p. 67).

This research is about domestic violence and changing organizational strategies, thus it is pragmatic to include organizational change concepts within the research questions. The research questions for this dissertation include concepts such as change, coordination/collaboration, planning, and decision making.

This study’s research questions included:

2. Research Questions

1) Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies?

The first question is a process question and is meant to answer how the TPD arrived at the conclusion that domestic violence policies needed to change. Of course incorporated within this question is dialogue on what leads a department to change policies and procedures. Organizational change literature provided a framework for this question's design. Questions centered on the problem facing the organization and the evidence that led to this conclusion.
This question sought to answer:

a) Why did the department decide to change domestic violence strategies and what evidence led it to change?

Secondly,

2) How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?

Questions centered on planning for change, i.e. developing and achieving goals and objectives; actually implementing the new policies; and the plan for resistance to change.

An important theme embedded within this question is how the department planned for change in the workload of the TPD Domestic Violence Unit and TPD officers. In other words, what was the scope of the strategy (similar to the strategy taken by Worden, 2001)? For example, how did the department decide how many people and who to assign to the Domestic Violence Unit? Is training mandatory? Or for instance, how was domestic violence defined? Were written reports required for all domestic cases? Is arrest mandatory? Could warrants be filed without a victim complaint? Are victims immediately put in touch with an advocate? When are domestic violence cases referred to a detective for follow-up?

This question sought to answer:

a) Who was the change agent leading change? How did the change agent implement change?
   o Was a plan developed?
   o Was a vision for the future created?
   o Were goals and objectives developed? Why or why not?
   o How did the department decide how many people and who to assign to the domestic violence unit?
o How did the department develop buy-in from officers? (motivation to change);
  o How did the department plan for resistance to change?

b) How did the TPD take the initiative in implementing strategies in a unique way? How did the “core technology” of policing domestic violence change? What strategies were implemented? (For example problem oriented policing strategies resulted in the development of Compstat and hot spot policing).

  o For instance, did the new strategies lead to the collection of domestic violence data? Why or why not?
    o Why is collecting data on domestic violence victims and offenders important?

c) How did the role of police officers change in handling domestic violence cases? For example, how do officers decide whether to arrest an offender? Or, how do officers decide whether to help a victim secure a restraining order?

3) What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?

The third question is also an outcome question and seeks to determine the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the TPD implemented. As Graphia (2010) pointedly noted and as mentioned in chapter one, “From a policy perspective, leaders want to ensure that precious financial and human capital are allocated and consumed wisely” (p. 141). However, administrators and policymakers also want to ensure that new strategies and procedures are allowing officers to “maximize their own ability to provide security and protection” (p. 141). In other words, it is one thing for strategies to be implemented and quite another for these strategies to assist officers in helping victims of domestic violence. This question sought to answer items such as:

a) How did individuals directly involved with the new strategy such as police officers, prosecutors, and support services feel about the new strategies? Strengths? Weaknesses? Suggestions for improvement?

  o How have investigations changed with the new policies? Strengths? Weaknesses? Suggestions for improvement?
o Collaborations?

b) Are a greater number of victims receiving support?
   o Why are a greater number of victims receiving support?

(also see Chan, 1997 for a discussion on changing police department culture.)

4) The final question is also an outcome question and sought to determine what the TPD experience can tell us about processes of organizational change. This question seeks to answer items such as:

a) How would TPD management teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies?
   o Would management change any strategies used by the TPD?

b) How would TPD officers teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies?
   o Would officers change any strategies used by the TPD?

c) In general, what recommendations would the TPD suggest to any agency or business trying to change its way of doing business?
   o What was the most important factor in implementing change?
     • Is coordination important?
     • Are goals and objectives important?
     • A change constituency?
   o What was the biggest impediment to implementing change?

In summary, James Q. Wilson (1989) provided a few useful suggestions for studying the success of organizations. To begin, understanding the success of organizations involves probing into the organizational management problem and understanding how they defined the “critical task.” In other words, what was the problem that the organization faced and how did it solve the problem? For instance, the problem for the TPD was high numbers of domestic violence homicides. Subsequently,
it began to solve the problem by developing a Domestic Violence Unit. According to Wilson (1989) the second challenge organizations face is persuading employees to endorse the changes and the mission of the organization. Finally, according to Wilson (1989) organizations face acquiring “sufficient freedom of action and external political support (or at least non opposition) to permit it to redefine its tasks as it saw best and to infuse that definition with a sense of mission” (p. 26). For example, in order to accomplish its mission some organizations need financial support for external political partners.

3. **Hypotheses**

Although qualitative research does not require researchers to have a predetermined research map, it is unrealistic to believe that individual intuitions, hunches, or points of view are mysteriously erased from memory during planning stages (Potter, 2008). In other words, everybody enters into research with preconceived ideas (Potter, 2008).

This research began with a few hunches or hypotheses based upon the author's work, academic, and personal experiences.

1. The TPD implemented new strategies based on rising domestic violence homicides within the city of Trenton.
2. A change agent committed to change is important in facilitating and security policy compliance.
3. The utility of new strategies are contingent on a strong change agent and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies and social agencies.
4. The Trenton experience provides evidence that certain organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation.
5.
4. **Data Analysis – Data Units and Themes**

Data analysis for this dissertation includes analyzing both interview transcripts and official documents. Building data includes searching each interview and official document for specific concepts and themes. The purpose is to begin piecing together and linking similar concepts and themes across interviews. This process is also known as responsive interviewing. In other words, each concept becomes a data unit and eventually, the data units are linked to form a theme. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) indicated, “After you find, refine, elaborate, and integrate your concepts and themes, you begin to code them, that is, figure out a brief label to designate each and then mark in the interview text where the concepts, themes, events or topical markers are found” (p. 207).

a. **Data Analysis: Coding – Sorting Data**

The next step in analyzing data is to re-sort the files and group them according to perhaps background characteristics, police department rank or ranking according to the level of importance (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The purpose of recategorizing, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005) is to determine whether answers given during interviews are contingent on, for instance, individual characteristics or job characteristics. This is important because information learned from this process could generate additional questions, which could generate themes leading possibly to new theories.

b. **Data Analysis: Coding and Building Theory**

This study adopts a hybrid approach to theory development (Brixey et al., 2007). The hybrid approach combines both inductive and deductive analysis. This type of analysis uses literature and theory to develop a “classification framework” and then adds
new categories that are inductively grounded in the data (grounded theory framework) (Brixey et al., 2007).

The grounded theory framework requires that concepts and themes are built from the data without the use of the literature (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Grounded theory is a systematic process that allows the researcher to develop middle range theory that is grounded in the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2005). In other words, the theory has routes in the data collection process; or as Charmaz (2005) pointed out, “Coding gives a researcher analytic scaffolding on which to build” theory (p. 517). As Rubin and Rubin (2003) indicated, the first stage in grounded theory is coding. Oral history or secondary interviews are reviewed and data units (concepts and themes) are “categorized” according to similarity. The second stage of grounded theory is developing new ideas through constantly comparing the data units. As Charmaz (2005) indicated, “Grounded theory is a comparative method in which the researcher compares data with data, data with categories, and categories with category” (p. 517).

Middle range theory, as indicated earlier, takes the case specific theory one step further by exploring how far “the principles and processes” discovered in the case specific study might extend (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). For instance, theoretically, perhaps changing departmental domestic violence strategies resulted in a more organized efficient response to domestic violence. Or, more broadly, perhaps there is a link between greater collaboration between the community, other law enforcement agencies and the police in pulling levers on chronic domestic violence offenders. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005) for themes to be upgraded to a middle-level theory, the researcher must either compare other similar cases to the current case or link the findings
from the current research to other published literature on the subject, a more deductive approach. Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested the majority of qualitative research aims to develop a middle-level theory “that builds on what was learned from the interviewing and then speaks to issues present in the literature” (p.231).

Grounded theory is useful when the researcher is using secondary qualitative data, such as oral history archives or needs to analyze interviews for a new research project, separate from the original research project (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). As indicated by Rubin and Rubin (2005) for the aforementioned project, the framework requires a detailed line by line review of the interview because the researcher did not have the “experiential learning” acquired through conducting their own research. Conducting interviews often leads to possible concepts and themes (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

c. Data Coding for the Trenton Police Department Study

The first step of analyzing this study's data involved coding interview transcripts and letters. Similar to the grounded theoretical approach, coding is the first step in responsive interviewing data analysis. Ideas for concepts and themes were developed through reviewing literature on organizational change (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). As Rubin and Rubin (2005) explained, "Using published literature to suggest concepts and themes by which to code is perfectly legitimate. In fact, doing so will help you later on if you are trying to relate your findings to what others have already written” (p. 209).

Secondly, interview transcripts were reviewed and data units (concepts and themes) are categorized according to similarity. This process facilitates final stages of data analysis and quickly finding data that refers to the same concept or theme (Rubin
and Rubin, 2005). In other words, interviews were categorized according to whether they took place with police department participants, prosecutor's office participants, and victim advocates.

Next, one of the last steps of data analysis for this study involved sorting and comparing the data according to job titles. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested, "Once you have worked out preliminary ideas from examining the sorted files of coded data, you then sort your files a second time, this time to see if when you group your interviewees by their background characteristics, the coded data from their interviews highlight the concepts, themes, or events in distinct ways" (p. 226). This study also used concept maps to help highlight concepts and how they are related to certain themes. This technique helped crystallize and bring to light certain connections not considered during initial stages of analysis.

Finally, checking for the truthfulness of any study's results involves a few steps including checking for thoroughness, believability, and accurateness (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Checking for the data’s thoroughness refers to playing detective and looking for discrepancies in interview accounts, solving the puzzle, and looking for new avenues to pursue (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Secondly, the interview should result in data that are both accurate and precise. A dartboard is often used to explain the difference between accuracy and precision. Accuracy refers to consistently hitting the bull’s eye. Precision refers to hitting the same area of the dartboard, just not the bull’s eye. In Figure 1, all of the darts hit the bull’s eye. If the darts signified data, the data would have been both precise and accurate. If however, the darts in Figure 1 were all over the board, the data
would be neither precise nor accurate. Finally, if the all the darts had hit the single bull, or the area right outside the bulls eye, the data results are precise, just not accurate.

In concluding, the benefit of coding using responsive interviewing is that the framework combines deductive and inductive analysis, a hybrid approach. Thus, the framework permits the researcher to review interviews and simultaneously study the literature "to gain ideas on what themes and concepts for which to code, develop new concepts where appropriate, and then work out the definitions prior to doing the physical coding" (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, P. 221). In the case of this research, organizational change literature was a useful starting point for developing concepts and themes. Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested a few useful organizational change categories, like organizational complexity and how organizational complexity affects personal actions (p. 235).

The interview should result in data that are believable and show that deception was not a factor in the interview (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested a couple of strategies for ensuring that data are believable. Data are more believable when the interviewee has direct knowledge about the topic. Finally, interviews designed with redundant questions build against distortion and help ensure consistency. When the same question is answered differently the interviewee can ask for clarity (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).

Newman (2004) pointedly noted that there are a couple of issues with gathering accurate data to serve as the “building blocks” of any study that is qualitative study. Among the number of points that Newman (2004) mentioned, a couple of the more
important points are that people may forget details; people may forget information that is traumatic in nature or; people may have vested interests in the content of what is being studied. Consequently, there are no “magical solutions” to these issues. However, Newman (2004) suggested a few strategies for dealing with these issues. One line of defense is awareness of the problem (Newman, 2004). Another line of defense is contextualizing the data (Newman, 2004). The final line of defense is triangulating the data (Newman, 2004).

Contextualizing the interview data refers to giving social meaning to the data in terms of everything that is known about the individual, i.e. the individual’s social position, political agenda, their personal agenda, etc. (Newman, 2004). As Newman (2004) indicated, contextualizing refers to shedding light on not only what a person “knows,” but how they “know it.” Triangulating refers to providing contextual meaning to the data by gathering data from a number of different interview sources and sources of data (Newman, 2004). This allows the researcher to determine whether different sources agree “on the same set of facts” (Newman, 2004). When contextualizing data, however, the weight of the evidence should be held on interviewees or data that are not “subject to known sources of bias” (Newman, 2004).

d. Protecting Subjects – Institutional Review Boards

As Padgett (2008) observed, a research proposal is incomplete without a discussion of ethics and institutional review boards. The whole purpose of investigating and studying different types of phenomenon is to learn more about the topic. There would be no need to study, for instance, the process of implementing domestic violence
strategies if everything was already understood about the process. Today, research is a regulated process. Federal agencies monitor research projects to ensure that the research meets ethical standards (Steinbeck, 2007). For example, University Institutional Review Boards (IRB) typically require that researchers complete a research protocol demonstrating how they incorporated steps to protect the research subjects within the research design (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Further, if the research involves interviews, the IRB asks the researcher to attach a written questionnaire (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The purpose of attaching the questionnaire is to ensure that the interview does not contain questions that may in some way shape or form harm the participant.

The problem for qualitative researchers is that interview protocols evolve with research. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) noted, there are a couple of strategies to use in handling “the problem of an IRB’s insistence on knowing the design of the project before the research can begin” (p. 105). First, the design could suggest that questionnaire items may evolve during the process of the research (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Or the researcher could conduct preliminary exploratory research to develop questions and a design that will serve as “a fair guide to the rest of the work” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 105).

Institutional Review Boards typically require that researchers ask subjects to sign informed consent forms. An informed consent form briefly describes the background of the researcher, notifies subjects of the purposes of the research, the potential benefits and risks of the research, indicates the degree of confidentiality, and highlights that the research is completely voluntary (Rubin and Rubin, 2005).
This study adheres to the aforementioned suggestions for an ethical research design. Rutgers University’s Institutional Review Board received a copy of the research protocol for review. Secondly, since this study involved interviews, the protocol included a number of question examples. Further, this research is completely voluntary and consent is required to participate. The research was also confidential. In other words, the research design precludes identifying participants within the research results. This study recorded the participant’s name, age, rank, and agency information. However, the identifying information will be excluded from the research report. For example, if the participant is a sergeant, the results will indicate “a supervisor.” Thus, the interviewee’s identity and data will be kept confidential. Once the interview is over participants are asked whether they consent to the interview being used for research purposes. Data are secured in a locked filing cabinet. Finally, the TPD will be provided a copy of the research results.

5. **Strengths and Study Biases**

   a. **Case Studies:**

   As with all research designs there are pitfalls to beware of when using the case study design. Yin (2009) suggests there are four tests that are typically used to judge the quality of a research design: 1.) the construct validity test; 2.) internal validity test; 3.) external validity test; 4.) reliability test. Yin (2009) suggested that construct validity is concerning for case study designs (Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2009) a common flaw among case study researchers is failing to operationalize measures. Yin (2009) suggested covering two steps to meet construct validity: 1.) defining specific concepts for study and 2.) use operational measures that match the concepts. Preferably measures proved reliable in prior research.
The plan for this research included identifying the path taken by the TPD to change domestic violence strategies and carry out the policies. Interviews were chosen as the primary method of collecting data because little is known about implementing change within a police department. In other words, little research explores the processes taken by departments to implement strategies or the perceived experiences implementing strategies. Drafting the interview involved reviewing literature relevant to police department organizational change and domestic violence. Yin (2009) suggested to improve construct validity researchers "have key informants review draft case study reports." This study followed Yin (2009)'s advice and pooled TPD administrators and detectives together in a meeting to review the research questions and interview construct. Administrators and detectives provided their opinions of the interview and questions. Overall, both administrators and detectives approved of the structure of the interview and the questions. Finally, during interviews, TPD staff, MCPO prosecutors, MCPO detectives, and victim advocates were asked whether the interview covered all relevant points. If not, what questions should be asked to future interviewees.

Usually internal validity is only a concern for explanatory studies (Yin, 2009). Meeting internal validity requirements requires that researchers ensure that their study is airtight. Is there really a causal relationship between x and y or is a third variable intervening? A method of ensuring internal validity is triangulating data. Triangulating refers to providing contextual meaning to the data by gathering data from a number of different interview sources and sources of data (Newman, 2004). This allows the researcher to determine whether different sources agree “on the same set of facts” (Newman, 2004). Using different sources of data also allows the researcher to explore
rival explanations. For example, in this study's case, did prosecutors have different ideas than police department participants on the processes of change?

A critique of those opposed to case study research is the research fails the test of external validity. Critics suggest that replication of single case studies is more difficult (Yin, 2009). In other words, generalizability is difficult for case study designs. This study used a precaution to help ensure generalizability. Research questions borrowed themes and constructs used by prior literature in the organizational change field (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). As Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested, "You can get ideas for important themes and concepts by which to code by examining published literature in your field" (p. 209). Comparing this research's results to prior research helps ensure the research is generalizable to other research sites.

The final test of validity is the reliability test. A study that is reliable will derive the same results multiple times. A researcher duplicating the study could follow the same steps and arrive at the same findings (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) suggested that researchers guard against unreliable results by operationalizing research steps. As Yin (2009) noted, "The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder" (p. 45). One method of ensuring reliability is to use the same initial set of questions for each interview.

This study used semi-structured interviews to ensure reliability. This type of structure allows for the interviewer to maintain a student status, learning what the participant has to offer. At the same time, however, the minimally structured interview
preserves the interview’s organizational integrity. Secondly and closely associated with the aforementioned point, an interview guide also helps maintain the interview’s organizational integrity (Padgett, 2008; also see Lofland et al., 2006). As indicated earlier, using an interview guide helps the interviewer to topically structure the interview. This approach maintains the interview’s clarity and ensures that the interviewer covers all of the main points.

b. Sampling

This study proposes to use the chain referral methodology. Wright and colleagues (2004) commented about the weaknesses and strengths of using “chain referrals” as a sampling method. They pointedly noted that this sampling technique is effective for finding hard-to-reach people (also see Marshall, 1996), but it also has pitfalls, especially concerning internal validity. As indicated above, this dissertation research proposes to depend on employees to make referrals to other employees and program staff. The risk of this method is who personnel that may have had valuable information are excluded from the study. If this were quantitative research, sample size would be an issue. When conducting qualitative research, however, the researcher continues to collect data until his data is “saturated” and the research questions are completely answered. In other words, patterns have been exhausted and there are no new pattern developments. As Patton (2002) remarked, when applying a purposeful sample credibility should not be based on probability sampling, but should be judged according to the purpose and rationale of the study.

Next, in an attempt to increase the representativeness of this study’s sample, thereby avoiding issues with external validity, research methods include data
triangulation. Research suggests that “data triangulation” is a method of cross validating sources by a variety of different means. Moreover, as Patton (2002) noted, although triangulation may not demonstrate consistencies, it may still be “illuminative.” Triangulation may provide negative cases, or cases that do not support developing hypotheses or theories. Hence, new hypotheses or theories would need to be developed. Consequently, however, these data are only generalizable to cities with characteristics similar to Trenton, New Jersey.

Finally for this study to achieve valuable outcomes, construct validity becomes extremely important. A poorly constructed instrument or a poorly defined construct will result in data that are incomplete or false. As Patton (2002) indicated, “Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings.” Patton (2002) makes an important point regarding qualitative data collection. The data are only as credible as the interviewer and the instrument. A concern of this research, therefore, is whether the data instrument for this dissertation, the interview, is credible. In other words, will the instrument help answer research questions? A couple of precautions were accounted for within the research that will help enhance validity: 1.) the interviews were based on theory and 2.) prior research.

6. **Summary Remarks**

This study sheds light on processes taken to implement new strategies at the TPD, the impediments encountered, the methods of overcoming impediments and the effectiveness of the domestic violence strategies. All things considered, data collection began, in January 2011, during the first meeting with the TPD. During this meeting,
participants explained: why the police department decided to implement new domestic violence strategies; other agencies with which they collaborate; and why they implemented DV Stat. Attendance at DV-Stat meetings between February and June 2011, to some measure, provided data for this study. The meetings provided a great degree of information about the new strategies and how they were working. This dissertation’s author also learned a lot from informal meetings with departmental staff.

In July 2011, the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office provided a domestic violence, two-day training to the Princeton University Police Department. This training provided a wealth of information on domestic violence procedures and policies.

Between June and July 2011, five pretest interviews were conducted with an administrator, middle management supervisor, line supervisor, detectives, and one police officer. The interviews ranged from 30 to 60 minutes. Middle management briefly informed participants that this was a study on TPD domestic violence strategies and has the full support of the director of the police department. The primary researcher provided a more detailed explanation of the research to participants. They signed an informed consent document and were provided a copy at the beginning of the interview. None of the officers opted for audio-recorded interviews. In order to ensure accuracy of the interview, for the purposes of analysis, officers were provided a typed copy of the interviews. No compensation was provided for participants in the study. Interviews with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s staff and Womanspace began in October 2011.

The interview questions were designed to elicit information on how and why police departments change policies; the process taken to implement change; utility of change; and key organizational dynamics relevant to other police departments during
organizational change. The research questions reflect factors that influence organizational change, the process taken to implement change, the perceived utility of strategies, and organizational factors essential in facilitating organizational change.

This qualitative analysis began with transcribing the hand written interviews. Interviews were transcribed and typed. Since interviews were not audio-recorded, exact wording is not possible. However, participant responses are still bracketed by quotes to highlight their ideas and comments.
VIII. RESEARCH FINDINGS

A. Introduction

This case study contributes valuable information for agencies looking at implementing specialized units within their departments. In “21st century policing,” departments face many unprecedented challenges, like gang violence and terrorism. Sometimes departments prioritize preventing crimes, like street violence, guns, and drugs because these crimes are visible and immediately pressing. This category of crime takes priority over developing policies and strategies that prevent victimization that occurs outside of the public eye. The issue is that crime that occurs indoors, like domestic violence, can reach the public eye. Police officers suggest that studies in domestic violence are practical because they encounter domestic violence calls frequently and new information is useful.

B. The hybrid approach - developing a classification framework

This study dedicated four chapters to theoretical perspectives and literature. This study highlighted and stressed the importance of prior literature to provide a classification framework for understanding this study's research results. As this chapter suggests, this study provides support for contingency theory. Data also suggests the TPD applied the tenets of the SARA model when planning and implementing their DV Unit.

Contingency theory is based upon an open systems framework. Contingency theorists suggest that police departments are affected by both internal politics and environmental contingencies, i.e. community politics, legislation, court decisions, etc. (Thompson, 2008). Agency efficiency depends upon planning for contingencies and revamping policies and procedures based upon the contingencies (Thompson, 2008). A
number of findings emerged from the interviews with participants, supporting contingency theory and elucidating how and why the TPD implemented its domestic violence unit.

First this study provides insight into how organizations make decisions to change and secondly how they implement change. In general, this study suggested that external factors and domestic violence homicides provided impetus for changing domestic violence strategies. Secondly, and in accordance with prior organizational change literature, a change agent is important during the implementation stages. Moreover, as discussed in chapter nine, when tailoring responses to domestic violence, police departments should be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, like advocacy organizations (Sampson, 2007). Participants, of this study, suggested that victim support is increased through interagency collaborations and increased compliance/accountability. Finally, participants suggested agencies implementing a domestic violence unit focus attention on a change agent; training and educating officers/public; and compliance and accountability. Several participants also referenced the need for adequate manpower.

Contingency theory, as noted above, suggests that agencies plan for resistance from employees. Organizational change literature consistently points to the role of resistance in impeding change within organizations (Twain, 1983; Thompson, 2008). An unanticipated finding of this study was the role of compulsion. At the TPD, officers did not resist, instead they felt compelled to change. Most participants understood the reasons for changing domestic violence strategies. Several participants pointed to the increase in domestic violence homicides over a short period of time.
Evidence suggests the model of problem oriented policing assisted the TPD change their domestic violence strategies. In retrospect and providing context for this discussion, in 1979, Herman Goldstein introduced the idea of problem oriented policing. At the time that Goldstein was writing, incidents drove police responses (Eck & Spelman, 1987). In other words, police would respond to calls for service without proactively trying to solve the underlying problems. Simply reacting to the incident, according to Goldstein (1979), does not solve the underlying cause of the problem. Goldstein (1979) suggested that rather than simply responding to calls, police should begin proactively problem solving and solving underlying community issues (Goldstein, 1979). As suggested by Eck and Spelman (1987), police began to understand the importance of collaborating with the community in controlling crime and disorder. Problem oriented policing and later community policing represented a change in organizational strategies of police departments. Departments changed from centralized, bureaucratic organizations to decentralized departments. Decentralized departments gave line officers more discretionary decision making powers (Eck & Spelman, 1987).

Newport News, Virginia set the stage for problem oriented policing and SARA. SARA is a four stage problem analysis by police to study ills that are plaguing communities (Eck & Spelman, 1987), comprising:

- **Scanning**: exploring the community for problems.

- **Analysis**: developing a familiarity with the nature of community problems. Police officers seek help from units within the police department and from citizens, including businesses and residents. Analysis is the core of the problem solving initiative.
- **Response:** police officers explore solutions to the problems by seeking the help from units within the police department and from citizens, including businesses and residents.
- **Assess:** Officers decide whether the solution corrected community problems.

In summary, from the observations of participants, the strengths of the new strategies included victim support, increased compliance/accountability, and improved collaborations. Victim advocates highlighted the need to work with the police department. Advocates explained the importance of respecting boundaries. Many police departments were resistant to working with Womanspace until they understood that advocates were, in all reality, making their jobs easier. Advocates paid a visit to the police department, not to play the role of a police officer, but to help the victim. Participants added to organizational change literature by explaining how other agencies could improve its response to domestic violence. Several supervisors expressed concerns about manpower. Others suggested that efficiency could be improved by streamlining the paperwork process. Participants also implied that agencies should focus on educating officers and the public on domestic violence.

Finally, a few themes emerged as important to other agencies developing and implementing a domestic violence unit. To begin, a change agent must be pressing for change. The department should also scan and analyze its current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance and accountability. Moreover, this study, similar to prior literature, suggests that agencies train and educate officers and the public on domestic violence. Training educated officers on the grey areas of domestic violence laws (Townsend et al., 2005).
This chapter addresses this study's research findings and ends with a summary of the research analysis. Analysis of research questions involved several steps. The first step of data analysis involved hand coding and analyzing data. The second step involved attending two-day training, in New York City, on how to use QSR Nivo 9. The third step involved entering data into QSR Nvivo 9. The final step involved developing concept maps. Four layers of data analysis helped ensure the accuracy of the research results. Similar to hand coding the data, once transcripts were uploaded into QSR Nvivo 9, data were classified into nodes. Nodes are containers that help organize and sort the data. Each node contains information related to specific ideas or themes. For this study, research questions were broken down into specific nodes. For example, the node, planning for change included ideas related to how the TPD planned for change. As a final step to ensure accuracy of the data, concept maps were developed that helped visualize how concepts and themes were related. The next section discusses the analysis of each research question more specifically.

1. **Research Question One: Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence strategies?**

   To explore this question, interview participants were asked why the TPD decided to alter domestic violence strategies. Most police department respondents answered identically. Participants from the prosecutor's office could not answer with the same consistency as police department respondents. Two participants from the prosecutor's office were not working with the office during the implementation stages. The remaining Mercer County Prosecutor's Office participants provided comprehensive responses.
Analysis of research question one involved several steps. The first step involved breaking down the research questions and developing concepts. In other words, this stage involved recognizing concepts that led to changing domestic violence strategies. Prior organizational change literature guided concept recognition. The second step involved developing themes that linked concepts. The third step involved coding concepts and themes. Concept Map 1 below presents a map of the stages of analysis. The blue box represents research question one; the yellow boxes represent the concepts that arose from the interviews; and the red boxes depict the themes that developed from the interviews. Two themes arose from research question one, the TPD developed new domestic violence strategies because of necessity and for prevention.

a. **Necessity**

Providing support for contingency theory, external factors resulted in a change in domestic violence policies. This study also provided evidence of problem oriented policing strategies and the importance of collaborating with supporting agencies. As discussed in chapter nine, when tailoring responses to domestic violence, police departments should be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, like advocacy organizations. TPD recognized the importance of stakeholders. The TPD applied problem oriented policing and the ideas of Compstat when developing the Domestic Violence Unit and DV Stat. As indicated earlier, Compstat's objective was to increase police productivity while reducing crime. Organizational change literature suggests that administrators plan for change by identifying contingencies.
1. Scanning

This study found that it is important to understand local problems and tailor responses to fit those problems (also see Sampson, 2007). For example, in the case of the TPD, as indicated earlier, the local problem included domestic violence homicides. Perceptions of a rise in domestic violence homicides, by local newspapers and the TPD, led to a change in domestic violence strategies. Moreover, administrators learned that domestic violence police reports were incomplete. Officers also suggested that domestic violence warrants were not actively pursued.

Since 2009, the TPD used DV Stat as a tool to hold various stakeholders accountable and bring these agencies together to discuss domestic violence in Trenton. As indicated earlier, the open systems approach focuses on how agencies depend on the external environment for survival. The organizational environment is anything external to the agency (Maguire, 2003). The environment could include, for example, an increase in homicides, legislation, the media, funding, etc. (Maguire, 2003). The TPD implemented new domestic violence strategies based upon necessity. In general, in 2009, a surge in domestic violence homicides resulted in the TPD changing domestic violence strategies and in the creation of a domestic violence unit. For example, in 2009, according to the TPD and local news, there were eight domestic violence murders. According to a local paper, four of these murders occurred within 46 days of one another (Mickle, 2010). In fact, in 2009, every domestic violence homicide in Mercer County occurred in Trenton. The TPD recognized that although the department was following the state regulated domestic violence mandates, their achievements in dealing with the domestic violence problem needed improvement.
Table Two: External Factors Leading to Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Leading to Change</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicides/Incidents</td>
<td>88% (15/17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Factors:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJ Simpson (2 officers);</td>
<td>35% (6/17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high profile cases (one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>detective); media (one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participant from Mercer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Prosecutor's Office;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state polices (one officer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>12% (2/17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Increase in Domestic Violence Homicides/Incidents

Most respondents (88 percent), supervisors, detectives, officers, and prosecutors from both the TPD and the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office suggested Trenton experienced a rise in domestic violence homicides in 2009, thus concerning leadership. As S1 stated, "Eight homicides in the first four to five months of the year concerned leadership. Domestic violence is serious, and the department didn't know if we were doing all we could do to prevent domestic violence." S2 who had been pushing for a domestic violence unit stated:

"The city experienced a rash of domestic violence homicides in 2009 (eight homicides, all domestic violence related). We began looking at how things were being done in terms of domestic violence investigations and realized there was a lot more to what was going on. We did not want victims caught in a cycle of violence. There is outreach to help victims out of violent situations. We realized that after the initial report was filed, follow-ups rarely occurred. For instance, did the victim receive the proper instructions to help them out of the violent situation? Did they receive information about outreach providers, court, etc? We also realized that we should be looking at why people were repeat victims. Moreover, and just as importantly, we wanted to ensure that efforts were also focused on the
offender and the domestic violence history of the offender. Moreover, what happened to the offender once he went to family court?"

S2 continued to explain that communications between the prosecutor's office and the TPD often caused frustration among officers. He stated, "In the past, on the prosecution side offenders would be released and the police department would receive no explanation. Officers would see the offender on the street and wondered how and why he is on the street? What happened in court? This causes frustration."

One detective from the TPD did not specifically suggest that rising domestic violence homicides resulted in new strategies. However, when asked to describe the goals of the TPD domestic violence unit, this detective suggested: "The short-term and long-term goals are to reduce domestic violence incidents." Thus, this answer suggests the new strategies were a result of rising domestic violence incidents.

There were also some perceptions that high-profile domestic violence homicides could have resulted in changing domestic violence strategies. S12 from the TPD stated:

"There were a number of domestic violence homicides. A couple were high profile. In one case, a mother got shot in front of her son. The shooter was her boyfriend. Officers taking short cuts also compounded the problem Trenton was facing. During this time period, officers were required to account for all of their time. If they spent too much time (on a job), they were admonished at Compstat meetings. Therefore, officers tried to quickly finish jobs."

A participant from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office similarly commented that a high profile case could have provided impetus for changing strategies.

S4 and S5 suggested the media helped initiate a change in police department procedures. S5 skeptically suggested, "First change occurred in 1994 with the O.J. Simpson case. Then an increase in homicides in Trenton in 2009 led to adding stuff to
the already cumbersome policy. It was a knee jerk reaction (overall, homicides were up, so naturally, domestic violence homicides would be up). It was an overreaction."

Similarly, S4 suggested, "The O.J. Simpson trial is when we started seeing more attention to domestic violence. As for why the Trenton Police Department implemented the new strategies...I think that there was an incident in the projects that caused the department to pay more attention to victims."

S18 from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office also confirmed that high homicide numbers resulted in the TPD changing domestic violence strategies. This participant offered insight into how the high domestic violence homicide numbers affected her job:

"When there were the eight homicides, I was asked to review the cases to see whether the system failed (how the system failed). I found that there was nothing more that we could have done at the MCPO level. People recant their statements all of the time. Victims are fearful, they pity the guys. Guys manipulate the women. The parties have children in common and that makes it difficult for the victims to put the fathers in jail. The women hear the children asking for their fathers."

c. Media

Supporting contingency theory, there is evidence also suggesting the media may have supported changing domestic violence policies (35 percent). As indicated above, S4 and S5, for example, suggested the 1994 OJ Simpson trial resulted in more attention to domestic violence. Another detective suggested there were a couple of high profile domestic violence homicides. One detective from the domestic violence unit suggested, "It appears as society flows, we go. News reports cover high profile cases, legislation, etc. The department follows through with changes." S15 from Mercer County
Prosecutor's Office also suggested the influence of the media. When asked whether he believed that Trenton's domestic violence strategies were successful, S15 replied:

"The strategies are definitely more helpful. With all of the news coverage, whether it be channel six or the newspapers, it is nearly impossible for someone to be turned away. There is more compliance knowing that people are watching."

S11 from the TPD also suggested that state or county policies could have provided impetus for changing policies at the TPD. Specifically when asked what led the TPD to change domestic violence policies, S11 responded:

"I would say that there was an increase in domestic violence homicides. I would also say that something was implemented at the state level. I'm not sure whose idea the unit was within the department....."

d. Summary

This research confirms results from previous research on organizational change in policing. Sometimes change is necessary, for example for prevention purposes. As Buzawa and Buzawa (1992) suggested agencies often reach a point when they realize the rational approach is not working. Change within the TPD appears linked to contingencies external to the police department. Officers and administrators alike point to rising violent domestic violence incidents as a cause of changing police department strategies. According to officers and administrators, rising violent domestic homicide incidents actualized the need for intervention from the police department. Only one participant from the TPD suggested a "knee-jerk, overreaction" to rising domestic violence homicides as a reason for change. Evidence suggests, however, the brain trust of domestic violence strategies developed years before the domestic violence homicide spike. Internal police department letters suggest that supervisors planted the seed for
the domestic violence incident tracking, in February 2006, years before setting up the
domestic violence unit.

**Concept Map One: Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence strategies?**

**Research Question Two: How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?**

a. **Introduction**

To explore this question, interviews began by exploring how the police department began implementing policies. This study's literature review suggests that individuals affected by new policies and strategies may resist change because the new ideas that go
along with the intervention require new skills the employee may find daunting (Twain, 1983). People leading change or administrators must be able to rebut these fears for the intervention to be successful (Twain, 1983). This study provided evidence of the importance of individuals leading change, analyzing problems, and planning for change.

Similar to research question one, analysis of this question involved several steps. The first step involved recognizing concepts involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance. A number of concepts arose from this research question. The research findings suggest that several police department dynamics are involved in creating a domestic violence unit. However, four themes emerged from the data. Implementing a domestic violence unit involves commitment, proactivity, collaboration, and compulsion. Concept Map 2 below depicts the relationship between concepts and themes. The blue box indicates the research question, the yellow boxes are concepts, and the red boxes portray the themes that arose from the concepts.

b. Commitment

According to S1, the idea to form a domestic violence unit developed in 2003, long before the rise in domestic violence homicides. Since about 2003, at least one employee from the TPD had been pushing for a domestic violence unit. About the same time this employee began pushing for a domestic violence unit, he developed relationships with Mercer County’s Domestic Violence Response Team (Womanspace). Womanspace is an advocacy group for battered women. In 2006, the
TPD employee contacted an administrator within the department with a request to develop a system to track domestic violence cases. This system would provide as a mechanism for smoother more efficient data collection and data review during DV-Stat meetings. The devised strategy also included a plan for follow-ups, for example contacting victims, assigning domestic violence warrants to Special Operations (TAC), Patrol Bureau/CIB for action, scheduling cases to be reviewed during DV-Stat, and intercommunications with outside agencies in preparation for DV-Stat. Until 2009, the proposed plan, however, was simply a proposed plan. A few participants from TPD suggested issues like gangs and drugs trumped domestic violence.

c. **Change Agent**

According to organizational change literature (Twain, 1983; Thompson, 2008) and this study's participants, a change agent is important to changing police department strategies. The impetus for change, according, to most respondents was from two administrators who were adamant change agents. Only two detectives could not answer who implemented the change. Both officers could not answer who implemented change. Respondents from the prosecutors were a lot less sure of the proponents for change at the police department. Only one participant from Mercer County Prosecutor's Office could answer who the proponents of change were within the police department.

When asked whether a change agent should be important for other agencies implementing change, most respondents answered “Yes.” Almost 60% of respondents in both the TPD and the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office suggested that either: a
change agent, top down directives, or "somebody pushing for change," is important in changing strategies.

d. Planning Meetings

Organizational change literature suggests that those agencies in the process of changing strategies should plan for change (Twain, 1983; Thompson, 2008). This study provides evidence that planning for change is important to the administration level. According to TPD supervisors, top organizational administrators sent middle management orders for implementation. Administration held informal meetings with middle management to discuss how to ensure compliance with New Jersey law and departmental mandates. S2 explained the purposes of the meetings. He suggested:

“(Administrator) led the initial change and sent the orders to (management). (Management) tweaked the plan a little. In terms of tweaking the plan, (management) decided that instead of looking at only indictable offenses, (the department) should go a step further than what is mandated in 2C and look at every crime….Informal meetings were convened for discussion on how to ensure compliance with 2C and the domestic violence mandates. Management discussed (how they) were going to report (data collection). Reporting standards (data collection) have been ongoing and changing. (Management) also discussed the types of crimes (they) were going to look at…(Management) took 2C a step further. Instead of looking at only indictable crimes, (the department) was going to focus on every crime. (The department) was going to collect statistics and use statistics to correct issues and find where the holes were in domestic violence investigations. Statistics allow the department to identify where cases are falling through the cracks and to correct the issues.”

About 50 percent of the TPD participants knew about these meetings. Most participants knew that some type of meeting occurred, but unless they were involved in the meetings they were not sure of who participated. For example, S6 commented, "I suppose that representatives would have included individuals from CIB (Criminal Investigations Bureau). I would not have liked to have been part of the implementation
meetings. I had my specific job to do." S7 also indicated that he was aware of meetings between higher level supervisors. He suggested, "I think that Compstat was a big push in changing domestic violence strategies. (Name deleted) was in a meeting every day. The former director asked, "what is happening with" every day. You had to be prepared for meetings." Although S7 did not specifically reference planning meetings, he did indicate that he understood that meetings occurred.

The majority of the TPD participants learned about the new strategies through the order, their supervisor, and or roll call. Not many participants suggested they would have liked to have been involved in the implementation meetings. However, S4 and S5 from the TPD suggested they would have liked to have been invited to meetings to offer input. Both suggested that they would have discussed reporting, including too much paperwork. They both suggested the need to focus more on preventing repeat victimization. Trenton is a revolving door city, according to both individuals. S5 from the TPD also suggested that prosecutors and judges need to be held accountable for their actions.

e. Proactivity

1. Analyzing

As indicated above, the tenets of problem oriented policing is evident within the process of change at the TPD. According to the literature presented in this study (see chapter nine), when analyzing and becoming familiar with the local domestic violence problem, police departments should consider calls for service, e.g. percentage of calls for domestic violence incidents, percentages of repeat victims, how many victims are
pregnant, the relationship status of the couple, etc. (Sampson, 2007). The goal of the DV Unit was to prevent victims from being caught up in a cycle of violence (harassing, pushing, slapping, kicking, punching, strangling, and possibly death). TPD officers were retrained in domestic violence procedures to ensure that the officers understood domestic violence investigation guidelines. If domestic violence victims were afraid to sign domestic violence complaints, the department supported officers signing a complaint against the suspected perpetrator.

The TPD began by studying the process taken in domestic violence cases, or “how things were being done.” The review concluded there were several underlying factors involved in domestic violence investigations. To begin, many times the offender had a prior record of domestic violence, secondly follow-ups rarely occurred, and finally spot checks revealed the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some police reports. TPD also began collecting statistics on, for example, the number of calls for service, number of police reports submitted, indictable offenses, disorderly persons offenses, domestic violence arrests, domestic violence warrants issued, temporary restraining orders and final restraining orders, children present, DVVRT callbacks, victims in headquarters, Walk-in to headquarters, Victims brought into headquarters, etc.

2. Responding

Organizational change literature also points to the importance of training police officers on new strategies. Literature suggests that resistance will occur and that administrators need to reassure employees of any concerns. Pragmatically, this reassurance could occur through trainings and education. Literature also suggests that if
officers have no understanding or investment in the policy change, little will change for victims (Ferraro, 1989 a,b; Frisch, 2002). In the words of Ferraro (1989b):

“Traditionally, domestic violence is a low status offense. The presumptive arrest policy tried to elevate its importance. But without clear-cut rewards or incentives, officers doubted the political significance of the policy. Some officers believed the policy was just for show, and some said it came from pressure from judges. But most did not know why they were suddenly urged to alter their responses in these cases. Family fights remain low status, undesirable calls for most officers” (P. 71).

Ferraro (1989b) found that despite the presence of a presumptive arrest policy in Phoenix, Arizona, other factors were involved in the decision to arrest including 1.) legal factors (police interpretations of probable cause); 2.) ideological factors (background beliefs and ideas about battered women); 3.) practical factors (restoring order); and 4.) political factors.

Wolf et al. (2003) also advocated police training that includes a section on the dynamics of domestic violence. Understanding the reasons that women fail to call the police or fail to leave an abusive relationship may help reduce police frustration with IPV calls for service. Walker (1979) highlighted that women fail to leave abusive relationships because of complex psychological and sociological reasons. Wolf et al. (2003) suggested three themes explaining why some women fail to call the police (also see Walker, 1979). The themes are as follows: 1.) situational/personal factors; 2.) fears of possible repercussions; and 3.) the removal of children. As Hart (1993) explained, battered women, because of fear, may be more concerned with preventing future violence than penalizing the offender for his transgressions. Thus, the victim’s decision will obviously create frustration with those in the criminal justice system seeking conviction (Hart, 1993). However, as indicated, training may help alleviate some frustration among
police officers and attorneys. As Hart (1993) noted, “An understanding of victim reluctance is critical for informed decision making about the role of the battered victim in prosecution, strategies to enhance victim cooperation and, ultimately, disposition by the prosecutor or the court” (P. 628). Walker (1979) added that understanding and developing strategies to prevent domestic violence involves becoming familiar with the concept of “learned helplessness.” In other words, once battered women perceive that abuse is inescapable, it is difficult to believe that the abuse will ever stop, even if a favorable outcome is experienced (Walker, 1979).

Finally, as Ferraro (1989b) discovered the views of officers may not change with training. Changing a police department’s culture is difficult (Stanko, 1989). However, as Ferraro (1989b) pointedly noted, departments embracing strong leadership and morale may have more success at implementing a presumptive policy (P. 72).

This study provided support for the importance of training and education. More specifically, TPD administrators explained to officers the importance of the new strategies. Officers were expected to complete a domestic violence package that included a number of steps. As S9 explained, the steps involve:

1. Completing the incident report
2. Having the report reviewed by the immediate supervisor
3. Submitting the domestic violence package to the domestic violence unit (arrestee history; victim notification form, domestic violence incident review checklist, and the police report).
4. Domestic violence unit completes additional checks on the victim and the defendant. Detectives determine whether additional charges could be filed. Detectives also identify additional services for victims. For example, they may reach out to Womanspace….Hey, this individual has been a victim five times, what can we do?
Supervisors explained the importance of accurate and complete police reports, as well as the importance of providing victims with support information. Administrators also recognized the importance of proactivity. They recognized that after the initial report was followed, follow-ups rarely occurred. For instance, did victims receive proper instructions about help? Did they receive information about outreach providers, court, etc.?

The TPD administration designed a safeguard to ensure the accuracy of domestic violence incident reports. To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the incident reports, Domestic Violence Unit detectives randomly reviewed about 10 percent of the domestic violence incident reports. The review’s purpose was shedding light on whether the offender, perhaps unknown to the victim, had a prior record of domestic incidents (TPD, interview # 2, August 2011). Administrators concluded they should be exploring why certain individuals are repeat victims. Initial spot checks revealed that some disorderly person’s cases should have been indictable. Through follow up of indictable domestic violence incident reports and spot checks of non-indictable cases, the department began pushing for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders (TPD, interview # 2, August 2011; TPD, interview # 3, August 2011).

During follow up incident report reviews, detectives also began looking at the patterns of offenders and charging them with more serious crimes, such as stalking. Moreover, in the words of S2, from the TPD, “We wanted to ensure that efforts were focused on the offender’s domestic violence history and what occurred in court.” S2 further explained that in the past the court released offenders and the police department would receive no explanation. Officers would run into an accused domestic violence
offender on the street and wonder how and why the court released the accused. This caused frustration on the part of officers. The department also attempted charging offenders with endangering the welfare of a youth, if youth were present. This was a tactic used to show the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office how serious the TPD was in terms of domestic violence.

f. **Ordered Change/Compulsion**

Roberg (2000) suggested, probably the most common “characteristic of change” is people’s resistance to change. Employees may resist new interventions because they fear: “economic loss, loss of status, loss of friends or associates, or job satisfaction” (Twain, 1983). Thus, administrators must prepare for resistance. This research suggested “the term” resistance may not fit the character of change at the TPD. This research indicates there may be times when officers cannot resist because change is mandated. The majority of respondents mentioned that officers could not resist because the department ordered change (see table 2 below).

Most TPD respondents suggested that they do not know whether the strategies received support from officers. However, changes occurred because they were mandated by the state of New Jersey. One middle manager suggested there are noticeable changes in handling domestic violence cases. For example, reports are more thorough; officers are providing victims with victim advocacy and support information; and arresting more suspects.

1. **Frustration/Revolving Door**
As explained above, by S2 from the TPD, officers historically have resisted change because domestic violence calls are frustrating (Stanko, 1989). Many times victims dismiss charges and this becomes frustrating. In the words of S2, “Officers began treating domestic violence as routine.” The departmental hurdle involved teaching officers and making them understand that victims react out of fear. S2 suggested, “The focus was on the victim and the offender, not headhunting of officers. Once officers realized the department was not head-hunting but trying to improve investigations and curb the cycle of violence, they were more understanding of the strategies.” S1 suggested, “I'm not sure if the change in domestic violence strategies ever received support from the officers. However, there have been some changes in the way that officers handle domestic violence cases. For example, there is more thorough report writing, officers are providing victims with support information, and they are issuing restraining orders, and arresting offenders. In terms of not following mandates, some officers were made examples of (through disciplinary measures).”

S3 suggested officers were not happy, yet not necessarily against the new strategies. This individual suggested there is more paperwork involved with the new strategies. S3 also suggested that domestic violence cases cause officer frustration. Many victims drop charges, and the courts have historically dropped charges if victims choose dismissal. However, police adopted the reforms immediately because “they really did not have a choice.” S3 also suggested that he accepted the reforms immediately because they were mandated. Moreover, he suggested that he recognized a need for change. One participant suggested, “It is easier for detectives because if it gets (to the detective bureau), the cases are more serious. These aren’t your pushing or shoving types of cases.
There is more satisfaction. (Detectives) are doing something about it (the problem). Whereas with patrol. Here we go again.” Finally, a number of TPD participants suggested that reforms were accepted because they were mandated orders. In other words, there is no discretion, for example, arrest is mandated.

Participants from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office agreed that department order's demanded change. S14 and S17 from Mercer County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) suggested that compliance is more likely from newer officers. In the words S17 from MCPO: "In the past couple of years, officers are complying. There is a new generation of officers who are complying with mandates and want to do a good job." S18 from MCPO stated, "More of them are complying. Intellectually, they may have had a lot of issues with temporary restraining orders and victims not being charged. (Victims who use the system to punish their significant others.) They realized that by not being thorough, they could get jammed up."

Responses to whether the department developed goals and objectives for the domestic violence unit also confirmed that domestic violence homicides helped drive the new unit. Those who understood the goals of the unit were either involved with the development of the unit, higher level supervisors, or detectives. About 75% of respondents from the TPD suggested the goals of the domestic violence unit were related to domestic violence homicides. One line supervisor and two line officers were the only respondents who could not state the goals of the domestic violence unit. However, the one officer suggested the domestic violence unit's role is to review officer incident reports.
S1 explained the goals of the unit. He stated, "The short-term goals were to identify issues with domestic violence policing and ensure that the police department was in compliance with statutes. The long-term goals were to provide the best services to the victim and following up with offenders and their dispositions."

S2 from the TPD suggested:

“We began to look at how we were doing things in terms of domestic violence investigations and realized there was a lot more to what was going on. Follow-ups were not being done. We began to do follow-ups with case reports. We began to look to see whether victims were receiving proper instructions. We did not want victims caught up in a cycle of violence. There is outreach to help victims out of violent situations.

S10 confirmed this supervisor's view, however also emphasized the importance of proactive policing to the new domestic violence strategies. He explained, "The goal was to reduce the number of domestic violence incidents through identifying patterns, identifying offenders, and making proactive arrests. Domestic violence offenders were not sought after as much in the past. In the past, a warrant may have been issued, but the offender would not be picked up until after he was stopped for a different incident. For instance, he was pulled over for a traffic stop." Similarly, S18 from MCPO:

“(Administrator) implemented efforts that stressed the seriousness of domestic violence and domestic violence investigations. He stressed the importance of arresting domestic violence offenders immediately. In the past, officers would respond to a call, look around for the offender, and if they did not see him, they would leave. Under (administrator), the Fugitive Task Unit became involved in looking for offenders who fled.”

g. Collaboration

S3, from the TPD, embraced these views but also highlighted the importance of collaboration. More specifically this detective stated:
"To follow-up on cases from patrol, to review reports, to track multiple offenders, review charges, are they (the charges) appropriate? The department set goals. Yes, to keep track of: multiple offenders and multiple offenses; tracking callbacks; trying to get victims to come into headquarters; issuing more restraining orders; working more with the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office; and looking at how many offenders were indicted."

Mercer County Prosecutor's Office participants also emphasized the importance of proactive policing and collaboration to the TPD’s Domestic Violence Unit. In the words of S17, from MCPO, "A common goal included taking domestic violence reports and following through on investigations. Making victims feel comfortable in reporting and with procedures. Domestic violence level collaborations have improved. Today, it is so much easier to reach detectives who are familiar with cases. The detectives chosen for the unit were right for the job." S11, from MCPO, also suggested the importance of choosing the right individuals for the unit. He stated, "Sergeant...led the trainings. People respected this sergeant. Also the right detectives were put in the right job. These are detectives that people respected. They complemented the Domestic Violence Response Team."

1. Assessing

Finally, at monthly DV Stat meetings the TPD, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, and Womenspace would unite and discuss and assess the status of certain offenders and whether any participants had concerns about how cases were being handled. Study participants suggested that through these meetings collaborations between the agencies greatly improved. It is important to note that data suggests that TPD lower ranking staff are beginning to scan the community for problems. For instance,
TPD staff suggested that educating the immigrant population on domestic violence might help prevent abuse in the neighborhoods.

h. Summary remarks

The emotions during interviews and data derived from these interviews suggested that police department dynamics are involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies. As suggested above, two extremely important concepts for implementing a domestic violence unit include committed supervisors and orders. Moreover, as indicated above, four themes emerged from the data. Implementing a domestic violence unit involves proactivity, commitment, collaboration, and compulsion. These themes are partially substantiated by the literature. Organizational change literature would imply that changing police department strategies involves proactivity, commitment, and collaboration of supporting agencies. However, compulsion, as explained above, is a new position on organizational change.

Despite some officers not knowing whether the department held implementation meetings, all officers understood the orders. They also suggested that orders were directed from their supervisors. Furthermore, the new unit and strategies were important to administrators. Therefore, administrators voiced their support for the strategies.

In the words of S18 from MCPO:

“Some officers were telling victims to wait under regular business hours to get a temporary restraining order. The process takes a long time and police would say, ‘Go to family court on Monday.’ This changed once the domestic violence unit was implemented. Under (administrator), Internal Affairs became involved in the process. (Administrator) implemented the domestic violence unit. Every domestic violence case was reviewed. In review, those officers who told victims to go to family court would be caught. (Administrator) stressed the seriousness of
domestic violence and the mandates that officers must follow. He stressed the importance of following rules. Instead of downplaying and making fun of domestic violence investigations, (administrator) commended officers who took the time during domestic violence investigations.”

S12 from the TPD similarly commented, “(Administrator) had the idea for the unit years before implementation. (Another administrator) was instrumental in the implementation stages and completely dedicated to the change.” A victim advocate also voiced the importance of collaboration between the police department and Womanspace. She stated, “DV Stat…(Administrator) wanted everybody involved in these meetings. (Administrator) wanted to start a DV Unit. He wanted to make sure that Womanspace did their job as well. We have always been involved with the police department. We are always at the police department. (Another administrator) was the coordinator (liaison) at first. He always has been a supporter.”

In summary, most officers and supervisors agree that implementing new strategies is a big commitment. Two supervisors suggested that changing domestic violence strategies is a big undertaking and a challenge. One supervisor suggested that he was a little apprehensive about the change because many officers consider domestic violence a taboo subject. Moreover, the department would double check and triple check officer reports for accuracy. This process, according to this supervisor, results in apprehensive officers. Another supervisor suggested that he was not apprehensive; however his dialogue suggested that implementing the strategies involved a big undertaking.
Table Three: Implementing a Domestic Violence Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Planning Meetings</th>
<th>Policy Change - Resistance or Compliance?</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Yes: 2/2</td>
<td>Compliance = 1/2</td>
<td>Short Term: Identification of issues and ensure compliance with statutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resisted in the beginning = 1/2</td>
<td>Long Term: Provide good services to the victim and follow up with offenders and their dispositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Short Term: Identification of issues; collaboration with other agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long Term: Breaking the cycle of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Yes - 2/4</td>
<td>Compliance = 3/4</td>
<td>Not sure (1/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure - 2/4</td>
<td>Nobody resisted/skeptical = 1/4</td>
<td>The vision of the new strategy was to reduce domestic violence homicides. The objectives were to improve investigations and tracking (review of reports and statistics). (3/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPD Staff</td>
<td>Yes - 2/4</td>
<td>Compliance = 4/4</td>
<td>Identification of issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure - 2/4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce homicides through review of reports/looking for patterns (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability/Accuracy of incident reports (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPD Staff</td>
<td>Yes - 0</td>
<td>Compliance = 2/2</td>
<td>Not sure (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure - 2/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPO</td>
<td>Yes - 1/2</td>
<td>Prosecutor: Older officers maybe/younger officers = no (1/2)</td>
<td>Could not answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure - 1/2</td>
<td>Compliance = 1 (1/2)</td>
<td>Improving investigations/keeping statistics (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cannot answer=1/2</td>
<td>Could not answer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure - 2/2</td>
<td>Compliance = 1/2</td>
<td>Improving investigations/collaborations (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Not sure - 1/1</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concept Map 2: How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?

Research Question 3: What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?

The third question is an outcome question and examines the experiences of the TPD in implementing new policies. In other words, what changed? Historically, as detailed in chapter four, society did not view domestic violence as a significant health problem. Not until the women's movement began advocating and cultivating change, during the 1960s and 1970s, were there improvements in victim support. For example and as explained in chapters four and five, mandatory arrest laws and protective orders were enacted. Thus, one would venture to assume that by the TPD cultivating proactivity,
commitment, collaboration, and officer compliance, overall victim response would
improve. Thus, this question explored the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the
strategies the TPD implemented.

Similar to the previous questions, analysis of this research question involved several
steps. The first step involved recognizing concepts that led to changing domestic
violence strategies. Concept Map 3 presents a map of the stages of analysis. The blue
box represents the research question; the yellow boxes represent the concepts and codes
that arose from the interviews; and the red boxes depict the themes that developed from
the interviews. As indicated in chapter five, studies on police intervention efforts tend
to address domestic violence in terms of the effects of domestic violence strategies on
arrest and conviction on recidivism (Sherman and Berk, 1984). More recent studies
have examined relationships between coordinated intervention efforts in addressing
domestic violence and arrest and conviction (Syers and Edleson, 1992). Overall, many
domestic violence policies are controversial. For example, research is not clear about
whether mandatory arrest laws (Worden, 2001), no drop policies, or restraining orders
are effective. The TPD study added to domestic violence literature by examining the
perceived utility of domestic violence strategies.

In the TPD study, three themes emerged from question three. In general
participants agreed that strengths of the strategies included victim support, increased
compliance/accountability, applying the tenets of problem oriented policing and
improved collaborations. Moreover, most participants suggested improving manpower
could strengthen strategies.
As indicated earlier, data suggests the TPD applied the tenets of the SARA model when planning and implementing their DV Unit. Perceptions of a rise in domestic violence homicides, by local newspapers and the TPD, led to a change in domestic violence strategies. The TPD began to analyze whether their actions to IPV were not appropriate. They began by analyzing incident reports and recognized that many reports were incomplete or even inaccurate. Moreover, after the initial report was filed, follow-ups rarely occurred. For instance, did victims receive proper instructions about help? Did they receive information about outreach providers, court, etc.? Problem response included explaining, to officers, the importance of accurate and complete police reports and the importance of providing victims with support information. To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the incident reports, Domestic Violence Unit detectives randomly reviewed about 10% of the domestic violence incident reports. The department also advocated warrant sweeps with the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal Marshalls. According to S2, from the TPD, one of the purposes of these sweeps was to “make sure that the word got out to the community, offenders, and victims alike, that domestic violence is a priority to the Trenton Police Department.” Finally, at monthly DV Stat meetings the TPD, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, and Womenspace would unite and discuss and assess the status of certain offenders and whether any participants had concerns about how cases were being handled.

a. Incident Report Reviews

As explained above, the goal of the Domestic Violence Unit was to prevent victims from being caught up in a cycle of violence (harassing, pushing, slapping, kicking, punching, strangling, and possibly death). After eight homicides, in 2009,
within months of each other, the police department recognized the need for changing strategies. In the words of S1, "(The TPD) didn't really know what to be looking for in terms of domestic violence. The eight homicides caused (the department) to realize there had to be something more that we could be doing." This realization led the TPD to retrain officers in domestic violence procedures to ensure that the officers understood domestic violence investigation guidelines. The department began proactively studying the process taken in domestic violence cases, or “how things were being done.” In the words of S2 from the TPD:

“The unit was developed as a proactive mechanism for focusing on domestic violence. Everything was being looked at...(TPD called) the unit the review unit (domestic violence unit). The review includes a couple of safeguards. First, officer incident reports were reviewed by immediate supervisors. Secondly, as a safeguard the domestic violence unit and Internal Affairs randomly reviewed incident reports to ensure that the incident was correctly documented.”

The review concluded there were several underlying factors involved in domestic violence investigations. To begin, many times the offender had a prior record of domestic violence, secondly follow-ups rarely occurred, and finally spot checks revealed the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some police reports.

Today, the department requires officers to submit a domestic violence package to the domestic violence unit. More specifically, the domestic violence package includes arrestee history, the victim notification form, domestic violence incident review checklist, and the police report). S9 explained, “One of the new forms is a check-off list that ensures that various reporting standards were addressed. The officer must check off requirements on the incident review checklist and have a detective and supervisor sign off on the report. The incident review checklist is a component of the incident report.”
The majority of respondents within the police department and the prosecutor’s office suggested that incident report reviews led to increased accountability and compliance. Most respondents (see table 3 below) suggested that incident report review led to more detailed information in incident reports. S3, from TPD explained, how the process led to a system of accountability and collaboration:

“Before the strategies were implemented, the case was over with paperwork. The officer took the report, made an arrest. After the strategies were implemented, officers are required to inform the victim about how to obtain a restraining order. They (the victims) are asked whether they want to go to headquarters to talk with someone on the domestic violence response team. After the strategies were implemented, we call the Division of Youth and Family Services when children are involved. There is also more accountability. All domestic violence cases are reviewed by the domestic violence sergeant. The sergeant gives the report to the domestic violence unit detective for follow-up if need be. The domestic violence unit will look at the reports to determine whether enough information is being collected in the initial report.”

S4 and S11, from the TPD, also suggested that state law as well as new strategies led to more departmental compliance and accountability. S11 suggested:

“You must respond as soon as possible. Before the new strategies, the procedures were more lax or lenient, and discretionary. The victim may sign a complaint. If there were signs of injury, we would make an arrest. If the individual wasn’t at the home when we arrived, we would issue a warrant. If the victim felt they were being harassed, they would be told that they could file a complaint. Our role was more advisory. We advised victims of their rights and asked if they wanted to file a complaint. Today, its law we must make an arrest and document everything because of departmental policies and state mandates.”

When probed about whether he thinks these strategies are successful, S11 again suggested “Yes” because the department is being held more accountable. He suggested, “It is helpful because before you didn’t have all of this information. We may have executed a warrant, but that was it. We wouldn’t actively search for the individual, if he was found, he was found. Well, the law is being taken seriously, and we are showing the community we are serious about domestic violence.”
When asked about what specifically changed with the implementation of the new strategies S11 suggested accountability. More specifically:

“There was a lot more discretion. Reports were always required, but were significantly less detailed. There was less supervision. Today, there is mandatory compliance with checklists. Responsibilities have changed. People are required to answer at Compstat meetings. An entire system was put into place to ensure accountability…Today unlike 15 years ago, if a woman was bleeding, we would call an ambulance. There is no discrimination because of the parameters that are set in place. From top to bottom there is more accountability. Every job has to be documented. There is more direct supervision. In the past, the report would be very minimal. GOA, victim wants no further assistance. Today, you would be asked about the victim’s outcome….Police must tell victims about their rights. In the past, if an officer did not feel that there was an injury or the victim was in great danger, they may say, ‘Sign here.’ The victim may not even have realized that they were signing off that they did not want a TRO. Today, the Victim Notification Form must be completed each time an officer responds to a domestic violence incident and a complaint is signed.”

A few respondents were, however, skeptical of the benefits of new paperwork and strategies. In the words S5 from the TPD,

“Nothing has really changed. There is just more paperwork, an extra form, and an extra phone call. We really need to know why we are going to the same house. Seventy percent of jobs are repeat houses. This is where the system fails….We are afraid not to write a report because we know it is a sore subject in the county and state. There is more second guessing going on. Reports have become longer. We have to turn in criminal histories and write the reports. There are several reports from previous times. You also have the application for restraining orders…Responsibilities haven’t really changed. We follow orders. Just more paperwork…”

When probed whether he believed that officers are more proactive, S5 was also more skeptical. He suggested that they ask about temporary restraining orders because it is mandated. He also did not believe that anything would change if the department dismantled the unit. In the words S5, “Nothing will really change if they get rid of the unit and strategies. The problem is with the victims. Yes, this sounds politically incorrect. How do you stop victims from repeat victimization? I don’t think new policies
have made this better.” Similarly, S9 from the TPD suggested, “Victim support improved through interagency collaboration. Investigations stayed the same; report writing stayed the same, with the exception of more forms; attention to laws stayed the same; and there is no data to support an improvement in offender accountability.”

b. Strengths of the Strategies

1. Compliance/Accountability (attention to detail)

Similar to the statements made above, most respondents in both the police department and the prosecutor’s office agreed the strengths of the new strategies fell within the categories of compliance and accountability (see table three below). For instance, the department ensured accountability through the review of incident reports and more detailed police reports. However, respondents in both the TPD and the prosecutor’s office, also generally agree that new strategies led to accountability through proactivity, collaborations, and as a result more victim support. For example, S12 from the TPD suggested,

“The strength of the unit was attention to detail. Everybody was working together. There was more offender accountability because the cracks are sealed. Nobody was going to fall through the cracks. Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office practiced evidenced based prosecution. In the past, officers would follow through with the process, writing reports, etc. and the victim would refuse to testify. The court would drop the case. Evidenced-based prosecution eliminates the need for victim testimony.”

S14 from the MCPO also explained the benefits of evidenced-based prosecution, suggesting that:

“Cases are stronger because of evidenced-based prosecution. There are better reports, more evidence (more officers are taking pictures). If there are indictable crimes, the police officer will call the crime scene technicians to process the
scene. Pictures will be taken by technicians. Detectives will also be called to the scene if the crime is an indictable offense.”

Confirming the above views, S12 from the TPD suggested:

"Report writing changed through the checklists, etc. Reports were required in the past, but lacked the details that are required today. Unit detectives would also personally talk to DV victims. Therefore, if the police officer did not give enough attention to the victim, the detective would say, I understand, please tell me your story.

We also began using a stricter definition of assault. In the past, “ahh, you were hit with a broom, that’s not an assault.” In all reality, it is an assault. So we began looking to see whether appropriate charges were filed. That’s why we had so many warrants issued within the first few months. We also reinterviewed victims. It is important to interview as close to the incident as possible because people forget details.

We also began focusing more on endangering the welfare of a child. If a child was present during the assault, we charged the offender with endangering the welfare of a child. DYFS wasn’t happy with us at first.”

Similarly, S10 from the TPD suggested the department became more proactive in investigations. He stated:

“Investigations are more thorough reviews of incident reports. Report writing has become more complete. There is more attention to laws. More crimes are being looked at today. For instance, stalking and child endangerment have always been on the books but until recently (were) rarely applied. Three to five incidents of harassing behavior is considered stalking. So now we look for patterns of stalking within incident reports. These crimes were always on the books, but typically not attached to domestic violence crimes.”

S7 from the TPD suggested that a strength of the unit is that officers proactively try to determine the incident's aggressor. This finding is particularly significant given the problem that many departments, throughout the United States, have experienced with dual arrests. In this detective's words:

"Today, we are not going to lock everybody up, like in the past. The mentality in the past was we will take the whole house that will take care of the problem. Today, proactively try and determine the aggressor in the dispute and arrest him/her. Many times there are also kids involved. People have more compassion.
Abuse affects kids in the long run. Our objective is to get the kids out of the house through DYFS, Angel Wings, or Womanspace, etc."

S17 from the MCPO also suggested that incident reports and charging improved after implementation of the strategies.

Despite a number of participants suggesting the new strategies led to accountability and more detail, there are others with alternative views. S5 suggested that nothing changed except for paperwork. He suggested the department needs to explore why there are so many repeat calls. More specifically, according to S5, “seventy percent of jobs are repeat houses. This is where the system fails.” A couple of other TPD employees suggested the TPD may want to try and streamline the process to reduce the amount of time spent on paperwork.

2. Collaborations

Participants with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office consistently remarked that strengths of the new strategies include improved collaborations, accountability, less “old school mentality,” and more victim support. For example in the words of S18 from MCPO, “Reports are much better. They are using the charts (MCPO) provided departments. You see officers using wording from the charts. They are using the tools to back up charging.” When S18 was probed about whether officers are more proactive, this participant responded:

“Yes, the department became a model for other agencies implementing domestic violence strategies. The domestic violence unit did follow-ups a month later to see whether victims needed any services. The reports always indicated that medical services or temporary restraining orders were offered. The police department would also help victims get locks changed before the defendants come home.”
This participant further suggested:

"Police understand that collaborating with advocates make their job easier because victims have somebody to talk with about their issues. If officers do a lousy job, they will be going back to the house. The job is not done on arrest, it's done on sentencing. Make sure that there is enough information to make a solid case. We used to joke about the three fingered report. There was so little information within the reports that you could fit all of it on three fingers. We don't see a lot of that anymore."

When asked whether officers have become more proactive in charging and investigating cases, S14 from MCPO suggested:

“It is hard to be proactive; you can’t force victims to obtain a temporary restraining order. Victims are, however, receiving more help. The domestic violence response team is called if the victim wants help. There is also the victim/witness advocate at Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office. He calls the victim to ensure that they understand programs that are available, like the Victims of Crime Compensation Program. I can’t say that I have seen more stalking charges or endangering the welfare of a child charges. If, for instance, a child was endangered, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office would end up adding the charges. Trenton Police Department is still undercharging. We still see officers writing 29-9 (a) instead of 29-9 (b). However, I do see officers trying to make more effort in making a case. They are looking at patterns, getting phone records, collecting evidence, etc."

In summary, every respondent from the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office suggested the TPD collaborations improved and officers are always available for questions about cases. In the words of the victim advocate, “There is more collaboration. In the past, it was almost as if everybody were enemies with everybody else. The police were enemies with Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, etc.”

Similarly, S17 from Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office suggested:

“Relationships have always been pretty decent. In the past, you had so many detectives that could have handled the case. Now you have one contact person who you know is familiar with the case. The department also made domestic violence detectives more accessible to Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office detectives. Many domestic violence incidents occur at night. Detectives, who worked at night, would not work during the day. Mercer County Prosecutor’s
office detectives work court hours. If we needed information for the case, we would have to wait for the police report. The department ensured that the domestic violence unit had a person working during the day. They also developed a highlight sheet. The highlight sheet highlighted people that were involved in the incident and the officer handling the investigation. For instance, if a detective working nights did not finish writing his report, he completed the highlight sheet. If Mercer County Prosecutor's Office needed information about the incident, we would call the domestic violence unit and ask about the case. If the detective did not finish writing the report, the domestic violence unit could at least tell us if the detective is finishing the report and which detective is handling the investigation.

Finally, at monthly DV Stat meetings the TPD, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, and Womenspace would unite and discuss and assess the status of certain offenders and whether any participants had concerns about how cases were being handled. Study participants suggested that through these meetings collaborations between the agencies greatly improved. It is important to note that data suggests that TPD lower ranking staff are beginning to scan the community for problems. For instance, TPD staff suggested that educating the immigrant population on domestic violence might help prevent abuse in the neighborhoods.

Participants also suggested that DV Stat carried out its goal of bringing together agencies for brainstorming sessions on how they could best serve the community. S1 suggested, “We wanted to bring everybody together, hold everybody accountable, and create partnerships through proactive approaches.” S3 further confirmed this view:

“DV unit detectives) collect the DV statistics. (They)review reports for key words in terms of data for monthly reports. The purpose of DV Stat is to bring different agencies together to discuss domestic violence cases and to review and compare monthly statistics on DV. "
DV Stat, according to participants, increased accountability and collaborations between the police department, the prosecutor's office and Womanspace. S2 from the TPD suggested that DV Stat helped increase the efficiency of the department. He explained:

"We are more efficient than we have ever been in following up on domestic violence cases. DV Stat has been extremely helpful in terms of statistics. We never kept statistics before. DV Stat has helped us develop a better understanding of what we are seeing overall in terms of restraining orders filed, the presence of children at the scene of domestic violence calls, the number of referrals to outreach agencies, and the number of repeat offenders."

S9 from the TPD also explained that DV Stat brought together agencies and improved departmental efficiency. He stated, "DV Stat brought a number of different agencies together and as a result, a number of agencies became involved. Data collection improved. We never really collected data before.

c. Victim Support

The TPD developed the domestic violence unit to improve responses to domestic violence, or “breaking the cycle of violence.” S1 from the TPD suggested that a reason for developing the domestic violence unit included developing proactive approaches to helping victims of domestic violence. S2 from the TPD suggested:

“Domestic violence scenes are emotional….Children are present….You begin to realize how many times they must have been subjected, over and over again to violence. Children who have lost a mother….You begin to realize what they must have witnessed in the past.

As a result, we began looking at what we could do to help intervene in the cycle of violence. So, we began by following up on cases and looking at the offender's history. The purpose of the review was to study the offender's history to uncover prior domestic incidents that the victim may not know about. Exposing prior incidents may help the current victim from becoming a victim of a more serious offense like for instance, homicide.

One of the more difficult hurdles was getting victims, who were hesitant to talk about their victimization, to talk, because they were afraid of retaliation.”
Participant interviews indicated that new strategies led to victim support. All respondents from the TPD and the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office agreed that new strategies led to increased victim support. For example, respondents suggested that increased support resulted from compliance with mandates, the dedication of the domestic violence response team, and collaborations between all agencies. S5 and S9 from the TPD also suggested that victims are more aware of available services because of police department collaboration with Womanspace. As S5 from the TPD suggested, "I think that more people are aware of Womanspace. Womanspace used to be a secret hide-away that people never saw. So they have grown because of the police department."

Departmental mandates require dispatch to call the Domestic Violence Response Team to headquarters when a victim responds to headquarters. S9 from the TPD explained the process:

“The responsibilities of officers have not really changed (with the new strategies). The officers, however, must ensure that somebody from the Domestic Violence Response Team (DVRT) responds. Ideally, officers should call the DVRT before asking the victim if they would like to speak with a victim advocate. When you ask the victim if they would like to speak with someone from the DVRT, they are more likely to say ‘No.’ If you suggest, however, the victim advocate is at the police department and available to talk, you may receive a better answer from the victim.”

S10 from the TPD suggested that in the past, it was left in the officer’s hands as to whether or not to call the Domestic Violence Response Team. Today, according to this officer, “Advocates are called upon each time there is an incident. The dispatcher calls the team. The team is great and is usually there (at headquarters) by the time the victim arrives to headquarters, so there is no waiting.”
According to data, the unit also led to increased personal support of domestic violence victims. Participants suggested that Womanspace is a great help to victims after a domestic violence incident. S8 from the TPD stated:

"Womanspace has been a great help to victims. The DVRT responds to the police department and counsels women, calms them down. Most people, in my experience, who talk with the team, end up obtaining a TRO. Womanspace does not persuade them to obtain a TRO. They help them think through the situation."

S12 from the TPD further explained:

“There was definitely more attention provided to victims. Even if the officer was having a bad day, detectives would speak with the victim. Cooperation with victims improved. We started evidenced based prosecution because victims weren’t appearing in court. Today, 30 to 40% of victims are cooperating. Womanspace would also help relocate domestic violence victims."

S17 from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office further confirmed the benefit of collaborating agencies in helping victims of domestic abuse. He stated:

"Everybody's strategies needed to change, not just Trenton. Domestic violence is by and large an unreported crime. By providing a contact person, a domestic violence unit, the people who are less likely to report may report. The streets talk. Everybody will find out about experiences with the police. If a person had a good experience, trust builds and a sense of security. If you talk to the police, they will help you."

In closing, a couple of participants brought to light the negative side of policing domestic violence. As S5 from the TPD suggested, "We ask about temporary restraining orders because it’s required and mandatory. Nothing will really change if they get rid of the unit and strategies. The problem is with the victims. Yes, this sounds politically incorrect. How do you stop victims from repeat victimization? I don't think new policies have made this better." This same individual suggested there needs to be consequences for victims abusing the system. He explained:
"Some victims abuse the system. There needs to be consequences for victims who abuse. For example, you have a victim who gets a restraining order. Then the victim tells the guy that she dropped it. They live together. Now you made me mad and I'm going to call the police and get you in trouble."

Similarly, S10 suggested, "securing a temporary restraining order depends on the victim. Sometimes police are a quick fix to the problem. The victim may not want to file a complaint. Police can only go so far."

c. **Suggestions for Improvement**

Besides asking about the domestic violence unit's perceived strengths, participants also explained weaknesses or areas of improvement. Several different, but interrelated concepts, emerged from this question. The glue binding concepts is the theme of manpower. Several supervisors expressed concern about manpower (see table three below). As explained in chapter five, amid preparing for this study’s data collection, the TPD laid off a significant number of the department’s officers. Consequently, the layoffs could have the potential to hinder domestic violence strategies. As S6 from the TPD explained:

"One hundred and three officers were laid off. Thirty percent of detectives were lost in the process. Today, the department cannot have a full-time officer just for domestic violence cases. I contacted the county and told them that the police department does not have the manpower to review small cases. If they have a problem with a police officer’s report, send the complaint to internal affairs (simple assault/harassment). The big cases are still reviewed by the county and police department sergeants. Before we were proactively handling cases by reviewing incident reports. Today, we're returning to reactive policing."

S1 and S2 from the TPD articulated the importance of manpower. S1 suggested the unit is in serious need of manpower. "The unit started out with three detectives and one supervisor. Now there is one detective that is part time and one supervisor." S2 suggested, "I would like a full unit with a command structure, for instance, a Family
Crime Unit with additional detectives and supervisors." S12 from the TPD also suggested the department could improve its response to domestic violence by "1.) restoring the unit to its full manpower and 2.) restoring the importance of domestic violence." Linked to the idea of manpower, a couple of line supervisors suggested the department needs to reestablish attention on the domestic violence unit. S9 from the TPD suggested:

"The concept and the strategies are a great idea. It has the potential to exceed expectations. The department needs to become more serious about the DV Unit. At one point we had three detectives in the unit. Now the unit supports one detective who is part time. The rest of this detective’s time is spent investigating sexual assault, etc. There needs to be more manpower. Dedicate two or three detectives and that is all they do during the day. Get more serious."

S10 from the TPD also offered his perception on the issue of manpower and education. This detective suggested that educating officers on the importance of the domestic violence unit is critical. When asked how he would respond to the statement "Do you think that officers are always resistant to change?" S10 responded:

"People take things differently when you are ordered. Change, however, would be easier if things were explained better. People need to see the whole picture. They need to understand what incidents can lead to in the future. People would comply better if they were educated more on the purposes of the strategies."

Later when asked about how he felt about how the department could improve its response to domestic violence, S10 from the TPD responded, "Education is the key. The issue is also manpower. Domestic violence investigations take a lot of time."

S7 from the TPD offered a different perspective, he suggested a task force and advertising. When asked how the department could improve its response to domestic violence, he suggested:
"Perhaps a domestic violence task force. Maybe advertising similar to the New Jersey State Police. The New Jersey State Police had a billboard that stated, ‘Drink and Drive, We'll Provide Your Chaser.’ Perhaps the domestic violence task force could advertise, "Commit a domestic abuse, we will be your new family."

A couple of participants also suggested streamlining the process. When asked what would make investigating domestic violence incidents easier, S3 from the TPD suggested:

- "Streamline the process
- Give officers their own cameras so they do not have to wait for evidence technicians.
- Not having to bring the victims to headquarters to speak with an advocate….Give me your phone so I can put you in contact with somebody who can help you. But, then you have to worry about cell phone minutes. All officers have cards that provide information to the victim about available services. Whether they give these cards to victims……Other victims know the phone numbers by heart."

S3 also offered insight on how the county could improve response to domestic violence.

S3 stated:

"Something that may help…..If agencies put their egos aside. Perhaps a countywide DV Stat with all the municipalities could be helpful. What can we learn from each other? Court involvement would be useful, we could ask that prosecutor’s office, what can we do to make your job easier? Countywide DV Stat in terms of what works best in terms of strategies."

Similarly, S5 from the TPD suggested:

"Streamline the process. There needs to be accountability of the support groups, like the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office, the judges, etc. The extra paper work would be worth it if we get results, if we saw fewer domestic violence incidents. How many repeat victims do we have? Is anyone following up on repeat victims? Jail time per arrest? How many temporary restraining orders turn into final restraining orders?"
When asked how the domestic violence unit could help him more, S4 from the TPD suggested the department should provide more insight into the status of cases. He stated, the unit is "doing fine, don't know of any other way they could help...Maybe keeping us updated on the status of the cases...Whether the person was convicted...If a warrant was issued...Was the person ever arrested?"  S18 from MCPO stated that she had no general issues with the unit. However, the department should remind officers they are doing a good job. S18 stated: "No general issues. Remind them they are doing a good job for victims. They pay attention to arrests. Every case you get a statement now. Keep following through."

**Table Four: Perceived Utility of the Domestic Violence Unit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Incident Reviews</th>
<th>Strengths of Strategies</th>
<th>Are victims receiving more support?</th>
<th>Suggestions for Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Ensures compliance (1/2) Proactive mechanism (1/2)</td>
<td>Maintaining Statistics (2/2) Proactivity (2/2)</td>
<td>Compliance 2/2</td>
<td>Manpower (2/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Ensures compliance (4)</td>
<td>Incident Reviews (2) Improved Report Writing (3) Pattern Analysis (1) Collaboration/DV Stat (2) Data collection (2) More victim support/ Focus on children/cycle of violence (3) Changed mindset of officers (1)</td>
<td>DV Response Team/more aware (3) Collaboration (1) More personal attention (1)</td>
<td>Repeat victims (1/4) Manpower (2/4) Become more serious about domestic violence (1/4) Status of case (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPD staff</td>
<td>Ensures compliance/accountability (4)</td>
<td>Maintaining Stats/Cases/DV Stat – (1) Pattern Analysis (2) Incident Reviews/Accountability (2) Improved collaborations (3) Proactive Investigations (securing TROs, arrests)(3) More victim support (3)</td>
<td>More aware of services (1) DVRT (3)</td>
<td>Not sure (1/4) DV Task Force (1/4) Manpower (1/4) Education (1/4) More streamlined process (1/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPD staff</td>
<td>Compliance (2) Ensuring accuracy (2) Accountability/Compliance (2) Comstat/DV Stat – Accountability (1) Collaborations (1)</td>
<td>More satisfied/appreciative (1) Must explain victim rights (1) DV Response Team is always called (2)</td>
<td>Status of case No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPO participants</td>
<td>More detailed reports Ensures compliance (1)</td>
<td>Victims are receiving more support Collaborations (2) Improved Reports (2) Victim Support/Proactive (1)</td>
<td>Victims are receiving more support (2)</td>
<td>People think that domestic violence calls will take a lot of time (1/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPO Participants</td>
<td>More detailed reports (1)</td>
<td>Victim Support/Proactive (1) Detailed Reports (2) Collaborations (2)</td>
<td>DVRT (1) More support system wide (1)</td>
<td>Not sure (1/2) No impediments to implementation (1/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPO Participant</td>
<td>Compliance/Accountability</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concept Map 3: What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?

Research Question Four: What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?

a. Introduction

The final outcome question seeks understanding on how this research is applicable to other agencies changing policies. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change. Again, similar to the previous questions, analysis of this research question involved several steps. The first step involved recognizing concepts that participants perceived as
important factors essential in facilitating change. In other words, if another organization desired to implement a domestic violence unit, what are the necessary components? The concept map below presents a map of the stages of analysis. The blue box represents the research question; the yellow boxes represent the concepts and codes that arose from the interviews; and the red boxes depict the themes that developed from the interviews.

Four themes emerged as important to other agencies developing and implementing a domestic violence unit. A change agent must be pressing for change. Next, the department should scan data and analyze its current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance/accountability. As suggested above, this study supports prior research on the importance of training and educating officers and the public on domestic violence. As chapter five indicated, training is extremely important because it educates officers on the grey areas of domestic violence (Townsend et al., 2005). Townsend et al. (2005) pointed out the issues that many departments have encountered with determining the primary aggressor. Finally, the domestic violence unit needs collaborations from other agencies. Concept map 4 below explains the relationship between concepts and themes. The blue box indicates the research question, the yellow boxes are concepts, and the red boxes portray the themes that arose from the concepts.

b. **Factors Important in Implementing Change**

This section discusses factors suggested by participants as important in implementing change. Police department participants all agreed that a change agent is necessary. Some participants, however, suggested the department does not necessarily need a change agent. The department simply needs top-down orders. Officers
confirmed this view suggesting that factors important in implementing change include reviewing incident reports and holding everybody accountable. On the same lines, prosecutors suggested that goals are important. Participants in both the TPD and the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office suggested that other important factors are education of both the public and police on the purpose of the unit and interagency collaboration. Thus, three themes emerged from the concepts: a change agent, training/education, and interagency collaboration.

1. Change Agent

When asked what the most important factor is in implementing change, S1 from the TPD suggested that a change agent is crucial. For example, he suggested, "The biggest hurdle that the department had to overcome was buy-in from the officers. A change agent was also a vital part of the process. (Administrator) was pushing for this type of change for years." S3 from the TPD also suggested that a change agent is important. S3 pointedly noted that implementing change involves public relations but is also more than public relations. S3 stated:

"A change agent is important because you need somebody who cares about the issue, not simply pushing a fad or a public relations aspect. You also need more than one detective, need more officers. You need to get word out to the community. This is what we are doing. Somebody is doing something."

The TPD suggested that agencies changing strategies should review current policies for holes. As S1 from the TPD suggested, "Start out with a microscope to determine what the department is positively achieving and what is not being accomplished. What is going wrong?"
2. **Top-Down Orders/Compliance and Accountability**

Other TPD participants suggested that top-down orders, training and collaborations are critical in implementing change. As S12 from the TPD explained:

"You need cooperation with other agencies. Moreover, it's virtually impossible to move forward without the head of the department on board. It is very important to have the head of the department on board. Make sure the public is aware of the problem. Have a media campaign. Tell officers if you help one person, you did your job."

Along the same lines, S6 from the TPD noted:

"If I were going to begin a unit elsewhere, I would suggest that the department order come from the top down. Secondly, review the current policy and change accordingly. Next, are officers following policies or is there a hidden policy? Next, teach officers about the new policies through trainings. Track statistics. Finally, collaborate with other agencies."

S9 from the TPD suggested that the directive from the chief and motivated detectives should be enough to stimulate change. In his words, "You do not really need a change agent. The directive from the chief should be enough to make the change. They will need motivated detectives who believe in the unit and what it can achieve." S7, from the TPD, similarly noted, "The policy must be distributed by supervisors. Supervisors must emphasize training and education. Officers need to be well balanced. There needs to be training similar to that of the New Jersey State Police. Supervisors need to try and make officers so gung ho that they could wear a blind fold and know what to do." That said, a number of participants suggested that education and training are important in implementing new strategies.

Several participants also suggested that other agencies implementing new polices should consider making certain that everybody in the process is held accountable. S4 and S11 from the TPD underlined the importance of holding employees accountable.
suggested, "Follow-up with all domestic violence cases is very important. You also need support from the Domestic Violence Unit." S11 noted it’s important to, hold everybody accountable. Throughout the interview S11 explained that officers changed their mentality because of "accountability and compliance with rules." He also mentioned that collaborations improved with other agencies because "it's all about accountability."

S17 from Mercer County Prosecutor's Office indicated that a few key components that should be considered are setting goals, training, interagency collaboration, and accountability. More specifically, S17 noted, "Leadership, goals, and standards. You need to train officers on what to ask victims. Interagency collaboration is important. You want to make sure that everybody is on the same page. You need to ensure that the job is done right, you don't want to miss anything." S18 from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office similarly remarked, "You need manpower to create the unit. Follow-up on incident reports and keep statistics. Dedicate someone who is overseeing the cases. Patrol needs to know to call detectives for indictables."

3. **Collaborations**

Several participants suggested that agencies trying to implement change will not go far without interagency collaboration. Victims are provided more help through interagency collaboration. Moreover, according to participants’ perceptions, cases are handled more efficiently through interagency collaboration. As indicated earlier, when probed about whether victims are receiving more support, S12 from the TPD suggested:

"There is a lot more personal attention to victims. I see a huge difference with victims. There is more cooperation. We began using evidenced-based prosecution because nobody would appear in court. Today, approximately 30 to 40% of victims appear in court. Detectives speak with victims, so even if officers
are having a bad day, detectives show support for the victims. Victims are saying a lot more thank you-s, not all of them. There is marked change."

When asked about how other agencies should prepare for change, S12 indicated that you need cooperation from other agencies as well as support from administrators. S15 from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office offered a different perspective on collaboration. S15 suggested that departments implementing change should contact departments with an intact and successful domestic violence unit for suggestions. In his words, "It is important to contact other directors to go over what they started." S17 from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office similarly noted:

"The agency should contact whoever is in charge of the Criminal Investigations Bureau, the detective unit. They need to come up with a contact and provide the contact with everything on trainings and what we would expect in terms of protocols for the domestic violence unit and the department. There definitely needs to be somebody within the department pushing for change."

4. **Education and Training**

Supervisors also suggested the importance of educating both the police and the public on the purposes of the domestic violence unit. Chapter five indicated that training police officers on domestic violence and developing domestic violence units is a fairly recent action. Liberman and Schwartz (1973) pointedly noted that as of 1966 no law enforcement agency within the United States maintained domestic violence training programs. However, by the end of the 1970s, a handful of jurisdictions within the United States began revising laws, department policies, and training officers in domestic violence laws and procedures (Little et al., 1988). S2 suggested that officer frustration and complacency with DV cases is a hurdle the department overcame through education. The department educated on the purposes of the unit and disciplined for non-compliance. When asked what the most important factors were in implementing change, S2 remarked:
"Highlighting to the public and police officers alike that investigations of domestic violence is a high priority to the TPD. It is important to make sure that the public understands that the department is responding immediately and effectively. A change agent is also very important. In the case of the TPD, supervisors were dedicated to change. Moreover, there were a couple of detectives that were dedicated to the changing strategies and sold the strategies to the other officers. Moreover, the continued cooperation with Womanspace, and Mercer County Prosecutor's Office was a huge factor in putting the strategies into practice."

S2 also mentioned in the beginning of his interview that when the department decided to change policies, it scanned for problems within its current practices.

S5 from the TPD also highlighted the importance of domestic violence training for not only officers, but the public. S5 offered a different perspective on education. He suggested that domestic violence many times is cultural, and the difficulty rests in breaking this view. He explained:

"Educating the community on domestic violence. Domestic violence is bad and they don't have to become victims. Many victims don't see domestic violence as criminal. It is cultural, a part of life. Generation after generation see it as part of their life to get beat up by their husbands. They don't think that they have a right to be protected. They don't take it seriously."

When asked how he would change this mentality, S5 responded:

"Education, maybe the domestic violence unit and Mercer County Prosecutor's Office could pass pamphlets out to community groups. There is a Hispanic community, church groups, African-American and Asian groups. It is a cultural thing. A lot are undocumented and fear being deported, so they don't report. Pamphlets would have to be in different languages. Perhaps they could explain that they cannot be deported for being a victim. It is not the Trenton Police Department's policy to ask the person's status unless they committed an indictable offense."

When further questioned about whether a victim would "turn in her husband" if he supported her, S5 responded, "You are getting my point."
This finding is in line with other research that has highlighted the problems mandatory arrest poses to immigrant populations (Loke, 1997; Goodman and Epstein 2005). Women fail to report because of fear of deportation of either themselves or their abuse. Future domestic violence policies should include a section on dealing with foreign victims of IPV and fears of deportation.

5. **Manpower**

Along with a change agent, dedicated staff, education, and training, participants also suggest that manpower is a critical issue that departments implementing change should consider. S10, from the TPD suggested, "Education is the key. The issue is also manpower. Domestic violence investigations take a lot of time." S1 from the TPD suggested that a suggestion for improvement in their department is manpower. He indicated that at one time the unit maintained three detectives and one supervisor. Today, there is one detective and one part-time supervisor. When probed about relationships with other agencies, S1 also referenced manpower. He stated, "The relationship with other agencies is great. Mercer County Prosecutor's Office thinks that the program should be implemented countywide. The issue is with manpower." S2 from the TPD also referenced the need for sufficient manpower. He suggested, "Manpower is extremely important. I would like a full unit with a command structure, for instance, a Family Crime Unit with additional detectives and supervisors."

c. **Conclusions**

In summary, supporting prior literature, participants suggested that agencies implementing a domestic violence unit focus attention to a change agent, training, and
educating officers and the public, and compliance/accountability. After sorting data according to job characteristics, data suggest that certain concepts distinctly link to job title. Supervisors suggested the need for change agents. According to participants from the TPD, change agents should scan policies for holes. Moreover, when implementing change, they should choose employees who are right for the job and will help lead change. Line supervisors, on the other hand, suggested that top down orders and dedicated detectives are crucial to changing policies. TPD officers offered no suggestions on a change agent. Prosecutors and detectives from the Mercer County Prosecutors Office suggested the need for setting goals and standards. Moreover, the TPD encouraged other agencies to ensure they have enough manpower to staff a full domestic violence unit. It emphasized the importance of good working relationships with the court system and advocacy groups.

The concept of accountability appeared quite a few times throughout interviews. This concept is also linked to job characteristics. All supervisors suggested that agencies need to scan policies searching for holes and compliance issues. When discussing the issue of how to apply what the TPD learned in other police departments, officers only referenced compliance. Officers did not discuss the concept of a change agent, training, or collaborations. The two concepts that appeared valuable to officers relate to reviewing incident reports for accuracy and holding everybody accountable for changing policies.

Data suggested that participants perceive that accountability is a major factor in implementing change. Accountability is linked to a number of concepts in this study. For example, change agents must ensure that dedicated detectives are in place to help lead change. Secondly, the majority of participants suggest that change agents develop a
protocol for educating and training officers and the public on the dangers of domestic violence. Finally, the majority of participants agreed encouraging interagency collaboration is a major factor in implementing change.

Data suggested that domestic violence strategies have changed within the police department. Supervisors, detectives, and officers indicate policies have influenced change. The policy influenced collecting statistics, more complete police reports, follow-up victim support, and collaboration. As S1, from the TPD, suggested, statistics allow a snapshot review of what is occurring on the domestic violence landscape, not only in terms of indictable offenses but also in terms of whether restraining orders are declining, whether victims are being referred to the Domestic Violence Response Team, etc. Statistics give the department a place to focus efforts. According S1, the DV Stat meetings were a proactive approach that brought different agencies together focusing on creating partnerships and holding everybody accountable. S5, from the TPD, indicated, “Womanspace used to be a secret hideaway that people never saw. So, they have grown because of the police department.” Moreover, participants suggested, follow-ups were never a part of the process in the past. In the past, incident report reviews never took place in the past. Reviews help determine whether offenders could be charged with more serious offenses, like stalking.

S5 from the TPD, however, provided skeptical assessment of accountability and collaborations. He suggested that new strategies have not improved collaborations. He suggested the system needs to hold courts more accountable. According to this supervisor, downgrading of crimes is problematic because it causes police frustration and results in downgraded punishments. For example, aggravated assaults are downgraded to
simple assault and as this supervisor suggested, “Nobody goes to jail for that, deterrence should be emphasized.” S5 suggested the extra paper work would be beneficial if it, for example, resulted in fewer domestic violence incidents. S5 asked me, “How many repeat victims do we have? Is anyone following up on repeat victims? What about jail time per arrest? How many temporary restraining orders turn into final restraining orders?”

All respondents suggested that since implementing the new strategies, victims are receiving more support. One supervisor suggested that a greater number of victims are receiving support because officers are complying with the rules laid down in state law. One line supervisor and detective suggested that victims are more aware of services.

In concluding, this case study is in accordance with prior literature that suggests the following factors should be present when departments consider implementing change: change agents; compliance/accountability; education/training; and collaborations. The fact that compliance and accountability are important factors in implementing change suggests that police departments remain mechanistic. Characterizations of mechanistic organizations include specialized tasks; hierarchical decision making; authority located at the top of the organizational apex; rule-oriented; and position oriented (Kuykendall, 1992). Position-oriented roles suggest that accountability is based upon an individual's position within the organization (Kuykendall, 1992). Moreover, employees obtain rewards from following the supervisor's orders (Kuykendall, 1992). Kuykendall (1992) suggested that police departments often remain mechanistic in design which limits their ability to change according to turbulent environments. The TPD appears to be moving in the direction of a more open environment. Experience at the TPD also suggests that collaboration between officers and collaborating agencies was important in implementing
strategies. Evidence therefore suggests the police department is becoming more open and less mechanistic.

| Table Five: Factors Essential for Implementing Change |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Staff**                                | **Dedicated Staff and Change Agents** | **Problem Oriented Policing** | **Education** | **Collaboration** | **Manpower** | **Accountability** | **Not Sure** |
| Management                               | Dedicated staff and a change agent are needed for change (2/2) | Scan for positive achievements and problems within policies (2/2) | Educating police and the public that DV is a high priority (2/2) | Prosecutor's Office and Victim Advocates (1/2) | Need sufficient staff (2/2) |                  |
| Management                               | Top down orders (3/4) Motivated detectives (1/4) | Scan for positive achievements and problems within policies (1/4) | Educating the public (5 and 12) Educate officers (1/4) | Collaborations with other agencies (2/4) |                  |                  |
| TPD Staff                                | Top down orders (1/4) | | | | | 1/4 |
| TPD Staff                                | Follow-up with incident reports (1/2) | | | | Holding everybody accountable (1/2) |                  |
| MCPO                                     | Goals need to be set (2/2) | Follow-up with incident reports (1/2) Training officers (1/2) Interagency collaboration (1/2) | | Need sufficient staff (2/2) |                  |
| MCPO                                     | Leadership goals and standards (2/2) | Training officers (1/2) Interagency collaboration (2/2) | | Need manpower (1/2) |                  |
Concept Map 4: What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?

![Concept Map Image]
B. Experiences of Victim Advocates

1. Introduction

Similar to police and prosecutors victim advocates suggested that collaborations are important in developing a victim advocacy program, like Womanspace. Thus, this study supports research suggesting that it takes a village to improve strategies against domestic violence. For example, literature suggests that departments must be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, for example advocacy organizations, medical providers, public health agencies, universities, clergy, etc. (Sullivan and Bybee, 1999; Belknap and Hartman, 2000; Coker, 2001; Krasnoff and Moscati, 2002; Sullivan et al., 2002; Fleury-Steiner, 2006; Bouffard and Muftic, 2007; Sampson, 2007). These agencies could provide valuable information and support to police departments in the process of changing domestic violence strategies. Moreover, aggregate data are important during this stage of investigation. Stakeholders, like victim advocates, could have data that may be useful to the police department.

Chapter four discussed the role of battered women's advocates. As indicated in chapter five, battered women’s advocates suggest that implementation of institutional reform, should not occur “without an infrastructure of community services in place” (Coker, 2001; Shepard, 1999). Fleury-Steiner (2006) suggested that a recent body of literature supports the role of coordinated services within the victim’s community (also see Coker, 2001). A supportive community infrastructure includes a network of community agencies available for helping victims in need (Shepard, 1999). The network provides services that protect the victim from the offender (Shepard, 1999). For example
services include: emergency housing, confidential victim-directed court advocacy, support and education groups, and financial assistance to help women separate from the abuser (Shepard, 1999, p. 116).

Consequently, the design of this research included interviews with victim advocates about their experiences as victim advocates. The data derived from victim advocates were not included in the section exploring the answers to research questions for the following reasons. After speaking with Womanspace supervisors decisions were made to eliminate implementation questions from the interviews. Womanspace supervisors explained that Womanspace and the TPD did not collaborate during implementation stages. Womanspace did attend monthly DV Stat meetings, but did not participate in implementing the strategies. Although victim advocates from Womanspace cannot answer research questions, they offer information relevant to understanding interactions between victim advocates and the police.

On average, Womanspace volunteers have eight years of experience. Volunteers explained that once a victim is brought to headquarters, police contact the radio room, and the dispatcher supervisor calls the advocate on call. Moreover, if a woman needs shelter, Womanspace calls the shelter. According to one advocate, either a police officer or victim drives to the shelter. Palm cards are offered if services are refused. The palm card explains a victim's rights and lists locations for victim support and important phone numbers. Four themes emerged from interviews with Womanspace advocates when questioned about their experiences as a victim advocate:

1. Rewarding
2. Concern for the victim
3. **Victim Fears for Safety**

4. **Interagency collaboration**

2. **Rewarding**

When asked what it is like being a Womanspace volunteer a number of participants suggested that the experience is rewarding. In the words of Volunteer One, "It is rewarding. You feel like you are helping someone. I was a victim, so it's easier. I feel like I helped someone at the end of the night." Similarly, Volunteer Two suggested, "I love it! It is empowering and educational. There is an inner peace in knowing that I am helping women. It is self-gratifying." Finally, Volunteer Three suggested, "it is a great job, but all consuming. I am on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week....."

3. **Concerns for the Victims**

In order to understand a little more about the process of responding to a call, volunteers were questioned about how they felt when responding to a call. All volunteers suggested their main concern centered around victim safety. In the words of Volunteer One, "Other than getting in quickly, so they don't leave, get there before they leave so you can help. Even if I can just give them a card. Volunteer Two responded:

"Usually nothing. I can't go into this with a specific thought, it's not good for me or the victim. I go in with an open mind. I step out from what I'm thinking and feeling and let them take the lead, giving them voice and an ear. I don't normally say anything. I want them to be comfortable and know that I'm not judging them and don't think that they are stupid. I give them information on their options, telling them about Womanspace, the shelter, and the DV hotline. A lot are not willing to go (to the shelter). Never know what happens (to them). Could have been anybody that called. Now with the law, police must arrest.

"They are not willing to go (to the shelter) because it's a combination of they love the person and have low self-esteem. They go through a cycle of, why do you make me act like this, then comes the hit, and then comes the honeymoon phase. You never know what happens behind closed doors. There may be guns/knife
Volunteer Three offered a different perspective. She explained that responding often is frustrating because volunteers want to help victims, but sometimes they do not want to share their feelings. As this volunteer explained:

"When I first started, I responded to a lot of calls. This gave me a lot of experience. In the beginning when people didn't want to talk, I got frustrated. I talked to my boss and said I feel like I didn't do enough. My boss said, 'Did you give them a palm card? You did all you can do.' When I get up at 2 a.m., I am always happy that I went."

4. **Victims Fear for Safety**

Similar to prior research (Tomes, 1978; Langan and Innes, 1986; Hart, 1993; Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; and Wolf et al., 2003), all volunteers indicated that safety is a major concern of victims. Victims experience a rash of feelings about whether to obtain a restraining order or whether to leave the relationship. If they leave the relationship, will the batterer become angrier? Will the victim lose financial support? The thoughts shared by victim advocates should be helpful to police in understanding the reasons that some individuals do not go forward with prosecution or obtaining restraining orders. Police are, however, aware of many of the reasons that victims do not go forward with prosecution. As indicated above fear is one of the reasons the court implemented evidenced based prosecution. The victim is not needed in court to go forward with prosecution. Volunteer One suggested that a main concern of victims is safety:

"Safety. A lot of the fear is going to court. I always tell them there is a person at the court that is a representative of Womanspace. Court is a big one. They are afraid to be in the same room with them (the offenders)."

Similarly, Volunteer Two suggested:
"Safety, is he going to be mad he is locked up? Getting a restraining order. I explain the restraining order process. I tell them they are geared to keep them (the offender) away, but they are not foolproof. It's a start. I am not there to persuade anybody. I don't lie to them. I explain the process. Knowledge is power. I give them information on the restraining order. I plant the seed; when it's watered it will grow."

Finally, Volunteer Three explained: "Depends, often they don't want to get the perpetrator in trouble or they are afraid of the perpetrator. They do not think that restraining orders will do anything." In discussion on the immigration status of the victim and whether this affects whether the victim reports the crime, Volunteer Three suggested:

"Batterers may tell the victim that they will be deported if they call the police, which they will not. Officers in Trenton are good about not asking where the victim is from. Many victims are financially dependent (on the offender).

Some of them (victims) don't realize they are in danger. I always say, I am really worried about you. Has it escalated (the violence)? They will sometimes respond, I'll be alright, I'm going to my mom's house tonight. I'll respond we are here if you need us, please don't hesitate to call us. We try to make ourselves accessible."

5. Collaborations

Similar to police and prosecutors victim advocates suggested that collaborations are important in developing a victim advocacy program. During interviews, victim advocates were probed about what is an important component of developing a victim advocacy program. The purpose of this question was developing insight into concepts other organizations feel are important in implementing new policies. Recall, a research question of this study is "What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?" Volunteer One offered personal insight into this question. She replied that she knew a person who initiated a group on a college campus. In her words, "Go to the dean (of a college). Notify the police department that you are going to start a
committee. Talking to possible victims.” Similarly, the volunteer offered advice on developing collaborations while also respecting boundaries:

"You definitely need everybody on board (battered women's shelter, Womanspace, reach out to the police department and get them on board). Explain to the police that you are not there to do their job. Explain that we are there to take the victim away so that you (the police) can get your paperwork done. My focus is on the victim. Involve other agencies (housing/shelter). Pull everything together and make sure that all bases are covered. It takes a village."

Volunteer Three offered an explanation on the benefits of collaboration, respecting boundaries, and developing job standards.

She explained:

"Womanspace has been here for over 30 years. Middlesex County was the first county that had a response team. East Windsor was the first township in Mercer County to have a response team. Either the coalition or the Attorney General asked Womanspace in Mercer County if they could use their model as a best practice. They liked the way we spelled out what the police department was going to do, what Womanspace was going to do...We were going to have a police liaison. We stated what was expected of volunteers. The police department would collaborate for recruiting volunteers, background checks, fingerprints, training. The volunteer would need a valid driver's license.

We have a room in the police department with resources (pamphlets, etc.). It makes it easier, responding to the police department. You need a good relationship between the advocates and the police department. You must respect their jobs and not interfere with it. We are not there to tell them what to do. We are here to help victims.

A lot of police departments did not want us there. Since it was mandated, there was resistance. When they found out that Womanspace was not there to do their jobs, but to help the victims, they were more responsive because it helps them. We are not there to interfere with investigations. We are there as a tool to help victims.

You need buy-in from everywhere, but that is with everything. You need to respect boundaries."
6. **Funding**

Finally, volunteers explained the importance of additional funding and the impact on victim support. According to advocates, additional funding could improve the amount and types of victim support. For example, Volunteer One suggested that additional funding could provide "housing for men and more housing for women and children."

Volunteer One raised an important point. In recent years there is more discussion about battering of men by their significant others. Consequently when men are battered, they too face emotional and physical problems, yet there are few available shelters or programs for men. There are also very few criminological or sociological studies on husband battering.

Similarly, Volunteer Two indicated that extra funding could support, "housing, shelters, hotline employees (hiring more), could move into a bigger space." Finally, Volunteer Three explained:

"We have a new building with a children's counseling program. However, we could really use money for that. We are going to do this anyway and then worry about the funding. Women sometimes ask, do you have counseling for my kids?? I love working for a place where everybody has a common goal, to help people. I never regretted (working here).

7. **Manpower**

Manpower, as suggested above, is a concern among a number of participants in both the police department and the prosecutor's office. For example, a concern of this research is whether the TPD will be able to maintain proactive crime prevention approaches. As a result, this research probed Womanspace volunteers about whether they perceive that manpower will affect collaborations between Womanspace and the police department. The words of the victim advocates are extremely important to any
agency developing a new program while simultaneously facing budget concerns. According to victim advocates it is possible to maintain proactive support for victims so long as the department maintains positive interagency relationships. This view is also supported, as indicated in the previous section, by the prosecutor's office. In the words of Volunteer Three:

"I do not think it's going to affect collaborations. I was fearful, but it has not happened. They are still calling. They are fine with us now. We are part of it, we have a room. They all know us there."

Similarly Volunteer Two suggested, "No, it hasn't cut down on the number of calls. Hopefully victims will not stop calling." In concluding, Volunteer One, advanced a more skeptical view. She suggested, "It has because they (the police department) prioritize. They have so many gang issues. For a while, I had been called out every Saturday, two to three times." However, this view also highlights the importance of maintaining good interagency collaborations.
### Table Six: Experiences of Victim Advocates - Womanspace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>What is it like being a Womanspace advocate?</th>
<th>How do you feel when you are responding to a DV call?</th>
<th>What are some of the biggest concerns of victims?</th>
<th>What recommendations would you give to an organization setting up a victim advocacy program?</th>
<th>How could extra funding help Womanspace?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Advocate One</strong></td>
<td>Rewarding</td>
<td>Get there quickly so I can speak with them or at least give them a card</td>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Collaborations</td>
<td>Housing for men. More housing for women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Advocate Two</strong></td>
<td>Empowering and educational</td>
<td>Go in with an open mind/concern for the victim</td>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Collaborations</td>
<td>Housing, shelters, hiring more hotline employees, could move into a bigger space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Advocate Three</strong></td>
<td>Great job, but all consuming</td>
<td>Concern for the victim</td>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Collaborations</td>
<td>Children's counseling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C. Research Analysis Summary**

**Research Question One: Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence?**

To begin, the TPD implemented new strategies contingent on a rising domestic violence epidemic within the city of Trenton. In other words, domestic violence strategies were developed to hold offenders accountable and offer victims relief. Secondly, the utility of the new strategies are contingent upon a strong change agent and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies and social agencies. As Thompson (2008) emphasized agencies like police departments, are affected by both internal politics and environmental contingencies, e.g. community politics, legislation, court decisions, etc (Thompson, 2008).
Consistent with organizational literature, this research suggests that implementation of new domestic violence policies is contingent upon need. In 2009, the TPD recognized a need to intensify operations against domestic violence and formed a new domestic violence unit. The TPD recognized that although the department was following the state regulated domestic violence mandates its achievements in terms of dealing with the domestic violence problem needed improvement. That said, the department formed a new unit of proactive detectives who collaborate with prosecutors from the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and trained volunteers from Womanspace.

**Research Question Two: How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing policies and ensuring compliance with policies?**

This study suggests the TPD truly understood the problem it was facing. As explained earlier, in 2009, the TPD recognized the need to intensify operations against domestic violence and formed a domestic violence unit. The department studied the process of handling a domestic violence call, or "how things were being done." The review found there were several underlying factors involved in domestic violence investigations. Many times, the offender had a prior record of domestic violence, secondly follow-ups rarely occurred by the police department, and finally spot checks revealed the incompleteness or inaccuracy of some police reports.

In Trenton, implementation of strategies did not occur overnight. Successful implementation involved a dedicated change agent who fought for change, developed a plan for change, and never stopped planning for change, even when these ideas were not a high priority within the police department. The change process also included dedicated supervisors, dedicated detectives, and collaboration and commitment from other criminal
justice and social agencies. According to participants, detectives chosen for the domestic violence unit complemented the unit and facilitated change. Respondents also pointed to the importance of explaining new policies to officers and training them on these policies.

In summarizing responses from participants, the department's vision for the future included breaking the cycle of violence. Responses to whether the department developed goals and objectives for the domestic violence unit also confirmed that domestic violence homicides helped drive the new unit. Those who understood the goals of the unit were either involved with the development of the unit, higher-level supervisors, or detectives. About 75 percent of respondents from the TPD suggested the goals of the domestic violence unit were related to domestic violence homicides. There were only a couple of respondents, from the TPD, who could not state the goals of the domestic violence unit. However, at least one of these respondents suggested the domestic violence unit’s role is to review officer incident reports.

S1, from the TPD, explained the goals of the unit. He stated, "The short-term goals were to identify issues with domestic violence policing and ensure that the police department was in compliance with statutes. The long-term goals were to provide the best services to the victim and following up with offenders and their dispositions."

This study also suggests the work of the TPD fundamentally changed. For example, the new strategies initiated domestic violence data collection. In the words of S2 from the TPD, “We are more efficient than we have ever been in following domestic violence cases. DV-Stat has been extremely helpful in terms of statistics. We never kept
statistics before. DV-Stat has helped us develop a better understanding of what we are seeing overall in terms of restraining orders filed, the presence of children at the scene of domestic violence calls, the number of referrals to outreach agencies, and the number of repeat offenders” (TPD interview #2, August 2011). There is evidence that the work of domestic violence unit detectives fundamentally changed. For example, detectives never reviewed incident reports in the past. Other participants from the TPD suggested that their work did not change significantly but for more paperwork. Finally, all participants suggested that interagency collaborations improved.

A finding that other agencies may find useful is that resistance from officers did not cause a major problem for implementation. Officers viewed change as compulsory because of mandates and discipline for failing to follow mandates.

**Research Question Three: What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?**

In general participants agreed that strengths of the strategies included victim support, increased compliance/accountability (attention to detail), and improved collaborations. As indicated earlier, respondents in both the TPD and the prosecutor’s office, also generally agree that new strategies led to accountability through proactivity, collaborations, and as a result more victim support. Most officers did not mention whether the new policies affected dual arrests. However, one officer suggested the department does not favor dual arrests. This finding is significant given the controversy dual arrests have caused throughout the country (see chapter four for a discussion on dual arrests).
Moreover, most participants suggested improving manpower could strengthen strategies. A few of the other noticeable changes that respondents pointed to are: committed staff, detailed data collection, working meetings with other social service agencies to discuss monthly city domestic violence statistics (DV Stat), more paperwork, more complete police reports, no domestic violence homicides, increases in restraining orders, increases in calls to the domestic violence response team, improved victim support, and improved relationships with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office. Participant interviews indicated that new strategies led to victim support.

Similar to Pennell and Burke (2002), this study found that training officers on strategies as well as reviewing incident reports resulted in improved documentation on incident reports. Secondly, similar to Pennell and Burke (2002), these data suggest that training officers on the necessity to call Womanspace and provide victims with support information led to more informed victims. This study could not interview victims about their perceptions of whether they received more support from the criminal justice system. Consequently, speaking with victims is the only method of truly determining whether they received more support. However, all respondents from the TPD and the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office agreed that new strategies led to increased victim support. Respondents underscored that increased support resulted from compliance with mandates, the dedication of the domestic violence response team, and collaborations between all agencies.

As suggested, victim advocates, besides law enforcement, are another important avenue to victims. In an economically depressed time period, it becomes important to show the need and efficacy of programs. The hope is that this research will help raise
public awareness of the importance of victim advocacy groups. This study is in accordance with recent research suggesting intensive advocacy programs for IPV victims are effective in helping free victims from abuse and securing their safety from offenders (Goodman and Epstein, 2005; Bybee and Sullivan, 2002; Sullivan and Bybee, 1999).

Subsequently, the hope is that this research will help funnel more funding to these groups. During economic downtimes and manpower shortages, departments should try and continue to show their support for advocacy groups such as Womanspace. S5, from the TPD, indicated people are more aware of Womanspace since the TPD began its collaboration with the group. S5 indicated, “Womanspace used to be a secret hideaway that people never saw. So they have grown because of the police department.” Moreover, as Sullivan and Gillum (2001) pointed out, the general public is still under the impression domestic violence programs focus solely on crisis intervention (crisis lines) and shelter services. Today, as Sullivan and Gillum (2001) suggested, the majority of programs consist of, but are not limited to, “support groups for women who are not residing at the shelter, advocacy services, individual and group counseling, programs geared specifically toward children, referrals to other community-based services, and financial assistance” (p.253).

**Research Question Four: What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?**

Four themes emerged as important to other agencies developing and implementing a domestic violence unit. A change agent must be pressing for change. Next, the department should scan data and analyze its current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance/accountability. The department should train and
educate officers and the public on domestic violence. Finally, the unit needs collaborations from other agencies.

The TPD encouraged other agencies to ensure they have enough manpower to staff a full domestic violence unit. It emphasized the importance of good working relationships with the court system and advocacy groups. Similar to previous organizational change studies, this research suggests that external political issues can hinder police department innovations. Amid data collection, the TPD experienced significant layoffs because of city budget constraints. The question is whether the TPD can maintain its proactive strategies. Officers suggested they will continue to follow legal mandates. However, in September 2011, the department cut DV Stat. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as a tool to bring together various stakeholders to discuss domestic violence in Trenton. During meetings stakeholders discussed monthly domestic violence statistics, specific cases, and ideas for prevention and outreach.

D. Conclusions

The hurdle for Trenton is whether it can continue collection of data and data analysis despite significantly fewer staff and the discontinuation of DV Stat. Ideally, to sustain proactive approaches, the TPD would receive grant funding or continue pleas with the state to provide more funding to hire back laid off officers. State Sen. Shirley Turner is encouraging Gov. Chris Christie to channel some of the $26 million dollars unearthed from forgotten state bank accounts to the TPD (Zdan, 2011).

Research clearly shows that solely reactive policing is not an effective strategy of operating a police department. Budget cuts, historically, leave remaining officers
discouraged and overworked. The question in Trenton becomes how to continue proactive crime prevention strategies in an environment with budgetary constraints. Reallocating resources is a method the department used in the past to implement the domestic violence unit. The TPD should continue focusing on data collection, research, and applying for grant funding. Data collection and research could show the impact that proactive strategies are having on crime victims and crime within the city. The flip side is that when departmental funding is scarce, hiring a researcher to conduct research is typically inconceivable, but important. The TPD recognized the importance of grants to help keep its proactive approaches and applied for grant funding.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Introduction

Many issues have fallen through the cracks of law enforcement organizational change in terms of domestic violence. Criminal justice practitioners, legislators, and criminologists know so little about the dynamics of domestic violence policing. Despite the number of articles and books dedicated to domestic violence, there are still questions that if answered could affect law enforcement domestic violence policy. One big problem with law enforcement is that policies are implemented before research is available that discusses implementation problems and effectiveness (see Laycock, 2001 and see Willis et al., 2007). As Buzawa and Buzawa (2012) underlined, this problem is important because failing to “focus critically on strategies to implement change effectively” could lead to policies that are ineffective or fail to produce change.

Another problem is that individuals working within the field of criminal justice may not be aware of the academic literature and knowledge available on certain programs that are considered best practices. As Laycock (2001) indicated, “Simply producing hard evidence of what works, where and why is not, of itself, sufficient to change practice. One of the realizations from the repeat victimization program was just how much extra effort was required to get the research results and their implications, out to practitioners on the ground” (p. 78).

Based on the results of this research, this study may offer a number of policy implications and suggestions for best practices. The next couple of sections reviews the results of this research and offers a number of policy implications.
1. Research Results Summary

This study provided evidence in support of prior organizational change literature and domestic violence literature. The TPD study also offered new insight into organizational change in law enforcement. Compulsion is a new position on organizational change. Organizational change literature consistently points to the role of resistance in impeding change within organizations. At the TPD, officers did not resist, instead they felt compelled to change. This study also provided evidence of problem oriented policing strategies and the importance of collaborating with supporting agencies.

Organizational change literature suggests that administrators plan for change by identifying contingencies. This study found that it is important to understand local problems and tailor responses to fit those problems (also see Sampson, 2007). Supporting prior domestic violence literature, this study found that when tailoring responses to domestic violence, police departments should be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, like advocacy organizations (Sampson, 2007).

Providing support for contingency theory external factors resulted in a change in TPD domestic violence policies. The TPD developed new domestic violence strategies as a result of necessity and as a preventative tool. In terms of police department dynamics, this study provided evidence that implementing a domestic violence unit involves commitment, proactivity, collaboration, and compulsion. Participants agreed that strengths of the strategies included victim support, increased compliance/accountability, and improved collaborations. Moreover, most participants suggested improving manpower could strengthen strategies. Finally, four themes
emerged as important to other agencies developing and implementing a domestic violence unit. A change agent must be advocating for change. Next, the department should scan data and analyze its current policies to highlight problems and ensure compliance/accountability. The department should train/education employees on the new strategies. Finally, the department should cultivate collaborations with support agencies.

B. **Policy Implications**

One lesson learned from the TPD study is that the impetus for change must come from administrators (also see Johnson and Hallgarten, 2002 for a discussion on policy implications and change). This finding is not of surprise to organizational change literature. According to organizational change literature (Twain, 1983; Thompson, 2008) and this study's participants, a change agent is important to changing police department strategies. Changing strategies involves training, coordination, and leadership (Rosebaum and Wilkinson, 2006). Without a change agent, coordinating and implementing strategies becomes difficult. When obstacles occur, change agents should become creative. Change agents are expected to develop creative solutions thus bringing about real reform (also see Rosebaum and Wilkinson, 2006). For example, S2 from the TPD, explained that "officers began treating domestic violence as routine." As a result, the departmental hurdle involved teaching officers and making them understand that victims react out of fear. S2 went on to explain that "the focus was on the victim and the offender, not headhunting of officers. Once officers realized the department was not headhunting, but trying to improve investigations and curb the cycle of violence they were more understanding of the strategies."
At the TPD, the impetus for change, according, to most respondents was from two administrators who were adamant change agents. Administrators held informal planning meetings with middle management to discuss how to ensure compliance with New Jersey law and departmental mandates. Other participants, however, suggested that departments do not necessarily need a change agent. The department simply needs top-down orders. Thus, based on the results of this study, agencies implementing change may also want to focus on agency oversight (also see Townsend et al., 2005). Through conversations with the TPD it became clear that most employees did not know whether the strategies received support from officers. However, changes occurred because they were mandated by the department and the state of New Jersey.

An unanticipated finding of this study was the role of compulsion. At the TPD, officers did not resist, instead they felt compelled to change because of state mandates and departmental regulations. This view provides evidence in favor of classical theory. Although literature suggests that more recently departments are moving more towards a decentralized open system, this finding supports the role of the classical role of bureaucracy in policing. Moreover, given the opportunity to resist change, it is hard to determine whether officers would have resisted. There is evidence for and against this view. One TPD participant, for example, suggested that when implementing the strategies, the department needed to change the mindset of the officers through education. Moreover, S3 suggested that:

“Officers were not happy. Not that they were against it. There was more paperwork, more time spent working on a job. A large number of victims would drop charges. Moreover, for lower level offenses, the court will dismiss if people want to dismiss.”

Similarly, S5 suggested:
“No, the department did not win support from the officers. More paperwork. No rhyme or reason for the extra paperwork. We accepted the strategic reforms because we had to, it was an order. I understand we are now a model department. Yet is anybody looking at why cases are being downgraded? Why are offenders not going to jail? Where is the accountability for other areas of the system?”

S5 also suggested that he was not sure the domestic violence strategies are successful. He suggested that the goal of the unit is to collect data and combat DV. However, “this is not actually having an effect on the people becoming domestic violence victims.”

There were also TPD employees who were more positive about officer acceptance of the strategies. S3 suggested that updating strategies were long overdue. Domestic violence strategies are not as popular as gangs and drugs. Other TPD employees indicated strategies are helpful because they provide more information. S7 for instance suggested that officers accepted the strategies with open arms. He suggested, “I think they accepted them with open arms. I think they thought; now I have somebody to go to with the incidents.” At this same time, however, S7 suggested that officers will comply with directives and orders. More specifically, according to S7, the process is not about resistance, but compliance. S7 also implied the strategies are useful because they provide a safeguard against mistakes. More specifically:

“Yes, I believe the process needed to change…The process is a little more detail oriented than in the past. After you file your incident report with a detective, they will reinitiate the process. They collect evidence, take statements, and write their own reports.”

S11 also provided a view that shed light on the nature of resistance to change and changing officer mindset. He suggested:
“Officers are very much resistant to change. We find a way to be disgruntled, etc. There are more forms. Forms are repetitive in nature. On a closer inspection, you see the reason for the extra steps and how things fall through the cracks. People begin listening when you are forced to understand the paperwork and you don’t know what to do… It’s all about accountability.”

In summary, agencies may find it useful to develop detailed orders which are enforced by committed supervisors. A related implication of this study is that agencies implementing a new domestic violence unit may also find it useful to choose employees suitable for the job. TPD administrators selected employees for the domestic violence unit who were "right for the job." A TPD officer suggested the importance of choosing the "right" individuals for the unit. He stated, "Sergeant...led the trainings. People respected this sergeant. Also the right detectives were put in the right job. These are detectives that people respected. They complemented the Domestic Violence Response Team."

Another implication of this study is the importance of proactively evaluating the domestic violence problem. In other words, implementing change involves understanding the reasons for change. In Trenton, after an increase in deadly domestic violence incidents, some of which were high profile, the TPD recognized the need for changing policies. The department used the tenets of problem oriented policing and studied how things were being done. The TPD concluded that there were several underlying factors involved in domestic violence investigations. Many times the offender had a prior record of domestic violence, follow-ups rarely occurred, and finally spot checks revealed the incompleteness or, in some cases, inaccuracy of police reports.

As indicated in chapter three, organizational theories suggest that agencies change when a problem exists with the current operation or there is a more efficient method of
conducting business. Organizational theories would imply that agencies fail to carry out plans when the organization did not fully grasp the problem and/or intervention and acted too quickly to implement the new intervention and practices. When agencies fail to grasp the factors and processes involved in organizational change they have to depend upon trial and error when trying to maximize change (Williams, 2003). That said, historically, police have changed their way of doing business when faced with uncertainties within dominant policing strategies.

The tenets of problem-oriented policing have important policy implications for police departments attempting to reduce domestic violence. In other words, reducing domestic violence incidents involves understanding local problems and tailoring responses to fit those problems (Sampson, 2007). Moreover, departments must be familiar with other stakeholders who have an interest in domestic violence, for example advocacy organizations, medical providers, public health agencies, universities, clergy, etc. (Sampson, 2007). These agencies could provide valuable information and support to police departments in the process of changing domestic violence strategies. Clearly, aggregate data are important during this stage of investigation. However, as Sampson (2007) noted, data are only useful when they are properly documented and investigated. In the words of Sampson (2007), “It is important for investigating officers to understand the context and history of domestic assaults to determine if the incident is part of a series of abuse the victim has sustained and if it’s likely to recur or escalate to more serious violence” (Sampson, 2007, p. 16).

As noted in chapter 7, part of research question two involved answering how the TPD took the initiative in implementing strategies in a unique way and how the “core
technology” of policing domestic violence changed. Put another way, how did domestic violence strategies fundamentally change the nature of police work? Evidence suggests the model of problem oriented policing assisted the TPD change their domestic violence strategies.

Data suggests the TPD applied the tenets of the SARA model when planning and implementing their DV Unit. Perceptions of a rise in domestic violence homicides, by local newspapers and the TPD, led to a change in domestic violence strategies. The TPD began to analyze whether their actions to IPV were not appropriate. They began by analyzing incident reports and recognized that many reports were incomplete or even inaccurate. Moreover, after the initial report was filed, follow-ups rarely occurred. For instance, did victims receive proper instructions about help? Did they receive information about outreach providers, court, etc.?

The department responded by explaining, to officers, the importance of accurate and complete police reports and the importance of providing victims with support information. To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the incident reports, Domestic Violence Unit detectives randomly reviewed about 10% of the domestic violence incident reports. As indicated earlier, the review’s purpose was shedding light on whether the offender, perhaps unknown to the victim, had a prior record of domestic incidents. Administrators concluded they should be exploring why certain individuals are repeat victims. Initial spot checks revealed that some disorderly person’s cases should have been indictable. Through follow-up of indictable domestic violence incident reports and spot checks of nonindictable cases, the department began pushing for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders. Warrant sweeps is another step the TPD has taken in
following up on offenders of domestic violence cases. The TPD collaborates with the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal Marshalls on warrant sweeps. According to S2, from the TPD, one of the purposes of these sweeps was to “make sure that the word got out to the community, offenders, and victims alike, that domestic violence is a priority to the Trenton Police Department.”

Finally, at monthly DV Stat meetings the TPD, Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, and Womenspace would unite and discuss and assess the status of certain offenders and whether any participants had concerns about how cases were being handled. Study participants suggested that through these meetings collaborations between the agencies greatly improved. It is important to note that data suggests that TPD lower ranking staff are beginning to scan the community for problems. For instance, TPD staff suggested that educating the immigrant population on domestic violence might help prevent abuse in the neighborhoods.

When analyzing and becoming familiar with the local problem, police departments should consider calls for service, e.g. percentage of calls for domestic violence incidents, percentages of repeat victims, how many victims are pregnant, the relationship status of the couple, etc. (Sampson, 2007). As indicated, TPD began collecting statistics on, for example, the number of calls for service, number of police reports submitted, indictable offenses, disorderly persons offenses, domestic violence arrests, domestic violence warrants issued, temporary restraining orders and final restraining orders, children present, DVVRT callbacks, victims in headquarters, Walk-in to headquarters, Victims brought into headquarters, etc.
Departments may also want to consider the offender’s history, e.g. how many offenders violated restraining orders, how many are repeat offenders, what is the criminal record of offenders, etc. (Sampson, 2007). Additionally, how many incidents occur each year and when is the “red zone” for domestic incidents. In other words, when and where do incidents commonly occur (Sampson, 2007)? According to Sampson (2007), police departments should review current responses to domestic violence and subsequently measure whether responses are adequate. For example, what is the current police department policy toward domestic violence and is it adequate? Or, how does the department encourage people to report domestic violence? Are there adequate advocacy groups that respond to the needs of domestic violence victims? How many victims take advantage of referral services? In concluding, Townsend et al., (2005) pointedly noted:

"Most departments review their policies and make revisions as needed, but most of the revisions are made to update the policy based on changes made to state statutes. Departments might consider other reasons for revision; for example, in response to a review of policy implementation that identifies responses in the field that are inconsistent with department goals. This could be accomplished through internal studies looking at incident reports or response patterns among officers, or working with the victim advocate community to identify weaknesses or inconsistencies in the department’s response" (p.4).

Similar to prior research (Pennell and Burke, 2002; Friday et al., 2006), another lesson learned from this study is that training is very important. As indicated earlier, training police officers on domestic violence and developing units is a fairly recent action. According to Liebman and Schwartz (1973) as of 1966 no law enforcement agency within the United States maintained domestic violence training programs. By the end of the 1970s, a handful of jurisdictions in the United States began revising laws, department policies, and training officers in domestic violence laws and procedures (Little et al., 1998).
This study suggested that the TPD re-trained officers on domestic violence policies to ensure that they understood what was required by the policies. Officers also suggested that each year they are updated on domestic violence polices at block trainings. The TPD also offered training to dispatchers on how to handle domestic violence calls. In their study, Townsend et al. (2005) found that only about half of the departments nationwide offered training to call-takers and dispatchers. Training is extremely important because it educates officers on the grey areas of domestic violence. Townsend et al. (2005) pointed out the issues that many departments have encountered with determining the primary aggressor. In their words:

"Policies and procedures provide sufficient guidance to call-takers and dispatchers to promote officer and victim safety, but officers may need more guidance on handling more challenging aspects of domestic violence calls for service – uncooperative parties, mutual combatants, alcohol or drug involved violence, and violations of protection orders. For example, if a policy just states that arrest is mandatory, but does not provide further guidance on how to determine the predominant aggressor, police may arrest both parties rather than just the perpetrator. More guidance may also be useful in handling minor domestic incidents that involve a 3rd party caller and subsequent denial among the parties involved. There is the potential for officers to use their discretion to reclassify these incidents as non-domestic and therefore not treat them as crime prevention opportunities" (p.4).

Another policy implication of this study is the need to develop collaborations with supportive agencies (also see Townsend et al., 2005). In terms of collaborations, several respondents pointed out the usefulness of DV Stat meetings. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as a tool to bring together various stakeholders to discuss Trenton's domestic violence problem. During meetings stakeholders discussed monthly domestic violence statistics, specific cases, and ideas for prevention and outreach. For example, agencies implementing change may find it useful to work with prosecutor's offices and victim advocates. To begin, collaborating with prosecutor's offices helps ensure there is
enough information to make a solid case. For example, Keilitz et al. (1997) suggested that law enforcement agencies do more to assist "prosecutors in developing cases for prosecution, to arrest perpetrators, and to help victims access the civil protection order process" (Keilitz et al., 1997). Keilitz and colleagues (1997) also suggested that court employees provide more information about the contempt process. They found that victims rarely use the contempt process.

Secondly, similar to prior research (DePrince et al., 2012; Fleury-Steiner et al., 2006; Coker, 2001; Shepard, 1999) this study suggested that collaborating with advocates makes the job of the police officer easier. Literature also suggests that, according to battered women's advocates, implementation of institutional reform should not occur "without an infrastructure of community services in place" (Coker, 2001; Shepard, 1999). Victim advocates, in addition to law enforcement, are an important avenue to victims. Domestic violence is very emotional and heated. Advocates try to calm down victims, explain their rights as a victim, and organize their thoughts, without using leading questions. As DePrince et al. (2012) underscored, “Victims cannot control whether their abusers continue to engage in abusive behaviors; thus, interventions should also affect domains in which women can have more control, such as victims’ own reasoning regarding staying/leaving” (P. 312). Thus, future research should focus on the efficacy of coordinated community response programs in responding to the needs of victims rather than offenders (Goodman and Epstein, 2005).

During economic downturns, it becomes extremely important to demonstrate the need and efficacy of these programs. It is the hope of this author that this research will help raise public attention to the importance of victim advocates and subsequently help
more funding reach victim advocates. During economic downtimes and manpower shortages, departments should try and continue to show their support for advocacy groups such as Womanspace. As S5, from the TPD, indicated people are more aware of Womanspace since the TPD began its collaboration with the group. As S5 indicated, “Womanspace used to be a secret hideaway that people never saw. So they have grown because of the police department.” Moreover, as Sullivan and Gillum (2001) pointed out, the general public is still under the impression domestic violence programs focus solely on crisis intervention (crisis lines) and shelter services. Today, as Sullivan and Gillum (2001) suggested, the majority of programs consist of, but are not limited to, “support groups for women who are not residing at the shelter, advocacy services, individual and group counseling, programs geared specifically toward children, referrals to other community based services, and financial assistance” (p.253).

Additionally, future research may want to explore victimization of men. There are also very few criminological or sociological studies on husband battering. In recent years there is more discussion about battering of men by their significant others. As indicated earlier when men are battered, they too face emotional and physical problems, yet there are few available shelters or programs for men. Moreover, men may be less likely to voice their abuse, thus suppressing their feelings. Consequently, the act of suppressing feelings could potentially have an impact on wellbeing.

A serious concern for the Trenton Police Department is how layoffs will affect their responses to domestic violence. If the department is not careful, there is some evidence to suggest that domestic violence strategies could regress to the pre-2009
period. The layoffs of July 2001 seriously compromised the domestic violence unit and morale overall. For example, S9 suggested:

“The concept and the strategies are a great idea. It has the potential to exceed expectations. The department needs to become more serious about the DV Unit. At one point we had three detectives in the Unit. Now the Unit supports one detective who is part time. The rest of this detective’s time is spent investigating sexual assault, etc. There needs to be more manpower. Dedicate two or three detectives and that is all they do during the day. Get more serious.”

When asked about recommendations for other departments implementing a DV Unit, TPD staff suggested that units require more than one detective and sufficient numbers of officers. As indicated, the department cut DV Stat. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as an innovative tool to hold various stakeholders accountable and bring these agencies together to discuss domestic violence in Trenton. Compounding the problem, because of the shortage in manpower, detectives are not actively working DV cases. According to TPD staff, they now review cases at the end of the month because there are not enough people to review incident reports. S17 from the MCPO suggested that manpower shortages could potentially compromise cases. In the words of S17:

“Since manpower was decreased, contacting officers may become more difficult. Reports may not be available right away. What if we had information two weeks ago? Moreover, the accuracy of reports reflects the time period in which they were written. Inaccurate reports could lead to lost cases for the prosecution. Indicating we only have so much time. Manpower issues affect the entire county. I may have to put off an investigation in West Windsor once Trenton reports become available.”

Finally, respondents also suggested the layoffs could negatively impact response time. S19 a victim advocate also suggested that collaborations are already being affected. She believed that advocates are not being called as frequently as in the past. According to this individual, police departments prioritize and Trenton has so many gang issues.
However, there is also evidence to suggest that TPD strategies could continue to remain intact. A significant point to highlight is that a couple individuals from the TPD believed that the layoffs cannot affect response time because it is a high priority. According to this individual other calls for service will be impacted. This is an important point because it suggests the department views domestic violence as an important crime. Recall in the past police departments did not consider DV policing real policing. Supporting this finding, a couple of advocates suggested the layoffs are not negatively impacting calls for advocacy.

The morale of the story is that if the TPD is not careful the old adage, the more things change the more they remain the same could prove true.

C. Conclusions

The hope of the TPD and this author is that the conclusions of this research will be useful to other police departments that are in the process of changing domestic violence policies and practices. As indicated, this research offers a number of policy implications. First, this research aims to shed light on potential strategies that protect the safety of victims and hold offenders accountable (see Worden, 2001). Recent research suggests that law enforcement must begin recognizing domestic violence as a real crime and investigating domestic violence as a real crime (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003; Worden, 2001). The TPD management recognized the need to treat domestic violence more seriously and implemented DV Stat and coordinated efforts with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office and Womanspace to address domestic violence. In accordance with Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows Theory, the police department
recognized that intervening in individual incidents might deescalate more violent
domestic violence incidents from occurring. For example, by identifying repeat
offenders, the department in collaboration with the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office
could push for more stringent sentences for repeat offenders.

This study has the potential of opening a Pandora’s Box leading to new hypotheses
and perhaps new strategies based upon the findings of the research. For example, in
areas with the same characteristics as Trenton, New Jersey, perhaps an effective strategy
in addressing and investigating domestic violence is problem-oriented policing.
Research suggests that police departments are not correctly applying Goldstein’s model
of problem-oriented policing (see Braga and Weisburd, 2006 and also Willis et al 2007).
Instead, departments are adapting the process to their own needs. In terms of domestic
violence, police cannot solve the underlying reasons for domestic violence. However,
they can change the way that they are responding to domestic violence. Secondly, this
research could potentially explain where implementation glitches are likely to occur and
reasons for the problems (Willis et al., 2007). Finally, this research has the potential of
shedding light on the collaboration dynamics between social agencies and law
enforcement agencies. Finally, similar to Worden (2001) it is unrealistic to expect that
the results of this study will provoke immediate policy revisions nationwide. More
realistically this type of study will “contribute to a long-term investment” in the TPD and
perhaps later in other police departments (also see Worden, 2001, p. 6). That said, like
Worden (2001), this dissertation’s results are of greatest value to two groups of people:

1. Researchers who might replicate this study in other sites.
2. Practitioners who might develop new strategies or refine strategies based on the results of this study.

In concluding, the reality of the 2011 police department layoffs has brought up another question. Will the TPD be able to maintain proactive crime prevention approaches? Will it be able to meet organizational goals (also see Skogan, 1976)? In the words of Lt. Mark Keiffer, the president of the police Superior Officers Association, “Since 2009, 40 officers have resigned and retired. So we’re already down 40 officers… It’s really taking a step back for policing…You’re going to take policing back to the 1950s, where we just respond to 911 calls. It’s going to severely hamper our tactical operations, our follow-ups, our investigations” (Fair and Zdan, 2011). What level of efficiency or effectiveness could society expect from police departments when they are functioning with significantly scarce resources?

The question for the TPD, in terms of budget cuts, is whether it will be able to maintain its proactive strategies. The department is staffing minimum levels of officers on each shift and officers are working overtime to fill these shifts (Zdan, 2011). The city established minimum staff levels decades ago, thus minimum staffing levels should, in all reality, probably be higher (Zdan, 2011). According to the TPD, the detective bureau was reduced 30 percent to compensate for patrol officers who were laid off (Zdan, 2011). In September 2011, the department discontinued DV Stat because of staffing and budget issues. Since 2009 the department used DV Stat as a tool to bring together various stakeholders to discuss domestic violence in the city of Trenton. During meetings stakeholders discussed monthly domestic violence statistics, specific cases, and ideas for prevention and outreach. The challenge for Trenton is whether it can continue to analyze
and collect domestic violence data and collaborate with stakeholders despite significantly fewer staff and the discontinuation of DV Stat.

Research clearly demonstrates that solely reactive policing is not an effective strategy of running a police department. Budget cuts have historically left remaining officers discouraged and overworked. The question in Trenton, New Jersey becomes how to sustain proactive crime prevention strategies in an environment with budgetary constraints. Reallocating resources is a method that the department utilized in the past to implement the domestic violence unit. This is an option for the department, yet how much can the department reallocate funds? Therefore, it is important to collect statistics and conduct research to show the impact that proactive strategies are having on crime victims and crime within the city. The downside of this coin is that if the department has limited funding, the option of hiring a researcher to conduct research is inconceivable but important. That said grants become highly valuable. The TPD recognized the importance of grants to help sustain its proactive approaches and applied for grant funding. Ideally, to sustain proactive approaches, the TPD would receive grant funding or continue pleas with the state to provide more funding to hire back laid-off officers. As noted earlier, State Sen. Shirley Turner is encouraging Gov. Chris Christie to channel some of the $26 million dollars unearthed from forgotten state bank accounts to the Trenton Police Department (Zdan, 2011).
D. OBSTACLES AND DIFFICULTIES IMPLEMENTING CHANGE - RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. Implementing Change at the Trenton Police Department

Manpower is not particularly a limitation of this research. However, the Trenton Police Department experience highlights that manpower is an obstacle in implementing change. Most participants suggested improving manpower could strengthen strategies. The only issue manpower posed for this research was in sampling officers. In this study, the preferred method would have been to randomly sample officers. Instead this research relied on purposive sampling of police officers. Originally, the research plan included randomly sampling officers, this proved more difficult than anticipated. Many times, officers were not available for interviewing as they were deployed to the streets. As a result, officers were interviewed upon availability. As a result, an issue for this research is generalizability. In other words, are the results reflective of all Trenton Police Department employees? A number of precautionary steps were taken to help ensure generalizability within the Trenton Police Department, i.e. chain referral and triangulation.

Through judgmental sampling and “chain referral,” this study identified employees who worked and experienced the changes in domestic violence strategies at the Trenton Police Department and those that were fundamentally involved in the development of these strategies (Watters and Biernacki, 1989; Marshall, 1996 for judgmental sampling). Judgmental sampling involves selecting individuals who would be most capable of answering the research questions (Marshall, 1996). This type of sampling helps ensure that the sample is comprised of a group that is representative of the
population and thus reliable. During the interview employees were asked whether they could refer other employees or former employees that may be able to provide valuable information. Finally, in an attempt to increase the representativeness of this study’s sample, thereby avoiding issues with external validity, research methods include data triangulation. Research suggests that “data triangulation” is a method of cross validating sources by a variety of different means.

Critics could suggest that a limitation of the research is that strategies have limited generalizability. This research is a case study of one urban center in New Jersey. Thus, research results are generalizable to cities with similar populations. This research developed with the hope that agencies will learn from the experiences of the Trenton Police Department. Most departments, urban, suburban, or rural experience obstacles with changing and implementing strategies. This study explored: why change occurs; experiences with implementing change; the dynamics involved in implementing change; the perceived utility of strategies; and how changes could be applied at the macro level.

A strength of this research is that included a built in strategy to ensure that results could be applied at the macro level. The final research question explored organizational factors essential in facilitating policy implementation. This question aimed to provide answers to other agencies looking to implement change. For example, what organizational factors are necessary in facilitating change? For example, future research may consider identifying the connection between compulsion and acceptance of law enforcement strategies rather than resistance.

Adding perceptions of victims would have strengthened this research. Future research should attempt interviewing victims. This research would have liked to sample
a population of repeat victims for their input on the strengths of new law enforcement department domestic violence strategies. More specifically, what are the perceptions of victims in terms of the utility of the new strategies? Understanding victim perceptions could help police departments in developing future domestic violence strategies.

Finally, domestic violence strategies may not succeed, long term, unless victims and offenders view police efforts as legitimate and fair. This fact has long been recognized in the community policing literature. As Skogan (2006) noted:

“In fact, the community crime prevention movement of the 1970s was an important precursor to community policing. It promoted the idea that crime was not solely the responsibility of the police. The police were quick to endorse the claim that they could not solve crime problems without community support and assistance…….” (Skogan, 2006, p. 29 and Skogan et al. (1999).

This research design does not allow testing of the procedural justice theoretical link. Future research, however, may want to explore whether procedural justice could affect the implementation and effectiveness of organizational policies. Conceivably, if victims fail to report crimes and are not directed to victim services, police policies cannot succeed long-term. The concern is not so much gaining legitimacy with powerful outside bodies, instead the concern is developing public confidence that police will listen to problems. The concern is persuading victims of highly personal crimes to come forward with information before the crime intensifies. As Kelley (2005) suggested, “Understanding public opinion toward domestic violence is crucial for criminal justice policy to become informed, and because knowledge of the public’s expectations and perceptions shape citizens’ willingness to report violent incidents and influences their judgments about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the criminal justice system and its agents.” A transcending and related issue for police is citizen compliance with the law
(Tyler, 1990). In other words, what strategy will result in compliance with the law?

How can a police department compel people obey the law?

Tyler’s (1990) Chicago study suggested that people are more likely to follow laws if they believe that police procedures or legal procedures are fair. In other words, citizens are more likely to comply with decisions of public authorities when they implement “decisions and rules” fairly (Tyler, 1990, p. 162).
Table 7: Data Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROCESS QUESTION:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Discussions will focus on how the unit came about? (What evidence led to change?)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interviews with police department supervisors</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. Which external or internal factors have an independent influence on law enforcement changing domestic violence policies? | • What was the problem facing the current practices  
• Whose idea was the unit? | **Review of archival data**                                           |
| • Aims to answer how the department strategically planned for change and who led the change. | **Discussions will focus on the level of research and planning that occurred before implementation.** |                           |
| • Incorporated within this question is dialogue on what leads a department to change policies and procedures. | • Who led the change? Any meetings to discuss change?  
• How will the new intervention correct the problem? |                           |
<p>| • For agencies to change, the organization must understand its current role, the problem facing the current practices, and the role that the new intervention is to assume in correcting the problem. |                           |                           |
| <strong>PROCESS QUESTION:</strong>                                                            | <strong>Discussions will focus on how the TPD began a process to implement the new domestic violence policies. For instance, what happens once a victim reports a domestic violence</strong> | <strong>Interview data</strong>        |
| 1. How are police department dynamics involved in creating a process for changing domestic violence policies? |                           |                           |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>policies and ensuring compliance with policies?</td>
<td>incident?</td>
<td>Interviews with police supervisors, police officers and prosecutors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the department fund the DV Unit?</td>
<td>• How did the department introduce the new policies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the department introduce the new policies?</td>
<td>• How does the department ensure that officers are following policies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the department ensure that officers are following policies?</td>
<td>• How did the department develop communication lines between governmental agencies, such as the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and private organizations, such as Womanspace? In other words, how have police opened up communication.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change?</td>
<td>• Resistance to change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OUTCOME QUESTION**

1. What is the perceived utility of domestic violence strategies in assisting victims of domestic violence?

- **Discussions will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies?**
  - How did strategies assist in helping victims of DV?
  - How have investigations changed with the new policies? Strengths? Weaknesses? Suggestions for improvement?
  - Better report writing?
  - More attention to laws?
  - How have the new strategies affected victims receiving support?
    - How are collaborations with other agencies?
    - How do law enforcement officers...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and others who collaborate with the TPD perceive of the new policy’s ability in assisting them in helping victims of DV?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Discussions will focus on whether officers, social agencies, and prosecutors believe a greater number of victims receiving support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Why are a greater number of victims receiving support?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions will focus on macro level topics. For instance, how would the TPD management teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions will focus on recommendations the TPD would suggest to any agency or business trying to change their way of doing business.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions will focus on the most important factor in implementing change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME QUESTION/MACRO APPLICATION 1. What organizational factors are essential in facilitating policy implementation?</td>
<td>Interviews with police supervisors, police officers and prosecutors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protection of Private Persons

This research is confidential. Confidentiality indicates that the research design precludes identifying participants within the research results. As indicated, this study will record the participant’s name, age, rank, and agency information. However, the identifying information will be confidential within the research report. For example, if the participant is a sergeant, the results will indicate “a supervisor.” Once the interview is over participants will be asked whether they consent to the interview being used for research purposes. Data will be secured in a locked filing cabinet. Finally, the TPD will be provided a copy of the research results.
Works Cited


Burke, Peggy B. and Michael Tonry. 2006. “Successful Transition and Reentry for Safer Communities: A Call to Action for Parole.” Silver Spring, Maryland. JEHT Foundation.


Publications.


Domestic Violence Training for Law Enforcement. September 13 and 14, 2009 at Princeton University Police Department. Given by Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office.


Meltzer, Paul. 2010. "New Trenton police tactics bringing peace to city after 138-day siege of killer love." *Trentonian*


2009 New Jersey Crime Reports

*Newark Star Ledger*, Editorial Board. April 27, 2011. “Newark police layoffs serve as a warning to state.” *Newark Star Ledger.*


Ryan, Kenneth John ; Joseph V. Brady; Robert E. Cooke; Dorothy I. Height; Albert R. Jonsen; Patricia King; Karen Lebacqz; David W. Louisell; Donald W. Seldin; Eliot Stellar; Robert H. Townsend, Meg; Dana Hunt; Sarah Kuck; Caity Baxter. 2005. "Law Enforcement Responses to Domestic Violence Calls for Service." U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.


city data.com; [http://www.citypopulation.de/USA-NewJersey.html](http://www.citypopulation.de/USA-NewJersey.html)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/family/dv.htm
http://www.mercercountyprosecutor.com/our-units/domestic-violence-unit

http://www/state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/dvpolrsp.htm
Appendix A: Interview Protocol

**APPENDIX A**

**POLICE MANAGEMENT: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES PROTOCOL**

This interview will be conducted with police management at the Trenton Police Department (TPD). Questions are designed to cover four core areas including the TPD decision to change and implement domestic violence strategies, perceptions of changes, processes of organizational change, and basic officer information. The categories are
intended to organize the interview and not intended to be read to interviewees. Furthermore, the majority of questions are open ended. Thus, responses could elicit information that creates new interview categories. Bullet points within the interview indicate probes that may be used for follow-up questions. Finally, interviews will last from between 60-90 minutes. The interview will be recorded upon the permission of the interviewee. The audio recordings are for the sole use of the principal investigator in order to ensure the accuracy of the information collected. It will also allow the principal investigator to focus on the conversation without the distraction of focusing on note taking. Notes, however, will be taken. Summaries of the interview will be typed after each interview.

TPD DECISION TO CHANGE and IMPLEMENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES

I. General Questions
   A. How long have you been on the force?
   B. How do you feel when you are responding to a DV call? What is going through your head?
   C. Process

II. Leading Change – RESEARCH QUESTION ONE

   To provide context to this case study, qualitative data focuses on understanding the organization and structure of the domestic violence unit. This data will be ascertained by reading through Trenton Police General Order 2009-03, the Domestic Violence Policy.

   To provide context about changing police department strategies, the following questions probe for the types of information recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005) and organizational change literature.

   1. I understand that the TPD developed a DV unit, in 2009, can you expand a little more about how the unit came about? (What evidence led to change?)
      A. Was there some kind of turning point that led the TPD to change DV strategies?
      B. Whose idea was the new unit and new strategies?

III. Providing Context
   A. What was it like working on DV cases before the new strategies were implemented?
   B. Did anything change with the implementation of the new strategies?

C. In your eyes, what are some of the more important components of the strategy? (Added after the initial interviews)

D. In your eyes, how have DV strategies affected officer discretion? (Added after initial interviews)
   1. Is taking away officer discretion a good thing?

IV. Implementing Change — RESEARCH QUESTION TWO

*How did the TPD begin implementing the new policies?*

The second question is an outcome question and seeks to determine how the TPD implemented domestic violence policies. Discussions will focus on how the TPD began a process to implement the new domestic violence policies. For instance, what happens once a victim reports a domestic violence incident? How did the department introduce the new policies?

Data will also be ascertained by asking police administration what types of cases are forwarded to the domestic violence unit. Secondly, administrators will be questioned about who reviews the cases to determine whether they should be investigated by unit detectives or sent back to patrol for follow-up. Finally, interviews probe about the procedures for responding to domestic violence incidents and the roles of the officers.

A. What happened when the TPD began implementing new DV strategies?

1. Were you apprehensive when you heard that the TPD was changing DV strategies, what made you apprehensive?
   1. Who told you about the strategies?
   2. Did you believe strategies needed to change?

2. Do you know if there were meetings to discuss change? (who led meetings)
   1. Would you have liked to have been involved in the planning stages?

3. Did the TPD have any short term or long term goals/objectives in terms of DV policing?
   1. Were specific goals that they would like to achieve developed? (A VISION)
2. Was a specific action plan to reach their goals developed? (set objectives)

3. Collaborations with other agencies?

4. Trainings?
   1. Who led trainings?
   2. Memos on new strategies?

5. Was anybody resisting this change?
   1. What were the reasons for resistance?
   2. How did the department win support from officers?
   3. Do you think officers bought into the new strategies?
      i. What makes you believe that they bought into the new strategies?
   4. How did you ensure compliance with the new strategies?

6. What has been your experience with impediments to implementing the department’s new strategies?

V. Questions About the DV Unit

A. What is the role of the TPD DV unit?
   1. How did the department recruit people to work in the DV unit?
   2. Does the unit have specific goals that they would like to achieve? (A VISION)
   3. Did the unit develop a specific action plan to reach their goals (set objectives)

B. Who reviews domestic violence incident reports?
   1. I understand, since the implementation of the DV Unit, the DV Unit also reviews all incident reports. How do you feel about this?

III. Strengths and Weaknesses – RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

How do law enforcement officers and others who directly collaborate with the Trenton Police Department perceive of the new policy’s utility in assisting them in helping victims of domestic violence and subsequently how did they arrive at these truths?

The third question is an outcome question and seeks to determine the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the Trenton Police Department implemented. As Graphia (2010) pointedly noted, “From a policy perspective, leaders want to ensure that precious financial and human capital are allocated and consumed wisely” (p. 141). However, administrators and policymakers also want to ensure that new strategies and procedures are allowing officers to “maximize their own ability to provide security and
protection” (p. 141). In other words, it is one thing for strategies to be implemented and quite another for these strategies to assist officers in helping victims of domestic violence.

The following questions probe for information relating to the perception of the new policy’s ability in assisting law enforcement officers and others who directly collaborate with the TPD in helping victims of domestic violence:

A. What is the utility of strategies in terms of DV policing? Overall from your experiences, how useful are the new strategies? What are the strengths?
   1. How do the new strategies assist you in helping victims of DV?
      a. Have investigations improved, how?
      b. Better report writing?
      c. More attention to laws?
      d. How have the new strategies affected victims receiving support?
   2. Has interagency collaboration improved?
      a. How does this help dv policing?

B. What is the utility of strategies in terms of DV policing? Defining Areas of improvement
   1. Weaknesses
   2. How could the DV Unit be improved?
      a. How could the department improve its response to domestic violence?

IV. How would TPD management teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies? – RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR

What does the Trenton Police Department experience tell researchers and practitioners about processes of organizational change?

The final question is also an outcome question and seeks to determine how this research is applicable at a macro level of analysis. As explained later, this section seeks to elicit information to understand whether there is component of the new strategies that officers and others who collaborate with the TPD feel are problematic or impediments to helping domestic violence victims. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change.

A. In general, what recommendations would the TPD suggest to any agency or business trying to change their way of doing business?
   1. Recommendations to other agencies
a. Is coordination important? How?
b. Are goals and objectives important? How so?
c. A change agent? How so?

VI. Layoffs

A. How will layoffs affect the DV Unit?
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

POLICE OFFICER: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES

This interview will be conducted with police officers and detectives at the Trenton Police Department (TPD). Questions are designed to cover four core areas including the TPD decision to change and implement domestic violence strategies, perceptions of changes, processes of organizational change, and basic officer information. The categories are intended to organize the interview and not intended to be read to interviewees. Furthermore, the majority of questions are open ended. Thus, responses could elicit information that creates new interview categories. Parentheses within the interview indicate probes that may be used for follow-up questions. Finally, interviews will last from between 60-90 minutes. The interview will be recorded upon the permission of the interviewee. The audio recordings are for the sole use of the principal investigator in order to ensure the accuracy of the information collected. It will also allow the principal investigator to focus on the conversation without the distraction of focusing on note taking. Notes, however, will be taken. Summaries of the interview will be typed after each interview.

A. General Questions

A. How long have you been on the force?

B. How do you feel when you are responding to a DV call? What is going through your head?

C. Process

B. Leading Change – RESEARCH QUESTION ONE:

What led the Trenton Police Department to change its domestic violence strategies?

To provide context to this case study, qualitative data focuses on understanding the organization and structure of the domestic violence unit. This data will be ascertained by reading through Trenton Police General Order 2009-03, the Domestic Violence Policy.

To provide context about changing police department strategies, the following questions probe for the types of information recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005) and organizational change literature.

A. Was there some kind of turning point that led the TPD to change DV strategies?
B. Whose idea was the new unit and new strategies?
C. Providing Context

A. What was it like working on DV cases before the new strategies were implemented?

B. Did anything change with the implementation of the new strategies?


C. In your eyes, what are some of the more important components of the strategy?

D. In your eyes, how have DV strategies affected officer discretion?

   1. Is taking away officer discretion a good thing?

D. Implementing Change — RESEARCH QUESTION TWO

The second question is an outcome question and seeks to determine how the TPD implemented domestic violence policies. Discussions will focus on how the TPD began a process to implement the new domestic violence policies. For instance, what happens once a victim reports a domestic violence incident? How did the department introduce the new policies?

Data will also be ascertained by asking police administration what types of cases are forwarded to the domestic violence unit. Secondly, administrators will be questioned about who reviews the cases to determine whether they should be investigated by unit detectives or sent back to patrol for follow-up. Finally, interviews probe about the procedures for responding to domestic violence incidents and the roles of the officers.

A. What happened when the TPD began implementing new DV strategies?

   1. Were you apprehensive when you heard that the TPD was changing DV strategies?
   2. Who told you about the strategies?
   3. Do you know if there were meetings to discuss change? (who led meetings)

   1. Would you have liked to have been involved in the planning stages?

B. Did the TPD have any short term or long term goals/objectives in terms of DV policing?
a) Were specific goals that they would like to achieve developed? (A VISION)

b) Was a specific action plan to reach their goals developed? (set objectives)

c) Collaborations with other agencies?

C. Trainings?

1. Who led trainings?

2. Memos on new strategies?

D. What would you say if I said that officers are always resistant to change?

1. Do you think officers bought into the new strategies?

E. What has been your experience with impediments to implementing the department’s new strategies?

E. Strengths and Weaknesses – RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

The third question is an outcome question and seeks to determine the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the Trenton Police Department implemented. As Graphia (2010) pointedly noted, “From a policy perspective, leaders want to ensure that precious financial and human capital are allocated and consumed wisely” (p. 141). However, administrators and policymakers also want to ensure that new strategies and procedures are allowing officers to “maximize their own ability to provide security and protection” (p. 141). In other words, it is one thing for strategies to be implemented and quite another for these strategies to assist officers in helping victims of domestic violence.

The following questions probe for information relating to the perception of the new policy’s ability in assisting law enforcement officers and others who directly collaborate with the TPD in helping victims of domestic violence:

A. What is the utility of strategies in terms of DV policing? Overall from your experiences, how useful are the new strategies? What are the strengths?

1. How do the new strategies assist you in helping victims of DV?

   a. Have investigations improved, how?

   b. Better report writing?

   c. More attention to laws?

   d. How have the new strategies affected victims receiving support?

2. Has interagency collaboration improved?
a. How does this help DV policing?

B. What is the utility of strategies in terms of DV policing? Defining Areas of improvement

3. Weaknesses
4. How could the DV Unit be more helpful?

C. How could the department improve its response to domestic violence?

IV. How would TPD management teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies? – RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR

The final question is also an outcome question and seeks to determine how this research is applicable at a macro level of analysis. As explained later, this section seeks to elicit information to understand whether there is component of the new strategies that officers and others who collaborate with the TPD feel are problematic or impediments to helping domestic violence victims. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change.

A. In general, what recommendations would the TPD suggest to any agency or business trying to change their way of doing business?

1. Recommendations to other agencies
   a. Is coordination important? How?
   b. Are goals and objectives important? How so?
   c. A change agent? How so?

VII. Layoffs

A. How will layoffs affect the DV Unit?
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

LEGAL: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES PROTOCOL

This interview will be conducted with legal advocates and social advocates who collaborate with the Trenton Police Department (TPD). Questions are designed to cover four core areas including the TPD decision to change and implement domestic violence strategies, perceptions of changes, processes of organizational change, and basic officer information. The categories are intended to organize the interview and not intended to be read to interviewees. Furthermore, the majority of questions are open ended. Thus, responses could elicit information that creates new interview categories. Parentheses within the interview indicate probes that may be used for follow-up questions. Finally, interviews will last from between 60-90 minutes. The interview will be recorded upon the permission of the interviewee. The audio recordings are for the sole use of the principal investigator in order to ensure the accuracy of the information collected. It will also allow the principal investigator to focus on the conversation without the distraction of focusing on note taking. Notes, however, will be taken. Summaries of the interview will be typed after each interview.

I. General Questions

A. How long have you worked for MCPO on DV cases?

B. What is your role at MCPO?

C. How do you feel when you receive another DV case? What is going through your head?

II. Leading Change – RESEARCH QUESTION ONE

To provide context to this case study, qualitative data focuses on understanding the organization and structure of the domestic violence unit. This data will be ascertained by reading through Trenton Police General Order 2009-03, the Domestic Violence Policy.
To provide context about changing police department strategies, the following questions probe for the types of information recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005) and organizational change literature.

A. Was there some kind of turning point that led the TPD to change DV strategies?

III. Providing Context

A. What was it like working with the TPD on DV cases before the new strategies were implemented?

Sample Questions:

1. How are strategies different from previous strategies, what changed? Priorities? Investigations? Are officers more proactive in securing TRO’s and arresting offenders? Data collection?

2. In your eyes, what are some of the more important components of the strategy?

IV. Implementing Change

A. What happened when the TPD began implementing new DV strategies?

Sample Questions:

1. Were you apprehensive when you heard that the TPD was changing DV strategies?

2. Who told you about the strategies?

3. What is the role of the TPD DV unit?

2. Do you know if there were meetings to discuss change? (who led meetings and was MCPO involved in the meetings)

3. Did the TPD have any short term or long term goals/objectives in terms of DV policing and collaboration with MCPO? A vision for the future?

   a) Were specific goals that they would like to achieve developed? (A VISION)

   b) Was a specific action plan to reach their goals developed? (set objectives)

   c) Collaborations with other agencies?
4. How did the department begin to implement the strategies?

5. Trainings? (who led trainings and was MCPO involved in the trainings)

6. Can you describe MCPO’s role in helping implement change at the TPD.

7. Buy-in from officers?

8. Resistance to change?

9. What has been your experience with impediments to implementing the department’s new strategies?

V. Utility of Strategies – Strengths and Weaknesses – RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

The third question is an outcome question and seeks to determine the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strategies the Trenton Police Department implemented. As Graphia (2010) pointedly noted, “From a policy perspective, leaders want to ensure that precious financial and human capital are allocated and consumed wisely” (p. 141). However, administrators and policymakers also want to ensure that new strategies and procedures are allowing officers to “maximize their own ability to provide security and protection” (p. 141). In other words, it is one thing for strategies to be implemented and quite another for these strategies to assist officers in helping victims of domestic violence.

The following questions probe for information relating to the perception of the new policy’s ability in assisting law enforcement officers and others who directly collaborate with the TPD in helping victims of domestic violence:

A. What is the utility of strategies in helping you better perform your job? Defining Success

1. Are victims following through with prosecution more so than in the past?

2. Are more officers appearing for court proceedings?

3. How have the new strategies affected victims receiving support?

4. Has interagency collaboration improved, how so?

B. What is the utility of strategies in helping you better perform your job? Defining Areas of improvement

1. Weaknesses

2. How could the DV Unit be more helpful?
   a. How could the department improve its response to domestic violence?
IV. How would TPD management teach other law enforcement agencies to implement new domestic violence strategies? – RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR

The final question is also an outcome question and seeks to determine how this research is applicable at a macro level of analysis. As explained later, this section seeks to elicit information to understand whether there is component of the new strategies that officers and others who collaborate with the TPD feel are problematic or impediments to helping domestic violence victims. Thus, perhaps these findings could provide answers to other law enforcement agencies and businesses implementing change.

A. In general, what recommendations would the TPD suggest to any agency or business trying to change their way of doing business?

1. Recommendations to other agencies
   a. Is coordination important? How?
   b. Are goals and objectives important? How so?
   c. A change agent? How so?

VI. Layoffs

A. How will layoffs affect the DV Unit?

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

VICTIM ADVOCATES: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES PROTOCOL

Example Questions

1. How long have you been a volunteer?

2. What is your role at Womanspace?

3. What is it like being a Womanspace volunteer?

4. I understand that the TPD refers victims to Womanspace, how does this process work?

5. Once the TPD refers a victim to Womanspace, how do you feel when you are responding to a DV call? What is going through your head?

6. What are some of the biggest concerns of victims?

7. In general, what recommendations would you suggest to any agency or business trying to set up a victim advocacy program?

8. Do you think the TPD layoffs will effect collaboration with Womanspace?
9. How could extra funding help Womanspace?

Vita

Michele-Lynne Muni

1977: Born May 17 in Trenton, New Jersey
1995: Graduated from Ewing High School, Ewing, New Jersey
1998-1999: Member of Alpha Phi Sigma, Criminal Justice National Honor Society
1999: Bachelor of Science in Law and Justice, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey
January 2000-2012: Graduate work in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001:</td>
<td>Executive Women of America Academic Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002:</td>
<td>Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice Academic Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002:</td>
<td>M.A. in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2011:</td>
<td>Lecturer, Rutgers University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003:</td>
<td>Teaching Assistantship, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ark, New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2010:</td>
<td>Researcher Juvenile Justice Commission, Office of Juvenile Parole, Trenton,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008:</td>
<td>Adjunct, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>Rutgers University Dissertation Fellowship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>Ph.D. in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>