THE IMPACT OF ARIZONA’S SENATE BILL 1070 ON LATINO POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PARTICIPATION: A MIXED METHODS STUDY

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION:

The Impact of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 on Latino Political Attitudes and Participation: A Mixed Methods Study

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In April of 2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), an immigration law that quickly sparked controversy for being considered the country’s toughest immigration bill to date. State legislatures throughout the country promptly began and continue to consider enacting similar bills. As of January 2012, 36 state legislature have proposed similar legislation, making this anti-immigrant policy a disproportionate burden on Latinos, Mexican Americans, and Mexican immigrants (lawful and unlawful, alike) living in the United States, not exclusive to those residing in Arizona. This study used a mixed methods design to ask, What was the impact of SB 1070 on Latino political attitudes and participation? The study used a mixed methods explanatory sequential design that began with a nationally representative quantitative analysis using the Pew Research Center’s Political Survey (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2010), and continued with an analysis of qualitative data collected in the form of in-depth interviews with Latinos residing in Arizona and New York. This design addressed a deficiency in the participation literature of qualitative methods and purposefully included Latino noncitizens that have generally been excluded from existing analyses in the participation literature. Findings indicate Latinos across the U.S. experienced and reacted to SB 1070 differently; Latinos along the southern international border in Arizona experienced more “democratic disenchantment” than Latinos in New York. The study found SB 1070 alerted Latinos of different nationalities (not only those of Mexican descent) and that the Latino population is not politically monolithic. More importantly, the study found Latino political mobilization in response to SB 1070 was influenced by legal status of the individual and his/her family members, generational cohort, English proficiency, ethnic solidarity, location, and affiliation with community-based organizations.
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Introduction

On April 23, 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), the nation’s “toughest immigration law” (Archibold R. , 2010), making it a misdemeanor crime for noncitizens to not carry proof of their respective immigration status. The bill also requires local law enforcement to question an individual’s immigration status if “reasonable suspicion” regarding the person’s lawful status exists.¹ Defendants argued the bill was necessary due to the lack of federal action to control the country’s borders while opponents predicted the bill would lead to an alienated and disenfranchised Hispanic² community. Senate Bill 1070 is a disproportionate burden on Hispanics, particularly those of Mexican descent, and quickly became a national controversial media event. This research argues the passage of SB 1070 resulted in an impact across the nation, affecting Hispanics in general and not exclusive to those residing in Arizona. This argument is based on the fact the Arizona bill inspired similar initiatives throughout the country. As of January 2012, 36 states have attempted “copycat legislation,” (NCLR, 2012). Five states have followed Arizona’s lead and successfully passed similar bills while bills were still pending in an additional five states at the end of 2011.³ This research examined the impact of SB 1070 on Hispanic political attitudes and participation as these are linked to trust in government and its democratic mechanisms.

¹ Senate Bill 1070, or the “Save our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act,” was scheduled to begin implementation July 28, 2010.
² The terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are used synonymously throughout this study.
³ See Table 1 for a complete illustration of states and “copycat legislation.” States that have passed similar bills are Alabama, Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina, and Utah. Similar bills are pending in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as of December 2011.
Previous research on political participation has concentrated on traditional models of citizen participation, grounded on individual socio-economic characteristics and political resources as the core, main explanatory variables for patterns of participation. This dominant paradigm of the socio-economic or SES model began with the seminal work of Campbell on the American voter in 1960 (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al 1978, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This body of literature then expanded beyond assuming a oneness of the population to include variables empirically proven to impact participation, such as length of residency, native or foreign-born (Bass and Casper, 2001; Lein, 2004; Ramakrishnan, 2005), English proficiency (Cho, 1999), acculturation (Lien, 1994), assimilation, discrimination experience(s) (Schildkraut, 2005), group consciousness (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Stokes, 2003), religious or non-religious group membership (Diaz, 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001), and social and racial contexts (Jang 2009); models have also looked beyond individual characteristics to examine group patterns and group-level behavior based on incentives (Jang 2009).

However, despite research evolving from individual socio-economic characteristics to include social and racial contexts, there still remains an important gap in the current literature regarding Hispanic participation patterns. Initial research has shown Hispanic participation patterns are, and continue to be, different than those of other racial and ethnic groups, even when controlling for the aforementioned socioeconomic variables. Even when looking at a broader array of political activities and examining beyond socio-demographic variables, which Verba et al did in 1995, the study still found Latinos and Latino citizens participated in lower rates than whites and blacks. There is still no clear answer to this.
This gap regarding Hispanic participation is mostly due to existing political participation studies that concentrate heavily, if not entirely, on electoral voting as the main means to measure participation. However, this presents certain problems when examining the Hispanic community for three reasons. First, a large portion of the population of interest is comprised of noncitizens, ineligible to vote and excluded from existing voting analyses. Second, there are different forms of participation within the formal and informal political arenas; this study inquired about at an array of political activities beyond voting that are open to citizens and noncitizens alike. Third, the 2010 U.S. Census shows that 34.9% of the Hispanic population is below the voting age of 18.

Because of the limited scholarship on Arizona’s recent immigration law, it is also unknown what impact SB 1070 will have on Hispanic political attitudes and participation; speculation exists claiming Hispanics will be more likely to mobilize because of the threat SB 1070 poses to the group, while others speculate Hispanics will more than likely withdraw from the political process due to disillusionment and lack of trust in government or motives and desire to participate after the passage of SB 1070.

There is also a methodology deficiency of qualitative methods in the literature on Hispanic political attitudes and participation; qualitative methods are suitable for this type of study that aimed to purposefully include noncitizens to contribute to what is known from existing voting analyses. When studying the Hispanic population, a large portion of this group is comprised of lawful noncitizens; this population is, by definition, ineligible to vote. Quantitative analyses examining voting patterns exclude this part of

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4 As SB 1070 draws parallels to Latino perceptions in California during the mid 1990s, Latino political participation increased after the “Save our State” initiative, also known as Proposition 187; also when California passed HR 4437 in 2006.
the population of interest, leaving out valuable information on political attitudes and unable to look at types of participation beyond electoral voting. Existing generalizations on Latino political participation are limited in this sense and may misrepresent political attitudes. In addition, because of the existing extensive history of anti-immigrant sentiment or immigration phobia in the U.S., this population is more likely to share political attitudes in person rather than via surveys. This study collected qualitative data to offer insight and elaboration to existing quantitative studies.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine Hispanic political attitudes and participation before and after SB 1070 through an explanatory mixed methods sequential design (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2011). The study began with quantitative data obtained from the Pew Research Center that is nationally representative. The researcher merged two of the Pew Research Center’s Political Surveys (these are cross-sectional datasets; one survey was conducted before SB 1070 and the other after its passage) to empirically test Hispanic political attitudes before and after SB 1070 through a difference and difference technique (Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011). After the quantitative analysis, the study continued with a qualitative strand of data, specifically in the form of in-depth interviews, gathered from 18 Hispanic residents across the three cities of Yuma, San Luis, and Phoenix in the state of Arizona and 10 Hispanic residents in New York City, New York. This data collection process deliberately included noncitizens ineligible to participate electorally to inquire if these respondents defined participation through an array of activities, including signing petitions, attending neighborhood meetings, marches or walks for a political cause, attending or volunteering at local school district activities, and contributing to local and/or state politicians’ campaigns. After this data was
collected and analyzed by themes, the study merged both strands of data in its final stage with the main purpose of using the qualitative data to help explain and interpret findings from the quantitative analysis by providing insight on how political attitudes and behaviors were affected by SB 1070.

Findings from this research help clarify the relationship between anti-immigration legislation that targets Hispanics of Mexican descent and the group’s subsequent political attitudes and civic participation. This would be an important contribution to existing, fragmented literature by including segments of the Hispanic population that have at large been excluded from existing voting analyses.
Chapter 1: Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to contribute to what is known on the effect of SB 1070, an anti-immigrant policy, on its targeted population, Hispanics and Latinos of Mexican descent; specifically, how did the policy (SB 1070) influence Hispanic political attitudes and participation? It is imperative to study this phenomenon because of the democratic principles of participation, representation, equity and inclusiveness in political processes, regardless of socio-economic status or individual resources, because these are meant to be inherent in the operation of the American government.

Anti-immigrant policies originated in the United States (U.S.) more than a century before SB 1070. Interestingly enough, restrictive immigration measures originally were meant to deter Asians and Europeans from entering the country, not Mexicans. Yet, the Latino population is now the “largest minority group” of the country (Stokes, 2003) and continues to expand at an exponential pace. Projections indicate at least one quarter of the U.S. population will be Latino by 2050 (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010), and the largest group of the Latino population is that of Mexican Americans (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001). The U.S. Census Bureau reported after the 2010 Census the Hispanic population “grew four times faster than the U.S. population [43% versus 9.7%, growth rate], [with] Mexicans [as] the largest Hispanic group nationwide in 40 states.”5 The 2010 Census also showed Hispanics are responsible for more than half of the U.S.’s population growth between 2000 and 2010 with an increase of the Hispanic population of 15.2 million, while the U.S. population grew by 27.3 million (U.S. Census Bureau News, 2011). Of

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5 In six states, Hispanics of Puerto Rican origin were the largest group of the Hispanic population, and Cubans are the largest Hispanic group in Florida (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).
this demographic growth in size between 2000 and 2010, Mexicans account for about three-fourths of the increase with 15.2 million; the 2010 Census showed Mexican origin continues to be the largest group of the Hispanic population and increased from 58% in 2000 to 63% in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau News, 2011). The Hispanic population increased across all 50 states and the District of Colombia and nationally represents 16% of the population; in eight southern states, it more than doubled in size between 2000 and 2010, and in a different eight states, the Hispanic population matched or exceeded the national level of 16% (U.S. Census Bureau News, 2011).

Because of the substantial increasing presence of immigrants of Mexican origin, scholarship has explored the nation’s changing demographics and the accompanying perception of a threat between racial groups, concentrating on perceptions of competition for scarce public resources, the belief immigrants take jobs, hurt the economy, negatively impact the unemployment rate and education, and deplete limited government resources and programs. This literature on anti-immigrant sentiment, which can be linked to subsequent policies, goes beyond the perception of a threat to a particular racial group in terms of the economy and access to social benefits; scholarship includes the contact hypotheses, group conflict theory, and symbolic threat, which occurs when groups perceive others as threats to cultural norms and values, such as language (Alexseev, 2006). Furthermore, the link between immigration and criminality has also undergone empirical testing.

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6 The Hispanic population more than doubled in Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
7 The Hispanic population matched or exceeded national Hispanic level in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.
Also noting the country’s demographical changes, literature on political participation has also evolved in a distinctive manner. In attempts to answer the basic question of “who participates and why,” scholarship on political participation and civic engagement has evolved beyond the basic socioeconomic model of the 1960s, noting that this model’s limitation is evident as education rates have increased and political participation has remained stagnant. Under this theory’s logic, an increase in the variable of education, as an important determinant of political participation, would then result in higher levels of citizen participation. Since this is not the case, scholarship on political participation and its catalysts have gone beyond individual demographic variables in attempts to answer what determines civic engagement.

This body of literature began with Campbell’s seminal work, *The American Voter*, in 1960, which mainly studied individual demographic variables, and now includes approaches accounting for contextual dynamics, including race and different group characteristics.

One theory of particular importance to this study, Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design, connected public policy formulation (for example, of SB 1070) to citizen participation. Schneider and Ingram state certain policies are deliberately crafted to appear democratic but are not if these discourage active citizenship through the manipulation of social images that lead to the stigmatization or disenfranchisement of certain societal groups (1997). Policy design subsequently affects political participation in different ways, depending on the group in question and whether it has been socially constructed as “deserving” or “undeserving” in society. A more complete overview of pertinent literature is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Problem Statement

The main concern of this study is the possible deterrence of Hispanic political participation caused by Arizona’s SB 1070, as well as the threat to democracy caused by hostile political contexts and environments. These hostile environments are triggered by the perception of a threat posed by the Latino and exacerbated by the current dreary economy, which began with the recession in 2008. If this policy encourages suppressing the voice or alienating the Hispanic community, it is undemocratic in nature and will contribute to a tense political climate. In addition, if failing immigration and security policies persist, the result is a compromise of civil liberties, less security, and “democratic disenchantment, as illustrated by the increasing level of political distrust at home” (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012). Not to mention, by abolishing the presumption of innocence, the state has reversed what was meant to decidedly stand as a pillar and tradition of the American justice system, and will now itself allow the harassment of the Latino population, citizens, lawful noncitizens, and the undocumented alike. This is of paramount concern as numerous state legislatures have begun to craft bills similar to Arizona’s.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the passage of SB 1070 influenced subsequent political attitudes and participation of Hispanics in the U.S., and, if so, what empirical differences occurred within the Hispanic community and its attitudes regarding the federal administration, the two main political parties, and political ideology? In addition, this study elaborates on findings by asking Latinos residing in
Arizona and New York what the main messages they received and internalized were after the passage of SB 1070 and how these influenced their political views and behaviors.

The theory of naturalized voter participation (TVP) suggests if an environment is one in which immigration is highly charged political topic, then political participation among Hispanics will be higher. This theory was empirically tested after the political climate of California in the mid 1990s and was supported through survey data (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001). It was also found, in another study based on California, the perception of a greater racial threat mobilized Hispanics to seek more information, leading to greater “political sophistication,” (Pantoja & Segura, 2003). Group consciousness is another theory that predicts individuals who identify as members belonging to a disadvantaged group will, within a sense of collectivity, become more active in the political arena; group consciousness predicts increased political participation for disadvantaged groups (Stokes, 2003).

However, other theories suggest the opposite. Barreto (2005) suggests lower rates of Hispanic political participation are attributable to the community because citizens are made and actively learn from the community’s behaviors. If the community expresses low enthusiasm on political participation, then this would translate into minimum voting. Other literature also identifies generational status, language proficiency, assimilation and acculturation, rhetoric, and socialization as explanatory variables of Hispanic participation.

Because different theories of political participation predict both increased and decreased participation, but limited research exists on Arizona’s SB 1070, this study
aimed to clarify what is known on Hispanic political participation within the context of the political landscape under which SB 1070 was passed.

This study also aimed to make a contribution of new knowledge to the literature by using a mixed methods research design and including qualitative data in studying Hispanic political participation. Existing studies are predominately quantitative in nature using survey data and voter records. Qualitative data may elaborate on what is currently known through personal insight of Hispanics residing in Arizona.

Most importantly, however, this study recognized Hispanics may participate in various forms, not just electorally, and deliberately includes noncitizens in its qualitative methods for numerous reasons. First, “non-citizenship is the most important factor depressing overall Latino participation rates vis a vis the Latino population size” (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001). At the national level, for example, just 42.7% of the Latino population is eligible to vote, according to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011). Lawful (and unlawful) residents of Arizona may not be eligible to vote, but still belong to the population of interest. Existing studies on participation that focus entirely on electoral voting omit a large segment of the population of interest and, ultimately, report fragmented findings. Second, this study examined participation beyond electoral voting, acknowledging an array of activities exist that allow citizens and noncitizens alike to participate. Schneider and Ingram predict disadvantaged groups would withdraw from participating in formal political processes, but are more likely to participate through other methods, which merits further analysis. Third, qualitative data in the form of in-depth personal interviews was included in the design of this study to learn more about the causal process and how the immigration bill affected the political attitudes and behaviors
of those it targeted. Literature states the decision to engage in the naturalization process itself is affected by political circumstances; it may be influenced by contemporary rhetoric, ballot initiatives, and perceived attacks on Latino immigrants (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001). This is important because “newly naturalized Latinos demonstrate a high propensity to vote” (Ramirez & Medina, 2010), which is directly tied to citizenship and civic engagement.

**Theoretical framework**

This study used Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design to study the impact of Arizona’s SB 1070 on Hispanic attitudes and participation.

This framework states a social construction, or how reality is shaped, is imposed on certain populations and determines whether this population is eligible for beneficial or burdensome public policy. These social constructions are created precisely by “politics, culture, socialization, history, media, literature, religion,” among other things, and refer to the way facts, beliefs, experiences, and events are taken to mean the truth; whether empirical data shows otherwise is irrelevant (1997).

The main components of this framework are based on Schneider and Ingram’s causal model of a degenerative policy design (see Figure 1). If a given policy meets the criterion of unequal societal and issue contexts that mainly serve narrow interests, the result is a degenerative policy design, or a defective policy with no “self-correcting mechanisms,” so, though faulty, policies continue to be reproduced (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 2). To determine whether a policy is defective and will thwart or manipulate public involvement in civic affairs, it is necessary to acknowledge “public policies contain ideas, assumptions, and symbolism not obvious or written in text;” yet these are
revealed through texts, practices, symbols, discourses, and even through practices and procedures of street-level workers (1997, p. 2).

This framework is appropriate for this study because it includes both symbolic and tangible components of policy design, and its subsequent effect and message to different groups. Arizona’s bill became a nationwide media event and can be considered representative of a distinctive national political climate since it was a large scale event; its scope affected not only Mexicans in Arizona, but individuals throughout the U.S. With substantial news coverage on all large television networks followed by coverage of a federal judge’s intervention to block the most controversial components of SB 1070 (amending it as HB 2162), the country at large was exposed to and tended to polarize on the heated subject. Intense political debate across states and within the federalist structure of the government followed, and proponents of the law in different state legislatures began writing similar bills considering how Arizona’s bill was amended. The nature of the event and the importance of both symbolic and real messages repeated through news media and/or reinforced through government units’ action(s) are central to Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design, and are also necessary for understanding theories that attempt to explain anti-immigrant sentiment, such as the perception of a real or symbolic threat, and for understanding the context of SB 1070 and the history of policies that serve as precedent.

This research using the Schneider and Ingram framework reviews the existing lines of literature, one that predicts increased participation and the other line that predicts decreased participation, to explain limitations of existing theories and explain why this approach is best equipped to answer the research question at hand.
**Nature of the study**

This study followed a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011). Because this social science research focuses on a traditionally marginalized group that has “historically been the target of discrimination and disenfranchisement” (Stokes, 2003), this study created an opportunity for voices that have generally been excluded, the philosophical assumptions of this research are clearly connected to social justice. This indicates the study represents the advocacy/participatory paradigm of mixed methods research, focusing on terms like “action research” and “collaborative research” with a clear advocacy tone. The study belongs to the emerging transformative-emancipatory paradigm of mixed methods research (Mertens, 2007) since its primary goal is not to reject a null hypothesis as it is within the realm of the social sciences and dealing with actual people. There is a clear sense of advocacy for social justice because the implications for practice and policy may potentially affect human lives. The use of mixed methods research is also justified in this study because of the “complex social phenomena” at hand (Riccucci, 2010).

In addition, this study justified the use of a mixed methods design because of the existing gap in the literature on Hispanic political participation using qualitative methods. Mixed methods allowed this study to go beyond electoral voting and include a segment of the population generally excluded from voting analyses due to their ineligibility to vote. A mixed methods design also addressed the current deficiency in the literature to concentrate on voting as the main indication of political participation (due to the survey data of voting polls or voting records used in quantitative voting analyses), and inquired about an array of informal political participation activities. Furthermore, this design
allowed the study to test political attitudes using national survey data and make inferences regarding Hispanic political attitudes on a national level since SB 1070 was a national event and not exclusive to the state of Arizona.

The qualitative strand of data was meant to elaborate and provide insight on the effect of SB 1070 on political attitudes and participation through in-depth interviews with Hispanic residents of Arizona and New York City. Each resident must have been living in Arizona for at least five years prior to the passage of the law and be, at least, 18 years old. The study used purposeful and snowball sampling to access noncitizens with the purposes of expanding participation research beyond electoral voting. (Snowball sampling was used to access other potential participants.) Interviews were conducted until the point of saturation. The qualitative data also included perspectives of a community-based organization in Arizona and in New York; this different perspective provided information on changes in the reactions and turnout at local events before and after SB 1070. This element was included based on research that reports ethnic-based group affiliation has a significant and positive influence on Hispanic mobilization. The merging, or mixing, of the data (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011) occurred sequentially after the qualitative data was collected and analyzed to identify overlaps and contrasts. Informal types of participation will include signing petitions, attending local meetings, volunteering at local schools, attending university or college sponsored events, demonstration rallies or marches. Methodology is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

*Operational definitions*
An immigrant, for the purposes of this research, refers to individuals who move across nation-state boundaries—“either for permanent resettlement or for temporary but prolonged stay. The term… encompasses legal and illegal immigrants, permanent and temporary settlers, guest workers, migrant farmers, students…” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 21). Immigration phobia refers to the perception of a threat and its accompanying fear, but heightened “emphasis [is] on exaggeration and inexplicability of [the] perceived threat” (p.21). The researcher used Alexseev’s definition of immigration phobia because it is comprehensive and encompasses “attributes of demographic, political, and socioeconomic contexts of migration, [which] get systematically filtered through a discrete perceptual logic that makes threat ‘exaggerated,’ ‘disabling,’ ‘illogical,’ and ‘symbolic’ across diverse settings—albeit with varying intensity” (p. 21). Central to the following discussion on anti-immigrant sentiment are the terms “exaggerated,” “illogical,” and “fear of a perceived threat” because these are its main characteristics and what different theoretical frameworks attempt to explain through different lenses.

For the purposes of this study, although the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are not synonymous, they are purposely used interchangeably here based on this trend in existing research on the Latino population. As of 2010, 63% of the Latino population in the U.S. is of Mexican origin, which is the main population of interest (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” do overlap in their meaning as they relate to origin from Spanish-speaking Latin American countries. In addition, very few of the existing research distinguish between ethnic subgroups of Latinos to specify national origin, and, although this study would like to focus entirely on those of Mexican origin or nationality and Mexican Americans, research pertaining to this group are generally found
under the labels of “Latino” and “Hispanic.” Research produced by the Pew Hispanic Center also uses the terms interchangeably; they provide the following explanation, “In the eyes of the Census Bureau, Hispanics can be of any race, any ancestry, any country of origin… For example, some 99% of all immigrants from Mexico call themselves Hispanic.” (Passel & Taylor, 2009). The U.S. Census Bureau notes the Hispanic question is a self-identification “ethnicity question and not a place of birth question” (2011).

Significance of research

The significance of this research is to contribute to the existing gap in the literature using mixed methods, to examine Hispanic political participation beyond electoral voting analyses to include other types of participation through the qualitative data collection, and to include noncitizens in this analysis, which have been largely excluded from previous studies.

Although this research topic and pertaining literature cuts across the academic disciplines of public administration, political science, law, economics, sociology, and global affairs, this research is important to public administration because the field itself is interdisciplinary and social equity is its third pillar (Frederickson, 1960). The field’s normative work on the principles of social equity and representation in government and its operations has long been established, and this research results in practical implications for public administrators at large, including policy makers and law enforcement agencies, and their use of discretion in the implementation of SB 1070. In addition, this study has the potential of positive social change through policy implications by battling existing social constructions that have proven to be detrimental to both democracy and society. By pointing out the degenerative, or faulty, design of SB 1070, this study also reveals
“citizenship [is] distorted [and] democratic values undermined” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 103).

The study’s main objectives included: first, to analyze Hispanic political attitudes and participation before and after SB 1070; second, to identify the most prevalent messages SB 1070 communicated to Hispanics through in-depth interviews of Hispanics residing in Arizona and New York; and third, to identify the main factors that either mobilize or suppress Latino political engagement within this political landscape as a number of states have begun to trend in the same direction of Arizona. This is important to study because participation affects political representation, which is imperative for the functioning of a democracy and for political equality.

Limitations of the Study

A limitation of this study is the inability to generalize qualitative data; although existing qualitative data is limited in participation research and can provide insight not able to be obtained through a survey, it is important to note the political views and behaviors of Hispanics residing in the state of Arizona do not represent those of Hispanics residing in the U.S. at large, and this data is not to be generalized. The information on political attitudes and behaviors gained through qualitative methods is useful, but cannot be generalized and in no means attempts to explain how Hispanics in Texas feel, for example. As evident through a Latino survey after California’s three anti-immigrant initiatives in the 1990s, Californian Latinos responded differently on the survey than Latinos in Texas and Florida (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001).

A further limitation is the discrepancy between using nationally representative survey data for the quantitative analysis, and then using local qualitative data for the
second portion of the analysis. To address this limitation, the researcher included three sites where qualitative data was collected in the state of Arizona: the cities of Phoenix, Yuma, and San Luis. The researcher also included a site of data collection in New York to compare Latino perspectives of different regions. Even though the qualitative data is not nationally representative like the Pew Center’s survey data, including more than one site and two different states allows for a better transition and understanding of Latino political attitudes and behavior after studying nationally representative data.

In addition, another limitation refers to the study of Jennings (1987), which referenced the long-term effect on rates of participation and political attitudes of individuals involved in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Likewise, the concept of “political socialization” refers to the unique political context that results in different cohort effects when Latino voters enter the electorate (Ramirez, 2007). The researcher considered “political socialization” while conducting this study, acknowledging Arizona’s immigration bill will result in cohort effects on the Latino electorate, as well as some long-term effects that may not yet be reflected in existing survey or qualitative data.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Certain components of SB 1070 were blocked by a federal judge due to a dispute on whether Arizona had the authority to pass this bill, as immigration policy is exclusive territory of the federal government; the bill was not challenged for concerns of racial profiling and/or discrimination. Media coverage, however, tended to focus on the latter and the potential threat of SB 1070 in inducing state-sanctioned discrimination on Hispanics residing in Arizona. It is imperative to understand, for the purposes of this study, SB 1070 did not simply fall from the sky, but that an extensive history of xenophobia and racial laden policies exists and has been documented in the U.S. Different theories have been developed in attempts to explain this immigration phobia, particularly against Mexican immigrants coming in through the southern international border, and, although this study does not empirically test these theories, they are necessary to cover in order to understand how SB 1070 came to be.

This chapter organized its contents in the following fashion: background and history of anti-immigrant sentiment, or immigration phobia, in the U.S. for contextual purposes of SB 1070, a review of the main theoretical foundations explaining anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration phobia in the U.S; this is then followed by a review of the main literature pertaining to citizen participation in the U.S., and, in the final section, narrowing in on the literature exclusively on Latino participation in the U.S.

History of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S.

The perceived threat new immigrants pose to the U.S. is not contemporary; in fact, this phenomenon predates the Declaration of Independence and is evident through the following essay excerpt written by Benjamin Franklin in 1751:
“Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion” (1961, p. 234).  

In an analysis of American citizenship laws, Roger M. Smith contributed a unique framework to understand the evolution of America’s national identity and political development, an evolution dependent on “exclusion and inclusion, that is identifying a group for exclusion from rights and privileges of full citizenship because of its perceived threat to national interests while, at the same time, calls are made for inclusion of other groups to be added to the aggregation of interests that comprise the national interest” (Fraga & Segura, 2006, p. 280). It is due to the politics of exclusion that immigration phobia exists today and targets the population of Latin American origin, particularly Mexicans.

Surprisingly, the creation of the Border Patrol federal agency in 1924 was not to deter Mexicans from entering the U.S. illegally; in the early 20th century, its primary targets were Asians and Europeans after federal legislation implemented restrictive immigration laws against these groups in 1882, 1921, and 1924. This unintentionally resulted in the use of Mexico as a conduit for Asians and Europeans traveling to the U.S.; eventually Mexicans became a substitute for these groups and were recruited as temporary workers in the U.S. during the labor shortage of the First World War and during the agricultural expansion of the southwest (Andreas, 2000). The following

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8 Italic original.
9 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
10 The Quota Law limited migration based on nationality; annual quotas totaled three percent of the foreign-born persons of each European nationality living in the United States in 1910. Congress made a modified version of this scheme permanent in 1924. (Skrentny & Gell-Redman, 2011).
section discusses how the federal government played an active role in framing the “illegal immigration problem” and highly politicizing it.

The Bracero Program was a temporary, guest-worker program created by the federal government in 1942 during World War II. This system allowed Mexican immigrants to legally work in agriculture seasonally, under contract. The program allowed 4.5 million immigrants from Mexico to enter as temporary workers (Andreas, 2000). The system is an illustration of “image crafting,” as it was meant to give the appearance of a border in order and under control (Andreas, 2000). Statistics of border patrol apprehensions went down when the program was created, mainly because the numbers of Bracero workers went up. The program was eventually ended after 22 years when poor working conditions were exposed to the nation. The ending of the Bracero Program in 1964 along with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that did not mention employment (precisely due to agricultural businesses in the southwest) had negative effects. Primarily, “the informal system replaced the formal system” (Andreas, 2000) quite rapidly, and, because the 1952 law failed to include employment and make it illegal for an employer to hire an undocumented immigrant, the result was the facilitation of an illegal immigration system lacking punitive measures for employers.

What eventually changed this scenario was the expansion of industrialization. Prospects of employment for Mexican immigrants extended to now include construction or factory work. This meant more permanent, less seasonal work; more importantly, this made immigrants visible (Andreas, 2000), and as demographics became noticeably

11 Agricultural workers were allotted housing near the fields they were laboring in. Living conditions became a concern when the documentary exposé “Grapes of Wrath” showed the exploitation of workers living in housing facilities that lacked electricity, running water, bathrooms, and housed as many workers in one unit as possible.
different, illegal immigration became a highly politicized issue, so a number of restrictive measures were passed in efforts of deterrence. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was the first legislation to include employer sanctions and made it illegal to “knowingly” hire illegal immigrants; it expanded the Border Patrol agency by substantially increasing its funding; and the IRCA also included a legalization program which legalized about “three million illegal immigrants” (Skrentny & Gell-Redman, 2011). This restrictive measure unintentionally contributed to the development of a strong support base or network for new immigrant arrivals, and, in order to give the image of compliance to the IRCA, the use of fraudulent documents widely spread (Andreas, 2000). As long as immigrants showed “some reasonable convincing fraudulent document, they could shield their employers (Skrentny & Gell-Redman, 2011). As a result, the IRCA’s workplace regulations have proven to be weak and ineffective in deterring employers from hiring illegal immigrants, which likely contributed to the “one of the largest mass migrations in modern history” and the presence of “more than 10 million Mexicans” in the U.S. from 1970 to 2007 (Preston, 2011).

**The Creation of the “Perceived Threat”**

It is impossible to arrive at the construction of the illegal immigrant or the Mexican immigrant without describing the longstanding history of the U.S.’s cyclical nativist movements; “nativism is opposition to sociocultural difference and thus involves rejection of internal ‘minorities’ as well as ‘foreigners”… the bases for such thinking has been multiple, including political beliefs, poverty, and health, [but] the most important factor over time has been that of race” (Nevins, 2002, p. 97). Examples begin with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first case in which the federal government included
“racist and nationalist discourse” in an immigration law (p. 100). The Literacy Act of 1917 is another immigration restrictionist legislation, which meant for the test to “distinguish between ‘unfit’ immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and ‘desirable’ ones from northern Europe” (Nevins, 2002, p. 101). Southern senators even advocated immigration laws mirror Jim Crow segregationist laws.

Through a comprehensive content analysis of periodicals and a survey of media coverage, Nevins (2002) found Mexican immigrants “remained largely invisible until the early twentieth century” (p. 105). However, as demographics became visibly different, particularly in California, where Mexican immigrants tripled between 1920 and 1930, more and more periodical sources printed articles on the “Mexican Problem.” Agricultural labor became synonymous with “Mexican labor” and Mexican wages with “cheap wages” in the southwest (Nevins, 2002, p. 109). During the 1930s in the context of the Great Depression, “mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of Mexican immigrants—including tens of thousands of U.S. citizens of Mexican descent—merely reinforced in the minds of many EuroAmericans the idea of Mexicans as ‘aliens’ and the ‘other’” (Nevins, 2002, p.110). Subsequently during WWII, U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry remained “second-class citizens” and became the target of nativist sentiment in California… “institutionalized subordination facilitated blatant discrimination and criminalization of Mexican youths” (Nevins, 2002, p.110). During the economic recession of the 1950s, Mexican immigrants were again the targets of nativist sentiment, manifested through Operation Wetback in 1954. This operation distinctly targeted Mexicans and, through wide sweeps coordinated by then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Border Patrol, about one million illegal immigrants were deported
or fled the southwest. These raids, however, were “cut short as the agribusiness and employers complained that plants were forced to close in the Midwest, and crops rotted in Georgia” (Schain, 2012, p. 221). Operation Wetback mainly served mainly symbolic purposes, as “the Bracero program vastly expanded” after Operation Wetback when INS “quietly permitted many to remain as legal workers under the Bracero program,” mainly due to agribusiness lobbyists (Schain, 2012, p. 221, 213, 267).

Still, despite the cycles of nativist sentiment, it was not until 1984 the Republican Party included the term “illegal immigration” in its platform, and the Democratic Party did not mention the term until 1996 (Nevins, 2002, p. 111).

The media’s role in shaping perceptions on illegal immigrants has contributed to the perceived threat amongst the public at large. Media coverage on illegal immigration is most correlated with times of economic recessions, particularly “in the 1890s, the 1920s, the 1950s, and again in the 1970s” (Nevins, 2002, p. 115). Nevins’s comprehensive content analysis which aimed to explain how the “alien” was constructed found that the association between the undocumented immigrant and criminal activity in the media became more notorious in the 1970s; the media also began to cite illegal immigrants as “a burden to taxpayers; taking jobs away from U.S. workers” and media depictions included “cartoon-like Mexicans with sombreros smashing through U.S. boundary blockades, overrunning boundary inspectors, and flooding into buildings with signs such as ‘schools,’ ‘welfare department,’ ‘Medicaid’ and ‘jobs’… U.S. News and World Report was especially aggressive in highlighting the alleged threat [because] ‘illegals’ pay no taxes; contribute to the flow of U.S. dollars out of the country… [media] also indirectly suggested Mexican immigrants were less desirable than the European
immigrants” (Nevins, 2002, p. 113). It was the constant “state-produced discourse (one constructed over many decades) that increasingly associated unauthorized immigrants with ‘illegal activity’ and the destruction of the country’s sociocultural fabric” (Nevins, 2002, p. 120) and eventually led to California’s Proposition 187, barring illegal immigrants from social benefits, and California’s Proposition 63, an “English as the official language amendment” (Nevins, 2002, p.116). It is particularly noteworthy rhetoric and restrictive measures are specifically targeted to Mexican immigrants, legal and illegal alike, because there hasn’t been public outcry against Canadian or European immigrants who are more likely to take skilled jobs.

While the media is important as a source of information, it is not the main actor responsible for framing illegal immigration as a top social priority. The primary shaper through its practices and discourse is, ironically, the state itself—the American government. The state and its “increased activism toward the U.S.-Mexico boundary and unauthorized entries is the most significant reason for the substantial rise in public concern about ‘illegal immigration’ over the past twenty-five years” (Nevins, 2002, p.119). The state created the illegal immigration crisis by socially constructing a situation in which its actions are not only justified but absolutely necessary—making the expansion of the INS and the Border Patrol and their increased enforcement capacity accompanied by high-tech equipment vital for relaying the message of national sovereignty and identity to its domestic audience (Andreas, 2000). In summation, the perception of the threat an immigrant or “the other” poses to the American people was created over years and has been sustained for a number of reasons depicted in the theories to follow.
Anti-Immigrant Theories: “Perceived Threat”

It is anti-immigrant sentiment, or immigration phobia, that is the underlying force of restrictive racial laden policies in the U.S. that impact immigrants’ civil liberties. Different theories have developed in attempts to explain this phobia, particularly against Mexican immigrants entering through the 2,000-mile southern international border. This section will explain how, over time, Mexican and Mexican Americans became targets of current anti-immigrant sentiment and policies, like Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (now amended as HB 2162), which rapidly prompted other state legislatures to begin “copycat measures” in 2010 (National Immigration Forum, 2010), and has, as of January 2012, led 36 states legislatures to consider “copycat legislation” (National Council of La Raza, 2012). The subsequent section will include a historical narrative on the role of the U.S. government in the creation of the “immigration problem” in the U.S.; and then, proceed with covering the contributions and limitations of the main explanatory theories of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Perceived Threat: A Dichotomy

As history dictates, times of economic downturn and problems of unemployment cue “burdensome policies” on socially constructed disadvantaged groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), and also mark distinctive peaks in anti-immigrant sentiment (Nevins, 2002; Andreas, 2000); when the economy is uncertain, it is an almost guaranteed predictor that opportunistic politicians and/or nativist organizations will begin to signal and publicly label the “illegal immigrant” as a lawbreaker for intruding in the U.S., and, more importantly, present the illegal immigrant as “a threat to national sovereignty and

12 See Table 2.1 for a summary of immigration phobia theories.
the American social and economic fabric” (Nevins, 2002, p. 11). The perception of a threat is a leading theoretical foundation in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment, and in regards to Mexican immigrants, phobia does not discriminate by legal status (lawful and unlawful immigrants are both recipients and/or targets). This theoretical approach of “perceived threat” exists in the dichotomy between symbolic threat and actual threat. Symbolic threat is based on the belief domestic culture, values, and norms are endangered by the presence of a particular race or religion, while realistic perceived threats view immigration in economic terms and focus on the size of the minority group and the impact of this group on access to social services, labor market competition, unemployment, and gross domestic product (GDP). In both sets of theories (stemming from interest and identity-based theories), “a sense of threat is a prior condition of hostility to immigration… What differs is the nature of the threat and [where] its origins lie” (Citrin, 2007).

Perceived symbolic threat, or a threat to group identity or culture, is based on “social identity theory,” which states “out-groups [are] symbolically threatening not necessarily and not primarily due to out-group size, but largely due to intergroup distinctiveness” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 14). What is exceptionally important to note here is the symbolic threat of a marginal minority can “matter as much or sometimes higher than differentiation from larger minorities that tangibly threaten an ethnic or racial status quo” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 15), suggesting the perception of a symbolic threat to individual, group, or national identity can be just as, if not more, detrimental than an actual threat and without much regard to actual size. Perhaps the best illustration of this category is Samuel P. Huntington’s *Who Are We: The Challenges to American National Identity*
Huntington claimed Mexicans’ presence in the U.S. was with the goal to reverse the outcome of the Texan-American and Mexican-American Wars (1835 and 1846, respectively). “No other immigrant group in U.S. history has asserted or could assert a historical claim to U.S. territory. Mexicans and Mexican Americans can and do make that claim” (2004). However, there is no empirical evidence on which to support the claim Mexicans and/or Mexican Americans plan to conquer U.S. territory along the southwest international border. The basis of Huntington’s work resulted from the perception of a symbolic threat because Hispanics of Mexican origin challenged his notion of American identity. Huntington considered America’s identity to be, generally, white and protestant:

America was created by 17th- and 18th-century settlers who were overwhelmingly white, British, and Protestant. Their values, institutions, and culture provided the foundation for and shaped the development of the United States in the following centuries. (2004)

Huntington emphasized how Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans constituted a “major potential threat to the country's cultural and political integrity” and warned the U.S. would become a country of “two people (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish),” taking offense with the unique assimilation pattern of Mexicans and this group’s retention of their Spanish language. This perceived symbolic threat on national identity through the lens of culture and language manifested in the form of anti-immigrant policy establishing “English as the Official Language.” Government units across the U.S. passed bills enforcing English as the country’s official language; these bills consequently relinquished the possibility of bilingual education programs, for example, but their main purpose was symbolic to relay the message of national sovereignty, again, to its domestic audience.
Empirical support for this theory exists through a study by Citrin and Sides (2007) using the European Social Survey (ESS) data on 20 countries; respondents from every European country included in the study overestimated the presence of immigrants, which references the “exaggerated” characteristic of immigration phobia. Citrin and Sides found evidence in their study that “symbolic predispositions, such as preferences for cultural unity, have a stronger statistical effect than economic dissatisfaction” (2007, p.1), which reinforces the notion the perceived symbolic threat could potentially be more detrimental than an actual threat. Citrin and Sides extended this work with an empirical study that included both sides of the Atlantic to provide empirical evidence of the phenomena within the U.S. context. Their 2008 study found Americans, just like Europeans, “tend to overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries and tend to favor lower levels of immigration” (2008, p.1).

This explanation of non-economic factors—ethnicity, language, and culture—has been supported with an array of empirical evidence within the context of the U.S.; Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) found the perception that immigrants failed to learn English was a significant predictor of negative anti-immigrant sentiment; survey research also found the perception that higher levels of immigration made it increasingly difficult to “keep the country united” (Cornelius, 2002, p. 175). Evidence shows cultural issues are potentially stronger than economic factors, such as competition in the labor market (Alexseev, 2006, p. 190). Citrin and Sides’s 2008 study indicates the U.S. public is most concerned with immigrants’ integration regarding American “culture and values” (2008, p. 52). This ties into the “groupness” hypothesis, which is composed of two dimensions: cohesiveness and capacity to assimilate (Alexseev, 2006, p. 64). Research indicates
immigration phobia will probably be greater in a host society that perceives immigrants as more distinct and cohesive. Social psychology literature indicates it is “natural for a member of any group to exaggerate or overate the ‘groupness’ and, consequently, the ‘offensiveness’ of out-groups” (p. 61). “Hispanics (especially Mexicans) are accused of being unwilling to integrate to the host society by maintaining their own language, avoiding mix marriages, keeping close links with the home country,” (Ceyan, 1997, p. 27) which are all factors that contribute to both dimensions (assimilation and cohesiveness) of groupness. This “groupness” hypothesis explains why, even though empirical studies show second and third generation descendants have good English language skills (Cornelius, 2002, p. 178), “the U.S. public tends to focus on the Spanish-dominant first-generation immigrants in their midst” (Cornelius, 2002, p. 179) and perceives this assimilation and language retention as a substantial threat to cultural and American identity. This could be because “immigrants are by definition outsiders in contexts where national identity is the basis of self-categorization and emotional attachment… the nation is an object of strong allegiances, so groups perceived to threaten a nation’s distinctive identity are likely to elicit hostility” (Citrin & Sides, 2007, p. 5).

The real threat framework explains immigration phobia by focusing on tangible “socio-economic challenges” through the lens of the economic, social, and environmental spheres (Alexseev, 2006). This framework derives from interest-based theories and “encompasses the rational choice theory emphasis on private self-interest” (made notorious by Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy of 1957). The realistic threat framework suggests the “economic threat hypothesis,” or the prediction competition between ethnic groups over limited resources is the force behind anti-
immigrant attitudes (Citrin & Sides, 2007, p. 4). This approach relies on terms of labor market competition, perceptions on whether immigrants take jobs from natives and affect the unemployment rate, whether immigrants consume more in social services and education than they contribute to the economy, and “weighs the threat to jobs and wages against the need for people to do the dirty and dangerous jobs many native-born workers eschew” (Citrin & Sides, 2007, p. 4). According to this framework’s logic, comparisons of gains from economic interactions will be made between the host group and the immigrant group to examine the impact of immigration in cost-benefit terms (Alexseev, 2006, p. 89). In addition, this theory’s logic has two distinct paths; one line of research focuses on explaining personal perceived threats and another focuses on collective perceived threats (to the country or societal groups), “but the underlying logic of preference formation is the same” (Citrin & Sides, 2007, p. 4). The perception of an actual threat begins with discussions of facts, such as cost-benefit analyses of immigrants, or the persistent influx of Mexican immigrants, and the substantially large size of the Hispanic community, at large. A recent headline in the New York Times read, “Births are Outpacing Immigration for Mexican-Americans, Report Says” (Preston, July 14, 2011). It is a well-known fact the Hispanic community of Mexican origin is the “fastest growing population in the U.S.” (Preston, 2011), so this in combination with the staggering economy sets the stage for a discussion of immigration in economic terms, a discussion on the size of the “minority” (now, demographically, a majority in many regions and states), and how this impacts access to social benefits and/or education. Because there are scarce resources, a consistent growth in the Hispanic demographic fuels the notion of competition between racial groups for those limited resources.
Empirical support for the economic threat hypothesis has been documented in existing research that shows an increase in the unemployment rate results in an increase of immigration opposition and support for anti-immigrant political parties (Fetzer, 2000; Jackman & Volpert, 1996). Citrin et al (1997) found through a quantitative study using nationally representative survey records (the American National Election Survey, or ANES) of 1992 that individuals who did not believe Hispanic and Asian immigrants would result in a negative effect on jobs and taxes would not support restrictions on immigration in the U.S.; unemployment was found to be a main predictor of attitudes towards immigration levels. Citrin’s study also found “perceptions that migrants compete for jobs with the host-country residents are insufficient to cause immigration phobia” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 87), meaning that although competition for jobs may occur between immigrants and natives, “the same [survey] respondents also recognized they [migrants] might have an overall positive impact on employment and taxation” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 87), which affects attitudes towards immigration levels. Likewise, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found, through their quantitative study using data from a CBS News/New York Times poll in 1993 (n=1262 respondents), feelings towards levels of immigration were linked to whether respondents believed immigrants took jobs Americans did not want and whether immigrants contributed or hurt the host country. Alvares and Butterfield (2000) found support for the economic threat hypothesis through a voter poll study from the 1994 California election; voters who perceived the economy as poor reported feeling financially threatened by illegal immigrants. The limitation with this voter poll study is it cannot fully establish the causality relationship of a poor economy due to labor market competition with illegal immigrants, and there are
endogeneity limitations because illegal immigration was highly politicized in California during the mid 1990s, meaning this threat perception may have been the result of an interaction between symbolism, discourse rhetoric and the state’s recession at the time.

Furthermore, within the real threat framework, there is also the group opportunity approach, which has to do with perceptions of a group’s collective opportunities and whether these are perceived to be open or blocked (Alexseev, 2006, p. 85). The presence and size of a different racial group can alter perceptions of a group’s collective opportunities; in Detroit and Newark, research by Caplan and Paige (1968) found African American perceptions of a “lack of group opportunity—through a sense of group exclusion—especially in employment and education, was the strongest predictor of riot participation,” suggesting how interethnic hostility can be triggered by the perceived threat of a group’s socio-economic position and a subsequent resistance to change the racial status quo. Perhaps this perceived real framework partially explains why Texas governor Rick Perry stated the Arizona bill would not be replicated in Texas after the business community expressed concern on the economic implications should a similar bill be passed in Texas (National Council of La Raza, 2012).

Expanding on the perceived threat framework based on socioeconomic status with a distinct emphasis on the assessment of power is the “power-threat hypothesis.” This theory has been empirically proven to be related to political behavior; research by Key (1949) and Blalock (1967) showed that an increase in the black population resulted in an increase of white engagement in behaviors that attempted to limit or control blacks. “Many studies have shown that an increase in the size of proximate minority groups is perceived as a potential threat to economic resources and political power of the dominant
group, thus resulting in various political behavior by the dominant group members to protect their interests” (Jang, 2009, p. 514). Power is an extension of the socioeconomic real threat framework because the perception is that incentives or group benefits, though not financial but in the form political resources and power, are threatened by the presence of another group; this also implies competition between groups to achieve higher status, power, and benefits. “It is textbook knowledge that power has no meaning in absolute terms but only makes sense comparatively” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 75). This hypothesis also emphasizes the perception of a threat occurs at a group level (going beyond the individual as the unit of analysis) and that incentives or a threat to group benefits are perceived to affect or motivate the entire group. This points out how group conflicts between races can begin with an increase in one group’s demographics, which then leads to the perception of a threat for group-level benefits. It is also important to note perceptions tend to be faulty and overestimate the number of immigrants substantially (Citrin & Sides, 2007).

The dichotomy of perceived symbolic and real threat may not be as neatly divided or mutually exclusive in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment as researchers would like. Citrin’s large-scale cross-national study with 20 European countries found that symbolic threat to cultural and national identity and economic interests are both important predictors of immigrant attitudes (Citrin & Sides, 2007). Another example is the Official English Movement in the U.S.; although the legislation was mainly symbolic, this movement was most intense in the states that experienced actual, rapid increases in the size of cultural minorities (Citrin et al, 1990). Both categories of symbolic and actual threat possess partial explanatory power (they may intersect) in answering the paradox of
exaggerating the migration scale in reference to the general population size. Even when
the immigrant community size is “favorable to the incumbent” and immigrant numbers
are “marginal,” a threat is perceived by the host society (Alexseev, 2006, p. 3). A recent
example of this can be the state of Alabama and its recent adoption of an Arizona-like
immigration law in 2011, HB 56. Although Alabama is not situated on the long
international border as Arizona, its state legislature passed HB 56, even though the U.S.
Census Bureau reported its white population made up 68.5% of the population and those
of Hispanic/Latino origin comprised 3.9% of the state population in 2010. The paradox
acknowledges despite the marginal numbers of the Latino group, it is perceived as a
substantial threat for a number of reasons: news stories reported the Spanish-speaking
immigrant community is geographically concentrated in an area called “Little Tijuana”
with Spanish road signs; immigrants are assumed to be residing illegally in the U.S.;
news media also reported locals’ statements including, “I don’t like them [immigrants]
putting nothing into the system and getting free [benefits]. They’re bleeding the
government dry,” “It’s [illegal immigration] a security risk,” and because the state’s
unemployment rate is at 10%, this initiative is necessary to “prevent valuable services
from going to people living in the state illegally and to save jobs for legal residents of
Alabama” (Associated Press, 2011). The justification for the bill through the
aforementioned factors include an interaction between the perceived threat framework of
symbolic and actual threat; symbolic because assimilation patterns through language and
geographically close knit communities with Spanish road signs are perceived as a threat
(though marginal in terms of its group size), and a real tangible threat is also perceived
because the state’s unemployment rate indicates competition within the labor market,
there are limited public resources for social programs so competition exists to access those benefits, and the impact of the cost to educate potentially illegal immigrants may outweigh benefits the immigrant community contributes to the state.

It must also be said that the “reverse tendency paradox” (Alexseev, 2006) may exist, meaning in areas where the immigrant group size is not marginal but substantial, there may be less manifestations of phobia or anti-immigrant policies. For example, in Texas, the white population made up 45% of the total population according to the 2010 U.S. Census, and the Hispanic population 37.6%. However, Republican Governor Rick Perry publicly stated the Arizona bill would not be replicated in Texas; Texas is a border state, has a substantial Hispanic population, and a Republican governor (most states following the Arizona trend share the commonality of a Republican governor), yet, there is no similar legislation, making it a “reverse tendency paradox” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 4) and pointing out variation among anti-immigrant sentiment cases exists. This makes it a difficult phenomenon to explain. The question of why certain states have followed suit after Arizona and others, which logically make more sense (i.e. Texas or New Mexico), do not is a challenging question to answer. Table 2.2 (see page 181) was created as an attempt to find commonalities among variables particularly relevant to the discussion of immigration phobia. Size of the Hispanic population is no indicator, although the perceptions may be over exaggerated in states like Alabama where the Hispanic population more than doubled in the past ten years, according to the latest 2010 Census. Also included is the senior population (over the age of 65) since studies show age is correlated with ideology, and younger citizens tend to be less xenophobic than older citizens (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012, p. 46).
Williams (1947) contributed the contact hypothesis, which predicted contact with out-group members is a mediating variable that ultimately impacts attitudes toward the out-group. Contact was hypothesized to “mitigate mutual animosities and prejudices… ethnic others would thus appear less threatening” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 19). Although Williams was the first to formally introduce the notion of “contact” as a mediator of prejudice, Allport (1954) specified the type of contact and the necessary conditions for which contact to have a positive impact on the out-group. Pettigrew et al continued this dialogue by pointing out the prerequisite conditions were actually more of facilitating conditions to allow for contact to have a positive impact on attitudes. The term “contact” is vague itself; more intimate contact, as in the form of friendships, has been found to have stronger effects on attitudes toward out-group members versus neighborhood and school contact, which alone cannot be expected to reduce prejudices (McLaren, 2003, p. 913). Pettigrew et al (1998) and Wilson (1996) provided empirical support for this theory through statistical path analyses within the context of the U.S. However, empirical support is cross national; McLaren’s (2003) empirical study using the Eurobarometer survey data of spring 1997 also supported the contact hypothesis, allowing for a partial, at least, explanation to the question on immigration phobia.

A further theoretical framework that can explain immigration phobia is the security threat approach; its main concern is to secure individual, group, and national identity as well as state sovereignty (Alexseev, 2006). The security threat framework evolved due to the 2,000-mile southern international border being hard to monitor comprehensively in order to keep undesirable flows from crossing the border and, most importantly, wanting to create and sustain an image of a border under control, for
national sovereignty reasons (Andreas, 2000). Historically, immigration control at the border is symbolic of its national sovereignty and territorial authority. Following the numerous political attacks after the passage of NAFTA on an open border for illegal substances or aliens to enter the country, the Border Patrol Agency took unprecedented measures to send a loud and clear message in the form of Operation Hold the Line in 1993, Operation Gatekeeper, Operation Safeguard, and Operation Rio Grande (Andreas, 2000). This strategy was novel—rather than detaining illegal crossers after the act, this strategy allocated hundreds of agents along the border, their mere presence stopping Mexicans from attempting to enter. A more aggressive approach of this manner implies an increase of personnel, with agents scattered across hundreds of miles, as well as an increase of resources to allow for new technologies.

However, as policy discourse became notoriously anti-immigrant with rhetoric like “a flood of immigrants,” “the border under siege,” and “illegal invasion” becoming increasingly widespread among government entities and politicians, public outrage surfaced and a strong “backlash against illegal immigrants” created by the state itself was “opportunistically channeled” as a political opportunity. The Clinton Administration defined the border as both the site of the problem and solution of the problem, and the result was escalation of restrictive immigration measures in the name of security (Andreas, 2000). The INS expanded, its budget jumping from $1.5 to $4.2 billion; the Border Patrol budget also increased by about 150%, and the Clinton Administration passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Andreas, 2000). This escalation and corresponding restrictive measures included “tougher sentencing, double penalties, construction of physical barriers, and use of
technologies and equipment on the border [originally intended for military purposes]” (Andreas, 2000). Escalation is subsequently accompanied by a negative outcome or consequence—in this case, the result was a drop in the number of apprehensions at the most commonly used points of entry, but jumped at other points. Because crossings became more remote and more hidden, the problem became invisible; the people smuggling business boomed, with about 75% of immigrants relying on these organizations to cross the border (Andreas, 2000); and, ultimately, a message to illegal immigrants—once across the border, stay indefinitely due to the increasing risk of border controls (Andreas, 2000). Traditionally, laborers traveled in more seasonal patterns; currently, illegal immigrants are encouraged to stay in attempts to avoid the risk of another crossing—a major unintended consequence.

This new paradigm shift to emphasize security has now “transformed the immigration flow into something threatening to the sovereignty of the state” (Ceyhan, 1997). Under the security rhetoric, anti-immigrant sentiment filled policy discourse and directly targeted Mexican immigrants, illegal and legal alike, in the state of California during the mid 1990s (Ceyan, 1997). Ceyan’s study (1997) conducted a discourse analysis of texts and policy discussions and found that since the 1990s, immigration has been constructed as a securitarian issue and included in a securitarian continuum linking immigration to “border crossing, illegal immigration, crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, incivilities, urban violence and ethnicity.” This approach explains immigration phobia because immigration has been socially constructed as a link to each of these aforementioned items, posing a threat to society’s safety at large. California’s Proposition 187 with the name “Save our State” suggested the state’s safety was
compromised because of immigration levels, and more immigrants resulted in a negative effect on security.

In addition, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S., “policymakers have begun [to] seriously consider individual migrants as security threats” (Cornelius & Rosenbloom, 2004, p. 104). Rhetoric after September 11th included statements such as “Abuse of the immigration system and a lack of immigration enforcement unwittingly work together to support terrorist activity” (The New York Times, October 8, 2004, p. 23). This logic’s link of immigration and terrorism is “the most threatening and the least verifiable” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 51).

Furthermore, the criminalization of immigrants and the indoctrination of this “deviant” in society is an important part of the security threat approach. Immigrants are now “identified with drug trafficking and [associated] with the growing criminality” (Ceyhan, 1997, p. 17). “Hispanic, and particularly Mexican, immigrants are often been stereotyped as criminals” (Warner, 2005-2006). Social science research, however, shows that “non-citizens and naturalized immigrants are predominately law-abiding,” but while the term “immigrant” has positive connotations in relation to U.S. history, “illegal aliens are vilified” (Warner, 2005-2006). This socially constructed phenomenon is difficult to challenge, even when presenting evidence “immigrants have a lower potential for criminality and a lower rate of criminal recidivism,” or when pointing out some immigrants, not all, become involved in criminal activity, “just as do some US-born citizens” (Warner, 2005-2006). A recent book on immigration by Margaret S. Orchowski, a congressional correspondent for Hispanic Outlook magazine, argued, “Illegal immigration is a violation of the law” and a “disrespectful act” (Reyes, 2010),
which has become a default explanation for taking a stance against immigration; through this logic, as soon as the immigrant enters the country, he/she has already violated the rule of law and is a criminal in the U.S. The solution Orchowski suggested is “tougher action,” (Reyes, 2010), which is certainly the approach taken by the state of Arizona, and the U.S. as a whole in its escalation of restrictive immigration measures.

Alexseyev (2006) contributed a unique logic focusing on uncertainty and insecurity in explaining immigration phobia across global contexts, not exclusive to the U.S. His explanatory model suggested anti-immigrant hostility is the result of an interethnic security dilemma, particularly when vulnerability exists on both accounts of socioeconomic and cultural threats. In his security dilemma model, immigration triggers perceptions in the host society of four categories: anarchy, intent, groupness, and socioeconomic impact; these perceptions are internalized as a threat and result in anti-immigrant hostility. Alexseev’s main contribution to existing frameworks of symbolic and economic threats is the emphasis on “the role of uncertainty and vulnerability in exaggerating socioeconomic and cultural threats” (p. 209). This contribution allows for flexibility in explaining why areas where substantial demographic changes do not have overt conflict, as in Texas, but would also explain conflict in areas where demographic changes are slow and/or marginal, as in the state of Alabama.

Chebel d’Appollonia (2012) extended the work of Alexseev by examining the securitization of immigration issues and evaluating whether the use of immigration policies as counterterrorist policies has “helped to solve the problems commonly related to immigration, such as the increasing number of illegal immigrants, the resilience of ethnic tensions that sometimes fuels civil unrest, and the emergence of homegrown
radicalization?” (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012, p. 5). This study concluded immigration and security policies were flawed before the attacks of September 11th; because the U.S. continued with “more of the same” faulty policies after 9/11, the end result is “less security and less democracy—not more” (p.5).

**Limitations of existing theories**

Although the perceived symbolic threat is “particularly potent” (Citrin & Sides 2007) in explaining immigration phobia and hostility, it is still a paradox why a perceived symbolic threat mobilizes groups to target minority or out-member groups when these consist of marginal numbers. “It is perfectly commonsensical that marginal minorities by definition are too small to ‘dilute’ or destroy the cultural identity of any host society” (Alexseev, 2006, p. 18). Yet, in Alabama, with a 3.9% Hispanic/Latino population, an Arizona-like immigration bill was recently passed. This framework, although it is understood identity and culture are important factors a host society wills to preserve in full integrity, cannot alone explain the exaggerated fear of host societies in acting hostile towards immigrant groups, particularly, Latinos of Mexican descent. In addition, the limitation of this framework is its volatility; if the assumptions of the perceived symbolic threat framework were able to fully explain anti-immigrant sentiment, then other states with minority populations, such as Texas or New Mexico, would be following suit, but this is not the case. This suggests there are still shortcomings in trying to concretely explain symbolic threat and what particular set of conditions triggers its mobilization against out-member groups, as well as why, in certain similar instances, intergroup conflict is absent.
The actual threat framework, including the economic threat hypothesis, fails to explain why during the latter part of the 1990s when there was weak economic competition, a healthy economy (unemployment at 3 to 4 percent), and companies actively searching for new workers, including immigrants, “approximately 50 to 70 percent of Americans in national opinion polls continued to express negative views on immigration” (Cornelius, 2002, p. 172). Under this approach’s logic, weak economic competition and a low unemployment rate would predict increased levels of attitudinal support for immigration, which was not the case. Therefore, this framework alone is unable to fully explain immigration phobia. This implies other variables, either cultural, symbolic, politicized rhetoric, or electoral incentives must interact with the socioeconomic variables to ultimately impact opinions on immigration (Schain, 2012).

A weakness of the contact hypothesis, readily pointed out by scholars exploring this concept, is the inability to establish the direction of causality within the relationship of contact and prejudice. The model attempts to prove contact causes less prejudiced attitudes regarding out-group members, but it may well be less prejudiced individuals are the ones to make contact with members of the out-group to begin with. “Are those who pursue intimate contact less prejudiced to begin with, or does the contact itself actually serve to reduce prejudice?” (McLaren, 2003, p. 913). Another flaw of this theoretical approach is it fails to account for the size of the immigrant population; contact is inherently more likely to occur in cases where the minority group is larger, so this raises an endogeneity issue. In addition, empirical testing of contact hypothesis has resulted in mixed findings. For example, Forbes (1997) found more contact actually resulted in increased intergroup hostility between culturally dissimilar groups in various social
contexts. Alexseev also cited the case of the “massive brutality in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where thousands of lifelong friends ceased contact and became enemies in a matter of months or even days” (2006, p. 20). A limitation of both the contact hypothesis and the power-threat hypothesis research is they predominately focus on white-black relations; opportunities exist to build and expand this research to include Latinos.

The limitation of the security threat and criminality framework is it assumes illegal immigrants are entering the U.S. illegally through the 2000-mile stretch along the southwest the U.S shares with Mexico. This implies the need for escalated efforts and resources for the Department of Homeland Security, which includes the federal agencies of Customs and Border Protection and the Border Patrol. However, empirical evidence exists to show at least half of undocumented immigrants do not enter the U.S. illegally, but are visa overstayers (Andreas, 2000). Although the federal government is well aware of this information, it still decided to make the border a political stage and the site of both the problem and the solution by mandating further escalation measures and willingly overlooking visa overstayers (Andreas, 2000). This approach cannot explain why increased escalated measures, a proven failing policy (Andreas, 2000), have not placated immigration phobia; at a time when the U.S. has invested unprecedented funds on border security, U.S. citizens still indicate it is not enough and demand further escalation efforts in the name of safety. This framework also links immigrants and terrorists, as immigration restrictionist policies are counterterrorist policies and vice-versa.

Immigration was lumped together with terrorism after 9/11 because the public internalized the attacks on the World Trade Center were done by foreigners, an identity immigrants also bear.
In summation, anti-immigrant policies originated in the U.S. more than a century before Arizona’s SB 1070. Interestingly enough, restrictive immigration measures originally were meant to deter Asians and Europeans from entering the country, not Mexicans. Yet, the Latino population has now become the largest minority group of the country and continues to expand at an exponential pace. The largest group making up the Latino population is composed of Mexican Americans (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001), and projections indicate at least one quarter of the U.S. population will be Latino by 2050 (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010). The Census Bureau reported 16% of the U.S. population is Hispanic as of 2010; the Bureau also reported “the majority of the growth in the total population came from increases in those who reported their ethnicity as Hispanic or Latino” (Enis, Rios-Vargas, Albert, 2011). Because of the substantially increasing size of immigrants of Mexican origin, scholarship has explored the perception of a threat between racial groups, concentrating on perceptions based on symbolism, such as culture and identity, as well as on socioeconomic terms, such as labor market competition, the impact of immigration on unemployment, intergroup competition for scarce resources, and cost-benefit analyses of migration flows. It is imperative to study the underlying assumptions and possible explanations behind anti-immigrant sentiment because of the possible deterrence these may infringe on Hispanic political participation, as well as the threat to democracy caused by hostile political contexts and environments. This sentiment is triggered by the perception the Latino population poses a substantial threat and is exacerbated by the current stagnant economy.

As of January 2012, 36 state legislations have considered “copycat legislation” (see Table 1); it is necessary to examine whether these policies, driven by immigration
phobia, ultimately encourage suppressing the voice or alienating the Hispanic community; if so, it is undemocratic in nature and will contribute to an increasingly tense political climate, affecting not just Hispanics in Arizona, but across the United States. In addition, by abolishing the presumption of innocence, the state has reversed what was meant to decidedly stand as a pillar and tradition of the American justice system, and will now itself allow the harassment of the Latino population, citizens, lawful noncitizens, and the undocumented alike. This is of paramount concern as a sort of domino effect began in 2010.

The next bulk of this chapter is dedicated to literature explaining citizen political participation, and, finally, summarizing what is known about Hispanic/Latino political participation in particular.

**Political Participation**

The body of literature originating on citizen political participation began with the basic question of “who participates, why, and what for.” This question is important because it examines the role of citizens in an active democracy. For the field of public administration, normative values of representation and equity are of central concern in the functionality of a democracy. Not only should citizen involvement be a requisite for democracy, but it should also be representative to ensure equity is not compromised in the arenas of policy-making, decision-making, and implementation. “Questions of representation… are germane to understanding citizen political participation” (Verba et al 1995). The following section summarizes what is known on citizen participation literature.
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes produced the seminal study, *The American Voter* (1960), which marked the first and most comprehensive study using national election survey data to determine predictors of participation, focusing particularly on the impact of demographic variables on electoral participation and political attitudes in their quantitative model. The answer to “who participates and why” has been primarily determined by the variables of income and education in the classic socio-economic (SES) Model, including other socio-demographic variables such as age, marital status, and occupation or employment. Verba and Nie (1972) focused on individual-level resources as an important predictor of political involvement. Wolfinger and Rosenstone contributed to the dialogue with *Who Votes?* This study provided an important lesson on voter turnout by pointing out although voters do have different demographic characteristics than non-voters, both share similar public policy attitudes (1980); these conclusions on non-voter representation were drawn from a quantitative analysis of census data for years 1972 and 1974. “In short, on these issues [government guaranteeing employment, medical insurance, bussing, abortion, legalizing marijuana, the role of women, and ideology] voters are virtually a carbon copy of the citizen population” (1980, p. 109).

However, as voting analyses in the traditional paradigm made distinctions primarily by socio-demographic variables, the academic dialogue then began to expand to incorporate political, cultural, institutional contexts to explain different rates of participation among groups. Assuming the classic SES model’s logic, as educational attainment rates have increased as a nation and more individuals are attending college than ever before, it should be the case that political participation has also increased; this
is not the case, and participation has remained stagnant and a complex question to answer.

Citizen participation literature was assuming a oneness of the population, pointing to individual resources and education as the main predictors of participation while all other variables were held constant, but the question soon became whether it was accurate to control for variables such as race, and why weren’t cultural and political variables captured in existing analyses to better understand different participation rates? “The central finding of the literature is that the traditional models of political participation, based on individuals’ socio-economic status and accompanying political resources, alone do not adequately explain the patterns in political participation among Latinos and Asian Americans” (Jang, 2009, p. 512). Logan, Darrah, and Oh (2007) found in their quantitative study using the Current Population Survey data (CPS) from five national election years that “although voting is a private act by an individual, this individual behavior is strongly influenced by group memberships and their social and political environment.” According to Logan et al, “collective factors,” such as race, ethnicity, the community context, and electoral policies, may either promote or obstruct participation among different racial groups (p.2). Logan et al pointed out variation in participation across racial groups has been longstanding and unanswered by the classic SES model; this research begins its discussion stating Hispanic registered voters are the least likely to turn out electorally (compared to rates of Asians, African Americans, and whites, and based on data from five national elections). This study’s main contribution was to emphasize participation as a collective act affected by contextual variables, such as the community and the political environment.
Consequently, different participation models emerged, more sophisticated in accounting for social and contextual circumstances, evaluating beyond individual socio-demographic variables in studying citizen participation and representation. Literature on Latinos’ political attitudes and behavior is still limited because existing studies concentrate on white-black relations (Jang, 2009, p. 514). Existing research suggests, “the variables underlying Latino political activity are distinct from those explaining black and white participation” (Hritzuk & Park, 2000, p. 151). Participation models have identified the following set of variables as possessing significant explanatory power in predicting political participation of immigrants, racial or ethnic minorities, and women: length of residency in the U.S., foreign-born, and generational cohort (Bass & Casper, 2001; Lien, 2004; Ramakrishnan, 2005), English proficiency (Cho, 1999), acculturation (Lien, 1994), discrimination experiences (Schildkraut, 2005), group consciousness (Leighley et al, 1999; Stokes, 2003; Uhlaner, 1989; Wong, 2005); religious and non-religious organizational membership (Diaz, 1996; Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001; Hritzuk & Park, 2000), assimilation (Cho, 1999; Bass and Casper, 2001) and its impact on mobilization (Ramirez, 2007), group mobilization (DeSipio, 2002; Duncan, 1999; Miller et al, 1981) and exposure to mobilization (Hritzuk & Park, 2000), integration into politically active social networks (Hritzuk & Park, 2000), socialization and information dissemination (Hritzuk & Park, 2000), and interaction of individuals with their particular racial context (Jang, 2009).

Political participation literature has also studied its main determinants by focusing on the perspective of assimilation theory. According to this line of reasoning, “to the extent that immigrants ‘assimilate’ (economically, culturally, residentially, or
linguistically), they should vote at rates no different from native born Americans with otherwise similar attributes… [This theory’s] key hypothesis is a linear increase in integration and participation from the first to the third generation” (Logan et al, 2007, p. 5-6). However, generational differences impacts racial and ethnic groups differently, and, in the case of Hispanics, evidence shows a decline in participation among Latinos by generation status.

Perhaps an answer to the Hispanic anomaly is the provocative work of Schneider and Ingram and their theory of policy design. This theory focused on the impact of social constructions, which are embedded in public policies, on different groups’ participation patterns, and suggested the stigma allotted to groups construed as undeserving and deviant was to deter these individuals from political participation (1997). The main point is not to determine whether the laws or policies are, in normative terms, good or bad, but to point out how assumptions are purposely embedded in policy design, and are meant to inconspicuously encourage participation from certain groups, but inhibit representation and participation of marginalized groups; Schneider and Ingram focused on the impact of degenerative policies on participation, meant to represent a democratic mechanism. This theory was corroborated through the mixed methods study of Soss in 1999 (Riccucci, 2010, p. 113). Using in-depth interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, direct participant observations of clients and the welfare agency, and national survey data from 1992 National Election Studies (NCES), Soss found the AFDC structure itself discouraged recipients from participating because of the stigma assigned on single mothers and their poor treatment in the AFDC program; this stripped their desire to participate and ultimately affected political engagement. A further study that
coincidentally validated the theory of policy design on stifling participation was produced by Barry on nonprofit organizations; because non-profit organizations feared losing their 501(c)3 status for engaging in “substantial” lobbying under changes in the Bush administration, these organizations resorted to abstain from lobbying altogether, despite the term of “substantial lobbying” was vague and unclear. Non-profit organizations did not enroll in the 501(c)3 H-option, which allowed lobbying in favor of marginalized groups without risking their status because information on this option was not readily available or public. In light of Schneider and Ingram’s framework, this is another illustration of a system with less democracy, less voices, and muted; the policy was deliberately written to favor certain groups, quiet others and worked exactly as intended, inhibiting the representation and participation of marginalized groups.

The literature on participation started with analyses on the “American voter” and has, since then, acknowledged the role of the community, the contextual political environment, assimilation of immigrants, and the role of immigrant status (assimilation, generational cohort, and whether foreign-born) on political participation in the U.S. The following is what is known specifically on Hispanic and Latino participation.

**Latino Political Participation**

It was Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) that finally expanded the definition of Latino participation to include a more broad range of activities and examined variables on opportunity, mobilization, and motivation. Although this research concluded Latinos are “less well endowed with the factors that foster participation… Principal among these factors is socioeconomic status” (p. 523) and reinforced socioeconomic variables as the main predictors of participation, this study is responsible for broadening the scope and
definition of “Latino participation,” and led to scholars to develop further models for empirical testing in a proactive search for boosting Latino participation.

This study (Verba et al, 1995) also tabulated participation scores across whites, blacks, Latinos, and Latino citizens summarizing participation in a broader set of political activities, and found Latino and Latino citizens still remained at the bottom, “reveal[ing] the overall pattern of lower levels of participation for Latinos. However, an understanding of Latino participation needs to move beyond a summary of activities and explore specific political participation arenas” (Garcia & Sanchez, 2008, p. 143). The notion of encouraging and suppressing participation within specific arenas is embedded in Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design, as it predicts different groups will be directed or encouraged to different means of participation. In the case of disadvantaged and/or undesirable groups, these are predicted to be discouraged from participating in the formal political arena like voting or contacting a public official, which is true of Latino participation, but are more likely to participate within the informal arena. This may explain the “National Day of Action” on April 10, 2006.

“No one could have predicted the huge scale of the national protests [on this day]… There were an estimated 500,000 protesters dressed in white to symbolize peace and solidarity in both Dallas and Los Angeles, 200,000 in Washington, D.C., 50,000 in Denver; and more than 100,000 in Phoenix, which represented the largest protest in the history of the state of Arizona… It is estimated that the total for all late April/early May marches may have reached 3 million participants in some fifty cities. This massive turnout has been recognized as the largest collective political effort of the U.S. immigrant population in American history.” (Garcia & Sanchez, 2008, p. 145-6)

In cases where disenfranchised groups lack the numbers in financial resources, the most efficient way to participate may be “protest politics” (p. 146). These are less conventional methods within the informal political arena, but this allows groups to use
their biggest resource—their size. Pooling their numbers and marching together is one example of Latino participation within the informal political arena. Barreto et al (2009) tested whether this widespread movement in 2006 was limited to Mexican immigrants or widespread among Latinos of different nationalities using both qualitative and quantitative methods and found “Latino support for the protests was strong across the population as a strong sense of solidarity unified the population around the immigration issue” (p. 1).

Another seminal study looking beyond socioeconomic variables was Barrio Ballots: Latino Politics in the 1990 Elections by De la Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio (1994). These authors conducted a series of ethnographic studies in five Latino communities across the country before the 1990 elections to examine the variables of mobilization, campaign issues, and electoral variables affect participation in Latino communities. This is one of the few existing qualitative studies to contribute to the discussion of Latino participation, suggesting that motivation for participation was greater when community level organizations were present and active, “which concomitantly educate and socialize Latinos into the political process” (Hritzuk & Park, 2000, p. 153). This study also found that motivation to mobilize was increased when Latinos considered campaign issues to be a part of their daily concerns; participation was also boosted when Latino candidates were contending in local elections and in the race for competitive seats, highlighting the issue of representation.

Hritzuk and Park (2000) made an important contribution by shifting the focus of Latino participation from the SES model to their “Social Structural” model (p. 151). An objective of this particular study was to broaden the definition of participation so as to
better understand Latino political involvement across a range of six activities: voting in the previous presidential election, volunteering for a party or candidate, contributing funds to a political party or candidate, attending a political rally, contacting a local official, and participating in a protest or demonstration (p. 157). This is one of the few studies to point out participation goes beyond electoral voting, especially in the case of noncitizens. “Clearly, examining only Latinos’ voting behavior would misrepresent overall levels of Latino political activity” (p. 157). This quantitative study used New York City’s Participation Survey, conducted in 1997 and meant to examine political activity among racial groups. The study found membership in community organizations increased participation across whites, black, and Latinos (p. 161); it also found “efficacy, political knowledge, and partisanship positively influence levels of Latino participation” (p. 162). This means those with a positive outlook on their ability to influence political processes are more likely to participate, which would be in line with Schneider and Ingram’s notion that messages are sent to different groups on behalf of government, which are then internalized, and indoctrinate certain groups positively on efficacy, while teaching others participation is futile. Interestingly, this study also found attachment to one’s native country does not decrease the likelihood of participation in political acts (p. 163), which is important to consider as the rate of assimilation and connection to one’s native country is commonly perceived to suppress Latino participation. Cultural factors are also found to affect Latinos differently than blacks and whites because the study found “if Latinos’ family, friends, and co-workers vote, Latinos themselves are more likely to engage in higher levels of political activity” (p. 161). This means that a politically active social network, exposure to mobilization, and affiliation with a
community-based organization are factors that make the Latino population unique in their participation patterns. The study concludes Latino’s social surroundings and their socialization are “requisite resources central to facilitating participation” (p. 151). The limitation of this study is the survey, though it was completed by 1,481 participants, was only distributed in New York City, and, although it included an oversampling of Latinos, the main group of Latinos that completed the survey were Puerto Ricans and immigrants from the Dominican Republic, which is a limitation for this study as the main population of interest are Mexicans and Mexican Americans.

Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura (2006) extended the work of Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) that suggested political information is a prerequisite for political participation. Nicholson et al studied how Hispanics make electoral decisions through a random sample of pre-election poll data from five states with large Hispanic populations; the study tested whether Hispanics were informed on candidates’ policy preferences. This logic suggests if voters are not well informed of political issues, then they cannot engage in “issue voting” (2006, p. 260). This study found ill-informed voters do not explain lower levels of participation because Latino voters were found to be “well informed on policy issues” (p. 269). Political knowledge is a predictor of greater mobilization and incorporation to political processes. Another noteworthy finding is that U.S. born Hispanics were .15% more politically informed than their foreign-born counterparts.

Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura (2001) studied the decision to naturalize in a heated political context through the lens of the theory of naturalized voter participation (NVP); “political circumstances can play a significant part in the decision to naturalize” (p. 734).
This study focused specifically on the political climate of California during the mid 1990s, characterized by contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric and ballot attacks on Latinos, and found that newly naturalized Latinos (naturalized between 1992 and 1996) in California were significantly more likely to turnout than comparable naturalized Latinos in Texas and Florida. This study suggests the “decision to turnout is not only motivated by individual level factors but also by the political context to see benefits of the larger group of interest (p. 735).

Pantoja and Segura (2003) also found the perception of an attack on Latinos in the mid 1990s in California to lead to an increase in “political sophistication” through the ability, motive, and opportunity framework. This study referenced the concept of “affective intelligence,” or how negative events have a powerful role in increasing attention and stimulating emotion (p. 269). By comparing levels of political knowledge of Latino citizens in California and Texas in 1997, the study found Californians perceived a greater racial threat than fellow Latinos in Texas; Californians also had increased levels of political knowledge, making this group more “political sophisticated than Latinos outside California” (p. 270).

A possible answer to the increased Latino political participation during the mid 1990s in California can be found in the literature on “group consciousness,” which was empirically strongly correlated with participation (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981). Stokes (2003) studied Latino group consciousness through an OLS regression analysis using national political survey data that measured its dependent variable through participation in eight political activities and its independent variable, group consciousness, in four components: group identity, polar power, polar affect, and
systemic blame (2003). The definition of group consciousness, according to Stokes, is when deprived group members share a “sense of commonality and collectivity that encourages groups to become more active in the political arena, thus explaining high rates of political participation among disadvantaged groups in American society” (p. 363). Stokes stated the low rates of naturalization “severely limits Latino voting power” (p. 366), and since “Latinos engage in various forms of participation,” to limit this phenomena only to electoral voting would misrepresent the Latino community (p. 367). Stokes examined three Latino subgroups (Mexican, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans) and found that group consciousness increases political participation, but variation exists within the different Latino subgroups; each subgroup emphasized different aspects of the construct of group consciousness.

Schildkraut (2005) examined understudied factors related to political engagement to “account for how experiences of immigrant minorities and their descendants—and the resulting perceptions generated by immigrant experience—might affect political engagement;” this study focused on individual-level perceptions of discrimination by the host society and the concept of self-identity to determine whether these promoted alienation from political participation venues or enhanced involvement in political activities. Using national survey data from the Pew Hispanic Center on close to 2000 U.S. citizens, this quantitative study found that, contrary to popular prose, strong ties to country of national origin is not an impediment to feeling proud to be an American; the perception of group-level discrimination makes it more likely to identify as Latino than American; thus, “the concept of self-identity is only politically relevant when accompanied by perceptions of discrimination” (2005). Identifying as Latino and
perceiving group-level discrimination in light of a political threat was found to predict political participation (p. 295); this cited the example of California in the mid 1990s when the “Latino electoral participation surged” as Latinos perceived to be under attack through numerous ballot initiatives. Schildkraut pointed to Latino political apathy if discrimination was perceived at the individual level, not at group-level (individual level discrimination perceptions do not point to an increase in political participation), which links the study to literature on “group solidarity.” This study also suggests perceptions of group-level discrimination deter the adoption of an “American” identity, as well as potentially promote attitudinal and behavioral alienation.

Exactly which “forms of political context need to be considered when explaining levels of participation” is a question tackled by Ramirez (2007) through a quasi-experiment of a comparable treatment and control group after phone canvassing efforts targeting Latinos. According to Ramirez, outreach to Latinos to increase voter turnout has mainly been symbolic, as Latinos are “rarely critical in deciding presidential elections;” since Latinos are not “preferred targets of mobilization, [they are] unfortunately, neglected” (p. 158).

Abrajano and Alvarez (2010) cited literature that “newer immigrants are more trusting than other immigrants” (not first generation) and use “segmented assimilation theory,” which is based on the impact of discrimination and efficacy (instead of socio-economic advancements) to evaluate political trust. This is noteworthy because, according to Robert Putman, it is the trusting individuals who “volunteer, participate, and engage in civic affairs” (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010, p. 114). Putnam’s work (1995) argued membership in social networks encouraged participation by providing access to
political information and a sense of collective attachment. In a quantitative analysis of a national random sample by the Pew Hispanic Center (data from 2002), this study found Latinos are more likely to be politically trusting than Anglos; the most assimilated Latinos are less politically trusting than more recent immigrants; and political trust is a determinant of support for the national government’s redistributive policies. The decline of political trust as Latinos become more assimilated in the U.S. is of particular concern because, according to Putnam, it is a mediating variable to political participation, and the decline of trust may be attributed to interactions with government representatives, which would make Schneider and Ingram’s framework a possible explanation.

Jang (2009) included interaction terms in his particular empirical model and emphasized the individual is situated within racial contexts that ultimately affect the perception of achieving, or not, group-level benefits. Jang found as the group size increased, so did the likelihood of Latino political participation. As the median income increased, however, the effect of the group size diminished. In more diverse or heterogeneous environments, the group size effect increased. Jang also concluded the group size affected the perceptions of Latinos’ group-level benefits.

**Limitations of Existing Approaches that Study Latino Political Participation**

Literature on political participation, evidently, mainly focuses on voting, and literature on Latino participation is no different. However, Latino groups’ composition is unique in that it includes a large number of foreign-born as well as undocumented immigrants. These are ineligible to participate electorally. The decision to undergo the naturalization process is itself considered to indicate political engagement, assimilation, and reflect political attitudes; however, political circumstances or climate affects lawful
residents’ political attitudes, which can play a significant part in their decision to naturalize (Pantoja, Ramirez, Segura, 2001). It is often held against the Latino community that naturalization rates are slow, claiming this group is resistant or hesitant to assimilate into American culture. A main gap in the literature is to look at voting patterns without addressing the vast group of Hispanics and Latinos ineligible to participate electorally, lawful (permanent resident) or unlawful (undocumented) alike.

Participation includes an array of activities linked to the political process, and these activities may be more significant to the Hispanic community as many are ineligible to vote. These other forms of participation include “running for office, working or volunteering for a campaign or organization, donating money to a campaign or organization, directly contacting an elected official, being involved with a political party, and protesting or demonstrating” (Garcia & Sanchez, 2008, p. 148). However, research focusing on these other modes of participation is scarce because the prevailing paradigm concentrates on individual-level resources as the main determinants for electoral participation. When discussing Mexicans and Mexican Americans, however, there is insufficient research on their participation in alternative engagement methods. Schneider and Ingram’s theory predicts undeserving groups will ultimately participate less in formal political arenas, but more in informal arenas, such as demonstrations, rallies, marches or other activities that do not require formal interaction with the government. This may explain the unprecedented rates of mobilization and participation in 2006 in response to California’s 4437 bill.

Other literature, however, indicates a greater likelihood to participate if the individual is affiliated with a local community-based organization, is exposed to
mobilization by social political networks, and whether family and close friends are politically engaged (Hritzuk & Park, 2000). These questions cannot be solely answered or elaborated on given existing data and quantitative voting analyses, but are questions this study addressed through qualitative inquiry from purposefully selected Hispanics ineligible to vote.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Quantitative Data Collection

The main goal of this study is to understand whether SB 1070 had an effect on Latino political attitudes and participation. According to the theoretical framework of this study, policies determine orientations towards government by sending formal and informal messages that divide the population into groups, either socially constructed as deserving or undeserving; citizens then internalize these messages. If SB 1070 had an effect on Latino political attitudes, which then affects their subsequent political participation patterns, then SB 1070 would have an effect on Latinos’ attitudes towards government, the president, towards political leaders, their political party affiliation, political ideology, and whether they register to vote.

Variables

The dependent variables of this study’s quantitative analysis are binary variables that measure political attitudes. Questions are dichotomous and ask whether respondents approve or disapprove of the President’s performance, Republican and Democrat political leaders’ performance, political party affiliation with either the Republican or Democrat party, and whether they are registered to vote; only one question is not dichotomous, and this is a 5 point Likert scale asking on respondents’ political ideology (range from very conservative to very liberal).

The first independent variable is whether the survey respondent is Hispanic, or part of the treatment group. The second independent variable is whether the observation occurred in the pre or post period.
The control variables include age, education, and income, which have been empirically found to be main determinants of political participation. The researcher used the mean centered values of the variables.

Data

The quantitative analysis used secondary survey data from the Pew Research Center for the People and Press; the Pew Center completes a “Political Survey” periodically throughout the year. The survey is completed through telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample by using random digit dialing (RDD) of both landline and mobile phone numbers.

This study merged two cross sectional surveys for the analysis; the researcher used the survey administered before the passage of SB 1070, administered in March 2010, and the first survey administered after the passage of SB 1070, which was done in June 2010. The survey questionnaire for March 2010 includes 1500 respondents, with a response rate of 13.2-19.2% of landline numbers and a rate of 13.3-14% for mobile numbers. The survey questionnaire for June 2010 includes 1802 respondents, with a response rate of 9.3-4.3% for landline numbers and 8.1-10% for mobile numbers. The merged dataset included 3302 respondents (n=3302).

The survey data was appended when using the Stata software to form one dataset to compare political attitudes and participation before and after the Arizona bill.

This data was selected because it is not limited to registered voters, to English speakers (the survey can be completed in Spanish), and uses random digit dialing to select participants.

Measurement
The dependent variables are binary variables coded “1” for respondents answering “yes” or “approve,” and “0” for respondents answering “no” or “disapprove” to these questions.

The researcher created dummy variables for the treatment group; respondents who indicated they were Hispanic were coded with a “1,” and non-Hispanic respondents were coded with a “0.”

The researcher also created dummy variables for the pre-post period. The survey data completed before the bill, the March 2010 questionnaire, was coded with a “0;” the survey data completed after the bill, the June 2010 questionnaire, was coded with a “1” to signify post SB 1070.

The analysis used the weighted data to more closely reflect the U.S. population. The proportion of Hispanics using the weighted data represents 13% of the survey’s respondents, while Hispanics reflect 16% of the national population according to the latest 2010 Census.

The researcher compared summary statistics of demographic data between the two individual survey datasets and found the percentages of white, African American, Hispanic, male and female respondents to be similar; the researcher did not trim or make changes to make data more alike since both datasets were comparable in demographics.

**Difference-in-Difference Method**

Before and after comparisons face the problem of internal validity (Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011). For this main reason, this study uses a difference-in-difference technique to allow for a stronger study. “Some refer to this study as a pre-post study with a comparison group” (Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011, p. 451).
The interaction term was created by multiplying the dummy variable of the treatment group (Hispanic respondents) by the dummy variable of the post period (following SB 1070). This interaction term “compares the difference between two before-after differences” (Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011, p. 451). The following equation depicts the research design for the pre-post analyses of Arizona’s SB 1070:

\[ Y = a + \beta (Rx) + \beta (Post) + \beta \text{int} (Rx \times Post) + \beta \text{control variables}. \]

Since most questions measuring the dependent variables are dichotomous, the researcher used both logit and probit models; the findings in the next chapter, however, report the results based on the logistic regression models. The results from the probit models can be referenced through the Appendix. Ordinary least squares regression was used with the political ideology variable since this was an ordinal variable using a five-point Likert scale.

The researcher also created a dummy variable for each geographical region: the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West to compare Hispanic survey responses by region. However, these analyses were affected by the small number of Hispanic respondents in each particular region. Because most Hispanic respondents are concentrated in the South or West regions, the researcher joined these two regions to run analyses focusing on these high impact areas. Analyses were restricted to this subsample in which Hispanic respondents were more represented to determine if interaction terms, Hispanics post SB 1070, resulted in significant changes in political attitudes.

The researcher also created a dummy variable to run analyses focusing on Spanish speaking Hispanics (as opposed to all Hispanic respondents in the survey) and determine if this resulted in significant interactions pre and post SB 1070. Another dummy variable
was also created to compare differences between foreign-born Hispanic and Hispanics born in the U.S.

**Qualitative Data Collection**

This study includes 28 in-depth interviews of Hispanic individuals in Arizona and New York. The researcher began with 18 in-depth interviews in Arizona. Using snowball sampling, the researcher began in Yuma, Arizona, and was then referred to potential participants throughout Yuma and the city of San Luis, Arizona. Both of these cities are in close proximity to the Mexican border and are a part of Yuma County. Three additional interviews were done in the city of Phoenix as a result of the sampling method. One interview was completed on behalf of a community-based organization that is an affiliated corporation of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) housed in Phoenix. The NCLR is the largest Hispanic advocacy civil rights organization in the United States. The researcher met with the CEO of the organization, La Raza Development Fund. Recruiting participants for this study was done mainly through snowball sampling and through fieldwork in the state of Arizona.

The researcher then conducted 10 interviews in New York City, following the same sampling method, in an effort to duplicate interview protocol as closely as possible to that of Arizona’s. One participant has been employed by a community-based organization that predominately serves Latinos in the south Bronx for over thirty years and shared observations gathered from the experience of working with the organization and Latino political engagement.

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13 The Institutional Review Board at Rutgers University approved this study January 1, 2012 for a maximum of 30 participants.
In order to be eligible to participate in the study, participants must have continually resided in Arizona, or New York City, for the past five years, at least, to provide an appropriate response of main changes before and after the implementation of SB 1070. Participants also had to self-identify as “Latino” or “Hispanic” and be over 18 years of age. Given the nature of this topic, the researcher explained in person with potential participants the purpose of the study and the nature of the questions so as to avoid any emotional stress that would occur from discussing polemic legislation.

In order to encourage participants to offer in-depth information, the researcher prepared open interviews with approximately eight open-ended questions. In an open interview, the researcher has control over the process, but little control over the direction of the conversation of the interview. Participants answered questions and also included narratives on certain experiences after the passage of 1070, some including exchanges with public entities, immigration officials, or their circle of family, friends, or co-workers, that they considered best illustrated their point of view and were most relevant to the research. Each interview was audio recorded by the researcher, with signed consent from each participant. In order to protect each participant’s identity through confidentiality, the researcher did not collect identifying information of the participants, such as names, addresses, or telephone numbers. The participants were asked eight open-ended questions, and then asked their age, occupation, and college education (if applicable).

The duration of each interview was contingent on how much the participant wanted to share; participants were advised against answering questions they did not feel comfortable with. Each interview was personally done, one on one, in the location of the
participant’s choice, as long as it was quiet and safe. Most participants in Arizona did not want to do the interview in a public space, so most were done in the participants’ homes. Interviews in New York City, however, were all done in public spaces, and were noticeably shorter in duration since participants in Arizona were more likely to include personal narratives on experiences that were a direct result of SB 1070.

Interviews were structured around eight key questions; interview protocol was replicated as closely as possible in New York to obtain comparable data. The questions included in the interviews included:

1. What can you tell me about your family’s history in migrating to the U.S.?
2. In your own words, please describe the bill 1070 passed by the state of Arizona in April, 2010.
3. What, if any, was the impact of SB 1070 on the Hispanic community in Yuma [or San Luis, Phoenix, New York City]?
4. Did SB 1070 make you feel discriminated against? If so, please elaborate. How did your family, friends, and co-workers feel?
5. If I were to ask local Hispanics whether they felt important to influence government, what do you predict I would hear the most? How much does SB 1070 have to do with this attitude?
6. If I were to ask local Hispanics whether they trust their government, what do you predict I would hear the most? How much does SB 1070 have to do with this attitude?
7. Did SB 1070 affect how you think about political participation? If so, how?
8. If you have taken part in any participatory methods, what was the main impetus for carrying out the activity?

Participants were asked to be thorough so the researcher could understand the impact of the bill and the main changes that were imposed on the Hispanic population after SB
1070; participants were asked to draw upon what they felt personally as well as what individuals within their circles (family, friends, co-workers, colleagues) expressed.

When the researcher mentioned linking the bill to Hispanic political attitudes and participation, participants spoke about their views on the Obama administration, the state government, the Republican or Democratic Political Party, Congress, and how their views had been changed by 1070 (if applicable). This is meant to provide insight on the quantitative national data obtained by the Pew Center’s Political Survey. The researcher also purposefully included participants that are not U.S. Citizens in this study as these individuals are generally excluded from literature on Hispanic political participation. Since voting is not an option, the researcher wanted to know if these individuals adopted a broader definition of “political participation,” one that includes an array of activities available to individuals regardless of immigration status.

The researcher attempted to duplicate interview protocol as closely as possible in both Arizona and New York. While interviews were open and structured around the same number of questions in both Arizona and New York, the researcher collected 16 hours of audio recordings from Arizona interviews, averaging about 53 minutes per person. In New York, interviews were considerably shorter in length, despite the smaller number of participants; each interview lasted an average of 33 minutes per person.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Collection:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cities of Yuma and San Luis are both part of Yuma County. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the population of the city of Yuma, Arizona is 93,064. Yuma’s Hispanic or Latino population is 55% (U.S. Census, 2010). The 2010 Census reports 38% of the population is White and not of Hispanic or Latin origin, and 3% is African American. Yuma is seven miles away from the Mexican border. About 16% of the population holds a Bachelor’s degree or higher, and 44% of the households report speaking another language besides English in the home (U.S. Census, 2010).

The city of San Luis, Arizona has a population of 25,505, according to the 2010 U.S. Census. As of 2010, 99% of this population is Hispanic or Latino, and .9% of the population is White, not of Hispanic or Latin origin. Only 6% of this city holds a Bachelor’s degree or higher, and the Census indicates 88% of San Luis households reported speaking another language besides English in the home. San Luis is located along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Because of the proximity to the Mexican border, SB 1070 impacts these two border cities very differently than Hispanics residing throughout the state of Arizona. Although Arizona is a border state and SB 1070 is a statewide policy and initiative, the larger cities of Tucson, Phoenix, and Scottsdale are not situated directly along the border itself. The researcher would like to point out that this data represents the views and experiences of a particular group of Hispanics that reside in Arizona, and not generalize Hispanic attitudes and experiences for the entire state.

The metropolitan region of New York has a population of 19,378,102, according to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau. The Census reported a Hispanic or Latino population of 17.6%, which is higher than the national average of 16.3%. The white population
comprises 58.3% of the metropolitan region, with African Americans comprising about 16%. About 32% of the city holds a Bachelor’s degree or higher, and 29% of households speak a language besides English in the home.
Chapter 4: Results

This chapter reports the results of the quantitative and the qualitative data analysis. The chapter begins with the quantitative data analysis, includes the descriptive statistics, and the results of the difference-in-difference analysis using logistic regression; the chapter then continues with the qualitative findings from in-depth interviews with 18 Latino participants conducted in the cities of Yuma, San Luis, and Phoenix in Arizona as well as 10 Latino participants in New York City.

Findings: Quantitative Data Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

The following two tables report the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis of this study.

Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Political Ideology</td>
<td>3123</td>
<td>2.7329</td>
<td>.9899041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1: Age</td>
<td>3302</td>
<td>51.964</td>
<td>18.997</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2: Education Level</td>
<td>3277</td>
<td>4.719</td>
<td>1.634</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3: Income Level</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>5.567</td>
<td>2.753</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for categorical variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV: Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>3017</td>
<td>92.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3269</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV: Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>54.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>45.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3302</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV: Hispanic x Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>3137</td>
<td>95.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3269</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Approval President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>49.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>1521</td>
<td>50.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2994</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Approval Republican Leaders in Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>30.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>69.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2873</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Approval Democratic Leaders in Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>34.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>65.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2956</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Political Party Affiliation: Republican Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>27.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>72.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Political Party Affiliation: Democratic Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>2170</td>
<td>67.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3215</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Registered to Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Yes</td>
<td>2782</td>
<td>85.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) No</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3243</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to using logistic regression, the researcher compared the pre and post means (or averages) of the responses among non-Hispanic respondents, Hispanics, foreign-born Hispanics, and Spanish-speaking Hispanics on all of the seven questions for descriptive purposes, to illustrate the trend among respondents.14

**Logit Model Results**

1. **Approval of President Obama:**

The null hypothesis would predict no change among Hispanic respondents’ attitudes towards the President before and after the passage of SB 1070. However, the

---
14 For this descriptive table with the means pre and post SB 1070, see Table 4.3 in Appendix.
researcher predicted Hispanics to be more likely to approve of President Obama’s performance in the White House after SB 1070 because his administration brought a legal challenge to the Arizona bill; the President spoke openly about Arizona’s state government choosing “the wrong approach,” and how this bill may “breach core values we all care about” (Nicholas, 2010). This means the interaction term would also be significant with a positive coefficient, as Hispanics post the immigration bill would approve of the President’s performance since he challenged and publicly opposed the bill.

<p>| Table 4.4 | LOGIT |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval of President’s Performance</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust standard errors</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.5752 ***</td>
<td>0.1701</td>
<td>1.7775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.0438</td>
<td>0.0889</td>
<td>1.0448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-0.1137</td>
<td>0.3403</td>
<td>0.8925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table 4.4 reports logistic regression results. In the model without control variables, the only significant variable is the Hispanic variable. With 99% confidence at a .01 level, approval of the president’s performance is significantly associated with Hispanic respondents; going from a non-Hispanic to a Hispanic respondent is associated with a [1.775-1] 78% increase in the odds ratio of approving the President’s performance.

This variable continues to be significant when control variables are added, which are all significant. The post variable and the interaction term, however, are not.

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15 Table 4.5, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
The model’s fit reported by the Wald chi-square statistic is significant with and without control variables; both Wald chi-square statistics have p-values less than .01.

2. Approval of Republican Leaders in Congress:

The null hypothesis would predict no change among Hispanic respondents before and after SB 1070, but the researcher predicted a negative effect among Hispanic respondents as this population is more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party, and because the immigration bill was passed and openly supported by a number of Republican Political Leaders.

In the models with and without control variables, the post variable is significant; the Hispanic variable and the interaction term, however, are not. The post variable was significant. With 99% confidence at .01 level, a change from the pre to post period is significantly associated with the approval of Republican Political Leaders’ performance; all things equal, going from pre to post, there is a [1.308-1] 31% increase in the odds ratio of approving Republican Congressional leaders. The Wald-chi square statistic indicates this model’s fit is significant with a p-value of .02.

The control variables of age and education were highly significant in this model, as well. Income was not. The model’s fit with control variables remained significant; the Wald chi-square statistic’s p-value is .0007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Predictors</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>0.1565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post Period</strong></td>
<td>0.2919 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic x Post Period</strong></td>
<td>-0.1496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model significance**

| Wald chi2 (3) | 9.61 |

---

16 Table 4.7, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
3. Approval of Democratic Leaders in Congress:

The null hypothesis would predict no change, but the researcher expected a positive change after SB 1070 reflecting Hispanics’ approval of Democratic Congressional leaders’ performance. This is because the Hispanic population is more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party, and because the political party responsible for passing the Arizona law was the Republican Party. The Obama administration publicly opposed and challenged the Arizona law; Democrat Congressman Raul Grijalva of Yuma County also publicly opposed the law and advocated for federal intervention, which manifested when a federal judge blocked the most controversial components of the bill.

The Hispanic variable in this model is highly significant and shows an association between Hispanic respondents and approval of Democratic leaders in Congress. With 99% confidence (.01 level), there is an expected $[2.116 - 1] 112\%$ increase in the odds ratio of Hispanics approving Democratic Congressional leaders’ performance, as opposed to non-Hispanic respondents.

The post variable was also significant at a .01 level. With 99% confidence, .01 level, respondents in the post period were associated with a 31% increase in the odds ratio of approving the performance of Democratic leaders in Congress.

The interaction term was significant at a .05 level; this, however, was negative. This means Hispanics were less likely than non-Hispanics to approve of Democratic Congressional leaders’ performance after SB 1070, as well as less likely to compared to
Hispanics before SB 1070. The results show a 50% decrease in the odds ratio [.5017-1] of Hispanics approving Democratic Congressional leaders’ performance after the Arizona law was passed as opposed to non-Hispanics and Hispanics before the law. The model fit is significant; the Wald chi-square statistic has a p-value of .000, and remained so when control variables were added.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.8</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Democratic Leaders Congress</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.7495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.2737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-0.6898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

Once control variables were added to the analysis, the Hispanic and post variables are still significant while the interaction term’s p-value changes to .109, which can be considered to be borderline significant; the interaction term is negative. This means that with .90 confidence, at a .10 level, holding all control variables constant, Hispanics after SB 1070 are negatively associated with approving Democratic leaders’ performance as opposed to non-Hispanics and Hispanics before SB 1070, a 43% decrease in the odds ratio [.5701-1].

This finding prompted further analysis. When the analysis of the approval of Democratic leaders in Congress was restricted to the South and West regions and compared foreign-born and native Hispanic respondents, the interaction term, still negative, was significant at a .05 level, which is consistent with the analysis done as a

---

17 Table 4.9, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
whole, and suggests this finding is stronger among foreign-born Hispanics in the South and West regions. This was the case both with and without control variables.\textsuperscript{18} The model without control variables had a Wald chi-square statistic that was not significant; once control variables were added, the p-value of the model’s fit improved to become statistic at a .10 level (p-value .08). All else equal, there is an 86% decrease [0.1396-1] in the odds ratio of foreign-born Hispanics, as opposed to native Hispanics, approving the performance of Democratic political leaders in Congress after SB 1070.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.10</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Democratic Leaders Congress: Foreign-born Hispanics in South and West Regions</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Predictors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Hispanics</td>
<td>-0.1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.7718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-1.6831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance</td>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness of fit</td>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

4. Political Party Affiliation, Republican Party:

The null hypothesis for this measure would have predicted no change in attitudes before and after SB 1070; the researcher expected to find a negative effect among Hispanic respondents after the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070.

In the model without control variables, the Hispanic and post term variables are significant; the interaction term is not. The Hispanic variable reports a negative coefficient, meaning with 99% confidence at a .01 level, going from a non-Hispanic to a Hispanic respondent, there is a [0.4907-1] 51% decrease in the odds ratio of affiliating

\textsuperscript{18} Table 4.11, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
with the Republican Political Party. The post variable, however, is positive; this means that with 99% confidence at a .01 level, going from pre to post period results in a [1.3083-1] 31% increase in the odds ratio of affiliating with the Republican Political Party after SB 1070. These results are also the case when control variables are added to the analysis;\(^{19}\) age and income were the only control variables significant; education was not. Both models with and without control variables have Wald chi-square statistics with p-values below .01.

\[
\text{Table 4.12} \quad \text{LOGIT}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party Affiliation: Republican Political Party</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust standard errors</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.7119</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.2232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.2689</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.0967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>0.5379</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation *\(p<.10\) **\(p<.05\) ***\(p<.01\)*

However, when the researcher restricted the analysis to the high impact areas of the South and West regions, the interaction term became significant at a .10 level with a positive interaction term, both with and without control variables.\(^{20}\) Both models’ Wald chi-square statistics had p-values below .01. This was contrary to what was expected and needed further analysis.

When this analysis included Spanish-speaking Hispanics, the interaction term, both with and without control variables,\(^{21}\) was very significant at a .01 level and negative,

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\(^{19}\) Table 4.13, Model with control variables included in Appendix.

\(^{20}\) Table 4.15, Model with control variables included in Appendix.

\(^{21}\) Table 4.17, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
contrary to the finding examining all Hispanics in the South and West Regions. The Wald chi-square statistics in the two models with and without control variables have p-values below .01. This was also the case when restricting the sample to the South and West regions. This finding suggested variation exists among Hispanics respondents, in this case, by language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.14</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Affiliation: Republican Political Party, South and West Regions</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Predictors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.67212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.27415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>0.93281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance</td>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness of fit</td>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.16</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Affiliation: Republican Political Party, Spanish-Speaking Hispanics</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Predictors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics</td>
<td>-8.5555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.2826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics x Post Period</td>
<td>-14.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance</td>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness of fit</td>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

5. **Political Party Affiliation, Democratic Political Party:**

The null hypothesis of this measure of political attitudes predicted no change among Hispanic respondents before and after the law; however, the researcher predicted
Hispanics to be more likely to identify themselves with the Democratic Party than non-Hispanics; the hypothesis also predicts the interaction term to be significant, meaning Hispanics would be more likely to identify with the Democratic Party after SB 1070 was passed as opposed to non-Hispanics and Hispanics before the law was passed.

Hispanics were positively associated with affiliating with the Democratic Political Party. With 99% confidence (at a .01 level), there is an expected 70.4% increase [1.7039-1] in the odds ratio of Hispanics respondents affiliating with the Democratic Political Party as opposed to non-Hispanic respondents.

The post variable and interaction term, however, were not significant without or with control variables in the analysis. Both models with and without control variables have Wald chi-square statistics with p-values below .01.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.18</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Affiliation: Democratic Political Party</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.5329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.0769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-0.3472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

6. Political Participation: Registered to Vote

The null hypothesis expects no change among Hispanic respondents before and after SB 1070. However, the researcher predicts the Arizona bill to have had a negative

---

22 Table 4.19, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
impact on Hispanic participation, within the Schneider and Ingram framework. This means there would be a negative interaction term.

In this logit model, respondents were asked whether they were registered to vote. The Hispanic variable is significant at a .01 level with a p-value of .000, with a negative coefficient. This means going from non-Hispanic to Hispanic respondents, with 99% confidence there is an expected decrease \([0.02597-1]\) of 74% in the odds ratio of being registered voters.

The interaction term is significant at a .05 level with a positive coefficient. Once control variables are added to the analysis, the interaction remains significant at a .10 level with a p-value of .07.\(^{23}\) With 99% confidence at a .10 level, holding all control variables constant, there is a 94% \([1.9411-1]\) increase in the odds ratio of Hispanics, as opposed to non-Hispanics being registered voters after SB 1070, as well as Hispanics before SB 1070.

Both models with and without control variables have Wald chi-square statistics with p-values below .01.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.20</th>
<th>LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Registered to Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-1.3482 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>-0.0177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>0.7343 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2 (3)</td>
<td>72.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * \(p<.10\) ** \(p<.05\) *** \(p<.01\)

\(^{23}\) Table 4.21, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
7. **Political Ideology, Very Conservative to Very Liberal:**

The null hypothesis for this measure would predict SB 1070 had no effect on Hispanic respondents’ political ideology. The researcher, however, expected a positive change.

This model used ordinary least squares regression, as opposed to earlier logit models, since respondents were able to answer on a five-point scale. The Hispanic variable is significant in the model without control variables at a .05 level with a coefficient of .16. When control variables are added to the model, however, the Hispanic variable is no longer significant. The three control variables of age, education, and income are highly significant.

Even when restricting the sample by region, age, and income, interaction terms are not significant in any of the analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.22</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ideology:</strong> Very Conservative to Very Liberal</td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.1606 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Period</td>
<td>0.0675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-0.0351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F(3, 3106)</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;F</td>
<td>.0607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

**Limitations of Quantitative Analysis**

24 Table 4.23, Model with control variables included in Appendix.
Although the advantage of using this data is that it is nationally representative, a limitation is that 252 out of 3302 respondents are Hispanic, which is a small percentage of the sample.

The researcher also restricted each analysis by age and income to compare responses since these are main determinants of political attitudes and behavior. Analyses were run to look at respondents strictly between the ages of 18 and 50, but did not produce additional findings. The sample was also restricted by income to only include respondents below the median line in the analysis; this also did not produce substantially different results.

Even when restricting analysis to the South and West geographical regions, which include the most Hispanic respondents in the survey, findings did not include significant interaction terms, except for two measures: the affiliation with the Republican Political Party and being a registered voter.

Findings from the quantitative analysis indicate, despite the researcher’s hypothesis of a national shift in attitudes due to the number of states following the Arizona trend, interaction terms regarding attitudes towards the President, political leaders in Congress, and political ideology are not significant. What was strongest at the national level and reinforced by the subsample of the West and South geographical regions is that Hispanics were more likely to become registered voters after SB 1070, indicating a positive change throughout the country, particularly in the West and South regions, in mobilization or a step forward in becoming more politically active. This does not support the hypothesis of political withdrawal as a result of a degenerative policy, so further study is needed to understand whether SB 1070 triggered the causal process.
predicted by Schneider and Ingram and if other factors might have contributed to the increase of Hispanics registering to vote after SB 1070.

Furthermore, although SB 1070 may not be a strong national movement as hypothesized, the negative interaction term of the approval of Democratic political leaders in Congress alludes to changes in political attitudes in Hispanics after SB 1070. Foreign-born Hispanics in the South and West regions reinforced this finding of a change in approval (a decrease) of Democratic Political leaders. However, the finding of a positive interaction term in affiliating with the Republican Party after SB 1070 in the South and West regions was unexpected; the opposite was found when the researcher focused on Spanish-speaking Hispanics. This presents the possibility the Hispanic population may have been affected by SB 1070 differently based on certain criteria, such as foreign-born or native and language (which also brings up generation status since English proficiency is correlated with time in the U.S., and studies show Hispanics’ English proficiency increases by generation).

The quantitative analysis uses the question of voter registration as a measure of political participation. However, there are other participation methods, such as attending public meetings, contributing to a local campaign, participating in local community boards or school districts, signing petitions, etc. These other methods are not possible to study with this existing dataset, so the qualitative data collection will emphasize political participation is defined beyond electoral voting. The researcher can probe further when interviewing Hispanic individuals who do not have the option to register to vote due to their immigration status; it may be the case this subsample of Hispanics are less active or less interested in voting, but politically active through other venues.
A further limitation of the quantitative analysis is the challenge of pinpointing the effects of Arizona’s immigration law. The two Political Surveys used in this analysis were from March and June of 2010. In between this time period, Obama’s health care bill, a very politically divided issue, was passed; headlines and media in May 2010 also included heated debate and discussion on the “Ground Zero Mosque;” and, between April 20th through July 15th, the Gulf Oil disaster was also heavily covered by the media, some media questioning President Obama’s ability to manage the crisis. These national political issues, like SB 1070, were heavily covered by the media and could have, potentially, interfered with the quantitative results and explain both some of the non-findings and findings.

Political distrust is also a limitation when using survey data to study the Hispanic population; for example, about 50% of Hispanics in San Luis, Arizona were reluctant to complete their 2010 Census, due to fear and distrust in government after SB 1070 (see qualitative findings, community leader in San Luis, AZ, page 121). This suggests a segment of the Hispanic population would be more unlikely to participate in surveys, particularly those asking about government performance; this means quantitative survey data can be skewed when analyzing the Hispanic population. This reluctance by a particular subgroup of the Hispanic population to participate in surveys may partially explain why the survey response rate declined from March 2010 to June 2010. Consideration of these issues addresses the methodological interpretation of why this analysis could have resulted in non-findings.

Moreover, a large portion of the Latino population is unable to become registered voters, due to permanent residency or undocumented status; it is unknown if these
Hispanic respondents took some sort of political action following SB 1070. The researcher probed while collecting qualitative data to attempt to provide insight on this.

Existing theoretical approaches predict both more and less Hispanic mobilization after the Arizona’s SB 1070; the exact impact of the law is still unclear. While being a registered voter does not reflect actual voter turnout, it is a reflection of whether respondents are aware of voting requirements and, to some degree, politically active.

In order to address the limitations of the quantitative analysis, the research design was deliberately meant to include qualitative data collection.

**Table 4.24 Summary Quantitative Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative interaction terms for:</th>
<th>Positive interaction terms for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Democratic Political Leaders in Congress</td>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics: Affiliating with Republican Political Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Joining South and West geographical regions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive interaction terms for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affiliating with Republican Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative interaction terms for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Hispanics’ Approval of Democratic Political Leaders in Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics: Affiliating with Republican Political Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

The qualitative data analysis began with written transcriptions done by verbatim of each interview. Transcripts were read twice to identify key themes and narratives that address this study’s purpose. In-depth interviews were audio recorded, completely transcribed, and, if conducted in Spanish, translated to English. Each participant chose to participate in either English or Spanish. Transcripts contain a note indicating which language the original interview was done in.
The researcher used Crabtree and Miller’s “Five steps of Qualitative Interpretation,” (1999), which include describing, organizing, connecting, corroborating, and representing. This process is not linear or sequential, but is presented by Crabtree and Miller as an “overlapping, interweaving” process (1999). As the researcher actively went through transcripts, the transcripts were organized by state, distinguishing between Arizona and New York participants, by foreign-born and native-born; data was then reorganized by foreign-born status, or if the participant was a permanent resident or naturalized citizen. If the participant was a native of the U.S, what generation was he or she? Reorganizing the data this way was to help answer the research question, as there were key themes and differences based on status and generation on Hispanic participation and political attitudes. In order to connect the data to help answer the research question, the researcher began to categorize data; a list was made of emerging patterns and themes. During the interview process, participants were regularly asked to verify the interpretation of data by the researcher; this is documented in the transcripts, as it was audio recorded. At the moment the original data was given, the researcher would paraphrase the data to the participant and ask if the interpretation was correct and if the researcher understood correctly; participants would either agree or elaborate for the researcher.

**Qualitative Data Propositions**

*Proposition 1:* Senate bill 1070 is a degenerative policy design exists. Latinos are construed and targeted as a “deviant” population, and SB 1070 results in a negative impact on Latino political participation patterns.

*Proposition 2:* Latinos are more targeted and socially construed in a negative manner in Arizona, so variation in Latino political attitudes and participation will result between Latino participants in Arizona and New York.
Qualitative Data Findings: Arizona

Through the steps of qualitative interpretation, the researcher noticed key themes and differences and reorganized by foreign-born and native participants. Foreign-born were then broken into two groups by immigration status: permanent resident or naturalized citizen. Native participants were then reorganized by generation status, first or second generation.

Foreign-born Participants of Arizona:

Nine participants from Arizona in the study were born in Mexico. These participants shared their experience in immigrating to the U.S. Two participants were children of Bracero Workers, the federal government program that played an active role in the immigration of 4.5 million laborers from Mexico (Andreas, 2000). Four other participants shared their experience of living in Arizona for a period of time as undocumented individuals. One participant shared the experience of being apprehended by immigration officials, deported, then returning by crossing over the hills on the border with California. The four that were undocumented at one point, however, originally entered the U.S. with valid visas and were visa overstayers. All four were migrant workers for a number of years. Three of the four became eligible for legal status during the national amnesty of the Reagan Administration in the late 1980s. Of these three, one has become a naturalized citizen. This particular participant was also the most active in the community and regularly promotes civic engagement throughout Yuma County. The five participants that were born in Mexico and are now naturalized citizens all have obtained college degrees and are very active in community-based organizations to
promote civic participation among Latinos. This group includes men and women between the ages of 20 to 58.

Table 4.25 Foreign-Born Participants in Arizona:
Nine Participants Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Immigration Status</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Male: 6| Permanent Resident: 2  
Naturalized Citizen: 4 | College: 3  
No College: 3 | 20-29: 0  
30-39: 1  
40-49: 1  
50-59: 4 |
| Female: 3| Permanent Resident: 1  
Naturalized Citizen: 2 | College: 2  
No College: 1 | 20-29: 1  
30-39: 1  
40-49: 1  
50-59: 0 |

*Four of these participants shared during interview they had been undocumented for a certain period of time in the U.S.

Native-born Participants of Arizona

Nine participants from Arizona in the study were born in the U.S. Five individuals are first generation, meaning their parents emigrated from Mexico, and they are the first in their families to be born in the U.S., and three participants were second generation, meaning their parents were the first in their family’s history to be born in the U.S. One participant is a third generation Hispanic. Of these nine, six have earned college degrees. This group also includes men and women within an age range of 25 to 64.

Table 4.26 Native Participants in Arizona:
Nine Participants Total (Born U.S. Citizen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Generation in U.S.</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Male: 5| First Generation: 3  
Second Generation: 1  
Third Generation: 1 | College: 2  
No College: 2 | 20-29: 2  
30-39: 0  
40-49: 1  
50-59: 1  
60-69: 1 |
| Female: 4| First Generation: 2  
Second Generation: 2 | College: 3  
No College: 1 | 20-29: 1  
30-39: 1  
40-49: 2  
50-59: 0 |
**Key Themes of Qualitative Data Analysis from Arizona**

Key themes that surfaced through the qualitative data analysis include attitudes towards the federal government, the Obama Administration, and Congressional leaders; the effect of SB 1070 on Latino political participation (including political party affiliation); narratives then discussed the effect of SB 1070 in the form of discrimination against Latinos, including discrimination based on language; attitudes towards the state government and Governor Brewer; Latino representation; social constructions manipulated and perpetuated by the State of Arizona; symbolic messages participants received and internalized from government and public entities; the securitization of the border; and the effect of SB 1070 on perceptions towards public entities, government efficacy, and trust in government.

When comparing the perspectives of foreign-born and native participants on SB 1070, the main differences in the data point to narratives on discrimination, discrimination based on language, and attitudes towards the Obama Administration. Key similarities include attitudes towards the state government; attitudes on Latino representation; the negative social constructions of the border, the immigrant, and the Latino portrayed by the state and the media and justified by the guise of security and the economy; the symbolic messages sent by the state; the merging of local law enforcement with immigration officials; and the deepened distrust in public entities.

This section is organized as follows: the analysis begins with the themes that are common to both the quantitative and the qualitative data, then proceeds to the themes that surfaced from the interviews that provide variation from the quantitative analysis. This is
meant to emphasize the link between the findings common to the two strands of data and to allow for a more integrated approach and explanation.

*Attitudes towards the Obama Administration*

Foreign-born and native participants in Arizona diverged along their attitudes towards the Obama administration. Four of nine foreign-born participants raised the issue the President had not done enough to oppose SB 1070 and had failed at the many promises he made to the Latino population while running for office in 2008, while only two out of nine native participants raised the same issues. Of the foreign-born, all participants with a permanent resident status shared this frustration with the administration. Respondents that discussed this theme indicated President Obama had “not done enough,” “done the bare minimum,” left them “disappointed” and “out in the cold” in the response to SB 1070, and added this demonstrated how the Latino population battling oppression in Arizona was not a priority to the President. Respondents also mentioned Obama’s “promises” of immigration reform within his first year as President, indicated they had genuinely felt hopeful of positive change, but ultimately decided those promises had been broken. “The Latino community is, to some degree, disenchanted with the Obama administration; at a national level, people have been disillusioned because he promised he would work with immigration issues in his first year, and that did not happen.”

Also regarding the Obama administration, foreign-born participants discussed more often that it is under this administration “record number of deportations” and “tougher laws” have taken place. Six of nine foreign-born participants discussed the record number of deportations that have happened under Obama’s watch, while three of
the nine native participants brought up this issue. These particular respondents expressed frustration as they affiliated primarily with the Democratic Political Party, which they thought would now “make strides in immigration policy and reform.” However, participants expressed frustration that the President had not put an end to the “circus” going on in Arizona, the racial profiling, and even though a federal judge had challenged certain aspects of the bill, this was considered “not enough.”

**Attitudes towards Congress**

Five foreign-born participants, however, elaborated that although President Obama and his administration had not been able to do much regarding immigration reform, they were conscious, “it is not completely due to him. We know that is due to Congress, which is right now dominated by Republicans, who do not want immigration reform and tend to be more conservative people. They are threatened that by enacting some form of reform, they will lose their power and status; they will be lost in the ‘invasion’ of Mexicans.”

Five native participants and two foreign-born participants also discussed the shift in their feelings about Congressional leaders. Participants discussed in particular Congressman Raul Grijalva, Democrat, who although was publicly against SB 1070 and was responsible for calling a national boycott against Arizona until it removed SB 1070, participants still felt disillusioned with this representative. Participants shared that although Yuma County was in his district, Grijalva had not visited Yuma County, but instead “spends all his time in Tucson. Who elected him to office? Tucson. He lost Yuma County. It gave me such fury because he had to get in here, instead of mailing us his campaign slogan.” These participants felt as if Yuma County, which includes both cities
of Yuma and San Luis, was “not important,” “forgotten,” “neglected,” “there is a feeling of emptiness, a bleak picture.”

Although participants mentioned Russell Pearce as the main person responsible for crafting SB 1070 in Arizona, there was disappointment among participants with their elected officials in Congress for not intervening on their behalf after the state passed SB 1070. “The bill really changed what I thought about congressmen. It made me very disappointed to see the state pass policies that are prejudiced and racist without much action from the representatives we elect to represent us nationally. There was a day where you looked up to congressmen, but not anymore.” Participants also reported feeling disappointed after the inability of political leaders to work together across party lines for the well being of the country; instead, “it’s all just a bunch of bickering.”

**Effects of SB 1070 on Political Attitudes & Participation**

Individual participants were asked to link SB 1070 to their political attitudes and participation. Previous research on the national 2006 immigration rallies found that solidarity among Latinos led to a large and strong mobilization effort, so participants were asked about community events, solidarity between Latinos in response to SB 1070, and were also reminded that political participation describes a number of political activities, not just voting.

**“No Big Reaction in Yuma, San Luis”**

“Senate bill 1070 did not result in a movement of Latinos here,” one participant said. At both interview sites of Yuma and San Luis, participants reported, “There was not a big reaction here.” Participants explained that although the Latino population is the
majority in both cities, there were no community events to voice opposition to SB 1070. Several respondents reported witnessing small demonstrations that took place on a busy intersection of Yuma (mainly a couple individuals with signs and posters), but aside from that, no citywide events were held in Yuma or San Luis to protest SB 1070.

Participants from San Luis and Yuma ultimately reported no “big reaction” and no mobilization in either city to express opposition to the law.

*Lack of Latino Solidarity*

Six participants from the two sites of Yuma and San Luis also reported “nobody came together; nobody united.” Four participants explained there is not a strong network between foreign-born and native Hispanics along the southern Arizona border. “There is no solidarity; there is no ‘Latino community’ because we are divided by those that are foreign-born and immigrants and those that are born in the U.S., those that are first and second generation, and so forth.” These four participants from the two sites also explained, “Those that are born in the U.S. think this doesn’t affect them, but it does! It affects all of us, as a people.” Of these four participants, two are foreign-born and two are natives. A different participant, a second-generation U.S. citizen, illustrated this particular approach by saying the following during the interview, “SB 1070 doesn’t affect me. There is no impact for me. It didn’t hit home, personally. It will not affect my daily life.”

Two participants in this study did speak about Latino solidarity as a result of 1070; however, this was in city of Phoenix. One participant experienced this at the neighborhood level, “The neighborhood I live in, predominately Latinos, came together after SB 1070 and started having meetings. People were scared to leave their homes, to
go to the grocery store, so we began to meet to discuss what was true, what was completely false, and what was developing regarding SB 1070; we figured the law was already passed, so we might as well deal with it and try to take care of each other.”

Another participant spoke of Latino solidarity between native and recent Mexican immigrants, “SB 1070 had the effect of looking at the immigrant and thinking they are like us, they crossed the border like us, maybe they don’t have papers but they are primos, compadres, amigos, [cousins, friends], and it woke up our community and brought us together thinking, we don’t have to tolerate this, this is wrong.” While respondents in the cities of Yuma and San Luis indicated no coming together, respondents from the city of Phoenix talked about more unity and action.

**Latino Participation: Boost in Phoenix, Blow in Yuma**

Two participants from Yuma predicted more participation in the community and an increase in the number of Hispanic registered voters due to SB 1070. “I did notice SB 1070 shook up people who hadn’t participated before the bill,” one participant said. Another participant explained that although voting may not be a form of participation widely used in the cities of Yuma and San Luis, “An easier form of participation is to gather in a group, demonstrate, or march; this is an immediate form of participation Latinos can engage in, and they find it less intimidating because they don’t have to be at a certain level of English proficiency, and they can feel safe in the crowd. The problem is a lot of Latinos are not registered to vote and don’t know how to engage in more formal methods, so community-based mobilizing is a more likely way the cities of Yuma and San Luis will participate in. In my experience, I’ve noticed Latinos here are more open and would be more comfortable with these methods than others.”
One participant speaking on behalf of a community-based organization in Phoenix also concurred SB 1070 had and would continue to have a positive impact on Latino participation. “Our numbers [in elections] have gone up since SB 1070, and the numbers of Latinos registering to vote really went up. There was a big difference in turnout at community events before and after 1070; I just attended a fundraiser for the DREAM Act student, and it was packed, that would have not occurred before 1070. You will also see a lot more community organizations, like us, going out to the streets educating the public.” The participant added, “There have been huge demonstrations. We shut down the city a couple of times. When 1070 hit, students did walkouts; kids marched to the Capitol. I was in awe, wow. Hundreds of thousands of people participated.”

This participant speaking on behalf of La Raza Development Fund made several key points about Latino participation. “I think the turnout in Arizona will be high [in the November 2012 election] because of the anger from the 1070 bill. I predict the numbers will be higher for Latinos in Arizona than Latinos in other states. However, there is a different dynamic within Arizona. In the border cities, that’s a whole different political climate. There is probably more disenchantment there. In an urban city, there are more local organizations, more support, and to some degree, a younger generation of Latinos that are at the universities.” Disenchantment with democracy, with government, the feeling that “Latinos do not matter to government” are all themes that arose throughout this study. The people of Yuma and San Luis, especially, feel “left out in the cold,” “forgotten,” “neglected.” This affects what they predict for Latino participation in Yuma and San Luis. In addition, there is a community college that serves these two communities, but not a four-year institution of higher education. Two participants
described this local college as the “maquinadora,” or the factory, because they enroll students for four years, which is the most a student can receive federal financial aid at a community college, then send them off, most without completing an Associate’s degree, “probably a certificate in something they won’t even use.” The presence of universities, as the community-based organization in Phoenix noted, makes a difference in the environment, the political climate, and the Latino perspective on political involvement.

Four participants from Yuma and San Luis, three foreign and one first generation citizen, predicted less Latino political participation as a result of SB 1070. “The Latinos I observe are disheartened after SB 1070, they are separated, withdrawn, they don’t believe in participation methods, and they think it’s a waste of time.” Another added, “The Latinos here are not motivated to participate; they feel angry and resentful; they feel there is no point to participating because it won’t make any difference.” Another participant added, “The majority of Latinos in this city lost the desire to participate because they are angry, hurt, and resentful. There is a history of low Latino turnout already, so now that they think it is useless, I predict an even lower turnout.” A last prediction of lower participation was from a native born participant in Phoenix, “My friends chained themselves to a university in Tempe, I went with them to a bunch of events. I saw how much they did. After everything people did, it still didn’t matter, and the law was still passed. Our participation makes no difference. I am done participating.”

One participant said, “The only type of participation that matters is voting. Marches, demonstrations, community events—who cares? What matters is whom you have in office. By the time policies are proposed, by that time it is already too late to organize.”
Another participant, however, predicted an increase in the number of permanent residents applying for naturalization as a result of SB 1070. The decision to naturalize is a political one, as previous research by Pantoja et al (2001) demonstrates.

**Green Card Status**

Six participants also specifically discussed Latinos with green cards, “Those that are not yet naturalized are scared and will not participate in anything. They can’t vote, and they won’t come out to speak out in public.” Three participants who hold green cards themselves specifically said they had to be “cautious” about “staying out of trouble” and not do anything that may jeopardize their application for naturalization. Two participants added, “There is no point in attending public meetings; they don’t care about what people like me have to say.” One added that since the town is small, attending a public meeting or forum to voice an opinion would probably lead to retaliation from the local authorities since “everyone knows each other.”

**Political Party Affiliation**

Four participants reported that as a result of SB 1070, they no longer affiliate themselves with any political party. “I already knew about the Republican Party, but now, this bill has made me think carefully about my own political party, and I’ve decided to no longer call myself a Democrat.”

The following themes expand from the topics common to both the quantitative and qualitative strands of data. The researcher also distinguishes along which themes foreign-born and native Latinos diverge and converge the most, as variation within the group exists by this and other criteria.

** Discrimination Narratives**
Seven of the nine foreign-born participants shared personal experiences in which they were either stopped by a local law enforcement officer or Border Patrol officer without a traffic violation or experienced being pulled aside upon crossing the international border for two additional private inspections (following the initial encounter with the agent). These individual narratives were responses to the effects of SB 1070 and what participants offered as justification to using the term “discrimination.” Of the native participants, none shared similar experiences. This may account for the stark difference to the question “Did SB 1070 make you feel discriminated against?” Eight of the nine foreign-born participants answered yes, while three of the nine native participants answered yes. An additional two native participants explained that while they personally didn’t feel discriminated against because the color of their skin was fair and they didn’t feel they matched the stereotypical profile of people who would be questioned the most as a result of 1070, they did feel the bill was discriminating because other members of their families did not share the same skin tone or speak English as they did. These two participants explained they did not personally feel discriminated against, but when they thought about how the bill could potentially impact family members of darker skin or of limited English speaking ability, then they felt discriminated against by SB 1070.

**Discrimination based on Language**

Language was brought up by all but one of the foreign-born participants. Participants shared instances in which they have had negative experiences on account of their English proficiency. Eight of the nine foreign-born participants discussed language as a reason for discrimination in Arizona, narrating experiences in which they had been cast aside for their accent while speaking English, instances in which people assumed
they didn’t know or understand English based on their appearance, identified language barriers as incredibly challenging for immigrants and a potential factor affecting community involvement and participation, and discussed how their Spanish names automatically enrolled them in “ESL” courses, or English as a Second Language, an assumption that made them angry because it occurred as if it was an automatic reflex. The foreign-born participants, as well as two of the native participants, referenced a Supreme Court case unfolding during the same time of data collection that ultimately decided Alejandrina Cabrera of San Luis, Arizona was not English proficient enough to run for a spot on the City Council. Participants explained Cabrera had been arbitrarily pointed out as “not qualified” to run for City Council, yet most of the residents of San Luis either have the same English proficiency or the same education level as her. Respondents discussed their frustration explaining Cabrera is a graduate of a local high school in Yuma County, and that it is not uncommon for a high school student to graduate without learning the language. “Why is the person targeted as not good enough, and not the school or the education system; now who will represent us?” Another participant said, “Now, just wait, new laws will be written soon to require English tests for anyone who wants to hold a public office. Instead of getting at the real issues on the quality of education, or that the Hispanics here in Yuma County are forgotten and neglected, now they [state government] are going to tell us we’re not qualified or good enough to be a part of the political arena.” Another participant added that this case was an extension of SB 1070, a way to discriminate and target foreigners, and called it Arizona’s present “English-Only” effort, another way “for them [Caucasians] to make a joke of us.” Participants also brought up the use of rhetoric as demeaning; many brought
up the term “illegal alien” and how the use of this term was offensive. In addition, participants cited examples of jokes on the radio or within their workplace, “it’s always a taco joke, or it’s always ‘beaner this, beaner that,’” which are ways that demonstrate “the comfort levels here with racism,” one participant said.

**Attitudes towards State Government and Governor Jan Brewer**

The theme strongest between foreign-born and native participants in Arizona were mainly attitudes directed at the state government and Governor Jan Brewer. Only two participants of this study did not mention Governor Brewer, two native participants, while the rest of the participants in the study explained SB 1070 had an impact on their perception of the state government. Participants indicated SB 1070 had caused a shift in their attitude towards the state, mainly Governor Jan Brewer. Participants discussed at length the damage Governor Brewer was doing to the state and its residents; also discussed was that Brewer was “not qualified” for the position as governor, but was made governor when Janet Napolitano, the previous Democratic Governor, was headhunted by the Department of Homeland Security. One participant discussed the development of SB 1070; “the trigger was the changes occurring to the global economy. Now Anglo-Saxons are not as easily middle class; the gap is becoming wider between different social classes. This was a political opportunity for Brewer that fell from the sky; the economy suffers, she blames the voiceless, and becomes the hero, winning her a re-election term.” The participant adds how this was not based on an economic analysis or on facts, but on lies that hurt society and the economy. Another participant shared “what Governor Brewer did was a slap in the face, an insult, a clear message we are not wanted here.” Another shared the effect of SB 1070 was mainly how “it pulled the shades and showed the state’s
true colors.” Respondents’ views on Governor Brewer included how she was “anti-Hispanic,” “anti-Latino,” “anti-diversity,” “anti-immigrant” with no “empathy” for people who “just want to work,” “racist,” “ignorant,” and “inhumane.” Because respondents perceived her as “opposing the Hispanic people,” many used the terms “offended,” “disappointed,” and “disillusioned” to describe the shift in attitude they had towards their state government.

Respondents shared Arizona already had a history of racism, but indicated the passage of SB 1070 made the environment considerably worse, and was responsible for a decline in trust and faith in the state of Arizona. All but two respondents in this study stated SB 1070 was responsible for a change in their attitude towards the state government and brought up a number of issues.

One issue is that Brewer was abusing the racism that already exists in Arizona to validate and perpetuate racism and division between Hispanics and Caucasians, as well as an ethnic divide between foreign-born and native Hispanics because after SB 1070, second and subsequent generation Hispanics were “jumping on the bandwagon” and repeating “prejudiced rhetoric.” Another theme that came to surface was that Governor Brewer “had not taken the time to get to know us, our culture, our values,” which made respondents reaffirm the statement she was unqualified for the role of governor as this is a responsibility to the state, not just the “white and conservative population.”

Respondents also believed Governor Brewer used the poor economy and the unemployment rate as an excuse to pass the bill, “when the economy crashed, it empowered Governor Brewer to attack the undocumented, but SB 1070 was a way to legally attack us, not just the undocumented, but all of us, people like myself, too.”
Respondents also believed the poor economy was “a mere excuse,” but had nothing to do with the passage of SB 1070 as they cited several ways in which the bill has actually had a negative economic impact on the different cities and state, “conferences, concerts, events were canceled right away as a result of SB 1070; the boycotts are not only within the U.S., but are international as well.” The city of Phoenix alone calculated about a $90 million loss due to boycotts of SB 1070, and shopping along border cities also experienced a drop in retail sales of about 40% (Warren, 2010). “The people used to travel from Mexico to shop here; that would help our economy. Now they don’t come anymore,” two participants said.

Participants also discussed how “Brewer wanted to ride the wave of existing anti-immigrant sentiment and pass as much oppressing legislation as possible during her term.” Because of the history of racism in Arizona, participants believe Brewer abused this sentiment to not only pass the bill, but also implement the bill. “The bill as it is written leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which is necessary for its implementation, and because people have their own biases and prejudices, their use of discretion is why it is possible to violate civil rights and engage in racial profiling.” Another participant mentioned SB 1070 is “forcing” public state entities “to become immigration officers, which they were not trained to do.” All foreign-born participants and eight of the nine native participants discussed “racial profiling” and their concern that authorities would abuse the discretion allocated to them by the state. Participants discussed how arbitrary this implementation could be because there is “no scientific way to distinguish between the documented and the undocumented person; clearly, there are underlying assumptions in order to implement this bill.” While discussing the possibility of racial profiling as a
result of SB 1070, all of the foreign-born participants and five of the eight native participants used the word “humanity” or “inhumane.” Participants asked, “Where is the humanity in all of this?” or discussed how “we are losing our humanitarian perspective,” becoming inhumane, and how “we are going back in time” in regards to civil rights because now “you are guilty until you prove you are innocent.” Senate Bill 1070 has shifted from assuming one is innocent until proven guilty to the opposite. Participants said, “You are treated like if you’re guilty, like if you’re a criminal, not like a human being.”

Seven of the nine foreign-born and six of the nine native participants also discussed Sheriff Arpaio of Maricopa County after discussing Governor Brewer. Arpaio faces multiple lawsuits and is under investigation due to abuse of power and racial profiling. Participants discussed Arpaio’s behavior as racist, inhumane, abusive, and were angry he is still allowed to remain in office in Maricopa County after the “circus” he is running. “There were certain types of people and vendors he was targeting,” one participant said, “He was going to the fruit and paleta [popsicle] vendors, which are Mexican; he wasn’t questioning the hot dog vendor. Look at who he is stopping and you will see a clear pattern.” Another participant added, “There was some horrible, horrible, horrible destruction of the families that were undocumented on account of Sheriff Arpaio, he was breaking up families, sending mothers and fathers away, the kids don’t know what’s going on, a lot of damage.”

Four participants, two foreign-born and two natives, also spoke about the role of Russell Pearce, the state senator who was credited for formulating and pushing SB 1070 in the state of Arizona. Participants emphasized, “It was not his idea, that idea was being
promoted nationally by certain groups. He played a role in passing this law in Arizona.” Participants spoke about Pearce in a similar way to Governor Brewer and Sheriff Arpaio, as “anti-Latino.” There was a sense of relief after Pearce was “recalled and voted out of office,” but participants still felt, overall, pessimistic about their state government.

One participant also mentioned Russ Jones, representative of Yuma County in the state legislature that voted in favor of SB 1070, describing this as an act of “betrayal,” and another example of how “state elected officials are disconnected from the people they serve.”

**Representation**

Eight of the nine foreign-born participants and seven of the nine native participants also discussed at length issues regarding representation throughout their interviews. Participants across a number of different employments brought up that in their respective organization, the top levels of the hierarchy were predominately white while the bottom levels were mainly Hispanic. “How is it that in a public organization that serves a largely Hispanic population, there are no Hispanics within top levels of administration?” Participants discussed at length how this impacted the culture and norms not only of the organization, but also of the society and the city. “When SB 1070 was passed, it divided the workplace, us and them, Hispanics and Caucasians. They began to treat us differently, with more hostility,” one participant shared. Another participant said, “The bill created a division between us and them, Hispanics and white people. That is still present. It is still us and them. The issue of SB 1070 was never to be discussed [at this public state entity]; I thought it very relevant given that such a high percentage of who we serve are Hispanics, but you could sense the discomfort. It was a
taboo issue to discuss, so we have to avoid the topic. We only talk about the bill and how we feel in our little caves, with other Hispanics.” Another participant said, “Because the top of the organization is white, we have to be ‘well-behaved,’ which means we aren’t able to be make our own stance on the issue public.” A different participant expressed frustration because, despite wanting to mobilize others in Yuma to express protest, it was very risky behavior should the workplace find out, “I should have been out there, but I can’t lose my job.” Another participant said, “There was not much of a public display here against SB 1070 because if you have a white boss, then you are scared to lose your job.”

Participants also discussed representation in government. “What an irony and a paradox that when SB 1070 was put up for a vote at the state legislature, our Hispanic representative didn’t attend to vote against it.” Participants discussed Hispanic representation in government as lacking and attributed this poor representation as a reason to why bills like SB 1070 are passed. “We need more representation at the state level,” but participants also mentioned that although Latinos are large in numbers, they are not large in power because of low political involvement and low turnout to vote candidates in office. “We are poorly represented, but how are we going to be able to have someone who looks like us, who will represent us, who will fight for us at the state level if we don’t come together and vote them into office? We are discriminated against because, although our population grows, we are still a minority in our minds; we are still a minority in education.” A different participant added to this, “We have to get ourselves out of this mindset, that we are a minority. It is a challenge to look beyond the racism, but that is our biggest challenge.”
Eight of the nine foreign-born participants and five of the nine native participants discussed lack of leadership as a determinant of poor representation and poor mobilization among Hispanics. These participants mentioned Cesar Chavez and how this movement had fought and pushed forward in protecting the civil rights of the Latino people. Participants conceded, “There is no current leader of the Latino people.”

Two of the participants, both native, discussed the “dichotomy between white and black,” and how the U.S. viewed diversity mainly in terms of the colors white and black. “Well, I am not white nor black; I’m brown.” These two participants discussed that the, perhaps unforeseen, consequence of concentrating between white and black is that “everything else in between is invisible,” referring to the belief Hispanics have largely been excluded or remained invisible, out of sight, for a large part of history. Another participant added, “It was until our numbers became large that other groups began to notice us and perceive us as a threat.”

**Social Constructions By The State of Arizona**

Participants focused on the state government administration and discussed at length matters that had been socially constructed by the state. Participants in this study discussed the “image portrayal” the state executed and perpetuated to disproportionately impact Hispanics in the state. A theme that surfaced was the negative image portrayal of the border. “The border is the problem,” one participant said, “but we know that half of the people who are living here undocumented are visa overstayers and did not come in illegally through the border, yet this is the image they [government] want to portray.” Of the study’s participants, all but two indicated the border is a source used to constantly portray negative images. Participants cited crime and drugs as what is most commonly
associated with the border, which they believed is due to the own work of the state itself, and said, “We are not criminals. We are not drug dealers.” One participant even said, “I am not a terrorist; why are you stopping me when I am crossing the border on foot with no belongings to show I am not carrying, much less smuggling, anything. The terrorists are not here!”

Participants also stated they took offense to the “welfare myth,” or the belief that immigrants come to the U.S. to exploit social programs and live off welfare programs. “It is not true. People that come here just want to work. They are the ones way in the background, they are silent, they don’t speak out, they work like dogs, they don’t try to access welfare programs because they cannot access those, but nobody sees that. The amount of bureaucracy you must go through to access a welfare program is substantial, and people that are here legally have a hard time producing all that paperwork; an undocumented person would not go there.”

All but two of the participants in this study discussed another theme, “Why is there no effort to build a positive image of our border?” Participants discussed how society thinks of migrant workers with condescension for having a “low” type of job, and asked why society takes this attitude towards migrant workers when these workers, predominately immigrants from Mexico, are responsible for an invaluable agricultural contribution to the U.S. “It is a service to this country what migrant workers do in the fields to be able to allow fresh produce in homes.” Another participant said, “Instead of emphasizing on the negative, the welfare, the unintelligent Mexicans, the drugs and criminals, why not highlight the positive? The agriculture business is possible because of the laborers, most of them Mexican immigrants that work in the fields. And if people
think it is an easy job, just ask Georgia because their crops began to rot when they passed a similar immigration law to 1070.” A news report also reported tomatoes rotting in Alabama, where similar legislation was also passed. “If you go out in the fields, they are all Latinos; you would not find a single white person.” All but two participants said Latinos, especially of Mexican descent, pay taxes, “just want to work,” are hard working, and contribute to the economy, but that is never showcased. Instead, “we are criminals. Yes, there will be a bad person that is a Mexican immigrant, but that is the exception,” one participant said, “and crime is everywhere. And those that are more involved in criminal activities are actually those that have been here for some time, that get broken along the way, but it is the assimilated ones that I see go bad, not the Mexican immigrant, not the first generation or the second generation.” Three participants mentioned that current migrant workers who use workers permits as a result of SB 1070 don’t pay the same in taxes like previous workers did, albeit by using someone else’s social security number. They reinforced the government didn’t lose money before SB 1070 because those individuals never collected any tax returns. A different one said, “The workers easily became the target. We began to hear the reason our state economy is so horrible is because ‘the undocumented are sucking out our tax dollars.’ That is not true. Yes, there may be one undocumented person somewhere taking advantage of the system, but it’s totally not true. They can’t collect their social security, they can’t collect their taxes, they leave money in the pot.”

Participants also expressed their discontentment with the state for “creating an attitude that this [SB 1070] was actually necessary!” All but three participants (three native born) brought up the theme of “safety” and how the state justified its actions as a
price to pay for “the sake of safety.” However, participants indicated, “This isn’t because you [the state of Arizona] are worried about us and our safety, that is an excuse to profile and question certain individuals.” Individuals explained how the bill created fear and a sense of danger, “to the point where my white neighbors have Border Patrol on speed dial because ‘it is very dangerous!’” Participants also felt this social construction of the threat the foreigner and the immigrant posed to Arizona ultimately intertwined the words “illegal” and “Mexican.” “We are all considered foreigners, and then it is assumed we are illegal,” one participant said. “There are no illegals from other countries, just us Mexicans are the ones that are probably here illegally, not any Asians, not any Europeans, just us.” Participants explained the state “is very successful at the construction of a false reality,” which ends up “abusing our individual freedom.” This was illustrated through an example given by one of the participants. “Because of SB 1070, the local college was required to do an audit of its entire student body to determine their immigration status. It cost us an incredible amount of money, personnel, and time to do that project. In the end, we found that of a student body of over 12,000 students, six had a questionable immigration status that we were not sure of. The amount of resources put into determining that was much more than any potential ‘savings.’”

After creating “a false reality” in which the state created an attitude that SB 1070 was not simply justified but “necessary,” participants expressed they felt like targets in their own state. Only one participant in Arizona did not mention the word “target” during the interview process. The rest of the Arizona participants used “target” numerous times to depict what life is like for a Hispanic living in Arizona after SB 1070. A number of participants also used the word “stigma” to explain how Hispanics and Mexican
immigrants in Arizona are seen and treated differently than other groups. “The law created fear and distance between us and the white people. It emphasized difference.” Another participant added, “The bill divided us. The white people were not rude or angry before. Now, our mere presence bothers them.” One participant shared the experience of being the only Hispanic employed in an office as one in which the sense of rejection, the tension, the awkwardness of being Hispanic was palpable; this participant described the experience as one in which this person immediately stood out as an outsider and felt rejected. Three of the eight native participants in this study also discussed at length how they were regularly told, “It’s not that bad; things aren’t that bad here.” These participants were frustrated with the inability of their white counterparts in their place of employment to relate, to empathize, or to even accept a Hispanic’s perspective of living in Arizona as a “target” and as “brown.”

Participants mentioned this bill was created on a foundation of “lies and false information, yet “actual evidence does not matter.” The reason “we are targeted and made to look like delinquents is because this presents a political opportunity, and immigration reform is a huge political risk that could potentially end any politician’s career.” For several participants, this also contributed to the decline in trust and faith in government after SB 1070 was passed. Several discussed with a sense of sadness how the government purposely lied to them and continued to do so, “the Governor is still fighting to enforce the components of the bill that were blocked by the federal judge!
Still fighting!”

Symbolic Messages Participants Received from Government
A keyword among the native participants but not the foreign-born participants was “diversity.” Five of the eight native participants described SB 1070 as an attack on diversity. Participants from the city of Yuma questioned when the city would simply acknowledge its diversity. “Not only do they not address diversity, they mock us,” one participant said. Another participant explained how diversity efforts at the public state entity this participant is employed by are “offensive and ignorant” because these mainly happen once a year, consist of a “taco party,” and have no real interest in learning about the Hispanic culture. “I am constantly advocating if 80% of the population we serve is Hispanic, we have to know who we serve, we have to be okay with the word ‘Hispanic,’ but no, the top level of the organization is adamant to not refer to us as ‘Hispanic serving,’ and the President of [this public organization] even said one day, ‘I don’t understand the point of this Diversity Office.’” Three participants emphasized the resistance to using the word “Hispanic,” and considered this especially detrimental to any efforts to promote diversity in the city of Yuma. “We do not serve Hispanics, we do not serve Mexicans, we serve people,” is what we are constantly told here, and this is a public state institution. The state is terrified of calling things by their name, and they don’t want to acknowledge diversity because that means they would have to acknowledge inequality and injustice.” However, four participants discussed how “diversity” is conveniently used to request federal government grants under Title V, which are funds meant to develop Hispanic-serving institutions; yet participants stated these funds were not administered or used effectively to truly help the Hispanic population progress. “Instead, we sit in a workshop for three days listening to presentations on ‘My Pets’ or ‘My Clothes’ in Spanish. How is that helping us develop as a Hispanic-serving institution?
How does that address diversity?” A different participant said, “By not using the term ‘Hispanic,’ we are being sent a message about our place in this society.”

Participants who discussed the role of Jan Brewer as Governor of Arizona discussed the feelings they had internalized after the passage of SB 1070. “As she is still fighting for and defending this bill, it shows what she thinks of us, and that is as a burden and of no value.” “The bill was passed to send us a clear message about exactly who is superior in this state, and who is subordinate,” another participant said. “SB 1070 is another way the state wants to mentally beat us down and plant the seed of doubt about what we can do, what we are worth. ‘Just keep picking lettuce,’ is what they basically tell us.” Another participant said, “We live in groups; your interaction with government will be determined by your appearance, how you speak the English language, your education level, and your socio-economic status. I am a migrant worker. I’m brown. I have no formal education. My interactions with government officials are abusive; there is maltreatment. That shows what they think of us, not that we are hard-working, that we pay taxes, that we work to provide for our families. I avoid any sort of exchange with government officials.”

Numerous respondents also said, “We are not a priority for the federal government right now.” This comment was made by seven of nine foreign-born participants and five of nine native participants. The message they internalized from the federal government is that the oppression and discrimination Hispanics in Arizona, particularly along the southern border, are dealing with is not too important, even though respondents pointed out that a number of other states are following Arizona’s example by
passing similar legislation. “The federal government bailed out the banks, but it won’t help us. They won’t intervene on our behalf because we are not a priority to them.”

Along this theme, other participants expressed how messages of expectations communicated to Hispanics are also damaging. “We are constantly faced with messages of very low expectations, which affects how much the youth think they are worth. For example, the counselor at a local public high school tells students to go to the community college to ‘get a certificate.’ There was one parent who was so upset, immediately went to the school, and asked the counselor ‘Why is my child being told to go get a certificate? Why not a degree? Why not a four year university?’ But unfortunately, the expectations communicated to us through various means are always low.”

**Securitization/ Militarization Along the International Border**

After SB 1070, a number of respondents discussed how border control measures escalated even further. For example, participants discussed how additional funds from the federal government’s Department of Homeland Security have been allocated in southern Arizona to add more immigration officials along the border. Border Patrol Agents are now on foot, in patrol cars, and on bikes along the border cities. Participants mentioned a larger presence of Border Patrol Agents, who are federal employees, around Yuma County after SB 1070 was passed. The federal government allocated an additional $500 million dollars for border security after SB 1070 was passed; these funds were also meant to increase the number of Border Patrol officers to increase enforcement along the border. The federal government also sent 1,200 national guards to patrol the international border (Warren, 2010).
Participants also mentioned more local police officers as well as an increased scrutiny on behalf of local police; “they are just thinking of who to stop next, they are different since SB 1070 passed, they will stop you for ‘looking suspicious’ and no traffic violation, or they will stop you for the tiniest detail, which is why people are incredibly cautious now. I was stopped for a little light that was not working properly and asked for my documents.” Another participant said, “Now when you are pulled over, instead of the police asking for you license and registration, they ask what your nationality is, then for your immigration documents.”

A total of 15 participants, eight foreign-born and seven natives, discussed one of the effects of SB 1070 was the noticeable merging of the local police officers and the Border Patrol and federal immigration agents. In addition, these respondents also discussed a new practice introduced after SB 1070, and that is the inspection now required of people traveling to Mexico. “They told us that it was for safety, to prevent individuals from smuggling weapons into Mexico, but it was another way to ask for your documents and determine who is undocumented. Migrant workers who have been working in the field all day are traveling home across the border to sleep. They are dirty from the fields and are carrying a small backpack with tools or supplies; they are not smuggling weapons. But this way, if you are caught, you are detained and processed for deportation.” “Some people wanted to return to Mexico after the law was passed, but felt stuck because of the inspection now mandatory for everyone traveling to Mexico.” Another participant said, “SB 1070 has affected all of us because we are interrogated so much at the border, our documents are scrutinized several times, it’s almost to the point of harassment.”
Five foreign-born participants also indicated SB 1070 was “implemented before it was passed,” under the “guise of security.” These participants spoke about escalated border controls done for the sake of “border security,” which had already begun merging law enforcement with immigration officers before SB 1070 was passed.

One individual said, “We already had the militarization and securitization of the border way before SB 1070 because of the anti-immigrant sentiment here; we already had the helicopters flying around and the physical barriers, the wall, along the border, for symbolic purposes, mainly. But SB 1070 did not arrive alone; ever since September 11th, the laws the Department of Homeland Security must abide to are broad and vague, so we have had a record number of deportations through questionable practices.”

**Deportations**

One participant referred to the west area of Yuma city where the “silent massive deportations” occurred; this participant took the researcher to the west area of Yuma to show several neighborhoods. This participant said, “If you want to learn about the effects of SB 1070, this is it.” The neighborhoods were predominately Mexican immigrants working in the fields as migrant workers; “this area used to be full, there was such joy, a lot of families, and now, it is a ghost town, as if no one was ever here.” The different neighborhoods of west Yuma were empty; the mobile homes that once housed immigrant families were vacant and looked abandoned. Sheets of wood covered front doors and windows, and most homes had a red “X” spray-painted on the front of the home. The participant explained the Border Patrol and local police have always known which neighborhoods the migrant workers live in, so when SB 1070 was passed, they did sweeps of these neighborhoods, mainly concentrated in the west side of the city of Yuma,
and went through the neighborhood one home at a time requesting documents. Filters were also set up, which are road blocks to keep people from driving through until they showed their immigration documents. “They did this knowing at what time the migrant workers drive to report to work; they did this very early and intentionally,” the participant said. Another participant also explained how immigration officials also arrived at a factory that packaged celery, “knowing well where the workers are,” to request immigration documents.

**Effects of SB 1070 on Latino Perceptions of Public Entities**

An immediate effect of SB 1070 several participants experienced in their respective workplaces was the requirement to request immigration documents. “I work for a mental health organization, and we were no longer allowed to serve and transport individuals until they proved their legal status. This affected people receiving their therapies, their medication.” Another participant who is an academic advisor also said, “Now I have to ask for immigration documents before any advising.” Senate Bill 1070 allocated immigration enforcement power to law enforcement, schools, colleges, and a number of public entities with personnel that were not trained to act as immigration officers.

All but two of the study’s participants mentioned the changes in the relationship between the community and the local law enforcement. “What had taken years to build between my neighborhood and the local police in terms of cooperation and information-sharing was immediately severed after SB 1070. Families knew the officers by name and were friendly. After SB 1070, that relationship collapsed. Trust was broken, communication ended, and that is still the case today. The relationship has not recovered.
The community is angry, resentful, and now considers the police as immigration officials.” Another participant also explained neighborhoods with large numbers of undocumented families were less likely to call the police if something happened, out of fear of being deported.

Six participants specifically discussed the effect of SB 1070 on denying access to education, which is unconstitutional. Participants of both Yuma and San Luis discussed changes in enrollments of public schools, certain schools closing, and schools operating now with less funding because of drops in enrollment. “There was an exodus period of kids from the schools because they were afraid to go to school thinking they’d be sent away or what if my parents are sent away.” In addition, participants discussed an additional bill passed by Arizona that requires college students unable to prove their legal status to pay out of state tuition rates. One participant referred to this as “shutting these students out of access to a higher education because out of state tuition is about three times the cost of an in-state student.”

Senate Bill 1070 also caused a fear to go to the hospital because “it was unclear whether they would ask for immigration status or call immigration, and on top of that, there were patients who were undocumented who were in the hospitals and were being deported to their country of origin because the hospital didn’t want to spend money on them. It was such a horrible backlash on public entities, various agencies, and those damages are here for a while.”

Four individuals brought up during their interview that they stopped riding in cars with others because of the severity of the law, “If the police stop you with an undocumented person, you face being convicted, too.”
Immigrants are generally mistrusting of public entities because of their unfamiliarity with the system in a new country; to add SB 1070 to that is to exacerbate and deepen an already existing mistrust in public entities and socialize individuals to question and avoid government agencies and officers, rather than consider those entities as sources to which cooperate with. This can be illustrated by an example of a community leader in San Luis who said “50% of San Luis residents refused to answer the 2010 U.S. Census, because it was after the passage of SB 1070.”

Participants felt, with the exception of one respondent, negative and pessimistic about SB 1070. Eight of the foreign-born participants and five of the native participants discussed how other states had begun passing similar laws, and this kept the issue present and upsetting to witness. “How can you move on when SB 1070 is constantly in your face, when you hear more and more states are either proposing or adopting similar bills, now it’s not just Arizona that is targeting the Latino. This keeps me angry and disappointed,” one participant said.

**Determinants of Latino Participation**

Respondents in Arizona shared information on what they considered the most important determinants of Latino participation after SB 1070, based on their experience and what they witnessed from Latinos in their families, friends, and co-workers. “Changes in Latino participation after SB 1070 are largely influenced by age and education,” two participants reported, both native participants. Another reported Latino participation would be greatly influenced by age and generation, “Those that are older and came here themselves will be mobilized, while those that are younger and are born here think it doesn’t necessarily affect them.” A first generation Hispanic participant said
Latino mobilization and participation depends on “generation status, the time in the U.S., and the experience getting here.” This participant held these beliefs due to the experience the participants’ own parents had, discussing how one of the parents was undocumented at one point. “If you embrace and respect the history of those that came before us to be able to give us a better life, then that influences your perspective.”

**White Reaction to SB 1070**

Two participants in the study emphasized living in Arizona exposed them to “more of a white reaction than a Latino reaction to SB 1070.” These participants elaborated they each heard more white people discuss SB 1070 than Latinos, “They were happy [because] Arizona suckered people in and sold them a story that created fear, ‘We’re doing this because there’s so much crime due to immigration problems.’ White people were relieved and happy.”

**The 2006 Latino Rallies**

Three foreign-born respondents in Arizona indicated they had participated in the national widespread marches and demonstrations of 2006 to protest proposed immigration laws. Two participants reinforced, “There were no mobilization efforts remotely similar to what happened in those demonstrations.” One participant, however, added to this observation and attributed the wave of anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the country to the 2006 demonstrations. “Those demonstrations and protests of 2006 made us visible. They showcased our large numbers. An unintentional consequence of this was that the country saw our large numbers coming together and perceived a threat, a strong threat based on 2006. We came together and worked together on something. But
those rallies and demonstrations are a strategy gone wrong because they are the reason why now other states are following Arizona’s example in making us a target.”

**Government Efficacy**

All participants were asked whether they felt Latinos mattered to government, whether Latinos felt important to government in a way that could influence government action; participants were then asked to think about how other Hispanics within their neighborhoods, friends, family feel and would likely respond.

All except for one participant in this study answered this question with, “No, most of us would say that we don’t feel important to the government and wouldn’t influence government action; we don’t feel we matter.” The researcher probed further to determine whether this attitude was a consequence of SB 1070, or whether participants had felt this way before the bill was passed. Participants responded, “Senate bill 1070 sent a very clear message right away to Latinos in this state that they don’t care about us,” “Governor Brewer sent us a clear message with this bill that we are not wanted here,” “The government does not care about people like me, I see that emphasized because of SB 1070 and what has been implemented so far,” “Governor Brewer and this state oppose the Hispanics here, that is why they passed this bill,” “The government did not consider the outcome, the way it would affect all of us, legal and illegal alike, when it passed 1070, so it does not care for us,” “No matter how many of us expressed our opposition to SB 1070 when it was proposed, it was still passed, the state does not care to listen to us, we are not heard, so we are not important.”

While most participants concentrated this response at the state level, the researcher probed further to ask whether participants felt they mattered to their national
government; all participants still replied with a negative response. Responses included statements like, “The federal government lacked action; yes, they questioned the bill and certain components, but that was it,” “The President didn’t intervene in our behalf, he didn’t do anything, but he will start making us promises again soon since he will want our vote for his re-election,” “We are not a priority to the federal government, we were left out in the cold, they know we are being treated differently here in this state, but they have other things to work on,” “The federal government was just dormant after SB 1070 was passed,” “Knowing that we are being treated differently under this harsh law, we must be forgotten and not heard by the federal government,” “Most of the Latinos I know would say no, because after the law, we became a target.” One other participant elaborated with an example comparing government action between “snowbirds,” which are white people who travel south during the winter, and Latinos: “They [the local government] cater to them [“snowbirds’] and extend the red carpet for them, telling us how much our local economy thrives when they are here, but snowbirds don’t want to spend money here. And after SB 1070, the image portrayal of Latinos was completely different, negative.”

The community-based organization, however, presented a number of points. “My gut instinct is that most Latinos in Arizona would say no, that they don’t feel important to government. But it depends on certain factors: someone very active in the community will say ‘Yes, not only are we important, we are the next government;’ the regular working person will probably say, ‘not really, we don’t count.’ But if you go to the people of Mesa, Arizona, they will say, ‘Yes! Because we succeeded in voting out Pearce.’ So there are a number of different responses from Latinos regarding whether
they feel they matter enough to government to have an impact, make a change.” Latinos’ interaction with government affects whether they feel they are able to reach government, voice their concerns, starting at the local level. Since most participants shared negative experiences with public entities in their city or negative perceptions once SB 1070 was passed, this may affect how far out of reach they perceive government to be, and how much, or little, they perceive government cares to listen to them.

Thirteen of the 18 Arizona participants reported in their interviews that they felt SB 1070 was done intentionally by the state of Arizona to hurt Latinos by adding an obstacle for this population to access “political power.” “It is a clear effort and strategy to thwart us so that we don’t threaten their [white] political power.” Participants felt the state deliberately wanted to “dishearten” Latinos. Another participant did not think SB 1070 was done to deliberately affect Latinos’ desires to be politically active, but thought it was a manifestation of the “negative mood and sentiment” of the state. Only one participant responding on behalf of the community-based organization in Phoenix reported, “The state was not anticipating that the ‘sleeping giant’ would awaken and become much more politically active.”

**Trust in Government**

Participants were asked whether they trusted their government, local, state, and federal, and were probed on how much of this was based on the passage of SB 1070. They were also asked to think about how their Hispanic friends, family, co-workers were likely to answer. All 18 participants responded no. Of these responses, only one participant stated this attitude had nothing to do with SB 1070, but was instead due to government being too large and abusing its power and its discretion. The rest of the
responses indicated their attitude, as well as Hispanics within their circles, was affected by SB 1070, “We can’t trust the government because they have made us a target, the enemy,” “After 1070, that is different because I realized government treats us differently, you have to be careful to stay out of their radar,” “No, at any level, but the state is definitely the worst and the least I trust after the abuse we’ve seen by Brewer and Arpaio,” “No, there is no trust because they [the federal government] left us in a racist state and tried to cover the damage with a band-aid,” “No, from an already distrusting immigrant community on the border, SB 1070 made that into a definite, resounding No.” One participant did distinguish between the state and federal level, indicating a little bit of trust at the national level because “At least the federal government questioned the state of Arizona on what it was doing.”

**Qualitative Data Findings: New York City**

**Table 4.27 Characteristics of New York Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Immigration Status</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Nationalities Represented (Both male, female)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male: 2</td>
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<td>College: 1 No College: 1</td>
<td>20-29: 0 30-39: 1 40-49: 0 50-59: 0 60-69: 1</td>
<td>Mexico Puerto Rico Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female: 3</td>
<td>Permanent Resident: 0 Naturalized Citizen: 2</td>
<td>College: 2 No College: 1</td>
<td>20-29: 0 30-39: 2 40-49: 0 50-59: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two participants of undocumented status included in this group*
Participants in New York City include five foreign-born and five native participants. Two of the foreign-born participants were of undocumented status at the time of this study; the remaining three are naturalized citizens. The native participants include four first generation Latinos and one who is second generation. Because the interview protocol recruits participants who self-identify as Hispanic or Latino without specifying nationality, the group of participants from New York include five participants of Mexican nationality, one of Dominican Republic, one of Colombian, and three participants of Puerto Rican descent. This group of participants ranges from age 21 to 60. Three foreign-born and three native participants had successfully completed a college degree at the time this study was conducted.

**SB 1070 Discriminatory**

All of the participants in New York City considered SB 1070 to be discriminatory in nature. However, all 10 participants also noted it was important to distinguish they felt Latinos in New York to “not be really affected [because] we are so far removed.” All 10 emphasized their perceptions of SB 1070 were different than those living in Arizona.

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**Table 4.28**

Native Participants, Five Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Generation in U.S.</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Nationalities Represented (Both male, female)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Generation: 0</td>
<td>No College: 1</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female: 3</td>
<td>First Generation: 2</td>
<td>College: 2</td>
<td>20-29: 2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50-59: 0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
because they were “not directly affected” by the passing and implementation of SB 1070. Participants reported feelings of frustration, anger, stress, but concluded, “It is very different because I don’t live in Arizona.” Two participants described it as a political discussion in their homes, but because of the distance between New York and Arizona, “it really is just talk over dinner.” However, aside from one foreign-born participant who reported absolutely no changes in political attitudes or participation as a result of SB 1070, the rest indicated a number of effects they experienced.

The following section on the qualitative findings from New York begins with the themes among New York Latinos which were also discussed by Latinos in Arizona, including attitudes towards the federal government, the state government, political participation, the lack of Latino solidarity, the issue of political representation, the social constructions of Latinos, and government efficacy and trust.

*Attitudes toward Federal Government*

Seven of the 10 participants, four native and three foreign-born, reported a shift in their attitudes towards government, at both the state level and the national level. Regarding the federal government, participants shared a sense of frustration. “This is the land of immigrants, this is the land of liberty, yet these laws are not what you expect from the U.S.” and another participant said, “It’s not what this country, built by immigrants, is supposed to be.” Participants felt disappointment with the lack of federal intervention, and mentioned, “We are not a priority to the government. This is why the federal government did the minimum,” “Obama’s response was the bare minimum, so it brought to light that the federal government is not pro-immigration, but is more in favor of strict immigration laws.”
One participant reported SB 1070 had completely changed the outlook on government, and that the challenges made by the federal judge did not remedy this. “The damage of SB 1070 was done when the state passed the bill because the message was sent. You can’t then take it back. The message was already sent, so the damage of SB 1070 wasn’t lessened when a judge challenged certain parts. We had already received the message very clearly.”

Two participants mentioned SB 1070 is related to the “safety” rhetoric that resulted from 9/11. “I felt a very strong wave of negativity towards people like me after 9/11, as if all of us who were foreign were also terrorists. It was very palpable.” Another said, “The national and state governments say these policies are to ‘stop terrorism,’ but that is all lies, it is not true.”

**Attitudes towards State Governments**

These seven participants were also disappointed with governments at the state level. One cited Alabama’s HB 56 as an extension of the disappointment in the direction of state level administration. Four participants specifically mentioned Governor Brewer, and how her role in SB 1070 affected their perceptions of the state of Arizona. “It changed my perception because I thought, that is the leadership of the state? That is not leadership.” Another referenced both Governor Brewer and Sheriff Arpaio as using SB 1070 to send a message to the Mexican people about “what is ours, not yours.” Six participants explained how they perceived SB 1070 as a “personal attack” because it identified people like them as potential “targets;” of the six, four are born in the U.S. and represent three different nationalities, indicating Latinos who are not of Mexican descent also feel targeted by SB 1070 and similar legislation.
One participant said, “SB 1070 is not the trigger, unfortunately, but it is a baby step in the right direction of more Latino political participation. It did succeed in engaging many Latinos for the first time in a political discussion, in creating more awareness among people who had never been politically active.” Another participant said, “I am very sad to say that although Latinos did talk about it [SB 1070] with others, and it was the first time I ever saw my parents engage in a political discussion, I don’t think the bill had any effect on Latino participation in New York. I did not see anyone in my circle of Latino friends or co-workers take any action, demonstrate, attend a forum or rally, nothing. It did not cause political action.” One other participant shared the topic of SB 1070 did increase the motivation to participate “out of anger,” but this, unfortunately, had not translated into “actually taking action.”

Only one participant in New York said the opposite of this. “There was an effect in New York when SB 1070 was passed. Latinos mobilized and demonstrated against it. This happened throughout the country. However, if I were living in Arizona and had Governor Brewer as my Governor, I would probably not want to participate in anything. I would probably think it was completely futile.” This participant enrolled in a college course on immigration policy as a direct result of SB 1070 and also predicted an increase in naturalization rates after SB 1070 based on the new incentives created by the bill.

A different participant felt pessimistic about Latino participation because SB 1070 did not result in the mass mobilization of Latinos, regardless of their large numbers. “But this bill has made me personally want to be much more active, so this November not only will I go vote, but I will go recruit as many people as I can; I will go house to house in
my neighborhood, gather my family, drive the elderly. So even though SB 1070 was meant to be a barrier, some of us will see to it that it produces the reverse effect it intended and that more participation results from this.”

Another participant said Latino participation greatly depended on generation status, age, and education. “The younger population is now exposed to political discussions via social networks, like Twitter, Facebook, and You Tube, which will pull them in [to being politically engaged] that way.” Two other participants also shared education as a main determinant of whether Latinos felt involvement would be futile, which then affects turnout.

A participant of undocumented status discussed three factors that affect Latino participation. The first was information, “Some Latinos don’t know exactly what their rights are and think that if they demonstrate, they will be arrested, which can then affect their whole livelihood. They feel behaving means enduring without speaking out.” This participant explained if information were disseminated, Latinos would probably be less fearful to participate. The second factor is whether Latinos unite, “This would mean both legal and illegal coming together as one community, which isn’t strong here now.” The last factor is trust in government. “We have low turnout because many are distrusting of the process. If we could increase trust in government processes, then there would be more turnout.” Four participants referred to representation and leadership as imperative to improving relations between the community and government.

**Lack of Latino Solidarity**

Six of the 10 respondents in New York City pointed out a theme that also manifested during the data collection in Arizona, the lack of Latino solidarity. “It is very
frustrating when we look at our numbers as Latinos, but then see how we don’t come
together to vote people in and out office, how we are not politically strong yet, and that is
because we don’t come together.” Participants compared Latinos to other racial or ethnic
groups in New York and explained Latinos do not unite, do not take care of each other,
while “other communities are very tight.” Five participants said living in New York had
confronted them with the experience that among other Latinos, divisions are made by
language (how well one speaks English), legal status, the time spent in the U.S., whether
one was born here or born abroad, and/or by nationality. “There is no solidarity among
Latinos, even though SB 1070 affects all of us. I have friends from Guatemala and El
Salvador that are also in fear after SB 1070.”

*Latino Representation*

Eight of the 10 participants in New York discussed issues dealing with
representation. Two of the native participants mentioned American’s fixation on “black
and white,” a dichotomy that has ultimately caused everything else in between to be
“invisible and excluded.” “That kept our family members, our parents, from participating
in politics, because they didn’t see anyone that looked like them, spoke like them, or
could relate to them, so it’s a perpetuating cycle; lack of representation keeps Latinos
from engaging, and lack of political engagement keeps Latinos from representing their
communities in higher positions within the community,” one participant said. Another
participant stated until there is more Latino representation in government, policies like
this will continue, regardless of the growing Latino population size because “in our
mind, we still think and act like a minority.” The irony of the size of the Latino
population compared to the political strength actually exercised by Latinos was also
discussed at length in New York, as it was in Arizona. Participants linked representation
to more Latino political engagement, more trust in government, and “the one thing that
would begin to change the image society has of us.” For that to happen, however, all
participants discussed the need for more education, the need of a bigger emphasis on
Latino youth to pursue a college education.

Social Constructions of Latinos

Five Latinos in New York City also spoke of frustration with the assumptions,
stereotypes, and image portrayal of Latinos they experienced in New York; participants
believed these images are, partially, an underlying reason policies like SB 1070 are
passed. This included narratives from two foreign-born and three native participants.
These spoke of how society construed them as wanting to access welfare programs, of
how “Mexican” or “Latino” usually carried negative connotation and were often used as
synonyms for “poor, unintelligent, unable to speak English, being a criminal or a gang
member, eating beans, and probably undocumented.” One participant spoke of the
stigma of being Latino growing up in New York as a constant battle against a negative
social portrayal, “I had a teacher in high school that called me ‘hub caps,’ because he
joked I would steal hub caps when I was out of school. It was a big laugh for everyone. If
I was ever absent, ‘oh, out stealing hub caps, again.’” Another participant also spoke of
the preconceived notions people had of Mexicans and the jokes that usually accompanied
this by those of a different race and/or ethnicity. “It is okay to make a joke out of us, to
make an insensitive racial comment. Newt Gingrich did it, and he is still running for
president. Had he made a comment about an African American or a Jew, I am sure he would have dropped out by now because of the backlash, but since it’s us, it’s okay.”

Two native participants spoke of the negative perception towards those in hard labor and society’s condescension, “but look at what happened with Georgia with their crops going to waste!” Another mentioned, “It is a service to the country what the workers do, prices of produce would go up significantly without them.” Participants reinforced how the positive contribution of Latinos in the U.S. goes largely unnoticed. One participant said, “The government cares about us very much; just look at how much they scrutinize and criminalize us; without us, who would be their scapegoat?”

**Government Efficacy**

Three participants felt Latinos belonging to different socio-economic classes would feel differently about their ability to influence and be heard by government. Another participant felt this was mainly contingent on the person’s time in the U.S., and their status, “If they are literally called an ‘alien,’ they won’t believe they are worth much to government, and won’t even try to participate much.” Two other participants believed this would be determined by whether the Latino was fluent in the English language, and one stated education played a large role in this.

One participant added, however, “In my age group [early 30s], no one is really concerned with whether or not we are heard by government, and this is not limited to Latinos, so I think age plays a big role. In our age group, there really isn’t much belief or interest in government processes, or trust.”

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26 Two Arizona participants and one from New York discussed Newt Gingrich’s comment of Spanish as “the language of the ghetto” to illustrate their disappointment with political leaders.
Seven of the 10 respondents, five of them native, indicated their experience living in New York City was one in which they already felt generally distrusting of local law enforcement. “Senate Bill 1070 is just another example of racial profiling I’ve been exposed to living in New York. Black and Hispanic young men are always much more likely to be stopped and searched by local police here. I saw that growing up, so the Arizona bill is an extension of that. I’m not surprised.” Respondents indicated the bill did impact Latino trust in government; however, the participants did not attribute their lack of trust to SB 1070 but explained their culture was one generally distrusting of law enforcement and of government already, so defined SB 1070 as more of an extension to that sentiment.

Another participant added, “SB 1070 did have an effect here. Those without documents are very cautious about not interacting with public entities. They are scared, and very unlikely to come out of the shadows. I would also predict an increase in the selling of fake documents and fraudulent social security numbers as a result of this bill.” Two participants who are undocumented also mentioned the process to rent an apartment in New York had changed into one more cumbersome and scrutinized, making it increasingly difficult to rent an apartment without proving legal status, “It was not like that before,” one said.

Two participants, however, both foreign-born, reported they did trust their government. One indicated this was due to an extensive history of participating in local community boards, being very involved with local community leaders, and because of a sense of accountability that exists between these and the Latino community in the south
Bronx, which was made possible by the role of community-based and non-profit organizations that exist in the area. Because of this active relationship of holding political leaders accountable, this participant reported a high level of trust among Latinos in this particular area that can be mainly attributed to the community organizations in the south Bronx.

**Diversity in New York City**

All but two respondents in New York, both natives, discussed the diversity of New York City as a main reason why, despite feeling anger towards states pursuing these initiatives, there was not a rush of panic in New York. “That bill would never happen here,” one participant said. Another participant explained that despite the frustration felt regarding the national government, locally, this participant felt very satisfied with the municipality government because the City actively encourages New Yorkers to become more politically active. “There were representatives of the City that visited my classroom and recruited volunteers to register eligible people to vote and work on Election Day; I immediately signed up and said I was going straight to Spanish Harlem to recruit my people to become registered voters.” Locally, participants felt safe and taken into consideration at the municipality level, a stark difference between the group of respondents from Arizona and New York. Three participants spoke about Mayor Bloomberg and the symbolic importance of delivering his speeches in both English and Spanish, “That man is a multi-billionaire. He isn’t speaking Chinese. He is speaking Spanish. That sends a message to us, that he knows we’re important, that our vote counts.”

“**Immigration is a Complex Problem**”
Participants also mentioned New York City was conscientious of the economic impact a bill such as 1070 would have on the entire city. Seven of the 10 respondents mentioned how New York was well aware of the impact a bill like SB 1070 would have on the local economy, as many workers are immigrants. “There are jobs that people can’t even imagine how rough they are, and they are done by workers who come here from other countries,” one participant said. “There is awareness here that the problem is complex, that there is a demand for labor, that undocumented workers find work here, and that something harsh like SB 1070 would have many consequences on the economy and on the price of food and produce here.” Another participant added, “The difference is that Arizona came up with a quick solution to a very complex problem in the U.S. It’s not that simple.”

“Not New”

Four of the participants, all natives, brought up another theme that surfaced in Arizona. “This is nothing new. It was already being done. Perhaps the positive in all of this is that it is easier to fight overt discrimination than covert discrimination,” a participant said. Another said, “SB 1070 is not novel, but it did put everything in writing. It made it legal for someone’s appearance to trigger questions on immigration status.” One participant said, “We always knew about the south, but what Arizona did was blatant, shameless, provocative. I think the election of our Black President has something to do with this political climate.” Another added, “This bill brought to light a number of humanitarian issues, such as the treatment of individuals detained by immigration officers, and how we don’t know a lot of what happens in deportation proceedings, especially after 9/11.”
**SB 1070 leads to Racial Profiling**

Seventeen of 18 participants in Arizona discussed racial profiling; in New York, seven of the 10 respondents discussed this issue. Four native and three foreign-born participants spoke about the effect of SB 1070 on racial profiling, which they considered as an abuse of human rights because “it does not matter if you’re legal or illegal, if you’re from Mexico or from another country in central America, you can be targeted and questioned based on your appearance.” One participant reported Latino business associates in New York being particularly discontent with this component of the law and discussing it at length.

**Deliberate Barriers to Participation**

Another similar theme to surface between Arizona and New York was the belief the state was consciously and deliberately trying to use policies as “barriers” to Latino participation. “This is clearly an obstacle meant to keep government white,” one participant said. Another participant cited the trend started by Arizona as well as the trend of state legislatures to pass new voter ID requirements as “active strategies to suppress voter turnout among Latinos. This is calculated. These barriers are done purposely. They are meant to hurt Latinos and those within the lower socio-economic class.” The participant elaborated with an example, “My mother is not going to leave work early when she gets paid by the hour to rush to an office with a long line and get the new ID that is required just so she could vote! She would have to take a whole afternoon off. States are becoming more creative at emotionally beating you down and setting up barriers for you if you’re a minority and/or poor.”

**Other New York Findings**
Seven of the 10 participants discussed how SB 1070 was not heavily protested in New York City because, “Latinos are primarily concerned with providing for the family,” “People have to work,” “A lot of us can’t take time off to go demonstrate.” One participant said, “I very much support the cause, but if I were to tell my boss, ‘I’m going down to City Hall to demonstrate,’ they would tell me to go, and not come back.” These responses were not attributed to fear or disappointment, as was the case in Arizona. Only one person in New York mentioned Latinos’ fear of being arrested and/or deported, and this was one of the participants without a legal status.

One participant, a native, specifically discussed the merging of law enforcement and immigration officers as an immediate effect of SB 1070, a topic discussed at length in Arizona.

Two participants, natives, also reported the passage of this bill had caused them to no longer affiliate with either of the two main political parties. Two different participants reported the bill caused a change in their ideology, “to more liberal.” “When you begin to see what Conservatives are willing to do to certain groups of people, as in this case with SB 1070, it makes you want to be more liberal; it makes you want to support other groups that are stigmatized, like being supportive of gay marriage, because the last thing you want is for people to have rights stripped from them or denied to them.”

Only two of the 10 participants brought up the 2006 Latino rallies and discussed they had participated in these. These participants cited this as a true example of Latino solidarity, something that was not replicated when SB 1070 was passed.
Two participants brought up the fact that other states were following Arizona’s trend, which is a stark contrast to the data collected in Arizona since many brought up the domino effect and the number of states following Arizona’s example.

Six of the Arizona participants suggested if the government wanted to keep this law, then it should be implemented in a way that “requires everyone,” regardless of appearance, to carry proof of legal status to make the law just. This sentiment was shared by two of the participants in New York.

One participant in New York who also worked for a mental health organization, as did one of the participants in Arizona, pointed out the organization does not deny services, even when clients voluntarily share they are undocumented. The organization does not ask for this information, but if clients volunteer this, they are not turned away. The participant explained, “This is the case for the time being. We do not deny services or request documents because our purpose is to provide treatment for their mental illness.”

**Qualitative Data in Arizona versus New York**

Although duplication of the interview protocol was attempted as closely as possible in New York, the researcher noticed a number of differences throughout the data collection process. For example, most participants in Arizona were hesitant and nervous to talk in public places and preferred to meet in their homes or behind closed doors in their personal offices. Participants agreed to interviews because of confidentiality; several mentioned this as a deciding factor in their participation in the study, and most discussed the inability to discuss SB 1070 at their workplace or with colleagues who were
Caucasian. New York participants preferred to meet in public spaces like cafes or restaurants and were not fearful of discussing the topic in public.

Participants in Arizona disclosed how impossible it was for someone to disclose if his/her status was undocumented in Yuma County because “Border Patrol would be at their front door in two seconds.” It was a highly sensitive issue. Participants explained many of those they knew that were undocumented had already left the area, but described being undocumented as something individuals would never share out of fear. The researcher was not able to speak to undocumented individuals in Arizona; rather, participants explained what had happened to those they knew who were undocumented. In New York, however, two participants openly shared their undocumented status. One said, “It does not bother me in the least to tell you about it.” There was less fear and hesitation to discuss the same topic in New York than in Arizona.

The participants were first asked to define SB 1070 in their own words, which generated very detailed responses by Arizona participants that usually included several dimensions of their interpretation of the bill. New York participants defined SB 1070 in broader, more vague, and shorter terms. Three participants indicated they were not very familiar with the law, except for one dimension of it. The most thorough and detailed responses were by the two participants of undocumented status whose responses were very similar to those of Arizona participants.

Finally, the researcher identified the main keywords that were most often used by participants in Arizona throughout their interviews by reviewing transcripts; these keywords included the words “fear,” “resentment,” “anger,” “disappointed,” and “discrimination.” Participants in New York also used these words, but all keywords
except for “discrimination” were used at a different rate in New York than Arizona. The researcher counted the raw number of times keywords were used by the Arizona group and the New York group and calculated the average number of times a participant used each keyword to be able to compare the two states used in the study. This simple descriptive content analysis reinforces the notion of a very local effect of SB 1070. A heightened sense of disappointment, caution, sensitivity, and of being identified as a target was found among participants residing in Arizona, indicating the two groups, although both Latino, were impacted differently and, ultimately, experienced SB 1070 differently.

Table 4.29 Raw Number of Keywords & Average per Participant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>“Fear”</th>
<th>“Resentment”</th>
<th>“Anger”</th>
<th>“Disappointed”</th>
<th>“Discrimination”</th>
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<td>Arizona</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>n=18</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=10</td>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Initial numbers reflect the raw number each keyword was used in Arizona and New York across all participants; the score in the parenthesis is the average count calculated by dividing the total number of each keyword by the number of interviewees)

For each participant interviewed in Arizona, the word “fear” was used about 5.3 times; in New York, this was about 2 times. For every one participant in Arizona, “resentment” was used 4.4 times while this was 3.2 among New York participants. For every one participant in Arizona, “anger” was used 3.9 times, and this was 1.7 for the New York group. For every one participant in Arizona, “disappointed” was used 2.9
times, and in New York, this was about 0.5. Finally, for every one participant in Arizona, “discrimination” was used 2.8 times, and this was 3.0 times in New York.

Figure 2: Comparison of Arizona and New York, Average Use of Keywords per Participant

Key Findings & Interpretation

The initial quantitative results did not show significant results in the interaction terms for most of the political attitudes included in the Pew Political Survey.

The findings were not what had been hypothesized; the interaction term was negative for the approval of Democratic Congressional leaders’ performance. Through the qualitative data analysis, there is a possible interpretation for this. Since a number of respondents in both Arizona and New York indicated they no longer considered themselves Democrat and were disappointed with their own political party, this might
help interpret why the quantitative analysis using the difference-in-difference method resulted in a negative effect (a negative coefficient with a decline in the odds ratio).

Furthermore, the finding that Hispanic respondents more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party after SB 1070 was also unexpected, but can also be interpreted through the qualitative data analysis. Since respondents across the three sites in Arizona and respondents in New York discussed a lack of Latino solidarity, a division between the foreign-born and the native Latinos in the U.S., the number of Latinos who considered SB 1070 to not affect them and so were not concerned, these themes are possible interpretations for this finding. Fourteen participants in Arizona and seven in New York discussed the ethnic division between Latinos themselves and mentioned how they had encountered a few Latinos who supported or were indifferent to the 1070 bill. “It all depends on your experience getting here, and even though I am born in the U.S., I am particularly sensitive to SB 1070 because of what my father did to get here,” one participant said, explaining the parent had been undocumented for a period of time many years ago. Another one added, “I have family who will tell you that the bill is a good thing, that everyone should ‘go get in line.’” Although Hispanics are more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party, “You have Hispanics that are more conservative and even affiliate with the Tea Party in Yuma,” one participant said, “and even though they may not be many in numbers, they’re the ones that are usually doing the loudest talking, yelling all sorts of prejudiced talk, and they are the ones that always get out and vote, unfortunately.”

The interaction term for Hispanic registered voters was statistically significant and positive. This first appears to be contrary to the hypothesis based on Schneider and
Ingram’s theory of policy design. However, through the qualitative data, this finding can be interpreted. The CEO of La Raza Development Fund in Phoenix clearly stated the numbers of Hispanic registered voters had dramatically increased since SB 1070 across large metropolitan areas in Arizona, and attributed the increase in numbers to the number of community organizations, a larger Latino support network, the presence and role of universities in larger cities, and a younger generation of Latinos more likely to mobilize. Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design predicts the disenfranchised to withdraw and alienate from formal political processes, but predicts an increase in their participation through community events that do not require formal interaction with government agencies, which is what the CEO of La Raza Development Fund explained happened in Phoenix. This may demonstrate a mediating variable to the framework, the role of community-based organizations, since these are not formal or intimidating to targeted populations, if these are registering people to vote, it may be a mechanism to engage individuals who would not do so otherwise.

Throughout the course of this study, it has become clear that the impact of SB 1070 is one that affects Latinos of distinctive characteristics differently. While SB 1070 motivated Latinos in Phoenix to mobilize, for example, it discouraged those living in the smaller border towns of San Luis and Yuma. Yuma County, because of the proximity to the border, “has a different dynamic… probably a lot more disenchantment there,” CEO of La Raza Development Fund said. In addition, Yuma County lacks the number of community-based organizations, the established support network the larger cities in Arizona have, the younger Latino generation enrolled in universities because it does not
have a four-year institution of higher education; one of the participants said, “This is my first time on a campus that does not host civic events or drives to register people to vote.”

Although there is some support for Schneider and Ingram’s theoretical framework, this study has found that, just as Stokes (2003) reported, variation exists within Latino subgroups; Stokes found variation by nationality, and this study confirms but extends this to include a number of other factors. Those who felt the most stigmatized and disenfranchised as a result of SB 1070 were more likely to be foreign-born, to have discussed a parent’s experience in migrating to the U.S. and how either or both parents might have been undocumented at one point, discussed the issue of language discrimination or the challenges in learning a new language, or not be of a naturalized citizen status yet. Participants who strongly cared about the issue of SB 1070 and were very active in the community to promote awareness were more likely to have completed a college degree, grasp the English language, to have become a naturalized citizens (if foreign-born), and were, to some point, already active in the community prior to SB 1070.

Although the initial hypothesis predicted SB 1070 would lead to a national shift among Latino political attitudes and behavior (due to the number of states proposing similar legislation), ultimately, this study found that the effect of SB 1070 is very much the product of geographical location. Results differ by region; furthermore, even within a state, this study found that Yuma is not Phoenix, the context and political landscape were extremely local, even though both cities are in the border state. It was also found that the Hispanic population is not monolithic; there is variation within the Hispanic population by a number of criteria, including immigration status, foreign-born or native,
English proficiency, family members’ immigration status, and generational cohort.

What is worth mentioning is that even though “politics are local,” meaning results varied distinctively by location, what was observed at the national level was a positive shift in Latinos becoming registered voters. The descriptive means of this response (see Table 4.3) showed a substantial gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, and showed an increase in the means across subgroups of Hispanics. The exact role of mediating variables, such as affiliation with Latino networks and community organizations, is something to be further explored in future research. While Schneider and Ingram’s theoretical framework predicts alienation from formal processes, the theory also predicts an increase in participation through informal processes that do not require interaction with government officials, which means Latinos could have felt alienated from government and still have organized with local Latino organizations and advocacy groups who provide support, information in both languages, and register eligible voters, allowing Latinos to participate via this informal channel; alienation and participation can both occur, but participation is more likely through alternative methods than through formal interactions with government public entities. The data in New York also revealed Latinos who perceived SB 1070 in a negative way was not limited to Latinos of Mexican nationality; Latinos of other countries discussed how the implementation of SB 1070 could potentially racially profile them, too, even if they were not from Mexico.
### Table 4.30 Key Findings, Quantitative and Qualitative Data:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative Analysis</th>
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<td><strong>Negative interaction terms for:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arizona Latinos on SB 1070:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Democratic Political Leaders in Congress;</td>
<td>Unjust, deliberate, targeting all Latinos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics: Affiliating with Republican Political Party</td>
<td>Fear, disappointment, discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No trust in government after SB 1070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No trust in government efficacy; no faith in process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive interaction terms for:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
<td>No reaction in Yuma County</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>More Latinos predicted less participation in Yuma Phoenix: more solidarity and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joining South and West geographical regions:</strong></td>
<td><strong>New York Latinos on SB 1070:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive interaction terms for:</strong></td>
<td>Angry, but “does not directly affect us”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliating with Republican Political Party;</td>
<td>More broad definitions of SB 1070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
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<td>No effect on trust in government</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Awareness and caution not limited to Latinos of Mexican nationality</td>
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<td><strong>Negative interaction terms for:</strong></td>
<td><strong>New York Latinos on Participation:</strong></td>
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<td>Foreign-born Hispanics: Approval of Democratic Political Leaders in Congress;</td>
<td>SB 1070 no effect on participation</td>
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<td>Spanish-speaking Hispanics: Affiliating with Republican Political Party</td>
<td>Representation of Latinos exists in New York City</td>
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter interprets the findings outlined in Chapter 4 within Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design and links the findings to the study’s research question. This chapter also discusses the importance of this research to the field of public administration.

To conclude, the chapter addresses the impact of the study on participation literature and identifies potential areas for future research.

“Framing Dynamics”

This research uses Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design as the main framework to answer the question of the effect of SB 1070 on Latino political participation. Throughout the qualitative data analysis, the components of the framework’s causal process became evident. The “framing dynamics” component is part of the causal process in which “contexts produce [policy] designs and designs, in turn, have consequences for society” (Schneider and Ingram, 1997, p. 73). This part of the causal process is based on social construction of knowledge; “social constructions of social groups are created by politics, culture, socialization, history, the media, literature, religion, and the like [and] refers to the way facts, experiences, beliefs, and events are constructed and certified as ‘true’” (p. 75). Because political power is unequal in the process, this power is used in “strategic, manipulative, and deceptive patterns” to socially construct target populations and to divide these into “deserving and undeserving groups” (p. 102). Schneider and Ingram explain groups are given an identity of deserving or undeserving through “images, stereotypes, and beliefs;” this process identifies “who are
possible candidates for receiving beneficial or burdensome policy” and targets undeserving groups (p. 75).

The number of Latino participants in Arizona that thoroughly discussed the creation of a “false reality” by the state and the constant depiction of portraying the Latino as a threat to safety by citing drugs, crime, and using the word “illegal” as a synonym for “criminal,” as well as portraying the Latino as an economic threat by repeatedly linking to the cost of welfare programs, the cost of educating and incarcerating undocumented Latinos, and blaming the Latino for the worsening economy illustrates how the state of Arizona is an active participant in the process of socially constructing the reality necessary for SB 1070. Participants in both Arizona and New York also discussed the inequality of political power or clout and the lack of Latino representation in political institutions to help offset the negative image portrayal and the perpetuation of Latino stereotypes.

Participants in Arizona discussed how SB 1070 was “a gift from above” for Governor Jan Brewer as the economy began to suffer; participants described SB 1070 as a “strategy” and “political opportunity” for the Governor to blame a group that is both voiceless and criminalized, which illustrates the Latino was identified by those in power as politically weak and negatively construed. Participants attributed her rise in popularity across the state and her re-election to her seizing the political opportunity of passing SB 1070. Schneider and Ingram explain those in the deviant category “are in the worst situation because they are both politically weak and negatively constructed;” deviant populations are “dangerous, deserving to be punished… powerless” (p. 109). Participants provided statements that support an “undeserving” identity when they discussed SB 1070
resulted in the division between “us and them, Hispanic and Caucasian.” Participants discussed the tense and hostile environments that accompanied SB 1070 in their respective places of employment, and as one participant said, “Now white neighbors have Border Patrol on speed dial because ‘it is so dangerous!’”

Participants thoroughly discussed the stereotypes associated with Latinos, in both Arizona and New York, but this was more emphasized by participants in Arizona. Participants in Arizona were also more frustrated in this discussion and referred to certain facts that demonstrate how false the beliefs embedded in SB 1070 were. Participants questioned why the economy hadn’t recovered if there had been massive deportations in Yuma County; participants questioned the validity behind statements of undocumented depleting social programs, and the validity of security rhetoric claiming SB 1070 was also necessary to protect against terrorism. However, as Schneider and Ingram explain, evidence is irrelevant to what has been socially constructed and certified as “true.”

“Designing Dynamics”

The next component in the causal process is the “designing dynamics,” in which contextual characteristics merge with careful calculations of opportunities and risks by elected officials [and] interest groups (p. 77). Schneider and Ingram expanded on the work of Kingdon (1984) by emphasizing, “policy entrepreneurs may take a pre-existing policy solution and construct an issue so that the solution appears to be the most logical one” (p. 77).

Arizona participants discussed how SB 1070 was “nothing new,” how it was just a repackaging of what already existed, referring to California’s Proposition 187, and how it was meant to scapegoat Latinos in light of the stagnant economy.
The current example of Arizona contains several parallels with California in the 1990s. As Schneider and Ingram point out, burdensome policy on target populations are most likely during times of economic downturn and uncertainty, and California’s recession in the 1990s was also the contextual landscape that provided a political opportunity for Governor Pete Wilson. Participants in Arizona emphasized SB 1070 was a manipulation and opportunity for Governor Brewer due to the suffering economy, linking the contextual characteristic of the economy with the creation of a “solution” to the state’s problem by those in power in the state administration. Participants in Arizona repeatedly referred to themselves as the “enemy” because they had been socially construed as “a deviant target population” (p.109) and were being blamed now for a number of the state’s problems, beginning with different dimensions regarding the economy (participants mentioned the state justified the 1070 bill by citing the costs of educating illegal immigrants, the cost of incarcerating illegal immigrants, the deficit problem of the undocumented not paying their share in taxes), but also included a number of issues regarding safety to defend the bill (the criminalization of the immigrant, gangs, drugs, the need for increased security to protect against terrorism). As one participant said, “An attitude was created [by the state] in which this [SB 1070] was actually necessary!”

The framework also explains why the policy has different effects on the attitudes and behaviors of Latinos residing in New York. Social constructions are not permanent or impermeable; these vary. “There is a continuing struggle to gain acceptance of a particular construction of events, people, history, and contemporary conditions that will become widespread and accepted” (p. 74). This can explain why Latinos residing in New
York provided different responses to SB 1070. Although some participants in New York did discuss the negative experiences they’ve had based on Latino stereotypes, participants were, in comparison with Latinos in Arizona, less fearful because of the existing social construction of Latinos and immigrants in New York City, which are less threatening. Social constructions are communicated through formal and informal messages, as well as the manner in which an issue is framed. Latinos in New York felt more secure and positive about their position in society for a number of reasons. First, respondents felt, generally, content with the government administration at the municipal level, mainly because they felt represented; participants referred to diversity, Latino representation in the City Administration, Latino community leaders and organizations that worked to advocate on their behalf as proof their presence was important to the city of New York. Participants also discussed how Mayor Bloomberg delivering key speeches in English and Spanish sent a clear message of the significant role Latinos play in the functionality of the city. Responses in New York also reflected a different social construction because many discussed the role of Latinos in the workforce, the economic impact of a policy like SB 1070 in the prices of produce, the restaurant and hotel industry, the tourism industry. Participants in New York felt confident a policy like SB 1070 would not be duplicated because of a common consensus that “immigration is a complex problem,” and an Arizona-like policy would imply consequences for the business community, a group that is positively construed in society, including a change in prices of different services and goods; participants indicated if something similar was passed, massive demonstrations and protests would ensue, not limited to those of Mexican nationality. As one participant
said, “SB 1070 was Arizona’s quick solution to a very complex problem that needs to be considered from a variety of angles.”

“Translation Dynamics”

This component of the causal process is based on the messages citizens internalize and the experiences that occur as a result of policy designs:

The most common encounters citizens have with government are not in the voting booth… Instead people confront government in the hundreds of ways affecting their daily lives… Depending on the choice of public design elements and the way they fit together, government can appear fair or unfair, logical and straightforward or illogical with hidden agendas, helpful or antagonistic, an important aspect of life or irrelevant. People can come away with encounters from government feeling informed and empowered or helpless, ignorant, and impotent… The language and symbols contained in policy send messages about what kind of people count as important… and whose problems will probably be ignored. Policies are lessons in democracy. (p. 79)

It is these formal and informal messages embedded in policies and how citizens interpret and internalize these messages that ultimately impact participation patterns by shaping attitudes and orientations towards government. Schneider and Ingram predict deviant groups will most likely be targeted for burdensome policy, especially in times of economic hardship, and citizens will therefore internalize the messages that they [the targeted, deviant population] are bad, that government should treat them with disrespect and hate; the targeted group will feel angry towards government, oppressed by government, and an abusive use of power in politics; formal participation will be low, informal methods such as demonstrations are more likely, and this group will most likely avoid citizen-agency interaction (p. 142).

Evidence these messages resulted from SB 1070 among Latinos was most prevalent among Arizona participants, but was also present by some Latinos in New York. Participants often referred to themselves as targets, as the enemy, as being
disproportionately burdened with increased scrutiny by local law enforcement and officials with the Department of Homeland Security; participants reported feeling discriminated against, being hated by other racial groups with more political power and representation. Participants in Arizona discussed it was not just SB 1070, but the number of subsequent policies after 1070, such as the ban of ethnic studies after Caucasian parents complained about a Mexican American history class at a public school in Tucson, the ban of certain Chicano literature in the state’s public education system, the ban of affirmative action programs in public education, public contracting, and the public sector workforce, and the upcoming policies they predicted will unravel soon after the language proficiency case of Alejandrina Cabrera was decided by the Supreme Court. Participants referred to all these, with SB 1070 on the forefront, as clear and loud messages from government that Latinos are not wanted, not respected, not valuable, not important.

Since polices are “lessons in democracy,” Latinos in Arizona depicted a more pessimistic and bleak picture; more respondents predicted less Latino political participation and mobilization due to a sense of withdrawal and the attitude any efforts were probably futile. As Schneider and Ingram predicted, Latinos in Arizona demonstrated no faith in government’s fairness or effectiveness; “they see themselves as alone... Conventional forms of participation such as voting and running for office will be viewed as largely ineffective or irrelevant” (p. 144).

**Importance to Public Administration**

_Evidence from the qualitative data collected, especially by participants in Arizona, suggests SB 1070 is in fact a degenerative policy with negative effects on Latino_
attitudes and participation patterns. The following section summarizes key points why this is important to the field of public administration.

First of all, degenerative policy designs create attitudes towards government, across different levels, and barriers for political participation, and this has serious implications for democracy and the normative values of social justice and equity. Rather than empowering citizens of the U.S. to become politically engaged and active in their respective communities, degenerative policies like SB 1070 increase the likelihood that targeted populations will “become alienated from public life and lose legitimacy in the eyes of others” (p. 88). Schneider and Ingram believe disparate political participation patterns in the U.S. are the result of differential treatment caused by public policy designs; this different treatment “is one of the major contributors to these inequalities” (p. 89). These inequalities hinder good citizenship because this cannot be promoted when policies send messages to encourage certain groups, “but tell other groups their problems are not important enough to be considered by government” (p. 89). The attitude of “We [Latinos] are not a priority,” referring to the state administration of Arizona and the federal administration illustrates how participants internalized the message their problems were not important enough for government at these two levels; certain participants stated feeling “alone” or “left out in the cold” by both the state and the national government. However, participants in New York felt content with the municipal government because of representation by race, ethnicity, and gender. This indicates policies impact citizen orientations towards government, but not uniformly; Latinos internalized messages after the passage of SB 1070 regarding the state of Arizona and the national government. What was unexpected was the number of respondents that disapproved and were
dissatisfied with the Obama administration and/or their own Political Party for a lack of action after SB 1070, despite the President’s public stance against the bill. This means a degenerative policy, although passed at a state level, affects attitudes across different levels of government and public agencies. The actions governments take or don’t take to address these type of policies are also messages that are internalized and shape opinions of government and justice; despite the President’s public stance against SB 1070, Latinos were more concerned with a lack of federal action and intervention, and several Latinos discussed a reluctance to vote for him again in 2012.

Participants in Arizona were more likely to discuss how angry and disappointed they were as opposed to Latinos in New York, yet this did not result in any mobilization efforts. Participants in Arizona discussed the lack of mobilization along the southern Arizona border in the cities of Yuma and San Luis. This also provides evidence of Schneider and Ingram’s theory as they predict targeted populations “will find it much more difficult to organize and mobilize for protection of their interests, at least partly because of their fragmentation and distrust of one another” (p. 144). The Latinos included in this study discussed the lack of ethnic solidarity that is imperative for mobilization, the separation between documented and undocumented Latinos, the distinction between foreign-born and natives, which became more exacerbated when Latinos were second generation and so on. More empathetic attitudes were taken by Latinos who were conscious of their family’s undocumented status at one point in time; “it depends on how you got here,” one participant said, while others who have been in the U.S. for several generations may be less empathetic and less interested in mobilizing based on their belief “SB 1070 doesn’t affect me.” Degenerative policies and designs
“teach dependents and deviants that mobilization is pointless” (p. 145). As one participant said, “I saw my friends chain themselves to the university [when SB 1070 was proposed]; I saw everything that they went through, protests, demonstrations, marches, and it still didn’t matter, the law still went through. I’m done participating.” This means the field has the opportunity to tackle the lessons that political participation is futile by promoting and sending messages of inclusiveness, as the example of Mayor Bloomberg delivering key points of his speeches in both English and Spanish.

This topic is also important to public administration because of normative values regarding policy effectiveness. Public administration emphasizes the values of effectiveness and economy as core values of the field, yet as the work of Chebel d’Appollonia (2012) states, the U.S. continued with “more of the same” failing policies after 9/11, and border escalation measures are costly, especially if these are meant to be mainly symbolic of state sovereignty. The use of public funds and tax dollars for border security and the repeated expansion of the Department of Homeland Security when evidence has found policies to be failing and ineffective is of concern. Democrat representative Raul Grijalva of Arizona reported to the media the SB 1070 boycotts had cost Phoenix alone $90 million from lost conferences, conventions, and concerts; he also brought up what several participants in Yuma County discussed regarding the drop in retail sales along southern Arizona by travelers from Mexico. There was a 40% drop in retail sales along the southern border as of June 2010 (Warren, 2010). Participants in Yuma County discussed how people from Mexico who would do their shopping in the U.S. had stopped doing so as a result of the increased border security measures when SB 1070 was passed. Grijalva also mentioned the allocation of an extra $500 million for
border security and an additional 1,200 National Guard troops from the White House to Arizona after the passage of SB 1070 (Warren, 2010). This is of concern because if SB 1070 is ineffective, then the increases in expenditures related to this policy are a misuse of public funds. Determining the policy’s effectiveness depends on whether the outcomes intended by the bill were achieved, which in this case would include measures of safety and economic growth at the state level; however, as Latino respondents in Arizona discussed, relationships with local law enforcement were immediately severed after SB 1070, as was communication and trust with a number of public entities.

Policy evaluation intertwines different levels of government, public agencies or entities, and a number of street-level bureaucrats (in this case in the areas of public law enforcement, public health, and public education), so considering the effect a policy has on this intersection is also important to public administration.

**Impact on Participation Literature**

The main purpose of this study to the participation literature is to discuss how degenerative policies impact orientations towards government and political participation patterns through a mixed methods research design, which is not often used in this literature. This study includes narratives from Arizona and New York, including Latinos of green card status and of undocumented status, to demonstrate how targeted groups within the causal process are affected and how these perspectives vary; the study also refers to the roles of education, community organizations, and ethnic solidarity play on Latino mobilization and participation.

Arizona residents were angrier and more disappointed as a result of SB 1070 compared to Latinos in New York; yet Latinos in the city of Phoenix had more positive
outlooks than those residing in Yuma County in the border cities of Yuma and San Luis. However, the dynamic along the southern Arizona border and the more harsh and constant exposure to the effects of SB 1070 as a result of the geographical location can be mediated. Two participants in Yuma when asked if affiliated with any community-based organizations that promoted Latino involvement replied, “Are there any organizations like that here?” Participants generally discussed the lack of community-based efforts to activate a very stagnant Latino population in Yuma County. This emphasizes the role of community-based organizations in promoting, educating, and actively recruiting Latinos to become politically engaged, rather than withdraw or alienate from formal political processes. Participants in Phoenix were also the only participants to discuss the presence of Latino solidarity and coming together with other Latinos who “didn’t have their papers, but are like us” after SB 1070, which presents the opportunity for political participation to focus on the contextual role of community leadership to boost solidarity as a way to increase participation.

In addition, participation literature can extend this to other targeted populations, such as other ethnic or religious groups, to learn more about what variables, besides socio-demographic ones, positively impact participation among what Schneider and Ingram call “deviant” and “contender” populations that are socially constructed as undeserving of beneficial public policy.

The study also provides insight on anti-immigrant sentiment, or xenophobia, and how this phenomenon interweaves the perception of a threat to include symbolic threat, as participants discussed the issue of language and identity, as well as a real threat, with participants discussing the suffering economy as a trigger to this sentiment. The
participants of this study, in both Arizona and New York, also discussed the issues of security, safety, and links to terrorism, which are also frameworks that attempt to explain xenophobia.

**Future Research Agenda**

Schneider and Ingram predict less formal participation by targeted groups; however, more political integration and participation is necessary to increase political representation of Latinos. Future research is needed on how degenerative policies like SB 1070 can be mediated. If these send discouraging messages to targeted groups and affect motivation and desire to participate, what can be done to the process to not result in less participation? For example, since respondents in Phoenix shared a more positive outlook on Hispanic political participation than those in Yuma County located closer to the border, perhaps more research is needed on the role of community-based organizations as a mediating variable in the causal process, as well as on the presence or location of these organizations. These can increase trust, hold government accountable, educate the public, are less intimidating for people of lower socio-economic status and people without a college education, and can bridge disenfranchised groups with government.

This study also presents an inconsistency within the Schneider and Ingram framework and SB 1070. Burdensome policy, like SB 1070, is used in times of economic hardship as a political opportunity without a substantial cost. In the case of Arizona, however, the costs of defending the bill in court, the cost related to the increase of personnel in the areas of law enforcement and immigration, the cost of escalated border measures, the cost due to boycotts and lost conferences, events, and concerts, and the
funds the state had to use to boost Arizona’s image and encourage travelers to visit the state after SB 1070 are all uncharacteristic of Schneider and Ingram’s burdensome policy. If this is due to a phobia of immigration and the perception of a real or symbolic threat, or whether other degenerative policies exist and target different groups regardless of financial cost is a further area to study and determine why so; the main appeal of a burdensome policy is it provides just as much, if not more, political support than a beneficial policy at no cost, i.e. a tax break for the middle class (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Further research can explore whether this cost was an unintended consequence or outcome, or whether a certain class of degenerative policies exist and defy the rule by being both burdensome and costly.

Finally, this study partially confirms the effects of a degenerative policy by providing evidence Latino participants felt like targets after SB 1070; participants shared their sense of disappointment with their perception of an unjust policy; the trend was to withdraw from formal political processes and have no desire to participate due to political distrust, frustration and alienation. However, this study also suggests there is more research needed on Latino participation emphasizing variables beyond the classic socio-economic status (SES) model of participation. There is research lacking on participation of Latinos of green card status, who are permanent residents but cannot vote. There is also research lacking on undocumented Latinos. Numerous individuals in this study shared their experience of being undocumented at one point, or of having a family member currently be or have been undocumented during some period of time, and two individuals were willing to share their status as undocumented at the time this study took place. These individuals discussed the manner in which they navigated crossing the
border with an intention to settle permanently due to their undocumented status (most had the intention of traveling back and forth, but are unable to do so without legal status), the maneuvers to find employment, the type of work they face, the challenges with the language and the challenge of not being able to return to visit Mexico.

Participants in this study, both in Arizona and New York, discussed the lack of Latino solidarity, the fragmentation within the group by immigration status, generation status (if native), by English proficiency, and education. There is research lacking to understand why Latinos in Phoenix were more willing to unite with undocumented Latinos, referring to them as “just like us” while those along the southern border in Yuma County were divided and explained there was no “sense of a Latino community.” There is also research missing within the realm of undocumented parents with children born in the U.S. A participant employed by a health organization in Arizona explained this agency no longer served clients unless proof of legal status was brought in as a result of SB 1070, and a participant in New York that worked for a similar organization in mental health also discussed this becomes problematic when a child who is a U.S. citizen needs and is entitled to the services, but has an undocumented parent that may or may not claim services.

Findings indicate community-based advocacy organizations were present in Phoenix, Arizona and New York City, but not in Yuma County; variation between Phoenix and Yuma regarding the presence of Hispanic advocacy organizations is not explained and is an area for further research since the southern border is very exposed and affected by SB 1070.
The role of fear regarding Hispanic political mobilization is also worthy of future study; Hispanics in Arizona expressed a higher level of fear which deterred participants from wanting to engage in political activities, but fear also exists in the native society and fuels anti-immigrant initiatives, which can become a perpetuating cycle. Latinos in New York, however, were not fearful, and it seemed social constructions of Latinos were less negative, threatening, and fearful of Latinos, as well. It is unclear what causes this, if this is a byproduct of the many dimensions of diversity that exist in New York City, or if it is the result of Latino representation.

Moreover, Arizona participants that were most disappointed and fearful were most likely foreign-born, of green card status, not proficient in English, lacking a college education, and had never previously experienced any methods of civic engagement. However, those that were foreign-born and had become naturalized citizens were much more likely to have attended college, be English proficient, and have indicated previous experience of political engagement. If the decision to naturalize is a political one and is influenced by perceptions of incentives and cost, what suppresses eligible Latino residents from applying for naturalized citizenship? Participants in Arizona discussed two obstacles: the financial cost of applying and the oral civic exam that is required and administered by an immigration official in a personal interview in English. One respondent shared the decision to naturalize was personally triggered by the presidential campaign in 2008, “I applied for citizenship because I wanted to vote for Obama in 2008.” The role of political representation, or lack thereof, may influence eligible Latino residents to retain green card status and to remain indifferent or uninterested in participating electorally and through other methods.
Finally, future research can provide a comparative element by looking at other targeted populations to determine whether Hispanics are alone in their patterns of mobilization. A comparative element can examine Muslim Americans, for example, in the U.S. to identify what, if any, themes within the Schneider and Ingram framework also surface and parallel Latinos, and what contextual differences exist. This would help extend participation research beyond socio-demographic variables to determine contextual factors that facilitate political integration and trust within the U.S., which would ultimately positively impact participation patterns of different racial, ethnic, religious groups in the U.S.

**Conclusion**

Findings from this study provided partial evidence of a degenerative policy’s negative impact on political attitudes towards government and, subsequently, participation. The framework was adapted, however, to a policy that resulted during a time of economic hardship, as predicted, but that was financially costly to pass, implement, and defend (in court and through other means), which is not characteristic of a burdensome policy on a targeted population. This can be linked to theories of anti-immigrant sentiment that explain cultural and social values are prioritized over economic implications when host cultures perceive a threat. This study found that while SB 1070 resulted in a widespread negative, angry, and disappointed sentiment among Latinos in both Arizona and New York, those that were most disillusioned and withdrawn from political processes were Latinos in Arizona who were foreign-born, of green card status, not English proficient, and without a college education. Empathy was common in participants who were at one point themselves or had a family member of undocumented
status. Participants in Arizona conceded SB 1070 had a negative effect of trust in government, a negative effect of perceptions of public entities, and a negative effect on their perceptions of government efficacy, conceding SB 1070 communicated Latinos were not important enough, despite their large numbers, to influence or be heard by government. This was exacerbated by the lack of Latino political representation in higher level, decision-making positions and the lack of Latino solidarity.
References


Table 1. “Copycat legislation”

“Copycat” Legislation, as of January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bills introduced in 2010 legislative session, ultimately rejected</th>
<th>Bills introduced in 2011 legislative session, ultimately rejected</th>
<th>Bills Passed</th>
<th>Bills currently pending in state legislatures, as of December 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Maryland</td>
<td>7. Louisiana</td>
<td>*Challenged and blocked by court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nebraska*</td>
<td>10. Nebraska</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. South Carolina*</td>
<td>15. South Dakota</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Texas</td>
<td>17. Virginia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Wyoming</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Reintroduced in 2011 legislative session

*Challenged and blocked by court

Source: National Council of La Raza, 2012
Table 2.1 Main Immigration Phobia Theories

### Summary of Main Immigration Phobia Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Contributing Author(s)</th>
<th>Studies providing Empirical Evidence</th>
<th>Key terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Symbolic Threat</td>
<td>Huntington, 2004</td>
<td>Citrin &amp; Sides, 2007</td>
<td>Symbolic threat to group identity or culture, such as language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Espenshade &amp; Calhoun, 1993</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cornelius, 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Real Threat, derived from rational choice theory</td>
<td>Downs, 1957</td>
<td>Citrin &amp; Sides, 2007</td>
<td>Socio-economic threat; private self-interest; competition in labor market between ethnic groups; access to limited public resources; immigrants impact unemployment rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexseev, 2006</td>
<td>Fetzer, 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cornelius &amp; Rosenblum, 2005</td>
<td>Jackman &amp; Volpert, 1996</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Espenshade &amp; Hempstead, 1996</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alvarez &amp; Butterfield, 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Derived from Perceived Real Threat: Power-Threat Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td>Key, 1949</td>
<td>Key, 1949</td>
<td>Size of out-group is perceived as a threat to political power of dominant group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blalock, 1967</td>
<td>Blalock, 1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derived from Perceived Real Threat: Group Opportunity</td>
<td>Caplan &amp; Paige, 1968</td>
<td>Caplan &amp; Paige, 1968</td>
<td>Impact of different racial groups on a group’s collective opportunities, and whether these are perceived to be open or blocked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Hypothesis</td>
<td>Williams, 1947</td>
<td>Pettigrew et al, 1998 Wilson, 1996</td>
<td>Contact is a mediating variable that impacts attitudes toward the out-group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Dilemma Model</td>
<td>Alexseev, 2006</td>
<td>Alexseev, 2006</td>
<td>Immigration is a threat to society’s safety because of links to border crossings, illegal immigrants, crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, incivilities, urban violence, and ethnicity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Security Model</td>
<td>Chebel d’Appollonia, 2012</td>
<td>Chebel d’Appollonia, 2012</td>
<td>Immigration policies after 9/11 are counter-terrorist polices, and vice-versa; “more of the same” failing policies implemented after 9/11.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2 Variables Associated with Explaining Immigration Phobia Theories
(Unemployment Rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics, August 2011; all other data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Pop. Size</th>
<th>2010 Census &amp; Hispanic Size</th>
<th>Hispanic Pop. Size</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>Age 65/older</th>
<th>College Edu</th>
<th>Median Household Income</th>
<th>% Below Poverty Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>SB 1070</td>
<td>6,392,017</td>
<td>29.6% Hispanic community matching/exceeding national level (16.3%)</td>
<td>9.1% Republican</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>$48,711</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>AB 26</td>
<td>37,253,956</td>
<td>37.6% Hispanic community matching/exceeding national level</td>
<td>11.9% Democrat</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>$58,925</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>HB 1107 and SB 54</td>
<td>5,029,096</td>
<td>20.7% Hispanic community matching/exceeding national level</td>
<td>8.3% Democrat</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>$55,735</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>HB 7089 and SB 2040</td>
<td>18,801,310</td>
<td>22.5% Hispanic community matching/exceeding national level</td>
<td>10.6% Republican</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>$44,755</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>LB 48, rejected at Judicial Committee</td>
<td>1,826,341</td>
<td>9.2% Hispanic community matching/exceeding national level</td>
<td>4.2% Republican</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>$47,470</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Total Hispanic Community</td>
<td>Hispanic Community matching/exceeding national level</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>Variation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8,791,894</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>$68,444</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>19,378,102</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>$54,554</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>SB 9 and HB 9 rejected June 2011; HB 12 also rejected.</td>
<td>25,145,561</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>$48,286</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>HB 56 signed into law June 9, 2011</td>
<td>4,779,736</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>$40,547</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Group “Secure Arkansas” did not achieve signatures necessary for November 2010 ballot, but legislation might be introduced</td>
<td>2,915,918</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>$37,888</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Bill Details</td>
<td>Hispanic Community (2000-2010)</td>
<td>Fiscal Impact</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>% Variation</td>
<td>% Variation</td>
<td>% Variation</td>
<td>% Variation</td>
<td>% Variation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>SB 6 passed the senate but not passed in the house due to fiscal-impact statement.</td>
<td>4,339,367</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$40,061</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>County Commissioners wanted to introduce similar bill, but defeated and did not reach the state house.</td>
<td>5,773,552</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>$69,193</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>SB 2179 and HB 54 passed, but chambers failed to agree on a single version; bill “dead” on March 29, 2011.</td>
<td>2,967,297</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>$36,764</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>HB 343 introduced March 24, 2011.</td>
<td>9,535,483</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>$23,754</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
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<td>State</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>Population 2011</td>
<td>Hispanic Community Growth</td>
<td>Republican %</td>
<td>2010 %</td>
<td>2008 %</td>
<td>2006 %</td>
<td>Income 2010</td>
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<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>S 20 signed into law June 27, 2011</td>
<td>4,625,364</td>
<td>Hispanic community more than doubled between 2000-2010, below national level</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>$42,580</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>SB 0780 and HB 1380 delayed until 2012 based on fiscal note on bills’ projected cost to implement.</td>
<td>6,346,105</td>
<td>Hispanic community more than doubled between 2000-2010, below national level</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>$41,715</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2,059,179</td>
<td>Highest proportion of all states</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>$42,830</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
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</table>
Table 4.3 Differences of means across all seven questions between non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Foreign-born Hispanic, and Spanish-speaking Hispanic respondents, pre and post period

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approval of President</th>
<th>Approval of Republican Leaders in Congress</th>
<th>Approval of Democratic Leaders in Congress</th>
<th>Affiliation with Republican Political Party</th>
<th>Affiliation with Democratic Political Party</th>
<th>Registered to Vote</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Pre</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.272</td>
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<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.258</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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<td>5.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.0%</td>
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<td>4.6%</td>
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<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.113</td>
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<td>-1.3%</td>
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<td>7.9%</td>
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<td>11.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign-born Hispanic</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.123</td>
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<td>-0.072</td>
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<td>-19.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish-speaking</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.462</td>
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<td>5.2%</td>
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<td>-4.9%</td>
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<td>Spanish-speaking</td>
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Table 4.5

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<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
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<td>0.3943</td>
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<td>1.4834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>0.0937</td>
<td>1.0129</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

Table 4.7

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<td>Robust standard errors</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*
### Table 4.9

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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01*

### Table 4.11

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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01*
**Table 4.13**  

Affiliation with Political Party:  
Republican Political Party  

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<th>Odds ratio</th>
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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

**Table 4.15**  

Affiliation with Political Party:  
Republican Political Party, South and West Regions  

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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*
### Table 4.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOGIT</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust standard errors</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-speaking Hispanics</td>
<td>-8.1157 ***</td>
<td>0.3389</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.3290 ***</td>
<td>0.1014</td>
<td>1.3896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>-14.22 ***</td>
<td>0.6965</td>
<td>0.0000664</td>
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<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.0027</td>
<td>1.0123</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.0321</td>
<td>1.0134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>0.0190</td>
<td>1.0829</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
<td>Wald chi² (6)</td>
<td>2209.44</td>
<td>(p-value .0000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0285</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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</tbody>
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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*

### Table 4.19

<table>
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<tr>
<th>LOGIT</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
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<th>Odds ratio</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.4346 *</td>
<td>0.2287</td>
<td>0.6476</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.3080 ***</td>
<td>0.1018</td>
<td>1.3607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
<td>0.5145</td>
<td>0.4702</td>
<td>1.6723</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0117 ***</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>1.0118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>0.0321</td>
<td>1.0191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.0803 ***</td>
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<td>1.0836</td>
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<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>2956</td>
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</tbody>
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*Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01*
Table 4.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered to Vote</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust standard errors</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
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<td>0.1892</td>
<td>0.4308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.0230</td>
<td>0.1317</td>
<td>1.0232</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hispanic x Post Period</td>
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<td>0.3680</td>
<td>1.9412</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0036</td>
<td>1.0304</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.0443</td>
<td>1.3927</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.0682</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(p-value .0000)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.1301</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2996</td>
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Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Table 4.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Ideology: Very Conservative to Very Liberal</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust Standard errors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main predictors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.0680</td>
<td>0.0771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.0574</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Post</td>
<td>-0.0118</td>
<td>0.1512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>*** 0.0012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0490</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>*** 0.0089</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Model significance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>F(6, 2875)</td>
<td>15.24</td>
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<td><strong>Goodness of fit</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.0438</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2882</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance levels are indicated by the following notation * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
Figure 1. Causal Model, Degenerative Policy Design

Causal Model of a Degenerative Policy Design

**Designing Dynamics:**
- Calculating Opportunities & Risks
- Exercising Leadership

**Issue Context**
- Social Constructions
- Political Power
- Institutions

**Policy Designs:**
- Goals & Problems
- Targets, Rules, Tools
- Rationales & Assumptions

**Societal Context:**
- Democratic Values
- Citizenship

**Framing Dynamics:**
- Interpretations of Events, Groups, Knowledge

**Translation Dynamics:**
- Experiences, Messages, Interpretations & Lessons
- Participation Patterns

Curriculum Vitae

Date and Place of Birth:

January 31, 1985    Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico

Education:

Texas A&M International University    Laredo, Texas
College of Arts and Sciences    2008
Degree: Masters in Public Administration

Texas A&M International University    Laredo, Texas
College of Arts and Sciences    2005
Degree: Bachelor of Arts, Communications

Principal Occupations:

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Texas A&M International University    08/08-08/09

Coordinator of Compliance, Financial Aid    Laredo, Texas
Texas A&M International University    05/05-07/08

Publications:
