ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Emergence of Opposition Movements

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When do people seeking political change choose to pick up arms and use violent means to bring about change, and under what circumstances do people turn to nonviolent peaceful means? There is a great deal of literature which states that in democracies we will see nonviolent social movements emerge and in autocracies we will see movements for change use violence. This study reviewed 323 cases of major non-state resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 and found just the opposite. Two-thirds of the campaigns in democratic countries were violent in nature and more than half of the campaigns in autocratic countries were nonviolent. Some alternative explanations were then explored including the possibility that the choice of whether a movement turns violent or nonviolent may have more to do with the global system and outside influences from other states than with any characteristic of the state itself.
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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to the fearless people throughout the world who have given their lives in the state’s violent reaction to society’s nonviolent movements, in the hopes of bettering the lives of their countrymen.
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Introduction:

In many areas of the world people seek to change their living and working conditions through pressuring the ruling regime or foreign occupations, to make changes in its laws and policies. When this is not enough they often start to look for more than policy changes and begin to seek an entirely new regime or the expulsion of a foreign occupation. Many times, especially in the past, people seeking to bring about this change did so through violent means. This can happen through various forms such as assassination, military coup, and civil war. More recently other groups seeking to bring in a new regime are doing so through nonviolent social movements. These nonviolent social movements work outside of the traditional institutional channels of change established by the state which include voting, running for political office, drafting new legislation, and petitioning elected officials. In contrast nonviolent social movements utilize strikes, boycotts, marches, sit-ins, protest campaigns and many other forms of demonstrations to bring attention and support for their cause, and increasingly change.

Central Question:

Political scientists are seeking to understand why people looking for these changes choose violent means and under what circumstances people turn to nonviolent tactics. If they can understand this dialectic, the hope is that the information can be used to help emerging movements make the changes they are seeking without resorting to violence. There will always be groups seeking political change. The question is: under what circumstances will these groups have a greater likelihood of success through nonviolent means? In an attempt to answer this question, this thesis will start with a review of the current literature and follow with an analysis of 323 cases of major non-state resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006.

Literature review:

Political scientists have long sought to understand what factors cause those seeking to make changes turn to nonviolent means while others will use violent measures with the same goals in mind. There are many studies depicting the success of the violent Soviet style military
guerilla warfare and the Chinese style peasant guerilla warfare which have influenced other campaigns, especially in the first half of the 20th century. But from the second half of the twentieth century we see an emergence of nonviolent social movements which appear to have a greater probability for a successful outcome, than violent campaigns. Two of the most well publicized of these were the campaigns lead by Mahatma Gandhi in the 1930’s and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960’s. Current day movement organizers can look back and see that some previous successful campaigns were violent while other successful campaigns were brought about through nonviolence. Several researchers point out that campaign organizers have a choice to make between violent or nonviolent means to bring about change.

Ackerman and Kruegler state that “the quality of strategic choice by practitioners of nonviolent conflict is a critical variable that must be taken into account; and it is becoming increasingly urgent to understand what circumstances are conducive to the success of nonviolent campaigns” (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994, p. xxi). Understanding the circumstances for success helps campaign organizers in their choice between violent and nonviolent means.

Ackerman and Duvall state that, “because violence became so widely accepted as a medication for injustice or tyranny, there was no incentive to consider less damaging alternatives for taking power, without considering how effective they have been in the past. The work of nonviolent movements in the twentieth century led to independence for India, equal rights for African Americans and South Africans, democracy in Poland and the removal of dictators in the Philippines, Chile, and a litany of other countries. But never in the postwar period did a military insurrection or violent coup, extend freedom to the people in whose name power was taken” (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000 p.459).

In considering the importance of the choices made, they point out that nonviolent action, (and they emphasize the word action) is not passivity but is like violent combat in at least two ways: it does not succeed automatically, and it does not operate mysteriously—it works by identifying an opponent’s vulnerabilities and taking away his ability to maintain control. “To shift the momentum of conflict toward its goals, a nonviolent movement has to:
1. Diversify the scope and variety of its sanctions
2. Keep the regime off balance with alert offensive moves
3. Defend its popular base against repression
4. Exploit any concessions
5. Undermine the regime’s claim to legitimacy and
6. Diminish its means of retaining control.” (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000 p. 479)

Ackerman and Duvall explain that a mass violent movement can force a favorable outcome in one of three ways: 1) coercing a ruler to surrender power or leave; 2) inducing a regime to compromise and make concessions; or 3) converting the regime’s view of the conflict, so that it believes it should no longer dictate the result. Those leading nonviolent movements must understand this and make choices that force a similar power-shift through nonviolence.

There is some concern that once the nonviolent movement has overthrown a repressive government they have “little democratic experience and will have a hard time holding the course, but those who voice this concern fail to consider that nonviolent movements themselves are based on voluntary participation where each individual chooses their own course of action and this freedom of choice has strong parallels with a democratic system of government” (Ackerman and Duvall, 2000 p. 503).

Kurt Schock explains that nonviolent action is one of the many possible responses to an intolerable situation and depicts hypothetical hierarchy of progression in decision making. Following the path to nonviolent action; from the starting point of a situation of political oppression and injustice, is recognition instead of non-recognition, non-acceptance instead of accepting the current situation, political action instead of everyday forms of resistance or exiting the situation, non-institution action instead of the normal institutional channels such as voting, holding referenda, engaging in litigation, and finally nonviolent action instead of violent means for change (Schock, 2005, p.13). At each step there are decisions to be made between these alternative courses of action.

Schock also states that social scientist studying third-world states are seeing a shift from the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist strategy of violent action through militarization of peasants which causes a protracted “people’s war” against the state toward nonviolent strategies for successfully
challenging regimes. He explains that this is due to a combination of factors including the fact that nation-states are now more capable of suppressing private violence, the advancement in communications which has facilitated the organizing of nonviolent actions, and the formation of a global civil society where third parties now are playing a crucial role in shifting the balance of power in other states. (Schock, 2005, p. 17)

Gene Sharp also talks about the fact that people are making choices in his three volume collection, written in 1973, which is considered to be the seminal work in nonviolent action. In the first volume: “The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part One, Power and Struggle” (Sharp, 1973) he discusses the nature of political power and describes nonviolent action as an active technique of struggle not just passivity as many mistakenly consider nonviolence to be. The book presents this description of the nature of political power and the choices people make, “There are two views of the nature of power. One can see people as dependent upon the good will, the decisions and the support of their governments. Or, conversely, one can see that government is dependent on the people’s good will, decisions and support.” (Sharp, 1973, p.8) In this definition he changes the dynamic of how people think about power, and puts it in the hands of the people.

Sharp quotes Gandhi as saying: “there is a need for: 1) a psychological change away from passive submission to self-respect and courage; 2) recognition by the subject that his assistance makes the regime possible; and 3) the building of a determination to withdraw cooperation and obedience” (Sharp, 1973, p.31). Dr. King also stated this same concept when he said, “the only thing that we decided, was that we weren’t going to go along with things that weren’t right, any longer!” (Carson, 1998)

In chapter two Sharp begins to describe what he means by nonviolent action. The crucial question for Sharp was whether there would be action (in which he included both violent and non-violent approaches) versus inaction; and he points out that several writers have said nonviolent action is similar to military war with strategy, tactics, battles, courage, and discipline. Sharp describes three broad categories of tactics: the first is largely symbolic actions such as parades, vigils, hunger strikes, and ceremonies. The second is non-cooperation, which could be economic (boycotts, strikes), social (assemblies, churches), or political (voting, running for local
office). And the third is direct intervention in the form of sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, and parallel governments.

Sharp states that to a degree which has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent technique operates by producing power changes; and continues to remain an underdeveloped political technique. He states that throughout history the practice of nonviolent action has usually been practiced “under highly unfavorable conditions and with a lack of experienced participants. Almost always there were no advance preparations or training, little or no planning, or prior consideration of strategy and tactics or the range of methods available. But amazingly the practice of the technique has been widespread, successful and orderly” (Sharp, 1973, p.101).

Charles Tilly explains that the choices made by campaign organizers are limited and based upon cultural and historical factors. He states that “challengers innovate only within a limits set by the repertoire already established by the place, and time. He sees a great embedding of contention in previously existing history, culture, and social relations.” (Tilly 2006, p.41) He chooses the word ‘repertoire’ purposefully to indicate that a choice of action is made, which is based upon the challenger’s past actions, familiarity with roles, and cultural norms. But says that innovation is important; in times of shifting circumstances power-holders will tend to cling to past proven performances, those actions that have brought them into power and kept them in-charge; and to the degree that challengers seek new means of collective claim making, expanding and changing their repertoires they will unsettle the power-holders and be successful in their pursuits.

Tilly states that completely new, genuinely unfamiliar actions almost always misfire, but perfect repetition from one performance to the next breeds boredom and indifference which does not lead to change. He feels that the challengers must expand their repertoires of contention to be successful, and that is difficult because repertoires are deeply cultural, structural, and based on shared understanding and history. Tilly explains that within these limits if challengers will experiment with new forms of collective action where tactical advantage dictates, in small ways, over the long run innovations will accumulate into substantial changes in repertoires enabling success (Tilly, 2006).
Schock also points out that the ruling regime is making choices as well. As in game theory where two independent groups of actors make separate decisions at the same time, the interplay of choices made, determines the success of the outcome. “Similar to the repertoires of contention available to dissidents are the repertoires of social control that states have to respond to challenges. Authorities have four broad options with which to respond to noninstitutional political action: they can ignore, conciliate, reform, or repress. Repression by authorities generally falls into three categories: imposing negative sanctions, using force or coercion, and violence by proxy” (Schock, 2005, p. 30 and 32). Interestingly Schock brings out that “the use of violent repression from the controlling regime against nonviolent challengers may invoke a dynamic that increases resistance to the regime by contributing to mobilization of the opposition movement. It can make the challengers more committed to their struggle and is far more likely to generate questions about the legitimacy of an authority using violence on unarmed citizens; as well as exacerbating divisions within the political elite and security forces, and cultivating influential domestic or international allies. Exposing the violence of the state in contrast to the nonviolence of the protestors (if that is the choice they make) casts the state in a negative light and may lead to shifts in opinion that alter power relations. (Schock, 2005, p.43)

What variables have been studied?

Beyond understanding that choices are being made by both the campaign organizers and the ruling regime, researchers have looked at many different independent variables in seeking to determine under what conditions are campaigns mobilized and whether those campaigns will be executed via violent or nonviolent means. The Economist, Paul Collier has indicated that overall low income heightens the risk of civil war; slow economic growth and dependence upon primary commodity exports increases the likelihood of violent opposition (Collier, 2007, p.19). He distinguishes these variables from other factors which his work shows do not bring rise to violent campaigns for change: unequal income distribution, history of colonial repression of the state, nor ethnic strife.

Charles Tilly has tied the decision of establishing a new movement as either violent or nonviolent, to the level of democracy in the state. Tilly observed: “Across the nineteenth century,
nonviolent social movements generally flourished and spread where democratization was occurring and receded when authoritarian regimes curtailed democratic rights. This pattern continued during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: with the maps of full-fledged social movements and of democratic institutions overlapped greatly” (Tilly, 2004, p.125). The emerging perception is that the well documented success of several nonviolent movements, some established under principled non-violent motives, others due to pragmatic non-violent motives, is encouraging more groups seeking to make a change to turn to nonviolent means. It is thought that this is particularly true in democratic states where people are free to hold protest marches, rallies, boycotts, strikes and any number of nonviolent protests with lower risk. It is also felt that in autocratic states, where the people may be under a great repression, we will see those seeking regime change to turn to violent tactics.

In addition to level of democracy, Tilly adds governmental capacity to the independent variables that he studies. “Governmental capacity does not enter the definition of democracy, yet it strongly affects the chances for democratic processes. If high governmental capacity does not define democracy, it looks like a nearly necessary condition for democracy on a large scale. But expanding governmental capacity also promotes tyranny at the other end of the scale of level of democracy” (Tilly 2005, p. 431). This leads Tilly to the conclusion that the relationship between governmental capacity and democracy is no doubt asymmetrically curvilinear.

Using these two variables, Tilly along with Sidney Tarrow lay out a quadrant of four dimensions, high government capacity with autocratic form of government, low government capacity with autocratic form of government, high government capacity with democratic form of government and low government capacity with a democratic form of government. Their analysis revealed that very different sorts of contention prevail in the four corners of the quadrant. “High government capacity with an autocratic form of government will experience campaigns for regime change which are violent clandestine oppositions and brief confrontations that usually are quickly repressed. Low government capacity states with an autocratic form of government will experience campaigns for change that break down into civil war. Low government capacity states with a democratic form of government experience campaigns for change in the form of
military coups and struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups. Only high governmental capacity states with democratic governments, will experience campaigns for change that are nonviolent social movements” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, p.57).

Other researchers looking at what independent variables affect the emergence and types of campaigns take a slightly different approach and look at the conditions of the state prior to the emergence of a campaign. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman study a large array of long-term data about political openings, transitions from authoritarianism, political rights, and civil liberties in order to better understand how key characteristics of the period prior to a transition correlate with the eventual outcome for freedom and democratic practice. Their report looks at the pre-transition environment of 67 states where a transition from authoritarianism occurred, and assesses and codes them according to three key characteristics:

a) The sources of violence that were present prior to the political opening;
b) The degree of civic or bottom-up versus power holder or top-down, influence on the process of change.
c) The strength and cohesion of a nonviolent civic coalition.

The study then compares these three transition characteristics with the degree of freedom that exists in each state using Freedom House’s rating of democracy on a seven point scale, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic political practices and effective adherence to fundamental civil liberties, and 7 representing the absence of all political rights and massive or systematic human rights violations.

The study’s principle findings were: “First, Civil resistance movements are a major source of pressure for decisive change in most transitions. The force of civic resistance was a key factor in driving 75% of the transitions in our study, over the last 33 years.

Second principle finding; there is comparatively little positive effectiveness for freedom in top-down transitions that were launched and led by elite power holders. Only two transitions that have led to high levels of freedom today were driven from the power holders. That result translates to only 3%.

The third finding is the presence of strong and cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions was determined to be the most important factor among those that this study examined that contributed
to lasting freedom. In 48% of the transitions studied, strong broad-based nonviolent civil coalitions were highly active and in many cases central to steering the process of change. Karatnycky and Ackerman found the stronger and more cohesive the nonviolent civil coalition operated in societies prior to transition, the deeper the transformation toward freedom and democracy.

The fourth finding the data suggests is that the prospects for freedom were significantly enhanced when the civil coalition did not use violence. And in those campaigns which turned to violent means, they were significantly less likely to produce sustainable freedom. The choice of strategies employed by the civic coalition is therefore of fundamental importance to the outcome” (Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005, p. 4).

The book “Nonviolent Social Movements, A Geographical Perspective” edited by, Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher brings out two interesting variables which affect where a campaign will be mobilized and with what means will they fight for change (violent or nonviolent). The first section contained two overviews of nonviolent social movements one by Kenneth Boulding an economist and the second by Pam McAllister who offers the woman’s perspective and highlights the role of women in nonviolent movements around the world. Boulding sets the stage by explaining that after two world wars, the great depression, enormous population growth and dramatic increase in per capita gross in world production, there is a widening disparity between the rich temperate zones and the poor tropics. To respond to this disparity, the world saw a surprising number of organized nonviolent movements as an instrument of social and political change.

The second article, written by Pam McAllister, discusses women in nonviolent movements. She writes of the peculiar strength of nonviolence which comes from the two-handed nature of its approach. This two-handed nature she describes as: “we won’t be bullied; but at the same time you needn’t fear us.” (Zunes, 1999, p.19). It incorporates the ideas of non-cooperation as presented by Gene Sharp, but at the same time using a nonviolent, unthreatening approach which seems particularly coordinate with the role that women have played throughout history. McAllister states that although women are often under acknowledged in the press they have been central to many nonviolent civil movements over the past century, and she discusses three of them:
• The 1970’s Los Madres of Argentina, who protested in the town square for information on their sons who had disappeared.
• The 2,000 + women including the most vocal peasants, in Tokyo Japan in 1981, who marched through commercial district to remind the country about Hiroshima as the peace-activities established after WW II began to be undermined.
• And the women at Greenham Common Peace Camp in England who watched and reported on the secret deployment of ground-launch cruise missiles.

Stephen Zunes provides an overview of unarmed resistance in the Middle East and North Africa. He explains that while terror, repression and war have dominated western media coverage of the Middle East there are numerous examples of nonviolent civil action, including “women marching together through the streets of Beirut demanding an end to Lebanon’s sectarian violence; thousands of Israelis and Palestinians holding hands to encircle the entire Old City of Jerusalem for the cause of peace and self-determination for both peoples; and Saudi women driving cars through the streets of Riyadh in open defiance of the kingdom’s ban on female drivers. With the US and other powers pouring billions of dollars-worth of sophisticated armaments into the region, it may be too simplistic to blame the militarism and authoritarianism of the Middle East on cultural or religious factors” (Zunes, 1999, p. 39). And Zunes points out that, despite Western prejudice to the contrary, many aspects of Islamic culture are quite consistent with the practice of nonviolent action. He explains that the true meaning of the Muslim’s jihad is: “the effort to improve one’s personal character, service to religion, and fulfillment of God’s will”. (Zunes, 1999, p.42) He describes several nonviolent struggles including the 1919 revolution in Egypt, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, where protestors were encouraged to win-over military troops, the 1967 movement to free the Golan Heights from Israel and once again join Syria, the 1987 to 1991 Palestine Intifada, which had a greater effect in changing the world’s perceptions of the Palestinian plight than the many years of fighting. He concludes by saying the limited but significant success of nonviolent action in North Africa and the Middle East raises the hope that the injustices which have led to the rise of violent and extremist movements might be addressed increasingly through the power of nonviolent action.
Many authors perform analysis of a select few representative case studies and, through inductive reasoning, expand their analysis to what they would predict to occur in the rest of the population. Other authors look at a large number of studies and, through quantitative analysis of past movements, predict the emergence and means of execution of similar movements in the future where circumstances are the same. For these authors, the challenge becomes what variables surrounding the movements of the past will predict future movements, means of execution, and possibly success of those movements.

The research study team at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) analyzed data on 58 countries between 1991 and 2000 for ‘structural stability’ in an effort to predict the emergence for campaigns for regime change. The concept of structural stability they describe as the ability of societies to handle intra-societal conflict without resorting to violence. The dependent variable in their study was “violence/ human security”. Their study investigated “the preconditions of structural stability and tested their mutual interconnections. Seven dimensions were analyzed:

1. Long-term economic growth. This dimension depends on the capability of increasing the accumulation of physical and human capital and on increasing productivity. The authors used GDP as published by the IMF.

2. Environmental security. This dimension is defined as the lasting and/or sudden negative change of an ecosystem. The author’s focus was placed on environmental stress with regard to water, population and soil. Two indicators from the seventh millennium development goal were aggregated: population with access to improved drinking water and slum population as a percentage of urban population (indicates potential environmental stress due to insufficient sewage).

3. Social equality. This dimension reflects the status in which all individuals have equal chances and opportunities to live their chosen way of life without having to endure extreme deprivations. It is reflected in a disparate allocation of economic, political and social resources. The authors chose the Gini Index to represent this dimension.

4. Governmental effectiveness. Is defined as the ability of states to deliver goods and services and carry out the normal administrative functions of government, such as
revenue collection, necessary economic regulation and information management. The authors chose the “Governance Index” by Kaufmann et al. which incorporates 31 sources to arrive at an aggregated indicator for 213 states and territories.

5. Democracy. This dimension is defined by the authors as the entire adult population being able to participate in political decision making by voting in regular, free, and fair elections. Several international indicators were scrutinized and the authors chose the ‘Freedom House, in the subcategory of Political Rights: the Electoral Process’.

6. Rule of law. The authors define this dimension as: states do not act arbitrarily but within the civil rights and constitution proclaimed by the people and that governmental action serve law and justice while being under independent judicial control. For a measure of this dimension the authors again turned to Freedom House, this time the category of ‘civil liberty’.

7. Inclusion of identify groups. This is defined as the acknowledgement of specific social groups as well as their integration into the political decision-making process. The authors sought to include both religious beliefs and ethnicity and ended up constructing an indicator of their own from data made available by GIGA and the Cingrandelli Human Rights Dataset.

The Study’s dependent variable was violence/human security, and the authors looked at two aspects of violence; first, war-like high intensity violence and second, every-day violence manifested in murder, manslaughter, robbery and rape. Both dimensions are signs of structural instability and were included in this project. For the dependent variable measurement the authors chose the ‘Peace and Conflict, Human Security Sub-index’ from the 2005 data of Marshall and Gurr of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM).

The results showed that none of the independent variables exhibited a strong correlation with the dependent variable of human security but, four of the variables showed to be significantly and moderately correlated: social equality (-0.33), democracy as shown in political rights (0.36), rule of law as shown in Freedom Houses’ measure of civil liberty (0.46), and inclusion of identity groups (-0.35). Surprisingly, the social equality variable turned out to be
negatively correlated with the dependent variable, which was contrary to the authors’ expectations. The authors explain this may be due to the limited data quality and several outliers.

The authors then sought to cluster the variables to determine if some combination of variables were mutually enhancing and could predict lack of violence and therefore structural stability. Although the results turned out to be tentative in character, the strongest correlations were for democratic states with good rule of law was correlated with low violence, and second, states with low inclusion of identity groups along with lack of governmental effectiveness were correlated with a high degree of violence. The other dimensions: sustainable economic growth, environmental security, and social equality were inconclusive.

Overall the authors initial expectation that the correlation of the various dimensions of structural stability with the dependent variable of human security would result in clear clustering of variables predicting structural stability were not confirmed. But this was a valuable study in that it worked with many different indicators and social science measures and presented the usefulness and limitations of each. It also indicated some interesting correlations and areas for future studies.

Jack Goldstone and colleagues (Goldstone et.al 2010), developed a global model for forecasting political instability through their analysis of 141 separate instability episodes between 1955 and 2003. The episodes included 44 adverse regime changes (which they define as dropping 3 or more points on the 21 point polity scale), 12 revolutionary wars, 13 ethnic wars, a single isolated politicide and 71 complex episodes involving a combination of different types of instability that overlapped or followed upon each other in close sequence. “We developed a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21 point polity scale, their model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the polity components. This new measure of regime
type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demographics, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability” (Goldstone et al., 2010, p. 190).

“Their model incorporates just four independent variables: a categorical measure of Regime Type, as indicated by patterns in the process of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation; Infant Mortality, logged and normalized to the global average in the year of observation; a Conflict-Ridden Neighborhood indicator, flagging cases that have four or more bordering states with major armed civil or ethnic conflict, according to the Major Episodes of Political Violence data set; and a binary measure of State-Led Discrimination, as indicated by a coding of 4 on either of the indices of political or economic discrimination for any group tracked by the Minorities at Risk Project. The most striking result in the model is the identification of partial democracies with factionalism as an exceptionally unstable type of regime. (Goldstone et al., 2010, p.197).

_How campaigns for change are studied:_

We’ve already seen that researchers have taken different approaches to understanding whether violent or nonviolent movements will be mobilized, and under what conditions will campaigns arise. Some researchers take a case study approach, looking in-depth at a few campaigns for change and present theoretical expectations through deductive reasoning approach. Other researchers take a very different approach where they look at data empirically on a large number of conflicts and often come up with very different results. Sometimes their results are inconclusive, as in the GIGA study where the correlations were not as strong as the researchers were hoping to see. Sometimes their results reveal simplistic models where unexpected variables such as Infant Mortality, are shown to be a strong predictor of conflict.

McCarthy and Kruegler explain that much of the research which has been done in the field of nonviolent action has been from the perspective of case studies; where a series of events in one location for a specific period of time is studied in-depth and then the social scientists draws conclusions. They express that this approach leads to several “red herrings’ in the form of
assumptions that are made without data driven theory building. McCarthy and Kruegler then define what they call the “technique approach” as a better framework for inquiry.

Studying nonviolent action as a technique that has spanned centuries, cultures, political arrangements and forms of government, brings rigor to the work of “identifying and exploring the factors and circumstances that contribute to effective nonviolent struggle; producing both social-scientific knowledge and the possibility of broader and more effective application” (McCarthy and Kruegler, 1993, p.4).

McCarthy and Kruegler feel that the large-N empirical research or “technique approach” holds the potential for greater advancement than the case study observation approach for because the technique approach better enables testable and falsifiable hypotheses which can predict relationships between variables.

A problem with the case study approach is that some assumptions are either unstated or not expressed as researchable problems and therefore overlooked. It makes its contribution by adding new insights but as a whole is unsystematic and piecemeal. “We believe that the literature uncritically repeats assumptions that are not supported by research.” (McCarthy and Kruegler, 1993, p.9)

“A research program impelled by the insights in the theory, aware of its gaps and absences, and aimed at developing the attesting theory, is the unexplored alternative in the study of nonviolent action.” (McCarthy and Kruegler, 1993, p.15) They see that nonviolent action can be viewed as a dependent variable or as an independent variable, depending on whether the researcher is oriented toward its causes or purposes; but state that much more empirical research needs to be done.

McCarthy and Kruegler feel that systematic theory-driven research would mean the researcher is agreeing to join an interactive community of scholars willing to test one another’s views and to achieve a common body of finding and ideas.

Methodological approach of this paper:

The nonviolent case studies approaches are very interesting and certainly show what nonviolent action is capable of achieving. But it often seems to be coupled with several untested assumptions perhaps bringing in a ‘western’ bias on what the researchers feel is best. There
appears to be a need for work based upon statistical methodology and testing of assumptions
drawn from historical evidence so that researchers could more accurately describe the nature of
opposition movements that have occurred in the past, and predict where new movements,
whether they are violent or nonviolent action, will most likely emerge in the future.

This paper will look at large-N aggregate consensus data of 323 major conflicts and seek to
verify the results presented in the quadrant developed by Tilly and Tarrow, namely that only in
high capacity democracies will we see campaigns for change that are nonviolent. To get to that
point, we will step through the analysis of seven hypotheses verifying or contradicting some of
the other theories presented in the literature.

1) The first hypothesis we will investigate is: that outside of the normal institutional
channels, nonviolent campaigns are overall more successful than violent campaigns in bringing
about change regardless of the level of democracy or capacity of the state. Normal institutional
channels would include those campaigns that follow the traditional institutional political
processes: voting, running for office, formal regulated petitioning procedures. None of the
campaigns included in this study used these institutional channels; both the nonviolent and
violent campaigns in this study were indeterminate, that is, outside of specified procedures and
determined results. And the expected results are that, non-violent campaigns will be successful
more often than violent campaigns.

2) Hypothesis two: As a result of the media publicizing the success of several major
nonviolent campaigns including those that were lead by Mahatma Gandhi in the 1930’s and
Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960’s, it is expected that the number of campaigns and proportion
of nonviolent to violent campaigns, will both increase over time. Historically, a majority of the
campaigns were violent in nature. But as we look at more recent times, we are expecting to see
more campaigns for change overall, and a greater proportion of those campaigns using
nonviolent means. To satisfy this second hypothesis, we will test for an historical effect in the
number of campaigns, and the increased proportion of non-violent campaigns.

3) Hypothesis three: Bringing in the consideration of democratization, and using a polity
measure on a scale of -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic), it is expected that
nonviolent campaigns would be more prevalent in democratic states and violent campaigns for
change, such as military coups, violent rebel uprisings, civil wars, would be more prevalent in autocratic states.

4) Hypothesis four: building on the third hypothesis we expect that nonviolent campaigns have been more successful as you move to higher polity levels, and that violent campaigns have been more successful with increases in autocraticization. That is, nonviolent campaigns would be more successful in democratic states and violent campaigns would have a greater rate of success in autocratic states.

5) Hypothesis five puts the level-of-democracy variable aside and considers the second dimension of Tilly and Tarrow’s quadrant, which seeks to predict if a violent or nonviolent campaign will emerge by the analysis of the capacity of the state government. Hypothesis five states nonviolent campaigns will be more common in strong high capacity states and that violent campaigns for change will be more common in weak low capacity states.

6) Hypothesis six looks further into the capacity-of-government variable and analyzes what types of campaigns (violent or nonviolent) have been more successful in strong high capacity states and what types of campaigns have been more successful in the weaker low capacity states. Hypothesis six postulates that nonviolent campaigns have been more successful in strong high capacity states and separately, that violent campaigns for change have been more successful than nonviolent campaigns in low capacity weak states.

7) Hypothesis seven looks at a quadrant comparing both level of democracy and capacity of government, after the model proposed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. Hypothesis seven is based upon Tilly’s and Tarrow’s view of a quadrant which suggests in high capacity autocratic states campaigns for change will feature both clandestine oppositions and brief violent confrontations that are usually ended quickly in repression. In low capacity autocratic states, campaigns for change will break down into violent civil wars. Change in low capacity democratic states comes in the form of military coups and violent struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups. And only in high capacity democratic states will we see the bulk of campaigns for change come as nonviolent social movements (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007 p. 56).
8) Hypothesis eight will then look at two other variables that may be impacting the decision of campaign organizers to mobilize either a violent or nonviolent campaign and they are overt external support of the campaign from other states in the form of overt military or economics support of the campaign, as well as international sanctions applied against the state where the campaign is mobilized. It is thought that these outside influences may be affecting whether a violent or nonviolent campaign is formed.

*The Dataset* --

Paul Collier points out that it is often more objective to use a dataset prepared by someone else as the biases the researcher may bring in the gatherings of the data through their understanding of its intended use, may not be present when someone else gathers the data for a different purpose (Collier, 2007). The data for this study was taken from the “Nonviolent And Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO)” dataset compiled by Dr. Erica Chenoweth and Dr. Maria Stephan and made publically available on the Wesleyan University Website. The data combines 323 cases of major non-state resistance campaigns from 1900-2006. “The dataset brings together numerous cases of violent and nonviolent campaigns with the objectives of expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military juntas), and in some cases, other major types of social change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns). Omitted from the data set are major social and economic campaigns such as the civil rights movement and the populist movement in the United States. The data consists of consensus information from experts on major armed and unarmed insurrections, with the purpose of testing whether the rate of success varies on the level of democracy of the targets of the struggle.” (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008 p.15)

It is often the case that campaigns use both violent and nonviolent methods, some at the same time, some alternating between methods over the course of the movement. This dataset addresses this dilemma by characterizing campaigns as “primarily nonviolent” or “primarily violent” based on the primacy of resistance methods employed as corroborated between multiple sources and experts in the field of nonviolent conflict.

The nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky
and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). Finally, the cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used.

Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as “violent.” Violent resistance involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from Kristian Gleditsch’s 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) for information on conflicts after 2002. The COW dataset requires 1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict.

**Analysis and Results:**

**First Hypothesis:**

To test the first hypothesis: that “outside of the normal institutional channels, nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns” the total population of campaigns was separated into two groups; one contains all of the violent campaigns and the second containing all of the nonviolent campaigns. Then looking at each group separately, the percentage of successful campaigns was determined. This initial test was performed without regard to the year of the campaigns, the level of democracy, or the strength of the state government; these independent variables were built into later analysis. This first test simply sought to determine the percentage of violent campaigns that were successful in the population of violent campaigns and the percentage of nonviolent campaigns that were successful in the population of campaigns that were nonviolent. The expected results based upon the literature is that, a greater percentage of nonviolent campaigns were successful compared to the percentage of successful violent
campaigns. The results in Table 1 show that nonviolent campaigns were successful 53.3% of the
time, and that violent campaigns were successful only 26.2% of the time; verifying the first
hypothesis,

Table 1. Successful Campaigns by Type of Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nonviolent</th>
<th>Violent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(161)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(218)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square=23.03, df=1, p=.0000016

Some other observations from this initial analysis are that during the time period studied
(1900 to 2006) there have been more than twice as many violent campaigns than nonviolent
campaigns (218 violent compared to 105 nonviolent). Considering the time period is roughly 100
years and the number of campaigns is slightly more than 300 campaigns that would equate to,
generally, two violent and one nonviolent campaign starting each year for that last 100 years.
Given that this initial result shows that nonviolent campaigns have a greater chance of success
(53.3% for nonviolent campaigns, compared to 26.2% for violent campaigns) it is expected, and
hoped, that in the future we will see more nonviolent campaigns and perhaps in the later part of
this 100 year period the proportion of nonviolent campaigns has increased. It also may be
expected that in the future we are going to see more campaigns for change overall. When new
groups of people seeking change see that others have had success they may be encouraged to
organize and execute new campaigns for change. Enhanced communication because of better
technology could very well aid campaign organizers of the future and increase the number of
campaigns we see going forward.
Second hypothesis:

The second hypothesis to be tested is that: “the number of campaigns and proportion of nonviolent to violent campaigns will both increase over time.” To test this hypothesis the dataset was split into three 35 year time periods (1900 to 1935), (1936 to 1970), and (1971 to 2006). The third time period has an extra year and is actually 36 years. Then, the number of violent and nonviolent campaigns in each time period was identified. This will confirm or reject the idea that the number of campaigns is increasing in recent years, and a greater or lesser proportion of them were violent. It is expected that a greater proportion of the campaigns in the third time period will be nonviolent based upon the analysis just performed which showed that nonviolent campaigns have a much greater chance for success. It would also follow that groups seeking to make a change could see the success in other campaigns and be encouraged to mobilize and begin new movements, thus increasing the number of campaigns overall. The results presented in Table 2 show that indeed, in the early time period there were fewer campaigns compared to later years, and of those early campaigns only a small percentage of them were nonviolent campaigns, 7.0%. The results also show that the number of campaigns in the middle years increased from the earlier period and the proportion of nonviolent campaigns also increased to 21.9%. And finally in the later years the total number of campaigns increased again, as well as the proportion of nonviolent campaigns increased to nearly half of the campaigns during this period, 48.4%; verifying the second hypothesis.

Table 2. Campaigns by Time Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>93.0% (53)</td>
<td>78.1% (82)</td>
<td>51.6% (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>7.0% (4)</td>
<td>21.9% (23)</td>
<td>48.4% (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (57)</td>
<td>100% (105)</td>
<td>100% (161)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 40.90, df = 2, p < .001
Some other observations from this analysis include the fact that the number of campaigns increased by roughly fifty campaigns in each time period; with the second time period nearly doubling the number of campaigns observed in the first time period (57 to 105) and the third time period increasing by just over fifty again to 161. Some of this may be due to the fact that in more recent periods we have better and more accurate counting methods, so there might be some under counting in the early period especially of campaigns that were nonviolent in nature, which might not have been considered significant and therefore may not have been recorded accurately historically. None the less there seems to be a definite trend toward more campaigns in later years and a greater percentage of those campaigns being nonviolent.

Another observation from Table 2 is the fact that the number of nonviolent campaigns increased dramatically from only 4 in the first time period, to 23 in the second and 78 in the third; while the number of violent campaigns increase from 53 in the first time period to 82 in the second, and added only one more, to 83 in the third time period. This seems to be showing a trend of leveling off in the emergence of violent campaigns. Of course, several more time periods would be needed to verify this trend, but it is encouraging to see that the number of violent campaigns has not increased dramatically between these two time periods.

So it can be said that we have an historical effect in the number of campaigns, and the increased proportion of nonviolent campaigns. The next step is to analyze under what conditions do campaign organizers turn to nonviolent means and under what conditions do we still see violent campaigns emerging. If we can understand under what conditions those seeking change turn to nonviolent means, we could perhaps work on establishing those conditions in new areas helping new groups of people seeking change to do so through peaceful means.

Third hypothesis:

To verify the next hypotheses, following the work of Tilly and Tarrow, this paper tested the historical emergence of campaigns in conflict situations along the two dimensions they define: level of democracy and capacity of government, and analyzed the types of campaigns that emerged.
Taking the first of these, level of democracy, the third hypothesis states: nonviolent campaigns would be mobilized to a greater degree in democratic states and to a lesser degree in autocratic states. And independently that violent campaigns would be mobilized to a great degree in autocratic states and to a lesser degree, if at all, in democratic states. Again the third time period (years 1971 to 2006) was used. To test for level of democracy the NAVCO dataset used the POLITY IV measure on a scale of -10 for the most autocratic states, to +10 for the most democratic states, lagged one year behind the end year of the campaign. The source of this measure in the NAVCO dataset was Marshall and Jaggers, 2005. Because there were not a large number of campaigns at each individual polity score from -10 to +10 it was decided to dichotomize the polity scoring into two groupings; autocratic and democratic. The analysis for this test looked at each of these two segments of polity and measured the percentage of the campaigns that were violent and the percentage that were nonviolent. Based upon the work already summarized by other researchers, it was expected that in autocratic states there would be a greater percentage of violent campaigns than nonviolent, and in democratic states it is expected that there would be many more nonviolent campaigns than violent campaigns.

The very surprising results presented in Table 3 show that in democratic states two-thirds of the campaigns mobilized were violent in nature, and that in autocratic states more than half of the campaigns mobilized were nonviolent in nature. This is the exact opposite of what we were expecting to find, and different from what the majority of existing literature is predicts.

Table 3. Campaigns Emerging by Polity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>44.9% (48)</td>
<td>66.0% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>55.1% (59)</td>
<td>34.0% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (107)</td>
<td>100% (50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 6.098, df = 1, p = .0135, (4 campaigns with polity = 0 were removed from this analysis)
Some observations from this analysis include the fact that a higher percentage of violent campaigns were mobilized in the democratic states. A few examples of the violent campaigns in countries with polity from 6 to 10 were the 1973 Pinochet-led rebels in Chile (successful campaign), the 1980 Muslim fundamentalist movement in Nigeria (unsuccessful campaign) and the 1982 Hezbollah revolution in Lebanon (successful campaign). A few examples of the violent campaigns in countries with polity from 1 to 5 include the 1978 Khmer Rouge movement in Cambodia (unsuccessful campaign), the 1983 PF-ZAPU Guerrilla uprising in Zimbabwe (unsuccessful campaign) and the 1996 Senderista Insurgency movement in Peru (unsuccessful campaign).

A higher percentage of nonviolent campaigns were mobilized in autocratic states. A few examples of nonviolent campaigns in countries with polity from -6 to -10 were the 1977 Iranian Revolution (successful campaign), the 1981 Solidarity movement in Poland (successful campaign) the 1986 People Power movement in the Philippines (successful campaign) and the 1988 Pro-democracy movement in Burma (unsuccessful campaign). A few examples of nonviolent campaigns in countries with polity from -1 to -5 were the 1981 Kosoyo-Albanion Nationalist movement in Yugoslavia (unsuccessful campaign), the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Hungary (successful campaign), the 1989 opposition movement to military rule in Bangladesh (unsuccessful campaign) and the 1990 pro-democracy movement in Russia (successful campaign). You can see in these examples some of them were successful and some were unsuccessful. At this point the analysis is focused on where we are seeing either violent or nonviolent campaigns being mobilized, not necessarily whether or not they had a successful outcome, that analysis will be built in a later step.

Clearly the level of democracy in the state is associated with the types of campaigns that have emerged, but it is opposite in nature to what was expected theoretically. The data points to the conclusion that there is something about autocratic states that is causing people seeking to make regime changes or expel foreign occupations to do so through peaceful means much more frequently than in democratic states. It’s possible in strongly autocratic states that people feel a violent take-over is not possible and so seek change through nonviolence. But that would seem to have more to do with the strength of the government and not the degree of autocracy. This data
shows the trend based upon degree of autocracy alone. Much more detailed analysis is needed to understand this trend. And correspondingly the data also shows that there is something about democratic countries that is associated with people seeking to make changes through violent means. Again we are not looking at strength of government here, just the fact that it is democratic and we are seeing a strong trend toward violent movements. There is something about democratic states that may be opening the door to violence. Merriam-Webster defines democracy as: “a: government by the people; especially: rule of the majority, b: a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections, c: the absence of hereditary or arbitrary class distinctions or privileges”. There may be groups within the state who do not experience that vested power, nor are able to participate in free elections, nor send representatives to government, and who may feel deprived through arbitrary class distinctions. These are the people seeking change and they exist in democracies as well as autocracies. The question becomes, why are the ones in democratic countries picking up arms to bring about change, especially considering that in the later part of the twentieth century their counterparts in autocratic states increasingly sought change through nonviolent means?

Fourth hypothesis:

The next step in the analysis is to understand where violent and nonviolent campaigns have been successful. We know from step one that nonviolent campaigns have had a greater rate of success than violent campaigns overall, with nonviolent campaigns experiencing success 53.3% of the time and violent campaigns only successful 26.2% of the time. Now considering the analysis just performed in step three which showed nonviolent campaigns were mobilized with greater frequency in autocratic states and violent campaigns were mobilized with greater frequency in democratic states; the question arises; is that because nonviolent campaigns have been more successful in autocracies and have violent campaigns been more successful in democracies? The original wording of the fourth hypothesis stated just the opposite that it was expected that nonviolent campaigns were most successful in democratic states and violent
campaigns had the greatest rate of success in autocratic states. But now considering the results just obtained we will test for the reverse of this. So the fourth hypothesis to be tested is that, nonviolent campaigns had a greater rate of success in autocratic states and violent campaigns had a greater rate of success in democratic states.

To test the fourth hypothesis we again took only the last time period and analyzed the number of nonviolent and violent campaigns that were successful in autocratic states and compared them to the number of nonviolent and violent campaigns that were successful in democratic states. The expected results based upon the previous findings that there were more nonviolent campaigns mobilized in autocracies and violent campaigns in democracies; we’re expecting now to see that nonviolent campaigns are more successful in autocracies and violent campaigns have a higher success rate in democracies.

The results of this analysis presented in Table 4 only partially verified these expectations. Nonviolent campaigns did indeed have a greater rate of success than violent campaigns in autocracies. But violent campaigns were not more successful than nonviolent campaigns in democracies.

Table 4. Campaign Success per Polity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>26.5% (13/49)</td>
<td>24.2% (8/33)</td>
<td>25.6% (21/82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>50.8% (30/59)</td>
<td>82.4% (14/17)</td>
<td>57.9% (44/76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 12.494, df = 1, p = .0004, (4 campaigns with polity = 0 were removed from this analysis)

Some observations; even broken out by polity, nonviolent campaigns were always more successful than violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns were by far more successful in democracies than violent campaigns, but still were at least 20% more successful than violent campaigns in autocratic states.

There was much less variance in the rate of success for violent campaigns than for nonviolent campaigns. Violent campaigns success rate varied only by 2.3% between autocratic
and democratic states. But, nonviolent campaigns varied by 31.6% between autocratic and democratic states, with the highest rate of success in democratic states further begging the question of why so many violent campaigns are emerging in democratic states.

These last two steps in the analysis produce results that do not seem to fit together. Step three looked at where different types of campaigns had been mobilized and based upon those results we predicted that violent campaigns must be more successful in democracies and nonviolent campaigns must have their greatest rate of success in autocracies. That prediction proved to be false. The results of this last step in the analysis does not explain why we are seeing violent campaigns occurring more often in democracies where the chances for success were less than half as good, (82.4% success rate for nonviolent movements, compared to only 24.2% for violent movement in democratic states).

It appears that even though the success rate of nonviolent campaigns is significantly greater than violent campaigns in all polity levels; there has been a clear preference for nonviolent campaigns in autocratic states and violent campaigns in democratic states. It seems evident that the rate of success for different types of campaigns at different levels of polity is perhaps not known, but in any case not taken into account, by campaign organizers. The central question remains unanswered; why are campaign organizers picking up arms in democratic states?

Fifth hypothesis:

The next step in the analysis looked at the effect of Tilly’s and Tarrow’s second dimension ‘capacity of government’ to see if it explains the emergence of violent campaigns in democratic states or the emergence of nonviolent campaigns in autocratic states. We will first look at the analysis for ‘capacity of government’ separately from ‘level of democracy’ and then put the results of both measures together. Looking at capacity of the state government, which Tilly define as “the extent to which governmental actions affect the character and distributions of populations, activities and resources” (Tilly, 2007, p. 55), the fifth hypothesis states that: in the scale of strength of government from weak and fragile states to high capacity strong states, a greater percentage of violent campaigns will be seen in weak and fragile states and as we move in the continuum to stronger high capacity states we will see the emergence of a greater
percentage of nonviolent campaigns. To test this hypothesis we again took the most recent years, 1971 to 2006, where the number of nonviolent to violent campaigns were about equal, and ranked them according to the Correlates of War, Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), computed by J. David Singer and his team at the University of Michigan. This measure is computed for each state annually, by summing all observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the 6 components. The 6 components in the index are: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, number military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members. This data is currently available for the years 1816-2007. This analysis used the CINC measure for each state in the study, the year prior to the emergence of the campaign and then ranked them from high capacity to low. Once all of the states were ranked, the dataset was cut in half after removing the middle 10 % as it was determined that these states could be considered neither weak nor strong but may flip-flop in ranking. With these two groups of states, those considered strong and highly capable versus those that were considered weak and fragile, the percentage of violent to nonviolent campaigns that emerged was determined. The expected result is that in strong states we will see a greater percentage of nonviolent campaigns, and that in weak states we will see a greater percentage of violent campaigns.

The results presented in Table 5 show that in strong states we did see slightly more nonviolent than violent campaigns and in weaker states we did see a greater percentage of violent campaigns, but the p value of 0.1491 indicates these results were not statistically significant.

Table 5. Percentage of Campaigns by Type, which emerged per Capacity of Gov.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square = 2.081, df = 1, p = .1491
The results show that in strong high capacity states the percentage of violent to nonviolent campaigns were nearly equal so roughly the same number of violent and nonviolent campaigns emerged, but in weaker low capacity states a preponderance of violent campaigns was observed. The data could be read to imply that in weak states those organizing campaigns felt they had a better chance of being successful through violent means. This may have been because of cost considerations, perceived time constraints, availability of arms, and lack of leaders to organize a nonviolent movement or any number of other factors. But it could be fairly certainly stated that they chose a method that they thought would bring them success.

*Sixth hypothesis:*

The next step in the analysis looks at the percentage of campaigns of each type (violent and nonviolent) that were successful in strong high capacity states and compares them success rates in weaker low capacity states. The expectation is that the preponderance of violent campaigns in low capacity states may be because they have a greater rate of success there; and because we observed a preponderance of nonviolent campaigns in high capacity states, because they have a higher rate of success there. To test this hypothesis we looked at the dataset of states already divided by capacity of government and analyzed the percentage of nonviolent and violent campaigns that were successful in each division.

The results presented in Figure 1 show that nonviolent movements were more successful in both high and low capacity states, disproving the first part of the hypothesis which predicted that violent campaigns may be more successful in weak, low capacity states. But, the second part of the hypothesis, that the rate of campaign success for nonviolent movements was higher in strong capacity states was confirmed. Nonviolent campaigns are overwhelmingly more successful in high capacity states (59.5% compared to 20.6%).
Observations from this analysis; nonviolent campaigns were successful more than 50% of the time no matter how strong the government but, violent campaigns were successful about a third of the time in weak/fragile states and only a fifth of the time in strong states. Again we find the conclusion that nonviolent campaigns are always more successful than violent campaigns. But this time the data also shows that the stronger the government the less chance of success for violent movements and the greater the chance of success for nonviolent movements. This last conclusion is very interesting. It might be thought that nonviolent campaigns have a greater chance of success in weaker low capacity states where the government has less financial resources, has fewer military personnel because of less military expenditures, than in strong high capacity states; but the results are showing just the opposite. Nonviolent campaigns are successful in weak low capacity states 53.6% of the time. This is much improved over violent campaigns which were successful only a third of the time. This may be a function of the instability of to weak and fragile states, so that even if a campaign is partially successful, it gets over-turned in the instability as the state evolves and develops. But in the grouping of strong high capacity states nonviolent campaigns are even more successful, increasing by 5 percentage points to 59.5%. What could explain this? How could nonviolent campaigns increase in success rate as they take on governments which are stronger in capacity? Could this be due to the
impression that strong high capacity governments are more transparent and less corrupt and therefore when a nonviolent campaign is successful the change is lasting and permanent? These statements are bringing in a ‘western’ bias and would need much more analysis to confirm.

Some examples of nonviolent movements in strong high capacity states that were successful are the Defiance Campaign in South Africa which went from 1984 to 1994 before toppling the government, the 1984 Diretas Ja movement in Brazil, and the 1989 Pro-democracy movement in East Germany which brought down the Berlin wall. Examples of violent movements which were unsuccessful against high capacity state governments were: the 1991 Shiite rebellion in Iraq, the 1983 Kachin rebels’ opposition in Burma, and the 1980 Muslim fundamentalists’ movement in Nigeria, amongst the small percentage of violent movements that were successful in strong states were: the 1971 Bengalis movement in Pakistan, and the GAM movement in Indonesia which brutally went from 1976 to 2005.

Looking at campaigns in low capacity states, some examples of nonviolent movements that were successful include: the 1991 Active Voice movement in Madagascar, a movement in Mali which went from 1989 to 1992 before overthrowing the government, and a 2001 movement in Zambia which ousted the president. Some examples of violent movements which were successful include the 1992 to 1994 Somalia militia insurgencies, the 2003 LURD uprising in Liberia, and the 1974 to 1980 violent movement of the Zimbabwe African People's Union. A few of the violent movements that were unsuccessful include the long 1979 to 1991 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front movement in El Salvador, and the 1975 Leftist movement in Lebanon.

Summing up the analysis on capacity of state and types of movements that emerged: the stronger the government the less likely a violent movement will be successful and the more likely a nonviolent movement will be successful.

*Seventh hypothesis:*

The next step in the analysis is to build a quadrant comparing both of Tilly and Tarrow’s dimensions, level of democracy, and capacity of government. Neither dimension alone was able to explain why we continue see specific types of campaigns in states where historically that type
of campaign has had a low rate of success. We will now look at the interplay of dimensions together as Tilly and Tarrow suggest to see if that helps us understand why campaigns of certain types emerge where we don’t expect them.

Hypothesis seven is based upon Tilly and Tarrow’s view of the quadrant which suggests in high capacity autocratic states campaigns for change will feature both clandestine oppositions and brief violent confrontations that usually end in repression. In low capacity autocratic states campaigns for change become violent civil wars. Change in low capacity democratic states comes in the form of military coups and struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups. And only in high capacity democratic states will we see the bulk of campaigns for change come as nonviolent social movements (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007 p. 56).

To test this hypothesis we took the data previously segmented by polity into autocratic and democratic states and then split these segments into high and low capacity states forming a quadrant. Next step was to look at the proportion of nonviolent to violent campaigns in the quadrant and seek to confirm Tilly and Tarrow’s analysis.

The results presented in Table 6 confirmed this prediction in only one quadrant. Where Tilly and Tarrow predicted that in high capacity autocratic states campaigns for change will feature both clandestine oppositions and brief violent confrontations that usually end in repression we saw 68.8% of the campaigns were actually nonviolent. Where Tilly and Tarrow predicted that in low capacity autocratic states campaigns for change become violent civil wars over half, 57.1% were nonviolent. Where Tilly and Tarrow predicted that change in low capacity democratic states comes in the form of military coups and violent struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups our historical results confirmed their analysis and showed that only 23.5% of the campaigns in this area were nonviolent. And finally where Tilly and Tarrow predicted that in high capacity democratic states will we see the bulk of campaigns for change come as nonviolent social movements, our actual results showed that only 31.2% of the campaigns in this quadrant were nonviolent.
Table 6. Type of Movements Emerging per Type and Strength of Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Violent</th>
<th>Strong Nonviolent</th>
<th>Weak Violent</th>
<th>Weak Nonviolent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.7% (13)</td>
<td>68.3% (28)</td>
<td>42.9% (15)</td>
<td>57% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68.8% (11)</td>
<td>31.2% (5)</td>
<td>76.5% (13)</td>
<td>23.5% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some observations shown in the results include the fact that there were more campaigns (of both types) mobilized in autocratic states. In total there were 76 campaigns for change in autocratic countries compared to only 33 in democratic states. This shows that historically more groups in autocratic states organized campaigns for change; that is, more people in autocratic states sought change.

Looking the other way across the quadrant there were slightly more campaigns for change (of both types) in strong high capacity states (57), mobilized than were mobilized in weak low capacity states (52). This shows that in the past 35 years slightly more than half of the people who organized campaigns for change did so in states with strong governments. The fact that the government was strong and highly capable did not deter them from seeking to make changes. Some of these were violent and some nonviolent; some in autocratic states and some in democratic states, but the fact that the government was strong and powerful did not deter them.

The quadrant that had the highest proportion of violent campaigns was in the low capacity democratic states. And the lowest proportion of violent campaigns was in the high capacity autocratic states. It has to be concluded that high capacity autocratic states have deterred most violent opposition, while low capacity democratic states were unable to do so, and in fact 76.5% of the campaign organized in these low capacity democratic states chose violent means. There is something about low capacity democratic states that is associated with seeking change through violent means. This may be something within the state itself; and most researchers seemed to be focused in this area, looking at whether the state has a history of violence, the availability of arms, frustrations due to slow economic growth, or low income, is there state-led
discrimination and/or is the state is in a conflict-ridden neighborhood. This result could also be due partly to outside influence upon it, the conflict-ridden neighborhood indicator that Goldstone and team studied and flagged when a state had four or more bordering states with major armed civil or ethnic conflict (more than one thousand casualties) begins to address the idea that something outside of the state, in this case neighboring wars, is spilling over and influencing campaigns that are being formed.

_Eighth hypothesis:_

Stepping back and looking at a larger picture of the complex global system, it may be that other powerful states have a political interest and alliances in the state, or area, and do what they can to influence campaigns for change in the direction that suits them. To try to tap in and quantify the effect of the global system and especially the superpowers two more analyses were done. The first looked at the percentage of each type of campaign in the quadrant that received overt external support. The second looked at the percentage of each type of campaign in the quadrant whose state had international sanctions laid upon it, in an effort by the international community to punish the government for cracking down or opposing insurgent movements.

Taking the first of these, overt external support, it's appropriate to say that covert external support which could very well be much larger and therefore a better indicator of whether a campaign became violent because of external support, would have been a better measure. But good data on covert external support is not well published, or if known not without questionable reliability. The measure of overt external support was therefore chosen could only be said then to hint at where external support lies. Given that, we were still interested in analyzing the data that is available to see how it might explain the different types of movements we are seeing in different areas of the quadrant.

To perform this analysis the same quadrant of strong and weak states and autocratic and democratic states was revisited but in addition to of looking at the number of violent and nonviolent campaigns emerged, the number of campaigns of each type that received overt external support from another state was measured and then converted to a percentage. The expected results are that overt support will explain why we are seeing so many violent campaigns in democracies and nonviolent campaigns in autocracies.
The results shown in Table 7 unfortunately do not conclusively explain this result. There is only slightly more overt external support for violent campaigns in weak democratic states, than nonviolent campaigns. And there is less overt external support for nonviolent campaigns in strong autocratic states.

Table 7. Percentage of Campaigns that Received Overt External Support

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<th>Weak</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5/13)</td>
<td>(2/28)</td>
<td>(10/15)</td>
<td>(1/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2/11)</td>
<td>(0/5)</td>
<td>(4/14)</td>
<td>(1/4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some observations from this analysis include the fact that violent campaigns in every quadrant received more overt external support than nonviolent campaigns. It would be fair to say that the international community has supported violent campaigns more often than nonviolent and it did not matter whether the state government was strong or weak, nor if the government was autocratic or democratic; the international community consistently supported violent campaigns more often than nonviolent campaigns.

The greatest percentage of campaigns that received overt external support was violent campaigns in weak autocracies (66.7%) and the least support was given to nonviolent campaigns in strong democracies (0%). That’s a major difference from two-thirds of the campaigns in one group to zero in the other.

These results could not be said to explain entirely why so many violent campaigns emerged in democracies; but the result that 18.2% of the violent campaigns in strong democracies received support and no nonviolent campaigns received support does indicate at least some external preference for violent campaigns and could contribute to the reason why some campaigns in this quadrant turned violent.

Another observation, a higher percentage of campaigns opposing autocratic governments were externally supported. We don’t know if these were supported by other autocratic
governments or by democracies, just that more of them received external aid than campaigns in
democratic states. Along with this there was little support of nonviolent campaigns opposing
autocratic governments. This may be reflecting the generally held perception contradicted in this
analysis, that violent movements are more successful in autocracies and nonviolent movements
in democracies. Hence we see the external support for violent campaigns in autocracies. Of the
population of nonviolent campaigns, the ones that emerged in weak democracies received more
support than nonviolent movements in any other quadrant, which may also be reflective of the
assumption just mentioned.

Now looking at government sanctions from the international community with the
understanding that governments seek to persuade other states onto a course of action through
economic sanctions, trade restrictions, penalties, withhold of promised aid until they perform as
the international community is expecting, thus helping the emerging campaign. We tested to see
where and when the international community applied these sanctions. The expectation is that
sanctions were applied against autocratic states when they were opposed by nonviolent
campaigns helping those movements and increasing the number of nonviolent movements in
those states. And on the other end of the spectrum we’re expecting that sanctions were applied
against democratic states when they were opposed by violent campaigns supporting them and
increasing the number of violent movements in those states.

The interesting span of results in Table 8 shows that in strong states neither prediction
was confirmed, but in weak states both predictions were confirmed.

Table 8. Percentage of campaigns that received international support through sanctions to the
state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>46.2% (6/13)</td>
<td>28.6% (8/28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>18.2% (2/11)</td>
<td>33.3% (2/6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some observations: the campaigns that received the most international support through sanctions were violent campaigns against autocratic states. 46.2% of the violent campaigns in this area were supported. Nonviolent campaigns were supported most in strong democracies. And the campaigns that received the least international support through sanctions were nonviolent (0%) and violent (7.1%) in weak democratic states.

There were more sanctions applied against strong governments than weak.

This could at least partially account for why we are seeing nonviolent movements in weak autocracies and violent movements in weak democracies, but not in strong states.

International sanctions may not be the best measure to use when seeking to understand why different types of campaigns emerge in different types of states since sanctions are only applied after the movement has begun and could not explain why a violent or nonviolent movement emerged; unless we consider that previous campaigns against the state that had sanctions applied against it had some level of success and therefore new movements of the same type sprung up. This would still only be true in weak states and then not by major margins so the results remain inconclusive. It’s possible that multiple factors are causing the emergence of violent or nonviolent campaigns in democratic/autocratic weak/strong states. It’s clear that much more analytical work needs to be done.

Limitations of dataset:

Because the results were so different than what was expected from the literature, a review of the dataset and a check that an accurate understanding of each of the reported variables was performed. The definition of the polity variable and when the polity measure was taken revealed that the polity measure was taken a year before the campaign ended, so that this dataset may not have been the best predictor of campaign mobilization by polity, given that it is possible that a state may have changed in its level of democracy over time, especially where campaigns are spanning multiple years. The ideal dataset would have been one where the polity measure was taken at the start of the campaign. However, the results of this analysis were overwhelming and the campaigns were grouped into ranges of polity so that if a state had changed over time, it could still be in the same polity group somewhat accounting for the timing factor. So although
we cannot definitively say that three-quarters of the campaigns mobilized in democratic states are violent and two-thirds of the campaigns mobilized in the most autocratic states are nonviolent, there is a strong indication that the majority of campaigns in democratic states were violent in nature and that the majority of campaigns in autocratic states were fought through nonviolent in means.

Summary of findings:

This section briefly summarizes the findings just described in debt. A review of the current literature on the emergence of nonviolent and violent movements seeking to change the governmental regime of the state or expel foreign occupations, revealed seven hypotheses which this paper sought to confirm through the analysis of 323 campaigns which occurred between 1900 and 2006. The first hypothesis investigated was that outside of the normal institutional channels, nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns in bringing about change, overall. The analysis showed that nonviolent movements had a 53.3% success rate compared to violent movements which were successful only 26.2% confirming the first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis stated that as a result of the media publicizing the success of several major nonviolent campaigns, it is expected that the number of campaigns and proportion of nonviolent to violent campaigns, will both increase over time. Both portions of this hypothesis were confirmed. The dataset was broken into three 35 year increments and each increased the number of campaigns observed by roughly 50 each time. Additionally the proportion of nonviolent campaigns increased from 7.0% in the earliest time period to 48.5% in the most recent period.

Hypothesis three brought in the consideration of democratization using a polity measure on a scale of -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) it was expected that nonviolent campaigns would be more prevalent in democratic states and violent campaigns for change would be more prevalent in autocratic states but the very surprising result showed just the opposite of the prediction. Nonviolent campaigns were mobilized in democracies only 22.7% of the time; while violent campaigns in autocratic states only comprised only 36.2% of the
campaigns in those states. Then began the search to understand why so many violent campaigns in democracies and nonviolent campaigns in autocracies.

The fourth hypothesis originally stated that nonviolent campaigns would be more successful in democratic states and violent campaigns would have a greater rate of success in autocratic states. But since the third test showed just the opposite, we tested the reverse assumptions in terms of success rate. The results showed that nonviolent campaigns were most successful in democracies with polity between 1 and 5, not in the most autocratic states as expected. But violent campaigns did support the hypothesis and were most successful in democracies with polity from 6 to 10, but by only a very slight margin. So this result did not explain why we are seeing a primacy of violent campaigns in democracies and nonviolent campaigns in autocracies.

Hypothesis five put the level-of-democracy variable aside and considered the impact of capacity of the state government; predicting nonviolent campaigns will be more common in strong high capacity states and that violent campaigns for change will be more common in weak low capacity states. Both of these predictions were confirmed, the first by a slight margin, the second by a wide margin.

The sixth hypothesis looks further into the capacity-of-government variable and analyzes what types of campaigns (violent or nonviolent) have been more successful in strong high capacity states and what types of campaigns have been more successful in the weaker low capacity states; expecting nonviolent campaigns have been more successful in strong high capacity states and separately, that violent campaigns for change have been more successful than nonviolent campaigns in low capacity weak states. The first part indicated that nonviolent campaigns were overwhelmingly more successful in strong states. The second part indicated that violent campaigns were not more successful in weak states.

The final hypothesis looked at a quadrant comparing both level of democracy and capacity of government, after the model proposed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow; which suggested in high capacity autocratic states campaigns for change will feature both clandestine oppositions and brief violent confrontations that are usually ended quickly in repression. In low capacity autocratic states, campaigns for change will break down into violent civil wars. Change in low
capacity democratic states will come in the form of military coups and violent struggles among linguistic, religious, or ethnic groups. And only in high capacity democratic states will we see the bulk of campaigns for change come as nonviolent social movements. The results showed that only the predictions around low capacity democratic states were true with violent campaigns more prevalent in that area. All other predictions were false.

We then looked at two other variables that may be impacting the decision of campaign organizers to mobilize either a violent or nonviolent campaign: overt external support of the campaign from other states, as well as international sanctions applied against the state where campaigns were mobilized. It was thought that these outside influences may be affecting whether a violent or nonviolent campaign is formed. Results for the impact of overt external support proved false for nonviolent campaigns but true for violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns were not supported in either strong or weak autocratic states, but violent campaigns were supported in both strong and weak democratic states. Results for the impact of international sanctions applied against the state proved false for strong states but true for weak states. Nonviolent campaigns were not supported by international sanctions in strong autocratic states nor were violent campaigns supported in strong democratic states. But nonviolent campaigns were supported by international sanctions in weak autocratic states and violent campaigns were supported in weak democratic states.

Conclusions and explanation of why empirical observations deviate from theoretical expectations:

The results based upon data analysis proved very different than what a review of the literature suggested. It seems that because of the nature of the work of social scientists and the need to understand all of the many factors and variables that are shifting as a society is changing that there is a preference for the case study methodology. Through case studies a series of events in one location for a specific period of time is studied in-depth and then conclusions are drawn based upon the researcher’s knowledge and understanding of society. But as McCarthy and Kruegler suggests this mode of study brings along with it several red-herrings in the form of assumptions that are made and unstated such as a preference in ‘western’ states for a democratic
form of government and a coupling of democracy with nonviolent movements. The many incites and explanations of repertoires changing, and connections between institutions, regimes, political power are all very interesting and useful, but did not lead in this situation to the results reflected in history. Nor could the case study method be said to accurately predict the types of movements we will see in the future. They are useful in pointing out the variables that need to be studied based upon their in-depth analysis of what is changing but could not be said to reflect the total grouping of campaigns of the past nor to predict the future. This study has shown the need of analysis based upon statistical methodology and the testing of assumptions such that researchers could be in a better position to survey historically what has happened and predict in the future where nonviolent or violent movements might emerge and under what conditions they will be successful.

Some conclusions based upon the detailed analysis; in the 106 years tested nonviolent campaigns were successful 53.3% of the cases whereas violent campaigns were only successful in 26.2% cases. The implications for new campaign organizers would be to keep the movement nonviolent as much as possible.

The fact that we are seeing nonviolent movements in autocratic states implies that autocratic government have done a better job than democratic governments in curbing violent campaigns within their borders. This could be for a variety reasons including unavailability of arms, lack of military training, or a feeling that violent opposition to a repressive government may not be possible. More research needs to be done to study this.

The fact that we are seeing a greater preponderance of violent movements in democratic states suggests that the democratic principles of free and fair elections, rule by the majority, a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people …etc., may not in fact be the experience of all people in the state. There are always groups that oppose the current policies and rule of the state, many of whom go outside the normal political channels in stating their opposition. The question is why are so many of them picking up arms, especially considering there are alternative political means? This paper began to explore the idea that perhaps it is not something about the state itself but the fact that other nations had political interests in the area and were supplying military equipment and training to opposition guerilla groups, by looking at
two measures of international support, overt external support and international sanctions; neither of which is the best measure to investigate support of guerilla groups. The results were indicative that violent campaigns received much more support from the international community than nonviolent campaigns but were inconclusive in predicting that a future campaign would be violent or nonviolent.

One additional comment on the comparison between the findings in this investigation to the work of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow involves the scope of the campaigns studied. Tilly and Tarrow’s work was based upon their analysis of all types of campaigns; small to large, separatist movements, civil rights movements, labor movements, as well as the larger regime change and expelling of foreign occupations. This study limited the scope of the campaigns investigated to those that would be considered to be ‘major’ in the number of participants involved and to have ‘maximalist’ objectives; that is, they were movements seeking the maximum amount of change in society and only those that had at least one thousand participants were included in the dataset. This might help explain the difference in findings between this investigation and the work of Tilly and Tarrow.

To round out this paper we will now examine two campaigns for change. The first is the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which is an example of a nonviolent campaign that was successful in a strong autocratic state. The second is the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Independence Movement which is an example of a violent movement that was successful in a democratic state.

**Iranian Revolution:**

Iranian Revolution, also widely known as the Islamic Revolution is one of the best examples of a nonviolent campaign which occurred in a strongly autocratic state. It was surprising because it lacked many of the traditional causes of revolution, defeat at war, financial crisis, peasant rebellion or disgruntled military. (Moin, 2009, p 200). It also was surprising because the movement overthrew a regime which was heavily protected by a lavishly financed army and replaced with a theocratic form of government guided by a religious counsel known as the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists”.

The Iranian people were living in a state which was dominated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose regime brought to the state a series of social, economic, and political reforms.
More freedom was given to women including the right to vote, and there was an increase in secular education (at the expense of religious education). More liberal, “western”, capitalistic influences were replacing the traditional religious values. Iran’s religious leaders saw the power and the moral authority which they held over the people begin to erode away. Although there were some advances and modernization the Shah’s regime was also perceived as brutally oppressive, corrupt, and wildly extravagant. It also suffered from basic functional failures, an over-ambitious economic program that resulted in economic bottlenecks, shortages, and inflation (Abrahamian, 1982 p.437). Under the Shah’s centralized, royal power structure, an increase in oil exports widened the gap between the state’s rich and poor causing further discontent throughout Iran. Shah Pahlavi also maintained a close relationship with the United States government, as both were concerned about the expansion of Iran’s powerful northern neighbor, the Soviet Union.

All of these factors contributed to the rise of a conservative religious ayatollah named Ruhollah Khomeini. He was a relatively unknown Islamic ayatollah. Other Shia leaders felt that it was not their place to neither become involved in political matters nor seek to overthrow the ruling regime, although they considered themselves a righteous minority who were unfairly treated under the cruel policies of the Shah. (Brumberg, 2001, p.1). Khomeini rejected this approach and argued that by overthrowing the shah, Iranians would hasten the return of the establishment of an Islamic state.

Khomeini began preaching that the Shah was “a wretched and miserable man” who had “embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran”. (Moin 2009, p.75) This lead to three days of wide-spread riots throughout Iran as well as eight months house arrest for Khomeini, where he continued to condemn the regime’s close cooperation with western states particularly the United States and its liberal western influence. In November 1964 Khomeini was exiled for 14 years. He settled in the Iraqi holy city of An Najaf, and continued to broadcast messages to his followers across the border in Iran. In 1978 the Iraqi government became fearful that the ayatollah’s powerful message would create similar uprisings in Iraqi and deported him.

Now in France, Khomeini worked to unite the opposition behind him, including constitutional liberals who argued the Shah was not adhering to the Iranian constitution of 1906.
(Abrahamian 1982, p.502) While out of the country Khomeini developed his ideology for a government under the control of a guardianship of Muslim clerics. He believed that everyone required such guardianship in the form of rule by the leading Islamic jurist. He saw it as a return to traditional sharia law and ultimately the means to protect Islamic teachings. In speeches to the public he avoided the specifics of his plan for clerical rule to oversee the government. He watched from afar and encouraged demonstrations against the Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) force, and the ever-widening discontent. When his son Mostafa died of a heart attack, Khomeini blamed his death on SAVAK. Mostafa’s memorial service in Tehran put Khomeini back in the spotlight (Moin, 2009, p.184).

Numerous clashes arose between the SAVAK and the growing number of opposition supporters. The most famous of these clashes occurred on September 8, 1978 when soldiers fired on 20,000 demonstrators in Tehran. Several hundred people were killed and thousands wounded in what became known as Black Friday. People took to the streets burning shops, banks and liquor stores; all the symbols of Western corruption, while the appearance of government brutality alienated much of the rest of the Iranian people as well as the Shah’s allies abroad. A general strike in October of the same year resulted in the paralysis of the economy as vital industries were shut down, and “sealed the Shah’s fate” (Moin, 2009, p. 189).

Facing the revolution, the Shah appealed to the United States for support. Because of Iran’s strategic location neighboring the US’s cold war rival the Soviet Union and because of its wealth of oil, it was an important ally for the US. But American analysis of the situation did not consider Iran in danger of revolution. The power of the nonviolent movement was greatly underestimated. The insurrection that eventually toppled the Shah was unexpected given Iran’s military might and extensive internal security apparatus in addition to the absence of a powerful armed guerrilla movement. (Schock, 2005, p.2) A CIA analysis in August 1978 concluded that Iran was “not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation.” (Carter 2007, p.438) Many Iranians still believe that the ambiguous US policy of sympathetic remarks to the Shah, awhile at the same time pursuing a course which lacked a plan for military intervention by the US, brought about the Khomeini victory. (Keddie, 2003, p.235)
On December 10th and 11th the two holiest days of the Shia calendar, a group of soldiers rebelled and attacked the officer’s mess of the Shah’s Imperial Guard. With that, his regime collapsed, and the Shah fled Iran in January 1979 staying for short periods of time in Morocco, Mexico, the Bahamas and the US before settling in Egypt, where he died two years later. (Brumberg, 2001, p.3)

Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, and became faqih, or ultimate leader. Many observers watched as “what began as an authentic and anti-dictatorial popular revolution based on a broad coalition of many groups opposed to the Shah, was soon transformed into an Islamic fundamentalist power-grab. Many people both inside and outside of Iran thought that since Khomeini was in his mid-70’s, had never held public office, had been outside of Iran for nearly 14 years, and having made statements which included: ‘the religious dignitaries do not want to rule’” (Matini 2003) soon saw him attack first the liberals and leftists, and later repressed even his clerical opponents. By 1981, 1,600 people had been executed under Khomeini’s rule. What began as a nonviolent, peaceful, religious movement which encouraged nonviolent discipline and the treating of soldiers as brothers rather than as enemies (Schock, p. 3) and which was very successful in bringing about a regime change with the hopes of more equitable living conditions for all its citizens; unfortunately soon changed to a new repressive theocracy. But it remains proof that a movement employing strategic nonviolence could be successful in bringing about regime change in one of the world’s most autocratic states.

_Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Independence Movement_

Zimbabwe is one of the many examples that had a movement to change the existing regime in a democratic state, which turned to violent means. As colonial rule was ending in many part of Africa, the white minority Rhodesia government led by Ian Smith made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom on November 11, 1965. The UK did not recognize the newly formed Rhodesian government but did not send in troops to re-establish control by force. And the newly formed government declared itself a republic.

The international community condemned the UDI. The UN Security Council authorized the use of sanctions against Rhodesia which lasted until December 1979. The sanction forbade
most forms of trade. However, not all states followed the sanctions. South Africa, Portugal, Israel, and Iran continued to help Rhodesia, and the US continued to import chrome, ferrochrome, and nickel from Rhodesia (Meredith, 1979, p.218) until 1970 when the US government stated that under no circumstances would it recognize Rhodesian independence.

Although the UDI sought to establish a free and equitable democratic government, critics of UDI stated that Smith intended only to defend the privileges of white elite, at the expense of the black majority. Discontent rose with increasing economic pressures on black farmers as they were pushed out of the market by white farmers who now were selling their goods on the home market, instead of internationally due to the sanctions.

Frustration in the black majority led to the uprising of two military forces. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was led by Robert Mugabe. After unsuccessful appeals to the British and US for military assistance Mugabe found support from the People’s Republic of China. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo which found support from the Soviet Union. ZANU and ZAPU together led the “Patriotic Front” and their targets were roads, railways, oil storage tanks, and isolated security forces seeking to disrupt the current governments’ control as much as possible. Initially the superiority in firearms of the white government enabled them to contain the insurgency, but as the neighboring state Mozambique changed from colonial rule to independence, Rhodesia found itself almost entirely surrounded by states that supported the Patriotic Front. Guerrilla fighters were trained across the border in Mozambique outside of the threat of Rhodesia security forces and their ranks steadily grew.

The Rhodesian government agreed to meet the Patriotic Front forces at Victoria Falls in August 1975 for negotiations brokered by South Africa and Zambia, but the talks never got beyond the procedural phase. Time Magazine reported, “The Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war to prevent black majority rule. Rhodesia’s whites seem to have made the tragic choice of facing Black Nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table.” (TIME, 1976, p.2)
The Rhodesian government relocated the local people to Protected Villages which were strictly controlled, in an effort to restrict the influence of the insurgents. This had a negative effect as many of the locals who were formerly neutral, now supported the insurgents.

As Rhodesia faced diplomatic isolation, economic collapse and increasing military pressures and a hard dozen years of fighting, the tide was turning to settlement with the Patriotic Front members. But during the closing stages of the war in a final effort the Rhodesian government resorted to biological warfare. Watercourses at several sites close to the border with Mozambique were deliberately contaminated with cholera and warfarin, an active ingredient in rat poison. Food stocks in insurgency areas were contaminated with anthrax. These efforts did not stop the Patriotic Front but instead caused hundreds of deaths in the local population as 10,000 people contracted anthrax between 1978 and 1980 killing 200 (Martin, 2001, p.1).

It became increasingly costly and unproductive for the Rhodesian army to maintain their counter-offensive measures. A power-sharing settlement was proposed which left control of the state’s police, security forces, civil service and judiciary in white hands, as well as one third of the seats in parliament, and the re-naming of state to Zimbabwe. But this fell far short of what the Patriotic Front was looking for, as the ratio of blacks to whites was now 22:1.

Margaret Thatcher issued invitations to the ZANU, ZAPU, as well as the white minority leaders to a peace conference at the Lancaster House. The three month long conference resulted in the Lancaster House Agreement which ended UDI, temporarily brought Rhodesia back as a British colony, and set the ground work for a supervised general election in early 1980. The ZANU party, led by Robert Mugabe, won the majority vote and ended the war.

The change in regime which occurred in this democratic state was very violent and this can be attributed to several factors including the support received by guerilla forces from nations who had political interest in the area (Russia and China) in the form of military training and equipment, and by the fact that level of democracy was not equally shared by all its citizens. Despite the fact that there were free elections, the minority ruling class held a majority of the police force, security force, and parliamentary positions setting the stage for two violent campaigns for change.
Recommendations for future research

The statistical analysis of this dataset showed a trend which seemed to contradict what a majority of other researchers were expressing. Further analysis should be done to look at other datasets and other types of movements to confirm these results; as well as further research to understand the choices being made by emerging movements to pick up arms or to fight through peaceful means.

The empirical analysis of the Iran Independence movement showed that nonviolent movements can have a major impact and bring about regime changes even in a most repressive state. The recommendation for international policy decision makers is to understand the greater success rates of nonviolent movements, and to encourage and support future nonviolent movements.

The empirical analysis of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Independence movement showed that it is necessary when seeking to predict whether an emerging movement will pursue a nonviolent policy or turn to violent measures may depend upon the level of freedom and democratic participation of all of its citizens, as well as the political interest that other nations may have in the area.
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