DescriptionSovereign defaults are a relatively common feature of (international) financial markets. They highlight the credibility problem in lending to governments: Creditors have no feasible means to enforce repayment of debts. Nevertheless, lending to countries takes place. Existing theories cite domestic representation or international reputation as explanations for ongoing lending. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. In addition, neither approach manages to include both domestic and external defaults. Building on existing research, a theory that accounts for the differences in between domestic and external defaults and lending is developed, connecting both types to countries' regime types and putting two distinct causal mechanisms -- accountability and transparency -- at the core of the theory. The argument is tested using data covering the past two centuries. Transparency is measured using the availability of military expenditure data, while accountability is measured using the Polity IV data set. A positive relationship in between democracies and transparency is presented. As expected, coefficients for the change in transparency are significant and negative. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, coefficients for transparency itself are positive and significant. The coefficient of accountability yields mixed results. The analysis thus underlines the importance of transparency in explaining international sovereign lending.