THE SPIRIT OF MARLOWE: CREATING AN ETHICS ON THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE STAGE

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The Spirit of Marlowe examines the ethics produced through performance in the plays of Christopher Marlowe. It contends that Marlowe’s contribution to the “Golden Age” of the English Renaissance lies in the ethics created on his stage—it is an ethics indebted to and conversant with those prominent in early modern England, but it is markedly “alien” to it; as I will elaborate throughout this dissertation, it has noticeable affinities with the philosophies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Deleuze. A Marlovian Ethics refuses the moralistic strictures of those contemporary ethics that prescribe modes of living; rather, in Spinozist-like fashion, value is attributed \textit{a posteriori} to the affects that are produced by actions and interactions between bodies.

From Dido to the Duke of Guise, Marlowe’s characters seek an ethics of abundance and excess: to become more than, or better than, oneself seems to be the foundational premise of their ethics. The objective of always becoming more than, or better than, one’s current self is indicative of the significance of how the idea of creation, of creativity, undergirds a Marlovian Ethics. As I will demonstrate in my readings of his plays, a Marlovian Ethics is established through various modes of creation: transformation; appropriation, or imitation; destruction, in Deleuzian terms of
territorialization/deterritorialization; pleasure, conceptually akin to Deleuzian desire; and critique.

Marlowe’s understanding of the theater as an apparatus conducive to the construction of an ethics entails a similar understanding of the creative potential of bodies and of spaces: actions build, they create—and create through destruction as well—performance. There is a momentum that characterizes his plays that demonstrates this sense of constant creation—the “ceaseless movement”—of characters and their surroundings, of plot and emotion. In sum, there are three central objectives of this dissertation: 1) to articulate the ethics immanent within Marlowe’s plays, thereby 2) depicting how Marlowe is philosophically aligned with the “bastards” of philosophy, from Lucretius to Deleuze; and finally 3) to evaluate Marlowe’s plays in order to reveal their value as a “minor literature” alongside the academic industry of Shakespeare.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my lovely puppies, Deleuze and Marlowe, who have imbued my life with infinite sweetness and light.
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The work was good, but dangerous…. They knew he was great, but they feared the intensity of his gift, and also what his subject matter might reveal about themselves. ¹

This is the spirit of Marlowe.

Patti Smith’s observation about Robert Mapplethorpe, who was a master of S&M and erotic photography, also bespeaks the force of Christopher Marlowe, whose plays are filled with black humor, homoeroticism, and are blatantly, and anachronistically, devoid of “political correctness.” The perceived danger of Marlowe’s plays lies in the magnitude of their affective potentiality; they are defined by their audacity and recklessness, not by their measured constraint. As Smith intimates, how Marlowe’s plays affect their audiences says more about the audiences than about the plays themselves.

*The Spirit of Marlowe* is a study of the ethics produced through performance in Marlowe’s plays: to contend that Marlowe’s contribution to the “golden age” of the English Renaissance lies in a timeless, or “untimely,” ethics because it resonates with those ethics conceived by more “modern” figures such as Nietzsche and Deleuze. Philosophical in scope, the objectives of this dissertation are to extract and articulate the ethics performed in Marlowe’s plays and, in turn, to formulate the conceptual tools necessary in order to contextualize a Marlovian Ethics not only in juxtaposition to contemporary ethics of the English Renaissance but also in relation to a range of extant philosophies of ethics—all distinguished by their advancement of materialist philosophy,

and all notorious for their unorthodox and eccentric perspectives on how to live one’s life well. Therefore, the aim of each chapter is to develop a tenet—a philosophical concept, and the correlative theatrical or performative techne—of what I am calling a “Marlovian Ethics.” In imagining and conceptualizing a “Marlovian Ethics,” my dissertation will demonstrate the extent to which Marlowe’s drama is iconoclastic and, arguably, how it has contributed to both the development of drama and, more significantly, to understandings about life and how to live life well.

A Marlovian Ethics is one that boldly positions itself as an alternative to the more traditional ethical philosophies extant in early modern England. The unconventional ethical positions created in his plays are eccentric and markedly different from pre-eminent modes of conduct and decorum advanced by popular humanist texts during the sixteenth-century in England, even though this ethics itself is founded upon these very same humanist texts that Marlowe read throughout his grammar school and Cambridge University education. The ethics of the English Renaissance correlated with the culture of humanism that sought to recuperate classical values. Robin H. Wells explains, “[i]n its broadest sense, Renaissance humanism was a literary culture that concerned itself with the question of how to promote civilized values and at the same time guard against the barbarism to which the baser side of human nature always to lead.”

Thus, he maintains, “[t]he ruling ambition of the humanists was to recover the values of classical civilization.” Classical values connote a classical, “civilized” ethics—a lifestyle that enacts and promotes those values. Ethics, then, for ardent English humanists, was

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3 Ibid.
essentially understood as moral philosophy. Through an appropriation of classical sources, above all, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and his *Politics* and Cicero’s *De Officiis*, as well as the work of Christian writers such as Augustine and Aquinas, poets and scholars looked to reintroduce ethical ideas about how man could attain the supreme good of “happiness” (*eudaimonia*) through fashioning himself as a virtuous, civic-minded, member of society. One of the period’s most famous examples, Ben Jonson, whose pedantry effortlessly extended to the realm of ethics, championed classical, civic-minded values through the study of poetry in his *Discoveries*: “[poetry] offers to mankind a certain rule, and pattern of living well, and happily.”

Jonson, like his contemporaries who esteemed literary study (and especially the study of rhetoric), comprehended the ethical import of poetry like his humanist peers. My impetus in this dissertation similarly seeks to extract and elevate the ethics at work in Marlowe’s theatrical poetry—an ethics that, clearly, Jonson would not approve.

The humanist philosophy of ethics developed throughout the sixteenth-century in England is cloaked in moral righteousness and given a sympathetic and “admirable” face in prominent personages of the time, with Sir Philip Sidney arguably being the most notable figure of Marlowe’s period. A courtly gentleman, soldier, and poet, Sidney’s humanism consisted of an amalgamation of a Christianized Aristotelian, Ciceronian, and Platonic ethics, which could be condensed into the simple category of a Christian moral philosophy. This philosophy advocated an ethics of contemplation; man’s aim was to

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5 “In 1579, when Sidney was only twenty-five, Edmund Spenser addressed him as the ‘president,’ that is the perfect union, ‘of nobles and of chivalry’” (cited in W.A. Ringler Jr., “Sir Philip Sidney: The Myth and The Man,” in *Sir Philip Sidney: 1586 and the*
live a contemplative life by elevating his mind—in Sidney’s words—“from the dungeon of the body to the enjoying of his own divine essence.”

Shirking the body’s needs and desires allowed man to contemplate life’s meaning purely, unadulterated by the filthy, distracting, “dungeon” of the body. Man’s capacity to reason provided him the ability to fashion himself as a morally virtuous individual; at the same time, the capacity to reason was valued because it allowed man to intuit Providential control, “a central tenet of Protestantism from which,” Arthur Kinney notes, “Sidney never wavered.”

Sidney’s death in 1586 could even be considered a watershed moment in England’s cultural history: the kind of ethics embodied by Sidney was supplanted in the late 1580s by what I am referring to as a “Marlovian Ethics.” Specifically, the “Sidneyean Ethics” that promoted an Anglicized version of Christian morality—which relied upon the epistemological belief that man’s rational mind was guided by Providence, and which, consequently, esteemed the development of the ascetic mind above the “filthy” body—soon gave way to a very different ethics performed in Marlowe’s plays.

One would probably openly laugh at the thought of Tamburlaine giving a fellow soldier the last few sips of water from his canteen—as Sidney was said to have done, moments before his death from a war wound.

A contemporary of Sidney, Fulke Greville perpetuated the myth of Sidney’s death: “…and being thirsty with excess of bleeding, he called for drink, which was presently brought him; but as he was putting the bottle to his mouth, he saw a poor soldier carried along, who had eaten his last at the same feast, ghastly casting up his eyes at the bottle. Which Sir Philip Sidney perceiving, took it from his head before he drank, and delivered

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8 A contemporary of Sidney, Fulke Greville perpetuated the myth of Sidney’s death: “…and being thirsty with excess of bleeding, he called for drink, which was presently brought him; but as he was putting the bottle to his mouth, he saw a poor soldier carried along, who had eaten his last at the same feast, ghastly casting up his eyes at the bottle. Which Sir Philip Sidney perceiving, took it from his head before he drank, and delivered
philosophically different from contemporary humanist philosophies that promoted the cultivation of a socially (and therefore politically) responsible, moral, person. A Marlovian Ethics could be considered akin to a kind of ethics propounded most famously by his contemporary Montaigne, who, in his *Essais*, recommends that in order to know what is best for one’s self, man needs to study himself and acknowledge that what is good for his own individual person may not be good for the general welfare of the state. The early modern notion of the “common good” is not a concept advocated by the likes of Tamburlaine, or any of Marlowe’s other protagonists for that matter. A Marlovian Ethics is an ethics that is created for the *living* body, a body that wants more, that is continuously becoming something else, something different, and something more than it already is. It is not an ethics of human “citizens”; in Nietzschean terms, it is not the ethics of the herd. A Marlovian Ethics, furthermore, is devoid of moral imperative, and, correlatively, it places an emphasis on the welfare of the individual body and not the collective body of humanity; that is, it is not a humanist ethics. The fact that it is not a humanist ethics is also exhibited by the ceaseless becoming of Marlowe’s protagonists; their bodies overflow with forces that crave to become more. This stands in contradistinction with the tenet of Renaissance humanist ethics that champions a type of self-preservation.

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9 This contention appears variously throughout his essays; see, for instance, “That the taste of good and evil things depends in large part on the opinions we have of them,” “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” and “On Repenting” (Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech (New York: Penguin Books, 1993)).

10 The act of preservation is a humanist imperative, claims Aaron Kunin, in his recent essay “Shakespeare’s Preservation Fantasy”: “Preservation is a value shared by
It is in part from this perspective that Harry Levin gave the appellation of “the overreacher” to all of Marlowe’s protagonists. In his seminal study The Overreacher: A Study of Christopher Marlowe, Levin wrote that Marlowe’s protagonists were overreachers in the sense of being excessive, and, he claims, daringly hyperbolic. He posits that Marlowe’s plays—and, therefore, implicitly Marlowe’s ethics—are crafted from the playwright’s beloved “heresies” Epicureanism, Machiavellianism, and Atheism. Levin calls upon George Puttenham, self-proclaimed master of rhetoric, for his working definition of hyperbole: “the Ouer reacher, otherwise called loud lyer.” Hyperbole is equated with “overreaching speech,” which Levin attributes to all Marlowe’s protagonists for their “ethos of living dangerously.” To be an overreacher, furthermore, implies that Marlowe’s protagonists are “untimely” because they refuse to conform to the morality of custom: “Marlowe’s heroes..., [b]y conquering kingdoms or amassing fortunes or scrutinizing the cosmos,...challenge the more settled ways of living. And, just as they break down the barrier between realities and figures of speech, so they seem to override distinctions between this world and any other.”

Marlowe’s protagonists certainly bear resemblance to characters in earlier drama, from Senecan revengers to medieval Vice characters, but they are uniquely Marlovian Renaissance humanism and by the humanities and sciences in modern academic culture” (PMLA 124.1 (January 2009): 92).

11 Levin elaborates upon Marlowe’s three heresies: “Epicureanism might have been libido sentiendi, the appetite for sensation; his Machiavellianism might have been libido dominandi, the will to power; and his Atheism libido sciendi, the zeal for knowledge. Singly and in combination he dramatized these ideas—these ‘highest reaches of a humaine wit’—pushing them to limits beyond which no other writer had gone...” (The Overreacher: A Study of Christopher Marlowe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 27).

12 Ibid., 23.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 26.
creations—born from the past, but ultimately dissimilar to what has come before. His characters, like his plays, carry elements of the untimely, and my analyses of his plays, read in juxtaposition to more recent continental philosophy, emphasizes the untimeliness of his plays—and, therefore, of his ethics. Marlowe’s protagonists’ “break[ing] down barrier[s]” supports the idea of their untimeliness. In asserting that Marlowe’s protagonists are untimely, I am also arguing that a Marlovian Ethics is imbued with an untimely quality as an ethics that sits contrapuntally to the humanist ethics of Elizabethan England. A Marlovian Ethics is untimely, in other words, because it is “out of fashion” with acceptable codes of living. In Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare, Jonathan Gil Harris explicates Nietzsche’s concept of the untimely—“unzeitgemässe”—in his theorizing of the multiple temporalities of objects.

For Nietzsche…that which is unzeitgemässe is out-of-time, inhabiting a moment but also alien and out of step with it. Hence it is often translated as “unfashionable” and “unmodern.” Both terms suggest the anachronistic apparition of a supposedly superseded past in the present, a scenario that resonates with Nietzsche the philosopher’s fascination with etymological roots and Nietzsche the Hellenist’s love of classical philosophy. Yet his unzeitgemässe does not simply connote the persistence of the past in the present, it brings with it the difference that produces the possibility of a new future even as it evokes the past. As he argues in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” Nietzsche sees the untimely as “acting
counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the
benefit of a time to come.”

Harris utilizes Nietzsche’s concept in his construction of three theories of temporality
specifically, the idea of the untimely coinciding most explicitly with “the logic of
explosion”—the logic that the old shatters the uniformity of the new—and with “the logic
of conjunction”—the logic, smacking of Bergson’s understanding of temporality as the
blending threads of past time which come to produce the present.

This excerpt from Harris’s text bespeaks the dynamic, untimely qualities of a
Marlovian Ethics: it is an ethics immanent from those prominent in early modern
England, but it is markedly “alien” to it, and thus, as I will elaborate throughout this
dissertation, it has noticeable affinities with the philosophies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and
Deleuze. A Marlovian Ethics refuses the moralistic strictures of those contemporary
ethics that prescribe modes of living; rather, in Spinozist-like fashion, value is attributed
a posteriori to the affects that are produced by actions and interactions between bodies. In
Harris’s estimation, something that is untimely “brings with it the difference that
produces the possibility of a new future even as it evokes the past,” which, again, could
be said to characterize a Marlovian Ethics. For, just as a Marlovian Ethics resonates with
philosophies of the future, it does indeed cull from philosophies of the past, particularly,
as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the materialist philosophies of Epicurus and of
Lucretius’s *On the Nature of Things*. That Lucretius was considered antagonistic to, and
slightly marginalized in relation to, the esteemed figures of 16th century England further
speaks to Marlowe’s untimeliness.

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15 Jonathan Gil Harris, *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare* (Philadelphia: The
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 11.
From Dido to the Duke of Guise, Marlowe’s characters seek an ethics not of the virtuous Aristotelian “mean,” or the temperance of Greek “tranquility” (*ataxaria*), but of abundance and excess: to become more than, or better than, oneself seems to be the foundational premise of their ethics. The objective of always becoming more than, or better than, one’s current self is indicative of the significance of how the idea of creation, of creativity, undergirds a Marlovian Ethics. As I will demonstrate in my readings of his plays, a Marlovian Ethics is established through various modes of creation: transformation; appropriation, or imitation; destruction, in Deleuzian terms of territorialization/deterritorialization; pleasure, conceptually akin to Deleuzian desire; and critique. These modes constitute the actions—the actual physical, thematic, and structural movements—of the plays. Indeed, they could even be considered Marlovian trademarks on the genre. Marlowe’s understanding of the theater as an apparatus conducive to the construction of an ethics entails a similar understanding of the creative potential of bodies and of spaces: actions build, they create—and create through destruction as well—performance. There is a momentum that characterizes his plays that demonstrates this sense of constant creation—the “ceaseless movement”—of characters and their surroundings, of plot and emotion. The language of performance is affective, and it is that affect that in part comprises the materiality of space. Dramatic language produces affect, which is the material, the matter, of space. Space is felt. It is lived. And, in drama, spaces are created through and in performance, with language, with action. In sum, there are three central objectives of this dissertation: 1) to articulate the ethics immanent within Marlowe’s plays, thereby 2) depicting how Marlowe is philosophically aligned with the
“bastards” of philosophy, from Lucretius to Deleuze; and finally 3) to evaluate Marlowe’s plays in order to reveal their value as a “minor literature” alongside the academic industry of Shakespeare.

“From jigging veins of rhyming [scholar] wits” to “a martyrology feeding on corpses”

This study of Marlowe’s plays adopts an eclectic methodological approach: it is primarily philosophical in its Deleuzian-materialism, with an emphasis on close-reading as practiced by Barbara Johnson and other deconstructive critics; it carries undercurrents of performance theory and post-structuralism pace Foucault, while also, admittedly, emerging out of the domain of New Historicism that undermined transcendental theories and “grand narratives” with its elevation of alternative voices into scholarly consideration. It also employs an unapologetic, Nietzschean tone. Finally, it departs from the habits of much current scholarship by devoting itself to an intensive study of a single “author,” in this case, the playwright Christopher Marlowe. Of course, as J.A. Downe explains, “[w]e know next to nothing about Christopher Marlowe. When we speak or

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16 Patrick Hayden offers the philosophical genealogy within which I would like to place Marlowe; or, more precisely, he provides the thinkers with whom Marlowe has a philosophical affinity: “Although Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza are radically different thinkers whose philosophies are often vastly divergent, for Deleuze they are all united on these points at least: The critique of transcendental realms, causes, values, and principles, and the affirmation of a dynamic, fluid, and immanent world within which human beings exist and create diverse ways of living. In this respect, all three thinkers are regarded by Deleuze as belonging to a philosophical tradition that affirms immanence and criticizes supernatural, divine, or mythical versions of transcendence” (in Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 68-69).
write about him, we are really referring to a construct called ‘Marlowe.’”[17] And, while I gleefully approve of Simon Shepherd’s estimation that “Marlowe’s name…means, before anything else, sex and violence,”[18] this study is completely uninterested in the historical Marlowe, instead, the “construct called ‘Marlowe’” that emerges within the forthcoming analyses is in essence a signifying body of the collective philosophical tendencies (the “ethics”) of the plays under discussion.

One might assume, considering the salaciousness of Marlowe’s plays, that Marlovian criticism would be just as enticing. Sadly, it is not—save a few sensational, and acrimonious, meta-critical pieces that detail the unsatisfactory state of Marlovian criticism.[19] Most meta-critical pieces that chart the history of Marlovian criticism—and of early modern dramatic criticism as well—mark a radical turn in the mid-1970s away from New Criticism and toward a Foucauldian-inspired New Historicism. Critics such as Richard Wilson and J.T. Parnell cite the 1976 English Institute essays offered by Marjorie Garber and Stephen Greenblatt as “effectively la[ying] down parameters of Marlovian criticism” for the remainder of the 20th century and into the 21st.[20]

“Dedicated to the memory of W.K. Wimsatt, the godfather of (the old) New Criticism,” Wilson observes, “Garber’s essay also looked forward to New Historicism when it

described Marlowe’s theater as a claustrophobic nightmare,…reveal[ing] the Renaissance dramatist to be a post-structuralist *avant la lettre*, caging his protagonists in mazes of their own making.”

Garber, whom Wilson describes as “a self-appointed *belle dame sans merci*,” effectively “frenchified” Marlowe, whereby her analytical method consists “of inscribing everything and seeing everything as inscribed.”

Greenblatt’s Marlowe was *avant Foucault*, more politically motivated than Garber’s, and, therefore, in the increasingly “irrelevant” humanities, more valuable, especially during the Reagan Era of the 1980s. For Greenblatt, Marlowe’s protagonists’ transgressiveness was bound by the Foucauldian logic that all identity (and thus “being”) was an ideological product of power. Nothing can escape power, so, in Greenblatt’s estimation, the protagonists’ “will to play” results in total destruction: “This is play on the brink of an abyss, *absolute* play.”

Greenblatt reads Marlowe negatively, through a Judeo-Christian lens that evaluates the “will to play” as negation, rather than seeing the creation that is sparked by this playfulness, as I discuss in Chapter 3. Wilson observes the significance of Greenblatt’s reading both within Marlovian criticism and literary criticism at large, regarded as the origin of New Historicism, or, quoting Deleuze, “a martyrlogy feeding on corpses”:

Greenblatt’s re-reading of Marlowe initiated a decade of so-called “political criticism” that interpreted Renaissance literature through just such a disingenuous identification with the marginalized voices of the

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22 Ibid.; Wilson, “‘Writ in blood,’” 127.
ruled, exploited, oppressed, and excluded, or what Deleuze acutely anathematized as “a martyrology feeding on corpses.” The bad faith of this “mime…in which intellectuals who occupy the place of master identify with the persecuted,” had been discernible in Greenblatt’s original paper.

Wilson, via Deleuze, perfectly encapsulates the negativity inherent in the New Historicist enterprise (granted, through his own noticeable harsh criticism): the methodology—exuding Christian pathos—is fundamentally reactive. The Marlovian World Picture it paints, while devoid of a grand historical narrative, is grim, claustrophobic, confining, and lifeless. New Criticism cautiously lauded Marlowe’s “overreachers” as characters who epitomized the aspirations of the “Renaissance man,” albeit with dramatic exaggeration. However, Wilson elaborates, New Historicists countered this reading by asserting that “it is the very limits imposed by orthodoxy that produce transgression, and which suspend the plays in an endless oscillation between power and subversion. Thus,” he concludes, “the Marlowe who was restored to the labyrinth of his texts came to seem strongly like the academic in the contemporary university: willful, masochistic, and defiant.”

New Historicism has continued to dominate Marlovian criticism since Garber’s and Greenblatt’s respective essays. Their colleagues and students in the 1980s and 1990s produced readings of Marlowe’s plays and of early modern drama at large that focused on themes and characterizations of Foucauldian “transgression” with particular regard to

24 Wilson, “‘Writ in blood,’” 124.
25 Ibid., 132.
minor cultures.\textsuperscript{26} Emily Bartels’s 1993 graduate dissertation turned prize-winning monograph, \textit{Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe}, hallmarks this trend. Soon the application of postcolonial theories to early modern drama, including Marlowe’s plays, became pervasive as the new type of political, and “politically-correct,” criticism aimed at exposing the “marginalized voices” of the past.\textsuperscript{27} Critical attention to kinds of social and political “alienation,” concomitant with the rise of women’s and LGBT studies in the late 1980s, led to an abundance of criticism that delineated and examined the homoerotic tendencies apparent in Marlovian drama (and suggested to reflect Marlowe’s own life).\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26} J.T. Parnell explains this critical movement in the 1980s: “The felt need to counter liberal-humanist interpretations of Renaissance drama led in the 1980s to a new critical emphasis on the period’s ‘other’ sides, especially those transgressive and marginal discourses which were perceived to challenge the dominance of oppressive orthodoxy” (8). Yet, Parnell notes the discrepancy in what occurs in this type of criticism: “Apparently sensitive to questions of performance and audience response, critics such as Greenblatt, James Shapiro, Thomas Cartelli, and Emily Bartels paradoxically move, in their zeal to access Renaissance ‘realities,’ further and further away from the particularities of Marlowe’s texts and ‘the praxis of theatre’” (Ibid.).


\textsuperscript{28} Seminal Marlovian studies of sexuality and gender in the 1990s, usually in regard to \textit{Edward II} or to \textit{Hero and Leander}, include Bartels’s “The Show of Sodomy: Minions and Dominions in \textit{Edward II},” \textit{Spectacles of Strangeness}; Claude Summers “Sex, Politics,
While I am critical of New Historicism, it would be irresponsible to claim that my dissertation has not been influenced by its methods, if only because it is a product of its academic time—with the academic impetus being to “always historicize.” With this critical imperative looming large over this dissertation, I have attempted to break away from this method in order to write an affirmative, a-moral, and philosophical study of Marlowe’s plays. The philosophies of Spinoza, Bergson, Nietzsche, and, especially, Deleuze offered me the means by which I could create such a study—a close reading of Marlowe’s plays in an effort to write a philosophy of Marlovian Ethics. The hinge of this dissertation, which connects drama and philosophy, is style. Aesthetics. Art. “It’s the styles of life involved in everything that make us this or that,” Deleuze says in an interview reprinted in Negotiations. My understanding of “ethics” is explicitly aesthetic in nature; it coincides with both Deleuze’s and Foucault’s definition of the concept: establishing ways of existing or styles of life isn’t just an aesthetic matter, it’s what Foucault called ethics, as opposed to morality. The difference is that morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to


transcendent values…; ethics is a set of optional rules that assesses what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved…. What are we “capable” of seeing and saying…? But if there’s a whole ethics in this, there’s an aesthetics too.\textsuperscript{30}

Deleuze’s observation of the similarity between ethics and aesthetics allows him to establish a relation between ethics and drama when he asserts that “everyday life is full of dramatizations.”\textsuperscript{31} Philosophical concepts come to life through drama:

Given any concept, we can always discover its drama, and the concept would never be divided or specified in the world of representation without the dramatic dynamisms that thus determine it in a material system beneath all representation.\textsuperscript{32}

This dissertation performs a reverse method, of sorts: my objective is to extract the concepts at work within the drama but which are made perceptible only by the “dramatic dynamisms”—the performance—of the drama itself.

My study of Marlowe’s plays will be different from critical interpretations that are driven by the political commitment of showing how literary texts are “relevant” through historical contextualization; instead my study will value the actions and language of the plays and place its methodological commitment in showing how the plays themselves are significant for their creation of philosophy of ethics. An enabling premise for the project is that art, and specifically Marlowe’s drama, creates new modes of existence and ethics while philosophy, in turn, allows for the conceptualizing of this new ethics. This

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 98.
understanding of the purpose of art—to not reflect reality but to create it—is essential to
my line of thinking and is explicitly derived from Deleuze’s work. Marlowe’s drama is
great art by Deleuzian standards because it presents various modes of existence that clash
with extant contemporary modes of decorous living.

There have been some recent studies focused on early modern drama that seek to
examine drama philosophically, such as Michael Witmore’s *Shakespeare’s Metaphysics*,
although he abstains from utilizing Deleuze’s “anti-humanist” work alongside the other
“philosophers of immanence” (Spinoza, Bergson, Whitehead) because his intention is “to
understand how a particular kind of human being is preserved within…the emotionally
charged worlds that Shakespeare creates…” In contrast, Deleuze is the philosopher who
foremost figures in my examination of Marlowe’s plays—specifically because he
advances an ontology that is profoundly anti-humanist and that champions “becoming
over being,” and, thus, professes time as the quintessential force of life. In addition,
Jonathan Gil Harris’s *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare* (2008) is another
recent critical study of temporality and materiality in early modern drama that shows
affinities to my dissertation, although his objectives are more aligned with matters of
material cultures than my own. Similar to my own interest in the creative immanence of
Marlowe’s plays, Ruth Linney’s superb *Marlowe and the popular tradition* explores how
“Marlowe’s ‘newness’ lies…in transforming the familiar, [and] in the way he makes use
of…old ways and old values.” Linney and I share the sentiment about the abundant
creativity manifest on Marlowe’s stage; while my project is primarily concerned with

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34 Ruth Linney, *Marlowe and the popular tradition* (New York: Manchester University
deciphering the ethical effects of this creativity, her methodological approach, however, is more historical, and slightly more phenomenologically-oriented, whereby her objective is discover how Marlowe created a new theatrical experience for theatergoers prior to 1595 (which she equates with the popular arrival of Shakespeare): “In six years, 1587 to 1593, the new rhetoric of Christopher Marlowe transformed theatrical experience in the London playhouses…. Marlowe’s plays, in effect, changed the ways that a spectator might see and make sense of the action on stage.”\textsuperscript{35} This dissertation also shares a generic affiliation with those recent studies representative of the “philosophical-turn,” including Colin McGinn’s \textit{Shakespeare’s Philosophy: Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays} (2006), in which he traces the philosophical themes prevalent in Shakespeare’s plays, and critical volumes such as (ed.) Michael D. Bristol’s \textit{Shakespeare and Moral Agency} (2010). Most noticeably, my work has been heavily inspired by the work of Elizabeth Grosz, who first introduced me (in various seminars and in her writings) to philosophy and the exquisite group of materialist, a-moral, philosophers of becoming: Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuze.

This dissertation is structured as part monograph, part philosophical assay, such that each chapter contains a close-reading of one Marlovian play (save Chapter 5, which considers two plays) in order to excavate and render the philosophical concept(s) immanent within the play itself that in turn come to define a Marlovian Ethics. The structure of this dissertation is rhizomatic; there is no argumentative progression, but there is, with any philosophical exploration, an increasing clarity in the conceptual components at work in the plays, which comprise a Marlovian Ethics. The concept of

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 182.
time, for example—proposed as the constitutive element of an ethics—while most readable in *Doctor Faustus*, is at work within all the plays. Minor argumentative threads apparent in the plays’ themes, motifs, and tropes that bespeak larger issues within drama—about genre, imagery, and rhetoric—run throughout the dissertation. Because this dissertation is philosophical in scope, the chapters, outlined below, are arranged conceptually, as follows:

*Queer Imitatio* as the Plane of Marlovian Ethics

In this preliminary chapter, I contend that *Dido* exists as the foundational plane within which Marlowe’s philosophical, dramatic concepts crystalize and emerge in his later plays. Because it was written during his Cambridge Years, Marlowe’s creative process for *Dido* was highly influenced by the trivium (grammar, logic, rhetoric), which formed the core of his humanist training at Cambridge. The challenge for this young scholar was to re-conceive this knowledge into a performative, pragmatic knowledge fit for the stage, and the humanist elevation of rhetoric enabled him to make this transition to the stage with ease. Marlowe seizes on the humanist conception of rhetoric as an instrument of power to be employed in the theater and amplifies its power as a material force in his drama to develop what critics have deemed his “mighty line,” a combination of bombast and eloquence. This articulation of rhetoric bespeaks the palpable, material power that it carries as an affective force, and it is with this understanding that Marlowe firsts harnesses the power of rhetoric for the stage in *Dido*. The principle ethic, therefore, at work within *Dido* is that of a *queer imitatio*: what Marlowe imitates in his plays is what traditionally would be discarded or overlooked as immoral, uncivic, and therefore
unworthy of imitation. The product of this *queer imitatio* is an eccentric type drama that challenges dramatic and generic convention and which will come to be recognizably deemed “Marlovian.” In this chapter, I examine how *queer imitatio* takes effect in *Dido, Queen of Carthage* in order to demonstrate how this play, while amateur in show, manifests multiple sites of dramatic invention through Marlowe’s conceptualization of rhetoric as a type of affective, (im)material force—in *Dido*, this rhetoric is explicitly saturated with pleasure, such that the forces that dictate the play’s action are motivated and compelled by pleasure. By organizing all character and dramatic action in terms of the interplay between forces, Marlowe not only creates a play that challenges generic convention but also lays the foundations of the anti-humanist ethics emergent in his later plays.

**The Materiality of Time; or, the Marlovian Spirit**

Chapter 2 is an examination of time, the constitutive element of an ethics, through a reading of *Doctor Faustus*. Through a dramatic adaptation of the Faust Legend, Marlowe presents a consideration of the temporality of ethics—how time gives shape to our lives in both material and seemingly immaterial ways. Time operates as the plane of immanence from which the techné of one’s life emerge, are cultivated, and are articulated as an “ethics.” Time in this capacity is not conceptualized quantitatively but qualitatively, as “duration.” In drama as in life, time is experienced as duration. The quantitative figure of time—the two hours of the performance; the twenty-four years as “spirit both in forme and substance” contracted to Faustus—has relatively little consequence both to the ethics that are created *in* the time of the performance and to the
play’s ability to affect its audience. By utilizing the form of drama, Marlowe uses
dramatic time in order to depict a life that is cultivate in an a-moral, anti-Christian time.
The dramatic time of the play moves with Faustus through the performance of his ethics,
through his adventures, conjurings, and interactions with other bodies on stage. The
philosophical underpinnings of this chapter derive explicitly from Henri Bergson’s
philosophy of temporality and his conception of spirit as a form of duration which
vitalizes matter. But with a difference, since Marlowe’s understanding of “spirit” is
influenced by contemporary occult connotations of the 16th century, such that Marlowe’s
spirit becomes a performative principle of creation. No longer simply duration in the
Bergsonian sense, spirit is a vital force that is performed and made real through the
actor’s body. Marlowe uses the concept “spirit” to present the embodiment of the
dynamic qualities that characterize the life lived outside a Christian telos and therefore
functions as the embodiment of Faustus’s ethics. Time becomes nothing less than a form
of spirit that imbues a body with freedom.

The Materiality of Space; or, the Synchronous Creation of Space and Ethics

The ontological impetus of Chapter 2 in deciphering the “materials” that make an
ethics corresponds with that of Chapter 3. The philosophical concept analyzed in this
chapter, through a reading of the two parts of Tamburlaine, is space. Logical convention
holds that space is the ontological ground upon which bodies move, but, as I argue in
Chapter 2, it is time that is the plane of immanence of movement, of action, and,
therefore, of an ethics. Utilizing the work of Henri Bergson, again, along with those of
Elizabeth Grosz, I contend that space does not exist prior to its occupation; rather, I
would like to propose that space is created as an effect of acting bodies. In the two parts of *Tamburlaine*, Marlowe advances, through performance, the idea that spaces and ethics actualize as the effects of bodily actions—the affective interactions between and among bodies—on stage. Significant, then, is the observation, through a reading of *Tamburlaine*, that both spaces and ethics are established externally to the bodies whose actions allow for their creation. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how space is produced through a reading of the play and articulate its creation as a philosophical tenet of a Marlovian Ethics: an ethics is created external to the bodies that act, through the affectations produced by the actions of these bodies, and thereby is perceptible in the spaces created through that performance. Marlowe uses the physical apparatus—the body—of the theater to show how these created spaces materialize and become palpable through the stage actions that constitute *Tamburlaine* as performance. *Tamburlaine*, as my reading will prove, is a play about the creation of an ethics and the creation of spaces, which are both an effect of and a condition for that ethics. At the same time, the physical and verbal movements—perceived by the audience as “performance”—that define those spaces, in turn, define those ethics. In short, there is an affective correlation between the spaces and the ethics created on stage, and this correlation is predicated upon movement, which is always affective.

**The Apolitics of Ethics**

Chapter 4 shifts the philosophical focus from an analysis of some of the foundational elements of an ethics and the bodies that create them to a discussion of politics in Marlovian drama via a reading of *Edward II*. Marlowe posits a politics that
coheres with the type of materialist, self-directed ethics he promotes in his plays. The philosophy of Marlowe’s plays advances a politics that draws upon, but ultimately diverges from, the traditional, humanist political practices of Elizabethan England. The combination of the more contemporary, anti-naturalist politics of Machiavelli and Montaigne along with the Epicurean school of Hellenistic philosophy provides Marlowe his very own eccentric, iconoclastic politics performed in his plays. Marlowe’s politics, furthermore, correlate with his ethics in that both have a strong foundation in materialism. This materialism is, I think, quite explicit in the gritty materialism of Machiavelli’s politics, but also in Epicurus’s, whose materialism was interpreted by his follower Lucretius in the poem *On the Nature of Things*, analyzed in Chapter 2. The relation of Marlovian Ethics to Marlovian Politics differs from the traditional relation of ethics to politics in that the care of the self is not displaced for the care of others. Specifically, the traditional relation, originating from the empathic, shared “human condition,” esteems the welfare of the collective over the individual. This utilitarian idea does not undergird the relation between a Marlovian ethics and politics—instead, this relation centers on the wellbeing of the individual. Through a dramatization of historical record, Marlowe makes politics the thematic force of the play. Through a reading of *Edward II* and a dissection of the concept the king’s two bodies, I will examine and define the type of politics that Marlowe presents alongside his ethics. In fact, the type of politics that Marlowe advances through the actions (ethics) of his protagonist, Edward II, emerges as a radical response to the politics performed by Edward’s opposing factions: a traditional, humanist politics, not so genuinely championed by the nobles, and a more devious Machiavellian politics promoted by the likes of Mortimer Junior and Queen
Isabella. Marlowe shows that, while politics is unavoidable, especially for Edward II, one is able to create his own politics in relation to his own ethics. Edward’s politics radically breaks from the politics of the state because it is self-directed and one that emerges from an ethics based on satisfying the needs of the self; needs directed to and towards expanding pleasure.

**Affective Instrumentality**

Chapter 5 presents a closer examination of the affective connections that inform the creation of an ethics on stage. In this chapter, I will analyze the bodily relations between the protagonist and other performative bodies, not in familiar terms of friendship, but within the ethical and affective domains of instrumentality via a reading of *The Jew of Malta* and *The Massacre at Paris*—Marlowe’s two plays that demonstrate how to capitalize—financially, politically, or otherwise—upon the instrumentality of bodies to one’s advantage. The connection between affect and instrumentality is that both directly affect a body’s power to act. The instrument is a performative device that literalizes the power of affect on stage, and, in this regard, the instrument becomes affective in its ability to affect the protagonist. It also, when joined with the user, expands the affective domain of the user’s body, thereby expanding that body’s horizon of affective potential—increasing that body’s capacity to be affected. (In Chapter 3, I presented a similar argument when I analyzed the affective spatiality of Tamburlaine’s body in relation to the concurrent creation of ethics and spaces.) The Marlovian ethic at work in these plays, in light of the above philosophical exposition, is the efficacious use of instruments to improve one’s ability to act. Drama, then, can be regarded as the “art of
ethics,” and instruments come into play when “organizing good encounters, composing actual relations, focusing powers, [and] experimenting.” My analysis will therefore focus on how instruments work and on how the protagonists—Barabas in The Jew, and the Duke, in The Massacre—harness and employ these instruments to their advantage. These protagonists exhibit the ability to “cunningly” use other bodies but, at the same time, remain emotionally detached from them. Furthermore, for both these protagonists, the ideological body of religion is utilized for their respective objectives, donned as guises to further their own respective purpose. Marlowe’s use and abuse of religion is not unique to these plays; it is a theme that figures variably throughout his drama, but in no other play does it function so centrally to the cultivation of the protagonists’ success. Marlowe perverts the idea of religion as an instrumental good by demonstrating its value to achieving one’s final ends—but the ends of these two protagonists are not in the slightest sense moral. In this regard, Marlowe offers a cultural critique via his protagonists’ use of religion for their own personal gain. This a-moral critique, moreover, is one that challenges traditional understandings of justice and revenge, as I discuss at the conclusion of this chapter.

Marlovian Becomings

This dissertation paves the way for a new type of Marlovian criticism—a type of criticism that places an investment in the plays themselves and derives value from how the plays inform our individual lives without the need to provide a greater purpose, political or moral. This has implied an exegetical method that is in no way “biblical”: to evoke Bergson, the expanse of the exegetical canvas has not been pre-cut by, in-formed
by, or predisposed to a re-turn to religion. Or, perhaps I would prefer to maintain that my atheism allows me to read differently, to provide alternative, idiosyncratic readings of Marlowe’s plays. This difference is most evident in how I read Marlowe’s plays as opposed to Stephen Greenblatt, because, in many regards, we have similar interpretations of his plays—we just evaluate them differently. So, for instance, I wholeheartedly agree with Greenblatt that “Tamburlaine is a machine, a desiring machine that produces violence and death,” but he utilizes this statement to reiterate his theory of the abyss that awaits Tamburlaine’s “absolute play”—“as if to insist upon the essential meaninglessness of space”—whereas I read this production positively, in a Deleuzian fashion, as one that both bespeaks a tragic (in the Nietzschean sense) ethics and that also creates the aesthetic space of performance. In contrast to his estimation of Barabas’s “will to play” as a process of “de-individual[ization]” that renders him “an abstract, anti-Semitic fantasy,” I see this process as Marlowe’s anachronistic Deleuzianism: his awareness of the forces at work in bodies and how the “de-individualizing” process creates a body that becomes more powerful. Likewise, both Greenblatt and I agree that “Marlowe’s protagonists

36 In his articulation of the idea of “fabrication” in Creative Evolution, Bergson explains that “fabrication” is a process of intellection whereby the form of all things is “artificial and provisional”: “The whole of matter is made to appear to our thought as an immense piece of cloth in which we can cut out what we will and sew it together again as we please” (trans. A. Mitchell (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1998), 156). My point above, via the allusion to Bergson, is that my analytical cloth has not been pre-formed or pre-cut by any religious design, thus my creative interpretive potential is more expansive than those that have a religious design.

37 Stephen Greenblatt, “Marlowe and Renaissance Self-Fashioning,” in Two Renaissance Mythmakers: Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson, ed. A. Kernan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 43. Thus, he concludes, “As Marlowe uses the vacancy of theatrical space to suggest his character’s homelessness, so he uses the curve of theatrical time to suggest their struggle against death, in effect against the nothingness into which all characters fall at the end of the play” (50).

38 Ibid., 53.
anticipate the perception that human history is the product of men themselves,” but while
he, citing Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, suggests that this foresight is undermined by
a kind of anxious recuperation of the past whereby nothing new is essentially created, I
understand it in the Bergsonian sense of how the past, as the virtual, does indeed establish
the new.\(^{39}\)

My desire was to produce a dissertation different from the accepted and
acceptable norm. I have refrained from citing an overabundance of secondary sources and
engaged with contemporary Marlovian and dramatic criticism when it help to elaborate
upon the significance of a point or when I wanted to contextualize a particular argument
(another use of New Historicist criticism). In tone, content, and method, I hope that my
dissertation could have a salutary impact on both Marlovian studies and on early modern
studies of drama. Future studies might explore the variety of Deleuzianisms in early
modern drama as means to uncover ways to rethink concepts like “the body” and to
rethink notions of performance read through Deleuzian “desire” and Nietzschean “will”
(force). Analyzing the plays of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods from an a-moral
perspective, too—one radically anachronistic and “presentist”—could produce readings
that exhibit how these half a millennia year old plays can inform our future(s). The tone
of this dissertation, albeit sometimes muted, is aggressive; it welcomes opposition, and it
intends to challenge. If anything, what the humanities need at this point in academic time
is an infusion of energy, verve, cunning—and spirit.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 54.
Queer Imitatio in Dido: The Plane of Marlovian Ethics

Attributed to his “Cambridge Years,” and conjectured to have been co-written with friend and fellow University Wit Thomas Nashe, *Dido, Queen of Carthage* (ca. 1585) is considered an “anomaly” in the Marlovian dramatic corpus: not only does it markedly differ from his other plays in terms of its classical content, its theatrical simplicity, and, simply put, the gender of its titular character, it also lacks the sensational, unrepentant violence characteristic of Marlowe’s plays, and its characters lack the rhetorical elegance and brazen verve recognizable in Marlowe’s male protagonists.

Because it was written during his academic years, Marlowe’s creative process for *Dido* grew directly out of the trivium, of grammar, logic, and rhetoric that formed the core of his humanist training at Cambridge. The challenge for this young scholar was to re-conceive this humanist university knowledge into a performative, pragmatic knowledge fit for the stage, and the humanist elevation of rhetoric—cast aside, Neil Rhodes explains, by scholasticism of the middle ages as the “magic violence of speech”—enabled him to

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1 *Dido* was not entered into the Stationers’ Register before its first quarto publication in 1594. H. J. Oliver, in his introduction to the Revels edition of “*Dido, Queen of Carthage* and *The Massacre at Paris*” dates the play’s composition between 1585-1586 ((Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), xxv-xxx).

2 In one of the best critical pieces on *Dido*, Sarah Munson Deats articulates the play’s idiosyncratic relation to the remaining plays in the Marlovian canon: “In many ways, *Dido, Queen of Carthage* is an anomaly in the Marlowe canon. In no other play does the male hero share his central position with a female protagonist—one who, according to many commentators, brazenly upstages her lover. In no other Marlowe play is heteroerotic passion the centripetal force of the drama’s momentum…. [O]nly in *Dido* do gods and goddesses gambol, glide, and stalk across the stage, bickering among themselves as they meddle in the fates of mortals” (“*Dido, Queen of Carthage* and *The Massacre at Paris*,” in ed. P. Cheney, *The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 194).
make this transition to the stage with ease. In the sixteenth century, Rhodes observes, there was a “re-emergence of rhetoric as an expression of individual will and as an instrument of power,” whereby the power and force of words, according to M.M. Mahood in *Shakespeare’s Wordplay*, was “literal [as well] as metaphysical”: Elizabethan rhetoricians “may have thought of their words going home by physical and physiological means.” Marlowe seizes this conception of rhetoric as an instrument of power and renders it the primary vehicle of communication in performance—what critics have deemed as his “mighty line,” a combination of bombast and eloquence—which effectively demonstrates how rhetoric itself is an affective force with material effects.

Rhetoric is the language of theater, it is inter-personal language, since language itself is, according to Barbara Johnson, “an articulation of power relations inscribed by, within, or upon the speaker.” With the articulation of rhetoric as an “instrument of power” with observable “physical and physiological” effects, the various parts of rhetoric identified by humanists, from *elocutio* (style) to *inventio* (matter), can be construed as constituent affective forces at work in performance. Marlowe first harnesses the power of rhetoric for the stage in *Dido*, but it is a type of rhetoric, Kimberly Benston asserts, that he develops distinctly from the humanist notion: Marlowe’s rhetoric, she claims, “is as a contest of will (*pathos*) and not of logic (*logos*) or attribute (*ethos*)…. Rhetoric [in *Tamburlaine*] is

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4 Ibid., 24.


7 Rhodes maintains that *Dido*’s power as an imitation of Virgil “lies in its fusion of eloquence and action” (74).
thus not merely a vehicle of conflict but becomes, indeed, its essence.”

Taking as axiomatic Benston’s insight that Marlowe’s rhetoric is the dramatic embodiment of conflict, especially in Tamburlaine, I will nevertheless argue against the sharp distinction she draws between pathos and ethos. Indeed, as it is part of my overarching contention of this dissertation, I believe there to be a strong correlation and symmetry between the two—between rhetoric and ethics—in Marlowe’s plays and especially in Dido, where Marlowe’s humanist training is most evident in performance.

Dido, I contend in this preliminary chapter, exists as the foundational plane within which Marlowe’s philosophical, dramatic concepts crystalize and emerge in his later plays, which I articulate in later chapters as tenets of a Marlovian Ethics. The principle ethic at work within Dido is what I will call a queer imitatio: what Marlowe imitates in his plays is what traditionally would be discarded or overlooked as immoral, uncivic, and therefore unworthy of imitation. The product of this queer imitatio is an eccentric type drama that challenges dramatic and generic convention, and which will come to be recognizably deemed “Marlovian.” In this chapter, I will examine how this queer imitatio takes effect in Dido, Queen of Carthage in order to demonstrate how this play, while amateur in show, manifests multiple sites of dramatic invention through Marlowe’s conceptualization of rhetoric as a type of affective, (im)material force—in Dido, this rhetoric is explicitly saturated with pleasure, and this is where Ovid’s influence is most palpable, in the overt sexuality of the style and language with which both gods and

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mortals address each other. By organizing all character and dramatic action in terms of the interplay between forces—between forces of epic constraint and sexual pleasure, between masculine and feminine, between moral obligation and a-moral desire—Marlowe not only creates a play that challenges generic convention but also lays the foundations of the anti-humanist ethics emergent in his later plays.

Marlowe’s queerly devised method of imitation stretches the moral parameters of the term as a “liberating means to creativity” that he learned during his studies at Cambridge. The type of “Erasmian” or Christian Humanist education engendered during Tudor and Elizabethan England advocated the power of language in classical terms of rhetoric, which was devised in five parts by Cicero and Quintilian (inventio, distributio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciatio). Quintilian esteemed elocutio as the most vital part of rhetoric:

The verb eloqui means the production and communication to the audience of all that the speaker has conceived in his mind, and without this power all the preliminary accomplishments of oratory are as useless as a sword that is permanently kept within its sheath…it is this which is the chief

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9 Arthur Kinney, in Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric and Fiction in Sixteenth-Century England, admits that we may today view imitatio as stultifying to our intellectual creativity, but argues that the Tudors found the method a “liberating means to creativity,” especially since, as Quintilian writes, “although invention came first and is all-important, it is expedient to imitate whatever has been invited with success” (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 11).

10 In “Christopher Marlowe and the Golden Age of England,” Michael J. Kelly writes, “Marlowe’s work was the product of his ‘Erasmian,’ or Christian Humanist, education, the state of affairs in England and his own ability and readiness to satirize the world around him” (in The Marlowe Society Research Journal 5 (2008): 1).
object of our study, the goal of all our exercises, and all our efforts at imitation, and it is to this that we devote the energies of a lifetime." Quintilian’s emphasis on style, especially as it is rendered through the rhetorical method of imitation, conveys the extent to which humanist studies in rhetoric were grounded in ethics. Indeed, one of the defining features of the English Renaissance was the educational endeavor of returning to classical texts in order to extract moral values that could be applied and taught to future generations. As Isabel Rivers writes, “[a] humanist was a classical scholar with two complementary aims: to recover the moral values of classical life, and to imitate the language and style of the classics as a means to that end.” Imitatio was thus a key concept in humanist education.

Marlowe’s version of imitatio for the stage translated these components of rhetoric into palpable forces that affected character action and the generic tenor of his plays—in Dido, this imitatio results in Marlowe’s own re-definition of tragedy in terms of wills and forces, noticeably distinct from the contemporary Aristotelian notion of tragedy performed on the stage, which emphasized the cathartic effects of those actions rather than the actions themselves. Marlowe’s vision of tragedy, like many of his

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12 This is a significant reason why I disagree with Benston’s definition of Marlovian rhetoric as a departure from its classical, innately ethical, one. See Chapter 4 for more on the relation between style and ethics, particularly as it is articulated in the philosophies of Spinoza and Deleuze.


14 Ibid., 129.
contemporaries, has its foundations primarily in Aristotle, but also in Seneca and Ovid. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle analyzes the distinctions between the genres epic and tragedy in primarily formal terms, but also in terms of action. Both epic and tragedy share an interest in “serious subjects” formed in “a grand kind of verse,” Aristotle observes, but the primary distinction between the two is that tragedy takes “a dramatic [form], not…a narrative form” that finds finality, or closure, in catharsis. Thus, Aristotle concludes, tragedy is “the art of imitation by means of action on the stage.” His idea of catharsis came to be esteemed, especially by 16th century humanists, as the defining feature of “tragedy,” as Patrick Cheney asserts, “[f]rom Aristotle forward, theorists have understood tragedy as an aetiology (or narrative of causality) crowning in *catharsis*: the dramatist’s story aims to explain the underlying causes of suffering and death…in order to purge or

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15 In his plays, Marlowe borrows a number of formal, stylistic, and thematic elements from Seneca, including the idea concerning the “power of time” as well as affective elements “concerned with madness, passion, vengeance, and the supernatural” (Robert Miola, *Shakespeare and Classical Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 55). According to Patrick Cheney, “Marlowe finds his tragic ideology inscribed in Ovidian myths of daring, contestation, and rivalry,” while Lauri Dietz explains the connection to the tragic in terms of Ovidian “love elegy” (Cheney, *Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession*, 90); Dietz, *Shattering the Epic Nation*, 67).

16 According to Deborah H. Roberts, “[i]t is in Aristotle’s *Poetics* that we first find articulated the view that an unhappy ending, with a change from prosperity to misfortune, is, if not definitive of the genre, at least a mark of those plays that are best constructed and most essentially tragic” (“Beginnings and Endings,” in *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*, 136).


purify the audience’s emotions of pity and fear.” Therefore, Cheney concludes, tragedy is known by its capstone of “crowning in cartharsis.”

The import placed on catharsis has radically reduced Aristotle’s insight into the genre, and Marlowe’s *queer imitatio* of Aristotelian tragedy in *Dido* and beyond seeks to reevaluate Aristotle’s notion of tragedy by re-emphasizing the significance of action as the essential element of tragedy:

> Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of *action and life*, of happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the *form of action*;…it is in our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse.

Tragedy is an imitation of “action and life,” in the movement produced by affective forces that compel bodies to act upon each other. That the defining element of tragedy is predicated upon action—and, in particular, of action that produces the specific affective responses of “pity and fear”—opposes the traditional understanding of tragedy as based in catharsis.

For Aristotle, “tragedy is impossible without action.” Perhaps Marlowe’s revision of Aristotle is in part a product of Marlowe’s medium, the stage—since drama consists of action, the onus must shift to action as the defining aspect of tragedy. The

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19 Patrick Cheney, Cheney, “Edward II: Marlowe, tragedy, and the sublime,” in *The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance Tragedy*, 183. In the same volume, Tanya Pollard writes, in “Tragedy and revenge,” “The therapeutic model of drama was rooted in Renaissance discussions of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, which famously claimed that through arousing pity and fear, tragedy could bring about the catharsis—purgation, purification, transformation—of such emotions” (62).

20 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1461; emphasis added.

21 Aristotle, in *Poetics*, explains that tragedy “in a dramatic form” is comprised of “incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions” (1460).

22 Ibid., 1461.
“meaning” is found in the method, the action, not the denouement—this is the influence that Aristotle had on Marlowe’s conception of tragedy. Thus Douglas Cole argues in his monograph on Marlowe’s contribution to the genre of tragedy, *Christopher Marlowe and the Renaissance of Tragedy*, that “a new sense of tragedy emerged” in Marlowe’s plays, whereby he moved “far beyond the formulaic and often banal Renaissance concept of tragedy as any disaster overtaking the high, mighty, or prosperous.”

Marlowe accomplished this feat in the short span of seven not-quite-completed plays by “rejecting the conventions of humanist tragedy [chorus, reflective mood, etc]” and “opt[ing] for a theatrical mode of communication, *a mode that accents action and emblem as its chief signals.*” Marlovian Tragedy, like Marlovian Ethics, is rooted in action; not in catharsis, which, in Marlovian drama, hardly exists.

Marlowe’s dramatic form of *queer imitatio* enacted in *Dido* diverges from more conservative interpretations of the rhetorical concept that stresses fidelity to the implicit morality of that which is being imitated; with *Dido*, that fidelity emerges as the moral imperative that Aeneas makes in leaving Carthage to found a new nation. Marlowe not only employs and parodies a façade of Virgil’s epic, the *Aeneid*, but he also establishes a separate, and very secular, set of values—premised on the ultimate value of pleasure—

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24 Ibid., 46.
25 As C.L. Barber attests in his reading of *Tamburlaine*, “[t]here is no stable moral, eschatological framework such as we get in *De Casibus* literature like *The Mirror for Magistrates*. There is no peripeteia: Tamburlaine’s death is presented simply as the result of the exhaustion of his natural vital powers as he looks beyond for further similar conquests by his sons” (C.L. Barber, *Creating Elizabethan Tragedy: The Theater of Marlowe and Kyd*, ed. R. Wheeler (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago 1988), 51).
distinct from the moral values that, according to the classical *imitatio* technique, *should* be extracted from the epic and translated into Marlowe’s creation.

Marlovian scholars concur that Marlowe’s imitation of Virgil’s epic is anything but proper: in Timothy D. Crowley’s estimation, Marlowe “parodies the convention of *imitatio*” in this play.26 “*Dido,*” Sarah Munson Deats explains, “finds its provenance in classical epic, dramatizing Books 1, 2, and 4 of Virgil’s *Aeneid* with a veneer of Ovidian shading from the *HEROIDES,*” the latter text which Patrick Cheney specifically cites as the version of Ovid that serves “as the chief agent of the critique” of Virgil.27 At most, as I will demonstrate in my reading in this chapter, Marlowe uses Virgil’s epic for the basic material content of his play, and the epic itself figures as the frame in which the play takes place. Indeed, Marlowe does anything but adhere to Virgil’s epic, and consequently he refuses a “Virgilian cursus.”28 Even though his plot and characters derive from the

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28 Marlowe’s use (or “abuse,” to traditionalists) of Virgil, in the minds of the aforementioned critics, not only constitutes a critique of the classical and most-revered genre of epic, this dramatic *imitatio* also is evidence of how Marlowe offers a critique of the literary and humanist tradition that esteems epic as the apex of achievement. As Patrick Cheney’s *Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession: Ovid, Spenser, Counter-Nationhood* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), has definitively shown, Marlowe’s literary cursus opposes the traditional poetic cursus attributed to Virgil and Spenser (whose *Faerie Queene* became the epic that glorified and mythologized Elizabethan England), and which effectively prescribes a political ideology of counter-nationhood. (A Virgilian cursus, portrayed by Colin Clout’s literary journey from writing pastorals and georgics to arriving at the crafting of a morally upstanding epic, describes what I will refer to as “Virgilian productivity,” because following this cursus renders someone (and their career) productive.) With a focus less on patriotic affiliation and more on eroticism, Lauri Dietz similarly examines how Marlowe’s cursus differs from Virgil’s and Spenser’s: “Marlowe transforms the rhetoric of epic with eroticism to critique the emerging ideological construct of the early modern nation” (in *Shattering the Epic Nation: Marlowe’s masochistic Ovidian poetics* (doctoral dissertation), 2005, provided graciously
Aeneid, Georgia E. Brown contends, Marlowe “resisted the political, moral, gender, and aesthetic ideals epitomized by [it].”29 Troni Grande reads Marlowe’s liberal adaptation of Virgil as the principle cause of the dilation that she typifies as characteristic of Marlovian drama.30 What Grande perceives as “dilation,” Donald Stump views as “deflation,” whereby Marlowe’s objective is to make “a laughing stock of the Aeneid.”31 I agree with these critics that Marlowe “plays with” (or, to put it bluntly, “bastardizes”) his primary source, but I think his dramatization of Virgil has more Deleuzian aspirations—that his return to this classical text, his appropriation of it, and his own transformation of the Aeneid infused with Ovidian overtones, signifies the virtual force of history, which can be invoked in the present to create the new as something emergent from but ultimately different from the past. In this specific instance of creation, whereby past historical and

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30 In her typology of dilation in Marlowe’s plays, Grande asserts that, in Dido, “Marlowe alternates at times between direct, faithful, and apparently reverent translation (even quotation) of his source, and a free retelling of the episode in contemporary Renaissance terms that parody the voice and intention of the original,” which she defines as the play’s “vernacular dilation” of its primary source (in Marlovian Tragedy: The Play of Dilation (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1999), 74, 73).
31 “Marlowe’s Travesty of Virgil: Dido and Elizabethan Dreams of Empire,” Comparative Drama 34.1 (2000): 91. Donald Stump contends that Dido is Marlowe’s conscientious attempt to deflate Virgil: “So persistent, in fact, is Marlowe’s deflation of Virgilian high seriousness that moments of elevated sentiment seem to have little purpose other than to remind the audience of the epic being parodied and to gain attitude for the next plunge into bathos” (96). This deflation occurs through the usually hyperbolic interpretations of Virgil’s epic, as well as Aeneas’s attunement to pleasure instead of his nation-founding quest; on pages 91-93, Stump lists over a dozen examples of how Marlowe “sly[ly] parodies” the Aeneid.
literary texts constitute the past, the new is the play itself. With Dido, Marlowe created a new experience from classical history, the effects of which enable a “revision” or rethinking of history. This is how the future can and does shape the past. The power of drama, and of art in general, is its ability to create the new and to be untimely in the sense that art, and especially in the case of Dido, is a palimpsest consisting of previous materials created throughout time. With Dido, therefore, Marlowe presents a queer imitatio of Virgil’s much-revered epic that essentially rewrites the epic as tragedy; instead of noble heroes and nation-founding quests, Marlowe gives us a story about the impossible feat of harnessing and controlling forces, primarily those affective forces that constitute pleasure, affective forces that affect emotion but which never submit to bodily (human) control. For if epic can be construed as a series of unknown forces

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32 I should note here that Marlowe’s play is not the first known adaptation of Virgil’s epic. Alexander Dyce, in the preface to his edition of The Works of Christopher Marlowe, alludes to at least three other dramatic adaptations written and performed by scholars: in the middle of the 16th century, John Rightwise, Master of St. Paul’s School, “made the Tragedie of Dido out of Virgil, and acted the same with the scholars of his school”; in 1564, “a tragedie named Dido[,] written by Edward Haliwell was played before Queen Elizabeth in King’s College Chapel, Cambridge”; and, the most well-known of the pre-Marlowe Dido’s, in 1583, William Gager, and hypothesized collaborator George Peele, adapted the epic for a performance for the Queen at All Soul’s College, Oxford (London: William Pickering, 1850, xli). Even though only a handful of years apart, there is no evidence that Marlowe was knowledgeable of Gager’s production, and the two play-texts differ completely, save one exception: Anna’s death, added by both writers, at the end of the play.

33 My argument vastly differs from the sparse, extant criticism of this play, succinctly described by Sarah Munson Deats as situated within two antithetical camps: “the romantic, pro-passion advocates” and the “moralistic, pro-duty” readers. Deats writes: “Two antithetical interpretations have dominated the criticism of Dido. On the one hand, romantic, pro-passion advocates have stressed the tragic elements of the play, embracing the victimized queen and censuring Aeneas as a callous deserter…. In response to this romantic approach, a moralistic, pro-duty reading emphasizes the comic elements of the play, adducing alterations in the sources that deface the tragic stature of Dido and thus the romantic ethos that she represents…. Romantic expositors thus assert that Aeneas and his commitment to duty over love are undercut in Marlowe’s drama, whereas pro-duty
puppeteering a hero’s quest, tragedy can be defined as the protagonist’s continual effort
to control forces—forces which Marlowe, ever the Deleuzian, knows are beyond human
control.\(^{34}\) (Hence, his Faustus, as we will see, uses magic to cast off his mortal trappings,
and Tamburlaine conceives himself in supernatural terms.)

Epic is one of the most easily defined genres, perhaps due to its origins in
classical antiquity and its correlative admiration throughout time. Richard P. Martin
outlines its defining features in “Epic as Genre,” including “a cosmic scale; a serious
purpose; a setting in a distant past; the presence of heroic and supernatural characters;
and plots pivoting on wars or quests,” and the formal features as “heroic verse
lines;...highly rhetorical speeches by heroic figures; [and] invocations or self-conscious
poetic proems”\(^{35}\) The genre of epic was used in the form of drama in addition to the
poetic form. Jean-Pierre Vernant’s definition of epic conveys the genres functionality in

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\(^{34}\) My reading of \textit{Dido} as a “show of forces” and tragedy as a kind of will to control
forces finds critical sympathy with Philip Ford’s \textit{“Quod me Nutrit me Destrui,”:}
Relationships in Marlowe’s \textit{Dido, Queen of Carthage,} in which he interprets the play as
a series of “creative and destructive processes, and displays the concepts of love and
violence to be but different manifestations of the same complex passions and desires”:
\textit{“Quod me nutrit me destruit—that which nourishes me destroys me—suggests not simply
that one is sustained and diminished by the same force, but that the forces themselves of
nourishment and destruction are in essence the same”} (in \textit{The Marlowe Society Research

(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 10.
drama: “Epic, which provided drama with its themes, characters, and the framework for its plots, had presented the great figures of the heroes of former times as models. It had exalted the heroic values, virtues, and high deeds.” On stage, the heroic protagonist becomes the locus of the dramatic action; Vernant explains, “[t]hrough the interplay of dialogue and the clash between the major protagonists and the chorus, and through the reversals of fortune that occur in the course of the drama, the legendary figure, extolled in epic, becomes a subject of debate now that he is transferred to the theatrical stage.”

This is how an epic becomes a tragedy, via the protagonist’s subjection as the dramatic site of action and intrigue: “the hero is no longer put forward as a model as he is used to be in epic and in lyric poetry. Now he has become a problem.” In Dido, however, Marlowe marginalizes Aeneas and concentrates the dramatic focus on his scorned lover, Dido. Aeneas is still a “problem,” but he is no longer the protagonist—and the consequence of this is that “tragedy” comes to be defined in relation to Dido as the dramatic site of action and intrigue. I believe the de-centering of the epic’s hero is why Crowley classifies the play as a “quasi-tragedy” and argues that Aeneas seems “a hollowed-out performer of that epic role.”

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 242.
39 Roma Gill deduces Marlowe’s “tragedy” to be a result of how he fashion Dido’s tale divorced from its epic source and back-story, which, she maintains, Virgil nicely packaged in the presentation of Dido’s story within the space of Book IV of the *Aeneid*: “For the space of this Book, Dido supplants Aeneas as protagonist, growing in tragic and isolated stature…. To this extent Marlowe’s material was hand-tailored for him; Dido’s tragedy is ‘detachable’ from the rest of the epic…” (in “Marlowe’s Virgil: Dido Queene of Carthage,” *The Review of English Studies* 28.110 (1977): 145).
40 Crowley, “Arms and the Boy,” 431, 430.
Whether through dilation or deflation, *Dido* stages a performative critique of the *Aeneid* on multiple levels. Critics agree that Marlowe “undercut[s] the *Aeneid*’s] gravity and pervasiveness,” and “flout[s] the high seriousness of the epic.” Marlowe’s play is anything but epic, instead presenting various scenes of pleasure via its dilation of a short, inconsequential episode in Virgil’s classic. These scenes of pleasure are indebted to Ovid’s influence on Marlowe. These scenes, Grande describes, all seem to evoke “the image of Zeus holding back the horses of the night, doubling a night of pleasure with his beloved and preventing the arrival of the sober daylight realities of duty, order, and reason.” In a sense, the play itself is an interruption—an interruption in Virgil’s text, and an interruption of Aeneas’s quest. The narrative of Aeneas’s tale is interrupted by Marlovian dramatic revelry. The narrative progression of the *Aeneid* is stalled, and it is stalled for “play.” And “playing,” Richard Halpern observes in his essay on the productivity of playing, “was not only seen as nonproductive; it was, in the eyes of its critics, anti-productive.” Not only was the content anti-productive, but theater itself was the embodiment of anti-productive theater as carnival, or, for Bakhtin, a kind of “carnival square” where social hierarchies are overturned and the world becomes topsy-turvy: “free and unrestricted, full of ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the profanation of everything

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41 Ibid., 410, and Lucy Potter, “Marlowe’s *Dido*: Virgilian or Ovidian?,” *Notes and Queries* (December, 2009): 540.
42 Grande, 14.
43 In “Eclipse of Action: *Hamlet* and the Political Economy of Playing,” Halpern writes, “[a]s its very name suggests, ‘playing’ was associated with holiday, not work…. [T]heater represented a kind of continuous carnival or holiday transposed to the heart of the workday itself. It embodied….an ongoing amusement camp that scooped out a space and time of idleness, a permanent void or crater of anti-production from within the plenum of the working day” (in *SQ* 59.4 (Winter 2008): 451-452).
sacred, full of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and
everything....”

While the play itself amplifies the Dido episode of the Aeneid in order to render it
the dramatic centerpiece, the title forcefully makes Marlowe’s rewriting of this epic
apparent. The eponymous figure is Dido, not Aeneas, and the dramatic focus on her
character—the plot depicts her political and personal sacrifices for Aeneas to secure his
love, for the pleasure of his company—upstages Aeneas’s import in the play. Dido thus
could be considered a critique of productivity in regard to nation founding and epic, since
the play’s denouement is not of Aeneas’s arrival but of a triple suicide (Dido, Anna,
Iarbas). If productivity intimates the creation of a durable object, then this play offers a
critique through its indulgence in destruction. And yet we know in Marlowe’s Deleuzian
plays that destruction is a form of creation. Like the significance of Marlowe’s hyperbolic
denouement, the opening scene of Dido differs greatly in content, mood, and scope from
the serious and somber tone of the beginning of the Aeneid, with Virgil’s invocation of
the muses in the hope of garnering the creative strength to tell the story of Aeneas’s
destiny, punctuated by epic moments of tragedy and pathos. However, Marlowe’s Dido,

44 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. H. Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), 129-130. The idea of the carnival as applied to the world of the
theater extensive in studies of early modern drama, especially Shakespeare (from C.L.
Barber’s seminal Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form in Relation
to Social Custom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) to the collection of essay
presented in R. Knowles’s Shakespeare and Carnival: After Bakhtin (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1998)). One defining feature of Shakespearean comedy is that the
aspects of carnival within the play are restrained, sublimated, and dispersed by the play’s
end; social customs and hierarchies are re-established. Marlowe’s plays do not follow this
trajectory, in large part because they are not comedies focused on “playing” with social
custom. Hierarchies, and tradition in general, are not reaffirmed in Marlowe’s plays,
particularly the political plays discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, but infiltrated and broken
down.
from start to finish, conjures none of this grave emotion; instead, we have overtures “to
play,” to pleasure. That is, like the critical opening scenes of Marlowe’s other plays—of
Faustus in his study with his books, or of Barabas counting his coins—Dido’s opening
scene also betrays the ethical emphasis of the play. And, in this play, the ethical emphasis
rests upon the ubiquity of the affective force of pleasure.

The play opens with Jupiter speaking the first line to his love, Ganymede: “Come,
gentle Ganymede, and play with me” (1.1.1).45 The first line, and the entire opening
exchange between Jupiter and Ganymede, has nothing to do with Dido, or Aeneas, or the
fallen state of Troy. It has nothing to do with epic, or with tragedy. It has to do with
“playing”—with wooing. The critique of epic occurs at the very start of the play with
Marlowe’s employment of gods who are noticeably Ovidian in character. Jupiter’s
feckless attitude and blaise detachment from the treacherous plights affronting Aeneas
and his men on the high seas underscores this “dilatory” scene saturated with kisses and
other veritable treasures, which are said to be a measure of Ganymede’s beauty—a
beauty so overwhelming that his looks continue to drive “backe the horses of the night”:
“cut the thred of time. / Why, are not all my Gods at my commaund, / And heaven and
earth the bounds of thy delight?” (1.1.26, 29-31). As “an Ovidian lover,” Jupiter woos
Ganymede with promises of vast treasures, and he even presents the youngling with
“linked gems”—anything so that Ganymede “wilt be [his love” 1.1.49).46 This scene,
even for the most amateur Marlovian, should immediately conjure thoughts of Marlowe’s

45 All internal citation, in this chapter and the following chapters, refers to (ed.) Fredson
46 Dietz, Shattering the Epic Nation, 44.
pastoral lyric, “The Passionate Shepherd to His Love,” which begin with the famous lines: “Come with me, and be my love, / And we will all the pleasures prove.” Marlowe’s pastoral is a far cry from the earlier, seminal, pastoral, Spenser’s Shepheardes Calendar: Marlowe’s Shepherd, like Jupiter, is a pleasure-seeker and unapologetic materialist. He promises, like Jupiter, to gift his love with “beds of roses, / And a thousand fragrant posies,” in addition to a “gown made of the finest wool” and “fair lined slippers.” In kind, Jupiter, like Marlowe’s Shepherd, promises his love these things only “if,” as he tells Ganymede, “thou wilt be my love” (1.1.29). This entire scene is like a performance of Marlowe’s lyric from the first to final lines—both echoed by Jupiter. The sentiment is one of *carpe diem*: to bathe the self in the myriad of material (fleshy and otherwise) pleasures of the moment. It is not, as is the sentiment expressed by Colin Clout, one of disappointment with life, whereby Colin is only able to cope with life by turning to God, who offers solace via the promise of an afterlife.

It is precisely this *carpe diem* mentality—not simply in the traditional classic Greek sense of being fully present in the moment, but more pointedly in Marlowe’s plays as an immersion in materialist and bodily pleasures—that sets the tone for *Dido*, as it does later, in a similar sexual register, in *Edward II*. As I will discuss more thoroughly

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47 Cheney understands the Ovidian emphasis, in conjunction with hints of “Senecan fatalism,” in *Dido* as a critique of “the providentialist design of the Aeneid and of Elizabethan ideology, especially as popularized by Spenser through The Shepheardes Calender (1579) and The Faerie Queene (1590), a Virgilian pastoral and epic that cohere in their encomium to ‘fayre Eliza, Queen of shepheardes all’” (in Marlowe’s Republican Authorship, 82).


49 Pierre Hadot delimits the general Greek idea—espoused by both the Epicureans and the Stoics—of carpe diem as “being content with earthly existence” and “knowing how to utilize the present [by] knowing how to recognize and seize the favorable and decisive
in the chapter on *Edward II*, Marlowe’s *carpe diem* philosophy is adapted from the Greek materialists such as Epicurus and Lucretius, but it has a surprisingly Foucauldian disposition in terms of pleasure. “For Epicurus and his followers,” Monica R. Gale explains, “[t]he goal of life...is pleasure, defined as the removal of physical pain and mental disturbance; while sensual pleasure is not thereby excluded, its ultimate end is the attainment of tranquility.”50 Edward craves this version of Greek pleasure, tranquility—nothing but a “little nooke” in which to live with Gaveston. Foucault’s concept of pleasure recognized the importance of sex in one’s lifestyle or ethics. As Dietz has argued, “[t]hroughout his career, Marlowe uses Ovid to explore the aesthetic and erotic relations that infuse political life....”51 Dietz’s larger argument is that Marlowe’s Ovidianism, and, specifically, the erotic encounters which dominate *Dido*, is antithetical to epic elements of the play and functions to distinguish *Dido* generically from the *Aeneid*. Marlowe’s *carpe diem* mentality and the element of pleasure that it bears both work to counteract the effectiveness of epic: erotic encounters, compelled by the affective force of pleasure, derail Aeneas’s quest to found a new nation. Marlowe’s interest in pleasure, and in exploring pleasure as an affective currency between and among bodies, is evident in the fact that his play focuses not on the epic quest but on the minor episode of the erotic encounter.

Marlowe’s version of *carpe diem* is less metaphysical, less “Greek” (in terms of the main Greek objective of carpe diem being “tranquility”), and more materialist, with a

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focus on experiencing pleasure. This version comes to fruition on the stage, which allows for pleasure to operate as a physical medium through bodies in performance. This exploration of how an affective force—in *Dido*, pleasure—traverses bodies on stage, of how pleasure can literally affect other bodies, is something we find later in Marlowe’s plays, especially as I will discuss in Chapter 4. The materiality of affect, and specifically the materiality of pleasure, is prevalent throughout Marlowe’s plays and his poetry. Patrick Cheney and Brian J. Striar propose that Marlowe’s materialist philosophy is most evident in his lyric, “The Passionate Shepherd.” In their reading, they establish a link between Marlowe’s materialism and the concept of “pleasure,” a word reiterated throughout the lyric:

The word “pleasure” seems a natural goal for erotic desire, but the following scientific word, “prove” (meaning *experience*), introduces a philosophical edge. The shepherd invites his love to engage in an epicurean or hedonistic way of life. In Elizabethan England, however, Epicureanism could signal the educated goal of materialist philosophy (quite literally, *a philosophy of matter*), which historically opposed essentialist philosophy…, especially as the Roman poet Lucretius…counters Plato in his epic poem [*The Nature of Things*]. Marlowe has been hailed as “the Lucretius of the English language,” and nowhere is this designation on more concentrated display than in “The Passionate Shepherd.”

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Marlowe, as “the Lucretius of the English language,” proposes a materialist ethics predicated on affect, and a valuation of “pleasure” over other conventional or moral affections (chastity being just one), that is at odds with the Christian humanist ethics that espoused transcendental ideals in order to succeed onto the afterlife, or even, to recall Vernant, the highly valued heroic ideals characteristically found in epic. In a political context, and as I point out in Chapter 4, this attention to pleasure and intent to indulge in it advocates a type of individualism that has become characteristic of Marlovian drama. It also functions as a critique of epic: if epic is the genre of nation-building and nationhood, in which pleasure must be subverted for the quest to be completed, then pleasure is the force of the anti-epic. If, as Dietz asserts, “individual [pleasure] must be sacrificed for the greater civic good,” then Marlowe clearly refuses that political (and particularly humanist) imperative in Dido as well as his other plays.

The concept of pleasure that circulates throughout Marlowe’s stage, and, especially, I want to argue, in *Dido*, is analogous to Deleuze’s definition of desire—and, to Foucault’s understanding of pleasure. Deleuzian desire and Foucauldian pleasure, as Elizabeth Grosz explicates in her essay “(Inhuman) Forces,” are synonymous: “For both [Deleuze and Foucault], it is forces, not subjects, which act and produce, which proliferate and transform, which are subjected to becoming and self-overcoming.”

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53 In *Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 193. Deleuze prefers “desire” to “pleasure,” because he regards desire in non-psychoanalytic terms of lack. He objects to the use of “pleasure” because, he explains in his essay “Desire and Pleasure,” “pleasure seems to me to interrupt the immanent process of desire” (cited in Grosz, *Time Travels*, 192). In the context of Marlowe studies, and, particularly since Marlowe was expressly Ovidian in both his poetry and his plays, I prefer the term “pleasure” over “desire,” the latter of which, for me, will always carry negative vestiges of psychoanalytic “lack.” Pleasure is Marlowe’s preferred term, and it seems to be imbued with more positive, luxurious connotations than desire, which, to me,
the purposes of simplicity and to avoid conceptual confusion among these different philosophies, I will use the term “pleasure” to refer to the bodily, yet impersonal, productive force that acts and creates assemblages, which is the Deleuzian definition of desire. The basic premise of Marlovian pleasure is that it is a positive force similar to Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s respective yet congruous formulations of desire as a form of making in terms of “becoming,” and in contrast to both the Platonic and the psychoanalytic traditions. The objective of my analysis of Dido is to deduce how pleasure as an affective force within the play influences and directs the interaction between characters. If pleasure operates as a primary force within Dido, then the theater itself as a conduit for the expression of pleasure, through the actions and connections between the characters onstage.

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54 Grosz provides a genealogy of the construction of desire as lack in Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism: “The negative notion of desire, like the subordination of body to mind, can be traced to Plato. In The Symposium, for example, Socrates claims…that ‘one desires what one lacks’ (199e). Hegel, along with Freud and Lacan, continue this long tradition insofar as each sees desire as a yearning for what is lost, absent, or impossible…. In opposition to this broad, Platonic tradition is a second, less pervasive and privileged notion of desire, which may be located in Spinoza, in which desire is seen as a positivity or mode of fullness which produces, transforms, and engages directly with reality. Instead of seeing desire as lack, Spinoza sees it as a form of production, including self-production, a process of making or becoming (see Ethics, III, ix). As part of this second tradition, Nietzsche, Foucault, and particularly Deleuze and Guattari are contemporary examples…” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, 222 Fn. 1.

55 The inspiration underlying this conception of the theater is, again, the Deleuzian desiring-machine. Elizabeth Grosz elaborates upon the significance of the desiring-machine, in regard to the notion of productivity, in Volatile Bodies: “the elements or discontinuities that compose [the desiring-machine] do not belong to either an original totality that has been lost or one which finalizes or completes it, a telos. They do not represent the real, for their function is not a signifying one: they produce and they
Interestingly, and speaking to Marlowe’s vested interest in materiality, the force of pleasure is materialized and made readable to the audience in the form of Cupid’s arrow, which functions to “enchant” Dido when he suggestively “touch[es] her white breast with the arrow head” (2.1.326). I think this moment is significant because it signals to the audience that the enchantment of the play has begun—if it was not obvious with the opening scene of “Jupiter dandling Ganimede upon his knee” (1.1 SD)—and that they too, as theatergoers affected by performance, will be enchanted by the play that unfolds before them. Enchantment is a product of the transversal quality of affect and is relied upon by the actors on stage in order for their performance to “take hold” of the audience. Shakespeare employed this meta-theatrical trope in a few of his plays, most notably *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (think of Puck’s epilogue to the audience, releasing them from their bonds, as the play was just a “dream”) but also later in his “romances,” particularly *A Winter’s Tale*.

Another means by which Marlowe renders pleasure a readable, material force on stage is through the presence of the gods, who are particularly Ovidian in their demeanor.56 His gods are another example of *imitatio* gone queer, for Virgil’s gods in the *Aeneid* carry a gravitas befitting an epic. Marlowe’s gods function similarly to Virgil’s themselves are real. Desire…experiments, producing ever-new alignments, linkages, and connections, making things. It is fundamentally nomadic not teleological...” (168).

56 Matthew N. Proser identifies the play’s “Ovidian spirit” in “such general features as urbanity, wit, satiric impulse, and, of course, eroticism, along with mythological interest, lyricism, shapeliness, and a peculiar combination of emotional sophistication and clarity…. In *Dido* the Ovidian influence is felt in Marlowe’s tongue-in-cheek view of the gods (and sometimes of Aeneas), and in various notable scenes and speeches involving such figures as Jupiter, Dido, and Cupid-Ascanius” (in “*Dido Queen of Carthage* and the Evolution of Marlowe’s Dramatic Style,” in “A Poet and a filthy Play-maker”: *New Essays on Christopher Marlowe*, eds. K. Friedenreich, R. Gill, and C. B. Kuriyama (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1988), 85).
omnipresent gods, who guide both the hero and the reader, but Marlowe’s gods, especially Jupiter, who is transformed into “an Ovidian lover,” are seemingly motivated by pleasure not by honor.\textsuperscript{57} In a morally saturated critique of the play, Mary-Kay Gamel harps on Marlowe’s tainting of the gods, perverting them by making them “selfish and petty, concerned only with status and pleasure, using human beings only to satisfy their desires. Jupiter is a middle-aged man making a fool of himself over a teenager: in the first scene he is not, as in the \textit{Aeneid}, looking down from Olympus and already thinking about Aeneas, but rather trying to seduce Ganymede….”\textsuperscript{58} What is evident from the language of Gamel’s observation is that Marlowe’s perverted gods do not compare to Virgil’s, who in her estimation are morally righteous because their minds are focused on the nationalistic enterprises of founding an empire. From a moral perspective, Marlowe’s figuration of the gods as Ovidian rather than Virgilian render these gods seemingly inconsequential to the dramatic plot: Jupiter, she argues, is not attentive to what in the \textit{Aeneid} is his “purpose” of assisting Aeneas with the founding of Italy. Virgil’s gods function as a moralizing, teleological force that guides the hero to the founding of a nation. In the opening scene of \textit{Dido}, however, the curtains are drawn to reveal Jupiter “dandling” Ganymede and Mercury “lying asleepe” (1.1.SD). Marlowe’s gods already exude pleasure, personal, primal pleasures of sex and sleep (a connection Jupiter makes himself when he tells Ganymede “Venus Swannes shall shed their silver downe, / To sweeten out the slumbers of thy bed” [1.1.36-37]). The exchange between the father of the gods and the mortal boy (said to be one cause of Juno hatred of the Trojans and,

\textsuperscript{57} Dietz, \textit{Shattering the Epic Nation}, 44.
\textsuperscript{58} In \textit{American Journal of Philology} 126.4 (Winter 2005): 614.
thereby, at the root of her conflict with Venus) magnifies the power of pleasure as an affective force. Jupiter is smitten with the beauteous youth, telling him:

What ist sweet wagge I should deny thy youth?
Whose face reflects such pleasure to mine eyes,
As I exhal’d with thy fire darting beames….
Sit on my knee, and call for thy content,
Controule proud Fate, and cut the thred of time.—
Why, are not all the Gods at thy commaund,
And heaven and earth the bounds of thy delight? (1.1.23-31)

Jupiter’s amorous language echoes medieval and, less so, early modern courtly love poetry. The medieval trope of love, metaphorized as “fire darting beames” that affect the lover’s eyes describes how affect works between bodies. Ganymede’s “face reflects pleasure” in Jupiter’s eyes, and this pleasure travels throughout Jupiter’s body to his heart and which he “expels” in his breathe. He is in complete thrall of this child, even going so far as to grant him command of all the Gods. Jupiter sets the tone of the play in one line; the play will not be about Aeneas’s epic obligation to found a nation, but about play and pleasure. Therefore, to “cut the thred of time” also signifies the import of the play as an episode “cut” from the epic. Dido is not an epic play; it is, however, a “play” that

59 To “cut the thred of time” signifies, according to Rick Bowers, the play’s “camp sensibility,” because cutting or stopping time liberates bodies from all temporal and moral obligations. Citing Susan Sontag’s seminal “Notes on Camp,” Bowers explains, “[t]ime liberates the work of art from moral relevance, delivering it over to the camp sensibility,” “debunk[ing] heroism” through “parody, androgyny, and italicized understandings.” In Rick Bowers, “Hysterics, High Camp, and Dido Queene of Carthage,” in Marlowe’s Empery: Expanding His Critical Contexts, ed. S.M. Deats and R.A. Logan (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2002), 97, 96.
explores (and “dilates”) pleasure. As such, the temporality of the play differs from the teleological emphasis of the epic.

The temporality of the play is symptomatic of the force of pleasure that seemingly dictates the actions that unfolds on stage. The key term that encapsulates both the play’s temporality and the force of pleasure is “wandring fate.” In Dido, and in terms of Marlowe’s education, “wandring fate” is a motif that exemplifies the power of forces—of pleasure—that lie beyond mortal control. Reiterated throughout the play, “wandring fate” describes Aeneas’s epic—or, in the play, anti-epic—trajectory, as well as the trajectory of the other players on stage. Aeneas’s men “happen” to land on Libyan shores, just as Aeneas does shortly thereafter, after fleeing a burning Troy. In other words, there is a conceptual synchronicity established between time and pleasure in the play via the idea of a “wandring fate”: both forces connote movement without direction, final end or telos. At the same time, the term is conceptually problematic, as Act 1 scene 1 shows us. Jupiter, in his attempt to placate Venus’s frustration about her son Aeneas’s trials on the seas, reassures her that Aeneas will survive this particular series of trials and tribulations, claiming that it is all a part of his “wandring fate”:

Content thee, Cytherea in thy care,
Since thy Aeneas wandring fate is firme….
But, first, in bloud must his good fortune bud,
Before he be the Lord of Turnus towne…. (1.1.82-87)

Jupiter, preoccupied with his succulent little Ganymede, coolly pacifies Venus by promising her son’s safety, only after he “wanders”—“three winters…with the Rutiles warre, / …And full three Sommers likewise shall he waste, / In mannaging those fierce
barbarian mindes” (1.1.89-92)—through “bloud” in order to earn and to be ready for his position as “Lord of Turnus town,” which is his “fate.” The term “wandring fate” is oxymoronic: “fate” implies predetermination and causality, whereas “to wander” conveys the opposite. As the OED defines it, “to wander” is to move about without purpose or aim, “to be (in motion) without control or direction; to roam, ramble, go idly or restlessly about; to have no fixed abode or station.” To possess a “wandring fate” suggests that a person’s fate is to wander—that his “purpose or aim” is to move about without any explicit or foretold rhyme or reason. Therefore, the temporality of wandering does not carry the force that it does in epic; like the definition suggests, the temporality of wandering is not linear, and, consequently, it is not measurable as quantitative time. There is no progressive linearity, essential in epic in order for the hero to achieve his goal, when one wanders. While an integral component of the epic quest, wandering always poses the potential to derail the hero from his path. In this regard, we could say that in Dido, that the wanderer himself appears less than agentic—not fully in control of his actions, as if he’s knowingly resigned himself to this “wandring fate.” In Marlowe’s play, pleasure operates as the force that dictates time, and renders the play characteristically anti-epic. Fred Tromly is correct, therefore, in perceiving that the affect of love is both “motion and emotion,” whereby “Marlowe transforms the epic linearity of the Aeneid into the to-and-fro interplay of lovers.” I believe pleasure—as lust, as indulgence—is a more befitting descriptor of the amorous relations of the play, and, in addition, I believe that it harbors the same potential to create both “motion and emotion.” What Marlowe presents in this play is a kind of dramatic adaptation of his sensual lyric,

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60 Fred Tromly, Playing with Desire: Christopher Marlowe and the Art of Tantalization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 47.
“The Passionate Shepherd”: in *Dido*, he attempts to comprehend and qualify time in terms of pleasure. Instead of the Deleuzian invocation of “time is not in us; we are in time,” Marlowe creates a performance were “we, and the characters on stage, are in pleasure.”

It is the “wandring fate” of Aeneas that functions as a kind of wayward catalyst of the play’s dramatic action. As forces at work within in play that serve to guide Aeneas’s “wandring fate,” the Gods assist in the production and dissemination of pleasure. God of Love, Venus, tellingly enough, is the “prime mover” or force that cultivates the play’s production of pleasure. Thus, in 1.1, Venus wishes her son “good lucke unto thy wandring steps” when she directs him to Dido’s court, “where [she] will receive [him] with her smiles” (1.1.234). She orders her son, Cupid—now “turne[d]…to Ascanius shape” (2.1.323)—to touch Dido’s breast with an enchanted arrow head: “That she may dote upon Aeneas love: / And by that meanes repaire his broken ships…. / And he at last depart to Italy, / Or els in Carthage make his kingly throne” (2.1.326-331). This is the dramatic crux of the play, which Venus, having written and directed, presents to the audience: once Dido is enchanted, will Aeneas arrive into Italy, or will he stay in Carthage? And, even though we are told that Aeneas lives a “wandring fate” for three winters, there is a time constraint placed on the decision, which Mercury imparts to him later in the play and which effectively curtails this “wandring fate,” rendering it more fatalistic than it initially seems to be.

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61 This assertion is evocative of Grosz’s explanation of forces, which “act through subjects, objects, material and social worlds without distinction,…which in turn produce ever-realigning relations of intensity or force” (in “(Inhuman) Forces,” 189).
The unusual alliance between the forces of Venus and her “mortall foe” Juno in Act 3 marries the affections lust and love, as well effectively imbuing the affect pleasure with an ethical dimension via the marriage between Dido (Juno’s patron) and Aeneas (Venus’s son). Juno, not fully aware of the enchantment that Venus has placed on Dido, suggests to Venus “a motion of eternall league” via a marriage between the two mortals because she notices that Dido is enamored of Venus’s son: Dido “cannot talke nor thinke of ought but him,” she tells a knowing Venus (3.2.73). Juno persuades the god of love to “let there be a match confrmed / Betwixt these two, whose loves are so alike, / And both our Dieities conjoynd in one, / Shall chaine felicitie unto their throne” (3.2.77-80). These two gods, as forces of pleasure, unite in order to breed pleasure through a production of a marital union—Juno’s specialty, as the god of marriage. As two variations of the affective force of pleasure, then, Venus and Juno’s pact is antithetical to the pursuit of epic, because the pact will result in Aeneas opting to stay in Carthage instead of fulfilling his epic quest. The pact acquires an ethical dimension at this particular moment because it is a joining of forces for the believed mutual benefit of those forces—for the benefit of pleasure and to benefit pleasure’s increase. However, another force, that of Jupiter, will find this pact to be ethically detrimental to his wishes—detrimental to the objectives of epic—and thus will shortly send Mercury to intervene on his behalf.

The pact between these godly forces is translated into the dramatic action when Juno conspires to make it rain while Dido and Aeneas are hunting, so that the must hide in a cave: “This day they both a hunting forth will ride…. / Ile make the Clowdes dissolve their watrie workes…. / Then in one Cave the Queene and he shall meete, / And
interchangeably discourse their thoughts, / Whose short conclusion will seale up their hearts” (3.2.87-94). The translation of these forces to the mortal realm is evident in the protagonists’ voices:

Dido:  Tell me deare love, how found you out this Cave?
Aeneas: By chance sweete Queene, as Mars and Venus met.
Dido:  Why, that was in a net, where we are loose,
And yet, I am not free, oh would I were. (3.4.3-6)

The “chance” location of the cave is an overdetermined one, and, while Dido’s response acknowledges their mythological antecedent (“as Mars and Venus met”) she is not fully aware of the irony of their predicament. In Homer’s *Odyssey*, Vulcan sets a trap for Mars and Venus, who he assumed was cuckolding him with the God of War. The allusion to Mars and Venus serves as a metaphor for the prison created by Venus’s enchantment of Dido. Mars fled to Thrace upon being released from Vulcan’s net, just as Aeneas will flee to Italy—thus resuming his epic quest—once Mercury reveals the complot of the enchantment has been revealed to him. Dido, however, remains ignorant of the full meaning of what she says—she equates the lack of physical bondage (by “net”) to their physical freedom, even though she intuits, at some minute level, her own feeling of captivity, in the sense of being controlled by something(s) else. What is apparent, by her performance, is a type of internal battle of wills, in Dido herself, the forces of pleasure and of reason. This is a battle that first emerges in the previous scene in which Cupid, who has taken the guise of Ascanius (while the real Ascanius remains in a deep sleep under Venus’s protective eye), enchants her with the arrowhead. This internal conflict is portrayed in a sequence of asides and disjointed clauses, in which she tells Aeneas that
she will repair his ships out of courtesy alone, but, to the audience, confesses her love for
him, all the while seeming confused by her conflicting feelings:

Dido: Aeneas, thinke not Dido is in love….

All these [suitors] and other which I never sawe….

Yet none obtained me, I am free from all.—

And yet God knowes intangled unto one.— [Aside]….

[I]t may be thou shalt be my love:

Yet boast not of it, for I love thee not,

And yet I hate thee not: — O if I speake

I shall betray my selfe…. (3.1.136-173)

A modern day Aeneas might think Dido a tad bi-polar, but, as is typical of Aeneas
throughout the play, he remains aloof and quite ignorant of what transpires around him.

There is an odd correlation between how the gods can affect the mortals without them
fully sensing it (even though, at times, Dido expresses a subtle sensing of something
unusual) and Aeneas’s inability to fully perceive the meaning of Dido’s emotional words.

Affect flows, but it does not flow smoothly in the play—intimating that Marlowe believes
that affective forces cannot be controlled, by mortals, or even by gods. Thus, what
Marlowe demonstrates in Dido is that it is impossible for bodies to capture, contain, and
control the force of pleasure, even though he attempts to do so through performance in
order to make pleasure perceptible to the audience. Affect flows, but the path of its flow
cannot be dictated, neither can its reception—how the receiving body both feels and then
interprets those feelings is beyond the agent’s power. This inability is apparent in Dido’s
contradictory emotions, which fluctuate between each line: in one line, she boasts of her
freedom from marriage and independence, yet, in the next, she evokes the opposite, betraying her love for Aeneas and her pitiful enslavement to that passion. “Betray,” in this speech of the battle of wills, connotes both definitions of disclosure and of betrayal: will she disclose her love for Aeneas, revealing her feelings and simultaneously deceive herself, effectively breaking her own vow to remain a widowed queen? Dido’s internal conflict—among the forces at work within her body—are conveyed through the verbalization of antagonistic thoughts. This internal conflict lingers throughout the duration of her enchantment, emerging in moments of self-questioning and disorientation; hence Dido’s concession, in 3.4, “And yet, I am not free….” Even the ignorant Aeneas perceives Dido’s internal conflict, when he questions, “What meanes faire Dido by this doubtfull speech?” (3.4.31). Aeneas perceives the contradictions at work within Dido, but he is unable to interpret the root of the symptom.

In addition to the forces of Venus and Juno, there are other affective forces at work within the play that also function as literal forces that constrain, coerce, and compel the protagonists to act. Like Dido, Aeneas encounters and struggles with these forces. Yet, unlike Dido—who perceives these forces as internal, conflicting wills or desires—Aeneas experiences these forces externally, in the bodies of Gods, which is why he comprehends their mandates as moral imperatives. Aeneas, in this sense, inhabits a generically liminal territory; some part of him always remains bound to epic—connoting, on a meta-level, the bounds or constraints of imitatio, because Aeneas is Virgil’s creation. But Marlowe makes Dido his own creation and therefore has that creative freedom, suggested in the concept of imitatio, to remove Dido from the parameters of epic. By interpreting these forces in this way, Aeneas effectively abnegates all responsibility for
his actions. In other words, within the confines of epic, Aeneas feels morally bound to
the will of the gods. For Aeneas, the gods are always Virgilian—while Dido, and we in
the audience, perceive the gods as Ovidian. This juxtaposition translates into an
awareness of Aeneas’s freedom from responsibility, because he believes that superhuman
forces dictate his actions. Aeneas’s ethics are cultivated and delimited by the heroic
qualities of the epic. His epic-minded ethics are at odds with Dido’s pleasure-oriented
ethics, and this difference is expressed in performance through the consequential actions
of the two characters: Aeneas becomes detached, while Dido becomes rapt by frantic
obsession of lost love.

The joint forces of Venus and Juno cannot maintain control over Aeneas once
Mercury intervenes on behalf of Jupiter, and this intervention results in Aeneas’s decision
to leave Carthage and resume his quest. In 5.1, Aeneas rationalizes his decision via an act
of detachment, asserting that his departure is not his decision at all—that forces beyond
his control have made this decision for him. Furthermore, he maintains that he has no
control over his fate; the Gods have made this decision for him. He explains to Dido,

Aeneas: I am commaunded by immortall Jove,
        To leave this towne and passe to Italy,
        And therefore must of force.

Dido: These words proceed not from Aeneas heart.

Aeneas: Not from my heart, for I can hardly goe,
        And yet I may not stay, Dido farewell. (5.1.99-103)

He “must of force”: Aeneas articulates himself the passive subject in this syntactical
construction in order to emphasize his belief that the Gods, and not he himself, determine
his fate. He is “forced” to leave Carthage; he is compelled by reasons that are not, he
intones, within the limits of his power. As he implores—sincerely, in Latin—to Dido,
“Italiam non sponte sequor”: “It is not of my own will that I make for Italy” (5.1.140).
Marlowe’s direct citation of Virgil here magnifies the discrepancy between creator
(agent) and imitator (conduit). Aeneas’s inversion of cause and effect functions to
perpetuate and reinforce his “wandring fate,” while, in this particular instance, allows
him to resume his epic conquest. During Hermes’s second visit, he chides Aeneas for
being “too forgetfull of [his] own affayres” (5.1.30), and, implicitly, too forgetful of his
epic quest, thereby insinuating that his “forgetfulness” is both cause and effect—producer
and product—of his “wandring fate.” Aeneas’s forgetfulness has allowed him to stay in
Carthage too long, but it also is what will enable him to leave Carthage’s shores to sail to
Italy, to secure his name in “Fames immortal house” (4.3.9). In a kind of performance of
Nietzschean philosophy, it is only by actively forgetting his promise to Dido, even if that
forgetting is presented as the will of the Gods, that enables him to leave her.
Forgetfulness prompts a “wandring fate,” and a “wandring fate” necessitates
forgetfulness, for Aeneas.

The affect of pleasure, which took on an ethical domain once Venus and Juno
made a compact, becomes inimical to Aeneas once he determines to break his wedding
vow. The enchantment, now lifted, no longer provides the network of pleasure that
influenced his actions. Dido, however, still within the veil of enchantment, protests
Aeneas’s decision and challenges his logic, asserting that he cannot place the onus of
responsibility—he cannot locate the cause—for his impending departure on the Gods. He
cannot claim victimization, either, as a result of his disowning of his actions. Dido tries to
re-place responsibility back on his shoulders by breaking Aeneas’s chain of causality and, at the same time, dismissing the collective force of the Gods.

The Gods, what Gods be those that seeke my death?

Wherein have I offended Jupiter,

That he should take Aeneas from mine armes?

O no, the Gods wey not what Lovers doe,

It is Aeneas calles Aeneas hence,

And woeful Dido….

Desires Aeneas to remaine with her…. (5.1.128-135)

The point of contention in this speech, from Dido’s perspective, is Aeneas’s motives to leave her. He claims he must “not gainsay the Gods behest,” but she is not convinced, saying that the Gods could care less about “what Lovers doe” (5.1.127). From Aeneas’s perspective, the point of contention lies with the promise, and, ultimately, he chooses to honor his promise to the Gods over his marital promise to Dido. Aeneas is unwavering in his decision, which he makes in part due to Hermes information that Venus “beguild the Queene”—that her love, in other words, was fabricated; it was not real, or true, in Aeneas’s estimation, thus he is resolved to depart for Italy. It is when Hermes, who becomes a type of force in service of epic itself, reveals the work of the Gods that pleasure departs from the play, since the forces of pleasure have been exposed, Aeneas becomes disenchanted, and they lose all power over him from this point forward in the play. The “prime mover” of pleasure, Venus, no longer appears onstage. And, when Dido gives him an ultimatum—“if thou wilt stay, / Leape in mine armes…. / If not, turne from me…. / I have not power to stay thee” (5.1.179-183)—Aeneas, without any word or
gestural indication, exits the stage—over 150 lines before the play’s conclusion. Dido is fully aware that she lacks the “power” to persuade him to stay: the force of epic—Jupiter’s power—has overpowered Dido’s force of pleasure.

Dido considers Aeneas to be weak, since he is unable or unwilling to be accountable for the “(inhuman) forces” at work within him, instead feeling the need to externalize those forces, and that responsibility, onto the Gods. Dido, strong, but not invincible or cunning like Marlowe’s future protagonists, still takes full ownership of her actions, regardless of the extent to which she is actually the agent of them. Dido performs a pseudo-Nietzschean version of the eternal return, whereby she fully accepts and takes responsibility for her actions in such a way that suggests she would, without hesitation, will its (eternal) return. This will “to return” is signified by the marriage contract and the promise to will the marriage into the future without knowing that future. However, there is one event—Aeneas’s flight from Carthage—that Dido refuses to accept. When Aeneas leaves, Dido is determined to “consume all that this stranger left…. / To cure [her] minde that melts for unkind love” (5.1.284-287). Her version of acceptance is equivalent to destruction. Perhaps pleasure has not absconded, for she is something that Aeneas has left, too, in addition to the sword, the garments, the “letters, lines, and perjured papers,” and other accoutrements that he has left behind in Carthage (5.1.295-300). Before throwing herself into the sacrificial fire, she exclaims, “Sic sic juvat ire sub

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62 Deleuze interestingly is the thinker who, in his book on Nietzsche, interpreted the eternal return as an “ethical and selective thought”: “[a]s an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the practical synthesis: whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return…. It is the thought of the eternal return that selects. It makes willing something whole. The thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything which falls outside the eternal return, it makes willing a creation…” (in Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson (1962; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 68-69).
umbras”: “Yes, yes, it pleases me to go into the dark” (5.1.313). Simultaneously
Nietzschean in its (re)affirmation (“yes, yes”) and emphatically reiterative of the
proliferation of pleasure (“it pleases me”), Dido’s suicide is the quintessential productive-
unproductive moment of the play. Pleasure produces her death—which, in turn, is
hyperbolically magnified by the following suicides of Iarbus (“Dido I come to thee”) and
Anna (“Iarbus stay, I come to thee”), who both jump into the fire (5.1.318, 329)—and
provides the play’s denouement. Philip Ford argues that the forces inhabiting the play
are indifferently both creative and destructive: “The only power she has left is the power
to destroy herself, and it is through this destruction that she can again create. It is for this
reason—the creative power of her own destruction—that Dido embraces death.”63 To
reinterpret Ford’s argument in terms of this chapter, Dido’s ethics are the embodiment of
“Quod me nutrit me destruit—that which nourishes me destroys me.”64 The material that
both “nourishes” and “destroys” is nothing but the affective forces at work within the
play, which dictate the play’s action—and the affective force that Marlowe situates as the
predominant affective force is that of pleasure. Pleasure, manifested by the gods, or
through the trope of enchantment, or via the motif of a “wandring fate,” is the force that
catalyzes and effectively concludes the play’s action. Furthermore, it is pleasure that
derails epic; indeed, epic quests do entail “wandring,” but “wandring” in epic is always
subsumed within the dictates of the hero’s morally imbued epic quest. Epic is thus
threatened to dissolve when the “dilation” of pleasure becomes the endgame.

63 Ford, “‘Quod me Nutrit me Destruit,’: Relationships in Marlowe’s Dido, Queen of
Carthage,” 7.
64 Ibid., 1.
By using the trope of interruption in *Dido* as a critique of epic, Marlowe generates a condition of dramatic stasis, of temporal arrest. The forces at work in the play—forces of pleasure that produce pleasure—do not effect movement beyond the production of pleasure. Venus and Juno are not temporal forces. Even Jupiter, who is lackadaisical throughout, requires the assistance of Mercury—the messenger God of trade and commerce—to spur Aeneas’s movement from Carthage to Italy. (Mercury plays the same role in Virgil’s *Aeneid.*) The central motif of a “wandring fate” implies circularity or an inability to move forward. Aeneas’s “wandring” occurs within the bounds, the stage, of Carthage—ruled by Dido, the “wanderer.” All movement occurs offstage; Aeneas’s quest resumes offstage. Still in the midst of his Cambridge education, which, arguably, coincides as the apex of his Ovidian phase, Marlowe is intent on exploring the productivity of pleasure as in terms of *carpe diem*; pleasure for Marlowe is non-reproductive, and therefore functions as a critique of traditional mores which value reproduction, in this case, in terms of imperialistic, nation-founding endeavors. In *Dido*, pleasure is the affective force that influences dramatic action in the play—similar to how pleasure operates as the main affective motif in Marlowe’s poetry. In the lyric form of the pastoral, pleasure connotes timelessness. Marlowe’s “passionate shepherd” offers images of material items—“beds of roses,” fair lined slippers,” a belt “with coral clasps and amber studs”—as pleasures he hopes will “move” his beloved: “And if these pleasures may thee move, / Come live with me and be my Love.” *Dido* as interruption ruptures

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65 The allusions to Queen Elizabeth, and the absolute brilliance of my argument, are made explicit in Jacqueline de Weever’s *Chaucer Name Dictionary*: “In Phoenicia she was known as Elissa, but she was called Dido (the Wanderer) in Carthage” (*Chaucer Name Dictionary: A Guide to Astrological, Biblical, Historical, Literary, and Mythological Names in the Works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (London: Psychology Press, 1995), 117).
Aeneas’s movement toward Italy for two reasons: Aeneas’s refusal to let go of the past, to anchor his self, and the play, in Trojan history; and, second, the productivity of pleasure, which motivates both Aeneas’s “wandring fate” and Dido’s “arresting” love within the bounds of the play. Once the enchantment is broken, however, Aeneas leaves the binds of pleasure and the bounds of Carthage and its Queen Dido.

Marlowe’s dramatized *queer imitatio* of Virgil’s *Aeneid* not only functions as a critique of the epic genre, but it also offers a critique of the genre of tragedy, and it is in this critique that Marlowe establishes his own type of tragedy, which he cultivates and improves throughout his later plays. Marlowe critiques epic by portraying the impossibility of containing pleasure; epic expels pleasure, thus Marlowe’s *queer imitatio* of the *Aeneid* is the re-valuation of pleasure as a force that escapes the parameters of epic. In the play, Marlowe conveys the power of the affective force of pleasure through the plot: the epic hero Aeneas, not pleasure, absconds from the stage. The force of pleasure is more powerful than any body, even a noble, epic body. What remains on stage is pleasure, which courses throughout the bodies on that stage—pleasure “nourishes and destroys.” If Marlowe’s *queer imitatio* is founded upon this valuation of pleasure, and if his critique of epic is produced via this idealization of pleasure as an immaterial-but-material, omnipresent force, then his critique of tragedy is similarly derived from this conceptualization of pleasure. In *Dido*, Marlowe conceives of tragedy in terms of the affective force of pleasure. The “tragic,” as I will argue, is classified as the unwavering will to control forces that, more times than not, appear beyond one’s control. In this sense, Marlovian tragedy corresponds closely to what Nietzsche, some three hundred years later, would describe as the will, the affirmative “Yes.” In *Twilight of the Idols*
(1889), Nietzsche describes his understanding of tragic as sitting contrapuntally to Aristotle’s definition: the Nietzschean tragic is the affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility…. Not so as to get rid of pity and terror, not so as to purify oneself of a dangerous emotion through its vehement discharge—it was thus Aristotle understood it—: but, beyond pity and terror, to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming—that joy which also encompasses joy in destruction.66

Not only does this conception of tragedy challenge the traditional, Aristotelian definition of tragedy, it also effectively deflates the import of “catharsis” in that generic redefinition. The ethic of affirmation championed by Nietzsche as a defining element of tragic advances, not a disavowal of the emotions of pity and terror, but of the affirmative acknowledgement and working through—the “becoming”—of these emotions in order to transcend one’s current existence.

_Dido_ is a Marlovian Tragedy because Dido’s ethics—her actions that impart her desire to control the forces that eventually overwhelm her; her destructive action of suicide intended to spark future creation, and, thus, revenge against Aeneas’s lineage—are tragic. Her death, when the action ceases, has no direct impact on the play’s generic designation as a _Marlovian_ Tragedy—while, as a Renaissance tragedy, Dido’s death would be typified as the quintessential element. Douglas Cole, in his seminal study on Marlovian Tragedy, concurs, observing that the tragedy of Dido is actually the “tragic paradox” that epitomizes her life: “The one thing that Dido feels has fulfilled her

[Aeneas’s love]…is the one thing she must lose. The tragic paradox is there, in that mutual contradiction, rather than in the death of a mighty queen.” On the level of affective forces, it is these forces manifest through Dido’s physical and verbal actions on stage that determine the play as tragedy. This is precisely Ford’s argument: the same forces that create are also those that destroy. Forces themselves carry no moral valence—which is an argument carried throughout this dissertation and which is fully articulated in Chapter 5—forces act indiscriminately, or, as Ford intones in a notably Deleuzian fashion, they are mutually creative and destructive. It is the moral and ethical indifference of forces that render them potentially tragic—tragic because they carry the potential to be creative or destructive, beneficial or detrimental. Tragedy resides in this indeterminacy.

Cole likewise identifies the indiscriminate nature of forces as comprising “Marlowe’s tragic pattern”: the “manifold connections between desire and destruction,” and, specifically in Dido, the connections between “desire, delusion, and destruction.” He continues, “[i]n Marlowe’s conception of tragedy, these are all bound as one.”

Dido’s performance is what makes this play a tragedy. It is her continual will, or desire, to control forces—forces that she intuits to logically be beyond her control—that constitutes her existence as tragic. Dido’s tragic existence contrasts from Aeneas’s, whose epic existence is defined by his willingness to submit himself to forces he believes to be beyond his control. Dido’s struggle to control the “inhuman forces” that pervade her body is exhibited by the conflicting, at times even contradictory statements that I alluded to earlier in this chapter. One of the most captivating, tragic moments of the play is scene

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68 Ibid., 57. I agree with Cole, however, I read “desire” as “pleasure” in this Deleuzian-inspired analysis.
69 Ibid., 58.
in which Dido desperately pleads Aeneas to stay with her in Carthage. Dido’s emotionally erratic lamentations—manifestations of the conflicting forces within her—are simultaneously affective and unaffecting that Aeneas departs during her speech. “[W]ilt thou not be mov’d with Didos words?” is Dido’s question to Aeneas, and the answer comes in his sudden departure, without any verbal articulation on his behalf (5.1.155). Dido’s pitiful lamentations are temporary; it is during the moment when she realizes that pity has no affect on Aeneas that she launches into a diatribe against Aeneas, and his heritage (“Thy mother was no Goddesse perjurd man” [5.1.156]), deeming him a “serpent” who plans to “slay her with [his] venomed sting” [5.1.167]). Yet, a mere five lines after she wishes revenge upon the “traytor” Aeneas, she implores him to “leape in [her] arms, [because her] armes are open wide” (5.1.180). In the next line, however, she retracts this openness and vulnerability by saying that, if he refuses to embrace her, then “turne from me, and Ile turne from thee” (5.1.181). Two lines later, in the midst of this emotional onslaught, Aeneas leaves the stage—which the audience is made aware of only by the stage direction and, ten lines later, Dido’s exclamation, “But wheres Aeneas? ah hees gone hees gone!” (5.1.192). Her only recourse is to “rid [herself] from these toughts of Lunacie” by throwing herself in a symbolically cleansing/purging pyre. By killing herself, she foretells of a future creation: “from mine ashes let a Conquerour rise, / That may revenge this treason to a Queene, / By plowing up [Aeneas’s] Countries with the Sword” (5.1.306-308). What Dido desires is for the forces—the forces of creation and of destruction—to rise from the flames of this pyre, to resurrect themselves collectively into a force of vengeance. (Here we can meta-dramatically observe that the spirit of this vengeance is found in Marlowe’s conqueror, Tamburlaine.) An epic hero reaps rewards; a
tragic hero pays the price. Dido’s tragedy is encapsulated by this act of willful destruction conducted in the hope that there will be creation (and destructive, vengeful creation, at that) through this destruction.

Another facet of Dido’s suicide that renders it tragic in the Marlovian rather than Aristotelian sense is that it is intended without pity. Indeed, the characters on stage seem to reject the emotion of pity whenever possible throughout the play. “It pleases me to go under”: Dido’s final line is spoken without the desire to evoke pity, and the audience is not compelled to pity Dido since she envisions a future where her wrath will wreak vengeance upon Aeneas’s descendents—in other words, there is no need to pity someone who situates herself in a dominant, agentic position. Aristotle asserts that the “tragic pleasure is that of pity and fear,” but, in Dido, the tragic pleasure is that which shirks these ascetic emotions. This is perhaps nowhere as evident than in the lengthy scene of ekphrasis in which Aeneas’s recounts the fall of Troy, which is intended to evoke “pity and fear” but which Dido curtly dismisses and instead calls for them to “thinke upon some pleasing sport” (2.1.302). In Virgil’s epic, it is this scene that causes Dido to fall in love with Aeneas. However, in Marlowe’s dramatic adaptation, Dido remains unaffected, thus the need to incorporate the godly forces of pleasure—Juno and Venus—to catalyze Dido’s love for Aeneas. Marlowe’s critique here is of Virgil and of Aristotle: pity is unaffective and ineffective in Marlovian drama (just as the virgins of Damascus in Tamburlaine and the hundreds of Huguenots in The Massacre at Paris were quick to discover) and it certainly does not render “the tragic.” As a result, the consequential production of catharsis is of secondary importance in Marlovian Tragedy; throughout his

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70 Aristotle, Poetics, 1468.
drama, Marlowe de-emphasizes catharsis by ending his plays abruptly, oftentimes in hyperbolic moments of chaos, as in *Dido*, with the grossly hyperbolic triple suicide. Marlowe diffuses cathartic-inducing emotions of pity and fear from his stage with campy hyperbole—there is nothing to be pitied in the absurd. The rhetoric of affirmation manifest in Dido’s actions, which render the play tragic, is simultaneously ethical: to affirm the forces of creation and destruction is to imbue the Marlovian (and, later, Nietzschean) notion of tragedy with value. Marlowe not only lays the foundation for his own form of tragedy in *Dido*, he also situates the play as the immanent plane within which his ethics emerge in his later plays. As I will examine throughout this dissertation, this ethics is explicitly tragic in its affirmation of creation through destruction, and, in particular, as evident in *Dido*, Marlowe’s elevation of pleasure as a tragic force.

After *Dido*, Marlowe continues to revise Aristotle’s idea of the import of action to the definition of tragedy in order to rethink the parameters of the genre. He determines that pleasure as the affective force of his tragedies does not allow for movement (in both senses of “to move” and “to emote”) beyond the affective production of pleasure. Pleasure, it seems, is tautological in this sense. *Dido* shows us that Marlowe comprehends the power of pleasure as an affective force, but he concludes that it is an unsatisfying, incomprehensive force in terms of tragedy. Once he departed his studies at Cambridge for London in the mid-1580s (and before completing his degree), a philosophical shift occurs in Marlowe’s drama, in which pleasure is sublimated and diffused throughout other tropes of power: more sadistic tropes, of violence and vengeance, in the case of *Tamburlaine, The Jew of Malta*, and *The Massacre at Paris*, and particularly political tropes, in *Edward II*. His arrival in London provided him a new coterie of friends,
including the Earl of Northumberland, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Raleigh’s tutor, Thomas Harriot, who introduced him to occult science and magic, which allowed Marlowe different avenues to think about the forces of movement beyond pleasure. These discourses, coupled with Marlowe’s studies in Lucretian philosophy (elaborated in Chapter 2) and his continued revaluation of Aristotle’s emphasis on action, enabled him to posit another force—that of time—as the quintessential productive force of movement, of creation, of becoming within his drama. That is, Marlowe finally understood—perhaps, even, through the very real temporal constraints imposed upon his drama by the theater (the open-air Rose Theater at London’s bankside)—that time not only controls all but that it is the metaphysical ground upon which everything is produced. Marlowe intuited that all life, all movement, occurs within time, and, therefore, he posited time as the foundational element of tragedy.

It is a philosophy that he first tests in *Doctor Faustus*. 
The Magic of Time in *Doctor Faustus*

[T]he Renaissance marked an important transitional stage from the ethics of the classical and medieval thinkers to the better-known theories of the modern ethicians. In particular, *it was in the Renaissance that a new and secular spirit came into ethical thinking.*¹

An elaboration of a Marlovian Ethics is very much contingent on an analysis of the aesthetics performed on the Marlovian stage, since, *pace* Deleuze and Foucault, there is an inherent association between ethics and aesthetics: both are defined by stylizations.² In other words, the assessment of an ethics requires an examination of the stylizations performed by characters on stage. If, for Deleuze, “it’s the styles of life involved in everything that make us this or that,”³ then there is no better place to begin this elaboration of a Marlovian Ethics than Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* (ca. 1589), Marlowe’s play that indulges in magic as art—and, in turn, as I will prove in this essay, as ethics, because it is a play that enmeshes the aesthetic with the ethical. While criticism has tended to interpret Marlowe’s play about magic as either a moral exemplum (via negative exemplum theory), or, more liberally, a dramatization of the aspirations of the Renaissance man,⁴ I believe this play primarily to be an examination of time and,

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² See pages 15-16 of the Introduction for more on this relation.
secondarily, Marlowe’s attempt to advance an alternative ethics to the morally-imbued and Christian-centered ethics espoused contemporaneously in early modern England. At this stage in his career, Marlowe turned from his Ovidian version of pleasure to the philosophical concept of time as the hinge of his tragedies. In Doctor Faustus, Marlowe attempts to dramatize how the body lives time, and thus establishes an ethics. How the body lives time is, in Bergsonian parlance, in duration—non-quantitative time. I believe, pre-Bergson, Marlowe presents an account of life in duration, and he accomplishes this via a dramatization of the body as spirit in order to render the philosophical concept of duration materially on stage.


5 According to Fritz Caspari, the humanist ethics of the time believed that the “purpose of human society must be to assimilate the world to the Divine as closely as it may be given to man’s powers to do so” (“Erasmus on the Social Functions of Humanism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 8.1 (Jan., 1947): 85). Likewise, Dorothy Brown explains that the “humanists in England believed in a rational world with a moral foundation…. Through education, they thought all men could learn God’s plan for their lives” (in Christian Humanism in the Late Morality Plays (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999), 17). To become closer to god, man must fashion himself, morally and civically, with God as his compass. Man’s conception of time was therefore linear, with its teleological end being his fate, which rested in God’s hands. Man’s awareness of time as a dominant factor in his life, Ricardo J. Quinones argues, is what distinguishes the Renaissance man from the medieval man: “for the new men of the Renaissance time was not plentiful but rare and precious…. One must work as much as possible to see that events turn our favorably…. [T]ime was an active part of moral exhortation” (in The Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 6-9).

6 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of how Marlowe sublimes his emphasis on pleasure and elevates his regard of time as the primary force of his tragedies.
One motivating objective of this study on *Faustus* is to produce a reading of the play that does not explicitly or implicitly rely upon or reinforce the type of moral tradition that has undergirded readings of this play. I do believe that Marlowe frames the play with Calvinist morality, but I believe this frame functions as a subtle façade, which can be read through in order to perceive the amoral “play” operating within it. My reading differs from criticism that persists in evaluating Faustus within this moral framework. So, while I agree with Lowell Gallagher that “the materiality of ethics…goes unacknowledged in the dramatic action” of *Doctor Faustus*, my argument, unlike Gallagher’s, refuses to adhere to moral critical tradition.7 Gallagher’s interest in the “materiality of ethics” is one of the driving impetuses of this particular chapter, but whereas he maintains that Faustus’s “blood protests on behalf of the legacy of Christological messianism,”8 I examine Faustus’s materiality—as “spirit”—along the line of philosophical tradition, from Lucretius to Deleuze, that is defined by its a-morality. Furthermore, with a focus on delineating Faustus’s ethics, this chapter is not preoccupied with observing Faustus’s “transgressions” on a political scale.9 Because this study is not interested in morality, I have no real inclination to either the 1604 concise A-Text or the 1616 comical B-Text. Even Mark Thornton Burnett recently commented that “neither

8 Ibid., 4.
9 In one of the most recognizable new historicists analyses of the play, Jonathan Dollimore writes: “In *Doctor Faustus*…sin is not the error of fallen judgment but a conscious and deliberate transgression of limit” (“*Doctor Faustus*: Subversion through Transgression,” in Christopher Marlowe, ed. R. Wilson (New York: Longman, 1999), 240). I agree with Dollimore that Faustus acts “conscious[ly]” and “deliberate[ly],” but I refuse, in my reading of the play, to prescribe to the moral frame, including the language, that Dollimore heeds in his reading—which, in a sense, enables his argument about transgressing “limits.”
version can be said to be categorically superior or preferable.” My preference, like a director envisioning her version of the play, is to pick and choose parts of both texts to my liking, which, clearly, is my own attempt destabilize notions of coherent and fixed (play)texts.

In addition to sharing critical sympathy with Gallagher’s essay, this study also has a critical affinity with a handful of recent studies of Doctor Faustus that are interested in the play’s materiality. For instance, I follow Patrick Cheney in arguing that “magic [functions] as an art of immanence,” in the play—magic is the trope that renders the material immaterial, and vice versa. His understanding of magic, I believe, is derived from Marlowe’s Ovidianism, and it is precisely his Ovidianism that Kristen Poole cites as

11 My choice of Bowers’s edition of the play is mostly due to a desire to be consistent with my Marlowe editions throughout this dissertation by using his two volumes of Marlowe’s plays. Fredson Bowers’s edition of Doctor Faustus, which is a composite text, is used in this study (Fredson Bowers, The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe, 2nd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Bowers laboriously explains the differences between the two texts in addition to his decision for using a composite text in the play’s textual introduction (pages 123-159). See also Eric Rasmussen’s A Textual Companion to Doctor Faustus for further textual analysis of the differences between the two texts (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993)). However, if J.B. Steane (quoting W.W. Greg) insists that “to prefer the A text is ‘to suspend historical judgment,’ but to prefer the B text is to suspend every other form of judgment,” then obviously the preference for this blatantly a-moral study is the B-text; thankfully, Bowers’s composite includes the entire B-text, minus a few emendations (J.B. Steane, Marlowe: A Critical Study (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 124. In addition, Sara Munson Deats’s assertion that “the most provocative binding of actors with spirits occurs only in the B-text” renders this text even more compelling to this reader (“‘Mark this show’: Magic and Theater in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus,” in Placing the Plays of Christopher Marlowe: Fresh Cultural Contexts, eds. S. M. Deats and R. A. Logan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 21).
12 Patrick Cheney, Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession: Ovid, Spenser, Counter-Nationhood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 207.
shaping Marlowe’s conception of the malleability of matter and space: “Doctor Faustus operates according to what I will call Ovidian physics, an understanding of the world in which matter and space are perceived as fluid and plastic.”\textsuperscript{13} Where Poole sees Ovid, I also see Lucretius—and Bergson. And, I interpret this conception of materiality as insight into the ethics advanced through the performance onstage. My reading of the play also advocates an affirmation of life divested of morality, and therefore my perception of magic as a positive vehicle for creation coincides with Noam Reisner’s belief that “Mephistophelian art triumphs in Marlowe’s plays because its offer of transitory ‘sweet pleasure’ is more real, more life-affirming in its illusory character, than the very real but in fact unimaginable, and therefore un-reproducible, transcendental alternative.”\textsuperscript{14} Yet I find Reisner’s reliance on mimesis at odds with his concluding argument that Marlowe’s “creative imagination...knows no bounds” in the play, and, as this chapter will demonstrate, I disagree that Faustus’s mimetic art is devoid of “ethical content.”\textsuperscript{15} I also, in contradistinction to these critics, intuit a correlation between Marlowe’s understanding of time as duration and his rendering of materiality as “fluid” or spirit-like in this play. Marlowe’s philosophy of materiality and temporality are both determining elements in the ethics that he presents on stage in \textit{Doctor Faustus}.

Marlowe acknowledges the traditional, teleological notion of linear time by utilizing it as the frame of his play. Within the frame of the play, time is experienced as


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 343.
duration; from without, the frame of “twenty-four years” is specifically designated as quantitative time, and moral force that imbues the play with its Christian overtones (and its affiliation with the medieval morality play). Within those twenty-four years, Faustus lives as he chooses, but the frame, set in motion by his contract with Lucifer, terminates his duration by resubmitting him into the constraints of Christian time. How Marlowe presents time, I want to argue, is very similar to how the 20th century philosopher Henri Bergson conceptualizes time as duration. In his first work, *Time and Free Will* (1889), Bergson articulates time as “duration” in order to distinguish his understanding of time as a qualitative force from the general understanding of time as a quantitative unit—time rendered in the form of numbers and clocks was beginning to emerge in Marlowe’s period. Bergson’s positing of time as duration is intended to convey the qualitative differences that emerge within, and that are produced by, time. Time as duration indicates that time allows for heterogeneity; time is continuous, indivisible, and non-spatial (only becoming spatial, or spatialized when it is transformed into a quantitative figure). For Bergson, rendering time as a numerical unit reduces it to a kind of space. In effect, time loses its dynamic quality and instead becomes a static, definitive quantity, or closed field. Time also loses its potential as a force of qualitative difference when it is translated into a system of calculation, whereby difference is simply the numerical distinction between two homogeneous units. The effect of rendering time as space affects our knowledge of feelings and sensations:

[L]et us notice that when we speak of time, we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity…. For if
time…is [this] medium…so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time…is nothing but space.\textsuperscript{16}

Space—and time as space—is an “empty homogeneous medium” that Bergson perceives to be a “reaction against [the] heterogeneity which is the very ground of our experience.”\textsuperscript{17}

Duration, for Bergson, connotes endurance: duration is \textit{to endure} (\textit{durée}). The term “duration” acknowledges the simultaneous continuity and multiplicity of affects as they are experienced by the body; it accounts for the heterogeneity that “is the very ground of our experience.”\textsuperscript{18} Bergson employs the metaphor of music to characterize the flow and seamless blending of qualitative forces that occur in duration: musical notes seamlessly flow into one another in the same way that images or experiences “permeat[e] each other and organiz[e] themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number.”\textsuperscript{19} They “melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another….”\textsuperscript{20} Bergson’s understanding of music is derived from aural, and other, perceptions, whereas, in Marlowe’s time, as part of the Quadrivium, music was understood as a mathematical science. Any effort to externalize


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 97.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 105.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 104.
these qualitative forces, to intellectualize them into language, or to rationalize them as “emotion,” would automatically render them in terms of space and effectively neutralize them of their (im)material vitalism. Bergson’s point is that the qualitative affections, which act as forces on our body and which our body perceives as sensations, become devoid of their multidimensionality once they are placed into language, as language itself functions as the linguistic unit that is used to describe the sensation being felt but which can never fully translate the totality of that sensation. Bergson’s articulation of language sits opposite to structuralist and psychoanalytic (Lacanian) models of language, whereas in Marlowe’s time, language was regarded as an eloquent conductor of thoughts between bodies. It is a part of Bergson’s philosophy that chimes with Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s before him: what occurs within and on the body is never fully comprehended by the mind. The body, for all three thinkers, is the ontological center of our existence.

Bergson’s understanding of time changed as his work matured throughout the early 20th century. In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson grounds his study of time as duration within the binaristic structure of duration and space, spirit and matter, as ontologically disparate categories. In his later work, *Matter and Memory* (1911), Bergson inquires whether matter itself contains duration within it. Even though his study begins, again, with binaries—spirit is temporal and pure memory (virtual), while matter is extension and pure perception—he eventually resolves that the difference between matter and spirit is one conditioned by the force of time, whereby the perception of each is contingent upon “the successive moments of the duration of things,” or the movement of images and  

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how the movement is perceived by the viewing body. For Bergson, matter is spatial, and
its felt or perceived spatiality is conditioned by duration. Duration influences how the
materiality of matter is felt, how it is perceived, by outside bodies. Time as duration may
even be considered an answer to Hamlet’s metaphysical inquiry about man’s nature—
“And yet, what is this quintessence of dust?” It is duration that constitutes the
“quintessence” of life, which has two tendencies: contraction (spirit) and expansion
(matter).

Bergson’s concluding argument in Matter and Memory is that spirit, in its most
contracted state as pure duration, functions to vitalize matter, and it is this function that
effectively distinguishes it from matter but simultaneously relates it to matter:

[t]he humblest function of the spirit is to bind together the successive
moments of the duration of things, if it is by this that it comes into contact
with matter and by this also that it is first of all distinguished from matter,
we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully
developed spirit—a spirit capable of action which is not only
undetermined, but also reasonable and reflective.22

Spirit’s “humblest function,” “to bind together the successive moment of the duration of
things,” can be imagined as the vital force that re-animates Faustus’s body-in-pieces later
in the play. The essence of spirit—as a kind of fluid conductor of movement, interaction,
and engagement—can also be interpreted as catalyzing the action of the play: only when
Faustus becomes spirit does he leave his study and forget his ruminations on the value of

22 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (Cambridge,
various disciplines to explore the universe, and, in turn, learn by experience from his travels and engagements with other bodies.

By proposing to read Faustus in terms borrowed from Bergson, one encounters the immediate problem that Bergsonian “espirit” can mean both “mind” and “spirit.” Furthermore, one should not be too quick to assume that spirit only has a theological meaning since we shall see that Marlowe incorporates occult philosophies that were marginal discourses during his period. For Bergson, spirit seems to be nothing less than the essence of creative potential itself, which is why Bergson later claims that the spirit in action is capable of engendering freedom, whereby “freedom” is indicative of the movement that spirit enables when it imbues and animates inert matter. Spirit allows for a body to “[evolve] more or less freely [in order to create] something new every moment.”

Or, as plainly stated by Elizabeth Grosz, “[i]t is the insertion of duration into matter that produces movement; it is the confrontation of duration with matter as its obstacle that produces innovation and change, evolution and development.” The freedom that spirit engenders is not only apparent in the vitality which animates matter, granting it the ability of movement, but it also therefore imbues that matter with the potential to create the new—new things, new experiences—through its bestowal of movement. This is the power of the spirit: if utilized creatively, spirit allows for the creation of “something new at every moment.” Bergson’s conceptualization of spirit allows for an optimistic rethinking of an ethics for life. He establishes a means to advance

23 Ibid., 222.
an ethics of life that advocates creativity, newness, and a becoming more than a body’s extant capabilities; this is the definition of spirit as the essence of freedom.

Faustus as spirit, in the Bergsonian sense of understanding spirit as the vital force or movement of a body—and not simply in the sense of spirit as mind or in a theological sense—even speaks to the body in and of performance: the body that we the audience come to know and perceive in action on stage is literally “bound together,” in its successive moments of performance, by the audience as we watch the dramatic action unfold before our eyes. Working from Bergson’s conceptualization of time, we can postulate that our notion of “character”—in both its noun and adjectival forms—relies on this “binding together”; character is formed, and the ethics of a character is formed, through the binding together of successive moments of performance. The sense of character that we establish in our minds, therefore, is a product of this narrative that we ourselves create through the duration of the performance. A character, and, by extension, that character’s ethics, are thus configured and presented as the “matter” of performance: how matter is perceived, again, is conditioned by duration, and, at the same time, this matter is a conglomerate of the spirit of the character melded with the actor’s body.

25 From this cognitive process of binding-together, one could surmise how the distinctiveness of individual moments disappear, or are overlooked, in the establishing of a coherent, unified, character, whereby, in effect, characters themselves lose their complexity as living figures on the stage. On stage personas “become characters,” it seems, by a process of simplification or reduction—or, in common parlance, stereotyping. Marjorie Garber attributes much of our understanding of characters to centuries of editorial heavy-handedness, and I agree, since how many of us come to know the plays is through reading them (instead of witnessing their performance). She discusses the ramifications of this type of elision of specificity in her essay “Fatal Cleopatra,” and, in particular, in regard to the editorial history of Shakespeare’s plays (in Profiling Shakespeare (New York: Routledge, 2008), 253-270). In a subtle feminist analysis, Garber observes that, at the hands of male editors, Shakespeare’s women—and, notably, Cleopatra—are whitewashed, muted, and refashioned to fit that particular editor’s agenda.
Bergson’s conceptualization of time not only affects our sense of character, but it also affects how we understand the durational moments of the play. Simply discussing the play in terms of act and scene, then, seems both inadequate and unproductive, because the durational moments of significance, which are the focus of this chapter, are those moments that perform ethics. Instead, it appears that ethical moments occur when a body engages with another body—and these bodies do not necessarily need to be human. Ethical moments are readable when Faustus handles his books to ruminate over the amount of satisfaction he feels from studying them. Ethical moments occur during his interactions with Mephistopheles, who variously functions for Faustus as teacher, comrade, and magical agent to carry out or enable his magical wishes. The duration of ethical moments, therefore, is not delimited by a play’s textual structure, which segments the play into acts and scenes. The duration of ethical moments is determined by the duration of the engagement, or interaction, between two or more bodies. Ethical moments, in other words, are moments of affect—when bodies affect and are affected by other bodies. Understanding that time is a qualitative force correlates with a rendering of the affective moments of a play as the ethical moments of that play—this is how Bergson innovates how we read drama.

Taking this understanding of duration, and the notion that ethics are durational creations, we can perceive how ethical moments in Doctor Faustus are determined by particular durational units. Ethical moments, which are designated “ethical” for their affective and sensory qualities, I believe, should be understood as distinct from measured time. Bergson’s example of how the dissolving of a cube of sugar, as measured by the feeling of impatience, conveys how we might, in turn, define an ethical “moment”:
Through our reasoning on isolated systems may imply that their history, past, present, and future, might be instantaneously unfurled like a fan, this history, in point of fact, unfolds itself gradually, as if it occupied a duration like our own. If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute.

What else can this mean than that the glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar’s melting in the water are abstractions, and that the Whole within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses, it may be in the manner of a consciousness?26

The sugar cube becomes in time; its duration is perceptible through its dissolution. The sugar cube as its own duration, separate from my own, and this difference is felt in my “impatience” for the cube to melt.27 The moment of the sugar cubes dissolution is different, is felt differently, from the moment of my impatience. From this example, we can assert that moments are qualitative in nature, but that they are also unquantifiable—

27 Deleuze states as much in his reading of Bergson’s example in Bergsonism: “Bergson’s famous formulation…signifies that my own duration, such as I live it in the impatience of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine” (31).
they are measured by the coming and going of qualities or sensations. Moments, too, in this regard, are active states: the dissolution of the cube is an action; the coming and passing of my impatience is an action (internal to the self). Faustus’s final monologue, spoken as the clock chimes repeatedly as the time passes from eleven to midnight, is a poignant example of how his moment of reflection contrasts with measured time.

Ah Faustus,

Now hast thou but one bare hour to live….

Stand still you ever moving Spheres of heaven,

That time may cease, and midnight never come….

The Stars move still, Time runs, the Clocke will strike,

The devill will come, and Faustus must be damn’d. [5.2.]1926-1937

This measured time is Christian time, whereby the chiming of the clocks signify the completion of Faustus’s pact and his consequential return to the constraints of time and his death. (There is a clear metaphor at work here between death and the binds of time that Marlowe plays with in this scene.) Faustus has become aware of the irony—of it being bound by the Christian, quantitative time that he desired to escape by establishing the contract in the first place—of his contract. He now craves to be re-turned back into “some brutish beast” from spirit ([5.2.]1968), but the clock strikes twelve only moments later.

In *Doctor Faustus*, each ethical moment possesses its own kind of performative duration. Not all moments eclipse an equal amount of time, and not all moments evoke or
affect the same affective response, even if they create or reiterate the sum of Faustus’s values, as we will see. Even at a cursory glance, it is clear that Faustus’s pleasure of tossing away his theological books with a satirical disdain is a qualitatively different pleasure from conjuring Benvolio’s horns to make the latter look like an ass (granted, the metaphor is one of the stag, and not an ass), just as Faustus’s intimate moment with Helen differs in its kind of pleasure. Again, in a Spinozist vein, a moment can be interpreted as ethical if it is affective. To affect is to act. For Faustus, ethical moments are those that perform and enhance his values—his primary value being pleasure. Ethical moments are moments of will, or willing, in order to obtain one’s desire: Faustus reading the four provisos of his contract aloud to Mephistopheles is an ethical moment, because in this moment the words of the contact are performative words that actualize through verbalization. In this recitation of the contact, Faustus becomes spirit in form and substance. Another ethical moment comes in the form of the performative declaration when Faustus tells “Divinitie adeiu” and picks up a book of necromancy. In this first scene, Faustus’s dismissal of various books and disciplines reveals a re-prioritizing of values in his life; necromancy will give him “a world of profit and delight” (1.1.81). Ethical moments also are frequently marked by Faustus’s harnessing of Mephistopheles power through command. Faustus’s magical power is derived entirely through his relationship with Mephistopheles: Mephistopheles must charm Faustus so that he become invisible to taunt the priests; Mephistopheles must transform and then un-transform Benvolio (“Mephistopheles, transforme him; and hereafter sir, looke you speake well of Schollers” [[4.1.]1314-1315]); and it is Mephistopheles who makes Faustus’s conjurings and happen, from bringing forth the spirit of Charles the Emperor to the spirit of Helen of
Troy. Pleasure and power are affective values produced through Faustus’s connection to the spirit, Mephistopheles. Furthermore, moments are ethical because they are creative; these affective moments produce something through action. Part of what is produced for the audience, and also for Faustus, are his values. Affective moments create values, reiterate values, change values, and strengthen values—this is how affective moments become ethical moments. The something produced could be another leg, or it could be a feeling, an understanding. Faustus asks Mephistopheles to bring back Helen in the hope that “her sweet embraces may extinguish cleare, / Those thoughts that do disswade [him] from [his] vow [to Lucifer]” ([5.1.]1763-1764). Again, Faustus seeks pleasure as a cure all. But what is produced, beyond some of the most famous lines ever recorded in English drama, is a desire for a type of pleasurable satiation that results in a type of self-obliteration. Similar to the life cycle of the phoenix, the creation of the new, or the elevation of the creative moment of experience necessitates an act of destruction. Helen’s appearance produces Faustus’s sensation; her appearance overwhelms his body, such that he compares himself to the “haplesse Semele” who was consumed by Jupiter’s glory upon seeing him fully ([5.1.]1784). This moment allowed for Faustus to have a deeper understanding of his feelings and a more perceptive ability to articulate these feelings in beautiful language. The creation is profound on the level of the self, as an affective creature.

Marlowe’s emphasis on Faustus’s desire to become “more”—more than human, more powerful, more intelligent—bespeaks the value that Marlowe places on a kind of carpe diem mentality, which manifests in the play’s treatment of the fantastical qualities of Faustus’s body. Marlowe uses the concept “spirit” to present the embodiment of the
dynamic qualities that characterize the life lived outside a Christian telos and therefore functions as the embodiment of Faustus’s ethics. In this regard, spirit functions as a kind of performative-correlative—that is, as the performance of the vitalistic philosophy—that materializes in the form of the body of Faustus. It is for this reason that magic is so significant to the driving philosophical force of the play at the level of its plot: it is magic that makes the immaterial material. Magic operates as the performative device that actualizes creative potential on stage; magic enables the figurative (language) a power over the material. Or, in the time of Faustus, it is magic that renders the concept “spirit” in and as the body of Faustus on stage.

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28 Here I am playing upon the literary concept of the objective correlative, as infamously developed by T. S. Eliot in his critique of Hamlet, which Eliot found to be a failure for want of adequate signifieds, it seems. Eliot perceived a logical disconnect between Hamlet’s exaggerated emotions and what Eliot traced as the cause(s) of those emotions. (“Hamlet and His Problems.” The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. London: Methune, 1920; accessed http://www.bartleby.com/200/sw9.html). Hamlet’s emotions, in other words, “exceeded the facts.” Eliot claims that “the only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.” My concept of the “performative-correlative” plays upon the function of the signifier “objective correlative”: the concept signifies the relation between the philosophical concept of “the spirit” and the performative body on stage. In this study, Faustus’s body functions as the performative-correlative to the concept of spirit.

29 Here my argument agrees with Andrew Sofer’s assertion that “Faustus traffics in performative magic not in the service of skepticism, as some critics have argued, but to appropriate speech’s performative power on behalf of a glamorous commercial enterprise, the Elizabethan theatre itself” (“How to Do Things with Demons: Conjuring Performatives in Doctor Faustus, Theatre Journal 61 (2009): 2). To perform is to make material; as he states, citing Mary Thomas Crane, “‘perform’ in all its early modern senses already incorporates a concept of performativity, in that it involves turning something immaterial (a duty, a contract, the pattern of a ceremony) into a material thing” (8). What allows for this performative materiality, of course, is the actor’s body, which gives form—physically, audibly—to Faustus as spirit.
Through our discussion of Bergson, we have observed how the concept of spirit is extremely significant to understanding both Faustus’s materiality and his ethics. Within the Anglicized world, the term “spirit” has historically carried its own mysterious, ontological, significance. By the time Marlowe penned Doctor Faustus in the late 1580s, the term “spirit” in contemporary parlance denoted a type of corporeal liminality; it was the bridge between the body and the soul. For Helkiah Crooke, the spirit was a “subtle and thinne body”; for Robert Burton it was “a common tie or medium between the body and the soul.”³⁰ Both definitions suggest that the spirit was understood to be a kind of ubiquitous substance, part material, part immaterial (meaning that the materiality of its immaterial element was not humanly visible or tangible). The spirit, Ioan P. Couliano claims, was discussed of as early as the sixth century BCE; the Sicilian physician, Alcmaeon of Croton, spoke of the spirit as the “vital pneuma circulating in the arteries of the human being,” with the pneuma, or spirit, being “the subtler part” of the blood.³¹ Later, Couliano continues, the Stoics developed the concept of pneuma as the force that “penetrates the whole human body, controlling all its activities—movement, the fire senses, excretion, and the secretion of sperm.”³² The Stoics concept of pneuma, translated into the concept of spirit, is still relevant today, even if “spirit” has become dematerialized over the centuries. The term also, according to the OED, carries with it supernatural connotations, in which the substance can be “conceived as troublesome, terrifying, or hostile to mankind.” The fine, translucent, and seemingly enigmatic

³⁰ Crooke’s Microcosmographia (1615) and Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) both cited in Hillman’s Shakespeare’s Entrails; Belief, Skepticism, and the Interior of the Body (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 173 n. 4.
³² Ibid., 9.
materiality of the spirit, therefore, was conceptualized in Marlowe’s period to intimate a sense of wonder, and, precisely, in an acknowledgement that the quintessence of life remains unknown. At the same time, it was regarded as the term that signified the vital energy of life (to recall Shakespeare’s sonnets and, in particular, how “the expense of spirit” is both a bawdy allusion to male climaxing and the mortal climaxing of one’s life in death).

We find a very close correlative to Bergson’s notion of spirit, furthermore, in Neoplatonic philosophy, where spirit is a concept used to encapsulate the vital forces of life that move throughout the universe, even at the micro-level of the body. In *De vita sana*, Marsilio Ficino explains that spirit is “defined by physicians as a vapor: sanguineous, pure, subtle, hot and shiny. Produced from the thinnest blood by the heart’s heat, it flies away to the brain and enables the soul to use actively both the internal and external sense.” In his summary of Ficino’s influence in the fields of Renaissance magic and alchemy, Brian P. Copenhaver outlines the accepted philosophical understanding of the spirit in the early modern period. The ultimate unknowability of the spirit’s potential resulted in the concept’s magical connotations, and, in particular, connotations that suggested its potential healing and protective capabilities.

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34 He enumerates the spirit’s potential as it was commonly regarded in magical and alchemical discourses: “The basic function of *spiritus*, conceived as tenuous matter or crass spirit or something in between, was to bridge the gap between man’s material and immaterial components. Since Galen’s time, the concept of medical spirits, based on Peripatetic and Stoic sources, had accounted for various physiological and psychological processes without obligatory reference to magical action, but Galen also knew that Plato’s description of the…vehicle of the soul implied an astrological context for spirits…. The astral origins of this spiritual vehicle enhance magical capacities implicit
matter” conveys that the spirit can be conceptualized as a type of matter but one lacking an ontological permanency or fixity. The fluidity implicit in this definition also connotes that the spirit contains and emits a type of vital force essential for movement, as well as for its connection to and acquisition of other bodies. Spirit in this sense is the vital force for life as movement and as continual, active, engagement with other bodies, which is acutely similar to how Bergson conceptualizes it in the 20th century. In his seminal *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, Keith Thomas discusses the particularities of materiality of the spirit outlined in Neo-Platonic discourse, “which swept through Renaissance Europe,” including England. Thomas explains how the “spirit” was conceptualized as a type of explosive, vital, creative force. The tentative distinction that Thomas draws between matter and spirit is that matter is “inanimate mass” while spirit is vital energy, the animate force, of life. Neoplatonic discourse, he describes, emphasizes

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even in the innocent medical spirits, which, because they unite things held separate under normal requirements for contact action, helped explain phenomena otherwise unexplainable. Thus, Ficino used medical *spiritus* to account naturalistically for *fascinatio* or the evil eye, but he also employed the magical consonance between cosmic and human spirits to show how music of proper astrological proportions acting through the medium of *spiritus* could awaken a beneficent resonance between a man and a planet, which always emits a music of its own.” (Brian P. Copenhaver, “Astrology and Magic,” in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 284-285.)

35 “The revival of this, the last school of ancient pagan philosophy, fostered a disposition to blur the difference between matter and spirit. Instead of being regarded as an inanimate mass, the Earth itself was deemed to be alive. The universe was peopled by a hierarchy of spirits, and thought to manifest all kinds of occult influences and sympathies. The cosmos was an organic unity in which every part bore a sympathetic relationship to the rest. Even colours, letters and numbers were endowed with magical properties. The investigation of such phenomena was the primary task of the natural philosopher, and their employment for his own purposes was the distinguishing mark of the magician. Three main types of magical activity thus lay open: natural magic, concerned to exploit the occult properties of the elemental world; celestial magic, involving the influence of the stars; and ceremonial magic, an appeal for aid to spiritual beings.” (Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Orion Publishing Group, 1971), 223.)
that all things, organic (“the Earth”) or inorganic (“colours, letters and numbers”),
contain an element of vital energy. All things are “endowed with magical properties,”
which can be harnessed and employed by a well-trained natural philosopher, or magician.

Marlowe seizes on the occult qualities of “spirit” and turns them into a
performative principle of creation: when Faustus expresses his desire for the “Lines,
Circles, Signs, Letters, and Characters” (1.1.78), he is not merely gesturing towards the
linguistic and seemingly “immaterial” “signs and signifiers of magical arts.”
Rather, “Lines, Circles, Signs, Letters, and Characters”—the “metaphysics of magicians”—are
imbued with spirit: they are forces that can be transformed and employed by the
magician. These figures are magic and operate as forces that actualize matter on stage.
As Thomas explains, “[s]ince the world was a pulsating mass of vital influences and
invisible spirits, it was only necessary that the magician should devise the appropriate
technique to capture them. He could then do wonders.”

The spirit, as the vital force that
animates life when infused into matter, materializes, or actualizes, in the performance of
the actor’s body. Here is where Bergson’s conceptualization of spirit becomes something
else when performed on the stage. Spirit is no longer just duration; it is a vital force that
is performed and made real through the actor’s body. The language of performance—the

36 Allusion to Marjorie Garber’s “‘Here’s nothing writ’: Scribe, Script, and
landmark reading of the play, the consequence of Garber’s Derridean reading is the
“circumscription” of every element of the play within the play as text (as the famous
Derridean line goes, “There is nothing outside the text”), except, she claims, history. I
disagree with Garber’s argument for the primary reason that not everything lies within
the text; what escapes, I believe, and functions as the currency of drama (as I discuss in
Chapter 5) is affect, which is very much communicated and transferred by language.
Thus, Faustus’s “lines, circles,” and so forth are affective in performance—this
affectivity of language is connoted as “magic.”
37 Thomas, 224.
act of conjuring through the use of performative language—is capable of creating substantive effects on stage; think of Benvolio’s transformation into a horned-man or Faustus’s charming the pub-folk dumb, for instance. Here we can recall Crane’s assertion that “to perform” something is to render it in material, or tangible, form, as witnessed by the audience. As Andrew Sofer contends, “[p]erformativity…is a kind of magical altering of reality through the power of the word, one that channels what might well be called an occult force.” Performative language can thus be interpreted as containing a kind of translucent materiality—but a materiality nonetheless—because it consists of force. Indeed, I firmly believe that the term “immaterial” is a misnomer employed to describe a genus of materiality that lies beyond the human capability to be perceived in a tangible, sensory, manner. The “immaterial” is material, but material in the sense that it cannot necessarily be quantified, measured, or contained. Think: the spirit, and, as we just discussed, the spirit is explicitly made material in the performance of the actor’s body. In utilizing performative language, in fusing its innate vital energy with his in the act of making magic, Faustus becomes more: more than a man, he becomes a demigod:

All things that move betweene the quiet Poles

Shall be at my command: Emperors and Kings,

Are but obey’d in their severall Provinces:

Nor can they raise the winde, or rend the cloudes:

But his dominion that exceeds in this,

38 Sofer, 5.
Stretcheth are farre as doth the mind of man:

A sound magician is a Demi-god,

Here tire my braines to get a Diety. (1.1.83-90)

As he contemplates the extent of his potential power, Faustus articulates the Neoplatonic cosmic theory of spirit, in which every body is connected through spirit, and, in that connection, can affect and be affected by other bodies. Dramatic action, in turn, occurs through these connections that are created in verbal articulation, as the expressive performative aspect of language. Faustus comprehends this connectivity on the level of power that being spirit provides him. The body imbued with magic can overpower all bodies in Nature; this is what makes a magician a demigod. Everything within Nature, and “betweene the quiet Poles” of the world, are capable of being controlled by Faustus.

In the process of making magic, Faustus’s body fuses with these other vital, figurative, bodies in order for his “profit and delight”; Mephistopheles, of course, functions as the primary body with which Faustus connects in order to make magic happen on stage. Therefore, if an ethics is predicated upon the types and effects of (literal or imagined) connections between bodies, then it is apparent that Faustus enacts an ethics that is characteristically Marlovian: a body harnesses or takes control of another body (or bodies) to become more than its extant self. In Doctor Faustus, Faustus becomes more powerful because of his relationship with Mephistopheles, who is specifically contracted to serve the magus: as the second proviso states, “Secondly, that Mephostophilis shall be his servant, and be by him commanded” (2.1.486). It is a vital ethics, a mythic-making ethics: Faustus, like other Marlovian protagonists, becomes mythic in his ability to
overcome assumed human limitations—Faustus perhaps more so than any other
Marlovian protagonist, because his actions are not limited by the human form.

For Marlowe, spirit, as the animating, vital, force of life, is translated into
moments of the play when Faustus turns spirit and also when he magically comes back to
life (after being decapitated, in addition to growing another leg). Faustus knows that, as
spirit, he is free from physical harm and has the ability to re-animate himself if harmed.
The scene in which Faustus makes a pact with Mephistopheles presents the quintessential
moment of ontological and ethical transformation in the play of Faustus from mortal man
to spirit. In the first and most important proviso of the pact, which he reads aloud to
Mephistopheles, Faustus carefully specifies that he is to “be a spirit in forme and
substance” ([2.1.]485). That the specification is to be a spirit in both form and
substance—in outward fashion and in bodily matter—implies the recognition of
contemporary Aristotelian notions of form and substance, and it, more importantly,
suggests that Faustus desires a type of existence that will not be constrained by human
form. (Here our minds might jump to Tamburlaine, who possesses a supernatural spirit
that nevertheless remains tethered to his human form, and which, like all human forms,
eventually dies.) Faustus’s first proviso conveys the extent to which he has “liv[ed] and
die[d] in Aristotles workes” (1.1.5). It is an interesting swap: Faustus willingly gives his
body and soul, but the condition of this gift is that he remains a spirit in both form and
substance. Upon the fulfillment of this condition, and, in addition to the three other
conditions that comprise the pact, Faustus promises Lucifer his body and soul: “foure and
twentie years being expired, and these Articles above written being inviolate, full power
to fetch or carry the said John Faustus, body and soule, flesh and bloud, into their
habitation wheresoever” ([2.1.]495-499). Faustus seeks to live for twenty-four years “in all voluptuousnesse” ([1.3.]320), and his idea to become a “spirit in both form and substance” implies that he knows that “becoming-spirit” will imbue him with a type of power that is impossible to even fathom as a mortal man—so that he becomes something more than simply remaining “still Faustus.”

Faustus’s life, unlike the lives of his fellow man, is now void of all risk and chance associated with the contingency of mortality; there is a certainty about his life that, in some ways, provides a great comfort and assurance to him. He knows that he will die twenty-four years to the day that he signs the pact, and he knows that his life throughout this duration will no longer be limited by mortal constraints but now is liberated by his transformation into spirit. His transformation also opens the world of the play beyond the literal constraints of the theatre, while at the same time transforming him into a creature of the theatre, whereby the “material-immateriality” of his character can be manifested through performance. This transformation creates the character of Faustus. Faustus’s bodily freedom as spirit is mirrored in the dramatic plot, as we see Faustus travel around the world and through the universe on a dragon. In becoming spirit, Faustus becomes otherworldly, translated into a “demigod” of mythic proportions—a metamorphosis either literal or figurative, and which is a characteristic feature of all Marlowe’s protagonists.39

39 In his discussion of Marlowe’s Ovidian influences, Patrick Cheney claims that Marlowe creates a “new myth” in his plays and that, in Doctor Faustus, Faustus himself “believes he can refashion the old mythology, to become a second Paris…” (in Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession, 209, 215). Sixteenth-century readers of Aristotle might have formed a correlation between his materialist theories and Ovid’s materialism as is evident in the Metamorphoses. “Reading the Metamorphoses,” William N. West
Faustus’s moment of metamorphosis from man to spirit occurs specifically during the infamous scene in which his blood congeals while signing the pact. Mephistopheles requests that the pact be signed in blood, which, at the time, was understood to be the liquid agent that operates as the connection between the body and the soul. The dramatic ignition is wonderfully figured in the scene where Faustus needs to set a torch to his arm to get his blood flowing again after its initial clotting—a preternatural clotting that I read not within the Christian paradigm of a moral warning to Faustus, but within a materialist philosophy as the signification of the final moment of Faustus’s mortal life before he turns spirit. Mephistopheles fetches a “chafer of fire,” and Faustus successfully seals the pact:

Mephistopheles: See Faustus here is fire, set it on.

Faustus: So, now the bloud begins to cleere againe:

Now I will make an end immediately….

*Consummatum est*: this byll is ended,

And Faustus hath bequeath’d his soule to Lucifer.

(2.1.459-462)

attests in his essay on materiality in Shakespeare, “requires imagining an Aristotelian world of matter and form, where a substance can be completely changed in every perceivable, describable way…and yet somehow remain the same.” I think West’s image of an Aristotelian-Ovidianism figures as a fitting description for Marlowe’s materialism in *Doctor Faustus*, and, specifically, as it pertains to Faustus’s newly assumed existence as spirit (“What’s the Matter with Shakespeare?: Physics, Identity, Playing,” *South Central Review* 26.1-2 (Winter & Spring, 2009): 112.)
Setting the fire on it makes Faustus’s blood run “cleere” again, which idiomatically translates into his blood running smoothly, or fluidly, again. In contemporary parlance, the spirit itself is a fluid substance; the force of spirit, in a Bergsonian sense, has the quintessential element of fluidity, except it is duration which flows. Faustus’s blood running clear, in other words, performs the transformation of Faustus into spirit. When his blood runs “cleere,” or changes into spirit, the pact is sealed; Faustus gives his blood and is filled with, and transforms into, spirit. After Mephistopheles applies heat to liquefy the congealed blood, Faustus signs the pact, only to notice an inscription etched into his arm that reads “Homo, fuge.” “Homo, fuge?,” Faustus inquisitively gesticulates upon seeing the phrase inscribed in his arm. Translated as “Man, flee!,” the Latin phrase alludes to both 1 Timothy 6:11\(^{40}\) and Psalms 139, the latter of which pertains to man finding solace in God’s omnipotence:

O Lord, thou hast searched me, and me…

For there is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O LORD, thou knowest it altogether.

Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me.

Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it.

Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?

\(^{40}\) According to the King James Bible, “But thou, O man of God, flee these things; and follow after righteousness, godliness, faith, love, patience, meekness.”
If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. (*The King James Bible*, Psalms 139:1-8)

In this passage from Psalms 139, God is figured as omnipresent and omnipotent, and, in relation to man, God’s supreme power allows for man to find solace in all their mortal inadequacies. Man’s deference to and admiration of God is a product of his human fallibility. Man is weak by nature, and he is fearful of life because he is weak. He is also fearful because life is filled with innumerable uncertainties, and, as such, God figures as the one modicum of certainty, the one guiding light, that man can hold onto as he slogs his way through life. God is everywhere; he knows all—man can thus take comfort in his weakness, and in his ignorance, for which God will act as his savoir. Instead of cowering in fear, the Bible tells man to put his faith in God, thereby the unknowns that he may encounter in his life will always be coupled with God’s presence.

“Man, fly”—but, how exactly does this mean in the scene? The inscription in Faustus’s arm seems a spiritual injunction to remove himself from the present situation, of selling his soul and body to Lucifer. Yet, Faustus does not heed this warning, and inquisitively responds: “whether should I flye? / If unto God, he’ll throw me downe to hell… / *Homo, fuge*: yet shall not Faustus flye” ([2.1.]466-470). Mephistopheles has already informed Faustus, prior to the blood-signing, that everyplace that is not heaven is considered hell, so, where exactly is Faustus supposed to fly to—God’s love? This is

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41 In 1.3304, Mephistopheles tells Faustus that “this is hell,” and elaborates his description of hell’s location: “Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscrib’d, / In one selfe place: but where we are is hell, / And where hell is there must we ever be. / And to be short, when all the world dissolves, / And every creature shall be purifi’d, / All places shall be hell that is not heaven” (2.1.509-514).
precisely what Faustus mocks in his retort. Furthermore, he refuses to situate God as a higher, omnipotent, power to himself. Indeed, one effect of the pact that he makes with Lucifer is to eliminate the assumed difference between men and god(s): the pact makes Faustus omnipotent. The pact imbues Faustus with the power to resolve himself of any ambiguities of life. Through the pact, he is able to attain all the knowledge that he desires—for Faustus, in turn, skeptical thinking is productive, because it catalyzes modes of inquiry and of problem-solving that leads him to greater knowledge. It is Faustus’s skepticism that turns him to necromancy, when he finds all other disciplines unsatisfying, and the pact itself is intended to allow Faustus to yield knowledge from all life’s ambiguities. Thus, the pact functions to foreclose all potential uncertainty from his life, which perhaps explains the basic components of the pact itself: the pact defines, with certainty, the duration of his life, and it also establishes his self as spirit, a mode of existence that allows him to encounter any uncertainties in life with the ability to conquer, resolve, and control them.

The play’s skeptical underpinnings are not surprising, given that Marlowe’s scholarly pursuits, both inside and outside the walls of Cambridge University, would have introduced him to skeptical thought. In his essay “Casting Doubt in Doctor 42

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42 Skepticism was in vogue in the 16th century, with critics such as Lawrence F. Rhu regarding it as “the most far reaching philosophical development in early modern thought” (“Continental Influences,” in A Companion to Renaissance Drama, ed. Arthur F. Kinney (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002), 442). Richard Popkin’s authoritative account of the development of skepticism cites three sources—“the writings of Sextus Empiricus, the skeptical works of Cicero, and the account of the ancient skeptical movements in Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers”—that were available to thinkers of the sixteenth century and that contributed to the philosophy’s revival (in The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 18). Rhu provides a succinct account of skepticism’s development in the context of continental influences on Renaissance drama. Marlowe’s
“Faustus,” William H. Hamlin asserts that skepticism, although characterized as a mode of discourse mired in uncertainty, is productive. In Hamlin’s words, “Faustus wants to perform miracles, to do the wondrous, to transcend human frailty, fallibility, uncertainty; he wants to ‘gain a diety’… And all this is associated with resolving ambiguity.” This is why Hamlin, among other scholars, reads *Faustus* as a skeptical play. Faustus’s skepticism compels him to discover solutions for all life’s ambiguities—for all that he may encounter within his twenty-four years of life. He is no longer a man (“Homo, studies, and particularly his graduate studies, which incorporated studies in philosophical thought, at Cambridge would have familiarized him with these ancient texts, and his poking at Ramus in his last play, *The Massacre at Paris*, indicates his knowledge of academic skepticism (“Continental Influences, 442-443). The humanist education that exposes Marlowe to skeptical thought, as that which promoted skeptical thinking, is ironically that which becomes a kind of victim to skeptical thinking, as Victoria Kahn suggests in *Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism* (See chapter 3, “Humanist Rhetoric,” in particular; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). The tenets and ethics correlative to humanism soon became the object under the skeptical microscope; we could even claim that Marlowe performs this own critique of humanism through a skeptical lens in *Doctor Faustus*. Of course, Montaigne is held as “the most significant figure in the sixteenth century revival of ancient skepticism” (Popkin, 42), but his *Essays* were not translated into English, by John Florio, until 1603—ten years after Marlowe’s death, in 1593. Even though Montaigne’s *Essays* were available as early as the mid-1570s, and even though there are clear resonances between the essays and Marlowe’s plays, it is impossible (and arguably, unnecessary) to confirm Marlowe’s knowledge of them. 

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43 Hamlin, 267.
44 It will come as news to no one that Christopher Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* can be and has been deemed a skeptical play,” is how William M. Hamlin introduces his essay on the productivity of skepticism in *Doctor Faustus* (1). He continues by citing a range of early 20th century criticism of the play, one of which, by J R. Green, even regards *Faustus* to be “the first dramatic attempt to touch the great problem of the relations of man to the unseen world, to paint the power of doubt in a temper leavened with superstition” (Ibid.). Identifying the play as the embodiment of skeptical thinking, Alan Sinfield regards the play as “entirely ambiguous” in *Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Benjamin Bertram outlines Marlowe’s religious skepticism in *The Time is Out of Joint: Skepticism in Shakespeare’s England* (Newark: University of Delaware Press/AUP, 2004). Francis R. Johnson attests to Marlowe’s empirical skepticism as portrayed by his knowledge of astrology in *Doctor Faustus*, in “Marlowe’s Astronomy and Renaissance Skepticism,” *ELH* 13.4 (Dec., 1946): 241-254.
fuge!”) who cowers before the unknown or refuses to continue on a path of inquiry because of fear or moral constraint. Faustus’s skepticism drives him to break through his mortal—physical and intellectual—barriers. It produces his desire to learn more, and also his turn to magic, which opens the avenue for him to become spirit. Skepticism is the philosophical acknowledgment of life’s infinite potentiality and the catalyst to pursuing any of those potentials.

Faustus’s turn to magic signifies the performative depiction, in Hamlin’s words, of the play’s skepticism. For Faustus, skepticism produces his desire to turn to magic because magic affords him the potential to create himself anew. Skepticism connotes continuous critical thinking, the interminable turning of the mind, for want of resolution. I want to take Hamlin’s observation that Faustus’s life becomes “incompatible with conventional earthly existence” a step farther in order to argue that this type of unconventionality epitomizes the lives of all Marlowe’s protagonists: from Dido to the Duke of Guise, Marlowe’s protagonists live lives—and, I want to argue, perform an ethics—that consciously clash with conventional standards. These ethics are unconventional because they depict the brazen unconventionality of the characters’ lives, from their actions, with and against others, and their personal motivations, to their forthright and explicit language and unself-conscious, or unremorseful, self-satisfying motivations. The performances are refreshingly unapologetic—as is Marlowe. His characters are not wary of “offending” or slighting others, especially if those other bodies get in their way of their goals. Marlowe himself thus walks a fine line: what he gives us are plays that embody this confidence while at the same time one calculatedly written to avoid complete censure.
Magic is both the productive effect of the skepticism that lies at the play’s base and the stimulus to Faustus’s creativity. Putting down the Bible and picking up a book of magic, Faustus marvels,

These Metaphisicks of Magitians,

And Negromantick bookes are heavenly.

Lines, Circles, Signes, Letters, and Characters,

I, these are those that Faustus most desires.

O what a world of profite and delight,

Of power, of honour and omnipotence,

Is promised to the Studious Artizan?

All things that move betweene the quiet Poles

Shall be at my command…. 

A sound magician is a Demi-god,

Here tire my braines to get a Deity. (1.1.76-90)

This speech can be posited as the opposite of the earlier allusion to the passage in Psalms: Faustus will himself become omnipotent through his new devotion to his studies of magic. Magic provides him the potential to harness every single ounce of life, of “[a]ll things that move betweene the quiet Poles” for power, “profit and delight.” As a “Studious Artizan,” Faustus’s potential to create, like his ability to acquire infinite power
is unlimited. This unlimited potentiality—to become something else, to become “more than”—is enacted through Faustus’s transformation into spirit. Through magic, Faustus becomes a god. Magic, as a way of life for Faustus, could be interpreted as a philosophy of potentiality, because it is a philosophy that advocates the possibility that anything can be accomplished, that any desire has the potential to be actualized.

Yet, with all of this power at his fingertips, Faustus does not set out to conquer the world. Craving a life of “voluptuousnesse” means that, as he tells his friend Cornelius, he wants “nothing” (1.1.176). In sixteenth century parlance, “want” carried dueling connotations of “desire” and lack.” While most notoriously memorialized by Shakespeare to refer to women’s private parts (in *Hamlet*), Faustus’s use of the word “nothing” conveys that what he desires is nothing of numerical or absolute value. Faustus desires “nothing” from magic because it is not a definitive thing that he seeks. Yet, his desire for “nothing” could in one sense be read as a desire for everything, whereby everything is that which is unknown and not yet realized, but which has the potential to be created through magic. Thus, Faustus craves a life that produces pleasure after pleasure, for the sheer purpose of pleasure itself. (Pleasure functions as both the means and the ends.)

*Pleasure is Faustus’s highest value.* It is therefore not surprising that Faustus’s life is filled with moments of nonsensical play and tomfoolery, from Faustus’s own comical exploits against the motley crew of people he meets—from Benvolio to the priests—to his assistant’s playful rhetorical exchanges with moronic scholars. The action of the play, which produces Faustus’s desired “nothings,” is what makes *Doctor Faustus* a play, in the full sense of the word.
Critics may classify *Faustus* a tragedy, but it is also filled with magical and fantastical moments that make it seem otherwise. The play’s plot consists more of moments of Faustus’s comical exploits than of serious, soul-searching, moments of despair. Those critics who read the play through the morality tradition typify *Faustus* as a tragedy laden with morality, which they read as being made explicit through Faustus’s abdication. But, I think Marlowe understands tragedy differently, and Faustus’s death speaks more to Marlowe’s regard for the genre of tragedy than to the moral implications of the dramatic plot, especially as contrived by critics. To take the reading one step further and place Marlowe within the philosophical genealogy that I am constructing, we could even say that Faustus ventriloquizes Nietzsche’s critique of morality, “why morality at all, if life, nature, and history are ‘immoral’?”

45 Marlowe’s use of the word “spirit” acquires a wonderfully satirical connotation when read through Nietzsche’s critique of the Christian free spirit:

Has any…Christian free spirit ever strayed into this proposition and into its labyrinthine consequences? has one of them ever known the Minotaur of this cave *from experience*?—I doubt it; more, I know better: nothing is more foreign to these men who are unconditional about one thing, these *so-called* “free spirits,” than freedom and liberation in this sense; in no respect are they more rigidly bound; it is precisely in their faith in truth that they are more rigid and unconditional than anyone.

These Christian free spirits are in no sense “free”; they are “rigidly bound” to Christian ideology, which promotes a refusal of pleasure and of life in exchange for the promise of an eternal afterlife. Christianity, Nietzsche contends, believes in the impoverishment of life—as understood by Deleuze, Nietzsche asserts that Christianity seeks to justify life through a submission of life “to the labour of the negative.” Nietzsche therefore condemns Christianity as a hypocritical ideology founded upon negativity and filled with resentment of life. The fact that Faustus seeks to affirm life by turning to magic and, specifically, by making a pact with Lucifer, is satire par excellence because it plays upon this Nietzschean assertion that life becomes active and is affirmed by turning away from Christ. Only Marlowe—the lover of tobacco and boys (and only tobacco and boys), who is a kind of Anti-Christ superstar himself—would have the audacity to showcase the life of a man who shirks Christ in favor of Lucifer. See especially section 344 of Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science*, sec. 344.
Faustus therefore is a tragedy not in the orthodox sense of depicting the life of a fatally flawed individual who falls from grace. Instead it is a tragedy in a profoundly satiric, Nietzschean sense: Doctor Faustus is tragic because every moment of magical creation, of wondrous destruction (which is also a form of creation), is gratuitous and fantastic. There is a strong correlation between the satiric and tragic genres, according to Alvin Kernan: “[s]atire shares [a] darkly serious view of the world with tragedy…and both satirist and tragic hero suffer an agonized compulsion to appraise the ills of the world and cure them by naming them.”

Drama of the 16th century was familiar with these generic blendings, but I think the type of satiric tragedy that Doctor Faustus performs a type of satire that is indeed dark, as Kernan impresses, but one that is also noticeably Nietzschean in its affirmation of “voluptuous living”—living that includes both creation and (creation in) destruction. Faustus himself can be understood as a tragic character in Nietzschean terms. He affirms life through a dismantling of the accepted, moral, strictures and codes that he is supposed to conform to; instead, he follows his own path. And, more remarkably, Faustus, for all but momentary lapses, thinks little on death and the idea of an afterlife, and he views time as something to be seized and harnessed for his enjoyment.

46 Alvin Kernan, The Plot of Satire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 21. Furthermore, in his introduction to his new study on satiric tragedy in Early Modern England, Gabriel Reiger defines satiric tragedy as “a specific subgenre of tragedy which highlights its satiric content, typically through the use of a satirist character who gives voice (and frequently action) to satiric attack.”

47 As Nietzsche says, saying yes to life, all of life, is the motto of the tragic character: “Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibility even in the very sacrifice of its highest types…. Not in order to get rid of terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its vehement discharge…but in order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity—that joy which includes even the joy in destroying.” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 729).
Once Faustus becomes spirit, much of the play consists of his adventures, which seem inconsequential as well as appear to deflate the power of magic since most of Faustus’s conjurings do not lead to his world domination. But, I think, it is in these scenes—where magic creates play for the sake of play—that Marlowe confronts the moralizing of art, both in his time and in ours. Faustus’s play through his conjurings does not need a higher purpose to substantiate its existence. This idea is precisely what Reisner qualifies as Marlowe’s “entirely serious and daring conceptual challenge to the Christian-Platonic platitudes of eternity and transcendence which dominated the theory of art and mimesis in the period.” In Marlowe’s time, as in ours, the value of art is continuously questioned when a piece of art lacks an explicit political objective or moral purpose. For Marlowe to linger on Faustus’s moments of play gives credence—by giving stage time—to play itself. In the scope of this dissertation, these seemingly pointless scenes contribute to our understanding of Faustus’s ethics, as well as exhibit how his body as spirit functions on stage. For instance, we see him at the court of the German Emperor Charles, who asks Faustus to conjure the spirits of Alexander the Great and his paramour, so that Charles “may wonder at their excellence” ([4.1.]1234). Faustus happily complies and conjures the spirits to everyone’s amazement, including Benvolio’s, who mocks Faustus prior to his conjurings: “[if] thou bring Alexander and his Paramour before the Emperour, Il’e be Acteon, and turne my selfe to a Stagge” ([4.1.]1254-1256). Faustus holds Benvolio to his word, and he is even generous enough to transform Benvolio into a stag himself. The next we see Benvolio, he has indeed become a stag. He awakens from his nap with what he feels to be a terrible headache, but, as the Emperor even observes, we

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see otherwise: “O wonderous sight: see Duke of Saxony, / Two spreading hornes most strangely fastened / Upon the head of yong Benvolio” ([4.1.]1276-1278). Not surprisingly, Benvolio vows revenge for his public humiliation, and shortly thereafter he sets out with a cohort of friends to murder Faustus.

The scene of Benvolio’s revenge marks a significant performative moment of Faustus’s desire for “nothing”: it is a fantastical moment of wonder. The scene serves no productive function to the development of the plot, especially if one were to hold the play bound to the generic framework of morality drama—whereby all scenes of conflict are symbolic performances of the battle between “Good” and “Evil”—the genre of which the play is frequently associated. The scene begins with Benvolio and his friends preparing to surprise attack Faustus. Upon finding Faustus, Benvolio exclaims, “[f]or hornes he gave, Il’e have his head anone” and strikes Faustus’s head with his sword ([4.2.]1361). The intended decapitation, however, does not go so smoothly, to say the least. Two blows are required to effectively lop off Faustus’s head, which indicates that Faustus’s body as spirit in both form and substance is one that is indeed substantive, even sinewy. (Or, perhaps, there is a human residual in Faustus’s demi god body, since demigods are technically half-human, half-immortal.) The physicality of his body as spirit connotes the real, material, presence of the body on stage and in relation to other bodies on stage—this point is significant to highlight because, while Faustus appears immune to physical harms

49 Douglas Cole, for instance, in his Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), explicates how Doctor Faustus resonates with defining characteristics of the morality genre. In morality drama, man is placed in a post-lapsarian situation, “where he is destined to die in sin unless he be saved by the intervention of divine grace and by repentance” (231). As the plot unfolds, Faustus’s encounters with various vice figures are clear signposts of the play’s resonances with the genre.
that mortal men face, he is not invulnerable to affecting and being affected by other bodies, whether mortal or immortal. The significance, in other words, is that the ability to affect and be affected corresponds to the ability to create an ethics. His power to affect and to be affected by others, therefore, is both psychological and physical in capacity.

Benvolio and his friends then proceed to discuss their plans for the various parts of Faustus’s body: nailing horns to his head, making a broom of his beard, and making his eyes into buttons for Faustus’s lips, “to keep his tongue from catching cold” (4.2.64). Faustus, hypothetically toyed with like an early modern version of Mr. Potato Head, appears to be quite dead. But, unfortunately for Benvolio, Faustus comes back to life. Sans head, he rises in front of them, effectively cutting short Benvolio’s revenge while simultaneously creating a fantastical scene of terror:

Benvolio: Zounds the Divel’s alive agen.

Frederick: Give him his head for Gods sake.

Faustus responds, quite calmly, however:

Nay, keepe it: Faustus will have heads and hands,

I, all your hearts to recompense this deed.

Knew you not Traytors, I was limited

For foure and twenty years, to breathe on earth?

And had you cut my body with your swords,

Or hew’d this flesh and bones as small as sand,
Yet in a minute had my spirit return’d,

And I had breath’d a man made free from harme.

But wherefore doe I dally my revenge? ([4.2.]1393-1401)

Faustus coolly rambles off on a tangent about his existence as spirit, only to stop himself by refocusing on the moment at hand: “But wherefore doe I dally my revenge?” This line works subtly to mock the cyclical pattern of revenge characteristic of the genre.\(^5\) The fact that this scene almost immediately repeats an act of revenge (with Faustus revenging Benvolio, who initially seeks revenge for his cuckolding) emphasizes the extent to which both the play and Faustus’s performance present moments of exaggeration, excess, and pleasure. Revenge is arguably, then, not cyclical in Doctor Faustus, particularly because Faustus’s revenge in no way affects either the plot or his fate, the latter of which ultimately rests in the hands of Lucifer.

Faustus’s aforementioned tangential rambling is not, however, to be read as an insignificant digression. It is quite a revealing passage about the materiality of his body, or, of his body as spirit. In this passage, he explains that his body can be shred to pieces; it can even be ground into fleshy bits “as small as sand.” Yet, he insists that when his spirit returns, he is able to breathe like “a man made free from harm.” In this context, the spirit is conceived as an animating force, the vitalistic force of life, and that, regardless of

\(^5\) The genre of revenge tragedy is characterized by the reiterated trope of revenge, as it materializes in acts of revenge that are typically crafted as elaborate spectacles, oftentimes as melodramatic plays-within-plays (as evidenced by, most notably, The Spanish Tragedy, Hamlet, and later Jacobean plays like Women, Beware Women). Acts of revenge create a vicious circle that essentially comprises the dramatic action of the plot, such that the denouement of a revenge tragedy is able to take effect only at the deaths—sometimes numerous—of most if not all the major characters of that play.
how immaculately his flesh is sliced and diced, his spirit will effectively render him whole, like a “man made free from harm.” The first proviso—of remaining a spirit in both form and substance—grants Faustus this magical ability to reconfigure the pieces of his body and to re-animate it. As spirit, Faustus becomes a malleable creature, one that can be pulled apart and put back together. This protean-like plasticity indicates that Faustus not only can appear like a “man made free from harm,” but he can act like a man who is free from any risk of potential harm. That is, he is able to live his life without fear of death.

By insisting on the sheer corporeality of Faustus in these moments, Marlowe’s version of Lucretian materialism manifests as this display of a “materiality” of spirit on stage. Regarded as the “Lucretius of the English language,” Marlowe appears to have been influenced by—in the words of Harry Levin—Lucretius’s “materialist system of metaphysics,” not to mention the “hedonistic code of ethics” that were expounded in his major work, *The Nature of Things*. Lucretius’s influence is significant for the philosophical insights that it provides about the ontology of bodies and also the ethical implications of the actions of these bodies on the Marlovian stage. His influence on Marlowe is not unique, for Lucretius’s epic poem was circulated and touted amongst

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52 Levin, 3.
53 Furthermore, this influence allows for the creation of a genealogy of philosophical materialism that situates Faustus’s body as spirit as the nexus at which classical and modern philosophies intersect. In particular, the kind of philosophical materialism posited by Lucretius in *The Nature of Things* has strong resonances with later philosophies of ontology; I am thinking about Spinoza but, more so the work of Henri Bergson, as I also discuss in relation to the creation of space in Chapter 3.
students of the natural sciences and proponents of atomism throughout the sixteenth
century, such as Marlowe’s friendly acquaintance Thomas Harriot, a fellow member of
Raleigh’s infamous cohort.

Lucretius’s materialism correlates with his philosophical rationalism and his
objective, in *The Nature of Things*, to put forth an argument that dispels what he
considers to be theological irrationalism and the fear of the unknown, which results in the
fear of death and the fear of what harms await spirits in the afterlife. Lucretius does not
believe in an afterlife and advocates that mortal life—the life of the material, fleshy,
body—is all that a body has and can be concerned with. Lucretius’s investment in
materialism, conveyed as his distinctive theory of atomism, is also evident in his
disavowal of the soul as a part of life. A soul is a vague, immaterial, and therefore unreal,
entity that has no bearing on the material wellbeing of a body. Marlowe adopts this belief

54 Stuart Gillespie, in his essay “Lucretius in the English Renaissance,” describes the
extent to which Lucretius was known and referenced in 16th century England. While not a
commonplace name like Aristotle or Plato, Lucretius had a notably significant influence
on a number of poets and other public figures, from Spenser to Shakespeare. Gillespie’s
essay is found in *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*, ed. Stuart Gillespie (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 242-253. See also George Depue Hadzsits’s
chapter on “Lucretius and the Renaissance” in *Lucretius and His Influence* (New York:

55 A defining feature of humanism in the English Renaissance is the conscious effort to
retrieve and translate classical texts; Lucretius’s *De rerum natura* was little read before
the 15th century, but with humanism was unveiled to the European world. In short, an
effect of humanism was to introduce alternative philosophies, such as Lucretius’s, to the
western world. (For a discussion on the recovery of classical texts, see Anthony Grafton’s
“The availability of ancient works,” in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance
767-791.) For Harriot, who is sometimes credited as the inspiration for Marlowe’s
Faustus, Lucretius proved foundational to his belief in the materialist philosophy of
atomism. As Jean Jacquot explains, “atomism offered the model of a universe indefinitely
extended in space and time, where everything was subject to generation and decay but
was made up of indestructible particles of matter. This view,” as Jacquot continues,
“could fit neither with Christian eschatology nor Aristotelian cosmology,” and lent a
great deal of weight to the accusations of Harriot’s (and Marlowe’s) atheism.
from Lucretius and integrates it into *Doctor Faustus*, as well as his other plays, in the way that he focuses the dramatic plot on material concerns of the present life and not some imagined afterlife. Faustus gives his body and soul away happily, in part because he is indifferent to how his body and soul will be affected in the afterlife. Mephistopheles, that oddly moral agent of Lucifer, reiterates that Faustus’s body and soul will suffer in hell, but Faustus’s response is one of indifference: “Think’st thou that Faustus, is so fond to imagine, / That after this life there is any paine?” ([2.1.]522-523). Faustus cultivates an ethics based on the life that he knows to exist: the present life. This is Lucretius’s rational materialism come to life on stage. Marlowe’s Lucretianism, therefore, manifests thematically in his plays as the confident, rational, and seemingly atheistic materialism that Marlowe’s plays are known for. Marlowe’s materialism, therefore, is presented as a blend of Neoplatonic spirit and Lucretian atomism. This blend enables the performance of a materialism that simultaneously embodies the fluid dynamism of the Neoplatonic spirit and the irreducible, tangible hardness of Lucretian atomism. Marlowe’s materialism relishes in the dramatic fleshiness of his characters, who perform his materialism through their energetic vitalism and dominant, physical presence: Faustus is a spirit that can physically touch and affect other bodies, whether spirit or human.

Lucretius’s influence is also evident in the play’s strand of materialism that functions to effectively subvert the current of skepticism that runs through the play. *Faustus*’s skepticism appears at the thematic level and is dramatized by the competing good and evil spirits at war for Faustus’s soul. It also appears at the meta-theatrical level of critical discourse, concisely summarized by the critical debate concerning if and when Faustus becomes “damned.” However, like the forces of good and evil fighting for
Faustus’s soul, it seems that critics are more concerned with Faustus’s fate than he is, as he nonchalantly casts aside his soul in order to become spirit. Faustus exhibits blatant indifference for the fate of his soul, and he willingly gives it to Mephistopheles. “I, and body too,” he tells Mephistopheles that “these are trifles, and meere old wives Tales” ([2.1.]521-524). The significance of the pact that Faustus makes with Lucifer is that it effectively works to eliminate any uncertainty that he might have encountered as a mortal man. As noted earlier, the contract guarantees his physical safety, and it also certifies the duration of his life. Gone are mortal concerns about physical wellbeing and mortality, which plague man. Having control of one’s material condition and material duration, in other words, chimes with the Epicurian/Lucretian concept of ataxaria, or state of unperturbed, inner peace, pervasive throughout The Nature of Things, which seeks to belie the fear of the unknown by discovering locatable, potential, causes of material events. Faustus circumvents mortal anxiety by delimiting the duration of his material

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56 This theme coincides with the Epicurean strand of Lucretius’s work, as Amy Olberding, in her essay on how Lucretius’s text posits a remedy for anxiety about mortality, explains:

[a] central theme of Epicurus' strategy for overcoming anxiety regarding death is control: we gain peace when we achieve a correct understanding of the domain of our control. For our anxiety largely stems from the way in which we feebly attempt to exert control where we can have none and fail to assert control where it is properly in our power. We struggle against the basic fact of mortality, frenetically striving to hold on to fragile pleasures and rail against life when we inevitably fail. To gain control, claims Epicurus, we must recognize that although we cannot evade death, we can discover a rational foundation for a decisive rejection of the psychic turmoil it engenders.

Amy Olberding, “‘The Feel of Not to Feel It’: Lucretius’ Remedy for Death Anxiety,” Philosophy and Literature 29.1 (2005): 118. Olberding’s description of the Epicureanism of Lucretius’s text is consistent with Gerard Passannante’s assertion that “[t]he point of De rerum natura is to debunk the myths of divine control that keep men rapt in fear, to
existence. The pact, in short, refuses to indulge the current of skepticism—apparent in moral-compass characters, like Old Man, who pleads with Faustus to repent to God for forgiveness—that layers the play. (To be precise, I believe Marlowe includes these skeptical-inducing elements in order to establish a Christian façade: to make his play safe and palatable to early modern audiences.)

The elimination of uncertainty from Faustus’s life results in the production of an ethics that embody the carpe diem mentality—one in which the desire is to seize moments of time, or duration, in all their intensity—that echoes throughout Marlowe’s oeuvre, and especially as it serves as the central theme in his poem “The Passionate Shepherd to His Love.” Faustus’s ethics consists of actions and manners that abide his desire to live twenty-four years in “all voluptuousness”; it is a life fashioned for his “profit and delight.” (Here Faustus’s sentiments chimes with those of the Shepherd, who attempts to persuade his love: “Come with me and be my love, and we will all the pleasures prove.”) Accordingly, we are told of his travels around the world, even “to the height of Primum Mobile” (Chorus 2). He values his pact as twenty-four years of living free, without any restraint, in which he can essentially do whatever he desires, and it is his life as spirit that affords him this liberty and luxury. In short, Faustus’s ethics is coterminous to the lived duration of his body.

Faustus’s ethics, which is produced in and through the time of his life, is, at its foundation, shaped by how he perceives time. It is obvious from how he lives his life—from his travels to his amorous encounters, from his pursuit of knowledge around the dismantle the archaic machinery that makes them slaves to superstition” (“The Art of Reading Earth quakes,” 808).
world to his comical jests at the expense of both the papal and naïve country folk—that he does not feel it to be restricted by its limited duration. In fact, Faustus seems to value the knowledge of his mortality as an asset; even his assistant Wagner is surprised to see him so full of life on the eve of his intended death. He conveys his disbelief of Faustus’s spirited behavior aloud to the audience: “if that death were nie, he would not frolick / thus: hee’s now at supper with schollers, where ther’s such / belly-cheere, as Wagner in his life nere saw the like: and see where / they come, belike the feast is done” (5.1.4-7). Faustus celebrates life by maximizing the pleasure that he derives from the adventures and events that fill his life. It is not at all surprising that he continues to celebrate life at the precipice of his death. At the close of his final evening he bids his friends farewell, noting casually that, if he lives through the night, he will visit them in the morning ([5.2.]1877-1878). Of course, it would be an egregious oversight not to mention that Faustus has moments of weakness when he is reminded of the weighty frame of Christian, mortal time that he will eventually return to, which causes him to question his resolve and his pact with Lucifer, but what is performed on stage is an ethics that values life regardless of death. Death is a certainty, for Faustus, as it is for everyone. And, as Lucretius emphasizes in *The Nature of Things*, its certainty should only serve as a calming antidote to one’s anxiety about death. Faustus’s pact nullifies the potential surprise of death. Anxiety free, he approaches life by focusing on the precise moment in which he is living it, instead of wasting it by either constantly worrying about his mortality or with overlooking pleasures of the moment in order to obtain a seat in heaven. Regardless of if and when Faustus dies in the course of the play, his death is inconsequential to the ethics that are created within the play itself—because the time of
Faustus’s ethics is *dramatic time*. The time of the play—not the time of God—creates and gives structure to Faustus’s ethics.

Rethinking the time of performance (as duration) allows for a rethinking of the ethical effects of the form of drama. Citing popular postmodern criticism on both the linguistic and formal aspects of the temporality of drama, Alekandra Wolska comments that the time of performance, while actualized in quantitative time, is positively affective beyond the duration of a specific performance. She therefore posits the affective potentiality of a performance in terms of “the theatrical event” to affirm the affective reach of a performance:

[T]ime is understood as the performance of mortality. The notion of the theatrical event as a form of absence is predicated upon something even more fundamental than the mimetic plight. It founds itself on an awareness that dramatic action moves away from the past toward the future, and that this future brings the end. Onstage, death (loss) appears, not as a failure of signification, but as *tempus fugit*.\(^{57}\)

For Wolska, the temporality of performance extends beyond the theater. While the performance itself exists on a stage and unfolds in “linear” or measured time, her contention is that, as a “dynamic site of temporal and spatial activity,” “a performance

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does not stop with the fall of the curtain but continues in the body and mind of the viewer.”\textsuperscript{58} A performance ensconces itself, in real, palpable, ways in its audience.

Performance has the power to penetrate to the very core of the real and transform it into the reality of fiction. In the cultural imaginary there exists what we might call a performative a priori—a set of conditions that makes people and phenomena come into the field of our vision from within a preexisting matrix of dramatic scenes. Embedded in its substratum, performance emerges as a field of activity that continues in the everyday. On occasions when we don our capes, we also participate in the performative a priori by doing so in style, using a gesture that belongs to our lexicon—a swirl of motion, and voilà!\textsuperscript{59}

Performative a priori, for Wolska, appear to be verbal or physical acts that exist in culture and that people pull upon to “give style” to their own life. The idea of the performative a priori speaks to how the ethics of \textit{Doctor Faustus} extends beyond the final moments of the play and has affects upon its audience well after the curtain falls. Sure, Faustus is torn to bits (this part was not made so clear in his contract, I’m afraid), but the ethics that is imparted to the audience emerges from the moments within the play. Faustus’s ethics are readable \textit{in} the moments of the play and are not conditioned by the play’s final moments. His ethics are readable in the actions of the play, as an ethics itself is constituted by action (acting, begin acted upon, acting with). Yet, just because a particular action ends does not mean that its effects do not persist through time. This is Wolska’s point: a

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\textsuperscript{58} Wolska, 87-88. \\
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 91.
\end{flushright}
performance affects its audience because the duration of that affectation lasts longer than
the duration of the performance itself. Performance “emerges in the everyday,” and, in its
affects, manifests in ways that we may or may not be conscious of. To think about the
ethics of the play as embodied by Faustus as spirit is to imagine an ethics of spirit: of
movement, and of affect. If an ethics materializes in Faustus and is performed by his
actions, then perhaps time—in which an ethics is constituted—is nothing less than a form
of spirit itself. If time, for Faustus and of the performance itself, is one filled with
creative potential and freedom—even though this time is delimited, both by the pact and
by the real time of the performance—then perhaps time is figured, for both Faustus and
for the audience, as a form of spirit that imbues freedom.

The significance of this understanding of time as duration allows for us to return
to affective resonance of Faustus’s ethics via Wolska: for Bergson, the difference
between the past and the present is one of duration, whereby the past exists in the present.
In short, the past and the present fundamentally coexist and function simultaneously. The
past only exists, and can only logically exist, in the present—without the “present,” there
is no “past” that is known as “past”—while, at the same time, with no past, there can
literally be no present. Wolska’s assertions about the affectivity of performance are
correct because performance exists as past in the present. Performance contains an
affective futurity because its affects exist in the future, well beyond the limited duration
of the performance itself.

Faustus’s ethics materializes in the form of his artistry, in his magical conjurings,
and in his adventures. Faustus, remember, craves “nothing” save to live his contracted
twenty-four years in “pleasure and dalliance” (3.1.59-60). What he craves, in other
words, is to create, to perform, to conjure.\textsuperscript{60} His ethics is invested in making his life into art, and his effort to do so holds value in itself—just as the play continues to hold value to the viewer even after the curtain has fallen at the theater. The value of art is found in what it creates and what it opens to creation, or becoming (different; something else). In the words of Elizabeth Grosz, “[a]rt enables matter to become expressive, to not just satisfy but also to intensify—to resonate and become more than itself.”\textsuperscript{61} To “become more than itself” could be said to be the central ethical tenet of Marlowe’s protagonists, especially Faustus. For Faustus, the time of his life is to make himself more than himself—more than the mortal Faustus. The making of the self is art. Faustus’s life as art, in other words, can be understood as the aesthetics—the material performance, the embodiment of spirit—of his ethics.

\textsuperscript{60} Again, see Sofer’s essay on the relation between the acts of performing and of conjuring.

When charting the groundwork necessary for the creation of an ethics, we determined, through a study of *Doctor Faustus* in Chapter 2, that time is the foundational component of an ethics, since how we perceive time influences how we live it: if we feel that time is malleable, and if we feel optimistic about our ability to give structure to it, as Faustus does, then we can see how time is the quintessential element of an ethics. If an ethics is created in time, then one might argue that it is also created, quite literally, in space. The logical foundation of this type of argument rests upon an understanding of space as an ontological *a priori* entity to, or, as a body that pre-exists its occupation by, other bodies. Yet, in this chapter, I would like to contend that space does not exist prior to its occupation; rather, utilizing the works of Henri Bergson and Elizabeth Grosz, I would like to propose that space is created as an effect of acting bodies. In the two parts of *Tamburlaine* (ca. 1588-1590), Marlowe advances, through performance, the idea that spaces and ethics actualize as the effects of bodily actions—the affective interactions between and among bodies—on stage. Significant, then, is the observation, through a reading of *Tamburlaine*, that both spaces and ethics are established externally to the bodies whose actions allow for their creation. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how space is produced through a reading of the play and articulate its creation as a philosophical tenet of a Marlovian Ethics: an ethics is created external to the bodies that act, through the affections produced by the actions of these bodies, and thereby is perceptible in the spaces created through that performance. Marlowe uses the physical apparatus—the body—of the theater to show how these created spaces materialize and...
become palpable through the stage actions that constitute *Tamburlaine* as performance. *Tamburlaine*, as my reading will prove, is a play about the creation of an ethics and the creation of spaces, which are both an effect of and a condition for that ethics. At the same time, the physical and verbal movements—perceived by the audience as “performance”—that define those spaces, in turn, define those ethics. In short, there is an affective correlation between the spaces and the ethics created on stage, and this correlation is predicated upon movement, which is always affective.

A caveat on the body as I refer to it throughout this dissertation, and, in particular, in this chapter: my working definition of body is directly appropriated from Deleuze’s, which he, in turn, extracts from Spinoza’s *Ethics*. Deleuze writes, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*,

> if we are Spinozists we will not define a thing by its form, nor by its organs and its functions, nor as a substance or a subject. Borrowing terms from the Middle Ages, or from geography, we will define it by *longitude* and *latitude*. A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity. We call longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, between particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between *unformed elements*. We call latitude the set of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an *anonymous force*…. In this way we construct the map of a body. The longitudes and latitudes together constitute Nature, the plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is constantly
being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and
collectives.”¹

The body as map is dynamic and affective: on one plane (Deleuze’s “longitudinal”
vectors) the body is understood as a material network of particles that are in constant
flux, and, due to this continual state of change, always remain “unformed” in shape. On
another plane (the “latitudinal” plane) lies the multitude of affects that already are
charging that body at that point in time. Affects are created, Deleuze explains, by
“anonymous force(s)” (causes unknown, unclear, or, frankly, unimportant) that touch the
exterior of the body, hitting its synapses, which, for human bodies, send messages to the
mind, which, in turn, attempts to comprehend those affects by simplifying and reducing
them into what is then articulated as emotion. Those affects are not permanent or
exclusive; they flow into one another and they change themselves—as they fade over
time or are overlaid, and made complicated by, new affects that infuse that body.

Deleuze’s theory of the body as map dehumanizes it and instead conceptualizes
the body as a composite of movements and affects. (In the context of 16th century
humanism, if Deleuze’s “body” is not human, then, it is also not Christian, as his body
was not molded in the shape of God.) Anything, therefore, could be understood as a
body, including the theater, whose structure is made from wood and stone, and which is
filled with other, human, bodies. So, what makes a theater are the affective forces at work
within it: the players moving on stage, gesturing with their limbs, speaking aloud their
lines; the audience, perhaps a rowdy one, chugging their beverages, chomping into some
fruit, moving around in their seats, and commenting upon the performance with their

nearby theatre companions; the theatre itself, wood and stone breathing, creaking, expanding and contracting as the weight upon it shifts, and as the density of the air changes as a warm day turns to a cool night. Remove the performers and audience, and the theater becomes something else entirely, and the identity of that something else depends upon, again, the affective forces at work within it.

Deleuze’s definition also attests that, while any thing could be construed as a body, every body is different, because each consists of its own unique network of affective forces. This definition could allow for a different understanding of the complex body of the character on stage, which actually consists of the body of the actor—a mortal body which could be conceptualized as somatized duration, delimited by its flesh—who has appropriated the guise of a particular character. In *Shakespeare and the Power of Performance*, Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster articulate the “doubleness” of the performative body as a blend of both actor and character, which they, taking a cue from Thomas Heywood, refer to as “personation”: “under Elizabethan stage conditions the dramatic display of artificial persons did not invariably bring forth the illusion of a self-contained scene peopled with lifelike persons and actions. Even under the alien contours of an imaginary role, performers did not relinquish all the visible signs of their social or sexual identity.”2 This is a sensible reading: the material body witnessed on stage is that of the actor, and, no matter the attire donned or prop wielded, that body remains visible to the audience and informs their understanding of that character. Deleuze’s concept of the body would align with this reading in the sense that the actor’s body and the projected character combine to create a network of forces that engage with each other; the forces at

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work in the somatic body—literally, cellular forces, in particular, the cardiovascular and the musculo-skeletal, the latter of which includes joint movement, and, in turn, the concentric and eccentric contractions of the muscles—are harnessed by that body to perform, while, at the same time, the forces at work in the body of the virtual character, which the actor studies and adopts, shapes the extent to which the actor performs that body. Thus, the character of Tamburlaine would be perceived and therefore known differently if it were played by a lithe woman as opposed to a finely chiseled man, or a flamboyantly queer, overweight man. This is why Sarah Bernhard playing Hamlet in the 19th century was so earth shattering, because the body of the actor—its sex, gender, and ethnicity (visually perceived as skin color) especially—provides the rudiment of the character. The actor, then, in one sense, is not in control of what the audience perceives as his character, because his projection of the character—his performance—is inflected by his body and how his body, voluntarily or not, acts. In Tamburlaine, the protagonist’s continual effort to create himself as larger-than-human, as we shall see, in an attempt to free himself from his mortal limits, is read through the actor’s body, in which how his words are understood are affected by the body that voices them. The drama on the page communicates the performance differently to the reader, whereby the visual presentation of the performance is absent from the reading, so the reader’s imagination must work differently in order to conceive the play.

On the stage, actions establish what we understand as “performance” and they also delimit the space of the performative body. Action is the material, or substance, of performance. In Michael Goldman’s estimation, an action “is felt as something playable, an impulse thrusting out at us from what the actors do, moment by moment, an unbroken
flow of energy carrying us forward in time.” 3 Referencing Aristotle’s Poetics, Goldman
explains that action is volitional and carries a sign of ownership. 4 Goldman’s
conceptualization of “action” verges on the ethical, which is the part of his reading that I
would like to emphasize in my rendering of the term. He intimates as much when he
summarizes his definition of “action” as “a movement from self to world, from inner life
to outer impact…. [A]ny significant action involves numerous events, inner and outer,
movements of desire and thought, of body and, perhaps, of voice, adjustments of self and
objects and others, which mysteriously appear to fuse in a single arc of
accomplishment.” 5 The duration of an action is defined as “a single arc of
accomplishment,” and the endpoints of this arc, I believe, are two bodies, which are, in
turn, affected by and in that action. Actions produce affects; they affect bodies on stage.
Furthermore, the overarching “arc” of successive actions, by actors, that occur within a
specific duration of time constitute a performance. Actions constitute the substance of
performance, while performance itself, Alice Raynor suggests, is the “style that actualizes
the structure of an act.” 6 The idea that the structure of the act is actualized by style
denotes that there is an aesthetics, or artistry, to performance, and, more importantly, to

3 Michael Goldman, Acting and Action in Shakespearean Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton
4 “Action is a notion that allows us to think of a person as having what he does. Action,
says Aristotle in the Poetics, springs from thought and character, and for ‘character’ he
uses hexis again—habitual pre-disposition to action, which, like our word ‘habit,’ derives
closely from the verb ‘to have.’ Character is a hexis of having because it points to the
difficult nexus between the self and its acts.” (Ibid., 7).
5 Ibid., 18.
6 Alice Raynor, in To Act, To Do, To Perform: Drama and the Phenomenology of Action,
asserts that performance’s “function is total thiness, of here and now…. [It] is an
exteriority, a surface, a concrete perception of material features that can be seen in the
difference, say, between Olivier’s face and Mel Gibson’s [in their respective
performances of Hamlet]. In this sense, performance is style that actualizes the structure
each action on stage. As performance, an action implies or carries with it a way of being (becoming) of that character and can therefore be considered ethical since it intimates that character’s capability to act (become) on stage. A performative act—in a Deleuzian and Spinozist sense—can be ethical when that act connotes a way of being or becoming. A performative act actualizes the ethics of a character onstage, as we will see in the following assessment of Tamburlaine, his actions, and his ethics.

In Tamburlaine, our understanding of the monolithic figure of the eponymous character of Tamburlaine derives from actions that are spatial and affective. Tamburlaine comes alive through action—and, in this regard, my argument finds symmetry in and is in part influenced by Stephen Greenblatt’s idea that the “self-fashioning” of a character requires constant movement. Tamburlaine is a character, he writes, that “[o]nce set in motion, cannot slow down or change course.”7 However, while this movement creates Tamburlaine, the consequence of this ceaseless movement is, in Greenblatt’s estimation, the effacement of the differences among the various places that Tamburlaine conquers: “[i]n Tamburlaine Marlowe contrives to efface all such differences, as if to insist upon the essential meaninglessness of theatrical space, the vacancy that is the dark side of its power to imitate any place.”8 This “contriving” occurs as the consequence of Tamburlaine’s rampage across the “world”—or, “map,” as Greenblatt asserts the world has been reduced to—and his destructive actions are, he believes, “almost entirely directed toward what we may call a theatrical proof of the body’s existence.”9 We can interpret Greenblatt’s reading of Tamburlaine as arguing that the body’s self-creation

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7 Greenblatt, 195.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 210; see page 198 for his assertion that Tamburlaine “reduces the world to a map.”
negates and destroys space, nullifying it into a vacancy, a nothingness. Tamburlaine, for
Greenblatt, is “all-consuming,” and in this consumption functions like a vacuum, voiding
the spaces around him of any meaning; Tamburlaine consumes everything around him—
adds it to his body, so to speak—and, as a result, everything that existed in space (as
space, even, for Greenblatt) has been translated into a part of Tamburlaine. My
understanding of the play and of the spaces of performance, in contrast, does not posit
space as an ontological a priori to bodies, nor does it contend that spaces are destroyed
through the ethical creation of Tamburlaine. Furthermore, I do not understand space as a
singular, quantitative unit that houses or functions as a vessel for actions. Indeed, I argue
the opposite: that the actions that constitute the creation, or “fashioning,” of the self also
create—rather than destroy—spaces. Tamburlaine does not reduce the theatrical
landscapes to nothingness; he helps imagine their creation, even if that creation is
produced through acts of destruction.

Critical interpretations like Greenblatt’s find this conceptualization of space
useful in discussions of drama because the theater functions as the literal space of
performance. The theater is like a metaphysical certainty that allows for performance; if
there is no theater—no predetermined, designated space that creates the boundary of
performance—then there is no drama. These interpretations are symptomatic of the
insistence on positing space as a precursor to bodily movement, and, furthermore, of
understanding the stage as space instead of a material apparatus or physical body.

My understanding of space is that it is an effect of movement, and therefore my
understanding of performance, as I conveyed above, as consisting of a series of actions
that unfold in an observed duration, proposes that spaces, characters (characters, or
personas, of bodies on stage), and ethics are all immanent in performance. I think Marlowe holds a similar understanding of the creative potential of bodies and of spaces: actions build, they create—and create through destruction as well—performance. There is a momentum that characterizes his plays that demonstrates this sense of constant creation—the “ceaseless movement”—of characters and their surroundings, of plot and emotion. Actors’ movements, Goldman contends, both affect the audience and “give [a] performance momentum.” Thematically, he could not be more different from Shakespeare, the period’s most famous dramatist, whose plays (the tragedies, and also, arguably, the histories) relish the tragic catharsis of closure as desolation, destruction—and, in my opinion, of pessimism and melancholia. From Henry V to Hamlet, from Richard II to Othello, Shakespeare’s plays close with the characters on stage voicing their desire for things lost and things past, a desire which echoes throughout the theater, affecting the audience with this sense of loss and, at times, desperation for the past to return (for example, for Cordelia to come back to life; for Iago to speak). One might conjecture that Shakespeare’s plays must terminate at these particular points in the drama, for the obvious reason that the remaining (oftentimes secondary) characters on the stage are unable to move beyond the loss; they are unable to act further, to move forward. Life cannot progress if action ceases. What remains in Shakespearean drama, what characters oft allude to in their epilogues, is the stage alone.

10 “Immanent” in the Deleuzian sense of being created in and by performance; emergent from within.
11 Goldman, 9. Goldman further explains that movement is “primarily mental or imaginative…but it seems to resonate with physical suggestion, for instance, the suggestion of a thrust out from the performer toward us, as he ‘projects the character he is playing’” (Ibid.).
While esteemed for his Ovidian-inspired lyrics, Marlowe was, more radically, a poet of the stage. Marlowe fully took advantage of the immediacy and the physicality inherent in the form of drama, known for its verbal rhetoric as well as their physical violence. Marlowe’s “mighty line” is in part “mighty” because of the physical action that supplements it on stage; meanings are created, erased, negated, and multiplied, via the conjunction of language and physicality—much like we witness today in cinema, and, even, I think, graphic novels. Indeed, it has often been argued that Marlowe, along with his fellow University Wits who also wrote for the stage, such as Robert Greene, helped to usher in a new age of drama in the 1580s. Kay Savage asserts that Marlowe and his Wits were setting theatrical conventions while developing them in the late 1580s; their plays were “ambitious staging[s] in the Elizabethan theatre. The English drama dared to present on the stage the kind of action that the Greeks had contented themselves with reporting.”

There is an unadulterated rawness, a violence, that characterizes Marlowe’s plays; according to Rick Bowers, his “violence inheres in the physicality of theatre itself…. [It] asserts something new, sensational and immediate, something more visceral, [and] dangerous…. “ Bowers’s argument, in “Marlowe’s Knifework,” is that Marlowe’s plays enact violence through visual and kinetic means, and that these means constitute “a

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12 In regard to the latter, I believe the juxtaposition of image with text, segmented in framed scenes to represent moments of action, to be very similar to how moments of action are conveyed in the dramatic form of the performance, especially of the performance as play text. Each scene in a play text can be broken down into distinct moments of action; it is feasible—as the editors of Classic Comics have demonstrated in their editions of a variety of Shakespeare’s plays—that each action could be a framed scene in a graphic novel.


new theatre of experience and action beyond the usual retrospective limits of moral consolation, critical response, and even legal explanation.”15 Other critics, like Janet Clare, who has written on Marlowe’s “Theatre of Cruelty,” and Johannes H. Birringer, who asserts that Marlowe’s dramaturgy radically breaks the form of drama itself through violence, have demonstrated how and why Marlowe’s plays were written for the stage, and how, therefore, the brilliance of his drama inheres in the interplay between the “mighty” rhetoric and the sensational action on stage.16 These critics collectively emphasize the significance of bodies in action on the Marlovian stage. These essays are critical testaments to my argument, which reiterates their argumentative emphases—

15 Ibid., 25.
16 The work of these critics undergirds my argument about ethics: Clare, in “Marlowe’s Theatre of Cruelty,” contends that Marlowe “produced a theatre of consistently violent techniques and effects. Confronted with a combination of Renaissance eloquence and extreme acts of aggression, it can be difficult…to find an appropriate critical vocabulary for Marlowe’s dramaturgy” (in Constructing Marlowe, eds. J. A. Downie and T. Parnell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 74). In “Marlowe’s Violent Stage: ‘Mirrors’ of Honor in Tamburlaine,” Johannes H. Birringer likewise emphasizes the physicality of Marlowe’s plays, and how this physicality is imperative to the dramatic thrust and effect of the play upon its audience. Thus, he contends, the form of drama is put under immense pressure by Marlowe’s pen; the violent action that comprises Tamburlaine, for instance, “opens up questions about the possibilities and affective powers of performance—performance understood as the specific theatrical expressiveness of a multidimensional rhetoric” (in ELH 51.2 (Summer, 1984): 220). Birringer thus concludes that “Marlowe’s conception of Tamburlaine’s self-centered heroism presses toward a radical ‘breaking of form’ and a displacement of the structure and ethics of the play that were written in this time…. Marlowe’s emblems and violent stage images are not effective vehicles for the expression of moral commonplaces; on the contrary, the hero’s aesthetic indulgence is carried by poetry of such brilliance that it actually succeeds in blanking out the moral outrage of the action” (236). The level of affectivity of Marlowe’s drama relies upon the audience’s perception and understanding of the interplay between the “violent stages images” and the “mighty lines.” Thus, the imaginative scope and the palpability of the spaces that are created as the product of this interplay are largely contingent upon the audience’s affective participation—as witness and sometimes participant—in the performance itself.
about the significance of physicality on Marlowe’s stage—that these actions form the basis of a Marlovian ethics.

Like other stages of the period, Marlowe’s stage, which was primarily the Rose Theatre, was bare of all but the essentials: the actors and a handful of emblematic props to help elaborate upon and intensify the themes of a play. The actors’ primary role, therefore, was to conjure the world of the play for the audience, and, since the stage was mostly unadorned, the spaces that were created could transcend time and space with the assistance of the audience’s imagination. The spaces were, in other words, constituted by movement and, as a result, never fixed in place, such that the very same wooden platform of the stage can be transformed into another place entirely, depending upon the characters’ actions that happen upon it. Space is immanent to characters’ actions. This continual change of scenery, of place, is especially true in Tamburlaine, in which the protagonist makes it his objective to traverse and conquer as much land as possible.

Minimal but suggestive scenery and props in Marlowe’s plays were paired with infrequent stage directions, as evident in early, published quartos of his play; this indicates that there was a strong audio-visual emphasis placed on the actors and their actions. That is, again, Marlowe’s plays were created primarily for the stage, not the page. In her essay “Marlowe’s Spectacle,” Jocelyn Powell, in observing that Marlowe

17 Leslie Thompson, in “Marlowe’s Staging of Meaning,” explains that while Marlowe “make[s] considerable use of properties and costumes, and feature[s] distinctive items or memorable business at thematically central moments—a chafer of coals, cage, chariot; banquets, hangings, bed scenes,” there is “little sense of place”: “[u]ntil Damascus [in Part I] there is little sense of place, which helps to convey the constant progress from one conquest to the next. Tamburlaine takes his 'show' with him: the stage directions call for a number of properties--treasure, crowns, dagger, swords, cage, chair of state, banquet, laurel branches--and specific costumes for Tamburlaine. But a performance requires no more than a bare platform...” (Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England 18 (2006): 9, 25).
bucks tradition, contends that Marlowe “creates his own images, giving them significance through context and language, underlining the action with significant visual detail, [and] extending the verbal action into the stage picture.” Once more, emphasis is placed on the extent of the visuality of Marlowe’s rhetoric: “[i]n constructing his plays, [Marlowe] pays very careful attention to the visual effect made by each scene in action, and contrives that the movements of the actors, their properties, their costumes, and the background against which they appear, should combine to form a picture, as representative as the words, of the psychological and moral tensions which he is writing.” The movements onstage, performed by the fleshy bodies of performance, I think, have greater visceral and immediate affects on an audience than is capable through the act of reading alone—even though, I will suggest, the reader, via the Bergsonian method of intuition, can fashion the imaginative spaces performed on stage. And, while an active engagement with a play text can produce these effects, a play text is a different type of body than the bodies that inhabit a performance, of which the audience, more often than not, figures as one of those performative bodies, who is incorporated into the show, as a part of the performance itself.

For Marlowe, there is no reduction of what has been created throughout the performance. It is in this sense, and in the idea that Marlowe values the creative potential of everything that actions produce, that I find the philosophy of Henri Bergson to be exceptionally useful to a reading of the creation of ethics in Marlowe’s plays. His entire oeuvre—from *Time and Free Will* (1889) to the collection of essays published as *Creative Mind* (1941) in the early twentieth century—presents his revolutionary thoughts

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19 Ibid., 197.
on the ontology of space as that which is produced through matter and movement (or, through the movement of matter). \(^{20}\) Bergson, via his philosophy on both time and space, has offered us a universe of movement—and it is space that is a map of this movement. Or, in other terms proffered by Bergson’s reader, Deleuze, space is “the schema of matter.” \(^{21}\) Space, therefore, contains both the lived, qualitative aspects of the movements that establish it, as well as the quantitative elements inherent in its mapping, when that type of quantification, or geometric mapping takes place. At the same time, space is infinitely extendable and multiple; it is not static, as the by-product of movement.

\(^{20}\) Bergson’s thoughts on space surface subtly in his first book *Time and Free Will*, his study of how the mind processes knowledge and how the idea of free will develops. It is, however, not until his second book, *Matter and Memory*, that he challenges extant notions of the ontology of space by first wondering why space is indisputably held as the ground upon which bodies act. Bergson discerns that our understanding of space has been inculcated in our minds, such that our minds posit space as a priori to movement instead of an a posteriori creation of it. Bergson’s argument is that space is something altogether different from the mind’s comprehension of it as existing prior to the bodies that act in it. In the following excerpt, Bergson describes how the human mind cognitively inverts the sequence that creates space:

Concrete extensity, that is to say, the diversity of sensible qualities, is not within space; rather it is space that we thrust into extensity. Space is not a ground on which real motion is posited; rather it is real motion that deposits space beneath itself. But our imagination, which is preoccupied above all by the convenience of expression and the exigencies of material life, prefers to invert the natural order of the terms…. Therefore, it comes to see movement as only a variation of distance, space being thus supposed to precede motion. Then, in a space which is homogeneous and infinitely divisible, we draw, in imagination, a trajectory and fix positions: afterwards, applying the movement to the trajectory, we see it divisible like the line we have drawn, and equally denuded of quality. (217)

The moment that movement no longer is movement is the moment that we situate space as preexistent to movement, because in doing so we effectively render movement in a way that allows it to be predetermined, known, entity—mathematically known and measurable—to us. The space that we establish is thus “homogenous and infinitely divisible,” whereby it becomes “denuded of quality.”

\(^{21}\) *Bergsonism*, 87.
Bergson’s theorizing of space provides the best way to think about the space of performance and, especially, Marlovian drama, which is overfull with movement.

Bergson’s understanding of space is optimistic in that space is not a deadened, static entity but is dynamic with potential to become (more, extensible, multiple, but also intensive and virtual). This rendering of space captures the life of the theater, as a space teeming with creative potential. This is also why Elizabeth Grosz, another of Bergson’s readers, defines space as the “field for the play of virtualities,” whereby this field is “an unfolding space, defined, as time is, by the arc of movement, and thus a space open to becoming….”

Her understanding of space, similar to Bergson’s understanding of time as duration that we discussed in Chapter 2, is heterogeneous and multi-layered; space is never singular, *space*, but always plural, *spaces*. Space for Grosz, like Bergson, is multi-layered with layers of the past enmeshed with the present. Invoking Bergson’s inverted cone, which he uses to illustrate how the virtual (the pure past; in layman’s terms, the past as memory) engages with and is recalled (as an act of remembering) in certain moments in the present, Grosz’s field of virtualities acknowledges the power of the durational past, and how these layers can affect the present in terms of space. This sense of a complex layered-ness underscores Grosz’s conjecture that perhaps there is “a materiality to space, rather than materiality residing with only its contents.”

A delimited frame, or area, of space consists of multiple lived moments that have taken place during a certain duration of time, whereby poly-temporality results from the fact that multiple

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23 Ibid., 127. The materiality of space, in other words, is that of the multiple layers of temporality that essentially are constitutive to the creation of that space or co-exist with that space.
individuals have lived in that space. Space, she claims, is “produced through matter, extension, and movement.” What occurs when space is framed, when it becomes an area, is the stabilization of the movement or action that has established that space—it is at this point that space, and the movement that comprises space, becomes linear, singular, and quantifiable.

Understanding space as a “field for the play of virtualities” provides a useful methodology for the interpretation of drama—as the form of performance, as that which simultaneously embodies both stage and page. Space, remember, is the product of a movement that has been stabilized via some type of stoppage; in Grosz’s words, “[s]pace is in itself an aggregate of the multiplicity of movements, a map not of locations, points, but of trajectories, movements.” This understanding of space offers different ways to think about the space of performance, because a performance in the theatre is filled with movement, both physical and verbal, even though, as Andrew Gurr has observed, we have no term in English that “acknowledges the full experience of both

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24 Ibid., 114.
25 Grosz, in another Bergsonian reading of the ontological dynamics of space, asserts that stoppages in movement coincide with the production of quantifiable spaces, and of objects:

The thing and the space it inscribes and produces are inaugurated at the same moment, the moment that movement is arrested, frozen, or dissected to reveal its momentary aspects, the moment that the thing and the space that surrounds it are differentiated conceptually or perceptually. The moment that movement must be reflected upon, analyzed, it yields objects and their states, distinct, localized, mappable, repeatable in principle, objects and states capable of measurement and containment. The depositing of a mappable trajectory by movement, its capacity to be divided and to be seen statically, are the mutual conditions of the thing and of space. (Time Travels, 133)

hearing and seeing the complete ‘action’ of a play.”27 The theatre cannot house the world but it can create worlds within it. Furthermore, each space is unique to the movement that creates it; therefore, it is impossible to specify this philosophy beyond its basic tenet of creation. As Claire Colebrook asserts, in her essay “The Sense of Space: On the Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari,” “[s]pace will differ within itself according to the lives that occupy it.”28 The spaces created within the play Tamburlaine are distinct from the spaces created within Marlowe’s other plays—clearly, each play is its own.

In addition, we must clarify our understanding of performative “movement” when the play in question is read as a play text instead of witnessed as performance. I believe that Grosz’s interpretation of Bergsonian space as a “field of virtualities” when read in juxtaposition with Bergson’s method of intuition, as outlined in Chapter 2, clarifies any preconceptions or concerns about the movement of a performance when read as text. Indeed, the act of reading is itself a modality of seeing. Both the performance and the text are temporal, and the performance, as that which is imagined via the reading, is likewise temporal. Both text and performance exist in the virtual, as different modes of

27 Andrew Gurr, *Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 85. Movement is a lived experience, but, as it is perceived, it is done so most readily through the sense of sight, but it also perceived by the sense of sound, among the other senses. Indeed, P.A. Skantze, in *Stillness in Motion in the 17th Century*, explains, “the state of performance is motion, even if the motion consists solely of an actor’s respiration. The motion of theatrical exchange, not simply the external one of the body on the stage, or the motion of the sound of voices in the air, or even the silent motion of time passing can happen in pauses or through gestures. Motion can beget motion: an audience can be moved—to tears, to laughter, to anger” (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3. Virginia Mason Vaughn and her co-editors in their introduction to *Speaking Pictures* concur, stating that the “actor [appeals] to the verbal by his words and the visual by the movement of his arms and legs, his facial expressions, his posture, his costume, and properties he carries” (“Introduction: Verbalizing the Visual and Visuality the Verbal,” (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 2010), 14).

temporality. How we know the performance is through an act of intuition. The condition of Bergson’s theory or method of intuition, and, thereby, the condition of the argument of this chapter, is that reading is an imaginative act; reading requires an imaginative action, and, in turn, transforms the text into an imaginary, but very real, landscape. To recall a passage in *Creative Mind*, the method of intuition “represents the attention that the mind gives to itself, over and above, while it is fixed upon matter, its object.”29 It is the method by which a person is able to step into the duration of the object of study—in this case, the play—and live in sympathy with that object. The reader of a play, therefore, steps inside of a play and acquires her knowledge of the play through feeling the movements of the play as she experiences them in her reading. To read intuitively, Bergson explains, requires a perception of the play’s movement and a “step[ping] into” the play in order to “be one with it in sympathy.”30 Bergson’s method of intuition offers a way to experience the text as performance, in which the temporality of the play is contingent upon how a reader experiences the play herself. The performance is accessible through the text, imbuing the text with a type of openness for infinite readings.

To conceptualize how a topography, or a spectrum of spaces, is fabricated in *Tamburlaine*, we must analyze the movements—and even seemingly nondescript trajectories of movement—that comprise the play. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, I will frequently refer to these moments as scenes; scenes as moments of action, rather than its common usage as the basic structural unit of drama, which are then

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30 Ibid., 102.
gathered together with other scenes to form “Acts.” The analysis will concentrate on the protagonist, Tamburlaine, who functions as the main impetus, directly and indirectly, to all the play’s action, and who has a notorious preoccupation with the acquisition and possession of space. Why is space so important to Tamburlaine, so crucial to his quest to obtain “an earthly crowne” (I, 2.7.29)? How does Tamburlaine understand space in relation to this quest, and, more broadly, in relation to his ethic of always becoming more, and better than, his extant self? In other words, how is Tamburlaine’s relationship to created spaces an “ethical” one, whereby those spaces acquire a positive value and benefit Tamburlaine’s quest for power and self-fulfillment?

The creation of space is integral to Tamburlaine’s quest to become emperor of the world, feared by all. Like Faustus, Tamburlaine has a desire to become more than a poor shepherd, so he determines, through sheer will, to become the “Scourge of God and terror of the world” (I, 4.1.54). The overarching theme of the two parts of Tamburlaine correlates with the one advanced in Faustus: the ethic of a constant bettering of one’s self, of doing things that are good for the self, while avoiding things that hurt the self. To live actively, to become more—these are the themes that epitomize Marlovian drama,

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31 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Henry Turner has observed that “‘structural’ theories of act and scene divisions are in some respect possible only from the position of the reader, who has the capacity to arrest the flow of the action temporarily, to pause over scenes, flip through pages, carefully weigh one moment with another, and gradually distinguish the architecture of the composition,” in The English Renaissance Stage: Geometry, Poetics, and the Practical Spatial Arts 1580-1630, 92.

32 This question is similar to the one asked of Faustus in Chapter 1; there the question was how does Faustus understand time, whereby this understanding has a direct affect on how he lives his life. Thus, I ask, how does Tamburlaine understand space, such that this understanding can be said to dictate his ethics.
and, indeed, a Marlovian Ethics.\textsuperscript{33} In order to create spaces that, in turn, become a part of him, Tamburlaine continuously imagines himself in figurative, lofty language that not only creates him as something more than human, but also creates the landscape around him, which becomes him, as something extraordinary. Throughout the course of the two plays we witness how his actions actualize, or make truths of, his words, transforming him into a stronger, more powerful body. As Tamburlaine proudly attests, his “words are oracles” (I, 3.3.102), “Wil and Shall best fitteth Tamburlain,” he declares (I, 3.3.41), and, as he fittingly reminds us halfway through the second play, “since I exercise a greater name, / The Scourge of God and terour of the world, / I must apply my selfe to fit those tearmes...” (II, 4.1.153-154). To exercise is to put into action—to train, to develop or condition—with the objective of becoming more skillful, more adept, in relation to the desired response. Exercising the greater name of “the scourge of god and terour of the world” suggests that Tamburlaine is a body in progress; he continuously trains himself to succeed the lowly shepherd’s status of his birth because he wants to become the terror of the world. He must, therefore, constantly “apply” his self to “fit” or become that dominating figure—to be the body that comes to embody that name. In this particular instance, language establishes the opportunity for future action to fulfill this desire; language creates the promise, while action (which may be performed linguistically)

\textsuperscript{33} If Nietzsche were to read Marlowe’s plays or see them in performance, perhaps he would deem Marlowe’s protagonists “well turned-out men.” A person who has “turned out well,” according to Nietzsche in \textit{Ecce Homo}, is one that is “carved from wood that is hard, delicate, and at the same time smells good.” Furthermore, “[h]e has a taste only for what is good for him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure of what is good for him is transgressed. He guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger” (Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Ecce Homo}, in \textit{Basic Writings of Nietzsche}, trans. and ed. W. Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 680).
securities it. If ethics are derived from the affects of actions, then to be able to satisfy a
desire—the promise, which Nietzsche esteems as “a real memory of the will”—is a
positive value that can be attributed as a component of Tamburlaine’s ethics.34

Tamburlaine believes that he, like every man, is capable of becoming whatever he
desires, and he presents this philosophy of human creative potential in a speech to Cosroe
about how the drive to become great is a natural, basic element of the human condition:

Nature that fram’d us of foure Elements,
Warring within our breasts for regiment,
Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds:
Our soules, whose faculties can comprehend
The wondrous Architecture of the world:
And measure every wandring plannets course:
Still climing after knowledge infinite,
And alwaies mooving as the restles Spheres,
Wils us to weare our selves and never rest,
Until we reach the ripest fruit of all,
That perfect blisse and sole felicitie,
The sweet fruition of an earthly crowne. (I, 2.7.18-29)

Embedded in each man are the four “warring” elements of Nature, each fighting for
control of the body which houses them. Akin to wills or forces that persistently try to
“exercise” control of the body, in sum, these elements work together to compel all men to

34 In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche writes of the promise that it is “an active
desire…for the continuance of something desired once, a real memory of the will” (494),
and the ability of man to make and satisfy a promise demonstrates his nobility, his power
over his self, and it exemplifies his “freedom.”
have “aspiring minds.” The forces within the body dictate that body’s cognitive desires and bodily actions. It is the body, and the warring forces within the body, that direct the mind to attain the ultimate goal of the “earthly crowne.” The spirit, as “soul”—that ambiguous site in the body where the warring elemental forces meet—lifts the mind (the “aspiring mind”) above its nature, beyond its natural inclination or tendency, to the “wondrous architecture of the world.” For Tamburlaine, man has the potential to extend himself beyond the mortal coil prescribed by nature, and, in seeking “infinite knowledge,” to elevate him to the heavenly spheres and planets. The spaces of man are infinite: in this speech, Tamburlaine, creates the spaces internal to the body (the warring forces) and external to the body (the architecture of the world, the planets, etc). Spaces range from natural to supernatural in scale. The movement is microscopic to telescopic; the effect of this juxtaposition is that Tamburlaine exists in both nature and the heavens. Like Faustus, Tamburlaine sees himself as capable of transcending the human condition.

To convey his potential to become and to make his power perceptible to others, Tamburlaine utilizes images that help create both his self and the spaces that surround him—and it is these created spaces that augment and make palpable the expanse of the awe-inspiring power of his person. These spaces are qualitative and affective because of the sensations that are produced through their creation in performance; this is another reason why Bergson’s work on space, which values space as a qualitative entity, is so relevant to the study of space in performance. Marlowe, in turn, to convey the expanse of Tamburlaine’s power, both in and beyond his body, employs mythic, and particularly martial, imagery throughout the two parts of the play. The spaces that are created exude power, authority, intimidation, and terror. Tamburlaine’s body is always described by
others in mythic terms, with allusions to and comparisons to gods, and as made of material that is other than human. There are two specific occasions, in Part I, in which the dialogue centers on Tamburlaine’s body; in both instances, the speakers are trying to discern the make-up and origin of Tamburlaine, because he seems otherworldly to those who encounter him. The first is Menaphon’s description of Tamburlaine in Act II, after Cosroe asks him to describe Tamburlaine’s “stature” and “personage.” Menaphon’s detailed description of Tamburlaine unfolds in twenty-five lines:

Of stature tall, and straightly fashioned,
Like his desire, lift upwards and divine,
So large of lims, his joints so strongly knit,
Such breadth of shoulders as might mainly beare
Olde Atlas burthen. Twixt his manly pitch,
A pearle more worth, then all the world is plaste:
Wherein by curious soveraintie of Art,
Are fixt his piercing instruments of sight:
Whose fiery cyrcles beare encompassed
A heaven of heavenly bodies in their Spheares
That guides his steps and actions to the throne,
Where honor sits invested royally:
Pale of complexion: wrought in him with passion,
Thirsting with soverainty, with love of armes:
His lofty browes in foldes, do figure death,
And in their smoothnesse, amite and life:
About them hangs a knot of Amber heire,
Wrapped in curles, as fierce Achilles was,
On which the breadth of heaven delights to play,
Making it daunce with wanton majestie:
His armes and fingers long and sinowy,
Betokening valour and excess of strength:
In every part proportioned like the man,
Should make the world subdued to Tamburlaine. (II, 2.1.5-30)

Menaphon’s speech is mythic-making; Tamburlaine’s physical presence portrays him as something other than human, as a body divine, or supernatural. He resembles man in proportion, but his appearance portrays him as larger than human, as an entity that has heavenly spheres for eyes, and who is able to hold the heavens upon his shoulders. The physical measurements of his body appear correlative to his motivation to become more than human (“his desire, lift upwards and divine”). Tamburlaine is no Richard III. He is physically compared to Atlas and Achilles; there is also a discreet allusion to Mars, who, like Tamburlaine, is described as having “fiery cyrcles” for eyes. (And, like Mars, too, Tamburlaine has a “love of armes.”) Menaphon’s speech figures as a kind of counterpart to Tamburlaine’s description of the warring forces that comprise his bodily make-up. Tamburlaine feels himself to be full of these forces, on the inside; to other bodies outside himself, he is perceived as super-human. Tamburlaine cannot be taken in full by the observing eye but is spatialized in parts; his observers can only see him in parts, which are then knitted together to form this god-like figure. His “large lims” articulate at his many strong joints, which are literally the locations in the body where limbs meet; the
more mobility in the joint translates into more mobility of the corresponding limbs. That Tamburlaine’s joints are “strong knits” connotes that he is indeed “straightly fashioned,” a goliath, or a titan, like Atlas, rather than a small and spritely individual. The warring forces of Nature within him figure differently throughout his form: Tamburlaine does not have eyes but “piercing instruments of sight”; he does not have a forehead but “lofty browes in foldes [which] figure death.”

The process of making Tamburlaine’s body materialize in the mind of Cosroe, and of the audience, requires figurative language rather than quantitative figures of measurement. A description of Tamburlaine, filled with mythic-making imagery, gives us a better sense of the Tamburlaine than a few numbers. Quantitative measures hold less affective potential than qualitative, descriptive language—the language of performance. The affective potential of this description—like all language—allows for the infinite creative potentiality of interpretation, for which the likes of quantitative measurements allow no room. What I want to suggest, in turn, is that there is a correlation between the power of language as primarily affective and the production of space, in the Bergsonian sense of space as that which is qualitative and affective. Language, and, in particular, dramatic language, harbors an affective potentiality that lies in wait and only becomes actualized in its usage, through and in performance. (The affective potential of language was understood by 16th century humanists, who wrote at length about the power of rhetoric.) The language of performance is affective, and it is that affect that in part comprises the materiality of space. Dramatic language produces affect, which is the material, the matter, of space. Space is felt. It is lived. And, in drama, spaces are created through and in performance, with language, with action. In the description of
Tamburlaine’s eyes, rendered mechanically as “instruments of sight,” lies the creation and juxtaposition of different types of affective spaces beyond his body. The eyes then become “fiery cyrcles,” like suns, within which there is “[a] heaven of heavenly bodies in their Spheares.” Figurative spaces are created through his description: the space of a laboratory, a tower, atop of which are “fixt his piercing instruments of sight,” becomes enmeshed with a space of the heavens. But these spaces are affectual in nature; they create and embellish sensations—here, of otherworldly power and magnificence—that become bound to the man. In this particular instance, the audience functions as a key component in how this linguistic figuration of Tamburlaine becomes a part of him. Menaphon’s speech moves through the air, touching and affecting the audience, who then, through an act of intellection, attaches these words not just to Tamburlaine, the character on the stage at that present moment, but also to the spaces of Tamburlaine which the audience intuits as his “presence” (which, as I will shortly discuss, lend to the historicity of the character as myth). In a Deleuzian sense, the audience contributes to the latitudinal gridlines of Tamburlaine as map. Looking into Tamburlaine’s eyes produces both telescopic and microscopic effects: one looks in, but one’s sees the expanse of his power and of his determination to conquer the world.

The second mythic-making instance of both Tamburlaine and the associative spaces around him occurs in a discussion between Meander and Ortygius, again in Act II, in which they ponder the mysterious origins that might have contributed to his god-like stature and his insatiable determination:

Meander: Some powers divine, or els infernall, mixt

Their angry seeds at his conception:
For he was never sprong of human race,
Since the spirits of his fearefull pride,
He dares so doubtlesly resolve of rule,
And by profession be ambitious.

Ortygius: What God or Feend, or spirit of the earth,
Or Monster turned to a manly shape,
Or of what mould or mettel he be made,
What star or state soever governe him,
Let us put on our meet in countring mindes,
And in detesting such a divelish Thiefe,
In love of honor and defence of right,
Be arm’d against the hate of such a foe,
Whether from earth, or hell, or heaven he grow. (I, 2.6.9-22)

Like Menephon, Meander and Ortygius find it most suitable to depict Tamburlaine’s awesomeness in otherworldly terms. Their curiosity is piqued by Tamburlaine’s mysterious origins. Meander believes that Tamburlaine was born from the mixture of angry seeds of divine powers, because the force of Tamburlaine’s ambition and “fearful pride” transcend what is assumed to be capable of man. Again, the language has an ominous feel but also one that elevates Tamburlaine—the movement of the language is one of transcendence, which, in turn, contributes to the mythic quality of Tamburlaine. Ortygius’s reply, on the other hand, sounds less inquisitive and more combative in his desire to defend “honor” and “right” against such a “divelish Thiefe.” Yet, even in the unwavering virulence of the tone of his words, his reply to Meander teems with
uncertainty—in the repeated use of “or”—and foments the mystery that underlies
Tamburlaine’s origins. Tamburlaine could be “God or Feend, or spirit of the earth / Or
monster,” or “mould or mettel”; he could be governed by “star or state”; from “earth, or
hell, or heaven.” The conjunction “or” functions to deepen this uncertainty. It creates the
possibility that Tamburlaine could be from anywhere; there are no limitations that
constrict his person because of his birthright—which is why he’s quick to remove the
shepherd’s weeds which, giving the connotations of low status, work against the
character who he is trying to become. The frequent use of “or,” in other words, constructs
a metaphysical (and, for the reader, grammatical) space around Tamburlaine that is
mysterious both in its unknowability (the unknowability of Tamburlaine’s origins) and in
its potential to be anything (and, for Tamburlaine to become anything, without
limitation). Tamburlaine’s body remains a mystery to us in large part due to the spatial
effect of the language used to describe him. The desire for description means a desire for
definition, yet Meander’s and Ortygius’s descriptions lack precision. Their language is
evasive; rather than pinpointing and locating Tamburlaine exactly, they are only able to
describe him in language that is associative, language that produces his character through
association—the figurative language of metaphor and metonymy—which, in turn,
produces an air of mystery around Tamburlaine’s character.

   Mystery—inhering in Tamburlaine’s physical being, in his origins—is a defining,
contributive, characteristic of myth. Mystery derives from a sense of the unknown,
which, in turn, produces a feeling of wonderment. Because everyone lacks the knowledge
of Tamburlaine’s origins, they fabricate an origin myth, and, as conveyed above, which
contribute to and reinforce the mystery of his origins. Tamburlaine assists in and compels
this fabrication with what Theridamas calls his “woorking woords”: to Corsoe, Theridamas says, “You see my Lord, what woorking woords he hath. / But when you see his actions top his speech, / Your speech will stay, or so extol his worth…” (I, 2.3.25-27). Both Tamburlaine’s words and actions are creative, with his actions supplementing his speech, which is arguably as effective as his physical, bodily actions—effective enough, as Theridamas explains, for him to turn his “poore charge” over to Tamburlaine. Tamburlaine assists in the fabrication with his creative words, in which, as we’ve seen, he situates himself in a type of metonymic relation to other mythic entities. In the commentary that precedes Theridamas’s remark, Tamburlaine reassures Cosroe that victory is secured by the “Fates and Oracles of heaven” that “have sworn, / To roialise the deeds of Tamburlaine” (I, 2.3.7-8). The effect of this metonymic relation is effectively space-making in its multi-temporality; the language of association—similar to allegorical language, in the elementary, de Manian sense of language as that which is always pointing backwards through an endless chain of signifiers—functions to imbue time with a spatial feel (a “spatiality”), in the domain of performance. The endless chain of signifiers, which link Tamburlaine to mythic entities of the past, conveys the temporal distance between the two temporal endpoints (here, the classical figures at one end and Tamburlaine at another). In one line, Tamburlaine situates himself alongside mythic entities, in this speech alone, Xerxes, Araris, and all the Gods that were offended by the

35 Here I am loosely employing (and thereby doing so in the most de Manian of ways) Paul de Man’s definition of allegory that he puts forth in his seminal essay, “The Rhetoric of Temporality.” Allegory, for de Man, is capable of inscribing temporality in language, in his estimation, more so than any other rhetorical concept (in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1983), 207). Allegory functions through association, and, in a way, Tamburlaine labors throughout the play to harness allegorical language for his mythic-making endeavor.
“Cyclopian warres.” He further situates himself above humankind, and alongside the Gods, by referring to himself in the third person. To refer to oneself in the third person, as Tamburlaine does throughout the two parts of the play, is standard of royal figures, and it effectively distances the speaking, performative body from the royal, figurative body. And, when that speaking, performative body is long gone from this world (of the stage), it is the figurative body that remains, as memory, as myth. Indeed, there is a permanency to language correlative to the idea of myth as atemporal and everlasting, as having a history. Myth is ideas in form;36 in the theatre, myth is ideas in character, especially because it is the character that remains through time, through the history of a play’s performance.

The creation of myth depends upon the idea of distance; a temporal distance must exist between one body and another for myth to be possible. The idea that distance—both figurative and literal—is essential to the creation of myth is borrowed from Jean-Pierre Vernant’s “The Reason of Myth.” In this essay, he contends that “ancient data ha[s] at least to be viewed from both a historical and a cultural distance” as a condition for the creation of myth.37 If this data is “too close” in any sense, then it seems “too natural,” or too familiar. Utilizing Vernant’s thoughts in this essay, I am suggesting that established myth is used in Tamburlaine to draw Tamburlaine himself closer to that past, and, therefore, away from the audience. The distance is temporal but conveyed in figurative terms. Aligning Tamburlaine with mythic pasts renders him mythic by making him seem

to us, and to those on stage, untimely. He exists in the present, but has tangible connections to the past. If in Part I, the mythic space of Tamburlaine is created via the creation of Tamburlaine as divine and via the conjectures of his mysterious origins, since myth, by definition, is motivated by a desire to create an account of origins unknown. In Part II, mythic space—of Tamburlaine, and of Tamburlaine—is created via narrative transmission, that is, through Tamburlaine’s education of his sons, who, in turn, create mythic memories of their father and his life. In death, Tamburlaine will exist as a collection of tales that depict his heroism and larger-than-life character. This collection becomes the epic history—the myth—of Tamburlaine. This is arguably the most important function of the sons in the play, to fashion and transmit the memory of Tamburlaine and, in turn, to continue Tamburlaine’s quest to conquer all the lands of the world. As myth, Tamburlaine is translated into the paramount model of martial behavior. As he says to one of his captives in Part II, his sons will “[r]ifle the kingdomes [he] shall leave unsackt” (II, 4.3.59). The map that Tamburlaine infamously calls for before his death is, in a way, Tamburlaine’s life memorialized as depicted geographic space:

Give me a Map, then let me see how much
Is left for me to conquer all the world,
That these my boies may finish all my wantes.

[One brings a Map.] (II, 5.3.123-125)

The boys are taught to study the map, to learn which lands are already their father’s, and which lands remain to be taken under his name. The map provides one narrative-less story of Tamburlaine’s life. As Donald Kimball Smith writes in The Cartographic Imagination, Tamburlaine “sees the map, not as a representation of the world, but as a
representation of his life.” The map has a futurity, in other words, that the mortal body simply cannot possess; again, the map is a memorial to Tamburlaine, and it contributes to the creation of mythic space in the play, in particular, because it is the body, the marker, situated in the future, which establishes the necessary distance for myth to emerge. Myth, in other words, emerges in the gap (in one form, as narrative history) that the distance produces between two temporally distinct bodies.

These spaces that encompass him and augment his power are also produced through his relationships with other bodies—from his close circle of friends, to his paramour Zenocrate, to the thousands of soldiers who fight for his cause. Tamburlaine understands his relationships with other bodies as signs of his power, and he utilizes these bodies as a part of his arsenal. He knows that his domain is, in part, measured by the number of bodies that serve under him, which is why he aims to gather as much support as possible. Even though Tamburlaine has no qualms about slaughtering hundreds of people at a time, he takes pains to persuade certain people, who seem impressive and “noble” to him, to make alliances with him; here, once again, we see how space is produced via this association, or connection. Thus, in the beginning of his quest to conquer the world, Tamburlaine places great value on the few friendships that he has with men who serve him loyally, even though he has yet to win a crown; these friends “help to weane [his] state, / Till men and kingdoms help to strengthen it” (I, 1.2.29-30). In Part I, there is strong emphasis placed on, and attention given to, Tamburlaine’s

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38 Donald Kimball Smith, *The Cartographic Imagination*, 134.
39 Here, we can invoke Nietzsche, who, in a passage in “What Is Noble,” writes: “a human being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and obstacle—or as a temporary resting place” (*Ecce Homo*, 412).
attempt to convert Theridamas to his side. He seeks Theridamas’s friendship because he perceives a greatness in him akin to his own. Upon first seeing Theridamas, Tamburlaine notes him to be “noble and milde,” and, from this, cursory, visual evaluation, then determines to win Theridamas’s friendship:

Forsake thy king and do but joine with me
And we will triumph over all the world….
If thou wilt stay with me, renowned man,
And lead thy thousand horse with my conduct….
Both we will raigne as Consuls of the earth….
May we become immortall like the Gods.
Joine with me now in this my meane estate,
(I cal it meane, because being yet obscure,
The Nations far remoov’d admyre me not)….
And sit with Tamburlaine in all his majestie. (I, 1.2.172-209)

Tamburlaine makes Theridamas an offer that he cannot refuse, and the latter tells Tamburlaine that he is “[w]on with thy words, and conquered with thy looks, / I yeeld my selfe, my men and horse to thee…” (I, 1.2.228-229). Tamburlaine’s promises of riches and immortal fame, in addition to Tamburlaine’s character, which Theridamas describes as “Natures pride, and richest furniture” (I, 1.2.156), win over Theridamas by what lucrative promises both portend. Tamburlaine’s physical presence exudes godliness; his words promise success. Theridamas does not doubt his decision for one moment, and the two men seal the friendship with a handshake, with Tamburlaine expressing his gratitude:

Theridamas my friend, take here my hand,
Which is as much as if I swore by heaven,
And call’d the Gods to witness of my vow,
Thus shall my heart be still combin’d with thine,
Untill our bodies turne to Elements:
And both our soules aspire to celestiall thrones. (I, 1.2.232-237)

The handshake, witnessed by Tamburlaine’s two closest advisors, Techelles and Usumcasane, not only marks a joining of their hands, but also a joining of their hearts. Their friendship, of course, is underscored by a lifestyle of martial ethics, primarily the ethic of loyalty (to Tamburlaine) and adherence to Tamburlaine’s objective of conquering the world. The physical act of the handshake in conjunction with the spoken vows form the complete action of this scene, and, therefore, an ethical moment in the play.

Theridamas’s joining with Tamburlaine not only increases the martial largess and power of his army, but, more significantly, it effectively turns Tamburlaine into a more authoritative martial power than he was without Theridamas. Prior to this union, Tamburlaine still smacked of Scythian rogue-ness. This union, symbolized by the handshake and vows, confers Theridamas’s strength and nobility onto Tamburlaine, who, as a result, becomes stronger and nobler because of this alliance—making it an ethical moment. The space of Tamburlaine’s body now not only includes his body, but it also encompasses the bodies of his friends, their horses, and their weapons, which make lend “substance” to Tamburlaine’s “mighty lines.” The space demanded of these two joined bodies—their union being that which predicates greater martial success for both of them—is larger than that which is required by one body. But the created space is more about pure, visual perception; it is about affective, sensate perception, as well. The space
created by their contract is one that radiates loyalty, strength, and unrelenting motivation. These qualities are felt perceptions—similar to the perceptions felt by Tamburlaine that bespoke Theridamas’s person. Thus, the spaces that are created in performance embody more than Tamburlaine’s total power, martial strength, or potential; they also impart the play’s ethics, as we’ll discuss more thoroughly towards the close of this chapter. The affectual spaces created in Tamburlaine establish a veritable plane—or, if you will, theater—of affects, which, in turn, constitute ethics.

In addition to his body and the bodies of his followers, Tamburlaine builds his empire via conquering ruling parties in battle and through the destruction of cities and towns across the African and Asian continents. The destruction of these places—i.e., localized spaces (usually affixed with proper nouns)—is essential to the creation of space that will function to signify the extent of Tamburlaine’s empire. The creation of space occurs in Tamburlaine via a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. This process is fundamentally one of creation through destruction, which echoes the tragic quality of Nietzsche’s concept of the “eternal return,” as I will later explain, and it also resonates with the concepts put forth by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and developed in What Is Philosophy? In this text, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between relative deterritorialization—or, put simply, reappropriation—which is transcendent in that it leads to reterritorialization, and absolute deterritorialization, in which the “earth passes into the pure plane of immanence.”40 In other words, a territory that is overtaken only to be reterritorialized again is an example of relative deterritorialization; relative deterritorialization has a correlative in the adage “same difference.” An absolute

deterritorialization, in contrast, is markedly different in that a territory is never reterritorialized again. Instead, an absolute deterritorialization produces immanence—no form or territory is (re)produced, rather, what exists is a network of forces, affects, and relations. Deleuze and Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, cite nomadic living as an example of absolute deterritorialization. In terms of the theatre, and in *Tamburlaine* in particular, one might fathom that Tamburlaine’s actions produce a kind of continual reterritorialization, especially through his acts of conquests. At the level of the material performance, even, actors are working with the “wood and grain,” the costumes, props, the basic materials, of the theater, such that all reterritorialization would by necessity be a reutilization of already-made materials. Each successive performance differs from the previous one—marking another type of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, if only by the fact that the performance differs by the composition of the audience, different from the last. The “thisness,” to invoke Raynor’s definition, of performance occurring at the level of bodily actions on stage, allow for a reading of performance as immanence—that is, as creating and existing within itself alone. Performance can be considered a deterritorialization in the sense that the spaces created within that performance—the physical, the verbal, the imagined, the grammatical—are immanent to that performance.

41 They explain, “only nomads have absolute movement…. [They] have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearances. If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary…” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. B. Massumi (1980; New York: Continuum Press, 1987), 421). In one regard, one might assert that Tamburlaine himself exhibits nomadic qualities in *Part I*, as he traverses all of Africa and Asia in the hope of becoming ruler of the world. Clearly, the difference between Tamburlaine and a nomad, as indicated by Deleuze and Guattari, is that Tamburlaine “deposits space” under and around him, as he conquers all the lands he passes through and destroys. Absolute deterritorialization, in this context, can never occur in an act of territorial conquest.
and exist within that performance alone. These spaces cannot be framed or reframed; they are imbued with a presentness, a “thisness” in Raynor’s terms, of the performance. At the level of the plot and also in regard to the concretized notion of a “scene,” the play continuously attempts to frame space. To frame a space is to make it a place; to frame it as art, or to frame it as a politic—Tamburlaine does both. His terrorization of the world holds an acquired artistry, and he aims to take these conquered places and recreate his own political empire from the rubble. Tamburlaine believes himself to be his own cartographer, who will “trace,” or create, his own set of regions that appear nowhere on the maps of those “blind Geographers” who “make a triple region of the world” (I, 4.4.75-76). Tamburlaine’s strategy is simple, yet sensible: in order to create his own domain, places already in existence must be destroyed, and Tamburlaine will continue to destroy and overtake control of places until some divine intervention forces him to stop or kills him: “I will with Engines, never exercised, / Conquer, sacke, and utterly consume / Your cities and your golden palaces… / And til by vision, or by speach I heare / Immortall Jove say, Cease my Tamburlaine, / I will persist a terror to the world” (II, 4.1.191-201).

The act of destruction in order to create something new not only produces space, it is also a fundamental component of Tamburlaine’s ethics. Tamburlaine is a poor shepherd; he has nothing, and he starts from nothing. To create himself into something—to become a stronger, more powerful person—he must utilize the materials, the bodies and spaces around him. He utilizes them, and incorporates these materials as his own, through destroying what already exists in order to create something from what has been destroyed; again, it is the process of reterritorialization—as “Tamburlaine’s Empire”—
through the act of deterritorialization. Every place shall be subject to his overtaking, from Persea to “th’Egyptian fields,” Tamburlaine protests, he will “whip down cities, and controwleth crownes” (II, 4.3.100). And, when he passes, he will leave his sons in charge, to “[r]ifle the kingdoms [he] shall leave unsackt” (II, 4.3.59). He will create his own glorious empire upon that which has been destroyed, as he tells Techelles, 42

The Euxine sea North to Natolia,

The Terrene west, the Caspian north north-east,

And on the south Senus Arabicus,

Shal al be loden with martiall spoiles

We will convoy with us to Persea.

Then shal my native city Samarcanda….

Be famous through the furthest continents,

For there my Pallace royal shal be plac’d:

Whose shying Turrets shal dismay the heavens,

And cast the fame of Ilions Tower to hell.

Thorow the streets with troops of conquered kings,

Ile ride in golden armour like the Sun….

Like to an almond tree ymounted hight,

Upon the lofty and celestiall mount,…

[Then] in my coach like Saturnes royal son,

Mounted his shining chariot, gilt with fire,

And drawn with princely Eagles through the path,

42 In Deleuzian terms, a form of “relative deterritorialization.”
Pav’d with bright Christall, and enchac’d with stares,
When all the Gods stand gazing at his pomp:
So will I ride through Samarcanda streets,
Until my soule disservered from this flesh,
Shall mount the milk-white way and meet him there. (II, 4.3.112-132)

Tamburlaine intends to use the martial spoils—including, of course, human bodies, which will function as footstools, chariot horses, and the like—43—from all the lands that he has conquered and create his own mythical domain, which will outshine even the famed towers of Ilium (another name for Troy). From these destroyed lands, Tamburlaine amasses the materials he desires in order to create his own kingdom, which will be based, we learned, in his native Samarcanda. Allusions to myth and the subsequent employment of mythical imagery abound, from the frequent comparisons to Jove (“Saturnes royal son”) to even Spenser’s contemporary adaptation of the chivalric tradition of King Arthur’s court in The Faerie Queene (particularly as evident in the imagery and syntax of the line “Like to an almond tree ymounted high,” which is an image that Spenser uses to describe the Red Crosse Knight’s helmet in the Book I). The effect, of course, through this kind of idealistic self-imagining, is that Tamburlaine produces himself as a god-like figure—then again, the image of him being mounted on a “shining chariot, gilt with fire, /
And drawn with princely Eagles” is vocalized the moment that he is riding in his own chariot, which is being pulled by the finely-dressed “pampered Jades of Asia.” The effect

43 Recall that it is in this scene, in Act Iv scene iii, that stage directions announce Tamburlaine’s entrance, in which he is “drawen in his chariot by Trebizon and Soria with bittes in their mouthes, reines in his left hand, in his right hand a whip, with which he scourgeth them….” While an example of Tamburlaine’s ruthlessness, the scene created for us verges on the kinky, I think, with Tamburlaine’s first words addressing his submissives, “Holla, ye pampered Jades of Asia” (1).
of this juxtaposition, in other words, is hyperbolic, as well as productive in its creation of multiple spaces—both stoic in its mythical associations and comical in its performance. That Marlowe is “synonymous with hyperbole,” according to Harold Bloom in The Anxiety of Influence, is a critical testament to the dominance of hyperbole in Marlowe’s plays.\(^\text{44}\) Hyperbole connotes exaggeration, excess, and it is one of Marlowe’s primary dramatic tools to both inscribe the performance as drama and to assist in the creation of these imagined, plural spaces. This scene is hyperbolic in its juxtaposition of Tamburlaine’s speech with his physical surround, of being pulled in a chariot by captured men—the camp nature of this scene is a product of hyperbole. The juxtaposition, furthermore, melds historical episodes into a temporal collage, such that this imagined place of “New Samarcanda” is deterroritalized into an ostentatious, and fabulously gaudy, ill-framed image. The landscape of this “New Samarcanda” is presented to us from Tamburlaine’s perspective, as he navigates the streets lined with “troops of conquered kings” in his chariot. Like Marlowe, Tamburlaine is fully invested in the show and the sense of showmanship necessary of the “Emperour of the three fold world.” Tamburlaine describes his dazzling accoutrements, in particular, his triple-plumed helmet fantastically “[s]pangled with diamonds dancing in the air.” The space of the streets of Samarcanda then become translated into heavenly paths “[p]av’d with bright Christall, and enchac’d with starres.” The movement, once again, consists of a dual forward and

\(^{44}\) Harold Bloom in The Anxiety of Influence, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, xxxii). Even David Riggs comments upon Tamburlaine’ penchant for hyperbole: it is “the trope that best conveys the cosmological reach of figurative language. On the horizontal axis, [Tamburlaine’s] hyperboles measure the geographical extent of his empire; on the vertical, they provide access to an upper region of deities, planets, and astral forces” (in The World of Christopher Marlowe (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 209.)
upward thrust. Tamburlaine uses the materials of the past to create future-oriented, imaginative spaces; this is how Tamburlaine’s destructiveness is ultimately creative.

Tamburlaine’s decision to destroy the town of Larissa also speaks to this ethic of destruction and, correlative, reterritorialization. Upon the death of his beloved Zenocrate, Tamburlaine vows to decimate the town in which she died, Larissa, which he promises will be “consume[d] with fire, / Because this place bereft [him of his] Love” (II, 2.4.137-138). Tamburlaine and Zenocrate were unified in marriage; she became a part of him, his signified body. His anger, therefore, is a form of mourning in order to cope with her passing, but it is also a form of mourning to cope with the death of part of himself. He must eradicate this death from his life, so destroying Larissa, which Tamburlaine attributes with causing Zenocrate’s death, is a part of the process of renewal, of becoming something else, something stronger and more resilient. Burning down Larissa purifies the space of the impurities that caused Zenocrate’s illness and death. Tamburlaine then decides to erect a monument to commemorate his wife, as a material signifier to represent his effort to build something upon that which has been destroyed. The scene unfolds with a set of stage directions: “[Enter] Tamburliane with Usumcasane, and his three sons, … foure bearing the hearse of Zenocrate, and the drums sounding a dolefull martch, the Towne burning” (II, 3.2). The scene opens ominously, with the doleful march situated in contrast with its burning landscape; the quickness of the flames, in juxtaposition to the subdued feeling cast by the mourning party. Tamburlaine initiates the scene with a declarative speech to “burne the turrets of this cursed towne,”

Flame to the highest region of the aire:

And kindle heaps of exhalations,
That being fiery meteors, may presage,
Death and destruction to th’inhabitants….
Flieng Dragons, lightening, fearefull thunderclaps,
Sindge these fair plaines, and make them seeme as black
As is the Island where the Furies maske,
Compast with Lethe, Styx, and Phlegeton,
Because my deare Zenocrate is dead. (II.iii.ii.1-17)

Tamburlaine wants to decimate the entirety of Larissa, from the turrets to the highest region of the air, from the plains to the people. Larissa is to be made black, perhaps even a type of blackness associated with a space that is palpable but, at the same time, eerily empty; it is transformed into a space of blackness associated with the ashen remains of something burnt into nondescript cinders. The remainder of what was, and of what previously had its own definitive space, has been transmuted into something new, with its unique affective space imbuing it with qualities associated with being the abject remainder. Tamburlaine wants the body of land, of Larissa, to be dead; thus he figures it as the land of the dead, encompassed by the rivers Lethe, Styx, and Phlegeton. These three rivers—the River of Forgetfulness, the River of Hate, and the River of Fire, respectively—frame, or provide the form, of Larissa, now an island of death. In its destruction, Tamburlaine makes Larissa in order to destroy it and, in turn, render it as a kind of mythological space. However, he is not finished with this town, and, after it is destroyed, makes it into a memorial site for Zenocrate. The mourning party erects a pillar, which reads “[t]his towne being burnt by Tamburlaine the great, / Forbids the world to build it up againe,” accompanied by a “mournful streamer” (II, 3.2.17-18). The
pillar’s inscription makes Larissa’s destruction permanent through writing. The fact that
the symbol of renewal is phallic only works to magnify Tamburlaine’s power. Next to
the pillar lies a table, upon which Tamburlaine places a picture of Zenocrate:

To shew her beautie, which the world admyr’d

Sweet picture of divine Zenocrate,

That hanging here, wil draw the Gods from heaven:

And cause the stars fixt in the Sourthern arke…

As Pilgrimes traveile to our Hemi-sphere,

Only to gaze upon Zenocrate….

Boyes leave to mourne, this towne shall ever mourne,

Being burnt to cinders for your mothers death. (II, 3.2.26-46)

Larissa has been transformed into a space that has been reduced to “cinders,” to a vacant
nothingness adorned only by a monument to Zenocrate. Tamburlaine's desire to
commemorate Zenocrate's life and death is effected through the creation of space: the
monument not only makes Zenocrate's absence “present,” but, more significantly, to
make material, or perceptible, the intangible emotions felt by Tamburlaine and his sons
because of her death. Emotions comprise a space of their own, but that space is
imperceptible because emotions are immaterial. Zenocrate’s monument materializes
these emotions—the affects felt by her death--in a recognizable space, and, therefore
becomes the “place” of Zenocrate’s monument—a place that “pilgrims” can literally
travel to. Imagine a space created through this kind of destruction, of which only remain
cinders, and in the middle of this barren space lies a table single with a picture of “divine
Zenocrate” upon it. Instead of a vibrant, populated town, Larissa has become a haunting
space of former abundance, and the face representing this blackness, this desolation, is Zenocrate, whom all, including the Gods, will gaze upon. Tamburlaine not only creates this space, but also transforms the space, or body, of Zenocrate into a terrifying figure. Her picture bespeaks the town of Larissa, now “burnt to cinders,” and her corpse, Tamburlaine attests, will travel with him in order to instill terror in the enemy. Her corpse will be like Bellona, the goddess of war, and her intimidating looks will be like “naked swords and sulphur bals of fire” (II, 3.2.41) that will devastate his opponents. Tamburlaine’s words refigure this scene of mourning into a scene of annihilation—a perfect transition, in Tamburlaine’s mind, to begin to teach his sons about “the rudiments of war” (II, 3.2.54).

Tamburlaine harnesses spaces by making them into functional parts of his life. Every conquered and decimated land is reconstructed into spaces of potential action and use. Tamburlaine’s actions—verbal and physical—produce these spaces to advance and promote his self as world conqueror and scourge of God. We could claim that the spaces created are done so from a perspective akin to the Nietzschean concept of amor fati, which is, arguably, the central tenet of Nietzsche’s ethics, as I discussed in Chapter 1. The ethic of amor fati is defined as affirming everything that one encounters in life, and is cultivated through sensational acts of violence. It is understanding destruction as a form of creation, and, I believe, it is a positive, or productive, understanding of destruction that coincides with Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of territorialization and deterritorialization. Nietzsche’s distinct understanding of tragedy is epitomized by amor fati; I believe Marlowe, as I discussed in the previous chapters, shares this understanding of the genre. Larissa is made into a space of terror, as Tamburlaine's wrath is ensconced
in the town's destruction and ashen remainder; in the ash, death pulsates, permeates the air, and visitors, Tamburlaine intimates, will feel the threat of death upon entering Larissa, feeling its environs, and seeing Zenocrate’s monument. In addition, Larissa’s transformation functions as an operative moment for Tamburlaine to introduce his sons to the “rudiments of war.” For Tamburlaine, it is imperative to his objectives of earthly crowns and world domination to make space into something useful for his advantage. Threats to his body, he determines, must be eradicated; thus, with this understanding of Tamburlaine’s character, it comes as no surprise that he kills his son, Calyphas, who has “wounded [his father] with shame” by refusing to partake in battle (II, 4.1.94). Calyphas is cowardly and effeminate, Tamburlaine protests, and he is the “image of sloth, and picture of a slave / The obloquie and skorne of [his] renown…” (II, 4.1.91-92). Tamburlaine declares that he seeks martial justice against his son, and grabbing a hold of Calyphas, he shouts to the Gods,

Here Jove, receive his fainting soule againe,
A Forme not meet to give that subject essence,
Whose matter is the flesh of Tamburlain,
Wherein an incorporeall spirit mooves,
Made of the mould whereof thy selfe consists,
Which makes me valiant, proud, ambitious,
Ready to levie power against thy throne,
That I might moove the turning Spheares of heaven,
For earth and al this aery region
Cannot containe the state of Tamburlaine
He curses Mahomet for sending him such a weak soul and vows that everyone, even those who “will not see the strength of Tamburlaine, / ....shal feele the strength of Tamburlain” (II, 4.1.133-135). Everyone will feel this renewed, stronger, more wrathful Tamburlaine; he will be felt in the spaces that he constructs around him, which surrounds them. As he reiterates, as the “Scourge of God and terrour of the world, / [He] must apply [himself] to fit those tearmes, / In war, in blood, in death, in crueltie” (II, 4.1.153-156).

To fit those terms, he must create those spaces, the ones filled with death and destruction, even if it means the death of his own blood. Tamburlaine affirms this murder as a necessity in order to create himself a stronger, more powerful, individual. He kills Calyphas in front of his enemies, so that they can witness his cruelty and grow more fearful of him. His allies, his tributary kings and his sons, who also witness the murder, say nothing of the act: the space of the tragic has been established on stage. There is no point in lingering on what has passed; there is no point in mourning forever. Everything that has happened must be understood as necessary in order for it to be accepted—this idea resonates with Nietzsche’s concepts of amor fati and the eternal return. As Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo, amor fati is “the loving acceptance of all that one experiences, whereby one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it.”

Deleuze regards Nietzsche’s eternal return as a supreme ethical principle: “whatever you

45 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 714.
will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.”\textsuperscript{46} The necessity of this affirmation is deemed tragic, for Nietzsche; affirmation of all that one has encountered throughout one’s life also necessitates that one live fearlessly. This is the ethic in particular that Tamburlaine teaches his children in self-mutilation scene in \textit{Part II}, in which Tamburlaine cuts his arm to prove that the potential of incurring a flesh wound need not affect one’s ambition. In this scene, Tamburlaine specifically addresses Calyphas’s observation about the dangers of war, to which Tamburlaine replies,

\begin{quote}
Villian, art thou the sonne of Tamburlaine,
And fear’st to die, or with a Curtle-axe
To hew thy flesh and make a gaping wound?...
View me thy father that hath conquered kings….
And see him lance his flesh to teach you all. \textit{He cuts his arme.} \\
A wound is nothing be it nere so deepe….
Now look I like a souldier, and this wound….
Come boyes and with your fingers search my wound,
And in my blood wash all your hands at once,
While I sit smiling to behold the sight.
Now my boyes, what think you of a wound? (II, 3.2.95-129)
\end{quote}

Tamburlaine’s two brave boys, Celebinus and Amyras, both beg for “brave” wounds like their father’s, while Calyphas—who seems oblivious to this teachable moment—calls the wound a “pityfull sight.” (Unfortunately for Calyphas, a dunce cap is not an option in Tamburlaine’s pedagogical bag of corrective teaching moments—is it any surprise that

Tamburlaine cuts off this weak attachment from his official body?) When inflicted, the wound may feel painful in that moment, but the pain is fleeting, and that fleetingness, for Tamburlaine, connotes the ability for one to transcend the pain and to accept the wound as “a grace and majesty.” For Tamburlaine, wounds should not be feared, but learned from and accepted as signs of valor, as “the God of Wars rich livery.” He tells his sons to “search [his] wound” as a method to distill any fear of it; one can overcome her fear of something by knowing it, which is precisely Tamburlaine’s method in this scene. Tamburlaine wounds himself to affirm how wounds can be translated into signs of power and honor. The wound is affirmed through its self-infliction.

At the end of Part II, Tamburlaine’s acceptance of his death a necessary one, even one deemed necessary by the gods, contributes to the tragic element of this play. Tamburlaine’s acceptance of his death, C. L. Barber explains, as something that simply “result[s from] the exhaustion of his natural vital powers as he looks beyond it for further similar conquests by his sons,” exemplifies the type of tragedy that we know as Marlovian. A Marlovian play is not tragic because the protagonist succumbs to his fatal flaw, neither is it tragic because it exalts a type of humanist, moral opprobrium that is intended to "teach (and delight)" audiences. A Marlovian play is tragic because it celebrates death, destruction, and human expiration (“of vital powers”) as components of life. Marlovian tragedy is thus profoundly Nietzschean in this affirmation of every aspect of life—even death. Here, Nietzsche’s thoughts on tragedy, from *Twilight of the Idols*, affirm this association of Marlowe’s plays with his definition of the tragic:

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Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and most painful episodes, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustible vitality even as it witnesses the destruction of its greatest heroes—that is what I call Dionysian, that is what I guessed to be the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to be liberated from terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its vehement discharge—which is how Aristotle understood tragedy—but in order to celebrate oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity—that tragic joy included even in joy in destruction.  

Tamburlaine’s ethics is undoubtedly tragic, in the Nietzschean sense. He continually affirms life through destruction—his continual reterritorialization; he affirms life by celebrating and even creating terror; he loves danger, which resonates with his martial mentality. Indeed, Tamburlaine harnesses power from acts of destruction, reterritorialization, and terror. His ethics—of self-fulfillment and empowerment through acts of destruction, martiality, and from, as we’ve seen, forging relationships with other noble figures—exhibits types of affirmation, and it is this affirmation that is tragic because, for Nietzsche, as for Deleuze, “the tragic = the joyful. This is another way of putting the great equation: to will = to create…. [T]he tragic is pure and multiple positivity, dynamic gaiety…. Tamburlaine laughs in the face of the gods as he

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48 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 49 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 36. Deleuze continues, “Affirmation is tragic because it affirms chance and the necessity of chance.” Tamburlaine, falls ill—some would claim, not too coincidentally—after burning the mound of Qurans, but he never voices any regrets about his actions, even as he sits himself in his coffin at the end of the play.
destroys towns, burns villages and mounds of biblical texts. He is the face of Nietzschean tragedy.

From the example of Tamburlaine, I am arguing that the essential component of
Marlowe’s tragedies that define them as tragic, are signified in the ethics imparted in the plays. Those ethics are constructed by actions, which, in turn, create spaces. The spaces created both echo and undergird the ethics created on stage—here, the ethic is affirmation, affirmation in destruction, and this form of affirmation is tragic. What Tamburlaine shows us is that ethics must be spatialized, made spatial or readable, in bodies—in living bodies, in lands, in objects, in maps—in order to become real. Ethics, in this sense, function as the measure of one’s action, of how much living is done, throughout his life. Space is a necessity in order for the force of a movement, physical or verbal, to be harnessed as potential for future action.
Edward II and the Place of Politics in a Marlovian Ethics

Does a Marlovian Ethics need or require a politics (to give it veritas, integrity, and significance)?

Marlovian Ethics as I have articulated it thus far has been devoid of a discussion of politics, which is not to suggest that impressions of the political are nonexistent in the plays, or the ethics. Instead, the focus thus far has been on describing and analyzing the essential elements of an ethics—time/duration and space. An additional layer of my argument has been that a Marlovian Ethics sits contrapuntally to the accepted humanist ethics of 16th century England, primarily because a Marlovian Ethics is an exaltation of the self and is directed to how the self can become progressively better throughout its life. Marlowe’s protagonists are characteristically selfish, driven by their self-interests and self-aggrandizement. They are not civic-minded, neither do they abide the tenet of classical philosophy that calls for political engagement in the spirit of improving one’s community (vita activa). This, however, does not mean that Marlowe’s plays lack a politics (as the many references and allusions to Machiavelli make clear); rather, the philosophy of Marlowe’s plays promotes a politics that draws upon, but ultimately diverges from, the traditional, humanist political practices of Elizabethan England.

Historically, the philosophical study of ethics is attributed a greater significance when it is regarded as a condition of politics. The purpose of an ethics is to discover the greatest ways of living in order to create the happiest life possible for that individual. That an ethics is established via interactions between bodies implies the larger question of politics—the taking account of multiple bodies instead of a singular body. In The Promise of Politics, Hannah Arendt frames the reason for politics as an unavoidable result of “human plurality”: “man is apolitical. Politics
arises *between men*, and so is quite *outside of man.*”¹ The injunction to a politics is one grounded in moral concern for the general good of men; “politics,” Arendt succinctly states, “is based on the fact of human plurality.”² An ethics does not need a politics, neither does it necessarily include or require one. An ethics is of the individual *body*, produced via bodily interactions. A politics is specifically a *human*—and humanist—enterprise because is concerns *mankind* and the interactions between *men*. The creation of a politics acknowledges that man is not singular; “human plurality” is a fact. The strong correlation between the two branches of philosophy results from an epistemological move, from thinking about the individual body on the micro level outwards, to thinking on a broader scale about “human plurality.”

In classical philosophy—from Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero, onward—ethics was imagined as counterpart to politics, thereby relegating ethics to a secondary branch of philosophy, as that which serves as building block to the formulation of a politics. A city, or *polis*, is comprised of people, or citizens, and, the virtuousness and nobility of the city depended on the same from each independent citizen. Aristotle explicitly positioned his *Nicomachean Ethics* as a precursor to his *Politics*, so that one practical science—the study of how man can achieve a type of virtuous happiness—is applied to the other, because the “greater good” of, or application of, an ethics is politics. It is a logic found in the structure of Plato’s *Republic*, which poses the general question, “is it better to be just than unjust,” and offers, through dialogue, responses that address the question on both the level of the individual (ethics) and the level of the polis (politics).³ In his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle elucidates this connection as early as the second chapter of the

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² Ibid., 93.
first book: “For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state
seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve it;
though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to
attain it for a nation or for city-states.”

The moral endgame—striving for the “greater good”—of his study on man is political science.
Cicero, whose works also had a significant influence on English Renaissance Humanism, touted the “common interests” as one of the fundamental
principles of justice in his De Officiis. Invoking Plato, he observes, “we are not born for
ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being…; in this direction we ought to
follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of
kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement
society more closely together, man to man.”

Men, in turn, who are occupied solely with their own affairs, are deemed “traitors to social life.”
Man, in short, has a moral obligation to think of the greater good; he has a moral investment, therefore, in politics.

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5 David Harris Sacks, in his discussion on political culture during the English Renaissance,
writes, “Since this ‘highest good’ incorporates the full range of activities necessary for human
flourishing, not just those connected to government, politics in the Aristotelian ‘state’ necessarily
encompasses the entire realm of social relations, and every morally valuable activity is
‘political,’ subject to ‘political’ judgment (“Political Culture,” in *A Companion to Shakespeare*,
Similarly, in *On Moral Ends*, he champions the good of collective man over the individual; a
classical form of utilitarianism: “Each of us is part of the universe. It follows naturally from this
that we value the common good more than our own. Laws value the welfare of all above the
welfare of individuals. In the same way one who is good and wise, law-abiding and mindful of
civic duty, considers the good of all more than that of any particular person including oneself”
7 Ibid., 29.
These classical, moral philosophies, both ethical and political, were revived in 16th-century England, most notably in treatises like More’s satirical *Utopia* (1516) and Hooker’s Anglican-inspired *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593) and in conduct-books such as Castiglione’s *Book of the Courtier* (1528; translated into English by Thomas Hoby in 1561). Regardless of form or genre, the objective of these works was the ethical cultivation of the civic-minded individual; the idea of politics was incorporated into ethical instruction. By the late 1590s, this form of humanism, which was a blend of Aristotle, Cicero, and NeoPlatonism, was challenged by a new form of humanism influenced by skeptical thought made available in Montaigne’s *Essais* as well as by Machavelli’s *Prince* and his *Discourses*. Martin Pzelzainis, in a study of political thought in late 16th century England, observes that this new form of humanism emerged as a result of England’s political turmoils of the 1580s and 1590s. In light of the nation’s numerous crises, he explains, people found this form of humanism appealing because “it encouraged an attitude of detachment from the world and constancy in the face of trials.” From the perspective of skeptical thought, this was an ethics of the self that advocated a conservative and limited involvement in politics—a sensible approach that might have saved Marlowe’s life if he abstained from politics and a part-time career in espionage. Both the ethics and politics advanced in Machiavelli’s writings also resonate with these ideas: man is inherently anarchic and

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8 Simon Shepherd’s *Marlowe and the Politics of Elizabethan Theatre* includes a thorough discussion of the political climate of the late 16th century in which Marlowe scribed his plays. Specifically, he places a discussion of extant trends in humanist, moral philosophy—of “placing country first, of how the virtuous individual “is at one with the state’s interest” (84)—in juxtaposition with the later, Machiavellian-inspired form of humanism, which advanced an ethics that did not cohere with the political theory of situating the country before the self. He writes, “Machiavelli defined the human will as anarchic and anti-social…. [I]ndividuals fight to preserve or advance themselves in a world that is always competitive” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986, 86). The role of government in the Machiavellian world was to limit chaos a posteriori rather than being a product of man’s social or moral tendencies.

anti-social, therefore he concentrates all his effort on self-care and self-improvement. This form of humanism, clearly a more secularized humanism than that of the Ciceronian or NeoPlatonic tradition, is one that Marlowe leverages in his plays against traditional mores. Marlowe perceived similarities, I believe, between this new humanism and Hellenistic philosophy, particularly Epicureanism, but also Stoicism, as both schools advocated a self-directed ethics. In regard to politics, Epicurus encouraged a complete detachment from political life; instead, man should surround himself with a community of friends. This combination of the more contemporary, anti-naturalist politics of Machiavelli and Montaigne along with the Epicurean school of Hellenistic philosophy provides Marlowe his very own eccentric, iconoclastic politics performed in his plays. Marlowe’s politics, furthermore, correlate with his ethics in that both have a strong foundation in materialism. This materialism is, I think, quite explicit in the gritty materialism of Machiavelli’s politics, but also in Epicurus’s, whose materialism was interpreted by his follower Lucretius in the poem *On the Nature of Things*, analyzed in Chapter 2. Graham Hammill, in “Time for Marlowe,” also describes the materialist qualities of Marlowe’s politics in

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10 The type of “care of the self” that is performed in Marlowe’s plays, I believe, is more Foucauldian than Epicurean, if by Foucauldian we understand this ethics as more selfish—as more invested in excess and pleasure—in the modern sense rather than the “care of the self” that was exercised by the Stoics of classical antiquity. In the classical sense, this ethic esteemed moderation and temperance, according to Pierre Hadot in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*. I agree with the distinction Hadot makes between Foucault’s care of the self and that same ethic of the Hellenistic philosophers; however, I strongly disagree with the moral hierarchy he establishes between Foucault’s “dandyish” interpretation of the “care of the self,” and the more “noble” version advanced by the Stoics, whereby the ethic of the care of the self was cultivated with an eye towards justice. (See Hadot’s chapter “Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Cultivation of the Self,’” in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, ed. A. Davidson (Malden, M.A.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1995), 206-216.)

11 In his introduction to Hellenistic philosophy, R. W. Sharples explains that “Epicurus’ original conception [was] withdraw from public life to live with a community of Epicurean friends, as Epicurus himself did in the Garden.” To be with like-minded friends provides one with security and pleasure (*Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 118). The similarity between Epicurus and Edward II is evident—both desire a pastoral life outside of politics but still amongst the company of friends.
an analysis of *Tamburlaine* and *The Massacre at Paris*, but one which, I think, holds true for all Marlowe’s plays: “Marlowe grounds politics in radical metaphysics, unfolding a deeply materialist understanding of sovereignty.”¹² This chapter will, in one aspect, examine the “materialist understanding of sovereignty” as embodied by Edward II. What I think Hammill’s observation indicates is that materialism figures strongly in both Marlowe’s ethics and his *politics*, and, furthermore, that Marlowe’s political materialism can be ascribed to the philosophies, from Epicurus to Machiavelli, that he utilizes in his plays.

Marlovian scholars have gone to great lengths to emphasize how political Marlowe is; Emily Bartels’s has called this politicization a part of “the Marlowe effect,” which she defines as “the unrelenting insistence that [Marlowe’s] texts are dynamically political and that they continually make history by challenging, exposing, and unmaking us.”¹³ This injunction to politicize is intended to add (academic) integrity and gravitas to both Marlowe’s plays and to Marlovian studies, and, perhaps to academia in general. I think Marlowe himself addresses the question of politics in relation to ethics most explicitly in *Edward II*. In this play, Marlowe posits a politics that coheres with the type of materialist, self-directed ethics he promotes in his plays. The relation of Marlovian ethics to Marlovian politics differs from the traditional relation of ethics to politics in that the care of the self is not displaced for the care of others. Specifically, the traditional relation, originating from the empathic, shared “human condition,” esteems the welfare of the collective over the individual. This utilitarian idea does not undergird the relation between a Marlovian ethics and politics—instead, this relation centers on the wellbeing of the individual. A Marlovian politics, then, involves many bodies, but it does not necessarily value all

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bodies equally. Through a dramatization of historical record, Marlowe makes politics the thematic force of the play. His staging of the concept of the king’s two bodies, as it is performed by King Edward, and appropriated by others, literalizes both the time and space of the political. Through a reading of *Edward II* and a dissection of the concept the king’s two bodies, I will examine and define the type of politics that Marlowe presents alongside his ethics. In fact, the type of politics that Marlowe advances through the actions (ethics) of his protagonist, Edward II, emerges as a radical response to the politics performed by Edward’s opposing factions: a traditional, humanist politics, not so genuinely championed by the nobles, and a more devious Machiavellian politics embodied by Mortimer, and, arguably, Edward’s Queen Isabella.

The divinely-inspired political concept of the king’s two bodies was well-known by the time Marlowe wrote *Edward II*.14 The idea of the king’s two bodies was developed and concretized most notably in the series of court proceedings and transcripts printed in Edmund Plowden’s *Commentaries or Reports* (ca. 1571). The king’s two bodies are termed the “Body natural” and the “Body politic”:

> For the King has in him two Bodies, *viz.*, a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident, to the Imbecility of Infancy or old Age, and to the like Defects that happen to the natural Bodies of other People. But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People and the Management of the public weal, and this Body is utterly void of Infancy, and old Age, and

14 *Edward II* was entered into the Stationers’ Register on 6 July 1593 and available in quarto in 1594.
other natural Defects and Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to, and for this Cause, what the King does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability in his natural Body.\textsuperscript{15}

The Body natural is material and mortal, while the Body politic is immaterial and immortal. The Body natural is “subject to Passions and Death as other Men are,” but “Body the King never dies.”\textsuperscript{16} While the two are incorporate into one body, the Body politic cannot be affected (“invalidated or frustrated”) by the Body natural. In the transcript of the court proceeding for \textit{Willion v. Berkley} (1561), Justice Harper elaborates the relationship between the two bodies:

\begin{quotation}
[T]he Body politic includes the Body natural, but the Body natural is the lesser, and with this the Body politic is consolidated. So that he has a Body natural, adorned and invested with the Estate and Dignity royal; and he has not a Body natural distinct and divided from the Office and Dignity royal, but a Body natural and a Body politic together indivisible; and these two Bodies are incorporated in one Person, and make one Body and not divers, that is the Body corporate in the Body natural, \textit{et e contra} the Body natural in the Body corporate.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quotation}

The two bodies, Justice Harper claims, become one and are “indivisible,” but, it seems, at the same time, the Body politic is greater, more powerful, than the Body natural, which is considered

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Plowden, 233a, cited in Kantorowicz, 13. Albert Rolls, in \textit{The Theory of the King’s Two Bodies in the Age of Shakespeare}, elaborates “[t]he status of the body politic as an unchanging immortal entity free from old age, imbecility, or any other conceivable imperfection obliges the court to accept that the king, when he functions in his capacity as King, always acts correctly despite any imperfection debilitating his natural body” (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellon Press Ltd, 2000), 58).
\item[17] Plowden, 213, cited in Kantorowicz, 9.
\end{footnotes}
“the lesser.” The term, “Body politic,” designates the collective entity of all English people—of the king and the commons. The definition also implies that the concept encompasses more than just the people, but the lands, the institutions, and the cultural discourses that are created by, support, and sustain the people. The Body politic is, in a sense, the life force of the nation, it infuses all subjects, and its essence is infinite; hence, Sir John Fortescue, in his tractate on *The Governance of England*, maintains that the king has a “character angelicus”: “The body politic of kingship appears as a likeness of the ‘holy sprites and angels,’ because it represents, like the angels, the Immutable within Time.” The Body politic is further distinguished from the Body natural in that it is immortal, and not subject to the mortal constraints of time; thus, when the Body natural dies, the Body politic transfers—apparently, seamlessly, because, as it is conceptual, it is impersonal—to “another Body natural.” What this atemporality of the Body politic suggests is that, while transferrable and therefore conceptually fluid in form, the actual content of the concept must remain unchangeable by definition, and not necessarily by content, in order for the Body politic to be able to move freely between bodies. The mobility of the concept from one figure to the next is why Gregory Bredbeck identifies the Body politic as a metaphor “that conveniently mutated according to the exigencies of the present moment.” The concept is a vehicle, and, as such, has a fluidity and which bodies can assume as a role (to play). “The theory of two bodies,” he concludes, “was hardly a theory but was, rather, a regulator that could conveniently shift the terms of a debate almost instantaneously.” The movement indicative of metaphor, and, therefore, of the Body politic, in regard to the ability for it and all of

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18 Cited in Kantorowicz, 8.
19 Plowden, 233a, in Kantorowicz, 13.
21 Ibid., 133.
its power to be possessed or appropriated, we will see, is what makes it so dangerous throughout the play.

The Body politic as a metaphoric body is similar to the Deleuzian understanding of the body in performance that I have presented thus far, especially in light of my discussion of Tamburlaine in the previous chapter: the body is a composite of movements and affects. The mobility—precisely, its ability to transfer—of the Body politic, however, is the only similarity that this body has with the Deleuzian body because the Body politic is first and foremost a conceptual body, denuded of affect. The Deleuzian body differs from the Body politic precisely by the fact that a Deleuzian body is one that lives in duration, while the Body politic is eternal, atemporal and atelic, and without duration—to propose that a body lives outside of duration implies that that body is not subjected to the affective potentiality that imbues time. It is to suggest, in other words, that the Body politic cannot be affected by the force of time nor by other bodies that it encounters within that duration. The Deleuzian body is affected by time because it is a product of time—to recall Bergson’s “we live in time, time does not live in us.” The Body politic is dispossessed of this sense of temporality; while it lives throughout time, it exists as a fixed concept that is performed as a role by another body. The pronounced rigidity and eternality of the Body politic is inherently problematic, as Bredbeck discusses in the aforementioned essay, and as Marlowe makes evident in Edward II’s performance of the role in the play. Marlowe comprehends that the idea of the Body politic is simply that—a fiction. The playwright takes advantage of its fictional status by transposing the concept into the theater, as a role to be played by an actor. Even though a theatrical counterfeit of its politico-theological counterpart, Marlowe’s Body politic attempts to demystify its “real world” counterpart by emphasizing the concept’s very real, material qualities. Through Edward II’s performance, Marlowe seems to ask,
how can the Body politic be lived? How can the Body politic be performed? Is it possible to live two bodies, two durations, at once? Marlowe, I think, answers these questions through the network of relations exhibited on stage between Edward, the nobles, his minions, his wife, and the invisible “commons” that function to prop the nobles’ opposition, as well as another offstage presence, Edward’s dead father, the former king, Edward I. Via the play-acting world and through praxis, in other words, Marlowe is able contemplate theoretical, metaphysical questions.

The Body politic, furthermore, is a role that is inherited—and not necessarily assumed willingly, as is evident in the case of Edward II—by another, mortal body. The Body politic as a role, divinely ordained or otherwise, allows for the ideation of the Body politic as role play, or role playing on the Elizabethan stage. Marlowe was the first playwright to portray this correlation between the political stage and the theatrical stage. What he inevitably shows, through Edward’s performance, is that the Body politic is a role played by a character—an actor playing a role—on stage. At times, when Edward appropriates sovereign power, his performance seems a character-within-character, a role-within-role. Edward’s drama showcases a body that is more Deleuzian in form than dualistic: Edward’s body is delimited by its affective relations with other bodies on stage, from his wife, Isabel, to his lover, Gaveston; from the nobles to the commons. Deleuze’s definition of the body, one that is heavily inspired by the work of Spinoza, is one that understands the materiality of the body as dynamic and affective:

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\text{a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is}
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capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds.\textsuperscript{22}

Deleuze’s definition is one that pertains directly to the internal workings of a body; a combination of movements and speeds that are descriptive of the qualitative components of the body, but components which nonetheless consist of, I believe, a type of materiality that is indicative of the material space of that body, which suggests that body’s shape. In this regard, I am appropriating Deleuze’s definition of a body and applying it to the network of relations amongst theatrical bodies; the relation between Deleuze’s definition and my application is fractal. The congruity I am establishing is between a Deleuzian body and a Marlovian body, which is anachronistically Deleuzian, but which pertains to \textit{external}, rather than \textit{internal}, movements and speeds. Those movements and speeds occur between bodies onstage, visible in the physical and verbal exchanges between characters in the performance. In the theatre, a body gains definition—a protean definition, one that does not concretize but allows for continual change—via its level of engagement (how close, how long, etc.) with other bodies external to it. Affects, produced by these interactions between bodies, are interpreted and rationalized by the mind in order for a person to comprehend, qualify, and evaluate a specific interaction. Knowledge is produced through the comprehension of the body’s affective responses. An interaction is qualitatively positive if it has positive effects on a person’s wellbeing; to recall an example from Chapter 3, Tamburlaine benefited from and was made stronger by Theridamas’s nobility and expertise in the battlefield. The ethics of that body, which is produced by the actions between bodies and is made readable (to those participating in and watching the action) in the

spaces created by these actions, reiterates that its creation requires a plurality of bodies. Thus, while Marlowe’s protagonists generally disdain the company of their fellow men, they do make strategic alliances when it behooves them and further enhances their wellbeing. That ethics is established via connections between and among bodies is evident in the form of action-packed, linguistically hyperbolic performance that characterizes Marlowe’s plays, even though Marlowe emphasizes the self-satisfying, self-directed ethics of the individual protagonists.

Throughout the entire play, Marlowe repeatedly problematizes the presumed immateriality and the ontological stability of the concept of the king’s two bodies through performative moments in which the power and authority of the Body politic manifests variously, as a handful of characters appropriate the voice of the king in order to control, and reign in, Edward, which is, in large part, responsible for the aforementioned confusion that Edward imparts about being king. The nobles’ invocation of the former king, Edward I, is a strategy taken to curtail Edward II’s decision to repeal Gaveston. That is, in an act of apostrophe, they throw their voices, and their will, onto the dead king and assert that this will is shared between them and Edward I. The concept of the Body politic becomes multifarious in performance: as a concept, it is defined by its mobility, its ability to take flight, in the Deleuzian sense, which correlates with Bredbeck’s reading of the concept as metaphor. In addition, the Body politic is a theatrical role that is performed by a character. As Shakespeare demonstrated so well in his history plays, especially Richard II, it is not necessarily the one who is called king who best portrays the performative signs of sovereign power and of the Body politic. Bolingbroke embodied a nobility and a kingliness that Richard II did not possess, which effectively persuaded both the nobles and the audience that he should become king. David Scott Kastan discusses this transference of and appropriation of sovereignty in Shakespeare After Theory when he notes that
“true royalty is not always self-evident” on the stage. Performance, he writes, and, in particular, the history plays, “expose the idealization of political power by presenting rule as role, by revealing that power passes to him who can best control and manipulate the visual and verbal symbols of authority.” These visual and verbal symbols of authority, are what I would term, in the context of this study, the spaces created through the performance of the Body politic. But, as Kastan suggests, these spaces can be created by any body who is capable of performing kingliness, thus, he concludes, it is ultimately the audience that is the “source of authority in its willingness to credit and approve the representation of rule.” This point is significant because it proves that the Body politic in performance, and, Kastan intimates, outside of performance (the theater of politics/the politics of theater), is validated and qualified by the performance itself—because performance, by definition, occurs before an audience, a plurality of bodies. The correlation between performance and politics is apparent, then, by the fact that both require a plurality of bodies in order to take place. The argument that performance is always political is credible on the most elementary of grounds. Marlowe’s plays, therefore, are indeed political, even if the politics advocated through performance is varied and disagreeable to the moral mindset of the 16th century playgoer. In Edward II, Marlowe offers a play in which the Body politic is embodied by a handful of characters at different moments in the play. By stressing the performative or metaphoric quality of the Body politic, Lawrence Normand attests, Marlowe

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24 Ibid., 121.
25 Ibid., 127.
gives us “the dissolution of the sacred category of king, and the revelation that kingship is not
intrinsic to the person, nor affirmed by God, but dependent on power.”

In a study of how Edward II challenges the possibility of living (the king’s) two bodies, William B. Kelly asserts that Edward’s subjectivity—a “subject” being a body with political agency—is conditional in relation to his connections with the nobles and the commons: “Edward II, like so many of Marlowe’s characters, is defined less by any essence than by the play of different and contradictory discourses that both define Edward and are manipulated by him as he seeks to discover an alternative to his being with a purportedly static structure.” Even though Kelly fundamentally relies upon the concept of the king’s two bodies to ground his argument, he shows how Edward’s body is comprised of multiple subjectivities: his mortal body, in which Edward “maps a more mobile, rhizomatic subjectivity,” and his immortal body, to which the barons try to hold Edward accountable in order to confine him to “an arborescent subjectivity” through which they attempt to control him. Kelly’s article is promising in its effort to think beyond humanist notions of subjectivity, but his analysis is compromised by his insistence on “mapping” what he sees as Edward’s dueling subject positions onto the appropriated Deleuzian concepts of the rhizomatic subject (the body natural) and the arborescent subject (the body politic). I believe, however, that the play opens up a more complicated field of connections among the bodies of Edward, his minions, the nobles, his wife, the commons, and also the conceptual body politic, and, as a result, requires a more thorough teasing out of this network of

28 Ibid., 4, 7.
connections in order to understand Edward’s relation to the concept of the king and also to how Edward performs an ethics in direct opposition to this concept. Marlowe has given us a play that performs the irreducibility of the body into two simple entities. *Edward II* magnifies a body’s struggle to exist and live as it desires in society—to create its own ethics without being circumscribed by the moralistic, civic obligations imposed on that body. Edward attempts to live an ethics that places his body and his desires first. In a Foucauldian context, the ability to create and to live one’s ethics indicates that the body has achieved a certain state of freedom—a freedom over the self that Edward struggles to attain throughout his life as king. For Foucault, “[f]reedom is the ontological condition of ethics…for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom?” Edward’s desire to live with Gaveston, and his desire to be surrounded by his male companions at court, is a sign of his freedom. His freedom is hindered both by the Body Politic and by the nobles’ enforcement of the ethics of the Body Politic onto Edward, as I will discuss shortly. Foucault would interpret the nobles collectively as “a state of domination” that curtails Edward’s freedom. The conceptual Body politic—itself a legal and, arguably, theological institution enforced by the nobles—plays a primary role in limiting Edward’s freedom, whereby the nobles monitor and police Edward’s actions against the parameters of this body, and its defined duties and obligations required of the one who inherit this role.

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30 Foucault, in the same interview, cited above, explains, “When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited” (Ibid., 283).
From the very beginning of the play, the distinction between the Body natural and the Body politic is blurred by both Edward and the nobles in an argument over a seemingly personal matter (one assumedly involving the Body natural and not the Body politic). Edward’s desire to repeal Gaveston from exile catalyzes the dramatic plot of the play because it is a desire that is strongly opposed by the nobles, who wish for Gaveston to remain in exile. The first exchange between Edward and the nobles is permeated with exasperation and contention:

Edward: Will you not graunt me this?—In spight of them [Aside.]
Ile have my will….

Mort. Sen: If you love us my lord, hate Gaveston….

Mortimer: Mine unckle heere, this Earle, and I my selfe,
Were sworne to your father at his death,
That he should nere returne into the realme….(1.1.75-83)

Already, in the first exchange occurring shortly after Edward II’s ascension to the throne, there is explicit tension and political dissencion: Edward craves Gaveston’s return, while the nobles refuse Edward his desire because they made a vow to the former king, Edward’s father, that they would uphold the king’s order that Gaveston remain in exile.31 The friendship that would seem to be a part of Edward’s private body is thrust into the political realm and made a political point of

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31 Bredbeck maintains that the nobles’ vocal opposition “is actually an allegiance to the politic king” because “the decision to banish Gaveston is one that Edward inherits as part of the Body politic” (“Writing Edward II,” 138).
contention between him and the nobles. Immediately, the ability to separate the two lives from the singular performative vessel—Edward—becomes impossible; politics saturates the entire scene. The dissolution between the public and the private, the Body politic and the Body natural, is literalized in Mortimer Senior’s whiny plea, “If you love us my lord, hate Gaveston.” Bredbeck correctly interprets what I envision to be a bratty retort as a “command” that “recapitulates the binary oppositions empowering Renaissance political theory: ‘you’/ ‘us’ recalls ‘king’/ ‘subject’, and ‘love us’ / ‘hate Gaveston’ invokes the constructed rift between ‘public’/ ‘private’ and ‘politic’/ ‘temporal’.” Furthermore, the nobles’ strategy to call upon the authority of the past challenges the new king’s appropriation of the sovereign power of the Body politic. Clare Harraway, in “Edward II: Underwriting History,” argues that the nobles’ appropriation of Edward I’s sovereign will demonstrates, from the beginning of the play, the extent to which Edward II’s sovereignty is circumscribed by the body of the Body politic itself and also by the ability for it to function, as Bredbeck maintains, as a “regulator.” The temporality of the Body politic, therefore, is jarring to the Body natural; it is one whose duration is haunted and influenced by the past while existing in the present, yet, the present seems to have little influence or power over the force of history. What Mortimer accomplishes in this situation

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32 Joan Parks also perceives the permeability of the private sphere in her essay “History, Tragedy, and Truth in Marlowe’s Edward II,” when she asserts, “Marlowe delineates a distinctively private realm and makes it the source and even the space of much political action” (SEL 1500-1900 39.2 (Spring, 1999): 282).
33 Ibid., 138.
34 Harraway writes, “Explaining that the barons will remain faithful to the word of the previous king, Mortimer dismisses Edward II’s attempt to write his own kingship, to make his own history. It is this conflict between the dead and living word of the king which precipitates the action of the play and which ultimately produces Edward II’s downfall. Although Edward I is physically absent from the world of the play, his word is ubiquitous; he is not only alive in the barons’ loyalty but also in the identity of his patronymically named son. Edward II’s sovereignty is therefore circumscribed by his dead father’s will” (in “Edward II: Underwriting History,” Reciting Marlowe: Approaches to the Drama (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2000), 63-64).
is the appropriation of the voice of the king’s authority through indirect citation. The nobles do not perceive Gaveston’s return to be the will of the Body politic, but rather the desire of the Body natural. Already, in other words, there is a disparity between who possesses and speaks as the Body politic: is it Edward, the new king, or his father, the former king? Or, as this instance suggests, is it ultimately neither, since it is the nobles whose own appropriation of the previous king’s voice destabilizes the bodily site of the Body politic? Upon Edward I’s death, the power invested in the Body politic was transferred to the new king, Edward II—the logical assumption, in light of theory of the king’s two bodies, is that Edward II fully possesses kingly regiment. If Edward’s possession of kingly regiment were inscrutable, according to this theory, then he could recall Gaveston with no opposition—at least not the type of virulent opposition that is so strongly articulated by the nobles. Both Edward and his brother, the Earl of Kent, are outraged by their opposition:

Edward: Beseemes it thee to contradict thy king?...

I will have Gaveston, and you shall know,

What danger tis to stand against your king….

Kent chimes in, “Barons and Earls, your pride hath made me mute,”

But now ile speake….  

…dare you brave the king unto his face.

Brother revenge it, and let these their heads,

Preach upon poles fortrespasse of their tongues. (1.1.92-118)
Both Edward and his brother remind the nobles of their position in respect to the king, who embodies the absolute, authoritative power of the realm. Yet, the nobles do not bridle their anger and continue to harass Edward. In addition to invoking the will of the previous king, they claim that Edward’s judgment is impaired by his love for Gaveston, who, Mortimer attests, has made the king “brainsick,” suggesting that Edward is not fit to rule (1.1.124). The nobles’ fear Gaveston’s influence upon the king will be transmitted to the commonwealth, like a sexual disease. This is a fear that is illustrated later in the play, in the faces of the nobles’ shields, which they bear to “greet” Gaveston upon his return from Ireland. Mortimer’s shield, for example, depicts a “lofty cedar” that is overtaken by a creeping canker. The symbolism, which does not escape Edward’s notice, gestures toward the nobles’ concern that Edward, and therefore England itself, both of whom are represented by the tree, will be destroyed by Gaveston, the creeping canker.

The nobles fear Gaveston because of his potential to infect and thereby destroy England. But, how exactly is this fear rationalized? Gaveston is of lowly birth, and he has no power or means to effectively overtake the nobles. Furthermore, as even Mortimer Senior says to Mortimer in an attempt to assuage the latter’s anger, “[t]he mightiest kings have had their minions, /…. [L]et his grace, whose youth is flexible, /…. Freely enjoy that vaine light-headed earle, / For riper years will weane him from such toyes” (1.4.391-401). The nobles never explain why they want to uphold Edward I’s decree that Gaveston remain in exile. They only refer to the former king once, and they soon decide to throw out this strategy when Edward refuses to comply with their demand. It seems that their wish for Gaveston to remain in exile is due to a

Rolls explains the nobles’ growing concern as a fear of infection in *The Theory of the King’s Two Bodies in the Age of Shakespeare*: “if the king were able to function, or were forced to function, in his capacity as body politic despite his disorder, his disorder would spread to other ‘members’ of the Body, and the realm would become disordered” (88).
combination of jealousy and fear. Jealousy is exactly what Mortimer voices throughout the play, as is evident in his response to Mortimer Senior’s importuning that he should not be so hateful of the king or weary of the king’s relationship with Gaveston. Mortimer replies, “Unckle, his wanton humor greeves not me, / But this I scorne, that one so baselie borne, / Should by his soveraignes favor grow so pert, / And riote it with the treasure of the realme” (1.4.402-405). This jealousy directly correlates with their fear of losing political power that comes from losing the king’s favoritism (which is given to Gaveston). Both their jealousy and fear is derived from the potential that Gaveston will replace them as a part of the Body politic.

The threat that Gaveston poses to the nobles, again, demonstrates the elision between Edward’s two separate bodies; if Gaveston is a friend to the Body natural, he should not be a threat at all. Yet the nobles construe their relationship with the Body politic as one that stands in direct contention with Gaveston’s relationship to the same body, figured nicely in the syntax of Mortimer Senior’s line: “If you love us my lord, hate Gaveston.” Edward must choose either the nobles or Gaveston. Lancaster phrases the choice similarly to Edward: “My lord, why do you thus incense your peeres, / That naturally would love and honor you, / But for that base and obscure Gaveston” (1.1.99-101). The play on peeres/Piers (Gaveston) connotes this competitive relation between the nobles and Gaveston. Lawrence Normand infers this fabricated contention as evidence that the personal is always political: “The barons see Edward’s relation with Gaveston as primarily political rather than sexual, and their sexual discourses,” which I will analyze shortly, “are deployed only insofar as they serve their political interests.”

The nobles are relentless in their discursive efforts to create a parallel relation between their relationship with the king and Gaveston’s relationship with Edward. In the minds of the nobles, Edward

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36 Lawrence Normand, 186.
should place his relationship with them—authorities and representatives of the state—above his private relationship with Gaveston. At the same time, their argumentative logic makes this private relationship a public one, hence the either/or dichotomy vocalized by the nobles in the aforementioned lines. Ideally, Edward should be able to have a relationship with Gaveston regardless of his obligations as head of the Body politic. However, this ideal does not translate smoothly into real life, as the performance makes clear. And, as I will explain shortly, Edward and Gaveston both contribute to the politicization of Edward’s “private” relations. Indeed, Marlowe demonstrates that the difference between the Body politic and the Body natural is purely a hypothetical one.

Edward desires a relationship with Gaveston, which he sees more affectively beneficial to his personal self than a relationship with the nobles. He so much prefers a private life with Gaveston to one of being king that he would rather the nobles divide up the realm themselves and leave him with “some nooke or corner” so that he can “frolicke with [his] deerest Gaveston” (1.4.72-73). Edward cannot help but to make his relationship with Gaveston a political concern (of the state and of the Body politic) because Gaveston’s exile was established as a dictate of the Body politic (Edward II’s father). Yet, in this line, Edward wants to abdicate the throne and politics altogether—the image he creates is idyllic (to “frolicke” on grassy hills); the king who wants to be a shepherd, instead of the shepherd who wants to be king (Tamburlaine). This dreamy idealism will prove detrimental to Edward’s ability to save his crown and his life by the end of the play. Furthermore, in this speech, Edward envisions a life, and an ethics, divorced of politics and his political role. Edward’s ethics appears to be concentrated on desire, on spending his life amongst friends, outside the political realm. On the other hand, the nobles repeatedly tell Edward that a relationship with them, instead of Gaveston, is both more “natural” and more
beneficial, to both the king and the realm. This is a logical argument, given the fact that the nobles are aligned with the nation’s interests; allegiance to them, they imply, is allegiance to the nation. Therefore, Edward’s relationship with the nobles is figured as more “natural” than his relationship with Gaveston; the king should have a close relationship with his peers, who are of a higher social stature, like Edward. From their perspective, Edward represents the Body politic; they do not see past this role and they do not take account of the Body natural that also resides in the same body, which is, in fact, the material body itself. The demand that the nobles make of Edward is of Edward as King because their relationship is with the Body politic. But these demands cannot be divorced from the Body natural; demands on one body necessarily are demands on both, and therefore have effects on both bodies, because both are lived by one single body. Edward is not only unable to live both lives simultaneously—I think, he does try to embody the role, but exhibits a type of confusion about how do live his life and perform “the king” harmoniously—he ultimately refuses to. He is so willing to give away his crown and to retreat to some “nooke” with Gaveston because he feels, from what the nobles require of him, that he has no life; he is merely a vessel for the eternal Body politic, to play the role, just as those who have played the role before him and as those who will continue to play the role after him—as witnessed by the play’s closure, with Edward III newly ascended to the throne and having recently ordered the beheading of Mortimer. From his perspective, even as king, he should be able to surround himself with those individuals whom he finds most beneficial to his body in general, Body politic or Body natural because there is no absolute difference between the two. This refusal is at once an affront to the nobles, who interpret this response, and Edward’s ensuing actions to keep Gaveston in England as well as decorating him with titles, as treasonous to the
nation. This refusal, as well, indicates that Edward is going to hierarchize his personal desires, his personal ethics, above the needs of the nation and the ethics of the Body politic. If there is a correlation between ethics and politics, with those ethical ideals establishing the ground of a political ideal, then it is clear that, whatever Edward’s politics, it is a politics not aligned with the nobles’ or the nation’s.

The nobles stress the “naturalness” of their relationship with the king through the parallelism that they have created with Gaveston, by casting his relationship with the king as “unnatural.” It is this unnaturalness of the relationship between the king and his minion that the nobles seize upon in order to foment the idea this “perverse” relationship will ruin the realm. The word “unnatural” generally refers to anything that is not conceived of as “natural”; as the OED defines it, to be unnatural is to not be in accordance with nature or moral standards. To be unnatural is to be artificial (a willed creation/connection), even abnormal and, arguably, impolitic. The idea that Gaveston is impolitic because he is perverse and unnatural is derived from the correlation between the natural and the political. Specifically, Gaveston’s marginal status relegates him as an enemy of the nation and of the political society, since he is the thorn, the nobles believe, in England’s side, “corrupting” the realm all together. The correlation

37 Upon hearing that Edward has given Gaveston the Bishop’s house and goods, Lancaster exclaims, “What? Will they tyrannize upon the Church? / Ah wicked king, accurssed Gaveston, This ground which is corrupted with their steps, / Shall be their timeless sepulcher, or mine” (1.2.3-6). This is just one example of the line of corruption that the nobles project as their reason to expel Gaveston from England: Gaveston is evil, and his relationship with Edward makes both Edward evil and the nation “corrupted with their steps.” Treason, furthermore, is an accusation hurled variously throughout the play, with the most overdetermined moment occurring in 2.2, when the nobles draw their swords on the newly returned Gaveston, Edward shouts, “Treason, treason: whers the traitor?” (2.2.80). Pembroke retorts, “heere, here,” pointing at Gaveston, and perhaps even Edward, since Edward’s accusation was vocalized in the form of a rhetorical question; the answer to the question remains open to debate. This is just one instance where Marlowe refuses to provide an answer—refuses to moralize the actions of his characters on stage.
between the natural and the political is drawn from A. John Simmons’s essay, “Theories of the
state,” in which he rehearses Aristotle’s argument that man is “by nature a political animal”—he
calls this “political naturalism”—as opposed to the belief that man’s natural condition is
apolitical. 38 “Political antinaturalism,” which, I believe is portrayed by less by Gaveston and
more by Edward, is the view that, according to Simmons, “while persons may be social by
nature, …the specifically political order of the world is artificial (in Hume’s sense of requiring
human artifice), as is the particular form that a political society make take, neither being
ordained by God nor otherwise natural.” 39 In short, Simmons maintains, “persons are naturally
subject to no political authority: the existence of political authority derives from acts of human
creation.” 40 We can infer that Gaveston is impolitic because he refuses to conform to the politics
of the nation—this assertion holds true for Edward as well.

The nobles’ emphasize the negative connotations of Edward and Gaveston’s “unnatural”
relationship through their duplicitous use of sodomitically-inflected language, which saturates
the dialogue of Act 1 in particular. Their continuous references to Gaveston as the king’s
“minion” (on five occasions, all of which occur in Act 1: 1.1.133, 1.2.67, 1.4.87, 1.4.198,
1.4.391) and allusions to Gaveston’s socially and sexually depraved “baseness” (“that base and
obscure Gaveston” [1.1.101], “base minion” [1.1.133], “base pesant” [1.4.7]) demonstrate their
conscious effort to contain him—and, by association, the king—by fashioning a specific
discourse in which to interpellate him as a sodomitical subject. The rhetoric of Edward II is
immersed in the discourse of sodomy, and Gaveston’s role as Edward’s “minion” and resident

38 A. John Simmons, “Theories of the state,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern
39 Ibid., 253.
40 Ibid.
sodomite implicates him as a dangerous figure from the very start of the play. His sexual proclivities only abet the nobles’ case against him as an unruly “base and obscure” “upstart” (1.1.101, 1.4.41). These appellations the nobles use to describe Gaveston’s transgressiveness indicate that he is threatening for reasons other than, but not excluding, his sexual inclinations. The word “base” certainly carries with it sexual connotations, and when supplemented with words like “obscure” and “upstart”—which suggest a kind of social transgression on the level of class or status—Gaveston comes to epitomize the multivalent dangerousness of “the sodomite.” In early modern England, “sodomite” was an attribution, as Mario DiGangi explains, that “could be deployed to stigmatize anyone who was perceived to threaten dominant conceptions not only of sexuality, but of gender, class, religion, or race.” Many scholars who have offered readings of the play’s sodomitical undercurrent have commented on how Gaveston’s sexual deviancy is supplemented by his transgression of class boundaries, and that it is the combination of the two that provokes the nobles’ actions against him. The idea that the nobles fashion Gaveston as a sodomitical subject through a particular discourse as a means to wield power against the king is consonant with Gregory Bredbeck’s assertion that “the opening of the play…presents the actions

41 The origin of this association is biblical, as David Stymeist succinctly writes: “perhaps the most virulent attack against sodomy [in Edward II] is the inclusion of Old Testament language concerning its ‘unnatural’ and ‘base’ nature” (“Status, Sodomy, and Theater in Marlowe’s Edward II,” SEL 44.2 (2004): 42). The OED includes the term’s etymological origins in the 16th century as pertaining to someone or something “low on the moral scale.”


43 Any strong piece of criticism within the past two decades that focuses on the play’s homoeroticism has observed this fact. Gaveston as sodomite is the scapegoat for broader political and social concerns pertaining to the maintenance of the ideological state. See in particular Gregory Bredbeck’s “Writing Edward II” in Sodomy and Interpretation and Emily C. Bartels’s “the Show of Sodomy: Minions and Dominions in Edward II,” Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1993), 143-172; DiGangi’s piece, op. cite; and most recently David Stymeist’s “Status, Sodomy, and Theater in Marlowe’s Edward II.”
of Edward’s peers as they strike a decision to obfuscate motives of political ambition with a
rhetoric of temporal sexuality.” Edward is interpellated into this discourse of containment via
his sexual association with Gaveston, which is one way to interpret DiGangi’s comment that
“sodomy is a matter of degree.” Thus, Bredbeck notes, “the king’s homoeroticism does not just
provide a means of maintaining political order but also marks the point at which political order
and the power it seeks to contain meet and may be negotiated.”

The nobles fear Gaveston because of his “baseness,” both in status and in sexuality. His
relationship with Edward is unrepentantly sexual, thus, he is doubly dangerous, as the nobles
believe he affects, and infects, both the body natural of Edward and the Body politic of the king,
and, thereby, the nation. Simon Shepherd, in *Marlowe and the Politics of Elizabethan Theatre*,
offers a suggestion about how Gaveston’s existence is offensive on many fronts through an
explanation of the virtuous individual: “Those who are virtuous behave in line with the interests
of the community…. The individual who is virtuous is at one with the state’s interests.”
Furthermore, Edward’s preference of Gaveston over the nobles demonstrates his failure to put
the country first, and, in doing so, “denies the operation of the law of reason,” and thereby
“disrupts community.” The parallelism between the nobles and Gaveston implies that the
appropriate or moral “desire” is the relationship with the nobles. This is evidence that desire is

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44 Bredbeck, 61.
45 DiGangi, 208.
46 Bredbeck, 71.
47 Simon Shepherd, *Marlowe and the Politics of Elizabethan Theatre* (New York: St. Martin’s
48 Ibid., 84.
49 I am working from Shepherd’s description of “legitimate pleasure,” which he defines as “one
that is moved by that which the state approves, that which is said to be moral, ordered or true…. Pleasure that ignores utility is formulated as emotion that ignores reason” (Ibid., 99), hence
Mortimer’s description of Edward as “the brain-sicke king” or Lancaster’s comical exclamation
variously homoerotic in the play; it is an example that reaffirms Normand’s assertion that
“homoerotic desires appear in the play as one strand in discourses that are not simply sexual:
namely, sodomy, friendship, and patronage.” Discourses supposedly affiliated solely with the
Body politic or solely with the Body natural are conflated; the discursive boundaries are
dissolved, such that, for instance, friendship becomes overtly political in the play. The nobles are
not the only ones to harness the perverse potential of homoerotic desire. Edward, too, enables
and promotes this homoeroticism throughout his interactions with the nobles and his minions,
further “disturbing” the political sanctity of the nation in the minds of the nobles. From the very
first scene of the play, Edward shows no hesitation in positioning Gaveston as his equal—
Gaveston is not just a peer, but, as Edward makes clear, he is of the same body as the King
himself. Thus, Edward tells Gaveston he need not kneel when they first encounter each other:

What, Gaveston, welcome: kis not my hand,

Embrace me Gaveston as I do thee:

Why shouldst thou kneele, knowest thou not who I am?

Thy friend, thy selfe, another Gaveston. (1.1.140-143)

Their relationship, from Edward’s point of view, is one that unifies them into one body—perhaps
shockingly, Edward does not claim to have taken Gaveston into himself, but rather proclaims
himself to be “another Gaveston”—just another man, and not the Body politic. Edward, King of

when witnessing Edward’s lament over Gaveston’s departure, “Diablo, what passions call you
these?” (1.4.319).

Normand, 186.

Normand explains, “patriarchy demands that a king should embody sovereign power, but by
redefining his position in relation to a friendship discourse entailing equality, Edward allows
patriarchal political hierarchy to seem disturbed” (Ibid., 187).
England and Lord of Ireland, is willingly submitting himself to Gaveston by claiming that he is another Gaveston, instead of claiming that Gaveston is a part of him. The joining of two mortal, sodomitical bodies, destabilizes any sense a unified, cohesive kingly body that the play might have presented. Bredbeck concurs, by reiterating the metaphoric power of the king’s two bodies and that the sexual is political in this play: “The rhetoric of homoerotic passion, which in other tales marks the place where politic concerns end and temporal ones begin, is, in this play, a part of the politic. There are not two bodies here by an amorphous one that mutates, stretches, and indeterminately transforms to fit the exigencies of power.”52 Marlowe’s figuration of Gaveston, Bredbeck concludes, “demonstrates tacitly that…the construction of the apolitical is always in and of itself political.”53 The political nature of Edward’s friendship with Gaveston conflicts with the moral politics of the nation, thus, in Normand’s words, “Edward’s representing himself as friend gives his enemies the chance to justify their rebellion by casting Edward as an enemy of the state…. [This] reasserts the nobles’ claims on political favor by erecting past practice as a timeless political principle on which the safety of the state depends.”54 Edward’s disregard for policy,55 and for the austerity of tradition embodied by the Body politic, by raising Gaveston from his knee (and, implicitly, lowering or debasing his kingly self) presents just one example of how the Body politic is performed: it is performed like any other role, and, on the Marlovian stage, that role is saturated with homoerotic sexuality.

52 Bredbeck, “Writing Edward II,” 137.
53 Ibid.
54 Normand, 188.
55 In discussions of political morality, the term “policy” was used interchangeably with “reason of state” (ragion di stato) throughout the late 16th century, but was the “favored term” through the 1620s (Martin Pzelzainis, “Shakespeare and Political Thought,” in A Companion to Shakespeare, ed. D. S. Kastan (Malden, M.A.: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd, 1999), 107).
In giving a part of his sovereign power to Gaveston by making the latter Lord of Ireland, Edward takes another step in shattering the (audience’s) fixed conception of Body politic. And, it is when Gaveston becomes Lord of Ireland, a title that Edward strategically bestows on him shortly after he is banished once again from England, that he becomes an exponentially dangerous threat to the nobles. Ireland, while under the control of England, harbored unknown dangers, and many, many, rebellious Irish kern who wanted to destroy the English and rid Ireland of English occupation. Ireland’s significance lies in the interpretive effects it generates as a trope of unknowable potentiality—depending on the perspective, Ireland represents a potential danger to some, while it functions as a potential solace for others. \( ^{56} \) This potentiality is actualized through metonymy and synecdoche: Ireland materializes in the figure of Gaveston, who, as governor of Ireland, comes to embody the dangerousness that Ireland poses to the sanctity of the English nation and to the purity of English national identity.

The destination of Ireland is critically important to understanding the extent to which Edward defies the nobles and provokes their certain response, and to understanding the magnitude of the threat that Gaveston now poses to not only them, but the nation as well. Ireland may seem an inconsequential location, but, particularly during Marlowe’s time, it represents an over-determined space of political anxiety and discontent. The intensification of relations between England and Ireland was complicated by England’s relationship with Spain, especially post-Armada in the late 1580s. The Irish threat therefore registered as the fear of a “poisonous ‘Popish’ incursion” and the spread of Catholicism.\( ^{57} \) England’s fears about collaborative efforts

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\( ^{57} \) I am quoting from Jonathan Gil Harris’s *Foreign bodies and the body politic: Discourses of social pathology in early modern England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45.
between Ireland and Spain were not unfounded. Throughout the 1590s the leaders of the Irish rebellion solicited the help of Spain on numerous occasions, failing on all attempts but one in 1601 when they were finally sent an army of approximately 3,400 soldiers to fight against the English.  

This is what critics have referred to as Ireland’s role in the “back door theory” of England’s invasion: Ireland functions as a “potential conduit for papal subversion.” Ireland is a “conduit,” a passageway that provides for easy, furtive penetration of the English realm from behind, where England is most vulnerable. Jonathan Gil Harris elucidates the implications of this form of invasion in *Edward II*: “[i]ncursion through the anus was frequently employed as a figure for an illicit ‘back door’ entrance to the body politic. In Marlowe’s *Edward II*, sodomy corporeally maps—at least for the envious Mortimer and his faction—the intolerable infiltration of a French ‘base mushrump’ into the English bodies of the king and country.”

Gaveston, the “base mushrump” and the phallicky-empowered “vile Torpedo” (1.4.223), who is interpellated as both sodomite and Ireland, is this convergence point where the idea of sodomy is posited as the penetration and infection not only of the temporal body of the king but also of the eternal body politic.

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59 Maley, in his essay “The Irish Text and Subtext,” explains that “[i]n throughout the histories, Ireland is invoked as part of a back door theory (conduit for French or Spanish invasion); domino theory (if it goes, Wales and Scotland will follow, Kent and Cornwall too); and conspiracy theory (English rebels use it as a launch pad), and sometimes all three together” (102). Neill similarly describes Ireland’s sodomitical function in England’s demise: “if the Irish were essential to the formation of English identity, they also threatened it. For in the English mind, Ireland constituted not merely a defining limit but a dangerously porous boundary, a potential conduit of papal subversion…” (3).

60 Gil Harris, 87.
Upon being given the title of Lord of Ireland, Gaveston, symbolically embodies the power of the king, which translates into real, material power (his “store of gold” which will purchase him “friends”—perhaps the same rebellious Irish kerns mentioned later by Lancaster who are invading the Pale). The irony is that Gaveston has succeeded in penetrating and possessing the king’s other body, the eternal Body politic, which invests him with the political power that the nobles feared he would obtain through his relationship with the king. The nobles initially oppose Gaveston in part out of fear of what he might become. Yet, because of their opposition, Edward purposefully imbues Gaveston with kingly regiment, thus literalizing the nobles’ fear. When Mortimer urges his peers “[t]o mend the king and do [their] country good” in order to prevent the possibility of Gaveston “front[ing] the mightiest of [them] all,” he is insinuating that, indeed, the rectum is the grave—for the king, for the nobles, and for the English nation. Mortimer, in his desire to “mend the king and do [their] country good,” employs a reparative rhetoric that effectively addresses both discourses. Edward has been sodomized and needs to be mended. England faces the possibility of being sodomized by Gaveston, just as Edward has been, so it is in their best interest to recall (and kill) Gaveston. Thus, King Edward’s relationship with Gaveston is not only unnatural for a myriad of reasons, but it is also, particularly in the nobles’ eyes, a terribly destructive force of the Body politic. Mortimer capitalizes upon the conflation of the mortal bodies of Edward and Gaveston as “king” in order to remove both men as head of England.

Edward himself is inconsistent in his representation of the Body politic, and his fickleness and unassertiveness in assuming this role evinces the disconnection between himself (the Body natural) and his role as king (Body politic)—this is yet another way that Marlowe interrogates the concept of the king’s two bodies via Edward’s performance. Edward’s body, one
may argue in this regard, is subject to an unnatural relationship with the immortal Body politic. How does one perform an atemporal, (supposedly) never-changing concept? Edward’s own uncertainty about his role as king portraits the impossibility of trying to live a fixed concept. Edward’s dialogue is filled with rhetorical questions and statements: “Am I a king and must be over ruled?” (1.1.36); “If I be king, not one of them shall live” (1.4.104-105; repeated later in 3.1.135 (“If I be Englands king, in lakes of gore / Your headles trunkes, your bodies will I traile…). There are two moments, in particular, in which Edward expounds at length his own discomfort with his kingly title. The first moment in which Edward expresses a type of confusion about how to embody the role of the king, and, likewise, what it means to be king, occurs in Act 5, when, imprisoned at Killingworth, he is asked to resign the crown to his son. Edward knows that resigning the crown will provide Mortimer the opportunity to usurp his son’s powers just as Mortimer did to Edward himself, but especially because his son is just a child (“For hees a lambe, encompassed by Woolves, / Which in a moment will abridge his life” [5.1.41-42]). In a speech that is echoed later in Shakespeare’s Richard II, Edward offers his own understanding of the concept of the Body politic in the form of a riddle:

The greefes of private men are soone allayde,

But not of kings….

But when I call to minde I am a king,

Me thinkes I should revenge me of the wronges,

That Mortimer and Isabell have done.

But what are kings, when regiment is gone,
But perfect shadowes in a sun-shine day?

My nobles rule, I beare the name of king,

I weare the crowne, but am contrould by them,

By Mortimer, and my unconstant Queene…. (5.1.8-30)

In this speech, Edward communicates his uncertainty (and his discomfort that results from his uncertainty), albeit with a hint of sarcasm, to the audience. He possesses the symbols of kingship, he “beare[s] the name of king” and he “weare[s] the crown,” yet has been divested of the authority and power inherent in kingship. So, the question for him, then, is “what is a king”? And he provides an answer: “perfect shadowes in a sun-shine day.” “When regiment is gone,” the formal authority of the king as Body politic no longer exists; when kings are divested of their authority, they are “[b]ut perfect shadowes in a sun-shine day.” The “sun-shine day” is the timelessness of the Body politic; the time of the king, whose symbol is the sun, continues, even when one specific body has been de-kinged, thus, becoming a “shadow” in that diachronic timeline of the Body politic, which will be assumed by another body (in the play, Edward’s son, even though Mortimer lays claim as the child’s protector). The Body natural as remainder, as shadow, connotes an ephemeral materiality, much like the spirit, as I have described it in Chapter 2. A shadow is impermanent, transitory, and does not have a fixed shape (the shape changes in relation to light). The Body natural as shadow, as intimated by Edward’s formulation, has the ability to haunt the sun—that is, it has the ability to effect the Body politic permanently, with the stamp of its own mortality. Edward fully recognizes that, while he has been divorced from the Body politic, this divorce between the two bodies cannot erase the effects that his own life has left on the Body politic. Thus, he says shortly thereafter, “Edwards name survives, though
Edward dies” (5.1.48). His name survives in his son—just as Tamburlaine’s name survived in the efforts of his sons. In this sense, the Body politic, as the theory of the king’s two bodies suggest, cannot overshadow the Body natural, whose trace is always readable on the virtual Body politic. Edward’s confusion about the nature of the king’s two bodies is symptomatic of the inextricable relation between the two bodies.

For the second moment, in Act 4, Edward reveals his profound “distresse” with his role as king; he conveys to the Abbott, who is helping Edward hide from Mortimer’s men, the feeling that embodying the Body politic is constraining:

O hadst thou ever beene a king, thy hart

Pierced deeply with sence of my distresse,

Could not but take compassion of my state.

Stately and proud, in riches and in traine,

Whilom I was, powerfull and full of pompe,

But what is he, whome rule and emperie

Have not in life or death made miserable? (4.6.8-15)

The sentiment of this passage chimes with Edward’s earlier statement that all he wants is a little “nooke” in which to live a private life with Gaveston. He does not want to be king, because to be king, regardless of the power and authority that comes with this position, renders impossible the life that he wants to live. “Rule and empery”—signs of being the head of the Body politic—have made Edward’s life miserable because these signs come with imperatives. He is obligated to rule
the realm; he has to continually appease the nobles and the Church, to which he is ultimately held accountable (“It bootes me not to threat, I must speak faire, / The Legate of the Pope will be obayd” [1.4.63-64]). To be the king, according to the theory of the king’s two bodies, is to have absolute control of the realm—but this is not the actual case, as Marlowe has shown in Edward II, in which Edward has very little (unilateral) power, even when it comes to his private life (Body natural). Speaking of the nobles, he laments, “Rebels, will they appoint their soveraigne / His sports, his pleasures, and his companie”? (3.1.174-175). Even his new minions, Spencer and Baldock, are appalled by the nobles’ presumptiveness and rebellious nature. They counsel the king on how he should act more kingly:

Spencer:   …my lord pardon my speeche,

Did you retaine your fathers magnanimitie,

Did you regard the honor of your name,

You would not suffer thus your majestie

Be counterbuft of your nobilitie. (3.1.15-19)

Baldock implores the King not to be “tied to their affection,”

As though your highnes were a schoole boy still,

And must be awde and governd like a child. (3.1.29-31)

To Edward and his friends, the nobles’ continually try to control him, like a parent’s ceaseless effort to control a child. Perhaps the nobles, who served alongside Edward’s father, still view Edward as the mischievous boy who was poorly influenced by the equally mischievous
Gaveston. They still, in other words, view themselves as parent-figures to Edward, hence Baldock’s comment that they nobles see Edward as a “schoole boy.” It is a type of relationship we see later in the play, after Edward relinquishes the crown, when Mortimer serves as Lord Protector to Edward III and to the realm. Not only is this political strategy infantilizing, but it effectively hinders Edward’s ability to act kingly, since he is continually fielding and fending off challenges from the nobles (“counterbuft” is Spencer’s term, meaning “beaten back” or “opposed by”). Edward’s repeated statement of “If I am king” bespeaks his confusion about the particulars, or parameters, of his actual position, for, if he were king, shouldn’t he at least have control over his own, personal desires (“His sports, his pleasures, and his companie”)?

The consequence of the diffusion of kingly regiment to various bodies associated with the king is that Edward himself becomes deprived of regiment. I believe this divestment of power and authority is felt and expressed by Edward—obviously, in the confusion he feels, discussed above, about what his role as king actually entails, and, most literally, in Edward’s frequent iteration of the word “must.” Edward speaks the auxiliary verb a total of sixteen times in the play, a usage which connotes both his lack of agency and his recognition that he lacks agency and authority over, it seems, all the English nobles. In Act 1 scene 4 alone, he “must speake faire” to the bishop (1.4.63); he “must” banish Gaveston (1.4.85); and Gaveston “must” leave immediately (1.4.110). Edward’s use of this word emphasizes that he is not acting out of his own accord, but that he acts through external compulsion. When Leicester tells the king, “Your majestie must go to Killingworth,” Edward retorts, “Must! tis somewhat hard, when kings must...

63 I also want to mention how different Spencer’s and Baldock’s relationship with Edward is compared to Gaveston’s relationship with Edward. In this moment, these two men offer sound political support; this political relationship seems lacking from Edward’s relationship with Gaveston. Yet, the nobles still identify them as minions that need to be plucked from the realm; Normand and Bredbeck rightly argue that the nobles, particularly Mortimer, employ a sodomitical discourse in order to continually bind Edward, in an effort to contain him.
go” (4.7.82-83). This emphatic repetition portrays Edward’s feeling of being compelled to do things he clearly does not want to do. About a dozen lines later, when Edward leaves for Killingworth and his minions, Spencer and Baldock, are taken away presumably to be beheaded, Edward departs from his friends, saying, “part we must, / Sweete Spencer, gentle Baldock, part we must” (4.7.95-96). While sorrowful, again, Edward’s repeated use of “must” represents the extent of Edward’s lack of agency throughout the play.

Mortimer and Isabella are the two most notable characters who appropriate the authority and power of the Body politic in order to dethrone Edward and, even more vicious, dispossess him of any vestige of kingship. Their actions throughout the play reaffirm Normand’s argument that kingliness is performed, not inherited, thus their actions function to serve the question of the naturalness of the Body politic. Mortimer and Isabella’s intimate relationship is hinted at throughout Act 1 scene 4, especially in the scene where Isabella speaks to Mortimer privately, away from the other nobles, in order to persuade him to allow for Gaveston’s recall from Ireland. Their relationship is made explicit to the audience in Act 4, when Kent observes that “Mortimer / And Isabell doe kisse while they conspire” (4.6.12-13). The Queen plays an unexpected part in Edward’s demise; she seems to lack aspiration and appears only to want Edward’s love, yet, with Mortimer at her side, she becomes a stronger individual. Upon their successful return to England, they subdue the King, who flees, with his minions, out of the country. (They try to escape to Ireland, but the seas refuse them passage.) Isabella, in the presence of Mortimer, her son, and her army, gives the following impromptu speech:

   Succesfull battells gives the God of kings,

       To them that fight in right and feare his wrath:
Since then successfully we have prevayled,

Thankes be heavens great architect and you.

Ere farther we proceede my noble lorde,

We heere create our welbeloved sonne,

Of love and care unto his royall person,

Lord warden of the realme…. (4.6.19-26)

God, who divinely ordains kings, determines who is successful in battle. Isabel claims that those who “fight in the right” receive God’s favor in battle, and, clearly, it is she and Mortimer who are fighting “in the right.” David Fuller, in “Love or Politics: The Man or the King? Edward II in Modern Performance,” explains Isabella’s language as a political maneuver available to her as the victorious body in battle: “Once Mortimer and Isabella have won, as victors usually do, they are free to redefine the terms on which this background to the war is understood,” and, I think, the freedom to write the future of the political realm. After invoking God and thereby aligning herself with him and his divine favor, she then, playing God and using the royal “we” in order to do so, proceeds to name her son “lord warden of the realme.” Her language is a verbal sign of the Body politic, of the single body speaking as two bodies. Isabella successfully portrays the Body politic in her ability to combine the ethical with the political, as evidence in her declaration that she ("we") creates her son “lord warden” with “love and care” in regard to his “royall person.” The language is ethical (“love and care”) but the concern is political (her son’s “royall person”). The ability to combine the ethical with the political is required of the body who becomes the

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Body politic—it is a requirement that Edward II fails to comply with, which illustrates his failure to be king, in the eyes of the nobles. Perhaps Isabella feels emboldened by her victory; perhaps she believes it suitable to speak as the royal authority of England since her husband has fled the realm. Indeed, the absence of the king from the realm, I want to suggest, facilitates Isabel’s appropriation of the regiment of the Body politic. The Body politic is a virtual entity, a conceptual body, which is actualized in the Body natural. A divorce between the two bodies allows for the virtual body to move freely to another body, even if just temporarily. The incorporeality of the Body politic is what renders it so powerful, so desired, and so dangerous—because it can be so easily appropriated.\textsuperscript{63}

The sovereign power of the Body politic is readily seized by Mortimer, who reveals his Machiavellian side as the plot to remove Gaveston from the throne—a plot which, we discover, also entails the dethroning of Edward—develops into a civil war between the king and the nobles. Harry Levin also comments upon Mortimer’s increasing Machiavellian—and Marlovian—nature: “as the play moves from open hostilities to more devious conspirations, Mortimer becomes increasingly Machiavellian and thus more characteristically Marlovian.”\textsuperscript{64}

When he becomes protector to Edward III, Mortimer carries himself as king and plays the role of Machiavellian prince in the most stereotypical fashion, as conveyed by the following monologue, when he reveals his intentions to the audience:

The prince I rule, the queene do I commaund,

\textsuperscript{63} My understanding of the concept of the Body politic is derived from the theory of the king’s two bodies, but it is also derived explicitly from Deleuze’s understanding of the concept: “The concept is an incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies” (with Guattari, in \textit{What is Philosophy?} (1991; New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 21).

And with a lowly conge to the ground,

The proudest lords salute me as I passe,

I seal, I cancell, I do what I will,

Feard am I more then lov’d, let me be feard….

They thrust upon me the Protectorship,

And sue to me for that that I desire,…

Now all is sure, the Queene and Mortimer

Shall rule the realme, the king, and none us…. (5.4.48-66)

Mortimer all but declares himself king: he rules the prince and queen; he signs, seals, and cancels—kingly acts done with the official stamp; and all the lords bow to him at court. Yet, Mortimer abstains from using the royal “we,” opting for the more Machiavellian, egotistical first person singular (he uses “I” nine times in this speech, “me” three times). The exaggerated self-reference bespeaks Mortimer’s Marlovian nature; it is as if Tamburlaine could have spoken these lines. And yet, Mortimer never seems completely comfortable with this appropriation of sovereignty, as if he recognizes that he is just one of many who lay claim to the Body politic (most explicitly, Edward II, Edward III, and Isabella, but also the other nobles, who have, along with Mortimer, placed a vice grip on Edward II’s rule). The fact that he will “do what [he] will[s]” and “desire[s],” and that he takes pleasure in making other lords cower as he passes suggests that Mortimer portrays an ethics—indeed a Marlovian Ethics—disagreeable to the ethics of the Body politic, an ethics which places the “we” before the “I.” Mortimer’s ethics, of caring for his own self, is what leads to his downfall, since he signs for the king’s death out of
fear of the common’s growing support for the garrisoned king, Edward II: “The king must die, or Mortimer goes downe, / The commons now begin to pitie him” (5.4.1-2). The difference, therefore, between Mortimer and Marlowe’s more noble Machiavells is that Mortimer is insecure. He assumes the Body politic, but his insecurity shows the world that the role does not fit. These cowering lords play the audience, and they are the ones, in line with Kastan’s assertions, who authorize Mortimer’s role as the (temporary) Body politic—as Machiavelli claims in the seventeenth chapter of *The Prince*, it is better to be “feared” than loved.\(^{65}\) Furthermore, like the modern, Machiavellian ruler, Bredbeck observes, Mortimer “recognizes that power comes not from above but from the amorphous relations of peers, parliament, and the people.”\(^{66}\) Edward II’s brother Kent, who has at this time aligned himself with Mortimer and the queen, becomes increasingly critical of Mortimer’s position. Kent voices his dissent when he seeks the audience of the actual king, Edward: “Where is the court but heere, heere is the king, / And I will visit him” (5.3.59-60). For Kent, the Body politic is inherited and cannot be divorced from a body by any means other than death. Mortimer’s embodiment of the Body politic radically differs from Edward’s, the latter whom bitterly notes that his single transgression while king was that he led with “too much clemency” (5.1.122).

Until this point in the play, Mortimer, as well as the other nobles, have used another means to divest the power of the Body politic from Edward: by situating the regiment of the Body politic strictly with the body of the realm, with England, instead of Edward’s body (the Body natural). By aligning the Body politic with England itself, it is easy for the nobles to disregard Edward and to effectively depose him: “But as the realme and the parlement shall

\(^{65}\) In his advice to princes, he writes: “one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved…” (Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Prince and The Discourses* (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 61).

\(^{66}\) Bredbeck, “Writing Edward II,” 144.
please, / So shall [Edward] be deposed of” (4.6.36-37). Throughout the play, the nobles reiterate the distinction that they have created and enforced in order to leverage power against the king; as Warwicke says, “it is my countries cause I follow” (2.6.10). By aligning the regiment of the Body politic with the realm, the nobles’ pledge their allegiance to the realm itself—not to Edward:

Isabel: I rue my lords ill fortune, but alas,
Care of my countrie cald me to this warre.

Mortimer: Madam, have done with care and sad complaint,
Your king hath wrongd your countrie and himselfe,
And we must seeke to right it as we may…. (4.6.64-68)

The nobles believe Edward to be “Englands scourge” (3.2.75), who, united with his lover, Gaveston, have corrupted and destroyed the realm. The nobles establish to opposing compound bodies: one body of Edward and his minions, the other body of the nobles and the realm—hence, Mortimer declares, Gaveston’s joining with Edward will “be the ruine of the realme and us” (1.2.32).

The collective body of the realm and nobles is supplemented by the commons, who figure as a subtly powerful component of the Body politic—because it is the commons, as offstage audience, who authorize sovereign power. The commons’ allegiance to the nobles is why Edward does not take swift action against them, and Mortimer in particular, when Gaveston recommends sending him to the Tower: “I dare not, for the people love him well” (2.2.234). The
combined power of the nobles and the commons is unstoppable, as Mortimer asserts, in his attempt to persuade the nobles to allow Gaveston’s recall:

For howsoever we have borne it out,

Tis treason to be up against the king.

So shall we have the people of our side,

Which for his fathers sake leane to the king,

But cannot brooke a night growne mushrump….

And when the commons and the nobles joyne,

Tis not the king can buckler Gaveston,

Weele pull him from the strongest should he hath. (1.4.280-289)

The commons, like the conceptual Body politic of which it forms a limb, are an absent-presence in the play. They are nowhere on stage, but, like the Body politic, are invoked at will to access a body of power at one’s disposal. Traditionally aligned with the King, as he is head of the Body politic, Mortimer predicts the common’s revolt against the King once his sovereign power, and consequently the Body politic, is defiled by that “mushrump” Gaveston. Throughout the play, the commons are portrayed as volatile, and because of their volatility their standing within the Body politic is rendered changeable. This factor, in conjunction with their collective power, is the reason why Mortimer signs Edward’s death: “The king must die, or Mortimer goes downe, / The commons now begin to pitie him” (5.4.1-2). The head of the Body politic needs the commons’
support. They contribute to the Body politic’s health and existence, just as the Body politic is supposed to nourish and care for them. In *Edward II*, however, the commons are not a reliable or intractable force; they are as restless as the nobles and have the potential to radically affect the stability of the Body politic. Their existence, even though they appear nowhere on stage, demonstrates that the Body politic, while conceptualized as atemporal, in fact is subject to temporality—since the components of the Body politic itself are subjects of time and live in duration.

What these performative moments of the Body politic indicate is that the Body politic is at once a body of morality, of history (conveyed as tradition), and of civic-mindedness—these are the ethical tenets of this conceptual body. The nobles are compelled to uphold the previous king’s dictate that Gaveston remain in exile; they accuse Edward and Gaveston of “tyrannize[ing] upon the Church,” the bastion of morality (1.2.3); and they chastise Edward for ignoring the commons, who have been “overstretched” with taxation and are continuously victimized by the Irish and the Scots (“The Northren borderers seeing their houses burnt, / Their wives and children slaine, run up and downe, / Cursing the name of thee and Gaveston,” Lancaster tells Edward [2.2.179-181]). The nobles champion these ethical codes and try to enforce them onto both how Edward should live his life and how he should rule the realm. The employ the word “must” to connote the necessity of their actions: “Your king hath wrongd your countrie and himself, / And we must seke to right it as we may” (4.6.67-68). Mortimer’s words to Isabella are soaked in morality; Edward has “wronged” England, while he and the other nobles

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67 After Marlowe, Shakespeare—the playwright credited for truly establish the history genre in drama—understood the significance of the commons to the health of the Body politic. I believe this is evident in his own sodomite king play, *Richard II*, when the Duke of York recounts how the common’s threw trash on Richard after he was deposed of the crown. This scene is significant to lend credence and authority to the new—and not divinely ordained—Henry IV.
will “right” these “wrongs,” because they “must”—it is their duties, as leaders of the realm. To claim that this “righting” is a “must,” or that it is done out of moral and civic obligation, is to remove all volition from the act. In other words, by asserting that he acts to correct Edward’s “wrongs” out of obligation, Mortimer effectively places himself on the “right” side of history. People with authority and power are never deemed “rebels,” but restorers of justice—as evident in the previously analyzed speech given by Isabella in 4.6 (“Successfull battells gives the God of kings / To them that fight in right and feare his wrath”).

Yet, as is evident in the play, Edward’s ethics differ from the morally infused ethics of the Body politic. He wants to live a private life, one which he shares with his male companions. He believes his happiness is tantamount to the time he is able to spend in the company of his friends—this is what makes his ethics particularly Epicurean, since Epicureans prefer a private life amongst friends instead of a politically active life in the community at large. Edward’s happiness, therefore, is tantamount to his ability to sustain his community of close friendships, and, in particular, his relationship with Gaveston. Thus, when Gaveston is exiled, for a second time, he laments, “Thou [Gaveston] from this land, I from my selfe am banisht” (1.4.1180). Gaveston is a part of him (“Thy friend, thy selfe, another Gaveston” [1.1.143])—his body is not a complex body of the politic, but a private body of the self. The Body politic relies on strong relationships between the king, as the head of the body, and the nobles, who comprise a part of that body. Edward, clearly, could care less about the nobles. Instead, the health of his body depends upon his relations to his friends, and when his friends, the politically designated “minions,” are forcibly removed from him, he feels deprived of life. For example, when Spencer and Baldock are taken from him, he pines,

O day! The last of all my blisse on earth,
Center of all misfortune. O my starres!

Why do you lower unkindly on a king?...

To take my life, my companie from me?

Here man, rip up this panting brest of mine,

And take my heart, in reskew of my friends. (4.7.62-67)

His friends are figured as part of his body, which he would eagerly exchange a part of in order to save their lives. When they are taken, Edward’s thoughts rest on death: “And go [to Killingworth] I must, life farewell with my friends” (4.7.99). Unlike Tamburlaine, Edward’s homosocial (and, arguably, homosexual) relationships are not motivated by political ambition. In fact, these friendships are cited as impediments to his kingship and are regarded as detrimental to the realm, which is how they are leveraged against him by the nobles. They are, however, beneficial to his person—his private self or Body natural—for another reason: pleasure.68 “It is our pleasure, we will have it so,” Edward happily states, as he sits Gaveston by his side on the throne, to the shock and dismay of the nobles (1.4.9). Pleasure is a desire and product of the private body, the Body natural. Pleasure does not lie within the ethics of the Body politic, especially because, in the play, pleasure and politics do not make for happy bedfellows.69

68 Deleuze and Guattari’s rendering of the BwO, I think, fits with this image of Edward’s body: “The BwO is the field of immanence of desire...(with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it)” (A Thousand Plateaus, 154). In contrast to Kelly’s call to interpret Edward’s body as rhizomatic, here another Deleuzian concept, the BwO, more appropriately portrays the significance of pleasure to Edward and his ethics.

69 Although, as we have seen, pleasure translated into the concept of sodomy, and thrust into political discourse, was a strategic ploy employed by the nobles’ in order to curtail Edward’s sovereignty. To recall Shepherd’s comments about “legitimate pleasure,” the use of “sodomy” is indicative of the nobles’ designation of Edward’s pleasure as illegitimate, as not approved by the
Edward’s ethics are concentrated around the increase of pleasure, which Edward derives from his friends, and also from such pastimes as music and poetry, as Gaveston notes of the King’s likes, “Musicke and poetrie is his delight” (1.1.54). “Therefore,” wanting to pamper his king, Gaveston gaily explains, “Ile have Italian maskes by night, / Sweete speeches, comedies, and pleasing shows,” because “[s]uch things as these best please his majestie, / My lord” (1.1.55-72).

Bredbeck regards Gaveston’s opening lines as an expression of Ovidian-inflected thoughts that idealize the desired “homoerotic reunion” with the king, which effectively “intermingle the temporal and the politic” at the very start of the play.\(^\text{70}\) I think, too, that Gaveston’s lines betray the temporality of Edward’s ethics, a temporality that reflects Edward’s Epicurean ethics as opposed to the ethics of Body politic, which, theoretically, is not and should not be affected by the impressions of time. Both Gaveston’s thoughts and Edward’s comments throughout the play indicate that the temporality of Edward’s ethics strives for a type of Ovidian, pastoral timeless—outside the time of the Body politic—in which Edward can safely escape to with Gaveston. This desired temporality reflects Edward’s distress with his extant life as king. Troni Grande, in her monograph on Marlovian tragedy, explains how Edward is bound to and suffers due to the time of the Body politic: “Edward cannot make time and desire agree.”\(^\text{71}\) From her discussion, we can infer that this disjunction between time and desire is a consequence of the time of the Body politic, represented as “history,” because “Marlowe makes history the fallen world of time from which Edward cannot escape.”\(^\text{72}\) Edward is supposed to live the time of the Body politic, and this obligation warps how he is capable of living his own time, his own ethics. He counters the

\(^\text{71}\) Troni Grande, Marlovian Tragedy, 129.
\(^\text{72}\) Ibid., 113.
timeless temporality of the Body politic by positing an idealized homoerotic timelessness—neither of which is sustainable by a mortal body that lives in duration. As a result, and since time is the foundational element of an ethics (elaborated upon in Chapter 2), Edward’s ethics are negatively affected by his double life, by the imposed time and ethics of the Body politic. Edward is bound to the time of the Body politic, so he imagines a ideal time—a time outside of time—in which to live with Gaveston. Edward’s ethics are expressed, therefore, in continual relation to the ethics of the Body politic; they seem reactive, and even, at time, childish in their petulance because he continually fights against the impositions of the nobles and of (their definition of) the Body politic.

In the end, one could argue that Edward symbolically embodies the Body politic without signifying any of its authority or power. In the final scene of the play, we witness Edward’s dead body, in its funeral hearse, addressed as “father,” by a disconsolate son. “Father” both signifies Edward’s private role, as father to his son, and, in a political context, signifies his place in the eternal Body politic. However, the Body politic is an immaterial concept, and the very material corpse on the stage effectively jars any kind of symmetry between Edward and this conceptual role. The presence of Edward’s dead, mortal, body, which is in no way required to end the play, is intended, I believe, to reinforce Edward’s abject positionality to the kingship throughout his life. This final scene epitomizes this discrepancy—between the man and the role, his ethics and its ethics, his politics, and its politics.

73 In his study of the concept of time in the Renaissance, Richard Quinones offers concurring thoughts, when he states, “the reality of time is hostile to [Edward’s] expectations and to [his] aspirations” (in Renaissance Discovery of Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 321). This statement holds true, Quinones asserts, of all kings in dramatic performance.
74 Bredbeck reads the presence of Edward II’s dead body, alongside the new king, as a performative gesture to the audience intended to indicate the continuation of the Body politic:
The play’s drama focalizes at the point of discrepancy between the contrasting ethics of the king’s two bodies: Edward’s ethics and the implicit and idealized ethics of Body politic. Edward’s desire to live his life in ways that are pleasing to him conflict with how he, as king, should live his life. Throughout the play, Edward tries to cultivate an ethics of the self that is distinct from morality, tradition and the numerous imperatives and restraints of being king. This is an ethics that esteems luxury and wantonness, of personal desires instead of political imperatives. Edward’s ethics, like the ethics of all Marlowe’s protagonists, elevate the care of the self over the needs of others. Marlowe highlights the difficulty of achieving this ethics—of putting one’s self first—when one also lives in a society where he is given a political role to play, a role which comes with a host of obligations, by featuring this quest for an ethics of the self in a play in which the protagonist is the King of England. In all his other plays, Marlowe’s protagonists are outsiders or outliers, who gladly situate themselves outside of society or who generally try to refrain from interacting with the common masses. But, in Edward II, the protagonist is the head of society and the nation. Marlowe presents the debate between the care of the self and civic obligation in the character of Edward II, who is supposed to embody and portray the concept of the king’s two bodies.

The conflict between Edward’s ethics and the implied ethics of the Body politic indirectly conveys Marlowe’s belief that history—the power of history in the forms of tradition and moral code, especially—has detrimental effects on one’s ability to create his own ethics, and his own life, free from political constraint. And, it is only fitting, and fittingly ironic, of

“The final moments of the play show Edward III accepting Mortimer’s severed head, and the closure is complete: the hubristic villain is reintegrated into a framework of fortune, fate, and order, and the validity of the body politic is reasserted in the person of a new king” (143).
Marlowe to have offered this critique in the form of a history play.\textsuperscript{75} The play’s title—“The troublesome raigne and lamentable death of Edward the second,” not “The history of Edward the second”—is significant because it connotes how Marlowe approaches the idea of history: in his play, he condenses over twenty years of events into approximately two hours of dialogue, and he manipulates factual evidence to abet the development of the play’s dramatic plot. Edward shows us that it is impossible to live (as) History, because one loses the vibrancy and movement of life in that mode of living. The concept of “history,” by definition, fixes events in (linear) time; it does not allow for disruptions, breakages, or change. History exists as time; as diachronic, it does not abide difference or unfold within duration. The Body politic is a concept that is defined by stagnancy, by permanency. To be chained to this concept is to be chained to the past, which, as Nietzsche believed, led to a depraved life of ressentiment.\textsuperscript{76} When the force of time as change, inherent in the dynamic quality of duration, is disallowed, the effect is that a body in unable to develop its ethics. The Body politic demands memory, or, in other words, it denies the Body

\textsuperscript{75} The conflation of historical events is discussed widely by critics of the play. For example, in my essay, “To Sodomize a Nation: Edward II, England, and the threat of Penetration,” I note how Marlowe made it a point—in light of Anglo-Irish tensions in the 1580s—to shipwreck Edward on Ireland instead of the historically accurate Flanders. Irving Ribner, in “Marlowe’s Edward II and the Tudor History Play,” explains, “Marlowe approached this vast storehouse of material [Holinshed, Stow, and Fabyan] with a sure awareness of his purposes and perhaps a keener dramatic skill than had ever before been exercised in a history play, for he selected out of this great mass of data only what he needed for a well integrated tragedy…. He condensed the events of almost thirty years into what appears to be about one year, although the play gives us little real indication of the passage of time. The resulting inconsistencies and chronological errors are too numerous to list, but all of Marlowe’s manipulation of his sources serves the functions of his play, and there is very little invented matter, his only significant addition to the chronicles being in Edward’s refusal to ransom old Mortimer, an invention which apparently afforded some suggestion to Shakespeare in 1 Henry IV.” (\textit{ELH} 22.4 (Dec., 1955): 245)

natural the ability to forget the past, because it is the past that defines the Body politic. Edward must remember the past in order to be an effective king—and, as seen throughout the play, Edward’s desire to forget his kingly duties is met with resistance from the nobles, who demand that the king remember his duties, which include an allegiance to them, not Gaveston: “We know our duties, let him know his peers” (1.4.23). But Edward finds it impossible to be king and to live his own private life simultaneously, because, in order to live the latter, he must forget the Body politic.

Here Foucault’s idea of ethics reemerges as an insightful source for understanding Edward II and Edward the man, and his ethics. For Foucault, a body must possess a certain amount of freedom in order to be able to cultivate an ethics. Edward seeks this freedom, but the nobles dominate him and effectively negate Edward’s ability to maintain the amount of freedom necessary to sustain his desired lifestyle. Edward tries repeatedly throughout the play to shirk the Body politic—to “forget” his duties to the nobles and to the realm—in order to live his own life. His role as head of the Body politic prevents this freedom, and, therefore, prevents Edward from creating and living an ethics of his own desires. In light of Chapter 3, we could also establish a correlation between freedom and space, in that the idea of freedom connotes an abundance of space. I think the binding forces of the past, presented in the play in the conceptual Body politic, are why Ian McAdam contends “Marlowe’s Edward II is a tragedy about the

77 My reading resonates with Katherine A. Sirluck’s reading of the play in “Marlowe’s Edward II and the Pleasure of Outrage”: “Edward’s choice of a lover isolates him, emphasizing his choice of personal freedom over political stability…. Edward wants to assert the absoluteness of rule through asserting the absoluteness of his personal will. At the same time, it is the constricting absoluteness of the role he is required to play as king which infuriates him” (MLS 22.2 (Spring, 1992): 19).
failure of self-fashioning.” 78 To borrow from Kantorowicz, and, in opposition to Kantorowicz, Edward II could be deemed “the tragedy of the King’s Two Bodies.” 79 Marlowe’s take on history in Edward II demonstrates how detrimental history can be if it is held too tightly. History—in the conceptual body of the Body politic, in the form of moral or civic obligation, or in the form of tradition—prevents an ethics of the self, because it denies the self the absolute freedom necessary to create an ethics unadulterated by the influence of outside forces. While an ethics of the care of the self is created among the society of men, as we see in the case of Edward II, the self must have the freedom to attend to caring for itself. Marlowe’s protagonists ensure this freedom by abstaining from the society of men, and what we see in Edward II is the protagonist’s inability to abstain, because he is the King of England. Marlowe shows that, while politics is unavoidable, especially for Edward II, one is able to create his own politics in relation to his own ethics. Edward’s politics radically breaks from the politics of the state because it is self-directed and one that emerges from an ethics based on satisfying the needs of the self; needs directed to and towards expanding pleasure.

79 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 26—this is an assertion that he makes about Shakespeare’s Richard II.
Affective Instrumentality in *The Jew of Malta* and *The Massacre at Paris*

The “materials,” or components, of a Marlovian Ethics include bodies, actions, and, as I will examine in this chapter, affect. As analyzed in previous chapters, from *Faustus* to *Edward II*, Marlowe’s protagonists share the desire to acquire more freedom—and, correspondingly, more power and control—over their bodies. In order to convey to the audience what their bodies are “capable of,” or, in order to increase their freedom—to become more powerful, more intelligent, more capable of becoming something different than before—Marlowe’s protagonists form alliances with other performative bodies. Thus, while Marlowe’s protagonists tend to shun society, they do not completely abstain from it for this reason: bodily engagement—whether that body is human or not—is imperative to their prosperity. The Epicurean tendency of Marlowe’s protagonists to congregate amongst a self-selected society of friends makes a Marlovian Ethics possible. The ethics espoused through the protagonists’ performances is one that demonstrates how affective forces both compel their bodies to act and direct their movements among the other bodies on stage. These affective forces are perceptible in their bodies—in Chapter 2, I articulated this force as apparent in Faustus’s vitalized body becoming “spirit”—and in their actions. The result, for example, of Faustus establishing a contractual relationship with Mephistopheles is that he becomes imbued with the demon’s other-worldly powers; by becoming spirit in “forme and substance,” Faustus is capable of “magical” feats. Tamburlaine, via his martial alliance with the noble seeming Theridamas, not only acquires Theridamas’s militaristic bodies (his troops, his horses, his equipment), but he also becomes more powerful, more “noble,” via this affiliation. In
Edward’s case, his overtly homoerotic relationship with Gaveston gives him more than just sexual satisfaction. Gaveston, like Edward’s other minions, seems to have given Edward the confidence to rebuff the nobles’ challenges; the minions come to figure as the perverse body that buttresses Edward’s Body politic. These relationships—contractual, militaristic, sexual, and political—compel and assist in the protagonists’ continual self-becoming onstage.

The Deleuzian concept of becoming, which, I argue, figures as one of the primary ethical undercurrents at work within Marlovian drama, manifests in performance as a character’s ability to act and to effect ends via those actions that are, in turn, conducive to that character’s becoming. The “art of ethics” is drama: the long-standing connection between the theater and ethics—visible from Plato and Aristotle forward—is predicated on the significance given to bodies, to their movement, and to the affects emergent from bodily interactions. In his second book on Spinoza’s Ethics, Deleuze asserts that “the art of [ethics and] the Ethics” itself consists of:

organizing good encounters, composing actual relations, focusing power, experimenting.”

Influenced by both Nietzsche and Foucault, Deleuze acknowledges the aesthetic element of an ethics, the “stylizations” that essentially come to define the daily techne that comprise an “ethics.” “It’s the styles of life involved in everything that make us this or that,” is Deleuze’s statement that deliberately shows the inherent connection between

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aesthetics and ethics. \(^2\) The “styles of life” can also describe the movements on stage, where verbal and physical actions are “dramatized”—as a kind of stylization—in performance. Stylized actions, which, on a conceptual level, comprise an ethics, can also define, on the level of performance, the dramatic form. Onstage, Marlowe gives us bodily “encounters,” and he “compose[s] actual relations” in order to show how his characters are able to “focus [their] power,” and thereby “experiment” with modes of becoming, which we witness as performance.

Vitalizing the “stylizations” through performance—on stage and in life—is the force known as affect. In what follows, I will explore how affect functions to imbue characters with the ability to act—to organize “good encounters,” compose “actual relations,” and focus their “power,” expanding their bodily freedom and investing them with the power to “experiment” in becoming. In other words, affect is the currency of drama, passing between, among, over, and through the performative bodies onstage and the witnessing bodies that comprise the audience. According to Spinoza and Deleuze, affect (inscribed on the body as “affection”) catalyzes action and concomitantly renders the body open to being affected. As Spinoza writes in his *Ethics*,

> By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.…”\(^3\)

Affect is a pre-subjective force; affection is the trace of affect on the body. Spinoza states that affect, as affection, is readable through its effect on a body’s potential to act and be

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acted on. Referencing the *Ethics*, Deleuze elaborated upon this definition of affect in order to convey its ethical implications:

Good and bad...are the two sense of the variation of the power of acting: the decrease of this power (sadness) is bad; its increase (joy) is good (Ethics, IV, 41). Objectively, then, everything that increases or enhances our power of acting is good, and that which diminishes or restrains it is bad.... Since the power of acting is what opens the capacity for being affected to the greatest number of things, a thing is good 'which so disposes the body that it can be affected in a greater number of ways' (IV, 38).... *What is good is any increase of the power of acting. From this viewpoint, the formal possession of this power of acting, and of knowing, appears as the summum bonum*....

While a pre-subjective affective force is never capable of being contained by a single body, affect's effect is that it can either augment or diminish a body's capacity to act, to engage, and to connect to other bodies. Spinoza answers Deleuze’s rhetorical question: What the “body is capable of” depends upon the force and primacy of affect.

Because of affect’s power over action, it has an immediate ethical quality: “What is *good* is any increase of the power of acting.” The power to act is the power to express one’s power (or, desire) to the limits of one’s ability. Deleuze explains the ethical import further in his first book on Spinoza when he elaborates on Spinoza’s idea of “conatus,” which he defines as “identical with our power of acting”: “ethical difference...relates to the kind of affection that determines our conatus...,” which [the conatus] is...always

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4 Deleuze, *Spinoza*, 71-72; emphasis added.
identical with our power of acting itself.” The concept of the conatus is significant to the connection between affect and ethics because it is, as Deleuze conceives it, the machine by which affect becomes cognitized affection, which, in turn is relied upon in the making of one’s ethics. Affect is ethical in its ability to influence action. That is, we live or style our lives in relation to the affections that we feel to be “good” to our living. Deleuze then asserts that a body’s power to act is made cognizant to that body, and, via communication, to other bodies, as “desire.” According to Sarah Ahmed, affect, once established as a mode of affection and cognitively processed as an emotional desire, predisposes us to certain orientations or relations, because “[t]o be affected by something is to evaluate that thing…. We move toward and away from objects through how we are affected by them.” To “evaluate” is to impart a value, and here Ahmed’s estimation exposes the implicit connection between the ethics of Aristotle, Locke, Spinoza, and Deleuze—philosophers she culls from in her essay—in order to convey the connection between affect and ethics, with the former functioning as the guiding force that works throughout the continuing cultivation of an ethics. Deleuze comprehends the guiding force of affect, in Negotiations, as evidence that what one values—what one incorporates into an ethics—is also immanent to one’s expression of power via bodily action:

5 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 261, 231. The conatus, for Deleuze, is “identical with our power of acting,” as the cognition of affection, and for this reason he interprets it as synonymous with desire, which is indeed “felt,” a subjective feeling (231).
6 Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth offer a similar definition of affect, and of affect’s ethical pulse, in the introduction to their recent Affect Theory Reader: “Affect…is the name we give to those forces—visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension… Affect can be understood then as a gradient of bodily capacity” (“An Inventory of Shimmers,” Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1-2).
“standards of value are internal or immanent: to live well is to fully express one’s power, to go to the limits of one’s potential.”\textsuperscript{8} Affect is inherently a-moral; it is force, not value, although affect can become imbued with value once it has been rendered by the mind as an emotion. The relation between affect and ethics, therefore, indicates that the actions that constitute an ethics can also be figured as inherently a-moral, since they are determined by the effects of affects on the body—how the affects become bodily affections, and how they are in turn reasoned by the body as emotion.\textsuperscript{9} It is for this reason that Deleuze, working from Spinoza’s treatise, declares that ethics are not “right or wrong” (moral) but “good or bad.”

The translation of this philosophy to the Marlovian stage is seamless: on Marlowe’s stage, relations are ethically “good” when they augment the protagonist’s ability to act upon others as well as upon himself. Correlatively, relations are ethically “bad” when they diminish a body’s ability to act. In the theater, affect is the currency which circulates among the players and the playgoers, and is that which underlies the dynamic energy manifest in performance. According to Elizabeth Wissinger, affect

Troubles the very distinction between self and others…. [A]ffects are not “within or without” the body; rather, they create the very affect of the

\textsuperscript{9} Elizabeth Wissinger explains the significance of affect in influencing one’s ethics in her essay, “Always on Display: Affective Production in the Modeling Industry”: affection, the “flow of affect” “is a reaction that occurs before the direction of aims and objects, that is, before there is individual desire or interpretation, before the affective flow is narrated as an affective state in a particular body. [The] effect of affective flow is always indeterminate until after it is registered and narrated as a physical state” (in \textit{The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social}, ed. P. Clough with J. Halley (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2007), 238). In short, the ethical choices made are effects of affects that traverse the body and which then register as affection.
surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds. Affectivity occurs between bodies, between psychological arousal and the conscious realization of it by bodies. *Affect is social in that it constitutes a contagious energy*, an energy that can be whipped up or dampened in the course of interaction.\(^\text{10}\)

The power of affect is that it is “contagious”—it can infect an entire audience, hence affect has a social productivity as a trans-subjective force with the capacity to “touch” multiple persons simultaneously. It is a social force that can affect many but can be contained by none. To evoke Deleuze, it directly affects a body’s power to act and therefore is expressed through performance, in the verbal and physical actions of the characters onstage.

This power to act can also be expressed via a character’s ability to control other bodies, to use them in order to advance themselves—a strategy employed by all Marlowe’s protagonists. Thus far, I have analyzed how his protagonists work with and join with other bodies to their advantage, and, in most instances, I have simply designated this joining as a “relationship” between bodies, or, often times, a “friendship.” In the previous chapter in particular I asserted, via Foucault, that the care of the self includes intensifying pre-existing relations, but that, in the case of Edward II, one must possess a certain amount of freedom in order to do so. With the exception of Edward and Gaveston’s explicit homoerotic relationship, friendship in Marlowe’s plays can be conceived as vastly different from traditional, virtuous, Ciceronian notions of friendship prevalent throughout the sixteenth century. For Cicero, as he details in his *De Amicitia* has well as his *De Officiis*, friendship prescribes a mutual benefit for both parties of *equal*

\(^{10}\) Wissinger, 232; emphasis added.
standing; a virtuous individual becomes more virtuous, more noble, as a result of his friendship with another individual who is considered equally virtuous and noble.

Friendship, the central theme of the treatise entitled the same, is defined as a joining of two people “with mutual goodwill and affection.”\(^{11}\) Cicero elaborates on the benefits of friendship in *De Officiis*:

> But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none more noble, none more powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in intimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends to the one in whose character it seems to dwell. And while every virtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good men; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the result is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are united in one. Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of kind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the ties of an enduring intimacy.\(^{12}\)


\(^{12}\) Cicero, *De Officiis*, 55-56.
For Cicero, as for the humanists who adopted his work in the sixteenth century, friendship was in large part an inherent aspect of humanity; humans are naturally inclined to fellowship—and therefore, as many humanists asserted (see Chapter 4), the development of politics and of political communities were naturally occurring creations of humanity. In *De Amicitia*, Cicero explains, friendship is not regarded as an act of kindness or as an investment, but “follow[s as] a natural inclination to liberality; so we look on friendship as worth trying for,” not because we are attracted to it by the expectation of ulterior gain, but in the conviction that what it has to give us is from first to last included in the feeling itself:

Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford.¹³

Marlowe’s views on friendship could not be more different, as we have seen. In *The Jew of Malta*, Marlowe’s view of friendship, like politics, is anything but an innate, natural inclination; instead, any relation between two characters that acquires a duration is one that, initially forged by affect, is maintained because of the positive affections of that relation. His protagonists use other bodies for their purposes; these relationships do not occur between equals, nor are these relationships predetermined by the “humanity” of the individual. These relationships, I will argue, are instrumental to the protagonists’ objectives, including their ethics. Barabas’s plain statement epitomizes, I think, Marlowe’s anti-Ciceronian view on friendship: “And he from whom my most advantage

¹³ Cicero, *De Amicitia*. 139.
comes, / Shall be my friend” (5.2.115-116). Barabas deems “friendship”—his idea of friendship—contingent upon the “advantage” he receives from the initial interaction between himself and another body, and for Barabas this advantage usually is translated into quantitative, monetary terms. As with all Marlowe’s protagonists, a momentary interaction becomes a relationship—consisting of a longer duration—if it is beneficial to that protagonist.

In this chapter, I want to analyze the bodily relations between the protagonist and other performative bodies, not in familiar terms of friendship, but within the ethical and affective domains of instrumentality via a reading of *The Jew of Malta* and *The Massacre at Paris*—Marlowe’s two plays that demonstrate how to capitalize (financially, politically, or otherwise) upon the instrumentality of bodies to one’s advantage. The connection between affect and instrumentality is that both directly affect a body’s power to act. An instrument can assist or hinder the user; it can be incorporated into the user’s daily life as a part of his ethics. The instrument is a performative device that literalizes the power of affect on stage, and, in this regard, the instrument becomes affective in its ability to affect the protagonist. It also, when joined with the user, expands the affective domain of the user’s body, thereby expanding that body’s horizon of affective potential—increasing that body’s capacity to be affected. (In Chapter 3, I presented a similar argument when I analyzed the affective spatiality of Tamburlaine’s body in relation to the concurrent creation of ethics and spaces.) The Marlovian ethic at work in these plays depends upon the efficacious use of instruments to improve one’s ability to act. Drama is then the “art of ethics,” and instruments come into play when “organizing good encounters, composing actual relations, focusing powers, [and] experimenting.” My
analysis will therefore focus on how instruments work and on how the protagonists—
Barabas in *The Jew*, and the Duke, in *The Massacre*—harness and employ these
instruments to their advantage. Furthermore, both these protagonists utilize the
ideological body of religion for their respective objectives; they don religion as a guise to
further their own respective purpose. Marlowe’s use and abuse of religion is not unique
to these plays; it is a theme that figures variably throughout his drama, but in no other
play does it function so centrally to the cultivation of the protagonists’ success. Marlowe
perverts the idea of religion as an instrumental good by demonstrating its value to
achieving one’s final ends—but the ends of these two protagonists are not in the slightest
sense moral. In this regard, Marlowe offers a cultural critique via his protagonists’ use of
religion for their own personal gain. This a-moral critique, moreover, is one that
challenges traditional understandings of justice and revenge, as I will discuss later in this
chapter.

The use of instruments to improve one’s ability to act has been discussed in
ethical discourse, appearing as early as Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*—widely read
during the English Renaissance—and the ethical, political, and moral uses of instruments
(and machinery in general) were widely debated during this period.† Aristotle regarded

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† The various uses of machinery and instruments, and how they contributed to English
Renaissance intellectual culture, is the focus of Jessica Wolfe’s exemplary *Humanism,
Machinery, and Renaissance Literature*. She provides an almost taxonomic overview of
the lexical, political, ethical, and moral implications of the emergence of machinery in the
16th century. She even offers an analysis of *The Jew of Malta*: “*The Jew of Malta*
explores the political and moral exigencies of instrumental means through mechanical
instruments, and the most demonic manifestations of Barabas’ means-based political
strategy are his machines…” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 121). Her
reading of *The Jew of Malta* holds a topical similarity to mine, but my argument differs
from hers in that I analyze the affective potential of mortal instruments in relation to
Barabas’s ethics. As well, I refrain from judgment (“the most demonic manifestations of
the efficaciousness with which one uses instruments as contributive to an ethics, in particular, to an individual’s ability to achieve “ultimate happiness.” “Instrumental goods,” he writes, describe those goods that function as instrumental to a person’s happiness; without these “external goods…it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments…. [Therefore, some goods] must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments.”

Aristotle indicates that the affective quality of instruments lies in their ability to assist the individual in doing “noble acts,” which comprise a noble ethics. He also explains that instruments can be both animate and inanimate, but he esteems mortal instruments for possessing the greater capacity to do work. In his discussion of the necessity of instruments and, in particular, the import of slaves “for maintaining life” in the Politics, he writes: “Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; …for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument.”

Aristotle’s influence is evident in Spinoza’s Ethics, when the latter declares, “By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.” An instrument can be attributed with a positive ethical value (of “good” or “noble”) if it increases an individual’s ability to act, whereby there exists a correlation between one’s ability to act. Similarly, as we will see particularly in The Jew of Malta, instruments possess the potential to fail. Jessica Wolfe summarizes the concerns

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17 Spinoza, Ethics, 116.
about the effectiveness of (here, political) instruments in “Renaissance culture at large[:]
Either they fail to transmit their messages properly, eroding a ruler’s confidence in his instruments, or they convey information too accurately, duplicating their principal with eerie precision and thus effacing the precious distinction between a ruler and his instruments.”18

In this study of Barabas’s ethics, I will specifically address two questions: Why does Barabas use instruments, and what do they allow him to do? My analysis significantly departs from critical studies of the play, which have traditionally aimed to produce historicized understandings of Barabas’s minority status within Christian-ruled Malta, and how his intentional manipulation of his religious alterity unveils the network of power coursing throughout the play. At the fore of this strand of criticism is Stephen Greenblatt’s “Marlowe, Marx, and Anti-Semitism,” in which he identifies Barabas as “his society’s most-hated enemy and its most characteristic product.”19 In addition, while Barabas’s instrumental means denote his Machiavellian influence, my reading is not concerned with the extent to which he is indeed Machiavellian.20 My perception of

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20 Irving Ribner presents the most sustained reading of Machiavelli in *The Jew* in his 1954 essay “Marlowe and Machiavelli.” The popular stage Machiavel presented in *The Jew*, he explains, was a fusion of two dramatic traditions: “the Senecan ‘villian-hero’, and
Barabas’s Machiavellian tendencies as descriptive of his adept use of instruments coincides with Jessica Wolfe’s reading: “To an Elizabethan audience, Barabas’s training as an engineer would have intensified his association with the devious polymorphousness of the stage Machiavel. Engineers are commonly depicted during the Renaissance as chameleon-like and cunning by virtue of the intricate, flexible machines they design as well as their tendency to shift patrons, countries, or political loyalties.”

My analysis of *The Jew of Malta* resembles Wolfe’s in its focus on instruments; however, I am interested more in how these (mortal) instruments affect Barabas’s ethics and not in his place in the political economy of Malta.

that of vice of the morality and the devil of the miracle plays. Marlowe, with Kyd, was among the most important perpetuators of this ‘pseudo-Machiavellian’ burlesque stage tradition. Its relation to Machiavelli’s political doctrine does not go much beyond its borrowing of the Florentine’s name” (in *Comparative Literature* 6.4 (Autumn, 1954): 350). Patrick Cheney succinctly outlined the three conclusions generally drawn about Machiavelli in the play: “in ‘Machavell,’ Marlowe invents his own stage figure, which neither is nor tries to be faithful to the real Machiavelli; in Barabas, Marlowe creates a Machiavellian villain who eventually gets out-Machiavelled by Ferneze, ‘the master Machiavellian’...; and in *The Jew* Marlowe creates a new genre, whether ‘farce’ or not. On how *The Jew* repeatedly suggests alternative forms of tragedy...” (in *Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession: Ovid, Spenser, Counter-Nationhood* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), fn.5 pg. 303). I personally enjoy Richard Wilson’s blunt statement: “it took New Historicists to infer that when Marlowe pretended to be reading from Niccoló Machiavelli, he was in fact quoting Michel Foucault” (“’Writ in blood’: Marlowe and the new historicists,” in *Constructing Christopher Marlowe*, eds. J.A. Downie and J.T. Parnell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 116).

This position distinctly contrasts to that espoused in Wolfe’s book-length cultural examination of the machine in Renaissance England, whereby her intentions are to excavate the political economy within which Barabas “the engineer” functions in order to determine his political agency. Wolfe interprets Barabas as a person unable to resist “the pervasive instrumentality of [the play’s] political culture,” whereby the consequence of this “political instrumentalism” is that it “strips its practitioners of their agency, individuality, or integrity” (Ibid., 119-120). I read Barabas’s use of instruments as producing the opposite effects—as being ultimately productive pace the productivity of the Deleuzian machine, which becomes via the joining of bodies, which, as its own entity, is “capable of acting” differently, with a greater capability and at a greater
Barabas offers answers to the two questions noted in the above paragraph in the first scene of the play. When the curtain rises, the audience finds Barabas “in his Counting-house, with heapes of gold before him” (1.1.SD), similar to the way we discover Faustus in his study amongst his books. Unlike Faustus, who craves knowledge (and thus is fittingly surrounded by his books), Barabas craves wealth; his ethics work towards this endgame: to “inclose / Infinite riches in a little roome” (1.1.37-38). In this first scene, Barabas presents a two-part discourse on the self: in a Deleuzian context, we could say the first part (1.1.1-48) is a description of his life and what his body has been capable of (to recall Spinoza’s assertion that a body is defined by what it is capable of), and the second part (1.1.101-139) is an exposition of his ethics and life philosophy. In the first part of his soliloquy, Barabas relates his worldly network of mercantile relations as “the ware wherein consists [his] wealth” (1.1.33). Barabas exists at an intersection “of traffique from the vulgar trade,” from which he derives—or, “breeds”—his wealth (1.1.35). His body seems expansive; his mercantile arms—his ships—traverse the seas, buying, exchanging, and selling goods around the world. His dominance and power within this “vulgar trade” is evident in the face that everyone knows him as “the Jew of Malta”: “Goe tell ‘em the Jew of Malta sent thee, man / Tush, who amongst ‘em knows not Barrabas?,” is his retort to the first merchant’s statement that he himself does not have enough credit to bring Barabas’s ships ashore (1.1.67-68). The instruments he employs to accrue wealth are the bodies that transport the items (his ships and servants)

intensity, than one body alone (recall Deleuze’s famous example of the cyclist, who is a machine comprised of one man and one bicycle). She also has a tendency to moralize his actions; in constrast—as my Marlowe is Deleuzian and hence a Marlovian Ethics by definition is devoid of morality—my analysis refuses to evaluate his actions via an implicit moral hierarchy. See also fn. 14.
and the bodies that enable the transactions (the merchants). At the present, he is awaiting
the arrival of his “Argosie from Alexandria, / Loaden with Spice and Silkes” (1.1.44-45).
Even though an outlier in Malta, Barabas maintains a powerful stature within the
mercantile world. His “hope” for its safe arrival with its goods in place connotes the
affective element of his mercantile enterprise, since he is (materially/financially) invested
in its safe passage. He questions the first merchant twice for reassurance about their safe
arrival: “The ships are safe thou sayst, and richly fraught” (1.1.55). For Barabas, affect is
experienced in quantitative terms; his emotions (affections rendered intelligently)
bespeak his financial status.

While rehearsing the network of his mercantile interactions, Barabas elaborates
upon the affective significance of his wealth in the second part of his soliloquy, in which
he delineates his ethics in contrast to the Christian society in which he operates:

Thus trowles our fortune in by land and Sea,
And thus are wee on every side inrich’d….  
Who hateth me but for my happinesse?
Or who is honour’d now but for his wealth?
Rather had I a Jew be hated thus,
Then pittied in a Christian poverty:
For I can see no fruits in all their faith,
But malice, falsehood, and excessive pride,
Which methinks fits not their profession.
Happily some haplesse man hath conscience,
And for his conscience lives in beggery….
I, wealthier farre then any Christian.

I must confess we [Jews] come not to be Kings….

I have no charge, nor many children,

But one sole Daughter, whom I hold as deare

As Agamemnon did his Iphigen…. (1.1.103-138)

Barabbas intuits the connection between wealth and emotion; wealth carries an affective charge: Some may “hate” him because of his “happiness,” which is tantamount to his financial success, while others may “honor” him for the same reason. He then establishes a correlation between wealth and religion. He “can see no [lucrative] fruits” in Christianity, as Christians live “in beggary” as demanded by their faith. He would rather be hated by the masses as a Jew than loved, through compassionate “pity,” as a poor Christian, who takes “excessive pride” in his poor, pitiful condition. For Barabbas, it is clear that he is indifferent to others’ estimation of him; he is not affected by their hate, and, as long as he is able to continue to live as he pleases (under “peacefull rule” [1.1.134]), his affective wellbeing is only determined by his wealth. Barabbas’s ethics is “the sense of cents”: the affections rendered by the flow and accumulation of money. His wealth, in other words, is the only thing he cares for, since it directly affects him—this significance of this ethic is highlighted by Barabbas’s closing remarks about his daughter, who he, like Agamemnom, appears willing to sacrifice if necessary.

Unlike the Christians, who take flagellatory pleasure in living in poverty and who are loved for doing so, Barabbas’s religion, which casts him at the margins of Maltese society, enables his acquisition of wealth. His “alien” status benefits his earning potential (this is the argumentative heart of Bartels’s reading of Barabbas’s subversive
performativity). Julia Reinhard Lupton accurately identifies Barabas’s outsider, “anti-civic” position:

Barabas, like Shylock after him, flourishes in the realm of pre-political association and exchange that make up what political theorists and social scientists call “civil society”—the modes of informal affiliation and negotiation that shape the give and take of the stock market and the coffee house, the university and the brothel, the trade union and the country club. Excluded from civic life, Barabas…flourishes in the realm of civil society. Although both words pertain to the life of the city, and often function interchangeably, the civic refers more precisely to the political participation of citizens in the official rule of the polis, whereas the civil refers to those social, economic, and domestic associations, civilian rather than civic, that exist outside the operation of the political per se. It is within the civil space of economic and social exchange that Barabas engineers, manipulates, and falls out of different forms of private association with Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Group in their own communities and furthering their economic interests, the Jews become symbols of both self-interest and special-interests, giving a recognizable face and a social body to the dynamic yet disintegrative effects of capitalism as the traditional fabric of communal life.23

Lupton’s insight derives from a reading of Barabas’s character, but I think it applies to most of Marlowe’s protagonists (save Edward II, who is born into civic life, although he loathes it immensely, desiring instead to “become civilian”). Barabas flourishes in civil, rather than civic, society; he profits most from the mercantilism that operates outside the domain of Maltan law. Thus, it is when Barabas is interpolated into civic society by Ferneze that he loses all his wealth. I agree with Lupton’s assertion that Barabas “flourishes in the realm of pre-political association,” but I believe that the basic plot of the play confounds her reading: Ferneze’s decision to tax the Jews in order to pay Malta’s “ten yeares tribute past” to the Turks demonstrates that the civil and civic distinction is theoretical and that it is impossible to live outside the civic or political domain. While Barabas happily lives as an outsider to civic society because he begets his wealth by living as an outsider, he is interpellated into that society (as the rich Jew who must be taxed for his innate sins) by Malta’s political leaders, who depend upon the outsider to save their Christian nation. And, before he even enters the Counsell-house to be told of this “taxation,” Barabas is aware of how the Christians perceive him as a body of wealth in his final soliloquy of the first scene, whereby he vows to “warily gar[d] that which I ha got” (1.1.188).

The plot of *The Jew of Malta* catalyzes at the moment Ferneze seizes Barabas’s wealth—this, within the genre of revenge, is the act that “wrongs” the protagonist, thereby compelling the protagonist to seek justice, also known as revenge. Ferneze gives an ultimatum to the (four) Jews of Malta: they must pay one half of each their estates or else “shal straight become a Christian” (1.2.73). Furthermore, if anyone refuses to give half or to convert, then he “shall absolutely lose al he has” (1.2.75). The First Knight does
not dissemble with Barabas, plainly telling him that they know he is “a monied man, /
And ‘tis thy mony, Barabas, we seeke” because Malta’s political survival—as a Christian nation—is dependent upon it (1.2.53-54). Addressing Barabas, Ferneze rationalizes his decision via a kind of Christianized, pre-modern notion of utilitarianism:

…Jew, we take particularly thine
To save the ruine of a multitude:
And better one want for a common good,

Then many perish for a private man…. (1.2.96-99)

Ferneze’s logic betrays an explicitly Christian—and, in Marlowe’s time, humanist—ethic: concern for the welfare of the common good supersedes the welfare of the individual. It is an ethic directly at odds with the central Marlovian ethic that advocates the opposite—the care of the self always is prioritized over the care of the masses—that is embodied by every Marlovian protagonist, especially Barabas, who emphasizes that he will only “looke…unto [his] selfe” (1.1.173). Ferneze understands this taxation as a form of justice, since he, along with the other Christians of Malta, have tolerated the Jews’ co-existence with them: “For through our suffrance of your hatefull lives, / Who stand accursed in the sight of heaven, / These taxes and afflictions are befal’ne” (1.2.64-66). Justice is defined and implemented in Christian terms, since Malta is ruled by Christians; it is the body in power that determines legal and moral concepts such as justice, a fact that Barabas fully comprehends when he says, “What? bring you Scripture to confirm your wrongs?” (1.2.110). 24 Barabas is enraged by Ferneze’s actions, and the knights of

24 It is in moments like this one that critics have read Barabas’s story as a type of perverse or inverted Christian parable. This reading is offered most adeptly by John Parker in his recent study The Aesthetics of AntiChrist: From Christian Drama to
Malta quickly seize his wealth and his house: “the goods / And wares of Barabas, which being valued / Amount to more than all the wealth in Malta” (1.2.132-134). Deprived of his “wealth, the labour of [his] life,” he asks Ferneze for death (to “bereave [his] life” [1.2.148, 144]), but Barabas soon resolves to “rouse [his] senses, and awake [his] selfe” (1.2.269) and recover his wealth.

Barabas’s wealth is his life-blood—affect may be the currency of the theater, but, in *The Jew of Malta*, currency itself the affective élan vital, if you will, that drives Barabas’s will to live. Without his wealth, he has no will to live and, expressing his shock at this sudden loss, “knows no meanes of his recoverie” from this “great injur[y]” (1.2.205-208). The loss of his wealth is a bodily injury, since his wealth is the affective currency of his life. Barabas, out of sheer determination, rouses his senses—of the affective remembrances of monies past (because affection can linger within a body even though the affect has passed)—in order to gather the motivation to avenge the wrongs done to him and to repossess his wealth. It is at this point in *The Jew*, when Barabas declares his determination to live and to regain his wealth, that the device of the mortal instrument comes into play. Abigail enters onstage precisely at this moment, empathizing with her father’s loss. But he advises her that passive emotions are ineffective means to repossessing his wealth: “Abigail, things past recovery / Are hardly cur’d with

*Christopher Marlowe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). See also Howard S. Babb’s “Policy in Marlowe’s *The Jew of Malta*” (*ELH* 24.2 (June, 1957): 85-94) and Troni Grande’s “To Save the Ruin of a Multitude: *The Jew of Malta* and *The Massacre at Paris*”, in her monograph on Marlowe, *Marlovian Tragedy*, 140-162—the latter of which is a continuation of Grande’s argument about how Marlowe dilates the tragic endings of his plays, but which also offers an account of the tragic scapegoat in both Christian and Hebrew tradition.
exclamations” (1.2.236-237). Yet, Barabas contrives a way to make Abigail productive, or conducive to the re-acquisition of his wealth. He decides to employ his daughter as an instrument in his plot to recover his wealth; asking her to “[b]e rul’d by [him] in this complot; she consents, replying “[w]hat will not Abigaill attempt?” (1.2.272, 276). Her verbal agreement is essential for Barabas to place his trust in her fidelity and her corresponding actions. An instrument must prove trustworthy and reliable; having her word, Barabas divulges his plot to her: she must recover the “ten thousand Portagues,” in addition to various jewels, which has been hidden in the floorboards of his house—now, in the possession of the Christians, turned into a nunnery. Therefore she must “become [a] nun”; Barabas order her to become “good dissemble[r]” and feign desire for entrance into the nunnery (1.2.290). That this act of dissembling takes on a religious façade bespeaks Barabas’s regard for instrumentality of religion to be wielded for his purposes: “for religion,” he asserts, “[h]ides many mischieves from suspition” (1.2.282-283). Religion comes in many guises, from Christian and Jewish in this play, to, as we will see, Catholic and Protestant in *The Massacre at Paris*. Living in Malta and being subject to Maltan law, Barabas has learned that cloaking motives in the guise of religion—by mimicking the Christians who populate Malta—is effective, so he utilizes this strategy as recourse to the Christians’ actions. Like attracts like: so is the motto that the Christians apparently abide by throughout the play, who willingly accept Abigail not once but twice into their nunnery, and who are gullible enough to believe Barabas’s feigned desire to

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25 Barabas is more Deleuzian than he is aware of, for Deleuze himself maintains that “passive force asserts nothing…. Our power of suffering is in fact our impotence, our servitude, that is to say, the lowest degree of our power of acting” (in *Expressionism*, 223-224). Abigail’s “exclamations” are articulated passive forces, and these articulations, Barabas attests, are not productive—“that is to say,” they convey a low “degree of acting” since exclamations alone do not effect wealth as their product.
become a “convertite.” The brilliance, and the cunning, of Barabas is that he comprehends how religion functions in society; as a body that can be appropriated donned as a role or assumed as an identity (much like the Body politic in *Edward II*), religion can thus be wielded as a powerful, pervasive, and subtle instrument.²⁶

Barabas, for his part, goes into hiding during Abigail’s assignment because he intuits the suspicion that would arise if he were to remain in Abigail’s presence: “No, Abigall, in this / It is no necessary I be seene. / For I will seeme offended with thee for’t” (1.2.301-303). An instrument can work even if the master is nowhere present, which Aristotle praises as one of a mortal instrument’s virtues; according to Wolfe: “a servant [as instrument] is so completely ruled by the will of his master that even outside the presence of his authority, that authority exerts itself upon the servant as seamlessly as an impressed force passes across a lever.”²⁷ Abigail performs Barabas’s will, begging the friar via an invocation of Christian sympathy to “pitty the state of a distressed Maid” (1.2.315; emphasis added). Pity, thy name is Christianity. Abigail is admitted into the nunnery and succeeds in recovering Barabas’s hidden wealth that night. Elated (“My gold, my fortune, my felicity” [2.1.48]) by her success, he calls her “the first beginner of

²⁶ The body of religion is an ideological one; it is immaterial but obtains a materiality when it is expressed in a material, physical body (in the body of an actor on stage, for example). Religion is a body in the Spinozist/Deleuzian sense in that it is affective and can be affected; it can be manipulated and used as a coercive force. Being wielded thus demonstrates its existence as a body as it is performed in a body onstage. In the second book of the Discourses, Machiavelli explains how religion can be used (like an instrument) by “princes and heads of republics” in order to keep their people “well conducted and united” (Chapter XII of The Discourses, in *The Prince and The Discourses* (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 150). In the following chapter (XIII), he rehearses a story about how “Romans employed religion for the purpose of reorganizing their city, and to further their enterprises” when its citizens became unruly (153; emphasis added).

[his] bliss” (2.1.50)—she is the instrument which has positively affected him by returning his wealth to him. In a short span of two scenes, Barabas informs us, he has “become as wealthy as [he] was…in spite of these swine-eating Christians” (2.3.12.7), but, unable to “soone forget an injury,” he vows further revenge—this time, on the lives of Ferneze and his son, Lodowick (2.3.19).

For this revenge, Barabas requires a more sinister tool, especially since his complot includes Abigail’s love, Don Mathias. Her affections, Barabas knows, would impair her from carrying out his will. As a result of Abigail’s affections, she is not a reliable instrument. He also intimates that she might function, in this new scheme, better as a player in his complot instead of his instrument; in an aside to the audience, while talking with Lodowick about engaging the latter with his daughter, Barabas says, “I have one left that will serve your turne: / I meane my daughter…” (2.3.50-51). Abigail will unknowingly play a part in his scheme to set Don Mathais against Lodowick, and, in order to set this scheme in motion, he purchases a slave, the Turk Ithamore: “thou,” Barabas happily informs him, “art for my turne” (2.3.129). Ithamore is indeed the “art” or “instrument” that Barabas will use to “turne” or perform his desired ends. “[F]or this is he,” Barabas whispers in another aside, “[t]hat by my helpe shall doe much villaine” (2.3.132-133). Like the necessary, improvisational lesson given to Abigail upon her first endeavor, Barabas needs to teach Ithamore how to be a villain—how to be his villainous instrument:

[Listen to my words,  
And I will teach thee that shall sticke by thee:  
First be thou voyd of these affections,
 Compassion, love, vaine hope, and hartlesse feare,
Be mov’d at nothing, see thou pitty none,
But to thy selfe smile when the Christians moane. (2.3.167-172)

Barabas’s first lesson to Ithamore is one that he has gathered from his own experience of using his daughter—her affections, for both young men, rendered her an inadequate instrument.28 Thus, the lesson is to be “voyd” of the “affections” of “compassion, love, vain hope, and hartlesse feare” because these affections disable the instrument from completing the task effectively; the instrument is unable to act coolly, detached, or “cunningly.” Barabas emphasis on becoming “voyd” of affections reveals his expectations of an instrument: to become void and empty, like a vessel, such that he can transfer his affections onto the instrument in order to control that instrument. To be filled with his affections indicates that the instrument will abide his command—that Ithamore, harboring the same affections as Barabas, will, in turn, act the same way that Barabas would if he acted for himself. In Abigail’s instance, she became a poor instrument because her affections (for the two young men) came to guide her actions. These affections, and especially “pitty” mentioned in the following line, are, Barabas intimates, connotative of the attributes he perceives, and mocks, in Christians (to recall the second part of his opening soliloquy). It is essential that Ithamore, like all instruments, remain devoid of affection, because affection might sway him to act in ways that depart from or disagree with Barabas’s plan. The ideal mortal instrument is one that, for Barabas, is

28 Here, I am alluding to Spinoza’s theory of “inadequate ideas,” which are product of affections not yet or incapable of being rationalized by the mind (while the ideas that are rationalized are deem “adequate ideas”). So, Abigail’s instrumental “inadequacy” is a result of her other inadequacies—her inadequate ideas which coincide with unreasoned (even unreasonable) emotions.
animate (so that it can act while Barabas is elsewhere) but lacks affection, or emotion.

The only thing that should “move” the instrument is the master who pulls its strings. Mastery over one’s instrument lies in the ability to “move” or control the instrument via a transference of affect onto that instrument. The master’s body functions as a focal point through which affect is filtered into, or projected onto, the instrumental bodies, filling them and compelling them to act according to the master’s will. Barabas initially believes he must impart such lessons to his new instrument, but he is happily informed otherwise when Ithamore details his own villainous schemes against Christians: “Why this is something,” Barabas responds, “we are villaines both… / we hate Christians both” (2.3.213-215). Ithamore’s following lesson is fieldwork, per se; he has watched Barabas play Mathias against Lodowick, using his daughter as the prized pawn under contention. Because Ithamore presents himself as a type of mimetic, second self to Barabas, the latter has no qualms immediately tasking Ithamore with his first duty—to deliver a letter to Mathias, challenging him to a dual: “[I]t shall be cunningly perform’d…. / ‘tis thou must doe the deed… / I cannot choose but like thy readinesse: / Yet be not rash, but doe it cunningly” (2.3.367-378). To perform the task “cunningly” is imperative (“cunning” and its cognates are used three times in under thirty lines to emphasize the word’s importance). Barabas’s concern is that Ithamore, who is so eager to act, will act impetuously and thus foil the endgame—because to perform something cunningly is to relish in the exhibition of its artistry. The aesthetics or artistry of actions—depicted in

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29 Shakespeare also utilizes the trope of instrumentality in Hamlet, specifically in the episode in which Hamlet mocks his friends for treating him like an instrument “to be played upon”: “Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me! You would play upon me…. Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret me, you cannot play upon me”—to the point: an instrument is an object, and Barabas must de-humanize his mortal instruments to play upon it as he pleases.
metatheatrical *mise en abymes* or in intimate, inset scenes—is one of the defining characteristics of revenge, as I will discuss shortly.

The danger of mortal instruments—of human instruments in addition to their mortality—is that they have the ability to refuse participation in one’s schemes. This is precisely what happens with Abigail, who, distraught over her father’s successful, double-homicidal plot against Don Mathias and Lodowick, decides to genuinely convert to Christianity and re-enter the nunnery permanently. Barabas’s disappointment in her is fleeting, however, as he conveys to Ithamore:

> For she that varies from me in beleefe  
> Gives great presumption that she loves me not;  
> Or loving, doth dislike of something done….  
>       Oh Ithamore come neere….  
> My trusty servant, nay, my second selfe;  
> For I have now no hope but even in thee;  
> And on that hope my happinesse is built….  
> Oh trusty Ithamore; no servant, but my friend;  
> I here adopt thee for mine onely heire…. (3.4.10-17, 3.4.42-43)

Abigail is no longer an effective instrument, primarily because she is no longer sympathetic to Barabas’s person or his beliefs, but also because she has shown herself incapable of being “voyd of...affections.” Perhaps this is one significance of her religious conversion; Christianity values the affections that Barabas devalues because these affections weaken a body. Ithamore, as a “second selfe” and “friend,” is more compatible with Barabas; this compatibility is performed via Ithamore’s mimicry of Barabas, who
regales in his anti-Christian exploits—“setting Christian villages on fire” and so forth—after Barabas tells of his own. Mimicry, in this regard, is a kind of literary trope that operates via affect; an affective connection incites the desire to mime or replicate another’s actions. Ithamore’s mimicry becomes more than a desire to shadow Barabas; as the play progresses, Ithamore tries to become Barabas, to steal Barabas’s wealth and usurp his position as the wealthy outsider of Malta. This turn marks his downfall.

However, another problem with mortal instruments is that they can turn against the body that uses them, or, in Ithamore’s case, can be appropriated by another body, which is what occurs when the pimp Pila-borza and his courtesan take advantage of him to steal Barabas’s wealth. In either instance, emotions, or affections, underlie the break with the master’s body, which reiterates the reason why Barabas teaches his instruments to be devoid of affections in the first place. Their bodies should be motivated and driven by the master’s will (affections), not by their personal affections. This idea of instrumentality thus exhibits how Marlowe conjures material instruments on the stage as vehicles to externalize, and make readable, affect. Ithamore’s lust for the courtesan—“O the sweetest face that ever I beheld!” (3.1.26)—trumps his senses; his desire to be with her (“I’le goe steale some mony from my Master to make me handsome” [4.2.5]) overpowers him, and Ithamore chooses—as all mortal instruments have the ability to do—the courtesan over his master. Barabas, one might argue, should have realized that he made himself vulnerable by placing Ithamore in such close proximity—as a second self and friend—because he is fully aware of the ease with which instruments can be appropriated. When Phila-borza comes to Barabas for money, the latter laments, “I am
betrayed…. / this angers me, / That he who knowes I love him as my selfe / Should write in this imperious vaine!” (4.3.39-43). As a second self, and no longer simply an instrument, Barabas has made available his wealth to Ithamore—but he has also, as a consequence, changed the balance of power by elevating Ithamore as his second self. Which is the instrument? And which is the Jew? In this instance, it is Ithamore who is capitalizing on Barabas. Fortunately for Barabas, who possesses a type of performative “cunning” that Ithamore can only marvel at (“was there ever seene such villany, / So neatly plotted, and so well perform’d?” [3.3.1-2]), he is able to out-scheme the slave by disguising himself as a lute playing Frenchman and killing the three of them with a poisoned flower, and this cunningly ability lies partly in the ability to identify new instruments. What effectively trumps Ithamore’s momentary power is Barabas’s cunning—it is this powerful skill that separates the master from the mere instrument.30

A significant contributor that makes Barabas’s cunning both so successful and so delicious is his instrument of religion. To wield religion as a tool—“a childish toy” (Prologue 14)—to effect one’s ends renders Barabas most Machiavellian, or, rather, it has

30 Barabas himself attests to his cunning, in 1.2, because he is “fram’d of finer mold then common men” (219). This assertion correlates with that of Sarah Munson Deats’s and Lisa S. Starks’s reading of Barabas in their essay, “‘So neatly plotted’….”: “For Barabas, we submit, delight in improvisation and impersonation proves paramount, and it is his obsession with “playing” (not the Machiavel’s desire for power nor the usurer’s greed) that galvanizes his energy throughout much of the play” (379). When reading through their essay, one can frame the difference between body and instrument as a difference of performative ability. All Marlowe’s protagonists possess a performative ability unparalleled by any of their rivals, from Faustus’s magical tricks to Tamburlaine’s mighty lines—and Barabas’s strategic and seemingly effortless cunning. Thomas Cartelli, too, intuits Barabas’s performative ability when he concludes that “Barabas emerges here as a protean character who can only be defined in terms of what he does and, hence, invites successive…redefinition as he moves from one position to another. His dramatic identity exists in a state of continuing process indistinguishable from the fluid process that is the play” (“Machiavel’s Ghost,” in ed. Bartels, 68).
been the reason why Barabas has been perceived as Machiavellian—a perception that holds as well for the Duke of Guise in *The Massacre at Paris*.\(^{31}\) In both plays, Marlowe is interested in exploring the idea of instrumentalized affect through performance; accordingly, he turns to the ideological body of religion, as a kind of organized affective power (and, at times, instrument) to dramatize the pervasive power of affect on an entire society. Borrowing from Greenblatt’s argument about Barabas’s “will to endless play,” Bartels contends that “[t]hroughout the play, instead of being the Jew, Barabas strategically *plays* the Jew—or rather, the various other Jews—which others fabricate” as a type of anticipatory strategy that plays upon his rivals’ naivety.\(^{32}\) He also uses the Christian faith against the Christians themselves: “It’s no sin to deceive a Christian,” he tell Abigail, “[f]or they themselves hold it a principle, / Faith is not to be held with heretics. / But all are heretics that are not Jews” (2.3.314-317). Most cunning is the instance where he feigns desire to convert to Christianity—the underlying premise that he is working from is that Christianity is the “right” and “true” religion; a religion that people aspire to partake in. So, in 4.1, when he tells the two friars that he wants to “turne Christian” to ease “the burthen of [his] sinnes,” and that, furthermore, he will donate all his wealth to the friar who converts him, the two friars do not once question his motives. Barabas’s dissembling is ingenious, as he pitifully confesses to the friars: “I am a Jew, and therefore am I lost. / Would penance serve for this my sinne, / I could afford to whip my selfe to death” (4.1.57-59). He is playing into the Christian conversion fantasy, and he

\(^{31}\) Ribner corrects this perception in his essay “Marlowe and Machiavelli”: “In [Machiavelli’s] *Discourses*…religion is described, not as ‘a childish toy’, but as one of the chief causes of the prosperity of home and as an essential factor in the well-being of any state” (352).

\(^{32}\) Bartels, *Spectacles of Strangeness*, 100.
does so successfully by utilizing specifically Christian language. The instrument of religion works so well because it exposes the friars’ gullibility, which is somewhat amazing even to Barabas: “But are not these wise men to suppose / That I will leave my house, my goods, and all, / To fast and be well whipt; I’le none of that” (4.1.122-124). Religion proves such a powerful instrument, in a sense, because it is an all-pervasive, ideological body that has infected, and continues to influence, the Maltan Christians. As an ideological body that lies dormant within other bodies, religion functions like a switch that can be turned-on at will—Barabas’s brilliance is evident because he appears to know this fact and utilizes it to his advantage. The electric current, to continue with the metaphor, that flows through the bodies once the switch has been flipped is nothing other than affect. Instrumentality, in *The Jew of Malta*, becomes a mode in which affect is made manifest on stage, via performance. Performative instruments, in short, are conduits of affect.

**How Religious Instruments Make a Massacre at Paris**

Marlowe’s working toward an understanding of the power of affect develops in his last play, *The Massacre at Paris*. Working through the idea of the instrumentality of affect for power in *The Jew*, Marlowe explores his interest in the instrumentality of affect as manifest by the body of religion in *The Massacre*. Affect is an a-personal, nonsubjective force that flows freely and that can affect many bodies simultaneously. Like many playwrights and anti-theatricalists of the time, Marlowe understood the theater’s affective power on its audiences. From this knowledge, Marlowe
sensationalized affect’s pervasive power in a play about massacre, and how religion operates as a kind of institutionalized grand master of the massacre’s production.

Religion, in Marlowe’s time and in ours, is the omnipresent institution that functions via its ability to be affective. In The Massacre, Catholicism affects the beliefs of the Guise and others to the extent that they massacre those that disagree with the Catholic faith.

The Guise, similar to Barabas before him, uses religion as a tool, but, unlike Barabas, he does so in order to garner the support of men to his—ultimately political—cause to usurp the King. In the following reading of The Massacre, I will examine how religion is an instrument wielded sharply by the Guise and other predominant characters in the play.

But, more significantly, I will argue that, by the end of the play, what Marlowe shows us is that humans are instruments of religion. Or, more pointedly and in relation to a larger argument of this dissertation, forces cannot be contained by bodies. Forces can be harnessed, and they can be directed—but forces, here the force of Christianity in the form of ideology, trumps the human body. Religion, as an ideology, is unable to be contained, or harnessed completely; its pervasiveness makes its instrumentality both powerful and improbable. Marlowe holds a mirror up to the audience, revealing them to be the puppets on strings, with the puppeteer religion dictating their every step.

The difficulty with assessing and analyzing The Massacre is that it exists as reconstructed, memorial text. Not surprisingly, the play has been overlooked or

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33 Both Barabas’s and the Guise’s use of religion exhibit their Machiavellian side. Troni Grande also sees a correlation between Marlowe’s two protagonists in this regard: “Machiavelli’s recognition of the political uses to which a unifying religion could be put inform The Jew of Malta and The Massacre at Paris, as does his insistence on the importance of hypocrisy (politic ‘profession’) for the prudent prince” (160).

34 Fredson Bowers cites Henslowe’s note in January 1593 of the existence of a “tragedy of the gvyes,” which was performed a total of ten times by the summer of 1594, and the
dismissed by Marlowe scholars as a bit of a bastard among the Marlovian corpus. Most critics discuss the topicality of Anglo-French relations in addition to the proximity of the historical events that were the sources of Marlowe’s play. The last play written before his untimely death, The Massacre is the third consecutive play—following Edward II and The Jew of Malta—in Marlowe’s oeuvre that addresses the fraught relationship between religion and politics. In The Massacre, Marlowe dramatizes the events comprising in the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the protestant Huguenots in France in 1572 by telescoping seventeen years of history into the short time-span of a play. The Duke of 

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35 Thus Wilbur Sanders opinion of the play as “a prostitution of art” as commentary on its Frankensteinian construction (in The Dramatist and the Received Idea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 36).

36 More recent works include Randall Martin’s “Anne Dowriche’s The French History, Christopher Marlowe, and Machiavellian Agency,” SEL 1500-1900 39.1 (1999): 69-87; Penny Roberts’s “Marlowe’s The Massacre at Paris: a historical perspective,” Renaissance Studies 9.4 (December, 1995): 430-441; and, a few decades older but, I think, holds as one of the most thorough analyses of the play, Julia Briggs’s “Marlowe’s Massacre at Paris a Reconsideration,” The Review of English Studies, 34.135 (August, 1983): 257-278. Another older, but still highly regarded essay on the play is Paul Kocher’s “François Hotman and Marlowe’s The Massacre at Paris,” PMLA 56.2 (June, 1941): 349-368. Marlowe used a handful of contemporary sources on the very recent event of the massacre in France: Francois Hotman’s A True and Plaine Report of the Furious Outrages of Fraunce (1573) and Jean de Serres’s The Three Partes of Commentaries Containing the Whole and Perfect Discourse of the Civill Warres of Fraunce (1574). The Massacre at Paris is unique among its dramatic counterparts in bringing a contemporary political event to the stage. Julia Briggs observes that The Massacre “is one of the earliest to present recent historical and contemporary political events on the English stage” (Briggs, 257). Marlowe, I think, tempered the tensions in presenting recent events on stage, as well as foreclosed the potential for legal retribution for doing so, by keeping the play “French” in every aspect, and relegating the role of England—and, synecdochally, Queen Elizabeth—as the moral, Protestant sister nation, which the Protestant Navarre promises to honor and respect.

37 John Bakeless explains that “the material with which The Massacre deals covers a period of seventeen years.” The action of the play begins on 18 August 1572 with the marriage of the Protestant future King Henry IV, now Duke of Navarre, with Marguerite de Valois, sister of Charles IX. It ends with the murder of Henry III in August 1589, the
Guise technically figures as the play’s protagonist—technically, because he instigates and spearheads the massacre, but he also dies well before the play’s conclusion (in Scene XIX; the play text, as it stands, contains twenty-two scenes). He leads the Catholic slaughter of the Protestants in an effort to cleanse the realm of France. The idea of cleansing the realm for the “common good” is reminiscent of the nobles’ call to action in Marlowe’s Edward II, and, there are numerous congruities between the two plays in addition to this call for an unadulterated nation; most noticeably, an effeminate king and his love of minions, and the threat of religious usurpation (rendered more complex in The Massacre, since Catholicism is the official religion of the English during Edward II’s reign).

From Machevil’s prologue in The Jew of Malta, Marlowe’s audience has been aware of the Guise’s character: “And now the Guize is dead, [Machevil’s soul] is come from France / To view this Land, and frolicke with his friends” (Prologue, 2-3). The dramatic characterization of Machevil, as I discussed in the previous chapter, is a simplistic caricature of the historical Machiavelli. The performative version of the historical figure is more akin to the comical Vice characters of morality drama. (Perhaps the spelling of the character (Mach-evil) is intended to emphasize the “evil” nature of the dramatized figure, in order to make him entertaining for theatrical audiences.) Yet, the Guise is noticeably more Machiavellian than Barabas, in part, because the former is assassination of the Duke of Guise and Navarre’s approach to the throne of France following Anjou’s fatal poisoning (Bakeless, Tragical History of Marlowe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 12, 78).

38 David Potter, in “The Massacre at Paris and the Reputation of Henri III of France,”” notes that the Guise speaks has 307 lines to speak (24.82% of the play) and is on stage for 578 lines (44.83%) (in Christopher Marlowe and English Renaissance Culture, ed. D. Grantley and P. Roberts (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), 74).
situated within the political ruling party of the country and he has political aspirations, whereas Barabas, a Jew, is happily ostracized to the margins of Malta. The Guise’s will to violence—his will to massacre—is a dramatic exaggeration of the Machiavellian, tacit approval of violence. Quentin Skinner observes that throughout his writings, but especially The Prince, Machiavelli “emphasizes the role of sheer force in the conduct of government.” 39 The Guise’s “policy,” Graham Hammill convincingly argues, is part-Machiavelli, part-Bodin, as a “dramatic portrayal of and expos[ure of] the bio-politics of sovereign power.” 40 “Policy,” in the context of Elizabethan theatre, is politically suggestive. According to Howard Babb, “policy designates the servicing of one’s private ends by cunning or deceit: the normal Elizabethan version of Machiavellianism” that is embodied by both Barabas and the Duke of Guise. 41 What the Guise will show, in contrast to Barabas, is that his particular Machiavellian cunning finds a correlative in his political acumen, derivative of his place at court.

40 “Time for Marlowe,” 306. Hammill explains, “The Massacre at Paris is a corrupt text. Even so, the problem of sovereign decision-making emerges as one of the organizing principles by which Marlowe explores the politics of massacre and viable responses to it. Staging the ability to step outside the law that Bodin identifies as one of the sovereign’s defining features, Marlowe uses the Guise to represent a kind of sovereignty that is grounded in and emerges out of extralegal action. Announcing his desire for the “Diadem” (W, 101) in his first soliloquy, the Guise goes on to explain how he will use “policye” (W, 122) or stratagem to attain this goal. Part of this policy involves the massacre of the Protestants…” (305-306).
41 Howard Babb, “Policy in Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta,” ELH 24.2 (1957): 86. Babb also explains that Elizabethans’ perceptions of Machiavelli were also strongly influenced by Innocent Gentillet’s Contre-Machiavel (1576), which coincidentally is believed to be the first political document tied to the political event of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. (For this relation of text to event, see Irving Ribner, “The significance of Gentillet’s Contre-Machiavel,” MLQ 10 (1949), 156.)
The play’s first scene—the post-wedding celebration of the marriage of the protestant Navarre with the Catholic King’s daughter, Katherine—functions as an ominous set up the Guise’s infamous soliloquy in which he details his plans and plot to massacre the Protestant Huguenots. The opening line of his soliloquy (“Now Guise, begins those deepe ingendered thoughts”) seems familiar—almost as if Shakespeare borrowed it in order to write his own soliloquy for the opening scene of Richard III. And, like the more famous Richard, the Guise outlines his plans, and thus the plot, of the play to the audience:

Oft have I leven, and at last have learned,
That perill is the cheefest way to happines….

What glory is there in a common good,
That hanges for every peasant to atchive?
That like I best that flyes beyond my reach.
Set me to scale the high Peramides,
And thereon set the Diadem of Fraunce,
Ile either rend it with my nayles to naught,
Or mount the top with my aspiring winges,
Although my downfall be the deepest hell.
For this, I wake, when others think I sleepe,
For this, I waite, that scornes attendance else….
For this, this head, this heart, this hand and sword,
Contrives, imagines and fully executes

42 In an aside, the Catholic Queen Mother (mother to King Charles and the Guise) rues that she’ll “desolve [the marriage] with bloud and crueltie” (Scene I.26).
Matters of importe, aimed at by many,
Yet understood by none.
For this, hath heaven engendered me of earth,
For this, this earth sustaines my bodies waight,
And with this wait Ile counterpoise a Crowne…. (Scene II.94-115)

The Marlovian ethic of the self—of the care of the self above the “common good”—emerges vividly here. His happiness is derived by “perill,” a counterintuitive affection to derive from violence, but one that suggest how the Guise works—the term “peril” not only suggests violence but also risk. The Guise believes that taking dangerous risks offers the greatest rewards, and, thus, the “cheefest way to happines” is to take the greatest risk possible. The Guise’s aspirations surpass those desires that hang low for “every peasant to atchive.” He distinguishes himself from the commons, and from the political idea of a “commonwealth,” by his aspiration for the “Diadem” and also by his willingness to take big risks, and to use violent means to achieve his ends. His ability, he believes, to “contrive,” “imagine,” “understand,” and “fully execute” his plan sets him apart from the common “peasant.” The Guise is methodical in his constructive deconstruction of the apparati (“this head, this heart, this hand” affix with a “sword”) of his body, which will serve as instruments to obtain the crown. He envisions an almost machinic construction of his body in order to suggest that the purpose of the machine—the reason why it was built (“For this, this earth sustaines my bodies waight”)—to rule, to “counterpoise a Crowne.”

Violent means are necessary for this goal to be achieved, because, he reasons, there is nothing that “cannot be extinguish but by bloud” (Scene II.93). The Guise’s quest
for the crown is financially supported by “the stately Catholickes” of Spain and by “a largesse from the Pope” (II.17-19). From this “priviledge,” the Guise asserts, “My policye hath framde religion”:

Religion: *O Diabole.*

*Fye, I am ashamed, how ever that I seeme,*

*To think a word of such a simple sound,*

*Of so great matter should be made a ground.* (II. 122-126)

In his mind, the Guise believes that various religious bodies—the Pope, Spain—are supporting his personal quest; his “policye hath framde religion.” Accordingly, he mocks religion (“*O Diabole*!”) for seeming of a greater import than it actually is; to echo Machevil’s words, from the prologue of *The Jew*, “I count Religion but a childish Toy” (Prologue, 14). Religion is an ideological instrument, the Guise construes, that provides material instruments, in the form of Catholic states and Catholic heads of state, for the Guise’s use. He enumerates the variety of Catholic instruments available to him in his arsenal in the same soliloquy:

*The Mother Queene works wonders for my sake,*…

*Rifling the bowels of her treasurie,*

*To supply my wants and necessitie.*

*Paris hath full five hundred Colledges,*

*As Monestaries, Priories, Abbyes and halles,*

*Wherein are thirtie thousand able men,*

*Besides a thousand sturdy student Catholicks,*

*And more: of my knowledge in one cloister keeps,*
Five hundred fatte Franciscan Fryers and priestes.

All this and more, if more may be comprised,

To bring the will of our desires to end. (II.133-144)

Essentially, the Guise counts every Catholic as an instrument that will work “wonders for [his] sake,” regardless of the primacy of the relationship that he has with these bodies. Unlike Barabas, who personally selects his instruments to ensure their loyalty and efficaciousness, the Guise appears less concerned about the quality of the instrument than the mass, or amount, of instruments that he can acquire. There is nothing that has inclined the Guise to their selection; there is no affective connection—as with Barabas and his instruments, who he personally selects. (Really, who would rely on an army of drunken college students and “[f]ive hundred fatte Franciscan Fryers” to overtake the ruling authority of a nation or even to subdue a bunch of Protestants?) Then again, perhaps the Guise surmises that quantity is more important than quality, since the event he is directing is a massacre. Furthermore, he could also assume loyalty because of their shared religion—a loyalty that, we learn as the play progresses, he wrongly assumes of Anjou (later King Henry III), the historical figure who actually converted to Protestantism after the debut of Marlowe’s play. At this moment in the play, however, these are the instruments that he counts at his disposal; thus, he concludes, he “hast all the Cardes within thy hands / To shuffle or cut, take this as surest thing: / That right or wrong, thou deale they selfe a King” (II.146-148). Before Middleton’s exquisite “game of chess,” Marlowe presented a game of cards, all of which the Duke of Guise holds in his hands. His success in obtaining the diadem lies in his ability to strategically “shuffle or cut” these instrumental cards; how he manages these instruments determines his
endgame. Note that morality is not a factor (“right or wrong”) in the Guise’s strategy—
since religion is an instrument, it is devoid of morality at the same time that morality
defines its very nature.43 The extent to which religion is used and “abused” for one’s political pursuits is an explicit critique of religion—and, I think, an implicit critique of moral code that Marlowe suggests in his play, since moral code is dictated by a religion.

After winning King Charles’s consent for the massacre—which the Guise sues for by claiming that he seeks, as the King should, his “countries good / Then pittie or releeve these upstart hereticks” (IV.221-222)—the Guise outlines his strategy as if he is reading a playbook: “They that shalbe actors in this Massacre,” he explains, “[s]hall weare white crosses on their Burgonet[s]” and tie white scarves onto their arms (IV.231-233). The Guise’s actors, which are thereafter referred to as the “Guisians” by all on stage, will kill anyone who lacks the white cross and the white scarf. The Guisians are performative instruments on the Guise’s stage; as soon as “the watchword” is given and the tower bell is rung, his actors begin the show of the Protestant massacre. The massacre itself is chaotic, with players, including the Guise running around the stage, killing whomever crosses their paths. As soon as the “bell tolles,” the Guise, reports the stage directions, “enters [the stage] againe, with all the rest, with their swords drawn, chasing the Protestants” (Scene V). “Tue, tue, tue,” he exclaims, “Let none escape, murder the Hugonets” (V.336-338).

43 Religion, especially Catholicism, is defined by the moral rites that establish the parameters of that specific religion; thus, morality is a defining characteristic of religion. Concurrently, as an instrument—in the Spinozist/Deleuzian sense of the instrument which I have been discussing thus far—religion is affective, but the affective qualities that occur as an effect of its implementation do not inherently carry a morality. Therefore, as I explained earlier in the chapter, instruments are affective, thereby giving shape or focus to an ethics, but they are in no way moral.
A massacre is a large-scale, indiscriminate killing. The Guise’s massacre, which he conducts for his own political advancement as well as for the benefit of Catholicism in the realm, has a targeted audience—the French Protestants. In terms of affect, a massacre is an event that presents an authentic dramatization of the workings of affect—of mass affect, on stage and into the audience. Instrumentalized and dramatized on stage in the form of massacre, affect is unrelenting, brutal, direct. The play sensationalizes specific performative moments to show how massacre is the manifestation of *mass*-affect on stage, while simultaneously demonstrating how massacre functions as a desensitizing event. These performative moments are intended to affect the audience; to keep them entertained and interested in the action onstage—because if the bodies onstage are denuded of specificity, and of character, such that they are killed indiscriminately, then how is the playwright going to compel them to care about the play enough to not leave the theater? That is, the play, whose plot operates upon the dis-affection of the performative bodies—the Guisians must be “voyd of affections” if they are to kill indiscriminately: “Tue, tue, tue, / Let none escape”—onstage, needs to be affective. This is accomplished through sensational moments of violence in which bodies are re-animated with affectivity, or affective potential. Scene IX is significant for this reason; the Admiral is long dead, but the scene focuses on the debate between two Guisian foot soldiers over what to do with the Admiral’s dead body.

1. Now sirra, what shall we doe with the Admirall?
2. Why let us burne him for an heretick.
   1. O no, his bodye will infect the fire, and the fire the aire, and so we shall be poisoned with him.
2. What shall we do then?
1. Let's throw him into the river.
2. Oh twill corrupt the water, and the water the fish, and by the fish our selves when we eate them.
1. Then throw him into the ditch.
2. No, no, to decide all doubts, be rulde by me, lets hang him here upon this tree.
1. Agreed.

They hang him. (IX.482-493)

The Admiral may be dead (a “liveles bulk,” the Guise calls him) but his body still possesses affective potential, as the two Guisians deliberate how to get rid of his body without negatively affecting their health. The problem is that they have no idea how to do so, and their conversation proves quite comical as a result. They first outline the causal chain of affect in their hypothetical responses—they cannot burn him, because the heretical quality of his body will then “infect” the fire, then the air, which, having in turned breathed, will infect the Guisians. Likewise, dumping him in the water will “corrupt” the water and the fish that live in the water; it is only a matter of time before they, the Guisians who plan to consume said fish, will be infected with the Admiral’s Protestantism. Then, they decide, the only “logical” solution is to string up the dead body; yet, moments later, when the Guise and the Queene Mother walk by the newly adorned tree, the Guise complains that “th’airs not very sweet” and orders his foot soldiers to “take him away and throw him in some ditch” (IX.499). In this scene, the Admiral’s body is objectified, like any other stage prop, while at the same time regarded as a body with the affective potential to negatively affect other, Catholic, bodies. Even
though the Guisians kill the Protestants indiscriminately, the dead bodies still matter—they still exist onstage. This scene affords a microscopic view of the large-scale massacre in terms of bodily affect. On the one hand, massacre is defined by the magnitude of death, the desensitizing and denuding bodies of affect and affective potential. The Guisians are ordered to kill every person who does not don “white crosses on their Burgonets, / And tye white linen scarfe about their armes” (IV.232-233). Religious identity is the primary signifier, whereas affect appears insignificant to the cause, or to the plot concerning the massacre in general. On the other, as evident in the debate on how to dispose of the Admiral’s body, a body carries the potential to affect. What occurs in The Massacre, therefore is the elision of the body by identity; religious identity, in this play, is the primary bodily marker (for the massacre), consequently defining, overtaking, and thus constraining the body. What Marlowe demonstrates in this scene and in the play in general is that bodies exist and are vital, affective, underneath their cloaks of identity.

The Guise is victorious in his massacre, but he retains his troop of Guisians because, as even the Queen Mother and Cardinal fully know, he has plans to usurp the King’s command. However, King Charles unexpectedly dies, and the Guise’s brother, Henry, rises to the crown during the hiatus post-massacre. King Henry is weary of the Guise’s intentions and especially his battle-ready troops, which he maintains for no explicit reason, post-massacre. Confronting the Guise, he says, “we understand / That you have gathered a power of men. / What your intent is yet we cannot learn, / But we presume it is not for our good” (XVII.821-824). “Our good” is a direct object pronoun in the first person plural to connote the royal “we” that figures as the representative body of France. It is also synonymous with the “country’s good,” which the Guise cited publicly,
not privately, as the reason for his Protestant massacre. Indeed, the “country’s good” is a rationale employed by other characters onstage in addition to King Henry and the Guise; it functions as a patriotic tool, a linguistic instrument used to both garner power and justify one’s actions. It was the same rationale used by Mortimer and Queen Isabella in their challenge to King Edward II, in Edward II—Edward, they informed the commons, was not acting justly, nor did he adequately fulfill his sovereign duties to protect the nation and to improve the common good. In The Massacre, the instrument is similarly employed by both Catholics and Protestants; the effect, I think, renders this tool a mere vacant gesture to the audience, but which carries rhetorical force within the play. The King’s reiteration of the Guise as a threat to the nation’s good, which works to mount an effort against the Guise, is reinforced by the words of the Protestant Navarre:

That wicked Guise I feare me much will be,
The ruine of that famous Realme of France;
For his aspiring thoughts aime at the crowne,
And takes his vantage on Religion,
To plant the Pope and popelings in the Realme,
And binde it wholy to the Sea of Rome:
But if that God doe prosper mine attempts,
And send us safely to arrive in France:
Wee’l beat him back, and drive him to his death,
That basely seekes the ruine of his Realme. (XVIII.921-930)

Navarre construes this Guise as the enemy whom he can oppose alongside King Henry—remember, until this point the Guise has been successful in creating and sustaining a civil
war between Navarre and his Protestants and the King and his Catholics. The Guise, as the “ruine of the realme” evokes thoughts of Gaveston, that “base mushrump” who threatened England in Edward II. This speech, furthermore, is a timely commentary and perhaps honest articulation of English fears of “popish incursion” in the 1590s—this fear proved the rationale for the Anglo-Irish Wars throughout the decade. Navarre speech also accomplishes the fashioning of the Guise in a two-fold manner: he is first the instrument that Navarre will posit to rejoin forces with the King and, more significantly, the Guise is depicted as being an instrument of religion. While he “takes his vantage on Religion,” Navarre acknowledges, he ultimately works to “plant the Pope and popelings” in France. The Guise functions as an instrument of Catholicism in this regard—one which the Queen Mother and her other son, the Duke Dumaine, allude to as the “prop” of their religious efforts on behalf of the Church of Rome (XXI.110).

Marlowe develops this ironic twist—of the Guise who appears to initially use religion, but who ultimately serves as an instrument of religion—through the figuration of the Guise as Caesar—referenced three times total in the play. It is in the same soliloquy, analyzed above, in which the Guise first compares himself to Caesar. When imagining his massacre and his progression to the crown, he exults to his imaginary followers who are listening to his speech:

As Caesar to his soldiers, so say I:

Those that hate me, will I learn to loathe.

Give me a look, that when I bend the browes,

Pale death may walk in furrowes of my face:

A hand, that with a graspe may gripe the world,
An eare, to heare what my detractors say,
A royal seate, a scepter and a crowne….
The plot is laide, and things shall come to passe,
Where resolution strives for victory. (II.156-165)

Figured as Caesar, the Guise is able to perform to the crowd, but, at the same time, by imagining himself as Caesar, he is super-imposing a historical narrative onto his own life. Consequently, he becomes subsumed in Caesar’s story. Rather than “become mythical” pace Tamburlaine, the Guise decides to appropriate a mythic body, that of Caesar, but in doing loses his own life, figuratively, then literally. Marlowe’s critique, one correlative with the philosophical emphasis of the Marlovian Ethics that I have been extracting from his plays—is that one must live his own life; to appropriate another’s life, another’s morality, ethics, or traditions is a form of Sartrean “bad faith” or Nietzschean ressentiment.

I agree with Hammill that the Guise’s figuration “exposes the bio-politics of sovereign power,” but my interest is in how this figuration, which incisively implicates affect as the force that underlies and is conceived power by Foucault and Hammill, results in the Guise’s instrumentalization of affect.44 The two scenes in which the three Caesar references occur—Scene II and Scene XIX, which depicts the Guise’s death—work together to solidify this reversal of instruments, as the Guise no longer functions as the orchestrator of the massacre but comes to figure—he figures himself—as a character within a historical tragedy. The Guise becomes another instrument within the play about massacre, and, like most instruments, is easily disposable. In scene XIX, the King hires

44 Hammill, 306.
three assassins to murder the Guise. While they lie in wait, Murderer 3 confesses the King’s plan to the Guise, when the latter asks, “Villaine, why doest thou look so gastly?” (XIX.989). The Murder’s face reflects the Guise’s Caesar-like face, in which “[p]ale death…walk[s] in furrowes on [his] face.” And, as he has “an eare, to heare what [his] detractors say,” the Guise does not listen. The Murder pleads him to “goe not foorth,” but the Guise ignores this advice, replying, “Yet Caesar shall goe forth”: “Let mean consaits [conceits], and baser men feare death, / Tut they are peasants, I am Duke of Guise: / And princes with their lookes ingender feare” (XIX.995-999). The Guise dismisses the Murderer’s warning because he along with the others in hiding are just “base peasants.” Alluding to his earlier discourse on the parts of his body, and just as he was able to deter the third murderer, he believes that his princely appearance will “ingender feare” and effectively halt the murderers before they act. Unfortunately for the Guise, the other two murderers do not respond the same as the first he encountered: “Down with him, down with him,” they shout as they stab him to death (XIX.1002). The repetition “down…down” is an ironic line given the Guise’s “aspiring” desires for power—it would, too, bespeak the de casibus aspect of the play as tragedy if I agreed with Grande that Marlowe’s plays are dilated, deferred, de casibus tragedies. The Guise, however, is not depicted as a de casibus, tragic character; characteristic of all Marlowe’s protagonists, he even refuses to repent his past actions: “Trouble me not, I neare offended [God], / Nor will I aske forgivenes of the King” (XIX.1005-1006). However, what he does request is “leave to speak”—center stage—to finish his story:

Oh that I have not power to stay my life,

Nor immortalitie to be reveng’d….
To dye by Pesantes, what a greefe is this?...

Vive la messe, perish Hugonets,

Thus Caesar did goe foorth, and thus he dyed.

*He dyes.* (XIX.1007-1015)

The scene of his death begins “Yet Caesar shall goe forth” and ends with the same line, except that it is spoken in the past imperfect, signifying that the event of Caesar’s death is in the past, but it is ongoing in the past. By appropriating the example of Caesar onto his own life, and by attempting to mirror Caesar’s successes, the Guise actually repeats Caesar’s fatal error—not listening to his warning and consequently being murdered.

Caesar’s story, in context of *The Massacre*, then, exists as virtual history, which was evoked and appropriated by the Guise (and by Marlowe), and is and was invoked to serve as an emblem—failed at that—for the Guise. That the Guise places himself within another’s story intimates his ultimate role in the performance of not only the massacre but of Marlowe’s play itself—that he, like everyone else within the play, is just an instrument, of religion and of Marlowe.

The King’s unbridled joy at the Guise’s death—he repeats, with some variation, that he was “nere King of France untill this hour” five times within fifty lines—does not conclude the play. That the play does not conclude with the protagonist’s death reinforces the argument that the Guise ultimately functions as an instrument of religion—that, perhaps, the protagonist of the play, which “appears” onstage in every scene, is religion itself. One question, I think, that Marlowe was trying to work through in performance was how to perform religion—how to perform a concept (like the Body politic, for instance), an immaterial “body” on the stage? Religion inscribes bodies in order to
control those bodies; one might conjecture that Marlowe displays this working through of a Foucauldian lesson—of the power of religion through its control of bodies—in the play’s progression. Initially, we perceive the Guise to be the play’s protagonist as orchestrator of the massacre, but we arrive at the realization that the massacre goes beyond the Guise, that the Guise himself was just one player in the larger play, the larger scheme, being the successful continuation of religion’s (Catholicism’s) dominance as a form of collective affect whose only “instrumental” purpose is to perpetuate itself. Thus, the Guise’s death—as a corrective of the “forraine warres and civile broiles” (XIX.1029) and as a preventative measure for the king to safeguard his life (XIX.1039-1040)—simply propels the plot, and the cycle of death, onward. The Guise’s brother, the Duke of Dumaine, employs a friar to murder the King in order to revenge the Guise’s death. The friar fatally stabs the King with a poisoned knife—ensuring the latter’s death—but only moments before the King takes the very same knife and kills the friar. The King’s dying words are to his successor, Navarre: “Weep not sweet Navarre, but revenge my death… / He loves me not that sheds most teares, / But he that makes most lavish of his bloud” (XXII.1234-1240). In the play’s concluding lines, Navarre promises revenge: “I vow for to revenge his death, / As Rome and all those popish Prelates there, / Shall curse the time that ere Navarre was King” (XXII.1247-1249).

The Art, Affect, and Ethics of Revenge

Through an exploration of affect on stage via instrumentalization, Marlowe effected a de-valuation of moral entities—concepts, like justice, and institutions, like
religion—on the Elizabethan stage. Concomitantly, what Marlowe—and, contemoraneously in the late 1580s and early 1590s, Kyd in The Spanish Tragedy—has done is to prove the value of revenge in an affective register on the Elizabethan stage, which I believe is a significant reason why revenge came to figure as the most popular form of drama of the final decades of the 16th century. If drama is the “art of ethics,” then revenge tragedy is the quintessential form of drama as ethics because it specifically confronts morality in the protagonist’s quest to revenge; more importantly, revenge tragedy functions and is defined by its artistry and “cunning” use and abuse of bodies onstage.45 To restate Freud by claiming that revenge is “repetition” and repetition is “compulsion” is to dismiss or overlook the artistry and affects of the specific acts that constitute revenge.46 The artistry of revenge is apparent in the consideration and preparation given to the deed. Barabas carefully selects his instruments; he wants a “leaner” slave, who does not act “rash[ly]” but “cunningly.” His daughter proves the ideal infidel turned Christian in his plot to repossess his wealth. “There is some Ceremony,” he tells Ithamore, in the pot of poisoned porridge he intends to send to the nunnery (3.4.83). He even temporally paralyzes himself to feign death in order to “be reveng’d on this accursed Towne” of Malta (5.1.62). All these deeds require “cunning,” the term that, I believe, best encapsulates the artistry, the actions, and the ethics of Barabas (more so than


46 The most respected Shakespeare scholar with said Freudian tendencies is Marjorie Garber, who maintains the repetition-as-revenge a defining literary motif of revenge drama; see any of her works on Hamlet for this argument (which I believe I quoted verbatim above)—most recently, her chapter on the play in Shakespeare After All (New York: Pantheon, 2005) or “A Tale of Three Hamlets or Repetition and Revenge,” in SQ 61.1 (Spring, 2010), 28-55”
the Guise, who claims “revenge” at times but who is really producing a massacre; the underlying distinction lies in the motivation to act: revenge is conceived as “reaction,” whereas the massacre is never reactive (or responding to a previous injury) but active).

In earlier chapters, I have spoken about Marlowe’s “theatre of cruelty”—to appropriate Janet Clare’s appropriation of Artaud\(^\text{47}\)—that distinguishes Marlovian drama from its dramatic contemporaries in the 1590s and prefigures, and allies him with, the more theatrical, violent drama of the likes of Middleton (The Revenger’s Tragedy of 1607), Webster (The Duchess of Malfi of 1613), and Ford (the “serve-my-sister/lover’s-heart-on-a-platter” ‘Tis Pity She’s a Whore of 1633). Pollard explains that the popularity of the genre “speaks to the attraction of seeing frustrated victims satisfy their demand for justice.”\(^\text{48}\) Citing Francis Bacon’s infamous definition of revenge “as a kind of wild justice,” Pollard notes that the figure of “revenge” in Elizabethan drama has its origins in Senecan drama, but that since Elizabethan England never adopted Roman law, the “largely informal, unwritten and unsystematic body of law increasingly required defending and defining.”\(^\text{49}\) The ambiguity in Elizabethan law—thus, the blurred line between what is “justice” and what is “revenge”\(^\text{50}\)—resonated with audiences in the theatre, who witnessed revenge dramas that “offered the gratifying spectacle of power for


\(^{48}\) Pollard, 59.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 60.

\(^{50}\) As Nietzsche says, “‘Just’ and ‘unjust’ exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the law….To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be ‘unjust,’ since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character” (in the second essay of The Genealogy of Moral, 512). Or, as he says in #92 of Human, All Too Human: “justice is repayment and exchange on the assumption of an approximately equal power position; revenge originally belongs in the domain of justice, being an exchange.”
those who lacked it, and reassured the injured that somehow justice could and would be done.”

Marlowe’s critique, directed to his audience, is that we are all instruments of religion. In *The Massacre*, every character functions as a Catholic or Protestant instruments. These mortal instruments are inspired by revenge for a moral wrong committed by (a body of) the opposite religion. Characters vow revenge but imply the revenge is just or justice. What Marlowe’s critique suggests is that revenge and justice are two sides of the same coin; they both incite action, usually, murderous action. Similar to the rationale of acting for the “country’s good,” revenge and justice are conceptual tools used for the justification of one’s actions and operate within a specifically moral economy. To show that revenge and justice are the same—only differentiated by the body in power that determines which is “justice” and which is “revenge”—Marlowe exposes the moral bankruptcy of religion, Catholic or Protestant. This is the critique that Marlowe offers throughout both *The Jew of Malta* and *The Massacre at Paris*.

Furthermore, Marlowe’s philosophical emphasis lies not with judging his character’s vengeful actions (through an implicit morality) but with showing how these actions are creative—they are affective and they affect ends. It is in this regard that Marlowe is Deleuzian:

Judgment prevents the emergence of any new mode of existence….

Herein lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by

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51 Ibid.
defying judgment…. It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring forces to us, or whether they return us to the miseries of war, to the poverty of a dream, to the rigors of organization.  

“It is not a question of judging…, but of sensing whether they agree or disagree with us” is precisely the emphasis that both Marlowe and Deleuze place on an ethics (over a morality). The protagonists of Marlowe’s plays join with other bodies onstage—they use instruments—depending upon the affect potential of that body (“sensing whether they agree or disagree”). There is an artistry or an aesthetics to these decisions, to these actions, that inform their ethics. Performance manifests art as ethics and ethics as art. 

Marlowe, I concur with Grande, presents “gratifying spectacle[s]” in his “revenge” plays The Jew of Malta and The Massacre at Paris. They are “gratifying spectacle[s]” of instances “of power,” yes, but, I think, in concurrence with sentiments both explicitly and implicitly conveyed by Cartelli and Hammill, the spectacles that Marlowe creates are more fantastical. They are valuable, “gratifying,” because they are affective. The violence of Marlowe’s plays is affective in a pleasurable way, which

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52 Deleuze concludes, “This is not subjectivism, since to pose the problem in terms of force, and not in other terms, already surpasses all subjectivity” (in “To Have Done With Judgment,” Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. D.W. Smith and M. A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 135).  
53 Cf. Cartelli’s assertion that Marlowe gives audiences plays that engage “with the fantasies of power, play, and more abandon” (in “Machiavel’s Ghost,” 59) and that Marlowe is more interested in the play of theatre “than in the prosaic shifts of power” (Ibid., 64). In his “Time for Marlowe,” Hammill acknowledges that Marlowe entices his audience via affect; Marlowe, he claims, “provokes affective identification to pull his audiences into the political logic he explores, [in order to] elicit prudence to grant his audience critical reflection on that logic” (305).  
54 I agree with Hammill on the workings of affect between the play and its audience, but my understanding of the play and of Elizabethan theatre in general differs from the
renders the plays utterly Nietzschean in that sadistic sense of the inextricable connection
between pain and pleasure that Nietzsche widely discussed throughout his writings.
Marlowe understood this about his audiences and the affective potential of theatre: the
audience finds pleasure in sensational violence. This is the attraction of revenge. His
plays might be “senseless” in the context of logic or moral meaning (undoubtedly), but
they are sense-ful in affect.

Second part of his argument. I am more than reluctant to assume that common,
Elizabethan audiences dissected the plays and methodically engaged with the plays on
such studious, rhetorical levels. Hammill maintains that “Marlowe provokes political
thought through affective identification,” but this (the provoking of political thought) is
just one of the potential effects of affective identification (Hammill, 304).
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